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This paper analyzes the Department of Defense (DOD) approach to the defense and protection of its members against terrorism when serving abroad. The common as well as unique factors of DOD and each service were analyzed to determine if the guidance, service approaches and organization provide the network required to ultimately provide protection to the DOD member and his family serving abroad.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE DOD APPROACH

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REQUIREMENT

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Problem Statement: This paper analyzes the Department of Defense (DOD) approach to the defense and protection of its members against terrorism when serving abroad. The common as well as unique factors of DOD and each service were analyzed to determine if the guidance, service approaches and organization provide the network required to ultimately provide protection to the DOD member and his family serving abroad.

Conclusions: Protection of DOD personnel against terrorism is affected by:

1. the present program management within DOD.
2. limited training of middle and lower grade personnel on antiterrorism.
3. a separation of responsibility and authority in several of the service organizations.
4. a question of classification versus free flow of current information to all affected personnel.
5. unclear lines of authority and responsibility when the Department of State is the lead agency.
6. unclear guidance concerning proper action while a captive of terrorists under peacetime conditions.

Recommendations:

1. Examine the Code of Conduct and develop interservice interpretation on application during peacetime captivity.
2. Renew DOD Directive 2000.12 and clarify the role of Department of State, strengthen guidance to the DOD components and establish minimum standards of training.
3. Review classification requirements with the aim of releasing more current terrorist threat data.
4. Change service organizational structures for antiterrorism to insure a more functional structure.

5. Insure OSD staffing of the responsible agency is sufficient to attain compliance with DOD Directive 2000.12 by all affected parties.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study analyzes the Department of Defense approach to the defense and protection of its members against terrorism when serving abroad. The common as well as unique factors of each service were analyzed to determine if the guidance, service approaches and organization provide the network required to ultimately provide protection to the DOD member and his family serving abroad.

The study presupposes that the recent increase in the use of terrorism against U.S. military and civilian personnel overseas will continue to present major problems for the Department of Defense. Policies have been announced, plans formulated and programs created to inform and protect personnel against attack. As a result of decentralized management, the services have proceeded in many directions, causing duplication of effort and inefficiencies in some service approaches, resulting in a fragmented approach to protecting our personnel in foreign countries.

The analysis of organization, guidance, methods of preparation, both physical and mental, and resource adequacy substantiate the view that significant disparities exist which weaken the overall program. Facts support the conclusion that the DOD program is inadequate to provide antiterrorism protection to DOD personnel serving abroad.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of terrorism has generated a wealth of attention during the past decade. While political and sociological explanations for the proliferation of terrorism abound, none is more cogent than the observation that terrorism succeeds. This success is measured by media publicity, threat perception and the relative impunity with which terrorists act. In an examination of international hostage incidents, the Rand Corporation observed that:

... the terrorist tactic of seizing hostages for bargaining or publicity purposes is far from being irrational, mindless, ineffective, or necessarily perilous. There is almost an 80 percent chance that all members of the kidnapping team will escape death or capture ... there is a close to even chance that all or some ... demands will be granted and virtually a 100 percent probability of achieving worldwide or at least national publicity.1

The observation is limited to kidnapping incidents. When one considers that bombings represent approximately two-thirds of all terrorist activity,2 it may be inferred that the overall rate of success increases significantly, inasmuch as the bomb tactic involves inherently less risk to the perpetrator than does kidnapping. In either event, the immediate payoff of publicity is an incentive for additional acts, even if the long-range political objective remains unattained.

The current working definition of terrorism, as expressed by the Department of State's (DOS) Office for Combating Terrorism, is as follows:
The threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims.\(^3\)

Publications of DOS reflect that during the period 1968 to 1981, victims of international terrorism represented 131 different countries. Thirty-eight percent of the attacks during the period were directed against American citizens. It is suggested that the disproportionate share of American victims reflects the view that Americans are seen as symbols of wealth and power targeted as an expression of resentment toward Western economic power, military strength and political ideology. An analysis of terrorism worldwide, without regard to the nationality of the victim, reflects that 40 percent of total incidents are directed against diplomats followed by businessmen and military personnel in that order. Significantly, attacks against military personnel are increasing at the greatest rate at this time. Statistics for U.S. citizen targets from 1968 to 1981 show that U.S. businessmen, primarily in Latin America, have been the primary targets of the more serious casualty producing attacks, though in recent years such attacks have been directed against U.S. diplomats and military personnel at a greater rate. For example, during 1981 in West Germany, a total of 30 attacks were targeted against U.S. personnel and property, a higher number than occurred in any previous year. These attacks included numerous bombings of U.S. facilities by the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the attempted assassination of General Kroesen, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR), in September 1981.\(^4\)

Against the backdrop of terrorist proliferation and success, this study assumes that terrorism directed against Department of Defense (DOD) personnel
abroad will increase substantially in the next decade and will require
increased awareness, action and resource dedication to effectively protect
such personnel. This assumption is supported by the trend evident from
historical events, societal desensitization toward violence, the acceptance of
violence as an implicit occupational risk for military and police personnel,
the increased exposure of military personnel abroad, intelligence information
supporting the notion of a loosely organized international terrorist network,
and the readily availability of weapons and explosives with which to carry out
terrorist attacks.

It has been suggested that terrorist groups fall into two categories;
universalists who focus on the vague objective of a world socialist
revolution, and separatists who seek specific territorial gains. It is likely
that a terrorist organization will display elements of both groups. The
identification of motivating factors which characterize a particular terrorist
group is of little value in determining the type, as opposed to situs, of
action to be taken by that group. The brutality, fanaticism and apparent
randomness of terrorist action are not the logical result of government
repression, individual pathologies or revolutionary ideology. In collecting
antiterrorist intelligence, the motivation of a terrorist group may prove to
be valuable in determining where and when an attack might come.

It is essential to recognize that the victim of terrorism is almost
incidental to the drama into which he or she is drawn. Terrorism is for the
benefit of the audience, and the more daring the act, the larger the
anticipated audience. The ultimate success of some terrorist events may be
measured by the publicity attained and the forum provided by the media,
frequently at the terrorist's request. The fear engendered by the terrorist's act is not limited to the immediate victim. The intimidation and consequent coercion may extend to any member of the audience who regards the government as incapable of providing protection, as evidenced by the terrorist's act. To deny the terrorist his stage by denying him his target is the first objective of any antiterrorist effort. This is accomplished by effective intelligence collection and training to minimize the risk to individual potential targets. After a terrorist act, the legitimacy of government may be measured both internally and externally by the appropriateness and effectiveness of its response. This requires policies and procedures carefully developed in anticipation of terrorist attacks. In sum, the protection and training of potential terrorist victims is the obligation of government.

Methodology

This study will examine the programs and policies of the DOD, its component agencies, and other agencies which interface with DOD, to determine whether the United States has adequately prepared to protect DOD personnel traveling in or stationed abroad who may become subject to terrorist attack. A review of the responsibilities of each service and DOD will be undertaken in order to assess compliance with taskings, comprehensiveness of effort, and potential deficiencies. Individual component reviews will be considered to determine strengths and weaknesses, redundancies and effectiveness. Analysis of key elements of the plans, programs and policies developed by each service and DOD will be both comparative and qualitative. An analysis of the various programs of the services, DOS and DOD must necessarily be limited in scope to
the concerns of this paper. The analysis conducted will seek to present general observations about organizational structure, guidance and directives, and an evaluation of the relative effectiveness of programs in preparing potential targets of terrorism for overseas duty. The analysis will focus on antiterrorism efforts particularly and counterterrorism efforts only as they impact on victim preparedness and immediate response guidance. Analysis and consequent evaluation will result in recommendations for improving the U.S. effort to meet the threat.

Scope

This study considers the adequacy of DOD and component element programs to prepare and protect potential terrorist victims. Excluded from consideration are applicable operations plans for responding to a terrorist incident. The sensitivity of specific antiterror intelligence collection techniques and sources places it beyond the purview of this paper, and an analysis of motivation of specific terrorist groups has not been undertaken. Rather, the focus of this paper is on the individual potential victim of a terrorist incident, and the measures to be taken to protect that victim. The subject of counterterrorism is a complicated component of the total spectrum of personnel protection and terrorism. As such, counterterrorism can only properly be reviewed through a separate study.
Legal Considerations

United States military forces are currently stationed in almost one hundred foreign countries. In most cases, there are specific agreements between the United States and each host nation which provide for the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to protection of these military forces. These agreements are entered into by equal governments, or sovereigns, for the purpose of expressing or modifying the customary international rules governing the presence of military forces of one nation within the boundaries of another.

The fundamental legal consideration in dealing with terrorism abroad is the concept of sovereignty, the lawful exercise of authority by a nation. Sovereigns are equal in law. No sovereign may lawfully infringe upon the legitimate rights of another without implied or expressed permission. The traditional rule of international law implicitly provides that a host nation, permitting forces of a friendly nation with whom it is at peace, to enter its territory and remain, has an affirmative obligation to protect the visiting force. This obligation does not preclude the visiting nation from exercising customary disciplinary jurisdiction over its soldiers.

The inherent right of the sovereign, represented by the commander in a foreign nation, to take those measures which are necessary to preserve the existence of his forces, is recognized in international law. It is this relationship between the duty of the host to protect, and the right of the visiting force to protect itself, which raises the necessity of diplomatic channels to resolve potential inconsistencies of action.
The law concerning host nation responsibilities is not the sole legal consideration for the U.S. commander abroad in dealing with terrorism. Beginning in 1937, international conventions address various aspects of terrorism, including attacks against aircraft, unlawful seizure of aircraft, internationally protected persons, and prevention and punishment of terrorism. The United States is a signatory to many of these treaties, and incurs certain obligations under them. With the involvement of DOS as the lead agency in combating terrorism abroad, it may be anticipated that the treaty obligations of the United States under these international conventions will be a matter of familiarity by appropriate embassy personnel. Nonetheless, exigent circumstances may require the commander to act swiftly to protect U.S. military personnel, before DOS involvement and coordination. It is essential that the legal advisor to such a commander be aware of the applicability of these international conventions. Even where the United States is not a signatory, such as the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, the sensitivity of international relations may dictate that the treaty provisions be observed.

The vast majority of U.S. military personnel stationed abroad are located in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, Korea, Japan and the Philippines. The treaty agreements between each of these countries and the United States are similar. Specifically, the provisions of paragraph 10(a) and (b), Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was the basis for similar agreement in the SOFAs negotiated with Iceland, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Korea. The treaty relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) will be used as a
model for analysis. A review of the applicable treaties for any other country is essential before any specific action is undertaken.

With respect to treaty approved action taken within an installation, U.S. forces have the right to police installations occupied by them to insure the maintenance of order and security of such installations. They must insure that German authorities can take such action as is necessary to safeguard German interests. Mutual cooperation will be undertaken to insure smooth implementation of such measures as each party undertakes to protect their respective interests and representatives will be appointed to agree on necessary implementing measures.

Outside the boundaries of installations made available for their exclusive use, U.S. forces have limited authority. Military police will be employed only subject to arrangements negotiated with FRG authorities and only to maintain discipline and order among U.S. forces. Such employment includes the patrol of public facilities. U.S. military police have the authority to arrest or take into temporary custody persons who are not members of the force if such person is caught in the act of committing a crime and is likely to flee or cannot be identified. They also may arrest or take into temporary custody a person when there are strong reasons to suspect that such person has committed or is attempting to commit any offense within or directed at an installation occupied by U.S. forces.
While these provisions limit the exercise of police power outside the premises of an installation designated for exclusive U.S. forces' use, they do not infringe on the inherent right of self defense. Implicit in every agreement is the right set forth in Article III of the Korean Agreed Minutes:

It is agreed that in event of an emergency, the United States Armed Forces shall be authorized to take such measures in the vicinity of the facilities and areas as may be necessary to provide for their safeguarding and control.

The self defense measures to be taken must be commensurate with the situation and prior consultation must be undertaken if time allows.

U.S. Policy Toward International Terrorism

In response to the proliferation of international terrorism, President Reagan has reaffirmed the strict "no concessions" policy of previous administration. U.S. policy provides for resisting terrorist blackmail and promoting the pursuit of terrorists. The U.S. will not pay ransom, nor release prisoners, and will not bargain for the release of hostages. Through efforts on the diplomatic front, U.S. policy encourage other governments to adopt similar policies. Host governments are expected to exercise their responsibilities under international law to protect U.S. citizens from terrorist actions. Should an American citizen be taken hostage, assistance can be provided to the host government, if requested. The host government will be urged to make no concessions to terrorist demands. Any concessions to terrorist blackmail would endanger others as it would encourage terrorists to resort to additional violence to attain political objectives. Furthermore, the United States will respond effectively and vigorously, exercising the use
of all appropriate resources at its disposal. In January 1981, on welcoming home the Tehran hostages, President Reagan stated; "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international justice are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I (Pages 1-10)

1Jenkins, B. M., Johnson, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (1977), Numbered lives: Some Statistical Observations from 77 International Hostage Episodes (P-5905) Santa Monica, CA., RAND.


5The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon and others, 7 CRANCH 117, 1812.

CHAPTER II
CURRENT PROGRAMS

Department of Defense

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2000.12, 12 February 1982, addresses the protection of DOD personnel abroad. It constitutes a broad statement of responsibilities, decentralizing primary antiterrorist effort to each service. It states the scope, policies and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD/ISA) and the heads of DOD components and provides guidance for each service to implement its own regulation on terrorism. Unlike its predecessor directive, which was issued in May 1976, it distinguishes between antiterrorism and counterterrorism, thereby focusing attention on prevention (antiterrorism) as well as response (counterterrorism). The new directive also deals with terrorism without regard to situs, whereas its predecessor limited the applicability of the directive to overseas.

The fundamental approach of DOD is to provide guidance and policy to DOD components, defined as Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), each military department, the Unified and Specified Commands and the defense agencies. Each component is then tasked with total responsibility for advising high risk personnel, protection of personnel, installations and activities, and coordination with commanders and chiefs of missions. The ASD/ISA is tasked to monitor and coordinate the DOD components' activities and to provide assistance to the components. Within this office, a small element staffed with two officers has the responsibility for the day to day management of this function.
The Unified and Specified Commands are given the additional responsibility of coordinating with local police agencies and serving as points of contact with U.S. embassies and host country officials concerning policies and measures.

Within this framework, the DOD components are directed to develop plans and policies to deal with the terrorist threat.

Department of the Army

The threat of terrorism has been a fact of life for the U.S. Army in overseas areas since at least 1972. The bombing of the Frankfurt Officers Club and Headquarters U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) in Heidelberg by the Baader-Meinhof gang in that year directed the energies of the Army in Europe to actions to combat terrorism. The growth of terrorism since that time has served to expand the Army's focus on such activities.

Prior to the incidents of 1972, the terrorist threat to Army personnel was confined to those persons serving with embassy staffs and military advisory groups in high risk areas. The random victims claimed by the Baader-Meinhof attacks signaled the fact that all service members overseas, without regard to their status, would be considered logical and potential targets of attack. Since the Army has the largest number of personnel stationed in foreign countries, it became apparent that specific measures were necessary to assure terrorism had minimum impact on service personnel and the mission of the Army.

Acting on DOD Directive 2000.12, the Army implemented programs to combat terrorism. The worldwide diversification of Army troop locations caused Department of the Army (DA) to take a centralized policy/decentralized
execution approach to the problem. DA directed that certain activities take place to deter the success of terrorist actions but left the manner in which these activities were executed to the discretion of the local commander. In implementing DOD Directive 2000.12, DA's focus was on training, information and assistance in defensive measures based on a threat analysis and the mission of a specific command. Beyond the individual training requirements, procedures for protection of personnel and property were to be formalized and contingency plans established to provide immediate response to incidents occurring on any Army installation worldwide (AR 190-52, 1978).

Initially, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) was responsible for all activities to combat terrorism on Army installations except for intelligence. With the publication of revised DOD Directive 2000.12 in February 1982, which defined antiterrorist and counterterrorist activities separately, the DCSPER became responsible for antiterrorism (security of facilities and persons, training, information) while the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) assumed responsibility for counterterrorism (planning for and response to terrorist attacks). The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) has responsibility for intelligence collection and dissemination.

As may be expected in any management environment where decentralized execution of general policy is the norm, responses at the field level to policy direction have been varied and multifaceted. In areas of high terrorist threat, commanders usually establish a single responsible office to combat terrorism and plans are developed and tested. In areas of low terrorist threat, that activity conducted results from specific efforts on the
part of the activity which assumes primary interest, normally the Provost Marshal or Security Officer. While many positive actions occur on low threat installations where the Provost Marshal has an interest, the absence of an immediate terrorist threat usually results in low command interest and unwillingness to devote resources to antiterrorist training and planning. In general terms, the high threat/low threat dichotomy equates to overseas elements (high threat) versus elements in the continental United States (CONUS) (low threat). As documented in an unpublished Doctoral Dissertation\(^1\) serious gaps, as perceived by local provost marshals, exist in planning and preparedness to combat terrorism at local levels. The study concludes that terrorism is perceived as a continuing and future threat to Army personnel, particularly overseas, and high risk personnel are not viewed as adequately protected from the threat. The study summarized these findings and recommended that action be taken by DA to address these perceptions on the part of local law enforcement officials.

DA has taken a number of steps to maintain and improve the anti and counterterrorism posture of Army personnel.

a. The U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) operates a staff officer level counterterrorism course to teach proper contingency planning and response to installation staff officers. The course has not been adequate to reach the wide audience requiring this training and, in the wake of the Dozier incident, it was exported to USAREUR by a mobile team to train the many community staffs which might need to deal with such incidents. It is now intended that the course be exported on a yearly basis.
b. The Army has published a pamphlet on personal security precautions against terrorist attack and requires all personnel traveling to high risk areas to receive a copy of the pamphlet. Again in the wake of the Dozier incident, the Army has directed preparation of classified and unclassified intelligence briefings and standardized terrorist awareness briefings. Lessons learned pamphlets have been obtained from the Air Force and distributed to all commands.

c. As a result of developing contingency plans to respond to terrorist incidents, the need for Special Reaction Teams (SRT) has been evident and extensive effort has been devoted to establishing and training such teams at all Army installations. These are essentially the equivalent of civilian police SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams and usually consist of specially selected and trained military police or security guards. Some major difficulties exist in this program. Since such units are "taken out of the hide," staffing and training them in an era of high personnel turbulence is a burden on most police and security units, particularly at smaller installations. Equipping such units with counterterrorist weapons such as sniper rifles is a second burden which many installations have found difficult to overcome. Without regard to these difficulties, most such teams are trained and prepared to respond. The previously cited dissertation concluded that more than 70 percent of responding provost marshals either had an SRT or had immediate access (2 hours) to one. The Air Force has established a training school for these units and the Army is currently programming FY 83 Army attendance needs to utilize this course to "train the trainers." Because of the number of Army installations, all teams cannot attend the course. Leaders will be sent and
then return to fully train their unit. A successful effort in this area will improve the training status of Army SRTs.

d. The Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) has been responsible for providing personal protective services for the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he is an Army general. The CID in the field further provides protective services to other high ranking officers when the threat justifies the need and resources permit. Local military police provide VIP protective services when the threat justifies the need or as directed. In areas of high risk, the need for protective services runs across service lines and often exceeds the capabilities of local law enforcement. Such services are provided in addition to normal investigative missions and are only staffed full time at Secretary of Defense level. In connection with providing protective services, VIP drivers and selected Military Police are to be trained in defensive driving techniques in the coming year at the Federal Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. The CID further assures that selected investigators are trained in hostage negotiation so as to provide services to installations requiring such expertise.

f. The DCSPER representatives regularly participate in DOD working groups on antiterrorism making recommendations on the development of personal protective measures and coordinating logistical requirements for items like armored vehicles. The Army also participates in a quarterly meeting of the Security Chiefs of each service which includes a functioning terrorist working group as a part of its activity.
The effectiveness of the DA program rests fully on the shoulders of the local commander who must make a reasoned estimate of the terrorist threat to his command and allocate reasonable resources to counter the threat. Because of this reliance on the local commander, implementation of programs are and will be varied from virtually non-existent to highly effective. Fortunately, this continuum of non-existent to highly effective seems, in general, to coincide with the continuum from low threat to high threat environments. Some improvements in the policy directive can be made to match the policy realistically with the reality that exists.

Department of the Navy

Although Navy ships, installations and personnel suffered much less from acts of terrorism than the other services, compliance with new DOD directives and initiatives was stimulated by an increasing worldwide threat. DOD Directive 2000.12 has been implemented by the current Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 3850.1A promulgated December 1982. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 3850.4, promulgated in 1979, is currently under revision. Some actions required by the DOD Directive have been implemented by the Navy. Others are still under review and evaluation for development of specific directives and actions, and several have not been undertaken.

The Navy's approach to terrorism is based upon threats that could inhibit the Navy's ability to perform its mission. These threats, as viewed by the Navy, are different in magnitude and scope than those faced by the other services. While Army and Air Force personnel assignments and placement of
resources and material abroad number in the hundred thousands, total Navy military, civilian and dependent personnel deployments overseas number only in the low ten thousands, a fraction of the total U.S. overseas commitment. Conversely, the Navy's dispersion of installations is extensive, consisting of bases for maintenance and repair, communications and intelligence collection. These are essential to successful accomplishment of the Navy's mission. Further, U.S. Marine Corps detachments exist at most overseas embassies.

By far the largest concentration of Naval personnel abroad at any time results from deployed U.S. Naval ships and aircraft squadrons in or near various ports around the world. The terrorist threat against a naval ship is different from that faced by military personnel permanently stationed ashore. Because of the classified nature, unpredictability and the tight security associated with ship and aircraft squadron movements, the exposure to terrorist attack is substantially reduced. When in port with a large percentage of the crew ashore, the threat to Naval personnel increases. The many small activities abroad, including training and advisory teams, small intelligence and communications facilities and liaison/administrative activities are particularly vulnerable to terrorist acts. An active anti-terrorism program where the threat is high is essential to meet this threat.

The Navy's organizational approach to terrorism has been aimed primarily at prevention. Under the SECNAV, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) are tasked to:

a. develop guidance to protect military and civilian personnel and resources from terrorist acts.
b. ensure all units and activities develop procedures, guidance, and instructions for addressing local terrorist threats and security against those threats.

c. coordinate antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts with other military services.

d. provide timely intelligence on terrorist threats to naval personnel and dependents.

e. monitor measures taken to protect naval personnel and resources from terrorist acts.

CNO and CMC directives reemphasize SECNAV policies and relegate to local commands and fleet commanders responsibility for development of protective plans and procedures to combat terrorism based on local conditions, threats and resources available. Specifically, appropriate commanders are required to periodically warn and instruct all personnel, whether permanently or temporarily assigned, of the terrorist threats in theater and to insure that subordinate installations and ships under their control develop and maintain active programs for combating local terrorist threats. The Director of Naval Investigative Service (NIS) is designated the action officer for OPNAV anti-terrorism and counterterrorism efforts within the Navy. This task involves developing guidance concerning the protection of naval personnel, providing guidance and assistance to local commanders in preparing briefing programs and vulnerability assessments and, on a selective basis, providing protective services for VIPs and high ranking officers. Under the Director of Naval Intelligence, a Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (Security) has recently
been established with specific responsibility for consolidating previously
diverse efforts in law enforcement and physical security matters.

The Navy, following the kidnapping of General Dozier by the Red Brigades
in Italy in 1981, increased antiterrorism briefings for high ranking naval
officers permanently or temporarily assigned overseas. Additionally, pro-
tective services by NIS agents was expanded almost immediately for all high
ranking officers in Italy and other Mediterranean countries. Later, NIS
agents were requested to provide similar protective services for non-Navy
military officers and U.S. Government officials in the Mediterranean area.
Concurrently, NIS developed and presented terrorist threat briefings to all
commands in the Mediterranean area and to commands and staffs in Europe and
CONUS. These briefings are available on an unscheduled, as needed basis.
Increased efforts were also expended in other countries but not to the extent
or for the duration given to the Mediterranean. Only recently have
evaluations begun of the ability of activities and units in and about the
Mediterranean to deal with a genuine terrorist attack.

In the Navy, between 1976 and 1981, annual budget submissions for
supporting efforts to combat terrorism were additive to existing NIS
expenditures, increasing little when compensated for inflation. Shortly
following the kidnapping of General Dozier, the Navy requested and received a
sizeable ($100K) budget supplement to cover increased costs resulting from a
sharp rise in demand for protective services, training and education programs.
Subsequently, additional personnel billets were requested incident to a Navy
wide reorganization which consolidated previously fragmented Navy agencies
dealing with installation physical security, law enforcement and program
management under the Director of NIS. As a result, some two hundred new billets in NIS were established while reductions in force were made in agencies previously responsible for these functions.

Today, the protective services provided by NIS for flag and senior officer and civilian officials have been somewhat reduced. Most Navy training and education threat briefings are conducted under NIS direction and control. NIS officials, in conjunction with the other services, also conduct terrorist threat briefings for all Navy flag officers and their dependents before departure for overseas duty. Other senior officers and dependents may also receive briefings. Middle and junior grade officers and enlisted personnel receive only general threat briefings and guidance after arrival in-country. NIS also provides technical assistance and threat summaries to the other services and assists with in-service training seminars for law enforcement and intelligence personnel. As the action office, NIS officials act as the Navy's representative at key meetings on terrorism with Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), DOD and Navy Department officials. Most of the Navy's efforts in development, promulgation and coordination of policy and planning are vested in the NIS. Few other naval officers or enlisted personnel are deeply involved or actively participate in antiterrorism programs.

Within the NIS organization, an active program of threat briefings and training of agents in terrorist tactics and techniques is conducted regularly. This program is supplemented by periodic detailed evaluations of field agent's programs. These evaluations include assessment of field agent ability to act as negotiators in realistic simulated terrorist situations, a task for which many NIS agents have received special training. Emphasis is
also placed at the field agent level on assisting commanding officers and staffs of activities and units in the development of effective antiterrorism training and education programs and crisis management teams. Weekly terrorist summaries are developed and provided commanders in most areas where large numbers of Navy personnel reside ashore or where ship movements increase the risk of a terrorist incident. Threat summaries are unclassified whenever possible to permit wide dissemination of information without risking a public announcement. On occasion, separate summaries and briefings are provided to Marine Corps Detachments at embassies and remote naval installations. The degree of dissemination of this material to lower echelons and individuals varies widely with individual commands.

Directly related to the education and training effort is the Navy's increased emphasis on the development of crisis management plans and teams to respond to terrorist acts. The visibility given this program through daily drills and exercises and the demonstration of resolve is a preemptive communication discouraging would-be terrorists. With no control military police organization similar to that of the Army and Air Force, crisis management team organizations must be developed by individual commands and stations from existing personnel and material resources. Under present CINNAV directives, each command and unit is expected to develop, train and periodically exercise their crisis management team using locally prepared plans. Some of the plans developed to date, reviewed and evaluated by NIS, show variations and gaps in understanding of requirements. Accordingly, NIS is developing a standard command crisis action plan to consolidate the best portions of existing Army, Navy and Air Force plans for dissemination to all Navy organizations.
Over a period of several years, the Air Force has had the unfortunate experience of encountering terrorism firsthand. Throughout the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s, Air Force personnel primarily serving in remote places such as Iran and Turkey were confronted with acts of terrorism to include bombings and the killing of senior Air Force representatives. At this early point in the current cycle of modern day terrorism, the Air Force took the lead and established policy and guidance which addressed terrorism and the Air Force member. This early guidance, though directive in nature, was not taken seriously and received limited discussion and effort. Most Air Force members serving overseas were never made aware of Air Force Regulation (AFR) 124-5 pertaining to terrorism or the threat. Most members serving in NATO received threat information from local wanted posters throughout the military and civilian community which offered rewards for information on local terrorists. Intelligence on the terrorist threat seldom reached the average airman because of classification of data and an overriding concern for the creation of false panic in the minds of service members or their dependents.

The impetus behind today's Air Force policy guidance started in 1976. At that time, the Air Force was confronted with terrorism, not in the Middle East or South America, but in the heart of Western Europe. The bombing of the Officers' Club at Rhein Main Air Base, West Germany, brought terrorism to the forefront in NATO. This increased awareness was somewhat short lived as the average service member in Western Europe soon went about freely traversing Europe with little concern for the terrorist threat. On August 12, 1981, the Air Force was once again confronted by an act of terrorism when the headquarters for the United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE), Ramstein Air Base,
FRG, was severely damaged by a terrorist bomb. Suddenly base gates were closed, access areas were controlled and the Air Force leaders brought the subject of terrorism to the forefront. Terrorism was no longer insignificant or isolated incidents which primarily affected air attaches in isolated regions of the world.

In support of DOD Directive 2000.12, the Air Force is organizationally aligned in support of antiterrorism and counterterrorism. On the prevention side, the Inspector General of the Air Force establishes policy, direction and guidance on antiterrorism through the newly formed Office of Antiterrorism (AF/IGT). Implementation then is conducted through the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and the base level security offices.

Air Force Regulation 208-1, the Air Force Antiterrorism program, outlines the program and responsibilities for antiterrorism in the Air Force. As stated in the summary of changes, this new regulation stresses the preventive, defensive nature of the antiterrorism program in contrast to the responsive nature of counterterrorism measures. AFR 208-1 sets the stage for an improved personal awareness, improved preventive measures and the improved distribution of information on the terrorist threat.

Air Force members and their dependents need to be aware of the terrorist threat in the area in which they are serving. Existing AFR 124-5 and Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 30-10, Security Precautions for Air Force Personnel Traveling Abroad, seek to warn Air Force personnel on acts of terrorism abroad. Continued individual awareness training and protection under AFR 208-1, lies with the overseas installation commander. The amount of information and the method of portraying the threat is unclear and is an area now under further
study. A fine line exists between giving the needed information and constraining information to prevent an over reaction or compromise of a classified source. A concern was prevalent that too much information would scare the dependents enough to inhibit voluntary assignments in some areas. The attainment of good data was also presented as a difficulty factor since the numerous channels of reporting intelligence data tend to be vertical in nature. The Naval Intelligence Agency, State Department, Office of Special Investigations and the Defense Intelligence Agency all collect and report terrorist threat information; yet the lack of formal cross-flow and classification tend to prevent proper distribution to the individual. The Air Force OSI has taken the lead and has prepared several excellent documents that tell of the terrorist threat in general and in specific areas. The OSI Executive Handbook on Terrorism, Security and Survival, and the many antiterrorism commentaries provide in depth data and guidance for the individual being assigned to areas with a high terrorist threat. Although intended for issue to personnel serving in high threat areas, document safeguard provisions have the potential to restrict distribution to all personnel abroad.

Preventive measures against terrorist attacks are primarily a function of training. The Air Force training is now geared toward the high risk target and selected enforcement personnel. An extensive seminar for high ranking Air Force officers is now taught to insure current data on residential, personal, family and travel security is available. This training is expensive and is highly individualized resulting in limited training for anyone other than our general officer force. As terrorists are known to prefer soft targets, this "General Only" approach to training could increase the threat to lower ranking
Air Force members. The death of Army LTC Ray in Paris and the early morning bombing of the USAFE Headquarters building on Ramstein Air Base, Germany, supports the notion that individuals other than high risk targets need to be trained. Although antiterrorist training is available at Hurlburt Field, Florida, it is not possible or desirable to mandate such a course for all Air Force personnel. As the threat in each area varies, the policy of unit training for both the individual and dependents reflects a sound policy. The present ad hoc approach to this training is recognized by AF/IQT as a program shortcoming needing command guidance, development and enforcement.

Possibly the most progressive antiterrorism program in the Air Force is protective services. Recognizing that protection starts with an awareness of the threat, the first element of protection deals with the collection, analysis and dissemination of terrorist threat data. The Air Force OSI has streamlined the intelligence gathering function in one office. Specifics on methods of protection and the depth of protection are classified. The active efforts of the protective agencies, the Security Police and OSI, have resulted in a force capable of providing protection to the Air Force high risk targets. Participation in technology development and procurement, personnel training, on-site analysis of security, visibility studies on personal habits and intensive protection of key personnel underlines the total spectrum of the protective effort. The philosophy pursued by OSI and Air Force units in areas of high threat is not IF a terrorist attack will occur, but WHEN it will occur. The future of the Air Force protection program will be dependent upon the sincerity and intensity of the local programs and individual preparedness.
As the Air Force addressed the growing potential for terrorist acts against Air Force facilities and personnel, management recognized that guidance reflecting peacetime conduct for Air Force personnel detained by unfriendly governments or terrorist groups was needed. JCS guidance on the subject states that military personnel detained in violation of international law, short of war, would be guided by the Code of Conduct. Following this directive, the Air Force published guidance which clearly defined a standard of conduct for its personnel to follow should they be detained during peacetime. This guidance recognized that certain articles of the Code could be detrimental under peacetime hostage situations. The new guidance supplements the spirit and intent of the Code of Conduct to enhance the members' chances of "survival with honor."

A significant part of this supplemental guidance deals with the military chain of command. Although the Code of Conduct addresses the chain of command in Article IV, the mechanism for confusion exists when military members are detained with civilian officials who are not guided by the Code of Conduct. In such a case, the supplemental guidance provides that the senior military member is in charge of all other military personnel and is the only military member who is to deal with the senior civilian member. The intent is to standardize the reaction of all military members and to insure that only one set of orders reaches all military members.

A second significant element of the Air Force guidance is to encourage dialogue with the captors. This type activity under Article V of the Code of Conduct is to be avoided. For a hostage in a terrorist situation survival is believed to be enhanced when the captive can open a dialogue with the captor.
and subsequently is perceived as an individual rather than a victim of their hatred. Such a dialogue buys time which, in the case of terrorist acts, is known to be on the side of the captive.

Department of State

The lead agency for combating terrorism abroad, as designated by the National Command Authority, is DOS. Because of the impact of DOS on U.S. military actions in foreign countries when confronted by terrorist acts, it is appropriate to address DOS in this study. Although other governmental agencies have overseas responsibilities, none impact on DOD in this area as much as DOS. Appropriately, DOS also accepts a responsibility for protecting its employees against terrorism overseas and a review of their programs contributes to a comparative analysis of DOD programs in this area.

The Office for Combating Terrorism is directed by an assistant secretary level director who is confirmed as an ambassador while holding the position. The director concurrently holds the position of Coordinator for Security Policies and Programs for the DOS. The basic functions of the office are as follows:

a. consultation and coordination with other governments on terrorism and security issues.

b. responding to overseas terrorist incidents.

c. coordinating U.S. Government policy and response on terrorism.

d. coordinating internal DOS policy and programs on security and terrorism.
In support of these functions, activities include the following:

a. negotiating and consultation with other governments and the United Nations, NATO, etc.

b. chairing the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

c. providing direction and core personnel for task forces responding to overseas terrorist incidents to carry out the department's lead role in such incidents.

d. developing and management of an antiterrorism training program for foreign government officials.

e. chairing interagency advisory committee on terrorism.

f. chairing the departmental policy group on security policies and programs and contingency planning.

g. developing policies and programs on protection of U.S. Government diplomatic personnel overseas and monitoring execution of these programs. Contingency planning and actions on threats to our diplomatic missions, evacuation of personnel, etc.

h. representing DOS on the White House committee on worldwide security threats.

i. formulating policy on protection of foreign diplomatic and consular personnel in the United States.

j. developing and monitoring an antiterrorism training program for U.S. personnel overseas.

The DOS operational antiterrorism program is managed by four divisions of the Office of Security (O/SY); Operations, Protective Security, Personnel Security and Investigations, and Policy, Training and Information. Six
Associate Directors represent the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security with regards to his responsibility for the security of U.S. missions in foreign countries. Each Associate Director serves an advisory/supervisory function for more than 100 Regional Security Officers (RSO) assigned to U.S. embassies worldwide. Responsibilities of RSO's which pertain to terrorism include the development of contingency plans to cope with bomb threats, acts of terrorism, riots, demonstrations and internal defense of embassies. RSO responsibilities also include the general protection of government property, supervision of Marine Security Guards at embassies, protective services for potential American targets of terrorist organizations and maintaining liaison with host government and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence organization officials. They also conduct antiterrorism training and indoctrination programs for U.S. government employees, dependents and American businesses overseas.

The Office of Security Operations Division operates a 24-hour Command Center consisting of two sections; the Watch Officer Group and the Threat Analysis Group. The Watch Officer Group provides 24-hour duty officer capability.

Working closely with the Watch Officers is the Threat Analysis Group which is responsible for the collection, research, analysis and dissemination of threat related intelligence to appropriate offices within the Office of Security and to other government agencies as appropriate. The group closely monitors activities of foreign terrorist organizations and provides threat assessments for use in security planning and specific antiterrorist program activities.
The Foreign Operations section under Operations Division, plans and implements the DOS security program for the protection of U.S. Government property, personnel and classified material at foreign service posts. Section officers review security plans and surveys developed by the RSO, participate in crisis management task forces and prepare security briefings for senior DOS officials and for security representatives of the American business community.

The Policy, Training and Information Division provides a variety of anti-terrorism training to both security professionals and U.S. Government employees and dependents. Mobile Training Teams provide instruction for foreign national guard forces, chauffeurs, and police officers who are trained in personal protection, firearms, recognition of explosives and emergency driving techniques. This division is also the primary contributor to the Coping with Violence Abroad Seminar which is given to all DOS employees and their adult dependents prior to being assigned overseas.

Three offices which participate in the crisis management activity of DOS are the Office of Security, the Office for Combating Terrorism and the DOS Operations Center. The Operations Center is responsible for the initial reporting and coordination in the event of a terrorist act directed against Americans (U.S. citizen, non-combatants) in foreign countries. They accomplish this responsibility through the DOS Emergency Action Manual of January 1982. The manual directs all U.S. diplomatic missions to develop contingency plans covering the following areas: Evacuation Preparedness; U.S. Military Evacuation Assistance; Emergency Destruction and Safehaven of Classified Material; Communications; Internal Defense of U.S. Missions; Bomb Threats; Fire Emergencies; Acts of Terrorism; Aircraft Hijacking; General Disasters; Press Guidance.
The Emergency Action Manual provides detailed instructions for all diplomatic posts concerning how to plan response to emergency situations falling in the areas listed above. Each post prepares and maintains its own Emergency Action Plan (EAP) which serves as the post's management tool in reacting to crisis situations. Departmental guidance for post reaction to terrorist attacks includes the following subjects: A statement of U.S. policy and specific policy guidance; Use of force; possible strategems which may be used in dealing with hostage situations such as delaying tactics, appeals (humanitarian/medical/release negotiations), communications, police liaison, aircraft hijacking guidance, and media guidance to include the designation of a spokesperson, rumor control, press liaison guidance.

Crisis management at Diplomatic Missions abroad is under the direction of the Chief of Mission, normally the Ambassador, of the post concerned. He has the responsibility for preparing emergency plans for his post and has full authority to implement those plans as necessary to protect U.S. interest. The Chief of Mission is assisted at posts by an Emergency Action Committee (EAC). This committee is responsible for the preparation and maintenance of the post EAP and the briefing of newly arrived personnel on the EAP procedures and general security/safety precautions at the post.

Guidelines for personnel who are taken hostage have been recently adopted by DOS and four other foreign affairs agencies; AID, USIA, Commerce and Agriculture. The complete official text of the guidelines is as follows:

U.S. Government personnel serving abroad are expected to be mature, responsible and patriotic individuals for whom the concept of service has a real and personal meaning. Individuals who are taken hostage should be aware that their captors may seek to exploit them. Their captors may be seeking information

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to be used to the detriment of the United States or of their fellow hostages, and are likely to use information obtained from one captive when interrogating another. Individuals should consequently be guided by the knowledge that whatever they say may be used to mislead or punish their colleagues and that their actions may result in reprisals. Captured individuals should not discuss sensitive aspects of the work of their fellow hostages. They should not divulge classified or sensitive information. They should not sign or make statements or take action which they believe might bring discredit to the United States. The decision to escape rests with the individual concerned. However, the decision should be consistent with the considerations set above. Hard and fast rules are not always helpful and the U.S. Government recognizes that the ability of individuals to resist extreme pressure differs. But to the extent possible, one must help one's colleagues and avoid exploitation. Sound judgement is essential.

The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism was created soon after the Reagan Administration assumed office and serves as the senior executive branch organization dealing exclusively with terrorism. The Interdepartmental Group formulates and coordinates policy and is composed of various U.S. agencies involved in combating international terrorism. The group is chaired by DOS and membership includes the Departments of Justice/FBI, Defense/JCS, Energy, Treasury, Transportation; The Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President. The Interdepartmental Group has no crisis management responsibilities. Crisis management responsibility at the national level belongs to the National Security Council and the President.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II (Pages 12-34)


2 JCS/J5 msg, UNCLASSIFIED, 122054Z Feb 82, Subj: Standards Applicable to Military Captives of Terrorists.

Organizational Structure

An analysis of the organizational structures of DOD, DOS and the military services provides an insight into the relative health of the individual terrorist management programs. Aggressive and responsive programs within each agency or service are best supported by organizations capable of responding to all facets of the subject.

Within OSD, the present organizational structure is inadequate to provide any effective monitoring function. Each service has proceeded to meet its antiterrorism responsibilities with disparate efforts. Little if any effort occurs to monitor the dysfunctional impact of these disparities in such areas as interservice cooperation, use of force, Code of Conduct and intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. To assume this task, DOD would require staffing commensurate with the degree of monitoring and evaluation undertaken.

A review of the organizational structure of the Services reveals that each service is implementing policy on protection of personnel against terrorism differently. On the one hand, the total Navy antiterrorism and counter-terrorist effort is the responsibility of the Director, NIS. Within the OPCNAV organization, there is no established structure to consolidate available NIS threat intelligence, promulgate it routinely to essential users, or to keep key deputies and their staffs informed of key policy issues and programs regarding terrorism. The structure does not exist to manage the requirements
determined and decided upon by JCS, DOD and interagency committees, and special problems of control and jurisdiction that develop, are not digested, evaluated and acted upon by all affected Navy agencies and codes. Since the key platform sponsors and staffs serve as the principle means of dissemination and collection of information between the fleet and OPNAV, keeping them well informed and current is vital to a successful antiterrorism and counterterrorism program. Such is not the case at present.

On the other hand, the Air Force reorganization capitalizes upon the separate elements of antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Lines of control, responsibility and action are clearly identified in the organization. At the same time, the Army represents a third organizational structure that has accommodated itself to the new DOD guidance in a less dramatic way than the Air Force but at the risk of separating responsibilities to the detriment of coordination and cooperation (e.g., the intelligence function is organizationally separate from the antiterrorism manager, which is separate from the counterterrorism manager. This does not facilitate communication and coordination.) The DOS organizational structure is not directly applicable to the services yet sets an example the others could follow. It is obvious that the DOS organization has benefitted from years of experience. The DOS organization is clearly aligned with the accomplishment of the worldwide mission in mind. Throughout the DOS, the identification of responsibility is organizationally supported by resources dedicated to meeting that responsibility.

Within the military services, the organizational structure of the Air Force is the most responsive to the new DOD guidance. The Air Force clearly
defines the lines of responsibility and is applying resources to the structure. The Army has made some realignment to accommodate the DOD guidance but resources have not been applied to the Program. Ultimate responsibility has been left to the commander to determine what resources to divert from other missions to deal with the terrorist threat as he sees it. The threat to the Navy from terrorism has had little impact on the structure within the Navy. Antiterrorism responsibilities are relegated to an organization outside normal operational channels.

In the final analysis, the organizational structures of the agencies and services reflect the degree to which each sees terrorism as a threat to their key personnel and dependents.

Guidance and Directives

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD/ISA), is tasked by DOD Directive 2000.12 to monitor programs, provide a forum for the exchange of ideas, provide assistance to the services, represent OSD at the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and maintain DOD 2000.12H, a handbook for dealing with terrorism. All other functions in the area of terrorism are delegated to the heads of DOD components, including the Secretary of each service. Notwithstanding the stated purpose of the DOD directive to:

... establish uniform DOD policies and responsibilities and give guidance on dealing with assassinations, kidnappings, bombings and other terrorist threats ...
the directive's guidance is only in the broadest sense instructive and is, in fact, a general delegation to each service secretary. The guidance to inform and protect DOD personnel and their dependents, with particular attention to high risk targets, is so vague and yet so obvious as to be of no significant value.

While DOD has not reorganized its terrorist organization along the lines of the new definitions contained in the directive, the distinction between antiterrorism and counterterrorism has been helpful to those services which have organized to meet the discrete responsibilities imposed by that distinction.

Perhaps in recognition of the different requirements and resources of each service, no attempt to impose DOD direction on the services, beyond that stated above, is evident. The services appear to be content to have free reign. The apparent reluctance of DOD to assume a more positive monitor role explains the DOD structure in the area of terrorism. The functional area is attached to a much broader assistant secretariat, with a small streamlined subelement to perform the function. The size of this organization is adequate to meet the decentralized implementation policy, but the soundness of this policy is questionable.

The adequacy of the organization to meet its self-imposed mission is not dispositive of the issue. The balance to be struck is how much direction should be provided without interfering with the inherent service prerogatives. No test to strike this balance is articulated however; review of certain issues confronting the services indicates that enhanced DOD leadership, if for no other purpose than uniformity, would be of immense value.
Specifically, it appears that the Code of Conduct is inappropriate to the hostage environment and is at odds with DOS guidance to civilian personnel assigned to embassies. This discrepancy could result in the situation of hostages taken in an embassy seizure operating under completely disparate rules. Further complicating matters in an embassy seizure is the lack of guidance as to leadership of military personnel. The Air Force has attempted to remedy this with its supplemental guidance.

The designation of DOS as lead agency in combating terrorism abroad and the designation of the ambassador as Chief of Mission could be construed as a designation of a command role. It appears that this confusion has resulted in at least one deployment of military personnel at the direction of a Charge d'affaires. The absence of approval by the National Command Authority in this incident may have been unintentional but clearly serves to illustrate the difficulties to be expected when the lead agency abroad for combating terrorism is other than a military organization in the direct chain of command to the Commander in Chief.

Other areas where uniformity would assist the services in enhancing anti-terrorist effectiveness were voiced by various service representatives interviewed. These include guidance concerning the use of force, clarity in command and control, collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence and the establishment of lines of communication. Each area in which DOD asserts itself subjects DOD to the criticism of intervening into the operational arena or interfering with service prerogatives. Nonetheless, it appears that DOD has erred on the side of abrogating the very purpose stated in the DOD directive. Present uniform policies are too broad to be of value,
guidance in dealing with the types of terrorism is vague and the fixing of responsibilities amount to a total delegation of those aspects of the problem which are most likely to be effective in preventing terrorism.

Psychological Preparedness

The subject of what happens when one becomes a peacetime hostage is generally considered to be a subject covered under counterterrorism, however; to be psychologically prepared for captivity short of war cannot be deferred but must be dealt with in advance as a function of the individual's training as a defensive element of antiterrorism. Current guidance to individual military members who are subject to acts of terrorism and peacetime captivity is insufficient in the Army and Navy directives, is limited or too generalized in DOS guidance and is considered to be appropriately defined in Air Force policy. To "serve with honor" under conditions of peacetime captivity is complicated by current JCS direction on the use of the Code of Conduct. This direction refers to the Code of Conduct as a moral guide that is to be used by members who are victims of captivity short of war.¹

The Navy adheres to the strict interpretation of the JCS guidance on the Code of Conduct which, when literally interpreted, is in conflict with the Air Force supplemental guidance which recognizes that certain articles of the Code could be detrimental if enforced during peacetime captivity. The Army effort to psychologically prepare its members for peacetime terrorist captivity parallels that of the Navy as no new guidance is available to clarify the Army's position. To complicate matters, a likely scenario involving both civilian and military hostages is ignored by all but the Air Force policy.
DOS guidance does not spell out the interdependence and relationship of the civilian captive to the military captive. DOS guidance refers to all U.S. Government employees as if all members had received the same level of psychological training. This attitude does not recognize the fact that military members, regardless of service, tend to be more structured than their civilian counterparts. Once the issue of what is acceptable is established, all services must then insure that the proper instruction reaches the lowest individual in the chain of command.

Individual Preparedness

All services, including DOS have emphasized training and protection for high risk targets. All too often, high risk targets equate to high ranking officers. General officers and Ambassadors are more likely targets. As protection for high ranking personnel is increased, terrorists will focus on softer, unprotected targets, where their chances of success with minimum risk are significantly improved. Indeed, in recent years junior officers and enlisted personnel have been victims of terrorist attacks.

When large numbers of lower ranking personnel are included in the potential target group, the task of providing adequate protection exceeds the capability of both the U.S. and the host government. Considering that terrorist targeting is often unpredictable and random in nature, it is essential that all military personnel and their adult dependents be afforded antiterrorism training without regard to their rank or duty station overseas.

The DOD (ASD/ISA) is tasked with providing DOD components with necessary assistance to support their antiterrorist efforts. DOD Directive 2000.12 also
directs ASD/ISA to develop, publish and maintain the Handbook for Protection of DOD Personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts (DOD C-2000.12H, June 1977). In the introduction to the handbook, it is stated that the contents contain suggested protective measures which are not established as formal DOD guidance. The introduction further states that the guidance in the handbook is to be treated as ideas for consideration and evaluation by the DOD components in exercising their responsibilities under the directive. DOD components are not properly exercising their responsibilities to provide, to the extent practicable, for the protection of DOD personnel and their dependents overseas. DOD has not insured that proper training and guidance is afforded all military members and dependents assigned overseas.

A review of Air Force and Army training/briefing material for their personnel reflects well written, informative pamphlets and handbooks which describe and encourage protective measures which should be taken by service members and their dependents. There was no evidence that the Navy has published similar guidance for its personnel serving overseas or during calls at foreign ports. The services have developed antiterrorism briefing programs and some have mobile training teams which provide training or briefings upon the request of local commanders.

As noted previously in this report, the Air Force training program is geared to the high risk target and selected enforcement personnel. This individualized training is of excellent quality but does not adequately train low ranking personnel concerning personal protective measures, particularly at installations where the threat is low. It is recognized that alarming personnel and dependents with antiterrorist briefings and training can be a
problem in low threat areas. The commander does have a responsibility to adequately train all personnel and not only those believed to be high risk targets.

The Army has demonstrated an uneven approach to antiterrorist training due to the decentralized nature of policy execution. In high risk areas, training is excellent but in low threat areas little attention is directed toward individual preparedness. It is recognized that the Army has taken a number of steps to improve its antiterrorism program. These steps include the development of a staff officer level counterterrorism course, the development of a mobile training team and the distribution of pamphlets and information concerning personal security and terrorism. The effectiveness of the Army's program rests with the local commander. Because of this reliance on the commander, implementation of antiterrorist programs and training will be varied. There appears to be a need to focus training efforts on lower ranking personnel and dependents in a more uniform manner to insure that all personnel and dependents are properly prepared to meet the threat of terrorism regardless of the perceived risk.

Neither DOD nor the services address the need for political awareness of DOD personnel. In the past, terrorists have used American hostages as pawns for their propaganda efforts by soliciting admissions or statements which are often used to embarrass the United States and attack U.S. Government policy. Such statements are usually made by hostages with no conception of the damage they might do to U.S. interests. There is a need to brief fully all potential DOD victims of terrorist abduction on U.S. political/military policy and interests within the country of assignment. Such an awareness would
significantly increase a hostage's understanding of possible adverse ramifications of his/her statements and actions while in captivity.

Resources

Within the services, the bulk of personnel and material support for implementing and maintaining antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs are taken out of existing assets. No single line items for expenditures directly related to controlling terrorism have been included in the DOD annual budget. Instead, with one exception, requirements for antiterrorism and counterterrorism initiatives by individual services are included in existing programs. Such a practice hides the real costs of these efforts and places additional workloads on existing personnel and material resources, many of which are already stretched thin and over extended from years of defense budget cuts.

The exception to this general practice of funding for terrorism out of existing budgets is the Air Force. Of all the services, the Air Force is clearly the most forward thinking and pragmatic in resource allocation for combating terrorism. Establishing separate and distinct organizational structures to deal separately with protection and response features of combating terrorism respectively, the Air Force has split off from the operational, logistic and administrative staffs the responsibility for dealing with international terrorism. This provides a basis for these elements to compete for scarce resources.

In contrast, Army and Navy antiterrorism and counterterrorism responsibilities are delegated as collateral duties to existing military police and intelligence agencies with apparent little thought given to the fiscal and
manpower impact involved. Since implementation of a more aggressive and ready military policy for combating terrorism by DOD in May of 1976, the annual budgets and manpower authorizations of these service organizations have grown only marginally while the requirements for education, training, protective and escort services, intelligence collection and dissemination, and counter terrorism crisis management development have increased substantially.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (Pages 36-46)

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Prevention of terrorism is the most effective means of protecting DOD personnel overseas. Aggressive training, education, evaluation and enforcement programs are vital elements of the antiterrorism program, the ultimate goal of which is to prevent the terrorist event.

The DOD antiterrorism program would be more effective if a more aggressive leadership role were assumed in coordinating, supervising and directing antiterrorism efforts within DOD components.

In all services, insufficient attention in antiterrorism programs is paid to the terrorist threat to middle and lower grade personnel deployed out of country. Current emphasis on educating, training and protecting high risk personnel coupled with the lack of strong, consolidated direction by OSD detract from an effective, integrated program.

With the exception of the Air Force, dispersion of effort and responsibility within each service is inefficient and separates responsibility from authority and resource control. While decreased service flexibility could result from a more functionally oriented structure designed to meet antiterrorism and counterterrorism requirements, the minimal extent of upheaval experienced by the Air Force reorganization was far outweighed by the benefits achieved by distinct lines of responsibility.

The individual services have not achieved a proper balance between the classification of terrorist threat assessments, the apprehension of DOD personnel and their dependents if kept informed of the threat of terrorism,
and the protection of those personnel. Security considerations and the desire to avoid increasing anxiety have inhibited greater dissemination of terrorist threat information, resulting in inadequately informed personnel and dependents stationed abroad, particularly at lower ranks.

DOD Directive 2000.12 and service policies do not clearly define the lines of authority and responsibility when the DOS, as the lead agency, is involved. Without a clear definition of responsibilities the potential for inappropriate unilateral action exists.

Guidance for individual conduct during peacetime captivity varies from strict enforcement of the Code of Conduct to an appeal to sound judgement. Disparity of expected conduct for individuals similarly situated gives rise to an appearance of fundamental differences in acceptable behavior and what constitutes survival with honor and dignity. Further, such disparities increase the potential for hostility and antagonism amongst hostages.

Recommendations

Toward the end of improving the antiterrorism program within the Department of Defense, the following actions are recommended:

1. Conduct an examination of the applicability of the Code of Conduct to the peacetime hostage environment with a view to establishing interservice uniformity and some consistency between DOD and DOS.

2. Conduct a review of DOD Directive 2000.12 to: (a) clarify the role of the Department of State; (b) strengthen the guidance provided to the DOD components and to establish minimum standards in the training of DOD personnel and dependents stationed or traveling abroad; (c) mandate interservice cooperation in the areas of intelligence collection and dissemination.
3. Conduct a review of the classification requirements which inhibit the dissemination of information concerning the terrorist threat.

4. Conduct an evaluation by OSD of the organizational structure of each DOD component to assess the dysfunctional impact of the structure on the antiterrorism program. Where appropriate, structures should be changed.

5. Increase the size and role of the ASD/ISA to monitor and review the programs of the DOD components.

6. Develop a more formalized role for ASD/ISA in providing guidance and ensuring compliance by the DOD components.


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Articles


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