FISCAL YEAR 1983 READINESS ASSESSMENT OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS



Reserve Forces Policy Board
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

28 AUG 1984

Mr. Louis J. Conti
Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Chairman Conti:

My personal thanks to you and the members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for your frank and forthright assessment of Reserve Component readiness. As we continue to work together in resolving challenges, I am pleased to note the Board's independently derived judgment that overall Reserve Component capability continues to improve.

The mobilization, deployment and war-fighting capability of our Reserve Forces is an essential key to the defense of this nation.

Sincerely,

Caspar W. Weinberger

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

July 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RA)

SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components--INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

I am pleased to send herewith the Reserve Forces Policy Board's independent assessment of Reserve Component Readiness for Fiscal Year 1983. As members of the Total Force, Guard and Reserve readiness and responsiveness are essential components and thus serve as the central focus of this report.

Fiscal Year 1983 marks the third year that the Board has independently collected detailed data from the Services for analysis as part of the process for preparing this Readiness Assessment. We have also expanded this year's report by adding new chapters on Medical Readiness and Full-Time Support to the Reserve Components.

Equipment shortfall continues to be the most serious and limiting factor affecting Force Readiness. The Board continues to express its concern over the lack of modern equipment in an effort to raise the visibility of the issue and to encourage remedial efforts by the Services.

The Board believes that the overall capabilities of Reserve Component units continues to improve. This improvement was principally the result of increasing numbers of trained unit personnel and the receipt of substantial amounts of modern equipment.

The Board joins me in expressing our appreciation to you for your outspoken support of the Guard and Reserve and their programs. We hope the enclosed report will assist you as you continue to review the role of the Reserve Components in the Total Force and allocate the resources necessary for assured military preparedness.

Louis J. Conti
Chairman

Enclosure

RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD

FISCAL YEAR 1983

READINESS ASSESSMENT OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

This report represents the views of the members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

June 1984

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D.C. 20301

Table of Contents

Table of Contents
(Continued)

Table of Contents
(Continued)

Table of Contents
(Continued)

Table of Contents
(Continued)

Table of Contents
(Continued)

List of Tables

List of Tables

List of Tables

List of Tables

List of Tables

List of Tables

CA = Classified Annex

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

General

This is the seventh year that the Reserve Forces Policy Board has prepared an annual readiness assessment of the Reserve Components and the third year that the Board has independently collected detailed data from the Services for analysis as part of the process for preparing this readiness assessment.

The purpose of this FY 1983 Readiness Assessment is threefold:

- To present the Board's evaluation of the readiness condition of the Reserve Components in FY 1983.
- To note significant progress or shortfalls in readiness since previous Board assessments.
- To make recommendations for improving future Reserve Component readiness.

This year's report has been expanded by adding two new sections: a chapter on Medical Readiness and a chapter on Full-Time Support to the Reserve Components.

Because of its statutory responsibility, the Board concentrates on problems and accomplishments of the Reserve Components. The Board recognizes, however, that many problems discussed herein are also prevalent in the Active Components and that the needs of the Total Force--Active and Reserve--must be served by the same limited resources. The Board, therefore, seeks to approach all its work from a Total Force perspective.

As in past reports, the Board again expresses its view that the current Unit Status Reports (USR), commonly called "readiness report," should be uniform, address the same criteria, and include the applicable uniform assumptions and considerations, so that all Services can report their "readiness" on the same standardized basis.

Selected Reserve Contributions to the Total Force

In this report the Board examines overall contributions of the Reserve Components to the Total Force for the 15-year period FY 1975 through FY 1989, including review of the last three Program Objective Memoranda (POM). This analysis shows some noteworthy differences in planning assumptions during these three POM periods.

- Selected Reserve strength is projected to show substantial increases during the planning periods.
- Strength of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is now projected to increase moderately during the FY 83-89 period.
- It is apparent that during the current POM period, there will be a greater reliance on the Reserve Components.
- The variation among the three planning periods reflects changing defense guidance based upon political and fiscal realities.

Measured by manpower, the total contributions of the Selected Reserve to total manpower at the end of FY 1983 were as follows: Army, 47%; Navy, 16%; Marine Corps, 18%; Air Force, 22%; and Coast Guard, 25%.

Reserve Component Readiness Summaries

Although use of the Unit Status Report data to portray readiness has some inherent limitations, it is the only multi-service data system which permits comparisons within and among the Services on the readiness of personnel, equipment and training.

In addition to the need for standardization of the reports mentioned above, the Board believes all units should be required to submit such information regularly.

Quantitative and qualitative defects in the current readiness reporting system make analysis and decision making difficult. Nevertheless, some overall conclusions can be drawn from analysis of data available.

- Nearly half (49%) of all DOD Reserve Component Units are rated combat ready (C-3 or better).

- This percentage is down from the 1982 level of 55% largely because of the temporary effects of modernization.

- The Coast Guard Reserve's readiness increased significantly from 88% in 1982 to 97% in 1983.

- On an overall basis, all Department of Defense Reserve Component Units rated C-3 or better declined in their overall readiness levels with the exception of the Naval Reserve (+11%) and the Air Force Reserve (+1%).

- The number of units reporting readiness appears to have improved substantially in FY 1983 as compared to FY 1982. In the case of the Army Reserve Components, a substantial number of units do not report readiness directly but are included within the readiness reports of a major organization.

- As part of the Board's efforts this year, much of the inaccurate FY 1982 data has been corrected and a new "base line" for readiness data established for FY 1983.

- On balance, the Board believes that the overall capabilities of Reserve Component Units continues to improve. This improvement was principally the result of increasing numbers of trained unit personnel and the receipt of substantial amounts of modern equipment.

The two major limitations to Reserve Component readiness generally remained unchanged from 1981 to 1983. These two limiting factors were, in order of importance:

- Equipment on Hand

- Personnel -- principally, the lack of individual skill qualification.

Furthermore, the report discloses that there were significant differences in limitations to readiness among various categories of units and among the seven Reserve Components.

The Coast Guard faces a serious personnel problem which urgently needs attention. Continued limitations on Active service strength have increased the importance of the Coast Guard Reserve which would be required immediately upon mobilization to support strategic mobility with the protection of inland and coastal waterways and major ports.

Coast Guard Reserve strength has remained constant at 12,000 for several years; however, it's early response mobilization requirements will be 24,000. By the Board's analysis, even when the IRR, retirees and Standby Reservists are counted against the shortfall, the Coast Guard will still be at least 6,000 individuals short of its mobilization requirements. The Board, therefore, recommends:

- That the Congress review this issue and consider increases in the authorized strength of the Coast Guard Reserve.

- That resources and missions be provided to the Coast Guard Reserve which will enhance and augment the extensive peacetime missions while, at the same time, enhancing mobilization and wartime capabilities.

Manpower Readiness Indicators

The manpower strength of the Total Force, both Active and Reserve, increased only slightly during FY 1983. The Active Components' strength increased 0.7% from 1982 levels while the Selected Reserve increased by 4.2%. Budget constraints, along with a strong enlistment demand in 1983, enabled the Services to practice selective enlistment and re-enlistment policies. FY 1983 was a year for the Services to improve the quality of the force.

The Board examined wartime unit strength requirements alongside actual or programmed trained unit strength for the period 1977 to 1989. Since last year's report, there has been a substantial increase in the projected Selected Reserve trained unit strength shortfalls for the FY 1984-FY 1989 period. The reason for these differences is that estimates of wartime unit strength requirements have increased more rapidly than the estimates of wartime trained unit manpower available.

The Board remains concerned with the continued attempts to reduce manpower recruiting, retention and bonus resources for the Selected Reserve simply because there have been increases in the end strength. As more missions are assigned to the Selected Reserve, strength requirements will increase, and thus, these manpower related resources are even more urgently needed.

Much remains to be done to close the gap between wartime strength requirements and trained unit strength.

In several previous reports, the Board has expressed its concern over the inadequacy of the pre-trained manpower pool for any future mobilization. Current DOD projections for growth of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) are far more optimistic than last year. During the 8-year period FY 1982 through FY 1989, the total IRR/ING is projected to grow 34%, reaching a total of 512,000.

The Board believes these projects of IRR/ING strength are overly optimistic and unattainable in light of continued manning level constraints. The Board again recommends that retired Reserve Component members who have completed 20 or more years of service but have not yet reached age 60 should be added to the mobilization pool. This could be accomplished by requiring these individuals to keep their Service informed of their addresses and to supply signed statements of physical health regularly in exchange for access to no cost/low cost privileges, the exchange and Space A travel.

Equipment Readiness Indicators

Equipment continues to be the most serious and limiting factor affecting force readiness of the Reserve Components. The Reserve Forces Policy Board has issued several reports and presented testimony to the Congress on this urgent problem. The Congress has expressed its concern by requiring annual reports from the Services on the status of Reserve Component equipment.

The Board continues to express its concern with the practice of some services to count as "on-hand and ready" non-deployable items of equipment or substitute items which have been issued in lieu of the normal line items of equipment. The Board believes this practice conceals the magnitude of the equipment shortfalls

facing the nation in both our Active and Reserve Components and does not allow these shortfalls to be properly addressed by the decision-makers during the resource allocation process. The Board recommends that such substitute items should be accounted for and reported separately in the Unit Status Report so that they can be clearly identified.

The Army's logistical management systems and severe shortages of equipment in the Army Reserve Components have drawn strong criticism from the Board in previous reports. The Board is now pleased to acknowledge significant progress by the Army staff in planning for equipping the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

The Army has adopted a series of initiatives designed to improve the ratio of equipment on hand to wartime requirements, modernize Reserve Component equipment on hand, dedicate equipment procurement for the Reserve Component and improve the equipment management programs and management information systems.

For the National Guard, a special problem arises with the issue of more equipment. More and larger armories are needed for this purpose, but present law requires states to fund 25% of the cost of National Guard armories. Since these new needs result from federal mobilization requirements, the Board recommends that the split should be 90%-10% instead of the present 75%-25%.

Training Readiness Indicators

Training readiness will be crucial to selection of units for utilization in any future mobilization. Training readiness is directly influenced by personnel strength, skill qualification, the availability and readiness of equipment and availability of training funds. Continued constraints on personnel training funds and travel funds have had significant impact on Reserve Component training readiness.

More training and travel funds are urgently needed in the Reserve Components to meet their increased responsibilities and to improve Reserve Component readiness.

The use of simulators and electronic training aids are a cost effective way to make the most effective use of training time.

The Board strongly recommends additional funding for simulators and electronic training aids for the Reserve Components.

Despite the difficulty of a precise measurement of training readiness, the following are widely accepted views of the scope and level of Reserve Component training:

- The general level of training in the Reserve Components has improved significantly over recent years.
- The training readiness of many Reserve Component units is as good as, and in some cases better than, Active Component units.
- The two major limitations to Reserve Component readiness are lack of equipment and trained personnel.
- Total Force exercises integrating Active and Reserve Components, often in multiple Services, are becoming the rule rather than the exception.

The Reserve Components today are no longer a force "in reserve" but rather an integral part of the Total Force performing "real world" missions alongside the Active Components. These missions require a high level of training readiness. This being the case, Reservists or survivors of Reservists killed or injured on any such mission status should be accorded the same entitlements as Active Component members.

Many Reserve Component units need additional training time to meet their training readiness requirement. Because of civilian job commitments, additional training should be as flexible as possible. The Board recommends that authority be granted for seven additional training days, not necessarily continuous, to be performed at the unit commander's discretion for the enhancement of small unit training.

Medical Readiness

The Board agrees with the statement that "Inadequate combat casualty care capability is a war stopper." It is clear that the total number of health care personnel available in the Guard,

Reserve and Active Components to meet wartime requirements has increased since FY 1982. However, the combined strength of medical personnel in all components is only equal to 35% of the Services' total health care wartime requirements. Serious shortfalls exist in all categories of physicians, surgeons, nurses, corpsmen/medics and health care specialists.

The Board continues to support a change to current OSD policy that "forces out", through a screening process, Standby Reservists who refuse to upgrade their status to Selected Reserve or IRR. The Board recommends policies to encourage all health care personnel to remain within the Reserve program.

The Board also recommends that the Selective Service law be amended to provide for registration and identification of professional medical personnel who could be drafted in the event of conflict.

Medical equipment presents another serious problem. Increases in the Guard and Reserve medical equipment inventory levels are urgently needed, the Board recommends support for such plans and budgets at the highest levels.

Budget and Resource Allocations

For the 15 year period FY 1975 through FY 1989, total Defense appropriations are forecast to increase 284%. The impact of modernizing the Force and the increasing cost of equipment is reflected in the 912% projected increase in total procurement appropriations over the same period.

Comparing the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) for the period FY 1984-1988 and FY 1985-89, the Board notes the percentage of defense appropriations which constitute support to the Guard and Reserve increased from 3.4% to 4%. This is an important improvement.

The Board remains seriously concerned however, that the 15 year period still reflects a decrease in the Reserve Components' share of the Defense budget from 5.6% in FY 1975 to 4.0% in FY 1989.

Full-Time Support to the Reserve Components

Since the Viet Nam era, the Active Component end strengths have been constrained while many additional responsibilities have been placed on the Reserve Components. These responsibilities mean increased readiness, improved mobilization and rapid deployment capability. Central to all these issues is time. More full-time support personnel are needed in the Reserve Components to maintain records and equipment, develop training and mobilization plans and assure that unit personnel optimize their training time.

At the end of FY 1983, overall full-time support of the Reserve Components represented 13% of Selected Reserve strength. Full-time support is projected to increase to 17% of end strength by FY 1989.

While recognizing the urgent need for these continuing increases in full-time support personnel, the Board has consistently supported the policy that each Service should be allowed to establish its own mix of full-time support personnel best suited for each Reserve Component.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Total Force Policy -- The Background

On August 21, 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird stated:

> "I am concerned with the readiness of Guard and Reserve units to respond to contingency requirements, and with the lack of resources that have been made available to the Guard and Reserve commanders to improve Guard and Reserve readiness."

In announcing Department of Defense "Support for Guard and Reserve Forces", Secretary Laird laid the groundwork for what we now call the Total Force Policy by stating:

> "...I desire that the Secretaries of the Military Departments provide in...future budgets, the necessary resources to permit the appropriate balance in the development of Active, Guard and Reserve Forces."
>
> "...A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve Forces."
>
> "...Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces."

The establishment of the All Volunteer Force and the Active Force drawdown following the Viet Nam war era precipitated

interest in a military policy that would provide the best defense given the available resources. In keeping with this goal, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Jr. expanded on the Total Force Concept memorandum of Secretary Laird and announced the Total Force Policy on August 23, 1973. He stated:

> "An itegral part of the central purpose of this Department -- to build and maintain the necessary forces to deter war and to defend our country -- is the Total Force Policy as it pertains to the Guard and Reserve. It must be clearly understood that implicit in the Total Force Policy...is the fact that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active forces.
>
> "Total Force is no longer a "concept." It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole."

The substance of this policy was to increase the role and responsibilities of the Reserve Component Forces as major participants in the nation's defense.

In addition, Secretary Schlesinger prescribed the need for defining the mission contributions of the Reserve Components, as well as the criteria and mechanisms necessary for measuring mission readiness against wartime requirements. Consequently, Service Secretaries were again directed to provide the resources necessary to produce a Reserve Force fully capable of meeting its commitments.

Succeeding Secretaries of Defense have agreed with and have added to the original policy statement. In turn, the Services and their respective Reserve Components have continued to work together in outlining a realistic integration of mission responsibilities and in developing the structures necessary to meet the contribution objectives set for the Reserve Components.

As a result of one of the Board's FY 1981 readiness report recommendations, and with the full support of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger issued two significant policy statements which markedly strengthened the commitment of the Department of Defense toward a full partnership of the Reserve Components and their Active Component counterparts in the total military force of the United States.

Although significant advances have been made in implementing the Total Force policy, the Board feels there are many areas in which much work remains to be done.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board Annual Readiness Assessment Report

General

This is the seventh year that the Board has prepared an annual readiness assessment of the Reserve Components. The Board first prepared its readiness assessment in 1977 as the result of a request from the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Since that first effort, the Board has continued to report to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress its independent review on Reserve Force readiness and to recommend changes in policy or law which would enhance the ability of the Guard and Reserve to meet the increasing demands placed upon them.

Purpose

The purpose of the FY 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components is threefold:

- To present the Board's evaluation of the readiness condition of Reserve Components in FY 1983.
- To note significant progress or shortfalls in readiness since previous Readiness Assessment reports.
- To make recommendations for improving future Reserve Component readiness.

Methodology

This report uses as a point of departure the Board's Fiscal Year 1981 and Fiscal Year 1982 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components.

Data was collected through individual Service Action Officers, and evaluated by the Board's staff. The analyzed data,

along with conclusions supported by the data, were then returned to the original source for verification and comment. All differences of interpretation of data and the conclusions drawn from that data were resolved between the Board's staff and data sources or exceptions were noted when agreement was not possible.

The final draft of the report was then submitted to the full Board which carefully reviewed it, added comments, and voted approval of the document. The document was then modified to incorporate the Board's changes and comments and circulated to all Services for comments only as to errors of fact or classification of data -- not editorial content.

Much of the data in this report is contained in other publications of the individual Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Some of the data set forth in the report was produced exclusively for the Board's readiness assessment report and appears in no other documents.

The data in this report has been evaluated for its authenticity and representation. All conclusions in the report are based upon data provided by the Services. Whenever possible, comparisons are made with data presented in previous readiness assessment reports.

Although the information contained in this report is unclassified, classified data was consulted, and where applicable for inclusion in the report, the information was processed to reduce its classified nature. For example, some specific data was converted to relative data or percentages, when such data was included in the report.

Some of the data for Reserve Component readiness levels remains classified and has been prepared as a SECRET Annex to this report. The Classified Annex to the Fiscal Year 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components is available to authorized recipients upon written request to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Room 3B260 - The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301.

Scope and Limitations of FY 1983 Readiness Assessment Report

This report is a comprehensive evaluation of the readiness of all Reserve Components including, where applicable, the Coast Guard Reserve.

Set forth in the report are the contributions to the Total Force of individual Reserve Components and the critical factors the Board has identified as having an adverse and limiting effect on Reserve Component readiness.

This year's report has been expanded to include data concerning medical readiness and full-time manning support programs.

Last year's readiness assessment report analyzed the equipment status of the Reserve Components in considerable detail. This year's report continues to emphasize equipping our Reserve Components.

Mission oriented training of Reserve Component units is further examined in this year's report.

This report once again includes a consideration of both past and projected Reserve Component budget appropriations. The analysis of the appropriation provides a basis for understanding and forecasting possible future Reserve Component readiness issues.

Throughout this readiness assessment, the Board presents its observations and recommendations for corrective action to overcome readiness shortfalls. Where appropriate, the Board recognizes areas in which improvements in Reserve Component readiness have been made from previous assessment periods.

A careful comparison between FY 1982 and FY 1983 data will reveal some differences. Generally, the differences are minor and do not change the substance of any of the observations or conclusions.

A Balanced Approach

This report reflects the Board's independent assessment as to the readiness and capability of the Guard and Reserve to meet their mobilization or wartime objectives. It is by nature a parochial document in that the focus is on serious problems or deficiencies which confront the Reserve Components as well as on those areas where significant advances or improvements have been made in the status of the Guard and Reserve.

It is not the intent of the Board to suggest that the problems discussed herein are exclusive to the Reserve Components or to ignore the equipment shortages and other problems which exist in the Active Components. It is recognized and acknowledged that many of the problems discussed herein are also prevalent in the Active Components and that the needs of the Total Force -- Active and Reserve -- must be served by the same limited resources.

It is the intent of the Board to highlight herein the most serious deficiencies which exist in the Guard and Reserve so they may be brought to the attention of and addressed by the Department of Defense leadership during the planning and programming cycles of resource allocation. It is also the Board's intent to provide recognition where it is merited.

The Board does not wish to suggest or imply that this report is an all inclusive review or assessment of the ability of our Reserve Components to perform their wartime mission.

Definition of Terms

"Readiness" -- Webster's Third International Dictionary (1976) defines the word "readiness" as:

> "...the quality or state of being ready."

"Ready" -- Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1975) defines the word "ready", in part, as:

> "prepared mentally or physically for some experience or action; prepared for immediate use; immediately available."

The Board selected the term "readiness assessment report" because of its common, albeit often improper use, within the defense community.

The report is a "snap-shot" of various indicators that influence the capability of a military force ("units") to perform its mission.

JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, offers the following definitions:

> "Operationally ready -- Capable of performing the missions or functions for which organized or designed. Incorporates both equipment readiness and personnel readiness...."
>
> "Operational readiness evaluation -- An evaluation of the operational capability and effectiveness of a unit or any portions thereof."

Indeed, if units have an adverse indicator of readiness, it has a direct bearing on that unit's capability or capacity to perform its mission. The unit can perform a mission but the degree or intensity or level of its capability to do so will be adversely affected by the stated deficiency. In other words, these deployable units have a reduced, or diminished, capability.

The Board considered changing the name of this report from "readiness assessment" to "capability assessment" but elected to continue with its current name and format.

As highlighted in last year's report, each Service applies different standards and criteria to measure its "readiness".

Various reports required by the Services, such as the Unit Status and Identification Report (UNITREP), sometimes referred to as "the Unit Status Report" (USR), are designed to measure certain select elements of a military force such as people, equipment and training. These are not all inclusive elements. The reports are used principally for the prioritization of resource allocations based upon the requirements of the Service. They are not designed to contain all information needed for a comprehensive evaluation of the broader aspects of readiness of the entire force.

Through these reports, which use different reporting standards, assumptions and mechanisms, each Service reports a condition which is not, in reality, its state of readiness as defined above, but the degree of capability its units have to perform their mission.

The Board remains convinced that the Secretary of Defense must redefine the purpose of the current "readiness reports" and direct a specific set of standards to be contained therein. The reports must be uniform, address the same criteria, and include the applicable uniform assumptions and considerations, in order that all Services report their "readiness" on the same, standardized basis.

Organization of the Report

The report is comprised of nine chapters which focus on the following topics pertaining to the Reserve Components:

Chapter 1: The Introduction offers a brief background as to the orgin and nature of the annual Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components report and provides the reader with an overview of the Fiscal Year 1983 edition of the report.

Chapter 2: Selected Reserve Contributions to the Total Force outlines each of the Selected Reserve Components' contribution to the Total Force in terms of strength and mission.

Chapter 3: Reserve Component Readiness Summaries contains an analysis of each of the Reserve Components' operational readiness as well as major factors limiting such readiness.

Chapter 4: Manpower Readiness Indicators contains a comprehensive compilation of Reserve Component manpower statistics. The data includes "wartime strength versus actual strength" comparisons, manpower projections, and such manpower characteristics as educational, age, skill, rank and grade profiles.

Chapter 5: Equipment Readiness Indicators focuses on the equipment issue. Equipment remains the most serious and limiting factor affecting Reserve Component readiness. The chapter provides equipment summaries from the various Reserve Components as well as on-hand equipment inventory comparisons to respective wartime requirements for the Guard and Reserve. Significant changes in Reserve Component equipment inventories are also discussed.

Chapter 6: Training Readiness Indicators addresses the most difficult element of Reserve Component readiness to accurately measure: training. This chapter focuses primarily on sum-

marizing the mission contributions of the Reserve Component within the Total Force.

Chapter 7: Medical Readiness is a new addition for this year's report. Due to the vital significance of the medical readiness of the Reserve Component, a separate, comprehensive chapter has been created to examine various aspects of this subject. Such aspects include the medical contributions to the total force by the Reserve Component, detailed profiles of unit readiness of Reserve Component medical units, and a comparison of medical personnel requirements for the various Reserve Components. This chapter also focuses on comparisons between wartime medical personnel requirements and actual medical personnel availability in the Guard, Reserve, IRR, Standby Reserve, and Active Component. Such focus also features cost comparisons of Reserve Component medical equipment under actual and wartime scenarios including projected wartime shortfalls.

Chapter 8: Budget and Resource Allocations includes actual and projected comparisons of Guard and Reserve appropriations to total defense appropriations as well as a comparison of Reserve Component appropriations for selected budget years.

Chapter 9: Full-Time Support to the Reserve Components is also a new addition to this year's readiness assessment report. It closely examines and defines the current status of each of the Reserve Components' various full-time support programs and includes projections of full-time manpower strengths to 1989.

Readership

The Board distributes this report to senior Active, Reserve and civilian leadership throughout the Department of Defense. In addition, extensive distribution is made to the Executive Branch, and Members of Congress and their staff. The Board is pleased with the response and support it has received for this document and pledges its continued effort to produce a quality product.

It was once written that "readership is a passing parade". It is certainly no exception that the readership of the various reports prepared by the Reserve Forces Policy Board varies from year to year. It is, therefore, no accident that we have repeated pertinent material published in previous reports, since such not only tells the story to a largely new group of readers, but also reinforces what was stated in past years.

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CHAPTER 2

SELECTED RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL FORCE

Composition of the Total Force 1975-1989

The overall contribution of the Reserve Components to the Total Force is shown on Table 2.1. This Table illustrates the significance of the Reserve Components to the Total Force from 1975 through 1989.

This table was first published by the Board in 1981. The table reflects three specific Program Objective Memorandum (POM) periods. Table 2.1 is not intended to reflect budget execution but is intended to demonstrate prevailing long-range plans within the Department of Defense at a point in time. Analysis of Table 2.1 reveals some noteworthy differences in the planning assumptions during these three periods.

- Active Force strength is projected to show a slight increase as compared to earlier projections.
- Selected Reserve strength is projected to show substantial increases during the projected periods.
- The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) strength projections have changed from the FY 1981-FY 1987 estimates. Currently, the strength of the IRR is projected to increase moderately during the FY 1983-FY 1989 period.
- It is apparent that during the current POM period, there will be a greater reliance on the Reserve Forces.
- The variation among the three different planning periods reflects changing defense guidance based upon the political and fiscal realities.

TABLE 2.1

Composition of the Total Force, 1975-1989



Sources:
Actual: *Military Manpower Statistics*, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense, Sept. 1983; Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) FY 1983 Summary.
Projected: *Five-Year Defense Program*, *Program Objective Memorandum (FY 1985-1989)*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Importance of Selected Reserve Components to the Total Force

Tables 2.2 through 2.6 summarize each Reserve Component's share of the contribution to the Total Force, by Service and by specific categories.

As used herein, the term "Total Force" means the combination of the Active Forces and the Reserve Forces within a service, or the combination of all Active and Reserve Component forces within the Department of Defense. In this context, the Total Force does not include the civilian work force or its contribution to each Service's mobilization requirement.

Information concerning various Reserve Component contributions to their respective Service was readily available from each of the Reserve Components. The examples given are continually evaluated by both Active and Reserve planners for the purpose of making the best use of available manpower and resources.

TABLE 2.2
ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS' CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOTAL ARMY

MAJOR RESERVE ELEMENTS	Army National Guard % of Total Force	Army Reserve % of Total Force	Combined % of Total Force
Combat Divisions	33	-	33
Separate Brigades	70	11	81
Special Forces Groups	25	25	50
Special Forces Battalions	19	19	38
Infantry Battalions	64	7	71
TLAT 1/ Infantry Battalions	100	-	100
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	42	2	44
Infantry Scout Troops	100	-	100
Armored Battalions	43	2	45
Armored Cavalry	57	-	57
Field Artillery Battalions	50	9	59
Heavy Helicopter Company	100	-	100
Medium Helicopter Company	25	25	50
Pathfinder Units	50	43	93
Combat Engineer Battalions/Units	43	26	69
Conventional Ammo Companies	22	51	73
Truck Companies (all)	36	30	66
Maintenance Companies (all)	51	22	73
Army Hospitals (MTOE)	11	62	73
Medical Units (other)	24	40	64
Supply and Service Capability	22	58	80
Civil Affairs Units	-	97	97
Training Divisions	-	100	100
Training Brigades	-	100	100
Psychological Operations Units	-	89	89
Judge Advocate General Units	2	98	100
Corps Support Groups HHC	17	62	79
Major Logistic Units TAACOM and COSCOM HHC/MMC Commands	8	31	39
Engineer Bridge Company (non-Div)	42	28	70
QM POL Operating Co	37	63	100
Chemical Units - Smoke Generator	14	86	100
Corps Signal Bns	55	9	64
Public Affairs Units	65	30	95
Military Police Cos (non-Div)	47	21	68
Railroad Units	-	100	100
Watercraft Companies	14	45	59
Overall Selected Reserve Manpower	28%	18%	47%

1/ TLAT = Tow Light Anti-Tank

Data as of: September 30, 1983

TABLE 2.3
NAVAL RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL NAVY

Reserve Element	Percent of Total Force	
CONUS Based Logistic Airlift (VR)	100	
Composite Service Squadrons (VC)	100	1/
Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HAL)	100	
Combat Search and Rescue (SAR)	100	
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare	100	
Control of Shipping Organization	99	
Ocean Minesweepers	86	
Cargo Handling Battalions	86	
Military Sealift Command (Military Pers)	75	
Mobile Construction Battalions	68	
Special Boat Forces	66	
Intelligence Personnel	34	
Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons (VP)	35	
Medical Support	30	
Tactical Carrier Air Wings (CVW)	14	
Base Operating Support	9	
Surface Combatants (Frigates)	4	
Amphibious Warfare Ships	3	2/
Overall Selected Reserve Manpower	16%	

Note:

1/ The overseas composite squadrons (VC) have been decommissioned. All remaining VC squadrons are CONUS based and are 100% Naval Reserve organizations.

2/ The figure for Amphibious Warfare Ships declined by 6% due to the transfer of two LKA type ships from the Reserve to the Active Fleet.

Data as of: September 30, 1983

TABLE 2.4

MARINE CORPS RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL MARINE CORPS

MAJOR RESERVE ELEMENTS	Percent of Total Force
Marine Division/Air Wing	25
Marine Observation Aircraft Units	29
Marine Light Attack Aircraft Squadrons	30
Marine Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalions	33
Marine Tank Battalions	40
Civil Affairs Group	100
Force Reconnaissance Units	50
Self Propelled 8"/175mm Artillery Batteries	33
Self Propelled 155mm Artillery Batteries	43
Bulk Fuel Units 1/	25
Force Service Military Police 2/	40
Overall Selected Reserve Manpower 3/	18%

Note:

1/ Active units will not be fully manned until FY 1985.

2/ Active units man two platoons in each Company by FY 1985. Reserve units are manned at 100%.

3/ There are three Active and one Reserve Marine Corps Divisions. The 4th Division accounts for 25% of the Total Ground Combat Marine Force Structure.

Data as of: September 30, 1983

TABLE 2.5

AIR RESERVE COMPONENTS' CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOTAL AIR FORCE

MAJOR RESERVE ELEMENTS	Air National Guard % of Total Force	Air Force Reserve % of Total Force	Combined % of Total Force
CONUS Strategic Interceptor Forces	66		66
Tactical Reconnaissance	54		54
Tactical Airlift	32	27	59
Tactical Fighters	27	7	34
Aerial Refueling/Strategic Tankers	17	4	21
Air Rescue/Recovery	14	23	37
Special Operations		28	28
Tactical Electronic Warfare	26		26
Tactical Air Control	33		33
Weather Reconnaissance		28	28
Strategic Airlift Aircrews		49	49
Aeromedical Airlift Aircrews		30	30
Tanker/Cargo Aircrews		50	50
Combat Communications Units	70		70
Aerial Port Units	9	47	56
Combat Logistics Support Squadrons		58	58
Medical Service Personnel		22	22
Strategic Airlift (Maintenance Crews)		40	40
Deployable Civil Engineering and Services Personnel	27	13	40
Special Operations Gunships		50	50
Overall Selected Reserve Manpower	13%	9%	22%

Data as of: September 30, 1983

TABLE 2.6

COAST GUARD RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL COAST GUARD

MAJOR RESERVE ELEMENTS	Percent of Total Force
Port Security Force (9650 Personnel)	75
Augmentees: 1/	
Vessels (1000 Personnel)	10
Aviation (200 Personnel)	6
RCC (150 Personnel)	33
MMS (200 Personnel)	25
Support/other (300 Personnel)	4 2/
Early-Reserve Mobilization Requirements:	
High Endurance Cutter wartime personnel	17
Patrol Boat wartime personnel	26
Port and Marine Safety wartime personnel	87
Support Center and Base personnel	9
Training Facility wartime personnel	15
Command and Control, Management and Support wartime personnel	13
Overall Selected Reserve Manpower	25%

Note:

1/ The numbers above are the best approximations available. The exact size of the peacetime base is difficult to determine because of the multi-mission nature of most operating units.

Last year's USCGR's data for contributions to the Total Force tended to be an indication of the degree of support for units involved in peacetime missions. This year the USCGR has changed the categories in which the data is collected such that the figures presented herein are more of an indication of the mobilization duties for which the personnel and units are in training. The overall size and nature of the USCGR has not changed. The changes indicated above are accounted for by the change in the computational base and an internal reallocation of resources.

2/ The percentage of change for the "support/other" category could not be computed due to the fact that the 1982 figure had not been included in the FY 1982 Readiness Assessement of the Reserve Components Report.

Data as of: September 30, 1983

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CHAPTER 3

RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS SUMMARIES

General

Background

The principal method of measuring unit readiness is through the use of the Unit Status Report (USR). This report is required by each Service and provides a uniform method within the Service to evaluate the readiness of a unit. Each Service has its own criteria on the types of units required to submit reports, the frequency reports are to be submitted, and the evaluation standards by which readiness is to be measured.

It is generally recognized that Unit Status Report data is not a precise measure of the combat capabilities of a unit; USR data is a management tool to be used in allocating resources.

Although the use of Unit Status Report data to portray readiness has some inherent limitations, it is the only multi-service data system which permits comparisons within and among Services on the readiness of personnel, equipment, and training.

Based upon the evaluation of Unit Status Report data, the Board believes that all units should be required to submit such information regularly and that the criteria used by all Services to evaluate unit status should be standardized to the greatest extent possible.

Classified Annex

The data presented in the tables which follow are based upon classified readiness information provided by the Services. In order to offer an unclassified across-the-board analysis on the readiness levels of the various Reserve Forces, the Board, after

extensive and close coordination with the Services last year, developed a formula which portrays the data in abstract percentages.

As in the past, the Board has prepared a classified annex to this report. Classified Annex to the Fiscal Year 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components is classified SECRET and includes detailed profiles of unit readiness for each of the Reserve Components. Classified Annex (short title) is available to authorized recipients upon written request.

Caution Needed When Interpreting Readiness Data

When reviewing the data contained in this chapter, it must be remembered that the information is the product of five different Service requirements which examine different readiness elements from differing points of view. It must also be remembered that each Service has different individual readiness reporting criteria and that direct comparison of individual reporting elements of a Service's readiness data is not meaningful.

Further complicating comparison of readiness data among Services is the fact that each Service has different requirements for the type of units which report readiness.

The reason given for the higher percentage (25%) of Army Reserve units which do not report readiness is that there is a high preponderance of non-combat units that are specifically organized for a single mission. These units, generally Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units, are organized with the required number of personnel and equipment necessary to accomplish a specific mission. TDA units are normally non-deploying units -- that is, their wartime mission is within the United States (see JCS PAM 6, Volume II, Part 2, Chapter 1).

In contrast, in the other Reserve Components where nearly all units are required to report readiness, there is often a lack of comparability between similar type units in a Service's Active and Reserve Components. These dissimilarities are often both quantitative and qualitative in nature and are most easily seen when comparing flying units.

Reserve Component flying units are generally organized with fewer "required" aircraft and with older, less combat capable

aircraft, as compared to their Active Component counterpart. Although both components within a Service may report readiness of their flying units to be C-1 "fully combat ready", using identical reporting criteria, it is clear that these similar units do not have the same combat capability.

For example, an Active Component squadron with 24 primary aircraft "required" and on hand might have a sister squadron in its Reserve Component with 18 primary aircraft "required" and on hand. Both squadrons report 100% "equipment on hand" levels -- or "C-1" in that category.

There also remains a serious qualitative difference. For example, aircraft in the Reserve Components often are older models which have not been upgraded to the same standards as those in the Active Component. The result is severe constraint in the type and quantity of aircraft which are deployable in a combat zone. The problem places a severe strain on the maintenance and supply systems.

Yet, based on the reporting criteria, similar type units may both report C-1 even though substantial differences exist between units and the mission capability of these units is vastly dissimilar.

These examples are not unique to any one Service but are uniform in their application within all Services. The Board has taken a strong position against dissimilar organizational structures between Active and Reserve Components as it masks true readiness. The Board remains convinced that the only way to get new, modern equipment in the Reserve Components and to assure total integration and interoperability is to be able to identify the shortfalls from wartime requirements.

Analysis of Reserve Component Unit Status Reports

Overview

The readiness reports for 1983 show a general decline in the percentage of units rated "marginally ready" or better when compared to the ratings in 1982. Although the Board believes that these ratings are technically correct, the ratings do not reflect the real increases in capability that have occurred in the last year in all Reserve Components.

The technical declines in readiness reports result from the introduction of more and more modern weapons systems and equipment into Reserve Component units. These new material authorizations and deliveries create a temporary situation of "unreadiness" because unit personnel are not yet fully trained on the new equipment, spares arrive later than the item itself and new units are being formed.

On balance, the Board believes that Reserve Component capability has increased substantially in the year reported and is encouraged that this trend appears to be continuing into 1984. The Board also notes that it is in the area of insufficient or obsolete equipment that most readiness deficiencies occur.

Significant Findings

Table 3.1A is a partial "wrap-up" display of readiness, portrayed in abstract percentages for all Reserve Components. Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve data is considered classified by the Services and is contained in the Classified Annex (Secret) to this report. An analysis of Table 3.1A discloses that:

- Nearly half (49%) of all DoD Reserve Component units are rated combat ready (C-3 or better).
- This percentage is down slightly from 1982 levels (55%) due largely to the temporary effects of modernization -- that is new equipment and force structure and increased numbers of new personnel with accompanying decline in skill qualification.

TABLE 3.1A
PROFILE OF UNIT READINESS AND MAJOR FACTORS LIMITING READINESS IN ALL RESERVE COMPONENTS (ROLL-UP COMPOSITE)

Component	Percent of Units Reporting Readiness	Percent of Units Reporting Readiness Level C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	C-5	Total	Percent of Units C-3 or better	Major Limiting Factors Most Critical	Second
Army National Guard	————	— See Table 3.1A (S) in Classified Annex —					——	——	Equipment On Hand	MOS Qualification
Army Reserve	————	— See Table 3.1A (S) in Classified Annex —					——	——	Equipment On Hand	Personnel
Naval Reserve	100%	5.4	15.2	16.6	62.3	0.4	100%	37%	Training	Equipment Readiness
Marine Corps Reserve	————	— See Table 3.1A (S) in Classified Annex —					——	——	MOS Qualification	Equipment Readiness
Air National Guard	————	— See Table 3.1A (S) in Classified Annex —					——	——	Equipment On Hand	Equipment Readiness
Air Force Reserve	————	— See Table 3.1A (S) in Classified Annex —					——	——	Equipment On Hand.	Equipment Readiness Personnel
Overall Readiness of all DoD Reserve Components										
FY 1983	88% 1/	13.1	16.9	19.3	49.7	1.0	100%	49%	Equipment On Hand	MOS Qualification Personnel
FY 1982	61% 1/	15.6	18.4	20.7	44.2	1.0	100%	55%	Equipment On Hand	Personnel
Coast Guard Reserve 3/										
FY 1983	82%	20.2	68.2	8.9	2.7	0	100%	97%	Logistics Readiness 2/	Training
FY 1982	87%	15.9	58.1	13.9	12.1	0	100%	88%	Logistics Readiness 2/	Training

Note:

1/ Out of a total of 7,834 major Reserve Force units in the Department of Defense, eighty-eight percent (88%) are required to submit Unit Status Reports. The difference between last year's number of reporting units (10,239) and the 7,834 now shown constitute those units which are included within the unit status reports of higher commands. Therefore, the 61% shown for FY 1982 is not an accurate reflection of the actual reporting posture.

2/ "Logistics Readiness" for the Coast Guard Reserve refers to plans for messing, berthing, and transportation — not equipment shortfalls.

3/ Coast Guard Reserve units are not commissioned combat units although they do augment combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

Total may not equal 100 percent due to rounding. Data as of: April 1982 and April 1983.

- The Coast Guard Reserve's readiness increased significantly from 1982 to 1983. Coast Guard readiness reached 97% in 1983.

- On an overall basis, all Department of Defense Reserve Component units rated C-3 or better declined from -%6 to -3% in their overall readiness levels with the exception of the Naval Reserve (+11%) and the Air Force Reserve (+1%).

- The number of units reporting readiness appears to have increased substantially in FY 1983 as compared FY 1982. In fact, some Services reported incomplete information in FY 1982. In the case of the Army Reserve Forces, a substantial number of units do not report readiness directly but are included within the readiness report of a major organization. As part of the Board's efforts this year, much of the inaccurate FY 1982 data have been corrected and a new "base line" for readiness data established for FY 1983.

Limitations to Readiness

The two major limitations to Reserve Component readiness generally remained unchanged from 1981 to 1983. These two limiting factors were, in order of importance:

- Equipment on hand

- Personnel -- principally the lack of individual skill qualification

An analysis of Table 3.1B reveals that there has been some shifts in the factors limiting readiness among the various Services and, interestingly, among different types of units.

TABLE 3.1B

CRITICAL FACTORS LIMITING OVERALL READINESS IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS, FY-1983 AND FY-1982

Component (Type of Unit)	Most Critical		Second Most Critical	
	FY 1983	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1982
Army National Guard				
Overall	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand	MOS Qualification	Personnel
Combat	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand/ Training	MOS Qualification	MOS Qualification
Combat Support	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand	MOS Qualification	Personnel
Combat Service Support	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand	MOS Qualification	Personnel
Army Reserve				
Overall	Equipment on-hand	MOS Qualification	Personnel	Equipment on-hand
Combat	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand	Personnel	Training
Combat Support	Personnel	MOS Qualification	MOS Qualification	Equipment on-hand
Combat Service Support	Equipment on-hand	MOS Qualification	Personnel	Equipment on-hand
Naval Reserve				
Overall	Training	Training	Equipment Readiness	Personnel
Commissioned Units:	Equipment Readiness	Personnel	Supplies	Equipment Readiness
Ships	Training	Personnel	Personnel/Equipment Readiness	Equipment Readiness
Air Units	Equipment Readiness	Personnel	Training	Equipment Readiness
Other	Supplies	Personnel	Equipment Readiness	Training
Reinforcing/Sustaining Units:	Training	Training	Personnel	Personnel
Marine Corps Reserve				
Overall	MOS Qualification	MOS Qualification	Equipment Readiness	Equipment Readiness
4th Marine Division	MOS Qualification	MOS Qualification	Equipment Readiness	Equipment Readiness
4th Marine Air Wing	MOS Qualification	Equipment on-hand/ Equipment Readiness	Equipment Readiness	Training
Force Service Support Group (FSSG)	MOS Qualification	MOS Qualification	Equipment Readiness	Equipment Readiness
Air National Guard				
Overall	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand	Equipment Readiness	Personnel
Combat	Training	Personnel	Equipment on-hand/ Equipment Readiness	Training
Combat Support	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand	Equipment Readiness	Personnel
Combat Service Support	Equipment on-hand	Equipment Readiness	Training	Equipment on-hand
Air Force Reserve				
Overall	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand	Personnel	Equipment Readiness
Combat	Personnel/Training	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand/ Equipment Readiness	Personnel
Combat Support	Equipment on-hand	Equipment on-hand	Equipment Readiness	Equipment Readiness
Coast Guard Reserve 1/				
Overall	Logistics Readiness	Logistics Readiness	Training	Training
Combat	Training	Personnel	None	Logistics Readiness
Combat Service Support	Logistics Readiness	Training	Training	Logistics Readiness

Note:

1/ "Logistics Readiness" for the Coast Guard refers to plans for messing, berthing, and transportation — not equipment shortfalls.

FY 1982 Data as of: May 1982 FY 1983 Data as of: May 1983

Army National Guard

Overall readiness for the Army National Guard was down slightly (-3%) from FY 1982 reported levels.

Complete readiness data is shown on Table 3.2A (C) is the Classified Annex (Secret) to this report.

There has been a substantial improvement to the readiness of Guard combat units. This improvement was due largely to the additiona of new equipment such as the M1 Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle to selected Army National Guard combat units. Additional training opportunities have also been provided to units receiving this modern equipment.

The major limiting factors to Army National Guard readiness remain "equipment on-hand" and "Military Occupational Skill" (MOS) qualification.

When comparing the components of overall readiness between FY 1982 and FY 1983, the following changes are revealed:

	Percentage Point Change
• Personnel readiness:	+7%
• MOS qualification:	+4%
• Equipment on-hand:	-4%
• Equipment readiness:	-3%
• Training:	+3%

• Most impressive of the improvements were the changes across-the-board in the readiness of combat units in the Army National Guard. Increases in "personnel" (+30%), "MOS qualification" (+12%), "equipment on-hand" (+26%), "equipment readiness" (+17%), and "training" (+17%), for an overall increase in one year of +24%, is the direct result of emphasis within the Army Directorate on improving the combat unit readiness of the Army Guard Force.

Army Reserve

Overall readiness of the Army Reserve declined from FY 1982 to FY 1983 by 4%. Complete Army Reserve readiness data is shown on Tables 3.3A and 3.3B both classified CONFIDENTIAL in the Classified Annex (Secret) to this report.

With the exception of the units scheduled to mobilize in the time period "D" to "D+30", the readiness of all categories of Army Reserve units had similar declines.

The major limiting factors to Army Reserve readiness for the FY 1983 reporting period were "equipment on-hand" and "personnel". This year, "equipment on hand" has replaced "MOS qualification" as the most critical limiting factor.

When comparing the components of overall readiness between FY 1982 and FY 1983, the following changes are revealed:

	Percentage Point Change
• Personnel readiness:	No comparison is possible. No data available for FY 1982.
• MOS qualification:	+4%
• Equipment on-hand:	-8%
• Equipment readiness:	-17%
• Training:	+2%

The continued low state of readiness of Army Reserve Combat units (17% C-3 or better) continues to be of major concern to the Board. In addition, the sharp and significant decline of the level of equipment readiness suggests an inability of the Army Reserve to maintain what equipment they have or, alternatively, an inability to provide an adequate maintenance support base.

Naval Reserve

Table 3.4A reveals that the overall readiness of the Naval Reserve and its major sub-classifications has declined 9% from that reported in FY 1982. Although the readiness data contained in table 3.4A is unclassified, the Naval Reserve considers its Detailed Profile of Readiness, as shown on Table 3.4B, to be classified CONFIDENTAL therefore, it is included in the Classified Annex (Secret) to this report.

During the 1983 time period, the major limiting factor to Naval Reserve readiness was "training", which includes both individual and unit training. The second most critical factor limiting Naval Reserve readiness changed from "personnel" to "equipment readiness".

When comparing the components of overall readiness between FY 1982 and FY 1983, the following changes revealed:

	Percentage Point Change
• Personnel readiness:	-20%
• Supplies:	-24%
• Equipment readiness:	-33%
• Training:	-5%

Personnel readiness was lower due to the creation of new units and substantially increased personnel authorizations within the Naval Reserve.

The Naval Reserve reported that the significant decline in equipment readiness was the result of several factors:

- A serious shortfall in certain aircraft engines.
- The identification of substantially increased wartime equipment requirements and a concurrent decision to defer acquisition of this equipment until a later date or mobilization.

The decline in the supply category (-24%) is due to both the acquisition of six (6) new ships during FY 1983 and the major overhaul of three (3) minesweepers.

TABLE 3.4A

PROFILE OF UNIT READINESS AND MAJOR FACTORS LIMITING READINESS IN THE NAVAL RESERVE

Types of Units	Percent of Units Reporting Readiness Level							Percent of Units C-3 or better		Major Limiting Factors	
	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	C-5	C-6	Total	1983	1982	Most Critical	Second Most Critical
Overall	5.4	15.2	16.6	62.3	0.4	0	100	37%	46%	Training	Equipment Readiness
Commissioned Units											
Overall	12.4	36.5	27.0	16.1	8.0	0	100	76%	77%	Equipment Readiness	Supplies
Reinforcing/Sustaining Units											
Overall	5.0	14.0	16.0	65.0	NA	NA	100	35%	40%	Equipment Readiness	Supplies

Note:

One hundred percent (100%)of Naval Reserve Units are required to report readiness.

Total may not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

Data as of: April 1983

Marine Corps Reserve

Marine Corps Reserve considers all of its readiness information to be classified, even when it is expressed in abstract percentages. Complete Marine Corps Reserve readiness data is shown on Tables 3.5A and 3.5B, both classified SECRET, in the Classified Annex to this report.

The overall readiness of the Marine Corps Reserve declined by 10% from FY 1982 to FY 1983.

The largest reduction in readiness level has occurred in the 4th Marine Division and in the Force Service Support Group.

The major limitations to Marine Corps Reserve readiness continued to be "MOS qualification". In FY 1983, "equipment readiness", the ability to maintain the equipment you have, has been added as a major factor limiting Marine Corps readiness.

When comparing the components of overall readiness between FY 1982 and FY 1983, the following changes are revealed:

	Percentage Point Change
• Personnel:	no change
• MOS Qualification:	- 6%
• Equipment on-hand:	-12%
• Equipment readiness:	-13%
• Training:	+ 1%

Some explanation is required in order to place the current readiness position of the Marine Corps Reserve into its proper perspective. The Marine Corps provided the Board with the following information:

"Based on a desire to strengthen the combat service support within the Marine Corps Total Force, the Marine Corps Reserve is undergoing major reorganizations affecting both (the 4th Marine) Division and (the) FSSG (Force Service Support Group). During FY 1983, 17 units were redesignated, 1 new unit was activated, and 2 units were reorganized from detachments to separate UNITREP reportable units. For the most part, redesignated units were of similiar mission orientation, thus minimizing the impact on personnel and training."

"These deficiencies (noted above) affect the overall readiness of the Marine Corps Reserve across the board and are largely a result of the priority of issue the Reserve units have from the Marine Corps Stores System as compared with Regular (Marine Corps) units.

The first priority of equipment withdrawal is to meet the mission requirements of the Active Force. Equipment in the stores system that previously had been earmarked toward filling overall Force requirements, to include the Reserves, has now been earmarked for stocking a portion of the Near-term Prepositioning Force and the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program. This has had a significant effect on the equipment readiness of the reserves, but was justified as a temporary measure, based on political decisions, and served as the only means that these requirements could be met in the time frame required.

If funded, the current 5 year Defense Plan should correct the majority of the deficiencies in available assets against requirements. Additionally, although not attributable to the Reserves for UNITREP purposes, the assets left behind by the Near-Term Prepositioning Force (Brigade) will be identified for potential use by the Reserve."

"Conclusion -- Although the overall readiness of the Marine Corps Reserve as reflected by UNITREP shows a negative trend, such trend is not indicative of the readiness of the entire Reserve force as such readiness is hidden in the mechanics of UNITREP. The actual force in being is larger, more modern equipped and better trained than in past years. As the stores system is replenished, overall readiness should take an upward turn."

The Board has continuously opposed Department or Service drawdown on Reserve Component equipment to meet the demands of multiple claimants such as foreign military sales and contingent or operational demands. When dictated by unusual circumstances, the highest priority must be placed on replacing this equipment. While recognizing the urgency of the Near-Term Prepositioning Force Program, the Marine Corps Reserve has suffered a significant decline in their readiness through no fault of their own. Equipment designated to meet Marine Corps Reserve requirements must be replaced at the earliest possible date.

Air National Guard

The Air Force considers all of its readiness information to be classified, even when it is expressed in abstract percentages. Complete Air National Guard readiness data is shown on Tables 3.6A and 3.6B, both classified SECRET, in the Classified Annex to this report.

Overall readiness of the Air National Guard declined by -4% from FY 1982 reported levels.

Significant improvement has been made within Combat Service unit readiness. However, much remains to be done.

"Equipment on-hand" remains the most critical factor limiting readiness in the Air National Guard. "Equipment readiness" has replaced "personnel" as the second most important limitation to Air National Guard readiness.

When comparing the components of overall readiness between FY 1982 and FY 1983, the following changes are revealed:

	Percentage Point Change
• Personnel readiness:	no change
• Equipment on-hand:	-8%
• Equipment readiness:	-1%
• Training:	-3%

The decline in the readiness of "equipment on-hand" is the result of re-engining and re-skinning of KC-135 aircraft and concurrent C-130 structural wing problems which resulted in required repairs.

Training was impacted by the introduction within the Air National Guard of F-4, 2-seat fighter aircraft which required training of Weapons System Operators. The need to recruit and train C-130 navigators also impacted on training readiness, as there is no civilian counterpart to that particular specialty.

Air Force Reserve

The Air Force considers all of its readiness information to be classified, even when it is expressed in abstract percentages. Complete Air Force Reserve readiness data is shown on Tables 3.7A and 3.7B, both classified SECRET, in the Classified Annex.

Overall readiness in the Air Force Reserve and its major elements improved by 1% from that reported in FY 1982.

"Equipment on-hand" remained the major limiting factor to readiness while "training" replaced "equipment readiness" as the second most critical factor limiting Air Force Reserve readiness.

When comparing the components of overall readiness between FY 1982 and FY 1983, the following changes are revealed:

	Percentage Point Change
• Personnel readiness:	no change
• Equipment on-hand:	+2%
• Equipment readiness:	+1%
• Training:	-2%

The gain in "equipment readiness" was due, in part, to the phasing out of older aircraft, the receipt of newer aircraft, and the modification of aircraft currently on hand.

It is believed that the reduction in Air Force Reserve "training" readiness was due primarily to the problems experienced in obtaining, training, and retaining Flight Engineers and Load Masters in strategic airlift (C-141 and C-5A) units.

Coast Guard Reserve

As set forth in Table 3.8A, the overall readiness of all elements of the Coast Guard Reserve increased by 9% to 97.3% reported as ready for mobilization (C-3 or better). The very significant improvement in the overall Coast Guard C-1/C-2 and C-3 readiness was primarily a function of improved logistics readiness.

Although the readiness data contained in 3.8A is unclassified, the Coast Guard Reserve considers its Detailed Profile of Readiness, as shown on Table 3.8B, to be Classified CONFIDENTAL and is included in the Classified Annex (Secret) to this report.

The apparent improvement in logistics was achieved through updating older logistics plans which are now in better alignment with current requirements, and result in a very much improved logistics readiness level.

Training readiness also dropped slightly due to a greater emphasis on mobilization site training for two weeks ACDUTRA and various exercises. This posed greater problems for inland units in drilling with their Active Component counterparts. Greater use of both military and commercial transportation could not quite offset the greater transportation requirements, and a lower readiness resulted.

When comparing the components of overall readiness between FY 1982 and FY 1983, the following changes are revealed:

	Percentage Point Change
• Personnel:	-2%
• Logistics readiness:	+20%
• Training:	-5%

"Logistics readiness" and "training" remain the two major factors limiting Coast Guard Reserve readiness.

TABLE 9.0A

PROFILE OF UNIT READINESS AND MAJOR FACTORS LIMITING READINESS IN THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RESERVE

Types of Units	Percent of Units Reporting Readiness Level						Percent of Units C-3 or better		Major Limiting Factors	
	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	C-5	Total	1983	1982	Most Critical	Second Most Critical
Overall	20.2	68.2	8.9	2.7	0.0		97%	88%	Logistics Readiness	Training
Combat Units	8.3	91.7	0.0	0.0	0.0		100%	83%	Training	na
Combat Service Support Units	20.7	67.1	9.4	2.8	0.0		97%	88%	Logistics Readiness	Training

Note:

Eighty-two percent (82%) of the Coast Guard Reserve Units are required to report readiness.

The Coast Guard Selected Reserve's current authorized strength only meets 50% of their early-response mobilization requirements. Thus, while personnel readiness only appears as a problem for a small portion of their units, reserve strength shortfalls remain a major problem for the USCG as a whole. See Text.

Total may not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

Data as of: May 1983

Coast Guard -- A Continuing Urgent Need

Although the data in Table 3.8A quantifies the readiness of the Coast Guard Selected Reserve, it is based upon the USCG's structured organization. It is a true statement that, based upon their structure, the Coast Guard Reserve is 97% combat ready.

A serious and substantial deterrent to the combat readiness of the Coast Guard exists, however, in the form of its "organizational structure."

The Reserve Forces Policy Board has been concerned about and has highlighted in its annual readiness assessment reports since 1981 what it perceives as a serious threat to our coast and inland waterways. Continued budget constraints for the Coast Guard have resulted in limitations on the Active service strength. This increases the importance of Coast Guard Reservists who are required upon mobilization to support strategic mobility through the protection of inland and coastal waterways and major ports.

Because of the relatively small size of the Coast Guard and its Reserve, and because of its organizational placement outside the Department of Defense, the military significance of their contribution to national security is largely unrecognized in the competition for scarce resources.

Unlike the other Armed Forces, the Coast Guard is not able to concentrate its efforts on preparedness for military operations in time of war or national emergency. Only two of the Coast Guard's thirteen operational programs have national security or military operations as their primary end product. The remaining eleven programs focus on their peacetime mission to assure the safety of maritime transportation and the enforcement of federal laws in the governed maritime regions of the United States. The eleven programs consume 89% of the Coast Guard's annual operating budget and 90% of its personnel

The resources of the United States Coast Guard are barely adequate to satisfy its peacetime responsibility. They are totally inadequate to provide for manpower, equipment, training and essential elements that would be immediately required upon a mobilization.

Unlike the Armed Forces within the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard has no Active duty forces that exist solely for war-

time military missions. All Active duty Coast Guard units are established, organized, and staffed primarily for the accomplishment of their peacetime statutory missions. The Coast Guard Reserve provides additional trained forces required to augment the Active Forces but does not provide for an expansion of the Coast Guard force structure to meet the increased demands anticipated by mobilization or war.

The Coast Guard Reserve augmentation training program is an invaluable means of training Reservists in skills required upon mobilization through performance of Coast Guard peacetime work requiring similar skills. Through it, the Coast Guard's 12,000 Selected Reservists contribute approximately 1,700,000 manhours of personnel support to various operating and support units of the Active Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard Reserve's early response mobilization requirements represent a substantial portion of the USCG's wartime force (see Table 2.6). Yet the Coast Guard's Selected Reserve authorized strength level has remained at a plateau level of 12,000 for several years. Likewise, the mobilization requirement has remained at a plateau level of 24,000. Authorization levels have not been increased to meet requirements, even as the missions and requirements have increased.

The requirement for the Coast Guard to perform its wartime mission will be immediate -- not six months after "M" day to permit a fill from the training base.

The Coast Guard Selected Reserve's current authorized strength only meets 50% to 55% of its early-response mobilization requirement of 24,000 individuals. The remaining 45% to 50% of the early-response requirement and those required to fill out the sustaining management and support base, between the second and sixth month after mobilization, are either presently unfilled or are allocated to be filled by a combination of the IRR, Standby Reserve and Retired Reservists or regular retirees.

By the Board's analysis, even when the IRR, Retirees and Standby Reservists are counted against the shortfall, the Coast Guard will still be at least 6,000 individuals short of its mobilization requirement.

Thus, while combat readiness ratings of the existing force appear to be high (97%), the Board warns that the overall Reserve

strength shortfalls remain a major deficiency and a serious limiting factor to wartime readiness for the Coast Guard as a whole.

The Board recommends that:

- The United States Congress review this issue and consider increases in the authorized end-strength level of the Selected Coast Guard Reserve.

- Resources and missions be provided to the Selected Coast Guard Reserve which will enhance and augment the extensive peacetime missions while, at the same time, enhance mobilization/wartime capabilities.

The Board believes that these steps are essential to the successful peacetime and wartime operational success of the Coast Guard and for the ultimate safety and protection of our coast line, inland waterways, and our armed forces and supplies which must pass through these facilities.

CHAPTER 4

MANPOWER READINESS INDICATORS

General

The manpower strength of the Total Force increased only slightly during FY 1983. The Active Components strength increased 0.7% from 1982 levels while the Selected Reserve Components grew 4.2%.

In some Services, the recruiting efforts and the number of accessions allowed by both the Active and Reserve Components was curtailed again this past year. Budget constraints along with a strong enlistment demand enabled the Services to practice selective enlistment and re-enlistment policies. FY 1983 was a year for the Services to improve the quality of the force.

Manpower Data Base

Since the inception of the Board's readiness assessment report, it has utilized the Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics fiscal year summary reports, as published by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), DASD(RA), as its primary source of manpower data.

Historical data was reviewed and revised when necessary to correct some of the inconsistencies and inaccuracies between Service data and the Defense Reserve Common Components Personnel Data System (RCCPDS), the principal source for the above report. The differences do not impact on the conclusions drawn by the Board.

The new office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), ASD(RA), is in the process of improving the quality of the RCCPDS, working in conjunction with the Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California, and the individual Services.

Manpower statistics included in this report, for the Services within the Department of Defense, have been provided by the ASD(RA). United States Coast Guard manpower data has been provided by Headquarters, United States Coast Guard.

Wartime Manpower Requirements for the Selected Reserve

Table 4.1A examines the wartime strength requirements, actual and programmed, for selected years 1977 to 1989. When the data on this year's table is compared to last year's report (FY 1982), it can be seen that:

- There has been a substantial increase in the projected Selected Reserve trained unit strength shortfalls for the FY 1984 - FY 1989 period. The reason for these differences, as predicted by this Board, are that estimates of wartime unit strength requirements between the two POM periods (FY 84-88 and FY 85-89) have increased more rapidly than the estimates for wartime trained unit manpower available strength.

The largest shortfall in Selected Reserve Trained Unit Strength compared with Wartime Required Strength throughout the budget and projected period is in the Army's Reserve Components. By comparison, the Marine Corps Reserve is projected to achieve its wartime trained units strength level by FY 1987.

Programmed strength shortfalls reported are due mainly to Service policies rather than the inability of the Reserve Components to achieve the wartime strength requirements. If not budgetarily constrained, the Guard and Reserve could achieve increased strength levels above those currently programmed.

TABLE 4.1A
WARTIME REQUIREMENT VERSUS ACTUAL OR PROGRAMMED TRAINED UNIT STRENGTH IN THE SELECTED RESERVE, FY 1977-FY 1989 (EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS)

Service	FY77	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89
Wartime Unit Requirement (Trained Strength)				(Projected)					
ARNG	400	446	451	462	472	480	483	488	493
USAR	219	286	300	300	307	314	322	325	330
USNR	52	112	118	118	117	121	123	124	125
USMCR	34	40	40	42	42	42	42	42	42
ANG	93	103	104	105	107	108	111	113	114
AFRES	54	53	54	57	61	65	68	71	72
DoD Total	852	1039	1066	1084	1105	1130	1149	1163	1176
USCG	—	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
Actual or Programmed Trained Unit Strength				(Projected)					
ARNG	355	371	369	371	393	417	425	438	444
USAR	189	214	225	232	246	256	263	271	274
USNR	90	93	101	104	110	116	123	128	128
USMCR	31	35	38	40	41	42	42	42	42
ANG	92	97	98	100	103	104	107	110	111
AFRES	50	52	54	57	60	69	67	71	71
DoD Total	808	862	884	904	952	999	1027	1060	1070
USCG	—	12	12	12	12.5	13.3	14	14.8	15.5
Shortfalls - Selected Reserve Trained Unit Strength Versus Wartime Requirement				(Projected)					
ARNG	-45	-75	-82	-91	-79	-63	-58	-50	-49
USAR	-30	-72	-75	-68	-61	-58	-59	-54	-56
USNR	+38	-19	-17	-14	-7	-5	—	+4	+3
USMCR	-3	-5	-3	-4	-2	-1	—	—	—
ANG	-1	-6	-6	-5	-4	-4	-4	-3	-3
AFRES	-4	-1	—	—	-1	-1	-1	—	-1
DoD Total FY 1983	-44	-177	-182	-180	-153	-131	-122	-103	-106
USCG	—	- 10	- 10	- 10	- 9.5	- 8.7	- 8	- 7.2	- 6.5
Percent Attained to Wartime Requirement	94.8	82.9	82.9	83.3	86.2	88.4	89.3	91.1	90.1
FY 1982 Projections			-168	-157	-134	-119	-104	- 94	
Difference FY 82-83			+ 14	+ 23	+ 19	+ 12	+ 18	+ 9%	
Percent Change FY 82-83			8.3%	14.6%	14.1%	10.1%	17.3%	9.5%	
USCG	—	-10	-10	-10	-9.5	-8.7	-8	-7.2	-6.5

Wartime Unit Requirement and Actual or Programmed Unit Strength

The Selected Reserve Wartime Unit Requirement consists of the required trained personnel to fully man Reserve Component units upon mobilization.

Programmed unit strength for the Selected Reserve consists of the trained unit strength immediately available for mobilization.

- This includes:
  - All members of Selected Reserve Units,

  plus all Active Component or Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) scheduled or designated to mobilize with Selected Reserve units,

  less those members of the Selected Reserve in or awaiting training (the training pipeline),

  less transients, patients, prisoners, and nondeployable female service members.

- Programmed unit strength for Selected Reserve units does not include:
  - Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA's).
  - Inactive National Guard (ING) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) manpower.

Reconciliation

By using the above method for computing the available trained forces on-hand versus requirements, one can accurately develop the shortfall for the Selected Reserve unit forces. Any other method will result in an overstatement of assets available and an understatement of the shortfall.

Reserve Component Strength, 1969-1989

A historical comparison of manpower strengths in the Ready Reserve along with the overall wartime requirements is graphically illustrated in Table 4.1B.

The Board remains concerned with the continued attempts to reduce manpower recruiting, retention and bonus resources to the Selected Reserve simply because there have been increases in the end strength in the Selected Reserve. Such attempts must be resisted. There still remains a serious manpower shortfall in the trained strength in the Selected Reserve as compared to the wartime requirement. Trained strength shortfalls are detailed in Table 4.1A by Reserve Component. The overall Department of Defense picture is shown in Table 4.1B.

Much remains to be done to close the gap between wartime strength requirements and trained unit strength.

TABLE 4.1B

Strength Trends
in the
Selected Reserve — Individual Ready Reserve/ Inactive National Guard — Standby Reserve
as of September 30, 1983



Selected Reserve Strength Trends

As set forth on Table 4.2, FY 1983 again showed a continued increase in the end strength levels of the Selected Reserve. All of the Reserve Components again reflected a net gain in the end-strength during FY 1983.

From FY 1978 through FY 1983, the strength of DoD Reserve Components increased by more than 27%. During the last year (FY 1983), Reserve Component strength increased over 4% as compared to 7% in FY 1982.

The largest gain in reserve strength was in the Naval Reserve, with an increase of 16% over FY 1982.

The gain in reserve strength over FY 1982, ranked in order of percentage of strength growth, is shown below. FY 1981 and FY 1982 growth comparisons are also shown.

Component	FY82-83 Growth	FY81-82 Growth
• Naval Reserve:	16%	7%
• Marine Corps Reserve:	6%	9%
• Air Force Reserve:	4%	5%
• Army Reserve:	4%	14%
• Coast Guard Reserve:	4%	0%
• Army National Guard:	2%	5%
• Air National Guard:	2%	2%

TABLE 4.2
SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH TRENDS

Component	End Strength FY 78 1/	End Strength FY 82	End Strength FY 83	Total Gain for FY 78-83	Total Gain for FY 82-83	Percent Gain for FY 78-83	Percent Gain for FY 82-83	Percent of SEL RES Force FY83
ARMY								
ARNG	340,996	407,601	417,178	76,182	9,577	22.3	2.3	41.5
USAR	185,753	256,659	266,188	80,435	9,529	43.3	3.7	26.5
Total	526,749	664,260	683,366	156,617	19,106	29.7	2.9	68.0
USNR 2/	82,965	93,919	109,094	26,129	15,375	31.4	16.4	10.9
USMCR	32,697	40,461	42,690	9,993	2,229	30.5	5.5	4.2
AIR FORCE								
ANG	91,674	100,657	102,170	10,496	1,513	11.4	1.5	10.2
AFRES	53,884	64,443	67,227	13,343	2,784	24.8	4.3	6.7
Total	145,558	165,100	169,397	23,839	4,297	16.4	2.6	16.9
DoD TOTAL	787,969	963,740	1,004,547	216,578	40,807	27.5	4.2	100.0
USCGR	11,158	11,846	12,156	998	310	8.9	2.6	1.2

Note:

1/ FY 1978 end-strength is used as a base year as it was the low point in Selected Reserve strength after the end of the draft and the formation of the all-volunteer force.

2/ FY 1978 and FY 1982 end-strength for the USNR as shown above includes 200 TARS.

Selected Reserve Enlisted Gains and Losses

Tables 4.3A and 4.3B disclose the source of enlisted personnel gains and losses to the Selected Reserve of each individual Service for FY 1982 and FY 1983.

There are a number of significant conclusions which may be reached from these tables.

- There was a smaller net gain in the Enlisted Selected Reserve strength in FY 1983 (+21,660) versus FY 1982 (+48,678).

- FY 1983 Enlisted Selected Reserve overall gains declined from FY 1982 levels. FY 1983 losses exceeded FY 1982 losses.

  The reduction in the gain of Enlisted Selected Reserve strength is generally considered by the Board to be the direct result of Service constraints on the end-strength levels of the Selected Reserve. The constraints resulted in a reduction of enlistments and in the qualitative retention of personnel.

- FY 1983 was a year in which the quality of the Selected Reserve was significantly enhanced. There was a greater emphasis within all the Reserve Components on the recruiting and retention of personnel with higher mental standards. This enhancement is expected to reflect itself in the personnel readiness of the Reserve Components in the coming years.

- All Services, except the Air Force Reserve, showed a reduction in their accessions from FY 1982 levels.

- The Naval Reserve (93%) and the Air Force Reserve (72%) both depended upon prior service personnel for the vast majority of their accessions.

Overall losses from DoD Selected Reserve enlisted personnel from FY 1982 to FY 1983 increased 6%. Enlisted losses from the individual Services varied widely.

After extensive investigation of Army Reserve loss statistics, the Board determined that coding errors in source documents

TABLE 4.3A
COMPARATIVE PROFILE OF SELECTED RESERVE COMPONENT ENLISTED PERSONNEL GAINS, FY 1982-FY 1983 (EXPRESSED IN PERCENT EXCEPT AS NOTED)

Component	Non-Prior Service	Prior Service								TOTAL Accessions (Number)	Percent Change
		Total	Civil Life	Active Duty	Other Comps	IRR/ IMG	Standby Reserve	Reenlist Gain	Other		
ARNG											
FY 1983	51.2	48.8	27.2	0.0	9.5	2.3	0.0	9.9	0.0	89,103	- 6.8 % 1/
FY 1982	54.0	46.0	24.4	0.0	8.7	1.9	0.0	10.9	0.0	95,618	- 0.8 % 2/
USAR											
FY 1983	46.9	53.1	17.6	4.7	2.5	24.9	0.1	0.1	3.3	74,438	- 0.6 % 1/
FY 1982	46.5	53.5	17.9	3.3	2.7	26.5	0.1	0.1	2.9	74,867	+10.3 % 2/
USNR											
FY 1983	6.7	93.3	40.3	9.5	1.5	41.5	0.3	0.0	0.1	30,388	- 2.3 % 1/
FY 1982	6.7	93.3	34.6	11.3	0.9	45.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	31,012	+13.4 % 2/
USMCR											
FY 1983	48.8	51.2	5.7	1.4	5.9	37.1	0.1	0.0	1.1	7,376	-46.2 % 1/
FY 1982	65.1	34.9	7.7	0.0	0.0	26.5	0.0	0.0	0.7	13,699	+16.8 % 2/
ANG											
FY 1983	42.5	57.4	31.6	4.2	16.4	0.0	0.0	5.1	0.1	11,933	-16.4 % 1/
FY 1982	38.7	61.3	34.3	2.4	17.1	0.0	0.0	7.3	0.2	14,269	- 2.6 % 2/
AFRES											
FY 1983	27.8	72.2	36.3	8.9	5.4	16.9	1.0	0.6	3.0	12,496	+ 9.5 % 1/
FY 1982	26.8	73.2	41.6	7.5	8.4	12.6	1.7	0.7	0.7	11,417	- 5.1 % 2/
TOTAL DoD											
FY 1983	42.0	58.0	25.8	3.6	6.1	16.8	0.1	4.2	1.3	225,654	- 8.3 % 1/
FY 1982	43.9	56.1	24.6	3.0	5.8	16.5	0.2	5.0	1.0	240,882	+ 4.7 % 2/
USCGR											
FY 1983	51.6	48.4	32.9	13.8	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,591	+20.3 % 1/
FY 1982	55.5	44.5	29.4	12.1	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,322	-20.4 % 2/

Note:
1/ Reflects Percentage of Change Compared to 1982.
2/ Reflects Percentage of Change Compared to 1981.

TABLE 4.3B

COMPARATIVE PROFILE OF SELECTED RESERVE COMPONENT ENLISTED PERSONNEL LOSSES, FY 1982-FY 1983 (EXPRESSED IN PERCENT EXCEPT AS NOTED)

	Losses from the Total Force to:				Reassignment								
Component	TOTAL	Civil Life	Death	Other	TOTAL	Ext AD	Other Comp	IRR/ IMG	Standby	Retired	Enl to Off	LOSSES (Number)	Percent Change
ARNG													
FY 1983	47.7	46.9	0.8	0.0	52.3	4.6	4.8	34.4	1.6	2.0	4.8	81,933	+ 5.3 %
FY 1982	52.1	51.5	0.7	0.0	47.8	4.6	6.6	29.6	0.7	1.9	4.6	77,840	+ 6.5 %
USAR													
FY 1983	28.5	27.2	0.4	0.8	71.5	7.6	5.7	29.6	23.4 1/	1.3	2.8	64,420	+22.2 %
FY 1982	34.1	32.2	0.5	1.5	65.9	8.5	7.8	41.7	3.5	1.6	2.9	52,736	+ 7.1 %
USNR													
FY 1983	12.8	12.0	0.3	0.5	87.2	10.1	1.4	73.6	0.9	0.6	0.6	28,939	+ 9.4 %
FY 1982	16.2	15.0	0.3	2.9	83.8	14.9	1.9	64.8	1.1	0.5	0.6	26,454	+ 2.8 %
USMCR													
FY 1983	63.7	35.3	0.5	28.0	36.3	4.5	3.0	28.2	0.0	0.2	0.2	7,742	-42.3 %
FY 1982	44.9	44.1	0.5	0.6	55.2	5.6	0.7	47.9	0.0	0.9	0.2	13,424	+17.7 %
ANG													
FY 1983	58.7	57.6	0.0	1.1	41.3	0.0	32.5	0.0	0.0	3.8	5.1	10,750	-12.2 %
FY 1982	63.1	62.2	0.0	0.9	36.9	0.0	32.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.5	12,240	- 8.0 %
AFRES													
FY 1983	24.3	22.7	0.5	1.0	75.7	8.6	4.6	49.0	9.0	3.5	1.1	10,210	+ 7.4 %
FY 1982	39.6	37.5	0.6	1.4	60.4	19.2	3.6	34.0	9.5	3.1	0.0	9,510	- 2.9 %
TOTAL DoD													
FY 1983	36.7	34.7	0.5	1.5	63.3	6.3	6.3	37.1	8.6	1.7	3.2	203,994	+ 6.1 %
FY 1982	41.8	40.2	0.5	1.2	58.2	7.2	7.7	36.7	1.9	1.5	3.1	192,204	+ 5.3 %
USCGR													
FY 1983	52.5	51.9	0.5	0.0	47.5	13.1	0.9	25.7	0.0	1.5	6.3	1,180	- 8.9 %
FY 1982	62.8	62.3	0.5	0.0	37.2	4.2	1.2	29.9	0.0	1.5	0.5	1,295	-15.4 %

Note:

Some of this data may be incorrect due to coding errors in source documents. Almost all personnel transferred from the Selected Reserve during FY 1983 were "transferred" into the IRR and not the Standby Reserve as indicated. For example, on September 30, 1983 there were only 55 enlisted personnel in the Standby Reserve. Based upon prior years experience, the percentage of personnel transferred into the IRR from the Selected Reserve is estimated to be approximately 50%.

distorted the true disposition of enlisted personnel transferred out of the Army Selected Reserve. Almost all of the personnel transferred from the Selected Reserve were, in fact, transferred to the IRR rather than the Standby Reserve as reported. It is a reasonable estimate that 50% of the transfers from the USAR went into the IRR.

Selected Reserve Strength versus Congressional Requirements

Tables 4.4A through 4.4C compare Selected Reserve authorized strength and assigned strength from FY 1979 to date.

An analysis of these tables discloses the following:

- With the exception of FY 1980, Congressionally approved end-strength levels have increased each year since 1979. During this period, the overall authorization has increased over 22%.

- Actual-end strength of the Selected Reserve has shown an increase each year since FY 1979. During this period, Selected Reserve strength has increased over 24%.

- FY 1982 showed a 7.2% increase in Selected Reserve end-strength. The greatest single increase since the end of the draft in 1973.

- Selected Reserve strength has exceeded Congressional floor strength authorizations each year since FY 1980.

TABLE 4.4
SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH AUTHORIZATION AND ATTAINMENTS (EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS)

Table 4.4a
Congressionally Approved
Average Strength Objective

Component	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83 3/	FY84
ARNG	369	365	381	398	407	425
USAR	201	200	220 2/	242	259	274
USNR	87 1/	87 1/	92 1/	94 1/	106 4/	113
USMCR	34	34	37 1/	39	38	40
ANG	93	93	98 1/	100	101	103
AFRES	54	57	61 1/	64	66	69
DoD TOTAL	838	836	889	937	977	1,024
USCGR	12	12	12	12	12	12
Percent Change from previous year		-0.2%	+6.3%	+ 5.4%	+ 4.3%	+ 4.8%
Accum Change		-0.2%	+6.1%	+11.8%	+16.6%	+22.2%

Table 4.4b
Actual End Strength

FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	Component
346	367	389	408	417	ARNG
190	207	225	257	266	USAR
88	87	88	94	109	USNR
33	35	37	40	43	USMCR
93	96	98	101	102	ANG
57	59	62	64	67	USAFR
807	851	899	964	1,005	DoD TOTAL
12	12	12	12	12	USCGR
+2.4% 5/	+5.5%	+ 5.6%	+ 7.2%	+ 4.2%	% Chg
+2.4%	+8.0%	+14.1%	+22.3%	+24.5%	Accum

Table 4.4c
Comparison (in 000's)

Actual Versus Congressional
Average Strength Objectives

	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	Percent
ARNG	-23	+ 2	+ 8	+10	+10	102.5%
USAR	-11	+ 7	+ 5	+15	+ 7	102.7%
USNR	+ 1	0	- 4	0	+ 3	102.8%
USMCR	- 1	+ 1	0	+ 1	+ 5	108.0%
ANG	0	+ 3	0	+ 1	+ 1	100.9%
AFRES	+ 3	+ 2	+ 1	0	+ 1	101.5%
DoD TOTAL	-31	+15	+10	+27	+27	102.7%
USCGR	0	0	0	0	0	100.0%

Notes:

1/ Reflects Specific Congressional Add-ons.

2/ Reflects Congressional Add-on plus Reagan supplemental request.

3/ Reflects President's Budget.

4/ Includes TARS personnel transferred from Active to Reserve Force accountability.

5/ Selected Reserve FY 1978 end-strength (787,767) used as base year as it was the low point in Selected Reserve end-strength after the end of the draft.

Totals may not agree due to rounding

Data as of: September 1983

Selected Reserve Strength In Training Pipeline

Table 4.5 sets forth a comparison of the Selected Reserve strength in the training pipeline (those receiving or awaiting training) at the end of FY 1983. This table reflects the immediately available trained strength in the Selected Reserve.

The following observations are made with regard to the training base:

- At the end of FY 1983, there were 1,416 more individuals in the training base than at the end of FY 1982 - an increase of only 2%. The reduced growth suggests that the recruiting efforts have been geared to training base capacity.

- The 75,079 trainees in the training base at the end of FY 1983 represent only 7.5% of the overall strength of the Selected Reserve as compared to 7.6% at the end of FY 1982 - a decrease of 0.2%.

- As shown below, there has been a sustained growth in the number of trainees in the training base for each year since 1978. This growth of 89% during the period is a reflection of Service efforts to expand the training base to accommodate the growth in the Guard and Reserve.

Fiscal Year (9/30)	Number in Trng Base	Sel Res end-str	% of Sel Res in Trng Base
1978	39,701	787,767	5.0%
1979	45,383	807,136	5.6%
1980	56,825	850,814	6.7%
1981	61,413	898,803	6.8%
1982	73,663	963,740	7.6%
1983	75,079	1,004,547	7.5%

- There were 40,335 more trained individuals in the Selected Reserve at the end of FY 1983 than at the end of FY 1982 - an increase of 4.5% as compared to 6.3% in FY 1982.

TABLE 4.5
SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH IN THE TRAINING PIPELINE (EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS)

Component	FY 83 SEL RES End Strength	In Training Pipeline	Percentage of Strength in Training Pipeline	Immediately Deployable In SEL RES	
ARNG	417,178	34,767	8.3%	382,411	
USAR	266,188	28,054	10.5%	238,134	
USNR	109,094	1,367	1.3%	107,727	
USMCR	42,690	5,822	13.6%	36,868	
ANG	102,170	3,002	2.9%	99,168	
AFRES	67,227	1,749	2.6%	65,478	
DoD TOTAL					
FY 1983	1,004,547	74,761	7.4%	929,786	
FY 1982	963,740	73,663	7.6%	889,451	
Differential	+40,807	+1,098	-0.2%	+40,335	(4.5%)
USCGR	12,193	555	4.6%	11,638	

Note:

Totals or Percentages may not agree due to rounding. Computations are based on actual strength/training pipeline figures from source listed below.

- The percentage of the individual Service's Selected Reserve personnel which are in the training pipeline is directly related to the percentage of non-prior service accessions in that Service.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) Strength Projections, FY 1982 - FY 1989

An analysis of Table 4.6 (IRR/ING strength projections for all Reserve Components for the period FY 1982 through FY 1989) discloses a number of significant variations among the Services:

- During the 8-year period, the total IRR/ING is projected to grow 34%.
- Officer strength is expected to increase 8%; while enlisted strength is projected to increase 40%.
- At the end of FY 1989, the total number of persons in the IRR/ING is forecasted to number 512,500.
- The Air Reserve Forces enlisted strength in their IRR/ING is projected to decline by 13.3%. They are the only Service projected to show a decline in overall IRR/ING strength.

Overall, the current projections of end-strength levels in the IRR/ING are far more optimistic than those projected last year.

Strength in the IRR is a direct result of "through-put". As a service member completes his active duty or active reserve obligation, but has a remainder of time to serve as part of his Military Service Obligation (MSO), the service member will be assigned to the IRR. The MSO will be increased to eight years in June 1984. The effects of this increased MSO will not be realized in the IRR end-strength until 1990.

The Board believes that the projections of IRR/ING end-strength contained herein continue to be overly optimistic. Based upon past projected and historical performance, the Board does not believe the projections to be realistic or attainable in light of continued manning level constraints.

TABLE 4.6
COMPARISON OF IRR/ING STRENGTH PROJECTIONS FOR FY 1982-FY 1989 (EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS)

	Actual		FY 1985-1989 POM Projected						Percent Change
Component	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY82-89
ARMY									
Officer									
IRR	42.2	42.4	42.5	42.5	42.5	42.8	43.1	43.6	2.1 %
ING	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	16.6 %
Total	42.8	43.0	43.1	43.1	43.2	43.5	43.8	44.3	3.5 %
Enlisted									
IRR	173.8	201.2	213.1	217.9	211.2	232.5	251.1	253.3	47.0 %
ING	10.3	9.5	9.0	9.3	9.6	9.9	10.2	10.4	0.9 %
Total	184.1	210.7	222.6	227.2	220.8	242.4	264.3	263.7	43.2 %
Total Army	226.9	253.7	265.7	270.3	264.0	285.9	308.1	308.0	35.7 %
NAVY									
Officer	21.2	18.8	21.8	21.9	21.6	21.7	22.1	22.7	7.0 %
Enlisted	56.1	51.0	63.3	71.0	75.9	79.1	85.3	91.8	63.6 %
Total	77.3	69.8	85.1	92.9	97.5	100.8	107.4	114.5	48.1 %
MARINE CORPS									
Officer	3.5	3.5	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	37.1 %
Enlisted	37.9	41.3	38.0	38.9	41.9	44.5	47.6	50.9	34.3 %
Total	41.4	44.8	42.8	43.7	46.7	49.3	52.4	55.7	34.5 %
AIR FORCE									
Officer	3.8	4.3	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.9	5.1	34.2 %
Enlisted	33.7	33.3	26.6	24.5	24.8	26.0	27.7	29.2	-13.3 %
Total	37.5	37.6	31.2	29.1	29.4	30.7	32.6	34.3	-8.5 %
DoD									
Officer	71.3	69.6	74.3	74.4	74.2	74.7	75.6	76.9	7.8 %
Enlisted	311.8	336.3	350.5	361.6	363.4	392.7	424.9	435.6	39.7 %
Total	383.1	405.9	424.8	436.0	437.6	466.7	500.5	512.5	33.7 %
Projected:									
FY84-88 POM	402.1	427.2	458.3	465.1	459.0	465.0	475.2	———	
FY85-89 POM	———	———	424.8	436.0	437.6	466.7	500.5	512.5	
Actual:	383.1	405.9							

Retiree Mobilization Pool

Table 4.7 reflects the "estimated" retiree mobilization pool as of September 30, 1983.

- From FY 1982 to FY 1983 there was a 2% decline in the estimated Department of Defense retiree mobilization pool.

- During the same period, the Coast Guard retiree mobilization pool increased by 93%. This was due to the addition of regular retired to the pool.

- When the size of the retiree mobilization pool is compared to the Services' estimates of the number of retirees which would be called on full mobilization, it can be seen that the retiree pool is more than 3 times larger than the Service estimates of need of persons to be recalled.

- The total number of Category I and Category II Reserve retirees is suspect since there has not been a system in place to properly track Reserve Component personnel who have completed 20 or more years service, are eligible for retirement, but have not yet reached age 60. The Board suspects that the number shown is substantially understated. At this writing, the Services are in the process of implementing systems which will meet this need, but accurate data and working systems are not yet operational.

- Both regular and reserve retirees with 20 years or more active duty service, are subject to recall as provided for by 10USC688. Reserve Component retirees, those having 20 years or more Reserve service, are not currently subject to recall on the same basis as their Active Component counterparts.

The Board supports the extensive use of Reserve Component retirees and believes that there is a vast resource of retirees already living in many communities across the United States who could support the mobilization effort of this nation.

As reported by the Board in past readiness assessment reports, there remains a serious problem in maintaining contact with

retired Reserve Component members who have completed 20 or more years of service but have not yet reached age 60 and are not yet receiving retired pay.

The Board has studied the use of Reserve Component retirees and forwarded its findings and recommendations to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Included as part of the Board's specific series of recommendations is the following statement:

- "...in order to assure that the individual (eligible Reserve retiree) is a mobilizable asset (after retirement but before receiving retired pay), an appropriate I.D. card be issued to the retired service member and the service member's (eligible) dependents every two years in exchange for keeping the service informed of current address and a signed statement of current state of physical health. This appropriate I.D. card would entitle the member access to two no cost/low cost privileges, the PX (BX) and Space A travel." (1)

The Board again recommends that the Department of Defense adopt and implement this policy.

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(1) Reserve Forces Policy Board, "Report for Subcommittee On Manpower and Personnel, Committee On Armed Services, United States Senate, On A Meeting Of The Reserve Forces Policy Board, Office Of The Secretary Of Defense, June 14-16, 1982," The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., September 29, 1982.

TABLE 4.7
ACTIVE AND RESERVE RETIREES AS MOBILIZATION ASSETS AS OF END OF FY 1983

	Estimated Retiree Mobilization Pool					
	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD Total	Coast Guard
ACTIVE FORCE RETIREES 1/						
Category I 3/	57,504	44,480	8,670	69,926	180,580	3,259
Category II 4/	158,080	155,558	31,299	241,068	586,005	3,871
Total Active Force Categories I & II	215,584	200,038	39,969	310,994	766,585	7,130
RESERVE RETIREES 2/						
Category I 3/	13,103	3,333	1,101	8,052	25,589	392
Category II 4/	13,950	15,303	2,099	9,600	40,952	201
Total Reserve Force Categories I & II	27,053	18,636	3,200	17,652	66,541	593
TOTAL OF BOTH GROUPS	242,637	218,674	43,169	328,646	833,126	7,723
Reported in FY 1982	244,400	235,000	45,800	333,300	847,600	4,000

Service Estimates of Retirees who would be recalled in a Full Mobilization at M+120: (EXPRESSED 000s)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD Total	Coast Guard
Fiscal Year 1985	124	97	25	N/A	246	N/A
Fiscal Year 1989	140	87	25	57	309	N/A

Notes:

1/ Includes retired regular members, retired Reserve members who have completed at least 20 years of active duty, and other members of the Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.

2/ Retired Reserve members who have completed 20 years of creditable service for Reserve retirement (Title III) and will be entitled to receive benefits at age 60.

3/ Category I retirees have retired within the last five years, are under age 60, and are not disabled.

4/ Category II retirees have been retired for more than five years, are under age 60, and are not disabled.

CHAPTER 5

EQUIPMENT READINESS INDICATORS

General

Equipment continues to be the most serious and limiting factor affecting force readiness.

Over the years, the Board has examined and prepared several reports which have expressed its concern over the lack of equipment and the threat of block obsolescence of equipment on-hand in the Guard and Reserve. The reports have also served to reinforce the Board's long-standing position that many of the equipment shortfalls in the Guard and Reserve are also prevalent in the Active Component.

In addition to the principal reports on this subject prepared by the Board, (The Reserve Forces in the 1990s, Volume 1; The Reserve Forces in the 1990s, Equipment Acquisition/Allocation Policies and the Guard/Reserve; Fiscal Year 1980, Fiscal Year 1981, and Fiscal Year 1982, Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components), the Board has presented testimony to the Congress and has been an active participant in various meetings and study efforts in the Pentagon.

These efforts have been designed to raise the visibility of the issue and to encourage remedial efforts by the Services.

Congressional Concern with Lack of Reserve Component Equipment

Congress has also become increasingly concerned about Reserve Component equipment. Their concern promptly resulted in a provision within Public Law 97-86 which requires the Services to report to Congress annually on the status of Reserve Component Equipment. Through the office of the Deputy Assistant (now Assistant) Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, this report is published as an annex to Volume 2, Force Readiness Report -

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report. This report is often referred to as the "RC Equipment Report".

The first report was submitted to the Congress during FY 1982 and was significantly expanded in its content in FY 1983. The report highlights the equipment status in the Reserve Components and serves as a standard from which the Reserve Components' equipment status can be assessed. The "RC Equipment Report" has similar purposes to this Chapter of the Board's annual readiness assessment report; that is, they both examine equipment, but from different perspectives. Thus, direct comparisons of the data found in the two reports is not always possible. Together, the two reports present a comprehensive picture of the current status of Reserve Component equipment and the projected distribution of equipment.

Board's Concern with Failure to Identify Substitute Equipment

The Board continues to express its concern with the practice of some Services to count as "on-hand and ready," non-deployable items of equipment or substitute items which have been issued in lieu of the normal line items of equipment.

Although this problem was outlined and discussed in some detail first in the Board's FY 1981 readiness assessment report and again in the FY 1982 readiness report, the problem continues to be significant enough for the Board to comment on it once again this year.

The Board is of the opinion that the practice of counting this equipment as "on-hand and ready" conceals the magnitude of the equipment shortfalls facing this nation in both our Active and Reserve Components, and does not allow these shortfalls to be properly addressed by the decision makers during the resource allocation process. Further, much of the equipment in this category is not deployable due to its inability to function with Active Component equipment within the area of operations. This facet is referred to as a lack of interoperability. Finally, there are severe shortages within the supply system of spare parts and other resources which are required to maintain the equipment in an operational status.

Substitutions of equipment in lieu of equipment authorized is a necessary process when there is insufficient first-line equip-

ment to meet all the demands. The degree to which equipment is substituted is not, in the opinion of the Board, fully known or recognized. Substitutions and shortfalls of this nature are substantial and constitute a major constraint in our nation's ability not only to fight a war but to sustain our forces in a hostile environment.

It is the Board's position that whenever non-deployable or substitute items are issued to Active or Reserve Component units in lieu of the required items, such substitute items should be accounted for and reported on the Unit Status Report separately so that they can be clearly identified. Once identified, it is then up to Department of Defense and Congressional decision makers to take those steps necessary to remedy the serious equipment shortfalls. The procedures and policies which are now followed make the identification of the substitution shortfalls difficult. It is difficult to remedy a problem which is not clearly identified.

Dollar Value of Equipment On-Hand versus Wartime Requirement

Table 5.1 compares the overall equipment status for the Reserve Components for FY 1982 and FY 1983. Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 examine major equipment categories for the Reserve Components.

The following observations may be made for the analysis of these tables.

- There have been substantial changes in the equipment status among Services from FY 1982 to FY 1983. Many of these changes are often unexplainable. Some changes, such as in the case of the Army Reserve Components, are said to be the result of a shift in pricing policies. The result is that the wartime equipment requirements and equipment authorized costs have increased dramatically as compared with the equipment on hand.

- The level of wartime equipment requirements has increased 4 times faster than equipment on hand in Reserve Components. Equipment authorized increased more than 3 times faster than equipment on hand. Thus, when compared to either equipment wartime requirements or equipment authorizations, the percentage of equipment on hand dropped significantly from FY 1982 to FY 1983.

TABLE 5.1

COMPARISON OF RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT STATUS - FY 1982 VS. FY 1983 (EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT DOLLARS)

	Total Equipment Items (see Table 5.2)			Status (+/-)		
	Wartime Requirement	Currently Authorized	Currently On Hand	$ Short On Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percent On Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percent On Hand vs Currently Authorized
Army National Guard						
FY 1983	$ 26,166	$ 25,150	$ 13,696	$ 12,470	52%	54%
FY 1982	$ 14,485	$ 12,004	$ 9,111	$ 5,374	63%	76%
Difference (+/-)	$ 11,858	$ 13,146	$ 4,585	$ 7,096		
Percent Change	82%	110%	50%	132%	-11%	-22%
Army Reserve						
FY 1983	$ 6,378	$ 5,173	$ 3,216	$ 3,162	50%	62%
FY 1982	$ 6,454	$ 3,436	$ 2,178	$ 4,276	34%	63%
Difference (+/-)	$ - 76	$ 1,737	$ 1,038	$ -1,114		
Percent Change	-01%	51%	48%	-26%	16%	-01%
Naval Reserve						
FY 1983	$ 9,442	$ 1,366	$ 1,558	$ 7,884	17%	114%
FY 1982	$ 10,300	$ 9,918	$ 9,495	$ 805	92%	96%
Difference (+/-)	$ - 858	$ -8,552	$ -7,937	$ 7,079		
Percent Change	-08%	-86%	-84%	879%	-75%	18%
Marine Corps Reserve						
FY 1983	$ 2,506	$ 2,506	$ 2,298	$ 208	92%	91%
FY 1982	$ 3,780	$ 3,711	$ 2,936	$ 844	78%	79%
Difference (+/-)	$ -1,274	$ -1,205	$ - 638	$ -636		
Percent Change	-34%	-32%	-22%	-75%	14%	12%
Air National Guard						
FY 1983	$ 6,874	$ 6,874	$ 6,067	$ 807	88%	88%
FY 1982	$ 5,848	$ 5,848	$ 5,362	$ 486	92%	90%
Difference (+/-)	$ -1,026	$ -1,026	$ - 705	$ -321		
Percent Change	-18%	-18%	-13%	-66%	-04%	-02%
Air Force Reserve						
FY 1983	$ 6,145	$ 6,145	$ 5,991	$ -154	98%	98%
FY 1982	$ 5,400	$ 5,400	$ 4,882	$ -518	90%	90%
Difference (+/-)	$ 745	$ 745	$ 1,109	$ 364		
Percent Change	14%	14%	23%	70%	8%	8%
All DoD Services						
FY 1983	$ 57,511	$ 47,214	$ 32,826	$ 24,685	57%	70%
FY 1982	$ 46,267	$ 40,317	$ 33,964	$ 12,303	73%	84%
Difference (+/-)	$ 11,244	$ 6,897	$ 1,138	$ 12,382		
Percent Change	24%	17%	-3%	101%	-21%	-14%

TABLE 5.2

ON-HAND EQUIPMENT INVENTORY COMPARISON TO WARTIME REQUIREMENTS FOR THE GUARD AND RESERVE (EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT DOLLARS)

	Army 1/ Guard	Army 1/ Reserve	Naval Reserve	USMC Reserve	Air Force Guard	Air Force Reserve	USCG 10/ Reserve
MAJOR ITEMS							
Wartime Reqmt	24,966	6,009	8,621	2,409	4,085	5,632	
Present Auth	23,955	4,813	1,055	2,409	4,085	5,632	
On-Hand (OH)	13,080	3,024	1,199	2,222	4,004	5,592 9/	
Short OH vs WR Reqmt	11,086	2,985	7,421	187 3/	1	40 9/	
% OH vs WR Reqmt	52%	50%	14%	92% 3/	99%	99%	
SUPPORT ITEMS	2/						
Wartime Reqmt		112	214	18	881	325	
Present Auth		108	214	18	881	325	
On-Hand (OH)		62	117	2	595	233	
Short OH vs WR Reqmt		50	97	16 4/	286	92	
% OH vs WR Reqmt		55%	55%	11% 4/	68%	72%	
SPARES							
Wartime Reqmt	197	11	92	.6	650 7/	161	
Present Auth	197	11	92	.6	650 7/	161	
On-Hand (OH)	125	6	27	.6	437	143	
Short OH vs WR Reqmt	72	5	65	0	213	18	
% OH vs WR Reqmt	63%	55%	29%	100% 5/	67%	89%	
WORKING 6/	2/	2/					
Wartime Reqmt			515	79	1,338	27	
Present Auth			5	79	1,338	27	
On-Hand (OH)			215	74	1,031	23	
Short OH vs WR Reqmt			295	5	307	4	
% OH vs WR Reqmt			57%	95% 6/	77%	85%	
STOCK FUNDED							
Wartime Reqmt	1,083	246	n/a	n/a	8/	n/a	
Present Auth	998	241					
On-Hand (OH)	487	124					
Short OH vs WR Reqmt	516	122					
% OH vs WR Reqmt	49%	50%					
TOTAL							
Wartime Reqmt	26,166	6,378	9,442	2,506	6,076	6,145	
Present Auth	25,150	5,173	1,366	2,506	6,074	6,145	
On-Hand (OH)	13,696	3,216	1,550	2,298	6,067	5,991	
Short OH vs WR Reqmt	12,470	3,162	7,804	208	807	154	
% OH vs WR Reqmt	52%	50%	17%	92%	89%	98%	

Numbers may not add due to rounding

Notes:

1/ Dollars are as per Army Supply Bulletin SB700-20, March 83 and current procurement price.

2/ Data not available.

3/ "Wartime Reqmt" includes only Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) while "On-Hand" includes all aircraft currently possessed, both PAA and Backup Aircraft Authorized (BAA).

4/ Includes only Navy medical/dental funded items, portions of which are deferred due to short shelf life/commercial availability. Marine Corps funded items are not established as a separate category and are included in equipage.

5/ Does not include aviation spare requirement which is provided by the Navy and presently under review. This year "spares" are limited to Supply Class IX (SRC 1 and 2) support for major equipments classified as combat essential/critical which appear on the Tables of Equipment (T/E's) for early deploying, non-aviation units.

6/ Equipage includes Supply Classes II and IV (SRC 1 and SRC 2) for initial issue requirements.

7/ Present authorized includes $570M funded and $80M unfunded.

8/ Support items, mobility equipment, and spares are separately identified; however, stock funded versus centrally procured are not separately identified.

9/ Represents requirement for 2 C-130H aircraft at Dobbins AFB, GA, to increase unit to standard Reserve PAA of 8 aircraft.

10/ For U.S Coast Guard, see Table 5.11.

Data as of:

Army National Guard:	September 30, 1983
Army Reserve:	September 30, 1983
Air National Guard:	September 7, 1983
Air Force Reserve:	July 31, 1983
Naval Reserve:	April 30,1983
Marine Corps Reserve:	November 10, 1983

Codes:

n/a - not applicable
WR - Wartime
OH - On-hand
Auth - Authorized

TABLE 6.3

ON-HAND EQUIPMENT INVENTORY COMPARISON TO WARTIME REQUIREMENTS FOR THE GUARD AND RESERVE, FY 1983 (EXPRESSED IN PERCENT OF CURRENT DOLLARS)

	Army Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Force Guard	Air Force Reserve	Coast Guard Reserve
MAJOR EQUIPMENT							
Auth vs WT Reqmt	96	80	12	100	100	100	n/a
OH vs WT Reqmt	52	50	14	92	99	99	
OH vs Auth	55	63	114	92	99	99	
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT							
Auth vs WT Reqmt	1/	96	100	100 2/	100	100	n/a
OH vs WT Reqmt		55	55	11	68	72	
OH vs Auth		57	55	11	68	72	
SPARES							
Auth vs WT Reqmt	100	100	100	100 3/	100	100	n/a
OH vs WT Reqmt	63	55	29	100	67	89	
OH vs Auth	63	55	29	100	67	89	
TOTAL							
Auth vs WT Reqmt	96	81	14	100	100	100	n/a
OH vs WT Reqmt	52	50	17	92	88	98	
OH vs Auth	54	62	114	92	88	98	

Code: n/a = Not Applicable WT = Wartime OH = On-Hand Auth = Authorized

Note:

1/ Data not available

2/ Includes only Navy medical/dental funded items, portions of which are deferred due to short shelf life/commercial availability. Marine Corps funded items are not established as a separate category and are included in equipage.

3/ Does not include aviation spares requirements which are provided by the Navy and presently under review. This year "spares" are limited to supply class IX (SAC 1 and 2) support for major equipments classified as combat essential/ critical which appear on the Tables of Equipment (T/E's) for early deploying, non-aviation units.

TABLE 5.4

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT INVENTORY (EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OR AS A PERCENTAGE OF DOLLARS)

	Army 1/ Guard 2/	Army 1/ Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Force Guard	Air Force Reserve	Coast Guard Reserve 3/
MAJOR ITEMS							
Wartime Requt FY82	13,300	6,210	10,300	3444	4331	4093	
Wartime Requt FY83	26,966	6,809	8,621	2409	4005	5632	
Difference	+11,666	-201	-1,679	-1035 4/	- 326	+ 739	
Present Auth FY82	10,900	3,281	9,623	3375	4331	4093	
Present Auth FY83	23,955	4,813	1,055	2409	4005	5632	
Difference	+13,055	+1,532	-8,568	- 966	- 326	+ 739	
On-Hand (OH) FY82	8,600	2,082	9,372	2779	4291	4477	
On-Hand (OH) FY83	13,080	3,024	1,199	2222	4004	5592	
Difference	+4,480	+942	-8,173	- 557	- 287	+1115	
% OH vs WR Requt FY82	65%	34%	92%	81%	99%	91%	
% OH vs WR Requt FY83	52%	50%	14%	92%	99%	98%	
Difference	-13%	+16%	-78%	+ 11%	0	- 7%	
SUPPORT ITEMS	5/	6/					
Wartime Requt FY82			195	77	1517	324	
Wartime Requt FY83		112	214	18 7/	1338	325	
Difference			+ 19	- 59	- 179	+ 1	
Present Auth FY82			195	77	1517	324	
Present Auth FY83		108	214	18	1338	325	
Difference			+ 19	- 59	- 179	+ 1	
On-Hand (OH) FY82			106	21	1817	230	
On-Hand (OH) FY83		62	117	2	1831	233	
Difference			+ 11	- 19	+ 14	+ 3	
% OH vs WR Requt FY82			54%	27%	67%	71%	
% OH vs WR Requt FY83		55%	55%	11%	77%	72%	
Difference			1%	- 16%	+ 10%	+ 1%	

Data reflects major changes in equipment levels or percentages based upon Reserve Forces Policy Board Fiscal Year 1982 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components as compared to the current data.

Note:

1/ Army FY 82 figures were reported as standard price per Supply Bulletin SB700-20. FY 83 figures were computed using latest procurement price or standard price if the item is no longer under procurement.

2/ FY 83 increases in ARNG requirement and authorization are a result of modernization of requirements documents in anticipation of issuing equipment and training personnel. This ensures equipment, training and capability compatability between Active and Reserve component units.

3/ The Coast Guard Reserve does not have any equipment.

4/ Differences are attributable to the application of lower, more realistic replacement cost factors for aircraft reported in last year's report, a change in internal reporting requirements for aircraft (see TABLE 5.1A), and fluctuation in items identified as combat essential/critical by MC Bulletin 3000.

5/ Data not reported prior to Fiscal Year 1983.

6/ Data not available

7/ Major differences are caused by deletion of Aviation support items from 1983 figures. Support item requirements for 4th MAW mobilization are provided by the Navy and are presently under review. A Navy War Reserve Project for Marine Corps Reserve aviation support has been established by CNO Washington DC 292144Z Sep 83.

- In the case of the Naval Reserve, the Navy reduced the equipment authorized and transferred the accountability for equipment on hand from the Naval Reserve to the Active Navy.

- The Army Reserve Components continue to have the largest actual equipment shortages.

- The practice of some Services, such as the Air Force, to organize units based upon available weapons systems such as aircraft, also may distort equipment shortfalls. This practice explains why wartime equipment requirements, equipment authorized, and equipment on hand match so closely.

- The Air Force submitted numerous changes to their FY 1982 data to correct their original methodolgy used for computing equipment status. The Air Force felt their 1982 data would lead to invalid comparisons and conclusions.

- When Services such as the Marine Corps have multiple claimants for the same available equipment on hand, it is questionable what the true equipment status and availability will be for the Reserve Component when it mobilizes.

Army Reserve Components

Table 5.5 compares equipment, categories for Army Reserve and Army National Guard for FY 1982 and FY 1983. There have been dynamic changes in both the equipment requirement costs and the equipment on-hand levels. A direct comparison of enhanced or diminished status from that reported last year is not practical.

When Army Reserve Component equipment dollar shortfalls are examined, Table 5.6, it can be seen that the Army National Guard is short on equipment on-hand from wartime requirements of nearly $12 billion. There is nearly a $3 billion shortfall in the Army Reserve.

Naval Reserve

Table 5.7 examines some specific equipment categories in the Naval Air Reserve program. Very little has occurred between FY 1982 and FY 1983 in aircraft requirements. However, in other categories listed, over $84 million has been added to the requirements and over $40 million has been added to equipment on-hand.

TABLE 5.5

ARMY GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT SUMMARY (EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OR PERCENT)

Equipment Categories	Army National Guard			Army Reserve		
	FY 1983	FY 1982	Change FY82-FY83	FY 1983	FY 1982	Change FY82-FY83
Aircraft Required	$ 2,994	$ 2,833	+ 161	$ 1,127	$ 746	+ 381
On-Hand	$ 1,886	$ 1,819	+ 67	$ 376	$ 364	+ 12
Percent On-Hand vs Required	65%	64%	+ 1%	33%	49%	- 16%
Tanks Required	$ 4,295	$ 3,500	+ 795	$ 1,307	$ 1,368	- 61
On-Hand	$ 2,953	$ 2,802	+ 151	$ 183	$ 139	+ 44
Percent On-Hand vs Required	69%	80%	- 11%	14%	10%	+ 4%
Trucks Required	$ 935	$ 371	+ 564	$ 1,299	$ 1,305	- 6
On-Hand	$ 383	$ 157	+ 226	$ 957	$ 642	+ 315
Percent On-Hand vs Required	41%	42%	+ 1%	74%	49%	+ 25%
Carriers/Bradleys Required	$ 9,751	$ 1,244	+8,507	$ 258	$ 218	+ 40
On-Hand	$ 6,241	$ 804	+5,437	$ 60	$ 39	+ 21
Percent On-Hand vs Required	64%	65%	- 1%	23%	18%	+ 5%
Radars Required	$ 163	$ 69	+ 94	$ 10	$ 2	+ 8
On-Hand	$ 33	$ 13	+ 20	$ 1	$ 1	0
Percent On-Hand vs Required	20%	19%	+ 1%	11%	50%	- 39%
Air Defense Required	$ 953	$ 877	+ 76	$ 13	$ 196	- 183
On-Hand	$ 0	$ 0	0	$ 1 2/	$ 18	- 17
Percent On-Hand vs Required	0%	0%	0%	5%	9%	- 4%
Telecommunications Required	$ 1,594	$ 1,128	+ 466	$ 235	$ 124	+ 111
On-Hand	$ 685	$ 496	+ 189	$ 135	$ 76	+ 59
Percent On-Hand vs Required	43%	44%	- 1%	58%	61%	- 3%
Artillery Required	$ 838	$ 577	+ 261	$ 111	$ 107	+ 4
On-Hand	$ 688	$ 478	+ 210	$ 76	$ 48	+ 28
Percent On-Hand vs Required	82%	83%	- 1%	69%	45%	+ 24%
Tactical ADPE Required	$ 164	$ 153	+ 11	$ 266 1/	$ 129	+ 137
On-Hand	$ 33	$ 13	+ 2	$ 11	$ .517	+ 10.5
Percent On-Hand vs Required	20%	9%	+ 11%	4%	4%	0%

Note:

1/ Dollar amount required for USAR is an estimated cost only. Dollar cost for all ADPE is not available in Army SB 700-20. TACCS/TTASC short 100%.

2/ Does not include 522 M42A1 Self-Propelled Anti Aircraft Guns, 40mm Dusters, that are not considered deployable or supportable, and were issued for training only (total value $18?M).

Data as of: September 30, 1982 and September 30, 1983

TABLE 5.6

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS' EQUIPMENT SHORTFALL SUMMARY (EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

ITEM	Army Guard Dollars Short	Army Reserve Dollars Short
Aircraft (all types)	$ 1,108	$ 751
Tactical ADPE		
DAS-3	$ 75	$ 75
TACCS	$ 58	$ 162
ITASC		$ 8
Other		$ 10
Tanks (all series)	$ 1,342	$ 1,124
Trucks	$ 552	$ 342
Artillery 1/	$ 150	$ 35
Radars	$ 130	$ 9
Air Defense		
Chapparal/Vulcan	$ 306	$ 12
Stinger	$ 647	
Carriers/Bradleys	$ 3,510	$ 198
Communications Equipment	$ 909	$ 100
Other to include Engineer Equipment, Trailers, Generators, Shop Sets, Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment, etc.	$ 3,099	$ 159
TOTAL	$ 11,886	$ 2,985

Note:

1/ Artillery requirements will increase based on projected activation of new battalions and conversion of ARNG units from a 3X6 (3 Battery, 6 Artillery guns per battery in each battalion) to a 3X8 organization.

TABLE 5.7
NAVY AIR RESERVE EQUIPMENT SUMMARY
(EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OR PERCENT)

Equipment Categories

	FY 1983	FY 1982	Change FY82-FY83
Aircraft Required	$ 9,520	$ 9,520	-0-
On-Hand	$ 9,170	$ 9,170	-0-
Percent On-Hand vs Required	96%	96%	-0-
Aircraft Support Equipment Required	$ 214	$ 195	+19
On-hand	$ 117	$ 106	+11
Percent On-Hand vs Required	55%	54%	+ 1%
Aircraft Repair Parts Required	$ 91.5	$ 100	+ 9.5
On-Hand	$ 26.9	$ 17	+ 9.9
Percent On-Hand vs Required	29%	17%	+12%
Advanced Base Equipment Required	$ 490	$ 434	+56
On-Hand	$ 212	$ 192	+20
Percent On-Hand vs Required	43%	44%	- 1%
Specific Advanced Base Requirements			
Fork Lifts and Handling Equipment	$ 28	$ 28	-0-
Tents, Clothing	$ 78	$ 28	-0-
Trucks, Earth Moving	$ 179	$ 139	+40

Data as of: April 1983

Marine Corps Reserve

Although Table 5.8 reflects some rather dynamic increases in Marine Corps Reserve equipment requirements and on-hand levels, the overall on-hand equipment position has declined in nearly all major categories during FY 1983 over that reported in FY 1982 (see Table 5.1).

Selected equipment statistics summary for the Marine Corps Reserve is shown in Table 5.9.

TABLE 5.8
MARINE CORPS EQUIPMENT SUMMARY
(EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OR PERCENT)

EQUIPMENT CATEGORIES	FY 1983	FY 1982	Change FY82-FY83
Aircraft Required 1/	$ 1,727.8	$ 2,690	- 28.4
On-Hand 2/	$ 1,830.8	$ 2,281	- 555
Percent On-Hand vs Required	106%	85%	+ 21%
Tanks Required	$ 134	$ 139	- 5
On-Hand	$ 83	$ 85	- 3
Percent On-Hand vs Required	62%	61%	+ 1%
Trucks Required	$ 65	$ 28	+ 37
On-Hand	$ 37	$ 15	+ 22
Percent On-Hand vs Required	57%	56%	+ 1%
Ground Support Radar Required	$ 4.6	$ 6	- 1.4
On-Hand	$ 3.3	$ 3.7	- 0.4
Percent On-Hand vs Required	71%	62%	+ 9%
Air Support Radar/IFF Equipment Required	$ 51	$ 40	+ 11
On-Hand	$ 21	$ 19	+ 2
Percent On-Hand vs Required	40%	48%	- 8%
Air Command/Control Equipment Required	$ 30	$ 12	+ 18
On-Hand	$ 14	$ 5	+ 9
Percent On-Hand vs Required	47%	42%	+ 5%
Missile Systems Required	$ 124	$ 84	+ 40
On-Hand	$ 63	$ 41	+ 22
Percent On-Hand vs Required	51%	49%	+ 2%
Communications Required	$ 59	$ 26	+ 33
On-Hand	$ 33	$ 8	+ 25
Percent On-Hand vs Required	56%	31%	+ 25%
Engineer Support Equipment Required	$ 32	$ 21	+ 11
On-Hand	$ 16	$ 2.2	+ 13.8
Percent On-Hand vs Required	49%	10%	+ 39%
Materials Handling Equipment Required	$ 26	$ 4	+ 22
On-Hand	$ 9	$ .5	+ 8.5
Percent On-Hand vs Required	35%	12%	+ 23%
Generators Required	$ 11	$ 6	+ 5
On-Hand	$ 9	$ 2.3	+ 6.7
Percent On-Hand vs Required	82%	38%	+ 44%
Environmental Control Equipment Required	$ 5	$ 2	+ 3
On-Hand	$ 3	$ .7	+ 2.3
Percent On-Hand vs Required	60%	35%	+ 25%
Amphibious Assault Vehicles Required	$ 46	3/	3/
On-Hand	$ 27		
Percent On-Hand vs Required	58%		

Note:

1/ Includes Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) + Pipeline Aircraft Required

2/ Reflects Basic Aircraft Allowance (BAA) (Total Aircraft Assigned: OH + SUER)

3/ Not reported in FY 1982.

TABLE 5.9

MARINE CORPS RESERVE EQUIPMENT SUMMARY SHORTFALL (EXPRESSED IN DOLLARS)

Major categories of equipment shortages in the Marine Corps Reserve.

ITEM	QTY SHORT	TOTAL COST ($000)
Radios	2,527	24,068
Trucks	2,204	28,569
Tanks	51	51,459
Engineer Support	247	16,278
Ground Support Radar	27	1,385
Materials Handling Equip	161	17,435
Artillery	28	4,298
Amphibious Assault	50	19,109
Aircraft	16	87,500
Remainder of equipment shortages include Comm Support, Generators, Earthmoving Equip, Air Support Radar, etc.		$127,065
		$377,166

Air Reserve Components

Table 5.10 compares some specific equipment categories within the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve.

United States Coast Guard Reserve

The Coast Guard equipment situation is described in detail in Table 5.11.

TABLE 6.10

AIR FORCE RESERVE COMPONENTS EQUIPMENT SUMMARY (EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OR PERCENT)

Equipment Categories	Air National Guard			Air Force Reserve		
	FY 1983	FY 1982	Change FY82-FY83	FY 1983	FY 1982	Change FY82-FY83
Aircraft Required/Authorized	$4,005	$4,079	- 74	$5,632	$4,893	+ 739
On-Hand	$4,003.9	$3,809	+194.9	$5,593	$4,477	+ 116
Percent On-Hand vs Required	99%	93%	7%	99%	92%	+ 7%
Vehicles Required/Authorized	$ 446	$ 402	+ 44	$ 72	$ 67	+ 5
On-Hand	$ 411	$ 377	+ 64	$ 61 1/	$ 57	+ 4
Percent On-Hand vs Required	92%	94%	- 2%	85%	85%	-0-
Specialized Trucks/Trlrs Reqd	$ 28	$ 20	+ 8	$ 10	$ 9	+ 1
On-Hand	$ 17	$ 12	+ 5	$ 6	$ 5	+ 1
Percent On-Hand vs Required	61%	58%	+ 3%	60%	56%	+ 4%
Mobility Equipment (Wartime)	$ 1,338	2/		$ 129	2/	
On-Hand	1,031	2/		$ 94	2/	
Percent On-Hand vs Required	77%	2/		73%	2/	
MH3E Helicopter Required	$ 13	$ 13	0			
On-Hand	$ 12	$ 12	0			
Percent On-Hand vs Required	92%	92%	0%			
C130H Aircraft Required	117	2/		$ 160	$ 108	+ 52
On-Hand	117	2/		$ 120	$ 81	+ 39
Percent On-Hand vs Required	100%	2/		75%	75%	0%
Aircraft Ground Svc Equip Reqd	$ 69	$ 224	- 115	$ 25	$ 22	+ 3
On-Hand	$ 51	$ 44	+ 7	$ 19	$ 15	+ 4
Percent On-Hand vs Required	74%	20%	54%	76%	68%	+ 8%
Heavy Duty Shop Equip Required	$ 45	$ 21	+ 24	$ 11	$ 11	0
On-Hand	$ 30	$ 14	+ 16	$ 8	$ 8	0
Percent On-Hand vs Required	67%	67%	0%	73%	73%	0%
Specific Comm Equipment Reqd	$ 228.7	$ 126	+ 102.7	$ 13	2/	
On-Hand	$ 168.5	$ 88	+ 80.5	$ 9	2/	
Percent On-Hand vs Required	74%	70%	+ 4%	69%	2/	
Long Term FY 83-86						
Aircraft Support and Mobility Equip				$ 66		
Communications				$ 9		
Cold Weather Clothing				$ 4		

Note: Reflects 1983 data.

1/ Includes $21M on-hand replacement coded vehicles.

2/ Data not reported in FY 1982

TABLE 5.11

COAST GUARD RESERVE EQUIPMENT SUMMARY

The Coast Guard Reserve presently has no unfilled requirements for major equipment. Ninety-four percent of the Coast Guard's early mobilization requirements are programmed for wartime augmentation of existing command structures in the United States and Territories. At these locations, Reservists will utilize equipment already on hand at the augmented active commands. The remaining six percent deploy overseas under the Operational Command of other Services with which they are negotiating to determine equipment requirements and sources.

No major weapons systems, other than those in the peacetime active service inventory, are required for training or wartime operations of the Coast Guard Reserve. All small arms planned for wartime requirements are in the current Coast Guard inventory. The only major items of equipment not on hand in adequate numbers for wartime needs are automobiles and harbor patrol small craft. Current plans call for commercial procurement of automobiles upon mobilization; small craft will be provide through the Coast Guard Auxiliary and, as needed, commercial procurement.

Assumptions regarding the commercial availability of protective clothing (rain gear, hard hats, steel toed shoes, etc.), office supplies and portable radios undergo continual review. An intensive revision of Coast Guard OPLANS is currently underway that may reveal some major shortfalls in this area. Should this occur, the cost would still be relatively incidental compared to the capital investment represented by the ships and shore stations already in the Coast Guard inventory that the Reserve would be augmenting.

Average Age of Equipment

Table 5.12 shows the average age of equipment categories within the various Reserve Components. Preparation of this table was dependent upon Service-provided information.

The equipment age data base within the Army continues to produce information with a high error factor. We have elected not to include the information provided as discussions with the Army staff indicated that there could be no degree of certainty as to the accuracy of the data provided.

The age of equipment in the Guard and Reserve, as compared to the Active Service, is an important comparison. The Board will continue to monitor and develop this section of data for future reports.

TABLE 5.12

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE EQUIPMENT AGES BY MAJOR CATEGORY FOR THE GUARD, RESERVE AND ACTIVE FORCES (EXPRESSED IN YEARS)

	ARMY			NAVY		MARINE CORPS		AIR FORCE			COAST GUARD
	Guard	Reserve	Active	Reserve	Active	Reserve	Active	Guard	Reserve	Active	Reserve
GROUND EQUIPMENT	2/	2/	2/								1/
Tanks						7	7				
Carriers						11	10				
Artillery						21	19.6				
Trucks						15	12				
All Equipment											
AIRCRAFT	2/	2/	2/								1/
Fixed Wing:											
Attack				13.1	11.0	15	7.5	8.6	5.7	4.0	
Fighter/Intercepter				17.9	10.5	15	6.5	18.3	17.2	8.6	
Cargo				18.3	21.5			21.8	22.1	16.3	
Tankers				24.1	17.9	13	15	24.6	24.5	21.7	
ASW Patrol				19.8	8.2						
Observation/Recon						15	15	18.8	17.7	14.7	
AEW				12.1	6.3	15	7				
Trainer								26.3		19.4	
Rescue								17.2	16.8	16.1	
Helicopters:											
Attack				21		13	9.5				
Utility				-	-	9	6				
Observation				-	-	-	-				
Cargo				-	-	14.4	9				
Rescue				21							
All Helicopters				-	-	-	-				
SHIPS								16.1	14.2	13.5	1/
DD				28	12.9						
MSO				29	28.8						
AMPHIB				13	15						
Support				37	23						
PF				11.8	9.7						

Note:

1/ Coast Guard Reserve - No major items of equipment.

2/ Data is not available due to errors found in the age data base.

Average age is not shown in every category because of the following reasons:

1. No equipment/aircraft of this type exists within the inventory of the respective component(s); or
2. Average age computations were made by consolidating several types of equipment/aircraft data.
3. Data is not available.

Equipping of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve by the United States Army -- A Special Report

General

Since the Board's FY 1980 readiness assessment report, the Board has taken a series of strong positions opposing various equipment policies of the Army with respect to their Reserve Forces. The Board was the first to point out the serious equipment shortages in the Army to meet wartime requirements and the demands of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve and has been very critical of various programs which excluded Guard and Reserve participation. The Board also expressed dismay with the Army's logistical management systems, or the lack thereof, which could not produce answers to basic questions concerning the equipment status in the Active, Guard or Reserve.

All that has changed.

A Job Well Done

The Board is pleased to note that the Army staff has made significant progress in planning for equipping the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Further, it must be highlighted that the Army has developed and placed into operation a computer system which can, for the first time, accurately report the on-hand status of the equipment within the Active, Guard and Reserve Forces. Not only has a sincere effort been made in this area, but the Army has also been up-front in showing the areas of need and deficiency and in its adoption of programs to overcome these shortfalls.

Since the Board has been highly critical of Army practices in the past, it has decided this year to highlight some of the progress which has been made by the Army and to outline existing plans to correct current deficiencies.

Army Equipment Initiatives

The Army has a number of significant equipment initiatives to improve the capability of its Reserve Components. The scope of these initiatives includes:

- Improving the quantity of equipment on hand vs the wartime equipment requirements.
- Modernizing Reserve Component equipment on hand.
- Dedicated equipment procurement for the Reserve Component.
- Redistribution of equipment from the Active to the Reserve Component.
- Substantial improvement in equipment management programs and management information systems.
- Procuring specific type of equipment for the Reserve Components, e.g. water support equipment; chemical and biological defense equipment; medical equipment; communications equipment.
- The standardization of combat Prescribed Load Lists (PLL) and Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL).

The paragraphs which follow will highlight some of the current programs and initiatives which are underway within the Army. It is not intended to be a comprehensive statement of activity but to reflect the dramatic changes which have occurred since the Board's first report in FY 1981.

Equipment Status

The following is a display of the equipment posture, as a percent of fill by dollar value, as of the end of Fiscal Year 1983.

Equipment Status -- Army National Guard/Army Reserve
with substitute equipment issued -- FY 1983
(Expressed in Millions of Dollars)

	Required	On-hand	Short	Percent Fill
Army Guard	$24,966	$13,080	$11,886	52%
Army Reserve	6,009	3,024	2,985	50%
TOTAL	$30,975	$16,104	$14,871	52%

The Army Reserve Components are equipped at 52 percent fill based on the dollar value of inventory versus their wartime requirement. These levels of fill include current generation of equipment as substitutes for new generation items. Generally, these substitute items are older and possess less capability than the new items. Therefore, they cannot be considered as full replacements, although current Army plans call for the equipment on hand being deployed if there were a war today.

During FY 1984 and 1985, Army plans for the provision of large quantities of equipment to their Reserve Forces. Projected equipment distribution planned for the Guard and Reserve is shown below. The year shown is the year of projected delivery and includes all sources, not just procurement.

Projected Equipment Distribution
(Expressed in Millions of Dollars)

	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985
Army Guard	$370	$611	$1,045
Army Reserve	95	304	352
TOTAL	$465	$915	$1,397

Equipment Modernization

Equipment modernization is a major program -- if not the most important program -- within the Army as a whole. The Army has focused its efforts on early deploying combat units as well as later deploying combat service support units, and has developed a detailed list of equipment to be distributed to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. This modern equipment includes the Sergeant York DIVAD Gun, M-1 Abrams Tank, M198 Towed Howitzer (155mm), Roland Air Defense Missile System, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and others. All of this listed equipment is due to be introduced in varying quantities by FY 1985.

Dedicated procurement for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve remains the single most important instrument for equipment upgrade and fill. There can be no doubt that Congressionally directed efforts in this regard are responsible for much of the new equipment in the Army's Reserve Forces. The dedicated procurement funds set aside by Congress and the Army are shown below.

Reserve Component Dedicated Procurement
(Expressed in Millions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year	Source	Army Guard	Army Reserve	Total
1978-1979	Army	$ 51.0	$ 19.0	$ 70.0
1980	Congress	29.5	-----	29.5
1981	Congress	25.0	25.0	50.0
1982	Congress	150.2	24.8	185.0
	Army	72.0	100.0	172.0
1983	Congress	113.9	15.0	128.9
1984	Congress	100.0	15.0	115.0
Total	Army	123.0	119.0	242.0
	**Congress	418.6	89.8	508.4
Grand Total		$541.6	$208.8	$750.5

** Reflects funds authorized by Congress above budget requests.

Overall Equipment Procurement Projections

The above figure represents dedicated procurement: specifically identified pieces of equipment or items to be purchased for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. In addition to those amounts shown above, there is an overall equipment procurement plan which includes all equipment to be procured and distributed to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

Shown below are the equipment distribution projections for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve which were included as part of the Army's budget in the FY 1984 President's Budget Submission made in February 1983. More current figures are not available as of this writing. It should be noted that the year shown is the year of appropriation, not the year of delivery. The Congressional and Army dedicated procurement funds shown on the preceding page are included in the FY 1982 and FY 1983 figures.

Projected Procurement for Army Guard and Reserve
(Expressed in Millions of Dollars)

	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984
Army Guard	$695.3	$802.6	$ 961.4
Army Reserve	151.9	92.5	176.5
Total	$847.2	$895.1	$1,137.9

Equipment Redistribution

The Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP) is being modified to identify assets available for redistribution which will allow for better management of the overall equipment program. Further, the Army is conducting an extensive review of critical training equipment shortages in order to identify and accelerate filling Army Guard and Reserve units so they might train more effectively.

Redistribution planned during FY 1984 and FY 1985 include M60 and M48A5 Tanks, new procurement of M60A3 tanks, M113 Armored Personnel Carriers, M113 TOW Carriers, and other items.

Equipment Storage

As more equipment is brought into the Reserve Component, there will be increased demands for adequate and secure storage facilities. This problem will become most acute in the National Guard and Army Reserve.

Most armories and training centers in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were designed and built in the 1950's and 1960's, before the Total Force policy was instituted. In those days, units were organized under an entirely different structure with most units manned and equipped at 50% levels. The armories and training centers were not, for the most part, designed with the storage space required to accommodate the types of units now in the force structure or the equipment levels which must be maintained.

Armories and Training Centers

With the exception of the National Guard, most reserve training centers are 100% funded by the Federal Government to include land, construction and maintenance. Because of the types of missions assigned to Air National Guard units, substantial federal funding is also the rule. This is not the case with Army National Guard Armories which must have the land donated or free and clear, and must be financed on a 25% state 75% federal basis. Continued financial constraints within the states on available funds and an increased need for space to accommodate not only the equipment but units to be formed have created a serious problem which will only be irritated in the years to come.

The Board recommends that the federal share of armory construction cost in the Army National Guard be increased from the present 75%-25% split to a 90%-10% split. Further, the Board recommends that a provision be made to allow 100% federal funding for storage facilities or other facilities needed to accommodate the enhanced equipage situation. A change to 10USC2236(b) would be necessary and is recommended to change the federal construction contribution percentage from 75% to 90%.

Other Areas of Emphasis

The Army has prepared an extensive report incorporating in detail their plans for the Guard and Reserve for the out years. As with most out-year projections, only time will tell as to whether or not their plans are achieved.

Considerable effort is being made to assure that the Guard and Reserve conduct training on equipment they expect to use once mobilized and deployed. This is particularly true of the combat support and combat service support units. A number of initiatives have taken place in water equipment programs to include funding of equipment and training to meet these requirements.

Management of equipment assets and programs to assure that management information systems are available to the planners has made substantial gains since the Board's report of FY 1981.

Chemical and Biological (CB) defense equipment programs include the procurement of two sets of CB defensive gear for each Reserve Component soldier -- one to be used for training and the second for contingency. The purchase of individual decontamination kits and ancillary items is also planned.

Reserve Component medical units do not have sufficient equipment for training or mobilization. Steps have been taken to eliminate the restrictions on the issue of medical equipment sets to the Reserve Components. Further, a program has been developed that will equip 89% of the combat hospitals by FY 1989. Specific program objectives include the funding of equipment for all hospitals and the upgrading of all other combat medical units.

Summary

From the mass of data accumulated by the Board this year, it is evident that the Army has made the commitment to correct long standing deficiencies in Reserve and Guard equipment. Equipping the Total Force is one of the biggest challenges and undertakings faced by the Army. All three components are short of equipment and require replacement of existing items with modern equipment.

Although procurement appropriations have recently increased, they are still not sufficient to provide for a completely modernized force in the near future.

The Board applauds the Army's efforts and will continue to monitor and review their progress in the coming years.

CHAPTER 6

TRAINING READINESS INDICATORS

General

In the event of mobilization for a national crisis, "training readiness" will be a crucial determining factor to the selection of units for possible utilization. Despite the vital importance of training, this aspect of our Reserve Force readiness remains the most difficult element to accurately measure.

Training readiness is directly influenced by personnel strength, skill qualification, and the availability and readiness of assigned equipment. The level of training readiness is also significantly influenced by the amount of training funds available.

In the last several years, some Services experienced constrained training funds which have severely impacted on training readiness. These funds constrained are personnel school funds, manday spaces, short active duty tour money, and O&M (organization and maintenance) money. The shortage of funds impacts on the full spectrum of Reserve Component training -- from sending enlisted or officer personnel to service schools, to movement of equipment and personnel to annual training sites.

The problem, in part, has been created by several factors:

- The high visibility of personnel and O&M money and the natural desire to cut defense spending by reducing these funds during the budget and review cycles within the Department and Congress.

- The "discretionary nature of personnel and O&M funds, as contrasted to funds allocated for procurement or other contract services, which makes them easier to cut.

- The use of a continuing resolution until late in a fiscal year resulting in the inability to properly plan the use and expenditure of funds.

- The Reserve Components' success in attracting and retaining personnel which increases the demand on the limited funds available.

Good training programs are essential if the Reserve Components are to attract and retain qualified personnel. As the Reserve Components achieve success in their recruiting and retention efforts, the increased personnel cost often appears to reduce the funds available for training.

Limited training funds have been reflected in such actions as reducing school quotas, limiting the length of annual training periods in some Services, eliminating special active duty tours, and restricting staff assistance visits and other activities which involve personnel payments.

Continued constraints on personnel training funds and travel funds significantly impact on Reserve Component training readiness.

It is regrettable that during a period of growing Reserve Component strength, more training funds have not been made available to school-train unqualified personnel. Accelerated training of this nature would have been a tangible investment in future Reserve Component readiness. Personnel trained at this time would likely remain in the program and Reserve Component strength probably would have increased more than it has during FY 1983. Reducing the number of unqualified personnel would have been a significant step in improving Reserve Component readiness.

Use of Simulators

The use of simulation continues to enhance Reserve Component readiness while conserving training funds. Heavy weapon subcaliber simulators, mini-target substitutes, and other training devices have enhanced training readiness while reducing the expenditure of costly and limited training ammunition. However, the growing complexity and cost of these training simulators are limiting their use to primarily Active Component installations.

The Board wishes to highlight the need which exists for these devices in the Reserve Components. Their use is not exclusive to any one Service. Their worth in enhanced training, better use of available time and, most importantly, a better individual awareness and therefore better individual combat readiness, has been demonstrated time and again in the evaluation and comments from training installations. Additionally, significant savings in repair parts and energy products result from the use of training simulators.

The Board is convinced that the purchase and distribution of simulators and other electronic training aids is the most cost effective way to take advantage of and make a better use of available training time. Examples of enhanced performance by individuals and units exposed to the use of these devices are numerous. There is an outspoken enthusiasm for the use of these devices by the personnel exposed to them. These individuals know from experience there is a direct correlation between retention rates of personnel in the Selected Reserve and the dynamics of their training experiences.

The Board strongly recommends that funding for simulators and electronic training aids be expanded.

Selected Training Activities

The Services generally lack an organized system to collect data on Reserve Component training activities. Thus, it is impossible to precisely compare the year's training activities with those of previous years.

There are a number of widely accepted opinions about the scope and level of Reserve Component training:

- The general level of training in the Reserve Components has improved significantly over the years.
- The training readiness of many Reserve Component units is as good as, and in some cases better than, Active Component units.
- The two major limitations to Reserve Component readiness are a lack of equipment and the lack of trained personnel.
- Total Force exercises integrating Active and Reserve Components, often of multiple Services, are becoming the rule, rather than the exception.

Mission Contributions

It is a fact that today's Reserve Component Force is not a force "in Reserve", but rather an integral part of the Total Force performing "real world", everyday missions together with the Active Components -- indeed, "a force in being".

There are many "real world" recurring missions which Reserve Component forces can perform as well as Active Component forces, and on a more cost effective basis.

In line with this philosophy, the Senate Appropriations Committee commissioned a Force Mix study to more fully define the missions and costs for the Reserve Components within the Total Force. The results of this study work will be released during FY 1984.

Mission Contribution Concerns

There are some serious concerns when either increasing the number of missions; the "combat" exposure; or, alternatively, the amount of time required by individual Reservists. Following are a series of questions which need to be reviewed.

- Are individuals protected (in case of death or injury) while serving on Inactive Duty for Training (IDT), Annual Training (AT), or "short tours" less than 30 days? What benefits are Reservists entitled to? Are these the same benefits as Active Duty personnel? What happens, for example, if a married Naval Reservist with dependents, serving on the U.S.S. New Jersey as a volunteer for 21 days, were to be killed or injured, or become Missing in Action (MIA), or a Prisoner of War (POW) in the line of duty? It is our understanding that there are some differences in survivor benefits.

- The same question applies to an Air Force Reserve C-141 crew flying a resupply mission into a hostile or combat zone, such as Grenada. Are their survivors protected to the same extent as a member of the active forces in the event of death, injury, POW or MIA status? From our preliminary investigation, there are still some differences.

In fact, Reservists used on any basis, unless they have been ordered to active duty for more than 30 continuous days, are not protected on the same basis -- nor are their dependents or survivors entitled to the same compensation, benefits, treatment or rights -- as Active Duty personnel (and their dependents) even though they may be performing the same job in the same environment.

Full entitlements should be extended to the survivors of Reservists killed or injured on any status. The fact a Reservist may be in an "Inactive Duty for Training" (IDT) status does not lessen the loss or the financial burden for his/her survivors. The same philosophy applies to Guardsmen or Reservists who are MIA's or POW's.

The Board fully supports and urges the Department of Defense and Congress to consider appropriate legislation to correct this injustice.

There are other concerns as the issue of force missions is considered. For example:

- How much more time can be expected from the average Reservist to participate in unit activities? If additional missions are given to the Guard and Reserve, will the force structure and resources be increased to allow the successful completion of the mission? Will these resources include additional full-time manning?

- Serious consideration and review needs to be given to reduce or discontinue the present practice of assigning missions to the Reserve Components which actually cause a direct degradation to their readiness. For example, hospital units in the Army Reserve are tasked to service other Reserve units with a variety of medical activities such as physical examinations, weight control counseling and over-40 cardiovascular screening in lieu of annual training. In addition, the units are not authorized the correct equipment, to accomplish these missions they have been tasked to perform.

- Increased requirements also result in increased need. This is particularly true in the area of individual training. Yet, their are few training dollars available for specific training at unit or organizational level.

The Board believes most of these difficulties could be resolved by the additional authorization of flexible training mandays, in addition to the two weeks currently used for unit training.

Annual training, normally two weeks each year, is dedicated in most Selected Reserve units to unit level training. There is often a requirement, however, for squad, section, platoon or other small group specialized training which cannot be accomplished during annual training or, realistically, during IDT. Current funding constraints preclude the effective use of special training schools at brigade, battalion, squadron, and company/battery levels for this purpose.

The Board recommends that current authority of the number of days for annual training be changed to provide for seven (7) additional training days, not necessarily continuous, to be performed at the commander's discretion for the enhancement of section, squad, platoon, or other specialized training.

Table 6.1 summarizes the mission contributions of the Reserve Components within the Total Force and reflects the validity of the Board's opinion.

TABLE 6.1

EXAMPLES OF MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL FORCE BY THE RESERVE COMPONENTS, FY 1983

Army National Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	USMC Reserve	Air National Guard	USNF Reserve	USCG Reserve
NASA Ground Security and Command and Control for Space Shuttle Landings	Annual Training	Air Transportation - 22,116 flight hours	Assumption by two SMCR F-4 Sqdns and one A-4 Sqdn of regular sqdn mission during transition to F/A 18	Tanker Task Forces Support	Tanker Task Forces Support	Boat Crews 570,000 man hours
Provide Instructors at Fort Bliss, TX for Duster weapons systems training	ROTC Support	Control of Shipping - 16,525 man days	Civil Affairs Group Assigned to FMFLant	Coronet Cove	KC-135 SIOP Alert	Facility Survey/ Inspection - 152,000 man hours
Heavy List Missions CH54/CH47 Support	Over 120 Units available to USCENTCOM	General Support of Gaining Command Units - 24,000 man days (Surface - 6,000/Air 18,000)	SOLID SHIELD	European Airlift Augmentation	Hurricane Recon	Vessel Augmentation 141,000 man hours
MAST - Military Asst to Safety and Transportation	Terminal Transfer Support to MTMC	Maritime Patrol 6,207 flight hours	REDDIEX - 83	Volant Oak	CONUS Search and Rescue	Groups, Bases, Stations 276,000 man hours
ROTC - Support ROTC Summer Training	Medical Support and Augmentation	Naval Air Systems Cmd - 12,000 man days	CAX 9-83 (August)	Volant Dew	MAC Support A/C	MOBEX - 42,000 man hours
Winter Training Spt at Camp Ripley for Army, Marines and Air Force	Civil Affairs support to exercise	Repair, Medical, Legal 207,597 man days	CAX 10-83 (August)	FAC RTU Support	COMPT LEV: Augmentation	Marine Safety - 55,000 man hours
Long-haul transportation for DARCOM	Initial Entry Training Support	Maritime Patrol and Early Warning Aircraft-1025 flight hours in support of drug enforcement	TEAM SPIRIT (March)	AIMR Mail	SOUTHCOM Support (Volant Oak)	Port Operations - 298,000 man hours
Linguist Support for Exercises- CONUS and OCONUS	Medevac Support to Active Installations	Construction Battalion - 28,500 man days	LOGEX	MAC Air Rescue Support	Aerial Spray	Air Stations - 21,000
Maintenance Support-National Training Center	USAR school units instructional support to the Total Army Force	Anti-Sub Command - 11,000 man days	ANGLICO in spt of 82nd Airborne	MAFFS (Airborne Firefighting Support) in CONUS	Space Shuttle Support	District/HQ Stations - 156,000 man hours
Provide cadre to Schools of the Americas		Composite squadrons 5,120 flight hours	Two Combat Engr Bns in support of 8th Engr	CONUS Air Defense Alert	Army Airborne Training	Misc/Other - 209,000
Dredge Support - Army Corps of Engineers		Extensive Naval Intel Integration	FTP supporting DIA Project	Project Season	Strategic Airlift Crews	
				European Communication Division Augmentation	Strategic Aeromed Evacuation Crews	
				KC 135 SIOP Alert	Tanker/Cargo Crews	
				Hawaii Air Defense Alert	A-10 RTU Support	
				F-4 RTU's	MPTS Augmentation	
				WSO Training	NSC COMSEC Support	
				A-7 RTU's		

CHAPTER 7

MEDICAL READINESS

General

"Inadequate combat casualty care capability is a war stopper." This statement, made by Dr. John Beary, III, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel on May 5, 1983, forcefully pointed out the vital role that medical personnel and medical materiel requirements play in a wartime effort.

The Board is most interested in the status of medical readiness servicewide and, accordingly, devotes an entire section in the FY 1983 readiness assessment report to this subject.

The purpose of this section is to provide information regarding the mix of Active and Reserve Component medical personnel as well as the medical force manning shortfall and readiness posture by analyzing the data submitted by each Service. This section will present specific information regarding:

- Overall force requirements
- Availability of medical personnel in the event of mobilization
- Medical unit mix in the Guard, Reserve and Active Component
- The profile of medical unit readiness
- Cost estimates for required medical equipment
- Comparison of medical data between FY 1983 and previous years.

Differences between the Services, in the definition of various categories of personnel, are set forth as footnotes to the tables or otherwise noted.

Anticipated Wartime Requirements

Tables 7.1A through 7.1D compare anticipated medical specialty wartime requirements, based on a multifront wartime scenario as established by each Service for Active, Guard and Reserve units. Significant variances are noted between the FY 1982 and FY 1983 wartime requirements. For example:

- The requirement for Army physicians has remained somewhat stable, while the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve requirement has more than doubled.

- The Air Force shows an approximate increase of 200% to 400% for all categories except the Active duty requirement for physicians and nurses which has decreased. The stated rationale for the significant changes in Air Force requirements is that the FY 1983 multifront scenario shows a significantly larger number of personnel at risk.

The Army Reserve shows an approximate 300% increase in health care specialists required while the Navy shows a decrease of approximately 200% in this category. The Army includes in the definition of health care specialists all medically related career fields. The Air Force, by comparison, only includes pharmacy, radiology, and laboratory career fields within this category.

It should be noted that in several instances the increased medical manpower requirements were arbitrarily allocated to the Reserve Components while either decreasing or maintaining Active Component requirements at approximately the same level.

It is the Board's judgment that there is nothing inherently wrong in this shift of tasking, but we are concerned as to why this shift in manning to the Reserve Components was accomplished without a commensurate adjustment in authorized strength. Further, there appears to be a basic contradiction regarding the rationale for the shift of manning responsibility. Specifically,

for many of the Services, a much greater responsibility has been placed on their Reserve Components for enhanced manning levels without commensurate increases in their authorized manning levels.

The data submitted by the Services leads to a number of observations relating to the specific Services as well as the means by which these statistics are developed.

- Significant wartime requirement changes are noted by all Services, but there is not an overall trend or consistency of changes among the Services.

- The varying definition of categories, particularly in the area of health care specialists, creates some difficulty in developing meaningful comparisons between the Services. Similarly, significant changes in authorized and assigned strength such as in the Army's health care specialists category may be due to changes in definitions or categorizations.

- The Army shows an increased shortfall in FY 1983 in most categories of medical personnel needed to meet the wartime requirement within the Guard and Reserve over that reported at the end of FY 1982. The only significant exception to this trend was a 12% increase in Reserve physician readiness.

- The continued shortfall in physician personnel is compounded because officer authorized strength has decreased for physicians in all categories, with a significant decrease of approximately 400 physicians in the Active duty authorization.

- The Air Force shows a significantly increased FY 1983 shortfall for the Guard and Reserve wartime requirements in all categories. This may be attributed to the allocation of increased wartime requirements almost solely to the Guard/Reserve. However, the number of personnel assigned has increased in nearly every category over 1982 levels.

- The Navy showed an increase from 78% to 93% in the number of Active Component physicians available to meet

wartime requirements. This Active Component readiness increase, however, was achieved in part by reducing the FY 1983 Active Component physician wartime requirements and increasing the Reserve Component requirement.

- The Coast Guard fills all Active physician billets with U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) doctors paid through Coast Guard funds. Included in the physicians category are 25 Warrant Officers certified as Physicians Assistants. The Coast Guard continues its efforts to bring USPHS personnel into the Coast Guard Reserve.

TABLE 7.1A

COMPARISON OF AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED MEDICAL PERSONNEL -ARMY

	ARMY					
	Guard		Reserve		Active	
	FY82	FY83	FY82	FY83	FY82	FY83
PHYSICIANS						
Wartime Requirements	1,206	1,223	3,388	3,631	6,335	6,510
Authorized	1,238	1,217	3,402	3,372	5,456	5,054
Assigned	620	609	1,160	1,662	4,554	4,878
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	51%	50%	34%	46%	77%	75%
NURSES 1/						
Wartime Requirements	721	777	5,712	17,306	6,445	6,775
Authorized	725	746	5,707	5,764	4,887	3,991
Assigned	850	842	3,831	3,946	3,823	3,941
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	118%	108%	67%	23%	59%	58%
CORPSMEN/MEDICS						
Wartime Requirements	13,469	15,093	8,212	11,586	18,038	23,068
Authorized	12,508	12,648	7,533	10,049	16,226	19,260
Assigned	12,201	11,581	7,803	8,260	16,742	18,977
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	91%	77%	95%	71%	93%	82%
HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS 1/						
Wartime Requirements	5,019	19,936	21,831	61,148	30,467	26,042
Authorized	5,095	18,661	21,227	28,864	20,812	20,290
Assigned	4,238	16,052	15,359	22,291	20,665	22,326
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	83%	81%	70%	37%	68%	86%

Note:

1/ The increase in 1983 Nurses and Health Care Specialists Wartime Requirements is based upon the Army's CONUS Base Mobilization Expansion requirements.

Data as of: December 1983

TABLE 7.1B

COMPARISON OF AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED MEDICAL PERSONNEL -NAVY/MARINE CORPS

	NAVY/MARINE CORPS			
	Reserve		Active	
	FY82	FY83	FY82	FY83
PHYSICIANS				
Wartime Requirements	1,400	1,762	4,544	4,048
Authorized	841	1,187	3,686	3,796
Assigned	690	814	3,549	3,748
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	49%	46%	78%	93%
NURSES				
Wartime Requirements	1,000	1,961	4,945	4,848
Authorized	444	624	2,715	2,864
Assigned	395	606	2,674	2,789
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	40%	31%	54%	58%
CORPSMEN/MEDICS				
Wartime Requirements	12,100	12,132	28,877	30,625
Authorized	5,318	7,458	24,325	25,026
Assigned	4,329	4,929	23,027	23,614
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	36%	41%	80%	77%
HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS				
Wartime Requirements	1,529	542	6,999	2,658
Authorized	957	502	5,836	2,135
Assigned	854	394	5,577	2,131
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	56%	73%	80%	80%

Data as of: August 30, 1983

TABLE 7.1C

COMPARISON OF AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED MEDICAL PERSONNEL -AIR FORCE

	AIR FORCE					
	Guard		Reserve		Active	
	FY82	FY83	FY82	FY83	FY82	FY83
PHYSICIANS						
Wartime Requirements	427	923	602	1426	5155	4721
Authorized	427	427	602	762	3692	3745
Assigned	361	393	532	611	3504	3589
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	84%	43%	89%	43%	68%	76%
NURSES						
Wartime Requirements	566	1556	1256	3191	7564	7122
Authorized	566	601	1256	1657	4449	4553
Assigned	497	500	1144	1300	4384	4496
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	87%	32%	91%	41%	58%	63%
CORPSMEN/MEDICS						
Wartime Requirements	1600	4549	3007	8397	14316	18735
Authorized	1600	1635	3007	3510	8217	9826
Assigned	1621	1627	2860	3513	8264	9409
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	101%	36%	95%	42%	58%	50%
HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS						
Wartime Requirements	459	1365	409	1543	3944	4232
Authorized	459	468	409	430	3369	3474
Assigned	485	461	410	412	3113	3307
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	105%	34%	100%	27%	79%	78%

Note:
Formal tasking of Air Reserve Forces has not been finalized. Table reflects "notional distribution of wartime requirements and shortfall between the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard."

Data as of: August 30, 1983

TABLE 7.1D

COMPARISON OF AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED MEDICAL PERSONNEL - COAST GUARD

	COAST GUARD			
	Reserve		Active	
	FY82	FY83	FY82	FY83
PHYSICIANS				
Wartime Requirements. . . .	94	57	52	90
Authorized.	0	19	52	79
Assigned.	0	11	52	79
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	0%	19%	100%	87%
CORPSMEN/MEDICS 1/				
Wartime Requirements. . . .	243	298	628	740
Authorized.	174	214	628	659
Assigned.	184	197	674	659
PERCENT OF REQUIRED	76%	66%	107%	89%
HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS				
Wartime Requirements. . . .			15	16
Authorized.			15	16
Assigned.			15	16
PERCENT OF REQUIRED			100%	100%

Note:

1/ This does not represent an increase in manpower, but instead reflects combining two ratings (Hospital Corpsmen and Dental Technicians) to form one new rating (Health Services).

Data as of August 30, 1983

Available Medical Personnel

Table 7.2 measures total available medical personnel against total wartime requirements for each Service. This or any evaluation dealing with the call-up of non active duty personnel requires a careful analysis of the sources of manpower.

The Board's FY 1982 readiness report expressed concern over the substantial number of health care personnel programmed to come from the IRR, Standby Reserve or from retiree pools to meet wartime requirements. The high percentage of fill was based on a 100% show rate which, in the opinion of the Board, is unrealistically high.

In the Comptroller General's Report to Congress dated June 24, 1981, the Comptroller General stated that the Services use a 50% to 80% show rate. However, Army personnel officials state that "in spite of management efforts, yield estimates are still little more than guesses."

The data provided to the Board for the preparation of this report shows a significant reduction in the dependence on these sources by all the Services. There is concern that the retired category includes only those persons actually receiving retirement benefits.

As expressed earlier in this report, the Board believes that there is a significant number of potentially qualified Reserve Component personnel, enlisted and officers, who have retired from the Reserve program after 20 years of service but are not yet receiving benefits. These personnel have been excluded from consideration as, once placed on the retired list, they have not been maintained on an active computer data listing. Only recently have systems been implemented to address this problem. These systems are not yet operable and, as such, the data immediately available at this writing is at best incomplete.

It is the Board's position that the assignment of Retired Reserve Component Medical personnel in wartime to various medical facilities within the United States is a most effective use of this retired pool. Accordingly, data must be developed to identify these retired personnel.

It is clear that the total number of health care personnel available in the Guard, Reserve and Active Components to meet

wartime requirements has increased since FY 1982. However, the combined strength of medical personnel in the Guard, Reserve and Active Forces is only equal to 35% of the Services' total health care wartime requirements. This condition has been exacerbated by the increase in wartime requirements projected in FY 1983 and the simultaneous but realistic decrease in the number of health care personnel programmed to come from the IRR, Standby Reserve and retirees.

Although individual Services vary widely, there remains an overall significant shortfall in all categories of health care personnel. For example:

Classification	Shortfall
• Physicians	1,726
• Surgeons	4,384
• Nurses	21,830
• Corpsmen/Medics	39,117
• Health Care Specialists	11,481

TABLE 7.2A
COMPARISON OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR WAR VS PERSONNEL AVAILABLE IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES -ARMY

	ARMY	
	FY 82	FY 83
PHYSICIANS		
Total Wartime Requirements	10929	11364
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	6679	7149
Available from IRR	1589	1188
Available from Standby	12	3
Available from Retirees	1956	580
TOTAL AVAILABLE	10236	8920
Percent of Required	94%	78%
NURSES		
Total Wartime Requirements	12878	24858
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	8504	8729
Available from IRR	1711	1683
Available from Standby	3	1
Available from Retirees	1776	623
TOTAL AVAILABLE	11994	11036
Percent of Required	93%	44%
CORPSMEN/MEDICS		
Total Wartime Requirements	39719	49747
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	36746	39359
Available from IRR	5382	4340
Available from Standby	50	2
Available from Retirees	0	4655
TOTAL AVAILABLE	42178	48356
Percent of Required	106%	97%
HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS		
Total Wartime Requirements	57317	107126
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	40252	80105
Available from IRR	2585	8226
Available from Standby	25	6
Available from Retirees	0	9752
TOTAL AVAILABLE	42862	98089
Percent of Required	75%	91%

Note:
The increase in 1983 Nurse and Health Care Specialist Wartime Requirements is based upon the Army's CONUS Base Mobilization Expansion requirements.

Table as of August 30, 1983

TABLE 7.2B

COMPARISON OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR WAR AND AVAILABLE IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES -NAVY/MARINE CORPS

	NAVY/MARINE CORPS	
	FY 82	FY 83
PHYSICIANS		
Total Wartime Requirements	5944	8390
Total Available in Selected Reserve and Active Components	4239	4562
Available from IRR	906	862
Available from Standby	2602	2479
Available from Retirees	2067	893
TOTAL AVAILABLE	9814	8796
Percent of Required	165%	105%
NURSES		
Total Wartime Requirements	5945	11780
Total Available in Selected Reserve and Active Components	3069	3395
Available from IRR	762	606
Available from Standby	1052	753
Available from Retirees	828	523
TOTAL AVAILABLE	5711	5277
Percent of Required	96%	48%
CORPSMEN		
Total Wartime Requirements	40977	1455
Total Available in Selected Reserve and Active Components	27956	28543
Available from IRR	2338	2446
Available from Standby	0	0
Available from Retirees	0	478
TOTAL AVAILABLE	30294	31467
Percent of Required	74%	58%
HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS		
Total Wartime Requirements	8528	4102
Total Available in Selected Reserve and Active Components	6431	2525
Available from IRR	374	135
Available from Standby	254	197
Available from Retirees	1017	725
TOTAL AVAILABLE	8076	3582
Percent of Required	95%	87%

Data as of August 30, 1983

TABLE 7.2C

COMPARISON OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR WAR AND AVAILABLE IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES -AIR FORCE

	--- AIR FORCE ---	
	FY 82	FY 83
	PHYSICIANS	
Total Wartime Requirements	6184	7070
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	4397	4593
Available from IRR	66	89
Available from Standby	2531	2453
Available from Retirees	414	347
TOTAL AVAILABLE	7458	7482
Percent of Required	121%	106%
	NURSES	
Total Wartime Requirements	9386	11869
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	6025	6296
Available from IRR	184	333
Available from Standby	3185	3037
Available from Retirees	944	698
TOTAL AVAILABLE	10338	10364
Percent of Required	110%	87%
	CORPSMEN/MEDICS	
Total Wartime Requirements	18923	31671
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	12745	14549
Available from IRR	831	820
Available from Standby	125	36
Available from Retirees	3745	1435
TOTAL AVAILABLE	17446	16840
Percent of Required	92%	53%
	HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS	
Total Wartime Requirements	4812	7140
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	4008	4180
Available from IRR	407	320
Available from Standby	1536	8
Available from Retirees	1095	708
TOTAL AVAILABLE	7046	5216
Percent of Required	146%	73%

Data as of August 30, 1983

TABLE 7.2D

COMPARISON OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR WAR AND AVAILABLE IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES -COAST GUARD

	— COAST GUARD — FY 82	FY 83
	PHYSICIANS	
Total Wartime Requirements	146	147
Total Available in Reserve and Active Components	52	90
Available from IRR	0	0
Available from Standby	0	0
Available from Retirees	0	0
TOTAL AVAILABLE	52	90
Percent of Required	36%	61%
	CORPSMEN	
Total Wartime Requirements	871	1038
Total Available in Reserve and Active Components	858	874
Available from IRR	134	113
Available from Standby	0	0
Available from Retirees	50	32
TOTAL AVAILABLE	1092	987
Percent of Required	125%	98%
	HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS	
Total Wartime Requirements	15	15
Total Available in Reserve and Active Components	15	15
Available from IRR	0	0
Available from Standby	0	0
Available from Retirees	0	0
TOTAL AVAILABLE	15	15
Percent of Required	100%	100%

Note:
Figures shown for both years are based on a 100% show rate.

Data as of August 30, 1983

TABLE 7.2E

COMPARISON OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR WAR AND AVAILABLE IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES—OVERALL

	OVERALL	
	FY-82	FY 83
PHYSICIANS		
Total Wartime Requirements	27468	26824
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	15367	16204
Available from IRR	2561	2139
Available from Standby	5195	4935
Available from Retirees	4437	1820
TOTAL AVAILABLE	27560	25098
Percent of Required	100%	94%
NURSES		
Total Wartime Requirements	46535	48507
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	17598	18420
Available from IRR	2657	2622
Available from Standby	4240	3791
Available from Retirees	3548	1844
TOTAL AVAILABLE	28043	26677
Percent of Required	60%	55%
CORPSMEN/MEDICS		
Total Wartime Requirements	100490	135873
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	78305	82541
Available from IRR	8685	7606
Available from Standby	175	38
Available from Retirees	3745 1/	6568
TOTAL AVAILABLE	90910	96753
Percent of Required	111%	71%
HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS		
Total Wartime Requirements	70672	118368
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	50706	86810
Available from IRR	3366	8681
Available from Standby	1815	211
Available from Retirees	2111 1/	11185
TOTAL AVAILABLE	57998	106887
Percent of Required	122%	90%

Note:

1/ Total does not include Army retirees.

Data as of August 30, 1983

Comparison of Surgical Personnel

Table 7.3 provides a comparison of surgical personnel required to meet wartime requirements versus those actually available for each Service. This is an especially critical category and deserves particular review by all Services.

"It has been estimated that, if war were to break out tomorrow, only one out of ten wounded soldiers could expect to receive the emergency surgery needed." Other estimates place the actual percentage of non-care closer to 65%.

While the Services report a possible 94% fill rate for physicians, they report only a 5% possible fill rate for surgeons.

A review of FY 1982 and FY 1983 readiness data shows dramatic changes in requirements as well as available personnel.

- The great increase in the reported number of available surgeons for the Air Force causes some question as to the reliability of the data provided to the Board. Assuming the figures are valid, the number of surgeons available shows an actual increase, but a percentage available decrease.

- Surgical nursing specialists show an increase in both actual availability and percentage availability, but a decrease in wartime requirements.

- The Navy reports a 31% increase in total available surgeons, but this figure is derived at because the number of surgeons required for wartime was reduced by 800 persons and 155 additional surgeons have become available. Nurse specialists need has increased by 500 positions with nearly 200 additional Selected Reserve and Active Force positions reported as being filled.

TABLE 7.3A
COMPARISON OF SURGICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR WAR AND AVAILABLE IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES -ARMY

	ARMY	
	FY 82	FY 83
SURGEONS		
Total Wartime Requirements		2834
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	728	810
Available from IRR		233
Available from Standby		0
Available from Retirees	386	124
TOTAL AVAILABLE		1167
Percent of Required		41%
DENTAL SURGEONS		
Total Wartime Requirements		254
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	178	162
Available from IRR		26
Available from Standby		0
Available from Retirees	45	53
	137	196
TOTAL AVAILABLE		241
Percent of Required		94%
NURSE SPECIALISTS		
Total Wartime Requirements		3309
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	1164	1191
Available from IRR		176
Available from Standby		0
Available from Retirees	310	174
TOTAL AVAILABLE		1541
Percent of Required		47%

Note:

Reserve Component assets have had show rates applied. Retiree Numbers include Categories I and II only.

Data as of August 30, 1983

TABLE 7.3B
COMPARISON OF SURGICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR WAR AND AVAILABLE IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES -NAVY/MARINE CORPS

	— NAVY/MARINE CORPS — FY 82	FY 83
SURGEONS		
Total Wartime Requirements	2604	1811
Total Available in Selected Reserve and Active Components	662	821
Available from IRR	176	230
Available from Standby	341	347
Available from Retirees	169	105
TOTAL AVAILABLE	1348	1503
Percent of Required	52%	83%
DENTAL SURGEONS		
Total Wartime Requirements	150	175
Total Available in Selected Reserve and Active Components	93	88
Available from IRR	12	41
Available from Standby	16	33
Available from Retirees	16	36
TOTAL AVAILABLE	137	198
Percent of Required	91%	113%
NURSE SPECIALISTS		
Total Wartime Requirements	259	838
Total Available in Selected Reserve and Active Components	116	300
Available from IRR	14	26
Available from Standby	10	32
Available from Retirees	14	60
TOTAL AVAILABLE	154	418
Percent of Required	59%	50%

Data as of August 30, 1983

TABLE 7.3C

COMPARISON OF SURGICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR WAR AND AVAILABLE IN THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES -AIR FORCE

	AIR FORCE FY 82	AIR FORCE FY 83
SURGEONS		
Total Wartime Requirements	1282	3456
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	257	607
Available from IRR	51	9
Available from Standby	154	385
Available from Retirees	36	46
TOTAL AVAILABLE	498	1047
Percent of Required	39%	30%
DENTAL SURGEONS		
Total Wartime Requirements	657	2314
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	78	2011
Available from IRR	47	125
Available from Standby	68	431
Available from Retirees	19	112
TOTAL AVAILABLE	212	2679
Percent of Required	32%	116%
NURSE SPECIALISTS		
Total Wartime Requirements	2166	1878
Total Available in Guard, Reserve and Active Components	649	747
Available from IRR	15	27
Available from Standby	165	228
Available from Retirees	209	162
TOTAL AVAILABLE	1038	1164
Percent of Required	48%	62%

Data as of August 30, 1983

Change in Medical Personnel Assets

Table 7.4 shows the change in medical personnel assets in the Individual Ready Reserve and the Standby Reserve from 1979 to 1983. It is clear from the following examples that the Services are managing their health care personnel in the IRR and Standby Reserve with effective but different policies:

- The Army policy, for example, has been to shift health care personnel from the Standby Reserve to the IRR. This has resulted in a net decrease in Doctor availability although an increase is shown in the Dental and Nursing categories.

- In contrast, more than 10% of the Air Force health care assets are staffed by the Standby Reserve.

- The Navy, like the Army, has pursued a program of shifting assets from the Standby Reserve into the IRR. Unlike the Army, however, the Navy has not dropped those personnel who elected to remain in the Standby Reserve.

The Board offers the following comments:

- The Board continues to believe that OSD efforts to "force out", through a screening process, Standby Reservists who refuse, after being asked, to upgrade their membership from the Standby Reserve to the Selected Reserve or IRR is counterproductive.

- The Board recommends that policies continue to be implemented that will encourage health care specialists, especially physicians, to join and remain in the Reserve program.

TABLE 7.4
MEDICAL PERSONNEL ASSETS IN THE IRR/ING AND STANDBY RESERVE, FY 1979-FY 1983

Component	INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE/INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD						STANDBY RESERVE						Component
	End FY 1979	End FY 1980	End FY 1981	End FY 1982	End FY 1983	Percent Change 82-83	End FY 1979	End FY 1980	End FY 1981	End FY 1982	End FY 1983	Percent Change 82-83	
ARMY													**ARMY**
Doctors	757	666	881	1,509	1,321	-178	1,300	932	675	12	3	-750	Doctors
Dentists	424	436	610	795	862	+8	350	266	161	16	1	-94	Dentists
Nurses	594	791	1,456	1,711	1,879	+9	500	500	164	3	1	-66	Nurses
Corpsmen	7,747	9,295	10,430	5,382	6,200	+15	0	39	101	50	2	-96	Corpsmen
NAVY													**NAVY**
Doctors	941	1,193	1,150	906	662	-56	2,993	2,721	2,513	2,602	2,479	-5	Doctors
Dentists	757	923	864	489	382	-22	1,285	1,179	1,144	1,146	787	-31	Dentists
Nurses	831	948	936	762	606	-21	895	898	1,052	1,052	753	-26	Nurses
Corpsmen	n/a	n/a	n/a	2,330	2,446	+5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	Corpsmen
AIR FORCE													**AIR FORCE**
Doctors		31	47	66	89	+268		3,483	2,511	2,581	2,453	-5	Doctors
Dentists		70	141	115	125	+8		1,766	634	514	431	-16	Dentists
Nurses		64	61	184	333	+85		3,160	3,188	3,185	3,037	-5	Nurses
Corpsmen		566	691	831	820	-1		219	176	125	36	-71	Corpsmen

Note:

Blank spaces caused by no data available from appropriate Service.

Data is as of Fiscal Year ending except for Army which is as of April 1981 and 1982 and March of 1983.

Reliance on Guard and Reserve Medical Elements

It may be assumed that peacetime military health care needs are adequately met through a voluntary system. The Board believes there will be an acute shortage of medical personnel during time of war.

At the present time, the Selective Service System has no authority to register, classify, or call for induction professional medical personnel. Dr. Jack Moxley, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, has stated that a shortage of medical personnel would seriously affect military health care, even in a conventional conflict.

The Board again recommends that the Selective Service law be amended to provide for registration and identification of male and female professional medical personnel who could be drafted in the event of conflict.

The Services' reliance on Guard and Reserve medical elements varies widely. The Army and Air Force have been particularly effective in adopting the Total Force policy relating to medical elements.

As shown in Table 7.5A, the Army relies heavily on Guard and Reserve units for a majority of its hospital and medical requirements.

Likewise, Table 7.5B shows that the Air Force looks to the Guard and Reserve for a significant percentage of its medical element requirements.

In contrast, the Navy and Marine Corps have chosen to staff virtually all of their medical element requirements through the Active Component with little or no reliance on Reserve Components. See Tables 7.5C and 7.5D.

TABLE 7.5A
RESERVE COMPONENT MEDICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL FORCE -ARMY

Medical Reserve Elements	Army National Guard % of Total Force	Army Reserve % of Total Force	Combined % of Total Force
Station Hospitals (300 Beds)	0	87	87
(500 Beds)	0	66	66
Combat Hospitals	28	34	62
General Hospitals	0	79	79
Evacuation Hospitals	25	54	79
MASH	10	50	60
USA Hospitals	0	100	100
Medical Battalions	47	33	80
Medical Groups	16	61	77
Medical Brigades	50	33	83
Air Ambulance Co.	33	0	33
Ambulance Co.	42	25	67

Data as of August 2, 1983

TABLE 7.5B
RESERVE COMPONENT MEDICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL FORCE -NAVY

Medical Reserve Elements	Naval Reserve % of Total Force	
Station Hospitals	1	
Combat Hospitals		
General Hospitals		
Evacuation Hospitals		
Other Hospitals		
Medical Battalions		
Medical Groups		
Medical Brigades		
Other (specific)	13.5	Composed of 101 medical contingency response units and 20 surgical teams
Overall (Manpower)		

Data as of April 30, 1983

TABLE 7.5C
RESERVE COMPONENT MEDICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL FORCE - MARINE CORPS

Medical Reserve Elements	Marine Corps Reserve % of Total Force
Station Hospitals	
Combat Hospitals	
General Hospitals	
Evacuation Hospitals	
Other Hospitals	
Medical Battalions (1)	25% 1/
Medical Groups	
Medical Brigades	
Other (specific) Dental Battalions (1)	25% 2/
Overall (Manpower)	25% 3/

Note:

1/ percent represents wartime T/C; full activation of Med Bn by FY87.
2/ percent represents wartime T/O; full activation of Den Bn units by FY 87.
3/ percent represents wartime T/O; units consist of Navy and Marine Reserve personnel.

Data as of April 30, 1983

TABLE 7.5D

RESERVE COMPONENT MEDICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL FORCE -AIR FORCE

	Air National Guard % of Total Force	Air Force Reserve % of Total Force	Combined % Total Force
Tactical Clinics	68%	23%	91%
Tactical Hospitals	43%	24%	67%
Aeromedical Evacuation Groups	-	100%	100%
Aeromedical Evacuation Sq.	13%	62%	75%
Aeromedical Evacuation Fl.	44%	56%	100%
Overall (Manpower)	9%	16%	25%

Note:

The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard have units which serve as personnel augmentation packages directly comparable to active duty medical units.

Data as of April 30, 1983

Medical Unit Readiness

While the Army and Air Force, as previously noted, rely to a significant extent on their Guard/Reserve Component medical units, the overall readiness of these units, especially those in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, is of concern to the Board.

Tables 7.6A through 7.6C profile the unit readiness of Reserve Component medical units. Tables 7.6A and 7.6C, both Classified Confidential, are contained in the Classified Annex (SECRET) to this report.

On an overall basis, only 40% of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve medical units reporting have attained a rating of C-3 or better.

In contrast, a high percentage of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve medical units reporting have attained overall ratings of C-3 or better. However, equipment on hand and equipment readiness information is not available for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve medical units because medical equipment is assigned to the Active Forces.

The Navy reports that 66% of all reporting units have attained a C-3 or better ranking. However, no information is available regarding supplies and equipment readiness because the responsibility for these assets is located with the Active Force. Marine Corps medical supply units are stockpiled and will be filled by Navy personnel when activated.

Current plans call for the activation of a medical battalion and a dental battalion within the 4th Service Support Group during FY 1984. The new units will be Marine Corps structured and manned by Naval medical personnel.

Based on the above indicated information, the Board offers the following observations:

- It is the opinion of the Board that increased emphasis needs to be given to the readiness of medical units.
- Although overall personnel requirements have been addressed earlier in this report, the Board wishes to again emphasize the need for continuing efforts to

TABLE 7.6B

DETAILED PROFILE OF UNIT READINESS OF RESERVE COMPONENT MEDICAL UNITS-NAVY

Readiness Categories	Percent of Units Reporting Readiness Level						Percent of Units C-3 or better
	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	C-5	Total	
Personnel	61%	18%	0%	21%	0%	100%	79%
Supplies	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA		
Equipment Readiness	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA		
Training	18%	26%	29%	27%	0%	100%	73%
Overall	14%	22%	31%	33%	0%	100%	67%

Data as of April 30, 1983

increase the number of medical units attaining a C-1 rating in the personnel on hand and individual skill qualification categories.

- It is recommended that the Air Force and Navy develop information so that medical equipment on hand and medical equipment readiness for their respective Reserve Force medical units may be measured.

- Increased emphasis on medical training is required for Reserve Component medical units in all Services. Unit training assemblies must lend themselves to those functions which will increase medical readiness of the Reserve Forces while providing a sense of accomplishment to the participating units.

- Medical training could be vastly improved if the current legislative constraints which preclude medical services from being provided to members and dependents of the Guard and Reserve during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) periods were to be removed. Dentists, as an example, are prevented from treating Reservists or Reservists' dependents. Reserve members and their dependents could be used as patients which would provide realistic training for the medical staff while extending medical services on a time/space available basis to the Reservists and authorized dependents.

Recent Department of Defense mobilization exercises, such as PROUD SPIRIT and PROUD SABER, have repeatedly concluded that shortfalls in such basic medical equipment such as operating room tables, x-ray equipment and surgical instruments, make an effective combat casualty treatment program virtually non-existent. Further, these same exercises have shown that the industrial lead time required to cure the medical equipment shortfalls is such that for all practical purposes, medical material may not be available in sufficient time to meet immediate needs.

Cost of Required Medical Equipment

Tables 7.7A through 7.7B show the dollar cost (in millions of dollars) of the required medical equipment for a wartime scenario, budget authorizations (if any) as they currently exist, the value of the medical equipment on hand, and the current shortfall.

The Army shows a significant shortfall in virtually every category. Neither the Air Force Reserve nor the Air National

Guard owns any deployable medical equipment. All such items have been capitalized by the active duty Air Force and are included in Air Force inventory. Naval Reserve Augmentation units as of April 30, 1983 augment CONUS medical facilities. There are no Reserve equipment allowances. All equipment is maintained by the Active Force.

The Air Force and Navy equipment is included in the Active Duty inventory and accordingly no shortfalls have been identified or broken out.

It is the conclusion of the Board that increases in the Guard and Reserve medical equipment inventory levels must receive the immediate attention of Defense planners at the highest levels.

Continuing efforts for the development of standard deployable field medical systems for all military departments by the Field Medical Systems Standardization Medical Group should provide modern medical facilities and help increase combat casualty care. In most cases, specifications for such standard equipment have been established and should result in greater purchasing economies.

- If it is not possible to stockpile adequate medical equipment to meet projected needs, a study should be undertaken to explore the feasibility of contracting with equipment suppliers in the United States and abroad to provide priority manufacturing capabilities if and when requested.

- The source and extent of civilian stockpiles should be explored. If such stockpiles do exist, contingent agreements with civilian facilities should be established for their effective and timely use. In particular, areas of expendable supplies, such as drugs with a short shelf life, need to be examined as surge production will not be responsive to the demand.

- The Services have on hand budget documents or plans to upgrade their medical materiel to overcome current materiel shortfalls and to meet future force requirements.

The Board strongly recommends that these plans and budgets receive support at the highest levels to insure their full implementation.

TABLE 7.7A
COST OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT—ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE

	Wartime Requirement Dollars	Present Authorization Dollars	On-Hand Dollars	Shortfall 2/ Dollars
Major Medical Items 1/	87.1 M	65.1 M	30.2 M	56.9 M

Note:

1/ List includes only major medical reportable items, such as aircraft, hospitals, labs, blood facilities, dispensaries, medical equipment sets, medical treatment facilities, etc.

2/ Shortfall: The value of Wartime Requirements minus value of Items On Hand. Dollar figures is expressed in comparable terms.

Data as of August 4, 1983

TABLE 7.7B

COST OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT - MARINE CORPS RESERVE

	Wartime Requirement Dollars	Present Authorization Dollars	On-Hand Dollars	Shortfall 2/ Dollars
Major Medical Items 1/	7.3M	1.7M 3/	-0-	7.3M

Note:

1/ List includes only major medical reportable items, such as aircraft, hospitals, labs, blood facilities, dispensaries, medical equipment sets, medical treatment facilities, etc.

2/ Shortfall: The value of Wartime Requirements minus value of Items On Hand. Dollar figures is expressed in comparable terms.

3/ Specified for obligation during FY-83 to field initial authorized AMAL's/ADAL's in support of 4th MED BN/4th DENT BN activation.

Data as of April 1, 1983

CHAPTER 8

BUDGET AND RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS

General

This section analyzes actual and projected defense appropriations from FY 1975 through FY 1989. The examination of this data provides valuable insight into emphasis placed on the various elements of the defense budget.

In discussing resource allocations for the Guard and Reserve, the Board is aware that substantial contributions are made by the Services in support of their Reserve Components.

Reserve Component Appropriations and the Defense Budget

Tables 8.1 and 8.2 disclose the relationship of Reserve Component budget allocations to the total defense budget and strength of Active and Selected Reserve forces.

In 15 years, FY 1975 through FY 1989, total defense appropriations are expected to increase 439%, while Guard and Reserve appropriations are forecast to increase 284%.

The impact of modernizing the force and the increasing cost of equipment is reflected by the 912% projected increase in total procurement (weapons systems and equipment) from FY 1975 to FY 1989.

When comparing the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) for the periods FY 1984-1988 to FY 1985-1989, a number of significant relationships may be seen. There is a decreasing percentage of growth in both overall defense appropriations and defense procurement, coupled with an increase in Guard and Reserve appropriations for the two FYDP periods.

TABLE 8.1

COMPARISON OF SELECTED ELEMENTS OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR SELECTED BUDGET YEARS

	FY 1975 through FY 1989									
	Percent Increase					Percent of Defense Appropriation by Budget Element				
Budget Element	FY75-81 1/	FY82-88 2/	FY83-89 3/	FY75-88 2/	FY75-89 3/	FY 75 1/	FY 82 2/	FY 83 3/	FY 88 2/	FY 89 3/
Overall Defense Appropriations	104%	106%	93%	412%	439%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Guard and Reserve Appropriations	106%	51%	61%	213%	208%	5.6%	4.6%	4.7%	3.4%	4.0%
Total Defense Procurement	176%	172%	118%	929%	912%	20.1%	30.0%	33.4%	40.4%	37.5%

Note:

1/ Historical Summary and Program Element Detail FY 1962-FY 1981, May 12, 1982 Update.
2/ Program Objective Memorandum (FY1984-FY1988), Summary and Program Element Detail, May 12, 1982 Update.
3/ Program Objective Memorandum (FY1985-FY1989), Summary and Program Element Detail, May 11, 1983 Update.

TABLE 8.2

A COMPARISON OF SELECTED PROGRAM ELEMENTS WITHIN DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FY 1975-FY 1989

(EXPRESSED IN PERCENT OF INCREASE—FY 1975 BASE YEAR)



The percentage of the defense appropriation which constitutes support to the Guard and Reserve increased from 3.4% in the FY 1984-1988 FYDP to 4% in the FY 1985-1989 FYDP. This increase in Guard and Reserve appropriation is significant for it represents real growth beyond the growth in procurement of equipment for the Guard and Reserve.

However, the Board remains concerned that even though Guard and Reserve appropriations have grown significantly since FY 1975, and are programmed to increase during the FY 1983 through FY 1989 period, the overall 15-year period FY 1975 through FY 1989 continues to reflect a historic decrease in the Reserve Components' share of the defense budget from 5.6% in FY 1975 to 4.0% in FY 1989.

Looking at the current seven-year period, FY 1983 through FY 1989, and deleting all procurement funding from consideration, the projected Reserve Component share of the defense budget continues to remain stagnant and shows no growth. It does not, in the view of the Board, provide the funds necessary to correct the deficiencies discussed in this report, provide for projected growth, or provide for enhanced combat capability for the Guard and Reserve.

As expressed in past reports, the Board remains concerned about the Reserve Components' decreasing share of the defense budget.

Percentage of Guard and Reserve Appropriations

An analysis of Table 8.3 discloses a number of interesting relationships among estimates for the percentage of Guard and Reserve appropriations to the Total Defense appropriations for FY 1973 to FY 1989.

- In general, when Guard and Reserve appropriations are forecast, the estimates for the "out years" are less than the year in which the forecast was made. For example, in FY 1979 the estimated percentage of Guard and Reserve appropriations was 5.6%, while in the last year of the FYDP period, FY 1984, the estimate was 4.4%.

  This relationship would suggest that budget analysts don't plan that the Guard and Reserve will receive an increased share of the defense budget in the future. In fact they plan for a smaller share of the budget than the present period.

- Usually, the actual Guard and Reserve appropriations exceed the first estimate for a budget year. For example, in the first year budget in which estimates were made for FY 1979, the percentage of Guard and Reserve appropriations was forecast to be 5.3%. When the actual appropriations were made in FY 1979 the percentage of Guard and Reserve appropriations totaled 5.7%.

  One reason why actual appropriations exceed early estimates is that actual appropriations include supplemental appropriations, budget amendments and other funding adjustments as effected by the Congress.

TABLE 8.3

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GUARD AND RESERVE FORCE APPROPRIATIONS TO THE TOTAL MILITARY FUNCTIONS APPROPRIATION—FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PLAN

	YEARS INCLUDED IN FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM																
Budget Year	FY73	FY74	FY75	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89
FY73	5.0	5.0	5.3	5.4	5.9	5.6	5.3										
FY74		5.0	5.0	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.2									
FY75			5.4	5.2	5.2	5.1	5.0	4.6	4.4								
FY76				5.6	5.1	5.4	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.8							
FY77					5.4	5.6	5.2	4.8	4.5	4.3	4.2						
FY78						5.7	5.2	5.1	4.6	4.5	4.8	4.4					
FY79							5.6	5.1	4.9	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.4				
FY80								5.4	5.2	4.7	4.4	4.3	4.0	3.9			
FY81									5.6	4.9	5.1	4.8	4.8	4.6	4.4		
FY82										4.6	4.3	4.1	3.8	3.7	4.3	3.4	
FY83											4.7	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.0
Actual %	4.9	5.3	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.9	5.7	5.5	5.6	4.9							

Note:

$$\text{Percentages} = \frac{\text{Total Guard and Reserve Forces}}{\text{Total Military Program}}$$

Composition of Reserve Component Budgets

Tables 8.4 and 8.5 illustrate the composition of the Reserve Component budgets among the Services.

An analysis of these tables shows the relationship of budgets of each of the Reserve Components with the other Reserve Components and the amount of emphasis placed by the individual Service on its Reserve Component(s).

The budget projections from FY 1983-1989 set forth the position of each Service with respect to its Reserve Component(s) in future years.

An analysis of the differing percentage of the Reserve defense appropriation by component provides little insight into how budget priorities among Reserve Components are determined.

From FY 1975 to FY 1989, gains in percentage within Reserve Component budgets are shown in the Army National Guard and the Naval Reserve. Losses in budget shares are shown in the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and the Army Reserve. The Marine Corps Reserve maintains a constant 2% share of the Reserve Force budget from FY 1975 through FY 1989.

TABLE 8.4
COMPARISON OF RESERVE COMPONENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR SELECTED BUDGET YEARS, FY 1975-FY 1989

Component	Percent Increase					Percent of Budget Appropriation by Reserve Component				
	FY75-81	FY82-88	FY83-89	FY75-88	FY75-89	FY75	FY82	FY83	FY88	FY89
ANNG	101%	101%	105%	257%	356%	32%	26%	30%	33%	37%
USAR	123%	49%	67%	258%	311%	20%	22%	19%	21%	19%
USNR	107%	81%	78%	286%	400%	12%	12%	13%	13%	14%
USMCR	156%	21%	40%	193%	317%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%
ANG	152%	35%	22%	230%	243%	22%	24%	25%	20%	19%
USAFR	134%	37%	44%	221%	279%	11%	12%	11%	10%	10%
DoD TOTAL	123%	61%	65%	249%	318%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
USCGR	71%	33%	249%		138%	n/a		n/a		n/a

TABLE 8.5

A Comparison of Reserve Component Appropriations for Selected Budget Years FY 75-FY 89



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FULL-TIME SUPPORT TO THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

General

Since the Vietnam era, Congressional initiatives have reduced the Active Components' end-strength and given increased responsibilities for mobilization preparedness to the Reserve Components. With the formal initiation of the Total Force Policy in 1972, the Services entered a period in which the Reserve Components have become a cornerstone of strategy. This policy links Active and Reserve Components into a single force designed to deter war or, if required, to fight and win.

This heightened reliance on Reserve Components embodies requirements for increased readiness, improved mobilization, and rapid deployment. Central to each of these issues, and paramount to total readiness, is time. Todays Guard and Reserve units must, for all practical purposes, deploy concurrently with Active Component units.

Background

As the Reserve Components have developed into a modern force, full-time support personnel programs have also evolved. Under the original caretaker concept of the early 1900's, the military technician primarily maintained and repaired unit equipment or worked in maintenance pools inspecting, repairing, and reconditioning equipment. After WWII, administrative positions were added to all command echelons down through companies and batteries. This increase and diversity of military technician duties was brought on by mobilization requirements and the added emphasis the Department of Defense placed on the Reserve Components.

Full-Time Support Defined

To appreciate the background of the full-time support program, one must understand the applicable terminology relative to "Full-Time Support".

"Full-Time Support" (FTS) is a description of the support provided to the Reserve Components. The FTS program encompasses personnel assigned or attached on a full-time basis for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training Reserve Component personnel.

There are five categories of personnel under the umbrella of FTS:

Active Component Personnel (AC)
Active Guard and Reserve (AGR)
Civil Service Personnel (CS)
Military Technicians (MT)
Status Quo Technicians (SQ)

The AGR program evolved as a result of the increasing requirement for Guardsmen and Reservists to serve on active duty in support of their respective components. Many of these early active duty Guardsmen and Reservists served in what was commonly referred to as a "statutory tour status", which meant that they were actually accessioned into the strength of the Active Component.

AGR personnel are assigned to support the Reserve Components as authorized by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned. They must be utilized in approved, validated full-time positions. When assigned at the unit level, AGR personnel will:

- Mobilize with their unit
- Participate in scheduled unit training assemblies
- Be counted as trained strength in unit status reports

All AGR members are counted against the Selected Reserve authorizations of their respective Reserve Component and against the authorized end-strengths for Reserve Component members on full-time active duty in support of the Guard and Reserve.

Complete definitions for all categories of full-time support are at the end of this chapter.

Full-Time Support Studies

The increased readiness requirements have been met in part by the full-time support personnel. A 1976 Defense Manpower Commission Report recommended that full-time manning be increased and that personnel currently employed in the technician programs be converted to full-time active duty Guardsmen and Reservists in order to be more cost effective. This report led subsequently to two other reports, commonly known as the "Stroud" study-1977, and the "Gerard" study-1978.

The "Stroud" study, Study on the Full-Time Personnel Requirement of the Reserve Components, examined the full-time requirements and the categories of full-time employees for the Army. The "Gerard" study, Report on Full-Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve, primarily looked at the cost differential between a full-time active duty program and the military technician program in all services.

These studies looked at a different aspect of full-time support personnel, but had the cost of full-time support and readiness in common. They were also somewhat in conflict with the 1976 Defense Manpower Commission Report.

The "Gerard" study concluded that any cost difference between a full-time military force and a full-time technician force was insignificant. Additionally, the technician program should be continued. The "Stroud" study recommended that additional full-time personnel be provided to enhance readiness.

The somewhat diverse findings and conclusions of the studies and reports caused the 95th Congress to direct the Secretary of Defense to implement a test program of full-time manning with the goal of determining if there was one full-time manning system which could work for all the Reserve Components. The test was inconclusive.

In Fiscal Year 1981, the Board recommended that each Service be allowed to establish its own mix of Active Component, Active

Guard and Reserve and Military Technicians to staff full-time support positions in the Reserve Components. In the House of Representatives, H.R. 97-333 used essentially the same wording but added "that will provide the best readiness and meet mission requirements."

Objectives of Full-Time Support

Full-time support personnel are essential to the Reserve Components and are needed to assist units in achieving the unprecedented levels of readiness now required of them.

Added full-time support has met with unparalleled improvements in both readiness levels and responsiveness. This conclusion has been reinforced by Reserve Component field commanders as well as numerous inspections and studies. Over the past 10 years, Reserve Component units have progressed from low level strength and equipage levels and an atmosphere of stressing annual General Inspections or "sumner training" to an environment which emphasizes early mobilization, 100% manning and equipage levels, combined arms training, overseas training and high proficiency levels in individual skills.

Full-time support means more available manpower in peacetime for operating and maintaining equipment, developing mobilization and exercise plans, personnel management, public protection missions, etc. Additionally, it assures that unit personnel optimize their training time without devoting an inordinate amount of time performing day-to-day functions which don't contribute directly to an advanced state of readiness and detract from the retention of quality personnel. The major advantage to FTS is the continuous availability of a larger percentage of highly skilled and trained unit personnel to assist with mobilization and deployability planning requirements consistent with the Reserve Components' wartime missions and other functions generally associated with readiness.

Full-time support provides a crucial link which permits the individual Reservist the maximum available time to train -- to prepare for wartime mission.

Qualified full-time maintenance personnel, instructors, and administrators are vital to insure that the time the Guardsmen and Reservists spend with their units is used most effectively to gain proficiency with the sophisticated weapons systems of the 1980s. Therefore, it is imperative that the programmed growth in full-time support personnel be implemented as planned in conjunction with the modernization which is so critical to the Guard and Reserve role in national defense.

Recognizing the value of the FTS program as an essential element to enhanced readiness, additional full-time unit support spaces have been programmed to support Reserve Component modernization, mission and structural changes. Both AGR and Military Technician strengths are programmed to increase between FY 1984 and FY 1989.

Overview of Full-Time Support in the Reserve Components

Table 9.1 provides a detailed breakdown of the current and projected full-time support posture for the Reserve Components.

By the end of the FY 1983, overall full-time support in all of the Reserve Components represented 13% of the Selected Reserve manpower end-strengths. Full-time support is projected to increase to 17% of end-strength by FY 1989.

As shown on Table 9.1, total full-time support of the Reserve Components will increase by 74,442, or 58%, from FY 1983 to FY 1989. This increase reflects a significant commitment to improve the readiness and capability of the Reserve Components as an essential element of the Total Force.

TABLE 9.1
RECAPITULATION OF ACTUAL AND PROGRAMMED FULL-TIME SUPPORT (FTS) IN RESERVE COMPONENTS

		Army National Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air National Guard	Air Force Reserve	Coast Guard Reserve	Overall
Fiscal Year 1983 Year End Strength									
Selected Reserve End Strength	1/	417,178	266,184	109,094	42,690	102,170	67,227	n/a	1,004,547
Full-Time Support End Strength	2/	37,706	20,631	21,634	5,654	29,188	13,450	n/a	128,263
Percent FTS to Selected Reserve End Strength		9%	8%	20%	13%	29%	20%	n/a	13%
Fiscal Year 1989 Programmed End Strength									
Selected Reserve End Strength		497,564	326,089	146,205	48,467	116,438	87,984	n/a	1,222,737
Full-Time Support End Strength	2/	76,995	42,278	28,324	3/ 6,992	33,091	15,025	n/a	202,705
Percent FTS to Selected Reserve End Strength		15%	13%	19%	14%	28%	17%	n/a	17%
Percentage of Programmed Full-Time Support Growth — FY 1983 through FY 1989									
Note:		104%	105%	31%	24%	13%	12%	n/a	58%

1/ Reflects year end-strenght as reported in the Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, FY 1983 Summary, OASD(RA).

2/ Includes all five categories of full time-time support personnel

3/ This figure includes an estimated 3,500 Civilian Support Personnel. Exact data not available. See Table 9.4

Status of Full Time Support (FTS) Programs by Reserve Component

General

Tables 9.2 through 9.7 illustrate the number of full-time personnel in support of each of the Reserve Components.

In examining these tables, it can be seen that there is no unity among Reserve Components regarding the mix of categories of full-time support personnel used by each Reserve Component. Each Service has structured its full-time support program to best suit the unique needs of its Reserve Component(s).

When reviewing this analysis of full-time support programs several caveats are necessary to keep in mind. First, the format used to display the data provides a convenient sequence by categories of personnel and the sequence is not intended to show a priority or a preference for a particular category of personnel.

Second, the intent of comparing the total spectrum of FTS personnel and the Selected Reserve manpower and strengths for each fiscal year is to show the total number of personnel in direct and non-direct support of the Reserve Components' units and activities. It does not necessarily agree with the Services' criteria of what is or is not counted against their manpower and strengths or sources of funding.

As stated earlier, the Board has taken the position and continues to support the belief that each Service be allowed to continue to manage its own unique mix of full-time support personnel.

After review of the programs as they now exist, the Board is convinced that the following areas need to be examined and provided for:

- Career packages to permit programmed progression need to be more clearly defined. Once guidelines are established, it is the Board's belief that senior commanders should be permitted more latitude to manage career progression as compared to some centralized program.

- Grade structure for AGR personnel should be determined by organizational manning/structure documents.

- Additional money and increases in strength ceilings for Service full-time support programs are needed.

- There needs to be greater latitude granted to senior commanders which permits flexibility in the assignment of full-time support manpower, rather than blanket management from Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, or the Services as centralized in Washington. Stating that each Army unit, for example, will have a certain position filled may or may not be where the need is. However, if the positions were allocated to the senior commander, he would then be able to assure the manpower available is placed to fill the most pressing need within the local command.

FTS in the Army Reserve Components

General

In 1979, Congress directed that a test be conducted by the Army and Air Force to ascertain whether full-time support could be provided by personnel serving in an active status (AGR). This test served as the impetus for converting Military Technician positions to AGR positions. As a result of the test, positions were converted on a voluntary basis when either the position became vacant or the incumbent desired to change his/her status from technician to AGR. Since this was a one-for-one tradeoff, there was no net gain or loss in manpower end-strength levels.

AGR full-time manning and technician conversion support programs have been a volatile issue with many pros and cons. On one point, however, most agree -- that the additional full-time manning has enhanced unit training and made better use of available training time.

The sub-sections to follow will examine the Army National Guard and Army Reserve full-time support program in more detail.

FTS in the Army National Guard

Status FY 1980 to FY 1989 (See Table 9.2)

- The Army National Guard's Selected Reserve strength is forecast to grow 36% from FY 1980 to 498,000 in FY 1989.
- During the same period, the number of FTS personnel is projected to grow 164% to 76,995.
- The percentage of FTS personnel is expected to increase from 8% of the Selected Reserve strength in FY 1980 to 15% in FY 1989.
- Over the 10-year period, the mix of FTS personnel is predicted to shift significantly as shown below:

FY 1980		FY 1989	
86%	Military Technicians	67%	AGR Personnel
11%	AGR Personnel	32%	Military Technicians
2%	Active Component	1%	DoD Civilians
1%	DoD Civilians	0.5%	Active Component

Characteristics

The ARNG planned for the mix-of-the-force to be attained through attrition of filled technician positions in units. No time frame for completion was established since no position was to be eliminated when occupied by a technician who did not desire to change status voluntarily. This posed little problem for the ARNG since technicians are members of the National Guard and are mobilization assets.

Congressional reaction has been positive towards providing increased full-time support to the National Guard. The reception of the AGR program by the field has been primarily positive while the conversion program has received some criticism.

Commanders and Adjutants General (AGs) have reacted to the program positively since it provides increased full-time support and increased readiness. All recognize that the AGR program must be part of an integrated program of full-time support which includes technicians, Active Army, and AGR personnel in the states.

TABLE 9.2

FULL TIME SUPPORT TO THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Military Technicians	24,939	22,141	22,557	22,742	24,119	24,119	24,119	24,119	24,119	24,411
DoD Civilians	335	399	487	423	455	444	444	444	444	444
AGR	3,218	9,886	10,933	13,757	16,632	26,583	34,888	42,330	50,558	51,901
Active Component	624	784	784	784	839	239	239	239	239	239
Total FTS	29,116	33,210	34,681	37,706	42,045	51,385	59,690	67,132	75,360	76,995
Sel Res Manpower	366,585	389,089	407,681	417,178	433,000	447,283	471,000	478,752	491,621	497,564
Percent of FTS	8%	9%	9%	9%	10%	11%	13%	14%	15%	15%

Composition of the Full-Time Force in Percent

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Military Technicians	86%	67%	65%	60%	57%	47%	40%	36%	32%	32%
DoD Civilians	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
AGR	11	30	32	36	40	52	58	63	67	67
Active Component	2	2	2	2	2	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5

Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Note: All strength data provided by OASD(RA).

FTS in the Army Reserve

Status FY 1980 to FY 1989 (See Table 9.3)

- The Army Reserve's Selected Reserve strength is forecast to grow 58% from FY 1980 to 326,089 in FY 1989.
- During the same period, the number of FTS personnel is projected to grow 150% to 42,278.
- The percentage of FTS personnel is expected to increase from 8% of the Selected Reserve strength in FY 1980 to 13% in FY 1989.
- Over the 10-year period, the mix of FTS personnel is predicted to shift significantly as shown below:

FY 1980	FY 1989
40% Military Technicians	65% AGR Personnel
34% DoD Civilians	18% Military Technicians
24% AGR Personnel	14% DoD Civilians
3% Active Component	3% Active Component

Characteristics

The objective of the Army Reserve technician program is to provide USAR units with a complement of full-time personnel.

Military Technicians in the Army Reserve are also military members of the employing unit. Their purpose is to achieve maximum mobilization and combat readiness of troop program units. Upon mobilization, these personnel deploy with their units and provide continuity during the transition to a wartime footing.

Readiness in the USAR, however, is affected due to the relatively large number of Military Technicians who are not

members of the unit to which they are assigned. Of the total Military Technician strength for FY 1983, approximately 1,585 Military Technicians, or 24%, were "status quo" technicians with no military assignment. Approximately 69% of the Military Technician force within the USAR were employed by units they would not deploy with on mobilization, although they do have a unit of assignment elsewhere.

The position of the Army Reserve is that a continuation of the prohibition of converting Military Technician positions to AGR should have no great impact providing there are no further cuts in the AGR programmed strength increases for the out years.

TABLE 9.3

FULL TIME SUPPORT TO THE ARMY RESERVE

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Military Technicians 1/	6,709	6,697	6,718	6,603 2/	7,585	7,585	7,661	7,687	7,692	7,711
DoD Civilians	5,740	5,939	5,851	5,725	6,076	6,112	6,011	6,019	6,022	6,031
AGR	3,959	5,092	5,894	7,033	9,022	15,027	19,120	22,587	26,668	27,266
Active Component	432	738	770	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270	1,270
Total FTS	16,880	18,466	19,233	20,631	23,953	29,994	34,062	37,563	41,652	42,278
Sel Res Manpower 3/	206,626	225,083	256,659	266,188	278,117	298,447	308,053	315,085	322,779	326,089
Percent of FTS	8%	8%	7%	9%	9%	10%	11%	12%	13%	13%

Composition of the Full-Time Force in Percent

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Military Technicians	40%	36%	35%	32%	32%	25%	22%	20%	18%	18%
DoD Civilians	34	32	30	28	25	20	18	16	14	14
AGR	24	28	31	34	38	50	56	60	64	65
Active Component	3	4	4	6	5	4	4	3	3	3

Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Note:

1/ Includes the status quo category of military technicians without military status.

2/ Approximately 69% of the military technician force within the USAR were employed by units with which they would not be deployed upon mobilization. Of the total technician strength for FY 1983, approximately 24% were status quo technicians with no military assignment.

3/ End strength figures for the USAR include pay categories PDS (Paid Drill Strength), AGR (Active Guard/Reserve), and IMA (Individual Mobilization Augmentee).

4/ All strength data provided by DASD(RA).

FTS in the Naval Reserve

Status FY 1980 to FY 1989 (See Table 9.4)

- The Navy Reserve's Selected Reserve strength is forecast to grow 68% from FY 1980 to 146,205 in FY 1989.
- During the period FY 1983 to FY 1989, the number of FTS personnel is projected to grow 31% to 28,324.
- The percentage of FTS personnel is expected to decrease from 20% of the Selected Reserve strength in FY 1983 to 19% in FY 1989.
- Over the 7-year period, the mix of FTS personnel is predicted to shift significantly as shown below:

FY 1983	FY 1989
55% AGR (TAR)	63% AGR (TAR)
31% Active Component	25% Active Component
14% DoD Civilian	11% DoD Civilians
1% Statutory Tour	1% Statutory Tour

Characteristics

Most of the full-time support provided to the Naval Reserve are active duty Reserve personnel serving in a special category known as Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR). Most TAR personnel work directly with Naval Reserve units and will mobilize with them in the event of war. TAR personnel, by design, serve multiple tours within the Reserve program to provide a cadre of personnel for continuity and readiness. The Navy believes the career nature of the TAR program has minimized personnel turbulence.

Enlisted TARs are recruited through two sources. The first source consists of approximately 350 first enlistment TAR applicants who are recruited for a four-year active tour by Navy recruiters each year. The second group, Navy veterans, enter through voluntary recall and agree to serve at least four years. Officers are selected by TAR selection boards from Active and Naval Reserve officers requesting TAR designations.

TAR officers are rotated between shore and operational assignments similar to regular Navy officers in order to bring current fleet practices into Reserve training.

TABLE 9.4
FULL TIME SUPPORT TO THE NAVAL RESERVE

		Actual				Programmed					
		FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
AGR (TAR)	1/	9,935	10,213	10,636	11,831	13,636	15,196	16,015	16,936	17,753	17,928
Active Support	2/	4/	4/	4/	6,614	5,601	5,680	6,384	6,669	7,050	7,129
DoD Civilians		4/	4/	4/	2,998	3,034	3,055	3,055	3,055	3,055	3,055
Statutory Tour	3/	200	200	230	199	210	212	212	212	212	212
Total FTS		5/	5/	5/	21,534	22,481	24,145	25,586	26,872	28,070	28,324
Sel Res Manpower		86,751	87,599	93,719	109,094	122,496	128,906	134,717	140,605	145,774	146,205
Percent of FTS		5/	5/	5/	20%	18%	19%	19%	19%	19%	19%

Composition of the Full-Time Force in Percent

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
AGR (TAR)	5/	5/	5/	55%	61%	63%	62%	63%	63%	63%
Active Support				31	25	24	25	25	25	25
DoD Civilians				14	14	13	12	11	11	11
Statutory Tour				1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Note:

1/ Full-time support for the Naval Reserve is provided primarily by three sources: Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) personnel; Active Component personnel; Statutory Tour personnel. The Navy does not use the technician program. The vast majority of the support is from TARS. Therefore, all figures provided are TARS unless otherwise indicated. TAR personnel were transferred to the Navy's Selected Reserve end strength as of October 1, 1982.

2/ Active Duty Navy personnel are detailed to Naval Reserve Forces ships and activities.

3/ Personnel in this category are in a non-direct support capacity. A limited number of Reserve officers (Selected Reserve) were recalled to active duty under the provisions of 10USC265. 34 officers were recalled in 1983 and the remaining 165 Reservists on active duty are in the TAR program.

4/ Data not available.

5/ Not calculated. Incomplete data.

6/ All strength data provided by OASD(RA).

FTS in the Marine Corps Reserve

Status FY 1980 to FY 1989 (See Table 9.5)

- The Marine Corps Reserve's Selected Reserve strength is forecast to grow 37% from FY 1980 to 48,467 in FY 1989.
- During the same period, the number of FTS personnel is projected to grow 44% to 6,992.
- The percentage of FTS personnel is expected to increase from 14% of the Selected Reserve strength in FY 1980 to 15% in FY 1989.
- Over the 10-year period, the mix of FTS personnel is predicted to shift significantly as shown below:

FY 1980	FY 1989
96% Active Component	72% Active Component
1% Reserve Personnel on Active Duty	24% Reserve Personnel on Active Duty
3% DoD Civilians	4% DoD Civilians

Characteristics

Expansion of the FTS program as shown on Table 9.5 will enhance the readiness posture of the Marine Corps Reserve, and is a significant and visible manifestation of the Marine Corps commitment to the Total Force. Particular emphasis is being placed on enlarging the role of FTS personnel in the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, where the addition of and transition of new aircraft is resulting in increased demands on support personnel. Members of the Marine Corps Reserve's Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) are being actively recruited to meet the new requirements in aircraft support and occupational fields.

The Marine Corps Reserve has a total of 5,654 full-time support personnel serving approximately 303 Reserve units in two categories. The 5,654 full-time support personnel represent 13% of the total end-strength of the Marine Corps Selected Reserve.

During FY 1983, there were 656 full-time support personnel (Reservists on active duty) serving at major headquarters, training commands and the IRR personnel center to facilitate training and mobilization. An additional 4,825 active duty personnel were detailed to support the Marine Corps Reserve, primarily at unit level.

TABLE 9.5

FULL TIME SUPPORT TO THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE

		Actual				Programmed					
		FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Reservists on Active Duty	1/	67	133	456	656	801	1,129	1,475	1,585	1,684	1,684
Active Support	2/	4,631	5,029	4,974	4,825	4,627	4,679	4,769	4,982	5,003	5,006
DoD Civilians		142	142	159	173	211	221	302	302	302	302
Total FTS		4,840	5,304	5,589	5,654	5,639	6,029	6,546	6,889	6,989	6,992
Sel Res Manpower		35,449	37,049	40,461	42,690	43,883	46,447	47,858	48,094	48,387	48,467
Percent of FTS		14%	14%	14%	13%	13%	13%	14%	14%	15%	15%

Composition of the Full-Time Force in Percent

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Reservists on Active Duty	1%	3%	8%	12%	14%	19%	23%	23%	24%	24%
Active Support	96	95	89	85	82	78	73	72	72	72
DoD Civilians	3	3	3	3	4	4	5	4	4	4

Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Note:

1/ Full-time support personnel (Reservists on Active Duty) serving at major headquarters, training commands and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel center to facilitate training and mobilization.

2/ Active duty personnel detailed to support Marine Corps Reserve. These individuals serve primarily at unit level.

3/ All strength data provided by OASD(RA).

FTS in the Air Reserve Forces

General

As stated earlier in this report, the Board has taken the position that no single full-time support system can be applied to all Reserve Components. After considerable study the Board has endorsed the position that each Service should develop the full-time support system, mix, and management process which best serves its needs.

No two Services are alike as to their requirements. In fact, no two components within a given Service can necessarily use the same exact system. An excellent example of this condition is evident in the Air Reserve Forces where one cannot help but note the sharp contrast between Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve attitudes regarding the issues of full-time manning and technician conversion.

To help illustrate the point that no one system can serve all, the listing which follows reflects some of the more extreme differences within the Air Reserve Forces:

- For the most part, the AGR program was received very well by the Air National Guard technician force.
- The Air Force Reserve expressed difficulty in finding adequate numbers of technicians to convert to the AGR program; the Air National Guard experienced little difficulty.
- The Air National Guard stated that there was a real preference for technicians wanting to convert to AGR status and stated that positive factors regarding AGR full-time manning and technician conversion support programs far outweighed the negative factors.
- The Air Force Reserve conducted a survey in 1979 which indicated that 88% of the Air Force Reserve technician force said they would not convert to full-time AGR status. The Air Force Reserve sub-

sequently reported that they were not able to attract sufficient numbers of personnel in a full-time military status, especially in the highly technical aircraft maintenance specialties which are critical to the combat readiness of their flying units.

- The Air Force Reserve maintained that technician recruiting efforts were impaired because of the AGR program while the Air National Guard cited overall increased recruiting and increased retainability as positive factors concerning the AGR program.

- The Air Force Reserve chose not to utilize a mixed, full-time support force beyond the military technician conversion test period which terminated on June 30, 1983, while the Air National Guard continued with the program and even expressed a desire to fill more of the authorized full-time positions than the hiring authority would allow.

The above dichotomy reflects the vast differences which exist between Components and within a Service. It serves to reinforce the Board's position that each Reserve Component should be allowed to manage its own system in its own way.

FTS in the Air National Guard

Status FY 1980 to FY 1989 (See Table 9.6)

- The Air National Guard's Selected Reserve strength is forecast to grow 21% from FY 1980 to 116,428 in FY 1989.
- During FY 1983 to FY 1989, the number of FTS personnel is projected to grow 13% to 33,091.
- The percentage of FTS personnel is expected to decrease from 29% of the Selected Reserve strength in FY 1983 to 28% in FY 1989.
- Over the 7-year period, the mix of FTS personnel is predicted to shift significantly as shown below:

FY 1983		FY 1989	
75%	Military Technicians	66%	Military Technicians
15%	AGR Direct Support	24%	AGR Direct Support
7%	DoD Civilian	6%	DoD Civilians
3%	Active Component	2%	Active Component
1%	AGR Hqtrs Support	1%	AGR Hqtrs Support

Characteristics

In the Air National Guard, the only manning positions actually converted from technician to AGR during FY 1981-1983 were Weapons System Security, Field Training Sites, and Gunnery Ranges. With the exception of recruiters and counselors that were previously AGR, all other full-time manning authorizations can be either military technician or AGR within the available end strengths shown on Table 9.6.

At this writing, the Air National Guard has no current plans to convert any other manning positions to AGR.

The Air National Guard believes the current Congressional guidance on use of full-time manpower in the Air National Guard to be satisfactory. They further state that they see no area which additionally needs to be expanded, nor do they see a need for further controls.

TABLE 9.6

FULL TIME SUPPORT TO THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Military Technicians 1/	21,815	21,829	21,834	21,949	21,846	21,846	21,846	21,846	21,846	21,846
DoD Civilians 2/	1,706	1,924	1,981	1,924	2,046	2,047	2,047	2,047	2,047	2,047
AGR (Direct Spt) 3/	1,418	2,705	3,076	4,275	5,572	6,874	7,118	7,567	7,864	8,053
AGR (Non-direct Spt) 4/	142	229	258	299	343	350	350	350	350	350
Active Component	5/	5/	5/	741	738	750	799	831	795	795
Total PTS	25,081	26,687	27,069	29,188	30,545	31,867	32,152	32,641	32,902	33,091
Sel Res Manpower	96,283	98,293	100,657	102,170	104,184	107,890	108,950	111,768	115,089	116,428
Percent of PTS	26%	27%	27%	29%	29%	30%	30%	29%	29%	28%

Composition of the Full-Time Force in Percent

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Military Technicians	87%	82%	81%	75%	72%	69%	68%	67%	66%	66%
DoD Civilians	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
AGR (Direct Spt)	6	10	11	15	18	22	22	23	24	24
AGR (Non-direct Spt)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Active Component	5/	5/	5/	3	2	2	3	3	2	2

Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Note:

1/ Since most personnel authorizations can be occupied by either military technicans or AGR personnel, technician strengths are not projected beyond 1985.

2/ Civilian personnel employed under Title 5 responsible for support of host base support requirements.

3/ Excludes AGR Headquarters Support personnel such as statutory tours, ANG Support Center Manpower and other miscellaneous activities. With the exception of recruiters/counselors that were always AGR, all other manning document authorizations can be either military technicians or AGR, within available end strengths.

4/ Headquarters support personnel in non-direct support.

5/ Data not available.

6/ All strength data provided by OASD(RA).

FTS in the Air Force Reserve

Status FY 1980 to FY 1989 (See Table 9.7)

- The Air Force Reserve's Selected Reserve strength is forecast to grow 49% from FY 1980 to 87,984 in FY 1989.
- During the period FY 1983 to FY 1989, the number of FTS personnel is projected to grow 12% to 15,025.
- The percentage of FTS personnel is forecast to decrease from 20% of the Selected Reserve strength in FY 1983, to 17% in FY 1989.
- Over the 7-year period the mix of FTS personnel is predicted to shift as shown below:

FY 1983		FY 1989	
60%	Military Technicians	60%	Military Technicians
32%	DoD Civilians	31%	DoD Civilians
5%	Active Component	5%	Active Component
2%	Statutory Tour in Direct Support	2%	Statutory Tour in Direct Support
1%	Statutory Tour, non-Direct Support	2%	Statutory Tour, non-Direct Support

Characteristics

The Air Force Reserve views the past technician conversion test as "totally unsuccessful and an unacceptable management approach."

The Air Force Reserve has chosen not to utilize a mixed full-time support force and remains convinced that converting Military Technicians to AGR status will not result in any cost savings and would, conversely, degrade military readiness.

TABLE 9.7

FULL TIME SUPPORT TO THE AIR FORCE RESERVE

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Military Technicians	6,111	6,544	7,189	8,813	8,175	8,385	8,460	8,704	8,906	9,001
DoD Civilians 1/	4/	4/	4/	4,267	4,384	4,524	4,551	4,639	4,658	4,624
AGR (Statutory Tour):										
Direct Support 2/	275	212	167	184	216	295	295	295	295	295
Non-direct Support 3/	267	271	298	281	301	328	328	341	343	344
Active Component	4/	4/	4/	705	707	753	758	763	761	761
Total PTS	5/	5/	5/	13,458	13,783	14,285	14,392	14,742	14,963	15,025
Sel Res Manpower	58,921	61,565	64,443	67,227	69,000	74,829	79,294	83,556	87,379	87,984
Percent of PTS	5/	5/	5/	20%	20%	19%	18%	18%	17%	17%

Composition of the Full-Time Force in Percent

	Actual				Programmed					
	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989
Military Technicians	5/	5/	5/	60%	59%	59%	59%	59%	60%	60%
DoD Civilians				32	32	32	32	31	31	31
AGR (Statutory Tour):										
Direct Support				1	2	2	2	2	2	2
Non-direct Support				2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Active Component				5	5	5	5	5	5	5

Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Note:

1/ Civilian personnel employed under Title 5 responsible for support of host base support requirements.

2/ The Air Force Reserve does not reflect PTS with any AGR personnel. The Air Force Reserve does not have, and does not intend to have, AGR personnel in its unit PTS program. Personnel in this category serve on Statutory Tours no lower than major command and special operating agency level.

3/ Primarily recruiting and retention personnel — non-direct support.

4/ Data not available.

5/ Not calculated — incomplete data.

6/ All strength data provided by OASD(RA).



Definitions of Full-Time Support Personnel

The aggregation of personnel positions providing all facets of support to the Reserve Components is properly described as Full-Time Support (FTS). There are five categories of personnel under the umbrella of FTS:

- AC Active Component Personnel: Military personnel on active duty who provide support to the Reserve Components and paid from Active Force personnel appropriations. This includes Reservists on extended active duty and regulars.

- AGR Active Guard/Reserve: National Guard members and Reservists on active duty 180 days or more who provide full-time support to the Reserve Components and are paid from the Reserve Personnel Appropriations of the Military Department concerned. This classification would include TARS personnel (see definition below).

- CS Civil Service Personnel: Federal competitive civil service personnel other than Military Technicians or Status Quo Technicians who provide full-time support to the Reserve Components but do not occupy technician positions. Commonly referred to as either "civilians" or "DoD Civilians", they are not required to be members of the Selected Reserve, the unit in which they serve, or to maintain individual readiness for military operations.

- MT <u>Military Technicians</u>: Federal civilian personnel who occupy technician positions and are members of the Reserve Component which they support as technicians. Sometimes referred to as <u>Excepted Service Technicians</u>, or "dual status", these personnel must maintain military membership in the unit of assignment or be automatically separated, thereby eliminating the problem of having technicians who cannot be mobilized. (See "Competitive Service Technicians" below)

- SQ <u>Status Quo Technicians</u>: Federal civilian personnel who occupy technician positions in Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve units but are not military members of the unit they support and are not mobilization assets. Often referred to as <u>Competitive Service Technicians</u>, these individuals must also meet military membership as a condition of employment. However, separation occurs only when loss of membership in the Selected Reserve is for reasons within the technician's control. Thus these personnel are "non-dual status" technicians who cannot be mobilized. It is the DoD policy that these positions will be reduced to zero as soon as practicable.

Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) personnel provide full-time support for the Naval Reserve as the Navy does not use the technician program. This is a special category of Reservists serving on extended active duty on a career basis to administer to the Naval Reserve.