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


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**MOBILIZATION AND DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
TECHNICAL REPORTS SERIES**

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MOBILIZATION RESPONSES TO WARNING



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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Frequently, the United States has had trouble deciding on meaningful and timely actions to be taken in response to warning indicators of enemy action. This paper examines the nature of warning and surprise in concert with the current threat to the United States, in an effort to determine those mobilization responses that would improve the country's ability to make meaningful and timely responses to enemy warnings.		

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the relationship between warning, surprise, the threat and our current mobilization capability to respond to these elements.

Our strategic thinking has been focused by concepts of a short war, nuclear escalations and reduced mobilization requirements. Such thinking reduces our capability for flexible action and response. By readjusting the strategic concepts to encompass alternate scenarios, we can provide mobilization preparedness actions that will give us flexibility in our response to enemy warning indicators.

The current threat to the United States is not appreciated by our public. When placed in context with Soviet historical developments, recent Soviet national actions and pronouncements by Soviet leaders, the threat translates into continued expansionist activities by the Soviet Union against the interests of the United States and the rest of the free world countries.

Mobilizing the national will is a critical first step in solving our mobilization response capabilities. A scrupulously honest and objective evaluation of the enemy threat will provide the basis for a mobilized national will. Improving the sustainability of our deployed forces to the point that they can conduct a winning war-fighting effort, will enhance the deterrence value of those forces and improve flexibility of our nation's responses.

The United States will not have the luxury of mobilizing from a cold industrial base once the need is upon us. Therefore mobilization preparedness

must begin now. Detailed plans and materiel preparations must be made to ensure that mobilization can be implemented from a "warm start" should it ever be required.

Improved and revitalized standby legislation should be developed to provide the Executive Branch an organized, easily accessible and well thought out program of legislation that can be implemented by Congress on very short notice. Such standby legislation would significantly decrease the time required to implement mobilization actions in the face of a national emergency.

Finally, interagency interaction and practice decision-making under simulated emergency conditions, are required to overcome the psychological barriers to accurate and timely responses to warning and surprise actions by an enemy.

INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, the United States has emphasized, de-emphasized and then re-emphasized interests and commitments respectively in Europe, the Far East and more recently the Middle East.

Today, and at least for the foreseeable future, the challenge is more demanding than ever before. We are confronted by a rival nation which can project its conventional forces to many areas of the world in which we have important interests and, at the same time, provide these forces with a nuclear umbrella that is equal to and perhaps in excess of our own.

In response to this unprecedented challenge, the current administration has significantly increased defense spending and has told the military services to be prepared to fight a global conventional war of prolonged duration.

Because of the threat, the U.S. must be ready to mobilize rapidly and effectively should some confluence of world events lead us to war. Further, we must have our national resource base so structured that our leaders have a range of options available to them to permit response to enemy actions that may prevent war.

Superimposed over these two requirements is the concept of warning and surprise and how these elements affect our response capability. The availability and allocation of our total resource base is a limiting factor in solving our national security needs. Thus in a democracy, with all the

competing demands for limited resources in peacetime, there is probably no other way of reconciling strategic means and ends other than to be prepared to mobilize additional needed military strength in response to warning.

This paper will examine the problem, the nature of warning and surprise and the threat. An exploration of mobilization responses and psychological factors posed by warning will offer various ideas that can be implemented to help solve the problem.

SECTION I: THE PROBLEM

The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words: Too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one's friends.

--General Douglas MacArthur

Throughout this century, the security policy of the United States has been strictly defensive. Our current policy incorporates substantial continuities present in our policy since before World War II--that is, we remain committed to a defensive use of military strength. Our objective is to deter aggression--failing that, to respond to such aggression with sufficient military force to ensure our national survival.

Given this policy, it should be expected that preparedness to respond to warning and to mobilize would always be accorded top priority. However, such is not the case.¹

Preparedness means the existence of detailed plans and materiel preparations, such that mobilization can be accomplished between the time the decision to mobilize is made and that point in time when the mobilized resources are needed to make a decisive impact on the outcome of the battle. This definition includes both "full" and "total" mobilization scenarios.

Until the advent of the missile age, the United States had as safe and as secure a geographic position as any nation on the face of the earth. We had

neighbors to the north and south of us who constituted no threat. We were protected by two oceans which meant that no overseas power could reach us. Most importantly, vast areas of the world were held by two countries who had been allied with us since the beginning of World War I, namely England and France.²

The geopolitical position afforded the United States the luxury of mobilizing for World War II behind a shield of geography and our European allies. In fact, the situation was one of mutual convenience. The European allies depended upon the United States as a mobilization base for industrial products, while the United States depended upon its European allies temporarily to contain the military thrust of the Axis powers. Our mobilization leadtime was very probably shortened somewhat by the growing materiel support we provided to the allies in 1939 and 1940.³ In turn, our defense budget incurred a ten-fold increase between the time of the German attack on Poland and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

But, times have changed. The cataclysmic events of 1945 ushered in a new era--one that was partially prophesied by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 when he wrote: "There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world which seem to tend towards the same end. . .the Russians and the Americans. Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same, yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."⁴

Of course, de Tocqueville did not predict the changes in the nature of war. He did not know that the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles,

armed with nuclear warheads, would reduce our tactical warning time to less than one-half hour. We no longer enjoy the safety and security of two vast oceans. We no longer have benign protectorate states to our south. We no longer have the shield of an allied Europe to provide us sufficient time to mobilize adequately, even though our allies possess considerable military strength.

In fact, the major aspects of our current military deployments and planning are based on the assumption that we can successfully exploit strategic warning of an enemy attack. Reinforcing our forward deployed forces with an airlift bridge to Europe, prepositioning equipment on the continent for use by those forces and activating the Rapid Deployment Task Force for worldwide deployment are examples of our potential responses to such warning.

In any event, to execute these responses successfully, three conditions must be met: we must receive warning, we must make the decision to respond and we must have adequate national resources to back up our decisions. The first task has long been recognized and dealt with. Ever since 7 December 1941, we have had a national obsession with strengthening and improving our intelligence capabilities. It is the second and third tasks that we have neglected. We cannot assume that the enemy will necessarily do us the favor of providing warning that is timely and unambiguous.⁵

In conjunction with this deficiency, we have also tended to adopt an overly narrow view of strategic warning. Previous mobilization studies have assumed that we would have two to six months warning prior to a massive

attack. The error in our planning is the assumption that only the indicators of the attack itself would provide the impetus for mobilization.⁶ Hence, we have allowed our mobilization preparedness to deteriorate by excusing it away through the faulty rationale that we would not have enough time to mobilize and that the war would be over before mobilization could make any difference.

Yet, it has been our historic experience, except in Vietnam, that a general deterioration in international relations or limited, flagrant aggression by other nations has served to stimulate our mobilization responses.⁷

Therefore, our problem is one of readjusting our strategic thinking to encompass the following elements:

--Future wars may very well not be short. If we prepare for a long war scenario and the war turns out to be of limited duration, we have erred in a positive, success-oriented direction. On the other hand, if the reverse is true, we have committed a potentially fatal error.

--Mobilization preparedness must be enhanced to the point where we in fact do have the concrete plans and materiel preparations in hand that will provide the decision-maker an adequate range of options to use in responding to warning indicators.

--Improvements in our national command structure decision-making process must be undertaken. These must encompass procedures to better perceive and evaluate warning indicators, to sort out deception and misinformation, and to overcome psychological barriers to action.

The first step in solving our problem is to understand the relationship between warning and surprise, which will be examined in the next section of this paper.

SECTION II: THE NATURE OF WARNING AND SURPRISE

The two factors that produce surprise are secrecy and speed. Both presuppose a high degree of energy on the part of the government and the commander; on the part of the army, they require great efficiency. Surprise will never be achieved under lax conditions and conduct. While it is true that it will never be completely ineffective, it is equally true that by its very nature surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful. It would be a mistake therefore, to regard surprise as a key element of success in war.

--von Clausewitz

While many military leaders often discuss the element of surprise as a basic essential operational element, von Clausewitz himself said that it is very rare that one state surprises another, either in an attack or in preparation for war.⁸ The reason this is so, is that surprise is basically a tactical principle; strategic surprise requires too much time to develop and does not offer the opportunity for secrecy required for successful execution.

However, lest the reader inadvertently assume that surprise means to be taken totally unaware, it actually means only that the victim becomes aware too late to react effectively.

Preparation to conduct conventional war usually takes many months or even years. The strategic element of secrecy has always been difficult, if not impossible to accomplish. This is even more true today than it was in the

days prior to long range camera and sensor-equipped platforms that can detect movements associated with mobilization, force deployments and other battle preparations.

Therefore, although history is filled with examples of what appear to be successful surprise by one state over another, an analysis of these cases reveals that, in fact, the situation really resulted from a combination of lack of intelligence, an unwillingness by political leaders to believe intelligence information and a reluctance by those leaders to authorized some form of response (political, economic or military) to counter early warning indicators.

Strategic surprise can result when the victim does not appreciate whether, when, where or how his enemy will strike. This lack of appreciation encompasses the three phases of warning: political, strategic and tactical. Failure to perceive warning accurately or to react to such warning in any of these phases, degrades defenses and enhances the enemy's capability to launch a successful surprise attack.⁹

Some writers have tried to distinguish between what they term "ambiguous" warning and warning that is not ambiguous. It is important to dismiss this artificial distinction and to accept the fact that no competent leader would intentionally display explicit warning to his enemy, just as no successful quarterback would intentionally telegraph a play to the defensive team. All warning indicators are doubtful or uncertain. The fact that a particular act is happening or has happened may well be obvious. However, the key element is the enemy's intentions--why did he do what he did, what will he do next, will A

lead to B, etc. Correct deciphering of the enemy's motive is the important element in properly assessing the obvious. Therefore, by their very nature, all warning indicators are ambiguous because the receiver does not and cannot know with certainty the enemy's intentions.

Therefore, if true surprise rarely exists and all warning is ambiguous, why do we continue to discuss and write about the success achieved through surprise by state X over state Y in a particular campaign? Because, throughout history, sudden attacks have occurred that have paralyzed, defeated or severely hurt the victim. Those attacks were not bolts from the blue. They all occurred in times of prolonged tension, during which the victim state's leaders recognized that war was possible. In all cases, the leaders failed to perceive and evaluate accurately the warning indicators; failed to sort out deception and misinformation; failed to overcome the psychological barriers brought on by political disbelief and therefore, failed to authorize effective counter actions.

Let us proceed with an analysis of some historical examples that will demonstrate the truth of this proposition:

German Attack against the West, May 1940

The warning indicators of this attack were certainly prevalent, relatively unambiguous and not at all dissimilar to the current situation that exists between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO Alliance. The first warning indicator was Hitler's philosophy toward France and his belief that a military victory over the French was necessary for successful implementation of his

plans to rebuild Germany's greatness. The publication of Mein Kampf in 1925, set the blueprint for Germany's goals and the specific means to achieve those objectives once Hitler ascended to power in 1933.¹⁰

The national mobilization and rearmament covertly carried out by Germany at first, but totally open and visible to the world from 1936 onward, complemented the prescription spelled out by Hitler eleven years earlier.

German development of the blitzkrieg military strategy and tactics was based in part on the writing of J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart and Charles DeGaulle. In fact, DeGaulle had urged the reorganization of the French army fully six years before the Germans attacked west. The preliminary testing of blitzkrieg tactics against Poland in 1939, gave the English and French a very clear and unambiguous indicator of Germany's capability.¹¹

The fact that the war had been underway for seven months was a further indicator that could not be ignored. However, as late as 5 April 1940, Prime Minister Chamberlain stated in part ". . .when war did break out, German preparations were far ahead of our own, and it was natural then to expect that the enemy would take advantage of his initial superiority to make an endeavor to overwhelm us and France before we had time to make good our deficienciesWhatever may be the reason. . .however, one thing is certain: he missed the bus."¹²

In 42 days the German army shattered the French army, drove the British forces into the English Channel, conquered most of France and negotiated an armistice with the Petain government. Those were not insignificant

accomplishments considering that the contending forces were about evenly matched in materiel before the battle began.

German Attack against the Soviet Union, 1941:

Exactly one year after signing the armistice with the Vichy government, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Here again, the balance of forces was almost equal. If any discrepancy existed it was in the Soviet's favor--they outnumbered the Germans in aircraft and in tanks three-to-one. Yet, despite this and the fact that the Soviets had good intelligence, the Germans managed to push the Soviet forces back over 400 miles in only four weeks.

Once again, the warning indicators were present in adequate numbers--many of them were the same indicators that were available prior to Germany's attack on France, only now reinforced by the success of that attack.

Following the fall of France, Soviet war games employing mechanized forces with blitzkrieg tactics and heavy air support, ended in victory for the forces playing the German role. Soon thereafter, the Soviets revived armored corps formations recommended by M.N. Tulchachevsky five years earlier, before he was purged. However, indecision by Stalin delayed activation of these armored corps until March 1941.¹³

Additionally, there were many separate warning indicators that were not reacted to by the Soviet leadership. Especially significant and important were personal correspondence from Churchill to Stalin, espionage by Soviet agents in Europe and Japan, leaks from the German High Command, evacuation of

German dependents from Moscow, withdrawal of German merchant shipping from Soviet ports and clear evidence of German mobilization and concentration of forces.¹⁴

However, Stalin (and even the British to some degree) through self-deception and mirror imaging, really believed that the Germans would attempt to negotiate a settlement before they actually attacked the Soviets. Stalin's beliefs caused him to reject calling up the reserves because he feared such action would provoke a German attack before diplomatic maneuvers had been completed.

German deceptive measures helped to feed the Soviet's self-deception. Actions such as deliberately planting false information; accelerating propaganda against Great Britain while reducing it against the Soviets; and constructing defensive field fortifications opposite the Soviet border, all contributed to Stalin's delusion that the Germans would negotiate before they attacked. Furthermore, Stalin did not want to take any action that would be interpreted by the Germans as a provocation to attack. Therefore, he further contributed to the suddenness of the attack by failing to man fully the Soviet defensive fortifications along the border.¹⁵

The two preceding examples exhibit specific points that support the premise that an attack is rarely made without warning indicators being present, often in abundant numbers, and sometimes even perceived by the enemy state. The real problem results from the victim state's inability to manage properly the warning indicators and their reaction to those indicators.

The reader would do well to ask what these examples from World War II have to do with the current world situation. The next section of this paper explores historical elements, trends and national proclamation warning indicators that comprise the threat to the United States today.

SECTION III: THE THREAT

For more than twenty-five years the countries of the Western Alliance have been preparing themselves against the dread possibility of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This war, which the strategists have called . . .the Third World War--has never come and may never come. Meanwhile, the real Third World War has been fought and is being fought under our noses, and few people have noticed what was going on.

Brian Crozier

Former President Nixon, in The Real War, builds a significant case for the proposition that World War III is simply a continuation of the Second World War with the cast of actor states slightly rearranged. He also theorizes that while we did rather well by ourselves in the first twenty years of this war, we have not done well recently and we are in danger of being totally subjugated by the Soviet Union if we do not soon wake up to the realities of the situation and take those actions necessary to protect our national sovereignty.¹⁶

We know that once a sociological event begins to move in a particular direction, inertia causes the trend to continue unabated until the event (or its environment) is sufficiently jolted from its course by another more

cataclysmic event or until the original event runs its course. The westward expansion of the United States population is an example of this phenomenon, continuing for over 100 years until there was no longer any place for further expansion.

By examining the historical past and the trends that have developed, we may be able to make some significant predictions about the future. Such predictions however, must be relevant to the situation and must enable our leaders to make reasonable predictions about the future in relationship to the warning indicators.

If one looks at the sociological events surrounding the development of the present day Soviet Union, one finds a trend that stretches back seven centuries when the Mongols swept across the Russian plains and conquered most of what is now the Soviet Union. After 250 years of ruthless terror, the Mongols were finally overthrown by Ivan the Great in 1480. Nonetheless, they continued to terrorize the Russian people every year by attacking them along their common frontier. This was repeated each year during a man's entire life and came nearer to our concept of total war than anything in pre-twentieth century history.¹⁷

Ivan the Great not only overthrew the enemy, but he also began an expansion of territory that has continued unabated for five hundred and three years. Nonetheless, it was Ivan the Terrible who was crowned the first Tsar and began the Russian imperial rule. Under his leadership the empire grew in all directions, with each newly conquered territory being absorbed into it.

Such a vast area required the use of imperial methods to control the population. Total domination of the people by the central government, employment of terror to enforce state policy and enforcement of the internal passport system by the secret police are all examples of internal control policies that have continued unabated for all this time.¹⁸

The Russian expansionist drives were contained during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the rise and power of the European nation states. Russia, realizing she would have to modernize and industrialize if she were to compete successfully with these great powers, began to adopt Western industrialization methods and equipment.

In 1945, the Soviet Union fell out with the other Allies over the question of sovereignty of the eastern European nations, especially Poland. Unless the Western allies were prepared to fight the Soviets, power in the eastern territories would go where the Red Army went. However, the Western nations chose diplomatic and economic policies in lieu of continued fighting, in an attempt to influence the outcome of the European sovereignty question. The Soviets perceived the Allied efforts as hostile toward them. Therefore, through their power presence, they were able to insure that pro-Soviet governments were installed in all the Eastern countries by 1948, thereby effectively bringing these countries under their domination.¹⁹

The cold war had begun. The United States chose containment as its policy against Soviet expansionism. While we have not been privy to the specific effects our responses have had on Soviet policy, we can discard the once

popular notion that the Soviets follow some type of specific blueprint and timetable for further expansion. We can only infer trends and objectives from the specific statements and actions the Soviets have made and carried out during the last thirty odd years. An analysis of these events and utterances provides an assessment of the future direction of these trends and serves as the precursor of warning indicators that should trigger us to action.

The first significant Soviet objective has been to obtain superpower status. The Soviets are convinced that the western powers hold antagonistic feelings toward them and have done so since 1917. They are keenly aware of Truman's reversal of Roosevelt's policies following World War II firmly opposing a Soviet hegemony in eastern Europe. Immediately following the war, the main Soviet thrust was to rebuild her defenses by expanding her sphere of influence and control out from her borders. Once secure, the Soviets realized they could not achieve their economic and political goals in the world unless they achieved a status equal to that of the United States.

The aborted attempt to expand absolute power in the Western hemisphere in the early 1960s, only solidified the Soviets view that they must attain superpower status. They have been successful in this goal by expanding military power during the last 20 years, following the Cuban debacle.²⁰

The Soviets attaining superpower status does not in itself pose a specific threat to the United States. In fact, some analysts maintain that the Soviets specifically do not want war. They predict that the USSR will not

deliberately initiate a major war and that the security of their homeland outweighs objectives they could obtain through war.²¹ While this may be so, attaining and maintaining supremacy or even parity in the correlation of forces enables the Soviets to attain other international goals and objectives that would otherwise be denied them.

Although specific expansion of communism through revolution may take a subordinate role to the Soviets' continental security interests, it has received their support and encouragement in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. The Soviets continue to support revolution throughout the world and continue to support countries that have interests and objectives that are not amenable to the Western ideals of individual freedom, democracy and peace. The trends of the last 20 years are all too clear in this regard--continual unrelenting support of turmoil and aggression throughout the world.

In concert with these goals, the Soviets have also been resolute in attempting to promote the drift of America's allies away from a close relationship with us and simultaneously preventing these allies from gaining self-sufficiency and becoming additional world power centers. Specifically, these actions apply to the NATO Alliance and to Japan.²²

Soviet pronouncements indicate that another of their principal objectives is to gain political control over the oil and mineral resources necessary to fuel the West's industrial democracies. The only logical conclusion to this objective is that they want to bring the western nations into economic and political hostage.

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov once commented that . . ."The area south of Batun and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf (is) . . .the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."²³ If this is true, we must accept the premise by Betts that a sudden attack is less likely to occur in Europe where we maintain a reasonable defensive posture, than in other areas of the world. The reasons behind this idea are that nuclear escalation is less likely and that western conventional response capabilities are exceedingly limited in these other areas. Hence, a sudden Soviet attack in these areas would provide greater reward to them with minimal loss in combat power.²⁴

An analysis of the Soviet actions and pronouncements over the last years, compared with those of the German government in the years immediately preceding World War II, brings forth a number of striking similarities.

First, both accomplished mobilization of industrial and military assets under the guise of self-protection. German mobilization was more active in that she immediately put the mobilized resources into active use against her enemies. The Soviets, on the other hand, have a more passive mobilization (when viewed by the West) in that their mobilized resources are, for the most part, placed in warm reserve to be immediately available should the need arise.

Second, both nations expanded absolute control and hegemony over neighboring states to protect their own self-interests and to provide "protection" to their neighbors as a result of that neighbor's "request" for assistance.

Finally, the leadership of both nations explicitly "warned" the other world nations of their goals and objectives vis-a-vis these other nations. In conjunction with this warning, the Soviets have counted on receiving the same response from the west that Hitler received--appeasement coupled with a passive military capability unable to conduct any type of armed response.

In the end, one must analyze the history of Soviet strategy, vis-a-vis surprise, and assume that because of their previous successes, they will continue this strategic trend. Surprise through secrecy, camouflage and deception has been a standard of Soviet military doctrine since well before World War II. Two specific examples illustrate this point: The actions taken by the Soviet forces prior to the Manchurian campaign in 1945 completely deceived the Japanese and caught them ill-prepared for attack. Similar measures were used by the Soviets in 1968 prior to their invasion of Czechoslovakia, although, in this case they furthered their deception by using the cover of extended war game exercises adjacent to the Czech border for approximately two months prior to their invasion and also by agreeing, the day prior to the invasion, to hold political discussions with the United States President.²⁵

SECTION IV: MOBILIZATION RESPONSES

You imagine you see danger in other parts of the globe and so you hurl the arrows from your depleted quiver there. But the greatest danger of all is that you have lost the will to defend yourselves.

--Alexander Solzhenitsyn

It is not so relevant whether one agrees or disagrees with the specifics of Solzhenitsyn's assessment of our quiver; what is relevant is his opinion of our will. Mobilization of the national will is basic, critical and vital for the success of all national security actions. Therefore, before the decision-maker can properly make a decision as to the response he will make to the enemy's warning indicators, he must first and foremost come to grips with the level of the American public's commitment to the cause. It will not be argued here what is right or wrong, just or unjust, or popular or unpopular; only that it is an obvious fallacy to commit the military (or prepare to do so) without first obtaining the commitment of the American people. Summers makes a strong case for mobilizing the American public. He also discusses the reasons that our nation's leaders believed such mobilization was not required during the Korean and Vietnamese wars, and the results of the lack of understanding and appreciation of this basic concept.²⁶

Mobilizing the national will reduces internal friction in the nation; sends clear and unmistakable signals of our resolve to our enemy; lays the ground work for the economic, social and political sacrifices that may become necessary to stop the threat to our security; and provides a sound base for

additional mobilization measures, particularly industrial and personnel measures. Further, mobilized national will leads to support for a declaration of war should armed conflict be required to achieve our objectives. In short, national will is essential for all other mobilization actions. It provides the national leadership with the ability to consider a broader range of options in dealing with warning indicators.

It is far easier to agree that national will is needed than it is to achieve it. In an open and democratic society where the vocal minority is too often the only voice heard, a full unembellished, objective, and scrupulously honest evaluation of the enemy threat is the basic requirement in developing support for national security problems. Once critical national interests and the threat to those interests have been determined, an effective public affairs program is needed to inform and influence the American public. Unfortunately, we have frequently lacked this ability in the past. The current administration has made some improvements in this regard, but we still suffer from a credibility problem.

Successfully building national will leads directly to achieving the resources and legislation required to enable our leaders to have a broad range of options available in countering specific warning indicators. Clausewitz characterized the activities of war in two main categories: preparation for war and war proper. All mobilization actions are of the first category--to produce a trained and equipped fighting force. Too often, the public confuses or blurs the distinction between these two categories. Hence, the Executive Branch has the responsibility to make clear the appropriate distinction as they seek the legislation and resources needed for

flexible and responsive action. A body politic that has a clear understanding of the threat and a belief in the reasonableness of the responses, will provide the legislation and resources required.

Only a national emergency brought on by imminence of, or actual attack upon our forces, or a direct threat to our national security will provide the climate for full mobilization. But, because we currently lack the materiel reserve to sustain our forces much beyond 30 days, we do not have the qualifications necessary to make the warfighting value of our forces believable. This is especially true if the Soviet forces' sustainability is greater than our own, and there is every reason to believe that to be the case. This is not to say that our sustainability *must match* the Soviet's day for day. To the contrary, ours must be sufficient to provision our committed forces from the time of commitment until the effects of increased production can catch up with the demand. This suggests a return to the D-P concept that was halted for economic reasons some years ago. While there are those who would argue that our nation cannot afford such a reversal of policy, it is the opinion of many that we can ill afford not to do so. Specifically, it makes little sense to continue to spend one quarter trillion dollars per year for a military force that we either intentionally, (or by default), plan to be defeated after the first 30 days of war because of exhaustion of supplies and equipment.

A separate, but complementary, effort is the application of the D-P concept to the industrial base. Under this plan, a target time to achieve desired output for some number of line items of equipment and supplies would be selected. The government could then buy and stockpile the long-leadtime

components required to reduce surge production time to the target time selected. Successful execution of this concept would correspondingly reduce the quantity of the finished product necessary to be stockpiled to increase the sustainability of our forces.

The cost of increasing procurement of long leadtime items is relatively low. Net additional funding would generally be limited to the cost of inventory storage and control. The cost of acquiring the actual inventory would not be an increase in program cost, but rather would only shift outlays from the future to the present. In peacetime, the total procurement would not exceed the program plan. But, because of the timing of purchases, should a surge production be needed, the material in being would greatly reduce the leadtimes required to achieve program increases.²⁷

For either of these programs to be successful, DOD must establish and enforce the policy. Congress, on the other hand, must insure that once begun, the effort is allowed to continue uninterrupted by the roller coaster effects of resource micro-management too often experienced in the defense budget. If a conscientious effort were to be applied to these two programs, significant improvements in our sustainability and surge capability could be achieved within five years. In the meantime, of course, the sustainability of our forces would be improved with each passing day and the corresponding deterrent value of them would be improved.

Mobilizing the national will and improving force sustainability are only part of the solution. Improving sustainability without the capacity to

move quickly into full mobilization is to promote false hope and an empty ideal.²⁸ Another element is required: robust mobilization planning.

Since the 1950s, mobilization planning has continually taken a back seat to other requirements of our national security program, such as Vietnam war consumption, post war modernization and strategic force structure improvements. Mobilization planning has been allowed to deteriorate for a variety of reasons. Chief among them is the refusal to provide resources to the program. Justification of under-resourcing has rested on the fallacious "short war/long-war" argument. Since a short-war scenario is less expensive than a longer one, the short war concept rapidly gained support among those who do not and will not have to fight the battle, thereby leaving more resources for their pet programs. A second cause of this deterioration is that responsibility for mobilization planning is fragmented throughout the federal government, to include many Congressional committees and a variety of Executive branch agencies. This lack of centralized control has inhibited a proper national focus from being consistently applied to the problem.

National Security Decision Directive 47, issued in July 1982, has provided a step in the right direction to solve part of the problem, but more needs to be accomplished. Specifically, a single individual, with Cabinet and NSC membership must have responsibility for the overall mobilization planning program. The Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board, prescribed by NSDD 47, like all committees, is susceptible to the political and bureaucratic struggles of its various and diverse members. Hence, much lost time may result while internal conflicts are being resolved.

The primary focus of the mobilization planning leadership must be to develop realistic total mobilization requirements based on a national strategy. The NSC has redefined our national strategy, similar to the effort that was accomplished with publication of NSC-68 in the early 1950s.

Once total mobilization requirements are postulated, an effective joint industry/government program can be established to rebuild industrial preparedness planning. Such a program, must of necessity, include a robust incentive and reimbursement package to insure that industry will be financially induced to accept the challenging task. The day of the free lunch is over. Rewards must be made available commensurate with the quality and quantity of planning that is needed. Defense production capacity can be improved--we are not on an irreversible down hill slide.

No matter whether we stick with a committee or whether we select a single individual to be responsible for mobilization planning, a serious examination of standby mobilization legislation must be undertaken immediately. This act of political will can add significant impetus to our total mobilization effort and will send strong signals to our enemy.

The Defense Production Act of 1950 contained vast powers required to give the Administration the tools needed to carry out mobilization in time of national crisis short of a congressional declaration of war. The Act originally contained seven titles, providing authority to divert materials and facilities from civilian use to military need and to expand production

facilities beyond the levels needed to meet civilian demand. The provisions of the Act were used successfully to enable our nation to prepare for war with the Soviet Union by building a war reserve large enough to last a year and simultaneously continuing to sustain our committed forces in Korea.²⁹

However, in the years since the end of the Korean War and termination of the accompanying mobilization effort, the DPA has been allowed to deteriorate through neglect and systematic dismantling actions by Congress. The deterioration has become so great that even today as this is being written, the remaining powers of the Act are operational only through a temporary continuation of the Act by Congress, at least until March 1983. While the act as originally written may not be politically acceptable today, it is critical to have some form of standby legislation available that can be immediately enacted by the Congress both prior to and following a declaration of national emergency.

Such standby legislation must include features that permit management of the national economy so that military requirements for personnel and materiel can be met rapidly, while at the same time enabling our leaders to have the tools necessary to fight inflation and to provide a reasonable level of output of goods and services for the civilian sector.

Additionally, standby legislation should include streamlined waivers of EPA, OSHA and equal opportunity requirements that would otherwise constrain a rapid mobilization capability. Current provisions to relax these constraints at declaration of national emergency are procedurally complex and time consuming.

Concurrently with the above, a full review and integration of other mobilization-related legislation needs to be undertaken. Specifically, we need to develop a single summary document that accurately lists all emergency authorities for both DOD and non-DOD agencies of the government.³⁰ This refinement and consolidation would permit all agencies rapidly and accurately to plan for and perform their mobilization responsibilities.

By enacting such legislation now, Congress will significantly aid the mobilization effort by reducing the time required to mobilize fully in the future and by demonstrating this country's political will to take believable actions necessary in countering any threat to our national security.

SECTION V: PSYCHOLOGICALLY ACCEPTING WARNING

There are no valid examples of successful attacks that occurred without warning. An analysis of historical examples of "surprise" attacks reveals that some elements of warning were present prior to the attack. In all cases, these warning indicators can be grouped into two classes based on time. For purposes of this analysis, long term indicators are those that are present at least four months prior to an attack and short term indicators are present less than four months prior to an attack. Generally speaking, all warning indicators are ambiguous, but the degree of ambiguity increases with the length of time the indicator is present.

Examples of long term indicators are: force structure and doctrinal changes, industrial mobilization actions (especially stockpiling long leadtime items), improved war reserve stock levels and statements of intention or goals expressed by a nation's leaders. Extrapolation of trends of past actions can, under some circumstances, also provide long term indicators.

Short term indicators, on the other hand, are less ambiguous, more concrete regarding future abilities and are more directly related to impending military actions. Examples include: alerting and repositioning troop units into tactical configurations; personnel mobilization actions; reserve force call up; breaking diplomatic relations; short leadtime industrial mobilization actions; stockpiling war reserve material (especially perishable items); and increased reconnaissance activities.

If the proposition that all attacks are preceded by warning is valid, and if we are aware of what comprises various types of warning indicators, then why do we witness nations being taken by surprise? Generally, all examples can be classed into three broad categories: intelligence failures, disbelief of possible enemy actions, and fear of inciting the enemy by taking actions to counter the warning indicators.

The broad class of intelligence failure is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that such failures on a strategic level must be so massive as to catch a state's leadership completely unaware. More often, the intelligence failures are extremely short term, tactically oriented and result in the failure of leaders to predict the exact time, place and force of an attack.

The previously cited example of the German attack on France in 1940, is representative of the class of failures that can be attributed to disbelief of pending enemy action. Although evidence exists that the enemy will act, the victim's leaders cannot psychologically accept the evidence. Leaders rationalize their beliefs by justifying in their own minds the inconsistency, craziness and lack of rationality of the enemy. Additionally, they will use mirror imagery of their own reasons why such an attack won't happen and then deceive themselves with the correctness of their beliefs, the political and diplomatic abilities of their nation and even the economic damage that would befall the enemy. Betts accurately summarizes this case when he states: "Nations go to war for political reasons, and failure to appreciate strategic warning is usually tied to political assumptions and pressures."³¹

The German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, provides a representative example of the third category of response to warning failure. In this situation, Stalin had ample warning, much more than even France and Britain had the year previous. In fact, Stalin expected the Germans to attack, but he believed that Hitler would not attack before 1942 or even 1943. Therefore, he reasoned, he had time to complete his preparations and he did not want to provoke an earlier German attack by taking obvious counter preparations or a firm stand against the German provocations. The fallacy of this case is to think that it is impossible for the intended victim to alter the attacker's plans, regardless of what he does or does not do. Once a decision has been made, hesitancy by the victim will simply add to the success achieved by the enemy. Whereas, if counter preparations, decisive action and firm political and diplomatic measures are initiated early in the warning phase, one can often thwart or deter enemy action. The actions taken by the United States against the Soviet Union in 1962 illustrate the veracity of this approach. However, the counter actions and initiatives of the intended victim must be backed by solid strength that is real, perceived and believed by the enemy.

There is no absolutely positive "sure cure" for either of the last two problem categories discussed above. There are some factors that would mitigate both problems for the leadership of the United States.

First, if one accepts Allison's model III as representative of our governmental decision making process, then at least the full spectrum of possible views on a particular crisis has the potential of being aired.

Nonetheless, Allison is less than optimistic about the determinants of the ultimate prevailing view.³² In this model, it is essential to have all key decision-makers and their staffs fully knowledgeable about the warning indicators, the enemy threat, and the possible range of U.S. actions. Further, each player must be aware of the role his agency plays in the various scenarios that may be adopted.

Practice decision-making is a second factor that leads to accurate and timely response in conditions of uncertainty. The practice, must include the key leaders and must be as close to a real crisis situation as peacetime activities permit. Generally, this practice comes about through participation in national level exercises such as the PROUD SABER/REX series. The full value of these exercises is frequently degraded by the absence of the key decision-makers for most or all of the exercise.

A third factor, that should not need elaboration but unfortunately does, is the quality of military and intelligence advice provided to the key civilian decision-makers. As Summers points out, the military was distrusted by the President during the early days of Vietnam. By the time Presidential leadership had changed, the military had accepted the status quo and by default, had no meaningful military advice to give.³³ The military leadership must be able at all times to give the President the advice he needs, not the advice they think he wants to hear. There must not be a dual standard nor any equivocation about the warning elements, the recommended action to take, nor the consequences of that action. To paraphrase Clausewitz,

their advice must consist of calculations that include the variable quantities of war, intertwined with the psychological forces and the effects of continuous interactions of opposites.

In addition to strong, ready and sustainable forces in being, we must be able to bring the potential strength that mobilization gives us to bear on the situation at hand in such a way that the enemy believes he would ultimately be defeated. This can happen only when leaders are able to overcome the psychological barriers to accepting warning indicators.

No matter what response to warning is ultimately made or the process used to formulate it, the decision must have a number of characteristics. First, it must be a reasonable response to the enemy's initiatives; second, it must be backed by strength--the strength to go to war if necessary and win; third, the actions that comprise the response must be believable to the enemy. Symbolic gestures such as lighting candles on Christmas Eve in protest of martial law in Poland, simply do not contain any of these characteristics.

In summary, meaningful responses to enemy actions can occur only when our nation possesses sustainability for forces in being; military, industrial and legislative mobilization plans; psychological strength of leadership; and most importantly, the united will of our citizens to respond; all of which are believed by the enemy. No nation has ever started a war that they did not believe they could win.

FOOTNOTES

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