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


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




# THESIS

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC MILITARY ACCESS IN NORTHEAST AFRICA

by

Harold L. Bakken

December 1984

Thesis Advisor: M. W. Clough

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This study examines and assesses the implications of U.S. efforts to obtain strategic military access in four Northeast African states: Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. Accomplishment of USCENTCOM's different missions requires access at various levels to varying degrees. This study establishes a general hierarchy of access priorities in the six most critical complexes in the region. Despite U.S. military and economic

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# United States Strategic Military Access in Northeast Africa

by

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B.A., North Dakota State University, 1976

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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## ABSTRACT

This study examines and assesses the implications of U.S. efforts to obtain strategic military access in four Northeast African states: Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. Accomplishment of USCENTCOM's different missions requires access at various levels to varying degrees. This study establishes a general hierarchy of access priorities in the six most critical complexes in the region. Despite U.S. military and economic assistance programs which are designed to deter Soviet expansion, increase American influence, and create regional stability, U.S. access has not been attained. A concern of American decisionmakers is that increased political pressure on the current regimes in Northeast Africa would be counterproductive to regional stability. For these reasons, strategic planners must consider alternatives to access, including elimination of USCENTCOM; reducing its size and mission; or maintaining the current force structure while expanding its strategic mobility.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. GENERAL

> Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force...and in that regard, we are improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas. [Ref. 1]

This statement by President Jimmy Carter, which later became known as the Carter Doctrine, led to the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) with the mission to plan for employment of a tailored military force to meet potential contingencies anywhere in the world. In January 1983 the RDJTF was redesigned as a unified command and became the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) with a specific mission to defend U.S. national or vital interest in the Middle East.

For the purpose of this study it will be assumed, at least initially that this mission is both politically and militarily viable. [Ref. 1: pp. 61-66] However, this mission cannot be successfully accomplished by military forces based on the current logistical and operational infrastructure in the potential area of operations. It is therefore determined in this study that facilities in or near the main potential area of operations must be established to support combat operations.

Mr. Veliotes' testimony clearly reflects the current Reagan Administration's perspectives on the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy is based on the containment strategy. The Soviet Union and its proxies provide the greatest threat to western interest. Accordingly, Reagan's strategies focus on a build-up of American military forces for projection or for intervention purposes. Now let us discuss the specific military organization designed for use in the defense of U.S. interest in the Middle East, USCENTCOM.

C. THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

USCENTCOM is a result of a three phase Carter Administration plan which was formulated following the 1980 State of the Union Address. The Carter Doctrine set into motion the actual formation of a Rapid Deployment Force. However, the concept of a RDF had been on the Pentagon drawing boards since 1977. U.S. planners had determined that a four service force, capable of rapid deployment to areas outside Korea and NATO, was needed to deter Soviet expansion around the world.

Phase one of the Carter Plan called for initiatives that would increase the speed and mobility of U.S. forces which could be deployed around the world, and in particular the Middle East. This would require a vast expansion of the strategic airlift and sealift capabilities in addition to establishing a stockpile of equipment for a full Marine Division.

military assistance. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and in particular Israel were chosen to become the new "pillars" of the American Security Program in the Middle East.

It is very apparent that Reagan's policy responses are militant in nature. The Marine contingency at the airport in Beirut and the naval support vessels off the coast are examples of Reagan's willingness to use military forces as instruments of foreign policy.

The current national interest of the U.S. regarding the Middle East, as outlined by Nicholas A. Veloites, the then Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, are consistent with traditional American views for the region. They include:

1. To preserve a global strategic balance which will permit free and independent societies to pursue their aspirations.

2. To assure the security and welfare of the state of Israel and other important friendly nations in the region.

3. To check the spread of Soviet influence in this strategic region and, by extension, elsewhere in the world.

4. To preserve and foster our critical interest in continued access to the region's oil.

5. To fill the inescapable responsibility of the United States to work for the resolution of conflicts in the region which threaten international security and the well-being of the countries and people of the region. [Ref. 9]

militant posture. As the Rapid Deployment Force was becoming a reality, other events occurred which signified an increased U.S. military role in the region: arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were increased; the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was expanded; facilities at Diego Garcia were improved; and access to ports in Somalia, Kenya and in Oman were obtained. U.S. efforts to normalize relations with key Arab states were exacerbated by the on-going Arab-Israel problems and the linkage of U.S./Israeli economic and military assistance.

The U.S. build-ups in the region were countered by Soviet improvements at its bases in Aden and the capabilities of its Indian Ocean Fleet. These actions, both Soviet and American, have contributed to the regional instability and have placed the region into a geo-strategic context.

As promised during the presidential campaign in 1980, the Reagan Administration came into office with the anti-Soviet rhetorical guns blazing. Reagan's concept of security in the Middle East was based on the theory of containing Soviet expansion. The President proclaimed that a strong military presence in the region would serve as a deterrent to further Soviet actions in the Gulf and the Middle East.

Strategic consensus was the basic concept for containment of the Soviets during the first two years of the Reagan Administration. This policy stated that key regional actors would protect our interest in exchange for economic and

hostage situation alerted the White House policymakers that the Nixon Doctrine and detente were dead issues. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Carter informed the Kremlin that further advances in the Gulf would provoke a United States military response.

Regardless of the Soviet Union's rationale for the invasion of Afghanistan, (the Kremlin's official explanation was that it was requested by the People's Democratic Party) the Carter Doctrine was partially based on the belief that Moscow's objective was to gain control of the Persian Gulf and its oil resources. [Ref. 8] Carter's more hawkish advisors, including National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, had been pushing for a firmer policy regarding Soviet adventurism since the events in the Horn of Africa in 1977 and 1978. Following the Afghan invasion, it became increasingly clear to Carter that detente had expired and that a return to the policy of military containment of the Soviets was necessary. The Soviet invasion also required Carter to reaffirm our commitment to protect our Northern Tier allies, in particular Pakistan.

Ralph H. Magnus points out that Soviet actions were perceived as offensive efforts aimed at the control of Middle Eastern oil and a reduction of American prestige. As a result of events in Iran the Carter Doctrine was molded along military parameters, and since the pronouncement of this doctrine, U.S. foreign policy has assumed a more

for the Shah, neither Tehran nor Washington were prepared for the outcome of events in 1979. When the Shah fell in 1979 the United States intensified its support of Saudi Arabia and included Egypt as a major defender of U.S. interest in the region. Relations between the U.S. and its moderate Arab allies have been and remain clouded because of several factors: (1) the U.S.-Israeli relationship; and (2) Arab fear of American imperialistic motives.

American security interests are invariably linked to the actions of the key regional actors, both Arab and Israeli. Stability and security in the region depends on three key variables: (1) global concerns of the super-powers which extend to the region, and in a sense are imposed on its people; (2) related regional policies towards outside powers, whether based on fear or confidence, economic strength or need, ideological beliefs or cultural aversions; and (3) local or regional objectives between the Middle Eastern states themselves.

## B. THE CARTER DOCTRINE AND BEYOND

Like a siege, political instability toward the end of the 1970s laid hold on U.S. interest in the geographic area extending from Pakistan to the Horn of Africa, often referred to as the "arc of crisis." Events in this region fostered a feeling of uncertainty and confusion in Washington which eventually led to the formulation of the Carter Doctrine. The rapid decline and fall of the Shah of Iran and the U.S.

1971 it appeared that U.S. security interests in the region were being seriously threatened. In the U.S., both liberals and conservatives were quick to back Israel. And for the first time, the United States began to supply Israel with some of the most advanced weapons in the American arsenal.

The Nixon Doctrine sought to remove the possibility of a direct super-power confrontation by emphasizing self-defense by regional powers, with U.S. economic aid and military assistance. By design the doctrine was a world-wide policy that happened to have particular applicability to the Middle East.

Iran and Saudi Arabia, both strongly anti-Soviet nations possessed a desire and, more importantly, the necessary revenues to increase their military posture. Iran's traditional enemy, Iraq, was being modernized with Soviet equipment and Saudi security had been seriously threatened by events in South Yemen. As Saudi Arabia and Iran assumed the role of pillars of American interests in the region, the mood of Congress was one of approval of this approach. Following Vietnam, U.S. forces were reduced and the American people did not want to see U.S. involvement in another regional conflict.

Once again however, the inability of Washington to correctly "read" Middle East politics led to another foreign policy debacle in the region. Despite warnings from the American intelligence community of impending political danger

military gains in several key Arab states. In retrospect it is amazing that the Soviets did not take greater advantage of U.S. foreign policy blunders. However, it is safe to say that the Soviet diplomatic corps was almost as ineffective as the American diplomats concerning the Middle East. The Arab states did not want to establish formal alliances with any major powers, East or West. [Ref. 7]

Israel added a new dimension to U.S. policies in the Middle East. In the years between 1948 and 1955, U.S.-Israeli relations were limited to formal recognition of Israel as the homeland of world Jewry. This recognition primarily involved economic assistance to the fledgling state, while diplomatic relations were cool at best. However, Israel's attack on Egypt in 1955 prompted a realignment of regional and world powers. President Nasser requested arms from the U.S., but because of perceived linkage between Arab nationalism and international communism his request was denied. Nasser then turned to the Soviet Union for arms, thereby forcing the U.S. and Israel closer together. Their relations were solidified between 1955 and 1967 by regional political activities and a growing Israeli lobby movement in the American Congress.

The Israeli position became even stronger following the 1967 war. American policymakers determined that Israel was now a regional military force to be reckoned with. As the Soviet arms build-up in Egypt intensified from 1967 through

President Nasser of Egypt at this point was ideologically neutral and warned Washington to be patient with his nation and other Arab nationalist states. But, the United States continued to apply pressure on the regional actors for a defense alliance. Again, the lack of foresight and understanding of Arab nationalist politics and Arab interests led to the formulation of the inept and actually harmful Bagdad Pact of 1955. [Ref. 6] The U.S. applied pressure on the regional actors to join the alliance. But, congressional pressures prevented formal ratification and acceptance of the Pact within the U.S. Bilateral defense agreements were later signed with some of the Arab and Northern Tier states. Although American power was theoretically protecting the Arab World from the Soviets, the new Arab governments did not want to be linked to this power. This reluctance combined with U.S. miscalculations to drive some of the Arab states, notably Egypt, into the Soviet camp. In essence the American "containment" policy failed to thwart Soviet expansion in the Middle East.

During the 50s and 60s the United States continued its efforts to fill the power gap left by the British evacuation from the area. Military bases in Turkey, Ethiopia and Iran were expanded and the U.S. Sixth Fleet was upgraded to meet its increased security mission. [Ref. 4: p. 5] While the United States was improving its position in the region, the Soviet Union was also making significant political and

Our image problems were intensified in 1951 when the U.S. applied diplomatic pressure on Egypt to join the Western-controlled Middle Eastern Defense Pact designed to counter potential Soviet threats to the region. The U.S. lack of understanding of Middle East politics surfaced during this sequence of events. American policymakers did not have a thorough understanding of the Arab interests and political aspirations. Most of the Arabs feared Western imperialism more than they feared Soviet intervention. In fact, the Arab world considered Israel to be more of a threat to their security than the Soviet Union. Little has changed in this regard.

Containment of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and around the world has remained the major U.S. security interest since the war. President Truman proclaimed in 1947 that the United States would "contain" Soviet expansion by any means necessary. Ambassador George Keenan stated in his famous "X" Article that: "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." [Ref. 5]

President Eisenhower also viewed the Middle East through the East-West prism and his foreign policy aims were anti-Soviet. His administration continued to urge Egypt to join the Middle East Defense Pact with Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Britain in order to seal the Soviets southern boundary.

simultaneously considering the regional security factors in the Middle East.

The second World War brought about major changes in the international system. Significant power shifts throughout the world and the growing Soviet military machine posed threats to American national interest. Washington assumed the role of the leader of the free world and was compelled to fill the power vacuums created by the decline of British and French political influences in the Middle East. Prior to the war, the United States had expressed little interest in the region. This fact would haunt American policymakers for years to come. Few American policymakers were familiar with the languages, cultures, religions and political desires of the people. This lack of knowledge would exacerbate our efforts to formulate foreign policy for the region.

Overall, immediately following WWII the United States' image in the Middle East was very favorable. However, as we became more involved in the Palestinian issue during the late 1940s this image began to tarnish. U.S. support of a Jewish state was initially based more on moral issues rather than on security considerations. In fact officials in the State and Defense Departments strongly opposed our support of the establishment of a Jewish state fearing that it would be detrimental to our economic and security interest in the region. [Ref. 3: p. 21]

## II. EVOLUTION OF USCENTCOM

### A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Security of Western interests in the Middle East has been stressed by every American political leader since Harry Truman. Since World War II three factors have shaped U.S. security policy in the Middle East. [Ref. 3] First and foremost, the growing threat of Soviet expansion and intervention in the region, which briefly caused a shift in the balance of power and raised the spectre of potential interference with the flow of oil to the West. Second, has been our support for Israel and its continuing conflict with the Arab World. Lastly, is the combination of the geo-political and economic factors which have led to a confusion of U.S. policy in the region. This factor illustrates how the U.S. is affected by the internal political affairs of the regional actors, their revolutions, conflicts among themselves, and their attitudes towards the West. [Ref. 4]

Today the nations of the Middle East find themselves in the position of a geo-political football in a game played by the two superpowers. At the same time however, the superpowers are now more dependent than ever before on internal political developments in these nations. The mix of these factors requires all players in the international community to assess the region in a global perspective while

study nations. Chapter five examines the past and present relations between the U.S. and Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya. The dependability of the current regimes will be examined to determine if access agreements, once achieved, can be relied upon. Chapter six will briefly describe current U.S. military and economic assistance to these states and relate that aid to the regime's needs and potential access agreements. Chapter seven examines possible alternative options to access that defense planners may consider. Finally, chapter eight will present a summary of the findings and conclusions of this study, plus recommendations for future studies concerning the subject of U.S. military access.

analyze the socio-economic-political situation within the four case nations and its impact on current or pending access agreements. The following questions serve as a guide for the analysis:

1. What is strategic access?
2. What are USCENTCOM's access requirements?
3. What facilities are available in the region?
4. Which of these facilities best meet USCENTCOM's needs?
5. How are internal and external threats perceived in the four nations?
6. Do U.S. strategic needs conflict with the domestic priorities of the potential host country?
7. Does security assistance facilitate the acquisition of strategic access?
8. What relations exist between current or pending access agreements, (security assistance programs) and U.S. strategic access in Northeast Africa?

## D. THESIS ORGANIZATION

Chapter two will examine U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East which led to the creation of USCENTCOM. This examination will entail analyzing the evolution of USCENTCOM, its mission, its organizational aspects, and the various types or levels of access needed in Northeast Africa. Chapter three provides a detailed assessment of those facilities in the region which potentially could enhance USCENTCOM's mission. Chapter four outlines in detail the internal and external sources of threat to the four case

## B. OBJECTIVES

Since early 1980 the U.S. has sought to gain military access in or adjacent to the Persian Gulf. The Carter Administration sought to gain this access in existing facilities rather than building U.S. owned and operated bases. Northeast Africa appeared to provide the most geographically and politically attractive region in which to locate facilities and attempt to gain access. This study will assess this decision from an historical perspective and attempt to assess future possibilities for further U.S. access in the region. The primary objective of this study is to assess the requirements for and the implications of U.S. military strategic access in Northeast Africa.

## C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Currently four countries in Northeast Africa, (Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya) have been targeted by U.S. defense planners for acquisitions of facilities for USCENTCOM's use. Two primary assumptions of this study are that USCENTCOM required access in the region in order to accomplish its mission, and that facilities exist in Northeast Africa that facilitate these requirements. This thesis analyzes the implications of U.S. access in the region by addressing current problems within each country which either enhance or inhibit U.S. access agreements.

In order to determine the validity of this thesis, the focussed comparison method of analysis will be used to

The second phase called for the establishment of a U.S. force structure to be identified as under the operational control of a separate task force commander. On 1 March 1980, the headquarters of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was established as a subordinate element of the U.S. Readiness Command.

Phase three involved diplomatic efforts to gain access rights for U.S. forces in various Middle Eastern nations. Forward staging at various facilities in or near the area of operation was deemed critical to the planning of military intervention operations in the region.

Prior to further discussion of USCENTCOM in its present state, it is worthwhile to digress briefly and re-state that the concept of a rapidly deployable force is not new. Going back to the early 1960s the Kennedy Administration perceived the need for a force that could strike anywhere in the world except Korea and in Europe utilizing naval, marine and airborne forces stationed in the continental United States (CONUS). In 1962 the U.S. strike command was created, primarily consisting of U.S. Army units that were CONUS based and could deploy to trouble spots around the globe. [Ref. 1: pp. 4-5] Deployability was predicated on the procurement of new strategic transport aircraft, the C-5A, and a new sealift vessel, the Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships, which was never approved by Congress.

The Vietnam war created several major problems for the strike command. First, assets (units) earmarked for its mission were diverted to Southeast Asia, for example, the 101st Airborne Division and the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. Secondly, Congress resisted apparently fearing that the maintenance of such assets and organizational capabilities would make it much easier to justify another intervention. During the immediate post-Vietnam era, the chances of a U.S. military intervention in areas other than Korea or Europe were extremely remote, primarily because of domestic political constraints. These constraints, especially adverse public opinion, produced a quasi neo-isolationist attitude which forced a reduction of the procurement process of all U.S. military forces.

The strike command was replaced in 1972 by the U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) which was still targeted at the global level. Between 1972, and the formation of the RDF in 1980, the Middle East was under the jurisdiction of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Headquarters in West Germany. Soon after Jimmy Carter took office he issued presidential directive (PD) 18 which became the basic planning document for the creation of a "quick-reaction" force. Initially there was little budgetary support for the plan. However, events in Iran and Afghanistan during the late 1970s prompted a realignment of fiscal considerations previously centering on NATO ground and air forces, to support the establishment of USCENTCOM as it is today. [Ref. 1: p. 46]

D. USCENTCOM'S MISSION AND ORDER OF BATTLE

U.S. Marine General Paul X. Kelley, the current Marine Corps Commandant, was designated as the first commander of the RDJTF in 1980. General Kelley stated the mission of the RDJTF was

> To plan for the employment of designated forces, to jointly train and exercise them, and to ultimately deploy them in response to contingencies threatening U.S. interest anywhere in the world, in essence, to provide the essential command and control that will bring together in a synergistic way, the capabilities of our four services. [Ref. 10]

It should be explained that a task force is a normal military organization tailored for a specific mission and has a specific chain of command for reporting purposes. The RDJTF reported through the Joint Chiefs of Staff directly to the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 10: p. 622] The importance of this fact lies in the uniqueness of a separate operational Task Force Commander having direct access to the executive branch with the service chiefs as intermediaries. This relationship exemplified the importance of the RDJTF mission as viewed by the Carter Administration. It is important to remember that the RDJTF was not originally targeted at a particular regional area.

USCENTCOM was established on 1 January 1983 and, unlike the RDJTF, it assumed responsibility for a clearly-defined geographic area covering the Middle East to include the Persian Gulf states, the Horn of Africa, and the Northern Indian Ocean region. USCENTCOM's role is not unique among

U.S. military commands. However, the political diversity of the region makes the command's responsibilities complex at best. USCENTCOM's primary mission is to protect the security interest of the U.S., our Western allies, and key regional actors by projecting a credible military deterrent to potential threats, particularly the Soviets. It is designed to maintain security and sovereignty of independent states is protected.

USCENTCOM planners have proposed three levels from which they would operate in the event of an external or internal threat to the region: (1) Assist the indigenous military forces of a friendly state to the maximum extent possible, (2) Provide assistance for the threatened nation and its allies in the region, and (3) Introduce CONUS-based U.S. ground, air or naval forces in the area to support the threatened state. [Ref. 10: p. 624] It is clearly stated that support at any of these levels must be formally requested by the threatened nation.

As already mentioned, the actual deployment force would be tailored to meet the threats for a particular contingency. A full deployment force could involve almost 300,000 personnel, and more if required. Table one indicates units that have been designated to be under the operational control (OPCON) of USCENTCOM in the event of a real-world contingency. It should be noted that the list is not all-inclusive due to the classification of the actual troop list.

TABLE 1

USCENTCOM ORDER OF BATTLE

USCENTCOM HEADQUARTERS

U.S. ARMY FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND

HQ 3rd Army
HQ XVIII Airborne Division
82nd Airborne Division
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
24th Infantry Division (Mech)
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)
1st Support Command

U.S. AIR FORCE CENTRAL COMMAND

HQ 9th Air Force
Seven Tactical Air Wings:
1st TFW (F-15), 27th TFW (F-111 , 347th TFW (F-4)
345th TFW (A-10), 366th TFW (F-111), 121st TFW Air
National Guard (A-7), and one more to be designated.
Four tactical Fighter Groups: 150th TFG Air National
Guard (a-7), and three more to be designated.
One Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4G Wild Weasels)
522nd Airborne Warning and Control Wing (E-3A AWACS)
One Tactical Reconnaissance Group (RF-4C)
One Electronic Combat Group (EC-130H)
1st Special Operations Wing (MC-130E, AC-130H, NS HH-53H)
Various Special Operations and Unconventional Forces

U.S. NAVAL CENTRAL COMMAND

HQ U.S. Navy Command
Three Aircraft Carriers
Battle Group, Each Carrier Possessing One Air Wing
With Between 85 and 95 additional Aircraft. (These are
drawn from 6th and 7th Fleets)
*These Carrier Battle Groups are tailored but normally
are supported by its Surface and Sub-Surface Defense
Force.
Three Amphibious Ready Groups
Five Maritime Patrol Squadrons
The U.S. Middle East Force

U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES

One Marine Amphibious including:
One Marine Division (Reinforced)

One Marine Aircraft Wing
One Force Service Support Group
7th Marine Amphibious Brigade, including:
One Marine Regiment (Reinforced)
One Marine Air Group

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*Source: Andrew J. Ambrose, U.S. Central Command: Revised Support Structure, Janes's, April 1983.

Following the events in Iran and Afghanistan, the Pentagon discovered that the Middle East was without an operational or logistical infrastructure from which military operations could be conducted. President Carter sought to utilize existing facilities in the region rather than building and maintaining U,S. owned bases. Timing was important as was the necessity of maintaining a low profile in the politically sensitive Middle East.

But what were USCENTCOM's logistical access needs? What facilities in Northeast Africa could be made available to enhance USCENTCOM's chances of success? These questions will be addressed in the next chapter.

## III. NEED FOR ACCESS

It is apparent that a force the size of USCENTCOM requires a vast logistical apparatus to support itself in sustained combat. Currently the U.S. military force structure does not possess the means to interject the type and amounts of equipment and supplies required to accomplish this mission.

The Carter Administration made the decision in early 1980 to attempt to gain access to key military and civilian facilities both inside and outside the target area. Carter wanted to utilize existing facilities in lieu of building U.S. owned bases in the region or building a massive transport fleet. Northeast Africa provided what appeared to be the most favorable politico-military and geographical area to seek strategic access. [Ref. 11]

### A. HIERARCHY OF ACCESS

Before we establish a rank order or hierarchy of access we must answer a very basic, but important question, namely what is strategic access? Webster defines strategic as: necessary or important in the initiation, conduct or completion of a strategic plan; required for the conduct of war. Webster defines access as: permission, liberty to enter; freedom or ability to obtain or make use of. [Ref. 12] While access may entail various types of military and

civilian connotations, for our purposes the term will be limited to the military context. To further amplify the terminology used in this study, it is important to draw a distinction between "bases" and "facilities." A facility refers to a complex where the host nation controls or limits the guest's use of an installation. Bases on the other hand refer to a user's exclusive control gained via treaties or under compulsion. Geopolitics within the past twenty years have rendered the latter almost obsolete. This study then will refer to USCENTCOM's access rights to facilities in the region. [Ref. 13]

For the successful accomplishment of USCENTCOM's mission, given current force structure limitations, strategic access in Northeast Africa is critical. Without a logistical system from which to operate, the feasibility and viability of the organization's mission is reduced drastically. For our purposes then, we must consider strategic access as the lifeline of current USCENTCOM doctrine.

Another key question is, what type of access do we seek in the region? Listed below are the various types of access as they apply to Northeast Africa. These types of access vary in the military importance as well as in the political complexities.

Our first level of access represents and best illustrates the political sensitivity of the access issue. This type of access involves the stationing of U.S. troops, aircraft or

naval vessel on a semi-permanent or *ad hoc* basis [Ref. 14]. Factions within the potential host countries have expressed concern that an increased U.S. military presence threatens their sovereignty and external relations. U.S. defense planners have stated that the prepositioning of war stocks, (fuel, ammunitions, spare parts, oil, water and support equipment) are critical to USCENTCOM's mission. This level of access also includes the use of airfields and ports for intra-theatre combat operations as well as resupply operations.

A separate, yet closely linked sub-level of this type of access also exists. This second level allows U.S. forces the use of airfields and port facilities for various types of repairs, refueling operations, crew recreation, or purely short term "flag waving" activities [Ref. 14: p. 12] The exact parameters for this type of access may or may not be formalized until a specific need arises.

A third level of access centers around short term training activities [Ref. 14: p. 11]. Often, as in the "Bright Star" operations, this type of access may be co-sponsored by the host nation (for example, Egypt) and the U.S. In the case of the "Bright Star 82" exercise, multiple nations benefited from these endeavors. For example Somalia, which was only a low-level player, received technical and economic assistance for the upgrading of the air facilities at Berbera. U.S. Commanders and staff benefited by gaining

first hand experience in dealing with the problems of desert warfare under realistic conditions.

A fourth type of access focuses on the more technical aspects of strategic access. These functions are related to advanced communications systems, intelligence collections and deep threat surveillance. It may cover an entire spectrum of national systems, from satellite tracking stations, JCS command and control communications systems to underwater submarine detection systems. [Ref. 14: p. 14] This type of access is critical, however classification of sources prevents a more detailed discussion.

The last level of access that is important for USCENTCOM is that of overflight rights. Overflight privileges are traditionally harder to control or scrutinize therefore are often much more flexible. [Ref. 14: p. 13] Currently all four of the nations in this study have agreed to grant U.S. military forces overflight privileges without restrictions. If another Arab-Israeli conflict broke out, Egypt and Sudan would more than likely revoke this agreement with the U.S., assuming that the U.S. would support Israel as it did in 1973.

The typology below provides a summarized view of the levels of access:

Level One: Semi-permanent Access

1. Allows temporary staticning of troops and or support personnel.

2. Allows for storage or prepositioning of combat equipment, aircraft and naval vessels.

3. Prepositioning of fuel, oil, ammunition, water and spare parts.

4. Allows for the prepositioning of support equipment, e.g. fuel trucks, administrative vehicles and cargo handling equipment.

Level Two: Limited Access

1. Temporary use of Airfields and Port facilities for refueling and minor repairs.

2. Diplomatic visits or "show the flag" type visits.

3. Recreational crew visits.

Level Three: Training Activities

1. Unilateral, bilateral or multilateral training exercises.

2. Temporary stationing of troops and technicians for training purposes.

Level Four: Technical Facility Access

Allows for the establishment of technical facilities with specific communications, intelligence or surveillance functions.

Level Five: Overflight Rights

Grants unhindered access to host nation's air space for normal or routine military flight operations.

## B. SURVEY OF FACILITIES

This chapter provides an analysis of the existing facilities in the region which can service USCENTCOM. The methodology of the survey includes a brief description of the features which make these facilities attractive or unattractive to defense planners. Key ports, airfields, and internal transportation systems will be identified in each country that could enhance USCENTCOM's mission. At the conclusion of this chapter a rank order of key facilities will be provided. This typology will prove helpful for our analysis of the U.S.'s willingness to provide military assistance packages in exchange for access agreements.

### 1. Egyptian Facilities

Within Egypt four strategic complexes have been identified for potential use by U.S. forces. The Port of Alexandria because of it's size and location on the Mediterranean, the Cairo West and East air facilities, Port Said at the northern mouth of the Suez, and Ras Banas, an austere but strategically located facility on the Red Sea.

#### a. Alexandria

Alexandria is Egypt's largest and most important port city. It's location on the Mediterranean makes it a strategically valuable port as well as a potential liability. Alexandria is capable of supporting all classes of naval vessels and is equipped with relatively advanced navigational and cargo handling equipment. [Ref. 15]




Figure 1. Indian Ocean Region

b. Port and airfield facilities require limited but necessary repairs.

c. Barre government seeks U.S. presence.

Disadvantages:

a. Proximity to the Gulf of Aden and Ethiopia makes U.S. forces vulnerable to air and sea attacks.

b. Instability of the Barre regime makes agreements tenuous at best.

3. Mogadushu

Advantages:

a. U.S. forces still enjoy quick access into the possible area of operation.

b. Barre support of U.S. presence.

Disadvantages:

a. Instability of the Barre regime.

b. Vulnerability of the facilities to air or sea attacks.

4. Mombasa

Advantages:

a. Current support of the host government for U.S. presence.

b. Limited construction would be required.

Disadvantages:

a. The harbor complex is vulnerable to denial operations.

b. It lacks the optimal proximity feature of the other complexes.

important to USCENTCOM. These qualities, listed below in terms of advantages and disadvantages, either enhance or exacerbate USCENTCOM's ability to accomplish its mission.

It must also be clear that a degree of duplicity or redundancy in the logistical and operational systems must exist. This requires access in several different facilities simultaneously, often with duplicate functions. This rank order will further facilitate our analysis in determining if a relationship exists between U.S. needs and the military assistance instruments used to gain access in the region.

1. Ras Banas

Advantages:

a. Proximity to the possible target area.

b. With an upgrading of the facilities, Ras Banas could support both intra and inter theatre operations.

Disadvantages:

a. Currently unable to reach an access agreement with the Egyptian government due to Arab pressures.

b. Sea access routes are subject to closure of the Suez Canal and the Bab El Mandeb Straits.

c. Facilities are currently in poor condition.

2. Berbera

Advantages:

a. Proximity to the target area makes logistical and limited combat operations possible.

Mombasa also possesses an airfield that is C-141 capable. The runway conditions are good, however cargo and fuel handling equipment is limited. Air access routes from the east and north are unrestricted. Mombasa's primary limitation is that it is the most distant of all facilities surveyed from USCENTCOM's target area. Also, the harbor complex is particularly vulnerable to sea denial operations.

b. Nairobi

Although more commercially important than Mombasa, Nairobi is less strategically important. Its major contributing factor is that Nairobi International Airport is capable of supporting C-5s, while Nairobi/Eastleigh and Nairobi/Wilson airfields are C-130 capable. Nairobi International possesses the latest navigational and electronic air control equipment in East Africa. Fuel and cargo handling capabilities are good. Again, air access routes and weather conditions are favorable all year round.

C. PRIORITY OF RANK ORDER OF ACCESS

Of the sixteen complexes surveyed in the last section only six could be considerd desirable or critical to USCENTCOM. In presenting a rank order of these facilities we risk the danger of providing a false image. An actual rank order may or may not exist at USCENTCOM headquarters. Clearly however each of the six complexes listed below do possess a set of qualities which make them strategically




Figure 5. Kenya

Mogadishu's vulnerabilities are similar to Berbera's with one exception. Because of its location and critical economic, military and government role, the city would provide a much more lucrative target for air and sea attacks.

c. Secondary Complexes

Chisimayu: This southern city possesses a lesser developed port facility. It also has an airfield that is capable of handling C-141s, but lacks any ground support facilities.

Hargeisa: This is a regionally important military and economic complex. Its location near the Ethiopian border makes it a key defensive site as well as a vulnerable target. Hargeisa International Airport is C-130 capable, but does not have any ground support capability.

4. Kenyan Facilities

Two principal complexes exist in Kenya which could support USCENTCOM. Nairobi, the capital and largest city is Kenya's most economically important city, while Mombasa, the country's major port city, has the most strategic value.

a. Mombasa

Mombasa is the country's only major international port and serves not only Kenya but other regional states. It is linked to Nairobi by a relatively high quality rail and road system. Storage areas, cargo handling and ship repair capabilities are of extremely good quality. Ships of all sizes are capable of accessing the harbor without concern for tidal variance [Ref. 15: p. 179].

with capabilities for handling large military and civilian ships. Repair capabilities do exist, as does fuel handling equipment, albeit in a state of much needed repair. [Ref. 15: p. 181] Cargo storage and handling capabilities are adequate. Roads and transportation systems within the city are marginal. Air facilities near Berbera can accommodate C-141 and C-5 aircraft, but currently are in poor condition. Berbera's airfields are under military control and lack any type of advanced air control equipment. Weather and topographic considerations are not a problem. Berbera's other limitations and vulnerabilities include: (1) its proximity serves as a disadvantage as well as an advantage in the event of an attack from either South Yemen or Ethiopia; (2) the internal infrastructure in Berbera is very weak; and (3) water supplies, electric power stations and communications facilities are vulnerable to terrorist activities.

b. Mogadishu

Mogadishu is the key political, military and industrial city in Somalia. It is serviced by two all weather roads, one north to Belet Uen and one west to Ag Foi and by international shipping and air lines. Mogadishu's port is primarily commercial in nature, however it can service a military force if required. The international airfield can support all U.S. transport aircraft. [Ref. 19] It does not possess sophisticated aircraft control equipment nor advanced ground support equipment.




Figure 4. Somalia

Atbarah: Atbarah is critical to the agricultural sector of Sudan and to the Sudanese rail system. Its small airfield is of little military value. The city's importance is primarily domestic in nature.

East Central Sudan: This area contains a majority of Sudan's agricultural production. It is located on the major lines of communication between Khartoum and Port Sudan therefore making it critical to intra-country movement.

3. Somali Facilities

Although vast improvements have been made in the past twenty years, Somalia remains a poorly developed country. Few all-weather roads link the major cities and the country totally lacks any type of rail system. Despite this weakness, Somalia does possess two major and two minor facilities that could be utilized by U.S. forces. Berbera, located on the Gulf of Aden in northern Somalia, and Mogadishu, the national capital, are the major air and deep water complexes. Secondary facilities at Chisimayu and Hargeisa could be used for intra-theatre/country operations.

a. Berbera

Berbera's location, rather than its facilities make the port city valuable to USCENTCOM. From its port and air facilities U.S. forces can operate close to the Bab El Mandeb Straits. Port facilities at Berbera are good

terrorist activities. Moreover, Khartoum's potable water supply, hydroelectric stations, and fuel storage facilities are also vulnerable targets for terrorists.

b. Port Sudan

Port Sudan is the only deep water port in Sudan and it also possesses the majority of the country's petroleum storage facilities. Internal road networks are good to fair. As previously mentioned, Port Sudan is connected with Khartoum via rail and road, but to few other cities.

The port facilities are small and marginally adequate for military use. Although the cargo handling capacity is limited, it could support U.S. naval needs. No major ship repair facilities exist, however minor repairs can be accomplished on a routine basis. [Ref. 18: pp. 185-186] Port Sudan's internal and external lines of communications (rail and road) are vulnerable to terrorist activities. Also, the city's piped-in water supply, massive petroleum storage facilities and power plants are also vulnerable.

c. Secondary Complexes

Juba: Located in southern Sudan, this city is the focal point of the internal dissidence for the central government. Juba's airfield is C-130 capable, but lacks any support facilities. The city is the port terminal for the White Nile river complex. Possibly its most important feature is its proximity and road linkage with the port in Mombasa, Kenya and Nairobi.


Figure 3. Sudan

complexes. Khartoum, the national capital and largest population center, and Port Sudan, the country's only deep water port are considered the two primary complexes for use by USCENTCOM. The secondary complexes located at Juba, Atbarah and East Central Sudan, are more important in an internal-domestic context, but could have a limited strategic role.

a. Khartoum

Khartoum, located on the Nile River is actually comprised of three suburbs: Khartoum, North Khartoum, and Omdurman. It is the educational, cultural and administrative center of the country. Road networks within the city are adequate with four lane routes connecting the primary air and Nile port faciltiies.

Two airfields, Khartoum International and Wadi Seinda, located 15 km north of Omdurman are capable of supporting C-130 and C-141 aircraft. Khartoum International possesses sophisticated air control equipment and ground support equipment to handle heavy cargo loads. [Ref. 18] Wadi Seinda's facilities are less refined, but still important. Weather and geographic conditions are generally favorable all year round. Transportation by rail and road from Khartoum to Port Sudan is generally good for movement of personnel or supplies. Limitations and vulnerabilities do exist however, for example, the rail and road systems are not redundant and are difficult to defend against

directly in the Persian Gulf. But, Cairo's air facilities are vulnerable to terrorist activities.

d. Ras Banas

Ras Banas is located on the Red Sea near Saudi Arabia and is clearly the most important military complex in Egypt. In spite of this claim, it is important to state that the facilities are good, but not excellent. The port will facilitate large ships and it's cargo handling capability ranges from fair to good. Support and storage facilities at the port are limited. The airfield is currently C-130 capable, with fair to poor ground support and navigational systems.

In light of the relatively austere and underdeveloped state of these facilities, one may ask why Ras Banas has been deemed so important. By referring to figures 1 and 2 the answer should become more evident. Ras Banas is centrally located and could serve a dual role as an inter and intra-theatre sea and air weigh station into the Persian Gulf. With substantial upgrading of its facilities, men and material could be transported into Ras Banas via C-5/C-141 or major sea transport vessels, transferred to intra-theatre aircraft and be quickly put into combat. [Ref. 17]

2. Sudanese Facilities

Sudan possesses what USCENTCOM would consider two major and three minor or secondary strategic facilities or

However, internal and external lines of communications to and from the city are outdated and antiquated. Alexandria does possess an airfield that is C-130 capable but support facilities are limited.

b. Port Said

Port Said is strategically located at the south of the Suez Canal, making it a critical control point on the shipping lines of communications (SLOC). It consists of a large harbor, with fair to good covered and uncovered shelters for cargo storage. The canal/harbor is capable of handling large classes of ships to include aircraft carriers. Information concerning the airfield at Port Said was not available. Again, it's location and capabilities make Port Said a valuable asset as well as a potential target.

c. Cairo West and East

Cairo's major contribution to USCENTCOM centers around the airfields near the city. Cairo has the only airports in Egypt that are fully capable of supporting large U.S. military transport aircraft (C-141 and C-5). [Ref. 16] This inter-theatre and intra-theatre capability makes Cairo's air facilities vital to U.S. defense planners. Support facilities and navigational data (supplied and confirmed during the Bright Star exercises) make Cairo a logical and desirable position from which to operate on a long term basis or to provide a jump-off point for operations




Figure 2. Egypt

5. Cairo East and West

Advantages:

a. Availability of advanced air facilities and accurate navigational data.

b. Existence of an experience data base within U.S. and Egyptian military forces gained during join operations in recent years.

Disadvantages:

a. Current Arab resistance to a U.S. military presence.

6. Khartoum

Advantages:

a. Proximity to the area of operations.

b. Current support of the host nation government for U.S. presence.

Disadvantages:

a. Instability of the Numeri government may be exacerbated by a U.S. presence.

D. SUMMARY

As presented in the data above, Northeast Africa does possess several military and civilian air and port facilities which would enhance the USCENTCOM mission. In order to accomplish its mission successfully, given the current force structure, USCENTCOM would require access at various levels and in more than one country simultaneously.

How have the four case study nations responded to U.S. requests for access? What variables must these governments consider when negotiating with the U.S. for access? These questions will be addressed in the next chapter.

## IV. RESPONSE TO ACCESS

This chapter looks at the issue of U.S. access in Northeast Africa from the perspective of the regional actors. More specifically it attempts to analyze the situation on the ground within each of the four African nations to assess their perceptions of internal and external threats. This analysis will provide a listing of the domestic priorities facing the leadership in the region.

### A. THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Instability in the Middle East and Africa is neither new nor uncommon. Within Northeast Africa in recent years coups, food riots, civil wars, inter-state conflicts and economic difficulties have become more the norm than the exception. It is with this in mind that we must attempt to analyze the threats facing the current governments in the region. These threats, both internal and external, real or imagined, must be considered because of their eventual impact of the assistance programs and the question of access.

The external threats are often confusing and difficult to verify. U.S. policymakers are often forced to make decisions without the benefit of validated intelligence reports. Washington must understand as fully as possible the sources of external threats in the region when considering military assistance packages.

Internal threats in this region may be of greater consequence when considering military and economic assistance programs. In order to analyze these threats a quantitative analysis of internal strife has been undertaken based on the following factors: economic, political; religious or ethnic factionalism; nationalistic or separatist movements; resistance to economic or political dependence on foreign powers; and lack of educational opportunities. [Ref. 20]

The time-frame for this analysis is from 1980 (following the pronouncement of the Carter Doctrine) to the present. Most of the conditions that exist in these states are persistent and are not short-term in nature. In other words, the problems or conditions creating instability within these nations have deep roots dating much earlier than 1980.

## B. EGYPT

Since the death of Anwar Sadat in October 1981, President Hosni Mubarak has actively sought ways to reduce the sources of threats to Egypt. Traditionally, Egypt's foreign policy clearly reflected the impact of its domestic factors. To an even greater degree this remains true today. However, Mubarak seems more politically pragmatic than either Nasser or Sadat.

Nasser emphasized Egypt's role in the international community as a third world power stressing Egyptian nationalism. Sadat initially followed Nasser's

nationalist programs, but after the 1973 war he switched alliances from the Soviets to the U.S. and sought peace with Israel. This decision cost him the isolation of Egypt from the rest of the Arab world and contributed to the growth of internal opposition. Both Nasser and Sadat failed to accomplish what was most needed in Egypt: internal economic development. This has traditionally been, and remains, a major source of instability.

1. Internal Threats

Two diametrically opposing factors have severely impacted on the Egyptian economy during the past twenty years, namely two major wars with Israel, and the subsequent periods of peace following these wars.

Sadat's "open door" policy called for an increase in foreign investments and various types of western economic aid. This aid has become the mainstay of the Egyptian economy. Prior to Camp David, the oil rich Arab states were the primary sources of aid and investments (reportedly between $1.7 and $2 billion by 1977). [Ref. 21] By signing the peace treaty with Israel, Sadat risked, and in fact lost, most forms of Arab economic assistance. Jimmy Carter proposed that the U.S. should fill the void as a reward for Camp David.

This produced another source of internal conflict, fears of economic dependency on a superpower. Arabs traditionally have feared and opposed the presence or

involvement of a major power in their internal affairs. This anti-imperialist attitude has transcended into current Egyptian political attitudes. Moderate and radical Arabs have strongly opposed U.S. economic and military aid for Egypt as an exchange for peace with Israel.

Internal resistance to U.S. assistance is closely linked with the larger issue of economic underdevelopment. In spite of President Mubarak's Five Year economic program, little progress has been made. Factors such as the oil glut, the world-wide recession, and the effects of Sadat's assassination on tourism have had a tremendously detrimental affect on Egypt's economic growth.

Egypt's internal political threats are inextricably linked to other sources of internal threats. Although four major political parties are recognized, the National Democratic Party (NDP) is clearly in control. This lack of a representative opposition has bred political unrest. [Ref. 22] Mubarak has attempted to establish a dialogue with the opposition leaders, indicating that he is willing to work with differing political interests in Egypt. This does not imply that a massive political transition has occurred or is programed in the future. The NDP and Mubarak have maintained a tight rein on the two factions that are the greatest threat to the government, radical Muslims and the military. Mubarak regards both elements as dangerous to the regime's stability. [Ref. 22: p. 149]

Other internal threats are less intense but still must be considered. Arab Nationalism remains a factor within Egypt. This movement, led by radical Arab Muslims and supported by Libya's Colonel Qaddafi, is a continuous source of concern for the Mubarak government.

A desire for educational equality is more of a motivation than it is a source of instability, at least among the Egyptian elites. Egyptians seek education as a vehicle for advancement, but the major downfall of the system stems from the lack of employment opportunities in the private sector. Most college graduates are employed by an already top-heavy bureaucratic government, thus exacerbating the problem of increasing cost of government. In the final analysis, Egypt's major sources of internal threat are based on the weak economy and lack of a fully representative government.

2. External Threats

With Mubarak's succession to power, Egypt's rhetoric about external threats has become somewhat reduced. Mubarak, while tempering Cairo's relations with Washington in recent months has moved cautiously but steadily towards renewing relations with Moscow. Mubarak has apparently tried to withdraw Egypt from the East-West conflict by establishing a sort of Pax-Egyptian with the two superpowers. Expansion of Egypt's economic base is also a prime factor in his decision.

Mubarak's main external concerns revolve around Camp David and the weakening relations with Israel. Egypt, as Mubarak well knows, cannot afford, either politically or economically, another war with Israel. Mubarak wants to avoid potential conflicts and devote maximum time and resources to rebuilding Egypt's economy and political structure. He stated, "that Egypt's commitments to the accords would be met and that Egypt's return to the Arab fold would not be at the expense of the peace agreements" [Ref. 22: p. 158]. As will be noted later, this commitment is not without cost.

Egypt has also wavered in its anti-Libyan rhetoric in favor of a more anti-confrontational attitude. Mubarak stated that Egypt does not want war with her neighbors, African, Jews or Arab [Ref. 23]. That does not imply that Egypt will sacrifice its southern ally Sudan to Qaddafi expansionism. Clearly, radical Arab opposition remains an external threat of concern to Egypt.

3. Domestic Priorities

Hosni Mubarak's priorities lie first of all in solving the country's economic problems.* He must find ways to reinvigorate the economy and reduce Egypt's dependency

*Mubarak's current five year economic plan, (1982-87) emphasizes growth of the agricultural and industrial sectors. A strong dependency on foreign investments remains a major theme in his program. Mubarak has called for austerity measures to reduce the national debt.

on foreign powers. [Ref. 24] Mubarak must also reduce the domestic political strife by granting greater representation, yet while maintaining control of the government through the NDP. Finally, Egypt must continue to support the Camp David Accord in order to avert another Arab-Israeli war. Accomplishing this while reestablishing ties with the Arab world will require a balanced and pragmatic approach.

C. SUDAN

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, yet its population is small, backward and factionalized. The Sudanese government has claimed that external threats exist from its neighbors, and has claimed Soviet involvement in the region. However, the major problems causing instability in Sudan appear to be domestic in nature.

1. Internal Threats

Arab proverbs often state that when Allah created Sudan he wept. It's also said that he laughed when the deed was done. [Ref. 18: P. xxi] Both proverbs serve to illustrate the diversity of the country and its people. It is this diversity that represents the root of Sudan's current internal conflicts and sources of instability.

Sudan is unique in that it is geographically divided between the Arab and Black African speaking worlds. The Arab north, which contains approximately 75 percent of

the Sudanese population, maintains strong ties with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the southern one third of the nation is inhabited by non-muslim clans with strong ethnic and cultural ties to Black Africa. [Ref. 18: p. xxii]

Since 1955, a continuous civil war raged throughout the country with the numerically and politically powerful Arab north maintaining control over the Black southern population. President Numeri's major contribution to the state has been the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 which granted regional autonomy to the south while maintaining a limited degree of national unity. However Southern blacks do not feel that the Northern Arab-dominated assembly has allocated fair portions of development funds or programs, despite the fact that the majority of the natural resources are located in the south. Educational opportunities, social programs and unfair military conscription laws, and the re-drawing of the regional boundaries are examples of the inequalities cited by Southern opposition groups. This has led to a renewal of regional factionalism since 1980.

Internal threats to the stability of the Numeri regime are numerous. Although political threats are intense, it would seem that the greatest problems are economic. Sudan imports far exceed their exports, thus creating huge balance of payments problems. By late 1982 and early 1983 it became apparent that Sudan would need to reschedule its debt payments to The International Monetary Fund (IMF), forced

Numeri to accept harsh austerity measures as part of its assistance package. [Ref. 25] This, of course, led to the now common IMF food riots.

Little positive evidence exists supporting Numeri's current economic programs. The government remains unable to provide security for the oil fields in the south which represent Sudan's greatest potential export item. Thus, economic conditions are also a major source of instability.

Other sources of internal instability are less pronounced. It appears as though the Armed Forces are "generally" loyal to Numeri. However, political factionalism within the army has produced numerous coup attempts. Numeri's pro-U.S. position has drawn sharp criticism from his Arab supporters as well as the Southern opposition. However this opposition did not stop him from seeking more U.S. military assistance in exchange for possible access agreements in 1982 and 1983.

2. External Threats

Sudan's strategic qualities including: its proximity to Egypt; access to the Red Sea; and its agricultural potential makes it a valuable asset to the West as well as to the Arab world. Its location and pro-U.S. position makes Sudan a critical player in regional affairs. Surely this fact has not escaped Khartoum. Numeri in recent years has played the anti-Soviet trump card in order to gain U.S. recognition and assistance as well as supporting the Camp David Accords.

Numeri has also announced that Libya's Colonel Qaddafi is a tool of the Soviets and that he must be dealt with accordingly. [Ref. 26] This rhetoric is not surprising since Libya and Sudan have been bitter enemies since 1976 when Numeri accused Qaddafi of funding and supporting a coup attempt in Sudan. The situation between the two worsened in 1980 when Qaddafi announced for a second time (the first time occurred in 1973), the annexation of the Aouzou strip in northern Chad. The Libyan presence in Chad was proclaimed by Numeri to represent a threat to Sudanese security. Khartoum continues to claim that Libya and the Soviet Union threaten Sudan's security. Since 1981 Libya and Sudan have exchanged harsh rhetoric and several air to surface rockets. The latest attacks in 1983 led to the U.S. positioning AWACS aircraft in Egypt.

Another major external threat, as perceived by Numeri, is the military build-up of forces along the Ethiopian and Sudanese border. Again Numeri claims Soviet sponsorship. Efforts towards a rapprochement in 1981 were squelched when the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed by Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen. This treaty was designed to target for destabilization any Northeast Africa nation that sought an alliance with the U.S. [Ref. 27]

3. Domestic Priorities

Sudan's major sources of internal threat are regional factionalism and the continuing economic crisis. Numeri must

seek ways to unify the north and south in order to reduce internal strife. He must also formulate economic programs that will invigorate the national economy and spur internal development on an equitable basis for both North and South* [Ref. 28]. Finally, Sudan must continue to seek secure borders to the west and south through peaceful means.

D. SOMALIA

The fact that Mohamed Siad Barre has remained in power for almost fifteen years borders on the miraculous. During his tenure Somalia has been beset by almost every form of political and economic setback known in the modern world. In the face of seemingly unbelievable odds, Siad Barre has survived. How? It cannot be because of an increase in his popular support, in fact the reverse is true. One can also discount the theory that Barre is being propped up by a major power. Is it by luck that he has survived? Not really. The most likely answer is that a better alternative to Barre does not exist. Yet, internal opposition does exist and has increased in recent years. As in all of the cases examined thus far, Somalia's sources of instability are centered on economic and political crises.

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*Economic figures indicate that Numeri has only been able to generate slight economic growth (GNP increased only $20 per capita between 1980 and 1982). Military expenditures decreased slightly during the same period despite a substantial rise in the percentage of military expenditures for the total import figures, (from 6.3 percent in 1980 to 13.2 percent in 1982).

1. Internal Threats

A useful place to start our analysis of Somalia is to examine its economy. Somalia ranks among the poorest and most underdeveloped nations in the world. Its per capita income is reportedly around $135 per year. [Ref. 19: p. 135] Most of the blame for Somalia's economic condition justifiably rests with the Barre regime. Soon after he assumed power in 1969 Barre adopted a "scientific socialist" ideology which included full nationalization of the country's meager economic resources. It failed miserably. Somalia's economic problems also stem from Barre's decision to initiate the war in the Ogaden in May 1977. This was a conflict that the Somali people could ill-afford. In November of that year he ousted the Soviet advisors in hopes of receiving military and economic assistance from the U.S. For several reasons this aid did not materialize until early 1978 and never did reach the level which Barre requested.

In 1980 Barre was pressured by the U.S. and the World Bank to adopt a modified enterprise economic system. To date this effort has met with only marginal success. High oil and food prices, commodities which are critically short in Somalia and a huge refugee problem continue to hinder economic growth. As well the widespread drought in the region has destroyed both Somali livestock and what little agricultural production the country possessed. In

Cairo and Washington have both argued that Soviet intervention into the region was the major outside threat to regional security. In addition to the Soviet threat, Egypt had several other reasons to intensify its requests for U.S. military assistance. First, refurbishment of the Egyptian armed forces with new American equipment was a high priority. This modernization not only deterred radical neighboring states, but also equalized the military balance of power with Israel. Secondly, the military, which if dissatisfied could become a prime source of internal threats, had been calling for a modernization of its forces. Military leaders were seeking to standardize the equipment of the armed forces, thus reducing the interoperability factor so pronounced by the mix of old Soviet equipment and second rate western weapons systems. Lastly, the overall assistance package included funds designed to generate growth in Egypt's infant arms industry as well as enhance overall economic development.

However, by 1982 the U.S./Egyptian relations were once again strained. Several major factors revolving around the question of U.S. access to Egyptian facilities and the reliability of access agreements were instrumental in this process.

First, looking at the reliability issue from the Egyptian standpoint one must be reminded of the strong anti-imperialistic feeling that runs throughout Egypt and the

A. EGYPT

Within the past fourteen years American-Egyptian relations have radically improved. The efforts of President Jimmy Carter and Anwar Sadat were primarily responsible for this turnaround. In many areas including economic, political, military, industrial and cultural endeavors, bilateral agreements were satisfactorily reached and have been successfully maintained under Ronald Reagan and Hosni Mubarak. Egypt has attempted to cultivate a self image of being the U.S.'s most important regional ally and has endeavored to make Washington accept this view. But, the U.S. response to these efforts has been less than what Cairo had hoped for. [Ref. 37] In 1981 the newly elected Reagan Administration was searching for a strategy to influence events in the Middle East. It appeared, at least intially, that the U.S. was leaning heavily in favor of an "Israeli pillar" for the defense of U.S. interests in the region.

Cairo expressed grave concern that the pro-Israeli policy would have detrimental effects on the Camp David process, as well as jeopardize Egypt's economic development plans, which were totally dependent on U.S. military and economic aid. Sadat in no uncertain terms informed President Reagan that this U.S. policy was very dangerous to U.S./Egyptian relations and would not be tolerated. Apparently Sadat's threats made Washington realize that it must soften its approach. By late 1981 additional military and economic agreements were reached.

## V. IMPLICATIONS OF ACCESS

The objective of this chapter is to assess the regional and geo-strategic implications of U.S. strategic access in Northeast Africa. To accomplish this we will briefly discuss the relations between each of the four case study nations and the U.S. This discussion will hopefully provide the reader with both the African and American perspectives from which to analyze the dependability of the current regimes in these states, and the reliability of current or future access agreements.

Reliability or dependability is not a concept which can be easily measured or quantified. However, the dependability of the regimes in power is paramount to the short and long term reliability of the access agreements in the region. The reliability of the agreements can be analyzed from two perspectives. First, from the U.S. perspective. American policymakers and defense planners question the reliability of long-term agreements with these states in the face of current political and economic instability in the region. Secondly, from the African perspective, the question of whether or not the U.S. will in fact meet its end of the bargain, even if American national interests are not being threatened.

TABLE 3

STABILITY MATRIX (EXTERNAL)

| EXTERNAL SOURCES OF INSTABILITY | EGYPT | SUDAN | SOMALIA | KENYA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. MILITARY CAPABILITIES/ POTENTIAL OF NEIGHBORS | H | H | H | M |
| 2. MILITARY CAPABILITY/ POTENTIAL OF SELF | S | M | M | M |
| 3. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION/ TERRAIN/RESOURCE CONSIDERATION | H | S | M | S |
| 4. OBJECTIVE/STRATEGY OF NEIGHBORS | M | H | M | M |
| 5. EXTERNAL ALLIANCES OF NEIGHBORS (East and West) | S | H | H | M |
| 6. EXTERNAL ALLIANCES OF SELF | S | S | S | S |
| 7. POLITICAL STABILITY OF NEIGHBORS | M | M | H | M |

RESULTING IN THE FOLLOWING DEGREES OF STABILITY:

H = HIGHLY DESTABILIZING
M = MODERATELY DESTABILIZING
S = NOT A FACTOR (STABLE)

TABLE 2. STABILITY MATRIX (INTERNAL)

| ACUTE INTERNAL SOURCES OF INSTABILITY | EGYPT | SUDAN | SOMALIA | KENYA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. ECONOMIC CRISIS | H | H | H | H |
| A. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS | H | H | H | H |
| B. DEPENDENCE ON U.S. AID | M | M | M | S |
| 2. POLITICAL UNREST | H | H | H | M |
| A. SEPARATIST/NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS | S | H | H | S |
| B. ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS FACTIONALISM | S | H | H | M |
| C. OPPOSITION TO U.S. LINKAGE | H | M | M | M |
| **CHRONIC INTERNAL SOURCES OF INSTABILITY** | | | | |
| 1. LACK OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL | M | H | H | M |
| 2. WEAK POLITICAL STRUCTURE | | | | |
| A. LACKING REPRESENTATIVE OPPOSITION | M | M | M | H |
| B. ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS FACTIONALISM | M | H | H | M |
| 3. SOCIAL INEQUITIES | M | M | M | M |
| A. EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES | M | M | M | M |
| B. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS | S | H | M | S |

RESULTING IN THE FOLLOWING DEGREES OF STABILITY

H = HIGHLY DESTABILIZING
M = MODERATELY DESTABILIZING
S = NOT A FACTOR (STABLE)

and a growing dependency on Western aid. Other internal sources of threat evolve from historic political and ethnic factionalism in these countries.

Tables three and four present a summary of the sources of instability in each case study nation. Chapter five will examine how these factors effect the dependability or reliability of access agreements with these four states, and how relaible the current regimes are from Washington's perspective.

3. Domestic Priorities

There can be little doubt that the major problems facing President Moi are economic in nature* [Ref. 36]. Political opposition and turmoil will continue to be sources of instability as long as the Kenyan economy continues to suffer. Therefore, Moi's major domestic priority will be to revitalize and reinvigorate Kenya's weakened economy [Ref. 31: p. 4].

F. SUMMARY

These four nations currently face a variety of internal and external threats which affect their response to U.S. requests for access. Fears of direct Soviet intervention, or by Soviet surrogates within the region pose the greatest source of external threat. For example, Libyan support of anti-Barre factions in both Somalia and Ethiopia pose a low level threat to regional stability. Also, Somalia irredentism continues to serve as a destabilizing factor in the region, although at a reduced level.

Internal sources of instability center around the inherent economic and political weaknesses present in all four countries. Economic problems stem from a growing balance of payment deficit, with limited potential for economic growth,

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*Current economic figures indicate that Kenya's economy is recovering, despite the effects of the drought. Growth in the GDP in 1983 was 3.9 percent compared to 3.4 percent in 1982.

4. Finally, the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 forced the new leadership to prove to the West that their policies would not change. [Ref. 34]

Kenya has always expressed concern for Soviet expansion in Africa. However, following the Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Ogaden War, the fall of the Shah of Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Nairobi became more adamant about its position in the East-West conflict.

Kenyan decision makers also see non geo-strategic sources of external threats. Of major concern is Somalia with its claims on the Northeastern Province of Kenya. During the past two years Nairobi has indicated that it would like closer relations with Mogadishu. Bilateral meetings with President Barre in both capitols have taken place and indicate limited success [Ref. 35].

Relations with Tanzania, which have not been cordial in the past also appear to be warming slightly. President Moi has reduced his resistance to Dr. Milton Obote's return to power in Uganda, despite concern that Tanzania may be controlling him. Obote has actively sought measures to reduce the tensions between both countries, thus enhancing stability on Kenya's southern border. Finally, relations with Sudan and Ethiopia appear on fairly stable ground. State visits have been conducted and various treaties of friendship have been signed.

Odinga Oginga and several leading academics from the University of Nairobi, were detained and imprisoned for voicing their discontent. Factions within the Air Force supported by University atudents attempted a coup, but it was quickly crushed on 1 August 1982 [Ref. 33]. Part of the rationale for the coup, as expressed by the rebels, was to eliminate corruption in government (ironically, this was also a major goal for the new Moi regime in 1978) and to end government repression. Moreover, the radical nature of this attempted coup was similar to other ideologically based coups in Northeast Africa.

2. External Threats

Under Moi's tutelage Kenya assumed a very active role in African and international politics. Kenya's move from the non-aligned, despite its continued claims of non-alignment, to a more active role in the East-West conflict has impacted on Kenyan internal politics as well as external foreign affairs. Samuel M. Makinda indicates that four events between 1974 and 1979 may have facilitated this decision:

1. The fall of the Haile Selassie in Ethiopia and his replacement by a socialist junta.

2. The fall of the Portuguese African empire.

3. The collapse of the East African Community in 1977, which forced Kenya to look elsewhere for regional markets.

while inflation increased. This economic crisis bred more political discontent, which in turn provided new impetus to the rising opposition movements.

1. Internal Threats

As in the previous cases, the sources of internal and external threats facing Kenya are closely linked. Numerous factors are responsible for the economic crisis. The major problem is Kenya's dangerously high population growth rate of four percent annually [Ref. 31]. This places a strain on public social programs, exacerbates labor and housing problems, and creates an imbalance in food imports. Also, Kenya (like the other cases) has suffered from continuous inflation. Moreover, less favorable terms of trade have contributed to the balance of payment problem. These factors, coupled with a sharp rise in government spending, the drought which has crippled the agricultural sector, government support quotas, and an over-dependence on multinational investments and aid have contributed to Kenya's economic troubles. [Ref. 32]

When Moi came to power in 1978 it appeared he would be more tolerant of political opposition. But as the economic crisis increased in intensity, support for Moi's opposition also grew. By the summer of 1982 Moi and the ruling party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) had solidified itself by passing legislation making it the only legitimate party in the state. Moi's opposition, headed by

Treaty appears to be the only document that lends validity to the Barre claim.

3. Domestic Priorities

Siad Barre must seek ways to minimize the internal political opposition without increasing repressive measures. Also, he must find ways to develop an economy, not "the" economy, but "a" economy.* This will not be easy given the limited potential of the state, the current drought and the massive refugee problem [Ref. 28: pp. 44 and 86]. To reduce the sources of external threats Barre must attempt to normalize relations with his neighbors. Currently it appears that the calls for Somali unification are less intense. This reduction in irredentism may bear fruit for Barre by allowing him to concentrate on internal matters.

E. KENYA

Until the early 1980s Kenya was considered by most political and economic analysts as one of Africa's prime examples of s successful capitalist system. However, recently internal political opposition increased markedly. This opposition has threatened the stability of the Daniel arap Moi regime. Meanwhile Kenya's economic growth decreased

*Barre has had little success with any economic program. The national debt has continued to increase while the GNP has continued its downward slide, (the per capita GNP has decreased from $337 in 1980 to $307 in 1982). Meanwhile the percentage of the GNP spent on military equipment has increased from 6.2 percent in 1980 to 8.15 percent in 1982.

outside of Somalia, are seeking the common objective of ousting Siad Barre and reducing government corruption.

Internal sources of threat to the Barre government run the entire spectrum from economic and political problems, to resistance to Barre's willingness to grant the U.S. military access.

2. External Threats

Somalia's greatest source of external threats are a direct result of their own efforts to re-unify the Somali people. Neighboring states, including Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, the majority of the OAU and, for that matter, the rest of the world clearly perceives Somalia as an aggressive state with irredentist designs. This attitude permeates today in Somali foreign relations, albeit at an apparently decreased level.

Barre has played the Soviet card in order to gain limited U.S. support. He used the access agreement of 1980 as a quid pro quo for additional U.S. assistance. [Ref. 30] Cuban and Soviet presence in Ethiopia continues to facilitate, although at an abbreviated level, Barre's request for arms.

Other than the Ethiopian and Soviet bloc threat, the only apparently valid external threat comes indirectly from Libya. This threat is limited to anti-Barre rhetoric and economic support for the various opposition groups within Somalia and Ethiopia. The Friendship and Cooperation

mid 1960s and began to build what was to become one of the largest military forces in East Africa [Ref. 19: p.40].

On October 21, 1969, Siad Barre led a bloodless coup and installed a scientific socialist government. His primary goal and strategy was to initiate social and economic reforms. Very little growth was realized during the next seven years. The drought in 1974-5 coupled with the inability of the Soviets to provide assistance other than military weakened Barre's position. In an effort to rally his cause Barre ordered the attack into the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. This proved to be a major mistake for Barre. His forces were eventually crushed by the Cuban led, Soviet supplied Ethiopian forces. The military was all but destroyed without a source for rearming and the already beleaguered economy was in a shambles.

Between 1978 and 1980 the economic situation improved slightly. However, since 1980 things have gotten progressively worse for the Barre regime. Thwarted coup attempts have led to an increase in government repression. Barre has been forced to look towards his tribal ties for support, an action that he would not have considered in 1969. This has, of course, raised the level of resistance and opposition from groups such as the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Front (SSF). Opposition has been met by increased repression, and so the cycle continues. These opposition movements, within and

sum, Somalia is in deep economic trouble and is totally dependent on foreign aid for survival.

If it appears that Somalia's economic problems are insurmountable, we need only consider the regional and political factionalism to better understand the instability of the Barre regime. The basis of Somalia's internal problems are in the deep-seated animosities created originally at the Berlin Conference in 1884-5. Somalia's independence was granted in 1960, with the boundaries along colonial lines, not along the traditional ethnic lines of the Somali clans. As a result, the achievement of a strong national identity and unification of the Somali people has never been accomplished. [Ref. 29] Tribalism has dominated the Somali political system since independence. Political parties correspond to specific ethnic and indeed personal interests. This has created a weak national governmental system with little or no authority in the periphery.

In the early 1960s the Somali Youth League (SYL) became the dominant national political party. The key to its platform was the claim to create a Greater Somalia by unifying all Somali people. This phrase referred to the unification of the Somali people living outside the state in northern Kenya, eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti. Aid was sought from the West, but was denied for fear of being identified as a supporter of Somali irredentism. The SYL then turned to the Soviet Union for military assistance in

Middle East in general. A brutal history of occupation by foreign powers, European in particular, has left a negative impact on the Egyptian people. French and British intervention and occupations dating back to the early 1800s provided the impetus for the creation of an intense Arab nationalist movement in Egypt unparalleled anywhere in the Middle East. This movement by the late 1940s not only called for a revampment of the domestic political and economic systems, but also called for the total elimination of Western domination. [Ref. 38] This continuous resistance is the basis for Arab unwillingness to grant military access to the west. Therefore, agreements for access are not only difficult to obtain, but may be subject to repudiation.

Like his predecessors, Hosni Mubarak is acutely aware of this bloody history and consequently has been unwilling to grant total guaranteed unconditional access or permanent basing to any western power, including U.S. forces. Instead the U.S. was granted "periodic" access to various facilities. This reluctance by Egypt has led to what is expressed as a lack of the spirit of "true friendship." U.S. perceptions of reliability will be discussed below, but it is important to note a major complicating factor at this point. As noted in chapter three, the facilities at Ras Banas are critical to USCENTCOM's mission. Over $525 million dollars was approved for use in upgrading these facilities in 1981, but because of the inability to gain a guaranteed access

clause, Congress has refused to provide the requested funds. To date, satisfactory arrangements still have not been made, nor have any substantial improvements to the facilities been accomplished.

It would appear that Cairo has been forced to distance itself from Washington primarily because of the lack of sensitivity towards the Arab cause by the Reagan Administration. Statements by senior administration officials have given the Egyptian leadership much cause to question the reliability of U.S. commitments in the Middle East. It was mentioned earlier that when Reagan assumed the Presidency, Washington's policies, whether intentionally or not, signalled a shift towards Israel. President Reagan when asked by a correspondent whether he considered the Israeli settlements on the West Bank to be illegal, responded by saying "No, I don't. I really don't." Other administration officials including Secretary of State Schultz and Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick have also made statements which have alarmed those Egyptians who continue to support Camp David. [Ref. 39] Cairo continues to be cautious of U.S.-Israeli relations, thus making Egypt wary of U.S. resolve in the region.

In spite of these statements, President Mubarak has put himself out on the proverbial limb by calling for support of the September 1982 Reagan Plan, which calls for establishing an autonomous Palestinian confederation by linking the

Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza to Jordan. He also called upon the Palestinians to unilaterally recognize Israeli's right to exist. [Ref. 39: p. 30]

When looking at the reliability of access agreements from the U.S. viewpoint, one must put events into perspective following Sadat's ousting of the Soviets in 1972. Skeptics in Washington did not really believe that Egypt was serious about its reversal. Many conservatives in Washington expressed grave concern over the "ideological flexibility" or "political opportunism" of the countries of the Middle East. Israeli lobbyists became active in creating an aura of uncertainty regarding the motives behind Sadat's "open door" policy.

In sum, Egypt possesses the most militarily desirable facilities in Northeast Africa for use by USCENTCOM. But Egyptian fears of Western domination, coupled with the responses of radical Arabs deters the attainment of access agreements on terms favorable to the United States. To complicate matters, defense planners must grapple with conservative factions in Congress that fear another Egyptian ideological reversal. During this election year, it appears doubtful that the Pentagon will pressure Congress for additional funds for military construction in Egypt. Continued pressures from Israeli groups will also deter these efforts until after the U.S. elections.

B. SUDAN

As pointed out in chapter four President Numeri faces serious sources of internal and external threats. These problems are placing Washington in a somewhat precarious position. Numeri's stability is much in doubt, yet Washington continues to support Sudan with military and economic assistance, apparently for a mix of strategic and regional reasons.

Congressman Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on African Affairs, stated that, "Under President Numeri, Sudan has become a good friend to the United States." Numeri supported the Camp David Accords, much to the chagrin of the moderate Arab states, Saudi Arabia in particular. By reestablishing diplomatic ties with Egypt, (there was a period in the early 1970s that formal relations were terminated), Numeri became a target of internal criticism and external pressures by radical Arab states such as Libya. Apparently as a reward for this support, and to thwart Libyan activities on Sudan's western borders, in 1981 the U.S. significantly increased military and economic assistance in Africa. [Ref. 40] But the relationship between Sudan and the U.S. has not always been so friendly and warm.

Jafar Al-Numeri came to power in 1969 in a military coup and quickly proved to be a skillful politician. During his first years of power Numeri's regime was distinctly radical

and clearly tied to the Communist Party. During the early Numeri years Sudan forged close diplomatic and economic relations with China and the Soviet Union. Simultaneously Numeri was moving towards greater Arab unity by joining the United Arab Republic (UAB). The move towards unification between Sudan, Egypt, and Libya was not acceptable to Moscow or the local Communist Party because of strains in relations created by the divergent muslim beliefs and the communist ideology. An abortive coup was attempted in July, 1971, which resulted in the dismissal of the Communist party representatives from Sudan. [Ref. 41]

During this phase, relations with U.S. were non-existent. Egypt, which historically had been a close ally to Sudan, ousted the Soviet's in 1972 and attempted to gain a cease fire with Israel following the 1973 War. These efforts eventually resulted in the Camp David Accords, and closer U.S.-Egyptian relations. Sudan followed suit by also seeking better relations with the West, and the U.S. in particular.

Numeri's greatest political achievement was the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, which theoretically guaranteed regional autonomy to the predominantly Black Christian South. This agreement ended a 17-year old civil war and proved to Black Africa and the West that Numeri was a masterful political tactician and a man with enormous potential. Western developers began spending vast sums on development projects throughout Sudan. Meanwhile, Arab states, now with large

surpluses of capital but lacking an agricultural base, began investing in Sudan with hopes of making it the "Breadbasket of the Arab World."

Unfortunately, Numeri's success was short lived. As indicated in chapter four the economic problems, coupled with the renewal of the North-South factionalism have done little to bolster Washington's confidence in Numeri. But the Reagan Administration continues to provide economic and military assistance at what must be considered a considerable risk. The reliability factor, from Washington's perspective, centers around the question of Numeri's stability in either the short or the long term. Although he has survived for over 15 years under difficult conditions, the U.S. cannot be assured that it is not jeopardizing the chances for future access agreements by continuing to support a weak or "lame duck" regime. Considering the worst case scenario, Numeri could be replaced by a more fundamentalist regime that does not have strong ties to Egypt, and does not desire a U.S. presence in Sudan. Several other variations of this scenario exist, to include a coup attempt by a Soviet-sponsored faction. The likelihood of this happening is quite remote given the strong anti-Soviet position of both the Arab North and the Black South. Other possible scenarios include another Numeri reversal, such as the recent indications that he may be changing his mind about the total Islamization of the state and perhaps withdrawing his opposition to the re-unification of the South. [Ref. 42]

From a different perspective, Numeri may see the question of access as vital to Sudan's security and therefore as vital to its national security. Presently he believes that Egypt and Washington will not allow the Sudan to fall to potentially unfriendly control. Therefore, by granting the U.S. access he believes that the agreements enhance his regime's survivability.

From a more negative perspective, providing U.S. military access may be adding fuel to the fire. In April 1981 Numeri expressed an interest in obtaining American aid for the purpose of upgrading and improving naval and air facilities in Port Sudan and Khartoum. This aid was to be in exchange for limited U.S. access during a crisis in the region. This offer intensified internal opposition to Numeri. Mohammed Bashir Hamid wrote, "Over identification with U.S. plans and interest could turn out to be a dubious and risky undertaking for the Sudanese regime." Another senior official states, "That some countries are calling us U.S. puppets." [Ref. 35, p. b102] This agreement also exacerbated his problems with the Arab states and possibly increased the risk of negative actions by neighboring pro-Soviet states. Numeri, despite internal opposition and increased fear of external threat, has apparently strengthened his pro-Egyptian/American ties, while moving towards an Islamization of the state.

It is this author's opinion that economic pragmatism is Numeri's primary rationale for what appears to be an

irrational policy towards greater U.S. access. As argued above, the major threats to the Numeri regime are internal political and economic unrest. It would appear that Numeri has chosen to deepen relations with U.S. in order to receive assistance in exchange for access for USCENTCOM. While the clouds surrounding the regional Arab situation clear, meaning that either a solution to the Palestinian issue is found, or a greater sense of Arab unity is achieved, it would appear that Sudan will not seek additional economic aid from the moderate Arabs. These conditions or alternatives do not appear likely in the near future, therefore Numeri must continue to depend on the U.S. to help eliminate the economic sources of instability and thus ensure his political survival.

C. SOMALIA

American-Somali relations can be described as cautious, skeptical and very situationally dependent. When President Mohammed Siad Barre ousted the Soviet contingent in November 1977, he was convinced that the West would grant military aid to Somalia. This did not materialize. Barre's request for military assistance during the 1977-78 war with Ethiopia was initially denied and later granted on a more limited basis. The Carter Administration conditionally agreed to a vastly scaled down assistance package after the withdrawal of Somali forces from Ethiopia was confirmed. Between seven and eight million dollars worth of economic aid was provided

between July 1977 and January 1978. In 1978 a military assistance package was approved by Washington, with the provision that the weapons would be used strictly for defensive purposes. The Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia alarmed the "hawks" within the Carter Administration, particularly Zbigniew Brzezinski. Following the pronouncement of the Carter Doctrine in 1980, it was determined that Somalia would have a more important geo-strategic role. Somali facilities provided an important link to the chain of logistical and operational facilities needed to support the military aspects of the Carter Doctrine.

As outlined in chapter four, Siad Barre is facing seemingly insurmountable internal and external threats to his regime. Washington is well aware of his regime's instability and has approached Barre with caution. Another less apparent reason for Washington's caution is that there are hopes that eventually Cuba and the Soviets will leave Ethiopia making it possible for the U.S. to return, albeit in a somewhat different capacity than enjoyed under Haile Selassie. Ethiopia has always been considered the plum of the Horn, both economically and politically. Washington is aware that relations with both states are quite impossible. With that in mind, policy planners and strategic thinkers are not really willing to put their eggs in the Somali basket.

Another reason for Washington to question Barre's reliability stems from the perennial calls for a Greater Somalia.

As long as this irredentist attitude prevails, Washington will endeavor not to give the impression to Somalia or the OAU that the U.S. supports Somali unification via military actions.

From the Somali perspective, the reliability of the U.S. is also in question. The arms promised in the 1980 access agreement were extremely slow in coming and eventually the terms were modified, (cancellation of the 12 Vulcan Anti-Aircraft Systems). [Ref. 35: p. b264]

Unlike Mubarak in Egypt, Barre is unable to operate from a position of strength in dealing with the U.S. for several reasons. First, Barre's domestic base of support is so weak that he constantly must protect himself. During the past fifteen years he has become increasingly adroit in the art of self-preservation. But, his time may be running out. Washington's reluctance to expand the military assistance programs to Somalia is closely linked to the Barre regime's instability. Secondly, from a purely military standpoint, the facilities in Somalia are important to USCENTCOM, but do have limitations. Somalia's geographic proximity makes its facilities a more susceptible target for anti-U.S. forces staged from either South Yemen or Ethiopia, thus reducing the willingness of U.S. defense planners to operate from Somali facilities. Also, from a purely economic standpoint, it would require vast sums of money to upgrade the facilities to a fully operational status. A third reason for

Barre's weakened position is the OAU's continued opposition to the Pan-Somali claims. Despite Somalia's claim to have given up its desire for Djibouti and the Northeastern Province of Kenya, the greater Somali movement remains a concern for the OAU.

The Reagan Administration has continued to slowly move towards strengthening U.S.-Somali relations. Access agreements are tendered very carefully so as not to provoke Black Africa, including Ethiopia and not send a false signal to the Pan-Somali groups seeking a military solution to their quest. Most importantly, Washington wants to ensure that in the event that Barre is overthrown, U.S.-Somali relations will be maintained, thereby allowing continued access in Berbera and Mogadishu.

D. KENYA

Relations between Kenya and the U.S. have traditionally been friendly and warm. American missionaries, tourists and businesses have been attracted to this, the most pro-western state in East Africa. Together with Great Britain, the U.S. strategy towards Kenya has sought to promote economic and political development along the Western model. [Ref. 31: p. 7] This strategy has been and remains mutually acceptable to both the U.S. and Kenya.

In recent years however the aura of stability surrounding Kenya has been tarnished by ecomomic and internal political strife. In March 1980, the U.S. and Kenya reached an

extensive access agreement which has exacerbated President Daniel Arap Moi's internal problems. Before discussing the implications of the agreement, let us digress briefly to highlight the factors which led to the agreement. These factors include: (1) Soviet adventurism in the region; (2) Somali irredentism regarding the Northeastern Province in Kenya; (3) historical tensions with Uganda and Tanzania; and, (4) finally, a faltering economy which has given rise to greater internal opposition. President Moi has attempted to move Kenya from its traditional nonaligned role. He sought to generate prestige for Kenya by bringing that state into a more active role in the East-West debate. Moi wanted Kenya to be part of the U.S. deterrence strategy in the Northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Kenya's ruling elite was anxious to prove to the U.S. that Kenya desired a role in the containment of the Soviet Union.

An important byproduct of increased U.S. access in the Horn is the apparent rapprochement is somewhat novel. Since independence Kenya and Somalia have been enemies, again primarily due to the Somali claims to the NFD. However, the U.S. has apparently persuaded both protagonists to search for ways to settle their differences. Washington, of course, does not want the two countries fighting each other with American trained and supplied armies.

What are the costs or implications of Kenya's close ties to the U.S.? As in most third world countries there is a

reluctance to side with either superpower. Kenya has enjoyed a history of neutrality in most conflicts. However, this access agreement jeopardizes her position as a non-aligned African power. Internal opposition to greater ties with the U.S. also is of major concern to Moi. The March 1980 access agreements were reached without debate in the Kenyan parliament. This decision provided greater credibility to opposition claims that Moi is an "American Puppet." The rapprochement with Somalia may also have negative effects. Ethiopia has normally been less of a threat to Kenyan interests. By negotiating with Mogadishu Kenya may be taking a security risk with serious consequences.

Kenya is dependent on the U.S. to accomplish certain tasks: First, to assist in the economic development of Kenya; secondly, to ensure the Somali irredentist claims are reduced; and thirdly, to protect Western interest in the region, including Persian Gulf oil, Indian Ocean sea lanes, and multi-national corporations operating within Kenya.

From the U.S. perspective the reliability of the access agreements appear to be on firm ground. Although Kenya does not provide the optimal strategic location for USCENTCOM's forces, it does possess what would appear to be the best political situation of the four cases. Following in Kenyatta's footsteps, Moi has demonstrated that Kenya can play a useful role in the international community. Although

Washington follows very closely Kenya's internal political affairs, little doubt has been expressed concerning the reliability of Kenya as a strategic ally.

## E. SUMMARY

For each of these cases, there exists several major factors which prevent or inhibit the attainment of U.S. access in Northeast Africa. Fear that an American presence threatens their sovereignty is a theme expressed by Arab groups and various opposition groups in Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia. This resistance to an increased U.S. military presence has deterred Cairo from granting unconditional access, much to Washington's chagrin. Sudan remains one of the largest recipients of U.S. assistance, yet Washington is skeptical about the reliability of the Numeri regime. In Somalia's case, Siad Barre actively seeks a greater U.S. presence, but Washington remains wary of embracing the Barre regime in light of its current instability. Agreements with Kenya appear stable, however, President Moi must not only consider internal economic matters, but he must also be sensitive to political opposition to the current American access agreement.

The implications of U.S. access are not lightly considered. These four states each have reasons for either resisting or seeking a greater U.S. presence. To reduce the threats discussed in chapter four, the U.S. provides

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


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substantial military and economic assistance to these nations. These programs will be examined in the next chapter.

## VI. SECURITY ASSISTANCE INSTRUMENTS

Since World War II the United States has sought to deter or contain Soviet expansion by building relations with key actors in strategically located regions of the world. A key instrument for implementing this cooperative defense system with allied and friendly governments has been security assistance programs in the form of economic support and arms transfers. [Ref. 42] The Reagan Administration's policies are designed to strengthen America's international position. As apparent by current policy, Mr. Reagan intends to utilize security assistance as a means to accomplish this task. Whether or not the policy is politically prudent is beyond the scope of this study and will not be addressed.

This chapter assesses the current security assistance programs offered in exchange for strategic access in the four case study countries. We have previously established in this study a priority of access for USCENTCOM, indicated the sources of threat facing these African states, and stated what the perceived domestic priorities of each state should be. We will now look at the actual military assistance agreements themselves to determine if a relationship exists between USCENTCOM's needs, the threats facing the states, and the security assistance to each of these states.

A. TYPES OF ASSISTANCE

U.S. security assistance is designed to advance or enhance national interests in the following ways:

1. Provide arms, weapons and military equipment to allies and friends for self-defense.

2. Deter outside intervention in areas of national interest to America.

3. Enhance U.S. relations with regional agreements in order to gain strategic access for U.S. military forces.

4. Promote economic and social stability within various regions of the world. [Ref. 43]

Based on the perceived threats and domestic priorities in the Northeast African region, one would conclude that the last item mentioned above would be the most important. The Commission on Economic and Security Assistance provides a succinct summation:

> Security from internal and external threats is essential for the evolution of democratic institutions and economic development. Economic development cannot proceed in a turbulent and insecure environment. Military assistance often provides the critical means to deter and repel threats to security, thus permitting development. [Ref. 43]

With this as a frame of reference, let us briefly look at the various forms of assistance and determine which are the most feasible for the use in Northeast Africa. However, before discussing the types of assistance programs, an important fact should be pointed out about security assistance programs. The figures and terms of the agreements are fluid

and therefore subject to modification or termination at any time. The decision making process within both the supplier and recipient governments is invariably linked to the fulfillment of the obligations. Also, the figures of the agreements seldom reflect the actual delivery of the funds, systems or training packages. These variables must be carefully considered when attempting to analyze raw dollar figures. [Ref. 44]

1. Economic Support Fund

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) provides the recipient nation with a means to develop its infrastructure or other critical internal developmental projects, or as a means to meet a balance of payment problem. [Ref. 43: p. 18] It is designed to reduce internal instability produced by economic and political chaos. Theoretically ESF programs are flexible in nature and can be adjusted for either short or long term development projects.

All four of the countries in our study are beset by severe economic crises. Accordingly economic development ranks high in terms of their domestic priorities. Appendix A indicates ESF budgeted funds for all four states from FY 1983 through FY 1985.

2. Foreign Military Sales

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) represents a government to government sale of arms, equipment or services. Ideally the transaction is accomplished on a cash basis, but can be

financed via one of three U.S. government programs: Department of Defense Guaranteed Credit, Direct Credit, or Waivered Credit. [Ref. 44: p. 127] These sales are designed to strengthen our allies by increasing their defensive posture, thus reducing the need for direct U.S. troop involvement.

FMS assistance increased sharply between the early 1970s and the early 1980s. Reasons for this increase exist both on the geo-strategic as well as at the regional plain. The reintensification of the East-West conflict following the events in Southwest Asia in the late 1970s can assume the major responsibility for this trend. But, other factors such as the increased availability of capital from oil revenues in the Middle East and the increased production capability in Western Europe led to a competetive arms market.

President Reagan in seeking ways to strengthen the U.S. position in the world determined that arms sales would once again become a primary factor in U.S. foreign relations. American planners have sought ways to regain and maintain regional influence in Northeast Africa to counter the Soviet presence in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Arms sales, or grants were an acceptable mode to gain this influence or, in the long run gain military access, to facilities in the region. In exchange for continuing support of the Camp David process, the U.S. has supported Egypt's request for military equipment and arms as well as economic aid. Sudan, Somalia and

long-time ally, Kenya, have become key players in the containment of Soviet expansion within the Northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean.

The reader is reminded that agreements, especially FMS programs do not always mean the terms of the agreement are fulfilled as designed. In fact, often less than half of the services or equipment specified in the agreement ever reach the recipient country. [Ref. 44: p. 130] Appendix B presents data (in constant 1977 dollars) for worldwide agreements and deliveries between 1974-1980 better illustrating this disparity.

As mentioned at the top of this subsection, FMS programs are ideally established on a purely cash basis. However, clearly not all of the U.S. recipients, in fact few, are able to pay cash for FMS purchases. The four states in this study obviously fall into this category. Therefore, a critical aspect to FMS programs is the method of payment or, in these cases, forms of credit available for arms purchases.

Egypt ranks second in the world to Israel in terms of total U.S. FMS credits received. Because of its unique and important role in the Middle East peace process, Egypt together with Israel has received these credits on a "forgiven" basis, meaning that they will not be required to repay FMS credits.

In order to reduce the debt problems within the other three Northeast African states, and in fact worldwide, the

Reagan Administration initiated a program which requires concessional interest rates for lesser developed nations. These rates are determined by economic needs and ability to pay of each state, [Ref. 43: p. 16] thus maximizing flexibility of the assistance program. Based on these criteria, Egypt and Kenya were programmed for FMS credit for FY 1984 and 1985 as indicated in Appendix C. Sudan and Somalia were not granted FMS credit for several reasons. First, the source of external threats was perceived as important, but as less intense. Secondly, and more importantly, neither country could afford FMS credit under any terms unless it were forgiven credit.

3. Military Assistance Programs

The Military Assistance Program (MAP) provides grant funds to states for the purpose of buying weapons for defense. Between the 1950s and the mid 1970s MAP was the U.S.'s primary assistance instrument. [Ref. 44: p. 156] This is no longer the case. By the mid-1970s western Europe and Japan were industrially capable of building their own weapons or buying U.S. systems. But more importantly, the now capital rich countries were able and in fact desired to purchase weapons on a cash basis.

In the early 1980s the world-wide recession and the oil glut reduced the recipient countries' ability to pay. Sudan, Somalia and Kenya's economic plight have put them in a position where they are unable to qualify for FMS credits, yet are considered important in the overall U.S. strategy.

Therefore, these three countries have been earmarked for MAP grants in FY 1985 as indicated in Appendix D. Egypt, because of its most favored basis was granted FMS forgiven credits and therefore does not need MAP grants.

4. International Military Education and Training Programs

The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) provides grant aid to chosen countries for the purpose of training and education of foreign military personnel. For the U.S. this program is a relatively low-cost/low risk way of gaining influence in a particular third world country via its intelligentsia. [Ref. 43: p. 27]

IMET programs provide future leaders of these nations with important exposure to American culture, traditions and military doctrine. Both the supplier and the recipient nations reap benefits from this relationship. These personnel once trained in American technology, management skills and values hopefully return to their homes and contribute to the internal development of the recipient nation.

All four of the states concerned in our study are active participants in the IMFT programs. (See Appendix E) This relationship hopefully will facilitate the acquisition of access for USCENTCOM, as well as reduce in some small ways the inoperability of U.S. and African/Arab military structures.




Figure 6. Assistance Programs to Southwest Asia

B. SUMMARY

The Reagan Administration's policies reflect a willingness to use arms transfers and economic assistance as a means to increase America's influence in the world. Assistance programs targeted at Northeast Africa, which are depicted in figure six and table four, are designed to accomplish two things: first, to create regional stability by reducing the internal and external sources of threats in

allied states; secondly, to enhance U.S. access in the region. U.S. assistance programs in the region appear to be consistent with the needs of the states and the overall U.S. objectives.

Having said that, it is now necessary to put the analysis together in order to determine if access in Northeast Africa is feasible for USCENTCOM. If not, then alternatives to access must be explored. Alternative options is the subject of the next chapter.

TABLE 4

MAJOR FUNDED PROGRAMS, FY 1985

| | ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS | FMS CREDITS | MAP GRANTS | IMET FUNDS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EGPYT | $750 Mil. | $1.175 Mil. | $ -0- | $2 Mil. |
| SUDAN | $120 Mil. | $ -0- | $69 Mil. | $1.7 Mil. |
| SOMALIA | $ 35 Mil. | $ -0- | $40 Mil. | $1.25 Mil. |
| KENYA | $ 55 Mil. | $ -0- | $23 Mil. | $1.8 Mil. |

Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1985, and Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Department of Defense, DSAA, 30 September 1983.

## VII. ALTERNATIVES TO ACCESS

In light of the current political situation in Northeast Africa, it does not appear feasible for the U.S. to maintain even a low-level military presence in the region. This chapter will briefly examine several alternatives to U.S. strategic access, or options that could satisfy or supplant USCENTCOM's access requirements.

It was stated at the outset that the political and military viability of USCENTCOM's mission would not be examined in this study. However, our analysis has raised some basic and important questions which concern viability. Viability can not be addressed without a brief discussion of some of the inherent weaknesses of USCENTCOM's organizational make-up. As the discussion of alternatives progresses, these weaknesses and their importance will become more evident to the reader. Jeffrey Record provides a fairly succinct, yet encompassing analysis of these weaknesses which include:

1. Lack of strategic mobility--e.g., the inability to get the forces to the target ares.

2. Lack of organic tactical mobility and firepower.

3. Dependence on a shore-based logistical infrastructure.

4. The inability to secure possible points of entry in the target area. [Ref. 1: p. 61]

Other factors include: the multiple operational taskings of units earmarked for USCENTCOM; the lack of cohesive allied support programs with NATO countries; and the absence of a clearly defined threat, reduces the viability of USCENTCOM. Needless to say, a more detailed analysis of the viability issue is warranted in future studies, however it far exceeds the purview of this project.

## A. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS

Three options exist for defense planners. Option one would be to repudiate the Carter Doctrine and eliminate USCENTCOM as an operational force. A second option would be to completely revamp the organizational structure and the mission of the command. This option would call for scaling down the force from its present 300,000 man multi-service figure, to a smaller purely Navy-Marine combat force. A final option, which appears to be the current administration's approach, would be to maintain the current force structure and reducing its lack of strategic mobility weaknesses.

### 1. Option One

Option one would require vast changes in current American foreign policy, not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere in the world. This option would signal the adoption of a neo-isolationist outlook. Western Europe and Japan, which are dependent on Middle Eastern oil, would no longer have the promise of American military intervention available to ensure their continued access to this oil.

relationship. Secondly, and much less obvious, is Washington's desire to ultimately reestablish relations with Ethiopia. [Ref. 30: p. 58] In light of recent events in Addis Ababa, particularly the declaration of the official Communist Ethiopian Workers Party, this hope may not be realistic. Thirdly, the U.S. has always feared linking itself with Somali claims for a unified Somalia, and their willingness to achieve this goal by force. Regional conflict is counter-productive to U.S. interests and Washington does not want to be identified by the OAU as a supporter of the Pan-Somalia movement.

Therefore, the U.S. will continue to deny Barre's request for offensive weapons, but will support the Somali government with military and civilian equipment which enhances internal development. The 1980 access agreement will remain on the back burner for now. USCENTCOM will continue to plan for the use of Somali facilities but will not be allowed to provide accelerated assistance to upgrade the facilities at either Berbera or Mogadishu.

D. KENYA

Kenya, a long time American ally and supporter also enjoys a critical strategic location for possible use by USCENTCOM. Currently, U.S. military forces do have access at Mombasa, the main port city, and at various airfields throughout the country. U.S. policy is focused towards

Current U.S. policy is aimed at maintaining access by deterring external threats and meeting humanitarian needs. Somalia's economy will not sustain full FMS credits, thus U.S. assistance is primarily grants for economic development and MAP funds for purchasing limited defensive arms. IMET programs are important because they provide the U.S. with a method of influencing the Somali military and upgrading of Somalia's infrastructure. [Ref. 43: p. 295] (See Appendix H)

If a relationship exists between access gained and military assistance expended it is only marginal. USCENTCOM needs and wants access in Somalia, but at what price? The original agreement signed in 1980 has never been fully realized much to Barre's chagrin. The bulk of $40 million assistance package was for air defense weapons (Vulcans), low level radars, and construction services. To date none of the ADA systems has been delivered and only partial upgrading of the facilities at Berbera has been accomplished. [Ref. 30: p. 57] If Somalia is so important to U.S. defense planners why have the terms of the agreement not been met? President Reagan's Somali policy remains cautious. Several reasons are apparent for this fact. First and foremost is the instability of the Barre regime. The economic and political unrest makes Barre's position tenuous at best. The U.S. has measured its support of Barre, yet has attempted to meet the needs of the people while maintaining a low-level

C. SOMALIA

Somalia by its geographic location alone is considered critical to U.S. defense planners. In August 1980, Somalia and the U.S. reached formal agreements granting access to American military forces. [Ref. 35: p. b264] These facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu are integral aspects to the logistical and operational infrastructure required by USCENTCOM.

President Siad Barre's regime is vulnerable to a number of potential and real threats. Internally, his nation has been ravaged by drought, the recession, a lack of natural resources, and a huge budget deficit. This budget deficit is clearly linked to some major fiscal and political mistakes made by Barre. Somalia's attack into Ethiopia in 1977 and their subsequent defeat in early 1978 left the Army destroyed and the economy crushed. Worst of all, the major objective of the attack, the unification of the Somali people living in the Ogaden was not accomplished.

This action further destabilized the borders, which continue to be a source of external threat. Soviet bloc/ Ethiopian forces have continued to operate along the Somali borders conducting various types of raids and air attacks. The Barre regime is also threatened by the existence of the Friendship Pact between Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen. The net result of these threats is a weakened central government with little means to create and sustain economic growth or political stability.

Sudan. (See Appendix G) This aid is designed to assist in Sudan's development, support new and established agricultural sectors, and meet short-term financial gaps. [Ref. 43: p. 229]

Political instability stems from the regional fractionalism of the Arab north and Black Africa south. American military assistance can do little to reduce this source of conflict. If anything, this schism has made Washington more cautious in dealing with the Numeri regime. Only limited types and quantities of military weapons have not been provided fearing that they may be used against internal factions, thus hurting future ties with the south in the event of a coup. Primarily U.S. assistance has been designed around economic endeavors, meanwhile reducing external sources of threats from Libya and Ethiopia.

It is this instability that has caused concern for establishing long-term access agreements. Current U.S. policy renders tacit support for the Numeri regime which may come back to haunt the Reagan Administration. Numeri's Islamization may be strengthening his position with the Arab North, but it is doing little to reduce the opposition from the South. Washington must tread lightly. Now is not the time to seek and gain access agreements with Numeri's government. This action would exacerbate Numeri's internal and external problems and possibly have very negative long-term effects on U.S. strategy in the region.

military access. Washington and Cairo both want regional stability, and U.S. military presence presently would be counter productive to this stability. Thus, USCENTCON must accept limited access to Egyptian facilities and American military assistance must continue.

B. SUDAN

Sudan is also strategically important for the protection of U.S. interest in the Middle East. Khartoum, in addition to being the political and industrial hub of the nation, also possesses key strategic air complexes which could be used by USCENTCOM. Sudan's importance to the U.S. also stems from its support of Egypt and the Camp David Accords. This support has been a mixed blessing for the Sudan as will be explained below.

President Numeri leads a country with several major problems which are primary sources of internal conflict. First and foremost is the state of the economy. Relatively poor in natural resources (except for potential oil exports) and an increase in imports has created a rapidly growing national debt in Sudan.

Prior to President Numeri's recognition of Camp David the moderate Arab world provided the majority of Sudan's economic assistance. Now virtually cut off from this aid, Sudan has turned to the West and the U.S. in particular for assistance. The ESF program is the cornerstone of America's assistance to

The U.S. continues to provide massive FMS credits to Egypt for the purpose of modernizing its military. By providing this assistance the U.S. helps Egypt reduce sources of internal threats from its military by providing modern weapons systems, and sources of external threat by deterring radical states in the region. This assistance is provided on a "forgiven credit" basis in order to prevent further growth of the Egyptian debt. (See Appendix F)

Does a relationship exist between the data in Appendix 6 and the degree of access achieved? In the author's opinion it does not. In 1981 $525 million dollars was requested for improvements of the facilities at Ras Banas. None of that allocation was ever expended. This year $49 million of the $53 requested for military construction projects at Ras Banas was approved, but only after Egypt agreed to grant "unconditional" access to U.S. forces. [Ref. 47] To date these conditions have not been met. Given the sensitivity of the access issue within Egypt, it would appear that these conditions will not be met in the immediate future. This indicates that Egypt is far more concerned with the more immediate threats, internal opposition and economic underdevelopment than they are with external threats, (the Soviets). Also, Mubarak fully recognizes Egypt's importance to the U.S. in the Middle East peace process. He does not believe that U.S. policymakers would jeopardize the Camp David agreement in exchange for demands of unconditional

in order to gain access. To complete the task, the following sections will assess each country individually reviewing the critical factors which affect the access issue.

## A. EGYPT

Egypt's strategic location and potentially valuable military facilities at Ras Banas make it critical for USCENTCOM to acquire unconditional access in Egypt. More importantly however is Egypt's continued role in and support of the Camp David Accords. These two factors, coupled with a shared concern for Soviet expansion places Egypt second only to Israel in total U.S. military and economic assistance.

Egypt's primary domestic concerns are economic in nature. ESF assistance provided since 1979 indicates that the American government shares this concern and is willing to assist. [Ref. 46] Since 1979, following Camp David, the U.S. has become almost the primary source of economic assistance to Egypt. U.S. assistance is designed to promote economic development, expand Egypt's infrastructure and reduce its balance of payment problems. Grant assistance supports both short and long term economic goals. Hosni Mubarak has in recent years attempted to diversify Egypt's outside sources of aid. He has renewed relations with Moscow and continues to mend fences with the moderate Arab world in hopes of creating greater regional stability.

## VIII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has attempted to analyze the very complex and politically sensitive issue of strategic access in Northeast Africa. It should be apparent to the reader that USCENTCOM's mission and organization requires a vast logistical system in or near the potential target area from which it must operate. Without this infrastructure, attained via access or some other suitable means, USCENTCOM will not be able to conduct sustained combat operations.

The four Northeast African nations addressed in this study possess at least one or more strategic complexes which would support USCENTCOM. Only six of the facilities are actually of significant military value and are critical to USCENTCOM planners.

Each of these four states also face major sources of internal and external threat which potentially either enhance or inhibit the possiblity of attaining and maintaining access agreements. These threats must be thoroughly considered by U.S. planners and these considerations must be reflected by which types of assistance instruments are provided in exchange for access.

Finally this study was designed to determine if a relationship exists between the situation on the ground within these four states and the U.S.'s willingness to provide particular types of military and economic assistance instruments

B. SUMMARY

As it stands today, a greater U.S. access in Northeast Africa is not feasible. U.S. policymakers have three basic options or alternatives to access to consider:

1. Eliminate USCENTCOM and risk losing Western access to Middle Eastern oil.

2. Modify the organization by reducing its size and altering command and control apparatus. This option also risks sending the signal to allies and potential adversaries that the region and its resources are less important to the U.S.

3. Maintaining USCENTCOM's force structure as it is, however continue to upgrade its strategic mobility, meanwhile continuing to attempt to gain access in countries near the area of operations.

equipment, and support materials near the area of operations. Prepositioning reduces the movement requirements of the forces. As should be clear by this time, prepositioning, which was one of the primary levels of access discussed in chapter three, requires some type of access agreement. Thus far the political situation in the region has prevented the prepositioning of U.S. equipment or supplies for use by USCENTCOM.

As mentioned above, prepositioning can also be accomplished on various types of ships within the fleet. Critical to the sea-based prepositioning concept is the tiny island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The sea-based prepositioning system currently uses Diego Garcia as the center of operations. This Near-Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF), currently consists of seven ships with enough equipment and supplies for a full Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). Ultimately, plans call for the prepositioning of equipment for two additional MABs. [Ref. 45: p. 183]

The third and final concept for improving USCENTCOM's viability and survivability is to continue to seek access, not only in the area of operations, but also enroute to it. This effort includes improving facilities at Diego Garcia, Lajes Air Base in the Azores, and at various air facilities in Morocco. [Ref. 45: p. 184] The political flexibility of the host nations and the sensitivity of the access issue makes these arrangements subject to day-to-day modification.

Airlift, the most flexible and rapid-force projection resource is vital to USCENTCOM. The Defense Department plans to add cargo aircraft to both the military fleet as well as the cargo capabilities of the civil fleet. [Ref. 45] In addition to requesting funds for additional C-5B and KC-10 tanker aircraft, DOD has also requested research and development funds for the C-17 cargo aircraft which would supplement the C-130 as an intratheatre transport. [Ref. 45: p. 179]

Sealift is also vital, not only as a projectionary force, but more importantly for sustainability of U.S. combat forces. Again, this program entails improving not only the U.S. naval assets, but also civilian U.S. flag carriers. As proposed by DOD, this program contains four separate features including: Fast Sealift which are converted SL-7 container ships; the Ready Reserve Force, which emphasizes the link between civil transport and possible war contingencies; Container Ship Utilization, which allows for the storage of heavy military equipment or supplies at sea in a semi-ready condition; and lastly, the Sealift Discharge Program, which makes the loading and unloading operations possible at austere or damaged ports. [Ref. 45: pp. 180-181]

The second method to improve the strategic mobility factor and enhance the mission accomplishment is closely linked to access and at improvements in air and sea lift capability. This method is the prepositioning of combat

Corps, can not presently support his plan. Ships and support vessels do not exist in the current inventory in sufficient quantity. In other words, we must continue to plan for war with the available assets. Option three will discuss plans for upgrading the fleet, but it nowhere comes near to the forces required by Record's recommendations.

A basic question that must be considered with regard to either option one or two is, what is the threat? Are we primarily concerned with internal instability within key regional states, or are we looking at a full-scale Soviet invasion via Afghanistan or Iran? Regardless of the plausibility of either of the first two options, current U.S. strategy appears to be driven, whether correctly or not by the Soviet threat. As will be seen later this may or may not be an accurate assumption.

3. Option Three

Option three could be called the status quo operational policy. This option calls for maintaining and actually enlarging USCENTCOM. Under this option, USCENTCOM'S mission would remain unchanged. There are however three areas which are to be improved and considered in order to enhance mission accomplishment.

The first area is the continued upgrading and expansion of the strategic mobility. This area would involve the greatest additional cost of the improvement efforts. These efforts are aimed at improving the air and sealift capabilities of the force.

significantly reduced. American resolve would be much in question by our allies and potential adversaries alike. Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the late 1960s, American military forces have represented the major deterrence force. By reducing the size of USCENTCOM, the U.S. could be signaling a major shift in our strategic interest.

As proposed by Jeffrey Record, this force would consist of an all Navy-Marine fleet force with its organic aviational and support assets. Record's recommended solution is to replace USCENTCOM with a small, agile, tactically capable intervention force that is based at sea, governed by a single, unified command, and supported by expanded sea power, especially forcible-entry capabilities. Record explains that this organization would be operational in the area on a continuous basis, logistically self-sufficient, and not require access at any shore facilities, thus eliminating its major weaknesses. [Ref. 1: p. 69]

Mr. Record's solutions are far more detailed and include additional concepts such as giving the airborne mission to the Marine Corps, and the creation of a 5th Fleet, under Marine Corps control. [Ref. 1: pp. 71-72] By themselves the solutions may prove very functional, albeit there would be great resistance from the Department of the Army. But one major problem exists in Record's suggestions, namely that the Department of the Navy, which includes the Marine

Although this option would delete the need for regional access, it is directly contrary to current U.S. national interests and objectives.

A unilateral withdrawal of American military commitments in the region could create a power vacuum, thereby allowing an expansion of Soviet influence. Conversely, option one could possibly eliminate the East-West issue from regional politics. Moreover, the withdrawal of U.S. forces, or the reduced possibility of U.S. intervention may enhance regional stability by suppressing the fears of Western imperialism.

The likelihood of option one occurring is extremely remote under the Reagan Administration, and for that matter even less so under a possible Mondale Administration. Mr. Mondale no doubt has vivid memories of the events that took place in Southwest Asia during his tenure as Vice President. He would not want to see an increase of Soviet influence in the region while he was in office. Ronald Reagan's defense policies clearly indicate that U.S. force projection is vital to regional security, and therefore will not eliminate USCENTCOM.

2. Option Two

Option two would call for a major restructuring of the organizational makeup of the RDF. These modifications are coupled closely with option one in that the force projection capabilities would not be eliminated, but would be

maintaining this access and the maintenance of regional stability.

Historically, Kenya has been the hallmark of economic and political stability in the region. However, in recent years the economy has stagnated and this problem has been exacerbated by a rapidly growing population. Politically Kenya is a one-party state and exercises tight control over various opposition groups. This tight control has led to ever-growing internal pressures for political change. The economic problems, coupled with the political unrest, have created an atmosphere of instability uncommon to the Kenyan people.

External threats are minimal but are a concern for Kenyan and American planners. Somalia, because of its irredentist activities, has always been considered an external threat. The Kenyan leadership hopes that the American presence and pressures will deter any Somali military action. To the South, the Kenyan borders with Uganda and Tanzania have been a source of concern. Recent diplomatic efforts hopefully have reduced, or at least minimized, this threat.

U.S. assistance programs for Kenya are targeted at helping rejuvenate the economy and rebuilding its military force. [Ref. 43: p. 261] Following the coup attempt in 1982 the Kenyan Air Force was disbanded. The current IMET program is designed to improve the level of pilot training and maintenance proficiency. Kenyan officials have adopted

harsh economic austerity measures to assist in their own economic recovery. U.S. ESF assistance will help to reduce the budget deficit and reinvigorate Kenya's agricultural sector. [Ref. 43: p. 262] (See Appendix I)

The relations between access achieved and assistance expended may be the strongest in the Kenyan case. As indicated by the figures in the appendices, Kenya has received economic and military assistance from the U.S. at a rapidly increasing rate. For example, requested MAP funds for FY 1985 indicate almost a 300 percent increase from the FY 1983 figures. The rate of increase for the other three nations was quantitatively much less. However, Kenya's facilities, because of their location, are the least desirable from a purely military perspective. Nevertheless, traditional ties to the West make access more palatable to the Kenya people.

But there are problems. The major problem comes from the repressed, but still strong opposition movements led by such men as Oginda Odinga. He has seriously opposed Kenya's involvement in the East-West conflict. President Moi's access agreement with the U.S., signed without parliamentary discussion in 1981, has become a source of internal conflict. [Ref. 32: p. 17] Moi is somewhat vulnerable but does not appear to be in major danger. With that, the U.S. is more willing to achieve the highest levels or degrees of access in Kenya. Washington must continue to monitor the internal

situation closely to ensure that access does not become a greater source of instability.

## E. CONCLUSION

Based on the current U.S. military force structure, strategic access in Northeast Africa is a requirement for the successful accomplishment of USCENTCOM's mission. Access will allow the logistical and operational activities of USCENTCOM to function under various levels which are critical to the organization. Six strategic complexes exist in the region, located at Ras Banas, Berbera, Mogadishu, Cairo, Mombasa and Khartoum, which facilitate and enhance the USCENTCOM mission.

Within each country, a multiplicity of internal and external threats exist that ultimately affect the question of U.S. access. The major conditions or factors in these four countries which contribute to internal conflict and high degrees of instability are economic difficulties and political instability. Religious/ethnic factionalism, nationalism or separatism, fear of domination by a superpower, and social inequalities are other major sources of internal strife in the region.

Soviet bloc or client intervention is the most common source of external threat. Claiming a Soviet interventionist threat has proven to have limited utility in the region. U.S. assistance is often gained at the expense of increased internal opposition within these countries. It is these

sources of threats, or fears of their by-products, that have created the parameters of U.S. assistance programs. U.S. assistance programs are in most cases consistent with our national goals and interests. The assistance instruments used appear to be congruent with the needs of the states and overall U.S. national objectives.

But a major dichotomy exists. USCENTCOM wants and needs access rights in the region, to support the organization's mission. However, it appears that instability within the region is so intense that Washington is not willing to press the access issue. Fears that increased U.S. pressures to gain unconditional access to facilities in the region would be counter-productive to regional stability. It would appear that Washington has applied some pragmatism to its national strategy.

However, there is a price for this pragmatism. The U.S. now has a military force designed and dedicated for the purpose of projecting American military power into a politically volatile region, but without a means to support or sustain it. It is not possible for American forces to operate in this area of the world without some type of operational and logistical support system.

If access is not politically feasible then alternatives must be created. Three alternative options that could be considered are: (1) eliminate USCENTCOM and/or its mission; (2) scale down the size of the organization by making it

a pure Navy-Marine Corps force; (3) maintain the present structure, increasing the strategic mobility of the force, meanwhile continuing to gain and utilize limited access to facilities in or enroute to the area of operations. Apparently the final option has been adopted by the current administration.

## F. NEXT STEPS

As indicated in this study, strategic access is a critical feature of current American defense policies. USCENTCOM and other major U.S. commands must be able to match their particular military needs with the political and economic situations within the potential host countries.

Future studies for USCENTCOM's access requirements must include similar analysis of states directly in the Persian Gulf area of interest, (Oman and Saudi Arabia), as well as nations on the periphery. Madagascar is a good case in point. Although this island nation possesses one of the best deep water ports in the Indian Ocean, their current ideological position makes U.S. access impossible.

Finally, a similar analysis should be accomplished for access to Israeli facilities. A greater U.S. presence may be welcomed by Jerusalem, but what would be the implications and responses from the Arab capitals? These types of questions warrant a more detailed examination in future studies.

APPENDIX A

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS

| | FY 1983 (Actual) | FY 1984 (Estimated) | FY 1985 (Proposed) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EGYPT | $750 Mil. | $750 Mil.* | $750 Mil. |
| SUDAN | $82.25 Mil.** | $120 Mil.** | $120 Mil.** |
| SOMALIA | $35 Mil.** | $35 Mil.** | $35 Mil.** |
| KENYA | $30 Mil.** | $40 Mil.** | $55 Mil.** |

*The amount for Egypt reflects $103.06 Million deobligated from the actual FY 1983 budget and $14.9 Million from the estimated FY 1984 budget request ($118 Million total) that was carried forward into FY 1984 figures.

**Reflects grant aid funds

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Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs for FY 1985, and Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Department of Defense, DSAA, 30 September 1984.

APPENDIX B

U.S. FMS AGREEMENTS VS DELIVERIES

| | FMS AGREEMENTS | FMS DELIVERIES |
|---|---|---|
| 1974 | $13,281,280,000 | $4,056,687,000 |
| 1975 | $19,043,235,000 | $4,153,903,000 |
| 1976 | $16,019,324,000 | $6,330,231,000 |
| 1977 | $ 8,304,674,000 | $7,022,408,000 |
| 1978 | $10,173,802,000 | $6,827,346,000 |
| 1979 | $11,075,333,000 | $6,338,329,000 |
| 1980 | $11,503,761,000 | $5,796,938,000 |

Figures are in constant 1977 dollars

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Source: The Reluctant Supplies: U.S. Decisionmaking for Arms Sales, pages 129 and 131.

APPENDIX C

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES FINANCING PROGRAM

| | FY 1983 (Actual) | FY 1984 (Estimated) | FY 1985 (Proposed) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EGYPT | $1.325 Bil. | $1.365 Bil.* ** | $1.175 Bil.* |
| SUDAN | $ -0- | -0- | -0- |
| SOMALIA | $ -0- | -0- | -0- |
| KENYA | $10 Million | $10 Million (Guaranty Credit) | $ -0- |

*"Forgiven" Credits

**$550 Million was unexpended from the FY 1983 authorization.

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Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1985.

APPENDIX D

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
BUDGET AUTHORITY

| | FY 1983 (Actual) | FY 1984 (Estimated) | FY 1985 (Proposed) |
|---|---|---|---|
| SUDAN | $43 Mil.* | $45 Mil. | $69 Mil. |
| SOMALIA | $15 Mil.** | $32 Mil. | $40 Mil. |
| KENYA | $5.5 Mil. | $12 Mil. | $23 Mil. |

*Only $900,000 expended.

**"0" dollars expended.

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Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1985, and Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Department of Defense, DSAA, 30 September 1983.

APPENDIX E

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION & TRAINING
PROGRAM BUDGET AUTHORITY OBLIGATIONS

| | FY 1983 (Actual) | FY 1984 (Estimated) | FY 1985 (Proposed) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EGYPT | $1.9 Mil.* | $2 Mil. | $2 Mil. |
| SUDAN | $1.33 Mil.* | $1.5 Mil. | $1.7 Mil. |
| SOMALIA | $601,000* | $1 Mil. | $1.25 Mil. |
| KENYA | $1.39 Mil.* | $1.5 Mil | $1.8 Mil. |

*All funds expended

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Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1985 and Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Department of Defense, DSAA, 30 September 1983.

APPENDIX F

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT

| | FY 1983 (Actual) | FY 1984 (Estimated) | FY 1985 (Proposed) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FMS | $1.325 Bil. | $1.365 Bil. | $1.175 Bil. |
| FOREIGN MILITARY AND CONSTRUCTION SALES* | $721.5 Mil. | $1.1 Mil. | $200,000 |
| ESF | $750 Mil. | $750 Mil. | $750 Mil. |
| MAP | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| IMET | $1.9 Mil. | $2 Mil. | $2 Mil. |
| COMMERCIAL EXPORTS | $30 Mil | $35 Mil. | $35 Mil. |
| OTHER | | | |
| P.L. 480 | $266.8 Mil. | $269 Mil. | $243 Mil. |

*Subtotal of FMS Program.

Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Program, FY 1985, p. 117.

APPENDIX G

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN

| | FY 1983 (Actual) | FY 1984 (Estimated) | FY 1985 (Proposed) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FMS | $ -0- | $ -0- | $ -0- |
| FOREIGN MILITARY AND CONSTRUCTION SALES* | $31 Mil. | $60 Mil. | $60 Mil. |
| ESF | $82.25 Mil. | $120 Mil. | $120 Mil. |
| MAP | $43 Mil. | $45 Mil. | $69 Mil. |
| IMET | $1.3 Mil | $1.5 Mil. | $1.7 Mil. |
| OTHERS | | | |
| DEVELPMENT AID | $28.5 Mil. | $22.7 Mil. | $28 Mil. |
| PL 480 | $51 Mil. | $51.7 Mil. | $52.45 Mil. |

*Subtotal of FMS Program.

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Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1985, p. 301.

APPENDIX H

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA

| | FY 1983 (Actual) | FY 1984 (Estimated) | FY 1985 (Proposed) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FMS | $10 Mil. | $ -0- | $ -0- |
| FOREIGN MILITARY AND CONSTRUCTION SALES* | $8.5 Mil | $30 Mil. | $30 Mil. |
| ESF | $21 Mil. | $35 Mil. | $35 Mil. |
| MAP | $15 Mil. | $32 Mil. | $40 Mil. |
| IMET | $601,000 | $1 Mil. | $1.25 Mil. |
| OTHERS | | | |
| DEVELOPMENT AID | $14.9 Mil. | $17.7 Mil. | $22 Mil. |
| PL 480 | $21.8 Mil. | $24.1 Mil. | $21.8 Mil. |

*Subtotal of FMS Program

Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1985.

APPENDIX I

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO KENYA

| | FY 1983 (Actual) | FY 1984 (Estimated) | FY 1985 (Proposed) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FMS | $10 Mil. | $10 Mil. | $ -0- |
| FOREIGN MILITARY AND CONSTRUCTION SALES* | $16.6 Mil. | $35 Mil. | $20 Mil. |
| ESF | $30 Mil. | $40 Mil. | $55 Mil. |
| MAP | $8.5 Mil. | $12 Mil. | $23 Mil. |
| IMET | $1.4 Mil. | $1.5 Mil. | $1.8 Mil. |
| OTHER | | | |
| DEVELOPMENT AID | $30.6 Mil. | $34.7 Mil. | $30 Mil. |
| PL 480 | $17.64 Mil. | $9.9 Mil. | $15.14 Mil. |

*Subtotal of FMS Programs.

Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1985, p. 263.

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