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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A
AN INTERGROUP PERSPECTIVE ON GROUP DYNAMICS

Intergroup perspectives began to shape the understanding of human behavior from the beginning of the twentieth century. Scholars reflecting upon such diverse events as political revolution, tribal warfare, labor management relations, and mental illness showed an awareness of group-to-group relations in their thinking and action. In the last thirty years, numerous intergroup theories have evolved and shaped methodological traditions. Currently, these theory-method combinations can be distinguished by their relative.
focus on group level concepts, attention to groups in context or in isolation, acceptance of interventionist behavior by researchers, and tendency toward examining the individual and group behavior of investigators.

Intergroup theory provides interpretations for individual, interpersonal, group, intergroup, and organizational relations. The version of intergroup theory given here uses a definition of group that is concerned with both internal and external properties. It explains intergroup dynamics in terms of group boundaries, power, affect, cognition, and leadership behavior. It examines the nature of identity and organization groups. It relates the state of intergroup relations to the suprasystem in which they are embedded. It presents an understanding of the changing relations among interdependent groups and their representatives through the operation of parallel and unconscious processes.

The theory relates to a wide array of social and organizational problems, including the development of effective work teams, the definition and management of organizational culture, and the teaching of organizational behavior in Management schools.
AN INTERGROUP PERSPECTIVE ON GROUP DYNAMICS

BY

Clayton P. Alderfer

Yale School of Organization and Management

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INTRODUCTION

The study of intergroup relations brings to bear a variety of methods and theories from social science on a diverse set of difficult social problems (Allport, 1954; Merton, 1960; Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Van den Berge, 1972; Pettigrew, 1981). Taken literally, intergroup relations refer to activities between and among groups. Note that the choice of preposition is significant. Whether people observe groups only two at a time or in more complex constellations has important implications for action and for understanding. Intergroup concepts can explain a broader range of phenomena than just what goes on at the intersection of two or more groups. The range of concern is from how individuals think, as revealed in studies of prejudice and stereotyping, to how nation states deal with each other in the realm of international conflict. A central feature of virtually all intergroup analysis is the persistently problematic relationship between individual people and collective social processes.

The argument in this chapter proceeds in four major steps. The first section describes several prominent historical developments that set the stage for intergroup theory and method as we know it today. Included in this section are accounts of limitations in the early works as well as contributions. The second section proposes several dimensions on which contemporary versions of intergroup theory may be compared. The perspectives in this section presents a version of intergroup theory. This particular formulation deals explicitly with organizations and provides answers to questions raised about early and contemporary formulations. The final section applies the particular theory to a variety of problems of
practice and theory in organizational behavior. Here the aim is to show how application of intergroup theory leads to potentially different interpretations and actions than suggested by other writers. Throughout the paper, concepts from intergroup theory address statements and actions by individuals from a wide diversity of organizational roles, including researchers, politicians, teachers, managers, publicists, and consultants. The aim of the chapter is to explain and to explicate intergroup theory.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The roots of contemporary social scientific thinking about intergroup relations can be found in the period between the 1890's and the 1930's. This era contains the origins of theory, method, and technique that influence much of today's work. Here I identify four key developments: (1) Le Bon's (1895) theory of The Crowd; (2) Sumner's (1906) concept of ethnocentrism; (3) Roethlisberger and Dickson's empirical work on Management and the Worker; and (4) the social invention of group treatment methods. Taken together the focus of attention ranges from the political behavior of nations, to the feelings and actions of clans and tribes, to the work activities of profit-making organizations, to the treatment of psychologically disturbed individuals.

Le Bon and The Crowd

Social scientists mark the beginning of intergroup studies with the publication of Gustave Le Bon's The Crowd in 1895 (Turner, 1981). Le Bon used political events of nineteenth century France as the basis for a series of propositions about individual and crowd behavior. Many of the issues and problems he addressed remain central to the study of intergroup
relations today. These include:

1. the effects of race in human affairs;
2. the substitution of unconscious action by groups for the conscious actions of individuals;
3. the impact of social scientists' group memberships on the views they espouse;
4. the stimulation of creativity and altruism in individuals by groups;
5. the tension between elites and masses;
6. the utility of group psychology for those who exercise leadership;
7. the manner in which groups shape the meaning of words and concepts for their members;
8. the role of leaders in groups; and
9. the variation in types of groups based on their composition and purpose.

All of these subjects were analyzed differently than they would be today. Le Bon was not a twentieth century social scientist. Nevertheless the breadth of his vision was notable. Contemporary intergroup research is far more precise in both theory and data than Le Bon's pioneering effort. But the extent of intergroup phenomena to which he attended is rarely matched by current scholars. Le Bon's work was also important because it provided a stepping off place for Sigmund Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1922), a small book that has been highly influential in many efforts to utilize knowledge about groups for the treatment of individual psychopathology. Yet, there is a double paradox in this connection. Le Bon was rather unsure about whether his knowledge could or
should be used to bring about change, and Freud did not conduct group treatment even though his analysis has been quite influential among those who do (Anthony, 1971).

**Sumner's Concept of Ethnocentrism**

Just after the turn of the century, William Graham Sumner (1906) formulated the idea that intergroup relations in a state of conflict took on a predictable syndrome-like pattern, which he called ethnocentrism. According to Sumner, ethnocentrism became the term to identify the "view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it... Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders" (Sumner, 1906, p. 13). Related to ethnocentrism were the concepts of in-group and out-group. The in-group is one's own group, and an out-group is any group with which one is in conflict.

Sumner's concepts have proved to be extra-ordinarily influential. Recently Levine and Campbell (1972) built an entire comparative theoretical analysis about theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behavior around the concept of ethnocentrism. Brewer and Campbell (1976) then conducted an extensive empirical study covering more than thirty groups to test hypotheses derived from comparing theories related to Sumner's (1906) propositions.

In both theoretical analysis and empirical study, Campbell and his associates demonstrate an awareness of the inability of investigators to escape being influenced by the phenomena they study. Examining Sumner's (1906, 1927) literature searches, Levine and Campbell (1972, p. 19) note,
"We must assume that the very great preponderance of the ethnographers available for Sumner to read were themselves unconsciously ethnocentric."

Brewer and Campbell (1976, pp. 125-126) describe a "triangulation" model for achieving what they term "objectivity" by having several observers describe several cultures. In employing this multi-group multi-observer model, Brewer and Campbell (1976) use a common interview format which they themselves brought to the study. Thus, while they are able to see a version of researcher group identification in reviewing Sumner's (1906) work, they seem unaware that their instrument, however carefully translated and used by different observers of diverse groups, is still their questionnaire. The issues they ask about are based on the theory of white male Yale professor, vintage early 20th century (i.e., William Graham Sumner). How likely are the concepts embedded in the interview to be relevant, or perhaps equally important, how likely are they to be similarly relevant to all groups in an array of thirty tribes in Eastern Africa in 1965? How likely were Brewer and Campbell, using the methodology that they did, to determine whether there were different degrees of relevance of their questions to the groups they studied?

The tradition of intergroup research set in motion by Sumner, even though subject to criticism for the ethnocentrism of its author and in spite of its conceptual power, has been one whereby investigators are not prodded to examine searchingly their own group identifications and their likely effect on research results.
Roethlisberger and Dickson's work moves the arena of attention from national politics and tribal warfare to business organizations. There was no question about pragmatic motives. The Western Electric Company cooperated with researchers from the Harvard Business School because both organizations were concerned with determining the factors in the work place that influenced the morale and productive efficiency of workers. But their effort did not explicitly contribute to Intergroup theory, despite the book's title. Rather the importance of their work, in my opinion, rests with the empirical results they produced, even though the interpretation of their findings remains problematical. In addition, the research process demonstrated a long term commitment to understanding and a repeated willingness to revise methods and interpretations in light of unanticipated findings.

The Hawthorne studies began with the aim of investigating the "relation of quality and quantity of illumination to efficiency in industry (Cass and Zimmer, 1975)." It ended by proposing that industrial organizations be viewed as social systems in which every part bears a relation of interdependence to every other part (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). The initial orientation was largely based on the disciplines of physics and engineering, and the concluding position set the stage for several generations of work in psychology, sociology, and organizational behavior. Beginning hypotheses were concerned with one-way causality between illumination and productivity. The final conceptualization emphasized multiple levels of analysis, multidirectional causes and effects, and multiple theories of explanation.
The steps from opening to closing modes of understanding included experimental, survey, and interventionist methodologies, but neither the original writers nor their contemporary interpreters were as catholic in their perceptions of intergroup effects. Despite several revisions in concept and method, the investigators did not arrive at an explicitly intergroup formation of social system dynamics even though the data for such a position were abundant. Data relevant to gender, age, and ethnicity were reported throughout the study (cf. Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939, e.g., pp. 349, 360, 491), and yet they did not enter into the final conceptual analysis. As recently as 1975, commentators on the Hawthorne legacy continued to refer to people who participated in the illumination experiments as "the girls" (Cass and Zimmer, 1975, pp. 279 ff.).

In the chronology of methodologies employed in the Hawthorne studies were several efforts to isolate work groups in order to observe their behavior carefully. This occurred both in the illumination studies and in the bank wiring room research. The investigators report evidence concerning reactive effect of these moves in both instances. Yet they miss the opportunity to conceptualize their experimental interventions as changes in the intergroup relations between the factory as a whole and the research participants and between the isolated groups and themselves as a "research group" with a position related to the organization hierarchy. As open as they were in methodological strategy, they did not have the conceptual or technical equipment to examine the consequences of their own group behavior on the system they were learning to study. Unwittingly, they may have begun a tradition of experimental research on small groups that closed off the groups under study and the researchers from being aware of their intergroup relationships. The study of "group dynamics" as mainly internal relations
among group members without attention to how the groups under study related to the larger social system in which they were embedded accelerated in the years after Hawthorne.

There are clues about the origins of the Hawthorne researchers' blindness to intergroup issues in Roethlisberger's (1977, pp. 14-15) autobiography. Describing his decision to disinherit (his word) himself from his family, he wrote:

"I was an American--an isolationist by factors then unknown to me... who was not going to have anything to do with the mighty battles fought in Switzerland between the Canton de Bern and the Canton de Vaux or with the Franco-Prussian War. This was America, where race, color, creed, birth, heredity, nationality, family, and so forth, did not count and where individual merit, skill, competence, knowledge, liberty, freedom, and so on did. I believed it with all my heart and in a crazy way, in spite of many subsequent experiences to the contrary, I still do." (Emphasis mine)

Is it possible that Roethlisberger could not permit his theory of organization to contain concepts which he was unable to integrate within his own self-perception?

Le Bon, the Frenchman who was able to talk about group differences, made an observation that anticipated Roethlisberger's difficulty many years before the American reported it. Le Bon (1895, pp. 107-108) wrote:

"I shall confine myself to observing that it is precisely the words most often employed by the masses which among different
peoples possess the most different meanings. Such is the case, for instance, with the words 'democracy' and 'socialism' in such frequent use nowadays.

In reality they correspond to quite contrary ideas and images in the Latin and Anglo-Saxon mind. For the Latin peoples the word 'democracy' signifies more especially the subordination of the will and the initiative of the individual to the community represented by the State... Among Anglo-Saxons, and notably in America, this same word 'democracy' signifies, on the contrary, the intense development of the will of the individual, and as complete a subordination as possible of the State..."

From Le Bon's perspective the changed relationship between the individual and the collective signified by 'democracy' was quite different for Latin and Anglo-Saxon people. Perhaps for Latins democracy was an alternative to anarchy, while for Anglo-Saxons democracy was preferred to totalitarianism. In the conceptual language of intergroup theory, Latins were responding to democracy as an adjustment to underbounded conditions, and Anglo-Saxons were reacting to democracy as an improvement to over-bounded conditions (Alderfer, 1980). If this interpretation is valid, it suggests that the meaning of an important term (in this case, democracy) depends in part on the group condition of the people using it.

Roethlisberger's life history included parental struggles between a German-Swiss father and a French-Swiss mother. His method of coping with this conflict was flight, and may have set limits on how able he was to incorporate ethnic differences into his theory of social systems. These two ethnic groups tend to evolve different roles for men and women in the family and may therefore have also influenced how Roethlisberger saw the
relations between men and women in his research (Mc Goldrick, 1983).

**Group Treatment Methods**

According to Anthony (1971), the use of groups by therapists to treat individuals' emotional difficulties may have begun as early as 1907. Using groups for clinical intervention adds an important element to the foundation of intergroup perspectives. The practice is only reasonable if one has a working hypothesis that group forces can be harnessed for constructive ends. In *The Crowd*, Le Bon recognized that groups can have constructive effects, but his emphasis was heavily on destructive irrationality. Moreover, his restrained attitude toward how knowledge of group processes might be used certainly did not suggest that pragmatic values could be served by group level intervention. Apparently physicians--some of whom were psychiatrists--first used groups for treatment purposes (Anthony, 1971). From the beginning, the emotional life of groups became the central feature in their potential role in effecting cures. One early experiment by Joseph Pratt, for example, involved group treatment for individuals with tuberculosis, who were known to be emotionally difficult for people close to them (Anthony, 1971).

As soon as a number of individuals are brought together for treatment, the professional faces a choice. To what degree does he or she treat individuals-in-the-group? To what degree does he or she treat the group-as-a-whole? When one moves from the customary one-on-one relationship to a group setting, the natural tendency is to continue working one-on-one with individuals in the group. However, the combination of the intellectual growth of group psychology during this period and the living experience of group life in the here-and-now led some of the early group workers to
recognize that they could aim their interventions toward group-as-a-whole rather than, or in addition to, individuals. Interventions aimed at individuals take the form of the therapist commenting about people by name, e.g., "I wonder what it means when Mary sits with her head down, arms tightly clasped, and back bent over." Interventions with the group as a whole take the form of the consultant impersonally commenting on group events, e.g., "The group might wish to examine why only the male members have been talking for the last ten minutes."

Advances in psychoanalytic theory and methods in this period also carried important implications for the conduct of group work. From the earliest experiences with their treatment procedures, psychoanalysts had learned the importance of paying careful attention to patients' emotional reactions to them as significant and powerful figures and, in turn, of their analogous feelings toward clients. The terms given to these two classes of emotional process were **transference** when the origin seemed to be with the patient, and **countertransference**, when the beginning seemed to be with the analyst. In either case, the fundamental idea was that both parties had tendencies to "transfer" or to reproduce the emotional dynamics of relationships with other important people (e.g., parents, lovers) in the therapeutic activities. Without proper attention, transferential effects interfered with therapeutic progress. When the transference was "positive" and unexamined, clients showed dramatic improvements, which did not last when the relationship with the analyst changed. When the transference was "negative" and inadequately worked through, treatment terminated prematurely without significant gains for the client. On the other hand, when properly understood and effectively managed, transferential phenomena became a major force in effective treatment. Analysts learned how to be
attentive to patients reactions to them and in turn to their reactions to patients and to comment on these data in ways that could advance treatment. Originally, the discovery of transference phenomena occurred in the one-on-one relationship between Freud and a female patient (Freud, 1905). Freud's (1922) Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego brought the same underlying psychological reasoning to the study of group as well as interpersonal behavior.

The book begins with a critique of Le Bon's The Crowd. The Austrian founder of psychoanalysis was rather mixed in his reactions of the French sociologist's work. Le Bon's attention to the powerful and pervasive operation of unconscious emotional processes "in" (the preposition becomes important) groups drew Freud's approval. But the psychoanalyst was not pleased with how the sociologist explained these effects. The dissatisfaction became an opportunity for Freud to present his own views, and, in the process, to begin the kind of theoretical arguments that would bring the transference reasoning into the realm of group behavior. One succinct formulation provided by Freud (1922, pp. 99-100) is:

The uncanny and coercive characteristics of group formations, which are shown in their suggestion phenomena, may therefore with justice be traced back to the fact of their origin from the primal horde. The leader of the group is still the dreaded primal father; the group still wishes to be governed by unrestricted force; it has an extreme passion for authority; in Le Bon's

1 My uses of the terms transference and countertransference here are broader than those of classical psychoanalysis (Singer, 1963). They have most in common with the formulation of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (1950) and have also been significantly affected by Sullivan (1953) and Jung (1946).
phrase, it has a thirst for obedience. The primal father is the group ideal which governs the group in place of the ego ideal.

Hypnosis has a good claim to being described as a group of two (emphasis mine); there remains as a definition for suggestion—a conviction which is not based upon perception and reasoning but upon an erotic tie... We have come to the conclusion that suggestion is a partial manifestation of the state of hypnosis, and that hypnosis is solidly founded upon a predisposition which has survived in the unconscious from the early history of the human family.

Freud's formulation makes explicit the unconscious emotional ties from members to leader and from members to one another. From time to time his work also makes allusion to intergroup forces by the portions of Le Bon to which he refers or by the concrete examples he selects to illustrate his theoretical points (e.g., Freud, 1922, pp. 50, 90, 44). Fundamentally, however, Freud's analysis of unconscious emotional processes derives from the one-on-one relationship (the 'group of two'). It shall remain for others to carry the analysis of unconscious emotional dynamics more fully into the realm of intergroup relations.

An additional problem posed by the practical application of group work is composing membership. The professional deciding to work with a group for curative purposes must determine who shall be members. Answering this question can hardly escape giving some attention, however implicitly, to intergroup dynamics. By deciding who is to be inside the group, the professional also determines who is outside. Whether conscious of it or not, members of the treatment group will have to deal with non-members; their relations with non-members will be changed somewhat—and possibly
dramatically—by their participation in the treatment.

In 1923 Harry Stack Sullivan undertook a most significant experiment in the treatment of schizophrenics at the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital where he established a special ward in which only male schizophrenics were to receive care. Staff for the special ward were men carefully selected by Sullivan. Many staff were former patients. There was also evidence that Sullivan himself had been a hospitalized patient, although he is not known to have acknowledged his patienthood to more than a few friends (Perry, 1982, pp. 3 ff.) In order to create the innovative setting, Sullivan had special permission from the administration of the hospital. Part of the "training" for his staff involved meetings at Sullivan's home and included attention to the personal tensions of the staff as well as those of the patients. Sullivan's innovation changed the customary intergroup relationship between male schizophrenics and female nursing staff as well as between his particular patients and the hospital administration as a whole. He did this, of course, without an explicit theory of intergroup relations. (cf. Perry, 1982, pp. 189-200). Like some other organization innovations to be described later, Sullivan's "successful" program was eventually terminated. Within the hospital itself he faced difficulties with the nurses (a predominantly female group), and eventually the senior administration of the hospital, who had been most supportive to Sullivan, was pressed by the Board of Trustees to discontinue Sullivan's activity. Perhaps if Sullivan or others in the setting had been thinking about his innovation from an intergroup perspective in addition to the intrapsychic and interpersonal viewpoints he could have found mechanisms to deal with the concerns of the other groups who eventually acted to impede his work.
The fact that many of Sullivan's carefully selected male staff were former patients probably greatly aided their effectiveness in the unit. If Sullivan himself was a recovered patient, that experience probably gave him an understanding of the male patient group that would be difficult to obtain in any other way. But, paradoxically, it may also be that Sullivan's reluctance to acknowledge his own patienthood interfered with his capacity to conduct intergroup negotiations on behalf of his unit and thereby was a factor in the demise of the innovation.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AMONG INTERGROUP PERSPECTIVES

Today there is no single intergroup theory. Instead, there are variety of conceptual and methodological positions. Clarity about the dimensions on which intergroup perspectives differ sets the stage for understanding the contributions and limitations of any one. Here I shall identify four dimensions on which intergroup perspectives differ. Level of analysis pertains to the degree that the group as a unit is central to the conceptual formula. Groups isolated or embedded refer to the degree that investigators take into account of the contexts in which groups exist. Empirical investigations into group life may be active or passive in terms of how investigators relate to the material they study. Finally, researchers may or may not be reflective about their own individual position and group memberships in relation to those they study.

Level of Analysis

Taken at face value, of course, intergroup theory deals with relations among groups. But intergroup perspectives have varied in the degree of attention they have given to individual, group, and intergroup phenomena.
Foci for attention have ranged from personality psychology (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950) to economic sociology (Blalock and Wilken, 1979) and cultural anthropology (Otterbein, 1977). Intergroup theorists generally accept the validity of multiple levels of analysis; the theory is often attractive because it offers intellectual equipment for cross-level reasoning (Rice, 1969).

Given the variations in level to which intergroup theory might be applied, researchers cannot be equally attentive to everything. They make choices according to their interests. Often these choices reflect preferences for methods as well as for data.

For the purposes of this article, a crucial choice pertains to whether group level phenomena become central. Although the group is the intermediate level in the range addressed by intergroup theory, it does not necessarily follow that all intergroup researchers thoroughly attend to the group as a unit worthy of attention in its own right. The idea of "group-as-a-whole" usually includes several elements: (a) a group is different than simply a linear sum of individual members; (b) groups share collectively unconscious assumptions about members' relations to the group's leadership and to one another; and (c) words spoken and actions taken by group members represent the whole group or subgroup of the whole group (Bion, 1959; Wells, 1980; Aazarian and Peters, 1981).

The question of whether the group becomes a unit in intergroup theory has both intellectual and cultural determinants. During the early part of the twentieth century, for example, there was considerable controversy among academic researchers about the concept of "group mind." Le Bon (1895) had started the idea that groups had properties that transcended and, in
some cases, overwhelmed individual functioning. At the other pole was a view that vigorously disputed the utility of group level concepts that existed apart from the functioning of individuals. Floyd H. Allport (1924, cited by Brown and Turner, 1981, p. 33) made the case against group level concepts as follows:

There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals. Social psychology must not be placed in contradistinction to the psychology of the individual; it is a part of the psychology of the individual (his emphasis), whose behavior it studies in relation to that sector of his environment comprised by his fellows.

Brown and Turner (1981, p. 34) note that Allport's influence was substantial and that "many social psychologists... especially in North America... conceptualize such phenomena as group prejudice and social conflict as interpersonal or intrapersonal processes simply writ large."

Scholars writing from a North American perspective, and perhaps particularly from the United States, may unwittingly have their "theories" shaped by the national ideology. The U.S. constitution vigorously defends the rights of individuals; it addresses some questions of "rights" by saying that individuals may not be denied the privileges conveyed by citizenship because of their membership in racial, ethnic, or gender groups. Thus, the very ideology of the United States pits the individual against the group. It is not surprising that scholars embedded within this cultural context would promote theories that were consistent with the national ideology. On the other hand, there are empirical findings that support the concept of group level phenomena independent of (not versus) individual effects (Alderfer, 1971; Klein, 1977; Alderfer, Tucker, Morgan
and Drasgow, 1983; Smith, 1982).

The extent of this cultural influence is illustrated by a recent article from the front page of the New York Times entitled, "Japan's Schools Stress Group and Discourage Individuality." The article begins with an example from a seventh grade mathematics class in a Japanese junior high school. A 13-year-old girl is called upon and is unable to answer a question. The Times reporter describes the situation:

[She] stood beside her desk staring at the floor, obviously at a loss to understand the problem. She tried a couple of guesses, then fell silent. Finally the teacher allowed her to sit down.

In an American school, the student would probably have been placed in a slower class where she could work along side students of comparable ability. In Japan there is no such thing as "tracking."

The social cost of a student's being removed from her peers is viewed as far greater than the frustration of sitting day after day in a class where the pupil does not understand what is going on...

The incident is indicative of how schools here in Japan are inextricably tied to distinctly Japanese values such as the primacy of the group rather than the individual. (Fiske, 1983, p. A1)

Fiske's implicit theory in the article is clearly of the individual versus group variety. The same events would be reported differently if the reporter used group level concepts. He might have written:
"The Japanese choose not to make separate groups of students according to their apparent levels of ability. They believe that the damage to individuals caused by assigning them to an out

group deemed to be of lesser ability is far greater than whatever gains might be achieved in educational efficiency by such group splitting. In the United States, we are witnessing changes of a similar kind. People with disabilities have organized to persuade school systems not to separate them into 'tracks' but rather to include them in the 'mainstream' of educational activities."

The re-written story reflects several aspects of using group level concepts. First, it recognizes that separating a category of individuals (apparently less able students) is a group level event making at least two groups where formerly there was one. Second, the re-written account suggests that group level interventions may help as well as hurt individuals. Third, it implicitly seeks to join rather than divide the United States and Japan by showing that similar logic is being used in both countries. Needless to say, the degree of subtlety in all this is not slight. The quoted piece was a news article, not an analysis, column, or editorial.

Within the field of organizational behavior, group level concepts are employed unevenly. Some researchers give the group a central place in their thinking, while others deal with the phenomena of group life without giving attention to the group per se. Katz and Kahn, for example, in their Social Psychology of Organizations (1966; 1978) give almost no attention to group level dynamics. They deal with some of the phenomena of group life by two alternative conceptual devices—the analysis of leadership and the detailed
formulation of the concept of role. Both of these concepts lend themselves nicely to a substitution for dealing with group effects for investigators who seem to prefer dealing with individual and interpersonal units of analysis rather than with groups-as-wholes. One sees similar conceptual assumptions in the presentation of Handbook chapters (March, 1965; Dunnette, 1976). In the Handbook of Organizations (March, 1965) there is a chapter on "Small Groups and Large Organizations" by Golembiewski. Despite the suggestive title, the political scientist makes the links from micro to macro levels by the use of supervisor-to-subordinate relations and by subordinate-to-subordinate relations; he thus stays "inside" the group by relying on interpersonal relations as the key mediating process. Later in the same book, Shepard reports on the processes for "Changing Interpersonal and Intergroup Relationships in Organizations." Again there is a suggestion that group level concepts might be employed, and, to a limited extent, they are. The major distinction is between a coercive-compromise mentality and a collaboration-consensus mentality. As Shepard conceives of these states of mind they seem to apply to both individuals and groups. It is clear that the state of mind analysis is more fully developed for individuals than for groups. Shepard is able to draw on a variety of studies about healthy individuals to specify what collaborative-consensus mentality means for individuals. He has no similar material for groups. It is also clear that he had at least the beginning of such ideas for groups because he talks about how groups develop a strategic sense of their relationship to the whole organization, and he recognizes that how members can function in temporary task forces depends on how the groups they represent relate to one another. The preference for individual and interpersonal concepts among organizational psychologists did not show notable change by the time the Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (Dunnette, 1976) was
prepared. In that collection there was just one paper with "group" in the title, and that was a chapter by Hackman on "Group Influences on Individuals." There was some attention to group level effects in a chapter on conflict by Thomas and on change processes by Alderfer.

Researchers from the Tavistock Institute in Great Britain have had a long history of attending to group level effects. The earliest efforts began with changes in the technology of coal mining (Trist et al., 1963) which in turn induced alterations in the structure of work groups. Later the theory and methods taken from the coal mining work was transferred to weaving mills in India (Rice, 1963).

Thus within both academic social psychology and organizational behavior we find differences between those who utilize group level concepts and those who do not. For theorists who prefer only individual and interpersonal constructs the notion of group is missing or, in the extreme, actively denied. The converse, however, does not seem to apply. Theorists who attend to group level phenomena tend also to use individual level. As shown in Figure 1, we seem to have two distinct modes of conceptualizing individual and group effects. The first emphasizes individual in opposition to group concepts. The operation of group forces as a threat to individuals is incorporated into the theory such that group dynamics are absent if individual consciousness is present. The second approach sees the individual and group as more orthogonal. According to this view, group and individual concepts may exist comparatively autonomously. At the very least, this orientation allows for the separate measurement and testing of individual and group effects. It allows for empirical data rather than the declaration of theorists to determine the relative potency of individual and group effects.
Isolated or Embedded

The question of isolation or embeddedness turns on whether the theory has a way to deal with how a particular intergroup relationship stands relative to its environment. An illustration may be helpful. One of the most significant studies of intergroup relationships were those conducted by Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif (1969). In these studies the investigators constructed a series of competitive games between teams of twelve year old boys at summer camps. The phenomena they documented pertained to how the external conditions of group competition or cooperation affected the internal dynamics of the groups. As the investigators went about their work, they seemed to take no cognizance of the fact that their groups consisted entirely of boys. Replications were conducted across time, in different geographical settings, and with variation in either the age or the gender of the respondents. The research implicitly assumed that gender has some bearing on their results or on their ability to carry out and replicate their results or they would not have held gender constant in their studies. But it is not obvious what their assumptions were. The studies were carried out in the late 1940's and early 1950's in the United States. During this period there was relatively little explicit questioning of the relationship between men and women or boys and girls. The pattern of having males as participants in the primary research activities in studies of the Sherif paradigm was also followed by Blake, Mouton, and Shepard (1964) who extended the work to industrial settings.
TWO MODELS OF CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP EFFECTS

Figure 1

Model 1
Individual versus Group

Model 2
Individual and Group

Relative Emphasis on Individual

Relative Emphasis on Group
What is especially interesting about the role of women in the Sherif studies is that both the camp studies and the industrial extensions included women on the research team. The Sherif studies were frequently reported in different places by Carolyn and Muzafer Sherif. The industrial extensions were authored by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton. In a summary of the work written for a general audience Muzafer Sherif discusses various replications of the work and includes references to doctoral dissertations that employed female respondents (Sherif, 1966, p. 96-97). In at least two reports Sherif (1966) and the Sherifs (1969) discuss the nature of generalizations to other forms of intergroup relations that might be made from their research. Included in these discussions are extensions to international relations, labor management conflict, and inter-ethnic relations. No mention was made of extensions to male-female relations, and I know of no attention by the Sherifs to how their paradigm might respond to mixed gender groups and no studies that varied the proportion of men and women in experimental groups. There are, however, interesting data on the Carolyn-Muzafer relationship in the 1966 report of their work, entitled In Common Predicament. Muzafer Sherif (1966, p. xiii) writes in the Preface:

Carolyn Sherif shared with me all the effort of putting together the material to go into this book, in organizing it through long hours of discussion, in writing much of what are probably its best chapters, and, not least, in going through the prolonged efforts and pain of revision. In spite of this she has resisted my urging that she share the title page with me. Yet I want to make it clear that this is a Sherif and Sherif work like several others published earlier.

From these words, one may suggest that the way the Sherifs handled their
female-male differences may have affected how they conducted, reported, and interpreted their research. There does seem to be a context-characteristic of both the times in which they did their work and in the collaboration itself--in which the pattern of relations between men and women working together are not examined or conceptualized.

Suppose the Sherifs had given more thorough and explicit attention to their own work relationship in terms of female-male dynamics, how might that have affected their research? The answers to this question are, of course, speculative. They are given to explain what it means to conduct research with consciousness of the embeddedness of intergroup relations and how that awareness can affect various elements of the investigation, not to criticize Carolyn and Muzafer Sherif personally. In fact, the responses to this question should be viewed as group level interpretations and predictions. Here then are the changes that might have occurred in the Sherif and Sherif paradigm: (1) There would have been explicit discussion about the proportions of boys and girls in the original studies and of men and women in the adult extensions. (2) These discussions would probably have led to some systematic variation in the female-male proportions in the series of studies employing the Sherif and Sherif paradigm. (3) As a result, there would be data on how the intergroup dynamics, so clearly documented by the studies, are affected by varying the proportions of men and women in the groups. (4) There would be data on whether female and male participants experienced the phenomena in similar or different ways as a function of the proportions of each gender in the groups. (5) Discussion of how the findings apply to practical problems would include attention to male-female relations. (6) Authorship and acknowledgements of the research reports would include cases where Carolyn was the first or only author and
would not include prefactory comments by one of the partners that explained why one of the partners deserved but did not accept joint authorship.

Research and Development or Clinical Methods

At the outset I noted that intergroup research has a long tradition of being concerned about social problems. Most intergroup research people take their subjects for investigation from "the real world" and aim to influence practical affairs with their findings. There is little in any facet of intergroup research that works only toward knowledge for its own sake. However, within the general orientation of seeking understanding both for the advancement of understanding and for improving social conditions there are important differences in research methods.

In a recent paper reviewing research on "Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior," Thomas Pettigrew (1981) identified three wings of social psychology. He called them experimental social psychology, symbolic interactionism, and contextual social psychology. The chief differences among these subgroups turn on their methods and the journals in which they publish their research. Pettigrew was also alert to how generational differences among social scientists and organizational locations also are associated with their intellectual products. According to Pettigrew (1981), experimental social psychologists focus on individual level properties, operate in the laboratory chiefly with college sophomores as "subjects," and thereby achieve internal validity at the expense of external generalizability. Symbolic Interactionists work in the field of naturally occurring events, attend to dynamics of social process, and collect data by observing, interviewing, and retrieving. From Pettigrew's perspective the symbolic interactionists achieve external validity at the price of internal
rigor. Finally, there is the third subgroup of contextual social psychologists in whose membership Pettigrew places himself. This group seems to share in the best of both worlds--achieving internal validity through probability samples and quasi experimental designs and attaining external validity by the variety of settings in which members act as researchers. From my perspective, there is also a fourth subgroup, which Pettigrew's analysis omits. All of the subgroups that he describes share a similar idea of "application". When research results have achieved the appropriate degree of validity they are to be transferred to policy makers who in turn will be guided by them in the making or changing of public policy. A good example of this sort of application is the use of Kenneth and Marie Clark's (1947) race research in the shaping of the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision to end the separate but equal doctrine of public education. I give the term research and development to the orientation that establishes research results separately from utilization and then applies the findings to social and organizational problems. Investigators who work in this manner are similar to many physical scientists who develop their innovations comparatively independently of the people who will use them. An alternative approach, representing a fourth group, which Pettigrew omits is clinical research.

Erik Erikson (1964) has put it this way: "One can study the nature of things by doing something to them, but one can really learn something about the essential nature of living beings only by doing something with them or for them. (emphasis his) This, of course, is the principle of clinical science." For the research and development orientation to intergroup research something is done to one set of people (often called subjects) so that something might be done with and for another set. For the clinical
orientation to intergroup research something is done with and for respondents.

A key difference between research and development versus clinical social psychologists turns on beliefs (and, for some, theories) about how much and in what ways the different research styles contaminate the phenomena they study. The R & D position is that by taking a "scientific" role and by exercising careful controls researchers can minimize their contamination of the phenomena under study. In this manner they more closely approximate objectively reliable and reproducible findings. Their criticism of clinical methods is that investigators become excessively involved with their data and thereby lose objectivity. According to the R and D group, the products of clinical methods are not research data but anecdotal accounts which, however interesting, do not qualify as valid research findings. Thus, Pettigrew omits clinical social psychologists from his subgroup delineation.

The clinical critique of R and D social psychology is that research is intervention (and often intrusion). The question is not whether to influence the phenomena under study but how (Berq, 1980). Laboratory social psychologists create temporary social systems to do their research work. They exercise legitimate authority by virtue of university faculty roles when they invite or require sophomores to participate in experiments. They alter existing group membership and authority relations when they join existing social systems as participant observers. They represent private or public organizations when they conduct survey interviews. For clinical social psychologists, objectivity is sufficiently elusive as not to be a primary goal, regardless of method or subject matter. Rather than attempting to produce bias free research, we attempt to understand and
acknowledge the inevitable bias in any research and seek, rather, to specify the conditions for reproducing the results we report. According to this manner of reasoning, reproduction of research results is not just an empirical exercise whereby the same laboratory instructions, the same questionnaire, the same interview questions, or the same kind of people are repeatedly studied. Rather, reproduction of results is a theoretical and empirical matter in which theory is used to develop methods of research as well as to predict and interpret findings (Alderfer and Smith, 1982; Alderfer, Tucker, Morgan and Drasgow, 1983).

Thus, for clinical organizational psychologists, research is not separated cleanly into investigation and application phases. The alternative mode is continuing exchange between intervention and understanding. Clinical organizational psychologists believe that research data are importantly shaped by the relationships between investigators and respondents as well as by the phenomena being studied. They believe that the goal of excellence in research is best served by being conscious of those relationships and by altering them as appropriate and possible.

**Individual and Group Reflection**

In conducting research, investigators vary significantly in whether they have a theory based method for examining and managing relationships with the people they study. It is probably fair to say that most social scientists have some awareness of their entanglements with what they study, and yet few have a disciplined, systematic way of understanding and managing how they affect and are affected by their work. Data generation methods implicitly shape researcher-respondent relationships either by aiming for minimal influence (participant observation, survey interviewing)
or by exercising tight control (laboratory experimentation).

Preceding sections contained a variety of examples in which researchers seemed to shape their investigations in important ways without being aware of what they were doing. Here, I summarize the more important episodes for two reasons. First, putting several cases in one place gives a clearer sense of their frequency. My own experience is that most investigators prefer not to think too hard or observe too carefully about these matters. Second, having several instances together helps a reader test the utility of concepts that will be proposed to explain and predict researcher-respondent relationships. The aim of reviewing these episodes is not, however, to criticize the investigators whose work is cited. We would not have an opportunity to learn from their experience if they had not reported it. The fact that the "data" I cite, for the most part, does not come from the "results" sections of their research reports is much more of a statement about the ideology of the research culture in which they worked than an assessment of them as individuals.

1. Marilyn Brewer and Donald Campbell (1976) did not seem to notice that their questionnaire for studying East African tribes emerged from a predominantly white male northern European-American scientific culture. The research team did show cognizance of how other (emphasis mine) investigators group identifications might have affected their perceptions of intergroup relations. They also did not reflect upon how their own gender differences and how they managed them might have influenced the research.

2. Fritz Roethlisberger and William Dickson omit consideration of age, gender, and ethnicity in their social systems conception
of the Hawthorne plant. In his "intellectual autobiography," Roethlisberger describes his own commitment to "individual merit ..." to the extrusion of group level variables.

3. Harry Stack Sullivan did not seem to be aware of the female-male and administration-patient dynamics he altered when he created an innovative treatment setting for male schizophrenics. As a result an innovation that many people today consider successful was terminated. Sullivan himself left the setting and turned away from hospital psychiatry.

4. Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif omit explicit consideration of female-male differences in their account of the boys' camp experiment on intergroup conflict and cooperation. Muzafer Sherif later gives a report on Carolyn's dropping authorship for an overview report of these studies despite clear acknowledgement of her extensive contribution to the work. In generalizing the implications of their work to an array of intergroup circumstances, the Sherifs omit discussion of men and women.

5. A counter example seems to be Gustave Le Bon. The French sociologist gave attention to how the concept of democracy varied between Northern European and Latin peoples. He did this in the context of reflecting upon the consequences of revolution and its aftermath in his own country. In the process he gave especially detailed attention to power of unconscious forces in group life. However, Le Bon's acknowledgement of group level forces on his own work was more implicit that explicit. He did not offer a set of concepts or methods for investigators to follow in order to take account of the impact of their own individual and group
identifications on their research.

Among sociologists who do participant observation, there is a literature reporting researcher-respondent relationships in some detail (Whyte, 1955; Adams and Preiss, 1960; Filstead, 1970; McCall and Simmons, 1970). An interesting effect of the phenomena is that reporting seems to be dominated by relatively junior investigators describing experiences associated with dissertations. In sociology, Bill Whyte may have started it all by publishing an appendix to *Street Corner Society* in 1955.

In clinical psychology and psychiatry, however, the tradition is much older beginning with Freud's work on transference and countertransference (Menninger, 1958). Within the classical psychoanalytic tradition, transference and countertransference are interpreted in terms of unconscious personality and interpersonal dynamics. Initially, the reaction to the phenomena by Freud himself was to call upon the analyst to become surgeon-like -- cool and aloof. As the phenomena became more fully understood and accepted, attitudes changed. Rather than something to be denied and avoided, countertransference feelings in the analyst became an important source of treatment data, which can provide clues about the interaction between the personalities of analyst and patient, and can serve both, if effectively examined and utilized (Searles, 1955).

Group level "transference," however, has received far less thorough attention. Thanks to Whyte and others who follow his lead, there is an empirical literature identifying the empirical phenomena although Whyte himself provides no conceptualization. The tendency for this material to come from younger people and to be reported without theoretical commentary, however, has worked against its being incorporated into the main currents
of social research method and theory. When senior people do not report their personal experiences, it is as if the collective assumption among social scientists is that group level transference and countertransference go away as investigators mature. One could hardly argue that investigators stop having gender, ethnicity, age, and organizational affiliations or that people stop noticing these attributes as researchers become more established professionals. There is, however, another view that takes account of both group and individual level transference and incorporates the phenomena into what is viewed as the natural on-going activities of the social scientist.

The first person I know of to incorporate the two levels of understanding was George Devereux who decided to conduct and report psychotherapy with a Plains Indian with a conscious awareness of both personality development and of areal culture patterns (Devereux, 1968). In conducting therapy, Devereux (1968) dealt with both individual and group level transference. In writing his book, he perceptively managed his intergroup relationship between the Plains Indian culture which he entered as an employee of the Veterans Administration and the white male dominant European-American culture which he belonged to by birth.

Conceptually, Devereux called upon anthropological analyses of Plains Indians to provide the group level knowledge necessary to understand the group membership of his patient. He integrated this group level knowledge with classical psychoanalytic personality theory in order to form a notion of the ethnic personality. In the therapy itself he examined and utilized the transference phenomena of the patient to him in terms of behaviors characteristic of the patient's tribal life. Thus, the concrete content of the transference was therapist as "guardian spirit". In terms of
therapeutic objectives and outcomes the intergroup differences between Devereux's own culture and his patient's were made very explicit. His general aim was "to restore the person to himself." In this particular case that self was a Plains Indian substantially identified with his tribal culture, and it was a culture that was in acute distress in response to its historically determined destructive relationship with the dominant white American culture.

Presenting his material to a predominantly white American culture, Devereux (1968) took account of that culture's relationship to Indians. He addressed the key elements in the classical perception of Indians by whites as inferior. In the 1968 edition of the book, he also dealt with critical reactions to the book from members of the dominant culture. In the process, he took the opportunity to refuse certain laudatory comments while interpreting the group level basis of their origin. An especially poignant example is his reaction to words from Karl Menninger, who is one of the most widely respected practitioner-theorists of individual-interpersonal psychoanalysis (Devereux, 1968, p. xxxiv)

In his Preface to the first edition, Dr. Karl Menninger commended my willingness to shoulder my share of America's guilt toward the Indian. But I feel no more guilty of these crimes than for the Athenians massacre of the Melians.

Here Menninger apparently makes a group level attribution to Devereux, who refuses to accept it. The interesting question is whether Devereux refuses because he does not believe he is influenced by group level forces

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1 The original edition of the Plains Indian study was published in 1951.
(i.e.; he is just an individual) or because he believes that Menninger has
given him the wrong group membership (i.e.; he identifies more with
continental French than with Americans). My own impression is that the
matter is more of Menninger getting the wrong group than of Devereux
denying the effects of his own group memberships. But in the Plains Indian
study, the matter is not clarified. In that book, Devereux is much more
explicitly attentive to transference than to countertransference issues. In
a later work, however, Devereux (1967) devotes an entire volume to
countertransference reactions in social research and, in that volume, draws
on many concrete examples from his own experience, which includes both
individual and group level processes.

In taking Devereux's (1968) work with the Plains Indian as a clear
example of an investigator using group and individual transference, one
should also be clear that his target for intervention was the individual.
As therapist, Devereux observed and utilized the effects of group level
forces on his client and on himself in relation to his client. The target
for intervention, however, remained the person. There was no attempt to
work with his client's tribal group. Nor was there any indication that the
group level concepts Devereux used fruitfully to assist his patient could
have been employed to aid the Indian's tribe.

Having posited the observation of group level transferences, I wish to
conclude this section by suggesting why the phenomena have been so widely
overlooked. The reasons are several. None are particularly comfortable to
bear if accepted. Most call for some degree of reorientation in feeling,
thinking, and acting among social researchers.
To accept the validity of these processes is to take on an unending task of self and group scrutiny. In the extreme, it means one should be regularly asking the question, "How is what I am as a person and group representative shaping what I am finding?" This is a demanding undertaking often characterized by emotional turbulence.

To acknowledge the force of transferential and countertransferential processes is to revise significantly the meaning of objectivity. In the extreme, it means that it may be impossible to separate any data from the relationship among parties associated with data collection (Bero, 1984). The pursuit of objective information therefore requires relationship skills—both interpersonal and intergroup—and a new degree of tentativeness that takes account of the limits of any person's or group's capacity to influence the nature of a relationship with other parties.

To face the effects of group level transference is to recognize that there may be circumstances in which one person alone cannot advance knowledge. One solution to the effects of group forces is to form groups that are capable of reflecting upon themselves in order to group and intergroup relations. The well-worn model of a single investigator alone in search of understanding must be complemented by teams of individuals composed to reflect the group level differences among members (Alderfer and Smith, 1962). Faced with this alternative, investigators may confront a new level of awareness concerning both how and why our knowledge of human behavior is limited. On this point, the difference between individual and group level transference becomes particularly significant. Working only with individual dynamics one can maintain a realistic goal of continuously expanding self-awareness. Given an array of techniques for self-scrutiny, an investigator can at least approach the ideal of full self-understanding,
even though in practice all accept the human limits of such a quest. But at
the group level, there are sharper limits. There are groups to which we all
belong that cannot change (e.g., gender, family, ethnicity). It is
especially difficult for groups to engage in self examination under
conditions of intragroup conflict. To the extent that group memberships and
relations among groups shape how others react to us and how we perceive
those reactions, we are indeed captured by the groups to which we belong.
We are, of course, most fully prisoner of those groups of whose membership
we remain unaware (Smith, 1982).

A THEORY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

In the two preceding sections I sought to establish two
metatheoretical points. The first was to establish intergroup theory in
general as a way of thinking about problems of human behavior; the aim was
to distinguish intergroup theory from non-intergroup theory. The second was
to determine dimensions on which particular versions of intergroup theory
varied from one another; the objective was to differentiate among versions
of intergroup theories. This section now presents a particular version of
intergroup theory.

According to the dimensions of difference among intergroup theories,
it has the following properties:
1. The group is the primary level of analysis. 2. Groups appear
embedded in social systems. 3. The orientation toward research is
clinical. 4. Concepts from the theory apply to researchers
as well as to respondents.
Historically, the theory evolved inductively from anomalous research findings and mistakes in social intervention. Studies crucial in identifying the need for such a theory have been concerned with generational struggles in management development (Alderfer, 1971; 1977a), leadership struggles in labor management relations (Lewicki and Alderfer, 1973), and organization development in a boarding school (Alderfer and Brown, 1975). Research that has proved fruitful in establishing the deductive utility of the theory addressed labor management cooperation (Alderfer, 1977b) and race relations in management (Alderfer, Alderfer, Tucker, and Tucker, 1980; Alderfer, Tucker, Morgan, and Drasgow, 1983). The theoretical perspective has also proved useful in understanding the behavior of behavioral scientists in their roles as research interpreters, teachers and investigators (Alderfer, 1969; 1970; 1971; 1973). The chief intellectual ancestor of the formulation is A. K. Rice's (1969) effort to explain the interdependence among individual, group, and intergroup processes. Material presented in this section closely follows formulations elsewhere (Alderfer, 1977b; Alderfer and Smith, 1982; Alderfer, Brown, Kaplan, and Smith, 1984).

Definition of Groups in Organizations

Within the social psychology literature there is no shortage of definitions of groups, but there is also no clear consensus among those who propose definitions (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Because much of the work leading to these definitions has been done by social psychologists studying internal properties of groups in laboratories, the resulting concepts have been comparatively limited in recognizing the external properties of groups. Looking at groups in organizations, however, produces a definition that gives more balanced attention to both internal and external properties.
A human group is a collection of individuals (1) who have significantly interdependent relations with each other, (2) who perceive themselves as a group, reliably distinguishing members from nonmembers, (3) whose group identity is recognized by nonmembers, (4) who, as group members acting alone or in concert, have significantly interdependent relations with other groups, and (5) whose roles in the group are therefore a function of expectations from themselves, from other group members, and from non-group members.

This idea of a group begins with individuals who are interdependent, moves to the sense of the group as a significant social object whose boundaries are confirmed from inside and outside, recognizes that the group-as-a-whole is an interacting unit through representatives or by collective action, and returns to the individual members whose thoughts, feelings, and actions are determined by forces within the individual and from both group members and non-group members. This conceptualization of a group makes every individual member into a group representative wherever he or she deals with members of other groups and treats transactions among individuals as at least, in part, intergroup events (Rice, 1969; Smith, 1977).

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Insert Figure 2 about here

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Figure 2 shows an "intergroup transaction between individuals." This is another way of reconceptualizing what may usually be thought of as an interpersonal transaction. In the diagram, there are three classes of forces corresponding to intrapersonal, intragroup, and intergroup dynamics. The general point is that any exchange between people is subject to all three kinds of forces; most people (including behavioral scientists) tend to understand things mainly in intrapersonal or interpersonal terms. Which class of forces becomes most dominant at any time depends on how the specific dimensions at each level of analysis differentiate the individuals. Suppose $I_1$ is a male engineering supervisor and $I_2$ is a female union steward. Intrapersonally $I_1$ prefers abstract thinking and demonstrates persistent difficulty in expressing feelings; $I_2$ prefers concrete thinking and shows ease in expressing feelings. $G_1$ is a predominantly male professional group who communicates to $I_1$ that he at all times should stay in control and be rational. $G_2$ is a predominantly female clerical group who communicates to $I_2$ that she should be more assertive about the needs of the $G_2$'s. The $I_{12}$ relationship includes ten years of labor management cooperation punctuated by a series of recent strike (from the labor side) and termination (from the management side) threats. The tradition in much of behavioral science intervention is to focus on the $I$ dynamics and to give little or no attention to $G$ or $IG$ forces (Argyris, 1962; Walton, 1969).

By viewing transactions between individual from an intergroup perspective, an observer learns to examine the condition of each participant's group, the relationship of participants to their groups, and the relationship between groups represented by participants as well as their personalities in each "interpersonal" relationship. Thus, in the
earlier example reporting Devereaux's psychotherapy with a Plains Indian, the investigator described the patient's personality, his relationship to his tribe, and the among his tribe, other tribes, and the dominant U.S. culture.

Properties of Intergroup Relations

Research on intergroup relations has identified a number of properties characteristic of intergroup relations, regardless of the particular groups or the specific setting where the relationship occurs (Sumner, 1906; Coser, 1956; van den Berge, 1972; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Billig, 1976; Alderfer, 1977). These phenomena include:

A. Group boundaries. Group boundaries, both physical and psychological, determine who is a group member and regulate transactions among groups by variations in their permeability (Alderfer, 1977b). Boundary permeability refers to the ease with which boundaries can be crossed.

B. Power differences. Groups differ in the types of resources they can obtain and use (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950). The variety of dimensions on which there are power differences and the degree of discrepancy among groups on these dimensions influence the degree of boundary permeability among groups.

C. Affective patterns. The permeability of group boundaries varies with the polarization of feeling among the groups: that is, to the degree that group members split their feelings so that mainly positive feelings are associated with their own group and mainly negative feelings are projected onto other groups (Sumner, 1906; Coser, 1956; Levine & Campbell, 1972).

including "distortions." As a function of power differences and affective patterns, groups tend to develop their own language (or elements of language, including social categories), condition their members' perceptions of objective and subjective phenomena, and submit sets of propositions -- including theories and ideologies -- to explain the nature of experiences encountered by members and to influence relations with other groups (Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Blake, Shepard, & Mouton, 1964; Tajfel, 1971; Billig, 1976).

E. Leadership behavior. The behavior of group leaders and of members representing a group reflects the boundary permeability, power differences, affective patterns, and cognitive formations of their group in relation to other groups. The behavior of group representatives, including formally designated leaders, is both cause and effect of the total pattern of intergroup behavior in a particular situation.

Group Relations in Organizations

Every organization consists of a large number of groups, and every organization member represents a number of these groups in dealing with other people in the organization. The full set of groups in an organization can be divided into two broad classes: identity groups and organizational groups. An identity group may be thought of as a group whose members share some common biological characteristic (such as gender), have participated in equivalent historical experiences (such as migration), currently are subjected to similar social forces (such as unemployment), and as a result have a consonant worldviews. The coming together of worldviews by people who are in the same group occurs because of their having like experiences
and developing shared meanings of these experiences through exchanges with other group members. As people enter organizations they carry with them their ongoing membership in identity groups based on variables such as their ethnicity, gender, age, and family. An organizational group may be conceived of as one whose members share (approximately) common organizational positions, participate in equivalent work experiences, and, as a consequence, have consonant organizational views. Organizations assign their members to organizational groups based on division of labor and hierarchy of authority. One critical factor in understanding intergroups in organizations is that identity-group membership and organizational-group membership are frequently highly related. Depending on the nature of the organization and the culture in which it is embedded, certain organizational groups tend to be populated by members of particular identity groups. In the United States, for example, upper-management positions tend to be held by older white males, and certain departments and ranks tend to be more accepting of females and minorities than others (Loring & Wells, 1972; Purcell & Cavanagh, 1972).

Considering the definition of a human group given above, we can observe how both identity groups and organizational groups fit the five major criteria. First, identity group members have significant inter-dependencies because of their common historical experiences, and organizational groups because of their equivalent work or organizational experiences, which result in their sharing similar fates even though members may be unaware of their relatedness or even actively deny it. Second, organization-group and identity-group members can reliably distinguish themselves as members from nonmembers on the basis of either ethnicity, gender, etc., or of location in the organization. However, the
precision of this identification process can vary depending on both the permeability of group boundaries and the fact that many groups overlap significantly, with individuals having multiple group memberships. A similar point applies to the third definitional characteristic, the ability of nonmembers to recognize members: this again will vary depending on the permeability of the group's boundaries. The less permeable the boundaries, the more easily recognizable are members. The fourth and fifth aspects of the definition are highly linked when applied to identity and organizational groups. For example, members may be more or less aware of the extent to which they are acting, or being seen, as group representatives when relating to individuals from other groups. Every person has a number of identity- and organizational-group memberships. At any given moment an individual may be simultaneously a member of a large number, if not at all, of these groups. However, what group will be focal at the moment will depend on who else representing which other groups is present and what identity-group and organizational-group issues are critical in the current intergroup exchanges. A white person in a predominantly black organization, for example, can rarely escape representing "white people" at some level, regardless of performance. But the same white person placed in a predominantly white organization will not be seen as representing "white people," but rather some other group, such as a particular hierarchical level. Rarely are individuals "just people" when they act in organizations. When there are no other group representatives present, individuals may experience themselves as "just people" in the context of their own group membership, but this subjective experience will quickly disappear when the individual is placed in a multiple-group setting. How group members relate to each other within their group, and the expectations placed upon them by others, is highly dependent
on the nature of both the intragroup and intergroup forces active at that
time.

The concepts of identity groups and organizational groups do not
permit an exhaustive listing of the elements in either set. In any
particular setting, the relevant identity groups and organizational groups
can be determined only by detailed study using intergroup methods. But it
is possible to specify the more frequently observed identity groups and
organizational groups and to note major issues around which those
intergroup relations develop.

Identity Groups.

The essential characteristic of identity groups is that individuals
join them at birth. While there is little choice about physical membership
in identity groups, there is some degree of "negotiation" about
psychological membership. A person may behave, think and feel more or less
as if he or she is a member of an identity group. Identity-group membership
precedes organizational-group membership. The identity groups to which we
give attention are gender, ethnicity, family, and age.

Gender differences between men and women in organizations reflect the
effects of unequal influence, stereotypical perceptions, and sexuality.
Although we are living in an era of significant social change, the

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The treatment given to each of these in the following
paragraph is inevitably incomplete. A more extended analysis of
ethnicity, gender, and age as they relate to organizations and
organizational groups may be found in Alderfer (1977a), which also
includes an extended bibliography. Guzzo and Epstein (1979) provide
an analogous bibliography on family business, and Paolino and McCrady
(1978) present a most useful collection of essays on families.
historical and contemporary relationships between men and women in the United States are unequal. In general, women tend to have less access to a variety of resources (e.g., income, position, and information) than men. There are views held by many men about the fitness of women for certain kinds of responsibilities, and there are increasingly successful efforts on the part of women and men to identify and change the consequences of these perceptions both for themselves and for the total culture. Research on female-male dynamics in organizations has documented structural, interpersonal, and personal effects of the power and perception inequalities between men and women (cf., Kanter, 1977; Filene, 1974).

Male-female dynamics in organizations are also determined by sexual dynamics, an area in which there has been little research, for understandable reasons. There are cultural taboos against discussing sexual behavior, except under relatively narrowly defined circumstances (e.g., with one's sex partner, in a therapy setting, or as part of legal proceedings to determine whether sexual harassment has occurred). But these prohibitions and inhibitions do not keep sexual feelings from arising and influencing the behavior and perceptions of men and women in organizations.

Ethnic differences are closely tied to the historical relationships between the most numerous ethnic groups in a region (van den Berge, 1972; Te Selle, 1973; Glazer & Moynihan, 1975). Specific kinds of work and organizational roles tend to be available only to members of particular ethnic groups. Struggles among ethnic groups for control of material, positional, and informational resources are more visible at some times (e.g., when violence breaks out or when nonviolent demonstrations occur) than at others (e.g., when surface appearances suggest peace). The potential for serious conflict among ethnic groups is present as long as
access to resources is understood to be inequitably distributed and group members believe that their ethnic identity is the basis for their losing or not receiving access to resources. In the United States some of the most severe ethnic conflicts have been between blacks and whites (Kerner & Lindsay, 1968).

As a result of cultural traditions and contemporary experiences, ethnic groups develop different ways of explaining what happens to themselves and to others: they have different "theories" to explain the world. Dominant groups tend to assume that their theories are correct. They either define other groups' views as wrong or they remain largely unaware that alternative theories exist. Less-dominant groups tend to be aware of both majority and minority theories, they expect their theories to be ignored or devalued by dominant groups, and they may try to make their theories dominant. (Billiq, 1976).

Family groups play an especially prominent role in business enterprises that were built around the contributions of family members (cf. Sofer, 1961; Miller & Rice, 1967). Family groups become a significant force shaping intergroup relations after the business grows to the point where non-family people are necessary to maintain or enhance the human capacities of the organization. When a substantial proportion of non-family members become organization members, the intergroup relationship between family and non-family members takes on the dynamics of an overbounded system (i.e., the family) dealing with an underbounded system (i.e., the nonfamily).

1 Clearly not all families are overbounded systems. But it seems unlikely that members of a family who work in the same family-owned business can escape being overbounded as a result of their internal dynamics and their relations with non-family members.
Family members face questions about whether they wish to share or give up control of the enterprise to non-family members. Non-family members struggle with whether they wish to remain psychologically outside the family or strive to earn the status of adopted daughters or sons, thereby enhancing their influence as individuals while maintaining the dominance of the founding family.

The pattern of relations between family members and non-family members is also related to generational intergroup dynamics. Non-family members often must compete with daughters and sons of the entrepreneur for positions of influence in the enterprise. Children of the entrepreneur, depending on the nature of their family relationships, must struggle more or less with their parents about whether they stay in or leave the business and with the implications of that decision for their standing in the family and in the business.

Generational groups, unlike the other identity groups, have the property that everyone who lives long enough will inevitably belong to several. As a result, members of older groups have the potential for developing empathy for members of younger groups because they inevitably have had some of the same experiences. But members of younger groups, because of their more limited experience, have far less potential for understanding the experiences of members of older groups. Levinson et al. (1978), for example, have noted the rather profound ways that individuals do not understand the significance of life events until they have passed through identifiable phases.
The patterns of dominance and subordination characteristic of generational groups are also unique in relation to other identity groups. In the culture of the United States, members of the middle-aged group (roughly late thirties to late fifties) tend to dominate both younger and older groups. But the younger people contend with their subordination knowing that at least some of their members will reach more influential positions, while the older people face the reality that their influence is determined to decrease with the passage of time. Generational groups tend to be bound together by their members sharing a common historical experience that in some material and symbolic way resulted in their members sharing a common deprivation (Feurer, 1969). The loosely defined ideology that evolves from the generational experience provides the rationale both for one generational group rebelling or resisting another and for one group dominating the others.

Organizational Groups. The essential characteristic of organizational groups is that individuals belong to them as a function of negotiated exchange between the person and the organization. Often the exchange is voluntary, as when a person decides to work to earn a living or volunteers to work for a community agency. But the exchange may also be involuntary, as when children must attend school, draftees must join the military, and convicted criminals must enter a prison. Regardless of whether the exchange about entry is mainly voluntary or involuntary, becoming an organizational member assigns a person to membership in both a task group and a hierarchical group. A person who stops being an organization member, for whatever reason, also gives up membership in the task and hierarchical groups. In this way task-group and hierarchical-group memberships differ from identity-group affiliations.
Task-group membership arises because of the activities (or, in some unusual cases, such as prisons or hospitals, the inactivities) members are assigned to perform. The activities typically have a set of objectives, role relationships, and other features that shape the task-group members' experiences. As a result, people develop a perspective on their own group, other groups, and the organization-as-a-whole, which in turn shapes their behavior and attitudes.

Membership in task groups also tends to be transferable from one organization to another because people can carry the knowledge and skills necessary to perform particular tasks with them if they leave one system and attempt to join another. As a function of developing and maintaining certain knowledge and skills, people may belong to known professional or semiprofessional organizations outside their employing (or confining) organizations. Support from these "outside interest groups" may help people achieve more power within the system where they are working, and it may make it more possible for them to leave the one system and join another.

Hierarchical-group membership is assigned by those in the system with the authority to determine rank in the system. The determination of a member's hierarchical position in an organization is typically a carefully controlled, and often highly secret, process. One's place in the hierarchy determines one's legitimate authority, decision-making autonomy, scope of responsibility, and, frequently, access to benefits of membership. Group effects of the hierarchy arise from the nature of the work required of people who occupy the different levels, from the various personal attributes that the work calls for from incumbents, and from the relations that develop between people who occupy different positions in the hierarchy (Smith, 1982; Oshry, 1977).
People at the top of the hierarchy carry the burden of responsibility for large segments of the institution (or for the whole organization). They have access to more resources than lower-ranking members, including relatively more autonomy in determining how to define and conduct their assignments. They also tend to maintain a larger network of relationships with key people outside the institution than lower-ranking members.

By the very nature of the hierarchy, people at or near the top have more potential power than lower-ranking people. However, despite their actual power, higher-ranking people tend to be seen by lower-ranking members as possessing more power than they experience themselves as being able to use effectively. The world confronted by higher-ranking people is typically very complex, and the untoward effects of misusing their power is often much clearer to them than to lower-ranking people, who typically face less complicated environments.

The positional attributes of higher-ranking people affect communications with people below them in the system. Because there are hazards to bearing bad news, lower-ranking people tend to censor information flowing upward so that it has a positive flavor. Because of the complexity of their work and the public visibility of controversial events, higher-ranking people naturally prefer good news. Thus, an unwitting collusion develops between higher- and lower-ranking people, which tends to keep higher-ranking people better informed about good news than about bad.

People in the middle of the organization have the task of holding the organization together in an uneasy alliance between the highest- and lowest-ranking members. They are truly people in the middle. They are more in touch with the concrete day-to-day events than those above them, and
they have more power, authority, and autonomy than those below them. They are aware of the tensions and pressures faced by those at the top, and they can be conscious of the deprivations and struggles faced by those below them. They must exercise some control over those below them in the system, and they must satisfy those above them if they are to retain their positions.

The middle holds the system together by dispensing rewards and punishment downward, and by exchanging information upward. They send information upward on the basis of judgments of what serves the joint needs of upper and middle people. The exercise of control is a balancing process: too much restriction foments rebellion, and too little permits chaos. The balance of rewards and punishments depends on the quality of interaction between middle and lower people. The more the affective balance is positive, the more rewards are used to influence behavior (and conversely). The more the affective balance is negative, the more punishments are used to shape behavior (and conversely).

People at the bottom of the system execute the concrete work for which the system was created. In terms of material needs and formal influence, they are the most deprived (Argyris, 1957). They have fewer material resources, and, as individuals working alone, wield less power than any other class of individuals in the system. There is a sense of anonymity about being at the bottom of large systems -- a consequence that encourages people to lose their individuality in groups and not to feel responsible for their actions.
The people at the bottom of the system cope with their relative deprivation and alienation by both passive and aggressive means. When times are "calm," they withhold some of their potential involvement in objectives set for them by middles in order to retain a modicum of control over their lives. They may also covertly undermine vulnerable parts of the larger system. When times are "turbulent," they organize and openly resist initiatives and structures set out by the middles (Brown, 1978). A portion of the lower group also identifies with the middle and upper groups: they are most susceptible to the rewards and punishments offered by the middle, and they often share and support the control of their "peers" by the middle group (Bettelheim, 1960).

No one who belongs to an organization escapes the effects of hierarchy. Finer differentiations than the three offered here (e.g., upper upper, lower middle, etc.) can be made, but the same basic structure will be repeated within that microcosm of finer distinctions. The effects of hierarchy are "system" characteristics; anyone occupying a particular position in the hierarchy will tend to show the traits associated with that level.

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Insert Figure 3 around here
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Figure 3 provides a schematic to show the intersection of identity and organization groups. There is an inevitable tension between the two classes of groups as long as there are systematic processes that allocate people to organization groups as a function of their identity groups. Sometimes these processes are called institutional discrimination. (Thought question: how
IDENTITY AND ORGANIZATION GROUPS
(side view)

Figure 3
many 30 year old (age group too young) Greek (ethnic group non-dominant) women do you know of who are presidents of major corporations?) There is usually enough tension among organization groups to occupy the emotional energies of the top group who have the task of managing group boundaries and transactions. Thus, unless there are special forces to strengthen the boundaries of identity groups within organizations (i.e., give them more authority), the inclination of those in senior positions will be to manage only in terms of organization groups. The manner in which an organization is embedded in its environment and the relations among identity groups in that environment will affect the degree to which management processes respond to identity and organization groups or just to organization groups.

A recent Time magazine article described IBM as "The Colossus that Works" (Greenwald, 1983). With profits of $4.4 billion on sales of $34.4 billion, the corporation was called the most profitable U. S. industrial company. This assessment can only be in terms of the values of organization groups. Late in the article, the writer notes, "Despite increased efforts to recruit women and minorities, there are still few of either in management ranks. Only 3,089 of IBM's more than 29,000 managers are women." Numbers are not mentioned at all for minority group members. If identity group values were considered relevant to Time's assessment of IBM, whether the "Colossus ... Works" would be far more conditional. They might say the corporation is effective in satisfying investors and energetic employees who accept the corporate culture and perform (conform) well according to IBM's special set of values.
Embedded Intergroup Relations

Any intergroup relationship occurs within an environment shaped by the supra-system in which it is embedded. In observing an intergroup relationship one has several perspectives:

1. The effects on individuals who represent the groups in relation to one another
2. The consequences for subgroups within groups as the groups deal with one another
3. The outcomes for groups as a whole when they relate to significant other groups
4. The impact of suprasystem forces on the inter-group relationship in question

Regardless of which level one observes, the phenomenon of "interpenetration" among levels will be operating. Individuals carry images of their own and other groups as they serve in representational roles (Berg, 1978; Wells, 1980). Subgroup splits within face-to-face groups reflect differing degrees of identification and involvement with the group itself, which are in turn shaped by the group as a whole's relationship to other groups. Then the group as a whole develops a sense--which may be more or less unconscious--of how its interests are cared for or abused by the suprasystem. The concept of embedded intergroup relations applies to both identity and task groups (Alderfer & Smith, 1982).

Figure 4 provides a diagram to illustrate how to think about embedded-intergroup relations from a system's perspective. The picture shows how to construct an embedded-intergroup analysis from an understanding of a particular group's place in a given social system. As
group members look toward the suprasystem, they make assessments as to whether their own or another group is in control of distributing scarce resources. When one's own group is in charge or has significant influence, the situation is less hazardous than when the other group dominates. The effects of one's own group occupying a favorable position in a system may be muted by its being at a relative disadvantage in the suprasystem (Alderfer & Smith, 1982).

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Insert Figure 4 about here
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In the particular example shown in Figure 4 the relationship is between two task groups, sales and engineering. Both groups do work that is essential for their corporation and, since they are "functional" groups, might be conventionally viewed as having about equal standing in the corporation. But close examination would probably reveal a pattern of differences. The diagram shows the relationship between sales and engineering work groups in a department dominated by engineers, which, in turn, is in a corporation dominated by sales. Any understanding of the relationship between the groups would be limited if it did not take account of different patterns of embeddedness of the groups in the larger system.

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Insert Figure 5 about here
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Figure 5 shows how intergroup dynamics might be exhibited in the dynamics within a ten person work group. The work group has four subgroups
Figure 4
Organization Level Analysis of Embedded Intergroup Relations

- Own group
- Other group
- Sales perspective
- Engineering perspective
- Work group
- Department
- Corporation
Figure 5

Intergroup Dynamics Embedded in a Small Group
Identified by dashed lines. Viewed exclusively from the perspective of intragroup dynamics, the work group is affected only by the individual and subgroup processes inside the group. An intergroup perspective, however, suggests that the subgroups inside the work group represent memberships in groups that exist beyond the boundaries of the work unit as indicated by the dotted lines. Suppose $l_3$ is a new group female leader, having recently joined the group from outside; $l_1$ and $l_2$ are men closely associated with former male group leader; $l_4$, $l_5$, and $l_6$ are junior male members of the work team; and $l_7$, $l_8$, $l_9$, and $l_{10}$ are junior female members of the work team. During the period of transition, and probably subsequent to it as well, embedded intergroup theory would predict that the relationship between the new female leader and the senior men would be affected by the authority of women in the total system, and that the relationship between the junior men and junior women in the workgroup would be changed by the group as a whole gaining a female leader.

**Parallel and Unconscious Processes**

In earlier sections I discussed transferential and countertransferential phenomena, mainly as these processes have been observed in psychotherapeutic situations and almost exclusively as they have been applied in one-to-one relationships. Previous examples have also included concrete illustrations from the lives of social researchers in which unexamined aspects of these people's lives have apparently shaped their work in ways that seem both meaningful and unrecognized by the authors. I have suggested but not actually proposed that these processes have both individual and group level components. The terms parallel and unconscious processes signify concepts for dealing with the somewhat puzzling and often over-looked processes whereby two or more human systems
in relationship to one another seem to "infect" and become "infected" by one another.

The basic proposition concerning parallel processes is that the dynamics of a system tend to reflect processes in the suprasystem and in its subsystems. Therefore, a system can face reinforcing or conflictual pressures as the outside affects the inside, and the inside, in turn, affects the outside.

From the group level perspective, parallel processes refer to the ways in which group representatives (i.e., individual people) or groups as a whole who have significant and changing relationships tend toward showing similar affect, behavior, and cognition. The primary mechanism by which parallel processes occur is generally emotional and frequently involves unconscious processes at both individual and group levels. Conventionally defined transferential and countertransferential processes between two individuals are special cases of parallel processes at the individual and interpersonal levels. When a therapist begins to show reactions to a patient as a result of unconscious dynamics set off in the therapist, the process is termed counter transference (Searles, 1955). When a patient begins to show similar reactions to a therapist as a result of unconscious reactions set off in the patient, the process is termed transference. At the group level, analogous phenomena occur. After interaction between groups, members may find that their characteristic pattern of roles and subgroups change to reflect the roles and subgroups of the group with whom they were relating.

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1 To be able to observe parallel processes takes special training and may not be accessible to everyone even with training (cf. Alderfer, Brown, Kaplan, and Smith, 1984 for a review of the literature identifying parallel processes and for detailed studies documenting the phenomena).
An organizational diagnosis team had assigned its members to each of five departments in a small manufacturing company. Members of the team had interviewed each department head and several department members. They had also observed department meetings. The team was preparing to observe their first meeting of department heads and were trying to anticipate the group's behavior in advance. At first they seemed to have no "rational" basis for predicting the top group's behavior because they "had no data" from direct observation. Their interview questions had not asked about department head meetings. Reasoning from the theory of parallel processes, they decided to role play the group meeting they had never seen. Diagnostic team members behaved as they thought the department heads would, and the result was almost uncanny. Team members found that they easily became engaged with one another in the simulated department head meeting; emotional involvement occurred quickly for all participants. When the team actually was able to observe a department head meeting they were amazed at how close the simulated meeting had approximated the actual session.

When parallel processes are set in motion from inside to outside, the unit in the dominant position is engaged in some sort of projection. Accordingly, the process-dominant (i.e., the inside) unit acts toward the other unit as if it were some part of itself and the other unit responds as if it were indeed that part. The benefit to the sending unit of this happening is that it can release troublesome emotions to another unit. When parallel processes are set in motion from outside to inside, the unit with the submissive process is engaged in some sort of absorption. Accordingly, the process-submissive (i.e., the inside) unit reacts to the other unit as if it were a part of its own, and accepts the offered conditions. The benefit to the receiving unit of this happening is that it can avoid having
to differentiate itself from its outside environment.

Without reference to content or purpose, parallel processes may be constructive or destructive. For the purposes of diagnosis, for example, it may be advantageous for a diagnosing unit (person or group) to absorb temporarily a client's condition. For the purposes of change, it may be beneficial for a more optimally functioning system to project its condition into a related unit. Constructive absorption of parallel processes may be aided by the submissive system's taking an empathic and receptive attitude. Destructive absorption of parallel processes may occur when the submissive system fails to maintain adequate control over its own boundary. Constructive projection of parallel processes may occur when a system with substantial awareness of its own and other system dynamics consciously plans to effect the relationship between the parties for the benefit of both parties and with the conscious consent of the other party. Destructive projection of parallel processes may occur when a system with limited awareness of its own internal dynamics begins to attribute these characteristics to others in order to damage or destroy them (cf., Alderfer, 1981; Alderfer, Brown, Kaplan, and Smith, 1984).

Understanding parallel processes requires a willingness to contend explicitly with emotional reactions -- both one's own and others'. Included among the emotional reactions are conscious and unconscious processes that may occur at both individual and group levels. Inevitably any direct dealing with the range of emotions characteristic of parallel processes involves being disturbed and giving up some degree of control. To accept parallel processes as phenomena worthy of attention is to be willing to face anxiety and uncertainty.
The mechanisms by which parallel processes may be altered differ for the projective and the absorptive positions.

(1) Projective mechanisms are reduced when the origins—whether individual or group—own rather than share responsibility for what is happening. Concretely, at the individual level, this means making "I" statements such as, I was feeling nervous when ... The analogue at the group level is "We" statements pertaining to characteristics of a group in which the speaker acknowledges membership.

(2) Absorptive mechanisms are reduced when the targets raise questions about why particular messages are being sent to them as they are. The question identifies the parallel process and inquires about its meaning or purpose. For example, "I wonder why members of the red group treat members of the green group as if we are untrustworthy."

Parallel processes are dynamic rather than static. They may affect relationships across levels of analysis (individual to group; group to organization) and between comparable units (individual to individual; group to group). Observation and management of parallel processes provide key avenues for understanding and changing systems from a group and individual levels. Thus, parallel processes are not only phenomena that investigators observe in systems they attempt to understand and change, but they are also dynamics that play out in the lives of investigators as they do their work. The behavioral aspects of methodology become the means by which researchers actively engage, or unwittingly suppress, the parallel processes set off by their activities (Alderfer and Smith, 1982).
APPLICATION OF THE INTERGROUP THEORY TO SELECTED PROBLEMS

As a general perspective on group behavior in organizations, the intergroup theory may be used to address a variety of human problems. In this concluding section, I shall discuss what the theory has to say about three problems that face organizational psychologists. The list of problems is short and by no means exhaustive; particular problems vary in the degree to which "the problem" is conceptional (i.e., developing a more fruitful way of thinking) or practical (i.e., establishing a more useful way of acting). I selected each of the problems because it has been a subject of my attention during the last several years. The problems are:

1. Developing Effective Teams
2. Understanding Organizational Culture
3. Teaching Organizational Behavior in Management Schools

Developing Effective Teams

For purposes of this work, a team is an officially sanctioned collection of individuals who have been charged with completing a mission by an organization and who must depend upon one another for successful completion of that work. The team may have a finite (e.g., a task force with a particular due date for its product) or infinite (e.g., a top management group) life. According to the concept of group given above, a team so defined is also a group.

Traditionally team building, as the social technology is usually called, has focused inward toward the interpersonal relationships among team members. The question is what difference, if any, the intergroup theory would make to conventional team building. Suggestive answers can be formed in two of the earliest reports on team building interventions.
In Money and Motivation, Whyte (1955, pp. 90-96) reports one of the earliest experiments in team building among hourly workers that failed because "it succeeded too well." The target for change was a group of "girls" who operated along an assembly line that produced wooden toys. The external consultant was a male as was the women's foreman. Changes were brought about by the consultant talking with the foreman, who in turn consulted with his subordinates and other key people in the system. Especially significant seemed to be the foreman's recognition of and working with the "informal leader" of the women's group. As a result of these consultations two socio-technical innovations were introduced within the work group. First, the women asked to improve the condition of the air in the setting where they worked. After much talk and considerable hesitation by management, they were given two fans. The work group as a whole decided how to locate the fans. Once the group had satisfied itself about the location, their morale increased dramatically. Second, they asked for and received -- again, with great reluctance, this time from the quality control engineers and senior management -- the right to control the pace of their assembly line. Again, there was a period of testing, but eventually the group established a pattern to their liking. After the changes were made, notable productivity gains were realized. The average pace of the line set by the team was higher than the rate originally established by the plant engineers. The team was paid on a group piece rate incentive, so they benefited financially from the productivity gains. Rationally, one might think that the program was a great success for the employees and for the factory.

\[1\] In this case Whyte himself was not the consultant.
In fact, the experiment was unilaterally discontinued by the foreman's boss. The work group’s success apparently was very disturbing to several other groups in the organization. Similar work teams were bothered by the experimental team's autonomy and income. The work study engineers were embarrassed by their exceeding the predicted production rates. Senior management was upset by the range and intensity of the complaints they received. Thus, the "successful" innovation was terminated. Within several months most of the original team members and the foreman left the group in order to find work elsewhere.

In *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness*, Argyris (1962) reports one of the earliest experiments in team building among senior managers. The consulting program brought about changes within the group who received consultation but eventually these changes eroded because the intervention failed to alter significantly the relationships of these men to others in their organization. The chief problems that face senior management groups differ from those encountered at lower levels in the organization. Argyris' (1962) executives acted to suppress emotions in their dealings with each other, demonstrated an inability to listen receptively, and withheld information relevant to interdependent tasks.

The intervention with the all male group included on-site interviews coupled with observations, a feedback meeting giving the group a diagnosis of their interpersonal patterns, an intensive off-site T-group workshop, and follow-up sessions to assess the impact of these activities. Roger

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1 In this case Argyris was a consultant to the group
Harrison (1962) conducted an independent assessment of the program using different methods than Argyris; his findings were mainly congruent with Argyris' own evaluation.

Despite major differences in method and minor differences in theory both researchers found that the executives who took the program reported and demonstrated substantial and significant changes in their perceptions of each other. Argyris also found behavior changes among the executives who had participated in the off-site workshop. Harrison found that the executives changed their perceptions only of those individuals who also attended the workshop. Both investigators explain the limited efforts of the change as arising from counterforces in the organization. The exact words used by Argyris (1962, p. 247) were:

"... The biggest difficulties encountered by the experimental group was (sic) in their relationship with their peers (who had not attended the laboratory) and subordinates (who also had not attended the laboratory) as well as the pressures from 'above' and 'outside.'" Furthermore Argyris (1962) reported a dampening of the effects of the program even for those who attended the off-site sessions as time passed.

Both the Whyte and the Argyris interventions show an awareness of external group forces acting on their innovative groups. In Whyte's case, the forces came from individual engineers, higher level management, and other work groups. In Argyris' case, the forces came from other groups of managers above, below, and beside the target group. For Whyte's group the innovation was ended by a single spectacular action taken by senior management. For Argyris' group, the gains of the intervention were slowly and subtly eroded by interactions with individuals representing groups who had not participated in the intervention program. From my perspective, the
difficulties with both interventions call out for intergroup interpretation. Both programs had intergroup data from the outset, gave primary attention to intragroup events during the intervention period, and then encountered difficulties that can be explained readily by the operation of intergroup dynamics.

Both the Whyte and the Argyris reports were pioneering efforts carried out before the technology and theory of applied behavioral science were as well-developed as they are today. The question naturally arises as to whether recent technology and theory of team development has begun to take more complete account of intergroup forces. In a recent book summarizing the social technology of team building, Dyer (1977) wrote 139 pages: of those, six were devoted to "Reducing Inter-Team Conflict," the only portion of the book explicitly addressing intergroup dynamics. In that section, he gives five different "inter-team" designs. All of these approaches deal only with the external boundaries between interdependent groups. None consider the effects of individuals within a group serving as group representatives (such as the effects of a single male in an all female group) or of the larger organization context consisting of many identity and organization groups. His work shows no awareness of embedded intergroup relations. In short, Dyer's (1977) review and summary of team development shows little more awareness of intergroup concepts or intergroup intervention than the original work by Whyte and Argyris. An alternative view may be found in Alderfer and Brown (1975) who report the failure of a team development effort that initially relied only on intragroup concepts followed by success in the same system with the same group after the theory and method were changed to include intergroup concepts and technology.
Alderfer and Brown (1975) faced the difficulties of an exclusively intragroup orientation from the outset of the intervention. Unlike the projects described by Whyte and Argyris, they were not permitted to start without taking account of the other groups in the system. Originally, the target for their efforts was the group of senior students leaders in a boarding school who had responsibilities for managing dormitory life. When initially invited to participate in an intervention, the students resisted because they viewed the consultation as an effort sponsored by the school administration to control them. Later, when the intervention design was altered to include faculty and students who had dormitory responsibilities, both groups responded enthusiastically to the invitation to participate.

In general, the problem of managing the intergroup relations of several identity and organization groups who may have an interest in a team development intervention can be addressed by creating a microcosm group of representatives from the interested units (Alderfer, 1977b; Alderfer, Alderfer, Tucker, and Tucker, 1980; Alderfer, 1981; Alderfer and Smith 1982).

**Understanding Organizational Culture**

As investigators and consultants have shifted their concerns from small groups to the organization as a whole, there has been a corresponding search for concepts that offer the possibility of giving a holistic formulation to the total system. The notion of an organizational culture has, in part, emerged from this quest. From the standpoint of this paper,

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1 The concept of organizational culture serves other functions as well, and not all organizational culture researchers are concerned with viewing organizations holistically.
the key question is what sort of intellectual conversation might occur
between the theorist of organizational culture and the intergroup theorist.
As a response to this question I examine the work of Schein (1983a) and of
Martin and Siehl (1982).

Schein's (1983a) analysis is especially useful because he approaches
the concept of organizational culture from the standpoint of group dynamics
and learning theory. He provides a formal definition of culture, as
follows:

Organizational culture is the **pattern of basic assumptions**
which a **given group** has **invented, discovered, or developed in**
learning to cope with its **problems of external adaptation and**
**internal integration**, which have worked well enough to be
**considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as**
the correct way to **perceive, think and feel** in relation to those
problems. (emphases his)

Schein's (1983a) view of culture is, "There cannot be any culture unless
there is a group which 'owns' it. Culture is created by groups, hence the
creating group must always be clearly identified." In his conceptual work,
Schein is mainly associating organizational culture with a single group,
but there is also a sense that he is not quite sure that it is one group;
he said, "Culture is created by groups" (plural). Yet the main focus of his
attention is on a group -- the set of individuals who work with the founder
to establish the organization (Schein, 1983b). However, even within that
orientation, Schein's empirical work describing three different
founder-cultures indirectly reports intergroup phenomena. One of the three
founders he describes in detail established a family business which
included non-family members in the founder's group. As it turned out the behavior of the founder was different toward non-family members than toward family members. Family members received stock options, easy access to developmental assignments, and ready excuses for errors -- none of which were available to non-family members. As a result "sub-cultures" formed around "groups of younger managers who were ... insulated from the founder." (Schein 1983a)

Martin and Siehl (1982) also use the concept of subculture. In their case, they propose the notion of a "counterculture" formed around a charismatic figure who provides sensitively balanced set of assumptions and behaviors that offer an alternative to the dominant culture. Their empirical material is drawn from the activities of John DeLorean when he was a senior executive with General Motors.

The notion of subcultures, of course, suggests an intergroup perspective, but it does not explicitly propose that view. Rather the term _subculture_ implies that the diversity of cultures is really subordinate to the main culture, or perhaps, that subculture is the theorist's way of accommodating to data that are obviously present but do not quite fit a "one group" view of cultural dynamics. What if the idea of organizational culture were viewed as a multiple group phenomenon?

A recent study by McCollom (1983) provides data that were gathered and analyzed from a multiple group perspective. Her work is especially interesting because she began expecting to find a single culture but emerged from her research to write about the cultures (emphasis mine) of the BCD School. Her own words state:
"I began this study expecting to be able to identify a
culture which typified BCD. Instead, I found a number of
distinct subcultures residing in the major groups in the
School (students, faculty, and staff). The interaction of
these cultures seemed to produce an organizational culture
that was far from homogeneous. In fact, conflict between the
groups seemed to become part of the culture of the whole
system (e.g., the generally held expectation that staff and
faculty would disagree). My hypothesis is that the relative
power of each of the groups over time in the organization is
a major factor in determining the culture."

This statement exemplifies an intergroup view of organizational culture. It
makes the culture of the whole system a product of the cultures of key
groups in the system in interaction with one another. In McCollom's (1983)
study the predominant pattern of interaction between at least two of these
groups was conflictual. Conflict, however, need not be the major style of
intergroup transaction for the organization culture to be usefully
conceptualized as dynamic intergroup pattern.

An important difference between McCollom (1983) on the one hand and
Schein (1983a) and Martin and Siehl (1982) on the other may be their own
roles and group memberships in relation to the cultures they described.
Schein was an outsider with direct access (perhaps as as a consultant?) to
his founders and their groups. Martin and Siehl were outsiders who read
published materials about GM and DeLorean and who interviewed people who
had been close to the scene. McCollom, on the other hand, was a member of
the organization she studied and was committed to examining the
perceptions her group memberships gave her on the system she studied. It
is likely that Schein and Martin and Siehl were prevented from fully seeing
the multiple group qualities of the organizations they studied because they
permitted themselves to become mainly associated with just one group. I
suggest again that the intergroup relationships of investigators and how
those relationships are managed are likely to shape the data they obtain
and the concepts derived from those findings.

Teaching Organizational Behavior in Management Schools

At one time there was a single normative model of the
learning-teaching process, which had roughly the following form:

One began with the material to be learned. Usually this had the form
of a mix of abstract generalizations and concrete applications. In some
settings, such as professional schools, the material also included
knowledge not only of how to think but also of how to act. In addition to
the material, the normative model included two other components: the
teacher who had access to the material and the student who did not, at
least initially. The task of the teacher was to transfer the material from
wherever it was (i.e., in her or his mind, in lecture notes, in books, in
cases) into the minds of students. The task of the student was to absorb
the material. The learning-teaching process succeeded to the degree that
the teacher was able to transfer and the student was able to absorb the
material.

I believe this normative model was both correct as far as it went and
extraordinarily limited, especially when the material is human behavior in
organizations. In the history of teacher education there has been a
long-standing tension between people who gave primary (or exclusive)
attention to the material versus those who gave primary (or exclusive)
attention to the transfer (Sarason, Davidson, and Blatt, 1962). I believe
the normative model was correct because its fundamental elements were
sound, and it was limited because it failed to deal adequately with the
great variety of transfer and absorption processes or with the complex
interactions between different kinds of material and alternative transfer
and absorption processes. The tension between those who emphasize the
material versus those who emphasize the transfer is made more
understandable if one assumes that the underlying functional relationship
is interactive (i.e., multiplicative); it takes both knowledge of the
material and of transfer-absorption processes to effect learning-teaching.
Tension arises because individuals and groups have difficulty holding such
tensions; they find a certain degree of relief from their own anxiety if
they can escape from one aspect of the conflict. Choosing to emphasize
either knowledge of the material or of transfer-absorption processes
provides at least short-term relief.

When the material is organizational behavior, interactions between the
material and transfer-absorption processes have special qualities because
every learning-teaching event is also a concrete here-and-now event in the
organizational lives of teachers and students. Organizational behavior
teachers vary substantially in the degree to which they show awareness of
this property and of how they take account of it, should they be aware of
it (cf., Bradford, Benne, and Chin, 1964; Rice, 1965; Alderfer, 1970;
Gillette and Van Steenbergh, 1983; Issues of Exchange: The Organizational

Intergroup theory treats the classroom as an organization embedded in
larger suprasystem (i.e., the school and the university). Teachers
represent their organizational groups by rank and discipline and their
identity groups. Students represent their organizational groups by 
seniority (year in program) and position in the university (program member 
versus not program member) and their identity groups. Classrooms usually 
include intergroup transactions among organization groups of students 
(e.g., first and second year students) and among identity groups of students (e.g., men and women) and between teachers and students. When 
faculty work as teams within a classroom or by having several sections of 
large courses, then complex interactions among organization and identity 
groups develop and exert powerful effects on the learning-teaching process.

An especially lucid case of the interaction between organization 
groups of faculty and students has been reported by Cohen and Miaoulis 
(1978). They describe the consequences of their efforts to coordinate the teaching of organizational behavior and marketing in two successive years within a graduate school of business. In the first year, the course "evaluations" favored the organizational behavior instructor and demeaned the marketing professor. In the second year, exactly the opposite pattern was observed; the marketing professor "won," and the OB professor "lost." Part of the descriptive data from the courses were the self assessments of the instructors, who in both years believed that the student assessments were exaggerated. Regardless of whether the instructor was on the favorable or unfavorable side of the split, he believed the student perceptions were significantly polarized. In my own teaching, I have observed similar phenomena. The course consisted of a weekly lecture of ninety minutes and a section meeting of similar duration. I gave the weekly lectures and took one section. The other five sections of the course were taken by teaching assistants. An evaluation questionnaire administered at the end of course showed significant differences in evaluations of the lectures as a function
of section membership. My own section gave the lectures the most favorable evaluation. The most unfavorable evaluation came from a section whose teaching assistant had the most strained relationship with me. The traditional normative model of the learning-teaching process has no way to explain the Cohen and Miaoulis (1978) data or my own. According to conventional notions of objectivity, the organizational behavior and marketing teachers are unlikely to be good or bad teachers one year and virtually the opposite the next. A "good" teacher (property of the person without group level concepts) is a good teacher, period, and similarly for a "bad" teacher. Even if one allows that a person might have good and bad years, it is unlikely that a team of people, as a function of their individual life fortunes, would have good and bad years in such an obviously complementary fashion. Furthermore, the data from my lecture-discussion course carries similar dynamics. According to the individually based traditional normative model, a large lecture setting involves communications from the person of the lecturer to the person of the student. There is no place in the model for the intergroup effects of different section membership in explaining why groups of students evaluate the same lectures differently as a function of their section group memberships. Moreover, the concept of parallel processes offers an explanation of how stress in the relationship between teaching assistant and me (i.e., an interpersonal dynamic) can be projected into a difference in evaluations by section (i.e., an intergroup effect). Intergroup theory applied to these events and others like them does offer an explanation; the relevant proposition is:

The permeability of group boundaries varies with the polarization of feeling among the groups; that is, to the
degree that members split their feelings so that mainly positive feelings are associated with their own group and mainly negative feelings are projected onto other groups.

Probably without awareness (i.e., unconsciously), the students participated in an ethnocentric process as they provided their evaluations. Faculty members generally have more control over their own behavior than over students. An understanding of these dynamics suggests a more complex evaluation process. To the extent that faculty choose to work directly with each other in their teams on the affective as well as on the cognitive aspects of their relationships, it is less likely that tensions which originate in the faculty-to-faculty relationships (whether intergroup, e.g., OB to Marketing or interpersonal, e.g., rivalry between individuals of similar identity and organization group memberships) are to be projected into the student-faculty intergroup relationship. The traditional normative model's focus on the transaction between the teacher and the student provides no reason to examine relationships among groups of faculty in order to understand how they might effect the learning-teaching process.

The affective patterns proposition from intergroup theory has implications for other aspects of the learning-teaching process as well. It offers insight regarding some effects of teaching by "the" case method. It suggests connections between how organizational behavior groups are embedded in management schools and events in the classroom.

The chief difficulty that intergroup theory raises with the case method is that it encourages projection of destructive parallel processes and discourages owning up to the effects of one's own individual and group dynamics. In carrying out a case discussion, students discuss the events in
the lives of other people in other groups and organizations. The method is a continuing invitation for the student to dissociate herself or himself from uncomfortable feelings and thoughts and attribute them to the characters in the cases. Inadvertently, instructors "teach" students to explain the difficulties and dilemmas of human affairs in organizations by projecting onto others. People so taught are less likely to examine their own behavior and relationships as a means of dealing with situations they face. The extent of this subtle encouragement to avoid dealing with one's own condition in the here-and-now is suggested by reflections offered by Anthony Athos (1979) who is one of the best known and well respected case method teachers. He describes his own thoughts on preparing for the first day of his course on Interpersonal Behavior:

They (the students) look at your clothes because they know that is what you chose to put on to present yourself to them. I do not know about you, but the first day I go to class, I have a strategy. Remember, It's Interpersonal Behavior but I dress like I was going down to do some consulting at McKinsey in New York City. I have a suit I use to wear to do that-- I bought it for that purpose. It is dark gray. It's a business suit and I walk in dressed like a businessman. I do not come in dressed like a professor. I do that from my understanding of where they are coming from out of the first year and what they think about soft Organizational Behavior type courses. I want the first day so organized so that they see a lot of the instrumental side of me.

An intergroup interpretation of Athos' strategy suggests that he expects to
be the object of an ethnocentric reaction by the students—a soft
organizational behavior professor. By his clothes he attempts to join
another group—(presumably) hard McKinsey consultants. One can wonder what
Athos’ response would be if faced with student questions such as,
"Professor Athos, why do you dress like McKinsey consultant? Is it because
you belong to that group? (I thought you were mainly a professor.) Is it
because you represent the McKinsey group’s values and concepts? (I have
never thought of McKinsey as especially progressive in its understanding of
human behavior.)" Intergroup theory also predicts that it is extremely
unlikely that Athos would be asked these questions on the first day of
class, which is not to say students would overlook his dress. How they
would interpret that observation depends on how they relate their own
groups to Athos. If he is correct, the most straightforward prediction (at
least for the male students) is that they would infer, "He is a member of
our group in good standing; he will not be disruptive to our existing ways
of thinking and acting; it will be a comfortable and cohesive class among
us McKinsey people." Perhaps that is what Athos wants.

Then again, it may not be quite or even mainly what Athos wants. The
article from which I quoted was published in the organizational behavior
teaching journal. Thus, there are clearly circumstances under which Athos
is willing to acknowledge his membership as an organizational behavior
professor. Perhaps the explanatory process is less Athos’ relationship to
his own group of organizational behavior teachers and more the relationship
of his group to the suprasystem in which it is embedded. Roethlisberger’s
(1977) autobiography provides a detailed accounts of the difficulties and
struggles encountered by the organizational behavior group at the Harvard
Business School, which is where Athos was teaching when he wrote the
article. Beyond the special circumstances of Harvard, however, there is also evidence that organizational behavior groups in general face difficulties within the context of schools of business (Filley, Foster, Herbert, 1979). Another intergroup interpretation of Athos' preparation for his first day in class is that it reflected his attempt to cope with systemic processes that reject and depotentiate his group. His own words say, "I do that from my understanding of where they are coming from ... and what they think about soft Organizational Behavior type courses ..."

Intergroup theory applied to the problem of OB groups facing intellectual ideologies that wish to deny the existence of behavioral phenomena--especially feelings--does not support denying one's own group membership or the group's potential for making a unique contribution to management school culture. Doing that colludes with destructive parallel processes whose unconscious (and sometimes conscious) aim is to prevent managers and management teachers from having to face the difficult emotional and behavioral issues characteristic of complex organizations.

The alternatives offered by intergroup theory are either to invite the students to give their perceptions (rather than operating on inferences) and thereby own up to whatever they think and feel or to have the instructor own up to his behavior and beliefs rather than dealing with his group membership covertly by dressing to disown his OB faculty group membership. Learning and teaching about the non-rational side of organizations is one major reason why organizational behavior groups exist. When organizational behavior professors act like McKinsey consultants we provide support to groups who argue that OB does not have a novel and worthwhile contribution to make to management education. The alternative is to be clear about one's group boundaries and group membership in the classroom and in embedded disciplinary group negotiations and from that
clarity, to demonstrate in here-and-now events that organizational behavior contributes uniquely from its own methods and theories to the overall multidisciplinary culture of management education.

Intergroup theory applied to teaching organizational behavior in management schools modifies the normative model of learning-teaching as follows:

One begins with the material which is constantly being enacted among organization and identity groups of students and faculty. Abstract generalizations and concrete applications about the material become part of the cognitive formations that student and faculty groups develop as a function of their power differences and affective patterns in order to explain the nature of experiences encountered by group members and to influence relations with other groups. The degree of change in cognitive formations for individuals depends upon their intrapsychic conditions, their relations with members of their own groups, and the relations between their groups and other interdependent groups in the system in which they are embedded.

CONCLUSION

Intergroup perspectives began to shape the understanding of human behavior from the beginning of the twentieth century. Scholars reflecting upon such diverse events as political revolution, tribal warfare, labor management relations, and mental illness showed an awareness of group-to-group relations in their thinking and action. In the last thirty years, numerous intergroup theories have evolved and shaped methodological traditions. Currently, these theory-method combinations can be distinguished by their relative focus on group level concepts, attention to
groups in context or in isolation, acceptance of interventionist behavior by researchers, and tendency toward examining the individual and group behavior of investigators.

Intergroup theory provides interpretations for individual, interpersonal, group, intergroup, and organizational relations. The version of intergroup theory given here uses a definition of group that is concerned with both internal and external properties. It explains intergroup dynamics in terms of group boundaries, power, affect, cognition, and leadership behavior. It examines the nature of identity and organization groups. It relates the state of intergroup relations to the suprasystem in which they are embedded. It presents an understanding of the changing relations among interdependent groups and their representatives through the operation of parallel and unconscious processes.

The theory relates to a wide array of social and organizational problems, including the development of effective work teams, the definition and management of organizational culture, and the teaching of organizational behavior in management schools.

The most important implication of intergroup theory may be the reorientation it offers to those who study and teach about human behavior in groups and organizations. Mannheim was among the most prominent of twentieth century scholars who connected the sociology of knowledge with the group memberships of writers.

"Accordingly, the products of the cognitive process are already... differentiated because not every possible aspect of the world comes within the purview of the members of a group, but only those out of which difficulties and problems
for the group arise. And even this common world (not shared
by any outside groups in the same way) appears differently
to subordinate groups within the larger group. It appears
differently because the subordinate groups and strata in a
functionally differentiated society have a different
experiential approach..." (Mannheim, 1936, p.29).

Intergroup theory proposes that both organization groups (e.g., being a
researcher versus being a respondent) and identity groups (e.g., being a
person of particular gender, age, ethnicity and family) affect one's
intergroup group relations and thereby shape one's cognitive formations.
The body of data supporting this general proposition grows as changes in
society broaden the range of identity groups with access to research roles
(cf., Balmary, 1979; Eagly and Carli, 1981; Herman, 1983), and consequently
the content of 'well-established' empirical generalizations and conceptual
frameworks are called into question. These new developments affect research
and development as well as clinical methods. None of the accepted methods
in their implementation escape potential intergroup effects between
researchers and respondents. Investigators who accept this idea cannot
avoid questioning the part they and their groups play in the knowledge
making process. Understanding one's intergroup relationships may become a
key ingredient for all who wish to study people effectively.
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