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RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FORCES IN EUROPE

Advanced International Studies Institute
4330 East-West Highway, Suite 1122
Washington, DC 20014

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Final Report for Period 15 May 1980-30 March 1982

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This report provides an indepth of the Soviet campaign against NATO nuclear modernization. It examines the background of Soviet efforts against NATO since its inception, with particular emphasis on precursor Soviet campaigns against NATO nuclear armaments. It surveys in detail Soviet views and actions against the 1979 NATO decision on deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, analyzes Soviet concerns about the possibility of such		

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deployment, and explores likely Soviet countermoves before, immediately after and for an extended period following implementation of the NATO decision.

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PREFACE

This draft report was prepared for the Defense Nuclear Agency under Contract Number 001-80-C-0285, as a contribution to the Agency's ongoing analyses of possible Soviet reactions to NATO modernization plans.

The purpose of the report is to assess the Soviet campaign against NATO modernization within a historical framework which highlights the continuities and innovations of the current Soviet efforts against implementation of the NATO nuclear modernization decision, and particularly within the context of the changing military balance between the U.S. and USSR, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Special attention is paid to precursor Soviet campaigns against tactical nuclear weapons in NATO--including flexible options, the multilateral force scheme (MLF), the Schlesinger limited nuclear option proposal, and the neutron bomb--which underscore basic Soviet views and suggests precedents for Soviet actions. The report examines in detail the course the current Soviet campaign has actually taken, the concerns and objectives behind it, and the range of possible Soviet countermoves both before and after U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles are deployed in Europe.

The study is based primarily on a close examination and analysis of Soviet open source materials as well as of Soviet diplomatic, political, economic and military actions, past and projected.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. The current Soviet campaign against NATO nuclear modernization is the latest in a series of Soviet efforts dating back to the immediate postwar period to frustrate attempts by the United States and the major countries of Western Europe to combine their resources and power in order to meet Soviet threats to the security of Western Europe. Throughout this series of efforts, the USSR has demonstrated a remarkable consistence in purpose and in approach and tactics, despite widely varying differences that have over time marked the relative power positions of the two sides and despite a dynamically developing situation within Western Europe and in overall international relationships.

2. The first of these efforts antedated the formation of NATO. They aimed at frustrating joint U.S.-West European responses to Soviet challenges to Western interests in Greece and Turkey, joint attempts to rehabilitate by means of the Marshall Plan war-torn West European societies threatened by takeovers by indigenous communist forces, and joint moves to unify West German territories and establish a viable West German government. Soviet efforts in each of these instances failed, but apparently without any effects on the motivations that underlay them or on basic Soviet hostility to U.S.-West European cooperation.

3. With the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, Soviet attention focuses repeatedly on attempts to destroy the new alliance or to reduce it to ineffectiveness, not merely because of its utility for the defense of Europe but also because of its role as a cornerstone of U.S. global power.

4. In this context, Moscow has consistently sought to get at all the elements upon which NATO's viability rests: mutual trust and good faith in the U.S.-West European relationship; the economic viability of individual members of the alliance; cooperative rather than competitive U.S.-West European economic relations; economic and political cooperation within the West-European membership; military strength in being and common commitments to build further strength as needed; uniformity in appraisals of the nature and seriousness of the Soviet threat; and West European acceptance of the U.S. leadership within the alliance.

5. A number of constants have marked Soviet attacks on NATO since its inception.

- o With respect to the Europeans, Moscow has mounted multiple campaigns to convince them that: (a) the U.S. purpose toward Western Europe is to hold it in economic and political thrall; (b) the U.S. nuclear umbrella is undependable; (c) the U.S. wants Europe to bear the brunt of war; (d) Europe cannot be effectively defended under any circumstances and European countries that support the U.S. will be destroyed; (e) there is in reality no Soviet threat to Europe and peaceful relations can be reached and maintained between the Europeans and the Soviets, given a will for this by the Europeans; (f) West Germany revanchism poses an especially dangerous problem for the alliance, both with respect to relations with the USSR and with respect to the security and independence of other members of the alliance.

- o With respect to the U.S., Moscow has made clear that its prime focus is on the U.S. and not NATO as such, and that it sees the U.S. as the main threat to Soviet interests and security. It has contended that: any European war will inevitably escalate into a general nuclear war in which the U.S. will be destroyed; the U.S. cannot achieve military superiority over the USSR or an effective war-fighting capability in or on behalf of Europe; the USSR poses no threat to the U.S. unless it is attacked by the U.S., or by way of an aggression on the part of a European member of NATO (i.e., Germany); the USSR actively seeks peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with the U.S. and its NATO allies, including especially trade relations.

- o In its own domain, the Soviet Union has sought to match steps to strengthen NATO with similar steps for the Warsaw Pact and to achieve military superiority in all respects over the U.S. and its NATO allies.

FOCUS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

6. Despite unbroken manifestations of Soviet hostility toward NATO along the above indicated lines, once that organization was firmly established and operative, and particularly after the issue of German admission to the organization had been settled, Moscow adapted to the new situation with, however, one very important exception. That exception was any step on the Western side that involved or might involve deployment of nuclear weapons on NATO territory and especially any that might reach Soviet territory or that could fall under German control. Each time such a possibility arose, Moscow immediately responded with as forceful a counter campaign as it could mount, short of the one of armed force.

7. The first case in point came in 1957-58 in consequence of a NATO decision to locate tactical nuclear weapons on European territory and, in principle, to deploy intermediate nuclear missiles. The USSR response was to instigate a terror campaign emphasizing not only European but U.S. vulnerability. The campaign took on greatly added scope and weight after the launching of Sputnik, and was marked by a succession of doomsday letters to the heads of each West European government as well as the U.S., with the most violent addressed to the FRG. Khrushchev reinforced the campaign with a succession of violent speeches. Meanwhile, Moscow peppered the West with peace proposals designed to slow down or reverse the NATO decision, various nuclear ban proposals, a TASS announcement on January 6, 1958 that the USSR was reducing its armed forces by 300,000, and a non-use offer to the FRG if it renounced nuclear weapons. In November 1958, Soviet pressures entered a new dimension when Khrushchev touched off the Berlin crisis. In the end, the USSR had to back down and to accept tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. But it did generate rejection by Norway and Denmark of such weapons, and FRG refusal to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles on its territory.

8. The second instance in which Moscow strongly reacted to a projected nuclear threat within the NATO context came with U.S. consideration of a flexible response doctrine as first enunciated by President Kennedy on March 28, 1961. In responding, Moscow evolved lines of attack which it would apply later to the Schlesinger Doctrine and PD-59: that the U.S. was seeking to escape from the binds placed on its ability to use military force by Soviet nuclear capabilities; to increase the utility of NATO military power; and to move to a counterforce, first-use strategy. Unlike later campaigns, Moscow argued that the U.S. sought a higher nuclear threshold in order to reduce nuclear war risks. At the same time, Moscow charged that the U.S. was seeking to condition the Western public to the greater acceptability of war, argued that any war involving the nuclear powers would inevitably escalate, and warned that countries with U.S. bases would be subject to killing retaliatory nuclear strikes by the USSR. While Moscow indicated satisfaction at the implied recognition in the doctrine of the formidable nature of Soviet power, it was disturbed at the prospect of increased U.S. options and uncertainties raised for it regarding the directions of U.S. strategy, especially with respect to McNamara's suggested counterforce approach. Moscow was also evidently concerned about a further buildup of conventional forces available to NATO, despite its existing superiority in that area.

9. A third strong Soviet reaction to a projected nuclear threat came in response to the proposed NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) scheme. Moscow's response centered in the main on propaganda warnings, new disarmament proposals, and charges of

violation of existing agreements. Soviet statements warned that the Warsaw Pact would be "compelled to take the defense measures necessary" if the MLF scheme were implemented. However, the Soviet response was basically low-key, mainly because Moscow was aware of difficulties within the alliance which in the end led to the collapse of the scheme.

PRECURSORS OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN

10. All the foregoing Soviet campaigns took place within the context of U.S. strategic superiority ensuring a reliable nuclear umbrella for the protection of Europe despite Soviet conventional predominance on the continent. By the early seventies, Moscow considered that it was well on the way to a major shift in the strategic balance, and judged that the United States recognized this as a fact in consequence of its acceptance of the SALT I agreements and willingness to agree to abide by the Soviet formulated "principles of peaceful coexistence" in its relations with the Soviet Union. Innumerable Soviet statements declared that these agreements and the peaceful coexistence relationship as a whole constituted acceptance by the United States that the correlation of world forces had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union and against the U.S. Thus, according to the Soviets, the USSR had come to have the means to wreak unacceptable damage on U.S. territory in a nuclear exchange, and the U.S. had consequently come to be estopped in practical terms from bringing to bear military force to resist "progressive" advances at any point they might occur on the globe and despite any resultant damage to its interests.

11. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union remained apprehensive that the United States and its allies would develop both the doctrines and accompanying weapons capabilities that would provide the West with new and more effective means of coping with theater attacks or piecemeal encroachments in critical areas, especially in Europe. In particular, Moscow was concerned that the West might shift from a retaliatory strategy and non-initiation of use of nuclear weapons, which allowed the USSR to base its strategy on either a Soviet preemptive first-strike or on a safe use of its superior conventional forces in localized situations. The West, Moscow feared, might turn to a selective first-use of nuclear weapons and in a context which would fall short of instigation of an all-out nuclear exchange. This would mean, if it happened, that in contrast to the situation Moscow thought it had reached with the development of its strategic power, it could be faced with the burden of making a choice between retreat in local situations and risking national suicide by instigating a nuclear war. This Soviet concern has been reflected in a series of Soviet campaigns first against the Schlesinger options in 1974-75, then against the neutron bomb in 1977-1978 and since 1979 against NATO plans to deploy U.S. medium-range nuclear missile

weapons in Western Europe.

12. It was in this context that the Soviets received and reacted to the so-called Schlesinger options doctrine. These were postulated by the then Secretary of Defense on January 10, 1974 and called for a U.S. strategy based on a limited use of nuclear weapons in less than total war situations, including possible strikes against selected targets on Soviet territory. Schlesinger's statement brought a spate of Soviet discussions. Although the proposal was seen as a direct descendent of U.S. and NATO flexible response doctrines of the sixties, it was taken more seriously because of the important addition regarding possible strikes against Soviet territory. Further it was seen or intended to negate Soviet strategic gains, and to reopen the possibility of a U.S. use of military power as an instrument of policy. Particular points that Soviet spokesmen stressed with respect to the Schlesinger proposition were:

- o that the U.S. was seeking, despite growing Soviet power, to find ways to use U.S. nuclear weapons;
- o that it was seeking thereby to reassure Europe about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella;
- o that it was shifting to a counterforce, first-strike posture;
- o that it was attempting to remove the boundaries between nuclear and conventional warfare;
- o that it was increasing the risks of nuclear war for Europe;
- o that it was seeking to reverse the balance of power, which it had recognized through SALT and the acceptance of the principles of peaceful coexistence;
- o that it was attempting to lower the nuclear threshold and thus make use of nuclear weapons more likely;
- o that it was fostering the idea of U.S. survivability in nuclear war;
- o that it was seeking to establish new rules of the game for the use of nuclear weapons;
- o that it was seeking to achieve a technological breakthrough in order to reestablish U.S. military superiority and to achieve greater freedom of political action for itself.

For their own part, the Soviets harped on such themes as the inevitability of nuclear escalation; Soviet capabilities to achieve effective technological responses; rejection of the notion that the U.S. can deter the Soviet Union from helping national liberation or revolutionary movements.

13. Beginning in July 1977, Moscow inaugurated a much stronger campaign against revelations in the U.S. press that the U.S. was developing an enhanced radiation weapon or the neutron bomb. Soviet agitation quickly reached mammoth proportions and came to involve the total of the Soviet domestic and international propaganda apparatuses. Moscow's extensive efforts appeared not so much to reflect concern about the weapon itself, the utility and limitations of which were well known to the Soviets, but concerns to take full advantage of a very promising opportunity directed beyond the issue of this weapon. The peculiar qualities of the bomb lent themselves to horror propaganda of the most lurid type. Moscow was also alert to the utility that agitation over the bomb would have in getting at its real target of the moment, budding U.S. and NATO plans for modernization of NATO nuclear forces generally. Virtually all the themes enunciated in the anti-Schlesinger campaign reappeared: U.S. hopes to limit a nuclear war; inevitable escalation; U.S. efforts to change the strategic balance; U.S. efforts to enhance the credibility of its doctrines and of the effectiveness of its European nuclear umbrella; the threat to Europe; and the blow to detente. The campaign was most notable, however, for the variety of techniques to which Moscow resorted. It made full use of front organizations, Brezhnev's speeches and letters to world leaders, directly and indirectly related disarmament proposals. The effectiveness of the campaign, which in Moscow's eyes led to President Carter's decision in April 1978 to defer production and deployment of the weapon, led to an obvious Soviet assessment that the USSR could assert strong influence on both vital West European and U.S. security decisions. With this assessment in hand, the USSR next turned its full-scale attention to its campaign against the NATO modernization plans which had come to be a real worry.

THE NATURE AND COURSE OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST NATO NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

14. The Soviet campaign against NATO nuclear modernization first centered on preventing a favorable decision on the proposition by the NATO membership. However, Soviet authorities were strangely slow in picking up the possibility that such a decision was in the offing. Moscow completely ignored FRG Chancellor Schmidt's speech of October 28, 1977 in which he first noted the growing importance of Soviet-NATO imbalances in the light of the Soviet-U.S. strategic standoff and its prospective codification by SALT II. Further, Moscow barely noted the NATO Council decisions of May 1978 on the

long-term strengthening of NATO which generated the discussions that later led to the decision on medium-range nuclear missiles.

15. It was only with the emergence of the Pershing issue in the Bundestag debate from January 1979 onward that Moscow first took note that something important was pending, and readied itself for a concerted preventive campaign. Kosygin on March 1 hinted at economic sanctions if new nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe, while Brezhnev on the following day offered to negotiate on the issue of "medium-range weapons in Europe" and for the first time broached the subject of U.S. forward-based systems. In May, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers proposed an all-European conference on military detente.

16. In the last two months before the NATO Council meeting of December 1979, Moscow mounted a last-ditch effort to forestall a NATO decision for new weapons. Brezhnev, speaking in Berlin on October 6, denied that the USSR had increased its medium-range nuclear forces "by a single missile" and offered to withdraw Soviet missiles in Europe if no medium-range missiles were deployed by NATO in Europe. Brezhnev also trotted out a long-standing Soviet proposal that the USSR would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against any country which renounced production or acquisition of such weapons. Brezhnev also warned that in case NATO plans were put into effect "we would have in such a case to take the necessary extra step to strengthen our security." These additional steps soon followed:

- o To back up the campaign, Brezhnev sent formal letters to NATO members and Soviet propagandists fanned out in Western Europe to argue the Soviet case.
- o Despite some vague signals from Brezhnev to the contrary, Gromyko at a press conference rejected the possibility of talks or negotiations if the NATO Council adopted a decision approving deployment of new weapons. Gromyko also rejected SALT III as a forum on the ground that this might take 7-8 years and proposed immediate negotiation outside the SALT framework, but subject to the condition that any such talks should precede a NATO decision.

17. Once the NATO decision was made, Moscow ignored Gromyko's earlier warnings, and shifted the target of Soviet efforts to prevention of implementation of the decision rather than the decision itself. As with repeated back-offs by the Soviet Union from threatening positions it had taken in the past in opposition to prospective actions by NATO, this turn of events suggested that Moscow was not inclined to bring the nuclear modernization to the

point of a showdown. This, it might be noted, has been an oft-repeated phenomenon with Moscow. A recent case in point was Moscow's ignoring of previous threats against Japan about inclusion of an anti-hegemonism clause in a treaty with China. In any event, the Soviet reversal of its position on the NATO decision suggested limits to Soviet willingness to carry out threats when confronted by firm defense of its interests by the West. Moscow's comparative mildness in this case may have stemmed, however, from a realization that it had at least three years in which to maneuver to induce NATO not to deploy the weapons.

18. For the next six months, Moscow put the negotiations issue on hold, especially as a result of its preoccupation with the invasion of Afghanistan which was unleashed shortly after the NATO decision. In mid-1980, however, Moscow moved the NATO modernization to the top of its international agenda. During a visit at that time of FRG Chancellor Schmidt to Moscow, Brezhnev proposed that bilateral talks be held between the U.S. and USSR which would cover Euromissiles, together with U.S. forward-based systems, but with the understanding that any agreement reached would come into force only after U.S. ratification of SALT II. And apparently as a follow up of this, inconclusive talks between U.S. and Soviet representatives did in fact take place in Geneva between October 17 and November 17, 1980.

19. With the advent of the Reagan Administration, the Soviet campaign went into high gear with the focus overwhelmingly on attempts to influence European opinion.

- o At the Soviet Party Congress in February 1981, Brezhnev proposed an immediate freeze on existing medium-range weapons pending further negotiations.
- o When the FRG and then NATO at a Rome meeting in May rejected the moratorium proposal, Brezhnev responded in Tbilisi with the threat that "if necessary, we shall find impressive means to safeguard our vital interests."

20. There then followed a shift toward more forceful tactics aimed especially at the FRG. In connection with wartime anniversary commemorations, the theme of German revanchism was revived. At the Supreme Soviet in June, Brezhnev appealed to "parliaments and peoples" to pressure the West to negotiate on nuclear arms. To introduce notes of hysteria into the anti-nuclear debate, leading Soviet spokesmen began to place unprecedented stress on the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, individual offers of one kind or another to bar nuclear weapons were made to Greece, Scandinavia, and Italy.

21. Soviet efforts were spurred toward the end of 1981 by the rise of a significant anti-nuclear movement in Europe and to a lesser extent in the U.S., the start in November of U.S.-USSR INF talks in Geneva, and the need to counter President Reagan's offer on November 18 of a zero option solution to the question. Clearly in response to these developments, Brezhnev modified his moratorium proposal first during his visit to Bonn in November 1981, next in February 1982, and finally in a speech on March 16 when he proclaimed a unilateral freeze on Soviet deployment until an agreement was reached or the U.S. began deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles. On the last occasion, the Soviet leader also voiced a new threat: that if NATO deployed the new weapons, the USSR would "take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position."

22. To generate new and wider support for its position and to further undermine the U.S. position in Europe, Moscow mounted a massive, and in many ways, unique campaign by disseminating three documents between November 1981 and January 1982 for external consumption: a pamphlet, The Threat to Europe, cast as a reply to questions in Europe about the issues involved in the Euromissile situation; a New Times Supplement entitled The Arms Race: The Danger, the Burden, the Alternative; and Whence the Threat to Peace, a slick Ministry of Defense publication explicitly billed as a reply to the Pentagon publication, Soviet Military Power, which had been released in September. Also, Moscow began to weave in Administration decisions in August 1981 on neutron bomb production and in February 1982 on upgrading of U.S. chemical weapons capabilities into the Soviet effort against NATO modernization.

SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

23. It is clear from Moscow's writings as well as from its diplomatic and agitational efforts that it considers the prospects of deployment of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe with the utmost seriousness. Soviet spokesmen emphasize over and over again that implementation of the NATO decision will change the military balance both with respect to the central U.S.-USSR equation and with respect to Europe. Although for propaganda purposes Moscow claims that current Western missiles in Europe already threaten the USSR, there is equally heavy emphasis that the Euromissiles will represent something new for the USSR. In terms of numbers, however, it is not the currently projected U.S. weapons which concern the Soviets, but the prospect that these will constitute the opening wedge for deployment of hundreds more, especially of cruise missiles.

24. Taken together with the announcement in August 1980 of Presidential Directive (PD) 59, Soviet concerns, as noted by Ustinov and numerous other Soviet spokesmen, are intertwined with even broader concerns that the nuclear modernization move involves a significant change in U.S. strategic doctrine aimed at broadening the options available to the United States. Among other things;

- o Soviet analysts have stepped-up charges that the U.S. is shifting to a first-use counterforce strategy and that implementation of the NATO decision would constitute an important practical step toward this end.
- o As during its critique of the Schlesinger option and its campaigns against the neutron bomb, Moscow emphasizes that NATO deployments will lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons.
- o Soviet analysts argue further that not only is the U.S. seeking to make nuclear war thinkable but evolving the doctrine and weaponry designed to make it winnable. The basic Soviet contention is that U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe are intended to give the U.S. the capability for a first counterforce strike which would destroy the Soviet ability to reply against the United States and thereby undermine the Soviet deterrent.
- o General Semeiko sees the new move as going beyond the Schlesinger option in calling for attacks against a larger number of Soviet targets, envisaging protracted nuclear war and looking toward a first disarming strike.
- o Soviet spokesmen also have evolved the concept that the U.S. is preparing a "double strike" against the Soviet Union which Semeiko in one article characterized as "fundamentally new." In his Armed Forces' Day Pravda article on February 21, 1981, Defense Minister Ustinov declared that "the Pentagon is counting on nuclear weapons for attaining U.S. global strategic goals by delivering preemptive nuclear missile strikes against the Warsaw Pact countries."

25. In all the material covered, only one commentary discussed the question of whether the planned number of weapons deployed by NATO fits a first-strike scenario. This commentator, a civilian specialist on German affairs, suggested a scenario in which the Pershings hit enough targets "including anti-missile systems" to enable the slower but "absolutely invulnerable" cruise

to finish off the work. This last point ties in with a growing body of evidence that suggests that the cruise missile issue is rising to the forefront of Soviet concerns. Until 1982 the main thrust of the Soviet concern on NATO modernization was confined to the Pershing II rather than the cruise missile issue. Hitherto Moscow may have considered that the cruise missile problem was taken care of by the SALT II protocol (despite lack of U.S. ratification of the SALT II Treaty). However, the lapse of that protocol in December 1981 and the Reagan Administration's plans for greatly expanded production and deployment of cruise missiles have generated a strong new Soviet outburst on this issue.

THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION

26. As the continuing fulcrum of world power, Europe constitutes a major focus of Soviet military and political strategy and the USSR has consistently sought to acquire and maintain overwhelming military supremacy on the continent. The deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles is seen by Moscow as a move which, in Brezhnev's words on October 6, 1979, "would change essentially the strategic situation on the continent." The combination of NATO deployments and the new U.S. doctrine as set forth in PD-59 is seen as "primarily intended to guarantee so-called escalation domination," or, as explained by one Soviet spokesman, as aimed at the "attaining of a marked superiority along the entire spectrum of nuclear arms, beginning with medium-range missiles in Europe up to MX intercontinental missiles, Trident, strategic cruise missiles."

27. Moscow is acutely aware that the issue of NATO modernization is a vital component of the entire relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe, particularly of the credibility of the the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Soviet writings on U.S. military doctrines from massive retaliation to flexible response to the Schlesinger option and finally NATO nuclear modernization see these as continuing efforts on the part of the U.S. to come to grips with the consequences of Soviet strategic weapons development in order to preserve the credibility of nuclear power especially for the defense of Europe. In this connection, Soviet commentators repeatedly noted the statement by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Brussels in 1980 suggesting that in view of U.S.-USSR strategic parity, U.S. European allies would not be able to expect protection from U.S. central systems, "the use of which would make America the target of a retaliatory strike." The NATO nuclear modernization decision, a Soviet spokesman has explained, was designed to provide "the missing rung in the 'ladder of armed conflict escalation,' a rung which was supposedly essential to the North Atlantic bloc as a result of progress in the strategic arms limitation talks and the modernization of Soviet medium-range nuclear missile systems."

SOVIET COUNTERMOVES

28. Soviet discussions suggest that three stages lie ahead in the Soviet campaign against NATO modernization plans.

- o First, between the present and 1983, that is, the period before implementation of the December 1979 decision during which the whole thrust of the Soviet effort will be to induce NATO members to renege on the decision.
- o The initial period following deployment when Moscow will face the problem of countermeasures, including possible measures to limit the extent and pace of actual NATO deployments.
- o The period to the end of the decade when the U.S., if able or allowed to proceed with its plans, will have developed weaponry commensurate with the actual requirements of flexible response, limited nuclear option, PD-59, and counterforce doctrines.

29. Moscow sees significant differences between the U.S. and Europe continuing throughout the period before deployment which will give Moscow leverage to work on the Europeans.

- o In particular, Moscow pins great hopes on anti-nuclear movements not only in Europe but in the United States to thwart U.S. and NATO plans. After periods of doubt in mid-summer and after President Reagan presented his zero option in November, the Soviets indicated an intent to go into high gear to supply ammunition to the anti-nuclear movement in order to exert pressure either against deployment or for agreement on Soviet positions on disarmament issues or both.
- o In the last few months of 1981, the Soviet media also increasingly called attention to a growing "peace movement" in the United States itself. Obviously with the Vietnam experience in mind, Moscow is hopeful that this movement will have a significant impact on U.S. nuclear policies at home and in Europe.

"PEACE" MOVES

30. In time-honored fashion, Moscow can be expected to use both carrot and stick to affect Western public opinion and policies. At the pacific end of the spectrum:

- o Moscow will continue to seek to assure the Europeans that Soviet weaponry represents no threat and that, in any case, the USSR as shown by its moratorium proposals, is not being excessive in its deployments. Brezhnev's March 16 declaration of a unilateral moratorium and possibility of unilateral reductions marks the ultimate in Soviet use of this tactic.
- o In addition to negotiations with the U.S., the USSR considers that it has other negotiation options: non-use offers to European countries which renounce nuclear weapons, nuclear free zones and the possible modification of its confidence building proposal in the Helsinki agreement context so as to enable the convocation of a European disarmament conference.

31. However, the main focus of Soviet efforts will be devoted to efforts to manipulate the intermediate nuclear force (INF) talks in Geneva. Moscow sees little incentive for the U.S. to negotiate on Euromissiles except the desire to mollify its European allies. Accordingly, Moscow before agreement on the talks and throughout the first months of 1982 cast doubts on U.S. sincerity and charged that the U.S. was adhering to the "absurd" zero option proposal in order "to gain time to deploy new nuclear missile devices in the countries of West Europe." On the basis of current Soviet positions, breakthroughs do not appear likely. Indeed, every aspect of the Soviet negotiating stance as set forth by an authoritative TASS statement on February 9, 1982 indicates that considerable difficulties lie ahead. Basic differences remain on such elementary matters as numbers, areas to be covered, the meaning and framework of modernization destruction versus withdrawal, verification procedures.

32. Within these parameters, however, there remains considerable room for Soviet maneuvering which will enable the USSR to argue that for NATO to go ahead with implementation of the December 1979 decision would jeopardize a real chance for a significant disarmament agreement or that the U.S. is renegeing on the NATO decision to negotiate "seriously" thereby opening the way for the Europeans to renege on deployment.

- o It is conceivable at some point, for example, that Soviet negotiators might agree that the West could deploy Pershing II or land-based cruise missiles in Europe but with conditions likely to be unacceptable to the U.S. but acceptable to the Europeans, such as small strictly defined limits and probably accompanying bans on sea-based cruise missiles, as already proposed by Brezhnev on March 16, 1982, and rigid counting of aircraft bearing cruise missiles against strategic totals allowable for the U.S.
- o Conceivably, the Soviets might reach or come close to an acceptable agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles, but make its finalization or coming into force conditional on U.S. ratification of SALT II as written. (The Soviet position remains unchanged that a Euromissile agreement can come into effect only after a SALT agreement is reached.) Such a development could and doubtless would generate great difficulties between the U.S. and its allies, probably to a point of a scuttling of the December 1979 decision.
- o Another possibility for Soviet maneuvering to create difficulties between the U.S. and its allies relates to the new strategic arms talks. Since SALT or START negotiations will presumably be under way before deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe, Moscow can be expected to argue that deployment might jeopardize these negotiations. As argued by the pamphlet The Threat to Europe, "the Soviet Union is being put in a position where it would have to agree to quantity ceilings of what are in effect American strategic weapons before it has any idea of what the United States intends to do with the other components of its strategic arsenal."
- o In any case, Moscow foresees INF talks of long duration which will certainly not be concluded before U.S. missiles are scheduled to be deployed in Europe. It would seem virtually certain that Moscow will seek to induce the West Europeans to insist upon waiting "a little longer" for results.

POST-DEPLOYMENT MEASURES

33. Should, despite all Soviet pressures, the FRG and Italy and possibly other NATO countries begin deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles, Moscow will face the problem of whether to live with a fait accompli or to make good on at least some of the

threats it has made vis-a-vis Europe and the United States, both directly and in third areas. If past experiences can be taken as a guide, it would appear reasonably certain that the Soviet leadership will bow to the will of fate and get back as best it can to business as usual. But, everything considered, it would seem highly unlikely that the Kremlin will perform as in the past. For one thing, the USSR now has the power to risk actions that previously were closed to it. For another, the stakes as the Soviets evidently see them are too great to permit a significant change to take place, or at least to begin, in the power situation in Europe without compensatory Soviet countergains. Thirdly, the Soviets may well see a U.S. success in NATO nuclear modernization as a potential watershed turn in the world power situation. Indeed, available evidence indicates that this is precisely the Soviet view. Elementary prudence would seem, therefore, to require that the U.S. be prepared for serious Soviet responses to the actual implementation of the NATO decision. At the least, the USSR can be expected to:

- o Announce an end to its unilateral moratorium on deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the western part of the Soviet Union. It will most likely make clear that it is taking all "necessary measures" to make sure that the U.S. and NATO gain no military advantages over the USSR, including a steady increase in Soviet missiles targeted against Europe.
- o Step up its reminders to the West Europeans about the danger to which they are subjecting themselves by implementing the NATO decision. Even more will be heard about the possibility of European destruction for U.S. purposes. In this connection The Threat to Europe added a new dimension to Soviet warnings to Europe that deployment will make Western Europe a hostage to U.S. actions in third areas.
- o Step up, in light of the shortened time and distances of nuclear strikes from Western Europe, its threats and preparations for a possible preemption. A Kommunist article in April 1981 specifically attributed to American experts the thought that "the growing vulnerability of major elements of strategic forces will increase the probability of their preemptive use in fear of losing these forces, as a result of a strike by the other side."

34. Such measures as these would be strictly minimal, indeed essentially symbolic, and would seem most unlikely to meet the requirements Moscow would deem necessary to safeguard its security

needs in the new situation. Much more in the way of Soviet retaliatory, or better compensatory action can consequently be anticipated.

35. Assuming full-hearted participation of the FRG in the deployment exercise (i.e., active fulfillment of its presently assigned role rather than a token, face-saving role) it seems likely on the basis of present evidence that Moscow would precipitate a new Berlin crisis with the aim of carrying it through to a point of a definitive change in the status of West Berlin. Moscow has already warned that deployment of U.S. missiles might lead to renewed Soviet-East German pressures in West Berlin. Pravda on September 3 linked the situation in Berlin with overall European affairs and a few days later the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany made the linkage explicit that implementation of the NATO decision would make impossible continued functioning of the 1971 agreements on Berlin.

36. Beyond this are good possibilities that Moscow would resort to economic sanctions against the FRG. Soviet spokesmen have directly or indirectly frequently suggested that implementation of the NATO decision would jeopardize economic relations between the USSR and any country that accepted U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles, particularly the FRG. Moscow has consistently combined discussions with Bonn on Euromissiles with talks on economic relations with the obvious intention to create vested interests in the FRG against the NATO decision. Because of its own interests in present relations, the focus on Soviet action in this regard might be to place limits on future deals rather than a cutoff in present ones, but with Soviet pressures adaptable to the actual status of current deals as well. It might well be, in fact, that the Soviets would see advantage to themselves in a cutoff operation. For one thing is the possibility of a Soviet repudiation of its debt to the FRG and other Western countries and Soviet encouragement of similar action by other East European countries. (This assumes, as present evidence strongly suggests, that debt payments by the USSR are becoming increasingly difficult to meet.) Also, by the time deployment of U.S. missiles would be carried to a point of no return, the FRG should have largely given such support as it presently plans to make to the construction of the Siberian-European pipeline, and Moscow might feel that the USSR would be well served if it could escape from its commitments to the FRG in this and other instances.

- o Meanwhile, the USSR has another potent pressure point with respect to the FRG in the form of its ability to manipulate East-West German relations. In this connection, East German leader Honecker on December 12 and 16, 1981 directly warned Bonn that implementation of the NATO missile decision would adversely affect ties between the two Germanies.

- o Finally, it is likely that Moscow will revive the German revanchism theme which has been generally muted as long as the Germans seemed receptive to Soviet blandishments. An indication of how quickly and irresponsibly this could be brought about is provided by the June 1981 play on the theme in Soviet commentaries on the anniversary of the 1941 invasion. The Soviets will seek to generate uneasiness in the FRG, revive fears of Germany among other members of NATO, and develop the rationale for tightened discipline in the Soviet bloc and in the USSR itself.

37. With respect to the U.S., Moscow has consistently emphasized that the Euromissiles issue concerns not only the European theater balance but the central strategic balance, and has assiduously sought to convey the threat that implementation of the NATO decision will increase the danger to the U.S. itself. With respect to posturing, the USSR will certainly continue to emphasize the theme of inevitable escalation and to do its best to demonstrate that the U.S. cannot expect to remain unscathed in case of a European war that involved any use of U.S. missiles deployed in Europe. This does not mean that the USSR might not be prepared to conduct limited nuclear operations itself. It is highly suggestive that the Soviets have a well-developed concept of theater war. However, the requirements of keeping the U.S. and its NATO allies under maximum pressures make it likely that Moscow will continue to adhere to a declaratory policy of inevitable escalation.

38. The main threat for the U.S. is a countermove by the USSR to place equivalent Soviet missiles in the immediate vicinity of the U.S. Brezhnev was as specific and as categorical as he could possibly be in his statement of March 16, 1982 to the effect that deployment of U.S. weapons "would compel us to take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position." The most obvious possibility is the reintroduction of Soviet medium-range missiles into Cuba. Soviet spokesmen have hinted for some time that the USSR is giving serious consideration to such a move. Several have emphasized an alleged link in the 1962 agreement ending the Cuban missile crisis between Soviet missiles in Cuba and U.S. missiles in Europe, with the clear purpose of suggesting the latter would justify change for the former. Since Brezhnev's March 16 speech, however, Soviet commentaries have avoided specifics, leaving it to Westerners to draw their own conclusion as to what Brezhnev has in mind. However, Soviet commentators have made no attempt to quiet the very extensive speculation in the Western press that the threat aimed at retaliatory Soviet missiles in Cuba.

It should be noted that prior to Brezhnev's speech, a high-level Soviet Central Committee spokesman replied in answer to a question about the possibility of a new Soviet missile for Cuba effort, that there were other means of placing Soviet missiles near the U.S. He refused to reply to speculative possibilities such as ships or submarines, saying only that present technology opens many possibilities. One such possibility that has so far not been emphasized is the basing of a profusion of Backfire bombers in Cuba, and at airfields now being constructed in Grenada and Nicaragua. In any event the specificity of Brezhnev's threat, together with the serious consequences that Moscow evidently believes would flow from an unanswared deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe, makes highly probable that Moscow means what it says and that some sort of action along the indicated lines will be taken.

- o The most likely possibility would seem to be missiles in Cuba, since that would constitute the most clearly "analogous" move that the USSR could take to fulfill Brezhnev's threat, and would also bring important strategic benefits to the USSR.
- o However, the other possibilities can not be ruled out. Indeed, there would appear a good chance that Moscow would take these as well as base missiles in Cuba.
- o Meanwhile, the Soviets would almost certainly attempt to equate the European development with a freeing of the hands of the USSR (plus Cuba) in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. (This sort of ultimate equation was clearly foreshadowed in the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchanges in Vienna in June 1961.)
- o Here it seems important to allow that the USSR intends to attain from the Euromissiles contest a net advantage for the USSR however it turns out. It is eminently possible that Moscow would calculate that placing the U.S. directly under nearby nuclear guns would be an excellent trade-off from their standpoint for a relatively few added weapons in Europe directed against the USSR.

39. Soviet linkage of Europe and Cuba suggests the broader possibility that the USSR may include among its counters to Western action in Europe new Soviet actions and policies for the Third World. Soviet propaganda has warned that deployment of U.S. missiles will cause the deterioration of international relations across the board. Charges of increased Western aggressiveness would be used as the pretext for Soviet actions in Third World weak spots. The Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 may thus have

been motivated in part as a response to the NATO decision on Euro-missiles one month earlier. The most logical possibility for such moves would be the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean area generally. The point that Moscow would be expected to especially emphasize is that the U.S. was forcing a new "base race" and that the USSR had to respond to threats of a "new encirclement." Northern Africa, with Libya at the center would be another logical possibility.

LONGER-TERM PERSPECTIVES

40. In the Soviet view, the danger that would be posed to the USSR by the implementation of the NATO decision would not be the immediate effects on the military balance but the longer-term end results going beyond current plans and in combination with all other U.S. armament objectives.

41. As indicated by one prominent Soviet analyst on military affairs in late 1980, the Soviet Union sees the main threat to its position coming in the second half of the eighties. This estimate points in two directions about possible Soviet approaches in the military-security area.

- o It suggests that the USSR feels it has a certain amount of leeway before the situation becomes really serious for the USSR. During that period, the USSR presumably will be able to take the necessary military measures and have at its disposal a variety of diplomatic and political potentialities to counter or limit U.S. and NATO moves.
- o This in its turn suggests that the USSR perceives that its most forceful actions must come during the next few years while the USSR still enjoys decided advantages in strategic and conventional power.

42. Soviet adjustments to all previous major NATO developments came in the context of an overall military balance favorable to the West, while the current Soviet response will come against the background of decided advantages of the USSR in Soviet strategic power, both absolutely and relatively, which Moscow may feel impelled to exploit.

43. In this connection, Soviet military writings over the past year indicate that U.S. military developments, including the possible implementation of the NATO decision, have resulted in a Soviet decision on an across-the-board step up in its war-fighting, war-winning capabilities. While reasons for this decision are not confined to implementation of NATO programs, this emphasis reflects planning for a long time ahead to enable the Soviet Armed Forces to be ready for any contingency that may arise and for any drastic actions that may be deemed necessary.

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO decided on December 12, 1979, "after two years of intensive consultations," to proceed with a plan to modernize NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces. The operational element of the NATO decision was to deploy in Europe "U.S. ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing-II launchers, which would replace existing U.S. Pershing-IA and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles." Paralleling and complementing the deployment of the new nuclear weapons would be the "vigorous pursuit" with the Soviets of a "meaningful and equitable arms control agreement on long-range theater nuclear weapons." However, according to repeated authoritative Western statements, NATO would "not entertain any notion of a freeze" in the deployment of the new weapons systems pending acceptable negotiation results.

Immediate concerns emphasized by NATO in reaching the decision centered on Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles targeted at Western Europe and offering "significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, greater range, and multiple warheads." But also noted were:

- o The Backfire bomber, "which has much better performance than other aircraft deployed hitherto in a theater role."
- o Soviet "modernization and expansion of their shorter-range theater nuclear forces" and great improvements in "the overall quality of their conventional forces."
- o The fact that continuation of these developments would mean that "Soviet superiority in nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in intercontinental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy."

For some time before this decision was reached, that is during the two-year period of preliminary discussion in NATO's ranks, Moscow had engaged in a mounting diplomatic-propaganda campaign to prevent its being taken. Indeed, Moscow had gone so far as to indicate that such a decision would in itself be intolerable to the USSR and would occasion immediate and severe countermeasures. Yet, when NATO went ahead at its December 1979 meeting, Moscow threw on the trash pile its past exhortations and threats and shifted its attention to efforts to prevent implementation of the decision.

The fact that the USSR in effect accepted the adverse December 1979 action of NATO once it was taken and refrained from doing any of the things it had threatened to do, was reminiscent of

USSR conduct on many occasions in the past when it had bitterly opposed a projected NATO move and had talked vehemently of the dire consequences that would follow its consummation as, for example, the admission of West Germany to the NATO alliance, and then had simply dropped the whole matter when the move had become a fait accompli. One might in consequence assume that the same sequence will occur with regard to implementation of the NATO decision: The Soviets will make great noises, attempt all sorts of pressures, resort to a variety of threats, and perhaps even take some concrete ominous-seeming actions, and then pull back if and when the U.S. and its NATO allies go ahead with deployment of the Pershing-II and cruise missiles on European territory.

It may indeed be that such will be the actual scenario that will be acted out for the Euromissile drama. After all, the USSR has little to worry about in terms of the numbers and kind of U.S. missiles that are slated for deployment. The effect would hardly be any significant alteration of the military balance for Europe. Already the USSR has put in place enough SS-20s to more than offset the U.S. missiles now projected, and it can and almost certainly will keep ahead of the U.S. in any future numbers race.

Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that the Soviet leadership views with utmost seriousness the prospective deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe. The factors involved from the Soviet standpoint have already been clearly indicated. For one thing, the USSR would be faced with something it has avoided since 1962, the risk of nuclear strikes against its own territory from Europe in case of a regional conflict in that area. To be sure, Moscow insists that nuclear exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR would be an automatic result of the outbreak of a war in Europe, leaving of little consequence any use of medium-range weapons. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that Moscow wants to keep its options open. Moreover, there is the fact that although the USSR could wreak nuclear havoc on Europe, should it be necessary, the Soviet Union itself would still face the possibility of great destruction from counter strikes of long-range theater weapons deployed on European territory. Then there are other considerations: a calculation that the numbers and kinds of U.S. missiles now designated would be but the beginning of more and better of the same; the danger that an ultimate outcome of missiles on West German territory would be German possession and control of such weapons; increased possibilities of an accidental precipitation of a nuclear conflict; and so on.

Perhaps of even greater moment is that Moscow already makes clear that it sees the Euromissile enterprise as a centerpiece for an overall resurgence of U.S. military power, and a resurgence that will increasingly face the USSR with the kind of arms competition that it least wants and can least hope to win, that is, one that

that will center on high technology. Moscow may well see--in fact has already suggested that it does see--frustration of the NATO plan as a means of fouling up the whole of the armaments program of the Reagan Administration. In this connection, implementation of the NATO decision would, in the Soviet view, constitute one more stage in the long series begun in the early postwar period tying the U.S. and Western Europe together in a common enterprise to meet the challenge of Soviet expansion. Strengthened U.S.-European military interdependence is, in other words, seen by Moscow as important not alone for Soviet policies and interests with respect to the countries of Western Europe, individually or collectively, but also, and even more so, for the global struggle underway between the USSR and the U.S.

On the positive side for the Soviets is the possibility of dealing a severe blow, perhaps a near fatal blow, to the relationship of the U.S. with its NATO allies through inducing or intimidating the latter to renege on the 1979 decision. Moscow shows acute awareness of prospects in this particular. Further, Moscow sees great dividends to be gained through utilizing the U.S. deployment issue to further excite and exploit to Soviet benefit the massive anti-nuclear movement sweeping across Europe and rapidly budding in the United States.

As a cap-off of everything else, as it were, is that the Kremlin evidently views the USSR as approaching the pinnacle of the world preeminence to which it has long aspired, but at the same time senses the possibility of a turnabout through a revitalization of U.S. power beginning with a successful modernization of NATO nuclear capabilities. When Reagan assumed office, the Soviets generally appeared to expect that, despite campaign oratory to the contrary, the new U.S. President would have no choice but to adjust, as his predecessors had had to adjust, to the harsh realities of an adverse world power balance. Within weeks, however, doubts within Soviet ranks became evident. More and more Soviet spokesmen began to show a suspicion that Reagan and his stated policies were for real. While many factors obviously entered into the Soviet appraisal, Moscow appears to have singled out NATO nuclear modernization as key both to Reagan's resolve and to his abilities to carry through with that resolve.

In any event, Moscow has come to place extraordinary emphasis on the NATO program. It has come to center its foreign and security policy pronouncements and activities almost exclusively around the issues involved. Not since the heyday of the anti-Marshall Plan campaign of the late forties has a single subject so dominated statements and pronouncements of the top leadership, beginning with Brezhnev on literally dozens of occasions. For the military, the modernization issue serves not only as the prime

target of their direct concerns but as the point of departure for a sobering, if not alarming, concentration at every possible opportunity on war danger themes and consequent needs of the USSR for a new order of war preparedness and greatly expanded military capabilities, as well as for new doctrines better fitted to the rapidly changing situation resulting from scientific and technological innovations in the military field. Thus a truly impressive succession of commentaries by such luminaries of the Soviet military establishment as Minister of Defense Ustinov, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ojarkov, Chief of the Political Administration Yepishev, head of the Soviet Navy Gorshkov, and countless others have summoned both the armed forces and the Soviet people generally to ready and steel themselves to deal with the same sorts of ordeals they faced with the German attack in 1941.

And hardly less impressive has been the marshaling of the total of the vast resources the Soviet Union now commands to spread its message, and effect its deceptions, regarding the new nuclear threat among opinion leaders around the world, but primarily in Western Europe. Leading lights from some dozens of institutes have been mobilized to literally swamp with Soviet views their seemingly endless foreign contacts, and to seize upon the openings offered them by Western TV producers, newspaper editors, columnists, public figures, and university professors, all with more influence than sense, and to grind out in vast numbers pamphlets, commentaries, articles in professional and military journals, and so on, stating and restating Moscow's arguments regarding the dangers the U.S. is generating for peace and even life in Europe while seeking to maintain for itself the same sort of safe haven that it enjoyed during the past two wars. And once more Moscow is organizing and manipulating to its service the net of domestic and foreign propaganda apparatuses commanded by the USSR, including foreign communist parties, front organizations, and ever growing and spreading "champions of peace" movements throughout the Western world.

Themes and techniques are strictly standard. Endlessly repeated are assertions that United States policies and purposes aim only at war, while Soviet aim only at peace. Intermixed are promises of a variety of economic and political pressures as well as direct military threats backed by postures and atmospherics to give them credibility. But also intermixed are conciliatory gestures and negotiating proposals designed to generate expectation that the USSR will in fact go along with a system of true equal security and military stability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and with that to undercut the concerns that led to NATO's December decision with the obvious purpose of inducing either critical defections from that decision or delays in the adoption of necessary follow-up actions.

Viewed against the background of a careful examination and analysis of past Soviet responses to NATO initiatives, there appears to be nothing new in Moscow's current arguments and maneuverings against NATO nuclear modernization. In terms of historical perspectives all that is now being said and done has been repeatedly said and done before. Current pronouncements differ not a whit in substantive content from pronouncements that extend back to the late forties. Indeed, in many key instances current texts represent reissues of past texts with changes limited to those necessary for updating. Thus, for example, one can hardly distinguish between the commentaries of today regarding LTNF and those that poured forth against the Schlesinger Options during the mid-seventies, the Flexible Response Doctrine during the early sixties, and decisions of the late fifties regarding adding nuclear weapons to the NATO arsenal.

There are, however, many suggestions of important differences between the present campaign and those of the past, differences that arise from the altered strategic situation that now exists. These might well be summed up in terms of tones of added confidence and purposefulness with which old arguments are repeated and standardized threats are voiced. It consequently is of utmost importance that the ongoing campaign be examined and weighed in and of itself, and with full allowance for the fact that an entirely new situation may exist insofar as Soviet purposes and intentions are concerned. The crucial problem that must be faced up to is that Soviet capabilities are now of an entirely different order than in the past, and that this can have the effect of transforming what amounted to gamemanship in earlier days to harsh realities in the future.

In keeping with this, the main focus of this paper is not on historical precedents--although these have been thoroughly examined--but on the dynamics of present Soviet policies and positions relative to ongoing NATO nuclear modernization plans as evidenced by:

- (1) Present Soviet attitudes toward the basic issue of a U.S. military presence in Europe;
- (2) Soviet policies and actions in response to prospective new developments in NATO doctrines and capabilities;
- (3) Variants in current Soviet views of Western perceptions of a "Soviet threat" to Western Europe, as against past Soviet views;
- (4) Present Soviet doctrine as distinct from propaganda regarding its military posture and purposes for Western Europe;

(5) Specific differences between the present Soviet campaign to frustrate efforts to improve NATO nuclear capabilities and past campaigns, with particular reference in the latter case to campaigns against the Schlesinger options and the neutron bomb;

(6) Soviet pronouncements and other Soviet materials bearing directly on implementation of the December 1979 nuclear weapons modernization decision;

(7) Materials relating on the likelihood of Soviet use of economic leverage and military threats and maneuvers to combat implementation;

(8) Direct and indirect evidences bearing on the question of likely Soviet courses of action in case U.S. missiles are actually deployed under terms of the 1979 decision.

II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. POINT OF DEPARTURE

Throughout the postwar period the Soviet Union has adamantly opposed and persistently fought any involvement of the U.S. in Europe--political, economic, and, above all, military.

This Soviet policy line was firmly established before the formation of NATO. In its initial manifestations, its dynamics were predominantly anticipatory and preventive rather than responsive or reactive. As, however, the U.S. and the West European countries have responded with a succession of collective actions on their own part to protect their interests against Soviet moves, Moscow has increasingly concentrated on countermeasures aimed at frustrating Western initiatives. In this, it has employed the range of means and techniques available to it, short only of armed action. It has combined pressures of every description with blandishments, but never with concessions involving any genuine compromise of its basic positions and objectives.

Nevertheless, until the present the Soviets have ended up reconciling themselves to such of the initiatives as the Western powers have insisted on carrying through. In several instances the Western powers have departed from a projected program for reasons relating to practical difficulties or a difference among themselves, but not in consequence of Soviet opposition. In such cases, which have been relatively rare, Moscow has indicated great satisfaction and has assumed for itself a large measure of the credit. But in the infinitely greater number of cases where the Western powers have adhered to their purposes, Moscow has at a given moment turned off its opposition activities and simply acted as if it all had never really happened.

Successive Soviet leaderships since the war--Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev--have been remarkably uniform in their approach to U.S.-West European ties and in the commonality of their strategy and tactics to deal with them.

Moreover, the successive leaderships have consistently adhered to and pursued their hostility to these ties despite fluctuations in the overall relationship between the USSR and the United States. Indeed, periodic Soviet moves toward a relaxation of tensions in relations with the U.S., or generally, as well as moves toward intensified hostility, have invariably been so designed and executed as to either (1) diminish existing U.S. ties with Europe, (2) prevent the forging of new ties, or (3) offset the effectiveness of new ties in the process of being consummated.

While the actuality and nature of Soviet opposition to U.S. involvement with Western Europe is uniformly accepted by students of postwar international affairs, great controversy exists as to the motivations and objectives of that hostility.

Many students place primary emphasis on the abiding concern of the Soviet leadership to safeguard the security of the Russian homeland. This concern, it is said, derives from the succession of invasions that Russia has had to endure over the centuries and, has been especially compounded by the unprovoked and devastating attack by Nazi Germany during the second world war.

The extreme version of this view is that Moscow preferred and actively sought to achieve its security aims through maintaining and extending wartime cooperative arrangements with the U.S. and its allies, and abandoned policies to this end only after the U.S. had begun to face it with increasingly dangerous challenges. This extreme is now generally identified with the "revisionist" school that emerged so strongly in the sixties. In fact, however, it was heavily manifest during the opening days of the cold war, reaching a climax in the intellectual rationale surrounding Henry Wallace's campaign for the U.S. presidency in 1948.

The more respectable and more pervasive version of the security view has been encompassed in the concept, which has been most succinctly stated by Thomas Wolfe, that the Soviets interpreted "the postwar diplomacy of the Western powers as confirmation of ingrained hostility to the Soviet Union" and consequently adopted what amounted to a "hostage" policy for Western Europe as a means of ensuring good behavior of the U.S. in the use of its military power. This concept holds that Moscow's objective for Western Europe has been and remains not to bring it under Soviet sway for exploitation by the USSR, but to keep it at the mercy of Soviet military power in order to enforce restraint on the U.S. in the use of its military power against the Soviet Union.¹

Neither of these versions of the "security" thesis, nor any of the variations of either, can stand up to a critical examination of the documentary evidence that exists regarding postwar policies and conduct.

¹ See, for example, Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 9-13.

The revisionist position that the Soviet Union had to act as it did because it was the victim of postwar U.S. aggressions ignores, or reverses, all available evidence. It can be, and is, documented only by the expressed views of other revisionists.

The contention that the USSR has shaped its policies toward the U.S.-West European relationship in consequence of Moscow's fears flowing from postwar U.S. policies and a consequent purpose of holding Western Europe hostage to U.S. restraint in its conduct toward the USSR is equally untenable. It requires a complete disregard of the evidence bearing upon U.S.-Soviet relations from 1944 to mid-1947. Further, the only source for Soviet adherence to a hostage doctrine as such is a scenario postulated by Soviet spokesman Eugene Tarle in 1947 which looked to Soviet war winning rather than war prevention. In case of a U.S.-Soviet war, Tarle said, the Soviets would easily overrun all of Europe, while the U.S. would be limited to bombing the USSR and occupied Europe, but its bombings would accomplish nothing decisive. The war might drag on for some time, but the end, whenever it came, would result in Soviet possession of Europe with the U.S. sitting on the outside. Thus, in Tarle's view, the war would be with the U.S., but for Europe, and in it the USSR would be successful. Other than for this one example, assumptions regarding the hostage concept have been based on abstract discussions or extrapolations from narrowly based particular views on developments.

If evidence provided by the Soviets themselves is used as a basis of judgment, overwhelming weight must be given to a supposition that Moscow's basic objective toward Western Europe has been and remains effective domination of the area as an important end in itself and as a decisive add-on to its power in its irrepressible struggle against the U.S.

Short of achievement of this objective and as a means of furthering it, the Soviets have given every indication that they have no interest in but are avidly opposed to a stabilized situation with respect to either relationships between the U.S. and Western Europe, among the West European countries, between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, or between West European countries, individually or collectively, and the USSR. They have given every indication that instead they wish to maximize uncertainty on the part of the U.S. and its West European partners regarding their respective dependability in a common defense effort against the USSR as well as regarding actual Soviet intentions toward each of them singly or in combination.

With respect to the military component of this objective, the Soviets' aim has been and is the deterrence of the U.S. deterrent as it might be applied to safeguard Europe from Soviet pressures

and aggressions, and to generate self-deterrence among the West Europeans as they might contemplate policies and actions that would contribute to their own defense.

B. THE EMERGENCE OF CONFLICT

World War II brought a shattering change in the balance of power in Europe. Irrespective of its original intentions, the Soviet Union emerged with overwhelming military superiority over any of the powers which had determined the politics of the region in the past (Great Britain, France, Germany). Soviet military power advanced permanently into the center of Europe, with no Eastern European buffer between the USSR and Western Europe.

No indigenous military forces existed capable of resisting further Soviet advances if ever and whenever Moscow might choose to undertake them. The only military obstacles facing the USSR were those provided by British and American expeditionary forces but these were to be quickly diminished when compared with Soviet forces. Moreover, Britain was in no condition to maintain other than token forces for any protracted period, and the U.S., both evidently and by testimony provided at Yalta by President Roosevelt, seemed intent upon an almost total withdrawal in relatively short order.

Meanwhile, the European populace gave evidence of being ripe for fundamental changes in socio-political orientation, apparently giving substance to Stalin's long-time contention that a second world war would serve as a forceful mid-wife of revolution. Stalin had argued as early as February 1919 that war "broadens the base of revolution, shakes the foundations of imperialism and hastens the inevitable catastrophe" and that in consequence of the first world war: "The tide of socialist revolution is irresistably rising and investing the strongholds of imperialism. Imperialism is doomed to inevitable destruction." Stalin had reiterated such views frequently during the interwar years, and these same views evidently loomed extraordinarily large in his mind in the wake of World War II.

Further, Moscow commanded a potent force within the several West European countries, and particularly in France and Italy, in the form of newly powerful communist parties fully subject to Kremlin direction and control. These parties, because of their reputed role in resistance movements during the war, enjoyed a level of respectability that was unique in their history.

Possessing these advantages, Moscow sought to lay quick foundations for an extension of its hegemony throughout continental Europe.

- o During the last months of 1945 and 1946, the USSR locked up its dominance over East Europe, leaving

only a final nail to be driven in the case of Czechoslovakia.

- o While reshaping under a handpicked communist regime the social, political, and economic life of its zone in East Germany, Moscow still pressed with all available means for a share in the control of the West German zones of the U.S., the UK, and France.
- o It also assiduously fostered efforts of West European communist parties to consolidate their strength and to maximize their role in the political affairs of individual West European countries.
- o Above all, it kept its armed forces in a state of full battle readiness and deployed in forward positions within the areas of its control.

In this situation, a profound mutual interest developed between Western Europe and the United States. The countries of Western Europe recognized that their security required a permanent American commitment and presence for the preservation of the independence and security of each country individually and of the region collectively. As for the U.S., its entry into both World Wars had stemmed from apprehensions about the impact for U.S. national security of domination of Europe by any power hostile to the U.S. and its ideals, and both its people and government appeared to accept the need for forestalling the rise of any such new threat.

Previously, that is as the war drew to a close, the U.S. and Western Europe had proceeded on the premise that the wartime alliance with the USSR would extend into the postwar period. The U.S., UK, France and the USSR undertook negotiations on undoing the consequences of Hitler's advances and, above all, on the future of Germany. It was accepted in the West that the Soviet Union had legitimate security interests in Eastern Europe but it was also expected that the Soviet Union would accommodate traditional Western interests and ties with the region. It was, of course, recognized that problems would arise but great hopes were placed on the ability of the newly formed United Nations to serve as a forum where these problems could be discussed and settled peacefully. Although differences with the Soviet Union became increasingly common as the war drew toward its end, admiration of its role in the war still far exceeded apprehensions. The precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, the United States' rapid overall demobilization and conversion to a peacetime economy--while reflecting in part the impact of the United States' monopoly of atomic weapons--stemmed basically from positive

expectations about the future of Soviet-Western relations.

These expectations, however, were rapidly dissipated by Soviet statements, policies and actions which generated alarm in the West about Soviet intentions.

Of great moment from the standpoint of impact on the West, and particularly the U.S., was the Kremlin's resurrection shortly after the war's end of the tenets of Marxism that had been submerged during the war about the inevitability of conflict between the USSR and the capitalist world. Hints to this effect appeared as early as 1944, but the clarion signal was provided by Stalin in an "election speech" on February 9, 1946. In this speech, the Soviet leader reaffirmed prewar communist concepts and postulates when he asserted, among other things, that (1) the war had not been any "casual occurrence" but "the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism"; (2) the "capitalist system of world economy harbors elements of general crises and armed conflicts," and it is "impossible" for "military catastrophes" to be avoided "under present capitalist conditions of the development of the world economy"; and (3) "hence, the development of world capitalism in our time proceeds not in the form of smooth and even progress but through crises and military catastrophes."

While pledging to increase the production of consumer goods, Stalin's main focus in his speech was on a new drive to build up the military potential of the Soviet Union. In particular, Stalin pledged "proper assistance" to Soviet scientists so that they might be able "in the near future not only to overtake but to surpass the achievements of science beyond the boundaries of our country," that is, through, among other things, the production of nuclear weapons.

Also heavy in its impact on the West was the fact that in the conduct of relations and negotiations with Americans and other Westerners, Soviet representatives at every level and in all circumstances assumed an adversary role as against their counterparts. Aggressive militancy represented the hallmark of the Soviet approach to every issue being dealt with, whether in determination of treaty terms for former enemy states (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Italy), meetings of the Foreign Ministers Council, control operations in Berlin, decisions affecting affairs in East European countries, organizational and procedural decisions for the newly established UN, etc.

Similarly, Moscow began to mount on the very morrow of the war an increasingly vitriolic propaganda campaign against the West and particularly the U.S., centering in its initial phases on charges incident to German reparations, obstacles to the "demilitarization

and democratization" of West Germany, "war mongering" and the "preparation of a new war," etc., and soon adding increasingly ominous notes about "atomic blackmail."

Militarily, the USSR proceeded with general demobilization at a much slower pace than did the Western allies, retaining levels of battle ready forces in the East European countries and adjoining Soviet territories overwhelmingly superior to Western forces. At the same time, Moscow rapidly consummated bilateral military pacts with each of the East European satellites except East Germany and Albania. Far more important and threatening, a wide-ranging program was launched to achieve on a forced draft basis an across-the-board modernization of Soviet ground and air forces, the fruits of which were revealed to a startled world at the beginning of the 1950s.

With respect to military doctrine, Stalin ostentatiously re-affirmed the continued decisiveness of the so-called permanently operating factors for war fighting and war winning (stability of the rear, morale of the armed forces, quantity and quality of divisions, equipment of combat units, and ability of commanders). He also ostentatiously belittled the significance of nuclear weapons, as for example in an interview published in Pravda on September 25, 1946 where he stated:

"I do not believe the atomic bomb to be so serious a force as certain politicians are inclined to consider it. Atomic bombs are intended to frighten the weak-nerved, but they cannot decide the outcome of a war, since they are by no means adequate for this purpose."

Nevertheless, and perhaps far more indicative as a measure of Stalin's real military thinking at the time was the fact that Stalin gave highest priority to a highly centralized, well coordinated, and resource rich nuclear weapons program that stressed both offensive and defensive systems and simultaneously looked to forced draft Soviet attainment of both fission and fusion capabilities.

Meanwhile, Soviet policies and conduct moved in directions which generated increasing doubts and fears about specific Soviet intentions. Whether Moscow's motives were defensive or offensive, its actions clearly involved the strengthening of Soviet positions at the expense of the West. In Eastern Europe, the communist leaders placed in the governments established in the wake of the Red Army proceeded ruthlessly to squeeze out coalition partners with ties to the West. According to Yugoslav dissident Djilas, Stalin declared at a banquet in April 1945: "The war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."

This process was also applied in Germany. Although negotiations on the unification of Germany were to go on for several more years, Stalin in January 1948, according to Djilas, asserted that "the West will make Western Germany their own, and we shall turn Eastern Germany into our own state." However, the Sovietization of the USSR's zone in Germany was tempered somewhat by the exigencies of Soviet-Western relations generally and more specifically by Soviet aspirations through Big Four mechanisms to gain footholds in West Germany, particularly the Ruhr. While Soviet motivations at that time are still not clear, what is clear is that an impasse developed in East-West negotiations on Germany and that Soviet demands would have meant a continued weakened status for West Germany and its perpetuation as a gigantic liability for the three Western occupying powers.

In assessing Western concerns at the time, note should be taken of actions by the USSR in other areas besides Western Europe proper, as well as of actions by non-Soviet forces identified with the USSR. Particularly important were such events as Soviet claims on Kars and Ardahan in Turkey and pressure for revision of the Montreux Convention; Soviet demands for a portion of Italy's empire in Northern Africa; the Iranian crisis in which the USSR withdrew its forces only after near ultimatum demands by the U.S., coupled with a difficult debate in the Security Council and the collapse of a Soviet-installed puppet regime in northern Iran; Soviet demands for a trusteeship in Libya; the externally-supported communist guerrilla campaign in Greece; Yugoslav pressure against Trieste, including the shutdown of U.S. planes; and Soviet support for the revived civil war in China. Those actions, when taken in conjunction with those for European issues, brought a steady dissipation of U.S. and West European expectations of cooperative relations with the USSR and the rise of doubts and fears about Soviet intentions, including genuine concern that the USSR might resort to military action.

Altogether, the overall situation as against the USSR had taken in Western eyes a hundred and eighty degree shift from what it had appeared to be at the war's end. As one of the authors of this report who was then serving as U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Moscow reported at the time to the Department of State:

"At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union stood at a crossroads. The USSR had gained not only awed respect as a major power but also acceptability and a great reservoir of good will among practically all the peoples of the world. She might well have lived in peaceful possession of her wartime conquest and gains, to a great extent the gift of her grateful and trusting allies. Had she chosen to play the international game cooperatively,

these would today be essentially little less than what she now possesses and they could have been securely held in a calm and peaceful world.

"Instead, the Soviet Government chose the opposite course--that of doubly ensuring and heavily exploiting its gains, of rejecting and antagonizing its wartime allies, of preparing the Soviet peoples for further conflict and of redoubling efforts to increase the scientific and industrial war potential of the USSR. Wartime cooperation with the capitalist West now receives no mention, efforts of Soviet propaganda writers on this period being devoted entirely to painting a war history picture in which the Western Allies, in particular the United States, were utilizing every opportunity to prepare positions for a third world war against the Soviet Union and the countries of the 'people's democracies.' While the continued existence of capitalist states is cited as a danger requiring the maintenance of the Soviet apparatus, the old concept of capitalist encirclement, no longer worthy of the Soviet giant, has been gradually allowed to lapse. It has been replaced by the Communist concept of the development of 'two world centers,' as described by Stalin, and the theme of 'time is on our side' is frequently mentioned. In other words, the picture of a world divided into 'two camps,' which Stalin in 1927 drew for the future, he today considers to have arrived.

"The deliberate choice which the Soviet leaders made after the end of World War II has in fact resulted in the creation of the two hostile centers predicted by Lenin and Stalin. It can only mean that the Kremlin has chosen to launch 'the struggle between these two centers' which is 'to decide the fate of capitalism and communism throughout the whole world!'"²

C. INITIAL WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET CHALLENGE AND USSR COUNTERMOVES

The U.S. and the West European countries in consequence of Soviet intransigence in the prospect of its objectives finally moved to a set of comprehensive policies which were

²See Foy D. Kohler, Understanding the Russians (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 89-90.

designed to contain the threat of further Soviet aggrandizements at any point on the globe, but particularly in Europe.

The U.S. calculation was that such policies might bring a substantial moderation in Soviet conduct; if not that, then they surely would have the effect of denying further benefits from Soviet aggressiveness. The USSR, however, responded with more of the same that it was already dishing out. The result was a succession of major trials between Washington and Moscow.

The first of these was over the U.S. decision to fill the power vacuum left in Greece and Turkey by British retrenchments in its overseas commitments, and with that to prevent a Soviet takeover of the southeast flank of what remained of free Europe. Through the Truman Doctrine proclaimed in March 1947, the U.S. committed itself to a variety of forms of aid to Greece in its then losing struggle against the Soviet-East European nurtured and communist-led guerrilla drive to seize control in that country, and to Turkey in its efforts to resist Soviet pressures for a variety of crippling concessions. The USSR reacted stormily. However, its break with Yugoslavia in mid-1948 undercut its direct and indirect abilities to continue support of the guerrillas in Greece and within a matter of months the threat of a takeover by a Soviet-oriented communist regime in that country had ended. Meanwhile, Moscow had quietly placed its demands on Turkey on ice.

The second major trial came with the Marshall Plan. The Soviet response to the Marshall Plan proved one of the more important watersheds in the early postwar period. The U.S. offer to the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe of participation in an all-European reconstruction effort with American aid represented in effect a finale in U.S. attempts to restore wartime unity. After an initial temptation to join or at least to undermine the effort from within, the Soviet delegation reversed its position in June 1947. The USSR then engaged in a series of actions which spurred not only ever greater urgency in U.S. moves to strengthen the economies of Western Europe but also generated the sense of alarm about the dangers to Western security which led to the formation of NATO.

In direct response to the Marshall Plan, Moscow declared ideological and political war against the West. On September 10, 1947, in a message on the 800th anniversary of the city of Moscow, Stalin spoke of Moscow's role not only as the center of the Soviet state but also as "the champion of the movement of toiling mankind for liberation from capitalist slavery." On September 18, Andrei Vishinsky in a speech to the UN General Assembly subjected the West, and the U.S. in particular, to a diatribe unprecedented even for the Soviets in its virulence and vitriol.

Then, in late September 1947, the Soviets instigated as a direct answer to the Marshall Plan the formation of a Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), which smacked of a revival, in select form, of the Comintern that had been ostentatiously dissolved by Stalin during the war. (The Cominform was limited to the Communist parties of the USSR, the East European satellites, France and Italy.) And on the occasion of its formative meeting, Soviet Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov gave new vitality to the old Soviet concept of a division of the world into two camps--the imperialist and the socialist--which are destined by history to struggle against each other until one or the other has completely triumphed. Stalin had first voiced this concept back in the early days of the military triumph of Bolshevik forces in their struggle to defeat their White Russian foes for domination of the vast reaches of the Russian Empire. He wrote in February 1919:

"The world has definitely and irrevocably split into two camps: The camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism.

"Over there, in their camp, are America and Britain, France and Japan, with their capital, armaments, tried agents and experienced administrators.

"Here, in our camp, are Soviet Russia and the young Soviet republics and the growing proletarian revolution in the countries of Europe, without capital, without tried agents or experienced administrators, but, on the other hand, with experienced agitators capable of firing the hearts of working people with the spirit of emancipation.

"The struggle between these two camps constitutes the hub of present-day affairs, determines the whole substance of the present domestic and foreign policies of the leaders of the old and the new worlds....

"Imperialism in its death throes is clutching at the last straw, the 'League of Nations,' trying to save itself by uniting the robbers of all countries into a single alliance. But its efforts are in vain, because time and circumstances are working against it and in favor of socialism. The tide of socialist revolution is irresistibly rising and investing the strongholds of imperialism. Its thunder is re-echoing through the countries of the

oppressed East. The soil is beginning to burn under the feet of imperialism. Imperialism is doomed to inevitable destruction."

Stalin had further developed these points in an interview with an American labor delegation on September 9, 1927, in which he said:

"...In the further progress of development of the international revolution, two world centers will be formed: the socialist center, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating toward socialism, and the capitalist center, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating toward capitalism. The fight between these two centers for the conquest of world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and Communism throughout the whole world."

At the formative meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, Zhdanov picked up where Stalin had left off some decades before. He said in his speech explaining the role of the new Cominform organization:

"The end of the Second World War brought with it big changes in the world situation. The military defeat of the bloc of fascist states, the character of the war as a war of liberation from fascism, and the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the vanquishing of the fascist aggressors sharply altered the alignment of forces between the two systems--the Socialist and the Capitalist--in favor of Socialism."

Currently, the two systems or camps, one led by the USSR and the other by the USA were said by Zhdanov to be engaged in a bitter, to the death struggle. Zhdanov added that central to this struggle was the "American plan for the enthrallment of Europe," and he demanded that the communist parties of Western Europe "head the resistance to /these/ plans of imperialist expansion and aggression along every line--state, economic, and ideological."

Subsequent to this summons, a massive campaign was inaugurated under communist direction to frustrate all efforts under the Marshall Plan and to disrupt by every means the economies and the social-political orders throughout Western Europe, and, as if to put icing on the cake, West European communist leaders, excepting only the British, proclaimed that in case of a war against the Soviet Union they would cast their lot with the USSR and not their own countries.

Moscow's estimate of the disruptive potential of West European communist parties proved decidedly faulty and despite propaganda and agitational extremes without parallel in Soviet history, it failed in its purpose of negating the Marshall Plan. However, it did succeed in taking advantage of its struggle to destroy the last vestiges of independence and coalition rule in Eastern Europe. The newly formed Cominform proved a useful instrument to impose a new order of discipline on the Eastern European countries. Further, the establishment in January 1948 of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), which was ostensibly in direct answer to economic aspects of the Marshall Plan, gave Moscow an enduring instrument for ever tightening economic controls. The next major step, which had a profound impact on the West, was the February 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia. The break with Tito in June 1948 was a product of the same process which was followed by a succession of purges in each of the satellites of any one suspected of less than total subservience to the Soviet Union.

The third trial of strength centered on Germany.

Despite Roosevelt's speculative surmise at Yalta that the U.S. would probably have to withdraw its troops from Europe in two or so years after the war, the U.S. actually stood ready at the war's end to participate with allied and friendly states in an international collective security system for the area. Thus, there was solid bipartisan support in the U.S. for a continued U.S. military presence in Europe so long as it might be necessary to prevent aggressions that might lead to a new war.

Initially, the prime U.S. concern was the possibility of a revived threat from Germany. U.S. leaders assumed that the Soviets, like the West Europeans, would welcome the indefinite presence of U.S. troops in Europe as a guarantee that the U.S. would share in any military action necessary to prevent new German aggressions, particularly since Stalin had laid heavy stress on the German danger at Yalta. However, persistent Soviet rejection in the spring of 1946 of a U.S. offer of either a 25- or 40-year treaty committing the U.S. to participation in security arrangements in Europe against Germany was seen as convincing proof that Moscow's prime aim was to avoid any entanglement of the U.S. in European affairs. Subsequently, the U.S. acted on its own. Then Secretary of State James Byrnes asserted in a speech at Stuttgart on July 11, 1946 that U.S. security forces would have to remain in Germany "for a long period," and then added: "I want no misunderstanding. We will not shirk our duty. We are not withdrawing. We are staying here and will furnish our proportionate share of the security forces."

The Soviet reaction was quick and bitter. Open antagonism and controversy became constants in every Soviet-U.S. relationship in connection with German affairs. While continuing to push relentlessly with its Sovietization and plundering of East Germany and placing it off-limits for the West, Moscow pulled all stops in attempts to establish positions for the USSR in West Germany and to frustrate all U.S./Western efforts to solve increasingly pressing problems they faced in their zones of occupation. Indeed, according to the testimony of Yugoslavia's Djilas, Moscow in early 1946 thought in terms of a communist takeover of all of Germany. Djilas indicated, however, that such aspirations were for the time being put on ice. But from the Western perspective the danger was not to be discounted as long as Germany remained weak and the rest of Western Europe in near turmoil. Meanwhile, Moscow pursued a classic Soviet policy in Germany of "what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable." As a continuing matter, it stepped up efforts to tie East Germany down with hoops of steel and at the same time to hamper or discourage any and all moves of the Western powers to strengthen their zones in Germany and integrate them economically and politically.

The Western answer was to continue with their own agenda; The U.S. and British zones were united economically and soon joined by the French; German authorities were increasingly entrusted with authority over domestic matters; and most important, steady movement was made during 1947 and 1948 to establish a unified West German government.

The immediate outcome was the Berlin blockade of 1948-49, aimed maximally at forcing abandonment of designs to form a West German government and minimally at effective incorporation of Berlin into the East German sphere. However, the Anglo-American airlift proved an effective response and the West proceeded with the establishment of a West German government, the Federal Republic of Germany, and at the same time preserved Western positions in Berlin.

D. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO AND THE SOVIET REACTION

In long-run terms, the most important consequence of the Berlin blockade was to convince U.S. authorities that Western Europe lay exposed to preponderant Soviet military power and that the essential element for the protection of Europe against this power was creation of a Western collective security system encompassing not only the West Europeans but the U.S. as well. Thus was laid the groundwork for the establishment of NATO.

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949 and the formal creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in August 1949 gave military substance to the Soviet concept of a

division of the world into two embattled camps.

- o On the one side stood the Soviet Union with its firmly held East European Empire extending to the Elbe River, and now enjoying a fraternal identity and close military alliance with the newly formed Peoples Republic of China, giving Moscow, as was so often trumpeted by the Kremlin, effective command of "one third of mankind."
- o On the other side stood the United States now closely allied with the great industrial countries of Western Europe and soon to be allied with Japan and enjoying a leadership status throughout the vast reaches of the "free world."

Thus, from the Soviet standpoint, the key determinant of its policies toward NATO was not its role in Europe but its role as a cornerstone of U.S. global powers: If NATO could be destroyed or reduced to ineffectiveness, the U.S. world camp would be mortally wounded. At the same time, in the Soviet view, the tie-in between NATO and U.S. global power meant that successful attacks on U.S. interests anywhere in the world would necessarily affect the viability and utility of NATO.

It is in this context that Soviet policies and actions toward NATO must be analyzed and weighed. Moscow has never had any interest in a live-and-let-live arrangement with NATO, regardless of the conditions that would govern such an arrangement. Rather, it has consistently sought to get at all of the elements upon which NATO's viability rests: the nuclear factor; the U.S. presence; the economic viability of members; intra-European and U.S.-European economic cooperation and interdependence; natural affinities between the West European and East European countries; and above all, factors that make for anything in the order of a military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The avidness, forcefulness and ruthlessness with which Moscow has sought to destroy or at least castrate NATO can be best demonstrated by an examination and analysis of Soviet policies and conduct in response to various specific U.S.-West European moves and efforts to achieve capabilities to effectively deal with the military threat posed by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. Before moving to this, however, it would be useful to note constants that have marked the Soviet attack on NATO since its inception.

With respect to the Europeans, Moscow has by means of propaganda campaigns, diplomatic moves, political and economic pressures,

and the development of military capabilities and doctrines sought to convince one and all that:

- o The U.S. nuclear umbrella is undependable.
- o The U.S. purpose with regard to Europe is to place on it the brunt of any war that may occur between East and West.
- o The impossibility of the effective defense of Europe.
- o The certainty of the total destruction of any European country that may support the U.S. in a war with the USSR.
- o There is in actual fact no Soviet threat to Europe and none will ever be unless the Europeans force the Soviet Union to act in defense of its own security.
- o Lasting peaceful relations with all the benefits thereof can be easily achieved except for U.S. machinations.

With respect to the U.S., the Soviets have sought to convince Americans that:

- o No war can be fought over Europe that will not escalate into a general nuclear war.
- o In case of a nuclear war, the U.S. would be largely destroyed and totally defeated.
- o Europe would be of no value to the U.S. in a nuclear war.
- o The U.S. has no prospect of achieving military superiority over the USSR or even of achieving capabilities adequate for effective war fighting against the USSR.
- o The USSR poses no threat to either the U.S. or Europe unless it unleashes aggression against the USSR and the "socialist community."

With respect to its own camp, Moscow has sought to match developments in NATO in every important respect.

- o NATO's formation was followed by the formation of the Warsaw Pact.

- o Institutional changes in NATO have been followed by corresponding institutional changes in the Warsaw Pact.
- o NATO maneuvers have been more than matched by Warsaw Pact maneuvers.
- o Any suggestions of new weapons systems have been offset by the reality of new weapons systems for the Warsaw Pact.

With respect to the Soviet Union itself, Moscow has striven without pause to achieve military superiority over the U.S. and its allies, both in the NATO setting and generally in every force category and in all phases of weaponry.

E. SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH NUCLEAR ARMS FOR NATO

Once NATO had been firmly established and the USSR had, without much effect, countered with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact system, Moscow essentially adjusted to the new systems in Europe. It continued, of course, a constant propaganda drum beat regarding the "aggressive" purposes of the Western organization, and automatically attempted to make an issue of virtually every specific move the West made to develop the NATO structure and to make it more effective.

Thus, Moscow noisily reacted to every step taken by the allies to incorporate political dimensions into the NATO structure. It especially stormed and threatened when the FRG was admitted to the organization, and it never gave pause in its charges and clamors regarding German revanchism and its purpose of capturing NATO and use it for a new war against the USSR. And it constantly harped on the continuing efforts of the U.S. to induce European members of the alliance to expand their individual military capabilities and to contribute more fully to joint NATO efforts.

Increasingly, however, Soviet reactions to such developments as these tended to become essentially routine in nature. There was no suggestion of a reconciliation to the existence of NATO, and particularly to the dominant role that the U.S. exercised in its affairs, but there were indications that Moscow knew it could do nothing about either under existing circumstances and would have to abide with what was, unless and until a major change in the overall international environment.

In one particular, however, the situation was entirely different. This related to any step on the Western side that involved or might involve the deployment of nuclear weapons on NATO's

European territories, and especially any that might be capable of reaching Soviet territory and, more especially, any that might be under German control or likely to fall under German control. Given any move along these lines, Soviet concerns and reactions instantly became very much for real. Moscow left no doubt of the seriousness with which it appraised the dangers, and resorted to every means of pressure it could command to frustrate the move.

F. REACTION TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

The first case in point came in 1957-58. The U.S. in April 1957 proposed and NATO in May agreed in principle that NATO required all kinds of weapons for its defense. On December 19, 1957 the NATO Council decided to build up stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons and to put intermediate range nuclear missiles at the disposal of SACEUR. Agreements were signed in 1958 with Italy and Turkey for emplacement of Thor and Jupiter missiles on their territories. Meanwhile, the West Germans kept open the possibility of deployment of similar weapons on their territory.

The USSR response was the immediate instigation of a terror campaign. A Soviet note to the FRG of April 1957 warned that in case of a nuclear conflict in Europe, Germany would be the "immediate object of retaliation," would become "one big cemetery," and could be "destroyed by one H-bomb." Khrushchev in Berlin in August 1957 said the FRG should keep in mind that a new war would turn "densely populated areas into a desert." Following the launching of Sputnik in October 1957, the campaign was greatly intensified. In December, Premier Bulganin sent separate threatening letters to the heads of government of the U.S., the FRG, the UK, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and, for good measure, all members of the U.N.

- o The letter to Eisenhower said NATO was generating an arms race it could not win, the U.S. was putting its allies at risk, the U.S. would not be unscathed, escalation was inevitable, weapons in the FRG were particularly dangerous.
- o The letter to Adenauer warned that all targets in the FRG would be vulnerable even to short-range weapons.
- o Letters to the other Europeans emphasized their vulnerability to certain destruction in case of war.

Meanwhile, special stress was placed on U.S. vulnerabilities to nuclear attack. In an interview with William Randolph Hearst on November 22, 1957 Khrushchev said the USSR now had "the absolute weapon" and in case of war, "the American people will suffer enormous

losses." Throughout 1959, Soviet spokesmen emphasized that the strategic balance had shifted, first to parity, and then to Soviet superiority. On January 14, 1960, Khrushchev claimed the USSR had the ability to "wipe out" any country and made clear he was making specific reference to the U.S.

Meanwhile, the Soviets modified their ideological doctrine supposedly in response to the new situation produced by nuclear weapons. In February 1956, Khrushchev had announced that war was no longer "fatalistically inevitable" because of Soviet capabilities to devastate the U.S. and destroy the capitalist system. He and other Soviet spokesmen now placed ever increasing emphasis on this pronouncement, particularly its latter element. Then in March 1958, Khrushchev proclaimed the end of capitalist encirclement ("who encircles whom?"), and in January 1959, announced that socialism was now irreversible in the USSR and immune to any outside action.

Meanwhile, the Soviets had organized their efforts into a comprehensive campaign, special diplomatic and propaganda pressures were intermixed with blandishments: Moscow and its satellites peppered the West with proposals which would slow down or reverse implementation of the NATO decision.

- o The East Germans in August 1957 proposed that the two Germanies renounce nuclear weapons.
- o Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki in October 1957 proposed a Central European nuclear-free zone,
- o In the UN, the USSR pressed proposals for a nuclear ban, adding in September 1957 a clause barring transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries or to bloc commands.
- o On January 6, 1958, TASS announced a 300,000-man reduction in Soviet armed forces and token Soviet troop withdrawals from the GDR and Hungary.
- o In April, Mikoyan signed a consular agreement with the FRG and added an offer that the USSR would not use nuclear weapons against Germany if the FRG renounced any intention to acquire such weapons or permit them on its territory.

In November 1958 Soviet pressures were extended into a new dimension when Khrushchev demanded that Berlin be declared a free city and a German peace treaty be signed, and threatened to act unilaterally if the Western powers refused to cooperate. In the end, the USSR was left with no choice but either to back down or to act

upon its threats, which obviously greatly exceeded its capabilities. It chose to backdown. Nevertheless, it could count important partial successes from its efforts. It effectively accepted the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Nevertheless, it did generate statements by Norway and Denmark refusing to accept such weapons. Also, it had to reconcile itself to the fact that Thors and Jupiters were being stationed in Italy and Turkey. But, most importantly from the Soviet point of view, the FRG refused deployment of medium-range missiles on its territory.

It later became clear that Khrushchev had been bluffing about the missile resources of the USSR, but the incident gave suggestive indications of how the USSR might use such resources should they become available. Further, Moscow began not only to focus major efforts on the buildup of its missile and nuclear power confronting Europe, but it also, after protracted debate, revolutionized its military doctrine so as to make nuclear missiles the centerpiece of its strategic concepts.

G. REACTION TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOCTRINE

The second instance in which Moscow faced and strongly reacted to a projected nuclear threat within the NATO context related to U.S. consideration of a flexible response doctrine beginning in the early days of the Kennedy Administration.

On March 28, 1961 President Kennedy first enunciated a line of thinking according to which the United States and its NATO allies should be prepared to meet the Soviet military threat across the entire spectrum of nuclear and conventional weapons. On June 16, 1962 Defense Secretary McNamara supplemented this with a speech on the need for a U.S. counterforce capability. In NATO these ideas became the subject of prolonged discussions, especially as a result of European fears that improvement of conventional capabilities would entail degrading the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

The Soviets interpreted the discussions as reflective of a new U.S. doctrine and treated the matter as a live issue throughout the period 1961-1968. In responding, Moscow evolved specific lines of attack which it would apply later to the Schlesinger Doctrine and PD-59. Soviet leadership statements, including Sokolovskii's book Military Strategy issued in 1962, and later doctrinal writings all charged the U.S. with having adopted the following purposes and intentions:

- o The U.S. was seeking an escape from the binds that Soviet nuclear capabilities placed on its ability to embark on aggressive enterprises. The increased Soviet might had compelled shift in U.S. and NATO doctrine away from massive retaliation, because of the certainty of counter massive retaliation by the USSR.

- o The basic U.S. objective was to increase the military options open to American policymakers.
- o The doctrine was designed to make more effective use of the military potential of the U.S. NATO allies.
- o The U.S. was seeking to reduce the risks (i.e., increase the nuclear threshold) for the U.S., in the use of a limited war (contrasting with arguments against later U.S. doctrines which charged the U.S. with seeking to lower the nuclear threshold).
- o The U.S., as indicated by McNamara's Ann Arbor speech on June 16, 1962, was moving to a counterforce strategy and a first-use of nuclear weapons.

In its response to the presumed doctrine, Moscow placed heavy emphasis on the implication that the U.S. had come to accept the growth of Soviet military power to a point where it could not risk general nuclear war with the USSR. However, it gave evidence that it was disturbed by the uncertainties that the doctrine raised regarding U.S. strategic intentions. Moscow's main concern was evidently over the counterforce approach being suggested by McNamara, particularly because of its first-strike possibilities. Moscow's counters to the doctrine centered on the following main elements:

- o The U.S. was seeking to condition the U.S. and European public to greater acceptability of war.
- o It was planning a preventive war.
- o Any conflict especially if it involved the nuclear powers would "inevitably" develop into a general war.
- o All countries with U.S. bases would be subject to retaliatory nuclear strikes.
- o Specifically with respect to counterforce, no distinction was possible between civilian and military targets.

H. THE MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE (MLF)

The third instance related to the establishment of a multi-lateral nuclear force which would be collectively manned by NATO countries.

Following considerable preliminary work by their advisers in each country, Kennedy and Macmillan, meeting in Nassau in December 1962, agreed in principle to support the concept of a NATO joint nuclear force (MLF). This was followed by extensive discussions, planning, and negotiations among all the NATO allies regarding implementing arrangements.

Moscow's response was immediate and strong but essentially low key, with its main indicated concern being that the scheme, if implemented, would enable the FRG to get access to nuclear weapons. Moscow, in attempting to foil the scheme, placed main reliance on propaganda warnings, new disarmament proposals, and charges of violation of existing agreements.

Varied techniques and instrumentalities were utilized. Warning notes were sent to the U.S., FRG, and other NATO members sounding the following major themes:

- o MLF meant FRG access to nuclear weapons
- o No one was threatening NATO
- o Implementation of the scheme would subject all participants to certain retaliation in case of war
- o The scheme was inconsistent with ongoing talks on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
- o If MLF were implemented, the USSR would take all necessary measures "to ensure the maintenance at a proper level of the security of the Soviet Union, its friends and allies."

At the same time, Moscow came up with new or modified disarmament proposals designed to undercut the scheme, including a proposal for a Mediterranean nuclear-free zone; applicability to MLF of non-transfer of nuclear weapons then under consideration to MLF; renewed emphasis on the Polish proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

Moscow in its reaction to MLF avoided indulgence in threats. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in January 1965 denounced nuclear sharing "in any form whatsoever" and warned that the Pact would be "compelled to take the defense measures necessary to ensure its security." However, this represented little more than an oft-repeated, hackneyed pronouncement. The circumstance that was probably responsible for the absence of threats, and for the lack of appreciable Soviet excitement over the scheme, was that serious difficulties were being encountered by the U.S.

and its allies in working out implementing details. In the end, MLF fell of its own weight rather than as a result of Soviet pressures.

As a general matter, Moscow's experiences with these several early threats of a nuclear potential based upon or involving the European territories of NATO appear to have left it with few real alarms for the time being about the potential dangers it faced in this direction. Among other things, it appeared to believe that the techniques it had employed to meet such threats would be effective against future possibilities. Nevertheless, it continued to remain keenly alert to a possible change in the situation, and as intent as ever on preventing anything from happening that would in fact raise new dangers for it.

It is in this light that the USSR's responses to the current effort at NATO nuclear modernization and its immediate precursors should be examined and analyzed.

III. THE SCHLESINGER OPTION AS A PRECURSOR CAMPAIGN ON NATO MODERNIZATION

Well before the December 1979 NATO decision proposing deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, the Soviet Union had engaged in campaigns in which much the same issues arose and in which the Soviet Union unfolded a variety of the tactics on which it proposed to rely to discourage the U.S. and the West from going ahead with NATO modernization. Two campaigns in particular stand out in this regard:

(1) Soviet attacks on the "limited nuclear options strategy" which Secretary of Defense Schlesinger postulated on January 10, 1974.

(2) The Soviet campaign beginning after the U.S. press revealed in June 1977 that work on an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb) was being provided for in the U.S. This followed extensive discussions regarding the weapon in NATO and was accompanied by indications that agreement had been reached between the U.S. and its NATO allies for such deployment.

From the Soviet perspective, both campaigns were eminently successful.

Coming when detente was in high gear, Soviet attacks on the Schlesinger options were carried out principally at secondary levels. Nevertheless it was fully evident that Soviet concern was genuine and intense. However, Soviet attention to the options all but disappeared when after some months it became apparent to Moscow that little if anything was being done, or was likely to be done, in the way of implementation.

Unlike the campaign against the Schlesinger option, the neutron bomb involved what appeared to be imminent threats of actual deployments and the Soviet campaign was at the highest levels and much more extensive and virulent. While uneasy that the issue remained on the book, Moscow clearly saw the April 7, 1978 Carter decision to defer production as a victory for Soviet pressure tactics. After April 1978, Soviet attention to the question died down considerably, but has recently been revived in response to Secretary of Defense Weinberger's indication of U.S. intentions to proceed in the field and within the context of an overall campaign against Euromissiles. Meanwhile, Moscow has clearly seen the campaign as a model for the future.

Beginning in the late sixties, authoritative Soviet spokesmen began increasingly to depict the U.S. as having reached a cul-de-sac in its capability to use military force as an instrument of

policy in the continuing global struggle between systems. On the one hand, failures of the U.S. in Vietnam and other Third World areas were said to have demonstrated to U.S. "realists" that the U.S. could no longer succeed in efforts to act as the "world gendarme" to stem the tide of revolutionary, national-liberation change around the globe. On the other hand, attainment of strategic parity by the USSR was said to have foreclosed to the U.S. operations "from a position of strength" in its dealings with the Soviet Union, either directly or in efforts to frustrate successful pursuit of its own worldwide objectives. The sum of the matter, as the Soviets explained it, was that a shift in "the correlation of world forces," which rested at heart "precisely on the power--the social, economic and ultimately military power--of the socialist countries," had demonstrated to the American leaders the "bankruptcy" of long-established policies and had "compelled" them to engage in an agonizing reappraisal of values."¹ "These leaders had found themselves with no choice but to concern themselves with ensuring that U.S. foreign policy objectives, methods, and doctrines for achieving them are appropriate to dwindling resources."² The result was a forced acceptance by Washington of defeat in Vietnam, adoption of the Nixon Doctrine, and finally movement to the "peaceful coexistence" relationship with the USSR. All of this represented "a great victory for our Party and for all the Soviet people--an event of great significance."³

Moscow, however, was emphatic in warning that the situation might change. Brezhnev asserted at the 24th Party Congress that the U.S. would "resort to all sorts of stratagems to save itself."⁴ Brezhnev on his return in June 1973 from his second summit meeting with Nixon cautioned that "the aggressive forces of imperialism" would not "lay down their arms for a long time yet" and that therefore the Soviets were duty bound "to make sure that nothing catches us unawares."⁵ Then Defense Minister Grechko echoed this and a stream of other such leadership utterances in a speech on January 8, 1974 in which he deplored "voluntary or involuntary attempts to

¹ A. Pumpianskii, "A Triumph of Realism," Komsomol'skaia Pravda, June 4, 1972.

² Izvestiia, August 10, 1972.

³ Izvestiia, November 2, 1972.

⁴ Pravda, March 31, 1971.

⁵ Pravda, July 12, 1973.

underestimate the military danger stemming from imperialism.... We must always be ready for any unexpected turns, dangerous adventures, and provocations on the part of the reactionary forces of imperialism."⁶

A main source of danger from the U.S. side, according to the Soviets, was that Washington might seek through use of its scientific-technological resources new military capabilities and appropriate new strategies to escape from the cul-de-sac in which it found itself. Georgii Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute, wrote in October 1973 that the U.S. was still counting on military technical breakthroughs to enable it again to effectively use military force as an instrument of policy.⁷ He repeated the charge with greater explicitness in February 1974: "Many representatives of the U.S. ruling circles /have not/ renounced the hope that some future achievements of a military-technical nature will even now make it possible to increase the viability of employing force and in some way turn back the course of events." He went on to say such hopes are "virtually groundless" since it is "difficult to envisage any breakthroughs in the foreseeable future which would radically alter the situation." However, he contended, the "work on new, ultramodern weapons systems" which is being pushed in the U.S. and other capitalist countries, can have a destabilizing effect merely by creating the illusion of advantage, and thereby engender "the temptation, which is difficult to overcome, to make rapid use of the superiority supposedly obtained."⁸

Against this background, U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger unveiled at a peace conference on January 10, 1974 proposals that had been in the process of development within the government for some time for endowing U.S. military with a broader range of options, encompassing both new doctrines and capabilities for responding to military confrontations and acts of aggression or threats of aggression. The effect on Soviet authorities, all evidence indicates, was and has remained profound. This is demonstrated in part by direct responses in the Soviet media and, more impressively, by indirect responses manifest in leadership policies.

⁶ Komsomolets Tartarii, January 8, 1974.

⁷ SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 10, October 1973.

⁸ Georgii Arbatov, "The Impasses of the Policy of Force," Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, No. 2, February 1974.

It is evident that Soviet spokesmen were not caught by surprise by substantive elements of Schlesinger's proposals. A number of publications, such as articles by Arbatov and Mil'shteyn and Semeyko incident to SALT talks which went to press in October and November 1973, respectively, and Arbatov's article which was submitted to the censor on the eve of Schlesinger's January 10, 1974 press conference, indicate considerable awareness of new trends in U.S. military-strategic thinking prior to the press conference itself. Of course, the Soviets were familiar with and had commented extensively on the earlier U.S. concept of flexible response, as well as the theoretical writings on limited war by people such as Henry Kissinger and Herman Kahn. Although these earlier concepts differ from flexible option proposals, they do contain common elements, and Soviet declaratory response to the flexible option strategy has echoed reactions to these earlier concepts.

Nevertheless, the Soviets appear to have been taken aback by formal announcements by the Secretary of the new trends. This is suggested by the fact that Soviet reactions were slow to appear. A torrent of Eastern European comments was issued before any appeared in the USSR. This device of using Eastern European spokesmen to air Soviet views in an unofficial manner pending solidification of an official Soviet position is not uncommon. The first Soviet published commentary which specifically discussed the Schlesinger proposals appeared only in April 1974, while the next reference was in May and was limited mainly in footnotes to a general review of Soviet-American relations. Moreover, initial Soviet commentaries were of a more general nature than the Eastern European, which from the outset contained detailed critiques of presumed actual U.S. and NATO weapons procurement plans associated with the new strategy.

Strikingly absent from the articles and statements have been direct references to the flexible options issue by high Soviet officials. Sources of most of the commentaries directly on the subject are what might be called the Soviet "defense intellectual establishment," both civilian and military. Present and former associates of the Institute of the USA and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) figure prominently among the authors.

After the initial slow start, Soviet responses followed closely U.S. demarches or public announcements suggesting forward movement in the development of the strategy, thus testifying to Soviet attentiveness to events concerning the United States. Thus, for example, Soviet commentaries peaked following such events as the annual submission of the Pentagon budget to Congress, publication of the Defense Secretary's testimony and briefings to

Congress, and meetings of the NATO Council.

In general, Soviet commentaries appeared to have concentrated on several key words or phrases from the various reports they cited on the evolving U.S. strategy. Concepts such as "limited nuclear war," "counterforce," and "selective strikes against Soviet territory" occupied much of the published and broadcast Soviet criticism. Analyses were at a fairly superficial level, however, either deliberately or through incomprehension. For example, the option of "first use" of nuclear weapons in defense of Europe was often portrayed as advocacy of a "first" or "pre-emptive" nuclear strike. Moreover, there was no specific treatment of the "echelons" of applicability envisioned in the options proposal. Comments contended that "no matter what you call it--massive retaliation, selective strikes or a limited nuclear--the final result would be the same: total destruction." Only in mid-1976 did the Soviets publish a detailed analysis of what they termed U.S. "categories of war."

Conspicuous in most commentaries was that until Schlesinger's ouster as Secretary of Defense, most commentators engaged in a very obvious campaign to separate the Secretary and the "Pentagon," which they held responsible for positing the new strategy and inciting the arms race, from the White House and Secretary of State Kissinger, both generally treated as in opposition. Schlesinger was depicted as contravening the detente policies of his own government. Soviet public response to Schlesinger's dismissal was, nevertheless, restrained. Moscow Radio limited itself to reporting that U.S. sources had noted that he had "become the target of criticism" particularly by Congressional liberals, and had disagreed with Kissinger on the SALT talks, and had also had disagreements over the military budget. The commentator then repeated President Ford's assurances that progress on the course of detente, including further SALT negotiations, would continue. The Soviets later asserted that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld "supported" Schlesinger's concept of the "limited utilization of nuclear weapons,"

Over time, Soviet commentaries placed greater emphasis on the possibility that a full-scale U.S. technological effort in connection with a new options strategy might in fact alter the military balance. In 1974, it will be recalled, the Soviets expressed skepticism concerning the possibility of any military-technical "breakthroughs" occurring in the "foreseeable future" that could importantly affect the existing military-strategic situation, "given existing military-technical standards..." Hence, some Soviet spokesmen termed as a "paradox" the growing awareness of the impossibility of employing military force for political purposes on

the one hand, and the continuation of the arms race on the other.⁹ By late 1975 Soviet commentaries suggested real concern that advanced U.S. weapons technology might indeed upset the existing balance, and termed it a "very important task" to "frustrate" these plans.¹⁰

Initially the Soviets had argued that "sober-minded politicians" in the West are prevailing over those elements who wanted to return to the "cold war," but in 1976 their concern seemed to increase that, under pressure of the U.S. election campaign and an increasing desire to restore confidence and instill the notion of the transient nature of the Vietnam defeat, the balance was tilting the other way. Thus, whereas previously they seemed confident that the trend was to complement political detente with detente in the military sphere, they subsequently evinced concern that a kind of reverse contamination will instead occur, with the changes in U.S. strategic doctrine causing a deterioration in political detente as well.

A. SOURCES AND NATURE OF SOVIET CONCERN

A critical Soviet objective all along has been to develop such a credible military posture as to maximize the Soviet Union's ability to exploit opportunities for political gains with the least risk of a dangerous confrontation with the U.S. Thus, paramount importance has been and continues to be attributed to the buildup of Soviet military might which will effectively neutralize the utility and credibility of the U.S. strategic forces and persuade the U.S. of the irrationality of resorting to their use in defense of its interests or those of its allies. It is not surprising, therefore, that in their commentaries on and analysis of the U.S. "flexible option" strategy, the Soviets focused on those elements of the U.S. concept which suggest a possible U.S. resort to force and the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons in general, and against Soviet territory in particular. This is seen by the Soviets as a radical reversal of earlier U.S. strategy and perceptions of risks, which had specifically excluded the territories of the superpowers from limited attacks and was said to have relied on limited wars as instruments of policy under the umbrella of an "assured destruction" deterrence posture. Consequently, Soviet

⁹G.A. Arbatov, "The Impasses of the Policy of Force," *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma*, No. 2, 1974.

¹⁰Ye. Primakov, "Political Detente and the Disarmament Problem," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, No. 10, 1975.

analysts concentrated attention on the U.S. concepts of "limited strategic war," "controlled counterforce war," and "selective re-targeting," as well as U.S. resort to nuclear weapons in non-total war situations.

As one would expect, Soviet analysts rejected and condemned these U.S. strategic concepts as well as any others which might make the U.S. more likely to resort to force in defense of its interests. In discussing the new U.S. strategic concepts, Soviet analysts linked them to the past U.S. doctrine of "flexible response." It was asserted that "it is perfectly clear that this 'doctrine of re-targeting' is very closely linked with the theory of 'flexible response' which was born in the United States back in the cold war period."¹¹ The new doctrine, however, was more refined, providing as it did for a range of levels of strategic actions rather than mere "city avoidance" of old, and becomes more credible as a result of technological improvements in strategic weapons systems. However, it was asserted that the flexibility provided by the new concept was only superficially greater than that in past U.S. doctrines.¹²

Soviet analysts interpreted the "Schlesinger doctrine" as adding "limited strategic nuclear war" to the "spectrum of nuclear" wars adopted by the "realistic deterrence doctrine."¹³ This concept was said to subsume the idea of limited counterforce strikes, so that the enemy "would be deprived of the possibility of delivering a crushing retaliatory strike against U.S. territory or at least would weaken the strength of this [retaliatory] strike as much as possible."¹⁴ The Soviets also claimed that the primary purpose of

¹¹ A. Karenin, "Detente and New Variants of Old Doctrines." Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizh, No. 5, 1975.

¹² L. Semeiko, "New Forms But the Same Essence as Hitherto," Krasnaia Zvezda, April 8, 1975.

¹³ M.H. Milshtein, in "Certain New Trends in the Development of U.S. Military-Strategic Concepts," SSSR: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 4, April 1976.

¹⁴ Major-General R. Simonian, "The Concept of 'Selective Targeting,'" Krasnaia Zvezda, September 28, 1976.

the concept of "limited strategic war" was to strengthen the credibility of the U.S. "nuclear guarantee to Western Europe, without allowing a theater nuclear war to escalate into a strategic (i.e., general) nuclear war,"¹⁵ and without exposing the U.S. itself to devastating Soviet nuclear retaliation.

The Soviets claimed to see in "selective targeting" and in the "retargeting concept," a U.S. decision to develop a counterforce strategy. "In practice," Soviet analysts claimed, "the concept provides for a first-strike potential involving the utilization of only part of the strategic forces,"¹⁶ the rest being held in readiness to deter a retaliatory Soviet strike against U.S. cities. This, in turn, meant that the U.S. would be more likely to resort to a surprise attack and attempts to "achieve victory on this basis."¹⁷ While it was acknowledged that the Pentagon denied any intention to develop "a so-called 'first-strike capability,'" it was claimed that this was merely "an attempt to camouflage the increase in nuclear potential for delivering a massive forestalling nuclear attack."¹⁸

The development of the U.S. concept was said to be closely connected with a new emphasis on "increasing missile accuracy, developing new guidance systems, increasing flexibility in targeting and retargeting,"¹⁹ and, of course, increased accuracy implies a greater "hardened-target counterforce capability." In this connection it is interesting to note a discussion by a Hungarian military spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Imre Szanto, over Radio Budapest, who remarked that:

"One advantage the United States has is the accuracy of delivery since the accuracy of delivery of the existing U.S. missile systems is somewhat greater than that of the USSR. However, it must be taken into consideration here that U.S. targets are different from those in the USSR. In the United States there are extensive targets

¹⁵L.S. Semeiko, in "Certain New Trends in the Development of U.S. Military-Strategic Concepts," op. cit.

¹⁶A.A. Aleksimov, "Security in the Nuclear Age," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 6, June 1976.

¹⁷Simonian, Krasnaia Zvezda, September 28, 1976.

¹⁸Major-General P. Sergeev and Colonel V. Trusakov, "Evolution of the U.S. Military Doctrine," Soviet Military Review, No. 11, November 1976, p. 53.

¹⁹A. Arbatov and G. Arbatov, "Schlesinger's Ideas in Form and Content," Novoye Vremia, No. 30, July 1975.

for which a large yield but relatively lesser degree of accuracy is needed to destroy. In the USSR industry has been decentralized. Smaller targets scattered over a large area mean a strategic advantage which determines the demands of various weapons systems, such as accurate delivery and relatively smaller warheads."²⁰

It was also asserted that the U.S. was using the new concepts to justify efforts to "obtain certain qualitative advantages in strategic weapons systems and obtain an opportunity to translate these advantages into reality in an endeavor to insure supremacy at levels of escalation lower than that of a general nuclear war."²¹ In other words, the U.S. was seeking to escape the constraints of strategic parity and reacquire the means of dealing with the Soviet Union "from a position of strength." The United States was said to "pursue essentially the same military-political source 'from a position of strength,' and to have the opportunity for 'a wide choice of flexible options' for the employment of strategic forces capable of accomplishing 'assured destruction' of the enemy's state or coalition of states by delivering both a preemptive and a 'retaliatory' massive nuclear strike."²²

Furthermore, the U.S. was said to seek a formula which not only will make the use of nuclear weapons more "possible" and "acceptable," but would give it advantages which it could translate into political and deterrence leverage, or, as the Soviet analysts said, the U.S. wanted to use this concept and the new capabilities for "psychological pressure" on Moscow and as a "trump card" in negotiations with it.²³

Soviet criticism of the "limited strategic war" and "retargeting" concepts ranged from arguments that they were in contradiction to the spirit of detente and U.S.-Soviet declarations on avoidance of the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons, to specific denials of the validity of the premises underlying these U.S. concepts.

²⁰ Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Imre Szanto, candidate of military sciences, Budapest Domestic Service, May 15, 1976.

²¹ G.A. Trofimenko, in "Certain New Trends in the Development of U.S. Military-Strategic Concepts," *op. cit.*

²² Simanjan, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, August 24, 1976.

²³ G.A. Trofimenko, "Problems of Peace and Security in Soviet-American Relations," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 9, September 1974, p. 17; Colonel V. Larionov, "Arms Limitation and Its Opponents," *Pravda*, April 7, 1974.

Soviet opposition was clear to any lowering by the U.S. of the threshold for nuclear war, especially as it applied to strategic forces and attacks on the superpowers' territories. The Soviets were clearly very disturbed that the U.S., rather than remain deterred by Soviet power and the risk of unlimited escalation from considering nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union, was now attempting to "legitimize limited strikes against targets actually located on the national territories of the two major nuclear powers."²⁴ What this was seen as implying was that 1) U.S. strategic forces are not fully neutralized by Soviet strategic power; and 2) the U.S. believes the Soviet Union to be equally deterred from escalating a conflict into an all-out nuclear war, thus precluding such a response to limited U.S. strikes on Soviet territory. "The assumption" underlying the U.S. "limited strategic war concept" was said to be that "neither side would be interested in broadening a nuclear conflict and would take steps to localize and, possibly, terminate it."²⁵ "In other words," it was said, "the idea of the thinkableness" and "survivability" of a nuclear missile war was gradually being suggested" to the broad American public."²⁶ And it was asserted that "this kind of war is considered the most probable under conditions of strategic nuclear parity."²⁷

Lowering the threshold for the use of strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviets maintained, creates the "illusion" that the war can be started and terminated "strictly according to the Pentagon's scenario."²⁸ This would represent a serious erosion of the credibility of the Soviet deterrent, according to which Moscow has sought to equate any attack on the USSR with the threat of an all-out Soviet retaliation. Indeed, Soviet spokesmen insisted that:

"The defense might of the country is expressed in the capability of the state to insure to society the ability to engage in peaceful labor and must be such

²⁴ M.A. Milshteyn and D.S. Semeiko, "The Problem of the Inadmissibility of a Nuclear Conflict," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 11, November 1974.

²⁵ M.A. Milshtein, "In Defiance of the Spirit of the Times," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, No. 7, July 1976, p. 105.

²⁶ G.A. Trofimenko, "The Logic of Detente Dictates," Za Rubezhem, No. 48, December 1976, p. 10.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ G. Svyatos, "The Pentagon's Calculations and Gambles," Novoye Vremia, No. 49, December 3, 1976.

that any aggressor understands the inevitability of the failure of his political and military aims in his planned military actions; that it is possible to frustrate the criminal designs at their inception, and if armed attack becomes a fact to decisively crush any aggressor."²⁹

While earlier the U.S. appeared to be increasingly inclined to accept such an image of the Soviet deterrent, the new U.S. strategic concepts were seen as reversing this trend in U.S. perceptions and, this, in turn, could result in a greater U.S. freedom of action and a tougher U.S. foreign policy.³⁰

Next, the Soviets feared the U.S. might deprive the Soviet Union of its ability to hold the strategic initiative, which earlier Moscow believed it could be reasonably certain of by virtue of its first strike doctrine and strategy and the U.S. reliance on a retaliatory strategy. As was noted, Soviet analysts claimed that the new U.S. strategy implied preparations for the delivery of a U.S. "forestalling nuclear attack" on the Soviet Union, and in any event, signified the possibility of U.S. first use of nuclear weapons.

"A serious change in this concept is that it accepts the use of nuclear weapons as a means of waging war and considers nuclear war to be totally admissible on the grounds that limited strategic nuclear war does not entail great risks and can, therefore, be regarded as something akin to conventional war."³¹

Finally, it was suggested, the U.S. will attempt to gain qualitative arms superiority over the Soviet Union, and even the "illusion" of superiority may suffice to embolden the U.S. to resume its "position of strength" policy. Thus, the implementation of the "limited strategic war" concept "could give a new twist to the arms race since advantages obtained in increasing missile accuracy create a potential opportunity for obtaining a first-strike capability."³²

²⁹ Major-General S. Tiushkevich, "The Fruits of Peaceful Labor Are Reliably Defended," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 11, June 1976, p. 12.

³⁰ G.A. Svyatov, in "Certain New Trends in the Development of U.S. Military-Strategic Concepts," op. cit.

³¹ Milshtein, op. cit., p. 106.

³² Ibid.

B. SOVIET COUNTER ARGUMENTS

Soviet commentaries naturally rejected the notion that it is possible to wage war by some sort of agreed restrictions or rules, or that once action is initiated it would not escalate into an all-out conflict. The general line was that the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons, and all the more so if used against the territory of a superpower, would in all probability escalate. It was argued that since "selective targeting" implies "a counterforce strategy" that "the other side could not be requested to hold its missiles meant for a retaliatory strike (including strikes against cities) in 'reserve' in the silos--after all, these missiles, according to Schlesinger's ideas, are in fact the main target of a 'limited' strike by the foe's nuclear forces."³³ Along with this, Soviet spokesmen denied the feasibility of avoiding large-scale collateral damage to civilians, because such targets are co-located, and because the retargeting doctrine implies a large increase in delivered nuclear warheads.³⁴ Thus, according to a prominent Soviet military commentator:

"A ballistic missile attack on military targets cannot be distinguished from attacks on civilian targets using the same means. But even allowing that such a war is possible, it could easily develop into a universal nuclear war even though it started as a limited war against military targets."³⁵

It should be kept in mind that, as the Soviets interpreted the "Schlesinger doctrine," they argued there would be no restriction on Soviet resort to a tit-for-tat attack on the U.S. in retaliation for "selective" U.S. strikes on the Soviet Union, since the U.S. continued to regard all-out war as inadmissible and, therefore, did not back up its limited or selective strikes with a credible threat of escalation to general nuclear war as a means of deterring Soviet retaliatory strikes. Therefore, while Soviet spokesmen were very careful to avoid any indication of the possible collateral Soviet civilian damage from U.S. counterforce strikes, they were quick to cite U.S. Congressional hearings on probable casualties from a limited nuclear exchange and specifically mentioned the case of a

³³ A. Arbatov and G. Arbatov, op. cit.

³⁴ Milshtein and Semeiko, op. cit., p. 10; Krasnaia Zvezda, September 28, 1976.

³⁵ Milshtein, op. cit.

nuclear attack on the Whitman Air Force Base where, according to some witnesses, nuclear strikes "could result in the death of 10.3 million people." From this, it was argued, "it is self-evident that the consequences of a 'limited' nuclear war would be even more destructive if not single, but massive nuclear strikes using tens and hundreds of nuclear warheads with yields in the megaton range were delivered against military targets."³⁶ However, Soviet spokesmen also pointed out that the population and industrial distribution in the U.S. makes this country more vulnerable to Soviet strikes than the Soviet Union would be to U.S. strikes, not to mention the asymmetry in the respective civil defense capabilities.

C. A MAIN PREOCCUPATION: POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET FREEDOM OF ACTION

A constant in Soviet analyses of world developments in recent years had been that the U.S. has become increasingly deterred by the military might of the USSR from the use of force or the threat of force to "export counterrevolution" or to stop "national liberation" movements and conflicts or otherwise to interfere with trends and developments anywhere in the world toward "peace, progress and socialism." This is by way of saying that any such use of force by the U.S. to protect its vital global interests is estopped because it would risk Soviet counter actions that could escalate to the point of total destruction of the U.S.

Moscow evidently perceived the possibility that this aspect of deterrence might be by-passed by a U.S. strategy for the limited use of nuclear weapons in limited conflict situations, since Washington might expect that such use "will not lead to the destruction of American cities."³⁷ As one would expect, Soviet spokesmen marshalled a range of arguments to negate any such thinking on Washington's part. The main line was that the U.S. sought to erase the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and war.³⁸ No advocacy of the use of nuclear weapons in theater warfare can be tolerated, the Soviets insisted, because such use carried with it the risk of immediate escalation into a general war.³⁹ Indeed, any

³⁶ Simonian, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, September 28, 1976.

³⁷ Milshtein and Semeiko, *op. cit.*

³⁸ A. Gridoryants, "The Aim Is to Deepen Detente," *Izvestiia*, December 28, 1976.

³⁹ Editorial, "Neither Respite, Nor Pause," *Za Pubezhom*, No. 24, 1975.

military confrontation of the nuclear powers was likely to escalate because "it is totally futile to expect the great powers' nuclear parity to 'neutralize' this threat."⁴⁰ Not only did the U.S. try to lower the threshold on or resort to nuclear weapons, but it also sought to lower another threshold, that of using strategic nuclear forces for tasks "formerly entrusted to operational-tactical nuclear forces," and this was said to be "an extremely dangerous symptom from the viewpoint of the possibility of a subsequent escalation of nuclear war."⁴¹ While all military conflicts between the two superpowers were said likely to escalate into an all-out war, conflicts waged with conventional forces were less likely to lead to this result than those waged with nuclear forces. Furthermore, it was noted, by making the use of low-yield nuclear weapons more acceptable, the U.S. risks encouraging "near-nuclear" countries to cease observing the nuclear war proliferation treaty and would encourage both the spread of and the resort to nuclear weapons.⁴² At the same time, however, it was also claimed that the destructiveness of modern conventional weapons is such that they facilitate escalation to the use of nuclear weapons,⁴³ and it was noted that the U.S. was investing heavily in improving its own and NATO's conventional capabilities.⁴⁴

⁴⁰Milshtein, op. cit.

⁴¹See Svyatov and Semeiko, in "Certain New Trends in the Development of U.S. Military-Strategic Concepts," op. cit. See also L.S. Semeiko, "From the Pentagon's Viewpoint," Krasnaia Zvezda, January 27, 1976.

⁴²Semeiko, Krasnaia Zvezda, April 8, 1975.

⁴³Ye. Primakov, "Disarmament Is a Problem of Paramount Importance," Novoye Vremia, No. 33, August 1975; V. Berezin, Radio Moscow, August 22, 1973.

⁴⁴Captain G. Svyatov, "The 'One and a Half Wars' Concepts," Krasnaia Zvezda, October 15, 1976; V. Kuznetsov, "Confusion Among Enemies of Detente," Za Rubezhom, No. 50, December 1976, p. 3; E. Cheporov, "A Bomb in Your Inside Pocket," Literaturnaia Gazeta, December 15, 1976; Grigoryants, op. cit.; D. Proektor, "Dangers, Real and Imaginary," Pravda, January 8, 1977; Colonel M. Ponomarev, "Reliance on Fear," Krasnaia Zvezda, January 23, 1977.

For all the dire warnings of the possible dangerous consequences of limited wars initiated by the West, Soviet spokesmen recognized that while the threat of all-out nuclear war had diminished, the occurrence of limited wars had not. Brezhnev himself declared that it is only "realistic" to expect that "wars and acute international crises are far from being a matter of the past."⁴⁵ In his book, Europe and Nuclear Weapons, published in 1972, Marshal of the Soviet Union Yefremov also affirmed the possibility of the occurrence of "limited wars." At the same time, other spokesmen speak of cases where the Soviet Union might be called upon to furnish "military support to those nations fighting for their freedom and independence,"⁴⁶ which was about as close as they came to admitting publicly the possibility of the Soviet Union initiating the use of military force.

D. SEEKING TO NIP IN THE BUD

Far more revealing than direct commentaries of the nature, depth, and ramifications of Soviet concern over possible U.S. development of a flexible options strategy, and more particularly of new weapons capabilities for such a strategy, was a sustained Soviet diplomatic-propaganda campaign, together with leadership pronouncements in connection with the campaign, aimed at inducing the U.S. to forego such developments. While the campaign was not geared directly to the flexible options issue as such, its stated rationale and the specific categories of new weapons against which it was targeted made clear that the Kremlin feared the U.S. had settled on, or might well settle on, just such a solution to its assumed strategic impasse. Moreover, the timing of the campaign indicated that Moscow, in contrast to its initial somewhat calm reaction to the "Schlesinger doctrine," had come to the belief that there was a real danger the U.S. might indeed be seeking a significant unilateral advantage.

The campaign focused heavily on securing U.S. agreement to a ban on the development of new weapons, including specifically new weapons of a type that would be especially needed for a flexible options strategy. In broad terms, two sets of themes were put forward as integrals of the campaign: (1) a set encompassing a variety of warnings as to the dangers and possible fatal consequences of the U.S. pursuing an "options course," and (2) a set designed to demonstrate that the Soviet Union has no hostile intent that would justify

⁴⁵ Pravda, October 27, 1973.

⁴⁶ V.M. Kulish, "On Aid to National-Liberation Movements," Voyennaya Sila i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia (Moscow: International Relations Publisher, 1972).

the course and that consequently it would be the height of folly for the U.S. to incur the great risks and high political and economic costs that would be involved. In support of this last, Moscow put forward various complementary proposals which ostensibly involved mutual obligations and benefits, e.g., on declaratory "non-first use" and "non-use" commitments and test ban refinements, but which, given Soviet-U.S. political asymmetries, would have no impact within the USSR and the socialist camp while greatly strengthening opposition to weapons development in the U.S. and allied countries.

Brezhnev inaugurated the diplomatic effort for the new weapons ban in his "election speech" of June 13, 1975, when he said it was "becoming more acute and more urgent every day" for states, "and first and foremost the great powers, to conclude an agreement on the ban of manufacturing new categories of mass destruction weapons, and new systems of such weapons." In September 1975, the USSR formally tabled a draft for such an agreement at the UN General Assembly. Key provisions of the draft were: (1) Contracting parties would undertake "not to develop and not to produce new types of mass destruction weapons or new types of systems for such weapons." (2) "If any party to this agreement suspects violations," consultations shall be held. (3) If consultations "do not lead to results acceptable to the two sides, the states harboring suspicions can complain to the UN Security Council." (4) Complaints "must contain evidence confirming the grounds for the complaint." (5) Each party "undertakes to cooperate in the holding of investigations by the Security Council."⁴⁷ Western observers quickly charged that an agreement along those lines would be completely one-sided. Western arguments went as follows: the USSR never reveals information regarding its plans and activities in the weapons development field until after the efforts involved have been carried to a conclusion. On the other hand the U.S., because of constitutional processes, engages in a considerable public airing of nearly all its forward projects. Thus, it would be impossible for the U.S. to secure and present "evidence" to back up "suspicions." The USSR in contrast would be able to get evidence for an endless series of fishing expeditions from merely reading U.S. newspapers.

After months of generalities, Brezhnev, in his speech on February 24, 1976 to the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, revealed for the first time that U.S. Trident and B-1 plans were immediate objects of the Soviet "ban on new weapons" effort.

⁴⁷ For text of the draft see Pravda, September 2, 1975.

In Tula on January 18, 1977 Brezhnev said that "the Soviet Union has offered to the United States to refrain on a mutual basis from the development of new types of submarines and strategic bombers."⁴⁸ Meanwhile, other Soviets indicated that the projected U.S. cruise missiles were included among the weapons covered by the ban proposal. Red Star on April 4, in a story on U.S. test-firing of such missiles, mentioned them in the context of the ban, and a TASS release on April 21 explicitly asserted that the ban "also refers to the cruise missile." (Other commentaries, however, discussed the cruise missile primarily in the SALT context.) Meanwhile, Soviet diplomacy maintained its pressure for the proposal in international organizations. The 1975 General Assembly sent the item for discussion to the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, after which it was discussed once more in the 1976 General Assembly.

Taking the May 28 signing of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as a point of departure, Pravda on June 5 published a major article calling for the U.S. to meet various Soviet disarmament demands, including especially those for a ban on new weapons development. Of the cruise missile, it said:

"American congressmen were originally persuaded to appropriate money for building the cruise missile under the pretext that another 'bargaining card' was needed in talks with the USSR. As a result the United States is now testing a cruise missile which can be launched either from carrier-aircraft, from surface ships, or from submarine torpedo tubes and has strategic range. Some American writers call this missile an independent 'fourth strategic weapons system' supplementing the existing 'triad' of ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers."⁴⁹

To this it was added that: "The United States' stubborn aspiration to exclude long-range cruise missiles--a strategic weapons system--from an agreement while at the same time incorporating in it a Soviet system [i.e., the Soviet Backfire bomber] which is not, is seen by many American specialists as the thing which is complicating the possibility of formulating the final text of an agreement." The article itself heavily belabored the innocence of Backfire.

⁴⁸ Pravda, January 19, 1977.

⁴⁹ G. Trofimenko, "An Important Task," Pravda, June 5, 1976.

Over the next 12 months the focal point of Soviet pressures shifted from the new weapons ban to SALT, which had been in seeming limbo since Vladivostok. However, interwoven in Soviet positions on SALT were demands regarding precisely the same specific weapons on which Brezhnev and others have targeted in the ban campaign: namely, Trident, the B-1 and cruise missiles. The tactic was, of course, to get at these weapons on grounds that they were "strategic," while still leaving them subject to condemnation on grounds that they represented "new and even more destructive systems."⁵⁰

E. DIRECT FOCUS ON THE FLEXIBLE OPTIONS ISSUE

Clearly intended to provide ammunition for a variety of facts of the Soviet diplomatic-propaganda campaign against new weapons development in support of a U.S. flexible options strategy, a conference on "Certain New Trends in the Development of U.S. Military-Strategic Concepts" was held in Moscow by leading Soviet Americanologists and was reported in the April 1976 issue of SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, monthly journal of the USA Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The major message of participants was that the U.S. was seeking to alter its doctrine of "realistic deterrence" and to develop more flexible strategic means and responses which it hoped would be more effective in support of its foreign policy. The American search for new strategic concepts was said to be the consequence of a variety of factors, prominent among which are "the consequences of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam." But cited as the "principal, determining factor, exerting a decisive influence," was "the further shift in the correlation of forces in the world, including the military-strategic sphere," in favor of the Soviet Union.

Apparent throughout the discussion was an evident concern that the U.S. was seeking means to defend better its "vital interests," which were said to remain undefined and therefore to generate "uncertainties," and that the U.S.' aim was to position itself to embark on a "tougher" foreign-military policy in the future. This concern was particularly related by conferees to the "concepts advanced by former Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger" regarding "flexible military options" which would add "yet another kind of war--'limited strategic nuclear war'--to the spectrum of nuclear wars accepted by the realistic deterrence doctrine." Echoing earlier Soviet commentaries on these concepts, the focus at the conference was on the possibility that the U.S. might shift from a deterrence-retaliatory strategy and non-initiation of use of nuclear weapons--which allow the Soviet Union to base its strategic doctrine

⁵⁰ Brezhnev's words at the 25th Party Congress.

on a Soviet first-strike and its foreign political doctrine on assumptions of an increasingly paralyzed U.S. in the world arena--to a selective U.S. first-use of nuclear weapons, and the possibility of the development of a capability, and doctrine, to make use of strategic nuclear weapons, particularly against selected Soviet military targets, in connection with theater or other limited conflicts.

Among the specific points developed at the conference were that the new U.S. "retargeting doctrine provides for an increase in the flexibility and feasibility of the use of strategic nuclear weapons in war"; that the U.S. was shifting its targets, i.e., a "return to the traditional-- so-called 'counterforce'-- rules of struggle"; that the U.S. was striving for strategic delivery vehicles in a variety and with a degree of accuracy as to allow "some part of the strategic nuclear forces" to be assigned to "missions formerly entrusted to operational-tactical nuclear forces" and hence to revive the usefulness of military force as an instrument of policy.

A sub-theme of the conference was that U.S. efforts to attain new, more flexible means of utilizing force would be unsuccessful because of Soviet countermeasures. Along the same lines, a number of Soviet spokesmen attempted to demonstrate that the U.S. cannot hope "to win" in new arms endeavors against the USSR, whatever direction these should take. While Colonel General A.I. Koldunov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, told *Izvestiia* on April 11, 1976 that "I do not want to minimize the danger of new means of attack," including cruise missiles, a more typical position was broadcast to North America on April 10 which declared that "some Pentagon leaders and politicians under their influence appear to think that the cruise missile can change the balance of strength in favor of the United States" but "again and again the Soviet Union has shown it is not to be beat militarily. It has the industry, the natural and labor resources and the scientific and technological potential to protect its security."

F. FLEXIBLE OPTIONS AND NEW WEAPONS

While ardently seeking to deter the U.S. from the development of new weapons, the Soviet leadership made clear (a) its own unshakable intention to strengthen constantly the armed forces of the USSR "by every means"⁵¹; (b) its conviction that at this stage the key to this was a shift "from the plane of the numerical buildup of 'big battalions' into the plane of developing and qualitatively

⁵¹ Brezhnev, "Report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU," *Pravda*, March 31, 1971.

improving new hardware"⁵²; and (c) its consequent recognition that "the qualitative improvement in weapons has acquired unprecedented scale."⁵³

According to the Soviets, this "new round in the arms race" was characterized by "special dimensions and comprehensiveness, for it appeared to include the idea of improving most types of weapons and hardware."⁵⁴ The key point, Soviet commentators said, was the link between a variety of new U.S. weapons with the "limited nuclear war" strategy:

"Ideas being nurtured by U.S. military circles suggest that further advances in the technology of the manufacture of nuclear weapons would, allegedly, make its unilateral limited ('selective') use quite acceptable, without this resulting in worldwide nuclear war."⁵⁵

In this regard, Soviet analysts continued to regard the main thrust in U.S. nuclear weapons programs to be the effort to enhance accuracy against small targets. As a Soviet official wrote:

"Costly research is being carried out into further increasing the destructive capability of nuclear weapons and the accuracy of strategic missiles and their nuclear warheads against small targets..."⁵⁶

In reporting and analyzing the "limited war" aspects of U.S. weaponry development plans, Soviet military writers cited the rearmament of nuclear submarines with Poseidon and Polaris-A3 missiles; the replacement of Minuteman ICBMs with Minuteman-3 missiles; the equipping of B-52 and F-111 bombers with SRAM missiles carrying nuclear warheads "equivalent to approximately 200 kilotons of

⁵²Krasnaia Zvezda, August 24, 1976.

⁵³Communist of the Armed Forces, February 3, 1974.

⁵⁴D. Proektor, "Military Detente: Primary Task," International Affairs, June 1976.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 42.

⁵⁶Ye. Primakov, "Political Detente and the Disarmament Problem," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, No. 10, 1975.

TNT"⁵⁷; the B-1 supersonic bomber, "which will be able to carry 32 such missiles" and was considered by U.S. specialists as "best adapted to the conditions of 'limited nuclear war'"⁵⁸; air-to-ground missiles; and various "winged missiles" (i.e., cruise missiles).

Soviet commentators cited the American press to the effect that "the U.S. Air Force has started training sessions for waging a 'limited nuclear war.'"⁵⁹ A Czech commentator, in addition to citing "U.S. press reports" that "crews of American bombers have begun training according to the new strategic concepts," also specified that according to NATO plans, "employment of tactical atomic weapons should be followed by further hard atomic strikes."⁶⁰ U.S. Strategic Air Command retraining should be completed by early 1976, the author asserted, while "the Army and Navy should also be prepared for the 'small war' concept."

The Soviets discussed U.S. development of air-to-ground missiles from the perspective of their usefulness for limited option purposes: i.e., their ability to penetrate "strong ABM systems" and then destroy "major administrative and industrial centers and military targets."⁶¹ The Soviets included three new U.S. weapons programs in this context. First were "missiles designed for neutralizing and for breaking through an enemy air defense system." The SRAM missile, designed to "knock out air defense guided missile positions and radar stations," was said to be intended for this purpose. The Soviets cited the opinion of "foreign military observers" that the SRAM, "which can be nuclear-equipped," will be very difficult to detect in flight, because of its small reflective surface area and high flight velocity. The SRAM will also be used, the Soviets said (based on U.S. reports), "for making strikes against military industrial installations located some distance away from

⁵⁷ Colonels M. Ponomarev and V. Vinogradov, "The Atlantists' Nuclear Ambitions," Krasnaia Zvezda, July 8, 1975.

⁵⁸ Engineer-Colonel (ret.) A. Smolin, "Counter to the Times," Krasnaia Zvezda, October 16, 1975.

⁵⁹ V. Soldatov, "The 'Concept of Force'--The Opposite of Detente," Sovetskaia Rossiia, June 20, 1975.

⁶⁰ Dusan Rovensky, "Dangerous NATO Plans," Rude Pravo, July 3, 1975.

⁶¹ Major-General V. Zhuraley, "Air-to-Ground Missiles," Krasnaia Zvezda, September 30, 1975.

state borders or front lines." Still in the developmental stage, according to Soviet reports from American sources, was the Asalm program, in which the inertial targeting will be supplemented by a final stage homing device, which will increase accuracy, and, in some instances, make possible the use of conventional rather than nuclear warheads.

Increasingly emphasized in the limited options context was the "winged missile launched from aircraft" and submarines. The Soviets stated that these cruise missiles--ALCMs for the Air Force and SLCMs for the Navy--are designed to "be used to destroy important targets deep in the opposing side's rear to a depth on the order of 2,000 km."⁶² It was said that U.S. specialists working on the Air Force version believed that it is "wholly realistic" to produce cruise missiles with strategic capability by using the most up-to-date miniature turbojet engines and microminiature electronic devices. The Navy's Tomahawk version, which, the Soviets stated, is no larger than a normal torpedo, is designed for launching from the torpedo tubes of submarines and surface ships and from ground and airborne launchers.⁶³ The Soviet military paper Red Star reported the first launch of the Air Force version in early March 1976, and the first successful Navy trial at the end of that month.⁶⁴ The Soviets cited Secretary of State Kissinger as saying that the U.S. already had the potential of deploying 11,000 cruise missiles on existing bombers and transport planes.⁶⁵ The cruise missile, according to the Soviets, featured high guidance accuracy and low altitude, which makes detection by radar stations extremely difficult.⁶⁶ However, the second highest Soviet air defense officer insisted that assertions that the cruise missile is invulnerable is

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Engineer-Colonel L. Neehayuk, "Aims Pursued by the Pentagon," Krasnaia Zvezda, May 5, 1976. According to this author, the Tomahawk's range "might be up to 2500 km."

⁶⁴ V. Vinogradov and B. Berezin, "The Pentagon's Dangerous Actions," Krasnaia Zvezda, April 4, 1976.

⁶⁵ Losev, Radio Moscow, January 2, 1977.

⁶⁶ Zhuralev, op. cit.

"rather more like sheer fiction."⁶⁷ While acknowledging Soviet concern, he stressed that Soviet forces "are capable of struggling against not only existing, but also prospective means of air attack." Moreover, another Soviet military author explicitly noted that "the flight of a cruise missile can be detected from a satellite."⁶⁸

The Soviets, citing U.S. sources, characterized U.S. development of cruise missiles and related weapons as aiming at a "fourth strategic weapons system" (after ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers). Some specialists attempted to portray the new system as "superfluous" in terms of U.S. security, and as unlikely to give the U.S. a "serious advantage over the Soviet Union in military equipment,"⁶⁹ or to change the balance of strength in favor of the United States. Some also contended that U.S. emphasis on the system is designed chiefly for "diplomatic" purposes -- as a bargaining issue in the SALT talks."⁷⁰ The cruise missile was omitted from the Vladivostok agreement, some Soviets asserted, because of U.S. insistence at that time that it is a tactical weapon with a 600 km. maximum range. In fact, they declared, "these apparatuses are so inferior to ballistic missiles" because of their limited speed and range that "until recently nobody abroad even thought of using them as a strategic weapon."⁷¹

Other analysts argued along entirely different lines. They insisted that the U.S. is seriously seeking to achieve unilateral advantages through technological innovation: "The imperialist circles seek to obtain advantages chiefly through further development of technology."⁷² It was said, and the cruise missile was cited as a case of the United States hastening to use scientific-technological progress for the manufacture of new weapons "long before any objective necessity" had arisen.⁷³ They charged that the "Pentagon's intention of making the cruise missile into a new strategic

⁶⁷ Colonel-General A.I. Koldunov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces (PVO Strany), "Radars Scan the Sky," Interview with V. Goltsev, *Izvestiia*, April 11, 1976.

⁶⁸ Neehayuk, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ Valentin Zorin, Broadcast in English to North America, April 10, 1976.

⁷⁰ Valdimir Mostovets, Commentary, TASS, April 21, 1976.

⁷¹ Neehayuk, *op. cit.*

⁷² Proektor, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁷³ TASS, January 6, 1976.

delivery system" is "fraught with serious consequences." Again citing U.S. sources, they pointed out that verification and control are extremely difficult. In the first place, they noted, it is impossible to distinguish strategic from tactical cruise missiles on the basis of external features; second, the testing of tactical cruise missiles can be the forerunner for strategic cruise missiles, thus escaping existing international controls.⁷⁴ Moreover, it was charged that the cruise missile's relative cheapness and simplicity of launch increased the risk of proliferation, especially among small countries. As an overall matter the Soviets contended that U.S. development of the cruise missile will open a Pandora's box. As Director of the U.S.A. Institute Georgii Arbatov warned, "this system is easy to launch, but it is very difficult to do something about the system later on."⁷⁵ And according to others, the system can have a very "dangerous and destabilizing" impact, and can lead to a "further unrestrained strategic arms race, the impossibility of reaching agreement on anything in the disarmament sphere, the growth of mutual distrust and so forth."⁷⁶

Following the June 1976 NATO meeting in Brussels, the Soviets reported alleged U.S. plans to modernize both its nuclear and conventional arsenal, again with emphasis on accuracy. "Some old types of atomic weapons, deemed 'dirty and inaccurate,' will be replaced by 'clean and accurate' ones," Pravda reported.⁷⁷ It also alleged that NATO planned to upgrade delivery means by replacing the "obsolescent" Honest John and Sergeant missiles with the medium-range Lance, the Pershing I with the Pershing II, and by placing "greater emphasis on equipping submarines with the latest missiles." Further, the article charged, U.S. and NATO planners devoted "special attention...to increasing the production of short-range missiles capable of carrying both an atomic warhead and a conventional one."

Along the same lines, it was claimed that a proposal put forward by General Goodpaster for the development of mini-nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe "would enable an attack to be aimed at substantial numbers of diverse military targets and

⁷⁴ Neehayuk, op. cit.

⁷⁵ Broadcast in English to North America, February 23, 1976.

⁷⁶ Vinogradov and Berezin, op. cit.

⁷⁷ Yu. Yasnev, "The Arms Race Is Growing," Pravda, June 18, 1976.

would do less damage to the civilian population."⁷⁸ A Czech commentator asserted that among anticipated new U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are "new types of atomic mines which will be placed in close proximity to borders of the socialist community."

In addition, the Soviets alleged that the United States "frustrated by its inability to achieve success in a protracted military action in Vietnam," in the future might resort to "mobile nuclear weapons which, by making accurate counterforce strikes, would produce a more rapid and successful termination of a conflict."⁷⁹ The Soviets purported to see in these and other similar developments a U.S. design to "make the most effective use of military might at primarily the initial stage of conflicts,"⁸⁰ with projected U.S. battlefield use of "primarily tactical nuclear 'mini-ammunition,'" closely related to the "strategic retargeting" doctrine designed to minimize risk to the U.S. and its allies.⁸¹ All of this, the Soviets charged, was intended by the U.S. to efface the boundaries between nuclear and conventional arms and to promote the idea of the "admissibility" and "controllability" of "so-called small or limited nuclear wars."⁸²

With Schlesinger's ouster as Secretary of Defense, Soviet attention to the option bearing his name dropped although the themes used in the counterarguments reappeared in a new and major campaign against the production and development in Europe of enhanced radiation, neutron, weapons.

⁷⁸Iu. Iakhontov, "Mini-War According to Goodpaster's Prescription," Radio Moscow, February 4, 1974.

⁷⁹Colonel A. Leontyev, "Base Strategy and the Lessons of Vietnam," Krasnaia Zvezda, July 13, 1975.

⁸⁰"Certain New Trends in the Development of U.S. Military-Strategic Concepts," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, No. 4, 1976.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ye. Primakov, "Political Detente and the Disarmament Problem," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, No. 10, 1975.

IV. THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN ON THE NEUTRON BOMB

The Soviet campaign against the neutron bomb was essentially an off-shoot of a broader Soviet effort that dated back to 1972-73 but became especially strong after 1975 to inhibit the United States from any attempt to use its admittedly superior technological capabilities to achieve qualitative improvements in weapons that would have the effect of extending Western military and political options to meet Soviet aggressions or threats of aggression.

The broad Soviet campaign against new weapons was inaugurated by Brezhnev himself who in fact led it in every subsequent phase. Speaking to a meeting of electors to the Supreme Soviet on June 14, 1975, Brezhnev declared that in view of a new "more and more acute and urgent" problem which was facing the world, the major powers should conclude "an agreement on a ban of manufacturing new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons."¹ In September of the same year, the USSR formerly tabled the draft for such a "new weapons ban" treaty to the UN General Assembly.

Brezhnev moved the campaign into its next phase at the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party meeting in February 1976, when for the first time he specified the sort of weapons the Soviet Union had in mind. In his keynote speech at the gathering, Brezhnev declared that "in concrete terms we have proposed an agreement on banning the creation of new and even more destructive weapons systems, in particular new submarines of the Trident type with ballistic missiles and the new strategic B-1 bombers in the United States and similar systems in the Soviet Union"² which, however, Soviet spokesmen have never identified. Supplementing this proposal, Brezhnev also called for a world treaty on non-use of force and particularly of nuclear weapons. In April 1976, following the U.S. Navy's first successful test of a cruise missile, Soviet spokesmen began to add the cruise missile to the list of weapons to be included in Brezhnev's roster of new weapons which should be banned. Throughout that year, Moscow sought to generate worldwide support for these proposals through a signature campaign for a "Stockholm Appeal" calling for an end to the arms race and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. The campaign was deliberately designed to be reminiscent of the 1950 "ban the bomb" Stockholm Appeal which Moscow claimed had garnered 500,000,000 signatures. Moscow complemented this propaganda ploy with new diplomatic efforts, submitting in September 1976 to the General Assembly a draft of the treaty on non-use of force which Brezhnev had

¹ Pravda, June 15, 1975.

² Pravda, February 25, 1976.

first suggested at the Party Congress and convening a meeting of the Warsaw Pact in November 1976 where the same proposal applying specifically to Europe was put forward.

Beginning in July 1977, barely one month after the Western press revealed that work on a neutron bomb was being proposed as an item in the new U.S. defense budget, Moscow began to direct its campaign against U.S. development of new weapons mainly against the neutron bomb. This was doubtless in part because events had largely outrun the first prime concern of the USSR. Development of the Trident submarine had become a fait accompli; President Carter had all but eliminated prospects of development of the B-1; and it appeared likely that SALT II negotiations would all but castrate the cruise missile. But a second consideration was clearly a Soviet calculation that the neutron bomb's peculiar qualities, at least as publicized in the Western press, lent themselves to a more dramatic public agitation campaign which could then be used to generate opposition to U.S. and NATO modernization policies generally.

A. 1977: THE MOUNTING "PEOPLES," DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN

The Soviet campaign appeared designed initially primarily to discourage the Carter Administration from appropriating funds for initial R&D efforts for the bomb, and if this failed to prevent a decision to go ahead with production. Soon, however, the main focus was shifted to generating European opposition to the weapon. While this objective had occupied an important place in Soviet calculations from the very beginning, it became central as it became evident that differences were developing between the U.S. and its NATO partners about the acquisition and deployment of the neutron bomb. To exacerbate these differences, Moscow combined a truly massive "peoples" campaign against the bomb together with a determined diplomatic effort in which Brezhnev again played the leading role.

Beginning on July 19, one Soviet international front after another formally protested against U.S. development of the bomb. These protests were climaxed on July 27 when the foremost of these organizations, the World Peace Council (WPC), announced that an "International Week Against the Neutron Bomb" would be held from August 6 to 13 to dovetail with annual commemorations of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On July 28, the Soviet Peace Committee became the first of a succession of Soviet organizations which for days thereafter chimed in with separate but orchestrated protests. On August 9, the front page of Pravda featured an appeal by 28 national communist parties against production of this "barbaric" weapon by the United States. Hardly had this initial campaign reached a climax when the WPC Presidium met in East Berlin from September 9 to 12 to issue an "urgent appeal" for "militant

actions all over the world against the neutron bomb and all other weapons of mass annihilation" to be conducted during the period from 1 to 15 October.³ Throughout the rest of 1977 and the first weeks of 1978, the Soviet press almost daily carried reports of protests in the U.S., Western Europe and other areas of the world against the bomb. The Soviet listener or reader was given the impression that the issue of the neutron bomb had become one of the most acute and pressing in public discussions throughout the world, with the intensity of feeling steadily mounting.

Late in 1977, Moscow began to interlock with the mass appeal campaigns carefully tailored diplomatic efforts to intimidate and influence governments. The first step had come on November 2 when Brezhnev, in his speech on the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, declared: "Today we are proposing a radical step: that agreement be reached on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all states--all such weapons whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles."⁴ His call at the same time for a moratorium on all nuclear testing was also applicable to neutron bombs. Then in a December 24 interview in Pravda, Brezhnev sought to give the impression that the USSR was undertaking diplomatic efforts in response to the public outcry against the bomb: "The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to the development of the neutron bomb. We understand and wholly support the voice of billions of people throughout the world who are protesting against it." Brezhnev then proposed in the interview to the Western powers that "we move to reach agreement on a mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb."

Next came in January 1978 a series of Brezhnev-signed letters to select signatories of the Helsinki Agreement. These set forth Soviet arguments against the bomb; warned in the spirit of the Khrushchev-instigated "Sputnik terror" letters of the late fifties of the consequences if it were deployed in Europe; and proposed that negotiations get under way on his December 24 proposal for a mutual renunciation agreement. Specific arguments against the neutron bomb were echoes of others used to discourage both the U.S. and Western Europe from developing limited nuclear options. Thus special efforts were concentrated on refuting the contention, put forward among others by President Carter, that the neutron weapon is a tactical weapon. It was argued inter alia that the bomb is instead an advanced-type, strategic-type of special horror and that

³ East German ADN International Service, September 12, 1977.

⁴ Pravda, November 3, 1977.

attempts to characterize it as tactical aim at simply lowering the "nuclear threshold." Thus Brezhnev in his December 24 Pravda interview charged:

"This inhuman weapon, especially dangerous because it is presented as a tactical, almost innocent one, is now being persistently foisted upon the world. Thereby, attempts are being made to erase the distinction between conventional and nuclear arms, to make the transition to a nuclear war outwardly, so to say, unnoticeable for the peoples."⁵

B. THE SOVIET ARGUMENTS

A Pravda editorial on January 25, 1978 purportedly summing up the worldwide campaign of protest stated even more pointedly:

"In recent months, the danger has been looming over mankind in connection with the U.S. and NATO plans to start the production of the neutron bomb and deploy it in Western Europe. The advocates of this aggressive weapon, which kills people but leaves material values intact, are hypocritically trying to present it as a tactical and even harmless weapon. Thereby, they are trying to reduce the difference between conventional and nuclear weapons and lower the threshold of nuclear war."⁶

In other variations of this point, Soviet commentators denied that the neutron bomb would be simply a battlefield weapon. Izvestiia on July 26, 1977 declared that "the biggest lie connected with the neutron bomb is the attempt to pass it off as an innocent toy which in terms of destructive power is considerably inferior to well-known types of nuclear arms and is, allegedly, not a strategic but a tactical weapon which does not in any degree alter the current military balance in the world."⁷ Pravda on August 10 stated that "the defenders of the new weapon have hinted that, since its effect is restricted both territorially and temporally, it can be used considerably earlier in any conflict which has begun than other types of hydrogen bombs and shells since it is, on the one hand, in a

⁵ Pravda, December 24, 1977.

⁶ Editorial, "No! To the Neutron Bomb," Pravda, January 25, 1978.

⁷ V. Kobyshev, "The Pentagon Is Pushing the Neutron Bomb," Izvestiia, July 26, 1977.

a way a nuclear weapon and, on the other, in a way a non-nuclear weapon. In other words the nuclear threshold, they say reassuringly, is lowered considerably, supposedly without the threat of a general nuclear cataclysm."⁸

Soviet commentaries did not reply to the arguments they cited on the basis of any technical qualities, although a few articles did inform the Soviet reader of the actual range of projected neutron warheads. Thus the youth newspaper *Komsomolskaia Pravda* on August 9, 1977 noted that after detonation, a "shift of intense radiation is formed which destroys everything living within a radius of 600 meters."⁹ *Red Star* on September 7 gave a slightly different description. According to its data, after the explosion, "the shock wave and light radiation causes total destruction in an area of 200-300 meter radius." The dose of neutron irradiation at a distance of 800 meters is almost lethal while "at a distance of 1400 meters from the epicenter of an explosion, produced at an altitude of 130 meters, the irradiation dose is 200 times less. However, as foreign specialists surmise, half of the victims of this will perish within a month."¹⁰

An ancillary argument was made by Moscow to the effect that European expectation that the neutron weapons will be cheaper is ill-founded. Thus *Red Star* in August noted that "in attempts to make the neutron 'attractive' in the eyes of American and West European taxpayers, Washington asserts that the bomb will be cheaper than existing types of weapons and that its adoption as armament will have an almost beneficial effect on the West European states' budgets, which are burdened by inflation, deficits, and other financial and economic problems." *Red Star* claimed that the same argument was used in the fifties to justify the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons and added "we can be certain that if the neutron bomb is adopted...the sad lessons of the fifties will repeat themselves."¹¹

It was presumably to refute the argument about the limited range of neutron bombs that Brezhnev in his round-robin letter in January argued that the weapon would hit "huge masses of population"

⁸G. Ratiani, "Operation Neutron Bomb," *Pravda*, August 10, 1977.

⁹V. Pakhomov, "The Humane Murderer," *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, August 9, 1977.

¹⁰M. Pavlov, "The Neutron Bomb and Its Admirers," *Red Star*, September 7, 1977.

¹¹A. Yefremov, "The Neutron Bomb: Myths and Reality," *Red Star*, August 14, 1977.

and projected its future combination with longer range delivery systems or with means of greatly enhancing its power.

While constantly repeating that the neutron bomb is a weapon of mass destruction, the main thrust of the Soviet argument as put succinctly by the World Peace Council on September 12 was that "production of the neutron bomb would project the world into a qualitatively new stage of the arms race, which would increase the danger of the initial use of nuclear weapons."¹² Beyond this, the argument ran, any use of nuclear weapons, whether neutron or not, will inevitably escalate to a total nuclear war. Thus Izvestiia on July 26 said that sober-minded Americans realize that the neutron bomb "could bring a nuclear catastrophe closer and could become a detonator of nuclear war."¹³ In a longer version of this thesis, Soviet Major General Rair Simonian wrote:

"Past wars show convincingly that it has never been possible to confine them within planned bounds. No sooner is a nuclear weapon used in a tactical zone than it will be employed strategically. The laws of war are inexorable. The aggressor unleashes war to bring his victim to his knees, to impose his will upon the victim. But he knows that the same fate awaits him if he himself loses the war. And so every belligerent country, irrespective of whether it is attacking or defending itself, will not stop short of anything to win and will not admit defeat until it has spent the entire arsenal of weapons at its disposal."¹⁴

Meanwhile, Moscow made clear that its prime concern was that the U.S. and NATO were seeking to change the balance of forces in Europe. It had long been the Soviet contention that strategic parity exists not only between the USSR and U.S., but between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Thus, Brezhnev told the 25th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1976 that Soviet proposals at the Vienna talks on MBFR "are based on the only realistic approach of preserving the existing relation of strength, in effect one of equilibrium, in the center of Europe."¹⁵

¹² East Berlin ADN International Service, September 12, 1977.

¹³ V. Kobysh, "The Pentagon Is Pushing the Neutron Bomb," Izvestiia, July 26, 1977.

¹⁴ Major General Rair Simonian, "The Pentagon's Nuclear Strategy," New Times, No. 35, August 1977.

¹⁵ Pravda, February 25, 1976.

Instead of this, wrote Red Star in August 1977, "behind the ballyhoo on the imaginary 'threat from the East' it is not difficult to discern the desire of certain U.S. circles and NATO leaders to achieve changes in the existing balance of forces in Europe. Representatives of these circles in the Senate...claim that the neutron bomb, 'by strengthening its nuclear arsenal, would have a decisively important significance for NATO.' Thus it is a matter of nothing less than attempts to achieve clear superiority."¹⁶ Accordingly, several commentators stressed, the neutron bomb is not a matter of "NATO modernization" but of introduction of a major new weapon with far-reaching consequences.

C. SPECIAL FOCUS ON GERMANY

Far from enhancing the security of Western Europe, Moscow constantly contended, possession of the neutron weapon posed special dangers especially for Germany. Thus, according to Red Star on December 11, deployment of the weapon in Europe "would inevitably destabilize the strategic situation in Europe."¹⁷ Speaking more cryptically, Brezhnev on December 24 "presumed" that Europeans opposed the bomb because "it will hardly suit them if an additional dangerous load is placed on this common roof of theirs, which as it is, caves in under the huge weight of weaponry."

With respect to Germany, TASS on July 31 attributed to influential forces in West Germany the thought that deployment of neutron weapons in the FRG "will not strengthen the security of the FRG a bit, but on the contrary will increase the danger of a nuclear conflict with fatal consequences for the FRG." Izvestiia on September 1 in a purported roundup of European reaction to the neutron bomb reported a particularly "stormy" reaction in Germany because of the "intention to make West Germany the most probable theater for the use of the new inhuman weapon."¹⁸

An interesting variant that appeared from time to time in Soviet commentaries was that what makes deployment of the neutron bomb so hazardous is that it is to take place on the borderline between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Thus a TASS political observer said European concern about the neutron bomb was justified because:

¹⁶A. Yefremov, "The Neutron Bomb: Myths and Reality," Red Star, August 14, 1977.

¹⁷Yu. Kornilov, "Neutron Gamble," Red Star, December 11, 1977; Pravda, December 24, 1977.

¹⁸V. Pshenkin, L. Volodin, "Europe Is Not a Firing Range for Neutron Bombs," Izvestiia, September 1, 1977.

"It is obvious that the plans about the neutron weapon cannot be regarded only as plans for another round of modernization of the NATO forces in Western Europe. The point is actually that a new system of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, a subtle weapon that is extremely cruel and inhuman, is to be deployed in Western Europe close to the borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."¹⁹

In an obvious bid to turn West Europeans against the U.S., Moscow printed an article by a leading military writer in its major publication aimed at foreign audiences, New Times, which stressed the argument that the neutron bomb and cruise missiles are part of a U.S. effort to develop a doctrine of tactical nuclear warfare designed "for a definite purpose: to confine the use of offensive nuclear weapons to Europe if a military conflict breaks out and thus divert the retaliatory blow from the United States." He declared that this was a re-run of past U.S. efforts especially in connection with the concept of flexible response which the Soviet Union had frustrated by "the policy of constraining imperialism's nuclear preparations."²⁰

D. THREATS OF SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES

In this connection, Moscow strongly denied that deployment of the neutron bomb would improve Western deterrence. New Times in early December rejected the idea that they could become "a mainstay of NATO deterrent doctrine" both on the grounds that the USSR has no aggressive intentions and because "there is no monopoly of new weapons, and people must not provoke the other side, force it to take countermeasures." New Times went on that if these weapons appear in Western Europe, "in order to safeguard its security and that of its allies, the Soviet Union will find something with which to counter the new wonder weapon."²¹ Other commentators cited (generally without attribution) Defense Minister Ustinov's statement in February that "U.S. militarist circles" who think they can achieve supremacy through creation of new weapons of mass destruction "should remember that the economy, science and technology in our country are now at such a high level that we are in a position to create in the

¹⁹Y. Kornilov commentary, Radio Moscow, July 28, 1977

²⁰Major General R. Simonian, "The Pentagon's Nuclear Strategy," New Times, No. 35, August 1977.

²¹Editorial, "The Right to Life," New Times, No. 50, December 1977.

shortest time any type of weapon on which the enemies of peace might care to gamble."²²

With the time for decision nearing in Europe, Brezhnev interjected notes of warning of Soviet countermeasures in his December 24 interview with Pravda and in his letter to various government leaders. In the former, he said that if the bomb were developed in the West, the latter "must clearly realize that the USSR shall not remain a passive onlooker. We shall be confronted with the need of answering this challenge."²³ In the latter, he compared the current situation with that of the atomic bomb implying that the USSR would once again reply in kind. However, one Soviet article hinted that the USSR might seek to develop defenses against the weapon. This article which appeared in Red Star on September 7 cited foreign specialists to the effect that laminated combined plastic materials have proved relatively effective against neutron radiation, with Austrian specialists reported to have "developed a material only 2cm. thick which lets through only one thousandth of neutrons which fall on it."²⁴

E. OTHER PROPAGANDA TWISTS

In marshalling its case against the neutron bomb, Moscow added a variety of politico-propagandist twists to its military-strategic castigations. There were endless references to an alleged threat to detente and to provocation of an upward spiraling of the arms race. There were also constant charges that the West is basing its policies on the "myth" of a Soviet threat and is ignoring Moscow's peaceful intent as expressed in Soviet disarmament proposals, especially those related to the issue such as those calling for no-first-use of nuclear weapons and a ban on new weapons development.

On the most elemental level, Moscow played up "horror stories" about the neutron bomb. In denying the limited scope and functions attributed to it by the West, Moscow sought not only to bolster its attacks on the military aspects of its possible use but to reinforce popular revulsion to the bomb. Within days of Western reporting

²²D. Ustinov, "The Guardian of Peaceful Labor and the Bulwark of Universal Peace," Kommunist, No. 3, February 1977.

²³Pravda, December 24, 1977.

²⁴M. Pavlov, "The Neutron Bomb and Its Admirers," Red Star, September 7, 1977.

about the bomb, Pravda had tagged it with the epithet "diabolical."²⁵ At first, however, Moscow did not make up its mind about what kind of diabolical weapon it was. Thus, TASS on June 27 termed it both a nuclear and "virtually" a chemical weapon.²⁶ While calling it a weapon of mass destruction, TASS on July 25 declared that "if we are to compare the neutron bomb with any existing weapon, we shall see that the Pentagon's new creation is similar in character to chemical or bacteriological weapons, only it is still more sophisticated." TASS also emphasized the "barbarous, inhuman nature" of the weapon.²⁷ The 28 Communist Party appeal called it a "barbaric" weapon "earmarked for the cold-blooded destruction of millions of people."²⁸ The fact that property would survive use of the weapon but not people was continuously attacked as an example of Western callousness. In this regard, Soviet commentaries from time to time wondered how "the U.S. administration which argues so much about human rights, can ask Congress for allocations for a weapon specially intended for the mass destruction of people."²⁹

Soviet propagandists also insisted that deployment of neutron weapons would jeopardize one disarmament effort or another. A number said that it would undermine SALT, others Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, some chances for a complete test ban agreement. One Pravda article suggested that the "specific stimulus for the acceleration of the American operation with the neutron bomb was the Pentagon's desire to oppose possible shifts" at the MBFR talks.³⁰ Bloc delegates also sought to inject the question into the Helsinki review conference in Belgrade.

²⁵G. Vasiliev, "Diabolical Devices," Pravda, June 29, 1977.

²⁶TASS, "On a Dangerous Road," June 27, 1977.

²⁷Y. Kornilov, "Once More About the Neutron Bomb, Its Opponents and Its Advocates," TASS, July 25, 1977.

²⁸Pravda, August 9, 1977.

²⁹"United States Whips Up the Arms Race," TASS, June 28, 1977.

³⁰G. Ratiani, "Operation Neutron Bomb," Pravda, August 10, 1977.

One interesting variant of Soviet argumentation was a warning that deployment of the neutron bomb would enhance the danger of nuclear proliferation. Specifically, according to several Soviet commentators, the whole process might be a backdoor scheme for German acquisition of a nuclear capability. Thus, Pravda wrote on September 7, "it is apparent that certain circles in the West German Bundeswehr are not abandoning hopes of getting accustomed to nuclear weapons, thinking that it will be easier to realize these hopes if these weapons and conventional weapons are equated."³¹

Several other Soviet commentators even saw broader dangers of proliferation. Izvestiia in July 1977 suggested that, because the West intended to treat the neutron bomb as a tactical weapon, "is it necessary to explain what a threat hangs over the world with the mass introduction of this weapon, which is so tempting to use and to which hundreds, if not thousands, of the most varied types of people will acquire access?"³² A Red Star commentator speaking over Radio Moscow on November 9 put it that "an increasing number of people will have a finger on the trigger, so the effectiveness of political control will grow smaller and the risk of unauthorized use greater."³³ The same commentator, speaking on December 19 said that the neutron bomb's "deployment in Western Europe would mean that more countries would find themselves involved with the weapon. This means in effect that the United States would be proliferating a weapon of mass destruction despite repeated official assurances to the contrary."³⁴

F. U.S. AND EUROPEAN HESITANCY: SOURCE OF HOPE

Soviet media for a time presented mixed evidence about how Moscow saw the final outcome of its campaigns against the neutron bomb. Thus Brezhnev's circular note asserted that "doubt and hesitation is still maintained on the political level" and that "irreversible steps" had not yet been taken. Soviet commentaries did not hesitate to take credit for this situation, although these commentaries often suggested that Western military establishments were going ahead with the neutron bomb despite popular opposition.

³¹A. Yefremov, "NATO: Captive of Dangerous Concepts," Pravda, September 7, 1977.

³²V. Kobysh, "The Pentagon Is Pushing the Neutron Bombs," Izvestiia, July 26, 1977.

³³Viktor Berezin commentary, Radio Moscow, November 9, 1977.

³⁴Viktor Berezin commentary, Radio Moscow, December 19, 1977.

With respect to the United States, despite Congressional votes in favor of appropriations for the bomb, Moscow was consistently encouraged by Administration hesitancy about a full-scale effort. Thus Izvestiia on December 13 declared that "under pressure from the international public, President Carter has twice been forced to put off his decision to start series production of neutron weapons."³⁵ However, Radio Moscow on January 3 noted that he was evasive when asked at his Warsaw press conference for his reaction to Brezhnev's mutual renunciation proposals.³⁶

It was, however, on Western Europe that Moscow appeared to be placing its greatest hopes. According to Pravda in September, for example, "the Pentagon is pressing its hesitant allies to make a decision" but "the United States' West European allies are still hesitating; they are by no means confident of being able to 'handle the political indignation' which the plans for the creation and adoption of the neutron are causing in their countries."³⁷ In October, Pravda once more reported that "the people across the ocean are in a big hurry" and were pressing for a positive decision at the Bari session of the Nuclear Planning Group. But "no agreement was reached in Bari on the neutron bomb. The reason is simple: the NATO countries' capitals fear an even greater explosion of the peoples' indignation."³⁸ When no mention was made of the neutron bomb issue following the NATO meetings in early December, some Soviet commentaries at first suggested that a move was afoot to introduce the weapon surreptitiously in a few selected countries. Later, the line was changed to suggest that silence on the issue was occasioned by continued disagreement within the alliance especially on the part of the Netherlands, Iceland, Denmark and Norway which were said to have been profoundly affected by popular protests.

Brezhnev's circular letter and Moscow's unabated propaganda campaign indicated a Soviet assessment that the USSR could still assert strong influence on West European decisions. Pravda on

³⁵ M. Sturua, "The Shadow of the Neutron Bomb," Izvestiia, December 13, 1977.

³⁶ Sergei Losev commentary, Radio Moscow, January 3, 1978.

³⁷ Y. Zhukov, "The Pentagon Is Hurrying," Pravda, September 17, 1977.

³⁸ Y. Grigoriev, "Maneuvers Around the Bomb," Pravda, October 15, 1977.

January 29, 1978 asserted that "the Pentagon's plan to begin production of the neutron weapon and deploy it in the European NATO countries is the biggest threat to peace at the current stage of international development." Accordingly, it went on, "the policy-makers of world governments, above all the countries of Western Europe, are now faced with a very crucial decision. When making the decision they must heed the views of the people who said 'no!' to the neutron bomb."³⁹

G. THE CARTER DECISION: PERCEPTION OF TRIUMPH

Moscow could hardly believe its good fortune when President Carter on April 7, 1978 announced that the U.S. had decided to deter production of the neutron bomb. The initial Soviet reaction charged that the decision "by no means indicates" that the U.S. was dropping the weapon and denounced Carter's linkage of future U.S. action with Soviet arms restraint.⁴⁰ Presumably before he knew of the Carter decision, Brezhnev speaking in Vladivostok on April 7 had scoffed at making the neutron bomb "the subject of bargaining and tying in this weapon with unrelated issues."⁴¹ Izvestiia on April 12 derided the decision as "half-cocked" because it left the issue unresolved. At the same time, Izvestiia began to portray the move as a retreat and to direct attention to the disarray the decision was causing in Western ranks:

"On the one hand, in taking its action the White House evidently took into consideration the broad public opposition to neutron weapons on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as the lack of unity among its West European partners. In this sense the decision to postpone and not to approve was somewhat unexpected, and, to judge from comments in the West European press, it has elicited a muffled critical reaction in NATO military circles and among some politicians. On the other hand, the very half-cocked nature of the action, which singled out as the chief factor the possibility of revising the position in favor of producing neutron weapons, is designed to appease the displeasure of die-hards in America itself. The result could be foreseen. Whereas true champions of detente justly accuse the

³⁹V. Korionov, "The International Week," Pravda, January 29, 1978.

⁴⁰TASS, April 8, 1978.

⁴¹Pravda, April 8, 1978.


U.S. Administration of the inadequacy of the announced measure, which by no means removes the danger of neutron weapons, ministers of the arms race religion almost anathematize President Carter. One of them, Senator S. Nunn, speaks of 'a big mistake which will harm NATO' and U.S. national security."⁴²

Two weeks later, Brezhnev moved in for the diplomatic kill in a speech to the Young Communist League Congress. Calling the Carter decision a "half measure," he announced that "taking such a statement by the President into account, we will not begin production of neutron weapons either, if the United States does not do so."⁴³

Although Moscow remained uneasy about the fact that the U.S. had not renounced neutron bombs, it is clear from subsequent Soviet commentaries that the Kremlin has been convinced that the main motive for the Carter decision was the pressure campaign that the Soviet Union mounted against deployment of the weapon in Europe. It is the success of that campaign which has, in turn, encouraged the USSR to consider comparable efforts against other U.S. and NATO weapons systems, particularly the decision on Pershing II and cruise missiles.

⁴²S. Kondrashov, "Half-Cocked Decision," *Izvestia*, April 17, 1978.

⁴³*Pravda*, April 26, 1978.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

V. THE NATURE AND COURSE OF THE CURRENT SOVIET CAMPAIGN

The Soviets have for more than two years been engaged in a campaign to forestall any meaningful program to effect a modernization of NATO theater nuclear forces. The first phase of the campaign until the NATO decision in December 1979, combined a series of carrots and sticks designed to induce the Europeans not to adopt a decision to deploy U.S. Pershing II missiles and Tomahawk crisis missiles in Western Europe.

The first phase was slow in getting underway. The Soviet media do not appear even to have noted the Chancellor Schmidt's speech on October 28, 1977 in which he first suggested that NATO would do well to focus on European imbalances in the light of the Soviet-U.S. strategic standoff and its prospective codification by SALT II.

In the first half of 1978, Moscow was focusing more heavily on the neutron bomb issue, on SALT, and on efforts to woo the West Germans, the last-named culminating in a Brezhnev visit to Bonn in May 1978.

Soviet commentators paid only glancing attention to the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons which they knew from Western sources was being studied by a high-level group established by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at its October 1977 meeting in Bari, Italy. Soviet commentaries on that session focused entirely on the neutron bomb question. Articles and statements during 1978 occasionally referred to the other elements of NATO nuclear modernization. Thus Red Star on May 21, 1978 noted in passing that during NATO European discussions, "it is intended to modernize tactical nuclear weapons in order to substantially increase the Atlanticist's nuclear potential in Western Europe."¹

Similarly, the Soviet reaction to the NATO Council decisions of May 1978 on a long-term program for the strengthening of NATO concentrated on the call for military budget increases and other aspects of NATO plans but only sporadically on the question of medium-range nuclear weapons. TASS on June 1 did note a statement by President Carter that the Nuclear Planning Group was examining tactical nuclear modernization projects "including distances." An article in the USA journal in August 1978--commenting on the NATO

¹Colonel M. Ponomarev, "An Unprecedented Program of Militarism Preparations," Krasnaia Zvezda (Red Star) May 21, 1978.

Council decisions--pointed to an "entire network of efforts directed at introducing a new generation of operational and tactical weapons (and to some extent strategic weapons also, considering the capability of some of the new systems in Europe to deliver nuclear weapons on the territory of the USSR)."²

The emergence of the Pershing issue in the FRG Bundestag debate from late January 1979 onward marked the real beginning of a concerted Soviet campaign against NATO modernization. The Soviet media were quick to seize upon the statement by the German Social Democratic Party (SDP) party leader Herbert Wehner on February 3 denying the existence of a Soviet military threat and stating that the Soviet military buildup "is defensive and not aggressive."³ Pravda noted Wehner's statement on February 8 and 10, the latter claiming that FRG "ruling circles" were "increasingly alarmed" about U.S. pressure on the Pershing missile issue and that the "vast majority" of the population in the FRG were convinced of the need for better relations and detente with the issue.⁴

Moscow at this state considered the issue as far from settled in the FRG and appeared to see official FRG reluctance to be the only Western European country to accept U.S. medium-range nuclear weapons as corroborating evidence to this effect. New Times on February 25 specifically noted that Schmidt had "warned against attempts to impose on the FRG in one form or another this role of a vanguard in questions of nuclear strategy."⁵

Za Rubezhom (Life Abroad) on February 22 saw "two distinct lines" inside the FRG on NATO modernization. One of them was said to favor "continuing the detente policy, reaching agreement with the socialist countries on disarmament problems and deepening mutual cooperation." This group, the article suggested, included "numerous" members of the ruling Social Democratic and Free Democratic Parties. The second group included members of the Christian Democrat opposition which favors a "deterrence strategy of pulling tension

²V.V. Zhurkin, "Behind the Scenes of the New Outbreak of the Campaign on the Soviet Threat," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, p. 19.

³Radio Cologne, February 3, 1979.

⁴Vladimir Mikhailov, "A Nuclear Palisade," Pravda, February 10, 1979.

⁵V. Kuznetsov, "The Pentagon, NATO Euromissiles," New Times, No. 9, February 25, 1979.

and of confrontation." The Schmidt government was described as vacillating between these two forces leading it, among other things, to put forward the line of combining NATO modernization with offers to the USSR to negotiate. Za Rubezhom suggested that statements along this line "leave an impression of duplicity and contradiction."⁶

Well before the initial FRG internal debate had run its course, the Soviet leaders sought to influence its outcome directly. In an election speech on March 1, Soviet Premier Kosygin clearly had the FRG in mind when he warned that "a buildup of military preparations" could jeopardize Soviet trade relations with any given country. Such actions, he further stated would cause the USSR "to an even greater extent /to/ orient ourselves to cooperation with those who do not jeopardize long-term interests for the sake of dubious benefits in the immediate situation."⁷

In quintessential good cop-bad cop fashion, Brezhnev on the following day weighed in with a conciliatory proposal for West German benefit recalling previous Soviet statements of willingness to negotiate a reduction of nuclear missiles or other weapons, Brezhnev now specified that "this concerns also medium-range weapons in Europe."⁸ Foreshadowing later Soviet proposals, Brezhnev added that such talks would have to take "due account, of course, for the existence there of American military bases as well."

Brezhnev's speech on the occasion was not devoid of threats to the FRG. Implementation of NATO modernization plans he said, "just as of the plans of the American military in respect to neutron weapons, would result only in a new growth of tension in Europe in a new resurgence of the arms race and also in a drastic growth of the danger to the FRG itself."

On balance, Brezhnev still appeared hopeful that the FRG could be dissuaded from agreeing to NATO modernization plans, noting "voices of protest against this can be heard in the FRG." At this point, however, Moscow's main concern appeared to be the conclusion of SALT negotiations with the United States.

⁶A. Tolpegin, "Deterrent Strategy or Security Through Disarmament," Za Rubezhom, No. 9, February 22, 1979.

⁷Pravda, March 2, 1979.

⁸Pravda, March 3, 1979.

Within days after the May 9, 1979 announcement that negotiations had been completed on SALT II, Moscow signaled its intent to convince the Europeans that the time was now ripe to go in this region from political to military detente with particular focus on the question of NATO modernication.

On May 14 and 15 the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers met in Budapest after which they issued a communique pointing to the "particular danger" of NATO plans and proposing the convening of an all-European conference (plus the U.S. and Canada) to discuss measures for transforming political into military detente.⁹ Evidently concerned that this proposal might suggest reduced Soviet concern about MBFR, Brezhnev in a Budapest speech on June 1 said that the proposed conference "of course, will not replace talks now under way on matters of disarmament" but would impact a more vigorous rhythm to them.¹⁰ In a speech in Frunze in August, Politburo member and Party Secretary Konstantin Chernenko declared that "the European continent will most feel the beneficial influence" of SALT. Indeed, he added, this was a talk on which "Leonid Brezhnev, the entire Politburo, the Soviet Government and our diplomatic service are constantly focusing."¹¹

A. LAST-DITCH MOVES BEFORE NATO DECISION

In the last two months before the NATO Council meeting of December 1979, Moscow mounted a last-ditch diplomatic and propaganda effort to dissuade NATO members and particularly the FRG, from going along with a decision on emplacement of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Brezhnev himself led the Soviet campaign in a series of overtures in various forms.

The first of these came in Berlin on October 6, when Brezhnev expressed the USSR's "serious concern" regarding NATO's "dangerous plans for the deployment of new types of American nuclear missile weapons in the territory of Western Europe." Brezhnev enunciated most of the major themes that have featured the Soviet campaign against NATO's plans.

He charged, first of all, that "implementation of these designs would change essentially the strategic situation on the continent." For the Soviet part, Brezhnev denied that the Soviet Union was seeking military superiority.

⁹ Pravda, May 16, 1979.

¹⁰ Pravda, June 2, 1979.

¹¹ TASS, August 15, 1979.

"The assertions that the Soviet Union is building up its military might on the European continent above its defense needs have nothing in common with reality. This is a deliberate deception of the broad public."¹²

Further, Brezhnev invoked his position as Chairman of Defense Council of the USSR to claim:

"The number of medium-range carriers of nuclear arms on this territory of the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by a single missile, by a single plane during the past ten years. On the contrary, the number of launchers of medium-range missiles and also the yield of the nuclear charges of these missiles have even been somewhat decreased. The number of medium-range bombers, too, has diminished. As to the territory of other states, the Soviet Union does not deploy such means there at all. It is already for a number of years that we are not increasing the number of our troops stationed in Central Europe as well,"

Then, aiming squarely at the forthcoming NATO decision, Brezhnev announced Soviet "willingness" to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear means deployed in western areas of the Soviet Union as compared to the present level if no additional medium-range nuclear means are deployed in Western Europe.

In addition, Brezhnev said he wanted to confirm solemnly that "the Soviet Union will never use nuclear arms against those states that renounce the production and acquisition of such arms and do not have them on their territory." This proposal had first been made on a worldwide basis in a message by then Premier Kosygin on February 1, 1966 as a proposed article in the non-proliferation treaty then under negotiation.¹³ Brezhnev's speech indicated a Soviet intention to use it heavily within the context of current NATO modernization plans.

¹²Pravda, October 7, 1979.

¹³ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1966, Washington, D.C., p. 11

Next, Brezhnev sought to demonstrate Soviet goodwill further by announcing a "unilateral decision to withdraw 20,000 Soviet servicemen and 1,000 tanks from East Germany in the following 12 months." He also modified previous Soviet proposals on modification of military exercises.

At the same time, Brezhnev's speech also contained threats aimed especially at FRG leaders who he stressed faced "a very dangerous choice."

"They will have to decide which is the best for the FRG--to help strengthen peace in Europe and develop peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation among European states in the spirit of good neighborliness and growing mutual confidence, or to contribute to a new aggravation of the situation in Europe and the world by deploying in this territory American nuclear missile arms spearheaded against the USSR and its allies."

Adopting a theme reminiscent of Khrushchev's terror diplomacy, Brezhnev added:

"It is clear that in the latter case, this position of the FRG itself would considerably worsen. It is not hard to see what consequences the FRG would have in store for itself if these new weapons were to be put to use by their owners one day."

On a broader plane, Brezhnev enunciated two other themes: first, that in case NATO plans were put into effect, "we would have in such a case to take the necessary extra steps to strengthen our security" and secondly, that "realization of NATO plans would inevitably aggravate the situation in Europe and initiate in many respects the international atmosphere in general."

Moscow followed up Brezhnev's speech with a short but intensive propaganda campaign at home and abroad. The Soviet-East German communique which concluded Brezhnev's visit to the GDR accused the U.S. and FRG of "playing a dangerous game" in connection with the Euromissile question which could "ultimately increase the risk of nuclear war" and "could not but evoke retaliation measures from the other side."¹⁴ Two days later, a Soviet party-government statement approving Brezhnev's mission declared that NATO members "are still searching for far-fetched arguments in order to carry out NATO's

¹⁴Pravda, October 9, 1979.

dangerous plans" and urged Western leaders to "display a sense of responsibility and respond to the example of the Soviet Union in a spirit of goodwill."¹⁵

At about the same time, Brezhnev sent a letter to NATO members formally putting his proposals before them.¹⁶ Major Soviet propagandists then weighed in with articles and discussions in the Soviet media as well as in Eastern and Western Europe setting forth Soviet arguments against the prospective NATO decision. Two of these propagandists, Central Committee officials Vadim Zagladin and Vladimir Falin in late October attended a so-called European Forum for Disarmament and Security, while Warsaw Pact parliamentarians on October 17 appealed to their NATO counterparts not to accede to the decision.¹⁷

At this stage, Moscow clearly wanted to discourage the notion being emphasized especially by the FRG that NATO should go along a double track, pursue negotiations with the USSR while going ahead with the NATO decision on deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles. Moscow's initial response was to suggest a variety of forums for possible future negotiations, all of which would only come into being in the indefinite future.

Brezhnev in his October 6 speech in Berlin seemed to suggest two such forums: an all-European conference as originally proposed by the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers on May 15, 1979 to meet the "danger" posed by NATO's plans or SALT III which he described as "lying ahead." With respect to the latter, he held out the prospect that talks could begin "immediately after the entry into force of the SALT II treaty" and that "within the framework of these talks we agree to discuss the possibilities of limiting not only intercontinental but also other types of armaments but with due account, of course, for all related factors and strict observance of the principle of the equal security of the sides."¹⁸

Except for a few Soviet commentators who suggested that negotiations should take place in the SALT III context,¹⁹ the major

¹⁵ Pravda, October 12, 1979.

¹⁶ Hamburg, DPA, October 16, 1979.

¹⁷ Bratislava Pravda, October 18, 1979.

¹⁸ Pravda, October 7, 1979.

¹⁹ Aleksandr Bovin in Izvestiia, October 9, 1979; V. Matveev in Izvestiia, October 19, 1979; V. Kuznetsov in New Times, No. 43, October 19, 1979.

focus of Soviet discussions was on reasons why NATO should not take a decision on this medium-range nuclear missile issue. Defense Minister Ustinov, writing in Pravda on October 25, complained that instead of responding to Brezhnev's overture with a counteroffer "to define the basis for talks," the U.S. had demanded of its allies that there be no change in the prepared decisions concerning the deployment in Europe of new U.S. medium-range nuclear devices."²⁰

On November 6, however, Brezhnev shifted ground. In an interview with Pravda, Brezhnev declared:

"As regards a practical solution of the problem of these weapons, there is only one way to follow--that of embarking on negotiations. The Soviet Union is of the view that negotiations must be embarked on without delay. We are prepared for this."

Brezhnev gave no indication of modalities for such talks but a Soviet analysis shortly afterwards did specify that they could take place outside the SALT framework and at a later date within it.²¹ Brezhnev's interview was notably restrained on the relationship between talks and a NATO decision. Brezhnev urged that "no hasty actions be taken" in order to enable "positive results" to come from the talks he was proposing. Further, he noted, "there will be a greater chance of obtaining such results if no decisions are taken on the production and deployment in Western Europe of the above-mentioned means pending the outcome of the negotiations." But if the decisions were taken, he concluded, chances for successful talks "will be undermined."

The Brezhnev interview was followed once more by a series of Soviet articles and interviews in the Western press as well as diplomatic forays by party ideologist Boris Ponomarev to Italy and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Spain and the FRG. Speaking to meeting of Soviet and Italian parliamentarians, Ponomarev described as a "very risky approach" the idea that "it is necessary to decide to deploy the new missiles and only then to start talks with the Soviet Union." Ponomarev said Brezhnev's calls for immediate negotiations were "the only acceptable alternative to the growth of military confrontation on the continent."²²

²⁰ Marshal D.F. Ustinov, "Military Detente Is the Imperative of the Time," Pravda, October 21, 1979.

²¹ D. Proektor in Turin La Stampa, November 7, 1979.

²² Pravda, November 18, 1979.

At a press conference after his talks in Bonn, Gromyko removed the ambiguities from the Soviet position about negotiations. First, he rejected the idea that talks would be possible in case of a NATO decision on deployment. According to Gromyko, "we have openly stated that such a formulation of the matter means political pre-conditions. This destroys the basis for talks."²³

Next, Gromyko for the first time spelled out Soviet objections to SALT III as a possible forum:

"If the SALT III talks concern not only strategic weapons but also medium-range nuclear missile weapons, then you can imagine how much time would be needed for these talks. It would be good if they ended in 7-8 years. And I wonder whether there lurks here a huge threat for Europe and not only for Europe--negotiations going on but no solution achieved. We propose that talks be started immediately without waiting for SALT III."

It should be noted that Gromyko on this occasion committed a faux pas, from the Soviet point of view by suggesting--as he and other Soviet spokesmen otherwise did at length--that U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles were not strategic weapons. At another point during the same press conference, he suggested that SALT III were not supposed to cover "non-strategic weapons," a category in which he also clearly included the medium-range missiles. No one picked up Gromyko on this formulation which in any case was intended as a debating point.

While Gromyko, one week before the NATO decision (on December 5), once more warned that the NATO decision would destroy the basis for talks on nuclear missiles in Europe, Moscow already seemed to accept the inevitability of the NATO decision and to be looking beyond it. Gromyko's November 24 press conference was notable for the mildness of his attitude toward the FRG's intention to agree to the NATO decision. In his prepared statement, Gromyko noted that "unfortunately" the USSR and FRG "have not found a common position on this issue" but emphasized their agreement on economic ties and the need for ratification of SALT II. When asked whether adoption of this "expected" decision by NATO would affect relations, Gromyko said "this is bound to have an effect" which "may be a negative one," an extremely mild statement under the circumstances.

The Warsaw Pact meeting which concluded on December 6, set the stage even more definitely for the next phase of the Soviet campaign.

²³Pravda, November 25, 1979.

Modifying Gromyko's warnings, the Warsaw Pact communique said it was not only adoption of a decision by NATO on nuclear missiles but "implementation of such a decision" which "would destroy the basis for negotiations." The communique expressed "that the NATO countries will give a positive response to the appeal of the socialist countries not to station more nuclear weapons in Europe, to their proposal to embark on negotiations."²⁴

It remains something of a puzzle why Moscow went so far out on a limb and so late in the game with its threats in seeking to dissuade NATO from adopting its decision on medium-range nuclear missiles. The tactic was reminiscent of that adopted in Moscow in seeking to discourage the Japanese from including the Chinese-sponsored clause against hegemonism during negotiations on the Sino-Japanese treaty which was ultimately adopted in August 1978. Despite frequent Soviet threats about the consequences of including such a clause in the treaty, Japan went ahead and the Soviets proceeded then in its relations with Japan as if nothing had happened. At the very least, both the Japanese treaty and the NATO decision experiences suggest limits to Soviet willingness to carry out threats when confronted by firm pursuit of its interests by the West.

In the case of the NATO decisions, other circumstances can also be adduced to explain the comparative mildness of the Soviet response. Moscow was, of course, aware that it would be a matter of at least three years between the NATO decision and its implementation and that new opportunities might open up to dissuade the FRG in particular from going ahead with the decision much as the Adenauer government had agreed to but not implemented by a previous decision on emplacement of Thor and Jupiter missiles in Germany.

The ongoing SALT ratification process in the United States may also have affected Soviet tactics on the NATO decision. Although Soviet propagandists overtly rejected the linkage made by many Europeans between the NATO decision and SALT ratification, Soviet opposition may have been tempered by the realization that the prospective NATO decision was helping generate European pressure for SALT ratification, a major aim at the time of Soviet policy. In this regard, Moscow probably felt it could have it both ways: use of the NATO issue to help get SALT ratification, then use of SALT ratification to generate opposition to a NATO decision on Euromissiles.

Finally, it should be noted that the final stages of Soviet tactics on the NATO decision coincided with planning for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which took place in late December 1979. A major crisis in Western Europe might, in the Soviet view,

²⁴ Pravda, December 7, 1979.

have generated tougher Western responses to the Afghan invasion than in fact took place. Aware that it could not prevent the NATO decision, the Soviet leadership may have seen an opportunity to use it to bolster the Soviet case on Afghanistan. Thus, after the invasion of Afghanistan, Brezhnev, in a Pravda interview, put U.S. countermeasures within the context of pre-invasion actions which he averred, dated back to May 1978 when the NATO Council "approved the automatic growth of the military budgets of NATO member countries as far ahead as the end of the 20th century." Brezhnev then cited a number of other U.S. actions before the Soviet invasion, ending with the NATO decision of December 1979 which he defined as a measure which the U.S. "forced on its NATO allies." According to Brezhnev, "Washington virtually muzzled those of its allies who were inclined to respond positively to the Soviet Union's constructive proposals to hold talks on this matter."²⁵

B. FIRST REACTIONS TO NATO DECISION

Moscow's immediate reaction to the December 12, 1979 NATO decision, when it finally came, was decidedly muted. TASS on the next day declared that "despite broad public protest," NATO had taken the decision "under crude pressure" from the U.S. but said nothing about possible consequences of the decision. Speaking to the French National Assembly on December 16, Soviet ideologist Ponomarev, as summarized by Pravda the next day, merely cited the USSR's intentions "on the nuclear missile issue" without even mentioning the NATO decision. Pravda's first major article on the NATO session appearing on December 17, dealt with the Polish issue. Izvestiia on December 16 reiterated Soviet objections to NATO's efforts to combine rearmament and arms control talks but focused principally on differences among the NATO allies and between the U.S. and NATO.

Presumably stuck with its pre-decision threats, the Soviet Union for the next six months adhered to its opposition to NATO's offer to hold talks on the nuclear missile question. In his January 13 Pravda interview, Brezhnev declared that "the present position of the NATO countries makes talks on this problem impossible" and revealed that "we have formally said as much to the U.S. Government a number of days ago." According to Western sources, the USSR on January 3 had given the U.S. a message formally turning down the NATO offer to negotiate on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.²⁶

²⁵Pravda, January 13, 1979.

²⁶See Hamburg, DPA, New York Times, January 6, 1980.

Until the Schmidt visit to Moscow on June 30-July 1, the Soviet leadership put the question of negotiations on hold. In his election speech on February 18, Gromyko said the USSR would be willing to hold such talks only if the NATO decision "is revoked or if, at least, its implementation is officially halted."²⁷ A European Communist Party conclave held in Paris at the end of April urged the people of Europe to "press for a cancellation of NATO's decision or for suspension of the implementation of these decisions, so that effective talks on the question of medium-range missiles might be started under conditions of equality and equal security."²⁸ The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee reaffirmed this call after meeting on May 14-15.

At the same time, Moscow made a determined effort to keep its lines open, especially to France and West Germany both in connection with the missile issue and in order to defuse opposition in these countries to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko visited Paris on January 24-25, Gromyko followed on April 23-25, and Brezhnev met French President Giscard near Warsaw on May 19. Announcements and communiques following these talks all emphasized the good relations between the USSR and France and their common dedication. The Gromyko visit also brought joint Soviet-French commitment to the notion of a European disarmament conference, a major aim of Soviet policy at the Helsinki review conference later in Madrid.

While the jointly agreed statement following Gromyko's visit avoided the missile issue, Gromyko was much less reticent in a press conference he held following his talks with the French. During his opening statement, Gromyko put the onus squarely on the U.S.

"It is no secret that in Europe the situation has greatly deteriorated above all in connection with an act undertaken by the State which is indeed responsible for this deterioration--scarcely anyone could dispute this statement. That state is the United States and the act is the decision to deploy new types of medium-range nuclear missile weapons in Europe."²⁹

Gromyko then went on to argue the lack of necessity for the NATO decision, especially on the grounds that the Soviet Union does not and cannot represent a threat to anyone. In Gromyko's words;

²⁷ Pravda, February 19, 1980.

²⁸ Pravda, April 30, 1980.

²⁹ Pravda, April 26, 1980.

"What threat allegedly emanating from the Soviet Union can there be if the Soviet Union consistently insists on conducting matters on an equal basis? What threat can come from the Soviet Union, together with its friends and allies, if it is unceasingly making specific proposals aimed at curtailing the arms race and at disarmament...?"

Moscow's next major target was the FRG. As early as December 29, 1979, Pravda noted:

"The missile zigzag has caused a fierce clash at every level of West German society. The point is that the peace-loving potential in that country has become so strong, especially in the detente years, that even those who are ready to return to cold war tomorrow are forced to reckon with it."³⁰

On March 4, Brezhnev (as later revealed by the West German press) sent a relatively conciliatory letter to FRG Chancellor Schmidt in reply to a Schmidt letter of January 31. The NATO decision was mentioned only in passing, with greater emphasis put by Brezhnev on warning the FRG against participating in boycotts against the USSR over Afghanistan. The main point of the letter, however, was Brezhnev's expression of interest in talks with the FRG on "curbing the arms race."³¹

The first stage of this renewed Soviet campaign in Germany came in the economic field, where Moscow saw particular potential for influencing German opinion. According to Pravda on January 19, 1980 "the action of detente's opponents /in the FRG/ are also fettered by the sentiments that have taken root among a considerable section of the country's business circles."³² It cited one FRG businessman, for example, who raised the question "what would happen to the West German economy if, for example, the Soviet Union responded /to Western pressures/ by ending its deliveries of industrial raw materials and fuel?" A few months later, a Soviet analyst pointedly noted that "the West Germans have a substantial dependence on deliveries from the East. Soviet gas meets 14% of the West German economy's requirements. Apart from this the USSR supplies chromium, phosphates, cotton, timber and, on an ever increasing

³⁰V. Mikhailov, "Missile Zigzag," Pravda, December 29, 1979.

³¹Bonn Die Welt, July 26-27, 1980.

³²V. Mikhailov, "Stab in the Back," Pravda, January 17, 1980.

scale, machinery and technology."³³ This last comment came in the context of a long-term economic agreement approved in draft during the visit to Bonn of Soviet Politburo member Nikolai Tikhonov on May 29-31, and finalized during the visit to Moscow by Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher.

C. SWITCH IN POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS

During the Schmidt trip, Moscow pulled out one more stop--changing its position regarding negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The essence of the Soviet proposal as explained by Chancellor Schmidt to the FRG Bundestag on July 3, was that the USSR was willing to engage in bilateral talks with the United States on medium-range nuclear missiles but which would also have to cover all U.S. forward-based systems (FBS) in Europe.³⁴ The Soviets also stipulated that any agreements reached would come into force only after U.S. ratification of SALT II.

Soviet revelation of its change in position came only piecemeal. The joint communique concluding the Schmidt visit stated merely that the two sides had "stated their corresponding positions" on the issues with no details given.³⁵ It was only after Schmidt briefly revealed the details of the Soviet proposal that a Soviet party-government statement the next day (July 4) then also gave details.³⁶

In letting Schmidt take the lead, Moscow may have deferred to his wishes to inform his allies. The procedure also reinforced the image of a serious rather than a propagandistic proposal. In addition, Moscow indicated a certain amount of sensitivity about appearing to have changed its former position that negotiations could take place only if NATO reversed its December 1979 decision. The party-government statement made a point of asserting that the Soviet side had "confirmed its stance, which it put forth earlier, regarding the most correct ways of solving the question on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe." A Pravda editorial on July 8 was more pointed, reiterating that "the best thing would be to start talks on medium-range weapons on the basis which was suggested by the Soviet side last autumn" but then going on:

³³ Radio Moscow "International Observer's Roundtable," June 29, 1980.

³⁴ Radio Cologne, July 3, 1980.

³⁵ Pravda, July 2, 1980.

³⁶ TASS, July 4, 1980.

"Considering NATO's stand, the Soviet Union is also prepared for an alternative version. Without withdrawing the proposals put forward earlier, it could agree to a discussion of issues pertaining to medium-range weapons even before the ratification of the SALT II Treaty."³⁷

One week later another Pravda editorial expressed pique that "someone in the West" was seeking "to misinterpret the position" of the Soviet Union by alleging that it had reconciled itself to the NATO decision "and agreed supposedly to enter into negotiations now virtually on the terms proposed by the West." According to Pravda, "nothing can be more remote from the truth than such assertions."³⁸

For the remainder of the year (and of the Carter Administration) Soviet spokesmen sought to maintain steady pressure on the U.S. to respond to Brezhnev's proposal. TASS on August 27 cited the Washington Post to the effect that Brezhnev "has complained in a letter to President Carter about the West's delay in responding to his willingness to negotiate reductions in medium-range nuclear missiles in organic connection with U.S. forward-based nuclear means." Speaking in Alma Ata on August 29, Brezhnev declared:

"We await a response from the leaders of the Western powers to our proposals. We are ready for practical actions to strengthen peace and make the international situation more healthy and we expect the same from them."³⁹

Moscow reacted with extreme caution and reticence to the October 17 - November 17, 1980 talks between Soviet and American representatives in Geneva on the Euromissile question. At a reception for Ethiopian chieftain Mengistu on October 27, Brezhnev remarked that "we are satisfied by the fact that the Soviet-American talks on curbing the nuclear arms race in Europe have begun at last" and declared that "much depends on the position of the American side, the more so since the results of the talks are in the final analysis linked with the ratification of the SALT II Treaty which is still blocked by the United States."⁴⁰

³⁷ Editorial article, Pravda, July 8, 1980.

³⁸ Editorial, Pravda, July 15, 1980.

³⁹ Pravda, August 30, 1980.

⁴⁰ Pravda, October 28, 1980.

However, the only direct Soviet comments on this phase of the talks took the form of interviews with Eastern European papers by General Staff Gen. Nikolai Chervov (on October 22 in the Bulgarian Rabotnichesko Delo, on October 28 and December 10 in the Czechoslovak Rude Pravo). Chervov emphasized with particular firmness that the negotiations could get off the ground only if U.S. forward-based systems were on the agenda. In his October 28 interview, he flatly stated that "the object of the negotiations must unconditionally be the medium-range means in vital connection with the American forward-based nuclear means." Chervov saw "justified doubts about U.S. sincerity" in U.S. failure to ratify SALT II, its new theories of limited nuclear war and its plans for U.S. rearmament.

In his December 10 interview following conclusion of the first phase of the Geneva talks, Chervov was even more negative. He charged that Western press statements "aimed at discrediting the talks and creating an atmosphere of overt suspicion." He denounced Western silence about Soviet views on the FBS issue and concluded:

"There is a quite obvious difference between the Soviet proposal and the attempt of the United States and the Western press to present the talks as a discussion of the issue confined to the mutual limitation of medium-range nuclear missiles in the European theater. The rickety nature of that attempt can be seen, so to speak, with the naked eye. It is aimed at obtaining unilateral advantages and objectively leads to erecting obstacles in the way of an agreement, instead of leading to achieving one."

On the eve of the new Administration, Foreign Minister Gromyko took a slightly up-beat approach putting in the "category of indisputably positive facts of present-day international life" the inauguration "on the USSR's initiative" of what he defined as "Soviet-U.S. talks on strategic arms limitation in Europe." At the same time, he affirmed that the talks must cover U.S. FBS and that any agreements reached "will be implemented only after the SALT II Treaty comes into force."⁴¹

The term "strategic arms limitation in Europe" obviously fit onto the Soviet argument that Pershing missiles in Europe are strategic and may have been intended as part of a classic Soviet maneuver to use procedural matters such as the definition of talks

⁴¹ A. Gromyko, "Leninist Foreign Policy in the Modern World," Kommunist, No. 1, January 1981, p. 20.

to make a substantive point. However, this appears to have been the only occasion in which this term was used. Conceivably, the Kremlin decided the ploy would be a non-starter as far as the West was concerned.

D. IMPACT OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

With the advent of the Reagan Administration, the Soviet leadership clearly anticipated a harder U.S. line which the USSR could take advantage of in a new campaign directed at Western Europe. One of Moscow's leading writers on German affairs wrote on January 29:

"The United States and leading organs of the North Atlantic Alliance can now see a real threat to the implementation of the well-known resolution adopted at the NATO session of December 1979 in the growing active opposition of the public and political and even some military circles in the European NATO countries to the plans for Europe's 'nuclear upgrading.' They can in no way pass off the storm of protest against the missiles now arising in West Europe as an 'act of Moscow.' So, in Belgium and the Netherlands the governments and majority parties are not dropping their reservations to 'the nuclear upgrading' plan and in the FRG, the Social Democrats are beginning to protest against them with increasing resoluteness."⁴²

The focal point of Soviet efforts at this was the contention that the Europeans had agreed to the NATO decision on the condition that the U.S. would ratify SALT II and that the U.S. was now violating its end of the bargain on SALT. Pravda on January 24 cited with approval a statement by William Borm of the West German Free Democratic Party that because of U.S. failure to ratify SALT II, "the basis agreed on by the Western alliance for NATO's decision to upgrade its armament has to a large extent been violated."

The Soviet Party Congress in February inaugurated still another phase in the Soviet campaign against NATO modernization. In the context of a variety of proposals covering all areas of the world, Brezhnev's heaviest artillery was directed toward discouraging Western Europe from going along with the December 1979 NATO decision on deployment of U.S. medium-range nuclear and cruise missiles in Europe by 1983. Brezhnev proposed an immediate freeze "both

⁴² N. Portugalov, "Atlantic Metamorphosis," Sotsialisticheskaja Industriia, January 29, 1981.

qualitatively and quantitatively" on existing medium-range nuclear facilities pending further negotiations, thereby making permanent the imbalance which spurred the Europeans and the U.S. to take the step in the first instance. In addition, Brezhnev expressed a willingness to include European USSR in an area of confidence-building measures, agreement of which would make possible a European disarmament conference in the context of the Helsinki agreement. He also reaffirmed a previous Soviet call for mutual renunciation of the neutron bomb.

Brezhnev's offer was not unaccompanied by threats as he directly warned the Europeans about the NATO decision:

"This decision is not an answer to an imaginary Soviet challenge, nor a run-of-the-mill modernization of the arsenal as they claim in the West. We have before us an obvious intention to change the existing military balance in Europe to NATO's advantage. It should be clear that the new deployment of new American missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies on the territory of the FRG, Italy, Britain, the Netherlands or Belgium can only affect our relations with these countries, not to mention the damage which will be done to their own security."⁴³

In the next few months, the main target of Soviet efforts was the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) which, much to Moscow's annoyance, completely rejected the moratorium proposal.

The moratorium issue was clearly the focal point for Moscow during West German Foreign Minister Genscher's talks with Brezhnev and Gromyko in Moscow on April 2 and 3. TASS on April 4 noted that "as was clear from Genscher's words /at a press conference/ he continued to hold a negative position with regard to the Soviet proposal on a moratorium."

Three days later in Prague, Brezhnev argued at length the merits of the proposal and sought to answer what was probably Genscher's objection that the moratorium seemed to be a precondition for talks. According to Brezhnev:

"Of course, our proposal on a moratorium is not an end in itself. It was advanced with the intention of creating a more favorable atmosphere for talks."⁴⁴

⁴³ Pravda, February 24, 1981.

⁴⁴ Pravda, April 8, 1981.

Brezhnev denied any "alleged preponderance of Warsaw Pact forces" and argued that if, as Secretary of State Haig was said to believe, the U.S. was concerned about future trends, then "according to the logic of things, and taking into account this assessment of the present situation and the prospects for its development, the leaders of the Western countries should have seized on our proposal with both hands."

In another passage at Prague, Brezhnev pressed the West to at least come up with counterproposals:

"If anyone has any other sensible proposals, we are ready to examine these too. However, frankly speaking, we have so far not noticed any practical readiness for talks on the part of the governments of the Western powers."

And in a gibe undoubtedly directed at Genscher, Brezhnev declared:

"Sometimes we are told that all this is very interesting, but requires lengthy study and, so they say, there is no point in hurrying things. At the same time, they give us to understand that the formulation of a stance depends not on the government in question, but of others--so in other words for the time being let the arms race build up and let international tension become even more exacerbated."

The FRG became the subject to continuous Soviet pressure since its rejection of the moratorium proposal. A major Pravda editorial on March 14 charged that the proposal had been "falsified with special obstinacy" by Bonn when it suggested that the offer was a step backward from previous Soviet positions. Several Soviet commentators expressed doubts about Bonn's statements that it favored early resumption of U.S.-USSR talks on European missiles. Izvestiia on March 29 thus asserted that "suspicions are strengthening that American pressure is forcing Bonn to give more and more ground on the issue of talks."

Moscow's major source of irritation was Bonn's adherence to the NATO view that implementation of the NATO decision on nuclear missile emplacement should go ahead simultaneously with negotiations. Pravda on March 14 took issue in this regard with Chancellor Schmidt's contention that the Soviet buildup of SS-20s worsened the chances for negotiations and charged instead that implementation of the NATO decision "will substantially complicate the situation." TASS in April reiterated the Soviet view that implementation would alter the military balance and declared that the USSR's proposed moratorium was in fact specifically intended "to prevent such a

violation of the balance and block a new, exceptionally dangerous spiral in the nuclear-missile arms race."

Beginning in May, Moscow indicated recognition that the moratorium ploy was not working and devised new tactics for dealing with the situation.

On May 9, TASS issued a bitter official statement attacking the May 4-5 Rome meeting of the NATO Council for its reaffirmation of the NATO decision, its acceptance of U.S. assurances about willingness to negotiate, and its rejection of the Brezhnev moratorium proposal.⁴⁵

On May 22, Brezhnev in a Tbilisi speech raised to a new level Soviet threats of countermeasures if the NATO decision is implemented, asserting: "I must say with a full sense of responsibility that we cannot leave without consequences the deployment on European soil of new American nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR and our allies. In this case we will have to think about extra defense measures. If necessary, we shall find impressive means to safeguard our vital interests. And then the NATO planners should not complain."⁴⁶

On May 28, Pravda carried a special editorial accusing FRG Chancellor Schmidt of having knuckled under to the U.S. during his talks with President Reagan earlier in the month.

Then in June, Moscow started to shift toward more forceful tactics aimed especially at the FRG.

First, it used the anniversary of the 1941 Nazi invasion to revive a Soviet line common from the early fifties to 1969 about an alleged danger of German revanchism and German schemes to obtain nuclear weapons. This line was all but dropped in the seventies in favor of emphasis on West German priority interest in Ostpolitik and a special form of detente. And in keeping with this, the overwhelming weight of initial Soviet treatment of theater nuclear forces (TNF) was on U.S. culpability both for originating the scheme and for alleged ruthless arm twisting pressures on the FRG to go along. The new Soviet approach clearly aimed to step up pressure on Schmidt and to provide a menacing background for the Brezhnev trip to the FRG scheduled to take place in November 1981.

⁴⁵ Pravda, May 10, 1981.

⁴⁶ Pravda, May 23, 1981.

Second, Moscow put its big guns out front in efforts to influence Western European governments and to generate popular pressure both in Europe and in the U.S. against implementation of the NATO decision. Brezhnev himself devoted half of his speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet on June 23 to reading out an appeal which called on "parliaments and peoples" to urge immediate negotiations on preventing "another round of the nuclear missile arms race," in which Moscow assigns a central place to NATO plans and the U.S. stance on SALT.⁴⁷ In May, the Soviet Communist Party had sent a circular message along the same lines to European Social Democrats, a move which bore fruit with the visit of Willy Brandt to Moscow at the end of June. It was Moscow's clear intent to provide ammunition for already existent anti-nuclear agitation in Europe and to emulate the successful struggle against the neutron bomb in 1978 and 1979. As a foil for these efforts and for pressure on European governments, top Soviet leaders charged on four occasions during June that the U.S. is not serious about negotiations (Brezhnev on June 9, 12, 13, 30, Gromyko on June 15).

Third, a new Politburo line stressing the destructiveness of nuclear weapons⁴⁸ and the play on war scare themes in connection with commemorations of World War II anniversaries had as perhaps their central aim introducing notes of hysteria into discussions of TNF. All indications were that this was but the beginning of a psychological warfare campaign against TNF, as well as other elements of the nuclear plans of the Reagan Administration, reminiscent of Khrushchev's terror campaign in the wake of Soviet sputnik successes.

Fourth, Moscow signalled an attempt to isolate possible Euro-missile recipients (e.g., the FRG, UK, Belgium, Italy) and to drive wedges within NATO. On April 3, Brezhnev had offered to negotiate an agreement with Greece providing that the USSR would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against Greece in case of conflict if Greece pledged not to permit deployment of such weapons on its territory. On June 27, the Soviet press carried a Brezhnev interview with a Finnish paper in which he made the same offer to Scandinavian countries and even suggested a willingness to talk about measures the USSR might take on its own territory in connection with a

⁴⁷ Pravda, June 24, 1981.

⁴⁸ This included statements by Brezhnev on May 9 and June 23, Leningrad party boss G.V. Romanov on May 23, Party Secretary Konstantin Chernenko on Lenin Day April 23 and in a May issue of Political Self-Education.

Northern Europe nuclear-free zone. In making his offer to Scandinavia, Brezhnev was obviously seizing upon the expression in early June of interest by five Nordic Premiers in a nuclear-free zone. The offer to talk about Soviet territory was a new wrinkle but seemed little more than a window dressing attempt to lend credibility to the Soviet overture. Brezhnev in his interview thus specifically emphasized that his non-use proposal was the "most important" obligation the USSR was willing to undertake.

In another ancillary move, Brezhnev on June 9 at a dinner in honor of President Bendjedid of Algeria made yet another move aimed in part at Italy when he proposed agreements "renouncing the siting of nuclear weapons in territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean States."⁴⁹ As explained in a later publication, the Kremlin is acutely conscious of the impact that emplacement of missiles in Italy could have outside Europe as well. According to the Soviet source:

"If matters reach the point of new American missiles appearing in Europe, this will create a threat to adjacent regions, not least of all the Mediterranean. A considerable part of the new American missiles is intended for emplacement in that region, on Italian territory, and more precisely in Sicily, from where the weapons can be used to threaten, and 'if necessary' to strike, practically any country in the Mediterranean and Northern Africa. This would give the United States additional muscle for pressure on Mediterranean and African countries whose policy or internal system might 'displease' it, and to associate other NATO countries with such pressure even if it does not serve the latter's national interests."⁵⁰

By the end of 1981, a number of new major developments spurred Soviet efforts on this issue.

First, the rise of a significant anti-nuclear movement in Europe and later in the United States on which the USSR seems to pin increasing hopes.

⁴⁹ Pravda, June 10, 1981.

⁵⁰ Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, Scientific Research Council on Peace and Disarmament, The Threat to Europe (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), p. 28.

Second, the start in November of U.S.-USSR intermediate nuclear force (INF) talks on the basis of the agreement on September 23 in New York between Secretary of State Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

E. THE ZERO OPTION: MOSCOW ON THE DEFENSIVE

The Soviets clearly found themselves on the defensive following President Reagan's November 18 speech proposing a zero option solution to the question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. And on another public relations level, Moscow also appeared concerned by the Pentagon's issuance in late September of its pamphlet, Soviet Military Power. The December crackdown in Poland may have constituted a further inducement to Moscow to demonstrate its pacific intents on European issues but the obvious fissures that opened up between the U.S. and Western Europe over East-West relations were also seen by Moscow as providing an opportunity for Soviet exploitation of detente issues.

Moscow responded to this complex of events with significant new diplomatic and propaganda efforts.

With Brezhnev taking the lead, the USSR made a series of modifications in his October 1979 offer to reduce Soviet missiles in the European part of the USSR if NATO did not deploy Euromissiles and his Party Congress proposal in February 1981 of a moratorium on deployment of further medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. In his reply to questions submitted by Der Spiegel correspondents whom he met on October 26, Brezhnev expressed Soviet willingness, if NATO plans are dropped, "to agree on rather substantial reductions from both sides."⁵¹

During his visit to Bonn from November 22 to 25, Brezhnev found himself in a new position as a result of President Reagan's zero option proposal on the eve of the visit. Brezhnev categorically rejected the Reagan proposal on the basis of the long-held Soviet position that medium-range nuclear missile parity exists in Europe and that the issue is U.S. forward-based systems. Speaking at a dinner on November 23, Brezhnev stated:

"How do we assess this proposal? ... It is being demanded of us that we should unilaterally disarm, while hundreds of land-based and sea-based missiles trained on our country and our allies, aircraft with nuclear bombs, all this formidable arsenal now in the possession of the

⁵¹Pravda, November 3, 1981.

United States and other NATO countries in the region of Europe is to remain intact. In other words, if at present the ratio between the medium-range nuclear weapons of the two sides of Europe is expressed quite accurately by the figure of one to one, the USA would wish to change it to about two to one favoring NATO. It is clear that the Soviet Union will never agree to such a variant."⁵²

To soften the impression that the USSR was being strictly negative, Brezhnev then presented a number of variants which a party-government statement on December 1 disclosed formed the basis of instructions to Soviet negotiators who began talks on November 30 with the U.S. in Geneva.

Brezhnev repeated a previous Soviet proposal that "while the talks continue, both sides should abstain from deploying new and modernizing existing medium-nuclear means in Europe." He then added that "we would go even further":

"As an act of goodwill, we could unilaterally reduce a part of our medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR. In other words, to engage in some anticipatory reduction, moving to that lower level which could be agreed upon by the USSR and the USA as a result of the talks."

Brezhnev called this "a new and substantive element in our position." And at the talks themselves, Brezhnev said, Soviet negotiators would aim for "radical cutbacks" in medium-range missiles "not by dozens but by hundreds." Finally, he offered a "genuine zero option," removal of all nuclear weapons, medium-range and tactical, from Europe, a proposal which increasingly became the focus of Soviet propaganda on the issue.

The upshot of all these proposals would be the effective disappearance of a U.S. nuclear presence in Europe. In return for this, the Soviet proposals called for the transfer rather than the dismantling of the SS-20 missiles which are mobile and which in any case can reach Europe from behind the Urals.

As another important element in Moscow's attempt to induce the Germans to reverse their position on Euromissiles, the Soviets sought to lock the FRG into a detente policy based on increased

⁵²Pravda, November 24, 1981.

economic ties which has two purposes; to demonstrate the USSR peaceableness and to provide the USSR increased leverage to prevent the FRG from adopting policies inimical to Moscow. During his visit to Bonn, Brezhnev put considerable emphasis on the beneficial aspects of Soviet-German economic relations. The December 1 party-government statement noted in particular that the gas for pipes deal which was consummated on November 20 "forms a solid basis for a consistent growth of mutually beneficial relations beyond the limits of the twentieth century."⁵³

In February 1982, Brezhnev made the Soviet offers to reduce its missiles more precise. While casting doubt on the sincerity of U.S. attitudes in the Geneva talks, Brezhnev told a visiting Socialist International delegation: "If the West is not yet ready for radical decisions,...we agree, as a beginning to come to terms on a big reduction of medium-range nuclear armaments by each side to one-third or even more, by doing so stage by stage."⁵⁴

An official TASS statement on February 9 reaffirmed Brezhnev's expression of "wariness," which it said was caused by "the reluctance, showing up with increasing clarity, on the part of the American side" to seek equitable solutions. TASS reiterated the basic Soviet positions against the zero option proposal and reaffirmed Soviet insistence that U.S. forward-based systems as well as British and French weapons must be taken into account.

At the same time, the TASS statement was careful to deny that the problems faced at Geneva were insoluble. All that was required was for the U.S. to accept the Soviet approach. TASS then revealed that the USSR had tabled a proposal at Geneva which stipulated that:

(1) An agreement must cover all medium-range nuclear weapons "deployed in the territory of Europe and in the adjacent waters or intended for use in Europe."

(2) Reduction of the present number of such weapons (as defined by the USSR) to a level of 600 units by the end of 1984, 300 by the end of 1998.

(3) Each side will determine the composition of the arms reduced and be authorized to carry out replacement and modernization "whose framework is to be determined additionally."

⁵³ Pravda, December 1, 1981.

⁵⁴ Pravda, February 4, 1982.

(4) The "main means" for reduction will be destruction "which /however/ does not exclude the possibility of withdrawing a part of the armaments behind some agreed lines."

(5) Verification procedures "will be worked out."

The Soviet proposal also reiterated various moratorium proposals which would immediately give the USSR what it wants: a cancellation of the NATO decision to deploy U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles, while leaving what is to be done about Soviet deployments subject to negotiation.

The TASS statement concluded:

"Now it is up to the United States of America to give an answer on all these questions. The negotiations on the nuclear arms limitation in Europe are now at a highly important stage. The question is: whether they will proceed along the path of barren polemics and putting forward proposals not designed in advance to reach an agreement, and it is precisely onto this path that the American side is attempting to push the negotiations, or will it be possible to assure their constructive directness in keeping with the principle of equality and equal security on which the Soviet side insists and to which its practical proposals are directed."⁵⁵

In fact, however, every detail of the Soviet proposal involves extraordinary costs for the U.S. and NATO. The issue as far as the Soviets are concerned appears to be who can best make its case with the Europeans. For its part, Moscow sought to increase pressure on West European governments to induce the U.S. to negotiate on Soviet terms or to provide the framework for governments to renege on the NATO decision on the grounds that the U.S. is not negotiating in good faith the second part of the NATO decision of December 1979 regarding negotiations.

In mid-March, Brezhnev upped the ante once more in a speech to the Soviet trade union congress on March 16, announcing that despite the fact that the U.S. was sticking to its "absurd" zero option proposal, the USSR had not lost hope and was proclaiming a unilateral moratorium on emplacement of SS-20s (currently estimated by open Western sources to number 300). In Brezhnev's words:

⁵⁵Pravda, February 10, 1982.

"I can inform you, dear comrades, that, striving to facilitate a just agreement on a major reduction of nuclear weapons by both sides in Europe, and desirous of setting a good example, the Soviet leadership has taken a decision to introduce, unilaterally, a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the USSR. We are freezing, in both the quantitative and qualitative respects, the armaments of this kind already stationed here, and are suspending the replacement of old missiles, known as the SS-4 and SS-5, by newer SS-20 missiles.

"This moratorium will be in force either until an agreement is reached with the United States to reduce, on the basis of parity and equal security, the medium-range nuclear weapons designed for use in Europe, or until the time, if and when, the U.S. leaders, disregarding the security of the nations, actually go over the practical preparations to deploy Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Europe.

"Further, we stated earlier that if the two sides reached agreement on a moratorium we would be prepared, as a sign of goodwill, to carry out a unilateral reduction of the number of our nuclear weapons in Europe as part of the future reduction agreed upon. Now we have decided to take a new step demonstrating our resolve for peace and our faith in the possibility of a mutually acceptable agreement. The Soviet Union intends already this year, unless there is a new aggravation of the international situation, to reduce a certain number of its medium-range missiles on its own initiative."⁵⁶

As supplementary proposals, Brezhnev also called for a resumption of SALT talks "in the nearest future" and, in a new twist, "pending their resumption we would propose that the two sides undertake a mutual commitment not to deploy sea-based or ground-based long-range cruise missiles."

Finally, in typical Soviet fashion, Brezhnev also included the threat of Soviet countermoves if the NATO decision is implemented:

⁵⁶Pravda, March 17, 1982.

"At the same time we regard it as our duty to make the following perfectly clear. If the governments of the United States and its NATO allies, in defiance of the will of the nations for peace, were actually to carry out their plan to deploy in Europe hundreds of new American missiles capable of striking targets on the territory of the Soviet Union, a different strategic situation would arise in the world. There would arise a real additional threat to our country and its allies from the United States. This would compel us to take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position. This should not be forgotten."

F. THE PROPAGANDA EFFORT

To generate support for its position and to undermine U.S. policies, Moscow has mounted a massive, and in many ways, unique propaganda effort. One highlight of this effort has included the issuance of three major Soviet pamphlets aimed at the whole range of U.S. military policies but targetted in particular at Western Europe.

Soviet authorities on November 20 began dissemination for the benefit of Western audiences a booklet, The Threat to Europe, translated into major European languages and designed as a major element in the Soviet campaign against the NATO decision to deploy new U.S. missiles in Europe. The arguments in the pamphlet were not new, but its format and tone were clearly intended to present a reasonable image of the Soviet case. This pamphlet listed as one of its authors the Scientific Research Council on Peace and Disarmament, an umbrella Soviet research body established in June 1979 to provide a scholarly panoply in support of Soviet military practices. A meeting of this body in April 1981 indicated that NATO modernization was to be a prime target of the group's work.⁵⁷

In December 1981 Moscow published a special supplement of its foreign affairs weekly Novoye Vremya (New Times) devoted entirely to the generation of Western and Third World resistance to across-the-board efforts of the Reagan Administration to refurbish U.S. strategic power, and containing long passages relevant to the

⁵⁷ O. Zartseva, "On the Scientific Research Council on Problems of Peace and Disarmament," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, No. 7, July 1981, pp. 131-134.

Euromissile question. Entitled "The Arms Race: The Danger, the Burden, the Alternative," the New Times Supplement was clearly intended to reinforce and extend the focus of The Threat to Europe. The New Times Supplement obviously represented a major ploy in the overall Soviet campaign. Encompassing 32 closely printed pages, it was initially issued in 330,000 copies in Russian and presumably large numbers in the other languages in which the journal appears: English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Polish, Czech, and Arabic.

In mid-January 1982, Moscow issued the third of its contentious efforts to shift the specter of a danger of a nuclear conflagration from the USSR to the U.S. The new effort was in the form of a glossy, multilingual Soviet Ministry of Defense pamphlet entitled Whence the Threat to Peace, which was explicitly designed as a response to the Pentagon's Soviet Military Power issued on September 29, 1981. Format-wise, the Ministry of Defense pamphlet is far more pretentious than its predecessors, rivaling if not surpassing its U.S. Department of Defense counterpart. It, like The Threat to Europe, was launched with considerable fanfare at a special press conference. The conference featured two Soviet generals, a Foreign Ministry official, and someone described as "a disarmament expert." The two generals performed all the ceremonies, including answers to all questions.

The main target of this product was clearly Western Europe with the principal purpose being to generate pressures on European governments, to take advantage of the anti-nuclear movement, to supplement Soviet diplomatic proposals and to counter U.S. justifications for missile deployments and President Reagan's November 18 zero option proposal. Moscow also used the arguments in the pamphlet to refute elements in the international communist movement, especially in Western Europe, who were holding the USSR equally responsible, along with the U.S., for international tension.

In supplementary propaganda campaigns, Moscow wove Administration decisions in August 1981 on neutron bomb production and in February 1982 on the upgrading of U.S. chemical weapon capabilities into the Soviet effort against NATO modernization.

During August 1981, the neutron bomb campaign moved to front and center in the general Soviet campaign against emplacement of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Izvestia on August 11 wrote that "the decision on the production of neutron weapons, alongside the implementation of plans for creating and deploying other forms of nuclear missiles, including medium-range missiles, shows up the far-reaching aggressive schemes of Washington." Trud on August 26 reported that protest banners in Western

Europe carried, side by side, slogans against American missiles on European soil and the neutron bomb.

Moscow also refurbished warnings that it will counter deployment of neutron weapons in Europe. Commentators recalled a Brezhnev statement in 1977 that the USSR "will be obliged to respond to this challenge." In suggesting that the USSR would respond in kind, some Soviet statements were more pointed than was the case three years ago. Deputy Chief of the USA Institute, V.V. Zhurkin, told a TV audience on August 26 that "the Soviet Union is in a position to start the production of neutron weapons if necessary." Sotsialisticheskaiia Industriia on August 27 stated that production of the weapon presented "no particular problem."

A few Soviet commentators suggested that it would be easy to evolve defenses against the weapon. The Sotsialisticheskaiia Industriia article of August 27 said that Swiss military specialists believe that tank crews could be insulated against effects of the weapon by adding a special spongy padding to the tank's armor. Sovetskaia Rossiia on August 30 reported that Austria has already developed a protective plastic layer. Sotsialisticheskaiia Industriia also suggested that "on an abstract level, a tank thrust could be preceded by a destructive, nuclear raid on neutron missile and howitzer positions since it would be crazy to send tanks to certain destruction."

In another innovative twist, Soviet commentaries argued against Western contentions that the neutron bomb is necessary to meet possible massive East-Bloc tank attacks, claiming the West already has more than enough anti-tank weapons to destroy all of the tanks that now exist.

In another effort to influence European and U.S. opinion on NATO armament, Moscow in February 1982 inaugurated a major campaign charging that the U.S. intends to increase production of chemical weapons, primarily for use in Europe. As argued in an official TASS statement on February 18 commenting on the U.S. decision to increase production of these weapons:

"It is not concealed in the United States that as it sees it, chemical war is to be conducted in densely populated areas of Europe and other continents. Also serving this criminal aim are the plans, that are now being discussed in the United States, of fitting the new chemical warheads on cruise missiles, aviation bombs and artillery shells, large quantities of which it is intended to deploy in European countries as part of the American forward-based weapons.

"Speaking in the United States Congress on September 15, 1981 the representatives of the Pentagon openly admitted that the purpose of the fitting-out of the American Army with the latest toxic agents is to have the possibility to wage a large-scale chemical war in Europe. This is yet another manifestation of Washington's 'Atlantic solidarity' in respect to its allies."

Soviet propagandists have also been using a number of other arguments: that U.S. plans constitute an extension of the arms race and U.S. quest for superiority, that the U.S. already has massive stores of chemical weapons, that U.S. measures will complicate any possibility for arms control measures in the field.

In another commentary denouncing U.S. claims that the Soviets have used chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, TASS on February 22 declared:

"At the same time, using the myth about the 'Soviet chemical menace,' they wish to prepare the peoples of Western Europe and other countries for accepting in their territories new U.S. chemical weapons, to reconcile them to the thought about the possibility of a chemical war. But will the peoples agree to the monstrous plans of making whole continents into giant gas chambers? A highly unlikely prospect."

All signs point to a Soviet intention to mount a major diplomatic and worldwide propaganda campaign on this issue comparable in scale and play on terror themes to the 1977-1978 effort against the neutron bomb and more recent drives against Euromissiles.

TASS on February 26 announced that the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation had protested against President Reagan's chemical weapons decision, and "urged the European public to make a decisive contribution towards curbing the Pentagon's chemical ventures."

On March 11, a USSR Defense Ministry "expert," Major General Anatoly Kuntsevich, and other Soviet officials held a press conference in Moscow on chemical weapons in which he stated, among other things, that "the United States' model of war is to fight on another's territory and spill others' blood." In reply to a question, Kuntsevich declared: "As to chemical troops existing in the Soviet Armed Forces, they have a defense

mission."⁵⁸

At a meeting in Geneva of the UN Disarmament Commission, according to TASS on March 11, the USSR and its allies submitted two proposals. One called for an agreement banning these weapons. The second was said to include "specific proposals providing for the inclusion in the future convention banning chemical weapons of provisions on non-deployment of such weapons and their removal from the territory of other states."

⁵⁸TASS, March 11, 1982.

VI. CONCERNS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN

It is clear from Moscow's writings as well as from its diplomatic and agitational efforts that it considers the prospects of deployment of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe with the utmost seriousness. Even if the Soviets accepted Western estimates on an imbalance in the Soviet favor (which they do not at least publicly) a redressing of the balance by the West necessarily seen by Moscow as depriving it of important leverage in dealing with both Europe and the United States.

Whatever Moscow's private estimates of the numbers involved, it is clearly concerned that deployment of Euromissiles will provide the United States with new capabilities. For propaganda purposes many Soviet spokesmen contend that parity exists between the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with several explicitly claiming that current Western forces already constitute a threat to Soviet territory.

On the eve of the NATO decision, Soviet sources used various figures on the number of launchers available to the West capable of hitting the USSR. In a Pravda article in October 1979, Defense Minister Ustinov declared that U.S. and NATO forces together had 1500 "units" at their disposal (presumably 1200 in U.S. forward-based systems, 300 in UK and France).

In this same article, Ustinov claimed that "the number of Soviet medium-range devices deployed in its western regions is comparable with the number of similar devices possessed by Britain and France alone."¹ Presumably Moscow thought better about this approach which hardly fit its overall line of parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, later Soviet commentaries turned the argument around to charge that it was the West which was comparing Soviet with British-French strength and leaving U.S. forward-based systems out of the calculations.

Two articles later in the year by Communist Party functionary Leonid Zamiatin attributed 784 launchers to U.S. forward-based systems, 300 to British and French.³ While some sources

¹ Pravda, October 25, 1979.

² For example, Izvestiia, November 22, 1979.

³ Izvestiia, December 9, 1979; Literary Gazette, December 25, 1979.

include the Pershing I missiles as medium-range weapons, others do not. Some sometimes add Poseidon missiles to the count, others do not. The next authoritative Soviet statement on the numbers involved came from Ustinov on July 25, 1981 when he declared:

"The proposal for a moratorium is based on the rough parity in medium-range nuclear weapons between NATO and the USSR which has existed in Europe for a number of years, in which both sides have about 1,000 carriers.

"On the NATO side these carriers are U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons--F-111's and F-4s--which are stationed at air bases in a number of West European countries, FB-111 medium bombers, aircraft-bearing nuclear weapons--A-6s and A-7s--on board U.S. aircraft carriers, of which there are over 700 in all; and also land-based medium-range ballistic missiles, missile submarines and the bomber force of U.S. allies, of which there are about 300 in all. All these have a range, a radius of operation of 1,000-4,500 km and are a real threat to Soviet territory."

On the eve and during his visit to Bonn in November 1981, Brezhnev established the definitive figure being used by Moscow to back up its line that parity exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact with respect to medium-range nuclear weapons. In his interview with Der Spiegel as carried in Pravda on November 3, Brezhnev declared:

"If among the medium-range means are included the main missile and aviation nuclear weapons of the NATO countries which are capable of reaching targets on the Soviet Union's territory from the territory of the West European countries and the water basins washing Europe, with a range (radius) of action of 1,000 kilometers and more (but less, of course, than intercontinental range) and the respective Soviet arms of similar range stationed in the European part of the USSR, there is presently a rough balance as regards such weapons between NATO and the USSR in Europe. The NATO countries have here 986 of such carriers. Among them the USA has more than 700 (F-111, FB-111, F-4 aircraft, planes on board aircraft carriers on the seas and oceans washing Europe). On top of it, the British potential includes 64 ballistic missiles and 55 bombers. France has 144 units (98 missiles and 46 bombers).

"The Soviet Union has 975 units of similar weapons. The situation has not become different even after the

USSR began replacing the 'SS-4' and 'SS-5' missiles, whose service life has expired, with the more advanced 'SS-20.' When deploying one new missile, we replace one or two old missiles and scrap the latter together with the launcher."

With respect to warheads, Soviet sources have been equally changeable. Several have used the figure of 8,000 warheads for U.S.-NATO forces (obviously lumping short and medium-ranges together). Semeiko in October twice averred that of these 8,000, at least 2,000 "could be delivered to very important targets of the USSR's western territory" or "can reach Soviet territory."⁴ In both articles, it should be noted, Semeiko included Pershing I missiles in his inventory. Another Soviet source Falin, however, specified that Pershing I missiles are "capable of striking deep inside the Warsaw Pact countries which are the USSR's allies."⁵

Moscow has been much more reticent about giving comparative figures about warhead strength than in the case of launchers. In a talk with a German magazine, Georgii Arbatov once claimed that "even Americans say that they have 9,000 nuclear warheads in Europe as compared with 3,500 of the Soviet Union."⁶

Only during 1981, however, the Soviets have worked out the line that despite parity in launchers, NATO has a 1.5 to 1 advantage in warheads over the Warsaw Pact. Speaking to the West German Communist Party Congress in May 1981, Boris Ponomarev declared that "if we are speaking of the number of nuclear warheads, NATO's medium-range arms, could already carry approximately 1.5 times more warheads than the USSR's corresponding weapons."⁷ That this has become the firm line was suggested by the fact that it emerged in a speech given by Foreign Minister Gromyko in honor of his Belgian counterpart in Moscow on June 15. Denying that the USSR had upset the balance, Gromyko asked: "But do not the NATO countries now have in that area one and a half times more nuclear warheads than the Soviet Union?"⁸

⁴ New Times, No. 44, October 26, 1979; Red Star, October 28, 1979.

⁵ Izvestiia, November 22, 1979.

⁶ Hamburg, Der Spiegel, November 5, 1980.

⁷ Pravda, May 31, 1981.

⁸ Pravda, June 16, 1981.

Moscow glosses over or omits those elements of Soviet weaponry which have generated NATO apprehensions. It does not discuss the Backfire or other Soviet aircraft at all. It concedes that the SS-20 is an improvement over its predecessor and mentions that it carries 3 warheads instead of one but ignores that, by implication therefore, the number of available Soviet warheads is steadily increasing.

General Sergei Akhromeyev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, sought to give the impression that there was no change in range between the SS-20 and older missiles. Speaking over Soviet television on October 13, 1979, Akhromeyev flatly said it "is not true" as stated by President Carter "that the new Soviet medium-range missiles have a far greater range than those in service." He then went on to state rather elliptically: "A considerable part of the missiles that have been in service for a long time have a range no smaller than that of the missiles they are being replaced with."

Another Soviet general, L. Semeiko writing at about the same time obscured the question of SS-20 range in a somewhat different way. Writing in New Times, No. 44 in October 1979, Semeiko declared:

"The qualitative modernization of Soviet missiles in Europe is presented by certain Western circles in an extremely one-sided way, and is often deliberately distorted. For instance, they often assert that the new Soviet SS-20 missiles (in Western terminology) allegedly have a significantly greater range than those formerly deployed in the Western part of the USSR. They tell ordinary people that these missiles can hit targets anywhere 'from Naples to Edinburgh' (Financial Times). But has the Soviet Union, which created ICBMs 20 years ago, really been unable to hit European targets until now?"

It will be noted that Soviet spokesmen studiously avoid any specific references to its missiles' ranges. Although they often quote the British International Institute of Strategic Studies' (IISS) Annual Military Balance when it suits Soviet purposes, Soviet sources have not mentioned IISS estimates that the SS-20's range is 2700 nautical miles, the SS-4s 1000, the SS-5s 2200.

Similarly, Soviet sources have been reticent about other aspects of SS-20 capabilities which are worrisome to NATO. For example, writing in the Italian Communist paper L'Unita on October 23, 1979 Vadim Zaqladin argued:

"When people in the West talk about missiles called SS-20s and the innovatory element in these missiles, they say that they are mobile missiles. This is true. But practically all the U.S. missiles located in the areas close to the USSR are mobile. Therefore, from this viewpoint we are doing no more than responding to a threat which those missiles have already constituted for a long time."

While Zagladin and other Soviet sources conceded that the SS-20s are "modernized" versions of earlier Soviet missiles, they nowhere discuss what the term "modernized" means. There appears, for example, to be no discussion in the open literature about the increased accuracy of the SS-20s, although this presumably is implied in Brezhnev's statement on October 6 that the yield of Soviet missiles has "somewhat decreased." Nor is there anything said about their reload capacity.

While reiterating the standard Soviet line that whatever the USSR did was defensive, one Soviet analyst, the prestigious Aleksandr Bovin, did go so far as to concede that the West might have cause for concern. Writing in the London Observer on October 29, 1979, Bovin cited a statement by Chancellor Schmidt that the Russians had overdone things in defense and commented:

"Yes, maybe, we have 'overdone' it, maybe we have created a five-fold margin of strength where we could, speaking in an abstract way, do with a three-fold one."

Bovin went on that it was not a matter of logic but of psychology, with outsiders needing to keep in mind that no Soviet could forget that the Germans had reached the Volga and the Caucasus in 1942. Besides, he claimed, there was a balance in Europe constituting "a complicated system consisting of a set of inequalities."

A. ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT

According to a Soviet pamphlet on the NATO decision, once begun there may be no end to the number of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles which might be deployed in Europe. In its words:

"Some in the U.S. are thinking not about a curtailment but about an increase in the quantity of missiles in Europe above the figure which was confirmed in Brussels. When, for example, U.S. Defense

Secretary H. Brown was asked at a press conference whether the U.S. intends to propose that any other country besides the five listed in the NATO decision, agree to deploy missiles on their territory, he answered that 'the candidature' of other countries was also discussed. I do not exclude the possibility of further study of the question. The American paper Christian Science Monitor in an article by J. Goodsell on December 31, 1979 expressed this even more frankly, reporting that the governments of the large countries adhering to the Brussels decision, consider that Moscow will be forced to go as they want in order 'to avert NATO deployment in the end of cruise missiles in Western Europe in unlimited numbers.' The hope 'to force' Moscow is, of course, in vain but the prospects depicted of populating Western Europe with an unlimited number of American cruise missiles is ominous."⁹

More recent Soviet articles have also warned that the U.S. and NATO deployments will not halt at present levels. Red Star on May 10, 1981 contended that "calls are already beginning to be made in the United States for a further buildup of American nuclear missile weapons in Europe above the ceiling of 572 units established within the NATO framework." As evidence, it cited the statement by a U.S. Congressman as reported in Aviation Week on the need to deploy air-launched and sea-based cruise missiles in Europe. Pravda on May 21, 1981 claimed that the "Pentagon is already talking about sending 1,500-2,000 missiles to the European continent.

The Threat to Europe pamphlet issued in November 1981 raised the same possibility in two different ways. It cites the German paper Die Welt to the effect that "the United States is considering the question of arming the new medium-range Pershing II missile with multiple warheads" and then suggests "there is nothing to guarantee that in the future the U.S. will not want to double or triple the number of Euromissiles."¹⁰

B. IMPACT ON STRATEGIC BALANCE

Soviet spokesmen emphasize over and over that implementation of the NATO decision will change the military balance both in Europe and with respect to the central U.S.-USSR equation. Defense Minister Ustinov in his Pravda article of October 25, 1979 thus

⁹V.K. Sobakin, "The NATO Decisions," Moscow, Znanie, No. 3, 1980, p. 58.

¹⁰The Threat to Europe, pp. 22-23.

declared that the proposed NATO action constituted "a program for a radical qualitative change in U.S. nuclear potential located in that region and intended for the solution of strategic tasks."

Along with the heavy emphasis for propaganda purposes that Western missiles already threaten the Soviet Union, there is equally heavy emphasis that Euromissiles will represent something new for the USSR. Thus one article in the journal USA, dropping all pretenses about the threat to the USSR of the current roster of U.S. weapons in Europe, stated:

"The NATO decision represents a serious escalation of the arms race both, by virtue of the new features of this American weapon (its size, accuracy and ability to elude means of detection and control) and by virtue of the new element it introduces into the European strategic situation. For the first time since the evacuation of American medium-range Jupiter missiles from Italy, and Turkey in the second half of the 1960s, NATO will have nuclear missiles capable of reaching Soviet territory. In 1982 and 1983, when the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles is supposed to be completed, a new weapon, capable of performing the strategic functions of nuclear missile aggression against the USSR and the socialist countries, will be added to other American weapons aimed at the Soviet Union--the land-based Minuteman ICBM, the Polaris submarine and the B-52 bomber."¹¹

Before adoption of the NATO decision, it should be noted, some Soviet discussions put the Pershing II into a "gray area." Izvestiia in August 1979 pointed out that the Pershings, if deployed in Europe, "could be targeted against the European territory of the Soviet Union," something, it went on, "the missiles with which NATO is currently armed are not capable of doing." Accordingly, it concluded:

"In this instance we are talking about a qualitatively new spiral of the arms race. The so-called 'continental range' of the Pershing II places it somewhere between strategic and tactical weapons, in the area customarily called 'the gray area' in U.S. military literature. However, if we avoid thinking in abstract terms of

¹¹ B.D. Piadyshev, "Military Detente in Europe: Two Approaches," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 11, November 1980, p. 9.

numbers of kilometers and take as a basis the specific geographical range of the Pershing II, this missile ranks with the strategic weapons rather than with tactical weapons."¹²

As noted by Ustinov and numerous other Soviet spokesmen, Soviet concerns about the NATO decision are intertwined with even broader concerns that the move involves a significant change in U.S. strategic doctrine and will broaden the options available to the United States in both military and political policies directed at the Soviet Union. A whole body of Soviet commentary has linked the NATO decision with U.S. doctrines of limited nuclear war, especially in connection with Presidential Directive 59 as announced in the U.S. press in August 1980.

Throughout 1979, Soviet military analysts saw signs of a U.S. shift to a counterforce strategy which, in the words of Gen. Semeiko, "is being revived to provide a theoretical basis for practical efforts to develop the latest nuclear missiles and to justify colossal military expenditures."¹³ In October 1979, well before PD-59, Aleksandr Bovin in an article on the prospective NATO decision pointed out that "the Americans' main argument is in the plane of the concept which they are elaborating of a 'limited' nuclear war in Europe."¹⁴ One month later Valentin Falin asked rhetorically "what actually lies behind" NATO modernization and answered that "what has changed is not the situation in Europe but American and, at the same time, NATO military doctrines." Specifically, he explained, "the doctrine of preemptive selective nuclear strikes put forward by the then defense secretary, Schlesinger 5 years ago has found its continuers and the appropriate material base is being erected beneath it" through the Pershing II and cruise missiles.¹⁵

Leading Soviet political analyst Aleksandr Bovin in a remarkable candid discussion gave a Radio Moscow roundtable on August 31, 1980 a clear exposition of the nature and usefulness of the increased options which the new U.S. targeting strategy is designed to achieve for U.S. policy-makers. According to Bovin:

¹²M. Sturua, "Nuclear Thunderclouds Over the Gray Area," Izvestiia, August 25, 1979.

¹³L. Semeiko, "The Counterforce Strategy," New Times, No. 14, May 1979.

¹⁴A. Bovin, "Captive to Inertia," Izvestiia, October 29, 1979.

¹⁵V. Falin, "Europe's Future Lies in Peaceful Cooperation," Izvestiia, November 22, 1979.

"A U.S. analyst might reason like this. Let us assume that the Soviet Union wants to take West Europe. What would a Soviet analyst be thinking in this case? He thinks, all right, I take West Europe. How can the Americans react to this? The Americans can deliver a mass strike on the Soviet Union. They have that capability. But now this same Soviet analyst thinks. The Americans know full well that if they strike the Soviet Union they will receive a reciprocal strike of the same strength. And here the Americans start weighing things: is it worth sacrificing America for the sake of West Europe?

"That, from the point of view of the Americans, is the way a Soviet analyst would reason, and he would think: No, the Americans won't strike us, so to speak, so we can take West Europe. And here the Americans say: So, this threat of a mass strike is not any constraint on the Soviets. And so a new element is introduced: these pinpoint selective strikes on military installations or, for instance, on command stations. Now the Americans reason: Aha! So now this Soviet analyst is sitting and thinking: the Americans can have more than one response. Right, they won't deliver a mass strike, but they can, for instance, choose a dozen specific pinpoint targets and hit them. And now Moscow finds itself faced with a choice, from the point of view of a mass strike on the United States, it risks getting the same sort of strike back. Moscow will not want that, the American reasons, and will be forced to adopt the U.S. rules of play and in response to these pinpoint strikes itself choose similar targets, for instance, and hit them."

As during its critiques of the Schlesinger Doctrine and its campaigns against the neutron bomb, endless Soviet commentaries emphasize that the NATO decision is dangerous because it lowers the threshold for use of nuclear weapons. According to Soviet military analyst General V.V. Larionov, the strategic weapons standoff is "the reason for attempts being made by the United States and NATO circles to quarantine nuclear superiority for themselves 'on the tactical level' and 'they feel that the lowering of the nuclear threshold aids in this--if not in the direct and physical sense, then at least in the psychological sense.'" Larionov in this connection sees this approach as going along with the development of new tactical nuclear weapons which "conveys the impression of

a stronger position--even if it is an illusory and temporary one."¹⁶

Soviet analysts at one point saw a cleavage between the U.S. and Europeans on the nuclear threshold issue. In the words of one: "If Western European military specialists, a significant part of whom are skeptical about the possibilities of conventional deterrence, especially actively favor the lowering of the 'nuclear threshold,' then the Pentagon divides conflict in Europe into the stages of conventional war, tactical nuclear and strategic war." The Americans, said the same author, are "inclined to fight in Europe basically with alien hands and do not by any means intend to risk their own territory."¹⁷

According to a Soviet book on U.S. strategic doctrines, "no conceptions of conducting nuclear war in Europe evokes such quarrels between American and West European specialists as this one" on the nuclear threshold. According to this book, "analysis of the statements of representatives of the U.S. military leadership in this connection permits the conclusion that the basic means for assuring a 'high threshold' is considered to be the raising of the combat readiness of conventional forces."¹⁸

Soviet military analysts argue further that not only is the U.S. seeking to make nuclear war thinkable but that it is evolving the doctrine and weaponry designed to make it winnable. The basic Soviet contention is that U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe are intended to give the U.S. the capability for a first counterforce strike which would destroy the Soviet ability to reply against the United States and thereby undermine the Soviet deterrent.

Major General Simonian in December 1979 declared that:

"In creating a qualitatively new generation of nuclear missile arms, the transatlantic strategists are counting on obtaining control of first-strike facilities. The point is that the flight time of Pershing II missiles to targets on Soviet territory would be only

¹⁶V.V. Larionov, "The Nuclear Threshold Debate," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 7, July 1978.

¹⁷G.A. Vorontsov, USA and Western Europe (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1979), p. 193.

¹⁸K.C. Bogdanov, M.A. Milshtein, L.S. Semeiko, USA: Military-Strategic Conceptions (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), p. 228.

4 minutes. This would create the temptation to launch them suddenly and the hope that the potential enemy would not have time to make a retaliatory strike."¹⁹

In September 1980, General Semeiko argued that PD-59, with the NATO decision a component part, had significantly expanded the Schlesinger Doctrine:

"The Schlesinger Doctrine emphasized the 'limited use of strategic forces' and primarily of intercontinental missiles. But now the nuclear strategy is also taking into account the plans for deploying in West Europe new American medium-range missiles whose radius of action also covers a considerable part of the USSR's European territory. The deployment of the Euromissiles is a component in the new strategy."²⁰

Specifically he declared the new doctrine calls for attacks against a larger number of Soviet targets, envisages protracted nuclear war and looks toward a first disarming strike. In increasing the number of targets, the U.S., according to Semeiko, had the "clear intention of winning a nuclear war," rather than "merely of producing an 'impression' on him by means of individual selective strikes."

Other Soviet discussions reinforced Semeiko's expression of concern that the Euromissile decision and PD-59 indicated that the U.S. was giving increased thought to the idea of how to fight and possibly win a nuclear war. Endless Soviet statements deplored the notion that the U.S.-NATO plans suggested that nuclear war was thinkable. Some articles, however, went even farther, suggesting that the U.S. was going beyond deterrence.

The Soviet military journal Communist of the Armed Forces argued that the new U.S. limited strategic war doctrine involves "not simply an increase in the number of targets but a clear intent to achieve victory in a nuclear war" over an opponent by "paralyzing his will to resist and forcing him to capitulate,"²¹

¹⁹ Pravda, December 12, 1979.

²⁰ L. Semeiko, "Directive 59: Development or Leap," New Times, No. 38, September 1980.

²¹ Yu. Babich, "The Strategy of Political Adventurism," Kommunist Vooruzhenikh Sil, No. 24, December 1980, p. 81.

Again it was Semeiko who discussed this aspect at greatest length in a reply in December 1980 to U.S. strategists Colin Grey and Keith Payne. Semeiko argued that U.S. critics claimed Soviet reliance on a counterforce damage-limiting strike was "aggressive" and therefore the same charge could be leveled at the U.S. "Grey and Payne," said Semiko, "in effect equate the 'deterrence' strategy and the war-fighting and war-winning strategy" which, he went on, "is essentially the substance also of Directive 59."²² And, according to a companion piece in the same journal on Grey and Payne, Pershing II and cruise missiles "are listed in the American arsenal as means of 'limited' nuclear war, as 'first-strike' weapons."²³

Soviet spokesmen also have evolved the concept that the U.S. is preparing a "double strike" against the USSR. For example, General Semeiko, after claiming that the U.S. was seeking to confine a nuclear war to the European theater through the NATO decision, went on in one article:

"The second goal is fundamentally new. It is perceptible in the fact that in the event of a world nuclear war, a dual strike would be launched against the Soviet Union-- not only a U.S. strategic strike but also a 'Eurostrategic' strike far more powerful than at present, while U.S. territory could be subjected only to a strategic strike from the USSR."²⁴

According to Semeiko, "the Pentagon assumes that the new Pershing II missiles could be used to hit primarily Soviet missiles and cruise missiles to launch nuclear strikes against hundreds of other military and non-military targets." Other Soviet spokesmen are even more precise about the Pershing II targets. Maj. Gen. A. Slobodenko suggests that "the Eurostrategic forces are targeted, above all, at Soviet medium-range missiles and the political centers of the Warsaw Pact countries."²⁵

²² Lev Semeiko, "Strategic Illusions," New Times, No. 50, December 1980.

²³ Yuri Gudkov, "Behind Directive No. 59," New Times, No. 35, August 1980.

²⁴ L. Semeiko, "Where Eurostrategy Is Heading," Red Star, October 28, 1979.

²⁵ Maj. Gen. A. Slobodenko, "The Strategy of Nuclear Adventurism," International Affairs, No. 1, January 1981, p. 30.

In one of the more precise bits of Soviet speculation about the targets of Pershing II and cruise missiles, V.V. Potashov, who specializes on U.S. military technology, wrote in USA:

"All of these systems have new self-steering devices which give them the highest accuracy and make them suitable for the destruction of such ground targets, located in the depths of a 'probable adversary' as medium-range missile launchers, naval and air force bases, command and communications centers, nuclear weapon storage facilities, ABM installations, army headquarters and reinforcements, bridges and so forth. If these systems, which have a range of around 2,500 kilometers, are deployed in the FRG, England and other NATO countries, they will be capable of reaching very important targets on the territory of the USSR and the European socialist countries."²⁶

While Simonian had stated that the U.S. was merely seeking the possibility of a preemptive blow, Defense Minister Ustinov in 1981 began to take a more alarmist tone. In his Armed Forces Day article in Pravda on February 21, 1981 he declared that "the Pentagon is counting on nuclear weapons for attaining U.S. global strategic goals by delivering preemptive nuclear missile strikes against the Warsaw Pact countries."

In his July 25, 1981 Pravda article, Ustinov was more specific about NATO's alleged plans for preemption:

"The new American medium-range missiles are strategic weapons with regard to the Soviet Union. Indeed the United States is well aware of this. Guided by selfish interests, however, it does not tell its European NATO allies about the true plans for the use of its medium-range missiles which are scheduled to be deployed in Europe. While declaring officially that the new missiles are allegedly meant for the defense of Western European countries, Washington in actual fact is intending them for the inflicting of 'preventive' strikes on Soviet ICBMs and other vitally important installations situated in the western areas of the USSR. After all, the Pershing II missiles, which possess a range of 2,500 km and a high accuracy, could inflict strikes upon the

²⁶V.V. Potashov, "Technological Research in the Arms Field," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 7, July 1980, p. 110.

Soviet Union's installations at which they are aimed just 5 or 6 minutes after their launch. This would substantially alter the strategic situation. The main plan of the United States is an attempt to lessen the force of a retaliatory strike against U.S. territory in the event of aggression against the USSR and is not concerned with the security of Europe."

Ustinov's article was obviously the source for the passage in the Defense Ministry pamphlet on this subject. With regard to the strategic function of Euromissiles, the pamphlet stated:

"This point deserves special attention. Although Washington has announced officially that the new missiles are intended for defending the West European countries, it actually intends to use them to strike 'preemptive' blows at Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and other vital objectives in the Soviet Union's western areas, in other words, at strategic targets. It must also be realized that the Pershing II missiles, which the U.S. intends to site in the FRG, have a range of 2,500 km and pinpoint accuracy and can strike Soviet targets within 5 or 6 minutes of launching. This alters the strategic situation substantially, not only in Europe but far beyond. The main intention underlying the U.S. wish to site its medium-range nuclear weapons in a number of European NATO countries is not to ensure European security but rather to soften the impact of a retaliatory strike against the USA if it attacks the Soviet Union."²⁷

In all the material examined, only one Soviet commentator appears to have even discussed the question of whether the number of weapons to be deployed by NATO fits a first-strike scenario. This commentator Nikolai Portugalov, who specializes in German affairs, recounted in a Radio Moscow broadcast on April 26, 1981 arguments in the West that only the Pershing II could be used in a first-strike and the number involved "is not enough for a massive first strike." Further, he noted, it was argued in the West that the cruise missile would take 3 hours to reach Soviet targets "and so is a typical retaliation weapon." In response, Portugalov postulated the following scenario:

²⁷ USSR Ministry of Defense, Whence the Threat to Peace (Moscow: Military Publishing House), p. 68.

"A hundred Pershing II's deliver the first strike, the preemptive strike by American vocabulary, on the Soviet strategic targets, including anti-missile systems, and one can only make an educated guess that the Pershing II's won't carry multiple warheads. That makes absolutely invulnerable the cruise missiles which, having been launched simultaneously with the Pershings, will finish off the work the Pershings have done."²⁸

In an earlier article on the same subject in Sotsialisticheskaiia Industriia, Portugalov went over much the same ground but added one more point:

"The suitability of a given nuclear weapon system for a first strike is determined not by the duration of the flight to its target but the precision of its aim and, most important, its degree of vulnerability to anti-missile defense methods. But according to the authoritative evidence of leading Western experts, cruise missiles are practically invulnerable to any contemporary defense systems."²⁹

C. GROWING CONCERN ABOUT CRUISE MISSILES

Apart from Portugalov, or until 1982, the main thrust of the Soviet campaign on NATO modernization has been confined to the Pershing II missiles rather than the cruise missile issue.

Until it lapsed in December 1981, Moscow may have considered that despite its failure to ratify SALT II, the U.S. would still consider itself bound by the SALT II protocol imposing limits on cruise missile range as well as by the non-circumvention clause which the USSR has interpreted as prohibiting the transfer by the U.S. of cruise missiles to its allies.

Lt. Gen. Chervov of the General Staff made the point explicit in one article:

²⁸ Moscow World Service in English, April 26, 1981.

²⁹ N. Portugalov, "Atlantic Metamorphosis," Sotsialisticheskaiia Industriia, January 29, 1981.

"Medium-range cruise missiles are a fundamentally new strategic weapon. Corresponding limitations are imposed on them by the protocol to the SALT II Treaty--they are not to be passed to third countries."³⁰

While U.S. spokesmen took the view that the three-year limit on the protocol meant that all options were open thereafter, Moscow had a different perspective. As explained in the pamphlet The Threat to Europe:

"During the signing of SALT II, the USSR and the U.S.A. agreed that questions dealt with in the above-mentioned Protocol, that is, among others, the banning of ground- and sea-based cruise missiles, were to be put on the SALT agenda. This was clear evidence of the intention of the two sides to come to terms while the Protocol was still in force, and not let that type of weapon ever appear in their armories.

"The December 1979 decision of the NATO Council shows, however, that the United States, had in effect, renounced its commitment and had in advance, before the start of negotiations, given to understand that it wouldn't agree to any accord on giving up cruise missiles."³¹

Since July 1981, there has been a notable increase in concern over the cruise missile program of the Reagan Administration. Indeed, that program seems to have exposed Moscow's worst fears. Shortly after the Administration took office, the number of cruise missiles planned for 1982 was increased to 88--nearly double the 48 planned by the Carter Administration. And in July, it was announced that the Pentagon was planning a greatly expanded mission for cruise missiles that would require deployment of several thousand additional missiles through the eighties and nineties. The deployment plan, not surprisingly, elicited sharp attacks from the Soviet propaganda apparatus.

The barrage of press commentaries intensified in January of this year. Pravda of January 7, carried a five-column article devoted to the cruise missile. A major theme was the duplicity of the American government in confining the range restrictions on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles to the protocol.

³⁰ Trud, November 1, 1979.

³¹ The Threat to Europe, p. 25.

"In violation of the Vladivostok agreement reached in 1974, the American side in the past has more than once attempted to renounce the limitation of cruise missiles. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, guided by a desire to close off the channels of a further strategic arms race, and proceeding from the principle of equality and equal security of the sides, it was firmly in favor of restricting cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km on a par with other types of strategic weaponry. Even the United States had to agree with this, recognizing cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km as strategic weapons.

"Air-launched cruise missiles were included in the SALT II Treaty,... The question of land- and sea-based cruise missiles was settled on a temporary basis. ... In the joint Soviet-American declaration of the principles of basic directions for subsequent talks, the agreement of the sides to review in the future the problem of land- and sea-based cruise missiles in order to reach a final solution was fixed. These agreements, together with the Treaty, were viewed as a complete whole and were taken into account in the agreement on the maximum quantitative levels of delivery systems.

"Having refused to ratify the SALT II Treaty and in ignoring other agreements and responsibilities, the United States has in fact conducted the matter so that beginning in 1982 it can deploy land- and sea-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km."³²

Despite its previous public reticence, the USSR may be even more concerned by the cruise missile than by the Pershings. One Red Star article made the point that "because of their small size, these missiles and their launch installations are extremely easy to disguise and to conceal from existing technical means. In other words, it is very difficult to monitor either the numbers of cruise missiles or the location of their bases."³³

³²N. Fedorov, "Cruise Missiles and the Arms Race," Pravda, January 7, 1982.

³³Col. M. Ponomarev, "NATO's Militarist Course," Krasnaia Zvezda, December 16, 1979.

While acknowledging some Western opinions that the cruise missiles are not suitable for first strikes because of their slowness, another Red Star article pointed to contrary suggestions that "a new generation of cruise missiles could be supersonic..., enhanced yield nuclear warheads could be created," and other measures such as target saturation could be taken to make a first-strike tenable.³⁴

The Threat to Europe pamphlet claims that the U.S. prefers to deploy ground-based rather than sea-based cruise missiles in order to tie the Europeans more tightly to Washington. In the pamphlet's words:

"Seen from this angle, America's categorical rejection of the West European countries' attempts to discuss the question of siting the new U.S. missiles on seaborne facilities, rather than on the territory of NATO members, acquires a most sinister complexion. The United States wants to have its missiles stationed on soil belonging to its allies precisely because it wants them to be hostages of the American claim to world leadership and to deny them the chance of taking a more or less independent stand in the critical situations which the implementation of its claim is bound to create. By reserving the right to the final decision on triggering Euro-strategic missiles--and this, mind you, also in the event of crises or conflicts far away from Western Europe that have no direct bearing on West European interests--the U.S. strategists are obviously bent on creating a situation in which European NATO members would have no freedom of choice and would be compelled to 'follow the leader of the Western world' as it secures its great-power 'vital interests' in the shape in which it alone conceives them."³⁵

However, the issue of cruise missile basing may confront the USSR with something of a dilemma if a defeat for deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe leads to a decision to transfer the program out to sea. Such a transfer would have the following untoward consequences for the Soviet Union:

³⁴ L. Semeiko, "Gambling on a First-Strike Potential," Krasnaia Zvezda, August 8, 1980.

³⁵ The Threat to Europe, p. 28.

- (1) It would alleviate Western Europe's deepening concern that the deployment on European territory of the Pershing II and cruise missiles would serve as a nuclear lightning rod in the event of war; concerns which Moscow has skillfully exploited to weaken allied cohesion;
- (2) Sea-launched cruise missiles are not as susceptible to preemption as ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs because of the greater mobility and geographical dispersion provided by sea-basing; and
- (3) A sea-launched cruise missile is a more useable and flexible weapon because the decision to launch would rest with the United States, thereby circumventing the potential problem of host country approval.

D. THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION

As the fulcrum of world power, Europe is the focus of Soviet military and political strategy and hence the USSR has consistently sought to acquire and maintain overwhelming military superiority on the continent. The deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in the European theater will, in the Soviet view, profoundly affect the "progress" the USSR has made to this end.

The overall Soviet view regarding the possible impact of the NATO decision on Europe was set forth by Brezhnev in East Berlin on October 6, 1979:

"The dangerous plans for the deployment of new types of American nuclear missile weapons on the territory of Western Europe...give cause for serious concern. To put it straight, implementation of these designs would change essentially the strategic situation on the continent. Their aim is to upset the balance of forces that has taken shape in Europe and to try to insure military superiority for the NATO bloc."

Occasional later statements were even more categorical about the impact of NATO deployment on the balance in Europe. A Pravda editorial article a few weeks before the NATO decision declared that "the appearance on the territory of Britain, the FRG, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands of several hundred super-modern missiles with nuclear warheads could change the

strategic situation on the continent to the advantage of the NATO bloc."³⁶ Addressing the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Italian Parliament on the same day, candidate Politburo member and Party secretary Boris Ponomarev was even more alarmist:

"We cannot fail to see that in the event of the adoption of the decision the United States is insisting on, a qualitatively new military-political situation will emerge, above all because NATO--in the event of retaliatory measures on our side--will achieve real military superiority in Europe."³⁷

General N. Chervov, writing in the Czech paper Rude Pravo on July 21, 1980 went somewhat beyond Ponomarev, stating that "if the United States deploys in Europe another 572 missiles above the current numerical strength, then NATO will have a considerable superiority."

Soviet analyst G.A. Trofimenko conceded that U.S. doctrine as set forth in PD-59 reflected "not merely a desire to guarantee a first (disarming) strike potential" but "is primarily intended to guarantee so-called escalation domination," that is, "to give the United States the ability to force its opponent in a nuclear missile exchange to accept the U.S. 'rules of exchange' or, as the Americans put it, 'rules of the game.'"³⁸ According to another article, escalation dominance is the achievement of "superiority in force with respect to any opponent at all possible stages of the development (escalation) of a military conflict." This is seen as part of a much broader U.S. program whose "official objectives" are said to include:

"The security of local superiority in regional conflicts by Rapid Deployment Forces, naval superiority, a preponderance of NATO conventional forces over the forces of the Warsaw Pact by 1985 and also the attaining of a marked superiority along the entire spectrum of nuclear arms

³⁶ Pravda, October 7, 1979.

³⁷ Pravda, November 18, 1979.

³⁸ G.A. Trofimenko, "The Washington Strategic Seesaw," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 12, December 1980, p. 56.

beginning with medium-range missiles in Europe up to MX intercontinental missiles, Trident, strategic cruise missiles."³⁹

One of Moscow's most authoritative commentators, Aleksandr Bovin, phrased the issue in the Soviet government newspaper Izvestiia as follows:

"Taking account of the opposing side's potential, the Americans do not seem to have much faith that they will succeed in upsetting parity at the level of central strategic systems. A large-scale nuclear missile war and its catastrophic consequences for the United States remain a nightmare even to gallant U.S. generals. So they are doubling their efforts to secure positions of superiority at lower levels of escalation on a potential conflict. Hence, the peculiar rebirth of the strategy of 'limited' wars--both conventional and nuclear."⁴⁰

By implication, the U.S. and NATO are expected to upgrade their conventional capabilities as part of NATO modernization. Moscow frequently portrays the U.S. as torn between efforts to make use of nuclear weapons credible, and fear that this is not possible and that reliance on the last analysis must continue to be made on conventional weapons. Thus one author speculated:

"In the face of parity between the strategic forces of the United States and the USSR, a special emphasis on the current 'grand' strategy of Washington is being made upon ensuring, for the United States and its allies, a regional 'balance of power' in various areas. In this connection, great significance is attached to increasing general purpose weaponry--including the so-called tactical nuclear and conventional weapons. The highest priority in this connection is assigned to an accelerated increase in the U.S. potential--and that of NATO as a whole--in Western Europe since Europe is regarded as the

³⁹ V.V. Potashov, "The Arms Race in the U.S. - A Threat to Peace," USA, No. 6, June 1981, p. 30.

⁴⁰ A. Bovin, "Attempts Using Unsuitable Means," Izvestiia, September 24, 1981.

principal regional theater for any military confrontation with the Soviet Union. American strategy calls for an increase in Europe of both nuclear as well as conventional components of its military potential."⁴¹

Moscow is acutely aware that the issue of NATO modernization is a vital component of the entire relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe, particularly the question of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Soviet writings on U.S. military doctrines have seen the changes in U.S. military doctrines from massive retaliation to flexible response to the Schlesinger option as efforts by the U.S. to come to grips with the consequences of Soviet strategic weapons developments in order to preserve the credibility especially for the defense of Europe of U.S. nuclear power.

A 1978 Soviet book, in a discussion of the Schlesinger Doctrine, indicated growing Soviet optimism about prospects that the Europeans were losing confidence in U.S. willingness to put U.S. cities at risk on behalf of the defense of Europe. According to the book:

"Formally Washington has never rejected the idea that its strategic forces can be used in the interests of NATO. On the contrary, American theoreticians increasingly portrayed U.S. strategic nuclear forces first (in the 50s) as the 'sword' and later as the 'shield' of NATO. However, the change in the correlation of forces in the world, the inevitability of a crushing retaliatory blow, objectively made even less probable the possibility of direct utilization by the U.S. of its nuclear-missile forces. The Soviet-American agreements of the 70s on limitation of strategic weapons, very strongly devalued in the eyes of Europeans the American 'nuclear guarantee' of NATO. The limitation according to the agreements of anti-missile defense systems to one single complex for each side, strengthening the possibility of a retaliatory blow, strengthened the situation of so-called mutual deterrence.

⁴¹Yu. V. Katsanov, "Military-Political Strategy of the United States on the Borderline of the 1970s and 1980s," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 2, February 1980.

"In these conditions, the declaration of American generals about their readiness to risk U.S. cities in the name of fulfillment of 'allied obligations' was now met in Western Europe with great skepticism."⁴²

The author then suggested that even some Americans favored a decoupling of U.S. and European defense. In his words, "the understanding by the West Europeans of the devaluation in fact of the 'nuclear guarantee,' of the fact that the notorious 'umbrella' had become full of holes was deemed by some soberly thinking American U.S. leaders as a situation making it possible for the U.S. without any harm to its own prestige to review its 'unconditional' obligations to NATO thoughtlessly accept in the epoch of American nuclear monopoly." However, the book went on, the Pentagon was alarmed and sought through the Schlesinger Doctrine to reaffirm U.S.-NATO nuclear links.

Later Soviet writings, however, have emphasized the importance to both the U.S. and Europe of their nuclear relationship. Thus a leading Soviet writer on U.S.-European relations, writing on the problems of weapons standardization, declared:

"In evaluating the tendencies toward increasing American-West European rivalry in the production of armaments, at the same time one must not exaggerate their significance. Western Europe as before retains military dependence on the U.S. Autonomous directions in Western European cooperation do not extend to the nuclear sphere--the central link of dependence on the U.S."⁴³

This same author, while conceding that NATO in the 70s had been rent by centrifugal forces, concluded that there had been "no cardinal changes in the essence and structure of NATO" which "is considered on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean as the only possible and necessary counterweight to the USSR and the Warsaw Pact."⁴⁴

⁴² Yu. P. Davydov, USA-Western Europe in Partnership and Rivalry (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), p. 138.

⁴³ G.A. Vorontsov, The USA and Western Europe: A New Stage of Relations (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1979), p. 199.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 313.

In this connection, Moscow has downgraded the chance that the Europeans will aspire to develop an independent nuclear deterrent. As noted by one source, economic and political integration processes in Europe are primarily regional but military ties must be seen in an Atlantic context involving the U.S. and Canada; this, it said, is the "main reason for the weak manifestation up to now of a West European integration process in the military sphere." Further, this source noted, "at the present stage, the presence of American armed forces in Europe, the preservation of U.S. military 'obligations' to its NATO partners still occupies an extremely firm place in the foreign policy strategy of the West European powers."⁴⁵

Stressing that Euromissiles will be in American hands, Moscow has further downgraded the possibility of a European nuclear deterrent independent of the United States. Thus Red Star on August 5, 1979 noted speculation that some elements in Europe would like to see the continent "militarily united and independent of the Americans' nuclear umbrella" but concluded that "in Washington there is somehow no sign of any manifestation of concern at the West Europe militarist circle's inclination towards an independent deterrent."

By the same token, the USSR has shown little concern about the possibility that NATO plans will lead to West German acquisition of nuclear weapons. One Soviet source claimed that until 1976, it could be said that the FRG government "openly strove to change by one means or another the country's non-nuclear status." However, its adherence to the non-proliferation treaty in 1969 as well as the series of agreements in 1970 between the FRG and bloc changed matters. Accordingly, this source now concludes, "the demands for access did not figure and does not figure in the programs of FRG governments headed by SDP [Social Democratic] leaders" who are said to be cool to the creation of a joint Anglo-French nuclear force and place "decisive significance from the point of view of Bonn's interests in the nuclear forces not of its West European partners but of the U.S."⁴⁶

Commenting on former Secretary of State Kissinger's speech in Brussels on the 30th anniversary of NATO, Soviet propagandists took the line that he was merely trying to pressure the Europeans to agree to emplacement of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles. Red Star on November 14, 1979 declared that the U.S. was "deliberately devaluing long-standing U.S. guarantees" for the same purpose.

⁴⁵ V.I. Kuznetsov, S.P. Madzoevskii, Western Europe in The Contemporary World (Moscow: Mysl, 1979), Vol. I, pp. 234-235.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 240-241.

Shortly after the NATO decision was reached, a Soviet analyst expanded on the theme that emphasis on the guarantee issue constituted "the most flagrant blackmail" by the U.S. to influence its allies.⁴⁷ The analyst, V.S. Shein, claimed that while official U.S. spokesmen reaffirmed U.S. nuclear guarantees, "this reaffirmation did not sound very convincing because it was accompanied by contrary unofficial statements by figures known in Western Europe," especially by Henry Kissinger at Brussels. Shein asserted that "with the pretense of sincerity, H. Kissinger unequivocally announced that in view of Soviet-American strategic parity, the allies would not be able to expect 'protection' from U.S. 'central systems,' the use of which would make America the target of a retaliatory strike."

Contrary to the general propaganda line that the U.S. was behind the concept, Shein noted that the idea "became quite popular in Western Europe that the achievement of approximate strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States had 'eroded' and 'undermined American obligations to 'defend' the NATO countries with the aid of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons." And in a rare Soviet reference, Shein recalled FRG Chancellor Schmidt's October 1977 "widely publicized speech in London" in which he had "aroused doubts in U.S. commitments with respect to the use of American strategic forces in Western Europe, in view of the fact that these commitments, in his words, had been undermined by Soviet-U.S. strategic parity." Shein noted that Schmidt "vigorously supported the idea of building up medium-range nuclear missile systems" in Western Europe.

Shein explained that "the Pershing II missiles and land-based cruise missiles are intended, Washington officials underscore, to become a means of implementing NATO's present military doctrine--the doctrine of flexible response--by providing the 'missing rung' in the 'ladder of armed conflict escalation,' a 'rung' which has supposedly become 'absolutely essential' to the North Atlantic bloc as a result of progress in the strategic arms limitation talks and the modernization of Soviet medium-range nuclear missile systems."

Shein further asserted that "there is absolutely no basis for the assertion that the reinforcement of medium-range nuclear missile potential on the European continent is essential for the enhancement of the reliability of American guarantees." It cited the Washington Post to the effect that the decision would still be in U.S. hands, that U.S. cities would still be in danger and Europe the target of Soviet missiles in case of war.

⁴⁷ V.S. Shein, "Behind the Facade of Nuclear Modernization," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 3, March 1980, pp. 6-16.

Nevertheless, Defense Minister Ustinov in Pravda on July 25, 1981 suggested that the outcome of implementation of the NATO decision will increase U.S.-Western Europe interdependence.

"We have the possibilities to prevent the military superiority of the United States. As a result, the equilibrium will be maintained, but on a higher level. If this happens, however, the security of West Europe will not increase, but decline, and the West European countries themselves will become even more dependent on the Pentagon's nuclear strategy."

E. THE OVERALL POLITICAL DIMENSION

Along with the heavy emphasis in Soviet discussions about the military threat behind U.S. weapons and doctrinal developments, Soviet spokesmen also make clear Soviet apprehension that what the U.S. is really seeking is to provide a credible military foundation for U.S. political action in the world arena. This basically is the meaning of continuous Soviet leadership statements that the U.S. was seeking to dictate political terms or bring pressure to bear upon the USSR. According to Gen. Semeiko "it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Washington increasingly views nuclear strength as a 'rational' means of attaining its foreign policy ends."⁴⁸

Another leading Soviet military analyst Gen. Milshtein, after noting the evolution of U.S. mutual assured destruction doctrine, cautioned that "the whole history of the development of U.S. strategic military thought shows that there has been and is in that country a constant quest for ways to make nuclear weapons 'acceptable' and to ensure the utilization of the huge arsenal of nuclear weapons as a means of resolving international problems in its own favor without running the risk of sustaining 'unacceptable losses.'"⁴⁹

One year later, in the growing campaign against the NATO decision, Semeiko reiterated this thought in a somewhat different way. Noting the official Western claim that this decision was needed as a response to the Soviet military threat, Semeiko retorted:

⁴⁸ New Times, No. 50, December 1980.

⁴⁹ M.A. Milshtein, "Some Characteristic Feature of Present-Day U.S. Military Doctrine," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 5, May 1980.

"The new missiles in Europe are needed by Washington and the NATO bloc for something quite different--to obtain superior positions in both politics and strategy. In policy this is allegedly a chance to exert political pressure from a 'position of strength.' It is a chance to achieve Soviet concessions in negotiations."⁵⁰

Beyond this, Moscow sees U.S. efforts to redress the military balance a design to open up the options for U.S. foreign policy throughout the world. As expressed by a bloc-wide meeting of communist party secretaries held in Moscow on November 30, 1981, "imperialism hopes to achieve military superiority over the world of socialism so as to weaken its position, its beneficial influence on world development, to continue to pursue its colonialist and neo-colonialist policy of domination and suppression of the peoples, and to stop and suppress the movements for national and social liberation."⁵¹

A constant in Soviet analyses of world developments in recent years is that the U.S. has become increasingly deterred by the military might of the USSR from the use of force or the threat of force to "export counterrevolution" or to stop "national liberation" movements and conflicts or otherwise to interfere with trends and developments anywhere in the world toward "peace, progress and socialism." This is by way of saying that any such use of force by the U.S. to protect its vital global interests is estopped because it would risk Soviet counteractions that could escalate to the point of total destruction of the U.S. Moscow evidently perceives the U.S. as anticipating that this aspect of deterrence would be bypassed by a U.S. strategy for the limited use of nuclear weapons in limited conflict situations in Europe.

⁵⁰Red Star, June 30, 1981.

⁵¹Pravda, November 5, 1981.

VII. ONGOING AND PROSPECTIVE SOVIET COUNTERMOVES

Several Soviet statements set 1983, when deployment of the new U.S. missiles is scheduled to start, as the target date for particularly intensive Soviet diplomatic and propaganda efforts. In the words of one propagandist: "Little time now remains: in 1983, according to the original plan, the first American Euromissiles are due to be deployed."¹ Until deployment actually takes place, it can be expected that Moscow will keep its campaign of propaganda attacks and blandishments, diplomatic moves, economic pressures, military posturing and specific threatening actions to frustrate the modernization program.

Moscow continues to see significant differences between the U.S. and Europe about how to deal with the Soviet Union which gives Moscow leverage on the NATO modernization problem. A comparison between the July 1981 and early 1982 versions of articles by Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Ogarkov illustrates Soviet hopes in this regard. In July, Ogarkov portrayed the U.S. and NATO as a united (if reluctant) entity:

"Under pressure from Washington, the West European countries affirmed at the Rome session [of NATO] the well-known NATO decision on 'additional nuclear arms'--for West Europe (the deployment on its territory of about 600 launchers for Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles, supplementing the U.S. strategic potential with respect to the USSR). In May the U.S. President and the FRG Chancellor Schmidt noted in a joint statement that they are fully determined to resolve this problem come what may."²

In an expanded version of the article issued in early 1982, he presented a more complicated picture inserting into a paragraph containing more or less the above statement the following:

¹Pravda, November 25, 1979.

²N.V. Ogarkov, "Guarding Peaceful Labor," Kommunist, No. 10, July 1981, p. 83.

"At the same time, it must be noted that the NATO countries on individual questions of economic and socio-political development have serious disagreements with their leader--the U.S. However,--in anti-Sovietism and anti-communism, in the struggle against socialism, democracy and social progress--they adhere in the main to a single line."³

And in a later passage, Ogarkov states:

"Statements against Washington's plans are acquiring a special sweep in Europe, which the Pentagon strategists intend to transform into an arena of nuclear war, not affecting the territory of the U.S. Millions of people, broad circles of society, many government and political leaders, recognize ever more clearly that the basic interests of the countries and peoples of Western Europe completely diverge from the strivings of the U.S. Disagreements between the U.S. and its NATO allies on many military-political problems, including production of the neutron bomb and deployment of nuclear devices in Europe are deepening even more and assuming an open character."⁴

As indicated by Ogarkov, Moscow is pinning increasing hopes on anti-nuclear movements not only in Europe, but in the United States, to thwart NATO modernization and U.S. rearmament plans generally, and is initiating and utilizing an ever broadening range of activities, programs and campaigns to realize these hopes.

Moscow, of course, has perennially used and encouraged the international communist movement to focus on peace issues as a technique to generate support for the USSR against U.S. and NATO efforts. Brezhnev at the Soviet Party Congress in February 1981 proposed, among other things, the formation of an international scientific committee to examine the consequences of nuclear war as a device to mobilize Western intellectual support for Soviet positions on nuclear issues.

³ N.V. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness For the Defense of the Fatherland (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), p. 21.

⁴ Ibid., p. 25.

Brezhnev made himself exceedingly responsive to opposition and protest groups from the West beginning in the summer of 1981. On June 12, he met a disarmament group led by former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme. On June 30, he met Willy Brandt and paid him the signal honor of seeing him off at the airport on July 2. Pravda on July 9 reported a message from Brezhnev to leftist lawyer groups on the threat of war. On August 8 and September 27, the Soviets reported Brezhnev messages to European peace marchers in northern Europe and Italy. In mid-September, he received a British Labor Party delegation led by Michael Foot, and in February 1982 a Socialist International group led by Finnish Premier Sorsa.

For a time, in late summer some Soviet commentators had been surprisingly cautious about what the peace movement could accomplish in Europe. Red Star on August 30 noted that despite growing popular opposition to deployment of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles "nonetheless there are some who, in defiance of the will of their countries' peoples, are continuing in the footsteps of the transatlantic ruling circles' policy." Izvestiia on September 18 recalled that in the late fifties and early sixties "after the upsurge in the anti-nuclear movement, it receded to some extent" as U.S. nuclear weapons were introduced in Europe. According to Izvestiia "bourgeois observers predict the same fate for the current public actions."

A certain amount of trepidation was also evident in Moscow's initial reaction to President Reagan's November 18 zero option proposal as well as the subsequent initiation of talks on theater nuclear forces in Geneva. Sovetskaia Rossiia on November 28 suggested:

"One of the main tasks of Reagan's speech was undoubtedly to try to stem the tide of Western Europe's anti-nuclear movement, which is increasing daily. The 'peace-making wrappings' in which the American proposals are offered should, according to Washington design, blunt the vigilance of the fighters for disarmament."

At the same time, Moscow saw in the Reagan proposal evidence that the anti-nuclear movement was having some impact on Western policy. Moscow interpreted President Reagan's November 18 speech at least in part as a response to the pressure of the anti-nuclear movement, especially on West European governments. Izvestiia on November 26 suggested that the President's offer was an "advertising show" put on because of the imminent Geneva talks and because "the powerful anti-war movement which has rocked the whole of Western Europe and crossed to the United States and the successes of the peaceloving foreign policy of the Soviet Union, whose voice reaches the peoples' hearts and meets with a response and understanding there, have really startled Washington and the NATO staffs."

Soviet hopes markedly increased when anti-nuclear demonstrations continued after the President's November 18 speech. TASS on December 7 wrote that "the mass movement...shows that Washington is unable to bring down the mounting wave of anti-war demonstrations by imposing the so-called zero option on Western Europe, the option which is designed not only to preserve the available American nuclear weapons on the continent, but also to continue to build up NATO's nuclear potential." Pravda on December 31 said that these demonstrations showed that people see that the "real threat" does not come from the USSR but from U.S. nuclear weapons. In an interesting variation, a TASS English-language summary attributed to the Pravda article the statement (not in fact included) that U.S. propagandists were claiming that European demonstrations were protesting not only against U.S. missiles but also Soviet SS-20 missiles.

In a speech to an international youth conference reported in Pravda on December 13, Boris Ponomarev signalled Moscow's attention to give more attention in the weeks ahead to the "peace movement" in Europe and the U.S. In Ponomarev's words:

"In the struggle against the anti-war movement aggressive circles employ all sorts of measures: propaganda, political and administrative measures. But the peoples' interest and the interests of preserving peace demand the further development of the anti-war movement. For no one has rescinded the grant U.S. military programs or Reagan's decision to produce neutron weapons. No one has renounced the statements that peace is not the most important thing and that a 'limited' war is possible in Europe. And this must be said over and over again to the broad masses."

In addition to the general effort to mobilize opposition against U.S. and European military preparations, Moscow indicates that it hopes to use the anti-war movement as a means of exerting pressure on Western negotiations to agree to Soviet positions on disarmament issues. According to Pravda on December 31:

"The question of negotiations between states had gone outside the walls of diplomatic offices. Anti-war forces not only insist on dialogue, not only demand a successful outcome of ongoing talks but also formulate concrete aims which, in their opinion, should be attained in the course of negotiations."

In the last few months of 1981, the Soviet press and radio increasingly called attention to a growing "peace movement" in the United States. Obviously with the Vietnam experience in mind, Moscow is hopeful that this movement will have a significant impact on administration policies regarding the refurbishing of U.S. military, especially nuclear power.

On October 15, Pravda's prominent political commentator Yuri Zhukov noted opposition in Nevada and Utah to the emplacement of MX missiles in those states and commented:

"So an interesting situation is being created in the West European countries. Resistance to new U.S. missiles on their territory is mounting rapidly while in the United States the struggle is being stepped up against the deployment of a new nuclear missile system on U.S. soil."

And Pravda declared on November 9:

"The anti-war movement is no longer contained in Europe. While they anathematize the West European champions of peace, the hawks on the Potomac fail to notice that there is a rising tide of protest on the American shore too. According to the latest public opinion polls, increasing numbers of U.S. citizens are voicing alarm at the Reagan Administration's military course.... And of course, you cannot cite any kind of 'hand of Moscow' to explain the significant fact that the leaders of the Catholic Church in the United States are joining in the anti-war movement."

Soviet spokesmen have veered between two approaches toward the anti-nuclear movement, especially in Europe. To broaden the spectrum of participation, some spokesmen have emphasized that the movement is spontaneous and not dominated by communists. But to bolster the communist cause, other spokesmen have emphasized the role of communists in leading and guiding the movement.

In Brezhnev's interview with Der Spiegel, carried by Pravda on November 3, he called attention to the "spontaneous anti-war and anti-missile movement which is unfolding nowadays in a number of NATO countries as an answer to the dangerous militaristic policy of that bloc's leaders." In another approach, Soviet spokesmen sometimes simply lump the communists in with other groups to demonstrate an affinity of interests among equals in the anti-nuclear movement.

In the weeks that followed, other spokesmen made a point of denying direct Soviet involvement. In a speech on November 24 to a meeting in Prague to discuss the work of the international communist journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, Soviet party Secretary and candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev evidently dealt with this question at some length. Pravda's summary of Ponomarev's speech on November 25 thus notes:

"Very different social and political forces including, incidentally, forces infected by anti-communist prejudices, rub shoulders in this movement and cooperate but

at the same time vie with each other. The socialist and social democrats are one of the most important components of the present-day peace-loving forces. To depict a movement of this nature and composition as 'inspired' by someone, as being directed from a single center and linked with some single ideological and political salient means demonstrates truly surprising 'intellectual poverty.'

At the same time, evidently emboldened by the continued anti-NATO, anti-U.S. demonstrations in November and December, Moscow is more explicitly proclaiming a linkage between these demonstrations and Soviet policy. Pravda on December 31 claimed that "the intense struggle of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and peaceful states, the international working class and its communist vanguard as well as the world democratic public against the plans of the Pentagon militarists, is now being supported by anti-war action of an unprecedented scope launched by the masses in the countries of the non-socialist world." The same article, looking ahead to further action by the anti-nuclear, anti-war movement, then declared:

"And here the communist movement has an especially great mobilizing and organizing role. Communists not only defend the vital interests of the workers in the struggle against the domination and arbitrariness of monopoly capital. They come out as advanced fighters for delivering mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. Communists decisively expose imperialist sophisms in favor of war, tirelessly rally the forces of peace."

In time-honored fashion, Moscow can be expected to use both the carrot and stick to affect Western public opinion and policies.

A. SOVIET PEACE MOVES

At the pacific end of the propaganda spectrum, Moscow will seek to reassure the Europeans that Soviet weaponry represents no threat to them. The emphasis on the existence of parity implies that Europe is already well protected. Beyond that, Soviet spokesmen will continue to insist that the SS-20 deployment has not altered the balance in Europe. Their major argument remains that the SS-20 is no more than a replacement for SS-4s and SS-5s, has the same mission as the older missiles and therefore cannot be said to have altered the basic military situation in Europe.

The series of moratorium proposals made by Brezhnev are clearly designed to demonstrate Moscow's pacific intentions and to provide ammunition to opposition elements in Western Europe against the

NATO decision. The unilateral moratorium announced by Brezhnev on March 16, 1982 and his simultaneous announcement that the USSR would reduce the number of its medium-range missiles sometime in 1982 brings Moscow just about to the end of the line on this tactic (although it can spin it out about one more year).

At the very least, once NATO deployments begin, the USSR would announce an end to its moratorium. In Brezhnev's words the moratorium will remain in force until an agreement is reached "or until the time, if and when, the U.S. leaders, disregarding the security of the nations, actually go over to practical preparations to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe." Thus an announcement could even precede deployment.

Apart from its negotiations with the U.S., it is evident that the USSR considers that it has other negotiating options designed to foster West European opposition to the NATO decisions. It will undoubtedly press for bilateral negotiations on its offers not to use nuclear weapons against countries which agreed not to accept them. In this connection, it will also seek to pursue its proposals for nuclear-free zones especially in Scandinavia. Another possibility would be modification of the Soviet position on the area to be covered by confidence-building measures in Europe so as to make possible the convening of a European disarmament conference within the context of the Helsinki review process. The current Soviet position is that the area should include the sea areas and adjacent waters. Moscow may have wanted to establish the precedent for inclusion of "adjacent waters" into any European disarmament proposal with the thought in mind of its later proposal at Geneva INF talks designed to prevent deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles. However, now that it has made the proposal at Geneva, it could drop the idea in the context of confidence-building measures in order to generate an all-European disarmament conference.

However, the main focus of Soviet efforts in this regard, it can be expected, will be in seeking to manipulate the course of the intermediate nuclear force (INF) talks in Geneva, mainly in order to influence Western public opinion.

B. MANIPULATION OF GENEVA TALKS

The Soviet position on negotiations with the U.S. on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) has been a mixture of pressure to get such negotiations under way with indications of apprehension that the talks might serve U.S. rather than Soviet interests. Moscow has made clear that it sees as the main, if not the only purpose of the talks, the scuttling of NATO plans to deploy U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles either as the outcome of the talks themselves or through utilization of the talks as a means of persuading the West

Europeans to postpone and ultimately reject implementation of the December 1979 NATO decision.

Until the very eve of the Gromyko-Haig agreement in New York on September 23, Soviet commentaries cast doubt on U.S. willingness to negotiate on INF. This line, it should be noted, fit in with a Soviet effort to persuade the Europeans that the U.S. had failed to live up to that part of the December 1979 NATO decision which called for negotiations and that therefore the Europeans were released from the other part of the decision calling for deployment of the weapons. Led by Brezhnev in June, Soviet spokesmen had strongly denied that talks had already started between the U.S. and the USSR on INF, although Soviet and American officials had been meeting. Along these lines, Izvestiia on September 18 declared:

"Washington is trying to depict as some kind of U.S. concession the statements by its officials to the effect that preliminary talks will begin this fall between the USSR and the United States on questions of medium-range missiles in Europe. The gamble is on lulling the public's vigilance and forcing through the latest armaments under cover of all this noisy talk."

Gromyko in his speech to the General Assembly also betrayed a certain amount of apprehension that the very existence of talks would satisfy the Europeans and induce them to acquiesce in deployment of the weapons. Accordingly, he declared that while the USSR seeks agreement on INF:

"At the same time, it should be stated with utter clarity that if the other side will artificially drag out the talks and commence the deployment in Western Europe of new medium-range nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union will have to take measures to restore the balance."

The Soviet weekly Za Rubezhom (Life Abroad) No. 39 of September 25 - October 1 declared:

"Under pressure from its allies, disturbed by Washington's position, the United States recently declared its readiness to enter into negotiations with the USSR on the question of medium-range missiles. But this declared readiness is surrounded by a multitude of all kinds of conditions, linkages, inequitable approaches. If the U.S. really intends to conduct them in such a key, then one can say ahead of time: nothing will come of it. Negotiations can be

successful only with an honorable, business-like approach. The present U.S. position forces one to ask the question: is the process of negotiation needed only as a diversionary maneuver, under cover of which it would like to make possible the deployment of new missiles in order to attain strategic superiority over the USSR?"

Throughout 1982, Moscow cast doubt on the sincerity of the U.S. negotiating posture. In a typical example, Brezhnev on March 16 called it "common knowledge that the American side so far has been evading a serious discussion, let alone a solution of these questions, taking cover behind the absurd demand that the Soviet Union should unilaterally disarm which Washington has, as though in mockery, called the zero option."

Indeed, Moscow sees little incentive for the U.S. to negotiate on Euromissiles except the desire to mollify its European allies. Marshal Ogarkov in his pamphlet issued in early 1982 declared:

"The United States for a long time dragged out renewal of talks on limitation of medium-range nuclear devices in Europe. However, under the pressure of the broad world public, including the West European countries, the U.S. was compelled to come to these talks. However, it is already increasingly clearly evident that they are least of all interested in the reduction of nuclear devices on the European continent. In setting forth proposals obviously unacceptable to the USSR such as the zero option, President Reagan, the U.S. in reality is not striving for a constructive solution of the problem of limiting nuclear weapons in Europe on the basis of the principle of equality and the equal security of the parties but is only trying to gain time to deploy new nuclear missile devices in the countries of Western Europe."⁵

On the basis of current Soviet positions, breakthroughs do not appear likely. Every aspect of the Soviet negotiating position as set forth in the TASS statement of February 9 indicate that considerable difficulties still lie ahead. The basic Soviet position continues to call for the nuclear denuding of Western Europe.

The first point of the Soviet proposal to the effect that an agreement must cover all weapons "deployed on the territory of Europe and in the adjacent waters or intended for use in Europe" indicates

⁵N.V. Ogarkov, *Always in Readiness*, p. 19.

how far-reaching Soviet demands are. The figures put forward by the USSR as its interpretation of what these weapons are, omit large numbers of weapons included by the West in its calculations. This also brings up the issue of British and French missiles which Moscow insists must be included.

Another point permits replacement and modernization weapons within a framework "to be determined additionally." However, the current Soviet position is that whatever they do is "replacement" or "modernization," while what the West does beyond modernization and constitutes introduction of qualitatively new weapons which violate the proposed agreement.

A third point provides that the main means for reduction would be the destruction of weapons but that this "does not exclude the possibility of withdrawing a part of the armaments behind some agreed lines." It is already evident that a major problem in the discussion is to define just what weapons are involved because the USSR can simply declare that given weapons beyond the Urals are not aimed at Europe but at other areas, notably the Far East. The Threat to Europe pamphlet complained that U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Gompert in June 1981 had stated the talks should cover "all SS-20 missiles, including those stationed in eastern regions of the USSR and trained on China and Japan." In this connection, the pamphlet commented:

"It is more than clear, therefore, that new American 'initiative' to alter the nature of the coming negotiations is creating a complication that will take a much longer time to overcome--providing this will be at all possible--than the 'double decision' envisages for starting the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe."⁶

Finally, the Soviet proposal calls for verification procedures which "will be worked out." This is a perennially difficult problem about which Soviet sources otherwise devote no attention.

Clearly, within these parameters, there remains considerable room for Soviet maneuvering which will give Moscow the opportunity to claim that it is being forthcoming in the negotiations and to allege that implementation of the NATO decision would be jeopardizing a real chance for achieving significant disarmament agreement.

⁶The Threat to Europe, p. 42.

It is conceivable at some point for example, that Soviet negotiators might take the position that the West could deploy Pershing II or cruise missiles in Europe within the limits to be agreed on for total numbers of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

As in the case of all its previous maneuvering, Moscow would seek to increase pressure on European governments to induce the U.S. to negotiate on Soviet terms or to provide the framework for those governments to renege on the NATO decision on the grounds that the U.S. is not negotiating in good faith the second part of the NATO decision of December 1979 regarding negotiations.

Even if agreement is reached on medium-range nuclear missiles, however, a further obstacle is certain to arise in connection with its relationship to SALT. For a long time, Moscow used the argument with the Europeans that the U.S. had agreed to consider the issue of medium-range missiles only in connection with a ratified SALT agreement. In this connection, the Soviets took the position that Euromissile negotiations should be conducted within the SALT framework, that is, in the phase following ratification of SALT II.

When ratification did not take place, Moscow dropped the linkage between Euromissile and SALT talks but established a new linkage when Brezhnev told FRG Chancellor Schmidt in June-July 1981 that any agreement on Euromissiles could come into effect only after a SALT agreement is ratified. This remains the Soviet position and was in fact strongly reaffirmed in the November 1981 pamphlet The Threat to Europe which declared:

"The problems of strategic arms limitation and Euro-strategic armaments are objectively linked. And in the circumstances, the absence of SALT negotiations will inevitably and drastically complicate negotiations on medium-range weaponry. The Soviet Union is being put in a position where it would have to agree to quantity ceilings of what are in fact American strategic weapons before it has any idea of what the United States intends to do with the other components of its strategic arsenal (and judging from available evidence it intends to keep increasing that arsenal in order to secure military superiority through the deployment of new MX and Trident ballistic missiles, and B-1 and Stealth strategic bombers)."⁷

⁷ The Threat to Europe, p. 40.

Since SALT or START negotiations will presumably be underway before deployment of the U.S. missiles in Europe, Moscow can be expected to have one more propaganda tool with which to influence U.S. and Western European opinion: the argument that deployment might jeopardize both sets of negotiations.

With or without SALT, Moscow even before INF talks began foresaw that they would be of long duration. A Pravda dispatch from Bonn on May 21, 1981 speculated that "the possibility of achieving an agreement on medium-range missiles before the deployment of new American nuclear missile facilities begins in 1983 does not appear too likely here."⁸ Pravda added that "few people believe that it will be possible to reach agreements in the time remaining before the deployment of new missiles unless" the U.S. and Western Europeans accept a moratorium as proposed by the USSR. Gromyko, it will be recalled, in November 1979 had noted that "if SALT III talks concern not only strategic weapons but also medium-range nuclear missile weapons, then you can imagine how much time would be needed for these talks. It would be good if they ended in 7-8 years."⁹

It will, therefore, be no surprise to Moscow that the talks will not be concluded when the U.S. missiles are scheduled to be deployed in Western Europe. Moscow at that point will be faced with a difficult dilemma. It may, as in the past, calculate that it is worthwhile, from Moscow's point of view, to continue the talks with the intention of slowing down the pace of deployments or, along with other measures, to induce a reversal of the action.

However, as a sign of seriousness with which it takes even the initial deployment and its assessment of the vulnerability of governments in Western Europe, Moscow may well break off INF talks. This would accord with the second part of basic Soviet tactics on the issue, the use of "terror" tactics warning both the Europeans and the U.S. about the consequences of the NATO decision.

C. NEW THREATS TO EUROPE

Particularly for the benefit of the Europeans, it can be expected that Moscow will play up the dangers to Europe to the world at large which implementation of the NATO decision will be said to bring. As early as October 18, 1979, Pravda correspondent Yuri Zhukov warned that "every one of these countries must realize that by deploying new American missiles on their territory, it would incur the danger of a retaliatory strike" in case of hostilities.

⁸ Pravda, November 25, 1979.

⁹ V. Mikhailov, "NATO's Spring Marathon," Pravda, May 21, 1981.

Izvestiia on February 26, 1980 refined the threat by suggesting that "every new missile launchpad on West European territory is a target for an inevitable retaliatory strike from the victim of an aggressive attack." Izvestiia on March 1, 1980 intensified the rhetoric by specifying that European countries which turned "their territory into a launchpad for American missiles targeted on the USSR," should expect "a nuclear counterstrike."

Soviet spokesmen play heavily on the theme that the U.S. is seeking both through the NATO decision and its recent doctrines to avoid nuclear war on American soil and to sacrifice Western Europe to U.S. strategic needs. Thus a Soviet military journal declared that "PD-59 graphically attests that the American plan for deployment in a number of Western European states of 108 Pershing IIs and 464 land-based cruise missiles of the Tomahawk type has no relation with the problems of ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, with the aid of such actions, U.S. militarist circles count on diverting the threat of an inevitable retaliatory blow from their own territory and transferring a nuclear war to the territory of Western European states who are assigned the unenviable role of hostages of Washington's nuclear strategy."¹⁰

In an interesting variation, a Soviet article in January 1982 warned that any war-winning variant the U.S. may be planning "is totally excluded for Western Europe" because "considering its limited territory, population density and tremendous concentration of arms and troops any war, nuclear or 'conventional' can only result in turning Western Europe into a lifeless desert."¹¹ The suggestion that even a conventional war would be fatal for Europe was unusual.

While the pamphlet The Threat to Europe notably omitted the scare propaganda which frequently features Soviet coverage on Euro-missiles aimed at the Europeans, it did break new ground in its warnings to the Europeans about the consequences of accepting U.S. medium-range missiles on their soil. In a striking passage, Moscow introduced its variation of linkage between events in Europe and possible crises in other areas.

¹⁰ Yu. Babich, "The Strategy of Political Adventurism," Kommunist Vooruzhenikh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), No. 24, December 1980, p. 80.

¹¹ V. Mikhailov, "The FRG and Peace in Europe," International Affairs, No. 1, January 1982, p. 17.

The essence of the Soviet threat is that Europe, armed with Euromissiles, will be a hostage to U.S. actions elsewhere:

"Furthermore, and that is the greatest danger, the new U.S. nuclear missiles to be stationed in Western Europe would not be a 'potential of deterrence' but a potential of aggression and provocation--a potential of aggression because Pershing II and cruise missiles are first-strike nuclear weapons, and a potential of provocation because they are designed to involve Western Europe in any nuclear or neutron venture the United States may start against the Soviet Union, even far away from Europe. In that event, will the Soviet Union be able to disregard the U.S. nuclear missiles stationed in close proximity and designed to strike Soviet defenses and centers of political and military leadership in a matter of minutes? Have the supporters of NATO's 'rearming' given any thought to what the answer to that question is likely and bound to be?"¹²

Especially in view of the shortened time and distances of nuclear strikes from Western Europe, Moscow may well step up its threats of possible preemption. A.G. Arbatov writing in Kommunist in April 1981 thus wrote:

"Reorientation of U.S. nuclear-missile policy toward the concept of 'limited' or 'selective' strikes leads to a lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold, that is to say, increases by chances of nuclear weapons being used at an earlier stage of a conflict. Some American experts note that the growing vulnerability of major elements of strategic forces will increase the probability of their preemptive use in fear of losing these forces as a result of a strike by the other side."¹³

It is clear from Soviet pronouncements that the Soviet leadership will seek in some ostentatious fashion to demonstrate that it is taking military measures to counter the deployment of Pershing II

¹²The Threat to Europe, pp. 26-27.

¹³A.G. Arbatov, "The Strategy of Nuclear Madness, Kommunist, No. 6, April 1981.

and cruise missiles. It has not been Soviet practice in the past to make formal announcements about specific weapons deployments, but general announcements would probably be made and, more important, the USSR would presumably make changes in its military posture, expecting that they would become known in the West and have the desired impact.

Constant Soviet statements that as a result of NATO deployments the USSR would have to take measures which would "restore" the balance but at a higher level seem to imply that the USSR would respond in kind. Presumably this means increased Soviet deployments of SS-20s and Backfires, and Soviet strengthening of tactical nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe capable of striking targets in Western Europe. The USSR might also announce that it would stop dismantling older missiles it claims to be retiring as new ones are introduced. As had been indicated by Soviet commentaries, Moscow would seek to bring home to the West Europeans that Soviet missiles had been increased to take into account the additional targeting requirements generated by the U.S. deployments.

Moscow could at any moment add to the rationale for any rearmament actions it took. A March 1980 Soviet pamphlet for example emphasized Soviet claims of the "right" to have missiles for the defense not only of the USSR but of its Warsaw Pact allies:

"Posing the question in which only the armaments of the Soviet Union on one side and those of Western Europe on the other are examined in isolation is false because it completely fails to take into account assuring the security of the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But their vital centers are threatened by that portion of NATO nuclear forces, whose range is insufficient for striking targets on the territory of the Soviet Union.

"It is natural, therefore, that the Soviet Union which in general does not deploy its medium-range nuclear means on the territory of other states, by right must have on its own territory corresponding means (besides those which are necessary for its own defense) earmarked for fulfillment of its obligations to the Warsaw Pact for the defense of its allies from NATO nuclear weapons targetted on them."¹⁴

¹⁴ V.R. Sobakin, "The NATO Decisions and the Fate of Military Detente in Europe," Moscow Znanie, No. 3, 1980, p. 48.

D. THE QUESTION OF WEST BERLIN

As for new pressures on Europe, and particularly the FRG, Moscow has already warned that it views the quadripartite agreement of 1971 on Berlin as hostage to abandonment of U.S.-NATO Euromissile plans.

The warning was first signalled by a Pravda article of September 3, 1981, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the agreement. After first hailing the great benefits of this agreement to the cause of peace and the relaxation of tensions, the article concluded with these suggestive words,

"Unswerving observance of all the elements of the four-power agreement is the guarantee that the situation around West Berlin and the conditions of its life will remain normal in the future. The agreement becomes particularly important at a time when the international situation is undergoing acute exacerbation through the fault of the United States. As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared, as is known, to fulfill all commitments in accordance with the four-power agreement just as conscientiously as before. And it is natural to expect the Western partners to the agreement to adopt the same approach. The interests of detente and of strengthening peace would undoubtedly be met if the West proceeded on the basis of the vital interests of the West Berlin population, the interests of peace and cooperation in Europe."

This Pravda article was given explicit meaning within a few days by an article signed by Petr Abrasimov, Soviet Ambassador to the GDR, who has written authoritatively on the Berlin problem for the Soviet press. (See, for example, his book West Berlin: Yesterday and Today, which was issued in 25,000 copies by Moscow's International Affairs Publishers in late 1980.) Abrasimov's article was written for the East German journal Horizont, No. 377, September 1981, and was repeated in essence in an interview carried by Radio Prague on September 16. The article states:

"The Quadripartite Agreement can withstand international crises and even mitigate them to a certain degree, on conditions that it is strictly and precisely observed. Even so one must not forget that this agreement was born under the sun of detente, it needs its warming rays and not the icy breath of the cold war or the powerful waves of the arms race. One must not forget that the American nuclear missiles, if they are deployed in Europe, are not only directed against the

GDR and the other socialist countries, but practically also against West Berlin and against the Quadripartite Agreement. One should also take into account that the USSR and its allies have sufficient means to correspondingly counter the provocative steps of NATO, which are staged on the other side of the Atlantic."

Linkage of the December 1979 NATO decision and Berlin also appeared in an August 1981 article in the Soviet journal on U.S. affairs.¹⁵ According to the article, "this decision posed a particularly serious threat to the population of West Berlin" because it is within the target zone of the projected U.S. missiles. Further, the article states, "many people there /in West Berlin/ realize that the normal existence of the city as a separate entity is closely connected with detente." And finally, the article contends that Administration expressions of doubt about detente "is alarming the public" in West Berlin which considered a U.S.-USSR dialogue "of considerable value" to it.

In explaining why the West had agreed in 1971 to a Berlin settlement, the article pointedly noted:

"The changing balance of world power, the establishment of U.S.-Soviet parity in strategic weapons and the development of detente in Europe, however, made the continued use of West Berlin as a generator of conflict increasingly difficult and hazardous for the United States and its allies."

Moscow would, of course, have a large range of actions it could take should it decide to revive the Berlin issue. The above-cited and other Soviet articles on Berlin emphasize that the FRG, in maintaining its ties to Berlin, does so in ways contrary to Soviet interpretations of the 1971 agreements. Moscow or East Germany could at any time find all manners of excuses to hinder access to the city, orchestrating any action according to the degree of crisis they want to generate or as to whether the target of pressure at any moment is to be the FRG, the Western allies or both.

¹⁵ D.V. Trenin, "The United States and West Berlin," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 8, August 1981, pp. 38-45.

E. OTHER PRESSURES ON FRG

Soviet spokesmen, with different levels of directness, have suggested that the implementation of the NATO decision will jeopardize economic relations between the USSR and any countries that permit the deployment of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles on their soil. Moscow's major target in this regard is West Germany. All top-level meetings between Soviet and West German leaders since the Euromissiles issue came to the forefront have featured statements on both sides about the importance of economic relations or agreements calling for significant increases in such relations. Soviet propaganda ceaselessly then notes that any jeopardy to detente might also jeopardize these advantageous economic relations. Moscow has thus consistently combined negotiations with Bonn on theater nuclear forces with economic talks not only for the benefit to the USSR but to create vested interests in the FRG which can serve as pressure points against the NATO decision and other prospective actions against Soviet interests.

From time to time, moreover, the element of threat has been more overt. With the FRG clearly in mind, then Premier Kosygin on March 1, 1979--when discussions in the Bundestag on the TNF issue had just gotten underway--had warned that countries which took part in "military preparations" unwelcome to the USSR would find that this "cannot but cloud prospects for economic links" with the USSR. He further stated that "we shall to an even greater extent orient ourselves to cooperation with those who do not jeopardize long-term interests for the sake of dubious benefits,"¹⁶

In his Party Congress speech on February 23, 1981 Brezhnev urged that "it must be clearly understood: the deployment in the FRG, Italy, Britain, the Netherlands or Belgium of new U.S. missiles, targeted against the USSR and its allies, is bound to affect our relations with these countries, to say nothing of how this will prejudice their own security."¹⁷

While any Soviet economic sanctions would entail losses for the USSR, Moscow may well believe that it can adjust to them better than the targets of any Soviet actions. Well before the gas for pipes deal, it will be recalled that a Radio Moscow commentator on June 29, 1980 had West Germany's "substantial dependence on deliveries from the East." After citing FRG gas imports, he had noted:

¹⁶ Pravda, March 2, 1979.

¹⁷ Pravda, February 24, 1981.

"Apart from this, the USSR supplies chromium, phosphates, cotton, timber and, on an ever increasing scale, machinery and technology. It is significant here that both trade unions and workers as well as representatives of the business world are in favor of developing cooperation between our countries. That is not surprising, either, because detente and the development of good-neighborly cooperation are to the mutual advantage of both countries."

In his March 16, 1982 trade union speech, Brezhnev, in the context of condemning Western sanctions, claimed that the USSR was better prepared to engage in an economic contest:

"The Soviet Union is a large country with a powerful economy and a wealth of resources. And the socialist community as a whole is even more than that. So we could somehow manage, and let no one have any doubts about that. Among countries Washington calls its allies, many are far more dependent on foreign trade for all their development. It is hard to say, therefore, whose interests are hit more painfully by the policy of cowboy attacks on international trade and normal economic relations."

With respect to the Germans, Moscow also is aware that it has another potent weapon at hand: West Germany's anxiety about maintaining its ties with the German Democratic Republic. Moscow's willingness to use this weapon became evident during the meeting between FRG Chancellor Schmidt and East German leader Honecker in December 1981. At a luncheon on December 12, Honecker declared that implementation of the NATO decision would harm East-West German relations, a point he reiterated in an interview broadcast by East Berlin radio on December 17 as follows:

"There are no plausible reasons why the FRG really needs the U.S. nuclear weapons which can provoke a new world war from German soil. It is obvious in this respect that their siting would also have an effect on relations between the two German states. Good neighborly relations can scarcely flourish in the shadow of new U.S. nuclear missiles. We have no interest in such a fateful development."

As also hinted by Honecker, the USSR may well revive the German revanchism theme which has hitherto been muted. The Soviets will seek to generate uneasiness in the FRG and among other NATO members, and provide the rationale for tightened bloc discipline.

F. THREATS AGAINST THE U.S.

Moscow has assiduously sought to convey the threat that implementation of the NATO decision would increase the danger to the U.S. itself. In particular, it has emphasized that it will not be possible to limit any nuclear conflict to Europe or to avoid escalation to the point of a strategic nuclear assault against U.S. territory.

At the 26th Party Congress in February 1981, Brezhnev warned that "a 'limited' nuclear war as conceived by the Americans in, say, Europe would from the outset mean the certain destruction of European civilization. And, of course, the United States, too, would not be able to escape the flames of war."¹⁸ In July, Defense Minister Ustinov also derided the concept of a limited nuclear war, declaring that "it is clear to everyone that the actions of an aggressor will inevitably and swiftly call forth a destructive retaliatory strike" and that "only completely irresponsible people can claim that nuclear war can be waged in accordance with some prearranged rules."¹⁹ Communist of the Armed Forces contended that "it remains inexplicable how precisely the overseas strategists propose to preserve the 'limited' characters of a nuclear conflict without having it grow into a general nuclear-missile war."²⁰

A number of Soviet commentaries quote Clausewitz that it is absurd to think that once a war starts, any of the parties will fail to bring to bear all weapons at its command. Paraphrasing this thought, an article by Soviet Maj. Gen. R. Simonian on NATO strategy repeated that "every country participating in a war, regardless of whether it is attacking or defending, will stop at nothing to achieve victory and will not acknowledge defeat without having employed and without having expended the entire arsenal at its disposal."²¹

Soviet leader Brezhnev in his interview with the West German magazine Der Spiegel, carried in Pravda on November 3, 1981, asserted:

¹⁸Pravda, February 24, 1981.

¹⁹Pravda, July 25, 1981.

²⁰Yu. Babich, Kommunist Vooruzhenikh Sil, No. 24, December 1980, p. 81.

²¹Maj. Gen. R. Simonian, "U.S. and NATO Nuclear Strategy," Zarubezhnoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Foreign Military Review), No. 6, June 1980, p. 10

"Maybe somebody believes that it will be possible to confine nuclear war to Europe, and considers it an acceptable variant from himself.... As a matter of fact, there can be in general no limited nuclear war. If a nuclear war breaks out, whether it be in Europe or in any other place, it could inevitably and unavoidably assume a worldwide character. Such is the logic on the war itself and the character of present-day armaments and international relations: One should clearly see and understand it."

This assertion reiterates, although in more categorical terms, the standard declaratory doctrine the USSR has maintained with regard to nuclear escalation since Soviet acquisition of a rudimentary inter-continental capability in the early 1950s. The object of the doctrine is and always has been to induce the U.S. to forebear use of its nuclear power as an instrument of policy. Utilization of the doctrine demonstratively involved for many years a calculated bluff on the part of the Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, in the Kremlin's view the doctrine has well served its purposes. The question now is whether the Kremlin is still engaging in such a bluff, and if so what will be its reaction if the U.S. and its allies adhere to policies and courses of action that will put them in a position to call that bluff.

Given the Soviet classification of wars, the question arises as to whether the Soviets envisage the possibility of conducting limited nuclear operations themselves, despite their denials of having any such intentions.

Highly, if not definitively, suggestive here is that the USSR has a fully developed concept of theater war and has a full panoply of doctrines, strategies and tactics aimed at achieving victory in a theater war as an end in itself. Moreover, the USSR has over the years encompassed within its war preparations a full retinue of forces and means to fight a theater war independently of any general war, and these are literally saturated with nuclear weapons of various sorts, to an extent in fact that they are said to constitute their "basic fire power," and are treated as the "principal means of conducting present-day offensive operations" in a theater war setting. Also, of very great importance, it would seem, is that the image Moscow has attempted to project over the past thirty years of a USSR that will put at risk its very existence in a localized contest that has less than total significance for its security interests and needs contradicts Marxist-Leninist principles and precepts in their entirety.

The problem about a possible, indeed likely, willingness of Moscow to engage in theater wars, with or without nuclear weapons,

is that the Soviets simply do not talk about the matter. Their prime aim is in deterring the U.S. from a use of force in local situations, especially in Europe, by predicting rapid escalation of such a war, all the more so if nuclear weapons are used on a limited scale.

Fundamentally, the question of what the USSR will actually do in a theater war situation, wherever it may arise or whatever it will involve in the way of forces and weapons will depend on how credible either side can make the threat of its readiness to escalate to an all-out war if it faces defeat or unacceptable losses. Obviously, if the credibility of such a threat by the U.S. is assessed by Moscow to be low because the U.S. cannot afford national suicide in defense of its allies, then the Soviet forces can feel much freer in initiating the use of nuclear weapons in the theater to facilitate the rapid attainment of Soviet objectives, assuming that the use of such weapons is necessary for this purpose.

G. THE MISSILES IN CUBA THREAT

The March 16, 1982 Brezhnev speech extended Soviet threats to a new plane with its specific threat of "retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position."

That Moscow might attempt to shore up its bargaining position over Euromissiles by a threat to reintroduce medium-range missiles into Cuba has been foreshadowed for some time by efforts of Soviet spokesmen to link the current situation with the 1962 one in Cuba and more specifically between the 1962 Soviet agreement regarding medium-range missiles in Cuba with an allegedly corresponding agreement by the U.S. regarding medium-range missiles on European territory.

Retired Gen. Semeiko made a direct comparison between the situations writing in New Times in October 1979:

"The United States and NATO are now planning to deploy medium-range missiles close to Soviet territory, and in conditions of a fundamentally different strategic correlation than before. The USSR proposes that they do not do so, in exchange for a unilateral reduction in its own missiles. But by all appearances the West is still not inclined to display the same good sense as the Soviet Union displayed in 1962."²²

²²Semeiko, "Does NATO Need Euromissiles?" New Times, No. 44, October 26, 1979, p. 6.

Similarly, Brezhnev himself offhandedly linked the two situations in his Der Spiegel interview in November 1981.

"Remember how the United States reacted to a possibility of the deployment two decades ago of several tons of Soviet missiles in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. Washington clamoured that mortal threat overhanged the United States."

More pointedly, however, Soviet spokesmen have increasingly claimed the existence of a Cuban for Turkish missile deal in 1962 which implies a link between missiles in the two areas and then, to drive the point home, linked the alleged deal with the current situation.

As long ago as 1978, a book by Anatoli Gromyko, son of the Foreign Minister, had contended that a deal had been struck behind the scenes that the U.S. would withdraw its medium-range missiles from Turkey in response to the Soviet removal of its missiles from Cuba.²³

In an interview over West German television on March 16, 1981, USA director Georgii Arbatov deliberately evoked the missile crisis. In reply to a question about possible Soviet "sanctions" if the NATO decision were implemented, Arbatov pointedly stated that the Pershing II missiles were comparable to the Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba in 1962. Arbatov side-stepped a question about whether the NATO action would generate a comparable crisis, but did say that "naturally there will be consequences."

²³ Anatoli Gromyko, Vneshnaia Politika SShA: Uroki i Deistvitel'nost', 60-70-e Gody (U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons and Reality, The 1960-1970s) (Moscow: International Relations, 1978), pp. 93-94. Gromyko's account of Dobyrinin's talk with Robert Kennedy essentially accords with the account given in Robert F. Kennedy's Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), pp. 85-87. A further point of possible importance is that, according to a White House Memorandum of Conversation, President Kennedy told Anastas Mikoyan, Deputy Soviet Premier, at a White House meeting following Mikoyan's post-crisis visit to Cuba that he had already ordered the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey and Italy.

New Times in October 1981 introduced a new twist when it suggested that the Soviet deployment in Cuba, in the first instance, constituted a response to the emplacement of Thor and Jupiter missiles in the UK, Italy and Turkey. The analogy to the current situation is obvious. The pertinent passage reads as follows:

"In the entire history of the development of nuclear arms the USSR has not once taken the initiative in upsetting the balance of strength by piling up arms or creating new types of weapons. This applies to Europe as well. The first nuclear weapon was delivered here from the other side of the Atlantic in the beginning of the fifties. By the end of the decade Washington already had thousands of nuclear warheads at the approaches to Soviet territory. The Soviet Union replied to this by deploying the SS-4 and SS-5. In the early sixties the U.S. took the next step by deploying medium-range missiles in Western Europe--50 Thor missiles in Britain and 25 Jupiters in Italy and Turkey. Only after this, at the request of the government of Cuba, was it decided to send several dozen Soviet missiles to Cuba. Washington saw this as presenting a deadly danger to itself, although only a short time before it had dismissed out of hand similar representations in respect to its missiles in the European continent. The sudden acquisition by Washington of the ability to understand the other side made it possible to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement within a short space of time. The USSR withdrew its missiles from Cuba and the U.S. pulled out its Jupiters from Turkey and Italy. To attribute this to U.S. good will, as the U.S. President is now doing, is simply to play ducks and drakes with the facts."²⁴

A later incidence of the linkage referred to was by Stanislav Menshikov speaking as a representative of the International Information Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU in an interview carried on February 14, 1982 by ABC News' "This Week With David Brinkley." Asked whether present Soviet military activities in Cuba are in violation of the 1962 agreement, Menshikov asserted that:

²⁴ Yuri Gudkov, "What Is Behind The Rhetoric," New Times, No. 49, December 1981, p. 8.

"I understand, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, there was an understanding as to medium-range nuclear weapons situated in Cuba, and at that time I think also in some European NATO countries, Turkey, I think, and that these weapons would be taken away. And they were."

To this Menshikov added:

"To my knowledge there are no medium-range weapons in Cuba at this moment capable of, in fact, no nuclear weapons, to my knowledge, and no, **absolutely** no medium-term nuclear weapons in Cuba. So I don't see that this understanding in any way has been abrogated as far as we are concerned." (Emphasis added.)

All these comparisons and even more so the March 16 Brezhnev speech are designed to raise the possibility of a reintroduction of Soviet medium-range missiles into Cuba.

In the only Soviet discussions of specifics, other possibilities were also adduced. In two widely spaced interviews, Valentin Falin, deputy Chief of the International Information Section of the Central Committee, hinted that the Soviet Union might respond to NATO emplacements by bringing offensive missiles closer to U.S. shores.²⁵ On both occasions, he denied that it would be necessary to involve Cuba, asserting that "there are technical ways to bring medium-range missiles close to the United States without involving the territory of a bordering or nearby country." In the first instance he noted that submarines were subject to SALT but "there are other possibilities" not subject to the treaty.

The use of Brezhnev to make the statement and the probability that it will become a staple in Soviet coverage of the INF issue constitute an increasing public Soviet commitment to make good on the threat, either with respect to weapons in Cuba or in some other fashion. The nature and timing of Soviet actions remain open. For example, Moscow might begin by announcing an intent to implement the threat but might link its implementation to the course of INF talks. It might make a point that Soviet weapons in Cuba already can serve a dual purpose. How it handles the issue will obviously depend on the state of play in 1983 and after.

²⁵With Der Spiegel on November 5, 1979; Stern on July 9, 1981.

H. OTHER THIRD AREA CRISES

Soviet linkage of Europe and Cuba suggests the broader possibility that the USSR may counter Western action in Europe with Soviet actions in the Third World. A basic postulate of Soviet propaganda has been that implementation of the NATO decision will jeopardize international relations across the board.

Although Moscow had a variety of motives in invading Afghanistan, the timing of the action one month after the NATO decision on medium-range nuclear missiles was probably not coincidental. This possibility is suggested in Soviet propaganda attributing to the West a linkage between the NATO decision and an undeclared war against Afghanistan. In any new actions in the Third World, the Soviet Union would claim that it was responding to growing Western aggressiveness as reflected in the deployment of new missiles in Europe.

Which areas the USSR would select for action will depend on the situation at the time. The new threat to Europe which appeared in The Threat to Europe warning Europe that it would be hostage to U.S. actions in third areas would appear especially applicable to the Persian Gulf and Near East, where European interests are particularly great and NATO involvement possible. Soviet commentators in the past several years have expressed concern about the possibility of extending the zone of NATO's responsibility. Generally, the issue has been portrayed as one of U.S. pressure in this direction and West European resistance.²⁶

However, the Soviets may calculate that Europeans, feeling more secure as a result of the added protection provided by the Euromissiles, might be more willing to adopt a more active policy in Third World areas. Moscow may, therefore, give more serious consideration to forestalling such a development in the initial period before Euromissile deployment.

I. FURTHER WAR PREPARATIONS

In view of the tremendous efforts it has made to forestall such a development, the actual implementation of the NATO decision would necessarily be considered by Moscow as a significant political defeat impelling the need for some kind of counteraction.

²⁶See, for example, S.A. Ulin, "United States Plans to Expand NATO's Zone," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 7, July 1981, pp. 44-48.

Beyond the psychological aspects, moreover, Moscow--as explained in the previous chapters--sees serious military consequences as flowing from the action.

Commenting on U.S. military doctrine, a leading Soviet analyst on security affairs, G.A. Trofimenko explained that it is not U.S. doctrine but actual weapons procurement to which the USSR pays prime attention. Denying that PD-59 had increased the threat to Soviet security, Trofimenko declared that "the Soviet Union's concern about its defense is not based on the content of various announcements, but on actual tendencies in U.S. military and military construction, and these are sufficiently apparent without any kind of announcements."²⁷

In the same article, Trofimenko seemed to suggest that the real threat for the USSR is not the current one but what will emerge from U.S. programs in the late 1980s. In his words:

"No matter how hard American civilian and military leaders try to frighten the Soviet Union with their 'well-orchestrated' strategy of counterforce superiority, the United States does not possess this kind of superiority because the majority of the systems on which Directive 59 relies will not be ready for use until the second half of the 1980s."

While this suggests that the USSR considers it has a certain amount of leeway before the situation becomes really serious for the USSR, the conclusion is also possible that Moscow estimates that it must act before this takes place while the USSR enjoys decided advantages in strategic and conventional power.

Throughout the second half of 1982, the Soviet military press has been replete with indications that the USSR is moving to step up its war-fighting capabilities. Although Moscow is concerned about the totality of U.S. military developments, the possibility that the NATO decision will be implemented is undoubtedly an important factor in major statements by Soviet military leaders about the need for increased Soviet combat readiness.

During this period, two major new additions have been made to the "Officer's Library" series designed to establish the line currently guiding the Soviet officer corps. One, issued early in 1981, was entitled The CPSU on the Armed Forces: 1917-1981 Documents. The second, which appeared late in 1981 constituted a second

²⁷ G.A. Trofimenko, "The Washington Strategic Seesaw," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 12, December 1980, p. 58.

edition of a 1979 compilation of Brezhnev pronouncements on security matters entitled On Guard of Peace and Socialism. In addition, pamphlets were issued in early 1982 by Moscow's top four military leaders, Defense Minister Ustinov, Chief of Staff Ogarkov, Warsaw Pact chief Kulikov and political-military chief General Yepishev. Similar volumes are issued every five years following the Soviet party congresses but they are important as indicators of the current Soviet line.

In a typical summary of current requirements, Marshal Ogarkov wrote:

"The character and peculiarities of modern nuclear-missile war presents heightened demands for the combat, moral-political and psychological preparation of army and navy personnel. The basic principle of this preparation was and remains unchanged: to learn what is needed in war, to learn how to win over a strong, technically supplied opponent in any conditions of modern war. A profound knowledge of arms and military technology, their masterful operation, high spiritual qualities, strong ideological-political hardening, profound belief in the rightness of the cause of the party, ability to bear unprecedented moral and physical burdens, to preserve in any circumstances the will to achieve victory over an enemy and have attained growing significance."²⁸

In particular, these books and accompanying articles in Soviet military press emphasize such requirements deemed necessary for victory in a nuclear war as training, political elan, improved nationality relations, civil defense, further subordination of the economy to military needs. All these are placed against the background of increasingly strident attacks against the U.S. and NATO. While not confined to the NATO decision, this current emphasis which reflects planning for a long time ahead, indicates an intent to prepare the Soviet armed forces for any drastic actions that may be deemed necessary.

²⁸ Ogarkov, Always in Readiness, p. 50.

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Science Applications, Inc
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SRI International
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System Planning & Analysis, Inc
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System Planning Corp
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T. N. Dunay Associates, Inc
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TRW Electronics & Defense Sector
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