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



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

THESIS

THE INFLUENCE OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE ON NEGOTIATING POSITIONS: THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE CASE

by

William Rockwell Blackburn

March 1984

Thesis Advisor: R. Bathurst

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This thesis explores the influence of the underlying political culture of the Soviet Union and the United States on the positions of those governments at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations. It defines the term political culture as the conceptual framework within which politics operates. The thesis then discusses the historical evolution and primary characteristics of the elite political cultures of both nations. In the process of this a cultural model, or stereotype of the political

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elite of each nation is postulated. This model is then utilized to evaluate the negotiating positions of each country from a cultural standpoint. Finally, the thesis concludes that political culture probably does influence the positions of governments and may be a useful method of evaluating those positions and predicting future actions. In addition, the thesis sees a possibility of utilizing political culture as one method of determining the importance of those positions to the governments involved.

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The Influence of Soviet and American Political Culture on Negotiating Positions: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Case

by

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Commander, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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This thesis explores the influence of the underlying political culture of the Soviet Union and the United States on the positions of those governments at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations. It defines the term political culture as the conceptual framework within which politics operates. The thesis then discusses the historical evolution and primary characteristics of the elite political cultures of both nations. In the process of this a cultural model, or stereotype of the political elite of each nation is postulated. This model is then utilized to evaluate the negotiating positions of each country from a cultural standpoint. Finally, the thesis concludes that political culture probably does influence the positions of governments and may be a useful method of evaluating those positions and predicting future actions. In addition, the thesis sees a possibility of utilizing political culture as one method of determining the importance of those positions to the governments involved.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ---------- 7

A. POLITICAL CULTURE DEFINED ---------- 10

B. FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 12

C. FRAMEWORK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE -------- 15

D. BASIC SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 17

E. BASIC AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 19

F. IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 21

G. THE USE OF THE CULTURAL MODEL AND THE INF NEGOTIATIONS ---------- 22

II. SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 25

A. RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 27

B. MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY AND THE SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 38

C. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 48

III. AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 53

A. AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE DESCRIBED ---------- 53

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE ---------- 70

IV. CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF INF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ----- 74

A. SOVIET INF NEGOTIATING POSITION ---------- 75

B. U.S. INF NEGOTIATING POSITION ---------- 83

C. ZERO OPTION ---------- 89

D. SOVIET REACTION TO ZERO OPTION ---------- 93

V. CONCLUSION ----------100

APPENDIX A: INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE NEGOTIATIONS ---------- 107

APPENDIX B. ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL ---------- 111

APPENDIX C. OFFICIAL SOVIET REACTION TO ZERO OPTION ---- 120

LIST OF REFERENCES ---------- 124

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ---------- 132

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States and the Soviet Union are adversaries. This adversarial relationship is the result of myriad causes which can be said to range over a continuum which includes basic political culture, national personality, ideology, national interests, superpower competitive interests, and competitive tactical advantage as some of its major points. Each level of this continuum might be seen as building upon and being related to the more general level beneath it. At the broadest and most nonspecific level are the basic cultural differences between the two nations, differences which can influence political behavior.

It is the thesis of this study that the political cultures of the Soviet Union and the United States may be differentiated from each other and that some of these differences between the two cultures may be generally specified. Having been specified, these cultural differences may be utilized as one dimension of understanding the relationship between the two countries.

The method utilized to investigate this thesis will be to define several characteristics of each political culture and then use those characteristics to construct a model representative of each nation, a national political stereotype, as it were. Once defined, the model can then be used to interpret and predict the behavior of the political leadership.

To check its validity the model will be used to evaluate and predict the reactions of each side to the positions and statements of the other at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Negotiations currently ongoing in Geneva, Switzerland.

This is not a precise subject. What Edward T. Hall calls the "covert culture" [Ref. 1] is one that is experienced on the subconscious, emotional level rather than on what we might consider the rational level. Thus, when cultures interrelate these unconscious forces are at work to a degree that is extremely difficult to understand, much less verbalize. Hall states:

> It is difficult....for mankind to come to grips with the fact that there are deep cultural differences that must be recognized, made explicit and dealt with before one can arrive at the underlying human nature we all share.... if man is not to destroy himself he must begin to transcend his own culture. First, the overt, obvious culture-which it is possible to bridge with patience and good will-but the second and more important, unconscious culture-which it is more difficult to transcend. [Ref. 2]

Because of the force of the unconscious level the effects of culture on political views are insidious and often obscure. As just one example, the massive influx of both legal and illegal immigrants to the United States, in contrast to the strict control of people both into and out of the Soviet Union, goes beyond mere policy and exemplifies a basic cultural difference between the two societies.

While open American borders reflect the operation of the "melting·pot" myth, at times in direct conflict with what

might be considered the best interests of the country, the massive Soviet effort to make its borders seemingly impenetrable shows a culture extremely concerned with its security and survival. One would expect a similar border violation to cause vastly different reactions in each society because of these basic cultural differences.

As might be expected these cultural differences are difficult to pin down. At the very least statements cited as proof of cultural impact in this thesis may be termed ambiguous. A so-called "realist" looking at a position or statement might see a clear-cut case of national or superpower competitive interest in the same situation this thesis will claim as an example of cultural nuance.

This leads to the importance of emphasizing the amorphous and ubiquitous nature of the cultural influence on the political relations between the two nations. Political culture can be thought of as shading each nation's views of events, ideas, even facts. It can also be seen as manifesting itself in both the actions and the rhetoric of each side.

For example, American rhetoric is often moralistic in tone, extolling the "goodness" or "rightness" of the American position. Soviet rhetoric relies heavily on references to Marxist-Leninist teachings, to the "correctness" of their scientific position. Each side seems convinced of the applicability of their rhetorical references, and well they might be because of the unconscious influences of the different political cultures.

It is also important to qualify any single explanation of the behavior of nations with the self-evident but oft forgotten concept of complexity. It is essential to understand "....every nation is a complex, with variations in behavior and personality...." [Ref. 3] and is populated by real people who "....are blends, more complicated and various-things of shreds and patches-than any scheme can encompass." [Ref. 4] Another important qualification is the fact that, "....background factors never directly cause behavior; they cause attitudes [and other mental sets] and the latter in turn determine behavior." [Ref. 5]

It is the integration of all the factors in the continuum mentioned above which is helpful in explaining the political behavior of nations. Not only must many factors be considered, but each factor may vary in importance depending upon the relative situation.

A. POLITICAL CULTURE DEFINED

As defined in this study political culture is the framework for ideas within which conceptual politics operates. Stephen White defines political culture as the "....attitudinal and behavioral matrix within which the political system is located." [Ref. 6]

Sidney Verba further defines it by stating that "....It refers to the system of beliefs about patterns of political interaction and political institutions. It refers not to

what is happening in the world of politics, but what people believe about those happenings...." [Ref. 7] More specifically, political culture may be called "....that set of attitudes, practices and sentiments that gives order and meaning to the political process in the minds of the members of the .... community." [Ref. 8]

Political culture appears to be evolutionary, a combination of national characteristics, psychology, and historical political experience. As such it is relatively stable, modifying in response to changes in historical conditions rather than changing outright. As Alfred Meyer says "Culture is that which lags." [Ref. 9] As an example, the Russian political culture, as Edward Keenan argues, appears to have shown a remarkable tenacity throughout its history, despite significant changes in the political and social conditions in the nation. [Ref. 10]

Participants in the political culture, particularly the members of the political elite, are socialized into the culture in such a way that the cultural beliefs become a person's fundamental beliefs, so basic that they remain as unstated assumptions about life that "....each individual holds....and believes that all other individuals hold." [Ref. 11]

The political culture of each nation studies in this thesis has evolved throughout its historical experience, as the nation has reacted to its environment, the background of its inhabitants, and the specific historical problems

confronting it. In order to understand the make-up of each political culture its historical framework must be discussed, its evolution studied. It is not the purpose here to recite a lengthy history of the U.S. and the USSR but rather to sketch the unique historical framework within which the political cultures have evolved.

B. FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE

The dominant factors in the Russian framework appear to have been space and vulnerability which combined to form a culture apparently dominated by a concern for survival.

The original Russian state, the Kievian, was located on the eastern edges of populated Europe, well to the west of the Ural Mountains which provided its only, if meager, natural protection from invaders from the east. And invasions there were, beginning in the fourth century with the Huns and continuing through many subsequent invasions including those by the Bulgars, Avars, Khazars, Magyars, and Pechenegs. This vulnerability to, and history of, invasion had an important impact on the development of survival as a characteristic trait of the Russian political culture.

It was during the Pecheneg invasion in the ninth century that the Slavic state of Kiev was set up with the help of Viking protectors. The Kievian state struggled through over three centuries of difficult existence only to be destroyed by Genghis Khan and his "Golden Horde" of Mongols. The Tartar

empire collapsed in the fifteenth century and a new Russian state, under Ivan the Great emerged. This state was also destined for a dreadful existence, exemplified by an invasion in 1571 by Crimean Tartars, in which 800,000 Russians were killed and over 130,000 taken prisoner. [Ref. 12]

Beginning in the seventeenth century the threats to the Russian state came mostly from the west, where no natural impediments to invasion existed. For seven years from 1606 the Poles occupied Russia. With the defeat of the Poles in 1613 the Romanov dynasty was established.

One result of the rise of the Romanovs was the concurrent rise of the characteristically Russian tendency to overcome their lack of geographical protection by expanding and acquiring buffer states. The historical expansion was in all directions, east across Siberia, south to the Black Sea and west to the Baltic. The extent of the expansion was phenomenal. One author captures its essence in this manner: "In the century and a half between 1550 and 1700 Moscow was annually adding to her territory an area equal to that of modern Holland." [Ref. 13/emphasis in original]

While the extent of the expansion is a matter of historical record, the motivation for it is less clear. Was it the result of some innate Russian need to conquer? Or was it just the reaction of a defensive minded people, attempting to assure the survival of their beleaguered state? As George Liska sees it the answer lies somewhere in between:

> From the very beginnings of Muscovite supremacy, the main direction of expansion was determined by the need to protect the geostrategic, economic and racially vital core against threats from south, north, and west--to wit, to the steppes from marauding Tartars, to approaches to the sea from militaristic Swedes, and to the seat of national faith and power from Catholic Poles. Generally, the impulse behind the either sequential or near-simultaneous thrusts northward (toward the Baltic Sea) and southward (toward the Caspian and Black Seas) was on balance defensive, while the drive eastward (toward the Pacific Ocean) was more acquisitive. But whether the Russians expanded in response to threat or to temptation, the core never ceased to feel vulnerable to hostile invasion or isolation. [Ref. 14]

If the expansion was defensive, designed to guarantee the survival of the Russian state it appears to have been successful, for the state (although in a different form) has survived the Napoleanic invasion of 1812, a disastrous defeat in World War I, and the German invasion of World War II. The survival of the Russian state was not without serious cost, upwards of a quarter of a million casualties in 1812 [Ref. 15], about 5.5 million casualties in World War I [Ref. 16], and the officially proclaimed twenty million dead in World War II. While it is obvious that the revolution put an end to a monarchy which had endured throughout Russian history, the state as an entity, despite its apparent radical change in character, survived.

This brief sketch was designed to show the geographical and historical environment in which the Russian political culture evolved. As will be discussed below the culture places a premium on survival. It is easy to see from the framework presented above that, "From the beginning in the

ninth century, and even today, the prime driving force in Russia has been fear." [Ref. 17] It follows, as Louis Halle has said, that:

> Russia's experience....was not such as makes for an open, friendly and guileless society. It was not such as makes for a liberal and pacificistic society. On the contrary, all the circumstances of Russian history have, from the beginning, imposed the necessity of complete discipline under autocratic authority-this is the price of survival. [Ref. 18]

C. FRAMEWORK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE

The dominant factors in the American framework appear to have been isolation and success. Early Americans found themselves with a vast continent that was virtually uninhabited (estimated indigenous population of about one and one half million [Ref. 19]). While the Russians struggled for survival in an unfriendly climate, constantly threatened by hostile invasions, Americans had to concern themselves basically with the struggle to dominate their environment. While this was certainly a formidable task, they were at least spared the constant fear of annililation by enemies which dominated Russian history.

Americans came to the continent seeking to strike out in new directions, to turn their backs on the old European problems. As early as 1678 the residents of Massachusetts were proclaiming that "....the lawes of England are bounded within the fower seas, and doe not reach America." [Ref. 20] Once independent the United States sought to continue this

isolation from European problems which could threaten the peace, prosperity and ideals of the new nation. This is given ample proof in Washington's farewell address:

> Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice? [Ref. 21]

With this pervasive attitude of isolation, and given the protection from invasion by two vast oceans and the de facto political protection of the British Navy for much of its early history, the American situation provided a unique environment for the nurturing of democratic institutions. Isolated by geography and inclination from the European problems they had sought to escape, the American experience appears to have been one of continuous success. Using the luxury of isolation Americans could devote much of their effort to the mastering of their environment. The conquering of the west and the carving out of a common civilization on the American continent in a relatively short time serve as examples to Americans of their uniqueness and ability to solve problems.

The success achieved in this endeavor set the tone for the American view of problem solution, one facet of its political culture. The ease of victory in the Spanish-American War, the success of the intervention in World War I, and the victory in World War II have continued to solidify the framework for the evolution of the American political culture, a culture which seems quite different from the Soviet.

D. BASIC SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE

The Soviet political culture will be discussed in chapter III of this thesis. A brief, generalized version which includes the major points under discussion appears here. These traits are presented not as strictly accurate indicators of political behavior but as nuances of that behavior which might be seen as characteristic and different from those which may be termed characteristically American.

It is the view of this thesis that the Soviet political culture can be described as one whose citizens view life as a struggle for survival which can only be successfully accomplished through group effort. This group process has evolved a method of operating in an informal manner, making decisions in secret and fostering a situation where each person distrusts all others as possible threats to group survival, thereby causing decisions to be made in a collegial or corporate manner. This group oriented, ad-hoc, consensus building method of making decisions seems to be as prevalent today in the operation of the Politburo as it was with the operation of the peasant councils in the ancient Russian village. [Ref. 22]

In this culture the authority of the group approaches the absolute, requiring virtually complete submission by its individual members. Since individual responsibility for failure can have serious consequences, it is essential that individuals not stand out, that responsibility for group action

rest with the collective. The well-known proclivity of the Soviet military to operate "by the book", and the seeming stifling of individual initiative are modern examples of this cultural trait.

The strong drive for survival leads the group to shun outsiders as threats. This fear of outsiders reaches virtually paranoic proportions, insinuating itself into many political situations. It manifests itself in a tight secrecy surrounding group processes, strict control over public disagreements among the group, and the facade of a united front to the outside. The lack of a large body of knowledge about the operation of the decision making process in the Soviet government serves as apparent proof that it does, in fact, operate in this closed manner.

Another manifestation of this paranoia is the use of deception and sometimes outright lying when dealing with non-members. The Soviet appears to fear chaos, and so must control his environment. Control, by definition, must approach the absolute, which means that possible threats to security cannot be tolerated for long. The Russians often deal with these threats in a "no-holds-barred" manner, unfettered by strict interpretations of legality, using means that employ secrecy and deception often applied in an autocratic and arbitrary way.

Thus the historical framework and its cultural manifestations appear to dovetail. Vulnerability probably leads to concerns

about survival which surely contributes to paranoia about enemies. Obviously there is greater safety in space and therefore expansion becomes one method of survival.

E. BASIC AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE

The generalized version of the American political culture presented in the succeeding paragraphs appears different from that of the Soviet. Again, these characteristics are presented here not as strict indicators of individual behavior but as examples of the nuances of political behavior that might show cultural influence.

Americans can be described as moralistic and idealistic, but less ideological than the Soviets. They pride themselves on being rational and pragmatic, which appears to lead to a legalistic method of operation. For example, the strong American support of international organizations shows a committment to the underlying legalism upon which these organizations are based.

Americans tend to be ethnocentristic, believing in the universality of their solutions to world problems, an apparent outgrowth of their history of success. The Marshall Plan, the IMF, and any number of other U.S. attempts to shape the post war world with American economic principles provide good examples of this American universalism.

This belief in the universality of American solutions to the world's problems leads to identifying oversimplification as another American cultural trait. This universalism allows

Americans to oversimplify extremely complex problems so that their solutions fit. The "Domino Theory" is a good example here. That the loss of one nation to a communist insurgency would lead inexorably to the loss of other nations in a region appears a gross oversimplification which ignores the immense complexities of the actual situation. The apparent U.S. solution to the problem posed by the "Domino Theory", to stop the domino in Vietnam, may be seen as an example of a simplistic view of what was really a complex situation.

In contrast to the Soviets, Americans seem to live in the present, having little specific, coordinated direction to their view of the future and no particularly strong ties to the past. This could explain the American prediliction for short term solutions to problems. *The New Deal* could be seen as an example of both of these points. It could be characterized as a radical change from past practices to solve an immediate crisis with little thought given to the future effects of the changes. While summing the New Deal up in one sentence is a serious oversimplification itself, the example serves to show the importance of the present to the American, as opposed to the past and future.

This emphasis on the present may also be partly responsible for the American desire to maintain the status quo. The support of Latin American dictators can be seen as an example of this trait. It appears that American leaders have been more concerned with the maintenance of known quantities in

their relations in Latin American than to the perpetuation of the Democratic ideals they so eloquently espouse. This indicates that Americans seem to see, in the present, a world, while not perfect, that is capable of being operated in so not in need of massive changing.

F. IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

It is an argument of this study that the Soviet political culture is strongly ideologically centered, while the American is less so. The term ideology is defined here as the existence of a single set of ideas and symbols which gives the citizen a systematic view of the world and is institutionalized in the state machinery.

This is a good description of the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Soviet state. On the other hand, the American ideology is less strictly defined, not institutionalized, and allows citizens to hold multifarious views of their nation's place in history. It is the existence of these differences which leads us to emphasize the importance of ideology in the Soviet culture and deemphasize it in the American.

Additionally, it appears that Soviet political culture seems to both shape and be shaped by its ideology. It is the Leninism part of Marxism-Leninism which allows the Soviet state to claim to be Marxist while deemphasizing two fundamental tenets of Marx's philosophy, democratic socialism and the withering away of the state. The previously cited enormous

sacrifices of the Russian people throughout their history, in part to ensure the survival of the state as an entity, could hardly be thought of as an environment which would allow the state to "wither away". Thus the culture, in this case has shaped the ideology.

On the other hand, the group oriented nature of Marxism seems to complement the historical Russian political culture, and is a piece of the ideology which could be expected to be adopted with fervor by the Russians. In this case the ideology fits the existing culture. It appears, then, that the Soviet state might be seen as being strongly ideological because the ideology and the culture are mutually supportive, and tend to reinforce each other.

G. THE USE OF THE CULTURAL MODEL AND THE INF NEGOTIATIONS

One test of whether there is a cultural basis for the political behavior of each nation is in the study of specific interactions. The interactions selected for study in this thesis are those associated with the INF negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR.

These negotiations bring no special qualifications to their role as examples of cultural influence upon political behavior. Any number of other Soviet-American interactions could have been chosen and, if the theory of cultural influence has merit, could serve equally well as examples for study. Choosing INF, however, does lend some convenience to this

thesis because the negotiations are finite and topical, and the positions stated in relatively specific terms. A synopsis of the INF positions to date follows below.

By way of introduction, the situation which led to the negotiations began because of a NATO decision in the late 1970's to correct the apparent growing imbalance of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe by modernizing its arsenal with the deployment of new U.S. Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM). At the same time negotiations with the Soviets were to occur which would attempt to control the level of weapons in Europe, and thus the threat of war.

In response to the NATO action the Soviets, in February 1981, proposed a freeze on their modern, capable SS-20 missiles if the Pershing II's and GLCM's were not deployed.

Just prior to the commencement of the negotiations in November of 1981 President Reagan proposed the "zero-option" plan, which would have cancelled the deployment of the U.S. missiles in return for the dismantling of all intermediate range Soviet missiles in Europe.

In December 1982 the Soviet Union proposed a cutback in its missiles to the equivalent of the British and French missiles already in place. Additionally, in May 1983 the Soviets proposed to reduce their missiles so that there would be an equivalency in numbers of warheads available to each side.

Finally, President Reagan countered with an interim relaxation of the "zero option" plan which would reduce the

number of Pershing II's and GLCM's deployed to an equal but unspecified number of Soviet missiles.

In Chapter IV this thesis analyzes these positions, the statements associated with them, and the reactions to them by each side; to determine if cultural factors might be present both in the substance of the positions and in the rhetoric surrounding them. It suggests that there are cultural factors at work here, factors which must be taken into account in any analysis of the opposing positions.

However, before this cultural analysis can be attempted a detailed discussion of the cultural points to be analyzed must occur. This will be accomplished for the Soviet political culture in chapter II and the American culture in Chapter III.

II. SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE

Modern Soviet political culture has direct roots in the Great Russian political culture. Edward L. Keenan argues this thesis convincingly when he states that:

> ....Great Russian political culture....has displayed remarkable tenacity and continuity over the last few centuries and that after an episode of aberrant and discontinuous development that embraced several decades beginning around the turn of the present century, the traditional vernacular political culture was, in a number of its essential features, reestablished. [Ref. 23]

The basic cultural assumptions which will be discussed in this thesis are:

1. Environmental conditions dictated that survival be a guiding principle of political action;

2. Individual survival was difficult, if not impossible, under these conditions impelling the individual to abandon his individuality to the group;

3. Man was considered as basically evil. If left on his own he would act in a manner which might threaten the survival of the group;

4. Since man was evil he must be strictly controlled. Rule tended to be autocratic and patrimonial;

5. Since the individual's political existence was tied to the group, group decisions about virtually all facets of life were necessary;

6. Once group decisions, arrived at by consensus, became operative little deviation was allowed;

7. If the group was successful at surviving it tended to take on a conservative outlook, avoiding risks which could detract from that survival;

8. The conservative group closed ranks and became extremely suspicious of outsiders; seeing them as threats to survival. This suspicion could take the form of showing a united front, demanding secrecy and deceiving outsiders about group processes.

The Soviet elite political culture is strongly ideological in nature. It is often said that the Marxist ideology has been abandoned by the Soviets, and that the country acts on the basis of superpower interest alone. The thrust of this argument is that because current Soviet ideology is inconsistent with the original concept of Marxism (reasons most often cited are the Soviet rejection of democratic socialism and the overpowering presence of the state), and that even accepting Lenin's modifications of Marxism at face value, there is insufficient evidence to indicate that ideology permeates the political behavior of the nation. What these arguments seem to disregard is the irresistable appeal of some Marxist ideas and behavior to the inheritors of the Russian political culture.

Adam Ulam states that, "Lenin instinctively groped for the uses of Marxism under Russian conditions and found in it the road to revolution." [Ref. 24/emphasis in original] The ability of Soviet leaders to adapt the Marxist ideology to the Russian experience in a complementary fashion has been an important ingredient in their success. Of the many groups seeking to gain power after the demise of the Tsar the Bolsheviks seem to have been the ones which most closely resembled the traditional Russian political culture in nature. That they prevailed in the end can be seen as an indication of the continuity of that culture.

It is this blending of the tenacious Great Russian political culture with the Marxist-Leninist ideology which forms the basis for modern Soviet political behavior. Each of these important elements will be treated in detail.

A. RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

In the introductory remarks of this thesis the historical framework of the Russian political culture was discussed. This section will build on that framework by tracing the development of the traditional Russian political culture, both peasant and elite, in response to the physical and political environment of early Russia.

The modern Russian state had its beginnings in the vast forest land which occupies much of the northern Eurasian land mass. The soil in this largest forest in the world is poor, containing little natural plant food and requiring deep ploughing in order to sustain growth. The climate in this area is hot in the short summers and extremely cold throughout the long winters.

Rain falls in an uneven pattern, being most plentiful in the northwest where the soil is poorest. Rainfall is the heaviest in the late summer, when nearly one quarter of the annual accumulation occurs. [Ref. 25] Thus only a slight deviation from the normal pattern could lead to drought conditions in the spring and heavy downpours at harvest. This combination of poor soil, long cold winters, and suboptimum

rainfall patterns leads to an extremely short and often unproductive growing season.

One consequence of these poor environmental factors is poor yields. Poor yields have an enormous impact on the industrial, commercial and political growth of a nation. As Richard Pipes states:

> It may be said that civilization begins only where one grain of seed multiplies itself at least five times; it is this minimum surplus which determines....whether a significant proportion of the population can be released from the necessity of raising food to pursue other occupations. [Ref. 26]

It wasn't until the late nineteenth century that Russian yields exceeded even 1:3, considered the minimum required to sustain life. [Ref. 27] Russian life was indeed a struggle to survive.

The poor land, harsh climate and vast expanses led to the development of a populace whose primary goal was necessarily to survive. This goal could more easily be reached by the development of certain behaviors "....caution, calculation, resoluteness, stoicism, [and] endurance." [Ref. 28] We still find these traits in the modern Russian political culture.

It also became clear that given the harsh climate and frequent invasions, survival in Russia could be best accomplished by combining all individuals into groups which would then be able to survive. The smallest political unit in Russia was not the individual but the village, to which all individuals were subordinated. And the village organization was directed to one end, survival. Keenan summarizes:

> Thus the overpowering objective of the peasant village organization--an objective developed over centuries of unchanging subsistence agriculture, an objective whose imperatives created a tight nucleus bound by immense forces of both cohesion and fission--was survival, economic, biological, and social survival. Not justice.... not material improvement or the accumulation of wealth, not the "preservation of way of life", but the preservation of life itself, human life, the life of vital stock, and the life-giving field cultures. [Ref. 29]

The village's measure of success in assuring the survival of its members was just that, survival. Once survival was assured the methods by which that was achieved would become difficult to change. Thus a primary goal of decision-making in that environment was the minimization of risk, the avoidance of a calamity which would endanger survival.

Unacceptable risks were those which might upset the precarious balance that ensured survival, even if that change could improve the quality of life in the village. Similarly, if the interests of the individual in any way could be seen as a threat to group survival, group interests tended to prevail. An example would be that if a family were to show signs of a prosperity above the level thought appropriate by the village, they would be forced to sacrifice for the common good. On the other hand, were a family to fall on hard times to the extent that it could no longer be a productive member of the community, it would be given the assistance necessary to ensure that it could do its share for the village. Thus, both upward and downward sanctions were imposed by the village to ensure group survival.

The viability of the group took on great importance in this society, often overshadowing the rights of the individual. An important aspect of the subjugation of the individual to the group is the pessimistic view of man held by the Russians. Edward Keenan describes this view as follows:

> ....the Great Russian peasant had a "low" opinion of Man, was "fearful" of Man's potential to be weak, destructive, and dangerous to the (vital) interests of the group, and, consequently, treated others, and himself in an authoritarian manner. [Ref. 30]

Since man was seen as not capable of internal control, he must be controlled by the group, if he is not to endanger its survival.

This view of man seems to be as true in the modern political culture as it was in ancient Russia. Evidence of this is shown in statements by Lenin who accuses the Russian of "instability and slovenliness", and Stalin who castigates them for their "backwardness". [Ref. 31] One manifestation of this view of man is the Russian obsession with control, in order for man not to destroy the group all aspects of his behavior must be controlled.

One example of control in governmental terms was the rise of authoritarianism. It is important to place this fact in perspective again. The vast expanse of Russia, the constant fear of invasion, the widely separated, conservative and autonomous villages all militated against any centralization of power. But centralization was essential to survival and could be best accomplished through strict authoritarianism:

> To survive in this hostile environment, the Russians had to organize their lives along quasi-military lines, united and disciplined. The whole society had to be prepared for continuous military defense. To command the men and resources necessary to protect the state, its government had to be in complete control. Thus, while others have faced foreign invaders without themselves adopting despotic methods of rule, the Russians, in the words of Cyril Black, "to a greater extent than most peoples.... have seen themselves facing a choice of unity under an autocrat or subjugation by a foreign power." [Ref. 32]

It appears that the Russians accepted authoritarian rule as a natural outgrowth of their desire for survival, view of the world, and view of man. This rule was not only authoritarian in nature but could be termed patrimonial in character.

The patrimonial form of government is one logical extension of the peasant family where the father had autonomous control over all the family's property and production. The term, patrimonial, as used to describe a form of government is defined by Pipes as, "....a regime where the rights of sovereignty and those of ownership blend to the point of becoming indistinguishable, and political power is exercised in the same manner as economic power." [Ref. 33] One of its most characteristic features is the apparent absence of distinctions between the state and society at large, which tends to lead to the nonexistence of individual rights vis-a-vis the state.

In a patrimonial state the government owns the property. There are few conflicts between the sovereign's rights and the individual's rights, for the individual has few rights.

Pipes describes it in this manner, "A despot violates his subjects' property rights; a patrimonial leader does not even acknowledge their existence." [Ref. 34] Thus in a patrimonial state there appear to be few limits on the authority of the leader.

In the Russian case power was also exercised in such a way as to ensure that no countervailing political institutions would grow which would weaken the grip of the leader. The relationship between the rulers and the ruled was decidedly "one-way":

> There is no evidence....of the mutual obligations binding prince and his servitor, and therefore, also nothing resembling legal or moral "rights" of subjects and little need for law and courts. [Ref. 35]

There were, therefore, few institutional checks on the arbitrary use of the monarch's power. "The system....was immune from pressure from below." [Ref. 36]

The method used to exert authority by both the village and the state was peculiarly Russian in nature. That authority could be characterized as absolute and arbitrary, and was often brutally and capriciously applied. Sanctions which might have been applied by the authority in the village included beatings, executions, and "letting loose the red rooster" (burning houses down). [Ref. 37] This brutal and arbitrary use of power has obvious parallels in the purges of the 1930's.

Henry Dicks, in his "Observations on Contemporary Russian Behavior" reports that interviews tend to show that authority is still viewed in the same manner:

> In virtual unaminity the informants talked of Authority as hard, deprivational and arbitrary or capricious-unpredictable. This is how a "vlast" (authority, power) always behaves. If the "vlast" were weak nobody would obey it, and governments have always to deprive you-tax you, make demands of goods and services, care nothing about your welfare, arrest you and push you around at their whim. [Ref. 38]

This statement is interesting not only for its exposition of the Russian view of authority but also for its unstated, but prevalent, view of man as evil or weak, virtually unable to respond to any but absolute authority.

The concept of authority seems to have extreme power for the Russian. It seems to be something that must be submitted to, not because it is right but because it is inevitable. Morton Schwartz discusses this point in differentiating the Russian from the American view of authority:

> By historical tradition and political ideology the Soviet people share an understanding of the concept of power and authority singularly different from that held in the United States. As Phillip E. Mosely perceptively observed:
>
> > One feature which strikes every foreigner who stays in the Soviet Union for a substantial length of time is the great respect, even awe, that is generally felt for power, for authority. Neither word exactly expresses the Russian word "vlast" which means power so great that one cannot oppose it. It can, if one is skillful, be placated; if one is lucky, it can be hoodwinked; but cannot be resisted, for there is no ground on which the isolated individual can take his stand. [Ref. 39]

To review, one reason for the tradition of absolute authoritarianism to arise was as a response to the environmental and historical factors that dictated that a primary goal of the Russian existence was survival. There are several characteristics of the methods Russians used to govern themselves that are important to the understanding of their political culture.

The first characteristic is group decision-making by consensus. Although the viability of the group takes precedence over the rights of the individual, these group decisions were reached in a corporate manner. Apparently a great deal of discussion was allowed during the formation of a decision. However, once a decision was made community members were obliged to unanimously support it. Decisions were reached by ad-hoc councils made up of the heads of households in a village. Edward Keenan points out that there appears to have been little formal structure to these groups, but they seem to have been powerful bodies which dominated village life. [Ref. 40]

Once decisions were made and successfully implemented, village political life took on an extraordinarily conservative character. The primary thrust of decisions was the avoidance of risk. Keenan describes it like this:

> If an innovation offered a short-term improvement of the standard of living at the cost of an increased risk of possible calamity, it was rejected....When faced with danger the village would hunker down-or pick up and move on-rather than change. [Ref. 41]

It is important at this point to generalize from some aspects of the village culture to the court culture so that a greater understanding of elite political culture may be gained.

It has been stated above that the Russian government naturally became one that was patrimonial and authoritarian. It too was concerned with survival - its own political survival. One method for it to accomplish this was to take on a conservative viewpoint. Actions were taken which were designed to ensure its "....survival as a distinct and effective political and economic unit...." [Ref. 42] Many mechanisms arose during this time and can be seen as enhancing this survival-centralization, secrecy and deception among them.

From its inception the Russian government appears to have been highly centralized. Important to the operation of the system was the presence of at least the illusion of an all-powerful Tsar at the center. This central prop was one reason that the system could operate under weak, incompetent even mad Tsars for, "....it mattered little, in most generations, who was at the center of this system, but it was crucially important that someone be, and that allegiance to him be at least nominally unconditional." [Ref. 43/emphasis in original]

The idea of a strong Tsar was a mainstay of the legitimization of the power and position of the princely Boyar clans, who participated in the decision-making, and the politically

neutral bureaucracy who carried out those decisions. The myth of a strong Tsar also helped to level the competing interests at court in such a manner that the system could not become unbalanced by one clan. The maintenance of the system helped ensure the power positions of the clans so they appeared eager to perpetuate it.

The necessity for the maintenance of the strong Tsar myth also led to the building up of the deception of his omnipotence. Most foreigners saw a constant picture of an all-powerful Tsar who was treated as omnipotent by even the most powerful of his Boyars. On the contrary, decisions appear to have been reached in the same secret, ad-hoc, consensus conscious manner that served as the basis for decision-making throughout the Russian culture. The deception was probably used to ensure the survival of the system in the face of changes in conditions.

It is the conservative, centralized character of the Russian government, perpetuated by deception and secrecy, born from a harsh climatic and historical environment that allows paranoia to become a major trait of Russian political culture. Again it seems to begin with survival, as noted by Morton Schwartz:

> Complete discipline and service to the state-no "society" outside the state- was the price seen as necessary for survival. It also produced, not surprisingly, an idiosyncratic view of the outside world, characterized in large measure by suspicion and fear. [Ref. 44]

This paranoia appears to permeate most aspects of political behavior. It has taken myriad forms throughout Russian history from the consistent difficulties in allowing Russians access to foreign ideas, either by restricting access to foreigners themselves or by declaring domestic and foreign news a state secret; to the "everyone is against us" attitude of the modern Soviet state.

Our interpretation has been that the Russian culture grew out of environmental conditions that dictated that life was a struggle for survival. The possibility of success of this struggle was enhanced by the subordination of the individual to the group. One method to ensure group survival was to enact strict control measures over weak and dangerous individuals. At the state level these measures were manifested by the existence of a tradition of authoritarianism and patrimonialism. The state took control of its subjects' existence. In its parallel search for institutional survival the state took on a conservative outlook, its actions being designed more to foster its perpetuation than to serve its citizens. In so doing the state appeared to take on the basic personality of the prevalent culture; closed, secretive, devious and paranoid.

This is one legacy of the traditional Russian political culture. Of equal importance to the analysis of the Soviet political culture is the Marxist ideology, to which we will now turn.

B. MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY AND THE SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE

As was stated in the introduction the role of ideology in the behavior of the Soviet leadership is a subject of some controversy. It is a thesis of this study that Marxist-Leninist ideology has become an integral part of the Soviet political culture and has an important influence on the behavior of the Soviet leadership. Robert Conquest sees it this way:

> In the West, Soviet concern with ideology is often not taken seriously. On the contrary....it constitutes the crux. Nor is it a matter of merely holding a particular political opinion: the attitudes of the Soviet leadership are not simply based on ideas in some abstract sense--they are soaked into its bones. [Ref. 45]

This section will discuss why Soviet behavior is ideologically based, how ideology influences elite behavior and what the major ideological points which affect Soviet political culture are.

The Soviets devote a great deal of time and effort to linking current policy and behavior to previous Marxist-Leninist pronouncements. As R. Judson Mitchell says; "Even if this is a purely formal exercise, its persistence indicates that ideological sources influence characteristic behavior in the political system." [Ref. 46]

It is important to identify some uses of ideology in the political system. Mitchell discusses three basic tenets of doctrine which are ideological in nature:

> First, since its inception with Lenin, Soviet ideology has above all justified control of society by the party. Second, the ideology has consistently postulated a linkage between foreign and domestic variables, maintaining a total world view of the theoretical interconnection of all sociopolitical structures. Finally, there is the perennial view of a global polarization of social forces, of a competition among social systems. [Ref. 47]

Therefore, ideology serves to justify the power of the political elite, and helps form the structure through which world events are analyzed. Because ideology legitimizes the leadership it appears to be essential to its survival, and is an example of the tie between the Soviet ideology and the traditional Russian political culture.

The Marxist dialectic emphasizes that struggle in all facets of life is constant. "The concept is both Marxist and deeply Russian, that life-people, nature, the elements, ideas- is in a constant state of struggle." [Ref. 48] In the dialectic all things are interrelated but are in constant conflict, there is a never ending chain of development. External stability has litt'e place in this reasoning. The chain of historical development will inexorably lead to the "workers paradise". Stephen P. Gibert shows how this dynamic view of social change affects the world view of the Soviet leaders:

* Soviet leaders see themselves as "men of the future";
* Russia's elites are confident that communism will ultimately prevail. There is no need, accordingly, to take unnecessary risks;
* Social developments follow objective laws;

* It is possible to develop a complete understanding of reality by means of a systematic approach; everything has its own inner logic;

* Management of global change can be accomplished by the Soviet leaders, since they understand the origins, development and direction of social forces. [Ref. 49]

These points summarize some important ideological underpinnings of Soviet political behavior--polarization between social systems, correlation of forces, the natural progression of history, the Soviet view of time, the supremacy of the party, and universality of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. These are the major ideological points which affect Soviet political behavior and will now be discussed.

The Soviet leader seems to see the struggle between different social systems as inevitable. This struggle takes place on many levels and is the basis of many interactions in the international arena. Everything is interrelated. This polarization concept serves to form the foundation from which events are judged. This fact is often confusing to external observers, as Nathan Leites points out:

> ....the Politburo in its interpretations of the world outside often seems to perceive connections between events where we see none; to regard unrelated details as symptomatic of major political trends; and to believe that there is complicated planning behind what we know to be fortuitous....
>
> Although the Politburo is realistic in dealing with the immediate consequences, military and industrial, of new technologies, it tends to feel that the essentials in human affairs-seen in terms of "capitalism", "socialism", "communism"-have not changed. [Ref. 50]

The process of the struggle between the different social systems is analyzed by the use of the correlation of forces.

To the Soviet the correlation of forces is the method of measuring the across-the-board strength of the different social systems. Since everything is interrelated the Soviets see their measurement of the correlation, which includes factors other than just the military balance, as an accurate depiction of the state of the world. One observer describes it in this manner:

> Soviet theoreticians maintain that correlation of forces provides a conceptual framework more conducive to accurate measurement than does the "balance of power" approach. In the Soviet view, Western practitioners of balance of power analysis engage in highly impressionistic assessments of the weights of power factors, while Soviet correlation analysts carefully, precisely calculate the weights of factors identified by scientific procedures....Soviet analysts list four main categories of factors in the correlation of forces: economic, military, political and international movements....Its primary importance, however, is probably not its value as an indicator but the attention it focuses on the presumed inevitable competition between systems. [Ref. 51]

This global view of the correlation of forces seems to fit nicely with the Russian trait of distrusting outsiders. Since struggle occurs on all levels, contact with foreigners must be avoided lest they exert a corrupting influence.

Another basic Marxist tenet which influences Soviet behavior is the immutable march of history in the socialist direction. This is what is known as "scientific socialism", the view that the march of history proceeds not "as a wild whirl of senseless deeds of violence", to quote Engels, but according to basic laws which Marx is said to have discovered. [Ref. 52] Politically significant events are explainable by

these laws, nothing occurs by accident. The true interpreter of these natural laws is the party and its leadership. It seems to be important to the legitimization of the party that these interpretations appear correct, and that the state's behavior appears to be based upon them.

An important corollary to this "march of history" is the Soviet view of time, which also serves as a good example of the blending of Marxism and traditional Russian political culture. Since there is a constant movement of historical development there is little need to worry about time schedules.

> "What came later was assumed to be....better; setbacks were only temporary, the reverse stroke of an historic spiral that had only one direction-upward to a higher level." [Ref. 53]

Since a primary goal of the traditional Russian was survival, he had only to endure as long as he could, a situation in which time schedules had little meaning. He consequently developed great patience. This combination of the Marxist view of gradualism with the inherent Russian patience is important because it seems to manifest itself in many ways in current Soviet political behavior. The Soviet negotiating style of consistently outlasting its American counterparts is but one example.

While the timing of historical events is not predictable, their general movement in the socialist direction is inevitable. But Marxism-Leninism is also an activist ideology, and as such allows the timing of events to be tampered with as occasions arise:

> However, it is a task of the Party to shorten as much as possible the road to (and hence the cost of) victory.... This can be done because at many historical junctures more than one outcome is "objectively possible". "Objective conditions" create certain "opportunities" for the Party; whether the Party will succeed in "utilizing" them and transforming them into "realities" cannot be predicted. [Ref. 54]

One result of this neat juxtaposition of logic is that the leadership can see failures in terms of improper timing- the objective conditions not being favorable when the failure occurred; while success affirms the inevitability of historical movement. It appears important to the survival of the party leadership that it cling to this particular point of the ideology, because this sense of timing seems to be deeply ingrained in the political culture.

The role of the party is important to the understanding of the Soviet political culture. The party appears to be essential to the operation of Marxism-Leninism in the USSR. It serves as the central focus of the ideology, the repository of the wisdom about the inevitable progression of history. It should most probably be the center of decision-making in the Communist state. However, from about the end of Stalin's purges the party aparatus in general-like the bureaucracy and the military- seems to serve an outwardly significant, but somewhat less important function in the realm of major political decision-making, which is the function of the small, ad-hoc, conspiratorial Politburo.

It appears that this is another example of the operation of Soviet political culture which has direct parallels to the traditional Russian culture. In that culture the myth of the omnipotence of the Tsar was promoted in an attempt to cover the actual extent of the power resident in the inner circle of boyars surrounding him. Currently the appearance of a semi-democratic decision-making procedure in the party seems to serve as a cover for the virtually absolute power which resides in the Politburo.

Both the inner circle of boyars and the Politburo seem to have similar operating principles. They share the same group of basic characteristics which we have attributed to the great Russian political culture--they are informal, corporate, avoid risk, and appear paranoid. These examples serve to show a continuity in the political culture despite the introduction of a radical ideology. The Marxist-Leninist ideology combined with the legacy of the Great Russian political culture is one basis for the hybrid which is the Soviet political culture.

Along these lines it is important to note that the victorious faction which survived the chaos of the Russian civil war appears to have been the one with the closest resemblance to the historical culture:

> ....among the organizations and trends that had competed for hegemony in the revolutionary period, it was the Bolshevik party whose creed of centralism, elitism and conspiratorial rule was most compatible with traditional patterns, that became the principle agent and benificiary of the reestablishment of political stability. [Ref. 55]

This would appear to be an obviously logical occurrence, the ideology reinforcing the underlying culture.

Marxism-Leninism can also be seen as being universalist in nature. As the end of the inevitable historical movement Marxist-Leninist goals and methods are thought by the Soviets to be the only true destiny of mankind. However, there is also a strong tradition of universalism prevalent in Russian history. During his interviews with Soviet citizens, Dicks uncovered a modern manifestation of Russian universalism:

> Every now and again we get glimpses of the persistence of old, deep beliefs and aspirations regarding the "special mission" of the Russian people to supercede the morbid, oversophisticated civilization of the west; a belief in the superiority of Russian strength, capacity to endure hardship, cunning, and inventiveness, and virtuous contempt for the enfeebling timidity that springs from attachment to physical possessions. [Ref. 56]

It appears that the tightly closed system which has prospered throughout Russian history might have spawned this universalist view of the world.

> Like the ruler of Old Muscovy, they tend to see themselves as the bearers of a unique message and the center of a new, higher civilization. Now as in the past Moscow proclaims itself an example to all peoples.
>
> These beliefs, rooted in history and buttressed by ideology, give rise to....striking personality traits....ideological exclusiveness always breeds xenophobia. Evidence of this abhorrence of foreign values is still....very much present. Thus, like their Muscovite ancestors, the Soviet leaders seem to share a profound lack of interest in the non-Russian. [Ref. 57]

We will also see a strong universalist tradition as one of the major tenets of the American political culture.

Some additional words on what we have loosely termed Soviet paranoia are appropriate. It has been shown above that the fear of invasion has been virtually constant throughout Russian history. In part, this might be responsible for the Russian obsession with survival and thus the growth of the closed, conservative system which engenders suspicion of outsiders and what we have called paranoia. Today this paranoia manifests itself in the Soviet preoccupation with the security of its borders and its sense of being "picked on" by the rest of the world.

This feeling that everyone is against them colors their views and is ingrained in their actions. It permeates Lenin, who felt (possibly with good reason) that the major capitalist powers were intent on the destruction of the fledgling Soviet state. However Lenin seems to build the conspiracy out of proportion to its actual strength:

> ....all events in world politics....are concentrated around one central point, viz., the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet Russian Republic. [Ref. 58]

Since the world has ganged up on them everyone who was not an ally was considered an enemy. George Kennan states this eloquently:

> There is no border zone of Russian power. The jealous and intolerant eyes of the Kremlin can distinguish, in the end, only vassals and enemies; and the neighbors of

> Russia, if they do not wish to be the one, must reconcile themselves to being the other. [Ref. 59]

Enemies like this are not only external but also thrive internally in the Soviet Union and must be constantly watched for so that they might not destroy the state. Nathan Leites points this out:

> Incessant and all-seeing vigilance are essential if mistakes which might "open a path" into the Party for enemies are to be avoided. Not only must no "door" be "open" to them, but there must not be the smallest "crack" through which some "worm" could "creep". [Ref. 60]

The object of this incessant vigilance is anyone who might be a threat. Note the Russianness in this quote by Lenin:

> Any group not controlled by the Party, both at home and abroad, is an enemy....[Lenin said] keep in mind that this is an unreliable friend (and hence an enemy). [Ref. 61]

It is, of course, Stalin who exemplifies this trait of seeing enemies at every turn. His brutal purges enforcing collectivization, of the foreign policy and military organizations in in the 1930's, and the so-called "doctor's purge" ongoing at his death are prime examples of the manner in which internal enemies were treated. The fates of Gomulka in Poland, the Bulgarian Kostov, Rajk in Hungary among countless other Eastern Europeans in the late 1940's shows that Stalin's paranoia did not stop at the border. [Ref. 62]

But these examples cannot just be explained away as the excesses of a madman. They are consistent with the behavior of Soviet and Russian leaders throughout history. Khrushchev's manner in dealing with Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovic, and even

his savior Zhukov, while bloodless, also shows this paranoid trait at work, as does the current practice of exiling or expelling dissidents. [Ref. 63]

In addition to influencing the Soviets to see enemies all around this paranoia also leads them to make claims that most Americans might consider irrational. Two examples, written by Soviet academics for an American audience are representative:

> The use of the atomic weapon was of no military significance; it had a different purpose- to demonstrate it, and to try to intimidate the Soviet Union. That is how American atomic blackmail had its start. [Ref. 64]

> Kennedy was firmly convinced that a balance of power between the United States and the USSR was intolerable, that it was essential to achieve a decisive superiority over the Soviet Union. For the sake of speeding up the armaments race he was prepared to misinterpret everything. [emphasis mine Ref. 65]

These statements would be labled as patently ridiculous by many Americans but are indicative of a Soviet view of the world, a view it is essential to understand if their actions in the world arena are to be properly understood.

C. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE

The preceeding discussion has been aimed at building a case for the description of the Soviet political culture. It is the purpose of this thesis to build this model for both the Soviet and American political cultures and then apply it to the INF negotiations as both a method for describing each government's position there, and as a predictor for the

reactions of one government to the other. Because political culture is a subconscious framer of attitudes the model built should be general in nature. For this reason we will stress attitudinal nuances over a "cookbook" approach in the political stereotype we are about to build.

With these qualifications in mind a discussion of some primary concerns of the Soviet elite political culture follows. These are generalizations, and while certainly not accurate descriptions of individual members of the elite, serve to accentuate the areas of cultural influence. This will be useful in applying the stereotype built here to the INF negotiations.

The Soviet leadership will be concerned first and foremost with the survival of the state, with the security of the USSR. Threats to this security will be seen as a tightly controlled and interrelated conspiracy whose design is the destruction of the Soviet state.

These threats will be met on all levels by a united front whose purpose is to control the environment so that chaos may be averted and survival assured. These threats will be taken seriously and met with a vast array of weapons directed at softening the adversary across the board and finding his weak link so that it may be attacked relentlessly. These views of struggle on all fronts and searching for the weakest link come directly from Lenin:

....The whole of political life is an endless chain consisting of an infinite number of links. The whole art of politics lies in finding the link that can be least torn out of our hands....and having found it, cling to that link as tightly as possible. [Ref. 66]

Our stereotypical Soviet leader will see his adversary as evil, as needing to be controlled. He will assume that his adversary will make tough decisions based on the end result and not be particularly concerned with the means to those ends. Because of this mirror-image the Soviet leader will be inclined to respond in kind. This response will use deception as a major tactic, hiding both strengths and weaknesses in an effort to manipulate the other side. An example from the Korean Airliner incident in September 1983, is illustrative. The insistence by the Soviets that the Korean airliner was on a spy mission for the U.S. and thus liable to be attacked can be seen as a mirror image of their own use of commercial airliners.

It appears to be important to the Soviets that they control the tempo of any interaction. In a negotiation, concessions would be on relatively minor points, which would be portrayed in the propaganda as major and unmatched by the other side. Concessions even remotely related to the core-issue, the survival of the USSR, would be made only in extreme circumstances, after all other options have been exhausted. Lenin was specific about concessions:

....the concessions we grant, which we are forced to grant, are the continuation of war in another form, by other means. [Ref. 67]

Decisions appear to be normally made by the Politburo on all aspects of the conflict, so that local representatives would have little independent power to explore avenues of agreement. An example of this is the now famous "Walk in the Woods" agreement between the Soviet and American negotiators in Geneva in 1982. This was a tentative guideline for agreement reached by the top level negotiators at the INF talks in which both sides made concessions. The concessions made by the Soviet negotiator, Ambassador Kvitsinsky, were overruled by the Soviet government ("with vehemence" is the description used for the rejection by the former head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow [Ref. 68]). It should also be noted that the U.S. government rejected some of the terms of the tentative agreement arrived at during the "Walk in the Woods".

These, then, are some of the effects of the political culture on the Soviet leadership. This leader is one who believes in the dominance of the group over the individual. To this leader survival of the state is all important, and considerations of morality, legality, or truthfulness should not be allowed to interfere. This leader believes he is surrounded on all sides by enemies as committed to his destruction as he is to his own survival. In order to survive this leader must exert iron control over the situation, for to loosen his grip is to invite chaos. His major adversary is socialized in the American political culture, which is

different in background and viewpoint. The next chapter will attempt to define this culture.

III. AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE

As we mentioned in the introduction American political culture was formed in both a natural and political environment that was significantly different from that of the Soviet political culture. The culture was allowed to evolve in a relatively peaceful framework, mostly free from outside interference.

As we did in chapter two we will generally state the cultural points which evolved in this framework. They are:

1. Americans appear to be generally moralistic and idealistic but somewhat less ideological in nature than the Soviets;
2. Americans tend to believe themselves to be rational and pragmatic, and think in a legalistic manner;
3. Americans place a strong emphasis on the universality of their method of problem solution;
4. Americans tend to pay more attention to events which are contemporary in nature rather than concerning themselves with specific plans for the future or living in the past;
5. Stability, the status quo and peaceful change are important for Americans in the international arena.

These are the specific assumptions which we will discuss about the American political culture.

A. AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE DESCRIBED

Contrary to the Soviet political culture the American culture is not based on several centuries of evolution in a relatively static environment, but can be seen as being born

as a unique entity slightly over two centuries ago. Peter Conrad in his Imagining America, sees America from a foreign perspective and captures this point:

> As [H.G.] Wells says, while modern European states haphazardly evolved, "The United States were planned and made" by those rational, historically guiltless gestures commemorated in the constitutional preamble. In 1492, America was merely discovered, in 1776, it was invented- or rather it imagined itself for the first time. Invention is a mechanical initiative, interrupting and accelerating the sluggish drift of history. [Ref. 69]

Americans like to see themselves as new, unique, made-up of the best parts of a combination of traditions, but beholding to none of them:

> The legacy of America's past is a heritage of separation- not only a physical separating between the New World and the traditional centers of world politics, but a moral distance, a willed and self-conscious separation of a "segment" divorced from its European background. This segment has quickly and constantly resorted to a celebration of its uniqueness....[Ref. 70]

Historically, the American emphasis has been on the individual's relationship with the environment,

> ....each man had to contend with the forces of nature for his success....He would be self-reliant and independent of others....They did not have to live out predetermined lives as they would have had to do in Europe. [Ref. 71]

This led to less of an emphasis on corporate survival than the Russians showed.

The uniqueness of the American experience leads to a fundamental belief in its own exceptionalism. A quote from George Ball is illustrative:

> As Carl Becker pointed out many years ago, we borrowed heavily from the Judaic idea of a chosen people. We

> were the "city on....a hill," what both Hegel and Tocqueville referred to as "the land of the future." [Ref. 72]

This view probably stems from a different view of man than the Soviets have, a view that appears to be more positive in nature.

One view of man from the American perspective is specified by Harold Laswell:

> In his list of democratic character qualities he includes; (1) an "open ego", by which he means a warm and inclusive attitude toward other human beings; (2) a capacity for sharing values with others; (3) a multi-valued rather than a single-valued orientation; (4) trust and confidence in the human environment; and (5) relative freedom from anxiety. [Ref. 73]

This view leads to some assumptions about authority, the capabilities of individuals, and the purpose of government that strongly influence political views.

In general, authority does not reside in the government but is delegated to the government by the sovereign people. Because of this it is within the competence of these people to remove that authority from the individuals exercising it. As Ronald Reagan says, "Government exists for their [the citizen's] convenience, not the other way around." [Ref. 74] This primary view of man as "good" and of authority emanating from him is one of the central themes of the American political culture.

Because man, in general, and American man in particular, is "good", the preservation and enhancement of that goodness becomes a primary goal of the political system. This leads

to one of the most pervasive of American political cultural traits, moralism.

The American political culture is permeated with moralism. It is constantly there, from President Reagan's moral pronouncements about the "evil empire" of communism, to the liberal's opposition to the Vietnam war on moral grounds. Americans not only appear to see themselves as moral but strive to act in a moral manner, or at least explain their actions in moral terms. Margaret Mead describes the American passion for moralism in this manner:

> To have a moral character does not mean to be good, but it means to think that goodness is transcendently important, that there is a right and a wrong and that in the end all final decisions must be made in terms of what is right and what is wrong. [Ref. 75]

It is important to Americans to believe that they have right on their side in their dealings with other nations. A subset of their actual moralism is the virtual requirement that things political be seen in moral terms. American principles and ideals tend to assume the strength of moral imperatives, expressions of cherished beliefs. Examples like this from Washington's Farewell Address are common in American political thought:

> Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensible supports....And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion....Reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. [Ref. 76]

This moralism is ingrained in the American political culture. It is not merely rhetorical. It is one logical outgrowth of the unique political framework and history of the United States. This moralistic viewpoint contains an idealism and a sense of mission that appears as uniquely American. Richard B. Morris sums up:

> Fundamental to the character of the American Revolution was the notion that the people were sovereign and that a republican system of government based upon their consent was innately superior to any other prevailing system. As the Founding Fathers envisioned it, their republic would prove more virtuous than systems embracing hereditary or caste principles of authority. It would command greater moral discipline. It would be more immediately concerned with the welfare of society, and, since the people were sovereign, it would more surely command their allegiance than other systems. Such a republic, they felt, was tailor-made for America, with its exceptional advantages, its boundless resources, and its immense distance from the Old World. Granted that a republican order had a better chance to put down roots in America, the Founding Fathers confidently expected that its success would serve as a model for all mankind. Thus, a sense of mission was from the start embedded in the national purpose. [Ref. 77]

Examples of the American proclivity to view the world in moral terms abound throughout its history. More directly pertinent to this thesis, the presidents in this century have carried on the tradition. Obvious examples run from Wilson's Fourteen Points to Carter's human rights policies.

Of equal importance is the perceived necessity to attach moral rhetoric to policies that might be driven more by superpower pragmatism. Stanley Hoffman discusses this:

> The deliberate transposition of policies decided on grounds of power or national interest into the language of principle thus corresponds to two characteristic

> assumptions: that this is the language that best moves the American people because it is its own; and that it is likely to be the most effective abroad. The first assumption reflects an experience, the second only a conviction. [Ref. 78]

The use of moralistic rhetoric to explain American actions, particularly, it seems, in this hemisphere, may be seen in Theodore Roosevelt's appeal to moralism with regard to the Panama Canal, in Lyndon Johnson's explanation of the Dominican Republic incursion in 1965, and more recently in Ronald Reagan's discussion of the invasion of (or "rescue mission" in) Grenada. A common thread running through these examples is the perceived need for the American position to be, or seem to be, on the side of right, while the actions themselves could be seen as being more pragmatic in nature.

This point is emphasized by Robert Dallek as he describes Roosevelt's actions in this way:

> Roosevelt's appeal to moral considerations for what some saw as immoral actions was but one of the several ironies in the progressive mood and world view. Not only had the United States casually overridden Columbia's legitimate self-interest and ignored customary international legal and moral constraints for the sake of a higher good, but it had also favored revolutionary disorder in the name of order and described its imperial control of a canal zone as Panamanian self-rule. [Ref. 79]

It is not really the hypocrisy that is important here but the virtual requirement that the action be seen as stemming from moral considerations. One corollary to the strong moral strain seen in the U.S. political culture is the existence of an equally strong idealistic influence.

Woodrow Wilson's famous quote is indicative of the extent of American idealism:

> Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well, that is the way I know I am an American. America is the only idealist nation in the world. [Ref. 80]

Idealism, like moralism, permeates American thought and rhetoric. Americans tend to believe in this idealism and, in most cases, demand that their politicians do so also. The American public, says Stanley Hoffman, "....wants some idealism in its foreign policy." [Ref. 81]

It might be said that Richard Nixon's "sin" in Watergate was not necessarily that he was caught committing serious criminal acts, but more likely that he destroyed the public's trust in the morality of its president. It was, perhaps, his perceived wanton disregard for the ideal of presidential morality that led to the erosion of support which ultimately caused his resignation.

For many Americans this ideal takes the form of the need for a national purpose, one seen in this manner:

> Our national purpose consists of a commitment to seek a set of lofty goals. Premised on belief in the value of respect for the essential dignity of the individual human being, our national aspirations relate primarily to liberty, equality, and justice. From this perspective the touchstone of government is the degree to which its activities do not impede but, if anything, facilitate and enhance each person's ability to realize his or her potentialities, to pursue happiness. [Ref. 82]

It is an important factor to the political longevity of American politicians that they believe in this purpose, at least in rhetoric if not in action.

As was stated above this idealism, moralism, and national purpose is not a direct result of a strictly interpreted ideology, defined here as a set of ideas and symbols which give the believers a systematic, almost programmed view of the world and which is institutionalized in the governmental machinery. This distinction is important for it indicates that America's principles are general sets of ideas which set the tone for, but do not necessarily prescribe action. Americans believe in "human-rights" and "self-determination" and any number of other ideals which may be characterized as abstract principles rather than strict guides for action. The definition of the American ideal of "human-rights" certainly seems to have changed from the Carter to the Reagan administration, while the commitment to the ideal still remains.

One way to think of American principles is as a relatively loose set of solutions to the problems which have afflicted Americans throughout their history. These solutions can be seen as resulting from unique American qualities- know-how, perseverance, ingenuity, and even goodness. These principles were not necessarily set down beforehand as a strict ideology but continue to evolve and grow with American experience.

This has spawned a method of dealing with problems may be described as rational and pragmatic. "Ours is a how-to-do-it society, and not a what-to-do society." [Ref. 83] The general American method of solving problems is to break them into simple elements and then solve them by what Stanley Hoffman

calls "skill thinking", an engineering or mechanistic approach to problem solution. Once the problems are taken down to their most basic level they are solved, to a large extent, by formulas which prescribe general solutions over a wide range of options.

As will be discussed below skill thinking poses some difficulties to its users:

> ....reliance on formulas makes one think by analogy--a very dangerous habit which is aggravated in the American case by the presence in the government of many lawyers, who are used to reasoning in terms of precedents. Analogical reasoning singles out, in the two complex events being compared, features that are common to both and suggests that since they were essential in the first case they must be decisive in the second. [Ref. 84]

Issues tend to be fragmented into compartments which can be solved by this formula thinking. However, there is no guarantee that the correct formula is being applied or even that the problem is capable of being solved in this manner.

Another difficulty is that even if the component problems can be solved, their interrelatedness is not necessarily addressed. George Liska describes the elite political culture in the United States as having:

> ....a stake in segregating issues into either technically or tactically definable and manageable slices of space, time or function. Their assumption is that such issues are separable and, when separated, can be mechanically reassembled into a coherent grand strategy. [Ref. 85]

This tendency to misunderstand the synergistic effect of these "slices" may lead to an overreliance on the ability to solve problems mechanically often at the expense of the "coherent grand strategy".

A prime example is President Carter's human rights and arms sales policies. The officially stated policy of the Carter Administration was spelled out by the State Department in 1978:

> The U.S. is seeking to integrate human rights considerations into its bilateral and multilateral relationships as a key element in decision making....We wish to develop a policy permitting a case-by-case approach to improve human rights situations in the most effective way possible. [Ref. 86]

This case-by-case approach is an example of compartmentalizing the human rights issue out of the overall strategy of dealing with major foreign policy problems, that of relations among individual nations and the proliferation of arms sales to those nations. [Ref. 87]

By compartmentalizing the question of what America can do to help the cause of human rights worldwide and then using as one method of solving the problem the denial of arms sales to rights violators the Carter administration alienated many third world countries. This could have done more harm to U.S. interests than good. For example, Brazil chose not to accept American arms shipments which were tied to changes in its human rights policies and almost immediately fulfilled its arms needs from other sources (primarily Israel and France, but also Libya). [Ref. 88]

The American penchant for rationality appears to be the key here. The American brand of rationality in the human rights example was simple. The formula was if a country would not stop violating its citizen's rights the U.S. would stop

selling them arms. This presumably would bring the violating country to its senses and rights violations would stop.

That many third world countries saw this as another example of American paternalism and an interference in their internal affairs does not seem to have been initially important to the framers of the policy. The policy can be seen as an attempt to apply the American brand of rationality to that situation, a rationality that might not have fit.

Hoffman's legalism can be seen as a combination of American moralism and rationality. It is one point of pride that Americans live in a society of laws, not men. Since laws govern the behavior of civilized people it follows that human interaction should be guided by those laws. Again the example of the American commitment to International Law and Organizations shows the belief in the rule of law.

In addition to the pitfalls of analogical thinking discussed above, Americans can seriously misjudge a situation by attempting to place it into a legal framework. American insistence on on-site inspection during disarmament negotiations, in addition to a showing a well-deserved lack of trust in the Russians, is indicative of this legalism.

The belief appears to be that if the Soviets can be caught breaking the agreement they will be liable to universal condemnation because they "broke the law". That the Soviet objection to inspection may not necessarily come from a desire

to cover up the breaking of the agreement but from a sincere, culturally determined, fear that their security might be breached appears to be overshadowed by the pervasive influence of legalism in the American attitude.

Legalism is a strong force in American foreign policy. Two reflections of this are in the idealistic establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations, both American ideas. These organizations can be seen as expressions of faith in International Law, that man can control conflict by organizing into a framework based on legal principles.

With regard to American/Soviet relations Robert Dallek sees a strong thread of legalism in the nonrecognition policy which dominated U.S.-Soviet relations for over a decade after the Russian Revolution:

> The nonrecognition policy toward the Soviets rested on the belief that Russia was not a civilized nation-that is, not one that paid its debts, honored agreements, and renounced international revolution. As the historian Christopher Lasch has explained, it was a widely held view that the United States "could have relations only with a regime which shared its own attitudes and assumptions about the world." [Ref. 89]

The pervasiveness of legalism is a significant point in the American culture. An excellent example showing the unconscious impact of legalism on American political behavior is in this rather lengthy quote from Adam Ulam regarding President Truman's political problems with the Progressive Henry Wallace during the 1948 presidential campaign:

> Truman publically characterized "Uncle Joe" [Stalin] as a man essentially of good will but thwarted by the Politburo, of which he was a prisoner. And on the eve of the election, it was proposed to refute Wallace's charges that Truman had betrayed Roosevelt's heritage of American-Soviet friendship by the dramatic gesture of sending Chief Justice Vinson as Presidential Envoy to Stalin....
>
> But why should the Chief Justice go on the mission? Truman's explanation is of great psychological interest: "If we could only get Stalin to unburden himself to someone on our side he could trust, I thought we could get somewhere." Why, might a foreigner wonder, should Stalin trust Justice Vinson, a man completely unknown to him, of no experience and background in foreign affairs? Well, in the American secular, legalistic system, the judiciary comes closest to what is in other societies the Established Church, and the Chief Justice serves as a symbol of judiciousness, probity, and independence from political considerations. But it did not occur to Truman, who was a man straightforward enough to think of the mission as not merely an electoral gimmick, that there was no reason in the world for Stalin or anybody else abroad to view the Chief Justice in that light and to discuss politics with him, let alone unburden himself. [Ref. 90]

Another theme which arises frequently in American foreign policy is that of universalism. We have already seen a strong strain of it in the Soviet culture, but it appears to be an even stronger influence in the American culture. This universalism seems to come from the American belief in their history of success. The logic seems to be that those principles which have contributed to American success should be applied universally to solve all of the world's problems.

George Liska sees this universalist strain as having negative connotations, as preventing Americans from treating the Russian state as a "normal" state. In order to accomplish this it is important for Americans to:

> ....relinquish the presumption of their own uniqueness and thus look upon themselves as just another group of people on the historical treadmill. They will not truly accept the essential continuity that exists between Soviet Russia and tsarist Russia but also all other great powers until they have given up the view of themselves as endowed with both capacity and the right to save the world from itself--and from history. [Ref. 91]

One manifestation of American universalism is in its view of negotiations. It seems that Americans believe that if men of good will sit down with each other and negotiate in good faith, the consensus solution will have something for everybody. That this fair-minded method might not yield an optimum solution to members of other cultures seems to be less important to most Americans than the practice of reaching the solution by the American method:

> The assumption of normalcy of consensus has often led American statesmen to offer friendship to foes of the United States on the condition that they recognize the universal validity of American principles. We do not think we are asking a humilating concession of them: once they have "mended their ways" they will become partners in the task of ordering the world and will see that their interests are better served thereby....[Ref. 92]

Americans, as other nationalities, have a very difficult time seeing the world as others might see it. Americans also have difficulty seeing their environment and the circumstances of their history as special considerations which might have made their success record possible.

Americans seem to think, and preach, that their principles are responsible for their successes, and can thus be applied to the rest of the world. This is an example of a simplistic

world view, one which is exacerbated by the inherent drive for simplicity in the American mechanistic problem solving method, and the inbred simplicity of its moral view of the world. De Tocqueville observed this over 200 years ago:

> The practice which obtains amongst the Americans, of fixing the standard of their judgment in themselves alone, leads them to other habits of mind. As they perceive they succeed in resolving without assistance all the little difficulties which their practical life presents, they readily conclude that everything in the world may be explained, and that nothing in it transcends the limits of the understanding. [Ref. 93]

Thus American pragmatism and universalism seem to lead to another cultural trait, simplicity. Skill thinking breaks problems down into their smallest, and simplest, components. These small problems are then relatively easily solved. Since Americans seem to believe that they solve problems easily it is a logical extension to see those solutions as universally applicable.

George Liska sees this as a trait caused both by the American culture and the requirements of policymaking in a pluralistic society:

> He [the elective statesman] perceives the vast public as needing to see issues starkly polarized in ways that are easy to grasp intellectually, are gratifying, or at least not offending emotionally, and are neutral in terms of whatever social or ethnic cleavages may beset his own political system internally. [Ref. 94]

Regardless of the cause of the importance of a simplistic world view, one result is that Americans tend to view the same events from a different perspective than those who have a more complicated view of the world, for example the Soviets.

This simplistic world view takes many forms, the aforementioned League of Nations and United Nations are simple (in concept), legalistic solutions to world conflict. Another example of the pervasiveness of simplicity and legalism is the 1928 Kellog-Briand Peace Pact which outlawed war. To its supporters the solution to war probably appeared simple, outlaw it and then bring the force of international law and public opinion to legitimize the ban.

This penchant for oversimplification is in conflict with the interrelatedness of the Soviet view. R. Judson Mitchell sees it as working to the disadvantage of the Americans in some cases:

> ....the most important advantage accruing to the Soviets.... lies in the tendency of Western policymakers to approach conflict in terms of particular problems. Once these problems are ostensibly resolved, Westerners assume that normal relationships have been established. As a result, the organization of resources for future conflicts is accorded lower priority or neglected. Western policymakers operate without a consensually accepted theory of general or long-range conflict; this contrasts with the Soviet approach, which integrates the short-run resolution of problems into a broader view of long-range continuing conflict....[Ref. 95]

The above quote also contains an example of the differing views of time between the two nations.

We have characterized Americans as living in the present. The lack of a strict ideology to show them what the future should be, and a similar lack of an ideological sense of history seems to lead them to believe that the present is more important in their world view. Americans see man as,

"....inventive, shrewd, and practical on a short run basis, and helpless, naive and unrealistic on a long range basis.... These traits resulted from the American's preoccupation with short range and manageable problems." [Ref. 96]

Since they tend to live in the present and have a record of success, Americans do not appear to have developed patience as a cultural trait to the extent that the Russians have. Problems are broken down, simplified, formulas applied, and solutions are usually forthcoming. There appears to be little need to wait for solutions as other problems are awaiting attention. Priority is given to what is urgent, often at the expense of what is important. It would seem quite easy for the Soviets to outlast the Americans at the negotiating table--Americans demand results, now, and appear willing to trade concessions for these results.

Time in negotiations becomes important due to the relatively frequent shifts in policy brought on by the American elections. In the INF case, negotiations were delayed for over a year to allow the Reagan administration time to formulate its policy. Now, with only slightly over a year left until the next elections one might expect a flurry of activity at the negotiations in order for the administration to reap some political gains from them. The Soviets, on the other hand, appear to know that the best time for them to gain advantages will be during this period when the Americans will be driving for an agreement.

The American view of time can be seen as leading to the final trait to be discussed here, that of a desire to maintain the status quo. We have said that there is no ubiquitous ideology which determines to shape of the future for Americans, no relentless march to utopia. American utopia appears to be a situation where American principles can operate:

> "....a world of plenty, of great expansion, of room for everybody to make a contribution and succeed....a world in which every human being has a right to develop what he has in him-a right to succeed, a right to the rewards of success." [Ref. 97]

This world is one in which stability is important. Although true stability certainly does not presently exist, the world as it is now is one where the United States can play a dominant role. It is not perfect but may be perfectable and thus should not be allowed to radically change.

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE

It is important to keep in mind that the previous discussion of the American political culture was designed to supply justification for the development of a model of that culture. It needs to be stated again that the stereotype developed is based on generalizations, not necessarily accurate in all respects but presented to point out some significant cultural traits which are to be used in the later analysis of the INF positions.

With these qualifications in mind the cultural stereotype of the American political elite follows. Of primary concern

to an American leader will be the actuality or appearance of morality. Just as the Soviet leader will be primarily concerned with survival the American leader will be concerned with the "goodness" or "rightness" of his position. This does not mean that the American will abandon positions of strength or national interest for the sake of morality, for he is also rational and pragmatic. It does mean that he believes he must be convinced of the goodness of his position as he sees it. The American leader's idealism will tend to make him believe that his position is best "for all mankind" and because of that he will invoke moral force to back his position.

Since the American leader can be seen as believing that he has the corner on the morality market, conflicts in which he is involved will tend to take on the character of good vs. evil. Since morality is all important, the contest becomes one of either-or. The American position is the best hope for mankind and that principle must be protected. The principle is the operant term here. History is full of examples where the initial American position has been significantly modified, but always with the profession that the principles were upheld. The coining of the term "peace with honor" to cover the collapse in Vietnam is but one example.

Because of his moralistic and idealistic bent the American leader will probably have a more limited set of "means" than his Soviet counterpart. This is not to say that Americans

can't be tough or don't use all available means to accomplish their goals. What it does say is that their utilization of these devices has limits. The American people have proven, either through the ballot or through Congress, that "extremism" (as in the case of Barry Goldwater) or "immorality" (in the case of Richard Nixon) are not considered as acceptable behavior on the part of their leaders.

The American leader will profess to reach decisions in a rational manner, and attempt to impress that particular brand of rationality on those with whom he deals. He will most probably see the world in legalistic terms, thinking by analogy and putting his own actions as well as those of others to the legal test. In his attempt to find solutions to the problems of the day he will simplify them to the smallest component which can be solved by mechanistic means.

This mechanistic and legalistic view of problem solving will lead him to a belief that if only the entire world would view things in the same manner our difficulties would be eased. Since many problems are solved by skill-thinking, in many cases by the application of predetermined formulas, this leader has little patience with long term solutions-he wants results now.

We have now seen some differences in cultural background upon which the behavior of the American and Soviet political elite may be based. In so doing general cultural stereotypes

of the leaders of each nation have been developed. The next chapter discusses the INF negotiating positions of each side from a cultural standpoint.

IV. CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF INF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

In the introduction to this thesis two possible utilizations for the cultural stereotypes which were to be developed were discussed. First, it was argued that these cultural models could be utilized as a method of analyzing the negotiating positions of each side at the INF negotiations. Secondly, the cultural models were to be applied in an attempt to see if predictions of each side's reactions to the other's proposals could be made.

This chapter will first generally evaluate both the Soviet and American negotiating positions utilizing the cultural models. Once this has been done the predictive capabilities of the models will be tested. In order to accomplish this a specific U.S. position, the "Zero Option" plan, will be analyzed culturally. Following that the model will be used to predict what the Soviet reaction to that specific proposal might be. Finally, the actual Soviet position will be analyzed to determine the efficacy of the model in predicting it.

References will be made throughout the chapter to specific weapons systems on both sides. Appendix A contains a discussion of the capabilities of all weapons referred to in this chapter and should be consulted should specific questions arise.

A. SOVIET INF NEGOTIATING POSITION

The initial Soviet negotiating position evolved between 1979 and 1981. It was originally proposed in a speech by Secretary Brezhnev in October 1979, in which he said:

> We are prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western areas of the Soviet Union in comparison with the present level.... but of course only if no additional medium-range nuclear weapons are deployed in Western Europe. [Ref. 98]

This offer to reduce the total number of delivery vehicles targeted on Europe said nothing about continuing to deploy the modern, multi-warheaded SS-20 (see Appendix A for specific weapon characteristics). The continued deployment of the SS-20 would have at least maintained the number of warheads available to the Soviet Union despite a reduction of delivery vehicles. In return for reducing the delivery vehicles NATO would not deploy any of the 572 new Pershing-II and GLCM missile scheduled for deployment in late 1983.

The thrust of this Soviet negotiating position seems to be designed to preserve their capability for inflicting massive destruction in Europe while denying NATO that same capability. This is euphemistically called "protecting the legitimate security interests of the USSR". It is a most obvious example of the Soviet cultural obsession with security. If the Soviet position were to be accepted it would retain its most modern and capable weapons while the NATO force would be significantly less capable.

In June 1980, Brezhnev further proposed that negotiations be aimed at balancing the Soviet INF missiles (but not bombers) against the not-yet-deployed U.S. missiles and the existing U.S. aircraft and theater submarine based missiles. [Ref. 99] In February 1981, he proposed essentially the same position as before but stated it slightly differently. The proposal consisted of: 1) a freeze on the number of INF missiles on both sides; 2) a halt to the modernization of existing INF missiles; and 3) a freeze on the number of U.S. aircraft. [Ref. 100] It was at this time that the Soviets began emphasizing their belief that there was "relative parity" between the two sides. Although puzzling at first, the Soviet insistence upon maintaining that a relative balance is already in place by putting *so much emphasis* on the numbers of delivery vehicles can be seen as a manifestation of the Soviet trait of seeking a weak link in an argument and pursuing it relentlessly.

In the 1981 Soviet weapons count there were 986 NATO units, of these 263 were British and French vehicles and 723 were American "units". The inclusion of British and French "units" in the Soviet negotiating position also became important at this time:

> Brezhnev told [the West German magazine] Der Spiegel that the Soviets would not seek to include the 263 British and French delivery vehicles in the Geneva negotiations with the Americans. He added, however, that the Soviets would insist that the NATO states measure Soviet security needs "by the same yardstick with which they measure their own." [Ref. 101]

This "yardstick" seems to indicate that the existence of the British and French units, whatever their number (now it's 162) is the floor beneath which the Soviets would not go in their bargaining with the Americans. It can be assumed that included in that floor number, on the Soviet side, would be their most modern weapons, the SS-20 and Backfire bomber. [Ref. 102] The logic appears to be that the threat to Soviet security comes from an integrated, unified NATO whose purpose is the destruction of that security, so only the most capable weapons would remain.

The inclusion of the British and French weapons in the negotiations is a good example of the clash of the cultural aspect on both sides. The Americans, in their legalistic manner, say the British and French weapons are not under NATO command and cannot be counted as NATO weapons. The Soviets see the entire alliance as a threat and insist that all weapons targeted against the USSR be counted, regardless of the command structure or legalities involved.

By reducing the base number of delivery vehicles on both sides to 263 the Soviets now suggested a "large reduction" in their remaining 712 delivery vehicles and the U.S.'s 723. This Soviet position was:

> With a view to reducing the level of the aforementioned weapons as much as possible for both NATO and the Soviet Union, the agreement should provide for a reduction in the present number of such weapons (approximately 1000 units on each side) to 300 units on each side by the end of 1990, with the establishment of an intermediate level of 600 units by the end of 1985....[Ref. 103]

As was stated above these units on the Soviet side would most probably consist of their most capable weapons while the NATO forces would be less capable.

As an example, if both sides were to draw down to 300 INF units each, and the Soviet moratorium on the deployment of new missiles was to be accepted, then (in 1981 numbers) the following force levels would occur:

> If the British and French were to retain all 263 units that Brezhnev judged unfit for negotiation, then the NATO arsenal of 300 units would consist of 144 French units, 119 British units and 37 U.S. units. [Ref. 104]

This obvious imbalance would serve to assure the security of the Soviet Union. It is important to note here that while the U.S. might see this imbalance as a manifestation of a Soviet drive for superiority, viewed from the Soviet cultural perspective this imbalance might appear to be considered necessary for the survival of the Soviet state, and as such reasonable from their point of view.

The remaining 723 American units were now made up solely of aircraft. It was also at this time that the Soviets dropped from their position any discussion of submarine launched missiles. This seemingly logical proposal was also designed with their security in mind for as Christopher Jones points out:

> Brezhnev specifically sought to relocate NATO's Poseidon missiles in the central U.S. arsenal. He proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union should "agree that the missile submarines of the two sides should be removed from their present extensive patrol areas and

> that their cruises should be restricted to limits mutually agreed upon". This would bar Poseidon submarines from "European" waters. [Ref. 105]

While the Poseidon possesses a relatively long range missile its removal from European waters would probably decrease its targeting flexibility, and presumably relieve some Soviet targets of the threat of the SLBM launch. Again this proposal is based in the Soviet obsession for security.

The current Soviet position is that talks should deal with all medium-range nuclear forces in Europe, including the French and British national nuclear forces, and all aircraft. In response to President Reagan's "Zero Option" plan (about which more will be said later) the Soviets proposed a reduction of their SS-20's to the British and French total of 162 missiles, and an equal limit on delivery aircraft. In early May, 1983, the Soviets proposed to reduce their medium-range forces in Europe to present NATO levels in numbers of warheads as well as in numbers of delivery vehicles.

There are several other cultural points that can be made which bear on the general design of the Soviet negotiating position mentioned above. The first is that the Soviets maintain a strict monopoly on the Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons in the European theater. Secondly, it appears important that nuclear weapons in Europe be coupled to the use of the U.S. strategic arsenal. Finally, the Soviet view of war in Europe and its concern with the lowering of the nuclear threshold shows a cultural influence.

All Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons are under the direct control of the Soviet Union and it also possesses all of the long range delivery systems. This absolute control evidences a distrust of its allies that seems deeply cultural in nature.

Even the threat the Soviet Union faces by basing these weapons on its soil does not appear to be enough to force it to relinquish this control. It is also important to note that basing these weapons in the Soviet Union raises the price for the U.S. to attack it by nuclear means. This leads to the importance of coupling European nuclear use to the U.S. strategic arsenal.

The Soviets appear to be genuinely concerned with the fact that the deployment of the NATO nuclear missiles would lower the nuclear threshold. A commentary in PRAVDA by N. Fyodorov explains this position:

> ....cruise missiles are a major factor increasing the threat that a nuclear war will break out....their use ....would lead to the obliteration of the distinctions between strategic and tactical weapons and would facilitate a lowering of the "nuclear threshold" and an increase in the risk of nuclear conflict. [Ref. 106]

While it is important to them that this nuclear threshold not be lowered, it would appear to be more important that any nuclear conflict which could damage the Soviet Union also include a direct threat to the survival of the United States. Not only is there a greater deterrent value of this coupling between a European nuclear war and the fate of the United States, but also it can be seen as part of the Soviet cultural

paranoia that it has always suffered great losses in war. The idea that it could suffer nuclear damage while the American continent would remain untouched is abhorrent to the Soviet leadership.

The stated Soviet position if the NATO missiles are actually deployed is important. Christopher Jones shows that its reaction would be to recouple the nuclear threat to the U.S. mainland:

> The Soviets have frequently warned that they will respond to the deployment of the 572 U.S. missiles in Europe with the deployment of additional SS-20 missiles. In March of 1982 they added a further warning that they would also respond by deploying new Soviet missiles aimed at targets on U.S. territory.... [The official Soviet position is]:
>
> If the Governments of the United States and its NATO allies, in defiance of the will of nations for peace, were to carry out their plan to deploy in Europe hundreds of new American missiles capable of striking targets on the territory of the Soviet Union, a different strategic situation would arise in the world.
>
> There would arise a real additional threat to our country and its allies from the United States.
>
> This would compel us to take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, its own territory in analogous position.
>
> This should not be forgotten. [Ref. 107]

It is generally regarded to be a constant theme of Soviet rhetoric that it bore the brunt of the suffering in World War II. The Soviets are particularly bitter towards the Americans who, they feel, waited until the Russians wore out the Germans before they opened the second front and reaped the benefits of victory. Devastation of the Soviet nation again, without a concomitant suffering on the American side, would appear to be unacceptable.

Finally, the Soviet view of nuclear war, especially a war in Europe contrasts with the U.S. view. These positions can also be seen as culturally based. An outgrowth of the ideological view of the correlation of forces is the virtual requirement that the Soviets seize the initiative when the conditions are right to do so. In addition, this seizing of the initiative quite probably includes a massing of force which would lead to a quick, decisive victory. These conditions appear to lead them to a prediliction to preempt.

This doctrinal preference for preemption would quite possibly lead to the early introduction of nuclear weapons into a European conflict. Nuclear war, in the Soviet cultural view, would introduce a chaos so strong that it probably could not be controlled. This is recognized by American planners:

> The Soviets believe that any tactical use of nuclear weapons, even limited, would be difficult to control, and rapid escalation-even theater-wide-is highly likely. [Ref. 108]

In the cultural view this lack of control could lead to the destruction of the state. This must not be allowed to occur. It would seem that the primary method of control which could be envisioned would be if the Soviets would dominate the utilization of these nuclear weapons.

This domination would probably take the form of early and massive utilization to ensure victory because:

> ....nuclear war cannot--indeed, must not-be deprived of strategic meaning, that is some rational relationship to the interests of the state....[it]must be something that the state can survive and some kind of meaningful victory is possible. [Ref. 109]

This early and massive use of nuclear weapons would most probably be to deny NATO any significant use of nuclear weapons, so that the survival of the Soviet state would be assured.

The early use of nuclear weapons would most probably be part of an integrated strike which would serve to ensure that the ground forces would "seize and occupy" [Ref. 110] the territory made available by the massive use of nuclear weapons. This is part of the long-established Soviet integrated military doctrine which can be traced to their cultural view of events as being integrated and interrelated.

To review, we have seen the following cultural points in the Soviet INF position: the obsession with security; the interrelatedness of the threat; the paranoia about the suffering of the Soviet state throughout history; the fear of chaos; and the ideological points of the correlation of forces, seeking the weakest link, and the integration of doctrine. The American negotiating position will now be analyzed.

B. U.S. INF NEGOTIATING POSITION

The current American position is a modification of the Zero Option plan (Reagan's Zero Option plan will be discussed

in more detail below). This plan would forgo deployment of the Pershing-II and GLCM missiles in exchange for the dismantling of all Soviet missiles. The Zero option plan appears designed to eliminate the Soviet capability to inflict massive nuclear destruction in Europe through the use of missiles. It is a model of the cultural trait of simplicity, trading those U.S. missiles not yet deployed for the destruction of all Soviet intermediate range missiles worldwide.

Presumably, the elimination of all INF missiles from Europe would place the two sides in a more even position, having to rely almost exclusively on aircraft as nuclear delivery vehicles in the European theater. It seems obvious that the mobility and multiple-warhead capability of the SS-20 is perceived as a significant threat which must be matched or eliminated.

The American position did not include aircraft as being negotiable in order to simplify the negotiations. [Ref. 111] This is an example of the American cultural tendency to simplify and compartmentalize problems.

In March of 1983 President Reagan proposed an interim agreement, by which the U.S. would substantially reduce its planned deployment of the new missiles for a corresponding Soviet reduction in medium-range warheads on a global basis. The American's side was undoubtedly becoming impatient with

the pace of the negotiations, reflecting, perhaps, the American view of time, an inner clock with a deadline.

The American emphasis on reducing warheads worldwide appears to come from the fact that the U.S. and Soviets also disagree over whether to count the Soviet SS-20 units deployed in Asia. The U.S. wants to count these because they are mobile and could easily target Europe. The Soviets say leave them out, because they are deployed to protect their eastern flank from an integrated threat and should not be included in discussions of reductions in Europe. The American position in this case may be seen as an emphasis on a strictly legal interpretation of the situation.

Further cultural points dealing with the NATO policy of flexible response, the American view of decoupling, and the American drive for stability are germain. While not specifically part of the negotiating position these points are important because they affect that position and show interesting cultural influences.

The American and NATO policy of flexible response exhibits a certain cultural perspective. The primary emphasis of flexible response seems to be a good example of skill-thinking, that escalation of the conflict would occur in distinct, rationally related steps. Additionally, American deterrence theory seems to place a premium on stability, another point with an important cultural background.

The thrust of flexible response as both a deterrent and a warfighting policy rests on the existence of discrete steps in the escalatory process which would provide for a method of controlling that escalation at each step. This graduated escalation method is thought to enhance deterrence by, "....raising the possibility that aggression at any one level of conflict might either be matched in kind or escalated." [Ref. 112] As a warfighting technique, "the range of options resulting from conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic forces provides some possibility of controlling escalation and stopping conflict at the lowest level possible...." [Ref. 113]

Flexible response can be seen as an example of skill-thinking. The purpose of controlled escalation is to:

> ....dramatically change the ....assessment of the WP [Warsaw Pact] political leaders regarding early or cheap victory, and create a situation conducive to negotiations in which NATO has some tactical advantages. To accomplish the above while trying to avoid escalation to general nuclear war....efforts would be made to control escalation in such desperate circumstances by a combination of clearly perceivable limits on the NATO nuclear response and the threat of more extensive strikes with theater and strategic forces if the WP chooses to escalate. [Ref. 114]

Presumably, at each discrete step in the escalatory ladder decision-makers would be given the time and information to determine rationally whether to proceed to the next step. This compartmentalization of nuclear war requires almost perfect perceptions of the other side's intentions and a belief that each step will be properly interpreted by the Soviet leaders, a primary example of skill thinking.

As previously stated the Soviet leaders show a preference in their strategic doctrine for early and massive use of nuclear weapons. That they would modify their culturally determined actions in response to limits which might not be as "clearly perceivable" to them as to the Americans, is optimistic to say the least.

Another cultural point is about decoupling. Flexible response provides a range of options which U.S. planners see as distinct steps on an escalatory ladder. The deployment of the Pershing-II and GLCM missiles would provide some very capable nuclear options to the U.S. planners at a level below strategic nuclear war. This decouples these nuclear options from an all out U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange. In the American view this would seem to be rational and pragmatic, both cultural influences.

To the Americans the deployment of the missiles in NATO's modernization track:

> ....could lessen any Soviet doubts about the U.S. strategic guarantee to NATO and help to alleviate concerns on the part of the Allies regarding Soviet force modernization by closing real or perceived gaps in the escalatory ladder. INF deployments by NATO are planned to be of a size and character so as to preclude the perception of decoupling, while at the same time serving to deter a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe. [Ref. 115]

This may be seen as universalism at work. The Americans expect the Soviets to see their deployment of the missiles in the same light as they do. The fact that the Soviets

might see these actions as coming from a more sinister set of intentions appears to be lost on the American policy makers because of this universalism.

On a military level these missiles would; 1) allow the capability to target previously untargeted "hard" targets in the Soviet Union; 2) permit the use of lower yield warheads (because of increased accuracy) thereby reducing collateral damage; 3) increase the weapons-system survivability over the current situation by reducing the reliance on manned aircraft; and 4) free some dual-capable aircraft for conventional roles. [Ref. 116] This again seems to be a rational decision for the Americans to make in order to correct the imbalance of Soviet missiles in Europe. The Soviets appear to be expected to accept this brand of rationality.

Stability is important to American deterrence theory. In the American view the lack of a NATO deterrent which matches the SS-20 is destabilizing; it invites the Soviets to take advantage of a weakness in NATO. Stability would be enhanced, in the American view, by the deployment of the weapons which would serve as a match for the Soviet capability.

The official U.S. position regarding the GLCM seems to require the Soviets to "mirror image" the American view of stability and the new missiles' place in it:

> The relatively slow flight of current generation cruise missiles should not represent an increased first-strike threat to the Soviet Union. Rather, cruise missile deployments symbolize a second-strike capability which should have a stabilizing effect. [Ref. 117]

The Soviet reaction to the deployment of the cruise missiles seems to show a belief that they will have the opposite effect and be destabilizing in the extreme:

> The U.S.'s unilateral actions with respect to the deployment of cruise missiles cannot be regarded as anything but an attempt at any cost to upset the military-strategic equilibrium in its favor. [Ref. 118]

Thus the belief that the deployment of these missiles would lead to a lessening of tensions appears to have a totally opposite effect on the leaders of the other side. Assuming that both sides are sincere, it becomes obvious that their perceptions rest on a different base, a base strongly colored by their political culture.

We have seen the cultural traits of pragmatism, skill thinking, legalism, and simplicity in the preceeding discussion of the American INF position. In addition to the general positions and doctrinal discussions mentioned above the importance of the cultural influence will now be shown on the specific negotiating positions of each side. It is here where some predictive capabilities of the cultural models developed earlier in this thesis will be displayed.

C. ZERO OPTION

The Zero Option proposal was presented by President Reagan during a speech to the National Press Club on November 18, 1981, just prior to the November 30 start date for the negotiations (the entire speech is included as Appendix B to

this thesis). It is important to note that the speech was beamed via satellite to Europe, with a worldwide audience of about 200 million. [Ref. 119] This is not the only attempt to court the opinion of the Europeans, a practice apparently considered essential by both sides. The speech appears to have been designed to have an impact on world opinion, and to persuade our European allies of the morality and necessity of the American position.

The American cultural model of moralism, legalism, a penchant for simple and short term solutions, the universalism of U.S. views and the desire to maintain the status quo are reflected in the speech.

President Reagan's speech is righteous in tone and sprinkled liberally with moralisms. He begins by reading a letter he sent to Secretary Brezhnev which, he says, sets the tone for the American negotiating position to follow:

> ....the peoples of the world, despite differences in racial and ethnic origin, have very much in common. They want the dignity of having some control over their individual lives, their destiny. They want to work at the craft or trade of their own choosing and to be fairly rewarded. They want to raise their families in peace without harming anyone or suffering harm themselves. Government exists for their convenience, not the other way around. [Ref. 120]

This emphasis on the individual and the role of government reflects the American cultural view of man, one we have described as being quite different from the Soviet.

After emphasizing (and universalizing) this American view of the world he goes on to claim the rights to the virtuous position. He says that the United States had the power to dominate the world after World War II but:

> ....The United States followed a different course, one unique in all the history of mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild the war-ravished economies of the world, including those of the nations who had been our enemies. [Ref. 121]

He follows this with the claim that: "....twice in my lifetime, young Americans have bled their lives into the soil of ....battlefields not to enrich or enlarge our domain, but to restore the peace and independence of our friends and allies." [Ref. 122] In these quotes that special "missionary" tone that identifies its moralistic base is apparent.

In the speech several times the President displayed the penchant of Americans to simplify:

> "There is a tendency to make this entire subject overly complex...I want to be clear and concise...It's [the American proposal] a simple, straightforward, yet historic message." [Ref. 123]

He continues by breaking deterrence theory into two simple sentences:

> Deterring war depends upon the perceived ability of our forces to perform effectively. The more effective our forces are the less likely it is that we'll have to use them. [Ref. 124]

There does not appear to be, however, an obvious underlying tone of legalism in this speech. Even the reference to verification, usually the prime example of American legalism

in arms control negotiations, is general in nature. "Our approach to verification will be to emphasize openness and creativity rather than secrecy and suspicion..." [Ref. 125] Although that seems to claim the high ground again, indirectly blaming the Soviets for previous "secrecy and suspicion", it could also be read as a softening of the normal American strictly legalistic approach to verification.

Examples of the American desire to maintain the status quo are also present in the speech.

> Our policies have resulted in the longest European peace in this century. Wouldn't a rash departure from these policies, as some now suggest, endanger the peace?.... These....elements of our policy have preserved the peace in Europe for more than a third of a century. They can preserve it for generations to come, so long as we pursue them with sufficient will and vigor. [Ref. 126]

We also see universalism here. The claim seems to be that the longest European peace of this century is a direct result of the American approach exclusively.

There are several other instances of the habit of universalizing American ideals.

> And terms like "peace" and "security", we have to say have little meaning for the oppressed and the destitute. They also mean little to the individual whose state has stripped him of human freedom and dignity. Wherever there is oppression, we must strive for the peace and security of individuals as well as states. We must recognize that progress and the pursuit of liberty is a necessary complement to military security. [Ref. 127]

This appeal to the basic morality of American ideals shows a belief that these are the true ideals which should be espoused by all mankind.

The final American cultural trait, the desire for a quick fix is not obvious in the speech, although it might be conjectured that as the 1984 elections get closer there will be more movement on the American side.

It appears from the above analysis that there was a cultural basis to President Reagan's Zero Option speech, and thus to the American position at the negotiations. It is also important to note that not only do the positions appear culturally based but the rhetoric is designed to appeal to the American public, by emphasizing those points which might be termed culturally attractive.

But what of the Soviets? It is a thesis of this study that the knowledge of the Soviet political culture might make one able to predict, in general, reactions to a speech such as President Reagan's. Before we discuss the Soviet reaction to the speech such a prediction will be made.

D. SOVIET REACTION TO ZERO OPTION

To review, the model of the Soviet political stereotype is based on the idea of constant struggle, that man is evil and can't be trusted, on the emphasis on control, on secrecy and deception, on collective decision-making and is permeated with a cultural paranoia that includes all these factors.

A prediction of Soviet reactions based upon the above model yields the following points:

1. The cultural paranoia of the Soviet government would probably lead it to suspect a trick, to accuse the Reagan administration of trying to gain superiority while claiming the existence of parity right now, since it deals in secrecy and and deception it might expect the American program to be a lie, to cover a move to gain absolute control;

2. The Soviets would object to, but might not comment upon the moralism and universalism in the President's rhetoric;

3. The Soviet negotiating position would probably stress the interrelatedness of all the types of weapons involved, and would be designed so that control of the strategic situation in Europe would remain in Soviet hands;

4. The Soviet negotiating position would quite probably be designed to ensure protracted negotiations in the hope that the Americans might lose patience;

5. The Soviets would most likely reject the Zero Option proposal out of hand, claiming it would interfere with their security and attacking it at its weakest link.

The actual Soviet reaction to the Zero Option proposal contains, in one form or another, each of the points postulated by the model, as will be discussed below.

Soviet press and commentator reaction to the Zero Option speech was immediate and negative. TASS called the proposals: "...a ploy to scuttle the disarmament talks...." and President Reagan's figures "absolutely fantastic" [Ref. 128] in an immediate dispatch from Washington. This is an excellent example of point 1 above.

It is interesting to note that, in response to a later Reagan proposal for an interim agreement calling for a reduction in the numbers of missiles, Soviet Foreign Minister

Gromyko called a news conference which was broadcast internationally. Apparently, the propaganda war, particularly that directed at Western European public opinion, is particularly important to this situation. This is no small point, and while not treated directly in this thesis, is an important tactic in superpower competition.

In the months between this immediate reaction and the official Soviet reaction and outline of the new proposals in TASS in February 1982, (this reaction is included in its entirety as Appendix C) news reports and commentaries were full of the "line" which included the following items: 1) the zero option requires that the Soviets unilaterally disarm and leave their European sector defenseless, an example of cultural paranoia; 2) the USSR has 975 delivery vehicles subject to INF negotiations, the U.S. has 986, a rough parity; 3) the French and British missiles must be counted as all NATO threats in Europe are interrelated; and 4) the U.S. is seeking to destroy the principle of equality and equal security upon which all agreements should be based. [Ref. 129]

Not bashful about assuming the cloak of morality for itself, the Soviet reaction in the TASS commentary claims that:

> Consistently guided by the interests of strengthening the peace and reducing the threat of war, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated and advocates...agreeing on concrete and effective measures designed to limit and to reduce the medium-range nuclear armaments in....Europe....As a result of the purposeful and principled line of the Soviet side,

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



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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it has proved possible to bring about the commencement of the negotiations with the USA. [Ref. 130]

A primary theme running through the reaction is that Reagan's proposal is an attempt to gain superiority for the Americans in the European theater. Again, cultural paranoia undoubtedly plays a part in this. This was officially stated as: "What is being tried at present is no more and no less than to obtain from the USSR a unilateral disarmament in the face of a military threat....". [Ref. 131] Another interesting bit of paranoia in the TASS reaction is this: "Washington's genuine design....lies in creating....a logjam at the negotiations, to block them and then to try to lay blame for this at the Soviet Union's door." [Ref. 132] This may also be seen as an example of the Soviet's "mirror imaging" their behavior on the Americans.

A final example of paranoia occurs when TASS sees a Pentagon plot seeking "....the creation of a first strike capability against the USSR...." [Ref. 133]. These comments seem to go beyond mere rhetoric and show a true Soviet fear that it will lose its superiority, and thus its security would be endangered.

There are several examples of point 3, the Soviet proclivity to see all things as complex and interrelated, and as threats. One example is an attack on the simplicity of the Reagan plan:

> But one may ask, why should the Soviet Union sacrifice the interests of its security for an imaginary "simplicity" of the solution which appears to be so pleasing to Washington? Can the Soviet Union in its assessment of the military-strategic situation in Europe ignore more than seven-hundred American aircraft carrying nuclear weapons posing a threat to it and its allies. And can it throw out of consideration more than two and a half hundred British and French missiles and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons? [Ref. 134]

Finally, a consistent theme in the TASS reaction is that the U.S. is trying to undermine the principle of equality and equal security upon which all negotiations are based. Aside from showing the Soviet obsession with security this theme points to its reluctance to give up even the appearance of its hard earned parity, another staple of Soviet rhetoric concerning the arms-control situation.

This appears to be an important point to the Soviets, their acceptance as a super-power confers certain rights upon them and enhances their position in the world. Given the basic paranoia resident in the Soviet personality they should be expected to guard this position jealously.

The TASS article also sets out the Soviet negotiating position. Much of this position was discussed above but will be briefly repeated because it is germane to the analysis of the predictive capabilities of the model. There are four major points in the position and each will be considered from a cultural viewpoint.

> Point 1 - "In keeping with the principle of equality and equal security, the agreement must cover...all medium-range nuclear weapons...." These points were discussed above and show Soviet paranoia and the principles of interrelatedness. [Ref. 135]

Point 2 - There should be a draw down of weapons to 300 delivery vehicles on each side by 1990, with an interim goal of 600 by 1985. Each side would get to choose which weapons would be allowed to remain in place.

Point 3 - While the negotiations are in progress there should be a moratorium on the deployment of new weapons. Both of these points, if accepted at face value, would serve to ensure Soviet superiority throughout the period of the agreement. Again, the Soviet position appears to be designed so that there can be no "window of vulnerability" to their security. Although an argument can be made that these are negotiating positions designed to be modified, the principle of absolute security appears so deeply ingrained in their culture that no significant movement in this area should be expected.

Point 4 - This is another example of not giving up an item of basic security. It states that while most weapons will be destroyed, each side reserves the right to relocate some weapons behind agreed lines. Again, this seems to be an attempt to maintain the advantage by utilizing the mobility of the SS-20 to their advantage. The Soviets would presumably scrap the obsolescent SS-4's and SS-5's while maintaining the SS-20, allowing their quick redeployment if necessary.

The Soviet reaction to the Reagan proposal and their own proposal are influenced, of course, by their political culture. How does this actual reaction fit the reaction predicted above? There were five basic points of prediction from the model (see above p. 94): 1) the Soviets would suspect a trick by the U.S. to allow us to gain superiority in the region; 2) they would object to President Reagan's moralism and universalism; 3) they would stress the interrelatedness of the threat to their security; 4) they would design their position to ensure protracted negotiations and; 5) they would reject the proposal as a threat to their security and would attack the weakest link in it.

Each point of the prediction has been illustrated to some degree, although points four and five are less obvious than the others. The predictive capability of the model appears to have validity. However, as will be stressed in the conclusion, it is important not to overemphasize the results of the model here. Cultural precepts form the framework within which politics operates but cannot be viewed as explaining every action.

V. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to construct a model, based on the elite political culture of both the U.S. and the USSR, which could be used to interpret and predict the behavior of the leaders of those nations. Such a model was developed utilizing the different environment and historical frameworks of each nation as a base. The model was applied to some general situations and policies and then to a specific negotiating position of each side, the American Zero Option and the Soviet reaction to it. It appears that it was relatively successful in its explanation function and moderately successful when used as a predictor.

Its use should not be overemphasized. Because these stereotypes are general in nature it becomes relatively easy to fit each government's behavior to them. As was stated in the introduction to this thesis the adversarial relationship between the two powers results from many causes spread over the broad continuum of their mutual relations. To see political culture as the proximate cause of the difficulties between the two nations not only overstates its case, but misunderstands its impact.

It is important to remember that Edward T. Hall's definition of the "covert culture" is that it must be experienced on the subconscious, emotional level rather than

on the rational level. [Ref. 136] To point to political culture as the direct cause of a position or statement takes it from the subconscious and places it on the rational level, in direct contradiction to its definition. How, then, can we assess its impact?

One might turn to Hall for assistance. In the introduction to his new book The Dance of Life, he specifies how what he calls "primary level culture" (which is analagous to his "covert culture" described above) operates:

> Primary level culture has core components which pattern our thinking and which give us sets of underlying assumptions for arriving at the "truth". [Ref. 137]

The definition of political culture utilized in this thesis allows it to be used as an example of Hall's "primary level culture". It is defined here as the framework within which conceptual politics operates. Could it be that the political cultures discussed here have formed the framework in which each nation sees the truth? This would allow explanation of such diverse positions as are evident in the INF negotiations, and yield the obvious conclusion that each state believes in the truth of its own position.

This may be the key to the operation of political culture on a government's behavior. If so, we might modify the definition here to say that political culture is the framework that gives the leaders of each government their view of the truth. How they behave once they have arrived at this truth may vary according to the specifics of the situation or the

personality of the leader, but the base from which they operate can be seen as culturally determined.

Political culture cannot be claimed as the immediate cause of the behavior of governments. That behavior is not played out as if it came from some culturally determined script. Behavior along these lines would seem to ultimately lead to an unstopable conflagration because of the differences between the cultures. George Liska shares this ominous view of the power of cultural conflict:

> When alienation rules between cultures, alliances of state either become impossible or are indicted by purists as treasonable; politics tends towards fanaticism rather than pragmatism; erosion of ideology is replaced with explosions of idiosyncracies. [Ref. 138]

There is an apparent finality to this pessimistic view of the conflict of cultures, an inexorable march to cataclysm And while Soviet-American relations have shown touches of "fanaticism" through the years with the short periods of good relations being indicted as treasonable in some quarters, there have been some successes and cataclysm has been avoided. So, as pervasive as the cultural influence is, it is but one of a number of causes of governmental, causes which operates concurrently in a complex web of action.

What, then is the value of understanding the cultural basis for a government's behavior? One idea may be that if the leadership can understand the cultural influence in both its own and its adversary's behavior it might be able to temper that behavior in such a way as to reduce its impact

on the other culture. In this thesis we have identified cultural influence in the stated positions of governments. We have also said that governmental behavior is not directly caused by culture alone, but by a variety of influences each more or less important as the situation dictates. Is it then possible to segregate those positions or statements which have a significant cultural influence from those which are less so?

If political culture is the subconscious framer of attitudes, of one's view of the truth, then we might expect those positions with the strongest cultural influence to be those which will be the most important to the leaders involved. If those positions can be segregated from the rest then it might be possible to deal with them as such. It might be appropriate here to re-state Hall's discussion of the importance of transcending culture cited in the beginning of this thesis:

> ....if man is not to destroy himself he must begin to transcend his own culture. First, the overt, obvious culture-which it is possible to bridge with patience and good will-but the second and more important, unconscious culture-which it is more difficult to transcend. [Ref. 139]

Adam Ulam, in his Expansion and Coexistence poses a series of "what-if" questions which might have changed the history between the two nations:

> What if Stalin's Russia had been more trusting and chose to abide by the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe which pledged the Big Three to abide by the free verdict of the nations liberated from the Nazi yoke? What,

> conversly, might have happened had Truman's America been capable of enough realpolitik to concede Eastern Europe to Stalin as his sphere of influence and curb its indignation about free elections not being allowed in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia....etc.? What.... if Stalin's fears had been less extravagant, America's moralistic passion more restrained? [Ref. 140]

The "what-ifs" discussed by Ulam appear to fit the category of positions with strong cultural influence. In order for any of them to occur each government would have had to transcend its culture in some extraordinary way. That it did not occur is not surprising because, as Hall has said, the unconscious culture is extremely difficult to transcend.

Based on the foregoing it would seem that the positions which had the most direct cultural influence would be identified as the most important to the governments involved. If this is true then modification of those positions by a government could be termed a significant indication. But an indication of what?

One would hardly expect the Soviets to yield on a question which deals with their core security any more than the Americans would yield on a point which would make them appear to act in conflict with their ideals. But if movement on a position identified as strongly related to the core security of the Soviet Union, for example, was noted it could indicate that a significant event had occurred. What that event was could be as diverse as a breakthrough in weapons technology which makes the previous weapon obsolete, and thus negotiable, to the long anticipated, but never seen, indication that the

Arms Race has finally become too much of a burden on the Soviet economy, and thus in some small way negotiable.

In this general postulation of extremes it is not important what the event is. What is important is that the signal that a significant event might have occurred came fror movement on a point which might be termed as being deeply culturally influenced.

Maybe this is the value of the understanding of the different political cultures, not as a method to explain or even predict behavior but as an evaluator of the relative importance of a position or policy. To be more specific, in the INF case, were the Soviets to drop their insistence that the British and French weapons be counted as part of the negotiations, it would seem to be a signal that they were ready to move, for whatever reason, on a point which is culturally related.

By the same token, were the Americans to accept this modification as a significant one and modify their position in response, it could also be seen as significant because of the strong cultural influence evident in the American position. It is a basic point with the Americans that the Soviet position on the British and French weapons is unacceptable from a legal standpoint, a position with strong cultural overtones. If the extent of cultural influence in these positions was realized on each side, and its significance appreciated, an opportunity to negotiate on a previously non-negotiable topic might exist.

While all this is admittedly conjecture, it points to the possible utility of an understanding of both one's own and the adversary's political culture.

This thesis has shown that there appears to be utility in the understanding of the influence of political culture on governmental behavior. This utility comes in three basic areas. First, an understanding of political culture can be useful in explaining a position or statement by one side. Secondly, given that position or statement, a knowledge of political culture might aid in the prediction of the reaction of the other side to the position. Finally, a knowledge of political culture may assist in determining the relative importance of different negotiating points to the governments involved.

Based on this possible utility the subject is certainly worth further investigation.

APPENDIX A: INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE NEGOTIATIONS

The bi-lateral INF negotiations have been in progress since 1981. Although this appendix will not discuss these negotiations in detail, it is essential to the understanding of the situation that a brief history of the talks and an explanation of the substantive positions of each side be attempted. This appendix will discuss the progress of the talks and describe and account for the weapons involved.

On December 12, 1979 the NATO Defense and Foreign Ministers issued a communique which set up a "dual-track" approach to the solution of what was considered to be a serious problem, loss of credibility for the NATO nuclear deterrent. The first, or "modernization track" proposed the deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles in West Germany and 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) in five countries (West Germany, Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, and Italy). This deployment was to commence in late 1983 and continue through 1988. The purpose of the time delay for the initial deployment was two-fold; 1) to allow for development time for the Pershing II missile and; 2) to allow negotiations with the Soviets along the "arms-control track".

The aim of the arms control-track was to "....achieve a balance between Soviet missiles already deployed and the U.S. missiles not yet deployed." [Ref. 141] Preliminary discussions began a few weeks before the 1980 U.S. presidential elections but were suspended when the new president was elected.

1981 was a year of long range preliminaries between the two powers until the formal negotiations began in November. The talks have proceeded on-and-off during the intervening time with little progress, despite some highly publicized, but not particularly significant, position modifications emanating from both sides.

As might be expected there is considerable disagreement between the positions of the two countries. At the most basic level there is disagreement about what is even to be negotiated. The term Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force is of U.S. origin and refers to:

> Nuclear systems below intercontinental range but above the range of system designed for use on, or in direct support of, the battlefield. [Ref. 142]

In the missile category, anything with a range of over 1000 KM is considered to be subject to negotiation. In addition, the U.S. position deals solely with missiles (SS-4,5, and 20, P-II and GLCM) as the "....systems of most concern to both sides." [Ref. 143] The Soviet position includes both missiles and nuclear capable delivery aircraft located in the European theater. For background both missiles and aircraft will be discussed here.

A. SOVIET INF CAPABILITIES

There are three types of Soviet missiles involved in the negotiations. The first is the SS-4, a liquid fueled rocket fired from stationary launch pads which was first deployed in 1959. [Ref. 144] It has a maximum range of about 1200 nm and can deliver its single, 1 megaton warhead with an accuracy of about 1 nm. In 1961 the Soviets deployed the second of the three missiles, the SS-5. It is also liquid fueled and fired from fixed pads. Its maximum range is about 2300 nm, and it also delivers a one megaton warhead to an accuracy of about a mile. [Ref. 145]

In 1977 the Soviets began replacing the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the much more capable SS-20. The SS-20 is a solid fueled rocket fired from mobile launchers. It delivers three separately targeted 150 kiloton warheads to a range of about 2700 nm with an accuracy of less than a quarter of a mile. Its increased accuracy and mobility are a significant improvement over the older missiles and pose a significant nuclear threat to NATO forces throughout Europe. [Ref. 146]

In addition to the missiles the Soviets have three types of bombers capable of nuclear weapons delivery within the range limits significant to these negotiations. The Badger can carry two nuclear devices to a range of about 1500 nm. The Blinder also carries two devices and has a range of 1700 nm. Finally, in 1974 the Soviets began to deploy the Backfire, which can carry four devices over 2100 nm. [Ref. 147]

B. NATO INF CAPABILITIES

NATO currently has no missiles deployed with a range in excess of 1000 KM. The two U.S. missiles to be deployed in late 1983 as part of the modernization-track will, however, have that capability. The Pershing II missiles carries a single 10-20 kiloton warhead over 1100 nm. [Ref. 148] It is a mobile, solid fueled rocket which represents a significant improvement over the existing Pershing Ia in the areas of

mobility, command and control, range, accuracy and survivability (the Pershing Ia's 900 KM range is too low to be included in the INF category). [Ref. 149]

The GLCM is a variant of the Tomahawk missile adapted for launch from mobile platforms. It is 219 inches long, powered by a turbofan engine and guided by inertial navigation which is updated by terrain matching at periodic intervals. [Ref. 150] It can carry a 200 kiloton payload in excess of 1600 nm. Its advantages are in mobility, ability to penetrate air defenses and accuracy. Since it flys at subsonic speeds it has a relatively long time of flight when compared with the Pershing II and is thus of marginal utility against long-range, time-sensitive targets.

Nuclear payloads can also be delivered in Europe by the following NATO aircraft: F-111B, F-4, F-104, and UK Vulcan Bombers. Land and carrier based A-6 and A-7 aircraft are also included here. [Ref. 151]

The United Kingdom has four nuclear powered submarines, each carrying 16 three-warheaded Polaris missiles. These are considered as strategic weapons by the British and their warheads are controlled by the British government. France has five SSBN's, each carrying 16 single-warheaded missiles. In addition France has 18 silo-based missiles of sufficient range to reach the Soviet Union. These nuclear weapons are also controlled by the French government and not under NATO command. [Ref. 152]

C. INF WEAPONS TOTALS

There are significant differences of opinion between the two countries as to how many of what type of weapons platforms each side has. Total estimates of delivery vehicles and warheads are difficult to ascertain and publish at the unclassified level of this thesis due to the poor quality of the data available. The 1982-1983 issue of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; The Military Balance sees the Warsaw Pact as having a distinct advantage in Theater Nuclear Weapons. By the Institute's figures:

> ....Without Poseidon/Trident being included on the NATO side, the Warsaw Pact overall advantage is about 3.1:1; with Poseidon/Trident that advantage falls to about 1.7:1. [Ref. 153]

On the other hand the Soviets have made the existence of a "relative parity" of delivery vehicles on both sides a

major negotiating position. Their 1981 figures include 243 SS-20's, 253 SS-4,5's, 18 SSN-5's (submarine launched) and 461 aircraft for a total of 975 delivery vehicles. Soviet negotiators in Geneva have claimed the following numbers of weapons in the NATO arsenal: 237 F-111's, 246 F-4's, 240 A-6's and A-7's and 263 British and French delivery vehicles for a total of 986 [Ref. 154].

Utilizing these numbers the Soviet press agency TASS says the deployment of an additional 572 warheads by NATO in the modernization track would give NATO a 1.5:1 advantage in delivery vehicles and 2:1 advantage in warheads. [Ref. 155] So the Soviets say that NATO has a 2:1 advantage in warheads while an authoritative western source says exactly the opposite.

APPENDIX B: ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL

This appendix contains President Reagan's Zero Option proposal which was given in an address to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on 18 November 1981. It is taken from the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, November 22, 1981, pages 1273-1278. This speech is quoted extensively in Chapter IV of the thesis. It is included as an appendix for reference purposes.

ARMS REDUCTION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Officers, ladies and gentlemen of the National Press Club and, as of a very short time ago, fellow members:

Back in April while in the hospital I had, as you can readily understand, a lot of time for reflection. And one day I decided to send a personal, handwritten letter to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev reminding him that we had met about 10 years ago in San Clemente, California, as he and President Nixon were concluding a series of meetings that had brought hope to all the world. Never had peace and good will seemed closer at hand.

I'd like to read you a few paragraphs from that letter. "Mr. President: When we met, I asked if you were aware that the hopes and aspirations of millions of people throughout the world were dependent on the decisions that would be reached in those meetings. You took my hand in both of yours and assured me that you were aware of that and that you were dedicated with all your heart and soul and mind to fulfilling those hopes and dreams."

I went on in my letter to say: "The people of the world still share that hope. Indeed, the peoples of the world, despite differences in racial and ethnic origin, have very much in common. They want the dignity of having some control over their individual lives, their destiny. They want to work at the craft or trade of their own choosing and to be fairly rewarded. They want to raise their families in peace without harming anyone or suffering harm themselves. Government exists for their convenience, not the other way around.

"If they are incapable, as some would have us believe, of self-government, then where among them do we find any who are capable of governing others?

"Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and economic philosophies, and governmental policies to keep us from considering the very real, everyday problems of our peoples? Will the average Soviet family be better off or even aware that the Soviet Union has imposed a government of its own choice on the people of Cuba because the Cuban military dictate who shall govern the people of Angola?

"It is often implied that such things have been made necessary because of territorial ambitions of the United States; that we have imperialistic designs, and thus constitute a threat to your own security and that of the newly emerging nations. Not only is there no evidence to support such a charge there is solid evidence that the United States, when it could have dominated the world with no risk to itself, made no effort whatsoever to do so.

"When World War II ended, the United States had the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military might was at its peak, and we alone had the ultimate weapon, the nuclear weapon, with the unquestioned ability to deliver it anywhere in the world. If we had sought world domination then, who could have opposed us?

"But the United States followed a different course, one unique in all the history of mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild the war-ravished economies of the world, including those of the nations who had been our enemies. May I say, there is absolutely no substance to charges that the United States is guilty of imperialism or attempts to impose its will on other countries, by use of force."

I continued my letter by saying--or concluded my letter, I should say-- by saying, "Mr. President, should we not be concerned with eliminating the obstacles which prevent our people, those you and I represent, from achieving their most cherished goals?"

Well, it's in the same spirit that I want to speak today to this audience and the people of the world about America's program for peace and the coming negotiations which begin November 30th in Geneva, Switzerland. Specifically, I want to present our program for preserving peace in Europe and our wider program for arms control.

Twice in my lifetime, I have seen the peoples of Europe plunged into the tragedy of war. Twice in my lifetime, Europe has suffered destruction and military occupation in wars that statesmen proved powerless to prevent, soldiers unable to contain, and ordinary citizens unable to escape. And twice

in my lifetime, young Americans have bled their lives into the soil of those battlefields not to enrich or enlarge our domain, but to restore the peace and independence of our friends and Allies.

All of us who lived through those troubled times share a common resolve that they must never come again. And most of us share a common appreciation of the Atlantic Alliance that has made a peaceful, free, and prosperous Western Europe in the post-war era possible.

But today, a new generation is emerging on both sides of the Atlantic. Its members were not present at the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. Many of them don't fully understand its roots in defending freedom and rebuilding a war-torn continent. Some young people question why we need weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, to deter war and to assure peaceful development. They fear that the accumulation of weapons itself may lead to conflagration. Some even propose unilateral disarmament.

I understand their concerns. Their questions deserve to be answered. But we have an obligation to answer their questions on the basis of judgement and reason and experience. Our policies have resulted in the longest European peace in this century. Wouldn't rash departure from these policies, as some now suggest, endanger that peace?

From its founding, the Atlantic Alliance has preserved the peace through unity, deterrence, and dialog. First, we and our Allies have stood united by the firm commitment that an attack upon any one of us would be considered an attack upon us all. Second, we and our Allies have deterred aggression by maintaining forces strong enough to ensure that any aggressor would lose more from an attack than he could possible gain. And third, we and our Allies have engaged the Soviets in a dialog about mutual restraint and arms limitations, hoping to reduce the risk of war and the burden of armaments and to lower the barriers that divide East from West.

These three elements of our policy have preserved the peace in Europe for more than a third of a century. They can preserve it for generations to come, so long as we pursue them with sufficient will and vigor.

Today, I wish to reaffirm America's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and our resolve to sustain the peace. And from my conversations with allied leaders, I know that they also remain true to this tried and proven course.

NATO's policy of peace is based on restraint and balance. No NATO weapons, conventional or nuclear, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack, NATO's defense plans have been responsible and restrained. The Allies remain strong, united, and resolute. But the momentum of the continuing Soviet military buildup threatens both the conventional and the nuclear balance.

Consider the facts. Over the past decade, the United States reduced the size of its Armed Forces and decreased its military spending. The Soviets steadily increased the number of men under arms. They now number more than double those of the United States. Over the same period, the Soviets expanded their real military spending by about one-third. The Soviet Union increased its inventory of tanks to some 50,000, compared to our 11,000. Historically a land power, they transformed their navy from a coastal defense force to an open ocean fleet, while the United States, a sea power with trans-oceanic alliances, cut its fleet in half.

During a period when NATO deployed no new intermediate-range nuclear missiles and actually withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union deployed more than 750 nuclear warheads on the new SS-20 missiles alone.

Our response to this relentless buildup of Soviet military power has been restrained but firm. We have made decisions to strengthen all three legs of the strategic triad: sea-, land-, and air-based. We have proposed a defense program in the United States for the next 5 years which will remedy the neglect of the past decade and restore the eroding balance on which our security depends.

I would like to discuss more specifically the growing threat to Western Europe which is posed by the continuing deployment of certain Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union has three different type such missile systems: the SS-20, the SS-4, and the SS-5, all with the range capable of reaching virtually all of Western Europe. There are other Soviet weapon systems which also represent a major threat.

Now, the only answer to these systems is a comparable threat to Soviet threats, to Soviet targets, in other words, a deterrent preventing the use of these Soviet weapons by the counter-threat of a like response against their own territory. At present, however, there is no equivalent deterrent to these Soviet intermediate missiles. And the Soviets continue to add one new SS-20 a week.

To counter this, the Allies agreed in 1979, as part of a two-track decision, to deploy as a deterrent land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. These missiles are to be deployed in several countries of Western Europe. This relatively limited force in no way serves as a substitute for the much larger strategic umbrella spread over our NATO allies. Rather, it provides a vital link between conventional shorter-range nuclear forces in Europe and intercontinental forces in the United States.

Deployment of these systems will demonstrate to the Soviet Union that this link cannot be broken. Deterring war depends on the perceived ability of our forces to perform effectively. The more effective our forces are, the less likely it is that we'll have to use them. So, we and our allies are proceeding to modernize NATO's nuclear forces of intermediate range to meet increased Soviet deployments of nuclear systems threatening Western Europe.

Let me turn now to our hopes for arms control negotiations. There's a tendency to make this entire subject overly complex. I want to be clear and concise. I told you of the letter I wrote to President Brezhnev last April. Well, I've just sent another message to the Soviet leadership. It's a simple straightforward, yet historic message. The United States proposes the mutual reduction of conventional intermediate-range nuclear and strategic forces. Specifically, I have proposed a four-point agenda to achieve this objective in my letter to President Brezhnev.

The first and most important point concerns the Geneva negotiations. As part of the 1979 two-track decision, NATO made a commitment to seek arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on intermediate range nuclear forces. The United States has been preparing for these negotiations through close consultation with our NATO partners.

We're now ready to set forth our proposal. I have informed President Brezhnev that when our delegation travels to the negotiations on intermediate range, land-based nuclear missiles in Geneva on the 30th of this month, my representatives will present the following proposal: The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. This would be an historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the people of Europe. This like the first footstep on the Moon, would be a giant step for mankind.

Now, we intend to negotiate in good faith and go to Geneva willing to listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts, but let me call to your attention the background against which our proposal is made.

During the past 6 years while the United States deployed no new intermediate-range missiles and withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750 warheads on mobile, accurate ballistic missiles. They now have 1,100 warheads on the SS-20s, SS-4s and 5s. And the United States has no comparable missiles. Indeed, the United States dismantled the last such missile in Europe over 15 years ago.

As we look to the future of the negotiations, it's also important to address certain Soviet claims, which left unrefuted could become critical barriers to real progress in arms control.

The Soviets assert that a balance of intermediate range nuclear forces already exists. That assertion is wrong. By any objective measure, as this chart indicates, the Soviet Union has developed an increasingly overwhelming advantage. They now enjoy a superiority on the order of six to one. The red is the Soviet buildup; the blue is our own. That is 1975, and that is 1981.

Now, Soviet spokesmen have suggested that moving their SS-20s behind the Ural Mountains will remove the threat to Europe. Well, as this map demonstrates, the SS-20s, even if deployed behind the Urals, will have a range that puts almost all of Western Europe--the great cities--Rome, Athens, Paris, London, Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, and so many more--all of Scandinavia, all of the Middle East, all of northern Africa, all within range of these missiles which, incidentally, are mobile and can be moved on shorter notice. These little images mark the present location which would give them a range clear out into the Atlantic.

The second proposal that I've made to President Brezhnev concerns strategic weapons. The United States proposes to open negotiations on strategic arms as soon as possible next year.

I have instructed Secretary Haig to discuss the timing of such meetings with Soviet representatives. Substance, however, is far more important than timing. As our proposal for the Geneva talks this month illustrates, we can make proposals for genuinely serious reductions, but only if we take the time to prepare carefully.

The United States has been preparing carefully for resumption of strategic arms negotiations because we don't want a repetition of past disappointments. We don't want an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end in dashed expectations.

Now, I have informed President Brezhnev that we will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable. Our approach to verification will be to emphasize openness and creativity, rather than the secrecy and suspicion which have undermined confidence in arms control in the past.

While we can hope to benefit from work done over the past decade in strategic arms negotiations, let us agree to do more than simply begin where these previous efforts left off. We can and should attempt major qualitative and quantitative progress. Only such progress can fulfill the hopes of our own people and the rest of the world. And let us see how far we can go in achieving truly substantial reductions in our strategic arsenals.

To symbolize this fundamental change in direction, we will call these negotiations START--Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

The third proposal I've made to the Soviet Union is that we act to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional forces in Europe. The defense needs of the Soviet Union hardly call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany today than were in the whole Allied invasion force that landed in Normandy on D-Day. The Soviet Union could make no more convincing contribution to peace in Europe, and in the world, than by agreeing to reduce its conventional forces significantly and constrain the potential for sudden aggression.

Finally, I have pointed out to President Brezhnev that to maintain peace we must reduce the risks of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation.

I am renewing our proposal for a conference to develop effective measures that would reduce these dangers. At the current Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we're laying the foundation for a Western-proposed conference on disarmament in Europe. This conference would discuss new measures to enhance stability and security in Europe. Agreement in this conference is within reach. I urge the Soviet Union to join us and many other nations who are ready to launch this important enterprise.

All of these proposals are based on the same fair-minded principles--substantial, militarily significant reduction in forces, equal ceilings for similar types of forces, and adequate provisions for verification.

My administration, our country, and I are committed to achieving arms reductions agreements based on these principles. Today I have outlined the kinds of bold, equitable proposals which the world expects of us. But we cannot reduce arms unilaterally. Success can only come if the Soviet Union will share our commitment, if it will demonstrate that its often-repeated professions of concern for peace will be matched by positive action.

Preservation of peace in Europe and the pursuit of arms reduction talks are of fundamental importance. But we must also help to bring peace and security to regions not torn by conflict, external intervention, and war.

The American concept of peace goes well beyond the absence of war. We forsee a flowering of economic growth and individual liberty in a world at peace.

At the economic summit conference in Cancun, I met with the leaders of 21 nations and sketched out our approach to global economic growth. We want to eliminate the barriers to trade and investment which hinder these critical incentives to growth, and we're working to develop new programs to help the poorest nations achieve self-sustaining growth.

And terms like "peace" and "security", we have to say, have little meaning for the oppressed and the destitute. They also mean little to the individual whose state has stripped him of human freedom and dignity. Wherever there is oppression, we must strive for the peace and security of individuals as well as states- We must recognize that progress and the pursuit of liberty is a necessary complement to military security. Nowhere has this fundamental truth been more boldly and clearly stated than in the Helsinki Accords of 1975. These accords have not yet been translated into living reality.

Today I've announced an agenda that can help to achieve peace, security, and freedom across the globe. In particular, I have made an important offer to forego entirely deployment of new American missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union is prepared to respond on an equal footing.

There is no reason why people in any part of the world should have to live in permanent fear of war or its spectre.

I believe the time has come for all nations to act in a responsible spirit that doesn't threaten other states. I believe the time is right to move forward on arms control and the resolution of critical regional disputes at the conference table. Nothing will have a higher priority for me and for the American people over the coming months and years.

Addressing the United Nations 20 years ago, another American President described the goal that we still pursue today. He said, "If we all can persevere, if we can look beyond our shores and ambitions, then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved."

He didn't live to see that goal achieved. I invite all nations to join with America today in the quest for such a world.

Thank you-

APPENDIX C: OFFICIAL SOVIET REACTION TO ZERO OPTION

This appendix contains the official Soviet reaction to the Zero Option proposal as released by TASS on 11 February 1982. It is taken from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 10 March 1982, p. 14. This reaction is quoted extensively in Chapter IV and is included as an appendix for reference purposes.

WILL THERE OR WON'T THERE BE A NEW ROUND IN THE ARMS RACE?

Invariably guided by the interests of consolidating peace and lessening the danger that a war will break out, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated and continues to advocate.... that agreement be reached on concrete and effective measures aimed at the limitation and reduction of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe or even at their complete elimination.

As a result of the Soviet side's persistent and principled line, it has been possible to start talks with the US on this question....

But the fact that talks have begun and are under way is not all that is important--the main thing lies ahead....

The American side continues to beat about the bush concerning the so-called "zero option," which US President R. Reagan set forth in his speech of Nov. 18, 1981, and is the basis of the American draft treaty whose submission to the Geneva talks was announced with such pomp in Washington on Feb. 4, 1982.

Soviet leaders have several times given a principled evaluation of Washington's "zero option" as totally unrealistic, as something that can in no way be called a serious proposal....

If the limitations to be established are to be really equal, are not to infringe the legitimate security interests of either side and are to correspond to the task of curbing the nuclear arms race, it's necessary to consider and take into account--on the part of both NATO and the Soviet Union--the entire complex of equally formidable medium-range nuclear arms, not some disconnected, arbitrarily chosen elements of the strategic equation.

As far as the question of Britain and France is concerned, the point is not whether they will participate in the talks or sign an agreement, since they don't want to; however, it's clear that their arms in the pertinent categories should be regarded as a component of the balance on the NATO side. Yes, as a component....

It's evident that Washington's true hope is, by advancing proposals that are designed to be unacceptable to the other side, to create a logjam at the talks, to block them, and then to try to blame the Soviet Union for this.

It's hard to get rid of the impression that Washington would like to use the Geneva talks to calm the public of the West Europe countries, which is protesting the US's dangerous military plans, and then, by deliberately leading the talks into an impasse, to try to justify the deployment in Western Europe, beginning in 1983, of almost 600 new American medium-range missiles. It looks as if the propaganda show that goes by the name of "zero option" was needed for just this purpose...

The Pentagon sees the deployment of medium-range missiles on the European continent as one avenue leading to the creation of a first-strike potential against the USSR, and its calculation is that in this event a nuclear war would be limited to Europe.

The fact that such calculations are groundless does not make them less insidious or criminal. The fact that Washington, with imperial arrogance, is disregarding the vital security interests of the European peoples and is making Western Europe a hostage of its aggressive policy cannot fail to arouse legitimate indignation.

Does all this mean that the problem of limiting medium-range nuclear arms in Europe is insoluable? No, it does not...

As L.I. Brezhnev stated earlier and reaffirmed in his recent conversation with representatives of the Socialist International, the Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement on a real "zero" solution--one that would mean not anyone's unilateral disarmament but the total renunciation by both sides of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe, and, moreover, of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. If the NATO countries agree with this solution, the real winner would be the cause of peace in Europe and the world over.

If the West isn't ready for such a radical solution, the Soviet Union proposes that agreement be reached on a major--by more than two thirds--stage-by-stage reduction by both

sides of their medium-range nuclear weapons, while retaining, at all stages of the reduction, a balance in the weapons of NATO and the Soviet Union that are subject to limitation.

In an effort to provide the necessary impetus to the Geneva talks, the USSR has submitted a proposal to concentrate efforts on the elaboration, in a short time, of a joint document that would determine the following parameters of a future agreement:

--in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, the agreement should cover and take into account all medium-range nuclear arms-i.e., those with a range of 1,000 kilometers or more that are deployed in Europe and in the adjacent waters or are intended for use in Europe;

--with a view to reducing the level of the aforementioned weapons as much as possible for both NATO and the Soviet Union, the agreement should provide for a reduction in the present number of such weapons (approximately 1,000 units on each side) to 300 units on each side by the end of 1990, with the establishment of an intermediate level of 600 units by the end of 1985;

--the two sides will have the right themselves to determine the composition of the arms subject to reduction and, within the limits of the agreed-upon levels of reduction, to carry out, at their discretion, the replacement and modernization of arms, the framework of which will be determined later;

--the principal means of the reduction of medium-range arms will be their dismantling, which does not exclude the possibility of the withdrawal of a certain part of these arms behind agreed-upon lines;

--provisions will be worked out to ensure adequate control over the fulfillment of commitments under the projected agreement;

--during the time talks are under way, the two sides will refrain from activity relating to the deployment of new medium-range nuclear arms in Europe. The two sides' medium-range arms already deployed in this region will be frozen, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The earliest possible reaching of an accord on the fundamental questions listed above would provide reliable guidelines for further work on the preparation of an agreement and would impart a purposeful and concrete nature to the talks.

Desirous of facilitating the reaching of an accord, the Soviet Union has stated that, if the other side agrees to establish a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons while talks are under way, the Soviet side would be prepared to reduce, as a gesture of goodwill, a certain part of its medium-range arms in the European part of the USSR on a unilateral basis-i.e., as a preliminary installment on the lower level that would result from the talks.

Now it is up to the United States of America to answer all these questions....(Tass.)

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
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