

ANNUAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY

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SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY
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(RCS-CHIS-6 (R3))

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HISTORICAL SUMMARY

(RCS-CHIS-6 (R3))

US Army Forces Command

Sixth United States Army

Presidio of San Francisco, California 94129

1 October 1981 to 30 September 1982

Robert P. Smith, Ph.D.
Sixth US Army Historian

PREFACE

This history of the activities of the Sixth US Army from September 1981 through October 1982 is a radical departure from previous histories. Rather than subdividing each chapter according to projects or actions as in the past, I have chosen instead to write in the narrative form so that each chapter follows the one before and suggests a unity of purpose rather than a series of separate activities. By emphasizing certain areas which--from the historian's vantage point--seem most significant in terms of the dedication of resources and/or potential contributions to the Reserve Component, I hope to appeal not only to the experienced soldier but to the general reader. There is, of course, room for honest disagreement; but the final answer lies in the future. An additional reason for this approach is to illustrate how we, at Sixth US Army, while working on projects that seem totally alien to other projects within the same organization, are all working toward a common end: improving the readiness of the Reserve Component. ↗

Some projects and studies have not been described in this history at all. Again, this is no denigration of the work of those involved with these particular activities. What was significant in one quarter or even one year might, on reflection and in light of succeeding actions, appear to be less so. The Sixth US Army handles hundreds of programs and activities a year, and no history could cover them all. What is discussed in this present volume, however, is a substantial number of activities which, taken together, suggest the large contribution USASIX is making to improving readiness and encouraging force modernization for the Reserve Component.

The history has been based in large part on the annual and semiannual staff and ARMR feeder reports, the Command Bulletin, selected correspondence, and other data. Prepared in compliance with AR 870-5, this history will be used by FORSCOM as a source of their annual historical review. It will also be used by the US Army Center of Military History as a guide for more comprehensive histories. Within USASIX, it will serve as a documented record of events and their courses, and as a briefing and orientation document.

The history was typed by Ms. Elena L. Joyner, ODCSOPS Word Processing Operator. Without her unstinting effort and support this work would not have been completed.

ROBERT P. SMITH
Historian
Sixth US Army

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Lieutenant General David F. Grange, Jr.
Commanding General
Sixth United States Army
1 August 1981 - Present

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Lieutenant General David E. Grange, Jr.
Commanding General
Sixth United States Army
1 August 1981 - Present

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CHAPTER 1

SUPPORTING THE TOTAL FORCE


"The Army understands more and more the fact that we can't have separate Guard and Reserve and Active Components, that they must be integrally linked," observed General Edward C. Meyer, US Army Chief of Staff, in the May, 1982 issue of ARMY magazine. "As we develop Division 86, . . . all of our divisions will experience greater integration of Guard and Reserve units in round-out modes." Continuing, Meyer noted that there will also be greater involvement of the Reserve Component in the way the Army trains and structures its support in the sustaining base with the Readiness Command (DARCOM). "The tactics and doctrine and everything that came out of Division 86," stated Meyer, "will be implemented in the Guard and Reserve at the same time they occur in the Active Component."¹

Citing the need for a flexible force, the Army chief spoke out in favor of "a strategically deployable and tactically and doctrinally sound" force. "We can't be preparing the Army of today for 1918 or for 1941 or for 1970. We have to be preparing it for today and tomorrow; we have to be able to sustain whatever force we commit for as long as it's committed."²

In its role as coordinator to the Reserves and National Guard within the fifteen Western States, the Sixth US Army spent the last fiscal year meeting the needs of a flexible total force. During these 12 months, Sixth US Army worked diligently to bring these two disparate military entities up to a high degree of readiness. Upon mobilization, the Reserve Component must merge smoothly with the Active Force. Once integrated, Sixth US Army will have fulfilled its mission.

Headquartered at the historic Presidio of San Francisco, overlooking the entrance to San Francisco Bay, Sixth US Army supported virtually every known activity in the United States Army. Sixth US Army shared, with two other Armies, the defense of the continental United States. Established in early 1943 at the request of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, then Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Theater, to spearhead the return to the Philippines and subsequent defeat of the Japanese military forces, Sixth US Army blazed a combat record which is regarded as unparalleled in the annals of military advancement.

By the direction of the War Department, General (then Lt. Gen.) Walter Krueger activated the Sixth Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on 25 January 1943. At that time General Krueger was commanding the Third Army, headquartered at Fort Sam Houston Texas; and as a logical consequence, he transferred the key members of his staff, both officers and enlisted, from the Third to the Sixth Army. Shortly thereafter, General Krueger, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. George Honnen, proceeded to Australia via air transport with the advance echelon of his headquarters, arriving at Brisbane, Queensland, Australia on 7 February 1943. Enroute by air, one plane carrying staff officers and enlisted personnel of Headquarters Sixth Army crashed at night



20

CANADA

ALASKA

BERING SEA

SEA OF OKHOTSK

SEA OF JAPAN

YELLOW SEA

INDIAN OCEAN

UNION OF SOVIET REPUBLICS

CHINA

INDIA

U.S.

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

AUSTRALIA

ALUTIAN ISLANDS

SEMI-PALAU ISLANDS

SEA OF OKHOTSK

SEA OF JAPAN

INDIAN OCEAN

UNION OF SOVIET REPUBLICS

CHINA

INDIA

U.S.

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

AUSTRALIA

INDIAN OCEAN

INDIAN OCEAN

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

MARIANAS ISLANDS

CAROLINE ISLANDS

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

INDIAN OCEAN

U.S.

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

AUSTRALIA

INDIAN OCEAN

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

AUSTRALIA

INDIAN OCEAN

INDIAN OCEAN

AUSTRALIA

INDIAN OCEAN

just off the coast of Canton Island. All the passengers and crew were lost with the exception of the copilot, a warrant officer, and a sergeant. These were Sixth Army's first casualties. The air echelon closed on 16 February, although individual officers who were subsequently added to the advance echelon continued to arrive by air. The rear echelon in charge of the then Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. (then Colonel) George H. Decker, sailed from San Francisco on 29 March 1943 and arrived at Brisbane on 17 April. In the meantime, the advance echelon established headquarters at Camp Columbia, about nine miles east of Brisbane on 16 February.

Major units initially comprising Sixth Army were: The 1st Marine Division in Melbourne, recently returned from Guadalcanal; the 32d Infantry Division at Camp Cable, Queensland, freshly returned from the Buna Campaign; the 41st Infantry Division in the Buna, New Guinea area; the 40th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade in Papua, New Guinea; the 41st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade in northern Queensland; the 2d Engineer Special Brigade recently arrived from the United States and located at Rockhampton and Cairns, both in northern Queensland; the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, freshly arrived from Panama and located in the vicinity of Cairns, Queensland; the 158th Infantry Regiment, newly arrived from Panama, and staged through Camp Cable to Port Moresby, New Guinea; and the 98th Field Artillery Battalion, at Port Moresby, also recently arrived from Panama, and later to become the famous 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion. These units were the nucleus of the Sixth Army which later rolled northward through New Guinea, New Britain, the Admiralty Islands, Morotai, Leyte, Mindoro, and Luzon, relentlessly crushing all enemy resistance encountered in an unbroken series of victories.

The military picture existing in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas at this time was hopeful but far from encouraging. Air activity was heavy but ground operations were limited to patrol activities. The Japanese had been stopped and definitely turned back at Guadalcanal and in Papua, New Guinea, but they had innumerable airfields stretching all the way back to the homeland, a mighty base of operations at Rabaul, and hundreds of thousands of troops in strategic locations throughout New Guinea, New Britain, the Solomon Islands and the Netherlands East Indies. General MacArthur was fast formulating his plan to return to the Philippines and in these plans, Sixth Army was scheduled to play a leading role.

The initial blow was set for 30 June 1943, with forces of the South Pacific striking at New Georgia in the Solomons, and an American-Australian task force making a combined overland, amphibious assault on Salamaua, New Guinea, and with forces of the Sixth Army seizing Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands in order to establish air bases.

By direction of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, all units of Sixth Army engaged in operations against the enemy were organized into a task force designated the Alamo Force. General Krueger commanded both Sixth Army and the Alamo Force and the staffs of these two organizations were identical. In preparation for the coming offensive, an advance party proceeded to New Guinea in late May 1943 to select a command post location. KB Mission at

Milne Bay was chosen as the sight for the new headquarters and General Krueger arrived at KB Mission on 20 June 1943 to officially open the Command Post of Alamo Force.

For the Woodlark Island operation, the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, under the command of Col. Julian W. Cunningham, was transferred from the South to the Southwest Pacific Area and was assigned to Sixth Army. The 158th Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Col. J. Prugh Herndon, was designated for the Kiriwina Island operation. It should be pointed out that for each operation conducted by the Alamo Force, a task force was formed, always built around a major unit participating in that operation. Likewise, the staff of the major unit formed the nucleus of the task force staff, the task force commander normally being the major unit commander.

The Woodlark and Kiriwina operations proceeded according to plan and without enemy ground opposition. Col. John T. Murray relieved Col. Herndon as task force commander on Kiriwina Island and Col. Herndon remained in command of the 158th Regimental Combat Team. Allied bombers struck Rabaul in daylight for the first time in September, covered by fighters from the Kiriwina airfields. From this time on, the usefulness of Rabaul as a base to the enemy sharply declined; in fact, it soon became a liability instead of an asset.

After the successful conclusion of the first round, plans were quickly formulated for the second, the seizure of the Cape Gloucester airfields and the establishment of control over Western New Britain. In order to provide a more central location for the command post and facilitate direct staff supervision over the development of Goodenough Island as a large staging and training area, Headquarters, Alamo Force moved to that island on 21 October 1943. Coincident with the development of Goodenough Island, both Oro Bay and Milne Bay were greatly expanded as bases and staging areas. The 41st Infantry Division was returned to Australia in September and reconcentrated in the Rockhampton, Queensland area. At the same time, the northward movement of the 1st Marine and 32d Infantry Divisions was initiated from Australia.

Consonant with the above activities, the Australian 7th and 9th Divisions, reinforced by the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, all under Australian command, captured Lae, cleared the Japanese from the Markham Valley, and, by a shore-to-shore movement from Lae, captured Finschhafen. South Pacific forces, meanwhile, had closed the New Georgia operation and landed a large task force in the Empress Augusta Bay area of western Bougainville Island. This bold move placed another air base under the very nose of Rabaul and isolated the large enemy garrison in the Buin-Faisi area of southern Bougainville.

By early December, Sixth Army was again ready to strike. On 15 December 1943, 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, commanded by now Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, was launched in a bold surprise landing at Arawe in southwestern New Britain. Before the enemy fully realized the import of this move, the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William H. Rupertus, made two landings in the Cape Gloucester area on 26 December 1943. On this same date, Company D, 592d Boat and Shore Regiment of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, was sent to make a landing on Long Island and assisted the accompanying Fifth Air Force

detachment in establishing a radar station on that island. In four days of sharp fighting the Marines captured the Cape Gloucester airfields and then proceeded to expeditiously mop up the western tip of New Britain and Rooke Island. The Allies now controlled the Vitiaz Strait with a secure entrance into the Bismarck Sea.


Busily engaged with the Australians along the Rai coast of the Huon Peninsula and in defending the overland approaches from the west to his supply base at Bogadjim, the Japanese Army suddenly found a sizeable task force at its rear. The 126th Regimental Combat Team of the 32d Infantry Division, under the command of Brig. Gen. Clarence A. Martin, had been rushed through Vitiaz Strait to land at Saidor, New Guinea, on 2 January 1944. The enemy's coastal escape route from the Huon Peninsula was now blocked and two more threatening air bases, Cape Gloucester and Saidor, were rapidly placed under construction.

Meanwhile, the Saidor Task Force had been reinforced by the 128th Regimental Combat Team of the 32d Division in order to more effectively block any escape route. The 32d Division Headquarters soon followed and Maj. Gen. William H. Gill, the Division Commander, took command of the Saidor Task Force. On 19 February 1944, contact was made with the Australians driving northward from Finschhafen, thus terminating the Saidor Operation.

By 10 February 1944, pushing east along the south coast of New Britain, the Marines had established contact with the cavalry pushing westward from Arawe. Thereafter, by shore-to-shore movements, the Marines advanced eastward along the north coast, isolating and destroying retreating Japanese remnants as they advanced, capturing Talasea, established control over the Williamuez Peninsula and then seizing the Cape Hoskins airfield. The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team (RCT), now reinforced by two battalions of the 158th Infantry, cleared enemy forces from the Arawe area and pushed eastward through Gasmata. Sixth Army was now in complete control of western New Britain.

In order to be in closer touch with the Cape Gloucester and Saidor operations, General Krueger had moved to Cape Cretin, just south of Finschhafen, on 24 December 1943, accompanied by a small coterie of his staff. The suitability of this location prompted him to later establish his headquarters there. And, in view of the early movement of the remaining Sixth Army units from Australia, the Rear Echelon, Headquarters, Sixth Army, was relocated from Camp Columbia to Cape Cretin in mid-February.

South and Southwest Pacific forces were now in a position to advance further northward, establish new air bases, and complete the isolation of Rabaul. Planning to this effect increased in tempo, with the Admiralty Islands selected as the next objective for the Alamo Force. The 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, which had arrived in Australia in July 1943, was given this assignment and moved from Australia to Oro Bay to ready itself for the operation. The Admiralty Islands operation was initially scheduled for 1 April 1944; however, General MacArthur decided to advance the date of this operation and ordered Sixth Army to make a reconnaissance in force on 29 February, to be exploited if successful. The reconnaissance force selected for this purpose was placed under the command of Brig. Gen. William



THE WAR WITH JAPAN
 Operations in New Guinea and
 the Bismarck Archipelago
 January - June 1944

Figure 3

C. Chase and consisted of a reinforced squadron of the 5th Cavalry. Following a successful landing in Hyane Harbor on Momote Island, this force was subjected to heavy attacks by superior enemy forces, but succeeded in holding its beach-head until sufficient reinforcements arrived to launch an offensive. Upon the arrival of General Swift with his headquarters, the attack was accelerated and Momote Island was quickly cleared of the enemy. Seeadler Harbor was opened to Allied shipping on 8 March and Lorengau was captured by the 2d Cavalry Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Verne D. Mudge, on 16 March. The enemy broke up into small isolated detachments which were ruthlessly hunted out and destroyed. Two large airfields, Momote and Makareng, were completed well ahead of schedule and construction was rushed on important naval facilities in Seeadler Harbor.

Shortly thereafter, forces of the South Pacific seized Emirau and Green Islands, thereby completing the isolation of eastern New Britain, New Ireland, and the Solomons. The enemy had a corps of three divisions in the Wewak area and confidently expected the next attack in that direction. But the Allies were now in a position to take longer steps in their march toward the Philippines. General MacArthur chose Hollandia for his next objective.

In the meantime, important troop movements had been taking place. The 40th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Rapp Brush, was assigned to Sixth Army and moved from Guadalcanal to western New Britain to relieve the 1st Marine Division, which was returned to Guadalcanal under Navy control. The 24th Infantry Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, which had closed in the Rockhampton, Australia area in September 1943, was concentrated on Goodenough Island. Likewise, Headquarters I Corps and corps troops were displaced from Rockhampton to Goodenough Island. The 3d Engineer Special Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. David A. D. Ogden, arrived from the United States and was staged on Goodenough Island and at Cape Cretin. The 41st Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller, which had been rehabilitating in Australia, was moved into the Cape Cretin area.

Planning for the Hollandia operation had kept pace with troop concentrations. The South Pacific Area had now completed its tasks and, for the first time, aircraft carriers were to support a Sixth Army landing. Since Hollandia was well beyond the range of Allied land based fighters.

The I Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Robert A. Eichelberger, and composed of the 24th and the 41st Infantry Divisions, less the 163d Regimental Combat Team, was assigned the mission of seizing and developing the Hollandia area. A separate task force, commanded by Brig. Gen. Jens A. Doe, and consisting in the main of the 163d, was given the separate mission of capturing and rehabilitating the Aitape airfields; 22 April 1944 was designated as D-Day for both task forces.

Complete surprise was again achieved. The 24th Infantry Division made an unopposed landing in Tanahmerah Bay and advanced rapidly southeastward toward the airfield area. The 41st Division landed on beaches in Humboldt Bay and advanced rapidly inland. What little opposition faced the 41st Division in the Hollandia town area was soon scattered into the surrounding hills, and this division pushed its elements westward towards the airfields. The two

divisions joined forces five days later, thus completely securing the Hollandia, Sentani, and Cyclops airfields. Upon these airfields were found almost 400 destroyed enemy planes, a tribute to the effective pre-D-Day bombing of the Fifth Air Force.

Meanwhile, at Aitape, General Doe's forces landed on the same date, quickly overran the ineffective enemy opposition and, on D-plus-two, the first Allied fighter planes landed on one of the hurriedly repaired Aitape airstrips. Mopping up in both areas was continued aggressively throughout the following weeks.

The Hollandia operation was a complete success and a major strategic victory. The enemy's large forces in the Wewak area were completely isolated, another large base of operations was now available to support further advances to the north and westward, and plans for these advances were quickly formulated.

In the meantime, additional forces were arriving from the United States. The XI Corps Headquarters, under Maj. Gen. P. Hall, was established at Cape Cretin; the 6th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, was staged at Milne Bay where it completed its amphibious training.

The 31st Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. John E. Persons, concentrated at Oro Bay in the area formerly occupied by the 1st Cavalry Division. The 4th Engineer Special Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Henry Hutchings, was also assembled at Oro Bay with the exception of one boat battalion, which was located at Cairns in northern Queensland, Australia. The 33d Infantry Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. Percy W. Clarkson, was staged at Cape Cretin.

Another question involving two separate task forces was prescribed. The first, an operation to secure Wakde Island and the Toem area, that part of the New Guinea coast opposite the island, was again entrusted to the 163d Regimental Combat Team, still commanded by General Doe. In the meantime, the 32d Infantry Division was concentrated at Aitape and took over all responsibility in that area. The second operation was directed at Biak Island and was assigned to the 41st Division, less the 163d. Wakde was a small coral island with a fine airfield. The Japanese had already built three airfields on Biak, all of which were considered capable of further development. D-Day for the Wakde-Toem operation was set for 17 May 1944; that for Biak was to follow in 10 days.

General Doe landed his assault forces at Arata, north of Toem on the New Guinea mainland, on D-Day and, pushing rapidly southward, secured Toem. Wakde Island was assaulted in a shore-to-shore movement the following day, the attack being supported by shore-emplaced artillery in addition to naval gunfire and Army bombers. After a sharp fight, the island was overrun and repair operations and an extension of the airfield were promptly initiated. But the Japanese had strong forces in the Maffin Bay-Sarmi area to the north, which were a serious threat to Allied supply bases in the Toem area. In

anticipation of this, the 158th Regimental Combat Team, now commanded by Brig. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick, was moved from Cape Cretin to Toem, where it was committed to action following its arrival on 21 May.

The landing on Biak was made in the Bosnek area and was practically unopposed; however, the subsequent advance toward the airfield area met strong opposition from enemy forces who utilized the dominating cliffs, ridges, and caves to full advantage. The ensuing and bitter struggle for the Biak airfields lasted throughout the month of June. The 41st Infantry Division was quickly reinforced with the 163d Regimental Combat Team from the Wakde-Toem area and, eventually, by the 34th Infantry of the 24th Infantry Division. Lt. Gen. Eichelberger and his I Corps Headquarters moved to Biak and took over the operation. In the end, the enemy forces were destroyed and a great air base established. Pending the capture of the Biak airfields, Owi Island, just off the south coast of Biak, was occupied and developed as an additional air base.

In the meantime, the 6th Infantry Division was moved to the Wakde-Toem area to carry on that operation and to release the 158th for a future assignment. Initial elements arrived on 5 June, followed shortly by the remainder of the division. Operations in the Maffin Bay area were promptly initiated. In order to supervise more closely the Wakde-Toem and Biak operations, General Krueger had established a small advance headquarters at Hollekang in the Hollandia area on 24 May 1944. On 16 June 1944, Headquarters Sixth Army and the Alamo Force opened at Hollekang.

Meanwhile, Sixth Army was again substantially increased by the assignment of additional units already in the theater and the arrival of new units from the United States. The 11th Airborne Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing (future Sixth Army Commander, 1951-54), arrived from the United States and was concentrated at Oro Bay, New Guinea, convenient to the Dabodura airfield. The 503d Parachute Infantry, now augmented by a parachute engineer company, was concentrated in an area adjacent to the 11th Airborne Division. Both units were not favorably located for airborne training.

The next objective assigned to Alamo Force was Noemfoor Island, situated in Geelvink Bay, and upon which the Japanese had already established two airfields and were commencing the construction of a third. The 158th was assigned this mission and D-Day scheduled for 2 July 1944. The 503d Parachute Infantry was designated as Army Reserve for this operation and was moved by air to the Hollandia airfield area so as to be better located strategically.

The landing on Noemfoor Island proceeded according to plan, initially against light opposition. However, the strength of the enemy force subsequently encountered made it advisable to commit the 503d which enabled General Patrick, the task force commander, to quickly destroy enemy forces on the island. Shortly thereafter, Noemfoor took its place along with Biak and Wakde as a powerful island air base. From this island, Allied long-range fighters and light bombers could reach out over all of northern New Guinea and the Halmaheras.

In order to give it combat experience and to relieve the 6th Infantry Division in the Toem-Wakde area for a subsequent operation, the 31st Infantry Division was moved forward from Oro Bay, the initial element arriving at Toem on 14 July, soon followed by the remainder of the division. This division promptly relieved the 6th Infantry Division from all responsibility in the Toem-Wakde area and continued operations to destroy enemy forces in the Maffin Bay-Sarmi area. The 6th Infantry Division assembled in the Toem-Maffin Bay area to prepare for its new assignment, which was soon forthcoming. General MacArthur deemed it essential to secure still another air base in northwestern New Guinea, and selected the Cape Sansapor area on the Vogelkop Peninsula in northwestern New Guinea, with its adjacent Amsterdam and Middleburg Islands. The 6th Infantry Division, less the 20th Regimental Combat Team which followed later, made an unopposed landing at Cape Sansapor on 30 July and occupied Amsterdam and Middleburg Islands on the same day. The few Japanese troops scattered throughout this area were quickly disposed of by subsequent minor operations in the interior and along the coast, and the construction of airfields was promptly initiated. This operation was the last on New Guinea. General MacArthur now had powerful air bases and strong ground forces strategically located for another long step to the northward. However, before invading the Philippines he needed one more air base to support this undertaking and to cover the left flank of his route of advance. His right flank would be covered by forces of the Central Pacific Area. The site selected for his air base was the southwestern tip of Morotai Island in the Halmaheras.

Meanwhile, other important activities were taking place. It became increasingly evident that the Japanese XVII Corps, isolated in the Wewak area, was planning an attempt to break out by overrunning Allied forces at Aitape. The 32d Infantry Division was substantially reinforced by the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, the 181st Field Artillery Battalion, and the 124th Regimental Combat Team of the 31st Infantry Division.

Moreover, the 43d Division, which had been assigned to Sixth Army and was being moved forward from New Zealand, was also ordered to stage in the Aitape area. To command this large force, General Hall, with XI Corps Headquarters, was moved from Finschhafen to Aitape where he took command. In late July, the Japanese crossed the Driniumor River in force, broke through the thinly held outpost line and turned northward toward the coast. General Hall executed a vigorous counter-offensive and, by 10 August, had completely crushed the enemy forces in this area and sent the Japanese fleeing back toward Wewak. The enemy left more than 12,000 dead along the Driniumor River and never again attempted to break out of the Wewak position.

The XI Corps was now free to concentrate its efforts on planning for the Morotai Operation, with D-Day scheduled for 15 September 1944, the same date which had been selected by Admiral Nimitz to land a large task force in the Palau group. The 31st Infantry Division and the 126th Regimental Combat Team of the 32d Division were assigned to the XI Corps for this operation. The 124th Regimental Combat Team of the 33d Infantry Division, under the command of Brig. Gen. Donald J. Myers, was moved from Cape Cretin to Maffin Bay in

order to relieve the 31st Infantry Division of operations in this area. Initial elements of this Regimental Combat Team arrived at Maffin Bay on 1 September 1944.

Additional reinforcements arrived from the United States. The 38th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. H. L. C. Jones, arrived at Oro Bay and took over the area vacated by the 31st Infantry Division. Other reinforcements arriving during this period included artillery battalions and artillery group headquarters, tank battalions, and badly needed service units. Goodenough Island was abandoned, but Oro Bay, Finschhafen, and Hollandia buzzed with increased activity. I Corps Headquarters arrived in early August and was established at Cape Cretin. The Eighth Army was activated in early September and Army headquarters established in the Hollandia area. Lt. Gen. Eichelburger was assigned to command the Eighth Army and was replaced as Commanding General, I Corps, by Maj. Gen. Swift. General Sibert was given command of X Corps, being replaced as 6th Infantry Division commander by Brig. Gen.(P) Patrick. Brig. Gen.(P) Verne D. Mudge replaced General Swift as Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, and Brig. Gen. Hanford MacNider replaced General Patrick in command of the 158th Regimental Combat Team on Noemfoor.

Spearheaded by the 31st Infantry Division, the XI Corps landed at Morotai Island on schedule, drove rapidly inland and secured the desired airfield area. Although the enemy strongly held adjacent islands, he did not seriously attempt to threaten Allied forces on Morotai and the construction of the airfields proceeded almost unmolested, except for occasional night air attacks. Upon the completion of these airfields long range fighters were able to operate over Mindanao and heavy bombers could reach out over the Visayan Islands of the Philippine Archipelago. MacArthur's pathway to the Philippines was now covered by Morotai on the left and Peleliu in the Palaus on the right; and Admiral William Halsey's powerful carrier force was now available to support landings in the Philippines.

So successful were Admiral Halsey's preliminary air strikes in the Philippines, General MacArthur decided to advance D-Day from 20 December to 20 October. Planning for this operation had begun in July when a large planning group from Sixth Army Headquarters went to Brisbane to work with GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Allied Air Forces, and Allied Naval Forces in planning the Philippine campaigns. Represented also were planning groups from the I, X, and XIV Corps. The latter corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. O. W. Criswold, was a veteran of the Solomons campaigns, its headquarters being located on Bougainville Island.

Leyte Island, in the eastern Visayas, was selected for the initial Philippine landing. The operation, however, was assigned to Sixth Army, the Alamo Force having been relegated to the historical records on 25 September 1944.


Two Corps and four divisions were made available for the Leyte Operation. The XIV Corps, composed of the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions, was diverted from the Yap Operation, assigned to Sixth Army as a substitute for the XIV

THE WAR WITH JAPAN (10)

PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN

Strategic Plan for Invasion of

THE ISLANDS



Corps, and held afloat in Seeadler Harbor. The XXIV Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge, the 7th Infantry Division by Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold, and the 96th Infantry Division by Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley. The other corps was General Sibert's X Corps, composed of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division. General Hodge and key members of his staff proceeded to Sixth Army Headquarters by air in order to take full advantage of the short time available to prepare a new plan of operations for his corps.

In making Leyte the target and plunging into the center of the Philippines, the Allies would isolate the Japanese in the northern islands from their forces in the south, and place Allied Air and Naval forces in position to complete the severance of enemy lines of communication to the valuable resources of the Netherlands East Indies.

D-Day was set for 20 October 1944. On D minus three, combat troops from the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion occupied the northern tip of Dinagat Island and made landings on the southeastern coast of Homonhon the following day. The securing of the vital points on these islands, which guarded the eastern entrances to Leyte Gulf, paved the way for the entrance of the Navy. Following the landings, minesweepers ranged back and forth across the gulf, clearing it for the armada already on the way. Warships of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf's Bombardment and Fire Support Group moved into the gulf to begin a two day air and surface bombardment of the landing areas. Meanwhile, in the open sea Allied forces converged and became one; hundreds of transports, an Australian squadron, Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, reinforced by additional elements of Rear Admiral Oldendorf's battle fleet and by escort carriers from the Pacific-Fleet. Protecting the north flank against any abortive attack by the Japanese Home Fleet was Admiral Halsey's powerful Third Fleet with its enormous water borne air power, Vice Admiral John S. McCain's famous Task Force 38.

Early on the morning of D-Day, the amphibious forces entered Leyte Gulf and at 1000 hours commenced landing operations. The X Corps stormed ashore near Tacloban and Palo. Fifteen miles to the south the XXIV Corps landed on the beaches near Dulag. Still further south the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division occupied Panaon Island and secured control of Panaon Strait for operations of PT boats. Resistance was scattered and disorganized. Meanwhile, the 1st Cavalry Division rapidly pushed toward Tacloban, capital of Leyte Province, and captured the town and its neighboring airstrip. The 24th Division thrust toward spreading forces, the Allies pushed inland, drove up to the Leyte Valley and took Jaro. By 2 November, the town of Carigara was firmly in their grasp. Meanwhile, on 29 October, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division crossed the San Juanico Strait and landed on Samar Island.


In the meantime, the enemy had committed the bulk of his fleet in an all out effort to wreck the invasion of Leyte. But the famous Battle of Leyte Gulf ended this naval threat and guaranteed an Allied line of supply.

Almost from the beginning, Sixth Army troops were hip deep in mud and water; first, there were the coastal swamps and rice paddies, and then came the monsoon rains and typhoons which turned roads and trails into quagmires

THE WAR WITH JAPAN 17

Battle for Leyte Gulf
23-26 October 1944


Landing on Mindoro 15 December 1944



THE WAR WITH JAPAN (15)

LEYTE CAMPAIGN

Situation 7 November 1944 and Operations Since 17 October



LEYTE

CAMOTES

SEA

and mountain streams into raging torrents. The sucking mud bogged down tanks, heavy guns, and supply trucks. The campaign slowed to a crawl and became an engineer's war, a matter of building and rebuilding roads to get supplies to the front. Mud hit the airstrips too. Thirty-five inches of torrential rain in 40 days forced the abandonment of two strips after weeks of work.

Aided by terrain and torrential rains the enemy selected his positions and fought fanatically to hold Ormoc corridor. He brought in two fresh divisions and major elements of two others to reinforce his badly decimated 16th Division, and struck back with fury. He planned a counteroffensive to split the Allied force, but Sixth Army forced him to the defensive. He made an airborne attack upon newly built airstrips; Sixth Army met it successfully. The enemy bombed Allied troops constantly and vigorously but reinforcements arrived: the 32d Division under Maj. Gen. William H. Gill, Brig. Gen. Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, Colonel George M. Jones' 503d Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team, Maj. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce's 77th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Swing's 11th Airborne Division, and Maj. Gen. H. L. C. Jones' 38th Infantry Division.

The enemy had dug in well in a corridor along Leyte's west coast. The port of Ormoc was its center and the mountains and caves to the north and east aided its defense. On the northern ridges around Limon the 24th Division, and later the 32d Division, of the X Corps fought a slow, logged, bitter battle. Meanwhile, the 1st Cavalry Division and 112th Regimental Combat Team, also of the X Corps, on the left of the 32d Division, drove through the heavily jungled mountains toward the Pinamopoan-Ormoc corridor. The 96th and 7th Division of the XXIV Corps pushed forward through the mountain chain toward the same corridor. When the 11th Airborne Division arrived it was put into the line to relieve the 7th Division which was then moved via Abuyog to Paybay on the west coast to advance northward toward Ormoc.



The Commanding General, Sixth Army, directed the XXIV Corps to dispatch the 77th Division to make an amphibious landing near Ormoc on 7 December. Perfectly timed, it was the decisive action of the Leyte Operation. Three days later Sixth Army troops entered Ormoc and the enemy's main gateway into Leyte was closed. Allied troops now converged on the Japanese from the north, the east and the south and decisive victory was in sight. On Christmas morning, elements of the 77th Division landed at Palompon, the last remaining port on Leyte in Japanese hands. By Christmas night the Leyte Operation was successfully terminated; nothing but mopping up remained and Sixth Army relinquished control to the Eighth Army.

The battle of Leyte was still raging when the Sixth Army went into its next action. Advanced air bases were needed from which to support air and amphibious operations against Luzon. General Headquarters directed Krueger to seize the San Jose area of Mindoro Island, seventh largest island in the Philippines, which flanked the route to Luzon.

For this operation, General Krueger organized the western Visayan Task Force and designated Brig. Gen. William C. Dunckel as its commander. The task force was small, consisting of the 19th Infantry Regimental Combat Team

THE WAR WITH JAPAN (16)

LEYTE CAMPAIGN
Situation 31 December 1944 and
Operations Since 7 November



(reinforced) and the 503d Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team, but was well suited for the job at hand. D-Day was 15 December 1944. The landing force came in at the southwest tip of Mindoro and by afternoon had captured the town of San Jose. The enemy was taken completely by surprise and no resistance was met. The area was found to be ideal for airfields and construction of strips began immediately with work progressing rapidly. On 21 December, a landing was made by a small force on nearby Marinduque Island while one company occupied Paluan and Mindoro's northwest coast. Still no enemy resistance developed. On New Year's Eve, the Western Visayan Task Force passed from control of the Sixth Army to Eighth Army.

During the Leyte and Mindoro Operations, Krueger completed plans for the invasion of the main Japanese fortress in the Philippines, Luzon. The Luzon Campaign, following immediately upon the heels of the Leyte and Mindoro Operations, was the third and most important step in the overall plan to liberate the Philippine Islands.

General Headquarters directed the Sixth Army to land and establish a base of operations in the Lingayen Gulf area of central Luzon, to advance southward and seize the Central Plain-Manila area and, following this, to conduct such operations as General Headquarters might direct to establish control over the remainder of Luzon. The major combat units initially assigned to Sixth Army for the campaign were: I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, consisting of the 6th Infantry Division under the command of Maj. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick commanding; the 43d Infantry Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. Leonard F. Wing commanding; the 158th Infantry Regimental Combat Team, under the command of Brig. Gen. Hanford MacNider; XIV Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. (then Maj. Gen.) Oscar W. Griswold, consisting of the 37th Infantry Division under command of Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler; and the 40th Infantry Division under command by Maj. Gen. Rapp Brush commanding the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Charles L. Mullins, Jr., was initially held in Sixth Army Reserve while the 13th Armored Group, under command of Col. Marcus E. Jones, was also held under direct control of Sixth Army. D-Day was 9 January 1945.


On D-minus three, the Navy began a final surface and air bombardment of the Japanese defenses in the Lingayen Gulf area. The enemy reacted strongly, sending large numbers of "Kamikaze" (Special Attack) suicide planes in a "one way" attack on Allied warships. While a large number of the ships in the bombardment force were damaged, the enemy was unable to keep up the tempo of these attacks and on D-Day the assault ships sailed into Lingayen Gulf practically unmolested by enemy air.

At 0730, 9 January 1945, Sixth Army began amphibious assault landings on beaches in the Lingayen Gulf area of Central Luzon with the XIV and I Corps abreast, the XIV Corps on the right. Contrasted with the lack of organized resistance on the front of the XIV Corps, bitter opposition was met by the I Corps on its left front. It soon became apparent that the enemy had elected not to give battle in the Central Plain but instead to defend strongly what amounted to flank positions in the rugged mountains to the north and northeast of the Central Plain. This constituted a dangerous threat to the left and to

THE WAR WITH JAPAN 5

PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN

Landings on Luzon 9 January 1945 and Operations to 31 January



the Sixth Army base at Lingayen. The Commanding General, Sixth Army, determined to remove that threat by offensive action. This offensive, carried out by elements of the I Corps, enabled the advance to the south to be continued by the XIV Corps.

While the I Corps drove against the enemy's defenses in front of the Army's left, the XIV Corps pushed southward and secured crossings over the Agno River and captured Tarlac. The arrival of the 32d Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William H. Gill; the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge; and the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, on 27 January, provided sufficient forces to permit employment of the XIV Corps in an all out drive toward Manila, while the I Corps was strengthened in order to protect the base of Lingayen Gulf and continue the attacks against the enemy forces in the north and northeast. The 25th Division had already been committed in the zone of action of the I Corps, and the 32d Division was also placed under control of that corps. The 1st Cavalry Division was placed under control of XIV Corps; 112th Regimental Combat Team was held in Sixth Army Reserve. In rapid succession, the XIV Corps captured the Clark Airfield area, drove the opposing enemy forces back into the Zambales Mountains west of Fort Stotsenburg and secured crossings over the Pampanga River at Calumpit. While Sixth Army forces rolled down the Central Luzon Plain toward Manila, one of the most daring actions of the war took place far behind enemy lines: the liberation of Allied prisoners of war from the Japanese prison camp near Cabanatuan.

Preceded by Alamo Scouts, Lt. Col. Henry A. Mucci, with 121 men of his 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion, and assisted by 286 Filipino guerrillas, slipped deep into enemy territory, threw up road blocks, fought off a sizeable enemy force and, on 30 January 1945, released and led 512 Allied prisoners of war back from Cabanatuan to the safety of the advanced front line positions at Guimba, 25 miles to the north.

Meanwhile, the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been concentrated at Guimba, crossed the Pampanga River at Cabanatuan on 1 February, advanced rapidly southward and, on the night of 3 February 1945, drove into the Grace Park area of Manila and liberated hundreds of Allied internees being held by the Japanese in Santo Tomas University. Meanwhile, the 37th Division had crossed the Pampanga River at Calumpit and was driving rapidly on Manila along Highway 3. On 4 February, this division drove into Manila and liberated hundreds of additional Allied internees from Bilibid prison.

In a desperately fought, month-long battle, the XIV Corps, spearheaded by these two divisions, destroyed approximately 17,000 of Manila's 20,000 defenders and succeeded in completely securing the city on 4 March 1945, while the 40th Division continued the bitter struggle against heavy Japanese opposition in the mountains west of Fort Stotsenburg.

Two additional amphibious assault landings had been made on Luzon by forces initially under control of the Eighth Army. The first, in the San Antonio-San Narcisco area of Zambales Province, was made by Lt. Gen. (then

Maj. Gen.) Hall's XI Corps, consisting of the 38th Division, Maj. Gen. Henry L. C. Jones commanding, reinforced on 29 January 1945 by the 34th Regimental Combat Team and the 11th Field Artillery Battalion of the 24th Division. On 30 January, the XI Corps passed to control of the Sixth Army and, after opening Subic Bay for development as a naval base, drove east on Highway 7 to isolate Bataan Peninsula and prevent an enemy withdrawal. The second landing at Nasugbu, Batangas Province, was made by the 11th Airborne Division, and reinforced by elements of the 24th Infantry Division, on 31 January 1945. Driving northward on Highway 17 and 1, this force approached Manila from the south, passing to control of the Sixth Army on the southern outskirts of the city on 10 February.

While the battle of Manila raged at its height, Sixth Army, initiated operations to open Manila Bay to Allied shipping. In a combined overland and amphibious assault on 15 February 1945, employing the 151st Regimental Combat Team (reinforced) of the 6th Division, the XI Corps established control over the southern portion of Bataan Peninsula. The Corps then followed this up on 16 February with a combined airborne and amphibious assault on the island fortress of Corregidor by the 503d Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team under command of Col. George M. Jones, reinforced by the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry of the 24th Division. Corregidor, which guarded the north channel entrance to Manila Bay, was secured after a ferocious 12-day battle in which the enemy lost over 4500 counted dead. Following the capture of Corregidor, the remaining islands in Manila Bay were captured by elements of the 151st Infantry, under direction of the XI Corps, in a series of shore-to-shore operations which culminated in the capture of Carabao Island on 16 April 1945.

The Japanese had organized a series of strong defensive positions in the mountainous area east of Manila extending northward from Laguna de Bay to include the Ipo Dam area. Japanese forward positions were so located that they could bring long range artillery to bear on the City of Manila. Even while the Battle of Manila was raging at its height, the Sixth Army commenced a series of operations against this fortified area. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 6th Infantry Division, operating initially under the XIV Corps, began an offensive on 23 February 1945 to crush the left of this enemy position on the Antipolo Front. By 12 March, Antipolo had been taken after much hard fighting in which Maj. Gen. Mudge, Commanding the 1st Cavalry Division, was seriously wounded; Brig. Gen. Hugh F. T. Hoffman assumed temporary command of the 1st Cavalry Division. Several days later, Maj. Gen. Patrick, commander of the 6th Division, was killed observing an attack by his troops north of Antipolo; Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) Charles C. Hurdis assumed command of the 6th Division. By 15 March the process of crushing the enemy's left was well under way. The XI Corps relieved the XIV Corps in the area east of Manila on this date so that the XIV Corps might concentrate on operations in the Batangas area and the Bicol Peninsula. The 43d Division relieved the 1st Cavalry Division in the Antipolo area and the 1st Cavalry Division concentrated on the west shore of Laguna de Bay for future operations under the XIV Corps. The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, meanwhile, screened the XI Corps left flank and reconnoitered enemy defenses on the approaches to Ipo.

Much bitter fighting to reduce the myriad of cave positions east of Manila still remained, but by 6 May 1945 organized resistance had been broken with the exception of a strongly fortified area in the bend of the Angat River on the Western approaches to Ipo Dam. Meanwhile, the 38th Division had relieved the 6th Division east of Manila and the 43d Division, having established contact with elements of the XIV Corps east of Laguna de Bay, had been shifted to the XI Corps left wing for operations on the western approaches to Ipo Dam.

On the night of 6 May 1945, the 43d Division, reinforced by a regiment of Filipino guerrillas, launched a night attack in the opening of a final offensive to reduce this enemy position and capture Ipo Dam. On 17 May, the division captured the dam, and on the 21st, broke the last remaining organized enemy resistance in this area. Meanwhile, the 11th Airborne Division and 1st Cavalry Division, operating under XIV Corps, drove south and southeast of Manila to open Balayan and Batangas Bays and to clear enemy forces from the area south of Laguna de Bay.

Simultaneously with these operations in south central and southern Luzon, the I Corps, reinforced on 10 February 1945 by the 33d Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Percy W. Clarkson commander, continued relentlessly its offensive against the enemy's mountain stronghold in northern Luzon, drove the bitterly resisting enemy back all along its front, captured Baguio (37th and 33d Divisions), advanced along the Villa Verde Trail (32d Division), and Highway 4 (25th Division), and after long and desperate fighting, totally defeated the enemy and secured the Imugan-Santa Fe-Balete Pass area on 27 May 1945, and therewith gained an access route to the upper Cagayan Valley.

In the meantime, the 158th Regimental Combat Team under direct control of Sixth Army, which had participated under the XIV Corps in the initial phases of the operations to clear the enemy from the area south of Laguna de Bay, made an amphibious assault landing at Legaspi in the Albay Gulf area of the southeastern Bicol peninsula on 1 April 1945. After establishing a beachhead, the force secured the northern exits to San Bernardino Strait and, turning northwestward, drove up the Bicol Peninsula, cleared the Bicol Province of enemy forces, and, on 22 April 1945, made contact with the 1st Cavalry Division (XIV Corps) driving southeastward. The junction of these forces marked the end of all organized enemy resistance in southeastern Luzon.

With the breakthrough in the Imugan-Santa Fe-Balete Pass area and the subsequent debouchment of Sixth Army forces into the upper Cagayan Valley, the Luzon Campaign drew to a close. While the 37th Division of the I Corps was dispatched northward into the Cagayan Valley, Sixth Army landed elements of the 11th Airborne Division by parachute and glider in the enemy's rear near Aparri to assist reinforced guerrilla units in blocking all possibility of escape to the north. When contact was established between the 37th Division and this airborne force on 26 June 1945, the Luzon Campaign came to a close with Sixth Army in complete control of Luzon. The only remaining enemy force of any strength on Luzon had been split into two pockets more or less equal in size: one in the Sierra Madre Mountains east of the Cagayan Valley; the other in the Kiangnan-Bontoc area where the Japanese had elected to make a final suicidal stand. The ultimate liquidation of these two pockets was merely a

matter of time. On 1 July, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, responsibility for the conduct of remaining operations on Luzon passed from the Sixth Army to the Eighth Army. Sixth Army was now about to embark on the greatest and most crucial campaign of the entire war -- the invasion of Japan itself.

Because of the suddenness of the Japanese surrender, the planned invasion of Japan never took place. At the conclusion of its Philippine Operation, Sixth Army immediately went into specialized training in preparation for the initial invasion of the Japanese homeland -- Olympic Operation. According to the plan, on 1 November 1945, Sixth Army, supported by allied naval and air forces, was to attack and invade Kyushu -- southernmost of the five home islands comprising Japan.

In preparation for this attack, replacement and new equipment were received. Arduous new training techniques and schedules went into effect. The previous two years of tough campaigning through the Southwest Pacific were about to be regarded as mere training preparation for the bitterest task of the entire war in the Pacific -- landing on the enemy's own territory. Almost on the eve of the announcement that the Sixth Army was invasionready and eager to open a new chapter in United States military history, the welcome news was received that Japan had accepted the unconditional surrender terms of the Allies. On 2 September 1945, 60 days after the Sixth Army had turned over the command of the Philippines to the US Eighth Army, the Japanese were signing surrender terms aboard the USS MISSOURI.

Spearheading Sixth Army's occupation of Kyushu, Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps troops landed at the port of Sasebo at 0900, 22 September 1945. This landing was quite different from previous ones: there was no accompanying pre-dawn naval bombardment of shore installations, rocket-firing ships did not appear, there was no deadly crossfire from enemy machine guns as troops hit the beach. Instead, all was calm. Blue-clad Japanese civilian policemen stood rigidly at attention, bowing politely, as the Marines stepped ashore. By nightfall, an estimated 10,000 Marines had been landed on the Japanese shores.

Traveling aboard the cruiser USS AUBURN, General Krueger came ashore at Wakayama to assume command of Sixth Army troops. On 28 September, the main body of the Headquarters moved into Kyoto, and for a period of four months, carried out the transitional phases of the occupation of Japan under the direction of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

On 28 January 1946, Headquarters Sixth Army was inactivated at Kyoto, Japan. General Krueger, who had commanded the Sixth Army for nearly three years, from its activation through the entire Southwest Pacific Campaign to Japan, with members of his staff, headed home to the United States. Sixth Army's inactivation appeared to be part of the over-all demobilization and reduction of the US Army from peak wartime strength to peace time era, but its inactivation period was short.

On March 1, 1946 the United States Sixth Army was reactivated just a short thirty days after its inactivation in Japan, to become one of the US Zone of Interior six Continental Armies which had been planned back in 1927. General Krueger was scheduled for new duties and subsequent retirement, and General Joseph W. Stilwell was named Commanding General, with headquarters established at the Presidio of San Francisco.

Covering eight Western States -- Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Idaho, and Montana--this area underwent several organizational changes. Previous to 1920 it was known as the Western Department, and included Wyoming, but not Arizona. On 28 August 1920 the continental United States was reorganized into nine separate corps areas. The Sixth Army area was known as the 9th Corps Area, with Arizona replacing Wyoming. In the early part of World War II, in 1942, the nine corps areas of the US were renamed Service Commands, and the 9th Corps Area became the Ninth Service Command. At the same time the War Department created the Western Defense Command to function in the same area; its primary mission was the defense of the West Coast from internal and external threats.

With the Western Defense Command Headquarters established at the Presidio, Headquarters, Ninth Service Command, the housekeeping and logistic supply organization for Army activities throughout the eight Western states, was moved from the Presidio of San Francisco to Fort Douglas, Utah. There it carried out the mission of supplying and equipping all troops organic to the Western Defense Command and all other troops passing through the West Coast ports of embarkation. The Ninth Service Command was under the control of the Army Service Forces. The Western Defense Command passed out of existence 1 March 1946, which became the date of reactivation of the Sixth US Army at the Presidio of San Francisco. General Stilwell, who commanded the Western Defense Command from December 1945 to March 1946, assumed command of the Sixth US Army, which became responsible for the functions formerly performed by the Ninth Service Command, also inactivated.

General Stilwell's command was not long. After lingering illness, he passed away on 12 October 1946, seven months after becoming the Army Commander.

Although much has been said about Sixth US Army's birth and its brilliant combat record in World War II, it also achieved an enviable peacetime record. Sixth US Army was conspicuous in community life throughout the command. High public interest was represented in the frequent invitations Sixth US Army received to participate with its bands, marching units, and displays in community parades, fairs, and celebrations. Westerners in great numbers visited posts and installations throughout Sixth US Army to see Army displays and demonstrations on annual Armed Forces Day.

One of the most important missions of an Army in peacetime is military training. Since the last half of 1948, the Sixth US Army faced the demands of an expanded peacetime defense Army in commendable fashion. When it became necessary for the United States Army to expand rapidly in the face of increased threats by Communism to the peace of the western World, Sixth US Army's Fort Lewis and Fort Ord became primary training centers for thousands of young Americans selected to man a larger Army.

Subsequently, when the North Koreans invaded the Republic of Korea, the facilities at Camps Cooke, Roberts, San Luis Obispo, and Irwin, and Fort Huachuca were reopened and reactivated. Those posts were given the job of training expanded active Army units, and recalled Army Reserve and National Guard organizations to provide the steady flow of replacements and combat units for American forces in the Far East.

The entire nation's effort to support the United Nations action in Korea fell heavily upon Sixth US Army facilities from Seattle to Los Angeles. Sixth US Army became the main supply point and the secondary line of defense against the communist forces in Asia. Its ability to meet the emergency and accomplish the huge task, and to properly equip and train personnel, plus the building up of vast quantities of material was an achievement that commanded the respect and pride of every soldier of the Sixth US Army.

On three separate occasions Sixth US Army provided the proving ground for outstanding developments in military science and activities. It was in the Sixth US Army area that the first attempts were made to test the unification of facilities and services of all the armed forces. In September 1948 the Secretary of Defense designated that the initial pilot program would be put into operation through Sixth US Army Headquarters. For the next three years Sixth US Army hosted the history-making experiments and demonstrations of atomic weapons at Camp Desert Rock, Nevada. Many Sixth US Army troops participated in the maneuvers and acquired information to analyze and develop protective measures for units and personnel in both defensive and offensive phases of atomic warfare.

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, James E. Forrestal, the first Armed Forces Public Information Office was opened in San Francisco in November 1948, staffed equally with public information personnel from the four services. Its mission was to provide a central clearing house and information center of military and naval publicity material for the benefit and convenience of all news media. Subsequently, because of the success of the first AFPI office, additional offices were opened in Seattle and Los Angeles.

Twice since World War II, Sixth US Army participated in two great history making events of the past decade. In September 1951 the Australia, New Zealand, United States pact for the joint defense of the Pacific area was signed in the enlisted personnel service club at the Presidio of San Francisco. Later the same month, when the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed in the San Francisco Municipal Opera House during which forty-nine allied nations were gathered, Sixth US Army personnel were conspicuous. Sixth US Army provided honor and security guards, plus vehicles and drivers necessary for protection and transportation of hundreds of statesmen and officials who attended these history making events.

Sixth US Army was always ready to respond to public disasters or catastrophes occurring within its area. Illustrative of many such public calls for aid in which Sixth US Army responded were the Columbia National Forest fire and flood disaster in the state of Washington; the damaging, threatening blazes in the Santa Cruz Mountains and on the Hunter-Liggett

Reservation in California in 1948; and the famed Operations Snowbound and Maylift in January and February of 1949 in the states of Arizona, Nevada, and Utah. In this latter call for Sixth US Army aid, hundreds of blizzard-stalled motorists were rescued, as were the Navajo Indians of the Arizona Reservation. Several thousand head of snowbound cattle were saved from starvation by the widespread hay drop over thousands of acres of range land. All of this was done in sub-zero weather and recurring snowstorms. Sixth US Army personnel also played a large role in the aftermath of the Mount St. Helens' disaster.

Once the war in Korea was terminated, the remainder of the Fifties saw Sixth US Army engaged in general housekeeping types of activities, its main emphasis being readiness of the active and reserve units under its command, and dwindling resources in manpower and money. Reenlistments were negligible, inductions remained at an all time low, and the country entered a period of relative calm. Military priorities were replaced by the business of getting ahead, enjoying the fruits of free society, and generally trying to get along with the Soviet Union. With President Dwight Eisenhower in command the country felt at ease and at liberty to pursue personal goals. The spectre of war receded while the vision of peace loomed large on the horizon. Like the remainder of the Army, Sixth US Army was faced with mounting personnel problems and the awesome responsibility of maintaining a modern fighting force capable of dealing with an aggressor. While the civilian side of the nation pursued its own goals, the military continued to prepare itself for eventual conflict. Accomplishing this was a difficult task given the sorry state of the Reserves and the National Guard. For example, in both 1957 and 1958, authorized strength for the National Guard was far below acceptable levels; enlisted strength in 1958 was only 59.5 percent of authorized.

For the Sixth US Army, the 1960s came in like a lamb and went out like a lion. Lt. Gen. Robert M. Cannon, the Sixth US Army Commander (Sep 59-Aug 61), characterized those times as, "comfortable The Army justifiably thought well of itself and was well regarded by the civilian community. Sixth Army went about its business with purpose and professionalism." In 1960, the Army's purpose was not challenged by any significant sector of American society, and few within the military raised the question of what professionalism meant. Sixth US Army strength in 1960 stood at 49,000 active Army officers and enlisted men, 10,000 civilians, and 323,000 reservists, including the National Guard. ROTC existed but it was more like a poor stepchild to the Army; its protection came more from the universities and colleges that housed it than from the parent organization of the Army. It wasn't until a decade later that the Army recognized the significance of ROTC and accorded it the recognition and support it needed.

Unlike 1960, which seemed placid by comparison, 1961 saw the Berlin Crisis and the subsequent build-up of American military strength. Sixth US Army was called upon to provide a rapidly expanding mobilization base and to prepare subordinate commands for overseas commitment. Berlin caused Sixth US Army to operate as a peacetime Army preparing for future contingencies while reacting

to immediate requirements that nearly put the command on a wartime footing. Sixth US Army resembled a field Army planning for future operations while fighting a war in the present.

But the "crisis" soon faded away, and Sixth US Army was left with an overstrength. 1962 saw a continuation of the atomic testing at Desert Rock, this time with a 1000 man battalion task force from the 4th Division. This exercise, called Exercise IVY FLATS, was the first nuclear exercise ever conducted wholly by the Army; (an interesting sidelight to these tests is that today a number of Sixth US Army soldiers are suing the Army and the United States Government for exposing them to nuclear radiation; so too are the local townspeople who were possibly exposed from the particles that were emitted into the atmosphere).

The same year, 1962, was the beginning of a Sixth US Army sponsored counter-guerrilla exercise in Washington's Olympic Peninsula, which involved the 4th Division and the 32d Division, Army National Guard. This exercise became the model for an annual counter-guerrilla exercise by the 4th, thus preparing them for their eventual role in the Vietnam conflict four years later.

As the Berlin situation stabilized, draftees began replacing reservists and Fort Ord staggered under the new training load. The Cuban Missile Crisis erupted in 1963 but Sixth US Army was not directly involved. The only major happening during this period was a reorganization of Sixth US Army HQ along the patterns established by the Department of the Army and Continental US Army Command (CONARC). In addition, Active and Reserve Component divisions were also reorganized under a major Army reorganization effort called the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD). During the Spring, the Army National Guard was also reorganized. Finally, CONARC directed Sixth US Army to train the 4th Airborne Division, Fort Lewis, as a special action backup brigade oriented toward operations in Southeast Asia.

The following year, 1964, Sixth US Army undertook a massive internal reorganization of its staff, and gave increased emphasis to improving the combat readiness of both Active Army units and Reserve Component forces.

1965 challenged Sixth US Army's ability to react effectively to emergency situations and still accomplish its other vital missions. Faced with the proposed closure of Fort Douglas and Camp Parks, Sixth US Army resisted and managed to stave off their closings. This year also saw a decline in all areas of readiness which continued throughout the year. This was due to the growing commitment of forces to the war in Vietnam and the deployment of Sixth US Army troops. In 1965 alone, USASIX deployed 68 units to support the US Military operations in South Vietnam. This situation continued on into 1966 and 1967, as the Army prepared to meet the challenge of activations, supervision of and preparation for deployment of units to the Asian mainland. Resources of personnel and equipment were expended in the achievement of maximum support of this effort without any increase in HQ, Sixth US Army personnel strength to provide for the human effort. This led to increased work time and the addition of a US Army Personnel Center and US Army Training

Center (ATC) at Fort Lewis, expansion of training brigades at Fort Ord, and the organization of a US Army Training Center at Fort Huachuca. Nonetheless, the operational readiness of the Sixth US Army failed to improve during 1966 due to deployment requirements and equipment shortages. In 1966, Sixth US Army deployed 92 units to Vietnam.

Vietnam affected the Sixth US Army's mission which was accomplished amid significant personnel turbulence, continuing deployment in competition with a CONUSA share of the reconstitution of the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF), and monitoring the disorders of the vocal critics of the war in Vietnam. For the first time, actual strength figures for Sixth US Army topped its authorized figures. 1967 also saw the creation of Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM), at Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Fort MacArthur. That same year, on 19 January 1967, the Secretary of Defense eliminated all 14 US Army Corps, including Sixth US Army's.

Because the United States was so committed in a limited war overseas, a partial mobilization was required to raise the readiness posture of the strategic reserve. Sixth US Army activations were redirected from the preparation of most units for deployment to Vietnam to the preparation of some of the mobilized Reserve Component units for reconstruction of the STRAF and to perfecting its capability to respond to the newly routine requirement of supporting civilian authority committed to riot control--of either minorities or students.

The early Seventies saw a continuation of these problems, including staggering fund reductions, manpower losses, personnel inadequacies, and equipment malfunctions, and this during a time of growth for Sixth US Army. Under Project GERONIMO, 29 September 1970, Sixth US Army acquired four additional states: Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming and 22,768 additional active Army personnel. The Seventies, like the Sixties, was a period short of men and money, long on missions and accomplishments.

Adapting to these changes, the Department of the Army undertook a major reorganization, called Operation STEADFAST. Approved on 1 July 1973, STEADFAST altered the Sixth US Army's mission. Its primary mission now became the command of all US Army Reserve units in fifteen western states (Kansas, Nebraska, and New Mexico were added to Sixth US Army's jurisdiction), the supervision of Army National Guard training, and the coordination of mobilization, defense, and emergency planning for these states. The active components were removed from Sixth US Army jurisdiction as were the ROTC programs. The transition was smooth and effective, both within and outside of Sixth US Army.

The reduction of America's participation in the war in Vietnam, together with the cut-back in defense spending, caused the US Army to again reevaluate the need for the many commands and supervisory elements existing throughout the US Army. A smaller military force primarily located in the United States coupled with increased emphasis on Reserve Components and more use of high-speed communications and data processing equipment was expected to

produce economies. Based on this assumption, the CONARC command structure came under scrutiny and the levels of effort; e.g., for Reserve Components and for Active Army, were reevaluated.

A comprehensive study was performed in 1972, which concluded that a major reorganization would improve the Army's effectiveness, produce economies, and better align priorities. Specifically, it would reduce the number of people in intermediate headquarters and increase the emphasis on Reserve Components. In general, the objectives of the reorganization were more efficient use of funds and manpower and improved Army readiness. The Comptroller's offices were designated to coordinate all actions in Sixth US Army headquarters; the DCSCOM Management Engineering Division was tasked with the project, dubbed Operation STEADFAST.

Basically, the reorganization relieved the CONUS Army Commander of responsibility for Class I installations, area support, and ROTC activities so that he could concentrate on Reserve Component activities. As a result, USASIX headquarters were considerably reduced in size, the Class I installations reporting directly to the next higher headquarters.

The specifics of the reorganization of the US Army were as follows: Two new major commands were established, replacing HQ CONARC and Combat Developments Command. These were the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) at Fort McPherson, GA, and the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, VA. To provide additional manpower for these new headquarters, the Third US Army at Fort McPherson was disestablished.

The Training and Doctrine Command was made responsible for all individual training, education and combat developments; Army Training Centers; Service Schools; and ROTC. TRADOC directly commanded 22 installations on which these functions were the major activity. Fort Ord, Hunter Liggett Military Reservation, and Presidio of Monterey became TRADOC installations.

The US Army Forces Command commanded the First, Fifth, and Sixth US Armies, all Strategic Reserve Forces and US Army Reserve units in continental United States, and supervised Army National Guard training. FORSCOM directly commanded the 19 installations not commanded by TRADOC. The new commands became operational on 1 July 1973. Elimination of Third US Army resulted in an adjustment of the remaining CONUSA boundaries. Kansas, Nebraska, and New Mexico were added to Sixth US Army's then 12-state area.

The primary missions of the CONUSA were to command all Army Reserve units, supervise National Guard training, and coordinate mobilization, defense and emergency planning. The CONUSAs no longer commanded installations or administered the ROTC program. In Sixth US Army, this became effective 1 August 1973.

Another change under STEADFAST was the creation of US Army Readiness Regions (ARR), effective 1 July 1973, to supervise Reserve Component training and to assist the Reserve Component in achieving and maintaining unit readiness. 1974 was a period of US Army Reserve recruiting and retention,

while 1975 and 1976 could best be described as transition years at HQ, Sixth US Army, as it adjusted to its new role of being primarily a Reserve Component-oriented organization. There was a loss of personnel from the Reserves which resulted in a loss of combat readiness. The overall upward trend of US Army Reserve strength in 1974 was reversed in 1975 and 1976. In general terms, the overall unit readiness showed a decline within the Reserve Component and National Guard during 1975 and 1976, due to the end of the Vietnam War and the draft.

Some of the major problems experienced by ARR VIII and ARR IX were personnel turbulence problems which directly affected their readiness; equipment shortages; inadequate man-day spaces or training assemblies; inadequate nearby training areas; shortage of Army reserve technicians; funding constraints; and poor training management.

In 1977, the new Commander, Lt. Gen. Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., tried to emphasize the uniqueness of the Reserve Component versus the Active Army. There was an identity gap between the Reserve Component and the Active Force and this gap, Flanagan argued, had to be filled if both Components were to achieve full partnership in combat readiness. Imposing Active Army requirements and methods on the Reserves without regard for the inherent differences of each, continued Flanagan, created many problems.

With the increase in the ratio of Reserve Component units to Active Army units in the total force structure, there was an increase in reserve participation in exercises. Readiness remained the main Sixth US Army mission; training was its means to achieve it.

When 1978 dawned, the Reserves were faced with a declining force. Like previous years, 1978 saw the Reserves declining in numbers at a time when they represented more than 50 percent of the Army's deployable resources, 50 percent of its infantry and armor battalions, and nearly 70 percent of its tactical support. As a result, Lt. Gen. E. P. Forrester, the new Commander (22 August 1978), established the Office of Recruiting and Retention (ORR) under the Chief of Staff to deal directly and forcefully with this very problem.

1978 was also the year of a Mobility Exercise (MOBEX 78), called NIFTY NUGGET, at Sixth US Army. A Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored exercise, MOBEX 78 was a 30-day, real time exercise to assess plans and procedures at all command levels during the first 30 days of mobilization and deployment. General Forrester took this opportunity to educate the public on the need for a strong Reserve Component Force, especially in light of the continuing saga of Sixth US Army's declining strength, poorly maintained equipment, and inadequate training activities. Mobilization became a watchword as well during this period.

By 1980, there was a new trend, as enlistment figures reversed themselves and more and more Americans joined the ranks of the Active and Reserve Forces. In 1979, for example, Sixth US Army's Reserve strength was 28,015; in 1980 it was 31,085; in 1979, its National Guard strength was 58,858; in 1980

it was 62,983. These figures represented substantial changes from previous years but they did not completely meet the needs of the command which was still beset by equipment problems and personnel shortages.

That same year, the Army Readiness Regions (ARRs) became the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMRs) signifying the emphasis the Army was now placing on mobilization. ARMR VIII and IX were now given the responsibility of coordinating mobilization planning for installations and Reserve Component organizations within their respective geographic areas. In addition, there was CAPSTONE, the organizational process to align many of the units belonging to the total force so that they could be quickly assembled in case of war. Created by FORSCOM to deal with actual mobilization, it envisioned little time in determining which units would go where, and when, for deployment, and it grouped the Active and Reserve Component units in preorganized packages.

If Mobilization was the key issue in 1981, Force Modernization became the primary focus of Army activity in 1982, and MOBEX 80 the main vehicle for implementing many of the Army's new weapon systems and unit changes. Called PROUD SPIRIT, MOBEX 80 tested an installation's ability to process Reserve Component units under full mobilization conditions. Unfortunately, the exercise again demonstrated that existing command and control arrangements between the Continental US Armies and the mobilization stations were confusing and unworkable. Correcting this problem became one of the chief missions or goals of the present Commander, Lt. Gen. David E. Grange, Jr., who assumed command on 1 August 1981.³

The Sixth US Army is a young Army compared to others, but its individual and collective achievements are many. It would take a long time and much research to recall the deeds of the famous outfits which at one time or another were elements of it during World War II. Overall, Sixth US Army has a brilliant record of combat achievement and an honor roll of heroes and heroic leaders comparable to that of any similar unit.

Today's members of the Sixth US Army have fallen heir to a proud and brilliant heritage. Many of Sixth US Army's officers and men who helped write the glorious history have passed on. The Sixth US Army's patch, a six-pointed star within the unbroken circle, the latter emblematical of the unbroken two year's advance across the Pacific toward ultimate victory, symbolized its achievements in both peace and war.

The readiness posture of Sixth US Army today is a reflection of the dedication and ingenuity of the men and women who make up this unique command. Not content to rest on the laurels of World War II, today's Sixth Army soldier, both military and civilian, forges ahead in many directions, seeking solutions to pressing mobilization and force modernization problems, devising better methods of training, and creating a force that is both ready for war and capable of winning should it be called upon to fight. "Born to War" to preserve the peace, this has been Sixth US Army's mission and its major accomplishment in its forty year history.

In its forty years of history, the Sixth US Army has witnessed many profound changes in Army weaponry, strategy, tactics, and logistics. It has also experienced some profound inner alterations, changing from an active, extremely successful battlefield Army to a more docile, less glamorous integrator of the Reserve and National Guard. Nonetheless, its role and its accomplishments have been impressive and of far reaching consequence. US Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, and the Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr., stated it succinctly when they told a Congressional Armed Forces Committee in 1982 that, "With the adoption of our Total Army policy in the early 1970s, and the increased global responsibilities, the contributions of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have become critical--possibly even decisive--because when mobilized, they augment, reinforce, support, and sustain the active force as well as expand the training and logistics bases. They are a cost-effective means of fulfilling these essential functions, and they are also an important indicator of national resolve."⁴

As the institution which attempts to insure the combat readiness of the Reserves and National Guard in the fifteen western states, the Sixth US Army continued to play a crucial role during this one year period in supporting the Total Army.

FOOTNOTES

1. "A Talk with the Chief," Army (May 1982), p 18.
2. Ibid., p 25.
3. Lt. Gen. David E. Grange, Jr., Essential Elements of Guidance for Commanders. (Sixth US Army Historian's Office)
4. John Marsh, Secretary of the Army, and General Edward C. Meyer, Army Chief of Staff, Congressional Statement, 1992, p 30.

CHAPTER 2

MANNING THE TOTAL FORCE

"Good things are happening in the Army's personnel system," wrote Lt. Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, in the October, 1982 issue of Army. Citing impressive figures of first term enlistments, General Thurman noted that 24,000 high school seniors and graduates had enlisted in the Army Reserve while another 22,500 joined the Army National Guard. "The executive branch of the government and Congress, together with public support for military service, combined to create a favorable climate to undertake a dramatic shift in the way we go about our personnel management--to turn from mere quantitative measures to qualitative measures to improve force readiness," wrote Thurman. "This is no quiet revolutionary change," he continued, "but a resounding turn about from the late 1970s." This leads to many notable achievements: "Readiness improves, professionalism soars, units are ready to accept those new M1 tanks or the Bradley fighting vehicle, or a TACFIRE or a PATRIOT! They are proud to serve--Army proud!"¹ The Sixth US Army Commander, Lt. Gen. David E. Grange, Jr., echoed these sentiments when he urged his troops to support, "a Total Army composed of professionals who loyally serve the nation in rewarding careers."²

One of the most rewarding programs initiated during the previous few years was the Full Time Unit Support (FTUS) program. Citing the significance of full-time unit support to "our total mobilization effort," General Grange urged the Commander, US Army Forces Command, to support, "judicious use of staff review and additional planning time," for implementing this program.³ Grange recommended that rather than just filling vacant positions, more attention should be given, "to those positions in the model which would make the greatest long-term contribution to the readiness of the Total Army." Those finally designated for early fill by converted advisors, argued Grange, "were the ones in which the recent experiences and perspectives of our advisors could make the greatest contribution to mission capability and readiness."⁴ During this fiscal year the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved full implementation of the program.

The USASIX Commander lamented the attention that was being given to making full-time unit support positions standard among like units. He suggested considering mission requirements, geographic dispersion, average unit strength, and other factors, affecting unit readiness when requesting full-time spaces. Mobilization, continued Grange, "required a greater degree of flexibility in determining the full-time contingent."⁵

"The impact of the reduction in the Command Grade Ceiling has been felt by all levels of command within the Army," continued Grange. "Its effect upon the Reserve Component is especially significant." He noted how "elimination of advisors would have had a negligible effect if the grade levels had been maintained as originally proposed for the FTUS model." As a consequence, the US Army Reserve had to contend with a reduction in the overall level of full-time

expertise. It is imperative, he argued, that priority be given "to reinstating the grade levels with FTUS once relief is given to the overall grade ceiling." Unless this is done, and done soon, the Army's overall readiness may be adversely affected.⁶

Historically, wrote Maj. Gen. William R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve, "the Army Reserve has had the lowest percentage of full-time personnel of all the reserve components. This deficiency is now being addressed by the full-time manning program of the active Guard-Reserve (AGR) long-tour program." Continuing, Berkman noted that, Reservists in full-time status support unit readiness in functional areas such as training, logistics and administration increased from 821 in 1980 to 1,932 by April, 1982. If funds are forthcoming in the FY 83 budget, concluded Berkman, the number of "full-time manning" Reservists will increase to 3,588.⁷

Another program that elicited Sixth US Army support during this period was the Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP). "More individuals ought to be able to participate in SMP," observed General Grange, in a 19 January 1982 letter to General Robert M. Shoemaker, Commander, US Army Forces Command. In addition, continued Grange, "more officers commissioned through the ROTC/SMP Program ought to be able to return to RC units after commissioning." Aware of the needs of the Total Army, the Sixth US Army commander emphasized the considerable time and effort spent by Reserve Component units, "in training SMP members and in seeing to their professional development." It was "only natural," he wrote, "for RC Commanders to want to retain as many SMP members as possible." Grange asked General Shoemaker's assistance in convincing both the National Guard Bureau and the Department of the Army to permit more ROTC cadets to join the Simultaneous Membership Program and to return to Reserve Component units after commissioning.⁸

During this same period, three Mandatory Promotion Boards were convened at the Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC), St. Louis: The CW2 to CW3 board, 12 June 1982, the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) Lt. Col. and Colonel Board, 20 July 1982, and the 14 September 1982 Lt. Col. Army Promotion List Board. Three hundred and sixty-eight Sixth US Army troop program unit officers were identified for promotion consideration under the mandatory criteria. Seventy-four officers were considered for promotion to CW3, 1,984 for Lt. Col and COL in the Army Medical Department branches, and 100 to the Lt. Col. Army Promotion List. The results of these boards were still pending. One Unit Vacancy Promotion Board was convened on 6 and 7 July 1982. A total of 326 officers were considered to fill 70 troop program unit positions. Promotion packets were required to be forwarded to USASIX by 6 June. Records were screened and prepared for board action.⁹

In response to the restraints imposed by the end strength cap, the Office of Strength Improvement (OSI) began initial work on a program to identify the projected total vacancies for which the US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) agencies can recruit in fiscal year 1983. This data was required by FORSCOM to assist the Recruiting Command and TRADOC in planning; (e.g. mission determination, school reallocations, etc.). The program will identify number of

vacancies by unit identification code (UIC) and provide the District Recruiting Command (DRC) and major US Army Reserve Command roll-up capabilities. Projected number of vacancies are arrived at by factoring historical attrition, assigned versus authorized strength, and unit mobilization priority.

Additionally, the Office of Strength Improvement conducted random monitoring of unit vacancy files to insure compliance with listing requirements, valid vacancy entries, correct bonus status and proper unit commander vacancy priority posting. Report programs were also being developed to assist in determination of FY 83 non-prior service/prior service accession ratio requirements. This data will be provided to the Recruiting Command for coordinating US Army Reserve needs and US Army Recruiting Command mission objectives.¹⁰

As the Continental US Army Command program manager for the Automated Unit Vacancy System (AUVS), Sixth US Army Office of Strength Improvement continued its efforts to purify the system data base and develop applications for management reports. To enhance the Recruiting Command capabilities and insure maximum support to the Reserve units, a 100 percent audit of the Automated Unit Vacancy System unit header data was performed. This audit checked accuracy of unit address and bonus status. Additionally, a 100 percent audit of the District Recruiting Command LINK Program was conducted. The program aligned Reserve units with support District Recruiting Commands. Management reports generated by the program assisted in determining the Army Recruiting Command production and in verifying sufficient and accurate posting of vacancy data.¹¹

Citing low statistics as his proof, General Grange, in yet another area of concern, told the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lt. Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman, that he, Grange, "was very much distressed" at the poor showing Sixth Army had in the recent O-6 selections. This low selection rate, argued Grange, "clearly signals to the Reserve Components that we are not as serious about the One Army concept as our rhetoric suggests" and that we should be avoided, "as it is professionally the 'Kiss of Death'." Realizing the injustice of these perceptions, the USASIX Commander asked Thurman, "to please adjust assignment policies to allow more top files to be assigned to Reserve Component duty." The Army stands to benefit, continued Grange, if it exposes, the 'Comers' to the Reserve Components early in their careers so that, when they are later in policy making positions, "they will be more sensitive to the needs of the Total Army." Finally, unless the selection rates were dramatically altered for those serving the Continental US Armies, concluded Grange, "those on whom we rely upon to help win 'day three of the war' will not be ready to do their part."¹²

Expanding on this theme, Grange, in a joint CONUSA letter to General Richard Cavazos, new US Army Forces Commander, spoke of his concern over the new Officer Distribution Plan (ODP) and the effect it could have on the experience level of officers assigned to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions and especially the Readiness Groups. "The Army has heretofore filled the Readiness Groups with experienced officers, mostly Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, in recognition of the level at which these officers must operate and

advise," Grange wrote. "The latest ODP lowers the authorized grade for many Readiness Group positions." He voiced concern that, "these officers lacking the necessary rank, schooling and experience just won't have the credibility required." He also expressed concern about, what he called, "the drop in quality and the turbulence" the CONUSA's were beginning to experience among personnel assigned to the Readiness Groups, Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, and the Continental US Armies, in that priority.¹³ He was joined in this letter by the other two CONUSA Commanders.

On the brighter side, the first half of this fiscal year was a busy period in the General Officer area. There were many changes within Sixth US Army's major US Army Reserve Command sections. Many Reserve generals and colonels were also nominated for flag rank mobilization designee positions at Army headquarters and to serve on prestigious Army boards and committees. Three Sixth US Army General Officer Advisory Boards were convened to recommend to the USASIX commander officers to fill the following four Troop Program Unit positions: Commander, 2d Hospital Center, Hamilton Field, CA; Commander, 221st Military Police Brigade, San Jose, CA; Commander, 91st Division (Training), Ft Baker, CA; and Commander, 124th US Army Reserve Command, Ft Lawton, WA. Col. James R. Sims, COL Darold Freeman, Brig. Gen. Robert S. Holmes, and Brig. Gen. Garnet R. Reynolds were selected for the above positions, respectively. Col. George J. Vukasin was approved by Army headquarters for reassignment from Junior Assistant Division Commander to Senior Assistant Division Commander, 91st Division (Training) and also recommended for promotion consideration by the Reserve of the Army Promotion Board. Eight general officers and 10 colonels were nominated to fill five general officer headquarters Army mobilization designee positions. Of those nominated, Brig. Gen. Daniel C. Helix and Col. Bernard Thorn were selected as Deputy Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General for Reserve Affairs, respectively. Six general officers were nominated for membership on the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC) and the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB). Maj. Gen. Beilyn Fragner was selected as a Reserve Forces Policy Board member. No decision was reached for the 16 Army Reserve Forces Policy committee.¹⁴

Promotion of enlisted Troop Program Unit (TPU) members in grades E-3 through E-6, without the necessity of a grade vacancy, was escalated in the first half of FY 82. The measure was emphasized as a means of providing growth potential for younger members. It contributed largely to an increase in strength in these grades of 969 members during the first sixth-month period.¹⁵ During the second half of the year, there was a decline in utilization of the alternate training program enlistment option for Army Reserve enlistment. This was caused by the Recruiting Command's stricter observation of Department of the Army's determination that this should be the last of all possible options--because it had the smallest return in productive service to the Reserves, and the highest cost, of all options.¹⁶

Turning from enlistments to assignment tour lengths, General Grange, in a 22 July 1982 letter to the Army Mobilization and Readiness Region commanders, reemphasized his support of stabilized tours of 36 months for officers and 24 months for enlisted personnel. "It is my aim," he wrote, "to abide by these

tour lengths and to approve requests for extension rarely, and only when unusual circumstances fully justify the retention of a person beyond the prescribed tour lengths." Adhering to this procedure ensured, "that the Reserve Components are continually infused with personnel possessing the latest experience working with the Army's new systems and programs." In addition, continued the Sixth US Army Commander, "we need to share the reserve story with the Selective Component forces, so that Reserve Component needs can be taken into consideration when Army-wide policies are being made. Personnel cross-fertilization will ensure that the Total Army concept becomes a reality."¹⁷

During this period, USASIX began furnishing the US Army Reserve unit commanders with Reservist's individual transcripts of the data contained in the Reserve Personnel Master File (RPMF). The transcripts were run annually and in conjunction with the Department of the Army Form 2 (Personnel Qualification Record Part I), which the Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center mails two months prior to a Reservist's birth month. Initial transcripts were for Reservists whose dates of birth occurred in September. The transcripts were expected to replace various outputs which Sixth US Army sent periodically to Reserve units for the purification and update of the Reserve Personnel Master File.¹⁸

In a further effort to modernize the Army's personnel system, the Army created the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System-U.S. Army Reserve (SIDPERS-USAR), Modules II and III. The former provided for the furnishing of unit manning reports (UMR) down to the U.S. Army Reserve unit level, while the latter offered Troop Program Units and all levels of command an automated user responsive, personnel system. Under Module II, Sixth US Army conducted an Initial Design Review on 10-11 December 1981, which included representatives from Department of the Army, Forces Command, Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center, and First and Fifth US Armies. The following year, the command selected test sites, and with representatives from St. Louis, conducted unit level training in February on input procedures, including Army Reserve unit required actions.

During this same period, in conjunction with St. Louis, Forces Command, and the other Continental U.S. Armies, Sixth US Army developed and evaluated module test plans. One problem which surfaced was Forces Command's inability to breakdown the Vertical The Army Authorization Documentation System (VTAADS) to subunit level. Presently, breakdown occurred at the battalion level; a sub-unit level breakdown was deemed essential for an accurate and useable Unit Manning Report.¹⁹

On 22 October 1981, St. Louis hosted a Continental US Army meeting to evaluate an additional 79 data items proposed for implementation under Module III. The proposed record layout for the Master Personnel File Maintenance System under this module was expected to be implemented during the 1 August 1983 through 1 August 1984 time frame. Upon implementation, Module III will provide to troop program units and all command levels an automated user responsive, personnel system. Some system outputs were reserve screening, which enabled it to screen the total data base, Retirements Points Accounting Data Bank, which issued individual unit and Continental US Army statements by

year, cumulative military service, and earned points, and finally, automated orders, which provided the Armies and St. Louis with the capability to produce automated assignments and active duty for training orders. In most cases, the major US Army Reserve Commands performed this function for the Sixth US Army.²⁰

In conjunction with these programs, the Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center conducted two Mobilization of Personnel System/Standard Installation/Division Personnel System-Wartime (MOBPERS/SIDPERS-WT) Conferences, 20-22 October 1981 and 12 August 1982, for the Armies, Forces Command, Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, Department of the Army, the US Army Finance and Accounting Center, the Army National Guard Computer Center and the National Guard Bureau (US Army Garrison and Reserve Personnel Service Companies). The October conference trained worker-level personnel in Mobilization of Personnel System/Standard Installation/Division Personnel System-War Time processing procedures. It also included a critique of deficiencies encountered in prior mobilization exercises and it provided input in preparation for the Personnel Mobilization Exercise (PERMEX) 1-82, a test involving mobilization stations with data base accessibility for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.²¹

The in-process review of 12 August, on the other hand, provided the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System-Reserve Component System Advisory Group (SAG) members and other interested agencies with the current status of the Personnel System-Army Reserve and National Guard project development. The group accepted the development plans and proposed a two-phase development and deployment of Module III: Phase I would replace Module I and incorporate Module II into Module III; Phase II would add an automated order function, development system interfaces, and system enhancements.²²

Select troop program units, under Sixth US Army, participated in the Personnel System-US Army Reserve Unit Manning Roster data conversion test, 12 July - 1 September 1982. This test evaluated the Reserves' ability to produce an updated unit manning report which resulted from change transactions submitted by test units. It also insured that the procedures for completing update transcripts were understood by test unit personnel, and it enabled Forces Command and the Armies to evaluate the flow of data reported to and from St. Louis.²³

During this same period, the USASIX Long Tour Management Program reached a level of over 1,000 personnel; troop-oriented programs, including inprocessing and sponsorship, changes in rating chains, and an evaluation of the Full-Time Manning (FTM) Program, were included. Of the 56 newly authorized technical redesignation positions, 51 were filled; of the 54 full-time manning positions authorized for FY 83, 45 were filled.²⁴

In an effort to streamline administrative details, Sixth US Army consolidated its pamphlets 140-3, 140-4, and 140-5 into one pamphlet, 140-3, thus providing Army Reserve units with one reference for updating the Reserve Personnel Master File and with procedures for requesting outputs. Each major US Army Command and Army Readiness and Mobilization Region participated; distribution was made to the field in July, 1982.²⁵

The Key Member Action Retention Seminars (KMARS) got off to a good start during this fiscal year. Comments from the attendees were overwhelmingly favorable; however, lack of man-day spaces (MDS) Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA) funds somewhat hampered this excellent retention training vehicle from the start. The training consisted of an intensive, 5-day program designed to provide small unit leaders--primarily commanders, first sergeants, administrative supply technicians, non-commissioned officer leaders--the tools necessary to positively influence the retention environment in their units. Fiscal Year 1982 Key Member Action Retention Seminars were presented to three groups: (1) 18-22 January, 104th Division (Training); (2) 1-5 February, 63d Army Reserve Command; (3) 29 March - 2 April, 104th Division (Training). Originally programmed one to each major US Army Command, except for the 351st Civil Affairs Command (due to its small size and over 100 percent of strength posture), the seminars were open to major US Army Reserve Commands with man-day space funds. Lack of sufficient retention Reserve Personnel Army funding resulted in cancellation of 2 of 3 key member action retention seminars. The one seminar was conducted for the 63d Army Reserve Command in August 1982.²⁶

During the same fiscal year, the USASIX Office of Strength Improvement placed emphasis on developing, printing, and distributing brochures, posters, and special awareness items to the Rapid Deployment Force-Army (RDF-A) and low strength units. As a result, a number of specialized brochures were developed and distributed: 391st Engineer Company, 436th Chemical Detachment, 177th Transportation Company, Detachment 2, 91st Division, 820th Engineer Battalion, 689th Quartermaster Company, 481st Transportation Company, and 172d Transportation Company.²⁷

During the first quarter of fiscal year 1982, the Sixth US Army's Office of Strength Improvement completed its round of assistance visits to Rapid Deployment Force-Army with visits to the 391st Engineering Company and the 436th Chemical Detachment. Visits highlighted available strength improvement programs and stimulated across-the-board staff assistance. Cumulative Army Reserve Rapid Deployment Force-Army strength increased by 4.2 percent with an end of March 1982 assigned strength of 552 against 713 authorized. Beginning in FY 82, assigned strength was 650 against 797 authorized with the authorization difference accounted for by the February addition of the 842 Quartermaster Company to the Rapid Deployment Force-Army list.²⁸

31 December 1981 marked the conclusion of the Sixth US Army, Office of Strength Improvement sponsored Rapid Deployment Force-Army Strength Improvement Incentives Award Program, which saw 7 recruiters awarded Letters of Commendation from General Grange and distinctive plaques in recognition of their support for the 177th Transportation Corps Company, 481st Transportation Corps Company, 282d Engineer Company, and the 689th Quartermaster Company. The office developed and monitored this program. Action officers from the same office also participated in readiness improvement conferences sponsored by the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region IX, 63d Army Reserve Command, and the 124th Army Reserve Command.²⁹

In the second quarter, the Strength Improvement Office conducted a review and analysis of Oregon and Washington recruiting markets to identify oversubscribed and undersubscribed market areas. Done in conjunction with the

Recruiting Command, the 124th Army Reserve Command, the 104th Division and the 351st Civil Affairs Command, this study identified severely oversubscribed areas, e.g., Portland, Fort Lewis, and Fort Lawton, and a number of areas where recruiting opportunities existed, e.g., Eugene, Medford, and Salem, Oregon. The 104th Division proposed several troop program actions as a result of that analysis.³⁰

The Strength Improvement Office completed staffing on an pre-initial active duty for training program (PREP TRAIN). Designed to reduce trainee discharge program losses by better preparing non-prior service Army Reserve personnel for the challenges of a military environment, the program included 22 hours of instruction in drill and ceremony, physical training, guard duty, weapons assembly and disassembly, and other general military subjects. In June, PREP TRAIN was sent through the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions to the major US Army Reserve Commands for comments on implementation. Preliminary responses were favorable and indicated PREP TRAIN will be implemented by the 91st Division (Training) in January 1983, and the 96th Army Reserve Command in March. Proponency for PREP TRAIN was transferred to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region commanders by the direction of the USASIX Commander.³¹

The Office of Strength Improvement also conducted a review of low strength Reserve units in Sixth US Army. This study tasked major US Army Reserve commanders to review the status of 28 chronically low-strength units, determining the causes of strength deficiencies and report current and projected remedial actions.³²

Having proponency for the revision of Sixth US Army Pamphlet 140-1, the Strength Improvement Office published the revision on 31 July 1982, incorporating new programs such as Automated Unit Vacancy System, US Army Reserve/US Army Recruiting Command Automated Unit Referral Program, and the Sixth US Army Strength Improvement Awards Program. Likewise, the revision incorporated evolutionary changes in the Selected Reserve Incentive Program, major US Army Reserve Command Transfer Agent Program, and the Sixth US Army Overstrength Policy Program.³³

At a Forces Command conference in August, standard major US Army Reserve Command staffing models for the full-time unit support retention spaces were developed. Minimum and maximum models, dependent upon major US Army Reserve Command authorized strength and whether or not major Army Reserve Commands had subordinate General Officer commands, were the key factors in model development. These models were staffed through the major US Army Reserve Commands and fill data was forwarded to Forces Command. Additionally, this conference developed a draft job description for the newly authorized-for-fill senior personnel sergeant (E7, 75Z) position in each major US Army Reserve Command retention office.³⁴

Preliminary research on the issue of considering persons with a General Educational Degree as nonhigh school diploma graduates for the purpose of Army Reserve non-prior service (NPS) recruiting was started during this period. This issue represented a revision of present policy, which considered the General Educational Degree as equivalent to a high school diploma graduate and could serve to shrink the non-prior service recruiting market.³⁵

During fiscal year 1982, the strength posture of the Army Reserve continued to improve; gains exceeded losses by about 4,294 personnel. The fiscal year percent of authorized strength rose 5.2 percent to 92.5 percent as of 31 August 1982; authorized strength increased by 374. In June, Forces Command Army Reserve strength was capped at 237,000 for FY 82 and the FORSCOM Commander directed that the quality of the force be "wrenched-up." Consequently, end strength objectives and attrition ceilings were suspended for the balance of the fiscal year. Clearly, emphasis was on retaining quality soldiers and eliminating non-performers.³⁶

In August, 1982, Forces Command informed Sixth US Army of its fair share of the FY 83 end strength cap. That fair share was 40,268 reservists. In coordination with the major US Army Commands, Strength Branch assigned fair share FY 83 end strength caps to each major US Army Reserve Command. Army National Guard units in Sixth US Army increased in strength from 90 percent to 92 percent, a gain of 1.1 percent during the reporting period. North Dakota, South Dakota, and New Mexico exceeded 100 percent of their authorized strength.³⁷

During this past fiscal year, 1,206 Sixth US Army reservists took advantage of the Selective Reenlistment Incentive Program (SRIP) reenlistment benefits for a total obligation of \$1,471,950.³⁸ That same year, Forces Command Army Reserve reenlistment goals were 50 percent first term and 80 percent career. First term reenlistments ranged from a high of 54 percent in August 1982, to a low of 44 percent in April 1982 with the cumulative rate during the fiscal year of 50.8 percent. Career reenlistment rates rose 69.6 percent in April to 75.2 percent in August with the cumulative rate of 76.69 for the fiscal year. During this reporting period, enlisted gains were 13,365 for an average of 1,276 accessions per month.³⁹

In addition to the Selective Reenlistment Incentive Program, Sixth US Army benefitted from the Split Training Enlistment Option. During FY 81, for example, 10.9 percent of all US Army Reserve accessions and 21.3 percent of Sixth US Army's accessions were split training enlistees. "This impressive increase was accomplished in spite of the OCAR imposed MOS restraints," observed General Grange in a 21 December 1981 letter to Forces Command. "The combined Split Training Option and the Education Assistance Bonus unquestionably provide a strong incentive for the high caliber non prior service applicant to enlist into the USAR. Together, these two enlistment options target the market that is vital to the USAR and the Active Army."⁴⁰

In a 4 March 1982 letter to Forces Command, Maj. Gen. Frederick H. Lawson, Commander, 91st Division (Training), argued convincingly about the importance to Reserve Component troop program units of attaining and maintaining assigned personnel strength. "The relative ease with which individuals assigned to these units can enter or leave these units, notwithstanding any individual enlistment 'contracts' they may have negotiated, is a matter of grave concern to all TPU commanders," Lawson wrote. "It should be understood, however, that under certain conditions, general attrition of personnel in TPUs, . . . can have both positive and negative results." An examination of the attrition formulas and the definitions of various categories of "losses" that make up

the attrition rate, led Lawson to conclude that," the Reserves were placing a negative connotation to some factors that are indeed positive and which in themselves often contribute to better strength and retention rates within units."⁴¹

For example, observed Lawson, transfer within a unit made solely to promote career enhancement of individuals or to place the best qualified person in the most demanding job had been defined as a negative attrition mark. In effect, Lawson argued, "a unit with a strong EPMS program will be shown as having 'high attrition' by your standards. This really is not attrition in any sense of the word and should not be classified as such."⁴² Additionally, "transfers from one major TPU to another major TPU, usually resulting from change of employment site, but which in many cases is negotiated by the losing unit with the gaining unit, becomes a negative attrition figure." This too, continued the 91st Division Commander, was false attrition. So too the loss of a reserve component member to the active component; "In truth, such interplay is a healthy one which can benefit both the active component and, to a degree, the reserve; yet his very loss under these circumstances has a negative impact on the losing reserve component unit because it is an attrition loss."⁴³

Attrition rates, wrote the 91st Division Commander, "if properly used and properly understood, can be effective management tools and an aid to effective personnel strength management." To be effective, however, they must be designed around factors that the Troop Program Unit commanders fully control. "It is difficult to give credibility to attrition rates that penalize units who exercise good personnel management or who actively work at making the transfer agent program effective by placing personnel in other TPUs in other states or areas if civilian employment causes displacement of a unit member." Lawson described as "an unhappy fact of life" the fact that we tend to compare major US Army Reserve Commands or states with each other, and that in so doing, only the negative side of attrition is shown.⁴⁴

General Lawson proposed a reevaluation of the elements that presently make up the basis of Forces Command's attrition rate. He further proposed, "that attrition rates focus on areas that TPU commanders can influence (e.g. loss to the IRR, unprogrammed losses, etc.) and that factors beyond the control of a TPU commander's influence, be eliminated from the attrition rate formula and recorded elsewhere." Concluding, Lawson noted that, "if TPU commanders can feel a sense of ownership in the maintenance of unit personnel strength as reflected in true attrition rates, then the FORSCOM goals in increased personnel readiness in the TPUs can be enhanced."⁴⁵

In the area of administrative support, the command won Forces Command approval to update and decentralize the Word Processing Center. It was decided that decentralization would allow for more job diversification and reduce the personnel turnover rate which was at 50 percent during this fiscal year. On 16 September, Forces Command approved the new concept; \$51,000.00 in the overall administrative effectiveness of the staff was saved. The entire system should be operational by 12 November 1982.⁴⁶

Finally, one of Sixth US Army's most innovative projects, the Continental Army Management Information System (CAMIS), approved 30 July 1981, went through some notable changes during this fiscal year. A Headquarters, US Army Forces Command directed and managed automation development project, the system was designed to provide automated management information through all levels of reserve commands.

The Continental Army Management Information System charter, approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (IL & FM) on 30 July 1982, called for the automation of the Reserve Component Management Structure of the Army which included the Forces Command, the three CONUSA Headquarters, nine Army Readiness headquarters, 28 Readiness Groups, 44 Major US Army Reserve Command headquarters, 53 State Area Commands (STARCs), and over 1,000 Reserve centers. Current system development began in September 1981 with the award of a contract to Rehab Group, Inc. The contractor's tasks were to gather functional requirements, document current procedures and the information necessary to support these requirements, and determine the information needs throughout the Forces Command mobilization management structure.⁴⁷

The Continental Army Management Information System was separated into two main efforts, Mainline CAMIS and the Demonstration CAMIS Validation System (DCVS). The definition and design of Mainline CAMIS had a November 1984 completion date, with testing and acceptance set for December 1984, and deployment scheduled from February 1985 through January 1986. The Demonstration CAMIS Validation System will be used to refine and validate functional requirements and demonstrate to users how the system can be used for exploration and experimentation in an operational environment during the period October 1982 to December 1984, and to provide a partial capability to support planning and execution of the Forces Command mobilization mission making this information visible to the functional user.⁴⁸

Sixth US Army prepared or distributed several user manuals to support CAMIS/DCVS training including the "CAMIS Users Manual," "Addendum to CAMIS Users Manual," the "User Manual for the Update Reserve Personnel Master File," the "Mailway User Manual," the "Equipment Concentration Site User Manual" and the "Demonstration CAMIS Validation System (DCVS) User Manual for MOBEX 83." In June 1982 Rehab Group, Inc. delivered the "CAMIS-FORMDEPS Functional Requirements Analysis," the "Functional Description for US Army Forces Command - Continental Army Management Information System (Draft)," and the "Conceptual Solutions for Project CAMIS for US Army Forces Command (Draft)." In July Rehab prepared the "Continental Army Management Information System Security/Classification Issue." All of these documents will be used for further CAMIS development efforts.⁴⁹

Training caused CAMIS the most problems during this period. Onsite training for administrative supply technicians was attempted in an effort to familiarize them with the operation of the computer terminal and the limited functions that were available to them in the early stages of development. Many showed reluctance to learn because of the strange nature of the equipment. As time progressed and the system grew in scope more precise and comprehensive training became necessary. Training teams for the field were deemed necessary

to train new users, provide training on new applications as they developed, provide refresher training for applications that were used infrequently, and check skill levels of users on a regular basis. "The system," argued the planners, "will not operate without a rigorous, standardized training package with follow-up training on a regular basis." Sixth US Army prepared such a training package and distributed it to First and Fifth US Armies for comment.⁵⁰

Several training seminars were conducted to train Reserve and Active Component as well as civilian personnel. Over two hundred CAMIS/DCVS users were trained during the past year as terminal operators to support the CAMIS major US Army Reserve Command Personnel System Development and MOBEX 83. The former system developed during 1982 provided users with the ability to create customized reports using any data items in the Reserve Personnel Master File, (RPMF), inquired against any data in the field, or choose from over 100 preformatted reports in personnel and logistical areas at the touch of a button. In addition, the system provided interactive update capability down to the Reserve Training Center level for all changes to the file and the Unit Organization Manning Table. These interactive update capabilities improved accuracy and timeliness tenfold at each echelon and caused users to believe in the data they used because they could control its input.⁵¹

In addition to training there have been other problems, such as data communication and personnel resources. Because of this the major US Army Reserve Command and unit test fell short of the goals that were first envisioned in February 1981. Nonetheless, the successes have been substantial, and it soon became apparent that in many cases, the user at the unit location level had, for the first time, access to information that affected the unit on a daily basis. More importantly, in the area of mobilization, the information that commanders at all levels need to make critical mobilization decisions became, for the first time, accurate and timely. Although the major US Army Reserve Command/unit module had not addressed mobilization as a separate issue, its worth was demonstrated in a mini-MOBEX conducted by the 91st Division (Training). All home station processing was conducted using the CAMIS system, individuals with particular problems that might prevent them from mobilizing were identified, and commanders were able to make decisions on the readiness capabilities of their units.⁵²

Personnel support for CAMIS/DCVS was provided by military and civilian personnel resources. Approximately 50 percent of these resources were provided by Reserve Component short-tour and civilian overhires. At the close of the fiscal year Forces Command approved eight AGR positions to support future CAMIS development. These tours included five officer and three enlisted allocations to fill positions for the project manager, an analyst, two training officers, one administrative officer, one training NCO, one programmer/analyst, and one computer operator. In addition, the contractor, Rehab Group, Inc., hired two civilian consultants to assist with the identification of CAMIS/DCVS functional elements.⁵³

During most of the fiscal year, computer equipment to support CAMIS consisted of a WANG VS-80 Minicomputer located and operated in the Sixth US

Army Automation Management Office (AMO). This computer was hooked up to high-speed disk/tape drives and printers for data storage and output. The system allowed CAMIS users located in 30 Reserve Centers in the 91st Division (Tng) to perform personnel transactions which were communicated to a WANG VS-80 minicomputer via an American Telephone and Telegraphic telecommunication network. In September 1982 CAMIS computer hardware was increased significantly to meet the upcoming demands for Demonstration CAMIS Validation System and mainline CAMIS development. At the close of the fiscal year, Sixth US Army was operating WANG minicomputers, the VS-80 and a VS-100, large capacity disk drives, tape drives, high-speed printers, 58 remote terminals, 49 remote printers, 11 local terminals and local printers. All of the equipment was tied together into a highly sophisticated telecommunications network.⁵⁴

In an 8 January 1982 letter to the Forces Command, the Sixth US Army chief of staff praised the Continental Army Management Information System highly, but offered some notes of caution in its application. Despite the overwhelming acceptance of the system by current users, "the problem now facing CAMIS is one of making the 'system' available to other users throughout the reserve system." The projected timeframe of 1985-1986 does not suit prospective users; "Units need the capabilities offered by CAMIS now." Studies indicate that while highly desirable, a minicomputer at each major US Army Reserve Command would not be the best solution. A large scale computer at each Continental US Army Command linked to all its major US Army Reserve Commands and units appeared the more economical solution: "Capability would not be reduced at any level; significant cost savings can be realized and ADP support during mobilization would be more flexible."⁵⁵

During this period, Sixth US Army continued to develop other automated systems to support the staff. These systems were designed to meet the user's needs. Functional requirements were identified from which computer programs were developed. Each program was then modified based upon user comment to increase program usefulness to the user. Programs written in support of the staff during the fiscal year included the Deconfliction Schedule used by Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management and other staff to resolve conflicts in staff element visits to subordinate commands. Another program was developed for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics to analyze Command Logistics Review Team (CLRT) assistance visit results. A third program was developed to provide automatic scheduling for maintenance at the Area Maintenance Support Activities/Equipment Concentration Sites (AMSA/ECS) located at Camp Parks. A fourth program was developed to assist the Sixth US Army Inspector General with the transmittal of inspection results from traveling teams to the Inspector General for early inclusion into an official inspection report. Additional efforts included a telecommunication link with the Logistics Control Activity (LCA) to provide easy access for programs run on the activity's computer by the Sixth US Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel. In addition to these custom programs, from time-to-time various staff sections requested specific personnel information on Reserve Component personnel throughout the Command such as the number of personnel by military occupational specialty (MOS) in a certain grade; this information was provided on a report-by-report basis as requested.⁵⁶

Other significant activities in support of the headquarters or in support of mobilization included the Garrison Terminal System that allowed Army Garrison units to interact with a base operations data base to provide automatic data processing support for mobilized Reserve Component forces. The Automation Management Office assisted in planning and implementation of this system in the 6211th US Army Garrison located at the Presidio. During the recent mobilization exercise, the system was successfully moved to Camp Roberts, California and intermixed with the Base Operations computer at Fort Ord, California.⁵⁷

At the close of the fiscal year the Automation Management Office planned to implement automated programs to provide the Sixth US Army chief of staff with a calendar of significant activities in the headquarters. It prepared to introduce an automated journal for the USASIX Emergency Operations Center to handle input and the retrieval of unclassified message traffic. In addition, plans were underway in conjunction with I Corps, Army Readiness and Mobilization Region IX and the 311th Corps Support Command to install the Interim Theater ADP Service Center (ITASC). Staff members, together with the logistics people, planned for the introduction of the Decentralized Automated Service Support System (DAS3) at six sites throughout the Sixth US Army Area. Final plans were also underway to implement access to the Facility, Asset, Cataloging and Tracking System (FACTS) which will provide the USASIX Engineer with automated information about Sixth US Army Reserve Component facilities and assets.⁵⁸

The Automation Management Office leased 22 Computer Device, Inc., 1205 Miniterms to support headquarter's data processing actions from remote locations. Using the Automatic Data Processing Company, Inc., headquarter's travelers can transmit or receive data over telecommunications circuits. This method was used by the USASIX Inspector General in support of trips throughout the command. The Office also conducted an analysis and economic justification for a computer graphics system which was to be used in the headquarters to support staff office actions. Equipment leased for this activity included a Tektronix 4052A computer terminal and a 4662 graphics plotter. Future plans call for interactive graphics capability on the CAMIS computer to support real-time decision making by the command.⁵⁹ The World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Entry System (WES) was supervised by the Automation Management Office. The system provided classified information on all defense units to the Sixth US Army operations chief and was essential for management of the force structure to include mobilization.⁶⁰

"We have embarked on a revolutionary change in the way we do business." wrote Lt. Gen. Thurman, "and exciting and challenging times lie ahead." Sixth US Army played an important part in meeting these challenges during the preceding fiscal year, and will continue to do so in this one. "Field commanders, staffs, and personnel managers all have a part to play in this exciting endeavor," continued Thurman. Our goal, he argued, "is to have soldiers train together, grow together, share together, stay together, build the bonds of cohesion in common purpose, anticipate each others needs, care for one another and ultimately, if necessary, fight for one another."⁶¹ In the fields of personnel administration and automation management, USASIX worked towards achieving these very ends. General Grange put it succinctly when he

wrote: "Our challenge is to achieve and maintain mission-ready unit strengths. Without people we can't train, equipment is useless and all the mobilization plans in the world are meaningless." Sixth US Army's continued success in manning the Total Force, Grange concluded, "depends on the leadership climate that we provide for our soldiers, . . ."62 How well Sixth US Army mans the force in the years ahead depends, to a large degree, on the dedication and spirit of its Reserve and National Guard forces and the men and women who make up Headquarters, Sixth US Army.

FOOTNOTES

1. "New Army's Power is its People," Army (October, 1982), p. 95.
2. Command Bulletin, Sixth US Army, 16 July 1982, (7 Jul and 25 Oct 82)
3. Ltr, AFKC-PA-PE, 28 Sep 82, sub: Full-Time Unit Support (FTUS). See also Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report (hereafter referred to as DCSPA SAHFR). The Long Tour Management (LTM) Section, Office of the DCSPA, was engaged in the management of over 1,000 personnel assigned to positions within the Full-Time Unit Support (FTUS) Program. Of significance was a proposal that the FTUS Program be constituted as an all-encompassing program to cover full-time personnel within the Army Reserve. Prior to this proposal, the term FTUS referred to three (3) separate programs: Full-Time Manning (FTM); Technician Redesignation; and Strength Maintenance. The consolidation of these programs also resulted in the establishment of a base level of full-time personnel, reflected in a document known as the FTUS Model. The new program was approved by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 June 1982 with responsibility for implementation being given to FORSCOM.
4. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982. See also Ltr, AFKC-CG, 21 Dec 81, sub: Full-Time Manning; Ltr, AFKC-PA-PE, 9 Sep 82.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid
7. Maj Gen William R. Berkman, "The Army's Reserves, But in Name Only," Army (October, 1982), p. 160.
8. Ltr, AFKC-PA, 19 Jan 82, sub: Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP).
9. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982.
10. Office of Strength Improvement, Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report 2 Nov 82, FY 1982 (hereafter referred to as OSI SAHFR, FY 82.)
11. Ibid.
12. Ltr, AFKC-PA-PE, 23 Jul 82.
13. Ltr, AFKA-CG, AFKB-CG, AFKC-CG, to General Canzanos, 5 Apr 83.
14. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982, 7 Jul 82.
15. Ibid.
16. DCSPA, SAHFR, FY 1982, 25 Oct 82.

17. Ltr, AFKC-PA, 22 Jul 82, sub: Personnel Assignment Tour Lengths.
18. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982, 7 Jul 82.
19. Ibid.
20. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982, 25 Oct 82.
21. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982, 7 Jul 82.
22. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982, 25 Oct 82.
23. Ibid.
24. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982, 7 Jul 82.
25. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982, 25 Oct 82.
26. OSI SAHFR, FY 1982.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. OSI SAHFR, FY 1982.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ltr, AFKC-SI, 21 Dec 81, sub: Split Training Option.
41. Ltr, AFKC-GCA-CG, 4 Mar 82, sub: Attrition.
42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. DCSPA SAHFR, FY 1982, 7 Jul and 25 Oct 82.
47. Automation Management Office Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report, FY 1982.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Thurman, Army (October, 1982), p. 103

CHAPTER 3

MANAGING THE TOTAL FORCE

Over the last decade the Army has emphasized the research, development and production of equipment for the largest peacetime modernization program in history. The Army Chief of Staff's White Paper noted that, "next to manning the force, the management of modernization is the most complex challenge facing the Army in the 1980s." Research, development, and procurement funds have received the greatest attention in the Army's efforts to field the many new and modernized items of equipment. "As the fielding tempo intensifies," wrote Lt. Gen. Ernest D. Peixotto, Comptroller of the Army, "funding to support this new equipment will demand the best efforts of all resource managers."¹ Keeping this philosophy in mind, the Sixth US Army Resource Management Office undertook a massive effort to prepare Reserve Component units for the complex challenges ahead.

In a policy letter to all his commanders, Lt. Gen. Grange, Sixth US Army Commander, reinforced Generals Meyer's and Peixotto's challenge, when he wrote that, "As commanders, our continuing challenge remains to work to get the most benefit out of the resources we manage." Army leaders, continued Grange, "must think smart, plan smart and train smart to conserve those valuable assets entrusted to our stewardship." Management, Grange argued, can be defined as "the science of achieving maximum productivity from resources--manpower, money, material and time through appropriate control systems and techniques."²

In describing his budget policies for FY 82, General Grange noted that while Army Reserve resource management procedures and systems were being streamlined, FY 82 funding levels and policy guidance represented, "a significant step forward from FY 1981." Both Army Headquarters and the Forces Command lifted many limitations, thus allowing commanders greater flexibility in managing their resources to support assigned missions. "This improved environment," continued Grange, was the direct result of the foresight of Sixth US Army subordinate commands, "in identifying and directing our attention to key issues which should be reviewed and resolved." Grange stressed the importance of effective management and he called upon all major US Army Reserve and Army Readiness and Mobilization Region resource managers to meet the challenges posed by these changes with dedication and ingenuity.³ Writing in a 9 September 1982 letter to all the major US Army Reserve and Army Readiness and Mobilization Region commanders, Grange stressed the need for "effective and prudent management" of resources as a means of improving the efficiency of Sixth US Army.⁴

To promote these goals, USASIX published Sixth US Army Regulation 5-2, which formally established the USASIX Management Assistance Program. Activated on 1 October 1981, the program made available to commanders and staff personnel the expertise of the Sixth US Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management. Advisory in nature and by invitation only, reports were to be made directly to the requestor. Since its establishment, the 63d Army Reserve Command and the 104th Division (Training) have sought assistance.⁵

Sixth US Army rendered assistance in other ways during this period. Responding to a 14 February 1982 Forces Command tasking, General Grange approved on 9 September a USASIX Action Plan on efficiency in the use of Army resources. "Effective and prudent management of our resources requires emphasis by commanders at all levels," wrote the Sixth US Army Commander. "Such emphasis must be thorough and continuous." Efficiency, he argued, "must become both a state of mind and a way of life."⁶

Part of the Economies, Efficiencies and Management Improvement (EEMI) Program, the Sixth US Army plan aimed at improving efficiency and reducing waste in the use of Army resources. It attacked fraud, waste, and abuse through the expanded use of existing mechanisms and it proposed to increase the readiness of the Army Reserve through efficiency.⁷

Another effort by Sixth US Army which aimed at eliminating waste in its operation was its Reduction of Administrative Workload (RAW) at Reserve Component Unit level. Being in the vanguard among Continental Armies in this endeavor, the Department of the Army sent representatives to USASIX to study, at first hand, its workload reduction efforts. The seven major US Army Reserve Commands were also active in developing their own Reduction of Administrative Workload programs, though some still tended to demand excessive administrative paperwork from their subordinate units. The 124th US Army Reserve Command, for example, formed a Reduction of Administrative Workload committee with action officer representatives from each staff section. This proved effective in getting the working level action in the program and removing the "adversary relationship" that was sometimes perceived when this program's issues were discussed.⁸

USASIX continued its publicity activities on the program, through the Command Bulletin, staff visits, and telephone contacts with the major US Army Reserve Command's points of contact. In addition, Sixth US Army distributed 70 posters to each major Reserve Command in early April; these were designed and printed through HQ, Sixth US Army. The command also established a telephone "hot line" in January. Operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, the Hot Line enabled Reserve Component members to call during weekends and night drills.⁹

At the end of fiscal year 1982, Sixth US Army surfaced a total of 181 workload issues of which 73 had resulted in manhour savings or improved procedures. A total of approximately 15,000 manhours had been saved at Army Reserve unit level hours which were then devoted to hands-on training, maintenance, and preparation for mobilization.¹⁰

On 9 July 1982, the Sixth US Army Reduction of Administrative Workload point of contact attended a workshop at Forces Command to discuss the preliminary draft of a proposed Army Regulation 340-XX, which will list every required publication, form and report in the Active Component as well as the Reserve and National Guard. Since expected publication is not until 1983, USASIX revised its Circular 140-4, which was distributed in October. Sixth US Army also prepared a Reduction in Administrative Workload Program for review and ultimate use by the other Armies.¹¹

On 1 January 1982, Sixth US Army Pamphlet 335-5, Management Information Control, was published as guidance for the headquarters and the major US Army Reserve Commands. During March, units of the 63d Army Reserve Command in Phoenix and Tucson were visited, followed by a visit to the major US Army Reserve Command. These liaison visits served to reduce the reporting workload through recommendations to eliminate, consolidate, simplify and/or reduce the frequency of reports. No new Sixth US Army initiated recurring reports were added; the total number was five. Efforts continued to reduce the total reporting workload.¹²

A new version of Sixth US Army Circular 335-1, List of Approved Recurring Management Information Requirements, was published on 30 May. This document identified 100 reporting requirements applicable to a Reserve Command. A major US Army Reserve Command Management Information Control Officers' Workshop was held at Sixth US Army headquarters on 23 September. The workshop was expected to reduce the reporting workload within the commands.¹³

Another pamphlet published during this period, Sixth US Army Regulation 5-1, established procedures for implementing the Sixth US Army Review and Analysis (R&A) Program. Published on 1 October 1981, the Program provided the USASIX Commander timely and pertinent information on the four Sixth US Army missions: (1) organize the force and plan for its mobilization and commitment to perform wartime and other missions; (2) support the force; (3) train and motivate individuals and units to perform assigned missions; and (4) provide an environment that will attract and retain the people required to sustain the force.¹⁴

Three months later, on 7 December, the USASIX Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Jere Hickman, eliminated the Review and Analysis, and established Program Summaries, which identified long-range objectives and resource requirements and supported the development of the annual operating and program guidance. To avoid duplication, quarterly program summaries complemented the quantified data used in the Sixth US Army Review and Analysis. On 3 March, 1982, General Hickman directed the staff to develop program summaries. The directive assigned staff proponency for each area of interest associated with the four Sixth US Army missions.¹⁵

The initial FY 82 Program Summary staff input was received at the conclusion of the Second Quarter. The Third Quarter Program Summaries achieved a special distinction because they were used by Sixth US Army to produce its FY 83 Operating and Program Guidance (OPG) to the field. This process reduced staff workload by eliminating separate input for Operating and Program Guidance development which had been the case in previous years.¹⁶

Sixth US Army worked to improve production in other areas as well. For example, the Quick Return on Investment Program (QRIP) steadily gained momentum in Sixth US Army during this period. By the end of FY 82, and spanning a period of approximately 19 months, four projects were completely funded; six additional projects were received by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management, for determination of their qualifications for the Quick Return Program funding; three other projects had the potential for Quick Return but

no requests had been submitted to Headquarters. From the current rate of project submission, it appeared that FY 83 should see a boom in productivity improvement in Sixth US Army.¹⁷

During fiscal year 1982, a study was undertaken to determine training requirements for major US Army Reserve Command resource management personnel; to assist their comptrollers in the preparation of Individual Development Plans (IDP) for key personnel and a training needs inventory for each command; and to provide each command with a plan of execution for upgrading individual knowledge and skills. A master plan was developed and then translated into a milestone schedule. By the end of the fiscal year, one-third of the milestones had been passed. An individual questionnaire had been developed, mailed out, completed by key resource management personnel, and returned to Sixth US Army. The information provided by those key personnel will be compared to training standards for each functional area of resource management. The differences, if any, will represent shortfalls and become the basis for the Individual Development Plan. The Management/Manpower Mobilization Designee Management Analyst was given the project. With assistance from and in collaboration with a full-time analyst, he was able to assess the completed questionnaires, draw significant conclusions, and extract meaningful data. He continued to pursue the study between periods of Annual Training (AT). His fiscal year 1983 training was scheduled for the first quarter to facilitate conclusion of the study. Once concluded, his counterpart analyst will confer personally with each command comptroller, explain the standards, review findings and recommendations, answer questions, and determine what further service can be provided by Sixth US Army.¹⁸

At the 14 April 1982 Continental US Army Commander's Meeting, General Richard E. Cavazos, Commander, US Army Forces Command, requested the Armies standardize as much as possible. On 2 June, the three Armies chiefs of staff met at Fort Meade, Maryland, and identified 13 areas for standardization and eight additional areas appeared to have potential standardization possibilities. Further, the conferees agreed to eliminate from discussion issues dealing with the organizational structure of their respective headquarters. On 15 June, the three Commanders sent Cavazos a message which summarized their findings, listed 14 issues which they agreed to jointly develop, and seven additional issues which required further action by the Forces Command. A follow-up meeting was scheduled for 1 December 1982 at the Presidio of San Francisco.¹⁹

Since this command considers the installation support of the Reserve Component unit essential to mobilization readiness, Sixth US Army required that conversion of installation support activities from in-house to contractor fully consider Reserve Component requirements in the statement of work (SOW). On 14 July, the command's Resource Management Office officially requested Sixth US Army area installations furnish a copy of their statement of work for its review.²⁰ In addition, in June, the command submitted to the Commander, Presidio of San Francisco, a proposal to consolidate certain Presidio activities with like activities of Headquarters, Sixth US Army; these included the Public Affairs Offices, the Automation Office and the Management Information Systems Office, and the Aviation Offices. Proposed consolidation, argued Sixth

US Army, would increase effectiveness, reduce recognized personnel requirements, and result in an estimated dollar savings of \$103,000. The Presidio nonconcurred.²¹

Another issue involving the Presidio surfaced in an April 5, 1982 letter from General Grange to General Cavazos. "I have always felt," wrote Grange, that "the senior Army commander at an installation should be the installation commander." As Sixth US Army Commander, representing both the Army and the Forces Command on policy and representational matters throughout the 15 western states, "assumption of installation command would give me tighter control over matters which are of constant concern." Another major advantage of having the Sixth US Army Commander in charge of the Presidio, continued Grange, "would be the potential for organizational economies and efficiencies." Upon approval, "I will initiate a study to develop the necessary organizational structure," which, believed Grange, would save on manpower and provide resources to reduce currently unfilled needs. Mobilization readiness will be improved, and "the closer ties of my current staff to installation operations will contribute immeasurably to their expertise in dealing with functional staff elements of other coordinating and supporting installations."²²

In another letter to General Cavazos, the USASIX Commander addressed the need for improving the role of the Continental US Armies in resource management. "The CONUSA must play a more active role in the FORSCOM process to identify and prioritize our most important needs," Grange wrote. "The real requirements for future resources just don't get identified in the present system." The Armies must be given, "the capability and opportunity to play a more important role in the allocation of resources and in monitoring their executions." He especially singled out Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve funds, which, noted Grange "the CONUSAs cannot effectively influence and monitor today."²³

In yet another area of command concern, the decentralization of financial management, Grange argued for giving functional staff chiefs resources with which to execute programs and making them fully responsible for the utilization of all available funds. Fragmentation of programs to units subordinate to the major US Army Reserve Commands tended to limit the financial flexibility of the command, implied an artificial funding constraint, and increased the administrative burden on subordinate units. As a result, more emphasis is now being placed in identifying total training requirements with maximum effort of the Sixth US Army staff to support these requirements.²⁴

The Sixth US Army staff also continued to monitor the submission of Joint Uniform Military Pay System-Reserve Components (JUMPS-RC) Performance Packages and submission of zero cards (drill attendance data) and late pay documents. By monitoring these management indicators, major US Army Reserve Commands can be advised when units have a high rate of lateness which may adversely impact on performance, morale and pay of Sixth US Army reserve personnel. An analysis of performance package submissions revealed that for FY 82 eight percent of all submissions were late; this rate was somewhat higher than the goal of five percent or less (see appendix for more figures). In addition, an analysis of late pay statistics revealed that 11.5 percent of all pay documents were

received late. This meant that 11.5 percent of all pay transactions were received at the US Army Finance and Accounting Center more than 30 days after their effective date. Sixth US Army is committed to improving this deficiency.²⁵

A Model Finance Office for Reserve Component finance units was conducted at the Presidio, from 11 July to 4 September 1982. Three Army Reserve units and one National Guard unit participated. Each session lasted two weeks and occurred during the unit's annual training period. Each unit operated a "live" finance office for the two week period, handling the Personnel Financial Records (PFR's) of approximately 2,000 active component soldiers assigned to the Presidio. Since the units' mobilization mission required knowledge of an active component finance office, the Model Finance Office gave them actual hands-on experience in preparing for their mobilization mission.²⁶

In yet another area, Force Modernization, USASIX's Resource Management Office submitted data for the Annual Modernization Resource Information Submission (MRIS) and the Command Operating Budget follow-on. Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) included funds for the 4,000 Pound Forklift; Forces Command funded \$14.0 million for the Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve Force Modernization guidance for the next fiscal year.²⁷

Paralleling this effort was the support side of the modernization program for the Reserves and National Guard which included the Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve funds. These funds routinely paid for those items found in the force modernization package--fuel, repair parts, and training developments. Of the \$16.8 billion in Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) requested in Army's FY 83 budget, almost 10 percent (\$1.4 billion) was devoted to these requirements. "Of note is the fact that these funds would support 153 different, major new or modernized systems which were fielded in fiscal 1982 and earlier, as well as those to be fielded in fiscal 1983," wrote Lt. Gen. Peixotto. "Viewed from another perspective," Peixotto continued, "\$485 million of the OMA growth from fiscal 1982 supports the modernization program." With continued emphasis on modernization, the Comptroller argued, the value of resources for this purpose will approach \$3 billion by FY 87.²⁸ "Understanding the relationship between the OMA appropriation and force modernization requires a more complete description of what OMA buys," continued Peixotto. "In short, OMA pays for the operating and support life-cycle cost from initial production contract through delivery, fielding, and operation and ultimately to the salvage yard." Generally, he noted, "OMA funds are not needed until the equipment leaves the factory doors."²⁹

Being an important part of the Total Army, Sixth US Army's fiscal year 1982 Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve funding improved significantly over its FY 81 budget program. Experts attributed this improvement to renewed White House interest in the country's defense posture and the long-standing shortage of equipment among Reserve Component forces. During this past fiscal year, Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve funds increased from a FY 81 total of \$75,309,800 to \$100,600,000, a growth of \$25,300,000. (See Appendix for annual funding comparisons). While a portion of these monies covered the 4.8 percent pay raise and increased fuel costs, the majority of these funds covered stock funded supplies to prepare early deploying units for possible mobilization.³⁰

Sixth US Army's Reserve Commands with Rapid Deployment Forces-Army and C to C+15 units received the largest share of Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve increases and were encouraged to "front load" requisitions to insure full utilization of FY 82 funds. Additionally, the aggressive campaign by USASIX to front-load obligations placed the major US Army Reserve Commands in a position to utilize an additional \$1.2 million declared excess by other Forces Command activities during year-end closeout. The sizeable purchase of supplies and equipment increased storage requirements, particularly for go-to-war stocks, and Forces Command provided additional operation and maintenance funds for leased space pending final agreements for permanent storage sites.³¹

With the emphasis on defense preparedness, mobilization became a priority mission at Sixth Army in fiscal year 1982. In addition to equipping its Reserve commands for mobilization, Sixth US Army received a Forces Command tasking to develop mobilization plans and tables of distribution and allowance to support them in coordination with support installations. This new mission greatly escalated travel within the headquarters, which grew by 30 percent during the first quarter over the prior year's experience. Excess funds were reprogramed from a subordinate command to offset this shortage and additional travel economies were imposed on the USASIX staff. Forces Command lifted the controls imposed in FY 81 on civilian pay management, allowing commanders full reprogramming authority among elements of expense. This flexibility enabled transfer of minor pay slippage to offset supply and travel shortages within the command.³²

Only minor funding increases were anticipated during the second half of the fiscal year since Forces Command's policy distributed all funds at the beginning of the year except for special interest projects. The increase for supplies and equipment created a need for stock fund bypass authority to expend funds for some items currently unavailable in the supply system. Forces Command requested early bypass authority from Army headquarters and assured the command that all valid requests would be approved. Forecasts indicated the supply and equipment upgrade would continue into fiscal year 1983 with an additional \$7,400,000 already added to the FY 83 Forces Command guidance.³³

Like the Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve funds, the Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) appropriations began the fiscal year under a continuing resolution authority. The Sixth US Army fiscal year 1982 Annual Funding Program was \$42,050,000, an increase of \$5,428,000 over the previous fiscal year. This increase was due to strength increases, pay raise provisions, and travel increases. There was considerably less growth in the schools and special training accounts.³⁴

Although annual training was up 28 percent, active duty for training (ADT) accounts suffered a 10 percent decrease. This reduction was compounded by both strength increases and cost growth in travel and pay. Congress also removed the ability to reprogram slippage in the annual training account to active duty for training requirements. As a result, the active duty for training unfinanced requirements (UFR), amounting to \$6,200,000, were never supported and numerous training opportunities lapsed throughout the command. Significant

events included the development of an annual training budget model, analysis of annual training site change budget impact, and improved obligation/adjustments of current year funds.³⁵

In a message to the Commander, 89th Army Reserve Command, General Grange voiced his "grave concern" over the current problems in the Reserve Personnel Army appropriations which, he noted, caused Sixth US Army, "to make hard decisions about reductions in training support," thus adversely affecting USASIX unit training. Generated by the large imbalance in funding among the Reserve Personnel Army accounts and a Congressional fence on the largest, Grange acknowledged that, "Key requirements such as USAAR school training support, Gallant Eagle, Mobex 83, and Pre-Camp conferences for AT could not be supported." Therefore, continued Grange, "it was necessary to reprogram school training funds from MUSARC accounts." In addition, "to partially alleviate the school training shortfall created by this redistribution of funds, priorities for AT were revised to continue support of individual training as a first priority requirement." He assured the 89th Army Reserve Commander that both Sixth US Army and the Forces Command shared the 89th's concern over the "catastrophic and long term effects of the Reserve Personnel Army restrictions," and Grange promised that he would personally, "articulate the seriousness of our shortages in RPA and their impact on Readiness Training within this command."³⁶

In the area of the mobilization table of distribution and allowances validation program, Forces Command initiated a two-year mobilization table of distribution and allowances validation survey program in April 1981. The survey reviewed, analyzed, validated, and documented in the mobilization tables as many manpower and equipment requirements as possible in coordination with the Continental Armies using the mobilization plan and the Army Automation Document System, the Reserve Component Metropolitan Plan (RCMP), Mobilization Troop Base Station and Plan (MTBSF), and other data.³⁷

Forces Command assigned to the Continental Armies the responsibility for installation mobilization plans approval. The review and approval responsibilities were further delegated to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region commands. Sixth US Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management, assisted the Region Commands as well as Fort Lewis, Fort Ord, Fort Carson, Camp Roberts, Fort Irwin, Presidio of San Francisco, and Gowen Field. All seven on-site surveys of the USASIX area mobilization stations have been completed. The Headquarters, Sixth US Army mobilization table of distribution and allowances has a projected completion date of 4 January 1983.³⁸

The approved major US Army Reserve Commands table of distribution and allowance documents, CCNUM 1083, effective 16 October 1983, were distributed for use. The seven major Reserve Command's tables of distribution and allowances documents, CCNUM 2083, were held in abeyance pending a Department of the Army decision. The present effective major Reserve Command documents were to be replaced by full-time support tables of distribution and allowances effective 16 March 1983.³⁹ These were then reviewed by the seven Major Reserve Commands and submitted to Forces Command. It included all personnel performing a full-time support mission for the major Reserve Commanders, such

as US Army Reserve technicians, full-time manning, both Active Component and Active Guard and Reserve, and Army Reserve Advisor personnel. (See appendix for personnel breakdown).⁴⁰

Due to congressional actions, the Assistant Deputy major US Army Reserve Commander (ADMC) position title, established during FY 82 for the proposed full-time support tables, was changed to Senior Army Advisor. Concurrently, the elimination of the Senior Staff Administrative Assistant (SSAA) was placed in suspense. These positions will remain in the full-time manning tables pending further Army actions.⁴¹

Located in the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management office, the Office of Internal Review (IR) hosted the first Sixth US Army Internal Review Workshop at Headquarters, 96th US Army Reserve Command, Fort Douglas, Utah, 17-18 October 1981. Comprising Resource Management personnel from Sixth US Army, the major US Army Reserve Commands, and other subordinate commands, the conference included instruction on proper internal review techniques as well as discussions of Sixth US Army and Forces Command internal review philosophies in the Army Reserve.

During fiscal year 1982, the Office of Internal Review was fully staffed with a chief, auditor, and auditor trainee. Because of the overwhelming response from Headquarters, Sixth US Army staff for the Annual Internal Review Program (AIRP) input, it was necessary to select only 22 out of 37 topics submitted for the program. Because of this difference in FY 82 and projected difference for FY 83, a Schedule X was submitted by Office of Internal Review for recognizing additional requirements. If positions are approved and authorized, it is anticipated that increased staff would be able to absorb the additional workload.

The Internal Review staff completed 15 of 22 programmed reviews. Three reviews for the fiscal year 1981 Annual Internal Review Program were also completed during the year. Administrative workload, essential training, and unforeseen complications in specific reviews were contributing factors in limiting the number of completed reviews. The reviews had an impact on the major Reserve Commands and subordinate units that were visited. The recommendations were accepted and when implemented should increase the effectiveness and management of the units. In addition, external audit agencies conducted nine audits during fiscal year 1982. Two audits were directly related to Headquarters, Sixth US Army. One audit conducted and completed was Individual Training Within the Reserve Components at 63d US Army Reserve Command. The audit of 351st Civil Affairs Command was still in progress. No tentative findings and recommendations have been submitted to date.⁴²

Finally, when General Grange assumed command, he elected to continue the Yellow Cards, a statement of guidance on Sixth US Army missions, goals, and supporting programs. Grange's staff chiefs and the new chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Jere Hickman, collaborated to produce an update called the Green Card. It differed from the Yellow in that the fiscal year 1982 missions, goals, and supporting programs were introduced by a letter signed by Grange and printed on the cover. Rather than relating directly to specific missions, the

supporting programs were listed as a contiguous group following the testing of missions and goals. Lastly, the Green Card provided an abridged edition of the Sixth US Army Commander's "Essential Elements of Guidance for Commanders." The Green Card was distributed to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, the major US Army Reserve Commands, and the Sixth US Army staff prior to 15 September 1982.⁴³

Sixth US Army's contribution to the Total Army's modernization effort moved steadily forward during this fiscal year. The improvements it produced moved the Reserve Components that much nearer to the goals set by General Meyer. Working within the traditions set down by General Krueger more than 39 years ago, Sixth US Army strove to meet the resource management challenges of force modernization. Much progress has been made but much remains to be done. Only by successfully marshalling and then utilizing its resources can Sixth US Army expect to meet the challenges of the future; only then, wrote General Grange, "will we be performing in peacetime as we would in war, and be prepared for a successful Total Army effort."⁴⁴

FOOTNOTES

1. Lt. Gen. Ernest D. Peixotto, "Managing Funds for Modernization," Army (October, 1982), p. 120.
2. Lt. Gen. David E. Grange, Jr., Essential of Guidance for Commanders (see Historian's Office).
3. Ltr, AFKC-RM-PB, 30 Nov 81, sub: Commander's Command Operating Budget Issues.
4. Ltr, AFKC-RM-MM, 9 Sep 82, sub: Sixth US Army Action Plan - Efficiency in the Use of Army Resources.
5. Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management, Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report, FY 1982, 28 Jul 82. (Hereafter referred to as DCSRM SAHFR).
6. Ltr, AFKC-RM-MM, 9 Sep 82, sub: Sixth US Army Action Plan - Efficiency in the Use of Army Resources.
7. DCSRM SAHFR, FY 1982, 5 Nov 82.
8. Ibid., 28 Jul and 5 Nov 82.
9. Ibid., 28 Jul 82. The RAW Project Officer visited 11 units in March 1982 in Denver, Salt Lake City, and Portland, Oregon.
10. Ibid.
11. DCSRM SAHFR, FY 1982, 5 Nov 82.
12. Ibid., 28 Jul 82.
13. Ibid., 5 Nov 82.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 28 Jul 82.
16. Ibid., 5 Nov 82.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

22. Ltr, AFKC-RM, 5 Apr 82, No Subject.
23. Ltr to Gen Cavazos, AFKC-CG, AFK3-CG, AFKC-CG, 5 Jul 82.
24. Msg, Sixth US Army Commander to Cdr, 89th Army Reserve Command, 221030Z Oct 81, sub: Decentralization of Financial Management.
25. DCSRM SAHFR, FY 1982, 5 Nov 82.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 28 Jul and 5 Nov 82.
28. Peixotto, Army (October, 1982) p. 120.
29. Ibid., pp. 121, 122.
30. DCSRM SAHFR, FY 1982, 28 Jul 82.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid. See also FY 1983/1984 Command Operating Budget, Commander's Statement, 20 May 82, sub: OMA, OMAR, RPA.
34. DCSRM SAHFR, FY 1982, 28 Jul and 5 Nov 82.
35. Ibid.
36. Msg, Grange Sends to Cdr, 89th ARCOM, 080750Z Mar 82, sub: Critical Shortages in Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) Funding; Msg, Grange Sends, 260815Z Mar 82, sub: RPA Funding.
37. DCSRM SAHFR, FY 1982, 28 Jul 82.
38. Ibid., 28 Jul and 5 Nov 82.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Headquarters, Sixth US Army, Command Bulletin, #8, August 1982, p. 1.

CHAPTER 4

EQUIPPING AND SUSTAINING THE TOTAL FORCE

"To be exempt from the calamities of war," wrote George Washington, "we must put the national militia in such condition as shall appear respectable in the eyes of our friends and formidable to those who might otherwise become our enemies."¹ Understanding this dictum, the Army has been engaged in a massive effort to modernize and equip the Total Army force, including Guard and Reserve Component units. And because the Guard and Reserve Component make up more than two-thirds of the combat support capability of the Total Army, it fell upon the Continental United States Armies to ensure that their respective units were logistically supported for any future confrontation. Unfortunately, the Army Reserve was short major equipment items totaling nearly \$6 billion dollars; the Army National Guard was similarly short \$4 billion dollars. Much of the equipment the Guard and Reserve did have on hand was old, obsolete or incompatible with equipment in the Active Army.²

General Edward C. Meyer, writing in the October, 1982 Army, noted that, "the final ingredient of our readiness is sustainability." The measure of today's Army, argued Meyer, "is steady progress and transition to a quarterly force capable of sustaining itself in combat."³ Again, in a May, 1982 interview, Meyer admitted that the area in which the Army was most vulnerable was in equipping the force; "The problem here is that it's the Total Army that's short, as well, not just the Guard or Reserve. The Active Army is short as well, so we have to intelligently approach the prioritization of available equipment in the pool." Continuing, the Army Chief argued that, "you have to have sufficient combat support and combat service support forces . . . readily available to ensure that you can sustain operations."⁴

Working towards that goal, the Sixth US Army devoted some of its energies towards improving the logistics base within the Reserve Component under its command. "Without a renewed commitment to equipping the Total Force--the Reserve components as well as the Active Army," wrote Lt. Gen. Richard H. Thompson, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, "our war-fighting capabilities . . . could be limited by inadequate supplies of major end items, secondary items, and forward-based supply stocks."⁵ Equipping and sustaining the force, Thompson noted, is the most important task facing today's Army, and Sixth US Army's role in the 15 western states was therefore a major one in achieving this goal.

For years, the Army neglected this aspect of readiness, concentrating instead on combat training, new weapons, and innovative tactics. Combat support and combat service support were relegated to the background by Army planners who were more captivated by the new weapons and technology. Even more worrisome to Army logisticians was the matter of equipping the Reserve Component. During the last few years, argued Thompson, "critics of the Army's equipment distribution policies have charged that we have failed to adequately support the Reserve Components."⁶ To redress this critical oversight,

Congress allocated dedicated procurements for the Reserve Component beginning with the 1978 appropriations bill. Then, in 1981, the Vice Chief of Staff tasked the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, "to investigate the equipping process and report the equipment status, both current and projected, for the Total Army, . . ." ⁷ Particular attention was to be paid to the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

One of the major problems facing the Army's logisticians in this decade, especially those associated with the Reserve Component, was adapting to the present logistic distribution system with the Army's modernization effort. Army logisticians had to meet increased demands on the distribution system by putting the existing hardware in the right place at the right time. In addition, the Army, including Sixth US Army, was challenged to balance the procurement of modernized systems with currently fielded items and to establish priorities for the distribution of that equipment to claimants in the Total Army.

Because the Reserve Component made up more than 73 percent of the Army's combat support and combat service support force, Sixth US Army faced a difficult task last fiscal year. General Grange, the Sixth US Army Commander, recognized that the ability of his Reserve forces to deploy and be sustained was critical to the Total Army's success in any future war.⁸ The bulk of Sixth US Army's Reserve Component units were in later-deploying force packages. Consequently, their position on the Department of the Army master priority list was low, preventing them from receiving modernization items early in the fielding process. Lacking new equipment, these units experienced equipment compatibility problems during annual training periods with Active force units. Their ability to conduct individual and unit training during drill assemblies was also severely limited.

The overriding consideration in mapping out distribution plans was deployability--first to fight was first to be equipped. Thus, Army National Guard and Reserve units within Sixth US Army that were affiliated with Active Army units and that could be ordered into combat ahead of other Active or Reserve Component forces were scheduled to be equipped first. Additionally, each Army Reserve Command submitted a projected warehouse storage space requirement when the bulk of the equipment was placed on order at the close of FY 81. All Army Reserve Command plans included a centralized storage concept for Go-to-War stocks storage. The requirements for space as well as available storage facilities were reviewed for adequacy and, where necessary, obtained for Equipment Concentration Sites (ECS) storage. The Sixth US Army Logistics chief provided personnel to sit down with the Army Reserve Command staffs to assist in the refinement of storage requirements, coordinate additional storage facilities and review potential storage sites. Considerable progress was made on all fronts, thereby averting a crisis as Go-to-War stocks were received. Most storage problems for the 89th and 124th Army Reserve Commands were resolved or were pending resolution in the immediate future. While considerable progress was made in obtaining additional storage for the 63d and 96th Army Reserve Commands, several key options (Bell, Stanton) were still pending. While the crisis was averted, Go-to-War stocks storage remained a top priority until all problems were resolved.⁹

In 1979, all Army Reserve Commands were ordered to turn in their Direct Support (DS) Aircraft Maintenance Tool Sets. Since implementation of the three level maintenance concept, the direct support mission for aviation maintenance was converted to Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM). Accordingly, those direct support tools were requested to be turned in due to lack of a Direct Support Aviation Intermediate Maintenance or mission at the Aviation Support Facilities and Aviation Flight Activity. These tools, for component rebuild and overhaul, and valued at \$414,000 per tool kit, were then inventoried and made ready to be turned in. Such turn-in allowed the Aviation Support Facilities and the Aviation Flight Activity more time for organizational maintenance.¹⁰

During the same period, the Department of the Army published regulatory procedures for implementation of a new program for establishing and maintaining standardized combat Prescribed Load Lists (PLLs) and Authorized Stockage Lists (ASLs). Designed to improve current stockage lists and to develop, as far as practicable, standardized stockage lists for war, the new combat Prescribed Load List and Authorized Stockage List program applied to the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve and was designed to be executed on a phased basis with total implementation dependent upon funds availability during the period FY 82 to FY 88. Commanders of Authorized Stockage List direct and general support units continued to stock the lists under demand supported criteria until the new Army regulations were published.¹¹

Under the previous Forces Command U.S. Army Reserve Prescribed Load List Stockage Program, all load list units having a priority of latest arrival date (LAD) 1 to 120, were authorized to stock Combat Essential (CE) Prescribed Load List for mission essential end items on hand. Current Forces Command policy guidance authorized units having combat essential prescribed load list items on hand to retain and load list as Combat Prescribed Load List pending implementation of the Combat Prescribed Load List Program.¹² The new Department of the Army Combat Prescribed Load List/Authorized Stockage List Program will remain unfunded for the Army Reserve until Fiscal Year 1985. Army Circular 700-81-2, which provided basic guidance and concepts for implementation, stated that total implementation was dependent upon funds availability during the period FY 82 to FY 88.¹³

Under the Army policy, Mandatory Parts List (MPL) was to be computed for all mission-essential end items on each table of organization and equipment. Repair parts selected for inclusion on the mandatory parts list were limited to combat essential repair parts. Repair parts whose replacements were to be deferred or whose failure could be corrected by a suitable field expedient, were omitted from the list, but were to be considered for inclusion in the supporting Combat Authorized Stockage List. During this period, the Army published two mandatory parts lists for implementation: Table of Organization and Equipment 7-047H and 17-037H, Tank Company and Mechanized Infantry Company. The 8th Battalion, 40th Armor, 63d Army Reserve Command, was included in this first publication; Sixth US Army instructed the Command to implement the list based on available funds.¹⁴

Under the previous Forces Command US Army Reserve Prescribed Load List Stockage program, all Army Reserve Prescribed Load List units having a priority of D to D+120 were authorized to stock Combat Essential (CE) Prescribed Load List for mission essential end-items on hand. Current Forces Command policy guidance instructed all Reserve units having combat essential load list stockage on hand to retain and maintain them as Combat Prescribed Load list, pending publication of the Army mandatory parts lists and availability of funds. There were 128 Sixth US Army units maintaining Combat Prescribed Load List stockage under the present Forces Command policy guidance.¹⁴ The Combat Authorized Stockage List program was under development during the past fiscal year; commanders of all authorized stockage list direct and general support units continued to stock under demand supported criteria until publication of a new Department of the Army regulation.¹⁶

Army Regulation 11-14 defined Logistic Readiness as "The state of preparedness of a unit to carry out its mission with respect to the availability and operability of materiel required to maintain an operational capability." For the October 1981 Unit Status reporting period, 61 percent of Sixth US Army Reserve units reported equipment on hand equaling their authorized level of organization (ALO). Ninety percent reported that at least 90 percent of their available equipment was operationally ready.

In accordance with Army Regulation 220-1, each unit must train to the highest level possible with the resources available. To this end, logistics comments in the training remarks of the Unit Status Report (DA Form 2715) identified training equipment problems. This information was brought to the attention of their respective major Army Reserve Command. The major Army Reserve Commands were to take appropriate action to insure that their subordinate units have the wherewithal to adequately train. If the equipment and materiel training cannot be resolved at this level, then the command would coordinate with Sixth US Army for resolution.¹⁷

A review of the Sixth US Army Logistics Readiness Team workload by the Civilian Personnel Office determined an additional requirement for an administrative clerk. In addition, several short-tour officers were requested for specific tasks. However, due to fund constraints neither administrative clerk nor short-tour officers were available. As a result, all planned efforts to reestablish a program of logistics readiness review, documentation and assistance to USASIX National Guard units were discontinued for another year. The only studies of National Guard state commands currently being accomplished occurred as a result of requests for information from members of the Sixth US Army Command Group when planning trips to Army National Guard state commands.

A review and analysis of the logistic portion of Sixth US Army Reserve Unit Status Reports with effective cut-off dates 15 October 1981 and 15 April 1982 was also accomplished during this period. This action involved research in many different logistic data sources, such as the Continuing Balance System - Expanded, Materiel Condition Status Report, Materiel Assistance Designated

Report, DARCOM Logistic Control Activity Requisition Status Reports, WWMCCS Terminal Report, Unit Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), and Aircraft Inventory Status and Flying Time Report. With this data, high priority units' logistics problems were highlighted, available assets identified for redistribution to full unit shortages, training problems highlighted and solutions recommended, unit commanders' miscellaneous logistics problems addressed, and unit document numbers and issue priority designators validated. Also, unit readiness problems reported by Army Reserve units were provided to Sixth Army, the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, and major U.S. Army Reserve command staffs for appropriate action.¹⁸

In addition, Sixth US Army logistics readiness trends have been monitored. The logistics readiness trend in the availability of critical mission essential equipment increased two percent from last year due to new equipment receipts. The steadily increasing quantity of reportable equipment on-hand continued to be maintained at the Department of the Army goal of 90 percent operationally ready in nine out of 10 units as of the October 1981 Unit Status Reports. However, this number (nine) dropped to eight and one half units out of 10 on the April 1982 Unit Status Reports.¹⁹ The prime contributing factors were the requirement from higher headquarters that table of distribution and allowance units submit Unit Status Reports starting 15 April 1982. This increased the reporting total from 279 Reserve units in October 1981 to 295 in April 1982. Additionally, 500 items of equipment (to include vehicles) were returned to US Army Reserve control after extensive use at the Fort Irwin National Training Center. Some vehicles were in substandard condition and were being refurbished to technical manual (TM) standards. The Army Reserve Command was directed to bring this equipment to acceptable equipment serviceable standards by 31 December 1982.²⁰

The Sixth US Army Logistics Readiness Trend executive letter continued as a viable tool to summarize logistics trends and problem areas for major US Army Reserve commanders. This semiannual logistics summary also made recommendations and reflected the appreciation of the Sixth US Army Commander for areas of demonstrated improvement. Several commanders expressed their appreciation for the succinct but total logistics coverage provided by the letter.²¹ General Grange acknowledged their importance, "in attaining maximum improvement in the logistical readiness of Sixth US Army units." Writing to Maj. Gen. Frederick H. Lawson, Commander, 91st Division (Training), Grange praised the Division for its improved logistics state, but cautioned them to pay more attention to logistics planning, an area of major concern. "Your command's poor showing in logistics planning," commented Grange, was due in large measure, "to almost 70 percent of your units having outdated, insufficient or no logistics mobilization plans." Grange suggested that the 91st reemphasize the importance of advanced mobilization planning; failure to do so, argued Grange, "will certainly reduce your organizations capability to expand your operation to control and maintain the equipment needed for your wartime mission."²²

Another readiness report, the Rapid Deployment Force-Army Readiness Report, became an important but time consuming activity during this period. A quarterly report with monthly updates, it required substantial coordination with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Sixth US Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, Mobilization Stations, and the FORSCOM Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The Sixth US Army's Logistics Office validated equipment shortages and located available assets to " earmark " for movement upon mobilization. The logistics Office prepared an appendix to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operation's letter of instruction and an earmarking letter of instruction were developed to instruct the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region Commands and the Mobilization Station personnel in correct Rapid Deployment Force-Army Readiness Reporting.²³

The Unit Status Report logistics standard operating procedures for reviewers was developed to provide specialized explanations in the logistics portion of the report. Major changes included additional unit status reporting organizations (Table of Distribution and Allowance units, the 91st and 104th Training Divisions); the exclusion from reporting two additional communication security lines; and the elimination of the Sixth US Army requirement to report all unit requisitions for Equipment Readiness Code-A (ERC-A) shortages.²⁴

The shortage of equipment reported as impacting on unit training was extracted from the Unit Status Report and provided to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions for verification. The verified listing was then processed through to the Department of the Army requesting approval for out-of-sequence DA Master Priority List (DAMPL) issues of this important equipment by the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command in accordance with Army Regulation 11-12, Logistics Priorities.²⁵

In the area of Force Modernization, the Logistics Office accomplished a number of significant actions, among the more important were the development of funding calculations for the FY 82 Modernization Resource Information Submission; the identification of equipment to be fielded in Sixth US Army's Reserve units; requesting Materiel Fielding Plans on all equipment planned for fielding within Sixth US Army; and, accomplishing other Force Modernization logistic management plans in coordination with the Operations Office. Several problems surfaced, however, during this period in developing a detailed Force Modernization Program. For example, there were frequent major revisions of distribution plans of Force Modernization items to be distributed to Sixth US Army units. In addition, Materiel Fielding Plans were unavailable for equipment planned for USASIX units. Distribution plans were also incomplete and did not list all Force Modernization items planned to be fielded within Sixth US Army. Finally, plans were not developed to provide special training to Reserve maintenance support units who were to support Force Modernization items in Active Army units. Sixth US Army was working towards resolving many of these pressing issues.²⁶

As a part of this effort, US Army Reserve units were notified bi-monthly on the frequency of changes to their assigned Force Activity Designator (FAD). Imbalance between this designator, the Date Required to Load (DRL),

and the Intensive Management Force List (IMFL) were noted and Forces Command was requested to review and to take appropriate action.²⁷

Semi-annually, Rapid Deployment Forces-Army, Essential Force and Round Out units were analyzed in detail to highlight and explain any logistics shortfalls. This data became a part of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Sixth US Army High Priority Unit Improvement System which was then briefed to the Sixth US Army Commander. In support of the Rapid Deployment Force Army Readiness Reporting requirements and in accordance with Forces Command guidance requiring priority support based on the Intensive Management Force List, great strides were made to ready these units in the area of logistics for mobilization. Of 45 line items short in the Sixth US Army Rapid Deployment Force-Army units, 29 (64 percent) line items were located and earmarked for transfer to the appropriate unit upon mobilization.²⁸

A separate action was initiated to identify equipment shortages impacting on training within the Sixth US Army training activities, 5th Brigade, 91st Division (Training), and 104th Division (Training). The training activities were assigned the lowest priority available, although they had a very important mobilization training mission in Army Regulation 11-12, Logistics Priorities. Sixth US Army headquarters recognized that such lower priority claimants should not be excluded from the allocation of equipment needed to maintain minimum readiness standards. Thus, USASIX took action to garner special consideration for equipment shortages impacting on training.²⁹

Another system which impacted heavily on Sixth US Army units was the Continuing Balance System-Expanded (CBS-X). The sole Army system for maintenance of equipment asset visibility within the command, equipment management reports from this system were used at Forces Command, Sixth US Army, and the major US Army Reserve Commands to make decisions in support of readiness, redistribution of excess, and other actions involving mobilization and training support requirements.

The second annual Forces Command Continuing Balance System-Expanded validation of unit property books (reconciling of property book balances with system balances), began 7 November 1981 and was completed by 6 June 1982. The Forces Command FY 82 validation for Sixth US Army was conducted on a cyclical basis rather than all major US Army Reserve Commands participating simultaneously. Major Reserve Command system representatives were requested to designate centralized locations within the command's area where Property Book Officers (PBOs) or their substitutes could be assembled and Continuing Balance System-Expanded validation actions accomplished with instructions and assistance given under supervision of Sixth US Army and major Reserve Command system representatives.³⁰

During the annual validation process, it was apparent that many unit property book officers and their representatives were not fully aware of system manual transaction reporting requirements. The most prevalent problem was the failure to submit a Continuing Balance System-Expanded Substitute Change Card, Department of the Army Form 4708, when a substitute item was received or turned in. The Continuing Balance System-Expanded was required to

provide visibility on items being carried on the property books as substitutes for authorized items. Failure to accomplish this manual transaction resulted in the substitute item being shown on all management reports as excess.³¹

It was evident that property book officers played a major role in improving and maintaining accuracy in the Continuing Balance System-Expanded and that their actions had a direct effect upon the readiness condition of their unit. Department of the Army Circular 710-81-1, 15 May 1981, provided detailed procedures for this system. Compliance with paragraph 5 of this circular was mandatory for property book officers. Assistance was requested from commanders at all levels to impress these officers with the importance of putting accurate and timely information into the system.³²

During this same period, the Forces Command informed the Sixth US Army that Department of the Army approved a third year of the Decentralized Automated Service Support System. Totally mobile and operational at divisional and non-divisional levels, the units that received this commercially built, off-the-shelf system (Honeywell Series 60, Level 6, Model 47 minicomputer) were the 164th Maintenance Company, and the 889th, the 1010th and the 1011th Supply and Services Companies. The Decentralized Automated Service Support System replaced the NCR 500 in all US Army Europe units and Continental United States Active Component and National Guard outfits. Army Reserve Commands, to which the aforementioned Sixth US Army elements were attached, were actively engaged in training personnel to fill requisite positions and in developing area supply support missions for the systems. The software for the system provided for the processing of requisitions for classes of Supply II, III (packages), IV, VII and IX, depending upon the type of direct support unit.³³

The beginning of calendar year 1982 brought to a close a four year period of Reserve Component support to "Brigade Rotation Training" with the transfer of functions to the National Training Center. During the period 1 October 1978 to 31 December 1981, Sixth US Army was tasked by Forces Command to provide personnel, equipment (approximately 500 pieces) and organizational maintenance in support of "Brigade Rotation Training."

The Temporary Equipment Concentration Site (TECS) at Fort Irwin was established (1975-76) to provide equipment support for Active Component rotational combat units. This operation was closed out, effective 1 January 1982. During this closeout phase, the sites supported rotational exercises while simultaneously turning over the operation to the National Training Center. This closing was accomplished in a 90 day period under extremely difficult circumstances in an outstanding manner. Personnel requirements were filled through a combination of Active Duty for Training tour personnel, man-day spaces, temporary civilian hire, and individual/unit annual training. The bulk of the equipment was obtained from 63d Army Reserve Command units and augmented by the 124th Reserve Command and 351st Civil Affairs Command. Some returned vehicles were in substandard condition and were scheduled to be repaired to technical manual standards. The 63d was directed to bring this equipment to acceptable serviceable standards by 31 December 1982.³⁴

Another problem area, highway movements, came under close scrutiny during Mobilization Exercises 78 and 80, when a need for control of all highway movements during a mobilization was identified. The various requirements for Department of Defense movements that would occur during mobilization necessitated prior planning and coordination. In December, 1981, Forces Command submitted a Mobilization Movement Control (MOBCON) concept to Continental U.S. Army Commanders and the National Guard Bureau for comments citing the deficiencies in control of highway movements identified in Mobilization Exercises 78 and 80. This concept established a Mobilization Movement Control Center (MMCC) in each state. Each center was responsible for collecting and analyzing mobilization plans for each Reserve Component unit within its state, together with contingency plans for all Active Component installations in the state. Following a review and analysis of all mobilization contingency plans, each center was to then develop a detailed Master Movement Plan to include proposed routes of march, time phasing, and priority movements. These master plans were to be coordinated with state Departments of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration. Each center was to be staffed by Army National Guard and US Army Reserve personnel on a full-time manning basis at Major or Lieutenant Colonel levels.³⁵

Sixth US Army recommended that the development of a master mobilization movement plan would be better suited on a regional basis rather than by individual states. The regional team would then be able to identify and resolve the problems for interstate movements. This indorsement recommended that prior to implementation of the mobilization movement control, Forces Command host a meeting with the Continental US Armies and National Guard Bureau personnel to develop a program to meet the needs of the Armies and the Bureau.³⁶ The major shortfall was obtaining the required funding for implementation of this program. Forces Command requested that the National Guard Bureau increase in staff from six to 10 state mobilization movement control centers as a prototype program to gain the needed data to request additional funding from Department of the Army. A decision was to be made this November, 1982.³⁷

In the field of mobilization designee training, there was a modest decrease through the first half of fiscal year 1982. Current shortages include liaison officers to the Colorado, Montana, Nevada, North and South Dakota, Oregon, New Mexico, and Utah National Guards. Sixth US Army continued to rely on the Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center to fill all designee position shortages as well as using the visits of the Commanding General, Sixth US Army to publicize these shortages to the various State Adjutants General. Of the 32 mobilization designee officers assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, 19 completed their annual training for this past fiscal year.³⁸

In another area of logistics concern, the Command Logistics Review Team (CLRT) conducted 277 logistics readiness evaluations of Army Reserve units during the past fiscal year. In addition, Sixth US Army conducted a Consolidated Command Logistics Review Team Conference, 14-16 December 1981, for all members of the CLRT Office. The conference included a face-to-face comprehensive, technical review of logistics policies and procedures with HQ

Sixth US Army staff offices. It also reviewed and refined internal team policies and procedures and enabled the team members (Presidio, Wichita, Kansas, Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Douglas, Utah) to personally review and update personnel files and discuss career management with the Civilian Personnel Office managers.³⁹

During January, 1982, the Automated Command Logistics Review and Analysis Program was implemented, enabling maximum benefit from data reported by command logistics review team evaluations through the establishment of an extensive data collection, retrieval, and trend analysis system. Under this system, standard reports could be generated in the following areas: (1) Weekly status reports of reviews performed and their results; (2) Evaluations listed by location; (3) Overall performance of major US Army Reserve Commands compared to Sixth US Army averages; (4) Impact of full-time manning on unit logistical readiness; (5) Unit/major US Army Reserve Command profiles of deficiencies; and (6) Profiles of recurring deficiencies.⁴⁰

The Sixth US Army Command Logistics Review Office published a new internal standard operating procedure on 3 January 1982. The project involved a major rewrite of the previous procedure and included a further delineation of procedures, policies and definitions of terms used in the evaluation process. Standardized terminology was given to each major US Army Reserve Command to facilitate accurate interpretation of evaluations.⁴¹

Finally, Company B, 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, Oregon National Guard, was selected as having the best Army National Guard field kitchen in all the continental US Armies in the Philip A. Connell Awards Program. During the final phase of the evaluation, conducted by the Department of the Army, the Sixth US Army unit competed with the best of units within First and Fifth US Armies. This was the first time a Sixth US Army unit had been selected since the program began in 1978. Selection as a winner by the Army Department in the Reserve Component Field Kitchen category necessitated dedicated, enthusiastic professional involvement.⁴²

Fiscal year 1982 saw a lot of changes in Army Logistics, both for the Active Army as well as the Reserve Component. The implications for the future were momentous, and Sixth US Army's role in implementing these changes was of major importance. But we have seen only the tip of the iceberg. The proliferation of modernization systems, the ever-increasing force structure requirements, and the complex nature of the modern Army continued to pose enormous logistics challenges, challenges which will consume the full energies and talents of all Army logisticians. "Increases in defense spending coupled with our extensive modernization process will place tens of thousands of new systems into the pipeline for logisticians to receive, store, issue, and repair," wrote General Thompson. "Moreover, our rapidly increasing reliance on automation support will require us to continually seek enhancements to management information systems."⁴³ By taking full advantage of all the benefits of computer technology, logisticians will be better able to support the Total Army of the 1980s.

"All of us who call ourselves logisticians must press on with this business of equipping and sustaining the total Army," Thompson concluded. "We must harness all of our energies and talents now so we will be able to meet future threats to the security of the Nation."⁴⁴ The Sixth US Army logistics community contributed immeasurably to equipping and sustaining the force during the last fiscal year; their efforts and accomplishments went a long way towards improving logistics for the Total Army. Since the Reserves comprise more than 70 percent of the combat support and combat service support personnel of the Army, Sixth US Army's role in improving Army logistics was a major one.

FOOTNOTES

1. John O. Marsh, Jr., "Five Keys to an Effective Land Force," Army (October, 1982), p. 14.
2. Ibid., p. 14.
3. GEN. Edward C. Meyer, "Time of Transition: A Focus on Quality," Army (October, 1982), p. 24.
4. Ibid., p. 19.
5. Lt. Gen. Richard H. Thompson and Major William R. Johnson, "Equipping the Total Force," Army Logistician (November - December 1982), p. 2.
6. Ibid., p. 2.
7. Ibid., p. 3.
8. Ltr, AFKA-CG, AFKB-CG, AFKC-CG, 5 Apr 82, p. 2
9. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report (Hereafter referred to as DCSLOG SAHFR), 12 July 1982.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. See also Sixth US Army Letter, 29 Apr 82, which provided procedures and instructions to Sixth US Army major US Army Reserve Commands for conversion of CE Prescribed Load Lists to Combat Prescribed Load Lists.
13. DCSLOG SAHFR, 1 Nov 82.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Command Bulletin, Sixth US Army, May 1982, p. 12.
18. DCSLOG SAHFR, 12 Jul 82.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

22. Ltr, Grange to Lawson, 25 Jan 82, sub: Logistics Readiness Analysis. See also similar letters to all MUSARC and ARCOM Commanders, Historian's File. Sixth US Army.
23. DCSLOG SAHFR, 12 Jul 82 and 1 Nov 82.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Command Bulletin, Sixth US Army, May 1982, p. 12, 13.
31. Ibid., p. 13.
32. Ibid.
33. Command Bulletin, Sixth US Army, March 1982, p. 12.
34. DCSLOG SAHFR, 12 Jul 82.
35. DCSLOG SAHFR, FY 1982, 12 Jul 82.
36. Ibid.
37. DCSLOG SAHFR, 1 Nov 82.
38. DCSLOG SAHFR, 12 Jul 82.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Thompson and Johnson, Army Logistician, p. 7.
44. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

TRAINING THE TOTAL FORCE

"Only through high training requirements, rigidly enforced, can low casualty rates be possible. Only well armed and equipped, adequately trained and efficiently led forces can expect victory in future combat."

Matthew B. Ridgway
General, U.S. Army

General Edward C. Meyer, Army Chief of Staff, in a May, 1982 interview, discussed the involvement of the National Guard and the Army Reserve in Army training, commenting that, "working together with US Army Forces Command the Army wants to insure that National Guard maintenance units that will support active units in wartime, have the opportunity to train on the more modern equipment introduced to the active component as part of their maintenance training in peacetime." The intent, continued Meyer, "is to make the Guard, Reserves and active component so integrated that if we go to war the voids are all filled in."¹

Because the young officers and enlisted soldiers trained during this decade will lead the Army in the next century, it behooved Army trainers, wrote General Glenn K. Otis, Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, "to address the challenges of today, while also being mindful of tomorrow." In responding to these challenges, continued Otis, "the Army training system for the 1980s and beyond must be guided by policies that give us the wherewithal to train effectively and manage resources efficiently. The system must be flexible and responsive to the needs of the unit commander, who is and must remain the primary trainer at each echelon of command." Above all, argued the TRADOC Commander, "it must serve the readiness needs of the unit, active and reserve components."³

Otis spoke about "collective training," and the need for a system of standardized local training areas. "The standardization of all our local training facilities," he observed, "is an important contribution to effective training." Planning and providing training support for mobilization remained one of the Army's most crucial tasks. "Mobilization," he concluded, "will be supported by training materials designed in building block fashion to allow ready tailoring for active, reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) needs."⁴

One major element in Army reserve unit training was participation in major exercises. During fiscal year 1982, for example, 178 Army Reserve units nationwide participated in 11 major exercises, including GALLANT EAGLE '82 and LOGEX '82; 27 Army Reserve units were part of the 1981 REFORGER exercise in Europe. Closer to home, Fort Riley, Kansas hosted the 1982 Major Logistical Control Headquarters (MLCH) Exercise from June-July 1982, under the planning, guidance and supervision of the 561st Support Group, Omaha, Nebraska, which is

part of the 89th Army Reserve Command. A training vehicle designed to provide mission-oriented training for Reserve Component combat service support (CSS) units in a realistic field environment, the 1982 Logistical Control Exercise provided support to the III ROTC region advance summer camp and included individual and unit mission related Army Training and Evaluation Program training. The planning and implementation of non-ROTC support mission training was an area of command emphasis throughout the planning phase of the exercise.⁵

Another exercise conducted during this period, the Combined Operations Logistics Transportation Training (COLTT) '82, incorporated local and line haul motor transport operations as well as watercraft operations in Northern California rivers and harbors. Sacramento and Sharpe, Army Depots, Tracy Defense Depot, Oakland Army Terminal, and the US Naval Supply Center provided the major areas of operation for the exercise. Field training areas were available at both Sacramento and Sharpe Army Depots. This exercise involved the handling and movement of live cargo in support of Defense Department activities. As such, participating units received realistic and valuable training not available elsewhere in the Sixth US Army area.⁶

GALLANT EAGLE '82, a US Army Readiness Command-directed Joint Readiness Exercise designed to provide a simulated combat environment, was oriented toward infantry and armored operations and the employment of tactical air. Strategic mobility and logistics support were also areas of special interest. Conducted in the semi-desert environment of Fort Irwin, 9 March to 9 April 1982, 54 Sixth US Army units participated, providing medical clearing, helicopter ambulance, veterinary services, fire fighting, maintenance, transportation, field services to include bread baking and shower points, postal, psychological operations and repair parts support. The 63d US Army Reserve Command operated a temporary equipment concentration site with over 400 pieces of equipment in support of Reserve Component units that participated in the exercise.⁷

In a letter to Maj. Gen. Berwyn Fragner, Commander, 63d US Army Reserve Command, General Grange lauded their participation and noted the excellent training opportunities presented to Reserve Component units in GALLANT EAGLE '82, "as they simulate realistic conditions which the units would be required to perform in actual combat." Its effect on unit recruitment, Grange continued, "is considered highly positive."⁸ GALLANT EAGLE, concluded Grange in a letter to Maj. Gen. Frank Schober, Jr., Commander, State Military Forces, California, "was a great opportunity for each part of the Total Army to plan and work together, . . . It proved, once again, the Total Army is a workable team that can effectively perform its mission."⁹

Another joint exercise deploying Sixth US Army units was LOGEX 82, a TRADOC-directed, Command Post Exercise, which trained participants in command and staff techniques and procedures as they related to combat support, and combat service support units. Conducted at Fort Pickett, Virginia, 15 to 28 August 1982, 10 USASIX units participated.¹⁰

Overseas deployment training (ODT) with Active Component commands occupied more than 40 Sixth US Army Reserve Component units during the past fiscal year. Designed to increase Reserve Component readiness by providing optimum participation of selected Reserve Component units and individuals in overseas unilateral and joint exercises, this year's training increased unit awareness of wartime mission requirements by providing realistic training in an overseas environment to which the unit was projected for early deployment in consonance with the CAPSTONE Program and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved operations plans. Additionally, overseas deployment training enhanced recruitment and retention of participating Reserve Component units.¹¹

Annual training of Sixth US Army elements, like the other exercises, occupied the attention and energy of USASIX planners during this fiscal year. Preparation for this training occurred at the Annual Training 1983 Site/Date Conference, 15 to 16 September 1982, held at the Presidio of San Francisco. It proved to be very productive, thanks to the coordination and cooperation of the Adjutants General, major U.S. Army Reserve Commands and the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region representatives; only seven units remained in an undecided category, the lowest number in Sixth US Army history. Additionally, the state Adjutants General and major US Army Reserve Commanders were directed to provide an initial Training Year 1984 Annual Training schedule to Sixth US Army; USASIX in turn provided a computerized out-year annual training schedule 12 months in advance, thus affording the State Adjutants General and major US Army Reserve Commanders the opportunity to revise the annual training plan prior to implementation, and to reduce the numbers of generated changes. Both Training Year 1983 and 1984 were placed in the Forces Command data bank on 30 September 1982.¹²

To minimize turbulence in annual training scheduling, site/date changes were not favorably considered unless the change benefitted mission-oriented training. Annual Training 82 site/date changes totalled 239. This number represented a marked reduction in changes compared to 1981 and earlier years.¹³ The next conference was scheduled for May, 1983.

In addition to exercises and annual training, Sixth US Army boosted an Active and Reserve Component partnership program, promoting a beneficial training relationship for both Active and Reserve Component units. Among the Active and Reserve Component units incorporated into this partnership during fiscal year 1982 were the 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, and the 12th and 19th Special Forces Groups from the California and Utah National Guard. A change was proposed to realign the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with the 4th Infantry Division. Sixth US Army spent the year seeking Forces Command approval.¹⁴

Playing a leading role in support of this concept was the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. The excellent training facilities at the Center for support of combined arms training mandated its use for training the "Total Force". Primary candidates for rotation to the Center included Sixth US Army Reserve Component armored and mechanized infantry companies, as well as Reserve Component combat service support companies. An extensive study undertaken during this period called for rotation of 16 Reserve Component units

per fiscal year (eight armor and eight mechanized infantry), with units deploying with individual equipment and weapons, and drawing unit pre-positioned equipment. The two-week period focused on squad through company-level maneuvers and live fire events in a dirty battlefield environment with a live opposing force. This force consisted of a Soviet Army on European battlefield with armor units firing Tank Table VII. Units were to be hosted by Active Component battalions stationed at the Center, with instructor and evaluator support provided from Active Component resources.¹⁵

General Grange, USASIX Commanding General, encouraged brigade and battalion commanders to observe Active Component National Training Center exercises and to become familiar with the facilities at the Center. Unfortunately, Forces Command decided to postpone Reserve Component use of the Center until further evaluations of Active Component utilization were completed.¹⁶

Continuing his concern for effective training, Grange expressed his disappointment at the lack of combined arms training that was being conducted during unit Annual Training programs. In a 6 July 1982 letter sent to all major US Army Reserve Commands, State Adjutants General, and Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, the Sixth US Army Commander stressed the importance of developing training programs incorporating combined arms training; "We must train the same way we will have to fight." During combat, Grange continued, "it is indeed rare that combined arms teams are not inseparably functioning as teams." This kind of training, he argued, must become routine, thus stimulating morale and motivation, and contributing to increased proficiency with weapons and tactical concepts. Combined arms, wrote the General, included not only infantry and armor, but air defense artillery, engineers, and Fire Integrated Support Team (FIST) elements. In the future, "I expect to see more units focusing on combined arms training during AT."¹⁷

On 7 April 1982, General Richard E. Cavazos, Commander, US Army Forces Command, provided his training philosophy and standardized the planning and execution of Active and Reserve Component training within Forces Command and the guidance for the evolution of Forces Command Regulation 350-1 and 350-2. The next war, wrote Cavazos, "will be a 'come-as-you-are' affair of a violence and intensity little understood." The basic aim of Forces Command, including the Reserve Component and National Guard, must be "to accomplish our mission with minimum loss of life."¹⁸

The General's objectives were clear and urgent, argued the USASIX Commander, in his 26 May 1982 endorsement of the FORSCOM Commander's training guidelines. The threat, argued Grange, was armor, air, indirect fire, rear area combat operations and NBC, and he urged his commanders and trainers to understand current realistic doctrine in these areas. "Similarly," he continued, "train in the most realistic environment your troops are capable of handling and you are capable of providing. We cannot afford to waste scarce training time. We must plan smart and train hard. Make every training opportunity the most productive and satisfying your soldiers have ever had."¹⁹

To ensure adherence to these guidelines, USASIX issued Sixth US Army Pamphlet 21-5, "How to Train," and Sixth US Army Circular 350-4, "Training

Management and Evaluations," cornerstones of a long-range program to streamline and simplify training management within Sixth US Army. This program, wrote General Grange to Brig. Gen. Daniel C. Helix, Commander, 351st Civil Affairs Command, was carefully developed "to capitalize on the momentum of BTMS and to provide an efficient reference with which to sustain BTMS expertise in our units, while at the same time reducing dependency on additional workshops or extensive refresher training." Recent world developments, concluded Grange, "have renewed our emphasis on military readiness; therefore, its essential that we continue to maintain effective training among our highest priorities."²⁰

In spite of this support, there were several issues in Forces Command Regulation 350-2 that needed to be clarified and resolved such as standardized physical fitness testing for the Reserve Component, incorporating Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) results into the new regulation, a strong Forces Command policy on subcaliber firing for crew served weapons, and standardization of Reserve Component training management and policy. Publication was targeted for January, 1983.²¹

In the area of tank gunnery training, Sixth US Army continued to identify Reserve Component tank gunnery shortfalls and to monitor the status of all functioning facilities. For example, the Fort Hunter-Liggett project (Tank Table VII, B9 Tank Range), was reinitiated, approved by Forces Command, forwarded to Department of the Army, where it was coordinated with the National Guard Bureau, and was then submitted for funding approval. The National Training Center, Fort Irwin, revamped its Tank Table VII to support Reserve Component requirements for both advance training and individual development training. The Center also received additional Automatic Tank Target Systems (ATTS) sets to help meet Reserve Component tank gunnery requirements. Indian Springs, Nevada, opened an operational Tank Table VII A and B, constructed by the Nevada Army Guard, and used by National Guard units from the state.²²

Nonetheless, the problem of adequate facilities for Reserve Component tank crew gunnery training was of major concern to the Sixth US Army Commander. Idaho's Gowen Field, one of the primary Reserve Component tank training areas in the USASIX area, lacked state-of-the-art target pop-up mechanisms, such as the automatic tank target systems. In a 26 January 1982 letter to Maj. Gen. Emmett H. Walker, Jr., Director of the Army National Guard, General Grange lamented their absence and he requested Walker's assistance in securing the necessary stock funds to procure these tank target systems for Gowen Field. These sets, argued Grange, "would significantly improve Gowen Field's tank gunnery facilities."²³

For fiscal year 1982, Sixth US Army received \$2,562,826 in training ammunition authorizations to support the Reserve Component; \$210,966 was returned to Headquarters, Forces Command, in April, 1982, reducing Sixth US Army's authorization to \$2,351,860. Based upon final expenditure reports for the fiscal year, dollar usage by major US Army Reserve Commands of authorizations remained poor (\$1,033,481). Accuracy of the Training Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS) expenditure reports remained highly suspect with the most questionable area being the expenditure data submitted by supporting installations. It was anticipated that fiscal year 1983 would see

a significant improvement in the Training Ammunition Management Systems accuracy.²⁴

Fiscal year 1983 authorizations were received late in October 1982. This was due to the fact that in FY 82, the Standards in Training Commission was established. It was composed of representatives from all the major commands, Army staff, and different echelons in the Army chain of command. Its mission was two-fold: (1) to establish levels of full caliber training ammunition required to attain and sustain specified levels of individual, crew or unit weapons proficiency relative to readiness levels, both in active and reserve component, making maximum use of aids, devices, simulators, simulations and subcaliber firing; and (2) offer these levels as a model making program, budget and allocation decisions. Thus FY 83 authorizations were not released until the results of the STRAC were released. Even though FY 83 requirements were higher, final authorizations released were about the same as FY 82.²⁵

For the same fiscal year, 1982, Additional Training Assemblies (ATA) for the Army Reserve allocations were 12,701 officers and 20,815 enlisted, a slight increase over fiscal year 1981. It was anticipated that final fiscal year 1982 expenditures would be 100 percent. In order to improve the effectiveness of the assemblies, Sixth US Army recommended to the Department of the Army and the Forces Command that they review the intended use of the assemblies and make their use less restrictive; ie. allow the assemblies to be used for logistical and administrative purposes. Earliest dissemination of assembly lines of instruction each fiscal year was to be a prerequisite for proper utilization and improved planning. It was decided that Sixth US Army needed additional training assemblies for administrative and logistical support and for individuals that needed additional assemblies beyond the restriction of 12 per individual per year (commanders, planners, and workers).²⁵

On 5 May 1982, a working level meeting was conducted at USASIX Headquarters to review and finalize fiscal year 1983 Sixth US Army requirements for the 75th Maneuver Area Command (MAC). Attendees included representatives from the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions VIII and IX, the 75th Maneuver Area Command, the 91st Division (Training), and the 1st Maneuver Training Command (MTC), and HQ, Sixth US Army. Agenda items addressed required support, reduction of overall exercise costs though augmentation of Maneuver Training Command personnel in maneuver area command exercises, manning of exercises and early identification of exercise support shortfalls within anticipated Sixth US Army fiscal year 1982 funding (\$200,000). From this meeting and subsequent negotiations, the fiscal year 1982 schedule was finalized at 13 exercises to include two external Army training and evaluation programs, a Corps command post exercise, a rear area protection exercise, and other exercises.²⁶

For this fiscal year, the 75th Maneuver Areas Command, a Fifth US Army unit, prepared and conducted 17 Reserve Component exercises for group and higher level units at a cost of \$180,000 in Sixth US Army Annual Duty Training funds. Two of the largest exercises held in May, 1982 were a medical exercise entitled "TAMEX" for the 2d Hospital Center and the 124th Army Reserve Command, as well as a rear area protection exercise entitled CORPS DEFENDER I for the 49th Military Police Brigade.²⁷

A key ingredient to Reserve Component readiness was the maximum use of close-in local training areas (LTA). Initiatives taken by Sixth US Army during fiscal year 1982 to develop these local training areas, complete with combined arms training areas, ranges, maneuver spaces, and impact areas, and which provided the realistic battlefield conditions required to conduct individual and collective training, included developing the Parks Reserve Forces Training Area (RFTA), Dublin, California. In keeping with the Sixth US Army's commitment to "state of the art" facilities at Parks, the US Army Training Support Center (TSC) assistance team visited and developed the following recommendations for the continued modernization of Parks: (1) Infantry Remote Target System (IRETS) Range (M16) -- standardize and upgrade to 10 lanes, add night-firing capability, increase target density, and reduce future maintenance costs, (2) Machine Gun range (7.62 and .50 cal) -- upgrade to Scaled Range Target System, employ plastic ammunition, and train mounted and dismounted crews, (3) Anti-Tank/Anti-Personnel Range -- consolidate M203, M79, LAW, and VIPER, use subcaliber and training munitions, and provide hard to moving targets (low cost), (4) Indirect Fire Range -- consolidate artillery and entire family of mortars, use SABOT, provide for transition to LITR, and train crews and FIST, (5) NBC Defense Training -- add decontamination site and use MOPP 4, (6) Common Task Proficiency -- sustainment training for all common tasks, multi-echelon training and OPFOR use of VISMODS, (7) Video Arcade -- use artillery direct fire trainer, and (8) Weaponner -- integrate in marksmanship training.

These recommendations, coupled with existing facilities and ones being completed now, were designed to develop Parks Reserve Forces Training Area into a model miniature combined arms training area. Its maneuver space and impact areas provided realistic and challenging training with minimal expenditures of resources.

The Fort Missoula/Blue Mountain, Montana area was also considered for additional development of training facilities to accommodate both Reserve and Active Component units. The draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and memorandum of understanding are presently under negotiation between the US Forest Service and concerned elements of Sixth US Army. The Commanding General recently approved the concept for the Blue Mountain development.

The acquisition of portions of Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) moved rapidly during this period. The Real Estate Summary prepared by Omaha District Engineer has been completed, reviewed by Sixth US Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, Training, and returned to the USASIX Engineer. The environmental impact statement may have significant impact upon the development of Rocky Mountain Arsenal as a local training area, and the Training Office has recommended it be initiated immediately. The Sixth US Army engineer project to purchase 10 acres near Butte, Montana for the 841st OD Company, 96th ARCOM, to use as a local training area was in the site selection phase.

The Oregon Army National Guard completed the development of a Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOVT) facility at Camp Riley, Oregon. This project was designed and built for Reserve Component personnel at a significantly lower cost than the facilities on Active Component installations. It

is presently available for use by Active and Reserve Component units. Areas being considered for future training facility improvement projects included Los Alamitos (Southern California) and Camp Bonneville (Washington and Oregon).²⁸

While there was much improvement in the training area, there were some weak points and General Grange, in a letter to his two Readiness and Mobilization Region Commanders, cited one glaring example of inefficient training. Acknowledging the amount of time and effort spent in the past years in upgrading tank gunnery training and ranges, Grange also noted that there was little effort devoted to training anti-tank gunners, specifically TOW gunners. "While practice tracking does not require a live range," Grange wrote, "such non-firing practice rapidly becomes dull and unrewarding training for the gunner." Recognizing this, Grange directed his training people, "to seek a suitable subcaliber device to provide 'hit satisfaction' for TOW gunners." Because of the confusion at Army level about the type of devices needed, Grange promised his support in pushing the acquisition and distribution of whatever system is approved, so that, as he put it, "our TOW gunners become as proficient as their tank counterparts."²⁹

Throughout the fiscal year, Sixth US Army Headquarters emphasized that Reserve Component units place greater reliance on simulation, subcaliber devices, and supplementary training techniques to achieve and maintain required training readiness to meet mobilization needs. The Forces Command designation of the Continental US Armies as focal points for all training devices actions within their respective areas of responsibility was expected to improve training aids and devices availability and control. In a 23 February 1982 letter to General Shoemaker, the then commander of Forces Command, General Grange expressed his concern about the inadequacy of existing training technology and the problems encountered in acquiring new technology for the Reserve Component. "Training devices, simulators, close in subcaliber ranges, and training facilities offer the greatest potential to reduce the differential between unit capabilities and wartime requirements," wrote Grange. "Distribution plans and initial buys of new training technology too often ignore the needs of the RC." Planners, Grange continued, "frequently overlook in their development of Basis of Issue Plans (BOIP) the unique RC environment and the absence of nearby ranges and training areas." Some Reserve Component units, he argued, "have access to installations which have the training technology but these units were the exception." Most Reserve Component units had to content themselves with what was available at their local training area.

To Further complicate the problem, the Army lacked a mechanism to identify, coordinate, and procure training technology requirements for all components. "Technology requirements are being generated through separate channels--NGB for ARNG; CONUSA for USAR; and FORSCOM for Active Component," continued the Sixth US Army Commander. Each agency, Grange noted, "responds in a vacuum without considering such particulars as joint planning and use, overall priorities, current availability, and alternate methods of training." Consequently, Grange appealed for new technology for the Reserve Component and better training, if the Reserves were to meet there responsibilities in any future battle.³⁰

In addition, Forces Command proposed that a Training Aids Simulation Office Liaison Officer be stationed at each Continental United States Army. During this fiscal year, Sixth US Army requested the training set fire observation (TSFO) for five locations within Sixth US Army. Approval for three was received and these were to be located at the 40th ID (Mech), Gowen Field, Idaho, and Ogallal, Nebraska. In spite of these systems, General Grange voiced his concern over the paucity of sets for Sixth US Army in a January 4, 1982 letter to the Commander, Forces Command, in which he not only complained about the absence of any Sixth US Army input in determining how many systems USASIX would get, but he also lamented the fact that Reserve Component units were once again being shunted aside in favor of Active Component units. "As currently programmed," he wrote, "few Sixth US Army artillery units will be able to use TSFO because of the long distance involved for RC units to travel to the active installations. . . . "Nonetheless, "the need to train RC forward observers using TSFO is greater in FY 82 than in previous years." Grange then asked for the issue of additional Training Set Fire Observation systems for Reserve Component use.³¹ "Sixth US Army," continued Grange, "has 23 battalion equivalents of artillery. Those units are already limited to 38 days of training per year and, therefore, should receive a higher priority on training devices than Active Component units which can schedule training anytime in a 300-day year." Going further, he stated that, "the whole concept that the RC subsist on what is left over after the Active Army is supported must be reassessed. We cannot give these units front line missions and third or fourth line support."³²

Like unit training, individual training received major attention in Sixth US Army's fiscal year 1982 training program. It was a period of expansion for programs implemented during previous years. The Warrant Officer Senior Course (WOSC), for example, began a new cycle; non-commissioned officers education system programs of instruction consisted of the Primary Non-Commissioned Officer Course (PNCOC) and Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course (ANCO), and Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Course (SNCO). The Army Training Board's "Method of Learning Course" (MOLC) became firmly established as instructor prerequisite training for all U. S. Army Reserve School instructors.

The Method of Learning Course received extra attention this past year, especially instructor and staff participation. The course enhanced instructional support and the quality of training through proper presentation of programs, of instruction prepared by the service schools. There was a continuing effort to replace officers techniques military occupational specialties classes with qualified non-commissioned officer instructors.

Increased emphasis was again placed on duty military occupational specialty qualifications. Sixth US Army Regulation 350-8 was published; it provided for directed military occupational specialty qualifications of US Army Reserve soldiers through the 16 Reserve schools of Sixth US Army. Partially initiated in 1982, a shortage of Reserve Personnel, Army monies forced the cancellation of one session of Command and General Staff courses at the University of Nevada and one session of the Military Occupational Specialty Training

Course. About 300 Command and General Staff Warrant Officer Senior Course students and 300 Military Occupational Specialty Training Course students were affected.³³

In a related area, General Grange, in a 17 December 1981 letter to General Otis, Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, voiced his concern that the same schools conducting basic advanced officer courses and the Command and General Staff Courses were not properly "emphasizing the unique problems an active component commander/staff will face when an activated Reserve Component unit is attached during combat." Grange argued that, "the tactical scenarios conducted at various professional development courses should include situations which require students to consider for example, how an armor brigade would integrate an RC battalion equipped with M48A5 tanks into tactical situations when the normal scheme of maneuver and logistics package has been developed to the capabilities of a battalion equipped with M-1 tanks." The USASIX Commander recommended, "incorporating 'How to Actually Do It' into the service school programs," as an additional step to increase the Army's preparedness.³⁴

A critical problem facing commanders in the Reserve Component was the excessive number of personnel who remained unqualified in their duty military occupational specialty. This problem was often compounded by requirements for extensive annual duty training at service schools, requirements for sophisticated equipment, lack of qualified instructors, and by the geographic dispersion of units in the Sixth US Army area.

The USASIX Commanding General recognized this problem and tasked the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Training, to develop a program to assist commanders in resolving it. The result was Sixth US Army's Directed Military Occupational Specialty Program which maximized utilization of existing Army Reserve Schools during Individual Development Training. With the assistance of the Automation Management Office, Sixth US Army determined potential Specialty Class requirements within easy commuting distances of the soldier population to be served and took the training to the soldier. Major US Army Reserve Commands received class schedules and student quotas along with a "by-name" listing of personnel eligible for training. The Adjutants General likewise were invited to participate through quotas provided to them based on their submitted requirements.³⁵

This program was expected to reduce materially the current overburden of unqualified personnel in the Reserve Component thereby enhancing unit readiness and deployability postures. The Directed Specialty Program was fielded under Sixth US Army Regulation 350-8. Initial classes commenced under the Directed Military Occupational Specialty Program as of 1 October 1981.

The US Army Training Support Center rapidly progressed in its program of special configuration of military occupational specialty courses. As the Training and Doctrine Command approves specially configured programs of instruction, interim specialty courses materials will be replaced. During fiscal year 1982, the Army Reserve Schools received instructional material support from the service schools on 78 military occupational specialty courses. Specially configured course materials were made available for 38 of these

courses. Most of the specially configured occupational specialty courses were divided into individual and annual development training phases with the individual phase a prerequisite for the annual phase.³⁶

The seventh year of operation of the Sixth US Army Military Occupational Specialty Training Center, Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, California, was completed in Annual Training 82. Sixteen Specialty courses, a Method of Learning Course (Course Manager Training), and a Faculty Development Specialist Course (Master Trainer) were conducted. Specialty classes were scheduled based on major US Army Reserve Command/The Adjutant General state requirements. To increase class attendance quotas were assigned to each Major US Army Reserve Command and reservations to each State Adjutant General. One two-week session was cancelled out of four scheduled due to lack of funds. The Training Center graduated 721 students during Annual Training 82.³⁷

The Skill Qualification Testing (SQT) Program underwent numerous changes since its introduction in the Reserve Component. Throughout these iterations, Sixth US Army Headquarters remained committed to an effective individual training program for the Reserve Component of which skill qualification testing was an integral part. When properly used, the testing provided not only an individual training motivation but served also as an excellent diagnostic training tool for unit commanders.

An interesting dichotomy developed in the Reserve Component with regard to skill qualification testing. All too often, commanders emphasized testing to the exclusion of all else. In either case, the end results were an impingement on the unit's ability to perform its wartime/CAPSTONE mission. For this reason, Sixth US Army reviewed its own policy on skill testing and developed an approach which should place skill qualification testing in its proper perspective and enhance its role in unit mission training.

The thrust of USASIX's skill qualification testing policy was to eliminate potential training detractors by focusing this training on the unit's wartime/CAPSTONE missions. In a policy letter published on 8 March 1982, General Grange established and clarified the uses of Skill Qualification Testing as supplementary to training Reserve Component units for their mobilization missions. Grange directed that unit training priorities be dictated by collective and individual wartime priority tasks rather than by skill qualification testing notices or tests. Grange added that while the level of performance on the testing was the individual soldier's responsibility, "The commander and his experienced NCOs must provide support for the individual by providing Soldiers Manuals, access to TEC programs, and equipment." Continuing, Grange noted that skill qualification tests were to be conducted for their value as individual training motivators and diagnostic tools. "Care must be taken," concluded the Sixth US Army Commander, "to insure that emphasis in SQT does not divert the focus of training from the unit's wartime mission provided by the CAPSTONE associated higher headquarters."³⁸

Also during this period Sixth US Army conducted two Reserve Component Noncommissioned Officer Education System Academies during Annual Training--82, at Camp Riley, Oregon (13-26 June), and at Camp Luis Obispo, California (11-24

July). The 517 students enrolled in both academies represented a 70 percent increase over 1981. Camp Rilea training increased from nine squads (Annual Training 81) to 25 squads (Annual Training 82), an increase of 130 percent. Because of the enthusiastic support of the Oregon and Washington Guard and Reserves, Camp Rilea was expected to be at maximum training capacity for school year 1983.³⁹

"NCO professionalism must be a vital and ongoing philosophy woven into our way of doing business," wrote General Grange in a policy letter to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, State Adjutants General, and major US Army Reserve Commands. Subscribing to the dictum, "The NCO is the backbone of the Army," Grange directed the Sixth US Army non-commissioned officers, "with their knowledge and experience," to take charge of the program, "leading the way." As soldiers, Grange continued, "we are in a deadly serious business, and if it comes to a fight, we will demand and expect great deeds of our noncommissioned officers. If we are not to be disappointed we must ensure that training begins now."⁴⁰

Additional training programs during the past fiscal year included the Army Logistics Executive Development Course, which graduated 23 students from the 6220th US Army Reserve School at the University of Nevada at Reno. During the inactive training period of FY 82, Phases I and IIIA of the Officer Advanced Course were taught with 623 students completing these phases. Sixth US Army conducted the annual development course phases (IV-VI) of the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, during the period 27 June - 9 July 1982. The 5043d Reserve School, at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, was the host school with a total of 100 students in attendance (27 in Phase IV and 73 in Phase VI).⁴¹

During the same fiscal year, 836 officers and enlisted personnel attended service and Army area schools. These courses provided for enlisted career development, military specialty system qualifications, and refresher-proficiency courses for officer and enlisted personnel. Eleven Army Reserve officers were also selected from the Sixth US Army area to attend Senior Service Schools during school year 1983 and 1984. These officers were nominated to attend the Army War College, National War College, and Command and General Staff College.⁴² Finally, three Sixth US Army non-commissioned officers were selected for the resident US Army Sergeant Major Academy and four were selected for the resident/non-resident course.⁴²

In yet another training area important to the overall strength and effectiveness of the Total Force, Sixth US Army's trainers concentrated their efforts on increasing the accuracy in the preparation of Forces Command Forms 1-R and enhancing annual training evaluator awareness of duties. In January, initiatives involving publication and distribution of the new Sixth US Army Pamphlet 21-5 and Circular 550-4, were completed. This effort marked the culmination of actions begun last year to provide an effective training management system in the form of clear, concise, and easy-to-use training manuals. Understanding and accepting this guidance was enhanced throughout the command by completion of training management briefings to all State Adjutants General and major US Army Reserve Commands. By year's end, most

units evaluated were using it adequately. Additionally, Sixth US Army efforts were directed at stabilizing the system by resisting unwarranted changes. This stability resulted in improved acceptance and implementation of the Battalion Training Management System in the field.⁴³

During fiscal year 1982, Sixth US Army training management evaluators conducted 352 training evaluations, validating evaluating units 60 days before or after Command Logistics Review Team inspections and annual training. Overall, inactive duty training was less effective than annual training, mainly because of insufficient planning and coordination time. To arrange for resources and to prepare adequately for training activities, where technical expertise, mission essential equipment, facilities, and training materials were within a trainer's control, and/or where training was dictated by routine work flow, training was generally found to be effective.

In evaluating training, USASIX evaluators agreed that most officers and non-commissioned officers within the Sixth US Army area were competent and technically proficient, although many lacked adequate leadership experience. Collectively, they were ambitious and dedicated to providing challenging and meaningful training for their troops. Mobilization training received extra attention during this period, especially CAPSTONE. By creating associations with Active Component units, Reserve Component units were able to energize with a strong sense of urgency to get ready for war. Mobilization exercises were conducted with increasing frequency, and training time was more heavily concentrated on wartime related tasks.

Officers and non-commissioned officers gradually learned the Battalion Training Management System. In addition, with the publication of the Sixth US Army Pamphlet 21-5, "How to Train," understanding and standardized training management procedures were improved within the command. At the same time, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Training published Sixth US Army Circular 350-4, which specified the minimum essential documents necessary for effective unit training.

Generally performance oriented, training within Sixth US Army emphasized better understanding of training principles and improved training resources. Consequently, "hands on" training became routine in most units. In spite of all these improvements, soldier proficiency remained relatively low in most units, mainly because of time and resource constraints, and because of high personnel turnover. Nonetheless, morale remained generally high thanks to meaningful training opportunities being provided.

Equipment shortages hampered training on some particular types of equipment. For example, hospital Medical Unit Self Contained Transportable (MUST) equipment, certain types of signal equipment, automatic data processing equipment, bakery outfits, and NBC gear were typically in short supply. Training ammunition, aids, and devices were also considered insufficient by most commanders' standards. Additionally, soldiers had little exposure to the new generation equipment which arrived in many Active Component units. As a result, training opportunities were often limited to what could be easily arranged. Often, the only exposure to these resources was at annual training.

In many units, planning was accomplished during a "dark night" before drill. Unfortunately, those who attended these meetings were often not paid for attending. This, of course, affected their willingness to do any more planning than was absolutely necessary. Constant last minute changes from higher headquarters also affected the willingness of trainers to prepare training plans ahead of time. As a result, training was often scheduled on tasks which were easiest to train (rather than on tasks which were most essential to readiness), and "hip-pocket" training was presented which was seldom coordinated and seldom adequately prepared. In many combat service support units, routine mission support requirements dictated training. As a result, intensive planning and coordination was not necessary in these units in order to provide quality training to the troops during inactive duty training.

As a group, company-grade officers and non-commissioned officers were not assigned sufficient tasks and goals to accomplish. Instead, many commanders relied primarily upon professionalism to get the job done. Usually, this confidence was warranted; however, in many instances, a lack of sufficient guidance and support resulted in slack time while supervisors waited to be told specifically what to do. This condition was also apparent in the general lack of effective training schedules and in the lack of structure in most on-the-job training duty military occupational specialty qualification programs.

Overall, performance was usually not tested as the final phase of training; therefore, trainees were less motivated to acquire proficiency, and proficiency assessments were less apt to be accurate. Finally, appearance standards were not strictly enforced in many units. The primary reason was that commanders feared that more rigid enforcement would have an adverse effect on soldier retention.

Overall, assessment of annual training performance with available assets was rated OUTSTANDING to EXCELLENT in 71 percent of evaluated units. This achievement was particularly noteworthy considering 44 percent (36,000 soldiers) of available personnel were new accessions and had been with their units less than a year. Of the remaining units, 27 percent were rated SATISFACTORY and 2 percent were rated MARGINAL. No units were rated UNSATISFACTORY. Other accomplishments included a five percent increase in available strength (now 84 percent of authorized) and reductions of excused and AWOL status to 1 percent in each category, thus raising the total personnel trained (constructive attendance) to 98 percent of available strength. In addition, annual training troop attendance with units of assignment was up to 76 percent (an all-time high). On the other hand, a two percent reduction (78 percent to 76 percent) in overall military occupational specialty qualification occurred due to an active enlistment of non-prior service personnel. As individuals complete annual training, specialty qualification status should improve.⁴⁴

More units trained harder, for longer periods of time, and under more realistic conditions than ever before. Soldiers characteristically displayed high morale and enthusiasm. Most units that were rated OUTSTANDING had a professional staff and fully utilized junior leaders. Thorough planning and preparation for annual training resulted in effective use of training time and

realistic performance-oriented training. Those units which were rated high in these areas were able to rapidly and effectively adapt to late site/date changes. Most combat support and combat service support units continued to perform in an outstanding manner. Realistic training missions provided these units an opportunity to conduct independent support operations and to demonstrate technical proficiency. Organizational maintenance also had an excellent record. Contributing to the expertise was civilian-related employment and a high percentage of skilled full-time technicians (particularly in maintenance-type units).

Overall, survival on the "dirty battlefield" continued to be the major weakness due to high personnel turbulence (35 percent). This turbulence equated to approximately 28,000 personnel losses during the past 12 months (as stated above, (44 percent) 36,000 soldiers had been with their units less than a year). This turbulence forced many units (particularly maneuver battalions) into continuous retraining, contributed to low soldier proficiency in basic survival skills, and resulted in critically low MOS qualification and expertise in technical fields. Another major recurring weakness was an absence, lack of knowledge, and/or use of tactical Standard Operating Procedures. This shortfall hampered operations at all levels and reduced units' combat effectiveness. The most notable equipment shortages affecting training were vehicles, signal, NBC, and medical equipment⁴⁵

Annual training, wrote General Grange, was, "the most important training event of the year for Reserve Component units;" as a result, Sixth US Army drafted a set of evaluation guidelines and distributed them on 5 May 1982. Evaluators, wrote Grange, played an important role in training. "Your primary objective," he continued, "is to advise and assist the unit commander," as well as, "identify capability shortfalls which will translate into future unit training objectives."⁴⁶ Grange reminded annual training evaluators to base their reports on the quality of training being conducted with resources available at the training site. Remember, he continued, "the unit commander needs the benefit of your Active Component experience which is the primary reason Active Component personnel are chosen to be evaluators of Reserve units." In assessing and reporting the annual training effort, argued Grange, "your appraisal should identify strengths and weaknesses, in terms of ARTEP tasks, which can be used by the unit commander to develop his Yearly Training Program for the following year."⁴⁷

Turning to more specific items, the Sixth US Army Commanding General addressed the all-important issue of survival techniques. "The ability to survive on the dirty battlefield under the 'come-as-you-are' war concept," remarked Grange, "was the major shortfall in the majority of units evaluated during AT-81." He cautioned USASIX evaluators to be, "especially observant of units' awareness of the rear area threat and how well they organize and protect troops, their equipment, and their installations."⁴⁸

To unit commanders, Grange urged them to consider the "shocking transition" that would occur to the soldier who survives the first 72 hours of battle and how best to train the soldier who survives. "Don't assume that because yours

is a combat service unit, you won't be shelled, bombed, or ambushed," wrote Grange. "Don't assume that because you're not an RDF-A unit, you'll have plenty of time to train."⁴⁹

Beginning with Annual Training 81, assessment of "go-to-war" capability was eliminated by Forces Command from the training evaluation process. The Training Office, Sixth US Army, thru the Readiness and Mobilization Regions made an independent assessment under Army Regulation 220-1 criteria of units' capabilities to perform their wartime mission. (This assessment was used as an internal training management tool and was not an entry on the Annual Training Evaluation Report.) In addition, this assessment indicated a significant inconsistency existed between this headquarters and Reserve Component commanders' estimates of time required to become combat ready with available resources, i.e., personnel and equipment. Among the more significant findings this year, assessment of post-mobilization training time required to perform full modified table of organization and equipment mission under Army Regulation 220-1 criteria monitored by training indicated that 57 percent of combat battalions evaluated were not capable of performing their full modification table of organization and equipment mission with available assets. Most of these battalions were organic to the seven major combat commands. Major upgrading of personnel and equipment, and training in excess of seven weeks, would be required prior to deployment or employment in combat. Of the 17 hospitals evaluated, 12 were not mission capable primarily due to a shortage of professional personnel and medical equipment. Thirty-five percent of separate company/detachment-size units were also not mission ready with available resources.

A review of the Reserve Component indicated that in many cases the Reserve Component chain of command was not following Army Regulation 220-1 criteria in estimating the training status of its units. For example, Reserve Component personnel of combat battalions with available strengths between 50-60 percent reported a capability to attain fully ready status with six to eight weeks of post-mobilization training. Equally important, the Sixth US Army assessment enabled the command to report that combat effectiveness showed a marked improvement compared to the previous year. For example, the percent of units not able to perform full MTOE missions with available assets dropped by 17 percent for battalions, 10 percent for companies/detachments, and 22 percent for hospitals.⁵⁰

In May, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Training, hosted a Training Management Development Officer (TMDO) Conference; Training Management Development Officers, Training Advisors and Reserve Component Training Staff from the Readiness Region's, Readiness Groups, State Adjutants General, major US Army Reserve Commands, and several USASIX staff offices attended. Objectives of the conference were to discuss the Inactive Duty Training Evaluation System, training management sustainment in the Reserve Component, Organizational Effectiveness/Training Management Development Officer interface, and Military Occupational Specialty qualifications. Additionally, update briefings were presented on training management, individual training, unit training, full time unit support and TRADOC revisions of Reserve Component Battalion Training Management System Workshops. A similar conference was being planned for next year because of the continued success and usefulness of this forum.⁵¹

In a 10 February 1982 letter to General Shoemaker, General Grange reiterated some of his concerns about training for the Army Reserve and National Guard, focusing, specifically on the National Training Center. The Center's Commander, Grange noted, notified him of two training opportunities which if adopted, would clearly enhance the training readiness of the Reserve Component. The first, a program for Reserve Component mechanized infantry and tank companies to train at the National Training Center during annual training at the frequency of one each type company per month, included the use of MILES at squad and platoon level the first week and the conduct of a company Army Training and Evaluation Program the second week. The second program involved a Reserve Component brigade commander and his battalion commanders visiting the Center to observe the free maneuver and live fire phases of the Active Component brigade rotations. It was decided that this group would be tutored by Brig. Gen. James T. Bramlett at a designated observation post on the actions of the friendly and imposing forces and would allow themselves an opportunity to war-game the mock battle in progress and learn first-hand the sound application of fire and maneuver. "I wholeheartedly endorse the above two programs," continued Grange and, "I have solicited FORSCOM's support with a message to the former and have taken action to encourage my senior Reserve Component combat unit commanders to participate in the latter."⁵⁴

The Reserve Component can do much to support the operation of the Center, especially during annual training. For example, Grange suggested the following areas: engineers constructing ranges, repairing training facilities; combat service support units performing maintenance and other support functions; signal units performing communication tasks. The National Training Center, concluded Grange, "in addition to providing a valuable training experience for CONUS-based Active Component combat units, is also a great proving ground for current tactical doctrine." As such, he continued, "the NTC plays a vital role for enhancing the combat training readiness of units having the opportunity to train there and provides the medium for fostering the total One-Army concept."⁵⁵

"There should be no doubt in any of our minds," wrote General Grange in an open letter to his subordinate commanders, "that the training of our soldiers for combat is the most vital activity in which we are engaged." He urged his commanders to be aware of the training available to their soldiers so as to maintain and improve the quality of America's ground forces. "In our efforts to build towards a strong total force the training of the Infantryman plays a preeminent role," argued Grange. "It is the Infantryman who has traditionally borne the brunt of every challenge to the nation and, in many instances, has been a soldier of the US Army Reserve or National Guard." Therefore, concluded the Sixth US Army Commander, "it is important that our soldiers receive the best training it is within our powers as commanders to provide."⁵⁸ During fiscal year 1982, Sixth US Army directed most of its efforts towards achieving that end.

FOOTNOTES

1. "A Talk with the Chief, "Army, (Oct 82), pp. 18, 19.
2. "Guide During Period of Major Transition," Army, (Oct 82), p. 43.
3. Ibid., p. 46.
4. Ibid., p. 50.
5. Deputy Chief of Staff for Training Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report (Hereafter referred to as DCST SAHFR), 23 Nov 82.
6. Ibid. See appendix for listing of units involved in COLTT 82.
7. DCSLOG SAHFR, 12 Jul 82. See appendix for participating Sixth Army units.
8. Ltr, Grange to MG Berwyn Fragner, Commander, 63d ARCOM, 10 Nov 81. See also ltr, Fragner to Grange, AFKC-ACA-CG, 22 Oct 81.
9. Ltr, AFKC-CP, Grange to MG Frank J. Schober, Jr., Commander, State Military Forces, California, 28 Apr 82
10. DCST SAHFR, 20 Nov 82. See appendix for further details.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ltr, AFKC-TR-U, Grange to MUSARC, State Adjutant Generals, ARMR, 6 Jul 82, sub: Combined Arms Training. See also Sixth US Army Command Bulletin, 23 Aug 82, introduction.
18. Ltr, AFKG, General Richard E. Cavazos, Commander, US Army Forces Command, to Commanders, FORSCOM Units, 7 Apr 82, sub: U.S. Army Forces Command Training Guidelines.
19. Ltr, AFKC-TR-E, Grange to subordinate commanders, 7 Apr 82, 1st Ind, sub: USA Forces Cmd Training Guidelines.

20. Ltr, Grange to BG Daniel C. Helix, Commander, 351st Civil Affairs Command, 16 Oct 81. See also Sixth Army Command Bulletin, March 1982, and Ltr, Grange to General Robert Shoemaker, Commander, FORSCOM, 16 Oct 81, sub: Sixth US Army Pamphlet 21-5.
21. DCST SAHFR, 23 Nov 82.
22. Ibid.
23. Ltr, AFKC-TR-U, 26 Jan 82, subj: Procurement of Automatic Tank Target System (AITS) for Gowen Field, ID.
24. DCST SAHFR, 23 Nov 82.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ltr, AFKC-TR-U, Grange to Commanders, ARMR VIII and IX, 21 Dec 81, sub: TOW Subcaliber Training.
30. Ltr, AFKC-TR-U, Grange to General Shoemaker, 23 Feb 82.
31. Ltr, AFKC-TR-U, Grange to Commander, FORSCOM, 4 Jan 82 sub: Training Set Fare Observation (TSFO).
32. Ltr, AFKC-TR-U, Grange to Shoemaker, 12 Feb 82.
33. DCST SAHFR, 23 Nov 82.
34. Ltr, Grange to General Glenn K. Otis, Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 17 Dec 81.
35. Ltr, AFKC-TR-I, Grange to MG Richard A. Bresnahan, Commander, ARMR VIII, 21 Dec 81.
36. DCST SAHFR, 23 Nov 82.
37. Ibid.
38. Ltr, AFKC-TR-I, Grange Sends, 8 Mar 82, sub: Sixth US Army Skill Qualification Test (SQT) Policy.
39. DCST SAHFR, 23 Nov 82.

40. Ltr, AFKC-TR-I, Grange to Cdrs, ARMRS, State Adjutant Generals, and MUSARCs, 15 Mar 82, sub: Sixth US Army NCO Development Program Policy Letter.
41. DCST SAHFR, 23 Nov 82.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ltr, Grange Seeds, AFKC-TR-E, 5 May 82, sub: Annual Training Evaluation Guidelines.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid. See also Ltr, AFKC-TR, Grange to ARMRS, MUSARCs, AGs, 11 Feb 82, sub: Survival on the Battlefield.
49. Ibid. See also Msg, Grange to Chief of Staff, FORSCOM, 182230Z May 82, sub: Failure of AT Support to 40tn Inf Division.
50. DCST SAHFR, 23 Nov 82.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ltr, AFKC-TR, Grange to General Shoemaker, 10 Feb 82.
56. Ltr, AFKC-TR-I, Grange to Subordinate Commands, 11 Feb 82, sub: Infantry Initial Entry Training.

CHAPTER 6

MOBILIZING THE TOTAL FORCE

As the United States' foreign policy shifted towards a global involvement, the Army's chief planners recognized the need to expand the force. "I think an expansion of the force is essential," observed General Edward C. Meyer, Army chief of staff, "if we are to respond to the total challenge we face." The need for more flexible forces, strategically mobile, well-armed, and doctrinally sound headed the priority list of the Army's top soldier as the Army moved through this era of transition. To meet its new global requirements, the Army exercised a flexible command and control, and improved its strategic mobility. During the past fiscal year, 1982, the Sixth US Army worked to achieve these goals, fitting the Reserve Component more tightly into the Total Force.

"The Reserve Component provides a substantial part of the total force," wrote Lt. Gen. Grange in a letter to Maj. Gen. Joseph D. Zink, Reserve Force Policy Board. "Reorganization plans will increase that role in the future." As the population base shrunk, the Reserve efforts to recruit suitable personnel increased proportionately. On the surface, the goal of achieving full wartime manning in the Reserve Component seemed desirable. In actuality, argued Grange, this proved counterproductive. In the tables of organization and equipment design for example, full wartime levels represented optimum staffing rather than the minimum needed for mission accomplishment. The current standard organization model used in the Reserves put officers at the wartime level and enlisted personnel at 10 percent less than full authorization. The unit positions which made up this shortfall were almost exclusively at the lowest enlisted grades with entry level skills, e.g., drivers, assistant clerks, cooks. Continuing, Grange observed that getting people, and more importantly, keeping these positions manned in the Reserve Component, took a disproportionate amount of time and effort which detracted from over-all unit readiness.¹

Sixth US Army experienced its greatest personnel shortfalls at these grade levels and types of positions. An increase to full wartime levels only served to intensify this problem. Many of these positions could be easily filled by untrained personnel. Even deployment without fill would not seriously detract from unit ability to perform required missions. In this regard, Grange suggested a look at the past; "If today's readiness standards had been applied to Army units in previous conflicts, most would have to be classified not ready, and therefore not deployable."²

Not wishing to change either the tables of organization and equipment design or unit readiness standards, USASIX planners suggested looking at these realistically to see if the potential benefit was worth the resources required. In terms of economy of force, Sixth US Army analysts felt the resources necessary to achieve 100 percent wartime manning in the Reserve Component could be better employed by putting additional units in the structure to satisfy overall Army shortfalls.

Some analysts outside USASIX asserted that a high level of equipment fill equated to personnel stability and retention. This had always been one of the arguments in support of Reserve Component units being equipped in peacetime at the wartime level. Sixth US Army experience indicated correlation was certainly valid for units which had no equipment at all. However, once enough equipment became available for training, this did not seem to be a significant factor. In fact, there have been indications that too much equipment can be just as much a deterrent as too little. This was especially true for equipment-intensive units where almost all available training time was spent doing routine maintenance, leaving little time for other training activities. The assertion that Reserve Component units should have a full wartime load of equipment may or may not be valid on other grounds. However, except as defined above, USASIX planners felt there was no cause-and-effect relationship between equipment levels and unit recruiting and retention.³

Under current procedure, all units in the force not specifically identified by Department of the Army for inactivation were presumed to represent valid mobilization needs of the Army. Existing units were not normally considered as assets in evaluating new force structure needs. This tended to emphasize maintaining the status quo. Even low priority units now in the force became disproportionately more important than new requirements merely because they were already in being. However, where the new requirement could not be met without adverse impact on the present structure, priority of need became paramount if the new requirement was of higher priority than units now in the force. It had to be satisfied even if it meant reducing, or inactivating lower priority existing units and using their assets to accommodate the new requirement. Conversely, new requirements could not be "forced" into the structure if they adversely affected existing higher priority units. The greater flexibility provided by this concept made the Reserves more responsive to the mobilization needs of the Army.⁴

In spite of this responsiveness, the Army Reserve continued to be plagued by a high level of personnel turbulence during fiscal year 1982. Some units had an annual turnover of 100 percent or more. With only 38 days a year to train, developing individual skills and team building within high turnover units was virtually impossible. The Reserves seldom had many problems getting and keeping people in its higher-graded positions. Most of its turnover came from first term enlisted, grades E4 and below. By way of illustration, USASIX studies showed that as many as 40 percent never got to their unit primarily because of training losses, transfers, or adverse action. This not only hurt the unit but also wasted the recruiting and training resources of the Army.⁵

Last year, Sixth US Army evaluated unit retention based on the number of reenlistments. This was the criterion used by the Active Component. In the Reserves, it was suggested that the Reserve Component shift its emphasis to the number of people who completed their first term of enlistment. The Reserves must reduce turbulence to an acceptable level. Recruiting and retention were actually two sides of the same coin--they were so closely related as to be almost inseparable. The key to understanding this problem is to learn more about reserve soldiers; why they chose the Army Reserve in the first

place; what motivates them to stay or leave. Sixth US Army could then better define the kind of person it ought to be recruiting and how its units could keep them in the US Army Reserve for one complete term of enlistment.

Finding answers to these questions will only be possible through close-focus analysis over an extended period by trained personnel. Last year, most market research and analysis done by, or on behalf, of the Army was dedicated to the problems of Active Component recruiting. Now that the personnel needs of the Active Army are being met attention can perhaps be focused on the problem areas peculiar to Reserve recruiting and retention. Last year, Sixth US Army worked closely with the Army Research Institute to develop research programs which focused on this question.⁶

Upon mobilization, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is designed to become one of the primary sources of personnel fill for both Active and Reserve Component units. Sixth US Army planners were therefore concerned about the present practice of putting individuals into the Ready Reserve who were being released from military service for cause prior to completing their obligation, e.g., Trainee Discharge Program (TDP). These people still had a legal obligation, based on their enlistment contract. However, if they couldn't or wouldn't, meet the standards for military service in peacetime, they would be even less able to do so under wartime conditions. In fact, calling up large numbers of these individuals during initial mobilization, instead of providing a ready asset, could actually have the opposite effect by clogging the system with "problem" soldiers.⁷

Another area of concern last fiscal year was training aids and devices. Reserve Component units quite often had only limited ability to use their equipment other than during annual training, e.g., tanks, artillery. It was argued that excellent training could be accomplished through use of appropriate training aids and devices at a saving in cost and time so critical to the Reserve Component. While considerable progress was made in material upgrade of the Army Reserve during the report period, training resources continued to fall far short of actual requirements. Sixth US Army strength increases equalled 9.3 percent at midyear and continued to climb. Reserve Component training needs affected the readiness posture and threatened to jeopardize the progress achieved thus far. As new tactical systems were integrated into the Reserve and force structure changes were made to realign for mobilization, training became a critical factor in the equation. Sixth US Army planners urged a balanced level of resource support between equipping and training the total force if the Army was to meet President Ronald Reagan's objective of "immediate readiness."⁸

In the all important area of equipment readiness, particularly in high priority units within Sixth US Army, recent budget enhancements for fenced equipment for the Reserves helped the situation. Last year, the Reserve Forces Policy Board recommended that Reserve Component units be built to full required, rather than authorized table of organization and equipment quantities of equipment, on the theory that personnel and military occupational specialty qualifications would follow. This was not supportable in last year's fiscal environment and the potential backlash to increase

defense hardware spending. Advocacy of filling Reserve Component units with "first line" equipment was similarly unrealistic, even if the Army could place such orders on industry at will. In any event, before the Army implemented such a policy, the first step was to stabilize mobilization requirements. In the past year, about 39 percent of Sixth US Army priority units changed.⁹

The Board advocated that identical, or at least totally interoperable equipment, should be issued to the Reserve Component units which were designated to serve with specific Active Component units. Sixth US Army concurred in this recommendation. However, as new equipment was developed and placed in service, the previous generation(s) of equipment could not simply be discarded; the equipment cost too much to acquire. The displaced equipment continued to be used until it no longer had national defense value. Unfortunately, an increased number of end items in the Army system caused an increased logistic tail (tools, repair parts, maintenance requirements, etc.) and an increased requirement for numbers of people to operate and support multiple generations of equipment. This was an acknowledged requirement and consumer of resources, which could ideally be eliminated if one generation of equipment existed in the entire system. This seemed unlikely because only one generation of equipment equated to stagnation of development and a danger of maintaining an up-to-date fighting force.

Even if Reserve Component units had 100 percent of authorized wartime levels of equipment and trained people on hand, two days a month were insufficient to maintain the equipment in an available, ready-to-use status plus accomplish required individual and unit training. The Area Maintenance Support Activities (AMSA/CS) system for maintenance was developed to mitigate the maintenance workloads; this system had to be greatly expanded, with a commensurate increased consumption of resources (primarily funds and personnel). These increased resource requirements were never addressed. It was argued that the nation's attitude had to be modified to recognize the existant threat, and to intelligently prepare for mobilization, making available to the Reserve Component the increased resources required to implement the Board's recommendation.¹⁰

In still another area of concern, that of the fiscal year 1982 U.S. Army Reserve Troop Action Program (TAP), Sixth US Army voiced its concern about stationing units which could not or had not been properly resourced. "The practice of placing unresourced forces into structure," argued USASIX's Operations Analysts, lent itself, "to a degradation of the entire force and limits our ability to develop a force capable of accomplishing its mission."¹¹

In assessing the program, USASIX planners told Forces Command that units which required major end items of equipment should have this equipment for operation and training upon activation but not later than one year subsequent to activation. A Troop Action Program 83 unit which cannot reasonably expect to receive the required minimum essential equipment (MEE) by fiscal year 1984 cannot be expected to attain a reasonable readiness condition within four years of activation. This was especially true of units heavily dependent on specialized equipment or equipment on which a majority of training had to be conducted.¹²

Sixth US Army also suggested to Forces Command that it early-on identify units to be activated and designate a Selective Reenlistment Incentive Program enhancement consistent with mobilization and deployment priorities. Announcement of units designated for this program status should be made prior to Effective Date (EDATE) to allow the recruiting force maximum advantage to activation data. Decisions on activations should be made at the earliest possible time. Additional personnel authorizations and unit changes demand a realignment of US Army Recruiting Command resources. Any activations should consider the lead time necessary to hire, school, train, and bring on personnel in support of increased authorizations. This time period can be up to six months. It is imperative that decisions be made at least six months prior to effective date to allow the Recruiting Command time to bring on and train additional support troops as required.¹³

In relation to personnel resources in the form of Full-Time Manning (FTM) and Full-Time Unit Support, it was further recommended that Department of the Army civilian technicians be on board and operating when the unit activated. In this way, units would be able to start immediately on a program designed to achieve an early operational readiness capability. Facilities should be made available for a unit upon its activation. This was especially true when units were to be located in areas where no other Reserve units existed. The activation of units with high troop densities and low grade structures, was detrimental to the Reserve force. Low population density required units of this type to be placed in several widely disposed locations. This situation of low population density existed within several of the 15 western United States. In the future, if units of this type are required for the force, consideration should be given to establishing them as cadre units with reduced equipment authorizations.

Considering the importance of stationing actions, the provision of adequate time and staffing must be taken into consideration. The approval of full-time staffing at the major US Army Reserve Commands was a step in the right direction; however, no one person effectively handled the numerous individual actions which comprised the development of an implementation plan. Therefore, Sixth US Army recommended an early approval of the addition of a force structure section to the major US Army Reserve Command tables of distribution and allowances, a reduction in the administrative paperwork required to justify and complete an action, and a longer time period for planning, development and staffing.¹⁴

On the all important issue of mobilization, General Grange, in a 1 March 1982 letter to the new FORSCOM Commander, General Richard E. Cavazos, argued for the development of doctrine in the establishment, organization and functions of a Seaport of Embarkation Coordination Group (SPOECG). In terms of facilitating sea deployment in a timely and satisfactory manner, the Coordination Group mission was as critical to deployment by sea as the Departure Airfield Control Group was to deployment by air. Coordination development of the Seaport of Embarkation Coordination Group required the combined efforts of Forces Command, Military Traffic and Management Command, the Training and Doctrine Command, and possibly the Joint Deployment Agency.¹⁵

A second issue, the requirement to provide alternatives for tents to house mobilizing units at the mobilization stations, needed to be addressed because, as Grange noted, "tents are not available in the quantities we will need." Even if procured, continued Grange, the storage and maintenance of "the tons of canvas needed seemed to prohibit this option. Other alternatives included the prepositioning of prefab buildings, concrete for concrete slabs, quonset huts and relocatables or modular dwellings (as used in Korea). The Army should also retain more World War II temporary structures in a minimum maintenance status.¹⁶

Thirdly, continued the Sixth US Army Commander, the Army must identify precisely what equipment training divisions will need to accomplish their mission and insure that the logistics system can provide it in time and in the numbers required. For example, the 91st Division (Training) was required by modified tables of organization and equipment to have 12,264 M-16's. However, the actual requirement, based on trainee loads, was 18,700. This left a shortfall of 6,436 rifles. Without these weapons and other mission essential equipment (machine guns, DRAGONS, mortars, binoculars, etc), the division could not properly and adequately operate an Army Training Center capable of producing the trainee loads required by the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT). Sixth US Army recommended that the Training and Doctrine Command review the equipment authorization documents, in conjunction with projected trainee loads, to determine shortfalls. After shortfalls were identified, the logistics systems could then be tasked to provide the needed equipment. It was decided, Grange continued, that mobilization day was too late to begin to solve this shortage problem.¹⁷

Lack of communication capability at the major US Army Reserve Command level represented another unresolved mobilization issue, argued the Sixth US Army Commander. Last fiscal year, the major US Army Reserve Command headquarters depended solely on the commercial telephone system for communications with their subordinate units. During emergencies, when the commercial line load control system was implemented, nonpriority lines were inoperable. The ability of the Armies and their Army Mobilization and Readiness Regions to pass classified data to major Reserve Commands rapidly was limited to time-consuming KAC codes. Headquarters, major Reserve Command's source of telecommunications from higher headquarters, was normally not colocated with the major command but at a fixed military facility located away from the headquarters. It was argued that a solution might be to provide SSB radio or radio teletype service to the major Reserve Commands and Readiness and Mobilization Regions. Although it was technically possible to have Reserve Component unit telephones exempted from line load control, arrangements had to be made with respective telephone companies. Resolution of this issue would greatly facilitate mobilization.¹⁸

Another issue raised by General Grange, that of responsibility for management and control of the total military highway movement requirement during full mobilization, was vaguely defined and did not consider the impact of Civilian Crisis Relocation programs. There was no workable plan or collected data for the management and control of defense highway movement. Federal, State and Continental US Army Emergency Highway Traffic Regulation Plans (EHTR) were designed to support natural disasters or an attack upon the United States; they

were not intended or written to manage full mobilization. This problem required resolution among many agencies. Sixth US Army planners suggested using the State Area Command Headquarters in planning. The dates contained in the Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan (MTBSP), wrote General Grange, were unrealistic. From observation, "we are not convinced that units can load their required equipment, move to the mobilization stations, and then move to POE within the present published schedules." Sixth US Army, Grange continued, "will look closely at the MTBSP during MOBEX 82 and make the appropriate recommendations accordingly."¹⁹

The last issue addressed by the Sixth US Army Commander was the integration of mobilization planning with contingency planning. "Our MOBEX scenarios exclude such likely concurrent requirements as land defense or Military Support to Civil Defense." As a result, concluded Grange, "we have even created different chains of command, dependent on the contingency. Mobilization has one chain, civil disturbance operations have another, and civil defense operations have a third chain, and operations for Graphic Hand is based on an ad hoc command structure totally different from any other."²⁰

To keep mobilization requirements at a high level of visibility within Sixth US Army, between mobilization exercises, the USASIX Commander inaugurated the Sixth US Army Mobilization Exercise (SAMEX-81), a three-day, free play, no-fault mobilization exercise based upon actions required during the first three phases of full mobilization, as outlined in the Forces Command Mobilization Plan. Conducted from 6-8 November 1981, the exercise included representatives from both Readiness and Mobilization Regions, the four Army Reserve Commands, and the three General Officer Commands. Of 15 National Guard units invited, only four elected to attend (California, Utah, Nevada, Washington), with the Nevada National Guard exercising one guard unit. Mobilization stations were also invited, and three (Forts Lewis and Ord, and the Presidio of San Francisco) volunteered to become involved in the Exercise.

Stressing the importance of mobilization planning throughout Sixth US Army, SAMEX-81 forced commanders, at all levels, to emphasize mobilization preparedness; identified unit level home stations and mobilization processing shortcomings; exercised command and control and communication systems that supported mobilization planning and execution among the Continental Armies, Readiness and Mobilization Regions, major US Army Reserve Commands, and State Area Command Headquarters; evaluated major US Army Reserve Command capabilities to assist Reserve Component units to mobilize at home stations, conduct home stationing processing, and prepare for movement to mobilization stations. In addition, it provided operational training for commanders and staff; tested alert notification plans and procedures; and prepared the major US Army Reserve Commands for participation in MOBEX-83.²¹

Reserve Component units participating in SAMEX-81 reviewed and updated unit mobilization files; exercised Unit Alert Plans; prepared updated mobilization support requirement forms; loaded some vehicles in preparation for Phase IV, and conducted maximum home station processing within exercise time in accordance with Part 3 Reserve Component Unit Commanders Handbook, to Volume III, FORMDEPS (Draft).

Preplanned and free-play messages were introduced to create situations and problems for members to resolve. Headquarters, Army Readiness and Mobilization Region IX, was realigned into a direct-rate-type staff to test its mobilization organization, and its staff was augmented by personnel from the 91st Military Training Command. Directorate standard operating procedures were developed and the mobilization table of distribution and allowance was analyzed in conjunction with staff training. Finally, it was determined that a mobilization table of distribution and allowance with an emergency operations center with a 24 hour capability was needed.²² Among the problems encountered were in the areas of communications, dependents, Reserve Center turn-in, emergency operation experience, emergency road network, dependent identification cards, mobilization documents, maintenance, coordination, training divisions, readiness groups, alert notifications, medical personnel, exemptions from mobilization, and unit assistance.

In the communications area, the accomplishment of exercise objectives was impeded by delays in message handling, even when immediate precedence was used. The current reliance on commercial telephone service and across-the-counter, AUTODIN message delivery was inadequate for the control of mobilization. Serious delays occurred in transmitting classified mobilization orders and in processing the anticipated quantity of administrative information because of the time required to use operations codes or for addressees to travel to their supporting communications center.

The vulnerability of commercial communications was an added risk which was offset only slightly by the existence of an unsecured AM voice radio net between the Continental Armies and state area commands. The March, 1981 draft of the US Army Communication Command (USACC) High Frequency Improvement Plan provided radioteletype equipment for the state area commands; it did not, however, provide for communications security devices, nor did it have any provision for Army Reserve command coverage. Expansion to include both state area commands and Army Reserve command headquarters was imperative.²³

Some units were not aware of their local telephone company's plan for line-load control which prevented their making outgoing calls. Guidance needed to be issued to alert all units to make the necessary local telephone coordination. Greater emphasis needed to be placed on preparing dependents for the possible mobilization of their sponsor. Dependents need to know from whom and where they will get assistance during post-mobilization. Many of the Reservists' families were poorly prepared for mobilization. Forces Command directives concerning the turn-in of Reserve Centers or leased property by the mobilized Reserve Component unit commander required additional clarification. Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System required turning in custody and security of Reserve Centers to the support installation. Upon mobilization, State Area Commands may be in a better position to accept custody and control of Army Reserve Centers. Commanders at all levels needed exercise experience to fully understand mobilization preparedness requirements. In many cases, this was the first Emergency Operations Center experience for Reserve personnel.²⁴

In addition, it was determined that the control movement on the highways during mobilization needed further clarification, especially when a unit must cross two or more States. Most of this coordination should be accomplished prior to mobilization. Definitive road march data should expand upon a strip map, to include fuel points, rest stops, check points, meal stops, etc. One agency should be tasked to coordinate this movement activity. There was some confusion as to which mobilization documents were to be used during a SAMEX because of the recent introduction of Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System, and the Sixth US Army Mobilization Plan (6AMP). This problem was expected to be resolved when the deployment planning system and the Sixth US Army Mobilization Plan were finalized.²⁵

Under existing regulations, National Guard and Army Reserve maintenance shops were ineffective due to loss of technicians mobilized with their units. Personnel staffing the Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA)/Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites (MATES), and California State Military Forces (CSMS) were required to be members of an active Reserve Component unit. Mobilization of the Reserve Component withdrew qualified personnel from these activities, sites and spaces. Completing the work required to reduce maintenance backlogs could not be accomplished with the drastically reduced maintenance staff. This problem was identified during MOBEX-80 and is being resolved by Forces Command and Department of the Army.²⁶

Greater emphasis must be placed on coordination between the State Area Commands and the major Reserve Commands. During SAMEX-81, the State Area Commands were not sure what requirements would be placed upon them to support Reserve unit, post-mobilization requirements. The Sixth US Army Mobilization Plan will define these requirements and responsibilities. Orders format in Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning Systems for assignment of training division to the Training and Doctrine Command must be revised. The question was whether or not training divisions will be attached to the installation for administrative matters (promotion, transfer, etc). The Readiness and Mobilization Regions have minimum capability to assist Reserve Component units at home station during Phase III. Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Teams (MAIT) were unable to assist units at home station. Therefore, major Reserve Commands and State Area Commands must provide home station processing assistance if needed. An alert plan must be continually updated and tested frequently. A shortage of medical personnel was noted; this applied both to those required to deploy with units, and those who were to administer necessary immunizations.²⁷

Current regulations were specific as to non-deployable and non-mobilization personnel assets. Nevertheless, there was a current belief, backed by historical precedence, that certain personnel would not be mobilized, e.g., postal workers, policemen, railroad workers, and certain government employees. Personnel requesting delays/exemption from mobilization included split-option training, initial ADT, college students, ROTC cadets, medical (temporary), temporarily out-of state, single parents, pregnant soldiers, and those soldiers who did not report, therefore, they were classified AWOL.

During full mobilization Reserve Component units would require assistance to accomplish legal assistance (wills, power-of-attorney, financial counseling, etc), and medical examinations and immunizations.²⁸

Finally, in its report on SAMEX-81, USASIX planners argued that during any mobilization exercise, greater effort must be exerted to involve Reserve Component units in phases IV and V; longer exercises were preferable so involvement of staff members became more complete and demanding. Future mobilization exercises should also involve a maximum number of Reserve Component units; controllers and evaluators should be considered for future exercises to enhance controlled testing of specific areas; and exercises should be scheduled frequently to ensure that all personnel are prepared and that mobilization planning becomes institutionalized. An objective ("milestone") of MOBEX-83 should include examination and validation of Army Reserve Command communications requirements; and the armies should minimize use of AUTODIN messages in future mobilization exercises and rely on telephone and State Area Command Radio Net, because of the inherent problems with transmission and receipt of AUTODIN messages by major Reserve Commands and some State Area Commands. Continental Army and major US Army Reserve Command mobilization exercises should be given greater support, including additional funding by Forces Command, to ensure that mobilization preparedness is emphasized in the years when MOBEX is not conducted. Additional funding for Army National Guard participation in Continental Army and state exercises needs to be addressed by the Army.²⁹

To standardize mobilization planning, the Sixth US Army published a Mobilization Plan on 15 August 1982, supplementing the Forces Command Mobilization Plan and prescribing the manner in which mobilization planning and execution would be conducted within the USASIX area. It provided tasking and guidance to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, the State Area Commands, major US Army Reserve Commands, and installations.

In July, 1981, the Commander, Forces Command, tasked the Continental United States Armies to identify missions for the State Area Commands, the Army Reserve Commands, and the General Officer Commands and to identify major US Army Reserve Commanders to replace deploying major troop unit (MTU) commanders at installations. In December, 1981, Sixth US Army recommended the new mission of giving State Area Commands operational control over all Reserve and National Guard units for movement control while moving through the states.³⁰ It further recommended that the Army Reserve Command move to mobilization stations after completion of their home station mobilization mission to organize, plan, and activate and train COMPO 4, and total mobilization units.³¹ This would be the first time Army Reserve Commands have been assigned a mission after the M+60 timeframe. Sixth US Army assigned major US Army Reserve commanders to a post-mobilization installation command. The 89th US Army Reserve Commander was scheduled to command Fort Riley after the departure of the 1st Infantry Division Commander, the 96th US Army Reserve Commander would command Fort Carson after the 4th Infantry Division Commander's deployment. Fort Ord was to be commanded by the 91st Training Division Commander upon the departure of the 7th Infantry Division Commander. The 124th US Army Reserve Commander was destined to be reassigned to command Fort Lewis upon the departure of the 1

Corps Commander, while the 63d Army Reserve Commander was tentatively scheduled to command Camp Roberts upon mobilization.³² All of these decisions allowed detailed mobilization planning to continue.

In July 1981, the Commander, Forces Command directed the Armies and the Regions to conduct a thorough installation mobilization plan review to permit Forces Command to validate installation mobilization tables of distribution and allowances. The program was divided into three phases: Phase I was a thorough review of the installation mobilization plan to insure it was sufficiently detailed to easily execute their mobilization missions. This phase was conducted by a combined Army and Region team. Phase I was conducted at Fort Ord, Fort Lewis, Fort Carson, Presidio of San Francisco, Gowen Field, and Camp Roberts, Fort Irwin, and Fort Huachuca. Phase II was a determination of manpower and equipment necessary to execute the mobilization mission of each installation; Phase II was completed by each installation staff. Phase III was the validation of those manpower and equipment requirements into an installation mobilization table of distribution and allowances. The entire program was completed in September, 1982. The results were detailed mobilization plans at the installation level. The tables were a realistic assessment of the necessary assets to successfully accomplish mobilization and deployment.³³

In July 1982 the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations published Sixth US Army Circular 500-2 establishing the USASIX Mobilization/Deployment Improvement Program (SAMDIP), which identified, resolved, and monitored the resolution of issues which hindered mobilization and deployment. Issues unable to be resolved at CONUSA level were to be submitted to Forces Command.

On 31 August 1982, a Letter of Agreement between the Idaho Army National Guard and Sixth US Army was signed by Maj. Gen. James S. Brooks, the Adjutant General, Idaho, and Maj. Gen. Robert W. Riscassi, Commander, ARMR VIII, to establish coordination of mobilization planning and to provide ARMR VIII approval authorization for State and state area command mobilization plans for Gowen Field. In addition it was agreed that Gowen Field would assume supporting and coordinating installation responsibilities for areas as designated by Sixth US Army through ARMR VIII. On 23 November 1981, Forces Command approved the USASIX recommendation that Gowen Field become a separate "stand alone" Forces Command installation upon mobilization and to proceed with planning on that basis. In addition, Forces Command directed Sixth US Army develop an intra-service support agreement which was subsequently changed to the letter of agreement mentioned in the above paragraph.

On 17 February 1982, ARMR VIII approved the Gowen Field Mobilization Plan which established Gowen Field as a separate Forces Command mobilization station. During the period 2-7 August 1982, Forces Command validated the mobilization table of distribution and allowances for Gowen Field and identified specific support requirements for Gowen Field to accomplish pre-mobilization installation planning and to perform its post-mobilization mission as a Forces Command installation. To satisfy these requirements, Fort Lewis became the support installation for Gowen Field and was tasked to provide support to Gowen Field in the areas of automatic data processing, engineering, legal, civilian personnel, and finance.³⁴

Another important facet of mobilization that surfaced last year was Nuclear Biological and Chemical Warfare, with all its ramifications. In June, 1981, Forces Command officially transferred its Nuclear Chemical Accident Incident Control (NCAIC) mission responsibility to the US Army Materiel and Readiness Command. This relieved Forts Carson and Ord of the requirement to maintain, train, and equip a large Service Response Force (SFR) to respond to accident control situations. Each installation in Sixth US Army was now tasked to respond to a nuclear/chemical accident with its existing assets (primarily fire-fighting, rescue, medical and security) when requested by the National Military Command Center. Sixth US Army continued to maintain its role as disaster relief coordinator for military assets within the 15 western states. The response to a nuclear/chemical accident or incident had, therefore, become similar to the response required for a natural disaster/emergency situation.³⁵

Forces Command replaced the Command Evaluation (CE) of Reserve Component Nuclear Capable Units with the Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP)/Technical Validation Inspection (TVI) system effective September 1982. Under the new system, headquarters of nuclear capable units will no longer be evaluated. This left Sixth US Army with a total of 25 units to undergo Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program/Technical Validation Inspection System testing by Training Year 1985. The new system featured each unit taking a nuclear and conventional training program once every three years followed by a technical validation inspection administered by the Forces Command Inspector General. Command evaluations were replaced by the Continental Army administered technical assistance visits (TAV) during a unit's non-evaluation program years. Twenty-four out of 25 of the Reserve Component nuclear capable field artillery units met or exceeded their Forces Command nuclear training objective under the old evaluation system this training year. One unit was administered a technical assistance visit under the new system in September 1982. Most of the coordination for scheduling of Training Year 1983's programs was completed in September 1982 by the Field Artillery Coordinators in Army Readiness and Mobilization Region VIII and IX. Sixth US Army was scheduled to implement the new evaluation system on approximately one-third of its units in Training Year 1983.³⁶

Continuing improvement in the qualification of Chemical Operations Specialist (MOS 54E20) was sought last year. The U.S. Army Chemical School released a new "MOS qualifying" 54E20 transition course for the nuclear, biological and chemical non-commissioned officer at company and battalion level. A special training course was offered to Army Reserve school instructors in November, 1982, to introduce the program of instruction and qualify appropriate instructors. Plans were ongoing to implement this new military occupational specialty course which required 136 hours of training configured in three MUTA-4s and an 11-day annual training. Tentatively, two 54E summer annual training sessions were planned at Parks Rapid Forces Training Area emphasizing hands-on equipment training, practical exercises and field problems. Once implemented, this program will enhance qualification levels of this specialty and, in turn, unit Nuclear, Biological and Chemical defense readiness posture.³⁷

Sixth US Army's proposal requesting a change to the Army Reserve Command table of distribution and allowances was approved; one chemical staff officer, 04, 74A, was added to the table of distribution and allowances effective 16 January 1983. Chemical Defense Equipment was more closely monitored by providing technical advice on handling and storage requirements, and by issuing revised unit stockage levels for contingency and training issues to all major US Army Reserve Commands. A recommendation was also made to the Major Commands to transfer unit level storage of chemical decontaminants DS-2 and STB to central storage facilities near mobilization stations.³⁸

Turning to another area indirectly related to mobilization, Sixth US Army, in an effort to improve liaison with the states for land defense and military support of civilian defense missions, activated a State Military Support Office (SMSO) in 1981. One of its many functions was to provide each state within the USASIX area of responsibility a two-man liaison team consisting of one colonel and one sergeant major. As a matter of routine, support office teams performed their liaison functions at their respective state headquarters on a 48-paid drill basis. General Grange, in a letter to Maj. Gen. Berwyn Fragner, Commander, 63d US Army Reserve Command, personally instructed his military support liaison personnel to become involved in mobilization activities, and to provide liaison between headquarters and the State Area Commands upon mobilization.³⁹

During the same period, weather support surfaced as a matter of grave concern to General Grange, especially its impact on Sixth US Army's combat readiness. In a 31 March 1982 letter to the Commander, Forces Command, the USASIX Commander discussed the problem regarding authorization and issuance of U.S. Army tables of organization and equipment to Air National Guard weather flights. As impacted on weather support to Army National Guard divisions, brigades, and armored cavalry regiments, it was, wrote Grange, vital to combat readiness.⁴⁰ During 1979, continued Grange, the 100-series US Air Force Weather Flight Detachments were realigned CONUS-wide to support the Reserve Component. Certain tactical equipment was to be provided by the Army to Air Force weather flights, as directed by the Joint Regulation AR 115-10 and AFR 103-3. To date, continued Grange, the Department of the Army has not authorized the equipment. Consequently, "weather units, which are only authorized Air Force meteorologist equipment, cannot train with the Army units they support."⁴¹

Implementation of Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) in the Reserve Component did not solve this problem. For example, wrote Grange, "while current CEWI TOE authorizes equipment for weather flight detachments, only two weather units in Sixth US Army are affected; the remainder of our brigades and armored cavalry regiments are not yet scheduled for CEWI support." Because weather support was vital to combat readiness, General Grange solicited Forces Command assistance in meeting this need.⁴²

Another problem area, that of Rear Area Combat Operations (RACO), prompted a 16 July 1982 letter to Maj. Gen. Jack N. Merritt, Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center. Having observed the Rear Area Combat Operations Command Post Exercise, Corps Defender I, conducted at Camp Roberts, General Grange wrote

that his first concern centered on the current proposal to eliminate the Rear Area Combat Operation Institute, a two-track approach to the rear area protection problem. As he understood it, "the proposal calls for RACO functions being shared by having the MPs responsible for RACO and the engineers responsible for area damage control." This proposal, argued Grange, needed closer examination because, the rear area combat operators he observed were, "a top-notch group of professionals," who were, "thoroughly oriented to the problem and capable of providing a critical service." He recommended splitting responsibility.⁴³ Grange's second concern, that of observing Reserve Component rear area threat management techniques exercises, prompted him to suggest sending Active Component personnel to these Reserve Component exercises so that they might track them and learn some new techniques peculiar to the Reserve Force.⁴⁴

Another important sidelight to mobilization, Reserve Component Rapid Deployment Force-Army (Intensively Managed Force List) Readiness, received special emphasis in Sixth US Army during the past fiscal year. Established by Forces Command in 1980 to evaluate the readiness of Reserve Component Rapid Deployment Forces-Army units, USASIX applied much effort to upgrade the readiness status of its designated units. Progress was limited, however, with 10 out of 12 units, unready, unfilled, illequipped, and untrained to perform their combat mission within the time required to deploy. The primary reason for this, wrote General Grange to the Commanding General, Forces Command, was the lack of authorized resources. "Eight of the non-mission ready units are presently organized at a low authorized level of organization (ALO)," noted Grange and, "past cross-leveling and ear marking of men and equipment at MOB stations and among other units in this region have not significantly improved the deployability of these units." Grange suggested that Forces Command upgrade these units' resource priority by raising their authorized levels of organization. In the meantime, Sixth US Army aggressively undertook actions to correct these shortfalls.⁴⁵

Finally, in three other areas peculiar to the Reserve Component, that of disaster relief, land defense, and military support of civil defense, General Grange passed on some observations to General Glenn K. Otis, Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. As a Continental Army Commander, Grange observed, he was responsible for planning and coordinating the use of Department of Defense resources in support of assistance to authority for disaster relief, land defense, and military support of civil defense. "These functions are closely related," continued the USASIX Commander, "and have dictated regular contact with a variety of agencies and activities which are normally outside the purview of the basic combat arms officer."⁴⁶

Grange admitted the need to establish good relations with civilian authorities but he questioned the time and energy it took to accomplish these tasks, especially since, "the cost of our troops and equipment has become so great and the time available to train for our wartime missions so limited. . . . " As local government budgets shrink and greater emphasis is given to civil preparedness, Grange predicted that, "our installation commanders and staffs will face more frequent contact with state and local civil agencies and such federal activities as FEMA." The line drawn between federal, military and

civil activities, continued Grange," is becoming indistinct and as our economy and society become even more interdependent, an understanding of the military role in these matters becomes more important."⁴⁷

As a possible remedy to this situation, the Sixth US Army Commander recommended the establishment, in the Army's senior officer and field grade officer schools, a block of instruction covering the civil-military relationship. He suggested a curriculum addressing, among other topics, the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the methods in which assistance to civil authority and support to civil defense are provided, and the roles of the Director of Military Support, Department of the Army, and Readiness Command in domestic contingency operations. Within five years, concluded Grange, the Army could have a core of commanders and staff officers in the field familiar with procedures for dealing with civil authority.⁴⁸

As an essential part of the Total Army, the Army Reserve must be prepared to mobilize in time of national emergency. While composed of predominantly support and general service support units, the Reserve Component must be able to sustain the total 24-division force. In addition, soldiers of the Individual Ready Reserve are required to be available as replacement and fillers for active and reserve units and as cadremen for new units. Even the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was heavily dependent upon the Army Reserve for a major portion of its transportation, fuel and civil affairs support.

In addition, the Army Reserve must be prepared to support operations in Europe on short notice. Approximately one-fifth of Army Reserve units would be committed within 30 days of mobilization, and some units have deployment times so short that they would move directly to their ports of embarkation when called to active duty. Fifty-seven percent of Army Reserve units were scheduled to deploy between 30 and 60 days after mobilization and virtually all units would be deployed within 90 days of mobilization.⁴⁹

With the Total Army thus so dependent on its capabilities, the Army Reserve must address readiness. Being an important part of this organization, Sixth US Army emphasized mobilization and combat readiness during the fiscal year 1982, paying particular attention to readying the Reserves for any eventuality. "We must anticipate the impact of modernization on each unit in terms of training, operations, personnel, supply and maintenance," wrote General Grange in the June, 1982 Commander's Bulletin. Turbulence was to be expected; therefore he reminded his commanders to "prepare our units to take the modernization program in stride and continue to maintain a high state of readiness." Most of the modernization equipment, continued Grange, "will present real challenges to the Reserve Component."⁵⁰

The Total Army Mission, concluded Grange, "is to provide deterrence against any attack upon U.S. National interests and, if we are required to fight, to win." All the new assets coming into the system ought to, "markedly improve our Total Army's ability to provide a viable response to any threat." In

closing, he admonished his staff and subordinate commanders to, "plan well in anticipation of the forthcoming equipment so that we experience as little turbulence as possible during this modernization period."⁵¹ Fiscal year 1982 saw Sixth US Army addressing the General's concerns and working towards modernizing the Reserve Component with energy and determination.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ltr, AFKC-OP-SF, Grange to MG ZINK, 9 Aug 82, sub: Reserve Force Policy Board.
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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ltr, AFKC-OP-SF, Grange to Commander, FORSCOM, 29 Jan 82, sub: FY83 USAR Troop Action Program (TAP).
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ltr. AFKC-OP-P, 1 Mar 82, Grange to Cavazos,
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report, FY 1982 (Hereafter referred to as DCSOPS SAHFR).

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ltr, AFKC-OP-P, Grange to Commander, FORSCOM, 21 Dec 81, sub: Mobilization and Deployment Tasks.
31. Ltr, AFKC-OP-P, 3 Feb 82, SAB.
32. Ltr, AFKC-OP-P, 20 Apr 82, sub: Post-Mobilization Installation Command. See also Ltr, AFKC-OP-P, Grange to Commander, 124th ARCOM, 14 May 82.
33. DCSOPS SAHFR, FY1982.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ltr, AFKC-OP, Grange to MG Fragner, 17 May 82.
40. Ltr, AFKC-OP-IS, Grange to Commander, FORSCOM, 31 Mar 82, sub: Army Equipment Support to Air National Guard Weather Flights.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ltr, AFKC-PM, Grange to MG Merritt, 16 Jul 82.
44. Ibid.
45. Ltr, AFKC-OP-OR, Grange to Commander, FORSCOM, 20 Jul 82, sub: RDF-A Authorized Level of Organization. See also ltr, AFKA-CG, AFKB-CG, AFKC-CG, 5 Apr 82, to General Cavazos.
46. Ltr, AFKC-OP-P, Grange to General Otis, 20 Sep 82.

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Sixth US Army, Command Bulletin, 28 June 1982.
51. Ibid.

CHAPTER 7

PROVIDING FOR THE TOTAL FORCE

In addition to its principal duties of organizing, manning, equipping, training, supporting, and mobilizing the Reserve Component, Sixth US Army accomplished other, equally important, tasks which served not only to benefit the Reserves and National Guard but the Total Army. While less visible than the other missions, these activities went a long way towards achieving General Meyers's goals for force modernization. In the field of Aviation Management, for example, Sixth US Army pushed hard for resource management surveys, aviation safety, flying hour programs, training, standardization, and flight courses.

In the first area of concern, resource management surveys, USASIX continued to conduct Aviation Resources Management Surveys (ARMS) throughout the Sixth US Army area. From October 1981 to September 1982, the Aviation Office evaluated 15 US Army Reserve and 19 Army National Guard aviation units and five Army Reserve aviation flight facilities. Emphasizing unit capabilities as a whole, Sixth US Army's evaluations encompassed 200 Reserve and 1,100 National Guard aviators, and 87 Reserve and 563 National Guard aircraft. In the past, Aviation Resource Management Surveys were document-oriented rather than performance-oriented in relation to the unit's tactical mission. Reserve Component surveys integrated tactical scenarios into unit evaluations using Army Evaluation and Testing Program tasks, aircraft training manual (ATM) tactical/special mission tasks, and threat considerations. This trend continued during this past fiscal year; therefore, commanders were instructed to develop a tactical standard operating procedure covering all facets of the unit's operation in the field and to practice "on the ground" at every opportunity. Only with realistic tactical training can commanders evaluate their total mission capability.¹

In the area of aviation safety, Sixth US Army focused its attention on the increased vulnerability to aviation mishaps; "Extended flying time, coupled with the pressures of evaluation and the desire to do well, simply makes us more subject to accidents during the critical period."² Sixth US Army reminded commanders of their responsibility to steady the training environment and insure that their soldiers strive for meaningful, realistic training--training to achieve the highest possible individual and unit readiness--and do it safely. "Training goals should be attainable from the current level of training and available resources," argued the June, 1982 Command Bulletin. "Failure to maintain this balance and have practical goals could create an environment which encourages mishaps to occur, thus causing losses in manpower, material, and funds; losses which will severely inhibit the ability to accomplish our mission."³ And while the fiscal year 1982 aviation safety record was an improvement over the previous fiscal year, there was one Class A aircraft mishap in the Army Reserve. A zero Class A safety record was emphasized for this fiscal year.

The fiscal year 1982 Flying Hour Program for Army Reserve Units, another aviation area of concern, totalled 15,865 hours (8,889 UH-1, 4,281 CH-47, and 2,695 Fixed Wing hours). At mid-year, Department of the Army announced a new policy limiting flying hours to Department of the Army established ceilings by type aircraft system, followed by a directed reduction of flying hours for all components for the fiscal year; Sixth US Army's Reserve program was reduced across the system by nine percent. Total constrained hours were 14,580, of which 14,315 hours were flown (1,633 fixed wing, 8,636 UH-1, 4,060 CH-47) for a 98 percent accomplishment. Total budget allocated to support the constrained program was \$5,289,395. Major US Army Reserve Commands submitted impact statements to Sixth US Army which resulted in a formal request to Forces Command for some relief of the reduction.⁴

In the all important area of aviation training, Sixth US Army emphasized the Aircraft Training Manual program. Additionally, the Aviation Office developed a scenario program designed to evaluate unit ability to perform its combat mission in a variety of environments. Scenarios were task oriented and integrated aircraft training manuals and Army training and evaluation training tasks. Additionally, throughout the fiscal year, emphasis focused on implementation of the manual aviation related NBC and Night Hawk/Night Vision Goggle training. Unit training programs expanded as new NBC equipment was received. A comprehensive NBC training program was fielded during this period, with milestones for implementation. However, lack of equipment and institutional support for training instructor pilots inhibited progress in many units. Nonetheless, the Forces Command Aviation Office adopted this program command-wide.

In conjunction with mission scenarios, the Aviation Resource Management Survey team conducted safety surveys designed to evaluate a cross section of unit personnel safety awareness and training status. Both scenarios and safety surveys were in conjunction with the Aviation Resource Management Survey and provided valuable feedback to units and higher headquarters concerning unit readiness. Training concepts, methods, and programs continued to improve during this year, and readiness was steadily upgraded.⁵

The fiscal year 1982 Standardization Committee Meeting was held 4 and 5 August 1982 at the Presidio and Royal Inn, San Francisco. The meeting was attended by all Reserve Component Aviation Officers and Aviation Safety Officers. Representatives from Forces Command, National Guard Bureau, Army Safety Center, and Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, Fort Rucker, Alabama also attended. The keynote speaker was Jere Hickman, Chief of Staff, Sixth US Army, who challenged each person to bring Sixth US Army aviation units to a high state of readiness. Noteworthy during this year's meeting was the high percentage of Sixth US Army issues addressed or forwarded to Department of the Army by Forces Command Standardization Committee. This speaks well for Sixth US Army Standardization Committee and its member input.⁶

On a more practical level, the Army Reserve received three U-21A aircraft as replacements for the aged and non-standard aircraft currently in the inventory of the Reserve CONUS wide. Following extensive depot restoration (less avionics) at Fort Carson, all three aircraft were allocated to Sixth US Army

and subsequently assigned to the table of distribution and allowance aviation division of the 63d, 96th, and 124th Army Reserve Command. The Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, requested that these aircraft receive priority for induction in the Product Improvement Program to install the King Avionic package.⁷

Another aviation program receiving Sixth US Army attention during this fiscal year was the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Aviation Training Program, which provided Reserve aviators realistic combat training on modern equipment in order to prepare and retain Reserve aviator assets for mobilization. The US Army Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center was assigned responsibility for reimbursable flying hours and corresponding funds, as well as screening potential Individual Ready Reserve aviators, coordination with the supporting Continental Armies, installations and units, and administrative procedures to place the Reserve aviator on active duty for training. Fiscal year 1982 saw the start of the Individual Ready Reserve aviator training with Army Reserve units and aviation flight facilities within Sixth US Army. Being the first full year for the program, 23 aviators were involved (63d, 96th, 124th ARCOMS), flying a total of 297 flight hours.⁸

During the same period, 61 Reserve aviators were entered in aviation service as compared to 35 who were removed from aviation service. At the end of the fiscal year, there were a total of 246 Reserve aviators assigned against 244 TOE/TDA aviator positions.⁹

Implementation of the Centralized Aviation Readiness Team (CART) concept progressed significantly within Sixth US Army. ARMR IX team members were on the ground and operational. Team members were located at Hamilton AFB, California, Fort Lewis, Washington and Los Alamitos, California. ARMR VIII continued to fill vacancies with teams located at Aurora, Colorado, Fort Douglas, Utah and Fort Riley, Kansas. Support to Reserve Component aviation units was geographically oriented with specialized resource teams being tailored to fit units needs.

General Grange, in a 28 April 1982 letter to General Cavazos, spoke of Sixth US Army's efforts to effectively implement the Centralized Aviation Readiness Training team concept as directed by a July 1981 "Shoemaker Sends" message. "The realignment does eliminate redundancy, conserves spaces and, in some cases, improves the command and control of the aviation advisor/assistant effort," commented Grange. Understandably, continued the Sixth US Army Commander, "the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMRs) are experiencing great difficulty in balancing a functional centralized CART system against the resultant loss of CART responsiveness to support units, vastly increased travel requirements, span of control problems for aviation coordinators and aircraft support for CART team member training." In order to best serve the CART concept and the advisory assistance effort, Grange suggested giving his region commanders sufficient flexibility to devise the stationing and command and control arrangements most suitable to their geographic areas and types of units supported. "Such latitude may necessitate reestablishing advisors in selected units in lieu of fulltime manning (FTM) personnel," which, Grange realized, was complicated by the National Guard's involvement in the placement

of full-time manning positions. In no case, he continued, "will arrangements exceed the total number of spaces each ARMR is currently authorized by the realignment plan nor will the spirit and intent of the plan be sacrificed."¹⁰

In short, Grange wanted Forces Command approval for his Readiness and Mobilization commanders to task organize aviation advisor/CART resources based on their assessment of considerations singular to the Sixth US Army geographic area. Unfortunately, Forces Command pressed for a need to quickly configure into a pure CART alignment. "Merely slowing the transition to a rigid standardized assistance structure," argued Grange, "obviates command prerogatives and does not resolve the gut issue of how best to facilitate the training and readiness advisory efforts in regions that vary widely in size, makeup, and dispersion."¹¹

In another area of Sixth US Army responsibility, inspections, both Army Reserve and Army National Guard received maximum attention during the fiscal year, 1982. In keeping with a policy established during fiscal year 1979, the Sixth US Army Inspector General did not provide overall unit ratings during inspections in fiscal year 1982. Instead, increased emphasis was placed on the four functional readiness areas of Personnel and Administration, Supply and Maintenance, Mobilization and Training, and Command and Staff. Functional areas were rated satisfactory or unsatisfactory, as opposed to identifying functional area strengths and weaknesses. General inspections were conducted with a view towards expanding the Inspector General assistance roll (50 percent inspection/50 percent assistance). Inspections also focused on the identification of problems that were beyond the capability of the unit to influence or correct. These "systemic problems" were referred to the appropriate level of command for resolution.¹²

During the second half of fiscal year 1982, 202 inspections of National Guard units were conducted in Arizona, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming. Also, 92 inspections of Reserve units in the 91st Division (Training), 96th Army Reserve Command and 351st Civil Affairs Command were performed. Active Army inspections included Army Readiness Mobilization Region VIII, three US Army Readiness Groups and three EOD Detachments. Areas most frequently rated unsatisfactory were: (1) security of arms, ammunition and explosives, (2) personnel qualifications, (3) actual strength, (4) attendance at training, ET, RST/SUTA, (5) NBC readiness, (6) additional training assemblies, and (7) supply records and procedures. During the first half of the year, 25 follow-up actions were processed. Principal problem areas addressed during the period included: disability pay and allowances, incapacitation pay for personnel in jump status, training ammunition management in the Guard, cost of living allowances for Active Component full-time unit support personnel, personnel attrition rate computation for reserve component units, and dependent eligibility enrollment system (DEERS) for full-time unit support personnel.¹³

During the first half of the fiscal year, 269 requests for assistance or complaints were processed. During the same period seven inquiries were initiated, and two special inspections were conducted. Additionally, the office provided a seminar on investigative and assistance policy and procedures

to Inspector Generals in the 89th Army Reserve Command and Kansas and Nebraska Army National Guard. The majority of Sixth US Army service members' requests for assistance dealt with delays in receipt of pay and allowances. Principal problems addressed by inquiries of special inspections during the first half of the year included inefficient use of full-time personnel, involuntary transfer to the individual ready reserve without proper authority, entitlements to continuation of pay status ("Incap Pay"), support of dependents of Active Army personnel by their sponsors, the Army's system of absence without leave reporting, and the Sixth US Army program for contract training of medical specialists.¹⁴

In 1981, a need was recognized for expediting delivery of final Inspector General Inspection Reports to inspected units. Processing typically took in excess of two or sometimes three or more months for a final report to reach the inspected unit. Since no written record was left with the unit when the inspection team departed, the effectiveness of the inspection was substantially diminished by not providing more immediate feedback. A means was needed to shorten processing time without compromising the quality of reports, increasing office staffing or adding to the present administrative burden. It was decided the introduction of remote terminals would solve the problem while at the same time offering many other advantages.

To date, the use of remote terminals has proven to be eminently successful. Report processing time has decreased sharply (37 days versus 66 in early FY 82). In large part, the decrease in processing time was due to the ability to transmit a draft report back to Sixth US Army the same day as the inspection, instead of one week later as was the case in the past using the postal system. With each inspection team doing likewise, a uniform workload was placed on Word Processing, thereby avoiding work load "peaks and valleys" which were so often the rule in the past. Because draft reports were now "typed" instead of being hand written and because Word Processing daily received a uniform number of reports to process, the quality of original drafts prepared by Word Processing had improved. Likewise, the remote terminal system necessitated an edit prior to sending the report, thus improving the draft submission and ultimately the final report issued by Sixth US Army's Inspector General.

In the past, inspectors continually wrestled with reports of units inspected weeks or even months previously. Now, inspectors finish all their reports during the week between inspection periods, thus freeing them to concentrate on upcoming inspections.

System reliability proved very high, and during the past fiscal year, software was created to produce original draft reports directly from inspector inputs, freeing Word Processing to concentrate on edit and production of the final report. In addition, a means was provided to record in computer memory all the deficiencies found so management reports could be prepared based upon an easily accessible and comprehensive data base.¹⁵

Reports of corrective action taken resulting from Sixth US Army Annual General Inspections (AGI) were no longer required from company-size units. Common subordinate unit deficiencies were included in the parent battalion-

level unit report and were addressed by that unit. Appropriate instructions for reporting corrective actions were also included in battalion level Annual General Inspection reports.

The new reporting procedures increased staff involvement in monitoring and assisting subordinate units in correcting deficiencies. Also, it reduced administrative workload on company-level commanders. Because of the need for increased coordination, the suspense for reports of corrective action was extended to 120 days. Commanders have been encouraged to support the spirit of the new procedures and insure staffs get involved and not increase reporting requirements by imposing needless administrative reports on subordinate units. Separate reports will continue to be provided to all company-size units and separate detachments¹⁶

In accordance with a Chief of Staff directive, a special inspection was conducted in June 1982 of the 91C Clinical Specialist Civilian Contract Training Program in Sixth US Army. This inspection was initiated because of the numerous complaints and requests for assistance received by the Sixth US Army Inspector General Investigations and Assistance Office. The 91C Clinical Specialist Civilian Contract Training Program, a one-year fully funded educational program conducted at nearby civilian colleges, brought participants on active duty and gave them full pay and allowance during the school period. In addition, the Army paid tuition costs, books, uniforms, etc. The Forces Command started the program in May 1976 with a request to Sixth US Army to identify Reserve units to participate, civilian institutions to be used, and other preliminary data needed to initiate the program throughout Forces Command. The Inspector General special investigation identified 13 issues requiring resolution. Eight recommendations, the principle one being the publication of a comprehensive Letter of Instruction, were made on 17 June 1982. As of 1 November 1982, the command was still awaiting publication of an Letter of Instruction covering the 91C program.¹⁷

The US Army Forces Command Fiscal Year 1984-88 Plus Backlog Reserve plan for military Army construction was published in March 1982. It contained \$44,820,000 construction requirements for Sixth US Army. During the reporting period, construction was completed at three Army Reserve facilities (Appendix), continued at two and started at seven new locations. Design was completed on four projects, continued on three, and started on 17 new projects. Congress appropriated funds to construct eight projects. The Command's Minor Military Construction, Army Reserve (MCAR) program for fiscal year 1982 consisted of five projects. Three projects were subsequently added to the program; the total current working estimate for the year was \$781,000. All were funded and construction was underway on seven of the eight projects. Construction on three projects was completed (Appendix). Sixteen projects were approved for design. The Command's Minor Military Construction Army Reserve program for the next fiscal year consisted of five projects eligible for funding with a current working estimate of \$577,000.

In the area of Real Estate, during this period, 15 new leases and seven lease renewals were consummated; 13 leases were terminated. The new increase in rental cost was \$198,128. Twenty-six outgrants were consummated. Special Real Estate Actions completed consisted of the use of the Palace of Fine Arts for the Bay Area Commanders Concert, and demolition of three buildings at Parks Reserve Forces Training area. Other related actions are shown in the Appendix.¹⁸

In three separate actions, General Grange requested additions to the Dodge City and Garden City, Kansas, armories for use by the Army Reserve units, acquisition of a part of Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and improvement of the facilities for the Reserve elements of the 91st Division at Chico, California. On 11 February, 1982, Grange wrote Maj. Gen. Ralph T. Tice, The Adjutant General for Kansas, soliciting his assistance in permitting construction of additions to the Dodge City and Garden City armories. "It is my contention," argued Grange, "that an addition to the Garden City and Dodge City armories would be beneficial to the overall Army's training and readiness." Therefore, he asked General Tice to intercede with the Kansas state authorities in getting their approval to expand existing buildings.¹⁹

On 31 March 1982, Grange sent a message to the Commander, US Army Material Development and Readiness Command, soliciting his assistance in identifying and retaining a 7 section parcel of land at Rocky Mountain Arsenal to be used as a local training area in the Denver area to support training of Reserve Component units. "It is my contention," wrote Grange, "that the continued development of local training areas is essential to the Army's overall training and readiness posture."²⁰

Finally, in a 17 May 1982 letter to Congressman Gene Chappie of California, the Sixth US Army Commander requested his assistance in improving the training facilities of the 91st Division at Chico California. Grange asked Chappie to intercede with the California State Military Force to get them to agree to share their Redding armory with the Army Reserve units. "We believe there is sufficient room in the building to accommodate all of the units, despite the apparent reluctance of the California State Military Forces to willingly share the structure." Grange then promised to correct any deficiencies identified by the Military Force commander.²¹ Action was still pending.

Another area of Sixth US Army responsibility, the Staff Judge Advocate, contributed its own share of training and readiness during this fiscal year, providing basic qualification training in MOS 71D (Legal Clerk) and 71E (Court Reporter) at Parks Reserve Forces Training Area for enlisted members of the Army Reserve Judge Advocate General's Service Organizations (JAGSO), other Reserve Troop Program Unit soldiers, Army National Guard personnel, an active duty soldier from Fort Huachuca, and two reservists from units in Hawaii, using facilities of the 6237th US Army Reserve School. Thirty-nine individuals completed the two-week course, and at the end of the fiscal year, qualification in these military occupational specialty groups was at approximately 90 percent in all Judge Advocate General Service Organization units authorized those specialties. The second warrant officer and non-commissioned officer development and refresher course was conducted at the Presidio on 11-23 July and was

attended by 23 persons, seven of whom were National Guard soldiers. In March and April, 1982, the 81st International Law Detachment deployed to Korea to participate in a large joint service field training exercise "Team Spirit 82." During the period 11-25 September, the 86th International Law Detachment was sent to Germany for "Reforger 82."²²

Staff visits to each of the 26 reserve functional Judge Advocate General's Command detachments were completed during fiscal year 1982, including units in Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, Idaho, Utah, Colorado, California, Kansas, and Nebraska. The Staff Sergeant Major of the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate General, Sixth US Army, expanded his assistance visits substantially during this period, providing assistance to legal clerks in Reserve and National Guard units.

Judge Advocate General Service Organization units averaged a fill of 118 percent enlisted strength and 103 of authorized officer positions throughout the year (103 enlisted assigned for 87 authorized, and 129 officers assigned of 124 authorized). Enlisted military occupational specialty qualification in Judge Advocate General Service Organization units was approximately 90 percent. These units were capable of assuming their mobilization missions with no additional training, except for a number of court reporters, who, due to unit equipment shortages, would need considerable practical work to increase their proficiency in court reporting skills.²³

In the medical field, the Sixth US Army Continuing Health Education (CHE) Program authorizing Army Reserve Medical Department personnel to attend civilian and military sponsored meetings on an Active Duty for Training basis and/or in lieu of annual training, continued to be an attractive recruiting and retention incentive. Physician participation increased from 56 percent in 1979 when the program was initiated to 87 percent this past fiscal year. Correspondingly, physician strength increased from 33 percent in 1979 to 62 percent today. Early coordination with Army Reserve Commands for medical personnel in support of training sites in fiscal year 1982 resulted in all requirements being met. All taskings were accomplished by members performing in an annual training status, thereby eliminating the need for the expenditure of Active Duty for Training man-day spaces to support this requirement.²⁴

In June 1982, a Medical Logistic Management Officer (67K) was assigned to the Staff Medical Advisor's Office. In May, Forces Command provided Sixth US Army with the March 1982 Fifth US Army Special Inspection - Medical Activities. This inspection uncovered several major problems which appeared to be systemic to Reserve Component units. The logistics officer undertook actions to correct these major deficiencies identified within the report related to logistics. Visits were made to all Installation Medical Supply Activities (IMSA) within the Sixth US Army to obtain visibility with Reserve medical requisitions. These activities provided the unit's customer's daily transaction registers which allowed the Sixth US Army Medical Advisor to monitor medical supplies being ordered and issued to Reserve Component units. Medical information letters for logistics were prepared detailing potential problems that might affect Reserve Component readiness and corrective actions that should be taken by these units to resolve these potential problem areas.²⁵

The Sixth US Army Chaplain had a busy schedule during the same period. Although Sixth US Army continued to lead the Continental Armies in the percentage of fill against authorized chaplain positions, retirements and transfers from Reserve Component to active duty status impacted negatively. The percentage of Reserve chaplains assigned against authorizations dropped from 92.7 percent at the end of the 2d Quarter, FY 82 to 87.7 percent; Army National Guard units went from 87.7 percent to 86.4 percent. In both cases, the number of personnel assigned was within the range of + or - 5 percent from 90 percent of the authorized strength, the Sixth US Army Chaplain objective. Upon full mobilization, the Army will be 1,000 chaplains short. To strengthen accessioning, Department of the Army and Forces Command implemented training programs which involve every chaplain in the process. During the reporting period, the Army approved a request from this Headquarters to assign long-tour Reserve Component chaplains as Assistant Army Readiness and Mobilization Region Chaplains; the action was staffed at Forces Command. Another request from this Headquarters involving chaplain coverage for military patients in civilian hospitals during mobilization was also approved by the Army Department. No provisions had been made for chaplain coverage in the Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System which called for Armed Forces Medical Centers contracting 50,000 beds in civilian hospitals upon mobilization. Sixth US Army proposed that retired colonel chaplains be recalled to active duty to provide coverage at hospitals contracted by Army Medical Centers.²⁶

A meeting was called by the Sixth US Army Chaplain in April to plan and coordinate all staff visits by the Sixth US Army Chaplain Staff, the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region Chaplains, and the full-time California National Guard Chaplain at annual training sites. This planning meeting made it possible for a knowledgeable, full-time chaplain to visit all annual training sites with Reserve Component chaplains. The Sixth US Army Chaplain met his goal of staff visits which calls for visiting major mobilization stations and major US Army Reserve Commands annually and all state Adjutants General over a two-year period.²⁷

The 24th annual Sixth US Army Chaplain Training School was held at the Anaheim Marriott Hotel, Anaheim, California, 18-21 January 1982. The theme, "An Exciting Ministry in Changing Times," enabled the instructors to present a wide range of relevant issues. The faculty included four general officers: Ch (Maj. Gen.) Kermit Johnson, Chief of Chaplains; MG Berwyn Fragner, 63d ARCOM Commander; MG Anthony Polumbo, 40th Inf Div (M), California National Guard; and Ch (Brig. Gen.) O. Dean Nelson, Assistant Chief of Chaplains for Mobilization Management. The banquet address was given by Dr. Julian Nava, until recently the ambassador to Mexico.

The school was under the direction of the Sixth US Army Staff Chaplain, Ch (COL) James E. Shaw. Chaplain Shaw was assisted by Ch (LTC) A. Marius Christensen, Sixth US Army Deputy Staff Chaplain; Ch (LTC) Donald C. Warren, ARMR IX Chaplain; Ch (LTC) Douglas H. Sowards, ARMR VIII Chaplain; and SG:: Robert J. Everett. The objective of the school was to renew commitments and to encourage continued service to the reserves. A total of 258 attended this

school: 136 Chaplains, 52 Spouses, and 20 Chapel Activities Specialists. From available records this was the largest attendance since the change in USASIX's mission in 1973.²⁸

The Sixth US Army Chaplain served as an instructor and resource person at the National Guard Chaplain Training Schools in New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Idaho, and at Camp Roberts, California. A Senior Chaplain Training Conference and Workshop, held at the Presidio, 28-30 September 1982, determined the shape and location of decentralized chaplain mobilization exercises for FY 84. The Army Chaplain recommended a mobilization field training exercise to be held at Forts Riley, Carson, Lewis, and Ord. All major US Army Reserve Commands and nine state National Guards were represented. The Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington National Guards had no representation. Cn (LTC) Harvey L. Schaffer, Deputy RCPAC Chaplain, gave an excellent briefing. SGM Robert J. Zverett, Army Chaplain Office Sergeant Major, conducted a training school for the Nebraska National Guard and 89th Army Reserve Command Chapel Activities Specialists in Lincoln, Nebraska in April 1982. SGM Joseph Norman, Assistant Sergeant Major, conducted a two-week MOS 71M1G producing course at Camp Parks, in July 1982. Of the 15 students attending, 13 graduated. SGM Norman attended a task selection board for the purpose of rewriting the 71M portion of Army Regulation 611-201 at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, May 1982.²⁹

Physical security, another mission of Sixth US Army, occupied the time of the Provost Marshall's Office for this period, and included such activities as planning, organizing, and executing the 1982 Armed Forces Day Parade, the 41st Military Police Anniversary Ball, assorted physical security staff visits, and attendance at conferences at Forces Command and Fort McClellan, Alabama. The Sixth US Army Physical Security program revealed improvement in the area of physical security of arms and ammunition; additionally, units placed more emphasis on administrative control and accountability of weapons, including key control. An important part of the staff visits conducted by the Sixth US Army Provost Marshall Office included providing technical assistance to commanders and other key Reserve Component personnel who were indirectly involved in the security of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, aircraft, and maintenance areas. More than 20 Reserve Commands were visited during this period.³⁰

From 1 October 1981 thru 30 June 1982, six Public Affairs Detachments within Sixth US Army participated in major Army exercises. These units provided extensive Public Affairs support by producing newspapers, video taping soldiers in the field, recording interviews for radio, and setting up media days. All these activities proved to be highly effective.

As the CAPSTONE relationship continued to expand and grow, Public Affairs Detachments played an ever increasing role with their counterparts on active duty. As of 30 June 1982, nine detachments had a formal Forces Command IR evaluation. Two of the detachments, the 116th from Bismarck, North Dakota and the 197th PAD from Cheyenne, Wyoming, participated at Team Spirit 82 in Korea; both units were rated as outstanding. They wrote feature stories, operated a photo lab for the combined services in the exercise, video taped items of Army

wide interest, and demonstrated their overall professional expertise in a field environment. This experience proved to the commanders that upon mobilization, Public Affairs Detachments could fulfill their missions.

The 122d Public Affairs Detachment, Army National Guard from the State of Washington took first place this year in category D, magazine format newspapers with this year's Keith L. Ware/Paul D. Savamck Awards. The Evergreen was selected by nationally recognized journalists for first place due to several significant features: Improved format and layout design, eye grabbing photos and well written stories. The publication continued to excel.

Emphasis from the Public Affairs Office at Sixth US Army on soldier skills proved effective in the field. Commanders of Public Affairs Detachments had their organizations in full field gear. The protective mask, weapons and food bearing equipment found their way out of lockers at some stations into utilization by members of the detachments during annual training. Army Training and Evaluation Programs were administered by the 1st Maneuver Training Command in ARMR VIII and the 91st Maneuver Training Command from ARMR IX.

Lack of audio/visual equipment continued to plague the detachments. Plans continued, however, at the Forces Command and Department of the Army levels to update the modified table of organization and equipment and develop a sound doctrine which defined the role of a detachment under both peacetime and war-time conditions. As determined by detachment commanders, military occupational specialty qualification continued at an average of 90 percent. Most detachments had individuals who had acquired experience in Public Affairs thru Defense Information Schools, civilian colleges and universities and practical expertise from working daily in the news media.

Due to the positive and interesting nature of public affairs, most detachments were at 100 percent or better of their authorized strength. The first nine months of the 1982 Training Year offered many opportunities and challenges to Public Affairs Detachments. The biggest challenge was to reach full mobilization readiness. The opportunity was there to excel while at home station during Inactive Duty Training and at annual training. Public Affairs Detachments proved capable of meeting this challenge.³¹

At Sixth US Army Headquarters, during this period, the Sixth US Army Band gave 258 performances, including 122 before civilian audiences, for a total of more than 340,000 people. During the same period, the Band toured Juneau and Sitka, Alaska, performed in San Francisco at events honoring the President of Italy and Queen Beatrix and Prince Claus of the Netherlands. Other band concerts included a Salute to the Medal of Honor, Independence Day Celebrations, the Philip A. Connelly food service awards ceremony in Reno, Nevada, as well as regular monthly concerts at the Schwartz-Letterman Theatre, the Presidio of San Francisco.³²

During this same period, the terms of seven Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army expired: Mrs. Margaret O'Brien Thorsen, Southern California; Mr. William E. McDonnell, Northern California; Dr. William J.

Keppler, Jr., Idaho; Harry Wald, Nevada; Oscar Mahlon Love, Jr., New Mexico; Harry R. Arneson, North Dakota; and Dr. Margaret E. Chisholm, Washington. Three Aides were reappointed: Mrs. Margaret O'Brien Thorsen, Dr. William J. Keppler, Jr. (appointed as Sixth US Army Aide), and Harry Wald. There were six new appointments: Joseph Coors, Colorado; Father Robert P. Hupp, Nebraska; Gerald S. Epstein, New Mexico; Harold Schafer, North Dakota; Arthur A. Riedel, Oregon, and Lloyd E. Haight, Idaho. Two positions continued to remain vacant during this period: Northern California and Washington. The Annual Sixth US Army Civilian Aides Conference was held at the Presidio of San Francisco on 8-10 November 1982. Ten Sixth US Army Civilian Aides attended, in addition to the Civilian Aide for Alaska.³³

During this period, Sixth US Army's Public Affairs Office continued to work with the Northern California Chairman for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) Communications Committee, and with the State Chairman. Mailing lists were considerably expanded, Committee membership - though in a state of flux - gradually solidified, and mass mailings sent to the Chambers of Commerce in California, to employers in large organizations and corporations, to organizations from throughout the United States having conventions in the San Francisco Bay Area, and to the Committee members themselves.

All was not smooth, however, as General Grange pointed out in two 18 January 1982 letters to Maj. Gen. Edward C. Binder, The Adjutant General, State of Nebraska, and Mr. Dick E. Ellis, Executive Director, National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. The largest employer support of the Guard and Reserve problem existing in the Sixth US Army area was the United States Postal Service. And while the Postmaster General may have signaled his support for the program, many mid-level and first-line supervisors have not. To facilitate solutions to these problems in the future, Grange recommended the appointment of a general officer, "to contact the local Postmaster involved as soon as the problem surfaces in an attempt to resolve the matter before it escalates to formal proceedings." Ellis was asked, "to assist in efforts to educate mid-level managers and first-line supervisors of the Postal Service with their responsibilities and obligations under the law regarding Guard and Reserve participation."³⁴

Fiscal year 1982 was a productive year for many Sixth US Army staff offices in the areas of aviation, security, medical affairs, inspections, law, morale and moral development, construction, and public relations. And while these missions may have lacked the glamour of the more visible functions, such as logistics and operations, these important responsibilities played their part in ensuring not only the continuity of Sixth US Army's mission and responsibility but also in ensuring the readiness of the Reserve Component in the fifteen western states.

FOOTNOTES

1. Aviation Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report, Fiscal Year 1982, (Hereafter referred to as AVN SAHFR) 13 Jul 82 and 29 Oct 82. See also Command Bulletin, August, 1982.
2. AVN SAHFR, 13 Jul 82. See also Command Bulletin, June, 1982.
3. Ibid.
4. AVN SAHFR, 13 Jul 82 and 29 Oct 82.
5. Ibid.
6. AVN SAHFR, 29 Oct 82.
7. AVN SAHFR, 13 Jul 82.
8. AVN SAHFR, 13 Jul 82 and 29 Oct 82.
9. AVN SAHFR, 29 Oct 82.
10. Ltr, Grange to Cavazos, 29 Apr 82, NS.
11. Msg, CDR USASIX, 082030Z Jul 82, sub: Centralized Aviation Readiness Team (CART).
12. Inspector General Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report (Hereafter referred to as IG SAHFR, 6 Jul 82).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. IG SAHFR, 2 Nov 82.
16. Ibid. See also Command Bulletin, March, 1982.
17. Ibid.
18. Engineer Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report (Hereafter referred to as ENGR SAHFR), 4 May 82 and 6 Oct 82.
19. Ltr, Grange to Tice, 11 Feb 82, NS.
20. Msg, USASIX, 311452Z Mar 82, sub: Local Training Area, Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA).
21. Ltr, AFKC-EN, Grange to Honorable Gen Chappie, 17 May 82, NS.

22. Staff Judge Advocate Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report (hereafter referred to as SJA SAHFR), 24 Sep 82.
23. Ibid.
24. Staff Medical Advisor Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report (hereafter referred to as SMA SAHFR), 27 Oct 82.
25. Ibid.
26. Chaplain Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report (Hereafter referred to as CH SAHFR), 13 Oct 82. See also Ltr, AFKC-CH (20 Jan 82), 1st Ind, Chief of Chaplains, 18 Feb 82, sub: Appointment of RC Chaplains as ARMR Staff Chaplains.
27. CH SAHFR, 13 Oct 82.
28. CH SAHFR, 1 Jul 82. See also Ltr, AFKC-CH, Grange sends, 4 Jan 82, NS.
29. CH SAHFR, 13 Oct 82.
30. Provost Marshall Office Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report (Hereafter referred to as PMO SAHFR), 16 Jul 82 and 2 Nov 82.
31. Public Affairs Office Input, Historical Office.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ltr, AFKC-CP-ES, Grange to MG Binder, 18 Jan 82, sub: Guard and Reserve Problem. Relating to USPS; Ltr, AFKC-CP, Grange to Dick Ellis, 18 Jan 82, NS.

CHAPTER 8

The Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions: ARMR VIII and IX

In the Sixth US Army area there were two Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions; ARMR VIII, with headquarters in Denver, Colorado, and ARMR IX, located on the Presidio of San Francisco. The Commander of ARMR IX was also the Deputy Commanding General of Sixth US Army. The Sixth US Army exercised its command over a large part of the United States, its 15 western and southwestern states, performing two distinct functions, command-and-control and training assistance. The ARMRS provided the major portion of the on-the-ground training assistance to Army Reserve and Army National Guard units.

ARMR VIII's geographic area of responsibility consisted of Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas, with Readiness Groups in Fort Douglas, Utah; Denver, Colorado; and Fort Riley, Kansas. ARMR IX's areas included Washington, California, Oregon, Nevada and Arizona with Readiness Groups located at Fort Lewis, Washington; Presidio of San Francisco, California; and Los Angeles, California. The ARMRS were assisted in their training efforts by Maneuver Training Commands; ARMR VIII by the 1st MTC in Denver, Colorado; and ARMR IX by the 91st MTC in Camp Parks, California.

The mission of the Commanders, Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions VIII and IX consisted of acting as the deputies to the Sixth US Army Commander for training and readiness of Reserve Component units within their regions and assisting the Sixth US Army Commander in the exercise of Reserve Component responsibilities. The Commanders of the ARMRS coordinated and supervised Reserve Component training, and in the performance of their mission worked particularly closely with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Training, evaluating training and the readiness status of Reserve Component units on a continual basis, and assisting them to establish and sustain unit and individual readiness. The Readiness Regions monitored the use of Readiness Reports as a tool for training and readiness management. In order to carry out their function to assist the Reserve Component commanders, the Regions helped to secure training facilities, training areas, transportation, and other training assistance, giving priority to early deploying units.¹

In addition to the mission areas outlined above, ARMR VIII and ARMR IX provided mobilization planning advice and assistance to Reserve Component units to insure understanding and compliance with appropriate plans and directives. The complex issue of mobilization continued as a particular concern during fiscal year 1982.

In more detail, the organization and specific missions of ARMR VIII and ARMR IX were both similar, with minor variations in practice. The major difference was that the Commanding General of ARMR IX became the Deputy Commander, Sixth US Army.

The specific responsibilities of the Commanders, ARMR VIII and IX were to command all elements assigned to their ARMRs; assist Reserve Component units in establishing, achieving, and sustaining individual and unit readiness; and to coordinate Reserve Component training. The Commanders were also responsible for establishing liaison with State AG and MUSARC commanders, and coordinating and implementing CAPSTONE and forces readiness programs.

In the ARMRs, their Readiness Divisions supervised training and readiness of Reserve Component units; chaired exercise planning conferences; assisted Reserve Component units to obtain training facilities, training areas, and transportation; and maintained the readiness status data of all Reserve Component units in the region. The division determined the composition of functional teams and coordinated their assistance visits to Reserve Component units. It monitored the training and readiness status of Minimum Essential Force/Risk Reduction Force units and assisted in annual training site and date scheduling. It also supervised the functioning and use of the implementation of the Battalion Training Management System; coordinated training, as appropriate, with other ARMRs; monitored all training evaluations submitted by Active Component evaluators; and assisted Reserve Component units in the implementation of Skill Qualification Testing.

The Mobilization Division provided mobilization planning advice and assistance to Reserve Component units, which included state area commands and Army Reserve commands headquarters. They reviewed and approved designated Active Component installation and Reserve Component unit mobilization plans; assisted in the coordination and implementation of CAPSTONE and all force readiness programs; and monitored force structure actions and made recommendations. The divisions maintained readiness mobilization data and participated in mobilization exercises. The ARMR's Services Divisions provided administrative support and personnel management services for the headquarters.

The Senior Army Advisors, another important adjunct of the regions, managed the Army Advisor Program to Reserve Component units and assisted the units to request readiness teams. The advisors also assisted Reserve Component units to secure training facilities, training areas, transportation, and other training support; supervised Reserve Component training and assisted readiness coordinators to evaluate unit readiness; and served as principal contacts between the Active Component, State Adjutants General, and the major Reserve Commands. The Reserve Component Advisors advised the Commanders of the ARMRs on matters pertaining to the Reserve Component and provided a point of contact between the Chief, National Guard Bureau; Chief, Army Reserve; and ARMR elements.

The Readiness Groups were established as subordinate elements of the ARMR, and were on the same command level as the senior advisor. Each group consisted of a chief, administrative and clerical assistants, branch team, special purpose teams staffed with officers of several branches, Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Teams, and administrative teams. The groups provided branch and functional team assistance; assisted in establishing and achieving appropriate training level objectives; assisted in achieving and sustaining individual and unit readiness; evaluated readiness status of units on a

continual basis; reported reasons and recommended action for units that could not attain premobilization training objectives; assisted in securing training facilities, transportation and other training assistance; provided guidance and assistance in ammunition forecasting; directed, supervised, and administered maintenance assistance and instruction team programs; employed administrative specialists to provide advice, assistance, and instruction as necessary; maintained liaison and conducted visits to senior National Guard and Army Reserve commands

In coordination with unit advisors, they provided branch and functional teams to assist Guard and Reserve units within the Readiness Groups area of responsibility or as directed by the ARMR. The group also tailored mobile assistance teams from branch, maintenance assistance and instruction teams, administrative teams, and other resources to meet specific mission requirements. When necessary, additional resources were requested through ARMR readiness coordinators.

Branch teams consisted of officers and enlisted men assigned to teams, organized by branch to assist in the training of Guard and Reserve units of like branch within the Readiness Group's geographical boundary. Personnel were assigned to branch teams on a ratio of approximately one branch specialist per Readiness Group battalion-equivalent located within the Readiness Group geographical area. Accordingly, the personnel of these branch teams provided the skills the readiness coordinator required to accomplish his mission. These teams provided the experience that permitted the readiness coordinator to deal with mixed units.

On a more specific level, Army Readiness and Mobilization Region VIII performed many of the same missions as its parent organization, Sixth US Army, but on a much reduced scale. Overall training and unit performance, for example, showed marked improvement during Training Year 1982. Annual training evaluations confirmed units strength, but concurrently developed the need for continued emphasis on NBC, communications, and individual soldiers skills. Major training exercises conducted during this past fiscal year and overseas deployment during Annual Training remained outstanding training vehicles, which expanded with overall training profiles. Emphasis continued to be focused on training to the Army Training and Evaluation Program and the Soldier Manual, with particular emphasis applied to improved planning and conduct of Inactive Duty Training.²

In the personnel area, the only major change was the retirement of Maj. Gen. Richard A. Bresnahan, Commander, Army Readiness and Mobilization Region VIII, on 31 January 1982, and the assumption of command by Maj. Gen. Robert W. RisCassi on 12 February 1982. In general, personnel strength remained at approximately 100 percent during this fiscal year. There was, however, a 40 percent personnel turbulence caused by normal reassignments; fortunately, this did not hinder operations and assistance to the Reserve Component. The quality of key personnel improved markedly during this period as the percentage of Senior Service School and Command and General Staff College graduates assigned increased. Full-time manning (active component personnel) strength during the year stayed fixed at 95 percent.³

In the field of aviation, ARMR VIII reorganized aviation personnel to provide better assistance to Reserve Component aviation units. They created an aviation advisor for each company size aviation unit; i.e., the air cavalry troops in Montana and Idaho, the attack helicopter units in Utah and Colorado, the medical company in Nebraska, and the Crane and Chinook companies in Kansas. They also placed an officer and enlisted aviation advisor with each Army Reserve Command (the Chinook company advisor is also the advisor for the 89th ARCOM). One fulltime manning Captain was placed with the 190th TC Company in the 89th ARCOM. ARMR VIII's Centralized Aviation Resource Training Team was moved to Denver, and consisted of 3 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 2 enlisted personnel, and provided for day-to-day assistance for major aviation units as well as providing a centralized aviation readiness training team to respond to region-wide needs.⁴

In the area of training, Annual Training, 1982, showed marked improvement over the previous training year, with more than 512 units being evaluated (See appendix for statistics.) In one of the major annual training events of the past training year, GALLANT EAGLE, ARMR VIII had 30 units participating at Fort Irwin. While a great deal of mission essential training was experienced by the Reserve Component units during the exercises, there were some weak areas identified which stemmed largely from last minute logistical planning. For example, in some cases Active Component evaluators were not identified until late, while some were not properly briefed. In addition, there was some degree of confusion with the Reserve Component units being unsure of which units they were supporting - at least in the early stages of the exercise. And there were some units which were under utilized, such as the transportation corps and the Heavy Equipment Transporter Company, who were not allowed to operate their equipment on California highways.⁵

On the positive side, medical and quartermaster units received meaningful, real world missions. Of special note, the 717th Medical Detachment, Helicopter Ambulance unit from New Mexico, performed extremely well in providing air evacuation for personnel of the 82d Airborne Division who were injured during a parachute assault.⁶

Two public affairs detachments, the 116th (ND) and 197th (WY), participated in TEAM SPIRIT in Korea, 6 March - 3 April, 1982. Both detachments had excellent training opportunities with "hands on" public affairs activities with the Korean press, other U.S. Armed Forces public affairs units, and Active Army personnel. During the same period, two ordnance companies, the 115th Maintenance Company and the 3631st Maintenance Company (New Mexico National Guard), supported the National Training Center during their annual training this fiscal year. Being the first Reserve Component unit to provide maintenance support to the Center, the 115th experienced some difficulties in getting a full workload for all military occupational specialties. The potential for future training of maintenance units, however, is excellent as use of assigned equipment is increased and component repair lines are expanded.⁷

ARMR VIII completed its initial mission of conducting Battalion Training Management System workshops in December, 1981, which caused it to reevaluate and redefine its training management office functions in the region to, (1) train ARMR personnel Battalion Training Management System principles and techniques; (2) training Reserve Component course managers in units and schools; (3) assist Reserve Component commanders in conducting tailored Battalion Training Management System training; (4) monitor management system presentations for quality control, and (5) assist Reserve Component leaders in planning training and developing training documents.

In order to achieve Battalion Training Management System sustainment, there must be command emphasis. Reserve Component commanders have the responsibility for the sustainment process, assisted as required by region personnel. One of the major shortcomings discovered by the ARMR personnel was that many Active Component personnel assigned to the region either had not had this training or did not understand it adequately. In the first case, the ARMR required all advisors, coordinators, and group personnel to attend the appropriate workshop soon after assignment to the Region. In the second case, to sustain it, the ARMR developed a four-hour refresher seminar for all Region officers in the headquarters. Sixth US Army's evaluation greatly enhanced sustainment by evaluating how the training system was implemented in the unit and it reminded commanders of the need to sustain the system. The ARMR encouraged continued use of the evaluation system.⁸

The 561st Support Group, under the command and control of the 89th Army Reserve Command, conducted the Sixth US Army directed Major Logistics Control Headquarters at Fort Riley, Kansas, from 6 June to 18 July 1982. Outstanding logistical support was provided to the III ROTC Region, 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley. The logistics support period was expanded from four weeks in Training Year 1981 to six weeks in Training Year 1982. Results of the Training 82 indicated outstanding logistics support and procedures proficiency. However, additional tactical training and rear area protection training was indicated. Therefore, Major Logistics Control Headquarters 83 directed by Sixth US Army, was again scheduled for six weeks (4 June to 16 July 1983) at Fort Riley. The 162d Support Group, 96th Army Reserve Command, was selected as the control headquarters, under the operational control of the 89th. It was designed to incorporate, in addition to normal logistics support, increased field training exercises for major logistics control headquarters participants and rear area protection training during all three increments.⁹

Combined Logistics Transportation Training 82 was another valuable training exercise for ARMR VIII units. During the exercise, the 139th Transportation Battalion from the South Dakota National Guard, operating under the control of the 319th Transportation Group (Army Reserve), provided command and control for the 740th Transportation Company (Medium Truck), also the South Dakota National Guard, and a California US Army Reserve unit, the 729th Transportation Company (Medium Truck). The battalion and subordinate units were involved in movement of Defense Department cargo by land in the San Francisco Bay and West Coast areas. The exercise consisted of "real world" missions performed between fixed facilities such as Sharpe Army Depot, Sacramento Army Depot, Rough and Ready Island, Fort Lewis, Reno, and others.¹⁰

Although the majority of units in ARMR VIII had some small local areas in which some unit training could be conducted, many had restrictions which hampered realistic, collective training. Many areas were privately owned and did not permit firing of either live or blank ammunition nor the use of tracked vehicles. Similar restrictions applied on some state owned property. In ARMR VIII, there were 25 areas which would accommodate maneuver or weapons firing and in some instances both. This did not include M31 sub-cal field artillery ranges. However, within the total of 25, only 11 were completely adequate and some of these had restrictions on weapons systems which could be fired. All artillery units in ARMR VIII reported adequate areas in which to conduct M31 sub-caliber firing except two batteries; one in South Dakota and one in Idaho. Negotiations were underway to obtain the requisite ranges for these two batteries. The cavalry units in Idaho and Montana used Gowen Field and Limestone Hills for sub-caliber and service ammunition firing. Limestone Hills, Montana had restrictions on main tank gun firing but Montana undertook steps to correct this problem. The tank battalions in Nebraska and Kansas used Forts Carson and Riley for service firing; sub-caliber courses could be fired at both these posts and at the Hastings, Nebraska training area. Machine gun firing with ball ammunition presented a serious problem in North and South Dakota. Camp Grafton accommodated the M-60 machine gun on a 25 meter range, but no facility existed in South Dakota. The caliber 50 machine gun could not be fired in these states. Most other states had adequate range facilities but travel time to the ranges often times precluded inactive duty training firing.

Some of the training problems eventually could be overcome with the introduction of plastic ammunition. Unfortunately, this resource was not then available. Tactical proficiency was hampered by limited training areas throughout ARMR VIII. Although some training areas offered impressive acreage, many had environmental restrictions. Again, travel time to adequate areas generally precluded realistic tactical training except at annual training. Helicopter aerial gunnery was conducted at Fort Carson, Colorado, Camp Guernsey, Wyoming, the Lakeside Aerial Gunnery Range, Utah, and to a limited extent at Limestone Hills, Montana, and Gowen Field, Idaho. There were small arms ranges adequate to accommodate M16 and pistol firing. In spite of the limited areas and many restrictions, it was important to note that many units did an exceptional job with very limited resources. Although a long term problem, units must begin thinking about training areas and the problems associated with the receipt of new weapons systems. Acquisition of new areas is a long term process and thought should be undertaken now to determine needs. (See appendix for some improvement initiatives.)¹¹

Of equal importance with training, mobilization occupied a considerable portion of ARMR VIII's time during this past fiscal year. On 22 February 1982, ARMR VIII published and distributed the ARMR VIII Mobilization Plan, OPLAN 1-82, which prescribed the manner in which ARMR VIII would conduct pre-mobilization planning and post-mobilization execution. Additionally, it provided taskings and guidance to its subordinate commands, mobilization stations, and Reserve Component headquarters. On 31 August 1982, ARMR VIII conducted its first Mobilization Planning Conference.¹²

Early in fiscal year 1982, the Region re-examined its approach to improving internal operations and determined that, as in most office environments, the primary staff function was to process information in order to perform the Region mission. Consequently, all forms of information processing (voice, data, image and text) occurring within the staff were reviewed within the context of office automation and recent technological innovations. It was determined that immediate payoff could be obtained by expanding word (text) processing to all administrative personnel, by incorporating automated file processing to eliminate manual sorting and collating of recurring information, by capturing budget information electronically during the typing process, and subsequently applying automated mathematical functions to produce simple management reports of internal budget management; and lastly, by incorporating telecommunications to network the systems with automatic data processing resources to perform data processing and with other automated systems such as the officer requisition system developed by the US Army Military Personnel Center. Word processing and telecommunications were also requested for Readiness Group Denver. Approval was granted by Forces Command in September, 1982 and the system will be operational next fiscal year.

The Army is now on the brink of the greatest modernization effort since World War II. ARMR VIII developed a series of briefings and discussion meetings in order to bring leaders within the Region up to date on all significant developments which will affect the Army through the end of this century. In June, a round table discussion was held at FAMC with all of the Senior Army Advisors and Readiness Group Chiefs. In September, a conference of all the Adjutants General and Army Reserve Command Commanders was held. In November, the Region Headquarters is planning two more force modernization conferences, one for all of the State and Reserve Command Plans, Operations and Training Officers and the other for all Sergeants Major within the Region. Finally, in December of this year, the Headquarters will host its Annual Winter Conference for the senior executives within the Region. All of these conferences will focus upon Force Modernization, specifically developments in Airland Battle Doctrine and changes within the training arena that impact on Reserve Component units. Major discussion topics in all of the previously mentioned conferences were Airland Battle, Concept Based Requirement System, Army 86 Studies, New Equipment, the US Regimental System, Army Training 1990, Platoon Test, Battle Drills, Situational Training Exercises, Multipurpose Ranges, and Simulations/Substitutions and Miniturizations. Of all the complex systemic issues facing the Army in the 1980's, Force Modernization is the most vital. It transcends all that we do; it must be accomplished in conjunction with other missions. Military leaders must have a commitment and an awareness of their own efficiency on molding and shaping this future.¹⁴

Army Readiness and Mobilization Region IX, located at the Presidio of San Francisco, with Maj. Gen. Kenneth E. Dohleman commanding, had its new table of distribution and allowances approved by Forces Command and Department of the Army on 28 January 1982. Authorized officers and enlisted were reduced by three and five respectively, while warrant officers were increased by two. The actual strength as of 31 March 1982 was 97 percent of authorization (see appendix for statistics.) While the Officer Distribution Plan continued to

support the ARMR at 95 percent of authorized, the grade substitute of 42 Captains for LTC and Major significantly decreased the experience level and technical expertise within the ARMR. Full-time manning increased by 21 personnel.¹⁵

In the area of reorganization, effective March, 1982, there was a reduction of 34 E-8 positions to E-7, the downgrade of the Sergeant Major positions in the Readiness Groups, the downgrade of the Headquarters, Executive Officer position to LTC, the deletion of the requirement for a Mobilization Brig. Gen. position, and the addition of Chemical Branch Assistance Teams in each Group and a Chemical Readiness Coordinator at the Headquarters.¹⁶

Finally, under operations, Reserve Component Aviation Advisors were realigned by Forces Command on 1 October 1982; centralized Aviation Readiness Training became a reality. ARMR IX developed three teams, one stationed at each Readiness Group, to effectively cover the vast geographical dispersion of units.

Maintenance personnel from the Signal Intelligence Electronic Warfare team developed an airborne jammer for the 519th ASA Company (USAR). The system is mounted in a UH-1H helicopter and functions as a training vehicle for electronic operators and combat radio operators. ARMR IX has coordinated procurement action to obtain commercial equipment (Bearcat Scanners) for Reserve Component Military Intelligence Units. This procurement gave the Reserve Component units the capability to perform radio intercept and radio monitoring missions, satisfy Army Training and Evaluation Program objectives, and provide training support to combat units. Coordination was effected with the U.S. Navy Security Group, Treasure Island, for use of their Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF). Indications were that they would provide live intercept training to Reserve Component Army personnel. The action was pending formal approval by Sixth US Army and Forces Command.¹⁷

During the first week of November 1981, ARMR IX participated in the Sixth US Army Mobilization Exercise (SAMEX). During this exercise, ARMR IX, (1) tested the ARMR's assumption of operational control over mobilization station major US Army Reserve Command and state area commands, (2) determined what additional communication was required between headquarters, (3) clarified Continental Army and Readiness and Mobilization Regions interface, (4) determined liaison requirements amongst various headquarters, (5) determined mobilization station support requirements for the Mobilization Assistance Teams, (6) developed standard operating procedures for headquarters staff elements, and (7) evaluated the transition of ARMR IX headquarters into a mobilization posture.

The major thrust of ARMR IX mobilization planning during 1982 was the development of mobilization plans and the tables of distribution and allowances for six installations (Forts Lewis, Ord, Irwin, Huachuca, Camp Roberts and the Presidio of San Francisco). The Mobilization Division was also actively involved in the review of major US Army Reserve Commands and state area commands plans. All plans were updated annually.¹⁸

The ARMR IX Mobilization Division hosted a series of workshops during fiscal year 1982 with widespread participation that included the Adjutants General, MUSARCs, mobilization stations and Headquarters Sixth US Army. The workshops were conducted on 4 May 1982 - with state area commands, major US Army Reserve Commands, mobilization stations, and Headquarters, Sixth US Army with emphasis on the Sixth US Army and ARMR IX mobilization plans; on 3 August 1982 - with readiness Groups and Mobilization Stations on the Mobilization Assistance Team role in Reserve Component unit validation at mobilization stations; and, on 17 September 1982 - with the 91st Maneuver Training Command on their post mobilization role to include mobilization assistance team mission.

These workshops resulted in improved major US Army Reserve and state area command mobilization plans and their tie-in with the mobilization station. They also provided better use of ARMR IX's three Readiness Groups and the 91st Maneuver Training Command in the mobilization planning and execution process.¹⁹

During August and September, 1982, the Mobilization Division conducted an indepth analysis of Forces Command's and Sixth US Army's PROUD SABER/MOBEX 83 directives to determine ARMR IX's missions. ARMR IX initial planning would, (1) test all elements of ARMR IX mobilization table of distribution and allowances headquarters staff, (2) test the mobilization assistance team concept at each Mobilization Station, (3) evaluate select Reserve Component units from alert to deployment, and (4) validate state area and major reserve commands, mobilization stations and ARMR plans. Headquarters ARMR IX published a letter of instruction in September 1982 outlining the missions which the Mobilization Stations, major Reserve Commands, state area commands, mobilization assistance teams, Readiness Group, 91st Maneuver Training Command and Headquarters, ARMR IX staff were to accomplish during PROUD SABER/MOBEX 83. PROUD SABER/MOBEX 83 is to be held from 15 October through 5 November 1982.²⁰

Like Sixth US Army, the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions VIII and IX emphasized training, mobilization, force modernization, and readiness during fiscal year 1982. Much was accomplished but much remained undone. Given the proper incentives and encouragement, both Regions should continue to perform their missions in ways that will reflect admiralty on themselves and Sixth US Army.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ltr, AFKC-SI, Grange Sends, 3 Jun 82, sub: Command Relationships
2. Army Readiness and Mobilization Region VIII End-of-Year Historical Feeder Report, 9 Nov 82. (Hereafter referred to as ARMR VIII EYHFR)
3. Ibid.
4. ARMR VIII EYHFR, 8 Jul 82.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid, 9 Nov 82.
14. Ibid.
15. Army Readiness and Mobilization Region IX Semi-Annual Historical Feeder Report, (Hereafter referred to as the ARMR IX SAHFR), 5 May 1982.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. ARMR IX SAHFR, ND. See Historical Office files.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

APPENDIX

The Sixth United States Army is one of three Continental United States Armies under the United States Army Forces Command. It is an extension in the command chain from Headquarters, Forces Command to two Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions and all Army Reserve elements in the western United States. The commander, Sixth United States Army, supervises the training and monitors the readiness of the Army National Guard units within the Army area.

MISSION

Lt. Gen. David E. Grange, Jr., Commanding General since 1 August 1981, exercised command during this period. Five deputy chiefs of staff managed the general staff elements of the Army--Personnel and Administration, Operations, Training, Logistics, and Resource Management--while nine other chiefs managed some of the special staff elements. In addition to the major and minor offices, the command group included a Secretary of the General Staff, a Protocol Office, an Organizational Effectiveness Office, Reserve Component Advisors, and an Advance Planning Group. Finally, there were two Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, VIII and IX.

The Sixth US Army commander operated under the supervision of the commander, FORSCOM, who issued directives, policies, planning, and program guidance, approved programs, priorities, resource allocations, and other matters of command direction. The Army was authorized direct communication with other major Army commands and with heads of DA staff and field operating agencies on matters of mutual interest. The Sixth US Army Commander was assigned five principal FORSCOM missions--to command the US Army Reserves, assure readiness in the Reserve Component, supervise training of the Army National Guard, provide area representation and liaison, and area emergency plans and operations.

More specifically, the Sixth US Army commander directed all assigned US Army Reserve tables of organization and equipment and tables of distribution and allowance troop program units and reinforced training units to include supervision of recruiting, organization, stationing, training, and arranging for administrative and logistical support of assigned units. He also exercised command over Reserve training divisions and Reserve schools.

The commander supervised the training of non unit Reserve personnel, except for mobilization designees not assigned to Sixth US Army, when ordered to active duty for training for annual training with, or otherwise attached to US Army Reserve and Army National Guard units within USASIX's assigned geographic area. He commanded the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (including requisitioning for and the distribution of military personnel and employment and utilization of civilian technicians.)

As training supervisor of the Army National Guard, the Commanding General, Sixth US Army, scheduled and supervised the training of the Guard and coordinated with installation commanders of the Active Component support required for the training of the units involved (excluding air defense on-site units). The Sixth US Army commander also determined the effectiveness of National Guard units to perform mobilization missions and he conducted annual general inspections and training inspections of Guard units.


During the past fiscal year, the commander planned for the execution of CONUSA defense to include joint operations for combined defense with civilian authorities, for the execution of NBC post-attack information collection, pre-attack and post-attack measures, and for the continuity of operations. Additionally, he planned for the execution of mobilization of Reserve Component units as directed, and the coordinated mobilization plans by Reserve Component units located in the Sixth Army area. He ensured that coordination of mobilization plans between Reserve Component units and their mobilization stations (installations) were accomplished.

The commanding general supervised and planned support required to accomplish geographic oriented activities, Reserve Component's participation in the Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic program, and as directed, support required for other Federal agencies. He coordinated and maintained as liaison with State Governors and other high government officials, Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army, and State Adjutants General, and he coordinated when required, Reserve Component oriented public information activities and community relations in the Sixth US Army area.

Finally, the commander maintained liaison with state and regional law enforcement agencies within the Sixth US Army area, and he provided detailed technical evaluations of Reserve unit maintenance programs; conditions of material; supply and food service operations for commanders and staff elements in assessing the adequacy of logistics support and the logistics readiness of USAR units through the Command Logistics Evaluation Team (COLET).


ORGANIZATION

Sixth US Army's command was essentially composed of 15 western states. It commanded the US Army Reserve (USAR) units with training supervision of the Army National Guard (ARNG) within these 15 western states. As a consequence of this division, Sixth US Army had two distinct chains of command that were in reality the two separate functions reflected in organization terms. First, the USAR units responded to the major United States Army Reserve Command (MUSARCs) for command and control purposes, but at the same time they were receiving on-the-ground training assistance from the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions and the ARMRS Readiness Groups. The MUSARCs were staffed by reservists and a cadre of civilian technicians and Active Army advisors. They were to be the intermediate levels of command in the event of mobilization to carry on most of the normal command and control functions. However, due to their limited training time and the broad base of units they commanded, they were assisted in many of their training and evaluation responsibilities by other parts of the Sixth US Army organization. USASIA




SIXTH US ARMY MISSION

- COMMAND OF THE US ARMY RESERVE**
 - ASSURE RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS**
 - SUPERVISE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**
- ### **TRAINING**
- AREA REPRESENTATION AND LIAISON**
 - AREA EMERGENCY PLANS AND OPERATIONS**



SIXTH US ARMY



HQ
Sixth
US
Army

Headquarters provided direct training to the Reserve Component units; the Readiness and Mobilizations and Readiness Groups, staffed by Active Army and some civilian personnel, provided assistance training. They were responsible for translating the "One-Army" concept into reality. Without their expertise, as well as that of the other Active Component experts brought in on temporary additional duty, it is difficult to imagine the Reserve Component units maintaining any semblance of military occupational specialty qualification. Although National Guard units received extensive training aids and supervision from Sixth US Army, they were under different chains of command in peacetime. If, however, a national emergency required their mobilization, they would be under the command of the Sixth US Army Commanding General.

Headquarters, Sixth US Army

The Command Group, general staff, special staff, and the ARMRs, made up the Headquarters, Sixth US Army. Although technically an extension of the Headquarters, the ARMRs were physically separated from the headquarters and each had its own commander. The Command Group consisted of the Commanding General, the Deputy Commanding General (who also served as Commander, ARMR IX), the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the General Staff, The Advance Planning Group, Reserve Component Advisors, Protocol and the Organizational Effectiveness Office; the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Resource Management, Logistics, Operations, Training, and Personnel and Administration composed the general staff. The special staff was made up of the Office of Strength Improvement, Chaplain, Engineer, Provost Marshal, Staff Medical Advisor, Aviation Office, Inspector General, Public Affairs Office, Staff Judge Advocate and Automation Management Office.


Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions

The two Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, previously mentioned, are ARMR VIII, located in Aurora, Colorado and ARMR IX, located on the Presidio of San Francisco with Headquarters, Sixth US Army. Their primary responsibilities were the training and readiness of the Reserve Component units in their geographic areas. The activities and responsibilities of each ARMR were described in Chapter 8.

Major United States Army Reserve Commands

The major United States Army Reserve Commands were the next level of command below the Commanding General of Sixth US Army. The MUSARCs functioned, on the one hand, as distinct Army Reserve headquarters but, on the other, served, de facto, as a part of the chain of command. This close relationship between two segments of the Total Army was effective, and became more so as the year progressed. The staff of the Sixth US Army worked closely and well with their counterparts on the MUSARC level.

SIXTH ARMY COMMAND STRUCTURE CHART




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
- - - - - TRAINING

ARMY READINESS AND MOBILIZATION REGIONS ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

US ARMY READINESS AND MOBILIZATION REGION VIII



US ARMY READINESS AND MOBILIZATION REGION IX.



MAJOR US ARMY RESERVE COMMANDS

63D ARMY RESERVE COMMAND LOS ANGELES, CA

89TH ARMY RESERVE COMMAND WICHITA, KS

96TH ARMY RESERVE COMMAND SALT LAKE CITY, UT

124TH ARMY RESERVE COMMAND SEATTLE, WA

91ST DIVISION (TNG) FORT BAKER, CA

104TH DIVISION (TNG) VANCOUVER BKS, WA

351ST CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND MT VIEW, CA

The Command Group

The Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff

The Chief of Staff directed and coordinated the headquarters staff. The Assistant Chief of Staff acted as the Chief of Staff in the latter's absence and otherwise assisted the Chief of Staff as directed. He also reviewed selected staff actions for the Chief and recommended courses of action; coordinated and directed staff action in matters of an interdisciplinary nature; monitored Sixth US Army staff procedures and administration; proposed changes as appropriate; and was the informal point of contact for ARMR VIII and Presidio of San Francisco staff.

The Advisors: ARNG and USAR

A thorough knowledge of the issues and pronounced problems in the Reserve Components was required for Sixth US Army's Command Group. Therefore, it possessed two Advisors, the Army National Guard Advisor and the US Army Reserve Advisor. The Guard Advisor advised the USASIX Commander concerning all matters pertaining to Army National Guard structure, performances, and special characteristics. He also established and maintained personal liaison with the 15 State Adjutants General and their principal staff members in the Sixth US Army area. As the most knowledgeable individual on Guard issues, he provided information concerning the Army National Guard to the USASIX staff and assisted the Commander and his staff in resolving National Guard issues and problems. The Advisor also represented the Commander at Guard association meetings and accompanied him on staff and training visits.

The duties of the US Army Reserve Advisor were similar in nature to the National Guard Advisor. The Reserve Advisor also advised the Commander on all Army Reserve matters, assisted the staff in developing policy and directives related to the Army Reserve, and monitored staff relationships with Reserve Commands and recommended changes, as appropriate. He maintained liaison with the Chief, Army Reserve and other Army Reserve Advisors to the Department of the Army, Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and CONUSAs. The Advisor also conducted periodic visits to Reserve Commanders and staff, represented the Commander at Reserve military association meetings, and accompanied the Commander on staff and training visits.

INTERNAL SIXTH US ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration (DCSPA) was responsible for the personnel management of Reserve and Active Military and civilian personnel within Sixth US Army; for safety; morale; equal opportunity; and personnel accounting and administration for the Headquarters, for ARMRs VIII and IX, and for Sixth US Army Reserve troop program units. The office also had responsibility for and representation on various boards throughout the year. In addition, the office took on the responsibilities of the Office of Strength Improvement, which included formulating Sixth US Army policies, programs, and procedures designed to improve Reserve Component strength. The office also advised the Sixth US Army Commander on strength matters pertaining

to the major US Army Reserve Commands, General Officer Commands, and Army National Guard Commands in the USASIX Area. It developed programs designed to increase enlisted and officer strength and directed and monitored the execution of other agencies and commands involved in improving the strength of units within Sixth US Army. This Office also assisted in the procurement of medical personnel through coordination with local staff elements of the Army Medical Department personnel.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS) supervised Reserve Component mobilization preparedness and exercises, developed and maintained mobilization plans, general war plans and supporting plans for CONUS land defense contingencies. The office coordinated preparation of contingency and war plans with other military services, and it developed and maintained supporting plans for military assistance to civil authorities in domestic emergencies, natural disasters and civil defense. It supervised crisis action team augmentation and operated and maintained an Emergency Operation Center responsive on a 24-hour basis. It coordinated military assistance to civil authorities and other federal agencies in natural disasters, initiated, supervised, and monitored Sixth US Army military support during domestic emergencies, crisis situations, and exercises, and coordinated electronics-communications matters. It also recommended the organization and stationing of Reserve units and coordinated this stationing with State Adjutants General, and it reviewed the Sixth US Army Military Construction Army Reserve (MCAR) 10 year program priority list and developed priorities for proposed construction. It implemented direct stationing and force structure actions pertaining to Sixth US Army, and recommended changes, modifications, and deletions to the Army Reserve troop basis and Army Reserve unit authorization documents. Finally, it published guidance on Army Reserve Troop Action Program documentation, established Full-Time Manning (FTM) positions for the Reserve and provided market analysis in support of stationing decisions for Army Reserve units. The office also managed the Sixth US Army Historical Program, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical training and evaluation of Reserve and National Guard units, and intelligence and security activities. The office advised and assisted the major US Army Reserve Commanders on strength improvement programs, managed day-to-day functioning of the Sixth US Army Strength Improvement Programs, and developed and administered USASIX reenlistment operations and programs.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Training (DCST), was responsible for Reserve Component, individual and unit training and evaluation of Inactive Duty Training and Annual Training of the Reserve Components, as stated in Sixth US Army Regulation 10-2. The fashion in which the Training office carried out its tasks was influenced by the readiness and abilities of the Reserve Component. It evaluated all inactive duty training and training management of Reserve Component units, developed inactive duty training evaluation policies and procedures, and supervised the Sixth US Army inactive duty training evaluation program. It developed and promulgated Sixth US Army unit training policies and exercised staff supervision over established policies and programs. It also managed the Annual Training program of the Reserve Component units as well as monitoring programs of the Active Component Training Assembly (ATA) program for the Reserves. Finally, it controlled input and monitored

attendance at all service schools of Reserve personnel and recommended and promulgated policy governing the establishment, supervision and operations of Reserve schools.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, provided logistic support for the operational readiness of Reserve Component units and monitored Army Reserve logistical support and the logistics readiness programs. Specifically, the Logistics Office reviewed all plans involving Sixth US Army mission responsibility and developed and provided appropriate logistical input to contingency, emergency, mobilization, operational, general war, and joint service plans. It prepared detailed analysis reports reflecting the logistics readiness status of each reporting major US Army Reserve and Army National Guard Command, and it took remedial action to correct logistics readiness deficiencies within the Reserves. Finally, its Command Logistics Review Team Office established, maintained, and conducted CLRT and CLRTX Programs, within the guidance of Army Regulation 11-14 as supplemented by Forces Command, in order to determine the logistical readiness of Army organizations, and it provided in-depth assistance to Army Reserve individuals who were responsible for accomplishing specific logistics functions and tasks.

The Deputy, Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM) controlled the budget, analyzed and reviewed requirements, and reallocated or shifted resources. An important but less visible sector of the office analyzed and forecast needs for the coming fiscal year by providing budget estimates and assessing what had been accomplished, and how efficiently, through review and analysis. In assessing priorities and forecasting needs, the DCSRМ worked with all staff offices within Headquarters, Sixth US Army, the installations in the USASIX area, and subordinate commands. The uniqueness of the Resource Management function was that it actually controlled the resources with which other staff officers met their responsibilities.

The Office of the Inspector General (OSI) was responsible for inquiring into and reporting on matters pertaining to the accomplishment of missions, discipline, efficiency, and morale of the Reserve Component units stationed in the Sixth US Army area and the Active Component personnel assigned to the CONUSA. The office also protected the rights of individual members and the best interests of the Army. More specifically, it conducted general and special inspections of both Reserve and National Guard (and occasionally Active Component) units, and conducted special studies as needed.

The special staff responsibilities of the Staff Medical Advisor (SMA) were medical service matters. The Medical Advisor supervised major US Army Reserve Command medical activities; advised on Reserve Component medical training; medical unit annual training; annual training site medical support; medical unit stationing and readiness; medical contingency and mobilization support plans; medical personnel recruiting, retention, and management matters. The Staff Medical Advisor also advised the Reserve Components on health care entitlement and medical logistics; he monitored and coordinated civil support programs; and he maintained liaison with regional health authorities and medical commands.

The staff responsibility of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) covered civil and military legal matters. The Judge Advocate coordinated and supervised the training and use of Reserve judge advocate officers and detachments, furnishing legal advice and assistance. The Staff Judge Advocate reviewed contingency and emergency plans for legal ramifications, determined legal sufficiency of investigative reports, and recommended appropriate action. The Staff Judge Advocate maintained liaison with the civilian legal profession and accepted service of legal process on behalf of the Commander, Sixth US Army.

The Engineer Office had special staff responsibilities to advise on engineer matters; real estate management and facilities use; management of Military Construction, Army Reserve, (MCAR) and Military Minor Construction, Army Reserve (MMCAR) Programs; the management of environmental and energy conservation programs, and to monitor and provide technical advice and assistance to State Reserve Forces Facilities Boards. The office also represented the Commander as Field Representative of the Secretary of the Army for implementation of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area and it provided a military liaison officer to the National Park Service.

The Aviation Office had the special staff responsibility of Army aviation management. The responsibility entailed a number of functions. The office managed the Sixth US Army Aviation Master Program; supervised and inspected the training of Reserve and Active Component aviators and aviation units; established and supervised the Sixth US Army Flight Standardization Program; supervised the aviation accident prevention program; and managed the Sixth US Army Flying Hour Program. It also advised and coordinated the requirements for stationing, activating, inactivating, and organizing Sixth US Army aviation units; determined the use and availability of aircraft; approved local flying rules and local flying areas; coordinated mutual support plans for Active and Reserve Component aviation units; processed flight status requests for Reserve aviators and Active Component nonaviation crew members and noncrew members. The division also processed senior and master aviator designation requests for Reserve and Active Component aviators and executed actions for Reserve Component unit and facility/activity, and aviation awards.

The special staff responsibility of the Chaplain (CH) was religious activity. The Chaplain determined chaplain requirements; assisted recruiting, appointing, and assigning chaplains and enlisted assistants. The Chaplain attended seminars and civilian church conferences; visited church organizations to publicize the chaplain program; maintained professional files on chaplains and enlisted assistants; and supervised chaplain training and conducted training conferences. He also advised on religious, morale, and moral matters, and maintained liaison with various church organizations.

The special staff responsibilities of Provost Marshal (PM) were military police and physical security activities. The Provost Marshal provided staff advice on all functions of military police activities to include discipline, law and order, crime prevention, civil disturbances, and civil disaster operations. The Provost Marshal also supervised the Physical Security Program with primary emphasis on weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and aircraft. He also monitored and made recommendations concerning training, equipping, mobilizing,

and stationing Reserve Component Military Police units, and established and maintained liaison with local, county, state, and federal law enforcement and security agencies as well as maintaining a working relationship with the installation Provost Marshal on criminal matters affecting the command.

The Automation Management Office (AMO) had the special staff responsibility of managing the automation resources of the Sixth US Army. The AMO was tasked to promulgate automation directives and policies; develop coordinated and executed plans for the Command's Automation Management Program; operate the Command's Automated Data Processing Equipment and manage the Continental Army Management Information System; served as a bridge between staff elements and various supporting MISOs; advised concepts; assisted the Deputy Chief of Staff, Training in the supervision of Automated Data Processing training for Reserve Component personnel; and supervised the World-Wide Military Command and Control Entry System (WES) terminal operations.


The Public Affairs Office (PAO) supervised all external and internal information activities, as well as all public information actions. It maintained liaison with the news media, operated a press center for various projects, set up news conferences, prepared news releases, and informed the Sixth US Army Commander of pertinent news items. Additionally, the office managed the Sixth US Army's command information program, published command information materials, monitored Reserve Component publications for compliance with Army and Forces Command information policies and provided public affairs support to the USASIX recruiting and retention program. It developed, revised, and evaluated public affairs annexes to Sixth US Army plans and provided personnel, budget, and management support to the office. Finally, it evaluated and assisted 20 Reserve Component Public Affairs Detachments (PADs) and seven major US Army Reserve Command Public Affairs Offices.

The special staff responsibilities of the Office of Strength Improvement (OSI) were to formulate Sixth US Army policies, programs and procedures designed to improve Reserve Component strength. The office advised the Sixth US Army Commander on strength matters pertaining to the Reserves, major US Army Reserve Commands, General Officer Commands, and Army National Guard Commands in the Sixth US Army area. It developed programs designed to increase enlisted and officer strength and directed and monitored the execution of such programs at subordinate levels, and cooperated with other agencies and commands involved in improving strength of units within Sixth US Army.

MAJOR REORGANIZATIONS

The major organizational change within Sixth US Army occurred on 30 September 1982 when the Office of Strength Improvement (OSI) was deactivated as a special office under the Chief of Staff. On 1 October 1982, the office was transferred to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration.¹ Another significant development was the establishment of the Advanced Planning Group on 3 August 1983 by the Sixth US Army Chief of Staff. Its purpose, wrote Brig. Gen. Jere L. Hickman, Sixth US Army Chief of Staff, was "to examine long-range problems or trends that will affect the manner in which Sixth US Army will conduct its business in the future, and to develop long-range programs that will help provide direction in accomplishing future missions."²

SIXTH US ARMY STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART



On 8 March 1982, the Organizational Effectiveness Office was transferred from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management, to the Command Group. Under the direct supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, this change was made in order to more effectively manage organizational effectiveness resources for several projects being implemented by the Chief of Staff.³ Finally, on 1 February 1982, the Sixth US Army Protocol Office was placed under the direct supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff. This change in supervisory authority, from the Secretary of the General Staff to the Assistant Chief of Staff, as well as the addition of one officer and two enlisted personnel to the Protocol Office, was a result of the increased emphasis on protocol services desired by the commander.⁴

MAJOR PERSONNEL CHANGES

During the reporting period, the Sixth US Army Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Robert S. Young, retired from the service and was replaced by Brig. Gen. Jere L. Hickman. A retirement dinner and ceremony was held for General Young on 19 and 20 January 1982, respectively; both were presided over by the Sixth US Army Commander, Lt. Gen. David E. Grange, Jr. General Hickman assumed the duties of Chief of Staff on 1 February 1982 and was given an Honors Ceremony on 11 February.⁵

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Colonel Richard J. Blake retired and departed the command on 30 November 1981. On 6 January 1982, Colonel Joseph A. Villa assumed the position of Assistant Chief of Staff.⁶

PERSONNEL STATISTICS

HEADQUARTERS STRENGTH

Sixth Army authorized strength for fiscal year 1982 was as follows:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
132	2	80

The Officer Distribution Plan for the headquarters was 91 for commissioned officers and two for warrant officers. This translates into the headquarters being supported at 76 percent of authorized strength. The assigned strength at the headquarters at the end of the fiscal year was as follows:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
121	2	78 ⁷

Figure 17: Personnel Strength

APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONED AND WARRANT OFFICERS. There were 739 cases processed leading to the appointment of 74 commissioned officers and 77 warrant officers. Out of the 739, 141 have been disapproved with 447 pending.

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS APPOINTED

<u>Unit Vacancies</u>	<u>Concurrent Active Duty</u>	<u>Control Group</u>
40	7	27

WARRANT OFFICERS APPOINTED

<u>Unit Vacancies</u>	<u>Concurrent Active Duty</u>	<u>Control Group</u>
34	41	2

Figure 18: Officer Strength

There were 76 commissioned officers and 6 warrant officers who applied for recall to active duty. Twenty-two were disapproved; 60 were still pending. The applications for appointment with concurrent active duty were extremely time-consuming. The Forces Command was requested to have this function transferred to the US Army Reserve Personnel and Administration Center. Due to the many telephone calls requesting information an instructions pamphlet was scheduled to be developed. Hopefully this will answer some of the questions from the applicants, allow them to better fill out the forms and instruction pamphlet, and alleviate some of the backlog in the appointment section.⁸

SELECTIVE RETENTION BOARDS. A statistical summary of the Sixth US Army Selective Retention Boards for Calendar Year 1982 were as follows:

	<u>Considered</u>	<u>Retained</u>	<u>Removed from TPU</u>
Colonels	116	104	12
Lieutenant Colonels	107	96	11
Majors	31	30	1
Captains	2	2	0
CW4	24	22	2
CW3	16	12	4
CW2	13	13	0
WO1	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	310	289	26 ⁹

Figure 19: Selective Retention Board

Several officers that were removed from Troop Program Units positions by the Selective Retention Board and transferred to the Army Reserve Control Group were being reassigned back to Sixth US Army Troop Program Unit's without the approval of this headquarters. Therefore, Sixth US Army implemented a policy to ensure that officers who have been removed by a Selective Retention Board under Chapter 9, Army Regulation 140-10 in this CONUSA or any other CONUSA will not be assigned to this command without the approval of this headquarters.

Summary of other Board actions was as follows:

	<u>Initiated</u>	<u>Finalized</u>
Physical Fitness Boards	2	1
Elimination Boards	5	2
Conscientious Objector		10

Figure 20: Selective Retention Boards

SIXTH US ARMY NATIONAL GUARD STRENGTH

MONTH ENDING: 30 September 1982

STATE	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH				ASSIGNED STRENGTH				PERCENT %	NET CHANGE
	OFF	WO	EP	AGG	OFF	WO	EP	AGG		
AZ	339	180	4606	5125	406	149	4054	4609	89.9	+46
CA	1670	465	19104	21239	1558	423	15541	17522	82.4	+230
CO	308	98	2953	3359	349	99	2839	3287	97.8	-1
ID	232	100	2627	2959	235	89	2397	2721	91.9	-7
KS	518	138	6627	7283	465	130	5308	5903	81.0	+39
MT	208	84	2422	2714	217	73	2374	2664	98.1	+18
ND	190	72	2469	2731	221	65	3171	3457	126.5	-42
NM	329	111	4258	4698	345	99	4019	4463	94.9	+36
NV	275	66	3434	3835	303	65	3746	4114	107.2	-21
NV	121	44	1002	1167	130	43	903	1076	92.2	+4
OR	524	111	6938	7573	477	116	6635	7228	95.4	+24
SD	285	73	3472	3830	318	77	3793	4188	109.3	+4
UT	565	158	4376	5099	537	145	4005	4687	91.9	+26
WA	450	146	5327	5923	415	138	4749	5302	89.5	+78
WY	153	43	1582	1778	157	50	1505	1712	96.2	+22
TOTAL	6167	1889	71257	79513	6133	1761	65039	72933	91.9	+456

Figure 21: Sixth US Army ARNG Strength, FY82

SIXTH US ARMY ARNG STRENGTH

MONTH ENDING: 30 September 1981

STATE	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH				ASSIGNED STRENGTH				PERCENT %	NET CHANGE
	OFF	WO	EP	AGG	OFF	WO	EP	AGG		
AZ	322	143	4316	4781	410	146	3785	4349	90.9	+185
CA	1660	456	19200	21316	1572	410	14287	16269	76.3	+217
CO	306	97	2886	3289	337	94	2769	3200	97.3	+26
ID	232	99	2603	2934	225	94	2367	2686	91.5	+105
KS	501	135	6648	7292	460	129	4965	5554	76.2	+54
MT	208	84	2422	2714	208	73	2126	2407	88.6	+74
ND	181	65	2347	2593	203	57	3128	3388	130.6	+35
NE	333	101	4192	4626	327	102	3779	4208	91.0	-25
NM	276	62	3350	3688	278	60	3535	3873	105.0	-14
NV	121	45	1033	1199	117	44	903	1064	88.7	+10
OR	508	105	5627	7240	432	110	5894	6436	88.9	+356
SD	283	72	3463	3818	301	75	3576	3952	103.5	+15
UT	561	158	4355	5074	499	136	3674	4309	84.9	+41
WA	450	146	5319	5915	400	138	4389	4927	83.2	+54
WY	154	44	1598	1795	159	50	1509	1718	95.7	+24
TOTAL	6104	1912	70359	78275	5936	1718	60696	68340	87.3	+1157

Figure 22: Sixth US Army ARNG Strength, FY81

Conferences/Exercises

The Sixth US Army Mobilization Exercise:

The Sixth US Army Mobilization Exercise (SAMEX-81) was initiated by the Sixth US Army Commander following Mobilization Exercise 80 (MOBEX-80) as a means of keeping mobilization requirements at a high level of visibility within Sixth US Army between mobilization exercises. The general concept of SAMEX was to conduct a three-day, free play, no-fault mobilization exercise based upon actions required during the first three phases of FULL mobilization, as outlined in the Force Command Mobilization Plan.

SAMEX-81 was conducted during the period 6-8 November 1981. The Sixth US Army Commander directed both readiness regions and the four Army Reserve Commands to participate in the Exercise. Furthermore, he required the ARCOMs to exercise at least two of their subordinate units. The other three General Officer Commands were invited to participate and elected to do so. All 15 States were invited to exercise their state area command stations during SAMEX-81 and four (CA, NV, UT, and WA) elected to do so, with the Nevada Army National Guard exercising one guard unit. Mobilization stations were invited to participate and three (Fort Lewis, Fort Ord, and Presidio of San Francisco) volunteered to become involved in the Exercise. Due to the concept of SAMEX, requirements for the mobilization stations input was minimal.

Headquarters, Sixth US Army, Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, major US Army Commands, and participating State Area Commands were operational during 6-8 November 1981. Playing Reserve Component units exercised during MUTA-4 on 7-8 November 1981.

SAMEX-83's overall objective was to emphasize mobilization planning throughout Sixth US Army. Specific objectives included: (a) ensuring that commanders at all levels emphasize mobilization preparedness, (b) identifying unit level home station, mobilization processing shortfalls, (c) exercising command and control and communication systems that support mobilization planning and execution among CONUSA/ARMR/MUSARC and STARC, (d) evaluating major US Army Reserve Command capabilities to assist Reserve Component units to mobilize at home station, conduct home station processing, and prepare for movement of a mobilization station, (e) providing operational training for commanders and staff, (f) testing alert notification plans and procedures, and (g) better preparing major US Army Reserve Commands for participation in MOBEX-83.

Reserve Component units participating in SAMEX-81 reviewed and updated unit mobilization files, exercised unit alert plans, prepared updated mobilization support requirements forms, conducted maximum home station processing within exercise time in accordance with Part 3 - RC Unit Commanders Handbook, to Vol III, FORMDEPS (Draft), selected units and loaded some of their vehicles in preparation for Phase IV, and with individuals from selected 124th US Army Reserve Command units, traveled to Fort Lewis, Washington the Monday following the exercise to receive briefings by Fort Lewis personnel.

Sixth US Army Headquarters initiated SAMEX-81 by issuance of the alert order for all participants. Subordinate headquarters notified their personnel when the alert was received from Sixth US Army. Preplanned and free-play messages were introduced to create situations and problems for staff members to resolve. ARMR IX headquarters was realigned into a directorate-type staff to test its mobilization organization. Readiness Region IX staff was augmented by personnel from the 91st Maneuver Training Command. Directorate operating procedures were developed and the mobilization tables of distribution and allowances were analyzed in conjunction with staff training. Requirements for further refinement of intra-staff relationships were studied. Organization of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) affirmed the need for a mobilization table of distribution and allowances with an Emergency Operations Center with a 24-hour capability.¹²

Maj. Gen. Richard A. Bresnahan, Commanding General, Army Readiness and Mobilization Region VIII, opened the ARMR VIII Winter Conference, 7-8 January 1982, by noting that command interest, at senior levels, in the readiness and training of the Reserve Components continued to be demonstrated through the initiation of new programs designed to upgrade overall readiness. This was perhaps best manifested in the new full-time unit support program. "Overall, those active duty personnel assigned to this program in the ARMR VIII area of responsibility," Bresnahan continued, "are good people." Two years ago, declared Bresnahan, "strength improvement had top priority because of low

strength in RC units." As strength improved, training assumed a priority status. However, "mobilization preparedness is now the priority issue and continued emphasis is needed at all levels of command to expand and improve mobilization planning." Bear in mind, he continued, "that the strength and training issues are not fully resolved and must continue to receive the appropriate emphasis. We still need additional personnel at the crew/foxhole level and of course they need to be trained. So although mobilization planning currently is being emphasized, we must maintain a proper balance in terms of obtaining and training new personnel."¹³

Training in the Reserve Component improved in 1981 primarily as a result of the introduction and use of the Battalion Training Management System as the management tool. The Reserves understood the system but, as with any new program, it must be sustained in order to remain effective. The new ARMR VIII 82 issues were, (1) increased emphasis on upgrading the intensive management force list (IMFL) units, (2) RDF-A units must be given special attention by all advisory personnel, (3) monitor closely the distribution of the limited assets available and insure high priority units have precedence, (4) know all units' mobilization posture (where, when, how, etc), (5) stay up-to-date on all CAPSTONE changes, (6) upgrade the NCO Development programs, (7) insure full-time manning personnel understand the importance of the program, (8) disregard the Army Times story relating to the realignment of the USAR advisory program, and (9) equipment and equipment shortages in the Reserve Component was a major problem impacting on training and readiness. Shortages and the status of requests for shortages must be fully understood.¹⁴

In addressing the Conference, General Grange spoke of the problems to be faced during the Eighties, citing such issues as the turbulence which would be created by new organizations which were to be introduced into force structure, new equipment coming on which would generate trauma as it was incorporated into the Force, and new manuals and references which outlined new equipment and organizations. Other issues addressed were the usefulness of a light infantry unit in meeting the threat, training and mobilization, and rear area security.¹⁵

CONUSA COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE. Representing General Grange, Maj. Gen. Dohleman attended, along with the Commanders of the other Continental Armies, the Forces Command Chief of Staff, and General Cavazos. During this meeting, Cavazos told how he had observed several under-strength Reserve Component units during annual training and the training in progress was not as effective as it should have been because the unit commander had not taken into account his under-strength situation. In some instances, continued Cavazos, sergeants "were standing around" because they had no soldiers to train. Zeroing out squads, platoons and companies on a permanent basis was no answer, because most units have a pretty fair complement of officers and non-commissioned officers. In under-strength units, argued Cavazos, there ought to be quite a bit of what he called "cadre training" -- cross training by rotating non-commissioned officers into different leadership positions, tactical exercises without troops, leadership development, etc. Forming composite units for certain tactical

training, for example MILES, was desirable. The Commanding General Forces Command had not seen very many good ideas on how to train under-strength Reserve Component units, but he believed that the CONUSAs could develop some if they worked at it. Forces Command promised to draft some guidance on this subject and send it to the CONUSAs for comment. The CONUSA Commanders requested that the Forces Command guidance be pretty general so as not to overly centralize the direction or to give the impression that the guidance was a receipt which must be followed rigidly.¹⁶

All participants agreed that too many Reserve Component units stand-down for the middle weekend of annual training and that this degrades the effectiveness of field training. It was one part of the larger issue of making best use of time during annual training. As an aside, the FORSCOM Commander commented that there were too many Reserve Component companies training separately during annual training -- i.e. a smoke generator company training alone on one side of an installation with a tank battalion training alone and simulating a "dirty battlefield" on the other side of the same installation. All agreed that the Readiness Regions need to work harder on getting the Reserve Component units to train together. All agreed that Reserve Component units should be urged to move to the field early during annual training, stay in the field continuously until training objectives were achieved, then return to garrison for maintenance, equipment turn-in, administrative matters and time-off. Forces Command promised guidance on this subject.¹⁷

General Cavazos was intent on changing the FORSCOM Form 1-R because he believed that it didn't "drive" Reserve Component Commanders and annual training evaluators to the CAPSTONE missions as the foundation for training and to the Army Training and Evaluation Program for tasks, conditions, and standards. He believed, as the FORSCOM Inspector General reported in the results of the special inspection of readiness groups, that there was more attention given to AGIs, CLRTs and similar "graded exercises" than there was to good training. His own experience as an annual training Evaluator, along with what he had been told by others, persuaded him that the Form 1-R was essentially completed during the first week of training so that the Site Chief Evaluator could have it in final form to present to the Reserve Component Commander and to forward to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions promptly at the end of training. Cavazos wanted a form that would show what the Reserve Component unit "needs to do" (CAPSTONE mission and ARTEP tasks) and measure how well it did it by Army Training and Evaluation Program conditions and standards.¹⁸

All agreed with the thrust of the FORSCOM Commander's remarks but cautioned that the purpose of the Form 1-R must remain diagnostic rather than evaluative. There was also agreement that the Form 1-R should focus on pre-mobilization training requirements. (Pre-mobilization and post-mobilization training requirements tend to run together in the FORSCOM staff information paper). There was also agreement that if the Form 1-R was to be filled out at or near the end of annual training, the Chief Evaluator and a few others would have to remain a day or two extra and this would require more funds. General Cavazos accepted this point and remarked that the requirement should be identified and HQ FORSCOM should "go after" the required resources. He asked the Fifth Army

Commander to draft a revised Form 1-R in coordination with the other CONUSAs and to forward it four or five weeks hence to FORSCOM so that he might discuss it with the CONUSA Commanders.¹⁹

The FORSCOM Commander recently extended to 1 April 1983 the deadline for notifying incumbent supervisory staff administrative assistants that their positions were to be abolished. The idea was to leave them in place for a few months on continuity after the Full-Time Unit Support Assistant Deputy MUSARC Commander comes aboard, and to allow the Army more time to transfer incumbent assistants to another Army Civilian Employee position. (The number to be reassigned may be fairly small, since most incumbent assistants are retirement eligible.) The First US Army Commander favored issuing the reduction in force notice by 1 October 1982. Fifth and Sixth US Armies favored the 1 April 1983 deadline. Cavazos affirmed the 1 April 1983 date but commented that the Assistant Deputy major US Army Reserve Commander would be in charge of all full-time unit support personnel in the major Reserve Command while the advisor remained on the job. No advisors should remain in units having full-time unit support members who were formerly advisors (this means that any existing Reserve Advisor who must remain in place until reassigned on an attrition basis, and for whom there was no full-time unit support authorization, must be given some kind of assignment rather than remain in an advisory capacity). FORSCOM intended to allow commanders reasonable flexibility in applying the full-time unit support model.²⁰

General Cavazos next voiced his concern about the effectiveness of the US Army Reserve schools. For example, he noted how the school commandants rather than the Continental US Armies and the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, were determining what courses would be taught and where. "The schools ought to provide the training capability," he argued, "but the CONUSAs and ARMRs should establish priorities and assign tasks to assure that courses taught met National Guard and Reserve requirements or, if all requirements could not be met, that the most important training was done first." In order to achieve this, National Guard and Reserve training requirements must go to the CONUSA or ARMR rather than directly from the Reserve Component commander to the Reserve School commandant. "When training requirements go directly from the Reserve Component unit commander to the Army Reserve school commandant," Cavazos noted "the commandant gets into the marketing business because he wants to conduct the courses which his people can do well and which will keep them busy." This approach did not necessarily coincide with meeting the training requirements. The FORSCOM Commander admired the Fifth US Army's STARS system and he recommended that First and Sixth US Armies examine it to see if it might provide better management over their schools than was then exercised.²¹

The linkage between Reserve Personnel, Army funding and the ability of Reserve Component commanders to send students to Reserve schools, in other than inactive duty or annual training status, was recognized. "Schools must do a better job of forecasting RPA funding requirements for this purpose," continued Cavazos and to exercise centralized control over priorities when there were funding shortfalls. The FORSCOM Commander believed that many Reserve School instructors remained in those assignments too long. "Instructors should be rotated in and out of reserve units so they know the practical aspects of what

they are teaching." Noting Fifth US Army's success in getting a couple of states to fund National Guard Officers as Reserve School instructors, Cavazos asked the CONUSAs "to work this" on a state-by-state basis while FORSCOM explore with NGB how to get this on a better funding basis." In addition, he told the CONUSA commanders to "work another three months" on improving Reserve school management, after which he promised to again examine the matter to see whether something further needed to be done at the FORSCOM level.²²

General Dohleman expressed concern about the long-term adverse impact of extensive officer down-grading attendant to the conversion of Active Component Reservist advisors to Reserve full-time unit support. For instance, 15 of 31 Active Component field grade officer advisor positions with Reserve units in ARMR IX were to be converted to full-time unit support Captains. "Captains will lack the experience and credibility to be very useful in their FTUS role," argued Dohleman, "and the resultant long-term degradation in the quality of Active Component support for the USAR is worrisome." The FORSCOM Commander acknowledged the problem, but remarked that the grade limitations of DOPMA were impacting field grade authorizations across the board. He cited, for example, the pending action to change the S-3 authorization of modified table of organization and equipment battalions from major to captain. The Fifth US Army Commander pointed out that none of the down-grading was being applied to Guard advisors and this obvious disparity vis-a-vis the Reserve, aggravated the situation about which Dohleman spoke. General Cavazos was unaware that officer down-grades were being applied to Active Component positions supporting the Reserves but not the Guard. He directed his Chief of Staff to look into the matter and see what could be done to bring better equity to the way in which the officer down-grades were being applied to Active Component positions supporting the Reserve Component.²³

FUNDING FOR SIXTH US ARMY (\$000)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY RESERVE (OMAR)	\$75,309.6	\$100,573.5
Command (HQ, 6A, ARMR, RG)	(12,166.2)	(14,076.2)
Mission (MUSARC)	(45,241.6)*	(65,687.2)
Base Operations (Coordinating Installations)	(17,902.0)	(20,810.1)
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE, ARMY (OMA)	\$ 154.4	\$ 157.5
Public Affairs (HQ 6A)	(114.7)	(104.0)
Support to Other Nations	(35.0)	(46.7)
.012 Funds	(4.7)	(3.6)

FORSCOM Supported Travel	(0.0)	(3.2)
RESERVE PERSONNEL, ARMY (RPA)	<u>\$36,570.9</u>	<u>\$42,006.0</u>
Total	\$112,034.9	\$142,737.0 ²⁴

*Includes \$19.2k mission funds at Fort Huachuca

Figure 23: Funding

RESOURCES

Resource requirements for the Army Reserve in fiscal year 1982 for supplies and equipment were funded at \$12,294,100. This figure did not include funding for contractual services. No specific requirement within the total funded requirement was identified in funding guidance at the beginning of the fiscal year. However, as the year progressed, FORSCOM provided additional funding in the form of supplements to meet Go-To-War Stock requirements. The chart below shows the status of FY 82 funds for the purchase of supplies and equipment at the end of a half year of operation, 31 March 1982:

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

<u>MUSARC</u>	<u>ANNUAL FUNDING PROGRAM</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE OBLIGATION</u>	<u>% OF AFP</u>
63d	\$8,230,800	\$4,543,100	55
89th	5,737,900	1,644,200	29
91st	389,300	248,500	64
96th	6,159,000	2,533,800	41
104th	303,700	100,500	33
124th	7,588,700	3,904,000	51
351st	<u>1,280,600</u>	<u>200,400</u>	<u>16</u>
Totals	\$29,690,000	\$13,174,500	44

Figure 24: Supplies and Equipment

During the first half of the fiscal year, funding for supplies and equipment increased by \$17,395,900. The increase was prompted by House Appropriations Committee mark-up of funds to support the Go-To-War posture of Army Reserve units. Increased funding was now available for chemical defense equipment (CDE), CTA, and other supplies needed to bring all RDF-A and C to C+15 units to required levels and all later deploying units to authorized levels, i.e., Go-To-War stocks.²⁵

RPA FUNDS STATUS

Program and Actual Obligations:

	<u>Program</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent Execution</u>
School Training	\$31,296,900	\$31,258,500	100
Special Training	4,593,300	4,593,300	100
Annual Training	<u>6,160,000</u>	<u>6,154,200</u>	<u>100</u>
Totals	\$42,050,200	\$42,006,000	100 26

Figure 25: RPA Funds Status

MCAR Projects Completed FY 82

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>COST</u>
Dec 81	Los Alamitos, CA	New OMS/AMSA/ECS	\$3,396,000
Feb 82	Ft Carson, CO	New OMS/AMSA/ECS	\$965,000
Aug 82	Ft Ord, CA	New 150M Ctr/OMS/AMSA	\$1,229,000

Figure 26: MCAR Projects Completed FY82

Minor MCAR Projects Completed FY 82

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>COST</u>
29 Oct 81	Fresno, CA	AMSA/OMS	\$145,811
10 Aug 82	Portland, OR (Sears Hall)	Electrical distribution service	\$8,461
17 Aug 82	Ft Carson, CO	Construct new arms vault	\$107,038

Figure 27: Minor MCAR Projects Completed FY82

Completed Real Estate Actions FY 82

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>COST</u>
1 Oct 81	Hutchinson, KS	Renewal of permit (Inlease) with Kansas State Industrial Reformatory USAR use of firing range (1 year)	na
14 Oct 81	Santa Cruz, CA	Renewal of lease (Outgrant) Santa Cruz High School District use of USAR Center (1 year)	na
19 Oct 81	Mead, NE	New lease (Outgrant) for grazing purposes (2-1/2 years)	\$22,500
31 Oct 81	Hamilton AFB, CA	Terminate permit (Outgrant) US Public Health Service use of Bldg 515	na
31 Oct 81	Sunnyvale, CA	Terminate lease (Ingrant)	\$49,500
1 Nov 81	Sunnyvale, CA	New lease (Ingrant) USAR Center (5 years)	\$116,153
3 Nov 81	Topeka, KS	Renewal of MOU (Ingrant) use of AFRC	na
2 Dec 81	San Francisco, CA	New permit (Ingrant) 6A Band use of Palace of Fine Arts (2 days)	na
3 Dec 81	Corvallis, OR	New permit (Outgrant) Dept of Trans (FAA) use of Engineer Room (5 years)	na
7 Dec 81	Rio Vista, CA	Renewal of permit (Outgrant) US Coast Guard (5 years)	na
22 Dec 81	Fresno, CA	Terminate lease (Inlease) Elm Street AMSA	\$22,284
17 Dec 81	Parks RFTA, CA	Renewal of permit (Outgrant) Dept of Justice use of Bldg 692 (5 years)	na
30 Dec 81	Santa Maria, CA	Terminate lease (Inlease) with City of Santa Maria	na
31 Dec 81	Syracuse, NE	Terminate lease (Inlease) for USAR Center	\$5,100

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>COST</u>
1 Jan 82	Syracuse, NE	New lease (Inlease) for USAR Cntr (5 years)	\$6,300
3 Jan 82	Silverton, ID	Terminate lease (Inlease) for dining facility	\$2,400
8 Jan 82	Vancouver Bks, WA	New ISSA (Outgrant) AFEES use of space (indef)	na
15 Jan 82	Santa Maria, CA	New lease (Inlease) for USAR Center (3 years)	\$5,400
30 Jan 82	Helena, MT	Renewal of lease (Inlease) for office space (5 years)	\$20,520
25 Jan 82	Vancouver Bks, WA	Terminate lease (Outgrant)	na
3 Feb 82	Longview, CA	New permit (Outgrant) US Coast Guard (5 years)	na
3 Feb 82	Parks RFTA, CA	Renewal of lease (Outgrant) Livermore Recreation District use of Bldg 880 (3 years)	na
3 Feb 82	Modesto, CA	Terminate permit (Outgrant) Civil Air Patrol	na
9 Feb 82	Oakland, CA	New lease (Outgrant) ASI imports use of Engineer Road (7 years)	na
11 Feb 82	Aurora, CO	Terminate lease (Inlease) for USAR Center	\$36,000
11 Feb 82	Aurora, CO	New lease (Inlease) for USAR Center (5 years)	\$94,716
1 Mar 82	Spokane, WA	New lease (Inlease) for storage space (5 years)	\$15,000
1 Mar 82	Logan, UT	Terminate lease (Inlease)	na
11 Mar 82	Trentwood, WA	Renewal of lease (Outgrant) Spokane Industrial use of .05AC land (5 years)	\$100

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>COST</u>
22 Mar 82	Longview, WA	New permit (Outgrant) CAP use of space (5 years)	na
31 Mar 82	Lewistown, MT	Renew lease (Inlease) addition of 2,500 SF for heating shop	\$24,084
1 Apr 82	Hayden Lake, ID	Renewal of license (Outgrant) Veterans of Foreign Wars use of USAR Center (5 years)	na
1 Apr 82	Sunnyside, WA	Terminate lease (Ingrant)	\$6,480
1 Apr 82	Sunnyside, WA	New lease (Ingrant) USAR Center (5 years)	\$10,800
1 Apr 82	Ft Lewis, WA	New permit (Ingrant) storage space for go-to-war stocks (indef)	na
6 Apr 82	Parks RFTA, CA	New license (Outgrant) East Bay Radio Controller's use of land (1 year)	na
16 Apr 82	West Los Angeles, CA	Renewal of license (Outgrant) US Coast Guard Auxillary use of USAR Center (5 years)	na
19 Apr 82	Wallace, ID	Renewal of lease (Ingrant) USAR Center (5 years)	\$3,000
26 Apr 82	Parks RFTA, CA	New permit (Outgrant) Dept of Justice use of Bldg 320 (5 years)	na
29 Apr 82	Parks RFTA, CA	Demolition, Bldgs 831, 832, 833	na
14 May 82	Bell CA	New permit (Ingrant) storage space for go-to-war stocks (1 year)	\$28,000
16 May 82	Parks RFTA, CA	Renewal of easement (Outgrant) Dublin-San Ramon Sewage District use of sewage treatment facility (50 years)	na
14 May 82	Santa Fe, NM	New permit (Outgrant) Dept of Air Force (2 years)	na

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>COST</u>
18 May 82	Idaho Falls, ID	New permit (Outgrant) Dept of Navy use of space for mobile dental clinics (5 years)	na
18 May 82	Ogden, UT	New easement (Outgrant) Right-of-way for road (indef)	na
18 May 82	Vancouver Bks, WA	New permit (Outgrant) Military entrance processing station use of Bldg 997 (3 years)	na
18 May 82	Wallace, ID	Terminate lease (Ingrant)	\$15,120
19 May 82	Wallace, ID	New lease (Ingrant) USAR Center (5 years)	\$24,300
21 May 82	Long Beach, CA	Terminate lease (Ingrant)	\$3,000
24 May 82	Helena, MT	Renewal of license (Outgrant) MT ARRG use of USAR Center (5 years)	na
26 May 82	Seattle, WA	New permit (Ingrant) with Dept of Navy (3 years)	na
26 May 82	Bakersfield, CA	New permit (Outgrant) Defense Mapping Agency use of space for trailer (9 months)	na
11 Jun 82	Las Vegas, NV	New ISSA (Outgrant) Marines use of USAR center (5 years)	na
23 Jun 82	Boulder, CO	New permit (Outgrant) DIS use of parking area (5 years)	na
28 Jun 82	Portland, OR	Renewal of permit with Portland International	na
25 Jun 82	Scott City, KS	Terminate lease (Ingrant)	\$4,800
29 Jun 82	Scott City, KS	New lease (Ingrant) USAR Center (5 years)	\$6,300
30 Jun 82	Osawatomie, KS	Terminate lease (Ingrant)	\$12,500
2 Jul 82	Osawatomie, KS	New lease (Ingrant) USAR Center (3 years)	\$16,500

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>COST</u>
2 Jul 82	Baxter Springs, KS	New lease (Ingrant) USAR Center (3 years)	\$21,600
19 Jul 82	Redding, CA	Renewal of license (Ingrant) (1 year)	\$1,488
27 Jul 82	Medford, OR	New permit (Outgrant) Dept of Air Force - Civil Air Patrol use of USAR Center (3 years)	na
26 Aug 82	Vancouver Bks, WA	Renewal of lease (Outgrant) Clarke- Skamania County use of space	na
20 Sep 82	Norton, KS	Terminate lease (Ingrant)	\$7,952
21 Sep 82	Norton, KS	New lease (Ingrant) USAR Center (3 years)	\$9,600

Figure 28: Completed Real Estate Actions FY 82

SUMMARY OF LEASE COSTS

FY 82

<u>LOCATION</u>		<u>ANNUAL LEASE</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>	<u>DECREASE</u>
<u>CA</u>				
Bell		\$28,000	\$28,00	
Fresno		22,284	-	22,284
Long Beach		3,000	-	3,000
Santa Maria		5,400	5,400	-
Sunnyvale	(New)	116,153	66,653	
	(Old)	49,500		
<u>CO</u>				
Aurora	(New)	94,716	58,716	
	(Old)	36,000		
<u>ID</u>				
Silverton		2,400	-	2,400
Wallace	(New)	24,300	9,180	
	(Old)	15,120		
<u>KS</u>				
Baxter Springs		21,600	21,600	-
Norton	(New)	9,600	1,648	
	(Old)	7,952		
Osawatomie	(New)	16,500	4,000	
	(Old)	12,500		
Scott City	(New)	6,300	1,500	-
	(Old)	4,800		
<u>MT</u>				
Helena	(New)	20,520	4,095	-
	(Old)	16,425		
Lewistown	(New)	24,084	4,500	-
	(Old)	19,584		
<u>NE</u>				
Syracuse	(New)	6,300	1,200	
	(Old)	5,100		
<u>WA</u>				
Spokane		15,000	15,000	
Sunnyside	(New)	10,800	4,320	
	(Old)	6,480		27
Total increase				
<u>\$196,128</u>				

Figure 29: Summary of Lease Costs, FY 82

FULL-TIME SUPPORT TDA

1. RESOURCES OF UIC W4DXAA:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AMSC</u>
12	122	134	51999231200
9	166	175	51999231300
(21)	(288)	(309)	

REDISTRIBUTION:

<u>UIC</u>	<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AMSC</u>
W3E1AA	USAR TECH GP, 63d ARCOM	3	39	42	51999231200
W3E4AA	USAR TECH GP, 96th ARCOM	2	40	42	51999231200
W3E5AA	USAR TECH GP, 124th ARCOM	5	10	15	51999231200
W337AA	USAR TECH GP, 89th ARCOM	2	33	35	51999231200
W3XLAA	ARMR VIII	4	74	78	51999231300
W3XLAA	ARMX IX	5	90	95	51999231300
		(21)	(286)	(307)	

2. REDESIGNATION OF USAR TECHNICIAN GROUPS:

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
W3E1AA USAR TECH GP, 63d ARCOM	63d ARCOM, FULL-TIME SUPPORT
W3E2AA USAR TECH GP, 91st DIV (TNG)	91st DIV (TNG), FULL-TIME SUPPORT
W3E3AA USAR TECH GP, 104th DIV (TNG)	104th DIV (TNG), FULL-TIME SUPPORT
W3E4AA USAR TECH GP, 96th ARCOM	96th ARCOM, FULL-TIME SUPPORT
W3E5AA USAR TECH GP, 124th ARCOM	124th ARCOM, FULL-TIME SUPPORT
W3E6AA USAR TECH GP, 351st CA COMD	351st CA COMD, FULL-TIME SUPPORT
W337AA USAR TECH GP, 89th ARCOM	89th ARCOM, FULL-TIME SUPPORT

3. TRANSFER OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISOR PERSONNEL:

<u>FROM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOT</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>AMSC</u>
W3XLAA ARMR VIII	18	9	27	2	W3E4AA USAR TECH GP, 96th ARCOM	5199923300
W3XLAA ARMR VIII	9	6	15	1	W337AA USAR TECH GP, 89th ARCOM	5199923300
	(27)	(15)	(42)	(3)		
W3XMAA ARMR IX	11	6	17	1	W3E1AA USAR TECH GP, 63d ARCOM	5199923300
W3XMAA ARMR IX	7	2	9	1	W3E2AA USAR TECH GP, 91st DIV(TNG)	5199923300
W3XMAA ARMR IX	2	2	4		W3E3AA USAR TECH GP, 104thDIV(TNG)	5199923300
W3XMAA ARMR IX	14	9	23	1	W3E5AA USAR TECH GP, 124th ARCOM	5199923300
W3XMAA ARMR IX	3	1	4	1	W3E6AA USAR TECH GP, 351st CA COMD	5199923300
	(37)	(20)	(57)	(4)		
Total	64	35	99	728		

*Two (2) Enl positions were returned to AGB (Virgin Islands) per FORSCOM guidance. Loss will be reflected on the next TDA update.

Figure 30: Full-Time Support TDA

PERFORMANCE PACKAGE SUBMISSIONS - FY 82

<u>MUSARC</u>	<u># OF UNITS</u>	<u># OF PACKAGES</u>	<u># OF LATE PACKAGES</u>	<u>% LATE</u>	
63d ARCOM	97	1164	104	8.9	
89th ARCOM	103	1236	105	8.5	
91st Division	72	864	63	7.3	
96th ARCOM	91	1092	94	8.6	
104th Division	102	1224	110	9.0	
124th ARCOM	87	1044	59	5.7	
351st CA Cnd	<u>44</u>	<u>528</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>7.6</u>	
Totals	596	7152	575	8.0	29

Figure 31: Performance Package Submissions - FY 82

CHE PARTICIPATION/STRENGTH IMPROVEMENT

BRANCH	ASSIGNED STRENGTH			CHE PARTICIPANTS			PERCENT PARTICIPATING					
	FY 1979	FY 1980	FY 1981	AS OF 1 APRIL 82	FY 1979	FY 1980	FY 1981	AS OF 1 APRIL 82	FY 1979	FY 1980	FY 1981	AS OF 1 APRIL 82
MC	200	199	241	318	112	118	161	235	56%	59%	67%	74%
DE	158	166	159	169	33	60	92	83	20%	36%	58%	49%
AN	671	784	777	849	20	48	185	198	4%	6%	24%	23%
AMS	81	86	70	74	8	9	27	11	10%	10%	39%	15%
MS	369	371	364	372	19	22	42	49	5%	6%	12%	13%
VC	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>18%</u>	<u>0%</u>	<u>30%</u>	<u>10%</u>
	1490	1617	1622	1792	202	257	511	577	14%	16%	32%	32%30

Figure 32: CHE Participation/Strength Improvement

SPECIAL PROGRAMS/TRAINING

The Strength Improvement Awards Program was implemented on 1 October 1981. The awards were presented to the major US Army Reserve Commands on a quarterly and annual basis in the following five categories:

- a. First-Term Reenlistment - for the higher percentage of eligible career soldiers who reenlist.
- b. Career Reenlistment - for the highest percentage of eligible career soldiers who reenlist.
- c. Retention - the lowest percentage of Individual Ready Reserve losses.
- d. Referral - the highest percentage of people who are referred and who enlist in the Army Reserve.
- e. Strength increase - major US Army Reserve Command with the highest percentage of strength increase.

	<u>FIRST QUARTER</u>	<u>SECOND QUARTER</u>	<u>THIRD QUARTER</u>
First Term Reenlistment	351st CA Cmd	104th Div	104th Div
Career Reenlistment	104th Div	351st CA Cmd	104th Div
Retention	104th Div	89th ARCOM	89th ARCOM
Strength Increase	351st CA Cmd	91st Div	351st CA Cmd

Figure 33: Strength Improvement Awards Program

The Commander's Cup, which was given for the best overall performance, was awarded to the 104th Division (Training).³¹

Local Training Areas Improvement Initiatives.

South Dakota and Idaho negotiated for land to establish M31 field artillery sub-caliber ranges for B-1-147 Field Artillery and Howitzer Battery 2-116 Armored Cavalry Regiment. In Idaho, at Gowen Field, the National Guard Bureau provided the Idaho National Guard \$500,000 to assist in the construction of a center lane of a multi-purpose range complex, consisting of 45 infantry pop-up targets, 22 infantry moving targets, 20 automatic tank target systems, and four automatic tank target system moving targets.

At the Townsend/Limestone Hills local training area, Montana, there were several improvements, including a tank range upgrade for tank tables VII A and B, construction of a moving tank target, a range control tower, and a forward

observation bunker. At Waco Training Site, Montana, negotiations were undertaken to obtain a proposed local training area which was to be called the Waco Local Training Area, located 35 miles east of Billings, to accommodate armored cavalry training needs. This area offered considerable training potential for approximately 5,500 Reserve and Active Component personnel located within two hours road march from Rocky Mountain Arsenal.³²

In North Dakota, at Camp Grafton, a 50 meter baffle range for small arms and machine guns was under construction, as well as a 50 caliber machine gun range at Campbell Range Area, which is southeast of Grafton. An in Colorado, at Camp George West, a 25 point 50 meter baffle range was under construction during this period. While at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, negotiations were started for development of a local training area, with a tentative completion date of 1983.³³

ARMR VIII PARTICIPATION

GALLANT EAGLE 82

13 Mar - 27 Mar 82

<u>HQ</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HOME STATION</u>
89 ARCOM	326 ASG	Kansas City, KS
89 ARCOM	809 S&S Bn	Fremont, NE
89 ARCOM	1013 S&S Co	N Platte, NE
89 ARCOM	842 QM Co (POL)	Kansas City, KS
89 ARCOM	821 TC Bn	Topeka, KS
89 ARCOM	172 TC Co (1st Inc) *	Omaha, NE
89 ARCOM	487 Engr Det (FF)	Washington, KS
KS ARNG	287 CS Bn	Norton, KS
SD ARNG	730 Med Det (CLR)	Winner, SD
SD ARNG	1085 Med Det (Hel Amb)	Rapid City, SD
96 ARCOM	419 TC Co (POL)	Salt Lake City, UT

27 Mar - 10 Apr 82

351 CA Cmd	24 PSYOPS Co	Denver, CO
CO ARNG	220 MP Co	Cp George West, CO
NM ARNG	720 TC Co (HET)	Las Vegas, NM
89 ARCOM	172 TC Co (2d Inc)	Omaha, NE
89 ARCOM	821 TC Bn	Topeka, KS
89 ARCOM	425 TC Ctr	Manhattan, KS
89 ARCOM	342 TC Det	Manhattan, KS
89 ARCOM	531 TC Det	Manhattan, KS
96 ARCOM	190 TC Det	Olathe, KS
96 ARCOM	406 Med Hosp	Aurora, CO
89 ARCOM	162 Med Bn	Lincoln, NE
89 ARCOM	447 Med Co (CLR)	Grand Forks, ND
89 ARCOM	971 Med Co (CLR)	Wichita, KS
89 ARCOM	469 Med Co (Gr Amb)	Wichita, KS
96 ARCOM	907 Med Det (Dental)	Albuquerque, NM
NM ARNG	717 Med Det (Hel Amb)	Santa Fe, NM
NM ARNG	744 Med Det (Disp)	Albuquerque, NM
96 ARCOM	449 QM Co (POL)	Ft Douglas, UT
89 ARCOM	1011 CS Co (DS)	Pittsburg, KS
ID ARNG	145 S&S Bn	Caldwell, ID ³⁴

* 1 Week early - 1 week late - Long haul of 89 ARCOM units equipment

Figure 34: ARMR VIII Participation GALLANT EAGLE 82

SAFETY

COMMAND ACCIDENT RATES:

During the period of this report (1 October 1981 through 30 September 1982), emphasis remained on accident prevention and the command safety program. The command suffered two work or military operations related fatalities. Eleven civilians suffered reportable accidents against a total of 3,226,728 manhours worked; 15 military suffered reportable accidents against a total of 7,129,136 manhours of duty; and there were three reportable military vehicle accidents against a total of 3,008,285 miles driven.³⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. DF, AFKC-CS, 1 Sep 82, sub: Office of Strength Improvement.
2. DF, AFKC-CS, 2 Aug 82, sub: Activation of the Advanced Planning Group.
3. DF, AFKC-SG-A (8 Jul 82), 21 Jul 82, sub: Submission of Mid-Year Historical Feeder Report.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. DCSPA SAHFR, 25 Oct 82.
8. Ibid.
9. DF, AFKC-PA-RO (13 Sep 82), 2 Nov 82, sub: Submission of End-of-Year Historical Feeder Report.
10. Ibid. See also ltr, AFKC-PA-RO, Hickman Sends, 3 Sep 82, sub: Reassignment of Officers Previously Nonselected for Retention by a Selective Retention Board.
11. See Historian's Files.
12. Ibid.
13. Memo, AFKC-RRR-RDPR, 12 Jan 82, sub: Synopsis, ARMR VIII Winter Conference, 7-8 Jan 82.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. MFR, AFKC-DC, 3 Dec 82, sub: FORSCOM/CONUSA Commanders' Conference, 1 Septemoer p. 1.
17. Ibid, p. 2.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid, p. 3.
21. Ibid, pp. 3, 4.

22. Ibid, p. 4.
23. Ibid, p. 7.
24. DCSRM SAHFR, 5 Nov 82.
25. DCSLOG SAHFR, 12 Jul 82.
26. DCSRM SAHFR, 28 Jul and 5 Nov 82. See also USASIX MSG 080750Z Mar 82, Grange Sends to Cdr, 89th ARCOM, sub: Critical Shortages in Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) Funding: USASIX MSG, 260830Z Feb 82, Hickman Sends, sub: Redistribution of Funds: USASIX MSG 260815Z Apr 82, Grange Sends to Cdr, 89TH ARCOM, SAB.
27. ENGR SAHFR, 6 Oct 82.
28. DCSRM SAHFR, 28 Jul 82.
29. Ibid.
30. Staff Medical Advisor SAHFR, ND. See Historian's Files.
31. Office of Strength Improvement SAHFR, 12 Jul and 2 Nov 82.
32. Ltr, AFKC-RRA-RDPR, 8 Jul 82, sub: Submission of Mid-Year Historical Report.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. AFKC-PA-PS, 25 Oct 82, DCSPA SAHFR.

CPX.....Command Post Exercise
 CS.....Chief of Staff Combat Support
 CSC.....Computer Systems Command
 CSMS.....California State Military Forces
 CSS.....Combat Service Support

D

DA.....Department of the Army
 DAMPL.....DA Master Priority List
 DARCOM.....US Army Development and Material Command
 DARNG.....Director Army National Guard
 DAS3.....Decentralized Automated Service Support System
 DCSLOG.....Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics
 DCSOPS.....Deputy Chief of Staff Operations
 DCSPA.....Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel and Administration
 DCSR.....Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management
 DCST.....Deputy Chief of Staff Training
 DCVS.....Demonstration CAMIS Validation System
 DEERS.....Dependent Eligibility Enrollment System
 DESCOM.....Depot Systems Command
 DMOS.....Duty Military Occupational Specialty
 DOD.....Department of Defense
 DPL.....Direct Private Line
 DRC.....District Recruiting Command
 DRL.....Date Required to Load
 DS.....Direct Support
 DSS.....Defense Strategy Seminar

E

ECS.....Equipment Concentration Sites
 EDATE.....Effective Date
 EEMI.....Economies, Efficiencies and Management Improvement
 EEO.....Equal Employment Opportunity
 EHTR.....Emergency Highway Traffic Regulation Plan
 EIS.....Environmental Impact Statement
 EM.....Enlisted Man
 EMS.....Emergency Medical Supervisor
 EOC.....Emergency Operations Center
 EOH.....Equipment of Hand
 EPMS.....Enlisted Personnel Management System
 ERC-A.....Equipment Readiness Code A
 ES.....End Strength
 ESGR.....Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
 ETS.....Expiration Term of Service
 EW.....Electronic Warfare

F

FACTS.....Facility, Asset, Cataloguing and Tracking System
FAD.....Force Activity Designator
FAMC.....Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center
FDAA.....Federal Disaster Assistance Administration
FEMA.....Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHMA.....Family Emergency Management Agency
FIST.....Fire Integrated Support Team
FONAC.....Flag Officers Nuclear Accident Course
FORSCOM.....United States Army Forces Command
FTM.....Full-Time Manning Program
FTUS.....Full-Time Unit Support
FTX.....Field Training Exercise
FY.....Fiscal Year

G

GAO.....General Accounting Office
GOCOM.....General Officer Command
GSA.....General Services Administration
GWP.....General War Plan

H

HF.....High Frequency
HDD.....Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
HQDA.....Headquarters, Department of the Army
HUMINT.....Human Source Intelligence

I

I&S.....Intelligence and Security
IDAPR.....Individual Activity Performance Reports
IDT.....Inactive Duty Training
IG.....Inspector General
IMFL.....Intensive Management Force List
IMSA.....Installation Medical Supply Activities
IPR.....In-process Review
IR.....Internal Review
IRA.....Intelligence Related Activities
IRETS.....Infantry Remote Target System
IRR.....Individual Ready Reserve
ITASC.....Interim Theater ADP Service Center
ITS.....Individual Training Plans

J

JA.....Judge Advocate
JAGC.....Judge Advocate General's Corps
JAGSO.....Judge Advocate General's Service Organization

JCS.....Joint Chiefs of Staff
 JOFFOR.....Joint Operations Force
 JRK.....Joint Readiness Exercise
 JTX.....Joint Training Exercise
 JUMPS-RC.....Joint Uniform Military Pay System - Reserve
 Components

K

KMARS.....Key Member Action Retention Seminars

L

LAD.....Latest Arrival Date
 LCA.....Logistics Control Agency
 LD.....Land Defense
 LOA.....Letter of Agreement
 LOGEX.....Logistical Exercise
 LOI.....Letter of Instruction
 LTA.....Local Training Area

M

MAC.....Maneuver Area Command
 MACOM.....Major Command
 MAD.....Material Assistance Designated
 MAFFS.....Modular Airborne Firefighting System
 MAIT.....Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Teams
 MARS.....Military Affiliate Radio System
 MAST.....Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic
 MAT.....Mobile Assistance Team
 MATES.....Mobilization and Training Equipment Site
 MCAR.....Military Construction, Army Reserve
 M-DAY.....Mobilization Day
 MDS.....Manday Spaces
 MEE.....Minimum Essential Equipment
 MG.....Major General
 MI.....Military Intelligence
 MILDAT.....Military Damage Assessment Team
 MIOAC.....Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course
 MLCH.....Major Logistical Control Headquarters
 MMCAR.....Military Minor Construction, Army Reserve
 MMCC.....Mobilization Movement Control Center
 MOB-TNG.....Modular Training Program
 MOBCON.....Mobilization Control
 MOBDES.....Mobilization Designee
 MOBEX.....Mobilization Exercise
 MOBPEERS.....Mobilization Personnel Processing System
 MOLC.....Method of Learning Course
 MOS.....Military Occupational Specialist
 MOSTC.....Military Occupational Specialty Training Center

MOUT.....Military Operations in Urban Terrain
 MP.....Military Police
 MPL.....Mandatory Parts List
 MPM.....Master Personnel File Maintenance System
 MPRJ.....Military Personnel Records Jacket
 MRIS.....Modernization Resource Information Submission
 MRR.....Material Readiness Report
 MSCD.....Military Support of Civil Defense
 MTBSP.....Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan
 MTC.....Maneuver Training Command
 MTOE.....Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment
 MTT.....Mobile Training Team
 MTU.....Major Troop Unit
 MUSARC.....Major United States Army Reserve Command
 MUST.....Medical Unit Self Contained Transportable
 MY.....Man Years

N

NATO.....North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NBC.....Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
 NCAIC.....Nuclear Chemical Accident Incident Control
 NCO.....Noncommissioned Officer
 NCOES.....NCO Education System
 NDP.....National Defense Plan
 NETEX.....Nuclear Emergency Team Exercise
 NG.....National Guard
 NGB.....National Guard Bureau
 NPS.....Non-prior Service
 NSGR.....National Committee for Employer Support of the
 Guard Reserve
 NTC.....National Training Center
 NUWAX.....Nuclear Weapons Accident Exercise

O

OCAR.....Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
 OCONUS.....Outside the Continental United States
 ODCSLOG.....Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
 ODCSOPS.....Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
 ODCSPA.....Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and
 Administration
 ODCSRM.....Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource
 Management
 ODCST.....Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Training
 ODP.....Officer Distribution Plan
 ODT.....Overseas Deployment Training
 OE.....Organizational Effectiveness
 OER.....Officer Evaluation Report
 OESO.....Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer
 OJT.....On the Job Training

RES.....Reserve Component Evaluation System
RFA.....Radio Frequency Authorizations
RFPB.....Reserve Forces Policy Board
RFTA.....Reserve Forces Training Area
RG.....Readiness Group
RICC.....Reportable Item Control Code
RIF.....Reduction in Force
RMA.....Rocky Mountain Arsenal
ROA.....Retired Officer Association
ROAD.....Reorganization Objective Army Division
ROTC.....Reserve Officer Training Corps
RPA.....Reserve Personnel, Army
RPIRS.....Reserve Personnel Information Reporting System
RPMF.....Reserve Personnel Master File

S

SA.....Secretary of the Army
SAG.....Study Advisory Group
SAILS.....Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply Subsystem
SAMDIP.....USASIX Mobilization/Deployment Improvement Program
SAMEX.....Sixth US Army Mobilization Exercise
SCIF.....Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
SCR.....System Change Request
SDS.....Site and Date Scheduling
SFR.....Service Response Force
SIDPERS.....Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SIGINT.....Signal Intelligence
SIR.....Serious Incident Reports
SJA.....Staff Judge Advocate
SM.....Soldiers Manual
SMP.....Simultaneous Membership Program
SMSO.....State Military Support Office
SNCOC.....Senior NCO Course
SOJT.....Supervised on-the-job Training
SOP.....Standard Operating Procedures
SOW.....Statement of Work
SPOEGC.....Seaport of Embarkation Coordination Group
SQT.....Skill Qualifications Test
SSAA.....Senior Staff Administrative Assistant
STANFINS.....Standard Finance System
STARC.....State Area Command
STRAC.....Standardization in Training Commission
STRAF.....Strategic Army Force
SWPA.....Southwest Pacific Area
SY.....School Year

T

PAADS.....The Army Automation Document System
TAG.....The Adjutant General
TAMIS.....Training Ammunition Management Information System
TAMS.....Training Ammunition Management System
TAP.....Troop Action Program
TAV.....Technical Assistance Visit
TDA.....Table of Distribution and Allowances
TECS.....Temporary Equipment Concentration Site
TLFC.....Teleconferencing
TMDO.....Training Management Development Officer
FOA.....Transportation Operating Agencies
TOE.....Table of Organization and Equipment
TNG.....Training
TPU.....Troop Program Unit
TRADOC.....US Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSFO.....Training Set Fire Observation
TVI.....Technical Validation Inspection

U

UCMJ.....Uniform Code of Military Justice
UFR.....Unfinanced Requirements
UHF.....Ultra High Frequency
UIC.....Unit Identification Code
UMR.....Unit Manning Reports
UNITRED.....Unit Status and Identity Report
US.....United States
USA.....United States Army
USAAVNS&C.....United States Army Aviation School and Center
USACC.....US Army Communication Command
USANCA.....United States Army Nuclear/Chemical Agency
USAR.....United States Army Reserve
USAREC.....US Army Recruiting Command
USASIX.....Sixth US Army
JSATSC.....United States Army Training Support Command
USR.....United States Report
UTA.....Unit Training Assembly

V

VHF.....Very High Frequency

W

WES.....WMMCS Entry System
WETS.....Weekend Training Sites
WIN.....WMMCCS Intercomputer Network
WOSC.....Warrant Officer Senior Course
WMMCCS.....Worldwide Military Command and Control System

X

Y

Z

ZBB.....Zero Base Budget
ZBP.....Zero Base Programming