

AD-A156 031

SOVIET AND CHINESE STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS IN PEACETIME
AND WARTIME (U) ROSENBAUM (HAROLD) ASSOCIATES INC
BURLINGTON MA B N GARRETT ET AL. 31 OCT 82


1/1


UNCLASSIFIED

DNA-TR-81-262 DNA001-81-C-0293

F/G 5/10

NL





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

AD-A156 031

(2) *WHE*

DNA-TR-81-262

SOVIET AND CHINESE STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME

Banning N. Garrett
Bonnie S. Glaser
Harold Rosenbaum Associates, Incorporated
111 South Bedford Street
Burlington, Massachusetts 01803

31 October 1982

Technical Report

CONTRACT No. DNA 001-81-C-0293

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

THIS WORK WAS SPONSORED BY THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
UNDER RDT&E RMSS CODE B311281466 W99QAXOA00017 H2590D.

DTIC FILE COPY

Prepared for
Director
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
Washington, DC 20305

AP
DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 1 1985
S B D

85 03 29 012

Destroy this report when it is no longer needed. Do not return to sender.

PLEASE NOTIFY THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY,
ATTN: STTI, WASHINGTON, DC 20305-1000, IF YOUR
ADDRESS IS INCORRECT, IF YOU WISH IT DELETED
FROM THE DISTRIBUTION LIST, OR IF THE ADDRESSEE
IS NO LONGER EMPLOYED BY YOUR ORGANIZATION.



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER DNA-TR-81-262	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD A156 931	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) SOVIET AND CHINESE STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Technical Report
7. AUTHOR(s) Banning N. Garrett Bonnie S. Glaser		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Harold Rosenbaum Associates, Inc. 111 South Bedford Street Burlington, Massachusetts 01803		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) DNA 001-81-C-0293
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Director Defense Nuclear Agency Washington, DC 20305		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS Task W99QAX0A-00017
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 31 October 1982
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 190
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		16a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A since UNCLASSIFIED
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This work was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency under RDT&E RMSS Code B311281466 W99QAX0A00017 H2590D.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) China Nuclear Strategy Asia Soviet Union U.S.-Chinese Military Ties Deterrence Strategic Environment Two-Front War Strategic Cooperation Balance of Power Peacetime/Wartime		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This report on Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the strategic environ- ment, examines Soviet perceptions of the threat posed by China on Sino- American security ties; Chinese perceptions of the Soviet threat and the role of the strategic cooperation with the U.S. and Chinese strategy; and Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the character of war, including pro- tracted nuclear war and post-war recovery. The study also develops peace- time/wartime framework for evaluating perceptions of the balance of power.		

DD FORM 1473

EDITION OF 1 NOV 85 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

SUMMARY

Introduction

U.S. policy toward the triangular relationship among China, the Soviet Union and the United States has been guided for more than a decade by the perception that neither war nor rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing is in American interest. Underlying U.S. triangular policies have been general notions about Soviet fears of China and Sino-American collusion, and about Chinese fears of Moscow and desire for anti-Soviet collusion. But there has been no consensus in the U.S. about the depth and nature of Soviet and Chinese concerns about each other.

This study examines Soviet perceptions of China and Sino-U.S. military ties to ascertain Moscow's fears about the actual and potential China and China-U.S. threat, its future expectations about development of Sino-American security relations, and its strategy for countering the perceived threat. The report also examines China's perceptions of Soviet strategy and its counterstrategy for managing the Soviet threat, including through strategic cooperation with the United States.

The report aims to provide an accurate picture of Soviet and Chinese perceptions which shape or reflect leadership views and military planning assumptions. Changing perceptions in the past have influenced historic shifts in Chinese, Soviet and American strategies and policies. Perceptions of national interest and geopolitics have been more important determinates in U.S. and Chinese policymaking on key strategic issues than have domestic politics and ideology. Bilateral issues between Washington and Beijing, including Taiwan, have been largely subordinated to larger strategic concerns by both Chinese and American leaders. Over the last thirty years, each country has feared collusion against it by the other two while also seeking to collude with

DTIC
COPY
INSPECTED
1

☒
☐
☐

ies
r

one against the other. But the realities of geography and the balance of power have placed China in the weakest position in the triangle, leading Beijing to seek a long-term strategic alignment with the more distant and less threatening of the two super-powers.

The Chinese have managed the Soviet threat through a complex but coherent strategy which includes both organizing a coalition against Moscow and improving bilateral ties with the Soviets. Eased tensions with the Soviet Union and military ties with the United States are not alternative strategies for China, but rather complementary elements of one comprehensive strategy.

The Soviet Union has warned for a decade of the dangerous consequences for China and the United States of establishing an anti-Soviet alliance between Washington and Beijing, yet Moscow has reacted cautiously to the forging of such a relationship.

Soviet, Chinese and American perceptions and analyses of the strategic environment and the "balance of power" are frequently discussed without explicit clarification of the underlying temporal environment being examined, that is, peacetime or wartime. Wartime is not simply the extrapolation of peacetime into the future, nor is it a function of only the order of battle in the peacetime military balance. Rather, political and economic factors are also important in the wartime balance, but the relative importance of various specific economic, political and military factors shifts from one time frame to the other. The peacetime/wartime framework should be expanded beyond a dichotomy to a continuum that looks at the balance of power in a wide range of environments including, for example: detente/cold war/crisis/mobilization/local war/U.S.-Soviet limited conventional war/general nuclear war/protracted nuclear war/post-nuclear recovery-counterattack. The most significant economic, political and military factors for achieving national goals and protecting national interests will be different at various points along the

spectrum, and estimates of the balance of power will shift as well.

The Soviets and Chinese, for example, emphasize the post-nuclear and recovery phases of war as elements of deterrence and measures of the military balance and war-fighting capabilities. From this perspective, the Soviets attach greater importance to China in the overall military balance than they would if they assessed the balance in the peacetime or conventional war segments of the spectrum. By contrast, American analysts tend to focus on the peacetime military balance and the initial phases of war, and thus downplay the significance of China's advantages in the protracted war/post-nuclear phase of war time frames in assessing the Soviets' perception of the China threat. The Chinese, however, perceive the Soviets' fear of surviving Chinese masses after a nuclear war counterattacking a crippled Soviet Union.

This peacetime/wartime framework underlies the analysis in this report on Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the strategic environment.

Soviet Perceptions of China and U.S.-Chinese Military Ties

In estimating the "China threat," Soviet analysts begin with an assessment of China's internal processes, which they see as the primary determinants of Chinese foreign and security policy. They explain China's strategic orientation as a function primarily of domestic political factors rather than as a response to international events and leadership perceptions of national interest.

Soviet leaders hoped in vain that the rise to power of the "pragmatists" in Beijing would result in a shift away from Mao's anti-Soviet foreign policy and a movement toward improved Sino-Soviet relations. Analysts see the persistence of Maoist

precepts under Deng Xiaoping as the primary reason for China's continued anti-Soviet policies.

Soviet sinologists watch internal developments in China for signs of domestic political instability that on the one hand could have unpredictable and dangerous consequences for Moscow, and on the other could provide potentially fertile ground for Soviet exploitation. They continue to look for the presence of pro-Soviet "healthy forces" in China, but are pessimistic that such forces exist.

Soviet analysts and commentators express uncertainty about the outcome of China's Four Modernizations program and often express conflicting views about the implications of China's economic development for the Soviet Union. Institute scholars say they disagree with the leadership's view that an economically strong China would increase the Chinese threat to Soviet security. Rather they argue that the failure to make significant economic strides could result in policy changes in China that might be potentially more dangerous to Soviet security.

There is a widespread belief in the Soviet Union that the Chinese do not fear nuclear war and even plan for the post-nuclear stage of war in which China would emerge as the world's strongest power.

Soviet writings describe in ominous terms the development of China's conventional and nuclear weapons and express concern that Chinese access to advanced Western technology will enable China to make more rapid progress, particularly in the development of its nuclear weapons system. Privately, Soviet analysts do not predict a major improvement in China's nuclear capabilities in the near future. They acknowledge, however, that China is already an important factor in Soviet military planning.

Soviet public assessments of the threat posed to the Soviet Union by Sino-U.S. strategic cooperation suggest Moscow's perceives potential nuclear and conventional military threats as well as strategic encirclement.

A major task of Soviet China specialists is to assess the likelihood of the Soviet Union's worst fears about U.S.-Chinese defense ties being realized. Soviet sinologists focus on assessing both the pace of development and the potential impact on the Soviet Union of such defense cooperation.

Soviet analysts stress that geopolitical and strategic interests were the primary factors that motivated U.S. leaders to establish military ties with China. They argue that the U.S. wants to change the "correlation of forces" in the world against the Soviet Union by confronting the USSR and its allies with the spectre of a two-front war.

Soviet fears of the threat to their security posed by a perceived nascent U.S.-China alliance diminished in 1981 and 1982. Soviet statements and commentaries expressed increased confidence that differences between Washington and Beijing will strictly limit the development of Sino-American defense ties in the foreseeable future. They stressed that constraints on the United States and U.S. uncertainty about the future direction of Chinese foreign policy may inhibit U.S. leaders' desire to enhance China's warfighting capability.

Soviet leaders and analysts have become increasingly pessimistic over the last decade about the possibility of China returning to the Soviet-led "socialist camp" in the near future. But deteriorated relations between China and the U.S. combined with positive gestures from Beijing have created new hopes in Moscow about the prospects for improved Sino-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, the Soviets remain uncertain about the possibility of a change in China's anti-Soviet strategic orientation and

continue to express concern about Sino-American military co-operation.

While Soviet statements have expressed a preference for an overall political settlement with Beijing, they have indicated a willingness to first improve the "atmosphere" of Sino-Soviet relations, step-by-step, while postponing the resolution of some problems until the future. High-level Soviet officials point out that both sides share the view that a thaw has set in and express hope that it will eventually lead to dramatic changes in China's strategic posture.

Chinese Perceptions of the Soviet Threat and Strategic Ties with the United States

The Chinese evaluate the Soviet threat to China in the context of a perceived strategy aimed at achieving global hegemony that uses both diplomatic means and military force. They conclude from their assessment of this strategy that the Soviet Union will not attack China in the foreseeable future, but rather seeks to encircle China as part of its effort to "win without a fight."

Chinese commentators argue that Soviet weaknesses and vulnerabilities severely limit Soviet strategic capabilities. This is based on their assessments of Soviet strengths and weaknesses relative to the extent of Moscow's ambitions and the degree of cohesiveness of the united front to contain Soviet power. Commentators identify economic, political and strategic weaknesses that will, in their view, make Moscow unable to achieve its global aims. The weaknesses they point to include: an increasingly low rate of economic growth; imbalance between industrial and agricultural development; shortage of foreign exchange; over-extended battlelines; financially burdensome allies; and the need to plan for the possibility of a war on two fronts.

Chinese leaders say there will be no substantial improvement in China's relations with Moscow until the Soviets alter policies which threaten Chinese security. Nevertheless, they do not rule out small improvements in some aspects of their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union including trade and sports, cultural and technological exchanges. The Chinese express willingness to talk with Moscow about their differences, but emphasize that an improvement in relations will not lead to a change in Beijing's strategic posture and that even normalization of Sino-Soviet ties would amount only to normal, "good neighborly" relations.

China's cautious responses to Moscow's recent overtures are aimed at keeping Moscow off-balance, minimizing potentially explosive tensions on the Sino-Soviet border, maximizing political leverage with both the Soviet Union and the United States, and obtaining the advantages of improved bilateral ties, including increased trade and greater understanding of their more powerful neighbor. Improved relations with the Soviet Union, however, is not an alternative to strategic cooperation with the U.S., but rather they are complementary elements of a comprehensive Chinese security strategy.

Chinese leaders and officials point to their experience with the Soviets in the 1950s as demonstrating that Chinese suspicions of Moscow's intentions are deep-rooted. Chinese statements imply determination that China never again be vulnerable to Soviet pressure.

Chinese analysts stress that a convergence of strategic views constituted the foundation of Sino-American rapprochement and that despite bilateral differences, Washington and Beijing continue to maintain this common strategic orientation.

The Chinese have viewed favorably the Reagan administration's firm commitment to counter Soviet power and to build up

U.S. military capabilities. But they have criticized the administration's global strategy and foreign policies as counter-productive. Chinese criticisms of U.S. "hegemonism" in the Third World and of Washington's failure to consult with its Western European allies on strategic issues have been indirect expressions of Chinese suspicions about U.S. intentions toward China.

Chinese commentators view the basic U.S. strategy of confrontation with the Soviet Union as unchanged. But they see a gradual shift in the Reagan administration posture toward Moscow from "rigidity" to "flexibility." Some commentators have expressed concern that this shift in U.S. tactics to meet the Soviet challenge could result in U.S.-Soviet collusion at China's expense.

Chinese leaders have viewed the expansion of economic ties as a particularly important element of the Sino-American relationship. Despite repeated official statements promising active American support for China's economic development goals, the Chinese have perceived a lack of political will in Washington to provide economic assistance and to expedite the expansion of trade and technology transfer to China. This has raised doubts in Beijing about the reliability of the United States and its value as a strategic partner.

Chinese leaders perceive deterrence of the Soviet Union to be strengthened by China's partnership with the U.S. Commentators and analysts argue that the Soviets' two front war dilemma has been further exacerbated by the development of strategic relations between China and the U.S. They also point to Moscow's increased concern about possible U.S. assistance to Beijing in a Sino-Soviet conflict.

The primary aim of Chinese foreign policy is to oppose "Soviet hegemonism" by promoting the formation of a broad anti-Soviet coalition. While the Chinese reject the creation of

formal alliances with other states, they have called for bilateral and multilateral efforts within a united front to contain Soviet expansion. These efforts include consultations, coordinated policies and complementary actions. Privately, Chinese analysts have discussed China's united front strategy in more specific terms, suggesting, among other things, the "integrated deployment of all anti-hegemonic forces" and the "development of a global network."

Soviet and Chinese Perceptions of Wartime Strategic Factors

There has been increasing concurrence of Soviet, American and Chinese views about the possible character of a future global war, including: a future U.S.-Soviet war could start in one theater and quickly spread to other theaters of conflict, becoming a global war; the war could either remain conventional or escalate to the use of nuclear weapons; in either case, the war could be protracted; a protracted war, even if nuclear, could require full mobilization of all the resources of the societies involved, and peacetime preparations should be made to do so in a pre-war crisis; and even a nuclear war conceivably could in some meaningful sense, be "won." All three powers see Northeast Asia as one of the key potential theaters -- along with European and Southwest Asia -- where a war could start or to which it could spread.

For geographical, historical and doctrinal reasons, the Soviets plan for a protracted global conflict that continues beyond massive nuclear exchanges and leaves a crippled Soviet Union vulnerable to attack by its previously weaker neighbors. The problem for the Soviet planner is to determine forces that threaten Moscow's control of Soviet territory, to prepare to defeat those forces, and to ensure the slower recovery of the enemy relative to the Soviet Union. From this perspective, even if a global war with the United States does not initially involve the Chinese, the Soviets must plan to defeat a Chinese enemy that

assumption that perceptions profoundly affect the policies and strategies of the three powers of the strategic triangle, and thus have major implications for defense planners.

Changing perceptions in the past have influenced historic shifts in Chinese, Soviet and American strategies and policies. Altered perceptions were possibly the most important factor in the extraordinary geopolitical realignment that was consolidated by the Sino-American rapprochement of 1971-72. On the Chinese side, the shift was orchestrated by Mao Zedong, who had led the revolution against the U.S.-supported Chiang Kai-shek regime and then had overseen China's war against the United States and Korea in the early 1950s, and risked military conflict with Washington again at the end of the decade in the Taiwan Straits crisis. Mao's perceptions of China's national interests, however, had also led him to seek ties with the U.S. in the 1940s and to open diplomatic talks with Washington in the mid-1950s. And when China broke with Moscow in the 1960s and entered into a period of military confrontation in 1969, Mao perceived that China's independence and security could be best insured by gaining an American counterweight to Soviet power through rapprochement with the United States.

The basis of Mao's strategy was the perception that the U.S. was a declining power in Asia -- despite the fact that the United States had over half a million troops fighting in Vietnam and was bombing China's ally and neighbor, North Vietnam. Mao not only perceived that the U.S. was no longer the primary threat to China, but that Washington was potentially a quasi-ally and long-term partner in a pending global struggle against rising Soviet power.

Sino-American rapprochement also depended on U.S. recognition of new perceptions in Beijing as well as on changed U.S. perceptions of China and Sino-Soviet relations. Anti-communist, pro-Taiwan Richard Nixon perceived these changes and also foresaw

The report also examines China's perceptions of Soviet strategy and its counterstrategy for managing the Soviet threat, including through strategic cooperation with the United States. In addition, the study explores Chinese and Soviet perceptions of the characteristics of modern warfare, including protracted global war, and of the wartime as well as peacetime implications of those perceptions for their respective strategies and military postures.

Careful analysis of Soviet and Chinese perceptions is essential for guiding U.S. defense strategy and planning. This is particularly important for Asia, where the strategic environment will be increasingly demanding for U.S. military planning and capabilities in the 1980s. Growing Soviet military power in the region presents new challenges for U.S. forces at the same time that requirements for the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions have increased without a decrease in U.S. commitments in Northeast Asia. U.S. capabilities are further stressed by new efforts to plan for conflict in Asia as part of planning for possible protracted global war with both horizontal and vertical escalation potential. This report outlines some potential opportunities for strengthening the U.S. position in Asia and the Pacific based on a better understanding of Chinese and Soviet perceptions, strategies and policies. In particular, the report assesses the strategic importance of China in both Soviet and U.S. defense planning and provides a basis for evaluating possible further developments in Sino-American strategic/military ties.

1-2 Strategic Importance of Perceptions

This report aims to provide a comprehensive picture of Soviet and Chinese perceptions which shape or reflect leadership views and military planning assumptions. Our approach is to integrate private and public comments, showing both parallels and differences between the views. Such an approach is based on the

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

1-1 Dangers and Opportunities

U.S. policy toward the triangular relationship among China, the Soviet Union and the United States has been guided for more than a decade by the perception that neither war nor rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing is in American interest. United States strategy has sought to maintain Sino-Soviet tension while gaining maximum leverage and strategic advantage over the Soviet Union through exploiting Soviet concerns about China and building an enduring bilateral and global relationship with the Chinese.

Underlying U.S. triangular policies have been general notions about Soviet fears of China and Sino-American collusion, and about Chinese fears of the Soviets and desire for anti-Soviet collusion with the United States. There has been little agreement in the U.S., however, on the depth and nature of Soviet and Chinese concerns about each other. Nor has there been agreement on the strategic value of military and strategic cooperation with China. Suspicions about the "unreliability" of China remain even ten years after Beijing and Washington forged a "new relationship" overcoming twenty years of hostility. These suspicions become especially prevalent at times of slight thaw in Sino-Soviet relations and tensions in U.S.-Chinese relations as occurred in 1979 and again in 1982.

This study addresses these and other concerns about strategic relations between China, the Soviet Union and the United States. It examines Soviet perceptions of China and Sino-U.S. military ties to ascertain Moscow's underlying fears about the actual and potential China and China/U.S. threat, its future expectations about development of Sino-American security relations, and its strategy for countering the perceived threat.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded)

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
4-1.8 Geostrategic Context of Military Options Against China-----	139
4-1.9 Dangers of "Swinging" Forces-----	141
4-2 Chinese Perceptions of War and Soviet Strategy-----	145
4-2.1 Introduction-----	145
4-2.2 Soviet Military Strategy-----	145
4-2.3 Prospects for a Manchurian Campaign-----	148
4-2.4 Tactical Nuclear War-----	149
4-2.5 Protracted Nuclear War and Post-nuclear "Revivability"-----	151
4-2.6 "Revivability" and the Post- nuclear Phase of War-----	153
4-2.7 Geostrategic Context of Deterrence of the Soviet Union-----	154
5 CONCLUSION-----	156
6 FOOTNOTES-----	162

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
2-5.3 Small-Step Diplomacy-----	78
3 CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND STRATEGIC TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES-----	82
3-1 Introduction-----	82
3-2 Soviet Strategy for Global Domination-----	84
3-2.1 The Strategic Plan-----	84
3-2.2 Threat to China: Not Immediate-----	85
3-2.3 "Paeans of Peace, Rumble of Tanks"--	87
3-2.4 Deterrence Through Psychological Manipulation-----	88
3-2.5 Peaking Empire?-----	90
3-3 Sino-Soviet Relations-----	97
3-3.1 Soviet Gestures, Chinese Reassurances-----	97
3-3.2 Lessons of the 50s-----	101
3-3.3 Managing the Soviet Threat-----	102
3-4 Sino-American Relations-----	106
3-4.1 Convergence of Strategic Views-----	106
3-4.2 Inconsistencies in U.S. Policy-----	108
3-4.3 Fear of U.S.-Soviet Collusion-----	110
3-4.4 Weakening the NATO Alliance-----	111
3-4.5 Alienating the Third World-----	112
3-4.6 "Loud Thunder, Little Rain"-----	115
3-4.7 Strategic Value of the Partnership--	118
3-4.8 Coordinated Policies and Complementary Action-----	119
4 SOVIET AND CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF WARTIME STRATEGIC FACTORS-----	123
4-1 Soviet Perceptions of War and The China Factors-----	123
4-1.1 Introduction-----	123
4-1.2 Concern About Evolving U.S. Strategy-----	125
4-1.3 Global War: Possibly Protracted, Theoretically Winnable-----	126
4-1.4 Post-nuclear Phase Decisive-----	129
4-1.5 China as Post-nuclear Threat-----	131
4-1.6 Nuclear Force Requirements Against China-----	132
4-1.7 "Lessons" of Manchuria-----	134

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
SUMMARY -----	1
PREFACE -----	15
1 INTRODUCTION-----	21
1-1 Dangers and Opportunities-----	21
1-2 Strategic Importance of Perceptions-----	22
1-3 "Lessons" of the Triangle-----	26
1-4 Peacetime/Wartime Framework-----	29
2 SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA AND U.S.-CHINESE MILITARY TIES-----	35
2-1 Introduction-----	35
2-2 China's Internal Situation-----	36
2-2.1 Mao's Legacy Persists-----	36
2-2.2 Fear of Instability-----	39
2-2.3 Pessimistic But Hopeful About "Healthy Forces"-----	40
2-2.4 Four Modernizations: Uncertain Implications-----	42
2-2.5 China's Future: Socialist or Capitalist?-----	44
2-3 China's Military Modernization-----	45
2-3.1 Serious Obstacles, Slow Progress----	45
2-3.2 China Would Welcome Nuclear War----	48
2-3.3 Conventional and Nuclear Threat----	50
2-3.4 Fear of Post-nuclear Attack-----	52
2-4 U.S.-Chinese Military Ties-----	53
2-4.1 Fears of Sino-American Collusion----	53
2-4.2 Contradictions Undermine the Alliance-----	57
2-4.3 Conflicting Motivations in Forging Strategic Ties-----	59
2-4.4 Strategic Threat: The Official View-----	63
2-4.5 The Analysts' Private Views of the Threat-----	68
2-4.6 Limitations on the Partnership-----	70
2-5 Sino-Soviet Relations-----	73
2-5.1 Evolving Leadership Perceptions----	73
2-5.2 New Opportunities in Sino-U.S. Differences-----	76

in almost apocalyptic terms, while on the other hand, they have apparently sought to reassure the leadership that contradictions between the U.S. and China would limit the development of military and strategic ties between Washington and Beijing. Public writings as well as private comments by some of these Soviet analysts over the years have proven uncannily accurate in their predictions, which likely has boosted their prestige among those for whom they furnish analyses in the Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee, and, possibly, the Defense Ministry and KGB. There are cases in the Soviet Union and in China where ideas first expressed in scholarly journals later appeared in major policy statements and prominent analysts in both countries are known to have written authoritative party documents. In a Chinese case, a major study of Soviet military strategy by two analysts from a recently established strategic institute appeared in the Party newspaper Renmin Ribao under the byline "Special Commentator," widely recognized as authoritatively representing leadership views.

Private conversations with analysts provide an opportunity to probe more deeply into issues and questions not directly or sufficiently explored in published comments. Such conversations reveal new insights, and enable greater understanding of how the Chinese and Soviets think about various problems and issues. Conflicting perceptions and opinions of individual analysts can suggest the parameters of debate on sensitive issues, and often bring into relief disputes that are presented in the media only in veiled terms. The views of informed analysts expressed in discussions also often assist in determining which public statements and writings should be taken seriously, which are intended as propaganda and which are unrepresentative or even iconoclastic views.

PREFACE

Preparation of this study has involved extensive research into published Soviet and Chinese documents, ranging from speeches by leaders and interviews with top officials to press commentaries and more in-depth scholarly analyses. The authors also have had extensive private discussions with Soviet and Chinese officials and analysts.*

In our judgment, public statements and writings by Soviet and Chinese officials and analysts, especially when combined with private discussions, are often useful guides to understanding leadership perceptions in both countries and not merely propaganda or disinformation. Certainly, these sources can disseminate propaganda or be intentionally misleading. But it is possible to ferret out the perceptions that reflect the views of national leaders and their policy decisions. It would be short-sighted to dismiss all statements by officials and analysts, just as it would be foolish to grant them full credibility.

While some institutes and individual analysts, especially in the Soviet Union, may see their functions as partly to deceive Westerners, there is little doubt that many Soviet and Chinese analysts and scholars also have an important influence in the policymaking process. In some cases, there is clear evidence that the analysts serve both functions simultaneously. Some Soviet sinologists, for example, have on the one hand, warned the West against selling arms to China by describing the consequences

* As part of this research effort, one of the authors, Banning Garrett, visited the Soviet Union twice in 1981 for talks with Soviet sinologists and other analysts. He also visited China and Japan in 1981 for similar discussions with analysts and officials. The results of the first visit to Moscow formed part of a study by Banning Garrett, "Soviet Perceptions of China and Sino-American Military Ties: Implications for the Strategic Balance and Arms Control," prepared for the SALT/Arms Control Support Group, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), by Harold Rosenbaum Associates, Inc., June 1981.

itself from the United States publicly in peacetime is not China's preferred option, but may nevertheless continue while privately the Chinese remain interested in extensive military and strategic cooperation with Washington to meet the wartime threat from the Soviet Union. This enduring Chinese posture should provide the framework for U.S. unilateral planning and cooperative measures with China to enhance deterrence of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets can be expected to protest any new developments in Sino-American military cooperation, and they will most likely perceive such steps as further stressing their peacetime military resources and complicating their wartime strategy. But if a U.S.-Chinese military coalition is properly managed, the Soviets will be more effectively deterred on a global scale while not rejecting peacetime measures to stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations, including conclusion of arms control agreements with Washington.

outcome -- and to shift the wartime balance -- may be as important as maintaining a Soviet perception of strategic equivalence or even of Soviet inferiority in the peacetime balance. This strategic environment provides opportunities for the United States to strengthen deterrence of the Soviet Union. Peacetime military cooperation with China would enhance the credibility of coordinated U.S.-Chinese wartime actions in a global war. Deterrence of Soviet action against third countries might also be enhanced through the prospect of a coordinated Sino-American response that increased the danger to Moscow of both horizontal and vertical escalation.

Recent developments in triangular relations, however, have mitigated Soviet fears of Sino-American strategic/military cooperation. Moscow has sought to capitalize on differences between the U.S. and China by making new overtures to Beijing for improved bilateral relations. From the Chinese point of view, U.S. policies have called into question Washington's reliability as a strategic partner and its peacetime value as a counter to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviets have carefully avoided creating new threats to China's security since Afghanistan. The Chinese have reacted to these triangular developments by tactical shifts to protect China's national interests and manage the Soviet threat. They have sought to demonstrate their peacetime independence from the United States by maneuvering tactically between the superpowers. But the Chinese have not changed their basic anti-Soviet orientation nor their strategy of forming a united front against Moscow. They will continue to view the Soviet Union as the primary wartime threat to China and the U.S. as a necessary strategic counter to Soviet Union military power.

This basic geopolitic assessment has guided Chinese strategy for more than a decade -- despite major leadership and policy struggles within China -- and is likely to form the context of Chinese strategic policy for the foreseeable future. Distancing

the Soviets' geostrategic weaknesses in assessing the likelihood of a Soviet attack and in their strategy for strengthening deterrence during a period when their top priority is economic modernization and the establishment of an industrial and technological foundation for a more rapid modernization of their armed forces at some later date.

Conclusion

Assessment of Soviet and Chinese views of war suggests that both countries may focus as much if not more on wartime and post-war factors of the military balance as on the peacetime balance of conventional and nuclear forces. From this point of view, a nation that is perceived as inferior in the peacetime balance might nevertheless be perceived to have an advantage in the wartime balance at various points along the spectrum from crisis/mobilization through post-nuclear conflict. And a nation's conventional forces also could be assessed as inferior by quantitative and qualitative military criteria in peacetime, yet be potentially more effective in protracted war conditions because of other economic, social, political and even military factors that are not addressed in strict peacetime measures of the military balance.

Despite the Soviet Union's rejection of an assured destruction strategy and adoption of a warfighting doctrine which envisions a protracted struggle beyond a massive nuclear exchange, the Soviets may nevertheless view the likely outcome of such a conflict to be "assured defeat" even if they can survive the initial nuclear attacks. In trying to escape such an outcome to achieve "assured survival" and an ability to prevail over the U.S., China and all their other potential enemies, the Soviets perceive themselves facing a very complex security environment with virtually open-ended force requirements.

For the United States, focus on protracted war/post-war factors to enhance the Soviets' perceptions of an unfavorable war

The Chinese concur with the Soviets' belief that ground forces determine the final outcome of war despite the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons. Chinese leaders and strategists express views that coincide with the Soviet view that a war involving the use of nuclear weapons could be protracted, go through a phase of major nuclear exchanges and even continue with the use of only conventional forces or with nuclear and conventional forces. The Chinese also see that China poses a major threat to the Soviet Union in such a protracted conflict, especially in the context of a global nuclear war in which the Soviet Union has sustained nuclear destruction and a degradation of its military capability in combat with the United States.

Chinese strategists say privately that China is in a better position to survive and fight a protracted war than is the Soviet Union. They argue that China's advantages in demography and grain production, and its abundant natural resources, will enhance its "revivability" after a nuclear war. They also emphasize that China's willingness to contemplate and plan for a protracted struggle serves as an important deterrent to Soviet attack.

The Chinese stress the importance of the larger geostrategic context in limiting Soviet options against China, especially the Soviets' two-front dilemma. Thus, Chinese deterrence of Soviet attack relies on a complex of factors, including the post-nuclear threat posed to a potentially crippled Soviet Union by surviving Chinese factors; China's ability to sustain and ultimately prevail in a protracted war against a militarily superior invading force; China's nuclear retaliatory forces, which have sufficient survivability to be launched "at any uncertain time;" Soviet uncertainty about possible U.S. aid to China; and the Soviets' concern about fighting a two-front war or Western exploitation of a war-weakened Soviet Union after a Sino-Soviet conflict. For the Chinese, their deterrence posture must ultimately rest on their own efforts and capabilities. But they place great emphasis on

may seek to take advantage of a war-ravaged Soviet Union by seizing Soviet territory and even attacking the Russian heartland. The Soviets must plan to destroy Chinese conventional as well as nuclear forces and Chinese recovery assets to ensure slower Chinese recovery. The Soviets fear China would have advantages for survival in a nuclear war and could be a serious threat to the Soviet Union in a protracted post-nuclear struggle. This "China threat" may place far greater demands on Soviet conventional and nuclear forces than is generally recognized. A Soviet target list for China based on the SIOP categories would have to be immense compared with a list restricted to nuclear weapons and related facilities.

The Soviet's highly successful 1945 Manchurian Campaign which routed the Japanese Kwantung Army in six days, is pointed to by Soviet, Chinese and American analysts as a model for current Soviet planning, including against China. But the Soviets' own writings extolling the Campaign's virtues by implication suggest that the Soviets know they cannot duplicate such an attack against China today. Most importantly, the Soviets could not count on a quiet second front to allow for both a one-front conflict and for swinging massive numbers of troops from the West to the Far East. They also could not carry out the preparations for such a large-scale attack in secrecy as they did in 1945.

The Soviets would view any military options against China in a geostrategic context and would see potentially unacceptable international risks involved in any effective military action against China, including U.S. military assistance to China or the opening of a second front during or after a Sino-Soviet conflict. Soviet diplomacy and the buildup of Soviet military power are aimed at reducing the likelihood of coordinated two-front war against them on the one hand, and acquiring sufficient military power to defeat all their enemies simultaneously on the other.

the strategic opportunities as well as dangers for the U.S. presented by the Sino-Soviet conflict. President Nixon dramatically departed from previous U.S. policy based on enmity with "Communist China" toward a new triangular policy that sought to build a friendly relationship with the People's Republic to counterbalance Soviet power.

National interests of the United States and China formed the foundation for the Sino-American rapprochement and the new strategic postures of the two countries; changing perceptions convinced American and Chinese leaders that a positive relationship between Washington and Beijing was both possible and desirable.

The new U.S. perceptions of China, and then the new U.S.-Chinese relationship allowed the United States to make a major change in its global strategy and force requirements. U.S. defense planners, who had operated on the premise of a 2 1/2 war strategy since the 1950s, although they never had the necessary resources to implement such an ambitious strategy, could then scale down to a more manageable 1 1/2 war strategy based on the new assumption that the U.S. would no longer have to fight the Soviet Union in Europe and China in Asia simultaneously. As China developed a positive relationship with the U.S. and indicated its support for stability in Asia and continued U.S. military presence in the region, U.S. forces could be further drawn down.

For the Soviets, who had hoped for Soviet-American collusion against China in the late 1960s and even as late as 1973, their worst nightmare of Sino-American collusion against them was now being realized -- including the spectre of a U.S.-armed China building up its military forces across the border. The Soviet Union could no longer base its military and strategic planning on having China as an ally and buffer in Asia, or at worst as an isolated, neutral power, but rather now had to plan for a nascent

alliance between its two most feared adversaries. Moscow has perceived the greatest danger to lie in the prospect of a two-front war in Europe and Asia, while China, like the U.S., could scale down its defense requirements to meet a one-front war threat from the Soviet Union.

In early 1978, shared perceptions of the threat posed by the Soviet Union led China and the United States into an overt strategic relationship to counter growing Soviet power. A convergence of views on the global situation and on an anti-Soviet strategy made possible the achievement in seven months of what had been stalled for seven years: the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing. Leaders of both countries attributed the political will to overcome obstacles to normalization to their common perceptions and strategic orientation. The Sino-American strategic relationship received another boost with the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- an event that had a profound impact on perceptions in the United States and which prompted the President to say that the Soviet action had fundamentally altered his views of the Soviet Union.

Perceptions in Washington and Beijing of the strategic importance of maintaining and developing Sino-American relations outweighed ideology and domestic politics in both countries in summer 1982 to produce the August 17 joint communique on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The agreement on the communique defused the worst crisis in Sino-American relations since the 1971-72 rapprochement -- a crisis precipitated not by changing Chinese or American national interests, but rather by changes in some perceptions on both sides. The Chinese perceived a change in U.S. intentions toward Taiwan and in U.S. global strategy and Third World policies. In the U.S., some officials perceived that China was neither as powerful nor as strategically significant to the U.S. as had been earlier argued, and that the Chinese, by placing defense modernization at the bottom of the Four Modernizations, were not serious about building up their forces to even keep pace with the ever-expanding Soviet capability in the Far East.

For the Soviets, their perceptions of danger in a burgeoning Sino-American military relationship in the 1978-80 period changed to a more relaxed assessment that contradictions between Washington and Beijing would continue to stall development of U.S.-Chinese defense ties. The Soviets also saw an opportunity to make new overtures to China to improve relations while Beijing was at odds with Washington. But the Soviets remained wary of the potential of Sino-American military ties, and continued to perceive the threat of possible U.S.-Chinese wartime cooperation.

1-3 "Lessons" of the Triangle

A period of Sino-American tension and Sino-Soviet thaw provides a crucible for assessing the more enduring perceptions, interests and strategies of the U.S., China and the Soviet Union. In the historical annex to this study, we have presented additional analyses for drawing some "lessons" about the triangular relationship and about the perceptions and policies of the three powers. The following are some of those lessons:

- Chinese and American policies toward each other and the triangle have been based more on geopolitics and national interests than on ideology or domestic politics. Since Mao and Zhou's first moves toward rapprochement with the United States in 1969-70, China's strategic orientation has been consistent despite tremendous internal upheavals in China, including major policy and leadership changes. The Chinese leadership, while at odds over many issues, has apparently carried out a very limited debate on the key issues of triangular relations. U.S. policy has been similarly consistent in its geopolitical orientation in the triangle since the Nixon administration, despite strong opposition from pro-Taiwan conservatives and other domestic political factors.

- Bilateral issues between the U.S. and China -- especially Taiwan -- have been largely subordinated to larger strategic concerns and interests by both Chinese and American leaders, although both sides have had limited room for maneuver due to domestic political pressures. This has been demonstrated at key points by the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the December 15, 1978 normalization agreement and the August 17, 1982 joint communique on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Domestic political and ideological concerns were overridden on both sides to make compromise possible for global strategic reasons.
- A basic dynamic of the triangular relationship for three decades has been collusion/anti-collusion: the U.S. feared Sino-Soviet collusion in the 1950s, China feared U.S.-Soviet collusion in the 1960s, and the Soviets have feared Sino-American collusion in the 1970s and 1980s. Each power has sought to prevent collusion against it by the other two, a concern which helped prompt both the Soviet Union and China to seek improved ties with the United States in 1971-1972. Despite the dominant trends of collusion in any given period, each power is always apprehensive about the other two colluding at its expense. The Chinese continue to worry, for example, that the U.S. might conclude a START or INF agreement with Moscow that would jeopardize Chinese security. The U.S. continues to worry that China might collude with the Soviets once again if the first steps toward improving Sino-Soviet relations result in a great leap toward rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow.

- The realities of geography and relative power have placed China in the weakest position in the triangle, leading Beijing to seek a long-term strategic alignment (collusion) with the more distant and less threatening of the two superpowers. Although China can distance itself from the United States for political purposes, its long-term enduring interest is in counterbalancing its stronger neighbor.
- The Chinese have managed the Soviet threat through a complex but coherent strategy which includes both organizing a coalition against Moscow and improving bilateral ties with the Soviets. Improved relations with the Soviet Union and alignment with the United States are not alternative strategies for China; rather, they are complementary elements of that strategy which also includes building up China's own defense capability. There is an inherent limit to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, and in that sense, Chinese policy toward Moscow is similar to the U.S. policy of detente which did not presume the end of U.S.-Soviet competition nor of conflicts of interest, but was a multifaceted strategy for managing the Soviet threat.
- China's ideological rhetoric has usually been irrelevant in guiding its fundamental triangular policies, which have been based on realpolitik and balance of power. While Chinese leaders have propagated a theory of "Three Worlds," for example, which calls for unity of the third world with the second world (Western Europe and Japan) to oppose the first world of both superpowers, in practice China has placed the U.S. in the second world as it has sought to build a coalition with the United States along with Western

Europe, Japan and Third World nations against the Soviet Union. The first Chinese probes for developing military ties with the United States were made in mid-1973, at a time of harsh Chinese attacks on the U.S. as well as Soviet hegemonism especially during the 10th Party Congress. Chinese analysts privately argue that it is in American as well as Chinese interest for China to maintain its non-aligned, pro-Third World image while also forging a military relationship with the United States.

- The Soviet Union has warned for a decade of the dangerous consequences for China and the U.S. of development of an anti-Soviet alignment between Beijing and Washington, yet Moscow has reacted very cautiously to the forging of such a relationship. President Brezhnev personally warned against "playing the China card" in June 1978, and Moscow continues to issue threats and warnings about further developments in U.S.-Chinese military ties. But the Soviet Union has responded pragmatically to Sino-American security relations. Since the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 pushed the U.S. and China into closer military cooperation, Soviet leaders have sought to avoid provoking Washington and Beijing into further collaboration. Moscow also has sought to capitalize on Sino-American differences over Taiwan through new overtures to China for improved relations.

1-4 Peacetime/Wartime Framework

Soviet, Chinese and American perceptions and analyses of the strategic environment and the "balance of power" or "correlation of forces" are frequently discussed without explicit clarification of the underlying temporal environment being examined, that

is, peacetime or wartime. Wartime is not simply the extrapolation of peacetime into the future, nor is it a function of only the order of battle in the peacetime military balance. Rather, political and economic factors also weigh heavily in the wartime balance. The relative importance of various specific economic, political and military factors, however, shifts from one time-frame to the other.

It is often noted, for example, that the United States has important advantages in the balance of power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the strength and significance of its allies, friends and "strategic partners," including China, that comprise its coalition. The United States has been "encircling" the Soviet Union with this coalition, creating anxiety in Moscow while enabling the Soviets' apprehensive neighbors to counterbalance growing Soviet power. The U.S.-led coalition has significant advantages over the Soviet Union and its allies in the peacetime balance of power. Its total economic and military power outweighs that of the Soviets' coalition. U.S. allies and friends make major contributions in economic strength, conventional military capability and even modest contributions of nuclear forces, while the Soviets' allies are largely an economic burden on the Soviet Union. The Soviets also have to provide a far larger share of their coalition's military power than does the United States.

The wartime balance, however, might be assessed very differently. The U.S. coalition might not hold together, with one or more nations refusing to enter the conflict or even to allow the U.S. to have access to bases or other facilities located on its territory. Alliance wartime decisionmaking might be a major obstacle to effective military action, especially any decision to use tactical or theater nuclear weapons. And the limited standardization and interoperability of NATO forces could further weaken the coalition's warfighting capability. For the Soviet Union, on the other hand, its peacetime weaknesses might prove to be wartime strengths, especially its primary reliance on

forces directly under its control. While Moscow may be less concerned than Washington about the problem of unreliable allies and friends in wartime, the Soviets nevertheless must worry that the U.S. coalition will function effectively.

Economic capability might also be judged differently in peacetime and wartime. In most assessments, the overall size, technological level, inner dynamism and global importance of the U.S. economy is contrasted with the smaller, more stagnant, and technologically inferior Soviet economy which seems unable to generate innovation, and rather relies on external technological inputs. The Soviet Union does have advantages, however, in its relative resource self-sufficiency, especially in energy, and its low overall dependence on world trade. In the wartime balance, the Soviets would have other advantages as well, including their highly centralized command economy, their larger military and heavy industry production base, and the low expectations of their consumers. The Soviet Union thus might be able to increase military production more rapidly than the United States and be able to sustain a protracted war effort more easily. On the other hand, excessive peacetime allocation of resources on defense for wartime contingencies has become an increasingly important contributor to stagnation in the civilian economy, thus weakening the Soviets' overall position in the peacetime balance of power. The Soviets massive preparations for war also have had a counterproductive peacetime political impact on their neighbors and the United States.

These examples provide a preliminary introduction to the idea of the peacetime/wartime framework. But that framework should be expanded beyond a dichotomy to a continuum that suggests more complex issues and questions for the policymaker and defense planner. At one end of the spectrum would be stable peace and at the other recovery from general nuclear war. Such a peacetime/wartime continuum might include the following gradations:

PEACETIME

WARTIME

DETENTE

COLD WAR

CRISIS/MOBILIZATION

CONFRONTATION

LOCAL WAR

U.S.-SOVIET:
LIMITED CONVENTIONAL WAR

GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR

PROTRACTED NUCLEAR WAR

POST-NUCLEAR RECOVERY/
COUNTERATTACK

The most significant economic, political and military factors for achieving national goals and protecting national interests will be different at different points along the spectrum. Estimates of the balance of power -- the overall balance of political, economic and military power, or just the military balance -- will change along the peacetime/wartime continuum. And as the actual global situation evolves, public perceptions of the balance -- the relative importance of various factors and the relative strengths of each power by those measures -- will change. During a period "positive peace" -- of which some thought detente was a harbinger -- perceptions of the significance of military power, and strategic nuclear forces in particular, relative to economic strength might be quite different than during a U.S.-Soviet crisis or pre-war mobilization period when the average citizen is counting opposing warheads and identifying civil defense relocation centers.

The Soviets and Chinese, for example, emphasize the post-nuclear and recovery phases of war as elements of deterrence and measures of the military balance and warfighting capabilities

(see Section 4.0). From this perspective, the Soviets attach greater importance to China in the overall military balance than they would if they assessed the balance in the peacetime or conventional war segments of the spectrum. The Soviets perceive China, despite its inferiority in military hardware, as having advantages in survivability and protracted war capability. By contrast, American analysts tend to focus on the peacetime military balance and the initial phases of war, and thus downplay possible Chinese advantages over the Soviet Union in the protracted war/post-nuclear phase of war time frames. The Chinese, however, perceive the Soviets' fear of surviving Chinese masses after a nuclear war counterattacking a crippled Soviet Union. The Chinese plan for protracted conventional and nuclear war and for post-nuclear survivability, and see this planning and capability as a major contributing factor to deterrence of Soviet attack -- both on China and on the West.

A major U.S.-Soviet military confrontation, for another example of the peacetime/wartime framework, would occur in a very different environment than the present world situation. It would likely follow a prolonged period of crisis and mobilization in which the elements of national and coalition power considered most important to pre-war deterrence or ultimate "victory" in a global conflict would be perceived as very different than in the current peacetime environment. The shifting elements of the balance of power in the crisis/mobilization period would be judged by their role in minimizing the effectiveness of the adversary's planning strategy and marshalling of assets, and in maximizing the deterrence and warfighting position of the U.S. This would include such factors as the ability to prevent neutralization of allies and friends and to ensure rational war-time allocation of the total military potential of the coalition. Another important factor, for example, would be the capability to mobilize industrial capacity and human resources for a protracted conflict.

This briefly-sketched peacetime/wartime framework should be useful for at least four general purposes: 1) clarifying the discussion of the balance of power and the significance of various economic, political and military factors in international politics; 2) more fully understanding the perceptions of leaders and analysts in other countries and the assumptions behind these countries' defense planning; 3) assisting defense analysts and planners in more systematically examining the interplay of various economic, political and military factors, and of each of those factors as different points on the peacetime/wartime continuum; and 4) aiding policymakers by making explicit the implications of a particular decision across the peacetime/wartime spectrum -- that is, the different possible temporal environments in which the country would have to "live with the decision." A limited form of this sort of analysis has previously been done for assessing the arms control impact of new weapons systems, and the warfighting impact of weapons limitations in arms control agreements.

This peacetime/wartime framework underlies the analysis in this report on Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the strategic environment. We have not attempted at this point to systematically apply the framework for all factors at all points along the continuum, but we have identified important peacetime/wartime perceptions and factors and examined some of their implications for U.S. military strategy and defense planning.

SECTION 2

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA AND U.S.-CHINESE MILITARY TIES

2-1 Introduction

Soviet perceptions of the "China threat" have major peacetime and wartime implications for Soviet military planning. Moscow's perception of a volatile, long-term threat from China after the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s led to a doubling of Soviet forces in the Far East -- from fifteen to more than thirty divisions between 1964 and 1969. Following the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, the Soviets continued the rapid expansion and upgrading of their forces in the region, reaching about 45 divisions by 1972 and some 50 divisions a decade later. The Soviets perceived the threat justifying allocation of between 1/4 and 1/3 of their conventional forces, deployment of their most advanced weapons systems, construction of extensive and expensive military facilities, and building of the multi-billion ruble, double-tracked Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) to provide additional, more secure rail access to the Far East. The Soviets also perceived a need for a buildup of theater nuclear forces in the region, including SS-20s and Backfire bombers, partially to offset the development and growth of a Chinese nuclear capability beginning in the mid-1960s.

That China poses a major, long-term peacetime and wartime threat to the Soviet Union is indicated in statements by Soviet leaders and commentators and in private comments by Soviet analysts. This threat is seen as compounded by potential developments in Sino-American strategic and military cooperation, which could result in the enhancement of China's unilateral military capability, and could raise the prospect of a coordinated Sino-American military effort in a two-front war against the Soviet Union.

Moscow has focused a major analytical effort on assessing the "China threat." These assessments begin with analysis of China's internal political and economic situation and the Communist Party's domestic policies. Soviet leaders and analysts see a direct link between domestic politics and foreign policy, and often explain foreign and security policy as primarily the outcome of internal processes rather than as a response to external developments and leadership perceptions of national interests. Consequently, Soviet estimates of the future of Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations are based in large part on their conclusions about internal factors.

In calculating the future Sino-Soviet military balance, the Soviets need to make judgments about the likely acquisition of foreign arms and military-related technology by China, and China's ability to absorb this technology and transform it into deployed military capability. These factors are in turn affected by political decisions in Beijing on strategy, priorities and resource allocation, and by Western willingness to transfer weapons and advanced technology to China.

The Soviets also look to potential internal instability in China that could have an unpredictable impact on Chinese foreign policy with possible dangerous consequences for the Soviet Union. Instability could also provide new opportunities for Moscow to encourage the development of "healthy forces" in China that might seek major improvements in Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet analysts and leaders have also watched for exploitable differences between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan and other issues. The Soviets perceive that Sino-U.S. contradictions could prompt Chinese interest in improved relations with Moscow.

2-2 China's Internal Situation

2-2.1 Mao's Legacy Persists

While Soviet leaders and analysts have seen continuing leadership struggles in China since the death of Mao Zedong, the

analysts if not the leaders, have disagreed sharply on the eventual outcome of the struggle and its implications for China's foreign policy and relations with the Soviet Union.

Soviet analysts, who generally view foreign policy as primarily an outcome of domestic politics, had hoped that the rise to power of the "pragmatists" in Beijing would result in a shift away from Mao's anti-Soviet foreign policy and a movement toward improved Sino-Soviet relations. Continued Chinese hostility toward the Soviet Union after Mao's death, and the failure of the Chinese leadership to respond positively to Soviet overtures, has perplexed Soviet leaders and scholars. It has also led to continued uncertainty and often pessimism about a significant improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and China, at least in the short run. In explaining this failure of the "pragmatists" to change China's foreign policies, Soviet leaders and analysts have argued that despite the dramatic changes in China's domestic policies under Deng Xiaoping, the fundamental precepts of Maoism have not been repudiated.

Soviet President Brezhnev, in his speech to the 26th Party Congress on February 23, 1981, expressed at the highest level of the Soviets' uncertainty about the direction of China, and cited the leadership's failure so far to depart from Maoism: "Changes are now taking place in China's domestic policies. Time will yet show their true essence. Time will show to what extent the present Chinese leadership will find it possible to overcome the Maoist legacy. However, as yet, one unfortunately cannot speak of any changes for the better in Beijing's foreign policies. As before, they are directed at aggravating the international situation, coming close to imperialist policies. Naturally this will not put China back onto a healthy path of development. Imperialists will not be socialism's friends."¹

The authoritative Communist Party journal Kommunist elaborated on Brezhnev's comments two months later. While acknowledg-

creation of new types of ICBMs (solid fuel, mobile), of operational tactical missiles and nuclear weapons for them." The ground forces, the article continued, "are developing a new tank, self-propelled guns, antitank guided rocket shells and anti-aircraft guided missiles based on Western models. Practical steps are being taken to increase the level of motorized units and formations and to raise the personnel's combat training by conducting exercises in which different categories of troops participate." Describing China's plans to modernize the navy, the article argued that "a central place in the program...is occupied by measures for the creation of a nuclear submarine fleet, for equipping surface vessels with modern weapons and hardware and for expanding the landing forces." Pointing to foreign press accounts of Chinese flight tests involving F-12A delta-wing fighters and F-12B variable geometry fighter-bombers, the article claimed that "the development of the Chinese Air Force is taking the form of the creation of new types of war-planes and aerial weapons."

Another article by the same writer, published three months earlier outlined the course of the development of China's nuclear missile forces in the 1980s in similarly ominous terms. He identified the priorities of China's developmental efforts as centered on: (1) deploying ICBMs with 13,000 km range; (2) creating MIRVed ICBMs; (3) increasing the survivability of the nuclear missile forces; (4) improving the guidance system and increasing the accuracy of missiles; and (5) equipping the ground forces with tactical nuclear weapons.³¹ The article also expressed concern that Chinese access to advanced Western technology will enable China to make more rapid progress in the development of its nuclear weapons systems.

The tone of the two 1982 Krasnaya Zvezda articles contrasts sharply with a 1981 assessment of China's nuclear missile program by another Kraznaya Zvezda writer.³² While the latter article also expressed concern about the development of China's nuclear

2-3.3 Conventional and Nuclear Threat

Soviet public analysis of Chinese military intentions, which rely on PRC and other foreign press accounts, generally argue that China seeks to become a hegemonist superpower. A Soviet analyst participating in an "International Observers Roundtable" discussion in January 1982 pointed to a People's Daily article, for example, that catalogued Chinese achievements in the production of conventional and nuclear weapons, and concluded that they testify above all, to "the mounting militarist ambitions of the present Beijing rulers."²⁹

Some Soviet writings address the role of the army in China's military strategy in a similar tone, pointing out Chinese preparation for a Sino-Soviet war. An article in Krasnaya Zvezda argued that "the modernization of the PLA is being launched in tandem with the creation of the material prerequisites of military might. That modernization includes equipping the army with new types of combat hardware and weapons, raising the standard of the forces' combat and special training, reviewing military doctrine and restructuring the personnel's ideological conditioning to ensure 'victory against a superior adversary.'"³⁰ As evidence that China's military planning is for conflict with the Soviet Union, Krasnaya Zvezda cited the Chinese Air Force newspaper Kongjun Bao, which, it said, "once demanded in an article that assessments of the combat readiness of divisions and units be primarily guided by the following: 'In a future war, the main target will be the very modern Soviet Armed Forces. Thus, the thrust of strikes should be chosen in the light of the Soviet forces' tactical methods and potential.'"

The same Krasnaya Zvezda article also painted an ominous picture of the development of China's conventional and nuclear weapons. "The nuclear military forces," it stated, "into which, according to foreign press data, the lion's share of military spending is being channeled, are energetically researching the

and the Soviet Union -- e.g., 250 targets, 75% of industry, etc. -- but how many targets need to be attacked in China to assure the same level of destruction?" The retired officer also expressed the concern that while "neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union studies the post-nuclear phase of a general war...the Chinese are studying this, because among Chinese strategists, in closed circles, they think they can tolerate a large number of casualties."

A China specialist at the USA Institute, also interviewed in 1981, disagreed with the hypothesis that China's professed fearlessness about nuclear war might be just another form of deterrence aimed at convincing their stronger adversary that they are not easily intimidated. "The Chinese seem to believe it," he said. "People in the 'East' do not have the same 'humanitarian' view of the value of life as we do. Secondly, the Chinese have consistently made comments suggesting that they do not appreciate the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. For example, Zhou Enlai said to a Soviet diplomat in 1958 during the Taiwan Straits crisis that use of nuclear weapons against Chinese cities would just be like a heavy conventional bombing raid. Also, in 1960, when the U.S. released a report on Bikini Island saying that there were live fish, animals, etc., the Chinese cited the report as proof that there were no long-range effects of the use of nuclear weapons."

The Soviet press has also pointed to Chinese statements as evidence that Beijing's leaders fail to comprehend the dangers of nuclear war. An article in the Defense Ministry's organ Krasnaya Zvezda in January 1981 argued that "the Chinese have historically underestimated the significance of nuclear weapons."²⁷ More than a year later, the same publication cited Chinese historical statements as "designed to mislead the Chinese people about the outcome and possible consequences of nuclear war."²⁸

2-3.2 China Would Welcome Nuclear War

There is a widespread belief among Soviets -- from the general populous to China scholars to the top leadership -- that the Chinese do not fear nuclear war and even plan for the post-nuclear stage of war in which China would emerge as the world's strongest power. This Soviet concern was expressed in an article by I. Aleksandrov, a pseudonym representing the views of the Central Committee of the CPSU, warning the U.S. of Beijing's global intentions. The Aleksandrov article, which appeared shortly after Secretary of State Haig announced in Beijing that the U.S. would allow China to buy U.S. arms, argued that China hoped "to cause a clash between the U.S. and the USSR, in order to dominate the world after a nuclear conflict which, according to its calculations, would reduce America and Europe to ashes while sparing, perhaps, a few dozen -- or a couple of hundred -- millions of Chinese."²⁵ After all, Aleksandrov noted, "there are already twice as many of them as the population of the U.S. and Europe put together." A recent article in Problems of the Far East, echoed Aleksandrov's words, arguing that "...Beijing hopes for a world nuclear catastrophe after which China, it is hoped, would become the world's most powerful state."²⁶

A former military officer at the USA Institute interviewed in 1981, also expressed the view that the Chinese might welcome a nuclear conflict in which China suffered a "few hundred million" casualties while the Soviet Union and the U.S. were destroyed. He explained that: "For the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons are for deterrence. The Soviet Union says it will never use nuclear weapons first. They are for a second-strike -- the other side must know it cannot succeed in attacking the Soviet Union without self-destruction. For China, however, deterrence may be to start a nuclear war." The retired officer proceeded to pose the question: "What is assured destruction of China? Nobody knows. McNamara outlined criteria for assured destruction of the U.S.

impediments to China's realization of this goal: lacking a "developed economic infrastructure, sufficient quantity of skilled personnel and mobile currency and financial reserves," China, "is physically unable to absorb all the technology and equipment which U.S. leading monopolistic groupings intend to market in China..."²³

The China experts interviewed in Moscow in 1981 likewise stressed the limits of the current military modernization program. They pointed to factionalism within the PLA, disagreement among China's leaders over procurement strategy, cutbacks in defense spending and the military's inability to absorb large amounts of foreign technology as serious impediments to any significant progress in China's military modernization efforts in the near future. One sinologist from the ISISS expressed the view that "without Western support, China cannot modernize militarily." He noted the U.S. estimate of \$41 to \$63 billion to supply China with sufficient conventional weaponry to withstand a non-nuclear Soviet attack, and suggested that China could not afford it, nor could the U.S. provide it.

While the majority of Soviet China analysts acknowledge the urgency accorded to improvements in agriculture, industry, and science by Beijing's leaders, and the limitations this imposes on China's military program, a few China specialists echo official Soviet claims that military modernization is China's top priority. A senior China analyst at the USA Institute, Boris Zanegin, argued in the Institute's journal in April 1980 that the primary objective of the Four Modernizations is "the modernization of the Chinese armed forces, which is absorbing the lion's share of the PRC's efforts and meager financial resources."²⁴ The more widely held view among Soviet China experts, however, is that China's military modernization efforts will be seriously hampered in the foreseeable future by limited funds and by the inability to absorb large amounts of foreign military technology, even if it were available.

priority buildup of the military-economic and scientific-technical potentials as an indispensable condition for creating a modern army. All the economic development programs are subordinated to this very aim to a considerable degree."²⁰ Krasnaya Zvezda cited as evidence a Chinese statement that "military modernization is impossible without developing agriculture industry, science and technology" -- a statement generally interpreted in the West as justifying placing priority on economic over defense modernization.

The views of Krasnaya Zvezda have also been expressed in the civilian media. A Pravda commentary in April 1981 by Boris Barakhta, who has consistently presented worst-case assessments of the "China threat," stated that "Beijing hopes to create a modern army with the West's help. That is the purpose of the 'Four Modernizations program.'"²¹ This argument was presented despite the August 1980 announcement that China planned to cut its defense budget by \$2 billion and the additional \$650 million budget cut that was made early 1981.

The day following the publication of that Soviet commentary it was reported that China's National Defense Minister, Geng Biao, had told Japanese officials that the defense modernization program would be given the lowest priority among the Four Modernizations and that it could not be achieved unless the other three modernization programs were carried out successfully.²²

Most Soviet China experts provide a far more realistic assessment of China's military modernization program. While pointing out Beijing's aim of "becoming an aggressive power" and "attaining world domination," China specialists also acknowledge the low priority given to military modernization and the Chinese failure so far to purchase significant amounts of foreign weaponry. A recently published book by Soviet sinologist Yevgeniy Bazhanov, for example, sees Beijing applying "maximum effort" to increasing its military potential, but also notes the

present policy combining the two could lead to economic and political chaos.

Soviet commentators warn of the dangerous consequences of the "petty bourgeois ideas" that "are gaining currency" in China.¹⁸ An analyst at the IEWSS repeated this Soviet concern, adding that "the Chinese themselves are frightened by the way private initiative has swept the country. They don't know how to control it."

Some Soviet analysts argue that the introduction of Western capitalist ideas and methods threatens China's existence as a socialist state. An authoritative article in the Soviet Party journal Kommunist advised that "the further involvement of China in the capitalist economic and political orbit opens China to the capitalists' ideological influence and that in turn threatens to deprive China's development of its socialist perspective."¹⁹ Thus, despite Brezhnev's claim in his speech at Tashkent in March 1982 that the Soviet Union "did not deny" and does "not deny now the existence of a socialist system in China," the Soviets remain uncertain about whether capitalism will ultimately undermine socialism in China.

2-3 China's Military Modernization

2-3.1 Serious Obstacles, Slow Progress

Soviet officials and commentators have been far more alarmist than Soviet analysts in their assessments of China's defense modernization program and the potential impact of the transfer to China of Western arms and military technology. One consistent theme in the Soviet media has been that China's economic modernization effort is aimed almost entirely at creating a base for a massive military buildup. An August 1982 article in the Soviet Defense Ministry Newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda argued that "China's current leaders are insisting on the

Modernizations program would increase the Chinese threat to Soviet security. Soviet China analysts interviewed in Moscow in 1981, however, unanimously expressed the view that political chaos or policy changes resulting from failure of China's modernization efforts could be more dangerous to the Soviet Union. Several of the analysts pointedly noted that their views contrasted sharply with those of Soviet leaders.

One specialist from the Institute of Oriental Studies argued that "A modernized China would not be as dangerous as a barbarian state. This would have to include modernization of their political behavior, culture, ideas, etc., as well as technical modernization, and lead to more sophisticated Chinese leaders. One cannot stop China from becoming rich and strong. We should not erect barriers in the way of Chinese modernization."

An analyst at the IEWSS stated more explicitly the Soviet fear that economic instability in China could prompt a more aggressive foreign policy in Beijing, noting that "hardships often serve as motives for aggression." Another China specialist from the USA Institute echoed this view, arguing that an economically and politically stronger China would be more confident and more willing to ease tensions with the Soviet Union.

2-2.5 China's Future: Socialist or Capitalist?

One potential source of political instability in China pointed to by Soviet sinologists is the long term impact of Western capitalist influence on China. A few Soviet China analysts express the view that China may successfully borrow capitalist methods and encourage Western investment without undermining the socialist structure of the economy and creating a political upheaval. But most Soviet sinologists argue that in the long-run China will reject capitalism and return to a Soviet-style centrally planned economy. They argue capitalism and socialism are fundamentally incompatible and that China's

One Soviet Sinologist from the Institute of Economics in the World Socialist System (IEWSS) expressed the view that "the situation in China is getting better, not worse. Domestic events since 1976 have improved the situation for realizing the Four Modernizations. We should differentiate between the general line, and the specific plans announced by Hua (in 1978). The specific plans of Hua went bankrupt. But the general direction has benefited from that bankruptcy. Every day the plan is made closer to reality and the Chinese understand their difficulties better."

Another Soviet China specialist from the same institute provided a different interpretation of Chinese economic policies. In her view, "the interests of economic reform and of readjustment are on a collision course. Reform called for decentralization; readjustment for centralization. Chinese leaders at the National People's Congress in September (1980) concluded that reform should be speeded up, but in December they decided that readjustment was to be the centerpiece of their policy and activities...This supports the idea that the Chinese leadership is losing control over the political and economic life of the country."

Despite their conflicting views of economic trends in China, most Soviet China scholars agree that the readjustment of China's economic policies is indicative of an attempt by Beijing's leaders to adopt a more realistic and pragmatic approach to the country's economic problems. They do, however, point to major impediments to realization of the Four Modernizations in China. Among the obstacles most frequently raised by Soviet scholars are: lack of leadership competence, corruption, bureaucratic inertia, a poor system of rewards, and public disillusionment following years of intense political campaigns and policy shifts.

The prevailing view in the Soviet Union, which apparently held by many leaders, is that Chinese success in their Four

This optimistic view is argued forcefully by Borisov, a prominent China expert of the Soviet Central Committee. In two books published in 1981 and 1982, Borisov expressed his belief in the inevitability of the downfall of the current Chinese leadership. Pointing to the "laws of social development and the fundamental interests of the Chinese people," Borisov concluded that "sooner or later China will take its place in the fraternal formation of the great socialist community and will again march along the tested road of friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries."¹⁵

2-2.4 Four Modernizations: Uncertain Implications

Although Soviet commentators examine China's economy less frequently than its foreign policies and domestic political situation, Soviet institute scholars are concerned with the possible impact on Sino-Soviet relations of China's economic modernization. In private discussions with China experts in Moscow in February and August 1981, Soviet scholars expressed conflicting views on the Four Modernizations program and on the degree of economic progress achieved by China in recent years. Some regarded recent Chinese experiments with decentralization, new types of incentives and foreign economic zones as positive developments and viewed the cutbacks that characterized the 1980-81 readjustment program as part of a necessary learning process. Others saw these experiments and the resulting retrenchment as reflecting the incompetence of the Chinese leadership and a loss of control over the economic and political welfare of the country.

Soviet uncertainty about the implications of the Four Modernizations was expressed by an important spokesman of Soviet views on China, F. Burlatsky, a year after Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng officially announced the new program in February 1978. According to Burlatsky, the future development of China "is not foreseeable even theoretically."¹⁷

an anti-Soviet orientation in their policies.¹¹ A prominent Soviet commentator, Alexander Bovin, in a detailed examination of the outcome of the 10th Party Congress, concluded that "the unstable equilibrium at the top had been restored...the positions of Zhou Enlai and the 'pragmatists' he represents were preserved, if not strengthened, and finally, Mao Zedong who will be 80 in December retained his unique position as the 'great helmsman' uttering the last decisive word."¹²

Some Soviet China experts argue that for the most part, the healthy forces were removed from influential positions in the Chinese leadership prior to the Cultural Revolution in 1966. M.S. Kapitsa, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's top official for Asia, writing in Problems of the Far East under the pseudonym M.S. Ukraintsev, asserted that "by the late fifties Mao Zedong's group had succeeded in eliminating, compromising or pushing aside many internationalist communists. Those who remained alive, and were, so to speak, on the surface" Kapitsa claimed, "were thrown into correction camps and annihilated during the Cultural Revolution."¹³ While Kapitsa states that all pro-Soviet forces "on the surface" at the outset of the Cultural Revolution were wiped out, he implicitly leaves open the possibility that those groups "under the surface" still remain. Explicit references to the possible existence of healthy forces in China, at least in public statements, have not been made by the Soviets since 1973. But they continue to point to the presence of diverse political groupings that constitute a formidable opposition to China's current leadership.

Although Soviet analysts disagree over whether pro-Soviet forces will re-emerge in China, in the short-run or in the long-run, most scholars are convinced that the return of China to the Soviet path of development under the leadership of such forces is inevitable. Soviet commentators often echo the view expressed by Brezhnev in 1974 that "this dark page in the history of China ...will inevitably be turned by the Chinese people themselves."¹⁴

Party spokesman, N.V. Shishlin, saw Deng Xiaoping as consolidating his position in a "great shakeup of the state and party apparatus."⁹ Shishlin noted that the people who are emerging in the Chinese leadership hierarchy "are all closely linked with Deng Xiaoping and his associates Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang." Shishlin added that the power struggle was continuing, however, and therefore "it is perhaps premature to talk about long-term political stability in China."

2-2.3 Pessimistic But Hopeful About "Healthy Forces"

While domestic political instability in China could have dangerous consequences for the Soviet Union, political unrest could also provide potentially fertile ground for Soviet exploitation. The Soviets continue to watch for the presence of pro-Soviet "healthy forces" in China, although their optimism that such forces exist has waned since the early 1970s following the Lin Biao affair and the 10th CCP Congress.

As late as mid-1971, Soviet sinologists pointed optimistically to the persistence of healthy forces in the Chinese Communist Party that would eventually gain control and steer China's domestic and foreign policies in a pro-Soviet direction. On the 50th Anniversary of the CCP in July 1971, for example, two Soviet scholars writing in the Party Journal Kommunist expressed the view that "the opposition that the Maoists encounter in the implementation of their plans testifies to the unceasing resistance offered by the healthy forces of the CCP. The genuine Chinese Communists find themselves in a grave situation now, but they do exist, and evidently there are a good many of them."¹⁰

Many analysts point to the 10th CCP Congress, held in August 1973, as marking the end of a definite stage in the struggle between the various factions in the party hierarchy. The victors in this struggle, according to one analyst, "were the murkiest forces of Chinese social chauvinism" who had explicitly assumed

2-2.2 Fear of Instability

Soviet leaders and analysts watch Chinese domestic politics not only for signs of "positive changes" that could lead to changes in China's foreign policy, but also for indications of political instability that could have unpredictable and dangerous consequences. Soviet analysts follow closely China's "power struggle" as reflected in leadership changes, party congresses and plenary sessions. After the June 1981 6th Party Plenum, L. Zamyatin, Chief of the Central Committee's Information Department, argued that the meeting had achieved only a temporary compromise and did "not signify a weakening of the systematic interfactional struggle in the Chinese leadership..."⁷

More apocalyptic conclusions were drawn in a Soviet radio commentary on the 6th Plenum, which argued it showed that "there is a continuing power struggle in the Beijing leadership."⁸ The commentator argued that "the power struggle in China has had a damaging effect on the internal situation in the country. There is neither stability nor unity in China, though the Beijing leaders claim otherwise. The unstable internal political situation in China," the commentary warned, "could lead to zig-zags in Beijing's foreign policy which justifies military methods, including a world war nuclear war, in order to attain the hegemonistic objectives of China's rulers." Soviet concern about Chinese instability and its military implications was reflected in an August 1981 interview in Moscow with a prominent sinologist who commented "imagine the danger of China with nuclear weapons and conflicting groups within the military holding these weapons."

While Soviet commentators rarely discuss the implications of Chinese political instability in such dramatic terms, they continue to perceive signs of both positive and negative changes in China's domestic politics. By the spring of 1982, an important

ing that Chinese leaders have criticized Mao, Kommunist argued that Mao's "basic ideas and tenets are still counted as the quintessence of the wisdom of the party and they continue to be the party's basic ideological and political platform."² An unattributed Pravda article in the same period echoed this theme, saying that China was experiencing a "profound crisis," and that a way out of the situation "is possible only on the basis of the surmounting of the Maoist heritage."³

Other commentaries, however, saw some positive if uncertain signs emanating from China. An important Soviet analyst, Fyodor Burlatsky, former head of an advisory group to the Central Committee, noted that "unsuccessful guidelines are being revised and a quest is underway for more effective economic and social development" in China, although "there is still a long way to go before genuine stabilization" is achieved.⁴

Another influential Soviet analyst, V.A. Krivtsov, saw positive developments in China that would inevitably affect foreign policy. In an April 1982 interview with the major Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun, the deputy director of the Far East Institute said: "in domestic politics, a positive change has begun to take place, particularly in the economic field. However, in the field of foreign relations negative aspects still remain from the viewpoint of our country. This condition, positive in domestic politics but negative in diplomacy, will not last long. A change in domestic politics will unfailingly affect diplomacy as well."⁵ In contrast with Krivtsov's optimistic viewpoint that a change in China's foreign policy is inevitable, Burlatsky expressed frustration that no changes had as yet taken place. Burlatsky noted that China's policy toward the Soviet Union has remained confrontational even though it emerged under completely different conditions and under the influence of motives rejected by China's current leaders themselves."⁶

weapons capability and its implications for the Soviet Union, it explicitly stated that the Chinese nuclear missile potential "should not be exaggerated." The 1981 article further noted that China's nuclear weapons program "is mainly in the initial, experimental stage of development and although developing intercontinental nuclear forces, they are as yet limited and are a source of anxiety mainly to neighboring Asian states."

2-3.4 Fear of Post-nuclear Attack

Soviet China experts, at least in private discussions, acknowledge the lack of evidence of rapid progress in China's nuclear program, including the slow development and deployment of an ICBM. In interviews conducted in early 1981, Soviet analysts generally described the Chinese as uncertain about the direction of their nuclear program. One military strategist at the USA Institute expressed greater concern about the Chinese army than about Chinese nuclear arms. He pointed to Soviet need to worry about Chinese ground forces, "particularly in the post-nuclear phase of war."

While Soviet China scholars do not predict a major improvement in China's nuclear capabilities in the short-run, they apparently do not think the Soviet Union can be assured of preempting China's nuclear arsenal. A retired colonel and China expert at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies said: "China's nuclear force now represents a credible second strike deterrent. It cannot be preempted." Another military strategist at the USA Institute said, however: "We don't fear China's nuclear capability until the end of the century."

The Soviets nevertheless must take account of the "China threat" in their military planning. An important China expert at the USA Institute interviewed in August 1981 frankly stated: "China is an important factor in Soviet military planning, although only for the more extreme, worst case scenarios. China

commands a large number of Soviet ICBMs as well as TNF, and the Soviet Union must worry about the post-nuclear capacity of China. The Soviet Union must have a reserve for dealing with China in a general war."

2.4 U.S.-Chinese Military Ties

In mid-1981, Soviet perceptions of the Sino-American relationship shifted dramatically. Moscow had not changed its assessment that U.S.-Chinese military and strategic ties posed a grave potential threat to Soviet security. But the Soviets had gained new confidence that differences between Washington and Beijing would strictly limit the development of Sino-American defense ties in the foreseeable future. Following the indefinite postponement of a trip to Washington by China's Deputy Defense Minister to discuss arms purchases -- originally scheduled for August 1981 -- Soviet commentaries and other writings and statements reflected a far more relaxed view of the Sino-American threat than at any time during the previous four years.

2-4.1 Fears of Sino-American Collusion

From the beginning of the Sino-American rapprochement in 1971-72, the Soviet leadership feared it would lead to U.S.-Chinese military collusion against the Soviet Union. Even before the idea was considered within the U.S. Government, the Soviets were warning Washington of grave consequences if the U.S. armed China. In his memoirs, Years of Upheaval, Henry Kissinger recounts a private discussion with Brezhnev in May 1973 in which the Soviet leader first appealed for U.S. acquiescence to a Soviet attack on China and then warned Kissinger that any U.S. military assistance to the Chinese would lead to a U.S.-Soviet war.³³

By spring 1978, the Soviets' worst nightmare of Sino-American collusion against them seemed to be coming true. They

perceived the visit to Beijing of President Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in May 1978 as resulting in an agreement by the U.S. and China to forge a strategic, anti-Soviet relationship, which would ultimately include the sale of U.S. arms to China. Soviet apprehensions were expressed by President Brezhnev personally, who charged on June 25 that "recently attempts have been made in the U.S. at a high level, and in quite cynical form, to play the China card against the USSR." The Soviet leader called the policy "short-sighted and dangerous," and warned that "its authors may bitterly regret it."

Brief periods of diminished Soviet concern followed the initial expression of alarm by Brezhnev, but further steps in strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing -- such as Secretary of Defense Brown's trip to Beijing in January 1980 -- continued to heighten Soviet fears of the threat to their security posed by the nascent U.S.-China alliance. By mid-1980 Soviet statements indicated that Moscow viewed the Sino-American relationship as shifting the global "correlation of forces" against the Soviet Union.

An article entitled "Dangerous Partnership" in the Party theoretical journal Kommunist in July 1980 warned of the "dangerous new phenomenon in world politics" created by the "actual alliance which is now taking shape between China and imperialism."³⁴ The deepening of cooperation among China, Japan and the United States, "is causing anxiety everywhere," Kommunist proclaimed, noting that "similar alliances preceded the most sanguinary war in history -- the second world war." Kommunist charged the U.S. with seeking to exacerbate the Soviet defense burden and attempting to undermine the Soviet and East European economies. Pointing to the critical role played by China in determining the success or failure of U.S. strategy, the Party journal acknowledged that "if China with its huge manpower potential and substantial political weight goes over to the side of imperialism, this will increase imperialism's position in the

confrontation with world socialism." Noting that the "negative influence of Chinese policies on the international situation is growing" and that Chinese policies have "adversely influenced the international relationship of forces," Kommunist warned that the Soviet Union will answer the challenge: "All this calls for increased vigilance, for reinforcing policy countermeasures and financial expenditures, including defense."

A similarly sharp Soviet reaction followed Secretary of State Alexander Haig's trip to Beijing in mid-June 1981. An I. Aleksandrov article in Pravda June 27, 1981 charged that Reagan had gone much farther than the Carter administration by his decision to sell lethal arms to China.³⁵ "What we are clearly confronted with is a new and highly dangerous stage in the development of the Chinese-American partnership" the article asserted. "These actions by Washington and Beijing" the authoritative statement warned, "cannot be seen as other than hostile to our country...The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the dangerous new turn taken by Sino-American relations." Despite the warning, however, the Aleksandrov article made no specific threats, calling only for "vigilance and a resolute rebuff from all peoples..."

Heightened Soviet concern in response to the "new stage" in Sino-American military ties was reflected in a spate of articles and comments in the Soviet media immediately after Haig's trip to Beijing:

- "The extraordinary scope and scale of this co-operation leads to the thought that what is being discussed is precisely the establishment of an alliance, although it is not being called this." (N.V. Shishlin, Head of the Consultants Group of the Central Committee International Department.)³⁶

- "There can be no doubt that during the Haig trip to Beijing a new desire was manifested by Washington to tie China even more closely to its strategy of militaristic preparations on a world-wide scale. No secret is being made in U.S. ruling circles that Washington would like to see Beijing as a reliable military ally." (Andrianov, all-union radio Commentator.)³⁷
- "...the U.S. decision to supply China with arms, including offensive weapons, and to establish military cooperation between the two countries appears exceptionally dangerous and short sighted...The U.S. has taken the path of arming China, which is fraught with very serious consequences for the general situation in the region as well as the world."³⁸ (Commentator, Moscow Domestic Service.)
- "If it [the U.S.] begins to arm China, as President Reagan said, it is taking on a great responsibility for the development of events in this region. This is fraught with the most serious consequences for the general situation in the world." (Zamyatin, Deputy-Director, Information Department, CPSU Central Committee.)³⁹
- "...obviously now is a new, extremely dangerous stage in the development of the American-Chinese partnership, primarily in the expansion of its military aspects." (N. Pakhomov, Tass Commentator.)⁴⁰
- "It is obvious that the acquisition of new U.S.-made weapons by China may lead to a change in the correlation of military forces in the region..." The Haig trip marks the "forging of the U.S.-Chinese military axis..." (Kharkov, Tass Commentator.)⁴¹

The statements of alarm and the ominous warnings emanating from Moscow in the wake of Haig's Beijing visit subsided quickly. By the fall of 1981, Soviet analysts and commentators were pointing to the "serious contradictions" emerging between Washington and Beijing, and were increasingly hopeful that Sino-U.S. relations would deteriorate further. They noted the U.S. failure to transfer arms or significant military-related technology to China, and suggested that some Americans had become disillusioned by Beijing's desultory military modernization effort as shown by the Chinese leadership's decision to cut the defense budget for a second time. The Soviets also perceived a growing dispute between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, which they saw as sowing the seeds of mutual suspicion which would damage the entire Sino-American relationship.

2-4.2 Contradictions Undermine the Alliance

Prior to mid-1981, Soviet analysts and commentators consistently argued -- even at times of heightened concern about U.S.-Chinese anti-Soviet collusion -- that the Sino-American relationship was fraught with contradictions that would inevitably come to the fore. These contradictions were usually portrayed in the most general terms as inevitably conflicting regional and global aims. But the developments in U.S.-Chinese strategic relations since 1978 had led the Soviets to view those latent conflicts as pushed into the background. Boris Zanegin, commenting on one of the most worrisome developments in U.S.-China relations, Secretary of Defense Brown's visit to Beijing in January 1980, noted that the potential conflicts between Chinese and U.S. security interests in Asia have "receded" for the time being "in the face of the common desire of the Carter administration and the Maoist leadership to put an end to detente..."⁴² Only a little over a year later, however, after the inauguration of the new U.S. President, Zanegin and his colleague at the USA Institute, V.P. Lukin, expressed uncertainty about future course of Sino-American security ties. They argued that the Reagan

administration's China policy, "the extent of its similarities to, and differences from" Carter's policy, had not yet become apparent."⁴³ The two analysts outlined three stages in the development of Sino-American relations since the 1971 rapprochement, describing the third stage as characterized by a shift in U.S. China policy "from normalization to the development of relations of the coalition type, against the interests of third countries."

By February 1982, Lukin had concluded that Reagan was not following the course set by his predecessor. Lukin asserted in a "Dialogue" in Literaturnaya Gazeta that a fourth stage in Sino-U.S. relations had begun under the new President.⁴⁴ He drew a parallel with the second stage, from early 1974 to late 1977, in which "a period of fluctuations ensued," and said the fourth stage was characterized by "signs of complications, uncertainty and later tension" between Beijing and Washington. Alexander Bovin, the other participant in the dialogue, agreed with Lukin's assessment, adding that these contradictions "cannot fail to cause major jolts to the entire system of Sino-U.S. relations."⁴⁵ Lukin argued further that "Washington does not so much want alliance with the PRC and the promotion of that country's military strengthening as to demonstrate loudly the possibility of all this in order to 'intimidate' the Soviet Union."

By 1982 the Soviets perceived the trends as reversed: the conflicts between the U.S. and China that had been overshadowed by efforts to build a strategic relationship, were now emerging as the dominant factor in Sino-American relations.

Soviet analysts identified serious conflicts between the U.S. and China over Taiwan combined with growing doubts in Washington and Beijing about each others' policies. Besides pointing to the Reagan administration's desire to continue selling arms to Taiwan over Beijing's protest that to do so would violate its sovereignty over the island, Soviet analysts noted

continuing debates in the U.S. over China policy. A USA journal article published in June 1982 argued that the realization in Washington that the cost of modernizing the PLA would be exorbitant had raised doubts about China's usefulness in countering Soviet power.⁴⁶ The same article pointed to "growing misgivings" in the U.S. about "the unpredictable nature of China's attitude toward the USA at a stage when it will move on to independent production of modern weapons."

Soviet analysts also noted that Beijing had begun to re-evaluate its relationship with Washington. M.S. Kapitsa, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's top official for Asia, noted that China's expectations for U.S. assistance in their modernization program had remained unfulfilled.⁴⁷ A Tass commentary asserted that Chinese leaders were questioning the benefits for China of a strategic partnership with Washington because it has "eroded China's prestige in developing countries."⁴⁸ Izvestiya commentator Bovin pointed to Beijing's repeated efforts to "impress upon the Americans that the U.S. cannot oppose the Soviet Union alone and that by 'offending' small countries and many other countries the U.S. is isolating itself and thereby weakening its position in the struggle against the USSR." Bovin noted these efforts had been in vain despite China's offer of "constant help and support" in "exerting pressure on the Soviet Union" once the U.S. renounced its hold on Taiwan.⁴⁹

The Soviets continued to note China's increasing criticism of U.S. policy. By early August 1982, a Moscow commentator was able to point to a Renmin Ribao article whose main point "is not the worn-out cliché of Beijing's anti-Sovietism, but the sharp criticism directed at the entire foreign policy of the Reagan administration."⁵⁰

2-4.3 Conflicting Motivations in Forging Strategic Ties

The Soviets see U.S. and Chinese purposes in entering into a strategic alignment as different and sometimes conflicting. The

most authoritative Soviet statements have consistently charged that China seeks to provoke a military confrontation, even a nuclear war, between the United States and the Soviet Union. An I. Aleksandrov article published in May 1982 argued that Beijing's leaders aimed to exploit "international tension and contradictions between the USSR and the USA" and push Washington into "confrontation" with Moscow, adding "everyone understands to what irreparable consequences it may lead in the age of nuclear missiles."⁵¹ In a somewhat contradictory argument, the Aleksandrov article, which represents the views of the Soviet leadership, accused the "imperialists" of trying to "bleed white the socialist states," including China, "by dragging them into confrontation, into the arms race."

The theme of China and the United States each seeking to push the other into confrontation with the Soviet Union had been expressed in an unprecedentedly alarmist article in the Party journal Kommunist two years earlier. The July 1980 article, entitled "Dangerous Partnership," warned its readers that "while the U.S. ruling circles seek to use China in their confrontation with the USSR, Peking pursues the aim of pushing the United States to a nuclear war against the USSR, while remaining on the sidelines."

While the Soviets frequently accuse the United States of using China to shift the "correlation of forces" against the Soviet Union, they focus primarily on China's alleged desire to provoke a global war. The Foreign Ministry's M.S. Kapitsa, charged in June 1982 that the Chinese have sought for twenty-five years to push the Soviet Union and the United States into a nuclear conflict.⁵² Kapitsa recalled Mao Zedong's alleged attempts to convince the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear attack on the U.S. between 1957-59 and charged Mao and his supporters with trying "in every way to set the USSR against the United States and cause a 'fight between two tigers' while the 'wise monkey' (China) would sit on a hill and watch their fight."

Having failed to persuade Soviet leaders to initiate the conflict desired by Beijing, Kapitsa claimed, Chinese leaders adopted a new strategy, and since then have been "persistently trying to push the United States into a war against the Soviet Union."

Soviet statements and commentaries also point to China's modernization goals to explain Beijing's anti-Soviet policy. The May 1982 Aleksandrov article argued that "under the promissory note of anti-Sovietism" China seeks to secure increased investment in the "modernization and militarization" of its economy. A Tass commentary in 1980 linked the "militarization" theme to China's ties with the U.S. Referring to Beijing's hopes for more aid from the West for "rapid modernization of the Chinese army and its war preparations," Tass noted that China's "close bonds" with Washington were also part of a strategy to deal with its enemies "one by one" while ruling out the "possibility of fighting on two fronts."⁵³

The primary U.S. goal in establishing military ties with China, according to Soviet analysts and commentators, is to regain political and strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Yevgeniy Bazhanov, a Soviet Foreign Ministry specialist on U.S.-China relations, noted this in his 1982 book Motive Forces of U.S. Policy Toward China. Bazhanov charged the U.S. with aiming "to harness Chinese nationalism" and direct "its destructive potential against the world of socialism in order to help the West regain its lost political and strategic superiority." Kommunist, in the article entitled "Dangerous Partnership," cited Defense Secretary Harold Brown as saying in Beijing in January 1980 that "it is extremely important for the United States to see China pin down as many Soviet forces as possible." Kommunist also charged the U.S. as well as China with seeking to change the balance of forces in the world against the Soviet Union by "confronting the USSR and its allies with a danger of a two-front battle."

Soviet China experts privately made similar arguments in discussions conducted in Moscow in February and August 1981. One USA Institute analyst said that "Sino-American security ties are intended as offensive pressure on the Soviet Union -- an attempt to overburden the Soviet Union so it will make more concessions." A retired military officer at the Institute remarked that "some people in the U.S. want the Soviet Union to be always on the alert over China -- troops, money, etc. -- and distracted from Europe and the U.S." At the same time, he said, the U.S. "is really trying to direct Chinese interests in the territorial and military sense toward the Soviet Union." A third analyst at the USA Institute, a prominent expert on Sino-American relations, said: "We do not believe the statements about the stabilizing effect of arming China. U.S. officials say Sino-American relations are not aimed against the Soviet Union, but this is a smokescreen for improving the anti-Soviet position of the United States."

USA Institute specialists, in their writings for the Institute's journal USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, also stress that geopolitical and strategic interests are the primary factors that motivated U.S. leaders to establish ties with China. Boris Zanegin wrote in mid-1980 that the "U.S. is trying to gain assistance from the Beijing regime to strengthen the strategic positions of American imperialism in the Southwestern part of the Asian continent."⁵⁴ In another article published a year later, Zanegin and his colleague Vladamir Lukin said that the United States is seeking to "use the anti-Sovietism of the Chinese leadership in the U.S. interest."⁵⁵ "In connection with this," Zanegin and Lukin argued, "American politicians from various camps view the normalization of relations with the PRC as a way of preventing the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations."

Both Zanegin and Lukin have repeatedly pointed to what they regard as the triangular context of U.S. policy. In an assessment of Vice President Mondale's trip to China in August 1979,

Zanegin noted that Mondale's trip had been "timed to coincide with the Soviet and Chinese Governments' agreement to begin talks in Moscow to discuss normalization of relations." Lukin argued that the pending Sino-Soviet talks had "served as another pretext for pressure in the United States in favor of forming 'quasi-allied relations' with the PRC."⁵⁶

Zanegin's and Lukin's writings also point to U.S. hopes to establish a pro-American faction in power in Beijing. "Normal relations with the PRC," they wrote in mid-1981, "including the offer of certain political and economic privileges to Beijing, is intended to keep China "among the foreign policy reserves of the United States." This echoes a theme addressed by Zanegin in an article a year earlier in which he noted that China's leaders "extreme interest" in American assistance for their military modernization plans, "makes the present time the most convenient" for manipulating Beijing's foreign policy."⁵⁷

2-4.4 Strategic Threat: The Official View

Official Soviet statements and commentaries outline a range of serious threats to the Soviet Union, its allies and other states posed by Sino-U.S. strategic and military cooperation. While many of these assessments are for internal or external propaganda purposes, they nevertheless suggest the Soviets perceived potential nuclear and conventional military threats as well as strategic encirclement presented by Sino-American military ties. At the same time, the Soviets are concerned with carefully assessing the likelihood of their worst fears about U.S.-China defense ties being realized. Soviet experts on China and Sino-American relations have focused on assessing both the pace of development and the potential impact of such defense cooperation. These analysts generally share the view that U.S.-Chinese military relations are not likely to soon lead to a shift in the Sino-Soviet military balance. But they do see dangers for the Soviet Union in bilateral military ties and

global strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing. They also point to contradictions between the U.S. and China that may limit Sino-American cooperation.

The depth of Soviet concern about the possibility of U.S. aid to China's nuclear program, is demonstrated in the frequently cited remarks attributed to President Brezhnev. In January 1980, the Soviet leader reportedly told Jacques Chaban-Delmas, head of the French National Assembly, that the Soviet Union "would not tolerate" the nuclear arming of China. It would lead, he was said to have warned, to a Soviet nuclear attack on China, which would give American leaders "only minutes to decide their options." According to the report, Brezhnev pounded his desk several times and declared: "Believe me, after the destruction of Chinese nuclear sites by our missiles, there won't be much time for the Americans to choose between the defense of their Chinese allies and peaceful coexistence with us."⁵⁸

The Soviets have expressed heightened concern about China's nuclear program since the successful testing of China's CSS-X-4 ICBM in mid-1980. A small book, China and the Arms Race, edited by Boris Zanegin of the USA Institute, charged the Chinese leaders with seeking to "upset the existing nuclear parity between the world's two social systems which provides the foundation for the process of detente."⁵⁹ "By upsetting parity," China and the Arms Race claimed, the Chinese leaders "want to acquire an effective means of influencing the international situation. Without an arsenal of such weapons, Beijing's ability to exert 'power' pressure is believed to remain at a regional level, restrained by the radius of operation of land and naval forces equipped with conventional weapons." The Chinese regard "the possession of nuclear weapons as the decisive political and military factor as well as a factor of prestige," the book alleged, and for this reason, "rapid development of nuclear-missile weapons is the centerpiece of the modernization program of the Chinese armed forces."

Such allegations about China's potential uses of nuclear weapons are part of the Soviets' anti-China propaganda campaign. But they may nevertheless reflect Soviet fears that China's access to advanced Western technology will provide a major boost to the Chinese nuclear weapons program -- even without an intentional Western effort to build up China's nuclear weapons capabilities. China and the Arms Race argues that advanced technology now being transferred to China as well as Western technological assistance and training, will open up "a real prospect" for the Chinese to "drastically slash time needed to acquire a substantial arsenal of strategic offensive weapons" that will become a "global strategic factor." Citing an article from Armed Forces Journal⁶⁰ as evidence, the book claims that by the late 1980s, China may be in a position to "replace the existing scanty, vulnerable and ineffective systems of nuclear missiles with solid-propellant ballistic missiles complete with multiple warheads, and effective targeting systems and other important components of up-to-date strategic weapons..." In an article in USA published the same year, Zanegin referred again to Armed Forces Journal "forecasts" that technology transfer from the West will enable the Chinese by the end of the 1980s to deploy "a new generation of effective offensive strategic weapons numbering in the thousands."⁶¹ A Soviet military writer even suggested that "some people in Washington" are proposing to place U.S. theater nuclear weapons in China as well as in Western Europe.⁶²

Soviet concern about such technology transfer with nuclear applications may be reflected in a Soviet commentary broadcast to Asia on May 28, 1982 that condemned a Japanese sale of an Hitachi M-180 computer as "the transfer of military technology" to China. The commentary said that the sale would undermine Soviet-Japanese relations, charging that it "undermines the foundations of security in the Far East."⁶³ The Soviets first expressed concern about the nuclear weapons development applications of powerful, advanced computers, in response to the Ford administration decision in October 1976 to sell China two Control Data Cyber 72 com-

Chinese Foreign Ministry officials and with a Vice Foreign Minister. Another top Soviet sinologist, Sergey Tikhvinsky, Deputy Director of the Institute of the Far East, visited China for unofficial discussions in January 1982.⁹⁰ Kapitsa again visited China in May 1982, for further "unofficial" discussion with Chinese officials. In August, Foreign Ministry official Yu Hongliang met in Moscow with Kapitsa, his Soviet counterpart, while purportedly on a routine inspection tour of China's embassy.⁹¹

Kapitsa returned to Beijing just as the Soviet leadership published in Pravda an authoritative statement on Soviet perceptions of China and Sino-Soviet relations. The May 19 statement under the pseudonym I. Aleksandrov, rejected Beijing's demands for "practical deeds" as "obviously unacceptable preliminary conditions," and viewed them as "deliberate unwillingness to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations."⁹² The article made explicit the significance of the Tashkent overture, saying that Brezhnev's speech "plays a special role" in Soviet efforts to normalize relations with China. "The new Soviet initiatives contained in that speech," the article said, "are the direct extension and further development" of earlier Soviet proposals for improving relations. The Aleksandrov article called for "detente" between the Soviet Union and China, and stated: "It is our profound belief that there exists a real possibility for improving Soviet-Chinese relations." The "best possible way" to normalize relations, the article said, would be to achieve a "settlement of political problems." But the authoritative Soviet statement also said Moscow was willing to reach agreement on "any measures acceptable to both sides" in any sphere -- including economic, scientific, cultural, and political -- to "the extent to which both sides are prepared to take some concrete steps."

The Aleksandrov article indicated the strategic importance Moscow attached to improving relations with Beijing by acknowledging that China's foreign policy "does damage to the Soviet

positive public reaction from Beijing. The Chinese repeated their response to previous Soviet offers, saying that Moscow would be judged by its deeds rather than its words.⁸⁰ But the Soviets did not perceive this as a final or definitive Chinese position. Rather, they looked to the increased contacts between Moscow and Beijing as a possible sign of China's willingness to reopen talks on improving relations, which had been suspended in January 1980 by the Chinese following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These limited but significant contacts included: an unofficial three month visit to Moscow in early 1982 by three top Chinese economists to study the Soviet economic situation, the first such contact in nearly two decades⁸¹; a railway container agreement reached by early 1982 providing for Chinese transshipment of goods to Eastern Europe and Iran via the Soviet Union, and Soviet transport of materials via China to third countries, clearly including Vietnam⁸²; the participation of Chinese gymnasts in an obscure international tournament held in Moscow in early 1982,⁸³ reciprocated by Soviet participation in a track and field competition in Beijing in June⁸⁴; the resumption of local Sino-Soviet border trade in 1982, along with a 45% increase in Sino-Soviet trade over 1981⁸⁵ and a Chinese proposal to double the trade⁸⁶; an agreement for Soviet students to attend Beijing's Foreign Language Institute for the first time since the Cultural Revolution⁸²; and both the Chinese and Soviet media reporting on warm reminiscences by their citizens visiting each other's country.⁸⁸

2-5.3 Small-Step Diplomacy

Along with these and other positive developments in Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviets had direct, though "unofficial," contacts with the Chinese about resuming talks on improving relations. M.S. Kapitsa, one of the top Soviet Foreign Ministry official who is also head of the Asia Department and a leading sinologist, visited Beijing twice in 1981.⁸⁹ He ostensibly visited the Soviet ambassador, but also met with mid-level

that the conflict over Taiwan would continue to divide the U.S. and China and provide an opening for improvements in Sino-Soviet relations. At the end of 1981, Izvestiya political observer Aleksander Bovin examined Sino-American contradictions and concluded that "a rather obvious hitch" had developed in Sino-American relations. While Bovin said the U.S. might "make some tactical concessions" to prevent further deterioration of relations, he argued that "it is clear that the Taiwan problem will long continue to be a stumbling block in U.S.-Chinese relations."⁷⁹

Three months later, in a speech at Tashkent, Soviet President Brezhnev made a new overture to Chinese leaders for talks aimed at normalizing relations. In an apparent attempt to capitalize on U.S.-Chinese differences over Taiwan, the Soviet leader affirmed Soviet recognition of PRC sovereignty over the island and pointedly noted "we have never supported and do not now support in any form the so-called concept of two China's." In his March 24 speech, Brezhnev repeated the Soviet position that Moscow had no territorial claims on China and was ready to resume border negotiations. He also explicitly stated Soviet willingness "to come to terms without any preliminary conditions on measures to improve Soviet-Chinese relations."

Brezhnev indicated a more hopeful Soviet perception of the direction of Chinese internal policies. In his 26th Party Congress speech, Brezhnev had said that over the past two decades China had distorted "the principles and essence of socialism." But at Tashkent he softened his criticism, saying only that many aspects of Chinese policy, especially foreign policy, were "at variance with socialist principles and standards." More significantly, Brezhnev added: "we have not denied, and do not deny now, the existence of a socialist system in China."

Despite the more conciliatory and positive tone of Brezhnev's remarks at Tashkent, his overture failed to elicit a

actively oppose China's plans. Brezhnev rather adopted a wait-and-see approach, commenting that "changes are now taking place in China's domestic policies. Time will yet show their true essence. Time will show to what extent the present Chinese leadership will find it possible to overcome the Maoist legacy." Brezhnev also failed to explicitly mention the prior conditions he had placed on improvements in Sino-Soviet relations at the 25th Party Congress, noting only that "we are following the course determined by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses" and "we would like to construct ties with it (China) on a good-neighborly basis."

An analysis of the decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU by Fyodor Burlatsky published in Literaturnaya Gazeta in March 1981, reiterated many of the key points in Brezhnev's speech and went one step further. Burlatsky suggested that the Soviet Union does not oppose China's domestic policies and is willing to tolerate Beijing's ties with Washington. Posing the question, "What does China want?," Burlatsky responded, "to get aid from the West, even if this involves a risk of increasing the country's dependence on the West? No one is stopping it." He also addressed China's desire to continue conducting experiments in its domestic policy, stating "Nobody objects to this either." Why then, Burlatsky queried, is it necessary for Beijing "to continue a policy of confrontation with the USSR, which," he argued, "arose under completely different conditions and under the influence of motives rejected by China's current leaders themselves."⁷⁸

2-5.2 New Opportunities in Sino-U.S. Differences

In the first year of the Reagan administration, the Soviets continued to be concerned about U.S. military ties with China, especially following Secretary of State Haig's announcement in Beijing, June 6, 1981, that the United States would be willing to consider selling arms to the Chinese. But they also were hopeful

placed prior conditions on improved Sino-Soviet relations: "if Peking returns to a policy truly based on Marxism-Leninism, if it abandons its hostile policy toward the socialist countries and takes the road of cooperation and solidarity with the socialist world, there will be an appropriate response from our side and opportunities will open for developing good relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China consonant with the principles of socialist internationalism."

In the intervening five years before the opening of the 26th Party Congress in February 1981, Soviet optimism about China's return to the socialist camp declined even further as the Soviets witnessed the failure of China's post-Mao leadership to abandon Mao's anti-Soviet foreign policy. But the Soviet's worst fears about the implications of the Sino-American strategic relationship forged in 1978 were not realized as U.S.-Chinese military ties moved forward only slowly. By 1981, the Soviets perceived new strains developing in relations between Washington and Beijing over the Taiwan issue, increasing Soviet hopes that China was not moving inevitably toward a closer and closer alliance with the United States and the West.

In contrast with his comments at the 25th Party Congress, Brezhnev's remarks on China at the 26th Congress contained less ideological rhetoric and were devoid of the acrimonious denunciations of Beijing's policies. In his 1976 statement, Brezhnev had accused the Chinese of making "frantic attempts to torpedo detente, to obstruct disarmament, to breed suspicion and hostility between states" and "to provoke a world war and reap whatever advantages may accrue." But in 1981, the Soviet President only criticized China's foreign policy as "directed at aggravating the international situation." Referring to China's assessment of the Cultural Revolution as a period marked by "the cruelest feudal-fascist dictatorship," Brezhnev remarked only that "we have nothing to add to an evaluation of this kind. He also dropped his earlier pledge that the Soviet Union would

particular. In private discussions in Moscow, China experts consistently rejected the view that Brezhnev's statements on China and Sino-Soviet relations made in his Party Congress reports are intended solely for propaganda purposes. Brezhnev's reports to the 24th (1971), 25th (1976) and 26th (1981) Congresses, they insisted, reflect official thinking about China at the highest level of the state and Party, and are major statements of Soviet policy toward Beijing.

A comparison of Brezhnev's Party Congress reports in the past decade reveals changing Soviet perceptions of internal developments in China and continued Soviet uncertainty regarding the future of Sino-Soviet relations. The Sino-Soviet hostility of the early 1960s had erupted into border clashes in 1969. But the opening of the 24th Party Congress in 1971 followed a period of eased Soviet-Chinese tension that was characterized by the initiation of border talks, the exchange of Ambassadors, the signing of a trade agreement and a meeting between the Soviet and Chinese premiers. Pointing to these developments in his remarks to the Congress, Brezhnev claimed to see the "signs of a certain normalization in relations" and promised that Moscow was "prepared in every way to further not only the normalization of relations but also the restoration of friendship..." and expressed "the conviction that this will ultimately be achieved."

Brezhnev's optimism of early 1971 was soon dampened by China's rapprochement with the U.S. and by Lin Biao's death later that year. The "Maoist victory" in the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 dashed Soviet hopes for internal changes in China, and by early 1976, China's anti-Soviet course seemed more certain. In his speech to the 25th Party Congress in February of that year, Brezhnev pledged to wage a "principled and uncompromising struggle" to rebuff Beijing's inflammatory policy. While expressing Soviet willingness to "normalize relations with China in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence," Brezhnev dropped any reference to "restoration of friendship" and

In an Izvestiya article, Bovin points to the suspicions both sides harbor of the other's intentions.⁷⁷ "Whatever tricks Reagan may play, America will be forced to return to the path of detente, dialogue and agreements with the Soviet Union," Bovin asserts. "And the Chinese, for as long as they remain in the anti-Soviet trap of their own making, cannot but regard this with extreme suspicion and concern." On the other hand, Bovin pointedly notes, "while the Americans frighten themselves with the 'Soviet threat' they will be pursued by the nightmare of the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations which also does not help increase mutual trust."

2-5 Sino-Soviet Relations

A few Soviet sinologists are optimistic that China will return to the "true path of socialist development" and a close relationship with the Soviet Union. But most Soviet China experts and, more importantly, the top leadership, seem to have become increasingly pessimistic over the last decade about the possibility of China returning to the Soviet-led "socialist camp" in the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, the Soviets have become more hopeful about the prospects for improved Sino-Soviet relations, even if improvements are limited to economic and cultural ties and occur only in very small steps. Soviet optimism increased in 1982 as Sino-American relations deteriorated and Beijing made a few positive gestures toward Moscow. Nevertheless, the Soviets remain uncertain about the meaning of these recent Chinese gestures, and about the implications for China's strategic aims and its ties with the United States of any improvements in Sino-Soviet relations.

2-5.1 Evolving Leadership Perceptions

In explaining the evolution of Soviet views on Sino-Soviet relations, Soviet analysts point to official government and Party statements in general, and President Brezhnev's speeches in

may inhibit U.S. willingness to expand its strategic relationship with China. In Bazhanov's view, "Americans lack confidence in the stability of the present political and economic course of the PRC." Pointing to the dramatic turnabouts that have characterized recent Chinese history, Bazhanov reminds his readers that "the Chinese betrayed friends and allies," and turned them into "rivals and even enemies." In the dialogue with Lukin, Bovin stressed that the Chinese are unpredictable, and noted that they could act contrary to U.S. interests. Recalling China's "punitive" attack on Vietnam in February 1979, Bovin asserted that although it did not contradict U.S. interests, "the Americans were still nervous. After all, events had obviously gotten out of control. And it could happen again."

Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute, argues that China will prove to be an unpredictable and unreliable partner for the U.S. In an assessment of U.S. foreign policy in the Institute's journal in mid-1980, Arbatov wrote that "China with its plans will hardly 'fit' the new American political schemes, schemes of heightened risk and military conflict brinkmanship which, naturally, demand increased confidence in the ability to control events. China is a power which will 'go it alone' even in the new situation. Moreover, it is a nuclear power whose weapons can reach the territory of its closer neighbors at the moment, but which very soon will be able to reach U.S. territory."⁷⁵ An article in USA in June 1982 suggested that Washington will view with suspicion China's development of nuclear systems capable of reaching the U.S. "The fact that Beijing considers it necessary for itself to develop nuclear-missile potential at an accelerated pace," the article said, "is a circumstance of no small importance for the USA from the military point of view."⁷⁶

Both publicly and privately, Soviet analysts argue that further development of Washington's strategic ties with Beijing may be hindered by a lack of mutual trust and fear of collusion.

of the United States and China do not coincide." They are rival powers, he adds, each of which pursues its own "hegemonist and expansionist goals." Bazhanov emphasizes that the "obsession of the two countries with anti-Sovietism" is only temporarily overshadowing their differences. "However, as the Chinese military potential grows," Bazhanov warns, "its ambitions will undoubtedly grow as well and lead Beijing hegemonists to clashes with the U.S."

Two USA Institute analysts, A.A. Nagorniy and A.B. Parkanskiy, detail the practical problems confronting the U.S. and China in the area of scientific and technological exchanges that make extensive security cooperation unlikely.⁷³ Writing in USA in mid-1980, the analysts pointed to China's lack of skilled workers, hard currency and educational infrastructure, and U.S. legal restrictions that prevent the export of the most modern, sophisticated technology. "If we soberly assess the potential for scientific and technological contacts between the United States and China," Nagorniy and Parkanskiy concluded, "we can expect these conflicts to be considerably exacerbated in the near future."

One Soviet analyst has asserted that the Soviet factor is an important constraint on the extent and nature of U.S. actions with China. A. Bovin, engaging in a dialogue with V. Lukin on the ten year anniversary of the signing of the Shanghai Communique, argued that "none of the benefits which forming a bloc with China would give could cover or compensate for the disadvantages which would arise from a tough and prolonged confrontation with the Soviet Union."⁷⁴ Lukin also noted that Washington was forced to take into account the concerns of its allies in Asia who "fear a rapid buildup of Beijing's military power with U.S. aid."

Soviet writings frequently cite Washington's uncertainty about the continuity of China's present policies as a factor that

'Soviet threat' in the U.S. The fear of the U.S.-China connection," he added, "has come to shape Soviet thinking about the world and foreign policy in every area. It must be stressed that in the future, the Sino-American security relationship will continue to influence Soviet perceptions and policy in a highly negative way -- just like the long-term impact of the 'Soviet threat' on the U.S."

Another analyst at the USA Institute also emphasized that the development of security ties between the U.S. and China had had a profound psychological impact on the Soviet leadership and had affected Soviet policy since May 1978. The problem for the Soviet Union created by U.S. military assistance to the Chinese, he argued, "is the psychological impact on our leaders and population, not the immediate military threat." Another China expert at the Institute for Scientific Information on the Social Sciences who predicted that U.S. arms transfers to China would remain limited said "U.S. military ties with China may be mainly symbolic, but the issue is highly sensitive to the Soviet leadership."

2-4.6 Limitations on the Partnership

While many Soviet commentators and analysts describe the potential threat to the Soviet Union posed by Sino-American military ties in the most ominous terms, the same observers both publicly and privately point to the contradictions between Beijing and Washington that may limit the extent of their military cooperation. They also stress that constraints on the United States and U.S. uncertainty about the direction of Chinese foreign policy may inhibit U.S. leaders' desire to enhance China's warfighting capability.

Soviet Foreign Ministry expert on China and Sino-American relations Yevgeniy Bazhanov, in his book Motive Forces of U.S. Policy Toward China, argues that "the long-term global interests

Oriental Studies acknowledged that playing the "China card" had shifted the balance of forces against the Soviet Union. It was argued, "a qualitative development that made certain quantitative changes. Previously, it was within the system of NATO and the Warsaw pact that the East-West confrontation took place. It was limited to that system, and in that framework a balance could be achieved. The U.S. surpassed this system through relations with China -- it unbalanced the system."

A USA Institute military analyst described the grave threat presented by the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the U.S. and its partners including China: "We face the European theater and nuclear forces; parity with the U.S.; and the Japanese, who are taking concrete steps to improve their military capability. In this framework of a strategic surrounding of the Soviet Union, Sino-American military ties are a very concrete challenge to the Soviet Union." At a conference on Soviet-American security issues held in Philadelphia in December 1980 and attended by many prominent Soviet and American analysts, the problems created for Soviet military planners by Sino-U.S. defense ties were raised by several Soviet delegates.⁷² One Soviet participant expressed concern about the alleged "American effort to expand the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact from one to two fronts through a search for coalition ties with China."

Soviet analysts privately insist that fear of the "China threat" pervades the Soviet leadership and the populous. An Asia expert at the USA Institute said in February 1981: "The Chinese threat to the Soviet Union is very, very deeply felt from the bottom to the top of the society. Although it may seem unreal or unrealistic to the foreigner, it is very deep and all pervasive. When Brzezinski said in Japan on his way back from Beijing in May 1978 that the U.S. and China shared identical world views," the Soviet expert continued, "this was seen here as very ominous -- and totally incompatible with detente for the Soviet Union. The 'Chinese threat' might be likened to the psychology of the

A USA journal article published in June 1982 summarized these alleged aspects of U.S. Asia strategy, including the U.S. decision to allow arms sales to China, and indicated they were intended to exacerbate the two-front war threat to the Soviet Union. U.S. activities in Asia, the article suggested look "like part and parcel of the elaborate plan to put military pressure on the USSR on the Far Eastern and Asian flanks of U.S.-Soviet confrontation."⁷¹

2-4.5 The Analysts' Private Views of the Threat

In private discussions, Soviet analysts provide a more relaxed assessment of the direct threat to the Soviet Union posed by Sino-American military ties. While they do not rule out the possibility of U.S. assistance to China's nuclear program or of significant conventional arms transfers to China, they stress that these developments are not imminent. Soviet analysts indicate greater concern about the exacerbation of the Soviet security problem created by the nascent Sino-American military coalition. They also emphasize the strong political and psychological impact on the Soviet leadership of the U.S. cooperating military with China.

Many Soviet analysts who stressed the limitation of the Sino-American military relationship, thought they had been somewhat unsuccessful in conveying these ideas to the Soviet leadership. One USA Institute China scholar claimed that "Soviet leaders look at a 'worst case' and see grand strategy at work -- and they also see the Sino-American military relationship as far more extensive than it is. In addition, they do not see how they can influence its development and in fact will take counter-measures likely to exacerbate the problem."

Nevertheless, Soviet analysts acknowledge that military cooperation between Beijing and Washington poses a major security problem for the Soviet Union. A top official of the Institute of

U.S. weapon sales on the military balance is significant, particularly since Soviet analysts privately acknowledge that massive arms transfers to China are seen as unlikely. The Soviets may be concerned that a limited transfer of selected offensive weapons systems to China will shift the military balance against the Soviet Union if the Chinese acquire the capability of carrying out limited cross-border attacks during a U.S.-Soviet conflict to "tie down" Soviet forces in the Far East.

The Soviets have also charged that the U.S. wants China to play a vital role in its strategy for meeting military contingencies in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Izvestiya asserted in December 1981 that "to implement Washington's militarist plans in the Near East and Southwest Asia, the United States is patching together an aggressive 'triangle' which would consist of the United States, Japan and China. This 'triangle' is basically designed to implement the United States' discrete aggressive tasks in Asia and the West Pacific. But at the present stage the Pentagon is not adverse to using the bloc it is patching together to safeguard rear services and communications leading to the Near East and Persian Gulf region."⁶⁹

In a later article, Izvestiya charged the U.S. was trying to change "the prevailing balance of forces" in the Far East. The May 1982 article accused the United States of using China along with Japan and South Korea "to obtain a one-sided advantage" for use in U.S. global strategy. To this end, Izvestiya said, the U.S. is building up its own forces in the region and stepping up "efforts aimed at creating a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul military axis" and at involving China in "joint actions" within this framework. Soviet commentaries also charged the U.S. with coordinating actions with China against Soviet allies in Asia, including alleged "parallel" and "complementary" moves against Afghanistan, India and Vietnam.⁷⁰

puters. Although those computers were ostensibly to be for civilian use, the Soviets undoubtedly noted that the same computers had been used for nuclear weapons test data evaluation.⁶⁴ Similarly, the Reagan administration approved the sale to China in September 1982 of a hybrid computer that was used by NASA for highly accurate simulation of missile fight.⁶⁵

A recent Soviet assessment of China's nuclear weapons program charged that "indirect and direct assistance from the West" to China's nuclear weapons development dates as far back as the mid-1960s when, the article alleges, China obtained from West Germany "heavy water for nuclear reactors, important components for missiles, special types of alloys and so forth."⁶⁶ The article, published in the military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda in May 1982, also claimed that with the aid of the West, China is achieving "scientific accuracy in the operation of land-based and on-board guidance systems" that "make it possible to hit small targets."

Soviet commentaries also point to the possible dangerous consequences resulting from the transfer of defensive and offensive conventional weapons to China. An article in Izvestiya berated alleged Chinese attempts to purchase Sea Dart air defense missiles from Great Britain that "made a good showing during the Falklands crisis."⁶⁷ Izvestiya accused the Chinese leaders of failing to consider the consequences of their actions, adding that "it would be worthwhile to think about them..."

Soviet concern about Chinese acquisition of offensive weapons was indicated by the sharp reaction to Haig's trip to Beijing in June 1981, during which he announced U.S. willingness to sell lethal weapons to China. A Tass commentary pointed to the potential dangers inherent in the U.S. decision, stating "it is obvious that the acquisition of new U.S.-made weapons by China may lead to a change in the correlation of military forces in the region..."⁶⁸ This assessment of the possible negative impact of

Union," and by noting that Sino-Soviet relations "constitute not only a bilateral problem but also an important factor affecting the interests of a vast region and the world as a whole." The article pointed to China's need for a peaceful international environment for economic development and stressed that "detente" with the Soviet Union would constitute "a major guarantee of the dependable normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations."

On the same day the I. Aleksandrov article was published, a major article by M.S. Kapitsa, under the pseudonym of M.S. Ukraintsev, went to press in Problems of the Far East, the journal of Tikhvinsky's Institute of the Far East.⁹³ Kapitsa's article elaborated on the Aleksandrov statement and on Brezhnev's Tashkent speech and was even more optimistic about the prospects for improved Sino-Soviet relations.

Kapitsa sought to identify reasons why China might change its policy toward the Soviet Union. China's role as "imperialism's junior partner," he argued, has "deprived China of allies and friends," while at the same time, Beijing's ties with the West have not yielded the expected economic benefits. Kapitsa acknowledged an increasingly pragmatic outlook in Beijing: "A growing number of people can see," he said, "that China has fallen decades and even centuries behind certain 'barbarians,' that in order to carry out modernization it is necessary not to engage in shamanism but to work hard for 50-70 years and implement the correct policy," and that "the imperialists will not present China with modernization on a plate."

Kapitsa departed from the usual Soviet practice of explaining China's foreign policy as the outgrowth of internal policies and domestic politics and rather pointed to the triangular context of Chinese decisionmaking. China's anti-Sovietism, the Soviet official argued, is designed to secure aid from the West for China's modernization: "The Beijing strategists are trying to instill in -- first and foremost -- U.S. imperialism the idea

that the enmity between China and the USSR is long-term, that China is ready to act as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Far East, but that the imperialist powers must make it more developed and stronger." Echoing the Aleksandrov article, Kapitsa charged that the Chinese are not interested in a settlement of the border dispute, but rather seek to "exploit it for political purposes." Even the question of resuming border negotiations, he said is used by the Chinese "as a means of bargaining -- and not only with the Soviet Union." Kapitsa's implied reference to the United States indicates Soviet displeasure about China's use of a "Soviet card" in dealings with Washington.

Kapitsa enumerated the 1982 Soviet proposals and initiatives toward improving relations with China, and the positive gestures toward Moscow made by the Chinese, noting that "Chinese authorities are taking some 'little steps.'" But, he said, "it is too soon as yet to draw conclusions as to whether these 'little steps' mean new shoots sprouting in Soviet-Chinese relations or whether they are isolated cases." Like the Aleksandrov statement, Kapitsa's article expressed a preference for an overall political settlement, but also indicated a willingness to first improve the "atmosphere" of Sino-Soviet relations, step-by-step while the remaining problems "could be postponed until the future."

Kapitsa's prescription for improving Sino-Soviet relations was reflected in comments to a Japanese newspaper by another senior sinologist and first deputy director of the Institute of the Far East, V.A. Krivtsov. Asked about the results of Kapitsa's and Tikhvinsky's visits to Beijing, Krivtsov replied: "It is a difficult question to answer. What is important is the fact that both sides have shared the view that a thaw has set in. We call China's effort along this line 'small-step diplomacy' in English. Each step might be small, but we hope that it will eventually form a large stride forward."⁹⁴

SECTION 3

CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND STRATEGIC TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES

3-1 Introduction

By the late 1960s, Chinese leaders perceived the Soviet Union as the main threat to China's security. Since then, they have witnessed a massive buildup in quantity and quality of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces along the Sino-Soviet border -- a buildup which has outstripped improvements in Chinese forces. This increase in Soviet military capability in the Far East, the Chinese argue, has only been part of a large-scale expansion of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces to implement a plan for global hegemony.

On the basis of a perceived Soviet goal of world domination, the Chinese evaluate the Soviet threat to China not only in bilateral terms but also in the context of Moscow's global strategy. On the basis of their assessments of this strategy, Chinese analysts argue that the danger to China is a long-term rather than immediate. The Soviets seek to encircle, not attack China, they say, while placing top priority on outflanking their primary target, Western Europe. China's counterstrategy, these analysts conclude, must therefore be global as well as bilateral.

Beijing's strategy for managing the Soviet threat is multifaceted. Besides modernizing its defense capability and building its economic strength, China has sought to develop strategic ties with the United States as the cornerstone of a united front to counter Soviet expansion. The Chinese calculate that their relations with the United States exacerbate the Soviets' two-front war problem, thus enhancing China's deterrence of Moscow.

Thwarting the Soviets' strategic plan and avoiding a third world war, they argue, also depends on the cohesiveness of the united front, whose members should consult with each other, coordinate their policies and take complementary actions. The Chinese see inconsistencies in U.S. policies under the Reagan administration as counterproductive to efforts to consolidate this anti-Soviet coalition as well as damaging to Sino-American relations and China's national interest.

Chinese strategy also aims at keeping the Soviet Union off-balance by responding cautiously to Soviet gestures and increasing contacts with Moscow. Chinese leaders stress, however, that a significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations is contingent on major changes in Soviet policy. They insist that Soviet hegemonism has not changed, and that therefore China's opposition to hegemonism, and by implication its strategic posture, remains unchanged.

3-2 Soviet Strategy for Global Domination

3-2.1 The Strategic Plan

The Chinese consider the fact that the Soviet Union has a global strategy, as well as the particular nature of that strategy, to have a direct bearing on their own national security. If the Soviets had no coherent strategy, they would be less predictable and possibly even more dangerous. That the Chinese perceive the Soviet Union to have a strategy allows them to assess the immediacy of the Soviet threat to China and to develop a counterstrategy. A Chinese foreign ministry official said privately in September 1981 that "the question of whether the Soviets have a global strategy or are opportunists is fundamental. War between the Soviet Union and China, for example, depends on this assessment." Publicly and privately, the Chinese argue that the Soviets' long term strategic aim is to achieve an undefined "global hegemony." Soviet efforts to attain this goal, they say, follow a systematic strategy that uses both diplomatic means and military force. This two-pronged strategy is intended to allow the Soviet Union to gradually expand its sphere of influence while avoiding a U.S.-Soviet war. At the same time, the Chinese say, the Soviets are building up their conventional and nuclear capabilities to gain superiority over the United States.

The Chinese continue to argue that the primary focus of Soviet strategy is Europe, but that since the Soviets have been stalemated there, they have intensified their southward drive in an attempt to "outflank and surround Europe." The Chinese point to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as evidence of this Soviet shift southward, and warn that the next Soviet target will be Pakistan or Iran to gain a strategic springboard into the Persian Gulf. This would allow them to seize control of the Straits of Hormuz, the critical supply line for petroleum shipments to Japan and Western Europe. A Chinese analyst argued in mid-1982 that once Moscow secures control of the Persian Gulf, it would cut off

the oil supply to the West and "wait for Western Europe and Japan to fall." Two Chinese scholars writing in Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) in October 1981 predicted that if the Soviets achieve their goal of establishing a "curved strategic zone" that goes through North Africa and the Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, "it will enable their military forces on the eastern and western fronts to join together and work in concert." The authors argued that Moscow's next step would be to "outflank Europe on its southern wing" in the west and "surround China and Japan" in the east. "In this way," they asserted, the Soviets "can basically fulfill their global plans."¹

3-2.2 Threat to China: Not Immediate

The Chinese conclude from this analysis that Soviet policy toward China is an inextricable part of Moscow's global strategy. Thus, they argue, despite the Soviets' massive buildup in the Far East, the Soviets do not intend to use that military force against China at this stage of implementation of their global strategy. The threat to China, therefore is perceived to be long term, not immediate -- thus providing China with a relatively long time period in which to concentrate on development of its economy rather than on massive defense preparations, and to implement a strategy to counter Moscow.

In their public analysis of Soviet strategy in Asia, the Chinese point to the foremost Soviet aim as trying to "squeeze out America and at the same time isolate Japan, encircle China and control Southeast Asia."² Since 1979, when "the Soviet Union set up a new command in the Far East theater," the Chinese note, they have "substantially expanded their naval forces there."³ As evidence of the Soviet buildup in the Far East, Chinese writings point to the incorporation of the aircraft carrier Minsk into the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the transfer from Europe to Asia of some submarines, large surface combat vessels and auxiliary vessels and the deployment of SS-20 missiles.⁴ They assert, however,

that "these preparations for war are directed not only at China, but also at the U.S. and Japan, which are the main objective" of the Soviet naval buildup.

At the same time that the Chinese point to the strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, they also argue that it confronts severe operational difficulties. The most limiting weakness of the Soviet fleet, an article in the Chinese Communist Party journal Hongqi (Red Flag) stressed, is that it "can only perch in two easily vulnerable bases (Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk)."⁵ for this reason, the article stated, the Soviet Union "urgently wants to find bases in the Southeast Asian sea area."

Despite Chinese acknowledgement that Soviet ground forces in the Far East are directed against China, they assert that the Soviets do not intend to attack China. "It is our view," a Chinese official said privately in 1981, "that the purpose of Soviet troops on the Chinese border is part of a global strategy, not an immediate threat to China or even to other countries in the region." A Beijing Review commentary in March 1981 said "an armed attack against China, including a nuclear attack, would not prove useful, but would bog the Soviet Union down in a strategically embarrassing position. Therefore," the author argued, "the Soviet Union has adopted a policy of encircling and isolating China," rather than of directly attacking it.⁶ He pointed to the Soviet occupation of the Wakhan region of Afghanistan bordering on China, the use of Vietnam to threaten China from the south as well as the presence of over one million troops on the Sino-Soviet border as elements of a Soviet strategy aimed at encircling China "with a two-pronged pincer movement, to create an atmosphere of uneasiness and to undermine her modernization drive."

Both publicly and privately, the Chinese nevertheless do not rule out the possibility of the Soviets trying to conquer China. They insist that the Soviets' long term goal -- as part of their

aim of global hegemony -- is domination of China through military or other means. But Chinese commentaries and most remarks by analysts stress that the Soviets' first priority is to outflank Western Europe by gaining control of the Europeans' oil lifeline from the Persian Gulf. One Chinese analyst implied, however, that the Soviets are capable of greater strategic flexibility and might seize an opportunity to solve the "China problem" before achieving other strategic aims. The likelihood of a Soviet attack on China, he said, depends "on the international situation and the development of contradictions between the two countries."

3-2.3 "Paeans of Peace, Rumble of Tanks"

While the Chinese portray Soviet strategy in ominous terms, they also perceive Moscow as patient and cautious. One Chinese analyst outlined what he viewed as the Soviets' guidelines: "tailor immediate objectives to existing capabilities, while long-term objectives can be attained gradually; wage wars at the lowest cost possible, while avoiding thermonuclear and quagmire conflicts; and never wage a war concurrently on two flanks."

The Chinese also perceive an active Soviet diplomatic strategy aimed at capitalizing on differences between the United States on the one hand, and its allies and friends, including NATO, Japan and China, on the other. This strategy, the Chinese argue, is "less risky and it costs less," but its results match those achieved through military force.⁷ The Soviets would like to "cause the West to disintegrate under the threat of war," a Renmin Ribao commentator asserted, "so they can win without a fight."⁸

By promoting discord between the U.S. and Western Europe, the Chinese argue, the Soviets hope to tilt the military balance in their favor. A Renmin Ribao article in March 1982 noted that Soviet plans to weaken the Western alliance are intended "to make U.S. strategic deployments aimed at checking the Soviet Union

suffer a setback."⁹ The Chinese charge that Soviet peace initiatives, including Moscow's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, are aimed at taking advantage of the pacifist movement that has emerged in the U.S. and Western Europe. Renmin Ribao argued that by capitalizing on people's fear of nuclear war, the Soviets aim to "force the U.S. to slow down the arms race." A Xinhua commentator warned the U.S. and its allies to be wary of Soviet diplomatic gestures, noting that "in between the paeans of peace sung by Moscow, one hears the distant rumble of Soviet tanks "¹⁰

At the same time, Renmin Ribao argued that Moscow seeks "to make Western Europe, under the Soviet military threat and the lure of economic benefit, gradually take a neutralist position between the U.S. and the Soviet Union." The Chinese see the dispute between the U.S. and Western Europe over the Soviet gas pipeline as aiding Moscow's strategy -- the Soviets benefit by both securing Western European help in building the pipeline and exacerbating conflict between Washington and its NATO allies. According to the Chinese, Moscow's aims in joint economic cooperation to exploit Siberia's resources are multifold: "to get its hand on the capital and technology urgently needed for opening up Siberia"; "to pit the Western European countries against President Ronald Reagan's economic strategy toward the Soviet Union"; and to create a "certain degree of reliance on Soviet energy sources in Western Europe and Japan," thus laying the groundwork for "wide-ranging and long-term economic ties."¹¹

3-2.4 Deterrence Through Psychological Manipulation

Chinese leaders, commentators and analysts downplay the Soviet threat to China and argue that they are confident of China's ability to deter the Soviet Union. They note that China's vast population would draw the Soviets into a protracted war. By constantly expressing China's determination to resist any attack and the willingness of the Chinese people to fight a

war, even a nuclear war, they assert that China has successfully intimidated the Soviets. They also point to Soviet fears that China would open a second front in a global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West, and stress Soviet uncertainty about whether the U.S. would come to China's aid in the event of a Soviet attack on China.

A Chinese analyst Si Mu, writing in Sixiang Zhanxian, argued that "no matter how much the Soviet Union is bent on subjugating our country," it is not likely to launch a war against China.¹² Noting that China's land area is over nine million square kilometers and that its population is greater than one billion, Si Mu claimed that if the Soviet Union invades China, "it will have to prepare to fight at least 20 years." China, he asserted "cannot be conquered or digested."

Privately, Chinese analysts also insist that China's large population is a strong deterrent to a Soviet attack. One analyst argued that the one million Soviet troops deployed on the Sino-Soviet border are "far from sufficient to attack China." He estimated that 3-5 million troops would be necessary to launch an attack, and that even then, the ensuing war "will go on a long time." Another analyst repeated this view, saying that "China's one billion population can digest millions of enemy troops in battle."

The Chinese perceive not only that they could ultimately repel a Soviet invasion, but that the assertion of their confidence of victory effectively manipulates the perceptions and emotions of the Soviet leadership, despite Soviet military superiority.¹³ Comments by Vice-Premier Li Xiannian in an interview in mid-1981 appear to have such a deterrent function. Li reportedly stated that even though it lacks advanced weaponry, China is "confident of winning" any military confrontation.¹⁴ An authoritative article by a Renmin Ribao commentator in January 1981 also seemed intended to deter possible Soviet military

action against China. The commentator stressed that "the Chinese people have both the determination and the capability to defend the territorial integrity of their country."¹⁵

Privately, officials and analysts acknowledge that Chinese public statements serve an important deterrent function against a stronger adversary. A foreign ministry official suggested in an informal discussion that a fundamental part of Chinese strategy is to try to intimidate the Soviet Union by indicating China's willingness to fight. "To let our adversaries know we are serious -- not just talking loud and doing nothing" is an important principle of Chinese policy, he said. "If we say we will fight back, we mean it," the official stressed. "The Soviets know our policy and have to be very careful. They have to listen to our statements." Citing China's entry into the Korean War as an example of this principle, the foreign ministry official argued that China does not bluff. He also pointed to China's implementation of its threatened "lesson" to Vietnam in February 1979 as further proof that "we are not talking idly."

3-2.5 Peaking Empire?

While Chinese commentators and analysts stress Soviet plans for global domination, most of them express doubt that the Soviet Union will achieve its goals. In their assessments, the Chinese point to an unbridgeable gap between the demands of Soviet strategy and actual Soviet capabilities. They identify the Soviets' greatest internal difficulties as increasingly low rates of economic growth, imbalance between the expansion of heavy industry and the development of light industry and agriculture, shortage of foreign exchange, and insufficient energy production. The external difficulties limiting Soviet expansion, according to Chinese assessments, include the financial and political burdens of supporting Soviet allies both in Eastern Europe and in the Third World, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In addition to draining the Soviet economy, these commitments and policies

have isolated the Soviet Union politically and have adversely affected its international image. Chinese commentators and analysts also argue that Soviet weaknesses have been exacerbated by the coordinated efforts of the anti-Soviet united front.

Chinese analysts consistently cite unfulfilled economic targets as evidence of a worsening crisis in the Soviet economy. They attribute Moscow's severe economic problems in part to the Soviet effort to expand its weapons arsenal which they say has resulted in an "abnormal" development of heavy industry. One analyst noted, for example, that "the proportional relationship between agriculture and light and heavy industry has become seriously unbalanced."¹⁶ This structural imbalance, in the view of Chinese commentators, has led to an acute shortage of consumer goods, inability to meet market demands and failure to satisfy the people's basic needs. A Renmin Ribao commentator, writing on the Soviet grain problem in February 1982, argued that despite "successively increased investment in agriculture in each of the 17 years since Brezhnev came to power," grain output "has not increased, and more and more grain has to be imported."¹⁷ The commentator pointed to several problems in Soviet agriculture that have hampered its development, including insufficient agricultural manpower, confused operations and management, low levels of mechanization and technical training, inefficiencies and waste, and frequent droughts that seriously affect grain output because of a shortage of irrigated farmlands.

Chinese analysts assert that Soviet leaders are pursuing a policy of arms expansion and war preparation at the expense of the requirements for their people's livelihood. Another February 1982 Renmin Ribao commentary accused the Soviets of replacing the meat on the common people's dining tables with "inedible and mass-produced lethal weapons."¹⁸ "If such a state of affairs goes on," the commentary warned, "the people's discontent is bound to intensify and culminate in a political problem." In addition to meat shortages, Chinese analysts argue that the Soviet

Union has chronic deficiencies of milk products and industrial consumer goods which have resulted in price increases for food, clothes, gasoline, transportation, travel and recreation.¹⁹ Chinese analysts see low levels of agricultural and industrial output in the Soviet Union resulting in greater imports as a major cause of an alleged shortage of foreign exchange. Chinese commentators closely observe Soviet activities on the international money market and watch for dramatic fluctuations in Soviet deposits in foreign banks. Several Chinese commentaries in the first half of 1982 described Soviet gold, oil and valuable metals sales at below market prices and argued that such sales were necessary to obtain the foreign exchange it needs.²⁰ One analyst asserted that the sale of large quantities of Soviet gold during a period of declining international gold prices is indicative of "the great trouble the Soviet Union is now confronted with."²¹

In their assessments of Soviet economic weaknesses, Chinese analysts also point to the inability of Soviet energy production to keep pace with the demands of economic development. A Renmin Ribao commentary on Soviet energy difficulties noted Soviet attempts in the late 1970s to promote energy production through increased investment and the purging of cadres who "failed to exercise 'effective leadership.'"²² The commentary stated that despite the "vast amount of manpower and material and financial resources as well as administrative measures," the Soviets have been unable to arrest the declining trend of the development of energy production. The reasons for this failure, according to Renmin Ribao, include a lack of sufficient technical facilities, capital and manpower. In addition, the commentary pointed to the inability of Soviet authorities to entice workers to Siberia for energy production and development despite payment of higher wages. The article concluded that in order to exploit energy resources in Siberia, "the Soviet Union is now using energy as a bait" to attract capital and technology from the West.

Chinese commentators and analysts stress that the main reason for the crisis in the Soviet economy, apart from domestic defense spending, is Moscow's large expenditures in support of its allies. A typical Renmin Ribao commentary pointed to the "Soviet Union's support to Cuba, Vietnam and its 'ever increasing' expenditure in Afghanistan" along with the crisis in Poland as creating "a long-term unfavorable trend" for the Soviet economy."²³ Another Renmin Ribao article noted that Cambodia is a "double burden" because Soviet aid to Phnom Penh chiefly takes the form of grain and petroleum, both of which are in short supply in the Soviet Union.²⁴

In a detailed analysis of Soviet strategy in a relatively obscure journal, Sixiang Zhanxian, Chinese analyst Si Mu identified Poland as the "central expression of the contradictions among the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," and "the most severe test of the so-called economic and political model of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."²⁵ The Polish crisis, according to Si Mu, brought to the fore the problems of minority nationalities, religion, and political dissidence, which the author calls "centrifugal forces that can disintegrate the Soviet empire." While acknowledging that the Soviets maintain tight control on domestic developments in Poland, Si Mu warned that the spread of these problems to other parts of the Soviet empire is "bound to cause the Soviet Union to be unable to fulfill its wishes or to have trouble back at home if it launches a major military adventure."

Si Mu also argued that Moscow's expansionist foreign policy had resulted in the Soviet Union being unprecedentedly isolated in the communist world. "Yugoslavia's condemnation and opposition to Soviet hegemonism," he noted "are increasingly open and sharp," while Romania is "heading toward a parting of the ways with the Soviet Union." In the international communist movement, Si Mu asserted the communist parties of Italy and Spain "have not only improved relations with our party but have jointly opposed

AD-A156 031

SOVIET AND CHINESE STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS IN PEACETIME
AND WARTIME (U) ROSENBAUM (HAROLD) ASSOCIATES INC
BURLINGTON MA B N GARRETT ET AL. 31 OCT 82

2/2


UNCLASSIFIED

DNA-TR-81-262 DNA001-81-C-0293

F/G 5/10

NL

END



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

the Soviet Union regarding the problems of Afghanistan and Poland," and they denounced the Soviet Union at the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. He also cited the Japanese communists' open condemnations of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Poland.

A highly authoritative article by a Renmin Ribao Special Commentator in January 1980 addressed Soviet strategic weaknesses. "It has wild ambitions, but its abilities are not equal to its ambitions," the Special Commentator argued.²⁶ "It has far-flung battle fronts so that it has too many things to take care of at the same time. The spheres of activity of the Soviet armed forces have extended to the oceans and land beyond their traditional stamping ground in the European and Asian continents," the authoritative article continued, "giving rise to a new and major problem of how to deploy their forces." This theme of over-extended battlelines was repeated in June 1981 in an article in the army newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao. "In pushing its global hegemonist and expansionist policy, the Soviet Union stretches its hand everywhere, extends its battlelines to great lengths and has to cover very extensive areas," the article noted.²⁷ In unusually explicit terms, the army organ described the Soviets' "crippling" strategic weakness as facing "the unfavorable situation of having to fight on two fronts." The article argued that Soviet fear of excessive burdens and the two-front war threat had resulted in Moscow's shift in strategy toward the south, away from its eastern and western fronts.

In contrast with the assessment that the Soviets are overburdened and over-extended strategically, at least one Chinese strategist in private discussions in June 1982 stressed Soviet strengths. He argued that the Soviet Union occupied a strategically advantageous location that enables it to "maneuver within secure interior lines of communication." He also noted that the Soviet Union has the most abundant and complete natural resources of any single country in the world, is the most self-sufficient

and leads in the production of such products as cement, steel, cotton and conventional armaments. Disagreeing with other assessments of Soviet internal difficulties, this analyst asserted that minority nationalities do not constitute a major problem for the Soviets. On the contrary, he cited the large Soviet population as a strategic asset that could enable the Soviets to conduct worldwide operations. In addition, the Chinese strategist insisted that the Soviet Union did not suffer from a negative international image. Rather, he argued that "Brezhnev enjoys a much better reputation than any other hegemonic predecessor," such as Hitler or Napoleon. While other analysts point to Soviet allies in Eastern Europe and the Third World as burdens on the Soviet economy, this strategist asserted that the Soviets reaped substantial benefits from their "satellite countries around the world."

Most Chinese assessments of the Soviet Union's strategic capabilities have examined Soviet strengths and weaknesses relative to past Soviet performance. A rare public analysis by Xinhua commentator Tang Tianri in December 1981, however, made a comparative evaluation of Soviet and American strategic capabilities.²⁸ Tang acknowledged that the Soviet Union has been confronted with various difficulties: declining growth rates, insufficient grain output, increasingly heavier burdens of empire, imbalanced development between agriculture, light and heavy industries, and international recriminations from its intervention in Cambodia and its invasion of Afghanistan. But he asserted that "for all these tough problems it cannot be said for certain that the Soviet Union is on the decline." While the Soviets' national growth rate has declined, Tang argued, it is nevertheless higher than "the United States and some other Western countries." More important, Tang noted, in the past 20 years, the Soviet Union has "steadily narrowed its economic gap with the United States." Pointing to reports of the falling growth rate of Soviet oil output, Tang claimed that this "is not necessarily an indication of an energy crisis" in the Soviet

Union in the 1980s. Soviet petroleum reserves, he stressed, now occupy second place in the world next to Saudi Arabia.

Regarding reductions in Soviet grain production, Tang argued that such difficulties cannot be viewed as a strategic weakness. Citing nine crop-failure years since Brezhnev's accession to power, he pointed to the Soviets' ability to acquire foreign exchange for the importation of grain by selling gold. According to Tang, the Soviets can produce three hundred tons of gold annually, and the exhaustion of Soviet gold supplies in the near future is unlikely. The burden on the Soviet economy imposed by its overseas allies, Tang argued, "is not heavier than what was shouldered by the United States in the Korean and Vietnamese wars." Citing the cost of Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam respectively, Tang estimated that the U.S. engaged over five times more troops than the Soviets and over one hundred times more in direct and indirect military expenditures. Tang advised his readers of the dangers of overestimating as well as underestimating Soviet strengths and difficulties, and warned of the unpredictability of the Soviet response if confronted with even greater difficulties. "Moscow can act with prudence or make a reckless move," Tang concluded, pointedly adding that "military adventures launched by the warmongers in history often took place in a period of economic crisis and not of economic prosperity."

The uncertainty about Soviet behavior expressed in Tang's analysis is rare in Chinese writings. Most Chinese analysts argue that while the Soviets harbor great ambitions, they will be unable to attain their goals. The June 1981 article in the army newspaper Jiefangjun Bao, for example, stated with greater certainty that "it is difficult" for the Soviet Union to accomplish its ambition of dominating the world, "because it is not strong enough."²⁹ The article also said that the Soviets will be unsuccessful in their attempts to achieve world hegemony because of the countermeasures taken by the anti-Soviet united front. "If the peoples of the world unite to oppose hegemonism and wage

a tit-for-tat struggle against it," the article asserted, "the Soviet Union's schemes for aggression and expansion will be disrupted and its global strategy will be unattainable."

Privately, one Chinese analyst stated that the anti-Soviet united front has already been successful in internationally isolating the Soviet Union to an unprecedented extent. But, echoing Chinese public statements he warned that "the trend of military expansionism has not been halted. The Soviets will continue to seek to strengthen their strategic position by increasing military strength and exploiting Third World chaos." Another Chinese analyst, also in private discussion, repeated that the Soviets seek world hegemony and stressed the "urgent necessity of comprehensive cooperation and coordination" between China and other nations of the world to contain Soviet expansion.

3-3 Sino-Soviet Relations

3-3.1 Soviet Gestures, Chinese Reassurances

The Chinese say there will be no substantial improvement in China's relations with Moscow until the Soviets alter their policies which threaten Chinese security. While Chinese leaders see such changes as unlikely, they nevertheless do not rule out small improvements in some areas of their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, including trade and sports, cultural and technological exchanges. They also do not reject holding talks with Moscow to discuss their differences as they have recently indicated. But Chinese leaders also insist that small improvements in Sino-Soviet relations will not lead Beijing to a strategic realignment and that even normalization of Sino-Soviet ties would amount only to normal, "good neighborly" relations.

Despite recently muted Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda, increased contact between Chinese and Soviet citizens, and preliminary discussions between Chinese and Soviet officials about

reopening talks on improving ties, Chinese leaders' basic demands for normalizing Sino-Soviet relations remain unchanged. In his speech to the 12th Party Congress, Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hu Yaobang restated China's position: "If the Soviet authorities really have a sincere desire to improve relations with China and take practical steps to lift their threat to the security of our country, it will be possible for Sino-Soviet relations to move towards normalization."³⁰ Hu cited the "grave threats" posed by the Soviet Union to "the peace of Asia and to China's security: Soviet support for Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, acts of expansion in Indochina and Southeast Asia and constant provocations along China's border; Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; and the deployment of massive armed forces along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders." Hu also implied, however, that China is not opposed to increased contact with the Soviets. "The friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples is of long standing," Hu said, "and we will strive to safeguard and develop this friendship, no matter what Sino-Soviet state relations are like."

Chinese Communist Party Vice Chairman, Li Xiannian, in an interview with a Western journalist published in January 1982, had expressed a willingness to reopen talks with the Soviets, if such demands were addressed. "Negotiate with the USSR. Why not?" Li asked. "We are not opposed. We are not opposed to the negotiations between the USSR and the U.S. taking place in Geneva. Why ever should we be opposed to negotiations between China and the USSR," Li continued, "provided, however, that tangible results are achieved?" Li pointed to the historical continuity of the Chinese position, arguing that "we have always advocated normalization," but he said, relations must be "on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Ultimately," Li added, the problem is whether or not the Soviets continue to practice hegemonism.³¹

Chinese leaders' statements and press commentaries in response to Soviet overtures in 1982 have similarly stressed the constancy of the Chinese position. Following Brezhnev's Tashkent speech in March 1982 (see Section 2.52), a Xinhua commentary noted that "it was not the first time for a Soviet leader to make such 'improvement' remarks. But so far," the commentary pointedly asserted, "people have not seen any substantive actions taken by the Soviet authorities in this respect."³² The report also indicated the contradictions between Brezhnev's denial that the Soviet Union poses a threat to China and the deployment of "massive Soviet troops" along the Sino-Soviet border. "...the true value of what the Soviet Union has said should be judged in the light of its actual deeds hereafter," the broadcast concluded.

In May 1982 a highly authoritative article under the pseudonym I. Alexandrov (see Section 2.53) in Pravda called for negotiations to achieve "detente" between China and the Soviet Union. A Chinese spokesman delivered China's reply to Moscow's offer, which was made in the wake of a visit to China by Vice President Bush's trip to China aimed at heading off a crisis in U.S.-China relations over Taiwan arms sales. In response to a reporter's question regarding the Pravda article, the spokesman recalled Premier Zhao Ziyang's remarks to Japanese journalists ten days earlier, in which he had stressed China's opposition to "Moscow's expansionist and hegemonist policy."³³

On the eve of the arrival of Beijing of Soviet Vice foreign minister Ilyichev for talks on resuming the Sino-Soviet dialogue, Huang Hua told his Japanese counterpart that there may be an improvement in cooperative relations with Moscow such as trade and personnel and technological exchanges in the future.³⁴ But, Huang emphasized in reply to Foreign Minister Sakurauchi's questioning, what is important for normalizing Sino-Soviet relations is that the Soviet Union removes its military threat.

While most Chinese statements on conditions for normalizing Sino-Soviet relations have emphasized the reduction of the direct Soviet threat to China, some statements have linked improved relations to changes in Moscow's global policies. A Beijing Review article in July 1982 repeated that relations between the two countries "should be maintained and developed on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence."³⁵ But at the same time, the article said, "there are many obstacles to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, the most serious being the Soviet Union's hegemonist foreign policies." A Chinese analyst, in an article in August 1981, implied that a change in Soviet policies is highly unlikely. "In the future," he said, the Soviet Union "will remain the main source of tension in the international situation and the most dangerous place of origin of a new world war."³⁶

In an article in Foreign Affairs in Fall 1981, Huan Xiang, the Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, stated that "Sino-Soviet discord goes far beyond the scope of bilateral relations. It is well-known that China has all along firmly opposed the Soviet Union's worldwide expansionism, its aggression against other countries and its sabotage of peace."³⁷ Attempting to allay Western concerns about a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement, Huan pointed out that antagonism between Moscow and Beijing "is not at all a transient phenomenon arising from a single issue, but has its roots deep down in the soil, past and present." He charged that Soviet leaders have "for a long time pursued a hegemonist and big-power chauvinist policy toward China" and tried hard to bring China under their control politically, economically and militarily.

Despite the ambiguity of Chinese statements about the conditions for improving Sino-Soviet relations, Chinese leaders have indicated that improved bilateral ties will not have far-reaching strategic consequences. Chairman Hu Yaobang, in a conversation with a delegation from Agency France-Presse in

August 1982, said that if the problems between China and the Soviet Union are resolved, China is simply "ready to have neighborly relations."³⁸

3-3.2 Lessons of the 50s

Chinese leaders and officials point to their experience with the Soviets in the 1950s as demonstrating that Chinese suspicions of Soviet intentions are deep-rooted. Chinese statements imply determination that China never again be vulnerable to Soviet pressure. In an interview with a Western journalist, Li Xiannian said that Sino-Soviet relations were strained after the establishment of the People's Republic because of Stalin's "reservations" which he set aside "only after the Korean War."³⁹ Li noted that Stalin provided a significant amount of economic assistance to China, but he emphasized that "we paid" for the Soviets help.

When Khrushchev assumed power, Li asserted, relations between China and the Soviet Union "were still good." But "as time went by," the Soviets imposed conditions, he said. "For instance, they wanted a naval base and a broadcasting station. They wanted to monitor telecommunications, for over a century." In a private discussion in September 1981, a foreign ministry official also talked about increasing Soviet military demands on China in that period. He said the Soviets actually wanted to "control our telecommunications system, and later wanted to control our airspace in the guise of helping Vietnam." In addition, the official said, Moscow wanted an airbase in China and sought to build a "joint navy" under Soviet control.

While the Chinese acknowledge that ideological differences had already developed in the 1950s between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties, they argue that these differences were not responsible for the deterioration of political relations between the two states. Li Xiannian implied this while referring to the

ideological aspect of the dispute. "Problems of that kind can be discussed," he said. "The rift occurred at the level of a rift between states," not between parties.

Li also downplayed the importance of the territorial dispute between China and the Soviet Union and suggested that China is less concerned with Soviet claims on Chinese territory than about the threat posed to China's security by Soviet deployment of troops on the border. "Currently there is a controversy over 80,000 - 90,000 square kilometers," Li noted. "They maintain that it is theirs, we maintain that it is ours. However," Li added, "they are occupying it with their troops."

3-3.3 Managing the Soviet Threat

In 1981-82, China politically distanced itself from U.S. policy, took a more prominent Third World leadership role, and responded cautiously but positively to Soviet gestures of "small step diplomacy" aimed at improving Sino-Soviet relations. Some analysts suggested that this indicated a shift in China's foreign policy and even in its global strategy. But these moves are not inconsistent with a multifaceted strategy followed by China since the early 1970s for coping with what they have perceived as a bilateral and global threat to their security from the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ China's strategy for managing the Soviet threat includes: 1) maintaining state-to-state relations with Moscow and improving various aspects of Sino-Soviet relations, including trade and cultural and technological exchanges; 2) creation and strengthening of an anti-Soviet coalition including the U.S., Japan, Western Europe and other countries; 3) modernization of China's nuclear and conventional forces to improve deterrence/ warfighting capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviet forces in the Far East; and 4) economic modernization to provide a stronger base for a buildup of military power in the future as well as to strengthen China's overall economic and political security, internally and externally.

China's cautious responses to Moscow's overtures are aimed at keeping Moscow off-balance, minimizing potentially explosive tensions on the Sino-Soviet border, maximizing political leverage with both the Soviet Union and the United States, and obtaining the advantages of improved bilateral ties, including increased trade and greater knowledge and understanding of their more powerful neighbor. Improved relations with the Soviet Union, however, is not an alternative to strategic cooperation with the United States, but rather the two are complementary elements of a comprehensive security strategy. Politically, China's strategy is aimed at organizing a coalition with the United States and other NATO countries, Japan and Third World nations to jointly oppose Soviet hegemonism. "If we really want to be able to place curbs on the Polar Bear," Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping said on the eve of his 1979 visit to Washington, "the only realistic thing for us is to unite." More recently, as noted in a Renmin Ribao special commentary in July 1981, China has sought "to consolidate and develop these strategic relationships so they can play a more effective role in safeguarding world peace and security."⁴¹ This strategy is designed to deflect Soviet pressure from China and "encircle the encirclers."

Economically, Chinese leaders have exhorted the United States and other Western countries to restrict the flow of capital and strategic goods to the Soviet Union, while Beijing has hoped to divert some of that investment and technology to help China implement its Four Modernizations program. A Beijing Radio commentary in May 1982 detailed Soviet military use of technology obtained from the West and charged that "providing the Soviet Union with advanced technology is tantamount to selling it the hangman's noose."⁴²

Militarily, China has sought to exacerbate the Soviets' defense problem and maximize deterrence by enhancing the two-front war threat faced by Moscow's planners. Beijing's strategic alignment with the United States is intended to heighten Soviet

concern about a possible American response to a Soviet attack on China -- even though Chinese leaders know they cannot rely on U.S. support. Similarly, although China will not make a commitment to support the U.S. in a global war, the Chinese do not want the Soviets to be sanguine that China will remain on the sidelines in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict or a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Persian Gulf. As one Chinese analyst explained in a private discussion in June 1982, if the Soviets were to succeed in pushing the U.S. out of Southwest Asia and Europe, Moscow could then turn their forces eastward to attack China.

The development of an international coalition against the Soviet Union is essential to deterrence from the Chinese point of view. "China's advocacy that various political forces should unite to oppose hegemonism is based on the policy conclusions made after serious analysis of objective reality," a Renmin Ribao commentator claimed in March 1981.⁴³ Since the Soviet Union seeks to dominate all countries and not just China, the Chinese argue, the Soviets can be deterred only through an international united front that resolutely opposes Soviet expansion. The relations between the members of this united front, according to the description of a Chinese analyst writing in Shijie Zhishi, "are based on the common interest of opposing the expansion of hegemonism," and on "the principle of equality. We consult with each other to coordinate our activities," the analyst added, "and take concerted action."⁴⁴

In the past few years, the Chinese argue, this united front strategy has achieved positive results. "The Soviet hegemonists greatly fear this antihegemonist strategy," the Shijie Zhishi article argued, "and have tried to sabotage and cause the disintegration of these relations by hook or by crook." An article in Sixiang Zhanxian noted that "...in the struggle between aggression and antiaggression, hegemonism and antihegemonism, the forces of war and the forces of peace in the whole world, in each case the latter is to a certain extent getting the upper hand."

In order to attain the goal of postponing or preventing the outbreak of a new war, however, the article stressed that the international united front must be consolidated and solidified.⁴⁵

China's strategy calls for the united front to wage a "tit for tat" struggle against the Soviet Union. Although the Chinese do not explicitly define the nature of this struggle, they imply that concrete actions should be jointly or individually taken in response to specific Soviet challenges around the world. Chinese statements have never advocated that united front members adopt a confrontational approach toward Moscow, however.⁴⁶ While China severed party-to-party ties with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, it has never broken off diplomatic relations. Similarly, it has not halted trade or taken gratuitously provocative actions against the Soviets and has recently increased people-to-people contacts, while at the same time continuing to verbally attack "Soviet hegemonism."

The Chinese see bilateral benefits from improvements in specific aspects of Sino-Soviet relations. In a move in early 1982 widely interpreted as a sign of thaw in relations between Moscow and Beijing, three Chinese economists went to the Soviet Union for three months to study the Soviet economy. A Chinese source explained at the time that the aim of the visit was to acquaint China "with the functioning of the economic system of the Soviet Union," as part of China's effort to learn from the "practice and experience of many countries."⁴⁷

A pro-Beijing Hong Kong newspaper in May 1982 suggested not only that China should learn from the Soviets' economic experience, but also that it should seek to better understand its adversary. The paper called for an increase in Chinese studies of the Soviet Union in response to a changed situation between Beijing and Moscow. "Sino-Soviet relations have become more complicated," the Wen Wei Po article explained, "and China must not only maintain its deployment of armed forces along the Sino-

Chinese commentators and analysts assert that the Soviets' two-front war problem has been further exacerbated by the development of strategic relations between China and the U.S. A Renmin Ribao Special Commentator argued in January 1980 that the Soviets' historical strategic problem of having to fight on two fronts "has been highlighted due to changes in the international situation in the past decade or so."⁷⁵ The Special Commentator described the two-front problem as a "fatal weakness that can hardly be overcome" and added that this strategic predicament "will be getting more serious."

The top-level Chinese leadership has acknowledged the key role of the United States in Chinese deterrence strategy. In an interview in June 1980, Deng Xiaoping reportedly argued that a Soviet surgical strike against China is unlikely because under such circumstances Moscow would recognize that China would receive military aid from the U.S. and would mount a long-term war against the Soviet Union.⁷⁶ Chinese analysts privately confirm that the U.S.-China strategic relationship has decreased the likelihood of a Soviet attack on China. One analyst who made this argument pointed to Soviet fears "that the U.S. would come to the assistance of the PRC if China were attacked."

3-4.8 Coordinated Policies and Complementary Action

The primary aim of Chinese foreign policy is to oppose "Soviet hegemonism" by promoting the formation of a broad anti-Soviet united front. While the Chinese have rejected the creation of formal alliances with other states, they have called for bilateral and multilateral efforts within the united front to contain Soviet expansion. The characteristics of this coalition have been left vague and undefined in most Chinese statements. But a few commentaries have provided more detailed descriptions of the "united front" and in private Chinese analysts have suggested specific steps that could be taken by the U.S. and China as part of a coalition strategy.

3-4.7 Strategic Value of the Partnership

Chinese leaders perceive deterrence of the Soviet Union to be strengthened by China's partnership with the United States. The U.S. potential as a counterweight to Moscow was China's primary motivation for rapprochement with the United States in 1971-72. The Chinese perceived that ties with the United States would enhance the Soviets' two-front war dilemma and create new fears in Moscow about possible U.S. aid to Beijing in a Sino-Soviet conflict.

Chinese commentators and analysts argue that the threat of simultaneous conflict in Europe and the Far East places Moscow in a strategically unfavorable situation. A Jiefangjun Bao article in June 1981 pointed to the Soviets' two front problem as a "crippling" strategic weakness: "The Soviet Union is situated between West Europe and East Asia, and its strategic focus is Europe, but the NATO military bloc is directly confronting it there. On its eastern borders, the existence of socialist China and the confrontation with U.S.-Japanese strength also tie down large Soviet forces. The reason the Soviet Union has adopted a strategy of moving south and outflanking its opponents in recent years without making a move first on its eastern or western fronts is that it has certain misgivings that if it launches a large-scale war of aggression on its western or eastern fronts, it will not only come into direct conflict with its main opponents but will also move into an unfavorable situation whereby it has too many things to take care of at the same time and faces a war on two fronts."⁷⁴

In private discussions in September 1981, Chinese analysts also pointed to this Soviet strategic dilemma. One analyst remarked that "the Soviet Union tries to avoid fighting on two fronts, but has to be prepared to do so." Thus, he argued, "its forces have to be divided."

Chinese textiles as discriminatory. They argue, he said, that "the value of Chinese textile exports permitted to enter the U.S. is fixed at a level lower than the value of cotton and artificial fibers imported by China from the U.S." Clough said that the Chinese point to textiles as one of the few products China can produce cheaply and in quantity, while maintaining a high standard of quality. They note that the U.S. strictly limits Chinese textile imports, despite the large trade imbalance in favor of the U.S. "The Chinese feel discriminated against," Clough said, "because as a latecomer in the textile trade, China is assigned a smaller quota than places with a much smaller population, such as South Korea, Taiwan or Hong Kong."

Chinese disillusionment with the slow pace of development in Sino-American economic relations was expressed by Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October 1982 in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. According to a Xinhua account of the speech, Huang charged the United States with intensifying discrimination against China in trade relations and in scientific exchanges, particularly citing restrictions on the export of high technology and sophisticated equipment of China. Huang reportedly commented, "I once said that the U.S. authorities had made many nice remarks about developing our bilateral relations. Yet what has happened can be described by a Chinese saying, 'loud thunder, but little rain.'"⁷³ Huang also reportedly accused the U.S. of treating China unfairly in trade-related matters, adding, "in view of recent developments, one cannot help but asking: Does the U.S. government regard China as a friend or an adversary?" Xinhua concluded Huang's remarks by quoting him as saying "the Chinese government highly cherishes Sino-U.S. relations and hopes that they will continue to develop and not stand still, and still less move backward. I believe that far-sighted U.S. statesmen will also fully recognize the great significance of developing Sino-U.S. relations and take a positive approach."

charged, "are important obstacles. In the export of advanced technologies, the United States has for a long time withheld licenses for a considerable number of products. It has also imposed various restrictions on imports from China, and this is one of the main reasons for China's huge trade deficits. The situation is rather incompatible with the present relations between the two countries," Huan wrote, and "particularly, with the United States' declaration that it considers China to be a close and valued friend. It is self-evident that a prolonged delay in keeping promises will not only impede Sino-U.S. economic relations," Huan warned, but will "exert negative influence on their strategic relations."

In conversations with U.S. Government representatives and former officials, Chinese leaders have repeatedly expressed concern about delays in transfer of technology to China that they consider vital to their economic development plans. Deng Xiaoping reportedly complained to former Vice President Walter Mondale in November 1981 about U.S. footdragging in approving the sale of IBM computers promised China by the Carter administration.⁷⁰ Chinese leaders were reportedly anxious to receive the computers for use in conducting a nationwide census, which they viewed as an essential means to gather necessary data for further national economic planning. When the computers were finally received in 1982, and the census began in July, Deputy Premier Yao Yilin described the undertaking as a "large-scale investigation of national conditions" and Premier Zhao Ziyang said the census was of great importance for China's modernization program.⁷¹

A recent study of Chinese elite perceptions of the United States by Ralph Clough also points to Chinese irritation over the restrictions on the export of U.S. high technology to China. "These restrictions," Clough wrote, "have produced some expressions of skepticism from senior officials that the U.S. is genuinely interested in building a strong China."⁷² Clough also reported that many Chinese perceive the U.S. quotas on imports of

global perspective, China cannot but look upon the United States' China policy as a most important factor in evaluating the strategic measures and foreign policy of the United States Government. This means that whoever truly fights hegemony must not retreat in their policy toward China. If anyone deliberately damages Sino-American relations, this certainly shows that he lacks a correct strategic point of view and also cannot really play an active role in the overall anti-hegemonistic strategy."⁶⁷ A pro-Beijing Hong Kong newspaper argued in October 1981 that "Reagan should know that the peaceful reunification of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan will be beneficial to peace in Asia and the world. A reunified China means a great increase in the strength of forces opposing hegemonism."⁶⁸

3-4.6 "Loud Thunder, Little Rain"

China's top national priority, reaffirmed at the 12th Party Congress in September 1982, is economic modernization. Chinese leaders have therefore viewed the expansion of economic ties as a particularly important element of the Sino-American relationship. They perceived a U.S. commitment to assist China in its Four Modernizations drive as part of the strategic relationship forged in 1978. Despite repeated official statements promising active American support for China's economic development goals, the Chinese have perceived a lack of political will in Washington to provide economic assistance and to expedite the expansion of trade and technology transfer to China. This has raised doubts in Beijing about U.S. reliability, and its value as a strategic partner.

Huan Xiang asserted in Foreign Affairs that "there are now some problems in Sino-U.S. trade."⁶⁹ While acknowledging partial Chinese responsibility for these problems, Huan argued that "the factors restricting Sino-U.S. trade are not entirely Chinese. The many discriminating and restricting measures the U.S. Government has to this day maintained against trade with China," he

countries," the commentary argued, "has gradually harmed the developed Western countries and has isolated the United States."⁶⁶

Renmin Ribao also charged the Reagan administration with focusing almost exclusively on the Soviet Union as the source of all problems in the world to the point of ignoring local and regional sources of conflict. "There are all kinds of political, economic and social problems in the Third World," the commentary explained. "These problems are always intertwined with complex national and religious conflicts. The Reagan administration has seen the Soviet Union playing an unsavory role in the turmoil of the Third World, but it has not been able to correctly grasp and deal with the inevitable changes within the Third World. The modus operandi of simply blocking Soviet expansion and differentiating enemies from friends according to the attitude they take against the Soviet Union, and the desire to stabilize and preserve the status quo in turbulent areas of the Third World," the article continued, "are unrealistic and merely simplify complex events. This inevitably produces the result of having things go contrary to one's wishes."

Chinese criticisms of Reagan administration policy toward China have frequently been explained by commentators and analysts as part of their broader objections to U.S. global policies. This link between U.S. bilateral policy toward China and its global strategy was explicitly stated on the eve of Ronald Reagan's inauguration by Yuan Xianlu, foreign editor of Renmin Ribao. Yuan wrote in the New York Times: "There are those who believe that China will accept every United States action regarding Taiwan as long as Ronald Reagan is tough on the Soviet Union. Such a belief is totally erroneous. It's true that while dealing with Sino-American relations, China not only considers them from her national interests but more from the overall strategy of opposing hegemony and maintaining world peace. But precisely because Sino-American relations must be viewed from a

Korea and the "Taiwan authorities" -- pitted the U.S. "against the Arab and African peoples and the peoples of many other Third World countries."

U.S. support for Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its intransigence in dealing with the PLO and the Arab states, a Renmin Ribao commentary argued in July 1982, has seriously hindered "the easing of the Arab-Israeli conflict," and undermined Washington's efforts to forge a "strategic consensus" in the Middle East against the Soviet Union.⁶⁴ This has "embarrassed certain U.S. friends in the Arab world," the commentary noted, adding -- in terms suggesting China's reaction to its perception of renewed "U.S. hegemonism" -- these countries "have had no choice but to keep a certain distance from the U.S., thus giving the Soviet Union a chance to interfere." The Xinhua correspondent concluded that the result of Reagan administration strategy was to provide the Soviet Union "with more opportunities for its hegemonic aims," and added that "U.S. policies toward certain areas of the Third World are in sharp conflict with its overall strategy."

The Chinese also charged that U.S. policies toward North-South economic relations contradict the administration's strategic aims. A major critique of Reagan administration foreign policy in January 1982 said "not only does it ignore the legitimate demands of the Third World countries and fail to realize fully the importance and critical necessity of satisfying these demands, but it generally refuses and opposes them."⁶⁵ The analyst charged that Reagan was "going against the tide" in North-South relations by insisting on the "superiority of the market mechanism." A July 1982 Renmin Ribao commentary said that the Reagan administration "has underestimated the determination of the developing countries to maintain independence and develop their economies. U.S. support of the old international economic system, which is detrimental to the Third World countries, and its shifting of the economic crisis onto the Third World

technology and equipment" and "large quantities of military goods and materials," one analyst wrote, "is an important cause of the rapid increase in Soviet economic strength, particularly military strength."⁶¹

Chinese commentators often point out that disputes between the U.S. and its Western allies benefit the Soviet Union. One Xinhua correspondent asserted that "Moscow is naturally very happy about the sharpening West European contradictions." The correspondent quoted a West German paper as saying: "This violent quarrel amid friends" is only helpful to the Soviet Union "whose consistent aim is to drive a wedge between the Europeans and the Americans."⁶²

3-4.5 Alienating the Third World

The Chinese initially responded favorably to the Reagan administration's stated aims in the Third World. The United States must "strive to build new relations on the basis of fairness and responsibility with the Third World" in order to check Soviet expansion, the Chinese quoted a Reagan administration official as saying. But as U.S. Third World policy began to take shape Chinese commentators charged that it "runs counter" to this stated goal, focusing on "immediate tangible interests" at the expense of the common long-term strategic interests of both the U.S. and China.

One Xinhua correspondent noted that "judging from the announced objectives of U.S. foreign strategy and President Reagan's words, it is obvious that the U.S. Government is aware of the fact that the main danger to the security of world peace comes from the Soviet Union and that the U.S., on its own, cannot restrain the Soviet Union. To counter Soviet expansionism and aggression, it is necessary to unite all possible forces, including those of the Third World."⁶³ But the Reagan administration's bias toward its "old friends" -- Israel, South Africa, South

3-4.4 Weakening the NATO Alliance

Chinese commentators have also criticized the Reagan administration's policies toward Western Europe as weakening the NATO alliance. They argue that in implementing its strategy for containing Soviet power, the U.S. has failed to sufficiently account for Western European security interests. One commentator noted that the U.S. and Western Europe have widely divergent views on detente: "The Reagan administration has held that the Soviet Union has used 'detente' to develop its military superiority and extend its global influence, but Western Europe has held that it has benefited from 'detente' in many ways; the Reagan administration has held that arms talks only play a very limited role in arms control, but Western Europe has held that talks are the only way to solve the problem."⁵⁸ The commentator described some Western European criticisms of U.S. policy that parallel Chinese concerns. "For their own security interests," the commentator said, "the Western European allies want the U.S. to adopt a 'firm' approach toward the Soviet Union, but they do not want the U.S. to move from 'firmness' to 'toughness'. They are afraid of importing tension into Europe, fearing that they will be sacrificed in U.S.-Soviet rivalry." Another Renmin Ribao commentary earlier in the month made similar points and added that Western European relations with the Soviet Union are different than U.S. relations with Moscow because the European countries "are geographically close to it."⁵⁹

Renmin Ribao also criticized the Reagan administration's manner of dictating policy to NATO countries. The commentary noted that "without consulting the Western European allies," the U.S. "demanded that they suspend transactions with the Soviet Union on building the natural gas pipeline."⁶⁰ At the same time that they have charged the U.S. with infringing on the sovereignty of its allies, however, Chinese commentators have opposed Western Europe's economic "appeasement" of the Soviet Union. The West's policy of supplying Moscow "with advanced

ships between individual problems and in distinguishing the priorities of various problems."

3-4.3 Fear of U.S.-Soviet Collusion

In mid-1982, Chinese commentaries noted a gradual shift in the Reagan administration's posture toward the Soviet Union from "rigidity" to "flexibility." An article in Shijie Zhishi in September 1982 pointed to the administration's nuclear disarmament proposal in May and its resumption of strategic arms control negotiations in June as evidence of Washington's new conciliatory attitude toward Moscow, the origins of which were traced to the summer of 1981. These moves, the article argued, were not indicative of a change in the "basic U.S. strategy of competing for hegemony and of confrontation with the Soviet Union," but "merely" reflected "that its methods and tactics in dealing with the Soviet Union have changed to some extent."⁵⁷ "Generally speaking," the article asserted, "whereas in the past the Reagan administration laid particular emphasis on military tactics, it has now changed to using military, political, diplomatic and intelligence means together or in turn. Its previous hard tactics have changed to dual tactics of coupling threats with promises."

The Shijie Zhishi article argued that while an "immediate breakthrough on major issues between the United States and the Soviet Union" is "impossible," the negotiations "will bring about certain influences on international relations." In wording similar to that used by the Chinese in the mid-1970s at the peak of China's concern about Washington's "appeasement" of Moscow and the possibility of U.S.-Soviet collusion against them, Shijie Zhishi pointedly noted that "people are wondering what kind of dirty deal is going on between the two hegemonists. This phenomenon merits our attention when viewing present relations between the United States and the Soviet Union." (emphasis added)

commentators approvingly quoted statements by U.S. officials that the United States could not take on the Soviet Union alone, but must work with its allies and friends to counter Soviet power. One Chinese analyst outlined U.S. foreign policy in August 1981 in terms that paralleled China's own united front strategy: "On the basis of enhancing America's position of strength," he asserted, "the Reagan administration aims to strengthen cooperation with Western Europe, Japan, and other allies, and to join up with China and other forces opposed to Soviet hegemonism in order to counter Soviet expansion."⁵⁴

But Chinese commentators and analysts have been perplexed by the Reagan administration's actions toward Moscow, which they have viewed as inconsistent with and counterproductive to its stated policies. A January 1982 analysis of Reagan's foreign policy in the new Journal of International Studies pointed out that while the U.S. wanted to restrict East-West trade, especially to halt the Soviet gas pipeline deal, it was "the Reagan administration itself" that "lifted the grain embargo against the Soviet Union."⁵⁵ A Renmin Ribao commentator, in July 1982, asserted that Reagan's resumption of grain trade with the Soviets represented "a step backward from the Carter administration's stand." The commentator charged that "the United States has been selling huge amounts of grain to the Soviet Union, greatly exceeding the amount sold to them before the embargo." Reagan's foreign policies "lack thorough consideration," the commentator concluded. "It's specific policies are always drifting away from the goal it wants to attain. Contradictions and the phenomenon of attending to one thing and losing sight of another are commonly found. In addition, inconsistency in the Reagan administration's foreign policy and the contradictory speeches delivered have put its foreign policy in a more chaotic and passive situation."⁵⁶ The article in the Journal of International Studies further charged that the Reagan administration "has made people suspect that it is unreliable and has given the impression that it lacks balance in dealing with the relation-

compels the United States to rely on China's strength for support and to develop a 'strategic relationship' with China. This is an objective demand. No matter whether the administration is Democratic or Republican and no matter who is in power, their policy toward China must be conditioned by this U.S. strategic interest."⁵²

3-4.2 Inconsistencies in U.S. Policy

The Chinese have viewed favorably the Reagan administration's firm commitment to counter Soviet power and to build up U.S. military capabilities. But they have criticized the administration's global strategy and foreign policies as counter-productive. They have charged that its Third World policies have created opportunities for expansion of Soviet influence and that the administration's unilateralist approach has been insensitive to the security concerns of its friends and allies, particularly the Western Europeans, and has undermined the united front against the Soviet Union that China is seeking to consolidate. The Chinese also have obliquely suggested that President Reagan's confrontational posture toward Moscow could drag China into a conflict against its interests. At the same time they have expressed concern that a shift toward more "flexible" U.S. tactics to meet the Soviet challenge could result in U.S.-Soviet collusion at China's expense. Chinese criticisms of U.S. "hegemonism" in the Third World and of Washington's failure to consult with its Western European allies on strategic issues have been indirect expressions of Chinese suspicions about U.S. intentions toward China.

Early in the Reagan administration, a Chinese commentator praised the U.S. for attaching "primary importance in its foreign policy to contending with the Soviet Union and using its strength to check Soviet expansion."⁵³ The commentary also pointed favorably to the administration's policy of "linking" improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations to Moscow's international behavior. Other

Washington continue to maintain this common strategic orientation, despite bilateral differences over Taiwan and sometimes conflicting conceptions of the most effective means of countering Soviet power, such as the dispute over detente in the late 1970s.

Mao Zedong, during his historic talks with Richard Nixon in February 1982, emphasized that his principal concern was growing Soviet power.⁵⁰ This concern provided the basis for a new strategic analysis by Mao -- his "Three Worlds" theory -- which included the assessment that the Soviet Union was the superpower on the offensive globally while the U.S. was on the defensive in trying "to protect its interests in the world." Mao's analysis coincided with changing U.S. perceptions, according to Huan Xiang, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In an article in Foreign Affairs, Huan noted that Washington recognized that the U.S. and its allies alone "were not strong enough" to cope with growing Soviet power.⁵¹ He pointed out that Richard Nixon told Congress in 1982 that the U.S. "could not afford to be cut from a quarter of the world's population...In a word," Huan argued "both China and the United States felt the need to change their policies" to meet the Soviet challenge. "It was against this background," Huan concluded, "and through the joint efforts of the two countries that Sino-U.S. relations began to change, culminating in the Shanghai Communique during President Nixon's 1972 visit to China."

Chinese analysts point to the United States' long-term need to cooperate with other nations to counter Soviet power as ensuring the continuity of American strategic orientation toward China. In an assessment of U.S. policy at a time of increasing Sino-American tensions over Taiwan in August 1981, a Chinese analyst emphasized the "objective" need for the United States to develop a relationship with China. "As a declining superpower," the analyst wrote, "the United States is no longer capable of countering the Soviet Union on her own and also feels that the combined strength of her allies is still insufficient. This

Soviet border to counter the Soviet Union, but must also be prepared to carry out various kinds of negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to increase trade and economic contacts between the two countries. In the face of this changed situation, China has to step up its studies of the Soviet Union in order to flexibly and effectively handle its relations with the Soviet Union while adhering to the principles of anti-hegemonism and peaceful coexistence."⁴⁸ The article said such studies were "imperative" to "adequately know an antagonistic neighbor," and would also "provide an important reference for China's socialist construction" and help China "avoid repeating the mistakes the Soviet Union has committed."

While developing contacts with the Soviet Union, the Chinese have consistently sought to reassure the West and Japan that China has not altered its strategic posture. Premier Zhao Ziyang reportedly told visiting Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki in September 1982 that "Soviet hegemonism has not changed, therefore, China's opposition to hegemonism remains unchanged."⁴⁹ Zhao said that contacts between Beijing and Moscow might increase in the future, and added that this did not mean that the Chinese were no longer suspicious of the Soviets. The Chinese Premier noted that such contacts would help the Chinese monitor Soviet intentions more closely.

3-4 Sino-American Relations

3-4.1 Convergence of Strategic Views

The key factor in the 1971-72 Sino-American rapprochement, according to Chinese analysts, was common concern with growing Soviet power and the mutual recognition that the best way to counter that threat was through U.S.-Chinese reconciliation. For the past decade, Chinese analysts have stressed that this convergence of strategic views constituted the foundation of the Sino-U.S. relationship. They also note that Beijing and

The Chinese argue that no one country or existing alliance has sufficient strength to resist the Soviet Union. A Renmin Ribao commentary asserted that "the United States alone or China alone cannot effectively check Soviet expansion. Japan or other East Asian countries could achieve even less in this respect. It obviously will not do just to rely on the U.S.-Japanese alliance either."⁷⁷ In order to effectively deal with the Soviet challenge, the Chinese argue, "it is necessary to strengthen the cooperation between the U.S. and its allies as well as the cooperation with all forces that resist the Soviet Union, including China and other Third World countries."⁷⁸

A Renmin Ribao commentary in March 1981 provided an unusually detailed description of this united front: "The unity against hegemonism that China advocates means that each country concerned should proceed from common strategic interests; act under the principle of equality, step up consultations and promote coordination in policies and cooperate with and complement each other in action. Due to the fact that positions and circumstances of the different countries vary, it cannot be demanded that this unity should have a permanent form and take unified action. However, this certainly does not exclude each country adopting parallel policy and action in the light of its own circumstances. Since it is in the common interest of every country to oppose Soviet hegemonism, each party should take the stand of the overall strategic pattern, make every effort to preserve, consolidate and develop this pattern, and also readjust its policy to this effect; each party should make its own effort in uniting to oppose hegemonism, in accordance with what is possible for it."⁷⁹

Chinese public and private statements stress the importance of bilateral relations between antihegemonist countries in the consolidation and development of a global united front. In particular, they point to Sino-U.S. bilateral ties as a significant factor in China's regional and global strategy. A special

commentary in Renmin Ribao in July 1981 cited U.S.-Chinese relations as "an important link of the joint antihegemonist cause in the Asian and Pacific region" as well as "an important component of the global antihegemonist strategy."⁸⁰ The commentary also noted the "decisive role" played by the Third World in Chinese strategy and called for Western countries to strengthen cooperation and "cement" their ties with the Third World to prevent further expansion of Soviet influence.

Chinese commentators and analysts see China as an important participant in the united front. One analyst, writing in Sixiang Zhanxian, asserted that "joint antihegemonism" will "not come naturally."⁸¹ "It is necessarily promoted by the effort of the peace-loving people of the whole world and by all farsighted politicians," the analyst said, adding that "in this regard, our country's initiative and efforts will also play a positive and key role." Pointing out that China now "pins down 1 million Soviet troops," the analyst argued that when China is modernized and becomes powerful it "will be able to pin down half and not just a quarter of the Soviet military force."

Chinese public statements have discussed the functioning of the united front only in general terms. In an extensive informal talk in June 1982, one Chinese strategist presented a more detailed outline of China's strategy. He argued that comprehensive cooperation and coordination between China, the U.S., Japan and NATO is the only means of ensuring "reliable collective security at low cost, while achieving rapid economic growth." This comprehensive cooperation would include, he said:

- "Integrated deployment of all 'antihegemonic forces' with the U.S. at the center, China and Japan in the east and NATO countries in the west.

- "Development of a global logistical network which brings the geographical advantages of the participants into full play.
- "Reduction of internal waste by ceasing research, development and deployment of systems that threaten only antihegemonic countries."

Echoing Chinese public statements, the strategist stressed that China will never seek a formal alliance with the United States or any other country. But he argued that it is by maintaining its "independence and initiative" that China can most effectively contribute to the united front. He pointed to China's position as a leader in the Third World as useful in securing the support and participation of Third World countries in coordinated policies. The strategist also argued that "an ally is not necessarily reliable, whereas a partner in an anti-hegemonic united front may contribute more than some allies."

SECTION 4
SOVIET AND CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF WARTIME
STRATEGIC FACTORS

4-1 Soviet Perceptions of War and The China Factors

4-1.1 Introduction

Perceptions of geopolitical alignments and intentions are especially critical for the geographically vulnerable Soviet Union. Soviet defense planning is further complicated by the extraordinary demands of Soviet strategy and by the increasing concurrence of Soviet, American and Chinese views about the possible character and force requirements for a future global war. These commonly-held assumptions include:

- the balance of forces must be viewed globally, not just regionally, in assessment of regional conflict between any of the three powers
- a war between the United States and the Soviet Union could start in one theater and quickly spread to other theaters of conflict, becoming a global war
- the war could either remain conventional or escalate to the use of nuclear weapons
- in either case, the war could be protracted
- a protracted war, even if nuclear, could require full mobilization of all the resources of the societies involved, and peacetime preparations should be made to do so in a pre-war crisis
- even a nuclear war conceivably could, in some meaningful sense, be "won"

FROM WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE?, USSR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 1982

All three powers see Northeast Asia as one of the key potential theaters -- along with the Europe and Southwest Asia -- where a war could start or to which it could spread. Although China has only a regional conventional military capability at most, and only a small strategic nuclear force, China has an important impact on the global balance and Chinese leaders plan for the possibility of China being involved in a global protracted war. The Chinese base their deterrence strategy on the global balance of power as well as on the Sino-Soviet military balance.

4-1.2 Concern About Evolving U.S. Strategy

The Soviets have expressed growing concern in the last several years, especially since 1981, about changes in U.S. military strategy which has evolved toward assumptions similar to their own. Soviet military and civilian leaders have harshly criticized public statements by U.S. officials and newspaper "leaks" about U.S. global strategy which have stressed that the U.S. is preparing to meet Soviet military action through both horizontal and vertical escalation, if necessary, and to sustain a conflict beyond a "short war." "The Soviet Union is increasingly acquiring the forces for global operations," Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger noted in a major address on defense policy in April 1982, "and must be deterred with flexible and mobile forces." The Secretary of Defense said that "a conventional conflict beginning in Southwest Asia, the Far East or other areas could now have global implications. Our strategy is to deter Soviet aggression by the prospect of a collective military response at whatever level of conflict is required...if a conventional war should be forced upon us, the United States and allied forces may also have to launch counter-offensives elsewhere to restore the peace and protect our freedom. The United States may take military actions that threaten Soviet vulnerabilities critical to their prosecution of the war, should that prove necessary to restore the peace. We next must be able

to increase the sustainability of our forces in order to balance the Soviets' ability to endure a prolonged conventional conflict." Weinberger added that the U.S. had "abandoned reliance on the dangerous fallacy of a 'short war' -- that any conventional war would necessarily be short because the aggressor would retreat or the war would quickly escalate to the nuclear level."¹ According to the New York Times, 30 May 1982, Weinberger's Defense Guidance, FY 1984-88 directs U.S. armed forces to devise plans to defeat the Soviet Union at any level of conflict from insurgencies to nuclear war, and notes that nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union could be protracted.

4-1.3 Global War: Possibly Protracted, Theoretically Winnable

In a major statement of Soviet defense policy, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, wrote in March 1982 that "another world war, should the aggressive forces of imperialism succeed in unleashing it, would become a decisive clash between two antagonistic social systems. It would spread to all continents of the world and would be waged by coalitions of armed forces with the most decisive targets, with the use of all means of armed struggle."² Citing the potential need for "a timely switch of the armed forces and the entire country to a war footing," Ogarkov wrote that "in order to increase the military preparedness of the country, today as never before, it is necessary to coordinate mobilization and deployment of the armed forces and the entire economy and particularly the use of human resources, transport, communications and energy to secure the stability and livability" of the country.

Although Ogarkov described nuclear war as a cataclysmic and instant exchange, he also indicated the importance of being prepared to wage a protracted war effort. He wrote that industries involved in arms production should "improve their cooperation" and secure autonomous supplies of water and energy in the

eventuality of war." They should also establish reserves in machine tools and raw materials, the Soviet Chief of Staff wrote, adding that the links between the economy and civil defense should be strengthened, which is "one of the most important conditions to sustain the required levels of defense capacity for the entire country."

Ogarkov was more explicit in his writings on protracted nuclear war in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia in 1979 and 1980 then in 1982.³ He discussed the possibility of a protracted war in which "the entire military, economic and spiritual might of the belligerent states, coalitions and social systems will be fully utilized." Ogarkov said that such a protracted war could be conventional or nuclear: "Soviet military strategy takes into account the possibility that a world war can begin, and be waged for a certain time, with the use of only conventional weapons. However, the expansion of military operations can lead to its escalation into a general nuclear war, the chief means of which will be nuclear weapons, primarily strategic ones."

Ogarkov went on to argue that contrary to popular belief, nuclear war could be both protracted and winnable: "It is considered that with modern mass destruction, a world war will be of comparatively short duration. However, given the enormous military and economic potentials of the belligerent states' coalitions, the possibility cannot be excluded that the war could also be protracted. Soviet military strategy proceeds from the fact that if a nuclear war is foisted upon the Soviet Union, then the Soviet people and their armed forces must be ready for the most severe and prolonged trials." Ogarkov added that the Soviet Union and its allies possess certain advantages, based on their "just" war aims and the "progressive nature of the social and state order," which provide them with the "objective possibilities for achieving victory."

While other Soviet military writers have examined protracted war⁴, Ogarkov's views, repeatedly expressed in the last four years, represent authoritative Soviet military, and probably civilian leadership views on the subject. Ogarkov focuses on the problem of fighting and prevailing in global war and argues for greater defense expenditures and for mobilization to make possible a prolonged military struggle. But he does not contradict other official views that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons and that nuclear war would be a catastrophe threatening the existence of humanity. Nor does he suggest that nuclear war is a viable offensive option for achieving political goals other than survival of the Soviet Union. He simply does not address these issues, and discusses instead the requirements for the Armed Forces to fulfill their role once a nuclear war begins.

A useful perspective on Soviet nuclear strategy and avoidance of war is offered by Michael MccGwire: "Marxist-Leninist theory asserts that initiation of war as a deliberate act of policy can only be justified if (1) the Soviet Union is virtually certain of winning, and (2) the gains clearly outweigh the cost. War with the West meets neither of these criteria. Communist theory and Soviet national interest coincide in this matter, and it is widely accepted by students of the Soviet Union that the prevention and avoidance of world war is a prime objective of Soviet foreign policy."⁵ MccGwire adds that "it is the catastrophic consequence of defeat which explains why, despite the admittedly low probability of such a war occurring, preparations to fight and win one are given such high priority within the Soviet Union."⁶ Another Western analyst, Robert Arnett, argues that Soviet statements about goals should be differentiated from their realistic expectations. "They might believe that the Soviet Union should try to win and survive a nuclear war, but this does not necessarily mean that they believe such an objective is possible under current conditions."⁷ Most Soviet military writers, Arnett argues, "appear to have little doubt

that the United States has the capability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union."

4-1.4 Post-nuclear Phase Decisive

Soviet military planners may not be confident they can win or even survive a nuclear war. But they have to plan for the "worst case," which entails setting requirements based on assessments of war outcomes, and then working backwards. Steve Kime notes: "Many Western military analysts seem obsessed with the politics of the nuclear balance and focus on how the war might begin. Soviet military strategists formulate their plans with a steady eye on how the war might end."⁸ The first question the Soviet planner must ask, Kime suggests, is "who will control post-war Eurasia?" The Soviets envision a protracted war in which the conflict may be settled in the post-nuclear phase: it is the battlefield on which the victor, if there is to be a victor, will be determined, Kime concludes, "War will probably be a global affair, but victory and survival have a distinct continental focus in the Russian mind." The history of repeated invasions has led Soviet planning to be based on perceived geographic vulnerability: the Soviet Union is surrounded by potentially hostile invaders, and in a post-nuclear phase of a general war, the Soviet Union could face dismemberment at the hands of peoples and states which in peacetime pose little or no threat to Moscow.

This "geographical vulnerability" reinforces Soviet thinking about the importance of planning for a possible conventional phase of combat after a nuclear exchange -- combat not with the United States but with the Soviet Union's vast array of neighbors and near-neighbors. Marshall Sokolovsky wrote in the 1960s: "in order to achieve victory in war (including nuclear war), it is still not sufficient to destroy the military potential of the aggressor, his strategic combat weapons, and his main groups of armed forces, and to destroy his government and military leader-

ship. For final victory it is absolutely necessary to defeat the armed forces of the enemy, capture his military bases if for some reason they cannot be destroyed, and to seize strategically important regions. In addition, it is also necessary to defend one's own country from invasion by land, air and naval forces. These tasks and a number of others can be performed only by modern ground troops..."⁹ In terms similar to Ugarkov's writings of the 1980s, Sokolovskiy called for preparations for such a protracted conflict: "The enormous possibilities of nuclear-rocket weapons and other means of combat enable the goals of war to be attained within a relatively short time...But the war may drag on and this will demand protracted and all-out exertion of the army and people. Therefore, we must also be ready for a protracted war and get the human and material resources into a state of preparedness for this eventuality."

One need not suggest the Soviets are trying to deceive the United States -- or their own population -- when they say both that nuclear war would be cataclysmic and possibly even destroy humanity, and that the Soviet Union must prepare for the possibility of protracted war, including protracted nuclear war.¹⁰ For the Soviet military planner, the problem is to assess and counter the potential threats to the Soviet Union -- even if the "worst case" may not be manageable with any confidence with current forces.¹¹ They also must seek to prevent war from escalating to unmanageable levels, that is, to deter escalation by prevailing at a lower level of conflict or creating military conditions for a political solution. Nevertheless, the Soviets must plan for the most stressing possibility, which -- based on their doctrine, strategy and geography -- is a protracted global conflict that continues beyond massive nuclear exchanges and leaves a crippled Soviet Union vulnerable to attack by its previously weaker neighbors. The problem for the Soviet planner, then is to determine the forces that threaten Moscow's control of Soviet territory, and to prepare to defeat those forces and to ensure the slower recovery of the enemy relative to the Soviet Union.

4-1.5 China as Post-nuclear Threat

From this perspective, the greatest threat to the survival much less "victory" of the Soviet Union, is China. Even if a global war with the United States does not initially involve the Chinese, the Soviets must plan to defeat a Chinese enemy that may seek to take advantage of a war-ravaged Soviet Union by seizing Soviet territory and even attacking the Russian heartland.¹² Thus, the Soviets must plan to destroy Chinese conventional as well as nuclear forces and to ensure that China revives more slowly than does the Soviet Union. The Soviets fear that through sheer numbers of survivors and backwardness and decentralization of its economy, China would have serious advantages for survival in a nuclear war. China could be a serious threat to the Soviet Union in a protracted post-war struggle -- a struggle in which the technological means of combat may have been equalized by the disruption and destruction of nuclear conflict. "The thought least likely to inspire composure in the minds of Soviet leaders," Benjamin Lambeth of RAND argues, "is the prospect of being reduced to China's level of industrial stature and thus prey to Chinese revanchism as the necessary price for strategic 'victory' in a war with the United States."¹³

A Soviet military analyst, interviewed at Moscow's USA Institute in 1981, explained his perceptions of the implications of Sino-American military cooperation, saying that "China could attack the Soviet Union following a U.S.-Soviet war, including a nuclear war." Another military analyst said "the danger of nuclear war is the greatest concern for the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and it could happen in the interest of a third country. Even if the war is not over China, it would be good for China." A third Institute military analyst indicated Soviet fear of China's indestructability when he asked "who knows what assured destruction of China is?"

These Soviet comments suggest underlying Soviet fears which are expressed in the frequently repeated charge that China is seeking to provoke a nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union: the Soviets fear Chinese survivability and potential ability to counterattack a crippled Soviet Union. The Chinese do not fear losing a few hundred million people in a nuclear war, Soviet analysts insist, and the surviving Chinese will be the only beneficiaries of a global nuclear conflict.

4-1.6 Nuclear Force Requirements Against China

Soviet concern about surviving Chinese conventional forces and the post-nuclear phase of war suggests that Soviet nuclear force requirements for China may be much larger than is generally recognized. Soviet SS-20s, Backfire bombers, and other nuclear systems deployed in the Far East and Siberia may be sufficient for destroying Chinese nuclear systems.¹⁴ But the Soviets are threatened by more than Chinese nuclear forces: if the Soviet target list for China is expanded to include conventional forces, leadership and C³ structures, along with industrial targets, economic recovery assets and infrastructure facilities, then the potential demands on Soviet forces are immense.

Some sense of the magnitude of Soviet nuclear force requirements to meet such demands may be gained from United States planning for nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union. Although hypothesizing the Soviets' behavior by mirror-imaging can be misleading, the process of targetting nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union likely follows the same logic as in the United States. This mirror-imaging indicates the magnitude of the problem faced by the Soviet Union in managing all the potential threats perceived by Soviet leaders and military planners. Reports on U.S. planning indicate that the list of potential targets in the Soviet Union includes several tens of thousands of military, political and economic installations.¹⁵ American planners have approximately 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads with

which to cover that immense and growing SIOP target list, and many of the U.S. strategic systems must be held in reserve. A Soviet planner may be forced to make even more difficult choices, working with a smaller inventory of warheads to be allocated against a presumably much larger target set that includes CONUS and worldwide U.S. targets, NATO military and non-military targets, and Chinese targets.

Since a Soviet target list for China based on the SIOP categories would have to be immense compared with a list restricted to nuclear weapons and related facilities, the Soviets may view their rapidly growing arsenal of strategic and theater nuclear systems as still inadequate for simultaneously covering the perceived global threats to the Soviet Union, including Chinese targets. Soviet diplomacy would aim at avoiding simultaneous combat, should war occur. But the Soviet planner has to prepare for the worst case. Some Western strategists have suggested one of the Soviets' goals in expanding their nuclear arsenal has been to make the China threat more manageable by making possible preemption of China's nuclear force while withholding a sufficient reserve to deter a U.S. attack. Edward Luttwak, for example, points out that "a Soviet disarming counterforce offensive would have expended three-quarters of the Soviet ICBM arsenal in 1967 and as much as one-half of the more modern ICBMs as late as 1972, but would only require a small fraction (less than 10 percent) of the Soviet ICBM arsenal now."¹⁶ Luttwak's calculation presumes about 400-500 Soviet warheads would be used against Chinese nuclear weapons and facilities, however, not the vast array of other military, economic, political and C³ targets for which this analysis argues the Soviets likely perceive they must reserve nuclear forces. In addition, unless the Soviets are irrevocably committed to devastating China at the outbreak of a U.S./Soviet nuclear war, these China-reserve warheads must be nuclear weapons that can survive U.S. nuclear strikes.¹⁷ What would the conservative Soviet planner consider an adequate number of surviving nuclear

argue, "is geared to preparing for fighting nuclear war as well as conventional war, and they are ready to engage in wars using any kind of weapons." Not only is the Soviet Union aiming to "overtake the United States in high technology and finally wrest all-round superiority from it," but Moscow has also switched from a defensive to an offensive military strategy. This is shown in the types of weapons deployed in the past decade or so, including highly-accurate MIRVed ICBMs, sophisticated tanks and infantry fighting vehicles like the T-72 and the BMP to "increase firepower, attack capabilities and mobility," large surface attack ships, including aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers, and advanced bombers and tactical fighters, and long-range transport aircraft. "In short," Cheng and Yao conclude, "the Soviet armed forces, after a decade or so, besides maintaining their traditional edge in ground forces, have also gradually made good their deficiencies in nuclear strategic, naval and air forces to become a global armed force basically capable of meeting the various needs of Soviet expansionism."

A prominent feature of the Soviets' offensive military strategy, the Chinese analysts argue, is its emphasis on surprise and preemption. "Based on this operational concept of surprise attack, the Soviet Union has clearly stipulated for the various services the task of launching surprise attacks on the enemy and demanded that it should be put into practice in peace-time maneuvers and training." Cheng and Yao note that the Strategic Rocket Forces and long-range aviation carry out their maneuvers mainly at night, Sundays or holidays. They also argue that surprise includes diplomatic deception to mislead the enemy of Soviet intentions on the eve of an offensive.

All these elements of the Soviets' offensive strategy in conventional war were employed in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia: "in this operation, the Soviet Union put into action 25 divisions, 800 aircraft and 7,000 tanks, and brought under control the important strategic points in Czechoslovakia

Wenbin, was published in Renmin Ribao, the Party newspaper, January 11, 1980.⁴¹ Although the article was published under the highly authoritative byline "Special Commentator," it is an edited version of a paper written by the two BIISS analysts for a conference in Washington in November 1979.⁴² Cheng and Yao perceive a major shift in the Soviet view of war following the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. "In Khrushchev's time," they argue, "the Soviet Union considered nuclear war using rockets the only type of war, holding that any war, even if it began as a conventional or non-nuclear war, would eventually develop into a devastating nuclear war fought by means of rockets." But in the Brezhnev period, they say, "the Soviet assessment of war gradually underwent a change, and it was announced that 'there could be a nuclear war, or a conventional war; a world war, or a limited war.'" Thus, Cheng and Yao conclude, "the Soviet Union has affirmed the possibility not only of a conventional war, but also of a nuclear war, either limited or worldwide."

The BIISS analysts say that with this new Soviet assessment came a new attitude toward nuclear weapons, which is now one of "nuclear blackmail to hold back the outbreak of a nuclear war and, at the same time, preparing for war so as to win the war if one breaks out." With this in mind, "the Soviet Union has been energetically developing its strategic offensive nuclear weapons as well as paying great attention to civil defense within its borders and redistributing its industries to survive a nuclear attack." Cheng and Yao assert that the Soviets adopted a "counterforce" strategy of targeting "enemy nuclear delivery systems" as well as conventional forces and military bases.

Not only have the Soviets moved from finite deterrence to a nuclear warfighting strategy, including limited nuclear war, the Chinese analysts argue, but they have also stressed the buildup of conventional forces, which had been neglected in the Khrushchev period. "Their military strategy," Cheng and Yao

4-2 Chinese Perceptions of War and Soviet Strategy

4-2.1 Introduction

The Chinese share the Soviet view that ground forces determine the final outcome of war despite the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons. Chinese leaders and strategists also argue, as do the Soviets, that a war involving the use of nuclear weapons could be protracted, go through a phase of major nuclear exchanges and even continue with the use of only conventional forces or with nuclear and conventional forces. The Chinese also see that China poses a major threat to the Soviet Union in such a protracted conflict, especially in the context of a global nuclear war in which the Soviet Union has sustained nuclear destruction and a degradation of its military capability in combat with the United States.

Soviet strategic thinking has its origins in pre-revolutionary Russian history, the character of the struggle for power during and after the revolution, and the protracted struggle against the German invasion in World War II. The Chinese view of war also grows out of the protracted war experience of the civil war and the fight against the Japanese invasion force, as well as millenia of wars within China and between China and foreign forces. Although their revolutionary experiences are very different -- the Soviets did not fight a protracted guerrilla struggle -- the Chinese have a uniquely keen appreciation of Soviet views of war, which is partly based on shared ideological roots.

4-2.2 Soviet Military Strategy

One of the most important public Chinese documents analyzing Soviet military doctrine and strategy was written by two top analysts from the Defense Ministry's Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies. The paper, by Cheng Mingqun and Yao

another under some circumstances. The Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for FY 1983 notes that the Soviets "can use their interior lines of communication to change rapidly the front at which they might concentrate their forces for power projection. They can, for example, rapidly move airborne forces and air forces on their periphery and they can shift Backfire bombers to attack our fleets more rapidly than we can shift aircraft carriers between widely separated regions near the Soviet Union."⁴⁰ Redeployment of large numbers of ground forces, however, would be risky and time consuming, and would likely be detected, thus losing the element of surprise seen vital to Soviet strategy. Furthermore, Soviet statements and perceptions provide indications that the Soviets do not plan to swing their forces from one theater to another in a pre-war or wartime situation. Nevertheless, a potential for swinging some forces exists, especially if the Soviets can be confident of peace on one of their fronts while launching an attack on the other.

reach of southern regions of the Soviet Union combines with the string of U.S. military bases stretching from the Mediterranean across the Middle East to Pakistan and countries in Southeast Asia. In effect, the Soviet Union is compelled to reckon with the likelihood of a blockade being put up around it. This is being made increasingly apparent, among other things, by the growing political and military cooperation between the United States and China.

"Further, it ought to be borne in mind that by virtue of its favorable geographical situation the United States can ensure the defense of its own national frontiers by a minimal force. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is compelled to guarantee proper balance and dependable defense by distributing its forces along the entire length of its borders and, moreover, ensuring a rough equilibrium in the World Ocean where it is exposed to growing dangers from the U.S. nuclear navy. Lastly, we ought to remember that the United States can add freely to its troop strength in Europe and Asia by moving reserves and weaponry stationed in its national territory, where they are not pinned down by anyone and in no way hemmed in. In this sense, the Soviet Union would be in a far less favorable position in the event of a conflict. (emphasis added)

"It is therefore completely wrong to compare the aggregate strength of the Soviet armed forces to the strength of NATO troops in Europe, as this is often done in the West, and to overlook the radical distinction in the geostrategic position of the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. It is clear that the more complicated global geostrategic situation of the Soviet Union makes its position in the European theater less favorable than that of the United States."³⁹ (emphasis added)

This does not mean that the Soviets could not and would not swing some of their forces -- especially rapidly redeployable forces such as air and airborne forces -- from one theater to

concludes that "the Soviet political-military leadership is acutely concerned about the prospect of a two-front war and could never be assured that the Chinese would not try to capitalize on a Soviet-American confrontation, either as an ally of the United States or independently, with a view toward exploiting the Soviet Union's predicament."³⁷ The Soviets are also likely inhibited from swinging substantial forces from the West to the East. Strategic Survey, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, suggests that "Soviet ground forces deployed in Siberia are capable of conducting limited offensive operations into China with a good chance of achieving initial success, especially in Western China. Substantial reinforcements from the European USSR would be required, however, to permit any chance of seizing and holding large areas of northern China. Such reinforcement plans are considered unlikely in light of the threat which the Soviet Union perceives from the West."³⁸

One of the most detailed and explicit official Soviet discussions of the Soviet Union's geostrategic situation, including the problem of two-front war, was in The Threat to Europe, published in the fall of 1981 to influence Western European opinion. The 74-page pamphlet, seeking to justify Soviet military strength as matching "defensive needs," argued:

"The Soviet Union's strategic situation compels it, for purposes of defense, to ensure not only a general equilibrium of strength between it and the USA, and between the Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO, but also a regional equilibrium in separate theaters, each with its own military specifics....

"Faced in the west by the NATO bloc, which includes three nuclear powers, the Soviet Union is simultaneously exposed to danger in the east from two American Pacific nuclear fleets and from China with its growing nuclear potential and the world's most numerous army. Furthermore, the deployment of U.S. naval nuclear forces in the northern sector of the Indian Ocean within

Arbatov also pointed out that the thrust of Soviet peacetime policy must be to prevent the coalescing of such a military coalition against the Soviet Union, and he indicated this could be achieved: "Only a very bad policy could lead to a joint military coup by the four (the U.S., Japan, China and Western Europe). That can be avoided by a good policy." A "good policy" presumably would aim at exacerbation of contradictions between the U.S. on the one hand and the NATO countries, Japan and China on the other, for example, through a "peace" policy toward Western Europe calling for arms control and detente, and new gestures toward Beijing calling for talks on improving relations. A "bad" policy might be an invasion of Afghanistan which heightens the shared perception of the Soviet threat and pushes China, Japan and Western Europe away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States.

4-1.9 Dangers of "Swinging" Forces

From the Soviets' geostrategic perspective, the prospect of "swinging" forces from one theater to another in a crisis or wartime situation is likely considered dangerous. Soviet statements suggest that the goal of Soviet planning is to have adequate forces-in-being in each theater to handle all contingencies. One Soviet author notes in his writings on the Manchurian Campaign that Soviet fears of the Japanese opening a second front against the Soviet Union during World War II "compelled the USSR constantly to maintain up to 40 divisions on its Far Eastern frontiers, though they were desperately needed for the war in the West." The author says that Japan had hoped the Soviet Union would become so pressed by the Germans that it "would shift part of this force from the Far East to the Soviet-German front." He quotes the Japanese Deputy War Minister as saying: "We believed the USSR would transfer its troops from the Soviet Far East to the Western Front and Japan would be able to seize the Soviet Far East without heavy losses."³⁶ The Soviets seem to perceive a similar dilemma today. Benjamin Lambeth

dilemma outlined above. Put another way, if the Soviet leadership were to decide to take such risky military action against China, they would likely do so because they perceived fundamental national interests at stake, such as the survival of the Soviet Union itself, and thus be prepared to risk escalation.³⁴ At that point, there would likely be no limits on the use of force against China, including nuclear weapons, as a prelude to or in conjunction with an attack on the West.

Soviet diplomacy and the buildup of Soviet military power are aimed at reducing the likelihood of coordinated two-front war against them on the one hand, and acquiring sufficient military power to defeat all their enemies simultaneously on the other. The Soviet perception of open-ended force requirements in response to the coalition threat of the U.S., China, Japan and Western Europe -- and the need to prevent coalition warfare against the Soviet Union -- was implied in unusual comments by Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, and an advisor to President Brezhnev. Arbatov claimed in a March 1981 interview with the West German magazine Der Spiegel that "nobody in our country has the illusion of being able to gain superiority" over the combined forces of Japan, China, the U.S. and Western Europe, although, he said "we are sufficiently armed to beat every attack back."³⁵ But with 25 percent of the gross national product and 15 percent of the population of these four," Arbatov said, "we can never be militarily stronger than these four together." The implications of Arbatov's remarks are twofold: first, the coalition arrayed against the Soviet Union -- including China -- forms the basis of Soviet threat perceptions and provides for open-ended force requirements that can never be attained in practice; second, however great the Soviet military buildup -- even if the Soviet Union achieves superiority over the U.S. alone -- it is justified to meet the combined threat of its potential enemies. If the Soviet Union can concentrate its forces on any one enemy or lesser combination of enemies, Arbatov implies however, it can prevail in the conflict with current forces.

4-1.8 Geostrategic Context of Military Options Against China

While the Soviets have often discussed the Manchurian model, Western analysts have suggested the Soviets have other military options against China, including cross-border attacks, seizure of Xinjiang province or other sparsely-populated areas, massive conventional air attacks against industrial targets, nuclear pre-emption of Chinese nuclear forces, and large-scale nuclear, chemical or biological warfare attacks to reduce China to chaos.³² Although some analysts argue that the Soviets would avoid playing into China's "people's war" strategy by engaging in a large-scale invasion of populated areas, others argue that Soviet conventional superiority in mobility and firepower is so great that a Manchurian-style campaign would be successful.³³ Some of these scenarios may be realistic: the Soviets have deployed a vast and expensive war making potential in the Far East in both conventional and nuclear forces, and they undoubtedly perceive militarily viable options for use of these forces. This analysis does not attempt to assess viability of various conceivable Soviet options, but rather to note that these are options based on Western perceptions and not on known Soviet perceptions.

This analysis suggests that the Soviets view military options vis-a-vis China in a global geostrategic context, and that they see potentially unacceptable risks involved in any effective military action against China. It is likely that the Soviets view the use of force against China on a scale small enough to be diplomatically and militarily low-risk as having little chance of achieving significant political goals and possibly being politically counter-productive. On the other hand, the use of force against China on a scale large enough to achieve important political goals -- major changes in Chinese foreign policy, the toppling of the Chinese leadership, or even the "regionalization" of China -- would also carry major risks of political and military failure, and more importantly, could expose the Soviet Union to the dangers of the larger geostrategic

scale offensive preparations without detection, especially if they had to "swing" forces from the West. In 1945, the Soviet military judged the 40 Soviet divisions in the Far East insufficient to launch such an attack. While those forces were of relatively low quality, they were also facing an occupying army that was perhaps mortally weakened by the general collapse of Japan's war effort. The Japanese had no popular base of support in China and also faced indigeneous Chinese Communist forces which assisted the Soviets. The Soviets today have better troops and far superior fire power and mobility. But they also face a more determined adversary that potentially could fight a protracted "people's war" even if the Soviets initially overwhelmed them. Chinese analysts and officials insist that the Soviets would need 3 to 5 million troops to successfully launch such an attack into Mancurian, while Soviet analysts interviewed by the author say Soviet forces would be insufficient to give Moscow assurance of a lightning campaign brought to a quick, successful conclusion.

Even if the Soviets did not have to risk the detection of their offensive preparations or the drawn down their forces elsewhere through transfer of troops and equipment to the Far East, they would have to be prepared to risk two-front combat. The Manchurian model is premised on avoidance of two-front war as well as on drawing forces from the second front. In pointing to this two-front dilemma in their writings about the 1945 Campaign, the Soviets are revealing an awareness of the grave risks of launching such an attack on China today. Soviet diplomatic strategy would have to be directed toward neutralizing a second front; but even if successful, Moscow would have to worry about possible escalation that could lead to Chinese nuclear attacks on the Soviet homeland, leaving the Soviet Union more vulnerable to Western military blackmail. In addition, the Soviets could not count out U.S. direct or indirect military assistance to China, which could both decrease Soviet chances for a quick victory and increase the possibility of confrontation with the United States.³¹

The Soviets resisted allied entreaties to join the war against Japan while they were still fighting Germany. Instead, Stalin agreed at Yalta to enter the war within two months of the end of the war in the West. Not only did the Soviets want to avoid fighting on two fronts simultaneously, they also wanted to more than double their forces in the Far East in preparation for a successful "lightning war" against the Kwantung Army. The additional forces -- some 750,000 -- had to be moved thousands of kilometers from the Western front, and many were transported to the Far East directly from combat in Eastern Europe. The transfer of these forces, along with massive quantities of armor, artillery, and aircraft -- the second critical factor of the Manchurian model -- allowed the Soviets to achieve the necessary superiority to quickly overwhelm the Japanese.

This movement of 50 divisions and their equipment was done in nearly complete secrecy, making possible the third key element -- surprise. The Soviets obtained strategic surprise through diplomatic measures as well as military secrecy. Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov sought to convince the Japanese that the Soviet Union would not attack Japan until the spring of 1946, and "Japanese intelligence informed Tokyo that the Soviet Union was militarily incapable of doing so" before then.²⁹ The Soviets achieved sufficient secrecy in their military buildup to disguise its scale. In addition, Soviet writings note "the successfully camouflaged" conversion of "border defense positions into offensive start sites and the secret deployment there of Front and army strike groupings," which made it possible to obtain complete surprise in executing the first operations at the beginning of the war.³⁰

These key elements of success of the 1945 Manchurian Campaign pointed to by Soviet military writers would be very problematic for Moscow to duplicate in attacking China today. The Soviets possibly could deceive the Chinese about their intentions, but they would have great difficulty making large

"the swift operations" of Soviet forces prevented the Japanese from using such weapons.²⁶ The Soviets may hope that a Manchurian Campaign-style surprise attack could be so disruptive and disorienting, and achieve its political goals so quickly, that the Chinese would not be able to respond with nuclear weapons. They also may hope not to have to use tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) themselves to achieve rapid success. But they cannot be certain about the Chinese response. China reported for the first time in June 1982 that it had conducted a major combine arms exercise involving simulated use of TNW²⁷ -- thus signalling the Soviets that China is preparing for possible Soviet use of TNW, and that the People's Liberation Army may be planning to use nuclear weapons against an invading Soviet force.

The uncertainty introduced into the Manchurian model for China by nuclear weapons may be no less disquieting to Soviet planners than other key aspects of the 1945 Campaign pointed to by Soviet military writers. Probably the most important factor they discuss is Moscow's prevention of a two-front war. Through force and diplomacy, Stalin successfully discouraged Japan from opening a second front against the Soviet Union, as they had promised Hitler they would, so that the Soviet armed forces could concentrate on defeating the Germans first. Prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Soviets delivered two sharp, didactic defeats to the Japanese forces occupying Manchuria -- at Lake Khasan in 1938 and at Kalkhin Gol in 1939. The Soviets nevertheless fought hundreds of border skirmishes against the Japanese during the war and had to maintain 40 divisions in the Far East -- only about ten divisions fewer than are deployed in the Far East today. The Soviets paid a price for this, according to one Soviet account, which argues that "undoubtedly the war against Nazi Germany would have ended earlier and with smaller losses for the Soviet Union if the latter had not been compelled to maintain large military forces in the Far East."²⁸

pieces, 5,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery, about 3,800 aircraft, and a naval force of over 600 combat vessels and submarines, and 1,500 naval aircraft.²¹ Soviet forces "enjoyed a 30 percent superiority in manpower; their superiority in artillery was nearly five to one, in tanks - four to one, and aircraft - almost two to one," according to a Soviet analysis, which concluded that such "superiority enabled the Soviet forces to accomplish their missions successfully."²²

Along three fronts -- stretching for 5,000 kilometers -- the Soviets launched a "massive, simultaneous, combined arms surprise offensive that enveloped and defeated the Kwantung army within 6 days."²³ The depths of the front missions ranged from 300 km to 800 km. One study by RAND concluded that the published Soviet writings on the Manchurian Campaign show that it is "the main Soviet precedent for strategically decisive, offensive operations," which may have been the model for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. "The outstanding features of this campaign, aside from the relatively light casualties incurred by Soviet forces, were the size, suddenness, speed, and depth of its initial operations. The Campaign is unique among Soviet military campaigns for having achieved major war objectives entirely within its 'initial phase,' the period of greatest concern in modern Soviet military doctrine. Such stunning success has thus made it an exceptionally attractive model for modern military emulation, given the dilemma posed by the traumatizing paralysis suffered before World War II and by the potentially apocalyptic outcome of the initial phase of a modern nuclear war."²⁴

The RAND report notes that the published Soviet material on the Campaign neither presumes nor excludes the use of nuclear weapons, "suggesting discrete uncertainties, internal differences and deliberate suspensions of judgment" on the issue.²⁵ Soviet writers, however, obliquely refer to the subject of nuclear weapons in noting that "the Japanese command pinned high hopes on 'new' methods of warfare," including bacteriological weapons, but

warheads, strategic and theater (and surviving conventional forces in the Far East), to manage the potential China threat? Can the U.S. threat be managed while reserving adequate forces for China, or the Chinese managed while a sufficient reserve is maintained for the U.S.?

4-1.7 "Lessons" of Manchuria

Do the Soviets perceive lesser military options against China that could achieve political goals at an acceptable cost with a minimum risk of escalation to the "worst case" nightmare of a protracted global nuclear war? Soviet and American writings have pointed to the 1945 Soviet route of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria as a model for a Soviet attack on China.¹⁸ An analysis of Soviet writings on the Manchurian campaign, however, suggests that the Soviets, in extolling and explaining the "model" campaign and its "relevance to war" under modern conditions, have actually demonstrated why it cannot be duplicated in the current strategic environment.

The Manchurian Campaign model began receiving considerable attention in Soviet military writings beginning in the early 1960s, coinciding with the Sino-Soviet split. Western experts suggest that the 1945 Campaign provided the planning model for the Soviet buildup against China in the Far East in the late 1960s and early 1970s.¹⁹ Both Soviet and Chinese analysts in private discussions point to the Manchurian Campaign as the model for potential Soviet operations against China, and American analysts have suggested that it is not only the model for action against the Chinese, but also the proto-type for Soviet offensive operations elsewhere.

The Manchurian campaign in August 1945 routed Japan's million-troop²⁰ Kwantung Army in less than a week at the end of World War II. At the start of the offensive, Soviet forces comprised 1.5 million men, more than 26,000 mortars and artillery

within only six hours and the armed occupation of the whole country within three days by adopting the customary tricks of surprise attack, slackening the vigilance of the opponents through negotiations, concentrating the troops on the pretext of maneuvers, employing large numbers of airborne units and launching rapid assaults with tanks and motorized units."

4-2.3 Prospects for a Manchurian Campaign

The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia largely followed the model of the Manchurian Campaign, which Chinese analysts and officials argue is the basis of Soviet military planning against China. But they also stress that it would not be successful. One Chinese foreign ministry official, in a discussion in Beijing in September 1981, outlined what he saw as the reasons why the Manchurian Campaign cannot be duplicated under current conditions: 1) the Soviets cannot secure the other front as they did in World War II both to prevent fighting on two fronts simultaneously and to enable them to move large numbers of troops to the East; 2) they cannot insure secrecy in the buildup and preparations for the attack; 3) they would not be fighting an occupying army with no popular support; and 4) they would not have the additional asset of the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army, which played an important role in tying down Kwantung Army units prior to and during the Soviet offensive. Chinese officials and scholars consistently repeated the estimate that the Soviets would need 3-5 million troops to attack China on a large scale like the Manchurian Campaign.⁴³

A BIISS analyst privately argued that, on the one hand, "China's one billion population can digest millions of enemy troops in battle," and that on the other, China "would take the initiative and counterattack," adding that "military strategists realize that the Soviet Far East is very vulnerable." Several Chinese specialists suggested that China could launch counterattacks at Soviet cities such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok to retaliate, and to sever LOCs and attack food supplies.

A BIISS assessment in spring 1981 reportedly concluded that the likely Soviet goal of a large-scale attack on China would be the occupation of all Chinese territory north of the Yellow River -- which includes Beijing and is a much larger area than that covered by the Manchurian Campaign.⁴⁴ According to the BIISS study, for the Soviets to succeed would require 4-5 million mechanized troops committed to fight for at least ten years. The prospects of the Soviet Union launching such an attack on China were judged virtually nil, however, partially because major Soviet military assets were already tied down on other fronts and because the Soviets were engaged in a renewed strategic and naval arms competition with the United States.

4-2.4 Tactical Nuclear War

The Chinese stress that they are prepared to engage not only in a prolonged people's war against a Soviet conventional attack, but also to fight and defeat the Soviets even if they use nuclear weapons. A Foreign Ministry official said that the Soviet Union might use TNW or chemical weapons in an invasion of China, but that "this would not change the character of the war or give them victory over China. China is too vast." He added that "China might respond to Soviet use of TNW by use of TNW itself." A BIISS strategist said only: "theoretically, the Soviet Union is preparing to wage both conventional and nuclear war, but with a stress on the former. But we will not leave anything to chance in our preparations -- we are ready for both."

While these general statements reflect official thinking about a possible Sino-Soviet conflict and more generally the nature of warfare, there have been few public discussions in China of these issues in detail. A rare glimpse into PLA debates on TNW was provided in an article in Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) in 1979 that showed serious concern about the need for the PLA to prepare for possible Soviet use of battlefield nuclear weapons.⁴⁵ The article criticized a "popular theory"

that "in the initial stages of a future war, or even throughout the entire war, the enemy is 'most unlikely' to use nuclear weapons to attack us."

The Jiefangjun Bao article took issue with the four reasons for the conclusion presented by the proponents of this view: 1) that it is "very difficult to distinguish" the use of TNW and of strategic weapons and thus the enemy would risk Chinese retaliation with strategic nuclear weapons; 2) that TNW would not be useful against Chinese defensive positions in the mountains; 3) that "the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with wars of predatory aggression"; and 4) that "since the enemy enjoys absolute superiority in conventional weapons, he is unlikely to use nuclear weapons in the initial stages of the war, even though he might use them in its final stage." The author noted that he found it "disturbing to base our war preparations and troop training on the strength of this theory," and went on to a detailed discussion of the small size and battlefield usefulness of TNW. He also suggested that China could also use TNW without triggering a massive Soviet attack on China cities: "if the enemy used tactical nuclear weapons to attack our major defense positions and if we hit back with tactical nuclear weapons, the enemy would not resort lightly to strategic nuclear weapons." The primary reason the author gives for this firebreak is that if the Soviets escalated to use strategic weapons, they "would face unfavorable international reaction." As far as the author was concerned, international reaction would act as a greater constraint on the escalation from TNW to strategic weapons than from conventional weapons to use of battlefield nuclear weapons -- but he indicated that PLA planning had been based on the opposite assumption. The author went on to note that "use of tactical nuclear weapons has gained top priority in Soviet military thinking" and in the planning and equipping of Soviet forces above the divisional level. The Jiefangjun Bao article also argued that the use of TNW would not destroy "urban centers, residential areas, and industrial bases -- the objective of pillage and en-

slavement," but rather would further the Soviets' strategy, which "rests on a sudden, extensive and overpowering attack" to achieve their "predatory objectives within the shortest possible time."

The 1979 Jiefangjun Bao article concluded by calling for emotional as well as material preparation for the Soviets' use of TNW in the initial stages of a future war, and warned that "if we believe a nuclear war is 'unlikely to occur,' pay very little attention to the study of nuclear war, do not include nuclear war in training, and do not base combat planning on the possibility of tactical nuclear attack but go by subjective, wishy-washy concepts, the consequences will be unthinkable in case the enemy actually uses nuclear weapons."

The Jiefangjun Bao article probably reflected a debate that was going on at the time within the Chinese military, and possibly civilian, leadership over the strategy and tactics of "people's war under modern conditions." That debate may have since been resolved. In June 1982, the PLA held its first publicly-acknowledged maneuvers involving the use of TNW. A detailed Chinese report described the exercise as involving simulated Soviet use of TNW in the initial stage of a massive air and ground assault on Chinese positions.⁴⁶ The report also described Chinese use of TNW: "Our troops nuclear strike capability zeroed in on the targets, took the enemy by surprise and dealt his artillery positions and reserve forces a crushing blow." The exercise was explained as implementing "our army's new task in organizing training under modern conditions," while at the same time concluding that a Soviet invasion would be engulfed "in the boundless ocean of people's war."⁴⁷

4-2.5 Protracted Nuclear War and Post-nuclear "Revivability"

While the Chinese are in a period of transition in their military strategy and planning -- deciding the meaning of "people's war under modern conditions" -- they continue to stress

planning to fight a protracted war, including a protracted nuclear war. Like the Soviets, they do not view the large-scale use of strategic nuclear weapons as either the end of civilization or the end of the war, although they acknowledge that their cities and industrial assets could be destroyed.⁴⁸ A rare authoritative statement outlining top-level Chinese thinking on protracted war was made on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PLA in 1977 by Su Yu of the Party's Military Affairs Commission:

"We do not deny that nuclear weapons have great destructive power and inflict heavy casualties, but they cannot be counted on to decide the outcome of a war. The aggressors can use them to destroy a city or town, but they cannot occupy them, still less win the people's hearts; on the contrary, they will only arouse indignation and resistance from the people of the country invaded and the world's people at large...Everybody knows that under the conditions when both sides have nuclear weapons, such weapons pose a much greater threat to the imperialists and social-imperialist countries whose industries and population are highly concentrated. China's economic construction takes agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor and adopts the principle of combining industry with agriculture, the cities with the countryside, large and medium-sized projects with small ones, and production in peacetime with preparedness against war. Thus it cannot be destroyed by any modern weapons."⁴⁹

The following year, on the occasion of the 51st anniversary of the PLA, Defense Minister Xu Xiangjian stressed the need to prepare to "successfully turn the nation from a peacetime to a wartime system of life and work" in the event of war.⁵⁰ "In a modern war," he wrote, "there is not much difference between the front and the rear and the various areas may be cut off from each other. Hence the need to build the base rear areas into strategic bases capable of supporting a prolonged war and fighting on their own." Xu called for military modernization, includ-

ing "new-type conventional equipment" and "better atom bombs, guided missiles and other sophisticated weapons," to "build up the material basis of increasing the might of people's war under modern conditions." The defense minister nevertheless stressed that protracted war would ultimately lead to victory even though "in a future war against aggression, it is quite likely that we shall fight an enemy who may have an edge over us in military technology and is better armed...." "We must adhere to the principle of protracted warfare," Xu concluded, "for we firmly believe that through long and arduous struggles we can gradually change the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, switch over to the strategic counter-offensive and win final victory."

4-2.6 "Revivability" and the Post-nuclear Phase of War

The Chinese, like the Soviets, focus on the decisiveness of the post-nuclear phase of war. In a study of Chinese perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet military balance, Michael Pillsbury argues that "the Chinese seem to be asking 'who will rule the post-war world with what surviving land, sea and air forces?' In other words, the Chinese concept of protracted warfare apparently leads them to value highly the relative balance between the forces that will survive a central nuclear exchange" rather than the pre-war balance.⁵¹ Pillsbury says that the Chinese have devoted considerable resources to hardening their ground, sea and air forces in caves and tunnels, and "have also discussed for years their plans for decentralizing the national administrative system in wartime to set up a series of self-sufficient economic and military regions to carry on a protracted war of resistance and an eventual counterattack."⁵²

Chinese strategists say privately that China is in a better position to survive and fight a protracted war than is the Soviet Union. They argue that China's advantages in demography and grain production, and its abundant natural resources, will en-

hance its "revivability" after a nuclear war. They also emphasize that China's willingness to contemplate and plan for a protracted struggle serves as an important deterrent to Soviet attack.

One Chinese strategist, interviewed in spring 1982, said that Chinese nuclear strategy is not based on "launch on warning" or immediate retaliation for a Soviet nuclear attack on China. Rather, he said, Chinese deterrent strategy is based on "launch at any uncertain time." He said the Soviets -- who cannot preempt all of China's nuclear missiles, which are carefully stored in caves or otherwise protected and camouflaged -- would have to continue to worry about Chinese retaliation, "perhaps hours, days, weeks, months or even years later." Even if China's leadership is destroyed in a decapitating nuclear attack, "the Chinese people would not lose confidence. They will be able to wait even three months or more until a new leadership is formed. In the United States, if the government did not retaliate in 24 hours," he said, "the people would panic. But the Chinese people can wait until a new leadership is capable of ordering the retaliation. Orders could even be sent by foot. The Soviet Union cannot help but be uncertain. Therefore," he concluded, "China does not need an invulnerable C³ system" to insure the viability of its nuclear deterrent.

4-2.7 Geostrategic Context of Deterrence of the Soviet Union

The Chinese stress the importance of the larger geostrategic context in limiting Soviet options against China, especially the Soviets' two-front dilemma. In a private discussion in September 1981, a BIISS analyst said: "The Soviet Union faces two fronts -- in the east and west. This situation is unfavorable to the Soviets. Strategically, the Soviet Union tries to avoid fighting on two fronts but has to be prepared to do so. Thus, its forces have to be divided -- Soviet warplanners have to take into account the requirements of fighting on two fronts." The same

analyst said that whether the Soviets tried to conquer China would depend on the "international situation" as well as the "development of contradictions between the two countries."

Another Chinese analyst, from the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Studies, said that the Soviets not only would need more troops to launch a major war against China, but that "such an attack would lead to weakening of their military in the rest of the world. They would be weaker than the U.S.," he said, "and unable to do anything." Furthermore, the analyst said, "the Soviets are afraid that the U.S. would come to the assistance of China if it were attacked. They must also be kept guessing what China would do if the Soviet Union attacked Western Europe -- they have to worry about two fronts."

Chinese deterrence of Soviet attack relies on a complex of factors, including the post-nuclear threat posed to a potentially crippled Soviet Union by surviving Chinese forces; China's ability to sustain and ultimately prevail in a protracted war against a militarily superior invading force; China's nuclear retaliatory forces, which have sufficient survivability to be launched "at any uncertain time"; Soviet uncertainty about possible U.S. aid to China; and the Soviets' concern about fighting a two-front war or western exploitation of a war-weakened Soviet Union after a Sino-Soviet conflict. For the Chinese, their deterrence posture must ultimately rest on their own efforts and capabilities. But they place great emphasis on the Soviets' geostrategic weaknesses in China's deterrent posture in a period when their top priority is economic modernization and building an industrial and technological foundation for a more rapid modernization of their armed forces at some later date.

SECTION 5

CONCLUSION

Assessment of Soviet and Chinese views of war suggests that both countries may focus as much if not more on wartime and post-war factors of the strategic balance as on the peacetime balance of conventional and nuclear forces. Such a focus would include assessment of the balance of such factors as: survivability of civilian and military organization; hardening of conventional forces; maintenance of civilian and military morale and loyalty; revivability of economic production and distribution; likelihood of wartime and post-war assistance from allies; vulnerability of geographic position to protracted counterattacks; survivability of population; ability of isolated economic and social units to function and fight autonomously; and many other measures of national capabilities for sustaining a conflict beyond an initial exchange of nuclear weapons.

From this point of view, a nation that is perceived as inferior in the peacetime balance -- as measured by such criteria as the number of usable nuclear warheads, the amount of deliverable megatonage, and prompt hard-target kill capability -- might nevertheless be perceived to have an advantage in the wartime balance at various points along the spectrum from crisis-mobilization through post-nuclear conflict. And a nation's conventional forces also could be assessed as inferior by quantitative and qualitative military criteria in peacetime, yet be potentially more effective in protracted war conditions because of other economic, social, political and even military factors that are not addressed in strict peacetime measures of the military balance. Conversely, a nation that has an edge in the peacetime balance might also have debilitating wartime inadequacies relative to its adversary (or adversaries). The Soviets, for example, might perceive themselves as having certain wartime/post-war advantages over the United States, while at the

same time perceiving the Chinese to have similar advantages over them. The Chinese may recognize the unfavorable Sino-Soviet peacetime military balance, yet perceive themselves to have significant wartime/protracted war advantages over the Soviets which serve as an effective deterrent both to Soviet attack against China and to Soviet actions that could lead to a global war.

One conclusion of this logic is that despite the Soviet Union's rejection of an assured destruction strategy and adoption of a warfighting doctrine which envisions a protracted struggle beyond massive nuclear exchange, the Soviets may nevertheless view the likely outcome of such a conflict to be "assured defeat" even if they can survive the initial nuclear attacks. In trying to escape such an outcome to achieve "assured survival" and an ability to prevail over the U.S., China and all their other potential enemies, the Soviets may see themselves facing a very complex security environment with virtually open-ended force requirements, with their worst case virtually unmanageable. But in building forces to try to implement Soviet doctrine and strategy to meet the designated threats, the Soviet leadership has built a vast, flexible military capability for lower levels of conflict or political intimidation. While this military power has proven usable -- in occupying Afghanistan or intimidating Poland, for example -- it also has been employed only when the chances of escalation to a global war were virtually zero. Soviet concern about conflict escalation weighs heavily on decisions to use military power. China is a key factor in this decisionmaking.

For the United States, focus on protracted war/post-war factors to enhance the Soviets' perceptions of an unfavorable war outcome -- and to shift the wartime balance -- may be as important as maintaining a Soviet perception of strategic equivalence or even Soviet inferiority in the peacetime balance. A key element in the Soviets' perception of "assured defeat" will be

maximizing Moscow's concern about the wartime threat from China, including two-front war and Chinese exploitation of a war-weakened Soviet Union in a U.S.-Soviet conflict. The Soviets also worry that the United States would provide military assistance to China in a Sino-Soviet war, both to enhance China's warfighting capability and morale, and to raise the specter of direct conflict with the U.S., or U.S. exploitation of a potentially weakened Soviet position across the peacetime/wartime spectrum.

This strategic environment provides opportunities for the United States to strengthen deterrence of the Soviet Union. Peacetime military cooperation with China would enhance the credibility of coordinated U.S.-Chinese wartime actions in a global war. Deterrence of Soviet action against third countries, such as an invasion of Iran, might also be enhanced through the prospect of a coordinated Sino-American response that increased the danger to Moscow of both horizontal and vertical escalation.

Recent developments in triangular relations, however, have mitigated Soviet fears of Sino-American strategic/military cooperation. The Soviets have perceived increasing differences between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan and U.S. global policies, and a concomitant slowdown in the development of U.S.-Chinese military ties. Moscow has sought to capitalize on these conflicts by making new overtures to China for improved bilateral relations. Chinese leaders have responded cautiously but positively to Soviet offers to resume discussion of normalization of relations, while at the same time maintaining a status quo relationship with the United States.

The Chinese currently perceive the U.S. as posing a peacetime threat to their national interests. They have perceived U.S. policy toward the Third World and Western Europe as counterproductive to achieving the shared strategic aim of containing Soviet power that brought the U.S. and China together.

U.S. policy, the Chinese charge, has created new opportunities for the Soviets to advance their strategy of "winning without fighting." More importantly, the Chinese have perceived the U.S. as threatening China's national sovereignty in the dispute over continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Despite the compromise on the issue reached between Washington and Beijing in agreeing on the August 17, 1982 joint communique, U.S. statements linking reduction of Taiwan arms sales to peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland continue to be perceived by the Chinese as U.S. "hegemonist" interference in China's internal affairs. From Beijing's point of view, U.S. policies have called into question Washington's reliability as a strategic partner and its peacetime value as a counter to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviets have carefully avoided creating new threats to Chinese security since Afghanistan and have reaffirmed their position that Taiwan is part of China.

The Chinese have reacted to these triangular developments by tactical shifts to protect China's national interests and manage the Soviet threat. They have re-emphasized China's role as a leader of the Third World in the struggle against "hegemonism"; they have distanced themselves from the United States to avoid both the appearance of being "bullied" over Taiwan and of being identified with U.S. policies in the Third World; and they have increased diplomatic and other contacts with the Soviet Union to keep Moscow off-balance, especially at a time of strains in Sino-American relations.

The Chinese have sought to demonstrate their peacetime independence from the United States by maneuvering tactically between the superpowers. But they have not changed their basic anti-Soviet orientation nor their strategy of forming a united front against Moscow, which will continue to include the United States, if only as a de facto member, while being publicly denounced for practicing "hegemonism."

While the Chinese may perceive U.S. policy as threatening their interests in peacetime, they nevertheless will continue to view the Soviet Union as the primary wartime threat to China -- and the U.S. as a necessary strategic counter to Soviet military power. This basic geopolitical assessment has guided Chinese strategy for more than a decade -- despite major leadership and policy struggles within China -- and is likely to form the context of Chinese strategic policy for the foreseeable future. Distancing itself from the United States publicly in peacetime is not China's preferred option, but may nevertheless continue while privately the Chinese remain interested in extensive military and strategic cooperation to manage the wartime threat from the Soviet Union. This enduring Chinese strategic posture should provide the framework for U.S. unilateral and cooperative measures with China to enhance deterrence of the Soviet Union.

The primary goal of strategic and military cooperation with China is managing the peacetime and wartime threat to the United States posed by the Soviet Union. This includes maximizing the U.S. position in the wartime balance while minimizing peacetime provocation of the Soviets, both to avoid putting China at greater risk and to prevent foreclosure of other U.S. options with Moscow. While the Soviets have reacted since 1978 with sharp warnings about unspecified consequences for the United States of its decision to forge a strategic relationship with China, the Soviet leadership has also expected Washington to seize the opportunity for strategic advantage. Despite Soviet threats, Moscow has acted cautiously in response to Sino-American collusion. Not only has it avoided military confrontation, but it also has made peace overtures toward Beijing to try to split the nascent Sino-American alliance rather than take further actions that would, like the Afghanistan invasion in 1979, push China and the United States into greater anti-Soviet collusion.

The Soviet leadership has also become more relaxed about the implications of potential U.S. arms transfers to China than it

was in the late 1970s. Soviet leaders have been advised by their most prominent sinologists that the Chinese can neither afford nor absorb large quantities of U.S. arms and that Washington is not likely to provide China with massive supplies of weapons. With this assessment of the limits of a U.S.-China arms supply relationship and the current thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviets are unlikely to overreact to further U.S. military ties with China, including limited arms transfers, or to see such developments as offensive measures in preparation for war. And many of the measures that may be of greatest interest to the United States -- and most effective in deterring the Soviet Union -- are far less dramatic than the sale of sophisticated arms to China.

The Soviets can be expected to protest any new developments in Sino-American military cooperation, and they will most likely perceive such steps as further stressing their peacetime military resources and complicating their wartime strategy. But if a U.S.-Chinese military coalition is properly managed, the Soviets will be more effectively deterred on a global scale while not rejecting peacetime measures to stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations, including conclusion of arms control agreements with Washington.

65. "The Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy."
66. "Commenting on the Contradictions..."
67. "China and Reagan," New York Times, 18 January 1981.
68. "New Talk" column, "The Dialogue Between Zhao Ziyang and Reagan," Hsin Wa Pao, FBIS-China, 23 October 1981.
69. "On Sino-U.S. Relations," excerpted in the New York Times, 18 September 1981.
70. Christopher S. Wren, "U.S.-Peking Relations Called Delicate," New York Times, 23 November 1981.
71. Christopher S. Wren, "China Counts Its Quarter of the World's Noses," New York Times, 6 July 1982.
72. "Chinese Elites: World View and Perceptions of the U.S.," prepared for the U.S. International Communication Agency, August 6, 1982, pp. 29-30. The evidence for Clough's study was gathered from in-depth interviews with 141 Americans and foreigners -- drawn largely from the official, academic, scientific, business and journalist communities -- who have had recent and sustained contacts in China with middle to senior-level government officials; university administrators, faculty and students; ranking staff members at research and think-tank institutes; and professionals in the media and the arts.
73. Speeches before the council are by custom off-the-record. Xinhua's report of Huang's remarks therefore may have been intended to publicize Beijing's dissatisfaction with this and other aspects of Sino-American relations. FBIS-China, 8 October 1982. See also Richard M. Weintraub, "State Department Wary on Sino-Soviet Initiative," Washington Post, 19 October 1982.
74. "Soviet Strength Fails to Match its Very Great Ambitions -- Jiefangjun Bao on Weaknesses in Soviet Global Strategy," Wen Wei Po, 23 June 1981, FBIS-China, 23 June 1981.
75. "The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union for World Domination," Renmin Ribao, 11 January 1980, FBIS-China, 15 January 1980.
76. Reported by one of the participants in the interview, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. in "China, Soviet Strategy and American Policy," International Security, Fall 1980, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 35.

49. Christopher S. Wren, "China Seems Cool to Soviet Overtures," New York Times, 28 September 1982.
50. Richard Nixon, "America and China: The Next 10 Years," New York Times, 11 October 1982, and Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 1062.
51. "On Sino-U.S. Relations."
52. Mu Guangren, "The Current U.S. Policy Toward China," Ban Yue Tan, No. 16, 25 August 1981, FBIS-China, 11 September 1981.
53. Special commentary by Zhang Yebai of the U.S. research center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "Commenting on the Contradictions in the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy," Renmin Ribao, 31 July 1982, FBIS-China, 2 August 1982.
54. "The Current U.S. Policy Toward..."
55. Jin Junhui, "The Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy," Journal of International Studies, No. 1, January 1982, FBIS-China, 18 March 1982.
56. "Commenting on the Contradictions..."
57. Zhu, "New U.S. Posture Toward the Soviet Union," Shijie Zhishi, No. 17, 1 September 1982, FBIS-China, 8 October 1982.
58. "Commenting on the Contradictions..."
59. Zhai Xiangqian, "Disputes Between the United States and Europe Sharpen Again," Renmin Ribao, 4 July 1982, FBIS-China, 7 July 1982. The commentary pointed out Western European leaders' concern that "the Reagan administration's excessively hard-line Soviet policy will damage their trade and economic interests with the Soviet Union, thus increasing their difficulties."
60. "Commenting on the Contradictions..."
61. "The Present International Situation and Modern..."
62. "U.S.-Western Europe Rift Widens -- News Analysis by Correspondent Yao Yun," Xinhua, 25 July 1982, FBIS-China, 26 July 1982.
63. Mei Zhenmin, "U.S. Relationship with the Third World," FBIS-China, 9 July 1981.
64. "Commenting on the Contradictions..."

36. Si Mu, "The Present International Situation and Modern Socialist Construction in Our Country," Sixiang Zhanxian, No. 4, 20 August 1981.
37. "On Sino-U.S. Relations," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1981, pp. 35-56.
38. The delegation was headed by AFP chairman Henri Pigeat. AFP report, 23 August 1982, FBIS-China, 24 August 1982.
39. Li interview by Ginzberg, 8 January 1982.
40. Banning Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Peking: Balancing Soviets and U.S.," New York Times, 19 July 1982.
41. Pei Monong, "A Brief Discussion of the Strategic Relationships Opposing Soviet Hegemonism," Renmin Ribao, 8 July 1981, FBIS-China, 9 July 1981.
42. "Western Technology Has Armed the Soviet Union," roundup report from the "International Current Events" program, 25 May 1982, FBIS-China, 27 May 1982.
43. Pei Monong, 27 March 1981, FBIS-China, 8 April 1981.
44. Li Dai, "Independence and China's External Relations," Shijie Zhishi, No. 19, 1 October 1981, FBIS-China, 19 November 1981.
45. Si Mu, "The Present International Situation and Modern Socialist Construction in Our Country," Sixiang Zhanxian, No. 4, 20 August 1981.
46. This point was made by Michael Pillsbury in his report entitled "Chinese Perceptions of the Soviet-American Military Balance." Pillsbury noted that Chinese commentaries have preached this "tit-for-tat" deterrence strategy to the United States. "The Chinese have not encouraged the U.S. to downgrade its relations with the Soviet Union as such," Pillsbury argued, "but rather have urged Washington to reply to specific Soviet challenges in a more assertive fashion." p. 28.
47. Tanjug report, 18 March 1982, FBIS-China, 19 March 1982. Soviet broadcasts to China stated that the Chinese economists were briefed on "Soviet management and organization of capital construction," "management of trade unions in the USSR," and on the division of work between the State Planning Committee and those in the various socialist republics." Moscow radio, 5 March 1982 and 11 March 1982, FBIS-China, 19 March 1982.
48. "It is Necessary to Step Up Soviet Studies," Wen Wei Po, 27 May 1982, FBIS-China, 27 May 1982.

25. Si Mu, "The Present International Situation and Modern Socialist Construction in Our Country," Sixiang Zhanxian, No. 4, 20 August 1981.
26. "The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union for World Domination," Renmin Ribao, 11 January 1980, FBIS-China, 15 January 1980.
27. "Soviet Strength Fails to Match its Very Great Ambitions-- Jiefangjun Bao on Weaknesses in Soviet Global Strategy," Wen Wei Po, 23 June 1981, FBIS-China, 23 June 1981.
28. Tang Tianri, "Is the Late-Coming Superpower on the Decline?" Xinhua in English, 25 December 1981, FBIS-China, 28 December 1981.
29. "Soviet Strength Fails to Match..." See also "A Year of Worries for Moscow," Xinhua, 30 December 1981, which describes the Soviet position as that of a hegemonist attempting to reconcile "the insurmountable conflict between its unlimited expansionist ambition and its limited strengths." FBIS-China, 4 January 1982.
30. "Hu Yaobang's Report to 12th Party Congress," Xinhua, 7 September 1982, FBIS-China, 8 September 1982. Deng Xiaoping reportedly told visiting Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki on 28 September 1982: "Sino-Soviet relations cannot possibly change rapidly because the core of this problem is that the Soviet Union continues to carry out its hegemonist policy, which is an obstacle to any change in Sino-Soviet relations." Deng reportedly added: "The Soviet Union should take concrete steps to lift its threats against China. That is the only way Sino-Soviet relations can be expected to improve." Wen Wei Po, 29 September 1982, FBIS-China, 30 September 1982.
31. Li was interviewed by Sigmund Ginzberg for L'Unita. A summary of the key points appeared in an AFP report 8 January 1982. The date of the interview is not given. FBIS-China, 8 January 1982.
32. "On Leonid Brezhnev's Speech in Tashkent," Xinhua, 26 March 1982, FBIS-China, 29 March 1982.
33. AFP report, 24 May 1982, FBIS-China, 26 May 1982.
34. In an apparent attempt to dampen speculation about a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement Huang disclosed that China has no immediate plan to upgrade the talks to the ministerial level. Kyodo, 3 October 1982, FBIS-China, 4 October 1982.
35. Mu Youlin, "Sino-Soviet Relations," Beijing Review, No. 29, 19 July 1982.

actions not limited to quantitative or qualitative improvement of military strength can deter aggression." See Pillsbury's "Chinese Perceptions of the Soviet-American Military Balance," Systems Planning Corporation, SPC-534, March 1980, prepared for OSD/Net Assessment, Department of Defense, p. 26.

14. The interview was conducted by Julie Moon, founder of the U.S. Asian News Service and was reported by Kyodo, 4 July 1981, FBIS-China, 6 July 1981.
15. "Moscow's Strange Tales and Absurd Arguments," Renmin Ribao, 2 January 1981, FBIS-China, 5 January 1981.
16. Mei Wenbin, "The Soviet Economy is in a State of Stagnation," Renmin Ribao, 20 February 1981, FBIS-China, 4 March 1981.
17. Fang Xuan, "The Grain Problem -- A Major Problem of the Soviet Economy," Renmin Ribao, 16 February 1982, FBIS-China, 25 February 1982. Fang states that "at present, irrigated farmland accounts for only 7.1 percent of the total area of farmland in the Soviet Union."
18. He Li, "No Meat to Eat," Renmin Ribao, 17 February 1982, FBIS-China, 24 February 1982. A similar argument is made in a later commentary by Jun Jun entitled "Guns and Butter," Renmin Ribao, 19 March 1982, FBIS-China, 6 April 1982.
19. See for example, two unattributed articles in Renmin Ribao entitled, "Signs of Crisis as the Soviet Economy Enters a New Year," 30 January 1982, FBIS-China, 2 February 1982 and "Soviet Economic Situation in the First Quarter was Still Not Good," 4 May 1982, FBIS-China, 7 May 1982.
20. See for example, Zhen Ya, "Too Many Problems to Tackle," Renmin Ribao, 8 February 1982, FBIS-China, 10 February 1982, and a Xinhua domestic report in Chinese, 4 April 1982, FBIS-China, 9 April 1982.
21. Zhong He, "Why Does the Soviet Union Want to Sell Large Amounts of Gold?" Heilongjiang Ribao, 29 May 1982, FBIS-China, 18 June 1982. Zhong cites Western estimates that Soviet deposits in Western banks have declined from \$9 billion to \$2 billion and that the Soviets will have to spend some \$10 billion on grain imports in the coming year.
22. Yan Zheng, "The Soviet Union Faces Energy Difficulties," Renmin Ribao, 28 April 1982, FBIS-China, 3 May 1982.
23. "Signs of Crisis as the Soviet Economy..."
24. Xiu Qing, "What the Power Failure in Phnom Penh Shows," Renmin Ribao, 27 February 1982, FBIS-China, 3 March 1982.

SECTION 3: Chinese Perceptions of the Soviet Threat and Strategic Ties With the United States

1. Gao Bo and Yu Lei, "The Soviets Strategy of Thrusting Southward and the Impediments it Faces," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, No. 1, October 1981.
2. Pei Monong, "The International Situation and Development Prospects in East Asia," Renmin Ribao, 27 March 1981, FBIS-China, 8 April 1981.
3. Special Commentator, "Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," Renmin Ribao, 11 January 1980, Beijing Review, No. 4, 28 January 1980.
4. Sun Fusheng, "Soviet Expansion in Southeast Asia," Hongqi, No. 3, 1 February 1982, FBIS-China, 18 February 1982 and Jian Yuanchun, "Soviet Strategy for East Asia," Beijing Review, 23 March 1981.
5. "Soviet Expansion in Southeast Asia."
6. "Soviet Strategy for East Asia."
7. Tang Tianri, "Moscow's Divisive Tactic," Xinhua, 29 June 1982, FBIS-China, 30 June 1982.
8. Special commentary by Shu Gang, "The Characteristics of the Soviet Hegemonist Strategy of Expansion," 20 February 1982, Renmin Ribao, FBIS-China, 22 February 1982.
9. Fang Xuan, "Why Does the Soviet Union Exaggerate the Gravity of the International Situation?" Renmin Ribao, 18 March 1982, FBIS-China.
10. Tang Tianri, "Will the Soviet Union Bless the New Year with Peace?" Xinhua, 11 January 1982, FBIS-China, 12 January 1982.
11. "Moscow's Divisive Tactic" and Shi Zhongxing, "The Soviet Union's Strategic Intentions in Opening up Siberia," Renmin Ribao, 25 April 1981, FBIS-China, 27 April 1981.
12. Si Mu, "The Present International Situation and Modern Socialist Construction in Our Country," Sixiang Zhanxian, No. 4, 20 August 1981.
13. In his study of Chinese perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet military balance, Michael Pillsbury argues that Chinese deterrence strategy is based in large part on manipulating the emotions of the enemy. "In the Chinese view," Pillsbury says, "it is the emotional feelings that the aggressor has about the potential victim that either invites aggression or deters it. Thus, a wide range of

made in May. (See N. Chanda, "Brezhnev Breaks the Ice," Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 April 1982.) The article, by Li Huichuan, was entitled "Where Does the Crux of the Sino-Soviet Border Talks Lie?" Renmin Ribao, 17 June 1981. FBIS-China, 18 June 1981. According to a Soviet diplomat, the Soviet response to Li was by P. Dalnev, "The Essence of the Difficulties at the Soviet-Chinese Border Negotiations," International Affairs, No. 10, 1981.

90. N. Chanda cites a source "close to Moscow" as saying that apart from re-establishing contacts, a visit such as this "has proved extremely useful in bringing Soviet sino-logists up to date. Coming back to China after 15-20 years, Soviet sinologists have discovered that, despite the madness of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China indeed has made some progress." See "Brezhnev Breaks the Ice."
91. Christopher S. Wren, "China and Soviet to Open New Talks," New York Times, 5 October 1982.
92. "On Soviet-Chinese Relations." On Soviet television, N.V. Shishlin, head of the Consultants Group of the Central Committee International Department, offered an explanation for China's reaction to Brezhnev's proposal, arguing that "today's China gives priority in its foreign policy to ties with the capitalist world." Shishlin further argued, however, that despite China's initial rejection of Brezhnev's offer, the "substantive orientation" of the Soviet President's Tashkent speech "in the final analysis will produce results." "Studio Nine," Moscow Domestic Television, 29 May 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 1 June 1982.
93. "Soviet-Chinese Relations: Problems and Prospects."
94. Asahi Shimbun, 24 April 1982.

Richard Sneider, Richard Stilwell, W. Scott Thompson, and Nils H. Wessell.

73. "United States Technological Contacts with China," USA, No. 8, August 1980, JPRS, USSR Report: USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, 16 October 1980.
74. "More Than Billiards..."
75. "U.S. Foreign Policy at the Start of the Eighties," USA, No. 4, April 1980, JPRS, USSR Report: USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, 2 July 1980.
76. Tass summary, 17 June 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 19 June 1982.
77. "Partnership Without Trust," Izvestiya, 31 January 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 10 February 1982.
78. Burlatsky is the vice president of the Soviet Political Science Association and former head of an advisory group of the Central Committee of the CPSU. According to one writer, Burlatsky reflects the views of the top-level leadership in Moscow. Burlatsky is well-known for his virulently anti-Chinese books and articles. The positive tone adopted in this article is therefore quite remarkable and noteworthy. See Ilya Zemtsov, "Ideology and Politics: The 26th Congress..."
79. "International Panorama," 27 Decmeber 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 31 December 1981.
80. Washington Post, 27 March 1982.
81. Washington Post, 21 May 1982.
82. N. Chanda, "Chinese Acrobatics," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 March 1982.
83. Washington Post, 21 May 1982.
84. Wall Street Journal, 26 July 1982.
85. Ibid.
86. N. Chanda, "Chinese Acrobatics," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 March 1982.
87. Wall Street Journal, 26 July 1982.
88. Ibid. and Washington Post, 21 May 1982.
89. According to diplomatic sources in Peking, the Chinese publication of a lengthy article on the Sino-Soviet border problem in June 1981 was a response to proposals Kapitsa

Morozov; G.I. Ragulin; L.S. Semeiko; M.S. Shmelev.
Published by the Soviet Peace Committee, Moscow 1980, 122
pgs.

60. Jusin Galen, "U.S.' Toughest Message to USSR", Armed Forces Journal, February 1979.
61. "The 'China Factor'..."
62. A. leontyev, "Military-Political Review: Washington's Far East Option," Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 May 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 25 May 1982, See also a Soviet untitled radio broadcast to Asia, 13 January 1982, which claimed a Reagan administration official had said the U.S. intended to deploy neutron weapons and TNF in China. FBIS-Soviet Union, 15 January 1982.
63. FBIS-Soviet Union, 21 June 1982.
64. Aviation Week, 25 October 1976; New York Times, 29 and 30 october 1976.
65. Washington Post, 22 September 1982.
66. Major G. Mosko, "Beijing's Nuclear Missile..."
67. 22 July 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 28 July 1982.
68. 18 June 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 19 June 1981.
69. V. Kudryavtsev, "The Pentagon's Asian Schemes," Izvestiya, 1 December 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 7 December 1981.
70. S. Agafonov and V. Ganshin, "The Far East: Two Courses, Two Objectives," Izvestiya, 10 May 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 14 May 1982.
71. Tass summary of USA article, 18 June 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 19 June 1982.
72. "Issues in Soviet-American Relations: Conference Report" prepared by Nils H. Wessel, ORBIS, Spring 1981. The Soviet delegation was co-chaired by Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute. The Soviet delegation included Vitalii Zhurkin, first deputy director of the USA Institute; Genrikh Trofimenko, head of the USA Institute's Foreign Policy Department; Alexander Chicherov, from the Oriental Institute; Alexei Arbatov, from the Institute for World Economy and Interntional Relations; and V.I. Trifonov, from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The American delegation was chaired by Ambassador William R. Kintner, President of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and included Paul Nitze, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Robert Scalapino, Richard Burt, Richard B. Foster, Gaston Sigur,

44. "More than Billiards, but not Quite Chess: Ten Years after the Shanghai Communique," Literaturnaya Gazeta, 24 February 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 10 March 1982.
45. Soviet analysts rarely engage in public debates. In this "dialogue," Lukin and Bovin sharply disagree on the future course of Sino-U.S. ties and its implications for the Soviet Union. Lukin describes developments in U.S.-China relations as "proceeding like a pendulum, with a general tendency toward rapprochement." Bovin, on the other hand, says he is uncertain of this, and argues that "externally it seems true. Political contacts have become more regular. Trade has increased considerably. All that is so. But have trust and mutual understanding increased? I may be wrong, but I am forming the impression that both the Americans and the Chinese are now looking at each other with far more suspicion than ten years ago."
46. Tass summary of USA article, 18 June 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 19 June 1982.
47. "Soviet-Chinese Relations: Problems and Prospects."
48. Tass, 28 November 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 30 November 1981.
49. "Partnership Without Trust," Izvestiya, 31 January 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 10 February 1982.
50. Zorin, "The World Today," 5 August 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 6 August 1982.
51. "On Soviet-Chinese Relations," Pravda, 20 May 1982, Tass, 19 May 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 20 May 1982.
52. "Soviet-Chinese Relations: Problems and Prospects."
53. 3 December 1980, FBIS-Soviet Union, 3 December 1980.
54. "The 'China Factor'..."
55. "United States-China: Between Triangle..."
56. "Washington-Beijing: 'Quasi-allies'?", USA, No. 12, December 1979, JPRS, USSR Report: USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, 14 February 1982.
57. "The 'China Factor'..."
58. "Brezhnev Reported to Warn U.S. on Arming China," New York Times, 30 January 1980, p. 15.
59. China and the Arms Race, edited by B.N. Zanegin; co-authors: B.N. Zanegin, G.I. Korotkov; Z.V. Litvin; G.M. Lokshin; A.P.

The May 1982 article points to additional developments in China's nuclear weapons program that are not included in the earlier analysis. It sees China's plans as evidence of a long-term nuclear strategy, "indicated by the creation of a whole system for missile tracking and flight control centered on the city of Xian" and the creation of a "special test backup fleet" and by the extension and improvement of the "material and technical base at three existing missile firing ranges (Shanxi, Jilin and Gansu)."

While the January 1981 article notes Chinese plans to "assign considerable space to the development of nuclear missile carrying submarines...to begin on an extensive scale," the later article cites foreign reports that "the creation of nuclear submarines armed with missiles with nuclear warheads is proceeding particularly slowly, with difficulty and frequent accidents."

In its discussion of the future evolution of China's nuclear capabilities, a subject not addressed in the earlier article, the May 1982 analysis states that China is developing "solid-fuel land-, sea- or air-launched missiles to enter service in the later 1980s." The author notes that this advancement is expected to enable launching from mobile launchers and to improve combat readiness. In addition, the article cites foreign experts' opinion that deployment of the CSS-X-4 will begin in 2-3 years.

33. Excerpted in Time, 15 March 1982.
34. Novosti Press Agency, No. 31, August 1980.
35. FBIS-Soviet Union, 29 June 1981.
36. "Studio Nine," Moscow Domestic Television, 27 June 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 7 July 1981.
37. "International Observers Roundtable," Moscow Domestic Service, 21 June 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 22 June 1981.
38. 18 June 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 19 June 1981.
39. "Talk on International Topics," Moscow Domestic Television, 20 June 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 20 June 1981.
40. 23 July 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 24 July 1981.
41. 18 June 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 19 June 1981.
42. "The 'China Factor'..."
43. "United States-China: Between Triangle and Quasialliance" USA, No. 9, September 1981, JPRS, USSR Report. USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, 13 January 1982.

25. Pravda, 27 June 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 29 June 1981.
26. "Banking on Confrontation," Tass report on article in Problems of the Far East, 29 June 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 30 June 1982.
27. A. Gorbachev, "Beijing's Nuclear Ambition," Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 January 1981, in "Soviet Strategic View," section of Strategic Review, Spring 1981, pp 93-95.
28. Major G. Mosko, "Beijing's Nuclear Missile Program" Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 May 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 6 May 1982.
29. Radio broadcast, 10 January 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 11 January 1982.
30. Major G. Mosko, "A Pernicious Course."
31. Major G. Mosko, "Beijing's Nuclear Missile..."
32. The Soviets rarely analyze China's nuclear program in detail publicly. The three Krasnaya Zvezda articles cited above therefore provide unusual insight to Soviet views of China's current nuclear capabilities and future plans. Following is a comparison of the two more detailed articles, from January 1981 and May 1982, outlining some of the similarities and differences between the two analyses and pointing to the more interesting information revealed by the Soviet military writers:

While both the January 1981 article and the May 1982 article, citing foreign sources, state that China has stockpiled over 700 nuclear warheads with a capacity ranging from 20 kilotons to 4 megatons, they note different locations for China's nuclear weapons production. The January 1981 article states that China's nuclear weapons plants are situated in Beijing, Baotou, Shenyang, Sian and Chuntsin. The May 1982 article says China's nuclear enterprises are concentrated in the northwest of the country, "in the triangle formed by the cities of Baotou, Yemen and Landzhou."

Both articles argue that China's space program is intricately linked with its military modernization plans. The January 1981 article claims that "all launches of artificial earth satellites are carried out within the framework of the development of strategic combat missiles" and adds that "Chinese satellites are launched for other military purposes, including strategic reconnaissance." Eight months later, in September 1981, China successfully tested the launch of three satellites by one launch vehicle, prompting the writer of the later article to conclude that "China is developing multiple warheads."

13. "Soviet-Chinese Relations: Problems and Prospects," Problems of the Far East, No. 2, 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union annex, 7 July 1982.
14. See Brezhnev's speech at a meeting in Berlin to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the formation of the GDR, in L.I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course: Speeches and Articles (1972-1975), p. 499, cited by Chi Su, Soviet Images...
15. B. Barakhta, review of O. Borisov's book, From the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations in the Fifties, Pravda, 31 October 1981.
16. Banning Garrett, Soviet Perceptions of China and Sino-American Military Ties: Implications for the Strategic Balance and Arms Control, prepared for SALT/Arms Control Support Group, OASD(AE), Harold Rosenbaum Associates, Arlington, VA, June 1981. This study is based in part on interviews with Soviet China experts and other analysts conducted in Moscow in February 1981. The author held further discussions with Soviet scholars in August 1981. Many of the private comments cited later in the present study are based on these conversations.
17. F.M. Burlatsky, "Against the Magic of Words," Supplement to Socialism: Theory and Practice, No. 4, 1979, pp. 16-18, cited by Chi Su, Soviet Images...
18. See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service summary of Kommunist, 29 April 1981.
19. Ibid.
20. Major G. Mosko, "A Pernicious Course," Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 August 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 13 August 1982.
21. "A Short-sighted Policy," Commentator's Column, Pravda, 11 April 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 15 August 1981. See also Burlatsky, "Greatness of Political Intellect" that argues "maybe without fully realizing it they (the Chinese leaders) are entertaining illusions of a new 'leap forward'; of modernizing the army and the whole national economy with aid from the West."
22. Kyodo report from Beijing, 12 April 1981, FBIS-China, 15 April 1981.
23. Tass summary in english of Bazhanov's book, Motive Forces of U.S. Policy Toward China, 1 June 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 8 June 1982.
24. "The 'China Factor' in Washington's Foreign Policy Adventures," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika Ideologiya, (hereafter cited as USA), No. 4, April 1980, JPRS, USSR Report: USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, 2 July 1980.

SECTION 6

FOOTNOTES

SECTION 2: Soviet Perceptions of China and U.S.-Chinese Military Ties

1. Vol. I, "Proceeding of the 26th CPSU Congress," FBIS-Soviet Union-supplement, 24 February 1981.
2. Moscow Domestic Service Summary, 29 April 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 1 May 1981.
3. "60th Anniversary of the CCP," Pravda, 9 April 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 14 April 1981. See also a January 8, 1982 Tass article by M. Yakovlev that argued "all this shows that the Chinese leaders have not drawn the correct lessons from the tragedy to which they were led by Maoism. Becoming even more obvious is the untenability of the present leadership's attempts to solve the problems facing the country while retaining the main precepts of Maoism.", FBIS-Soviet Union, 11 January 1982.
4. See Ilya Zemtsov, "Ideology and Politics: The Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU," Crossroads, Winter-Spring 1981 and Fyodor Burlatsky, "Greatness of Political Intellect," Literaturnaya Gazeta, 18 March 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 26 March 1981.
5. Asahi Shimbun, 24 April 1982.
6. "Greatness of Political Intellect."
7. "Talks on International Topics," Moscow Domestic Television, 18 July 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 20 July 1981.
8. Korolev, Radio Broadcast in English, 30 June 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 1 July 1981.
9. "Studio Nine" with G. Arbatov, V. Zorin and N. Shishlin, Moscow Domestic Television, 29 May 1982, FBIS-Soviet Union, 1 June 1982.
10. O. Valdimirov and V. Ryazanov, "The 50th Anniversary of the CCP," Kommunist No. 10, July 1971, p. 88, referred to in an unpublished PhD Thesis, Soviet Images and Policies Toward China, 1969-79 for Columbia University, by Chi Su.
11. A.G. Kruchinin, "Peking's Struggle against the Socialist Community Traced," Problems of the Far East, No. 1, 1974, cited by Chi Su, Soviet Images...
12. Izvestiya, 12 September 1973, cited by Chi Su, Soviet Images...

77. Pei Monong, "The International Situation and Development Prospects in East Asia," Renmin Ribao, 27 March 1981, FBIS-China, 8 April 1981.
78. Si Mu, "The Present International Situation and Modern Socialist Construction in Our Country," Sixiang Zhanxian, No. 4, 20 August 1981.
79. "The International Situation and Development Prospects..."
80. Pei Monong, "A Brief Discussion of the Strategic Relationships Opposing Soviet Hegemonism," Renmin Ribao, 8 July 1981, FBIS-China, 9 July 1981.
81. "The Present International Situation..."

SECTION 4: Soviet and Chinese Perceptions of
Wartime Strategic Factors

1. Speech to the New York Council on Foreign Relations, 20 April 1982. See also Weinberger's Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY 1983, pp. I-14, 15.
2. Ogarkov's comments were in a Defense Ministry book entitled Always Ready to Defend the Homeland, published in March 1982. See the Washington Post and the New York Times, 11 March 1982. The publication was noted in Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 February 1982, FBIS Soviet Union, 5 March 1982. The statement cited from Ogarkov's book was a verbatim quote from an important article by Ogarkov in the Party theoretical journal Kommunist, July 1981, cited by Tass, 16 July 1981. FBIS-Soviet Union, 17 July 1981.
3. See Strategic Review, Summer 1980, which quotes from Vol. 7 of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979) pp 555-565; and the Washington Post, 23 October 1981, Dusko Doder, "Nuclear Flap Prompts New Kremlin Line."
4. See for example: Richard Soll, "The Soviet Union and Protracted Nuclear War," Strategic Review, Fall 1980, Steve F. Kime, "The Soviet View of War," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1980; and Robert Arnett, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Can Win?" Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 1979, Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1, July 1977.
5. Michael McGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 4, Spring 1979, pp 141-142.
6. Ibid, p. 142.
7. Arnett, "Soviet Attitudes..." p. 181. See also his footnote number 58, p. 191, which concludes: "For the current Soviet leadership, there seems to be only one instance in which they would make a calculated decision to use nuclear war as an instrument of policy -- that would be if they believed the U.S. was about to launch a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union."
8. Kime, "The Soviet View..."
9. Cited by Soll, "The Soviet Union..." quoting from Harriet Fast Scott, Soviet Military Strategy. (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1975), p. 247. Scott is quoting from Military Strategy by Marshall of the Soviet Union, V.D. Sokolovskiy, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962, 1963 and 1968). See also Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, the Armed

Forces of the USSR, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979) pp. 74-81 for the historical context of the writings by Sokolovskiy, who was chief of the General Staff from 1952-1961.

10. Both Ogarkov and Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov have endorsed Brezhnev's statements about the disaster of nuclear war, indicating a Soviet recognition of the likelihood of "assured destruction," even if MAD does not form the basis of Soviet doctrine. See Robert Arnett, "Soviet Attitudes...", p. 181, on Soviet recognition that the U.S. has an assured destruction capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. For Ogarkov's statements endorsing Brezhnev, see "Always Ready to Defend...". For Ustinov's views, see his authoritative statement in Pravda, "For Averting the Threat of Nuclear War," 12 July 1982. FBIS-Soviet Union, 13 July 1982. Ustinov cites Brezhnev's message to the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, in which the Soviet President renounced the first use of nuclear weapons and said "nuclear war, should it breakout, could mean the destruction of human civilization and, perhaps, the very end of life on earth." Ustinov indicates some military dissatisfaction with Brezhnev's "no first use" pledge, saying it was "no simple matter" for Moscow to make such a pledge and that it "objectively makes rigid demands on further enhancing the combat readiness of our armies..."
11. A leading Soviet analyst of U.S. strategy, Henry Trofimenko of the USA Institute, wrote in an article for publication in the United States in 1980 that the mission of the Soviet military is to prepare to fight and win. "One has to acknowledge that the military in the United States and the Soviet Union must be ready for war-fighting; that is required by their professional duty...And if one leaves out differing war goals for different states, then technically the military in every country has one and the same mission: to do its utmost in case of war to ensure its country the favorable outcome of every battle and of the war." ACIS Working Paper No. 25, July 1980, "Changing Attitudes Toward Deterrence," Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles. Secretary Weinberger made a similar remark in August 1982 in response to protests from administration critics about U.S. strategy aimed at "prevailing" in a nuclear war by ending the conflict in terms favorable to the U.S. Asserting there was no alternative, Weinberger declared: "You show me a Secretary of Defense who's not planning to prevail, and I'll show you a Secretary of Defense who ought to be impeached." At the same time, Weinberger also repeated his view that nuclear war was not winnable. Richard Halloran, "Weinberger Defends His Plan to Fight Long Nuclear War." New York Times, 10 August 1982. Soviet officials and analysts insist that Soviet strategy has evolved over the last two decades with

a greater emphasis now on assured destruction and rejection of limited nuclear war. See for example a New York Times interview with the USA Institute's General Mikhail Milshtein by Anthony Austin, "Moscow Expert Says U.S. Errs on Soviet War Aims," 25 August 1980. The interview was conducted in response to the leak of President Carter's PD 59 on U.S. nuclear strategy.

12. "A weakening of Soviet military resources in Siberia as a result of attrition in a war with the United States could increase the prospects of Chinese aggression against the Soviet Union." Paul Dibb, "Soviet Capabilities, Interests and Strategies in East Asia in the 1980s," Survival, July-August 1982.
13. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Risk and Uncertainty in Soviet Deliberations About War," Project Air Force, (Santa Monica: RAND, R-2687-AF, October 1981), p. 26.
14. This would theoretically allow for a Soviet nuclear attack on China without using ICBMs, which would both create the false initial impression of a Soviet attack on the U.S. and would draw down Soviet strategic reserves for deterrence/warfighting against the U.S.
15. Desmond Ball, "PD-59: A Strategic Critique," F.A.S. Public Interest Report, October 1980; "Research Note: Soviet ICBM Deployment," Survival, July-August 1980; "Counterforce Targeting: How New? How Viable?" Arms Control Today, February 1981.
16. Edward Luttwak, "The PRC in Soviet Grand Strategy," in China, the Soviet Union, and the West, edited by Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), p. 268.
17. This is pointed out by Michael McGwire, "Naval Power..." McGwire argues: "Russia may hope that in a fight to the finish between capitalism and socialism, China would take its side. Nevertheless, Soviet contingency planners must assume that world war may also mean war with China. If Russia is to avoid being irrevocably committed to automatically devastating China at the outbreak of a world war (this could well be present policy, as the only way of ensuring that China does not emerge from the war stronger than Russia) and thereby forfeiting the possibility of an alliance, then the nuclear weapons required to cover the contingency of war with China (or to compel its neutrality), must be of a kind that can survive nuclear strikes by the West." p. 145.
18. A number of studies have been done on the Manchurian Campaign, including two seminal works by RAND for Net Assessment: Lilita I. Dzirkals, "'Lighting War' in

Manchuria: Soviet Military Analysis of the 1945 Far East Campaign," January 1976, P. 5589; and John Depres, Lilita Dzirkals, and Barton Whaley, "Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy," July 1967, R-1825-NA. See also: Peter W. Vigor and Christopher Donnelly, "The Manchurian Campaign and Its Relevance to Modern Strategy," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1980; and William C. Green and David S. Yost, "Soviet Strategic Options Regarding Mainland China: Note on a Range of Alternatives," Issues and Studies (Taipei), April 1981, pp. 24-25. For Soviet writings in English on the Manchurian Campaign, see: "Leonid Vnotchenko, Victory in the Far East, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1980; O. Borisov, The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base, 1945-1949, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp 57-93; and "Liberation on Northeast China and Korea," Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 371-402.

19. Depres, et.al., "Timely Lessons....," pp XI1, 2-3, 11-12.
20. For the Soviets' claim of Japanese strength, see Liberation Mission, pp. 382-383.
21. Dzirkals, "Lightning War...", p. 8.
22. Vnotchenko, Victory in the Far East, p. 38. See also Vigor and Donnelly, "The Manchurian Campaign..."
23. Dzirkals, "Lightning War...", p. 8.
24. Despres, et. al., "Timely Lessons...", p. 2.
25. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
26. Borisov, The Soviet Union, p. 86. See also Vnotchenko, Victory in the Far East, pp. 26-27.
27. "The Might of Helan Shan Shakes," Ningxia Ribao, 29 June 1982, FBIS-China, 3 August 1982.
28. Borisov, The Soviet Union, pp. 76-77.
29. Vigor and Donnelly, "The Manchurian Campaign..."
30. Dzirkals, "Lightning War...", p. 30.
31. See Luttwak, "The PRC....," pp. 268-269, for his views on how the Soviets would have to calculate the U.S. factor in a Sino-Soviet war.
32. See, for example, the essays in Stuart and Tow, China, The Soviet Union and The West, by Edward Luttwak,

Kenneth Hunt, and William Kennedy. See also Green and Yost, "Soviet Strategic Options..."

33. See Hunt, Ibid. p. 111, who says the Soviet Union, if it had any intention of attacking China at all, "it is not likely to contemplate large-scale invasion, conducting a war on Chinese terms." Luttwak, Ibid., pp. 269-270, sees the massive Soviet buildup in the Far East as providing Moscow with "mid-range" capabilities for large-scale non-nuclear attacks on China.
34. Lambeth, "Risk and Uncertainty...", p. 27, makes a somewhat analogous argument in discussing Soviet deliberations about whether to use nuclear weapons in a European war. Lambeth suggests that Western analysts who address the military balance and war scenarios "as though the analytical problem simply entailed a grand replay of World War II with modern technology," are "living in a world of sublime unreality." The stressful decision for Soviet leaders, Lambeth suggests, would, "turn on the question of whether to go to war in the first place, not on whether they had a choice between conventional or nuclear options."
35. Der Spiegel, 23 March 1981, FBIS-Soviet Union, 25 March 1981.
36. Vnotchenko, Victory in the Far East, pp. 21-22.
37. Lambeth, "Risk and Uncertainty...", p. 26.
38. Strategic Survey, 1981-1982, p. 105.
39. The Threat to Europe (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), pp. 12-13, published by the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, and the Scientific Research Council on Peace and Disarmament. Some of the same points are made in a booklet published by the Soviet Defense Ministry, Whence the Threat to Peace (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1982), p. 69.
40. Annual Report, FY 1983, pp. I-14-15. Interviews with knowledgeable U.S. government officials suggest there are no indications that the Soviets plan for large scale movement of troops or ground force equipment from the Far East to other theaters of military operations in a crisis or in wartime, although the possibility is not ruled out.
41. The article was published in Beijing Review, 28 January 1980, under the title "Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination."
42. The paper, entitled "Some Problems Concerning the Soviet Military Strategy" was prepared for the "Sino-American Conference on International Relations and the Soviet Union,"

organized by the Research Institute on International Change of Columbia University, and was held in Washington, 8-11 November 1979. At that time, Cheng and Yao were Research Fellows at the Institute of World Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Cheng soon thereafter became director of the just-organized Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies, and Yao became a BIISS researcher. The passages cited from their study are from both versions.

43. One specialist from BIISS said that the Soviets, if they attacked now, would strike not just in Manchuria, but all along the border from Xinjiang in the northwest and north to Manchuria in the Northeast. The basis for this assessment may have been Chinese observation of Soviet maneuvers. In their analysis of Soviet strategy, Cheng and Yao note that many of the long-range aviation maneuvers "conducted in Soviet Asia were carried out on the assumption that large numbers of bombers were used for a surprise attack on the major cities in north, northeast and northwest China."
44. Reported by Jonathan Pollack, "The Men But Not the Guns," Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 December 1981.
45. Xu Baoshan, "We Must Be Prepared to Fight Nuclear War in the First Stages of any Future War," Jiefangjun Bao, 16 September 1979.
46. "The Might of Helan Shan Shakes," Ningxia Ribao, 29 June 1982, FBIS-China, 3 August 1982. See also "China Tests New Military Strategy," New York Times, 14 July 1982; a Kyodo news service report, FBIS-China, 2 July 1982 and South China Morning Post, 7 July 1982, FBIS-China, 7 July 1982.
47. One Chinese strategist suggested that China would modify its pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons to include the phrase "on foreign territory," thus giving China the option of initiating the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet invasion -- and implying that China already considers first use of nuclear weapons in such circumstances a live option.
48. Chinese officials and analysts seemed dubious about the effectiveness in a nuclear war of China's massive system of bomb shelters in the major cities. A visit by one of the authors to part of the Hangzhou bomb shelter complex in September 1981 confirmed reports that the Chinese were putting the massive underground shelter and tunnel system to civilian uses and downplaying preparations for wartime. The complex visited, which went 50 meters underground and was accessible by car, was being used for a 1,364 seat movie theater, a small shopping center, a rollerskating rink and a

large cafe. Officials said that so far about 100,000 square meters of the entire city's shelter system was being used for civilian purposes, including for underground factories, and that this process of conversion was continuing in Hangzhou and other Chinese cities. Although the officials stressed such use of the system was economically rational and also improved the maintenance of the shelters and tunnels, they acknowledged that there were no nuclear or chemical warfare filters in the air conditioning system and that plans for installing them were a low priority. An official in Shanghai deprecated the city's sheltering system and indicated a lack of belief in the value of the system for protection in a nuclear war. Similarly, officials in Beijing were highly skeptical of the shelters' utility, although they appreciated the value of building the shelters for both boosting Chinese morale in the face of Soviet threats and signalling the Soviets that China would not be intimidated and was prepared to fight if necessary rather than submit to pressure. A radio broadcast from Anhui province, 7 January 1982 (FBIS-China, 8 January 1982), reported that at a meeting on civil defense it was stated that since 1978, more than 800,000 square meters of shelters had been put to peacetime use. Another report pointed out that "the success in carrying out this task is not only favorable to building up war preparedness but is also conducive to the development of the national economy in our province." A report from Shanxi provincial radio, 16 February 1982 (FBIS-China, 24 February 1982), also discussed conversion of shelters: "Apart from being able to serve society and contribute to the four modernizations, the people's air defense projects can also be properly maintained and managed by being used in peacetime, thus creating conditions for their use in wartime." For a description of the tunnels and shelters in Beijing in early 1979, apparently before large-scale conversion of the system to peacetime use, see William Beecher, "Safety for Millions in China Tunnels," Boston Globe, 23 April 1979.

49. Su Yu, "Great Victory for Chairman Mao's Guideline on War," Peking Review, No. 34, 19 August 1977.
50. Xu Xiangjian, "Heighten Our Vigilance and Get Prepared to Fight a War," Peking Review, 11 August 1978, excerpted from Hongqi (Red Flag, the Party theoretical journal), No. 8, 1978.
51. Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Perceptions of the Soviet-American Military Balance, p. 39. For an edited version of the study, see "Strategic Acupuncture," Foreign Policy, No. 41, Winter 1980-83.
52. Ibid., p. 39.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Armed Forces Staff College
ATTN: Library

Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
ATTN: R. Stivers
ATTN: Policy Plans & NSC Affairs
ATTN: ISA/R, L. Armitage

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Atomic Energy
ATTN: R. Wagner
ATTN: Mil Appl, W. Kahn

Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
ATTN: J5

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
ATTN: C3
ATTN: J-2
ATTN: J-52
ATTN: J-5
ATTN: J-3
ATTN: J-55
3 cy ATTN: J-54

Office of Secretary of Defense
ATTN: F. Tapparo

Defense Advanced Rsch Proj Agency
ATTN: TTO

Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: Library
ATTN: DB-1G, D. Silvers
ATTN: DB, G. Negus
2 cy ATTN: DB-2, Col T. McClain

Defense Nuclear Agency
ATTN: STNA
ATTN: NATD
ATTN: STRA
ATTN: STSP
ATTN: NAFD
ATTN: NASD
2 cy ATTN: NATA
4 cy ATTN: STTI/CA

Defense Technical Information Center
12 cy ATTN: DD

Deputy Under Sec of Def (S&TNF)
ATTN: T. Jones

DNA PACOM Liaison Office
2 cy ATTN: J. Bartlett

Field Command
Defense Nuclear Agency
ATTN: FCPR

Intelligence Center, Pacific
ATTN: Commander

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Continued)

Joint Chiefs of Staff
ATTN: J-3 Strategic Operations Division
ATTN: J-5 Nuclear Division/Strategy Div
ATTN: J-5 Dep Dir for Force Dev & Strat Plns
Bg, R. Peat
ATTN: J-5 Nuc/Chem Div, LTC J Laslie
ATTN: Far East & South Asia Div, J. Smith

National Defense University
ATTN: NWCLB, CR

National Security Council
ATTN: D. Laux

East Asian & Pacific Region
ATTN: J. VanSickle

Office of the Sec of Defense
Net Assessments
ATTN: Document Control
ATTN: G. Ruhl
ATTN: G. Butler

Program Analysis & Evaluation
ATTN: M. Leonard

US Readiness Command
ATTN: J-3

Under Sec of Defense for Policy
ATTN: R. Lehman
ATTN: W. Hoehn

United States Central Command
ATTN: CCJE-03, Daigneault

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Dep Ch of Staff for Ops & Plans
ATTN: DAMO-SSM, Pol-Mil Div
ATTN: DAMO-SS BG, G. Watson

Eighth US Army
ATTN: CJ-POX-NS

US Army Chemical School
ATTN: ATZN-CM-CC

US Army Comb Arms Combat Dev Acty
ATTN: ATZL-CAP

US Army Comd & General Staff College
ATTN: Combind Arms Research Library
ATTN: DTAC

US Army Concepts Analysis Agency
ATTN: CSSA-ADL

US Army Nuclear & Chemical Agency
ATTN: Library

US Army Training and Doctrine Comd
ATTN: ATCD-FA

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (Continued)

US Army War College
ATTN: AWCAC, F. Braden, Dept of Tactics
ATTN: Library

USA Military Academy
ATTN: Document Library

Western Command
ATTN: APOP-NC
ATTN: Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
ATTN: Commanding General

Marine Corps
ATTN: MC-PL MGEN, B. Trainor
ATTN: MC-PO

Marine Corps Dev & Education Command
ATTN: Commander

Naval Postgraduate School
ATTN: Code 1424 Library
ATTN: Professor P. Parker

Naval Surface Force
US Pacific Fleet
ATTN: Commander

Naval War College
ATTN: Code E-11, Tech Service

Ofc of the Deputy Chief of Naval Ops
ATTN: NOP 02
ATTN: NOP 06
ATTN: NOP 022
ATTN: NOP 09
ATTN: NOP 950, Force Level Plns Div
ATTN: NOP 03
ATTN: NOP 05
ATTN: NOP 65, RADM W. Holland
3 cy ATTN: NOP 654, Strat Eval & Anal Br

Office of Naval Research
ATTN: Code 200

CNO Executive Panel
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
ATTN: OP-00K

Submarine Force
US Pacific Fleet
ATTN: Commander

US Naval Air Forces
Pacific Fleet
ATTN: Commander
ATTN: Code J-5

US Navy Seventh Fleet
ATTN: Commander

US Navy Third Fleet
ATTN: Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (Continued)

US Pacific Fleet
ATTN: CINC
ATTN: Code N2
ATTN: Code N6

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Air University Library
ATTN: AUL-LSE

Assistant Chief of Staff
Studies & Analysis
ATTN: AF/SAMI, Tech Info Div

Deputy Chief of Staff
Research, Development, & Acq
ATTN: AFRDQI

Deputy Chief of Staff
Plans and Operations
ATTN: AFX00R, Opns, Opnl Spt

Pacific Air Forces
ATTN: XO
ATTN: XPX
ATTN: IN

US Air Force Academy Library
DFSEL
ATTN: Library

US Air Force Scientific Advisory Bd
ATTN: AF/NB

US Air Forces in Europe
ATTN: USAFE/XPX, Plns

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Central Intelligence Agency
ATTN: OSWR/NED
ATTN: OSR/SE/F
ATTN: NIC/AL
ATTN: L. Miller FB/15 Analysis Group

US Arms Control & Disarmament Agcy
ATTN: A. Lieberman

US Department of State
ATTN: PM
ATTN: T. Otis

Federal Research Division
ATTN: R. Wordan

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS

Analytic Sciences Corp
ATTN: D. Johnson

Analytical Assessments Corp
ATTN: A. Wagner

BDM Corp
ATTN: J. Braddock
2 cy ATTN: R. Welander

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued)

Boeing Co
ATTN: MS-85-20, J. Russel

Garjak Research Corporation
ATTN: G. Erickson

Georgetown University Center for Strategic
and International Studies
ATTN: R. Jones
ATTN: J. Sands

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
ATTN: R. Faltzgroff

Advanced International Studies Institute
ATTN: M. Harvey

General Research Corp
ATTN: Tech Library

Harold Rosenbaum Associates, Inc
ATTN: H. Rosenbaum

Horizons Technology, Inc
ATTN: J. Sumner

Hudson Institute, Inc
ATTN: NAVWAG

Institute for Defense Analyses
ATTN: E. Kerlin
ATTN: Classified Library

JAYCOR
ATTN: E. Almquist

Kaman Sciences Corp
ATTN: E. Conrad

Kaman Tempo
ATTN: DASIAC

Kaman Tempo
ATTN: DASIAC

Leon Sloss Associates, Inc
ATTN: L. Sloss

Natl Institute for Public Policy
ATTN: C. Gray

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (Continued)

ORI, Inc
ATTN: B. Buc

Orion Engineering, Inc
ATTN: W. Parks

Pacific-Sierra Research Corp
ATTN: H. Brode, Chairman SAGE

Pacific-Sierra Research Corp
ATTN: D. Gormley

Palomar Corp
ATTN: C. Feldbaum
ATTN: B. Glaser
10 cy ATTN: B. Garrett

R&D Associates
ATTN: J. King
ATTN: P. Haas

Rand Corp
ATTN: Library
ATTN: P. Davis
ATTN: J. Pollack

Rand Corp
ATTN: B. Bennett

SRI International
ATTN: M. Earle, Jr
ATTN: W. Frieman

Science Applications, Inc
ATTN: J. Martin

Science Applications, Inc
ATTN: C. Makins
2 cy ATTN: J. Goldstein

System Planning Corp
ATTN: G. Parks

TITAN Systems, Inc
ATTN: E. MacGrath

TRW, Inc
ATTN: Dr J. Beling

END

FILMED

8-85

DTIC