

AD-A145 331

(2)



AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

DTIC
ELECTE
SEP 5 1984
S B D


STUDENT REPORT

MARIUS AND TRAJAN
TWO GREAT ROMAN STRATEGISTS

MAJOR JON A. FISCHER 84-860

"insights into tomorrow"

DTIC FILE COPY



DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

84 09 05 247

DISCLAIMER

The views and conclusions expressed in this document are those of the author. They are not intended and should not be thought to represent official ideas, attitudes, or policies of any agency of the United States Government. The author has not had special access to official information or ideas and has employed only open-source material available to any writer on this subject.

This document is the property of the United States Government. It is available for distribution to the general public. A loan copy of the document may be obtained from the Air University Interlibrary Loan Service (AUL/LDEX, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112) or the Defense Technical Information Center. Request must include the author's name and complete title of the study.

This document may be reproduced for use in other research reports or educational pursuits contingent upon the following stipulations:

-- Reproduction rights do not extend to any copyrighted material that may be contained in the research report.

-- All reproduced copies must contain the following credit line: "Reprinted by permission of the Air Command and Staff College."

-- All reproduced copies must contain the name(s) of the report's author(s).

-- If format modification is necessary to better serve the user's needs, adjustments may be made to this report--this authorization does not extend to copyrighted information or material. The following statement must accompany the modified document: "Adapted from Air Command and Staff Research Report (number) entitled (title) by (author)."

-- This notice must be included with any reproduced or adapted portions of this document.



REPORT NUMBER 84-860

TITLE MARIUS AND TRAJAN: TWO GREAT ROMAN STRATEGISTS

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JON A. FISCHER, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR MAJOR JOHN BLAMEY, ACSC/EDOWA/3

SPONSOR MAJOR BERNIE CLAXTON, ACSC/EDCJ

S DTIC
ELECTE
SEP 5 1984 **D**
B

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

**AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112**

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

**Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited**

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 84-860	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A145331	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) MARIUS AND TRAJAN TWO GREAT ROMAN STRATEGISTS		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Jon A. Fischer, Major, USAF, [REDACTED]		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS ACSC/EDCC, MAXWELL AFB AL 36112		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS ACSC/EDCC, MAXWELL AFB AL 36112		12. REPORT DATE APRIL 1984
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 70
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) STATEMENT "A" Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Presents a review, analysis, and comparison of the military strategy of Marius and Trajan in the context of the ACSC Strategy Process Model. This provides an insight into the evolution of the strategy for the defense and spread of the Roman Empire.		

PREFACE

This work is both a history and an analysis. The history is of ancient Rome during the Republic and the Empire. It involves two great Roman leaders, Caius Marius and Marcus Ulpus Trajan. The first was a military leader during the period of the Roman Republic. The second was an Emperor during the period of the Roman Empire. I will analyze their use of national and military strategies using the Air Command and Staff College Strategy Process Model as an analytical vehicle.



Accession For	
ADIC	✓
ADIC T&E	
Unannounced	
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author is a Course Officer at Air Command and Staff College. He is a Major in the United States Air Force and has wide experience as a Missile Combat Crew Member and a Navigator in a B-52. As an Missilier, Major Fischer served as Deputy Commander (DMCCC), Instructor DMCCC, Evaluator DMCCC, Crew Commander (MCCC), and Evaluator MCCC. As a B-52 Crew Member, Major Fischer served as Navigator (Nav), Instructor Nav, Radar Navigator (RN), and Instructor RN.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface-----	iii
About The Author-----	iv
List of Illustrations-----	vi
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION	
Purpose-----	1
Organization-----	1
Assumptions, Constraints, and Limitations-----	2
CHAPTER TWO - CAIUS MARIUS	
Introduction-----	3
Background-----	4
The Conflict is Resolved-----	13
Analysis-----	25
Conclusions-----	34
CHAPTER THREE - MARCUS ULPIUS TRAJAN	
Introduction-----	37
Background-----	38
The Wars against Dacia-----	44
Analysis-----	53
Conclusions-----	60
CHAPTER FOUR - CONCLUSION	
Marius-----	61
Trajan-----	62
Bibliography-----	63

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURES

FIGURE 1 - CARBO 113 B.C.	5
FIGURE 2 - SILANUS 109 B.C.; LONGINUS 107 B.C.	7
FIGURE 3 - MAXIMUS/CAEPIO 105 B.C.	9
FIGURE 4 - BARBARIAN ATTACK 102 B.C.	11
FIGURE 5 - TEUTONE DEFEAT 102 B.C.	17
FIGURE 6 - CATALUS/CIMBRI DEFEAT 101 B.C.	21
FIGURE 7 - EUROPE 98-101 A.D.	39
FIGURE 8 - DACIA & SURROUNDING AREA 98 A.D.	43
FIGURE 9 - CAMPAIGN OF 101 A.D.	45
FIGURE 10 - CAMPAIGN OF 102 A.D.	47
FIGURE 11 - CAMPAIGN OF 106 A.D.	49

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to provide an analysis of the military and political strategies of two great leaders of ancient Rome. In both cases, their times involved major conflicts for Rome. These conflicts will be analyzed and compared to the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) Strategy Process Model.

The first leader, Caius Marius, will be analyzed in Chapter Two. Marius was a general during the Roman Republic period. Specifically, this chapter will cover the period from 113-101 B.C. The significance of this time for the Republic was the military threat created by the invasion of three barbaric German tribes: the Cimbri, Teutone, and Ambrone. Without the leadership of Marius, the Republic would have faced certain destruction.

The second leader, Marcus Ulpius Trajan, will be analyzed in Chapter Three. Trajan was a general and emperor during the time of the Roman Empire known as the Golden Age. The period covered will be from 100-107 A.D. The significance of this time was Trajan's conquest of the Dacian Empire. The Dacians were a continual thorn in the Roman side, and their defeat was a stepping stone to the maximum extension of the empire under Trajan's rule.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapters Two and Three will be divided into five parts. Part I will be an introduction to the chapter. It will provide the purpose, a brief introduction, and the period of time covered.

Part II will be background. It will include the factors that led to the conflict, the history of the conflict prior to the leader's involvement, and background on the leader.

Part III will be a detailed historical discussion of the conflict. It will cover the leader's part in the conflict and how he influenced its outcome. No analysis will be made in this part.

Part IV will be a comparison of the linkages between the levels of

strategy employed in the conflict with the ACSC Strategy Process Model as the means of analysis. The discussion will cover national security objectives and grand, military, and battlefield strategies. The background of the conflict, the leader's influence, and the strategies of his opponents will also be analyzed.

a. Analysis of national security objectives will determine how quickly they were recognized, whether they were imposed or selected, and how well they were satisfied.

b. Analysis of grand strategy will determine how well the leader developed the economic, political, and military instruments of national power, and how well they were used and coordinated.

c. Analysis of military strategy will include the development, deployment, and employment of military force and the limitations on their use.

d. Finally, the battlefield strategy employed by each participant will be analyzed. This analysis will include the tactics of all combatants prior to and after the leader's involvement.

Part V will be conclusions drawn from the analysis. They will summarize the effectiveness of the participants to employ a linked strategy approach as identified through the Strategy Process Model.

ASSUMPTIONS, CONSTRAINTS, AND LIMITATIONS ON THE STUDY

ASSUMPTIONS

The reader has studied and is familiar with the Strategy Process Model.

CONSTRAINTS

Chapters Two and Three are designed to be self-contained. These chapters can be removed from this project and treated as separate entities for further study. A comparison of the two characters will be accomplished in Chapter Four simply as a vehicle to tie this project together.

LIMITATION

Initial study showed that records are contradictory or incomplete in certain aspects of this topic. Therefore, conflicting interpretations between historians are weighed, and the most reputable, widely accepted interpretation is used. Missing facts in certain areas of the study required the use of inferences. However, these are identified to the reader. In all cases, the priority for these decisions were: preponderance of evidence, majority opinion, reputation of the historian, or currency of the work.

Chapter Two

CAIUS MARIUS

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to provide an analysis of the strategies of the Roman general Caius Marius using the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) Strategy Process Model as the analytical vehicle. Marius lived from approximately 157 B.C. until 86 B.C. This was during the period of Roman history known as the Republic.

The time covered in this study is from 113 B.C. until 101 B.C., an era of conflict for the Republic. The conflict resulted from an invasion by three barbaric German tribes. This invasion can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase covers the years from 113 B.C. to 105 B.C. These years witnessed the initial invasion by the barbarians and were prior to the involvement of Marius. The second phase covers the years from 104 B.C. to 101 B.C. These years saw the entry of Marius into the conflict through its conclusion.

BACKGROUND

THE BARBARIANS

In the year 113 B.C., a group of German tribes first came into contact with the Roman Republic. This group was composed of two major tribes, the Cimbri and the Teutones, one minor tribe, the Ambrones, and many smaller tribes. For the purpose of this study, this group, as a whole and in its various divisions, will be known as the Barbarians.

For eight years now, Germanic wanderers had been searching without success for a new home in Europe outside the Roman frontier, and their continued failure made it ever more certain that in the end they would be driven to stake their future on a bolder throw. When other regions had been tried in vain, they would turn to the Roman provinces, if not to Italy itself. (2:139)

For the Romans, this migration was both a surprise and an ominous threat. During this period of the Republic, the Romans had very little knowledge of the peoples in the northern part of Europe. This was beyond their sphere of influence and trade. (10:336) Because these people were totally unknown, the Romans attributed superhuman powers to them. "They were of invincible strength and fierceness in their wars, and hurried into battle with the violence of a devouring flame; none could withstand them; all they assaulted became their prey." (10:337) This naturally fed Roman fears of a totally unknown opponent. Added to this were reports of their unbelievable numbers.

The accounts at first exceeded all credit, as to the number and strength of the approaching army, but in the end report proved much inferior to truth, as they were three hundred thousand effective fighting men, besides a far greater number of women and children. They professed to be seeking new countries to sustain these great multitudes, and cities where they might settle and inhabit, in the same way as they had heard the Celti before them had driven out the Tyrrhenians, and possessed themselves of the best part of Italy. (10:336)

THE INVASION

In their southerly search for a new homeland, the Barbarians were forcibly evicted by the inhabitants of every territory they traversed. Beginning in approximately 120 B.C., they finally arrived at Carinthia in 113 B.C. This was their first contact with the Roman Republic. When word of the invasion reached Rome, the Senate directed Consul Cn. Papirius Carbo to repel the Barbarians with his army. (3:141) [See Fig. 1]

The Cimbri were in no mood to court a new defeat: at the consul's order to retire they obeyed. But Carbo was out for glory. Fearing that his victims might escape, he hurriedly prepared for their destruction; and when treachery had provoked the battle for which ambition sought, the incompetence of their general involved the

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE




FIGURE 1 - CARBO 113 B.C.

Romans in a defeat which would have been annihilation but for the timely intervention of a thunderstorm. Such was the battle fought near Noreia, midway between Klagenfurt and Ljubljana [in Yugoslavia]. (2:141-2)

Carbo returned to Rome where he was shamed into committing suicide. "The ignominy of his end became him well: by conduct of the most culpable ineptitude he had thrown away an army, and--what was worse--had given the migrant hoarde their first taste of victory." (2:142) However, the Barbarians did not procede into Italy, rather they fled to the Alps. It appeared that ". . . they were half frightened at their victory over a giant whom they had for this once caught napping, but could hardly hope to resist when he was fully awakened." (1:306)

After four more years of nomadic wandering and being rebuffed by all peoples they met, the Barbarians returned and entered eastern France in the year 109 B.C. Their numbers had grown, being reinforced by the Tigurini and other Celtic tribes from Switzerland and southern Germany.

The Romans, again threatened by invasion, sent Consul M. Iunius Silanus to meet them in battle. [See Fig. 2] The two armies faced each other near the borders of Gallia Narbonensis [near Marseille, France]. The Barbarians, still fearing the Republic and hoping to keep the peace, requested land within Roman controlled territories and made an offer of mercenary service to the Republic. Consul Silanus sent their message to the Senate.

Such terms, presented to Roman emperors of another age, often met with glad acceptance; but the Senate, to whom the application of the Northmen was referred, disdained their assistance. By way of proving their military worth, the Cimbri and Teutones attacked Silanus and broke his army at the first onset. (1:306)

Again the Barbarians refused to enter Roman territory. However, the harm had already been done with this second decisive defeat. First, the Barbarians' confidence was again increased. Second, the demonstrated vulnerability of Roman armies caused other subjected peoples to consider open rebellion. Rome's prestige was at an all time low. (2:142)

The main body of the Barbarians withdrew into the interior, but the Tigurini detached themselves from the main group and proceeded to raid and cause rebellion along the west bank of the Rhone. This was a particularly rich and fertile area and the Roman influence was extremely weak. [See Fig. 2]

To meet these dangers the Senate had another army in the field by 107 B.C., under the command of Consul L. Cassius Longinus, who turned out to be as bad as his predecessors. He did, indeed, drive the Tigurini from the neighbourhood of Tolosa [near Toulouse, France]; but an ill-judged pursuit down the valley of the Garonne ended in a great disaster. Longinus himself . . . [was] killed, and such remnants of the troops as reached the camp alive only escaped destruction because the senior surviving officer, C.

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE




FIGURE 2 -SILANUS 109 B.C.; LONGINUS 107 B.C.

Popillius Laenas, bought their lives by surrendering half the baggage and even agreeing that they should pass beneath the yoke. (2:143)

During ancient times, conquerors would spare their vanquished foes by making them walk under an ox yoke or arch of spears. This was an act of submission and disgrace by the conquered. The passing of the army under the yoke brought great dishonor on Rome. It had not occurred for many years.

The passing of a Roman army under the yoke at the hands of the Tigurini so inflamed public opinion that an impeachment for 'perduellio' (treason) . . . against Popilius [sic] . . . ended in a vote of condemnation. . . ." (1:309-10)

This was the third army lost by the Republic in the course of six years.

In 106 B.C., the Tigurini voluntarily withdrew, leaving the inhabitant Tectosages at the mercy of Consul Q. Servilius Caepio. It is not historically clear why the Tigurini left their former allies, but the approach of Consul Caepio and his army may have been the reason. Consul Caepio and his army soundly defeated the Tectosages and razed their chief sanctuary at Tolosa. As a sidenote of historical interest, an enormous treasure was taken from the Tectosages and transported back to Rome. Somewhere enroute, it disappeared. This cast a grave suspicion on Consul Caepio and he was later charged with embezzlement. (1:306)

In 104 B.C., the Barbarians returned from Central France, having again failed to secure themselves a new homeland. With further reinforcements, the Barbarians no longer hesitated entering Roman territory. The Senate, wanting to ensure victory this time, sent a second army under Consul Cn. Manlius Maximus, to join Proconsul Caepio, who had not yet been charged with embezzlement. The two armies camped near Arausio [near Orange, France]. (1:306) [See Fig.3] Consul Maximus, outranking Proconsul Caepio, could not persuade him to join the two forces together. Proconsul Caepio was extremely jealous of Consul Maximus and felt the command, and thus the victory, should be his. (2:144) In addition to being unable to control Proconsul Caepio, Consul Maximus was also another inept general. He failed to maintain discipline in his army, in fact losing control to his men. The Barbarians again approached and sued for peace. They made the same offer as before and were again refused by the Senate. (1:306) The Barbarians wiped out an advance Roman guard. It now became evident to both Caepio and Maximus that they should join forces. Caepio begrudgingly followed Maximus' orders, and led his forces over to the east side of the river but still refused to join Maximus. Their two camps were separated by such a distance they were almost out of touch. Even a Senatorial depute could not convince the two men to bury their differences. (2:144) When they finally attacked, ". . . the barbarians fell first upon Caepio, and the two Roman armies were cut to pieces in succession." (2:144) Both generals had chosen to fight with their backs to the river, making retreat impossible. Historical estimates of Rome's losses on that day at Arausio are 80,000 fighting men. Amazingly, both Caepio and Maximus escaped to

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE




FIGURE 3 - MAXIMUS/CAEPIO 105 B.C.

meet their fate in Rome. (2:144) After this defeat, the Barbarians still did not press their advantage. They broke up and withdrew in separate directions. The Teutones went to Gaul, and the Cimbri went to Spain. (1:307)

Meanwhile, when news of the defeat reached Rome, the remaining Consul, Rutilius, took major steps to improve the military position of the Republic. He had already begun training his troops using gladiatorial instructors. Additionally, he issued edicts declaring men of military age could not leave Italy, and orders to officials at all ports to prevent the departure of men under 35. Rutilius had only weeks before the end of his Consulship to make these changes. It was at this time, on New Year's Day 104 B.C., that Marius was given control of Rome's future. (2:144-45)

The Barbarians returned after two years in 102 B.C. The Teutones and the Ambrones had been repelled by the Belgae from Northern Gaul and the Cimbri had been repelled by the Celtiberians from Spain. This time, for no other reason than they had no place left to go, they decided to invade Roman territory.

For unknown reasons, they decided to split their forces and try a three pronged invasion. [See Fig. 4] The Teutones and the Ambrones proceeded along the most direct route through southern France. This path took them by the seaside through Liguria. (10:338) The Cimbri passed along the northern edge of the Alps in order to enter Italy through the Brenner Pass by the Valley of the Adige and on into the Po Valley. The Tigurini went even further along the Alps and invaded Venetia by way of the Julian Alps.

CAIUS MARIUS

Little is known of Caius Marius' early history other than he was born of the common people and chose the army as a career. Being of the common country people, his manner was not refined and his politics were not polished. This caused him to be extremely unpopular with the nobility. (10:333) He is known to have been a hero in early wars while under the command of Consul Scipio Africanus at the siege of Numantia. Historical records indicate Consul Africanus respected Marius and expected great things of him. (10:333) Continually throughout his life, he advanced his army career through politics, and his political career through his military glory.

After a brief turn at politics, during which he made many enemies among the nobles, he won a position as Lieutenant to Consul Metallus who was in charge of the Jugurthan War in Africa. "From the outset Marius intended to use the appointment for his political advancement." (7:197) This occurred in approximately 109 B.C. After two years in Africa, Consul Metallus had not yet won the peace. Over Metallus' objections, Marius took advantage of his popularity with his troops and returned to Rome to sue for the consulate now held by Metallus. He won the position by popular support in 107 B.C., much to the dismay of the nobility in the Senate. The nobles felt they could embarrass him by authorizing him to raise additional troops for the unpopular war. (7:197) They felt that he, not being a noble, could not

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE



FIGURE 4 - BARBARIAN ATTACK 102 B.C.

appeal to the Roman landholders enough to raise an army. At that time, Roman armies were only composed of Roman landholders. They would volunteer to meet a threat and then return to their lands when the threat was gone. Marius realized what the nobility were attempting to do and began to enlist Romans from all walks of life. (10:335) By doing this, he informally opened the army to all Roman citizens, landed or not. This led to the first truly professional army in Roman history. The soldiers were drawn to the army in hopes of sharing in the spoils and glory of war. This was the first of the historically important Marian reforms. After raising his army, Marius returned to Africa where he, through treachery, put an end to King Jugurtha, thus ending the war as the year 105 B.C was ending.

Marius' triumphant end to the Jugurthan war was occurring at the same time as the defeat of Maximus and Caepio. The failure of the Senate and nobility to end the northern invasion caused a popular uprising among the people of Rome. (7:197-8)

The Romans, being from all parts alarmed with this news, sent for Marius to undertake the war, and nominated him the second time consul, though the law did not permit any one that was absent, or that had not waited a certain time after his first consulship, to be again created. But the people rejected all opposers, for they considered this was not the first time that the law gave place to the common interest. . . . Thus it was decided; and Marius, bringing over his legions out of Africa on the very first day of January, which the Romans count the beginning of the year, received the consulship. (10:337)

Nor did this breach of law last a short time. The people cast their fate with Marius and were determined to see it through to the end. He became their only hope.

In 105 [B.C.] the news of the disaster of Arausio raised up a storm which took five years to blow itself out. In this and the four ensuing years the Comitia Centuriata [the lower house of legislature, equivalent to the Senate] re-elected Marius to five successive consulships without asking the Senate to suspend the Lex Villia, which declared such a practice illegal, or inviting it to prolong Marius' office by prorogation; and the Tribal Assembly, taking yet another senatorial privilege into its hands, appointed him commander on the northern front, as it had previously nominated him to take charge of the war in Africa. (1:310)

Through the incompetence of the nobility, the Senate forfeited control of the Republic. The common people took charge and nominated their champion.

THE CONFLICT IS RESOLVED

MARIUS TAKES CHARGE

"Fortune gave Marius time to make his preparations. After the defeat of Caepio and Mallius the invaders had refused once more to follow up their success with an advance on Italy." (2:145) Marius began preparation immediately.

He began by instituting four major changes in the way the Roman army operated. First, he formally did away with the property requirement. (14:21) This was probably done for several reasons. It provided Marius with a ready supply of recruits, thus allowing him to fill his army and relieve the landed-class of their military responsibility. This made him extremely popular with both the landed and non-landed Romans. It also allowed him to demonstrate his political power to the nobility. They were powerless to stop him in the face of this popular support. However, even though he did enlist men without property, he was careful to recruit experienced veterans as well by offering them special inducements. Much to the Senate's displeasure, Marius was becoming a potent political power. (15:37-8)

Second, he presented an aquila to each legion. This was a golden eagle which served as the legions standard. It provided a corporate identity to the legion and allowed them to build their esprit de corps. (14:21-2)

Third, he discarded the legionary cavalry and light-armed troops (velites) and gave their duties to the auxiliary forces. This left the legion with one duty. They were now strictly heavy infantry. (14:22)

Finally, he changed the basic tactical formation of the army from the maniple to the cohort, a change which would last for many centuries to come. (14:21-2) Up to this point, the maniple had been the main tactical division of the Roman legion, consisting of 60 or 120 men. With his change to a legion of heavy infantry, he acquired a larger mass of men to carry out the tactics he desired. The maniples were combined to make a cohort, which consisted of from 300 to 600 men. The change to the cohort meant that the legion now became a specialized force, being used as both heavy infantry and combat engineers. With the addition of engineering specialists to the legion, the infantry could be used as a source of skilled and unskilled laborers in the construction of canals, dams, roads, and fortifications. (6:40-1) The consolidation of the maniples into cohorts produced a highly trained, highly disciplined line of solid troops never before seen in warfare. Led by competent centurians, this formation proved to be a flexible, tactical unit of unequalled infantry. (2:147) Under the right conditions, this formation was indeed formidable. "The 'right conditions,' were those of high-intensity warfare: close combat to hold ground under attack, or to seize ground against concentrated enemy forces . . ." (7:41) As it turned out, this was exactly the type of fighting that occurred in Marius' next campaign.

Yet it is clear that Marius did not create these changes but merely institutionalized changes that had been occurring over the past few years. Concerning the property requirement, Marius was simply formalizing what had probably become common practice.

Minor reforms of Gaius Gracchus had been to make the State responsible for the supply of equipment and clothing to the legionaries and to forbid the enlistment of youths under seventeen. This clearly indicates that neither property qualifications nor an age limit had been deterring those responsible for recruitment. (15:37)

The change to the legion was also in response to recent military experiences. By giving the duties of light infantry and cavalry to auxiliary troops, Marius was perhaps responding to the quality of Roman troops. "Thanks to the auxilia, the Romans could avoid a dilution of their citizen manpower into the kinds of forces for which it was unsuited, such as the cavalry and missile troops, archers and slingers." (6:41) By combining the maniples into cohorts, Marius was merely confirming what seems to have been a growing practice. "For some time in the third century the maniple had been proving too small a unit for tactical convenience, and it had grown more and more common to group the maniples in cohorts." (2:146-7)

Marius also continued with the change in training instituted by Rutilius prior to the end of term of his office as consul in 105 B.C. He was obviously pleased with the results.

We know from Valerius Maximus that Rutilius in 105 BC [sic] introduced the methods of the gladiatorial schools into military training, and from the author of the fourth book of the 'Strategemata' that Marius was so impressed by the troops trained by Rutilius that he preferred them to his own. (14:56)

This would justify Marius' choice of Rutilius' army over his own African veterans. Previous to this, the training of the Roman soldier was woefully inadequate, depending mainly on the veterans instructing the new recruits. Marius continued to train his soldiers in the gladiatorial method of combat. This

. . . created in the legions a more sophisticated system of avoiding and delivering blows. He united courage with craft and craft with courage: craft was made bolder by the vehemence of courage, courage more circumspect by the awareness of craft. (18:56)

MARIUS GOES TO GAUL

As soon as he was organized, Marius took his army to Gaul. "From the moment of his departure from Rome . . . the general made it his foremost care to raise his troops to the standards attained by the veterans from Africa." (2:145) While enroute, he carefully disciplined and trained his army. He drove them into good physical condition through long marches and running. He made every man carry his own baggage and prepare his own food.

(10:337) By doing this, he complemented his changes to the army in professionalism and training with necessary physical fitness and discipline.

In addition to giving his soldiers confidence in themselves, he also initiated them into his way of command. At first, they thought him hard, but he soon developed a reputation for competence and fairness.

But to proceed . . . for by the enemy in manner changing their course . . . he had time to exercise his soldiers, and confirm their courage, and, which was most important, to show them what he himself was. For that fierce manner of his in command, and inexorableness in punishing, when his men became used not to do amiss or disobey, was felt to be wholesome and advantageous, as well as just, and his violent spirit, stern voice, and harsh aspect, which in a little while grew familiar to them, they esteemed terrible not to themselves, but only to their enemies. (10:337)

He was soon respected as a good commander upon whom a soldier could count. His fairness of command is best demonstrated in an incident related by Plutarch.

But his uprightness in judging more especially pleased the soldiers, one remarkable instance of which is as follows. One Caius Lusius, his own nephew, had a command under him in the army, a man not in other respects of bad character, but shamefully licentious with young men. He had one young man under his command called Trebonius, with whom notwithstanding many solicitations he could never prevail. At length one night he sent a messenger for him and Trebonius came, as it was not lawful for him to refuse when he was sent for, and being brought into his tent, when Lusius began to use violence with him, he drew his sword and ran him through. This was done whilst Marius was absent. When he returned, he appointed Trebonius a time for his trial, where, whilst many accused him, and not any one appeared in his defence, he himself boldly related the whole matter, and brought witness of his previous conduct to Lusius, who had frequently offered him considerable presents. Marius, admiring his conduct and much pleased, commanded the garland, the usual Roman reward for valor, to be brought, and himself crowned Trebonius with it, as having performed an excellent action, at a time that very much wanted such good examples. (10:337-8)

This incident not only won his army's respect and admiration, but also was used to help him win his third consulate in a row, ". . . the people being unwilling to trust their fortunes with any other general but him." (10:338)

During the time the Barbarians were off in Spain and Gaul, 104 to 102 B.C., Marius continually trained his army. During the summer of 104 B.C., they received experience in putting down rebellions that had flared up as a result of Rome's many defeats. (2:145-6) He was elected to two more consulships during the interim, the previously mentioned third and now his

fourth. This was unprecedented in Roman history and was driven by two factors. First, his consulate was forced upon the Senate by the popular masses. The people had found themselves a hero and were not about to give him up. Secondly, the Senate itself, although disliking Marius greatly, considered him the only competent general around. They had previously appointed five nobles, and all five had been defeated by the Barbarians rather easily. Marius had demonstrated his competence in Africa and the Senate was simply afraid to choose anyone else, not only for the sake of Rome, but also for their own safety against the masses.

While waiting for the approach of the Barbarians, Marius built a fortified camp at the junction of the Rhone and Isere rivers. (4:91) [See Fig. 5] However, he ". . . took care first for plentiful supplies of victuals: lest at any time he should be forced to fight at a disadvantage for want of necessaries." (10:338) To ensure this, he designed and built a canal to make access to the Rhone from the sea much easier, thus expediting his supply lines. (2:147)

While Marius was in Rome being reelected to his fourth consulship, word came that the Cimbri were returning. He hurriedly returned to his camp only to find that once again, the invasion was delayed. For reasons unknown to Rome, the enemy decided to split their forces and invade by three routes. This decision made the threat much less fierce and gave hope to Rome. (2:147-8)

DEFEAT OF THE TEUTONES AND THE AMBRONES

"But the Teutones and Ambrones with all expedition passing over the interjacent country, soon came into sight, in numbers beyond belief, of a terrible aspect, and uttering strange cries and shouts." (10:338) They immediately challenged Marius to battle. But Marius did not fight since he knew that his army was not ready. The Roman soldiers were afraid of the Barbarians for two reasons. First, the Barbarians were unknown. Their wild appearance and strange behavior struck fear in the Romans. Second, these were the same tribes who had defeated five Roman armies in the past eleven years. The Barbarians appeared to be invincible.

The Teutones and the Ambrones took up camp outside Marius' fort. [See Fig. 5] They continued to challenge Marius, but he ignored them. He had to restrain his soldiers because they now wanted to fight. Instead, Marius made them watch the Barbarians while they practiced with their weapons. The Roman soldiers quickly became familiar with the Barbarians' dress, behavior, weapon skills, and mannerisms. The Barbarians were no longer the terrible horde but just another group of soldiers. The fear that the Romans had felt decreased and they became indignant and courageous when they heard the threats and insults from their enemies. (10:338-9) "When the barbarians saw that the Romans would not fight, they began to taunt and insult them. They walked up and down in front of the Roman camp day after day, calling the soldiers cowards." (5:151) The soldiers again began to complain. Although this complaining pleased Marius because it showed their growing confidence, he again had to restrain them. This time Marius used a different tactic. He first confided in them his battle plans, to choose

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE




FIGURE 5 - TEUTONE DEFEAT 102 B.C.

the time and place for victory as directed by the oracles. Then he used a Syrian prophetess to support this plan with her prophesies, although it is doubtful he really believed her himself. (10:339)

The Teutones attempted to entice the Romans out in any way they could, even to the extent of offering Marius personal combat to prove his courage.

One day a gigantic Teuton chief, with a long shield and spear, came up to the very entrance of the Roman camp and called loudly for Marius himself to come out and fight. The great general laughed heartily at the impudence of the barbarians, and he sent out a gladiator to fight with him in order to give sport to the Romans It did not take the gladiator long to defeat the Teuton. In a few minutes he laid the savage giant low, and the Romans shouted with joy at the sight. (5:151-2)

Marius allowed this stalemate to drag on for the better part of a year. Meanwhile, his troops were learning about the enemy and continuously gaining confidence in their own abilities to win. (1:307) The Barbarians finally lost patience. They attacked the fort but were driven off. They then decided to pass the camp and proceed forward into Roman territory, hoping to reach the other side of the Alps without further opposition. (10:339) The Barbarians intentionally passed close by the Roman camp,

. . . where the greatness of their number was especially made evident by the long time they took in their march, for they were said to be six days continually going on in passing Marius's [sic] fortifications; they marched pretty near, and revilingly asked the Romans if they would send any commands by them to their wives, for they would shortly be with them. (10:339-40)

Marius broke camp after the Barbarians had passed and followed them, camping each night a short distance away in a heavily fortified camp. At Aquae Sextiae, or Sextilius' Water [Aix-en-Provence, France], Marius decided to do battle. [See Fig. 5] He chose a position well designed for defense but intentionally away from a water source. The site was on top of a steep hill with a river at the bottom. He wanted to put an edge on his soldiers by keeping them away from the water and making them build a fortified camp first. In the meantime, some of the camp followers, with a small escort, went down for water. They ran into a small group of the Ambrones and engaged them. The Ambrones responded by gathering with a force of thirty thousand. Although the Ambrones were heavy with food and drink, they advanced in battle order, clashing their arms and shouting their own name in unison. The Romans quickly gathered into battle formation. The first to meet the Ambrones were the Ligurians, who responded by shouting their own name. (10:340) "This acclamation, banded from one army to the other before they joined, served to rouse and heighten their fury, while the men on either side strove with all possible vehemence, the one to overshadow the other." (10:340) The Ambrones attack was disordered by the river and the uphill charge. Before they could reform, the Ligurians attacked and the two forces engaged in hand to hand combat. (10:340)

The Romans, too, coming to their assistance, and from the higher ground pouring upon the enemy, forcibly repelled them, and the most of them (one thrusting another into the river) were there slain, and filled it with their blood and dead bodies. Those that got safe over, not daring to make head, were slain by the Romans, as they fled to their camp and waggons [sic]; where the women meeting them with swords and hatchets, and making a hideous outcry, set upon those that fled as well as those that pursued, the one as traitors, the other as enemies, and mixing themselves with the combatants, with their bare arms pulling away the Romans' shields, and laying hold on their swords, endured the wounds and slashing of their bodies to the very last with undaunted resolution. Thus the battle seems to have happened at that river rather by accident than by the design of the general. (10:340)

As night fell, the Romans retreated up the hill to their original position. However, there were no victory celebrations because there was still a formidable force of Teutones approaching up the valley and the Romans still had not fortified their camp. Added to this, there was a great wailing arising from the entire plain below - nothing like any Roman had ever heard before. The Romans spent an uneasy night. However, the Teutones were as hesitant of a night engagement, with all its confusion, as were Marius and his officers. (10:341)

The Barbarians spent the next day gathering their forces and deploying them.

Of this occasion Marius made good use; for there were beyond the enemies some wooded ascents and deep valleys thickly set with trees, whither he sent Claudius Marcellus, secretly, with three thousand regular soldiers, giving him orders to post them in ambush there, and show themselves at the rear of the enemies when the fight had begun. (10:341)

After this day of rest, Marius was ready for battle with rested and well fed troops. He lined his troops up in battle order in front of the camp, still on the strategically higher hill. He then sent several cavalry units down into the valley to taunt the Barbarians into the fight. The Teutones, having very little military discipline, responded by charging up the hill in a fury. (10:341)

Marius, sending officers to all parts, commanded his men to stand still and keep their ground; when they came within reach, to throw their javelins, then use their swords, and joining their shields, force them back; pointing out to them that the steepness of the ground would render the enemy's blows inefficient, nor could their shields be kept close together, the inequality of the ground hindering the stability of their footing. (10:341)

Marius quickly took his position at the head of his own troops and wisely followed his own advice. This encouraged the rest, and seeing his judgment and bravery, they followed. (10:341)

The Romans met the charge and stood their ground. True to Marius' word, they slowly pushed the Barbarians back down the hill and out onto the plain. The Teutones, now glad to be on level ground, formed for the final attack. But the surprise planned by Marius turned the tide of battle. (10:341)

For Marcellus had not let slip the opportunity; but as soon as the shout was raised among the Romans on the hills, he, setting his men in motion, fell in upon the enemy behind, at full speed, and with loud cries, and routed those nearest him, and they, breaking the ranks of those that were before them, filled the whole army with confusion. They made no long resistance after they were thus broke in upon, but having lost all order, fled. (10:341)

The Romans pursued them hotly, and killed or took prisoner about one hundred thousand, including women and children. (10:341)

While the army celebrated its victory, messengers brought word of his unprecedented fifth consulship. Within a few days, Marius was informed of the defeat of Consul Catulus at the hands of the Cimbri in their attempt to enter through the Alps. Marius immediately preceded his army to Rome. (10:341-2)

DEFEAT OF CATULUS

Consul Catulus had been sent to stop the Cimbri invasion through the Alps. [See Fig. 6]

When the Cimbri were found to be moving southwards from the Brenner, Catulus, instead of waiting to destroy them as they debouched on to open ground, advanced up the Adige far into the hills. There he chose a position, probably in the neighborhood of Trento, and essayed to block the way. But the choice was foolish: in the narrow valley there was no room for manoeuvre, nor even for the legions to deploy. In place of a battle wherein discipline and training might have told, the Romans were threatened with a hand-to-hand struggle round a bridge--a struggle of the sort in which skill goes for nothing and attrition leaves victory with the larger numbers. From this miniature Thermopylae Catulus was ejected by the good-sense or cowardice of his troops. For whatever reason, the men refused duty in such circumstances: with difficulty the army was disengaged; and from Trento it retired south of the Po, leaving the invaders in undisputed possession of all Transpadane Gaul which they might care to occupy. (2:149-50)

As it turns out, it was the "good-sense" of his army that saved the day. Catulus had positioned his army on both sides of a river the Cimbri would have to cross. He built a fortified camp on each side and a bridge between the two so that he might assist the far side. When the Cimbri arrived, they easily outflanked Consul Catulus and his army. They built a great dam above the two forts and stopped the water flow. Then they rolled large

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE




FIGURE 6 - CATALUS/CIMBRI DEFEAT 101 B.C.

rocks down the riverbed until the bridge was finally torn apart. Seeing that they were cut off from each other and in danger of being flooded, the Roman soldiers ran. Consul Catulus, realizing his mistake and wishing for the honor of his army to remain intact over his own honor, took his colors to the front of the rout and led it as a strategic retreat. (10:342)

Consul Catulus reformed his army south of the River Po, with the idea of holding the Cimbri to the north. "Fortunately the invaders, intent on enjoying the harvests and vintages of the rich sub-Alpine plains, made no serious attempt to cross that river or to capture the neighbouring cities." (1:308)

DEFEAT OF THE CIMBRI

"Once more, therefore, Marius was given time to retrieve the Roman losses. In 101 [B.C.] he joined hands with Catulus. . . ." (1:308) The Cimbri were caught by surprise by the sudden appearance of the second Roman army. For they had been waiting for their allies, the Teutones, to join them.

They professed they were in expectation of the Teutones, and, saying they [the Cimbri] wondered [why] they [the Teutones] were so long in coming, deferred the battle; either that they [the Cimbri] were really ignorant of their defeat or were willing to seem so. For they certainly much maltreated those that brought them such news, and, sending to Marius, required some part of the country for themselves and their brethren, and cities fit for them to inhabit. When Marius inquired of the ambassadors who their brethren were, upon their saying the Teutones, all that were present began to laugh; and Marius scoffingly answered them, "Do not trouble yourself for your brethren, for we have already provided lands for them, which they shall possess forever." The ambassadors, understanding the mockery, broke into insults, and threatened that the Cimbri would make him pay for this, and the Teutones, too, when they came. "They are not far off," replied Marius, "and it will be unkindly done of you to go away before greeting your brethren." Saying so, he commanded the kings of the Teutones to be brought out, as they were, in chains; for they were taken by the Sequani among the Alps, before they could make their escape. (10:342-3)

The King of the Cimbri challenged Marius to battle and Marius accepted, appointing the day of battle as the third day after and the place at the plain near Vercellae [near Milan, Italy]. (10:343) [See Fig. 6]

Marius did not foolishly accept this invitation. As before, he had studied his opponents. He knew they had spent the previous year in the luxury of the rich Po valley and were not in fighting condition. On the other hand, his own troops were in very good condition. (9:220-1) They had just defeated the Teutones and the Ambrones. They were in high spirits because of their victory and in good physical condition due to the forced march from Liguria to the Po Valley.

Marius lined up his army to give greatest advantage to his own troops. He knew, in battles of such extensive fronts, the center of the line does not get the majority of the fighting and usually ends up falling back. He put Consul Catulus and his 20,000 troops directly in the middle and split his 32,000 and put them on each of Catulus' flanks. He did this for two reasons. First, his men on each flank would bear the brunt of the fighting and reap the glory of the victory. Second, he did not trust Catulus and his troops. They had run when they first met the Cimbri and he did not know how they would react now. (10:343)

The Cimbri gathered opposite the Romans. "The foot soldiers of the Cimbri were formed into an immense square, and the men in the front ranks were chained to one another by iron chains so that they could not run away." (5:154). The Cimbri started the battle with a cavalry feint, followed by an advance of their foot soldiers.

The Roman position had been chosen well. They had the advantage of the sun at their backs and the Cimbri had the sun in their faces. The Cimbri, used to cool and shady climates, and out of condition, suffered profusely in the heat and sun. The Roman soldiers, used to the August heat, performed well. (10:343-4)

At the start of the battle, a great cloud of dust rose over the field, giving advantage to the Romans. It covered the Cimbri and hid their great numbers. Thus the Romans did not panic, as each soldier saw only those Cimbri in his immediate area. Finally the Cimbri line broke and retreat began. To the horror of the Romans, the women again slew their own men as they retreated. There was wholesale slaughter and suicide among the Cimbri as many warriors took their own lives and many women took their own and their children's lives. (10:344)

In spite of the slaughter, about sixty thousand were taken prisoner and one hundred forty thousand including men, women and children were killed. (4:91) "The victory was conclusive: the Tigurini, who now alone remained, did not wait to share their allies' fate, but left their station in the eastern Alps and returned peaceably to their homes in Switzerland." (2:150)

Conflicting historical records indicate that Marius and his soldiers got lost in the dust and bypassed the main fight. Catulus' army, in this version, received the brunt of the Cimbri attack and should have received credit for the victory. This version is supported by two facts. First, Catulus ended up with most of the worthwhile spoils of the battle. Second, witnesses from Parma indicate that most of the Cimbri were slain with javelins belonging to Catulus' men. (10:344)

Although both men claimed the victory, Marius was given the credit. They triumphed together, but the victory belonged to only one. (2:150)

It was Marius who had saved the State and was hailed, after Romulus and Camillus, as the third founder of Rome. But his glory was not earned in the final battle. Whatever he may have contributed to the last campaign, his supreme service had been rendered the year

before, when, with Rome fighting on two fronts at once, he had destroyed the enemy in Gaul single-handed and so enabled both Roman armies to be concentrated against the invaders across the Alps. Aquae Sextiae, like Salamis, was the crisis of the war: Vercellae was a sequel, like Plataea. (2:150)

ANALYSIS

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

The national security objectives of the Roman Republic were twofold. First, the Romans feared for the survival of their nation. The Senate overreacted to the initial news of the Barbarian incursion. This can be understood in light of the terrible injury inflicted upon Rome by the invasions of Hannibal in 217 B.C. This incident was compounded further by the ambition and incompetence of Carbo in the initial meeting between the Barbarians and the Roman Republic. This initial threat was not as great as the Romans thought. However, after the year 104 B.C., the threat became very real. "Having vanquished all they [the Barbarians] had met, and found abundance of plunder, they resolved to settle themselves nowhere till they should have razed the city and wasted all Italy." (10:337) The late part of the conflict posed the most serious threat to Rome since its military reputation no longer protected it.

The second national security objective was preservation of the Roman military and diplomatic reputation. Without this reputation, Rome could expect rebellions in occupied lands and further invasions. Rome could not accept any appearance of weakness. The Barbarians offered the Romans terms of peace. "Such terms, presented to Roman emperors of another age, often met with glad acceptance; but the Senate, to whom the application of the Northmen was referred, disdained their assistance." (1:306) Although the Barbarians offered this peaceful settlement in exchange for land, cities, and mercenary employment, the Romans viewed this as a sign of weakness.

This type of approach to the national security objectives carried both strengths and weaknesses. If the Senate had fielded an army of sufficient strength, ably commanded, then the objectives would have been easily fulfilled. However, by overreacting to the threat and underreacting with its response, the Senate created a serious situation.

By employing these objectives, the Romans were placing themselves in an "all or nothing" situation. They left no latitude for negotiation. This creates a serious situation since you are not only discarding your own alternatives, but also limiting the alternatives open to your adversary. Given their fears and their refusal to face those fears, they really had no choice. This position was further weakened by the situation in the Republic at the time. With war in Africa and Roman resources spread thin throughout the rest of the Republic, it was doubtful whether resources were available to support another military campaign.

Yet, the Senate did have the greatest strength a nation requires to wage war: the support of its people against the Barbarians. The populace also feared all invasion. "The Romans, being from all parts alarmed with this news [of the Barbarian invasion]. . . ." (10:337) Added to this popular strength was the strength of the military reputation of the Republic. Even after the first Roman defeat under Consul Carbo, the Barbarians refused to enter Roman territory, as if ". . . they were half frightened at

their victory over a giant. . . ." (1:306) This "strength by reputation" lasted even after the Barbarians defeated Caepio and Maximus at Arausio.

The national security objective of the Barbarians was quite simple. They were searching for a new home. They would have preferred it be outside Roman territory, but their military failures kept pushing them back to Roman lands. (2:139)

This objective was realistic in light of the military capability of the Barbarians. They were a formidable military force, numbering ". . . three hundred thousand effective fighting men. . . ." (10:336) This did not include reinforcement from other tribes which they received later. But the Barbarians were hampered by three serious problems. First, there was no central unified leadership. This horde was a combination of many tribes, none being superior. Each tribe did what it thought best for itself. Second, the tremendous reputation of the Republic scared them. They simply did not have the courage or wisdom of a Hannibal. Finally, they did not have a specific goal in mind. This was their most serious weakness. The Barbarians were looking for a homeland, but they simply headed south, ". . . having no clear idea of their destination, but trekking in search of broader lands and of adventure by the way." (2:140-1) If the Barbarians had had a specific goal, they could have pressed their initial advantage and history may have been significantly different.

GRAND STRATEGY

THE EARLY YEARS (113 - 104 B.C.)

The political and economic instruments of grand strategy were not available to the Romans during this time. As discussed earlier, this condition was self-imposed. They refused the political option of negotiation because of their national security objectives. There was no type of economic pressure they could apply, and they forfeited the option of "buying off" their adversaries because of their national security objectives. Thus the only option left under grand strategy was the military option. The Romans, because of their fears of invasion and losing their reputation were willing to risk everything on the military option. That is, direct confrontation and its possible enormous costs.

The limitation to this strategy was Rome's ability to support it. At least one Roman army was tied up in the African campaigns. Other armies were occupied in maintaining Roman authority in the territories. The enormous costs of direct confrontation could have ruined the Republic. The loss of five armies was a tremendous cost to pay. Historical records are not specific, but given the average size of Roman armies, this could have approached 200,000 men. Given the composition of Roman armies at that time, these men would have been landowners or the sons of landowners. This direct approach was further weakened by the incompetence of the Senate in managing the war. First, they could not believe the reported strengths of the Barbarians, and therefore, sent armies of inadequate strength to repel them. Second, they continually appointed "favorite sons" instead of qualified soldiers to lead their armies. Leadership was based on birthright,

not ability. The early failures of this strategy left the Republic defenseless after each army was defeated. At these times, the Barbarians could have walked into Rome without opposition. Only Rome's military reputation and the Barbarians' lack of clear objectives saved the Republic.

However, this strategy also had certain strengths. The Senate was totally convinced of their purpose and committed to it. They were in absolute command of the early situation. They recognized the goals of the Republic and acted on them, appointing commanders and raising armies. They used the reputation of the Republic to its fullest advantage. Even after they had lost five consecutive armies, the Senate refused to negotiate. This probably proved to the Barbarians the Romans did not fear them. "The way to Italy now stood clear to the Northmen; but the prestige of Rome still overawed them." (1:307)

The Barbarians' alternatives were also limited. Their political and economic options were closed by the objectives of the Republic. That only left the military option. In the early years, this option was limited by the Barbarians themselves. First, they feared the reputation of Rome so much that they failed to follow up on their military successes. Second, they did not have confidence in their own abilities because of their failures at every military venture outside the Republic.

THE LATER YEARS (104 - 101 B.C.)

The grand strategy of this period remained the same. The political and economic options remained closed. The ability of the Republic to support the military option was weakening, both fiscally and militarily. The military option suffered most under Senatorial tutelage. Rutilius, the sole remaining Consul in 105 B.C., had to prevent the departure of military age men from Italy. To do this, ". . . orders were sent to the ports that none under thirty-five should be permitted to embark." (2:145) But that was not Rome's only problem.

Serious as had been the strain imposed by the Jugurthine War on the sources of recruitment, its most ominous result was the revelation of Rome's poverty in competent commanders. So rare had able generalship become, that Rome, it seemed, could not fight with success on two fronts at once. . . . (2:145)

This led to a general breakdown in the ability of the Senate to control the situation. They were losing the support of a terrified populous. "In reaction the people turned to Marius, whom they elected in absentia against all constitutional practice to the consulship for 104 [B.C.] . . ." (7:198) The Barbarians were quickly losing their fear of the Republic. The reputation of the Republic was receding with every subsequent military defeat.

However, the Barbarians were in no better position. The Romans still refused to negotiate. They had been militarily rebuffed from every other territory they had entered, and ". . . their continued failure made it ever more certain that in the end they would be driven to stake their future on

a bolder throw." (2:139) That "bolder throw" was the military invasion of the Roman Republic. Although the Barbarians still feared Rome, it appears they had no place else to go. They had tried every other territory available and met with military defeat. Rome was the only area left where they felt they could win.

MILITARY STRATEGY

THE EARLY YEARS

The early years of the conflict demonstrated many weaknesses in the Roman system. This was true of the development, deployment and employment of forces. The designation of Consuls for a period of only one year, with constitutionally prohibited reelection was a major weakness. Often these Consuls were political appointees whose selection was based on their family power and not necessarily their military expertise. The armies they commanded were not professional. They were a group of volunteer citizens who had no formal military training. They were trained on the way to battle by the more seasoned soldiers. If the leadership and training were not taken seriously, then discipline was absent. The case of Consul Manlius Maximus is a prime example. "But Manlius . . . was entirely lacking in Marius' self-assurance. He failed to maintain discipline among his men, who converted their camp into a bazaar. . . ." (1:306) This lack of training and weak discipline directly contributed to the loss of at least two Roman armies.

The successive deployment of armies of inadequate strength to carry out the national objectives eroded the reputation and the authority of the Republic. With each succeeding defeat, the confidence of the Republic also declined. When the Republic did deploy an army of adequate strength, such as the armies of Maximus and Caepio, the inherent weakness of no specific line of command or authority caused their destruction. Maximus is the prime example because ". . . although as consul he was the superior of the proconsul Caepio, he could not prevail upon his subordinate to obey orders." (1:306) This line of authority was so weak that ". . . even the good offices of a deputation from the Senate failed to persuade Caepio and Mallius to sink their differences." (2:144) In this case, defeat was inevitable against a unified force.

The military strategy of the Barbarians was consistent. They were in reality a paramilitary organization based on family lines and tribal associations. This did not change their strategy at any time during the course of this period of the conflict.

THE LATER YEARS

The first major change in the development of forces to improve the situation was actually taken by the people of Rome. That change was the abandonment of the constitutional limitation on reelected consulates and forcing the Senate to accept Marius as Consul. "But the people rejected all opposers, for they considered this was not the first time that the law gave place to the common interest. . . ." (10:337) So the origins of the Roman

salvation lay with its people.

Once Marius came into power, he instituted reforms to overcome the earlier weaknesses of the Roman armies. Through his changes in recruiting, they became popular armies composed of all citizens' classes of Rome. This change made the army more professional, opened up a totally new pool of manpower, and relieved landed citizens of their burden to support the military goals of the Republic and allowed them to give their fullest economic support. (15:37-8) "But he was careful to enlist experienced soldiers as well, by offering special inducements to veterans." (15:37) It also gave the non-landed citizens a voice in the destiny of the Republic, and a chance to become landed through the spoils of war and pensions for service. It removed significant power from the aristocratic party since now a talented general of either aristocratic or common background could raise an army on the strength of his personality and record. "As Rome began to draw from the new reservoirs of man-power, the strong ties of loyalty and responsibility [to the Republic] would inevitably weaken." (15:41) This was to create severe problems in the future but it was a source of strength for the present.

Marius added experience to generalship in the Roman army. While earlier leaders were inexperienced and overconfident, Marius took the time to know his army and his enemy.

Marius was a very able commander; lacking the brilliance and imagination of Scipio or Caesar, he nevertheless understood the basic requirements of a good army: training, discipline and leadership. His men became devoted to him because he shared their way of life and identified himself as 'one of them' as distinct from one of those others--the gilded youth of the senatorial aristocracy. (15:38)

His training was gladiatorial, his discipline was stringent, and his leadership was fierce but fair. (10:337) He changed the army by making it a more professional, better trained and disciplined organization which was not only confident of itself but of its leader. This gave them the winning edge.

During the later period, the military strategy of the Barbarians changed with their final decision to invade the Republic. Until that point, they had attempted to negotiate with Rome, always fearing the Roman reputation. When forced into a military confrontation, they had always acted as one army. When no other options remained open to them, they finally acted. "With belated audacity they planned a converging advance upon Italy on three fronts." (1:307) There is no historically evident reason why they ". . . embarked on a manoeuvre of amazing rashness and stupendous scale." (2:148) Furthermore, they were not successful in their execution of this strategy. "The Cimbri were a considerable time in doing their part. But the Teutones and Ambrones with all expedition passing over the interjacent country, soon came in sight. . . ." (10:338) Thus they not only forfeited their massive numerical superiority, but also lost the element of simultaneous surprise attack. This change in strategy is the main

element in the downfall of their invasion.

Vast as their numbers might be, by adopting such strategy as this the barbarians played straight into the hands of Rome. Marius and his lieutenants were allowed to operate on interior lines against three independent forces which, though united they might have been of overwhelming strength, individually were by no means invincible. (2:148)

BATTLEFIELD TACTICS AND STRATEGY

THE EARLY YEARS

Early defeats were directly attributable to the inexperience and overconfidence of the Roman leaders. Consul Carbo was the first. Even though the Barbarians, at Carbo's orders, ". . . gave an undertaking to fall back from the Italian frontier . . . [Carbo attacked when he] anticipated an easy triumph over a multitude encumbered with a large baggage-train." (1:305) He foolishly chased a numerically superior enemy, forcing them to fight on their terms, even after ". . . he [had] hurriedly prepared for their destruction. . . ." (2:142) The Barbarians were already retreating and may have never returned, but Consul Carbo, in his hunger for glory, threw his army away.

Consul Silanus followed Carbo. Although historical records do not clearly indicate why Silanus was defeated, the Barbarian victory was total. It appears the Barbarians were angered by Rome's refusal to accede to their offer. "By way of proving their military worth, the Cimbri and Teutones attacked Silanus and broke his army at the first onset." (1:306) Silanus was either totally unprepared for the attack or was inept. Whatever the reason, a second Roman army was lost.

Consul Longinus was able to drive the Tigurini out of Tolosa, but he then proceeded to pursue them down the Garonne valley, again allowing the enemy to choose the place of battle. (2:143) Consul Longinus ". . . allowed himself to be lured by the Tigurini into Gascony and to be killed in an ambush. . . ." (1:306) A third Roman army not only went down in defeat, but its survivors were humiliated by being forced to pass under the yoke.

In the case of Consul Maximus and Proconsul Caepio, they "quibbled" their armies to their death because of jealousy. This was the one time the Senate had provided an army of sufficient strength to stop the invasion. "His [Maximus] arrival in Gaul meant that the control of the Roman forces was divided; and the jealousy of the two commanders made effective cooperation impossible." (2:144) Even when the advance guard was destroyed, Caepio refused to combine his forces with those of Maximus. "On 6 October 105 B.C. . . . the barbarians fell first upon Caepio, and the two Roman armies were cut to pieces in succession. Retreat was impossible--for they had chosen to fight with their backs to the river. . . ." (2:144) A total of eighty thousand soldiers, and forty thousand Roman non-combatants were killed. (4:90-1) Both generals miraculously managed to survive, but the damage was done. Rome had lost its fourth and fifth army to the Bar-

barians.

THE LATER YEARS

The later years reflect a change in Roman abilities and fortunes. Marius was experienced and well liked by his troops. His battlefield tactics were sound and well thought out. "While at the mouth of the Rhone, waiting for the enemy [the Teutones and Ambrones], he used his troops to construct a large canal to bring transports and supplies more quickly to his base." (15:38) Thus he ensured his men would never have to fight with the disadvantage of hunger. (10:338) He drew up impregnable fortifications to frustrate the Barbarians. He knew his army was not ready to fight the Barbarians, for they feared them. Thus, he allowed his troops to familiarize themselves with the enemy, both in their appearance and the way they fought. At the same time, his soldiers were getting angry at the Barbarians because of their continual insults. This helped to build the morale and effectiveness of Marius' army. He tricked the Teutones and the Ambrones into thinking the Romans were cowards, thus underestimating their enemy. (10:338-9)

Marius realized that tactics and confidence would make the difference. Everything had to be in his favor for him to do battle, since he was outnumbered. "The army under Marius was not of enormous size. . . . But, as always when Marius was in command, lack of numbers was made good by high efficiency." (2:145) When the Barbarians decided to pass the strong fortification, Marius followed.

Marius did not develop any new battle tactics, but relied mainly on surprise and always showed a reluctance to engage in set-piece fighting of the traditional kind. He preferred to determine the time and place and would not be hurried. (15:38)

Thus, Marius was patient at the Rhone and refused battle. But when he reached Aquae Sextiae, he did not hesitate. By positioning himself at the upper end of a narrow valley, he left no choice to the Barbarians but fight or retire.

At this point the Barbarians made their first mistake. The Ambrones, after so many months of frustration at the Rhone, did not wait for the main body of troops to arrive. Instead, they attacked with a roughly equivalent force instead of the vast superiority available. They gave the Romans a further advantage by attacking across a river, up difficult terrain after they were gorged with food and drink. (2:148) Historians are divided as to whether this initial engagement was planned by Marius or not. Most believe, based on Plutarch's accounts, that this first battle was accidental and occurred before Marius was ready. At least one historian believes that, "This splitting of the enemy forces and causing them to fight at an inconvenient time could hardly have been an accident, but has the basis of some shrewd planning." (15:38-9) Whatever the reason, Marius had picked the best terrain and used good battlefield tactics by keeping the high ground.

The battle with the Teutones two days later was definitely not accidental. Marius astutely sent a detachment under Marcellus to the enemies' rear, then he prepared for battle. He first formed his legions and instructed them how they should meet the enemy. He then took his place at the head of his army and followed his own advice. This simple act gave his army great confidence. (10:341) Marius committed himself and his army. By sending his cavalry down to taunt the enemy, ". . . it is clear that Marius invited the Teutones in Hannibalic fashion to attack him. . . ." (1:307) "Here Marius astutely gauged the temper of his enemy; knowing that they were eager for the fray, he drew up his legions on a hill slope on uneven ground and waited for the enemy to tire themselves by charging uphill." (15:39) Once again, Marius used terrain to his advantage. To that he added surprise, ". . . the simple tactic of hiding a small force in woods at the enemy's rear and when the battle was joined, with great noise they attacked, throwing the German army into confusion and panic. . . ." (15:39) When this happened, Marius pressed his advantage.

The fight was long and stubborn; but superior equipment, sounder discipline, the advantage of position and the confusion caused . . . by the unexpected attack . . . from behind finally gave Marius a victory decisive beyond hope. (2:149)

At the battle of Vercellae, Marius chose the most advantageous time, place, circumstance, and position for his troops. He began by unnerving the Cimbri by displaying the captured Teutones' kings. They now knew for sure the Teutones would not be joining them. But they also realized that the great Teutone tribe had been totally destroyed by a force of less size than they now faced. This was surely a blow to their confidence. Marius also knew the enemy had been in the Po Valley for a year.

During this year the Cimbri had been living in a rich and fertile country which had not been invaded for long years, and they had been living on good food and sweet wines. The climate was softer and milder than that to which they had been accustomed, and so these barbarians were in no very good fighting condition. Marius knew this, and knowing, too, that his own men were in perfect condition, he gave battle to the Cimbri, feeling certain of victory. (9:220-1)

To take further advantage of the situation, he delayed the battle until the weather favored him. "As in the previous season, he held his hand a long while before he struck, so that the midsummer heat of Lombardy might sap the vigour of the Northmen." (1:308) In addition to the heat, the sun was also in the face of the Barbarians, adding further to their discomfort and problems. (10:343) Plutarch also gave credit to Marius for altering the construction of the javelin. Marius replaced one of the two metal pegs joining the wood to the iron with a wooden peg. This meant the javelin would break on impact and could not be used as a weapon against the Romans. (10:343) For the battlefield tactics, Marius ". . . tried to emulate Hannibal at Cannae and allow the enemy to become engulfed between strong enclosing wings." (15:39) To accomplish this, he placed the recently defeated troops of Catulus in the least vulnerable position and his own

troops in the most vulnerable position. (10:343) It appears Marius used every means available to bring his army victory.

Once the battle was joined, it became a hard fought hand-to-hand struggle. The Cimbri attacked again and again, each time being repulsed by the Romans. Finally, the Barbarian line broke. (5:154)

This encounter appears to have been a soldiers' action, in which the Roman troops outstayed the enemy, as in the battles of old against the Gauls, and ended the day in a slaughter and slave-haul rivalling that of Aquae Sextiae. (1:308)

What brought on this catastrophic defeat of the Cimbri? As with the battle of Aquae Sextiae, the Roman victory was the result of planning, discipline, and superior equipment. The Barbarians were, on the other hand, faced with a lack of discipline, poor physical condition, poor leadership, and a growing fear of the Romans, as demonstrated by chaining their warriors together.

CONCLUSIONS

"Whatever one may read into these accounts, Marius stands out as the architect of two great victories and saved Rome from a massive barbarian invasion." (15:39) The first victory at Aquae Sextiae was his alone. The second at Vercellae was his to share. But it appears the first victory was the most important, for it occurred when Rome was threatened from three directions. He accomplished, single-handedly, what Catulus could not do against the Cimbri. This totally eliminated a major threat and this allowed him to face the Cimbri with a combined force of arms. (2:150) Whatever the real truth, the people of Rome honored him as their saviour.

Yet Marius would be better remembered not as a tactician, but as an organizer. His massive changes to the Roman army allowed his victory.

Marius took the decisive step in converting the Roman army from a conscript militia into a standing force of professional warriors The new-style legionaries were highly-trained duellists, whose technique in cut-and-thrust was modelled on that of the gladiatorial schools, and they developed an esprit de corps which was foreign to the old-time militia. By these reforms Marius not only won his own victories, but prepared for those of his more famous successors. (1:308)

And what of the Barbarians? Were they really a great threat to the Republic?

The terror inspired by the Cimbri and Teutones caused ancient writers to exaggerate their numbers and their military prowess. In the course of their long wanderings they had continually improved their discipline and equipment, but they always remained slow in their movements, and if they failed to carry a battle at the first onset, they ceased to be formidable. (1:308)

This invasion force was indeed awesome in its numbers, but it could never equal the threat posed to Rome by previous or later invasions. It was made more terrible by Senatorial and military incompetence, but as soon as Roman generalship became worthy of its past, the Barbarians were finished. (2:150-1) Had they acted after the destruction of each succeeding Roman army, then history might have been different. But they didn't. And the terrible horde which had been thrown out of every country it had entered, finally met its fate at the hands of a competent Roman general.

Considering the ease with which Marius dispatched the Barbarians, the significance of the invasion cannot be considered as a serious threat to the Republic. Rather, Rome learned its weaknesses, and took steps to solve them.

The migration was one which only energetic opposition could stop, and it came at a time when Rome's energies were in large part absorbed elsewhere; but the loss of five Roman armies, which alone gave its alarming aspect to the affair, was needless flattery of

the foe. The episode of the Cimbri and Teutoni is entitled to remembrance, not for any peril to the Roman state, but for the heights of influence to which Marius, a mere soldier, was raised, for the lesson which Rome learnt about the value of control beyond the Alps if the Alps themselves were to be inviolate, and for Rome's first contact with Germans, a people who in later centuries were to bulk large in Roman history. (2:151)

Chapter Three

MARCUS ULPIUS TRAJAN

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to provide an analysis of the strategies of the Roman Emperor Marcus Ulpus Trajan using the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) Strategy Process Model as the analytical vehicle. Trajan was Emperor of the Roman Empire from the years 98 A.D. until 117 A.D.

The time covered in this study is from 101 A.D. until 107 A.D., an era of conflict for the Roman Empire. This conflict was the result of continual friction between Rome and Dacia. The Dacian Empire, the historical predecessor of modern day Rumania, had caused Rome many problems, both military and diplomatic, for many years. This era finally culminated in two wars between Rome and Dacia. The Dacian Wars can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase covers the years from 98 A.D. to 102 A.D. These years involved the crowning of Trajan through the end of the first Dacian War. The second phase covers the years from 103 A.D. to 107 A.D. These years saw the final conquest of the Dacian Empire and its total dissolution by Trajan.

There is a severe shortage of information on Trajan's conquest of Dacia (98-107 A.D.). The majority of written records have been destroyed. The only remaining records of the conquest are preserved in graphic form on the "Column of Trajan", a memorial column in Rome. According to M. Cary in his A History of Rome,

But while this invaluable record throws a flood of light upon the equipment and organisation [sic] of the Roman armies, it does not wholly clear up the strategy of Trajan, or establish his routes of march beyond dispute. (1:650)

Several other of the authors cited in this study, including S. A. Cook (Source 4), agree with Cary's judgement. Therefore, the history presented here is based on interpretation and guesswork on the part of many prominent historians.



BACKGROUND

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

The history of conflict between Dacia and Rome dated back over a century. Under a chieftain named Burebistas, the Dacians, a people of Thracian stock located in modern Rumania and Transylvania, were continually raiding Roman territories as early as approximately 45 B.C. (1:412) Intermittent conflicts between the two peoples failed to produce a decisive victor. The wars began again during the rule of the Emperor Domitian.

Domitian was faced with a problem north of the Danube. [See Fig. 7] The area north of the Danube, which flowed from the center of Germany through Austria, Hungary and Rumania, was peopled with tribes who were in continual conflict with Rome. These included two German tribes, the Marcomanni and Quadi (from the area of Vienna), who ". . . had been under a loose but effective form of diplomatic control. . . ." (6:100) To the east were the Sarmation Iazyges, of oriental descent, in the approximate area of modern Hungary. Further east were the Dacians, of Thracian stock, in the area of modern Rumania which is bounded by the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps. Finally, the Sarmatian Roxolani inhabited the area between the Dacians and the Black Sea. Rome could never have successfully fought all of these peoples at once.

The acquiescence of these powerful neighbors was essential for any strategic offensive against Daci [sic], just as the acquiescence of the Dacian was essential for any strategic offensive against the Marcomanni, Quadi, or Iazyges." (7:100)

"These were some of the vast tribes, fortunately for Rome often divided, that lived just outside the Empire. . . ." (11:596)

In 85 A.D., Rome was again facing war with Dacia. "During the reign of Domitian a new danger arose from the reunion of the Dacian tribes, after a period of disintegration, under the strong hand of a chieftain named Decebalus." (1:621) Decebalus was able to reverse this disintegration and draw the Dacian tribes together again.

But the Dacians were a united race, conscious of nationhood and thoroughly organized under a prince of genius. . . . Decebalus was fired by an unquenchable hate for Rome and dreamed . . . of a wider union of Rome's enemies than was bounded by his mountain circle. . . . (3:224)

He built a national Dacian army, patterned after the Roman army, and set about a war of conquest. In 86 A.D., he invaded Moesia and conquered the territory. Emperor Domitian responded by sending his praetorian prefect, Cornelius Fuscus, on an invasion of Dacia. This drew Decebalus out of Moesia and into Daci to defend his own territory. This worked well for Rome until Fuscus, through unfamiliarity with the terrain and poor tactics, lost his army. (1:621) Decebalus however did not press his advantage and the front remained quiet until 88 A.D.

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE



FIGURE 7 - EUROPE 98-101 A.D.

Domitian sent another army into Dacia in 88 A.D. The army, under the command of Tettius Iulianus, severely defeated Decebalus in a set battle. (1:621) However, the Romans were unable to press the advantage this time for two reasons. First, Domitian faced a revolt by the legate of upper Germany, Antonius Saturninus, in January, 89 A.D. (6:100) This diverted Domitian's attention. Second, ". . . the client system on the Danube sector was crumbling, and this drastically restricted the strategic options open to the Romans." (6:100) Decebalus had not wasted the intervening years since his first campaign. He had incited the Marcomanni, Quadi and Iazyges to attack Rome at about the same time Iulianus was entering Dacia. This created a second area of conflict for Domitian and took the pressure off Decebalus. Domitian responded by personally leading an army against these tribes. He was badly defeated. There is little doubt he could have been reinforced and pursued a retaliatory campaign against the Germans; however, this type of campaign would have cost greatly in both money and lives and he refused. Consequently, he settled for a prolonged defensive action. (1:621) "Thus, when the Marcomanni, Quadi, and Iazyges all threatened war, Domitian was forced to make peace with Decebalus. . . ." (6:100) The terms were not favorable to Rome. Iulianus was ordered to withdraw and Decebalus was given back control of his territory, plus an annual payment, and a technical aid program involving the use of Roman engineers and miners to develop the Dacian gold mines. In exchange, Decebalus "acknowledged" himself to be a vassal of Rome. "The gift of engines and technicians was particularly dangerous, for Rome thereby transferred to the barbarian world the one advantage she possessed, technical knowledge, with its obvious requirement of discipline." (11:596) This unfavorable settlement by Domitian,

. . . while in the circumstances it was perhaps the wisest temporary expedient, could hardly be a permanent solution, nor is there evidence that its author ever intended it for such. A policy of subsidy can only be so effectively used . . . where the recipients are numerically too weak or traditionally too disunited ever to constitute a serious menace to the neighbouring [sic] provinces. Elsewhere it can at best be a temporary measure, to tide over a period of general stress or to await better local conditions for a final settlement. (3:223-4)

Domitian acknowledged this temporary situation by building a line of fortifications along the Danube to protect against further attacks from Dacia. "He concentrated a force of nine or ten legions in a chain of camps along the river, extending from Vindobona (Vienna), Carnuntum, and Aquincum (Buda-pest) to Troesmis (near Braila)." (1:621) "The Dacians, united under their great leader, remained a serious potential threat to the security of the Danubian provinces." (15:76) Domitian's temporary fix of the situation became permanent for two reasons. First, the war with the other three tribes proved inconclusive. Second, Domitian was murdered.

TRAJAN'S ASCENDENCY TO THE THRONE

Domitian was considered a tyrant by the Senate and a threat to their order. From the rebellion by Saturninus in 89 A.D. to 96 A.D., Domitian

faced continual resistance and was caught in a vicious circle of plots and executions. Continually fed both true and false information from informants, ". . . his precautionary executions undoubtedly created an additional sense of personal insecurity among the senators, out of which arose fresh plots and aggravated repression. . . ." (1:624) Finally, his own wife out of fear for her life convinced a palace domestic named Stephanus to stab Domitian ". . . while he was reading a report on an imaginary conspiracy." (1:624)

The senate acted quickly. They ". . . ordered that his memory should be cursed and his name stricken from all monuments." (11:596) And they appointed M. Cocceius Nerva as the new emperor. "When Nerva succeeded the murdered Domitian in 96 [A.D.], it was by no means certain that the armies would accept a nice old unknown emperor. The danger from ambitious generals was so real. . . ." (8:502) A crisis immediately arose when the palace troops demanded an execution in atonement for the murder of Domitian. Nerva had to give in to humor them but he did not miss the political point. "Realising the need to play off force against force, he won the support of the commander in Upper Germany, M. Ulpius Traianus [Trajan], by adopting him and making him cogent." (1:628) Thus Nerva was able to call upon the forces under Trajan, which happened to be the nearest armies to Rome, for support. No further crises happened during his short reign. Nerva died of natural causes in 98 A.D. This not only brought Trajan to the throne, but also set the precedent for Emperors to adopt their successor.

Trajan was born in either 52 or 53 A.D. in Italica, a Romanized town in Spain. This was significant since he became the first emperor to be born outside of Italy. (13:967) "Henceforth non-Italian lineage was no bar to even the highest position in the empire." (8:502) Trajan had selected the army as his career. He worked his way up through the ranks until he achieved the rank of Praetor (magistrate, directly below a consul) in 85 A.D. In 89 A.D., he was sent by Domitian to put down the revolt of Antonius Saturninus. He became a consul in 91 A.D. (13:967)

"Trajan . . . was first and foremost a military man, who commanded the respect of the soldiers, and had no need to humour [sic] or bribe them." (1:629) "His mode of living was very simple, and in his campaigns he shared all the sufferings and privations of the soldiers, by whom he was both loved and feared." (13:967) He was an extremely popular Emperor, for, although not highly educated, he ". . . had good sense, a knowledge of the world, and a sound judgment. . . . He was a friend to justice, and he had a sincere desire for the happiness of the people." (13:967) He immediately won the support of the senate by taking an oath not to execute them without a fair trial, and gave them the right to vote by ballot, rather than openly. (11:597)

At the time of Nerva's death in 98 A.D., Trajan was on the Rhine. He did not return to Rome immediately, but remained to complete his mission of settling the Rhine frontiers. He then proceeded to the Danube frontier where he spent the winter of 98-99 A.D. [See Fig. 8]

The fruits of his visit appear in the construction of at least one new road . . . in the sector from which the advance of A.D. 101 proceeded, and it need not be in doubt that he had already made up his mind for war [with Dacia]. . . . (3:225)

In 99 A.D., he proceeded to Rome. (13:967)

Trajan was set on war with Decebalus. "A bit of glory is a source of strength to a new regime, and Trajan seems to have decided to correct Domitian's policy of 'weakness' toward the Dacians." (8:502) He did not waste time, for ". . . after a short time in Rome which coincided with the delays of preparation rather than the necessity of his presence in the capital, he left Italy in March, 101 [A.D.], to open his campaign." (3:225)

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE




FIGURE 8 - DACIA & SURROUNDING AREA 98 A.D.

THE WARS AGAINST DACIA

THE FIRST WAR (101-102 A.D.)

The reasons for Trajan's decision to attack in 101 A.D. are unknown. It was an inopportune time. Decebalus was at the height of his influence, the German frontier regions were barely reorganized, and many of the troops were still disheartened from the previous failures against the Germans. (3:224) Nevertheless, Trajan decided to push ahead, ". . . and in his early decision to invade, Trajan's own military ambitions and self-confidence were probably the dominant factor." (3:224) The problems faced by the Romans in their invasion were also of serious proportions.

The invasion of Dacia presented a problem of special difficulty to the Romans, both because of the mountainous and wooded nature of the country, and because its defenders could operate on inner lines, while the Roman lateral communications along the Danube were of inconvenient length. (1:650)

However, Trajan would not be deterred. He wanted to conclusively solve the Dacian problem. The reasons behind his desires were very clear. "The unsatisfactory agreement . . . with Decebalus, by which Rome contributed to the development of the latter's kingdom, rankled, and the existence of gold mines in the Carpathian Mountains added inducement." (12:620)

"In 101 [A.D.] Trajan found a pretext for attack and led the Roman army across the Danube." (12:620) Trajan selected the same route that Tettius Iulianus had used in 88-89 A.D. for his successful invasion of Dacia. [See Fig. 8] He planned to enter Dacia from the west. He was to begin his campaign at Viminacium in Moesia Superior (Yugoslavia) and proceed via the Iron Gate Pass to Tepae and thence into Dacia proper. This route presented obvious advantages. The base at Viminacium made an accessible logistic and reinforcement center, and the line of communications for the advancing army was short and comparatively secure, since the Sarmatian Iazyges on Trajan's left flank were at this time friendly to Rome. (3:226)

To insure his lines of communication and advance, ". . . Trajan improved the connexions [sic] between Pannonia and Moesia by cutting a road and tow-path along the river through the defile of the Iron Gates." (1:650) While Trajan followed this line of advance, he sent a second column, led by Lusius Quietus, along a second road. This road led from Tsierna, over the Teregova Keys pass, to the town of Tibiscum. This second advance was a diversionary attack.

Decebalus fell back under the Roman advance. He employed the same tactics he had used against Fuscus in 86 A.D. This was a combination of strategic retreat to an entrapment and "scorched-earth" policy. Decebalus was

. . . hoping to draw out the opposing line of communications and cut the enemy off in the mountains of Transylvania. The sculptures show abandoned fortresses, crops destroyed and hills empty save for

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE




FIGURE 9 - CAMPAIGN OF 101 A.D.

a few spies. (3:227)

But Trajan would not walk into Decebalus' trap. He moved forward cautiously and consolidated his position at each major point of advancement. He built roads, bridges, and forts to protect his lines of supply and communications. (3:227)

The first major battle took place at Tapae. [See Fig. 9] The Dacians had established defenses at the entrance to the Iron Gate Pass. There are no records of the actual tactics used in the battle, only the scenes from "Trajan's Column".

The sculptor represents it as a Roman victory; but it seems to have failed in its objective. The defences [sic] were not forced, and as the campaigning season was now far spent Trajan contented himself with securing the Banat and maintaining his advanced position. (3:227)

Trajan decided to winter with his main force at the city of Drobetae, thus blockading Decebalus from the west. (3:227)

Decebalus was not content to spend the winter in inactivity. [See Fig. 9] He gathered his allies, the Sarmatian Roxolani from the Moldavian plain, and counterattacked south of Trajan's position. (3:227)

The two forces swam the river and gained at first considerable success. The exact locality . . . is uncertain . . . but the city of Nicropolis which he [Trajan] founded some miles south-east of Novae has been supposed to commemorate its repulse. (3:227)

With the advent of spring, Trajan changed his tactics, probably due to the proven strength of the Iron Gate Pass defenses. [See Fig. 10] Instead of this direct attack, Trajan decided to enter Dacia from the east.

His route in this year has been plausibly traced along the easternmost of the practical entries into Dacia, up the Aluta (Oltu) valley and through the mountain barrier by the comparatively broad and easy Red Tower pass. (3:227-8)

He left a strong detachment at the Iron Gate Pass to hide his movements. In the meantime, Decebalus was facing problems of his own. With the reverses in the winter and the defection of his allies, Decebalus decided to sue for peace. He sent at least two groups of emissaries to Trajan. The first Trajan rejected outrightly. The second, because it contained Dacian nobility, was received. Trajan sent his terms with his chief of staff, Licinius Sura, and praetorian prefect, Claudius Livianus. "But the conditions offered by Rome were too severe for Decebalus--still himself undefeated--to accept; and the war went on." (3:228)

"Meanwhile Trajan continued his march and was enabled to penetrate the Red Tower pass before a Dacian army could be sent to block it, and at Cedoniae (Sibiu) he stood inside the Carpathian ring." (3:228) Trajan now

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE




FIGURE 10 - CAMPAIGN OF 102 A.D.

had two choices as to route. Due west was Sarmizegethusa, the Dacian capital. However, the easiest route was to advance northwest down to the Apulum (Alba Julia) and then turn left for an advance down the valley of the Marisus, the principal river of Dacia. In taking the second option, Trajan would expose his left flank to a series of Dacian fortresses imbedded in the Muhlbach mountains. This would have exposed his rear to being cut off and allowed Decebalus to encircle him with ease. "This was no doubt the king's hope, and it may even be that he had designedly allowed him to pass the Red Tower defile with that object; but Trajan was too skilful [sic] a general to fall into the trap." (3:228) [See Fig. 10] Trajan decided to split his forces into three parts. Trajan himself took the strongest component and headed due west across the Muhlbach foothills. His objective was to take each Dacian stronghold as he encountered it. Two smaller detachments, under a certain Maximus and Lusius Quietus, were sent on separate routes. These smaller forces were ". . . detached to sweep up the valleys and foothills . . . one no doubt was sent round by the northern route to rejoin the Emperor somewhere near the junction of the Marisus and the Strell." (3:228)

The key to the success of this strategy lay in Trajan's own power to take the Muhlbach fortresses within a reasonable time, and this after hard fighting he accomplished. When the last and most stubbornly defended of these, the Muncel Cetate on high ground above the upper waters of the Varosviz river, fell and the Dacian relieving army was defeated, the way to Sarmizegethusa lay open and the war was won. Decebalus, to save his capital the horrors of a useless siege, capitulated, and one of the most striking scenes of the Column illustrates his surrender in Trajan's camp, probably at Aquae (Kis-Kalan) on the Strell. (3:228-9)

"The terms of peace were now for Trajan to dictate; and the half-measures he adopted was perhaps the fruit of over-confidence in the effects of his recent success." (3:229) At his surrender, Decebalus had sworn allegiance to Rome and Trajan hoped to use this allegiance to keep the Dacians from further war. Therefore, Trajan spared Decebalus and reinstated him as client-king. To prevent future problems, Trajan left a Roman garrison in Sarmizegethusa and some of the Muhlbach fortresses, tore down the other fortresses, disbanded the Dacian army, and required Decebalus to turn over Roman deserters and all his artillery and engineers. Trajan also kept the territorial gains from 101 A.D. and incorporated them into Upper Moesia. (3:229) To further insure Decebalus' good behavior, Trajan built a permanent stone bridge across the Danube near the Iron Gate pass. (12:620)

At the time of the settlement, Trajan was influenced by many factors. First, he had to consider the problems of a drawn out campaign. He had not conquered all of Dacia but had only taken the capital. He would have to keep a full army in the field in the Dacian winter if he wanted to finish the conquest. He would also incur severe losses in a thorough conquest of the country. Second, with Decebalus' professed loyalty to Rome, Trajan hoped to use him as an instrument of Roman policy. (3:229) By setting Decebalus up as a client-king, Trajan ". . . followed at this time the standard Roman policy of establishing a subservient client kingdom along

ALL LOCATIONS ARE APPROXIMATE




FIGURE 11 - CAMPAIGN OF 106 A.D.

the frontier." (12:620)

THE SECOND WAR (103 - 106 A.D.)

"The peace of 102 [A.D.] was not destined to last for long. Trajan had misjudged his man, and one by one the clauses of the treaty were broken." (3:230) It appears that Decebalus had never intended to fulfill the terms of the treaty. (13:967)

The peace by which Trajan concluded the First Dacian War was a half-measure which effected no permanent solution to the Dacian question. In limiting his armaments and quartering Roman troops upon him, he injured Decebalus' pride, yet failed to reduce him to impotence. (1:650)

For two years, Decebalus made secret preparations. (1:650) He "... now showed his intentions by building forts, collecting war material, and welcoming Roman deserters." (13:967) In 105 A.D., Decebalus committed his forces. He attacked the Iazyges in Hungary and massacred the Roman garrisons in his own country. (12:620) In June 105 A.D., Trajan set out for the frontier. By the time he arrived on the frontier, all of the Roman forts in Dacia had fallen. Additionally, Decebalus' forces had penetrated south of the Danube and had eliminated or were besieging many other Roman fortifications. It took the remainder of the campaigning season of 105 A.D. for Trajan to clear Moesia of Decebalus' advances. (3:230)

Trajan used the winter of 105 A.D. to gather his forces and prepare for another attack upon Dacia. "There could be no doubt of his intentions; indeed the rupture of peace within three years of its conclusion left no alternative to the thorough subjugation of the country." (3:230) Trajan was determined to end the Dacian problem forever.

The Second Dacian War which he [Decebalus] thus brought on was one of the greatest in Roman history, if we measure its importance by the number of Roman troops engaged, for Trajan commanded a force of no less than twelve legions, which points to a total strength of not less than 120,000 men on the Roman side. (1:650)

Trajan set out to reconquer Dacia in 106 A.D. [See Fig. 11] He recrossed the Danube via the newly built stone bridge near the Iron Gate Pass. (3:230) He attacked Decebalus on two sides, presumably through both the Iron Gate Pass and the Red Tower Pass.

Decebalus' precarious allies melted away, and after abortive attempts to conciliate Trajan or to poison him, he found himself faced by ruin. . . . he showed a desperate opposition, and much hard fighting was necessary before Sarmizegethusa fell to the united armies in the late summer of the year. (3:230)

But this did not end the war. Decebalus escaped to the north, hotly pursued by Roman cavalry. [See Fig. 11] This area had never been penetrated by the Roman army. "The northern chiefs, not ignorant of their

certain fate, rallied to the king and gave way stubbornly, even gaining some success." (3:230) However, the overpowering numbers of the Roman army made this resistance only a delaying action. Decebalus finally found himself surrounded and committed suicide. Many of his subordinates followed his lead, others submitted to Roman authority, and a few carried on a small guerilla war, which ended quickly. (3:230-1)

The war proved to be an economic boon for the Romans. It involved the last great Roman war booty of 27,000,000 Pounds in gold and silver. (1:654) Rome also added the income from the Dacian gold mines to their treasury. The mines ". . . were at once re-opened with a staff of Dalmatian miners . . . and played henceforward an important part in the imperial finances." (3:232) In addition, ". . . fifty thousand prisoners of war were taken to Rome to be sold as slaves, ten thousand of them to fight to the death in gladiatorial combats." (12:620)

"Trajan was now free to make a final settlement and the extreme measures which he took are a testimony to the respect with which four seasons' hard campaigning against the Dacians had inspired him." (3:231) This final settlement was to remove Dacia as an independent nation and make it a Roman province. His first task was to erase the Dacian heritage. This had already been started since Dacian military losses had eliminated a large part of the male adult population. (1:654) The previously mentioned fifty thousand slaves sent to Rome further decimated the male adult population. (12:620) The remaining population ". . . either fled the country or adopted the speech and habits of the colonists so thoroughly that Dacia became Latinized, and even the name of Rome has survived there in the modern Rumania." (11:599) Those who fled went north towards Ruthenia in the area of the head waters of the Theiss. (3:232) To fill this vacuum, Trajan imported colonists from all over the empire. They came, sometimes forcibly, from the areas of the Danube, Africa and Syria. To these were added peoples of oriental heritage and a number of veterans who received their pensions in the form of land grants.

Trajan used both the military and government functionaries to improve the area. "Besides the gold mines, salt and iron were also worked, surveyors were active and pasture lands let out on lease." (3:232) "Engineers, architects, and workmen built roads and fortresses, which promoted peace and travel." (11:598-9) Many small settlements grew along the main routes of travel.

From an economic standpoint the Roman occupation of Dacia was no less beneficial to Dacia itself. In a land which had hitherto contained no town except the royal residence, native villages and Roman garrison centres [sic] presently developed into municipia and coloniae. (1:654)

To protect this newly incorporated territories, Trajan established a line of fortifications in the northern part of the new province. These fortifications became known as the Limes Porolissensis, which was simply a line of frontier forts.

By the end of 107 A.D., Dacia had ceased to exist. It would be many years before the final colonization was complete; however, Trajan was confident enough to declare the region the new Roman province of Dacia.

ANALYSIS

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

THE ROMANS

Since Trajan ruled over an impotent Senate, Roman national security objectives were directly related to his goals. The four national security objectives which Trajan pursued reflected his personal ambition and his belief in the destiny of Roman greatness. By the time he died in 117 A.D., ". . . Trajan had advanced farther and conquered more than any Roman since Augustus. . . ." (6:110)

The first national security objective was his determination to correct the inequitable treaty arranged by Domitian with Decebalus. This was required to reinstate the diplomatic and military reputation of Rome. "Decebalus, king of Dacia, had compelled Domitian to purchase peace by an annual payment of money; and Trajan determined on hostilities, which should settle matters so as to secure the peace of the frontier." (13:967) Rome had been weakened by Domitian's treaty and Trajan was determined to correct this situation. He had to remove Decebalus' power and never considered any other alternative.

The result was two Dacian Wars (101-102 [A.D.] and 105-106 [A.D.]), the first apparently sought by Rome, the second clearly a Dacian try for revenge. After the first war Dacia was humbled; after the second it was annexed. (8:92)

It does not appear that Trajan had intended to totally destroy Dacia. The settlement for the first war indicates he was attempting to follow the long used Roman policy of establishing a client state. However, due to Decebalus' hatred for Rome and Rome's inability to concentrate sufficient strength to continually threaten the Dacian state, Trajan was forced into the measures he took.

Thus it can be argued that Dacia had to be annexed, paradoxically enough, because the empire had become visibly defensive [sic] and its rulers reluctant to annex. In other words, Trajan had to destroy Dacian independence because the option of indirect rule was no longer open to the empire. (6:115)

The second national security objective was to insure the peace and development of Dobrudja and all the lands of the Danube. "Trajan saw clearly that in the Danubian provinces lay the key to the prosperity of the empire of whose frontier they formed the backbone." (3:236) This area had not been able to develop properly due to the continual raiding and fighting. "The elimination of the Dacian threat provided security for the Dobruja [sic] and all the Danube lands up to Vienna. . . ." (6:101) "After Trajan's wars the Danube lands enjoyed some sixty years of almost unbroken peace." (1:654) This allowed them to develop and grow. The defeat of Decebalus ". . . brought a return of prosperity to the Dobrudja. . . . By

the middle of the century the country had become widely sown with small farming communities. . . ." (3:234) Prosperity also returned to the cities. Many new cities grew, especially in the localities of the now abandoned Roman camps. With this growth, the Dobrudja and the Danube valley began to contribute human and material resources to the empire. (6:101-4) The results of peace did not stop there. "Behind the border, the new Danube solution had its repercussions also in the interior, particularly in Thrace. Here the process of civil development and urbanization . . . was rapidly pushed forward. . . ." (3:236)

The third national security objective was the expansion of the Roman empire. This would serve two purposes. First, it would add to the glory of Rome as the greatest empire in existence. Second, it would add to the security of the empire. "Trajan . . . must also have seen the wisdom of advancing a wedge of Roman territory between Rome's possible barbarian enemies, the Germans to the west and the Sarmatians to the east." (8:502) He realized the defeat of Decebalus would accomplish two things. First, it would eliminate the threat of Dacia. Second, it would drive that wedge between those northern barbarians who continually threatened Roman security.

On either side of the Dacian salient were the plains occupied by the subsidized Sarmatians: Iazyges to the west and Roxolani to the east. Had Rome been weak and the Sarmatians strong, the Dacian provinces would have been vulnerable to encirclement (across the neck of the peninsula of Roman territory on the Danube); but with Rome as strong as it then was, the Dacian frontier effectively separated the Sarmatians on either side and weakened their combined power. (6:101)

This wedge solved a problem that dated back to the treaty Domitian made with Decebalus. Were it not for the threat of a combined barbarian attack, Domitian would have been free to pursue his war with Decebalus. But when a combined German and Sarmatian war threatened him, he was forced to make peace at an expensive price. Trajan was able to turn this disadvantage to Rome's favor by ending forever the threat of a combined barbarian attack.

This new frontier, which makes so little sense in the light of the superficial strategy of small-scale maps, becomes highly rational in the light of the hierarchy of priorities of Roman policy: the elimination of Dacia's independent power provided the necessary conditions for a restoration of Roman diplomatic control over the Germans and Sarmatians of the entire region. Both deterrence and positive inducements (i.e., subsidies) would be needed to keep Marcomanni, Iazyges, and Roxolani from raiding the Danube lands; and as long as Decebalus remained in defiant independence, the deterrent arm of the policy would be fatally weakened. As a province, Dacia was not worth having, but as a strategic shield for the region as a whole it was very valuable indeed. (6:101)

Although this salient did extend the perimeter that Rome must defend, the benefits of disposing of an enemy and firmly establishing diplomatic con-

trol over other possible foes was overriding.

The only priority of Roman frontier policy that the Dacian frontier did not satisfy was the lowest tactical priority, since the perimeter was lengthened rather than shortened. This did not, of course, affect imperial communications, which could now follow routes just as short but much more secure. Nor is the impression of vulnerability given by the map of the Dacian frontier justified. Aside from its obvious topographic advantage, the Limes Porolissensis was a salient only in purely military terms: its flanks east and west were not open invasion axes, for they were occupied by peoples under Roman diplomatic control. . . . Far from being vulnerable to encirclement, the salient itself could be used as a base to encircle the Iazyges to the West or the Roxolani to the east: Roman forces could advance on the Drobeta-Apulum highway and then turn to attack the Sarmatians in the rear. (6:104)

The last national security objective was the addition of the Dacian resources to the imperial treasury. The importance of this objective is historically doubtful, but the results are not. "We have no evidence that the Dacian gold mines were other than a subsidiary motive for the war, but they were at once re-opened . . . and played henceforward an important part in the imperial finances." (3:232) In fact, much of Trajan's success as an emperor is based on this. "His [Trajan] finances were prosperous, partly from his good economy, though partly also from the good fortune of Dacian mining operations." (13:967) Even after Trajan's death, his successor could not abandon the territory, not only because that would have been desertion of the colonists, but ". . . it would have deprived the fiscus of a substantial revenue from the metal deposits of the Carpathians. . . ." (1:654) Trajan did indeed want revenge against Decebalus, but he was wise enough to recognize the additional benefits.

THE DACIANS

The national security objective for Decebalus and the Dacians was survival. Through his treaty with Domitian, Decebalus had insured future confrontation with Rome. This was further aggravated by the continual friction on the border areas between Rome and Dacia.

The Dacians could never accept being under Roman control. They were ". . . a united race, conscious of nationhood and thoroughly organized under a prince of genius." (3:224) Decebalus could never accept being a vassal of Rome. He was

. . . fired by an unquenchable hate for Rome and dreamed like him [Mithridates, a former Dacian ruler] of a wider union of Rome's enemies than was bounded by his mountain circle; and during the Trajanic wars he even made overtures to the Parthian king for a concerted plan against the common danger. (3:224)

Like Trajan, Decebalus also joined his ambitions to the destiny of his own country. But unlike Trajan, he did not have "the power and might of the

Roman Empire" behind him.

After the first war was concluded, Decebalus' objectives did not change. He merely surrendered in the face of overwhelming odds so that he might fight another day. "In limiting his [Decebalus] armaments and quartering Roman troops upon him, he [Trajan] injured Decebalus' pride, yet failed to reduce him to impotence." (1:650) This allowed Decebalus to rebuild his forces and attack at a time of his own choosing.

GRAND STRATEGY

Trajan initially never intended to use either the political or economic instruments of national power. Indeed, the political option had placed Rome in the untenable treaty position earlier. There was only one way to correct the unfavorable treaty with Decebalus. That was war. And Trajan eagerly sought it out. (8:502) There is evidence he planned this action as early as 98 A.D.

Trajan was therefore soon free to turn his attention farther east, and he spent the winter of 98-9 [sic] [99 A.D.] on the Danube frontier. The fruits of his visit appear in the construction of at least one new road (and probably more) in the sector from which the advance of A.D. 101 proceeded, and it need not be in doubt that he had already made up his mind for war, even if he had not now designed the actual annexation of the Dacian kingdom. . . . (3:225)

The political and economic tools were not available to him. Dacia was an independent and powerful state. Decebalus had firmly based the Dacian economy upon the gold and iron mines, which Roman technicians and miners were making productive. He had politically united all the tribes under his strong leadership. He had trained a powerful army using Roman techniques and supplying them with machines of war provided by Domitian. (1:621) But most of all, he hated Rome. There was no real choice for Trajan but war.

Once Trajan had established Roman superiority at the end of the first war, he did try to use a political tool. "The peace by which Trajan concluded the First Dacian War was a half-measure which effected no permanent solution to the Dacian question." (1:650) After the capitulation of Decebalus, Trajan attempted to turn Dacia into a client state. This was a common diplomatic tool during earlier Roman periods. Rome was, in those years, perceived to be capable of further expansion and even powerful states would submit to client state status at the threat of annexation. During Trajan's time, however, Rome was becoming visibly strained under its expansionist policies and strong states like Dacia could not be intimidated into subjection. Trajan failed to understand this change in the relationships of power between states. Therefore, his attempt to turn Dacia into a client state was doomed to failure before its birth. (6:114-5)

With the death of Decebalus in the second war, Trajan decided upon a final settlement which would solve the Dacian problem forever.

The death of Decebalus might have removed the immediate threat to the Roman peace; but a century and more of experience could tell that Dacia was a permanently dangerous neighbour [sic], a focus for the union of all the middle and lower Danubian peoples . . . and an enemy to be reckoned with whenever, as in 69 [A.D.], necessity elsewhere weakened the garrisons and offered an opportunity. (3:224)

Trajan's political settlement was annexation and destruction of the existing Dacian culture. This effectively removed any further threats from Dacia since it eliminated the cultural cohesion upon which Decebalus had built his power.

There were no economic tools available to Trajan, but the economic result of the war was favorable to both nations. Rome gained a windfall to its treasury. Dacia, in essence, gained civilization.

From an economic standpoint the Roman occupation of Dacia was no less beneficial to Dacia itself. In a land which had hitherto contained no town except the royal residence, native villages and Roman garrison centres [sic] presently developed into municipia and coloniae. (1:654)

We must, of course, keep in mind there were very few native Dacians left to enjoy the new Roman culture.

MILITARY STRATEGY

Trajan did very little to develop and deploy his forces. Rome had a standing army of approximately twenty-eight legions. He was emperor with total control of the situation. He ordered those troops necessary from other regions to converge in the Danubian area. "By A.D. 101 Trajan was ready: two new legions . . . had been raised to replace the two which had been lost [Domitian's German defeat], and by now at least thirteen legions were available on the lower Danube." (15:76)

Trajan used the peaceful years (99-101 A.D. and 103-105 A.D.) to support his invasions. As mentioned previously, he built a road to support the first invasion. (3:225) After the first war, he built a permanent stone bridge across the Danube near the Iron Gate Pass. (12:620) This would facilitate his next invasion of Dacia.

There are no records to indicate if Trajan had a reason to justify his invasion. He could have had a legitimate reason to invade, such as a Dacian raid into the Danubian area, or he may have manufactured an excuse. Whatever the event, he did not hesitate once his forces were ready. (3:224) Considering his abilities and reputation as a soldier, ". . . Trajan's own military ambitions and self-confidence were probably the dominant factor." (3:224)

Trajan's route was the same used successfully by Tettius Iulianus in 88-89 A.D. He advanced along the two most western roads leading into

Dacia, while maintaining a strong base at Viminacium for reinforcements and logistics support. (3:226) Considering the size of his forces, this base would be required to support their large supply needs. Additionally, it would allow him to station a considerable number of reinforcements there. This would reduce the supply needs of the forces at the front and thus ease his logistics problems.

Trajan was an experienced general. He took no chances as he advanced. Although the use of a two pronged attack strategy is not historically certain, "The use of separate columns in penetrating difficult country and splitting the opposition at key points was obvious strategy, well known at the time. . . ." (3:226) He refused to allow Decebalus to rush him into hasty advances and ill-founded decisions. As the Roman forces advanced, Decebalus withdrew, hoping to eventually draw Trajan into a trap. "Despite the lack of opposition, however, Trajan moved forward cautiously, consolidating his advance at each point, and building roads, bridges, and forts as he went." (3:227)

Trajan effectively used military strategy. He employed a force of overwhelming strength, perhaps in excess of 100,000 fighting men. He followed a well-established invasion route, one that had been successfully used by a former Roman general. He used a strategy of slow, solid advance without exposing himself to unnecessary risks. These all indicate Trajan was well aware of his strength, weakness, and enemy.

During the second war, he used an overwhelming force, ". . . for Trajan commanded a force of no less than twelve legions, which points to a total strength of not less than 120,000 men on the Roman side." (1:650) This force was split into another two pronged attack. However, this time, he both breached the Iron Gate Pass and invaded by the Red Tower Pass. Thus he applied an overwhelming force to a previously successful military strategy.

Nothing is known of the Dacian side of either war. Whether Decebalus invited the first attack or was prepared is unknown. His strategy of luring Trajan into a trap was a failure. He did not adapt to Trajan's strategy but selected a defensive posture. Although this was effective during the first year, he failed to respond to Trajan's change in strategy the second year. When Trajan advanced up the Red Tower Pass, Decebalus failed to take advantage of the mountain barrier. This led to disastrous consequences as Trajan was allowed to easily gain the mountainous plateau without having to fight for it. In the second war, he tried to fight the Romans using their strategy. Because he did not have time to rebuild his defenses at the Iron Gate Pass, he was forced to face the Romans using their battle tactics. This was certain to end in failure since the Romans had the best heavy infantry in the world.

BATTLEFIELD TACTICS

There are no accurate records of battles and tactics used. It does appear that Decebalus was beaten by overwhelming odds and excellent Roman battle and siege tactics. The speed by which Trajan defeated the Dacian

fortresses and troops further emphasizes the superiority of Roman arms. The only victories Decebalus was able to record were the repulse of the Romans at the Iron Gate Pass during the first war and the early victories over inferior Roman troop strengths during the second war.

CONCLUSIONS

The national security objectives were the result of Trajan's expansionist policy. He was determined to rectify the unfavorable treaty with Decebalus, regardless of cost.

The power of the Roman Empire was centered in Trajan. He had stripped the Senate of their effective power. His personality, reputation and accomplishments carried the empire to its greatest expansion. In essence, he mirrored the messianic complex of the Roman people. He returned to Rome its former glory.

The only weakness seen in all of Trajan's strategy was his political solution after the first war. He miscalculated his victory and Decebalus' subjection to Rome. He had not actually beaten Decebalus or the Dacians. The client-king status he imposed on Decebalus was destined to failure. Rome did not have the military power to support this policy, and Decebalus was not sufficiently cowed to abide by it.

This weakness was solved after the second war. The total obliteration of Decebalus and his nobility, and its replacement with a mixture of peoples from around the world ensured Dacia would never again rise to power. Trajan had found his final solution.

Chapter Four

CONCLUSION

Both Marius and Trajan clearly demonstrate the interrelationships of the components in the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) Strategy Process Model. They corrected the mistakes made by their predecessors and improved on their successful policies. The errors made by their predecessors lay in violation of the three Principles of Strategy. These principles are the Principle of Linkage, the Principle of the Future, and the Principle of Reality. Marius responded to the critical situation created by the Senate. Trajan created the situation through his expansionist policies.

MARIUS

The Senate failed to fulfill the Principle of Linkage. They did not field armies adequately led or trained to meet their national security objectives. They would not change their national security objectives to meet their resources. Thus the senate broke the link of ends to means. They permitted a strategy-force mismatch to exist, and it initially had near fatal results for Rome.

The Senate failed to fulfill the Principle of the Future. They held to the policies already established and did not look for new answers. Fear was a prominent factor in their inability to change. They could have easily accepted the offer of mercenary service from the Barbarians. This would have eliminated the need for war and provided Rome with a large army. This was unacceptable because they feared that agreeing to the terms would be a sign of weakness and lead to an invasion by the Barbarians. They would not accept the idea that their refusal would lead to the invasion they feared so greatly.

The Senate failed to fulfill the Principle of Reality. They initially refused to believe that the threat was serious. Even after the loss of several armies, they failed to insure that the new armies sent to the field under Maximus and Caepio had a unity of command. The political competition among Roman generals should have been recognized by the Senate. A jointly commanded army was doomed before the first battle.

Marius' arrival corrected the situation. The people finally overrode the Senate, took control and appointed a competent leader. Although Marius did not change the national security objectives, he did ensure his army was adequate to meet those objectives. His leadership and training proved a winning combination. He linked the national security objectives, grand

strategy, military strategy, and tactics to form a successful combination.

TRAJAN

Domitian failed to fulfill the Principle of Linkage. His goal of controlling the entire area north of the Danube was not realistic. He did not have the resources or diplomatic power. Again we see an example of strategy-force mismatch.

Domitian also failed to fulfill the Principle of the Future. He established a treaty with Decebalus which was only temporary because he was unable to extract himself from other problem areas (the Germans and Sarmatians) in order to solve the Dacian situation. He should have developed a strategy before his campaign in Dacia to insure, as a minimum, the neutrality of the Germans and Sarmatians.

Finally, Domitian failed to fulfill the Principle of Reality. He did not recognize the loss of Roman power and prestige that had occurred over the years. He failed to ensure the German tribes would be quiescent while he invaded Dacia in 89 A.D. This could have been accomplished through either military or diplomatic means. He did neither.

Trajan, however, changed the situation when he took power. He finished a pacification and fortification of the German frontier, and then prepared for the invasion of Dacia. He used adequate troops in his wars against Decebalus. Although the settlement after the first war was a failure in the Principle of Reality, he corrected the situation after the second war.

CONCLUSION

Marius and Trajan successfully fulfilled the three Principles of Strategy and the ACSC Strategy Process Model. The dominating factor in this change to success was LEADERSHIP. They set goals, gathered resources, and applied the appropriate strategies to those goals. However, they could not accomplish this until they were given total command of the situation. Marius received his authority through consent of the people. Trajan received his power through his office as Emperor.

The predecessors to Marius and Trajan, the Senate of the Republic and the Emperor Domitian, failed to successfully fulfill the three Principles of Strategy. Their objectives and the resources they applied were disjointed and not in the realm of reality. They violated these principles because, in the case of the Republic, no one person was in charge; and in the case of Domitian, he was unaware of his limitations in power and resources.

The ACSC Strategy Process Model is accurate. Although every situation is unique, loose but thorough application of the model can provide the framework for the successful accomplishment of national objectives.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. REFERENCES CITED

Books

1. Cary, M. A History of Rome. New York, New York: Macmillan and Company, 1965.
2. Cook, S. A., et al, Edited By. The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol IX. Cambridge, England: Cambridge at the University Press, 1954.
3. Cook, S. A., et al, Edited By. The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol XI. Cambridge, England: Cambridge at the University Press, 1954.
4. Dupuy, Ernest R. and Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History. New York, New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970.
5. Haaren, John H., & Poland, A. B. Famous Men of Rome. New York, New York: American Book Company, 1904.
6. Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978
7. McGraw-Hill. The Encyclopedia of World Biography, Vol VII. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973.
8. McGraw-Hill. The Encyclopedia of World Biography, Vol X. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973.
9. Mills, Dorothy. The Book of the Ancient Romans. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927.
10. Plutarch (Translated by John Dryden, Revised by Arthur Hugh Clough). The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952.
11. Robinson, Charles Alexander, Jr. Ancient History. New York, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951.
12. Roebuck, Carl. The World of Ancient Times. New York, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.

CONTINUED

13. Smith, William, Sir, & Marinden, G. E. A Classical Dictionary of Greek & Roman Biography, Mythology, & Geography. London, England: John Murry, Publisher, 1909.
14. Watson, G. R. The Roman Soldier. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969.
15. Webster, Graham. The Roman Imperial Army. New York, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969.

B. RELATED SOURCES

Books

- Adcock, F. E. The Roman Art of War Under the Republic. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1940.
- MacMullen, Ramsey. Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Smith, R. E. Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1958.

Unpublished Materials

- Snow, Donald M. & Drew, Dennis M. Introduction To Strategy. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Command And Staff College (United States Air Force), 1983.