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
AFRICA: A STRATEGIC FACTOR IN THE STRATEGIC EQUATION OF
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
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AFRICA; A STRATEGIC FACTOR IN THE STRATEGIC
EQUATION OF THE WORLD

BY

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2 MAY 1984

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

AFRICA: A FACTOR IN THE STRATEGIC EQUATION OF THE WORLD

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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The title of this study should in fact be a question: Is Africa a factor of any worth in the strategic equation of the world? The relevance and the importance of the question have increased since my recent close association with United States' government policy and public attitudes and perceptions regarding Africa. During the 1960's and the early 1970's, the United States virtually blanked out most of Africa in its foreign policy and generally regarded the continent as an area of European influence. Except for uncoordinated and generally unpopular decisions regarding apartheid in South Africa and direct participation in two invasions in the Zaire Republic, Africa was and remains low in United States' policy considerations. At the same time, while professing solidarity with the African in his fight for freedom, the USSR is suspected of regarding Africa and Africans as no more than suitable vehicles for the achievement of its goal for supremacy over the West and, in particular, over the United States. Because the United States and the USSR are the two superpowers of the world today, they ultimately determine who and what is important. Their apparent shortsightedness regarding the high potential of Africa's human and material resources and their underestimation of the determination of the African to be free and to take his place in the scheme of things is alarming. Despite over 30 years of expressed and demonstrated yearnings of the African for freedom and the enormous progress achieved within this period, the strength and the message of the winds of change is not yet fully appreciated. The United States, rather than the USSR, is the nation best suited to influence the course of lasting history in Africa. The United States should lead the way to free Africa, extend worthwhile, longlasting assistance programs, encourage the evolution of democratic processes and cultivate mutually beneficial relationships. Such sustained efforts will go a long way to safeguard United States' interests in the region.

PREFACE

This Individual Study Project was produced as part of the academic requirement of the resident course of the US Army War College. The scope and general methodology were outlined by the College. The Study is designed to provide the reader, in one handy publication, important information and commentary on Africa with the aim of highlighting Africa's potentials in all fields and relating such potentials to the international scheme of things. Research was unconstrained and the views expressed are those of the author. Such views are of necessity influenced by the author's background and nationality. The excellent book collection of the USAWC Library and the willing assistance of the library staff were of great contribution to the successful completion of the study.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Of what consequence is Africa in the present day global setting? Hopefully, the contents of this study paper will, to some extent, provide the answer to this question.

The relatively enormous size of Africa, its geographical location, its considerable resources, the political emancipation of its peoples and the large number of its nation states, have all failed to earn for Africa no more than a passing reference in global arguments and considerations. Why?

The continent of Africa (see Figure 1) is approximately 12 million square miles in area. It is bounded at its extreme points by latitudes 37°N and 35°S, and by the longitudes 17°W and 50°E. It is almost entirely surrounded by water, and it is suitably located in such a way as to possess the potential of affecting intercontinental sea and air travel.

An unevenly spread population total of approximately 500 million people in Africa compares favorably with those of other continents. The existence of more than fifty independent nation states within its borders makes Africa a significantly important continent in international politics. (See the complete list of African nations in Annex A.) In contrast, Africa is currently by far the poorest of the world's continents. It is also the most hungry, the least healthy and, on the average, the most economically and technologically backward. It is a continent where colonialism still survives, racism is a way of life, illiteracy is a major problem and birth control is regarded as immoral and sinful. It is a continent, said Chou En Lai, "ripe for revolution," without indicating who should revolt against what or whom. Chou En Lai's remark is a sample of the unguarded general remarks one frequently hears about Africa.


Africa, especially the sub-Saharan part of it, is only just emerging from centuries of humiliation and ignominies. Inter-tribal/inter-ethnic wars, slavery (by Arabs and Europeans), and divide-and-rule colonialism by European powers are events and periods unlikely to be forgotten by Africa for a very long time. The effect of colonialism was to create new sets of distinct elites with acquired cultures and languages. English, French and Arabic are the languages of government in most of Africa. Ironically, English speaking Africans are more distant culturally from French speaking Africans than they are from the native English people from Britain.

Underdevelopment in all facets of life has been a major hinderance to progress in all fields. The situation is reflected in politics, government, education, economy, the military and so on. There is no clear-cut ideology in any part of the continent except for South Africa. That country has settled for minority democracy based on racially rooted denial of black equality and rights.

Tribal and ethnic affiliations are stronger than the threads of nationhood. Religion and culture far outweigh consideration for political compatability and free choice. Dictatorial and eccentric leaderships come to power by military means other than the free choice of their peoples. The composition of governments is generally biased in favor of tribal and ethnic loyalties. Corruption and greed in high places are the rule rather than the exception in most of Africa.

Such then is the situation of the continent under study with a view to assessing its place in the scheme of things. While the introductory story may not sound optimistic, the entire assessment is likely to be stimulating, full of color, full of hope, and a considerable degree of wishful thinking.

Fig 1



CHAPTER II

GEOGRAPHY

LOCATION

The location of Africa in relation to other continents is shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 also shows other features of interest which derive their importance to the location factor. The following important, and obvious, points can be noted:

(1) Four masses of water, vital for world trade and military traffic, surround Africa: the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

(2) Africa's geographical location in relation to Europe, Asia and the Americas dictates that a large volume of air traffic utilizes Africa's airspace.

(3) The Mediterranean coastline is both a gateway and a strategically located launching stage for military action against Europe in the not unlikely event of the control of the coast being exercised by a hostile power.

(4) Almost the entire eastern coastline of Africa overlooks the rich, strategically important oilfields of the Middle East as well as the sealanes over which the oil travels to the west. The control of the coast or any part of it by a contending power, will be a major and continuing danger to the security of the fields, and of the world.

(5) The coastline of Africa is generally smooth, a situation whereby only few points along the entire length are suitable as seaports.

(6) The tropical location of Africa ensures an all-year warm water sea navigation capability.

The continent of Africa is well placed strategically to effectively influence the affairs of the world. As will be seen later in this study, the location factor does outweigh all other factors.

SIZE

Africa is a large continent as shown by Figure 1. As already mentioned elsewhere, Africa is almost 12 million square miles of land area and extends to well over 70° of latitudinal measure and to nearly 70° longitudinally. Both measures apply to the longest and the widest points of the continent. A number of "orbit" islands lie peripherally around and close to the continent. Many of the islands are of potential strategic importance. They could be used, and some were one time or the other, to subvert African nations as well as to threaten the surrounding sealandes. During the Nigerian Civil War, Sao Tome was used by the Portuguese in support of Biafra. Diego Garcia, Sychelles and Mauritius are in the current news. While most of these islands are African in population, others like the Canary Island are European; while some of them are independent nations, others are not yet independent and remain under the control and occupation of the colonial powers, such as Reunion. A list of Africa's islands is given as Annex B, including comments regarding recent history and military strategic relevance.

Africa's land area is one of its most valuable assets. Conventional wisdom recognizes value in real estate. A large proportion of Africa's land is fertile and given time, education and improved farming methods, the land will be sufficient to support double the size of the present total population. Large desert and semi-desert areas can and will be put to cultivation using irrigation methods in due course. Africa will in the not too distant future be self-sufficient in food. Available records show that the exploration and search for the mineral wealth of Africa has not yet covered a large part of the continent. In fact, not up to one tenth of the area has been explored. The desert areas and the jungles are in the most part still to be covered, and it is reasonably believed that they contain reserves of valuable mineral resources. While concrete proofs are not yet available, Africans believe that Africa is the continent of the future.

CHAPTER III

LAND AND PEOPLES

Africa is generally a plateau and continent with little land below the 500 foot contour. The land descends steeply to narrow coastal plains. The only exceptions to the plateau features are the fold ranges of the Atlas in the northwest and the Cape Ranges of the extreme south. See Figure 2 for more details.

CLIMATE

Because most of the continent lies within the tropics and since the rest is not very far outside the tropics, temperatures are very high everywhere, except on the highest mountains. Seasonal temperatures and rainfall levels alternate within the year between north and south. The shape and size of the continent and its position in relation to the oceans have far reaching effects on moisture laden winds coming from offshore. The situation ensures that large portions of the central regions of the north and the south receive little or no rain. This gave rise to the expansive Sahara Desert in the north and to the Namib and Kalahari deserts in the south. The existence of the deserts have profound effects on the continent. The Sahara effectively divides the Arab and the Negro peoples. Constant shortages of rainfall have continued to increase the size of the desert. The occurrence of drought situations affecting a very large part of the continent has become cyclical, with an approximate 5-year frequency. Its devastating effects on human life and livestock have pushed back the clock of progress of Africa and the Africans.

POPULATION

The peoples of Africa are, for practical purposes, made up of light

skinned Arabs in the north, dark skinned Negroes in the sub-Saharan region and a white settler group in the extreme south. The Arabs are generally of Islamic faith and the Negroes are of Christian, Moslem and Animist faiths. The white settlers of southern Africa, while professing Christianity, have fraudulently modified Christian teachings extensively to suit their racial psyche.

The 500 million estimated population of Africa is expected to double by the end of the century. The twin problems of hunger and poverty are extreme enough at the moment to attract the concern of the international community. Unless a lasting solution can be devised, the plight of the poor and the hungry of Africa will pose very serious security problems for the continent and the world. The resulting disorder will ignite and perpetuate revolutions. Given the super power peripheral interests in Africa, vis a vis sea lanes and military bases, such a situation will invite direct intervention and result in direct confrontation.

Religion and racism, though hardly related, have an extremely sentimental hold on Africa. A large number of religious disputes are alive within many countries in Africa. The politico-religious tensions are already being given physical expression in the Sudan, Ethiopia and Chad. The civil war in Nigeria cannot be said to be entirely free of superficial religious undertones. The erratic, but real, Libyan romance with power is couched in part within politico-religious slogans. It is known that religious conflicts have provided pretexes for external inroads and interventions into Africa by external power.

Opposition to the racial policies of the white settlers of South Africa is a matter of life and death to the average African. It is a situation where death is considered more honorable than living within a system which relegates human beings to conditions far below those of the farm animals of the white settlers. An explosive keg is smoking in the continent, and the sound of its

explosion will attract the attention of the entire world. A number of scenarios have been expounded as to what will actually happen. The fact that something very serious will happen is not in general doubt. At that point in time, Africa will be at the center of world spotlight. The strength of the moral fiber of the white race will be put to the severe test. Given the stubborn attitude of white South Africans, a black revenge will come sooner than later.

SEA AND AIR LANES

Mention was made about the importance of sea and air traffic as it relates to Africa and to the likelihood that Africa's strategic importance will derive more from this resource than from any other. The super powers, and especially the US, have worldwide interests, some of them vital. The continued realization of these interests depends on secure sea and air traffic. It will be shown that great importance is attached to the strategic location of Africa in this regard.

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMY

GENERAL

The economy of most of Africa is very weak indeed. Annex A gives the current estimated Gross Domestic Products of all African countries. A large number of these countries are economically unviable and are likely to remain that way for a very long time. Presently, they rely on regular subventions from external sources for day to day administration. Except for the Republic of South Africa and a handful of Arab states, basic economic systems and infrastructures are weak and underdeveloped. Little manufacturing and hardly any exporting of finished products occur in African countries. The dawn of heavy industry is only just breaking in a few African countries; that of electronic cum high-tech industry is a very long way in the future.

For an exhaustive examination of current (and potential) economic resources of Africa, a country by country listing of agricultural, fuel and nonfuel mineral resources of the continent is given at Annex C. While not showing specific numbers of production or reserve levels, the listing does provide an assessment of the current and potential economic viability of Africa. It not only provides a ready reference data on African resources, it clearly shows the almost even and continent-wide distribution of African resources.

Africa's economic impact on the world is in the area of raw materials. During the first half and the early part of the second half of this century, Western Europe relied to a considerable extent on Africa for the supply of the raw materials needed by its industries. The raw materials, which were and still are to some extent mainly agricultural, consisted of palm products, ground nuts (peanuts), cocoa, coffee, tea, cotton, hides, skins and ivory.

While many of these are still exported, quantities available for direct export have declined. The decline may be attributed to a generally decreasing production output and increases in local processing and consumption.

This decline in agricultural production will continue until improved methods of farming and a general change of attitude towards farming is generated. The farmers who have been responsible for the tediously outdated production of farm products are now very old men. Their children are unwilling to replace them but instead have gradually moved into the cities in search of better standards of life. Given fewer and older hands, the physically demanding profession of farming has declined considerably. In fact, many African countries which not too long ago were not food exporters are now major food importers, a situation which contributes to the economic plight of the continent.

MINERALS

The mineral resources of Africa, fuel and nonfuel, far outweigh and have completely eclipsed the agricultural resources in money earning. They have also brought recognition to Africa. As will be shown in due course, petroleum and a number of metallic minerals have transformed Africa into a continent worth the consideration of the world. The maintenance of oil flows and the dependence of one of the world's super powers on a few minerals, under almost total African monopoly, are the topical issues. The importance of gold to the world's monetary system of the world is well known. It is also known that a large proportion of the world's marketed gold comes from the Republic of South Africa. The news-maker and the prime money earner of all African minerals is petroleum. The production and sale of this important commodity are important landmarks in the emergence of Africa as a credible trading block in the world.

Twelve African countries, shown at Annex D, produce appreciable quantities of crude petroleum. Petroleum has been found in every region of Africa, and evidence from the numerous exploration efforts indicate more findings with potential for commercial viability. The cost of importation of petroleum by African nations who do not produce the commodity has been a major source of their negative economic growth. It is estimated that by the end of this century, almost half of the African nations would be self-sufficient in oil.

The major oil exporters, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As members of OPEC, they exercise considerable influence in the organization. OPEC policies have major consequences on the world economy, as the major industrial nations of the world depend heavily, if not exclusively, for their oil supplies on the uninterrupted flow of OPEC oil. African production represents nearly 30 percent of this flow.

An analysis of the metallic and related mineral resources of Africa show considerable diversity, variety and great economic potential. An easy reference rundown of this class of minerals, showing their respective sources, is shown at Annex E. Almost in every country in Africa is found an important metallic mineral. Other countries have basketfuls of them. The dominance of southern and central African countries in this regard is readily noticed.

Mention was made of the rare strategic minerals found in Africa. Chromium, platinum, manganese and bauxite have been identified as not being only rare, they are extremely important in high technology, civil and military industry. Six countries in Africa hold large reserves of one or the other of these minerals. South Africa is a leading country in this regard, as the following tabulation shows:

<u>MINERAL</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>PROPORTION OF WORLD'S KNOWN RESERVES</u>
Chromite	South Africa	44%
	Zimbabwe	30%
Cobalt	Zaire	42%
	Zambia	13%
Manganese	South Africa	14%
	Gabon	40%
Bauxite	Guinea	28%
Platinum	South Africa	55%

SOURCE

In many instances, the majority of that proportion of the known world's reserves of strategic minerals which is not located in Africa is held by the communist world. It is instructive therefore to note the degree of dependence of the USA on external sources (mainly African) in respect to the minerals.

The approximate figures are:

- o Chrome 90%
- o Cobalt 92%
- o Manganese 98%
- o Bauxite 94%
- o Platinum 84%

It is worth the effort to reemphasize the extremely important value of the above minerals to science, technology, and industry. Chromium is used in the production of stainless steel and in the plating of metals; cobalt is used as an alloy in aerospace and electrical products. It resists heat, tear and wear. Manganese is used in the production of batteries, chemicals and in hardening of steel; platinum group minerals are used as catalysts and in the

production of nitrogenous fertilizers. Some is used for jewelry; bauxite, in the form of aluminum, is used as light weight body frame material for aircraft.

The strategic importance of the listed metals is emphasized by the situation that alternative sources to African supplies are either in the Soviet Union, as already stated, or, where they are found in the West, are prohibitively expensive to extract given the current market values. While stockpiling and recycling processes may overcome the problems of limited short-term import disruption, a prolonged cutoff of supply will prove disastrous.

As stated elsewhere in this paper, much of Africa has yet to be explored for resources. Large quantities of oil and metallic mineral reserves are believed to abound. Many discoveries have not been followed up to determine economic viability. Explorations are going on in many countries. Vast regions are yet to be explored.

It is strongly believed that the Sudan will soon be a major oil producer/exporter. Improved extraction methods and effort will make Morocco and Zambia major cobalt exporters. Similar measures will improve the standings of Sierra Leone, Upper Volta and Ghana as regards cobalt. Such examples can be carried across the board in respect to all minerals. The vast Sahara Desert may yet deliver much more than the oil, the phosphates and the uranium it is presently obliging.

Africa's major trading partners are Western Europe, the Far East and the United States of America, in that order. The three trading giants represent about three quarters of the world's economy but remain dependent to a degree on Africa's oil and some strategic metals. While Africa's ability or willingness to hold the world to economic ransom is out of the question, a major disruption or a threat of total disruption of African trade is almost certain to cause a major dislocation of the international economic well-being.

CHAPTER V

POLITICS AND CULTURE

THE OAU

Except for the Arab north, Liberia, Ethiopia and South Africa, political freedom came to Africa in the late 1950's and the 1960's. Not one country in Africa now remains under external colonization. The Western Sahara and Namibia, the only non-independent nations, remain illegally occupied and colonized by Morocco and South Africa, respectively.

Almost like a natural phenomenon, political independence brought political cooperation. After attempts at regional groupings, the Organization of African Unity, OAU, was born. All African countries except South Africa and the two "colonies" are members of the OAU.

The OAU is, by and large, the voice of Africa. It brings to bear the full weight of African opinion into world affairs. Through the auspices of the OAU, various African blocks continue to present African views and protect African interests in international bodies and forums. Generally non-aligned and independent perceptions are articulated on all overarching world issues, but in particular issues dealing with human rights, independence, morality, freedom, poverty, refugees and world literacy. Though common African views on East-West relations and conflicts carry no military or economic weight, such views are succeeding in sending the message of a large continent which is politically conscious and active.

It is no exaggeration to say that no African dispute can be settled without the cooperation of, or at least the non-opposition of, the OAU. It is also probably true to say that no bilateral or regional security agreements between African states and external powers will be secure in the long run without the

support or the sympathy of the OAU. Though economically weak, the OAU has demonstrated an encouraging degree of willingness to stick together on many issues. It has shown limited but promising capacities for diplomacy and military action in efforts to internalize African disputes. A long standing proposal for an African High Command is still alive. The dream of the founding fathers of the OAU for an African Central Government may still be a dream. But some dreams have been known to come true. When, not if, the African dream comes, it may surprise the optimists and probably choke the pessimists.

TOPICAL ISSUES

Despite its latest new-found bullying tactics following the failure of its constructive engagement policy, South Africa remains the tinder box of Africa. Barring miracles, the lid will come off despite its awesome military machine including nuclear weapons' stockpiles.

It is clear that for economic, anti-Communist, strategic, and racial affinity considerations, the West is unwilling to exert the necessary pressure on South Africa for a change in its racially unfair and humanly immoral policy. The South African problem, therefore, remains the most valuable hunting ground of the Soviet Union, and by the time the final solution is arrived at, South Africa may have provided the USSR its richest prize yet when the country turns out to be a Soviet satellite. Because history has always been on the side of the oppressed majority, the cost to the Soviet Union is minimal. It is more of a waiting game.

Almost entirely by itself, South Africa continues to saddle Africa with certain prospects of tragic destiny. Namibia, a side show, will be independent. Cuban troops, another side show, will leave Angola. Mozambique, Botswana and Angola will find their feet. Black Africans within South Africa, with the active

and direct assistance of African nations, will dismantle apartheid, somehow, someday. With decades of warning, the world should not be surprised.

The numerous problems of Africa, a large number of them seen at Annex F, are not uncommon to nations consolidating their independence and struggling to cultivate sense of nationhood. While border disputes and cross-border ethnic division problems exist in Africa, so do they still persist in Europe, Asia and the Americas. Religious disagreements are a worldwide phenomenon. Instability, dictatorships, one-party rule, military interventions in government, etc. are apparently logical evolutionary stages of development. Hunger, disease, illiteracy, refugees, etc. are primarily Third World problems. If anything, these problems solicit the attention of the human community and ironically, are used as avenues by the USSR to recolonize African nations.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

The political independence of African nations brought with it little in the form of strong economies for the new nations. Reasons abound, the basic one being that the mission of the colonizing powers was not the development of the colonies.

For reasons of almost total economic insolvency and associated security problems, many African nations remain closely tied to their former colonial powers. France leads the way in this regard while Britain, in the form of the symbolic but romantic Commonwealth, ranks a distant second. The United States, a non-African colonizer, has occasionally let it be known that all African nations that are ex-French and ex-British colonies remain within the spheres of influence of the colonizing powers. Needless to say, the strong influence of these foreign powers on their weak "protectorates" has detrimental effects on the ability of the OAU to solve African problems within the African context.

The struggle for the minds and resources of Africa and Africans is as fascinating as it is intense. The oil-rich Arab nations dole out money in the dual guise for the advancement of Islam and the Palestinian cause. The Israelis, in a continuing effort to counter the Arab efforts and to secure recognition for the Jewish nation, offer technical assistance in engineering and agriculture, but at the same time they ensure the failure of the efforts by pursuing very visible cooperation with South Africa in economic, military and nuclear fields. The two Koreas plead their cause relentlessly. The Chinese, who sounded much more anti-Soviet than revolutionary, and acted likewise, formerly had a field day in East Africa. They seem to have almost gone! Obviously, their economy cannot support their ambitions.

The most interesting drama in the struggle for Africa is that between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the north to the south and from the west to the east, from country to country, each of the two superpowers reacts to the actions of the other.

The Soviet Union, under the pretext of solidarity with the underdogs, and taking advantage of its not being a colonial power in Africa, made considerable headway in many emerging African states. Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Angola and Mozambique can be classified as Soviet successes in this class. The Arab-Israeli conflict forced Egypt, Sudan, and to a less extent Somalia, and lately Libya into the Soviet sphere of considerable influence. While Egypt and the Sudan have retraced their steps, Libya remains a country of significant strategic value to the Soviets and of more than a nuisance threat to Western interests in Africa and the Middle East.

The Soviet backed Marxist takeover of Ethiopia brought to an end the Soviet relationship with Somalia. Taking advantage of local conflicts, the Soviets have transformed Ethiopia into a garrison state. With massive Soviet military assistance, Ethiopia has been able to fight three wars simultaneously in the Ogaden, Eritrea and Tigre Province. In close collaboration with Libya, Ethiopia's next target appears to be the Sudan. The South African political system of apartheid and the Namibian problem have been a handy vehicle for the Soviet Union to make inroads into Southern Africa. The Soviet support of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) is not in doubt. Cuban troops are in Angola under the sponsorship of the Soviet Union. The troops continue to remain in Angola "to protect the Luanda government" from the South African backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

The United States, being more inclined toward international trade than to ideology, has concerned itself more with stability than with change. It did

little to hasten the speed of Western colonial powers in granting independence to their colonies. In many parts of Africa, the United States was seen as being on the side of the colonialists and came under the usual anti-colonial distrust as did the actual colonial masters. To this day, such a feeling has not totally evaporated in many parts of Africa. Many believe that it is within the capability of the United States to resolve the remaining racial and colonial legacies of Africa in line with the tradition of the United States for freedom, human rights and fairness. Morocco is able to defy the OAU and the world by refusing to move out of the Western Sahara by virtue of the economic and the military support of the United States and France. South Africa shows no inclination to change its racial system or to release Namibia partly because of a lack of determined political, economic and military pressure from the United States. In fact, the military cooperation between the Israeli and South African governments is believed by many in Africa, to be either US-sponsored, US-encouraged or at least not discouraged by the United States.

So while the United States is undoubtedly seen as a humane and freedom loving country, its attitude to basic African feelings has robbed it of trusted friends. Almost conventionally all the countries that are not under Soviet influence would automatically be in very warm friendly relationship with the United States, but as matters stand now, the friendship of many of these are anything but warm.

The implications of the bipolar division of Africa into US and Soviet camps are far reaching. Apart from the likely roping-in of Africa into the international superpower controversy, the situation has brought internal instability to the continent. Such instability has now been entrenched and has very regularly caused tensions and sometimes open military conflicts. The militarization of Ethiopia and its consequences have already been alluded to. A second

and potentially more dangerous example will strengthen the point. Libya has carried out three separate incursions into Chad, has regularly threatened Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan with military action, has had a hand in changes in government in Ghana and Upper Volta, has gone to assist Idi Amin in Uganda, and has meddled in the affairs of Liberia and many other nations in Africa and outside Africa. Libya, with a population of less than 3 million people, is able to undertake such activities partly because its leader is believed to be eccentric, partly because Libya has huge oil resources, and certainly because the Soviet Union has decided, for economic and strategic reasons, to arm Libya to a level far in excess of that considered reasonable for the defense of Libya. Sudan now alleges a coordinated attack on it by Ethiopia and Libya. It is already being feared in African circles that Ethiopia may be developed by the USSR and be used as Africa's Cuba.

The most dangerous stages of the benefactor-client relationship is direct external intervention in Africa by a world power, or its surrogate, and the stationing of foreign troops on African soil. French troops stationed or operating in Ivory Coast, Gabon, Central African Republic and Chad are no more welcome or less resented than are Soviet and/or Cuban troops stationed in the several countries of Africa. The presence of Cuban troops on African soil is widespread. The Soviets have found in the Cubans a very convenient surrogate in Africa using the Cubans' cultural and social similarity to Africans to maximum effect. The Cuban presence in Africa is estimated as follows:

o Algeria	35	Technicians
o Cape Verde	16	Technicians
o Guinea Bissau	200	Soldiers
o Guinea	1,000	Soldiers
o Sierra Leone	200	Soldiers
o Benin	20	Soldiers
o Sao Tome & Principe	100	Technicians
o Equatorial Guinea	500	Soldiers
o Congo	1,000	Soldiers
	200	Technicians
o Angola	30,000	Soldiers
	6,000	Technicians
o Libya	1,000	Soldiers
o Ethiopia	12,000	Soldiers
o Mozambique	1,000	Soldiers

The recolonization of Africa appears to be in progress. Ironically, this time around, the colonialists are invited by Africans themselves. Tragically, Africa is being prepared as a battleground for an eventual military confrontation between the world's major powers.

The struggle by external powers for influence and/or presence in Africa is a reflection of the strategic importance of the continent to these powers. In varying degrees of attribution, the importance is economic, political and military. The economic importance, in the form of availability of raw materials (agricultural products and minerals) and markets for finished products, has already been identified. The political importance, in the form of cherished international cooperation and diplomatic support at international forums, has also received treatment. The military significance of the continent is by far the most prized by the contending powers. A number of passing references have been made to Africa's military and strategic importance. In particular, the availability of very important strategic minerals and the strategic location of the continent are prime indices of attraction. A discussion of the military factors will be the object of the next stage of the study.

CHAPTER VII

THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

Despite the regular occurrence of wars throughout the continent, Africa's military forces are weak and largely symbolic organizations. A few relatively strong forces are found in countries which have fought large scale wars and in those countries whose political systems, ambitions and resources allow them to own and maintain such large forces. Egypt, Ethiopia, Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Libya and Morocco are examples of one category or the other in the class of nations with large armed forces. Annex A shows a summary of the strengths of the defense forces of all African countries.

African countries have found it necessary to foster military cooperation between themselves and their neighbors. Bilateral and multi-lateral regional cooperations flourish. Several reasons are responsible for the urge to enter into such relationships. Mutual suspicion, general instability and military weakness provide incentives for defense cooperation. Similar reasons, in addition to economic and military assistance, are responsible for a number of military agreements between African countries and foreign powers. The United States, USSR, France, Britain and to lesser extents, China, other Warsaw Pact nations, other Western nations, have various bilateral defense agreements with countries in Africa.

It is interesting to see the mutual defense agreements entered into by African nations among themselves. Many of the agreements have a direct relationship to local on-going or potential conflicts:

- o Algeria and Libya signed a defense agreement in 1975.
- o Egypt and Sudan - 1977, for the establishment of a Joint Defense Council and Joint Training.
- o Egypt and Sudan - 1982, an Integration Charter including combined military policy.

- o Ethiopia and Sudan - agreed on security and non-interference in July 1982.
- o OAU sponsored African Defense Commission formed 1963.
- o African Intervention Force - formation of 1979.
- o Inter-African Intervention Force for Chad - set up 1981.
- o Defense Council of Equatorial Africa formed 1961.
- o ECOWAS' Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense Matters - 1981.
- o Kenya and Ethiopia - Defense Agreement 1963.
- o Kenya and Ethiopia - Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in January 1979.
- o Kenya and Somalia - Agreement on Limiting Border Disputes and Incursions - 1981.
- o Sierra Leone and Guinea - Defense Agreement - 1971.
- o Sierra Leone and Guinea - Mutual Defense Pact - 1981.
- o Djibouti and Somalia - 1981. Djibouti and Ethiopia - 1981.
- o Nigeria and Benin - 1983, for joint exercises.

Internal and regional instability and the recourse to armed conflicts in settling disputes have provided major inroads into Africa by external powers. The increasing conflict atmosphere encourages intervention, giving rise to massive arms build-ups in every region of the continent. Arms build-ups give rise to more instability and provide more incentives for destabilization. The phenomenon of Libya can be easily explained in this light. Armed to the teeth by the USSR, Libya has gone amok, not only within most of Africa, but has extended its message to the Philippines and Central America. More than ten African states are worried about Libyan interference and subversion. South Africa, in active cooperation with Israel and some Western nations, particularly Germany and France, is a wholly militarized nation. It is a major arms manufacturer, self-sufficient in most weapons and equipment including tanks, fighter aircraft and naval ships. The destabilizing strategy of the South

African government against neighboring countries is a classic example of the negative effects of arms build-ups and foreign interventions and assistances.

While the Libyans are reportedly making efforts at acquiring a nuclear capability, South Africa is widely believed to possess a considerable arsenal of such weapons. Given the nature of the government of South Africa and its unwillingness to change the system of apartheid, its military posture presents a direct challenge to black Africa. Heated debates have gone on in the public media of Nigeria about the likely response to the South African challenge. It is freely suspected that South African nuclear power has been designed for use against Nigeria and Nigerian opinion moulders are calling for a nuclear program for Nigeria. Though certainly an unlikely proposition given the low-level scientific capability and a very weak economy, the nuclear option is a living subject in Nigeria.

Putting aside Libya's romance with the nuclear weapon and the South African's alleged possession of the weapon, Africa is relatively nuclear-free. Nuclear weapons are of little concern to Africa. Nuclear non-proliferation has a strong base in Africa, if only for economic and technological reasons. Except for external interference, Africa would be a conflict-free region. If not for the external arming of belligerent states, Africa would never have to be pre-occupied by wars. As stated, no country, except South Africa, has the capacity or capability to arm itself. No nation, a group of nations, not even the proposed African High Command, is willing or likely to develop into a world military power. Militarily, therefore, Africa is not a significant factor in the world's power equation. Given the enormity of its problems which include hunger, fighting to achieve human respect and equality, and consolidation of hard won independence, Africa is unable, even if willing, to participate in the world's power game. These internal problems have dissipated useful energy and diverted much needed funds into military pursuits.

It is in defense of their worldwide interests along with the requirement of projection of military power abroad that causes the USA, the USSR and some lesser powers to require the use of the natural strategic attributes of Africa. Location, size, and sea and air routes have already been identified as important factors in this regard. The world powers have been jockeying for positions and influence among African nations. They regularly displace each other from one country to the other. A glance through the list of military and diplomatic relationships between foreign powers and African nations at Annex G will form a good basis for discussion in this section.

While the US interests in the world which require of Africa's cooperation in efforts to protect those interests are clear, the interests of the USSR are not justifiably so clear. The defense of Western Europe, the protection of the middle east oil fields, and the protection of sea and air traffic to and from these regions are clear vital interests of the United States. It would appear that the main Soviet interest is to frustrate the achievement of the objectives of the United States. The competition is not for the welfare of the African but for the supremacy of the contending powers. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Soviets intensify their activities on the strategic northern (Libya), eastern (Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique), and south-western (Angola, Namibia) coasts of Africa. Those locations put them in advantageous positions to interfere with sea and air military traffic from the United States to Europe, interfere with the supply of Africa's strategic minerals to the West and threaten sea traffic of oil to the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

The Persian Gulf region holds about 60 percent of the world's known reserves of petroleum. Most of the oil goes to Europe and Japan. The USSR is self-sufficient in oil, and its interest in the area is nothing other than as part of its worldwide military strategic calculations. Soviet threats to the region,

and therefore to the healthy existence of the free world, include its presence in Afghanistan and South Yemen, especially its huge military presence in Aden and on the island of Socotra Island. Soviet, Cuban and Warsaw Pact troops in Ethiopia and the considerable Soviet influence in the Marxist oriented islands of Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles present visible threats both to the oil fields and to the oil tanker routes out of the region. To protect its interests and those of its allies, the United States has intensified its search for basing and overflight rights within the region. United States' relationships alluded to earlier are part of this effort. Facilities in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Diego Garcia Island provide forward deployed locations and maintenance facilities. The strategic importance of Africa to the economic health of the world and to the survival of the free world is not in doubt.

Mention has been made about the necessity to keep open the supply (and resupply) sea routes from the United States to Europe and the Persian Gulf in the event of hostilities. The security of the Atlantic and Indian Ocean routes is of utmost importance if the United States' war effort is to be sustained in these distant regions of the world.

Nearly 30,000 ships a year now pass by the Cape of Good Hope off the Republic of South Africa. Most of the ships are bound to and from the West. The acquisition of friendly ports is essential within this region to ensure the security of this vital passage. It is clear that the active and visible presence of the USSR in the ports of this strategic area present a major security problem. Angola on the Atlantic coast with Mozambique, Madagascar and a few island nations on the Indian Ocean coast are confirmed Soviet military and naval bases. From the United States' perspective, it may be necessary to reconsider the possibility of using the large South African naval base at Simonstown.

The sea route from the United States to Southern Europe and the Middle East

to the Persian Gulf via the Mediterranean Sea face similar security challenges as the South African cape route. The presence of the Soviet navy on the west and north coasts of Africa is increasing by the day. Libya provides bases for Soviet naval and air forces, an action directly aimed at threatening the freedom of action and movement of the air naval and civil traffic of the United States in the region. The agreements for the use of Tunisian and Moroccan sea and air facilities by the United States is aimed at countering this threat. The acquisition of limited use of Moroccan airfields appears to be a response to the experience which the United States went through in its efforts to resupply Israel in the last Arab-Israel war. The blunt refusal of some European countries to allow refueling and transit facilities was a bitter experience.

Perhaps the strategic importance of Africa is best demonstrated by the dramatic recognition given to the issue by the US military. A new major command, the CENTRAL COMMAND, has been created for South West Asia. Prominent among the areas covered by this command is the geographical region made up of Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia. Though no corresponding information is available, it is safe to believe that Africa shows up clearly and importantly on the strategic maps of the Soviet military. The strategic importance of Africa to Britain, France, West Germany and other European countries has been briefly mentioned at many points in this study.

Western Europe is far more dependent on the minerals of Africa than is the United States. The stakes of Europe in the continent are therefore much higher than those of any other region of the world. Correspondingly, the strongest residual colonial controls on Africa are exercised by France and Britain. To a lesser, but very important extent, are the controls exercised by Spain, Portugal and Belgium. The neocolonialist flavor of the British Commonwealth of Nations (of which more than 10 African countries are nominal

co-equals of Great Britain) is a clear manifestation of such controls which keep the ties to the mother country strong. In the wake of such follow such important relationships of trade, large contracts, mineral rights, bilateral defense and military cooperation and so on. British interests in South Africa in the form of capital investment, general trade and mineral importation are considerable. Military ties between Britain and Kenya and between Britain and Uganda are strong and the British colonial possessions of the Atlantic islands of St. Helena and Ascension are of high strategic value. Their use in the recent war for the Falklands proved invaluable for the entire operation.

The Francophone community of nations, though never officially inaugurated, comprises African nations that were under French colonial control. For all practical purposes, these nations, well over 15, are still under the total direction of France. A majority of them are under severe economic crisis, and their budgets are routinely subsidized by France. France, therefore, uses these countries as both a shield and an access to insure the protection of its interests in Africa. France's dependence on African minerals is so acute that France violates basic international decency to protect them. To protect its one-sided trade with and exploitation of Africa, France still maintains some 10,000 troops on African soil in countries as far apart as Senegal, Gabon and Djibouti - and in others in between. France virtually owns the cocoa in Ivory Coast, the uranium in Niger and the oil in Gabon. To insure the supply of strategic minerals from Southern Africa, France has supplied all categories of military hardware, including nuclear reactors and technology to the Republic of South Africa. In a brazenly insensitive manner, the French have declined independence for several African Islands in the Indian Ocean. The reason is strategic and relates to the protection of super tanker oil routes from the

Gulf and round the Cape of Good Hope to France. Despite their special relationships, the more than 15 ex-French African nations are too weak, dependent and inept to influence France.

The special relationship between Belgium and Zaire is a living insult to Africa. The relationship guarantees almost perpetual exploitation of Zaire's resources through the sustenance of the despotic rule of Mobutu. The United States backed series of Belgium invasions of Zaire in order to save Mobutu from rebel attacks are a humiliating reminder of the hollowness of the independence of many African nations.

In African eyes, the government of the Republic of South Africa is regarded as a Western regime planted in that strategic region of Africa as part of the entire western defense strategy. The increasing political, economic and military cooperation between Israel and South Africa goes to strengthen this belief. Interestingly, South Africa provides credibility to the belief by the way it courts the United States and other Western nations. Using the catch phrase of being the bulwark against communism, South Africa has told the world that the demand of its black people for equality is nothing but a communist cry. Perhaps that explains why the Western world turned a blind eye to the massive nuclear program of South Africa. Despite undeniable proofs of at least two nuclear tests and the potential threats to world peace resulting therefrom, not even a rebuke has been heard from the West.

CHAPTER VIII

WHAT FUTURE?

Control of population and a determined drive towards self-sufficiency in food production will remain the most important basic challenges facing Africa. The two problems could be attacked by a program for universal education of the people, strict birth control measures and a return to rigid self-reliance. The present rush to the urban areas and the insatiable universal craze for foreign goods and foodstuffs must be checked in order to create the necessary broad local economic base and generate savings to meet basic educational, scientific and technical development. Prestige projects must be done away with. Recourse to foreign loans and assistance must be resisted, since the net effect of such programs is to insure perpetual poverty and political emasculation of the recipient African nations.

The problems of scarcity of homegrown food, over population, massive illiteracy, uncontrollable tastes for foreign goods, unnecessary prestige projects which give rise to high foreign loans, will continue to negate Africa's apparent potential for economic power. Without such power, the largely symbolic independence will never be consolidated and African nations will continue to be disintegrated appendices of the world's major powers and power blocks. Without economic power, military capability is limited and Africa will continue to be that unstable region of the world where Third World wars perpetuate, providing a lucrative testing ground for new external weapon systems.

Economic growth will require a realistic program of accelerated industrialization with the aim of manufacturing a large portion of the basic needs of the people. The continent's hydro-power resources are extensive and remain largely untapped. Due to the huge capital outlay requirement, regional cooperation is

imperative in order to exploit the potential in full. Electrical power, a most deficient and inefficient utility in most of Africa at the moment, is a basic requirement for the manufacturing industry. Given the relatively large market for manufactured goods, the potential for local industries based on such regional bodies as ECOWAS is very good.

Without doubt, the future for Africa in fuel and non-fuel minerals is excellent. Encouraging finds of oil are made almost everywhere. Within a short period, and hopefully by the close of this century, most African nations will be able to meet, internally, a large proportion of their requirement of petroleum products. Such a situation will release resources for use in the critical areas of agriculture and education.

Africa will remain for a long time a major supplier of non-fuel mineral resources. It is believed that the known existing reserves are only a small proportion of actual reserves and that large quantities of different types of minerals remain undiscovered in many parts of Africa. What price, other than money, Africa will exert on the world remains to be seen. For the moment, economic factors override political and military ones over the fate of the strategically important mineral resources of Africa.

The political (and strategic military?) fate of Africa seems to lie on a strong OAU. Ultimately, the possibility of an amalgamation of countries within regions into large and strong countries should not be ruled out. External influences which continue to plague and destabilize the OAU will almost certainly work against the fusion of regional organizations such as ECOWAS, OCAM, League of Arab States, East African Community, Front Line States, etc. into more functional and united political entities with strong, though federal central governments. The dream of an All Africa Central Union Government, though 30 years old, may never come to pass. But since that dream, Africa has come close

to total political independence with a corresponding, though not total, decline of the influence of the colonial powers. Given that rate of progress towards self-discovery and freedom, the days are not far off when the goal of some form of unity will be achieved. Only through continental or strong regional unity will Africa achieve economic independence, insure its security and be an active participant in world events. The present situation, whereby fragmented Africa does not possess a strong voice and cannot safeguard its security and independence, is a challenge to African elites.

Perhaps the clearest vision of a likely successful regional unity is provided by the ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Western African States. Though very far from achieving its stated goals, which include a common market, custom-free trade, free movement of peoples, coordinated defense policy, and ultimate political unity, the resilience of the organization to survive for up to 10 years is a clear testimony of the willingness of black Africans to form a virile and strong black nation.

ECOWAS is made up of the following 16 nations (Fig 2):

- o Benin
- o Cape Verde
- o Gambia
- o Ghana
- o Guinea
- o Guinea Bissau
- o Ivory Coast
- o Liberia
- o Mali
- o Mauritania
- o Niger
- o Nigeria
- o Senegal
- o Sierra Leone
- o Togo
- o Upper Volta

The following data provides a proof of the immense geographical, economic and human viability of the ECOWAS nation:


ECOWAS Nations	Area Square Miles	Population	GNP-GDP \$	Major Minerals	Major Agriculturals	Armed Forces
16	3m	147m	115b	Petroleum Phosphates Iron Ore Coal, Tin Uranium, Gas Bauxite Manganese	Cocoa, Coffee Livestock Timber Ground nuts Rubber Palm Products Fish	215,000


A united ECOWAS will represent a giant leap forward for the black race and for Africa. What the data tabulation does not show are the common ancestry of the Negroid peoples of ECOWAS, their similarity of life, occupation and faiths. The data also does not reflect the fact that in view of the democratic ideals planted in the region by colonial powers, the nation of ECOWAS is bound to these ideals. The emergence of a powerful democratic country is a plus to the free world and is far better to the present situation whereby mini-dictators rule the individual small countries.

The ECOWAS has already shown concern for its cohesion and security. In this regard, it is noted that in May 1981, ECOWAS nations adopted a protocol on "Mutual Assistance on Defense Matters" calling for a joint Defense Commission intended to create a joint force using assigned units of the national forces. The joint force is to be used as an intervention or peacekeeping force. Encouragingly, thirteen of the sixteen nations have so far signed the protocol. Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mali have so far declined to sign. The creation of the ECOWAS nation state will transform the outlook of Africa and project into a major factor in world affairs.

The prospects for the future unity of Arab Africa are very remote indeed. African Arabs are more inclined towards the Middle East than to Africa. In addition, they have not shown the willingness to be good neighbors. Neither has their membership of the 20-nation League of Arab States nor their common race and religion done anything to foster or improve the prospects of regional unity into one major nation. The antics of the Libyans in dealing with their Arab neighbors is well known. Morocco and Algeria have hardly been on speaking terms since their border war in the mid 60s. Their strategic location as the gateway to Europe and the Middle East, their command of the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, and their possession of a sizable proportion of the world's

Fig 2 ECOWAS





petroleum reserves, places Arab Africa high in importance in African and world affairs.

Central Africa has not yet provided any regional organization which can provide a rallying point for future unity. An eventual success of ECOWAS may provide a stimulus, if not a challenge which will cause countries in Central Africa to unite. By far the most promising and the most flourishing regional organization was the East African Community comprising Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Since its destruction by Idi Amin, the three countries have shown no wish for a new cooperation arrangement. An organization similar to ECOWAS in that part of Africa appears most unlikely in the near future, but one is desirable.

By its latest strategy of military intimidation of its neighbors, South Africa may achieve for Africa what would normally not be thought likely. South Africa's military incursions may provide the catalyst required for the unity of the surrounding weak and weakened nations. Given that the problem of racism in South Africa is unlikely to be solved in the near future, South African reprisals will force Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique into some form of military cooperation. In the long run, a political unit will emerge which will ultimately be the key to the solution of the apartheid situation in Southern Africa.

The future outlook for peaceful co-existence within Africa is bleak. There can be no peace for as long as blacks are regarded and treated as sub-humans in the Republic of South Africa. The policy represents the most serious potential threat to world peace. The question is not whether or when the real war will erupt but in what form and intensity the war will develop. It is certainly not a question of whether the rest of Africa can face the awesome military might of the mighty Republic of South Africa but whether the war will be fought only by

Africans and whether such a war will be confined within Africa's borders. The spectra of slavery and slave labor within Africa and as represented by the racist policies of South Africa must be removed somehow otherwise all the gains that Africans have made are worthless.

Technologically, the state of most black African states can be equated to the situation in Europe and the United States in the middle of the 19th century. While the development of Europe and the United States went along without foreign manipulation and sabotage, Africa's progress is hamstrung by circumstances beyond the immediate and long term control of Africa. Reinventing the wheel is considered laughable and is discouraged. International economists tell Africans that it is cheaper and economically wiser to import steel than to set up local steel plants. It is said to be cheaper to import radios, motor cars and other modern gadgets than to set up local production lines. African nations were often discouraged about developing hydro-power resources on the reasoning of economic unviability. Imported refined petroleum was figured to be economically cheaper than outputs from projected local refineries. Proposed gas liquefaction plants remain on the drawing board because of lack of foreign capital interest on the grounds of economic unviability.

Until such a time that negative foreign interference recedes and the overall educational standard of the African improves, Africa is doomed to perpetual stagnation. For obvious reasons, commerce-based Western countries are unlikely to tolerate, much less to assist, the industrial progress of their rich markets. The socialist countries claim not to possess investment capital and have therefore contributed little to the economic development of Africa. Their contributions relate to arms supplies for which Africa has paid either through direct barter or with hard earned currency which would otherwise have gone for economic development. Economically, Africa remains a wreck, carrying

a burden of high foreign debts. Africa accounts for less than one percent of the world's industrial production. The figure is indefensible considering the fact that the continent has:

- o 97% of the world's reserve of chrome.
- o 87% of the world's reserve of platinum.
- o 64% of the world's reserve of manganese.
- o 25% of the world's reserve of uranium.
- o 40% of the world's reserve of hydroelectric potential.
- o 15% of the world's population.

Except for the adventurous antics of Libya and the die-hard attitude of the Republic of South Africa, Africa would have remained a zone of peace and certainly a nuclear free zone. Since the pollution of the air by South Africa (with Israeli and Western help) and by Libya (with the help of the USSR), it would be logical to assume that arms race in Africa, though unfashionable, has taken root. Egypt's nuclear program has been mentioned and the disquiet expressions coming out of Nigeria regarding South Africa's nuclear weapons' program are loud, if unclear. Zaire is said to own and operate a nuclear power plant. One would believe that the strengthening of close military and ideological cooperation between the Soviet Union and marxist Ethiopia is likely to give rise to some form of nuclear cooperation. The future appears mixed and Africans would wish to pray that their continent develops into a major positive factor (not negative) in the strategic equation of the world.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

After many years of obscurity and humiliation, Africa is now a worthy member of the world community. Its presence on the international stage is acknowledged.

The Study has attempted to exalt Africa's virtues, expose its weaknesses and take a promising look to the future. The effort tried to show that by virtues of size, population, location, the large number of nation states and large quantities of known and potential resources, Africa is slowly moving to an ultimate position of contention in the international arena.

The days when Africa was regarded as the dark continent are long gone. The notion that Africa is no more than a land mass obstacle between Europe and the spice lands of Asia is outdated. Instead, the location of the continent has been shown to be strategically important for world trade and world security.

From the modest colonial barter trade between Europe and Africa dealing mainly in loose gold, diamonds, skins, ivory, cotton, ground nuts, and later slaves, the relative dependence of Europe on Africa for industrial raw materials increased significantly. Africa's farm produce had considerable impact on the economy of Europe. The discovery of minerals escalated the dependence relationship. As shown in this study, Europe and Japan rely to a large extent on Africa for supplies of fuel and nonfuel minerals. The United States' dependence on a few strategic minerals of Africa has been shown to be significant.

While local conflicts in Africa are hardly a threat to world peace and security, foreign intervention in such conflicts has proved excessively destabilizing. The apparent threat to Africa's independence posed by intervention of alien ideology and forces has been shown to be of concern to enlightened Africans.

The close proximity of the oil rich Arab states in the Persian Gulf areas and the surrounding sea-lanes, along which oil-carrying supertankers must pass on their way to Europe, the United States and Japan, has continued to emphasize the strategic importance of the African continent. Along with the increased concern for secure sea-lanes and the security of the oil fields, increased activity has been detected in the entire region. While the United States is strengthening its vigilance and assessing contingencies (through the newly created CENTCOM), the USSR is increasing its sea and land presence, apparently perfecting its oil supply disruption contingencies in the event of major world conflict.

Young politically and weak militarily, some of Africa's critical political problems have the potential of endangering world peace. Libya and South Africa do, in their separate ways, signify potent danger to the security of Africa and the world. To protect its inhuman policy of apartheid, the Republic of South Africa is believed to possess a modest stockpile of nuclear weapons. To amplify his craze for power and his apparent wish for hegemony over his neighbors, the Libyan leader has busied himself with the quest for a nuclear capability. These are dangerous trends and present a challenge to other African nations and, to a lesser extent, the entire world.

It has been suggested that salvation for Africa lies in the regrouping of African nations into major units, i.e. bigger and certainly more viable nation states. Using ECOWAS as a ready example, regroupings are suggested along economic blocs (ECONAS), ethnic blocs (Arab League) regional/political groups frontline states, East Africa, etc. It appears that, given the present state and potential growth of the economy of the numerous impoverished nation states of Africa, amalgamations into bigger nations are the only logical answers to Africa's woes. The emancipation of the African will only be complete if major powers are capable of ensuring political, economic and security independence of the continent.

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ANNEX A

AFRICA: NATIONS, POPULATIONS, GNP-GDP, ARMED FORCES

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>GDP/GNP Estimated \$bn</u>	<u>Armed Forces</u>
1. Algeria	19,590,000	41.71	140,000
2. Angola	7,260,000	Not Avail	37,500
3. Benin	3,640,000	1.30	3,150
4. Botswana	850,000	0.95	3,000
5. Burundi	4,350,000	1.12	5,200
6. Camerouns	8,650,000	6.81	7,300
7. Cape Verde	330,000	0.10	1,100
8. Central African Republic	2,350,000	0.56	2,300
9. Chad	4,550,000	0.55	4,200
10. Comoros	370,000	0.11	Ukn
11. Congo	1,580,000	1.35	8,700
12. Djibouti	320,000	0.36	2,700
13. Egypt	43,470,000	29.61	447,000
14. Equatorial Guinea	370,000	0.14	1,550
15. Ethiopia	32,160,000	4.47	250,500
16. French East African Islands	Ukn	Ukn	Ukn
17. Gabon	560,000	3.50	2,200
18. Gambia	620,000	Not Avail	Nil
19. Ghana	12,060,000	10.70	12,600
20. Guinea	5,150,000	1.64	9,900
21. Guinea Bissau	580,000	0.24	6,050
22. Ivory Coast	8,300,000	10.80	5,070
23. Kenya	17,150,000	5.95	16,000
24. Lesotho	1,370,000	Not Avail	
25. Liberia	2,040,000	0.77	5,550
26. Libya	3,100,000	33.05	73,000
27. Madagascar	8,960,000	2.69	21,100
28. Malawi	6,120,000	1.00	4,650
29. Mali	7,160,000	1.20	4,950
30. Mauritania	1,680,000	0.72	8,470
31. Mauritius	940,000	Not Avail	Ukn
32. Morocco	20,650,000	14.98	144,000
33. Mozambique	10,760,000	2.95	12,650
34. Namibia	880,000	Not Avail	Nil
35. Niger	5,480,000	2.85	2,220
36. Nigeria	79,680,000	79.20	133,000
37. Rwanda	4,950,000	1.28	5,150
38. Sao Tome & Principe	86,000	Not Avail	Nil
39. Senegal	5,810,000	2.20	9,700
40. Seychelles	66,000	0.14	1,000
41. Sierra Leone	3,570,000	1.15	3,100
42. Somalia	4,900,000	1.75	62,550
43. South Africa	30,130,000	79.42	82,400
44. Spanish Sahara	480,000	Not Avail	Nil
45. Sudan	18,900,000	9.16	58,000

46.	Swaziland	570,000	Not Avail	Ukn
47.	Tanzania	18,510,000	5.26	40,350
48.	Togo	2,710,000	1.20	5,080
49.	Tunizia	6,510,000	8.08	28,500
50.	Uganda	13,620,000	0.81	15,000
51.	Upper Volta	7,090,000	1.30	3,775
52.	Zaire	29,100,000	5.27	26,000
53.	Zambia	5,960,000	3.52	14,300
54.	Zimbabwe	7,600,000	6.24	41,300

ANNEX B

AFRICA'S ISLANDS

1. Madeira Islands (Portuguese)
2. Canary Islands (Spain)
3. Cape Verde (Independent)
4. Fernando-Po (Guinea Bissau - Independent)
5. Annobon (Guinea Bissau - Independent)
6. Sao Tome (Sao Tome & Principe - Independent)
7. Principe (Sao Tome & Principe - Independent)
8. Ascension (British)
9. St. Helena (British)
10. French Island Colonies of South-East Africa
 - Reunion
 - Mayotte
 - Europa
11. Madagascar (Independent)
12. Mauritius (Independent)
13. Seychelles (Independent)
14. Zanziba (Tanzania - Independent)
15. Pemba (Tanzania - Independent)
16. Diego Garcia (British - American)
17. Comoros (Independent)
18. Dahlak (Ethiopia - Independent)
19. Socotra Islands (S-Yemen - Independent)

AFRICAN ISLANDS

The recognition of the strategic importance of Africa's Islands goes back to the colonization period. The British, the Spanish, the French and the Portuguese made extensive use of offshore islands as transit bases on their way looking for the East Indies and at footholds for the eventual exploration and exploitation of the mainland Africa. In contemporary periods, world powers have incorporated the islands in their strategic calculations. In fact, extensive use of some of these islands have been made recently for military purposes. A few examples are given:

o The US, under an agreement with Spain, operates and maintains naval and air facilities on the Canary Islands off the North West African Coast. The Canary Islands remain a colony or at best a province of Spain.

o The Soviets have visible military and naval presence on the independent ten-island nation of Cape Verdes.

o Spain maintains military presence on Fernando Po, one of the two island provinces of the independent country of Equatorial Guinea. Fernando-Po is 40 miles off the oil-rich Nigerian Coast.

o The Soviets and the Libyans are having a field day on the 2-island independent nation of Sao Tome and Principe - 200 odd miles off the coast of Central West Africa. Sao Tome was a major off-shore Biafran base during the Nigerian Civil War.

o The British maintain extensive military and communication installations on the colony islands of Ascension and St. Helena. The two islands played important roles in the Falklands War.

o The French, for obvious strategic reasons, maintain their hold on more than 30 islands lying along the oil sea lanes of the South East African Coast. Claims by Madagascar, Comoros and Mauritius on the islands have been ignored.

o The US, having acquired Diego Garcia from the British and in spite of Mauritius' protestations, has developed the island into some form of forward deployment base as part of its South East Asian military strategy.

o The Soviets have developed extensive naval facilities on the Ethiopian (Eritrian) Dahlak Island on the Red Sea within almost visible distance of the oil rich Arabian mainland.

In addition to the international military and paramilitary "deployments" listed above, the following islands and neighboring mainland nations can be said to be either Marxist or are good friends of the Soviet Union:

o Madagascar	These islands lie along the oil sea route.
Mauritius	Together with Mozambique, the security of ships
Mozambique	in the Mozambique channel is greatly threatened.
Seychelles	

- o Cape Verde
- o Guinea Bissau
- o Guinea
- o Sierra Leone

Negative

A combination of effort could frustrate western shipping along the West African Coast.

- o Dahlak Island
- o Aden
- o Socotra Island
- o Ethiopia

This grouping contains large Soviet presence in each one of its units. An effective adversary military network is closing in on the Gulf Oil areas.

ANNEX C

AFRICAN RESOURCES - COUNTRY BY COUNTRY

ALGERIA

Agriculturals

1. Wheat
2. Barley
3. Fruits
4. Tobacco
5. Cotton
6. Esparto
7. Cattle
8. Cork

Minerals

1. Iron Ore
2. Phosphates
3. Zinc
4. Lead
5. Iron Pyrites
6. Manganese
7. Petroleum
8. Natural Gas

ANGOLA

Agriculturals

1. Coffee - highest export product for Angola
2. Sisal
3. Maize
4. Sugar
5. Cotton

Minerals

1. Petroleum - for export
2. Coal
3. Copper
4. Iron Ore
5. Manganese
6. Diamonds

BENIN

1. Palm Products account for 85% of exports. Minerals - None.

BOTSWANA

Agriculturals

1. Cattle, Sheep
2. Maize, Corn
3. Ground nuts
4. Cotton
5. Fruits
6. Wheat
7. Tobacco

Minerals

1. Asbestos
2. Coal
3. Copper
4. Kyanite
5. Gold
6. Manganese

BURUNDI

Coffee - for export
Hides - poor quality
Skins

DJIBOUTI

Much of Djibouti is waterless desert and its value lies in the port on the Suez Route.

CAMEROONS

Agriculturals

1. Cocoa
2. Coffee
3. Tea
4. Palm Products
5. Bananas
6. Sugar
7. Ground nuts
8. Rubber
9. Timber
10. Tobacco
11. Cotton
12. Cattle
13. Fishing

Minerals

1. Aluminum
2. Petroleum
3. Gold
4. Iron Ore
5. Titanium
6. Tin

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Agriculturals

1. Cotton
2. Coffee
3. Ground nuts
4. Timber

Minerals

1. Gold
2. Diamonds

CHAD

1. Livestock
2. Fish
3. Hides & Skins

CONGO

Agriculturals

1. Palm Products
2. Timber
3. Ground nuts
4. Tobacco
5. Cocoa
6. Coffee

Minerals

1. Lead
2. Copper
3. Petroleum
4. Iron Ore

EGYPT

Agriculturals

1. Cotton - major producer
2. Maize, Millet
3. Wheat, Barley
4. Sugar
5. Pulses
6. Clover
7. Rice - surplus production
8. Dates

Minerals

1. Petroleum
2. Phosphates
3. Iron Ore
4. Manganese

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Agriculturals

1. Timber
2. Palm Products
3. Cocoa - outstanding export
4. Coffee
5. Copra

Minerals None

ETHIOPIA

Agriculturals

1. Cereals
2. Pulses
3. Livestock, Hides & Skins, Civet, Catskins
4. Beeswax
5. Coffee - major export
6. Oilseeds

Minerals None

GABON

Agriculturals

1. Timber

Minerals

1. Iron Ore
2. Potash
3. Petroleum - 70% of export value
4. Manganese - world's largest exporter
5. Bauxite
6. Uranium

GAMBIA

Agriculturals

1. Ground nuts
2. Palm Products
3. Rice, Fish, Hides, Beeswax

Minerals None

GHANA

Agriculturals

1. Timber
2. Cocoa - 2/3 of total exports
3. Palm Products

Minerals

1. Manganese
2. Gold
3. Diamonds
4. Bauxite

GUINEA

Agriculturals

1. Fruits
2. Palm Products
3. Coffee
4. Rice
5. Maize
6. Kola, Tea, Cinchona
7. Livestock

Minerals

1. Iron Ore
2. Diamonds
3. Gold
4. Bauxite

GUINEA-BISSAU

Agriculturals

1. Livestock
2. Rice
3. Ground nuts
4. Palm Products

Minerals None

IVORY COAST

Agriculturals

1. Cocoa
2. Timber
3. Coffee
4. Rubber
5. Bananas, Pineapples
6. Cotton
7. Sisal
8. Ground nuts

Minerals

1. Petroleum

KENYA

Agriculturals

1. Coffee
2. Tea
3. Pyrethrum
4. Livestock, Meat, Dairy Produce
5. Hides, Skins
6. Tobacco
7. Sugar

Minerals None

LESOTHO

Agriculturals

1. Wool
2. Mohair

Minerals None

LIBERIA

Agriculturals

1. Palm Products
2. Piassava
3. Coffee
4. Timber
5. Rubber

Minerals

1. Iron Ore - a major world source
2. Diamonds
3. Gold

LIBYA

Agriculturals

1. Wheat, Barley
2. Fruits
3. Olive
4. Mulberry
5. Vine
6. Tobacco

Minerals

1. Petroleum

MADAGASCAR

Agriculturals

1. Coffee - 40% of total export
2. Rice
3. Cloves
4. Vanilla
5. Sugar
6. Sisal
7. Tobacco

Minerals

1. Graphite
2. Mica
3. Phosphates

MALAWI

Agriculturals

1. Maize, Corn
2. Tobacco
3. Tea
4. Cotton
5. Ground nuts

Minerals

1. Coal
2. Bauxite

MALI

Agriculturals

1. Livestock, Hides, Skins
2. Ground nuts
3. Gum Arabic
4. Karite
5. Fish
6. Cotton
7. Rice

Minerals

1. Iron Ore
2. Phosphates

COMOROS

1. Flowers Perfume
2. Vanilla
3. Copra, Cloves, Cinnamon
4. Rice, Cassava
5. Bananas

MAURITIUS

1. Maize
2. Potatoes
3. Cattle
4. Sugar
5. Tea
6. Tobacco

SEYCHELLES

1. Potatoes
2. Fruits
3. Fishing
4. Vegetables
5. Cinnamon
6. Copra
7. Vanilla
8. Tea
9. Cloves

MOROCCO

Agriculturals

1. Fruits, Vegetables
2. Vine
3. Sugar
4. Cork
5. Wheat
6. Esparto

Minerals

1. Iron Ore
2. Manganese
3. Phosphates - extensive reserves, second only to Florida-USA
4. Lead
5. Zinc
6. Cobalt

MOZAMBIQUE

Agriculturals

1. Cotton
2. Copra
3. Sisal
4. Ground nuts
5. Sugar

Minerals

1. Gold
2. Coal
3. Tin
4. Iron Ore
5. Chrome
6. Asbestos

NAMIBIA (S.W. AFRICA)

Agriculturals

1. Livestock
2. Maize
3. Ground nuts
4. Beans
5. Wheat
6. Fish

Minerals

1. Diamonds
2. Sulphide Ores
3. Copper
4. Lead
5. Zinc
6. Tin
7. Manganese
8. Germanium
9. Tantalum
10. Lithium

NIGER

Agriculturals

1. Millet
2. Ground nuts
3. Livestock

Minerals: Uranium

NIGERIA

Agriculturals

1. Livestock, Hides, Skins
2. Ground nuts
3. Palm Products
4. Timber
5. Rubber
6. Cotton
7. Cocoa

Minerals

1. Tin
2. Columbite
3. Coal
4. Iron Ore
5. Petroleum
6. Natural Gas

RWANDA

Agriculturals

1. Coffee
2. Cattle, Hides, Skins

Minerals

1. Tin

MAURITANIA

Agriculturals

1. Cereals - Maize, Millet
2. Rice
3. Gum Arabic
4. Livestock
5. Fish

Minerals

1. Iron Ore
2. Copper Ore

SENEGAL

Agriculturals

1. Ground nuts - about 90% of exports
2. Maize
3. Rice
4. Fish

Minerals

1. Phosphates

SIERRA LEONE

Agriculturals

1. Palm Products
2. Tuna

Minerals

1. Iron Ore, Gold, Diamonds
2. Chrome, Platinum, Titanium
3. Bauxite

SOMALIA

Agriculturals

1. Livestock, Hides, Skins
2. Gum, Resins
3. Cane Sugar
4. Cotton
5. Rice
6. Maize

Minerals None

SOUTH AFRICA

Agriculturals

1. Corn, Wheat, Barley, Oats, Maize
2. Fruits
3. Tobacco
4. Cane Sugar
5. Ground nuts
6. Fish
7. Cotton
8. Cattle. Sheet, Merino, Wool

Minerals

1. Gold
2. Diamonds
3. Phosphates
4. Asbestos
5. Coal - 80% of all African Reserves
6. Copper
7. Dolomite
8. Iron Ore
9. Sulphur
10. Uranium
11. Manganese
12. Platinum
13. Chromium
14. Nickel

SUDAN

Agriculturals

1. Cotton - 60% of total export
2. Dura
3. Gum Arabic
4. Ground nuts

Minerals

1. Coper
2. Vermiculite
3. Manganese
4. Iron Ore
5. Gold
6. Petroleum

SWAZILAND

Agriculturals

1. Cotton
2. Sugar
3. Wattle Bark
4. Fruits

Minerals

1. Asbestos
2. Coal
3. Tin
4. Iron Ore
5. Barytes

TANZANIA

Agricultural

1. Cloves
2. Cocoa
3. Sisal
4. Coffee
5. Cotton
6. Tea

Minerals

1. Coal
2. Gold
3. Copper
4. Silver
5. Lead
6. Diamond

TOGO

Agriculturals

1. Coffee
2. Cocoa
3. Palm Products

Minerals

1. Phosphates
2. Bauxite

TUNISIA

Agriculturals

1. Fruits
2. Cereals, Wheat, Barley
3. Cork
4. Olives
5. Dates
6. Sugar

Minerals

1. Phosphates
2. Petroleum
3. Natural Gas
4. Iron Ore
5. Lead
6. Zinc

UGANDA

Agriculturals

1. Cotton
2. Coffee
3. Tea
4. Tobacco
5. Sugar
6. Sisal
7. Maize
8. Ground nuts
9. Livestock, Hides, Skins

Minerals

1. Phosphates
2. Copper
3. Cobalt

UPPER VOLTA

Agriculturals

1. Livestock
2. Cotton
3. Ground nuts
4. Fish
5. Shea Nuts, Shea Butter

Minerals

1. Gold
2. Manganese
3. Copper
4. Bauxite

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

1. Cocoa - 80% exports
2. Coffee
3. Copra
4. Palm Products
5. Bananas
6. Maize
7. Bread fruit
8. Manioc
9. Fishing

Minerals None

ZAIRE

Agriculturals

1. Palm Products
2. Cotton
3. Coffee
4. Timber
5. Rubber
6. Bananas
7. Maize, Beans, Cassava
8. Livestock
9. Tobacco

Minerals

1. Uranium
2. Radium
3. Germanium
4. Cadmium
5. Tantalum
6. Niobium
7. Palladium
8. Coal
9. Zinc
10. Lead
11. Copper - 4th largest reserves in the world
12. Cobalt
13. Tin
14. Tungsten
15. Gold
16. Platinum
17. Coal
18. Petroleum

ZAMBIA

Agriculturals

1. Maize
2. Livestock
3. Coffee
4. Tobacco

Minerals

1. Copper
2. Coal
3. Zinc
4. Lead
5. Vanadium
6. Cobalt
7. Manganese

ZIMBABWE

Agriculturals

1. Wheat, Maize
2. Tea
3. Tobacco
4. Livestock

Minerals

1. Asbestos
2. Coal (Ammonia, Tar, Benzene)
3. Chrome
4. Gold

ANNEX D

PETROLEUM PRODUCERS - AFRICA

Algeria	Provides 95% of exports. Large reserves of gas. OPEC member. OPEC production ceiling 650,000 b/d.
Angola	Cabinda and off-shore production. Not yet a major exporter.
Cameroon	Off-shore production and limited export.
Congo	60% of total exports.
Egypt	31% of total export value.
Gabon	70% of export value. Large gas reserves.
Ivory Coast	Very little production. Net importer.
Libya	A major exporter.
Nigeria	A major exporter. Large gas reserves.
Sudan	Late discovery. No exports yet.
Tunisia	About 45% of total export value.
Zaire	A net exporter. Not yet a major producer.

ANNEX E

MINERALS OF AFRICA

AND THEIR SOURCES

Silver - Tanzania

Nickel - South Africa

Germanium - Namibia, Zaire

Tantalum - Namibia, Zaire

Lithium - Namibia

Vanadium - Zambia

Dolomite - South Africa

Iron Ore - Morocco - Tunisia - Mali - Sierra Leone - Nigeria - Egypt
- Algeria - Mauritania - Guinea - Liberia - Gabon - Sudan
- Angola - Mozambique - Swaziland - South Africa

Phosphates - Morocco - Algeria - Tunisia - Senegal - Mali - Togo - Egypt
- Uganda - Madagasca - South Africa

Manganese - Morocco - Algeria - Upper Volta - Ghana - Gabon - Egypt
- Sudan - Angola - Zambia - Botswana - Namibia - South Africa

Lead - Morocco - Algeria - Tunisia - Congo - Zaire - Tanzania
- Zambia - Namibia

Zinc - Morocco - Algeria - Tunisia - Zaire - Zambia - Namibia

Cobalt - Morocco - Zaire - Uganda - Zambia

Copper - Mauritania - Upper Volta - Congo - Zaire - Sudan
- Uganda - Angola - Mozambique - Zambia
- Botswana - Namibia - South Africa

Bauxite - Guinea - Sierra Leone - Upper Volta - Ghana - Togo
- Gabon - Malawi

Gold - Guinea - Sierra Leone - Liberia - Upper Volta - Ghana - CAR
- Zaire - Sudan - Tanzania - Mozambique - Zimbabwe
- Botswana - South Africa

Diamonds - Guinea - Sierra Leone - Liberia - Ghana - CAR - Zaire
- Tanzania - Angola - Namibia - South Africa

Chrome - Sierra Leone - Zimbabwe - South Africa

Platinum - Sierra Leone - Zaire - South Africa

Titanium - Sierra Leone

Uranium - Niger - Gabon - Zaire - South Africa

Tin - Nigeria - Zaire - Rwanda - Mozambique - Swaziland
- Namibia

Columbite - Nigeria

Coal - Nigeria - Zaire - Tanzania - Angola - Malawi - Botswana
- Mozambique - Zambia - Zimbabwe - Swaziland - South Africa

Cadmium }
Niobium } - Zaire
Tungsten }
Palladium }
Radium }

ANNEX F

AFRICAN CONFLICTS - A CATALOGUE

1. Algeria-Morocco *over Western Sahara. Polisario is supported and based in Algeria. No physical clash between the two countries yet. Basic reason for conflict is a carry-over from the border conflict in early 1960's between Algeria & Morocco.
2. Angola-South Africa *over Namibian problem and the use by SWAPO of Angolan territory to launch attacks into Namibia. International flavor concerns UN, Cuban troops.
3. Angola, Internal *Civil war between government and UNITA, given world prominence due to presence of nearly 30,000 Cuban troops in support of government.
4. Chad, Internal *Civil war - given international importance by the central location of Chad and the threatened domination by Soviet-backed Libya. French and US presence and concern have stalemated the conflict so far.
5. Ethiopia-Somalia *War in the Ogaden presently quiet following Ethiopian victory, which was achieved through Soviet-Cuban assistance. More war likely. The US is now in Somalia and the now traditional US-Soviet rivalry will fuel the conflict to new heights.
6. Ethiopia, Internal *The wars of liberation by the Eritrean and Tigrean movements appear to be unending. Despite massive

Soviet assistance, the wars go on and Ethiopian people are experiencing the worst case of poverty and hunger ever witnessed in Africa. Drought and the war are seen as responsible for the disaster.

7. Ghana-Ivory Coast *recent accusations by Ghana against Ivory Coast could lead to war. Ivory Coast is accused of harboring rebel soldiers who attack Ghana regularly. Given Libyan support for Ghana and the French presence in Ivory Coast, a stage for international conflict is set.

8. Libya-Egypt
Sudan-Chad *The Libyan craze for the bully and the headlines has engulfed its immediate region with fear of attack and destabilization. The presence of the French in Chad, and the AWACS in Egypt/Sudan, are indications of the seriousness of danger to international peace.

9. Morocco-Western
Saharra *The war goes on and Morocco intends to hold on to Western Sahara regardless of international opinion and a considerable drain on resources.

10. Nigeria-Cameroon *A war could erupt any day over the contested border region and the possession of oil-rich sea coast.

11. Seychelles,
Invasion *Mercenary attack remains a constant threat. Tanzanian troop presence provide some security.

12. Somalia-Kenya *The problem of ethnic Somalis in Kenya is a living conflict issue.

13. South Africa
Namibia *The war of independence of Namibia continues.
14. Southern Africa *The internal and regional instability of Southern Africa is a major threat to international peace.
15. Sudan, Internal *The problem of southern Sudan will continue to keep the country on its guard. Alleged meddling by Ethiopia and Libya is internationalizing the problem
16. Uganda, Internal *Since the advent of Idi Amin, Uganda has yet to see peace.
17. Zaire, Internal *Rebellion and invasion within the Katanga province have not occurred lately but the potential is ever present. Instability in Angola presents a base for the insurgents.
18. Zimbabwe, Internal *The internal rebellion of the minority Matabeli and the ruthless military action by government continue.

Comments

Almost all the trouble spots have international connection or possess some potential for such a connection. In each case, the conflict opens doors for foreign intervention through arms sales, basing rights, etc.

The South African conflict, when it finally matures, is likely to engulf the African continent, and probably the entire world. For good or bad, the conflict, whose basis is apartheid, has awakened African nations to the impending danger. Recent forced accommodations with South Africa is certainly an interim solution. A final solution may take a hundred years but it will come, nuclear weapons notwithstanding.

The conflict in the Horn and the Libyan shadow boxing in North East Africa have great strategic significance for the West. The reaction of the West gives cause to believe that this significance is fully appreciated.

ANNEX G

MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FOREIGN POWERS AND AFRICAN NATIONS

- o USA - Egypt. Mutual Defense Agreement 1952.
- o USA - Egypt. Use of Egyptian bases. Dated 1981.
- o USA - Morocco - Use of bases. Dated 1982.
- o USA - Tunisia. Strategic Cooperation Agreement 1981.
- o USSR - Egypt. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in May 1971. Egypt abrogated the treaty in March 1976.
- o Libya - Romania, 1983.
- o Sudan - Romania, 1982.
- o Libya - North Korea, 1982.
- o China - Egypt, 1978.
- o China - Sudan, 1982.
- o USA - Ethiopia, 1975 - Security Assistance Agreement.
- o USA - Ghana, 1972 - Security Assistance Agreement.
- o USA - Kenya, 1980 - Security Assistance Agreement.
- o USA - Liberia, 1972 - Defense & Assistance Agreement.
- o USA - Mali - Defense & Assistance Agreement.
- o USA - Niger, 1962 - Security Assistance Agreement.
- o USA - Senegal, 1962 - Security Assistance Agreement.
- o USA - Zaire, 1972 - Security Assistance Agreement.
- o USA - Somalia, to allow for limited access to naval & air facilities.
- o USA - Kenya, to allow for limited access to naval & air facilities.
- o USSR - Angola, 1976.
- o USSR - Mozambique, 1977.
- o USSR - Ethiopia, 1978, including use of Dahlak Island Naval Base.

- o USSR Military Aid to: Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, Zambia.
- o China - Cameroon, Military Assistance Agreement.
- o China - Equatorial Guinea, Military Assistance Agreement.
- o China - Guinea, Military Assistance Agreement.
- o China - Mali, Military Assistance Agreement.
- o China - Tanzania, Military Assistance Agreement.
- o China has given aid to Mozambique and Zaire.
- o France has military and/or defense agreements with Benin, Camerons, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta and Zaire.
- o France - Djibouti, an agreement to station French forces, 1977.
- o Britain - Kenya.
- o Britain - Uganda.
- o Britain - Zaire.
- o Spain - Equatorial Guinea.
- o Cuba - military relationship including stationing of troops/military advisers to more than ten countries.
- o Israel - South Africa.
- o Israel - Zaire.
- o Several East European countries have military cooperation relationship with African nations.
- o North Korea - Togo.
- o North Korea - Zimbabwe.
- o South Yemen - Libya - Ethiopia.
- o North Korea - Uganda.

ANNEX H

NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY/WEAPONS IN AFRICA

Africa has entered the field of nuclear technology and regrettably has also decided to join the nuclear weapons club. For reasons that remain debatable, South Africa leads the way in this dangerous effort. Libya is said to be obsessed with the idea of being a nuclear power. A chain of predictable reactions to the South African and Libyan efforts has been let off and other countries including Egypt and Nigeria are considering the nuclear option. The known and suspected stages reached by African countries in nuclear matters is given, country by country.

Republic of South Africa

- o Operates two research reactors supplied by US - went into operation in 1965 and 1967, both at Pelindaba, near Pretoria.
- o One of the reactors, the SAFARI-1 is a large reactor, using 90% enriched uranium fuel, output to 10 MW, with capacity for one atomic bomb every four years. By 1981, this capacity has increased to one or two bombs per year.
- o Whether nuclear bombs have been produced is an open question but capability is not in doubt. In fact, on 22 Sep 79, an explosion similar to a nuclear release was detected off the South African Coast. US satellites and a report in the Washington Post all but confirmed that South Africa had exploded a nuclear device.
- o New reactor, 925 MW at Koeberg went into operation in 1983. A French supplied reactor.
- o Another French reactor also at Koeberg is to go into operation in 1984. Capable of producing 250 kg plutonium (30 atomic bombs) per year.

- o Black African nations believe South Africa possesses nuclear weapons. No international safeguards or inspections on South Africa.
- o Nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa is a fact of life. It is believed that nuclear technology has been transferred from Israel to South Africa in exchange for South African uranium. Israeli technicians have worked at South Africa's uranium enrichment plants at Pelindaba.
- o Along with Israel, it is believed that assistance to South African nuclear efforts came from the UK, West Germany and France. The use of US reactors and initial fuel has been mentioned.

Libya

- o Operating a 10 MW research reactor at Tajura.
- o Installing Soviet supplied nuclear-power reactor 440 MW with capability to produce 100 kg of plutonium (or 20 nuclear weapons) a year.
- o Libya signed the nuclear treaty and has its facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
- o Tried to buy a nuclear weapon from PRC!
- o Cooperates in nuclear matters with Pakistan and Argentina.

Egypt

- o Egypt has had a research reactor at Inshas, near Cairo since 1961. Reactor supplied by the USSR.
- o Intends to install a nuclear power reactor - also imported from the USSR.

Comments

One would ask why would South Africa and/or Libya want a nuclear weapons' capability? Whatever the reasons, and there are many, the possession of the capability has given rise to a nuclear arms race in Africa. The nuclear debate is loud in Nigeria. It will be difficult to restrain Egypt in the face

of the Libyan program. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a major threat to world peace.

With the West turning a blind eye to and in many ways extending direct and indirect assistance through Israel to South Africa, and the USSR giving full backing to the unpredictable Libyan leader, the superpowers should take the responsibility for the on-coming disaster.

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