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BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY JOB ANALYSES

Volume I

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officer and enlisted positions, it comments on factors relating to the circumstances of leadership and job performance.

Discrepancies were noted between specified MOS job descriptions and actual duties performed at the site. Junior officer roles and functions were determined to be somewhat inconsistent with the need to maintain the integrity of leadership. Maturity and experience among junior officers seemed to predict greater efficacy as a leader in this environment. Junior officers tended to perceive their roles and functions in managerial, rather than "command," terms.

Enlisted duties were found to be conducive to boredom and perfunctoriness in some cases. Some duties were viewed in negative terms. Jobs tended to lack challenge and positive attitudes toward those jobs depended upon internal motivation factors. Assignment of some auxiliary duties to enlisted personnel is possibly conducive to lowered efficiency in physical security tasks. Overt expressions of interdependence between guard force and support personnel were not encountered.

Conclusions were that training could be improved to emphasize the importance and nature of nuclear security tasks; that formalized career progression patterns in nuclear security be considered; that consideration be given to standardization of nuclear security functions and tasks and specification of preferred behaviours; and that authorities and responsibilities be clarified.

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PREFACE

Analyses of jobs performed by U.S. Army nuclear security force personnel were conducted over an 18-month period at 7 storage sites (2 domestic and 5 European).

Although this research focused upon jobs which were, or could be, performed by first-term enlisted members and newly assigned junior officers, NCO supervisory positions were examined in order to determine continuities between the functions of junior and senior enlisted personnel.

Expanded discussion of environmental, attitudinal, and organizational effects which influence the performance of jobs evaluated herein (labelled "key stressors" in this report) is contained in a companion report entitled "Behavioral Analysis of Physical Security Job Personnel and Environment" (in preparation).

The utility of this research would seem to reside in the identification of specific "job behaviors" which are required for successful completion of nuclear security tasks. To facilitate the identification of task families (functions, in this context) a functional taxonomy of nuclear security jobs was created. This technique allowed researchers to more precisely identify interdependent tasks and inventory critical skills, attributes, and training requirements.

Whatever insights may derive from this effort is due to the thoughtful and generous recitations of the officers and men of the nuclear security sites involved. Their abiding courtesy and cooperation were always sufficient to revitalize the researchers' enthusiasm for this project.

A special note of thanks is due the contract monitoring staff of DNA. Always generous with their time and constructive commentary, they unfailingly provided an indispensable extra-measure of support and encouragement.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Nuclear security force job analyses were derived from interviews, observations, and a review of operating procedures and instructions at two domestic and five overseas sites. Jobs directly associated with security of the exclusion area were emphasized. This report outlines specific tasks, functions, roles, and responsibilities for key security force jobs, and provides commentary on aspects of morale and interpersonal relations which influence the effectiveness of assigned personnel.

APPROACH AND METHOD

Substantial discrepancies between MOS job descriptions and actual site-specific duties were apparent from the outset. Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) job descriptions proved to be too general.* A new survey tailored for this analysis was thought to offer inadequate opportunity to expand upon MILPERCEN job descriptions. Critical Incident Technique interviews were not appropriate insofar as most interviewees did not perceive their jobs in terms of response to hypothesized critical incidents. A review of on-site operating procedures and instructions offered some insight to the operational functions and tasks; however, it was necessary to determine whether or not security force personnel articulated their duties and responsibilities in terms of those instructions.

Accordingly, a composite research method was devised which incorporated interviews, observations, and systematic review of operating instructions.

Interviews

Site personnel were asked to relate the sequence of tasks they performed during a particular work shift, concentrating on two-hour intervals. During interviews, researchers suggested a task component which might be used as a starting point for discussion of a task. Interviewees were encouraged to be

*Based on survey information often furnished by supervisors, tasks were recorded in terms which were not suitable for this study. Job survey questions tended to be biased toward military police law enforcement functions.

as candid and forthcoming as possible (through assurances of non-attribution). Embellishments of role and responsibility were discouraged by concentrating upon distinct functions and tasks which clearly related to responsibilities, even if those responsibilities were cast in personal, rather than operating instructions, terms.

Observation

Prior to conducting interviews, researchers observed job performance. As the interviews proceeded, observation continued, both to validate initial impressions and to ascertain if interviewees altered their work behavior to influence the researchers' perceptions. (For the most part, no changes in working behavior were noted; however, interviewees apparently became more conscious of their roles and duties once having discussed them with researchers.) Interviews were nonintensive. Interruptions were allowed, both to prevent undue interference with site operations and to reduce potential for contrived responses. During elicitation of job information, interviewees were permitted to express their opinions on morale, leadership, or operational problems.

Review of Operating Instructions

Pertinent directives, regulations, procedural manuals, and operating instructions/special orders were reviewed to determine if nominal tasks and functions were consistent with observed tasks and functions. (A listing of these references appears in the bibliography.) Discrepancies were *not* pointed out to interviewees; however, wherein discrepancies existed, researchers attempted to account for them by seeking clarifications.

Some behaviors included in these job analyses will bear close resemblance to others which appear on the same list. That semi-redundance permitted the researchers to disclose the subtleties of the job analysis without belaboring those subtleties with a discussion of the semantics involved.

The reasons for this approach are several. First, when interviewees provided descriptions of duties and responsibilities *per se*, they often failed to give discrete task descriptors. Secondly, the identification of tasks often left obscure expectations for the way in which those tasks were to be performed (e.g., over what duration, in accordance with what performance parameters, or with task interdependencies fully disclosed). Thirdly, no accurate assessment of training requirements for nuclear security jobs could be made until affective behaviors associated with major tasks could be accurately portrayed.

The Analyses

Analysis of physical security jobs consisted of a four-step procedure to: (1) inventory duties and responsibilities (as described by interviewees and determined from existing SOPs); (2) identify specific behaviors which were associated with those duties and responsibilities in terms of actions taken ("affective" behaviors) and cognitive processes involved ("cognitive" behaviors); (3) ascertain appropriate job qualifications (educational, military training, experiential, attributional); and (4) identify significant job-related stressors.

It must be emphasized that salient behaviors and job-related stressors were, for the most part, identified by the researchers in the course of interviews and observations.

In some instances, interviewees grouped lesser tasks (which the researchers thought discrete) with greater tasks. In others, tasks were described in colloquial terms requiring considerable interpretation on the part of researchers. Consequently, researchers applied standardized terminology to physical security job behaviors in order to lend precision to the choice of task, function, and role descriptors; and to delimit the number of terms which could be considered behaviors. Additionally, it was desirable to describe job-connected tasks and functions in parsimonious terms.

Some job descriptors were peculiar to individual sites. For example, guard shift supervisors were alternately identified as shift supervisors, sergeants of the guard (SOGs), and patrol supervisors. Colloquial labels also varied. Members of foot patrols were sometimes referred to as "rovers" or "walkers." In one instance, a label had pejorative connotations--"tower rat" for a tower-based guard. These descriptors are identified in job descriptions outlined below. Researchers were sensitive to the implicit meanings which attached to these labels, insofar as the relative status of various security force jobs were sometimes revealed in the colloquial references to them.

Having identified principal affective behaviors, it became necessary to: (1) describe them as actions, understanding, or knowledge (which are generically termed "job behaviors" in this context); (2) indicate the frequency, duration or intensity of those behaviors; (3) determine appropriate qualifications or attributes for such behaviors; and (4) inventory the reasons for job-related stress ("stressors").

Researchers attempted to restrict the number of terms used to denote job behaviors as a means to avoid the use of descriptors which were commonly applied to some jobs but not to others.

That restriction was thought to be a prerequisite for obtaining a job behavior inventory which could be usefully employed to (1) indicate personnel qualifications; (2) define skill levels; (3) suggest patterns for career progression; and (4) provide a basis for recommending standardized USAMPS or on-the-job training (OJT). Superior performance in the physical security environment is clearly a function of abilities, aptitudes, skills, and tolerances which must be collaterally refined, broadened, and developed as knowledge of physical security operations expands. In effect, knowledge without *practiced* task performance for a purpose will not suffice. This is particularly true when job behaviors involve a requirement to convince, deter, elicit from, instruct, or counsel others. Therefore, establishing continuities in job behaviors across jobs becomes a function of delimiting the terms of reference.

Presumably, leadership/followership styles and fundamental human relations skills needed for the superior performance of job behaviors in the physical security milieu can be acquired elsewhere. However, one of the basic questions confronting the researchers was the extent to which the nuclear security environment modifies the practice of such skills. This is especially true when negative reinforcement occurs as the search for diversion from prolonged periods of inactivity and routinization inhibits the practice of job skills.

As a result, performance styles may contribute more to superior task performance than in many other jobs wherein activity rates are greater or tasks more varied; and the necessity to stylistically embellish ordinary tasks is correspondingly reduced. In that respect, it is important to be concerned with *how* some tasks are performed; insofar as they are more conducive to the projection of a credible deterrence when performed with a degree of flair, than when performed perfunctorily. An illustration of this point can be given by contrasting motorized patrol duties with that of a walking patrol guarding the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The motorized patrol person, constantly moving from point to point on his/her circuit, generally meets job performance criteria by moving about at a rate which establishes an

effective presence. On the other hand, the walking guard enhances presence by pacing and weapons handling in a military manner. (Additionally, the latter's appearance is essential to the portrayal of professionalism.) The motorized patrol member would merely appear theatrical if he/she performed demounted routines with similar precision or discipline.

Be that as it may, researchers did not attempt to ascertain the margins of style which might differentiate superior performance in this setting. They *could* determine the actions and behaviors which were susceptible to stylistic enhancement through training and experience, however.

LIMITATIONS

Functions, tasks and associated behaviors mentioned in this report do not necessarily represent the most desirable functions, tasks, and behaviors for physical security jobs at issue. Neither are they fully consistent with governing SOPs. They are essentially *derivative* functions, tasks, and behaviors which represent a composite of those observed and reported. In most cases they can be subdivided and further specified by action sequences. For example, inspecting or observing involves a number of discrete activities which are particular to the entities being observed or inspected.

Very detailed specification of function/task behaviors was considered inappropriate prior to the standardization of procedures and position descriptions. Local variances severely inhibited any attempt to compare and contrast function and task behaviors across sites. Moreover, to have more precisely identified specific behaviors included in composite listings would have implied that security personnel were essentially in agreement as to what those specific behaviors should be, when such was not the case. In fact, that may be the major dilemma of this study. The lack of consensus on how key functions and tasks should be structured and performed (especially those connected with leadership) necessitated far more interpretation and inquiry than was expected. The remedy for this situation would apparently reside in a concerted effort by management and training personnel to specify *preferred* behaviors for functional groupings (or "task families," as the case may be) and then devise job/position descriptions accordingly. Thusly, by using terms such as "randomly" or "continuously" in conjunction with a specified task far more information is imparted as to expectations for the quality or style of job performance.

II. OVERSEAS-CONUS DIFFERENCES WHICH IMPACT UPON PHYSICAL SECURITY JOBS

Site layout and structural differences are primarily responsible for job-functional variations between European and CONUS sites. However, there are environmental differences which affect the way tasks are performed that merit discussion within the job analyses context.

Each site has its own SOPs. Insofar as possible, those SOPs conform to basic directives--in CONUS, UR 50-5, DOD directives, and DARCOM regulations; in Europe, ER 50-100 and ED 60-10. FM 19-30 provides MP doctrinal guidance throughout. No security functions or procedures established by local SOPs were observed to be inconsistent with command directives, at variance with requirements posed by local security environments, or extraneous to the basic mission. Some SOPs were cast in terms of personal responsibilities (almost in the form of an oath--"I will. . ."), while others were comprised of lists of duties and responsibilities for various positions. One European site included a comprehensive discussion of site mission, operating parameters, and the potential threat, among its SOPs. Most sites carefully outlined instructions for the use of deadly force. Some sites meticulously covered escort, convoy, and patrol functions. However, most sites did not specify local chain of command or provide a local table of organization. All sites maintained comprehensive instructions for weapons handling. Some sites gave considerable attention in their SOPs to the critically important functions performed by sergeants-of-the-guard (SOGs) and commanders-of-relief (CORs).

Although there were considerable differences across sites (not just between Europe and CONUS), none of the variances disclosed contradictions in security standards for the system at large. SOPs, which provided greater detail and more comprehensive coverage of site security functions, were clearly preferable in terms of their capability to establish expectations for job performance, however.

Detracting from the authoritativeness of some SOPs was a lack of editorial control (misspellings and syntactical anomalies were common), and their reproduction on poor quality multiliths. In some cases, the issuing authority

was not disclosed. Few sites bound their SOPs together or indexed them. Most sites visited did not cite underlying directives, or incorporate information on the frequency of updating in their SOPs. A few sites outlined procedures during inspections; however, no site that furnished the researchers their SOPs had an integrated SOP for site operations during inspections. A similar deficiency existed with respect to site operations during an alert. No written evidence of attempts to achieve SOP standardization across sites was furnished, although commonalities in job titles and functions were indicative to informal attempts to maintain standardization at European sites.

Site-specific variances were somewhat constrained by the age, condition, and historical use of facilities. European installations were not newly constructed for nuclear storage, but were host-country posts adapted for the purpose. Thusly, before upgrading, and until that is completed, those installations will require uses of personnel which differ from their CONUS counterparts.

Foreign site personnel obviously were required to deal with indigenous personnel on post and in the community, faced language barriers professionally and socially, and were required to adjust to this foreign environment during their initial Army assignment. There are certain equipment differences in both settings which are too minor to mention here.

These differences define or affect some jobs and functions. Certainly, those differences should be considered in the training. Specific variances do not seem so dramatic as to require a separate training regimen for U.S. and European sites. However, such variances can be incorporated in guidelines for orientation of first termers. Such knowledge might be valuable for more rapid adjustment to differing operational situations. At all sites, the need for infantry skills remains constant, although site-specific tactics to be used by SATs, BAFs and AFs may vary.

An important consideration for all planners is the effect of upgrading upon critical specialized skills and the need to examine manpower requirements as they may change with new sensor equipment, different communication techniques, and altered employment of reserve or backup forces.

III. JUNIOR OFFICERS (O-1 AND O-2)

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of junior officer jobs was confined to those functions and tasks which were, or could be, performed by officers first entering the physical security specialty in the grade of O-1 or O-2. By job title, that included: platoon leader, site security officer, and MP company executive officer. In some instances, all jobs but platoon leader were performed as auxiliary duties by members of the MP company.

Because responsibilities and authority of junior officers varied from site to site, it became difficult to ascribe uniform functions and tasks to those jobs. As a result, the following junior officer job descriptions incorporate such functional and task commonalities as may exist, as well as functions and tasks which are performed at some sites but not at others. By so doing, the researchers do not propose to establish definitive job descriptions for the positions surveyed. Rather, they simply wish to emphasize the variety and range of responsibilities that *can* accrue to those positions.

In all instances, junior officers were subject to being duty officers, either at the site or in the company area. No two sites had the same duty officer's protocol, however. Responsibilities of a duty officer could vary from being the officer-on-call during a designated period to actually being responsible for on-site inspection and contingency command during the duty tour. The most common role for a duty officer was that of being an officer-on-call in the company area, available for exigencies during which a commissioned officer's authority was required. As such, the role was analogous to that of a headquarters duty officer in any command, and the connection with site operations was limited to occasional interaction with personnel of his/her command who happened to be on guard shift. In almost every case, it was a decidedly passive role, which was largely irrelevant to site operations. In the one instance wherein the duty officer had on-site responsibilities, he apparently functioned as a surrogate site security officer during his duty tour.

Auxiliary (or additional) duties--such as supply, communications, transportation, and weapons officer--were discharged by platoon leaders. Consequently, the job analysis for platoon leaders incorporates those functions/tasks. Auxiliary duties were usually performed on a rotational basis with newer members of the command being assigned at least one major auxiliary duty upon arrival. The complexity of those duties varied across sites, insofar as site size and layout constrained the numbers and disposition of equipment and supplies involved. In some cases, major portions of the junior officer's time and energies were devoted to auxiliary duties, a circumstance which often detracted from the performance of mission-essential tasks less subject to scrutiny and accountability.

While this may imply a need to standardize job descriptions across sites, the researchers have not concluded that such standardization is essential, owing to local variances in site size, complexity, and proximity to potential combat operations areas. Thus, inclusion of functions and tasks which are optional or extraneous to some sites should be regarded as an attempt to alert management and training personnel to the full extent of education, training, and familiarization requirements which attend the preparation of junior officers to perform their jobs in the system at large.

For a more comprehensive discussion of the problems associated with the performance of junior officer roles, the reader should refer to the companion study, "Candidate Assessment: Perceptions of Job Environments of Physical Security Personnel" (Abbott Associates, Inc.).

FACTORS RELATED TO OFFICER PERSONNEL JOB PERFORMANCE

Leadership roles among junior officers at the sample sites were somewhat indistinct. Traditional command responsibilities and prerogatives are substantially altered and made diffuse for the following reasons:

- The mission, being essentially the maintenance of a quiescent status quo, does not create opportunities to forge unit esprit in collective "crisis" problem solving, or to build a collegial sense of accomplishment by having successfully completed a significant operational mission, such as a combat-arms exercise or a contingent deployment. This circumstance deprives appointed leaders of the opportunity to project authority and make decisions in operational settings which would tend to strengthen their role and clarify

leadership roles, responsibilities and functions within the MP company (particularly at the platoon level).

- Junior officers, lacking the experience to be forceful leaders, and experientially and generationally junior to their senior NCOs, by their own estimation, tended to be preoccupied with administrative duties and the achievement of a nominal state of operational readiness. This latter role involved a complex of ill-defined tasks directed toward abstract purposes, i.e., toward the improvement of human relations, the bolstering of unit morale, and mission preparedness. From that standpoint the junior officer's leadership role becomes anomalous because he/she is only "another officer" among many, if not most, of the periods when a leader would normally project his/her authority (e.g., during the actual operation of the guard shift manned by his/her unit). Given the indistinct leadership role of the platoon leader, the natural tendency among enlisted members is to look toward senior NCOs for direction as well as line supervision. This tends to result in a *de facto* leadership autonomy among NCOs, who seemingly exercise some of the prerogatives of command without substantively possessing the authority for it.

- At a few sites, acting platoon leaders were NCOs. These were described as temporary appointments; however, at one site that appointment continued over a period of several months. The longer the tenure of an NCO as an acting platoon leader, the greater the tendency of other NCOs and enlisted members to hold an impression that NCOs could effectively serve as commander surrogates at that level--a condition which would imply a concomitant depreciation in the attributed authority and leadership stature of junior officers thusly displaced.

When platoon leaders become distanced from all but episodic leadership roles, they tend to legitimize their functions and responsibilities in abstract, managerial terms. Thus, junior officers described their principal responsibilities in terms of the indistinct purposes, such as improvement of human relations, fostering good morale, ensuring mission preparedness, and administration. The junior officers interviewed were quite consistent in describing the general nature of their jobs, although they voiced differing perceptions of what constituted the most effective behavior for accomplishing their jobs. In view of this, it became necessary to distinguish between junior officer jobs within a solely military duty, security force context and junior officer roles within a managerial context.

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Enlisted personnel also tended to associate the platoon leader with managerial roles. Implicitly, they seem to have concluded that abstract management problems are within the platoon leader's purview, but line authority resides with senior NCOs. When platoon leaders actually exercised their authority by engaging in line supervision, some enlisted members criticized them for "overstepping their boundaries."

This is not to suggest that experience alone increased leadership abilities in every instance. However, given the drawbacks to physical security duty, it would seem that officers with prior service have greater tolerance for those drawbacks and function to ameliorate the tensions and frustrations which tend to grow out of that duty. More than in most military units, junior officers cannot expect to accrue respect or be accepted as natural leaders solely because they are officers, insofar as their leadership roles are not defined in terms of unity of command. Junior officers in this context are usually required to *manage* rather than command; and effective management is a more subtle and indirect process. Their nominal experience and training would seem to indicate that there was neither time nor opportunity for the acquisition of sophisticated management skills. By contrast, senior NCOs, despite their lesser education, demonstrated considerable management skill. Familiarity with the "system" was one reason for this; maturity and experience factors seemed to account for the others.

In addition, leadership and management responsibilities for junior officers in nuclear security are ill defined and unregularized across commands and sites. This inhibits an assessment of preassignment training and follow-on experience requirements necessary to establish junior officer assignment criteria. Although experience, maturity, flexibility, and other obvious attributes of effective leaders are clearly desirable, the precise behaviors in a nuclear security environment which are to be discriminated in training or personnel evaluations are difficult to ascertain owing to local variances in operating procedures and the attendant vagaries of authority and responsibility.

There also exist differences of opinion between junior officers and enlisted personnel over the nature of duties which are appropriate for the latter. Officers frequently opined that additional duties which they assigned to enlisted members were fully integral to the jobs performed and contributed

to better morale as well. By contrast, enlisted personnel often regarded most additional duties as officer-imposed "makework" which adversely affected performance of mission-essential jobs.

JOB ANALYSES

Job Title: Platoon Leader

Alternate Job Descriptors: None

Authorized Grade: O-1 (E-7 or above authorized on temporary basis)

Number of Jobs This Title, Each Platoon: 1

Key Behaviors: administer, alter/change, approve, brief, check, communicate, control, counsel, decide, direct, discipline, elicit, inspect, mediate/arbitrate, monitor, observe, orient, oversee, plan, regulate, report, represent, systematize, train/instruct.

Key Stressors: volume of work; simultaneous demands; maintenance of authority; irregular hours; necessity to maintain objectivity toward, and distance from, subordinates; scheduling pressures; operational alerts and emergencies; relative lack of extrinsic rewards; constant necessity to prove credibility and competence; need to constantly supervise some subordinates; responsibilities tend to be disproportionate to authority; career field is not in the "main-stream" of Army operations, thereby constraining career opportunities and progression; conflict between providing real security tailored to site-specific conditions and meeting generic (e.g., inspectable) criteria.

Training Required: Officer training program, USAMPS, informal OJT

Desirable Experience and Training: Previous line supervisory experience; human relations training.

Knowledge/Skills Particular to the Job: detailed knowledge of all functions and tasks performed by members of the unit; knowledge of infantry operations and tactics; intimate knowledge of the physical security site (particularly its vulnerabilities); detailed knowledge of governing directives, regulations, and SOPs; human relations skills; and knowledge of capabilities and idiosyncrasies of key subordinates in order to continuously assess their reliability.

Other Qualifications: PRP qualified

Nature of Work: Leads the platoon, with the assistance of subordinate NCOs, directs and controls activities of the platoon in support of the primary physical security mission; overseas maintenance or readiness and training standards; responsible for unit cohesion, morale, operational

discipline; responsible for the good order and function of unit equipment and facilities.

Specific Job Behaviors:

Checks order-of-the-day to determine impact upon unit, *interprets* that impact, and *communicates* nature of impact to the unit through NCO subordinates or directly, as he/she deems appropriate.

Plans and *schedules* daily activities to conform with externally or self-imposed priorities, *develops* hierarchy of problems and demands which require personal or supervisory attention according to prior assessment and evaluations of unit function and readiness.

Continuously *delegates* authority and responsibility for problem solving and operational decisionmaking to subordinate NCOs as appropriate to meet established or exigent command/management requirements.

Implements his/her daily work plan and schedule in conformance with identified priorities.

Conducts, supervises, and monitors the following activities as necessary in accordance with self-generated work plan; *meeting* and *orienting* incoming personnel; and *training/instructing* as part of preparation of personnel for SQTs or pursuant to self- and externally-generated OJT requirements.

Periodically and with prior planning, *inspects* facilities, operational areas, and personnel in order to *monitor* unit and individual compliance with pertinent directives and SOPs.

As required in accordance with externally or self-imposed priorities, *initiates* remedial actions appropriate to the elimination or minimization of variances in unit or individual performance, readiness, training, maintenance, or operating standards.

Continuously *evaluates* unit morale to determine the levels of motivation, harmony, cohesion, and reliability possessed by the unit.

Continuously *assesses* unit operational readiness by *evaluating* manning and equipment status, *reviewing* upgrading of personnel skill levels through successful completion of SQTs and completed OJT sequences, *observing* on-site job performances, *reviewing* inspection reports, and *eliciting* formal and informal evaluations of unit readiness from subordinates.

Periodically *directs, controls, and participates* in morale-enhancing programs and processes through individual and corporate counseling, initiation

of recreational activities, and conferring recognitions and decorations.

Periodically *regulates* unit and individual discipline through personnel counseling, restriction, referral of proposed punishments under Article 15 UCMJ or courts-martial to higher authority, or alteration of operational procedures.

Periodically, *decides* upon action/decision alternatives posed by operational circumstances and functional requirements which are presented to him by subordinate NCOs or which are self-determined.

Periodically *briefs* higher authorities and official visitors on unit function, status, and performance.

Periodically *develops* unit procedures and processes for assessing readiness and mission performance.

Regulates the authority and responsibility of subordinate NCOs, as necessary.

Continuously *regulates* and *systematizes* the upward and downward flow of official communications in order to *maintain* the integrity of unit command, management, and supervisory hierarchy.

Periodically *evaluates* the performance of key subordinates and *reports* upon their effectiveness in accordance with standardized instructions.

Periodically *prepares* such management information reports to higher authority as may be required.

Continuously *oversees* unit administration, including recordskeeping, personnel action memoranda, facilities and equipment accountability, disciplinary action memoranda, supply vouchers, and equipment maintenance schedules.

Periodically *approves* specified personnel actions, equipment and supply requisitions, work scheduling, and departures from standard operating procedures.

Periodically *commands* mission-essential, on-site operations when serving as site duty officer.

Continuously *supervises* immediately subordinate NCOs.

Periodically *reviews* pertinent directives, instructions, and regulations for currency and utility.

Periodically *reviews* pertinent reports, memoranda, and professional literature for information bearing upon the conduct of all duties and responsibilities.

Represents the unit at command functions, briefings, and staff meetings as required.

Performs auxiliary duties as directed by the company commander, including *maintaining* accountability for weapons, vehicles, supplies, and communications equipment; *overseeing* the scheduling of equipment maintenance; *directing* and *controlling* procedures for the use, maintenance, and safety aspects of that equipment, and periodically *inspecting* that equipment to assure that it is properly functioning; *overseeing* the preparation of, and *approving* sundry supply requisitions and utilization vouchers as may be required; *overseeing* the use of disposable supplies and the disposition of surplus or obsolete equipment in accordance with governing regulations and directives. (NOTE: These tasks are distributed among senior members of the command.)

Performs such duty officer functions and tasks as may be locally required by command directives and SOPs, including on-site inspections and the assumption of command of site personnel during contingencies when authorized.

Job Title: Site Security Officer (may be auxiliary duty for senior platoon leader).

Alternate Job Descriptors: None

Authorized Grade: 0-2

Number of Jobs This Title, Each Site: 1

Key Behaviors: brief, check, control, coordinate, determine, direct, evaluate, initiate, inspect, monitor, oversee, prepare, review, revise, supervise.

Key Stressors: indeterminate authority for taking corrective action; competing priorities and responsibilities; persons responding to guidance are not always directly subordinate; lack of preassignment experience together with functional discontinuities makes projection of credibility and authority difficult; inability to influence choice of systems and methods for dealing with security problems tends to breed frustration; lack of opportunity to take unilateral action to correct deficiencies; constant pressure from higher authorities and inspectors to assure readiness; need to refer recommendations for personnel actions to other officers prevents quick response to problems caused by personnel; duties vary according to the degree of delegated responsibilities, and often that delegation is insufficient to perform the full range of tasks required to insure the integrity of the job; derives all

authority/responsibility from commanders through delegation, so is not final arbiter of his decisions, must reconcile site security operations with site custodian's responsibilities, priorities, and availability (see final listed job behavior below); constraints of career field and lack of extrinsic rewards; and handling sensitive determinations regarding PRP qualifications.

Training Required: Same as for platoon leader.

Desirable Experience and Training: As for platoon leader; tour of duty as a platoon leader.

Knowledge/Skills Particular to Job: Knowledge of infantry operations and tactics; detailed knowledge of operations (guard orders for all jobs within the controlled, limited, and exclusion areas; knowledge of ways to accurately assess site readiness posture and defensive capabilities; detailed knowledge of the site, especially its vulnerabilities; detailed knowledge of governing directives, regulations, and SOPs; detailed knowledge of site protection contingency plans and procedures; detailed knowledge of status of all detection and warning systems; familiarity with security of site; understanding of capabilities and limitations of off-site security forces and augmentation units; understanding of local protocols and conventions for responding to operational contingencies which are not covered in site contingency plans; and discretion in handling sensitive PRP-related matters.

Other Qualifications: PRP qualified; weapons qualified (.45 caliber pistol, M-16, shotgun); radio qualified, including use of ten-series codes; capable of driving all official vehicles assigned to site.

Nature of Work: Assures that site security procedures and practices are in accord with established directives, regulations and SOPs; monitors the integrity of site security operations by conducting appropriate checks, inspections, reviews, and testing needed to ascertain security posture; recommends corrective actions for security deficiencies and exceptions to company commander; prepares such reports and briefings as may be required to support findings and evaluations; when so delegated, takes command of site during operational contingencies until relieved.

Specific Job Behaviors:

Reviews guard/operation orders to determine impact of those orders upon overall site security posture; *interprets* that impact; and *communicates* the nature of that impact to site personnel or the company commander as directed by the commander.

Periodically *inspects* the site generally to assure that personnel are properly deployed, functioning, and tasked.

Periodically *checks* status of, and *inspects* as necessary, the site security control center (SSCC), the guardhouse, and the towers (if present) to ascertain operational readiness.

Periodically *confirms* status of the limited and exclusion areas, either by self-inspection or through reports from the sergeant-of-the-guard (SOG).

Periodically *monitors* training/familiarization of personnel in the use of codes, security devices, and weapons to *assure* the integrity of security posture.

Periodically *confirms* that guard/operation orders have been posted as necessary.

Checks personal weapons and vehicle status as required.

Periodically *devises* and *initiates* operational readiness tests for site security personnel.

Evaluates and *critiques* performance of site security personnel during and after operational readiness tests.

Briefs commander and/or site security personnel on his evaluations and critiques of operational readiness test performance in accordance with the commander's direction.

Regularly *oversees* preparation of such logs and reports which are incidental to the maintenance of records on security operations readiness and tests in accordance with established directives, regulations, and SOPs.

Debriefs site security personnel on any operational problems or equipment malfunctions which could affect operational readiness, as necessary.

Recommends such corrective actions and procedures regarding security as may be warranted to the commander or other site personnel as directed by the commander, as necessary.

Directs and *controls* the taking of such corrective actions as may be necessary to assure the integrity of site security systems and procedures when instructed to do so by the commander.

When so delegated by the commander, *commands* security operations during contingencies or operational readiness tests until relieved.

As necessary, *coordinates* site security requirements with site custodian and *cooperates* with custodian in the upgrading of site defensive capabilities.

Continuously *supervises* small security operations staff.

Continuously *monitors* compliance with PRP requirements and *makes determinations* regarding PRP qualification.

Prepares and *revises* security SOPs as required.

Continuously responsible for *assuring* proper function of electromechanical devices in absence of site custodian, *reporting* malfunctions, and *initiates* action to assure that such malfunctions do not compromise site security until they are rectified.

Job Title: Company Executive Officer (may also be a platoon leader)

Alternate Job Descriptors: None

Authorized Grade: 0-2

Number of Jobs This Title, Each Company: 1

Key Behaviors: administer, assist, brief, check, control, coordinate, counsel, decide, direct, inspect, interpret, monitor, oversee, plan, prepare, preside, refer, report, review, schedule, screen.

Key Stressors: indeterminate authority derived from commander's delegation; distance from direct chain of command except when acting as the commander's surrogate; need to constantly maintain objectivity in attending to matters affecting the platoons; job tends to be reactive, opportunities to initiate actions are minimal; most tasks are time constrained; competing priorities and responsibilities; responsibilities tend to be disproportionate to authority; company NCOIC tends to compete for primacy of authority and responsibility; job lacks definition within established SOPs; job tends to be concerned with detail and administrative procedures to the exclusion of "big picture" problems; career field constraints and lack of extrinsic rewards.

Training Required: As for platoon leader.

Desirable Experience and Training: As for platoon leader; previous time as for platoon leader.

Knowledge/Skills Particular to the Job: As for platoon leader; detailed knowledge of security operations, problems, and procedures handled by site security officer; demonstrated leadership skills, detailed knowledge of commander's policies and procedures; and knowledge of accepted administrative practices.

Other Qualifications: PRP qualified.

Nature of Work: directs and controls company administration; monitors conduct of operations as the commander directs; handles such personnel and operational problems as the commander may direct; generally oversees the maintenance of company morale and operational integrity as directed by the commander; coordinates the issuance of orders to the company and the maintenance of uniform standards and procedures among the platoons as directed; oversees scheduling of activities, meetings, and events as directed; supervises company administrative staff; screens the referral of problems and decisions to the commander.

Specific Job Behaviors:

Continuously *directs* and *controls* company administration.

Continuously *supervises* company administrative staff.

Continuously *oversees* the function of the platoons and *assists* the commander in evaluating the performance of key personnel.

Continuously *oversees* programs and processes to maintain established standards for training, operational readiness, and morale as directed.

Periodically *coordinates* the issuance of orders and actions taken to assure maintenance of uniform standards and procedures as directed.

Screens problems and actions which must be referred to the commander and makes such operational and personnel decisions as the commander may direct.

Continuously *oversees* scheduling of company activities, meetings, and events as directed.

Continuously *monitors* the performance of company auxiliary duties and *reports* on the performance of those duties to the commander.

Inspects, monitors, and checks company operations, personnel, and equipment for compliance with the commander's and other pertinent directives as required by the commander.

Occasionally *counsels* personnel as directed.

Briefs the commander on actions he has taken subject to his delegated authority as necessary.

Prepares such reports, evaluations, correspondence, orders, and SOPs as the commander directs.

Presides over company staff meetings as directed.

Interprets the commander's policies and preferences to company personnel as directed.

Reviews outgoing correspondence, reports, and evaluations for accuracy and clarity as directed.

Refers lower echelon reports and decisions within his purview to the commander as appropriate.

Monitors company compliance with extant directives and regulations as required and directed.

Occasionally *plans* company meetings, activities, and events as directed.

Periodically *assists* the commander with the latter's duties and responsibilities as directed and authorized by extant regulations.

IV. ENLISTED PERSONNEL

INTRODUCTION

Job analyses for enlisted personnel were conducted for those positions which were or could be performed by first termers (usually E-4s and below, occasionally by E-5s). These jobs incorporated functions and tasks which were directly connected with site security, either in an actual guarding capacity or in the control of access to the site. Certain functions and tasks were actually auxiliary to some other set of functions and tasks but were significant enough to be separately considered. As a result, analyses were grouped according to whether the functions were static (e.g., requiring the performer to be relatively stationary during his/her tour of duty), mobile (e.g., requiring movement from place to place), standby (e.g., being in an alert or backup mode), or technical (e.g., requiring specialized training to operate electromechanical devices).

FUNCTIONS

For first termers only, 13 functional classifications were identified. Some sites did not require the performance of all functions, and exceptions are noted in conjunction with the formatted job analyses set forth below.

At the end of the data collection period (November 1979), MPs who were *not* Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) qualified were denied the opportunity to perform any of these functions in close proximity to the storage site. In an emergency, non-PRP-qualified personnel in alert or backup capacities could be allowed entry to the site on the presumption that when their official duties required them to do so, they would be, in effect, under escort by PRP-qualified site personnel.

Comments regarding variances in functions and tasks performed in conjunction with the following functional categories are incorporated in the analyses. However, as a general rule, site-trained first termers without experience were initially assigned to be tower guards (for sites having towers), walking patrol members, motorized patrol members (for domestic sites not having towers), and members of Security Alert Teams (SAT), Security Response Teams (SRT, one site), Backup Alert Forces (BAF), or the Augmentation Force (AF). At some

sites less experienced first termers could also perform entry control/gate guard functions. More senior first termers (usually E-3s or E-4s) were normally assigned to entry control and badge functions at the main entrances to sites. Intrusion Detection Alert/System (IDA/IDS) operators were usually more senior first termers.

The 13 functions performed by first-term enlisted personnel which were analyzed during this study, grouped by functional categories identified above, are as follows:

1. Static security functions--gate guard/entry control, badge/entry control, and tower guard.
2. Mobile security functions--escort, convoy, walking patrol, motorized patrol (at some sites) and sentry or patrol dog handlers.
3. Standby security functions--SAI/SRT, BAF, and AF.
4. Technical security functions--IDA/IDS operator, and switchboard/radio operator/communications clerk (at one site).

For personnel having sensitive key/lock/seal control functions, enforcing the two-man rule and performing escort duties in the limited and exclusion areas, the special designation of Custodial Agent (CA) was employed to distinguish their level of access from those not having these sensitive responsibilities.

FACTORS RELATED TO ENLISTED PERSONNEL JOB PERFORMANCE

Beyond the need to identify personal skills and aptitudes which are fundamental to the performance of enlisted security jobs, there remained the question of attitudes, motivation, and personality characteristics which were conducive to heightened appreciation for and identification with these jobs. In the main, the crucial issue seemed to be whether or not individual security force members were disposed to fully employ the skills and aptitudes which they possessed.

Comprehension of duties and responsibilities was not a question among personnel interviewed. In fact, personnel generally seemed to possess the requisite intelligence and training to perform their jobs. However, it was not apparent that they were fully employing their abilities. Several reasons for this can be suggested:

- Few of the physical security jobs are sufficiently complex or demanding of attention to pose an intellectual challenge.

- The tendency to routinize tasks which have already been regularized leads to perfunctoriness. Moreover, boredom robs even the most alert members of the force of their attentiveness. Contrived alerts, rather than stimulating interest, merely heightens the sense of unreality.

- The relative lack of interaction with other persons on some jobs contributes to boredom and wandering attention (particularly patrols, towers, and the IDS operator [at some sites]).

- There is a prevailing sense of detachment from the setting of formal performance criteria, establishing equipment standards, and making operational decisions. Added to the sense of distance and anonymity that the junior members in any large organization possess, this sense of detachment heightens the frustration level of security personnel. Thus, creativity tends to be stifled within a system that is constrained by instructions and equipment which originate outside it.

COMMONALITIES OF ENLISTED SECURITY FORCE JOBS

Specific job behaviors, training, and knowledge requirements for most security force positions held by first-term enlisted personnel are sufficiently alike to permit the development of a consolidated listing. Job characteristics, behaviors, training, and knowledge requirements which are unique to particular positions will be covered in the next section (Unique Aspects of Security Force Jobs).

Two assumptions governed this consolidation: (a) static, mobile, and standby security functions can be interchangeably performed by the same individual, even though subspecialization was noted; and (b) local variances in procedure were not so great as to preclude such a consolidation.

With respect to local variances, site layout, size, and age, combined with prevailing local weather conditions, terrain and the proximity of non-military activity or perceived threat significantly affected the extent and intensity for some job behaviors. Not all sites possessed towers; some sites did not use vehicular patrols; and some sites did not employ sentry/patrol dogs. In addition, the levels of activity of certain subfunctions--such as convoy, air mission, or escort duty--were predicated upon external factors.

The review of SOPs for the respective sites disclosed general agreement upon the *nature* of specific jobs among sites. For the most part, those SOPs

accorded with observed functions; however, as will be noted in the companion report, the quality of performance for those functions was not always in strict compliance with SOPs. Those exceptions existed for reasons which were not related to the inherent logic or coherency of the function. The functions discussed here were, in the opinion of the researchers, necessary, properly devised, and consistent with security needs. However, as the companion report indicates, numerous impediments to the diligent performance of those functions were revealed.

From that standpoint, it is important to emphasize the adverbial modifiers for specific job behaviors, e.g., when a guard is to *continuously* observe, *regularly* report, *carefully* scrutinize, or *thoroughly* search, the prospects for failure do not reside so much in neglect of the function as they do in the lapse of diligence and attentiveness while performing it. In essence, perfunctoriness, for whatever reason, becomes the principal enemy of professionalism in this context.

JOB ANALYSES

Commonalities

Common Authorized Grades: E-1 through E-4

Common Key Behaviors: challenge, check, communicate, coordinate, detain, enforce, halt, identify, inspect, log, observe, report, search, surveil, verify, warn.

Common Key Stressors: multiplicity of supervisors and overseers; potential for confrontations with higher ranking personnel; potential for hostilities; boredom interspersed with intense activity; inability to relax vigilance while posted; frequent exposure to inclement weather; relative lack of protection from hostile fire; frequent inspections; inability to have diversion or respite from tasks while posted; relative isolation from others (if posted singly); insufficient sensory input to prevent the progressive degradation of alertness; lack of reinforcement of perception that job is importance; lack of extrinsic rewards and recognitions; necessity to appropriately respond to real or simulated emergencies; necessity to constantly project an image of competence, authority and alertness while posted.

Common Training Required: USAMPS, formal OJT in preparation for SQT upgrading, informal OJT.

Common Desirable Experience and Training: previous MP duty, previous physical security and/or law enforcement experience.

Common Knowledge/Skills Particular to Jobs: know and properly employ challenge procedures; know when and how to employ deadly force; knowledge of and demonstrated competence in use of duress code, including actions to accompany that use; knowledge of and demonstrated competence in use of password procedures; knowledge of and demonstrated competence in use of search procedures; knowledge of badges, badging procedures, and badge inspection and control measures; knowledge of and demonstrated competence in application of personnel and vehicle detention procedures, know chain of command.

Detailed Knowledge of Job-Connected General Orders and SOPs including: prohibited items, substances; communications procedures using TA 312 field telephone, HT220 radio, and intercom (if installed); alarm and alert procedures; search procedures; detention procedures; in/out processing of visitors, contractor representatives, badged personnel; escort procedures; two-man rule procedures; vehicles and personnel search procedures; fire reporting and fighting procedures; fire safety standards; rapid entry/exit procedures; package/container control procedures; response to intrusion plans/procedures; mission vehicle/aircraft/helicopter security procedures; emergency destruction; key and lock control measures; instant visual indicator procedures; accident scene control procedures and security measures (safety, photo, access); Soviet military liaison mission reporting procedures (overseas only); unidentified aircraft and vehicle alert procedures; familiarity with area of responsibility and location of sector demarcation markers/panels; precise knowledge of site structures and location of hazardous materials and items; detailed knowledge of site vulnerabilities; understanding of characteristics and capabilities of personal weapons (variously, .45 pistol, M-16, M-60, M-79, M-203); knowledge of procedures, items, and substances used in NBC/CBR defense (mask, M-258 and M-13 kits, antidotes, associated symptomology); knowledge of and demonstrated competence in employment of infantry tactics; knowledge of how to prevent diversions from visitors and inspectors and how to respond to inspector questions and impositions; knowledge of and demonstrated ability to use radio communication codes (ten-series); driving skills (various, according to vehicle assigned).

General Abilities, Aptitudes, Skills and Tolerances Required for Physical Security Duties:

At the physical security sites surveyed, there was general agreement upon the basic abilities, aptitudes, skills, and tolerances needed for physical security duty. Although many military jobs are equally demanding of these attributes, physical security duty apparently places a premium on the following: attentiveness/alertness; assertiveness; composure under stress; commitment to colleagues; human relations skills; individual initiative; mental agility; "military bearing"; patience; physical stamina; practiced leadership skills (officers and NCOs); responsiveness/quick reaction; self-assurance; thoroughness; tolerance of and ability to concentrate in spite of distractions; tolerance for physical discomfort; tolerance of prolonged periods of inactivity; versatility; visual and auditory acuity; willingness to follow orders.

UNIQUE ASPECTS OF SECURITY FORCE JOBS HELD BY FIRST TERMERS

Static Security Functions

For purposes of this study, static security functions are considered those performed by posted guards who do not voluntarily leave the immediate vicinity of their posts. Because these guard positions require prolonged periods of relative inactivity, specific job behaviors tend to be affected (and often degraded) by episodes of boredom, introspection, and somnolence.

Functional titles in this category include gate guard/entry control, badge/entry control, and tower guard.

Job Title: Gate Guard/Entry Control

Alternate Job Descriptors: Post (number), guard shack, sentinel, sentry, gate house.

Authorized Grade: E-1 through E-4

Number of Jobs This Title, Each Site: Variable, usually four or more, sometimes two per post.

Nature of Work: prevent unauthorized entry of personnel not cleared for access; regulate and control authorized entry; provide for site safety by controlling and/or preventing introduction of flame-producing devices and flammable substances; prevent egress of controlled items from site; assure site security by observing the condition of physical security barriers, structures, and lighting.

Qualifications Particular to Job: PRP, custodial agent for some posts at some sites.

Specific Job Behaviors:

Continuously *observe* fence line and clear areas.

Immediately *report*, as necessary, the presence of intruders or unauthorized personnel in his/her sector (in vehicles or on foot) to the sergeant-of-the-guard (SOG) or the commander-of-relief (COR).

Immediately *challenge* intruders/unauthorized personnel and personnel approaching post, according to approved procedures.

As required, *halt* personnel approaching post for identification and/or provision of proper password as prescribed in pertinent SOPs.

As required, *inspect* entry badges of authorized personnel entering site for currency, condition, authenticity, and type.

As required, *verify* that persons possessing proper identification badges are listed on site access lists or vouched for by accompanying company officer

If necessary, *detain* personnel not properly identified as cleared, according to established SOPs.

As required, *report* personnel ingress to area/site to SOG/COR and other guard posts and log entry, as prescribed by SOPs.

As required, *challenge* and *halt* vehicles approaching post.

Identify vehicle passengers and *verify* authority for access as noted above.

As required by SOPs, *inspect* vehicles entering site for safety by *checking* safety condition of the vehicle (for gas or oil leaks, malfunctioning exhaust system, faulty wiring, presence of fire extinguishers).

Log vehicle safety condition on vehicle inspection form as prescribed by SOPs.

As required by SOPs, *search* ingressing personnel and vehicles for prohibited items and substances (flammable materials, flame producing devices, commercial radios and electronic devices, alcoholic beverages and controlled substances, food, cameras, unauthorized firearms, reading and writing materials.)

As prescribed in SOPs, *confiscate* ingressing prohibited items/substances, and *detain* personnel or vehicles transporting those materials.

Immediately *report* detentions and confiscations to the SOG/COR as required by SOPs.

Request assistance from SOG/COR or SAT by phone, intercom, or radio as is expedient to identify, inspect, search, or detain.

Constantly *control* personal weapon(s) when approached by ingressing/egressing personnel or inspectors, by coming to port arms as prescribed in SOPs.

Brief ingressing personnel having temporary badges on safety, security, and escort requirements for site per established SOPs.

If required, *instruct* ingressing personnel or vehicles as to how to enter through protective barriers and *unlock* barriers.

Immediately following entry of personnel or vehicles, *relock* barriers.

According to SOPs, periodically *check* communications capability on all communications devices.

Immediately *report* malfunctioning communication devices or loss of communications to SOG/COR and/or switchboard or IDA operator as required by SOPs, using voice relay if all other communications capability is lost.

Constantly *observe* visibility conditions and immediately *report* inability to fully observe area of responsibility to SOG/COR as prescribed in SOPs.

Constantly *observe* condition of fences and other security barriers and lights and immediately *report* breaches or outages to the SOG/COR and other guard posts as required by SOPs.

Report status of post to approaching company officers recognized by sentry in accordance with SOPs.

Prepare post condition checklist as required by SOPs.

As required, *police* the guard post and the immediate vicinity as prescribed in SOPs.

As required, *set* instant visual indicator to record entry and exit of personnel from specified areas, as prescribed by SOPs.

As required by appropriate SOPs and as appropriate to post, *inventory* keys in conjunction with another person, and *sign* for keys on inventory control sheet.

As required by SOPs, *relinquish* keys to authorized personnel when departing post subject to proper inventory.

According to SOPs, periodically *check* bunker/igloo doors.

As prescribed by SOPs, *limit* the number of personnel in designated areas at one time.

As required by SOPs, *verify* that the proper escort-to-escorted personnel ratio is maintained within designated areas.

As required by traffic volume, *instruct* entering personnel to proceed past post and security barriers in single file.

As required by SOPs, *search* egressing personnel, vehicles, and parcels for controlled items and government property and *confiscate* such items and/or *detain* personnel as appropriate.

As prescribed by SOPs, *walk* the vicinity of the post to *observe*, *police* the area, and *maintain alertness*.

As necessary, *immediately report* fires as prescribed by SOPs.

After departing post, *clear* weapon in clearing barrel in presence of NCO or as prescribed by SOPs.

As necessary, *use* duress code as prescribed by SOPs and *respond* as required to other guards using the duress code.

Job Title: Badge/Entry Control

Alternate Job Descriptors: Same as above.

Authorized Grade: Generally E-2 through E-4

Number of Jobs, This Title Per Site: Usually one.

Nature of Work: Responsible for issuance of site access badges; preparation of package control forms (DA Form 1818); maintenance of access lists in accordance with established SOPs in order to provide accountable control over ingress and egress of personnel; sometimes supervises other guard posts and coordinates badging and access process; performs such entry control functions as may be required and authorized; responsible for key control at some sites. (This task is performed by the IDA operator at one site.)

Qualifications Particular to Job: PRP, CA (at some sites).

Specific Job Behaviors: In addition to performing tasks outlined for gate guards above, the incumbent:

Periodically *accounts* for badge forms (AR Form 2656/A, B, C) as prescribed by SOPs.

As required, and as authorized by SOPs, *issues* badges in accordance with authorizations accompanying access lists, upon presentation of required identification by individuals receiving badges.

Maintains access lists, "boards," and "cards" for issuance of badges according to SOPs.

Prior to issuance of badges, *inspects* them for condition, currency, authenticity, and *retires* damaged, expired, or doubtful badges.

Upon issuance, immediately *records* that issuance upon logs prescribed by SOPs.

Immediately *reports* discrepancies, falsification, access denial on the basis of badge expiration or missing badges to SOG/COR (and/or site security officer).

Continuously *updates* badge accountability records, as prescribed by SOPs.

In the presence of another designated person, jointly *inventories* keys and *enforces* key control procedures established by SOPs.

As required, *coordinates* vehicle, package, and personnel control processes and procedures with other guard posts, in accordance with SOPs.

As and if required, *supervises* other sentries engaged in entry control duties outlined above.

As required, *receives* reports on access procedures from other guard posts and *authenticates* the opening of areas of access, in accordance with SOPs.

Job Title: Tower Guard (European settings)

Alternate Job Descriptors: "Tower rat"

Authorized Grade: E-1 through E-4

Nature of Work: to prevent unauthorized entry to site by providing for the visual detection of intrusion and, using authorized means, to interdict that intrusion from a tower post.

Qualifications Particular to the Job: PRP

Specific Job Behaviors: Behaviors appropriate to the tower guard function include those under entry control above. In addition, a tower guard immediately *reports* evidence of intrusion, lowered visibility, and degraded communications at this post to other guards on the tower line.

Maintains log (if required).

Operates spotlights (if equipped).

Mobile Security Functions

Mobile security functions refer to jobs which require either routine and patterned movement within the site (patrols) or nonroutine, random movement inside and outside the site (escort and convoy).

The most distinguishing characteristic of mobile security is that the need for it changes according to the status of warning, detection and communication systems, visibility at the site, the number of visitors, the number and frequency of munitions transfers, and changes in the character of external threat.

"Surge" requirements for mobile guard forces (whether in teams or vehicles, or provided with dogs) are not always predictable. A worst-case scenario might have the need for substantial munitions transfers simultaneously accompanied by poor visibility, communications system failures, warning and detection system outages, an increased proximate threat from terrorists, an adjacent accident involving a munitions carrier, during the period of a scheduled inspection, while in the throes of a flu epidemic!

The point in citing such an unlikely combination of contingencies is not to point out that available personnel resources would be severely strained for the duration, but to emphasize the implicit need for cross-training and versatility among members of the security force. For that reason mobile security may be interpreted as a single job, and all the functions discussed here (with the notable exception of dog handling) may be regarded as being integral to that job.

Job Title: Escort

Alternate Job Descriptors: None

Authorized Grade: E-1 through E-4

Number of Jobs, This Title Per Site: Variable according to operational circumstances.

Training Required: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Desirable Experience and Training: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Qualifications Specific to the Job: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Nature of Work: accompanies visitors, workers, and other persons who are not authorized unaccompanied access to the site in the course of their business on-site; deters and prevents escorted personnel from actions which are detrimental to site safety and security; assures that escorted personnel comply with SOPs; assures that escorted personnel are under positive control and surveillance at all times; coordinates and directs the movement of escorted personnel within the site.

Job Title: Convoy

Alternate Job Descriptors: None

Authorized Grade: E-1 through E-4

Number of Jobs, This Title Per Site: Variable according to operational circumstances.

Training Required: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Desirable Experience and Training: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Qualifications Specific to the Job: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Nature of Work: observe, check, report, challenge, halt, detain, respond, search, and coordinate/communicate in the same manner as other sentries acting in accordance with established SOPs.

Specific Job Behaviors:

Continuously *enforce* the two-man rule for persons working or inspecting in the proximity of mission vehicles or aircraft.

During alerts, *direct* itinerant personnel not essential to the mission at hand to a remote guard post and *stand guard* over mission vehicle/aircraft.

During alerts, *employ* standard procedures to admit emergency mission-essential personnel in an expeditious manner.

At heliport and airhead, *receive* briefing from on-scene NCOIC to cover special instructions and on-scene chain of command.

At heliport and airhead, *move* to preassigned perimeter guard position having specified entry control point as prescribed by NCOIC instructions and established SOPs.

If at a control point, as required, *challenge, halt, identify, detain, check, inspect* badges, *search, verify* and *admit* personnel as prescribed by NCOIC and pertinent SOPs.

Continuously *observe* surrounding area of responsibility for evidence of unauthorized personnel, intrusion, and potentially inimical activity.

If radio equipped, periodically *report* and *conduct* communications checks, as prescribed by the on-scene NCOIC and established SOPs.

Constantly *maintain* defensive posture as the situation warrants by *assuring* readiness of weapon, and *wearing* required protective gear, as prescribed by the NCOIC and pertinent SOPs.

If instructed, *accompany* mission vehicles or aircraft from pick up to delivery point, either by being present on that mission vehicle or aircraft or by presence on an escort vehicle or aircraft.

As instructed by NCOIC, *move* to guard positions adjacent to travel routes or possible interdiction points (bridges, culverts, choke points, etc.) and *observe, sweep, or inspect* in area as instructed/appropriate in conformance with established SOPs.

As required, immediately *warn* convoy members by most expeditious means of ground safety or security hazards which have been detected in course of prescribed guard functions.

During ground convoys, attempt to *prevent* closure of unofficial or non-convoy vehicles or personnel upon the mission vehicles by physically blocking the closure path in accordance with NCOIC instructions or established SOPs.

Maintain position to protect other members of the convoy guard force within area of responsibility and *assure* that fields of fire are established in accordance with prescribed tactical SOPs.

After mission vehicles depart, if so assigned, *sweep* area of storage structure and *inspect* interior of structure to *check* for unauthorized personnel, before *securing* area as instructed by NCOIC or in accordance with established SOPs.

Prior to transfer of munitions to heliport or airhead, if instructed, *sweep* the adjacent area as prescribed.

In accordance with established SOPs, *prepare* patrol log.

As necessary, *coordinate* intruder or vehicle intercept actions with site security control center and other motorized or boat patrols in the vicinity in accordance with established SOPs.

Job Title: Walking Patrol

Alternate Job Descriptors: Rovers, Walkers

Authorized Grade: E-1 through E-4

Number of Jobs, This Title Per Site: Variable according to operational circumstances.

Training Required: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Desirable Experience and Training: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Qualifications Specific to Job: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Nature of Work: deters intrusion by patrolling designated areas of the site on foot; if instructed, makes visual check of detection stations, fences, and other security barriers, and lighting and determines causes of alarms or malfunctions; defensively responds as required.

Specific Job Behaviors: Within his/her area of responsibility, the walking patrol member *observes, checks, reports, challenges, halts, detains, responds, searches, and coordinates* in the same manner as a stationary sentry, acting in accordance with established SOP (refer to above). In addition, the walking patrol member:

Walks preassigned routes within the sector of responsibility, varying the pattern to assure random observation.

Periodically, *communicates* by radio with other walking patrol members and the site security control center to *report* position and status as required by SOPs (if radio equipped).

Periodically *checks* radio communication (if so equipped) to assure operability of radio and availability of other communicators in the net.

Continuously *observes* his/her area of responsibility with emphasis upon locales which are obscured from the vision of stationary sentries.

If accompanied, or in close proximity to another patrol member, *keeps* that member in sight.

During an alert or actual intrusion, *positions* to protect other members of the patrol as required.

When required, *requests* such assistance as may be warranted to perform duties prescribed in SOPs.

Inspects, as required, fences and other security barriers, IDS stations, and lighting to *ascertain* causes of alarms or malfunctions, *spot* potential causes of malfunction or alarms, or *ascertain* condition of barriers or stations.

Inspects, as required, possible hiding spots (ditches, culverts, concentrations of foliage, terrain irregularities, etc.) to *assure* absence of potential intruders.

Job Title: Motorized Patrol

Alternate Job Descriptors: None

Authorized Grade: E-1 through E-4

Number of Jobs, This Title Per Site: Variable according to operational circumstances.

Training Required: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Desirable Experience and Training: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Qualifications Specific to Job: See Commonalities section (pp. 28-30).

Nature of Work: deters intrusion by patrolling designated areas by vehicle; if instructed, makes visual inspections of detection stations, fences, and other security barriers, and lighting to determine causes of alarms and malfunctions; defensively responds as required.

Specific Job Behaviors: Within his/her area of responsibility, the motorized patrol member *observes, checks, reports, challenges, halts, detains, responds, searches,* and *coordinates* in the same manner as a stationary sentry, acting in accordance with established SOPs. Additionally, the motorized patrol member:

Travels a preassigned route within the sector of responsibility, varying the pattern of patrol to assure random observation.

Periodically *communicates* by radio with the site security control center and other motorized patrols to *report* position and status as required by governing SOPs.

Periodically *checks* radio communications to *assure* operability of radio and availability of other communicators in the net.

Continuously *observes* area of responsibility with emphasis upon locales which are obscured from the vision of stationary sentries.

When required, *requests* such assistance as may be warranted to perform duties prescribed by SOPs.

Inspects as required, fences and other security barriers, IDS stations and lighting to *ascertain* causes of alarms or malfunctions, *spots* potential causes of malfunctions or alarms, or *ascertains* physical condition of barriers or stations.

Inspects, as required, possible hiding spots, to *assure* absence of potential intruders; and, when appropriate, *demounts* from vehicle to do so in accordance with established SOPs.

Prior to patrol, *inspects* vehicle to *assure* its operability, proper function of safety equipment, and readiness for patrol, as prescribed by SOPs.

As required and instructed, *intercepts* unauthorized vehicles in vicinity of site.

Job Title: Dog handlers (sentry and patrol)

Alternate Job Descriptors: dog patrol, sentry dog post (number)

Authorized Grade: E-2 through E-4 (observed)

Nature of Work: to perform sentry and/or patrol tasks, generally on the

periphery of the limited area, wherein dogs function as both sensors and deterrents. (At present, this utilization is confined to three European sites.) Dog patrols are basically employed in the same manner as roving patrols at domestic sites.

Training Required: Formalized handler training

Desirable Experience and Training: As for sentry, patrol personnel.

Qualifications Particular to Job: ability to control and discipline sentry/patrol dog under all circumstances; knowledge of dog behavior under variety of circumstances, including limitations to utility of dog for sentry or patrol work.

Other Qualifications: PRP, CA qualification desirable for most sites.

Key Behaviors: As for sentry or patrol personnel, command (dog), control (dog), observe (dog's behavior), communicate.

Key Stressors: As for sentry or patrol member; uncertainty as to dog's reliability/controlability under some circumstances; continuing requirement to monitor dog's health and assess its utility; willingness to work alone in dangerous terrain during periods of darkness and/or adverse weather conditions.

Specific Job Behaviors:

Sentry Duty

Continuously *control* the sentry dog to *assure* that the dog correctly responds to commands and does not jeopardize site personnel.

When commanding the dog to act, *issue commands* which are in accordance with established SOPs such as to *insure* safety of personnel and comply with directives governing the use of deadly force.

Perform such tasks as may be required of a sentry in accordance with established SOPs, as outlined in Chapter III above.

Constantly *observe* the dog's behavior to detect hostile or search reactions.

Patrol Duty

In addition to the behaviors outlined above: when unleashing the dog, constantly *observe* the dog's reactions and movements and *issue* the proper commands.

Constantly *maintain radio communications* with the SOG/COR (through the communications operator, at most sites), or if radio communication is interrupted, through verbal relay with the nearest sentry post (usually a tower

guard at overseas sites), establishing such relay immediately upon discovery of interrupted radio communications at regular intervals thereafter (usually every 30 minutes).

Standby Security Functions

The term "standby" was used to denote response or reaction force functions, whereby designated fire teams were posted in various states of alert to serve in mobile point-defense roles. Standby security is provided by a four-tiered system consisting of the Security Alert Team (SAT), the Backup Alert Force (BAF), the Augmentation Force (AF) (sometimes referred to as a Response Force), and the Augmentation Reserve Force (ARF).

The SAT and BAF, comprised of three to five and ten to twelve persons respectively, are usually referred to as the Response Force at most sites. Both are integral to site operations; however, the SAT is required to have a one-minute response time, whereas the BAF is to respond in five minutes. The combination is often referred to as the "15-in-5 rule" (15 persons on-scene in combat array in 5 minutes).

The AF consists of 30 MPs who are generally located in the MP company area. With a 30-minute response time, these personnel are permitted to discharge other duties or recreate during their shift as long as they are readily available.

The ARF is a company strength contingent (not necessarily MPs) which is required to respond within four hours of notification.

Only the SAT and BAF were considered for this study, insofar as such employment of the AF or ARF as may occur parallels that of the BAF.

In all cases the primary point-defensive roles of the SAT and BAF can be expanded during normal operations by their *ad interim* employment as "sweep" personnel for convoys or air missions, supplemental patrol or sentry duty, and assorted housekeeping details.

Although key stressors and qualifications for these positions were substantially the same as for all other jobs, there was one stressor which was prominently mentioned among SAT/BAF members--vulnerability. SAT/BAF members interviewed for this study often concluded that they were cast in a sacrificial role, being responsible for holding actions until a more substantial defense force (the Augmentation Force) could arrive. Heightening this sense of vulnerability was their impression that their normal duty stations (in the

security control center or the "shack") were highly vulnerable to concentrated fire and that their prospects for exiting their alert post unscathed were minimal at best.

Combat arms specialization occurs in the BAF, insofar as rifleman, grenadier, machine gunner, and assistant machine gunner duties are assigned.

Common Authorized Grades: E-1 through E-4

Common Key Behaviors: challenge, check, combat, communicate, coordinate, detain, engage, enforce, halt, identify, inspect, observe, react, report, search, surveil, verify, warn.

Common Key Stressors: As for guards and patrol personnel; additionally, vulnerability to hostile fire (insofar as they are responsible for initial engagements of hostile forces and would be expected to bear the brunt of fighting until relieved by BAF or AF personnel); coordination of actions and deployment with other guard force personnel; need to constantly maintain position to protect other members of the team; need to constantly anticipate "worst case" circumstances/contingencies; need for extraordinary state of alertness and self discipline while deployed; and need to instantaneously change from state of quiescence to full operational readiness.

Common Training Required: USAMPS, formal OJT leading to preparation for SQT upgrading, informal OJT, marksmanship training, training in small group infantry tactics.

Common Desirable Experience and Training: Previous MP or infantry duty, previous law enforcement and/or physical security experience.

Common Knowledge/Skills Particular to Job: As for sentry/patrol personnel (see Chapter III); knowledge of ways in which point-defense operations are controlled and coordinated; detailed knowledge of small group infantry tactics to include rules of engagement, covering fields of fire, protective positioning, combat in built-up areas, use of terrain concealment, precautions against silhouetting and exposure of position, counterfire suppression tactics, maneuvering tactics, use of camouflage attack discipline, fire-fight discipline (conserving ammunition, target identification, aim points, etc.) and enveloping procedures; detailed knowledge of emergency destruction procedures and devices.

Common Specific Job Behaviors:

Instantaneously *react/respond* to alerting and deployment instructions from SOG/COR and/or NCOIC.

Quickly *move* in a disciplined manner toward the point(s) under threat and *deploy* as directed by NCOIC and/or in accordance with governing SOPs.

Upon arrival at defensive position, immediately *communicate* position and identity of threat or nature of intrusion.

Continuously *observe* area of responsibility to *determine* changing nature of intrusion or threat, and *report* such to the site security control center.

If intrusion is not apparent, *check* alarm area to *determine* the cause of alarm or alert.

In unarmed, nonhostile intrusion is involved, *challenge*, *halt*, and *detain* intruders as required by SOPs.

If armed, hostile intrusion is involved, *engage* intruders using approved practiced infantry tactics (see special knowledge and skills), while *exercising* proper weapons, movements, and coordinated engagement *discipline*.

If hostile intrusion threat at the point of engagement exceeds that which the individual committed can counter, immediately *request assistance* from NCOIC according to established SOPs.

Once engaged, *attempt to limit* the efforts of intrusion by *protecting* and/or *clearing* those parts of the limited or exclusion area nearest to storage bunkers, as prescribed by SOPs.

During periods of lowered visibility or when otherwise prescribed, *supplement* stationary guard force by *patrolling* in accordance with established SOPs.

As required, *check* IDS sensor station/points to *determine* condition or causes of malfunction, and/or *test* the sensors in accordance with SOPs.

"*Sweep*" the area adjacent to the location of an alarm as prescribed by SOPs.

As required and prescribed by local SOPs, *check* condition of physical security barriers and lighting.

During patrolling functions and during tactical maneuvering to counter intrusion, *maintain* communication and *coordinate* movements/actions with other sentries, SAT/BAF/AF members, in accordance with local SOPs, and tactical necessity to *maintain* and *delimit* fields of fire and *protect* other counter-intrusion force personnel.

Job Title: Security Alert Team (SAT) member

Authorized Grade: E-1 through E-4

Number of Jobs, This Title Per Site: three per SAT, each shift

Nature of Work: Operating from the site security control center (SSCC) (or its equivalent), the SAT acts as a rapid-response contingent for initial point-defense; during periods of poor visibility or heavy mission-related activity, SAT members may be assigned to supplement mobile patrols or sentries; generally responsible for determining the nature or cause of IDA alarms, SAT members conduct such on-scene inspections and checks as required to assure the integrity of physical security barriers and IDS sensors.

Key Stressors, Training Requirements, Knowledge/Skills: For SAT and BAF (below), see above (p. 41).

Job Title: Backup Alert Force (BAF) member

Authorized Grade: E-1 through E-4 (NCOIC can be E-5 or above)

Number of Jobs, This Title Per Site: 10 to 12 per BAF, each shift

Nature of Work: Operating from a central location (commonly referred to as the BAF shack), the BAF acts as a rapid-response contingent for follow-on point-defense in response to requests from on-scene personnel (either the SAT or sentries/patrol personnel); during periods of poor visibility or heavy mission-related activity, may be assigned to supplement mobile patrols, sentries or the SAT; configures as a combat-capable fire team, principally functions to provide a within-five minutes response to operational alerts, at which time their role essentially complements that of the SAT. At some sites, BAF is assigned to details involving inspection and preventative maintenance of structures, locks, sensors, and physical security barriers. Special duties include "grenadier" (able to employ M-79 or M-203 grenade launchers or the M-72A2 LAW), machine gunner (able to use the M-60) and the assistant machine gunner. (NOTE: The BAF is usually delivered to the proximity of the alert area by truck. The driver of this vehicle is a BAF member [rifleman].)

Technical Security Functions

Technical security functions are those directly associated with site security which involve operation, and frequently first-line maintenance of sensor systems, surveillance devices, or communications equipment. These functions are becoming increasingly important and complicated as site upgrading incorporates the installation of newer and more sophisticated systems.

Further complicating the duties of personnel engaged in technical security functions is the increasing frequency of system failures as older

equipment breaks down. This has necessitated the informal acquisition of preventative and first-line maintenance skills among systems operators, whose wait for protracted arrival of regular maintenance technicians could mean a serious degradation of site security--a degradation which usually is compensated by the deployment of perimeter sentries and patrols using personnel acquired from the SAT or BAF. When operational contingencies occur simultaneously, site personnel can be seriously overburdened.

Centralization of detection system monitoring and communications switching clearly enhances the site capability to manage responses to intrusion; however, it also creates an additional vulnerability by concentrating that capability and proportionately increasing the significance of related jobs. For that reason, the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or Alarm (IDA) operator and the communications system operator require increasing technical skills, poise, equanimity under pressure, and levels of intelligence. Moreover, because systems test and dispatcher duties are incorporated in their jobs, these individuals must maintain close coordination with the SOG and/or the site security officer.

IDS operators have a particularly sensitive responsibility, insofar as they must be fully aware of the idiosyncrasies of individual sensors in the system, must be able to instantaneously react to alarms with a preprogrammed test-retest sequence, and immediately detect compromise or malfunction patterns from their annunciator panels. In times of poor visibility, the importance of their function increases dramatically for they may be the only personnel who can accurately describe SAT or BAF deployment requirements. Moreover, persistent sensor malfunctions cannot be allowed to breed a sense of complacency (even though that occurs), and the IDS operator must know his system well enough to instantly discriminate between predictable miscues and genuine "drops" (a term used to describe a sensor event).

At some sites, the IDS operator also performs as a radio operator and/or entry controller, and under conditions of an actual alert must call upon the SOG/COR for assistance.

This complex of responsibilities and tasks can create considerable challenge for incumbent operators. On the other hand, in the absence of malfunctions, alerts, tests, or communication checks, it can be an extraordinarily tedious job. When that occurs, an individual who is intelligent

enough to handle the job during peak workloads can be expected to find the job quite aversive. For that reason, and for reasons of necessity cited above, most IDS and radio or switchboard operators have assumed or accepted limited equipment maintenance roles without complaint. That extension of roles tends to further restrict the number of personnel who can successfully perform these jobs, however.

As a result, these jobs have become sufficiently specialized to preclude random assignment of personnel to them. Furthermore, the need for additional formalized instruction (as opposed to on-site OJT) has apparently increased-- a need which has not been recognized, insofar as all training for these jobs is currently conducted within an OJT framework. The introduction of more sophisticated sensors, annunciator panels, and TV monitoring stations not only intensifies the need for technical knowledge of the equipment itself, but adds a requirement for increased knowledge of electronics. This becomes increasingly desirable as instrument calibrations, variable sensitivity settings, integrated testing circuitry, and solid-state components become features of operational equipment.

Of special importance to the successful performance of these jobs is an intimate knowledge of duress and access codes. As the communications net expands with the introduction of more portable radios that knowledge becomes essential to the integrity of the upgraded system.

Job Title: Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Operator

Alternate Job Descriptors: Intrusion Detection Alarm (IDA) operator

Authorized Grade: E-2 through E-4 (observed)

Number of Jobs, This Title Per Site: Usually one per shift, with a backup available (usually the SOG or COR). At one site there were separate annunciator panels for different areas. At another, an assistant IDS operator performed entry control/badging tasks.

Nature of Work: Monitors IDS annunciator panel to detect location of sensor alarms; conducts system test procedures (usually with assistance of SAT/BAF personnel, mobile patrol personnel, or the SOG/COR); at some sites, performs rudimentary preventative or first echelon maintenance on equipment associated with the system; at some sites, is concerned with emergency and other electrically controlled locking devices.

Training Required: As noted for common training.

Desirable Experience and Training: Previous experience as sentry or member of a patrol, SAT, or BAF; prior experience with remote monitoring systems; formal training in annunciator panel operations, testing, and maintenance.

Qualifications Particular to Job: PRP, CA (most sites), ability to instantly recall authentication and duress codes, ability to quickly determine priorities of response/actions during periods of peak workload. (See radio operator for additional qualifications if jobs are combined.)

Key Behaviors: Authenticate, authorize entry to bypass alarmed locks, check (conditions, capabilities), confirm (conditions), guard (annunciator panel), inspect, monitor, listen, log, maintain, monitor, notify (of alarms, malfunctions, etc.), observe, oversee (maintenance), report, test, and verify.

Key Stressors: Necessity to constantly maintain alertness/vigilance over panel; relative isolation, usually in cramped quarters with little ventilation and no outlook (some sites); frequent distractions from surrounding area (some sites); necessity to immediately isolate source or cause of alarm (if malfunction); excessive work during peak periods interspersed with periods of little activity; frequent system malfunctions (most sites); and inability to predict or schedule workload.

NOTE: Although no formalized training in IDS operation and maintenance is given at USAMPS, the installation of newer equipment and the increasing use of radio communications would seem to warrant a period of formalized instruction in both the IDA and switchboard (i.e., communications) procedures and equipment maintenance. This would serve to increase the potential available pool of skilled operators, and somewhat compensate for the delays and inconveniences attendant to the absence of qualified maintenance technicians at the sites. In addition, such training would emphasize the importance and professionalism which should attach to this job, and possibly increase the challenges (and, thus, the desirability) associated with it.

Specific Job Behaviors:

Continuously *monitor* the annunciator panel by observing indicator lights and *listening* for audible alarm signals.

As required and according to governing SOPs, *log* alarm incidents, system malfunctions, and maintenance events.

Continuously *guard* the panel to *prevent* tampering or unauthorized access to panel.

At the beginning and end of each tour of duty (shift), with the incoming/ outgoing IDS operator, *test* the system in accordance with established SOPs, by *manipulating* the proper switches, and *observing* or *listening* for the correct indicator/alarm signal.

At the beginning of the shift, *release* shift authentication numbers for the duty period to authorized personnel in accordance with governing SOPs.

As required and subject to established authentication procedures for entry control, *authorize* and *authenticate* entry to secured facilities subject to the two-man rule. (Authentication occurs via radio or intercom through the switchboard.)

Verify through annunciator panel indicators as required that structures are relocked after egress of personnel, and *notify* guards, the SOG and/or the site security officer (or operations officer, some sites) and facility engineers of any malfunctions.

Upon *observing/hearing* an "unannounced" alarm, will immediately *notify* the SOG/COR or SAT/BAF NCOICs as prescribed in governing SOPs of the alarm point location.

Know, before assuming duties, all pertinent SOPs and special orders.

Jointly, with the replacement or replaced IDS operator, *inventory* and *sign* for red locking keys.

Before beginning tour of duty, *inspect* his/her post and *report* discrepancies to the SOG as required by governing SOPs.

At some sites, during the tour, as required by governing SOPs, *monitor* radios and field phones, and *report* malfunctions, improper communications discipline and use of duress code, as necessary, to the SOG/COR.

At some sites, periodically (usually every half hour) *confirm* the proper functioning of the alert phone system by *conducting* an alert phone *check* in accordance with governing SOPs, and *report* malfunctions to the SOG/COR as required. (During alert periods this check will be more frequent.)

At some sites, *conduct* radio and phone checks with the guard towers (usually every half hour) to *confirm* proper functioning of those communications systems, as prescribed by governing SOPs. (During alerts this check will be more frequent.)

Check the water level of the VRC batteries once during the shift, and *report* low water levels to the SOG/COR as required.

Periodically, as required by governing SOPs (usually at the beginning of the first day shift), *check* the fuel, oil, and battery levels for the emergency generator and *log* findings in the IDS operator's journal.

Periodically, as specified in pertinent SOPs, *test* the functioning of emergency power sources, using panel-mounted switches to bring auxiliary power on line.

As needed and in accordance with governing SOPs or local practices, *perform* such preventative or first echelon maintenance of the IDS (particularly the annunciator panel) as the operator is qualified to perform in lieu of a regular maintenance technicians and *oversee* the performance of regular maintenance which occurs on the operator's shift.

At domestic sites, *monitor* video screens to *verify* ingress or egress of vehicles or personnel, *inspect* vehicle tops for evidence of contraband or safety hazards, and *report* discrepancies, as required by governing SOPs.

Job Title: Radio Operator

Alternate Job Descriptors: Switchboard operator, commo (clerk)

Authorized Grade: E-2 through E-4 (observed)

Number of Jobs, This Title Per Site: Usually one per shift with a backup available (usually the IDS operator, SOG/COR). Some sites merge this job with that of the IDA operator (see above).

Nature of Work: Manages and coordinates site communications via field radios, portable radios, field telephones, intercoms, and commercial telephone lines; monitors communications with sentry/patrol posts to assure the maintenance of proper communications security discipline and detect the usage of duress codes; relays instructions for deployment and response actions to sentries, patrols, SAT/BAF/AF personnel.

Qualifications Particular to Job: As for IDA operator; knowledge of ten-series codes and radio communications discipline; clear enunciation; ability to project urgency or authority in communications with composure.

Key Behaviors: account for (radios, logs), authenticate, check, communicate, confirm, coordinate, dispatch (radio), issue (radios), listen, log, monitor, report, test, and verify.

Key Stressors: As noted for IDS operator, and uncertainty of the limits of responsibility and authority for initiating dispatch actions (insofar as differing SOGs/CORs may require greater or lesser supervision/coordination).

Specific Job Behaviors:

Continuously *monitor* communications devices to *respond* to incoming messages.

As required by governing SOPs, selectively *monitor* intrasite communications to *assure* maintenance of communications security discipline and *listen* for use of duress code.

Immediately, upon indication of system malfunction, break of communications discipline, or use of duress code, *report* occurrence to SOG/COR and *log* incident in duty journal as prescribed.

As required by direction of the SOG/COR or other authorized supervisor(s), *dispatch* patrols, SAT/BAF/AF personnel to the location of alarm points and *maintain* communication with the forces dispatched, as required by governing SOPs.

Periodically and as specified in appropriate SOPs, *check* status of communications systems (usually in a half hour or 15-minute recycle, depending upon circumstances) to *confirm* proper functioning of intrasite intercom, radio net; *report* discrepancies/malfunctions to the SOG/COR and installation engineers as required; and *log* such discrepancies or malfunctions in the operator's journal as prescribed.

As required, *establish* and *maintain* communication links with SOG/COR while the latter conducts on-scene inspections/visitations around the site.

At some sites, *account for* and *issue* radios to site personnel.

At some sites, periodically *test* and *replace* portable radio batteries.

As required and in accordance with established SOPs, *supplement* or *assist* the IDS operator in the tasks outlined above.

As necessary, *authenticate* exclusion area entry authorization under two-man rule in accordance with appropriate SOPs regarding authentication; *verify* that the proper procedures have been employed (a duty which normally accrues to the radio operator due to the need for remote authentication); *verify* authorization for entry and *coordinate* the authorization for entry with the IDS operator; *communicate* that authorization to those requesting access; if access denied, *immediately report* incident to SOG and/or *initiate dispatch* of SAT/BAF to location; *log* all such authorization/incidents in the appropriate journal as prescribed.

V. SENIOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL

INTRODUCTION

Researchers analyzed several jobs performed by senior enlisted personnel as a means to determine continuities in specific job behaviors manifested by junior members. This was done in order to obtain insight into the ways in which NCOs influence their charges (positively and negatively), the assumption being that NCO functions which were most like those performed by junior personnel were those wherein the potential for positive or negative influence (by example or through contradictory behavior) was greatest. Additionally, it was desirable to isolate those behaviors which represented consistent enlisted behaviors (as opposed to consistent officer behaviors) as a means to determine logical functional delimitations for enlisted personnel and identify those enlisted security functions which should receive the greatest emphasis in training.

Two senior enlisted functions/positions stood out--the sergeant-of-the-guard (SOG) and the commander-of-relief (COR). Individuals occupying those positions bear greater responsibility for assessing and controlling job behaviors and setting examples for diligence and professionalism than any other members of the security force. Beyond the critical oversight and coordination functions which they perform, they alone provide on-scene guidance essential to the proper functioning of the entire security system.

The quality of direction and coordination emanating from the SOG and COR, more than any other factors, influence the professionalism of first termers--for theirs is truly the voice of authority and confidence in operational contingencies. They must *know* the status and disposition of every sentry, patrol member, and SAT or BAF member, and the condition of the site security systems and barriers. As the most visible and significant role models for junior enlisted personnel, they are obliged to uphold standards, project assurance, and take their responsibilities seriously. For that reason, SOG/COR performance style is critically important. And previous experience in performing sentry and/or patrol duties would seem to be essential.

SOG/COR JOB ANALYSES

Common Authorized Grades: E-5 through E-8

Common Key Behaviors: assure, check, confirm, correct, inspect, instruct, know, log/journal, oversee, supervise, verify; in addition, must be prepared to behave as sentry/patrol personnel (See Chapter III).

Command Key Stressors: Responsibility often exceeds authority; during alerts and inspections situations often become chaotic; competing demands and priorities; need for precise knowledge of site conditions and SOPs at all times; large number of significant functions; responsibility for directing initial response to threat; generational differences with subordinates and most junior officers; tensions resulting from need to constantly project authority; need to frequently improvise solutions to complex problems; lack of control over organization and environmental problems; need to always respond to contingencies in an appropriate and authorized manner (no margins for error or omission); lack of extrinsic rewards and recognitions; uncertain career growth and progression opportunities; and potential for authority and role conflicts with junior officers.

Other Common Experience and Training: Should possess all knowledge and attributes desirable of junior enlisted personnel (as noted in Chapter III); in addition, because they are key personnel for maintaining integrity of PRP, must be fully aware of strengths and weaknesses of assigned personnel and able to determine PRP qualifications under operational pressures; because of their function to control and inspect weapons, should be intimately familiar with all weaponry in use at the site; should stay abreast of all changes to SOPs, intelligence assessments, and operational changes resulting from site upgrading, equipment outages, convoy/escort mission requirements, weather, and operational contingencies of the host command.

Specific Job Behaviors (SOG):

Conduct M-16 weapons checks for each sentry/patrol member before and after duty hours to include *confirming* the selector lever is on safe, *locking* the bolt open and *inspecting* the receiver and chamber for brass and/or rounds, *closing* the bolt, *reinsuring* the safe position of the selector lever, *inserting* or *removing* an 18-round magazine.

Continuously *oversee* the conduct of security operations during the tour of duty.

At the outset of the duty tour, and periodically thereafter, *confirm* that all guards are properly posted.

Verify through inspection, if necessary, that cleanliness and safety of the site and all assigned vehicles are maintained during his/her tour of duty.

Oversee the conduct of all inventories, checks, and tests conducted during his/her tour of duty, and the preparation/maintenance of all site accountability records.

Oversee and *assure* the completion of required paperwork, *check* the quality of such paperwork, and *supervise* the turn-in of paperwork to the proper receiving office.

Continuously *supervise* "front room" (or SSCC) personnel in the performance of their duties. (This usually includes the IDS operator, SAT members, and any communications personnel assigned to work in the immediate vicinity of the SOG's post.)

Periodically *check* to *assure* that safety and security SOPs are posted.

Periodically *confirm* that assigned personnel are familiar with governing SOPs by *questioning* them for their knowledge of those directives.

Continuously *know* the position of demarcation panels, the condition of: physical security barriers, structures/bunkers; the condition and operability of: assigned vehicles, detection and surveillance systems, illumination systems, and communications gear; and *annotate* discrepancies to the duty journal as necessary.

Continuously *know* the contents, meaning and intent of all site special orders, SOPs, and operations memoranda, and the content of pertinent current intelligence reports.

Prior to posting of guards, *inspect* to *assure* that all personnel have the required personal equipment in their possession and that such items are properly worn.

Upon changes of guard post/tower personnel, *verify* that changes have occurred as prescribed by SOPs and that appropriate safety, security, and cleanliness checks have been conducted.

After guards have been posted, personally *inspect* and *check* each post/tower to *determine* that all procedures are being correctly followed, and *annotate* discrepancies on post/tower check sheets, while *correcting* such discrepancies as can be corrected. This includes *inspecting* the condition and operability of field telephones, microphones, and radios.

Approximately every two hours, personally (or delegate to the COR) *check*

all guard posts to *assure* that guards have proper safety equipment and weapons; there are no prohibited items at the post.

As the occasion demands, *confirm* that personnel (including radio operators) are using correct communications procedures and discipline.

As the occasion demands, *confirm* that all personnel know and correctly use passwords and duress codes.

Periodically/frequently *check*, or cause to be checked, clear areas, unused structures, and obstructions to vision (stumps, trees, earth mounds).

Confirm that fence and exterior lights are turned on at dusk and off at dawn by *supervising* those actions.

Supervise the COR to confirm that the guard journal is properly maintained to reflect correct entries for repair of lights, communications, and sensing devices.

Oversee and *verify* the proper maintenance of weapons security and handling procedures by the BAF NCO.

Oversee and *verify* that a custodial agent (CA) of the "old" relief and a custodial agent of the "new" relief conduct a joint inventory of the bunkers, with appropriate journal entries made to indicate time and results of that check.

Inventory (jointly with the outgoing/incoming SOG) classified documents, and *journal* the results of those inventories.

Know the location of, and procedures for issuing, "combo pin injectors."

Inspect the M-72A2 (LAW) container and key upon assumption of duties, and *confirm* that safeguarding and use standards are met.

As required, *perform* IDA functions and *assist* the IDA operator during peak periods.

Know and be able to *instruct* other personnel as to the nature, sequence, and procedures to be taken during emergencies, actual alerts or military/paramilitary attack.

Specific Job Behaviors (COR):

In the absence of the SOG, *assume* SOG responsibilities and conduct SOG duties.

In the absence of any sentry, *replace* that sentry until relieved by a substitute sentry.

Safeguard and maintain accountability for all weapons, ammunition, boltcutters, and equipment in his/her custody.

Know the general and special orders which apply to all shift personnel.

Confirm that copies of general and/or special orders are posted at each guard station.

Prior to posting, *train, instruct, and question* each guard to *confirm* that each understands duties and SOPs, has proper uniform and equipment, possesses no unauthorized items, and has weapon(s) on safe.

Inspect each guard post to *confirm* cleanliness, conditions, integrity of communications, integrity of seal on ammunition can, and availability of nerve agent antidote injectors; immediately *report* discrepancies to SOG, and *correct* such discrepancies as may be correctable.

Once during the shift or as prescribed by SOPs, physically *check* guard posts under his/her supervision to *confirm* the continuance of conditions confirmed at the initial inspection.

Upon delegation of the SOG, *conduct* the weapons-clearing sequence for each guard for which the COR is responsible.

As delegated, continuously *supervise* the SAT (or NCOIC), on the performance of all duties and responsibilities appertaining.

As directed by the SOG, *supervise* and/or *conduct* roving patrols for coverage of designated areas or supplement of stationary guards during periods of impaired visibility.

Confirm the performance of all duties/tasks required of stationary or mobile guards subject to the COR's authority in the manner prescribed by pertinent SOPs.

NOTE: The COR, as the intermediate level of authority between the individual guard and the SOG, must be prepared to perform any task which he/she supervises and supervise any task which others perform. Unlike the SOG, who will presumably have one or more CORs, to carry out his/her instructions, the COR truly functions as a line supervisor who can delegate responsibility but not authority to individual guards. On the other hand, the SOG apparently is unable to delegate authority to the COR (according to the various SOPs which were reviewed for this study). This potentially places the COR in the unenviable position of personally accruing authority and responsibilities disproportionate to his/her experience and grade, without commensurate opportunity to pass along the burdens of supervision.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The majority of conclusions regarding factors which affect job performance are contained in the companion study entitled "Behavioral Analysis of Physical Security Job Personnel and Environments." For cross-referencing purposes, those factors were summarized in this report under "Key Stressors."

Although environmental factors which contribute to maladaptive behavior are probably manipulable, environmental factors are not a major influence on the conclusions presented here. The rationale for such a view is based upon an assumption that the location/configuration and condition of storage sites will not change radically; site upgrading to include the installation of new equipment is under test and will be implemented gradually, accompanied by suitable modifications in training and security force organization and functions; the functions which are currently performed are now necessary, logical, and likely to incorporate the same basic tasks (and, therefore, job behaviors), regardless of site modernization or organizational alterations.

Nevertheless, the study of specific tasks and job behaviors identified in this portion of the research yielded the following conclusions:

- In combination, nuclear security jobs require skills, composure, maturity, independent judgment and prudence which highly recommends screening of personnel, the continuance of the current or a modified version of, the personnel reliability program, and both formalized instruction and on-the-job-training (OJT).

- Although individual tasks are not highly complex, task families (or functions) incorporate an impressive number and variety of tasks. When specific job behaviors are considered, there exists a natural hierarchy of nuclear security jobs. That hierarchy is based upon a rank ordering of functions as they include a progressively larger number of behaviors requiring practice, diligence, precision, and coordination with other members of the guard force. Even though some jobs do not require the performance of all the possible tasks within the same duty period, the number of alternative tasks which can be performed as part of that job considerably increases its overall complexity. This ought to be emphasized by trainers and supervisors at all

levels and reinforced through the requirement for enlisted and NCO personnel to demonstrate effective task performance (e.g., job behaviors) across a specified range of functions as a criterion for promotion and elevated skill qualification. By making the actual complexity of nuclear security functions apparent to all concerned, and by reinforcing the necessity to deal with that complexity by demonstrating competence in a large variety of tasks, trainers and supervisors have available a means to stimulate professionalism and motivate commitment to job mastery (which, by definition, should include demonstrated willingness and ability to support organizational goals).

- There is a need to specify the quality of expected behaviors, as well as the nature of tasks to be performed. In that regard, standardization of job titles, function and task nomenclature, and responsibilities which accrue to specified jobs should be considered.

- A blurring of authority and responsibility (and of supervisory roles) occurs between junior officers and senior NCOs and between senior NCOs and junior NCOs.

CONCLUSION 1--PREPARATION FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY DUTY

The complexity of maintaining a credible deterrence posture at nuclear sites cannot be overemphasized. That complexity derives more from the necessity for coordinated action and "team effort" than from the complexity of tasks, per se. Accordingly, the need for cooperation, precisely defined roles and functions, responsiveness, and a shared sense of mission is vital to the integrity of nuclear security operations.

For those reasons, nuclear security personnel are more obliged to limit their desire for personal fulfillment, comfort, and recognition than other combat and noncombat arms personnel, in the interests of group cohesion and accomplishment of security goals.

Because the potential for hostile confrontations and use of deadly force is omnipresent, nuclear security personnel have a special obligation to exercise impeccable judgment and self discipline. That requirement presupposes high standards of maturity, prudence and subordination to organizational discipline.

Although similar attributes are desirable for all MP personnel, nuclear security operations impose the additional burden of protection of weapons which are essential to national security. In effect, there are no margins for

lassitude or error, a condition which is reflected in the stringent inspection standards which are applied. However, for nuclear security personnel, passing inspections or demonstrating a proper response to practice alerts merely evidence unit readiness in bureaucratic terms. The critical factor for site readiness is the manner in which individual members of the guard force accommodate their personal attitudes, aspirations, and skills to command objectives. Given the age and experience of typical officers and enlisted personnel assigned to nuclear security duty that accommodation must be encouraged, nurtured, and rewarded. Ever more stringent discipline will not suffice to encourage peer group affinity. Operational/procedural discipline is necessary for team work, but affiliation and identification with the security unit and its mission proceed from conviction that shared purpose and mutuality are superordinate.

When individuals fail to take their jobs seriously, or become content with marginal performance, the entire command is affected. This may occur because individuals have become a "weak link" in security, or, more seriously, because they diminish the positive effects of superior performance by others who may be partially dependent upon them.

For these reasons, the means to promote appreciation of the mission, encourage attitudes of professionalism, raise group consciousness, hone skills, develop stylistic improvements in job behaviors, and extend recognition for superior individual and group-supportive performance require serious attention and continual refinement. Furthermore, responsible assignment should be premised upon demonstrated performance of increasingly complex tasks within the nuclear security operations speciality, on the assumption that nuclear security operations are sufficiently distinct from other MP duties to warrant reinforcement and comprehensive training.

RECOMMENDATION 1--PREPARATION FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY DUTY

USAMPS courses dealing with nuclear security and formalized site OJT sequences might better emphasize:

- the actual complexity of the functions described herein;
- the critical importance of individual development of the skills/ behaviors involved and performance "style";
- the significance of the nuclear security mission in terms of: national

security objectives, the uniqueness of the mission, and its function to prevent incidents or compromises which could be politically detrimental to U.S. alliances; and

- the necessity for interdependence among nuclear security personnel.

Site OJT sequences could assure that new personnel progressively master specific tasks identified with the security functions identified in this research. As part of that process, attention might be paid to specific job behaviors so that trainees have constructive supervisory evaluations of the way in which tasks are performed, without undue criticism during the learning phase.

To increase appreciation for the mission, junior personnel should be given periodic threat briefings by intelligence personnel, and be given more opportunity to review site protection plans. Moreover, *all* personnel should be elicited for suggestions on how to improve security procedures connected with jobs they perform. In that regard, encouragement of self and peer group evaluations of the system's operation becomes critical to individual awareness of the benefits of professionalism.

CONCLUSION 2--HIERARCHY OF FUNCTIONS

As individual job analyses would attest, nuclear security tasks and their associated behaviors can be quite specialized. Moreover, given the progressive complexity of functions and tasks (as well as the progressive levels of responsibility), a natural hierarchy exists among jobs performed by enlisted personnel. For nonsupervisory tasks, other than those connected with standby security functions, convoy duty in its entirety would seem to potentially require the greatest number of skills, the most consistent exercise of individual judgment, and the largest number of responsibilities (e.g., for the mission, prudent use of deadly force, and protection of colleagues). Although only a few of the tasks connected with this duty are performed by a single person during one period, the range of tasks included in convoy assignments, as a whole, requires a large number of specific behaviors which are highly interdependent with the behavior of others. This is followed, in turn, by escort duty, IDS and communications operations, badging/entry control, patrol, motor and walking patrol, sentry duty (entry control) and tower guard. (SAT/BAF and AF tasks are situation-dependent and, therefore, are more akin to

infantry operations--i.e., responsibility and task complexity increase in proportion to the threat being countered.)

Allowing for the necessity of subspecialization for IDS operation and communications, there remains a requirement for demonstration of appropriate sentry and walking patrol behaviors before personnel are assigned to badging/entry control, motor patrol, escort, and convoy duties. Moreover, communications, IDS, and SAT/BAF personnel should demonstrate their knowledge of sentry and walking patrol tasks/behaviors in order to: (a) understand how their guard force colleagues will respond to various contingencies, and (b) effectively complement their colleagues.

Additionally, as the requirement for interactions with, and support to, other personnel increases, the necessity for organizational discipline increases proportionately. However, self discipline and the capability to exercise individual judgment and responsibility are first demonstrated in those tasks requiring less dependence upon coordinated actions.

This is not to suggest that one function is more important than another. Rather, it indicates that the number and sophistication of job behaviors increase as personnel move from tower guard duties to convoy members, and mastery of tasks/behaviors at lower levels of complexity would seem to be a necessary prelude to successful performance of those at higher levels.

For junior officers, the hierarchy of functions is more apparent, with platoon leaders being the entry level (along with ancillary duties). Because some sites did not have both executive officer and site security officer positions, it is difficult to determine which position requires more knowledge and experience. However, based upon functions and tasks which directly affect site security, those performed by the site security officer (whatever his/her organizational title) would seem more operationally important. The progression from platoon leader to site security or executive officer to company commander has not been formalized. However, it is at once logical and highly conducive to gaining the experience needed which is valuable and relevant to a potential commander of a nuclear security unit. Given the current rate of progression from O-1 to O-3 (approximately 54 months), an intervening assignment to some other specialty may be appropriate. Nevertheless, previous experience as a platoon leader and site security officer would seem to be highly desirable for a security company commander.

This leads to the issue of how promotions and career progression should be related to breadth of experience. For enlisted members, it would seem advantageous to base promotions on the progressive attainment of experience in the functional hierarchy outlined above. At supervisory levels (COR or SOG and NCOIC BAF) prior experience in one of the major security functions (static, mobile, or technical) would seem desirable.

RECOMMENDATION 2--HIERARCHY OF FUNCTIONS

Consideration should be given to establishing formalized career progression patterns for the nuclear security duty along lines suggested above. This would entail the establishment of experience qualifiers and optimal grade levels for designated functions, as well as formal and informal training requirements. Additionally, consideration could be given to the establishment of exercises at USAMPS for refresher and upgrade training of both enlisted members and officers in nuclear security specialities. This latter point is based upon an impression that on-site operational demands can severely limit the time and attention devoted to structured OJT programs.

CONCLUSION 3--SPECIFICATION OF TASKS AND BEHAVIORS

The derivative tasks and job behaviors cited in Chapters III, IV, and V above became more identifiable (and exact) when their frequency, duration, and intensity was specified. Lacking a standardized lexicon of job behaviors and a composite listing of designated functions and tasks for nuclear security operations, researchers frequently had to elicit such descriptive information from interviewees. Even so, qualitative specification of tasks and the inclusion of task associated behaviors, was not sufficient to fully denote functional complexities. Interdependency of tasks became the gauge for assessing complexity--that is, the more discrete tasks which had to be done in sequence, the more complex the task family or function. What the appropriate sequence, frequency, duration, or intensity of job behaviors should be (as opposed to what they were observed to be), is open to debate. Clearly, there must exist *some* optimal conditions and criteria for specific behaviors. To indicate that "observation" takes place does not provide clues as to the actual attendant behaviors. For example, we are not told whether that observation consists of a general scanning, followed by close scrutiny of possible hiding points, then by scrutiny of shadowed areas, and finally observation of lighted

areas. Implicitly, that procedure will vary across sites. Next, we should ask how often that observation should occur. By specifying that there are different observing behaviors, and that one behavior may be paramount, a period for each behavior must be considered. Logically, close scrutiny of areas having vision obstacles or shadows is more important than the observation of lighted areas, and yet lighted areas cannot be ignored. If that is true, then the relative duration and frequency of observation for those areas is important. How, then, does one discriminate "professional" observing behaviors from amateurish ones? The answer would seem to reside in the detail given to expected job behaviors in SOPs and OJT.

Without agreement on what those expected behaviors should be (and, thus, upon the terms used to describe those behaviors) their specification is undetermined. Moreover, if a particular sequence of behaviors is appropriate (particularly for operation of the IDS, radio checks, inspection of vehicles, clearing of weapons, use of deadly force, walking or motor patrol, etc.) that sequence needs to be specified. Such specification was included in a number of special orders reviewed during this research; however, there were procedural variances which indicated an absence of uniformity in expected job behaviors. In some cases, randomized behaviors were warranted--particularly for communications checks, patrol routes and observation patterns. However, the desirability of that randomness was not indicated in the subject special orders.

RECOMMENDATION 3--SPECIFICATION OF TASKS AND BEHAVIORS

Nuclear security functions, tasks, and specific job behaviors might be surveyed to determine what needs for standardized instructions on sequence, frequency, duration, and intensity may exist. Additionally, consideration might be given to the adoption of standardized nomenclature (where feasible) for functions, tasks, and job behaviors. With the adoption of common terms and a specification of desirable behaviors, consideration should be given to the publication of a standardized series of special orders (with local supplements authorized) to cover each designated nuclear security function. The purpose of this effort would be threefold: (1) to review existing special orders to assure that all necessary guidance was provided; (2) to eliminate unnecessary procedural variances; and (3) to survey the entire nuclear security system for evidence of inconsistency in job behavior standards.

CONCLUSION 4--CLARIFYING AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Throughout the job analysis process, researchers were confronted with a realization that supervisory layering and blurred lines of authority created some confusion as to the actual limits of responsibility and authority for each supervisory echelon. A discussion of this problem is contained in the companion report. However, a review of the specific job behavior listings for junior officers and senior NCOs disclosed a number of overlapping responsibilities and authorities. Uncertain distinctions of responsibility and authority, which are often a matter of degree rather than clear divisions, apparently can and do cause confusion among subordinate personnel. Although local practice can effectively eliminate that uncertainty and confusion, the specification of functions, tasks, and behaviors recommended above, would augur for clarification of authority and responsibility for all concerned. Moreover, by incorporating the appropriate delegational options in that specification, local instances of uncertain or weak leadership could be ostensibly compensated. This would enable a more thorough reconciliation of supervisory roles, as well, insofar as those roles could be more readily expanded or contracted to suit local needs if delegational options were clearly specified.

RECOMMENDATION 4--CLARIFYING AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Authority, responsibility, and supervisory roles of senior personnel might be specified and clarified through standardized function, task, and job behavior statements which incorporate delegation options.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Task orientation and job satisfaction in the nuclear weapons security milieu would seem to be dependent upon two factors:

- the extent to which the task demands concentration and practice to be performed well. (Preoccupation with a task, whether that preoccupation is due to intrinsic fascination or complexity of the task itself, clearly makes the task more bearable and increases the sense of involvement with, and dedication to, it.)
- an internalized drive to perform one's duty. If performance of a necessary duty carries its own reward, and if that attitude is consistently reinforced by the praise of others, the duty itself accrues merit and importance.

An unpleasant duty performed out of obligation to duty is still significant if the person performing it gains satisfaction from having "done his duty"--no matter how trivial it may seem in an objective sense.

To the extent that individual security force members managed to internalize that obligation to duty and the task itself became engrossing, the tendencies to be bored, detached, or perfunctory were overcome. For example:

- The desk clerk who concentrated upon his tasks ignored the distractions and minimized the interruptions which were part of his work environment, maintained a sense of accomplishment, and increased his overt satisfaction with the job.

- The IDS operator who became engrossed in learning the intricacies of his equipment, expanded his concept of duty, and avoided boredom at the same time.

- The patrol member who took particular pride in his thoroughness and attentiveness described his tasks in more positive terms.

- Supervisory NCOs who felt that their tasks were imbued with responsibility and a call to duty were apt to regard their role and function more seriously.

- Wherein supervisors sought to praise a display of dexterity, strength, facility, or poise by a security force member in the performance of a task, the worth of that task was apparently enhanced for all concerned.

In this perspective, assessing appropriate or noteworthy behaviors becomes as much a function of performance *style* as a function of adequacy. Whether or not a particular style was influenced by personal pride or a sense of duty was irrelevant. If the individual security force member was concerned about that style, enthusiasm for the task at hand apparently increased.

The most significant observation that can be made concerning jobs assigned to enlisted personnel at most sites is that they are seldom challenging or demanding enough to preclude episodes of boredom, or interesting enough to inhibit the temptation to seek diversion. The most salient problem would seem to be a necessity to structure a complex of interrelated tasks (a job) which would elicit dedication and diligence for complete mastery, without requiring extraordinary cognitive skills. Assigning ancillary duties and increasing the frequency and realism of operational readiness tests may

provide some job enrichment. Assigning auxiliary duties which appear to be contrived or which merely add to administrative complexities may become counterproductive. Although such additional duties do not complicate the primary tasks, they cannot be integrated with them in ways which add to the intrinsic fascination with those tasks. And, if such duties are relatively simple in their own right, their addition may merely increase the lower order task workload and, thereby, the potential for boredom.

In this perspective, the addition of reporting/paperwork duties to essentially sedentary jobs (such as desk sergeant or IDS operator) does not necessarily enrich those jobs, particularly if the administrative aspects are perceived to be "make work." Similarly, the greater the number of routinized checking/reporting procedures performed by security patrol or response force members (which may complicate their function and add to the tediousness of reporting procedures), the more assiduous their search for diversion tends to become. In essence, "keeping the troops busy" can imply more regularized tedium and increase the desire to escape from it.

However, the question remains--what is the characteristic of excellence in physical security? A motor vehicle operator cannot be considered excellent simply because a vehicle is operated without mishap. A radio operator does not display excellence in the normal operation of a radio. Those results are expected, and the tasks are neither so complex nor difficult to merit praise for routine performance. Nevertheless, the security force as a whole would seem to merit praise for its "normal" performance--deterrence. The excellence of that deterrence can only be gauged by the protracted absence of hostile action against the site, and that is a dubious higher goal for most personnel.

An absence of higher-order goals for each job may elevate the importance of lower-order goals, such as tolerance or endurance. If security force personnel do not attach significance to their safeguarding roles, we must ask if there are lesser completion or quota fulfillment goals which might obtain. This occurs to the extent that personnel are praised for a hiatus in ground safety incidents or the absence of downtime due to maintenance of vehicles, weapons, or security devices. On the other hand, a given number of patrol completions is hardly significant because, barring accident or illness, they will be completed in any event. A variant of this situation

exists for passing inspections or maintaining operational readiness. While there are negative incentives for meeting operational readiness standards (failure can bring disciplinary action or retarded advancement), the existence of positive incentives depends upon the value individuals attach to consistent meeting of those standards.

By contrast, on-the-job mastery of the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can result in a sense of isolation and sensory deprivation, on the one hand, or preoccupation with surrounding activities, on the other. In either case, the operator's responses are more constrained by the environment than the annunciator panel. *In fact, the alarm, rather than producing a sense of involvement, can create an irritation as conversations or daydreams are interrupted.* The demands for increasing mastery of the equipment are insufficient to preoccupy the operator. The only work productive outlet is to accept auxiliary tasks or to somehow gain technical knowledge of the equipment--knowledge which cannot be used to perform equipment maintenance at most sites. Much the same can be said about radio operators, but this conclusion is somewhat site dependent. At some sites, radio operators seem to enjoy sufficient stimulation on the job to keep alert.

There seem to be some anomalies in task assignment. For example, escort and entry control were assigned as rewards in some instances but given as "punishment" in others. Group esteem for these jobs governed whether or not they were considered desirable assignments and influenced how they were assigned. In addition to the problems that such a practice might be expected to engender within one platoon, there existed the differences in appreciation for various jobs across platoons.

Exercises which test reaction times are probably useful for motivating task refinement to the extent that individuals are provided with immediate goals. However, at the point refinement/improvement plateaus are reached, those goals are no longer meaningful. A similar paradox may exist for inspections which emphasize the adequacy of paperwork. This may lower motivation to the extent that the faultless preparation of routine reports and logs becomes identified as a bureaucratic exaction.

These observations emphasize the necessity to view security force jobs in terms of components/tasks which directly support mission accomplishment, as opposed to those which are peripheral. Any job which involves weapons

handling might be viewed as being the most mission essential. Furthermore, the responsibility for knowing when to apply deadly force connotes a need for uncommon judgment and prudence which should add to the prestige of jobs involving weapons handling. The personnel holding those jobs are then, by inference, "elites" when they perform those jobs. By extension, those who maintain and operate the devices and vehicles which enable security force weapons handlers to accomplish their mission are essential to insure that the latter will not be jeopardized for lack of warning, communications, or mobility. In this case, there is an explicit trust that they will unerringly perform their task. This functional symbiosis should be self evident. However, at most sites the overt commentary on interdependence between guard force and support personnel suggests that the relationship is neutral or antagonistic rather than symbiotic. Personnel who perform primarily administrative or managerial functions may be viewed as altogether extraneous by some guard force personnel, for the relationship between their responsibilities and those of the administrators becomes more distant as the supportive nature of administrative functions becomes increasingly vague.

For nuclear security operations, teamwork would benefit from explicit definition of role distinctions--and from commonalities of purpose.

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ATTN: DASIAC

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