


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
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




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URBAN INSURGENCY: A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

BY

BRIGADIER DEVPAL SINGH RAGHUVANSHI



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flexible and highly professional force. It is imperative that such a force be well-organized, equipped, and trained for such conflicts especially in developing countries where urban insurgency is increasingly likely.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

URBAN INSURGENCY:
A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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March 26, 1984

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URBAN INSURGENCY: A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Two weapons today threaten freedom in our world. One - the nuclear bomb - requires vast resources of technology, effort and money. It is an ultimate weapon of the civilized and scientific man of this age. The other - a nail and a piece of wood buried in a rice paddy field - is deceptively simple, the weapon of the unsophisticated.

2. For those who cherish, love freedom, self respect and prestige, as that is any human beings birth right, but do not possess sophisticated weapons or the scientific know-how, have to find ways and means to safeguard their cherished ideals. This awakening in mankind and particularly in the down trodden will one day lead to an unconventional conflict. The implication of this conflict by violence which can be described as guerrilla warfare or insurgency or rebellion, is not clearly understood at present. Usually the rebellious citizens have neither the talent nor the means to organize any army that can meet the Government Forces in a conventional battle and thus support a direct bid for power. They can only nibble away at the strength of the Government by subversion and irregular attacks.

3. In simple terms, there is no difference between guerrilla warfare, rebellion, uprising, revolt or insurgency. All these actions can be described as a rising against authority, whether it be national or foreign. According to the WEBSTER Dictionary, all these words are interchangeable. All these activities do not create a revolution, unless and until they are successful, but a revolutionist, seeking to make a revolution, is equally clearly a rebel or an insurgent. Subversion is also an effort to overthrow authority, but its usage has given the word a less violent connotation than the others.

4. Guerrilla warfare has revolutionized the concept of war - the traditional warfare - as we used to know it. It was a clearcut affair; the troops fought at the front; behind the front line, there was near peace. According to Article 43 of the Hague Convention on land Warfare, the General in command of an army in occupied country is responsible for restoring and ensuring, as far as possible, public order and safety. He is vested with executive power. He exercises sovereignty, promulgates law, keeps the administration going, installs judicial authority, and protects the civilian population. Restoring and ensuring public order and safety was a simple enough task in the time of old fashioned warfare. After all, the commanding general was the master of the occupied territory, and once the territory was occupied, he could restore and maintain law and order by simply exercising his restraining authority over his own troops. The indigenous population were generally peaceful civilians.

5. The lesson learnt by the French in INDO-CHINA, Americans in VIETNAM, Portuguese in ANGOLA/MOZOMBIQUE and by PAKISTAN in BENGLADESH can be neglected only at our own peril. There is no doubt that in any future war, the opposing countries will organize insurgent movements, as this is less devastating, cheap and psychologically more strong. The two super powers have made a note of this but the countries of the third world, particularly those who are slightly more developed than the others, must wake up to this threat in their own rear.

6. It is no good relying on the recent experience in guerrilla Warfare/insurgency in MALAYA, KENYA and in the erstwhile colonies of PORTUGAL. Insurgents there fought on their own and they had no national army behind them. Yet in any future war enemy insurgents will act as auxiliaries to their regular army, as they did in VIETNAM campaign with specific tactics and techniques, peculiar to a supporting force on the "other side of the hill." However one must guard against blind confidence in subversion and in the guerrilla insurgent. What is really required is a more balanced and more informed view of this subject.

7. A lot has been said about guerrilla warfare/insurgency in the country side in the large number of books and magazines that are available in the market and in professional institutions, but very few of them contain more than a chapter on urban insurgency and that too not under the circumstances that are obtained in a democratic country. This paper, therefore,, deals with this particular aspect, so as to bring out clearly the problems of both the insurgents and the Government and thus the means to cope with the situation, which one is likely to face in the near future.

8. For a time, the success of the peasant guerrilla overshadowed all other revolutions. However, due to recent failure of rural guerrillas insurgents in some parts of Latin America, it has placed urban insurgency back to its former position. In fact, this type of strife has become rather fashionable. The urban terrorist has become a problem nearly everywhere, and, with increasing frequency, he is becoming a problem beyond the capacity of the civil police. In many countries, the army has been called in to assist the police. It seems that, in future, counter measures against urban insurgents are likely to play an important part in the conventional soldiers training and role.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

9. Spanish resistance to Napoleonic invasion put the word "guerrilla" into the dictionary, but civilians taking up arms and fighting as irregulars are as old as war itself. CAESAR, for one, encountered them in GAUL and GERMANY, and in succeeding centuries, their formations and tactics frequently played a part in European conflicts. Their potential increased with the expansion of war in the last years of the eighteenth century. Spain's struggle against the French not only gave the irregular fighter a new name but also provided an early case study of one type of modern guerrilla warfare. An understanding of why and how the Spaniards fought between 1808 and 1913 is essential since this struggle embodied basic characteristics that apply to later times and places also.

10. Above all, the Spaniards were willing to fight. Many other European people who in large part regarded their own governments with apathy or hostility, and who welcomed the message of the French Revolution brought to them by the Napoleonic armies, lacked sufficient motives for resistance. But in SPAIN, conditions were right for violence from the beginning. Spanish peasants, influenced by their priests and nobles, had always hated foreigners, felt some attachment to the monarchy, which NAPOLEON had overthrown, and now feared the destruction of the Spanish Church. These feelings, not the externally imposed discipline of a regular army, held the Spanish guerrillas together and made them willing to risk death.

The Defensive Pattern

11. The guerrillas fought to protect their lands and their way of life, their objectives was defensive. But they could hardly hope to expel or annihilate what was then the best army in EUROPE. Whenever the French were willing to allot sufficient forces and take the necessary casualties, they could sweep a limited area clean of opposition and effectively control it. The Spanish objective was thus not only defensive, it was also by necessity, psychological. The strategic task of the guerrillas was not to destroy the French but to undermine their will to stay in the country.

12. While both the impetus and objective of Spanish guerrilla action lay in the realms of ideology and morale, a third determining factor was geographical. The guerrillas based themselves in mountainous, inaccessible terrain that only they knew well. The road net, poor even by the standards of a century and half ago, channeled French movements narrowly, provided critical targets for attacks, and rendered surprise or encirclement of the guerrillas almost out of question. A well functioning intelligence system might have made up for the French army's geographic handicap, but the patriotic basis of the conflict blocked its access to local sources of information.

13. Clearly, the Spanish capacity for guerrilla war was very high. Of almost equal significance in the conflict were certain French weaknesses. The very qualities that had made the French successful against other regular armies, rendered them vulnerable to irregular attack. The Revolution had produced military leaders who stressed audacity and speed of movement, usually at the cost of security. Mobility was further increased by the French system of requisitions and living off the country, which freed units from the fixed supply point system of the past. But in SPAIN, these innovations worked against them. Neglected flanks and rear, proved natural areas for irregular operations, as they still are today. Stragglers, foraging parties and detached units provided easy targets for guerrilla attack. Improvised supply made the French extremely dependent on the natives, and their requisitions upon the already poverty stricken country fanned the hatred that had initially aroused the peasants and villagers to fight. As modern irregulars can exploit the weaknesses of mechanized units, organized and equipped to develop the greatest possible forward thrust, so the Spanish exploited the tactical and logistical limitations of the French.

14. Finally, Spanish resistance was marked by a fact that has been too frequently overlooked; Spaniards used irregular tactics only after their regular forces had collapsed. Guerrilla strategy was not the preferred strategy: it was the only strategy that remained available. Moreover, it did not succeed until a British army entered SPAIN from PORTUGAL. In SPAIN, as throughout history, guerrilla warfare was the weapon of the militarily weak.

15. Not only must the irregular fighters themselves be able to bear the extraordinary physical and psychic burdens of animal-like existence, they must also be prepared to see great injury done to the society they strive to defend. Used against a strong and determined opponent, guerrilla warfare is sure to result in heavy damage to people and property, and to exert severe strain on the political and social structure. From the commander's point of view, moreover, there are grave risks involved in basing his plans on precarious civilian attitudes, especially when his strategy is one of attrition, which requires a considerable, perhaps intolerable, time to do its work. Finally, there can be little assurance that it will work; even victorious guerrilla leaders have rarely argued that guerrilla operations can succeed without the eventual aid of regular forces.

The Offensive Pattern

16. The employment of guerrillas against a foreign invader is well established in military history and theory, and certainly remains conceivable today and in the future. In the last two centuries, however, two further uses of the insurgent have clearly emerged: he may be a weapon of insurrection, and he may be the agent of foreign aggression.

17. In the past, people rising against an oppressive government often fought as guerrilla insurgents. This is natural enough, since terror, bushwhacking, and small raids are the only military means readily available to civilians. The modern prototypes of insurgent guerrilla operations, however, stem from the age of the French Revolution. Fifteen years before the Spanish peasants took up arms against Napoleon, the young French Republic had to content with a whole series of counter-revolutionary outbreaks that, by the use of irregular military tactics, combined with propaganda, and foreign support, attempted to reestablish the Bourbon monarchy. But only in our time has guerrilla action become systematized as a weapon of the disaffected for the seizure of power. The great Communist instances are the Russian Revolution and Mao's conquest of China. Among the successful non-Communist examples may be mentioned the Arab revolt, with T. E. Lawrence's guerrilla campaign against Turkish Communication; the Jewish operations against the British and Arabs between 1945 and the founding of Israel; and EOKA's fight to gain Cyprus' independence from the United Kingdom.

18. The third use of the guerrilla - that of fighting in his native country as an agent of a foreign power - is more difficult to pin down. This may seem surprising, since Communist agitation and subversion are well known facts of contemporary life. But until today, the Communists have never organized and dominated a foreign guerrilla movement from the outset. It most nearly happened in INDO-CHINA, where the rebel Vietminh

were trained in CHINA and equipped by the Chinese very early in the game. Yet, it would be a mistake to see the French defeat simply as the outcome of an externally manipulated attack. As an observer pointed out at the time, "The French had never encouraged, or even allowed, any moderate constitutional party comparable to the Indian Congress Party to exist; hence the Communist Party had absorbed nationalist aspirations without competition . . . HO CHI MINH had a stronger position in South-east Asia than any of the other Communist leaders because he gained strength in a period when he was the incarnation of nationalism and when there was no alternative to him." Here, too, though the guerrillas clearly helped advance the interests of a foreign power and received its active support, their basic strength was derived from identifying with their own compatriots. If a sufficient number of Indo-Chinese had not wanted a greater measure of independence from FRANCE, if they had not been disgusted with corrupt puppet regimes, externally manipulated agents would never have got beyond the stage of banditry.

19. No one group or "ism" holds a monopoly on the use of guerrillas insurgents as tools of insurrections or as agents of a foreign power to exploit peoples desires for independence and economic improvement. In fact, these are products of the modern age, when, in CLAUSEWITZ' words, war was taken out of the hands of small groups of professionals and "again became a matter for the people as a whole."

20. Since the eighteenth century, war has grown progressively more encompassing. The industrial revolution, first in the West and then in the whole world, and the simultaneous acceleration of nationalism and the development of the modern state have created new means and new motives for armed conflict. Once war breaks out, all aspects of national life are caught up in it, each effecting the other. In particular although until recently, government and general staff have found great difficulty in accepting this - there remains almost no area that may be termed purely military or exclusively political.

21. A full understanding of CLAUSEWITZ's famous dictum on the interaction of war and politics is the key to successful modern insurgent operations. The insurgent's motive for fighting is at least partly political - or, to put it differently, ideological. They are enrolled not only by administrative machinery, but also by some powerful idea - love of country, hatred of the foreigner, envy of the rich landowner. Social pressure, at times even terror, plays a role; but it requires an element of individual conviction to compel men to take part in this most punishing kind of combat. Undoubtedly, this conviction can be created; yet even sophisticated processes of indoctrination are ineffective unless they can exploit real problems, real hopes and fears.

THE CAUSES AND SYMPTOMS OF URBAN INSURGENCY

22. Urban insurgency and revolt is not guerrilla warfare in the classic sense of the word, but it is closely related to it. The world is likely to see more of this sort of activity in the years to come, for urban violence is a natural symptom of political instability in areas where increasing industrialization has led to overly swift growth in the size of cities.

23. Even in the most backward areas, there is an accelerating drift of population to the towns, and consequently there is an accompanying geographic concentration of political and economic power. A Government may be able to survive and win out over an insurgent movement which has established its authority over large sections of the countryside, but it is extremely hard to fight back against rebels who have gained control over cities, with the communications, transportation facilities, and commerce which center in them.

Causes and Symptoms

24. Previously, nationalism provided the prime fuel for insurgency. Now a days, socialism is often the motive power. Societies in the underdeveloped and developing countries are experiencing the shock of abrupt changes in the social, economic, political and ideological structures of societies. With so many successful insurgencies in the recent years, the temptation for any discontented group is always great.

25. The socioeconomic climate in the world is fast changing, setting new patterns of individual, social and national behaviors. Some of the prominent socioeconomic and behavioral changes that may lead to urban insurgency, and thus pose a threat to national security are summarized below:

(a) Disenchantment with existing system. Due to an inefficient government where all possibilities of peaceful reform are closed, or the government has been too long in power, and hence, has started stagnating. In such a situation, there may come a bright spark, who has his own ideas, but lacks the resources and/or the following. Therefore, he starts with the basic target of controlling men's mind but not the territory. Once he succeeds in this, the control of territory is exiomatic.

(b) Sectional Loyalties/Racial Estrangement. Due to sectional loyalties or deteriorating race relations the Basque extremists who kidnapped the WEST GERMAN Consul at SAN SEBASTIAN in 1970, the Flemings who took to the streets to protest about the dominance of the French language in BRUSSELS and the Quebec terrorists who claim to be combating Anglo-Saxon imperialism are examples of the sectional loyalties.

(c) Failure of Rural uprising. The failure of peasant uprising, as it happened in Latin AMERICA in the decade of 1960s.

(d) Rapid Industrialization.

(i) In the developing countries, the cities are growing at a faster pace than the industrialization, thereby creating vast and unpalatable slums. More than two thirds of the population of ARGENTINA, URAGUAY, VENEZUELA and CHILE now live in the towns. For MEXICO, BRAZIL and COLUMBIA the figure is 50 percent. In Southern ASIA, by comparison, some 14 per cent of the population of this region lives in towns. The figure for black Africa is slightly lower - about 13 per cent. Third world cities are growing at a rate of between 3 and 8 percent a year.

That means most of them are doubling in size every 10 or 15 years. The reason for this is internal migration rather than natural population growth, since there is evidence to suggest that the birth rate in most cities is below the national average.

(ii) Creation of an organized labor class, formation of powerful trade unions, political influence and manipulation of the organized labor class by political parties results in labor unrest, ghettos, go-slows, work to rule and frequent violence trends in "capital-shift" in the wake of violence and uncertainties.

(e) Land Hunger and Mechanization. There are many reasons why peasants are leaving the land. Over population or land hunger is probably the most important and it has been accentuated in some areas by mechanization and the application of modern techniques that have caused extra redundancies. Better roads and communications between city and countryside have facilitated population movement, and the fact that more people are going to school or listening to radios have influenced job expectations and helped to give the city a glamorous image in the minds of the young villagers.

(f) Natural Calamities. Political disturbances like that of BANGALADESH and natural disasters like the draught in some parts of India have sent hordes of starving villagers to the cities.

(g) Social tensions. Sometime back the statistics from the American Census Bureau showed that half of America's Negro population was now concentrated in 50 cities. 15 of these cities account for a third of the total. While black Americans have been moving into the city centers, middle class whites have escaped to the suburbs, taking new industry with them. But this is not a one way process. The study of the CLEVELAND riots in 1967 showed that Negroes with steady incomes were also moving out of the slums, leaving behind those at the very bottom of the social scale.

(h) Domination of key services by one class of people. The slums are often located close to the traditional centers of commerce, or command key services like railways, power stations, transportation services, make racial unrest a threat to the normal functioning of the economy.

(j) The Sense of relative deprivation. Population movement in AMERICA has sometimes added to the sense of relative deprivation. A negro left behind in the 'riot Zones' of CHICAGO or WASHINGTON while a more enterprising neighbor moves out to a new factory job in the suburbs will feel a more acute sense of frustration; and is more likely to join a rioting mob on a hot summer night. Men do not rebel because they are deprived, but because they are conscious that they are deprived. De Toqueville's celebrated argument that the French revolution came about because things were getting better. (People who had formerly accepted their lot became conscious of the possibility of changing it.)

(k) Economic crisis. The economic crisis that began in the late 1950s in URAGUAY crippled public services salaries and led to cutbacks in social spending, while the activity of an exceptionally efficient

guerrilla movement forced the Government to resort to repressive measures, thereby antagonizing the public, and making them support the guerrilla movement.

(l) Rapid Population Growth. Offsetting the achievements of planning, socioeconomic problems multiplying resulting in unrest and uncertainties, as in many developing third world countries.

(m) Rapid Growth of Literacy. Mass education, but lack of commensurate job opportunities, is creating a massive and unemployed educated class and a potentially revolutionary situation. This is more true of the developing countries.

(n) Effect of Western Customs: Large-scale imitation of the West in dress, customs and behavior and not the least in violence and crimes. Development of crises of conscience, unrest, in discipline and violence in public life and educational and cultural institutions.

(o) Students unrest. Shortage of job opportunities, effects of Western culture, subversion by communist ideology, exploitation by the political parties, giving rise to student in discipline, unrest and violence.

(p) Changing pattern of Society. Break up of the family system, changing values of social conduct and behavior and setting new patterns of individual and social behavior.

CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN INSURGENCY

26. Waging war in the more civilized and built up parts of a country presents peculiar problems and opportunities for both, the rebel leaders and the Government authorities, but the basic principles of operation change surprisingly little from those of the more wide open guerrilla struggles in the countryside. Each side seeks to gain the active support of the population, and the contest is still primarily political rather than military.

27. The urban rebel who can not count on military assistance has to work with great care and discretion if he is to escape the overwhelming attention of the police and the military. Like his country cousin the rural guerrilla, he (the urban guerrilla) has to compensate for his combat weakness by superior mobility, intelligence, and knowledge of the battle field. These terms have a slightly different meaning in the urban situation than in the jungle and forest, but in essence they are the same. Similarly, the Government must seek to trap the rebel, force him into battle on unfavorable terms and isolate him from the general population.

Mobility and Knowledge of Battlefield

28. The side streets, the alleys, the roof tops, and the sewers are the jungle trails of the urban guerrilla. These are his refugees, his bases and his concentration points. His mobility depends in part on his intimate knowledge of these places and in this regard he may be in a

stronger position than the rural guerrilla. In many ways, the mazes of the Algerian Casbah and the twisted alleys and shanty towns of great cities like Calcutta and Singapore are more difficult for the authorities to search completely than the thickest jungle or the most rugged hill country. Equally important to the urban rebel is his understanding of the workings of the Government he is trying to overthrow. The reactions and counter measures which certain acts are likely to evoke from the authorities. The patterns which investigations of raids will follow, the attitudes which different officials will take towards different situations. It is a knowledge of these matters that will provide the rebel leader with the freedom and the time - both fruits of mobility, to carry on his work.

Intelligence

29. The city rebel has many potential sources of intelligence for the enemy (the Government), is bound to be observed in almost everything that he does and he has few ways of knowing who among the entire population, may be watching and reporting on him. The authorities cannot isolate the rebel from the population or prevent his access to the sources of supply of information which serve the public as a whole. The urban rebel is not like MAO's famous description of the guerrilla, as fish swimming in the sea of the population. Rather he is handful of something very like sea water himself and cannot be swept up by the most efficient fish net.

Organization and Loyalty

30. But if the discreet city rebel is relatively immune from military counter measures, he is painfully vulnerable to detection and exposure by traitors and spies who manage to infiltrate his organization. The leader of urban insurgents must be even more careful and selective in recruiting his lieutenants and followers than is the guerrilla leader in the field. In the city he cannot exercise the same degree of control and discipline over them and this unavoidable looseness of organization and the fact that the authorities are always near at hand means that the danger of betrayal is always high. Therefore, the leader, in most instances, tries to build the loyalty of his group on top of existing loyalties or bond which already exist among them. The rebel who then wavers in his loyalty to the movement will hesitate to leave or betray it because of ties to relations, friends, or old associates who are also involved.

Terrorism and Sabotage

31. Urban insurgency is a particularly difficult sort of problem to deal with. It is characterized by continuous acts of terrorism, violence involving women and children, armed rioters, demonstrations, general civilians disobedience, frequent strikes, powerful and skillfully manipulated propaganda to discredit the authorities and an intimidated population who offer no assistance for fear of their lives.

Strategy of the Urban Insurgent

32. The urban insurgent does not hesitate to disrupt and destroy the present economic and social systems. His objective is to assist the rural insurgents. In close collaboration, these two forces develop an entirely new political and social structure in which an armed population is likely to hold all power.

33. The urban insurgent is assigned the task of harassing the police to invite repression in order to show that the Government has resorted to extermination of its opposition, thereby making the police appear to be responsible for all the blunders and violence. He further impedes all political overtures, elections or democratic measures the Government may take to retain order. In short, he attempts to create environments in which the Government attempts to act into disaster thereby providing circumstances for the revolutionaries to unleash the rural insurgents into the middle of an uncontrollable rebellion. This is achieved by ensuring that the rural infrastructure is established while the urban insurgent is creating chaos at places of Government authorities. The money and the arms secured by stealing and other means, frees the urban insurgent from the requirement of outside support. It must be remembered that urban and rural insurgency is complimentary. Urban insurgency on its own and without a proper aim and policy cannot last very long, although its effect is likely to be more magnified due to the presence of the intelligentsia in a compact town.

The Strategy of externally aided Insurgency

34. Today the circumstances are very different. A country which finds the normal diplomatic procedures too ponderous or ineffective, can seek to achieve any aggressive aims by instigating insurgency, instead of hazarding all on a declaration of war. It will need a considerable issue to provoke a nuclear conflict, but insurgency can always be labelled as a "struggle for freedom" and can be promoted, financed and encouraged with minimum of risks. Publicity can be used by the sponsors of the revolt to portray the insurgents as patriots and sufferers under the oppression of brutal and power imperialists and there is no lack of publicity today for such a cause. That is why it is so necessary to carry out adequate public relations coverage for our own cause in the early stages of a counter insurgency campaign; it is much easier to create a well informed public opinion from the start rather than to correct an unfavorable image which has already been projected to the world by the opposition.

35. Insurgency as a pattern of future war has come to stay. It is therefore, imperative that we study counter insurgency as seriously as we have in the past studied conventional warfare.

HOW THE INSURGENT FIGHTS AND HIS BASIC REQUIREMENTS

How the Insurgent Fights

36. The aim of any insurgency force is to achieve a political objective by military means. It is rare, though not unknown, for the insurgents to achieve a decisive military victory by defeating the security forces in battle. Military success is not however essential to them, for they can still gain their objective, if they can enforce a stalemate, in which the security forces finally decide that the cost of continuing an indecisive struggle is no longer worthwhile. Their purpose is to defeat the Government's will to fight on, and military action is only one factor in their struggle to achieve this.

The Basic Requirements for Successful Insurgency

37. In order to conduct a successful campaign, an insurgent force needs to be assured of the following basic requirements:

- (a) A cause to fight for.
- (b) Support from the local population.
- (c) Bases.
- (d) Mobility (achieved by mingling with the local population not being recognizable).
- (e) Supplies.

38. Conversely, of course if the security forces can deprive the insurgents of any of these essentials, it may prove to be a more effective method of defeating the revolt than hunting individual rebels. However it is not so easily done than said. It is therefore necessary to study some of the problems that the Government has to face in fighting urban insurgency.

PROBLEMS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN URBAN INSURGENCY

Identifying a Rebel

39. The pressing problem in fighting the city insurgent is to make him show himself or to find him among the crowds in the streets and rabbit warrens of a great town. In seeking to find and seize the rebel, the official is caught on the horns of an almost inescapable dilemma; and here again his difficulties are essentially political.

Isolating a Rebel Without Discredit

40. The rebel's objective is to discredit the government and to make it impossible for the authorities to govern. If officials wish to secure and hold popular support, they must prevent the rebels from gaining

these ends and must demonstrate their own interest and concern for the public welfare. Unfortunately for them, just about every step which officials can take to isolate and cope with insurgents in a city, interrupts and hinders the normal process of orderly life and trade the very thing which the Government is trying to protect.

Alienation of Public due to Protective Measures by Government

41. Curfew, travel limitations, check points for identity papers and spot searches of buildings and individuals may be necessary steps for the authorities if they are to hold down rebel activity and essential if the Government is to protect the population, from increasing coercion by the rebels. But these moves work against the Government in two serious ways.

42. First, they are public signals of the Government's concern at the activity and, by implication, at the strength of the rebel movement. A resistance movement becomes really serious at the moment when the people begin, as a whole, to take it seriously. They are much more likely to do so when they see evidence that the authorities themselves are concerned, and such evidence is hard to conceal in a crowded area.

43. Second, control measures almost invariably irritate and alienate the people they are designed to defend. Even the most enlightened and far sighted political programmes of reform and development is weakened or nullified if the people come to feel that they are being hedged about with unwarranted limits on their freedom of action. In this situation, the rebel propagandist have the best of it coming and going. They can either take the line that the restrictions are unnecessary, absurd, and merely another indication that the incompetent authorities should be replaced, or they can claim that the insurgent movement is far too strong to be slowed down by such petty hinderances, and that the restrictions are the last desperate twitchings of a regime that is nearly dead.

Dilemma of Government Officials On Control Measures

44. The Government officials are placed in a difficult position in this sort of conflict. They must take strong action to counter the evident disorders, but by it they weaken themselves by the very admission that such action is needed. Certainly, they make their situation far more awkward if their corrective measures are clumsily or brutally carried out. Few things are more useful to a struggling rebellion than a few bonafide martyrs, and, if the Government hopes to retain a broad base of popular support, it must see that its officers use the minimum force necessary and apply it adroitly. Mass reprisal and the arrest and detention of innocent bystanders will rapidly alienate supporters of the Government true offenders are far harder to spot in an urban than in a rural setting.

45. This is not to say that the threat or the problems it creates can safely be underestimated, but if the authorities can project to the population a impression of efficiency and confidence in meeting any urban crisis, be it an epidemic, a bad fire, or a rebellion, they will have moved a long way towards controlling the situation.

46. Knowledgeable and prompt action by the police and constabulary are just as important as operations by the military forces in coping with any insurrection or guerrilla rising. In coping with rebellion within the cities the role of the police becomes infinitely more important. Most Governments are aware of the Psychological dangers that attend using soldiers to serve as substitutes or reinforcements for police and other security forces. Not only do the rebels gain considerable prestige from the fact that the Government has to use its heaviest instrument of force against them, but armed soldiers represent an alien element in the average citizens daily life, particularly in cities, and they are resented as such. As already mentioned, well armed troops can be brutally effective in suppressing insurrection within the confines of a city, but even if the soldiers' behavior is exemplary and no lives are lost, the very fact that they are brought on the scene give an appearance of cruelty and harshness which is meat for rebel's propaganda.

47. In deciding whether or not to use troops to suppress urban rebellion and violence, the Government must also consider the effect that the move will have on the troops themselves. If authorities lose the loyalty and support of their own military forces during a period of revolt, they are in really serious trouble. Troops will rarely have qualms about fighting and killing armed guerrillas when they are often suffering a disproportionate number of casualties themselves. It is quite another thing to ask troops to use lethal force on youths of their own nationality who are throwing stones.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

48. No insurgent movement with a high desertion rate can hope either to operate effectively or to survive long. For practical purposes, its back is broke but paradoxically the question of how to handle a waning urban insurgency is a difficult one for the Government, both from the political and military points of view. Militarily, the law of diminishing returns begins to operate against the authorities, for the last hard core guerrillas are always the most difficult to kill or capture. The number of troops required and the number of casualties likely to be suffered in the process seem out of proportion to the gains of rounding up relatively small number of men who are reduced to little more than armed and desperate fugitives. If a weary nation, already reviewed of its worst pressures, sees a continuing and costly operation with little visible return, it may well begin to have new doubts about the wisdom and efficiency of its Government.

49. On the other hand, the surrendered insurgent is a tricky problem in himself. In arousing the people to fight off the rebellious attack, the government has repeatedly emphasized that insurgents are evil and dangerous criminals working in a treasonous cause. After months and years of following this line, it is awkward to shift and try to reintroduce the individual member of the criminal movement into law abiding society without punishing him for his deeds.

THE ESSENTIALS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

Aim

50. The end in an insurgent type of warfare must always be a political one, it is not for the soldier to decide it - that is a matter for the statesman. But the soldier expects to be given and is entitled to demand, a clear cut directive in any counter insurgency campaign. This directive should include both the political and military aims and these should have been agreed by all concerned from the very start. As the military aim is dependent on political consideration it is essential that the political directive should clearly state three points:

- (a) The purpose and scope of military operations.
- (b) The short term political and military aims governing the campaign.
- (c) The long term political aim which it hopes to achieve when the military campaign is over.

51. The military aim is normally to defeat or neutralize the insurgents as soon as possible, so that lawful Government can be restored and a political settlement can be reached, based on the good will and the free wishes of the population. Speed is an essential part of this aim, so that the conflict can be limited or quelled before it can develop into a threat to peace.

The Essentials for Counter Insurgency Forces

52. All counter insurgency forces have certain essential requirements, in the same way that the insurgents do and they are:

- (a) Civil and military understanding.
- (b) A joint command and control structure.
- (c) Good intelligence.
- (d) Mobility.
- (e) Training.

53. These requirements are different from those in conventional warfare in several ways and it is not sufficient merely to adapt conventional warfare methods to meet the special conditions of counter insurgency campaigning.

Civil and Military Understanding

54. It is to be hoped that the days of mutual mistrust and misunderstanding between soldiers and civilians are now past and that both now appreciate the need to work together as one team.

55. There is no purely military battle field in counter insurgency warfare and the campaign can only be won by combined civil military efforts. Many military measures can not be effective without the support of the civil administration and conversely, a wise Government can often ease the task of the security forces or even finish it for them. In the HUK insurgency in the Philippine, the revolt was stifled by the imaginative policy of the Defense Minister, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, in offering such generous surrender terms that the majority of the insurgent lost the will to fight on.

56. There are equally points on which civil and military are liable to disagree, due to differing view points that they each tend to have of the situation. The military commander is primarily concerned to defeat the enemy as soon as possible and at the same time to protect the lives and maintain the morale of his troops. As a result, he will at times feel that his freedom of action is being unduly restricted by political consideration.

57. The civil authorities, for their part, have their eyes primarily on their long term settlement, based on the goodwill of the people and they are liable to feel sometimes that they are being pressured unreasonably by military demands into action which is prejudicial to this aim. It is a matter always of priorities and these priorities will continue to change as the situation changes.

58. A really sound civil-military liaison and understanding is essential under these circumstances and there are three main ways in which it can be achieved. These are:

(a) Clear cut directive from the government.

(b) A unified command (it is not always possible to find a man to fit the post).

(c) A close liaison and understanding between the three agencies during peace and cold war.

Intelligence

59. Good intelligence is undoubtedly one of the greatest battlefield winning factors in counter insurgency warfare and the acquisition of it depends on the following six principles:

(a) Money and effort spent on the gaining of intelligence and the preparation of an effective organization before the insurgency begins, will pay handsome dividends in the long run.

(b) Every effort must be made to "know the enemy" as thoroughly as possible before the insurgency starts.

(c) The best results are achieved from a full integrated intelligence organization, under one chief of intelligence.

(d) Intelligence must be worked for and not waited for and the acquisition of it must be made a top priority task for the security forces, particularly in the early stages of a campaign.

(e) The cooperation of the population is not essential to the gaining of intelligence, but it is a tremendous asset and every effort must be made to win its support.

(f) The best intelligence comes from penetrating the insurgent organization.

50. The actual joint command and control structure has not been discussed fully, since it will depend on the situation and the level at which it is decided to establish, but this does not in any way decrease the importance of its requirement which has already been emphasized earlier. The other two essentials of mobility and training, which though equally important, are self explanatory. However, there is a requirement to lay more stress on the training of propaganda and psychological warfare, which can bring greater dividends comparatively in a much shorter period.

The Will to Win

51. In an insurgent campaign, each side is constantly trying to undermine and to destroy its opponents will to fight on, for success in that direction means victory and it can be one of the easiest and cheapest methods of winning the fight. Propaganda and psychological warfare properly applied can also be used effectively to undermine the insurgent's belief in their cause, by sowing seeds of doubts and suspicion in their minds and by countering some of the indoctrination from which all insurgents suffer. It is important in all propaganda that the enemy should always be able to confirm for himself the accuracy of at least some of the information that is fed to him, so that he can be convinced of its truth. For example, reference can be made to insurgents who have been killed or who have surrendered and to actions of which it is likely that insurgents in question will have personal knowledge.

62. This weapon can also be used to persuade insurgents to surrender, chiefly by portraying the danger and the hopelessness of their position as opposed to the safety and comparative comfort that awaits them if they give themselves up. Alongside the appeals there must also be convincing incentives, for the insurgent will not to be reasonably sure of the fate that awaits him before he makes his decision to desert. The lenient treatment of prisoners usually encourages defection, for news of this will reach the surviving insurgents somehow. One way of making sure that they know, is to arrange for surrendered insurgents to sponsor leaflets or broadcast their voice by helicopters or aircraft.

PROBLEMS/LIMITATIONS OF SECURITY FORCES IN COUNTER INSURGENCY

63. Having understood the fundamental principles, it makes it easier to understand the problems of the security forces in fighting urban insurgency. In this section only the essential ones have been discussed and only some of them highlighted about which a passing reference has been made.

(a) The Problem of Identification - In a jungle or in a mountain retreat, a terrorist is hard enough to distinguish from a villager. In town the problem is almost inseparable. A grenade thrown by a terrorist at a passing security force patrol could be robbed by any bystander in the area of incident. They all might be terrorists active or passive supporters, or quite innocent people. The only real way to identify a terrorist is to catch him literally in an act of terrorism.

(b) The Problem of Retaliation - Again in jungle or in the mountains, most modern weapons can be brought to bear against known terrorists in the near certain knowledge that no innocent inhabitants will get hurt. This is far from being true in towns where only direct firing weapons of limited range and calibre can be used.

(c) The Problem of Cover - An urban terrorist has only to step into a shop or a house, or best of all mix with a crowd to achieve perfect cover, not only from identification but also from view. This type of cover is infinitely harder for the security forces to break than that afforded to the terrorist by jungle or mountains.

(d) Vulnerability of Property and Population - Property and population in urban areas are more vulnerable to the various means of conventional warfare than in the case of rural areas. Weapons like the artillery and air power in which the government is always superior are inappropriate to make use of. This restricts the choice of weapons and the freedom of maneuver by the security forces.

(e) Over Reaction - The danger of over reaction by the security forces is constantly present. Destruction of a city or a few buildings to get rid of a few terrorists would result in playing into the hands of insurgents, because the resultant loss of life and property will alienate the friendly population. The public must be informed of the measures contemplated to fight insurgents to avoid such losses.

(f) Political Decisions - Political decisions like arrests of people on suspicion and their internment without trial have important influence on the security measures and at times these measures may make the security forces unpopular amongst the population. Unfriendly public can jeopardize the aspect of security that is necessary for the efficient running of counter insurgency activities.

THE OVERALL POLICY FOR THE CONDUCT OF
OPERATIONS BY THE ARMY

64. Having discussed the problems, it is now opportune to consider as to what should be the attitude of the security forces in regard to these operations, their priority of tasks and finally the employment of police.

Attitude

65. (a) It is important here to note that the army would generally be called in aid to civil power, when the civil police is ineffective and is likely to be demoralized, the para military forces will not be able to control the law and order situation. At this stage the terrorists are likely to be well entrenched and induction of the army will be a challenge to their position. They are likely to react violently. Like in internal security duties, all action must be effective but principle of minimum force may not be strictly capable of application. In majority of the cases to begin with, psychological advantage of civil belief in Army's effectiveness, will be on its SIDE. This big advantage should not be lost. To be effective, the security forces will have to meet these acts of terrorism with force and appear tough in public eyes. As long as force is justified and made to seem so, it will have the desired effect. This tough attitude will draw the inevitable adverse publicity which must be countered at the earliest and with firmness.

(d) There is no doubt that soldiers fighting against urban terrorism have a frustrating task and that great demands will be made on their patience and discipline. However at no stage should an attitude of animosity against all the local population be permitted to gain hold in the minds of the security forces otherwise the results of counter insurgency effort will all be negatived. BANGLADESH is a by-product of this anomosity.

(e) Pursual of a softer policy will undoubtedly be construed by the terrorists as a sign of weakness and exploited.

Priority of Tasks

66. A policy decision is necessary as to whether the security forces are to first go all out to destroy the terrorists or to defend the local population from terrorism. In other words should the control of the areas which are terrorist strongholds be the first priority, or the areas relatively free of their influence. A purely defensive policy will commit many troops without imposing much deterrence on the terrorists. On the other hand lack of intelligence along may necessitate a defensive posture.

Employment of Police

67. (a) The civil police having become ineffective because of the penetration/conversion of some undesirable elements within the force and demoralization, its independent employment in terrorist dominated areas is therefore not advisable in the initial stages, whereas they could

perform reasonably well in other areas. This has an indirect effect on restoring of their self confidence. However, some loyal members of civil police could be fully co-opted with the army for operations in terrorists dominated areas as their local knowledge will be of immense value. As the operations proceed, civil police is likely to pick up by and by, and later on could be used more extensively.

(b) Civil police should be used for registration of the population and issue of identity cards if necessary. Due to their intimate knowledge of the population, they are best suited for this job. They should also supervise rationing.

(c) Para military forces can be employed on worthwhile tasks as they are not affected seriously. Some of the tasks they should be employed on are:

(i) Cordon. To prevent further infiltration of terrorists, arms and other critical items. It will help in isolating the terrorists, in satellite towns from those in the main city.

(ii) Establishing control in areas relatively less affected by terrorist actions.

(iii) Protection of vulnerable points to include food godowns.

(d) The police, unlike in internal security duties, has performed in the initial stages to act in support of the army. In the event of sudden and serious trouble, the army may utilize police by detailing them with those arrested, in providing escorts, search parties and as interrogators.

RESOURCES AND POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED IN THE MAIN CITY

68. In order to provide protection to the population and deny terrorists the resources necessary for their existence and operations, certain control measures need to be enforced by the security forces. Some of these are:

(a) Sealing off the City. To prevent further infiltration of terrorists, arms and ammunition into the city, it must be sealed off. This will not be so easy. There are numerous paths leading into the city and to establish road blocks on each of these is out of question. However, road blocks must be established on the important and likely routes of infiltration. The others must be patrolled and ambushed thus dominating them.

(b) Searches should be carried out not only of civilian vehicles but also those of the Government departments. In order to evade search, these vehicles may be used in collaboration with the Government employees in sympathy with the terrorists.

Ban on Arms

59. All arms licenses, except those considered essential for counter insurgency effort, should be cancelled and the owners ordered to turn them into the police. Arms possessed even by loyal individuals are a source of danger because they are liable to be snatched by the terrorists by force. However, arms should be permitted to be retained by members of loyal communities living in separate areas and capable of defending themselves. In fact, such involvement of the population in their own protection is desirable. In the Philippines, the ban on arms was one of the effective counter insurgency measures.

Prevention of Crowd Forming

70. Measures should be undertaken to prevent forming of crowds. Once formed, it is a potentially dangerous security problem. With the presence of unobtrusive terrorists among the crowd, it can be misguided and can turn into a violent mob. Action against it is bound to be misconstrued as repression and provide an ideal theme for terrorist propaganda. Action against a few selected individuals is more palatable than against a large number of people. In order to prevent crowds from forming, the following action should be taken:

(a) Declaring an assembly of more than 5 people as unlawful. This may already have been done.

(b) Picqueting of places where crowds generally gather or bottlenecks through which a crowd must pass.

(c) Immediate action by security forces to disperse a small assembly before it turns into a crowd.

Curfew

71. The imposition of curfew is one of the best methods of keeping the streets clear, preventing crowds from forming, denying terrorists the cover of traffic so indispensable to them and keeping the innocent out of harm's way.

Detainees

72. If the security forces do an effective job in the main city, there will inevitably be a large number of detainees. Steps must therefore be taken to see that:

(a) Jail facilities are adequate.

(b) The legal processes of prosecution are swift.

(c) Justice is seen to be done.

73. A detention center is a ready source of intelligence if properly handled. If not properly run, it may be a propaganda source for the terrorists.

Quick Reaction

74. Governing all these various measures must be the cardinal principle of quick reaction. If a grenade is thrown, a person assassinated, a mortar fired, then the security forces must be in the area at once. Ten minutes later may be too late. Therefore, it will be necessary to have patrols out in the city by day and night, to have check points at key places and to have first class communications. For quick and secure movements, the streets must be dominated from high buildings.

Raids and Searches

75. These should be carried out mostly at night to achieve surprise and quick reaction.

REMEDIAL MEASURES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

76. Defeating urban insurgency in large cities having concentrated population is a delicate and complex task. It is not a military or political problem alone. It is a law and order problem created by the economic and political exploitation of the masses especially the working class and the students and is fully supported by a political ideology. It requires a coordinated operation by the civil administration, police and the Army to prevent disruption of city life, destruction of the property and finally to uproot insurgent/guerrilla activity. These operations must be fully backed by economic and political measures to counter the subversive organization, ideology and propaganda. In order to achieve the aim of countering urban insurgent actions therefore, the precautionary measures suggested in the succeeding paragraphs must be taken in the potential areas of insurgency.

Political and Economic Measures

77. (a) Promulgation of Essential Services Act. No sooner the indications of an insurgency are evidenced, the government should promulgate the Essential Services Act or even an emergency may be declared in the affected part of the country immediately.

(b) Propaganda. Rigorous counter ideological propaganda by the press and radio to subvert insurgent designs must be carried out. For this a political organization of constructive forces may have to be evolved. Eminent local dignitaries and professional men having public influence must be included in these organizations. They should also be protected in person and their property from violence.

(c) Socio-Economic Uplift. Measures for socio-economic uplift of the workers and slum dwellers must be adopted at the State and National level. Want and poverty are the two breeding grounds of insurgency.

(d) Prompt Removal of Grievances. The Government and the administrative machinery should be quick in the identification and recognition of the grievances leading to an insurgency. Prompt and positive measures to remove/reduce these grievances must be taken and executed vigorously.

Administrative Measures

78. Administrative measures should include the following to cater for insurgencies whether they be at the city, state or national level:

(a) Maintenance of Essential Services. Plans should be formulated and resources catered for the functioning of the city economy and the maintenance of essential services during an urban guerrilla war.

(b) Refugee Centres. The administration must be prepared to overcome refugee problems during an insurgency. There will be many strays, specially the old women and children, during the conditions of unrest who will need care and protection temporarily. As such, contingency plan for organizing and setting up refugees centers including arrangements for medical aid must be evolved at the outset of such disturbances.

(c) Rescue and Aid Facilities. Rescue and aid facilities like fire control organization, mobile aid posts and canteen should be catered for and located in various sectors of the cities.

(d) Psychological Warfare. Security forces employed in a counter insurgency situation normally operate in an environment inherently sensitive, both politically and militarily. Most important, the scope and nature of missions assigned will frequently include political, administrative and socio-economic aspects and objectives not usually considered normal to military operations. It is in this environments that the psychological warfare must play its role; a role which seeks not only to reduce the effects of insurgent activities, but also the furtherance of environment improvement and building-up high morale of the security forces and the local population. To achieve the immediate goals, following action should be taken:

(i) Divide, disorganize and induce defection and dissatisfaction among the insurgent elements.

(ii) Neutralize the civilian support of the insurgents.

(iii) Dissuade civilians from participating in covert activities on the side of the insurgent.

(iv) Gain the confidence of the mental or so-called committed elements of the population.

(v) Gain, preserve and strengthen friendly civilian support.

(vi) Win popular approval for the presence of security forces in the area.

(vii) Establish an effective intelligence network at unit and sub-unit level.

Recommendations to Prevent and Combat Insurgency

79. Prevention is always cheaper and better than to cure a disease or to combat an insurgency. Timely awareness of the nature and magnitude of the problem would go a long way in preventing the insurgency to take place. A suggested strategy is as follows:

(a) Establishment of a stable, strong and efficient government where the country takes priority over the political party in power.

(b) Determination of the leadership to prevent and finally to combat it.

(c) Creation of an efficient administrative machinery with roots in the masses.

(d) The Government should rectify the danger signs as soon as they appear even though it may require some harsh decisions instead of letting the circumstances take the decision for the Government.

(e) Timely creation of a machinery to prevent it by:

(i) An efficient intelligence organization and an information service, suitably coordinated and directed in the likely areas, without any political interference.

(ii) Correct assessment and prompt reporting to concerned authorities.

(iii) Detection and infiltration into insurgent organizations.

(f) To avoid communal clashes, remove the sources of friction well in time, ensure good police intelligence, prompt and decisive preventive measures. Educate and socially better the lot of the people in such areas to avoid reoccurrence.

(g) An administration dedicated to implementing social measures for the betterment of down trodden, alert and impartial police force and the will to deal firmly with the guilty could confine the threat to manageable proportions.

(h) Adult literacy and education campaigns should be given high priority, particularly in the case of an uneducated, ill-disciplined, labor force, which has been pampered by an initially ill informed Government and encouraged by rival trade unions. A realistic wage structure, related to productivity and for eliminating disparities is essential. All these would enable the workers to distinguish between political promise and performance, understand the link between productivity and earnings and appreciate the need for industrial peace for social betterment.

(j) The student population is restive, militant and quite often destructively violent when aroused. The cry "jobs not degrees" gains volume and momentum with fair justification, and unfair exploitation by unprincipled politicians. A national survey should determine requirements of trained youth in the various fields and disciplines coupled with the revamping of the education system, this should put an end to further trouble by the youths.

(k) The solution of tackling the urban unrest lies in the development of rural areas including location of suitable industrial units and improved education. Development of facilities for commuting from rural areas to cities and back is also required. Meanwhile, for the immediate future, city administrations should anticipate this trend and make contingency plans to tackle the problem rather than letting it drift.

(l) To set up a joint Army, Police and Civil administrative staff school in order to develop a joint approach to this problem and find new ways and means to conduct an efficient counter insurgency warfare.

CONCLUSION

80. The aggressors in these conflicts mount a complex campaign involving subversion, guerrilla forces and, psychological and economic offensives. The Governments defensive or counter insurgency campaign is even more complicated, involving greater expenses, larger forces, and numerous new political problems, all of which, lead to a drain on the country's economy and in antagonizing the public which needs to be avoided, particularly so in a developing country. We have also seen the political problems of the Government. What we really need to consider, is how best we can keep ourselves prepared for such a threat.

81. Rebel leaders worldwide have studied this form of warfare to see how it can be used to achieve their ambitions, whatever they may be. In a developing country the climate for insurgency is always more congenial than in a developed one. This calls for flexible and a highly professional force which should be prepared to meet any contingency whether it be external or internal or conventional or unconventional. It is, therefore, imperative that greater emphasis is required with regard to organizations, equipment and training of the present day Army. Since this is a subject which is constantly changing its form, it calls for continuous and intensive study, if we are to be one move ahead of the opposition instead of dancing to their tune.

82. Campaigns to defeat insurgencies require a considerable effort by the Government and the armed forces if they are to be successful; and campaign is usually lengthy and costly, particularly where an insurgency develops, since it is a characteristic of this type of warfare that a handful of skilled insurgents can tie down a totally disproportionate number of security forces for a long time.

83. There is no easy or quick answer as to how to defeat insurgency, but much can be learned from a study of the many campaigns that have occurred in the past, they provide useful experience and lessons, which can be applied to the present and the future. We must not only profit from the past but must try to anticipate possible future foes and their methods.

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