LIBYA: A COUNTRY IN TRANSITION SEEKING TO ASSERT ITS INFLUENCE (U)

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Libya is an oil rich, lesser developed, Arab, Islamic fundamentalist country undergoing modernization and vying to assert its influence on world affairs. Because of its geographic location and economic wealth it is a key player in both the Arab and African worlds.

Continued
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This paper is a country study of Libya, first briefly recounting Libya’s history up until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969, and then examining the political, economic, social and defense systems that have evolved since then with emphasis on their significance in terms of present day Libya’s internal development and projection of influence in the international arena. Analysis will assess the available evidence in each of these four areas and present conclusions which should prove helpful in any assessment of US policy towards Libya.
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LIBYA: A COUNTRY IN TRANSITION SEEKING TO ASSERT ITS INFLUENCE
A GROUP STUDY PROJECT
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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Until independence in 1951, the history of Libya was essentially that of tribes, regions, conquest and occupation.

PEOPLE

Libyans are principally a mixture of Arabs and Arabized Berbers. They are classified as Caucasians of predominantly Mediterranean stock. The Berbers were the main original element in the indigenous population. Their origin is a mystery, but they are believed to have migrated from southwestern Asia into North Africa early in the third millennium B.C. The Berbers historically have identified themselves in terms of their tribe, clan and family, although new social imports brought by the Arabs in the seventh century ultimately displaced most of the traditional institutions of the Berber people. The Berbers, however, even now are a distinctive element in the political life of Libya. Too, the influence of tribal organization has persisted over the centuries.

GEOGRAPHY

The separate development of Libya's three historical regions was due to Geography. They were cut off from one another by land (desert) and water (Gulf of Sidra). Although the term Libya was used by the ancient Greeks to identify all Northern Africa except Egypt, it was not used to identify
modern day Libya until 1911 when the Italians adopted "Libya" as the official name of their colony consisting of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, the three historical regions that make up Libya today.

CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION

Libya has a long history of subjection to foreign domination and influence. In antiquity various parts of it were ruled successively by the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals and Byzantines. Although the Greeks and Romans left impressive ruins, little else remains today to testify to the presence of Libya's ancient cultures.

Of all the historic stages, none has had more lasting effects on contemporary Libya than the seventh century arrival of the Arabs. They came as both conquerors and missionaries, but not as colonists. Arab rule had as its goal the establishment of political and religious unity under a caliph (the Prophet Muhammad's successor as supreme earthly leader of Islam) who governed based on the Koran (the scriptures believed by Muslims to be God's revelation to the prophet). After the Arab conquest, North Africa (including what is now Libya) was governed by a succession of Amirs (commanders) who were subordinate to the Caliph in Damascus, and after 750 A.D., in Baghdad.

Communal and representative Berber tribal institutions contrasted sharply with the authoritative Arab rule and Berbers frequently clashed with the Arabs over the next five hundred years. The Arab armies traveled without women and married among the Berber population transmitting the Arab language, culture and Islamic religion.

The comixture of the Arabs with the Berbers continued under subsequent Turkish rule. The Turkish language and other elements were confined to the small ruling class and the Turkish army. The modern day emphasis on
the Arabic character of Libya may, therefore, be justified on the basis of this historical process over the centuries. However, it should be kept in mind that the comixture of cultures and races was not one in which only one culture or one racial element survived, but that the outcome was the product of the fusion of all into what constitutes the present population of Libya. One thing is unquestionably Arabic—the language, although Berber dialects may be found in some small communities today.

By the early 1500's North African countries were dominantly Muslim due to the Arab's missionary success in spreading the concept of Islam universally regardless of territorial borders. Therefore, when this region was faced with European Christian encroachments on their seaports, rulers from Algeria to Libya invited the Ottoman (Turkish) sultan to extend his control to their countries. This resulted in an easy occupation of Libya by the Turks beginning in 1552 and lasting until Italian colonization of Libya in 1911. The Ottoman sultan governed Libya, not as Turkish rulers, but as Muslim Caliphs, and their Islamic rule made their Muslim subjects, whether Turks or Arabs, feel at home. The hand of the Ottoman sultan never rested heavily on his distant Libyan subjects even for purposes of taxation. Libya's internal administration was left to local tribal rulers.

Italy launched an unprovoked attack against Turkey in 1911 and invaded Libya. Italian strategy was to find a place to assert Italian rights in the Mediterranean. In the name of Islam the Libyans rallied to the support of the Turks and put up a strong resistance to the Italian aggression, but World War I diverted the Turk's attention and Libya became an Italian colony in 1912. Resistance continued against the Italians in the form of guerrilla warfare under the leadership of King Idris I, then Amir of Cyrenaica. It was not until 1932 that Italian pacification of Libya was sufficient to permit large-scale colonization.
During World War II the desert of Libya became a battleground. In 1943, the British, aided by a Libyan Arab force led by King Idris I, won a decisive allied victory over the Axis powers. This resulted in a caretaker occupation of Libya by Britain and France until the end of the war. Under the terms of the 1947 peace treaty with the Allies, Italy relinquished title to Libya.

INDEPENDENCE

Under the auspices of the United Nations, the United Kingdom of Libya was proclaimed on 24 December 1951 under the rule of King Idris I. During the next two decades the government of Libya could generally be characterized as that of a conservative, traditional Arab state. The structure of the government was essentially a tribal-based system of power as it had been throughout its history. King Idris concerned himself primarily with arbitrating tribal disputes and left the day-to-day operations of government to the bureaucracy.

At independence Libya was categorized as one of the poorest nations in the world, and there was no visible chance for improvement. It possessed no known mineral resources in commercially exploitable quantities, and of its total land area—roughly two and one-half times the size of Texas—less than one percent was considered susceptible to permanent cultivation.

With the discovery of major deposits of petroleum in 1959, Libya was suddenly transformed from a "have not" nation into one of enormous potential wealth. As a sparsely populated and underdeveloped country, it was ill-prepared for its rapid entry into the modern technological world. Although the new oil wealth resulted in dramatic economic change, the benefits tended to impact only on the traditional governing elite and other elements of a loyal minority. Social progress with improved amenities for all
citizens received little attention by the monarchy thus widening the gulf between the elite and the masses. This situation combined with increasing outside political pressures from progressive Arab states to support pan-Arabism, hardly argued well for the future of a conservative monarchy.

On 1 September 1969, the monarchy was overthrown in a bloodless military coup led by a group of young officers who proclaimed a republic. The new regime, headed by a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), to which all government powers were reserved, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the new Libyan Arab Republic. Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhaafi emerged as the head of state. In March 1977, the word republic was dropped from the official name of the country and the Arab word Jumhuriya was substituted. It may be translated as "a state of the public" or "a State of the Masses," and signifies the idea of the people governing themselves.
CHAPTER II

POLITICAL SYSTEM

A NEW DIRECTION

The revolutionary leadership of 1969 wanted to take the country in a new direction. The ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) made its motto "Freedom, Socialism, and Unity," and pledged itself to: remove backwardness, take an active role in the Arab cause in "Palestine," promote Arab unity, and encourage domestic policies based on social justice, nonexploitation, and an equitable distribution of wealth.5

On 11 December 1969, a little over three months after coming to power the RCC issued a constitutional proclamation which incorporated the major goal statements of freedom, socialism, and unity. The brief document, issued in the name of the Libyan people, reflected the objectives, philosophy, and policy that motivated the revolution and guided the RCC's subsequent conduct of government.6 Part one defines the state, describing Libya as a democratic Arab republic whose people constitute part of the Arab nation and whose objective is overall Arab unity; elaborates on the concept of a planned economy with socialist overtones; and reaffirms Islam as the state religion. Part two provides for a system of government based on the Koran and Islamic law.

Early pronouncements by the RCC rejected Communism as well as Capitalism as unsuitable for Libya. Nonalignment with the west stems from long-standing policy differences, including the most important Palestinian issue. The RCC advocated war as the only appropriate way to resolve the
Arab-Israeli dispute. Communism was described as a rejected, atheistic system alien to Islam in general and Arab socialism in particular.\(^7\)

In support of this policy of nonalignment, Qadhaafi developed his "Third International Theory" based on religion and nationalism, which he describes as the paramount drives in history. The Third International Theory plots an alternate course between Communism and Capitalism with a Libyan brand of socialism at its heart. Based on the Nasser-Egyptian example but going further, Qadhaafi defines his brand of socialism as "social justice" to differentiate it from common Arab usage which means little more than non-monarchial government.\(^8\) Qadhaafi has emphasized that it is neither Marxist nor a form of classical European socialism and still less a variant of post-Lenin Communism. Instead it is in simple terms, a combination of social justice and mutual egalitarian rights and responsibilities (under an authoritarian umbrella).

**POLITICAL EVOLUTION**

Since 1969 Libya has experienced revolutionary change in its form of government as the revolutionary leadership searched for an administrative framework that would: (1) replace an inefficient traditional bureaucracy with administrators with the skills needed to mobilize the country; (2) increase civilian commitment to and participation in the revolution; and (3) provide a centralized, authoritarian political system.\(^9\) The structure of government has progressed from a tribal-based system of powers in 1969 to the present system of people's committees and popular congresses. It began in 1973 when Qadhaafi announced the start of a "cultural revolution," and called upon the population to establish "people's committees" in schools, businesses, industrial enterprises, and public institutions in order to oversee the administration of those organizations in the public
interest. For the first time in the nation’s history, subnational government structure allowed popular involvement in the local policymaking process.

The next step was in March 1977 with the establishment of "people power" under a system of direct popular participation in the selection of representatives to the people's committees and the General People's Congress. The most profound change wrought by this action was in the institutional structure of the Libyan political system, i.e., the transfer of principal government authority from the RCC to the people. Under the announced change, the RCC would give way to a General Secretariat elected by the General People's Congress, the national representative political and legislative body. This action was given symbolic form by changing the name of the country to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jumhuriya, which signifies people governing themselves.

Qadhaafi was subsequently named General Secretary of the General People's Congress and the remaining members of the RCC comprised its General Secretariat. It is not clear if this was the result of the popular representation process or an authoritative move by the government leadership pending transition to a popular election process. However, in early 1979, Qadhaafi resigned his position as General Secretary in favor of, in his own words concentrating on "revolutionary activities." He retained his position as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and adopted the new post of Leader of the Revolution. Regardless of formal position or title, he remains the de facto leader of the Libyan state.
POLITICAL STRUCTURE (Figure 1)

Executive and Legislative

The primary instrument of government, at least formally, is the General People's Congress (GPC), both an executive and legislative body. The GPC serves as a clearing house and sounding board at the national level for the views of the Libyan people as transmitted by their representatives. The General Secretary of the GPC is the Chief Executive. The General Secretariat of the GPC, a five man body elected by the GPC, exercises day-to-day policymaking authority with the assistance of the General People's Committee. The General People's Committee, whose members are called secretaries, perform the functions of a cabinet. Subnational representation in the administration of government is through a network of people's committees and self-management units at every level of government, and through professional associations.

Reinforcing this administrative framework of government are the Armed Forces and the Arab Socialist Union, the only authorized political organization. The Arab Socialist Union's "popular Congresses" for political affairs parallel the "people's committees" for government administration at roughly equivalent levels. Another element, the "revolutionary committee" system also parallels the people's committees and popular congresses systems and serves as the real cadre of the revolution. Revolutionary committees are responsible for conducting elections at the basic popular congresses levels and for guiding grass roots political activity. More significantly, the presence of revolutionary committees "in all places" serves an important communications function and provides Qadhaafi a direct link with the people. They report to him directly with no intervening step.
Figure 1. Government Organization
Thus, the subnational structure for popular representation and participation is two-tiered; people’s committees (administrative) and popular congresses/revolutionary committees (political)—found at the basic and municipal levels. The leading representatives from the subnational committees and congresses make up the 1,000 member GPC (legislative) at the national level. Besides the GPC, the national structure consists of the General People’s Committee (cabinet) and the General Secretariat (Executive), both of which are selected by the GPC.

Judicial

The court system consists of a supreme court, three courts of appeal (located in the three major cities, one in each of the traditional regions that make up the country), and courts of first instance with subordinate summary courts in each municipal province. There is also a special people’s court with jurisdiction to deal with any cases referred to it by the revolutionary committees, but it has been primarily concerned with cases of political corruption. All legislation must conform to Islamic law.

POPULAR REPRESENTATION

A key element in the overall political system is the process for providing popular representation and participation in the various elements of the government structure. It begins at the grass root level with the basic popular congresses (basic political element of the Arab Socialist Union). All citizens are encouraged to join popular congresses and by doing so ensure their representation in the overall political process. These basic congresses nominate candidates to serve on specialized functional people’s committees (self-management administrative organizations) at the municipal level. There is a municipal committee for each of the
major departments of government found at the national level, e.g., Agriculture, Education, Housing, Interior, etc. The nominating process is supervised by the revolutionary committees which "open book" on the credentials of individuals standing for nomination. Nominees not selected as representatives to the municipal level serve at the basic level.

The representatives selected from the grass root levels, collectively, serve as the municipal people's committee. One of the representatives is selected by the municipal leadership to serve as chairman. All representatives on the various municipal people's committees automatically become candidates for the post of secretary at the national level (cabinet post) for their respective functional area.

This same popular representation process applies in the selection of representatives to self-management units which run schools, businesses and industrial enterprises.

The process of people's committees at the municipal level serves to decentralize the national bureaucracy and bring it under the direct scrutiny of the masses. A network of municipal secretaries exist to assume authority for implementing policy decisions of the GPC as they pertain to their respective area. Communications flow from the secretaries at the national level to the corresponding secretaries at the municipal level and the self-management committees which manage all business and industrial enterprises. All people's committees, of course, are subject to the overwatch of the popular congresses and revolutionary committees at their respective levels.
CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC SYSTEM

This chapter examines the economic situation of Libya with a view toward systematic development, including the use and availability of resources, the involvement of government in the planning for an allocation of resources, and the various demographic factors which impact on the developmental process. The initial portion reviews the government with respect to its ability to deal with the economic development process and government's role in insuring economic growth to be followed with a review of Libya's resources, both natural and human with respect to proper direction for continued development.

PLANNED ECONOMY

The economic development of Libya has progressed in recent years at an unprecedented rate of growth. However, at the beginning of the century, Libya ranked at the bottom of everyone's development scale; a country with the majority of the people living at subsistence level without sources of power or mineral resources, with minimum agriculture expansion limited by climatic conditions, with a capital formation at zero or less, with a void of skilled labor supply and no indigenous entrepreneurship. A grim potential for modern development.

The evolution of Libyan economic developmental planning has progressed through several phases.
Pre-Independence

In the pre-independence period Libya was almost continuously poor during the thousands of years over which the history of the country extended.

This was the position of Libya at the end of the Italian occupation or pre-independence (1911-1942) and at the end of the military occupation by the allies, 1946-1951. Some planning and development had gone on under the Italian occupation, but the extent and direction of these programs were naturally inspired by the paramount purposes of the administration. The Italian government during this thirty year period spent over 50 million Libyan pounds on public works, utilities, agriculture development and land reclamation. The Italian administration left Libya with a valuable legacy of buildings, roads, ports, and other public facilities, together with the results of fairly extensive research work relating particularly to agriculture and mineral resources. However, the Libyans paid heavily for what the Italians achieved. Libyans were pushed off some of the best farming land in the country, large numbers of their livestock were lost in the fighting and their traditional industries suffered severely from competition from Italian produced goods. Further, the Italians did little or nothing to prepare the Libyan people for self-government. Education and technical training were neglected, and the Libyans were virtually excluded from the administration. Consequently, through no fault of its own, Libya has remained heavily dependent on foreign administrative and technical personnel. Thus, training of Libyans to replace foreign personnel is still the most difficult of all the problems associated with economic development.

In World War II, Libya was the critical battleground in North Africa. With the defeat of Italy and Germany, two administrative units of Libya,
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, fell under British military administration while Fezzan, the third administrative unit, fell under French military occupation. Preoccupation with the political future of Libya kept economic planning stagnated. Most of the legacy left by the Italians was destroyed during the period of conflict leaving Libya little else than a barren waste land, with a dislocated population, a deficit, and a deteriorating economy that was faced with massive repair and reconstruction problems. The situation became worse, when the national government was set up in 1950 and with the assumption of new responsibilities, and could only be met by grants-in-aid from the administering government.

Independence

When Libya became independent on 24 December 1951, following the United Nations resolution to this effect on 21 December 1949, the economic situation was clearly desperate. The continuation of foreign aid was in consequence vital for the containment of further economic decline. These circumstances gave birth to the first comprehensive plan for the economic development of Libya. At the outset, Libya found itself with little or no real capital and monetary savings, and a birth rate that was extremely high, 5.3 percent per annum. The only relief was a high death rate of 4.2 percent per annum. A savings/income ratio of 5 percent per year appeared impossible, incentives to induce savings and growth appeared to be weak, and the probability of local customs and institutions adjusting to a new development thrust could not be clearly determined. It was clear that resources necessary to meet new development plans were going to have to come from outside Libya. Economic planning was somewhat further complicated by problems inherent in the federal constitution. By virtue of its federal makeup with three provinces, Libya was faced with three regional
governments that may or may not have had the structure to develop, administer and carry out proposed economic plans. Nonetheless, it was in the midst of this challenging but complex situation that the first planning agencies emerged in Libya.23

The first comprehensive economic plan was a six year plan, and it was envisioned that this would be followed by a second, a third, a fourth, and subsequent six year plans. The first six year plan placed emphasis on training, education, agriculture research, experiment, demonstration, and improvement; the repair of war damage, public works, and public utilities; the net absorption of manpower into the public development program; increased import surplus, large budget deficits, reliance on foreign financial and technical assistance; capital accumulation of 5 to 10 percent of the national income, 50 percent to be covered by domestic savings; and if necessary, the taxing away of any increase in productivity to maintain a supply of effort and restrict population growth.24

In terms of modern economic planning the first plan was somewhat unusual. It embodied no proposal for new industry, new types of transport, new public utilities, or any large-scale investments. It was designed simply to make agriculture "a more remunerative and attractive occupation" and consisted entirely of projects and programs for improvement, expansion, or restoration of existing plant, skills, and undertakings.

The second and third six year economic plans placed emphasis on: agricultural processing and light industry, with domestic markets and domestic raw materials; some mechanisation; reducing the import surplus, budget deficits, foreign aid and technical assistance; a level of capital accumulation equal to 10 to 15 percent of national income; and on reducing taxes and increasing the sales of consumer goods.
The economic development planning set forth by the fourth and subsequent six year plans were envisioned to accelerate development. This acceleration was to impact on development of agriculture processing and similar light industries; further mechanization of handicrafts; the achievement of balanced trade, balanced budgets, independence of foreign financial and technical assistance; and capital accumulation and domestic savings of at least 15 percent of the national income.25

Unlike planning in many developing countries, the Libyan planning effort, as designed by the United Nations, had no ideological rigidities generating any explosive strain and resistance to the realities inspiring the planning effort. This unusual nationalism, stubbornly uncompromising for independence, proved elastic enough to accept a plan with planning institutions, harmonizing contemporary Libyan economic realities with United Nations ideals and foreign interest. With a quietness contrasting sharply with the militancy of three thousand years of Libyan history, the country under independence ushered in almost a philosophy of non-ideological realism in the initial approach to planned economic development. Because of the deep involvement of the United Nations with the economic planning of Libya, after independence, a strong thrust of Keynesian economics prevailed through the planning phases. In view of the western influence from the United States, Great Britain and France during this period, a Western economic model was prevalent in developing the Libyan economic programs.

ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS (1951-1959)

The monarchy suffered from the beginning in that monarchism was not part of the Libyan tradition. There were no kings of Libya from 900 B.C. until monarchism was reinstituted in 1951. Monarchism reinforced and was
supported by elitism—a small group of ruling families traditionally accustomed to power as a natural right. Further, the regionalist emphasis, despite constitutional concentration, still endured as a natural consequence of the Sunni's association with one part of the country. Monarchical patronage became increasingly challenged by a growing populism and resentment of pronouncements and decisions handed down from above. The international elements in economic choices also came under increasingly critical reaction bred by nationalist sensitivities. The application of orthodox economic doctrines proceeded under imperfect accommodation with these sensitivities and the deterioration of the political situation. Moreover, classical and neoclassical economic principles appeared to go awry in a country where 44 percent of the population was under 15 years of age at a time when the monarch was nearly eighty and when nationalism had become uncompromisingly wedded to the political stance adopted by Egypt, Algeria and other liberal, if not radical, members of the Arab world.

The aforementioned problem of Monarchism was only one of many problems experienced by Libya during the period 1951-1959, even though there appeared to have been sound economic planning accomplished at the outset. There were problems connected with the physical character of the country—the sparse and irregular rainfall, the shortage of water and soils impoverished by centuries of neglect; the paucity of known mineral resources apart from oil; and the dispersal of a small population over a very large area. This called for exceptionally heavy per capita expenditure on transport and communications which greatly complicated the business of distribution and marketing. A more difficult problem that faced Libya during this period was that of solving the human problems arising out of Libya's past history. The lack of opportunities given to the Libyan people to acquire education and experience in self-government and in modern techniques of production.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that economic development does not depend simply on how much money is invested in farms, factories, roads, harbors, schools, hospitals, public buildings and so forth. It more importantly depends on the kind of social and political institutions a country has, on the aims and policies of the government, on the education and training of the people and the value attached by all classes of society to the benefits accruing from increased production. It became increasingly apparent that Libya lacked the capacity to invest money fruitfully in productive schemes. The country was limited by a lack of experience in administration and planning, by weakness in government organization and by the shortage of trained personnel. Libyans had not had the time to acquire advance technical and professional skills or training in administration; there was an acute shortage of skilled craftsmen, artisans, and intermediate technicians. Libyan farmers were generally without the knowledge and experience required to make productive use of the capital placed at their disposal. It became evident that Libya would have to place a high priority on a well conceived education and training program at all levels, while at the same time create a more effective organization for planning and execution of economic projects and policies.

Even though Libya was heavily dependent on agriculture during this period, the economic programs did not meet the expectations of the economic plans set forth. As pointed out prior, education had a significant impact, however popular attitudes and institutions also contributed to the lag in production. The tribal ownership of land and water rights impacted heavily on the individual fairness, security or incentive needed to improve the land and increase output. This was one of the largest obstacles to the development of agricultural production and forestry development in Libya during this period. Another factor retarding economic progress in Libya
was the prevailing attitude towards appointments to government jobs, which were frequently made on the basis of personal friendship or family connections rather than merit (patron-client relationship). This had a sizeable adverse impact on the efficiency of public administration and proper distribution of manpower as well as the morale of the regular officials who were trying conscientiously to do an honest job.

Additional retardants to the economic development of Libya were the Libyan view of manual labor and the status of women in society. Manual labor was commonly viewed as undignified. Most males who attended higher levels of education considered it was beneath them to perform work with their hands. This created a void in the manpower base which was already extremely short of skilled workers. Women in Libya possessed a tremendous potential as far as the work force was concerned, however, because of the traditional customs, this arm of productivity was not developed to the degree it should have been. This trend began to change during the latter portions of the 1950's with more females attending schools and taking employment in private and public sectors as nurses, teachers and stenographers.

A certain amount of the economic retardation grew out of frustration over expectations not being met or taking too long to attain goals. Also a certain amount of apathy set in because of the retardation, but, more importantly, a feeling existed that economic programs and projects were not Libyan because of the heavy influence of Western nations on Libyan affairs.

Economic growth during this period was not attained at the level anticipated at the outset of the economic development planning. The period (1950-1959) closed with high deficits, only moderate improvement in social advancement, sustainable only through large grants and assistance from Western governments. The governmental structure had reached a point of
breakdown within the planning administration and organization. This set the stage for a change of direction and change of government with a change of economic and social development for the future.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
1960-1969

When oil was discovered, administration planning and organization had practically broken down as previously noted. Planning responsibility was ill-defined. Technical staff was yet to be found to carry out innumerable past decisions which had yet to be harmonized. However, the United Nations still remained and were relied upon to assist Libya through the oil transition period. It was within this context that planning institutionalization was rationalized in 1960. In that year, by decision of the Council of Ministers, the previous planning agencies were liquidated under the Development Council Law published in the Libyan Official Gazette of 1 July 1960.

The establishment of the Development Council was of an evolutionary nature in that the powers were no more and no less than the powers held by the previous planning organizations. The valuable experience gained within the previous organizations was maintained because principle officers of the new Development Council were from the old organization. So the experience gained in those agencies became a decisive advantage to a country still critically short of trained personnel.

Despite the prospects for oil, Libya remained sensitive to the importance of continuing foreign aid in terms of finance and of personnel. Previous agreements with western nations were maintained by the Development Council. The only symbolic change was in the leadership and personnel of the Council, where Libyans took full charge of planning for their own economic development.31
Even with the bright prospect of oil, Libya pursued a calm, cautious course in the evaluation of economic problems confronting the nation and in creating a climate of confidence for public and private foreign capital.32

Within three years of the establishment of the Development Council, the financial resource base for planning and development became sensationally transformed in consequence of the discovery and enlargement of Libya’s oil resources. Between 1960-1963, oil production from the historic Zelten Field alone increased nearly fifteen times and associated gas increased by almost the same dimension. During these years, oil production, oil exploration, oil exports, and oil export revenues changed dramatically. The Libyan economy, literally floating on oil, had become in 1963 a capital-surplus economy.33

Within eight years of the first oil shipment, Libya became the world’s fourth largest exporter of crude oil, a rate of growth unknown anywhere in the industry’s history. This dramatic change was reflected in the government budget and national economy.

Libya’s society, administration, and economy were unprepared to utilize and absorb the new wealth. One effect of oil production on the economy was the rapid move of one-way migration from the rural areas to urban centers. A migration that resulted in crowded urban centers and deserted farm land in many parts of the country. As a result of increased urban population and increased per capita income, there was a sudden increase in the demand for food and agriculture products. This situation, given a healthy economy, could have been a strong stimulus to agricultural production. However, the low state of technological development in agriculture and the increasing costs of labor resulted in reliance on agricultural imports, which increased three-fold during the sixties.34 In view of the adverse agricultural situation, the First Five Year Plan 1963-1968
increased the budget for agriculture from 3.1 million in 1962 to 29.3 million in 1963 in an attempt to shore-up a stagnate sector of the economy and reduce imports which had been growing at an uncontrollable rate.

Industry growth was much like that of agriculture, it had not produced or met the expectations outlined in the Five Year Plan even though a sizeable monetary infusion had been provided. For the most part industry remained small and domestically oriented.

In comparative terms, however, the performance of agriculture and industry remained very poor. Between 1962-1967, the annual rate of growth of the agriculture and industry sectors was only 4.5 percent and 9.6 percent respectively—lagging far behind the average annual growth of the economy (28 percent); of construction (30 percent); and of services (over 20 percent). Despite the capital-surplus situation, agriculture and industry remained comparatively backward, resisting the breakthrough of modernization.35

Population and housing continued to be a problem for the Libyan economic system. Throughout this period Libya had to continue past policies of importing many foreigners (46,868) to fill the gap within the work force, most of whom were skilled laborers employed within the rapidly expanding oil industry. The import of foreign labor and the mass migration of local populace to the urban centers put an unprecedented demand on housing in urban areas. Consequently, large expenditures were required in housing construction. Even with the increased emphasis on housing construction, inequality still existed and many of the migrating Libyans were forced to live in squatter slums that began to envelop the towns. In place of the old divisions based on family background, income became the basic determinant of differentiation between residential neighborhoods.36 However, Libya did not face the same population problems that other developing
countries faced, because the oil capital provided the means to compensate for the shortage and at the same time provided for those less fortunate. This is not to say there was not a large difference between the Libyan elite and the mass population.

The educational problem continued to have a wide impact in all aspects of development from agriculture technology, construction, business, government and skilled or technically trained employees for the total work force. Accordingly, considerable emphasis had to be placed on education during the 1960's. Education became mandatory for both male and female and enrollment increased accordingly from 150,000 in 1962 to 360,000 by 1969.$^{37}$ Even with this increase, a considerable period of time would be required to overcome the shortage of skilled, educated population to fill the void within the work force. The problem for the future will be a much smaller, older, mostly illiterate generation that will contrast with a larger, young, literate majority.

To improve the quality of life, Libya's government earmarked a larger portion of the budget for health care and social services (14.8 million). Further, Libya developed a social security system that offered a range of conventional advantages, including protection against sickness and injury at work and protection in case work had to be abandoned or interrupted because of disability, old age, maternity, unemployment, or death. The program included: maternity benefits, disability payments, pensionable payments for widows and orphans, provisions for medical care for the family including care at general hospitals under specialists, dental care, and the supply of pharmaceutical products from dispensaries existing and being set up throughout Libya.$^{38}$

Private sector investment as well as involvement in economic planning was for the most part directed towards the oil industry. To this end,
considerable investment was made by western private enterprise. However, in the areas of agriculture and industry little incentive was forthcoming to entice private investment. Accordingly, the public sector was required to make sizeable investments in these other sectors.

As for an economic model being employed during the 1960's it would closely relate to a Western capitalistic emulation based on heavy influence initially by members of the United Nations, which were still supporting Libya, and the influence by Western oil companies.

Even though Libya had demonstrated a healthy economy during the 1960's, considerable frustration still remained within the society. The young intellectual viewed the western enterprises as exploiters of the country and the administration as a ruling elite that did not provide for its people and which was stagnating true growth.

**ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 1969--PRESENT**

The Laissez-faire arrangement came to an end with the military coup d'état of September 1969. The previous government's personnel and much of its administrative framework were scrapped, and the oil companies were put on notice that they were overdue on large payments for unpaid taxes and royalties. In other respects affecting the economy the new government marked time, except for its policy of Libyanization, that is, that Libyan citizens and firms should, to the extent possible, replace foreigners and foreign-owned firms in trade, government and related activities. In mid-1970 the government embarked on a program of progressive nationalization.

The nationalization program, in addition to establishing at least a temporary veto power over the activities of the oil companies, included sequestration of all Italian assets, socialization of the banking and
insurance system, Libyanization of all forms of trade, and progressive substitution of Libyans for foreign administrative and management personnel in resident foreign concerns. In the petroleum sector, a constant increasing financial bite was put on the companies. By the end of 1974 the government had either nationalized or had become a participant in their concessions and their production and transportation facilities. Thus, the government of Libya had a larger share of the profits than under the previous royalty and tax arrangements. Despite varying degrees of nationalization of foreign oil firms, Libya in 1978 was still highly dependent on foreign companies for the expertise needed in exploitation, marketing, and management of the oil fields and installations that remained the primary basis of the country's economic activity.

By 1972 the nationalization program was supplemented by a policy of economic modernization and independence, copying the example of Algeria. During the transition period there was no deliberate long-range plan, rather, the government employed a plan of ad hoc investment in the areas that needed assistance for the period 1970–1975. The government claimed that 85 percent of their priority programs had met with success. These programs being so successful, the government embarked on its first long-range plan officially called the Five Year Economic and Social Transformation Plan 1976–80. The plan was designed for an annual increase of nearly 11 percent in gross national product, and a per capita income increase of 5.6 percent annually. Priorities were given to agriculture, industry, electricity, education, municipalities, and housing. Basically, all people oriented programs.

Agriculture began to improve, production began to increase, and wages for agriculture workers began to increase. However, there remained a wage
difference between state owned farms and private owned farms in that private farm workers (most of whom were foreign laborers mainly from Egypt) received less in wages. A further indication of improvement within this sector was the decrease in the farm product import list. However, Libya still required and was dependent on imports of agriculture products to sustain itself.

A major change in housing distribution took place in 1978. In March a resolution by the General People's Congress established guidelines for equal distribution of housing, which reduced the number of persons with rental income. Until then real estate had been the main area of private investment. The resolution stated that every family had the right to just one house, except for widows whose only source of income was rent and families with at least one son over the age of eighteen. Non-Libyans and Libyans requiring only short-term accommodations would continue to have access to rental property. By September of 1978 most tenants of apartments and houses previously owned by government agencies and private companies had become owners of their residences. The task then began of taking over and redistributing properties owned by private individuals. The state paid full compensation to landlords for confiscated property and resold it to tenants at subsidized prices.41

An additional evolutionary move was made by the new government, when it passed a 1973 law which provided profit sharing for all firms including state owned companies having more than ten employees and annual profits of more than $4,000. One fourth of the profits were to be distributed to all workers, 30 percent in cash and 70 percent in the form of employee benefits. Also, all private firms with fifty or more employees had to appoint two workers to the board of directors.42
In an attempt to hold down the cost of living, government subsidized a dozen basic commodities such as cereals. Additional action was taken through wholesale and retail markups of imports, and domestic products required permission for price changes. Duties on luxury goods were increased. In order to stabilize real estate and prevent speculation, price ranges were established for every vacant lot in every city.43

Industry started to change after the revolution. The new government opted for a restructured industrial policy that resembled those of Egypt and Algeria. In the late 1970's the industrial sector (including manufacturing) was planned by the government, which had assumed control over those aspects of industrial production that were sensitive or too large for the domestic private sector. The new policy leaned heavily on freeing industry, including manufacturing, from dependence on foreign ownership or control. The government required local companies that engaged in trade to be Libyan and had nationalized the properties of the Italians (who represented the bulk of the country's entrepreneurship and private sector).44

Libya maintained a healthy foreign trade balance throughout the 1970's. These exports have had a steady increase from 1973 through the present with one exception, 1975, when they experienced a small decrease. The decrease was raised by reducing oil production during 1975. Imports have risen but not to the degree of that of their exports. Accordingly, Libya has maintained a surplus balance of payments through 1970 to present.45

The institution of the new government in Libya brought about a fundamental change in management and in the ideological framework which immediately governs the formulation and implementation of development planning in Libya. The new managers of the republic and of the economy adopted "Freedom, Socialism, and Unity" as the basic principle of the revolution. On
contemporary evidence the new management and new managerial methods appear to constitute innovations aimed at correcting misallocation of resources, maximizing available manpower resources, giving chances to more entrepreneurs by not conveying privileges to a chosen few, and ending distributional inequities, limitations on the demand side, nonproduct dependence, and dependence on foreign goods for which local industries can be developed. They are also accelerating investment in the infrastructure, developing education at a more rapid rate to produce relevant skills for development, widening public participation in planning endeavors, completing the Libyanization of all financial institutions, and eradicating corruption.
CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL SYSTEM

This chapter examines the social system of Libya from the respect of evolution and impact on development and modernization process prior to the 1969 revolution and that period after the 1969 revolution.

DOMESTIC CLASSES

Libya is made up of a mixture of Arabs and Arabized Berbers, all of whom are Muslims, with the exception of those temporary employees engaged in the economic development of the country. There are three distinct variants of Libyan culture: the nomadic or seminomadic herdsmen who exploit the productive desert regions; the settled agriculturist who exploit the oases; and the urban population of merchants, administrators and educators. Each of the three variants of Arab life traditionally occupied a known and accepted place in the economic and social scheme, and individuals rarely moved between them. Recent developments (the oil discovery and the revolution) however, have vastly increased physical and social mobility; in the late 1970's in accordance with the new government's avowed intention to create a classless society, distinctions based on education and personal competence rather than on descent are gaining in importance.

Prior to the 1970's the social structure in the Libyan society under the monarchy conformed closely to the model of traditional society. The basic units of Libyan society were the extended family, clan, tribe and village with some modifications of this arrangement in the urban centers.
The father or oldest male was usually the top authority in the family. The individual in Libya's traditional society subordinated his personal interests to those of his family and considered himself to be a member of a group whose importance outweighed his own. It was the family unit that integrated virtually every aspect of the individual's life: social, economic, and political. It was the family that socialized the individual into his culture and which bore primary responsibility for his adherence to social norms. Family membership was the requirement to become a member of the larger unit. The family as well as the clan and the tribe, functioned as the educational, economic, and security-providing organization for its members.

The power, prestige, and influence enjoyed by the families in the social structure come from multiple sources: birth, individual or collective wealth, size of family, clan, or tribe, religiousness, political or administrative position, power and prestige associated with professional stature of lawyers, doctors, judges and others who required a high level of education.48

The idea of the family influence had been used by the national leadership as a source of control and mobilization, and functioned as a link between national authority and citizens. The so-called ayan (or notables), wujaka (or influentials) or sons of prominent families, took the roles of leadership in the Libyan society during this period.

Decisionmaking in Libya's traditional society was highly authoritative. Heads or chiefs of social units with some consultation with elders made the decisions. The same roles of hierarchy, kinship and collective solidarity played a major role in selection of leaders in Libya's traditional society.49 The top of the social structure, from the time of independence until the Socialist revolution of 1969, consisted of the king.
(Idris), head of the Monarchal Government. The king was given broad powers through the state constitution which provided that ultimate decisionmaking would be embodied with the king as supreme head of state. King Idris devoted most of his energy to religious and other tribal matters and for the most part regretted any of the time that was needed to be spent on state matters. While the country was suffering from poverty and lack of funds for social and economic development, King Idris spent government funds generously on matters of religion and promoting his family history and image. The king was confused and reluctant in his political and social stands and rarely expressed support for any specific programs or took a clear-cut position on any public issues. Because of this ineptness, the Royal Diwan headed by loyal traditional leaders controlled most aspects of the country. However, this brought about a crises situation within the governmental structure, a clash between the Royal Diwan and the cabinet. In view of this turbulence within the social hierarchy little social reform took place until oil production began to provide capital for social reform programs. Also a contributing factor for social reform delay was stagnation engendered by incompetence. The great majority of cabinet members were incapable of handling the fundamental issues of their posts. These members were chosen not by capability but by family, tribal or religious influence. However, during the second half of the monarchy, technocrats and bureaucrats played the major role in running the country as well as molding the social fiber.

From the domestic class viewpoint, religion stood next to the importance of family, clan and tribe, thus, religion impacted greatly on the social structure, values and attitudes throughout Libyan society. The Mufti held the highest honorary religious position in the country. The Kodat
(judges) and the Ulama played a very important role in the social, educational and political life of the country and its people.

There was an inevitable association between family prominence and religious leadership. This produced conservative attitudes which were predominant in Libya. Values and behavior have been a function of religious background and attachment; hence, evaluation and acceptance of innovative change has been subject to religious beliefs and notions. Libyans have looked to the Koran as the source of and guide for right action. The supreme laws have been the Laws of God, which determine people's relations with each other and with God. These policies and notions contributed to isolationism and resistance to social change, thus, being a significant impediment to progressive social and economic development until petrodollars were available and the government changed in 1969.

With the change of government in 1969 came a new direction in social mobility. One of Qadhaafi's aims was to put an end to social inequities that had marked both the colonial periods and the monarchical regime. The new government that resulted was socialist, but Qadhaafi stressed that it was to be a kind of socialism inspired by the humanitarian values inherent in Islam. It called for equity of distribution in order to reduce disparities between classes in a peaceful and affluent society. The dominant class after the revolution emerged as a group of young educated students, technocrats and young army officers. This group's aim was to provide a government with composition of 50 percent of the members being peasants and laborers, thus eliminating class differences and avoiding any class struggles. Accordingly, this provided for social reform and equality. The current political and social structure is shown in the chart attached to Chapter II. The reforms initiated by the new government did not eliminate the old structure but put them more into the main stream of policymaking.
through participatory leadership at all levels. Oil production had as large an impact on social mobility and reform as the new government in view of monetary gain, increased education and exposure to a more sophisticated social environment.

INEQUALITY

Libya's greatest inequality was its treatment of its women. They were assigned a socially inferior status and led private lives, subject to the will of the husband. The social setting in which the family lived significantly affected the circumstances of the wife. This setting, however, was changing during the 1970's. Until the discovery of petroleum—and to a lesser degree until the 1969 revolution—a traditional setting had dominated the social scene. In the late 1970's, however, modification in the traditional relationship between the sexes became evident, and changes appeared in the traditional role of women; evidence of change varied with age, education, and place of residence.

In traditional society beduin women—who did not wear the veil that symbolized the inferior and secluded status of women—played a relatively open part in tribal life. Their relative freedom, however, did not ordinarily permit their exposure to outsiders. Urban women tend to be more sophisticated and socially aware, but they are also more traditional and conservative in social relations and dress.

During the 1970's new educational opportunities and the influence of television, coupled with the relatively liberal attitude of the revolutionary government towards the rights of women, has progressively narrowed the male-female gap. Even among the best educated Libyan women, however, there still remains the feeling of insecurity about changing times and new opportunities. Their self-confidence and social awareness still remain
restricted, and they continue to seek only a limited degree of occupational and social participation in a male dominated social and economic environment.53

Even though a major shift has been made in women's education in preparation for employment and women's employment within the work force, the subjugation of the women has resulted in the underutilization of female labor. This minimum utilization is in direct conflict with Libya's severe need for development of more workers. It would appear that over the next several years this situation has great promise for change and could assist in decreasing the number of workers that must be imported to carry out economic development.

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL INJUSTICE

There appears to be little social injustice in Libya other than discussed toward women. Prior to discovery of oil there was considerable injustice between the different classes. This dissipated considerably with the flow of money, education, and upward mobility that was provided to the society through oil capital. However, with the revolution and change of government it appears that equality is beginning to reach the masses, fostering a more tolerable social environment than that previously experienced in Libya. A greater movement toward women's rights by government will probably be forthcoming over the next several years. This is not seen as a challenge to the government or to social values within the country but part of the evolutionary change that would take place in the modernization of Libya.

However, within the overall realm of possible social problems, the Libyan government is providing the degree of stability necessary to promote economic and social expansion.
CHAPTER V

LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY

NATIONALISTIC AND UNPREDICTABLE

As a regime, Libya defies the orthodox classification of right, left, moderate or radical, but it is certainly nationalistic and unpredictable. Since Qadhaafi came to power in 1969, the principle features of Libyan foreign policy have been hostility to communism and imperialism and support for Islam and Arab unity and nationalism. Skillful use of oil revenues and ideology have enabled him to pursue a policy of foreign interference which has caused Libya to be a turbulent factor in international politics and of growing concern to the United States and other Western nations.

FREEDOM, SOCIALISM, UNITY

One way to examine Libya's foreign policy is within the context of the goal statements of freedom, socialism, and unity which were contained in the December 1969 Constitutional Proclamation following the September 1969 coup that brought Qadhaafi to power. These goals with associated ideology and policy first motivated the revolution and subsequently have consistently guided the conduct of Libya's foreign policy.

Freedom

Freedom symbolizes Qadhaafi's determination to achieve political and economic independence from any foreign (especially non-Arab/non-Islamic) influence or constraint. The Libyan government has therefore supported liberation movements from Palestinian guerrillas to the Irish Republican
Army to Moslem insurgents in the Philippines to Polisario rebels in the Western Sahara. Qadhaafi has supported them with promises, cash, or arms. Besides the movements already mentioned, he has supported the Basque, Corsican and other separatists throughout Europe; the leftist in the Lebanese Civil War; the Black Muslims in the United States; the Eritrean Nationalist in Somalia against Ethiopia (later switching support to Ethiopia after Libya became an ally of the Soviets) and liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

Similarly, Libya's policy calls for regaining Palestine by isolating Israel politically and economically and then conquering it militarily. Qadhaafi maintains that the entire Arab World must unite in waging a holy war that will finally eliminate Israel and liberate Palestine. According to Qadhaafi, the only solution to the Palestinian homeland issue is to give the Palestinians their own homeland, to establish a Palestinian democratic state which would supplant, not exist alongside, Israel. In this connection Qadhaafi has provided military support to extreme terrorist African rulers simply because they opposed Israel, such as Idi Amin of Uganda and Bokassa of the Central African Republic.

Terrorists of all nationalities are trained in special camps in Libya by the Soviets, East Europeans and even ex-US CIA officials. From such camps came the gunmen who attacked the Israeli team at the September 1972 Munich Olympic games. Qadhaafi also provided shelter in Libya for the terrorists following that attack. Qadhaafi's brand of terrorism has become so extreme that the PLO has sought to disassociate itself from Libyan style acts of terrorism.
Socialism

Qaddafi has his own brand of socialism, frequently defined as "social justice." Within this context, socialism focuses, for the most part on matters that are internal to a country; therefore, for purposes of our discussion of Libya's foreign policy, we will simply address the questions of origin and export.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, Qaddafi's brand of Arab socialism is based on the Nasser (Egypt) model, but goes beyond that example. In simple terms, it is a combination of social justice and mutual egalitarian rights and responsibilities. It has its roots in Islam and is administered under an authoritarian umbrella. It is pragmatic, rather than doctrinal, and closely associated with nationalism.

Qaddafi has continuously sought to export his brand of Arab socialism as part of his Third Internation Theory, which seeks to develop an alternate course between communism and capitalism. It is intended to embrace Libyans, the Arab world and indeed the whole world. However, Qaddafi greatly overestimated its appeal. To date he has been unable even to sell his brand of socialism to the rest of the Arab world, let alone to the world at large.

Unity

The question of Arab unity has dominated Libyan foreign policy since 1969. Arab unity or an Arab nation is an ideological, even emotional, bond joining a common sociological and cultural history and people with a faith in the destiny of that people as the equals to any human beings on earth. Qaddafi believes the key to Arab unity is the unification of Arab lands comprising the Arab nations into a single Arab state. He has actively sought union with a number of Arab states, but was unsuccessful each time.
Subsequently, he modified his original goal of a pan-Arab block to a pan-Islamic block, which would embrace Muslims of Africa and the Middle East. Qadhaafi sees himself as the spokesman of such a group and has no respect for existing internationally recognized boundaries. To this end Africa increasingly has become a victim of Qadhaafi's diplomacy of subversion. Despite the failures to date, of all of his efforts at union, he continues to push such proposals.

The first such proposal was on 27 December 1969, less than three months after coming to power, when at Qadhaafi's initiative, a unity pact was signed in Tripoli between Nasser of Egypt, Nimery of Sudan, and Qadhaafi of Libya. This pact proclaimed as its purpose "a tight revolutionary alliance whose goal is to thwart imperialist and Zionist intrigues."

Subsequently in April 1971 after Nasser's death, Egypt, Syria and Libya agreed to form a Union of Arab Republics. Nimery of Sudan had bowed out because of internal problems at home and Assad of Syria had joined because of his shared interest with Qadhaafi in Arab unity. The new state was officially to come into being on 1 January 1972, but never did due to growing ideological differences between Sadat and Qadhaafi as well as the fundamental difference between the societies of Egypt and Libya. There was a natural estrangement between the two peoples. The Libyans were rather crude and rustic in comparison with the more educated, cosmopolitan Egyptians. The Egyptians, especially the women, considered themselves liberated from Islamic fundamentalism as practiced by the Libyans. The bottom line was that while Qadhaafi continued to push for union, Sadat became more and more the reluctant partner.

Finally in July 1973 as a last ditch effort, Qadhaafi decided on a "people's march" and jammed some twenty thousand Libyans into trucks and cars.
for a trip across the desert to Cairo with petitions—signed in blood—to demand that Sadat ratify the merger agreement. Sadat blocked the invading motorcade and for all practical purposes the merger was dead. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War followed and further disagreement resulted between the two leaders over Sadat's prosecution of that war and his subsequent peace initiative with Israel.

In January 1974, President Bourguiba of Tunisia, a strongly pro-western nation, signed an agreement with Qadhaafi to merge Tunisia and Libya. Within a week, however, Tunisia repudiated the pact and Bourguiba declared it null and void. In January 1980 Qadhaafi tried to instigate a rebellion against Bourguiba as revenge for breaking off the 1974 talks about union. However the Libyan-backed guerrilla attack was successfully repulsed by the Tunisian security forces.

In 1976, Qadhaafi tried to merge Libya with Algeria. When that failed, he tried a union with Malta, but that too failed due to a dispute over offshore oil drilling rights. Subsequently, Algeria claimed that Libya tried to take over a narrow strip of territory on its border and was providing money, Libyan passports, and rifles to Algerian nomads.

On 10 September 1980, Syria and Libya issued a joint declaration which provided for the merger of the two countries. By December certain disagreements had arisen over the methods of achieving unity and it was subsequently announced that the two countries had agreed only to form a joint "revolutionary leadership" to supervise unification efforts. No further progress toward unification has been noted.

In 1980, President Goukouni of Chad invited Libyan armed forces into Chad to help crush a rebellion led by the former Chad defense minister, Mr. Habre. On 15 December 1980, the Libyan-backed forces of Goukouni captured the Chadian capital and shortly afterwards, in January 1981,
Qadhaafi announced the intended merger of the two countries. This event caused shockwaves of protest throughout Africa and under the Organization of African States (OAU) pressure and at Goukouni's request, Libya backed down from its plan. However, there are indications that this occurred only after a Libyan sponsored bid for power by the Chadian foreign minister was foiled by the rallying of factional support behind Goukouni. That failure may have persuaded Qadhaafi that his hold on Chad could not be tightened and therefore had better be relinquished before it was broken. At any rate, in November 1981, Libyan troops were withdrawn from Chad, with Qadhaafi proclaiming that he had held true to his promise that he would leave when asked by the Chad government, since it was the Chad government that had asked the Libyans to come into the country.

At one time during the Libyan intervention into Chad, Libyan troops were reinforced in Chad to a level of some 7,000. Libya also introduced tanks, armor and air power and began building permanent facilities in the north. The threat from this Libyan troop build up was felt in many African countries. Qadhaafi unleashed threats on Niger saying it was second in line after Chad. Sudan too was directly threatened by Qadhaafi who was still smarting from the failure of earlier attempts at union with Sudan. Sudan was subjected to cross-border air raids from Libyan forces in Chad. Nearly all the surrounding countries—Cameroon, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, and in countries farther away such as Ghana, Gabon, Guinea, and Liberia—voiced open concern over the implication of the Libyan military presence in Chad.

**CONTRADICTORY**

Qadhaafi advocates self-determination, but in his continued quest for a pan-Islamic block, is ready to work actively against any country which

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resists his ambitions. If union is not possible through diplomatic accord, Qadhaafi reverts to terrorism, subversion, assassination, or a combination thereof. Too, he has shown a willingness to use military force. But, at present, he is restricted in this regard by the limited readiness capability of his armed forces. However, the current presence of some 2500 Soviet military advisors in Libya could enhance this capability for future use.

An example of Qadhaafi's diplomatic efforts to implement his expansionist goals is the treaty among Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen, signed in August 1981. The treaty contains provisions under which the armed forces of each of the signatories may, under certain circumstances, deploy in the territory of the others. Specifically there have been indications that units of the Ethiopian armed forces may be sent to Libya. While such forces may be primarily to protect the Libyan regime against various threats, there are also grounds for concern that they may participate in Qadhaafi's foreign adventures including efforts to destabilize governments in the region.

Another pending diplomatic move is the March 1983 announcement that the Soviets and Libya have agreed in principle to sign a friendship treaty soon. Such a treaty could not only provide the Soviets with much sought after base rights in the Middle East, but could further reinforce Qadhaafi's own war fighting capability. Although Qadhaafi presents his nation as non-aligned, the consumation of a friendship treaty with the Soviets will place Libya in a position of compromise.

Qadhaafi's terrorist plots are legion. While initially focusing on Western Europe, they now include the United States. Besides providing terrorist training in Libya, Qadhaafi provides both money and weapons in support of terrorist plots; examples follow. Qadhaafi is said to provide approximately $5 million a year to the IRA Provisionals and an undisclosed
monthly subsidy to a neo-Fascist group in Italy known as Lotta di Popolo. Qadhaafi supplied the Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles that shot at an El Al plane in 1973 from a balcony near the Rome airport, and has been implicated in numerous other airplane terrorist acts. It is also reported that Qadhaafi gave $10 million to each of the gunmen who murdered the Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich.

Perhaps the most bizarre Libyan policy has been the claim to a right to murder Libyan dissidents on foreign soil. Qadhaafi's assassins have often sought to liquidate his enemies abroad. At least eight Libyan dissidents have been slain abroad by Libyan hit teams. Libyan students, who as part of Qadhaafi's "Green Revolution" took over Libyan embassies from professional diplomats and renamed them "People's Bureaus," have been asked to leave the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and a number of African countries because of their alleged involvement in such assassinations.

Assassinations are not only limited to Libyans. Our ambassador in Sudan was killed. It is believed that Qadhaafi also threatened to kill Herman Eilts, the former US Ambassador to Egypt. Besides Eilts, Qadhaafi made a standing offer of $1 million for anyone able and willing to murder Egyptian President Sadat. Although to date there has been no positive proof of a Libyan connection, there was jubilant celebration in the streets of Tripoli following Sadat's assassination. A Libyan attempt was also made on the life of the US Ambassador to Rome in 1981 and it was alleged in December 1981 by the Reagan administration that Qadhaafi had dispatched a squad of assassins to the US to attempt and kill the President and other top Cabinet officials.

As to subversive acts, examples of Qadhaafi's diplomacy of subversion are numerous. The leaders of Niger and Mali have charged the Libyans with
attempts to overthrow their governments. The governments of Senegal and
Gambia also have charged Libyans with imprisoning their nationals and
putting them into military training against their wills and because of
this, have severed diplomatic relations with Libya. Qadhaafi has long been
involved in the civil strife of Uganda in support of former dictator Idi
Amin. Reportedly, Qadhaafi was supplying weapons to the Ugandan guerrillas
as recently as in August 1982. The civilian, democratically elected gov-
ernment of Ghana charged Libya with internal subversion when it expelled
Libyan diplomats, and examples of Libya's subversive efforts in Chad,
Tunisia, and Algeria have been mentioned previously. Libya's support in
the attempted overthrow of the Sudanese government in January of this year
is perhaps the most recent example of Qadhaafi's subversive tactics.

Still another contradiction in Libyan foreign policy is Libya's sup-
port to non-Arab Iran in its current war against Iraq, an Arab state. So
much for Arab unity.

US-LIBYAN RELATIONS

During the first ten years following the 1969 revolution, diplomatic
relations between Washington and Tripoli followed a dichotomous pattern.
The Libyan government became one of the Soviet Union's staunchest clients
in the Arab world, purchasing a huge arsenal of Soviet arms. At the same
time, Libya sought to maintain close economic ties with the West, selling
the bulk of its oil to the United States and Western Europe in return for
massive imports of Western technology. Libyan students went abroad for
university education and they went largely to the US, not the Soviet Union.
Moreover, Qadhaafi repeatedly emphasized his friendship for the American
people as official relations between Washington and Tripoli deteriorated.
At the center of the deterioration of relations between the two governments
were some basic, long standing policy differences, the crucial one being the Palestinian issue, which has had a profound impact on Libya's policy toward an overall Middle East settlement, its relations with many African and Middle East states, and its position on terrorism.

Since 1979, US relations with Libya have declined more rapidly as a result of evidence that Qadhaafi is a major source of support for international terrorists and because of Libya's growing militant, anti-American foreign policy. Present US-Libyan relations have been reduced to the lowest level possible consistent with maintenance of diplomatic relations.60 A major bench mark in the growing American-Libyan hostility was the sacking and burning of the US Embassy in Tripoli in December 1979, by a Libyan mob. Many US officials were convinced that the attack was sanctioned by Qadhaafi. In May 1980, President Carter ordered the expulsion of four members of the Libyan Embassy in Washington—called the "People's Bureau"—for intimidating anti-Qadhaafi Libyans living in the US. At the same time, the US ordered home its last two diplomats from Tripoli. A year later President Reagan ousted the remaining Libyan diplomats for what was called "unacceptable conduct... contrary to accepted standards of diplomatic behavior" and growing concern about Libyan acts of terrorism against opponents of the Qadhaafi regime.61

In mid-August 1981, the simmering hostility between the two nations entered a new and critical phase when on 19 August, two F-14 Navy Tomcat fighter planes shot down two Soviet made Libyan SU-22 fighters about 60 miles off the Libyan coast over the Gulf of Sidra after one of the Libyans fired at, but missed, the Americans. The aerial duel was triggered by Libya's long-standing claim to sovereignty over the waters and airspace above the Gulf of Sidra, extending over 100 miles off the Libyan coast. The US recognizes only a 3 mile limit in accordance with international law.
Determined to challenge Qadhaafi's claim and uphold the principle of freedom of the air and seas, the US sixth fleet was conducting routine maneuvers in the area when the incident occurred. The US immediately lodged a protest with the Libyan government for the "unprovoked attack" and warned: "Any further attacks against US forces operating in international waters and airspace will also be resisted with force if necessary."

Libyan officials accused the US of reverting to the "law of the jungle" but promised no reprisals against American oil workers living in Libya. A year later, however, Qadhaafi during an interview with an American journalist concerning the Gulf of Sidra dogfight stated:

We would rather negotiate with America, but we find ourselves compelled to use force. And we will use it again to repel aggression by our enemies, even if that leads to mass martyrdom on the part of our people. We're willing to turn the Gulf of Sidra into a red gulf, a gulf of blood, if that is the only choice we have.

Qadhaafi again in February of this year threatened to turn the Gulf of Sidra into "blood and fire" if American planes or ships enter the disputed waters. This latest threat was in connection with Libya's protest against America's deployment of four Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes to Egypt and the US carrier Nimitz to the Mediterranean just off the Gulf of Sidra in response to a Libyan threat to overthrow Sudanese President Nimery. Planes from the Nimitz flew over the Gulf but the carrier did not enter the Sidra waters. Nothing other than Qadhaafi's verbal warning occurred.

In December 1981, the US government received creditable evidence that Qadhaafi had organized teams of assassins to infiltrate into the US to attempt to kill the President and other top US officials. Necessary security precautions were taken but the FBI was unable to verify the teams' presence in the US. On 10 December 1981, President Reagan invalidated US
passports for travel to Libya and asked the estimated 1500 Americans living there to leave.\textsuperscript{67} Finally, on 10 March 1982, President Reagan banned all future US imports of Libyan oil and restricted the exports to Libya of high technology equipment that had any military application.\textsuperscript{68} This announcement came after nearly a year of public pressure by the US on Libya to moderate its role in international terrorism. It was considered inconsistent for US policy to criticize terrorism on the one hand and provide as much as $10 billion a year in payment for Libyan oil to fund terrorism and Libya's arms purchases from the Soviet Union on the other hand. The US hoped the embargo would force Libya to spend its hard currency revenues in the face of declining oil revenues due to a worldwide oil glut.

At present, evidence supports that Libya is feeling an economic squeeze. This squeeze results from a combination of the worldwide oil glut, reduced oil production, falling oil prices, and the US oil ban. It is reported in some circles that the economic squeeze may have curtailed Libya's foreign adventures, but, to put it in the words of one African expert, "If Qadhaafi can finance a coup to his liking for a few million dollars, he is prepared to do so and make trouble."\textsuperscript{69} This is further supported by Libya's recent interference in Sudan and Qadhaafi's, March 1983, announcement to the world that he is willing to help the Soviet/Cuban backed Sandanista regime in Nicaragua to fight against the US supported rebels in that country. Subsequently, Libyan shipments of arms to Nicaragua were intercepted by Brazil. Apparently economics, although now a factor, do not preclude the continuation of Libya's foreign adventures with the corresponding trouble they cause the US and other nations.
SOVIET-LIBYAN RELATIONS

In contrast to the US government's confrontational relation with Libya, the Soviet Union has been very assertive in seeking to improve and expand its relations with Libya since Qadhaafi came to power. Since the Soviets were expelled from Egypt in 1972, they have looked upon their relationship with Libya as an opportunity to increase their voice in Middle Eastern and African affairs, undermine Western influence, and ease the logistical problems of maintaining a naval force in the Mediterranean Sea. Other Soviet motives include a need to earn hard currency and potential access to an oil source should their own supplies run short. The Soviets have made repeated offers of military and technical assistance in return for hard currency. The Libyan government has been very responsive to these offers and the purchase of Soviet arms including sophisticated weapons systems has mushroomed over the years. Qadhaafi has also allowed the number of Soviet advisers in Libya to increase steadily.

Pursuant to its policy of nonalignment, the Libyan government's early relationship with the Soviets was carefully limited to the commercial sphere in general and the purchase of Soviet arms in particular. The Libyans attempted to keep the numbers as small as possible and to retain a degree of independence by diversifying their arms suppliers. This policy was marked by early success, but soon collided with the growing concern in the West for maintaining a military balance in the region. Specifically, the Libyan government's strong policy on anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, its vehement denunciation of Israel, and its repeated links with terrorist activities dampened enthusiasm in the United States and Western Europe for further arms sales to Libya.
Qadhaafi's insatiable appetite for modern armaments and a foreign policy which increasingly isolated Libya from the West combined as primary reasons for a growing Soviet-Libyan relationship. In a very real sense, Libya's troubles with the West opened opportunities for the Soviets. When the Libyans could not get the military supplies they wanted from the West, the Soviet Union provided some of the most modern systems in its arsenal. The Russians have sold far more arms than the small Libyan army could effectively use, thus enabling Libya to become an arsenal for the Third World governments it supports, or possibly, a staging ground for Soviet military adventures in the Persian Gulf region.

The huge stocks of Soviet tanks, aircraft, artillery, military electronics, ammunitions and other military hardware bought by Qadhaafi are stored in close range of southern Europe. These stocks, valued at $12 billion could possibly be used by the Soviets as prepositioned equipment for a war in the Middle East or Europe.70 About 2500 Soviet military advisors in Libya and additional East German security personnel exercise a degree of custodianship over the arms stocks. The Soviet advisors control the MIG-25's; they alone operate the missile systems. Airstrips have been built to accommodate the gigantic Soviet Antonov planes transporting personnel and spare parts.71 Although Qadhaafi has said that the arms are intended for worthy African or Arab liberation movements—especially an Arab army to liberate Palestine—Soviets or surrogate troops, airlifted from outside Africa, could quickly activate these arms stores.

Apart from arms sales, the economic and political relationship between Libya and the Soviet Union has been much to develop. With substantial oil reserves, Libya does not need Soviet economic assistance. With exception to the area of nuclear energy the Soviets have been unable to offer the
material and know-how to help the Libyans accomplish their development goals.

Qadhaafi has been very interested in developing a nuclear energy program, although he has emphatically denied any intent to manufacture nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding, it is believed that Qadhaafi's ambition is to make Libya the first Arab nuclear power.\(^7\) It is reported that Qadhaafi even tried to buy an atomic bomb from China but was politely turned down. Evidence also supports that during 1977 and early 1978, Libya sent considerable quantities of untraceable Libyan money to help finance the Pakistani nuclear project, but with no material results for Libya.

Libya has been more successful, however, in dealing with the Soviets in this regard. In 1975 the Soviet Union announced it would provide Libya with its first nuclear reactor, a 10-megawatt research facility. Three years later, the Soviets agreed to construct a nuclear power plant and research center with a capacity of 300 megawatts. By 1981, the two countries were talking about further expansion of their nuclear cooperation to include a power station with two 400-megawatts units.\(^7\)

Political cooperation between the two countries lacks a strong ideological base and has been at a relatively low level. In general, the political cooperation that has occurred has been due more to coincidence than to a plan or to the ability of the Soviets to use arms sales to influence the Libyans. The overriding political consideration is that Qadhaafi's Islamic/Arab Nationalist views have nothing in common with Soviet ideology.

As mentioned earlier, the policies of the US government toward Libya are designed to further isolate Libya from the West as well as Africa and the Arab world. The success of this policy may be measured by the overt political cooperation of Libya with the Soviets as evidenced by the
recently announced friendship treaty now pending between the two countries. This treaty certainly would be another step for the Soviets toward their goal of achieving a permanent role in the Middle East. The treaty is expected to include formal arrangements for Soviet access to Libyan ports and Libyan airfields. (Libya already permits Soviet ships to visit Libyan ports. The first such visit by Soviet naval forces occurred in July 1981.74)
CHAPTER VI

MILITARY

ARMED FORCES EXPANSION

The inception of the Libyan Army can be traced to the Libyan Arab Force, which was known as the "Sanusi Army" of World War II. The support to organize this force was directed from outside Libya, by exiles who encouraged their close associates, that remained in the country, to organize and seek alliance with the British against the Axis powers. Thus, five battalions were organized to conduct guerrilla warfare operations under British command in the Jabal al Akhar region of Cyrenaica. However, because the nature of desert warfare required units with high mobility, a capability which did not exist within the Libyan units, Libyan forces were relegated to installation and prisoner security. Only one Libyan battalion participated in combat operations with the British at Tobruk.

Upon the successful occupation of Libyan territory by the British, a need for Libyan military forces was no longer required. Thus, most of its members transferred to the police force in Cyrenaica under British military control and remained there until Libya gained its independence in 1951. With independence came the birth of the Royal Libyan Army formed from the veteran members of the Sanusi Army of World War II.

The expansion of the military force was very slow. There were several factors that contributed to this slow growth. Libya at this time was one of the poorest nations in the world and major defence outlays were not available, nor, were they high on the new nation's priority list. Further,
the reigning Monarch, King Idris, did not want the military to become the center of power within the new state. This was so strongly felt by the King that Army forces and police forces were deliberately separated as a counterbalance preventing any attempted coup against the established government. In addition, the small population of Libya could not supply a sustained manpower base for a large military force. Also, the external threat to the nation was not great enough to require large numbers of the population to be put under arms. Consequently, the Libyan Military expanded very slowly from 1951 to 1969 when it was estimated to have had 6,500 in its ranks. However, the police force had expanded to an approximated 13,000 man force. Throughout the expansion period the police force enjoyed considerable force modernization over that of the regular army. The police force was upgraded with modern weapons, helicopters and armored cars. For the most part, British military specialists supervised, advised and trained the military as well as the police forces of Libya during this transition period.

The naval and air arm of the Libyan Armed Forces were not developed until much later; the Navy was established in November 1962, followed by the Air Force in August of 1963. The Air Force initially consisted of only a few aircraft and two pilots, by 1967 the force had increased to about 250 American trained personnel and a few jet trainers and piston driven transports. A notable concern developed within the Libyan government to increase the size of the Air Force after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. This concern rapidly developed into a purchase of 10 American F-5 fighter bombers that were delivered during 1968-1969. As a follow-on modernization of the military force, Libya entered into a contract with Great Britain to purchase a $300 million air defense system. The British were to provide a missile system, radar detection and control system as well as train Libyans
to operate this sophisticated defense system. The modernization of the
army ground force was not undertaken because of the view held by the king,
that such weapons and equipment could be employed against his government as
quickly as against an external threat. Thus, the ground forces remained
basically unchanged until after the overthrow of the monarchy.75

Militarism has been one of the most striking features of the Libyan
"Jumhuriyah" through 1981. It has been characterized by the buildup of a
formidable arsenal, a near tripling in armed manpower since 1970, and the
training of youth in particular and the nation in general through an eco-
nomically disruptive system of conscription and "popular militias."
Although the four day frontier war with Egypt in July 1977 had shown the
country's vulnerability to invasion, not least because of the enormous
distances and logistical difficulties involved, the military buildup had
started long before this time.76

Upon assuming control of the nation, the new Qadhaafi regime set out
to reorganize and modernize the Libyan national defense system. Many arms
and equipment contracts were negotiated with numerous arms supplying coun-
tries. These contracts ran into the millions of dollars, all of which were
paid in hard cash received from oil sales to countries throughout the
world. As early as 1970, 110 Mirage jet fighters were purchased from
France. By late 1970, the Army had two thousand T-54, T-55 and T-62 medium
tanks, as well as an extraordinary array of nearly 1,400 scout and armored
cars, armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles of Brazilian,
British, French and Russian makes. To further strengthen the national
defense of Libya, numerous anti-tank, long-range and short-range, air-to-
air and surface-to-surface missile systems were purchased. In the mid
1970's two squadrons of TU21 bombers and two squadrons of MIG-23's, with
the capability to strike targets in Israel, were introduced into the air.
force inventory. The naval arm of Libya's defence structure did not expand as rapidly as the air and ground arms, however, expansion was forthcoming with vessels supplied by Russia and Spain. It was Qadhaafi's goal to possess the third largest navy in the Mediterranean, but, with only a few submarines and a few "Fast Attack" boats this goal fell considerably short.77

As of 1981, Libya's armed forces could be described as impressive but at the same time mediocre. In armaments, it certainly is impressive. The Army is divided into about 40 battalions (tank, infantry, artillery, missile). The Army has at its disposal: an estimated 2,500 Soviet T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72 combat tanks; nearly 2,000 armored cars including British Ferret scout cars and Brazilian EE-9 Cascavel armored cars; 1,500 artillery pieces; and about 50 surface-to-surface systems including FROG-7, Scud-B with a range of 300 kilometers, as well as an unknown number of SS-12 Scaleboard missiles which can hit a target 900 kilometers away. It also has on order from Italy 200 Lion tanks and Fiat armored cars, as well as 200 Brazilian Urutu armored personnel carriers.

The Air Force is currently equipped with about 300 combat aircraft (including Soviet MIG-25 Foxbats) which rank among the most sophisticated warplanes today. The force also includes 100 French Mirage III and I; 160 MIGs (15's & 23's), 17 Tupoleve bombers, an unknown number of Antonov giant cargo carriers—all Soviet made; and several dozen helicopters. In addition, several small anti-insurgency aircraft have been acquired and adapted for localized operations. The Air Force should soon take delivery of 32 additional Mirage F-1 fighters, 30 transport planes (of which 20 are Italian C-222 and 10 Canadian Twin Otter), 90 trainers as well as numerous air-to-air missiles.
The Libyan Navy has continued to be more modest with between three and six submarines, 15 missile-carrying fast attack craft, 10 large patrol craft, and six landing craft. With the delivery of four Wadi M'ragh corvettes and eight missile-carrying fast attack craft, modernization of the Navy should be completed for the time being.\(^7\)

This extensive military weapons and equipment buildup has not been without a sizable price tag. In 1977 alone Libya paid the Soviet Union an estimated $1.8 billion for weapons. An additional $2,694 million was paid out for arms contracts with Canada, Germany (FR), France, Italy and the Netherlands. This was the fourth largest expenditure by any country in the Middle East or North Africa. Libya was only exceeded by Israel with 3,956 million worth of arms purchases followed by Iraq at $3,740 million and Syria with $3,600 million.\(^7\)

The vast amount of highly sophisticated weapons flowing into the Middle East and North Africa often transcends the capacity of the armed forces to absorb these weapons. Highly skilled personnel are needed to man and to maintain them—but in most countries this is a valuable and desperately scarce resource. Long training periods will be required before these weapons systems can be operated effectively, and training can to a large extent only be provided by foreigners. A country then has to send either a great number of soldiers abroad or alternatively provide training teams. Already, foreign military advisers can be found in many Middle Eastern and North African countries. These technical problems will prove a formidable and sometimes extremely difficult barrier on the way towards a highly effective military force. To overcome this barrier will mean a heavy drain on precious and scarce resources in terms of manpower and capital. Further, the influx of modern weapons is also likely to have social and political consequences on these nations and Libya is no exception.\(^8\)
STATUS OF FORCES

The emphasis on the military seems excessive and bears no relation to the country's defense needs. But alongside this formidable arsenal comes the human factor, the main weakness in Qadhaafi's armed forces. With a surface area of 1,775,000 square kilometers, Libya has only 3.2 million inhabitants. In 10 years, the regular Army has increased probably from 20,000 to an estimated 53,000 men including 45,000 in the Army, 4,000 in the Air Force and 4,000 in the Navy.

To overcome the shortage in manpower, the authorities in Tripoli have created an "Islamic Legion" made up of recruits from Muslim Arab and African countries. Generously remunerated, they are used in external operations. For example, they were employed in Uganda, Tunisia and Chad allowing the regular force to be free on the other fronts.

Qadhaafi's aim is to build up the armed forces to 500,000 men which would imply an unprecedented mobilization of one-third of the population. Outlining the 1981-85 five year plan, the Libyan leader said that "the call to militarize school establishments and enterprises is a revolutionary decision and a fundamental question—a strategic choice." Since then, the units of production have been given over to the military dictates. Women are enlisted into the Army and a military academy for young women—a "unique institution in the world" according to Qadhaafi—has been established. Military training is doled out in the schools and universities. But, training is the second Achilles heel of the Libyan army. The maintenance and manning of specialised equipment requires a high degree of technical knowledge which the cadres in Qadhaafi's army lack, hence the need to call in experts from the eastern bloc for the maintenance and instruction, and the Palestinians, Yemenis and Syrians for manning.81 Some two thousand
Russian military advisors are performing assistance duties in Libya. For some time now North Koreans have been piloting and maintaining two squadrons of MIG-23's based at Bomba in northeast Cyrenaica. Other Libyan aircraft are being flown by Pakistanis and Palestinians; Czech specialists are maintaining tanks; the East Germans are active in civilian and military intelligence; Cubans had reportedly trained Colonel Qadhasfi's personal bodyguard and other nationalities involved with the armed forces include the French, Yugoslav and Taiwanese. In addition, many Libyan servicemen are being trained in the Soviet Union. Even though Libya has received considerable external assistance both in the areas of training and manning much of the equipment remains in storage.

Due to the vast array of equipment purchased from numerous countries, the Libyan armed forces suffer from the lack of a common supply system. Reportedly, repair parts and major equipment assemblies have impacted seriously on equipment readiness. This situation projected on to a battlefield would have a major impact on Libya's ability to sustain any type of long-range or long-term conflict. Even conflicts of short duration would probably require considerable maintenance cannibalization to keep equipment available for combat operations. In addition, skilled Libyan maintenance and logistical personnel probably would not be available on the battlefield to accomplish these necessary tasks to sustain the force.

Since mid-1978 there have been indications that Libya has been attempting to move toward greater self-reliance in the field of military material. An organization known as the General Board for War Industry was created, apparently to oversee the development of a heavy industrial capability to manufacture military supplies. Later that year Yugoslavia reportedly agreed to build a large plant in Libya to manufacture ammunition and spare parts.
for the Soviet military weapons in the Libyan inventory. Such a capability, if achieved, would be an important addition to the country's present-day limited ability to produce only basic quartermaster items, uniforms, small arms, and ammunition.83

Among North African countries Libya is unique in the absence of a military tradition in its recent history. Except for the short and limited encounter with the more experienced Egyptian armed forces during the border clash of mid-1977, the fighting capabilities of the contemporary Libyan military establishment are largely untested. There is a minor exception to this, however, in that an unknown number of Libyan soldiers have received some combat experience as volunteers serving with Palestinian commando groups based in Syria and southern Lebanon.84

The quality of some units is thought to have been improved by the arrival of East German instructors, widely regarded as the best in East Europe, to replace Soviet experts. The performance of the tank and artillery crews sent to Chad is thought to result from this change, and contrasts with the dismal show put up by the units sent to Uganda in 1977 to prop up Idi Amin's disintegrating tyranny.85

PERSONNEL

In the course of the reorganization of the services into a single unified command, the Qadhaafi regime retired or fired—for political reasons—the entire leadership of generals and colonels. In addition a few younger or lesser rank who were identified with the monarchy were also dismissed. Again, after the countercoup attempt in December 1969, a second group of officers were dismissed. On this occasion nearly 100 officers were retired, and many others were transferred to the civil service. These senior officers of the armed forces reportedly had been chosen not on the
basis of professional military expertise or past training, which in the case of many of the tribal leaders was largely absent, but rather through such criteria as personal loyalties or political favors provided to the king and through recognition of their overall political and religious conservatism. These conditions, which determined the way many senior officers receive their initial commissions and subsequent promotions, were the reason for much of the low morale at the junior officer level and were important contributing factors in the overthrow of the monarchy.86

In terms of political outlook, the new military leadership has been described as both soldier/revolutionary and ardent pan-Arabist. Further, the new military leaders have frequently emphasized their passionate commitment to the moral tenet of Islam and to their own concept of Islamic socialism. They are committed to modernization in terms of acquiring the capacity to operate and maintain technical military equipment and sophisticated weaponry, as reflected in their continuing emphasis on improving the literacy rate and on the development of technical skills and training.87

As of mid-1978 it was estimated that in the predominantly young population of roughly 2.6 million Libyan citizens about 559,000 were males aged fifteen to forty-nine. Of this number approximately 327,000 were considered probably fit for military service. An average of about 22,000 young men reach the military age of eighteen each year. Thus, the manpower base to provide enlisted ranks for the expanding regular forces appear to be more than adequate. The chief problem—a less than desirable literacy rate and lagging technical education among Libyans of military age—has remained and is especially limited in view of the national effort to build a modern force equipped with sophisticated air defense missiles and maintenance-intensive equipment such as tanks and modern jet aircraft.88
In addition, the Libyan regulars are backed by "ideological mercenaries" from Palestine, Egypt, Syria and other Middle East countries. Some of these troops, especially the Palestinians from Lebanon, are experienced and tough, despite their poor showing in Uganda. They are well paid, well equipped and well fed, and have lately been joined by other foreign volunteers from the Moslem countries of the Sahel and the Moslem area of West African countries. This is the so-called Islamic Legion, whose members can be used for subversive or irregular work as well as more conventional warfare. For example, the Gafsa raid in Tunisia last year was carried out by Tunisian troops equipped and trained in Libya; it is believed that Chadian nationals made up a substantial part of the 5,000 man intervention force in Chad.89

**TRAINING**

Little is known about the training that was provided the army personnel before 1969. A military academy at Benghazi, which had been established after independence with British assistance, had offered its cadet classes courses in higher education and military subjects to prepare them for active duty as junior officers. This academy was closed after the coup and later a military academy was opened in Tripoli. It appears that the new institution has been established as a joint service school. Libya does possess a number of schools for noncommissioned officers and various technicians. Training for the Army has at times been integrated with that given the Popular Resistance Force. In addition to the large training exercise conducted in mid-1972, a similar effort that also involved units of the Air Force was mounted in mid-1973 in mock defense of Tripoli and its suburbs. In the fall of 1978 all elements of the armed forces participated...
in a combined exercise to provide national security elements with training experience against a mock invasion.90

In view of the rapidly expanded air force, many problems arose from trying to organize and train educationally limited personnel to operate and maintain a sophisticated fleet of aircraft. Thus, many of the pilots, aircrew members and maintenance personnel were trained and continue to be trained in foreign military schools. The overall level of training of both pilots and maintenance personnel is below that required to operate and maintain the modern aircraft and missiles in Libya's arsenal.91

The Navy as late as 1979 was still completely dependent on foreign assistance for equipment, spare parts, and training. Nearly all naval personnel have been trained abroad, mostly in the United Kingdom but also in Greece, the Soviet Union, Egypt, Turkey, and Italy. Within the constraints imposed by its shortage of technically qualified manpower and given the country's position in a narrow part of the Mediterranean, its small but expanding naval capability has become a factor for consideration in the strategic planning of large naval powers operating in the area. Moreover, the establishment of a helicopter base at Malta in 1978 only increases the factors to be considered by allied planners in preparation of operations in the Mediterranean area.92

By 1981 all education had been militarized as part of the drive to build a citizen's army numbering half a million trained men and women.93 The young, who constitute more than half the population, have always given Qadhaafi generous support and are unlikely, whatever happens, to return their allegiance to ethnic or other traditional authority figures. Thus, the decision to militarize all education establishments aroused little objection among the believers.94
PERCEPTIONS/SPECULATIONS—MILITARY BUILDUP

The establishment of a sizeable armed force, the thinking behind it, its equipment and its training are all determined by known or potential enemies. With exception perhaps of Egypt, Libya is not threatened by any of its immediate neighbors. The buildup of the Libyan forces is therefore seen by many observers as not just a means of defence, but as an instrument to enable Qadhaafi to assert himself and to inspire respect. Some observers have speculated that Libya was becoming a Soviet surrogate in Africa, stockpiling modern weapons for use in future Soviet or Cuban adventures on that continent. Others have remained convinced that the vast arsenal is being assembled to support a pan-Arab move against Israel in which Libya would play a major role. In late 1978, for example, the Libyan Secretary of Foreign Affairs was asked in an interview if he expected a war with Israel in the near future. His answer: "Definitely." Another explanation for the arms buildup was total miscalculation of the capacity of the armed forces to absorb weapons systems.

Libya has not specified its long-term aims but has followed its customary course of alternating soothing diplomatic assurances with provocative outbursts. The new situation created by the occupation of two thirds of Chad has caused much anxiety in Africa. West African governments plainly fear that the Chad intervention is the first stage in an expansionist plan designed to recuperate a large area of the Sahara and Shabel for Libya under the banner of a new Islamic state.

Other Africans see the situation as a major power struggle between France and Libya for dominance over Africa and at a minimum a concession and division of the continent between the two countries.
Early in 1981, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planners become concerned that the Soviet Air Force might gain the use of Libyan airfields in the event of a Mediterranean crisis. Even if Qadhaafi himself might never grant such facilities, there is always the danger of his replacement by a leader who would.
CHAPTER VII

THE IMPACT OF OIL

After 1955-56, when Libya granted concessions for exploration to several American companies, the search for oil resources became one of the main interests of the Libyan government. By the end of 1959 some fifteen companies held oil concessions in Libya. An oil field at Zelten in Cyrenaica was discovered in June 1959. Before the year was out, six productive wells had been found in Tripolitania, four in Cyrenaica and one in the Fezzan. By the beginning of July 1966 there were thirty-five oil wells in production, yielding altogether a little less than 93,000 barrels of oil per day. Oil production showed a tremendous increase in the 1962-66 period, with exports rising from 8 million tons in 1962 to over 70 million tons in 1966. This increase in production and exports continued over the next several years, up to the time the world markets experienced the first turbulence and upheavals in the Middle East. 101

In April 1971 the negotiations with oil companies in Libya, which had begun soon after the 1969 coup, finally ended in a new five year agreement raising the total price of Libyan crude to $3.44 per barrel. In the last stages of the negotiations, conducted in Tripoli, the Libyan government also represented the interests of the Algerian, Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian governments. Threats of an embargo on the export of crude oil were used as a lever in the negotiations.

In ten years Libya’s position has changed from one of penury and dependence to one of power based entirely on her ability to cut off oil supplies. The pronouncements of President Qadhaafi were, therefore, by the
70's of great moment to the West. In July 1971, the Deputy Prime Minister, visited West Germany, France and Britain. Germany, which buys a particularly large proportion of its crude oil from Libya, needed to maintain good relations. France was anxious over the use to which Libya would put the Mirage jet fighters being supplied under the 1970 agreement. The same anxiety was revealed in Britain over the supply of armaments, but none of these countries could afford to alienate Libya. In December 1971, avowedly in retaliation for Britain's failure to prevent the Iranian occupation of the Tunb islands in the Gulf, Libya nationalized the assets of British Petroleum. This began the process of nationalizing the foreign oil companies.

Relations with Egypt and Syria were somewhat strained at the end of 1971, the cause of the friction being largely Qadhaafi's uncompromising hard line on the Arab/Israel conflict. In October, President Sadat and Qadhaafi met for talks on the problem and Qadhaafi continued to press for an all out war. Relations with Britain were also very much strained in the winter of 1971/72, not only because of the nationalization of British Petroleum but also because of Libyan intervention in the dispute with Malta of the British bases there. Libya had for some time been actively fostering relations with Malta, with talks on possible Libyan aid being provided in August 1971. In January 1972 the British naval training mission was ordered to leave Libya. And in February the 1954 agreement with the United States was abrogated.

Libya's attitude towards the Soviet Union had remained cool and the government was violently opposed to the Iraqi/Soviet treaty signed in April 1972. Nevertheless, in February 1972, Libya proposed an oil cooperation agreement which was signed in March of 1972. Out of this agreement of
cooperation came the arms supply agreement that began to supply weapons and advisors to Libya.102

The October 1973 war with Israel caused further upheavals in the price situation and Libya doubled the posted price of 40% API crude to $18.76 a barrel, effective 1 January 1974. In March 1974 a three-tier price system was proposed, giving preference to Islamic countries, followed by developing countries, with the industrial powers paying the highest prices. In April and May 1974 cuts in prices to contract customers, and in the buy-back prices to companies with participation agreements, were announced. Overall, Libya supported the general principle of higher prices to meet inflation. Libya's policy of conserving its oil also led to disputes with companies. In October 1975 Occidental was ordered to reduce output to 210,000 barrels per day and a vigorous dispute ensued. Thus, a compromise was made allowing Occidental to produce 300,000 barrels per day over the next three years with subsequent reductions.

Following all the turbulence production fell from 159.9 million metric tons in 1970 to 71.5 million metric tons in 1975. In 1976, however, output rose to 93.5 million tons under the influence of more reasonable prices and generally rising demand. This recovery in output continued into 1977, when production rose to 100 million tons but fell by 3.5 percent in 1978 in response to competition from North Sea oil and generally depressed market conditions. In 1979, production reached a level of 2.07 million barrels per day the highest since 1973. In 1980, production was again cut by some 16.8 percent, however, prices were increased to $30.00 per barrel an increase of 28 percent. A further increase in price was implemented later the same year to bring the price to $36.12 per barrel.

The fact is that, although Libya is still committed to its stated goal of "gaining full control of the sources of oil wealth," it is agreeable for
the time being to foreign oil companies continuing to explore for and market crude oil and to provide specialized services. This is why the Libyan government has not in general, pursued a policy of complete nationalization. Considerable exploration continues throughout the nation in the most promising areas. As of 1980, several new wells had been found in Agip, Mourzouk and the Sirtica Basin.103

Libya, however, in common with other large oil producers, would much prefer to refine and process its own oil, rather than export it in its crude state. Thus, a major effort has been undertaken to accomplish this critical goal; but, as of 1981, it has not been met. However, over time Libya has established on the part of several countries a heavy dependence on the crude oil they provide. Accordingly, these countries' economies would be badly shaken if Libya was to cut off their oil supply. The United States was not excluded from such an action. Therefore, during 1981-82 the US began to reduce its dependence on Libyan oil. Further, political relations began to deteriorate to the point that by March of 1982 the US enacted an oil boycott against Libya. Libya suffered a 60% production drop from the boycott of oil. However, in the long-term, as great an impact will be felt in the area of oil technology supplied by American firms. The boycott has had far-reaching effects on the Libyan economy—a major shift in balance of payments, a reduction in economic programs and placed the nation into a position of not being able to pay for military equipment received. For example, Spanish, Italian and French bankers and businessmen claim the Libyan government is more than $2 billion in arrears on payments due them. The total amount due western countries is $4.6 billion. Part of Libya's problems arise from their attempt to buy influence in Africa through gifts of lots of oil to countries like Ghana, Mali, and Chad.

Western oil companies have reduced their take of Libyan oil from a high in
1981 of 1.7 million barrels a day to a low in 1982 to 500,000 barrels per day. Thus, considerable creative financing has begun in Libya to pay off foreign bills. First priority has been to big buyers who had not cut back on purchasing Libyan oil. Regardless, there is considerable instability in Libya's oil economy and it may become increasingly worse if the oil glut remains for an extended period of time.104

With production already off from 1.7 million barrels a day to under 500,000 currently, Libya's oil revenues are running under half of 1980's $20-odd billion. The Chad adventure cost well over $2 billion. So, unless Qadhaafi is prepared to live off his monetary reserves, the cash flow squeeze should be immediate.

To further compound the problem, Libyan oil money has gone to support IRA terrorists in Ireland, virtual civil war in Turkey, and internal unrest in Egypt. Also Libyan oil money has subsidized Malta's Dom Mintoff and cost NATO a key naval base in the Mediterranean.105

Even though Libya has experienced some turbulence within their oil industry over the more recent years, the country still has the highest Gross National Product (GNP) per capita of any African country. In 1975 its GNP per capita was over $5,000, more than twice that of its nearest rival, Gabon (another oil producer with a small population) and nearly four times that of "developed" South Africa. All this money has made Libyans accustomed to a standard of living which is unusual anywhere in the Third World except in a few oil states. Conscious of the vanishing nature of petroleum the Revolutionary Command Council has invested hugely in industry, agriculture and infrastructures with the intention of turning Libya into a modern industrial state, self-sufficient in food, by the end of the century. Planned investment over the next 20 years is more than $250 billion. Considerable oil money has been used to a good effect. Medical

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services are well equipped and free, as are the schools and the universities whose population has risen from 400 to 10,000 over the past decade. More than a million young people are undergoing education at various levels.106

Even with all of the advancement, the country's small and initially untrained population has left it lacking manpower at all levels. There are at least 500,000 foreigners working in Libya, ranging from 32,000 European expatriates (engineers, agronomists, doctors, etc.) to 70,000 Pakistanis (some experts, many ordinary workers) and more than 100,000 Egyptians (mainly workers). The country's chronic labor shortage and high wage levels attract long- or short-term immigrant workers from countries all over Africa and the Middle East.107

The future of Libya's oil industry remains bright. The oil and gas reserves known to be in the ground as of 1980 promise the country a continuing inflow of revenues for at least a further generation, and on a scale unlikely ever to be repeated. The fact that these revenues were already so large, and promised to continue increasing even if oil production was unchanged, was initially at least the most effective and far-reaching achievement of the revolution. For, instead of producing more hydrocarbons to increase revenues, as had been the necessary practice under the monarchy, the revolutionary government could leave oil and gas in the ground for the benefit of the nation well into the next century.108
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Revolutionary changes have occurred in Libya. The former socioeconomic and political system has been destroyed or drastically modified and the Libyan people cannot return to it, regardless of future changes in national leadership. In assessing Libya's political development, three fundamental components need to be examined: control, mobilization, and adaptation to change.

Control is a passive concept and implies the absence of overt resistance to the regime, i.e., maintaining stability. Stability is a necessary ingredient for the modernization process. Modernization is not likely to occur in an environment of political chaos and is equally unlikely to occur in an environment in which control is maintained through the perpetuation of illiteracy and tribalism.

There can be little question of the fact that Libya's revolutionary leadership appears to be in control of its human and material resources. If control is measured by the absence of civil disorder, the revolution has experienced neither strikes, nor riots, and very minor hostile demonstrations. With the exception of aborted military coup attempts, there have been no other visible signs of organized resistance. If control is measured in terms of passive acceptance of revolutionary programs, all revolutionary political institutions (people's committees, popular congresses,
self-management units, etc.) meet as scheduled. The revolutionary leadership remains in control of the political system despite enactment of a resocialization program which has cut into the very core of Libyan society by attacking traditional and cultural values. Tribes have been abolished, the economy totally socialized and the traditional practice of Islam radically transformed into a revolutionary practice of Islam centering on the popular, self-revealed interpretation of the Koran.

The second component, mobilization, is an active concept. It involves the ability of the political leadership to harness human resources in support of modernization (or other) goals. Mobilization involves inducing individuals to engage in behavior supportive of regime goals, and depends upon the leadership's organizational capacity to shape mass behavior and socialization mechanisms and to equitably distribute goods and services. Finally, mobilization involves the regimes coercive capacity to assure its supporters that it can and will enforce rules and that they can rely upon the long-term stability of the regime. Clearly, the more a citizenry of a state believes its political institutions and leaders to be legitimate and the more it perceives itself to be part of the political community, the more readily it can be mobilized in support of a regime's development objectives. Too, the more members of a society remain tradition-bound, the more difficult they will be to mobilize in support of development goals.

Looking at the organizational dimension of mobilization, one must credit the revolution with considerable success. An organizational structure capable of penetrating all segments of the population is in place. Virtually all Libyans currently belong to a basic popular congress. These congresses do exercise real authority. Through their people's committees, they regulate the daily life of Libya's citizens and allocate resources. Individuals who do not participate in the basic popular congresses have no
recourse from the Congresses' decisions. Also the network of professional unions, federations, and associations, which cap every professional and social group including farmers, students, doctors, lawyers, electricians, and others can input through their designated professional committees. Alternate avenues for political expression do not exist. So the stakes for non-participation in popular representational organizations are high.

Two facets of organization, however, continue to pose difficulties for the regime: the media and the bureaucracy. The media has failed to play a crucial role in shaping the behavior and values of the Libyan masses. Although the media provides full coverage of revolutionary accomplishments, it does not convey a particularly inspirational tone. Redirection of media effort is needed. The bureaucracy was at the outset the revolution's weakest link in relation to both its ability to regulate and control Libya's resources and to build regime support through the efficient distribution of goods and services. Attempts at modernizing the bureaucracy have been made in terms of: (1) selecting skilled administrators through a nominative and credential examination process, and (2) by decentralizing the national bureaucracy through integration of people's committees at the municipal and grassroots levels. How well increased reliance upon popular committees will ease the bureaucratic bottleneck remains to be seen.

Regarding increased civilian commitment to the revolution, many of the structural innovation instituted by the revolutionary leadership have failed to produce the desired behavioral results both in motivating support for the revolution and upgrading the quality of that support. Several modes of political behavior must be strengthened.

First, the political system, particularly its institutions, must be legitimate. Just getting people to show up for meetings is not enough. As
things currently stand, it is Colonel Qadhaafi, not the political institutions of the State, that is the focal point of mass attention in Libya. Political institutions do not have legitimacy except through his blessing. The people simply have not had time to catch up with the rapidity of institutional changes.

Secondly, the basic popular congresses must develop a broader sense of political community. The deliberations of the basic popular congresses continue to reflect vestiges of tribalism, deference to social status, and the tendency to use new-found popular powers to settle old parochial scores. At the national level, their decisions and their claim upon national resources must be mitigated by some sense of national priorities and fiscal constraint.

The revolutionary leadership's awareness of these problems led to attempts in 1979 to take corrective action. Revolutionary committees were established and at the same time action was taken to bolster the efficiency of the basic popular congresses by providing them with tangible authority in broad areas of policymaking, perhaps at the expense of national coordination and efficiency. In terms of long-range political development, the continued presence of traditional and transitional behavior patterns among large segments of the Libyan population not only poses real dangers to the routine administrative capacity of people's committees, but undermines progress toward the institutionalization of the popular congress system as well.

Another behavior problem relates to the low levels of technical and administrative skills available at the lower-level people's committees. For the most part, formal technical and administrative training among people's committee members has been minimal. Some delays and confusion
will be inevitable until these skills can be upgraded. This, more than anything else, appears to be a matter of time.

The third aspect of Libya's political development relates to adaptation to change. This is hard to evaluate since the revolution has moved so quickly in a relatively short time; the dust has hardly had time to settle. One thing stands out. The revolution has been particularly effective in destroying the foundations of traditional Libyan society without incurring notable resistance from the masses. The destruction of past institutions has been more successful than transforming attitudes and behavior patterns, which remain very traditional. The population has not been totally reintegrated into the institutions of the revolution.

In summary, the revolution has made tremendous strides in developing and putting in place a political organizational structure to mobilize mass participation in Libya's revolution. It remains to be seen how effective the new institutional structure will be in terms of increasing popular support for the revolution and facilitating the resocialization of the population. People participate in the popular congresses, but many have yet to become believers in the new political system. They watch and wait. The answer lies in the regime's future success in the production and equitable distribution of goods and services.

ASSESSMENT OF SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Since independence in 1951, Libya has gone from one of the poorest nations in the world to one of the richest. However, this evolution has not been an absolutely smooth transition. The country experienced considerable stagnation of economic growth until the discovery of oil. This stagnation was largely due to the Monarchial system, and lack of ability in public administration, planning and innovation within the governmental
system. Further, the level of education and ability among those setting out the plans for economic mobility was lacking. Accordingly, Libya required considerable outside assistance both monetary and organizational from the western world. The country probably would not have advanced in modernization without the assistance from the western sector or without the riches acquired from crude oil. But both were forthcoming and have projected the country out of the status of a developing nation. However, Libya is not without problems. The age old problem they have faced, one of small population and not enough workers, still persists. This in itself has maintained Libya a dependent country within the global context. This will continue to be a problem for many years to come. The country still remains dependent on technical assistance within the petroleum sector, industry and agriculture because growth and technology have outstripped their educational capabilities to develop the necessary human resources to be self-sufficient. Again, given time and it will be several years, with the emphasis education is receiving, the void has a good possibility of being filled. Even though there are problems and outside dependency is required, Libya through its oil riches has become a nation within the world community that must be dealt with as a viable entity. Libya will continue to gain strength in the world community as it resolves its internal problems and as more industrial nations become dependent on the crude oil of Libya to sustain their industrial base. A recent Rand Corporation report indicates Libya will have a domestic growth rate of 8 percent and an overall 10 percent growth rate for the country. However, this is much lower than Libya has experienced in years past. This drop in growth rate is largely due to fluctuation in oil prices, internal setbacks, high imports
of military equipment as well as a decrease in oil production after nationalization. However, in the macro sense this nation only faces the same pressures as any other nation in today's world community.

As for "modernization" and alignment to any model, Libya has progressed through several. At the beginning after independence one would have to conclude it progressed by emulating a western model, mainly because of the massive influence by the members of the United Nations and the western participation in the country's planning, organization and development as well as the influence from western oil companies during the development of the oil industry. However, since the revolution Libya announced, (by Qadhaaf) that it would be a socialist government with values inherent in Islam. No one socialistic model could be identified with Libya. There have been portions of socialism imported from several other socialistic countries. The three that appear to have influenced Libyan socialism the most are Egypt, Algeria and Yugoslavia. And of these, Libya most closely parallels the Yugoslavian model.

ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

As long as Qadhaaf remains in power, with a creditable military force supported by large amounts of petro dollars, he will continue to create instability in the Middle East as well as in Africa. He will continue to support or initiate terrorist aggression against those who do not accept his beliefs or goals. And he will continue to seek a pan-Arab move against Israel to support his ultimate goal of uniting all Arab nations and emerging as the central power figure in that part of the world.

Qadhaaf's ability to continue his present foreign policy depends largely on two factors: the availability of sufficient petro dollars to finance his adventures and good relations with the Soviets, the source of
the necessary military hardware to support his adventures. The interruption of either of these factors would have an adverse impact on Qadhaafi's actions. The importance of Libya maintaining good relations with the Soviets underscores the potential for increased Soviet influence over Libya which could have an impact on the strategic balance of power in the Middle East. Under certain circumstances Libya could easily be used as a Soviet surrogate in Africa. Some analysts see the massive military buildup as a Soviet stockpile or prepositioning of stocks that could be employed in that part of the world with little difficulty. This in itself has created considerable uneasiness among the African leaders. If this were to come to pass, it would create a worse situation than that brought about by the presence of Cubans in Angola.

Concerning the continued availability of petro dollars, the United States has sought to reduce this through its ban on US imports of Libyan oil and by encouraging other western nations to do likewise. (US imports previously constituted approximately forty percent of total Libyan exports.\textsuperscript{10}) The western European allies have not shown the same willingness to isolate Libya with their own embargos, especially the Italians who are heavily dependent on Libya for energy. Although Libya undoubtedly is feeling an economic squeeze, there has been no evidence to date to suggest Libya is unable to finance foreign adventures of its choosing, e.g., Sudan in February 1983 and arm shipments to Nicaragua in April 1983.

The nature of future Libya-Soviet cooperation is difficult to predict since that relationship has never been a natural and comfortable one. Under changed circumstances, the Soviet position in Libya could deteriorate even faster than its position in Egypt. To date, however, both sides have benefitted from the relationship, and if present relations (i.e., pending Soviet-Libyan friendship treaty) are any indication, they are likely to
maintain, if not expand, the present level of cooperation as long as it
remains in their mutual interest to do so.

On the other hand, any attempt to expand Libyan-Soviet relations from
the present level of arms sales and limited technical cooperation to more
concerted political cooperation and action could prove paradoxical. Soviet
pressure for such a move could result in short-term political gains, but
because of the tenuous foundation on which the overall relationship is
based, could have a reverse effect and destroy the Soviet foothold in
Libya. This could then result in Qadhaafi turning toward the West, specif-
ically the United States. But improved relations with the United States
would hinge on Qadhaafi's willingness to moderate some of his present
violent and radical approaches to Middle East issues.

For the foreseeable future, however, it is safe to say that Qadhaafi
will have the wherewithal to continue his same course in foreign policy.
Target countries will continue to include western, Arab and African regimes,
whether of the "right" or the "left." He will remain a destabilizing force
in the Middle East and Africa and a threat to western strategic, political
and economic interests.

**ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY**

Even though the Libyan armed forces expanded very slowly in the begin-
nning they have evolved into a creditable size force, modernized with some
of the most sophisticated weapons that are available today. This expansion
as well as the modernization has surpassed that of any other African coun-
try to include South Africa. The armed forces have attained a level much
beyond that required to defend the nation against any likely enemies.

The armed forces however, are not without severe problems. The age
old problem of a small population limits Libya's ability to provide the
necessary qualified numbers of personnel to sustain an ever increasing force. Thus, considerable numbers of personnel must be recruited from outside the nation to fill the ranks and critical positions. This situation limits Libya’s ability to conduct combat operations over a protracted period of time. Further, those indigenous personnel that are available for service in the military are not at a level of proficiency that would enable them to employ the new sophisticated systems. These limitations will remain within their force for sometime to come. This shortage of manpower has also forced the military services to store considerable amounts of their equipment, which over time will become a sizeable maintenance and repair problem for a system that is less than capable of handling normal requirements. This in itself is only a small part of the problem which Libya faces. In light of the multinational purchases of military weapons and equipment their supply and maintenance system has become one that is practically unmanageable. Their system requires a considerable amount of outside assistance to include technicians that are familiar with and trained on the various types of equipment. This again becomes a severe limiting factor in sustaining combat operations for any length of time against a capable enemy force. It remains questionable whether those personnel who are hired from nations outside Libya would remain in their positions if Libya was to go to war, thus creating an insurmountable problem for the Libyan armed forces at a most critical time.

In an attempt to overcome some of the manning problems within its combat forces, Libya has created a multi-national “Islamic Legion.” This action has the possibility of solving some of their manpower problems in the short-term. However, over time, financing of such a force will require a sizeable portion of the military budget which may become a major issue to be dealt with in the future.
Qaddafi's goal of increasing the armed forces to 500,000 men is not attainable in any near time frame without a massive mobilization effort. If mobilization were to be undertaken it would have a severe impact on all the other sectors of the economy as well as the workforce required for the infrastructure. Consequently, it is unlikely that Qaddafi will take such an action unless truly threatened by outside forces.

Indications are that the training and readiness of the Libyan armed forces is far from being at a level to conduct efficient combat operations. It appears that it will take several years before such a level of proficiency can be achieved. Foreign personnel are required to fly and maintaining most of Libya's sophisticated aircraft. A situation that will continue for at least another five to ten years. Their new tanks will continue to be manned and maintained by personnel other than Libyans another situation that will not be reversed anytime soon. However, with the increased emphasis on military training within all the educational systems, the potential to reverse the aforementioned problems does exist. In the most recent years there has been a considerable improvement, mainly because of the training assistance provided by the East German forces. The most recent indication of training improvement was demonstrated during combat operations directed against Chad. Regardless of this improvement, Libya will require considerable additional training assistance in country as well as formal military school assistance requiring personnel to be sent to foreign nations for a number of years into the future.

Upon examination of Libya's military hardware inventory it becomes evident that Libya does not possess currently the ability to project power into areas of the world other than into nations on their immediate borders. Their lift capability by air or by sea is insufficient to project their
forces over any great distance, not to mention the sustainment of such a
force once introduced into a high intensity environment.

However, Qadhaafi continues to harbor the desire to invade and crush
the state of Israel. The possibility of this being achieved is very remote,
even if the current Libyan/Egyptian relationship was to change. Libya
would still have insurmountable difficulties in such a major adventure.
The difficulties Libya experienced during operations against Egypt in 1977
would be increased many times over, largely because of the vast distances
the Libyan force would be required to traverse as well as the extended
lines of communication that would exist.

Absent the capability to project power over great distances, then why
the large military force and the continuation of military expansionism?
Perhaps African adventurism is one of Libya's top priorities. Without any
force of consequences on the continent of Africa with the exception of
Egypt and Libya, provides Qadhaafi a real opportunity to seize control of
major portions of the area. Many leaders of North African nations pre-
ently fear this possibility, thus considerable military assistance has been
provided these nations from outside sources. A most recent example of this
Libyan adventurism was the invasion of Chad. Many see this as the begin-
nning of Qadhaafi's plan to bring a large area of the Sahara and Sahel under
Libyan control and the beginning of Qadhaafi's dream of a New Islamic
State. The probability of this happening in the new term is remote, how-
ever, over time the possibility exists. Libya possesses the capability to
sustain such cross border operations, but they would be costly and hence
degrade many other programs that are vital to the strength of Libya as a
nation. Therefore, such adventures will probably remain on a small scale
for the time being. Nonetheless, it is an issue that must be monitored by
the world community with the attitude of early prevention if required.

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ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF OIL

Oil from Libya does not possess that great of an impact on the US as long as substitute quantities are available from other sources. And it appears that they will be. However, it presents a problem to our allies, so, in the long-term it could become a problem to the United States.

Oil wealth will continue to sustain the Libyan economy, social structure and military for several years to come. It will provide for: the means to improve the standard of living, the increase in the level of education, improved medical facilities/benefits and the expansion and modernization of the armed forces, well into the next generation. Over time, this wealth should provide the means to become self-sufficient in production of arms and equipment. If this is achieved, Libya will take on even greater importance within the strategic setting. Thus, the situation with Libya must be monitored and weighed carefully to ensure that the United States and its allies are not placed at a disadvantage.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF LIBYA

The strategic importance of Libya is based on several factors. As a nation or separate entity the significance probably does not rate high. However, when viewed in the context of potential, probability, ability and capability, then strategic importance would rate fairly high. As pointed out Libya has the capability to influence the African nations through petro dollars, subversion, terrorism or military intervention. Geographically, Libya has the potential and capability to choke off naval traffic between Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. Thus, creating a sizeable problem for the US to influence actions that might have to be taken in that part of the world. Moreover, if Libya would on its own or under duress provide bases and
facilities to the Soviets, it would place the US at a great disadvantage in projecting power into that part of the world and it would threaten the southern flank of NATO. Conversely, it would seem in the best interests of the United States to seek an improvement in relations with Libya so as to counter the growing Soviet-Libyan relationship. Carrying this still further, improved relations between Libya and the United States could deny the Soviets base rights while providing critically needed base rights to the United States and its allies in support of possible future military operations in the region.
ENDNOTES


5. "Libya," p. 3.


23. Farley, p. 164.
25. Farley, p. 164.
32. Farley, p. 181.
33. Farley, p. 189.
34. El Fathaly, p. 21.
35. Farley, p. 265.
37. Nelson, p. 112.
38. Farley, p. 68.
42. Nelson, p. 133.
43. Nelson, p. 133.
45. Nelson, p. 137.
47. Nelson, p. 61.
49. El Fathaly, p. 18.
52. Nelson, p. 96.
55. Alexander, p. 833.


75. Nelson, pp. 241-244.


77. Wright, p. 203.


85. Howe, p. 15.

86. Nelson, p. 246.


89. Howe, p. 255.

90. Nelson, p. 255.


93. Wright, p. 201.
94. Howe, p. 15.
95. Howe, p. 16.
97. Wright, p. 203.
98. Howe, p. 16.
99. Howe, pp. 16-17.
100. Wright, p. 217.
103. Fisher, p. 570.
108. Wright, p. 257.
109. For a fuller treatment of this subject, see Omar el Oathaly, Political Development and Social Change in Libya, pp. 209-215.
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