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16 MAY 84

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
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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR  
SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LOREN C. RADER

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
FOR  
SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS  
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Loren C. Rader, CE

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16 May 1984

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ABSTRACT

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The increasing high demands placed on the United States reserve force leadership requires the best professional development. The challenge of what the United States Army can and should do, to develop and retain a better qualified reserve leadership, is a vital issue to the success of preserving peace. This study reviews the current professional development of our senior reserve officers, making some comparisons with that of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Additionally, this study identifies issues and makes recommendations regarding the Army's senior reserve officers professional development.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

We Americans are privileged to live in a nation at peace, but we must be prepared to preserve this peace on very short notice. Our national strategy is based on a total force made up of active and reserve components (AC & RC). Fifty-eight percent of the Total Army's deployable forces are in the reserve components. The Army's senior leadership is thus charged with the responsibility of insuring that these reserve forces are adequately trained and ready to accomplish any assigned mission.

Historical experience underscores the fundamental truth that an army which must fight numerically superior forces, under difficult circumstances, and with limited resources, must place a high priority on the excellence of its officers' professional development. Military excellence depends upon an officer corps which can think creatively about war -- one which understands and applies the principles and theories of war.

Proper professional development of our senior reserve force leadership has historically proven to be a key battlefield force multiplier. An excellent example of this is the TRAINING AND

DOCTRINE COMMAND'S selection of a Civil War volunteer Colonel as the principal model for the new leadership philosophy in the Army's Military Leadership Manual FM 22-100 (Oct 83). This volunteer provides an 1862 example of what we would now call an officer from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). FM 22-100 depicts Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain as one of the greatest small-unit combat leaders in the history of war. He helped develop and lead a cohesive unit that had a significant impact on the outcome of the Civil War and, consequently, on the current structure of our nation. FM 22-100 asserts that

We can develop leaders like Joshua Chamberlain in our schools and in our units. You can become this kind of leader, and you can teach your subordinates to be this kind of leader. This is your challenge and responsibility. (1)

The assertion that military leadership may be developed through means other than active duty and army resident courses is thus set forth by the Chamberlain model. He was a volunteer with no formal military education. He had not been educated at the Military Academy. Rather, he studied at Bowdoin College, a small liberal arts college, and at the Bangor Theological Seminary in Maine. He had studied to be a minister and attained a professorship of rhetoric at Bowdoin College. When, at the age of 33, he left his academic position to put on the union blue with the Army of the Potomac.

On 8 August 1862, Governor Washburn tendered Joshua L.

Chamberlain a commission as a Lieutenant Colonel (Second in Command) on the new 20th Regiment Infantry, Maine Volunteers. "Three years, 24 battles, six wounds, four citations for bravery, and three promotions later, Brevet Major General Chamberlain mustered out of the Army." (2)

Even though current command and control calls upon technology and strategy far removed from the muskets, bugle calls, visual commands, and shoulder to shoulder battle formations of the Civil War

much of the face of battle [has not and] will not change. The attributes of leadership required to develop cohesion and discipline, and to inspire soldiers in battle have not changed. The payoff in battle is moral force of soldiers confidence, morale, courage, and a will to fight. (3)

The Army's new definition of leadership in FM 22-100 is "a process by which a soldier influences others to accomplish the mission. A soldier carries out this process by applying his leadership attributes (beliefs, ethics, character, knowledge, and skills)." (4) Even though by accident Joshua Chamberlain may have been well prepared for leadership, we need officers who are teachers, who communicate a message of dedication, and who perform that way.

#### Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study is to outline the professional values and character traits exemplified so well by Joshua Chamberlain, and to determine ways to instill them in the senior leadership, and in those who will be trained to provide the senior

leadership of our reserve forces. To accomplish this, we need an analysis of where we are, where we should be, and how we can be where we should be to accomplish this professional development.

This study will supplement the information gained from the 1984 Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) study team, directed by Colonel Ward M. LeHardy. (5)

#### Investigative Procedures

To gain knowledge of the current reserve professional officer development system in the United States, I initially interviewed seventy-five senior reserve component officers (grade E5-E8). Their current duty status ranged from, individuals on a 3 year AGR tour, to an 11 month active duty tour to attend USAWC, to service in a drilling troop program unit, to simple membership in the IRR.

I spent nine days touring the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to observe the FRG's reserve officer force structure and Territorial Army. (6) Additionally I spent five days in London and South East England to learn about Great Britain's reserve officer force structure and Territorial Army. (7)

Further I reviewed the current military literature on officer educational and professional development at the USAWC library. Finally, I conducted followup discussions with various Army War College staff and faculty. (8)

This study will give a comparison of training/educational programs in several modern armies, an analysis of "success factors"

of senior US Army RC officers, and a model position essay on leadership. Conclusions and recommendations will supplement the comparisons, analysis and position leadership model.

CHAPTER I  
END NOTES

1. Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership, October 1983 p. 16
2. Lieutenant Colonel Boyd M. Harris, "A New Army Emphasis on Leadership: Be, Know, Do" Military Review, February 1983, p. 66 and Michael Shaar, The Killer Angels, New York: Ballantine Books, 1974. p. 360
3. Harris, op.cit., p. 66
4. DA FM 22-100, op.cit., p. 44
5. I attended several briefings from the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) Review Study Group. Coordination for Reserve Component issues was with 1Lt Dee Waldrop, and for education and training, LTC Paul Hotard. Coordination with OCAR for this study was through LTC Dick Jellen.
6. Interviews were conducted with Major Bernard McDaniel, Assistant Military Attache in the US Embassy, Bonn, Germany, and with Lieutenant Colonel Eugene H. Kobes, TRADOC LNO for training, Bonn, Germany. Colonel Dieter R. Brand, the USAWC, Class of 84, International Fellow from Germany, has been helpful and patient with me in my effort to better understand his country's reserve officer development system.
7. Interviews were conducted with MG. Gerrard-Wright, commander of the Territorial Army Land Forces, with Colonel Crawford and Major Gary Dover, DTA&C, Duke of Yorks Barracks, London. A Territorial Army Officer Study completed 30 April, 1983, was reviewed for background. Interviews were conducted with LTC Paul De Bankes, a senior reserve officer, who in civilian life is a human resource and professional development consultant.
8. Professor Jay Luvass from the Military History Institute was of a significant help with his advanced course, "Ride with Great Captains", and his after hour discussions provided insight into human nature, military professional development, and the importance of studying military history.

## CHAPTER II

### PROFILE OF A SENIOR RESERVE COMPONENT OFFICER

If once again this country must defend its freedom and territorial integrity, 58% of our deployable army will come from reserve component forces. These forces are trained and will be commanded in combat by our senior reserve component officers. Our country is continually searching for senior reserve officers with outstanding credentials to fill vital positions at senior command levels. But who are these officers? Where do they come from? How are they developed? What are their values and success traits?

The information assembled in this chapter is an attempt to answer these questions. A random selection composite profile of a 1984 Senior Reserve officer will be drawn up. This typical officer profile was developed as a result of seventy-five interviews conducted for this study.

The representative Senior Reserve officer was born in 1938 and spent most of his childhood in urban USA. As the oldest of three children, he attended public schools, helped put himself through college by working part-time, and then earned an advanced degree at a major university. He started his reserve career 24 years ago as an enlisted person, and he has changed his branch once since his commission. He is married, has three children, and his wife has no outside career.

Our composite officer is a successful government administrator (GS-14) with salary and benefits comparable to military O6 pay, plus his annual reserve pay of \$12,000. He carries out his military training on his 15 day government military leave and his 20 day annual vacation leave, and he spends an average of 3 weekends per month at drill or making command visits.

By his own report his strongest character trait is his "concern for results", followed by the importance he places on "integrity" and a strong "desire for greater responsibility". He rates the ability to "get along with people" of primary importance and, in some cases, as the overriding factor in his professional success. He considers "creativity", "ambition", and "agressiveness" as secondary success traits. Although he mentioned the following, he doesn't predict a successful career based on "social skills," "appearance," and "exceptional intelligence."

Even though "loyalty" was not considered a prime trait for enhancing success, he has been "loyal" to his major command and has been adept in gaining loyalty from his subordinates.

When asked in the format of an open-ended response what one single factor was the most significant in his personal success, He responded, "hard work and the desire to achieve."

When asked to cite the single factor most responsible for his personal success, he cited the following factors, listed in their order of decreasing frequency:

Table 1

<u>Factor Category</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Hard work	15.5
Ambition, drive, desire to achieve	10.2
Getting along with others, understanding human nature	10.0
Timing, being in the right place at the right time	5.5
Concern for results	4.4
Desire for responsibility	3.7
Persistence, dedication, consistency, diligence	3.5
Integrity, honesty	3.4
Education	3.2
Loyalty, dedication to unit	3.1
Use of intelligence, thinking	2.9
Professional or technical competence	2.5
All other categories of less than 2%	<u>32.1</u>
	100.0

The trait mentioned most often that enhance military success was "the concern for results." Other traits were frequently cited as well:

Table 2

TRAITS THAT ENHANCE MILITARY SUCCESS

<u>Mentioned Traits</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Concern for results	75
Integrity	68
Desire for responsibility	58
Concern for people	52
Creativity	44
Ambition	38
Aggressiveness	36
Loyalty	24
Exceptional intelligence	17
Social adaptability	16
Appearance	15
Other traits	8

The factors influencing his decision to change branch or change reserve units (when he had the option to initiate change) were as follows: 1) increased responsibility (mentioned by over 50% of the officers) 2) increased challenge (mentioned by over 40% of the officers) 3) a chance for better compensation (more paid man-days for training and professional development--mentioned by less than 30% of the officers). For the most part, a chance to be creative and innovative did not initiate change in his career (mentioned by less than 10% of the officers).

A survey of his political philosophy shows him to be a Republican who votes regularly. He exhibits conservative-to-moderate leanings on social issues and conservative leanings on fiscal issues.

Table 3

Political Affiliation

Vote regularly	95%
Republican	67%
Democrat	14%
Independent	19%

Reserve Officers' political party affiliations significantly differ from those of the general population. A recent Gallup Opinion Index indicates that the nation's voters are 23% Republican, 48% Democrat, and 29% Independent.

## CHAPTER III

### THE US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT OFFICER'S FORMAL TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM COMPARED WITH THAT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT

Considerable progress was made during the 1960's and 70's toward incorporating the Army Guard and Army Reserve into the total army scheme, but there still remained significant shortfalls in personnel, training, equipment, and funding. During the last four years, the Reagan administration has vigorously reaffirmed this policy with action and commitment of funds,. Thus the Reagan administration has done more than any previous administration. In June 1982, Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger told the Reserve Forces Policy Board that

I wish to affirm my belief in -- and full support of -- the Total Force Policy. The Guard and Reserve are going to be full partners with their active counterparts in this administration... my office will not accept substandard support or degradation of the Reserve Forces. (1)

The congressional personnel cap on the Army's Active Component of 780,000, the Army's modernization program, and the restructuring of our forces to meet the new demands placed on the Army will impact significantly on the reserve component leadership. Considering the civilian obligations and responsibilities of

reserve leaders, what structure does the Army need to provide an effective military educational system for the reserve component officer?

Effective military educational systems have been the focal issue of five major Army studies since WW II. The recommendation of a 1945 War Department Military Education Board Study was responsible for the formation of the National War College and the Armed Forces Staff College, the expansion of the civilian schooling program, and additional extension courses for the reserve components. In 1948, the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Army Officers recommended the reestablishment of the Army War College, a more centralized direction of the Army School System, and higher educational goals for Regular Army Officers.

In 1958, the Department of the Army Board to Review the System of Officer Education and Training studied officer education from commissioning through completion of a senior service college. Then in 1965 the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools made comprehensive recommendations following a major reorganization of the Army. In 1978, the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) Study Group published its five volume assessment of the officers' career development program to meet the Total Army's needs through the 1990's.

The RETO study was directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army to review officer education training from precommissioning through career completion, to determine appropriate training requirements

based on Army missions and individual career development needs, and to propose policies and programs to meet those needs.(2)

Reserve component officer tours have been authorized at TRADOC headquarters, Fort Leavenworth, and at branch schools to resolve reserve component issues contained in the RETO proposals. Correspondence courses, USAR school courses, and resident-nonresident options have been created to give the RC officer better access to the current educational requirements for promotion. At present, the only exception to this policy is the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), a course recently designed by the Army for AC Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) managed officers, to be completed between the sixth and ninth year of AC commissioned service. Neither the National Guard Bureau (NGB) nor the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR) have included CAS3 as an educational requirement for RC promotion. However, now a few allocated resident training slots in CAS3 are allocated for RC officers.

Table 4 shows the progression and possible options in formal officer education from commissioning through the completion of the Army's Senior Service College.

TABLE 4

PROGRESSION OF FORMAL OFFICER EDUCATION




Table 5 shows the minimum educational requirements for promotion through colonel.

Table 5  
Minimum Educational Requirements for the RC Officer Promotion

Lt to Cpt:	A basic resident officer course must be completed within 3 years
Cpt to Maj:	An advanced course
Maj to LTC:	CAS3 or one-half of Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC)
LTC to Col:	CGSOC or CAS3

#### TRAINING IN FOREIGN ARMIES

The United States' formal reserve officer training system has made good use of the active component training structure while still recognizing the needs of the reserve officer's civilian employment. A comparison of the US staff training with five other modern armies may help to identify practices and policies for adoption into our system.

The following comparisons are taken primarily from the comprehensive work completed by the REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICER (RETO) STUDY, 1978, (3) and updated by the "Final Report, Army Staff College Level Training Study", June 1983, by Colonel Huba Wass de Czege. (4)

Colonel Huba Wass de Czege commented on the austerity of the US officer school training compared with that of five other modern

armies.

We do considerably less officer schooling than other modern first-rate armies. Staff college training, which occurs in all these armies at about the same career point as it does in ours, is illustrative of our relative austerity. The Israelis send their staff college selectees to 46 weeks of school, supplemented with 9 additional weeks for those chosen to command battalions. The Canadians send all officers to a 20 week staff course and a selected minority to 45 weeks of preparation for service on higher level staffs. The British and Germans each devote about 100 weeks, while the Russians put their potential general staff officers through an astonishing 150 weeks of intensive education. In sharp contrast is the United States' modest 42 weeks of CGSOC instruction. (5)

Command and staff training is more restrictive in foreign armies being provided only to selected officers in the Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the Soviet armies.

#### US and Foreign Staff College Faculty Comparison.

The Canadian staff college instructors, who meet their students on an eight-to-one student-to-faculty ratio, are regarded as the "best of the best" -- virtually all of whom have commanded at the battalion level. The British instructors are elite lieutenant colonels and colonels, including some high grade, early promotion officers. The Federal Republic of Germany, like the British, provide each of their 10 to 12 students a mentor/tutor, who, as a successful former battalion commander, assists, guides, instructs, and evaluates his junior charges. Israel provides a colonel as mentor to an average of 5-6 students.

The Soviets specially educate their faculty members in

academic and doctrinal areas from the time they graduate from staff college. They become professional instructors and scholars. In addition to teaching and tutoring, they write manuals and publish articles in military periodicals and journals. They remain in military education systems for their entire careers, most of them retire as a colonel, although some retire as high as two-star rank. In my view, the US Army has placed less emphasis on selection of faculty and on their career progression than other armies have. Depending on the area of instruction, the US student-faculty ratio ranges from one-to-fifteen to one-to-five. Compare this to Israel's ratio of one-to-five or-six; Canada's one-to-eight; FRG's one-to-ten or-twelve; and the Soviet Union's one-to-ten.

#### Student Selection for Officer Staff College (CGSOC level)

All six armies use duty performance as the key criterion for selection to staff colleges. Except for the US, they all use qualifying written examinations. Only very recently has the US Army begun to use qualifying tests for entrance to a staff college: Last year, US officers were required to qualify by test into Phase II of the CAS3 course. Canada screens candidates by examination, and each of the other countries select candidates by competitive examination. The following table indicates the approximate percentage of students selected for officer staff college by country:

Table 6

USSR	5-10%
FRG (West Germany)	8-10%
Great Britain	25%
Canada	40%
USA	50%
Israel	75%

(6)

Selection for foreign staff colleges is highly competitive. Soviet officers are expected to study 2,000 to 3000 hours before taking staff academy entrance exams. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and Soviet armies often include scientific research and civilian advanced degree programs as part of the staff college experience.

Table 7. on the next page indicates curriculum requirements of mid-level staff college education country by country.

Table 7. Mid-Level Staff College Education and Training

CANADA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Command and Staff Course</u> (45 wks). Joint. Selection is highly competitive. Mostly majors.</li> <li>2. Middle Management Course (15 days). As required.</li> <li>3. Management Course (14 days). As required.</li> </ol>
UK	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Self-study (+3 weeks of formal instruction) for promotion exam to major.</li> <li>2. <u>Staff College</u>. (Promotion exam to MAJ used also as entrance exam to SC.) First phase - Royal Mil College of Science (2-12 mos); Second phase - Staff College, Camberley (12 mos). Selection is highly competitive.</li> </ol>
ISRAEL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Staff College</u> (11 mos). Entrance examinations required.</li> <li>2. Bn Cdr course. Preceded by self-study. Course begins with diagnostic test. Mostly majors.</li> </ol>
FRG	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Field Grade Qualification Course</u> (3 1/2 mos). Joint. All captains.</li> <li>2. Either <u>S-Staff Courses</u> (3 mos) or <u>General Staff Course</u> (21 mos). Joint. GS Course highly competitive. Exam required. Mostly captains. GS Course is pre-requisite for promotion to general (with some exceptions).</li> <li>3. Bn Cdr update course.</li> </ol>
GDR	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Friedrich Engels Military Academy</u> (3-5 yrs). Joint. Course length dependent on branch and type of outside research. Some advanced civilian degrees awarded. Selection is intensely competitive. Entrance exam is probably required. Mostly CPTS. Trained to command bn and regt, perform staff functions at division.</li> <li>2. A few graduates of academy sent for further schooling to Soviet Staff Academies or those of other Warsaw Pact countries.</li> </ol>
USSR	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Eight Ground Force staff academies</u> (3-5 yrs). All branch/specialty specific. Course length dependent on specialty and type of outside research. Some adv civilian degrees awarded. Trained to command bn and regt and perform staff functions at division. Pre-requisite for promotion to general. Selection is intensely competitive. Entrance exam required.</li> </ol>

A time phased progressive officer development course comparison is shown in Appendix 1 for the US and the major foreign armies just discussed. The total maximum and minimum number of weeks of senior officer formal education for each country is:

	Israel	Canada	UK	FRG	USSR	USA
Maximum	185	174	253	263	374	152
Minimum	76	82	71	124	124	68

Successful senior United States Army officers average approximately 138 weeks of formal military instruction. Thus formal military education of US officers is nearly two years less than that of UK and FRG senior army officers, and four years less than that of USSR officers. The main question we need to ask is whether we are providing adequate time to develop our senior officers. Other concerns suggested by comparison with foreign armies are: 1) whether US student to faculty ratios are low enough; and 2) whether there is sufficient emphasis on faculty quality and continuity of faculty education in our educational system for quality instruction and development of doctrine and strategy.

THE RESERVE SYSTEMS: UNITED STATES,

BRITISH, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The United States, the British (UK), and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) all make good use of the active component (AC) training programs for RC officers.

#### The United States RC

The US reserve component retains many officers who, having spent up to 16 years on active duty, are the products of the army's resident schools plus their active duty experience.

The US also has a reserve track of commissioning officers and educating them up through the completion of a senior service college with a promotion system through two-star rank. AC and RC officers move from the active system to the reserve and back, depending on civilian employment and the extent of military involvement the country requires at a particular time. The US compensates the RC and AC equally when the RC officer is on active duty for training.

The amount of resident training a reservist gets is dependent on his civilian employment and his desire to improve his military qualifications. All military education for the RC is available through correspondence or a local USAR school with the very recent exception of Phase II, CAS3.

The US RC officer has a distinct and unique advantage over his British and FRG counterparts in that he is supported by a retirement system based on total time served and rank. The present US military compensation (pay and fringe benefits), for both AC and RC, provides the highest military standard of living in the world compared with

that afforded by pay scales, fringe benefits, a retirement systems in other countries.

#### The British RC

Like the US, the British retain some AC officers in their RC (Territorial Army) after they complete their active duty tours and return to civilian life. Because of the lack of appreciation for the role played by the Territorial Army (TA) in most levels of civilian life, and to some extent in the Regular Army, an insufficient number of high quality officers have elected to retain their commissions as part of the TA. Another reason for this reluctance to maintain a position in the TA may be the social and economic need of these officers to find and establish their civilian employment without disruption.

Until 1960 Britain had conscription, and since 1849 they have had the regimental system. The British way of life, with a close relationship among the church, the state, and the military tends to make the TA more "tribal". Family heritage runs within some regiments. But now, like the US, Britain is getting National Directors who have had no national military service, and the best TA officers are frequently busy business executives, who are difficult to retain in the TA.

The RC senior officer structure for a TA of 72,000 is one Brigadier General, fifty-four Colonels, and 200 Lieutenant Colonels (1/2 of these are RC in the Regular Army). The RC officer education

consists of a series of self-taught subcourses with a rigid testing system for promotion. Also included for the RC is a two week specialist course in his branch for selected Captains, an 8 day command and staff course for senior Captains and junior Majors (age 26-29), a two week squadron commanders course (qualifying Captains to Majors) and a senior command and staff course for TA staff officers (age 36-37).

Eighty-five percent of the TA units drill one night a week, 52 weeks a year. These drills are unpaid except for a travel allowance for those out of the local area. Officers have programmed funding for 42 training days annually, 15 of which are annual training. A specialist course may be done in lieu of annual training. Annual tax-free bounties are paid for three different levels of training commitment:

Group A	15 days of annual training
Group B	12 days or 6 weekends a year
Group C	6 days or 3 weekends a year

Table 8 shown on the next page displays the British military pay schedule (bounties and training expenses. The exchange rate as of May 1984 was \$1.30 = £.

A British Major's pay is less than one half that of his US counterpart. Weekend drill pay per day is paid at the same daily rate as active duty pay, while in the US the reservist receives one day's pay per 4 hr training period, or two days pay for each weekend training day. The British RC member has no retirement at age 60 as does his US counterpart, but the British Officer does receive

approximately \$520 as a tax-free annual bonus if he elects the highest training obligation.

Table 8

## PAY

When at annual camp, attending a course of instruction or for any complete day's training performed at other times, members of TA receive pay at the rate appropriate to their rank.

### Daily Rates of Pay (minimum)

	Men	Women
	£	£
<b>OFFICERS</b>		
Second Lieutenant	16.85	16.71
Lieutenant	21.74	21.43
Captain	27.26	26.87
Major	34.41	34.00
<b>SOLDIERS</b>		
Private*	11.47	11.30
Lance Corporal*	14.18	13.98
Corporal*	17.31	17.06
Sergeant	20.29	20.00
Staff Sergeant	21.57	21.26
Warrant Officer 2	23.06	22.73
Warrant Officer 1	24.69	24.34

An increment of 20p per day is payable to soldiers on completion of 4 years service.

Pay is subject to tax, and under certain circumstances, to the deduction of national insurance contributions.

\* Or equivalent ranks.

## PAY, BOUNTIES AND TRAINING EXPENSE ALLOWANCE WITH EFFECT FROM 1 APRIL 1982

1983

### BOUNTIES

Members who complete their obligatory annual training and are certified as efficient by their commanding officer will be eligible for a single tax-free bounty at the rates set out below.

	First year of service	Second year of service	Third and subsequent years of service
	£	£	£
Group A Higher Training Obligation	150	275	400
Group A Lower Training Obligation	120	220	320
Group B	60	70	80

### TRAINING EXPENSE ALLOWANCE

For attendance at voluntary training periods in the evenings, a training expense allowance is payable to cover out-of-pocket expenses at the following rates:

	At least two and under five hours	At least five and under eight hours
	£	£
Officer	1.09	2.14
Sergeants and above	0.87	1.85
Corporals and below	0.75	1.56

Expenses are also paid for travel to and from the TA Centre.

The information in this leaflet is intended for guidance only and cannot be quoted as an authority.

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### The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) RC


The FRG Army is a conscript army (225,000 annually). That means that a reservist in the FRG has completed a compulsory military service period of at least 15 months (24 months if he has volunteered for military service).

Those with a 24-month obligation attend officer training at a branch school after having gained practical experience as a squad leader in a unit for 3 months. For promotion to lieutenant they are required to serve an additional training period as platoon leaders after finishing basic military service. Conscript Sergeant Cadets who leave the army after the normal 15 months have the opportunity of becoming reserve officers after 4 training periods of 4 weeks each.

All designated reservists (officers, NCOs and enlisted) are fully trained during their required active duty. In this army of one million, as in the US, 60% are reservists. The Army Field Forces and Territorial Army breakout of reservists is as shown in table 9.

Compensation for a FRG reserve officer under current exchange rates is approximately equal that of the British, and thus considerably less than the US military pay scale. Because of the current economic restraints on the FRG economy, the FRG RC officer will probably spend less time in a paid drill status than his US counterpart.

Table 9



Higher rank opportunities for the FRG RC officer is limited. There are very few O6 positions in the RC and a very limited number of O5 command positions. Company (O3) level command is normally the highest command level in either the Army Field Forces or the Territorial Army for an RC officer.

The FRG's RC and AC work well together and are integrated into a well trained and functioning national defense system. The AC occupies all of the higher command positions and most of the higher ranks.

## CHAPTER III

### ENDNOTES

1. US Department of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy, Fiscal Year 1981, p.ix.
2. US Department of the Army, Study Group for the Review of Education and Training for Officers, A Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) Volume 1, p. 1-3
3. Ibid ,. Volume 3
4. Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, 83 Army Research Associate, "Final Report, Army Staff College Level Training Study." 13 June 1983
5. Ibid ., p.16.
6. Ibid ., ANNEX C, Staff College Training in Foreign Armies p. C-2
7. Ibid ., ANNEX C, Staff College Training in Foreign Armies pp. C-3, C-4

## CHAPTER IV

### CULTIVATING EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP

Whatever the structure or curriculum of a military training program, it must set forth a model of leadership. As a mentor addressing a tutor, through my observation, analysis, and experience, this chapter focuses on the leadership qualities successful senior reserve officers exhibit to increase their productivity and to make exceptional personal gains. The methods and techniques of leadership set forth here should inspire subordinates, should provide personal recognition for these officers' accomplishments, and should be influential throughout the entire chain of command.

How do others see you? Your effectiveness as a leader, either in the military or as a civilian, is keyed to the example and

model you provide for those with whom you work. Leadership style is reflected in how work is done by subordinates. This style is most evident in the way you manage your subordinates, which has a significant influence on total results achieved.

A positive approach in dealing with people is compounded as it ripples through an organization. Effective executive leaders routinely engage in the following activities:

Create clear standards. Effective leaders talk openly on a regular basis with their subordinates. They send a positive message of the performance standards expected. They may share their approach to their own tasks if there is a need to make things more explicit for the subordinate. During the initial phase of an operation or project, they share their concerns and any helpful experience with similar tasks, so subordinates will clearly understand what is expected and know what support and assistance they can expect. During the operation, they allow the subordinate enough freedom to complete the action required without over-supervising. Upon completion of the operation, they provide adequate feedback and a subordinate-directed critique to be better prepared for the next requirement.

Put work in perspective. When assigning work or giving work direction, effective leaders explain why it needs to be done, as well as what the task is. Any unit can be much more effective by linking its efforts to the larger effort of which they are a part. If subordinates understand how each task fits into the whole, their

work will be more meaningful. Likewise this linkage allows the subordinates to transmit such meaning in their sub-assignment of tasks. When people understand the reasons for and purposes of their requirements, they perform more effectively and with greater dedication.

Set a positive collaborative tone. Patterns of communication with subordinates can set the tone for willing cooperation. An open, questioning, and encouraging listener, who fosters face-to-face boss subordinate discussions is much more likely to be effective than a brusque, strictly to-the-point leader who communicates largely by memos and directives. An effective leader is one whose normal encounters with subordinates takes place randomly to share problems and concerns. The ineffective leader is one whose normal encounter with subordinates is strictly formal and imperative in nature, such as in the case when the leader walks up to a subordinate and simply states that, "I need to see you in my office at 1300 HRS."

Show respect for subordinates. Effective leaders respect their subordinates. Such respect is displayed by more than just words. The way to show respect to the people with whom you work is through a series of simple courtesies such as greeting them in and around the work area, returning radio or phone calls and answering requests promptly, and attending meetings on time. The positive consideration and respect shown others will more than likely cause them to behave similarly with their subordinates. Courtesy

throughout an organization creates a "growing environment" for people and reduces friction, thereby improving the quality and quantity of work.

Credibility: The key to subordinate influence. Effective executive leaders and military commanders must also build and maintain credibility so that subordinates will have trust that actions will be made in good faith towards them.

Pieter Bruyn, a Dutch specialist in administration, states that authority is not the power a boss has over his subordinates, but rather the boss's ability to influence subordinates to recognize and accept that power. Bruyn calls this a "bargain" in which the subordinates accept the boss in return for the kind of leadership they can accept.

How can a leader establish the kind of credibility that builds and maintains the trust of others? Be honest. If a leader "sells" his subordinates to the point where he is shading the truth, or putting the highest priority on everything, (rather than carefully selected and articulated tasks and objectives) his credibility will diminish. On the other hand if he conveys accurate information, and lets others evaluate it, he will more likely win acceptance.

An effective leader must also be candid about himself. If a leader does not ask questions for fear of revealing a lack of knowledge, and must always be "right" and have the last word, he will be unconvincing. To the more perceptive observers and

subordinates he will seem insecure. A candid willingness to admit mistakes and reveal faults and weaknesses, encourages trust from subordinates. They will also be less likely to hide their own errors and to cover their own weaknesses when they know their leader has no illusions of being perfect.

A good leader also gains credibility by accepting people as human beings, with their own emotions and life problems. A senior military officer who can reach out to others when that is clearly what they need becomes himself a more accessible, trusted person. Mutual trust is strengthened if neither the boss nor subordinate pushes for advantages, or lessens the other's dignity during moments of informality. Senior officers, and other effective leaders who inspire trust by maintaining their credibility also create the advantage of being able to trust those who work for them. Such mutual trust is the essence of strong leadership. it produces a strong command structure.

Several Colonels serving under a senior officer in the Pentagon would go out of their way to extend every military courtesy to him, even though they could have avoided doing so quite easily. Although they personally disliked his very demanding nature and feared his intelligence and perception as a man, they respected him for the position he held in the Army.

There are several successful leadership styles. This general officer didn't make his subordinates comfortable. He was a tireless, forceful, hardworking officer, an effective communicator

who exhibited intellectual acuity and precision, and he expected the same from his subordinates. His subordinates willingly deferred to him and took pride in the service they rendered under him. He is a paragon of a modern military leader using the "tough boss" approach.

The respect this General officer earned for his accomplishments as a senior military leader is what professional officers should strive for. Realistic senior military officers can not command effectively without the trust and respect of those they want to follow their leadership.

An increasing number of senior officers are able to get the best from their subordinates by using the "supportive boss" as opposed to the "tough boss" approach. The following questions will help you gauge whether you are "supportive" or merely "tough".

Do your subordinates use their access to you, whatever the reason -- query, complaints, report, or personal problem?

Are you open with them? Except for confidential information, do you keep them informed on what is happening in the organization and have honest and open discussions with them about their part of the job?

Are you alert to their problems? Your offer to help when you suspect they are in trouble will mark you as a boss who wants to see people succeed for their own sake.

Do you support them when necessary? Do you protect your subordinates against unnecessary overwork and harrassment from other managers?

Do you advance their causes? When subordinates suggest useful ideas, do you give them the credit for their innovation or inspiration?

Are you willing to let them go? When promotion possibilities open, do you encourage their individual advancement?

Even if you perceive yourself to be a "tough" boss, you can be supportive if the answers to the above questions are predominately "yes". Whatever your style of leadership, your subordinates need to know they can depend on you. Conversely, you can depend on them to do their best.

In addition to leading within the organization another aspect, sometime overlooked is leading for the organization, this is representing the army to the public at large.

No matter how effective a leader is, his executive skills can be honed by experience. Some of the best training for executive leadership development occurs in related professional organizations. Also they are the main sources to represent the needs, values and services of National defense to congress. These organizations are always seeking and developing new qualified leadership.

While cultivating executive leadership skills, professional organizations can provide a forum to develop speaking engagements to many service and civil organizations throughout this country. (2)

Thus senior military leaders must also be able to communicate, orally and in writing, in an effective and persuasive manner. Unfortunately the United States Army seemingly places less emphasis

on the ability to communicate persuasively than does the Air Force, the Navy, and other large successful corporations. This fact has been noted by various congressional committees. It is painfully evident in the distribution of funds Congress gives each service. When asked why other services get a larger share of the budget, the repeated answer is that the other services are more persuasive and do a better job communicating their needs.

The more effectively we prepare both the active duty and the reserve component senior leadership to communicate with Congress, the media, and the public, the more likely we are to get the human and material resources and support needed for national security.

The art of good self-expression will invariably give the edge to the officer who has persevered. But mediocrity will plague those who place little importance on it.

Battles are won through the ability of men to express concrete ideas in clear and unmistakable language. All administration is carried forward along the chain of command by the power of men to make their thoughts articulate and available to others. (3)

This basic truth has been with us in the past and will continue into the future. Each of us must decide whether we will advance ourselves in this proven way or hide behind the of excuse, "I'm simply a fighting man without a gift for writing or speaking." Such rationalization marks an officer without ambition to identify his professional role and values. He may be only justifying his own laziness.

"Of those who have excelled in the conduct of great

operations, at least four out of five have made some mark in the field of letters." (4) This long list of names includes: U.S. Grant, W.T. Sherman, Robert E. Lee, Joshua Chamberlain, John J. Pershing, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George Patton Jr., Douglas MacArthur, and Joseph W. Stillwell.

A noted military historian has suggested that there is a direct correlation between writing ability and Generalship (quality of leadership) in all the important civil war generals, with the single exception of General Hancock. (5) Not one of these Generals was a born writer. History tells us that without exception, they acquired their skill in self-expression by sustained practice which was self-imposed in the interest of furthering their military efficiency.

Successful senior military officers, including those who have not been noted authors and public speakers, know how to use language effectively. They all can effectively present their thoughts to their staffs and their troops, whether it is a succinct operational order, a doctrinal exposition, or an inspirational message on the eve of battle or a major field training exercise. The command of language is a main source of power in any command. "Men who command words to serve their thoughts and feelings are well on their way to commanding men to serve their purposes." (6)

Good writing and speaking are a direct reflection of good thinking. They condense and concentrate thought, encouraging and requiring orderly and precise thinking. To progress as a writer or

a speaker, you should become a student of the best writing and of the best speakers. You should study not only to understand great ideas for their own sake, but study the manner in which they are expressed.

Military history is an important influence. During a senior reserve officer's career there will be many reading requirements. Early recognition of the important contribution of history and the great military writers is excellent preparation for senior leadership.(7)

Many enthusiasts, seeking to make history relevant, do it a disservice by asserting that "history repeats itself" or by forcing historical evidence into reoccurring patterns or exemplary "lessons learned" to be applied to some current situation. Others see its primary value in illustrating points of leadership or doctrine, or instilling in the young officer the proper military values.

While not discounting such benefits altogether, most soldiers who have read much history would probably agree with General Douglas MacArthur's assertion some 50 years ago:

More than most professions, the military is forced to depend upon intelligent interpretation of the past for signposts charting the future. Devoid of opportunity, in peace, for self-instruction through actual practice of his profession, the soldier makes maximum use of historical record in assuring the readiness of himself and his command to function efficiently in emergency. The facts derived from historical analysis he applies to conditions of the present and the proximate future, thus developing a synthesis of appropriate method, organization, and doctrine... These principles know no limitation of time.

Consequently the Army extends its analytical interest to the dust-buried accounts of wars long past as well as to those still reeking with the scent of battle. It is the object of the search that dictates the field for its pursuit.(8)

"The purpose of studying military history is not to predict the future, but rather to gain fresh insights into the present so that we might make cleaner judgements on programs and strategies designed for the future."(9) History does not offer ready-made solutions. Yet, properly used, it should help an officer to prepare mentally for future tasks. This becomes all the more important in an army that has not experienced serious war in over a decade.

The Army's formal education works best when it is companion to certain qualities that distinguish good military leaders: an awareness and sensitivity to the people around them; the ability to listen; the courage to make decisions; the intuition to know what your subordinate or colleague or boss is thinking; the deep study of military traditions, events, and values; an increasing ability to reflect upon and to articulate the nature and purposes of bearing arms. These traits are learned not so much in school as in the world of your command or staff assignment.

## CHAPTER IV

### END NOTES

1. Information and key ideas for the first part of this chapter were gained from a biweekly paper from the Research Institute titled Personal Report for the Executive , "Special Report, Cultivating Executive Stature". March 1984
2. Professional organizations like the National Guard Association (NGA) and the Reserve Officer Association (ROA) do an excellent job of promoting professional growth. Dues and expenses to participate in their activities are tax deductible and in some cases travel and lodging costs are covered for conventions and speaking engagements. The information and experience gained through these associations, their publications, meetings, and conventions, provide the professional development and background information needed to assist Reserve officers in effectively promoting national defense issues.
3. DOD Pam 1-20, The Armed Forces Officer , p. 132
4. Ibid ., p. 133
5. The comparison made by Professor Jay Luvaas uses their after action reports and letters with the detailed historical accounts of each battle fought during the civil war.
6. DOD pam 1-20 op.cit ., p. 134
7. A current contemporary military reading list is included in Appendix 2.
8. MacArthur, Douglas, provided by Dr. Jay Luvaas in an interview.
9. Interview with Dr. Jay Luvaas, Professor of Military History, US Army Military Institute, Carlisle, Barracks, PA May 1984

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Within a fast changing environment the production of better military judgement is the ultimate goal in the professional development of our senior reserve officers. The "science of war" is obscure and imperfect and in many cases not based on fixed principles. As history and technology change -- the Army changes its doctrines, means, methods, and procedures in an attempt to improve combat power. Obviously, the "art of war," carried on within an imperfect obscure "military science," is best learned in combat during the course of several campaigns.

Because this country has not been involved in a major war in the last ten years, and because of the critical importance of initial performance of our leaders during the first part of what we think will be a short war, we must concentrate our efforts to develop sound military judgement in peacetime.

#### 1. Conclusion

An advanced civilian degree especially in combination with civilian or military leadership experience provides excellent

professional development. It should improve an officer's sophistication and communication skills, both of which contribute to the better quality senior RC officer.

#### Recommendation

Consider incentives for members of the RC which encourage civilian education in conjunction with military education. Some state universities offer free or reduced tuition for their National Guard members. Consider a national program of tuition remission for all members of the RC.

## 2. Conclusion

Senior reserve officers report that their personal success is directly related to hard work, ambition, desire for achievement, and understanding human nature.

#### Recommendation

To retain quality young officers in the RC and to help them develop those reported success traits, more informal officer professional development needs to be done through tutor/mentor relationships throughout each chain of command. For professional development, allocate training sessions where mature senior officers lead discussions of case studies of successful officers or where groups of senior officers hold a forum for exchange of success stories, career strategies, and exchange of professional values. (see Appendix 3)

### 3. Conclusion

Student-faculty ratio in the RC officer's formal education development is higher than that of our allies.

#### Recommendation

The Army should reduce student-faculty ratios by increasing the dollar and manpower investment in the Army's education system and by a better student screening. Comprehensive testing for officers should be considered for screening at various levels of education not just for the completion of particular courses. This would also tend to reduce the diversity of professional knowledge in various levels of formal education.

### 4. Conclusion

Some USAR and resident course faculty and some RC command structures do not fulfill the tutor/mentor role to properly develop and retain the type of RC officer who is or will become the best qualified senior reserve officer.

#### Recommendation

RC command conferences and faculty development courses should have this stressed as an area of command emphasis by commandants and general officer command levels.

### 5. Conclusion

The department of the Army has no plan for a USAR School or

correspondence course for CAS3 Phase II, which greatly limits staff training to RC officers who can not attend the resident course. Within the next few months the Advance Courses will delete the course material which is now taught in CAS3 which will further restrict RC staff training at the senior company grade levels.

#### Recommendation

Develop a CAS3 Phase II course for USAR schools taught by USAR instructors who are trained and qualified by Ft. Leavenworth. This will make CAS3 Phase II education consistent with all other formal RC officer education.

#### 6. Conclusion

Foreign Armies better screen and qualify their students for CGSOC than the United States.

#### Recommendation

Be more selective for CGSOC student qualification; consider a screening test.

#### 7. Conclusion

Active resident course faculty selection and development are not given a high enough priority. Because of this the formal USAR and resident course instruction is not the highest quality demanded for our future leaders. Commanding troops and teaching officer education both have significant impact on our army of excellence and the quality of future army leadership.

### Recommendation

Consideration should be given to using the "Army's best" interchangeably in command and as instructors. The AC Command list could be expanded and designated the Command and Instructor list. In the USAR and Guard this selection process should be coordinated at the general officer command level to insure the army's best RC officers get both experiences.

### 8. Conclusion

The abilities of senior RC and AC officers to effectively deal with the media, congress, and the public is a weakness in the army structure.

### Recommendation

Consideration should be given to mandatory communication and media interface education at CAS3, CGSOC and senior service colleges. Refresher courses should be given to all senior leaders on a regular up date basis. These courses should be individualized and as a minimum should include a video tape standup hostile news reporter interview and a sit down studio interview. The Army's Public Affairs Offices has the talent and structure to make this a current reality.

### 9. Conclusion

The instructional technique of case studies and historical

role models, as used extensively in the Army's New FM22-100 , Military Leadership, is an improvement over the last edition. It is better received by all levels of leadership than the old step-by-step, dull field manuals without history or human charisma. Historical case studies should help an officer prepare mentally for future tasks.

#### Recommendation

For formal and informal officer development, read, study, and discuss military history as a case study -- not to predict the future, but to gain fresh insights into the present so we can make cleaner judgements for the future.

#### 10. Conclusion

Unit and individual subordinate effectiveness is keyed to the example and model set by the command. A positive honest personal approach to leadership inspires trust and a dynamic, effective two-way command structure.

#### Recommendation

Use the Army's Organizational Effectiveness (OE) structure or use their formula to improve leadership effectiveness, communications, and command relationships.

#### 11. The Conclusion

The well developed art of self expression will invariably give the edge to that officer over all of his peers. Power and

responsibility go to men who make their thoughts articulate and available to others.

#### Recommendation

In addition to completing the written requirements of the officer formal education system, accept the challenge of getting an article published and of presenting military subjects as a speaker to the public. Training for written personal development can be done through a local university or as an adjunct to course work at CGSOC or a senior service college.

General Charles deGualle's 1941 observations are appropriate today.

Whatever may be the effect on the value of leaders of more liberal training and wider autonomy, the essential thing will remain as always, the personal hidden efforts of those who aspire to command.... they build up in the secrecy of their inner life the structure of their feelings, of their ideas, or their will. That is why, in the tragic hours when the storm sweeps away conventions and customs, they alone stand up, and are therefore necessary. Nothing is of more importance to the state than to produce in its reserve of officers these exceptional men who will be its final resource.  
(1)

The educational autonomy given to the Army's higher level students will continue to combine its benefits with other higher education to produce the exceptional senior officers needed in our reserve component forces.

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## END NOTES

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Figure PROGRESSIVE COURSES AND DURATION OF TRAINING

YEARS OF SERVICE	ISRAEL	UKS	CANADA	UKS	UNITED KINGDOM	UKS	WEST GERMANY	UKS	USSR	UKS	USA	MKS
Preconsl- ationg (? mon minum)	Must pass exam and board	Basic Adv Ind B/A Unit Sqd Ldr Offr/Cadet	12 8 12 14 22	Officer Training Conducted during 4 summers while at a Mil College or a Civ University. Must pass exam/bnd	43	Must pass exam and board Cadet	28	Must pass exams and board Basic Ind 14 Adv Ind 14 Cadet 42	Much test/screening HS Universal Mil Sv Military Academy Conducted during a 4/5 yr crs at 1 of 60 Army Academies	4 120	Conducted 6 wks at 16 summer camp & 350 hours on campus	MKS
	Company Cdr Mandatory prior to cmd. Incl Res	8	Basic Branch Qual	9	Career Crs Branch Crs (Varies with branch e.g., engineers spend total of 4 wks)	23 10	Unit Ldr 19 Branch Unit Ldr 16 Intensive Testing				Basic Crs 12	
3					Must complete Offi- Must pass written & cer Prof Dev Prog exam Staff School 80% attend	10	Jr Cdr & Staff Crs All Captains Attend	10	Tactics 1		Advanced Crs 26	
6	CISC reqd for all mid-level staff po- sitions & all odrs above company.Exam a prerequisite.75% attend CISC 46	Land Forces Staff College 85% attend Advanced Branch Course	20	Must pass written exams and be selected on basis of perform- ance of duty	100	Staff College 25% attend	100	Field Grade Quali-15 fication & staff Course (Intensive testing) 100% Cpts attend General Staff 128 Officers Course 8-10% attend	Exam a prerequisite requires 2000-3000 hrs self-study Conducted in one of 8 branch oriented academies Command & Staff Academy 5 to 10% attend	150	Combined Arms and 12 Services Staff Schi Command & General Staff College 50% attend	
12	New crs reqd prior to command Brigade Cdr Crs	4	Command & Staff College, 40% Land Forces Officers attend	45				Battalion Cdr Crs 9			Bn Cdr Preced Crs 4	
16								Cdr's Tac Update 5				
19	National Defense College, less than 5% attend 50		National Defense College, 5 to 10% attend	47	24 attend Military Studies	27	War College Royal College of 50	3 to 5% attend Exam prerequisite Voroshilov General Staff Academy	100	20% attend	War College 20% attend	36
22	Total Wks in Instit Training	185	174	253		263					152	
Min Wks in Instit Tng	76	82	71	124		64						

## APPENDIX 2

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

#### 1983 CONTEMPORARY MILITARY READING LIST


<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>YEAR</u>
*Abel, Elie, Editor	What's News: The Media in America Society	1981
*Alger, John I.	The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War	1982
*Baker, David	The Shape of Wars to Come	1982
*Berman, Larry	Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam	1982
*Binkin, Martin and Eitelbrug, Mark J., et al	Blacks and the Military	1982
*Bissell, Richard E.	South Africa and the United States: The Erosion of an Influence Relationship	1982
*Calleo, David P.	The Imperious Economy	1982
*Collins, John M.	US Defense Planning: A Critique	1982
*Cox, Arthur Macy	Russian Roulette: The Superpower Game	1982
*Daniel, Donald C. and Herbig, Katherine L., Editors	Strategic Military Deception	1982
*Dizard, Wilson P., Jr.	The Coming Information Age	1982
*Donovan, Robert J.	Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-1953	1982
*Edwards, John	Superweapon: The Making of the MX	1982
*Eisenhower, John S. G.	Allies: Pearle Harbor to D-Day	1982
*Farrell, William Regis	The US Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy	1982
*Feinberg, Richard E., Editor	Central America: International Dimensions	1982
*Gilder, George	Wealth and Poverty	1981
*Gray, Colin S.	Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience	1982

# APPENDIX 2 (cont)

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>YEAR</u>
*Hackett, General Sir John	The Third World War: The Untold Story	1982
*Hamilton, Nigel	Monty: The Making of a General, 1887-1942	1981
*Hardesty, Von	Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941-1945	1982
*Holley, I. B.	General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy	1982
*Holm, Jeanne (Major General)	Women in the Military: An Un finished Revolution	1982
Hough, Jerry F. and Fainsnod, Merle	How the Soviet Union is Governed	1979
*Huntington, Smauel P., Editor	The Strategic Imperative	1982
Jencks, Harlan W.	From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981	1982
Jones, Christopher D.	Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Anatomy and the Warsaw Pact	1981
*Kahn, Herman	The Coming Boom	1982
*Keegan, John	Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, June 6th-August 25th 1944	1982
*Kellett, Anthony	Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Men in Combat	1982
*Kennan, George F.	The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age	1982
*Kissinger, Henry	Years of Upheaval	1982
*McNeill, William H.	The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces, and Society since A.D. 1000	1982
*McWhiney, Grady and Jamieson, Perry D.	Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage	1982
*Millar, P. B.	The East-West Strategic Balance	1981
*Podhoretz, Norman	Why We Were in Vietnam	1982

# APPENDIX 2 (cont)

<u>AUTHOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>YEAR</u>
Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F.	The Armed Forces of the USSR	1981
*Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, Editor	US Strategic Interests in Southwest Asia	1982
*Tow, William T. and Fenney, William R., Editors	US Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach	1982
Waltzer, Michael	Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations	1977
*White, Theodore H.	America in Search of Itself: The Making of the President, 1956-1980	1982
*Wilkins, Roy with Mathews, Tom	Standing Fast: The Autobiography of Roy Wilkins	1982
*Wilmot, H. P.	Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942	1982
*Wright, John	Libya: A Modern History	1982
*US Army, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas	Leavenworth Papers	Issued Irregularly 1979
*Books new to the list.		



*Ability is important, but the ability  
to discover ability in others and then  
help them develop it is the true test of  
leadership.*

*L. Rader*

APPENDIX 3

**END**

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