

Research Note 84-58

①

PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA
(A COMPUTER SIMULATION)

AD-A141 753

Eleanor L. Criswell, Kenneth W. Unger and Robert W. Swezey
Science Applications, Inc.

Paul van Rijn, Contracting Officer's Representative


Submitted by

T. Owen Jacobs, Chief
LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT TECHNICAL AREA

and

Joyce L. Shields, Director
MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL RESEARCH LABORATORY

DTIC FILE COPY



U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

February 1984

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

This report, as submitted by the contractor, has been cleared for release to Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) to comply with regulatory requirements. It has been given no primary distribution other than to DTIC and will be available only through DTIC or other reference services such as the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

84 58 51 106

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER Research Note 84-58	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A141 753	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA (A COMPUTER SIMULATION)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER SAI-84-03-178
7. AUTHOR(s) Eleanor L. Criswell, Kenneth W. Unger, Robert W. Swezey	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) MDA 903-79-C-0699	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Behavioral Sciences Research Center Science Applications, Inc. 1710 Goodridge Dr., McLean, VA 22102		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS 2Q162722A791
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral & Social Sciences, 5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333		12. REPORT DATE February 1984
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 85
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		13. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		13a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This research was technically monitored by Dr. Paul van Rijn of the Leadership and Management Technical Area of ARI.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Participant's Manual Simulation Decision making		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This Participant's Manual accompanies the Yugoslav Dilemma (a computer simulation which collects a variety of participant's response data and assesses decision- making style). This manual presents 1) instructions on how to interact with the computer during the simulation and 2) fictional background information to set the stage for the Yugoslav Dilemma.		

DD FORM 1473
1 JAN 73EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-LF-014-6601

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

FOREWORD

This document is one in a series which reports on research conducted by the Behavioral Sciences Research Center at Science Applications, Inc., under Contract No. MDA 903-79-C-0699 with the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. The work on this contract has involved designing and developing a management assessment training and simulation system (MATSS), which includes a computer simulation called the "Yugoslav Dilemma," used to assess the decision-making strategy employed by executive level managers. Decision making has been found to be one of the most prevalent factors in organizational management. The major documents produced by this project include:

Swezey, R. W., Streufert, S., Criswell, E. L., Unger, K. W., and van Rijn, P. Development of a computer simulation for assessing decision-making style using cognitive complexity theory. (SAI Report No. SAI-84-04-178) McLean, VA: Science Applications, Inc., 1984.

This report is the project final report. It describes the history of the project, theoretical (cognitive complexity theory) rationale for the simulation and its assessment measures, and a complete description of the simulation. Interested readers should refer to this report for an overview and description of the project.

Baudhuin, E. S., Swezey, R. W., Foster, G. D., and Streufert, S. An empirically derived taxonomy of organizational systems. (SAI Report No. SAI-80-091-178) McLean, VA: Science Applications, Inc., 1980.

This document describes the factor analytic procedures used to cluster and rank-order over 350 variables involved in systems theory and organizational management. The procedure yielded six factors. Factor one was multidimensional information processing including decision making. This factor lead to the decision-making emphasis of the simulation.

Swezey, R. W., Davis, E. G., Baudhuin, E. S., Streufert, S., and Evans, R. A. Organizational and systems theories: An integrated review. (SAI Report No. SAI-80-113-178) McLean, VA: Science Applications, Inc., 1980.

This 300-page literature review provides an integrated discussion relating the diverse fields of organizational and systems theory. Its contents are organized according to the taxonomy developed in Baudhuin, Swezey, Foster, and Streufert (1980).

Unger, K. W. and Swezey, R. W. Programmer's manual to accompany the Yugoslav dilemma (a computer simulation). (SAI Report No. SAI-83-08-178) McLean, VA: Science Applications, Inc., 1983.

This manual describes the eight programs which run the Yugoslav Dilemma. Each program is listed and annotated. Various possible program manipulations are described.

Criswell, E. L., Unger, K. W., Swezey, R. W., and Streufert, S. Researcher's manual to accompany the Yugoslav dilemma (a computer simulation). (SAI Report No. SAI-84-02-178) McLean, VA: Science Applications, Inc., 1984.

The manual 1) explains the researcher's responsibilities in running participants through the simulation, 2) describes all materials necessary to operate the simulation, 3) provides step-by-step operating procedures, and 4) presents instruction for interpreting participant profiles.

Criswell, E. L., Unger, K. W., and Swezey, R. W. Participant's manual to accompany the Yugoslav dilemma (a computer simulation). (SAI Report No. SAI-84-03-178) McLean, VA: Science Applications, Inc., 1984.

This manual presents 1) instructions on how to interact with the computer during the simulation, and 2) fictional background information to set the stage for the Yugoslav Dilemma.



A 1

PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA (A COMPUTER SIMULATION)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

The Yugoslav Dilemma is a computer simulation designed to assess the decision-making style of high-level managers in complex situations. In order to participate competently in the simulation, each participant requires both background information on Yugoslavia and detailed instructions about how to interact with the computer during the simulation. The Participant's Manual provides the necessary background and computer information.

Procedures:

The contents of the Participant's Manual include an introduction, instructions, and background information on Yugoslavia. The instructions contain step-by-step instruction for 1) receiving messages in the Yugoslav Dilemma and the Storm scenario practice session, 2) entering decisions into the computer, and 3) using special decision-making aids. Background information about Yugoslavia presented in this manual was adapted from a training scenario provided by the U.S. Army War College.

Findings:

Using the Participant's Manual enables a participant to interact with the computer during the Yugoslav Dilemma simulation. The Participant's Manual is a necessary tool for participants in the Yugoslav Dilemma.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD	iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	v
I. INTRODUCTION AND SEQUENCE OF EVENTS	1
II. SIMULATION MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS	4
A. Materials	4
1. Scenario maps	4
2. Note-taking Form.	5
3. Decision alternatives	6
B. Simulation Components	7
1. Messages.	7
2. Decisions	8
3. Other decision information.	9
III. THE PRACTICE SESSION.	11
A. Introduction.	11
B. Simulation Timing	11
C. Step-by-Step Practice	13
IV. THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA.	30
A. General Procedures.	30
1. Materials	30
2. Simulation components	31
3. Simulation timing	32
4. Preliminary screens	33
B. Objectives.	37
1. Purpose of dilemma.	37
2. Your role in the dilemma.	37
C. Background Fiction.	38
1. Overview.	38
2. Strategic position of NATO and Warsaw Pact.	40
3. Military/political climate in the countries involved.	42
D. Diary of the Crisis	57

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)

	<u>Page</u>
APPENDIX A SCENARIO MAPS.	A-1
APPENDIX B NOTE-TAKING FORM	B-1
APPENDIX C DECISION ALTERNATIVES FOR THE STORM PRACTICE SESSION . .	C-1
APPENDIX D DECISION ALTERNATIVES FOR THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA	D-1

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	Activities included in participation in the Yugoslav Dilemma.	3
----------	--	---

I. INTRODUCTION AND SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

You are about to become a participant in the Yugoslav Dilemma. You should read this manual thoroughly before the simulation begins.

The Yugoslav Dilemma is an experimental computer simulation which records information on your performance. Your performance is making decisions and taking action which you hope will solve the dilemma. The information the computer records about your decisions is not so much what decisions you make, but rather how you approach the simulation. In other words, the simulation measures how you plan your decisions.

It is important that you understand that the purpose of the scenario is to measure your decision-making strategy. It does not measure things such as aggressive tendency, intelligence, how well you calm down irate diplomats, or even how well you prevent war. It measures your planning strategy. During the simulation, the computer may ask you to enter information about your plans and strategy--TAKE THE TIME TO ENTER THE INFORMATION EACH TIME THE COMPUTER ASKS FOR IT. The more information the computer has about your strategy, the more accurate the assessment will be.

At the end of the Yugoslav Dilemma simulation, you will receive a computer printout with information about your decision making. The researcher will discuss this information with you. The simulation is still in an experimental stage and the assessment has not yet been validated, so the assessment of your decision-making style will be tentative.

The Yugoslav Dilemma is a very complicated and challenging simulation. The simulation places you in a position of dealing with a military/political crisis in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. War is a distinct possibility. In addition to understanding the scenario, you also need to understand the mechanics of interacting with the computer. This manual will help you with those tasks.

Chapter II of this manual introduces you to the components of the simulation. Chapter II also presents some general simulation procedures.

Chapter III describes the brief practice simulation called "Storm." You will participate in the Storm simulation before going on to the Yugoslav Dilemma. Chapter III contains step-by-step instructions for you to follow during the Storm practice session. If you follow these instructions, you will get practice in all aspects of interacting with the computer. This practice will enable you to interact well with the computer during the Yugoslav Dilemma.

Chapter IV describes the Yugoslav Dilemma. General procedures are reviewed from Chapters II and III. The bulk of Chapter IV is fictional background information about the state of affairs in Yugoslavia and other countries in the 1980s. This information will set the stage for the Yugoslav Dilemma.

Figure 1 is a diagram of all participant activities. You can keep track of where you are in the process by referring to Figure 1. The amount of time it takes participants to complete all the activities in Figure 1 varies, but below is an estimate:

- Preparation - 1 to 2 hours
- Practice - 30 minutes
- Yugoslav Dilemma - 1 to 2 hours per period plus breaks
- Decision-making Profile - 30 minutes

Usually a participant is given the Participant's Manual a day or two in advance of participating in the simulation. If the participant prepares in advance, time is saved on the day of the simulation.




Figure 1. Activities included in participation in the Yugoslav Dilemma.

II. SIMULATION MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS

This chapter describes the materials you will use during the simulation and the components of the simulation.

A. Materials

The materials you need to participate in the simulation include

- Participant's Manual
- Scenario maps (one for each scenario)
- Note-taking forms (the same form for both scenarios)
- Decision alternatives (one set for each scenario)

Scenario maps appear in Appendix A. The note-taking form is in Appendix B. Appendix C contains the one page of decision alternatives for the Storm scenario and Appendix D contains the eight pages of decision alternatives for the Yugoslav Dilemma.

1. Scenario maps

Each scenario has its own scenario map with grid squares labelled by their x, y coordinates. The Storm scenario map has eight x-coordinates and nine y-coordinates. The Yugoslav Dilemma map is a map of Eastern Europe with a 32x45 grid. During the simulation, you may need to enter a location into the computer. The computer is programmed to accept x, y coordinates from only the scenario map.

For example, you may want to enter troop movement to Belgrade, Yugoslavia during the Yugoslav Dilemma. You could designate the location of Belgrade by entering AS23. Other coordinates such as latitude-longitude coordinates from standard world maps will not be accepted by the computer.

For the Yugoslavia dilemma, Appendix A also contains a map of Yugoslavia. This map shows the republics and major cities of Yugoslavia; however, this map may not be used for computer coordinates. Other commercially prepared maps of the Yugoslav region will be available from the researcher. In addition to the maps in Appendix A, you may use the researcher's maps for your own orientation.

2. Note-taking Form

You will use the Note-taking Form to record notes on all the action in the simulation. You will record information you receive from the computer as well as information you put into the computer. A copy of the form appears in Appendix B.

The form is divided into columns for notes about all types of information given and received during the simulation. Under "messages received," space is provided to enter the message number (e.g., 1, 2, 3), receipt time of the message, and the text (e.g., U.S. ambassadors en route to Sofia). Under "decisions I made," space is provided for the decision number (e.g., 1, 2, 3), decision code number from the decision alternatives list (e.g., 21122, 1441), time, text of decision (e.g., influence attitudes of Russian leaders), and results. You would fill in results when the computer responds to your action (e.g., Russian ambassador now leaving for Yugoslavia).

The three right-most columns are used for plans or strategies. In the column for "future decision plans," you enter the code numbers for decisions you are planning at the time of the present decision. You might execute your seventh decision, coded 32421, and at that time plan to execute a future decision coded 32441. You can keep track of your plans on the form.

In the column "decisions which led to this decision," you might note that your seventh decision was planned when you executed decisions #3 and #5. Similarly, in the column "messages which led to this decision," you might record that your seventh decision was based on the first message.

Step-by-step practice in using the form is given in Section B of this chapter and Section C of the next chapter.

3. Decision alternatives

Decision alternatives are your choices of action. There are even decision alternatives for requesting information. In the simulation, making a decision and taking action are the same thing.

Decision alternatives for the Storm scenario and the Yugoslav Dilemma appear in Appendixes C and D. There are 32 choices of action in the Storm scenario. You may choose to 1) evacuate or 2) request information about the situation. If you evacuate, there are 22 courses of action you may take. There are 10 bits of information you may request. Each decision alternative has its own unique code number which you enter into the computer. For example, if you want to "move the students of Kennedy High School to Marsh Park," you enter "12221" into the computer.

The Yugoslav Dilemma has 411 decision alternatives. The alternatives are divided into six action areas:

- Economic, 64 alternatives
- Political, 106 alternatives
- Military, 88 alternatives
- Covert Operations, 88 alternatives
- Public Opinion, 8 alternatives
- Information Request, 57 alternatives

You may refer to the decision alternatives in Appendixes C and D of this manual. The researcher may also provide the alternatives to you in a small pamphlet for easy reference.

Information about how to enter decision code numbers is given in Section C in the next chapter.

B. Simulation Components

The two main simulation components are:

- Information called "messages" you receive from the computer
- Information called "decisions" you enter into the computer

1. Messages

When the computer tells you something, it presents a message on the screen and at the same time, the message is printed out on paper by the printer. A sample message appears below:

```

-----
MESSAGE NUMBER=1
TIME = 1202:00          2 APR 1985

THE DAM UPRIVER IS ABOUT TO BREAK.
  
```

The message number appears on the first line. Messages are numbered sequentially. The simulation time and date of the message are provided on the second line. The text of the message appears under the time and date.

When you receive a message, you should make notes about it on your note-taking form. Notes for the message above might look like this.

STORM SCENARIO/YUGOSLAVIA DILEMMA - PARTICIPANT'S NOTE-TAKING FORM

MESSAGES RECEIVED		DECISIONS I MADE			MY FUTURE DECISION PLANS	DECISIONS WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION	MESSAGES WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION
#	TIME/TEXT	#	CODE/TIME/TEXT	RESULTS	CODE	#	#
1	1202 2 APR 85 Dam upriver about to break						

2. Decisions

To indicate to the computer that you want to make a decision, you press D. The computer then prompts you to enter the code number of your decision. Once you have entered the code, you check your entry, then you press RETURN to execute the decision. Once the decision is executed, it appears on the screen and is printed out. A sample decision appears below:

```
-----  
DECISION NUMBER=1  
TIME=1230:00           2 APR 1985  
  
YOU HAVE MADE THE DECISION TO SEND  
THE NATIONAL GUARD TO JACKSON H.S.  
AFTER 1502:00 2 APR 1985.
```

The sequential decision number and simulation time appear on the first two lines, followed by the text of the message. Note that the decision code number does not appear on the screen or printout. Your only record of the decision code will be in your notes. Each decision will be implemented after a certain time; that time will be displayed in the message text. For example, the sample above shows that the National Guard will be sent sometime after 1502:00 on 2 APR. The earliest time the Guard will be sent is 1502, although there is no guarantee it will be sent at that time.

When you make a decision, you should make notes about it on the Note-taking Form. You may also use the form to write out your planned decisions, then execute these decisions. Notes for the decision might look like this:

STORM SCENARIO/YUGOSLAVIA DILEMMA - PARTICIPANT'S NOTE-TAKING FORM

MESSAGES RECEIVED		DECISIONS I MADE			MY FUTURE DECISION PLANS	DECISIONS WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION	MESSAGES WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION
#	TIME/TEXT	#	CODE/TIME/TEXT	RESULTS	CODE	#	#
1	1202 2 APR 85 Dam upriver about to break	1	93261 1230 2 APR Send Natl Guard to JWB after 1530				

Later, the computer may give you a message about your order to the National Guard. You would make notes about that message on the Note-taking Form. Then your form might look like the sample below:

STORM SCENARIO/YUGOSLAVIA DILEMMA - PARTICIPANT'S NOTE-TAKING FORM

MESSAGES RECEIVED		DECISIONS I MADE			MY FUTURE DECISION PLANS	DECISIONS WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION	MESSAGES WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION
#	TIME/TEXT	#	CODE/TIME/TEXT	RESULTS	CODE	#	#
1	1202 2 APR 85 Dam upriver about to break	1	93261 1230 2 APR Send Natl Guard to JWB after 1530	Delayed until 1830			
2	1530 2 APR 85 Guard delayed 3 hours						

3. Other decision information

You will notice three columns on the right of the Note-taking Form. The columns are:

- My future decision plans
- Decisions which led to this decision
- Messages which led to this decision

After you execute each decision, the computer will prompt you to answer questions about each of those three items.

My future decision plans. Here you enter the code number of any decisions you plan to execute later.

Decisions which led to this decision. Here you enter the sequential number (not the code number) of all previous decisions you made as you planned the present decision.

Messages which led to this decision. Here you enter the sequential number of all messages which led to the present decision.

The sample below shows a Note-taking Form as it might look after three messages had been received and three decisions had been made.

STORM SCENARIO/YUGOSLAVIA DILEMMA - PARTICIPANT'S NOTE-TAKING FORM

MESSAGES RECEIVED		DECISIONS I MADE			MY FUTURE DECISION PLANS	DECISIONS WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION	MESSAGES WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION
#	TIME/TEXT	#	CODE/TIME/TEXT	RESULTS	CODE	#	#
1	1202 2 APR 85 Dam upriver about to break	1	93264 1230 2 APR Send fire dept. to Kennedy HS after 1630		-	-	1
2	1330 2 APR Buses stalled along route to HS	2	10456 1300 2 APR info request: Are roads to Jackson HS passable (info available 1400)		87624 93622	-	1
3	1530 2 APR Helicopter delayed 2 hours	3	87624 1340 2 APR Alert Red Cross & local hospital (possible after 1430)		6243	2	2

III. THE PRACTICE SESSION

A. Introduction

The Storm practice session provides an opportunity for you to participate in a simulation and practice interacting with the computer. The Storm scenario is a brief simulation with no solution. No matter what your decisions are, the crisis will not be solved before the simulation is over. The Storm scenario is not a test or assessment of any kind - it is for practice only.

The researcher will assist you in gathering the materials you need for the Storm scenario:

- Participant's Manual, which includes:
 - Decision alternatives for the Storm scenario (Appendix C)
 - Step-by-step practice exercise (Section C of this chapter)
 - Storm scenario map (Appendix A)
- Supply of Note-taking Forms
- Pencils

B. Simulation Timing

Simulation timing may take some "getting used to." Two aspects of time are involved in the simulation:

- Real time
- Simulation time

Real time is the time that is measured by normal clocks and watches. The computer does not keep track of real time -- that's left up to you.

Simulation time is the special rate of time progression used in the simulation. Simulation time progresses one hour for every 30 seconds of real time. (Interruptions to the time progression are noted below.)

A time line appears above the broken line (----) in almost every frame in the simulation. The "time" line found above each frame looks like the sample below:

TIME LINE

TIME = 2050:00	2 APR 1985

IF YOU WISH TO MAKE A DECISION, HIT THE 'D' KEY.	

Simulation time of day is given in hours and minutes (seconds are always 00). In this example, the time is 20 hours, 50 minutes or 8:50 pm. The date is April 2, 1985. After 30 seconds of real time, the simulation clock will read 2150:00, 2 APR 1985.

The Storm scenario has one period of nine real minutes during which simulation time progresses. Because simulation time does not progress during decisions, the real time length of the session varies depending on how long you spend making decisions and entering plans. If you make no decisions, the Storm scenario will last nine real minutes. In simulation time, however, 18 hours will pass in the Storm scenario.

When you make a decision, the simulation clock stops. The clock remains stopped until:

- The decision is entered.
- Any future planned decisions are entered.
- Any previous decisions made while current action was planned are entered.
- Any previous messages which lead to current action are entered.

When you reenter the scenario, the simulation clock progresses one hour.

Because the simulation time stops during decision times, total length of session in real time cannot be predicted. Real time session duration increases with time spent making decisions and entering plans.

C. Step-by-Step Practice

The purpose of the practice session is to give you practice interacting with the computer. Please follow the steps below during the Storm scenario: they will lead you through all the computer operations you need to know.

The researcher will start the computer. Then follow the screens and action below:

SCREEN

M A T S S
(graphic)

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

WELCOME TO THE.....

MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT AND
TRAINING SIMULATION SYSTEM

-----M A T S S-----

THE MATSS SIMULATIONS WERE
DEVELOPED FOR THE U.S. ARMY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE BY THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES RESEARCH
CENTER OF SCIENCE APPLICATIONS,
INC.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

ACTION

Press any key.
Whenever the computer says
PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE,
it means to press any key
except CTRL, SHIFT, RESET,
or REPT. Pressing any of
those four keys has no effect.
However, if you press CTRL and
RESET at the same time, you
will end the program; so do
not press CTRL and RESET at
the same time.

Press any key.

SCREEN

ACTION

THE MATSS CONSISTS OF TWO
SIMULATIONS:

1. THE STORM SCENARIO
(A SHORT PRACTICE SIMULATION)

2. THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA
(A MILITARY POLITICAL
DILEMMA WHICH ASSESSES
DECISION-MAKING STRATEGY)

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
PARTICIPATING WILL BE
PRESENTED ON THE COMPUTER.

PLEASE REFER TO THE PARTI-
CIPANT'S MANUAL FOR DETAILED
INFORMATION.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

S T O R M
(graphic)

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

THIS IS THE STORM SCENARIO!!

THE PURPOSE OF THIS SESSION
IS TO LET YOU SEE HOW A COM-
PUTER SIMULATION WORKS, AND
TO GIVE YOU PRACTICE WORKING
WITH THE COMPUTER.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

SCREEN

ACTION

YOU SHOULD HAVE ALREADY READ
YOUR PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL.

PLEASE TURN NOW TO THE STEP-
BY-STEP PRACTICE EXERCISE IN
THE PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL.
YOU SHOULD FOLLOW THAT EXER-
CISE ONCE THE SIMULATION
STARTS.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS AT
THIS TIME, PLEASE CALL THE
RESEARCHER.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

HERE'S WHAT YOU NEED FOR THE
PRACTICE SESSION:

1. PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL
2. DECISION ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE STORM SCENARIO
3. NOTE-TAKING FORMS
4. STORM SCENARIO MAP
5. PENCIL

PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE
ALL YOUR MATERIALS NEAR
YOU NOW.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.

Press any key.

SCREEN

ACTION

AS YOU READ IN THE PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL, THE STORM SCENARIO IS A SIMULATION THAT PROGRESSES IN COMPUTER TIME.

THE COMPUTER WILL PRESENT INFORMATION TO YOU. THE INFORMATION WILL COME IN THE FORM OF MESSAGES.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

YOU WILL BE MAKING DECISIONS AND TAKING ACTION DURING THE STORM SCENARIO. YOU WILL PICK YOUR ACTION FROM THE ALTERNATIVES PROVIDED IN THE PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL.

IN THE STORM SCENARIO, YOU CAN REQUEST INFORMATION, ALERT CITIZENS, AND ORDER THEIR EVACUATION. WHATEVER YOU DO, YOU WILL ENTER THE CODE NUMBER OF YOUR DECISION AS THE COMPUTER ASKS FOR IT.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

SCREEN

ACTION

AFTER YOU TAKE ACTION, THE COMPUTER WILL ASK YOU IF YOU ARE PLANNING ANY FUTURE RELATED ACTION. IF SO, YOU'LL ENTER THE CODE NUMBER(S) OF ANY FUTURE ACTION YOU ARE PLANNING.

NEXT, THE COMPUTER WILL ASK IF YOUR PRESENT ACTION WAS BASED ON ANY PREVIOUS MESSAGES. IF SO, YOU'LL ENTER THE MESSAGE NUMBER(S). YOU CAN GET THE MESSAGE NUMBERS OFF THE PRINT-OUT OR YOUR NOTES.

THEN, THE COMPUTER WILL ASK IF YOUR PRESENT ACTION WAS PLANNED IN ADVANCE. IF SO, YOU WILL ENTER THE CODE NUMBER(S) OF THE DECISIONS YOU MADE AS YOU PLANNED THE PRESENT ACTION.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

YOU MAY KEEP TRACK OF MESSAGES AND DECISIONS ON YOUR NOTE-TAKING FORM.

YOU READ ABOUT THE FORM IN YOUR PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL. YOU WILL PRACTICE USING THE FORM DURING THE STORM SCENARIO.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

SCREEN

ACTION

IMPORTANT NCTE!!!

THIS STORM SCENARIO IS FOR
YOU TO PRACTICE WORKING
WITH THE COMPUTER.

YOUR DECISIONS WON'T AFFECT
THE OUTCOME. IN FACT, THERE
IS NO OUTCOME TO THE STORM
SCENARIO!!!!

AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN, GO
THROUGH THE STORM SCENARIO
USING THE STEP-BY-STEP
PRACTICE EXERCISE IN THE
PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL. THE
EXERCISE WILL LEAD YOU
THROUGH ALL THE COMPUTER
PROCEDURES YOU NEED TO
KNOW.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

NOW, LET'S GO ON TO THE
STORM SCENARIO.

PRACTICE THE COMPUTER
PROCEDURES: RECEIVE
SOME MESSAGES, PRACTICE
MAKING DECISIONS, GET
FAMILIAR WITH THE NOTE-
TAKING FORM, MAKE SOME
PLANS, (THEN IT WILL
BE ON TO THE YUGOSLAV
DILEMMA!!)

READY? DO YOU HEAR THE
RAIN?

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE

Press any key.

SCREEN

ACTION

TIME=1200:00 2 APR 1985

HIT ! TO START SIMULATION

Press ! (that is SHIFT 1)
to start the simulation.

TIME=1201:00 2 APR 1985

MESSAGE NUMBER=1
TIME=1201:00 2 APR 1985

THE DAM UPRIVER IS ABOUT
TO BREAK

Next you hear a tone and
automatically receive the
first message. Notice that
the message appears on the
screen and is also printed
out. You'll notice that
time on the time line con-
tinues to progress.

Now, record the message on
your Note-taking Form. Fill
in your form like the one
below:

STORM SCENARIO/YUGOSLAVIA DILEMMA - PARTICIPANT'S NOTE-TAKING FORM

MESSAGES RECEIVED		DECISIONS I MADE			MY FUTURE DECISION PLANS	DECISIONS WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION	MESSAGES WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION
#	TIME/TEXT	#	CODE/TIME/TEXT	RESULTS	CODE	#	#
1	1201 2 APR 85 <i>Dam upriver about to break</i>						

SCREEN

ACTION

TIME=1238:00 2 APR 1985

IF YOU WISH TO MAKE A
DECISION, PRESS THE "D"
KEY.

After about 15 seconds, the message disappears and this screen appears. Time keeps ticking off.

Now you can either wait or act.

JUST FOR PRACTICE, wait. Wait and see what happens.

TIME=1501:00 2 APR 1985

MESSAGE NUMBER=2
TIME=1501:00 2 APR 1985

THE GOVERNOR HAS DECLARED
A STATE OF EMERGENCY.

Finally, you'll hear a tone and receive your second message.

Now, enter notes about this second message on your Note-taking Form.

TIME=1538:00 2 APR 1985

IF YOU WISH TO MAKE A
DECISION, PRESS THE "D"
KEY.

After about 15 seconds, this screen appears. Again, you can wait or act.

Now you will practice making a decision. First, turn to the decision alternatives for the Storm scenario; you can either evacuate (alert and/or move) or request information. Now, use the available alternatives and decide what to do.

JUST FOR PRACTICE, request information about damage to roads in the city. You might need this information to plan an evacuation. Find the code number of that decision; it is 2211.

Now, press D to make a decision.

Notice that the clock stops. It will remain stopped until you re-enter the simulation - so you need not feel rushed.

SCREEN

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

ACTION AREA: 1. EVACUATION
2. INFORMATION SEARCH?
PLEASE SELECT 1 TO 2: 2

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

ACTION AREA: 1. EVACUATION
2. INFORMATION SEARCH?
ENTERED: 2
ACTION AREA: 1. THREAT
ASSESSMENT 2. DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT
PLEASE SELECT 1 TO 2: 2

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

ACTION AREA: 1. EVACUATION
2. INFORMATION SEARCH?
ENTERED: 2
ACTION AREA: 1. THREAT
ASSESSMENT 2. DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT
ENTERED: 2
ACTION AREA: 1. ASSESS THE
DAMAGE TO ROADS 2. ASSESS
THE DAMAGE TO COMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS
PLEASE SELECT 1 TO 2: 1

ACTION

You cannot just type in 2211.
You type in only one digit at
a time in response to the screen.
You do not press RETURN between
digits.

The screen now prompts you to
select each portion of the
decision. The screen asks first
if you want to 1) evacuate or
2) request information. You
want to request information so
enter 2.

Now, under "Information Search,"
the screen asks if you want to
assess threat or damage. You
select 2.

(If you make an error in entering
a code number, you may cancel the
decision; but you must go ahead
and answer all the screens; you
will be asked after you enter the
code number if you want to cancel
the decision.)

Now you're asked about the next
portion of your decision. You
select 1.

(You will notice the screen
scrolling up as new text appears.)

SCREEN

ACTION

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

ACTION AREA: 1. ASSESS THE
DAMAGE TO ROADS 2. ASSESS
THE DAMAGE TO COMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS

PLEASE SELECT 1 TO 2.

ENTERED: 1

ACTION AREA: 1. IN THE
CITY 2. IN THE SUBURBS

PLEASE SELECT 1 TO 2: 1

Now select the final part
of your decision, and enter
1.

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

ASSESS THE DAMAGE TO ROADS
IN THE CITY.

THIS DECISION CANNOT BE
IMPLEMENTED BEFORE 0 DAYS,
1 HOURS AND 0 MINUTES.

ENTER "E" TO EXECUTE THIS
DECISION, "A" TO ADD TIME
BEFORE EXECUTION OR "C"
TO CANCEL.

Now, check the decision and
make sure that is the one you
want.

You cannot get your answer for
at least one hour of simulation
time from now. (It always takes
time to execute a decision.)

You press E if you are ready
to execute.

You press A if you want your
answer more than one hour from
now. If you press A, you will
be prompted to enter additional
time to execution in days, hours,
and minutes separated by commas.
After you enter the time, you are
asked again if you want to execute,
add more time, or cancel.

You press C if you made an error
in entering the decision code,
or if you do not want to execute
the decision for any reason. If
you press C, you will reenter
the simulation.

SCREEN

ACTION

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

 DECISION NUMBER=1
 TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

 YOU HAVE DECIDED TO REQUEST
 INFORMATION ABOUT:

 ASSESS THE DAMAGE TO ROADS
 IN THE CITY AFTER 1747 ON
 2 APR 1985

JUST FOR PRACTICE, press E.

Now the decision is entered.
 The screen says you will
 receive your information some-
 time after 1747 on 2 April;
 the exact time is unspecified,
 just as in real life.

Notice that the clock is still
 stopped.

You may have noted the decision
 on your Note-taking Form before
 you executed it. If not, next
 make notes about your decision
 on the Note-taking Form as shown
 below:

STORM SCENARIO/YUGOSLAVIA DILEMMA - PARTICIPANT'S NOTE-TAKING FORM

MESSAGES RECEIVED		DECISIONS I MADE			MY FUTURE DECISION PLANS	DECISIONS WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION	MESSAGES WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION
#	TIME/TEXT	#	CODE/TIME/TEXT	RESULTS	CODE	#	#
1	1201 2 APR 1985 Dam upriver about to break						
2	1501 2 APR 1985 State of emergency declared	1	2211 1647 Request info re city road damage (available after 1747)				

SCREEN

ACTION

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

ARE YOU CURRENTLY PLANNING
ANY FUTURE RELATED
DECISIONS?

ENTER YES OR NO (Y/N).

Now the computer will ask questions about your plans related to decision 1. First, you must tell the computer if you are planning to execute any other related decisions later in the simulation. At this time, look through the decision alternatives and decide if you want to execute any more decisions later.

JUST FOR PRACTICE, please enter Y. Tell the computer you are planning to evacuate the students of Kennedy High School to map quadrant AA5. The code for this decision is 12223. You should note this plan on your form now.

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

ACTION AREA: 1. TO MARSH
PARK 2. TO TYSONS CORNER
3. TO QUADRANT

ENTERED: 3

ENTER QUADRANT:?

Now enter the planned decision. On your own, please enter 12223, one digit at a time as you practiced earlier.

The screen scrolls up as new text appears.

Note that when you enter 3 for quadrant, the computer will ask you to ENTER QUADRANT:? You enter AA5 and press RETURN.

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

YOU ARE PLANNING TO: MOVE
THE STUDENTS OF KENNEDY
HIGH SCHOOL TO QUADRANT AA5.

ARE YOU PLANNING ANY
ADDITIONAL FUTURE RELATED
DECISIONS?

ENTER YES OR NO (Y/N):

At this point, if you have made more decision plans, you enter each decision, one at a time.

Enter the code number of all the plans on your Note-taking Form. The computer will not provide you with a record of your plans during the simulation. Therefore, keep all your planning information on your form.

Now for practice, enter N.

SCREEN

ACTION

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

IF YOUR DECISION WAS MADE ENTIRELY OR PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO RECENTLY RECEIVED MESSAGES, ENTER THE NUMBER(S) OF THE MESSAGE(S). SEPARATE MESSAGE NUMBERS WITH A SEMI-COLON (;). IF NONE, ENTER Ø (ZERO). PRESS RETURN AFTER THE NUMBER(S) HAVE BEEN ENTERED.

Notice that the clock is still stopped.

Now the computer wants to know if your decision to assess damage to roads in city was based on any messages received recently. Examine your notes or the printout and see that you have received two messages. You can enter Ø RETURN, 1 RETURN, 2 RETURN, or 1;2 RETURN. FOR PRACTICE, enter 1;2 and then press RETURN.

TIME=1647:00 2 APR 1985

THANK YOU. YOUR DECISION NUMBERED 1 IS BEING PROCESSED.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.

This screen tells you that you may now reenter the simulation. You press any key to continue. (If you do not press a key, the simulation will restart automatically in a few seconds.)

TIME=1747:00 2 APR 1985

IF YOU WISH TO MAKE A DECISION, PRESS THE "D" KEY.

Notice that as soon as the simulation restarts, the time advances one hour and continues. (Time advances one hour following each decision you make. It does not matter how long it takes you to enter all the required information. Time always advances one hour following a decision.)

Now check your notes: you may either wait or make a decision. JUST FOR PRACTICE, execute the decision you previously planned: to evacuate the students of Kennedy High School to quadrant AA5, code number 12223.

Press D.

SCREEN

ACTION

TIME=1950:00 2 APR 1985

ACTION AREA: 1. EVACUATION
2. INFORMATION SEARCH?

PLEASE SELECT 1 TO 2.

This screen appears after you press D. It is the first of the prompts that get you to enter the decision code number. The screen will scroll up as new text appears.

Now enter decision 12223 on your own. Enter AA5 RETURN when the computer asks for QUADRANT:?

TIME=1950:00 2 APR 1985

YOU HAVE MADE THE DECISION TO MOVE THE STUDENTS OF KENNEDY HIGH SCHOOL TO QUADRANT AA5.

THIS DECISION CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED BEFORE 0 DAYS, 1 HOURS: 27 MIN.

ENTER "E" TO EXECUTE THIS DECISION, "A" TO ADD TIME BEFORE EXECUTION OR "C" TO CANCEL THIS DECISION.

JUST FOR PRACTICE, enter E.

TIME=1950:00 2 APR 1985

DECISION NUMBER=2
TIME=1950:00 2 APR 1985

YOU HAVE MADE THE DECISION TO MOVE THE STUDENTS OF KENNEDY HIGH SCHOOL TO QUADRANT AA5 AFTER 2117 ON 2 APR 1985.

ARE YOU CURRENTLY PLANNING ANY FUTURE RELATED DECISIONS?

ENTER YES OR NO (Y/N):

Now the decision is entered.

Now the computer will ask you about your plans related to decision #2.

JUST FOR PRACTICE, do not enter any future decision plans at this time. Press N.

SCREEN

TIME=1950:00 2 APR 1985

IF YOU PREVIOUSLY PLANNED THIS DECISION, PLEASE ENTER THE DECISION NUMBER(S) OF ALL PREVIOUS DECISIONS THAT YOU MADE AS YOU PLANNED THE CURRENT ACTION. SEPARATE DECISION NUMBERS WITH A SEMI-COLON (;). IF NONE, ENTER ZERO (Ø). PRESS RETURN AFTER ALL NUMBERS HAVE BEEN ENTERED.

TIME=1950:00 2 APR 1985

IF YOUR DECISION WAS MADE ENTIRELY OR PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO RECENTLY RECEIVED MESSAGES, ENTER THE NUMBER(S) OF THE MESSAGES. SEPARATE MESSAGE NUMBERS WITH A SEMI-COLON (;). IF NONE, ENTER Ø (ZERO). PRESS RETURN AFTER ALL NUMBERS HAVE BEEN ENTERED.

TIME=1950:00 2 APR 1985

THANK YOU. YOUR DECISION NUMBERED 2 IS BEING PROCESSED.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.

ACTION

The computer continues to ask about your planning strategy related to decision #2.

You made one decision before you made the current decision. The screen asks if this decision #2 was planned while decision #1 was executed.

You check your notes. When you executed decision #1, you also entered that you were planning a decision, code 12223. You just executed decision 12223. Now do you feel decision 12223 was based on decision #1? If so, enter 1 RETURN.

If you now think the two decisions are unrelated, enter Ø RETURN.

Now enter information about messages related to decision #2. (You practiced this screen earlier.) For this, you check back over your notes.

JUST FOR PRACTICE, say that decision #2 was based on message #2 and not on message #1; enter 2 RETURN.

Now you are set to reenter the simulation.

Now check your notes. They should look like the sample below:

STORM SCENARIO/YUGOSLAVIA DILEMMA - PARTICIPANT'S NOTE-TAKING FORM

MESSAGES RECEIVED		DECISIONS I MADE			MY FUTURE DECISION PLANS	DECISION: WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION	MESSAGES WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION
#	TIME/TEXT	#	CODE/TIME/TEXT	RESULTS	CODE	#	#
1	1201 2 APR 1985 Dam upstream about to break						
2	1501 2 APR 1985 State of emergency declared	1	2211 1647 Request info re city road damage (available after 1747)		12223	—	1, 2
		2	12223 1950 Evacuate KHS students to AAS (possible after 2117)		—	1	2

Now you have practiced the following computer operations:

- Receiving messages from the computer
- Making notes and plans using the Note-taking Form
- Entering decisions into the computer
- Entering future decision plans into the computer
- Entering into the computer the decision and message numbers which relate to a present decision

You also know how to:

- Add time before execution
- Cancel a decision if you made an entry error or if you decide not to execute the decision

Now you may:

- Continue practicing on your own until the scenario automatically ends.
- Call the researcher when you have finished practicing or when the scenario ends.

IV. THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA

In this chapter, general simulation procedures which were presented in earlier sections are reviewed. In addition, fictional information which sets the stage for the Yugoslav Dilemma is presented.

A. General Procedures

Materials, simulation equipment, and simulation timing are similar to those elements of the Storm scenario. They will be reviewed here briefly.

1. Materials

The materials you need to participate in the Yugoslav Dilemma include:

- Participant's Manual which includes:
 - Scenario map (Appendix A)
 - Eight pages of decision alternatives (Appendix D or a separate pamphlet)
- Supply of Note-taking Forms (sample in Appendix B)
- Pencils

Scenario map. The scenario map of Eastern Europe has 32x45 grid squares labelled by their x, y coordinates. The computer accepts coordinates from only the scenario map. If you want to indicate to the computer location of Skopje, Yugoslavia, you would enter quadrant AU17. Latitude-longitude coordinates from a commercially prepared map will be rejected by the computer. The map of Yugoslavia in Appendix A shows the republics and major cities in Yugoslavia. It is for your reference.

Decision alternatives. The 411 decision alternatives for the Yugoslav Dilemma are printed on eight pages. (The researcher will provide them to you in the form of a pamphlet with four two-sided pages.) The alternatives are divided into six types: economic, political, military, covert operations, public opinion, and information request.

Note-taking Form. The Note-taking Form is the same one used in the Storm scenario (Appendix B). Information about the form appears in Sections A and B of Chapter II. The practice exercise in Section C of Chapter III provides detailed instruction in the use of the form. You will use the form to record messages received and decisions made as well as plans and strategy information. You need to use the form in order to be able to completely answer computer inquiries about your decisions and strategies.

2. Simulation components

As presented earlier in Section B, the two main simulation components are:

- Messages you receive from the computer
- Decisions you enter into the computer

Yugoslav Dilemma procedures concerning messages and decisions are the same ones you practiced during the Storm scenario (see Section C of Chapter III).

The Yugoslav Dilemma is designed to simulate real world situations. Thus, the messages in the simulation:

- are given to you at varying rates of speed,
- may or may not address your decisions,
- may indicate success or failure of your decisions.

Sometimes you may become annoyed with poor quality answers to your questions. Sometimes you may find that you cannot make exactly the decision you want. These aspects of the simulation will make the simulation more realistic and will challenge you as well.

As described earlier, when you make a decision, the simulation clock stops. The clock remains stopped until:

- The decision is entered.
- Any future planned decisions are entered.
- Any previous decisions made while current action was planned are entered.
- Any previous messages which lead to current action are entered.

When you reenter the scenario, the simulation clock progresses one hour.

Because the simulation time stops during decision times, total length of session in real time cannot be predicted. Real time session duration increases with time spent making decisions and entering plans.

PLEASE REMEMBER THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE DILEMMA IS TO MEASURE YOUR DECISION-MAKING STRATEGY. IF YOU RUSH THROUGH THE DILEMMA WITHOUT ENTERING PLANS, ETC. BECAUSE YOU WANT TO FINISH, THE MEASURES WILL PROBABLY NOT MEAN MUCH. WHEN YOU HAVE INFORMATION TO ENTER, PLEASE TAKE THE TIME TO ENTER IT. ALTHOUGH REAL TIME OF COURSE WILL NOT STOP, THE SIMULATION CLOCK WILL STOP WHILE YOU MAKE YOUR ENTRIES!

3. Simulation timing

As described earlier, the "time" line found above each frame in the simulation looks like the sample below:

TIME=2050:00	12 JULY 1988

IF YOU WISH TO MAKE A DECISION, HIT THE 'D' KEY.	

Simulation time of day is given in hours and minutes (seconds are always 00). In this example, the time is 20 hours, 50 minutes or 8:50 pm.

Simulation time in the Yugoslav Dilemma progresses one hour for every 30 seconds of real time (the same time compression used in the Storm practice scenario). Interruptions to this time progression are noted in 2 above.

The Yugoslav Dilemma has three periods, each lasting 30 real minutes of simulation time. Because simulation time stops while you enter decisions, the real time length of the session varies depending on how long you spend making decisions and entering plans. If you make no decisions, the Yugoslav Dilemma will last 90 real minutes. In simulation time, however, 2.5 days pass in each period, just over a week (7.5 days) in the entire dilemma.

4. Preliminary screens

The following screens are presented preliminary to the Yugoslav Dilemma. You will take action as noted in the ACTION column below.

<u>SCREEN</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
U.S. flag graphic PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.	Press any key.
Russian flag graphic PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.	Press any key.

SCREEN

ACTION

WELCOME TO THE.....

MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT AND
TRAINING SIMULATION SYSTEM

-----M A T S S-----

THE MATSS SIMULATIONS WERE
DEVELOPED FOR THE U.S. ARMY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE BY THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES RESEARCH
CENTER OF SCIENCE APPLICATIONS,
INC.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.

Press any key.

THE MATSS CONSISTS OF TWO
SIMULATIONS:

1. THE STORM SCENARIO
(A SHORT PRACTICE SIMULATION)

2. THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA
(A MILITARY POLITICAL
DILEMMA WHICH ASSESSES
DECISION-MAKING STRATEGY)

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.

Press any key.

SCREEN

ACTION

THIS IS THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA!!

THIS SIMULATION IS DESIGNED TO ASSESS YOUR DECISION-MAKING STRATEGY. AFTER THE SIMULATION, YOU'LL RECEIVE FEEDBACK ABOUT THE STRATEGY YOU USED.

YOUR ROLE IS THAT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER ADVISING THE U.S. PRESIDENT. YOU'LL MAKE DECISIONS AND TAKE ACTION. YOUR DECISIONS WILL LIKELY BE BOTH MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.

Press any key.

BELOW IS A LIST OF THE MATERIALS YOU WILL NEED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA:

1. PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL
2. DECISION ALTERNATIVES FOR THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA
3. NOTE-TAKING FORMS
4. MAPS
5. PENCILS

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.

Press any key.

SCREEN

ACTION

AS YOU READ IN THE PARTICIPANT'S MANUAL, THE CRISIS TAKES PLACE IN YUGOSLAVIA IN THE LATE 1980'S.

CIVIL UNREST HAS INCREASED TO THE POINT WHERE STREET FIGHTING OCCURS REGULARLY. BOTH HUNGARY AND BULGARIA HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT EXTENSIVE MILITARY TRAINING EXERCISES WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

IT APPEARS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY USE THE CIVIL UNREST AS AN EXCUSE TO INVADE YUGOSLAVIA.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.

Press any key.

THE SIMULATION IS ABOUT TO BEGIN.

IT IS JULY 12, 1988.

YOU'RE IN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL HEAD-QUARTERS.

YOU HAVE YOUR MATERIALS BEFORE YOU ON YOUR DESK.

THE SIMULATION WILL BEGIN ON THE NEXT FRAME.

PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE.

Press any key.

SCREEN

HIT ! TO START SIMULATION

ACTION

Press SHIFT and the number 1
at the same time.

B. Objectives

There are two objectives to the Yugoslav Dilemma: one pertains to the real world purpose of the dilemma; the other pertains to your role in the dilemma.

1. Purpose of dilemma

The dilemma was designed to assess structural aspects of your decision-making processes. In other words, how you plan and execute decisions in difficult situations is of interest. The simulation does not measure your intelligence or anything about your personality such as aggressive tendencies.

If the Yugoslav Dilemma were occurring in real life, decision makers would not follow a set of rules. And in this simulation, there is no set of rules, no right and wrong decisions. The content of your decisions is not of primary interest: the structure of your decisions and plans is the primary interest.

2. Your role in the dilemma

The Yugoslav Dilemma puts you into a very complex military/political crisis in the late 1980s. The crisis arises as a result of considerable turmoil in Yugoslavia and the apparent goal of the Russians to capitalize on Yugoslav vulnerabilities and invade. Obviously, such an invasion would not be in the best interest of the United States or the West in general. It would be advantageous to the United States for Yugoslavia to strengthen its ties to the West or remain non-aligned. Your objective in the simulation, then, is to plan and implement decisions which will prevent an invasion of Yugoslavia by forces of the Soviet Union or other Warsaw Pact nations.

Your role is a member of the National Security Council, and you are to make recommendations (both military and non-military) to the United States President. The Council is composed of both civilian and military personnel whose expertise encompasses a variety of areas. Your expertise may be military in nature. Even if your primary expertise is military, however, you should make decisions which are non-military. In fact, your role is to suggest courses of action that fall both within and outside your area of expertise. Fresh approaches from "non-experts" are highly valuable to the Security Council. The decisions you make in the simulation are actually recommendations to the President concerning the best way to resolve the total crisis.

C. Background Fiction

This section of the manual is divided into three parts:

1. Overview
2. Strategic position of Alliance and Warsaw Pact
3. Military/political climate in 10 countries involved

A day-by-day diary of the crisis is presented in Section D of this chapter.

1. Overview

The Yugoslav scenario suggests that after President Tito's death it became increasingly difficult for the Yugoslavian government to remain non-aligned and in full control of the country. A crackdown on political dissidents occurs, fighting breaks out between rival political factions, and the local government in Macedonia (a southern republic in Yugoslavia) begins to lose control. While these events are occurring, the Russians are conducting maneuvers in neighboring countries. It appears that the Russians intend to use the internal political situation in Yugoslavia as an excuse to invade the country and bring Yugoslavia back into the Communist sphere of influence.

The global situation in the late 1980s is relatively stable in the sense that armed conflict between major powers has been avoided.

Nations throughout the world are primarily occupied with internal growth and economic problems. Beneath this relative calm, major powers are fiercely competitive in their quest for influence and resources.

The United States is not the only country with economic difficulties. High inflation and an inability to achieve a growth rate adequate to satisfy the electorate are problems in many nations.

A brief respite from OPEC's manipulation of the oil shortage was experienced in the early part of the decade. However, OPEC was able to regain some of the leverage it enjoyed in the 1970s and it continues to exert undue influence over the economies of the Common Market (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, England, Ireland, Denmark, and Greece) and Japan. The United States has continued its security commitments to ensure the uninterrupted flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf region. At the same time, the United States increased imports of Mexican oil.

The world community has become aware of the possibility of shortages of other items. For example, concerns about possible shortages of food and strategic industrial materials are being expressed. Many countries have become painfully aware of their increasing dependence on world trade for the most basic of supplies and essential goods. This heightened awareness of interdependency has emphasized the need for an international monetary system to arrange for the orderly trade of goods.

The United States has maintained its place as a superpower by introducing new weapons systems and upgrading existing systems. The American public appears willing to support large military procurements, although a vocal minority continues to push for an end to massive military expenditures. Economic growth has been stagnant, and inflation is ever present. Neither Democratic nor Republican party leaders have been able to implement economic reforms which would revive the sluggish economy.

2. Strategic position of NATO and Warsaw Pact

In the early 1980s, two significant trends developed in the world's strategic environment: (a) The two superpowers, the USSR and the USA, both modernized their strategic forces; and (b) Western European countries had mixed reactions to the problems posed by the necessity of deploying intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems to match Soviet capability.

The upgrading and modernization of the United States military forces included a major problem deploying the MX Missile System in order to maintain a strong land-based missile capability. Additionally, the United States increased the number of TRIDENT missile submarines to replace older seaborne strategic systems. Naval construction was dramatically increased, and an improved strategic bomber was ordered.

Soviet strategic capabilities were substantially improved. Deployment of a new family of ICBMs, SS-25s, SS-26s, and SS-27s proceeded rapidly. In addition, the Soviets also deployed a new strategic bomber, thus providing them with strategic flexibility similar to that enjoyed by the United States.

A new dimension was added to the global nuclear balance by additional intermediate-range weapons. The Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the Backfire-manned bomber were further deployed, which posed a substantial threat to targets in Western Europe.

The improved theater nuclear forces of the Soviet Union brought home to Europeans the fact that the Soviets could threaten nuclear operations in Europe alone.

The response by NATO to this increased Soviet capability was the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IRBMs in Europe to improve the NATO's ability to reach targets deep in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.

A mixed reaction from Western European countries greeted the problem posed by the necessity to deploy expanded and modernized theater nuclear

forces. The Dutch were uneasy and refused to allow deployment on their soil. Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Greece passively accepted the program, but did not wish deployment in their countries.

West Germany recognized the need to deploy modern nuclear forces, and in the mid-1980s allowed them to be deployed in their country. However, massive anti-nuclear and anti-United States demonstrations made it clear that a willingness to sponsor nuclear initiatives within NATO would be highly unpopular. Further, substantial points of contact which had been developed with East Germany could have been jeopardized by adopting a strong nuclear position.

Italy provided solid, but not outspoken, support for the program despite continued changes in government administrations and a large domestic Communist Party.

The deployment of United States nuclear weapons in England was greeted by small groups of protesters, but deployment progressed smoothly.

The United States was able to obtain NATO endorsement of the program with ground deployment confined to West Germany, England, and Italy, but the forces were entirely in United States' hands rather than the "two-by-two" system used with many tactical nuclear weapons and earlier theater nuclear forces deployed in Europe.

In the early 1980s, Spain entered NATO, and initial discussions were held regarding France's reentry into the military aspects of the NATO alliance. Both of these events were viewed by the Soviets as offering potentially serious implications for Soviet security interests.

Elsewhere in the world, the balance of power between the two super-powers has remained relatively unchanged during the last decade. Although the Soviets have gained footholds in Africa and Central America, these gains remain tenuous and unconsolidated.

3. Military/political climate in the countries involved

The 10 countries involved are:

- NATO Countries
 - United States
 - Great Britain
 - West Germany
 - Greece
 - Turkey

- Warsaw Pact Countries
 - Soviet Union
 - Bulgaria
 - Romania
 - Hungary

- Nonaligned Country
 - Yugoslavia

THE NATO COUNTRIES

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is composed of the United States, Canada, Ireland, Norway, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Luxemburg, Portugal, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, West Germany, and Spain. Of these, the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Greece, and Turkey were most affected by the events in Yugoslavia. The situation in each country is described briefly later. The following overview of the NATO community will help set the stage.

The entry of Spain into the NATO Alliance and discussion with the French about military aspects of the Alliance served to strengthen NATO's main purpose of coordinating the Alliance's response to the threat of Soviet armed aggression in Western Europe.

Many Western European nations are apprehensive about the continuing IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) reduction talks and would like to have direct input during the negotiations. Political figures in Europe still question whether the United States would use its strategic nuclear

forces in the event of a conventional invasion in Western Europe. The acceptance of the United States-Soviet parity in strategic forces focused attention on military forces below the strategic level.

The damage done to detente by the Afghan invasion and Soviet pressure to Poland caused Europeans to think carefully about the tendency to rely heavily on the benefits of detente as a basis for foreign policy. The Soviet downing of an inflight Korean passenger airliner caused NATO allies to rally together. NATO's commitment to defense was increased by England, Germany, Italy, and most especially by the United States. NATO allies quickly forgot the United States's military anti-Communist moves in Grenada.

The United States, with a high portion of gross national product (GNP) devoted to defense spending, prodded its allies to increase their defense expenditures. All were in agreement that a stronger alliance was a necessity. Several allies, however, were interested in having a stronger influence in the choice of military equipment adopted by NATO. The intent was to have their countries produce and sell to NATO an increasing share of its military equipment.

After heated negotiations, procurement of NATO military supplies was made more equitable; however, decisions in this area still remain a sensitive political issue among the allies.

The economic recession of the early and mid-1980s made defense spending difficult for most Western European countries. There was almost zero growth in the early 1980s. Real growth in the mid-1980s, however, was three to four percent.

The Middle East remained a volatile area. The United States pursued policies aimed at balancing its commitment to Israel with its interests in oil, blunting Soviet influence, and promoting stability in the area. Some European states disagreed and emphasized access to energy supplies at the expense of other factors.

Spain, Portugal, and Greece were admitted to the Common Market. Cooperation between Western European countries continued, though intra-alliance rivalry prevented full economic cooperation. Efforts to coordinate a European monetary policy and to develop a common European currency have not yet been successful.

1. United States

The Republican President and a split Congress were able to work together on most foreign policy issues in the early and mid-1980s. Both branches of government perceived Soviet intentions as being more assertive than they did during the era of detente. Trade and cultural exchange activities with the Soviet Union were curtailed, but not eliminated.

Military preparedness was increased. In addition to modernization of strategic forces, conventional forces were strengthened. A new secret strike force attacked El Salvador, ended years of guerilla fighting, and prevented a totalitarian government from controlling that country. The force consisted of airborne troops and Marines lifted by air and sea. The move, reminiscent of the United States' invasion of Grenada in the early 1980s, reminded the world that the United States position was firm with respect to threats from Communist regimes.

Economic and military aid was increased to a wide variety of countries. Some countries in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Central Africa received increased assistance.

These increased expenditures, however, added to economic problems and controversies at home. Social welfare programs were reduced, and the beneficiaries and supporters of these programs were dissatisfied. A national health plan was initiated in the late 1980s with the benefits limited to major medical costs and a program to contain inflation in all health care areas. Revision of the Federal tax structure was modest with benefits to individuals and business running somewhat behind the additional tax revenues from inflation.

Oil imports remained at high levels but tended to level off at 7 million barrels per day. Other forms of energy, particularly the use of coal by industry and electrical generating utilities, were increased.

The President, Congress, and special interest groups were often at odds on domestic policy, so measures on energy, social welfare, and economy seemed uncoordinated. These domestic controversies were the subject of much comment from overseas by allies and opponents alike.

In the Third World, the United States government pursued economic ties with the stronger less developed countries. For example, agreements and understandings were reached with Mexico to export American technology and reduce tensions associated with immigration and restrictions on some Mexican products. Relations resumed with the Philippines.

Closer ties were pursued with China. More high-technology goods were exported with the support of the Export-Import (ExIm) Bank of the United States. A request to purchase large jet transport aircraft was not fulfilled, but sales were made of medium-sized Hercules aircraft.

The domestic political controversies faced by the United States President in the election year 1988 presented substantial problems. The President's effectiveness was reduced considerably because of deteriorating relations with congressional leaders in late 1987 and early 1988. Primarily, this was due to his hawkish attitudes and huge defense budgets.

2. Great Britain

Conservatives continued to lead the British government in the early and mid-1980s. Early in 1988, new elections were called and a conservative government was returned; however, the conservative margin in Parliament narrowed to 15 seats. This reduced margin was likely due to Britain's close ties with American defense efforts. However, public protest over the United States deployment of cruise missiles near London subsided.

The English economy, long beset with problems in productivity and lagging behind other European countries in per capita income growth, improved significantly after taking austerity measures during the global recession of the early 1980s. Growing petroleum self-sufficiency due to the North Sea production helped improve British economic performance.

The conflict with Argentina over the Falkland Islands induced Great Britain to increase its defense budget every year. Failure to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Argentines has forced the British to expend considerable resources defending the Islands. These resources spent in the South Atlantic served to reduce the effectiveness of Britain's commitment to NATO.

An agreement was signed with the United States to acquire new TRIDENT submarines with a view towards phasing out the aging POLARIS undersea nuclear system.

Great Britain pursued policies independent from the United States in European councils and in Third World relations. However, in support of important United States initiatives in NATO and in Warsaw Pact relations, Great Britain generally backed the United States position.

3. West Germany

West German economic performance continued to be the envy of the industrialized world with low inflation and solid growth in output after a pause in 1980-82. Defense expenditures increased.

In the political sphere, West Germany continued to pursue closer ties with East Germany, emphasizing economic and cultural contacts. The West German Chancellor consolidated his political position in the most recent national elections. The Green Party, whose main issues were disarmament and peace, remained small. A sizable minority of Southern Europeans remained in the country, but steps were taken to improve their living conditions and provide better education for their children. This reduced tensions between Germany and their homelands. Renewed terrorism required harsh measures by police.

To match her increased economic and military strength, West Germany became more assertive in foreign affairs. While remaining a supporter of the Western Alliance, West Germany felt free to pursue a more independent course with its contacts in the Third World, Europe, and the United States.

4. Greece

During the mid-1980s, solutions to the issues of territorial rights of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus remained elusive, but not impossible. Greece and Turkey began to focus on realistic solutions for both sides. NATO pressured both countries to resolve their problems in order to continue as full-fledged members of NATO's military command structure. Greece's Socialist rulers, however, may not be motivated to negotiate with Turkey because of NATO pressure.

Greece expanded its relations with Balkan (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Turkey) neighbors. Joint projects in energy development, transportation, and arms production were initiated. A state visit by the leader of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s was returned by the Greek Premier. Commercial contracts were signed with Hungary and Poland for the supply of industrial plants.

A Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed with the United States. It allowed the use of an airbase communications station on Crete, while the United States provided modern military equipment.

Greek reaction to the United States military support of Turkey was moderate. The United States increased arms shipments to Greece. There was greater access to Greek ports by ships of the 6th Fleet; however, full "Home Port" basing rights were not reestablished.

5. Turkey

United States relations with Turkey, strained since Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus, improved. The United States and Turkish foreign ministers met in 1983 and came to several understandings. Military aid was once again provided to Turkey and Turkey allowed the reestablishment

of United States sensitive electronic monitoring stations on Turkish soil. Her commitment to NATO was reaffirmed. The Turkish-Soviet commercial pact remained in effect, but there were shortfalls in delivery by both sides.

In the face of continuing terrorism and rioting, the government gave additional powers to the police and army units to preserve internal stability. The military junta imposed tight controls on the economy. Though provoking unrest, these measures along with a rescheduling of foreign debt may have begun to improve Turkey's economy. However, in spite of strong lobbying and political pressure, Turkey was again refused admission to EEC. Unemployment was reduced, but remained at 15% of the labor force.

A spark of hope is now evident for an accommodation with Greece over the Cyprus problem. Talks are now underway which would provide substantial autonomy for the Turkish minority in Cyprus. These talks are under the sponsorship of the United States. Their scope, however, does not include the traditional dispute with Greece over rights in the Aegean Sea. Tensions between Greece and Turkey, however, are considerably lower now than they were in the mid and late 1970s.

THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

The Warsaw Pact includes the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. These countries, like the NATO countries, have affirmed that an attack on any one of the countries is taken as an attack on them all.

The dominant force in the Warsaw Pact has been, of course, the Soviet Union. However, stress and internal disunity were noted within the Warsaw Pact in the early 1980s, as some member countries pursued their own interests independently. Despite over 35 years of Soviet influence and control, it was evident that a sufficient bond of common interest has not been forged by the Soviet Union to fully insure unquestioned obedience.

Nonetheless, despite this trend, the stark reality is that the Soviets have over 30 divisions stationed in Eastern European countries to keep

policies from straying too far from USSR core interests. The threat of using these forces can be highly effective in inducing cooperation in Warsaw Pact nations. For example, the Soviets had become wary of worker unrest and the formation of an independent union in Poland in the early 1980s. The threat of intervention by Soviet troops was sufficient to cause Polish authorities to institute a crackdown on union leaders and impose marshal law for well over a year.

The events in Poland foreshadowed the beginning of an era of increased dominance by the Soviet Union. This phenomenon coincided with the death of Yuri Andropov and several other senior Soviet officials. The new Soviet leadership which has emerged is much less willing to accept divergence from the official party policy, and appears more willing to use force to achieve its objectives. Thus, Warsaw Pact countries in the late 1980s are much more hesitant to implement policies which would interfere with Soviet objectives.

6. The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union in the early 1980s avoided the outright use of force in dealing with its challengers. After retraining Afghanistan's army and police force, Soviet troops began to be less visible in the countryside. The number of combat troops decreased considerably; however, Soviet control remained unquestionable due to the strong Soviet influence on the police and political structure of the country.

After Andropov's death, the new Chairman and leader of the Communist Party, a key position in the collective leadership coalition of the Soviet Union, consolidated his power without a significant struggle since retirements and ill health came to a number of aging leaders. The new Soviet leadership is characterized by a strict adherence to communist principles. Moscow is now more hostile to the West, and is less willing to allow Warsaw Pact nations to develop independent policies.

The Soviet Union has continued to upgrade its strategic forces. In conventional forces, the buildup in land capabilities continued, with new improved armor, aircraft, and mechanized equipment being introduced and distributed

substantial quantities to units stationed in Western Russia and in the vicinity of the Russo-Chinese border. Soviet naval forces were increased as well.

The Soviet economy continued to advance, but growth slowed compared with the 1970s. Agriculture remained a problem and the Soviets turned to world markets to supplement their own grain production. Increases in cattle and meat production were modest. Russia became a modest importer of oil in the mid-1980s.

Capital goods and high technology products were imported from Western Europe and Japan. Soviet commercial contracts with NATO members frustrated attempts by the United States to apply economic pressure. However, after significant increases in the early 1980s, the scope of high-technology imports declined. The debt that resulted from imports of food, oil, and capital goods made it difficult to obtain finances for additional imports.

Soviet leaders called upon their people to accept sacrifices in view of the external threats from China and increased assertiveness from West Germany and other NATO countries. Furthermore, the steps that the United States had taken to rearm and impede commercial and cultural exchange were portrayed to the Russian people as signs of the dangers they faced.

Russian exports of arms continued both to Warsaw Pact countries and sympathetic elements of the Third World. Proxy forces (notably from Cuba), advisory forces, and military aid were employed in Africa and Yemen. However, the Soviet Union was not able to consolidate any new gains in Africa.

Ethnic minorities and intellectual dissidents were dealt with firmly by Russian officials. While there were protests from other parts of the world, Soviet leaders were often not responsive to protests made by outsiders.

7. Bulgaria

Bulgaria (Yugoslavia's neighbor to the southeast) continued its acceptance of increased integration of its political and cultural systems with the Soviet Union. The Bulgarian Prime Minister was a close ally of Russia all through the mid-1980s.

Bulgarian farm production dropped in the mid-1980s, and the high per capita income level it enjoyed in the early 1980s was threatened. Russian aid poured in, and several new industries (especially the manufacture of automobile parts) were started. Quickly, Bulgaria was economically indebted to Russia.

As the economy in Yugoslavia faltered, Russian officials moved into Bulgaria, especially around Sofia, to be near the troubled land. The Bulgarian government welcomed the Russians.

8. Romania

Romania continued to retain its strong sense of national identity. It maintained relations with China and Albania, much to Russia's continued consternation. It strengthened ties to Israel in the mid-1980s.

In the early 1980s, Romania was able to resist demands for an increase in military budgets, but the strength and state of the modernization of other Warsaw Pact forces remained impressive.

Romania developed closer ties with Yugoslavia. After Tito's death, Romania openly supported the new Yugoslav government. The President of Romania vowed that Yugoslav and Romania would stand together against any threats from the East or the West. However, an increasingly more difficult economic situation, especially one in which Western credits are withheld or curtailed, could force Romania back into the Soviet fold and decrease its support for Yugoslavia.

9. Hungary

Although Hungary did not consummate any Western trade agreements, it accumulated a large financial debt to Western countries. It was unable to make interest payments without help from Russia.

The new Hungarian Premier developed strong ties with Russia. Hungary built up its military strength drastically through the mid-1980s.

NONALIGNED

10. Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia, formally known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is located in the southern part of central Europe. (See maps of Yugoslavia in Appendix A.) The country borders the Adriatic Sea on the west, and seven nations including Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Romania.

Approximately half of Yugoslavia is dominated by a series of rugged mountain ridges which run parallel to each other and the coastline. Most of the mountain passes are high, thereby isolating the coast from the rest of the country. In the northwest, Alpine ranges can be found, while in the south, a narrow irregular belt of plateaus dominates the countryside. Under these plateaus, water has dissolved the limestone rocks to form a series of caverns and potholes (known as the Karst Zone) which forms another barrier between the coast and the interior of the country.

The Adriatic coastline is distinctive. Mountain ranges and valleys have been submerged by changes in sea level. The ranges have become peninsulas or islands while the valleys have become sea channels.

Plains cover 25% of Yugoslavia. The most important and fertile of these is the Pannonian Basin which lies between the central highlands and the northern frontier and it is drained by the Danube. The plains are

dotted by many settlements. Trade routes lead to the north to central Europe, to the east to the Black Sea, and to the southeast to the eastern Mediterranean. The mountain ranges make transportation between the plains and the Adriatic coast difficult.

Yugoslavia is composed of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Each republic sends elected representatives to the Federal Executive Council which administers the government. Vojvodina and Kosovo are two autonomous provinces which are subordinate to Serbia. Belgrade, the capital, is located in Serbia. Serbs make up 40% of the population; Croats, 22%; Slovenes, 8%; Macedonians, 6%; and Montenegrins, 2.5%. Additionally, Muslims, who constitute about 9% of the population, are regarded as a distinct ethnic group. Among the largest groups of non-Slav peoples are the Albanians (8%) (concentrated in Kosovo) and Hungarians (2.3%). Other notable nationalities include Turks, Romanians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Germans, and Italians.

The Yugoslav people speak three different official languages: Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, and Macedonian. The Cyrillic alphabet is used by the Serbs, and the Latin Alphabet is used by the Croats.

Religion is deeply rooted in Yugoslavia. Over 41% of the population are Greek Orthodox, 32% are Roman Catholic, and 12% practice Islam. Traditionally, the Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins (located in the east) adhere to Eastern Orthodoxy, while the Croats and Slovenes (located nearer Austria) practice Roman Catholicism.

Yugoslavia's population exceeds 23,000,000. The growth in population has been high in recent years with birth rates highest in rural areas. The decreasing death rates are probably the result of national health programs. As is true in most western nations, there has been a shift in population away from rural areas and towards large cities.

Chief among Yugoslavia's sources of national income are the following:

- Industry. The Yugoslav economy has changed remarkably since World War II in that

industrial growth, especially in heavy industry, has increased dramatically. Generation of electricity, oil refining electrical engineering, metalworking and machine building, ore mining and smelting, and the chemical and rubber industries have all shown high rates of growth.

- Agriculture. Agriculture has been a traditional weak spot in the Yugoslav economy. Less than 20% of the national income derives from agriculture in spite of the fact that 33% of the land is devoted to agriculture. Most land is farmed by an aging peasant workforce whose productivity is quite low. Similarly, most livestock is poorly managed by peasants. The most important agricultural products are wheat, maize, and sugar beets. Food shortages are not uncommon in many areas in the late 1980s.
- Forestry and Fishing. Furniture factories, paper and pulp mills, and sawmills are located in west and central Bosnia and Serbia. Fishing is an important part of local economies in cities along the coast and major rivers.
- Tourism. The tourist industry has become important. The influx of foreign currency from tourists who frequent the Adriatic coast is significant.
- Foreign Trade. Over 20% of Yugoslavia's national income is derived from foreign trade. Important trading partners include the USSR, West Germany, Italy, and the United States. A significant deficit in the balance of trade exists with Western nations.

Approximately 80% of public transportation is conducted by rail, often through difficult terrain. Road and air traffic are just beginning to develop. Belgrade and Zagreb are the main air centers. Although most Yugoslavian freighters were destroyed during World War II, maritime trade has made a remarkable comeback.

Yugoslavia employs a unique system of management by the workers. Immediately after World War II, the basic means of production and financial

institutions were nationalized and based on the Soviet model which calls for a highly centralized administration. However, in the early 1950s, the Federal Assembly authorized the establishment of workers' councils which were designed to provide workers a chance to determine economic policy. These councils exercised little power at first, but during the subsequent decade their importance increased greatly. In the 1960s, further economic reforms accelerated the change away from the Soviet model. Centralized administration was further reduced and individual enterprises were given greater responsibility. The trend continues in the late 1980s.

Modern Yugoslavia dates from the end of the first World War. In 1918, the new nation was created from the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Following World War II, a federated people's republic was set up under the leadership of Josip Broz, nicknamed Tito. During the war, Tito had led the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in armed resistance against the Germans and established the foundation for a strong Communist Party.

After the war, Tito's party took over the government with help from the Allies, yet Yugoslavia became the most militant, Communist, pro-Soviet country in Eastern Europe. For the next two to three years, Tito was the spokesman for Communist expansion into central and southern Europe. At the same time, however, Tito's policies allowed freedom in arts, travel, and enterprise.

On June 28, 1948, Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the International Communist Movement (COMINFORM). The main issue was whether Yugoslavia could remain in the Soviet bloc while pursuing policies decided upon by its own leaders instead of by Moscow. Stalin decided that this degree of independence was unacceptable, and viewed Tito as the one responsible. Stalin thought that if Yugoslavia were expelled, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) would replace Tito, and then again seek entrance to the COMINFORM. Thus, Stalin would be rid of Tito, and at the same time control Yugoslavia.

However, the charismatic Tito prevailed in the LCY, and attempted in the mid-1950s to identify himself as a leader of nonaligned nations, thereby avoiding total dependence on either the Soviet or Western military bloc.

Tito died on May 4, 1980. The fate of Yugoslavia was uncertain. "After Tito, there will be no Yugoslavia." "The internal and external pressures will be too much." "His successor will never be able to fill those shoes." "There is no one around with the prestige and understanding that Tito had." "You cannot rule out a Soviet invasion in the near future." Such were the predictions and opinions on the day of Tito's death. Yugoslavia did not fall, nor was it invaded by the Soviets. Due to Tito's long illness, the country, in fact, had been functioning for some months without him. The loss proved to be more psychological than physical.

With the backing of the army under General Nikola Ljubicic, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was able to make a smooth transition into the post-Tito era. The complex machinery of succession, based on collective leadership, was put into effect. The head of the nine-member committee, Lazar Kolisevski (a Macedonian), became the country's first interim President upon Tito's death. No dramatic events took place - the status quo remained.

Steven Doronjski from Vojvodina, the northern province in Serbia (see map in Appendix A), was the chairman of the 24-member Presidium of the ruling Yugoslav League of Communists (LCY) when Tito died. He automatically became party chief. From the start, however, he carried out his duties as party chief in a very precarious manner. He appeared to be chief in name only. His authority was questioned.

Within a year after Tito's death, the expected power struggle within the LCY began. Stan Dolanc, the well-known party secretary, took over as party chief after a long and bitter clandestine meeting in Belgrade. Many outside observers believe that this caused irreparable damage to the party. The change had a ripple effect. Within two years, Dolanc also

became President of Yugoslavia, replacing Lazar Kolisevski. Changes also occurred in the leadership of the republics. The new leadership favored centralization and, generally, a strong military capability. Albanians in Kosovo rioted to gain republic status, but hundreds were arrested and the riots put down.

Initially, under Tito, a decentralized form of Communist government was used, and the six republics and two provinces had a high degree of self-government. After the Croatian crisis of 1971-72, Tito centralized the Party, thus concentrating political power. Dolanc went a step further: he centralized the armed forces, including those previously under control of the republics. The local police became part of the National Police Force. Banks were also centralized, thus giving the government a very high hold on the currency.

The size and the cost of maintaining the added armed forces became a sensitive political issue among the populace. They feared the Army would be used against them instead of protecting them from any Soviet threat. Dolanc insisted that the new regime and new policies would bring an era of stability to Yugoslavia.

D. Diary of the Crisis

JANUARY 1988

Nationalistic republic rumbles began to be heard. Milos Minic, former Foreign Minister, openly criticized Dolanc on television. He called for greater political pluralism in Yugoslavia.

Minic was immediately arrested. Dolanc charged him with being a traitor and a leader of a separatist movement for an independent Croatia.

MARCH 1988

Dolanc, a devout Titoist, realized the precarious position of his country since it stood in the neutral ground between East and West. He had seen Tito walk this tightrope with great skill and success for almost 40 years.

Dolanc had visited Washington in 1987 and was able to obtain financial and military assistance from the United States. Six months later he was in Moscow, also seeking economic and military aid. He obtained the aid, but the Soviets tied strings to it. In return, Dolanc agreed to let the Soviets use the Adriatic seaports of Split and Rijeka (see map in Appendix A), thus giving the Soviets a much-coveted access to the Mediterranean. In March 1988, sharp protests were raised in Washington and some previously promised aid was withheld.

Dolanc proved equally as inept in providing leadership to the Third World nonaligned movement. At the World Meeting in Peking in March, the leadership of the Third World was assumed by Castro, and Yugoslav influence in the Third World diminished. Only Romania retained close ties with Yugoslavia, maintaining a mutual support agreement with them.

The Dolanc regime faced significant problems. "The dissident movement in Yugoslavia today is real and significant," wrote a London journalist in March. "It is only a matter of time before Dolanc's fate is sealed -- a change is inevitable."

MAY 1988

Threats to Dolanc's lead appeared to be coming from three different but related factions. First, strong nationalistic republic groups (e.g., the Croats) gave the impression that they would ally with any internal or external group to further their goal of autonomy. These groups had approached both the KGB and the CIA for support.

Second, the Communists in Yugoslavia had for some time been split into two groups. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), headed by Dolanc, was the largest group in power at the time. The Yugoslav Communist Party is a pro-Soviet group which had received considerable aid from Moscow. This group, growing in numbers and influence, appeared to threaten Dolanc's group.

Finally, neighboring countries, especially Bulgaria and Albania, were eyeing the turmoil in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia borders Bulgaria and was once a part of Bulgaria. Macedonians and Bulgarians share ancestral, linguistic, and religious origins. Territorial disputes between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have been common, and Bulgaria saw a chance to recapture Macedonia.

During May 1988, the LCY regime of Dolanc became increasingly more authoritarian. Many dissidents were exiled from the country; many were executed. On orders from Dolanc, thousands of pro-Soviet Yugoslav Communist Party members were arrested, and hundreds were imprisoned. The Party went underground and urgently called for help, invoking the old Brezhnev doctrine of international solidarity for all Communist parties.

JUNE 1988

In late June, Hungary and Bulgaria announced that they would be conducting extensive military training exercises on their borders and that Soviet troops would be joining the maneuvers in two weeks.

Yugoslavia immediately appealed to the United Nations, claiming that an invasion was at hand. Romania denounced the maneuvers and pledged to stand with Yugoslavia in case of an invasion.

JULY 1, 1988

The rumors of Soviet troops massing on the Bulgarian and Hungarian borders had a devastating effect on the Yugoslav government. Local

government lost considerable control, especially in the Republic of Macedonia. In search of safety, people were beginning to flee from Bulgarian borders.

JULY 3, 1988

Insurgent armed groups made night raids on police stations and army posts in Macedonia. Large quantities of military and medical supplies were destroyed or captured by these groups.

JULY 5, 1988

Open fighting broke out in the streets of Skopje, Macedonia. Platoon-size groups (later identified as pro-Soviet Communists) attacked and destroyed the National Police Headquarters and terrorized city officials. By the time the Yugoslav Army units arrived, the insurgents had fled to the mountains.

JULY 6, 1988

Dolanc appeared on Yugoslav television and declared a national emergency. He informed the people that an invasion was imminent and that mobilization of the country was necessary for survival. He also called on friends and allies around the world to stand behind Yugoslavia in its struggle to remain a free and independent nation. The following day, President Dolanc issued mobilization orders.

JULY 12, 1988 (DAY 1 OF THE SIMULATION)

On July 12, 1988, in New York, the Yugoslav Delegation to the United Nations formally asks the Secretary General to send a commission to investigate military preparations by Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Soviet troops along the Yugoslav borders. They hope to be able to expose to the world the impending aggression on the territorial integrity of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The world reacts to the Russian presence and imminent invasion of Yugoslavia:


- Bucharest. In response to Dolanc's request for assistance, the President of Romania offers his good offices to mediate the alleged differences between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Noting that Romania has a significant Macedonian population, he expressed optimism that leaders from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia could meet and provide a forum for airing their differences.
- Ankara. Military leaders express concern over the Turkish minority in the Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia. They appeal to Yugoslav leaders to seek a peaceful solution to avoid providing an excuse for outside forces to take advantage of the situation in Macedonia.
- Rome. The Prime Minister publicly expresses concern that the Bulgarians are using the problems of Macedonia to undermine the Yugoslav government. He recalls over 30 years of tranquility on the border between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Italian delegate to the United Nations expresses concern over the situation and generally endorses Yugoslavia's call for an investigative mission.
- Paris. The French Foreign Minister is quoted as being disappointed by the Yugoslav developments, which he describes as an internal matter. He suggests that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia demilitarize an area on each side of their common border.
- London. The British Foreign Minister states that the Soviet Union should not take advantage of the difficulties in southern Europe. In response to a journalist's question, she points out that there are substantial differences between this situation and the 1980 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: Yugoslavia does not border the Soviet Union, but is bordered by states that form part of the Atlantic Alliance. She expresses optimism that the Soviets will exercise restraint and that the Macedonian question will be resolved without outside intervention.

- Bonn. Leading West German newspapers express concern over developments in southern Europe. They point out that if Bulgaria intervenes in the problems in Macedonia, a bloody conflict with the Yugoslavian government is likely. These papers further suggest that even without the intervention of Soviet troops, this event may be interpreted as Soviet intervention in the European continent because of Bulgaria's complete domination by the Soviet Union.
- Athens. The Premier expresses concern about the conflict between two of Greece's northern neighbors. There are reports that Athens is transferring to Yugoslavia anti-tank and other critical weapons.
- Moscow. The Party Chairman states that the Soviets have no interest in the Macedonian issue which is a problem to be solved by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. He says that Warsaw Pact exercises in Hungary and Bulgaria are routine training exercises and should not be matters of concern to anyone. He points out that Greece and Turkey have increased their armed strength in recent years with the help of the United States. Furthermore, Greece has supported the Yugoslav Army in its efforts to subdue domestic minorities. He calls on all European governments to avoid interference in the internal affairs of southern Europe. He warns that attempts by the United States or NATO to reinforce the disintegrating Dolanc regime in Yugoslavia will be viewed by the Soviet Union as a provocation and appropriate response will be forthcoming. He reminds the world that Soviet land and naval forces are second to none on the Southern Tier.
- Washington. In Congress, members of both parties voice alarm at the events in southern Europe. Some urge the President to declare that the continued independence of Yugoslavia is vital to the United States. However, others point out that the Dolanc regime is not fully effective and has committed civil rights violations. Many urge caution against being drawn into Balkan affairs.


The simulation begins at 0800, 12 July 1988. The United Nations has just convened. The United States President has asked you, a member of the National Security Council, to advise him as the crisis continues.

APPENDIX A
SCENARIO MAPS

MAP FOR STORM SCENARIO



MAP FOR YUGOSLAV DILEMMA



MAP FOR YUGOSLAV DILEMMA
(DO NOT USE FOR COORDINATES)



Base 50466 (1:4,000,000)

APPENDIX B
NOTE-TAKING FORM

STORM SCENARIO/YUGOSLAVIA DILEMMA - PARTICIPANT'S NOTE-TAKING FORM

#	MESSAGES RECEIVED	DECISIONS I MADE			MY FUTURE DECISION PLANS	DECISIONS WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION	MESSAGES WHICH LED TO THIS DECISION
		#	CODE/TIME/TEXT	RESULTS			

APPENDIX C
DECISION ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE STORM PRACTICE SESSION

STORM SCENARIO DECISION ALTERNATIVES

Evacuation Action You Can Take

1111	Alert the administrators of Jackson High School	
1112		of Kennedy High School
1121	Alert the teachers of Jackson High School	
1122		of Kennedy High School
12111	Move the administrators of Jackson High School	to Marsh Park
12112		to Tyson's Corner
12113		to quadrant
12121	Move the administrators of Kennedy High School	to Marsh Park
12122		to Tyson's Corner
12123		to quadrant
12211	Move the students of Jackson High School	to Marsh Park
12212		to Tyson's Corner
12213		to quadrant
12221	Move the students of Kennedy High School	to Marsh Park
12222		to Tyson's Corner
12223		to quadrant
12311	Move the teachers of Jackson High School	to Marsh Park
12312		to Tyson's Corner
12313		to quadrant
12321	Move the teachers of Kennedy High School	to Marsh Park
12322		to Tyson's Corner
12323		to quadrant

Information Search You Can Request

2111	Determine threat to administrators of Jackson High School	
2112		of Kennedy High School
2121	Determine threat to teachers of Jackson High School	
2122		of Kennedy High School
2131	Determine threat to students of Jackson High School	
2132		of Kennedy High School
2211	Assess damage to roads in the city	
2212		in the suburbs
2221	Assess damage to communications facilities in the city	
2222		in the suburbs

APPENDIX D
DECISION ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE YUGOSLAV DILEMMA

ECONOMIC ACTION YOU CAN TAKE

Reduce exports of food

1111 to Russia
1112 to Bulgaria
1113 to Yugoslavia
1114 to Romania

Reduce exports of high technology products

1121 to Russia
1122 to Bulgaria
1123 to Yugoslavia
1124 to Romania

Reduce imports of raw materials

1211 to Russia
1212 to Bulgaria
1213 to Yugoslavia
1214 to Romania

Reduce imports of manufactured goods

1221 to Russia
1222 to Bulgaria
1223 to Yugoslavia
1224 to Romania

Reduce credit by 1 million dollars

1311 to Russia
1312 to Bulgaria
1313 to Yugoslavia
1314 to Romania

Reduce credit by 5 million dollars

1321 to Russia
1322 to Bulgaria
1323 to Yugoslavia
1324 to Romania

Reduce credit by 10 million dollars

1331 to Russia
1332 to Bulgaria
1333 to Yugoslavia
1334 to Romania

Reduce credit by 50 million dollars

1341 to Russia
1342 to Bulgaria
1343 to Yugoslavia
1344 to Romania

Increase exports of food

1411 to Russia
1412 to Bulgaria
1413 to Yugoslavia
1414 to Romania

Increase exports of high technology products

1421 to Russia
1422 to Bulgaria
1423 to Yugoslavia
1424 to Romania

Increase imports of raw materials

1511 to Russia
1512 to Bulgaria
1513 to Yugoslavia
1514 to Romania

Increase imports of manufactured goods

1521 to Russia
1522 to Bulgaria
1523 to Yugoslavia
1524 to Romania

Increase credit by 1 million dollars

1611 to Russia
1612 to Bulgaria
1613 to Yugoslavia
1614 to Romania

Increase credit by 5 million dollars

1621 to Russia
1622 to Bulgaria
1623 to Yugoslavia
1624 to Romania

Increase credit by 10 million dollars

1631 to Russia
1632 to Bulgaria
1633 to Yugoslavia
1634 to Romania

Increase credit by 50 million dollars

1641 to Russia
1642 to Bulgaria
1643 to Yugoslavia
1644 to Romania

POLITICAL ACTION YOU CAN TAKE

Send messages concerning the potential imposition of economic sanctions

21111 to the Russian Ambassador
21112 Foreign Minister
21113 President
21121 to the Bulgarian Ambassador
21122 Foreign Minister
21123 President
21131 to the Yugoslavian Ambassador
21132 Foreign Minister
21133 President
21141 to the Romanian Ambassador
21142 Foreign Minister
21143 President

Send messages concerning the potential resumption of normal trade

21211 to the Russian Ambassador
21212 Foreign Minister
21213 President
21221 to the Bulgarian Ambassador
21222 Foreign Minister
21223 President
21231 to the Yugoslavian Ambassador
21232 Foreign Minister
21233 President
21241 to the Romanian Ambassador
21242 Foreign Minister
21243 President

Send messages concerning the potential involvement of U.S. forces in Yugoslavia

21311 to the Russian Ambassador
21312 Foreign Minister
21313 President
21321 to the Bulgarian Ambassador
21322 Foreign Minister
21323 President
21331 to the Yugoslavian Ambassador
21332 Foreign Minister
21333 President
21341 to the Romanian Ambassador
21342 Foreign Minister
21343 President

Send messages concerning U.S. interests in a non-aligned Yugoslavia

21411 to the Russian Ambassador
21412 Foreign Minister
21413 President
21421 to the Bulgarian Ambassador
21422 Foreign Minister
21423 President
21431 to the Yugoslavian Ambassador
21432 Foreign Minister
21433 President
21441 to the Romanian Ambassador
21442 Foreign Minister
21443 President

Send diplomats to discuss potential imposition of economic sanctions

22111 to the Russian Ambassador
22112 Foreign Minister
22113 President
22121 to the Bulgarian Ambassador
22122 Foreign Minister
22123 President
22131 to the Yugoslavian Ambassador
22132 Foreign Minister
22133 President
22141 to the Romanian Ambassador
22142 Foreign Minister
22143 President

Send diplomats to discuss potential resumption of normal trade

22211 with the Russian Ambassador
22212 Foreign Minister
22213 President
22221 with the Bulgarian Ambassador
22222 Foreign Minister
22223 President
22231 with the Yugoslavian Ambassador
22232 Foreign Minister
22233 President
22241 with the Romanian Ambassador
22242 Foreign Minister
22243 President

Send diplomats to discuss potential involvement of U.S. forces in Yugoslavia

22311 with the Russian Ambassador
22312 Foreign Minister
22313 President
22321 with the Bulgarian Ambassador
22322 Foreign Minister
22323 President
22331 with the Yugoslavian Ambassador
22332 Foreign Minister
22333 President
22341 with the Romanian Ambassador
22342 Foreign Minister
22343 President

Send diplomats to discuss U.S. interests in a non-aligned Yugoslavia

22411 with the Russian Ambassador
22412 Foreign Minister
22413 President
22421 with the Bulgarian Ambassador
22422 Foreign Minister
22423 President
22431 with the Yugoslavian Ambassador
22432 Foreign Minister
22433 President
22441 with the Romanian Ambassador
22442 Foreign Minister
22443 President

Arrange a conference with cabinet members
2311 to assess previous political actions
2312 military actions
2313 economic actions
2314 covert operations
2315 public opinion actions

Arrange a conference with cabinet members
2321 to plan future political actions
2322 military actions
2323 economic actions
2324 covert operations
2325 public opinion actions

MILITARY ACTION YOU CAN TAKE

Alert U.S. 6th fleet
3111 to prepare to move
3112 to prepare for combat

Alert U.S. Air Force
3121 to prepare to move
3122 to prepare for combat

Alert U.S. Army Europe
3131 to prepare to move
3132 to prepare for combat

Alert U.S. Rapid Deployment Force
3141 to prepare to move
3142 to prepare for combat

Move U.S. 6th fleet
32111 Task Force A to the Adriatic Sea
32112 to the Aegean Sea
32113 to the Ionian Sea
32114 to quadrant
32121 Task Force B to the Adriatic Sea
32122 to the Aegean Sea
32123 to the Ionian Sea
32124 to quadrant

Move U.S. Air Force interceptor squadrons (W. Germany)
32211 to airfields in Britain
32212 in W. Germany
32213 in Greece
32214 in quadrant

Move U.S. Air Force ground attack fighter squadrons (W. Germany)
32221 to airfields in Britain
32222 in W. Germany
32223 in Greece
32224 in quadrant

Move U.S. Air Force reconnaissance squadrons (England)
32231 to airfields in Britain
32232 in W. Germany
32233 in Greece
32234 in quadrant

Move U.S. Air Force transport squadrons (U.S.)
32241 to airfields in Britain
32242 in W. Germany
32243 in Greece
32244 in quadrant

Move U.S. Air Force bomber squadrons (England)
32251 to airfields in Britain
32252 in W. Germany
32253 in Greece
32254 in quadrant

Move U.S. Army Europe Division A (armored)

32311 to bases in Britain
32312 in W. Germany
32313 in Italy
32314 in Greece
32315 in quadrant

Move U.S. Army Europe Division B (infantry)

32321 to bases in Britain
32322 in W. Germany
32323 in Italy
32324 in Greece
32325 in quadrant

Move U.S. Army Europe Division C (mechanized)

32331 to bases in Britain
32332 in W. Germany
32333 in Italy
32334 in Greece
32335 in quadrant

Move U.S. Army Europe Division D (airmobile)

32341 to bases in Britain
32342 in W. Germany
32343 in Italy
32344 in Greece
32345 in quadrant

Move U.S. Rapid Deployment Force Division A (mechanized)

32411 to bases in Britain
32412 in W. Germany
32413 in Italy
32414 in Greece
32415 in quadrant

Move U.S. Rapid Deployment Force Division B (airborne)

32421 to bases in Britain
32422 in W. Germany
32423 in Italy
32424 in Greece
32425 in quadrant

Move U.S. Rapid Deployment Force Division C (air assault)

32431 to bases in Britain
32432 in W. Germany
32433 in Italy
32434 in Greece
32435 in quadrant

Move U.S. Rapid Deployment Force Special Forces Units

32441 to bases in Britain
32442 in W. Germany
32443 in Italy
32444 in Greece
32445 in quadrant

Conduct reconnaissance missions

3311 in Russia with satellites
3312 with SR-71 aircraft
3313 with foot patrols
3321 in Bulgaria with satellites
3322 with SR-71 aircraft
3323 with foot patrols
3331 in Yugoslavia with satellites
3332 with SR-71 aircraft
3333 with foot patrols
3341 in Romania with satellites
3342 with SR-71 aircraft
3343 with foot patrols

COVERT OPERATIONS ACTIONS YOU CAN TAKE.

Transmit false information

4111	about planned U.S. military actions	in Russia
4112		in Bulgaria
4113		in Yugoslavia
4114		in Romania
4121	about planned U.S. political actions	in Russia
4122		in Bulgaria
4123		in Yugoslavia
4124		in Romania
4131	about planned U.S. economic actions	in Russia
4132		in Bulgaria
4133		in Yugoslavia
4134		in Romania
4141	about planned U.S. covert operations	in Russia
4142		in Bulgaria
4143		in Yugoslavia
4144		in Romania

Send additional agents

4211	to penetrate military organizations	in Russia
4212		in Bulgaria
4213		in Yugoslavia
4214		in Romania
4221	to penetrate political organizations	in Russia
4222		in Bulgaria
4223		in Yugoslavia
4224		in Romania
4231	to penetrate intelligence organizations	in Russia
4232		in Bulgaria
4233		in Yugoslavia
4234		in Romania

Sabotage

4311	power plants	in Russia
4312		in Bulgaria
4313		in Yugoslavia
4314		in Romania
4321	rail lines	in Russia
4322		in Bulgaria
4323		in Yugoslavia
4324		in Romania
4331	communication facilities	in Russia
4332		in Bulgaria
4333		in Yugoslavia
4334		in Romania
4341	air fields	in Russia
4342		in Bulgaria
4343		in Yugoslavia
4344		in Romania
4351	fuel dumps	in Russia
4352		in Bulgaria
4353		in Yugoslavia
4354		in Romania
4361	navy yards	in Russia
4362		in Bulgaria
4363		in Yugoslavia
4364		in Romania
4371	bridges	in Russia
4372		in Bulgaria
4373		in Yugoslavia
4374		in Romania
4381	industrial plants	in Russia
4382		in Bulgaria
4383		in Yugoslavia
4384		in Romania
4391	army bases	in Russia
4392		in Bulgaria
4393		in Yugoslavia
4394		in Romania

Influence attitudes

4411 of military leaders in Russia
4412 in Bulgaria
4413 in Yugoslavia
4414 in Romania
4421 political leaders in Russia
4422 in Bulgaria
4423 in Yugoslavia
4424 in Romania
4431 of the general population in Russia
4432 in Bulgaria
4433 in Yugoslavia
4434 in Romania

Remove key officials

4511 by kidnapping in Russia
4512 in Bulgaria
4513 in Yugoslavia
4514 in Romania
4521 by assassination in Russia
4522 in Bulgaria
4523 in Yugoslavia
4524 in Romania
4531 by encouraging defection in Russia
4532 in Bulgaria
4533 in Yugoslavia
4534 in Romania

PUBLIC OPINION ACTIONS YOU CAN TAKE

Collect information

5111 from U.S. public concerning support for U.S. actions
5112 for Soviet actions
5121 from pro-Western nations concerning support for U.S. actions
5122 for Soviet actions

Disseminate information

5211 to U.S. public concerning current U.S. actions
5212 Soviet actions
5221 to pro-Western nations concerning current U.S. actions
5222 Soviet actions

INFORMATION SEARCH YOU CAN MAKE

Economic

6111 Describe the importance of U.S. imports from Russia
6112 from Bulgaria
6113 from Yugoslavia
6114 from Romania
6121 Describe the importance of U.S. exports to Russia
6122 to Bulgaria
6123 to Yugoslavia
6124 to Romania
6131 Estimate the current line of credit (millions of dollars) to Russia
6132 to Bulgaria
6133 to Yugoslavia
6134 to Romania

Political

6211 Describe the foreign policy of Russia
6212 of Bulgaria
6213 of Yugoslavia
6214 of Romania
6221 Describe the relations between the U.S. and Russia
6222 and Bulgaria
6223 and Yugoslavia
6224 and Romania

6231 Describe the results of the latest diplomatic mission to Russia
6232 to Bulgaria
6233 to Yugoslavia
6234 to Romania

Who is responsible for the latest
62411 Yugoslavian economic actions?
62412 political actions?
62413 military actions?
62414 covert operations?
62421 Bulgarian economic actions?
62422 political actions?
62423 military actions?
62424 covert operations?

Military

6311 What is the location of the U.S. 6th fleet Task Force A?
6312 Task Force B?
6321 What is the location of the U.S. Air Force interceptor squadrons?
6322 ground attack fighter squadrons?
6323 reconnaissance squadrons?
6324 transport squadrons?
6325 bomber squadrons?
6331 What is the location of U.S. Army Europe Division A?
6332 Division B?
6333 Division C?
6334 Division D?

Covert Operations

Provide information gathered by U.S. agents
6411 in military organizations in Russia
6412 in Bulgaria
6413 in Yugoslavia
6414 in Romania
6421 in political organizations in Russia
6422 in Bulgaria
6423 in Yugoslavia
6424 in Romania
6431 in intelligence organizations in Russia
6432 in Bulgaria
6433 in Yugoslavia
6434 in Romania

Public Opinion

Describe the results of the latest opinion poll concerning
6511 support for U.S. actions
6512 Soviet actions