


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THE PHILIPPINE SCOUTS: A CASE STUDY IN THE USE OF INDIGENOUS SOLDIERS,
NORTHERN LUZON, THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 1899

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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE



by
ALLAN D. MARPDE, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1970

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Findings reveal that the original Philippine Scouts were instrumental in supporting the defeat of the Filipino revolutionary army, nearly capturing Aguinaldo in November 1899. This they would accomplish in March 1901. Their performance was so impressive that Congress enacted legislation to institutionalize the Scouts as an official element of the U.S. Army garrisoning the Islands. The results of this study are compared to the Kit Carson Scout program during the Vietnam War with a view toward determining if the U.S. Army applied any lessons learned from the Philippine Scouts experience. Although the situations were similar, a first glance does not support the conclusion that the U.S. Army remembered the successes of the Philippine Scouts during the Vietnam War.

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
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
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ABSTRACT

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This study attempts to investigate how the Philippine Scouts originated and how they were used during the Philippine Insurrection. It focuses on determining the precedence for the U.S. Army's use of indigenous soldiers prior to 1899. Given this background and the situation in the Philippines during the first year of the Insurrection, this study examines the operational tactics employed by the U.S. Army, particularly Generals Lawton and Young, in utilizing Macabebe scouts to defeat the Philippine revolutionary army under Emilio Aguinaldo during the conventional portion of the fighting.

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To Jose S. Tatang--a friend, companion, and
former Philippine Scout--who "guided" me during my tour
in the Republic of the Philippines,
and
to my wife who has guided me since.

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GLOSSARY*

BANCA (bahn'-cah), Spanish; a small boat made out of a hollow tree and with a top or roof of bamboo.

BARRIO (bah'-rryoh), Spanish; a political division of a pueblo, which is composed of a head town and several barrios (wards) or hamlets. The barrios or wards are either town or country, urban or suburban.

BOLO (boh'-loh), Spanish; a wood knife.

CASCO (cahs'-koh), Native; a large boat with 1 or 2 masts and matting or hemp sails slightly narrower at the top than at the bottom, for carrying freight. It is almost square, somewhat resembling a scow, flat and very serviceable, especially on the Pasig River between Manila and Laguna de Bay, and also to and from ships to the wharf.

CIMARRON (see-mah-rrohn'), Native; a native living in a state of wild freedom; a name given to wild beasts.

INDIOS (een'-dyohs), Spanish; the natives are generally known by this name, but particularly those subject to the Spanish Government in contradistinction to the Cimarrones.

PUEBLO (pway'-bloh), Spanish; a town or district, corresponding rather to a township or county than to town, often embracing a large area and many hamlets. The pueblo is the name community, or town, the surrounding barrios or districts within defined or accepted limits being appurtenant thereto for local administration or other purposes.

*The Bureau of Insular Affairs, U.S. War Department, A Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), pp. xxxi to xxxvii.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

NORTHERN LUZON, THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 1899

- 4 February The Philippine Insurrection begins when fighting breaks out in Manila.
- 26 July Lieutenant Batson recommended for the Medal of Honor.
- late August General Otis allows Batson to recruit 100 Macabebes.
- mid September Macabebes prove themselves in battle near Arayat.
- 20 September General Young assumes command, 3d Brigade, 1st Division.
- 14 October Batson's and Lowe's Scouts report to Young.
- 17 October Native scouts prove themselves to Young in battle near Cabiao.
- 20 October Batson ordered by Young to recruit a full battalion of Macabebes.
- 3 November Macabebes ambushed near Aliaga. Batson recommended for a second Medal of Honor.
- 7 November Young kicks off the attack through the mountains which eventually encircles the revolutionary army.
- 8 November Macabebes capture revolutionary orders outlining the Filipino retreat into the Cagayan Valley.
- 12 November Young and the Macabebes cross the Agno River in hot pursuit of Aguinaldo.
- 16 November Aguinaldo narrowly escapes the Macabebes at Pozorubbio.
- 19 November Batson is wounded during the attack on Aringay.
- 23 November Castner's Scouts begin Bachelor's March into the Cagayan Valley.
- 6 December Macabebes ordered back to Manila for rest and recuperation.
- 21 December Castner's Scouts complete Bachelor's March and return to Vigan via ship.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Almost any soldier or interested observer who has served with or studied the combat arms of the United States Army--especially armor and infantry forces--has probably gained some familiarity with the highly motivated and often select group of infantrymen or cavalrymen known as scouts. Whether on foot or horseback, by boat or aircraft, or in a wheeled or tracked vehicle, these highly mobile, fearless soldiers have been called on to be the commander's extended "eyes and ears" gathering enemy intelligence far out in front or away from the main body of friendly soldiers.¹ In the past, scouts were the first soldiers to find and fight the enemy, and they may have been the first to die for their cause. Their's was a noble purpose if for no other reason than they led the way for their comrades who followed. Today, infantrymen and cavalrymen serve to perform the same missions in the scout platoons organic to U.S. Army infantry, armor, and cavalry units around the world.²

However useful scouts may have been in the past was most certainly a function of their advanced skill and military professionalism, which, when coupled with a derived appreciation for the environment in which they were thrust, provided the military commander valuable time and information on which to prepare for military operations. Until the Mexican War which began in 1846, the early battles of the U.S. Army were fought on familiar homeland territories. But the

Mexican War crossed over into a territory unfamiliar to most men. The American Indian Wars witnessed the same experience just as did the Spanish-American War. By 1898 when American military power was projected across the world into the Philippine Islands, the precedent had already been set within the U.S. Army experience to augment the use of military scouts with indigenous civilians. The impact of native scouts on the outcome of the Philippine Insurrection was profound for the very achievement it failed to accomplish in 1899. Under innovative American officers and combat experienced senior leadership, the Philippine Scouts narrowly missed capturing the enemy revolutionary leader--Emilio Aguinaldo. What they failed to gain then they achieved eighteen months later. Momentous as that may seem, the war which finally ended in 1902 was only the beginning of a long tradition of military service which would stretch through the end of World War Two. American and Filipino soldiers who served with the Philippine Scouts during its near fifty years' existence have proudly recorded the many significant contributions of the organization. That record of service would not have been possible had the original Philippine Scouts--particularly the Macabebe Scouts--not convincingly demonstrated their value and worth to the American cause in 1899--a cause which pitted Filipino native scouts under U.S. military leadership against Filipino revolutionaries.

Purpose and Objectives of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the use of Filipino natives by the U.S. Army in the first year of fighting during the Philippine Insurrection. The objectives of the research effort are

to: identify historical precedents that may have facilitated the origination of the idea to employ indigenous soldiers under the U.S. Army's control; gain an understanding for the causes of the war; present a military appreciation for the strategy and tactics of the war; precisely integrate the early use of native soldiers into the military conduct of the fighting in order to understand the contribution they made to the American effort; and, carefully examine the advantages and disadvantages, gains and limitations, and developmental impact of the Philippine Scouts organization with a view toward establishing a sense of relevance for a future application of important lessons learned in a similar setting. Simply, the opportunities to learn are plentiful if one can distinguish viable linkage connecting past events with future challenges. If for no other reason, this study may be noteworthy as an attempt to dwell on an issue which has apparently escaped the attention of most military scholars--the magnificent record of the Philippine Scouts in the Philippine Insurrection.

Background for the Study

The use of native auxiliaries to augment a colonial army was not, at the time of the Philippine Insurrection in 1898, an American idea. Colonial countries such as England, France, Germany, and others temporarily assigned regular regiments to their colonies with a view toward soon replacing those forces with native or indigenous units to minimize the burden and expenses of an occupation military force. The indigenous units were drilled in tactics appropriate to the mother country, but, on occasion, were allowed to officer themselves once

their service proved trustworthy and reliable. In most instances, the indigenous forces eventually outnumbered the government's own regiments. Very simply, many European colonial empires by the late 1800's were too large, too widespread, and too costly to be garrisoned entirely with governmental soldiers. Hence, the use of indigenous forces was an expedient solution in most colonial systems at the turn of the nineteenth century.³

Hitherto introspective and more concerned with internal development and westward expansion, by 1890 the U.S. had diverted its attention beyond the continental territories and began to display the imperialistic tendencies of the other world powers of that day. When the Spanish-American War erupted in 1898, the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Squadron in the Pacific Ocean had already received its instruction regarding the Spanish colony in the Philippine Islands. On 1 May 1898 after the war had begun in Cuba, Commodore George Dewey sailed into Manila Bay, sank the Spanish naval squadron, and consequently launched the U.S. as a world power. Filipino insurgents who had earlier staged a partially successful revolution against the Spanish shared a common interest with the Americans in bringing about a Spanish defeat. In time, however, the McKinley administration came to the view that the U.S. should retain the new acquisition. By the fall of 1898, American and Filipino relations had deteriorated as a result of the obvious split in national goals--the U.S. seeking a Pacific colony while the Philippine revolutionaries hoped to achieve immediate independence. In order to protect American interests, the U.S. promptly dispatched Army ground forces to Manila.⁴

Indian Fighters

During the summer of 1898 and through the end of 1899, the U.S. Army shaped an expeditionary force in the Philippines which initially numbered fifteen thousand but eventually built up to a strength of seventy thousand regular and volunteer soldiers. The senior U.S. Army officers who commanded the divisions and brigades in the Philippines were, in many instances, seasoned veterans of the Civil War and the American Indian Wars while many of the younger officers and soldiers had seen limited service on the western frontier or in the ground battles in Cuba during the early part of the Spanish-American War. Veterans of the American Indian Wars who had fought the various Indian skirmishes across the American west came to appreciate the many similarities between fighting Indians and Filipino revolutionaries. Although the Filipinos employed a conventional array of weapons and tactics against the Americans in 1899, the U.S. Army was once again faced with an elusive enemy fighting on a strange territory in a unique environment. A need for indigenous soldiers who knew the Filipino revolutionary, his tactics, and his hideouts emerged in the minds of those senior officers who witnessed the utility of using Indian scouts to assist the U.S. Army during the American Indian Wars. Not without exception, generally, the experienced senior U.S. Army commanders in the Philippines who recognized the worth of military scouts and the limitations of the American scouts in a strange environment supported the idea of recruiting native scouts for the U.S. Army units. When Filipino scouts were finally provided, U.S. Army leaders with a clear understanding of scouting and, often, a first-hand experience in dealing with either Indian or native scouts, were able to achieve the remarkable

synergistic results of small, perceptive native scouting parties in the van of the main U.S. ground forces. Three senior American military leaders were instrumental in forming up and using native scouts during the early months of the Philippine Insurrection.

Henry Ware Lawton

A veteran of over twenty battles in the Civil War, Lawton emerged from that war as a brevet-colonel and recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor. Entering the Harvard Law School in 1865, he missed the Army more than his schoolbooks and rejoined as a regular second lieutenant in 1866. In 1886, Lawton accompanied Generals George Crook and Nelson Miles in Arizona, New Mexico, and Mexico. A respected Indian fighter and soldier of extraordinary toughness and strength, Captain Lawton commanded a mixed company of infantrymen, cavalrymen, and Indian scouts which succeeded in capturing Geronimo and defeating the Apache Indians.⁵ Appointed a brigadier general of volunteers in 1898, he commanded the Second Division of the Fifth Army Corps during the battles in Cuba. President McKinley personally counseled Lawton on his heavy drinking before assigning him to the Philippines.⁶ Physically, a huge man over six feet tall and weighing over two hundred pounds, Lawton and his family landed in Manila in 1899. When Major General Lawton was killed at the age of fifty-six, the American people raised a fund of ninety-eight thousand dollars which was paid to his widow on 6 March 1900.⁷

Samuel Baldwin Marks Young

Born in 1840, Young commanded various cavalry units during the Civil War rising to the grade of brevet-brigadier general in 1865. After the war, he participated in many scouting actions against the

Indians on the western frontier. In 1898, Young was appointed a brigadier general of volunteers and given command of a cavalry division in the Fifth Army Corps in Cuba. Following service during the Philippine Insurrection, he was promoted to lieutenant general and filled the office of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army until his retirement in 1904.⁸

Frederick Funston

Born in 1865, Funston attended the Kansas State University and, in 1888, became a reporter for the Kansas City "Journal" traveling with the U.S. Army during various Indian campaigns in the southwest. During the summer of 1896, he joined Cuban Junta forces against the Spanish participating in twenty-two engagements in two years of fighting where he was wounded three times and finally captured by the Spanish. After his release from captivity, he accepted an officer's commission in 1898 to lead Kansas volunteers in the Philippine Insurrection. In April 1899, Colonel Funston was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. A little man of only one hundred pounds with a slight limp and an effervescent sense of humor, he was commissioned a brigadier general of volunteers in May 1899. In the spring of 1901, General Funston would lead native scouts on a secret expedition which would eventually end the Philippine Insurrection.⁹

Review of Literature

The bulk of material pertinent to this study was largely gathered from four sources. The Philippine Scouts: The Development of America's Colonial Army, a doctoral dissertation by James Woolard at the Ohio State University in 1975, provided the only comprehensive and detailed study available on the formative years of the Philippine Scouts. This

unique document distills and reorganizes an immense amount of primary source information into a detailed, single account of the Philippine Scouts from 1898 to 1920. It is one of the few available sources of information dedicated solely to a discussion of the Philippine Scouts. Second, numerous articles written at the turn of the century and published in various military journals provide a flavor and impressionistic overview on various aspects of the Philippine Scouts. Periodicals such as the Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association, the Infantry Journal, and the Journal of the Military Service Institution are a ready source for such articles normally written by junior officers following service in the Philippines. Third, comprehensive War Department Annual Reports offer, in part, official accounts of various battles as written by commanding officers and staff and were compiled by the Eighth Army Corps. Unfortunately, these personal accounts and transcripts from message traffic do not largely deal with the Philippine Scouts. They do, however, give excellent descriptions of various campaigns and are accompanied by very detailed operational maps and sketches. Finally, the Batson Papers from the U.S. Military History Research Collection at Carlisle Barracks offer an excellent account of the original Philippine Scouts in the form of family letters written home. Lieutenant Batson was the officer responsible for organizing the Macabebe Scouts and commanded the first Scout battalion until he was wounded in November 1899. Aside from the Batson Papers, it is unfortunate that apparently no Scout officer has ever written a detailed account of his service during such a remarkable and unusual period of U.S. military history.

Method and Methodology

Using the historical method, this study directs its attention toward understanding how the Philippine Scouts originated, the manner in which they were used by U.S. Army commanders, and the contributions they made to the American effort given their strengths and weaknesses. Chapter Two presents an historical overview for the use of indigenous scouts by the U.S. Army prior to the Philippine Insurrection. Chapter Three outlines certain events which caused the war and describes the setting into which the U.S. Army was projected. Following a recap of the major events of the Philippine Insurrection, Chapter Four describes the fighting in 1899 from both a strategic and tactical viewpoint. Chapter Five integrates the origination and early role of the Philippine Scouts into the conventional fighting of the war in 1899. Finally, Chapter Six describes the final events of 1899 with an emphasis on the Philippine Scouts and analyzes military characteristics of the native scouts. Following Chapter Seven, which serves to analyze the role of the Philippine Scouts during 1899 with a view toward establishing significant relationships which may exist between that experience and later U.S. Army experiences, Chapter Eight describes the final events of the Philippine Insurrection after 1899 which served to institutionalize the Philippine Scouts for almost fifty years.

NOTES

¹Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, 28 October 1980, pp. 3-11.

²Department of the Army, Field Manual 17-95, Cavalry, 20 April 1981, pp. 306. FM 7-20, op. cit., pp. 3-11.

³Colonel James W. Powell, United States Army, "The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions," Journal of The Military Service Institution of the United States, 30 (January-June, 1902), pp. 23-41.

⁴Maurice Matloff, gen. ed., American Military History (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 319, 335-339.

⁵Frank C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), pp. 291-297.

⁶Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1961), p. 239.

⁷"Lawton, Henry Ware," The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, (New York: James T. White & Co., 1909), X, 290.

⁸"Young, Samuel Baldwin Marks," The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, (New York: James T. White & Co., 1906), XIII, 313.

⁹"Funston, Frederick," The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, (New York: James T. White & Co., 1909), XI, 40-41.

CHAPTER 2

A HISTORY OF INDIGENOUS SCOUTS

The Philippine Insurrection involved both conventional and guerrilla warfare. Making the transition from one to the other during the winter of 1899 and 1900 was extremely difficult, if not impossible, in a hostile and totally unfamiliar environment.

The Army had to grapple again with the perennial problems of a force whose reliance has been upon weight of numbers and armament, confronted with an enemy whose specialties are mobility and deception.

A solution to many of the difficulties in conducting military operations in the Philippines necessitated forming a top-notch intelligence, reconnaissance, and tracking service. Fortunately, the U.S. Army had done this before, in a fashion, during earlier military campaigns in other alien territories. In fact, all of the colonist countries in the world during the latter 1800's dealt with this challenge. Practically any time soldiers from an invading country had marched onto foreign soil or into unfamiliar territory recreated the same need for professional scouts. The experience of the Texas Rangers during the Mexican War (1846-1847), the use of Pawnee Scouts during the American Indian Wars (1865-1898), and the results of the British experiences of Robert Baden-Powell during his scouting career which began in 1857 serve to demonstrate the development of an idea to institutionalize indigenous soldiers from a colony into the armed forces of the mother country. The Mexican War, America's first experience as an alien military force,


demonstrated an unsophisticated use of indigenous personnel in assisting the scouting exploitations of the Texas Rangers. Although the Texas Rangers never solved the problem, they did establish a clear need to use the local populace. The Mexican War represents the starting point for the U.S. Army's first experience with indigenous scouts.

The Texas Rangers

The Mexican War

In the mid-1840's, most Americans were caught up in the spirit of continental expansionism with particular regard for the southwest, northwest, and the far west. Although the newly elected Democratic president in 1845, James K. Polk, was strongly in favor of extending the borders of the country, during his presidency he demonstrated a strong and stable leadership which limited the country's expansion to the present-day continental shape of its borders--rather than allowing it to spread over Mexico and north to the borders of Alaska as some expansionist radicals sought.² As such, some historians have called President Polk "the one bright spot in the dull void between Jackson and Lincoln."³ The Mexican War, which was to begin on 24 April 1846 when Mexican General Arista crossed the banks of the Rio Grande River moving north against brevet-Major General Zachary Taylor, was entrusted to the direction of President Polk.⁴ The American Army of Occupation--initially under General Taylor and later under the Commanding General of the Army Winfield Scott--would, during the one-year period of the War, be composed primarily of thirty thousand Regular Army soldiers systematically organized for the first time into tactical divisions fighting on foreign soil.⁵ Additionally, over seventy thousand volunteers from a number of

Map 1: Operations of the Mexican War.



states were raised to fight in Mexico, to include the recruitment of two regiments of mounted riflemen from Texas--the Texas Rangers. The First Regiment of Rangers, commanded by Colonel John C. Hays, consisted of ten companies which independently performed scouting and reconnaissance missions as well as battalion and regimental-size maneuvers during the battle of Monterey.⁷ One of the most renown company commanders in the Texas Rangers, Captain Benjamin McCulloch of Company A, became a celebrated Army scout and, on occasion, used indigenous personnel to guide scouting parties and lead forays on raid missions.⁸

Captain McCulloch

Benjamin McCulloch was born in Tennessee about the year 1814 and spent twenty years learning how to hunt and kill bears for his father who had once been aide-de-camp to a General Coffee under General Andrew Jackson during the Creek War. In 1835, he decided on a life of adventure, joining up with a band of soldiers under Colonel David Crockett and heading west. Due to illness, he missed linking up with the famous Texans at Christmas--in turn missing their illfated thirteen-day battle against Santa Anna at the Alamo. Out of great despair and disappointment he joined the Texan Army under General Sam Houston which eventually defeated Santa Anna. After the battles ended, McCulloch settled down in Texas working for the frontier of Texas as a land surveyor. It took the Texans about ten years to overflow boundaries which, in turn, sparked the Mexicans into action.⁹

American Army of Occupation

In the spring of 1845, General Taylor, who was commanding in Florida, was ordered to Corpus Christi, Texas to assemble an American

Army to counter Mexican troops massing south of the Rio Grande.¹⁰ Of about six thousand soldiers under his control, approximately fourteen hundred were sent from Texas.¹¹ Included was the company of Texas Rangers which Captain McCulloch raised on the banks of the Guadalupe River within thirty-six hours after notice arrived describing the critical situation on the Rio Grande.

This company was perhaps the best mounted, armed, equipped, appointed corps that was out in the ranging service; and from the time of its arrival at head-quarters until after its disbandment at Monterey, enjoyed more of the trust and confidence of the commanding general¹² than any other volunteer company of the invading army.

It was not long in the field before the Texas Rangers took on the look of an outlaw party, even though many doctors, lawyers, and college graduates had volunteered for service with it. In truth, though, anyone of fitness who owned a sidearm and a good horse would have probably passed the scrutiny of Captain McCulloch.¹³

Indigenous Guides and Spies

In June 1846, the Texas Rangers were immediately ordered by General Taylor to cross the Rio Grande and track the rearward movement of General Arista's army from Matamoros to Monterey. The terrain was rugged and dry, and it seemed that the forty men under McCulloch followed the retreating Mexicans from one rancho to another--always a few days behind their quarry. Being on foreign soil, the few maps available frequently proved inaccurate. Often the search for Mexican soldiers became a search instead for water for the Rangers and their horses. Logically, the Rangers came to depend on friendly and unfriendly Mexicans in the area of operation, even though the terrain was sparsely populated. On occasion, Mexican shepherds were persuaded to accompany the thirsty Americans to little-

known, muddy water holes. On one daring night raid near the town of Reynoso, the Rangers "picked up a little Mexican boy on the road, who agreed to be our pilot for the consideration of one dollar, paid in hand."¹⁴ Although the Rangers never formalized their use of indigenous Mexicans, it would have been quite impossible for them to have performed their screen and pursuit missions out in front of Taylor's army without the assistance of the local civilians who knew the territory.¹⁵

Having to depend on the cooperation of an enemy populace did not foster respect for the Mexicans. Although the Army of Occupation was under strict orders to "conquer the Mexicans by kindness" and to take nothing from them without compensation, the Rangers generally regarded the Mexican peasants they met in these harshest environments of Mexico with contempt.

The Mexicans generally, we speak of the character of the mass of the people, are certainly base cowards. Whenever the Indians approach the ranchos, the men run off, and hide themselves, leaving the women totally unprotected. As soon as they think all danger is over--they then return, and braggadocio-like, swear vengeance, threatening to exterminate the tribe; and mounting their caballos, pretend to give chase, but taking good care not to come up with their foe. The Indians, well knowing their character, frequently lie in wait, on the occasion of these exhibitions of bravery, and reward them for their cowardice by cutting their throats. The Comanches are far superior to the class of piones or serfs in Mexico, in every particular.¹⁶

Mexicans were not the only source of help on which the Rangers depended. Americans such as Jack Everitt, the son of a well-known judge in Alabama, had traded in Mexico for years. Because he dressed like a Mexican and spoke the language, Everitt was hired by the Army Quartermaster Department to serve as an interpreter and contractor. Everitt was known throughout northern Mexico and was allowed to travel unmolested in spite of his obvious relationship with the American forces.

He also knew the roads, trails, and landscape well.¹⁷

The use of spies by both American and Mexican forces provided untold amounts of information. The general feeling among the Rangers favored the Comanches as the best in the business. The Americans were fairly good at it, "but the Mexicans excel them, and...the Indians are superior to either."¹⁸ In any event, spies were constantly about alerting military commanders to troop movements, unit descriptions and identifications, and the status of logistical operations.

The Mexicans are Defeated

In September, as the American forces closed on Monterey to begin the battle for the citadel and town, the Mexican commander of forces, General Pedro de Ampudia, issued a proclamation threatening Mexican citizens with death for all who proved to be a traitor or a spy. "Every native, or foreigner, who shall, either directly or indirectly, voluntarily aid or assist the enemy in any manner whatsoever, shall suffer death by being shot."¹⁹ This threat seemed not to matter as the Mexicans were rapidly defeated, an eight-week truce was proclaimed by General Taylor subject to governmental approval, and the defeated Mexican army was allowed to repair from battle without restrictions.²⁰ At the end of the month, the Texas Rangers were released from service by General Taylor who remained in place while General Scott led an American expedition into Mexico City where the Mexicans under Santa Anna were decisively defeated and peace was signed in February 1848.²¹ Although General Taylor called again on newly promoted Major McCulloch in February 1847 prior to the great American victory at Buena Vista, a greater victory came to General Taylor when he was nominated by the Whigs and subsequently voted into

office as the twelfth President of the United States.²² The regard Zachary Taylor held for the Texas Rangers during the Mexican War seems based, in a large measure, on the exploits of young officers, like Major Benjamin McCulloch, and their soldiers who were able to utilize all the available resources in a foreign country in the execution of daring missions deep in enemy territory. The Mexicans were not of great assistance; however, the Texas Rangers clearly needed local expertise when their maps failed them and the dusty trails faded away.

The Pawnee Scouts


The Indian Campaigns

From 1865 to 1898, the U.S. Army fought nine hundred forty-three officially listed skirmishes and battles in thirteen campaigns against hostile Indians west of the Mississippi River.²³

The elimination of the North American Indian constituted a drab page in our national history. From the very beginning, as we have seen, he had been a stumbling-block to progress. His was the land; so the white man took it away from him. Resenting the encroachment of civilization, which deprived him of his hunting grounds, his reactions were violent. So, too, were the equally violent and frequently both provocative and inexcusable acts of the white man....

Here was guerrilla-type, light-marching, fast-moving warfare against an enemy crafty, elusive, bold and savage. The Plains Indians--the Sioux, Cheyennes and Comanches--were the finest light cavalry in the world....²⁴

Although the area west of the Mississippi had been traversed for years by the beaver traders, it was generally unknown, unexplored, and seldom traveled by white men except over a few emigrant roads and trails. Long before 1865 when the U.S. Army moved west with the advance of white people, scouts who were either indigenous Indians or white men who understood the methods of the hostile Indians and were acquainted with



**MAP SHOWING ROUTES
OF THE
NORTH BROTHERS**

25

Routes of the North Brothers are shown in Red
 Union Pacific Railroad: - - - - -
 Other Railroads at end of Seventies: - - - - -
 Scale of Statute Miles
 0 50 100 150 200 250

110° 108° 106° 104° 102° 100° 98° 96° 94° 92°

104° Longitude West 102° from Greenwich 100° (Laramie) 98°

the countryside were called upon to lead the way. All of these scouts performed their work under great peril and suffered conditions of severe physical hardship--often at the sacrifice of their lives. The North brothers--two of the greatest scouts serving in the plains country of the Platte River--achieved remarkable successes leading a battalion-size element of Pawnee scouts for thirteen years. Although the history of the North brothers remains obscure, official Army correspondence documents their work along the Union Pacific Railroad line and into the frontier along side a number of more famous names such as Crook, Custer, Sheridan, and others. The idea of enlisting Pawnee scouts into the U.S. Army was conceived by General S.R. Curtis (West Point, Class of 1831) in 1864. This idea was the first American example of the use of indigenous scouts who were officially recruited and uniformed for the purpose of guiding U.S. Army maneuver elements.²⁶

The North Brothers

Frank J. North was born in New York in 1840 and his brother, Luther H., was born in Ohio six years later. By the time Frank was twenty years old, he and his brother, who farmed together with the rest of the North family outside of Columbus on the Platte River in Nebraska, had come to know the Pawnee tribe and speak the Pawnee language. During the fall of 1860, both Frank and Luther were hired at the Pawnee reservation to haul logs and wood for the traders. The North brothers knew the Pawnee seldom killed but were more interested in capturing horses. As a result, these Indians had few friends on the prairie and were constantly attacked by the Sioux. By 1818, the Pawnee had signed a treaty with the United States ceding nearly all of their land to the United States. Over

the years, their population had dwindled to several thousand as the tribe had been displaced from one agency to another. More than anything else, the white man's disease and attendant starvations rather than the hardships of the prairie had killed them.²⁷

In 1862, the younger brother, Luther, enlisted in the Second Nebraska Cavalry for eighteen months and participated in an expedition into North Dakota to hunt Sioux, the unit killing over one hundred and capturing one hundred fifty-six Indians. Frank remained at the reservation until the summer of 1864 when bands of Sioux repeatedly ambushed the Pawnee tribe and terrorized the white settlers. Major General Curtis, commander of the Nebraska District, knew and liked Frank. He also knew the Pawnee hated the Sioux and he asked Frank to organize a seventy-seven man detachment of Pawnee scouts at Fort Kearny to be paid as cavalrymen. Initially, Frank was commissioned a first lieutenant; however, by the end of the expedition, General Curtis promoted him to captain and authorized him to form a second company-size element which would be equipped and uniformed. Although it took less than one hour to raise the new company, most warriors being anxious to kill Sioux, it was not until January 1865, after the winter buffalo hunts were over, that all could be assembled and officially sworn in as Company A, Pawnee Scouts.²⁸

The Pawnee Scouts

During the winter of 1865, when the Pawnee were not participating on short patrols in the snow around Fort Kearny, they were ludicrously pulling picket duty as sentries--to no avail, as the Pawnee soldiers could neither speak nor understand anything but Pawnee. Soon, this

duty was overtaken by alarming reports and evidence of large Sioux and Cheyenne band attacks against emigrant wagon trains on the Overland Stage Road. The new Nebraska District commander, Major General P. Edward Connor moved his headquarters to Julesburg and, in June 1865, organized a thirty-three hundred man force to march on three separate columns to assemble within three months at the junction of the Yellowstone and Tongue Rivers in Montana Territory. The Pawnee Scouts accompanied General Connor's column while another scout company of Winnebago Indians moved with a second column of march.²⁹

Little action had taken place until the Pawnee Scouts discovered fresh Indian tracks north of Fort Reno. As it was customary for the Scouts to ride well-out in front of the main body of troops, Captain Frank North allowed the Pawnee to strip off their uniforms prior to chasing the hostile Indians. By nightfall, twenty-four Cheyenne had been killed and scalped--not necessarily in that order--and, because General Connor was so pleased, the Pawnee were allowed to celebrate the victory all night by a scalp dance. As was the custom, the Pawnee changed names renaming Captain North as "Pani Leshar" or "The Pawnee Chief."³⁰ The celebrations were not entirely unjustifiable as

...these dead [hostile] Indians had a number of white men's scalps...and also had articles of wearing apparel belonging to women and children, from which it was concluded that they had attacked and captured an emigrant train.

Shortly before reaching the rendezvous point in Montana, North's scouts located a large Arapahoe camp of at least fifteen hundred Indians including five hundred warriors. The Pawnee led the charge killing one hundred sixty-two men, and some women and children, as was the Indian custom, and capturing seven hundred fifty animals and assorted plunder. General Connor was so disturbed by the plundering of his white soldiers

that he ordered every soldier except selected Pawnee to display and burn every piece of contraband. Later, at the rendezvous location, the Pawnee saved the lives of twelve hundred survivors in the first column which, having become thoroughly lost, had been attacked by two thousand Sioux warriors and had suffered the loss of nearly every animal after the hard fight when the weather turned bitterly cold. Nine hundred animals which had nearly frozen to death during the storm were shot by the troopers. The starving soldiers were tracked by the Pawnee Scouts and reunited when General Connor brought his column forward after receiving a message explaining the delay. Unfortunately, mail caught up with the expedition. An official cable directed a change of command to Major General Wheaton and ordered the expedition to Fort Laramie where the Pawnee Scouts were mustered out of service and sent back to the Pawnee reservation.³²

In March 1866, Captain North was promoted to major and was instructed by General Augur, commander of the Platte Department, to raise two hundred Pawnee scouts to be organized in a Scout battalion of four companies. The unit was formed in two weeks and assigned duty to patrol the Union Pacific Railroad with one-half of the force at the end of the line at Alkali and the other half at Fort Sedgwick near Julesburg. The Pawnee performed this service--skirmishing hostile Indians along the railroad and following them over long rides to recover stolen animals--for two years before the Battalion was reduced by one-half and mustered out.³³

General Custer

In the spring of 1874, General George A. Custer arranged for

Major North and a Pawnee Scout detachment to accompany a scientific exploration into the Black Hills country.³⁴ The mission was successful, although Custer's disregard for the fighting ability of Indians and the Pawnee, in particular, was evident as "he considered the Indians very inferior and underrated them."³⁵ General Custer and a great many others did not understand that each Indian fought for himself.

Much has been written about the great chiefs...they have been described as great leaders and in a fashion this is true. Besides being themselves brave, these men were orators, able to stir the emotions and were looked up to with much respect. Some of them were great warriors, but in battle not one of them could have given an order that would have been obeyed, for among the Indians there was no such thing as discipline...The individual Indian fought just in his own way and took orders from no one and it was for this reason that Indians seldom conquered disciplined troops....³⁶

General Crook

In the summer of 1876, following the Little Big Horn, General Sheridan ordered Major North to recruit scouts to take part in a campaign against the hostile Indians under the leadership of Brigadier General George Crook. Following the successful conclusion of the campaign, the Pawnee were mustered out of service for the last time and sent to the Pawnee reservation where they were made United States citizens in 1892.³⁷

By 1906, less than six hundred fifty Pawnee Indians survived the brutal hardships of life on an Indian reservation.³⁸ The idea of Pawnee scouts, though, remained in the mind of General Crook. During his expedition into the Sierra Madre of northern Mexico in 1883, he wrote:

An Indian in his mode of warfare is more than the equal of the white man....

The first great difficulty to be met is to locate them, and this must be done by Indian scouts, then we must move against them in such manner that the Indians may not discover our movements. The marches must be by stealth, and at night. The Indian scouts must be kept sufficiently in advance of the troops

to be able to discover the enemy without being seen themselves.... They must leave absolutely no trail, but must travel over rocks, and keep constantly under cover. The enemy discovered, runners are sent back to the command, which must make forced night marches, so as to attack by surprise; the scouts meantime if possible surround the hostile camp, and keeping constantly concealed should be able to give all possible information with reference to the situation of the camp....³⁹

Frank North Retires

For the first time in fourteen years, Major Frank North was mustered out of U.S. Army service in June 1877. He went into the cattle business with his brother, Luther, and W.F. Cody [Buffalo Bill Cody] but his health had become frail after many years of constant exposure and hardship. Finally, the North ranch in western Nebraska on the Dismal River was sold. At the age of thirty-nine, the "Pawnee Chief" was dead.⁴⁰

Both Generals Curtis and Crook realized that neither the plains Indians nor the Apaches could have been conquered quickly by uniformed troops. The hardships of the territory as well as the fighting skill of the Indians were overwhelming factors which played against the U.S. Army. Taking advantage of the inherent tribal hatreds between the Pawnee and Sioux, General Curtis wisely uniformly selected Pawnee scouts under the extraordinary leadership of the North brothers to counterbalance the natural advantages of the hostile Indian warriors. In the same way, General Crook hired Apaches under a number of white chiefs of scouts such as Al Sieber and others. Under brilliant field commanders such as Generals Connor and Crook, the U.S. Army achieved the desired results. In many ways, the hostile Indians were often beaten by their own people. The key ingredients in the whole system were willing indigenous Indian scouts under skillful and respected

junior leadership in a command structure headed by flexible but aggressive general officers in the field. The results of these campaigns during the American Indian Wars speak for themselves and are indicative of how important indigenous scouts were to the U.S. Army during the American Indian Wars.⁴¹

African Scouts

A British Idea

The idea of using indigenous scouts in a colony was successfully tried by a British soldier named Robert Baden-Powell in 1888. Although the United States had not yet acquired any foreign territories requiring occupation by the U.S. Army, the reputation and techniques of England's foremost scouting authority were well understood by many U.S. Army officers at the beginning of the Philippine Insurrection. By the time Baden-Powell retired from the British Army as a lieutenant general of Cavalry in 1910, the situation in the Philippines had already settled down. Nonetheless, British experiences with indigenous scouts more than likely influenced and shaped the U.S. Army's policies in the Philippines at the beginning of the Insurrection in 1899.⁴²

Robert Baden-Powell

Robert Stephenson Smyth Baden-Powell was born to a prominent and highly educated English family in 1857.⁴³ Although a talented young man, he failed his examinations for Oxford but scored well on the Army entrance test. He joined the Thirteenth Hussars in 1876 and spent the next eight years as a junior officer in India and Afghanistan where he wrote Reconnaissance and Scouting, the first of over thirty books or manuals he authored during his lifetime. He held little faith in formal,


rigid drill and training for soldiers; rather, he believed that a soldier's training should encourage the individual initiative to think and act, and then trust in one's own judgement. Above all else, he believed that training should be most interesting if not, indeed, fun. His professional military life and personal example were modeled after this training precept.⁴⁴

In 1884 as adjutant of his regiment, Captain Baden-Powell sailed with the Thirteenth Hussars to the city of Durban in the British colony of Natal, South Africa. Expecting civil war to break out between the British, Boers, and Zulu tribesmen, he alone was given a special mission to find and map a passage over the Drakensberg Mountains to the northeast. After one month, he returned with a complete, accurate picture of six hundred miles of previously unmapped territory. However, war was averted and the Hussars returned to England.⁴⁵

Zulu Scouts

In 1888, Baden-Powell returned to Cape Town, South Africa as aide-de-camp to his uncle, General Henry Smyth, who was commander-in-chief of British forces. Finding aide duties very boring, Captain Baden-Powell was ordered to the field by his uncle to find a Zulu rebel chieftain named Dinizulu following a violent uprising that summer. Baden-Powell recruited a small group of Zulu scouts to help him. He and his small force of partisan Zulus and British scouts cornered Dinizulu on a mountain called Ceza where the chieftain eventually surrendered.⁴⁶

Two years later General Smyth was ordered to the island of



Map 3: South Africa.

ly gaining military information in peacetime in preparation for eventualities....scouting on the other hand is the gaining of information about an enemy during the ordinary course of military practice."⁴⁸ In 1893, thirty-six year old Major Baden-Powell finally returned to his regular regiment. However, his reputation in the British Army was well-known and he soon received orders to West Africa.⁴⁹

Elminas and Adansi Scouts

In West Africa, Major Baden-Powell recruited five hundred local tribesmen--primarily from the Elminas and Adansi tribes--who would join with an advance element of British scouts under Baden-Powell's command

Malta, a British possession in the Mediterranean Sea, where he became governor and commander-in-chief of British forces. Major Baden-Powell was transferred as the aide and also head of British intelligence for the mediterranean area. For the next three years, an often-disguised Baden-Powell traveled alone in Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Italy, the Austrian Alps, and Algeria gathering information of concern to his government. Baden-Powell wrote that scouting and spying were similar in that "spying is secret-

to lead a fourteen thousand man British expeditionary force against the Ashanti tribe. The Ashantis had become rich and powerful over the years by supplying human traffic for European slavers. Further, they had often resorted to raiding local tribes as well as using human sacrifices during their own tribal ceremonies. The Baden-Powell scout force led the way through the enemy interior to the Ashanti throne where the Ashanti King and Queen Mother were forced to accept exile and disbandment of the Ashanti tribe.⁵⁰ Baden-Powell was rewarded with early promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He returned to South Africa where he served as the chief of staff for a British expeditionary force against Matabele tribesmen in Rhodesia. In reality, though, he led the advance element of British scouts and friendly indigenous Matabeles which suppressed the uprising. For his often individual scouting efforts,⁵¹ he was respectfully nicknamed "The Wolf Who Never Sleeps" by the Matabele and again was rewarded by the British Army with early promotion, at the age of forty, to the rank of full colonel.⁵²

Unfortunately, promotion to full colonel meant that he could not return to his beloved regiment, the Thirteenth Hussars, for he outranked the regimental commander who was only a lieutenant colonel. Instead, he received command of the Fifth Dragoon Guards in India where he started a scouting school for his soldiers as a part of the official training program. He also designed a military badge which was officially approved for wear by the few soldiers who were able to earn it. And in 1899, he wrote another military manual, Aids to Scouting.⁵³

The Hero of Mafeking

In 1899 and 1900, Colonel Baden-Powell and the Fifth Dragoons participated in the Boer War at Mafeking in South Africa where the

regiment gallantly defended the besieged town from an overwhelming Boer force of over nine thousand enemy soldiers for nearly seven months.⁵⁴ During this two hundred seventeen day period, the small, outnumbered and outequipped British force under Baden-Powell's leadership used bluff and boldness to outwit and outfight the superior enemy force. When the news reached England following linkup with friendly British forces, Baden-Powell became an instant national hero. Again, he was rewarded by early promotion--to the grade of major general at the age of forty-three--becoming the youngest general of that grade in the British Army.⁵⁵

African Scouts

In 1910, Lieutenant General Baden-Powell finally retired from active military duty.⁵⁶ He was still a national hero and literally the hero of English boys everywhere who were familiar with his scouting books. Yet Lord Baden-Powell's military contributions in England and around the world were largely based on the expertise he had developed as a young lieutenant in India where he taught his soldiers scouting and reconnaissance skills. Lord Baden-Powell taught these skills to British Army scouts and friendly indigenous scouts in nearly every assignment in Africa where the effectiveness of his efforts surely saved many British Army lives. Perhaps by coincidence, the culmination of Lord Baden-Powell's most significant contributions to his country--at Mafeking during the Boer War--took place at precisely the same moment American soldiers in the Philippines were suggesting the use of indigenous scouts against the Filipino revolutionaries. It is no accident, though, that the U.S. Army and other colonist armies carefully noted the success of the British Army in using indigenous scouts in their colonial armies around the world.⁵⁷

NOTES

¹Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 268.

²Vincent Wilson, Jr., The Book of the Presidents, 5th ed. (Brookville, Maryland: R.R. Donnelley & Sons, 1973), p. 28.

³Ibid., p. 28.

⁴Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, U.S.A.-Ret., The Compact History of the United States Army, 4th ed. (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1956), p. 92.

⁵Weigley, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

⁶Brigadier General Vincent J. Esposito, U.S.A. (Ret.), ed., The West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York: Praeger, 1967), I, p. 13.

⁷Samuel C. Reid, Jr., The Scouting Expeditions of McCulloch's Texas Rangers (Philadelphia: G.B. Zieber and Company, 1848), p. 251.

⁸Ibid., p. 47.

⁹Ibid., pp. 23-24.

¹⁰Dupuy, op. cit., p. 92.

¹¹Weigley, op. cit., p. 183.

¹²Reid, op. cit., p. 38.

¹³Ibid., pp. 23, 26, 38.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 72.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 43, 93.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 114.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 114.

²⁰Weigley, op. cit., p. 176.

²¹Dupuy, op. cit., p. 101.

²²Wilson, op. cit., p. 30.

²³Dupuy, op. cit., p. 149.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 149, 154.

²⁵George B. Grinnell, Two Great Scouts and Their Pawnee Battalion (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1928), frontispiece.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 15-21.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 25, 51, 56-60, 63, 65.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 65-67, 69, 71, 73, 79.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 81, 87-89.

³⁰Ibid., p. 93.

³¹Ibid., p. 92.

³²Ibid., pp. 90, 93, 105-111, 115-121, 124-125.

³³Ibid., pp. 137-139, 145-150, 173, 183. "People nowadays can hardly understand what our saddlehorse meant to us in those days. I doubt if today one could find a horse that, even in daylight, would take the plunge into icy water that he took when it was pitch dark, and he never hesitated a moment. This horse was high-strung, but gentle, was very fast, and there seemed to be no limit to his endurance...." Occasionally, the Pawnee Scouts paraded at Fort McPherson prior to campaigns. "...the Pawnees made a very good appearance. They had been supplied with regulation cavalry uniforms and on the occasion of the review...were finely mounted and appeared in full uniform. They were highly commended for their soldierly appearance by the inspecting officers."

³⁴Ibid., p. 239.

³⁵Ibid., p. 242.

³⁶Ibid., p. 243.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 60, 244-264.

³⁸Ibid., p. 56.

³⁹Dan L. Thrapp, General Crook and the Sierra Madre Adventure (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), pp. 130-131.

⁴⁰Grinnell, op. cit., pp. 20, 285.

⁴¹Dan L. Thrapp, Al Sieber, Chief of Scouts (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1964), p. 89.

⁴²Russell Freedman, Scouting with Baden-Powell (New York: Holiday House, 1967), p. 212. The idea of scouting may conjure up in the minds of most Americans who are familiar with American pioneer spirit and frontier lore such names as Daniel Boone, Kit Carson, and Davy Crockett. But others who are familiar with the Boy Scouting and Girl Scouting youth programs might point out that the history of Boy Scouting began in the lively imagination of a famous British military hero, Lord Robert Baden-Powell. Retiring from the British Army as a lieutenant general of Cavalry in 1910, he went on for a second career as the founder and Chief Scout of the World in the Boy Scout program. Nominated in 1939 for the Nobel Peace Prize, it is no accident that he was associated with Boy Scouting for he had been the foremost British authority on military scouting and reconnaissance during his thirty-four year career in the British Army. No Peace Prize was awarded in 1939 as Hitler marched into Poland before the Nobel Committee could meet.

⁴³The Scoutmaster's Handbook (North Brunswick, New Jersey: Boy Scouts of America, 1972), pp. 366-367.

⁴⁴Freedman, op. cit., pp. 46, 151.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 46, 50.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 51, 56.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 48. Map by Gilbert Etheredge.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 59.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 58-65.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 83. Ironically, the old king, King Prempeh, returned to the British protectorate in 1924 where he became President of the Kumasi Boy Scouts.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 88-97. Baden-Powell was often accompanied by a young African of Zulu descent named Grootboom. He served Baden-Powell not only as a reliable guide but also as a comrade. They formed an inseparable team, each other's life depending on one another. Even though Baden-Powell was chief of staff of the British expeditionary force, his administrative duties were transferred to another officer while he scouted.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 67-71, 83-87, 97.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 97-100. Aids to Scouting was eventually adapted for peacetime use by the Boy Scouts.

⁵⁴The Scoutmaster's Handbook, op. cit., pp. 396-397.

⁵⁵Freedman, op. cit., pp. 101-134, 138. The London Times wrote and published great praise for Baden-Powell and the Mafeking defense.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 175.

⁵⁷Captain Charles D. Rhodes, Sixth U.S. Cavalry, "The Utilization of Native Troops in our Foreign Possessions," Journal of The Military Service Institution of the United States, 30 (January-June, 1902), p. 3. "But the more an American travels in the Orient, the more he realizes that our country is indeed an amateur in the colonizing business. And setting aside all questions of national expediency, we would do well to set about organizing native forces, if for no other reason than that the veteran colonizers of the old world have found them absolutely necessary to permanent success. Great Britain, the greatest colonizer the world has ever seen, has made brilliant use of her Indian, Beluchistan, Egyptian, Assyrian, and Soudanese troops; and France is following suit with her Algerian and Chinese forces."

CHAPTER 3

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, REVOLUTION, AND INSURRECTION

The American interests being served upon annexation of the Philippine Islands at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898 had been in the making for some twenty years--at least since 1876 when the United States had achieved a favorable balance of trade.¹ During this twenty-year period, the United States' industrial output had outstripped its needs, unemployment was a problem for at least one million workers, and the solution seemed to be linked to locating foreign markets for American goods.² Clearly, one vital American national interest was tied to the protection of the American economy--specifically, regarding new opportunities for trade in the Pacific.

An equally important national interest at stake concerned the projection of American naval power into the Pacific Ocean. In order to protect trade routes already in existence, Alfred Mahan offered a theory of strategy in 1890 which argued for an expansionist policy. Commodore Matthew Perry had already opened Japanese ports in 1855; naval bombardment in Korea in 1871 led to a treaty in 1882; and, the Navy's Commander Meade made a "treaty" with a single Samoan chief in 1872 which, in turn, served to initiate protectorate status later. The American Navy justified a need for coaling stations and bases in the Pacific in conjunction with commercial links already in existence.³

Not to be left behind, American churches exhibited a missionary zeal which was, in enthusiasm, not to be outdone by American national

interest advocates. Somewhat related, historians have suggested that the Vatican encouraged any western power to intercede the Spanish in the Philippines hoping for an end to the stories circulating during this period describing the tyranny of the Catholic friars and alleged atrocities of the Catholic Church in the Philippines.⁴

Finally, the British who were already overextended in their colonist enterprises hoped that the Americans would act in the Philippines before a rival European power threatened to fill the vacuum left by the Spanish. In fact, a German squadron larger than Dewey's entered Manila Bay shortly after the American victory to challenge the American Navy. By luck, British naval reinforcements were already present to reinforce the American Navy.⁵

Therefore, the United States' acquisition of the Philippines was not, perhaps, an accident even though President McKinley publicly portrayed surprise and inaction. On 21 November 1899 to a missionary committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church, he said:

'Before you go I would like to say a word about the Philippine business....The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. When the war broke out, Dewey was in Hong Kong and I ordered him to go to Manila and to capture and destroy the Spanish fleet, and he had to; because...if the Dons were victorious they would likely cross the Pacific to ravage our Oregon and California coasts...

When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess that I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides--Democrats as well as Republicans--but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight, and I am not ashamed to tell you gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way--I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain--that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany--our commercial

rivals in the Orient--that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves--they were unfit for self-government and would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the best we could for them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map maker), and I told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States (pointing to a large map on the wall of his office) and there they are and there they will stay while I am President!'


If the President of the United States was ignorant of the importance of the Philippine Islands to American strategic interests, he obviously stumbled along aided by other American officials who pointed the way. The sequence of these events is worth reviewing.

The Philippine Islands

The Land and Climate

In 1898, the Philippine Archipelago consisted of more than seven thousand volcanic islands in a tropical climate spread over one thousand miles from north to south and six hundred miles at the widest point from east to west. The two largest islands which made up sixty-five percent of the land mass--Luzon, in the north, and Mindanao, in the south--lay five hundred miles from Taiwan and one hundred fifty miles from Borneo, respectively. In all, the Philippines totaled one hundred fifteen thousand square miles of land area; however, six thousand five hundred tiny islets were less than one square mile. Hence, most of the population was concentrated on Luzon and Mindanao.⁷

Many of the islands were mountainous, quite rugged, and subject to floods, typhoons, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions during either the wet (July to October) or dry seasons. The mountain barrier which



Map 4: The Philippine Islands, 1899.

ran from north to south on Luzon fostered the limited development of roads in the same pattern and the clustering of population centers, accordingly, but especially in the fertile plains of central Luzon. Manila, one of the world's best natural harbors, was established as the capital during Spanish rule becoming the center of economic activity and principal city of the Philippines.⁹

The People

Just as Manila was isolated by inaccessibility from most of the other islands in the Philippines, the sea insulated the development of the country from the mainstream of Asian history.¹⁰ Basically, the Filipino retained the customs and languages of a Malay-Polynesian origin with Christians settling on Luzon under Spanish, Chinese, and Arab influence. In Mindanao, Muslims fought-off the Spaniards and other invaders never being conquered by any other foreign influence. Because the closest neighboring country to the west--Hawaii--was so distant, no direct influence was felt from that direction.¹¹

During the eighteenth century, three socio-economic classes existed side-by-side: native based on subsistence; Spanish based on trade; and, Chinese based on merchantilism in conjunction with trade. In 1775, the Spanish expelled all but several thousand Chinese; even so, the social void was soon filled by the mestizos--a new class of rich with a mixed Filipino and Chinese ancestry. Selected elite from the mestizos and indios--true Filipinos--were able to travel and study in Europe often bringing back new ideas to change the plight of the majority of Filipino peasants who were dominated by the Spanish-instituted friar system which performed many governmental functions and controlled vast

amounts of the most valuable land.¹² To counter the growing threat of dissension promulgated by the educated Filipino elite--or ilustrados--the Spanish, in 1890, encouraged the return of many thousands of Chinese merchants and laborers resulting in a total population growth to over seven million. In spite of these measures, the seeds of the Philippine Revolution irrevocably grew beyond Spanish control.¹³

The Philippine Revolution

A Spanish Colony

The Philippines was a Spanish colony from 1565 to 1898 established primarily for two purposes: economic and Christian missionary. In time, the latter became the dominant rationale for the country seemed to lack any precious minerals. With the Spanish came Roman Catholicism and the Filipinos "continued to be governed by the spiritual guidance of a Spanish friar and the economic guidance of a landlord who maintained a mutually satisfactory patron-client relationship with his tenants."¹⁴ The Filipino discontent with Spanish dominion was carried forward by the ilustrados and manifested against the friars.¹⁵

Dr. Jose Rizal

Historically, the Philippine Revolution dated back to 1872 and the pay-related uprising of workers at the Cavite arsenal across from Manila.¹⁶ Only a young boy at the time, five years later Jose Rizal received his Bachelor of Arts degree and entered the medical school of Santo Tomas University in Manila. In 1882, he traveled to Spain where he attended the University of Madrid returning to Manila in 1887. A fine poet and author of two popular novels written to awaken Filipinos to their situation,

in 1892 he was exiled to Mindanao because of the revolutionary themes which he authored. Although Dr. Rizal advocated the peaceful reunification of Filipinos with the Spaniards, the Spanish authorities associated him with the Katipunan, a secret revolutionary society, which had attacked Spanish forces on 25 August 1896. Spain declared martial law in the Philippines and augmented Spanish troops in Manila. At the age of thirty-five, Dr. Rizal was tried and executed in December 1896. The leader of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, was also killed in 1897 at the age of thirty-four. In the end, ilustrados living abroad in Europe and Filipino peasants at home were outraged by Dr. Rizal's execution and became united in their fight for both reform and independence.¹⁷

The Philippine Revolution--A Stalemate

Under the leadership of Philippine General Emilio Aguinaldo, the Filipino revolutionaries successfully fought the Spaniards to a standoff leading to a peace truce in 1897. In return for the voluntary exile of Aguinaldo and certain key leaders to Hong Kong, the Spanish granted general amnesty and peso payment to the Filipino revolutionaries. In many ways, the signing of the peace Pact of Biac-na-Bato was a victory for the revolutionaries in their quest for independence. Finally, on 12 June 1898, the revolutionaries claimed national independence and joyfully anticipated full independence as soon as the Americans finished their war with Spain in Manila and Cuba.¹⁸

The Philippine Insurrection

The Beginning

On 1 May 1898, American Commodore George Dewey sailed into Manila

Bay and militarily resolved any questions about the outcome of the Philippine Revolution which had been waging between Filipinos and Spaniards.¹⁹ Even though the United States had officially been at war with Spain since 25 April 1898 "to stop Spain's war of suppression against the Cuban revolution,"²⁰ how or why United States military power had been targeted half way across the globe into this remarkable Pacific archipelago has been subject to no little debate over the years. It hardly seems likely that Dewey's defeat of the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay contributed in any large measure to the American ground campaign in progress in Cuba. Dewey's orders to attack were received four weeks before the Spanish-American War was officially declared--yet the attack came three weeks after Spain had already agreed to all American concessions in Cuba. Nevertheless, Commodore Dewey gained the American naval victory in Manila Bay ending over three hundred years of Spanish colonialism and, thus, beginning almost fifty years of various forms of direct affiliation with the United States.²¹

The United States little seemed sure of itself in its new role as a colonial power. American foreign policy instructions from President William McKinley simply did not focus on the Philippine Islands. Unfairly perhaps, a current joke of that day compared the President's mind to that of a bed as "it has to be made up for him every time he wants to use it."²² At Dewey's request, fifteen thousand poorly prepared American volunteer soldiers under the leadership of Major General Wesley Merritt landed in Manila during the summer of 1898 with instructions to "complete the reduction of the Spanish power."²³ By then, though, newly-promoted Admiral Dewey had allowed the Filipinos under the fiery leadership of Aguinaldo to declare a Philippine national independence.²⁴ With the

landing of American forces and the subsequent surrender of Spanish forces to the United States--excluding Filipino representation during the deliberations--peace was finally declared in Manila on 12 August 1898.²⁵ As American intentions slowly cast their shadow during the summer and fall of 1898, President McKinley's Philippine policy emerged into an American desire for total annexation. If any doubt remained, it became clear on 10 December 1898 when Spain formally ceded the Philippines to the United States by signing the Treaty of Paris officially ending the Spanish-American War.²⁶ The Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on 6 February 1899 and proclaimed by the President on 11 April 1899.²⁷

Many minds in Washington D.C. were unenthusiastic over America's new acquisition until fighting erupted between American soldiers and Aguinaldo's Filipino revolutionaries on 4 February 1899. Although some Filipinos were split in loyalty to either the American soldiers or the Aguinaldo-appointed revolutionaries, Major General Elwell Otis, a graduate of the Harvard Law School and a veteran of the Civil and Indian Wars who relieved Major General Merritt on 28 August 1899, was unable to address the countless frustrations of a country which had witnessed the passing of one repressive colonial regime--under Spanish control--to a seeming American substitute. Whatever hopes the McKinley administration harbored for averting armed conflict were shattered in the first two days' fighting. Fifteen thousand American volunteers who were outnumbered by thirty thousand armed Filipino revolutionaries and reinforced by an unknown number of sympathetic Filipinos scattered throughout the countryside suffered fifty-nine combat deaths as compared to five hundred Filipino soldiers who were killed during the fighting. The President appointed

a Philippine Commission under the leadership of the Cornell University President, Jacob G. Schurman, and two others including Admiral Dewey and General Otis to study the problem entrusted to the military authorities in Manila.²⁸ The Schurman Commission assembled in Manila shortly after hostilities began only to witness the futility in attempting to avert the inevitable struggle. In a nutshell, Aguinaldo's Filipino revolutionaries rapidly gained control of the countryside while the American military pursued a benevolent policy--confined primarily to Manila--coupled with limited active military operations in Luzon which were greatly restricted by poor weather, inadequate resupply, and soldiers whose volunteer enlistments were about to expire.²⁹

Early American Policy

The early policies of the American military government in Manila in 1899 were bound to meet with some degree of success as American and Filipino goals to improve conditions in the Islands were very close. The truth of the matter was that the American force was literally surrounded by Filipino revolutionaries who controlled the major islands and ports even though the revolutionaries, as a major fighting force, had been driven to flight from Manila. Local bandits took advantage of the military standoff outside Manila by dressing as Filipino revolutionaries before terrorizing villages as they had done for many years under Spanish rule. Propaganda regarding atrocities committed against the local populace was thrown about by both sides as each attempted to gain predominant popular influence and support. Attempts by the Americans to establish any form of municipal government outside Manila were often met by revolutionary reprisals against the villagers concerned. As more American

officers advocated a more active military response to counter the revolutionary effort, General Otis, in turn, became more ardent in maintaining the American policy course he had set toward benevolent pacification. By November 1899, American cavalry forces had succeeded in pushing Aguinaldo's revolutionary elements even further from Manila and up into northern Luzon. With what appeared to be the defeat of the Filipino revolutionaries, Washington D.C. fully endorsed a benevolent policy. President McKinley being satisfied with the fact-finding efforts of the Schurman Commission appointed a Second Commission under William H. Taft to transform American military control of the situation in the Philippines over to American civil control.³⁰ Presuming to have solved the minor crisis in the Islands, the conservative American President finally turned his attention toward re-election in 1900--after what appeared to be the political expense of reluctantly but ironically launching the United States as a global power in spite of American political campaign cries of "imperialism."³¹

A New Challenge--Guerrilla Warfare

The official American military policy of benevolence was actively pursued in a manifest attempt to maintain law and order while respecting local laws and customs. School building and reopening, water purification efforts, mass vaccinations and general city cleansing, and the restoration of street lights, bridges, ports, and marketplaces were only a few projects which demonstrated the remarkable flexibility and efficiency of the military leadership in charge and their subordinate officers and men. The Filipino revolutionaries regarded these American efforts as a threat to the revolutionary cause and strove to undermine the positive impact of

these events in the minds of the local populace. Facing loss of popular support, lack of expected international support from Europe, and an unresourced military posture unable to cope with the American force, weakened as it was, the Filipino revolutionaries dispersed into the countryside embracing guerrilla warfare tactics. The revolutionaries moved to counter the impressive American pacification efforts which were beginning to appear even in some of the outlying towns and villages. The revolutionaries feared the American policy of attraction while the Filipino landed-elite feared anarchy and a loss of wealth. However, neither the revolutionaries nor many of the other Filipino citizens-- elite or poor--feared the Americans as much as they had hated the Spanish.³²

By 1900, the Filipino revolutionary leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, had organized the Philippine Islands into guerrilla geographical districts and directed activities from the many different hiding places he was forced to flee to. Revolutionaries ferreted out American sympathizers and neutrals--especially Filipino officeholders--as terrorist targets when their appeals failed to effectively control or limit support for the Americans. In time, Major General Arthur MacArthur, who had succeeded General Otis, realized that benevolence for all Filipinos was not a practical solution in response to the significant control which the revolutionaries retained over a large portion of the population. However, a "lack of knowledge of local languages, customs, and terrain on the part of American troops placed them at a great disadvantage in their attempts to locate and destroy the guerrillas."³³

American Policy Revised

During 1900, Major General MacArthur studied the written records

of the Filipino revolutionaries prior to formulating a policy change which would be more effective than the blanket benevolence policy instituted by General Otis. Analysis of the American problem centered on the influence of the Filipino revolutionaries over towns and villages-- even ones garrisoned by American troops. In spite of an increase in the number of American soldiers to over sixty thousand, rifle bounties, and general amnesty, most Filipinos were generally reluctant to support the American effort until after the outcome of the American presidential election in the fall. If President McKinley had been defeated by his anti-imperialist political opponent, William Bryan, the Americans might have granted immediate independence to the Philippines. When that outcome proved to be untrue and the rainy season was over, General MacArthur published a proclamation on 20 December 1900 guaranteeing protection in return for loyalty but prosecution under the laws of war for anyone else including sympathizers and part-time guerrillas. Further, terrorists were executed, important revolutionary prisoners-of-war were shipped to Guam, a naval blockade was established, American garrisoning was increased, and active patrolling and scouting into guerrilla sanctuaries were significantly increased. A turning point in the war was reached by spring, 1901, after Aguinaldo was captured and the revised American policy of selective benevolence for Filipinos loyal to the American cause made an impact. Though much fighting was to take place over the next year until peace and amnesty were officially declared in May 1902, a cornerstone in the success of the revised American policy was implemented earlier in the war. As in a previous American war on foreign soil, the use and tactical integration of indigenous personnel and units into an American military field force demonstrated an appropriate

response to resolving the problems of an expeditionary force in alien territory. The origination of the Philippine Scouts during the Philippine Insurrection was quite identical to the use of Indian scouts during the American Indian Wars when a native force was raised and committed to battle under the colors of the United States Army.³⁴

NOTES

¹Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (London: Longman's, Green and Co., LTD, 1960), p. 12.

²Renato Constantino, A History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 283.

³William J. Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism: Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia (New York: Internal Publishers, 1970), pp. 13-15, 28-30.

⁴Ibid., pp. 47-49.

⁵Ibid., pp. 48-49.

⁶Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), pp. 36-37.

⁷John Cockcroft, The Philippines (Sydney, Australia: Angus & Robertson, LTD, 1968), pp. 14-15.

⁸Russell Roth, Muddy Glory (W. Hanover, Massachusetts: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981), frontispiece.

⁹Nena Vreeland et al., Area Handbook for the Philippines, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies of the American University, 1976), pp. 9-11.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 9.

¹¹Cockcroft, op. cit., pp. 18-20, 54-56.

¹²Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 12.

¹³John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 8-12.

¹⁴Vreeland, op. cit., p. 55.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁷Cockcroft, op. cit., pp. 68-71.

¹⁸Vreeland, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

- ¹⁹Vreeland, op. cit., p. 56.
- ²⁰Pomeroy, op. cit., p. 4.
- ²¹Ibid., p. 4.
- ²²Wolff, op. cit., p. 2.
- ²³Gates, op. cit., p. 2.
- ²⁴Vreeland, op. cit., p. 57.
- ²⁵Gates, op. cit., p. 20.
- ²⁶Vreeland, op. cit., p. 57.
- ²⁷Major C.A. Mitchell, A.G.D., "The Philippine Department," Infantry Journal, 33 (April 1927), p. 342.
- ²⁸Grunder and Livezey, op. cit., p. 54.
- ²⁹Gates, op. cit., pp. 9, 18, 23.
- ³⁰Ibid., pp. 23-25, 28.
- ³¹Vincent Wilson, Jr., The Book of the Presidents, 5th ed. (Brookville, Maryland: R.R. Donnelley & Sons, 1973), p. 54.
- ³²Gates, op. cit., pp. 16, 30.
- ³³Ibid., pp. 32-33, 36.
- ³⁴Ibid., pp. 31, 36-39, 47.

CHAPTER 4

THE SITUATION EARLY IN THE WAR


Fighting in the Philippines--particularly on the central plains of Luzon--was difficult for everyone. Notwithstanding that American soldiers were often ambushed in the open by hidden enemy forces, both sides suffered the attacks of an endless variety of insects; the dreaded rampages of cholera, dysentery, and other disease; and, the constant vigil of day and night alerts.¹ The Americans, particularly, had to contend with a unique country which forced the uninitiated to adopt the simple techniques of the enemy in order to accomplish even the most rudimentary tasks such as transporting equipment, supplies, and troops. On the other hand, the many obstacles facing the American soldiers were in themselves also hindrances to the revolutionaries. The exception being that the revolutionaries were intimately familiar with expedient solutions to most problems.

Aside from the cultural impediments imposed on any Filipino who spoke one language or dialect but who tried to travel to any other locality where the inhabitants probably spoke another of the five hundred different languages and dialects of the Philippines in 1899, the Philippine Insurrection was, for the most part, a dream spawned by the educated, elite Tagalogs who spoke the Spanish language and lived in Manila. Many Filipinos fought against the Americans. The key Tagalogs who led the revolutionary forces were not always in control of the Filipino masses and, on occasion, were despised by certain tribes which harbored blood hatreds that were obviously related to the many heterogeneous cultures,

languages, and ethnic differences between even neighboring tribes.³ One of the most prevailing difficulties in the Philippines, though, was the geography of the terrain coupled with the impact of the wet and dry seasons.

Transportation

Luzon certainly has its share of mountains, valleys, and plains. However, the conventional portion of the fighting during the Philippine Insurrection, from February through November 1899, centered on Manila and later the central plains of Luzon. Hence, the U.S. Army was not initially



Map 5: Map of Cultural-Linguistics.

confronted with trying to establish and protect hundreds of miles of inter-island lines of communication between the thousands of tiny islands comprising the Philippine Archipelago. Instead, the U.S. Army encountered a territory devoid of trafficable road networks which favored the use of light watercraft such as native paddle canoes or bancas in order to traverse numerous streams and waterways crisscrossing the cultivated lowlands where the population clustered about the food-producing rice fields. Where the population was thickest, unimproved roads and trails could be used by two-wheel, carrabao-drawn carts. In the towns and on the poorest trails, Chinese and Filipino coolies or cargadores were effective. The single




Figure 1: Terrain of Luzon.

concentrations bordering rice fields, which were commonly intersected by numerous streams and raised, but muddy dikes or bamboo thickets, with grass and bushes on the edge. As the rice fields were creatively tiered and interconnected by a water drainage system designed to insure a constant level of water, especially in the wet season, the only dry ground in the rice plains was found on unimproved roads along the outside edge of select rice fields. These roads often proved to be little more than rugged trails in the dry season or mud tracks during the rainy

exception to the near-absence of a modern-day trafficable support base for the American expeditionary forces in the Philippines in 1898 and 1899 was a single-track, narrow gauge railroad which had been laid between Manila and Dagupan on the Lingayen Gulf. In any event, interior lines of communication for either the revolutionary or the American forces focused on this railroad.⁵

Fighting in Rice Fields

Fighting on Luzon quite often took place in or adjacent to population

weather of the wet season. Caught in the crossfire of an enemy fire-fight, U.S. soldiers were unable to lift their feet quickly through the rice paddies. If they fell in the water, the extra weight of water-soaked haversacks slowed their movement even more. Worse yet, if wounded, they easily drowned in the rice paddies. If they were able to stagger onto the roads along the fields, the hidden revolutionaries could easily ambush them from the foliage of ditches along the roads. Even if the entire column of a U.S. unit were put on the roads, flank security was unable to keep pace along the flanking jungle. Coupled with the heat of the dry season or the humidity of the wet season, movement overland by U.S. foot soldiers was exhausting except in the rice fields or at the numerous, bridgeless streams--then it was impossible. For U.S. soldiers, the most significant impracticality of the fighting was the sheer inconvenience of having to traverse the terrain.⁶

Initially, American forces lacked a number of wagons, horses, pack-mules, and light-draft boats which could travel the road networks or traverse the relatively shallow intra-waterways and canals. During the rainy season, anything that was pulled by an animal was useless anyway. What proved to be the most practical form of transportation was native bancas which could literally be paddled anywhere except up into the mountains.⁷

Filipino Revolutionary Tactics

Had the Filipino revolutionary units been well-armed and trained marksmen rather than untrained troops armed with either a twenty-seven caliber Mauser rifle or a forty-four caliber Remington rifle, American losses in the exposed rice plains would have been absolutely incredible. Instead,

the major Filipino units which fought the conventional battles in 1899 along the railroad lacked the combat effectiveness required to overcome American forces on the offense. Worse yet, one-half of the revolutionaries backing the riflemen were brave but ignorant and unprotected bolomen who charged the American soldiers. Unquestionably, Filipino revolutionary soldiers were courageous; however, they were commanded by many Filipinos who had previously enjoyed lives of luxury as ilustrados with close Spanish connections. The revolutionary forces' lack of training, equipment, and experienced leaders served to undermine the sound methodology of their tactical attempts to surround Manila and, subsequently, attrit the American forces which pushed them north into Luzon.⁸

The revolutionaries dug carefully designed and constructed trenches throughout Luzon in 1899. Nearly the entire western seacoast of Luzon was covered with skillfully prepared fortifications. Often, the constructions exceeded the size of the revolutionary force available to defend them. Although the ground was neatly revetted, camouflaged, and concealed, American forces were often able to seize and occupy adjacent trench lines thus turning the initial advantage of the defenders against the defense. Safe routes of escape were always carefully integrated into the overall construction, but were often prematurely used before a decisive engagement could be joined, especially when the revolutionary defenders were local villagers who feared for the safety of their nearby families. To their credit, American lead elements became adept at pinning down revolutionaries in trench lines to the front, while trailing American maneuver elements were able to move around the flank to achieve enfilade fires into the revolutionary forces caught in the

trenches. Nevertheless, the Filipinos became experts at ambushing American units which, in turn, required the Americans to move constantly forward in immediate reaction.⁹

American Soldiers and Tactics

During the summer of 1898, the American force consisted of Regular Army and State volunteer units. By the time war broke out in February 1899, the United States was raising federal volunteer regiments especially for service in the Philippines. Regulars and volunteers were essentially equivalent in terms of fighting capabilities, as volunteer officers had been handpicked while the Regular Army officers were normally younger and less experienced.¹⁰

When fired upon from enemy trenches, American ground forces deployed into a line of skirmishers under the leadership of the unit officers who exercised fire control. Although some preferred firing their Krag-Jorgenson rifles at will, many American leaders favored controlled platoon volley fire which could be adjusted and directed by the officer. Although the officer would be exposed (officer casualties were correspondingly high as a result), ammunition conservation and effective fire could be insured.¹¹ Though horse cavalry did not exist initially, when horses finally arrived, they proved to be quite effective in rapidly delivering fresh soldiers to the fight. American cavalrymen could reach enemy trenches before enemy outposts could run back to report their approach. Before the horses arrived in the Philippines, many cavalrymen in the fight around Manila were towed in native canal boats or cascoes by U.S. Navy gunboats or launches. When attacked, they disembarked on the shore to assault hostile towns along the water-

ways. In summary, American tactics featured the continuous movement of dismounted cavalymen and infantry columns forward against the withdrawing Filipino revolutionaries.¹²

Initial Strategic and Tactical Situations

When Major General Merritt arrived in Manila on 25 July 1898 during the Spanish-American War, all of the American expeditionary forces were organized in two divisions--one commanded by Brigadier General T.M. Anderson and later by Major General H.W. Lawton, and the other by Brigadier General Arthur MacArthur, Jr.--under the headquarters of the Eighth U.S. Army Corps. Filipino revolutionaries who were primarily Tagalog residents of Manila had been armed with captured weapons from the Spanish arsenal at Cavite and were prepared to join with the American forces in defeating Spanish forces. The Philippine revolutionary commander, Emilio Aguinaldo, had already developed three operational strategies: a militia defense throughout the Philippines in which every able-bodied male Filipino enrolled; the division of the Philippine Archipelago into independent operational zones commanded by a Filipino revolutionary lieutenant general; and, a field army of Tagalog revolutionaries prepared to assist the Americans.¹³ Following the near-bloodless capitulation of the thirteen thousand Spanish regular forces to General Merritt on 13 August 1898, the Filipino revolutionaries joyfully announced the beginning of the Philippine Revolutionary Republic with general headquarters at Malolos. With the Spanish-American War at an end, General Merritt turned over the command of the Pacific Department and the military governorship of the Philippines to Major General Elwell Otis.¹⁴

The American

Eighth Army Corps located in Manila was literally surrounded by thirty thousand unhappy Filipino revolutionaries when the Philippine Insurrection broke out on the night of 4-5 February 1899.

Philippine General Antonio Luna commanded the ground forces north of the Pasig River while General Mariano Trias commanded those on the south side. Although American forces totaled twenty thousand, approxi-





Figure 2: Disposition of Forces, Manila.

approximately ten thousand were available to General Otis for operations on Luzon. They could be broken down as follows: Eighth Army Corps, General Otis, strength 10,303; First Division, General Lawton, strength 3,850; and, Second Division, General MacArthur, strength 6,453. Essentially each division was composed of two maneuver brigades of about four battalions each, and division artillery and engineer elements. General Otis had planned to defeat the revolutionaries in a phased operation on Luzon based on the assumptions that peace could be separately negotiated in the Mindanao Archipelago, sea patrols could neutralize Mindoro, and occupation of key ports in the Visayan



Map 6: Major Islands & Waters.

Gulf. In March, less than one month after hostilities had broken out between the Americans and Filipinos, General Otis kicked off the operation in Manila.¹⁷

Phase I: Americans Split the Revolutionary Ring Around Manila

In mid-March 1899, a provisional brigade was secretly organized under the command of Brigadier General Loyd Wheaton and assembled south of Manila. Under the covering fire of an American gunboat on the Pasig River, five battalions of ground soldiers from Wheaton's brigade split the revolutionary line south of the Pasig River. On 15 March, the Americans crossed the River to the north and defeated the revolutionary

Islands would contain Filipino revolutionaries there. The strategy on Luzon depended on isolating and defeating revolutionaries to the south of the Pasig River outside Manila. After the end of the rainy season, this was followed by an operation north of Manila designed to split the enemy forces away from their critical lines of resupply along the Manila-Dagupan railway, thereby defeating enemy units below the Lingayen

line commanded by Philippine General Pio Del Pilar. As a result, the revolutionary encirclement of Manila was broken along the Pasig River, and the riverline was secured half-way to the Laguna de Bay.¹⁸

In April, the First Division under General Lawton moved down the Pasig River in over thirty riverboats, clearing both sides of the riverline as well as the Laguna de Bay. General Lawton garrisoned the shoreline at strategic points and began gunboat patrols to secure the waterway.¹⁹

In May, General Lawton organized two columns of First Division soldiers--one under Brigadier General R.H. Hall near San Pedro Mecati




Figure 3: Phase I, 1899.

Moving overland and by boat along the Pasig River, Colonel Wholley drove the revolutionaries north of the Pasig River from Manila to the north shores of the Laguna de Bay in the vicinity of Morong. By early June General Hall's column joined the attack on the north shore and pushed the revolutionaries southward from Morong into the Morong peninsula, thereby entrapping them along the north shore of the Laguna de Bay.²¹

Phase II: Americans Attack Northward Into Central Luzon

While American Generals Wheaton, Hall, and Lawton were splitting

and the other under Colonel J.W. Wholley at Pasig City--and gave orders to each commander to widen the gap in the Filipino revolutionary encirclement by rolling up the enemy flanks on both sides of the Pasig River.




Figure 4: Phase II, 1899.

General Luna withdrew his units step-by-step, avoiding decisive engagements but stubbornly counterattacking and destroying the railway in order to deprive the Americans of its use as a resupply conduit. In February, the Americans captured the Caloocan railyard; during March and April, they had reached Malolos and Calumpit, respectively; and, at the end of May, General MacArthur halted the American advance at San Fernando in order to complete the extensive railroad repairs required to utilize it as an American line or resupply and communication.²³

In conjunction with General MacArthur's northward advance from Manila, a column of General Lawton's First Division soldiers flanked and maneuvered east of the railroad tracks successfully reaching Arayat and San Isidro by May. However, this column eventually returned to Calumpit. By this time the Philippine Revolutionary General Headquarters had been moved north to Tarlac. Mistakenly assuming the American offensive had

the Filipino encirclement of Manila and the enemy defense along the Pasig River toward the Laguna de Bay under Philippine Generals Trias and Del Pilar, a simultaneous northward attack oriented on the railway was being launched by Second Division soldiers under General MacArthur in an effort to push Philippine General Luna's forces northward. From March through May,

stalled out along the Rio Grande de la Pampanga River, the revolutionaries heatedly debated whether to continue to defend or launch a counterattack. General Luna, who wisely advocated continuing the defense and delay operations in progress, was murdered and, on 16 June, General Aguinaldo led a counterattack against General MacArthur at San Fernando. MacArthur repulsed the enemy attack and pushed northward, capturing Angeles. There General Otis stopped the operation on 9 August because of the forthcoming rains of the wet season. The campaign to date was overwhelmingly favorable for the Americans. It had relieved pressure on Manila, splitting

the revolutionaries north and south of the Pasig River, and isolated support of the revolutionaries to northern Luzon where twenty-five thousand Filipino soldiers were split into two divisions--one under Philippine General Concepcion facing MacArthur and a second under Philippine General Del Pilar squared off against Lawton. Meanwhile, the Americans reconstituted and reorganized their forces along the railroad in preparation to continue the attack.²⁴




Figure 5: Fall Campaign, 1899.

The American Fall Campaign

Having increased in

fighting strength from ten thousand to almost sixty thousand.²⁶ General Otis' plan after the rainy season was a classic exploitation and pursuit with encirclement. General MacArthur's Second Division was instructed to fix the Filipino units along the railroad while General Lawton and the First Division maneuvered to the right up the Rio Grande de la Pampanga River to shut the revolutionaries' northeast route of escape into the Cagayan Valley at the Carranglan Pass. Meanwhile, General Wheaton's brigade would travel by boat along the east coast of Luzon to the Lingayen Gulf, where the northwest route of escape along the San Fabian coastal roads could be blocked. With the blocking forces in place, MacArthur's follow-on mission was to aggressively and relentlessly destroy the retreating Filipino forces.²⁷

When the campaign began on 30 September, three thousand Second Division soldiers led by Brigadier General S.B.M. Young advanced north through Arayat. On 26 October, they departed San Isidro, eventually reaching the Carranglan Pass by 6 November. Meanwhile, logistical resupply wagon trains pulled by mules, carts pulled by tandem carabao, and rivercraft followed from the rail line, with the Second Division supply base established at Calumpit and advance depots setup at Arayat and San Isidro. General Young broke contact with his supply trains at San Isidro and rapidly traveled to Carranglan, succeeding in capturing numerous Filipino supplies and ordnance.²⁸

When the Carranglan Pass was blocked on 6 November, General Wheaton's brigade of twenty-five hundred men sailed for San Fabian under the escort of six gunboats. Landing under the covering fire of the of the gunboats on 7 November, they assaulted revolutionary emplacements along all the coastal roads establishing blocking positions at

Dagupan and San Fabian. Meanwhile, General MacArthur's First Division elements of five thousand men rapidly attacked northward along the railroad on 1 November. Finding Tarlac abandoned on 12 November and the railroad in tact, they pressed forward over one hundred kilometers, soon linking up with General Wheaton at Dagupan.²⁹

Finding both the Carranglan Pass and Lingayen Gulf routes of escape blocked, General Aguinaldo called a revolutionary council of war at Bayambang on 13 November. The Philippine Revolutionary Republic was dissolved and Filipino tactical units were reduced to forty-man guerrilla bands that could more easily exfiltrate north into the Cagayan Valley. By the end of November, the Americans had captured all of the Filipino artillery and ordnance as a result of a most successful fall campaign against the Filipino conventional units.³⁰

American Campaign Results, November 1899

In spite of a longer rainy season, which extended into November rather than ending in October, the American Fall Campaign was a magnificent demonstration of a determined American effort to encircle the retreating Filipinos. Under General Young, American units on the east flank literally out flanked the Filipinos by closing off key escape routes into the mountains. This maneuver coincided with the movement of General Wheaton's "flying brigade" which sailed around the west flank of central Luzon as the exploitation element. Together, both efforts facilitated the rapid and final destruction of conventional Filipino resistance by General MacArthur's division in pursuit up the center of the Tarlac valley.

In slightly over three weeks the campaign was over. In sweeping

over the central Luzon plains, General Otis had captured the very heart and granary of the Philippines. Although Philippine General Aguinaldo narrowly managed to escape the American forces (the Philippine Insurrection might have ended then had he been captured), the conventional war was reduced to a guerrilla contest.³¹ Notwithstanding that the upcoming campaigns would be more protracted and no less difficult than the campaign of 1899, American military prowess conclusively proved that it could adapt successfully to conditions in the Philippines. The decisive factor of the Fall Campaign was the rapidity of its execution, especially the movement of General Young on the east flank of the American advance. A close examination of how that occurred will involve an examination of the use of native scouts in the lead elements of the American ground forces.

NOTES

¹Major General William Weigel, "Foreword from Division Commander," Infantry Journal, 30 (April 1927), 339.

²Nena Vreeland et al., Area Handbook for the Philippines, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies of the American University, 1976), p. 77.

³Colonel Charles R. Howland, Infantry, "The Philippine Insurrection of 1899," Infantry Journal, 30 (April 1927), 396.

⁴Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (London: Longman's, Green and Co., LTD, 1960), frontispiece. Figure was traced.

⁵Howland, op. cit., p. 397.

⁶Lieutenant Colonel James Parker, 45th Infantry, U.S. Vols., "Some Random Notes on the Fighting in the Philippines," Journal of The Military Service Institution of the United States, 27 (July-December 1900), 317-319.

⁷Ibid., pp. 327-328.

⁸Ibid., pp. 319-321.

⁹Ibid., pp. 321-325.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 325-326.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 328-332.

¹²Ibid., pp. 336-337.

¹³Ibid., p. 398.

¹⁴Major C.A. Mitchell, A.G.D., "The Philippine Department," Infantry Journal, 30 (April 1927), pp. 342-343.

¹⁵Wolff, op. cit., frontispiece. Figure was traced.

¹⁶Vreeland, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁷Howland, op. cit., pp. 397-402.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 399-401.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 401.

²⁰Wolff, op. cit., frontispiece. Figure was traced and adapted.

²¹Howland, op. cit., p. 402.

²²Wolff, op. cit., frontispiece. Figure was traced and adapted.

²³Howland, op. cit., p. 402.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 402-404.

²⁵Wolff, op. cit., frontispiece. Figure was traced and adapted.

²⁶Ibid., p. 259.

²⁷Howland, op. cit., p. 404.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 404-405.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 405-406.

³⁰Ibid., p. 406.

³¹Captain W.L. Sibert, Corps of Engineers, U.S.A., "Military Occupation of Northern Luzon," Journal of The Military Service Institution of the United States, 30 (January-June 1902), 404-408.

CHAPTER 5

THE ORIGINATION AND EARLY ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SCOUTS DURING THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION: CONVENTIONAL WAR--FEBRUARY TO NOVEMBER 1899

Just as soon as the American forces broke out of the Filipino revolutionary encirclement of Manila during the spring of 1899 and began to maneuver overland against the Filipinos, American soldiers were hand-picked to form small groups of covering forces in the lead of the advance guards and main bodies of the American units. These American scouts were given the very dangerous missions of conducting reconnaissance well out in front or to the flanks of the main American units in order to provide early warning in case of ambush or to engage and fix weak Filipino forces in place so that following combat elements could maneuver to an exposed flank or the rear of the hostile force. Their duty was extremely hazardous and required professional skills and confidences well beyond that of the normal American infantryman or cavalryman.

American Scouts in Action

Both Generals Lawton and MacArthur employed American scouts for their headquarters. As this was a doctrinal concept well-entrenched in the American profession of arms, most battalion-size maneuver units in the Eighth Army Corps selected their own scouts and came to view their services as absolutely essential in the conduct of any tactical operation. However, American leaders such as General Lawton, who had extensive experience fighting Indians during the American Indian Wars, were able

to achieve the most impressive results. Whether by the process of selection of the American soldiers for scouting duty and the careful assignment of their duties or for any other endless number of reasons, General Lawton's American scouts in the First Division during the spring of 1899 achieved absolutely remarkable successes--often with serious casualties.

By May 1899, General Lawton was very favorably impressed with the fearless performance of his detachment of approximately twenty-five American scouts under the civilian leadership of Mr. W.H. Young, Chief of Scouts.

The services of these scouts have been from the beginning peculiarly valuable, and are daily increasing in value as a result of experience. The individuals detailed were in all cases men who had either lived for years on our Indian frontier, were inured to hardship and danger, and skilled in woodcraft and use of the rifle, or had demonstrated during their service in these islands peculiar fitness for the work contemplated.

During a five day period in May, the First Division scouts had been in constant contact with Filipino revolutionaries just west of Calumpit near the towns of Angat and Baliug.² Although the Division scouts had been recruited from the Fourth U.S. Cavalry, First North Dakota and Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry Regiments, they worked for the entire First Division. On 13 May near the town of San Miguel de Mayumo, twelve Division scouts

without waiting for the supporting battalion to aid them or to get into a position to do so, charged over a distance of about 150 yards and completely routed about 300 of the enemy who were in line and in a position that could only be carried by a frontal attack.³

Six of the twelve scouts were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.⁴ On 16 May near San Isidro, twenty-two Division scouts "charged across a burning bridge, under heavy fire, and completely routed 600 of the enemy who were entrenched in a strongly fortified position."⁵ Seven of these Division scouts were also awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.⁶

In all, nearly half of the First Division scouts had been recognized for their bravery and daring in a period of less than two weeks. By this time, their courage was renown throughout the entire Eighth Army Corps, and justly so as they had won twelve of the forty-six total Medals of Honor that would be issued to American soldiers during the Philippine Insurrection in 1899.⁷

Unfortunately, the capability of tiny, elite organizations such as the First Division scouts was largely a function of their leader's personality and his ability to set the example. Mr. Young, the Chief of Division Scouts, was equally as brave as any scout he led--which he always did from the front of the scout column. When Mr. Young was wounded and evacuated to Manila on 13 May, a bit of the spirit and life of the First Division scouts was lost. On 16 May, Mr. Young died of his wounds while, on the same day, his favorite scouting companion, Private Harrington, was killed in action. Although both men were replaced by soldiers of courage and ability, the fighting spirit and selfless bravery of the Division scouts faltered--and General Lawton knew it.⁸

The Macabebes

Just south of Calumpit, the Pampanga River breaks down into an endless series of streamlets which feed into estuaries at the Manila Bay. Overland travel in this territory was terribly difficult as the land mass was a lowland dissected by innumerable streams and creeks which were unfordable due to mud and swamps or else crossable only over native footbridges not designed for heavy traffic.⁹ Historically, this section of country had always been the home of the Macabebe tribe whose inhabitants were infamous for harboring thieves and robbers along the




Figure 6: Macabebe Tribal Homeland.

bands wasted no time in joining the ladrones in their sanctuary of safety in the Pampanga River lowlands.¹²

Batson's Scouts

First Lieutenant M.A. Batson, a young American officer who earned the Medal of Honor on 26 July while working as a scout for the Fourth U.S. Cavalry under General Lawton, heard of the Macabebe tribe's reputed ability to traverse the waterways in their bancas.¹³ Upon investigation, he learned that the Macabebes had enlisted enmasse with Spanish regiments fighting against the Tagalog revolutionaries during the Philippine Revolution in the late 1800's.¹⁴ For their loyalty to the Spanish, the Filipino revolutionaries imposed great cruelties upon the Macabebes-- primarily because of intertribal hatreds and disloyalty to the revolutionary cause.¹⁵ The Macabebes anxiously awaited any opportunity to serve retribution on the Filipino revolutionaries.

coast of Manila Bay.¹⁰

Not only was the area impassable for American forces in the Second Division under General MacArthur, but the bandits or ladrones continued to pursue their thievery against the Second Division logistical resupply trains moving north from Manila.

Filipino revolutionary

In late summer 1899, Lieutenant Batson guided a large Macabebe contingent to the headquarters of General MacArthur. The Macabebes desired to join the Americans in the fight against the Tagalog revolutionaries. Neither General MacArthur nor General Otis was prepared at this point in the war to trust and arm Filipinos. Further, General Otis realized that

many of them had been Spanish soldiers and were acquainted only with Spanish methods of dealing with rebellious subjects, or with natives from whom they wished to extract information, and those methods were in most instances attended with inexcusable harshness.¹⁶

Though both American generals feared their use, General Otis allowed Lieutenant Batson to devise a plan whereby under Batson's supervision, the Macabebes conducted boat exercises near their home driving out ladrones and revolutionaries.¹⁷ The experiment proved highly successful. In August, Lieutenant Batson was allowed by General Otis to unofficially recruit, organize, and train one company of one hundred Macabebes. They were not to be administered an oath of allegiance to the United States. Employed under the Army Quartermaster as civil employees in the field, they were theoretically authorized Mexican currency (worth one-half of a U.S. dollar) in the amounts of fifteen dollars and eighteen dollars monthly for privates and corporals, respectively. To assist in training the Macabebes during the month of September, Lieutenant Batson was allowed to use American soldiers as training cadre and company staff. By the end of the month, several Macabebe soldiers were identified to serve as the unit's non-commissioned officers. Known as "Batson's Scouts," the Macabebes were finally issued Krag-Jorgenson carbines with ammunition although they were not uniformed or provided rations.

At the end of the month, in a daring mission near Arayat, Batson's Scouts established their reputation when ambushed by an entrenched Filipino revolutionary force. In charging the revolutionary trench line and engaging in bloody hand-to-hand combat, the Macabebes forced the revolutionaries to withdraw leaving behind their dead, fifty rifles and a number of wounded who were taken prisoner. The first Macabebe died in action as a result of this fight. Elated at this successful skirmish, General Otis authorized the organization of two more companies in the strength of one hundred twenty-eight Macabebes each. One company remained with General MacArthur while General Lawton persuaded General Otis to send the first two companies of Batson's Scouts to him under Lieutenant Batson's leadership for the approaching fall campaign. In large measure, the origins of Batson's Scouts was a tribute to the initiative of Lieutenant Batson and the permissive command environment of General Otis' Eighth Army Corps, wherein individual initiative was nurtured rather than stifled.¹⁸

General Lawton's Fall Campaign

Arriving in the Philippines on 24 July 1899, Brigadier General Samuel B.M. Young assumed command of General Lawton's third brigade but, four weeks later, relinquished those responsibilities and traveled north to San Fernando where he began to organize a provisional cavalry brigade on 20 September in anticipation of the forthcoming fall campaign. Over the next two weeks, while the rains of the wet season continued to fall, the following units began to assemble: two battalions of the Twenty-fourth U.S. Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Keller; first and second battalions of the Twenty-second U.S. Infantry under Captain Ballance and Major

Baldwin, respectively; first and second squadrons of the Fourth U.S. Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Hayes and Captain Erwin; an artillery battery (Battery G) of the Thirty-seventh U.S. Volunteer Infantry under Captain Scott; and, three distinct scout elements. Dorrington's Scouts consisted of approximately thirty-five soldiers from the Thirty-fourth Infantry under Lieutenant L.A. Dorrington;¹⁹ Lowe's Scouts consisted of sixty-five soldiers including eighteen cargadores and twenty-two Tagalog scouts initially under Captain Lowe, Twenty-fifth Infantry, later First Lieutenant J.C. Castner, Fourth U.S. Infantry;²⁰ and Batson's Scouts consisted of two companies under Lieutenant Batson and Lieutenant Boutelle.²¹

In early October, Young's provisional brigade moved to the east from San Fernando toward Arayat encountering stiff resistance along the way from reinforcing Filipino revolutionary units dispatched by General Aguinaldo. In the lead, Captain Ballance captured Arayat on 12 October, killing five revolutionaries and taking thirty-five prisoners (who were later released) at the cost of one American casualty. Escorting the brigade's resupply trains, Batson's Scouts and Lowe's Scouts arrived in Arayat on 14 October longing for action. They would not be disappointed.²²

General Young's Expedition to Cabanatuan, October 1899

After General Young consolidated and reorganized his brigade at Arayat, he brought supplies up the Pampanga River and planned for the next operation expected to take place in the vicinity of Cabiao. Movement along the river road was very difficult for the foot soldiers and impossible for anything pulled by a horse. Animals which slipped off the road simply




Figure 7: Young's Campaign, October 1899.

The fight was over by noon without any American casualties; the revolutionaries fell back in disarray, having sustained at least four killed, thirty wounded, and forty others taken prisoner. Due to unexpected difficulties, Batson's Scouts failed to join in the attack. Yet two achievements were noted: first, a small force could move quickly, strike hard, and decisively defeat numerous, entrenched Filipino revolutionaries; and second, the unproven Macabebes would fight to kill the revolutionaries. For General Young, this was

sank to their bellies in the muddy ditches. Finally, after the brigade was ready, General Young sent Ballance forward during the night of 17 October. It was planned that he would make a frontal attack supported on the right by Lowe's Scouts (henceforth called Castner's Scouts). On the left, Batson's Scouts would cross to the west bank of the Pampanga River, sneak into Cabiao, and attack any Filipino revolutionary positions from their rear.

...the first real fight in which the Macabebe Scouts had been engaged, and there was considerable doubt as to how much dependence could be placed on them. Although they failed in making the difficult and dangerous part assigned them they did well otherwise and showed they could be trusted to fight efficiently against Tagalos.²⁴

By evening on 17 October, Baldwin moved to Arayat to garrison the town, while General Lawton moved to collocate his forward Division headquarters there.²⁵

The American attack to San Isidro on 19 October was simply a continuation of movement northward. General Young selected his trusted but junior commander, Captain Ballance, to command a provisional brigade-size advance guard consisting of all the scout units as well as the artillery battery, the Fourth Cavalry, and Ballance's own Twenty-second Infantry. Using thirteen hand-picked American scouts well out in front of his own battalion, Ballance moved his column forward on the river road with artillery in the middle, while Castner's and Batson's Scouts screened the main body's movement from across the river on the west bank. While trying to cross a partially dismantled bridge over an unfordable stream, Ballance's tiny covering force was ambushed. Three of his thirteen scouts were killed.²⁶ Nevertheless, by 19 October Ballance occupied San Isidro, after dispersing approximately one thousand Filipino revolutionaries under the command of Philippine General Del Pilar. During darkness, the revolutionaries crept back into town and evacuated nearly every piece of equipment, including spent cartridge shells dropped along the roads. In spite of the obstacles and hardships, the advance guard closed on San Isidro as the Twenty-fourth Infantry followed in support to garrison Cabiao and San Isidro. General Young continued to move supplies forward along the river which became more

trafficable as the rains raised the water level. In contrast, the incessant raining exacerbated tactical movement by creating water obstacles at every ditch, transforming unmapped streams into raging torrents, and transmuting uniforms, blankets, and even shoes into useless equipment to be abandoned by nearly naked soldiers. Because General Young viewed Batson's Scouts as increasingly important to future operations, he ordered Batson back to Macabebe to raise two more companies as soon as possible. General Young was keenly aware that he would probably exhaust the Macabebes if the pace increased and the terrain became more difficult. Both events were to happen.²⁷

While Batson was recruiting native scouts in Macabebe, Ballance moved out on 27 October to capture Cabanatuan, which was reported to be a key ordnance manufacturing center for the revolutionaries. The Americans encountered one thousand revolutionaries on the far shore of six rivers which intersected the river road northward. In the early afternoon, Ballance deployed his advance guard into a skirmish line at the Taboatin River. In support, a U.S. Navy gunboat provided gunfire from the Pampanga River in coordination with two artillery pieces moved forward with the main column. Castner's Scouts maneuvered to the right to locate a ford. The American attack overwhelmed the Filipino defense resulting in thirteen dead and twenty-six wounded prisoners. By 29 October, Batson had brought four companies of Macabebes forward along the west bank of the Pampanga River while Dorrington's Scouts moved forward on the east bank. The next day, Ballance assaulted Cabanatuan, capturing vast stores of food and ammunition. On 31 October, the Americans launched a three-pronged attack, with Batson's Scouts attacking to Aliaga, the Fourth Cavalry

(less selected units) attacking Talavera and capturing an assortment of small artillery pieces, and two troops of cavalry conducting a reconnaissance in force to Bongabong. Meanwhile, Castner's and Dorrington's Scouts escorted resupply trains forward to Cabanatuan in an effort to consolidate the new American gains. The fight at Aliaga proved to be serious combat for Batson's Scouts.²⁸

Two critical events occurred on 2 and 3 November. Early in the morning of 2 November, Batson departed Aliaga with two companies of Macabebes--one under Boutelle and the other under his control. Traveling in their normal formation behind the lead of Batson, the Macabebes marched southward with a small advance party to the front and flanks, providing security for the main body. During one of the frequent security halts, two hundred Filipino revolutionaries ambushed the main element. While Boutelle provided a base of fire, Batson led the trail company around the left flank and succeeded in killing more than a dozen revolutionaries in hand-to-hand combat. (Batson was recommended for his second Medal of Honor and early promotion to the rank of major.²⁹) Unfortunately, Boutelle was killed during the early moments of the ambush. As the column of scouts marched back toward the small barrio, they were nearly caught in a second ambush of charging bolomen. The barrio was burned to the ground and the scouts moved back toward Aliaga.³⁰

The next day, Castner's Scouts attempted to resupply Batson in Aliaga, but were approached outside Cabanatuan by a group of revolutionaries who claimed to be Macabebes. Batson's Scouts wore no distinctive apparel so Castner held his fire until the assailants were only seventy-five yards away. Then he led a frontal charge, scattering the imposters.

As a result, General Young immediately ordered four hundred and fifty small U.S. Army campaign hats for the Macabebes.³¹

At the end of October, General Young faced a dilemma regarding future operations. Confident that his light forces could outfight and outmaneuver any revolutionary units, he realized that his command could not stretch its line of resupply any further than Cabanatuan. Further, his soldiers had already suffered immensely during the constant rains, having to slog through mud quagmires that drowned horses and sucked the boots from a soldier's foot.³² Any hope of snaring Aguinaldo and the retreating revolutionaries south of the Lingayen Gulf depended on the immediate continuation of his movement forward. The General boldly planned the next operation and announced his decisions.

General Young's Expedition from Cabanatuan to San Fabian, November 1899

In Field Order Number Seven issued from Cabanatuan on 6 November, General Young specified that his brigade would break away from its cumbersome resupply depots and trains and, in the lightest configuration possible, press forward after the retreating Filipino revolutionaries. Exact loads of equipment were outlined for each soldier. Limitations were also placed on the number of wheeled carts allowed to follow the maneuver units: four carts for companies, two carts for battalions, and two carts for a regimental headquarters. The order of march placed Batson's Scouts in the lead. They were followed by Captain Dodd's troop of the Third U.S. Cavalry, Captain Ballance's battalion, Captain Koehler's battery of mountain artillery, and Lieutenant Colonel Wessels with the remainder of the Third U.S. Cavalry. General Young would accompany the lead elements.³³

In a separate operation, Lieutenant Colonel Hayes secured crossing sites over the Pampanga River on 7 November and pressed northward through Talavera and San Jose. At San Jose, he swung right and set off




Figure 8: Young's Campaign, November 1899.

for the Carranglan Pass, where he was to block in place any revolutionary elements attempting to slip through the mountains to the Cagayan Valley north of the Luzon central plains.

Following Hayes the next day, General Young and the lead elements from the main body moved out, crossing the raging Pampanga River with great difficulty. By nightfall, the Macabebes and Dodd's cavalry were in San Jose. In a stroke of good fortune, the Macabebes captured the personal effects of a Philippine general officer, including orders from

Aguinaldo outlining the evacuation of all revolutionary regular units through the San Nicolas Pass. General Young realized that his force had to move rapidly if it expected to intercept Aguinaldo's flight northward.³⁵

Leaving his command's slower elements at San Jose, General Young and Dodd's mounted cavalry troop spurred their horses over the difficult mountain trails toward Lupao. The Macabebes swept forward at the trot, finally reaching Humingan on 11 November. There they overran revolutionary soldiers having a breakfast of roast pig and rice. While the Macabebes rested and enjoyed the captured feast, Lieutenant Colonel Wessels and General Young continued the pursuit on horseback through San Quintin and Tayug. General Young left Dodd's troop in a blocking position at San Quintin and then ordered Wessels to secure the San Nicolas Pass with Lieutenant Johnston's troop. Johnston carried out the order and, in doing so, captured a large revolutionary convoy of thirty carts containing Aguinaldo's personal effects, including his wife's clothing, a printing plant, and six carts of silver money which had been hastily buried off the mountain trail. Additionally, huge resupply stores were also captured at Tayug on 11 November. General Young realized that his command was thinly stretched from Cabanatuan to Tayug and that it was becoming increasingly difficult to control the operation. Further, he knew that the rain-swollen Agno River might contain his force unless he could find safe crossing sites. His mind was made up to press on when, on the evening of 11 November, a Spanish prisoner convincingly stated that Aguinaldo and his main body were just across the Agno River in Asingan. General Young moved out in hot pursuit on 12 November.³⁶

General Young ordered Ballance to leave Humingan for Rosales at once. Upon taking the town, he was to cross the Agno River and join in an attack northward, through Urdaneta, where several thousand revolutionary soldiers were reported to be. After Ballance departed, General Young and the Macabebes rafted across the Agno River and swept through Asingan and into Binalonan. Apparently Aguinaldo had escaped the previous night. Young sent a small mounted party to the west in an attempt to link up with General Wheaton's forces, which had landed in either Dagupan or San Fabian on 7 November. Realizing that he could probably outflank Aguinaldo by sending the few mounted cavalry to Pozorubbio, Young immediately galloped westward. Unfortunately, his small party became disoriented and attacked only the rear guard of Aguinaldo's retreating forces at Mandoag on 14 November. The appearance of cavalry on huge horses so frightened Aguinaldo's rear guard that most of the Filipinos threw down their weapons and equipment and fled through the woods. Young missed Aguinaldo's main body by a scant two hours.³⁷

On 16 November, the Macabebes hobbled into Pozorubbio. General Young's trap to ensnare Aguinaldo had narrowly failed. Had it succeeded, the outcome of the Philippine Insurrection might have been decided after only a year's fighting. Young's expedition accomplished two things: first, Aguinaldo's army disintegrated as a result of Young's movement around the flanks of both the Filipino and the American armies; second, the pressure on General MacArthur's campaign up the railroad was much reduced as Aguinaldo retreated rather than delayed to the north. Tired and worn but proud, the Macabebes were even more determined to press northward after Aguinaldo. Batson was convinced they could capture the prize.³⁸

NOTES

¹U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army, 1899 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), Part 3, p. 201. Taken from the Report of Maj. Gen. H.W. Lawton, U.S.V., of an expedition to the Provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Pampanga, Luzon, April 22 to May 30, 1899 (San Isidro or Northern Expedition), and accompanying reports of subordinate commanders. Basic document is hereafter referred to as War Report, 1899, Part 3.

²Ibid., p. 202.

³U.S. Department of the Army, Public Information Division, The Medal of Honor of the United States Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 242-243.

⁴Ibid., pp. 242-243.

⁵Ibid., pp. 243-244.

⁶Ibid., pp. 243-244.

⁷Ibid., pp. 242-246.

⁸Lawton, War Report, 1899, Part 3, op. cit., pp. 230-231, 238-239, 248.

⁹James R. Woolard, The Philippine Scouts: The Development of America's Colonial Army (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 1975), p. 3.

¹⁰U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 2, p. 209. Taken from the Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, U.S.A., commanding the Division of the Philippines and military governor of the Philippine Islands, September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900. Basic document is hereafter referred to as War Report, FY 1900, Part 2.

¹¹Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (London: Longman's, Green and Co., LTD, 1960), frontispiece. Figure was traced and adapted.

¹²Otis, War Report, FY 1900, Part 2, op. cit., p. 209.

¹³U.S. Department of the Army, Public Information Division, op. cit., p. 244.

¹⁴Captain J.N. Munro, 3d Cavalry, "The Philippine Native Scouts," Journal of the U.S. Infantry Association, 2 (1 July 1905), 180.

¹⁵Otis, War Report, FY 1900, Part 2, op. cit., p. 209.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 210.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 209.

¹⁸Captain Ben H. Chastine, 57th Infantry (PS), "Macabebes," Journal of the U.S. Infantry Association, 36 (January-June 1930), 626-629.

¹⁹U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 4, p. 382. Taken from the Report of Maj. Gen. H.W. Lawton, U.S.V., of an expedition to the provinces north of Manila, P.I., during the months of September, October, November, and December, 1899. Basic document is hereafter referred to as War Report, FY 1900, Part 4.

²⁰Ibid., p. 516. Taken from the Report of Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan, U.S.V., of an expedition into the province of Cavite, October 7 to 14, 1899.

²¹Lawton, War Report, FY 1900, Part 4, op. cit., pp. 294, 126.

²²Ibid., pp. 262-264.

²³Ibid., map following p. 272. Figure was traced and adjusted from a "Map of Northern Luzon" prepared under the direction of General Young and compiled by First Lieutenant H.P. Howard, Third Cavalry, aide-de-camp on 6 January 1900. Hereafter referred to as Luzon Map.

²⁴Ibid., p. 297.

²⁵Ibid., p. 264.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 297-298.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 265-268.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 268-271.

²⁹Ibid., p. 126.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 126-127.

³¹Ibid., p. 272.

³²Ibid., p. 273.

³³Ibid., p. 274.

³⁴Howard, Luzon Map, op. cit., traced and adjusted from map following p. 272.

³⁵Lawton, War Report, FY 1900, Part 4, op. cit., p. 274.

³⁶Ibid., p. 275.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 276-278.

³⁸Ibid., p. 278.

CHAPTER 6

THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION:

GUERRILLA WAR--DECEMBER 1899

Virtually exhausted, weakened by disease and constant exposure (to an abnormally long rainy season) but elated at the prospect of closing in on their fleeing prey, Batson led the surviving members of his Macabebe battalion north from Pozurrubio on 18 November. By that time, General Young had been able to pull together the remnants of his command, scattered along the one hundred-mile long mountain trail from Cabanatuan to the Agno River. General Lawton, not to be left out of the fight, had steadily moved his division field headquarters behind Young's advance. Tragically, General Lawton nearly destroyed his headquarters attempting to raft it across the Agno River. In the end, several soldiers in his headquarters were swept downstream with their equipment and horses in the raging torrents of the mountain water. But the Americans knew that Aguinaldo was only hours in front of them, heading north for Rosario. Any semblance of an orderly Filipino withdrawal had already been abandoned--along with livestock, overturned carts, and discarded weapons and personal equipment. It seemed unlikely that Aguinaldo would slip away from the Macabebes.¹

The Last Macabebe Attack in Northern Luzon

On 19 November, Batson led a gallant charge on Aringay, wading across the Aringay River in the face of concentrated Filipino guerrilla fire. Batson was crippled by a gunshot wound in the left foot, while

another officer leader was knocked down during the assault. Although Batson's wound was not critical, the Macabebes had every good reason to lose their determination and willingness to continue now that their beloved leader and compatriot had been injured and would soon be evacuated. The detrimental impact of Batson's loss was obvious to General Young. It was a serious blow to the American effort but an eventuality given the nature of the dangerous duty the Macabebes had performed with their American leaders. Regardless of the loss of Batson, General Lawton knew his Macabebe experiment had been a success. The Macabebes had spearheaded Young's pursuit of Aguinaldo across the most rugged terrain in central Luzon. Before Batson's loss, he wrote to General Otis that


...I can not forget the Macabebes, who have distinguished themselves from the moment of their employment, and are now our main reliance and support. They have been well-behaved, loyal and active, notwithstanding that they have been maligned and are falsely accused by the insurgents, who, I am satisfied, have themselves² committed outrages, representing themselves to be Macabebes.

General Young appointed Lieutenant Colonel Wilder to replace Batson as the Macabebe battalion commander. Then orders were issued to press on.³

No Rest for the Weary

While General Wheaton remained in place at San Fabian, General Young's provisional cavalry brigade with its crippled, shoeless horse cavalry and limping Macabebes reached San Fernando de la Union on 21 November. As the main body--a loose expression for the small band of surviving remnants of Young's command--traveled quickly over the excellent coastal road, Wilder checked the adjacent and rugged escape

route via Gallano and Naguilian toward Trinidad. Convinced it had not been used by Aguinaldo, Wilder returned to San Fernando and led the Macabebes forward to Namacpacan, arriving on 26 November. Again, Wilder pushed eastward into the mountains toward Cervantes, insuring that



guerrilla stragglers were not using that route of escape. When he returned to Namacpacan, the Macabebes were simply too spread out, sick, and demoralized to continue the pursuit. On 6 December, both Generals Young and Lawton agreed to relieve the one hundred remaining Macabebes from further duty in northern Luzon. All the surviving natives were evacuated to Manila for rest and recuperation.⁵ In short order, the Macabebes joined Batson at San Pedro Macati in Manila,

Figure 9: Young's Campaign, Nov-Dec 1899. where they were paid for the first time and allowed to return to their Macabebe homeland for a much needed rest.⁶ In the meantime, Young ordered Dorrington's and Castner's Scouts forward from Cabanatuan, where they had protected the rear logistical bases of the brigade. In conjunction with Captain Bachelor's Twenty-

fourth Infantry, Castner turned north at Tayug and headed through the San Nicolas Pass into northern Luzon.⁷ Dorrington's Scouts continued westward, where they finally linked up with General Lawton at San Fabian.⁸ In all, Young's command demonstrated a remarkable resolve and dedication to one single purpose--the destruction of Aguinaldo's guerrilla band and the capture of its leader.⁹

Bachelor's March--With Castner's Scouts


Although the Macabebe Scouts--the only pure native scout organization--were unfit for continued service in December, Generals Young and Lawton were able to call on Castner's Scouts, a mixture of American and Tagalog scouts in one company, which had been held in reserve during Young's chase across east and central Luzon. On 23 November, General Lawton personally briefed Castner at Tayug on his new and important mission--to march north through the San Nicolas Pass into the Cagayan Valley, thereby sealing off eastern Luzon from Aguinaldo's retreating army. In particular, Castner was instructed to seize Bayombong, the capital of Nueva Vizcaya province, as intelligence reports indicated it to be Aguinaldo's new capital. Wearing brand-new guerrilla uniforms, Castner immediately dispatched a small advance guard into the mountains.¹⁰

Captain Bachelor, commanding the three hundred and fifty man battalion of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, also received specific instructions from the First Division commander. Following the trail broken by Castner, Bachelor would independently push his light infantry behind Castner, garrisoning the entire Cagayan Valley from Tayug to Aparri, on the northern tip of Luzon. Turning toward the eight

thousand foot mountains, Bachelor had no idea that he would traverse the course in twenty-four days, cross one hundred twenty-three deep fords, fight two battles, and capture three provinces complete with one thousand guerrillas, their rifles and artillery pieces, and over one hundred river boats.¹¹

Castner and Bachelor, working as a team, departed the civilized world of central Luzon and climbed into the mountains with no experienced guides, useless maps, and a small stream of Chinese cargadores carrying supplies that would soon be exhausted. To the astonishment of the guerrillas in Bayombong, the soldiers who made Bachelor's March traveled ninety miles in six days, reaching Bayombong on 29 November. Even the tiny ponies packing needed ammunition and medical supplies survived the slippery foot-wide paths which zig-zagged across the faces of the mountain ranges. Sick, barefoot, and followed by a trail of recently

impressed Igorotte headhunters carrying supplies, Castner, who had preceded Bachelor's column, had already graciously allowed another lieutenant to accept



Map 7: Bachelor's March.

the surrender of Philippine General Canon, the provincial military governor. Too tired to pursue the Philippine forces in front of his battalion, Bachelor loaded his sick soldiers into carts and moved northward behind Castner's Scouts. On 8 December, Bachelor accepted Philippine General Tirona's surrender at Iligan, the provincial capital of Isabela and, four days later, the American force entered Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan province, to the brassy sounds of the town band. The U.S. Navy met the depleted, but conquering Americans via the Cagayan River on 13 December. Bachelor wisely garrisoned the major towns, liberated prisoners, established Filipino civil authority when necessary, and paid for food as he went. American soldiers were severely disciplined for any infraction against the civilian populace. In time, the reputation of the Americans preceded their arrival as the word was passed from town to town not to fear the American soldiers--in stark contrast to the undisciplined looting of the retreating Filipino guerrillas. On 20 December, Castner's Scouts embarked on seagoing vessels, sailed to Vigan on the west coast of Luzon, and reported to General Young for duty on 21 December.¹³ This joint venture between Bachelor, Castner, and the U.S. Navy into the lush and mineral-rich Cagayan Valley seemed to guarantee the fate of Aguinaldo, who was now located on the west coast of Luzon just beyond the grip of General Young. How Aguinaldo eluded the Americans until March 1901 was as much a miracle as Bachelor's March in November and December 1899.¹⁴

General MacArthur's Scouts

While General Young dashed around the revolutionary army in conjunction with MacArthur's steady thrust north along the Manila-Dagupan

railroad, General Wheaton landed at San Fabian and waited for the battle to come to him. Neither Wheaton nor MacArthur needed the expertise of friendly Filipinos to guide the way--as long as such prominent terrain features as a railroad and the Lingayen Gulf were at hand. However, MacArthur also commanded one company of Macabebes and his own Division scouts, the latter being officered by his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Thomas H. Slavens.¹⁵

Slavens, a West Point graduate and former Indian fighter, arrived in Manila on 11 August 1899. Originally assigned to the Fourth U.S. Cavalry under General Lawton, he was reluctantly transferred to General MacArthur's personal staff. Basically, the Headquarters scouts consisted of twenty-eight American soldiers and a handful of natives who performed reconnaissance and advance guard missions to the front of MacArthur's division, which was considerably stretched to either side of the railroad. From 29 October to 22 November, MacArthur's column fought from Angeles to Dagupan. In more ways than not, Slavens' scouts were a trip wire for MacArthur--out in front to trigger an ambush or breach a trap set by the retreating Filipinos. The duty was just as dangerous as any scout duty in the Eighth Corps--except that it lacked the challenge and thrill of rapid movement. Even so, Slavens demonstrated extraordinary bravery and was recommended for early promotion and reassignment to Manila. For a variety of reasons, aides did not last long. MacArthur was a personable and thoughtful general to serve, but perhaps there were more sought-after jobs for young officers than being aides and chief scouts. Scouting duty in the First Division was remarkably different from that in MacArthur's Second Division.¹⁶

The Filipino As A Scout

General Lawton agreed with one of the greatest American Indian fighters, General George Crook, when the latter theorized that one had to "use Indians to catch Indians."¹⁷ Not only that, but General Crook thought the American army needed "extraordinary white men to lead them [Indian scouts]."¹⁸ The conventional portion of the Philippine Insurrection during 1899 repeatedly demonstrated that given both of General Crook's prerequisites, the Filipino could be successfully employed to assist Americans in the fight. However, in the literal sense of the characteristics of military scouts, few of the native scouts in either Batson's or Castner's Scouts were, in fact, scouts at all. And General Lawton knew it.

Native Scouts are Native Infantry

For every reason that Macabebes and Tagalogs were superior soldiers and marvelous assets to the American cause, a corresponding factor surfaced to demonstrate a weakness in the suggestion that Philippine Scouts, as the Macabebes and Tagalogs were later called, were ever anything more than good soldiers. In the first place, the average Filipino in 1899 could not find his way in unfamiliar territory. For most, having to travel outside their homeland was more traumatic than transporting an American soldier from the United States to the Philippines for combat duty.¹⁹ Most Filipinos were not inclined to study terrain, know landmarks, gather infinite amounts of information from the slightest irregularity or trivia in the environment, or distinguish objects at great distances. Largely, their livelihood did not depend on hunting which is what a scout was needed to do for a maneuver unit. The Philippine Scouts could

simply not be compared to the Indian scouts who spent their entire lives scouting, whether or not they worked for the U.S. Army.²⁰

A Talent for Differentiation

The typical Philippine Scout was able to adapt to the American military service, learning skills over time which were quite beyond the expertise of the common American soldier. Simply, he was easily motivated to become a good soldier. Given experience, he was able to acquaint himself with unfamiliar terrain. Once acquainted, most Filipinos retained an exceptional memory for the features and landmarks. More importantly, Filipinos were instinctively able to differentiate among various tribes and other characteristics. Obvious physical differences among the regional ethnic variations were not difficult. Tagalogs from Manila were slender, muscular, had flat features, coarse black hair without beards, small hands and feet, and were very graceful and proud.²¹ In the north, they were taller and darker; and, in the south, they were hard and rough men of the sea.²² Understanding that there were numerous tribes and some intermingling between races, clear distinctions became cloudy. As such, guerrillas who claimed to be Macabebes were able to convincingly trick other native scouts. Yet the Macabebes who could essentially smell out a Tagalog were seldom wrong when they pointed a finger toward a guerrilla claiming to be a simple peasant. The Macabebes were unique in their natural ability to identify the revolutionary, and when they did, frightful results would be forthcoming unless the scouts were adequately supervised. The Macabebes were so often correct that it seemed they were prejudiced toward the Tagalogs--which was often exactly correct.²³

Not only could the native scouts identify revolutionaries--later guerrillas--they instinctively knew how and where the Tagalog would fight, how he would recruit, where he would obtain his rations, when he would visit towns and barrios, and exactly where his equipment and weapons might be hidden.²⁴ The tendencies and habits of native scouts were similar to the revolutionary Tagalogs they hated. American leaders who understood their own native scouts came to also understand their enemy.

...when the Army enlisted natives to serve as scouts a new era began. They knew the people, the language, their organizations and leaders, whom to watch, and the country, better than a white man could ever hope to know these things. Through them and their friends information came in, and results were attained. The greater the number of scouts enlisted, the more people broke away from insurgent organizations, until every time the guerrillas came out of their mountains into the plains, around the villages and towns, it was at once reported,²⁵ and they ceased to...rob and...it became harder for them to live.

Personality Traits

If the American soldier was rightfully accused of being brutally honest and frank, the native scout was exactly the opposite.²⁶ Their natural intelligence and quick minds were concealed by an often undemonstrative and taciturn exterior.²⁷ However, the Filipino was a consummate actor and schemer. Often, he had no interest in telling the truth if it did not suit his purpose.²⁸ Noncombatant Filipinos could easily play a double role--one day as a friend to the American soldiers, another day his enemy.²⁹ There was nothing morally wrong about ladronism for a cause.³⁰ Yet, the Filipino was courteous and respectful of authority and formalities. Their family and tribal ties were incredibly strong, regardless of whether or not the cause was just. "It is clear, then, that for every Filipino soldier we enlist we gain numerous friends,

as his immediate family and relatives,--and they usually are legion,-- are interested, and take sides with him."³¹ Generally, the Filipino scout was a soldier of contrasting personality characteristics which, when undertood, enabled him to be a great asset in the American effort.

Military Capabilities

Inherently, Filipinos had a dormant warrior spirit which, when properly officered, enabled them to "strike the enemy swiftly and hard, and have no compunction about hurting him; rather, needing restraint."³² Psychologically, they needed a father-figure just as a child did for it was the custom of the Filipino

...to select some one as a patron, or leader, and to attach themselves to him, for good or evil. When this happens, the patron's word on every occasion is as law, and he can go to the most extreme lengths and resort to the greatest unjustness, before any of his followers leave him. This is most strongly marked when they take on military service. They form a very strong attachment for their leaders, looking on their officer almost with reverence, and his sentiments become in a lesser degree, their sentiments.³³

Once enlisted, the native scouts seldom attempted to desert and were quite willing to risk their lives in combat.

The Filipino scouts were accustomed to life in the tropics, jungle, swamps, and mountains. Given fish and rice, the primary staples of both rich and poor, a native scout could drink water from any source without the attendant side effects Americans suffered. They were immune to constant exposure, heat extremes, and most intestinal disorders except they appeared to be highly sensitive to chilly weather during the rainy season.³⁴

Native scouts were especially skilled and resourceful in their use of natural materials.

The skill with which the average native uses the simple material at hand for every form of construction is a matter of common knowledge. His knowledge of cordage seems to be born in him....Examine a bridge built by a native....every piece of material in the entire structure was found probably within 200 yards of the bridge and perhaps the only tool that assisted in construction was the ever-present bolo.³⁵

Every Filipino could handle a bolo, as a weapon or a tool, and they were especially adept in their bancas. They did not need shelter halves as they could construct sleeping arrangements anywhere in a matter of minutes. Because their requirements were few, native scouts seldom needed cargadores to carry their equipment and supplies--these soldiers lived off the land and could carry what they needed by themselves.³⁶

The Nature of the Duty

It is difficult to sense the magnitude of the contribution made by native scouts in terms of personal sacrifice. Even though the natives were used to certain hardships in their daily lives, it was impossible to measure how lonely they were, how isolated they felt, and the degree of fear and danger to which they were exposed during their initial service in 1899--"it has to be experienced to be appreciated"³⁷ and measured. They accomplished on foot what very few other American scouts were able to do and conceivably no ordinary American infantryman could have done. In comparison to Indian scouts, Filipino scouts lacked a certain expertise with the land and nature. However, they were no less fearsome in the eyes of their opponents and certainly no less effective in dealing with the American enemy in the Philippines. "If the Native Scouts had not been used it is possible that the war, in a desultory fashion, would still be going on in Central and Northern Luzon...."³⁸ They simply served the Americans well.

NOTES

¹U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 4, p. 279. Taken from the Report of Maj. Gen. H.W. Lawton, U.S.V., of an expedition to the provinces north of Manila, P.I., during the months of September, October, November, and December, 1899. Basic document is hereafter referred to as War Report, FY 1900, Part 4.

²U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 2, pp. 265-266. Taken from the Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, U.S.A., commanding the Division of the Philippines and military governor of the Philippine Islands, September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900. Basic document is hereafter referred to as War Report, FY 1900, Part 2.

³Lawton, War Report, FY 1900, Part 4, op. cit., pp. 279-280.

⁴Ibid., map following p. 272. Figure was traced and adjusted from a "Map of Northern Luzon" prepared under the direction of General Young and compiled by First Lieutenant H.P. Howard, Third Cavalry, aide-de-camp on 6 January 1900. Hereafter referred to as Luzon Map.

⁵Ibid., pp. 230-231.

⁶Captain Ben H. Chastine, 57th Infantry (PS), "Macabebes," Journal of the U.S. Infantry Association, 36 (January-June 1930), 629. Eventually, all six companies of the Macabebes under Lieutenant Colonel Wilder were stationed at Calumpit under the command of General MacArthur in the Second Division. See U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 6, pp. 94, 122, 368-394. Taken from the Report of Operations of Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, May 31, 1899 to April 6, 1900, by Major-General Arthur MacArthur, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding. Basic document is hereafter referred to as War Report, FY 1900, Part 6.

⁷Otis, War Report, FY 1900, Part 2, op. cit., pp. 289, 297.

⁸Ibid., p. 297.

⁹Lawton, War Report, FY 1900, Part 4, op. cit., pp. 279-286.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 342.

¹¹Ibid., p. 380.

¹²Russell Roth, Muddy Glory, America's 'Indian Wars' in the Philippines, 1899-1935 (W. Hanover, Massachusetts: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981), frontispiece.

¹³Lawton, War Report, FY 1900, Part 4, op. cit., p. 344.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 373-379.

¹⁵Brig. Gen. T.H. Slavens, U.S.A., Retd., Scouting in Northern Luzon, P.I., 1899-1900 (Publisher unknown, 1947). pp. 3-6.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 6-21.

¹⁷Dan L. Thrapp, Al Sieber, Chief of Scouts (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 49.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁹Major J.N. Munro, Philippine Scouts, "The Native Scout Organization," Journal of U.S. Cavalry Association, 20 (July 1909 to May 1910), 290.

²⁰Captain J.N. Munro, 3d Cavalry, "The Philippine Native Scouts," Journal of the U.S. Infantry Association, 2 (1 July 1905), 178.

²¹Lieut. John W. Ward, U.S.A., "The Use of Native Troops in Our New Possessions," Journal of The Military Service Institution of the United States, 31 (July-December 1902), 794.

²²Ibid., p. 794.

²³Captain Munro, op. cit., p. 178.

²⁴Ibid., p. 179.

²⁵Ward, op. cit., p. 798.

²⁶Ibid., p. 799.

²⁷Ibid., p. 794.

²⁸Captain Charles D. Rhodes, Sixth U.S. Cavalry, "The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions," Journal of The Military Service of the United States, 30 (January-June 1902), 9.

²⁹Ibid., p. 12.

³⁰Ibid., p. 6.

³¹Ward, op. cit., p. 797.

³²Ibid., p. 802.

³³Ibid., p. 799.

³⁴Rhodes, op. cit., pp. 5-7.

³⁵Major Munro, op. cit., pp. 285-286.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 286-301.

³⁷Captain Cromwell Stacey, 21st U.S. Infantry, "The Philippine Scouts," Journal of The U.S. Infantry Association, 4 (July 1907), 218.

³⁸Ward, op. cit., p. 797.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In a peculiar way, it seems senseless to dwell on the accomplishments of approximately five hundred Macabebes and one hundred other native scouts during the campaigns of seventy thousand American soldiers in the first year of the Philippine Insurrection. A glance at the statistics certainly fails to justify further deliberations. The inattention of most historians over the last eighty-four years adds a silent affirmation to the premise that studying the origination, use, and contributions of the Philippine Scouts in 1899 is, at first glance, unimportant.¹

Simply stated, American soldiers in the Philippines needed native scouts. Perceptive American generals realized that fact but also recognized the limitations of the natives. First, their loyalty was unproven. Second, their primary motivation to fight for the U.S. Army was based on a deeply rooted hatred for the Tagalog revolutionaries. Third, only the most capable American leaders could control them and employ them. Fourth, they really were not very good scouts--at least compared to the Indian scouts. To the everlasting credit of certain leaders--particularly Lawton, Young, and Batson--the Philippine Scouts were skillfully utilized in 1899. Based on their proven record of courage, the Philippine Scouts established a reputation which insured their institutionalization and growth as an American colonial force in the Philippines for almost fifty years.

Analysis

Historical Precedents

The American precedent for utilizing indigenous scouts as an official element of the U.S. Army was set in 1864 by General Curtis. The Pawnee Scouts, under the North brothers, hated the hostile Indians (who were predominantly Sioux) and, given their primeval motivations, were readily employed in the van of the U.S. Army during various campaigns into unmapped frontier territories during the American Indian Wars. Mounted on their Indian ponies, armed, equipped and uniformed, they were officially enlisted to serve the U.S. Army from 1864 to 1876. The need for a dynamic and capable leadership to control these indigenous soldiers was filled by the North brothers and a select group of other equally tough and experienced white settlers. The Indian scouts were employed as cavalymen who performed scouting roles rather than light infantry missions. Once they made contact with hostile Indians, the Indian scouts were responsible for bringing forward the main body of troopers. Often, in their zeal to kill hostile Indians, they attacked first, but that was clearly beyond their mission responsibilities. Their service on the central plains and in the southwest, for the Apache scouts under General Crook, is acknowledged as an instrumental element in bringing peace to the western frontier.

The use of Indian scouts was neither accidental nor designed. Many veterans of the Mexican War in 1846, including General Curtis, were aware of the reputation of the Texas Rangers. Zachary Taylor came to depend on the Rangers to lead his army in pursuit of the withdrawing Mexican army. When the Rangers became disoriented, they

sought the help of the indigenous populace. In no way was this method institutionalized; however, it was, for the U.S. Army, the natural beginning and first use of the indigenous populace for scouting purposes.

By the late 1880's, the British, who had established colonial armies since the seventeenth century, had considerable experience in indigenous soldiering. The exploits of Baden-Powell, with the Zulus in 1888 and the Eliminas and Ashantis in 1893, were already recorded in the official records of the British army and in many of Baden-Powell's books and manuals. At the U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, notes on the English army and on patrolling were commonly lectured and distributed to the students assigned.² The mainstream of the U.S. Army's officers passed through this institution, nearly all of them destined to serve in the Philippines. By coincidence, Lieutenant Batson (Batson's Scouts) and Lieutenant Castner (Castner's Scouts) were graduates of the same class--1895.³

Though the direct ties between the Texas Rangers, Pawnee Scouts, and various African scouts are limited, it would be unwise to conclude that these early experiences with indigenous soldiers had no bearing on the Philippine Scouts. Whether in sum total or in part, they gave the key decision makers in the Philippines a historical background to fall back on when the suggestion to employ Macabebes was first brought forward in 1899.

Causes of the War

It seems as if the U.S. accidentally acquired the Philippines. Expansionist interests in the late 1800's justified a need to protect the American economy by taking advantage of new trade opportunities in

the Pacific and protecting those interests with advance naval bases. The fact that the U.S. won the Spanish-American War narrowed the options in the Pacific to one--the Philippines. Once direct involvement ensued, fifteen thousand American soldiers were on the ground and in combat within months. The U.S. Army could hardly have picked a more challenging environment and complicated set of circumstances in which to launch a colonial experiment.

Appreciation for the Operational Situation

Surrounded by unhappy Filipinos, the U.S. Army broke out of Manila in early 1899, driving a wedge between the revolutionary forces in southern and northern Luzon. With limited operations south to Laguna de Bay and north to the Pampanga River, the few American scouts operating at Division headquarters easily met the challenges of the traditional mission requirements. But once the Fall Campaign was initiated, General Lawton soon learned how inadequate the American scouts were in the mountainous areas northeast of Manila. The elusive and quick enemy he faced was terribly difficult to locate and defeat in this rugged terrain. Further, Lawton and Young began to realize that their logistics could not follow them through the mountains. The decision was made to cut the umbilical cord between Young's light infantry and cavalry and the resupply depots in Manila. It was an ideal setting for native scouts who could travel light and endure the hardships of tough terrain and an unusually long rainy season that lasted the entire campaign.

Early Use of Native Scouts

Finally agreeing to experimentally assemble three companies

of Macabebes under Batson during the summer of 1899, General Otis was fearful of their reputation for brutality. Macabebes hated revolutionaries, particularly Tagalogs. Batson proved that he could supervise the Macabebes. In the early days of Young's fall campaign, the Macabebes demonstrated unquestionable loyalty to the Americans. As a result, five companies or about five hundred were recruited-- one company with MacArthur and the remainder with Young under Batson. When Young broke away from his supply lines on 7 November, the Macabebe battalion under Batson marched first in the order of march as the advance guard.

While Castner's Scouts, a small group of both Americans and Tagalogs, and Dorrington's Scouts, a platoon-size composite of Americans and natives, guarded the forward logistics base at Cabanatuan, Young's brigade moved out. In two weeks it would sweep around the central Luzon plains and seal off many of the revolutionary units below the Lingayen Gulf in a brilliant encirclement operation which almost entrapped Aguinaldo. In the final days of the operation, Young's brigade was reduced to less than one hundred combat effective Macabebes and cavalrymen. Without the Macabebes, Young would probably have failed to link up with American elements on the Lingayen Gulf with enough speed to have routed Aguinaldo into a full retreat.

In the final analysis, the native scouts were the most important factor in Young's pursuit of Aguinaldo in November. Very few American soldiers were able to continue the attack west of the Agno River. Due to the drive and determination of Generals Young and Lawton coupled with the enthusiasm of Batson, the Macabebes completed the difficult campaign, enduring incredible hardships and dangers. Many American

soldiers who accompanied Young dropped out along the way due to exhaustion and disease. Had Young succeeded in capturing Aguinaldo below the Lingayen Gulf, the impetus for the struggle in northern Luzon would probably have evaporated. If the conflict had not ended on that note, it might have been less protracted or markedly different than two and one-half years of counterinsurgency warfare which did occur.

Participation in Young's campaign was the most significant contribution of the Macabebes in 1899. Castner's Scouts nearly equaled that record during Bachelor's March into the Cagayan Valley. Later, both organizations continued to serve in a counterinsurgency capacity. Both feats were remarkable for indigenous soldiers who proved to be poor scouts in comparison to the Indian scouts but ever more useful as light infantry in an environmental setting which punished mounted cavalry and large tactical units.

Conclusions

The following findings are drawn from the presentation of evidence and information in this study:

- (1) The Philippine Scouts were not scouts in the traditional sense. Rather, they were capable light infantry, normally operating in the advance guard of the main body of U.S. Army forces.
- (2) The precedence for using indigenous soldiers was actually founded in the American Indian Wars rather than the Philippine Insurrection.
- (3) The Philippine Scouts were unconcerned about uniforms, pay, and accrued benefits from service with the U.S. Army. Although grateful when paid and cognizant of the prestige of working for the Americans,

the Scouts were motivated by strong American leadership and a desire to kill Tagalogs.

(4) The original Philippine Scouts, the Macabebes, were considered to be an undesirable element of the population. Notwithstanding that perception, they made unusually good soldiers.

(5) Native scouts possessed many soldierly characteristics:

(a) Filipinos retained a strong, dormant warrior spirit. Regardless of the legitimacy of a cause, once committed, they remained loyal to the American cause in spite of terrorist pressures and combat dangers.

(b) Philippine Scouts were experts in the art of survival, easily living off the land.

(c) When the Philippine Scouts were not carefully supervised, they reputedly terrorized the local Tagalog population.

(6) Once a native scout enlisted, his family and friends also came to side with the American cause. One enlistment accounted for innumerable American sympathizers scattered about the scout's village and countryside.

(7) The use of the banca by native scouts solved transportation problems which heretofore had impeded the U.S. Army's rapid movement and mobility during the Fall Campaign.

(8) The greatest contributions of the original Philippine Scouts were:

(a) Their service during Young's fall campaign enabled the Americans to destroy most of Aguinaldo's army below the Lingayen Gulf. The effect of Generals Wheaton and MacArthur would have been minimal had Young been unable to complete the encirclement of Aguinaldo.

(b) That service justified the continued use of indigenous soldiers in the Philippines which officially stretched on for almost fifty years.

Lessons Learned

The U.S. Army employed indigenous soldiers after the Philippines experience which lasted through the end of World War Two. Whether or not any lessons were taken from the era of the Philippine Scouts is doubtful.

In June 1950, the Lodge Act or Public Law 597 (Alien Enlistment Act) was passed authorizing the recruitment of two thousand five hundred European aliens who could be enlisted and granted American citizenship after five years' service. By 1959, when the law expired, almost two thousand aliens had enlisted for U.S. Army service with special forces units and military intelligence detachments. Their language expertise and foreign area knowledge proved to be invaluable. Somehow, all of Asia was ignored during the recruitment program which lasted nine years.⁴

Many thousands of Korean nationals were enlisted for service under the KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army) program, beginning during the Korean War when American units first arrived in 1950. These Korean soldiers were very helpful in orienting American soldiers to conditions existing in Korea. Today, the program is still alive although KATUSA soldiers are not members of the U.S. Army. Their service is particularly invaluable as interpreters for Americans given the language barrier which may exist when Korean and American units conduct interoperability operations in Korea.

Finally, the Kit Carson Scout program during the Vietnam War

repeats many of the lessons learned from the Philippine Insurrection. In a remarkable way, the Kit Carson Scout and Philippine Scout programs were identical. The exception being that the U.S. Army demonstrated unusual ignorance and sluggish mismanagement in Vietnam.⁵

The first American tactical units arrived in Vietnam during the summer of 1965. By 1966, the First Marine Division under Major General Herman Nickerson began experimenting with the use of six Hoi Chanh (ralliers) in two of his Marine regiments. These ralliers were exceptionally good at identifying suspected Viet Cong guerrillas and sympathizers from large gatherings of villagers. Further, they were useful as scouts during tactical operations and during the interrogation of prisoners. Hence, General Nickerson nicknamed them "Kit Carson Scouts" after the famous American frontiersman.⁶

Finally, in 1968, the U.S. Army picked up on the idea and formalized the Kit Carson Scout program under the J-2 (Intelligence Staff Officer) at the Military Assistance Command Headquarters, Vietnam. By 1969, American tactical unit commanders were so impressed by the early results of the Kit Carson Scouts that requests for additional scouts were difficult to fill. By this time, the Kit Carson Scouts were being recruited from Vietnamese Chieu Hois (defectors from the Viet Cong or North Vietnam) who were carefully screened in Saigon. At the peak of the program in June 1970, twenty-five hundred Kit Carson Scouts were being utilized in most American and allied tactical units in Vietnam.⁷

From the outset, the U.S. Army was slow to organize its employment of Kit Carson Scouts in spite of the phenomenal Marine successes. These scouts were marvelous guides. Further, they saved

many American lives by pinpointing ambushes and booby traps. Often, however, the Kit Carson Scouts were misutilized as barbers or extra help around the various headquarters elements. The most formidable barrier was overcoming language difficulties. Once this was accomplished, the next obstacle was the U.S. Army's tardy response to what was obviously a good idea coupled with a distinct lack of guidance on how to administer the program from the highest levels.⁸

Just as in the Philippines, only flexible and dynamic American leaders were able to adapt to the idea of Kit Carson Scouts in Vietnam--and keep it going.

A Spectrum for Future Conflicts




Figure 10: Spectrum of Conflict

of future conflicts in a world filled with varied locations for those conflicts, the idea of indigenous soldiers seems relegated to the very last considerations of note. Whether or not the next American conflict will be located in a remote and unfamiliar region of the world is not important. But if it is, indigenous scouts will be helpful

In the spectrum of future conflicts in a world filled with varied locations for those conflicts, the idea of indigenous soldiers seems relegated to the very last considerations of note. Whether or not the next American con-




Figure 11: Potential Sources of Conflict

to American units. How the U.S. Army reacts to that type of challenge has roots in earlier American wars. A study of past events will ease the burdens of the next challenge.

NOTES

¹ A similar fate seems to have met the military histories (or lack thereof) of any scouts--American or indigenous--since the days of the American Revolution.

² U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School, Annual Report, June 30, 1898 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: n.p., 1898), p. 16.

³ U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School, Annual Report, 1895 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: n.p., 1895), pp. 3-4.

⁴ Colonel David E. Grange, Jr., Infantry, "The Requirement for a new 'Lodge Act'," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 1970, pp. 3-34.

⁵ Major Gary A. Olsen, Infantry, "The Kit Carson Scout Program," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1972, p. 21.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 1-7.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 8-12.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 12-21.

⁹ General Edward C. Meyer, "The Challenge of Change," 1981-82 Green Book, (October 1981), 16.

¹⁰ The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 1.

CHAPTER 8

EPILOGUE

At the end of the conventional fighting in November 1899 and until the official end of the Philippine Insurrection in July 1902-- although there would be some fighting and dying for many years to come--significant events would take place in the Philippines and the United States which served to either enhance or detract from the record of military service of the Philippine Scouts, particularly Batson's and Castner's Scouts. Unquestionably, the military record of the Philippine Scouts was superb. What had begun in the summer of 1899 as only an experiment had proven to be so militarily beneficial that, within time, native Filipino soldiers eventually became official members of the U.S. Regular Army garrisoning the Philippines. Even though the strongest advocates and initial proponents of the idea were absented from the scene, the strength of the system became intuitively obvious to even American legislators in the U.S. Congress who acted to institutionalize the concept of utilizing native or indigenous soldiers. The legislative measures which were to evolve during the last two and one-half years of the Philippine Insurrection were almost entirely based on one single aspect of the Philippine Scouts--their superior performance in 1899.

Two Big Tears

No stranger to scouting--based on his experience with Indian

scouts in the American Indian Wars--General Lawton was the most avid supporter of Batson's Scouts during 1899. Under his leadership, as the First Division commander, Batson's Scouts were expanded from two companies to battalion-size. The Scouts performed as a battalion-size maneuver element under General Young during his fall campaign in the central Luzon valley. In contrast, the single company of Macabebes under General MacArthur which followed the Manila-Dagupan railroad simply never developed expertise as a maneuver element. General Otis, the Corps commander, was pleased with the results of the Macabebes working for General Lawton, yet he never really trusted them nor considered them to be completely aligned with the American cause. General Lawton was really the only U.S. general to fully recognize the merits of Batson's Scouts and, under his guiding hand, Lieutenant Batson ably produced a fierce fighting body of foot soldiers.¹

On 19 November 1899 at Aringay, the Macabebes lost their father-figure. As the crippled Batson lay wounded on the bank of the Aringay River, General Young rode up and tenderly lifted the fearless lieutenant to a spare horse and saw that he was safely carried to the rear.² In the hearts and minds of the Macabebes, Batson was irreplaceable. In time, Batson's Scouts, consisting of six companies under Lieutenant Colonel Wilder, were collected at Calumpit and were reassigned to General MacArthur's Division where they fought the remainder of the war in and around the Zambales Hills.³ Under General MacArthur, Batson's Scouts never again progressed to the level of a maneuver battalion although they were comparable in size to any other U.S. battalion or squadron in the Philippines.

With one leg missing from the triad of leadership supporting the

Macabebes, another fell out thirty days later. While Batson painfully recovered in a hospital bed in Manila, General Lawton came by to see the young hero on 18 December 1899.⁴ Unbeknownst to everyone, General Otis had secretly ordered General Lawton back to Manila to plan an attack on a large concentration of guerrillas which had garrisoned San Mateo about eighteen miles northeast of Manila.⁵ The idea had been brewing in Otis' mind for several months awaiting the termination of the fall campaign in central Luzon.⁶ Prior to announcing his plan of attack in the afternoon of 18 December, General Lawton stopped by to see Batson.

...I [Batson] shall never forget that visit. He [Lawton] showed so much feeling about my misfortune and told me how he had urged General Otis time and time again to have me made a major...when Colonel Edwards [the doctor] told me...that I would probably lose my foot two big tears rolled down his [Lawton's] cheek.

The next day, standing over six feet tall and wearing his white helmet and yellow rain slicker, Lawton coolly paced the firing line on the west bank of the San Mateo River. Shortly after nine o'clock, he pitched forward to the ground and died with a Filipino bullet buried deep into his heart.⁸

...Thus died on the battlefield, this great, heroic soldier; large of frame and large of heart, with an indomitable will and a power unsurpassed for overcoming obstacles—a soldier who had never shown fear, who knew not what fear was.

The Philippine Scouts Survive Reorganization

In April 1900, the American tactical division organization in the Philippine Islands was modified into geographical areas of responsibility, comprising four departments: Northern Luzon; Southern Luzon; the Visayas; and Mindanao and Jolo. General Young, who commanded a district from his headquarters at Vigan in General Wheaton's department

of Northern Luzon, continued to place emphasis on the Philippine Scouts. Originally, Castner's company of scouts consisted of a mixture of American soldiers and Tagalogs. Eventually, Castner's Scouts, who had returned from Bachelor's March, were raised to two hundred and fifty; the increase composed of natives from the Ilocano tribe. Brigadier General Frederick Funston, commanding another district at San Isidro, also organized one hundred and fifty Ilocano scouts. Although the Macabebes were still fighting out of Calumpit, by June 1900, they had been converted into a squadron of four troops of Philippine Cavalry--complete with five hundred sets of specially designed horse equipment. U.S. soldiers worked diligently at teaching the Macabebes, who were expert boatmen but not horsemen, the fundamentals of riding Filipino ponies. They never developed into a mounted force. By 1 September, native scouts had been organized in the Department of the Visayas on the island of Negros. The Philippine Scouts not only survived reorganization but began to appear throughout the Islands even though the general who had backed the original Macabebe Scouts was dead.¹¹

By Law--The Philippine Scouts

1901 was a banner year for the Philippine Scouts. On 2 February, the second session of the Fifty-sixth Congress passed a law which, for the first time, legally authorized the enlistment of native scouts into the Regular Army of the U.S. and organized them as infantry or cavalry companies and battalions. A ceiling of twelve thousand was placed on the total number of natives while pay, rations and a clothing allowance were provided. By June, fifty-five hundred native scouts were in the ranks.¹² Most importantly, at some future date Filipinos could be selected for promotion to the grades of first and second

lieutenant.¹³

General Funston Captures Aguinaldo

General Funston, commanding a district in the Northern Luzon Department in 1901, strongly believed in the use of both U.S. scouts and native scouts. He believed that the Iloncanos "were splendid marchers and fighters, and were as trustworthy as the Macabebes, and that is saying a great deal."¹⁴ In March, based on intelligence which had been captured, an expedition conceived by Funston was launched to retrieve Aguinaldo at a hideout located near Palanan in northern Luzon. Eighty-one Macabebes captured Aguinaldo and several other key leaders after a long march along the coast, posing as Tagalog guerrillas with American prisoners of war (including Funston). This important event paved the way for serious peace negotiations and an eventual termination of the Philippine Insurrection by the summer of 1902.¹⁵

The Philippine Constabulary

On 4 July 1901, military control of the Philippine Islands was transferred to civil authorities. Shortly thereafter, an insular native constabulary, known as the Philippine Constabulary, was authorized by an act of the Civil Commission to serve as a police force to suppress ladreses and other violators of peace and order. Essentially, the Philippine Constabulary was created because the Civil Commission was unwilling to "intrust to the various provinces the police protection of their own inhabitants."¹⁶ Although the Philippine Constabulary was military oriented and uniformed, it was lightly armed, under civil

control, and members were recruited for service only in localities with which they were familiar. The Philippine Constabulary generally equaled the strength of the Philippine Scouts and both often worked in cooperation on significant events. At times, there appeared to be little difference between the Philippine Constabulary and Scouts.¹⁷

The Philippine Scouts, 1903

The Philippine Scouts numbered fifty companies, in all, with the largest proportion of scouts coming from Macabebe and Ilocano origin. By this time, scouts were also recruited from the Cagayan, Tagalog, Bicol, and Visayan tribes. The Philippine Scouts, as an organization, was not only growing in size and spreading throughout the Philippines, it began to take the appearance of an outfit destined to remain an integral part of the colonial army in the Philippines.¹⁸

NOTES

¹ Lieutenant Matthew A. Batson, The Batson Papers (n.p., 24 September 1899), n. pag.

² Ibid., Letter dated 20 November 1899, n. pag.

³ U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 2, p. 344. Taken from the Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, U.S.A., commanding the Division of the Philippines and military governor of the Philippine Islands, September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900. Basic document is hereafter referred to as War Report, FY 1900, Part 2.

⁴ Batson, op. cit., Letter dated 23 December 1899, n. pag.

⁵ Captain H.H. Sargent, Second Cavalry, "The Action of San Mateo. The Death of Major General Lawton, U.S. Volunteers." Journal of The Military Service of the United States, 30 (January-June 1902), 42.

⁶ Ibid., p. 43.

⁷ Batson, op. cit., Letter dated 23 December 1899, n. pag.

⁸ Sargent, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

⁹ Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁰ Captain J.N. Munro, 3d Cavalry, "The Philippine Native Scouts," Journal of the U.S. Infantry Association, 2 (1 July 1905), 181.

¹¹ War Report, FY 1900, Part 2, op. cit., pp. 45-50, 332.

¹² James E. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914), I, 120.

¹³ Captain Charles D. Rhodes, Sixth U.S. Cavalry, "The Utilization of Native Troops in our Foreign Possessions," Journal of The Military Service Institution, 30 (January-June 1902), 1-2, 21-22.

¹⁴ Frederick Funston, Brigadier-General, U.S. Army, Memories of Two Wars (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), p. 319

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 385-418.

¹⁶ LeRoy, op. cit., p.121.

¹⁷ Rhodes, op. cit., pp. 13-15.

¹⁸ LeRoy, op. cit., p. 123.

APPENDIX A-I

APPENDIX A *

MILITARY GOVERNORS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Major General Wesley Merritt	August 14, 1898, to August 29, 1898
Major General Elwell S. Otis	August 30, 1898, to May 5, 1900
Major General Arthur MacArthur	May 5, 1900, to July 4, 1901
Major General Adna R. Chaffee	July 4, 1901, to July 4, 1902 (Only over those districts in which insurrection against authority of U.S. continued to exist, or in which public order was not sufficiently restored to enable provincial civil governments to be established)

COMMANDING GENERALS OF UNITED STATES ARMY

FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Brig General Thomas M. Anderson	June 30, 1898, to July 24, 1898
Major General Wesley Merritt	July 25, 1898, to August 20, 1898
Major General Elwell S. Otis	August 30, 1898, to May 4, 1900
Major General Arthur MacArthur	May 5, 1900, to July 3, 1901
Major General Adna R. Chaffee	July 4, 1901 to September 29, 1902

et al

* W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), II, p. 451.

APPENDIX B*

PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN
Signed at Washington, 12 August 1898

Protocol

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which the two Governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to say:

Article I

Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

Article II

Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.

Article III

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.

Article IV

Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other Commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under

under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

Article V

The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

Article VI

Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice of that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

Done at Washington in duplicate, in English, and in French, by the Undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals, the 12th day of August 1898.

[Seal] William R. Day

[Seal] Jules Cambon

* W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), II, pp. 425-426.

APPENDIX C*

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION OF THE CITY OF MANILA

Manila, August 14, 1898

The undersigned, having been appointed a commission to determine the details of the capitulation of the city and defenses of Manila and its suburbs and the Spanish forces stationed therein, in accordance with the agreement entered into the previous day by Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, United States Army, American commander in chief in the Philippines, and His Excellency Don Fermin Jaudenes, acting general in chief of the Spanish army in the Philippines, have agreed upon the following:

1. The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate with the city and its defenses, with all the honors of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States, and remaining in the quarters designated and under the orders of their officers, and subject to control of the aforesaid United States authorities, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations.

All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their respective homes, which shall be respected as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.

2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property.

3. All public horses and public property of all kinds shall be turned over to staff officers designated by the United States.

4. Complete returns in duplicate of men by organizations, and full lists of public property and stores, shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date.

5. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces and of their families, and of the expenses which said repatriation may occasion, shall be referred to the Government of the United States at Washington.

Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them.

The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city, or when the American army evacuates.

6. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied

by the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid as though they were prisoners of war until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the United States and Spain.

All the funds in the Spanish treasury and all other public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

7. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.

F.V. Green
Brigadier General of Volunteers, U.S. Army

B. P. Lamberton
Captain, U.S. Navy

Chas A. Whittier
Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General

E. H. Crowder
Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge-Advocate

Nicolas de la Pena
Auditor-General Exemo.

Carlos Reyes
Coronel de Ingenieros

Jose Maria Olaquen Feliu
Coronel de Estado Major

* W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), II, pp. 427-428.

APPENDIX D*

PROCLAMATION BY GENERAL MERRITT FOLLOWING THE
OCCUPATION OF THE CITY OF MANILA

Headquarters Department of the Pacific

August 14, 1898

To the People of the Philippines:

I. War has existed between the United States and Spain since April 21st of this year. Since that date you have witnessed the destruction, by an American fleet, of the Spanish naval power in these islands, the fall of the principal city, Manila, and its defences, and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to the forces of the United States.

II. The commander of the United States forces now in possession has instructions from his Government to assure the people that he has not come to wage war upon them, nor upon any part or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, by active aid or honest submission, cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection.

III. The government established among you by the United States is a government of military occupation; and for the present it is ordered it is ordered that the municipal laws, such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions, and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force, so far as compatible with purposes of military government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the government of occupation.

IV. A provost-marshal-general will be appointed for the city of Manila and its outlying districts. This territory will be divided into subdistricts and there will be assigned to each a deputy provost-marshal.

The duties of the provost-marshal-general and his deputies will be set forth in detail in future orders. In a general way they are charged with the duty of making arrests of military as well as civil offenders, sending such of the former class as are triable by courts-martial to their proper commands with statements of their offences for trial by military commission, provost courts, or native criminal courts, in accordance with law and the instructions hereafter to be issued.

V. The port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the

Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces, will be open while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation.

VI. All churches and places devoted to religious worship, and to the arts and sciences, all educational institutions, libraries, scientific collections, museums, are, so far as possible, to be protected; and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places or property, of historical monuments, archives, or works of science and art is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity. Severe punishment will be meted out for all violations of this regulation.

The custodian of all property of the character mentioned in this section will make prompt returns thereof to these headquarters, stating character and location, and embodying such recommendations as they may think proper for the full protection of the properties under their care and custody, that proper orders may issue enjoining the cooperation of both military and civil authorities in securing such protection.

VII. The commanding general in announcing the establishment of military government and in entering upon his duty as military governor, in pursuance of his appointment as such by the Government of the United States, desires to assure the people that so long as they preserve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States, they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.

Wesley Merritt
Major-General U.S. Army, Commanding

* W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), II, pp. 429-430.

APPENDIX E*

TREATY OF PARIS
Treaty of Peace of December Tenth, Eighteen Hundred and
Ninety-Eight

The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end the state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States.

William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States:

And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,

Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the Senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, deputy to Cortes and associate justice of the supreme court, Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerezo, General of Division;

Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles:

Article I

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

Article II

Spain cedes to the United State the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the Island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.

Article III

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:

A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth to the one hundred and twenty-seventh degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes north, thence along the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars, within three months after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty.

Article IV

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

Article V

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the Island of Guam on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the protocol of August twelfth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands

on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

Article V

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the Island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the protocol of August twelfth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two Governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibers, with their carriage and accessories, powder, ammunition, live stock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.

Article VI

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.

Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The Government of the United States will, at its own cost, return to Spain and the Government of Spain will, at its own cost, return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article.

Article VII

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba, and

prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war.

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.

Article VIII

In conformity with the provisions of Articles One, Two, and Three of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands of the West Indies, in the Island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to.

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills, and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain in the islands aforesaid..

Article IX

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds;

and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

Article X

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

Article XI

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.

Article XII

Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules:

1. Judgements rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgements should be carried out.

2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgement that may be substituted therefor.

3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the supreme court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgement; but, such judgement having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent authority

of the place in which the case arose.

Article XIII

The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents required by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba, and in Porto Rico, the Philippines, and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

Article XIV

Spain shall have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.

Article XV

The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade.

This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either Government to the other.

Article XVI

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

Article XVII

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.

[Seal] William R. Day
[Seal] Cushman K. Davis
[Seal] William P. Frye
[Seal] Geo. Gray
[Seal] Whitelaw Reid
[Seal] Eugenio Montero Rios
[Seal] B. de Garnica
[Seal] W. R. de Villa Urrutia
[Seal] Rafael Cerero

* W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), II, pp. 431-436.

APPENDIX F*

PROCLAMATION OF JANUARY 4, 1899

Office of the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands
Manila, P.I., January 4, 1899

To the People of the Philippine Islands:

Instructions of His Excellency the President of the United States relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands have been transmitted to me by direction of the honorable the Secretary of War, under date of December 28, 1898. They direct me to publish and proclaim, in the most public manner, to the inhabitants of these islands that in the war against Spain the United States forces came here to destroy the power of that nation and to give the blessings of peace and individual freedom to the Philippine people; that we are here as friends of the Filipinos; to protect them in their homes, their employments, their individual and religious liberty, and that all persons who, either by active aid or honest endeavor, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection.

The President of the United States has assumed that the municipal laws of the country in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force in so far as they be applicable to a free people, and should be administered by the ordinary tribunals of justice, presided over by representatives of the people and those in thorough sympathy with them in their desires for good government; that the functions and duties connected with civil and municipal administration are to be performed by such officers as wish to accept the assistance of the United State, chosen in so far as it may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands; that while the management of public property and revenues and the use of all public means of transportation are to be conducted under the military authorities, until such authorities can be replaced by civil administration, all private property, whether of individuals or corporations, must be respected and protected. If private property be taken for military uses it shall be paid for at a fair valuation in cash if possible, and when payment in cash is not practicable at the time, receipts therefor will be given to be taken up and liquidated as soon as cash becomes available. The ports of the Philippine Islands shall be open to the commerce of all foreign nations, and goods and merchandise not prohibited for military reasons by the military authorities shall be admitted upon payment of such duties and charges as shall be in force at the time of importation.

The President concludes his instructions in the following language:

'Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the Administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by insuring to them in every possible way the full measure of individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of beneficent assimilation, which will substitute the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, while upholding the temporary administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there will be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance, and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands.'

From the tenor and substance of the above instructions of the President, I am fully of the opinion that it is the intention of the United States Government, while directing affairs generally, to appoint the representative men now forming the controlling element of the Filipinos to civil positions of trust and responsibility, and it will be my aim to appoint thereto such Filipinos as may be acceptable to the supreme authorities in Washington.

It is also my belief that it is the intention of the United States Government to draw from the Filipino people so much of the military force of the islands as is possible and consistent with a free and well-constituted government of the country, and it is my desire to inaugurate a policy of that character. I am also convinced that it is the intention of the United States Government to seek the establishment of a most liberal government for the islands, in which the people themselves shall have as full representation as the maintenance of law and order will permit, and which shall be susceptible of development, on lines of increased representation and the bestowal of increased powers, into a government as free and independent as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces of the world.

It will be my constant endeavor to cooperate with Filipino people, seeking the good of the country, and I invite their full confidence and aid.

E. S. Otis
Major-General, U.S.V., Military Governor

* W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), II, pp. 437-438.

APPENDIX G*

FIELD ORDERS, NO. 7
FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS
Cabanatuan, P.I., November 6, 1899

I. This command will prepare immediately for a move to the front. All surplus weight and articles must be discarded from man, animal, and wheel transportation. Cooking stoves, buzzacott ovens, and all kitchen furniture, except boilers or camp kettles for cooking coffee, must be stored here or abandoned. Four carts will be allowed to each troop, battery, or company; one cart to a hospital of an independent battalion or less; two carts to each regimental headquarters; two carts to each squadron or battalion, being one for headquarters and one for medical department. One hundred and twenty rounds of ammunition to be carried by each trooper; 100 rounds by each foot soldier (more if desired). One hundred rounds per man to be carried on company transportation. One noncommissioned officer to have charge of company transportation; one commissioned officer to have charge of transportation of each battalion or squadron.

The loading of all carts will be supervised by an experienced officer, who will not permit the weight loaded on any one cart with two bulls to exceed 1,000 pounds, and for single bulls 600 pounds.

A supply train will follow. The following remarks by the major-general commanding the division, already published to this command, are republished and will be read to every organization: "The great problem to be solved on this expedition and on the solution of which the entire success or absolute failure of it depends is the transportation of our supplies. We have a long and difficult line to bring them over and a most insufficient means to work with. The major-general commanding the division therefore appeals both to the personal pride of every officer and man of this command and to his patriotism, to work at all hours and at all places, to advance our supplies and aid the transportation. To confine his necessities to the lowest possible limit and to husband all supplies to the utmost should be considered by everyone as his own particular duty."

The brigadier-general commanding the brigade joins his appeal with that of the major-general commanding the division to the personal pride, fidelity, and patriotism of every officer and enlisted man of this command and he feels as certain of success as of the hard work to be performed and the hardships to be endured. We can accomplish any success within the possibility of trained soldiers.

II. Order of march for to-morrow:

First. Battalion of Macabebes, Lieutenant Batson commanding.

Second. Troop F, Third Cavalry, Captain Dodd commanding.

Third. Battalion Twenty-second Infantry, Captain Ballance commanding.

Fourth. Battalion Thirty-seventh Infantry (mountain battery), Captain Koehler commanding.

Fifth. Second squadron and one-half of third squadron, Third Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Wessells commanding.

The first and second organizations named being already across the river, will proceed in the order named, in accordance with previous instructions, to Talaver. The march of the other organizations will be governed in their progress by the time consumed in crossing the river.

The third organization will be prepared to cross immediately on completion of the rope ferry. Each succeeding organization will be prepared to move from its cantonment in time to follow without delay the preceding organization. Each organization will furnish its own train guard. The Third Cavalry will furnish a strong guard for the entire train. Trains will move in order of the organizations to which they belong.

By command of Brigadier-General Young:

W. R. Smedberg, Jr.
First Lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry, A.D.C., A.A.G.

* U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), Part 4, p. 273. Taken from the Report of Maj. Gen. H.W. Lawton, U.S.V., of an expedition to the provinces north of Manila, P.I., during the months of September, October, November, and December, 1899.

APPENDIX H *

ACT OF CONGRESS
FOR THE CREATION OF SCOUTS
Approved February 2, 1901

Sec. 36. Act of Congress approved February 2, 1901.--That when in his opinion the conditions in the Philippine Islands justify such action the President is authorized to enlist natives of those islands for service in the Army, to be organized as scouts, with such officers as he shall deem necessary for their proper control, or as troops or as companies, as authorized by this act, for the Regular Army. The President is further authorized, in his discretion, to form companies, organized as are companies of the Regular Army, in squadrons or battalions, with officers and noncommissioned officers corresponding to similar organizations in the cavalry and infantry arms. The total number of enlisted men in said organizations shall not exceed twelve thousand, and the total enlisted force of the line of the Army, together with such native force, shall not exceed at any one time one hundred thousand.

The majors to command the squadrons and battalions shall be selected by the President from captains of the line of the Regular Army, and while so serving shall have the rank, pay and allowances of the grade of major. The captains of the troops or companies shall be selected by the President from first lieutenants of the line of the Regular Army, and while so serving they shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of captain of the arm to which assigned. The squadron and battalion staff officers, the first and second lieutenants of companies, may be selected from the noncommissioned officers or enlisted men of the Regular Army of not less than two years' service, or from officers or noncommissioned officers or enlisted men serving, or who have served, in the volunteers subsequent to April twenty-first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and officers of those grades shall be given provisional appointments for periods of four years each, and no such appointments shall be continued for the second or subsequent term unless the officer's conduct shall have been satisfactory in every respect. The pay and allowances of provisional officers of native organizations shall be those authorized for officers of like grades in the Regular Army. The pay, rations, and clothing allowances to be authorized for the enlisted men shall be fixed by the Secretary of War, and shall not exceed those authorized for the Regular Army.

When in the opinion of the President, natives of the Philippine Islands shall, by virtue of their services and character, show fitness for command, the President is authorized to make provisional appointments to the grades of second and first lieutenants from such natives, who, when so appointed, shall have the pay and allowances to be fixed by the

Secretary of War, not exceeding those of corresponding grades of the Regular Army.

* Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1904, Report of The Philippine Commission, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), XIII, pp. 17-18.

APPENDIX I*

AMNESTY PROCLAMATION, JULY 4, 1902
By the President of the United States--
A Proclamation

Whereas many of the inhabitants of the Philippine Archipelago were in insurrection against the authority and sovereignty of the Kingdom of Spain at divers times from August, eighteen hundred and ninety-six, until the cession of the Archipelago by that Kingdom to the United States of America, and since such cession many of the persons so engaged in insurrection have until recently resisted the authority and sovereignty of the United States; and

Whereas the insurrection against the authority and sovereignty of the United States is now at any end and peace has been established in all parts of the Archipelago, except in the country inhabited by the Moro tribes, to which this proclamation does not apply; and

Whereas during the course of the insurrection against the Kingdom of Spain and against the Government of the United States persons engaged therein, or those in sympathy with and abetting them, committed many acts in violation of the laws of civilized warfare, but it is believed that such acts were generally committed in ignorance of those laws and under orders issued by the civil or military insurrectionary leaders; and

Whereas it is deemed to be wise and humane, in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Government of the United States toward the Filipino people, and conducive to peace, order, and loyalty among them, that the doers of such acts who have not already suffered punishment shall not be held criminally responsible, but shall be relieved from punishment for participation in these insurrections and for unlawful acts committed during the course thereof by a general amnesty and pardon:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power and authority vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby proclaim and declare, without reservation or condition except as hereinafter provided, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who have participated in the insurrections aforesaid or who have given aid and comfort to persons participating in said insurrections, for the offences of treason or sedition and for all offences political in their character committed in the course of such insurrections pursuant to orders issued by the civil or military insurrectionary authorities or which grew out of internal political feuds or dissensions between Filipino

and Spaniards or the Spanish authorities or which resulted from internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves during either of said insurrections.

Provided, however, That the pardon and amnesty hereby granted shall not include such persons committing crimes since May first, nineteen hundred and two, in any province of the Archipelago in which at the time civil government was established, nor shall it include such persons as have been heretofore finally convicted of the crimes of murder, rape, arson, or robbery by any military or civil tribunal organized under the authority of Spain or of the United States of America, but special application may be made to the proper authority for pardon by any person belonging to the exempted classes, and such clemency as is consistent with humanity and justice will be liberally extended.

And further provided, That this amnesty and pardon shall not affect the title or right of the Government of the United States or that of the Philippine Islands to any property or property rights heretofore used or appropriated by the military or civil authorities of the Government of the United States or that of the Philippine Islands organized under authority of the United States, by way of confiscation or otherwise.

And provided further, That every person who shall seek to avail himself of this proclamation shall take and subscribe the following oath before any authority in the Philippine Archipelago authorized to administer oaths, namely:

'I,....., solemnly swear (or affirm) that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of America in the Philippine Islands and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I impose upon myself this obligation voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.'

Given under my hand at the city of Washington this fourth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and two, and in the one hundred and twenty-seventh year of the independence of the United States.

Theodore Roosevelt

By the President:

Elihu Root, Secretary of War

* W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), II, pp. 449-450.

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