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public opinion. Trend analyses and cross-national comparisons are emphasized. The nations included in this study are Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

Support for NATO was found to be substantial while support for an Atlantic foreign policy was not. The priority placed upon national defense by Europeans was found to be increasing, and anti-Americanism was also found to be increasing.

Two findings are of particular significance. European publics appear to be diverging over these issues; British and German respondents consistently support NATO in greater relative numbers, are more likely to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, place a higher priority on national defense, and possess less anti-American sentiment than those of the other countries examined. Additionally, partisan cleavages were found to be substantial and increasing on these issues; respondents identifying with parties on the political left are less supportive of NATO, Atlanticism, national defense, and are more anti-American than respondents identifying with centrist or rightist parties.

The data presented do not support the notion that the end is at hand for NATO or the Euro-American partnership; however, there are indicators that West European foreign policy and defense attitudes are changing and that these changes may impact on US and Alliance policies.

FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE ATTITUDES IN WEST EUROPE:  
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts.

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FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE ATTITUDES IN WEST EUROPE:  
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

BY

ANDREW H. ZIEGLER, JR.

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF  
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL  
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

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*JANUARY* 1984

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To my wife Kalli, and to my parents

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

		<u>Page</u>
	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . .	iii
	ABSTRACT . . . . .	vi
CHAPTER		
ONE	RESEARCH PROBLEM . . . . .	1
	Introduction . . . . .	1
	Literature Review . . . . .	4
	Military Security: NATO or Neutra- lism . . . . .	6
	Foreign Policy: Atlantic or European . . . . .	13
	Anti-Americanism . . . . .	17
	The Successor Generation . . . . .	21
	Partisanship . . . . .	28
	Critical Reaction to the Literature . . . . .	30
	Summary . . . . .	32
TWO	METHODOLOGY . . . . .	36
THREE	EUROPEAN ATTITUDES . . . . .	42
	Military Security and NATO . . . . .	42
	Foreign Policy and Neutralism . . . . .	53
	Hawks, Nonhawks, and Defense . . . . .	62
	Anti-Americanism . . . . .	71
	Summary . . . . .	73
FOUR	INFLUENCES ON EUROPEAN ATTITUDES . . . . .	75
	Anti-Americanism as an Influence . . . . .	75
	Generational and Educational Influences . . . . .	80
	Partisan Influences . . . . .	95
	Summary . . . . .	104
FIVE	CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . .	106
	Linking Mass Opinion and Policy . . . . .	107
	Research Findings . . . . .	109
	Implications . . . . .	110

	<u>Page</u>
REFERENCES . . . . .	115
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH . . . . .	119

Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate Council  
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the  
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FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE ATTITUDES IN WEST EUROPE:  
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

By

Andrew H. Ziegler, Jr.

April, 1984

Chairman: David P. Conradt  
Major Department: Political Science

This study examines West European foreign policy and defense attitudes along four dimensions: military security, foreign policy approaches, national defense priority, and anti-Americanism. Following a review of the recent literature on this topic, data from Eurobarometer surveys are used to test several propositions concerning European public opinion. Trend analyses and cross-national comparisons are emphasized. The nations included in this study are Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

Support for NATO was found to be substantial while support for an Atlantic foreign policy was not. The priority placed upon national defense by European publics

was found to be increasing, and anti-American sentiment was also found to be increasing.

Two findings are of particular significance. European publics appear to be diverging over these issues; British and German respondents consistently support NATO in greater relative numbers, are more likely to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, place a higher priority on national defense, and possess less anti-American sentiment than those of the other countries examined. Additionally, partisan cleavages were found to be substantial and increasing on these issues; respondents identifying with parties on the political left are less supportive of NATO, Atlanticism, national defense, and are more anti-American than respondents identifying with centrist or rightist parties.

The data presented do not support the notion that the end is at hand for NATO or the Euro-American partnership; however, there are indicators that West European foreign policy and defense attitudes are changing and that these changes may impact on US and Alliance policies.



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Chairman

CHAPTER ONE  
RESEARCH PROBLEM

Introduction

There is a growing perception among policymakers, journalists, and academicians on both sides of the Atlantic of a fundamental change in the Euro-American partnership. According to Stanley Hoffman: "A number of factors have led, in the past couple of years, to an acute sense of crisis among the members of the Atlantic Alliance and to heightened tensions within it" (1981, p. 105). Josef Joffe, a senior editor at the West German weekly DIE ZEIT, recently wrote an article entitled "Allies, Angst, and Arms Control: New Troubles For An Old Partnership," in which he discusses the increasing incongruence between European and American international perspectives (1983).

This concern with Euro-American relations has numerous sources. America's European allies were reluctant to support US policies following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland. A widespread peace movement emerged in Europe in 1981 opposed to NATO's deployment of the new theater nuclear forces. There is also a growing belief that European attitudes

toward military security, neutralism, and foreign policy are changing. These events and perceptions may eventually challenge the stability and unity of the Alliance.

A variety of explanations have been advanced as to why trans-Atlantic relations seem to be changing, and these explanations can generally be divided into two broad categories. On the one hand is the school of thought that emphasizes national interests and the balance of power. Joffe typifies this viewpoint: "Our disputes are rarely fueled by misperceptions or false consciousness but by solid differences in situation and interest which we understand only too well even if we hesitate to articulate them" (1981, p. 846). The second type of explanation emphasizes political ideas and culture rather than national interests. Stephen Haseler, a founder of Britain's new Social Democratic party, illustrates this approach: "To look at the foreign and defense debate in the West--particularly between the United States and Western Europe--without reference to ideological changes or governing political ideas is to look at the world with a half-shut eye" (1983a, p. 2).

Both types of explanation are relevant and useful. The argument that changes in national interests have resulted in changes in the Euro-American relationship is persuasive. The interests of Europe in the 1980s are greatly changed from those of the 1950s. However, it must be remembered that national interests do not exist independently of those who perceive and define what those interests are. Among the

separately, the literature review was divided into subsections representing broad themes found in the literature. The second part of the project was a secondary analysis of survey research data drawn from the Eurobarometer studies. This analysis tested the conclusions discussed in the literature review. In other words, the findings from the literature formed the research questions for the data analysis. The methodology and findings for the data analysis are covered in Chapters Two, Three, and Four. Finally, some conclusions and implications are provided in Chapter Five.

#### Literature Review

The proliferation of books and articles concerned with the problems of NATO and Euro-American relations has been substantial. Interest in this topic has even been labeled a "cottage industry" by one contributor to FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Bull, 1983).

Though seeming to command more attention today, concern with trans-Atlantic relations is not new. In 1965 in his book THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP Kissinger wrote:

The most constructive American foreign policy since the end of World War II has been the development of Atlantic relationships . . . In recent years this promise has been flawed by increasing sharp disputes among the Allies. The absence of agreement on major policies is striking.  
(pp. 3, 4)

The most common approach to analyzing Euro-American relations concerns international politics, national interests, and balance of power; however, several studies have been published recently that deal with European attitudes and public opinion. These will be examined below within five thematic subsections: military security, foreign policy, anti-Americanism, the successor generation, and partisanship.

The nations of primary importance for this study are Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. In some cases the authors discussed below may include other countries, and at times certain nations in the above list may seem ignored; however, the above six all receive adequate attention in the later chapters.

In the literature review that follows, the original data sources are cited where they are known. The analysts collected opinion data from a variety of sources: United States Information Communication Agency (USICA), Eurobarometers, Gallup, European newspapers, and others. As best as can be discerned, all of the studies used data from representative national samples collected by accepted survey techniques. In other words, there is no reason to doubt the reliability of their data. In some cases, however, the validity of an item may be questioned in regard to how one should interpret the findings. These instances are commented on where necessary.



Military Security: NATO or Neutralism

"The total trend picture of public opinion in Western Europe appears to be producing a widening gulf between the two sides of the Atlantic that eventually could endanger both NATO and the Atlantic defense in general" (Feld and Wildgen, 1982, p. 133).

"At stake is the survival itself of the North Atlantic Alliance, formed in 1949. . . . (There is) a climate in which the need for sustaining the partnership itself is now being questioned" (Alting von Geusau, 1982, p. 153).

The above quotations illustrate a common viewpoint found in the literature, that the Euro-American military partnership is weakening. However, the recent studies on European public opinion do not present such a definitive picture.

First, NATO is reported to be the accepted military security arrangement for Europeans. Questionnaire items that specifically include NATO among other defense options indicate that European publics consistently choose NATO (except for France which is not a member of the military component of the Alliance). Stephen Szabo (1983b) writes of "a substantial national consensus favoring membership in NATO" that exists in Britain, West Germany, and Italy. He also writes of a French "national consensus that views NATO with indifference" but not dislike (p. 172).

Feld and Wildgen (1982) cite a USICA survey taken in 1980 that included the question: "What is the best way to

provide security?" The results are displayed in Table 1-1 and illustrate significant support for NATO in Britain and Germany. The second response represents a security arrangement similar to the present one, but it gives West Europe a separate command allied to the US. Taken together, the combined percentages for responses 1 and 2 indicate significant backing for NATO and a military alliance with the US.

Another question measuring NATO support asks whether or not NATO is still considered essential for the security of the respondent's country. Adler and Wertman (1981) cite a USICA survey taken in 1981 which found that NATO was considered still essential by wide margins in Britain (70% to 15%), Germany (62% to 20%), Italy (59% to 28%), Norway (66% to 21%), and the Netherlands (62% to 15%). Even in France a plurality considered NATO essential (44% to 34%).

Although these figures seem to show that West Europeans still embrace NATO, Feld and Wildgen (1982) conclude that "in Western Europe support for NATO appears to be slipping somewhat" (p. 123). However, no study includes sufficient trend data that would enable this statement to be tested. Feld and Wildgen themselves do not support their statement with data. Adler and Wertman (1981) claim that "over the past decade, the level of support for NATO has remained constant in three countries for which trend data are available: Great Britain, Italy, and Norway. There has also been no change in France" (p. 9). Additionally, Adler and Wertman write:

TABLE 1-1  
MILITARY SECURITY OPTIONS, 1980

(Percentages)			
	Britain	Germany	France
NATO	50	58	13
W. Eur Command Allied with US	21	30	33
W Eur Command Not Allied with US	10	6	24
Independent Nat'l Force	14	4	22
Reduce Defense Forces and Seek Accommodation with USSR	5	2	8
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%
N	853	851	766

SOURCE: Feld and Wildgen, 1982, p. 99.  
Original cited: USICA 1980.

In West Germany, however, where support for NATO has been consistently high since the 1960s, backing appears to have declined between October 1980 and March 1981. During this period, the percentage considering NATO not essential rose from 8 to 20 percent. (p. 9)

Thus, the literature is somewhat mixed on the question of European support for NATO. Generally, one can conclude from these studies that support for NATO is substantial, but that there may be signs that the level of backing is decreasing, as evidenced by Adler and Wertman's finding on Germany. The research questions these findings pose are: What is the level of support for NATO among European publics? Is there any evidence that public support for NATO is weakening in West Europe? What are the comparative trends?

The second issue of concern here is the extent to which European publics are embracing neutralism and pacifism. There is a perception that these attitudes are increasing: "The fact is that nuclear pacifism, and the drive toward unilateral disarmament which accompanies it, are now a settled aspect of European life" (Haseler, 1983b, p. 28). Also, William Schneider writes: "Europeans . . . increasingly tend towards neutralism" (1983, p. 5).

As Adler and Wertman (1981) mention in their study, neutralism is a hard concept to define, and it is difficult to know what respondents are thinking of when they select it as a response. Neutralism could represent a desire to avoid a conflict between the superpowers, or it could simply mean

a dislike for military alliances. Neutralism could also be linked to the desire for unilateral disarmament. Thus, public opinion data on this concept must be interpreted carefully.

When faced with the choice of NATO or neutralism, European publics (except for France) select NATO by wide margins. Data from the USICA presented by Schneider (1983), however, indicate an increase in support for neutralism between March and July 1981, as Table 1-2 shows. The question used for Table 1-2 was: "Do you think it is better for (this country) to belong to NATO, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?" All five countries surveyed registered increases in the percentages favoring neutralism.

A more recent survey question concerned with neutralism is cited by Schneider (1983) in which the findings indicate a much higher level of support for neutralism. In this particular question NATO is not provided as an option: "Some have said that Western Europe would be safer if it moved toward neutralism in the East-West conflict. Others argue that such a move would be dangerous. Would you, yourself, favor or oppose a move toward neutralism in Western Europe?" This question, asked by the Gallup organization for NEWSWEEK illustrates the problems with defining neutralism and interpreting responses. On this item a respondent could believe neutralism to mean a lessening of tensions, such as detente or OSTPOLITIK. Or a respondent

TABLE 1-2  
NATO VERSUS NEUTRALISM

	(Percentages)			
	NATO		Neutralism	
	Mar 81	Jul 81	Mar 81	Jul 81
Britain	67	59	20	29
Germany	67	64	14	18
France	45	33	40	51
Italy	60	49	30	42
Netherlands	62	56	17	25

SOURCE: Schneider, 1983, p. 6.  
Original cited: USICA, July 1981.

could be thinking of disarmament. There is no way to know. The responses to this question are displayed in Table 1-3, and they do seem to indicate substantial backing for neutralism.

Other authors believe neutralism is not increasing at all:

West Europeans . . . as yet show little sympathy for a neutralist foreign policy. . . . Nowhere is there substantial support for military neutrality or accommodation to the Soviet Union (Finlandization), or even for creation of a European military force independent of the US. (Russett and DeLuca, 1983, pp. 185, 186)

While neutralism may be difficult to define and measure, European attitudes toward pacifism appear clear. On a

TABLE 1-3  
SUPPORT FOR NEUTRALISM, 1983

(Percentages)		
	Favor Neutralism	Oppose Neutralism
Britain	45	42
Germany	57	43
France	43	41
Netherlands	53	32

SOURCE: Schneider, 1983, p. 6.  
Original cited: Gallup 1983.

question asking "Would it be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination?" Russett and DeLuca (1983) find little support in Britain (12%), Germany (19%), France (13%) or Italy (17%) for the response preferring domination by the Russians (p. 189). This question does not refer to any alliance arrangements or foreign policy choices, so it appears to be a good measure for pacifism.

In his study of German attitudes Szabo (1983b) writes: "This review of survey data collected over a period of nearly 30 years reveals no perceptible increase in neutralist sympathies" (p. 62).

Concerning French attitudes, Michael Harrison (1983) writes: "The French have never seriously contemplated

disarmament or demilitarization as solutions for national or regional security problems" (p. 39).

Thus, the literature again presents a mixed picture as it did with NATO. While some survey items seem to indicate that neutralism is increasing, others do not. The manner in which neutralism as a concept is defined and interpreted must also be questioned. Pacifism, though, appears to receive little support. Therefore, the research problems created here are first to decide on a satisfactory operationalization for neutralism, and then second to see to what extent neutralism is embraced in West Europe and to what extent it is increasing or decreasing. Cross-national comparisons must also be made.

This section has examined the current literature on European attitudes toward military security arrangements. Two aspects of this subject were covered: NATO and neutralism. The studies reviewed are agreed that backing for NATO remains high, but there may be signs that it is decreasing. Support for neutralism may be increasing, but there are problems with determining exactly what is meant by the term. Pacifism, however, receives little support.

#### Foreign Policy: Atlantic or European

While support for NATO as the accepted military security arrangement appears high, European opinions toward foreign policy orientations are reported to be more diversified. An



Atlantic approach toward foreign policy is generally understood in the literature to be one in which the European nations support the foreign policies and decisions of the US in an effort to provide a unified Western front in the international environment. This approach appears to be receiving little backing in Europe today. "The Atlanticist consensus, so much a solid feature of postwar Europe (outside of France), is now no more" (Hasseler, 1983a, p. 3).

French support for an Atlantic foreign policy as with their backing for NATO is lowest among the West European states. This phenomena, however, does not represent a change in French perspectives or policy. Ever since de Gaulle and the birth of the Fifth Republic in 1958, France has consistently charted an independent course. The withdrawal of France from the integrated military command of NATO in 1966 as well as the maintenance of the French independent nuclear deterrent, the FORCE DE FRAPPE, illustrate the independent nature of French policy.

For the French, the alternative to Atlanticism has never been neutralism or pacifism but the assertion of an active foreign policy backed by a strong, independent defense effort on behalf of France alone. (Harrison, 1983, p. 38)

In Germany, on the other hand, public opinion has shifted away from a foreign policy linked directly to the US according to Stephen Szabo (1983b). He writes that Germany's unique geographical position in the center of Europe and the existence of the two Germanies, East and West, have contributed to this shift. Also, "Adenauer's policy of integration

within a Western framework has become modified by the OSTPOLITIK and the result is a distancing from the US" (p. 70).

Table 1-4 is drawn from Feld and Wildgen (1982), and it reflects responses to a survey question on preferred foreign policy arrangements. The authors conclude that "the publics in most major NATO countries do not favor a common Atlantic foreign policy" (p. 140).

The only study with any trend data on this issue of foreign policy preferences is Peter Fotheringham's (1983) on

TABLE 1-4  
PREFERRED FOREIGN POLICY ARRANGEMENTS, 1980

	(Percentages)					
	GB	Ger	Fra	Ita	Bel	NL
Atlantic Foreign Policy	28	37	11	25	19	25
EEC Foreign Policy	20	25	38	40	33	33
Independent Foreign Policy	35	12	27	16	16	22
Join w USSR for All-European Foreign Policy	6	10	8	6	5	8
DK	11	16	16	13	27	12
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SOURCE: Feld and Wildgen, 1982, p. 141.  
Original cited: USICA 1980.

Britain. Using Eurobarometer data, Fotheringham reports the results for three time periods. Table 1-5 displays his findings. The time periods span only 18 months, so longitudinal conclusions can only be speculative. Though increasing, British support for an Atlantic foreign policy is not high.

Thus, Europeans appear to differentiate between military security arrangements and foreign policy approaches; however, the implications of this distinction are not adequately covered in the literature. Russett and DeLuca (1983) allude to this distinction:

TABLE 1-5  
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES

(Percentages)				
	Spring 1979	Spring 1980	Autumn 1980	Change
Atlantic	19	27	26	+7
EEC	21	20	17	-4
Independent	34	34	36	+2
All-European	10	6	10	0
DK	16	12	11	-5
-----				
TOTAL	100%	99%	100%	

SOURCE: Fotheringham, 1983, p. 86.  
Original cited: Eurobarometers 11, 13, 14.

If the question is asked in terms of security, that is, in the context of military relationships and fears of war or invasion, the overall level of commitment of West Europeans to NATO is strong. (p. 186)

Research in this area should attempt to isolate these separate attitudinal dimensions, determine the relationship between the two, and then compare the political and social correlates of each.

#### Anti-Americanism

there are several types of questionnaire items used in the literature to measure the extent of anti-American sentiment in Europe. As with the concept neutralism, it is not always clear what attitudes the survey questions are tapping into. One type of question refers to confidence in the US to defend Europe, another asks whether respondents have good feelings about the US, and a third type questions the confidence of Europeans in the ability of the US to handle world problems.

Russett and DeLuca (1983) conclude that "West Europeans are less confident than they once were in the basic prudence and reliability of the US" (p. 183). They cite a Gallup survey to illustrate this decline, and Table 1-6 displays this decrease. Russett and DeLuca believe the Falklands War caused the low British figure for 1982; however, given the nature of British attitudes on other issues, the validity of the British results for 1982 is questionable. However, Russett and DeLuca (1983) draw a distinction between the

TABLE 1-6  
 CONFIDENCE IN US ABILITY TO HANDLE WORLD PROBLEMS

	(Percentages)	
	1972	1982
Britain	65	4
Germany	57	49
France	41	33
Italy	58	42

SOURCE: Russett and DeLuca, p. 184.  
 Original cited: Gallup 1982.

confidence Europeans have in the US government and their feelings toward Americans in general:

Doubts about the ability of the US government to deal responsibly with world problems must not, however, be confused with simple anti-Americanism. On the contrary, at the same time that indicators of confidence in American leadership has waned, indications of positive personal feelings toward Americans have waxed. (p. 185)

Szabo (1983b), in his study on German attitudes, claims that the US image is declining: "During the 1970s polls indicated that, although the American image in West Germany remained generally positive, signs of a decline were evident" (p. 60). However, his data are not conclusive and even show a sharp increase in 1980 (although the findings are from different polling agencies asking different but similar questions). Szabo shows 61% of the German public in

1954 with very good and good feelings about the US. A different question in 1965 found that 58% liked Americans, but by 1973 it was only 48%. A question in 1980 concerning the trustworthiness of the Americans found that 78% believed Americans to be either very or fairly trustworthy. Szabo concludes: "The US image among the general public in West Germany has lost some of its lustre but remains positive" (p. 64).

Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman (1981) conveys a much more positive view of German feelings toward the US:

What is perceived as growing anti-Americanism in West Germany appears to be a combination of media coverage and the younger generations critical attitude. . . . Impressive pictures on television, reports in the newspapers, pictorials in magazines--all stir one's memory and confirm the reality of the new peace movement. But the questions posed in our surveys over the last three decades, most recently in May of 1981, speak a different language. (p. 13)

The Allensbach survey she refers to found 65% of the German public with "pleasant" perceptions of the US as opposed to 17% with "unpleasant" (p. 13).

Harrison (1983) found that 52% of the French public in 1980 believed Americans to be either very or fairly trustworthy (p. 30).

Feld and Wildgen (1982, p. 108) cite a USICA survey item that questioned European confidence in US resolve to defend Europe. They report that in 1980 the respondents having a great deal plus a fair amount of confidence were significantly high in Britain (74%), Germany (73%), and France (73%).

Attitudes toward the US can also be viewed as a causal or independent variable. According to Feld and Wildgen: "The more Europeans have confidence that the United States will intervene to help them, the more appropriate NATO seems to be, and the more support for arms expenditures" (1982, p. 108). They also conclude: "Nothing seems to alter the crucial role played by perceptions of the United States" (p. 116).

Szabo (1983b) discusses the relationship between feelings toward the US and policy opinions: "It is not necessarily anti-American to disagree with American policy. It is not valid, however, to argue that policy disagreements are not related to images of America" (p. 70). He also writes of a "link between perceptions of America and support for the NATO double decision" as well as a "link between policy disagreements, support for the peace movement and the Greens, and low trust in Americans" (p. 70).

Thus, the issue of anti-Americanism in Europe is complex, and the evidence contained in the literature is not conclusive. Whether or not feelings of anti-Americanism are increasing must first be determined, and then the relationship between anti-Americanism and other phenomena should be analyzed. These are both research questions to be addressed later.

### The Successor Generation

Several journalistic accounts of the reportedly growing neutralism and anti-Americanism in Europe accentuate the generational factor. David Broder's piece in the WASHINGTON POST, "Fading Memories Threaten the West," and Judith Miller's article in the NEW YORK TIMES, "US Is Planning Bid to Win Over Europe's Young," illustrate this emphasis. Miller (1983) writes: "Government and private public opinion polls show that these young (European) leaders--known here as the successor generation--have a far less positive image of the US" (p. 1).

Interest in the political effects of generational change is also found in the scholarly literature. Perhaps the most comprehensive study on this topic is the book titled THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION edited by Stephen Szabo. This book includes articles on several European countries, each analyzing the generational factor in the relationship between Europe and the US. Szabo's concern is "that a generational changing of the guard will weaken the basis of the Atlantic Alliance" (p. 1).

The successor generation refers to postwar Europeans: the generation born after WW II. The thinking is that since this younger generation has had little or no direct experience of war or of the struggle for survival, that their values and perceptions of interests will be different from those of their parents' generation. Inglehart's materialist-postmaterialist value dimensions appear to support this



concern with generations, because the young have a greater tendency to be postmaterialist in orientation (Inglehart, 1977). According to Szabo:

Postwar Europeans have matured in a new Europe in which the European Community and NATO, affluence and political stability are given. . . . America does not connote the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift, or even John Kennedy; rather it means the Vietnam War and Watergate. (1983b, p. 1)

There are wide differences in the literature on the structuring of age groups for analysis. Some authors use only two generations: prewar and postwar. Others use as many as seven or eight cohorts forming generational units that span only five or six years. However, there seems to be general agreement that 1950 marks the beginning of the postwar group:

Most of the authors would agree that the postwar generation in Europe begins with those born in 1950 or afterwards. . . . Europeans born in the 1940s are clearly transitional in the sense that they had direct experience of the Cold War. (Szabo, 1983b, p. 169)

Some of the findings Szabo (1983b) reports are as follows: "Postwar Europeans are the least likely to support increases in defense spending for NATO and are the most likely to support decreases in defense spending" (p. 172). "Belief in the necessity for defense and in the use for force, in international relationships is weakest among the better educated young" (p. 173).

Postwar Europeans, especially those with the most education, tend to be skeptical of American leadership and prefer either an independent foreign policy or closer cooperation between Europeans rather than Atlantic cooperation. (p. 172)

In an earlier article he wrote: "The generation gap appears to be greatest in West Germany and Italy and smallest in Britain and France" (1983a, p. 11).

Alder and Wertman (1981) analyzed the relationship between age, education, and neutralist sentiments.

In all six countries surveyed, such (neutralist) sentiments are more widespread among university educated young people--the successor generation from which the future leadership of Western Europe will be drawn--than among those over fifty who have a university education. (p. 10)

Table 1-7 displays their findings. It includes only respondents with a university education, and it shows the percentages of those who selected NATO as opposed to neutrality.

TABLE 1-7

PERCENT OF BEST EDUCATED WHO FAVOR NATO  
AS OPPOSED TO NEUTRALITY BY AGE, 1981

	18-34	35-49	50+
Britain	62	70	86
Germany	59	63	95
France	53	61	79
Italy	56	82	81
Netherlands	64	65	86

SOURCE: Adler and Wertman, 1981, p. 6.  
Original cited: USICA 1981.

Table 1-7 does illustrate a clear tendency for the better educated young to be the most neutralist. Russett and DeLuca (1983) use the same data to draw the following conclusion:

There are signs of a serious generation gap among Europeans on this issue, a gap that is most serious in the ranks of the well-educated and therefore in the ranks of those who are likely over time to be most politically influential. (p. 182)

Szabo also uses these data. In fact, these same data (Table 1-7) are found no less than four times in the literature, and in some cases they are the primary evidence for concern with the successor generation.

The attention the findings in Table 1-7 have received indicate that the successor generation notion is supported primarily by evidence of the combined influence of age and education. It is only the better educated of the postwar generation who are of concern.

The nebulous nature of the concept neutralism was mentioned earlier. The survey question from which the data for Table 1-7 were collected is another example of this vagueness. The question provided only two responses--NATO and neutralism. Thus, how the responses are interpreted may be open to question.

In his study of Britain's successor generation, Fotheringham (1983) reports the following mixed findings:

The lowest degree of support for an increase in defense expenditures came from university educated 18-24 years olds. . . . Yet the 18-24 non-university educated were among the strongest supporters of increasing expenditure. (p. 96)

"The British reaction to their environment is more likely to be shaped along class and partisan lines than along generational cleavages" (p. 98).

Young Britons, in spite of their disproportionate involvement in the CND, should not prove to be more supportive of pacifism or anti-defense trends than their elders. They, like their parents' generation, tend to support the NATO alliance and the need for defense spending. They are not likely to be any more sympathetic to anti-Americanism or neutralism than other Britons. (p. 98)

Table 1-8 displays British responses to the question "How much confidence do you feel we can have in the US to come to our defense?" The youngest age group is most confident in the U.S. Also, according to Fotheringham: "The 18-24 year old university educated did not stand out on this issue" (1983, p. 97). Thus, the evidence for a generation gap in Britain on these issues is not clear.

TABLE 1-8  
BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE US BY AGE  
AND EDUCATION, 1980

	(Percentages)				
	18-29	30-39	40+	University	Non-univ
Confident	77	69	70	76	69
Not Confident	19	25	25	22	24

SOURCE: Fotheringham, 1983, p. 97.  
Original cited: Multiregional Security Survey, March, 1980.

Russell Dalton (1980) in his panel study of German youth concludes: "The American image is weakest among New Politics adherents who are commonly found among postwar generations" (p. 40). However, Szabo (1983b) in his German study finds "no major generational contrasts concerning public perceptions of the US and the USSR" (p. 62). Perhaps feelings toward the new politics is as significant a factor as age; this is not pursued in the literature.

Other findings by Szabo (1983b) on German attitudes are as follows: "No generational contrasts appeared on issues related to NATO" (p. 66). "Surveys indicate the postwar Germans are more supportive of anti-war and anti-defense attitudes than prewar Germans" (p. 53). "This new generation, especially the most educated and politically active part of it, will remain independent in its foreign policy orientation and distant from both superpowers" (p. 71).

In his analysis of French attitudes, Harrison (1983) finds little evidence of a generation gap:

As far as foreign affairs is concerned, differences between pre- and postwar generations are sometimes interesting but are of secondary importance compared to cleavages within the postwar generation and to the fact that class, occupational status and party preferences are the primary determinants of French values and opinions on political issues. (p. 17)

"Although there is evidence of less intense nationalism and less defense-mindedness in the French postwar group, the generational shift in values seems less significant in France than elsewhere" (p. 38). "The postwar generation was

somewhat more inclined to trust the US, by 55% against 48% for the pre-1940 generation" (p. 30).

According to Harrison (1983), ideology is the dominant feature of the French postwar generation: "During the 1970s, the most distinctive and important feature of the French postwar generation was its steady move to the political left" (p. 23). Perhaps partisanship and ideology are stronger influences over attitudes than age alone.

The attention devoted to the generational variable has been criticized. Joffe (1981) expresses his skepticism:

It has become fashionable to blame generational change for a good part of our troubles (two years ago, the National Security Council even commissioned a study on the successor generation issue). . . . This is not really the core of the problem. (p. 846)

Also, Feld and Wildgen (1982) report findings that give no support to generational influence:

The perceptions in Europe . . . regarding the various security and East-West issues are not significantly influenced by the ages of the respondents. In other words, young and old people express similar views. (p. 123)

The studies reviewed do not attempt to separate life-cycle from generational effects. Szabo (1983b) concludes his German analysis: "The data available for this study do not permit a conclusive answer to the question whether a generational or life-cycle change is occurring in West Germany" (p. 71). The distinction between these two types of effects as well as the importance of period effects is significant. As Kenneth Adler (1983) points out:

The concern about the successor generation expressed by scholars and policymakers implies that they accept the thesis that the values and attitudinal differences between the younger generation and its elders will persist and will therefore affect policy. (p. 7)

In other words, they implicitly reject the life-cycle hypothesis that holds that the young will change their views as they grow older.

Szabo (1983b) summarizes the generational factor as follows: "The successor generation argument, consequently, must be viewed with some selectivity. . . . Generation, then, is a factor in a larger complex of sociological and historical change" (p. 174).

Important research questions concerning the generational factor to be considered subsequently in this research are as follows: Which issues are and which ones are not affected by age? What are the relationships between age and other influences, such as, education and partisanship? What evidence is there of life-cycle effects rather than generational effects?

#### Partisanship

Like anti-Americanism and generational influences, partisanship is another correlate examined in the literature; however, partisanship is mentioned only a few times. Feld and Wildgen (1982) believe it to be the dominant influence on security attitudes: "Partisanship, not the sociological basis for it, conditions attitudes toward defense" (p. 117). They conclude that age, education, and occupation

are not significantly related to defense opinions (p. 113). They also report that in 1980 in Germany, 58% of the CDU supporters preferred NATO as compared to only 43% of the SPD backers (p. 118).

Noelle-Neuman illustrates partisan differences in Germany on the question concerning perceptions of Americans. Her findings are displayed in Table 1-9. There is a clear partisan difference indicated in this table with the CDU followers tending to have more pleasant feelings toward Americans than those of the other parties.

Szabo (1983b) mentions partisanship in his study of German public opinion: "Polls taken between the early 1970s and 1981 found little party variation on orientations toward the essentiality or reliability of NATO, but contrasts did emerge when relations with the US were involved" (p. 68).

TABLE 1-9  
GERMAN FEELINGS TOWARD AMERICA BY PARTY, 1981

	(Percentages)			
	Greens	SPD	FDP	CDU*
Pleasant	25	63	62	75
Unpleasant	46	17	20	10

\*Includes CSU.

SOURCE: Noelle-Neuman, 1983, p. 13.

Original cited: Allensbach 1981.



Foreign policy perspectives, according to Szabo (1983b), are also associated with partisan loyalties in Germany:

In general, respondents who identify and or vote for the SPD are more likely to favour an independent, European, or neutralist course for the Federal Republic than are Christian democrats, who tend to be much more Atlanticist in their orientation. (p. 68)

The relationship between age and partisanship may be significant. Szabo (1983b) writes:

Young and old Christian democrats and young and old social democrats tended to hold similar views. It should be remembered, however, that younger Germans tend to be much more likely to identify with the SPD than with the CDU. (p. 68)

Similarly, Harrison (1983) writes of France: "The most compelling conclusion of this study . . . (is) the steady and now overwhelming leftward political shift of the postwar generation in France" (p. 40). Harrison concludes: "(This) raises the possibility that strong ideological cleavages are at work to fragment the Atlantic system and even the Europeans among themselves" (p. 40).

Thus, partisanship appears to be a significant variable that has received insufficient attention in the literature. The strength and changes of the relationship between partisan loyalties and defense attitudes form important research questions for further study.

#### Critical Reaction to the Literature

There are several criticisms concerning this body of literature that warrant consideration. First, very little data are provided to support longitudinal conclusions. In

other words, the studies reviewed assume that current findings represent a change in attitudes. For example, Feld and Wildgen (1982) conclude that "support for NATO appears to be slipping" (p. 123), but their data are from only one time period (displayed in Table 1-1).

Another problem is that there is no attempt to structure European attitudes. The confusion mentioned earlier with the neutrality questions applies here because how the concept fits into the European belief system is not examined. Also, as discussed earlier, if attitudes toward military security and foreign policy represent distinct dimensions, then survey items that blur the two are not valid.

A third criticism is that there is little effort to analyze the influence of control variables. Education and partisanship especially appear to warrant such multivariate analysis. Adler (1983) comments on this shortcoming in THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION:

If the generation born after World War II is, on the average, much better educated than its parents, and if the young are more likely to belong to socialist or communist parties, then education and party should be controlled in analysis. . . . Yet, given the reliance on surveys conducted by others, such multivariate analysis was not possible in this study. (p. 15)

Finally, concerning the generational studies, decisions concerning which age groups comprise particular generations in some cases appear rather arbitrary, and there is little consistency even within individual studies regarding generational boundaries. Also, there is no true cohort analysis

in the successor generation literature. A cohort study involves the analysis of given generational units at different points in time using data collected during these particular periods; although the specific individuals in each sample differ, they are all survivors and members of the original generation investigated (Williamson, et al., 1982). This type of analysis is not found in the literature. Additionally, no systematic attempt is made to isolate life-cycle effects from generational effects.

Thus, the impression one receives from much of this literature is that some rather broad conclusions have been derived from a few rudimentary and cursory looks at opinion data (Russell Dalton's study is an exception to this statement). This is not to say, however, that the conclusions reached are wrong, for they may very well be correct. The point is that there appears to have been little in-depth, systematic data analysis in these studies. To achieve a higher level of confidence in our understanding of European attitudes on these issues more detailed research is needed.

#### Summary

The research problem as outlined in the introduction to this chapter concerns European attitudes toward security and national defense issues. Are European attitudes changing? Are their views toward these issues associated with age, partisanship, or other factors? What are the cross-national

comparisons and longitudinal trends? What are the implications of these attitudes for the Euro-American partnership?

The literature review just completed provides the background necessary to place this research problem in proper perspective. The findings from the literature review can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Support for NATO is high, but there are some indications that this support may be decreasing.
- (2) Neutralism may or may not be increasing.
- (3) Support of an Atlantic foreign policy is not high.
- (4) Anti-Americanism may or may not be increasing.
- (5) There is evidence that the attitudes of postwar Europeans are different from those of their parents' generation. The postwar attitudes are generally believed to be more neutralist and less Atlanticist than those of the prewar generations.
- (6) Partisanship influences opinions on these issues. The members of left leaning parties appear to be more neutralist and less Atlanticist.

These findings from the literature provide the focus for the research which is discussed in the remaining chapters. The intent is to confirm or reject the conclusions found in the literature as well as to expand on them through an in-depth analysis of Eurobarometer survey data. The specific research questions examined are as follows:

- (1) What is the level of support for NATO among European publics? Does this level represent an increase or a decrease?
  - (2) What are European attitudes toward foreign policy? Are these attitudes changing?
  - (3) Do European attitudes toward military security arrangements and foreign policy approaches represent separate attitudinal dimensions?
  - (4) What are European attitudes toward neutralism? Are these attitudes changing?
  - (5) What evidence is there of other attitudinal dimensions on these issues?
  - (6) What is the current level of anti-American sentiment in Europe? Does this level represent an increase or a decrease?
  - (7) To what extent do anti-American attitudes influence attitudes on military security, foreign policy, and national defense?
  - (8) What are the generational and educational influences on the above attitudes? Are these influences increasing or decreasing?
  - (9) What are the partisan influences on the above attitudes? Are these influences increasing or decreasing?
- The data base, statistical procedures, and research techniques are discussed in the following chapter on methodology, and the findings of the research are reported in

Chapters Three and Four. Conclusions and implications drawn from the findings of this project are examined in the final chapter.

## CHAPTER TWO

### METHODOLOGY

This chapter briefly discusses some methodological topics and procedures. The following are covered: research design, data base, the "don't know" problem, and the Tau B statistic.

The research design is straightforward. The intent is to test the validity of the findings from the literature concerning European foreign policy attitudes. The conclusions drawn from the literature review were used to formulate the specific research questions listed near the end of Chapter One. A secondary analysis of survey data is used in Chapters Three and Four to answer those questions. Chapter Three describes cross-national comparisons of foreign policy opinion, and Chapter Four examines political and social correlates of these attitudes.

The European public opinion data are drawn from the European Community and Eurobarometer studies. These are semiannual surveys sponsored by the Commission of the European Community. The time periods analyzed range from 1970 to 1982. The data through 1981 were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. The 1982 data were

provided directly by the ZENTRALARCHIV FUER EMPIRISCHE SOZIALFORSCHUNG in Cologne, West Germany.

The nations selected for analysis in this study are: Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The Eurobarometer studies drew representative samples of the total population in each country. The separate samples each contained approximately 1000 respondents. National probability samples were drawn in Belgium and the Netherlands based upon complete listings of the national populations 15 years and older. Stratified national quota samples were drawn in Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, which took into account region and the size of localities; respondents were chosen within selected sampling points to provide a regionally representative sample with respect to sex, age, and occupation.

The quality of the Eurobarometer data is probably at least as good as the results of American surveys. Some of the sampling may in fact be better than in the US because the availability of very complete and up-to-date electoral lists permits excellent probability sampling. Further, all the data are based on personal interviews in the home, while many American public opinion polls, such as, ABC-Louis Harris and CBS-NEW YORK TIMES, are conducted by telephone (Adler, 1983).

The Eurobarometers are a somewhat limited source for the study of foreign policy attitudes. This is because the Eurobarometers contain only limited numbers of national



security and foreign policy items. In fact, there are no European survey data on these topics equivalent to the wealth of data that is available on US foreign policy attitudes. For example, using data gathered under the sponsorship of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981) created 22 attitudinal scales based on 198 foreign policy questionnaire items. Such a project is not possible using the Eurobarometer data.

A technical problem that requires a methodological decision is the treatment of respondents who express no opinion. Rarely is the response "don't know" provided as an option in the Eurobarometer studies; however, there are usually numbers of respondents who simply refuse to answer certain items. The French are the most noted for this; at times over 40% of the French respondents refuse to answer (see Table 3-4).

The "don't know" problem is complicated by the manner in which the Eurobarometer data are compiled. Respondents for whom data is missing are combined with those refusing to answer. This creates one single "don't know-not ascertained" (DK-NA) category for most items.

Whether or not the DK-NA category is included in an analysis may alter the interpretation of a survey item. Differences that appear important when the DK-NA category is included may no longer be important when these responses are removed and the data repercentaged on the basis of those who have an opinion. The procedure followed in this study is to

display the DK-NA category in the simple descriptive tables; however, since there is no satisfactory method of placing this category into an ordinal ranking of data, the DK-NA responses are not included in the construction of scales or in the computation of correlation coefficients.

The Tau B statistic is used to measure the strength of association between attitudinal variables and other factors, such as, age and political party affiliation. The Gamma statistic is not used because it omits tied pairs of observations from the calculation, and thus could lead to a misleading indication of the degree of association (Agesti and Agresti, 1979). Tau B is also more appropriate than Kendall's tau and Spearman's rho because the data used here are not fully ranked.

Thus, the Tau B coefficient is a satisfactory ordinal measure of association. It describes the extent to which the relationship between two variables is monotonic. In other words, it measures the degree to which high rankings on one variable tend to occur jointly with high (or low) rankings on another variable.

Interpreting the value of Tau B is somewhat relative and problematic. The values of Tau B as with all ordinal measures of association range between -1.0 and 1.0. The sign indicates whether there is a positive or negative relationship between the variables. Obviously, a value of .60 indicates a relatively stronger relationship than .30,

but the question of what value represents a substantial degree of association for this study remains.

The calculation of Tau B is based upon the numbers of concordant and discordant pairs of observations, and the value of the statistic represents the difference between the proportion of concordant and discordant pairs (C-D). In other words, a Tau B value of .40 means that 70% of the pairs of observations are concordant and 30% are discordant ( $.70 - .30 = .40$ ). Likewise, a value of  $-.20$  means that 40% are concordant and 60% are discordant ( $.40 - .60 = -.20$ ).

The absolute value of Tau B = .20 for this type of social science data usually represents a reasonable threshold for designating a relationship substantial or not substantial. Generally, absolute values of Tau B less than .06 in this study equate to a range of less than 10 percentage points between the upper and lower categories of the independent variable. Further, absolute values of Tau B in the .20s reflect ranges of greater than 20 percentage points.

As a guideline for the relationships discussed in Chapter Four, absolute values of Tau B less than .10 are considered not substantial. Those between .11 and .19 are considered marginally substantial, and those .20 and higher are considered substantial.

This concludes the methodological discussion. Chapters Three and Four explore European security attitudes in depth,

and Chapter Five contains the conclusions and implications of this research project.

CHAPTER THREE  
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

This chapter uses data from the Eurobarometer studies to test the propositions discussed in Chapter One. European attitudes toward military security and foreign policy are examined, and evidence is presented which indicates that attitudes toward these two issues represent separate attitudinal dimensions.

Two other attitudinal dimensions are analyzed. The priority that European respondents place on national defense is examined using a constructed measure labeled the "defense priority variable." Anti-American sentiment in Europe is another attitude that is also investigated.

The cross-national differences and longitudinal trends for each of these four attitudes are also discussed.

Military Security and NATO

The military security issue concerns European public support for NATO. Eurobarometer 14 (1980) contained three items that refer to NATO. One question asked respondents to select one of several military security arrangements. This is similar to the USICA question used by Feld and Wildgen (Table 1-1). The question and responses are as follows:

Thinking now of the protection of (country) against possible attack from the outside, which of the statements listed on this card comes closest to your own view of how (country) should provide for its security in the 1980s?

- (1) Continue in NATO among the countries of Western Europe, the US, and Canada.
- (2) Establish within NATO a unified West European defense force under European command, but allied to the US.
- (3) Withdraw our military forces from NATO but otherwise remain in NATO for things such as policy consultation.
- (4) Establish an independent West European defense force under European command, but not allied to the US.
- (5) Rely on our own nation's defense forces without belonging to any military alliances.
- (6) Reduce our emphasis on military defense and rely on greater accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Table 3-1 displays the results of this question. NATO appears to receive fairly wide support in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, while in France NATO receives low support. The accommodations response receives very little backing in any country.

The results of this same question are displayed in Table 3-2, but the responses are collapsed to achieve greater clarity. The first and second responses are combined to form a Euro-NATO category, because both responses favor the present NATO organization and an alliance with the US. Responses 3,4, and 5 together represent a desire to

TABLE 3-1  
MILITARY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, 1980

		(Percentages)					
		GB	Ger	Fra	Ita	Bel	NL
(1)	NATO	43	57	10	27	24	50
(2)	NATO with unified W Eur command	24	18	16	29	25	17
(3)	Withdraw mil forces from NATO but remain in Alliance	4	7	16	7	2	6
(4)	W Eur def not allied with US	4	3	10	9	7	7
(5)	Independent nat'l def with no alliances	9	3	8	6	3	4
(6)	Reduce mil def; rely on accommodation with USSR	5	2	6	5	5	10
(0)	DK-NA	11	11	35	18	35	7
-----		-----					
TOTAL		100%	101%	101%	101%	101%	101%
N		1132	1108	986	1108	1022	1114

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

TABLE 3-2  
MILITARY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, 1980

		(Responses Combined) (Percentages)					
		GB	Ger	Fra	Ita	Bel	NL
(1,2)	Euro-NATO	67	75	26	56	49	67
(3,4,5)	Euro-Independent	17	13	34	22	12	17
(6)	Accommodation	5	2	6	5	5	10
(0)	DK-NA	11	11	35	18	35	7
-----							
TOTAL		100%	101%	101%	101%	101%	101%
N		1132	1108	986	1108	1022	1114

SOURCE: Table 3-1.

separate one's country from the US and NATO and in the case of response 5 to have no alliances, so these three are combined into a category labeled Euro-independent defense.

As Table 3-2 indicates, support for the Euro-NATO category is substantial in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, while in Italy and Belgium it is somewhat lower. France, on the other hand, displays the lowest support for NATO (26%). The influences of Gaullism and French nationalism may account for the low French support for NATO, while the large Italian Communist party may explain Italy's low support.



Table 3-3 shows the responses to a question that asked respondents whether they felt NATO to be essential to their nation's military security. These findings are similar to those in Table 3-2. Again British, German, and Dutch respondents are the most positive about NATO; those from Italy and Belgium are less positive; and the French are the least.

European attitudes toward increasing defense spending for NATO are displayed in Table 3-4. The wording of this question was: "Should our defense spending in support of NATO be increased, decreased, or remain at the present level?" This question is somewhat vague because it is not clear whether defense spending overall is to be increased.

TABLE 3-3  
IMPORTANCE OF NATO, 1980

	(Percentages)					
	GB	Ger	Fra	Ita	Bel	NL
Essential	71	80	31	49	45	63
Not Essential	11	7	26	23	16	24
DK-NA	18	13	43	28	39	13
-----						
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1132	1008	986	1108	1022	1114

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

TABLE 3-4  
 OPINIONS TOWARD SPENDING FOR NATO, 1980

	(Percentages)					
	GB	Ger	Fra	Ita	Bel	NL
Increase	27	20	3	8	5	11
Same	42	48	27	30	34	49
Decrease	14	17	23	32	27	29
DK-NA	17	15	47	31	34	11
-----						
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%
N	1132	1008	986	1108	1022	1114

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

Regardless, the combined percentages favoring an increase or the same amount of spending for NATO are fairly high for Britain (69%), Germany (68%), and the Netherlands (60%), while the figures are less for Belgium (39%), Italy (38%), and France (30%). The response favoring a decrease in spending for NATO receives the largest support in Italy (32%).

As the data from these three questionnaire items indicate, the level of support for NATO in Europe is not uniform. However, for the most part European publics support NATO; there is no other military security arrangement that receives similar support as Table 3-2 indicates.

To achieve economy of expression and a more useful analytical tool, these three survey items were tested to determine if together they form a scale. Using the SPSS subprogram RELIABILITY (Hull and Nie, 1981) as the procedure for evaluating this potential scale, a reliability coefficient of Cronbach's alpha = .71 was obtained. This level indicates a reasonably strong association that is sufficient for accepting the scalability of these three items.

The scale was then computed by summing for each respondent the responses to the three questions: military security arrangements (Table 3-2), importance of NATO (Table 3-3), and spending for NATO (Table 3-4). The DK-NA categories were dropped from Tables 3-2 and 3-4 thus leaving three responses for each question. The range of possible scores for each respondent was 3 to 9, and the scale was recoded so that the summed responses of 3 and 4 could be labeled as high NATO support, responses 5, 6, and 7 as mixed support, and 8 and 9 as no support.

Table 3-5 reports these scale scores. As with the three separate survey items discussed previously, Britain and Germany demonstrate the highest backing for NATO. Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands indicate moderately high support, and France has the lowest. The unique position of France was discussed in Chapter One, and the French data here reinforce the findings reported in the literature review. Thus, support for NATO varies among European publics; however, the percentages displayed in the no

TABLE 3-5  
NATO SUPPORT SCALE, 1980

	(Percentages)					
	GB	Ger	Fra	Ita	Bel	NL
High	73	76	26	46	51	54
Mixed	19	19	47	32	38	31
None	8	4	27	22	11	15
-----						
TOTAL	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	843	790	396	676	476	865

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

support category were all low. Even in France, only 27% are categorized as having no support for NATO.

Later in the study this scale will be useful for analyzing multivariate influences on attitudes about NATO. Rather than compare the effects of control variables on each of the three different NATO questions, this scale will be used.

The second research question asked whether the current level of European public support for NATO represents an increase or a decrease. The data available from the Eurobarometer studies allow for only a limited answer to this question.

An item similar to the 1980 question used for Tables 3-1 and 3-2 was asked in April 1979. The question and possible responses asked in 1979 were as follows:

Which of the following appears to you the best way to provide for the military security of (country)?

- (1) Participate in the NATO military alliance between the countries of Western Europe and the US.
- (2) Participate in a military alliance between the countries of Western Europe but independent of the US.
- (3) Participate in a non-military alliance between the countries of Western Europe but independent of the US.
- (4) Do not participate in any alliance--take a completely neutral position.

Table 3-6 displays the findings for this question. Responses 2 and 3 have been combined to create one West Europe defense category. The cross-national differences in this case are similar to those for 1980. Britain and Germany along with the Netherlands demonstrate the strongest support for NATO, while Italy and Belgium show moderate backing, and France the lowest.

Given the limited survey items, the only longitudinal analysis possible is to compare the findings for Table 3-6 (1979) with those of Tables 3-1 and 3-2 (1980). Despite the differences in item construction and the short time interval, these are the only measures available.

When the NATO responses for Table 3-6 are compared to the first response in Table 3-1 it appears that support for

TABLE 3-6  
MILITARY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, 1979

		(Percentages)					
		GB	Ger	Fra	Ita	Bel	NL
(1)	NATO	57	55	22	32	34	64
(2,3)	W Eur Alliance not allied with US	12	17	33	29	17	11
(4)	No Alliance- Neutral	15	8	25	25	21	14
(0)	DK-NA	16	17	21	13	28	11
TOTAL		100%	99%	101%	99%	100%	100%
N		1011	1003	1010	1178	982	1023

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 11.

NATO has declined during the 18 months between surveys (except for Germany). However, when Table 3-6 is compared to the Euro-NATO response of Table 3-2 it appears that support for NATO has increased in all six countries as indicated in Table 3-7.

Thus, there is a reasonable degree of comparability between Tables 3-2 and 3-6, and the findings provide evidence that support for NATO may have increased between April 1979 and October 1980. Both the Iranian hostage crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan occurred between these two surveys and may explain the increase in support for NATO.

TABLE 3-7  
PERCENT SELECTING NATO AS THE PREFERRED  
MILITARY SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

	Apr 1979	Oct 1980	Change
Britain	57	67	+10
Germany	55	75	+20
France	22	26	+ 4
Italy	32	56	+24
Belgium	34	49	+15
Netherlands	64	67	+ 3

SOURCE: Tables 3-2 and 3-6.

A comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands is interesting. These two "low countries" appear similarly situated in Europe, yet their popular levels of support for NATO are quite different. The media tend to picture Holland as the center of Europe's peace movement today, but the Dutch public support for NATO is higher than that of Belgium, Italy, and France. Belgium was a major battlefield in WW I while Holland was not, and Belgium may also have seen more destruction in WW II than the Netherlands. Both nations have major internal religious, social and political cleavages. Despite these geographical and social similarities, different historical circumstances may explain the different levels of support NATO receives in these two countries.

#### Foreign Policy and Neutralism

This section examines attitudes toward foreign policy approaches, their relationship to military security attitudes, and their contribution to a better understanding of the neutralism concept.

The survey item used here for measuring foreign policy attitudes is the same one used by Fotheringham for Britain (Table 1-5). It is also very similar to the USICA question used by Feld and Wildgen (Table 1-4). The question is as follows:

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views of how (country) should conduct its foreign policy?



- (1) Join with the other EEC member states and the US to develop a common Atlantic foreign policy.
- (2) Join with the other EEC member states to develop a common European Community foreign policy.
- (3) Make its own foreign policy decisions independently of other nations.
- (4) Join with the other EEC member states and with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to develop an all-European foreign policy.

Tables 3-8 and 3-9 display the results of this question for two time periods: April 1979 and October 1980, respectively. These findings support those discussed in the literature review that while Europeans in general support NATO, their attitudes toward foreign policy approaches are much less concentrated. No one approach is overwhelmingly embraced by the public of any nation.

According to these data, Atlantic foreign policy attitudes increased in all six countries; especially in Germany (12 percentage points). Also, the All-European response which advocates considering the Soviet Union's wishes receives little backing. The time span between these two surveys is again only 18 months, so longitudinal conclusions must be limited. The main finding from these two tables is, however, that no one perspective dominates European attitudes on foreign policy.

The question was posited in Chapter One as to whether military security attitudes and foreign policy attitudes

TABLE 3-8  
FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES, 1979

	(Percentages)					
	GB	Ger	Fra	Ita	Bel	NL
Atlantic	19	21	7	13	10	20
W Eur (EEC)	21	33	37	45	34	42
Independent	35	23	25	18	20	19
All-European	10	7	15	12	8	8
DK-NA	15	16	16	12	28	11
-----						
TOTAL	100%	101%	100%	100%	101%	100%
N	1011	1003	1010	1178	982	1025

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 11.

TABLE 3-9  
FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES, 1980

	(Percentages)					
	GB	Ger	Fra	Ita	Bel	NL
Atlantic	27	33	11	22	12	27
W Eur (EEC)	18	31	31	40	34	35
Independent	37	16	23	17	17	18
All-European	10	11	13	11	9	13
DK-NA	9	9	22	11	28	7
-----						
TOTAL	101%	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%
N	1132	1008	986	1108	1022	1114

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

represent separate attitudinal dimensions. It could be argued that the two are inseparable because questions concerning military security, especially alliances, obviously involve foreign policy. For this study, however, military security questions are those that specifically involve alternative alliance relationships (as discussed in the first section of this chapter), while foreign policy questions are those that refer only to broad foreign policy approaches or perspectives in general. In other words, the military security issue is whether NATO is the preferred alliance arrangement, and the foreign policy issue is whether an Atlantic perspective is the preferred approach.

The foreign policy question for 1980 was evaluated for scalability along with the three NATO variables discussed in the previous section. When the foreign policy item was included the reliability coefficient failed to reach .70. The foreign policy item was identified as being the only variable that, if deleted, would improve the scale's alpha. The Pearson correlations indicate the comparative weakness of the association between the foreign policy question and the NATO variables. A correlation matrix is provided in Table 3-10, and the differences are apparent. Also, the mean inter-item correlation for the three NATO variables is .45, but when the foreign policy item is included this correlation is only .33.

TABLE 3-10  
CORRELATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND NATO VARIABLES  
(Pearson's r)

	Foreign Policy	Military Security	Importance of NATO
Military Security	.29	1.0	--
Importance of NATO	.21	.49	1.0
Spending for NATO	.23	.36	.50

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

A factor analysis also indicated the lack of an association between the foreign policy question and the three NATO variables. Factor loadings for the NATO variables were: military alliances .61; NATO importance .68; and spending for NATO .68. The factor loadings for the foreign policy question was .39. Thus military security attitudes and foreign policy attitudes as operationalized here do represent two attitudinal dimensions.

The purpose of this dimensional analysis is to clear up some of the confusion surrounding European neutralist sentiments. That the concept neutralism is vague was discussed earlier. Unless precisely defined, neutralism could be interpreted by respondents to mean withdrawal from

NATO or unilateral disarmament. Neutralism could also be linked with foreign policy decisions, defense budgets, or other issues. The cause for this confusion may be found in this dimensional feature of European attitudes.

The data presented thus far show empirically that Europeans tend to support NATO as the preferred military security arrangement. The data also show that no single foreign policy approach is supported by a large margin. However, Tables 1-2 and 1-3 from the literature review indicate substantial backing for neutralism. The apparent contradiction in these results may be caused by the survey items blurring these two attitudinal dimensions. Respondents selecting the neutralist response could in their minds be answering a foreign policy question. In that regard, respondents may favor an independent or European foreign policy, so they select the neutralist response which is the alternative that best fits their thinking.

The questions used for Tables 1-2 and 1-3 illustrate this. The question for Table 1-2 is: "Do you think it is better for this country to belong to NATO, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?" No reference is made to military security or foreign policy; the question is not placed in any context; the respondent must choose. The question for Table 1-3 is: "Some have said that Western Europe would be safer if it moved toward neutralism in the East-West conflict. Others argue that such a move would be dangerous. Would you,

yourself, favor or oppose a move toward neutralism in Western Europe?" Again, the East-West conflict could be interpreted as diplomatic, economic, or military; no alternative is provided to neutralism except implicitly to become embroiled in the East-West conflict. Thus, these two questions are not valid measures of either military security or foreign policy attitudes because they tap into both dimensions and therefore confuse the issues.

Adler and Wertman (1981) define neutralism as "a policy that eschews military alliances" (p. 10). This appears to place the concept firmly within the military security dimension. Accordingly, they find that "neutralist sentiments, by this definition, are not widespread, except in France" (p. 10).

Using this same definition the only question in the Eurobarometer studies that enable neutralism to be measured is the one that appeared in 1979 and 1980 concerning military security arrangements. The findings were displayed in Tables 3-1 (1980) and 3-6 (1979). In 1979 the term "neutral country" was used in the no alliance response (number 4). In 1980, however, the responses are different, but number 5 is: "independent national defense with no alliances." This response also fits the definition of neutralism without using the term.

Table 3-11 presents the findings to those neutralist responses for both time periods. The survey items are not identical and the time period is very short; so again, care

TABLE 3-11  
 PERCENT FAVORING NEUTRALISM AS  
 A MILITARY SECURITY OPTION

	Apr 1979	Oct 1980	Change
Britain	15	9	- 6
Germany	8	3	- 5
France	25	8	-17
Italy	25	6	-19
Belgium	21	3	-18
Netherlands	14	4	-10

SOURCE: Tables 3-1 and 3-6.

must be taken in reaching any longitudinal conclusions. However, the findings do indicate that support for neutralism (when the concept is precisely defined to tap only one attitudinal dimension) is not high. The level of support for neutralism may also have decreased between April 1979 and October 1980.

To summarize this section, European attitudes toward foreign policy vary widely among several approaches with no single approach being favored by a large margin in any nation. Within the limitations of the available data, the findings indicate that support for an Atlantic foreign



policy increased. Period effects provide the best explanation for this increase; specifically, the Iranian and Afghan events.

Foreign policy and military security attitudes were found to represent separate attitudinal dimensions. Using this finding as the framework with which to analyze neutralism, the concept was first defined and operationalized as belonging to the military security dimension. It was then determined that within this dimension neutralism receives little support in Europe, and that this support may be decreasing.

#### Hawks, Nonhawks, and National Defense

Discussed so far have been the issues of military security alliances and foreign policy approaches. A third dimension contains attitudes toward national defense in general. In other words, regardless of alliance preferences and foreign policy opinions, Europeans probably have an opinion of how important national defense should be when compared to other national concerns.

To measure where Europeans place national defense in their structure of political priorities a variable was created with two questions from the Eurobarometer surveys. The first question is:

On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which of these you, yourself, consider the most important?

- (1) Maintaining a high level of economic growth.
- (2) Making sure that this country has strong defense forces.
- (3) Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities.
- (4) Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

The second question listed the same responses as above but asked respondents to choose which would be the second most important goal.

This same pair of questions was asked in Europe in 1973, 1978, 1979, and 1980, and thus provides a good basis for longitudinal as well as comparative analysis. There was a difference, however, on one of the possible responses in 1980. Rather than providing the option, "to make our cities and countryside more beautiful" for response number 4, the choice was instead, "more emphasis on cultural growth than economic growth." Obviously this difference in item construction will cause the results to be affected in some manner; however, despite this problem, the questions are basically the same and can still allow for generalization to be made.

On the basis of the choices made on these two questions, respondents were dichotomized into two value groups. Those selecting response number 2 (strong defense forces) on either question (top priority or second priority) were classified as hawks. All others were labeled nonhawks.

The term dove was rejected as being too strong because of obvious connotations. The term hawk may also be too strong, but it satisfies the need for a label.

This operationalization is called the defense priority variable, and it was created to measure attitudes toward national defense. Keep in mind that those labeled hawks are not necessarily war lovers or reactionary anticommunists. Likewise, nonhawks are not necessarily unilateralists or peace activists. Most people place a positive value on all four of the goals from which they had to choose. For this study, however, the relative priority among valued objectives is the vital consideration. Thus, this forced-choice item is a reasonable attempt to measure these priorities.

To determine whether or not this constructed variable represents a dimension separate from those already discussed, it was also included in a test for scalability and factor analysis. In both cases the relationships between the defense priority variable and the others were weak. When included in the NATO support scale the coefficient fell to  $\alpha = .65$ . A correlation matrix including the defense priority variable is displayed in Table 3-12, and the factor scores for the five variables are listed in Table 3-13.

Both Tables 3-12 and 3-13 show weak relationships between the defense priority variable and the others. The strength of the association between the variables used to construct the NATO support scale is apparent when compared to the weak association with the defense priority variable

TABLE 3-12  
 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEFENSE PRIORITY  
 VARIABLE AND OTHERS  
 (Pearson's r)

	Defense Priority	Foreign Policy	Military Alliances	Importance of NATO
Foreign Policy	.16	1.0	--	--
Military Alliances	.20	.29	1.0	--
Importance of NATO	.20	.21	.49	1.0
Spending For NATO	.32	.23	.36	.50

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

TABLE 3-13  
 DIMENSIONALITY OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

	(Factor Loadings)			
	Unrotated Scores		Rotated Scores*	
	Factor I	Factor II	Factor I	Factor II
Military Alliances	.61	.04	.48	.38
Importance of NATO	.68	-.06	.60	.32
Spending For NATO	.68	-.23	.69	.19
Foreign Policy	.39	.23	.19	.41
Defence Priority	.36	-.20	.41	.03

\*Orthogonal rotation (varimax)  
 SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

and the foreign policy variable used previously. As these tests indicate, it appears that the national defense variable does represent a separate attitudinal dimension.

Table 3-14 displays the percentage of hawks (those who selected strong defense forces as the first or second national priority) for each nation for the four time periods. The British and German respondents appear consistently to be more hawkish than the others. Also, for all nations the percentage of hawks is increasing. The difference in item construction for 1980 may have influenced the large increases between 1979 and 1980; however, the 1979 data were collected prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and

TABLE 3-14  
PERCENT CATEGORIZED AS HAWKS ON DEFENSE  
PRIORITY VARIABLE

	1973	1978	1979	1980	Change
Britain	23	41	34	50	+27
Germany	21	36	36	52	+31
France	17	12	12	24	+ 7
Italy	13	13	12	19	+ 4
Belgium	7	8	8	15	+ 8
Netherlands	15	19	16	26	+11

SOURCE: 1973 Community Study and Eurobarometers 10, 11, and 14.

the Iranian hostage crisis, and those events may have caused the increase.

This measure is helpful because it is not linked to the US, NATO, the EEC, or any international arrangement. It is also not linked to defense spending levels or specific weapons programs. This variable simply indicates how important Europeans perceive national defense to be in comparison with other national goals.

Thus, regardless of European attitudes toward NATO or the US, the importance placed upon national defense has been increasing since 1973. This is the strongest longitudinal conclusion reached so far because of the length of the period covered.

Another observation concerns the wide range of responses. In 1980 52% of the German respondents were classified hawks but only 15% of those from Belgium; a difference of 37 percentage points. In 1973 the range was only 16 points between the highest and lowest. This may indicate some kind of a European international polarization over national defense attitudes with the citizens of some countries being more willing to shoulder the burden of defense than others.

This trend toward polarization may be attributable to perceptions of national power. Respondents of those countries with the lowest percentage of hawks (Belgium and Italy) may perceive that their contribution to a Western defense would be insignificant, and therefore national defense ought not to be given a high priority domestically.

There are no Eurobarometer items available to test this idea.

Adler and Wertman (1981) commented on this notion of a "sense of futility in the smaller countries" (p. 12). Citing a survey by INUSOP in Belgium, they found that a plurality (by 41 to 30 percent) believed in 1980 that what their country does for defense does not seem useful.

A different survey question was asked in 1976 and 1978 that can be included in this attitudinal dimension of national defense. This question asked respondents how important they feel strengthening defense to be. This item fits into the operationalization for national defense because alliances and foreign policy are not included in the question.

The possible responses to this question are that strengthening defense is: very important, important, of little importance, and not important at all. These responses were dichotomized into those who favor strengthening defense (first two responses) and those who do not (last two responses). Table 3-15 displays the findings to this question.

The previous measure of hawks in Table 3-14 showed increases for all six countries, but Table 3-15 shows only Britain and Germany increasing. The range of responses widens from 34 percentage points in 1976 to 39 in 1978. This item thus supports the notion mentioned earlier that



TABLE 3-15  
PERCENT FAVORING A STRENGTHENED DEFENSE

	1976	1978	Change
Britain	76	81	+ 5
Germany	59	65	+ 6
France	57	49	- 8
Italy	48	46	- 2
Belgium	42	42	0
Netherlands	66	50	-16

SOURCE: Eurobarometers 6 and 10.

European national attitudes may be diverging on this issue of national defense priority.

In sum, a third dimension was identified in this section as attitudes toward national defense. Two measures were used that showed British and German publics increasing their support for national defense while the respondents of the other countries appeared somewhat less inclined to give national defense a high position in their structure of political priorities. As this disparity of responses increases, this raises the question of a possible European polarization on this issue.

### Anti-Americanism

To measure pro or anti-American attitudes, a survey question was used that asked respondents to what extent they find Americans trustworthy. Four responses were possible: very trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, not very trustworthy, and not at all trustworthy. The first two and last two responses were combined to form a dichotomy of those who feel Americans are trustworthy and those who do not.

This is an excellent variable because data are available from 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1982. This enables longitudinal conclusions to be made with a high degree of confidence.

The trend as depicted in Table 3-16 is that anti-American sentiment is increasing in all countries except Britain. Respondents in Belgium displayed both the largest overall increase in anti-American sentiment as well as the largest single percentage (53% in 1982).

Four countries displayed very large increases between 1980 and 1982: Germany 12%, Italy 13%, Belgium 28%, and the Netherlands 23%. These increases may be attributable to the Reagan presidency, the Euromissile issue, or a combination of factors. Nevertheless, there appears to be substantial change in European opinion.

As with the national defense variable in the previous section, European publics appear to be drifting apart on this issue of anti-Americanism. In 1970 the range of responses from highest to lowest was 18 percentage points,

TABLE 3-16  
 PERCENT RESPONDING THAT AMERICANS  
 ARE NOT TRUSTWORTHY

	1970	1976	1980	1982	Change
Britain	--	27	21	27	0
Germany	18	23	18	30	+12
France	36	43	39	40	+ 4
Italy	27	35	27	40	+13
Belgium	24	37	25	53	+29
Netherlands	20	24	21	44	+24

NOTE: Britain was not an EEC member in 1970 and therefore not included in the 1970 survey.

SOURCE: 1970 Community Study and Eurobarometers 6, 14, and 17.

while in 1982 it was 26. This difference is not as substantial as that found for the defense priority variable. Germany and Britain seem to have the most favorable image of the US in 1982 with the other countries possessing different opinions.

Period effects appear to have heavily influenced these attitudes. Taking 1970 as the base period, anti-Americanism increased in 1976 but was reduced in 1980. It then increased greatly in 1982. Thus, while anti-Americanism is not the overwhelming feeling of Europeans, the trend is clear that anti-American sentiment is rising.

### Summary

In general, European publics choose NATO as their preferred military security arrangement; however, there is no single preferred foreign policy approach. There is evidence that in these six countries both support for NATO and support for an Atlantic foreign policy increased between April 1979 and October 1980. When placed specifically in the context of military security options, neutralism receives little support in Europe.

A third dimension, national defense priority, illustrates an overall increase in the importance placed on national defense in all six countries.

Anti-Americanism is an issue area of importance to these defense and security issues. The amount of anti-American sentiment is clearly increasing in Europe.

Present in each of the four major areas examined is a divergence of opinion between national publics. This is perhaps the most substantial cross-national finding. The findings from Britain and Germany are consistently different from those of the others. The British and German respondents support NATO in greater numbers, are more likely to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, place a higher priority on national defense, and they possess less anti-American sentiment than those of the other countries. The Netherlands can be grouped with Britain and Germany on questions concerning NATO and foreign policy, but not national defense

or anti-Americanism. These divergent trends between nations are true for all time periods, and the amount of divergence is increasing.

CHAPTER FOUR  
INFLUENCES ON EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

This chapter goes beyond the cross-national comparisons of basic attitudes presented in Chapter Three. The influences or correlates of European attitudes are examined in this chapter to determine what social and political factors may be related to particular attitudes.

There are three areas of interest. First, the item measuring pro and anti-American sentiment is treated as an independent variable to observe the relationships between feelings about Americans and support for NATO, foreign policy approaches, and hawkishness. Second, the successor generation thesis is tested. Generational and educational influences are initially treated separately, and then the combined influences of age and education are analyzed. Third, the associations between political party and these attitudes are determined.

Anti-Americanism as an Influence

Strong evidence was presented in the previous chapter that anti-American sentiment is increasing in Europe. In four countries 40% or higher felt that Americans were

untrustworthy in 1982 (Table 3-16), and in each case this represents a large increase.

The relationship between these feelings about Americans and other issues may be important. If the view Europeans have of Americans conditions or affects their attitudes on other issues and policies, then the pattern of increasing anti-American sentiment may allow some predictions to be made. Thus, this section examines the relationships between feelings about Americans and the support for NATO, support for an Atlantic foreign policy, and hawkishness.

Using the NATO support scale and the trustworthiness variable, Table 4-1 illustrates substantial relationships in Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. The correlation is strongest for Italy ( $\text{Tau B} = .44$ ). The degree of association is weak for Britain and Belgium. The effect is that those who feel Americans are trustworthy have a greater tendency to have high support for NATO.

The relationships are much weaker on the question of foreign policy preferences as indicated in Table 4-2. There is a greater likelihood for those who feel Americans are trustworthy to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, but the level of association is not very high, Italy having the strongest correlation ( $\text{Tau B} = .24$ ).

The relationships between opinions of American trustworthiness and the defense priority variable (hawks and nonhawks) are the weakest of these three variables as indicated by Table 4-3. Respondents who feel Americans are

TABLE 4-1  
 PERCENT WITH HIGH SUPPORT FOR NATO BY  
 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF AMERICANS, 1980

	Americans are		Tau B
	Trustworthy	Not Trustworthy	
GB	77	63	.13**
Ger	81	55	.22**
Fra	33	15	.30**
Ita	59	15	.44**
Bel	55	43	.13**
NL	63	19	.38**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.  
 SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

TABLE 4-2  
 PERCENT FAVORING AN ATLANTIC FOREIGN POLICY  
 BY TRUSTWORTHINESS OF AMERICANS, 1980

	Americans are		Tau B
	Trustworthy	Not Trustworthy	
GB	34	17	.12**
Ger	39	21	.15**
Fra	18	7	.09**
Ita	31	8	.24**
Bel	22	6	.14**
NL	34	12	.19**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.  
 SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.



TABLE 4-3  
 PERCENT HAWKS BY TRUSTWORTHINESS  
 OF AMERICANS, 1980

	Americans are		Tau B
	Trustworthy	Not Trustworthy	
GB	52	46	.05
Ger	55	40	.12**
Fra	24	23	.01
Ita	23	10	.14**
Bel	15	13	.02
NL	30	13	.16**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.  
 SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

trustworthy are only slightly more likely to be classified as hawks.

This weak association between anti-Americanism and hawkishness is logical. The defense priority variable was intended to measure the priority placed on national defense separate from attitudes toward alliances or foreign policy, so the absence of any substantial correlation between it and feelings about Americans is to be expected.

Table 4-4 summarizes the Tau B statistics from the three previous tables and thus facilitates comparisons between the three attitudinal variables. The NATO variable is clearly the most strongly related to feelings about

TABLE 4-4  
 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FEELINGS ABOUT AMERICANS  
 AND THREE VARIABLES, 1980  
 (Tau B)

	NATO	Foreign Policy	Hawks
Britain	.13**	.12**	.05
Germany	.22**	.15**	.12**
France	.30**	.09**	.01
Italy	.44**	.24**	.14**
Belgium	.13**	.14**	.02
Netherlands	.38**	.19**	.16**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.

NOTE: Positive correlations indicate that pro-American sentiment is related to high support for NATO, an Atlantic foreign policy, and hawkishness.

SOURCE: Tables 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3.

Americans. Additionally, Italy and the Netherlands stand out as the countries where the effects of feelings about Americans are the strongest, while these effects are weakest in Britain and Belgium.

Thus, one could conclude that as anti-Americanism increases, support for NATO will decrease, especially in Italy, the Netherlands, and France. The data used in this section were all compiled in 1980. Table 3-16 in the previous chapter indicated that anti-Americanism increased substantially between 1980 and 1982. This could lead to the conclusion that support for NATO decreased during the same period. This may in fact have happened; however, without access to more recent survey items on NATO, such a conclusion is only speculative.

#### Generational and Educational Influences

The studies examined in Chapter One on the successor generation concept indicated that generational influences may be an important factor, but the evidence presented was not conclusive. This section will look first at purely generational influences on a series of issues, then at the educational influences, and then finally at the combined impact of age and education. The changing significance of these variables will also be examined by using several time periods where available.

Three cohorts were established. They were labeled the postwar generation (born since 1949), the WW II generation

(birth years 1929-1949), and the predepression generation (born prior to 1929). These same birth intervals were used for each time period, thus the postwar generation becomes larger in the more recent time periods.

Using the NATO support scale the relationships between age and support for NATO in 1980 are displayed in Table 4-5. Except for Germany, there is a clear, though weak, association with the older generations more likely to have high support for NATO. The strongest relationship is in the Netherlands where 23 percentage points separate the postwar and the predepression generations (Tau B = .18).

TABLE 4-5  
PERCENT WITH HIGH SUPPORT FOR NATO BY AGE, 1980

	16-30	31-51	52+	Tau B
Britain	68	75	76	.06*
Germany	77	75	77	.00
France	22	20	38	.11**
Italy	37	51	50	.10**
Belgium	44	53	56	.08*
Netherlands	36	64	59	.18**

\*Statistically significant to .05.

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

The relationships between age and foreign policy attitudes in 1980 are not as strong as those for NATO as Table 4-6 shows. In Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium there is virtually no relationship, and there is only the slightest association in France and the Netherlands.

The relationships between age and the defense priority variable (hawks and nonhawks) are displayed in Table 4-7. The highest value for Tau B is again in the Netherlands (.18). There is essentially no relationship present in Germany and Belgium. However, the most substantial relationship is in Britain, because the percentages are spread about 50% rather than being skewed as in the Netherlands. In Britain 41% of the postwar generation are hawks, while

TABLE 4-6  
PERCENT FAVORING AN ATLANTIC FOREIGN POLICY BY AGE, 1980

	16-30	31-51	52+	Tau B
Britain	27	34	28	.00
Germany	34	37	37	.02
France	12	11	19	.08**
Italy	24	24	27	.03
Belgium	14	19	19	.02
Netherlands	23	31	34	.09**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.  
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

TABLE 4-7  
PERCENT HAWKS BY AGE, 1980

	16-30	31-51	52+	Tau B
Britain	41	45	63	.17**
Germany	51	51	53	.02
France	18	17	38	.17**
Italy	12	19	29	.16**
Belgium	13	13	18	.05
Netherlands	15	28	36	.18**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.  
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

63% of the predepression generation are hawks (Tau B = .17). This is a substantial relationship.

Table 4-8 displays the relationships between age and feelings about Americans in 1982. These are not strong correlations. In France, the postwar generation thinks more highly of Americans than the older generations. There are no significant relationships for Britain, Italy, and Belgium. In Germany and the Netherlands there are weak correlations (Tau B = .10).

Table 4-9 displays the Tau B correlations for several time periods and thus allows for trend analysis concerning these four issues and age. The NATO support scale is only

TABLE 4-8  
 PERCENT RESPONDING THAT AMERICANS ARE  
 TRUSTWORTHY, BY AGE, 1982

	16-32	33-53	54+	Tau B
Britain	73	77	72	.00
Germany	65	78	74	.10**
France	65	54	55	-.09**
Italy	58	64	59	.03
Belgium	47	46	46	-.01
Netherlands	50	59	63	.10**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.  
 SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

available for 1980, but it is also included for comparative purposes.

Many observations can be made from Table 4-9. All of the correlations are low; all are below Tau B = .20. The issue related most strongly with age is the hawk-nonhawk national defense priority variable. The issue with the lowest correlations is the anti-American variable.

There is a trend, however, for the gap between generations to be increasing on the national defence issue, except for Germany. There is also a trend for the gap to be narrowing on the foreign policy variable, except for France.

TABLE 4-9  
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AGE AND FOUR VARIABLES  
(Tau B)

	Foreign Policy		National Defense (Hawks)		Trustworthiness of Americans	
	1979	1980	1979	1980	1976	1980
GB	.06*	.00	.08**	.17**	.02	.03
Ger	.00	.02	.07**	.02	.00	.10**
Fra	.11**	.03	.12**	.13**	-.01	-.09**
Ita	.10**	.13**	.07**	.16**	.06*	.12**
Bel	.08*	.09**	-.03	.05	-.07*	-.01
NL	.18**	.10**	.08**	.18**	.03	.08**

\*Statistically significant to .05.

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.

NOTE: Positive correlations indicate that the older generations have a greater tendency to support NATO, to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, to be categorized as hawks, and to respond that Americans are trustworthy.

SOURCE: 1973 European Community Study and Eurobarometers 6, 11, 14, and 17.



There is no general trend in the association between the anti-American measure and age. In Germany and the Netherlands generational differences appear to be widening somewhat, but in Britain, Italy, and Belgium no trend is discernible. In France, the gap is widening, but with the postwar generation becoming increasingly more pro-American than the others.

The Netherlands is the country with the strongest relationships between age and these issues, while Germany has the lowest. The rest are somewhere in the middle. Thus, there is little evidence of a successor generation based solely upon age.

Education as a separate influence will now be discussed. Table 4-10 is identical in format to that of Table 4-9, except that it displays correlations between education and these four issues.

The education measure is a weakness of the Eurobarometer data. Respondents are classified according to what age they completed school, rather than according to what grade or type of school they completed. Students in technical school and "gymnasium" may all finish at age 17, but these two schools represent different curriculums and types of students. For this study, based on the age respondents completed school, they were placed into one of three categories: low education (14 years old and below), middle education (15-17 years old), and high education (18 years old and above).

TABLE 4-10  
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EDUCATION AND FOUR VARIABLES  
(Tau B)

	Foreign Policy		National Defense (Hawks)		Trustworthiness Of Americans	
	1979	1980	1973	1980	1976	1980
NATO 1980						
GB	.00	.05*	-.08	-.12**	.02	.00
Ger	-.03	.00	-.03	.17**	.05*	-.05*
Fra	-.07	.00	-.13**	-.11**	.01	.05
Ita	.05	.06**	-.06**	-.13**	.06*	.02
Bel	.05	.03	.00	-.08**	.05	.04
NL	.02	.00	.06**	-.03	.08*	.01

\*Statistically significant to .05.

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.

NOTE: Positive correlations indicate that the higher the education the greater the tendency to support NATO, to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, to be categorized as a hawk, and to respond that Americans are trustworthy.

SOURCE: 1973 European Community Study and Eurobarometers 6, 11, 14, and 17.

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
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As with Table 4-9 the relationships in Table 4-10 are all low. The strongest correlation is  $\text{Tau B} = -.17$ . On the NATO and foreign policy issues the correlations are extremely low.

The hawk variable again has the strongest relationships. The less-educated are more likely to place a higher priority on national defense than those with higher education, and this disparity is increasing.

Shifts can be seen in Table 4-10 on the American issue. In Germany in 1976 the highly educated were more pro-American than those with less education, but in 1980 and 1982 the less-educated were more pro-American. A similar shift occurred in Italy and may be occurring in the Netherlands. The trend is in the opposite direction in Britain and France where the higher education category is becoming more pro-American.

Thus, education as a separate independent variable does not produce strong correlations. In most cases there is no relationship.

Having observed the separate effects of age and education on these attitudinal variables, the combined effects of age and education can now be examined. This is the heart of the successor generation argument, that the joint influences of age and education create distinct attitudinal patterns between generations.

Table 4-11 shows the percentages of those with high education who have high support for NATO, by age. In other

TABLE 4-11  
 PERCENT OF HIGHLY EDUCATED WITH HIGH SUPPORT  
 FOR NATO, BY AGE, 1980

	16-30	31-51	52+	Tau B
Britain	75	73	78	.02
Germany	86	69	76	-.07
France	18	22	38	.12*
Italy	33	56	64	.23**
Belgium	48	55	68	.12*
Netherlands	36	67	72	.25**

\*Statistically significant to .05.

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

words, considering only the highly educated, the percentages reflect the portion of each generation who have high support for NATO. The construction of this table and the others in this section is identical to that of Table 1-7 which was used by many of the authors discussed in Chapter One to support the notion of a successor generation.

Substantial relationships can be seen for Italy (Tau B = .23) and the Netherlands (Tau B = .25). In both there are more than 30 percentage points separating the postwar and predepression generations. Marginally strong correlations are seen for France and Belgium. In Britain, however, there is no relationship, and in Germany it is the

postwar generation that displays the greatest support for NATO. Thus, the evidence of a successor generation varies on this issue of support for NATO, with strong evidence in some countries and none in others.

Table 4-12 displays the percent of the highly educated who favor an Atlantic foreign policy by age for 1980. This variable fails to produce any strong relationships, just as it did not produce any for age or education separately.

The percent of the highly educated who were categorized as hawks in 1980 are displayed in Table 4-13. Substantial relationships can be seen for Britain and the Netherlands (for both  $\text{Tau B} = .21$ ). For Germany, France, and Belgium the correlations are low.

TABLE 4-12  
PERCENT OF HIGHLY EDUCATED WHO FAVOR AN ATLANTIC  
FOREIGN POLICY, BY AGE, 1980

	16-30	31-51	52+	Tau B
Britain	36	35	30	-.03
Germany	35	45	47	.07
France	7	12	18	.11*
Italy	29	27	36	.02
Belgium	15	20	25	.08
Netherlands	26	28	38	.09*

\*Statistically significant to .05.  
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

TABLE 4-13  
 PERCENT OF HIGHLY EDUCATED WHO ARE HAWKS, BY AGE, 1980

	16-30	31-51	52+	Tau B
Britain	32	43	65	.21**
Germany	31	38	39	.07
France	15	14	25	.06
Italy	9	10	33	.19**
Belgium	10	9	16	.05
Netherlands	16	25	43	.21**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.  
 SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

Again, as with this defense priority issue and age alone (Table 4-7), the British response percentages center around 50%. The range between the youngest and oldest generations increased from 22 percentage points in Table 4-7 (which measured age alone) to 33 percentage point, in Table 4-13. Thus, within Britain on this particular issue of national defense, generational effects controlling for education are substantial.

The percentages of the highly educated in each generation who respond that Americans are trustworthy in 1982 are displayed in Table 4-14. There are no strong relationships, and the French postwar generation continues to be more pro-American than the older French generations.



TABLE 4-14

PERCENT OF HIGHLY EDUCATED WHO RESPOND THAT AMERICANS  
ARE TRUSTWORTHY, BY AGE, 1982

	16-32	33-53	54+	Tau B
Britain	76	83	76	.05
Germany	61	76	69	.11*
France	65	55	63	-.06
Italy	53	66	56	.07
Belgium	44	46	57	.07
Netherlands	50	64	65	.13**

\*Statistically significant to .05.

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 17.

Trend data for these four issues controlling for age and education are shown in Table 4-15. When compared with Table 4-9, it is seen that isolating those respondents who are highly educated produces stronger relationships in most cases than age alone. However, the evidence displayed does not lend overwhelming support to the successor generation thesis.

The hawk issue again produces the strongest correlations, and for the Netherlands the relationship is increasing. In Germany, however, the relationship is decreasing.

TABLE 4-15  
 THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AGE AND FOUR VARIABLES FOR  
 THE HIGHLY EDUCATED  
 (Tau B)

	Foreign Policy		National Defense (Hawks)		Trustworthiness of Americans	
	1979	1980	1973	1979	1976	1980
GB	.02	-.03	.11*	.23**	.01	.05
Ger	-.07	.07	.15**	.11	.10	.11*
Fra	.12*	.01	.05	.16**	.02	-.06
Ita	.23**	.11*	.17**	.06	.16**	.07
Bel	.12*	.09*	.00	.03	-.07	.07
NL	.25**	.12**	.13**	.15**	.10*	.13**

\*Statistically significant to .05.

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.

NOTE: Positive correlations indicate that the older generations have a greater tendency to support NATO, to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, to be categorized as hawks, and to respond that Americans are trustworthy.

SOURCE: 1973 European Community Study and Eurobarometers 6, 11, 14, and 17.

The anti-American variable produces the most diverse results. There were major shifts of opinion in both Belgium and France on this issue, but in opposite directions. In both Germany and Italy the older generations of the highly educated are more pro-American, and in Germany the gap is increasing, but in Italy it is decreasing.

For Britain, the national defense issue produced strong correlations, but the other three issues did not. This indicates that generational influences do not effect how the British perceive external affairs, such as, NATO, foreign policy, and Americans. Domestically, however, the priority that national defense should receive does create generational cleavages in Britain.

The strongest evidence for the successor generation argument can be found in Italy and the Netherlands. The weakest evidence is in Germany and Belgium. The successor generation phenomenon is strongest in those countries where overall attitudes are somewhat mid-ranged among European publics. In other words, in countries with consistently high support for NATO and Americans as seen in Chapter Three (Britain and Germany), and in those with consistently low support for NATO and Americans (France and Belgium), there is the least evidence of the successor generation. Only in the countries with mid-range support for these issues are generational effects most substantial (Italy and the Netherlands).

As pointed out, the generational and educational influences vary between countries as well as within countries depending on the issues. Thus, the presence of a successor generation with distinct attitudes differing from those of the older generations is only partially supported by these data, and such a presence is clearly not a uniform European phenomenon.

#### Partisan Influences

In this section political party is the independent variable, and the effects of party identification on the four attitudinal variables are examined. Belgium and the Netherlands are excluded because of the complexity of their party systems. The French party system is also complex, and the source used for ensuring an accurate portrayal of the French parties is Safran (1979). Minor parties that are habitual coalition partners are included with the major parties in both France and Italy, but are not named in the tables.

Table 4-16 displays the percent categorized as having high support for NATO on the NATO support scale within each party in 1980. This appears to be a highly partisan issue in all the countries except for Germany. Members of parties of the right tend to have higher support for NATO. In Britain, 25 percentage points separate the Labour and the Conservative parties. Larger ranges are present in both

TABLE 4-16  
 PERCENT WITH HIGH SUPPORT FOR NATO BY PARTY, 1980

	Labour	Liberal	Tory	Tau B	
Britain	61	69	86	.25**	
-----					
	SPD	FDP	CDU,CSU	Tau B	
Germany	77	73	83	.05	
-----					
	PCI	PSI	DCI	Tau B	
Italy	6	24	34	.32**	
-----					
	PCF	PS,MRG	UDF	RPR	Tau B
France	6	21	46	39	.32**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.  
 NOTE: SPD - German Social Democrats  
 FDP - German Free Democrats  
 CDU,CSU - German Christian Democrats and their  
 Bavarian partner the Christian Social Union  
 PCI - Italian Communist Party  
 PSI - Italian Socialist Party  
 DCI - Italian Christian Democrats  
 PCF - French Communist Party  
 PS,MRG - French Socialist Party and the Left Radicals  
 UDF - Giscard's French center-right party  
 RPR - French Gaullist Party  
 SOURCE: Eurobarometer 14.

Italy and France. Substantial Tau B values are present for Britain (.25), Italy (.32), and France (.32).

The NATO support scale is available for only 1980, so trend data are not available. There are, however, multiple time periods for the remaining three issues.

Table 4-17 displays the percent that favored an Atlantic foreign policy within each party of each nation for April 1979 and October 1980.

The foreign policy issue is becoming more partisan in Britain, Germany, and France. In Italy, the measure of partisanship decreased between 1979 and 1980, but Italy still remains as the nation with the highest level of partisanship in 1980 despite the decrease (Tau B = .32). These high correlations in Italy may be because of the large Italian Communist party and its opposition to a foreign policy based on US and Western perspectives.

This issue is not as partisan as the NATO question, except for Germany. Having displayed only very small party differences over NATO, the German parties display moderate differences over foreign policy (20 percentage points separate the SPD from the CDU CSU in 1980).

Table 4-18 reflects the percent hawks in each party for three time periods. This issue is becoming more partisan in all countries except France. The French Communist and Socialist parties both greatly increased their degree of hawkishness between 1979 and 1980, thus resulting in a decrease in partisan cleavage. The increase in support by

TABLE 4-17  
 PERCENT FAVORING AN ATLANTIC FOREIGN POLICY BY PARTY

BRITAIN	Labour	Liberal	Tory	Tau B	
1979	17	26	26	.11**	
1980	20	29	41	.18**	
-----					
GERMANY	SPD	FDP	CDU, CSU	Tau B	
1979	21	24	30	.10**	
1980	31	36	51	.19**	
-----					
ITALY	PCI	PSI	DCI	Tau B	
1979	2	5	30	.40**	
1980	6	24	34	.32**	
-----					
FRANCE	PCF	PS, MRG	UDF	RPR	Tau B
1979	3	7	13	9	.13**
1980	6	9	20	23	.20**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.  
 SOURCE: Eurobarometers 14 and 17.

TABLE 4-18  
PERCENT HAWKS BY PARTY

BRITAIN	Labour	Liberal	Tory	Tau B	
1973	21	15	30	.07	
1979	25	31	42	.16**	
1980	39	39	65	.23**	
-----					
GERMANY	SPD	FDP	CDU,CSU	Tau B	
1973	15	21	27	.13**	
1979	27	29	44	.17**	
1980	43	47	68	.22**	
-----					
ITALY	PCI	PSI	DCI	Tau B	
1973	8	6	17	.13**	
1979	9	6	17	.12**	
1980	8	14	29	.22**	
-----					
FRANCE	PCF	PS,MRG	Reform	URP	Tau B
1973	6	11	14	28	.19**
	PCF	PS,MRG	UDF	RPR	Tau B
1979	3	6	22	28	.26**
1980	22	20	31	39	.13**

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.

NOTE: Reform - French anti-Gaullist center-right party

URP - The French Gaullist party

SOURCE: 1973 European Community Study and Eurobarometers 11 and 14.



members of these two parties may be attributed to Mitterand's election as president in 1979, and his advocacy of a strong French defense.

This shift in French partisan opinion may be an example of public opinion being shaped by elite opinion, rather than elites being influenced by the public. Regardless, the percentages of hawks within the PCF and the PS,MRG in France are still low (22% and 20% respectively).

Both Britain and Germany reflect substantial partisan differences on this issue in 1980. In Britain, 26 percentage points separate Labour from Conservative, and in Germany, 25 points separate SPD from CDU, CSU. According to these data Britain and Germany are clearly becoming more partisan over this issue of national defense priority, and the politics of 1983 substantiate these findings.

The final issue considered in this section is the extent to which party members differ in their opinion of US trustworthiness. Table 4-19 displays these findings for three time periods.

This issue creates very large partisan cleavages, except for Britain. The degree of partisanship is increasing for all countries, especially Germany and France. In France, between 1980 and 1982, the Socialists decreased by 10% their pro-American sentiment, and in Germany the SPD members decreased theirs by 14%.

On this issue of feelings toward Americans, Italy demonstrates the most partisan cleavage for any country on

TABLE 4-19  
 PERCENT RESPONDING THAT AMERICANS ARE TRUSTWORTHY, BY PARTY

BRITAIN	Labour	Liberal	Tory	Tau B	
1976	72	74	76	.04	
1980	78	78	81	.03**	
1982	70	76	84	.12**	
-----					
GERMANY	Greens	SPD	FDP	CDU,CSU	Tau B
1976	--	74	70	81	.09**
1980	--	82	85	86	.04
1982	35	68	67	85	.30**
-----					
ITALY	PCI	PSI	DCI	Tau B	
1976	38	55	84	.40**	
1980	36	67	89	.45**	
1982	28	57	80	.43**	
-----					
FRANCE	PCF	PS,MRG	UDR	Tau B	
1976	41	52	64	.15**	
	PCF	PS,MRG	UDF	RPR	Tau B
1980	48	58	63	61	.08*
1982	43	48	76	78	.27**

\*Statistically significant to .05.

\*\*Statistically significant to .01.

NOTE: In 1982 in Britain the Liberal party was combined with the Social Democrats.

Greens - German ecology party.

UDR - French Gaullist party in 1976.

SOURCE: Eurobarometers 6, 14, and 17.

any issue (Tau B = .45 in 1980 and .43 in 1982). The members of Italy's Communist party clearly are not pro-American.

Table 4-20 displays the Tau B values for the four issues just discussed for all time periods. With only two exceptions, all issues are becoming more partisan for all countries. Italy clearly has the most partisan cleavage of these countries. The questions of NATO and American trustworthiness produce substantially higher levels of partisanship than the foreign policy and hawk questions.

The relationships obtained by examining party identification as an independent variable are much stronger than those obtained earlier in this chapter on either anti-Americanism, age, and education. Party membership appears to strongly influence attitudes. Members of parties traditionally considered as more conservative in all countries have a much greater tendency to support NATO, to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, to be categorized as hawks, and to feel that Americans are trustworthy.

Thus, partisan influences may generate potentially serious consequences. Should the electorates continue to diverge along party lines over these issues, campaign rhetoric and party manifestos will become more extreme as party leaders try to out-bid each other for public support. The high stakes of election politics may result in policy positions and campaign promises detrimental to Euro-American relations.

TABLE 4-20  
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARTY AND FOUR VARIABLES  
(Tau B)

	Foreign Policy		National Defense (Hawks)		Trustworthiness of Americans	
	1979	1980	1973	1979	1976	1980
NATO 1980						
GB	.25**	.11**	.18**	.07**	.16**	.23**
Ger	.05	.10**	.19**	.13**	.17**	.22**
Fra	.32**	.13**	.20**	.19**	.26**	.13**
Ita	.32**	.40**	.32**	.13**	.12**	.22**
					.04	.03
					.09**	.04
					.15**	.08*
					.40**	.45**
						.12**
						.30**
						.27**
						.43**

\* Statistically significant to .05.

\*\* Statistically significant to .01.

NOTE: Positive correlations indicate that members of the more conservative parties have a greater tendency to support NATO, to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, to be classified as a hawk, and to respond that Americans are trustworthy.

SOURCE: Tables 4-16, 4-17, 4-18, and 4-19.

### Summary

This chapter has examined several influences on European attitudes: anti-Americanism, age, education, and party identification. Wide variations were found to exist between countries and between issues on the extent to which these variables influence attitudes.

Feelings about Americans were related most highly to support for NATO. Substantial Tau B values were present for Germany (.22), France (.30), Italy (.44), and the Netherlands (.38). On the issues of foreign policy and defense priority, feelings about Americans were not substantially related.

Some evidence supporting the successor generation argument was found. Age and education as separate influences produced low correlations with the four attitudinal variables (all Tau B values were less than .20). By combining age and education to observe the generational influences of the highly educated, some moderately strong correlations were produced. The strongest were found in Italy and the Netherlands, and for these two countries the NATO issue generated the highest Tau B values: Italy (.23) and the Netherlands (.25). Thus, there is some evidence supporting the successor generation thesis, but generational influences vary between nations and also within nations depending on the issues. Additionally, these influences were not found to be increasing substantially.

Party identification is the variable that produced the strongest relationships with the four attitudinal variables.

Partisan cleavages were found to be substantial and increasing in the four countries examined. The highest degree of partisanship was in Italy (Tau B = .45). The issues of NATO and anti-Americanism appear to generate greater party differences than others, although all four issues were clearly partisan.

Thus, anti-American sentiment may influence attitudes toward NATO, and the combined effects of age and education may be significant within Italy and the Netherlands. However, party identification appears to be a substantial factor in all the countries and attitudinal variables examined.

CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The temptation exists in a comparative study of this type to draw from the different historical and cultural traditions of the nations studied and attempt to "explain" the findings. Such discussions normally include Britain's long history of political stability and deference, the turmoil of French political development as well as the effects of Gaullism on French attitudes, the German and Italian experiences following WW II, and the internal cleavages present in Belgium and the Netherlands.

Such factors have been mentioned briefly throughout the body of this paper. However, this final chapter does not attempt to explain why European attitudes have come to be structured in a particular manner; but rather, the intent is to look to the future to see what implications current European attitudes may have for Euro-American relations.

This concern with implications assumes public opinion influences policy, and the first section of this chapter addresses this assumption. Next, the major findings of the research are reviewed; and finally, the implications of the findings are examined.

### Linking Mass Opinion and Policy

The attempt to link public attitudes with foreign policy is understood to be a risky business, given the absence of any empirically demonstrated link. Political scientists cannot agree among themselves to what extent (if any) attitudes and public opinion influence policy. Class analysis and elite theory are two analytic approaches that would assert that attitudes have little or no influence on public policy.

Other approaches affirm the importance of public opinion. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger included several inputs when he spoke of foreign policy making: "Policy emerged from an amalgam of factors: objective circumstances, domestic pressures, the values of our society and the decisions of individual leaders" (from Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982, p. 529). His mention of domestic pressures and societal values can be interpreted as references to public opinion and attitudes. Adler and Wertman (1981) write: "Public opinion will play a key role in determining whether the NATO governments have the political will to increase defense spending and . . . to go through with the planned deployment of the new nuclear weapons on their soil" (p. 9).

The mechanism by which public opinion is linked to policy is understood within democratic theory to be the political party. Sartori (1976) asserts that what distinguishes modern politics is that societies are politically



mobilized and that the channel for this activity is the political party. He claims that parties are the central intermediary structure between society and government. Samuel Eldersveld (1982), another party theorist, writes: "What emerges to facilitate government in modern systems under these complex conditions are linkage structures. . . . The political party is one type of linkage structure; some would say it is the central one" (p. 4).

The impact of political parties on domestic spending policies has been demonstrated empirically by David Cameron (1981). He used the Pearson product-moment correlation to measure the relationships between government spending policies and the partisan composition of governments for several nations. He found that

. . . nations in which leftist parties governed were much more likely to have experienced large increases in total spending and to have relatively large public economies than nations in which centrist and rightist parties governed. (p. 9)

Within this theoretical framework which emphasizes the importance of political parties, the partisan influences on European foreign policy attitudes discussed in the previous chapter appear to be especially significant. This aspect of the findings will be discussed shortly.

Despite the importance of parties, the impact of attitudes cannot be directly measured or quantified. Additionally, there are other variables in the decision-making formula, such as, leadership, institutions, the

international system, and issue saliency. The point of this discussion, however, is that attitudes do count, and that they cannot be ignored. This is especially the case when mass attitudes divide along party lines. In this regard, inferences can be made concerning the likely policies that individual governments may pursue.

#### Research Findings

The findings from the literature review for the most part were supported in this study. Support for NATO is substantial, support for an Atlantic foreign policy is low, anti-Americanism is increasing, and partisan influences are important. The major differences concern neutralism and the successor generation. By structuring European attitudes into distinct dimensions, and then precisely defining neutralism within the military security dimension, support for neutralism was found to be low and to be decreasing. Responses favoring neutralism in 1980 were found in Britain to be 9%, Germany 3%, France 8%, Italy 6%, Belgium 3%, and the Netherlands 4%. This finding differs with several of the authors discussed in Chapter One who reported that neutralist sentiment in Europe is substantial and increasing.

Some evidence supporting the successor generation argument was found. By combining age and education to observe the generational influences of the highly educated, some moderately strong correlations were produced; however,

these influences vary greatly between nations and also within nations depending on the issues. In some cases the successor generation effects are increasing, but in most the effects are decreasing. Thus, the notion of a successor generation cannot be used as a general explanation of European attitudes. Anti-Americanism and opposition to Atlanticism as a foreign policy approach are not the result of generational effects.

#### Implications

The lack of support in Europe for an Atlantic foreign policy has important implications for US policy. The European opposition to US policies following the events in Afghanistan and Poland should be viewed within this dimension of foreign policy approaches, within which Europeans generally proceed along a European or independent course depending how they perceive their interests. This cannot be interpreted, however, as an indication of declining support for NATO or the Atlantic Alliance. NATO receives high support, but it is viewed within the narrow context of military security, of repelling a Soviet military invasion. In such a context NATO is widely supported. In the broader realm of foreign policy where issues concern economics, the mideast, Africa, trade, and so on, there is little support for blindly following the leadership of the US.

The increase in anti-American sentiment may also have important implications. These attitudes were shown to be

related to support for NATO. Because the US is intimately involved with most Alliance decisions, such as, the Euro-missiles and the 3% annual defense budget increase policy, as well as with arms control talks, attitudes toward these issues are probably closely tied to feelings about the US. Thus, one can anticipate that if anti-American sentiment continues to increase, support for Alliance policies will decrease.

The conclusion reached by many of the authors discussed in Chapter One was that European attitudes pose a threat to the traditional Euro-American partnership. To substantiate this conclusion references were made to the perceived increase in European neutralist sentiment, the declining support for NATO, and to the notion of the successor generation. While these three propositions were not validated by the data analyzed in this project, the conclusion that European attitudes are challenging the Euro-American relationship may be correct.

Two aspects of European foreign policy attitudes that received no attention in the literature were uncovered during this project. These two findings, the European divergence on these issues and the increase in the partisan nature of these issues, may affect Euro-American relations.

European attitudes are not monolithic. The inability of Europe to progress any further towards political unification attests to this. There is a divergence of opinion between national publics on the issues examined in this

study. The British and German respondents support NATO in greater numbers, are more likely to favor an Atlantic foreign policy, place a higher priority on national defense, and possess less anti-American sentiment than those of the other countries. These divergent trends between nations are true for all time periods examined, and the degree of divergence is increasing.

These differences are most significant on the defense priority measure. The percent hawks in Britain was found in 1980 to be 50%, and in Germany 52%. The percent hawks in the others is considerably less: France 24%, Italy 19%, Belgium 15%, and the Netherlands 26%.

Should these divergences continue to increase (and the data suggest that they will), Europe may polarize into two camps. Another possibility is the disillusionment of the British and Germans. Seeing the increasing reluctance of their European neighbors to "do their share" may result in a loss of will by the Germans and the British.

There are other possibilities. The divergences between nations may have no effect. Or, the other countries may change their attitudes and follow the example set by the British and the Germans. Neither of these is likely.

The point is that this polarization is a phenomenon that has received little or no attention, and the implications of this polarization for Euro-American relations should be examined further.

The increasing partisan nature of European security attitudes is another area that has received little attention. Partisan cleavages were found to be substantial and increasing in the four countries covered. The largest increases concerned feelings toward Americans. Except for Italy, this was not a partisan issue in 1976 or 1980, but in 1982 it was clearly an issue that divided parties (in Germany Tau B = .30, France .27, Italy .43, and Britain .12).

Given the theoretical framework that parties link the wishes of their constituencies to policy outputs, and given the evidence presented in this study that European electorates structure their foreign policy attitudes in a partisan manner, one can conclude that European attitudes on defense and security issues are reasonable indicators of programmatic differences between political parties.

There is evidence of this in European politics already. As Table 4-19 showed, substantial decreases in favorable attitudes toward Americans on the part of British Labour party and German SPD members preceded the 1983 campaign positions of these two parties with their anti-NATO, anti-missile, and anti-American orientation.

The absence of data regarding attitudes toward specific defense related policies is a shortcoming of the Eurobarometer surveys. While this study generally found support for the broad issue of NATO, the possibility exists that this

may be, as Puchala and Rosenthal (1983) suggest, a "knee-jerk" reaction, and that within the highly partisan debates over specific policies, such as, missiles and budgets, the European political will may not be sufficient to support Alliance decisions.

To conclude, there are important implications to be drawn from the data presented in this study. Clearly, the end is not at hand for NATO or the Euro-American partnership as some have suggested, but there are indications that European attitudes are changing and that these changes may impact on Alliance policies. Most significant is the increasing partisan cleavage over these attitudes. As Alliance decisions become increasingly embroiled in European domestic politics, the manner in which the US conducts its relations with Europe can be expected to change.

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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Andrew H. Ziegler, Jr., Captain, United States Army, is studying political science at the University of Florida in preparation for joining the faculty of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. His responsibilities there will be to instruct cadets in the areas of American federal government, comparative politics, and international relations.

Prior to his present assignment, Captain Ziegler served in a variety of command and staff positions. These included secretary of the general staff for the 3rd Armored Division, Frankfurt, West Germany (1981-1982); mechanized infantry company commander, Gelnhausen, West Germany (1979-1981); and a platoon leader, company executive officer, and the assistant operations officer for an airborne infantry battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (1975-1979). Captain Ziegler's military awards include the Meritorious Service Medal and the Army Commendation Medal.

Captain Ziegler has a Bachelor of Science degree from Florida State University (1974), and he is a candidate for a Master of Arts degree at the University of Florida. He is also a graduate of the Infantry Officer's Basic and Advanced Courses as well as the Airborne and Ranger Courses.


Captain Ziegler was born in Alliance, Ohio, in 1952, and he graduated from Brandon High School in Brandon, Florida, in 1970. He currently lives in Gainesville, Florida, with his wife, Kalli, and their two daughters.

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This thesis was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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