


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ANVIL REVISITED: THE IMPACT OF ULTRA ON THE
DECISION TO INVADE SOUTHERN FRANCE

BY

COLONEL CARL R. MORIN, JR.
FIELD ARTILLERY

ERIC
COLLECTOR
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The author completed a Masters Degree in History at the University of Florida in 1968 and is currently participating in the US Army Strategist Program at the US Army War College.

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ANVIL REVISITED: THE IMPACT OF ULTRA ON THE
DECISION TO INVADE SOUTHERN FRANCE

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Carl R. Morin, Jr.
Field Artillery

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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
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PREFACE

The decision to invade Southern France in August 1944, was one of the most debated Anglo-American strategy decisions both during and after the Second World War. It has been called the cross-roads of World War II strategy and lies at the focal point of differences between the British and American concepts for defeating Germany. In the arguments over the Southern France operation (ANVIL)¹ British-supported momentum in the Mediterranean clashed head on with the United States determination to make Western Europe the decisive theater of the war. The ANVIL decision decided the strategy debate in favor of the United States position. Debate over the correctness of this decision and the resulting strategy implications continues today.

Group Captain Winterbotham's revelation, in 1974, of the ULTRA project has initiated a wide-ranging review of earlier analyses of World War II. As more and more of the information produced by ULTRA becomes available for study new material to feed a continuation of the Anglo-American strategy debates--to include the ANVIL debate--surfaces. ULTRA's maturation at the height of the ANVIL debates (1943-1944) and Prime Minister Churchill's strong involvement in ULTRA are but tips of a potential iceberg of impacts on previous analysis.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the information revealed by ULTRA to determine its impact on the ANVIL decisions. It is not a campaign analysis but rather an attempt to shed additional light on the factors which decided one of the key strategic decisions of the war. In presenting the study results it is assumed that the reader is neither conversant with the components or timing of the wartime strategy debates over ANVIL nor current on the organization and methodology for interjecting ULTRA intelligence into the decision making process. Consequently a summary of the Allied strategy debates leading to the ANVIL decision and a review of the general procedures for using ULTRA intelligence is provided as a backdrop to the meat of the study--the attempt to show what ULTRA intelligence was available to the decision makers who participated in the ANVIL decisions and what its impact may have been.

The study by necessity is limited by a number of factors. Time and travel restrictions prevented an exhaustive review of primary sources which have been made available. Although a considerable volume of ULTRA material has been declassified a great deal of the material remains unavailable for unclassified work. This is particularly true of sensitive proceedings taken at the highest governmental levels. These factors are compounded by the extraordinary procedures taken during the war to protect the source of ULTRA intelligence which resulted in no attribution of information to ULTRA in secondary sources.

¹The code name for the operation into Southern France was ANVIL until 1 August 1944, when it was changed to DRAGOON. For simplicity, I will refer to it throughout this paper as the ANVIL operation.

The foregoing limitations notwithstanding, the study draws conclusions which hopefully shed light on the ANVIL debates, the success of ULTRA and the important business of strategic decision making in a coalition.

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CHAPTER I

THE ANVIL DEBATE

At the American-British staff talks early in 1941, it had been decided that a strategy of "defeat Germany first" would be followed in the event of Anglo-American involvement in war against both Germany and Japan. The events of 7 December 1941, closely followed by a German declaration of war on the United States put these contingency plans into effect. Almost immediately an impasse developed over how to implement this approach.¹ The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, with an eye toward a quick defeat of Germany so that forces could be allocated to the Pacific, proposed a direct assault upon the European continent from the United Kingdom. The British, having previously expressed a desire to move through Southern Europe, adamantly insisted that a cross-Channel attack was impracticable in 1942. As a result of this impasse, a threat to the "Germany first" strategy developed because of a Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal to President Roosevelt to shift the United States emphasis to the Pacific. The President decided the debate by going against his military advisers and opting for operations in North Africa. He believed that the Russians were badly in need of some Allied operation in 1942, which would show a sincere effort to open a "second" front, and the peoples of the United States and Great Britain needed early operations in Europe to bolster their morale.

Interestingly enough then, President Roosevelt's decisive vote for the North African invasion for November 1942, resulted in the snowballing Mediterranean momentum which the Americans spent two years in

checking. The invasion of Southern France lies at the climax of the tug-of-war between British and American differences in how to implement the "Germany first" strategy. The British, professing to support the cross-Channel approach as the decisive climax of Allied strategy, continually insisted that conditions for the invasion were not yet right and advocated continuing operations in the Mediterranean in order to keep pressure on the Axis powers. The ill-fated Canadian raid on Dieppe in August 1942, provided credence to the British arguments. In opposition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, soon to be joined by Roosevelt, believed that a direct attack on Germany through France would prove decisive and feared that continuing operations in the Mediterranean would unnecessarily delay this approach.

With the success of operations in North Africa the question naturally arose--what next? The great industrial might of the United States had not yet reached its peak and resources were a world-wide problem. As the early conferences of 1943 began, there were the following demands on resources: American concern to get back to the cross-Channel proposals; British desires to expand Mediterranean operations; Air Force desires to have an opportunity to knock Germany out of the war with strategic bombing; General McArthur's demands to step up operations in the Southwest Pacific; Admiral Nimitz's desires to reinforce the South and Central Pacific; a realization that more should be done in Southeast Asia; and Soviet desires for more lend-lease equipment.

The Casablanca and TRIDENT Conferences (January and May 1943) represented Anglo-American compromises in apportioning the available resources among national interests. The Americans were willing to agree to further action in the Mediterranean to seize Sicily and to knock Italy out of the war as long as limits were placed on resources to the

Mediterranean and they could have their way in the Pacific. Wary of British intentions in the Mediterranean the United States demanded a limit of twenty-seven divisions to that theater in order that they could begin building up resources in the United Kingdom for their cross-Channel attack. On the other hand, the British received approval for continuing operations in the south by launching an attack against Italy. This decision to invade Italy would delay the cross-Channel operation until the Spring of 1944 and drew the wrath of the Russians who were demanding operations in Western Europe to relieve pressure on themselves. Shipping limitations, caused largely by German submarine operations and continued British fear that the Germans were too strong in France, necessitated postponement of the proposed cross-Channel operation.

Meanwhile, in the course of events, several seeds had been planted which would later affect the Anglo-American tug-of-war in the Mediterranean. As part of the American effort to redirect thinking to Northwestern France it had been agreed at Casablanca in January 1943, to begin concrete planning for an invasion from England. Consequently, a staff to the future commander of this undertaking was gathered under a British officer, General Fredrick Morgan, who was saddled with the title: Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander designate (COSSAC). On 30 July 1943, General Morgan presented his first draft plans to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These plans, among other things, called for diversionary attacks on Pas-de-Calais and in Southern France. This was one of the germs which later developed into ANVIL.

The results of another earlier event began to be felt in the summer of 1943. During the Allied preparations for the invasion of North Africa, relations and agreements had been established with members of

the French Armistice Army in France and in North Africa. The story of the United States agreements to create a French military force capable of taking part in conjunction with the Allies in the liberation of France has been detailed in the United States official histories.² It is sufficient here to note that a French military force expected to reach eleven divisions was being created in North Africa in 1943, and this force was to have a growing influence on Allied strategy.

Between the TRIDENT and QUADRANT Conferences (May-August, 1943) the Joint Chiefs of Staff became restive over continued British emphasis on the Mediterranean. Prime Minister Churchill, impressed by political possibilities in Italy and the Balkans as a result of the fall of Mussolini, had established a military mission with Tito in Yugoslavia and continually talked of the bright prospects there. During a trip to North Africa in May 1943, the Prime Minister had openly pressured General Eisenhower, commander of Allied forces there, to propose continuation of the Mediterranean campaign. In addition, President Roosevelt was concerned about relations with the Soviet Union which had deteriorated after TRIDENT.

By this time President Roosevelt had lined up behind his military advisers and as the QUADRANT Conferences approached they became determined to further solidify support for a cross-Channel operation in the spring of 1944. In an attempt to accomplish this they decided to propose "the eventual entry of Anglo-American and French forces into Southern France" as a compromise to Mediterranean momentum.³ This proposed operation was still considered a diversion. It would aid the prospects of the cross-Channel move, utilize re-equipped French forces in France and could be carried out under present limits on forces for the Mediterranean. At the QUADRANT Conferences this proposal was accepted by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower was directed to draw up plans for such an operation. From this point forward, the cross-Channel attack had the inside track even though its timing was strongly questioned at times. The growing influence of the French was evident in a partial recognition of the French Committee and the decision to include French forces in Italy and future plans for Southern France.

In November, when General Eisenhower presented his plan in compliance with the QUADRANT directive, it was a much beefed-up plan, calling for a two or three division assault with a build-up to ten divisions.⁴ This force was to include the rearmed French forces and would move north to Vichy to join with the strong Maquis in that area. Although this operation seems still to have been considered a diversion to draw German forces from Northwest France, it was much larger and required more resources than the Combined Chiefs of Staff had envisioned.

COSSAC was not enthusiastic about the Eisenhower plans as it promised to compete with OVERLORD (cross-Channel attack) for scarce shipping.⁵ The shortage of assault shipping was one of the greatest problems faced by strategy makers in the last two years of the war. Trying to allocate these scarce vessels to satisfy the demands from Europe, the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia proved one of the great tasks of the war. American insistence on sticking to long-range plans so as to effectively use scarce shipping was not amenable to British desires to remain flexible and ready to seize whatever opportunities presented themselves. This difference in approach, coupled with the shortage of shipping, was the root of Anglo-American differences of 1943-1944.

Little has been said to this point of the political attitudes of Great Britain and the United States which affected these strategy decisions and which were to prove important at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences in late 1943. The British had traditional interests in the Mediterranean--their "life line" to the Far East. It is natural that they should want to clear this route and protect their interest in Greece and the Dardanelles. In October 1943, Prime Minister Churchill expressed to President Roosevelt his growing interest in the signs of unrest coming from the Balkans. He also had kept close watch on developments in Yugoslavia through Brigadier Maclean, the Chief of the British Military Mission with Tito. During 1943, British attempts to aid Greek guerillas revealed the growth of Communist resistance forces which threatened post-war British influence in that country. Throughout the war, Churchill had been attempting to get Turkey to enter the war in hopes of driving the Germans out of the Dardanelles thereby opening that route to Russia for lend-lease shipments. At this point there appeared to be little concern for post-war Russian influence in Europe, and Churchill was looking to a joint drive with the Russians into Southeast Europe as a means of driving Germany's unwilling eastern satellites from the war. On his way to Cairo, the Prime Minister related to Eisenhower a proposal to send an expedition to the head of the Adriatic for the purpose of trying to force a way through the Ljubljana Gap in Northern Yugoslavia and then move on to Austria.⁶ He envisioned that Allied forces in the Hungarian Plain would precipitate an open break of Germany's satellites and force Axis divisions from the Balkan peninsula.

The Americans, on the other hand, exhibited a strong determination not to get involved in Balkan politics. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull already had their sights set on a post-war international organization and wanted no political commitments to encumber post-war settlements in Europe. The President recognized that Russia would be in a position after the war to grasp whatever parts of Central and Eastern Europe she wished and proposed that this be prevented by making Russia an equal partner in any peace conferences, thereby winning the confidence of the Soviet Union. In addition, it must be remembered that there remained the war against Japan. Roosevelt had been seeking to obtain Soviet participation against Japan after Germany was defeated and was openly courting the Russians. With the Japanese consideration in mind it was easy to see why the President did not want to become involved in the Balkans where the possibilities of civil wars promised long occupation duty for United States forces which were needed in the Pacific.

Beside the political aversion to the Balkans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower shared a dislike for the rugged terrain in Italy and the Balkans. They felt this terrain would so slow Allied operations that an approach from this area would unnecessarily lengthen the war.⁷ Already it had taken the Allies in Italy four months to advance less than 70 miles from Salerno.

As the Cairo-Tehran Conferences approached, the Western Allies felt that an Anglo-American showdown would result over strategy differences. Despite previous planning the direction that strategy would take was again in doubt. Stalin was to be included in the talks for the first time and there were indications that he would call for further Mediterranean operations to assist Soviet forces in the Southern Ukraine. The

British claimed that recent Russian successes and Italy's surrender had changed the conditions which prompted the QUADRANT plans. In the period July-November 1943, the Red Army had advanced their whole front, south of Smolensk, from 200-250 miles further west, severely mauling Hitler's southern armies. Further Allied operations in the Mediterranean would help hold German forces away from the southern portion of the Eastern Front. Consequently, on 25 November, the British Chiefs of Staff sent a note to the Combined Chiefs of Staff demanding a re-evaluation of the plans for OVERLORD.⁸

Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed to meet at Cairo before meeting Stalin at Tehran in order to present a united front to him. However, they could not settle their differences and Stalin was to become the arbiter at Tehran. The British continued to be disturbed at estimates of the forces the Germans would be able to bring to bear against OVERLORD during the first ninety days. They argued that the Allies must pursue an aggressive course of action in the Mediterranean during the winter and spring in order to best prevent German reinforcement not only of France but also the southern sector of the Eastern Front. Consequently, they were proposing continuation of the Italian campaign, support of the partisans in Yugoslavia and Greece, an operation against the island of Rhodes and renewed pressure on Turkey to enter the war against the Axis. This they claimed could all be done with a cost of only a six to eight week delay in OVERLORD.

At the opening session at Tehran, Stalin came out strongly for OVERLORD in May with an operation in Southern France as the most advantageous complementary operation from the Mediterranean.⁹ He put the British on the defensive by continually questioning the sincerity of

their support for OVERLORD and even suggested that the Italian campaign be stopped immediately so that forces could be released for ANVIL. This ended the debate though Churchill was obviously unhappy. Stalin also announced that Russia would enter the war against Japan as soon as possible after Germany's defeat. With these transactions completed, the British and Americans returned to Cairo to work out the final details of the strategy for 1944.

Upon returning to Cairo, it became obvious that, when details were required, United States planners began to have doubts about OVERLORD similar to those of the British. COSSAC had let it be known that he believed OVERLORD should be strengthened to something greater than a three-division assault in order to insure success. An ANVIL assault of three rather than two divisions was also discussed. The central determinant continued to be assault shipping. Planners were trying to juggle landing craft between OVERLORD in May, a simultaneous ANVIL, an operation which Roosevelt had promised Chiang Kai-shek for March in the South China Sea, and a proposed landing in Italy, south of Rome, for early in the year. By persuading President Roosevelt to rescind his promise to Chiang Kai-shek and receiving from Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, an offer of shipping previously scheduled for the Pacific, the Combined Chiefs of Staff appeared able to meet shipping requirements. The conferences ended with the following statement of intent on

5 December 1943:

1. OVERLORD and ANVIL would be the supreme operations for 1944. Nothing in any other part of the world would hazard their successful completion.
2. OVERLORD would be strengthened if possible.
3. ANVIL would be launched with not less than two divisions--more if possible.

4. Operations in the Aegean, particularly against Rhodes, were desirable if they did not interfere with OVERLORD-ANVIL.
5. Every effort would be made to increase production of landing craft.¹⁰

With the appointment of General Eisenhower in December to command the OVERLORD operation, his view of ANVIL as a major operation gained more weight. He viewed OVERLORD-ANVIL as a whole, seeing it as more than a mere diversion. In the strategy debates which took place in January and February 1944, the new Supreme Allied Commander insisted that resources be found for an increased OVERLORD without eliminating ANVIL. In December, before taking a new post, he had promised the French that the newly formed French divisions in North Africa and Italy would be utilized in Southern France as envisioned at Tehran.

Again, the determinant of Allied strategy was landing a craft. In January and February 1944, ANVIL became a competitor with OVERLORD for scarce shipping. ANVIL was still viewed by the British as purely a diversion and they now supported reducing it to one division so that sufficient shipping could be found for an enlarged OVERLORD. The proposed landing south of Rome (ANZIO) had been cancelled but then revived, to the enthusiasm of Churchill, on a larger scale. This, of course, further complicated the shipping problems. Prime Minister Churchill still carried visions of great successes in Italy and, when operations there went extremely well between 10-23 January, hopes were raised that the forces in Italy could move north and then west into southern France by way of the Riviera thereby reducing the shipping needs of ANVIL.¹¹

About the 1st of February the Anglo-American arguments took a new turn. Since the Cairo-Tehran Conferences, Allied discussion had centered on the competition of OVERLORD and ANVIL for shipping resources.

Now, with the stalemate of the Anzio landings south of Rome, the British insisted that the Italian campaign could serve the diversionary purpose of ANVIL better than ANVIL itself. The Germans had reinforced Italy with eight divisions and the British saw a German determination to stalemate the Allies in Italy.¹² If this be so, they argued, then a continuation of the Italian campaign would serve to draw off more German divisions from Northern France than would landings in Southern France. In addition, the forces for ANVIL had to come from Italy and now were needed there to prevent German successes. They discounted General Eisenhower's continued arguments that ANVIL was necessary to OVERLORD; that it had a definite tactical and strategic contribution by providing another line of communication.

At any rate, the unforeseen necessity to continue assault shipping support to the Anzio beachhead made shipping impossible for a five division OVERLORD assault and a simultaneous two or three division ANVIL assault in early May as planned. On 20 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to move the date for OVERLORD back until the first week in June in an effort to relieve the shipping problem. They also consented to leave all men and shipping in the Mediterranean until the problem could be reviewed on 20 March, in order that General Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean, would not be hampered in his conduct of the Italian campaign. Upon review, the stalemate in Italy had not improved and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to postpone ANVIL until 10 July (later to 15 August) against British protest that it should be abandoned altogether. These postponements weakened ANVIL's argument as an integral part of OVERLORD. The British argued that a landing on 15 August would be so late that it would not influence action in Normandy.

In early June, Rome was captured, OVERLORD was launched and the arguments between British and American leaders took a new turn. The breakthrough in Italy caused the British to see bright possibilities for a major victory over General Kesselring's forces in Italy. Generals Alexander (Commander of the Allied Armies in Italy), Wilson and Prime Minister Churchill now strongly advocated a continuation of the Italian campaign eastward through the Ljubljana Gap into Austria. This move, they claimed, would not only support OVERLORD by drawing more German forces to Italy, but would in conjunction with the Russians¹³ liberate the Balkans and place British forces on the southern borders of Germany. Against these proposals, the United States leaders continued to support ANVIL using their promises to the Russians and French in addition to a new concern for the port of Marseilles as a logistics intake for OVERLORD. They argued that Allied resources would not allow support of two major theaters--France and Italy.

In late June the arguments reached an impasse on the military level with Churchill and Roosevelt being called upon to decide the issue. The President supported his military advisers and on 2 July, with a telegram to Churchill refusing to accept his reasoning for continuing the Italian campaign, the debate appeared ended. Late June and early July were anxious times for General Eisenhower as OVERLORD fell behind schedule and a possible stalemate loomed on the horizon. These developments, coupled with German destruction in ports in Northern France, redoubled Eisenhower's concern that the port of Marseilles be added to his logistics system.

Churchill continued right up until 8 August in his efforts to have ANVIL cancelled and in his memoirs stated that he acquiesced because the preponderance of American contribution to the war was so great that

there seemed nothing else he could do. He was so concerned that British interest were being unfairly trodden underfoot by the bullying Americans that in August he threatened to "lay down his mantle of high office" if the ANVIL operation were carried out.¹⁴

From the foregoing one can see that the debates over ANVIL were integral to the overall Anglo-American debate to decide between the British flexible peripheral approach and the United States desire for early focus of resources to directly confront Germany in Western Europe. Any attempt to analyze the ANVIL debates in isolation from the overall strategy debate has the potential of oversimplification. Nevertheless, in order to narrow the focus of this study, the analysis that follows will examine the impact of ULTRA on key elements of the ANVIL debates only. The key elements to be examined are:

1. How to best support OVERLORD.
 - ANVIL versus Italy as a diversion.
 - Best use of assault shipping.
 - Necessity for additional ports.
2. Use of French forces.
3. How to best support the Russians.
4. Best support of post-war aims.

CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

1. Detailed discussion of the events related in this chapter can be found in: Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1959); John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V: August 1943-September 1944 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956); Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957); et al.

2. Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1957).

3. Matloff, p. 175. The JCS did not yet support the Joint War Plans Committee proposal to make ANVIL a major operation aimed at merging the two fronts.

4. Fredrick Morgan, Overture to OVERLORD (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), p. 242.

5. It should be remembered that General Eisenhower was Commander, AFHQ in the Mediterranean not yet being designated Supreme Allied Commander.

6. This appears to be the first reference to an operation through the Ljubljana Gap. Feis, p. 260.

7. US, Department of State, Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 210. Cited hereafter as Conferences at Cairo and Tehran.

8. Ibid., p. 409.

9. Many authors claim that Stalin's siding with the United States was a complete surprise. However, there is ample evidence to indicate that Stalin knew of Allied plans and had, at the Moscow Foreign Minister Conference (October, 1943), indicated a preference for ANVIL. See Feis, p. 228; Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 140, 327-28.

10. Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 796.

11. Ehrman, p. 237.

12. Ibid., p. 239.

13. Although arguments of forestalling the Russians are used in post-war accounts, most contemporary accounts argue for joint operations with the Russians.

14. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946), p. 639.

CHAPTER II

THE ULTRA PROJECT

The ULTRA Project was the name given to a British signals intelligence operation during World War II involving the breaking of German high-grade wireless traffic enciphered on the enigma machine, and the handling and use of the resulting intelligence.¹ As a result of the project, from mid-1940 to the close of the war, Anglo-American national decision makers and senior Allied Commanders in the field were provided unparalleled insight into enemy dispositions, capabilities and intentions. Detailed descriptions of the workings of the ULTRA Project have been provided from a number of viewpoints.² The purpose of this study is not to recount the history or mechanics of the project. After a short summary of how ULTRA intelligence was produced an attempt will be made to indicate how it was used by decision makers in the United Kingdom and the United States. This description should serve as a useful backdrop for understanding the analysis of ULTRA's impact on the ANVIL debates which will be presented in Chapter III.

Winterbotham, Lewin, Jones, Welchman and Calvocoressi have related in considerable detail how the British developed the capacity and organization to intercept, decode, translate, analyze and distribute German top secret radio traffic during the Second World War. By mid-1940 a sophisticated organization had been established at Bletchley Park, north of London, for producing this information and distributing it to selected recipients. There can be little doubt concerning the value of this operation which provided the translated texts of radio intercepts

of key elements of the German government, at all levels from lower-level military units to the Fuhrer himself, in a fairly steady stream. It was deemed an operation of such crucial value that such extraordinary means of security were established to protect knowledge of its success from the Germans that the essentials of the project were kept from the public and determined historians until 1974.

Several aspects of the ULTRA operation need review in order to understand the project's impact on strategic decisions. ULTRA intercept stations established in the British Isles were capable of fairly continuous and reliable intercept of enciphered German radio traffic to all German theaters except the far reaches of the Eastern Front. Nets monitored were those employing the enigma cipher machine which included all military services, the Abwehr (Intelligence Service), internal German governmental organizations, and even traffic to submarines and other ships at sea. Traffic analysis of these nets produced intimate knowledge of nets and procedures which, not only was key to breaking the ciphers, but also produced invaluable information concerning unit locations and order of battle changes. British intercept capabilities were steadily improved throughout the war.

Bletchley Park's decode, translation, analysis and distribution operations also bear review. The operation was organized to provide timely "raw" intercept information to decision makers. It was not an intelligence staff organized to make detailed appreciations of the intercepted information; that function was left to the recipient. However, valuable service was performed by keeping a detailed system of index cards which enabled those personnel decoding and translating the messages to better interpret military terminology used in messages, relate messages to previous message traffic, cross-reference messages

for verification, and add comments to signals sent to recipients which assisted in understanding. This system of index cards became so extensive that it provided a valuable source of intelligence in itself.

After intercepted German messages were deciphered and translated they were passed to military advisors of the appropriate service who decided what information should be sent to whom, the priority or urgency with which the information should be transmitted, and then drafted an appropriate outgoing signal for the appropriate recipient(s).³ Urgency of transmission was based upon the operational impact of the information transmitted. The great majority of ULTRA intercepted information was routine message traffic from which the recipient and his staff had to glean the significance to their situation.

Finally, a few comments on the impact of operational security procedures on the use of ULTRA information. In order to keep the Germans from discovering that their ciphers were being broken an elaborate security procedure was developed for the ULTRA Project. A separate organization similar to current United States Special Security Detachments was established to receive and safeguard ULTRA information sent from Bletchley Park to field commands. Personnel of these Special Liaison Units (SLUs) were not permitted to be integrated into the Intelligence staff but operated as a separate entity charged simply to deliver ULTRA information to London-cleared recipients and to see that established procedures for the protection of ULTRA were being followed. SLU officers were junior in rank and had to depend on their skill and ULTRA's usefulness for access to recipients. SLUs were permitted no lower than Army level with British Intelligence determining which headquarters were authorized an SLU and who in the headquarters was authorized access to ULTRA information. Recipients were indoctrinated by

Group Captain Winterbotham of British Intelligence before access was granted.

The source of information passed through SLUs to recipients could not be revealed to uncleared personnel. Signals from Bletchley Park containing ULTRA information were hand carried by the SLU to recipients, usually passed orally, but if written, immediately destroyed after reading by recipients. Any operation based on ULTRA had to be carried out in such a manner that the enemy and those Allied personnel not authorized to receive ULTRA would not know the source of the information. The demands of secrecy required that no records be kept of ULTRA's role in decisions made in the field. These procedures, originally established for British forces, were accepted and followed by the United States as conditions for access upon entry of United States forces into the war.

By mid-1940 the ULTRA operation had successfully penetrated the Luftwaffe Cipher and uninterruptedly read their messages until the end of the war.⁴ The first break of Army ciphers came in late 1941 during operations in North Africa. Breaking of Army ciphers was more erratic--sometimes being lost for thirty days--and did not become reliable until the Spring of 1942. This difficulty was considerably offset by the vociferousness of Luftwaffe liaison officers (Fliegerverkingsofficer - Flivos) who kept their headquarters informed of Army plans and operations. Naval ULTRA was even more difficult to break but the Bletchley Park operation succeeded well enough to make major contributions to Allied success against German U-boats during the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942.⁵

By 1944, over 44,000 ULTRA signals--averaging some 100 signals per day--were sent to commands in the field.⁶ ULTRA had become an established, expected part of the intelligence picture. The Bletchley Park operation had become so efficient that the majority of these signals were deciphered and in the hands of recipients within 6-12 hours of intercept.⁷ The first signals sent to an SLU with a field organization were sent to the British Eighth Army in Cairo in March 1941; by July 1944, Bletchley Park was servicing 40-50 subscribers in Northwest Europe, Italy and the Mediterranean.⁸

As the war progressed and the Anglo-American Alliance developed and gained strength, the manner in which leaders of the two Western Allies used ULTRA information was markedly different. Little knowledge concerning the existence of ULTRA appears to have been provided Americans until early 1942 and it was a year later before a formal system was established to pass ULTRA to the United States War Department.⁹ Prime Minister Churchill's fascination with ULTRA and his tendency to become closely involved in the running of the war in its early stages contrasts sharply with President Roosevelt's more distant involvement. It is doubtful that President Roosevelt ever saw pure ULTRA signals and only started receiving summaries of ULTRA information produced by the War Department in June 1944.¹⁰ Whereas the British senior level military leaders were introduced to ULTRA in 1940 soon after it began to function, senior War Department personnel did not obtain steady access to ULTRA until mid-1943. A major factor in this difference in attention to ULTRA was an agreement made at about the time of United States entry into the war that executive responsibility for day to day conduct of the war in Europe would be the responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff,

while overall responsibility for conduct of the war in the Pacific would reside with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹¹

As F. W. Winterbotham has indicated, Prime Minister Churchill had a great fascination for ULTRA from his initial exposure, and constantly requested his "very special intelligence." As a matter of fact, it was largely through his interest and support that the organization at Bletchley Park was formed and continued to grow to meet expanding needs of the Allied forces. As early as August 1940, Churchill requested that any important signals which ULTRA produced be sent to him with notes of explanation of their significance. F. W. Winterbotham has vividly explained his role in keeping the Prime Minister constantly informed of what ULTRA was producing.¹² One of the side effects of the Prime Minister's interest was that the British Chiefs of Staff and field commanders--both British and Allied--were acutely aware that Churchill had privy to the same key intelligence they received and could--and often did--challenge their performance as a result.

The Prime Minister and his chief military advisors had worked with ULTRA information for two years, confirming its value, prior to the first American exposure to ULTRA. It had proven critical in the Battle of Britain and in Eighth Army's successes against Rommel in North Africa. It had also provided invaluable information concerning German intentions to invade Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, thereby further threatening British interests in the Mediterranean. Although Winterbotham indicated that with the establishment of Eisenhower's AFHQ in August 1942, Churchill "relaxed the urgency of his demands for ULTRA" it appears unlikely that the Prime Minister's fascination for ULTRA and its secrets diminished. On the contrary, it would seem to me that his intimate knowledge of this unique source of information would argue that he used

it to the maximum during strategy debates with his American partners. In fact, Professor Harold Deutsch has argued that ULTRA gave Churchill "an advantage in striving to maintain some sort of equilibrium in relations with Roosevelt and Stalin."¹³

ULTRA was a key factor in the war's conduct by British military leaders as well. The War Office, Air Staff and Admiralty had direct lines to Bletchley Park, and received ULTRA output immediately. Although similar operational security procedures as previously discussed were employed, key British military in the decision making process which resulted in the ANVIL decision were regular recipients of ULTRA information. Field Marshals Alexander and Montgomery, and their G-2s, have been described as enthusiastic users of ULTRA, as well as Air Marshal Tedder, Eisenhower's deputy throughout the war. Lieutenant General Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and Brigadier Strong, the SHAEF G-2, were recipients of ULTRA and acknowledged its key role in performing their duties. There seems little doubt that key British leaders involved in the ANVIL debates, from the Prime Minister down were knowledgeable of ULTRA's proven value and were enthusiastic users of the unique capabilities it offered.

The use and influence of European ULTRA on United States decision makers in the ANVIL debates appears to have been less complete. The first American officer cleared for ULTRA access was Colonel Palmer Dixon, United States Army Air Forces, in the early months of 1942.¹⁴ At the time he was attached to the Intelligence Department of the British Air Ministry. He succeeded in getting an ULTRA representative assigned to advise General Spaatz during United States strategic air force operations in North Africa. General Eisenhower was briefed in and

became a recipient of ULTRA information in his capacity as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Headquarters in June 1942.

Despite this early introduction of Americans, it was not until April 1943--well into the ANVIL debates--that a formal United States delegation headed by Colonel McCormack was sent to England to study the ULTRA set up and to negotiate American involvement.¹⁵ This visit resulted in organizational changes within the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), attached to the War Department G-2, to provide secure handling of ULTRA information within the War Department. It also resulted in the assignment of American officers to Bletchley Park and the training of American officers to be ULTRA representatives with American Armies being formed in England for the invasion of France.

As a result of Colonel McCormack's visit to England the first message with ULTRA information was sent to the War Department on 27 August 1943.¹⁶ By September 1943, United States advisors at Bletchley Park began to send a conservative selection of ULTRA messages by radio to the War Department followed up by a wider ULTRA coverage by courier pouch by sea. This process coupled with normal delay in receiving operational information from the European Theater produced untimely intelligence. It was not until February 1945, that MIS began to receive signals direct from Bletchley Park in the same manner as commanders in the field.¹⁷

The War Department's methods of handling ULTRA information once received also contrasted sharply with British methods. Prior to receipt of ULTRA information, the Special Branch, MIS was producing a daily intelligence summary from American signals intercept--primarily diplomatic signals--titled the Magic Summary. This summary was distributed only to the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff

G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of State. Once ULTRA information became available in September 1943, a military and naval supplement to the Magic Summary was produced and distributed to the same restricted clientele. Although the source of information for the supplement was protected it was estimated that ninety percent of the information it contained came from ULTRA.¹⁸ The summary and its supplement became so useful that its distribution was expanded to include, by June 1944, the President, Chief of Staff to the President, Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, Deputy Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence and the Deputy Chief of Staff G-2.

Although the MIS organization had improved somewhat by June 1944, the focus on security for ULTRA produced some serious shortcomings. Special Branch officers with access to ULTRA were not permitted to discuss ULTRA information with sources outside the Special Branch. Copies of the Military and Naval supplements to the Magic Summary were not even distributed to the Chief of Theater Branches who were MIS (signals intelligence) "experts" for their assigned theater.¹⁹

As can be seen from the foregoing, senior United States military decision makers in Washington did not have near the access to ULTRA as did their British counterparts. Beyond the information contained in the Magic Summaries and its associated supplements most of the available ULTRA information was so restricted as to be limited in its impact. Because of the limited personnel authorized knowledge of ULTRA, the G-2 himself was briefed by Special Branch, MIS, each day before the daily intelligence briefing to General Marshall so the G-2 could interject appropriate ULTRA information into the briefing provided by other

members of the G-2 staff. Despite these shortcomings, United States recipients of the Magic Summary put increasing pressure on the system for information. They followed intently the information provided between late 1943 and June 1944 concerning operations in Italy--the only place United States forces in Europe were engaged at the time.

As we examine ULTRA's impact on the ANVIL strategy debates in Chapter III we must remember the role played by General Eisenhower in these debates. As the senior Allied commander, first in the Mediterranean, and then in Western Europe, he played a unique role in finalization of the Allied strategy. As the senior Allied commander he had a special relationship with the British Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister. He received much of his day-to-day directions and higher level intelligence support from the British ministries--all of whom were avid users of ULTRA. He, his key staff officers, and many of his subordinate commanders were cleared recipients of ULTRA. Consequently, from August 1942 on he was able to base his recommendations and decisions on intelligence of which ULTRA was a major contributor.

In another vein, although he was clearly a subordinate to General Marshall and the War Department, he played a unique role in the European theater--being delegated many responsibilities which, under other circumstances, might well have been reserved to the JCS. Without doubt, he had a major input to the development and promotion of United States strategy. At least twice during the ANVIL debates, United States authorities delegated to General Eisenhower authority to decide the United States position concerning ANVIL.²⁰ As Commander in Chief, AFHQ he drafted the original plans for ANVIL and later, as Supreme Allied Commander, he presided over final arguments concerning the importance of ANVIL and its relationship to the cross-Channel attack.

CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

1. The term ULTRA is used in many contexts--the entire process, the deciphered signals sent to recipients, and as a unique security classification. In this paper the term will be used for all these purposes with its context making its meaning clear.

2. See Bibliography entries for Bennett, Calvocoressi, Jones, Lewin, Welchman and Winterbotham.

3. Peter Calvocoressi, Top Secret ULTRA (New York: Panthoan Books, 1980), p. 59.

4. Ibid., p. 70.

5. Ibid., pp. 85-92.

6. Ibid., p. 96.

7. Ralph Francis Bennett, ULTRA in the West: The Normandy Campaign, 1944-45 (New York: Scribner, 1980), p. 16.

8. Ibid., p. 25.

9. War Department, "Use of CX/MSS ULTRA by the United States War Department (1943-1945)" (Unpublished Report, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1945), p. 7. Cited hereafter as SRH005.

10. Ibid., p. 13.

11. Ibid., p. 11.

12. F. W. Winterbotham, The ULTRA Secret (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974).

13. Harold C. Deutsch, "The Influence of ULTRA on World War II," Parameters, Vol. VIII, Number 4 (December 1978), p. 7.

14. Winterbotham, p. 131.

15. SRH005, p. 7.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 17.

19. Ibid., p. 14.

20. Mark A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front (West Port, Conn: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977), p. 127; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (Ed), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 1708.

CHAPTER III

ULTRA AND THE ANVIL DEBATE

Thus far this study has described the primary elements of the ANVIL debates and summarized the ULTRA Project, to include how the information produced was used by United States and British decision makers. The next step--determining how the information produced by ULTRA impacted on the ANVIL debates--will be more difficult. Tracing the factors involved in any strategic question is difficult owing to the complexity of strategic issues. As we have already seen, the ANVIL debates were even more complex than most. The role played by ULTRA in deciding those debates is made more difficult to discern because: (1) all the information provided by ULTRA is not available for research; (2) ULTRA information was blended into other available intelligence; and (3) decision makers were not permitted to refer to ULTRA in recording their decisions.

Notwithstanding the above difficulties, an attempt will be made here to show how ULTRA influenced the ANVIL decisions. The approach will be similar to that of Ralph Bennett albeit without the benefit of his extensive research.¹ After a description of the importance ULTRA played in intelligence operations during the ANVIL debates describe specific ULTRA information available to decision makers concerning the key elements of the debates identified in Chapter I will be provided.

As indicated earlier, ULTRA had matured and was fully functioning by 1943 when the ANVIL debates moved center stage. A post-war War Department report indicated that the

reliable guiding influence of ULTRA in working with other intelligence outweighed its value as a separate and distinct source of operational information; its normal function was to enable the representative (SLU) to select correct information from the huge mass of other (sources). ULTRA was guide and censor to conclusions arrived at by other intelligence-- other sources provided cover.²

Brigadier Williams, Field Marshal Montgomery's G2, indicated that ULTRA "provided a standard to measure intelligence work against; a check-- because of it one did not have to plan for the worst case."³ The importance of ULTRA is further indicated by a 1943 remark by General Eisenhower while describing requirements for his G2. He indicated that "the head of that section (G2) must be a British officer because of the network of special signal establishments he operates."⁴ Although these are the comments of operational decision makers there appears little doubt that ULTRA played a major role in developing the intelligence picture used by all decision makers in the ANVIL debates.

Much has been written concerning the different ways ULTRA contributed to Allied intelligence. Peter Calvocoressi argued that ULTRA's most valuable contribution was order of battle and capabilities of ground forces.⁵ Harold Deutsch goes even further to state that because of ULTRA the Allies knew "all there was to know about the state and distribution of Hitler's forces."⁶ Because of the type communications intercepted and Bletchley Park's index card system, the Allies were well informed about where enemy units were, in what strength, what supplies they carried and where they were being told to go. Even a cursory review of the messages available during 1943-1944, reveals the extent of information available concerning the order of battle of German forces.⁷

ULTRA also provided detailed information concerning the state of supplies available to German forces. In fact, Ralph Bennett argued that

ULTRA's greatest value was providing the "unspectacular accumulation of evidence about the German's supply situation."⁸ This supply status became increasingly important as Allied planners attempted to determine German capabilities to move German forces to Normandy.

A unique contribution provided by ULTRA that was difficult to obtain from other sources was the knowledge it provided concerning the success of Allied deception plans. ULTRA provided regular information about German assessment of Allied dispositions and confirmed that the bait was being taken. The success of FORTITUDE (deception plan for OVERLORD) in keeping German forces away from Normandy is well known. Less well known--to be described later--is the success of Allied deception efforts in the Mediterranean in drawing German forces away from Western France. Without ULTRA confirmation, Allied confidence in these critical supporting plans would have been much less strong.

No discussion of ULTRA's contribution to Allied knowledge of the enemy would be complete without mentioning its ability to identify German intentions. Anyone familiar with commands sent over today's secure radios can readily imagine the value of being able to read the enemy's instructions to his subordinates from the highest levels down. As the war became more mobile, greater reliance was placed on wireless communications that were being intercepted by ULTRA. Although most of these intercepts produced information of value at the operational level, we will see later that ULTRA provided key insights into Germany's longer range plans with strategic impact.

Although much of Chapter I deals with inter-Allied strategy differences, it must be remembered that Anglo-American teamwork reached new heights for cooperation in coalition warfare. A number of writers have argued that ULTRA played a major role in making combined staffs work.⁹

ULTRA provided a degree of information on enemy locations, capabilities and intentions never before available to commanders and their staffs. It produced a degree of confidence about the enemy that reduced potential inter-allied differences. The credibility of ULTRA, coupled with British primacy in day-to-day operations in the European Theater of Operations, made ULTRA the common basis of intelligence for the United States as well as the United Kingdom. Strategy development could have been even more devisive if each side had been operating from different, less complete intelligence.

Before we became completely mesmerized with ULTRA's contributions it should be pointed out that it also created some problems of its own. The very completeness of its success produced an obvious tendency to overrely on this unique source. General Eisenhower was exposed early to the dangers of overreliance on ULTRA. The Battle of Kasserine Pass produced one of the few operational surprises of Allied forces during the war. A root cause of Rommel's success was overreliance by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, Eisenhower's G2, on ULTRA provided information concerning Rommel's intentions. The incident resulted in the only relief of duty of a British officer by General Eisenhower during the war.¹⁰ Eisenhower's investigation indicated that there were significant other intelligence indicators available to have demanded a more balanced estimate--one that would have argued for greater security where Rommel struck.

The Kasserine lesson was reinforced in September-October 1943. ULTRA intercepted messages concerning Hitler's intent to withdraw forces from south and central Italy upon an Allied invasion led Ike to expect a relatively unopposed landing at Salerno.¹¹ Later events resulted in a change in German plans and a long, bloody stalemate in Southern Italy with major impacts on the Anglo-American strategy debates.

The foregoing two incidents are excellent illustrations of its potential shortcomings. In both cases German commanders had taken action which differed from plans/orders intercepted by ULTRA. Decision makers needed to constantly remind themselves that ULTRA could only intercept what the Germans sent by radio and not all these messages were intercepted. The German Ardennes counteroffensive later in the war again vividly illustrated the dangers of overreliance.

In summary, ULTRA played a key role in Anglo-American intelligence. The information it provided proved reliable, comprehensive and timely. Its value to strategic planners lay in the "totality of information it provided--in painstakingly providing the essential pieces of a complete picture."¹² It was so valuable that strategic and operational planners alike had to guard against neglecting other sources of intelligence.

With this description of ULTRA's role in Allied intelligence operations as a backdrop let us turn to an attempt to identify specific information made available by ULTRA to ANVIL decision makers with an indication of some probable impacts. As a means to focus these comments we will look at known ULTRA intercepts which may have impacted the key factors of the ANVIL debates identified in Chapter I.

One factor in the ANVIL debates was how to best assist the OVERLORD operation in Northwestern France. This part of the debate initially focused on how to best divert German forces from the landing sites in Normandy. As early as July 1943, ULTRA intercepted German signals indicating that a new Army Group B, with Field Marshal Rommel in command, was being established in Northern Italy as a strategic reserve for Italy and the Balkans.¹³ ULTRA also reported OKW orders to Field Marshal Kesselring to withdraw from Southern Italy while preparing for a

possible Italian collapse.¹⁴ This information could be used by both the Americans and the British to support their strategic arguments. The British argued at QUADRANT in August, that the Italian campaign should be continued as the best diversion since it would knock Italy from the war and force Hitler to use the newly formed reserve in Italy to stop the Allied advance. Continuing in Italy would maintain Allied momentum and threaten the Balkans thereby diverting German forces from France and possibly even from the Russian Front. These messages also provided strength to Prime Minister Churchill's arguments to attack the island of Rhodes and move into Greece. The Americans reasoned that since the Germans would withdraw from southern Italy, Rome and airfields in central Italy could be quickly secured so that forces could then be withdrawn for OVERLORD and an accompanying diversion in southern France. They continued to be adamant about limiting operations in Italy to securing Rome so that the buildup for OVERLORD could be accomplished.

Field Marshal Kesselring's decision to stand and fight in southern Italy despite OKW instructions produced a stalemate in Italy by mid-October 1943. This decision coupled with reports of German reinforcements were reported by ULTRA.¹⁵ These ULTRA intercepts strengthened British arguments that Italy was a better diversion, temporarily diverted Churchill's push to invade Rhodes, and provided strong ammunition for British demands in November 1943, to reconsider the QUADRANT decisions.

ULTRA also provided support for American arguments to limit operations in Italy and get on with OVERLORD and ANVIL. In November, ULTRA relayed decisions by Hitler to support Kesselring's decision to defend Italy inch by inch,¹⁶ that the Western theater was now the decisive

theater,¹⁷ that Rommel's Army Group B in Northern Italy had been disbanded,¹⁸ and increasing details on a series of strong defensive lines being prepared in the rugged Italian terrain to support a determined defense. This information added fuel to American concerns that Allied operations would get bogged down in Italy with further delay of OVERLORD. They believed that German forces in Italy could be held there with the Allied residual after pulling forces for OVERLORD and ANVIL.

As seen earlier, Stalin's support at Tehran for OVERLORD in May 1944, supported by ANVIL, greatly strengthened the United State's position but did not terminate the ANVIL debates. The debates were kept alive as a consequence of demands to increase the size of both OVERLORD and ANVIL in order to better ensure success. These demands for greater assault and follow-up forces grew out of the natural concern of planners as detailed plans began to develop. A primary factor driving planners to request larger forces was the size and capability of German forces in France. As indicated earlier, ULTRA was the primary source of information concerning enemy order of battle. By June 1944, ULTRA had identified 24 of 42 German garrison-type divisions, all mobile armor units, and all headquarters above division.¹⁹ Bletchley Park had also intercepted reports by Field Marshal Rundstedt detailing the condition of beach defenses in Northwestern France. With this and other information, Brigadier Strong (SHAEF G2), developed precise tables showing the ability of the Germans to move reinforcements to Normandy.²⁰ These estimates underscored the need to keep German forces diverted from Normandy as long as possible and the need for more ports to support the Allied buildup. Consequently, ANVIL's ability to provide both a significant diversion and a major port increased its value as a supporting operation for OVERLORD.

Insufficient landing craft to mount OVERLORD and ANVIL simultaneously in their enlarged configurations kept the Anglo-American debates over ANVIL alive. Since ANVIL could not be mounted with OVERLORD, Prime Minister Churchill argued for retention of forces programed for ANVIL in Italy to break through the German defenses and either move west into France or east through Yugoslavia into Austria. He argued that either of these operations would divert more forces away from OVERLORD than a delayed ANVIL. In fact, the Germans did reinforce Italy with eight divisions after the Allies seized Rome in June 1944. ULTRA had intercepted a message from Kesselring to Hitler prior to receiving these reinforcements requesting a decision whether to withdraw to the Alps or to reinforce on the Apennines. By this time American leaders were convinced that the combination of rugged Italian terrain and determined German defense would not permit the Italian campaign to fulfill British expectations.

Meanwhile, the threat of an Allied invasion of southern France concerned German leaders from the Axis surrender in North Africa until the time of the ANVIL landings. ULTRA intercepted traffic frequently indicated the German concern. During 1943 this concern reflected the results of Allied deception plans aimed at making the Germans think Allied operations were aimed at Southern France, the Dodecanese or Greece, rather than Italy. After General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander, deception efforts to support OVERLORD also contained requirements to hold German forces away from Normandy by threatening Southern France--ANVIL. ULTRA, as indicated earlier in this chapter, provided invaluable confirmation of the degree to which the Germans believed these deception efforts. Throughout 1943 and 1944, messages were intercepted which provided assurance of German concerns.²¹

This threat was so significant that in April 1944, the Germans established Army Group G to command forces south of the Loire river. Ralph Bennet, in his study of ULTRA's impact on OVERLORD, judged that

deception plans in the Mediterranean were almost as effective (as FORTITUDE) and resulted in widely fluctuating forecasts of a new assault between mid-July and mid-August--forecasts for landings in Italy, Southern France, the Aegean and the Adriatic.²²

A second major element of the American argument for ANVIL was the need for additional ports and lines of communications to support operations in Northwestern France. This component of the American argument grew as detailed planning progressed and OVERLORD grew in size. Brigadier Strong's appreciation of German reinforcement capabilities--based largely on ULTRA data--resulted not only in a larger OVERLORD but an increasing concern by General Eisenhower that he could adequately supply the buildup for the operation. These concerns were strengthened by ULTRA intercepts indicating a German realization of the importance of ports to the Allies with accompanying efforts to improve their defense of the ports.²³ ULTRA-reported commands to destroy the port of Cherbourg and to defend the Cotentin peninsula to the last man,²⁴ coupled with a severe storm in early June 1944, produced an overriding concern by General Eisenhower to add the ports in Southern France via ANVIL and establish an additional LOC up the Rhone Valley.

Three other factors in the Anglo-American debate over ANVIL--how to best support the Russians, concern for post-war objectives, and fulfillment of American commitments for use of rearmed French forces are more political and to this date less ULTRA material concerning these issues has been released. However, it would appear from limited information available and descriptions of the scope of ULTRA operations that significant intercepts impacting on these subjects were available.

As early as January 1941, ULTRA intercepted directives from Hitler to German commanders in Roumania to prepare to attack Greece.²⁵ Later messages concerning the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, and plans for the airborne invasion of Crete were available through ULTRA and obviously contributed to Churchill's concern for extending Allied operations into the Balkans. ULTRA intercepted and reported German appreciations concerning the strength and capabilities of insurgency operations in Yugoslavia and Greece--information of great interest to the British with their traditional interests in these areas.²⁶

Mark Stoler, in The Politics of the Second Front, has written a well researched and documented analysis of the impact of post-war political aims on the Anglo-American strategy. He argues that there was strong potential in 1943 for Stalin to support Allied operations into the Balkans as the Second Front he demanded.²⁷ However, at the time of the Tehran Conference (November 1943) the Germans transferred 6-12 divisions to the Eastern Front for a major counterattack near Kiev which, Stoler argues, convinced Stalin the war could not be won in 1944 and therefore he threw his support behind OVERLORD and ANVIL as the best way to support Russia.²⁸ This move of German forces to the East was most likely reported via ULTRA.

Stoler makes clear in his analysis that both the British and American decision makers were well aware of post-war political considerations as they developed their positions in the strategy debates. ULTRA produced nothing that convinced American decision makers that British alternatives to ANVIL would produce the probability of a quicker victory over the Germans thereby best meeting the objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

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2. War Department, "Synthesis of Experiences in the Use of ULTRA Intelligence by US Army Field Commands in the European Theater of Operations" (Unpublished Report, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1945), p. 24. Cited hereafter as SRH006.
3. War Department, "Reports Received by US War Department on Use of ULTRA in the European Theater, World War II," (Unpublished Report, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1945), pp. 1-2. Cited hereafter as SRH037.
4. Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1981), p. 60.
5. Peter Calvocoressi, Top Secret ULTRA (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 81.
6. Harold C. Deutsch, "The Influence of ULTRA on World War II," Parameters, Vol. VIII, Number 4 (1978), p. 4.
7. The US Army Military History Institute is in possession of microfilm of in excess of 52,000 documents released by the United Kingdom Public Records Office.
8. Bennett, p. 33.
9. SRH037, p. 27; Deutsch, p. 10; Calvocoressi, p. 110.
10. Ambrose, p. 60.
11. Ibid., p. 72. Detailed accounts of ULTRA intercepts during the Italian Campaign are available in classified sources held by the National Security Agency (NSA).
12. Deutsch, p. 10.
13. F. W. Winterbotham, The ULTRA Secret (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), p. 162; confirming information available in classified sources available at NSA.
14. Ambrose, p. 71.

15. Ibid., p. 72; Winterbotham, p. 165.
16. Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 287.
17. Bennett, p. 49.
18. United Kingdom Public Records Office, "CX/MSS/T10/80, 272020Z/11/43" (Microfilm, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA), Reel 2, Ref. 7, p. 96.
19. Bennett, pp. 53-57.
20. Ambrose, p. 88.
21. United Kingdom Public Records Office documents contain numerous messages reflecting German concern. See "CX/MSS KV8667 181828Z/6/44" (Microfilm, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA), Reel 25, Reference 174, p. 106.
22. Bennett, p. 151.
23. Ibid., p. 50.
24. United Kingdom Public Records Office, "CX/MSS/T219/16 KV8635 181305Z/6/44" (Microfilm, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA), Reel 3, Reference 174, p. 143.
25. Winterbotham, p. 100.
26. "CX/MSS/T219/107 KV8725 190156Z/6/44," Reel 3, Reference 174, p. 28.
27. Mark A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Fleet (West Port, Conn: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977), pp. 141-147.
28. Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The major impact of ULTRA on the intelligence factor during Anglo-American strategy making leading to the ANVIL decision is undeniable. In no previous conflict did one side possess such comprehensive, reliable and timely intelligence about the capabilities and intentions of its enemy. This information ran the spectrum from order of battle to detailed knowledge of how the enemy appreciated Allied dispositions and plans. The intelligence that resulted was appreciated and used by all major actors in the strategy debates over the ANVIL operation.

Although some will argue that the information produced by ULTRA was primarily used at the operational level--the conduct of campaigns within the theater--it also was a primary factor in intelligence at the strategic level. Even though the British Chiefs of Staff were given executive authority for day-to-day operation of the war in Europe, frequent Anglo-American conferences were conducted to chart the overall strategy. ULTRA, through its painstaking accumulation of information, was the key element producing Allied estimates of enemy capabilities and intentions for these strategy decisions. As seen in Chapter I, ANVIL was at the focal point of these national debates.

ULTRA was so important to Allied intelligence operations that it has been argued that it played a role in melding the combined staffs together thereby contributing to the success of coalition warfare. There appears little doubt that the comprehensiveness of the information

provided made for greater confidence in decision making and therefore reduced potential differences that might have developed.

Notwithstanding the major role played by ULTRA, intelligence was only one factor in the ANVIL debates. Decisions concerning how to best defeat Germany had to be taken in the wider context of the global war. The strategy had to accommodate different national interests and objectives. It also had to resolve a shortage of resources and a growing preponderance of United States resources on the Allied side. Overarching these factors was the problem of how much post-war concerns and objectives should impact the decisions on how to conduct the fight on the battlefields.

Although ULTRA dominated Allied intelligence, intelligence was not the dominant factor in the strategy debates. In fact the ANVIL debates provide a clear example of how two different decision makers will interpret the same information concerning the enemy so as to support their arguments. ANVIL was a vehicle by which the United States could direct the momentum of 1942-1944 to France to support their overriding objective of producing a concentrated effort to defeat Germany quickly so they could get on to the defeat of Japan. They were concerned to improve relations with Russia in hopes of securing Russian support for the defeat of Japan and in post-war efforts to establish an international organization. On the other hand, the British resented ANVIL because it directed forces away from their traditional areas of interest in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, and reduced the importance of the last theater where they were in control. ANVIL was the decision in which the United States forced its own objectives at the expense of British objectives.

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