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
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
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CAMBODIA: ANALYSIS OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO CAMBODIA, 1970-1975

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

KENNETH R. BOWRA, MAJ, USA
B.A., The Citadel, 1970

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This study attempts to serve as a historical study and analysis of the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia during the period 1970-1975. The study is focused on the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia, which was charged with administering and directing the Military Assistance Program for the Khmer Republic.

It is hoped that this study will be of assistance not only to military historians, but also to those who may at some future time be charged with determining policy and organization, military doctrine, and training and tactics for the security assistance effort should the United States again be charged with providing support under special circumstances similar to those which existed in Cambodia.

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
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
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Accepted this 1st day of June 1983 by Philip J. Brookes,
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

CAMBODIA: ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE, 1970-1975, by Major Kenneth R. Bowra, USA, 343 pages.

This study attempts to serve as a historical study and analysis of the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia during the period 1970-1975. The study is focused on the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia, which was charged with administering and directing the Military Assistance Program for the Khmer Republic.

It is hoped that this study will be of assistance not only to military historians, but also to those who may at some future time be charged with determining policy and organization, military doctrine, and training and tactics for the security assistance effort should the United States again be charged with providing support under special circumstances similar to those which existed in Cambodia.

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
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Beginning of the Khmer Republic

In 1970, the political leadership of Cambodia under Prince Norodom Sihanouk clearly supported the Communist movement in Southeast Asia, despite the "non-alignment" policy announced by Cambodia. Cambodia had initiated political contacts with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1962 and had consequently received significant economic and military aid. Vietnamese Communist forces soon occupied large portions of Cambodia territory in the east, southeast, and south of the nation in support of their war against South Vietnam.

Public opinion in Cambodia soon turned against Sihanouk for his pro-Communist policy. Realizing this, Sihanouk publicly and repeatedly denounced the exactions of the Vietnamese Communists. Finally he announced to the nation that he would depart on January 6, 1970 for France for medical treatment, following which he would travel to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to discuss economic and military aid. In intellectual circles in Cambodia there was general agreement that the two latter visits had no other real purpose than to find some way to resolve the political difficulties caused on the one hand by the Vietnamese Communists and by the activities of the Khmer Communists on the other, activities which were becoming more widespread all the time.

Sihanouk's absence from Cambodia provided the pretext for several demonstrations. On the 8th and 9th of March 1970 there were demonstrations in the capitals of the provinces of Svay Rieng and Prey Veng. Even in Phnom Penh there were violent demonstrations organized by university students against the Embassies of North Vietnam and the PRG and supported among intellectual circles. Mr. Cheng Heng, acting Head of State, and General Lon Nol, Head of Government (Prime Minister) tried in vain to make Prince Sihanouk aware of a situation which was worsening daily in Cambodia. When the Prince refused to receive the delegation sent to brief him, Lon Nol and Cheng Heng turned to the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom.

The two legislative bodies assembled to consider the problem of Sihanouk's conduct and absence. They were the same two bodies which had ten years earlier, in 1960, designated the Prince as Head of State. On March 18, 1970, the two bodies by unanimous vote withdrew their confidence in Prince Sihanouk and removed him from office. The members accused him among other things, of having authorized North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops to illegally occupy Khmer territory and establish bases (sanctuaries) during the latter half of the 1960's, an occupation in flagrant violation of Khmer neutrality as provided by the Geneva Accords of 1954. The occupation was characterized as well, as an attack on the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country.

Following action by the legislative bodies, the Prince Head of State was tried by the High Court of Justice and condemned to death in absentia for high treason.

It is important to note that following the break in diplomatic relations with the PRC and Cambodia on 5 May 1970, the PRC sent emissaries from Peking to discuss with General Lon Nol, the head of the Khmer Republic, the possibility of future relations between the two nations. The following is a description of the delegations discussion with the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) in an attempt to normalize relations so as to continue uninterrupted PRC support for North Vietnam in their war against South Vietnam through Cambodia.

The "matter between Sihanouk and the Khmer government was nothing more than an internal problem" and that Peking could overlook personalities involved so long as the Cambodian side accepted the following three conditions:

1. Permit China to continue to use Khmer territory to resupply the NVA/VC with weapons, munitions, and materiel so as to continue the war against South Vietnam.
2. Authorize the NVA/VC to establish their bases in Cambodia as before.
3. Continue to support North Vietnam and the Viet Cong with propaganda.¹

The above conditions were rejected by the GKR. Following a failure by the government of North Vietnam to meet with the GKR to discuss the problem of the evacuation of their forces from Cambodia, NVA/VC forces conducted armed aggression against the GKR from their sanctuaries along the South Vietnamese borders. Shortly thereafter, at the request of the GKR, President Nixon reinstated a Military Assistance Program for Cambodia. The first United States Military Aid Program had terminated in 1963 when Sihanouk had broken diplomatic relations with the United States.

The United States' initial Security Assistance Objective for Cambodia was to assist in the development of the Armed Forces of the

Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) so that they would be capable of defending the GKR from Communist insurgency and of providing their own logistics, training and maintenance support. To help achieve that objective, the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) was charged with administering and directing the Military Assistance Program for the Khmer Republic (MAP-CB).² On 12 April 1975, the final elements of MEDTC, along with the remaining members of the United States mission, were evacuated from Phnom Penh during Operation Eagle Pull, during which the author was an active participant. On 17 April 1975, the Khmer Republic fell to the victorious Khmer Communist (KC), terminating MAP-CB and the MEDTC mission.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a historical study and analyze the United States Military Assistance Program for Cambodia during the period 1970-1975; account for the defeat of the GKR's Forces, and the failure of the United States Security Assistance effort and objectives. It will show how the United States objectives changed in direct relation to Khmer Communist (KC) success on the battlefield.

Major sources for this thesis will be the following declassified documents:

- a. Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report, Brigadier General Theodore C. Mataxis, 12 February 1972.
- b. Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report, Major General John R.D. Cleland, 20 February 1974.
- c. Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report, Brigadier William W. Palmer, 30 April 1975.

Extracts from these reports are at times lengthy; however, this is due to the fact that the reports are not readily accessible due to the limited number of copies initially distributed. It should be stressed that information from them was written at the time specified, while other references used have been written in retrospect. It has been a difficult task to make an interesting, accurate publication from fact-loaded after-action reports. The above reports provide considerably more detailed information of the United States Military Assistance Program should the reader desire additional information.

The myriad of political events which occurred in the Khmer Republic during this period will not be addressed specifically; however, a detailed chronology enclosed at Annex A provides a listing of those political events which related directly to the survival of the Khmer Republic and will enable the reader to understand their impact on the events in relation to the war. The chronology will also include significant military activities during the 1970-1975 period. Information for the chronology came from a working chronology filed by the Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia and the United States Embassy, Phnom Penh.

Throughout this work a summary of major FANK (Forces Armees Nationales Khmer) military operations is presented to provide an accurate situation which existed. Information on military operations has been extracted from LTG Sak Sutsakhan's The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse, published by the United States Army Center of Military History. LTG Sak Soutsakhan served as Commander-in-Chief of FANK, Chief of FANK General Staff, as an Ambassador, and as the last Chief of State of the Khmer Republic.

Considerable information for this publication will come from personal experiences. In 1972 the author was assigned as a Special Forces Officer tasked with the mission of training Khmer Infantry units within the Republic of Vietnam. A description of the training program is included in chapter four, The Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic. All information is based on personal documents and knowledge of the program. In May 1974, the author was assigned to MEDTC as aide-camp to BG William W. Palmer, Chief MEDTC. During the tour with MEDTC, the author was assigned the additional duty as Secretary of the Joint Staff, which enabled him to keep abreast of all MEDTC activities. The author likewise was able to participate in inspections of FANK combat units participating in combat operations in order to report on their capabilities, limitations and use of United States equipment.

Overview of the United States Effort

"The initial United States objectives in Cambodia were not so much directed at any long-term solution to the Cambodian insurgency, as they were to the short-term objective of insuring the success of Vietnamization. Compared with the initial, longer-term approach taken by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) of creating a viable main force organization, the United States was at a disadvantage from the outset."³

The United States was never totally committed to solving Cambodia's problems. Chapter eleven discusses the severe legislative restrictions placed on the United States Assistance Program to Cambodia. Cambodia has often been called a "sideshow" to Vietnam. Dr. Henry Kissinger has described United States involvement in Cambodia as follows:

There is no doubt that Cambodia was the orphan of the Vietnam settlement. The engagements regarding it were the least binding; its indigenous Communists were the most ferocious. The non-Communist Cambodians, despite their reputation for passivity, fought perhaps the most heroically of all the peoples of Indochina, with the least outside help.⁴

The United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia and the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia continued to support the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) until its final days. BG Palmer's End of Tour Report describes the United States efforts as follows:

It is ironic that even on 16 April 1975, the day prior to the capitulation of the GKR, MEDTC from its rear base in Thailand, arranged and controlled six aerial resupply missions into Phnom Penh. Thus, giving the narrowest possible interpretation of the MEDTC mission, it was successfully accomplished until the end. But the 'end' involved complete failure of the United States' security assistance objective of developing a self-sustaining armed force capable of defending the GKR from insurgency.⁵

This thesis, then, will provide a historical study and analysis of the United States Military Assistance Program to the Khmer Republic during the period 1970-1975.

With the Khmer Communist victory on 17 April 1975, Cambodia's fratricidal war was concluded and a new genocide began.

"Peace" came in the once-lovely land of Cambodia on 17 April 1975. "On 17 April 1975, a society collapsed; another is now being born from the fierce drive of revolution which is incontestably the most radical ever to take place in a short time. It is a perfect example of the application of an ideology pushed to the furthestest limit of its internal logic. But the furthestest limit is too far, and "too far" is akin to madness - for in this scheme of society, where is man?"⁶

CHAPTER ONE

ENDNOTES

¹LTG Sak Sutsakhan, The Khmer Republic at War and The Final Collapse (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), p. 15.

²End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1974-1975, BG William W. Palmer, 30 April 1975, p. 1.

³Ibid., p. 10.

⁴Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston - Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 15.

⁵Ibid., BG Palmer, p. 14.

⁶Francois Ponchaud, Cambodia Year 2010 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977), p. 192.

⁷Air America was a contract air service used by the USG throughout the Southeast Asian conflict, using civilian pilots.

CHAPTER TWO

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE BEGINS

Introduction

This chapter will describe the beginning of the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia in 1970 and the formation of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia in 1971.

Brigadier General Theodore C. Mataxis was the first Chief, MEDTC. Information relating to MEDTC organization and operation has been extracted from his End of Tour Report.

"America has nothing to be ashamed of in having tried to help a brave people defend itself against a group of genocidal murders. Those who actively prevented adequate assistance, have the more reason to be uncomfortable."¹

United States Military Assistance to Cambodia following the removal of Prince Sihanouk on 18 March 1970 was initially as a Presidential determination utilizing funds from the world-wide 1970 MAP. "During the remaining two months of FY 70, 8.9 million in Military Assistance was provided to Cambodia. In FY 71 Congress authorized a Military Assistance Program for Cambodia of \$185 million."² From 22 April to 14 June 1970, the Military Assistance Program was administered in-country by the Defense Attache, supported from MACV J-4. On 14 June 1970, Mr. Jonathan F. Ladd (Colonel, USA Retired) was appointed Political/Military Counselor (PMC) and CINCPAC Special Representative for Military and Security Assistance Matters (SRMA) and assumed responsibility for the in-country execution of the Military Assistance Program with continued support by the MACV SSG. The PM operational staff in-country was gradually augmented to 16 authorized personnel, of whom six officers and four enlisted men were actually present for duty in Phnom Penh on 31 December 1970. Requirements for assistance was established by COMUSMACV through the Special Support Group.

During mid-May 1970, a Special Support Group (SSG) was established in MACV J-4 to coordinate material deliveries to Cambodia. Elements of the MACV Training Directorate and Military Assistance Office initiated plans to train and equip the Cambodian Forces, (Forces Armees Nationales Khmère) FANK. Various staff sections of MACV provided individual and groups to study the Cambodian situation, survey requirements

and participate in the development of plans to assist the Khmer Republic to mobilize, equip and train its armed forces. During June and August 1970, two CINCPAC conferences were held to establish an organized and coordinated approach to the program. During this period, quantities of captured enemy equipment and older United States weapons (i.e., M-1 carbines, M-1 garand rifles, etc.) were furnished to Cambodia. The two Khmer Khrom Mobile Strike Forces (previously under United States Special Forces in South Vietnam) and La Bang Siek Chock Brigade were reequipped and dispatched to Phnom Penh to bolster the outnumbered and demoralized FANK. Support for FANK ranged from aerial supply shipments to close support air strikes and cross border operations. At the same time the \$185 million dollar FY 71 program was introduced into the CINCPAC and DOD MAP data bases. Because of rapidly changing requirements and the relatively late development of the program (in context of the named MAP planning, programming, and budgeting cycle), the program included many undefined lines. "All items were provided on a call forward basis in response to requirements established by the SRMA. Concurrently, MACV in conjunction with RVN, established the battalion and company training programs and specialist training in RVN."⁴ This program is discussed in chapter four, The Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic.

Formation of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC)

During the late calendar year of 1970, it became increasingly evident that a single point of contact was required to administer the support to Cambodia. During December 1970 a special study group was

formed in MACV to plan for the establishment of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC).

MEDTC was organized on a "crash basis" with practically no institutional memory except for rudimentary working files inherited from its predecessors in the Military Aid Program for Cambodia; the Political Military Counselor's Staff in Phnom Penh and the provisional Special Support Group of the MACV staff in Saigon.

MEDTC was activated on 31 January 1971, being initially staffed from MACV assets, specifically officers from the SSG and MACV staff who had administered the Cambodian assistance and ten military personnel who had formed a part of the operational staff of the SRMA. The first Chief of MEDTC was Brigadier General Theodore C. Mataxis.

BG Mataxis described his appointment as Chief, MEDTC:

I was called one afternoon in January 1971 and told to report to Saigon - I was being reassigned from my job as Assistant Division Commander (operations) of the Americal Division. I reported into MACV Headquarters and was told it was "hush-hush" and General Abrams would see me the next day. So I reported to him first thing in the morning - first thing he said was, "Ted, you're the new Chief, MEDTC, new name for MAAG, Cambodia. President Nixon said get a General Officer into Cambodia as the chief of a military mission to build up the Cambodian Armed Forces - the goal is 200,000 and you'll have \$180 million from now until July and \$200 million plus for the next fiscal year. He said you're a separate mission just like Laos, Thailand, etc., and will come directly under Admiral McCain, Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC)." That was about it. When I questioned him he said, "You're the expert - all that time in South Asia, MAAG Army Chief in Iran - you should know the ropes." He then said that there was an Army AG Lieutenant Colonel down the hall setting up an office for the team. He would be my liaison with the AG to put in requisitions for the type people I needed - in so far as numbers in country went, Congress had pretty strong constraints on us. He finally said, "Don't worry about the money, we lose more than that from the warehouses and LOC here in Vietnam every year. Your mission is to field an Army which will harass the enemy, keep Cambodians out of their forces and force them to fight for the

Tonle sap rice. Anything else will be a bonus during our phase down." My key mission was to do all I could to keep the Cambodians in the field to "harass" the enemy (NVA) divisions in the sanctuaries - in order to assist the withdrawal of United States troops and the Vietnamization program.⁵

As stated by former President Nixon, following the United States offensive into Cambodia on 30 April 1970,

"Our principal purpose was to undercut the North Vietnamese invasion of that country (SVN) so that Vietnamization and plans for the withdrawal of American troops could continue in South Vietnam. A secondary purpose was to relieve the military pressure exerted on Cambodia by the North Vietnamese forces that were rapidly overrunning it."⁶

The original authorization for MEDTC provided for 16 personnel to be stationed in Cambodia and 44 in Saigon. They provided some continuity for the newly organized MEDTC. MEDTC was also strongly influenced by the final MAAG report submitted by BG Taber, when military assistance to Cambodia was terminated late in 1963. Although nearly seven years had elapsed since his report, most of the conditions reported then still existed and the recommendations were still valid.

The organization of MEDTC was unique. It was designed to execute the Cambodian Military Assistance Program within the guidelines of the Nixon Doctrine, the constraints of the Cooper-Church Amendment and in consonance with the overall United States objectives and strategy for Southeast Asia. "The keystones of the Nixon Doctrine were partnership, strength and the willingness to negotiate."⁷

The Nixon Doctrine

"Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in the purest form...because in Cambodia what we are doing is helping the Cambodians to help themselves, and we are doing that rather than to go in and do the fighting ourselves, as we did in Korea and as we did in Vietnam."⁸

At Guam in June of 1969, President Nixon had detailed the framework of the Nixon Doctrine. The United States would participate in the defense and development of her friends and allies. We would not, however, conceive all plans, elaborate all the programs, put in action all the decision, or assume the total defense of the free world. As generally interpreted at the time, this meant that the United States, as its national interests dictated, would assist other nations with military material, training, advisors, but would not commit its ground troops to another Vietnam. No direct mention was made of air support, but it was generally considered to be within the sphere of available assistance. Understandably, the specifics of the support to be rendered, except for the non-participation of ground troops, would be decided on a case by case basis.

The MEDTC Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) and Terms of Reference were prepared within these guidelines, submitted through CINCPAC, and approved by Department of Defense (DOD) in March 1971.

The ten military personnel stationed in Phnom Penh and working under the supervision of the SRMA became MEDTC Forward, under the control of an Army Colonel (O-6) who was designated as Deputy Chief Forward. With the approval of the JTD, the Cambodia contingent was increased to 23 and MEDTC was authorized a total of 113 personnel. However, 31 of the JTD spaces were not filled because of their functions required a presence in Cambodia and the personnel ceiling authorized in Cambodia continued at 23.

As the tempo of material shipments increased, the contingent in Cambodia could not keep abreast of determining requirements to support

FANK's mobilization, much less execute even minimally the statutory requirements to monitoring and executing a Military Assistance Program. The Department of Defense pressed for approval to station the entire team in Phnom Penh, except for a small element to coordinate support from MACV. After numerous exchanges between DOD and SECSTATE, a compromise position developed in which SECSTATE agreed to permit 50 MEDTC members to enter Cambodia provided the majority were fluent in French. The Departments responded rapidly to assign French language specialists to MEDTC and by September 1971 the forward MEDTC element approached a strength of 50, which was increased to 62 in December 1971.

MEDTC Missions and Functions

From the initial MEDTC organization established by General Mataxis and improved upon by following MEDTC Chiefs, General John R.D. Cleland (1972-1974), and General William W. Palmer (1974-1975) MEDTC developed into a model organization.

MEDTC, operating within the Congressionally approved Military Assistance Program to Cambodia had three specific missions:

- . Determine the needs of the Cambodian Military Forces.
 - . Arrange for the shipment and delivery of equipment and materials.
 - . To observe and report on the utilization of United States material and Cambodian personnel trained by the United States and by third countries. (Conduction of End Item Utilization Inspections, EIUI's.)
- The Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia functioned similar to a MAAG. With a Brigadier General as Chief (CHMEDTC) it planned, programmed,

ordered and monitored the shipment and distribution of MAP material. As a tri-service organization it came under the command of CINCPAC. However, CHMEDTC was a member of the Cambodia Country Team and therefore directly responsible to the Chief of the United States mission, Phnom Penh, as well. In contrast to a MAAG, MEDTC was legislatively prohibited from advising or instructing by the Cooper-Church Amendment which became law on 22 December 1970. The act restricted the "providing advice" aspect of the Nixon Doctrine by requiring that no United States military personnel in the Khmer Republic would act in an advisory or training capacity nor participate in ground combat operations. It proclaimed that any assistance given by the United States does not constitute a commitment by the United States to the defense of Cambodia.

Conclusion

By the end of 1971, MEDTC was performing its specific missions, operating out of South Vietnam and Phnom Penh. Chapter five will discuss the Military Assistance Program during the period 1971-1972 in detail. Before this is done, however, it is necessary to understand the Khmer Communist enemy, a well equipped Communist main force army. The next chapter will discuss the KC - his origins, military development, performance and problems.

CHAPTER TWO

ENDNOTES

¹Letter, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to Brigadier General Theodore C. Mataxis, USA (Retired), 30 June 1980. Authorized for use by Dr. Kissinger in letter to Major Bowra, 8 April 1983.

²End of Tour Report, MEDTC, General T.C. Mataxis, 12 February 1972, p. 1.

³Khmer Khrom - Ethnic Khmer from Vietnam's Mekong Delta Area.

⁴Ibid., General Mataxis, p. 2.

⁵Interview with BG Mataxis and author, 26 November 1982.

⁶Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1981), p. 109.

⁷Ibid., General Mataxis, p. 2.

⁸"Cambodia: A New Model for Military Assistance", BG Theodore C. Mataxis, Army Magazine, January 1973.

CHAPTER THREE

THE KHMER COMMUNIST ENEMY

Introduction

As sources of information on the Khmer Communist organization and development are not readily available, portions for this chapter have been directly extracted from The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse by LTG Sak Sutsakhan. Other sources are as noted.

Using Mao/Giap's Protracted Warfare/Peoples Army organization concepts, the KC laid the base for their regular army in the areas under NVA control. From initially famed village defense units came the personnel to fill territorial units during the next dry season, followed by graduation of the better qualified territorial survivors to regular units in the next campaign. This three step cycle in the creation of main force units was self-perpetuating as long as the villages continued to produce an annual crop of healthy 15-16 year olds.

"The use of Sihanouk's name, still revered in the conservative countryside, the call to adventure, and a salutatory display of brutality to recalcitrants brought to the crop. Once in, the location of the recruit's family in the NVA/KC controlled zone and harsh communist discipline insured compliance with orders. With such a system, the KC over the course of the war evolved from a small political/terrorist force to a relatively well equipped and disciplined military organization capable of fielding 175+ main force battalions."

The primary objective of the Khmer Communist (KC) remained the capture of Phnom Penh, the political-administrative capital of the Khmer Republic and with it the destruction of Lon Nol's GKR. KC forces continually maintained pressure of GKR forces protecting the city.

In order to understand the KC, it is necessary to look at the KC political origins, military development and performance and problems.

Khmer Communist Political Origins

After the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk on 18 March 1970, Sihanouk took refuge in Peking, where his activities led to the creation of FUNK (Front Uni National du Kampuchea) and the formation of GRUNK (Government Royal d'Union National du Kampuchea) as well as the Indochina Summit meeting in Canton in April 1970. For the pro-communist Khmer, these events offered them the opportunity to pursue their goals more actively and more openly. With the assistance of the NVA/VC, they were able to extend their influence and to develop rapidly, both politically and militarily.

The actual political origins of the Khmer pro-communist date back to 1945, and passed through the following stages, which paralleled communist developments in Laos and Vietnam.

1. 1945-1954. During this period, there was development at the movement of Khmer Issarak in Cambodia, the Lao - Issarak in Laos and the Viet Minh in Vietnam, movements all affiliated with the Indochinese Communist Party, directed by Ho Chi Minh.

2. 1950. This year marked the beginning of the disintegration of the Khmer Issarak Movement, as some of its leaders rallied to Prince Sihanouk, then King of Cambodia. Remaining elements of the Khmer Issarak, however, remained true to their communist ideology, and under the leadership of Son Ngoc Minh, then in North Vietnam, went underground and continued their activities in Cambodia.

3. 1951. The Khmer Issarak Movement was dissolved and the "Prachea Chan Party" or Parti Revolutionnaire du Peuple Cambodgien (Revolutionary Party of the Cambodian People) was created.

4. 1954. At the conclusion of the Geneva Accords in 1954, it was the Prachea Chan Party that decided to send some 5,000 communist sympathizers to North Vietnam for political indoctrination and military training.

5. 1960. The Prachea Chan Party changed its name to "Workers Party" and constituted a central committee for the party at the conclusion of its first plenary session.

In order to better understand this evolution, note the following footnote to an article by R.P. Paringaux, published 31 March 1978 by the French newspaper Le Monde:²

According to Radio Phnom Penh on 20 March 1978, Mr. Pol Pot (KC leader) told a group of Yugoslavia journalists that he had become the secretary of the Khmer Communist Party par interim in 1962, after "...the secretary had been assassinated by the enemy" and that he had been confirmed in the position of secretary by the second party congress in 1963. Mr. Pol Pot added that he belonged to the anti-French underground from 1953 to 1954. Furthermore, according to official statements in Phnom Penh, the Khmer Communist Party was founded not in 1961, but on 30 September 1960.

6. 1963. The second plenary session of the Worker's Party continued in effect those decisions taken during the first plenary session in 1960.

7. 1965. Son Ngoc Minh decided to profit from the strained relations between the United States and Cambodia, following rupture of diplomatic relations in May of that year, by bringing about the return to Cambodia of Khmer Viet Minh who had been trained and indoctrinated in Hanoi. This corresponds with the sharp increase in Communist subversive activity noted during that period. These activities were brutally repressed by Prince Sihanouk, and this repression, carried out systematically, forced the Khmer Communists and their sympathizers to go underground.

8. 1966. The principal communist leaders, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim and Hou Yuon, disappeared from Phnom Penh; they had been involved, with the help of the Khmer Viet Minh cadres from Hanoi, in carrying out subversive activities in Prey Veng and Kompang Cham. During the same year, there was a proposal to change the name of the Worker's Party to the "Communist Party of Kampuchea" and to adopt the basic political line of the Marxists-Leninists (note how this contradicts the statements attributed to Pol Pot in the Le Monde article). These proposals were destined to be approved during the 3d Plenary Assembly which would take place before 1970.

A study of the enemy would be incomplete without analysis of the various groups or tendencies among the enemy shortly after 18 March 1970.

Within the FUNK there existed three such groups.

1. Those Khmer Communists (Khmer Rouge) and Khmer Viet Minh who had gone underground before March 18, 1970, and who were decided on a war of long duration. This extremist group opposed the nomination of Sihanouk as President of FUNK and also opposed the continued practice of Buddhism.

2. The group known as the Khmer Romdas, who were loyal to Sihanouk.

3. A moderate group within the Khmer revolutionary movement directed by intellectuals under the leadership of Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Hou Yuon.

There was little harmony among the three factions, especially as it concerned political tactics. The Khmer Rouge and Khmer Viet Minh

called for total war until final victory, and for absolute non-cooperation with Sihanouk and his partisans. Even though they were in agreement on this point, there were some misunderstandings between the two groups. In general, the Khmer Viet Minh were proud to have been educated abroad in a socialist country, and they underestimated the purely local Khmer Rouge, and the strategic and tactical competence of the latter for making revolutionary war.

The Khmer revolutionaries of Khieu Samphan, for their part, sided with Sihanouk on strategy shortly after the creation of FUNK and GRUNK, and were given key posts in these two entities. Khieu Samphan, Ho Yuon, and Hu Nim expected to make use of Sihanouk as they had done before; they organized behind him, reinforced themselves, and even called for his return to power for a period of transition. This would have given them the time to prepare the final phase of their revolution, that is the overthrow of Sihanouk, and the taking of power by their party. The pro-Sihanouk movement created at the start of the conflict, lost its influence gradually, and was finally replaced by the progressive expansion of the Revolutionary Movement.

Khmer Communist Military Development

Prior to 18 March 1970, there were two general periods in the development of Khmer communist military units and institutions. Between 1945 and 1954, the presence of the Viet Minh in Cambodia contributed to the formation of an auxiliary Khmer - Viet Minh force estimated at several thousand. After the Geneva Conference of 1954, this force was disbanded. One part, along with certain sympathizers, moved to Hanoi, while the

remainder either returned to a more or less normal life or went underground. Between 1965 and 1967, several dozen intellectuals, mostly teachers and discontented students from the Sihanoukist regime went underground. Together with former elements of the Khmer - Viet Minh, these intellectuals constituted an embryo force which began to confront the established order. The zones of action of these elements were found in the provinces of Battambang, Kampot, Prey Veng and in the frontier zone from Kompang Chan to Kompang Thom.

The concept for the organization of Khmer Communist forces after 18 March 1970, was established at the Indochinese summit, held in Canton in April 1970. These plans were made to develop a force of 50,000 regulars, including three divisions, all to be equipped by Communist China. They would be modeled after the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao as follows:

1. Popular forces and auto-defense groups at village and city levels.
2. Regular forces with a territorial mission, organized at the levels of country or district and province.
3. Regular forces, having no territorial responsibility, and functioning under the orders of the general military command.

The above forces were expected to undertake military tasks under the same conditions as units of the Viet Cong or Pathet Lao, with the support of North Vietnam.

In practice, the first FUNK units were made of: ex-Khmer-Viet Minh elements; some who had been Khmer Rouge prior to 18 March 1970; and certain individuals who deserted the FANK and the Provincial Guard

immediately following the 18th of March. Because these cadre were of uneven military capability, the VC/NVA established special training centers for them and for new recruits, and located them throughout the regions they controlled in Cambodia and lower Laos. On leaving these training centers, the Khmer elements were incorporated into various VC/NVA units who continued their training. As they became more accomplished, the Khmer elements participated more and more actively alongside the VC/NVA in actions against FANK. As the Khmer Communist infrastructure developed, autonomous FUNK units began to appear on the battlefield; these had been judged competent by the VC/NVA command and free to operate more or less independently. "The total strength of the FUNK was estimated at 12,000 to 15,000 by about the end of 1970; between 18 and 25,000 in November 1971; and between 35 and 40,000 in 1972."³

By January 1973, FUNK strength was estimated at 40,000, with a total of 125 battalions. By November 1974, FUNK strength was estimated at 60,000 with a total of 230 battalions.⁴

"At the termination of hostilities in April 1975, the KC were credited with 230 battalions, including 35-40 regiments and 12-13 division/brigade equivalents for a total force of some 55,000-65,000 combatants. VC/NVA strength in the Khmer Republic decreased from an estimated 36,000 in March 1973 to 26,200 in December 1974. Of this total, only 1,200 were combat troops with the remainder assigned to administrative, logistical, and service organizations."⁵

Long Term Strategy - North Vietnam

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) adopted a two point strategy for the war in Cambodia. Flowing back into the sanctuary areas following the withdrawal of United States ground forces, the NVA

quickly regained control of them. In a series of sharp clashes with South Vietnamese and Khmer forces, they indicated that their primary strategic objective in Cambodia would be to insure the uninterrupted use of the border lines of communication (LOC's) essential to their operations in South Vietnam. Their second objective became the "Khmerization" of the war against the GKR. At best, this secondary objective promised to give them a Communist satrapy, while at worst it cut their own involvement and losses to a minimum. Through the rapid development of FUNK, the DRV compressed the normal development of a Communist "revolutionary" military force.

"The KC of 1972-74 were not the Viet Cong of 1963-65. They were not hit and run guerrilla bands equipped with an assortment of weapons. They were regular units equipped with the best infantry weapons in the Communist bloc inventory. They proved themselves capable of engaging in sustained, coordinated military operations."⁶

KC: Performance and Problems

In a series of battles throughout 1972-1973, the KC wrested large areas of additional territory from the GKR, taking advantage of the heavy VC/NVA combat assistance at the beginning. Having seized the initiative, they were operating at time and places of their own choosing against FANK forces stretched thin defending vital LOC's and population centers. Massive United States air support was required to prevent Phnom Penh itself from falling during the climatic days of August 1973. At this time KC personnel losses were heavy, and a weakness inherent in the manner of the KC's evolution as a fighting force surfaced. Lacking troop level ideological commitment to communism, some KC units began to question

their participation in a fratricidal war. Debates occurred as to whether their sacrifices were not more beneficial to the Vietnamese than to themselves. These debates and other differences over rice distribution and population control led in some cases to open conflict with NVA units.

"The 15 August bombing halt in U.S. air support, however, inevitably raised the question of the degree of U.S. commitment to the GKR. The KC control apparatus was able to mute the dissent within their own ranks and by January 1974 the KC had regrouped and were once again seriously threatening Phnom Penh. Thus, the KC were not without their own internal problems."⁷

The KC failed to achieve their objectives in 1973-74 because of an ineffective command and control apparatus, a lack of strategic mobility and poor communications security. These shortcomings combined to cause commitment of units in an uncoordinated, piecemeal fashion allowing an unexpectedly aggressive FANK force to respond effectively. They also experienced munitions shortages and an inability to replace casualties, particularly those in key positions. In the successful 1975 New Year's offensive, the KC were much better organized and even though faulty command and control continued to result in some missed opportunities, their adherence to the overall strategy of depriving Phnom Penh of its lower Mekong River LOC prior to the all-out direct assault on the capital itself was executed effectively.

The KC also improved their logistics support dramatically. In addition to large amounts of captured/abandoned material, they were apparently assured by the NVA of increased weapons and ammunition stocks as well as the transportation assets to move them. In addition, many of the local distribution problems which hampered their activities in the past appeared to have been successfully worked out.

"The KC ability to pound Phnom Penh, Pochentong and Neak Luong, with continuous fire attacks during the final offensive attests to this newly acquired sustaining capability. Initiation by the KC of extensive mining operations on the Lower Mekong not only further demonstrated their increased levels of logistical support, but achieved sufficient surprise and effectiveness to eventually seal the Mekong. Moreover, the KC continually demonstrated a superior ability to replace the massive personnel casualties experienced during the final months of the war. The sum total of these improved logistics capabilities enabled the KC to press their successful attack far longer and much more relentlessly than ever before."⁸

Conclusions

"The NVA training and logistics base, NVA advisors and specialists, and above all, the Cambodian cadre "un-Khmerized" through their long association with and immersion in the more aggressive Vietnamese culture, insured that as a military organization the KC was a relatively more disciplined, centralized, and responsive organization than FANK."⁹

The final KC success on the battlefield was never assured until the last days of the war. Yet, it was readily apparent during the KC New Year's offensive (1975) that they had the requisite logistical support and will to press for a solution favorable to them.

It is apparent that the KC leadership by the end of the war was most effective in planning, coordinating and executing multi-unit combat operations in pursuit of an effective strategy. Their ruthless organization of occupied areas and mobilization of every population and transportation resource therein assured them of sufficient impressed recruits to replace the massive personnel losses inflicted by government firepower; it gave them control over a series of effective, albeit tenuous, local lines of communications, and it drove masses of refugees to the government side, forcing the GKR to provide for them from ever-dwindling food supplies - this further complicating the government's war effort,

in spite of the apparent political advantages accruing from this massive "vote with the feet".

In summary, throughout the Wet Season - Dry Season ebb and flow of the war, there developed a tendency on the part of the GKR to overestimate KC abilities, while the KC, for a long while, underestimated the resolve and staying power of its enemy.

"By 1975, the KC apparently developed a much more healthy respect for the firepower and will of FANK, planning and executing their maneuvers accordingly. Conversely, FANKs respect for KC capabilities remained low, based on earlier insurgent failures; hence, they entered the Dry Season (1974-75) generally underestimating their opponent. In five years of war, the KC came into its own as a substantially matured military force. The GKR/FANK did not."¹⁰

The next chapter will provide a description of FANK beginning with the Royal Khmer Armed Forces of 1970, the initial expansion of FANK, the National Strategy, the formation of FANK as a "Light Infantry Force," the Khmer Soldier, FANK training, and leadership.

CHAPTER THREE

ENDNOTES

¹End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1972-1974, MG John R.C. Cleland, 20 February 1974, p. 9.

²Article, R.P. Paringaux, Le Monde, 31 March 1978.

³LTG Sak Sutsakhan, The Khmer Republic at War and The Final Collapse (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), p. 27.

⁴MEDTC MAAG Chiefs Conference Briefing Chart, 1974, by MG Cleland.

⁵End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1974-1975, BG William W. Palmer, 30 April 1975, p. 2.

⁶*Ibid.*, MG Cleland, p. 10.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*, BG Palmer, p. 3.

⁹*Ibid.*, MG Cleland, p. 10.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, BG Palmer, pp. 3-4.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC


Introduction

The organizational, training and leadership problems which would eventually cause the Khmer Armed Forces to collapse were their inheritance from the earlier Royal Forces. During the brief period of intensive United States direct involvement in training of Khmer forces, these problems were overcome, but the involvement was too short-lived to provide an adequate base for the rapid expansion of FANK in the midst of war and it ceased before the fundamental changes could take effect. This chapter will then, take an in-depth look at the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic.

Prior to 18 March 1970, the Royal Khmer Armed Forces (Forces Armees Royals Khmeres - FARK) were an insignificant military force whose strength did not even reach the authorized ceiling of 35,000 men. The primary mission of the FARK remained territorial defense.

The Army consisted of 20 infantry battalions, 13 - 15 separate infantry companies, support battalions (signal, transportation and engineer), one armored reconnaissance regiment (1st ARR), one field artillery battery, and one anti-aircraft artillery battery. All of these units were under the control of the FARK General Staff, whose chief was the commander-in-chief. The remaining technical services such as medical, ordnance, quartermaster and signal were the responsibility of the Service Directorates, which came under the Ministry of National Defense. Army units were deployed as shown in the following map:

Map 1. Locations of Principal Fark units prior to 18 March 1970.
Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak
Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington,
D.C., 1980, p. 34.



The Royal Air Force had a strength of 1,250 men with its only air base being at Pochentong, on the outskirts of Phnom Penh. Due to its low strength and limited aircraft (a few MiG aircraft and other aircraft of all types and origins), the Royal Air Force was not capable of defending the national airspace. In order to maintain loyalty of the pilots, Sihanouk insured that a majority of the pilots were from the Royal family and the lesser nobility, hence, the Royal Air Force was commonly referred to as the "Royal Flying Club" within Phnom Penh. "Maintenance of this 'aerial museum' was at best haphazard."¹

The Royal Navy was a small force which had a river base at Chrouy Chang War, located outside Phnom Penh, and a Naval Base at Ream. Within the Navy was one marine company. Most naval activity was confined to the Bassac River, the Mekong and the Tonle Sap in the vicinity of the Great Lake. The Royal Navy was capable of limited coastal patrols.

In order to fully understand the development of the Khmer Armed Forces, it is necessary to look at its development as described by LTG Sak Sutsakhan, former Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff and last Chief of State of the Khmer Republic.

Practically speaking, the FARK never had a corps of reserve units as in other armies. Starting about 1955, training was begun of reserve officers from among those high-ranking government officials who volunteered to take a course of basic instruction at the Military Academy or officer school. This school was established in Phnom Penh after the French had accorded the Khmer a certain autonomy, an initial step prior to granting full independence. Instruction at the school was provided by French military personnel. Because of political considerations at the time, there was adopted for the first Khmer reserve officers an accelerated course of practical and theoretical instruction lasting one year. During

the period of peace, from 1954 to 1969, this course was extended in length to two years. This was followed by the initiation of training of noncommissioned officers of the reserves, recruited this time from among the mid-level government officials; this course lasted only about six months.

For lack of a precise plan for the development of the armed forces, the reserve officers and noncommissioned officers were simply incorporated into the corps of active duty officers and noncommissioned officers. They were needed for expansion and to take the place of departing French cadre, as was the case of certain reserve officers in the territorial commands. Furthermore, certain civil servants were given military rank without having ever received military training of any sort; also their military grade was based on their civil rank. For example, the governor of a province or the president of a tribunal could become a LT. Colonel or Colonel. This was done in a number of cases in order that the entire FARK might be Khmerized by the time of Cambodian independence.

Thus, a number of reserve cadre were trained, but there were no reserve units. Many of the reserve cadre, after their short periods of instruction, simply remained in the active armed forces and never returned to their civilian positions in the government.

As the number of reserve cadre grew, the FARK command became more aware of the lack of reserve units; in other words, the need for some mission for the newly trained reserve cadre. From this came the idea to institute compulsory military service for all Khmer of age for such service. Several laws were issued, and several groups of young people were trained in haste, but no reserve units were ever organized and, as in the case of the reserve officers and noncommissioned officers, the newly-trained recruits were used for fillers in the active units. By this time a number of the active forces were reaching the end of their periods of service or were ready for retirement. Now these errors were seen and understood by those in command, and several measures were adopted to fill this gap. Unfortunately, they met insurmountable obstacles, economic and financial, to mention only two. Cambodia could not afford to have a truly modern or "de luxe" armed force. This was the expression used over and over again by Prince Sihanouk, when addressing the nation, he launched for the first time the ideas of ". . . participation of the armed forces in the economic life of the country. . ." an idea called to mind by the picture Sihanouk formed of the "Grand Army" of Red China during his visits to that country. The general slogan under which the FARK developed was thus, "as for the economy, Cambodia will aid itself."

With this changed situation, the impetus of the FARK toward orthodox military capability was essentially halted, and their efforts were devoted almost one hundred percent to the economy. FARK participated actively in the construction of roads, dykes, dams, etc., and the entire administrative and territorial organization of the country, neglecting for the most part military instruction and training. With the mission of FARK thus divided, their value as a defense force was reduced little by little. A battalion or company having a mission of territorial security in the region of the South Vietnam border (Moudolkiri, Ratankiri, Svay Rieng Provinces, for example) would continue to be devoted to road work and building of model villages rather than looking after the security of the frontier. It was not surprising during this period (1963-1969), described as the time of "The Great Economic Leap of Cambodia," to note the increase of VC/NVA infiltration into the frontier zones of Cambodia, and equally, the construction of Communist base areas to support their war in South Vietnam. Much of the equipment of the FARK was also used to support projects in the economic sector. All vehicles and mechanical equipment received through U.S. and French military assistance were rapidly worn out, and no solution to the problem of their replacement could be found. The same can be said for the condition of material in the Navy and Air Force. I remember that in 1963, just prior to the Khmer rejection of U.S. military aid, the French Military Attache and the Chief, U.S. MAAG, Phnom Penh, called on me for the express purpose of registering their dismay and disapproval at the misuse of the equipment which their countries had granted to the FARK.²

Having reviewed the Forces Armees Royales Khmers (FARK), the reader can now understand the state of the Khmer Armed Forces when Cambodia commenced its fratricidal war following the events of 18 March 1970. They were armed and equipped in a haphazard way. They were no match for the VC/NVA units located within Cambodia.

Initial Expansion of FANK

As a result of VC/NVA attacks on 29 March 1970, by early May 1970 the Cambodian provinces along the RVN border were practically all occupied by Vietnamese Communist forces. The mobilization called by General Lon Nol was to fight a new war of independence, adopting the slogan "National Resistance". Initial reaction to the mobilization

resulted in many volunteers, particularly among students, teachers and certain intellectual circles with the permanent goal of the abolition of the monarchical regime and for its replacement by a republican regime.

Training centers were directed to cut the period of recruit training by 50 percent as a way of accelerating the formation of new units. Equipment, however, remained a critical problem:

Another problem concerned equipment and arms for the new soldiers; what stocks were available in unit supply rooms were quickly expended and without concern for uniformity. In a single combat unit were to be seen an entire range of individual and crew served weapons. The resupply and logistical support of FANK units as a whole became more burdensome and insoluble as the war developed.³

Another way in which FANK units increased was by the incorporating directly into FANK the armed villager forces, which had been in existence since the early days of Sihanouk's struggle for Cambodian independence from the French (1949-1953). These groups had received very limited military training, and were poorly armed with outdated United States, French and English rifles.

Other methods of rapidly creating FANK units was by recalling reservists to active duty and by "unit doubling", whereby one-half the strength (officer and enlisted) was taken to form the framework of a new unit. The majority of the personnel of these units were hastily trained recruits.

Starting with 35,000, FANK had expanded to 110,000 by June 1970. The infantry units had been formed into twelve brigades by 1 May 1970 and deployed as follows:

1st Inf. Brigade:	headquartered in Phnom Penh and constituting the general reserve.
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2d Inf. Brigade: based in Kompong Cham and the main force unit of MR-1.

3d Inf. Brigade: activated in the 2d MR and based in the Kompong Som area.

4th Inf. Brigade: activated in Prey Veng (MR-1). This brigade was assigned the mission of defending the special zone of the Mekong River. It operated in the areas of Prey Veng and Neak Luong.

5th Inf. Brigade: composed basically of Muslim Khmers and intended for future deployment in the north. Located in Phnom Penh, it served as a reserve unit.

6th Inf. Brigade: also composed basically of Muslim Khmers. Its units operated in the Kampot area (MR-2) and in Kompong Cham (MR-1).

8th Inf. Brigade: composed of volunteers from the provinces of Takeo and Kandal. It was based in the border area of Takeo and Chau Doc (MR-2).

10th Inf. Brigade: activated in Siem Reap, then deployed to Kompong Thom (MR-4). Its units were stationed in Oudar Meachchey.

11th Inf. Brigade: activated with units stationed in Takeo (MR-2) and reinforced with volunteers from Kandal and Takeo. It defended Takeo and Route No. 5.

12th Inf. Brigade: activated exclusively with volunteers from Battambang and Siem Reap (MR-4). It defended Siem Reap.

13th Inf. Brigade: activated at Kompong Speu (MR-2) during this period, this brigade participated in the operation for the defense of Takeo-Angtasom. Later, it was redeployed permanently to Kompong Speu for the defense and protection of Route No. 4.

14th Inf. Brigade: based at Tram Khnar (MR-2) along with elements of the anti-aircraft artillery half-brigade. This brigade had been reconstituted after its defeat by enemy forces from Phuoc Long.⁴

The location of FANK units on 1 May 1970 are as shown on Map 2. The Military Regions are as shown on Map 3.

National Strategy

NVA forces easily countered the military efforts of the fledgling Khmer Armed Forces in the early months of the republic. A number of boldly conceived, poorly planned and poorly executed operations by FANK against VC and NVA units led eventually to operation CHENLA II and the demise of the FANK offensive spirit. "The presence of the U.S. Special Forces trained 'Mike Force' units of Cambodian origin and U.S. air support precluded the failure from deteriorating into a total rout."⁶

By default, the military objectives of Lon Nol operated as the GKR national strategy. It involved three phases:

Phase I: The retention and solidification of territory and population centers then under GKR control while building and training the armed forces.


Phase II: Spreading GKR control to all territory and population south of the Lon Nol Line (Map 4), a line which extends from the Thailand border generally along Route 6 and 7 to the Republic of Vietnam border, this phase also entailing the elimination of enemy and insurgency south of the line.

Phase III: Reconsolidation of the nation by moving north from the line to regain control of all GKR territory and total elimination of enemy forces and insurgency.


In conjunction with these broad military objectives was the objective of retaining a strong military force under the control of and loyal to Lon Nol.

Map 2. Location of FANK Infantry units on 1 May 1970.⁵


Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center for Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 44.



Map 3. The Military Regions of the Khmer Armed Forces in 1971.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 49.



Map 4. FANK Strategic Concepts for Defense of the Khmer Republic.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 68.



The United States missions position on the national strategy is described as follows:

It was the U.S. Mission position at the time, still considered valid, that with certain limitations related to the practicality of Phase III, the above strategy and the related concept of a strong central government should be supported. The rationale was that without strong central government, prospects for the survival of the GKR were not promising. There was no strong U.S. military presence to bolster the country during a period of political turmoil such as occurred in Vietnam during the mid-60's. The massive U.S. military and economic aid which held the NVA/VC in check until the political situation could be stabilized in RVN was not available to the GKR. Consequently, U.S. support to strong leadership and centralized control was considered essential. As events would show, strong leadership in the limited, feudalistic sense of a "grand patron" would be present but centralized control in the sense of impersonal, functioning governmental organizations responsive to national objectives was something that would evolve only painfully.⁷

By 1974 the strategy was reduced to the purely reactive-defensive effort required to achieve a modicum of phase I. While moderately ambitious offensive plans were discussed, none were implemented, and national survival became the national strategy. The means to that end were conceived to be demonstrable control of the national capitol and provincial capitals south of the "Lon Nol Line", and some workable system of lines of communication between them.

This strategy of survival was particularly important for external consumption. That is, apparent control and palpable success as a government were mandatory in the GKR's quest for continued recognition on the international scene, particularly the all-important political battle to save the GKR's United Nations seat in September-October, 1974. Demonstrable survival was also a key to the continuing struggle for continuation of United States military and economic assistance in the amounts required to sustain it.

Light Infantry Force

Early actions taken by MEDTC were aimed at reorganizing FANK to support the above GKR strategy within the predetermined light infantry concept. A study was made to identify, from within the mass of existing FANK units, those organizations that appeared most effective and to use them as the basis for a streamlined, more realistic force structure of 220,000 personnel. Standardized TO&E's were developed, distributed and used as the basis for issue of more modern equipment.

The imposed objective was the creation of an unsophisticated light infantry force with some light artillery but no tanks. It was never intended that this force would be able to operate independently against NVA main force units. When and if it did, it would be in conjunction with regular South Vietnamese units and with the support of both SVN and United States air power. The primary purpose of the force was to combat the "Khmer Insurgents." That such "insurgents" might one day evolve into main force units in their own right, thus requiring a rethinking of the "light infantry concept", was a possibility never fully addressed within the parameters and limitations of MAP and prescribed United States Mission objectives.

Though not the most significant, this initial premise is one of the reasons for FANK's subsequent mediocre performance.

During July 1972, a force structure coordinating committee, made up of members from FANK and MEDTC, agreed on the following force structure for FANK ground units:

Infantry Brigades:	32
Infantry Battalions:	202
Territorial Infantry Companies:	465

Within the above totals, 128 of the battalions formed the maneuver elements for the 32 brigades, of which 20 were independent and 12 were organized into 4 separate divisions with appropriate supporting arms, i.e., a 155-mm field artillery battery and an armored cavalry squadron. Each of the brigades was to have an organic 105-mm howitzer battery. In addition, separate artillery and armored brigade rounded out the combat elements of the force structure. The bulk of the army's 202,000-man slice of the MAP-approved FANK force structure of 220,000 personnel was located within the above units.

Implementation

The implementation of the GKR strategy and reorganization of FANK was described as follows:

There were no illusions that the mere enunciation of a national strategy, or the reorganization and streamlining of the FANK force structure, would be sufficient for the conduct of the war. The GKR and FANK would have to effect a transition from concept to implementation. It did not happen. The GKR and FANK proved unable to fully marshal their resources. The result was that throughout 1972 and 1973, the initiative belonged to the enemy. He not only dominated the countryside by default, but proceeded to cut the GKR's vital lines of communication. FANK lost Route 1 in the spring of 72. Route 2 went in the early summer of 73 followed by Routes 6-7 late that summer. It was not until 1973 that FANK began to demonstrate some ability to establish priorities and reallocate forces based on operational objectives. The planned reorganization of FANK began to take hold at this time. The equipment for constituting the divisions arrived, and the forces to form the infantry intervention brigades were designated and standardized in terms of organization, equipment and command structure. The successful defense of Phnom Penh in August 73 can be

attributed primarily to U.S. Air force firepower and the defense put up by the four newly formed divisions and two of the intervention brigades. Air power destroyed the attacking KC's ability to sustain an offensive with mass. The remaining enemy did not have the will or the capability to continue an offensive drive prior to the rainy season. FANK's defense of Kompong Cham later in the fall was made possible by rapid movement of four intervention brigades, newly arrived C-123's and the initiative of the Khmer Navy. The latter half of 1973 also saw the FANK command and control structure continue to evolve and provide a degree of effective control to its forces in the field. Central to this control was the establishment of a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) in mid 1973 and an Artillery Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) in August 1973 and their integration with the FANK Operations Center in a single, Combat Operations Center (COC). These steps were only taken when FANK was essentially restricted to a perimeter defense of Phnom Penh, having conceded the initiative elsewhere throughout the country.⁸

Analysis

The failure of the GKR and its armed forces to successfully implement a national strategy was described in MG Cleland's (Chief, MEDTC, 1972-1974) End of Tour Report:

Three factors underlie the failure of the Cambodian government and its armed forces to successfully implement a national strategy over the past two years. The first was the previously alluded to premise that a light infantry force would prove adequate for the threat facing the GKR. The second involves the manner in which U.S. policy in Cambodia was implemented. Both of these factors are discussed in the succeeding section on U.S. policy. The third and perhaps most significant factor is the nature of Cambodian society itself and FANK as a reflection of that society.⁹

Later, in BG Palmer's (Chief, MEDTC, 1974-1975) End of Tour Report, an analysis of FANK is described as follows:

During the period covered by the report, considerable progress was achieved in many areas of the Khmer military establishment. On several occasions during 1974, the Khmer Army properly employed its significant engagements. The

performance of armor units was particularly outstanding demonstrating the effectiveness of U.S. training on a segment of the Khmer officer corps.

KAF, for its part, developed into a thoroughly competent tactical air force capable of effective close air support which further increased FANK's overall firepower, while providing an ever-increasing tactical airlift capability, as well. KAF has maintained at or near its authorized strength and benefited by a constant infusion of U.S.-trained pilots and maintenance personnel. Increased strike and transport sortie rates throughout 1974 reflected its growing capability, but it was understandably never able to completely replace the firepower provided by the USAF prior to August, 1973.

The most critical element of the MNK, its thoroughly professional riverine forces, although finally decimated and immobilized by a superior enemy ground force dominating the river banks, nonetheless provided, for a considerable period, security of the Mekong River lifeline. In addition, the MNK progressed markedly as a self-sustaining force, capable of conducting independent supply, maintenance and training activities. On the other hand, the BFM's suffered from extremely weak leadership and were poorly trained.

In spite of the many improvements achieved, there existed severe debilities in the FANK war-fighting effort which continued to resist all efforts at correction or amelioration. These problems finally combined to bring about the defeat of the Armed Forces and contributed to the collapse of the GKR.¹⁰

There is no doubt that FANK made some progress in implementing the national strategy. However, progress was too slow and some problems too profound for early resolution. In order to understand the Khmer armed forces, it is necessary to understand the Khmer soldier.

The Khmer Soldier

General Palmer's End of Tour Report describes the Khmer soldier as follows:

The soldier was a sturdy, rugged fighter who thrived on adverse living conditions and danger. These fine soldierly qualities are well known to those American officers who served with Khmer units in Vietnam, most of whom place the Khmer foot soldier far above the Lao and at least on a par with the

Vietnamese. It is a tribute to this soldier that units of the Khmer Republic's Army lasted as long as they did under some of the poorest leadership in Asia. Despite the flagrant absence of their officers during critical actions, the failure of their top leadership to even visit them or recognize their heroic deeds, the long periods that they and their families went without pay or even food because of their officer's incompetence or dishonesty, and the unimaginative tactics that they were ordered to execute, Khmer foot soldiers continued to fight for their country until defeat was inevitable. The KC leadership proved the Khmer soldier capable of well-executed night attacks and, as a normal course, demonstrated the ability to avoid or withstand superior firepower. 11

Training

The basic training course of six weeks duration was too short. MEDTC's position was that eight weeks should be the minimum. Too much of the training was devoted to political indoctrination and formal instruction, too little was devoted to practical firing exercises, care and cleaning of equipment, patrolling (day and night), combat training of the individual soldier, field fortification, and other practical work. As a result, the soldier was generally inadequately prepared for his tasks on the battlefield, leading to high casualties and early desertion. NCO and officer training was also slanted toward the theoretical rather than the practical. The Khmer Republic's military leadership also failed to devise, or implement to the degree necessary, their own training plan, and failed to correct deficiencies noted on the battlefield by their own and MEDTC inspectors. (As the United States was prohibited from advising FANK units, MEDTC devised End Item Utilization Inspections - E.I.U.I.'s for the purpose of evaluating the use of United States equipment by FANK in the field. This placed United States officers in daily contact with FANK combat units. Suggestions were

often given to FANK on how to best employ the equipment.) In addition, many basic trainees only received three-four weeks training and NCO courses were always undersubscribed. Combined arms training was non-existent. Selection of Khmer students to receive United States or Thai training was poor and FANK collusion often led to selection of the favored few. Efforts by United States officers to improve FANK training programs was consistently frustrated by high-level apathy on the part of the Director General of Instruction and his staff.

The most effective training program was that conducted in South Vietnam by the United States Special Forces - The United States Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (U.I.T.G.).

USARV Individual Training Group

The United States Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (U.I.T.G.) was established by USARV and MACV jointly on 24 February 1971, and was tasked to train battalion-size Khmer units at training camps located within South Vietnam. A total of four training camps existed, each being designated a training battalion. They were:

- (1) Long Hai Training Battalion (LHTB), U.I.T.G.
(24 February 1971 - 30 November 1972)
- (2) Phuoc Thuy Training Battalion (PTTB), U.I.T.G.
(24 February 1971 - 30 November 1972)
- (3) Chi Lang Training Battalion (CLTB), U.I.T.G.
(24 February 1971 - 1 September 1971)
- (4) Dong Ba Thinh Training Battalion (DBTTB), U.I.T.G.
(24 February 1971 - 30 November 1972)

The headquarters for U.I.T.G. was located at Bien Hoa, utilizing the former Company A Headquarters of the 5th Special Forces Group. The first

commander of U.I.T.G. was LTC Edwards Rybat. He was later succeeded by Colonel John V. Hemler.

Within each camp the United States Special Forces were organized into the standard twelve-man A-detachment, each detachment being responsible for the training of a Khmer battalion. The majority of United States personnel were Special Forces qualified and wore the United States Special Forces unit insignia and Green Beret with the Khmer Republic insignia (flash) affixed to the beret. They were not assigned to a United States Special Forces Group; however, served in a special forces duty position and were entitled to parachute (hazardous duty) pay.

Khmer battalions were transported from Pochentong airfield outside of Phnom Penh to the respective training camp on United States C-130 aircraft. In the case of Long Hai, all aircraft arrived at Vung Tau, where the Khmer units were met by the designated Special Forces Detachment. Movement to Long Hai was via military convoy.

Upon arrival at the training battalion, all of the Khmer soldiers were given physical examinations prior to commencing equipment issue and training. The leaders of the battalion (Battalion Commander, battalion staff members, Company Commanders and designated officers and NCO's) were sent to the training camp two weeks prior to the units arrival to receive leadership training. Upon the units arrival they would rejoin their unit and participate in training.

Equipment issued to each battalion included fatigue uniforms, field equipment and the following new weapons:

- . M-16 Rifle
- . 1911A1 .45 caliber pistols

- . M1919A6 .30 caliber machine guns
- . 60mm mortars (3 per company)
- . 81mm mortars (3 per battalion)
- . M72 LAWS (light antitank weapons)
- . M18 claymore mines
- . M79 40mm grenade launchers

All funding came from MAP Cambodia. The training cycle, which lasted 13 weeks, included individual weapons training, squad, platoon, company and battalion level training. The program was very rigid and concluded with company and battalion field operations against VC/NVA in the areas of operations close to the training camps. The first company operation lasted approximately six days, while battalion operations lasted approximately twelve days. The Special Forces detachment was given responsibility to develop the situation in each exercise based on the enemy situation. Patrolling, ambushes, raids, company and battalion defensive operations were conducted. Enemy contact became more frequent and resulted in large contacts in some cases, to include two Khmer battalions against a VC/NVA Main Force regiment (333d NVA MFR) in April 1972.

The U.I.T.G. program was also unique in that the program was conducted with the assistance of Australian (Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam-AATTV) and New Zealand Special Air Service and airborne personnel, the United States Special Forces counterparts. Additional United States Special Forces teams from the 1st Special Forces Group (Okinawa) supplemented the U.I.T.G./FANK personnel on a temporary duty status.

Following completion of a training cycle, the Khmer battalions were issued a basic load of Class V (ammunition) and returned to Phnom Penh aboard United States C-130 aircraft.

On 15 May 1972 U.I.T.G. was redesignated FANK (Forces Armee Nationale Khmer) Training Command, Army Advisory Group, Vietnam (AAGV). FANK Training Command remained active until 30 November 1972.

In accordance with the Cooper-Church Amendment (January 1971), United States advisors were prohibited from advising Khmer units in Cambodia. The U.I.T.G./FANK Training Command program enabled "the mountain to come to Mohammed, since Mohammed could not go to the mountain."

As each training camp was capable of training 3-5 Khmer battalions simultaneously, the U.I.T.G./FANK training Program in South Vietnam resulted in the training of seventy-eight Cambodian battalions.

Types of units included the basic light infantry battalions, airborne battalions and Khmer Special Forces. Additionally, several MNK (Marine Nationale Khmer) - Marine units, received training at the training centers in South Vietnam. United States Marine Corps personnel were assigned to the respective camps to assist with this training.

USARV U.I.T.G./FANK Training Command also were tasked with the requirement to organize, reequip and train Vietnamese Armed Forces units which had been badly mauled in the Spring 1972 Offensive, forming Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) which trained over sixty Vietnamese battalions. See Annex C, U.I.T.G./FANK Training Command Meritorious Unit Commendation which describes the U.I.T.G./FANK Training Command Program.

Training - In-Country

As 1972 progressed and United States forces continued to draw down in Vietnam, it became evident that RVN, faced with providing its own military defense, would require full use of Vietnamese training

facilities in support of their own armed forces. In fact, following the NVA 1972 Easter Offensive, FANK/U.I.T.G. personnel in South Vietnam were additionally tasked to provide Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) to train numerous RVN forces which strained their capability.

Consequently, in anticipation of a drastic reduction in Khmer training in SVN, GKR with MEDTC support and assistance developed and began execution of a plan to expand the Khmer in-country recruit and unit training capability. The result was the expansion and improvement of the two existing training centers and the establishment of four additional training centers. A realignment of training center missions was accomplished to provide for basic combat training for Khmer recruits, NCO upgrade training and unit training for battalions and regional infantry companies. Construction of new facilities was underway by mid-1972, however, progress was slow as the wet season began and FANK command emphasis waned somewhat. As it turned out, this move toward enhancing in-country capability was a fortunate move. By the January 1973 cease fire agreement in Vietnam which precluded all Khmer training in that country, GKR individual and unit training capability had been established and was expanding, although slowly.

The following is an extract from MG Cleland's End of Tour Report describing aspects of the training program:

By late 1972, minimal progress in service school and training facility improvement had been achieved, when negotiations underway to establish a Vietnam cease fire indicated that successful conclusion of these negotiations was dependent in part, on the cessation of Khmer training in RVN. With only a rudimentary training base in-country, it became obvious that GKR would require another source for an extension out-of-country training program. Consequently, GKR successfully negotiated with RTG (Royal Thai Government) for a drastic increase in training to

be accomplished in Thailand. Prior to this time, some unit training (non-MAP supported) had been underway in Thailand, but now MAP supported Thai training would become the primary source of quality individual training. Because the Thai training would require extensive MAP funding, the number of units/individuals to be trained would be drastically reduced from that programmed for training in RVN. Thai training would be subject to course costs, ammunition costs, living allowances, and, in the case of KAF training, provision of aircraft and associated equipment, training would be conducted by the Thai's in their own service schools, or by U.S. MTT's/units in Thailand. Decision as to who would conduct training and where, would be the responsibility of RTG. Normally, if the training capability for a specific skill was available in the Thai training base, training would be conducted by the Thais and paid for by MAP-CB. If the Thais did not have the capability to provide requested training, or if the numbers to be trained were so small that it would be uneconomically feasible to conduct a course in the Thai training base, training would then be conducted by U.S. MTT's, formed or called forward for a specific program, or by U.S. units in Thailand through OJT programs. Costs for U.S. conducted training would be supported by MAP-CB, but would be less costly than Thai conducted training. For KAF pilot training, Det 1, 56 SOWG at Udorn, MAP-CB/KAF would provide aircraft, and pay associated maintenance and logistics support costs in addition to student living allowances.

The Thai training program started in earnest in early 1973 as training initially programmed for RVN was diverted to Thailand. Twenty-nine courses in one or more increments were scheduled in the Thai service schools. An extensive program of T-28 pilot and aircraft maintenance skills was started at Udorn. USARSUPTHAI scheduled an OJT program for small groups of students in various logistic and maintenance skills. Two USAF MTT's in Thailand provided combat crew training for UH-1H gunship crews and crew and maintenance training for AU-24 crews and maintenance personnel. A third USAF MTT was called forward to provide air crew and maintenance training for the C-123K aircraft which were programmed into the KAF inventory. This MTT would train the KAF crews on their own aircraft, then provide C-123K transition training for the RTAF. The USARPACINTA MTT, located in Bangkok would provide intelligence training in four different skills. Due to the scheduled Thai student load at the Thai artillery school and the smaller number of Khmer students to be trained, a U.S. MTT from Fort Sill was called forward to provide training for 12 FANK 105 Howitzer MTT's and the cadre for 2 FANK 155 Howitzer batteries. The Khmer 105 Howitzer MTT's would return to GKR and provide upgrade/refresher training for 105 Howitzer batteries in their combat positions. The 155 Howitzer cadres would provide the nucleus for newly formed

artillery batteries programmed for accelerated delivery later in the year as the much talked about USAF bombing halt became a reality.

The CONUS training program paralleled the rapid expansion of the Thai program in 1973 and will maintain the 1973 level during the years 1974 and 1975. This program was originally designed as a source of high quality personnel to provide badly needed leadership and to assist in upgrading the in-country training base. As a result of an increasing level of hostilities and the infusion of additional equipment to replace firepower lost with the cessation of U.S. Air Force support, most of the CONUS students returning from the FY 72 and early FY 73 programs were diverted to fill operational positions in committed units. This trend has begun to subside and as of late 1973, increasing numbers of CONUS trained officers are being assigned to positions where they can effectively contribute to the in-country training program.

The CONUS program is keyed to three critical functions: Planning, Selection of the Best Qualified Candidates, and Language Training. All three areas have shown significant improvement during the past two years. A major breakthrough was achieved in the planning function by increasing the role of MEDTC liaison officers to FANK in-country branch oriented schools and technical support activities. These officers were actively initiated into the training program as an additional channel to that between the MEDTC training branch and the Director General of Instruction (D.G.I.) of FANK. This overcame the greatest obstacle in both the accurate determination of training requirements and the selection of the most professionally qualified officers, the lack of communications between the DGI and the various branch and activity coordinators. As activity chiefs became more aware of the quality and variety of training available, they increased communications and put pressure on the DGI to react to the "needs of the users." Three major benefits have evolved from this concept. (1) The DGI is becoming more effective in dealing with MEDTC, in that it is receiving sufficient information from FANK to develop effective programs. (2) The DGI is becoming more effective in dealing with FANK as closer ties are established with each activity in working out training requirements and (3) The renewed interest of branch and activity coordinators in the training program has resulted in a more careful selection of professionally qualified candidates.

English language qualification has remained a key function in the CONUS training program and rapid progress is being made toward the goal of achieving a complete in-country capability for candidates in all services. Since the establishment of a 40 position language laboratory in 1972, the Defense Language Institute has developed the capability of bringing candidates

to ECL 80. The two branch 20 position language laboratories at Khmer Navy Headquarters and at the Air Force Training Facility at Battambang, established in the middle of calendar year 1973, should achieve this level with the completion of the FY 75 language instructor training program at Lackland AFB. Two additional 20 position language laboratories are due in-country late spring calendar year 1974. These will alleviate the current problem of insufficient capacity of the Language Institute and its branches, and will finalize material needs for the institute less books and maintenance. To insure this goal is maintained, once achieved, a continued program of CONUS training in the Language Instructor and the Instructor Refresher Course must be pursued.

As 1973 progressed, the enemy threat increased and the advent of a USAF bombing halt loomed in the horizon, it became obvious that FANK forces would require increased combat power to fill the void created by the cessation of USAF firepower. Accelerated deliveries of equipment programmed for entry into the Khmer inventory were requested and approved. The impending arrival of this equipment required an intense effort to accelerate the supporting training programs. Det 1, 56 SOWG at Udorn increased input to their ongoing T-28 combat crew and maintenance training programs. The U.S. Army 70th Aviation Detachment at Don Muang RTAFB, Bangkok, provided combat upgrade training for UH-1H pilots and crews. The 105 Howitzer MTT (U.S.) in Thailand suddenly shifted gears and became a 155 Howitzer MTT, as previously mentioned.

In the meantime, in-country schools geared up to provide training within their capabilities so that FANK could absorb this new equipment with the least possible delay in making it operational in the field. Accelerated deliveries of aircraft, M113 armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, vehicles, and river craft for the Khmer Navy in addition to the increasing combat losses strained the in-country training base.

With the onset of the wet season, immediately following the bombing halt in mid-August, FANK enjoyed a slight battlefield breather. However, it was obvious that the following dry season starting about mid-December, would require FANK to make preparations. Attempts to increase recruiting were not enjoying success and after one false start, a national conscription influx of new troops, some emphasis was placed on upgrading facilities at the six national basic training centers in operation by this time. The new troops faced primitive living conditions, lackadaisical cadre at some training centers and a lack of command interest. However, as the AWOL and sickness rates in some training centers increased, the GKR finally realized that the training centers were the key to the survivability of the GKR and that something had to be done. Money previously allocated

for training center construction was released, security forces at some training centers were increased, barrier materiel was provided (not to keep the enemy out, but to assist in keeping the recruits in), medical support improved, two camp commanders were changed and a reorganization of the office of the Director General of Instruction with attendant removal of certain ineffective personalities resulted in improvements in training center facilities and operation. By December the training centers were operating at near capacity, in some cases AWOL and sickness rates had reduced, and quality of training had improved. Some new barracks, mess facilities and training support facilities had been completed or were underway.

On the other hand, progress at service schools was much slower. Most schools, of necessity, are located within the Phnom Penh perimeter in more or less temporary facilities. Classrooms are make-shift in many cases, but serviceable. Equipment to support training many times is diverted to combat units to replace combat losses. Cadre improvement is slow, but as personnel complete training in CONUS and Thailand, small numbers are provided to service schools as instructor personnel. The impact of these personnel on the quality of training is beginning to become apparent as the qualifications of school graduates are beginning to show improvement. Training management at the service schools and training centers continues to improve as more experience is gained in scheduling, conducting and supporting a variety of courses at the schools.

Unfortunately, training management at the national level (Director General of Instruction) shows little improvement. The Khmer personnel in DGI do not understand the principles of projecting and programming training requirements. One of the most important aspects of training management, a system of skill identification of trained assets, is completely lacking. Without a skill identifier (MOS) system centrally controlled at national level, projecting training requirements is extremely difficult, if not impossible. There is currently no method to identify trained personnel by skill category or to insure that the problem, a system of mandatory quotas or "levies" was being used to fill school courses, both in and out of country. Within this system little attention was given to the needs of the unit and personnel were being trained in skills that their parent units did not need. However, personnel completing training were being returned to their parent units whether the newly acquired skills could be utilized or not. This system has finally been abolished and personnel levied for training are being drawn from and returned to units requiring the skills to be learned.

Contributing to the problem of skill training is the lack of a program of Advanced Individual Training (AIT) following basic combat training. The training centers are not presently staffed

to conduct AIT, therefore basic skill training must be provided by the service schools, unit OJT or through third country training. Since there is no system of aptitude testing, and no way at national level to identify training requirements by skill, personnel received by the units are basic combat soldiers only. Advanced individual training is a unit responsibility through OJT or service school courses. The establishment of an AIT program would relieve unit commanders of this responsibility and enhance unit effectiveness by providing the units with personnel trained in a needed basic skill. However, establishment of such a system is complicated and time consuming and should be deferred until the intensity of hostilities decreases significantly. To function properly, such a system would require a program of skill identification, aptitude testing, personnel resource inventory by skill and improved force structure planning. The Khmers are not ready for this degree of sophistication at the present time.

Prior to the VN peace accords, MEDTC staff maintained an element in RVN and a forward element in GKR to effect coordination of activities associated with RVN training. When training was moved to Thailand, the RVN element was dissolved and a MEDTC Liaison Office (one OFF; one EM) under the staff supervision of CHMAD was established with MACTHAI (J-34) in Bangkok. Primary mission of this office is to coordinate all Khmer training in Thailand with MACTHAI, FANK Liaison Office in Bangkok, and the Thai Supreme Command. This office also is responsible for accomplishing twice-a-month living allowance payments to all Khmer students and Khmer support personnel (interpreters, translators, clerks, etc.) in Thailand. In addition, this office coordinates all administrative support and provides assistance to Khmer students going to or returning from CONUS or other third country (Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, etc.) training sites as they pass through Bangkok. As the Thai program built up and the CONUS program increased, it became obvious that this office was understaffed. Consequently, a JTD position for an additional liaison officer (USAF) at Udorn was established and a temporary-hire civilian secretary was hired for the LNO office in Bangkok. These four individuals supported by one Thai driver and one vehicle and augmented by one Khmer/English/Thai interpreter are capable of accomplishing their assigned missions.

At MEDTC Headquarters, the staff element responsible for effecting all necessary coordination and administration associated with the MAP-CB training program is the Training Assurance Branch of the Management Assurance Division. This Branch consists of a Branch Chief (Army) three Army, one Air Force and one Navy training officer. It is responsible for monitoring all in-country training and training facilities, coordinating and administering all out-of-country training supported by MAP-CB and effecting direct coordination with the office of the training officials of the separate Khmer services. In addition this Branch must coordinate

constantly with appropriate elements of MEDTC-LOG and MEDTC-P&P concerning equipment deliveries (school and training center support equipment as well as unit equipment), force structure actions and MAP-CB training program funds, all impacting on Khmer training. At present the Branch is augmented by training visits by other MEDTC staff officers responsible for monitoring the activities of their comparable Khmer basic branch service school.¹²

A statistical recap of GKR training completed under MAP Cambodia from 1970-1974 is at Table 1. Additional statistics included in the Annex include:

- . Status of Army training FY 74-FY 75 - Annex D.
- . In-country training data for FY 74-FY 75 - Annex E.

Conclusions

The existing in-country training capability did not quantitatively or qualitatively support the MAP-planned force structure. FANK needed to place a much greater emphasis and concerted effort to maximize training and strengthen its combat capability, especially during periods of low combat intensity.

Throughout the entire MAP Cambodia program FANK Headquarters (E.M.G.), DGI and commanders at all levels lacked interest in and failed to support the Khmer In-country Training Program with resultant disastrous effects on the battlefield.

The CONUS training program likewise had its failures, which include the following conclusions extracted from BG Palmer's End of Tour Report:

- a. The lack of long-range planning for training and the failure to consider force structure requirements and previously trained personnel seriously detracted from the development of annual training requirements of FANK. Additionally, ineffective and poorly timed tasking by DGI for input for the ensuing fiscal

Table 1.

Source: End of Tour Report. MG Cleland, p. H-1-1.

TRAINING RECAPITULATION

Following is a recapitulation of GKR training completed under MAP Cambodia since 1970:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NO. PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TYPE TRAINING</u>
Khmer Republic	18,611 23,001 37,797 22,051	37 Bn Size Units * 146 Co Size Units * Specialist Basic Combat
South Vietnam	39,975 31,441 12,118	85 Bn Size Units * 262 Co Size Units * Specialist
Thailand	2,460 4,224	20 Co Size Units * Specialist
Philippine Republic	102	Specialist
Republic of China	10	Specialist
CONUS	197	Specialist/Professional Development
	<hr/> 191,987	

* Training included basic combat training.

year's training program yielded a product that was not responsive to the true training needs of FANK.

b. The specified goal of CONUS and third country training was to enhance the capabilities for eventual FANK self-sufficiency in training. To accomplish this, Khmer personnel trained in CONUS should have been used to improve the Khmer training base. This was not accomplished to a satisfactory degree. One limiting factor was the dire need to keep all trained personnel in military units, particularly as the intensity of war increased.

c. Students returning from CONUS training, even when they were not to be utilized as instructors in the Khmer training system, were often inefficiently utilized. The offices of DGI did little to monitor - and even less to enforce the MAP-required utilization of trained personnel.

d. DGI did not place appropriate emphasis on student qualifications for CONUS training. DGI appeared more interested in filling a space than with identifying candidates with some background in a given field.

e. The parochial and uncooperative attitudes of the three services concerning language training sources proved to be inefficient and counterproductive. This in part contributed to the less-than-optimum results obtained from language training.

f. The late input of students from DGI, untrained and inexperienced language instructors, and the lack of native speakers all contributed to an approximate twelve percent ECL failure on the part of Army students at IMLE.

g. The course content of many of the CONUS courses to which Khmer students were sent was of questionable long- or short-term value.¹³

The numerous failures of the various FANK training programs were, for a great part, a direct reflection of the FANK leadership. The following section will look at FANK leadership and attempt to point out its weaknesses.

Leadership

The leadership of FANK varied greatly. To a great degree, leadership problems could be traced to the system used by Marshal Lon Nol, which frustrated United States efforts to improve leadership.

In order to maintain an objective view of FANK leadership, the following observations are extracted from MG Cleland's End of Tour Report:

Leadership begins at the top with Marshal Lon Nol. He is a political figure and uses the FANK for political as well as military ends. He insures that promotion and good assignments go to loyal officers, not all of whom are capable. He ignores normal staff procedures in many instances, going directly to officers whom he knows and trusts. Several officers may be tasked by the Marshal for a solution to the same staff problem. When major operations and in many cases minor operations are planned or underway, he has the commander or commanders involved report directly to him.

This proclivity of the Marshal to ignore the established command/staff system makes the development of an effective chain of command and a functioning staff at FANK EMG difficult if not impossible. Field commanders bypass the EMG or ignore EMG directives to the extent they believe their political affiliations will allow. This failure to recognize the authority of EMG is a serious problem. It impacts on personnel actions with unit commanders proselyting for personnel and forwarding incorrect and late reports; it impacts on the intelligence system since units fail to forward the intelligence information and commanders rely on their own private intelligence sources; it impacts on operations since it almost requires personal emphasis by the Marshal to get units out and aggressively moving; it impacts on logistics since the directives issued by the J-4, which if followed could alleviate many logistics problems, are often ignored. As a consequence the staff is frustrated and cautious and the commanders in the field castigate the staff in Phnom Penh for inactivity and lack of support.¹⁴

A year after General Cleland's report, BG Palmer's report reflects similar observation:

The unevenness of effective leadership throughout all levels of command, and at certain echelons, its total absence are unquestionably the prime determinants of GKR/FANK failure. Decision-making was highly centralized. Consequently, subordinates had little encouragement to exercise initiative and the normal process of developing leaders was severely inhibited. Moreover, established chains of command and staff relationships were more often than not bypassed, especially where important matters were concerned.

The Commander-in-Chief of FANK was also the Chief of Staff. His effectiveness as Armed Forces Commander (CINCFANK) was restricted by an unfortunate, but intentional, lack of rapport between the

military and civilian sectors of government. In addition, Marshal Lon Nol occasionally issued orders directly to field commanders, bypassing CINCFANK and EMG entirely. As a result, the general staff was constantly frustrated and cautious, while field commanders berated EMG for inactivity and lack of support. In addition, field commanders, many of whom owed their jobs directly to the Marshal, particularly the independent regional military commanders, ignored directives to the extent they believed politically expedient. CINCFANK was thus placed in the role of mediator and negotiator rather than Commander-in-Chief, all of which resulted in a time-consuming, cumbersome decision-making process at the highest levels of command.

At lower levels there was some notion of command, but none of leadership or management, except in isolated cases. Too few battalion and brigade commanders lived in the field with their units. Senior leaders and staffs seldom, if ever, visited units two echelons below. Unit leaders were quick to report that they ordered something to be done, but were at a loss to give any current status, since they rarely checked on the performance of a subordinate, a practice thought to be indicative of a lack of trust and confidence in the individual concerned.¹⁵

In summary, leadership varied greatly between units. Some units, the Airborne Brigade and mechanized units had excellent leadership. They were the exception. The rapid expansion of FANK in 1970 found FANK incapable of providing the required leadership. This lack of qualified leadership affected all of the services, and in particular the Khmer Infantry units. General Palmer's End of Tour Report provides an excellent description of the leadership problems in infantry units:

Expanded rapidly in 1970 from a small, inexperienced cadre, the Khmer infantry leadership initially received a large group of enthusiastic young leaders who joined to fight the VC/NVA. When the war had evolved into a civil war by 1974, the motivation for this group was removed and the burden of leadership fell on the pre-war officer, often ill-prepared, ill-trained, and not respected by the Khmer citizen, partially because of a FANK's reputation of corruption. No comprehensive leadership program was instituted to upgrade the quality of the officer corps. Promotion was secured by pre-war association and loyalties, while enemy leadership selection was evidently made based on combat success. The end result was a FANK infantry leadership cadre that was incapable of preventing desertion of its troops; incapable of executing a modicum of successful attacks against the

enemy despite overwhelming firepower and the presence of the fine, sturdy Khmer foot soldier; incapable of appealing to the Khmer citizen and obtaining the required popular support in order to defeat the KC; and finally, incapable of devising a system to improve its officer corps by purging its ranks. The Khmer infantry officers often were well to the rear during combat action or in some cases absent. They saw to their personal needs first and their troops second. A good example of this was that almost invariably, Khmer infantry units robbed ambulance jeeps for parts in order to keep the officers' personal jeeps running. Ingenuity among these officers was usually restricted to building their own office or quarters; battlefield tricks or successful ploys against the enemy were rare. The normal technique against the enemy was to use massive firepower and inch forward by day, while the Khmer Communist frequently achieved success in his night attacks.

The largest single problem created by corrupt practices in Khmer infantry units was the creation of "phantoms" in order for officers to gain additional funds for unit welfare, purchase of supplies and equipment and personal gain. At its worst, this practice presented the General Staff with seriously undermanned units, which were thought to be combat worthy. Notable examples were attacks on Kompong Chhang in October of 1974, Battambang in February 1975, and Siem Reap in January 1975, where woefully undermanned units were besieged by the KC. It must be kept in mind, however, that the GKR faced a 200-percent-plus yearly inflation, and, whereas an officer could afford a home and a car in 1971, he had to sell them in 1974 to feed his family unless he gained funds from sources other than his normal pay and allowances.¹⁶

The problems created by the "phantoms" never were resolved and as noted, created seriously undermanned units.

Force Structure

"The planned force structure objective of FANK was to achieve a balanced force of 220,000 MAP supported personnel out of a total Force Structure of 253,000. The remaining 33,000 personnel being in headquarters and operations units which would only receive payroll assistance.¹⁷

According to General Palmer's End of Tour Report the force structure had developed as follows by 1974:

By mid-1974, the force structure for a 220,000-man FANK force was complete, except for headquarters and support organizations above division level. Serious deficiencies existed

based on failure to provide necessary maintenance and logistic units, such as Direct Support Ordnance Companies, which were repeatedly thrown into shortfall because of funding constraints. Deviations from MAP-approved organizations did occur--such as creation of the 9th Division (Presidential Guard) despite strong MEDTC organizations--and resulted in diversion of personnel and equipment, thus weakening existing divisions. In addition, authorized and provisionally created headquarters were overstrength and were not MAP-supported, thereby reducing the effective strength of authorized combat and combat support units and reducing equipment (radios, etc.) available to them. A major deficiency was the failure of FANK to exercise effective manpower management; it was too late by the time a comprehensive program to examine the force structure was initiated in December 1974.¹⁸

A detailed description of FANK force structure, to include Army, Navy (MNK) and Air Force (KAF) is included in Annex F, Force Structure.

FANK's expansion was not without turmoil, particularly in its initial stages. FANK units which were properly led, along with their support and firepower superiority, proved to be more than an even match for the KC main force units. As an army, it excelled at only one thing - holding on and fighting after enemy initiatives had cornered it.

The following chapter will review the United States Military Assistance Program during the period 1971-1972.

CHAPTER FOUR

ENDNOTES

¹End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1972-1974, MG John R.D. Cleland, 20 February 1974, p. C-6.

²LTG Sak Sutsakhan, The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), pp. 36-37.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁶*Ibid.*, MG Cleland, p. 2.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁰End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1974-1975, BG William W. Palmer, 30 April 1975, pp. 4-5. A further detailed analysis of FANK problems and performance is included in this report.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. B-1.

¹²*Ibid.*, MG Cleland, pp. H-1 - H-6.

¹³*Ibid.*, BG Palmer, p. B-70.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, MG Cleland, pp. 5-6.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, BG Palmer, p. 5.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. B-17 - B-18.

¹⁷Ibid., MG Cleland, p. C-1.

¹⁸Ibid., BG Palmer, p. B-8.

CHAPTER FIVE

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE 1971-1972

Introduction

This chapter will discuss the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia during the period 1971-1972. It will focus on the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC), which was tasked with administering MAP Cambodia. Brigadier General Theodore C. Mataxis was Chief, MEDTC during this period. His End of Tour Report is the basis for all information contained in this chapter. Specific data is referenced to footnotes to direct the reader to the appropriate section of the End of Tour Report.

From its inception on 31 January 1971, MEDTC made excellent progress in establishing internal operating procedures to insure the performance of the many varied functions required in the execution of a Military Assistance Program for Cambodia. MEDTC was operating from two locations during this period - Saigon and Phnom Penh.

Progress was likewise made in coordinating the logistic operations which originated in Saigon. Responsibility for coordination of logistic functions was with the MEDTC Plans and Programs Division and Logistics Division, located in Saigon.

MEDTC was faced with the problem of establishing a viable transportation program for the movement of MAP cargo from its transshipment point in RVN to Phnom Penh. The following modes were established:

a. River Convoy.

This was the primary method of supply. The Mekong River Convoy was established as the water LOC in February 1971. It was initially comprised of Vietnamese Navy (VNN) LST's, but rapidly converted to barges provided by contract with the Alaska Barge and Transport Company with security provided by VNN and MNK river patrol craft. Bulk POL also was shipped on charter tankers via these convoys. "During the period February 1971 to 13 January 1973 a total of 67 barges were delivered to Phnom Penh."¹ Cargos consisted principally of munitions, barrier materials, bridging components and rolling stock. The number of convoys per month reached a peak of four each in April and July 1971 and maintained a mean of three each per month.

b. Water (Deep Draft).

A system test of the feasibility of using the port of Kompong Som, Cambodia as an alternate port of entry for MAP cargo was favorably conducted on 1 January 1972. The vessel "Transglobe", a United States time charter vessel, arrived at Kompong Som and discharged an initial increment of 25 M-35A2 vehicles (2½ ton trucks). Due to the success of this system test, a second, larger incremented delivery of 79 M-35A2 vehicles was scheduled and arrived 2 February 1972 aboard the same vessel. Kompong Som had been established as a viable port of entry.

c. Air.

Air became the secondary mode for MAP cargo delivery. In the initial stages it was primarily conducted utilizing Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) C-119 and C-123 aircraft with United States C-130 aircraft as backup. VNAF discontinued their service on 31 October 1971 and the entire aerial support mission (less air drop) was assumed by USAF C-130 aircraft.

"During the period February 1971 - 31 October 1971, VNAF flew a total of 801 sorties. USAF aircraft (C-130) during the February 1971 to 13 January 1972 period flew a total of 559 sorties with 78 of those missions coming after the cessation of the VNAF support. For comparison, during the month of October 1971, VNAF flew 88 sorties and USAF 19, in November, USAF aircraft as sole support flew 56 missions."2

d. Air Drop.

During the period February 1971 to January 1972, the USAF flew seven emergency aerial resupply missions in support of FANK field units engaged in combat. This system was utilized only after FANK exhausted all other means of resupply to include VNAF, which has primary "Vietnamization"

responsibility for providing this support. The number of VNAF resupply missions is unknown.

e. Military Airlift Command (MAC).

MEDTC used MAC Special Mission Airlift (SMAR) direct from CONUS to Phnom Penh for the first time in early January 1972. A total of seven missions were flown with a combined cargo of 36 105 mm howitzers, model M102.

f. Highway (motor convoy).

The highway mode was used to support MAP Cambodia requirements for a limited period. MAP purchased a total of 600, 7 ton, commercial trucks (International Harvester and Dodge) with 100 trailers from the Government of Australia (GOA). These vehicles were convoyed by highway from Vung Tau, RVN to Phnom Penh. The first convoy was conducted in April 1971, and the fifth and final increment in September 1971. All convoys were successfully completed without major incident. The cargo consisted of conex containers loaded with individual combat equipment and organic spare parts.

Port Operations Management

FANK improved steadily in the areas of vessel and aircraft off-loading. Aircraft remained on the ground the minimum time necessary to off-load, and FANK gained experience in discharge with aircraft as large as USAF C-141. Air cargo did not remain in the aerial port overnight under any circumstance, due to the vulnerability of the Khmer air base at Pochentong, which was subject to an enemy sapper attack in January 1971.

MEDTC undertook efforts to rectify the security problems following this attack. By coordinating with MACV/7th Air Force, MEDTC obtained the services of USAF "Red Horse" personnel in RVN (Air Force Engineer unit). A Red Horse team surveyed Pochentong, Ream and Battambang and drew up defensive plans for each. The plans showed layout of outer and inner perimeter barriers, gun posts, towers, lighting system, ramp expansion and revetments. From this survey, some improvements were made in the security of the KAF bases. Security forces to man the new defenses came from a Mobile Operation Battalion, which was trained and equipped by the U.I.T.G./FANK Training Program in RVN. This unit was transferred to the KAF and assigned to defend Pochentong. An additional battalion was equipped and trained in GKR to expand the Pochentong perimeter. Additional units were deployed to Ream and Battambang to relieve regional and general reserve units for their primary missions.

Highway convoy operations within Cambodia were successfully carried out utilizing the MAP provided United States vehicles and the MAP purchased commercial vehicles. Major main supply routes (MSR) in use by FANK on a regular basis were Route 4 (Kompong Som to Phnom Penh) and Route 5 (Battambang to Phnom Penh). As noted in General Mataxis' End of Tour Report, "the increased use of Route 4 as a MAP LOC will undoubtedly turn the attention of the enemy to Route 4, which can be easily blocked."³

Transshipment Thru Vietnam

Upon activation of MEDTC, the storage of MAP Cambodia general cargo was being performed by USARV (United States Army Vietnam) at USAD (United States Army Depot), Long Binh. Ammunition was also stored

in USARV facilities at Long Binh and Cam Ranh Bay. MEDTC operated a small warehouse at Tan Son Nhut Air Base which was used to stage cargo for air shipment.

On 27 April 1971, USARV notified MEDTC that as of 1 September 1971, the United States Army could no longer support the storage and local haul of MAP Cambodia supplies nor the deprocessing of MAP vehicles received in Vietnam. MEDTC recommended and CINCPAC concurred in obtaining contractual services to assume these functions.

Vinnell Corporation was awarded the contract and as of 1 September 1971, operated the 29,000 foot Long Binh warehouse; the 4,000 square foot Tan Son Nhut warehouse and provided local haul services using three S&P trailers and two 5 ton flatbeds, deprocessed MAP vehicles received in Vietnam, and provided a port representative at Newport Army Terminal, South Vietnam. The Long Binh Depot provided approximately 10,000 square feet of refrigerated storage space.

The assumption of these functions by a civilian contractor gave MEDTC closer control of the MAP cargo being received in Vietnam and destined for Cambodia.

When the contract was initiated, all Army cargo was taken to Long Binh and received into stock. All Navy and Air Force cargo by-passed the warehouse and was sent directly to Cambodia. Permission was eventually obtained from the Inventory Control Center to use various unit identifier codes to indicate various depots in Cambodia. The Army cargo was then able to by-pass the warehouse and go directly in-country. This was a major improvement in the "throughput" system. It enabled the warehouse personnel to concentrate on storing items that should be stored instead

of throughput. "The magnitude involved was indicated in the growth of line items stored from 329 lines to 890 lines over a two month period."⁴

Use of Excess

The MEDTC Long Supply and Excess Section made substantial strides in using established excess programs to provide material for MAP Cambodia. The major excess programs used were MIMEX, MAPEX and PAMEX/SIMEX. Through use of MIMEX (Major Item Excess), a program in which major items are obtained from world wide sources, MEDTC received \$17 million in property for Cambodia during the 1971-72 period. "Included in this were over \$5 million in various aircraft, \$6 million in weapons and \$4 million in ammunition."⁵ Through the use of MAPEX (Military Assistance Program Excess), a program in which excess property was made available from Southeast Asia agencies, MEDTC acquired over \$5 million in property for MAP Cambodia. Included in this figure was over \$3 million in individual equipment. To facilitate this program, teams consisting of one United States Army and five FANK personnel were located at each of four property disposal offices in South Vietnam. Through the use of PAMEX (Pacific Area Excesses), a program which enabled MAP countries to use the PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA), MEDTC became eligible for distribution of many classes of excess property which were reported to PURA by DOD agencies within the Pacific Command. The above major excess programs proved to be a valuable source of material for MAP Cambodia.

MEDTC Relationships With Other Agencies

MEDTC (FWD) functioned as a member of the Country Team in the American Embassy, Phnom Penh. MEDTC additionally was required to

coordinate with other United States agencies in the conduct of MAP Cambodia. These included MACV, Office of the Defense Attache, Phnom Penh, USAAG (United States Security Assistance Group), USMAC THAI (United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand) as well as the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Contacts with DOD and JCS were normally accomplished through CINCPAC. A detailed description of MEDTC's relations with other agencies is at Annex F. MEDTC additionally realized the need of cooperation between South Vietnam and Cambodia, and consequently on 15 January 1971 the Tripartite Deputies were established to foster and encourage cooperation between RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces), FANK and MACV. This high level group was originally staffed by the Deputy Commanders of RVNAF, FANK, and MACV. Prior to the Vietnam cease fire, meetings were held in Saigon. Effective with the cease fire, however, Deputy COMUSSAG/7th AF was nominated to lead the delegation and the location of the meetings was shifted to Phnom Penh. Chief MEDTC was a key participant of all deputies' meetings.

Despite traditional ethnic animosities, cooperation between the South Vietnamese and the Khmer within the framework of the Tripartite Deputies' Working Group and associated study groups increased significantly. Outgrowths of the Tripartite Deputies' meetings included a series of cooperative efforts between FANK and RVNAF to include combined operations of Mekong River convoys, combined tactical operations joining RVNAF and FANK ground forces in securing lines of communication, RVNAF support of FANK with close air support, tactical helicopter troop lifts, aerial resupply missions, artillery fire support, exchanging of liaison teams and training programs. The fact that the Mekong River LOC was

strongly contested by the enemy but never denied to the GKR until the final year of the war is an important achievement and represents proof of the success of Tripartite.

With the passage of time, the role of the United States in Tripartite shifted from that of leader to that of active participant. This was consistent with the desires of both the Departments of State and Defense.

Significant Accomplishments

During the period 1971-1972 the primary accomplishment was the successful application of the Nixon Doctrine to achieve United States goals and objectives in Cambodia. With a minimal use of United States manpower, the Khmer Armed Forces were trained and equipped sufficiently for the Khmer Republic to maintain its independence. Elements of four VC/NVA divisions were diverted from South Vietnam to protect Communist base camps and lines of communication. VC/NVA manpower, ammunition and material were also diverted to and expended in Cambodia with a corresponding degrading of their capability to attack and harass United States and GVN forces in Vietnam. These actions all facilitated Vietnamization and met the United States short term objective. The GKR, however, lost some of its finest units and equipment. Following this period, FANK was forced to rebuild and reequip units.

Working primarily through the Tripartite Deputies Group, regional cooperation was fostered between the GVN and GKR.

Throughout the period, the lines of communication were maintained open to a degree that no real crisis developed in either the supply of

military hardware and supplies or the flow of goods for the civilian sector. The Mekong LOC was operated without interruption and the land convoys operated along Routes 1, 4, and 5 with only intermittent, infrequent and minor delays.

The training and equipping of combat units in RVN continued at a rapid pace, with the majority of MAP trained battalions performing well in combat and becoming the backbone of the FANK combat capability. The training and equipping of other combat support and combat service support units progressed well during this period. Progress was also evident in the FANK school system and training centers.

Coordination of all activities associated with MAP Cambodia was in itself a significant accomplishment. As stated by General Mataxis in his End of Tour Report:

Notable success has been attained in coordinating the activities of all parties concerned in the execution of the Cambodian MAP program. Keep in mind that many actions involved three countries; the U.S., the GKR and either the GVN or the RTG and as usual many U.S. agencies. To closely coordinate all U.S. agency actions, the country team meets weekly in formal session to discuss military security affairs. Likewise weekly and at times daily coordination meetings are held with high level FANK officials to coordinate the execution of the Military Assistance Program.⁶

General Mataxis' recommendations for MAP Cambodia included the following:

1. MAP Procedures

A major constraint in the execution of the Military Assistance Program for Cambodia is the relative inflexibility of MAP procedures under wartime conditions. Changes in the tactical situation and intensity of combat with resulting changes in requirements, often urgent, cannot be rapidly executed by the normal MAP procedures. Although CINCPAC and DOD have made prodigious efforts to process changing Cambodian requirements, emergency approval and dissemination of funding authority

routinely exceeds six weeks before supply action can be initiated. Then long leadtimes and pipeline shipping times incur further delays.

Some provisions should be made in MAP procedures to designate MAP countries at war with institute special procedures for their support. These procedures should include limited authority to:

- a. Requisition items not listed in the MASL.
- b. Requisition items not programmed and approved by DOD before the fact and,
- c. Purchase items through offshore sources.

This limited authority should be delegated so that a rapid response can be made to urgent military requirements and to minor requirements when a speedy response will have a psychological or morale impact.

2. French Language Requirement

The requirement for personnel assigned to MEDTC FWD to be qualified in French should be deemphasized. Although the French language is important to U.S. officers in Cambodia, the technical competence and professionalism of assigned personnel continue to be paramount. In the past, individuals have been assigned to MEDTC who were expertly fluent in French but did not have the requisite experience in technical matters. It is important to have individuals assigned who can act as interpreters both in French and Khmer; the remainder of the personnel require only limited French and technical competence of assigned people should be of primary concern.

3. Combined Planning

Within the context of the Nixon Doctrine and considering the constraints of an extremely small U.S. contingent, planning documents specially the MAP plan should be releaseable to the host country. This release must be sanitized and certainly must include caveats that the final plan will be dependent on congressional action. For the host country to execute their portion of the plan effectively, the plan to toto must be a combined product to include considerations of force structure, deferral priorities and material requirements.⁷

The following chapter will review the first two years of the war, providing a review of critical military operations which directly related to the survival of the GKR, the United States' Vietnamization effort and the Military Assistance Program in Cambodia.

CHAPTER FIVE

ENDNOTES

¹End of Tour Report, MEDTC, General T.C. Mataxis, 12 February 1972, p. I-8.

²Ibid., p. I-8.

³Ibid., p. I-9.

⁴Ibid., p. I-6.

⁵Ibid., p. I-6.

⁶Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁷Ibid., pp. 5-6.

CHAPTER SIX

THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF WAR

Introduction

In order to fully understand the United States Military Assistance Program during the period 1970-1972, it is imperative that the military actions of the period be reviewed for the reader to fully realize the situation which existed and faced the Khmer Republic and the United States Military Assistance Program.

Primary source material for this chapter has been extracted from The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse by LTG Sak Sutsakhan. Further details may be obtained from this source.

On 29 March 1970, North Vietnamese/Viet Cong units began their overt aggression against Cambodia. The initial attacks were very sudden and widespread, conducted along the eastern and southeastern boundaries and coming from the sanctuary areas. These initial attacks drove FANK back and in rapid succession, the following towns and cities fell to the NVA/VC units:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>City/Town</u>
MR-1:	Snoul, Chup, Mimot, Krek, Saag, Koh Tham
MR-2:	Kompong Trach
MR-5:	Stung Trang
MR-6:	Modulkiri, Kratie City

In addition, other important towns were attacked (Map 5). FANK units in Ratanakiri were cut off from Phnom Penh by the enemy capture of Stung Treng and Kratie.

By August 1970, the situation began to slowly stabilize; however, NVA/VC units had made considerable gains.


FANK initiatives in 1970 and 1971 following the rapid formation of combat units, the reorganization of FANK and the receipt of initial United States assistance took the form of operations known as CHENLA I and II.

CHENLA I

The initial zone of operation for Operation CHENLA I was the triangle formed by the three villages Skoun - Kompong Thmar - Traeung, the base of which was Route 7 connecting Skoun and Kompong Cham (Map 6). Skoun had been repeatedly attacked during the initial fighting and had


Map 5. Initial Communist Attacks, March - April 1970.

Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. Indochina Monographs. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. 1980, p. 62.



Map 6. Operation CHENLA I and Area of Operations.

Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 70.



changed hands often. Prior to CHENLA I it was under FANK control and was developed as an advanced logistical base.

The final objective of CHENLA I was Kompong Thmar and its accomplishment depended primarily on United States and RVNAF air support. The final objective of Kompong Thmar was to be achieved in three phases as indicated on Map 6. However, any advance beyond the phase one objective of Tang Kauk would ultimately depend on the enemy situation.

Some ten to twelve of the best FANK infantry battalions, with artillery and armor support were selected for the operation and placed under the command of Brigadier General Um Savuth. CHENLA I was launched in late August 1970, and went entirely according to plan. Tang Kauk was retaken in early September.

In conjunction with the main advance North along Route 6 from Skoun, there was a secondary attack from Traeung to Bos Khnoar. Pressure from elements of the 9th NVA Division located in the rubber plantations east of Route 6 prevented advance of the CHENLA I column beyond Tang Kauk during 1970.

While there was a general slowing of enemy attacks throughout the northern parts of the country following the recapture of Tang Kauk, the areas east of the Mekong, around Kompong Cham, and south of Phnom Penh were scenes of significant enemy initiative in November and December 1970. The enemy reaction to CHENLA I was not directed at the column itself; rather VC/NVA units carried out a series of attacks against FANK posts along Route 7, between Prey Totung and Kompong Cham, which had the effect of cutting the Route 7 LOC to Kompong Cham. When it appeared in December that the enemy was preparing for a major attack on Kompong

Cham, the RVNAF conducted an airmobile operation in to the airfield in Kompong Cham. This operation permitted reopening of Route 7. "FANK units also received help from RVNAF units east of the Mekong in a combined operation to reopen Route 4 by clearing enemy units from the Pich Nil Pass."¹

For FANK the most remarkable and also most depressing enemy action came in January 1971 when a group of approximately 100 VC/NVA commandos mounted a large scale attack on the KAF air base at Pochentong airfield west of Phnom Penh. Carried out during the night of 21-22 January 1971, it destroyed practically all of the aircraft, including all of the MiG fighters. The attack on Pochentong was accompanied by attacks on villages located to the west and northwest of the airfield. In response to this attack, FANK withdrew some of the units from the CHENLA column at Tang Kauk to reinforce the outskirts of Phnom Penh. On 5 February, the "state of emergency" was extended for another six months.

CHENLA II

As a means of regaining the initiative, a reactivation of the operation on Route 6, stalled since October 1970, was conceived and known as CHENLA II. It would also serve the purposes of Lon Nol's program of general mobilization of the population (Mobilization Generale) by returning additional civilians to friendly control. The concept of CHENLA II called for reopening Route 6 all the way to Kompong Thom (Map 7). The garrison in this provincial capital had been isolated from all land contact with the remainder of the country for almost a year and it was at the center of a very rich rice-producing area.

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CAMBODIA: ANALYSIS OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
CAMBODIA 1970-1975(U) ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF
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
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
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
NL





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Map 7. Concept for Operation CHENLA II and Area of Operations.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. Indochina Monographs. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. 1980, p. 73.




The first phase of the operation was a great success for FANK. Prakham was retaken on the first day. By 24 August, FANK units attacking north of Rumlong were able to retake Barai on 26 August. The recapture of Kompong Thmar on 1 September was followed by a brief period of rest and consolidation of the liberated zones south of Kompong Thmar. On 2 September, one brigade of the 5th Brigade Group attacked south from Kompong Thom along Route 6 and east toward Phnom Santuk. There was heavy fighting in these areas, and Tang Krasang was taken on 20 September. On 5 October FANK units advancing from north and south met in the vicinity of Kompong Thmar. On the same day, three brigades were committed to the capture of the key terrain of Phnom Santuk mountain from the south. The 8th Brigade was moved by helicopter to a position from which it could attack southeast. After intensive fighting Phnom Santuk was taken and on 25 October 1971, the first phase of CHENLA II was declared officially at an end. Marshal Lon Nol marked the junction of FANK units on Route 6 with an "Order of the Day", dated 5 October, and there were numerous religious and military ceremonies on 25 and 26 October to mark the victory. North Vietnamese and VC units, however, on the night of 26-27 October 1971, launched an attack out of the Chamkar Andong rubber plantation and assaulted FANK positions along Route 6, particularly that portion between Kauk and Rumlong (Map 8). The following extracts from the after-action report of Brigadier General Hou Hang Sin, commander of the operation describe the events which took place:

On the night of 26-27 October 1971, the 9th NVA Division, reinforced by the 205th and 207th regional regiments, launched a general attack against our static defense positions. About 0100, the enemy attacked in force the FANK 376th Battalion, located on Route 6 at WV115640, one km north of Rumlong. This

Map 8. Enemy Attacks Against Operation CHENLA II Column,
26-31 October 1971.

Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak
Sutsakhan. Indochina Monographs. U.S. Army Center of
Military History, Washington, D.C. 1980, p. 76.



greatly understrength unit was completely overrun at a single blow; about 20 were able to make their way to Bari, and some others got to Rumlong.

Simultaneously with the above attack, the enemy was able to encircle and isolate Rumlong, held by the 14th FANK Battalion and the CP of 46th Infantry Brigade, reinforced by a platoon of 105-mm artillery. The bridge of Spean Dek at Kilometer Mark 54, Route 6 was blown by the enemy on the same night.

The 211th FANK Battalion at Damrei Slap (WU 134592) was heavily attacked on the night of 28 October 1971 by enemy units using toxic gas shells. The majority of the FANK were overcome by the gas and retreated to Kreul.

The 118th FANK Battalion at Kreul, after having suffered successive enemy attacks, retreated to Tang Kauk on 29 October 1971, in company with the 211th Battalion.

After having sustained successive attacks on 28 and 29 October, the 61st Infantry Brigade (composed of the 63d and 425th Battalions) located at Kiri Andeth (WU 157642) was ordered to withdraw to Treal, at that time held by the 22d Battalion.

Having also been attacked at the same time as the 211th Battalion, the 377th Battalion at Neak Veang (WU 127608) retreated in turn on the night of 31 October to Tang Kauk.

During this critical period from 27 to 31 October 1971, our side suffered numerous dead, wounded, and missing, both military and their families.

From 28 to 31 October, the FANK counterattacks by two brigades to break the line of enemy resistance on Route 6 between Phum Svay and Rumlong did not produce the results hoped for. The combat was very difficult; at times our units arrived just at the line of the enemy, only to have to withdraw because of losses. The following day the same terrain had to be retaken. We were on very unfavorable terrain; there was water everywhere, in the rice fields, and bordering Route 6 north of Rumlong. During the first five days of the counterattack, our air support was, for a variety of reasons, insufficient.

The troops were by this time very tired, many of the cadre had been killed or wounded. The average FANK losses were estimated at 100 personnel put out of action per day. In spite of this, we tried to carry on; and orders were given to all those who continued to fight bravely to try to break

through. But we were not able to succeed, due to difficulties on the battlefield, irregular arrival of resupply, the air drops being intended one day for the counterattacking force, and the next day for the garrisons at Rumlong and Treal, which were surrounded. During this effort, our air support was reported to have strafed our own units, at the time in the process of infiltrating toward Rumlong. We do not know who called for this strike, but the incident led to the discouragement of our troops in their efforts to relieve Rumlong. In order to accelerate resupply, an air strip for light aircraft was established north of Barai, and put into service on 25 November 1971. We were not sufficiently mobile, due to insufficient helicopters and armor, which could have permitted us to move in force from one point to another.

In contrast, the enemy, expert in this type of warfare, dug deep trenches in which their drugged and chained soldiers waited to strike us, all of which was synchronized with the fire of heavy weapons located in the Chamkar Andong Plantation, and directed by observers located everywhere. We found it impossible to carry out effective counter-battery fire, due to lack of sufficient weapons.

In order to strike the enemy a heavy blow, we were able to obtain B-52 strikes in the Chamkar Andong area on the 1st and the 14th of November. We asked for additional strikes, but did not receive them.²

During this 15 day period FANK received extremely heavy losses. The CHENLA II column had been cut in several sections, causing FANK units to break away as they could. The large bridge on Route 6 southwest of Skoun had been blown and the logistic base for the operation which had been established in Skoun could not be resupplied except by air.

During the entire month of November and until 3 December 1971, the final date of CHENLA II, heavy actions took place the entire length of Route 6 from Prakham to Phnom Santuk. The operation rapidly became totally uncontrollable for FANK.

FANK losses from CHENLA II were extremely heavy. It is estimated that FANK lost ten of its best trained battalions and approximately the loss of equipment of an additional ten battalions.

Despite the tragic ending of CHENLA II, the operation was extremely costly to the North Vietnamese 9th, 7th and 1st Divisions in manpower, munitions, weapons and other supplies. Several months later, during the 1972 Spring Offensive in Vietnam, "intelligence reports recounted the poor showing of the 9th Division as the reason for the chastisement of its commander and its relief from the seige of An Loc by the 7th Division - which in turn fared no better."³

Conclusion

During the period 1970-1972, FANK engaged North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Main Force Units. Operation CHENLA I and CHENLA II directly assisted the United States Vietnamization effort by causing heavy casualties on enemy units. As the primary United States objective during this period was to assist in Vietnamization, this short term goal was achieved at the expense of FANK's finest units.

Following CHENLA II, FANK was forced to rebuild its forces. During the same period the Khmer Communists were able to build and improve their forces with relatively little interference from FANK.

The following chapter will discuss the Military Assistance Program during the period 1972-1974.

CHAPTER SIX

ENDNOTES

¹For descriptions of the two operations at Kompong Cham and Pich Nil Pass, see Tran Dinh Tho, The Cambodian Incursion Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.

²LTG Sak Sutsakhan, The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), pp. 75-78.

³BG T. Mataxis, "Cambodia: A New Model for Military Assistance", Army Magazine, January 1973, p. 30.

CHAPTER SEVEN

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE 1972-1974

Introduction

This chapter will discuss the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia during the period 1972-1974, focusing on the role of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC). Major General John R.D. Cleland was Chief, MEDTC during this period. His End of Tour Report is the basis for all information contained in this chapter. Specific data and information is referenced to footnotes to direct the reader to the appropriate section of the End of Tour Report.

Overview: Implementation of National Strategy and Reorganization 1972-1974.

There were no illusions that the mere enunciation of a national strategy, or the reorganization and streamlining of the FANK force structure, would be sufficient for the conduct of the war. The GKR and FANK would have to effect a transition from concept to implementation. It did not happen. The GKR and FANK proved unable to fully marshal their resources. The result was that throughout 1972 and 1973, the initiative belonged to the enemy. He not only dominated the countryside by default, but proceeded to cut the GKR's vital lines of communication. FANK lost Route 1 in the spring of 1972. Route 2 went in the early summer of 1973 followed by routes 6 and 7 late that summer. It was not until 1973 that FANK began to demonstrate some ability to establish priorities and reallocate forces based on operational objectives. The planned reorganization of FANK began to take hold at this time. The equipment for constituting the divisions arrived, and the forces to form the infantry intervention brigades were designated and standardized in terms of organization, equipment and command structure. The successful defense of Phnom Penh in August 1973 can be attributed primarily to United States Air Force firepower and the defense put up by the four newly formed divisions and two of the intervention brigades. Air power destroyed the attacking KC's ability to sustain an offensive with mass. The remaining enemy did not have the will or the capability to continue an offensive drive prior to the rainy season. FANK's defense of Kompong Cham later in the fall was made possible by rapid movement of four intervention brigades, newly arrived C-123's and the initiative of the Khmer Navy (MNK). The latter

half of 1973 also saw the FANK command and control structure continue to evolve and provide a degree of effective control of its forces in the field. Central to this control was the establishment of a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) in mid 1973 and the Artillery Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) in mid 1973 and their integration with the FANK Operations Center in a single, Combat Operations Center (COC). These steps were only taken when FANK was essentially restricted to a perimeter defense of Phnom Penh, having conceded the initiative elsewhere throughout the country.

In order to fully analyze United States Military Assistance to Cambodia during this period, it is necessary to understand the impact of the following events and activities:

- . Paris Peace Accords
- . Congressional Restrictions
- . Accelerated Delivery and the 15 August 1973 Bombing Halt
- . Fighting the war by CRA/MAP (Continuing Resolution Authority/Military Assistance Program)
- . Reallocation of the Logistic Base from RVN to Thailand
- . Transportation and Development of LOC's
- . The Ammunition Program

Paris Peace Accords

In January 1973 the Paris Accords came and went. The war in Vietnam continued and in Cambodia it picked up. The reason was basic - nothing had yet been resolved on the battlefield. The immediate effect of the Accords was to force, in the midst of an ongoing war that was in

the process of heating up, a relocation of the MEDTC logistical base from SVN to Thailand, and the termination of major training programs being conducted on behalf of FANK in SVN. The Accords did not bring a cessation of hostilities or a neutralization of Cambodia. If a neutral Cambodia was therefore to remain an objective of United States policy, even if one resulting from some future negotiations between the GKR and the KC, the United States support of FANK would have to be a continuing objective.

"What also became increasingly apparent throughout 1973, however, was the disparity between the amount of U.S. material and money being invested in pursuit of those dual objectives, compared to the limited capability we had left to influence the situation. The reason was that, in the intervening years since the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, Congressional action had considerably narrowed and restricted its original flexibility."¹

Congressional Restrictions

As discussed earlier, in January 1971 the Cooper-Church Amendment modified the Nixon Doctrine, at least in its application to Cambodia, by specifically prohibiting "advisors". The Symington-Case Amendment, passed in February 1972, ordered that the total number of official United States personnel in Cambodia should not exceed 200. The intent was "to prevent the further growth of a large American presence in Cambodia which would drag our nation even more deeply into that difficult situation."

While the intent of such legislation is understandable in view of America's Vietnam experience, the effect of its rigidity was to insure that at a time when the United States was investing millions in the defense of Cambodian neutrality, we would simultaneously limit our ability to ensure that the money was well spent. It was obvious by 1973 that the

KC, under close NVA tutelage, had evolved into a relatively effective Asian field Army. It was equally obvious that FANK, despite its expansion in size, remained deficient in those organizational skills and techniques essential to the waging of a coordinated military effort on a national scale. If it was to perform with any degree of professionalism against the KC, some program for modernizing it was desperately needed, particularly in the areas of staff planning and coordination, training, personnel and financial management, technical know how, and tactical leadership. "An input of 200-250 specialists, U.S. or third country nationals, could have had a major modernization impact on the GKR and FANK at this stage of their development. Congressional limitations effectively precluded the establishment of any such program."² Instead, we provided FANK modern equipment, but would not give it the advisory support to insure the best employment of that equipment. This they would have to learn on their own by trial and error, at a corresponding increase in cost to the United States. "The success of our Cambodian policy would not appear to be riding on the outcome of that do it yourself learning process."³

Accelerated Delivery and the 15 August 1973 Bombing Halt

With equipment being the principal means by which the United States could influence the situation, 1973 saw an increase in equipment deliveries. The M-16 rifle had begun arriving as replacement for the M-1 carbine during the latter half of 1972. Some M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers had also been delivered. As the ground war intensified during the spring and summer of 1973, steps were taken to increase the flow of

of this material, as well as to speed up the reorganization of independent FANK battalions into intervention brigades and divisions with appropriate supporting arms.

The need for such reorganization and force upgrading was given added emphasis with the Congressional decision to halt United States combat air support of Cambodia effective 15 August 1973. "The one sacrosanct absolute in all U.S. force structure planning for FANK was now simply declared void."⁴ FANK, never designed to operate against main force units without United States air support, was told to do so in the middle of an ongoing battle for their capital. To offset the loss, they had to be provided an immediate means to increase their firepower. This was the reason for the accelerated delivery programs - code-named Nimble Thrust and Nimble Voyage - effected in the latter half of 1973, which delivered combat power in the form of artillery, M-113's and heavy river craft.

It should be added that another important reason for these deliveries was psychological. In the wake of the withdrawal of United States air support, the accelerated delivery of 105/155 mm artillery batteries, equipment for the headquarters and combat support elements of two divisions, and for three armored cavalry squadrons provided a positive indication to the GKR of continued United States support.

While the equipment delivered by these programs did increase FANK firepower, as well as impact politically, any long term attempt to offset the loss of United States air support needed to center on revamping the Khmer Air Force. The Tactical Air Improvement Plan instituted early in 1974 was a short term means for focusing on increased KAF tactical

capabilities. "If the war continues thru 1974, a long term improvement in those capabilities will become a major additional expense to the Military Assistance Program."⁵ See Annex H describing Accelerated Delivery Program in detail.

Fighting the War by CRA/MAP

The Military Assistance Program was not designed to provide the flexibility needed to fund a "shooting war". Under normal MAP procedures, operations were sustained via receipt of material required for and funded during prior year programming. The sudden unplanned delivery of 14 AU-24 and 8 C-130 aircraft in 1973 are but an example of the impossibility of predicting tactical requirements under rapidly changing military and political conditions. Another example was the impossibility of predicting ammunition expenditure rates which fluctuated with the level of combat.

When the MAP was funded through Continuing Resolution Authority, as it was in Cambodia, the problem was further compounded since not only was the level of funding restricted to the prior years, but the funds themselves were doled out in quarterly increments. The result was the loss of continuity in any planned program.

Prior to the beginning of each quarter it became necessary to evaluate the funds available and allocate for those items determined to be most critical. This meant that long lead time items, which were an integral part of the overall long term program, were often denied funding because day to day requirements for such items as ammunition had to come first. Attempts to give longer term investment items primary funding priority invariably foundered when the quarterly costs of ammunition

and operations and maintenance costs could not be met. The result was that the portion of the investment program for which a procurement request had not been initiated was dropped into shortfall in order to free funds for ammunition costs. The Operations and Maintenance Program lines were also drastically reduced. "Prior to or as the quarter ends funds are frequently depleted and the whole requisition cycle must slow down, and in some cases stop, while waiting for funds for the new quarter."⁶

Effects of force planning were equally disruptive. The orderly rounding out of a planned force structure was not possible with funds committed at the beginning of a quarter, but reprogrammed by the end of the quarter to fund more urgent requirements. In addition, it became difficult to match training programs with unit activation when the units were repeatedly placed in shortfall and new type units hastily activated.

Although all Departments and CINCPAC effectively responded in delivering equipment, only limited relief was foreseen through normal MAP procedures for providing required materiel, services, and training on short notice.

Relocation of the Logistic Base from RVN to Thailand

The signing of the Paris Peace Accords signaled the virtual end of logistics support for FANK from bases in the Republic of Vietnam. By March of 1973, with few exceptions, all support functions had been shifted to Thailand. The bulk of this massive and complicated transformation was smoothly accomplished in the remarkably short time frame of sixty days. The effects of the shift were beneficial in some areas and

and detrimental in others. To gain a more thorough understanding of these effects, it is best to consider the impact on the various support functions involved.

(1) Equipment Deliveries. Initially the shift of the logistics trail from RVN to Thailand caused some problems in equipment deliveries. In spite of the diversion of equipment already in shipping channels, some items still arrived in RVN after the shift was accomplished. Some pilferage of equipment awaiting transshipment in RVN occurred, and accountability of material became extremely difficult during this time. To reduce pilferage, supplies were packed in conex containers which were then welded shut. Airlift of general cargo at that time was through 8th Aerial Port Squadron (APS) at Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base, South Vietnam. As discussed in chapter five, early in 1972 cargo began to be delivered to the Khmer port of Kompong Som. This proved to be very successful, and MEDTC supply and warehouse operations in RVN were terminated in June of 1973. In conjunction with receiving cargo at Kompong Sam, procedures for documentation, title transfer, in-transit storage and forward movement of cargo to Phnom Penh by land convoy using Route 4 were implemented and adopted by FANK. In addition to movement of MAP-CB cargo from Kompong Som, some items were off-loaded at Sattahip, Thailand, transshipped through Utapao and transported by United States C-130 aircraft to Phnom Penh. Other items were shipped by barge from Sattahip via the Mekong River to Phnom Penh.

(2) Transportation Activities. The shifting of airlift support from Saigon to Utapao lengthened the air lines of communication simply as a result of the greater distance from Phnom Penh. In comparison, support using the Mekong LOC was significantly altered.

Originally, the majority of MAP cargo arrived by sealift was processed and transshipped using the facilities at Newport, Saigon, SVN. Likewise, retrograde cargo, particularly end items being routed to depots for repair and return, was also processed through Newport, RVN. As of March 1973, the use of Newport by MEDTC was denied by the Paris Peace Accords.

Transshipping activities were subsequently established at Sattahip, Thailand, for both inbound and retrograde shipments of MAP-CB cargo. Items were transferred from deep draft vessels to barges for onward transportation to Phnom Penh via the Mekong River. Retrograde was accomplished by backloading barges for the return trip.

The retrograding of cargo from Kompong Som by deep draft vessel was hampered by the necessity to comply with sanitation and quarantine regulations. The Port of Kompong Som did not have the operational equipment, supporting facilities, and trained personnel to process retrograde in accordance with these regulations.

(3) Engineer and Ordnance Equipment. The operational shift caused few problems in the supply of airlifted programmed engineer and ordnance support items. However, the shift did require the delivery of many large quantity, high volume equipment items, such as barrier materiel and vehicles to Kompong Som. The onward movement of this materiel to warehouses in Phnom Penh became increasingly erratic and precarious because of the frequent enemy interdiction of Route 4, especially as of November 1973.

During 1972, large quantities of excess engineer materiel were made available from sources in RVN. These included items such as

prefabricated buildings, barrier materiel, sand bags, and Bailey bridging. The subsequent shift of supply operations to Thailand effectively decreased the access to such material during 1973.

The flow of repair parts for engineer and ordnance equipment was not materially affected by the shift.

(4) Communications and Signal. Although Phnom Penh's long haul United States communications system continued to terminate in RVN, the effect of the ceasefire agreement was to restrict options for upgrading the system by forbidding the introduction of even minor or temporary equipment into RVN and by limiting the movement of materiel from RVN to the Khmer Republic.

MEDTC was denied the use of ARVN facilities previously established with United States aid to orient FANK soldiers now facing similar problems experienced in Vietnam. For example, the AN/TRC-1 rebuild program, the PRC-25 modular repair facility, and the Vung Signal School could no longer serve FANK needs.

Some difficulty was encountered in coordinating repairs and calibration of signal equipment with communications maintenance facilities in Thailand because most of them were contractor operated. However, concentrated efforts were made to obtain the desired support from these facilities to the extent possible.

(5) Petroleum Products. The logistics trail for bulk POL was not affected by the shift. The supply arrangements for bulk POL remained by ship or barge via the Mekong from Nha Be and Vung Tau in RVN.

Package products were being provided by contract through USARSUP-THAI and by MILSTRIP from CONUS. These products were then hauled by SCOOT (Support Cambodia Out of Thailand) barges from Sattahip to Phnom Penh.

(6) Ammunition. The shift of the logistical base for ammunition from RVN to Thailand was beneficial to the military forces of the GKR. Although the supply line, and hence, the order and ship time were lengthened, reliability, responsiveness, flexibility, and security were significantly enhanced.

Munitions were delivered by barge to Kompong Som and Phnom Penh, by land convoy to Battambang, by airland to Phnom Penh, and by air drop to isolated areas.

(7) KAF and MNK Activities. The shift of logistics support from RVN to Thailand was extremely beneficial for KAF. The quality and responsiveness of third echelon maintenance support was noticeably improved. While one contract for the IRAN (Inspect, Repair as Needed) of O-1D aircraft at Air Vietnam in Saigon still remained to be completed, all other contract maintenance was shifted to locations in Thailand.

The shift of the logistics trail resulted in no significant impact on Navy follow-on consumable and repair parts support. MEDTC began submitting requisitions directly to NAVILCO, Bayonne, New Jersey, vice Saigon. The receipt of air cargo via Utapao instead of Saigon, did not affect Navy support except, perhaps, to marginally speed up delivery.

Development of LOC's and Transportation

Transportation and development of LOC's continued to develop during the period 1972-1974. As the base of supply was shifted from RVN, various changes were required for the delivery of MAP-CB cargo. A description of MEDTC activities in transportation and development of LOC's during the 1972-1974 period follows, as extracted from MG Cleland's

End of Tour Report. Key elements included the establishment of a viable, centralized control of transportation movement, as well as the further development of the air, water and highway LOC's.

1. MOVEMENT CONTROL. Movement control functions of MEDTC encompass movement of MAP-CB cargo into the GKR ports of entry from CONUS, other countries, and U.S. bases of supply located in the Pacific area. In addition, MEDTC monitors the operation of aerial and water ports and arranges for movement of retrograde cargo from the GKR. The movement of MAP-CB cargo into GKR ports of entry is initiated by the supply activity within MEDTC by designating the mode of delivery based on required delivery dates. The transportation activity of MEDTC assures that MAP-CB cargo delivery is made to the desired port of entry once cargo has arrived in the theater. The transportation activity maintains liaison with Military Sealift Command, Thailand, and USARSUPTHAI to coordinate desired surface mode of transport and appropriate destination within the Khmer Republic of cargo transshipped from Thailand. Transportation coordinates surface movement of cargo transshipped in the Republic of Vietnam by coordination with DAO Saigon. Aerial movement by USAF aircraft of MAP-CB cargo into the GKR is accomplished through coordination with PATMA, Thai, Utapao RTNAB, Thailand. Onward movement within the GKR from ports of entry to warehouses, depots and ultimate user units is a function of the FANK J-4.

In an effort to develop a viable, centralized control of transportation movements to successfully support combat operations, FANK established a Joint Transportation Board at the J-4 level in January 1974. The JTB consists of members of the Army, Navy and Air Force who commit portions of their respective fleets to accomplish movements requested by the services. The functions of transportation movements are then accomplished by the Director of Transportation acting for the JTB and J-4. The Director issues orders to call modes to move cargo within the guidance of the JTB and priorities established by the FANK J-3. The JTB is currently operating with limited success.

2. AIR. Air delivery of MAP-CB cargo is performed primarily by USAF C-130 aircraft operating from Utapao RTNAB, Thailand. This service moved to Thailand in July 1972 when support for MAP-CB began to shift from the Republic of Vietnam. Historically, the air line of communication has been utilized to provide rapid delivery of vitally needed ammunition and military equipment to the GKR. The short response time, or order and ship time, for air delivery makes air particularly responsive to the logisticians' needs when managing rapidly changing stock levels of critical supplies such as ammunition. The employment of air delivery to the Khmer Republic has

fluctuated in accordance with the level of combat intensity and its corresponding changes in ammo expenditure rates and loss and damage rates for military equipment. During the past year it was necessary to bring in massive amounts of military ammo and equipment during July and August to offset the loss of firepower after cessation of U.S. bombing on 15 August 1973. The stockage levels for all supplies were increased and additional artillery pieces, armored personnel carriers, and fighter bombers were brought in to increase Khmer firepower. This in turn created greater expenditures of ammunition and spare parts because of a much greater density of aircraft, weapons, and vehicles. Again in November and December of 1973, it was necessary to increase the stockage level for supplies and bring in additional equipment to meet the enemy's expected dry season offensive estimated to begin 15 December 1973. As combat intensity increased and the enemy showed his capability to attack the air line of communication by striking at Pochentong AB with attacks by fire, it became obvious that airlift delivery of cargo to Phnom Penh must be reduced and a greater reliance placed on surface movement of MAP-CB cargo. Consequently, aircraft sortie rates were reduced from a high of 34 sorties per day during October to the current average of 6 to 10 daily sorties. Only the most critical cargo is now moved by air.

3. WATER. Waterborne transportation has traditionally been the lifeline of Cambodia with the Mekong River being the lifeline. The bulk of all general cargo imported into Cambodia has historically been delivered via the Mekong River to Phnom Penh. This LOC continues to be of utmost importance for the delivery of MAP-CB supplies and ammunition. With the move of MAP-CB supply support from RVN to Thailand in late 1972, the SCOOT (Support Cambodia out of Thailand) tug and barge contract was negotiated by MSCFE to provide for ammunition barges loaded at Vayama, Thailand, to be towed to Vung Tau, RVN, and then via the Mekong River to the Port of Phnom Penh. Due to lead time for acquiring tug and barge assets, it became necessary to re-establish the supply of ammunition from Cat Lai, RVN, until March of 1973 when the SCOOT contract became fully operational with convoys plying the Mekong every 10 days. As the intensity of combat increased, with correspondingly higher expenditures of ammunition, it became necessary to renegotiate the SCOOT contract to provide for increased assets with greater reliability. Additional tug and barge assets reduced the requirement for air delivery of munitions except for emergencies and helped to prevent ammo stocks from dropping below the safety level.

The second water LOC for Cambodia is by surface ship to Kompong Som and via RN4 highway to Phnom Penh. Kompong Som, Cambodia's only deep water port, was developed under the regime of Prince Sihanouk. During the period of the late

1960's until 1970, it was used by Communist Bloc countries to ship war materials direct to NVA forces occupying Cambodian soil and fighting against the RVN along the Cambodia/Vietnamese border. As the base of supply was shifted from RVN, ammo vessels were diverted from Vietnamese ports to Sattahip/Vayama, Thailand. MAP-CB cargo vessels were calling at Kompong Som on a trial basis by May of 1972. On 10 June 1972, the SS Seatrain Maryland became the first U.S. flag vessel to deliver MAP cargo to Kompong Som on a regular basis after sailing from a CONUS port. By August 1972, the Kompong Som - RN4 LOC was operating. The arrival of ships at Kompong Som continued at a regular pace of two to three ships per month. Plans formulated in 1972 to include fuel delivery capabilities along the Kompong Som - RN4 LOC were continued with construction of a fuel bladder farm at the port in November 1973 and acquisition of 208 tank and pump units to be mounted on standard 2½ ton trucks to provide highway tanker support up RN4. Limited ammo shipments were made into Kompong Som by SCOOT tug and barge assets to support the maritime provinces' ammo requirements. These shipments were limited by the ammo storage capacity as well as the availability of SCOOT assets.

Additional internal water LOC's were developed by GKR forces operating on the Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers. MNK riverine convoys played an important, if not vital, role in the defense of Kompong Cham by running convoys under fire up the Mekong after the city was cut off to further highway or aerial deliveries by enemy action. MNK also operates convoys as far up the Great Lake (Tonle Sap) as Kompong Chhnang and Siem Reap when water levels permit.

4. HIGHWAY. Highway transport was used by MEDTC to deliver MAP-CB cargo into Cambodia only for ammunition delivered via RN5 from Thailand to Battambang. Ammunition was moved by Thai contractors thru U.S.-Thai agreement beginning 4 July 1973 and with continuing shipments moving each month from ammo depots in Thailand for resupply of ammo to the northwestern provinces of the GKR. After closure of RN5 in September 1973 from Phnom Penh to Kompong Chhnang, it became necessary to increase the tonnage moved by this means since Kompong Chhnang was then supplied from Battambang vice Phnom Penh. The two most vital road links to Phnom Penh, RN4 and 5, were interdicted in the fall of 1973. RN5 remains closed denying FANK any highway link between its two major population centers of Phnom Penh and the "Rice Bowl" area of Battambang. The closure stopped flow of rice from the major rice producing area to the major population center of Phnom Penh. This forced greater reliance on the Mekong River LOC for rice delivery to the capital. Closure of RN4 for the greater part of October, November and December 1973 caused additional shift of movement to the Mekong River LOC. Ships due to call at Kompong Som Port with MAP cargo were diverted

to Sattahip, Thailand, and Newport, RVN, for transshipment by barge to Phnom Penh via the Mekong or by C-130 via Utao RTNAB. RN4 was opened by a (concentrated) FANK effort in January 1974 and convoys began to move immediately to relieve the backlog of equipment in Kompong Som. However, the use of RN4 was short lived since FANK had to withdraw its security forces for the second defense of Phnom Penh later that month.⁷

In summary, it was clear that FANK's concept of adequate movement control planning and scheduling was only beginning to take place. As chapter eight will describe, the KC displayed the capability to influence the availability of LOC's supplying the Khmer Republic. A continuing requirement existed for USAF air transport support for the delivery of high priority MAP cargo and for the administrative support of MEDTC. The bulk of MAP cargo continued to be delivered via the Mekong River, the Khmer Republic's most vital supply line. Detailed statistics showing MAP-CB cargo transported over all LOC's are included at Annex I.

The Ammunition Program

Firepower was the most significant advantage which the military forces of the GKR had over the enemy. The FANK depended on firepower to win. Seldom did FANK outmaneuver the enemy - he outgunned him. With the withdrawal of United States Air Support in 1973, the provision of sufficient ammunition in support of FANK's firepower was perhaps the most vital logistical task confronting MEDTC.

Ammunition requirements vary in direct ratio with the size of the force involved and the intensity of combat. The growth of the ammunition portion of the MAP Program over the period 1972-1974 reflects both factors. In Fiscal 72 ammunition costs comprised about 37 percent

of the total MAP budget. In Fiscal 73 the proportion rose to 65 percent and for Fiscal 74 it rose to 87 percent. Dramatic increases in weapons density/force structure (see Annex J) and the level of combat from 1972-1974 are only two of the factors bearing directly on MAP-CB ammunition requirements. A third was the 15 August 1973 cessation of United States combat air support. The USAF had been delivering massive firepower in support of FANK. Following 15 August, FANK had to make up as much of the difference as possible through increase use of its own firepower capability. "Ammunition issues rose slightly less than 200 short tons a day in July 1973 to slightly more than 600 short tons a day in January 1974."⁸ (See Annex K.) The ammunition problems facing FANK were described in MG Cleland's End of Tour Report:

FANK must be able to expend enough ammunition to break any developing enemy offensive.

FANK must have sufficient ammunition available to allow major units to take the offensive.

FANK must have sufficient ammunition at its disposal in sufficient quantities throughout the country so that individual positions do not fall because of lack of ammunition.

But at the same time:

Total MAP-Cambodia funding must remain within established ceilings.⁹

The following actions were taken by MEDTC in addition to field visits and inspections as a solution to the problem:

- Established an allocation control system based on ASR's to limit consumption of all critical lines.
- Emphasized - at all command levels - the need for fire discipline and control.

- Continually encouraged improvements in accounting, receipt, issue and storage procedures - to include extensive use of Third Country National contract personnel.

FANK has responded by:

- Establishing a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) for control of Phnom Penh area artillery.

- Training personnel from military regions to expand the FSCC concept to all artillery.

- Completing conversion from the French to the U.S. system of ammunition resupply.

- Improving allocation controls on the expenditures of all critical munitions.¹⁰

As a result of these actions, the following occurred:

- The daily consumption rate initially decreased by approximately 15 percent in November and early December 1973, reflecting a lull in the fighting as well as improvements in logistics management and tactical command and control by the Khmer. However, during periods of heavy fighting as were experienced in late December and January 74, FANK had its back against the nation's capital and under these last ditch conditions, as could be expected, expenditures reached an all-time high.

- FANK ammunition management and accounting procedures developed sufficiently to give a close fix on receipts and issues at the Kantauk Depot and at the Military Region Logistic Centers - as well as on artillery expenditures at major units. Expenditure data obtained from the FSCC are compared and correlated with issue data. Records maintained at the Kantauk Depot on the turn in of 105MM expended cartridge cases are also correlated with issues. Ammo accounting at the unit level is much more uneven and presents a particular problem in the case of units manning enclaves under pressure (Kompong Cham and Takeo in particular). MEDTC continued to monitor ammunition use at the unit level by announced and unannounced end item utilization inspections, reviewing airdrop requirements and intelligence sources. Without advisors in the field, however, consumption at the unit level is not subject to the degree of control exercised over large caliber artillery weapons or the KAF. A proposal has been prepared for an additional TCN complement to be hired by the GKR under a contractual arrangement with the Vinnell Corporation. This would provide TCN's under MEDTC/Vinnell control to assist at critical management positions in the Phnom Penh, Military Region and Division areas, and would materially assist efforts to encourage the development of logistical and fire discipline at all military echelons.¹¹

In summary, as long as the fighting continued, a key element of United States support to the Khmer Republic was the provision of ammunition to its military forces. Adequate and timely ammunition resupply was vital to the survival of the Khmer Republic. To meet that requirement, the End of Tour Report goes on to state:

a. Sufficient ammunition stocks must be on-hand at all times within Cambodia to meet not only normal requirements, but equally as important to provide necessary supply to sustain the forces in-country in the event of contingency - whether that contingency be an interruption in the normal supply lines, a surge in requirements, or a loss of a portion of the stocks. In this regard it is recommended that as a minimum 45 days of supply be authorized for in-country stockage.

b. Likewise, additional stocks must be available in theatre for normal replenishment as well as emergency backup. Currently the majority of these stocks are located in USAAAT facilities in Thailand. It is essential that these stocks be maintained at authorized levels (currently 60 days).

c. Sufficient surface transportation assets must be provided to meet requirements. Recent increases in the quantity of SCOOT tugs and barges available for the transshipment of ammunition has significantly lessened the impact of this constraint, as has the implementation of the SCOOT/T program. This latter program allows for the discharge of deep-draft ammunition vessels in the port of Vung Tau directly onto barges for subsequent shipment to MAP-CB, thus reducing Mekong transit time and effectively increasing available lift capability. Nonetheless, there has remained a continuing requirement for airland delivery of munitions either to offset a shortfall in the amount of surface transportation assets available, to meet required delivery dates, or to provide emergency resupply. The flexibility offered by this mode must be retained.

d. Sufficient funds must be provided in a timely manner to insure a responsive flow of ammunition into the country, to allow for the detailed advance planning that management of a multi-million dollar program demands and to reduce requirements for airland delivery by permitting the stockage in-country of sufficient ammunition to allow for temporary surges without an attendant requirement for airland stock replenishment.

e. In conjunction with the above, the production base in CONUS must be made more responsive not only to MAP-CB requirements - but to world-wide ammunition requirements as well.

Recent and recurring shortages of 40MM HE, 60MM Mortar, 60MM LAW and 106MM RR are the more significant examples.

f. MEDTC must be provided real time access to a computer facility in order to continue to effectively and efficiently manage an expanding program - especially in view of tight MAP funding and the limitations imposed on the size of the MEDTC staff by Congressional legislation. Preliminary action has begun to establish a remote input/output terminal with real time direct access to the USSAG/7AF computer facility (IBM 360/65) at NKP. Timely approval of this action by SECDEF, and the expeditious delivery and installation of the necessary equipment will provide for the development of a management information system that will prove to be invaluable not only to the management of the ammunition portion of the program but to the entire Cambodia Military Assistance Program.

The above recommendations are made in the interest of improving the responsiveness and quality of the support provided by the U.S.G. - this while simultaneously reducing costs.¹²

Conclusions - Military Assistance 1972-1974

The period 1972-1974 showed a drastic increase of the Military Assistance Program within the existing Congressional and funding restrictions. The prospects for the future was summed up by MG Cleland in his End of Tour Report:

FANK has the ability to retain control of Phnom Penh and thereby insure the near term survival of the GKR. Whether it has the ability to follow up with a sustained, coordinated offensive on a national scale depends on many factors. What is clear is that the manner in which the U.S. has chosen to pursue its military/political objectives in Cambodia did not serve the best interest of the U.S. Considering Cambodia as ancillary to the Vietnam problem, we did not provide for nor equip a Khmer Armed Force capable of withstanding alone, for a prolonged period of time, the type threat it presently faces. We are now involved in a holding action and with present fiscal and policy constraints, the best that the side we have chosen to support can achieve is a military stalemate. The only option left to the GKR, therefore, should it seek to resolve the conflict, is a negotiated settlement with the KC involving political concessions. No military solution appears possible.¹³

MG Cleland's conclusions and recommendations were as follows:

Conclusions

1. The objective of assisting the "Vietnamization" program in SVN was accomplished.
2. The achievement of a neutral Cambodia will be dependent upon the results of direct negotiations between the GKR and the KC. The initiation of such negotiations will require agreement by the DRV or the separation of the DRV from the KC.
3. GKR bargaining power in future negotiations will be dependent upon the military power then exercised by FANK.
4. MAP aid has been the single most significant factor influencing the GKR and FANK to continue fighting.
5. The KC, despite inherent political and military problems, have within the parameters of the Cambodian war developed into a relatively effective main force communist army.
6. FANK has improved significantly in the critical organizational areas of personnel and financial management. The primary reason has been MEDTC "institution building" efforts to create centralized, impersonal management systems.
7. FANK has demonstrated great improvement in the employment of MAP equipment to include coordinated Mekong operations with "Monitor" gunboats; air/artillery fire coordination; and armored cavalry operations. The improvement is due to the capability and elan of individual FANK commanders and the impact of high visibility equipment items.
8. Congressional restrictions, severely limiting the scope of the Nixon Doctrine, precluded MEDTC from adequately addressing FANK's core problem, immaturity as an organization, in such vital areas as staff planning and coordination, training, technical expertise, and tactical leadership.
9. The "on again, off again" nature of CRA/MAP funding unnecessarily complicated the MEDTC force structure planning/equipment delivery mission.
10. U.S. Policy in Cambodia was guided by "Vietnamization", thus failing to consider Cambodia within its own specific context or within the perspective of Indochina as a whole. DRV policy to date has taken better account of both individual Cambodian realities and long-term DRV geopolitical objectives.

Recommendations

1. The commitment of U.S. money and prestige via military assistance must be carefully considered if objectives to be

achieved by such assistance are dependent upon "peace" to be achieved elsewhere.

2. A detailed assessment of the time, money, and level of U.S. involvement required to sufficiently upgrade a host army, compared to its adversary's level of effectiveness, should be the basis for deciding whether U.S. interests are sufficiently vital to warrant military assistance to an underdeveloped nation engaged in an active war.

3. If the U.S. is to become involved via resources and prestige committed, the U.S. military mission should have flexibility in terms of the mechanics of funding and freedom from arbitrary political restraints sufficient to accomplish U.S. objectives.

4. Military assistance funding of an active war should be via Military Assistance Service Funded vice Military Assistance Program.¹⁴

The intensity of the war continued to increase as the next chapter will discuss. Hopes for a negotiated truce did not appear and the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia kept the Khmer Republic alive. As the next chapter indicates, some of MG Cleland's conclusions (especially numbers 6 and 7) are somewhat premature and failure to follow the recommendations made success of the United States Military Assistance Program in insuring survival of the Khmer Republic increasingly doubtful.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ENDNOTES

¹End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1972-1974. MG John R.D. Cleland, 20 February 1973, p. 12.

²Ibid., p. 13.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 14.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., pp. I-1 - I-3.

⁸Ibid., p. M-1.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. M-2.

¹¹Ibid., pp. M-2 - M-3.

¹²Ibid., pp. M-4 - M-5.

¹³Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 16-18.

CHAPTER EIGHT

MILITARY OPERATIONS 1972-1974

Introduction

The period 1972-1974 saw the initiative pass from FANK to the VC/NVA and Khmer Communist Forces. FANK's strategy during this period was that of a defense. The enemy dominated the countryside by default and proceeded to cut the GKA's vital lines of communication. FANK lost Route 1 in the spring of 1972. Route 2 went in the early summer of 1973, followed by Routes 6 and 7 late that summer. It was not until 1973 that FANK began to demonstrate some ability to establish priorities and reallocate forces based on operational objectives. The planned reorganization of FANK began to take hold at this time and the equipment for constituting the divisions arrived. The forces to form the infantry intervention brigades were designated and standardized in terms of organization, equipment and command structure.

Major military operations will be reviewed in this chapter. Information has been extracted from The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse by LTG Sak Sutsakhan. Further details may be obtained from this source.

Following the high levels of combat activity that characterized the period of CHENLA II, the first three months of 1972 saw a significant decrease in activity, as the VC/NVA forces carried out extensive logistic activities in preparation for operations in South Vietnam. During this period, FANK participated in Operation PREK TA and ANGKOR CHEY. (See Map 9.) The eastern Kompong Cham Province, RVNAF withdrawal of its Operation TOAN THANG units prompted FANK to withdraw the 22d Brigade from Krek on 10 January 1972, and redeploy it to the vicinity of Neak Luong. These withdrawals left this part of the province in enemy hands and was never reoccupied by FANK. Operation PREK TA was a combined FANK/ARVN operation involving a combined total of 11 battalions and was launched on 10 January 1972 south of Route 1, between the Mekong River and the RVN border. In Siem Reap Province, Operation ANGKOR CHEY was launched on 29 January with the objective of encircling the Angkor Wat/Angkor Thom temple complex and ruins, and to interdict the flow of enemy supplies into the Angkor area. Initially the operation was marked by small scale skirmishes along Route 6, east and west of Siem Reap. On 21 February FANK units encountered stiff resistance and were halted.


Operations in Military Region 1 and 2,
and Against Phnom Penh, March-April 1972

On 20 March 1972 the KC directed attacks against Prey Veng City and Neak Luong. (See Map 10.)


ARVN's Operation TOAN THANG VIII, which began on 9 March north of Svay Rieng City, ended on 29 March with significant results. "Enemy losses were reported as 765 killed (583 by air), 29 captured; 1,117

Map 9. FANK Operations ANGKOR CHEY and PREK TA.

Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 100.



Map 10. Areas of Operations, March-June 1972.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 102.




individual weapons and 37 crew served weapons captured. Additionally, 871 tons of rice, 49 tons of salt, 73,000 meters of communication wire and 24,000 litres of gasoline were captured. Friendly losses were 9 killed and 67 wounded."¹

At the same time as the attacks on Prey Veng, the KC launched what was to that date (March 20) its heaviest rocket and mortar attack against Phnom Penh. (See Map 11.) Seven separate areas within the city's west and northwest sector, as well as positions near Pochentong Airfield received a total of approximately 200 rounds of 122-mm rocket fire and 75-mm recoilless rifle fire. The shellings, accompanied by a ground attack against the governments radio transmitting facility southwest of the city, left 102 friendly killed (mostly civilians), and 208 wounded. FANK reacted to this attack with several small-scale clearing operations along the capital's outer perimeter.

Following the attacks of 21 March, the KC conducted a series of terrorist and sabotage actions, mostly targeted against Cambodian shipping. On 23 March, a 5,000 ton cargo vessel was sunk and another damaged on the Mekong near the Chruoy Chang War Naval Base. Several days later, two POL barges moored in the same area were damaged by floating mines. On 24 March the KC damaged the Friendship Bridge (built by Japan as retribution payment for WWII) in Phnom Penh which spanned the Tonle Sap River by detonating at midpoint in the structure, an estimated 200 kilos of explosives which were loaded in a truck.

On 18-19 April, the KC renewed attacks along Route 1, east of the Mekong. Within three days, a total of 22 government positions along the highway had been abandoned, leaving Neak Luong, Svay Rieng and Bavet

Map 11. Phnom Penh.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 104.



Village (near the SVN border) in friendly hands. FANK responded to the attacks by reinforcing Neak Luong and Svay Rieng and by initiating a route clearing operation toward Kompong Trabek. By late April 72, little headway had been made in the reopening of Route 1. Due to the rapidly deteriorating situation, FANK withdrew five battalions from the U.I.T.G./ FANK Training Program in RVN to augment forces which were stalled about 6 kilometers west of Kompong Trabek.

During May, Prey Veng City received 17 separate rocket, mortar and recoilless rifle fire attacks resulting in light casualties and no significant damage. The city was isolated on 7 April by an estimated two-battalion enemy force located on Route 15 midway between Banam and Prey Veng City. Attempts to reopen the roadway were halted when the 23d Brigade was redeployed to Neak Luong for use along Route 1. Two battalions of the 15th Brigade were subsequently assigned to Prey Veng City to augment the garrison there in anticipation of increased enemy pressure. In Military Region 2, FANK and RVNAF units continued to engage which were probably elements of the 1st NVA Division in the vicinity of Kompong Trach. In mid-April Kompong Trach was surrounded by enemy forces, creating a serious situation which was not eased until after the arrival of RVNAF reinforcements from Ha Tien on 24 April 1972.

On 6 May 1972 Phnom Penh received its second major attack. During this attack the city, Pochentong Airfield and Chruoy Chang War Naval Base received rocket, mortar and recoilless rifle fire, resulting in 28 deaths and 96 wounded, the majority of the casualties being civilians. Damage at Pochentong Airfield was one aircraft destroyed and four damaged. Enemy sapper raids, estimated at battalion strength, were conducted in the

city's southern area against the Monivong Brigade, electric power station, and the Caltex fuel storage facility. No significant damage resulted from the activity. Light shelling of Phnom Penh continued 9-11 May 73. Beginning on 26 May, Svay Rieng City was subjected to increased enemy attacks by fire and small-scale ground assaults, with no major casualties or damage reported. This increased action was probably designed to keep FANK confined to the city's defense, thereby facilitating a new logistic push by the enemy in southeast Cambodia.


In Military Region 2, enemy forces further expanded their control over key terrain in southern Kamput and Takeo Provinces. On 30 April the KC captured Kompong Trach and advanced north on Route 16, forcing FANK to abandon five outposts. RVNAF units continued to conduct cross-border operations in the area east of Kompong Trach in an effort to curb the flow of enemy supplies and reinforcements into the Delta region of RVN.

The situation near Svay Rieng eased substantially during June as enemy forces directed their efforts towards RVN. Southeast of Neak Luong, two battalions of the 48th Khmer Krom Brigade were ambushed on 25 June along Route 1, resulting in the loss of approximately 600 soldiers.

FANK Efforts to Keep Lines of Communications Open July-December 1972

On 4 July, FANK launched Operation SORYA, a combined operation with RVNAF, to seize Kompong Trabek, which was successfully captured on 24 July. (See Map 12.) Five battalions of the 11th FANK Brigade Group and three battalions of the FANK 66th Brigade were left to hold FANK positions on Route 1, pending phase II of Operation SORYA, planned for

Map 12. Operation SORYA. July-August 1972.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 108.



late August with the objectives being to clear Route 1 and relieve encircled FANK forces. In Military Region 3, KC were successful in closing Route 5 for approximately two weeks.

The enemy reacted to FANK/RVNAF successes at Kompong Trabek by attacking friendly positions on Route 1 on 6 August. These attacks were supported by enemy armor and gave him control of a 7 kilometer section of Route 1, isolating five battalions of the FANK 11th Brigade Group west of Kompong Trabek. This was the first use of enemy armor by the NVA/VC in the Cambodian conflict. As of 24 August, a total of 31 enemy armored vehicles had been destroyed or damaged. Operation SORYA II was launched on 11 August and after 10 days FANK and RVNAF units succeeded in linking up with the isolated 11th Brigade Group elements. A FANK garrison was established at Kompong Trabek; however, there was no immediate plan to push eastward toward Svay Rieng. South Vietnamese forces assumed positions south of Route 1 along the RVN-Cambodian border, and Route 15 between Neak Luong and Prey Veng City was reopened by government forces on 13 August 1972. In Siem Reap, FANK's Operation ANGKOR CHEY was dealt a serious blow when elements of the 203d VC/KC Regiment recaptured Phnom Bakhang Mountain, which had been under FANK control since 19 May 1972. Enemy control of this area left the Siem Reap airfield exposed to harassing fire and denied its use to friendly air operations. As a result, FANK was forced to use the Tonle Sap Lake and a new airfield south of Siem Reap for supply deliveries.

On 8 September 1972 the enemy attacked Kompong Trabek in strength, forcing three FANK battalions to evacuate the Neak Luong, with two 105-mm artillery pieces destroyed and two more captured. In Military Region 3,

Route 5 remained closed during September despite the efforts of a FANK 17-battalion relief force. This interruption in the rice supply provoked a "rice crisis" in Phnom Penh and during the period 7-8 September numerous lootings and demonstrations occurred.

On 6-7 October, an enemy sapper force of approximately 100 infiltrated into the northern part of Phnom Penh and attacked the Chruoy Chang War Bridge and the M-113 personnel carrier parking area near the west end of the bridge. A large portion of the bridge was destroyed; 86 enemy were killed and seven captured. A total of seven M-113 ADCs were destroyed.

In Military Region 3, despite strenuous efforts by FANK, a five-kilometer section of Route 5 remained in enemy hands during October, preventing the movement of rice from Battambang to Phnom Penh.

During November, FANK gradually overcame enemy resistance on Route 5 and five convoys were able to make the trip from Battambang to Phnom Penh without incident. At Takeo, KC forces overran several positions on the outer defensive belt during the period 5-8 November, thereby isolating Ang Tassom on Route 3 and Prey Sandek on Route 2. During this period the USAF conducted daily air support and aerial resupply of ammunition to FANK forces. From 16-30 November FANK reinforced Takeo and on 30 November launched the first phase of an operation to clear the enemy from central Route 2.

During December, FANK units were able to open Route 4, which had been closed by the KC in October. On Route 2, FANK units relieved the garrison at Prey Sandek on 4 December, which had been isolated for six weeks. On 21 December FANK and RVNAF units conducted a joint operation

to clear the last remaining section of Route 2 still under enemy control (section from Prey Sandek to Tun Loap). On 23 December the area was cleared.

The major enemy effort in December was directed against Kompong Thom, in Military Region 4, where an estimated 4,000 - 7,000 KC and NVA troops attacked on 7 December. FANK and the USAF responded with an aerial resupply to the 3,000 man FANK garrison, which suffered heavy losses. FANK reinforced the Kompong Thom garrison with elements of the 12th Brigade troops from Siem Reap on 19 December. Despite another enemy drive 22-24 December, FANK defense of Kompong Thom held.

Other critical activities in December 1972 included the sinking of the cargo ship BRIGHT STAR in Phnom Penh port on 7 December and of a POL barge on 15 December 1972.

KC Dry Season Offensive, January-July 1973


During January 1973 FANK kept all major LOCs open except for a two day period during which one Mekong convoy was delayed. A major FANK operation was the relief of a battalion size outpost at Romeas, southwest of Kompong Chhnang. An unidentified enemy force estimated at 2-3 battalions, encircled the battalion outpost on 6 January 1973. On 31 January FANK committed eleven battalions to the relief of the outpost. Following an airmobile operation on 19 and 21 January, FANK units finally reached Romeas on 23 January. USAF tactical strikes and aerial delivery of ammunition played a vital role in the defense and link-up operation.

During February 1973, KC units launched a major offensive along the Mekong and made secondary efforts on Routes 2 and 3 and at Kompong

Tham. FANK reacted with effective United States air support and contained the major enemy efforts. Active United States air support permitted the passage of two major convoys despite the presence of well over two KC regiments actively employed on both banks of the Mekong. The major enemy effort of the month of February began 6 February with attacks on FANK positions in the Neak Luong - Banam - Prey Veng corridor. On 10 February KC units seized Banam and thereby cut Route 15. FANKs counterattacks were unproductive. Enemy pressure against FANK positions along the east bank of the Mekong remained constant during the month. As a result, a 13-kilometer section of the river bank below Neak Luong was under KC control by the end of February. (See Map 13.) On 27 February Banam was retaken by FANK and the west bank of the Mekong was cleared on 29 February. USAF tactical sorties continued at a high level during February as a special USAF operation was mounted to break the enemy siege of Kompong Thom and to provide close air support for ground operations in the Route 15 and Routes 2 and 3 areas.

In March 1973, enemy efforts continued at a high level throughout the country, directed primarily at the Takeo area and the Mekong - Route 1 corridor. Early in the month Prey Sandek, 9 kilometers south of Takeo, was isolated. On 9-10 March, a two-company position east of Takeo was overrun, as were two positions on Route 2, north of Chambak. On 12 March both Prey Sandek and Chambak were lost. FANK reacted with an operation to retake Chambak and Samroang Yong. With the assistance of four United States B-52 strikes, Chambak was retaken on 18 March. The road to Takeo was opened on 23 March. On 31 March the KC renewed its efforts against Chambak, resulting in substantial losses to FANK's

Map 13. Areas of the Mekong Controlled by KC. February-April 1973.
Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 117.



7th Division. Despite significant FANK reinforcements north of Takeo, aerial resupply to isolated FANK units and substantial United States air support, the KC regained control of Route 2 south of Takeo and much of Route 2 to the north of Takeo.

On the Mekong - Route 1 corridor, following the safe passage of a Mekong convoy on 20 March 1973, the KC launched heavy attacks on both banks of the river, overrunning several FANK territorial company positions and controlling some 25 kilometers of the east bank of the Mekong. On the west bank of the Mekong, the KC were also successful in overrunning six FANK positions along Route 1, leaving the enemy in control of approximately 25 kilometers of Route 1 north of Neak Luong.

During April, the KC continued offensive actions in southern Cambodia, begun in March, making his greatest effort to complete control of the Mekong and capture Takeo. KC forces approached to within artillery and mortar range of Phnom Penh. Despite initial FANK success in deploying troops along the Mekong corridor in early April, KC forces again cut Route 1 and occupied substantial portions of both banks of the Mekong by the end of April 1973. Third Division elements were driven back north of Route 2 to positions north of Siem Reap/Kandal, some 10 kilometers from the outskirts of Phnom Penh. After Siem Reap was retaken, it was inexplicably abandoned under no enemy pressure, thus opening the southern flank of the capital's defense. The high command ordered the town retaken and after a delay of two days, Siem Reap was occupied with no resistance. Takeo continued to hold against heavy enemy attacks by fire and ground pressure due to a very heavy application of air power, reinforcement by several battalions, and United States aerial resupply of ammunition. On 16 April the sea resort of Kep fell, located in southern Kampot Province.

At the beginning of April, FANK controlled only some 30 percent of the Mekong River bank. The last April convoy was delayed 12 days as FANK reinforced with elements of more than two brigades conducted clearing operations on the east and west banks. Towards the end of the month, FANK gave up important portions of the east bank and Route 1 was closed again north of Neak Luong. Enemy efforts against Mekong shipping during April resulted in the loss of one POL and one munitions barge, two cargo ships, and the damage of eight ships.

The enemy offensive continued into May, but slowed at month's end, due in part to high levels of United States air support. On the Mekong, the enemy continued to control portions of both banks. Six convoys (three each way) received 56 major hits, causing the loss of one ship.

The month of June began on a positive note for FANK. Route 5, which had been closed for two months, was reopened on 5 June. A Mekong convoy arrived in Phnom Penh without serious harassment. The enemy then launched an offensive on Route 4 only 25 km from Phnom Penh. "FANK committed four brigades (7, 13, 28, 32), supported by two squadrons of M-113s and some 12 105-mm howitzers."² Both United States and Khmer air units provided air support as weather permitted, and FANK's superior numbers and firepower -- due to United States air support -- forced the enemy to withdraw. Route 5 was reopened to traffic on 7 June, and three rice convoys reached Phnom Penh before the enemy closed the road again on 16 June.


Although the military situation continued to deteriorate in July, FANK was able to survive another month of the enemy offensive which had begun six months previously. The enemy appeared to shift from his earlier

strategy of attacking major LOCs to one of more direct assault on the capital. As the month began, there were three active combat areas in the region of Phnom Penh: (Map 14.)

1. Route 2 and 3. Originally and adjunct to Route 4 operations in June, this LOC became a major combat area in July as the enemy offensive spread from Route 4 east into the near regions of the capital. Early in June, the 3d Division (-) had initiated sweep operations south of the Prek Thnaot River which threatened the east flank of the enemy's Route 4 attack. Reacting sharply to the threat, the enemy drove the 3d Division unit back 5 kms to Route 3, with over 100 casualties. Following that, the 3d Division (-) held to the road in a basically defensive posture, conducting only shallow sweeps away from the LOC. Two key positions held by the Division fell in mid and late June. Counterattacks proved ineffective but served to prevent the enemy from penetrating Phnom Penh's inner defenses. On 6 July, the enemy captured the Kompong Tuol Bridge, a district headquarters, and neighboring town, following a sharp attack. Casualties in the FANK 3d Division were high, and increased further as the 43d Brigade, cut off south of the Prek Thnaot River, exfiltrated to the north following an unsuccessful FANK airmobile operation to relieve it six days later. Despite United States air support on a 24-hour basis, FANK was not able to push its defense line south to the Prek Thnaot River during July.

2. The Phnom Baset approach. This area, northwest of Phnom Penh, was controlled by the FANK 7th Division. Despite strong efforts by the enemy, which rendered ineffective the 72d Brigade (previously critically understrength), the 7th Division fought back aggressively

Map 14. Combat Operations near Phnom Penh, July 1973.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 121.



and, in concert with United States air support, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and was in control by the end of July. Units from the 7th Division, as well as others from the Phnom Penh and 2d Military Region were committed hastily to counter enemy threats northwest of Pochentong during the prior week. With the general reserve fully committed, FANK was forced to withdraw sorely needed units from other areas, notably Route 3 and Phnom Baset, to counter this developing threat.

3. Phnom Del. FANK was unable to hold on to its positions in the area north of the capital; they fell in quick succession on 6 and 9 July despite aerial resupply and reinforcement. On 13 July, the enemy captured the ferry site at Prek Kdam.

The First Months Without U.S. Air Support August-December 1973

The enemy dry-season offensive against Phnom Penh came to an end in August and the capital area entered a period of lessened activity which lasted into December. The 3d Division reestablished control of the north bank of the Prek Thnaot River, and the 1st Division was able to clear Route 1 south of Neak Luong.

However, north of Phnom Penh there was heavy fighting in the Route 6, Route 7, Kompong Cham areas. "With the fall of Tang Kouk, Skoun, Prey Totung and Traeung, FANK lost eight 105-mm howitzers, two mortars, large stocks of ammunition, three battalions and 19 territorial companies to the enemy."³ By August the enemy was able for the first time to direct all his efforts to capturing a provincial capital of the war, Kompong Cham; a series of shelling attacks, followed by strong ground attacks caused the FANK defense line around Kompong Cham to be steadily threatened

along with the loss of full use of the airfield. FANK reinforced initially with the 70th Brigade, two battalions of the Parachute Brigade, two battalions of the 5th Brigade, and an additional battery of four 105-mm howitzers. Efforts to restore or expand the perimeter were unsuccessful. The enemy's main effort to take the city came on 1 September with heavy mortar and 105-mm fire, and multiple ground attacks which penetrated the FANK defensive line to within 1 km of the city. FANK forces were able to stop the enemy's momentum and stabilize the situation on 2 September. The two remaining battalions of the 5th Brigade and the Parachute Brigade, two Special Forces Detachments, and 12 Navy craft were designated as additional reinforcements for Kompong Cham. On 7 September, FANK contained the enemy's advance and slowly began to push him back from within the city. By 14 September the enemy had been cleared from the city and FANK gained offensive momentum which continued throughout the month. As FANK advanced and regained control of lost territory, enemy efforts diminished to attacks by fire and ground probes of friendly positions at the airfield. As the month ended, FANK reoccupied and controlled Wat Angkor Knong, the village of Boeng Kok, the textile factory, and were affecting link-up with friendly forces at the airfield. During the last week of September, approximately 100 Air Force (KAF) personnel were airmobiled to Kompong Cham airfield to bolster defenses against enemy ground attacks.

During October there was again heavy fighting along the Prek Thnaot River. On 1 October the last elements of the 3d Division located south of the river were either withdrawn to the north bank or overrun. On 2 October, FANK was forced to abandon Kompong Toul and Kompong

Kantout. The 1st Division was ordered to reinforce on 3 October and committed its 1st Brigade in the zone of the 3d Division and its 48th Brigade, reinforced by one M-113 squadron, to move along Route 2. A constant exchange of fire at long range and a lack of ground initiative by both forces characterized the combat action during October. During the last week, 3d Division elements moved south across the Prek Thnaot River at night and established a foothold on the southern banks. The continuous daily shelling of friendly positions by enemy indirect fire weapons caused casualties to already severely understrength FANK battalions which exceeded replacements received by the 1st and 3d Divisions.

The most significant activities in November were the losses of Tram Khnar, Srang, Tuk Laak, and Vihear Suor. The garrison at Vihear Suor was overrun and occupied by the enemy on 30 November. "Losses at Vihear Suor were: two 105-mm howitzers, two 75-mm howitzers, six 81-mm mortars, six 82-mm mortars and an unknown amount of ammunition."⁴

December was highlighted by FANK efforts on Route 4. On 18 December units of the 13th Brigade, the 28th Brigade and one M-113 squadron demonstrated the ability to react rapidly when the enemy interdicted Route 4 between Kompong Speu and Phnom Penh. FANK troops cleared the enemy from the road after 12 hours of fighting. On 3 December, the 1st Division was committed to the task of clearing the month-old interdiction of Route 4, west of Kompong Speu, extending from Sre Khlong north to Moha Saing. Route 4 was reopened on 6 January 1974 due largely to the commitment of a M-113 squadron, additional 155-mm howitzers and the deployment of the 18th Brigade to assist the 1st Division.

Conclusions

In the previously recounted series of operations throughout 1972 and 1973, the KC acquired large areas of additional territory from the GKR, taking advantage of heavy NVA/VC combat assistance at the beginning. Having seized the initiative, they were operating at times and places of their own choosing against FANK forces stretched thin and defending vital LOC's and population centers. Massive United States air support was required to prevent Phnom Penh from falling in 1973. The 15 August halt in United States air support inevitably raised the question of the degree of United States commitment to the GKR and KC alike.

As discussed in MG Cleland's End of Tour Report,

"FANK has the ability to retain control of Phnom Penh and thereby insure the near term survival of the GKR...the only option left to the GKR, therefore, should it seek to resolve the conflict, is a negotiated settlement with the KC involving political concessions. No military solution appears possible."⁵

The next chapter will review the United States Military Assistance Program during the 1974-1975 period which ended with a KC victory over the GKR in April 1975.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ENDNOTES

¹LTG Sak Sutsakhan, The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), p. 101.

²*Ibid.*, p. 119.

³*Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁵End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1972-1974. MG John R.D. Cleland, 20 February 1974, p. 16.

CHAPTER NINE

MILITARY ASSISTANCE 1974-1975

Introduction

The period 1974-1975 was characterized by Khmer Communist forces continually maintaining pressure on GKR forces protecting Phnom Penh and periodically mounted major assaults against it.

The second major attack on Phnom Penh in January 1974, dwarfed the first offensive against the capital in August 1973; in that more artillery, rockets and ground troops were utilized in multiple, although relatively uncoordinated, assaults. Subsequent to major offensives against the capital, the enemy mounted selective attacks on major provincial capitals in order to maintain the initiative, tie down potential reserves, and keep psychological and military pressure on the GKR. Simultaneously and progressively, the KC either permanently interdicted or intermittently cut all GKR land lines of communication, particularly the roads into Phnom Penh. By early 1974, Phnom Penh's only reliable source of adequate resupply was the lower Mekong River LOC.

During the 1974 Wet Season, FANK pursued a major operation in the Bassac area southeast of Phnom Penh. FANK was also forced to respond continually to KC provincial initiatives at a level of combat intensity which did not as in previous wet seasons abate appreciably. As a result, FANK did not retain and refit as in previous wet seasons and was not prepared for the major KC assault which was launched on 1 January 1975 with

two objectives: complete interdiction of the Mekong LOC and seizure of Phnom Penh.

This chapter will discuss the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia during the period 1974-1975. As did chapters five and seven, it will focus on the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC). Brigadier General William W. Palmer was Chief, MEDTC during this period. His End of Tour Report is the basis for all information contained in this chapter. Specific data and information is referenced to footnotes to direct the reader to the appropriate section of General Palmer's report.

In order to fully analyze United States Military Assistance to Cambodia during this period, it is necessary to renew the following events and activities:

- . MAP/CRA Funding
- . MEDTC Reorganization
- . Transportation and LOC's
- . The Ammunition Program
- . Aerial Resupply

MPA/CRA Funding

Initially, FY 75 MAP-CB was programmed to obligate as early as possible during the fiscal year for longer lead-time investment items so as to secure much-needed delivery as soon as possible. The incremental (Continuing Resolution Authority) funding of the program quickly obviated this approach, driving all available funds into operations and maintenance lines, particularly ammunition. By December, 1974, when Congress finally authorized New Obligational Authority for FY 75, MEDTC had been spending at a rate (\$70 million per quarter) for nearly one-half of the fiscal year which unfortunately turned out to be forty percent in excess of the amount finally authorized (\$200 million for FY 75). Management philosophy radically shifted to severe retrenchment and an eventual request for supplemental funding.

In order to provide a modicum of continuity to the program in spite of the funding constraints, and assuming that absolutely essential ammunition would be made available, the decision was made in late December to maintain all non-ammunition lines at the bare minimums

required to get through until 30 June 1975, expressing the entire remaining program shortfall in days of ammunition supply. Since the ammunition pipeline was full and 60 days' stocks preposition in Thailand, last-minute funding decisions could best be accommodated in ammunition lines.

However, by 7 February, with notification that all funds under the authorized CB-MAP ceiling of \$275M were exhausted, this philosophy had clearly been overtaken by the following events. First, the severe restrictions placed on the use of Section 506 draw down authority granted by the President reduced its flexibility to the point where available funds could not be applied to the lines in which they were most needed. Second, the FY 75 authorization legislation directed a series of heretofore undeducted charges to MAP-CB. The final blow was the enemy's successful interdiction of the Lower Mekong. The initial and very expensive failures to break the blockade, followed by total reliance on civilian contract airlanded resupply from Phnom Penh and on airdrop for most enclaves, resulted in massive added PCH&T costs chargeable to MAP-CB.

To finance these sizeable unprogrammed aerial delivery costs, a drastic overall reassessment of the remaining MAP-CB open lines was immediately conducted, and continued throughout the Team's last two months of in-country operation. Generally, this day-by-day reprogramming effort involved cancellation of all longer lead time items in favor of basic operational commodities, transportation assets, and any critically needed attrition/investment items which could be made available and delivered in the short term. Even this management effort was continually frustrated by a practice analogous to a run on a failing bank. The total amount of funds remaining was drained at both ends, as the various

DOD agencies, from which MAP-CB had acquired goods or services since 1971, scrutinized their accounts and submitted their belated, but nonetheless valid, claims against the rapidly dwindling dollar amounts available. Program lines could not be drawn down to zero balance in view of possible delayed billings and resultant over-obligations. The effect of these factors, coupled with the inherent lag time between a MEDTC line manager's obligation or program change action and its final posting at the military departments, was to frustrate the very day-by-day program management made necessary by the dearth of funds. Quite clearly, the MAP/PPBS was not designed for, nor was it completely adaptable to, an operational combat environment.

MEDTC Reorganization

MEDTC was originally organized along functional lines with a Plans and Programs Division, a Management Assurance Division and a Logistics Division. This organization scheme had proven an effective vehicle for discharging earlier MEDTC missions of delivering massive amounts of major equipment items to the Khmer Armed Forces. By August 1974, however, sustaining an existing force structure in hostilities of ever-increasing intensity and service-oriented sophistication became the norm. For that reason, a MEDTC reorganization along component service lines (Army, Navy, Air Force Divisions) was directed and implemented. Because of the singular importance of ammunition, POL and related services a separate, hybrid division was provided as a hold-over from the functional organization, as well as a small overall interservice coordination agency for planning and programming in the Office of the Special Assistance to the Chief, MEDTC (SACSA).

The new organization almost immediately resulted in much closer coordination between MEDTC and the respective Khmer Armed Forces, one of MEDTC's major responsibilities. It did not, per se, further the growth of a true joint staff apparatus in FANK, which although strongly urged by CHMEDTC, met with initial service reluctance, if not resistance on the Khmer side. The dangers of clientism and incomplete coordination were anticipated, but presented no major problems. Without doubt, the new organization was more responsive to MEDTC's overall needs during the reporting period than its predecessor would have been.

A description of MEDTC's new organization is enclosed in Annex M.

. Transportation and LOC's

The movement of MAP-CB cargo into GKR ports of entry was accomplished by designating a mode of delivery based on required delivery dates and then assuring that MAP-CB cargo delivery was made to the desired port of entry once cargo arrived in the theater. The MEDTC Transportation Section maintained liaison with Military Sea-Lift Command, Thailand and USARSUPTHAI to coordinate desired surface mode of transport and appropriate destination within the Khmer Republic of cargo transshipped from Thailand. The Transportation Section coordinated surface movement of cargo transshipped at Vung Tau, Republic of Vietnam, by coordinating with Military Sea-Lift Command, Saigon. Aerial movement by MAP-CB cargo into the Khmer Republic was accomplished through coordination with PATMA Thai U-Tapao RTNAB, Thailand. Internal movement within the GKR from ports of entry to the deposits was a function of the FANK J-4. To accomplish this mission, the J-4 had a Joint Transportation Board which met to allocate transportation assets of each mode.

The JTB consisted of members of Army, Navy, and Air Force who committed portions of their respective assets to accomplish the cargo movements. The actual movement order was then accomplished by the Director of Transportation acting for the JTB and J-4. The Director of Transportation issued orders to all modes to move cargo within the guidance of the JTB and priorities established by the FANK J-3. Although the execution of transportation missions assigned to a single service improved during the period 1974-1975, the smooth flow of passengers and cargo from one mode to another was rarely realized. Cargo and passengers would often wait excessive periods of time due to FANK's inability to coordinate the entire movement with all service commanders and staff sections. Frequently, a sound tactical maneuver would become ineffective due to the untimely arrival of MNK river transportation or the non-arrival of truck or aircraft transportation. In February 1975, the concept of a Transportation Movement Control Center was proposed to the FANK. The idea to have a single point of contact for the movement of personnel and cargo was warmly received; however, it was never fully implemented.

(1) Highway Movement of Cargo

Highway movement of cargo was used to deliver ammunition via Route 5 from Thailand to Battambang. Ammunition was moved by Thai contractors (ETO) per United States-Thai agreement. The shipments moved each month from ammo depots in Thailand to Battambang for re-supply to the northern provinces of the GKR. After closure of Route 5 from Phnom Penh to Kompong Chhnang, it became necessary to increase the

tonnage moved by this means, since Kompong Chhnang was then supplied from Battambang instead of Phnom Penh. The most vital road links to Phnom Penh, Routes 4 and 5, were interdicted in the Fall of 1973 and reopened only for very short periods of time. The closure of Route 5 denied FANK any highway link between its major population centers of Phnom Penh and the rice bowl area of Battambang. This closing forced greater reliance on the Mekong River LOC for rice delivery to the capital. Ships due to call at Kompong Som Port with MAP cargo were diverted to Sattahip, Thailand, and Vung Tau, RVN, for transshipment by barge to Phnom Penh via the Mekong. Route 4 was opened by a concentrated FANK effort in January 1974, and convoys began to move immediately to relieve the equipment backed up in Kompong Som; however, it was not long before the route again closed, this time permanently. See Annex N for a breakout of tonnage transported.

(2) Water Movement of Cargo

Waterborne cargo had traditionally been the lifeblood of Cambodia with the Mekong River the transportation lifeline. This LOC continued to be of utmost importance for delivery of MAP-CB supplies and ammunition to the population center of Phnom Penh. With the move of most MAP-CB supply support from Thailand, the SCOOT (Support Cambodia Out of Thailand) tug and barge contract was negotiated by Military Sea-Lift Command Far East Yokohama, Japan, to provide for ammunition barges loaded at Vayama, Thailand to be towed to Vung Tau, RVN, thence via the Mekong River to the Port of Phnom Penh. The second water LOC for Cambodia was by ocean vessel to Kompong Som and then transshipped via Route 4 to units in that

enclave. The arrival of ocean cargo vessels and barges at Kompong Som continued at the irregular pace of two to three vessels per month. Limited ammo shipments were also made into Kompong Som by SCOOT tug and barge assets to support the ammo requirements of the maritime provinces. These shipments were limited by the ammo storage capability as well as availability of SCOOT assets. Additional internal water LOC's were developed by GKR forces operating on the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers. MNK riverine convoys played an important, if not vital, role in the defense of enclaves by running convoys under fire up the Mekong after cities were cut off by enemy action. MNK also operated convoys as far north as the Great Lake (Tonle Sap), Siem Reap, and Kompong Chhnang; however, as the Khmer Rouge closed in during January 1975, the routes became less usable. The last Mekong River convoy was TP 113 which arrived in Phnom Penh on 30 January 1973. See Annex N for breakout of cargo transported.

(3) Air Movement of Cargo

The United States Airlift Operation in the Khmer Republic from 11 April 1973 to 17 April 1975 stands out as the largest sustained airlift operation since the Berlin Airlift. The survival of Phnom Penh and several important isolated provincial enclaves became dependent on United States Airlift to provide life-sustaining rice, ammo, POL and general cargo. USAF C-130's (including those crewed by Bird Air, a civilian contractor, and contracted DC-8's) flew 5,413 airland missions to deliver 123,631 short tons in the two-year sustained operation. The

continuous Khmer airdrop support to approximately 25 different enclaves, such as Kompong Seila and Neak Luong, was the largest sustained airdrop effort in USAF history. USAF C-130's flew more than 3,000 airdrop missions to deliver 38,893 short tons of ammunition and rice, which is more than three times the tonnage delivered to Khe Sanh, Vietnam in 1968. The airdrops were highly successful, using the AWADS high-altitude (12,000 feet), high-velocity drop system in a combat environment. Approximately 98 percent of total bundles dropped were reported recoverable, even though some of the drop zones had less than 500 meter radii of security. Neither USAF nor KAF lost any aircraft to enemy fire during airdrop operations. To reduce United States military presence in the Khmer Republic, USAF contracted with Bird Air for civilian aircrews after 7 October 1974. All flights into the Khmer Republic, other than a small number of USAF-crewed administrative support flights, were crewed by civilian aircrews. As airlift requirements increased, the contract was expanded to 15 aircrews. The best results were recorded on 17 March 1975, when 34 missions were flown (26 airland and 8 airdrops), delivering 654.1 short tons to Phnom Penh and Neak Luong. During February 1975, the MAP-CB airlift was supplemented with three MAC-contracted DC-8's to provide ammo airlift from U-Tapao to Pochentong. World Airways and Airlift International flew 111 missions from 15 to 26 February 1975, when 11 missions delivered 523.5 short tons. At the completion of MAP-CB augmentation on 27 February 1975, the Airlift International and World Airways DC-8 operations moved to Saigon and were joined by Trans International (TIA), Flying Tiger, and Seaboard World which began to provide airlift of USAID rice and kerosene to Pochentong. The DC-8's delivered

27,480 short tons of rice and 873 short tons of kerosene to Pochentong in 617 missions. A TIA DC-8 flew 58 missions to airlift 2,763 short tons of ammo from U-Tapao from 4 to 21 March 1975 as trade-off for C-130 "bladder birds" transporting USAID fuel. On 18 March 1975, a record total, 1,133.9 short tons of rice, ammo, kerosene, was delivered to Pochentong. The largest single day for rice delivery was 1,085.6 short tons on 31 March 1975. See Annex N for a break out of tonnage transported. This huge airlift was conducted under difficult and hostile conditions. From 1 January 1975 until 17 April 1975, over 2,500 105-mm howitzer shells and 107-mm rockets impacted on or near Pochentong airfield. Impact patterns were monitored continuously and every conceivable step was taken to minimize the possibility of damage. These steps included changing operational patterns, movement of off-load activities to areas of least impact, and, when prudence dictated, suspension of operation for variable periods of time until favorable changes in the impact pattern could be discerned. These steps, plus a large measure of good fortune resulted in the completion of the airlift with no loss of aircraft or American lives. There were eight instances of aircraft receiving minor to moderate shrapnel damage, and nine members of the Khmer military and civilian off-load crews were killed and some 40 were wounded. The performance of all United States personnel in a most demanding and hostile environment at Phnom Penh and under a relatively primitive operating condition was outstanding. There were numerous instances of individual performance in the sustained Khmer Airlift which reflect impressive dedication and heroism.

The Ammunition Program

Increasing combat activity, escalating costs and completion of major equipment deliveries caused ammunition to completely dominate the Military Assistance Program to Cambodia in terms of funding, as over 80 percent of every MAP-CB dollar was allocated for this commodity. It was also a major effort in terms of manhours expended assuring timely responsive positioning of essential stocks. The problems of incremental funding, escalating costs, and the Congressional funding pattern (CRA; NOA; Section 506 drawdown authority) were magnified in the ammunition program due to fluctuating demand and short lead times. Deliveries were accomplished by barge up the Mekong LOC, barge or deep draft ship to Kompong Som, road convoy to Battambang and Sisophon on Thai contract trucks, airland to Phnom Penh by United States contract C-130 aircraft, and airdrop to isolated enclaves by contract C-130 aircraft. "The FY 74 ammunition program was funded at \$310.4 million and the FY 75 program at \$160.3 million."¹ Ammunition deliveries to the Khmer Republic from January 1974 until 17 April 1975 totalled 208,652 short tons of Army, Air Force, and Navy stocks, valued at \$445.9 million. (See Annex O.)

A lack of training in ammunition logistical management within the Khmer services resulted in chronic over-issues and a measurable munitions loss through improper storage and handling. To combat these losses and attendant unwarranted expenditures, the MEDTC Ammunition End Item Utilization Inspection (EIUI) program was reoriented in May from combat units to ammunition activities. "215 Ammunition Inspection visits were made to 31 locations between May 1974 and April 1975."² Resultant recommendations, on-the-spot training of FANK personnel by Third Country National specialists and information gathered by the

inspection teams played an important role in improving storage, accountability, handling and in-country logistics. Ammunition waste and hazardous storage situations within the FANK were significantly diminished.

Between May and December 1974, changes in ammunition logistic procedures within FANK were effective, but staff organization and functioning were suboptimal due to the fragmentation of responsibilities between J-3 (operations) and J-4 (logistics). Inspection visits during this time frame corrected some logistics problems, but could not eliminate over-issues, driven as they were by requests from independent field commanders and improper FANK staffing and prioritizing of requirements. On 1 January 1975, a major staff change was made within FANK to create an Ammunition Logistics Directorate answerable directly to the Commander-in-Chief. Concurrently, a graduated allocation system based on local enemy threat was implemented to reduce issues and realign expenditures. Inspection visits during January-March 1975 verified that this positive approach was reducing the amount of ammunition issued without reducing combat capability.

The two factors which influenced ammunition requirements were the size of the force being supported (specifically, to include quantity and types of organic and supporting weapons) and the intensity of combat. As discussed in chapter seven, from FY 72 - FY 74, weapons densities and force structure in the GKR rose dramatically (see Annex J); however, from the last half of FY 74 until April 1975, densities generally remained constant or showed a slight downward trend, as combat losses, without offsetting replacements, took their toll. (See Annex P.) Also affecting

ammunition requirements was the shift from massive USAF air support in August 1973 to FANK reliance on its own artillery as the chief means of achieving a firepower advantage.

Once ammunition was received in country and title transferred to the GKR, MEDTC had no operational control over stocks; however, from a supply point of view, the stockage positions at the four in-country receipt locations (Phnom Penh depot complex, Siem Reap, Battambang, and Kompong Som depots) was closely monitored. As ammunition conservation became more critical, the ability to rapidly and accurately obtain information on stocks status became an invaluable management tool. During the period January 1974 until 17 April 1975, ammunition issues from the four in-country receipt locations totalled 216,257 short tons valued at \$462.4 million. (See Annex Q for a breakout by month.)

Aerial Resupply

(1) General.

Airdrops began on 19 June 1972 when four C-130 sorties of ammunition were delivered to Svay Rieng. Initially missions were flown out of Tan Son Nhut, RVN and U-Tapao, Thailand. Only in March 1973 did all missions originate solely from Thailand. In 1972, 133 missions were flown which represented 2,128 Containerized Delivery System (CDS) bundles or the equivalent of 1,893 short tons. Annex R gives complete month-by-month listing of airdrop tonnages for Project SCOOT (Support Cambodia Out of Thailand) between 1 January 1974 and 17 April 1975.

Air delivery of MAP-CB ammunition and USAID rice was performed by USAF C-130 aircraft. Commencing in October 1974, the C-130 aircraft

were operated by civilian crews who were employed by Bird Air under the terms of a service contract. The air delivery role for the Khmer Republic fluctuated with the level of combat intensity and was proportionately higher during the Dry Season, when surface transportation by water and land was easily interdicted by the Khmer Rouge (KC).

Operations in Southeast Asia played a major role in the development of high-altitude airdrops. The Cambodian airdrops were unique, because for the first time aircraft employed the Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) and Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) for high-velocity Containerized Delivery System (CDS) airdrops from 12,000 feet. The drops were made using a 26-foot ring-slotted parachute and individual CDS bundles were weighed 1,800-2,000 pounds. Bundles were assembled and parachutes installed by qualified United States parachute riggers. A normal C-130 load averaged 14.2 short tons, consisting of 16 CDS bundles.

(2) Planning.

Requesting an airdrop consisted of a coordinated plan between the MEDTC airdrop officer and the USAF ALCC detachment in Thailand. A request was received from FANK or was generated internally from a MEDTC/United States Embassy element (as in the case of rice). Based on available resources, a coordinated MEDTC/FANK decision was made and the operation would be approved or denied. Once an operation was approved, a message was sent out describing the location, type and amount to be dropped, and when the drop was required. Some operations consisted of hundreds of short tons and continued for several weeks.

"In addition to the special airdrop message request, coordination was made by phone to direct bundle configurations and specific drop items. A standard 16-bundle ammo load was

designed that would meet the requirements of most FANK units. The load consisted of the following items:

105mm HE	8 BUNDLES	240 RDS
81mm HE	3 BUNDLES	270 RDS
60mm HE	1 BUNDLE	288 RDS
40mm	1 BUNDLE	2,160 RDS
5.56mm	1 BUNDLE	43,360 RDS
.30 Cal MG	1 BUNDLE	20,000 RDS
105mm Fuses & 5.56mm	1 BUNDLE	240/23,520 RDS

A rice bundle consisted of 1,800 pounds of rice. A 16-bundle plan load carried 28,800 pounds (14.4 S/T) of rice."³

Standard bundles for various types of ammunition were developed which provided an easy and efficient method of designing a 16-bundle plan configuration and maintaining accurate accounting of munitions.

The largest and longest United States supported aerial delivery resupply mission ended on 17 April 1975 with the GKR capitulation. Between 19 June 1972 and 17 April 1975, the USAF and contract C-130 support had dropped more than 45,000 short tons of ammunition and rice into beleaguered Cambodian enclaves. "This extraordinary airdrop effort required the Air Force to fly 3,103 airdrop sorties and the Army riggers in Thailand to prepare 52,758 containerized delivery system (CDS) bundles."⁴

On 12 April 1975, the final elements of MEDTC, along with the remaining members of the United States mission were evacuated from Phnom Penh during Operation Eagle Pull. On 17 April, Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Communist insurgent forces and the GKR collapsed, terminating MAP-CB and the MEDTC mission.

Despite untiring efforts on the part of every member of the Military Equipment Delivery Team and significant improvements in many areas, major conclusions from MG John R.D. Cleland's End of Tour Report (see chapter seven) remained particularly valid while the KC continued

to demonstrate enhanced viability through improved organization and increased logistical support.

Conclusions from BG William W. Palmer's End of Tour Report describing the failure of the United States to achieve its stated Security Assistance Objectives are as follows:

On 16 April 1975, the day prior to the capitulation of the Khmer Armed Forces and the collapse of the GKR, MEDTC from its rear base in Thailand, arranged and controlled six aerial re-supply missions into Phnom Penh. Thus, given the narrowest possible interpretation of the MEDTC mission, it was successfully accomplished until the end. But the "end" involved complete failure of the United States' security assistance objective of developing a self-sustaining Armed Force capable of defending the GKR from insurgency. In microcosm, this paradox was with MEDTC from its inception to its disestablishment.

In spite of the myriad of Congressional limitations placed on the Team's activities, the unprecedented program turbulence generated by uncertain funding levels, and the body blow to FANK's morale which negative public debate on increased aid created from as early as October 1974, MEDTC, magnificantly supported by higher and coordinate headquarters, successfully accomplished its most rudimentary mission--the logistical support of the Khmer Armed Forces. However, those same, strictly implemented, Congressional limitations prevented the effective transfer of American technical expertise, military skills, leadership traits and professional attitudes to the FANK in enough quantity to offset their considerable, and repeatedly identified, deficiencies in each of those areas. FANK failure to redress those deficiencies coupled with inadequate, uncertain and untimely MAP-CB funding caused its defeat and the failure of the U.S. to achieve its stated Security Assistance Objectives.

Whether by lack of external support or by self-destructive practices within, it is certain that the morale and will to resist within FANK gave way before the material means to do so were totally depleted.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. A generally corrupt and incompetent officer corps, uneven leadership, an innate lack of a sense of urgency, and fragmentation of authority led to untimely and ineffective decisionmaking in the FANK. These leadership deficiencies either led directly to or were instrumental in most other

shortcomings of the Khmer Armed Forces. Firepower, mobility and materiel advantages are no substitute for effective leadership at all levels.

B. Poor manpower management, ineffective recruiting, inability to control desertions or correct military pay deficiencies and failure to ameliorate the "phantom" problem resulted in grossly understrength Army units incapable of performing sustained combat missions. Poorly conceived and improperly executed training, coupled with mal-assignment of trained personnel exacerbated desertions and combat unit strength deficiencies.

C. The lack of a joint staff in fact, or even joint effort in spirit, caused ill-conceived, poorly planned and frequently uncoordinated joint operations. "Team spirit" in pursuit of common objectives was seldom evidenced by FANK, at any level, despite concerted MEDTC efforts to instill it.

D. Restrictive CRA funding methods; uncertain, tardy and then drastically reduced funding levels; coupled with inflationary prices, did not permit the attainment of the planned force structure, particularly with respect to combat service support units. Procurement of combat loss and attrition materiel was also severely impaired, thereby reducing FANK's combat and combat support capabilities. The MAP/PPES system is neither sufficiently flexible nor responsive to meet fully the needs of a supported nation in active warfare.

E. The psychological impact of uncertain funding, highlighted by U.S. public debate on its merits, permeated FANK to its lowest leadership levels, with considerable adverse effect on morale.

F. There were too few MEDTC personnel and too many restrictions on their activities for the Team to completely monitor the entire MAP and effectively apply its professional expertise to improving the FANK.

G. Third country nationals and technical assistance contracts, both in-and out-of-country, are indispensable to a MAP effort involving an embryonic host country technical base and severe limitations on the use of U.S. military personnel.⁵

The next chapter will review the final military activities during the period 1974-1975 which resulted in the defeat of the GKR by the Khmer Communists and the failure of the United States' security assistance

objective of developing a self-sustaining armed force capable of defending the GKR from insurgency.

CHAPTER NINE

ENDNOTES

¹Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report.
BG William W. Palmer. 30 April 1975, p. E-1.

²Ibid., p. E-2. See Appendix 2 to Annex E for a detailed
description of ammunition management and inspection and analysis.

³Ibid., p. E-25.

⁴Ibid., p. E-3.

⁵Ibid., p. 14-15.

CHAPTER TEN

MILITARY OPERATIONS 1974-1975

Introduction

This chapter will review military operations during the period 1974-1975, ending with the defeat of the GKR on 17 April 1975. The major operations are broken into the following critical events:


- . Dry Season Operations, January-July 1974 and the 1974 Summer Counterattack.
- . 1974 Fall Offensive for the 1974 Wet Season.
- . The KC New Year's Offensive, 1 January 1975.

Dry Season Operations and 1974 Counterattack

Military operations during the period January through July 1974 were highlighted by heavy enemy attacks northwest and northeast of Phnom Penh and with major FANK reactions to restore the defenses of the capital in these sectors. In addition, there was significant combat along the Bassac River corridor, and a major enemy effort against the city of Kampot. By this time the defense of Phnom Penh were organized generally into four sectors. (Map 15.)

The last portion of the 1974 Dry Season saw the Khmer Republic's army successfully defend its besieged positions and regain some of its lost territory. On the south coast, the intensive siege of Kampot began to ease in April and the KC gave up this attack in May; by this time, all attention had shifted to the RN5-Oudong-Lovek complex north of Phnom

Map 15. Defense Sectors for Phnom Penh, January 1974.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 126.



Penh. Oudong had fallen to the KC in mid-March and FANK efforts to retrieve this political important town had been countered. By April, Lovek was under pressure, but in May, FANK infantry and artillery units, well supported by armored personnel carriers, began a steady, determined attack to relieve Lovek and retake Oudong. Constant fighting in June saw FANK get the upper hand, retake most of RN5 to Oudong and lift the siege of Lovek. On 11 July, Oudong was retaken and 200 KC were killed in their unsuccessful counterattack. FANK had demonstrated an improved coordination of combat arms and a significant degree of tenacity and drive under fire. The performance of armor units was particularly outstanding. "This area, with a heavy infusion of U.S.-trained officers, proved that a U.S. training effort could upgrade the performance of Khmer officers."¹ The prospects for the 1974 Wet Season appeared to be bright. The army of the Khmer Republic had successfully defended and repulse determined enemy attacks on Kompong Cham, Kampot, Lovek and Phnom Penh without United States air support and had staged a successful counter-attack up RN5 to Lovek.

1974 Fall Offensive

The initial GKR strategy proposed for the 1974 Wet Season envisioned a simple order for all units to attack in sector. The goal was to place KC units under constant pressure, to regain a fertile section of land between the Mekong and Bassac rivers southwest of Phnom Penh--the Upper Bassac Corridor, and concurrently to remove 107mm rocket threat against the capital. This strategy was revised in July when it was pointed out that any strategy that did not envision regaining a

secure route to the rice-rich Battambang region failed to address the vital need to improve the precarious economy of the Republic and missed the opportunity to sever a prime KC LOC. The initial attack of the season belatedly commenced in September, the Army leadership having frittered away the entire month of August in celebrations and repose. The assault in the Bassac corridor met with early success because the KC had removed most of their forces from the Phnom Penh region for refitting and retraining. However, the KC managed to construct a successful Bassac defense in October with limited forces. The government forces continued to attack, taking an increasing number of casualties while gaining small amounts of territory. FANK was also able to reopen RN5 from Kompong Chhnang to Battambang and effect passage southward of large rice convoys. The Summer and Fall of 1974 had demonstrated that the Khmer Republic's army could coordinate their arms and successfully conduct attacks and defend against territory. An important enemy weakness had also been demonstrated - the apparent lack of strategic mobility made the KC vulnerable to being "whip sawed." The requirement was for FANK to gain the initiative, press a combined arms attack in one sector, then shift rapidly to another sector once the KC managed to assemble a successful defense. Such a plan was conceived for the Dry Season of 1975, but never implemented.

1975 Dry Season FANK Strategy

The Bassac offensive had been conducted by phasing into Phnom Penh almost one-half of the Republic's intervention brigades, so as to reduce the number of casualties received by any one unit. As a result of continually pressing this attack, infantry unit foxhole strengths

had dropped from an average of 55 percent to an average of 45 percent by December. The territorial gains were not commensurate with the cost, since no significant advance had been made since October. The KC had successfully countered the offensive and it was now obviously time to use the FANK's mobility advantage to shift the offensive. The chosen area for the attack was RN5 between Lovek and Kompong Chhnang. This attack would hit an enemy sector already known to be depleted by reason of the KC need to reinforce the Bassac area and his retraining of substantial forces in the vicinity of Kompong Cham. It was also far enough away from enemy concentrations so that the initial advantage in strategic mobility could be exploited before resistance could be organized. It would sever an important enemy LOC and thus insure bringing about a battle in an area favorable to FANK, since the chosen battlefield could be influenced by riverine forces and armored personnel carrier units and was located between two centers of GKR strength. In order to secure this advantage, the offensive would have to begin by 15 December, as the Bassac operation was grinding to a close and the KC were preparing for their Dry Season offensive. Although the need for urgent action was repeatedly considered by the Khmer general staff, FANK moved at the same pace as their previous Wet Season performance--one month late. A successful, early, RN5 attack would undoubtedly have upset the KC timetable and diverted forces destined for Phnom Penh, in that it would cut the major East-West LOC of the enemy. This was the turning point in the transition from the Wet to the Dry Season campaigns of 1975 and a major tactical turning point of the war.

The KC New Year's Offensive

The 1 January 1975 enemy attack took government forces by surprise. The enemy had greater quantities of ammunition and weapons available, had improved their communications security and command and control of their forces, and had conceived and executed an intelligent, well-balanced plan designed to pin down the forces of the GKR in the Phnom Penh perimeter. The FANK perimeter around Phnom Penh steadily was reduced until KC forces entered the capital on 17 April 1975.

This chapter will review the above operations. Material has been extracted from LTG Sak Sutsakhan's The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. Endnotes will direct the reader to the appropriate section of this excellent reference from which maps and certain statistics have been extracted. Other references are as indicated.

Dry Season Operations, January-July 1974
and the 1974 Summer Counterattacks

On the night of 5 January an estimated two enemy regiments moved into the northwest sector, approximately 5-6 km from Phnom Penh. FANK reacted on 6 January by committing the 28th Brigade, reinforced with two M-113 squadrons. Heavy fighting ensued on 6 and 7 January and 100 enemy were killed in action. On 8 January the 1st Division was committed to the operation as its subordinate units became available from the Route 4 clearing operations. "By 10 January, over 300 enemy had been killed in action with friendly losses of 2 killed and 56 wounded."² Fighting continued for 12 more days at the 28th Brigade, moving from the south and the 1st Division moving from the east attempted to reduce the enemy penetration. One brigade of the 7th Division was also committed to the operation to move south in an attempt to seal off the penetration. This force never joined battle with the enemy, nor did it succeed in sealing off the penetration. Using this penetration as a firing base, the enemy was able to fire 75-mm RR fire and 122-mm rockets against targets in the northwest part of Phnom Penh and Pochentong Airport. Supported by heavy air and artillery strikes, the 1st Division succeeded on 22 January in breaking through the shoulders of the penetration and the enemy withdrew to the west.

"Casualties from the northwest sector fighting in the 1st Division zone were: 31 friendly killed and 175 wounded; an estimated 200 enemy were killed, 26 POWs taken and 70 weapons captured. In the 28th Brigade zone casualties were: 35 friendly killed and 268 wounded; an estimated 300 enemy were killed and 121 weapons were captured."³

Attention shifted from the northwest to the southwest capital defense sector on 19 January when enemy elements infiltrated the 3d

Division's frontline positions, causing the 334th Battalion to withdraw without orders. Adjacent battalions then withdrew from the south of Route 201 to positions north of the Prek Thnaot River. Within 24 hours, much of the 3d Division front had withdrawn to positions north of the Prek Thnaot River, despite the fact that very little enemy pressure had been exerted. The most threatened area during the initial enemy penetration was in the vicinity of Prey Veng. On 20 and 21 January, FANK high command reacted to the newly developed threat by attacking two additional battalions from the 1st Division to the 3d Division and directing the 20th Brigade to move from Route 4 to the southwest sector. Upon arrival, the 20th Brigade was committed to reinforce the weakened 51st Brigade. An additional two battalions of the 81st Brigade, 1st Division were committed on 20-21 January to counterattack to the south and east of Prey Veng. On 1 February 1974, the 1st Division's 1st Brigade replaced the 20th Brigade on the Prek Thnaot River and as January ended it appeared that FANK had contained the enemy in the southwest sector and reestablished control of its units.

FANK seized the dry season initiative from the enemy in February, pushing the enemy back in both the northwest and southern sectors of Phnom Penh. The KC, their penetration stopped by FANK in early February, shifted to 105-mm howitzer attacks on the city. FANK counterattacks late in February forced out the enemy from his January gains.

The 80th Brigade was moved to Phnom Penh on 6 February and committed on 9 February to clear the northwest sector in conjunction with the armor brigade, the 23d Brigade, the 28th Brigade and units of the 7th Division. Enemy resistance was very determined from 9-14 February, until

the 80th Brigade, reinforced with the M-113 squadron of the 7th Division, penetrated the enemy's primary defense lines. Fighting decreased progressively until 26 February when FANK units linked up north of Tuol Leap.

The enemy continued to attack and harass convoy shipping throughout February and two incidents of mining occurred on the Mekong. Nine attacks by fire were reported on convoys which resulted in two killed and seven wounded, with the most significant on 18 February when the tug Bannock and the ammunition barge Mt. Hood received 75-mm RR fire and 12.8-mm machine gun fire. This subsequently resulted in the loss of approximately 1.4 million dollars of munitions and severe damage to the barge. The tug Saigon 240 with ammunition barge 108-1 sustained several hits from B-41 rockets which destroyed an estimated 50.3 tons of munitions. A total of 11 convoys transited from Mekong during February (6 to Phnom Penh and 5 from Phnom Penh).

During March, the major military activity shifted away from Phnom Penh and to the provincial capitals of Oudong and Kampot. The enemy was able to overrun Oudong, but the defenses of Kampot held.

Enemy pressure on Kampot commenced on 26 February with attacks north of the city. During the first week of March, several territorial companies and units abandoned defensive positions. These actions combined with a dwindling water supply (the enemy had captured the city water works) caused an exodus of over 50 percent of the civilian inhabitants from the city. Enemy directed direct and indirect fire attacks against both tactical units/facilities and the civilian populace in Kampot City also added to the rapidly deteriorating situation. Effective support from Navy, Air Force and artillery units during this critical

time provided the FANK high command enough time to reinforce. The 20th and 12th Brigades were deployed to Kampot and directed to attack northeast, parallel to Route 3 to retake the Chakrei Ting Cement Factory. Virtually no advance was made by either unit. During the period 2-10 March two more Army battalions, some Navy personnel, and six 105-mm howitzers were deployed to Kampot. FANK and United States aerial resupply operations increased significantly to support Kampot. As of 3 April FANK defensive positions near Hill 169 which dominated the Kampot Airfield, had been abandoned after the enemy effectively isolated the positions. The 20th and 12th Brigades sustained significant casualties during the month, and by 2 April their effective strengths had been reduced to 664 and 827 respectively.

The most significant action during March was the fall of Oudong, which had been the Royal capital of Cambodia until the arrival of the French in the 19th Century. On 3 March the KC initiated their attack on Oudong, resulting in the withdrawal of the FANK territorial battalions to the southeast of Oudong. During the period 16-18 March, Oudong fell to the KC, despite FANK counterattacks to retake the city and relieve the encircled garrison southeast of the city. The encircled garrison fell to the KC on 28 March.

During April, the enemy continued his attacks north of Phnom Penh, focusing on Kompong Luong. Following the capture of Oudong in March, FANK forces remaining along the river were directed to establish a defensive position on the Tonle Sap. On 20 April, enemy ground pressure along the river bank increased sharply and several positions fell back. Pressure continued. On 21 April enemy infiltrators overran key

friendly positions along the Tonle Sap River bank, effectively encircling the Kompong Luong garrison. FANK forces withdrew and on 21 April the first elements linked up with the Lovek Garrison defenders. The defeat added valuable psychological momentum to the new provincial phase of the enemy's dry season offensive and represented his second significant military victory of the dry season. FANK troop and materiel losses along the Tonle Sap in April were heavy: approximately 600 military personnel were unaccounted for; four 105-mm howitzers were lost; all heavy weapons (mortars and machine guns); two M-113's, one bulldozer, one POL truck, and several other pieces of engineering equipment were abandoned. Three Navy river craft were beached. Kompong Luong and a sizeable stock of ammunition was abandoned and later bombed by KAF. Subsequently, the FANK high command decided to withdraw the civilian population and military garrison from Sala Lek Pram to Lovek, consolidating assets into a single defensive position. Approximately 15,000 civilians and 2,000 military personnel moved into the Lovek garrison on 26 April. The population of 52,405 consisted of 5,260 military, 15,488 military dependents, 22,383 civilians, 8,383 refugees, and 891 para-military personnel. Heavy enemy shelling on Lovek began on 30 April.


In Kampot, April opened the FANK forces being pushed deeper into the city, giving up approximately three km on the north and west of the city. By 10 April, the western perimeter had collapsed to within 1.5 kms of the heart of the city. The Naval Infantry had given up the southeast sector, and the enemy had stopped the flow of supplies and reinforcements by sea to Kampot. During the same period, enemy artillery struck the 105-mm howitzer positions ammunition storage area, destroying approximately

3,500 105-mm howitzer rounds and rendering eight 105-mm howitzers inoperable. Two battalions of reinforcements arrived and their immediate deployment in the southeast sector appeared to switch the offensive momentum from the enemy to FANK. After two days of heavy fighting on 8 and 9 April, the 28th Brigade reported 86 enemy killed, while the 20th Brigade in the west claimed another 100 enemy killed. Enemy initiatives diminished as fresh FANK ground forces began to slowly advance and push the enemy away from the city. The garrison military strength increased from 3,018 on 1 April to 4,006 on 9 April. The two remaining battalions of the 28th Brigade arrived, along with replacements for losses in other units. By 25 April, the Kampot military strength exceeded 4,561.

On 30 April, FANK reoccupied Kbal Romeas to the east of Kampot and reopened the river supply route. FANK losses during the period 3 March-3 May 1974 in the Kampot area were estimated at 416 killed (25 civilian), 2,363 wounded (88 civilians) and 79 missing in action. The KC suffered an estimated 2,363 killed.

After a lull of several months, KC pressure increased sharply in April in the Bassac/Mekong corridor against units of the 2d Division and territorial forces of Kandal. (Map 16.) The enemy forced FANK units out of Kbal Kaol and Prek Pau in the first week and by mid month, the enemy cleared Anlong Chen Island, occupied Svay Solum on Route 30, and Koh Krabie Krom. There was heavy fighting and enemy gains allowed occupation of 75-mm RR and 107-mm rocket positions from which fires were delivered on Takhmau and Phnom Penh. The month ended with Kandal Province forces holding on the Bassac south bank and 2d Division forces beginning to advance slowly on the north bank.

Map 16. Operations along the Bassac River, April-July 1974.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 137.



KC operations begun during April in the Bassac/Mekong corridor continued into May with the enemy penetrating to within five kms of Phnom Penh. From this point, enemy gunners fired 107-mm rockets into Takhmau and the southern and central portion of the capital. By the end of May, FANK forces had cleared KC forces from positions northwest of the Boraoh Angkanh Trail.

North of Phnom Penh, FANK was able to stabilize the situation during a month of hard fighting in May. The primary action was the FANK initiative of the 7th Division/5th Brigade conducting operations toward the north, along Route 5 in order to relieve enemy pressure on the isolated garrison at Lovek. FANK attacks and enemy counterattacks resulted in a seesaw battle between Kruos and Prek Taten during most of the month. On 25 May, ground forces overcame enemy flank pressures, penetrated the enemy forward defensive lines, and advanced 2.5 km north of Prek Taten.

The FANK garrison at Lovek received heavy enemy attacks by fire throughout May. KC ground attacks were launched from the south and northwest, resulting in the loss of the training center on 4 May. As a result of these enemy gains, the 80th Brigade counterattacked to halt the enemy's advance. By 14 May the training center and the southern perimeter had been retaken. Limited friendly ground operations were conducted during the month in the most critical area along the southern defensive line. The military strength of the garrison, 4,305 troops, precluded maintaining a firm defensive posture in the northwest and southwest, while at the same time attacking east with the 80th Brigade to establish a beachhead on the Tonle Sap. Evacuation of the 15,000-20,000 civilian refugees were dependent upon this operation; reinforcement of the 80th Brigade was planned by

the FANK high command; however, execution was not successfully accomplished. The month closed with enemy pressure diminishing and FANK attempting limited offensive action to the south and east.

June saw continued FANK success north of the capital. In that area, the 5th Brigade, reinforced by the 7th Brigade, progressed slowly north during the first 10 days of June. On 19 June the 15th Brigade reoccupied Kompong Luong. The major enemy force was located in the 7th Division zone and the high command again decided to mass combat power, reinforcing with two battalions and one M-113 squadron. FANK attacked on 28 June with elements from three brigades. Route 5 was cleared on 29 June, with 114 enemy killed, 5 POW's and FANK units sustained a total of 4 killed, 13 wounded, and two M-113's damaged. The month closed with FANK forces firmly entrenched on Route 5 and in Kompong Luong.

There was success as well at Lovek, whose garrison was able to end its isolation. A heavy enemy attack on 8 June against the northwest and southwest section of the Lovek perimeter was repulsed by the counter-attacking 80th Brigade. On 12 June, Lovek forces attempted to move east to link up with ground forces who had established a beachhead for the evacuation of the civilian population to Kompong Chhnang. After two and one-half days of no progress, they broke through and reached the Tonle Sap. Consolidation of the beachhead at Peam Lovek and evacuation of approximately 10,000 civilians was accomplished by 24 June.

FANK success north of the capital continued into July. The highlight of the month was the breakthrough by the 7th Division and 4th Brigade of the enemy's defensive line north of Phnum Chetares on 6 July and the successful link-up with the forces from Lovek in Oudong on 9 July.

Total enemy losses during the period 22 April to 9 July were 1,366 killed in action, 45 captured, and 18 ralliers. FANK losses were 104 killed and 786 wounded. The loss of Oudong was not only a tactical defeat for the KC, but a psychological one, as well.

During the period 16-23 July FANK forces along Route 5 were reinforced and consolidated their gains so that on 23 July an offensive west of Oudong could be launched in conjunction with the 80th Brigade and 8th M-113 Squadron attacking out of Lovek. On 23-24 July FANK forces moved more than 3 km west of Oudong against moderate enemy resistance.

The 1974 Fall Offensive for the 1974 Wet Season

The 1974 wet season was a period of lessened military activity throughout Cambodia as a whole, although there was some heavy fighting east and south of the capital.

The northeast sector was a very active sector in August as enemy attacks occurred in almost all areas. The month began with an enemy force holding part of Route 61 fifteen kms northeast of Phnom Penh, and a government force at Muk Kampul encircled. On 2 August, the 23d Brigade and 1st M-113 Squadron conducted an attack against enemy positions astride Route 61 and, aided by effective air and artillery support, broke through the enemy's main defenses and linked up with the besieged garrison at Muk Kampul on 3 August. Government losses in actions along Route 61 during the period 26 July to 3 August were 15 killed and 106 wounded, while enemy losses were 212 killed and 45 weapons captured. As August ended, government forces in the northeast sector returned Route 61 to government control and successfully countered determined enemy efforts to extend KC control in that area.

August was also a very active month in the southeast sector, as both government and enemy forces launched offensives to secure control of key positions along the Bassac River and in the Bassac corridor. FANK objectives were to deny the enemy areas from which rocket attacks could be launched against the capital. On 7 August a joint 1st Division/2d Division operation was launched in the Bassac corridor. On 8 August, 1st Division units succeeded in moving south from Route 1 to Prek Thmei, a key enemy position on the Bassac River. On 9 August the 1st Division units linked up with 2d Division units advancing along the east bank of the Bassac. On 12 August an enemy attack forced the 2d Division elements out of Prek Thmei, and on 15 August forced 2d Division units back as far as two kms. However, the 2d Division was able to reconstitute a defense line and keep 107-mm rockets from reaching Phnom Penh and disrupting armed forces day celebrations.

FANK reinforcements moved into the area on 21 August for a major offensive along the Bassac River and stabilized the situation. This operation involved 17 infantry battalions and four M-113 squadrons from four divisions and was the first major FANK offensive action of the rainy season. The objective of the operation was to extend government control in the Bassac region and establish a new defensive line between Route 1 and the Bassac River further away from the capital. On 23 August, a brigade from the 1st Division established a beachhead on Anlong Chen Island in the Bassac River, against heavy enemy resistance. FANK forces on the island then made slow progress against stiff enemy resistance, as did the government units along both banks of the Bassac River. Meanwhile, elements of the 3d Division, attacking south from Route 1, advanced


toward the Bassac River and reported reaching the east bank on 29 August. Although enemy resistance was determined, the greatest obstacle to movement was the difficult terrain and flooding that inundated many areas and severely restricted the use of vehicles and M-113s. As August came to a close, units attacking along the Bassac River were still over five kms from the elements that had reached the river from Route 1, and progress was disappointingly slow. Moreover, enemy counterattacks and harassing fire against advancing government units were beginning to produce significant government casualties. In the latter part of August, activities in the northwest sector were centered west of Tuol Leap. On 22 August, KC gunners fired four 107-mm rocket at the Kantouk ammunition depot west of Phnom Penh. The rockets failed to hit the depot and caused no damage but triggered a government operation to the west and south of Tuol Leap in order to expand the outer defensive perimeter and prevent the enemy from firing more rockets at this vital installation.

Enemy attacks against Mekong River convoys continued during August, but their intensity, by comparison with previous months, lessened due to more frequent clearing operations.

In September, the Bassac operation in the southeast sector continued to make slow progress -- progress often measured in meters per week. (Map 17.) Severe flooding continued to hamper maneuver and resupply. The enemy was well entrenched in ideal defensive positions along most avenues of approach and had heavy automatic weapons, rocket and other fire support. By the end of the month Task Force Alpha, consisting of three brigades of the 1st and 2d Divisions, a battalion of the 7th Division, two Kandal provincial battalions, and one M-113 squadron

Map 17. Operations in the Bassac-Mekong Corridor, September-December 1974.

Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 145.



had reached Russei Srok (WT040673) on the north bank, WT042667 on the island, and WT025660 on the south bank. Task Force Bravo, consisting of the 43rd Brigade of the 2d Division, two battalions and one M-113 squadron were moving west across the corridor. They were stopped just short of the east bank at WT067653. This gap on the east bank between Russei Srok and Task Force Bravo provided the enemy a corridor through which he resupplies his units and infiltrated behind attacking forces.

Attacks against Mekong River convoys were at a lower level in September than August; four convoys reached Phnom Penh during the month. (See Annex S which describes Mekong River and MNK operations from the 1974 Wet Season through the KC victory on 17 April 1975.)

In October, the Bassac operation continued, making slow progress. On 2 October, an enemy counterattack in the Task Force Bravo area caused FANK to withdraw 1 km to the east, and continued enemy pressure prohibited friendly progress on either axis. On 19 October, heavy enemy attacks were directed toward Task Force Bravo, in an apparent attempt to cut the friendly locations at the Sophi bridge site. Repeated enemy ground attacks failed to dislodge the FANK defenders, as Khmer air support was of high order. On 24 and 25 October, elements of the 43rd Brigade conducted a sweep operation near the Sophi bridge site and killed 81 enemy during the two-day operation. The enemy continued its ground attacks and shelling against Task Force Bravo's area, failing however to take any friendly positions and paying a heavy price for their efforts.

The use of the Mekong was again unrestricted in October. Four convoys made the round trip from Vietnam to Phnom Penh, sustaining nine attacks by fire, light cargo damage, and no personnel losses.

During November, the northeast sector was the scene of defensive action by FANK of a position which blocked that area to the enemy for rocket positions. The FANK garrison at Barrong Khnar Kar, 14 kms north-east of the capital defeated an estimated 2-3 enemy regiments. However, on the following day, the determined enemy succeeded in overrunning two company-sized positions on the northern portion of the perimeter. Thirty-nine FANK soldiers were reported missing, including an unknown number killed in action. FANK reinforced the garrison with elements of the 128th Battalion and the complete 2d and 4th Airborne battalions. Enemy attacks were launched almost daily against friendly positions for the next 13 days; however, government defenders successfully defeated each one. Friendly artillery and air support largely were responsible for over 400 attackers killed during this period. On 25 November, the garrison undertook to retake those positions lost on the 11th. In two days of heavy fighting, another 160 enemy were killed in action and the lost positions were retaken. November ended with FANK forces mopping up small pockets of resistance. Final results of the 20-day battle were 558 enemy killed, 9 captured, 16 FANK soldiers killed and 185 FANK wounded.

In the southeast sector, the FANK operations in the Bassac area continued to "slug it out". On 5 November heavy enemy attacks against 72nd Brigade elements in Task Force Bravo of the operation resulted in three battalions retreating 1 km to the north. Friendly casualties were not high; however, the loss of terrain was significant. The enemy shifted his attention to Task Force Alpha on the east bank of the Bassac, which had taken 600 meters from the enemy during mid-month assaults. On the night of 24 November heavy enemy attacks into the rear of the 78th Brigade

of Task Force Alpha resulted in a retreat of 700 meters of the west of three of its battalions. FANK defensive positions were quickly consolidated but in the early morning of 27 November, enemy attacks against the 78th Brigade again forced it to retreat to the west. FANK reinforced the area with two battalions of the 28th Brigade, and by the end of the month the situation appeared to be under control. Total casualties for the Bassac Operation during the month of November were 95 FANK killed, 499 wounded, while only 34 enemy were killed.

Although there was some increase in harassment of Mekong convoys during November, the combined efforts of the Navy, Air Force and Naval Infantry made possible four round-trip operations from RVN. On a resupply mission by river to Kompong Cham there were unfortunate losses, however. On 21 November, the enemy carried out a violent attack north of Phnom Penh. Of 316 tons of ammunition, 1,000 tons of rice, 50 tons of salt and 100 tons of POL shipped, only 25 tons of ammunition, 100 tons of POL and 25 tons of salt arrived. Enemy forces sank 2 munition junks, 1 USAID tug, 2 rice barges and 1 Navy monitor. Eight navy personnel were lost.

The Bassac Operation in the southeast sector was again the scene of heavy fighting in December. Early in the month, the enemy attacked the 78th Brigade and succeeded in completely decimating it. The 24th Brigade, an independent brigade, was selected to replace the 78th Brigade in the 2d Division. A few days later the enemy attacked the 24th Brigade, defending in the Task Force Bravo area between Route 1 and the Bassac, forcing that unit to retreat in disorder with heavy casualties. By the 20th of the month FANK had reinforced the Task Force Alpha units with

elements of the Airborne Brigade, who moved aggressively and enjoyed great success against the enemy. By 24 December, a defensive line was consolidated between Route 1 and the east bank of the Bassac River. The main FANK effort was then directed along the west bank of the Bassac. In order to clear the region and finally end the operation, four divisions (1, 2, 3, and 7) conducted an operation which had their M-113 squadrons attacking abreast to sweep the last remainder of the enemy from the horseshoe portion west of the Bassac River, killing 63 enemy, and by 31 December terminating the Bassac Operation.

There were five Mekong convoys to Phnom Penh during December, four of which were subjected to some enemy attack. Two ships sustained significant damage.

The KC New Year's Offensive, 1 January 1975

On 1 January 1975 the KC initiated their final and successful offensive against the GKR. The New Year was greeted in Phnom Penh with the retort of enemy 107-mm rockets around the capital and rapid gains on the east bank of the Mekong, which was illuminated by burning buildings and impacting rounds in the early morning hours.

KC activity in January included heavy attacks on Route 1, along the Mekong. He was also able to mine the Mekong thereby blocking the passage of resupply convoys and all MNK operations. The last Mekong convoy arrived on 26 January. The river was effectively closed on 5 February. At the same time, the KC continued attacks on Pochentong Airfield, firing an estimated 30 to 40 rounds of 107-mm rockets and 105-mm artillery rounds per day.

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
CAMBODIA: ANALYSIS OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
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
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By 6 February 1975, it was estimated that approximately 700 107-mm rockets had impacted in Phnom Penh since the KC's New Year's offensive began, with the United States Embassy becoming a favorite KC target, although never directly hit.

On 26 February 1975 the KC captured Oudong, located only 18 miles from Phnom Penh. The fighting around Phnom Penh was now concentrated within a radius of some 15 kilometers of the capital. In the northwest, the 7th Division had its front cut in several places, particularly in the region of Toul Leap where the situation had changed hands several times. The 3d Infantry Division, located on Route 4 in the vicinity of Bek Chan, some 10 kilometers west of Pochentong was cut off from its own command post at Kompong Speu. In the south, the 1st Division continued a defensive action. In the region of Takhmau, Route 1, and the Bassac, the 1st Division was subject to continued enemy pressure. East of Phnom Penh were the parachute brigade and the troops of the Phnom Penh Military Region. The Naval Base and Pochentong Airfield were defended by their own forces. The key position of Neak Luong on the east bank of the Mekong was completely isolated.

Beginning on 15 March 1975, the intensity and accuracy of 107-mm rocket and 105-mm howitzer fire at Pochentong Air Base increased significantly. On 22 March 1975, the United States Airlift was suspended until 25 March 1975 after two United States planes were hit by rockets at Pochentong. By 3 April, two aircraft had been destroyed and 39 damaged in these attacks. Aircraft parking, bomb storage, and maintenance working areas had been moved to avoid high-threat areas. By early April, such shifting was a futile exercise, due to the greater coverage of incoming

artillery. (See Annex T for a complete description of KAF operations covering the period 1974-1975.)

On 1 April 1975, Neak Luong fell, despite attempts by FANK to support this critical point. This resulted in the opening of Phnom Penh from the south and the capture of six 105-mm howitzers. (See Map 18.) Within two days, all friendly positions on Route 1 above Neak Luong fell to the enemy.


North of Phnom Penh, in the 7th Division area, enemy attacks continued, despite KAF air support. FANK counterattacks met with no success. FANK casualties increased significantly and air evacuation of wounded no longer was possible.⁴ The last reserves of the high command, reconstituted hastily by taking the battalions of the former Provincial Guard, were rushed north, only to be completely dispersed by the KC after several hours of combat. Finally a great breach was opened by the enemy in the north. To the west the 3rd Division, despite reinforcements, were unable to link up with their own elements of Kompong Speu to retake the position of Tuol Leap.

Despite efforts by FANK and the United States to negotiate with the KC for a cease fire (see chronology 8 April and 12 April), the enemy continued his push towards Phnom Penh.

On 12 April 1975, the United States Embassy conducted "Operation Eagle Pull", the evacuation of the remaining United States staff and civilians. GKR acting president Soukham Khoy departed with these last United States elements. (See Annex U which describes Operation Eagle Pull and the Emergency Evacuation Plan (NEMVAC).)

Map 18. Final Assault on Neak Luong and Closing of the Mekong,
March 1975.


Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak
Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington,
D.C., 1980, p. 157.



On 15 April the town of Takhmau, Pochentong Air Base, and the dike running east/west to the north of Phnom Penh, all of which formed the last ring of defense around the capital, were overrun by enemy assaults. (Map 19.) "On 6 April MEDTC, from its rear base in Thailand, arranged and controlled six aerial resupply missions into Phnom Penh."⁵ FANK moved the parachute brigade from the east of the Mekong to the west of the capital in an attempt to slow the rapidly advancing KC forces; however, this move had no effect as the brigade was only able to move 6 kilometers down Route 4.

On 17 April 1975, five years of fratricidal war ended as KC forces entered Phnom Penh ending the government of the GKR and the termination of MAP-CB and the MEDTC mission. The next chapter will review the United States objectives in assisting the GKR as well as significant lessons learned from this military assistance effort by MEDTC and the United States.

Map 19. The Battle of Phnom Penh, April 1975.
 Source: The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. LTG Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 159.



CHAPTER TEN

ENDNOTES

¹End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1974-1975. BG William W. Palmer, 30 April 1975, pp. 8-10.

²LTG Sak Sutsakhan, The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), p. 125.

³Ibid., p. 127.

⁴In estimating FANK strength and casualties, from the New Year's Offensive, BG Palmer's End of Tour Report provides the following description: (pp. 8-19)

Many Khmer infantry units crumbled during the KC offensive. The 36th Brigade, 72nd Brigade, 38th Brigade, 12th Brigade, 4th Brigade, 20th Brigade, and several others either dissolved in the face of the enemy attacks or were steadily destroyed in day-to-day action. In four months of fighting, Khmer infantry lost the equivalent of one battalion per day. Khmer infantry officers were incapable of leading successful counterattacks despite firepower, materiel and mobility advantages. They were incapable of preventing desertions and recruits were obtained often were unarmed due to the inability of the Khmer General Staff to redistribute sufficient available weapons. Starting at an approximately 50 percent foxhole strength in January, most Khmer infantry units were at 30 percent by March. The Khmer infantry was consistently outfought, outsmarted, and outmaneuvered by the enemy infantry during these final days of the Republic.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

U.S. OBJECTIVES, POLICY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO CAMBODIA 1970-1975

Introduction

This chapter will review United States objectives in Cambodia during the period 1970-1975. It is interesting to note the changes in this policy which were a direct result of the instability of FANK to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield.

Other topics of this chapter include:

- . MEDTC performance.
- . FANK problems.
- . MEDTC conclusions and recommendations. Significant conclusions and observations by previous Chiefs, MEDTC will be highlighted. Complete conclusions and recommendations from each End of Tour Report may be found in each respective MEDTC chapter of this publication.
- . Recommendations for future Military Assistance Programs based on the Cambodian experience.

U.S. Policy and Objectives

United States involvement in Cambodia during the period 1970-1975 was similar to a classic tragedy. The United States started on a path with specific immediate goals and objectives which were achieved; however, the United States did not end its involvement once they were met. By achieving the first goal, we were precluding the ability to achieve the secondary goals, which were not changed in importance after the specific goals were achieved. United States strategy in Cambodia initially envisioned three objectives: (1) assisting the Vietnamization programs in SVN by tying down NVA forces in Cambodia; (2) promoting Cambodian neutrality; (3) improving FANK to the point where they could creditably contribute to the maintenance of that neutrality. Assistance to Cambodia in pursuit of these objectives was within the parameters of the Nixon Doctrine. United States policy envisioned that peace would automatically fall on Cambodia when the war in Vietnam was concluded.

From the very beginning the United States seemed to consider Cambodia as secondary and of importance only in so far as it affected the situation in South Vietnam. Thus, as MG Cleland so clearly points out in his End of Tour Report, efforts in Cambodia were directed not so much at understanding and seeking a solution to the Cambodian problem as to assuring the success of Vietnamization.

United States objectives, therefore, would not include a commitment of United States ground troops to Cambodia. The Nixon Doctrine and Congressional limitations and restrictions clearly limited this and the use of advisors in Cambodia.

"While the intent of such legislation is understandable in view of America's Vietnam experience, the effect of its rigidity

was to insure that at a time when the U.S. was investing millions in the defense of Cambodian neutrality, we would simultaneously limit our ability to ensure that the money was well spent."¹

In reviewing United States policy, Mr. Jonathan F. Ladd, who organized and directed the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia in 1970 as a Foreign Service Officer assigned to the United States Embassy as Politico-Military Counsellor described his appointment and the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia as follows:

Prior to accepting the position and assignment, I received assurances from Misters Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig that the purpose of the proposed program was to assist the Cambodian military in a modest way, to help themselves in their struggle against the VC/NVN/KR forces opposing them. I was convinced of the futility of the massive U.S. assistance and direction of the Vietnamese struggle and wanted no part in a mini-Vietnam situation in Cambodia. As I stated previously, I was assured that was not the intent.²

Congressional restrictions placed on the United States Military Assistance Program to Cambodia ensured that the above proposed program was limited from the very beginning. In further reviewing United States policy and objectives, it should be noted that in 1971 (see chapter two) BG Mataxis, Chief MEDTC during the period January 1971-February 1972 stated that the

"principal purpose was to undercut the North Vietnamese invasion of SVN so that Vietnamization and plans for the withdrawal of American troops could continue in South Vietnam. A secondary purpose was to relieve the military pressure exerted on Cambodia by the North Vietnamese forces that were rapidly overrunning it."³

This description of United States policy involved assisting the Vietnamization program in South Vietnam as the first priority. In reviewing the early combat operations (chapter six), it should be noted that Operation CHENLA II was directed against North Vietnamese and VC

units and contributed little to assisting GKR stability. As discussed earlier, the NVA 1972 spring offensive in the An Loc area failed largely due to their CHENLA II losses. CHENLA II destroyed some of FANK's finest units. It was conducted within Cambodia, but it primarily benefited the war, in South Vietnam.

While the author is unable to determine the extent of United States involvement in planning CHENLA II, several results are evident. The first is that FANK was considerably weakened by the loss of its finest units. This then resulted in KC forces within Cambodia being able to continue their build-up while FANK was rebuilding its forces.

By 1973 the first United States short term objective, during which United States ground forces were withdrawn from South Vietnam, was met. The United States now shifted to more modest objectives of improving FANK to the point where they could creditably contribute to the maintenance of its neutrality. This goal was at best, difficult to achieve, due to FANK's losses in assisting the United States Vietnamization effort and the numerous Congressional limitations placed on the Military Assistance Program to Cambodia. The United States did not, or could not change its policy to achieve this goal. These objectives were not directed at any long-term solution to the Cambodian insurgency. As stated in BG Palmer's End of Tour Report, the minimum United States objectives had changed by 1974.

By the beginning of 1974, the minimum U.S. objective had become a negotiated settlement between the KC and the GKR. Achievement of that objective necessitated continuous demonstration of GKR survivability, if not viability. National survival in turn meant holding the capital and major enclaves against enemy encroachment, while at the same time providing minimum necessities and some economic stability to the population

under government control. All of this required protection of a strategic LOC, a battlefield stalemate and continued U.S. military and economic assistance, so that the KC would be faced with the prospect of a long term, no-win proposition.⁴

In accordance with the United States policy of obtaining a negotiated settlement, FANK had to achieve only a stalemate on the battlefield, rather than a clear-cut victory.

Pursuit of U.S. Objectives

The manner in which the United States chose to pursue its objectives in Cambodia did not serve the best interests of the United States. Dr. Henry Kissinger described the controversial United States policy and restrictions in his book, Years of Upheaval:

Sadly Cambodia became a symbol and a surrogate for the whole controversy over Vietnam. To Nixon it was "the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form." * meaning that our policy was to help defend itself without American troops. To his opponents it was an opportunity retrospectively and symbolically to defeat by legislation both our incursion into the sanctuaries and Nixon's very effort to achieve a defense against aggression by building up local forces. They sought, and succeeded, in imposing on Cambodia the restrictions they had failed to inflict on South Vietnam. Their failure over South Vietnam meant that we are strong enough there to prevent collapse; but their success over Cambodia doomed that country and therefore South Vietnam as well. The restrictions made inevitable the diplomatic impasse that served Hanoi's purposes. Once Hanoi was committed to conquest and the Khmer Rouge to total victory, the only way to extricate ourselves honorably was to demonstrate that these goals were unfulfillable. Our domestic divisions produced the opposite result. The restrictions on our aid saved the Khmer Rouge from defeat in 1970-1972 when it was still an embryonic force; and thereafter they prevented the leverage over the Khmer Rouge and Hanoi that was essential to induce a political negotiation. Antiwar critics who made the collapse of Indochina inevitable then turned on those who had sought to resist the Communist takeover and blamed them for the resulting carnage.⁵

General Cleland stated in his End of Tour Report in 1974 that the only path for the GKR at that time was a negotiated settlement with the KC due to the way the United States pursued its objectives.

Considering Cambodia as ancillary to the Vietnam problem, we did not provide nor equip a Khmer Armed Force capable of withstanding alone, for a prolonged period of time, the type threat it presently faces. We are now involved in a holding action and with present fiscal and policy constraints, the best that the side we have chosen to support can achieve is a military stalemate. The only option left to the GKR, therefore, should it seek to resolve the conflict, is a negotiated settlement with the KC involving political concessions. No military solution appears possible.⁶

GKR bargaining power was dependent upon success on the battlefield.

It never appeared that the GKR could survive with the limited United States assistance and restrictions placed on the program. Dr. Kissinger describes the restrictions on the Military Assistance Program to Cambodia and how they contributed to the collapse of the GKR.

America contributed to the disaster in Cambodia not because it did too much but because it did too little. In 1970, after American and South Vietnamese troops withdrew from their brief incursion into the sanctuaries - designed to destroy North Vietnamese base areas from which American and South Vietnamese had been killed for years - antiwar critics sought to achieve by legislation what had eluded them in the street demonstrations of May 1970. Between 1970 and the end of the war, the following restrictions on American assistance to Cambodia were passed into law, always over Nixon's veto or vigorous objections:

. The Fulbright amendment to the Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization for Fiscal Year 1971, enacted on October 7, 1970, specified that South Vietnamese and other free world forces (such as Thailand's) could not use funds provided by the act to furnish military support and assistance to Cambodia. It also prohibited South Vietnamese or other free world forces from transferring to Cambodia any military supplies furnished under the act. Thus the ceiling placed on our aid was imposed as well on our allies in Southeast Asia, as if our primary national problem was to close every loophole by which Cambodia might be aided. It was passed three months after our incursion was over and on the same day that Nixon offered a cease-fire throughout Indochina - which the Communists quickly rejected.

. The Cooper-Church amendment to the Supplementary Foreign Assistance Act of 1970, enacted on January 5, 1971, prohibited the use of funds for "the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisors." Thus the United States was barred by law from giving the Cambodians the kind of advice and training that they needed to become an effective fighting force.

. The Symington-Case amendment to the Substitute Foreign Assistance Act and Related Assistance Act, enacted on February 7, 1972, limited the total number of "Civilian officers and employees of executive agencies of the United States government who are United States citizens" in Cambodia to 200 at any one time. It also limited the number of third country nations employed by the United States in Cambodia to 85. This made any effective military or civilian advice to the Cambodians impossible.

. The Second Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1973 (signed into law reluctantly by Nixon on July 1, 1973) prohibited the use of funds appropriated in the act to "support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam." Also, it prohibited any funds appropriated under any act to be used after August 15 for the above purposes. Thus any American military action anywhere in or around Indochina became illegal. With it vanished any Communist fear of a penalty for violating the Agreement.

. The Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1974 likewise prohibited the use of any funds to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by U.S. forces "in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia." This continued the prohibition of the previous year.

. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which became law on December 17, 1973, provided that no funds authorized or appropriated under any provision of law would be available to finance military or paramilitary combat operations by foreign forces in Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam or Thailand unless such operations were conducted by the forces of the recipient government within its borders. This meant that allies like Thailand, threatened from Indochina, could not use our equipment - and therefore not their forces - to assist the countries whose survival they judged important to their security.

In addition, the Congress limited by any aid for Cambodia to \$250 - \$300 million a year, about 2 percent of what was being spent to help Vietnam.

These cumulative constraints not only prevented effective American assistance; they also precluded our allies in South-east Asia from committing the horrible offense of helping their Cambodian neighbors. Military advisers were prohibited, which our Embassy in Phnom Penh interpreted to bar even field trips by our military attaches. Thus the Cambodian army grew in size but not in competence. Our restrictions forced it to rely on firepower rather than mobility (and the rigidity our critics imposed was then used by them as an indictment of the Cambodians' military effort). To stave off disaster we could look only to American air power - until that too was prohibited.⁷

All of the above restrictions contributed to the Khmer Communist victory in 1975. Those individuals tasked with administering the Military Assistance Program to Cambodia, however, were faced with countless problems from these restrictions.

Due to the Symington-Case amendment, the United States mission in Phnom Penh was forced to send official personnel out of Cambodia for any temporary additions to the staff. The use of Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) to assist FANK was restricted due to this "headspace" problem. No buffer existed for the use of such teams. Had the limitation of 200 personnel been increased, additional MTT personnel could have been used to improve critical operations within FANK. As it existed, the United States Embassy and MEDTC were forced to interrupt operations and send critically needed personnel out of Cambodia to Thailand in order to have additional personnel in-country. The headspace problem likewise precluded any smooth transition for new replacements arriving in Cambodia.

MEDTC initiated End Item Utilization Inspections (E.I.U.I.'s) to ensure the proper use of United States equipment by the various Khmer units. This was perhaps a circumvention of the law, as United States officers were assigned to monitor specific FANK units, which may have been involved in combat operations. E.I.U.I.'s involved frequent trips

to the units, and inevitably involved assisting these units with "suggestions", although not officially advising.

The officers of the Defense Attache Office (DAC) likewise spent the majority of their time commuting to the field with FANK units, doing what they could to assist them and report on their operations.

The final fate of the GKR apparently was evident early in the United States assistance program. General William C. Westmoreland in his book A Soldier Reports, published in 1976, describes as Chief of Staff in 1971 the following statement on his view of survival for the GKR:

The final collapse came in Cambodia on April 17, 1975, even before the end in South Vietnam. The Lon Nol government held out militarily almost until the end, but as I had discerned during my visit to Phnom Penh as Chief of Staff in 1971, there was really no hope for Cambodia. Even though President Nixon had looked upon Cambodia as an ideal example of the so-called "Nixon Doctrine," whereby the United States would provide the means of self-defense but no troops, financial and military aid was not enough, in view of North Vietnamese support that as early as 1969 involved importing cadres of Khmer Rouge insurgents into North Vietnam for the same kind of training earlier provided VC cadres from South Vietnam. Although Prince Sihanouk had maintained a kind of perilous neutrality even as the Khmer Rouge gradually extended their areas of the country for operations against South Vietnam, that kind of neutrality would have been short-lived even had Lon Nol and his colleagues not ousted Sihanouk. The brief incursions by American and South Vietnamese forces in 1970 did nothing to hasten Khmer Rouge successes; they would have come, unless there was major American commitment, in any case. The only real question was whether the downfall would be through a military or a political solution.⁸

Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, remarked in his book Years of Upheaval on the fate of Cambodia:

After the summer of 1973, I knew that Cambodia was doomed and that only a miracle could save South Vietnam. North Vietnamese communications to us grew progressively more insolent. There was no longer even the pretense of observing the Paris

Agreement. And our legislated impotence added humiliation to irrelevance. We struggled to furnish what economic and military aid for South Vietnam and Cambodia was obtainable from Congress.

But the reasoning that had led to the legislated bombing halt also produced a systematic drop in aid levels. By the spring of 1975, Congress was considering a derisory "terminal grant" - as if Saigon and Phnom Penh were the beneficiaries of some charity - when the accumulated strains led to their collapse and spared us that ultimate disgrace. In 1973 in my bones I knew that collapse was just a question of time.⁹

Cambodia, therefore, had only little chance for survival. Why, then, did the United States not change its policy to Cambodia? Our policy makers made a commitment and, understandably, fought to increase assistance as the KC threat increased. The United States program had to change if the GKR was to survive - it did not. Those tasked with implementing the assistance program did what they could on a daily, short term basis to assist FANK.

MEDTC Performance

MEDTC's role in achieving United States objectives was to administer and direct the Military Assistance Program, a task which involved developing a close working relationship with the FANK at all levels; determining FANK needs and capabilities; coordinating the transfer of MAP material and services; reporting on the utilization of the equipment provided and providing the focal point for information on MAP-CB.

General Palmer's End of Tour Report describes MEDTC's performance and problems:

In spite of the myriad of Congressional limitations placed on the Team's activities, the unprecedented program turbulence generated by uncertain funding levels, and the body blow to FANK's morale which negated public debate on increased aid created from as early as October 1974, MEDTC, magnificantly supported by higher and coordinate headquarters, successfully

accomplished its most rudimentary mission -- the logistical support of the Khmer Armed Forces. However, those same, strictly implemented Congressional limitations prevented the effective transfer of American technical expertise, military skills, leadership traits and professional attitudes to the FANK in enough quantity to offset their considerable, and repeatedly identified, deficiencies in each of those areas. FANK failure to redress those deficiencies coupled with inadequate, uncertain and untimely MAP-CB funding caused its defeat and the failure of the U.S. to achieve its stated Security Assistance Objectives.

Whether by lack of external support or by self-destructive practices within, it is certain that morale and will to resist within FANK gave way before the material means to do so were totally depleted.¹⁰

MEDTC successfully accomplished its mission until the collapse of the GKR. (See Annex V, MEDTC Meritorious Unit Citation for a description of the Teams accomplishments.) All members of the Team did all that was possible to assist the GKR in its survival. There were, unfortunately, too few MEDTC personnel and too many restrictions on their activities.

FANK Problems

Following the United States bombing halt in 1973, FANK heavily relied on firepower to offset the leadership and manpower deficiencies. Due to escalating munitions costs and reduced funding, FANK was required to rely on manpower; however, FANK never effectively increased its combat units. With the initial expansion of FANK it became evident that a leadership base did not exist for new units. Units such as the Mechanized squadrons and the parachute brigade distinguished themselves from other FANK units by their professional competence and leadership. This professionalism was probably the result of a combination of factors which included their training and relatively small expansion when compared to

other FANK units. As FANK increasingly employed and relied upon these excellent units, they were unable to replace many of the competent commanders killed and wounded, gradually, resulting in a decrease in their effectiveness.

Directly related to FANKs leadership problem was the "phantom" problem which resulted in grossly understrength units. One battalion commander in Siem Reap turned pale when his reportedly full strength unit was ordered to deploy to Phnom Penh in 1975; he had carried over 400 lucrative "phantoms" on his payroll roster, but in reality only had 40 combat effective troops. Officers in Battambang were helpless in 1975 when hitherto weak enemy units began a surprisingly successful offensive; the preponderance of "phantoms and absence of capable leadership precluded any reasonable defense."

Conclusions

Many factors including those previously discussed in this chapter contributed to the collapse of the GKR. The following are extracted from BG Palmer's End of Tour Report explaining the failure of the United States Military Assistance Program and the collapse of the GKR.

. The MAP system is neither sufficiently flexible nor responsive enough to meet the needs of an army at war. CRA funding, reduced budgets, and inflationary prices did not permit the attainment of the complete force structure, particularly with respect to combat service support units. Procurement of combat loss and attrition material also was not achieved, thereby reducing the Army combat capability. Uncertain funding contributed to a lack of offensive spirit in the top leadership of FANK. Procedures do not presently exist for program flexibility and timeliness of response to rapidly changing situations. ||

. FANK had made some management and tactical progress in many areas by 1974; however, many critical problems remained and significantly contributed to the collapse of the GKR. These included:

(1) A generally corrupt and incompetent officer corps, uneven leadership, an innate lack of sense of urgency, and fragmentation of authority led to untimely and ineffective decisionmaking in the FANK. These leadership deficiencies either led directly to or were instrumental in most other shortcomings of the Khmer Armed Forces. Firepower, obility and material advantages are no substitute for effective leadership at all levels.

(2) Poor manpower management, ineffective recruiting, inability to control desertions or correct military pay deficiencies and failure to ameliorate the "phantom" problem resulted in grossly understrength Army units incapable of performing sustained combat missions. Poorly conceived and improperly executed training, coupled with mal-assignment of trained personnel exacerbated desertions and combat unit deficiencies.

(3) The lack of a joint staff in fact, or even joint effort in spirit, caused ill-conceived, poorly planned and frequently uncoordinated joint operations. "Team spirit" in pursuit of common objectives was seldom evidenced by FANK, at any level, despite concerted MEDTC efforts to instill it.

. The psychological impact of uncertain funding, highlighted by U.S. public debate on its merit, permeated FANK to its lowest leadership levels, with considerable adverse effect on morale.

. There were too few MEDTC personnel and too many restrictions on their activities for the Team to completely monitor the entire MAP and effectively apply its professional expertise to improving the FANK.

. Third country nationals and technical assistance contacts, both in-and out-of-country, are indispensable to a MAP effort involving an embryonic host country technical base and severe limitations on the use of U.S. military personnel.¹²

. Reliance on firepower. General Palmer's report noted that FANK was originally conceived as a "light infantry force" designed to fight "Khmer Insurgents". When it became apparent that the "insurgents" were rapidly evolving into main force units in their own right, the United States objective of keeping FANK alive and the GKR viable was assured through the quick fix of massive United States airpower. With the United States bombing halt in August 1973, the Khmer Army artillery

and tactical air inventories were augmented because this solution provided less expensive and politically more palatable sources of firepower to offset the leadership and manpower deficiencies in the Khmer Armed Forces. As that firepower was increasingly denied to them because of escalating munitions costs and reduced funding, the only remaining option appeared to be manpower.

However, the Army's inability even to maintain the strength of its intervention brigades, let alone achieve significant growth, soon became self-evident. Moreover, serious leadership and training deficiencies, combined with the absence of any United States advisory or training effort, obviated major changes in the Khmer force structure, battlefield tactics or doctrinal reliance on firepower, even if sufficient time had been available.

In sum, the United States taught the Khmer Armed Forces to survive through firepower. FANK was equipped with the means to employ it in large amounts. Outside sources of firepower were withdrawn so that they relied solely on their own firepower assets. Firepower and the logistics to support it became the two most important advantages FANK had over the KC, and by 1974 it was too late to change that orientation to any extent in the short term. Therefore, as escalating prices drove munitions costs progressively higher, increasing rather than decreasing levels of MAP funding were necessary to promote successful achievement of United States objectives in Cambodia.

General Cleland's conclusions in 1974 included:

- . MAP aid has been the single most significant factor influencing the GKR and FANK to continue fighting.

- . The "on again, off again" nature of CRA/MAP funding unnecessarily complicated the MEDTC force structure planning/equipment delivery mission.

. U.S. policy in Cambodia was guided by "Vietnamization", thus failing to consider Cambodia within its own specific context or within the perspective of Indochina as a whole. DRV policy to date has taken the better account of both individual Cambodian realities and long term DRV geopolitical objectives.¹³

Recommendation for Future MAP Programs

MG Cleland's recommendations included several significant observations which remain valid for future United States Military Assistance Programs.

1. The commitment of U.S. money and prestige via military assistance must be carefully considered if objectives to be achieved by such assistance are dependent upon "peace" to be achieved elsewhere.

2. A detailed assessment of the time, money, and level of U.S. involvement required to sufficiently upgrade a host army, compared to its adversary's level of effectiveness, should be the basis for deciding whether U.S. interests are sufficiently vital to warrant military assistance to an underdeveloped nation engaged in an active war.

3. If the U.S. is to become involved via resources and prestige committed, the U.S. military mission should have flexibility in terms of the mechanics of funding and freedom from arbitrary political restraints sufficient to accomplish U.S. objectives.¹⁴

MG Cleland likewise stated that military assistance funding of an active war should be via Military Assistance Service Funded vice Military Assistance Program. The relative inflexibility of MAP procedures under wartime conditions was initially discussed by BG Mataxis in February 1972; however, this problem remained a constant constraint in the execution of the Military Assistance Program to Cambodia throughout the entire life of the program.

A significant factor which contributed to the collapse of the GKR was the nature of Cambodia society itself and FANK as a reflection of that society.

The French in Indochina said that the Vietnamese would make the rice grow, the Cambodians would watch it grow, and the Laotians would listen to it grow. They also delineated between the various capitals of Indochina by classifying Hanoi as the industrial and educational, Saigon as the commercial, Phnom Penh as the provincial, and Vientiane as the rural.

These Gallic Witticisms, coupled with some French commercial interests, a few public works, and a taste for French culture among the Phnom Penh elite, constitute practically the sum total of 90 years of French presence in Cambodia. No real effort was made to alter Cambodian society or its institutions. This suited the Cambodians, since they are possessed of an agricultural abundance compared to population, and a gentle climate. One does not, or did not, have to work very hard to survive in Cambodia, and most Cambodians did little of the former but managed the latter quite nicely. The role of minor craftsman or lower ranking functionary was filled by Vietnamese. The business world was dominated by Chinese. The French administered the country in conjunction with the existing mandarinat, exploited their limited commercial interests, and generally proved unobtrusive. They also kept the Thai's and Vietnamese, Cambodia's traditional enemies, from territorial expansion at Cambodia's expense. The King lived in splendid, if slightly mad, isolation in the royal palace. Ten years before France annexed Cambodia, it was a decentralized, paternalistic, traditionalist society ruled by an erratic king. Ten years after the French amicably departed, Cambodia was a decentralized, paternalistic, traditionalist society ruled by an erratic King/president.

It is important to realize that the Cambodian leaders with whom the U.S. has chosen to associate itself reflect the above background and thus impacts directly on the manner in which the GKR and FANK conduct the war.¹⁵

The final Khmer Communist victory on the battlefield was never assured until the last days of the war. In five years of war, the KC came into its own as a substantially matured military force. The GKR/FANK did not, resulting in the defeat of the GKR's armed forces, the fall of the Khmer Republic, and the failure of the United States Security Assistance effort.

When MEDTC, from its rear base in Thailand, was asked how much military equipment of FANK had been captured by the KC, one MEDTC officer summed up the amount very simply as "the equipment of a light

infantry force" capable of combating "Khmer insurgents", and possessing light artillery and no tanks; a small but separate air force, with limited airlift and strike capability; and a navy capable of limited surveillance and protection of the coastline and riverine operations.¹⁶

Cambodia Under the KC

Since the KC victory in 1975, a genocide has been reported in Cambodia. The total number of killed is unknown, however, what is known is that the KC initiated a new holocaust. Was a "blood bath" expected? On 9 July 1974 when Oudong, the former Royal capital was retaken by FANK, scores of skeletons were uncovered with their hands tied and heads lying nearby. Many ignored this as an isolated incident; however, it actually was an indication of future KC policy.

In summary, it is hoped that this study will be of assistance not only to military historians, but to those who may at some future time be charged with determining policy and organization, military doctrine, training and tactics for the security assistance effort should the United States again be charged with providing support under special circumstances similar to those obtained in Cambodia.

One quote for future United States Military Assistance Programs deserves special attention. During the final days of the Khmer Republic, MEDTC's counterparts in FANK's logistics directorate were clearly able to see the end nearing, as funding and ammunition reached the critical level. One FANK officer stated the following to a MEDTC officer:

"You know, Cambodians don't like the Thai's. A few years from now the Vietnamese will pressure Thailand, who will ask for U.S. assistance. As much as I hate the Thai's, don't help them the way you helped us."¹⁷

CHAPTER ELEVEN

ENDNOTES

¹End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1972-1974. MG John R.D. Cleland, 20 February 1973, pp. 13-14.

²Letter from Mr. Jonathan F. Ladd to author, 16 February 1983.

³BG Theodore C. Mataxis, "Cambodia: A New Model for Military Assistance," Army Magazine, January 1973.

⁴End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1974-1975. BG William W. Palmer, 30 April 1975, p. 10.

⁵Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston - Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 339.

⁶*Ibid*, Cleland, p. 16.

⁷Kissinger, pp. 337-339.

⁸General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976) p. 490.

⁹Kissinger, pp. 369-370.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, Palmer, p. 14.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. G-13.

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

¹³*Ibid.*, Cleland, p. 17.


¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁶Interview, LTC D. Riggs, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 1982.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 22 April 1983.

ANNEX A



ANNEX A

CHRONOLOGY

- 1960 King dies, Sihanouk elected Chief of state by assembly.
- January 14, 1962 Sihanouk in speech to students in France indicates Communist may rule Asia.
- 1963 Cambodia stops U.S. aid (\$400 million 1955-1963, 4/5 economic). U.S. interests represented by Australia. August Cambodia breaks relations with RVN. Leaders of the left-wing opposition to Sihanouk leave Phnom Penh for the jungle and mountains.
- 1964 Cambodian Government inspired mob burns U.S. Embassy.
- 1965 May 3, Cambodia breaks relations with U.S.
- 1966-67 Sihanouk allows the Vietnamese Communists use of border areas and use of port at Sihanoukville. 1967 Sihanouk's armed forces crush a left-wing peasant revolt in Battambang province. More left-wingist flee Phnom Penh to "les Khmer Rouges" faction.
- 1968 10 January, U.S. Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles visits Cambodia to solicit Sihanouk's private concurrence of bombing VC/NVA in unpopulated sanctuary areas within Cambodia. Explores restoration of relations between Cambodia and U.S.
- 30 January. Tet offensive by VC/NVA launched partially from Cambodia.
- 1969
- January-February Sihanouk orders Cambodian Army to drive NVA out of Highway 19 area. Results in Cambodian Army being mauled.
- February 9 General Creighton Abrams, Commander of U.S. forces, Vietnam, requests B-52 strikes on Communist base areas in Cambodia.

March 17	President Nixon approves General Abrams' request.
March 18	Operation BREAKFAST, B-52 strike against Base Area 353, takes place.
May 9	New York Times reports U.S. B-52 strikes inside Cambodia.
June 11	Sihanouk announces that Cambodian-U.S. relations will be restored.
July 25	President Nixon announces the "Nixon Doctrine" on future U.S. commitments in Asia.
November	U.S. air strike in Cambodia results in 25 civilians killed. Protests follow.
<u>1970</u>	
January 7	Sihanouk leaves for France for medical treatment.
February 20	U.S. apologizes for killing 35 civilians in air strike.
March 11	An estimated 20,000 Cambodians demonstrate against Vietnamese Communist presence in Cambodia and sack North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Embassies in Phnom Penh.
March 18	Sihanouk deposed as Cambodia's head of state while on trip to Moscow and Peking. Power is seized by Prime Minister, General Lon Nol, Prince Sirik Matak and Cheng Heng.
March 19	U.S. states that Sihanouk has been legally deposed.
March 23	In Peking, Sihanouk announces the formation of a National United Front of Kampuchea with his former enemies, the Khmer Rouge, to struggle against the Lon Nol government.
April 14	Prime Minister Lon Nol makes an international appeal for aid.
April 20	President Nixon announces the withdrawal of 150,000 troops from Vietnam.
April 30	President Nixon announces incursion into areas of Cambodia occupied by NVA and VC. States mission is to destroy "COSVN".
May 1	32,000 U.S. troops enter Cambodia, 48,000 ARVN. Move only 20 miles into Cambodia. Cambodian Government

notified by U.S. 1 hour after President Nixon's TV speech. Prime Minister Lon Nol states that U.S.-ARVN operation was mounted without his approval or knowledge.

- May 5 In Peking, Sihanouk announces the formation of a government in exile, the Royal National Union Government of Kampuchea. His government is immediately recognized by China and North Vietnam.
- May 6 China, North Vietnam and North Korea break diplomatic relations with Cambodia.
- May 11 The Senate takes the first step to approve an amendment introduced by Senator Sherman Cooper and Senator Frank Church to prevent any future U.S. military operations in Cambodia.
- May 25 French press reports fall of Prek Kak rubber plantation to NVA. Cambodian militia receives heavy casualties.
- May 27 Cambodia and RVN sign agreement. ARVN to remain in Cambodian areas until mission completed.
- June 29 U.S. ground troops withdraw from Cambodia.
- June 30 President Nixon reports to nation, praises "successful" completion of the Cambodian "incursion".
- July 5 A Cambodian court condemns Sihanouk to death on grounds of treason and corruption.
- August 1 Radio FUNK established according to the GRUNK press office.
- August 10 Clandestine Agence Khmere de l'Information (AKI) launched.
- August 13 The last contingent of Vietnamese residents of Cambodia leave Phnom Penh port for repatriation to South Vietnam. Tens of thousands died in an anti-Vietnamese program in the wake of Sihanouk's deposition.
- August 17 Trial in absentia of 32 "accomplices" of Norodom Sihanouk. Seventeen condemned to death for treason through passing intelligence to a foreign power. Monique and her mother are sentenced to life at labor. Eleven receive 20 years at hard labor; all are deprived of Khmer nationality and their goods are seized.

August 20	By exchange of letters, U.S. and Cambodia enter into agreement concerning the regulation of military assistance furnished to Cambodia.
August 28	Vice President Agnew visits Phnom Penh and lunches with Chief of State Cheng Heng.
August-September	Cambodian army fails to open Route 6.
September 2	Foreign Minister Koun Wick leaves for the Lusaka Conference of Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers. The Conference decided not to seat either the GKR or Sihanouk's GRUNK.
September 8	Government launches largest offensive of the war to relieve Kompong Thom by land and water. Fifteen hundred troops arrive by water two days later.
September 15	Emory Swank presents letters of credence as first U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia since relations were restored in 1969.
October 7	The National Assembly votes approval of the law proclaiming the Khmer Republic.
October 9-11	Proclamation of the Republic and three-day holiday. A new Khmer flag unveiled.
October 14	The National Assembly votes a law liberalizing rice and maize export-import operations and stipulating that only rubber, precious stones and certain other products will remain state monopolies. All other export-import operations are open to the private and public sectors.
October 22	The Ministry of Information denies press reports that the GKR seeks to compromise with the North Vietnamese by offering them control of the northeastern provinces.
November 2	Chief of State Cheng Heng returns to Cambodia from the 25th UNGA and a visit to Japan. He was received by the Emperor of Japan October 20. President Nixon received him October 25.
November 10	Tran Van Phuoc presents his credentials as GVN Ambassador to the Khmer Republic.
November 16	Initialling of a 5-point GVN-GKR agreement on frontiers, tourism, postal service, road transport and Mekong navigation.

December 1 Time bomb explodes in American Embassy with no deaths and little damage.

December 1-5 Khmer Thai negotiations on the continental shelf result in a communique promising only further meetings.

December 9 Asian Parliamentary Union admits GKR to full membership at its Saigon Conference. Ung Mung, National Assembly Second Vice President, led the Khmer Delegation.

December 14 Case of former Kratie Commander Colonel Cheng Sayamborn and accomplices opens before the Military Tribunal. He was sentenced to death, imprisoned and escaped in late 1971 to Bangkok. He later returned to Cambodia as an insurgent commander.

December 22 The Cooper-Church amendment becomes law and prohibits the use of authorized funds for sending American troops into Cambodia or for attaching American advisors to Cambodian forces. It proclaims that any assistance given by the U.S. does not constitute a commitment by the U.S. to the defense of Cambodia.

December 29-30 Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman arrived in Phnom Penh for a two-day visit to sign five Khmero-Thai economic cooperation agreements.

1971

January 5 Congress approved authorization bill PL-91-652 for \$85 million for additional military assistance for Cambodia, \$70 million for "special" economic assistance and \$100 million to replace funds transferred from other programs for use in Cambodia during FY 1971.

January 8 Congress approves PL-91-665, an appropriation bill for military and economic assistance to Cambodia.

January 10 The Military Equipment Delivery Team is formed with 16 personnel in Phnom Penh and 44 in Saigon.

January 13 Combined Khmer-Vietnamese operation launched to reopen Route 4 in several places.

GVN Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky visits Kompong Som and Phnom Penh.

January 20-21	Prime Minister Lon Nol officially visits South Vietnam.
January 21	Information Minister Keuky Lim announces a plan to release 17 NVA prisoners in return for 17 journalists.
	Successful sapper attack on Pochentong airfield. Three-fourths of the Cambodian Air Force is destroyed on the ground.
January 27	Route 4 reopened to traffic after hard fighting.
January 31	MEDTC "officially" activated.
February 3	Nong Kimmy presents his credentials as Khmer Ambassador to Thailand.
February 10	Government spokesman announces suspension of all Lon Nol's activities for reasons of health. The Prime Minister had suffered a severe stroke.
February 11	Takeo Governor, General Neak San, killed on the battlefield.
February 13	Lon Nol leaves for Hawaii for treatment of disabilities resulting from his stroke. General Kang Keng accompanies him. Sirik Matak is to act as Prime Minister and Defense Minister.
February 18	Sihanouk's party, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum is dissolved in a party congress presided over by Cheng Heng. The Central Committee of the Sangum decided on the dissolution January 25.
February	Since March 1970, U.S. supplied \$33 million in military aid (30,000 carbines, 12,000 M-1 rifles, 60 trucks, 6 helicopters, 4 howitzers, 400 radios and U.S. air support).
March 1	Clandestine AKI reports attack on Kompong Som petroleum refinery. The refinery was 80% destroyed.
March 2	U.S.-Khmer negotiations on economic assistance to Cambodia conclude with \$8.5 million in PL-480 commodities, in addition to \$70 million in economic assistance.
March 26	Twenty-five M-113 armored personnel carriers given under the U.S. Military Assistance Program arrive at Phnom Penh port.

March 27	The USG agrees to provide \$10 million more in CIP aid bringing the total CIP program to \$20 million.
April 3-6	The Military Tribunal sentences Norodom Naradipo, Sihanouk's son to five years of forced labor and acquits Botum Bopha, Sihanouk's daughter. The two and others were accused of passing intelligence to a foreign power.
April 12	Lon Nol returns from Hawaii (see February 13).
April 20	Sirik Matak informs the Cabinet of Lon Nol's resignation as Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and FANK Chief of Staff, for reasons of health.
April 21	Cheng Heng accepts Lon Nol's resignation adding that he designates Lon Nol, in consultation with the Presidents of the two Parliamentary chambers, to constitute a new government.
	The National Assembly, In Tam presiding, votes a unanimous resolution conferring the title of Marshal Lon Nol for his services to the nation.
April 29	Lon Nol informs Chief of State Cheng Heng that his health prevents his forming a new government.
May 3	In Tam declines to form a government; Lon Nol unanimously designated to resolve the cabinet crisis in a meeting among In Tam, Ong Sim, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak. Chuop Hell and Sirik Matak had declined to form governments earlier in the week.
May 6	Reshuffled cabinet invested Sirik Matak as Prime Minister delegate with In Tam, Sek Chhong and Hang Tnun Hak as First, Second and Third Vice Premiere.
May 7	First convoy since February successfully travels Route 5.
May 11	Yem Sambaur, former Minister of Justice, elected President of the National Assembly replacing In Tam.
May 20	Lt. Col. Lon Non opens operation AKINETH MOHA PADHEVATH to reopen Route 3 between Tran Khra and Ang Tassom.
May 22-24	Undersecretary of State John Irwin visits Cambodia
May 25-26	Tran Thien Khiem, GVN Prime Minister visits Cambodia at Prime Minister Lon Nol's invitation.

May 30 Public demonstrations in Oudong, north of Phnom Penh, protest sharply rising food prices.

May 31 USG and GKR sign a \$50 million economic agreement for import financing.

June 4 GKR and GVN sign Mutual Assistance Accords covering transit and customs fraud repression.

June 6 Sihanouk announces that Defense Minister Khieu Samphan is Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian Peoples Liberation Armed Forces

June Draft CIA paper provides first substantial U.S. intelligence analysis on KR. Claims strength at 100,000. Source: Sam Adams, resigned CIA officer.

JCS proposes \$350 million in aid for Cambodia. Secretary of Defense Laird disagrees with amount and proposes \$200 million.

June 11 GKR in an open message proposes to make the Angkor WAT area a demilitarized neutral zone under international control in order to preserve the monuments.

June 15 Operation AKINET ends (see May 20) with link-up of force from Tran Khra and Ang Tassom.

June 25 Government troops win their biggest victory as their opponents retire from the Tonle Toch area. Twelve thousand of the GKR's best troops took part. ARVN helicopters ferried two Khmer Krom battalions into the action.

August 20 Operation CHENLA II launched.

August 24 FANK units reach Rumlong, the first objective of Operation CHENLA II.

August 26 FANK retakes Barai during CHENLA II.

September 1 FANK reaches Kompong Thmar on Route 6 technically completing Operation CHENLA II but decides to press on.

September 4 Sirik Matak tells the press about August trip to the USA.

September 15 Foreign Minister Kour Wick leads the Khmer delegation to the 26th UNGA. The Khmer express liveliest regrets that Taiwan was expelled and bow before the majority decision to admit Red China.

September 19	Sappers destroy some Phnom Penh petroleum storage facilities.
September 20	FANK forces retake TANG KRASANG.
September 23	First Deputy Prime Minister In Tam resigns.
September 24	The UN and Japanese-supported Prek Thnaot hydro-electric and irrigation project is attacked with damage to construction equipment.
October 4	National Assembly votes the law creating the Ecole Nationale d'Administration. Sihanouk had suppressed the former Royal Administrative School.
October 5	Government forces open Route 6 to Kompong Thom.
October 18	Parliament becomes a Constituent Assembly as its term, prolonged the legal maximum of one year, expires.
October 20	Cabinet reshuffled. Lon Nol declares a state of emergency.
October 25.	First phase of CHENLA II declared officially at an end.
October 27	CHENLA II forces are hit from the flanks on Route 6.
October 28	Second Deputy Premier Sok Chhang gave a speech explaining the economic stabilization program. Budgetary deficits and control of inflation, require new tax measures he said. The perequation tax would be suppressed and import taxes on unessentials increased. Interest rates on bank deposits were increased. From October 29, a three list system of imports would eliminate most restrictions on imports: the first list would be exclusively for U.S. CIP goods; the second or general imports list would be those products eligible for financing under compensated exchange and without foreign exchange. Only the third list would continue to need import licenses. The exchange rate was also to be permitted to float and importers would bid for foreign exchange.
November 8	In Tam elected Chairman of the Constituent Assembly.
December 1	CHENLA II forces, after over a month of retreats, abandon major positions along Route 6 and fall back in disorder with heavy losses.

1972

- January 20 VC/NVA order French led conservation work at Angkor Wat halted. The GKR again appeals for internationalization and demilitarization of the ruins.
- January 29 Operation ANKOR CHEY launched.
- January 30 FANK forces fire at the moon during an eclipse with seven killed and 105 wounded by stray and spent rounds.
- The GKR recognizes Bangla Desh.
- February 5 The U.S. Senate Refugee Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee reports that two million Cambodians have been made homeless by the war.
- February 9 Chief of State Cheng Heng presides over a special meeting in which the Cabinet supported the November 27, 1971 ASEAN declaration on the neutralization of South-east Asia.
- February 29 A Decree creates the Exchange Support Fund to assist financing foreign exchange costs for imports to the civilian sector. Australia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States and the Khmer Republic contributed a total of \$34.5 million for the Fund's operation, initially scheduled to run from March 1, 1972 to the end of the year.
- March 3 Education Minister Pan Sothi temporarily calms students outraged at Sirik Matak's dismissal of Law Faculty Dean Keo An. The Minister spoke at a mass meeting of law and students from other faculties who saw the right of free expression threatened.
- March 5 Sihanouk raises his claim to 80 percent of Cambodia's territory and seventy percent of the people.
- March 8 Prime Minister Delegate Sirik Matak issues a statement in the wake of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green's March 7 visit, expressing the complete satisfaction of the GKR with Green's explanations on President Nixon's visit to China. Sirik Matak assured the Khmer people that Khmer-U.S. relations remained unchanged and that assistance would continue.
- March 9 ARVN's Operation TOAN THANG VIII launched North of Svay Rieng.

March 10 Chief of State Cheng Heng resigns transferring his powers to Prime Minister Lon Nol. Lon Nol accepted and immediately dissolved the Constituent Assembly expressing disagreement with the Assembly's amendments to the first draft of the new Constitution written earlier by the "enlarged committee" of 230 delegates chosen from ministries and various private and public bodies. The Cabinet immediately resigned but will stay on until replaced.

March 12 Lon Nol assumes the title President and the functions of Prime Minister and Chief of the Armed Forces.

March 16 Sirik Matak declares over Phnom Penh radio that he would not take part in the new government in formation, and says he seeks to leave public life. Students continue to attack the Prime Minister-Delegate pending proof he will not be included in any new government.

North Korea and the GRUNK Minister of Military Equipment, Lt. Gen. Duong Sam Ol, sign an agreement to provide unspecified North Korean military aid to GRUNK.

March 20 Enemy rocket/mortary attack on Phnom Penh.

March 21 Lon Nol announces the formation of a new government presided over by Son Ngoc Thanh as "First Minister". Radio Phnom Penh had announced Son Ngoc Thanh's new duties on March 18.

March 23 Cargo vessel sunk and another damaged on Mekong near Chruoy Chang War Naval Base.

March 24 KC damage Chruoy Chang War Bridge.

March 29 Operation TOAN THANG VIII ends. 764 enemy reported killed.

April 3 Clandestine radio announces establishment of a FUNK Committee for Phnom Penh headed by Prince Norodom Phurissara who fled to the insurgent area some weeks previously.

Student agitation in Phnom Penh subsided as the government waxed conciliatory and gave the impression of accepting their demands including a youth assembly.

April 27 Bullets hit about 20 students as military police fired when rock-throwing students tried to break

through a police cordon to join other students harboring agitator Koy Pech who was ordered arrested after criticizing the government in an April 24 telecast. Mass demonstrations resulted with the government denying that any fatalities occurred. No bodies were ever found.

April 30

Voters resoundingly approve the draft Constitution for the Khmer Republic. Official final results showed an 81 percent turnout of the 2 million registered voters; 1.6 million voted in favor, 41,000 against, and 866 ballots were void. Former National Assembly President In Tam and lawyer Douc Rasy had criticized the Constitution for giving excessive power to the executive at the expense of the legislative branch.

May 3

Student demonstrators vacate the Independence Monument but stayed on strike until May 8.

May 6

More than 100 rockets, mortars and recoilless rifle rounds hit the city, the airport and the naval base killing 28 and injuring 96. Two VC/NVA ground probes against the Monivong Bridge, the CALTEX storage facilities and the generating plant are repulsed.

May 10

Sirik Matak is appointed Special Counselor to Lon Nol triggering student agitation including posters attacking the Marshal by name for the first time.

May 11

The Constitution of the Khmer Republic is promulgated following the April 30 referendum approving it.

May 20

Presidential campaign opens with In Tam, Keo An and Lon Nol candidates. In accordance with the new Constitution, Sim Var, Ambassador to Tokyo, was rejected because his wife is not Khmer.

During the week of May 13 two political parties surface. The Socio-Republican Association, less a break-away section led by pro-Sirik Matak politician Tep Khunnah, and In Tam's revived Democratic group, applied for registration as parties. The Socio-Republicans include an alliance between supporters and Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh and the Marshal's brother Colonel Lon Non.

GRUNK Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak telegraphs UNESCO expressing reservations regarding the GKR request to inscribe the Angkor monuments under the protective

clauses of the Hague Convention. He declares that the GKR is not qualified to represent Cambodia and the monuments are in a GRUNK-controlled zone.

- June 4 Lon Nol defeats In Tam and Keo An in the Republic's first Presidential election. Ministry of the Interior figures gave 1.1 million of 1.8 million registered voters actually voting. Lon Nol receives 579,000 (55 percent); In Tam get 257,000 (24 percent); and Keo An, 117,000 (21 percent). Law professor Keo An had capitalized on pro-Sihanouk sentiment announcing at once that he would permit the deposed leader to return "as a private citizen". In Tam promised to reform the army but leave military affairs to the military.
- June 8 Eighteen 122mm rockets land in downtown Phnom Penh. Takhmau City simultaneously receives a severe attack by fire followed by a ground probe during which the Kandal governor is seriously wounded.
- June 14. The Republican Party was informally launched with Sirik Matak Acting Secretary-General.
- Khmer Student Association President Im You Hay resigns under pressure of students who claim that he exceeded his authority in associating the student group with Marshal Lon Nol's campaign.
- June 15 The Provisional Constitutional Court proclaims Lon Nol President of the Khmer Republic. While admitting some electoral irregularities, the Court rejects the appeals of candidates In Tam and Kao An on the grounds that these irregularities did not materially affect the final result.
- June 19 Sihanouk arrives in Rumania to begin the first leg of the first trip out of China's Asian orbit since his overthrow. He will proceed to Algeria, Mauritania, Yugoslavia and Albania.
- June 27 A strick new press law is promulgated. The government is empowered to seize an issue prior to the distribution and to levy fines and prison terms on violators and seize their presses. Top editors require government licenses. Prior censorship, however, is not provided for.
- July 2 The Democratic Party Congress elects a 21-member National Committee with In Tam as president and Chau Sau of the National Bank as Secretary-General.
- July 3 Lon Nol is invested as President of the Khmer Republic.

- July 9 The Socio-Republican Congress elects a 20-man central committee with Hang Thun Hak receiving the largest number of votes, followed by Pan Sothi, Keng Vansak, Keam Reth, and Um Sim.
- July 13 The Exchange Support Fund, which was agreed on during a January 14, 1972 conference, comes into operation as the Governor of the National Bank, Hing Kunthel, announces to the ESF Working Group that the GKR would continue the stabilization program. (See February.)
- July 15 Former Third Deputy Prime Minister Hang Thun Hak is elected Secretary-General of the Socio-Republican Party by its central committee. The central committee also decides to place the party under the patronage of Marshal Lon Nol, to support the Marshal completely, and to accept six members of the Marshal's choice to "sit" with the central committee including Lon Non, Chhan Sokhum and Un Tramuch. Chhan Sokhum and Un Tramuch were earlier defeated as candidates for the central committee.
- July 21 Lon Nol announces his decision to raise civil service and military salaries of those earning less than 3,500 riels/month. He also sets a minimum wage of 80 riels/day for daily hire.
- July 23 The Republican Party congress elects Sirik Matak as Secretary-General. About 800 people attended the meeting which elected the 10-man Central Committee.
- July 29 Sihanouk returns to Peking after a 40-day tour to North Africa and Eastern Europe. The trip was the first since the Prince went into exile in the Chinese capital.
- August 2 Legislative election campaign opens.
- Republican Party Secretary-General Sisowath Sirik Matak holds a press conference to explain his party's failure to file candidates for the September 3 legislative election. He denounces the electoral law and use of state machinery to support "a particular party" and declares, "the Republican Party withdraws its confidence in the present government."
- August 5 After submitting a list of 118 candidates for the legislative election, the Democratic Party decides to withdraw denouncing "violation of fundamental democratic principles and the Constitution by the

authorities." The Women's Party also withdrew leaving the Socio-Republicans contested only by the 10-candidate Pracheachon Party.

Lon Nol visits encircled Svay Rieng and places emphasis on assistance to refugees. It was his first trip to the provinces in his capacity as President of the Republic.

August 10

The Fourth Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Nations seats the GRUNK (and PRG) delegations. The seating bent the "consensus rule" by which Non-Aligned States operate and provoked the walkout of Malaysia, Indonesia and Laos.

August 13

Route 5 to Battambang cut by enemy.

August 21

Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh barely escapes when only one of two claymore mines hidden in a parked car detonate as his motorcade passed.

August 26

Route 2 to Takeo definitively cut.

September 2

The vernacular press publishes the August 30 response of opposition leaders to Chief of the Mohanikay Order Huot Tath's letter urging reconciliation among the men of March 18. Lon Nol refused to consider postponing the election or revising the electoral law and opposition leaders saw no meeting of the minds.

September 3

The National Assembly election proceeds without incident. Voter turnout is a controversial issue. The two major opposition parties boycotted the election and all 126 deputies were elected from the Socio-Republican Party. The minor Pracheachon Party, which attempted to capitalize on the former leftist party of the same name, received a negligible fraction of the vote.

September 7-9

Rice shortages and rising prices prompt incautious government broadcast which troops interpret as giving them the right to monitor prices. Heavy handed control over prices leads to looting and rioting September 8 by troops and civilians. Order was finally restored September 9.

During the week of September 5 In Tam resigns as President of the opposition Democratic Party. Chau Sau was elected President and Mrs. Tip Mam, Secretary-General of the Party's National Committee.

September 8 FANK withdraws from Kompong Trabek leaving Route 1 between Neak Luong and Svay Rieng to the enemy. Initial efforts to retake Route 1 began July 4.

September 14 The National Assembly opens and elects Tan Kim Huon, Rector of the University of Agricultural Sciences as President, for a two-year term.

September 16 Government forces finally reopen Route 5 to Battambang cut since August 13; damaged or destroyed bridges prevent convoy traffic. KC forces hit the road again on October 5.

September 17 Sosthene Fernandez is named FANK Chief of Staff.

Voters go to the polls to elect the Senate. The pro-government Socio-Republican party was contested by the feeble Sangkum Reastr party, which only fielded eight candidates. The Socio-Republicans won all seats.

September 18 With the arrival of a Mekong River rice convoy, Air America ends its rice airlift to Phnom Penh. It brought three days rice supply during ten days of operation.

September 21 In a meeting with all commanding officers new Chief of Staff MG Sosthene Fernandez insists that discipline must be established. He gives commanders one month to submit actual strength figures for their units, and warns against profiteering.

Angkor Chey, the operation to recapture Angkor Wat, is finally abandoned.

September 27 Terrorists electrically detonate a plastic bomb hidden under a bundle of charcoal as the American Charge d'Affaires drives by. The Charge escaped unharmed but two others died and two were injured.

September 30 A decree creates the State Council, the last of the Republican institutions provided for by the Republican Constitution. (The decree was not released until the middle of October.) Only the Vice-Presidency remained to be filled. In theory completion of the Institutions ends rule by decree and inaugurates parliamentary process.

First open celebration of the Anniversary (21st) of the founding of the Khmer Communist Party held in "liberated" territory.

- October 4 The Senate, having validated its members October 2, opens for business. The 40-man body includes 32 Socio-Republican party members, who swept all 24 popular and 8 civil administration seats, and 8 military senators. Lt. Gen. Saukam Khoy was later elected President of the Senate.
- October 7 North Vietnamese sappers destroy three of the six spans of the Chruoi Changwar Bridge (formerly the Sangkum Reastr Niyum Bridge), temporarily blocking the Tonle Sap River channel. They simultaneously attack the municipal stadium used as a military base capturing 6 and destroying 4 armored personnel carriers. FANK subsequently destroyed three and recaptured three of the seized APC's. FANK killed 92 and captured 7 of the estimated 103-man enemy force. The attack was timed to the religious holiday Pchum Ben and occurred two days before the second anniversary of the founding of the Republic.
- October 15 Hang Thun Hak, Secretary-General of the Socio-Republican Party leads Lon Nol's choices for a new government to replace that of Son Ngoc Thanh. Lon Non as Minister attached to the Interior for Liberation and Nation-Building assumes a position of undefined but potentially broad power. The new "First Minister" told the National Assembly that the Cabinet would resign in three to six months if "no visible progress" had been made.
- The Patriarchs of the two Buddhist orders vigorously denounce the sapper attack on Phnom Penh, an apparently unprecedented action probably prompted by their indignation that the attack occurred during the Buddhist religious holiday Pchum Ben which corresponds to All Soul's Day.
- October 22 Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger arrives in Phnom Penh to confer with GKR leaders. This was Kissinger's only visit to Cambodia. Kissinger remained only four hours and briefed Lon Nol on the progress made in his talks with the North Vietnamese.
- November 3 President Lon Nol creates a National Committee of Peace and Concord with Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, FANK Chief of Staff Sosthene Fernandez, the Cabinet, others and all political parties except the Democrats. Former Democratic President In Tam attended the second meeting but announced his intention to stay aloof from the Committee. The organization soon lapsed into torpor.

November 18	All Route 5 bridges repaired. The KC heavily attacked the first Mekong River convoy. Blown bridges or enemy troops had kept the vital route closed since August 13.
December 4	FANK units relieve garrison at Prey Sandek, breaking a six week isolation.
December 7	Cargo ship "Bright Star" sunk by KC in Phnom Penh Port.
December 23	Route 2 cleared by FANK and ARVN units.
<u>1973</u>	
January 13	Hsinhua announces that GRUNK and the PRC have signed an agreement for 1973 covering military equipment and economic aid.
	Gasoline rationing begins in Phnom Penh.
January 16	Local press reports that Sisowath Sirik Matak was offered the Vice-Presidency but replied he would accept only if the Assembly, the senior military commanders and the Socio-Republican Party agreed. The nomination fell afoul of parliamentary opposition to 107 of 126 Assembly Deputies supported a motion introduced by Lon Non supporters to oppose the nomination.
January 27	The U.S., DRV, PRG and GVN sign Paris Accords on Vietnam. Article 20 requires withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia.
	Sihanouk says the Accords mark the beginning of a Third Indochinese War. He changed his position before leaving for Tet in Vietnam by calling for talks with the United States; a reduction in insurgent activity; and amnesty for all but Lon Nol and his entourage, who, however, could go into exile. The Prince ascribed his change of the tone to pressure from "our friends", who claimed GRUNK's adversaries were "accusing it of bellicosity while peace was being built."
January 28	Marshal Lon Nol orders a unilateral suspension of FANK offensive operations pending NVA/VC withdrawal from Cambodia, at the same time reserving the right of self-defense and of reoccupation of territory held by the NVA/VC.
February 1	Vice President Agnew visits Phnom Penh to confer with Khmer leaders.

February 5-6	The Phnom Penh general strike, which closed 16 major industries in the capital ends as abruptly as it began. Strikers claimed to belong to a "Workers and Peasants Union" which the government promptly dissolved.
February 7	Sihanouk leaves Hanoi for Canton. During his visit to North Vietnam, he reversed earlier peace talk. The joint DRV/GRUNK Communique endorsed the in-country insurgent line that the struggle must go on because of U.S. continued aggression until a solution is found in accord with Sihanouk's five points.
February 8	Clandestine radio asserts insurgent opposition to the re-introduction of representatives of the 1954-established International Control Commission into their zone and reject responsibility for consequences ensuing should the ICC begin activities in their zones (Sihanouk had expelled the ICC from Cambodia). Clandestine radio marks the renewal of massive B-52 and F-111 bombing after a halt since the January 27 cease-fire accords.
February 10	Insurgent forces launch an offensive between Phnom Penh and Neak Luong cutting Route 1. The road stayed interdicted for 12 days.
February 15	The GKR decides to raise prices of gasoline, kerosene, and fuel oil.
February 20	Teachers and students strike closing all schools. They demand rollback of prices and measures to strengthen the economy and corruption.
February 23	In Tam resigns as Special Adviser to the President for rallying after only 16 days in office. He cites failure of the government to specify his authority to negotiate with the insurgents and notes that he had been assigned to the Ministry of the Interior where he would have been under Lon Non's orders.
February 25	A communique from GRUNK Minister of Defense Khieu Samphan's office claims 90% of Khmer territory and 5.5 million people for GRUNK/FUNK control.
March 4	Striking teachers meet with eight Ministers at Chadomukh Hall but produce more heat than light debating economic issues including corruption.

- March 6 Lon Nol broadcasts an invitation to North Vietnam to begin negotiations anywhere on the withdrawal of their troops from Cambodia in accordance with the Paris and Geneva agreements and to discuss an exchange of prisoners.
- March 9 In response to demands by striking teachers and students, Prime Minister Hang Thun Hak, in a 16-point speech on national television, promises to stop importation of unnecessary luxury goods; to reduce the number of officials with the rank and prerogatives of Minister (the number was reduced from over 200 to 10 within a month); to organize price control committees; and strengthen financial controls to reduce corruption. He also promises that the price of rice would not be increased and postponed water and electricity rate increases pending parliamentary study. Finally, he says that a technical committee would establish a new lower price for POL products.
- March 14 The Information Minister clarifies Marshal Lon Nol's instructions to government departments to study the possibility of new legislative elections to reunite all Khmer, including the insurgents. He says these elections would be held after fighting ends, although a formal, written cease-fire was not a prior condition. The elections must be supervised by the ICC, and although it is not clear whether insurgents could present themselves as candidates, the Minister did say that enlargement of the cabinet to include insurgent Ministers was under consideration.
- March 15 The government issues an order banning demonstrations aimed at striking teachers.
- March 17 Three men force their way into a meeting of striking teachers and students at the Faculty and Pedagogy and assail one of the speakers who was denouncing the Lon Nol government. After the three are overcome and locked up, an estimated fifty others reportedly push their way in and throw hand grenades, which kill two persons and injure eight others while Gendarmerie Nationale troops watch on. Student suspicion falls on Lon Non.
- So Photra, an air force pilot relieved for indiscipline in 1972, hijacks a Khmer Air Force T-28 and bombs the Presidential palace compound missing the palace but killing at least 43, mainly family members of palace guards.

President Lon Nol proclaimed a "state of siege" and security forces began a round-up of royal family members and others associated with the family.

March 19	Private press suspended.
March 21	Parliament approves the state of siege (or nation in danger) as required by the Constitution. Route 5 cut but reopened two days later. Route 1 cut.
March 25	Route 4 cut.
March 27	Trapesng Thnet, 12 miles south of Phnom Penh, lost by FANK.
April 3	Route 5 cut (see June).
April 6	Sihanouk arrived in Hanoi after a 1½ month visit to Cambodia which he claimed took him as far as Angkor Wat.
April 7	U.S. OV-10 pilot killed during mission in Cambodia.
April 9	Route 4 to the sea was reopened after being interdicted March 25. Convoy arrives Phnom Penh via Mekong, 2 vessels hit. Haig visits Phnom Penh.
April 11	Sihanouk returns to Peking after his "inspection trip" of the "liberated zone" in Cambodia. GRUNK/FUNK with Chinese and North Vietnamese support launched a campaign using the trip as proof that Sihanouk is the undisputed, recognized leader of a united movement.
April 14	Military sources say 40 enemy BN's located vic Phnom Penh.
April 16	The coastal resort of Kep falls to the insurgents.
April 18	A Decree (released later in the month) disbands Lon Non's Special Committee of Coordination.
April 19	Route 2 interdicted.
April 23	The Parliament votes its approval of the creation of a High Political Council and enlargement of the government and authorized the government to rule by decree for six months thereby putting itself in suspension.

University students resume classes at student leadership urging.

April 24 President Lon Nol announces formation of a four-man High Political Council which reunites the "Men of March 18" -- In Tam, Sirik Matak, Cheng Heng, and the Marshal himself.

April 29 The decree creating the High Political Council ordains that all affairs of state must be submitted to it and its decision is to be by majority vote. Lon Nol's voice is deciding in case of a tie.

April 30 BG Lon Non leaves on an extended trip to France and the United States.

May 7 Convoy arrives Phnom Penh. 1 Tanker sunk.

May 10 Sihanouk and entourage arrive in Algiers on the first leg of an 11-country trip to Black and North Africa and Eastern Europe.

The U.S. House of Representatives blocks the use of funds for the continued bombing of Cambodia. This is the first time in the war that the House has voted to undercut a military action on which the President insists.

May 14 During the week a GVN delegation arrives in Phnom Penh to open negotiations on delimitation of the continental shelf. No results were published.

About 500 soldiers newly transferred to the 7th Division demonstrate in downtown Phnom Penh to protest delay in receiving pay. They received some pay the next day and disbanded.

May 16 In Tam as First Minister leads a new 24-man Cabinet. The new government's program aims at reorganization of the army, designation of a Commander in Chief responsible to the government, creation of a police force under the Ministry of the Interior, financial austerity and national reconciliation. The new cabinet resulted from a month-long series of negotiations which saw two candidates for Prime Minister proposed and rejected. The Democratic Party dropped out of inter-party negotiations on the new government program when the other two parties refused to adopt the Democratic program.

121 Vietnamese freed from jail, flown to Saigon.

May 17 Sam Adams resigns from CIA over underestimation of KC strength in Cambodia and overestimation of NVA strength in Cambodia. Does not deny that KC gets supplies from North Vietnam.

May 18 Mekong convoy attacked. Total of 10 ships have been seriously damaged or destroyed in last 60 days.

May 25 FANK battalion routed at Lovea Sar.

May 26 GRUNK Minister Chau Seng with Minister Thiounn Prasith and Paris FUNK Committee Chairman In Sophan attending, denounce the compromise maneuvers of GKR-encouraged intermediary Son Sann.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan arrives in Phnom Penh to brief the High Political Council on the Paris talks.

May 29 U.S. reduces B-52 sorties to cut costs from 60 to 40/day. TAC air level at 150/day.

May 30 The High Political Council orders the release of 46 royal family members and others imprisoned or placed under house arrest after the March 17 bombing of Chamcar Mon. Also released is Sihanouk's son, Naradipo, imprisoned in 1971 for subversive activities.

June 3-4 The Algerian press reports Sihanouk's assertion that he had sent peace proposals to President Nixon through an African intermediary (whom he later identified as Mauritania's President). Nixon did not reply, according to the Prince, who noted that his plan included restored diplomatic relations and peace with honor; exile for a dozen traitors and amnesty for the rest.

June 5-6 Insurgent forces launch widespread attacks by fire and ground probes against FANK positions in the west and southwest sections of Phnom Penh's outer defenses. Routes 2 and 4 and Mekong River corridor were major objectives.

June 8 Route 4 cut. Route 5 open. River convoys under heavy fire.

June 10 For the first time during the war Battambang airfield is attacked by fire. Mixed rocket and mortar fire killed seven; the field was lightly damaged.

June 13 The U.S. and DRV Joint Communique includes a sentence agreeing to observe scrupulously Article 20 of the January 27 Paris Accords. The High Political Council

expresses its hope that this phase constitutes more than a simple declaration of intentions and emphasizes that no agreement can be reached among Khmer as long as foreign troops remain on Cambodian soil.

Major General Sosthene Fernandez is named Commander-in-Chief responsible for the conduct of the war before the government. The job had been vacant since mid-1972.

June 14

Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's negotiator, tells AFP that "no tacit agreement" on Cambodian exists between him and Henry Kissinger on Cambodia.

Convoy traffic resumes on Route 5, closed since April 3. The route to rice-rich Battambang is opened May 20 but requires considerable repair. The route stayed open only until June 16.

Enemy attacks Kompong Kantout, 10 miles from Phnom Penh on Route 3.

June 15

The GKR announces a package of stern economy measures which include: reducing subsidies on prices of domestic rice; raising water and electricity rates; and increasing gasoline prices. Civil servants and military receive a 1,600 riel family allowance increase.

This date marks the beginning of CPNLF attacks against Route 6 and 7 according to a later press release from Khieu Samphan's headquarters.

June 16

3 rice convoys arrive Phnom Penh via Route 5.

June 17

Three government outposts on Route 6 are attacked in what proved to be the beginning of an offensive to seize Route 6 in Skoun and thereby isolate Kompong Cham. On August 12 Skoun fell, putting Route 6 from the Prek Kdam ferry to the juncture with Route 7 in enemy hands.

June 19

Route 4 is reopened with enemy activity continuing both north and south of the highway.

Mekong convoy arrives Phnom Penh. Japan advises evacuation of their citizens from Cambodia.

June 20

The official vernacular press reports that on June 18 the GKR decided to release 27 political detainees arrested immediately after the deposition of Sihanouk.

Notable among those freed were Sihanouk's brother-in-law, Oum Mannorine, and the Chief of the Prince's youth group, Yim Dith. This second release was in accord with Prime Minister In Tam's program which promised either release or indictment of detainees.

- June 22 The GRUNK denies that the CPNLAF holds U.S. advisors, pilots or any other foreigners as prisoners of war. The statement attributed U.S.-sparked rumors to such effect as part of a maneuver to justify continued bombing.
- June 23 6 killed, 30 wounded in grenade attack at restaurant in Phnom Penh. Possible personal vendetta.
- June 24 Route 4 open.
- June 25 U.S. Embassy had drawn up evacuation plan, but says "worst is now past."
- June 30 The Congress and the administration reach agreement on a compromise over the Cambodia bombing, it will continue to August 15.
- River convoy arrives Phnom Penh.
- July 3 President Nixon issues a statement on the upcoming August 15 bombing cut-off. He noted, "Should further actions be required to that end (a lasting peace through a stable Cambodian settlement) later this year, I shall request the Congress to help us achieve our objective."
- The text of a rider to the Continuing Resolution Authority reads: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia." The August 15 date resolved a series of legislative-executive confrontations over an immediate halt to Southeast Asia bombing during which the President vetoed the Mutual Security Assistance measure because of a rider ending the bombing.
- July 4 Route 5 is reopened against light resistance. It was closed June 16 and briefly opened twice in-between. All other routes closed.

July 5 Sihanouk returns to Peking after a 56-day visit to 11 African and Eastern European countries. He claimed in a welcoming banquet speech that his forces control 91% of Khmer territory and uttered a three-point requirement for ending the war: A stop to U.S. and other hostile military intervention; withdrawal of U.S. and pro-U.S. military personnel and all non-Khmer serving U.S. imperialism; and elimination of the Khmer Republic.

July 6 Foreign Minister Long Boret gives assembled diplomats and journalists a GKR six point plan calling for: a) an immediate cease-fire; b) "talks with a delegation of Khmer of the other side at a place to be mutually agreed upon for the purpose of achieving a cessation of hostilities and national reconciliation"; c) implementation of Article 20 of the 1978 Paris Accords; d) the "overriding necessity of an immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Khmer territory"; e) reactivation of the ICC; and f) an appeal to the signatory nations to the Final Act of Paris and the UN SecGen to assist in obtaining application of Article 20. He neither affirms nor excludes the possibility of negotiating with Sihanouk or his representatives in a subsequent question and answer session.

 FANK loses the Kompong Tuol Bridge on Route 3 over the Prek Thnoat River. Enemy troops thus threatened Pochentong airfield, only 12 kms away. This victory proved to be the high water mark of the enemy's offensive as the FANK High Command, with U.S. air support, successfully reacted to halt the attack.

 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger states end of bombing may "bring about a much higher degree of dedication than exists at the present time."

July 10 Sihanouk and the GRUNK Information Ministry issues complementary rejections of the GKR's July 6 peace initiative. The Prince adds that he would refuse to see Dr. Kissinger during the Presidential Advisor's projected trip to Peking.

July 11 Thai training of Cambodian troops discontinued.

July 13 Commander-in-Chief Sosthene Fernandez proposes conscription. General Weyand visits Phnom Penh.

July 14 Routes 4 and 5 open.

July 16 President Lon Nol signs a decree instituting compulsory military service. All males from 18 - 25 are required to spend 18 months on active duty. Students, civil servants and those with heavy family responsibilities are eligible for deferments.

A "Mixed Staff" of military and civilians headed by MG Sak Sutsakhan is created to mobilize popular support for the war, coordinate civilian and military activities and implement the draft.

A Council of War with an entirely military membership is established to restore discipline and fight against military corruption.

July 18 AKR publishes an ordinance establishing a "Republican Police" responsible for general surveillance organization of auto-defense in cooperation with FANK and disaster assistance.

USG prods RVN to loan rice to Cambodia. Rice in Phnom Penh now cost \$380/ton compared to \$140/ton in 1971. Mekong route costs are now tripled.

July 20 USAF now using heat flares after every bomb run to foil SA-7 missiles.

July 19-21 A "National Congress" held in the "liberated zone" under Khieu Samphan decides that peace requires an end to U.S. military activities in Cambodia, the overthrow of GKR leaders and replacement by GRUNK/FUNK, the "sole and unique legal representatives of the Khmer nation and people."

July 25 Phnom Penh receives a 30-minute shelling of mixed rocket, mortar and 105-mm artillery fire. Twenty-four are killed and sixty-five wounded.

July 30 The National Gendarmerie (PM) rounds-up some 1,200 draft eligible men throughout the capital. Use of force was abandoned the next day when neighborhood associations promised to produce volunteers. The PM's were moving in advance of Defense and Interior orders implementing the decree on compulsory military service. The Ministries decided Phnom Penh would furnish 10,000 conscripts, Battambang would give 5,000 and Svay Bieng 1,000. Localities would draw up lists of eligible men by August 5 and 31 to 35 year-olds would be the first to go.

August 1 The newly-created Council of War takes its first decision in stripping Major Yin Kheng, arrested six

months ago for misappropriating government money, of rank and sending him to a military tribunal. All his property is confiscated.

- August 3 GRUNK representative in Moscow Chea San returns to the Russian capital after a five-month absence, a first step in closer USSR-Sihanouk relations.
- August 6 Students at the Letters and Humanities Faculty issue a letter supporting the August 4 Law and Economics student condemnation of the National Gendarmerie round-up of draftees. The condemnation declared that students refuse to serve "corrupt fascist leaders."
- August 7 An off-target B-52 bombs the government town of Neak Luong, killing over 125 civilians and FANK troops and injuring more than 250.
- August 10 National Gendarmerie Commander BG Chea Kim Eng is relieved apparently because of Gendarmerie excesses in rounding up draftees in late July.
- August 13 In a ceremony at the headquarters of the General Staff, C-in-C Major General Sosthene Fernandez strips Lt. Col. Cheam Tay Ly of his rank and orders him sent before a tribunal which eventually sentenced him to 20 years imprisonment. Photos of the ceremony were published in the army daily. The offender had commandeered the first helicopter evacuating his forces from encircled Skoun causing the garrison to collapse. The Council of War had made the decision to break and try the officer.
- August 15 At 11 A.M. local time, all U.S. bombing stopped.
- In a Peking press conference, GRUNK Prime Minister Penn Noath sees the bombing halt a victory for the Khmer people and CPNLA (the army) but warns that the halt only marks a new phase in U.S. aggression now aimed at "Khmerization" as well as splitting FUNK by isolating it internationally and "bringing it to negotiation, compromise or national accord."
- August 16 Kompong Cham's defensive outpost at Trsoug is overrun beginning a period of severe enemy attacks by fire and ground attacks into the provincial capital (see October).
- August 17 During the week the GKR approves new electric and water rates retroactive to July 1. Electricity rates

increased 400 percent over the old rates which were established in 1958.

- August 22 The Ambassador and Foreign Minister sign a project agreement to provide nine million riels of counter-part funds for the reconstruction of the 40-bed Neak Luong hospital damaged by an off-target B-52. The Ambassador also announces donation of a 200-bed disaster hospital and says that the U.S. will make 15-20 million riels in solatium payments to injured survivors and to relatives of those killed.
- August 25 The First Division quickly clears Route 1 between Phnom Penh and Neak Luong, inflicting severe casualties and recovering more than 100 mixed individual and crew-served weapons.
- Route 5 cut. It had been open to convoy traffic since June 14.
- August 27 The riel devalues from 230:1 U.S. dollar to 250:1. FANK institutes a system of hazardous duty pay retro-active to July 1. A 1,500 riel/month bonus will be paid to members of the general reserve, regional intervention units and some Air Force and Navy personnel thus providing a much-needed incentive to those troops who bear the brunt of the fighting.
- Sisowath Sirik Matak releases an open letter calling on Sihanouk to recognize that his resistance movement is a front for Vietnamese communist aggression and urging him to retire from the scene to show his true patriotism.
- August 28 Sihanouk states KC will wait for dry season in December to start attack on Phnom Penh.
- August 29 Lon Nol, in his first press conference since January, denounces Sihanouk for his collaboration with VC/NVA aggressors. He highlights Sihanouk's statement during an interview that he is struggling to make Cambodia a Communist country. The Cambodian President declares that since the aggressors responded to his government's six-point peace plan in bad faith, they would have to be driven out by force of arms. He notes, however, that the July six-point peace proposal is still valid.
- September 2 Both Kompong Cham and Ang Snoul under siege.
- September 4 In a farewell press conference, Ambassador Swank calls Cambodia Indochina's most useless war. Stated Cambodia

bought time for the U.S. in South Vietnam. States U.S. action in Cambodia designed to bring KC into negotiations with GKR.

- September 6 Route 5 cut between Oudong and Kompong Chhnang. The route remained cut over the 1973-74 dry season (and was not open at the beginning of the 1974-75 dry season) forcing the GKR to truck Battambang rice and other produce to Kompong Chhnang and then barge the goods down the Tonle Sap River to Phnom Penh.
- September 5-8 In Algiers the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State seats Sihanouk and the PRG without debate. The Conference's final declaration included condemnation of the U.S. and GKR and recommendation that Non-Aligned States immediately recognize GRUNK. At the Conference the exile government picked up recognition from Guyana, Uganda, Tunisia, Oman and Zaire to bring to 44 the number of countries recognizing it.
- September 8 Kompong Cham under attack, with 50% being captured by KC.
- September 9 Six 105-mm artillery pieces reported lost to KC at Kampong Cham.
- September 13 Enemy driven from Kompong Cham. Estimated to take 2,000 civilians with them. 400 FANK killed, 600 civilians killed.
- September 18 Route 4 open.
- October 3 The Military Tribunal sentences Major Yin Kheng to death for embezzlement of public funds and misuse of army property. Yin Kheng escaped from prison December 27 with the collusion of the prison commandant.
- KC start push on Phnom Penh from south along Prek Thnot River. FANK troops who did not receive pay walk away from Route 4 positions.
- October 4 Kompong Cham city forces link up with troops defending the city's airport marking the end of a battle for the city that started August 16 and saw fighting reach to within 100 meters of the province headquarters. Tens of thousands of the town's inhabitants were led away by insurgent troops and the city was devastated. The Khmer Navy saved the city by convoying

reinforcements and supplies and giving naval gun-fire support.

- October 9 The Soviet Union continues three months of moving closer to Sihanouk in a Peking meeting between the Prince and the Russian Ambassador to China. The Russians left recognition a fuzzy issue (the TASS account of the meeting called Sihanouk merely "Chairman of FUNK") but withdrew its Embassy staff from Phnom Penh except for three "caretakers." The East Germans also withdrew their Embassy staff.
- October 10 Draftees report to their boards as the GKR's revised and better organized conscription campaign began under Defense Minister Major General Thappana Nginn's leadership. The campaign produced more than 11,000 men by year end; most, however, were volunteers and no effort went to arresting draft-dodgers.
- October 12 The Law Proclaiming the Nation in Danger is extended for an additional six months (see April).
- October 19 President Nixon asks Congress for \$2.2 billion in emergency assistance for Israel and \$200 million for Cambodia. He argued Khmer ammunition expenses had increased since the August 15 U.S. bombing halt and said that a Hanoi-controlled government in Cambodia would threaten the "fragile structure of peace" established by the Paris Accords. The President noted that the U.S. remained hopeful that the conflict would be resolved by a negotiated settlement.
- October 21 Imminent reconvening of the suspended Parliament prompts a reshuffling and expansion of the In Tam government which saw more Sirik Matak and Cheng Heng supporters brought in. In Tam's earlier resignation was not accepted and he agreed to stay on as Prime Minister to see a developing Sihanouk challenge at the UN to conclusion.
- October 25-29 The Khmer Air Force initiates its first major air offensive "Operation Thunderstrike" with 70 sorties, the largest number to date, against strongholds and logistics bases. The operation served to prepare KAF for its ground support role in the 1973-74 dry season.
- October 29 U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh states MEDTC officers have not gone beyond their statutory function or have not acted as advisors, but have an obligation to see military equipment put to good use.

November 2 Prince Sihanouk announces the end of personal meetings with the press claiming he has been misquoted. He stayed secluded until January 21, 1974. The move came after the Prince gave several interviews, beginning with T.D. Allman's at the Algiers Non-Aligned Conference, in which he cast doubt on his future under the Khmer communists thereby damaging the GRUNK hopes for the UN seat at the 28th UNGA.

November 3 Sihanouk's mother, Queen Kossamak, and forty other members and friends of the royal family leave Phnom Penh for China by special air charter. The Queen's poor health was a major influence in the decision to permit her to leave.

November 7 FANK abandons SRANG, 26 miles SW of Phnom Penh.

November 9 Sihanouk announces that all GRUNK ministerial portfolios have been transferred to the interior of Cambodia. He waited until December 7 before listing the new ministers. Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak and Prime Minister Penn Nouth remained in Peking; Thiounn Thoeun, Toch Phoeun, Chou Chet, Mme. Ieng Sary and Norodom Phurissar joined the Cabinet from in-country. A number of long-time associates of Sihanouk are displaced suggesting a further decline in Sihanouk's stature vis-a-vis the in-country organization.

November 19 A KAF T-28 conducts a one-man operation to assassinate President Lon Nol by bombing Chamcar Mun Palace. Three were killed; Lon Nol was unhurt. Government reaction was not as strong as it was after the March bombing.

November 29 KC shell Kompong Speu. Refugees flee to Phnom Penh.

November 30 The capital of mini-province Vihear Suer across the Mekong from Phnom Penh falls. Only half of the 500-man garrison returned to friendly lines.

Vihear Suer falls. Defenders claim NVA were assault troops. Several 105-mm Howitzers lost. Estimated 350 FANK casualties.

December 5 The UN General Assembly approves by a vote of 53 to 50 with 21 abstentions a motion to postpone the Khmer representation issue until the 1974 session. Later in the month the Assembly approved the credentials committee report thus leaving the GKR in the Cambodian seat and ratifying its participation in the 1973 UNGA.

December 9	GKR announces increased prices for petroleum products.
December 10	The In Tam government resigns but assumes a caretaker status pending selection of a new cabinet.
December 12	Teachers at all but two of the capital's secondary schools strike mainly citing economic grievances.
December 20	<p>Secondary Teachers form a Strike Committee which meets on Christmas eve and decides to return to work January 3, 1974. They give the GKR two weeks to answer their salary demands, and resolve to work only ten days/month if their demands are not met, arguing that their salaries only covered one-third of their monthly expenditures.</p> <p>Four USAID-supplied two-megawatt generators arrive. The new generators complement five USAID-financed compact units totalling 10.5 megawatts dedicated October 12.</p>
December 23	<p>Heavy shelling of Phnom Penh begins with a 122mm rocket barrage. The shelling continues until February 16, 1974 with many casualties and significant damage caused primarily by captured 105mm artillery.</p> <p>The Khmer Teachers Association (AMCEK) re-elects Mai Lon President at a General Assembly. AMCEK enters an accelerating phase of political activism which results in confrontation with the GKR and eventually in the organization's dissolution (see September, 1974).</p>
December 26	Long Boret as "First Minister" heads a new, more compact government with somewhat greater talent than the four previous Cabinets. He faced immediate challenge from teachers and increasing student radical activism. Ministers from the Republican Party and number of independents associated with Cheng Heng continued in the new cabinet.
December 28	Long Boret presents his Cabinet and program to the National Assembly. His government's program a) reiterated the July, 1973 six-point negotiating offer; b) promised "closest cooperation" between the civil administration and the army; c) pledged application of national conscription; d) noted inflation is the toughest problem facing the new government and promised a raise in allowances and revamped rise distribution system; e) forbade luxury imports; f) committed the

GKR to an austerity program including establishment of a foreign exchange budget, reduction in official travel and the size of foreign missions; g) promised a tax reform, taxation of surplus wealth and a realistic monetary policy to even out the economic burden of war, and h) proposed to create a non-political, autonomous foundation to resettle refugees. Long Boret also said he would tackle corruption.

1974

- January 3 The riel is devalued from 302 to one dollar to 377:1.
- January 5 Premier Long Boret says GKR will not talk to KC. FANK loses Prek Krabao.
- January 6 The KC open a major offensive against the northwest sector of the capital's perimeter and push to within 5 kms of Pochentong Airport. FANK had contained the attack by month's end.
- Route 4 reopens to convoys after having been cut since November 11, 1973.
- January 12 Respected former Prime Minister Son Sann publicly urges Lon Nol to go abroad for medical treatment in the interest of restoring peace in Cambodia. The move excited great attention throughout Cambodia and the GKR speedily riposted by reaffirming the Marshal's worth, reiterating the efforts the GKR has made to begin talks and pointing out that peace will not come until the other side agrees to talk. Son Sann's declaration was seized by teacher and student leaders, who used it to try to politicize their movement which had hitherto been based primarily on economic grievance.
- January 16 9 122mm rockets hit Phnom Penh. 13 KIA. Fernandez's office hit.
- January 18 122mm rocket hits school in Phnom Penh. 1 civilian killed.
- January 19 KC gunners open up a series of 105mm artillery barrages on Phnom Penh which culminates February 11 in a daylight bombardment that killed 139 and caused fires to raze a section of the capital housing some 10,000 people. The last major 105mm bombardment took place February 16 after which FANK pushed the gunners further southwest and out of range.
- GKR closes all schools on the grounds that KC rocket attacks had made large gatherings of children dangerous.

A rocket had hit French-run Lycee Descartes
January 17.

January 21 The Socio-Republican Party Congress elects a new
Central Committee which then chose Pan Sothi as
Party Secretary General.

CBS radio, Bob Shaffer states Laird advocates
nothing more than supply to RVN; if they fail
they didn't have the desire.

January 25 70 killed in Phnom Penh by rocket attack and captured
105mm Howitzer.

January 27 Military prison authorities murder four young men
arrested for sowing panic in the wake of the January 26
shelling of the capital. The GKR arrested the guards
and began an investigation (see December).

January 28 5 killed, 28 wounded in attack by fire on Phnom
Penh refugee camp.

February The month saw FANK provincial commanders take advan-
tage of KC concentration around Phnom Penh to make
thrusts outside their perimeters and scoop up tens
of thousands of willing peasants. Takeo, Siem Reap,
Kompong Cham and especially Kompong Thom, where more
than 35,000 returned to friendly lines, were note-
worthy successes. The refugee influx continued until
about 350,000 had crossed to GKR control by mid-
November, according to Prime Minister Long Boret.

February 2 President Nixon assures Lon Nol "maximum possible
assistance." "Will continue to stand side by side."
15 killed in artillery attack in Phnom Penh. Total
of 150 killed since December 23, 1973.

February 3 Western military analysts claim the enemy push bigger
than last summer, expect a big drive before June.
Routes 4 and 5 largely shut, Mekong open. U.S. aid
expected to reach 600 million this year. Sources say
KC ask for VC/NVA help. VC deny advisors but agree
to send commando group.

February 7 The Prime Minister begins the first of a series of
short visits to the provinces which by March 24 had
included agriculturally crucial Battambang and Pursat,
Kompong Thom, Siem Reap and Takeo.

GKR reports 31 KC defected in last week of January.

February 11	Phnom Penh launches a ten-day census to update population statistics and thereby expend manpower lists for the draft. 70 rounds of 105mm artillery and 122mm rockets hit Phnom Penh.
February 16	Phnom Penh shelled 1700 hours. 8 killed, 50 wounded. KC radio states targets are military and strategic. KC use propaganda leaflets on currency.
February 17	Thomas O. Enders, Deputy Chief of Mission (1971-1974) states CAF flies too high to be effective against KC artillery.
February 18	FANK operation south of Phnom Penh stopped by enemy fire. 2 ammunition barges destroyed on Mekong River.
February 19	CAF reports destroying 2 enemy 105mm howitzers northeast of Phnom Penh. (To date, at least 10 are believed to have been captured.)
March 1	Lt. Col. Sbond Var, Commandant of the prison from which the notorious embezzler Major Yin Kherg escaped, is sentenced to death by a military tribunal as an accomplice in the jailbreak. (The Supreme Court reviews such decisions by military tribunals, at the end of 1974, Sbond Var's case was still pending.) The KC switch emphasis from attacks against Phnom Penh to a provincial strategy seeking to reduce GKR enclaves. They tested this new strategy with heavy attacks at Kampot forcing the seacoast city defenders to retreat into the city.
March 6	The second phase of the National Conscription Campaign gets underway as draft notices are issued from lists updated by February's census. On March 25 districts began calling 25-35 year-olds because the 18-25 pool had reached depletion. FANK operation fails to open Route 4.
March 7	742 Khmer Rumda defect to GKR. Desire to live near Route 4, 90 miles west of Phnom Penh. Phnom Penh shelled, 1 killed.
March 9	KC control vicinity Kompong Thom weakens.

March 11-15 Sihanouk and party visit Pathet Lao headquarters presumably, to show solidarity with the participants in the Indochinese Peoples' Summit of 1978. He continued on to North Vietnam March 16.

March 13 Senator Alan Cranston claims a gross violation of 3 U.S. laws by officers in Cambodia who were advising. Ambassador John G. Dean appointed as Ambassador to Cambodia.

March 15 Kampot under seige. Defense Attache Office (DAO) accused by Washington Post of advising. Senator Church protests to Secretary of State Kissinger. Fighting on Chong Koh is 10 miles north of Phnom Penh.

March 16-18 The former royal capital at Oudong falls to the KC; only an encircled garrison of 1,300 territorial troops and one battalion of the seventh division held out just east of the town.

 Cambodian Paratroop Brigade takes Oknhatei Island, 2 miles northeast of Phnom Penh.

March 18 In Phnom Penh, former Prime Minister Sim Var pronounces a five-point peace plan calling for neutral Asian and UN troops to supervise VC/NVA withdrawals, an end to foreign aid to Sihanouk and Lon Nol, cease-fire and formation of non-party government to hold constituent assembly elections. He also announces his resignation as Ambassador to Tokyo. The plan received little reaction.

 Phsar Oudong falls.

March 19 1200 FANK troops near Oudong cut off. KC destroy bridge on Route 5. Sink 2 boatloads of reinforcements.

March 23 The U.S. and GKR amend their agreement on funding for the refugee program to provide \$2.7 million in riels (\$1 = 377 riels) for the Resettlement and Development Foundation, a semi-private entity launched March 9 and devoted solely to resettling refugees.

March 25 Teachers return to work pending on April 5 General Assembly of the Khmer Teachers Association (AMCEK). Teacher Strike Committee leaders had appealed for the return which was also due to the Prime Minister's meetings with teachers on their economic grievances, earlier announced government plans to give teachers 100 million riels for a teacher consumer association, and release of two teachers arrested March 16.

March 28 GRUNK Deputy Prime Minister and Army C-in-C Khieu Samphan leads a delegation from the interior to Hanoi on the first stage of a 77-day visit to friendly Asian, East European, African and Middle Eastern countries. The delegation included Ieng Sary, Special Advisor to Khieu Samphan; Khieu Thirith (Mrs. Ieng Sary), Minister of Education; and Tiv Ol, Vice Minister of Propaganda. Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak joined the delegation in China.

The FANK enclave at Oudong falls causing heavy losses in men and equipment. The KC had seized most of the former royal capital by March 13 in the first phase of their assault. Relief forces had stalled at their bridgehead at Kompong Luong on the Tonle Sap River.

March 31 Lon Nol dissolves the High Political Council arguing that the resumption of Parliament obviates the need for such an organization.

April 2 Long Boret announces creation of an Executive Council "to assist the President in the execution of his civil and military policies." Sirik Matak, Sosthene Fernandez and Boret himself are made members of the Council which replaces the High Political Council but does not have the legislative powers of the defunct body because Parliament, Boret noted, has resumed. Long Boret also reads the text of a decree naming Sirik Matak as High Assistant to the President.

April 3 John Gunther Dean presents his credentials as American Ambassador. He arrived in Cambodia March 31. 20-25,000 NVA estimated in Cambodia.

April 5 In a one-day national congress teachers decide to return to their classrooms but to teach on reduced hours. Their consensus, which even radicals conceded, was that the teachers' strike was not effective. They decide to give the GKR one month to show progress toward solving economic and social problems.

April 6 FANK loses 3 outposts south of Phnom Penh. Unable to reinforce due to commitment to Kamput and Oudong.

April 14 KC resume rocket attacks on Phnom Penh - 3-5 107mm rockets per day. Fighting vicinity Oudong still in progress. KC attacking outposts south of Phnom Penh.

April 21 Enemy pressure causes FANK to retreat from the Kompong Luong bridgehead to Lovek. FANK left much equipment, including one operable 105mm howitzer, and reported several hundred troops missing.

April 22 FANK C-in-C Sosthene Fernandez officially designated in charge of the national conscription effort.

April 24 Administration requests \$390 million for Cambodia military assistance. FANK loses Koh Krabei, 8 miles Southeast of Phnom Penh.

April 26 Grenade incident in wedding ceremony in Phnom Penh in which Long Boret was present. 9 killed, 14 wounded.

April 28 Since January, 354 killed, 923 wounded in Phnom Penh rocket and artillery attacks. Inflation for 1973 is 275%; 40% in first quarter of 1974. KC reported conducting collectivization of agriculture.

April 30 The GKR announces the following measures aimed at reducing inflation under wartime conditions of declining or interdicted supply: a systematic monthly national budget review to reduce expenditures and increase receipts, a prohibition of ESF financing of luxuries; an excess profits tax; devaluation from 377 riels/dollar to 420:1; the establishment of committees to stimulate domestic production and move produce from surplus to deficit areas; creation of a consortium of commercial banks to finance, with government participation, small enterprises and production cooperatives.

ARVN operation in Cambodia vicinity Go Da Ha, Route 1 against NVA 5th Division claims 300 enemy K.I.A.

May 1 FANK reopens the riverine resupply line into Kampot, lifting the siege, and begins to expand the city's perimeter. Some KC forces had apparently left the siege to begin operations against Route 4. Attacks begin against Veal Renh and O Chamna on Route 4 north of Kompong Som. The KC slowly took control of a 45 km stretch of the highway.

May 1-8 The KC launch a major offensive against lower Route 4.

May 2 FANK Commander-in-Chief Sosthene Fernandez meets with city officials, veterans, military and others and appeals for harder work from the Phnom Penh conscription/recruitment machinery.

May 3-4 The KC make their greatest penetration into the Lovek enclave north of Oudong as they take the training center and hold it for several days.

Prey Veng, 29 miles east of Phnom Penh under siege. KC give up siege of Kampot.

May 6 Anti-government banners blossom at Phnom Penh state-run lycees as teacher/student activism resumes.

May 13 Kompong Speu under pressure. 9 outposts have fallen in vicinity. Jack Anderson column states USMC HQs denies planning reentry into Southeast Asia, the point of rumored "Operation Eagle Pull", involving 3,000 Marines with air and ground elements, states the operation only for extraction from Phnom Penh of American Embassy and U.S. citizens.

By decree, Lon Nol retires 8 General officers (six Brigadier Generals and three Major Generals). Mekong convoy arrives Phnom Penh. 2 of 26 ships receive hits. None sunk.

May 14 Parliament passes a new law against proclaiming "the nation in danger" which permitted the GKR to suspend constitutionally-guaranteed rights of assembly, domicile and correspondence. The lawmakers refused to suspend freedom of the press thereby opening the way to reappearance of private dailies for the first time in fourteen months. The previous law was allowed to expire April 12.

May 17 The Khmer Teachers' Association central committee declares that the GKR had not resolved economic problems during the grace period afforded it at an April General Congress of the Teachers' Group and withdraws confidence in the Long Boret Government. The declaration scored the GKR for corruption, incompetence, fascism and accused Khmer leaders of seeking to enrich themselves through ties to crooked Chinese businessmen. Other teacher and student leaders made similar declarations.

May 20 Kompong Seila on Route 4 south of the Pich Nil Pass comes under siege.

May 21 Three private dailies make pre-publication deposits under a new GKR press law.

May 26 Police arrest 60 students in a dawn sweep at Lycee 18 Mars. All but five are shortly released. The head of the Lycee 18 Mars Student Association was among those held. The raid came the day after meetings at Lycee 18 Mars protested May 23 and May 21 arrest of four teachers among whom was the President of the Mixed Teachers' Strike Committee.

- May 28 A Khmer Navy convoy travels the Tonle Sap from Phnom Penh to Kompong Chhnang, removing one barricade en route. The river had been interdicted since April 21.
- May 30 After a marathon interpellation of the PM and Ministers from his party, the National Assembly with only 1/4 of the deputies voting, passes a decision strongly criticizing the GKR but stops short of formally withdrawing confidence. The decision charged incompetence and implied Cabinet lack of respect for the Constitution.
- Several hundred students stage an orderly protest march decrying continued detention of five students and four teachers.
- June 2 The Socio-Republican Party's Phnom Penh branch votes a six-point decision asking Lon Nol to authorize Lon Non's return "to consolidate the party and his country...."
- June 4 Minister of Education Keo Sangkim and Presidential Advisor Thach Chia are shot to death while students held them hostage at Lycee 18 Mars. The two officials had been taken from the Education Ministry earlier in the morning and marched in good spirits to the Lycee where student protestors offered to ransom them in exchange for five students arrested in May. A student leader was later tried in absentia and found guilty of the murders.
- Four Republican Ministers offer their resignations over National Assembly criticism of their work and GKR refusal to submit them to interpellation. The resignations came before the two officials are seized.
- June 13 Khieu Samphan ends his world travels and heads back to Cambodia. His 77-day trip started in North Vietnam and he went on to China, North Korea, Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, Algeria, Mauritania, Cameroon, Egypt, Syria, the Pathet Lao zone of Laos and finally, the PRG zone of South Vietnam. He made airport stopovers in Ghana and Chad. The Chinese afforded him Head of State treatments with the apparent aim of giving Samphan international stature.
- June 16 Long Boret continues as Prime Minister of a new 17-man Cabinet. Socio-Republican Party Secretary General Pan Sothi assumes the post of First Deputy Prime Minister. Republican Party participation in the Cabinet ended but Op Kim Ang started to sit in on Executive Council sessions. Ex-Information Minister

Trinh Hoanh and former PTT Minister Chheng Kim Suor shortly joined Op Kim Ang as presidential assistants. A week later the new government added fifteen Under-secretaries of State; primarily technician.

KAF flies a record 223 tactical air sorties; 159 are T-28 missions.

- June 21 FANK reopened Route 4 between Kompong Som and its airport at Ream.
- June 25 FANK elements from Kompong Speu cap a push down Route 4 by linking up with Das Kanchor enclave cutting a major enemy supply route in the process. The KC re-established their supply route in the process. The KC re-established their supply line by cutting Route 4 again on August 25 after a week of unsuccessful attacks.
- June 29 FANK's 28th Brigade retakes the former royal capital at Oudong in very heavy fighting thereby giving the GKR a psychological lift. A week later forces from isolated Lovek linked up with the Oudong troops (see March).
- June 30 Final AID program obligations bring the total for FY 1974 to \$95.2 million: commodity import program \$71.6 million, Exchange Support Fund \$18.3 million, Refugees \$4.1 million and Technical Support \$1.2 million. PL-480 Agreements during FY 1975 totalled \$182.5 million, U.S. military assistance amounted to \$375.0 million. The \$652 million included emergency assistance which Congress had granted in late 1973.
- July 1 The encircled village of Ta Hen in Battambang Province falls as a relief effort stalls within 5 kms. A small FANK garrison supported the village's self-defense forces, which were unable to hold out against a steady enemy push. The siege opened KC activities against isolated villages 40-50 kms from Battambang City.
- July 4-5 A two-day government sweep, prearranged with villagers, allows about 15,000 people to move to Neak Luong.
- July 9 The GKR calls for unconditional negotiations with Khmer "on the other side" and any time or place. This new proposal drops the July, 1973, requirements for a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops and reactivation of the ICC prior to the beginning of peace talks. The U.S., U.K., South Vietnam and Thailand rapidly welcomed the initiative. Sihanouk on July 10 categorically ruled out talks with the "puppets" and

vowed to fight on to total victory should the U.S. not withdraw from Cambodia. In-country insurgent statements dismissed the GKR offer as a "fallacious maneuver".

Oudong retaken by FANK. Scores of civilians found executed by KC. Indication of KC policy.

- July 20 The GRUNK press agency reports a decision to nationalize all foreign-owned rubber plantations in their zone effective this date.
- July 26 The first Tonle Sap River convoy to include US/AID-chartered barges brings rice and sugar from Kompong Chhnang to Phnom Penh. The convoys are necessary to by-pass the Route 5 interdiction south of Kompong Chhnang and increase the flow of commodities into Phnom Penh.
- July 30 Former Chief of State and High Political Council Member Cheng Heng returns to Cambodia. In a subsequent press interview he states his approval of the GKR's July 9 unconditional talks offer but stressed difficulties and complexities in reaching agreement with the other side. He noted France should have an important position and attitude toward Cambodia. He added that the USSR might be helpful in returning peace.
- August 1 A three-battalion FANK force with 20 armored personnel carriers breaks through enemy defenses on Route 61 northeast of Phnom Penh relieving a garrison cut off at Muk Kapul and blunting a strong enemy initiative that begun July 26.
- August 9 President Nixon resigns the Presidency. Kissinger remains Secretary of State.
- August 10 A PL-480 agreement for FY 175 provides for early delivery of \$15.7 million worth of rice (50,000 metric tons). The FY 1974 agreement had brought in \$182.5 million in mainly rice and also wheat, corn, tobacco, vegetable oil and cotton yarn.
- August 11 FANK reopens Route 6 between Siem Reap and Sisophon closed since August 5.
- August 12 In his first speech before a Joint Session of Congress, President Ford notes "...we hope to see an early compromise settlement in Cambodia..."
- August 15 The GKR celebrates Armed Forces Day with a massive parade marking a year of operations without U.S. Air

Force bombing. President Lon Nol thanked the military for their sacrifices and renewed the July 9 offer for unconditional talks. Thirty-six 107mm rockets, the largest number of incoming artillery since the February 11 105mm barrage, landed south of the capital with little effect.

August 20 Sihanouk arrives in Bucharest for the 30th anniversary of Romania's liberation. He returned to Peking August 25. While in Bucharest he told the New York Times that he had given up political leadership in Cambodia and would be content with a representational role when the Khmer Rouge came to power.

August 21 Six FANK brigades and other elements kick off the first GKR offensive of the rainy season. They moved into the corridor between the Bassac and Mekong Rivers attempting to form a line between Route 1 and the Bassac River that would keep the other side out of rocket range of Phnom Penh.

August 23 FANK keeps the initiative in the Siem Reap area by launching a two-brigade operation east of the city which quickly secured the historically significant ruins at Roluos, where the first of Angkor kings proclaimed himself. The operation was named "Operation 802" for the year of that event. It aimed to interdict major KC supply lines into the Angkor area, and control the rice-rich area east of Siem Reap city. After initial FANK success freed Roluos, the KC struck back at FANK forces weakened by desertions, malaria, poor logistics and low morale, on October 1. By October 3, the KC had regained all of the ground the had formerly lost.

August 26 The Mixed Teachers' Strike Committee states that teachers will not proctor August 29 "diplome" exams on the September Bacc I and II exams unless the GKR releases seven students held in the wake of the June 4 assassinations. The GKR held firm and a majority of teachers nevertheless appeared to proctor the diplome while the GKR later used soldiers with a teaching background to assist in proctoring the baccalaureat exams.

September 1 The Military Tribunal sentences Thuch Sau Khy, the alleged assassin of the Education Minister and a Presidential Assistant, and another student to death in absentia. Fifteen others are acquitted or receive terms ranging from life imprisonment to suspended sentences.

September 3 Jordan recognizes the Khmer Republic, giving the GKR its first diplomatic success in the Arab world with favorable consequences for the defense of the GKR's UN seat.

September 7 FANK operations in Kompong Chhnang allowed 2,500 refugee families to join the government side.

September 13 An oil rig doing exploratory drilling for French-owned ELF departs an area of the continental shelf that is in disputed sovereignty between the Khmer and Vietnamese governments. The GKR and GVN both declared their intentions to solve the dispute peacefully by negotiations. Press stories from Saigon and Singapore reported that the Vietnamese had threatened to use force to remove the rig.

September 15 The GKR publishes a comprehensive package of economic measures designed to restore balance to the economy by rectifying severe price distortions. Official rice prices triple; paddy prices quadruple; petroleum products sharply increase; import duties and export licenses are abolished; the riel devalues from 420 to 1,200 to \$1 and a three-tier foreign exchange operation sets different rates for the CIP Exchange Support Fund and free market sales of dollars. Soldiers and civil servants receive substantial salary increases; front-line intervention troops double their salaries.

September 16 Attacks begin north and west of Kompong Chhnang forcing armed villagers and FANK territorial forces to abandon their homes and positions. The attacking forces cut Route 5, September 23; it was reopened October 6. The attacks generated over 13,000 refugees.

September 17 The 20th United Nations General Assembly begins and four days later inscribes without opposition an item concerning restoration of GRUNK's lawful rights on the agenda as had been decided at the 28th UNGA.

September 19 The Ambassador and Acting Foreign Minister sign an agreement increasing commodity import program funds by \$15.5 million to a total of \$23.6 million for FY 1975.

September 21 Brigadier General Lon Non returns to Cambodia after a 17-month absence.

September 24 The National Assembly opens its 3rd session and elects Ung Bun Hor President for a two-year term.

- September 25 The GKR dissolves the Khmer Teachers' Association (AMCEK) after the Association leadership published a strong condemnation of the September 15 economic reforms. They had characterized the new measures as a "criminal act" and criticized Lon Nol's regime as self-serving and tied to corrupt (Chinese) business interests. Two days later the GKR launched a "Funds for the Support of Khmer Teachers (FASCEK), a purely social and professional organization which inherited AMCEK's substantial assets and insurance/social welfare programs.
- September 27 The U.S. Defense Department announces that, beginning in early October, Bird Air, an American civilian contractor, will use civilian crews to operate U.S.-furnished C-130s from Thailand in support of U.S. airlift requirements for Cambodia, replacing the USAF operation. Bird began operations October 7.
- October 10 FANK Commander-in-Chief Sosthene Fernandez opens the second year of the National Conscription Campaign by congratulating draft officials for the past year's work, calling on citizens to fulfill their military obligation and briefly outlining increased benefits for intervention troops.
- October 17 The GKR does not submit credentials at the opening of UNESCO's General Conference. Sihanouk supporters did not formally challenge Republican attendance at the meeting.
- October 21 Twenty-two (later increased to 23) co-sponsors ask the UN Secretariat to circulate a resolution the Asian Working Group drafted. The resolution in the name of the UN General Assembly urged the indigenous (Khmer) parties to negotiate, called on UN member states and the Secretary General to assist getting talks started and decided to take no further action pending a report to the 30th (1975) General Assembly. Sihanouk denounced the draft resolution as a tactical move aimed at avoiding discussion of the agenda item on "restoring GRUNK's lawful rights" at the UN.
- October 25 The U.S. and GKR sign agreements to add \$42.2 million to PL-480 commodities sold the Khmer Republic. The money is for an additional 100,000 tons of rice, and raises the amount of U.S.-supplied rice for Cambodia to 200,000 tons.
- October 28 Ieng Sary arrives in Hanoi as head of a GRUNK/FUNK economic and financial delegation which, however,

lacked the GRUNK Economic Minister. The group went on to Peking and Pyongyang and returned to China for provincial visits following a meeting with the hospitalized Chou En Lai. The group quietly returned to Cambodia December 4; no results of their mission were announced.

Prince Sihanouk and Monique leave Peking for Algiers to attend the 20th anniversary of the Algerian Armed Revolution. Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak and alternate Politburo member Thiounn Prasith went along. They returned to Peking November 4.

- November 1 FANK intervention forces reinforce local troops and push the KC off Route 5 between Kompon; Chhnang and Pursat. The route was opened to convoy traffic November 4. The road had been briefly reopened several times in the five weeks since it was first interdicted in September.
- November 6 Clandestine radio sets military goals for the coming dry season as follows: a) attacks around Phnom Penh and shelling of military targets near the capital; b) control of key roads and waterways; c) encircling the provincial enclaves, and destroying FANK positions, d) launching a rear area offensive to increase production to support front line troops. The cautious tone is somewhat more hedged than 1973's pre-dry season oratory.
- November 14 A parliamentary vote, effective on this date, extends the law putting "the nation in danger" by an additional six months. Freedom of the press was again excepted from those liberties subject to government decree.
- November 21 In a joint press conference Prime Minister Long Boret and FANK Commander-in-Chief Sosthene Fernandez drew a favorable balance sheet for the past rainy season's military activities but report no movement in the effort to get talks started. Long Boret notes that 350,000 refugees were unwilling to submit to the other side's rule and came to the GKR side in 1974. The newcomers swelled the refugee population in 1970 to two million resulting in major social and economic difficulties. Boret acknowledges that corruption had worsened during the war but said priority is now on the search for peace. He notes that the IMF publicly praised the September economic reforms but says the reforms still need time to bring about the desired stability. General Fernandez claims the enemy's provincial strategy, which sought to keep Phnom Penh

isolated while reducing key provincial enclaves, basically failed as FANK initiatives forced the KC to shift their troops to protect enemy lines of communication. He concludes that the enemy suffered 2,500 - 3,000 casualties in the wet season and failed to extend their territory or increase the population under their control although he admits they made gains around Kompong Chhnang.

November 26

Svay Rieng repulses two heavy attacks during the past week killing 40 enemy. The number of 107mm rocket attacks against the city decreased as did ground attacks and small caliber attacks by fire indicating reduced enemy activity and signalling an end to determined enemy offensive against this enclave which began October 29.

November 27

Two positions lost November 11 are recaptured and FANK begins mopping up around Berrong Khmar Kar, a village and small garrison fifteen kilometers north-east of Phnom Penh which was the scene of heavy attacks beginning November 10. At least two regiments of KC tried to take the village which guards access to potential rocket-launching sites near the capital. FANK heavily reinforced and with KAF support claimed over 500 enemy killed while taking 16 killed and 100 friendly wounded.

November 26-29

In four days of discussion with six separate votes, the UN adopts a 23-nation-sponsored Resolution seeking to involve the UN in the search for peace in Cambodia while leaving the Khmer UN seat in GKR hands. A key vote, 58 to 56 with 20 abstentions, gave the 23-nation Resolution priority in debate over the Albania resolution to "restore GRUNK's lawful rights" at the UN. The Assembly then voted 56 to 54 with 24 abstentions and three absences to approve the Resolution with last minute amendments, and finally defeated a tied part of the amendment by mutual agreement of the amendment's sponsor and the GKR's supporters.

The final resolution (3238 XXIX) notes that GRUNK "presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk" controls part of Khmer territory but that the GKR controls "a preponderant number" of the Khmer people. It states that the Khmer people should solve their own political problems peacefully without outside interference. The resolution then calls on "powers influencing the two parties...to use their good offices for conciliation..."; asks the Secretary General to consult and lend assistance

to the contending parties and report his results to the 1975 General Assembly; finally decides on no further action until members examine the Secretary General's report.

Sihanouk reacts by saying GRUNK would fight on and the Chinese UN representative calls the decision "a shame to the UN" and the resolution "but a scrape of paper"..."utterly null and void and meaningless."

November 30

Lon Nol addresses assembled members of the government, parliament, armed forces, and the diplomatic corps hailing the UN decision and reiterating the GKR's July 9 offer for unconditional talks.

A State Department press spokesman expresses U.S. pleasure at the UN vote, welcomes Lon Nol's statement and voices the hope that all UN members will "turn their attention to urging a peaceful solution to the conflict in Cambodia and supporting the UN's call for negotiations."

December 4

An Elysee press statement reports that French President Giscard d'Estaing told his Cabinet that French abstention on the Khmer issue at the UN does not mean French indifference to the suffering of "the Khmer nation." The President also said France hoped that the war would end soon and that it would only end... in accordance with the Khmer's own choice." He expressed French sympathy and friendship "to the Khmer nation." The GKR praised the statement and interpreted it as supporting their July 9 call for talks and the recently passed UN resolution.

December 5

Representatives of Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, the U.S., U.K. and IMF agree to continue the Exchange Support Fund into 1975 at a Manila meeting. The Philippines, Indonesia, Italy and the Asian Development Bank attended as observers.

According to the local press, a Military Tribunal acquitted five and gave a suspended sentence of eight year's imprisonment to the sergeant in immediate command at the time military authority murdered four students held for looting and sowing panic in the wake of a severe artillery attack on the capital in January. The sergeant was also ordered to pay 400,000 riels damages to the victim's parents.

December 6

In Pyongyang, Sihanouk says the UN resolution is a disgrace to that organization and that the UN must

bear "full responsibility" for continued war in Cambodia. He adds that despite their respect for the UN Secretary General, "we say...do not try to contact us and see us. We reject...and unjust resolution...We will fight to the end."

Khieu Samphan supports earlier Sihanouk rejections on behalf of those "who work at home" adding they "absolutely forbid the UN to interfere in their internal affairs." A December 4 clandestine radio editorial says that "the UN must not interfere in the affairs of Cambodia...if U.S. imperialism or anybody enters Cambodia to help the Lon Nol clique, they will be resolutely driven from Cambodia..."

December 12

A 237-truck convoy travels Route 5 from Pursat to Kompong Chhnang. The road was cleared to December 5, but bridge repairs delayed the convoy a week. Significant activity continued thirty kilometers northwest of Kompong Chhnang as three outposts fell despite heavy enemy casualties from KAF bombing. The last convoy had negotiated the highway November 25; five days later KC forces cut the road.

December 16

The final communique following President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing's summit in Martinique states, "...Regarding Cambodia, they (the two Presidents) expressed the hope that the contending parties would enter into negotiations in the near future rather than continuing the military struggle. They expressed the hope that following Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam might find their political way toward civil peace."

The UN General Assembly votes down a Syrian amendment to the Credentials Committee report that would have rejected the Khmer Republic's credentials. Fifty-three voted for the anti-GKR amendment, 61 opposed it, 19 abstained and four were absent.

The U.S. adds one million dollars to its Exchange Support Fund contributions bringing the total to \$11,870,000 during CY 1974.

December 18

Congress passes the Foreign Assistance Act for 1975. Cambodia is subject to a ceiling of \$377 million with a limit of 200 million on military aid. A \$75 million "drawdown authority" under the provisions of Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act raises effective military aid to \$275 million and the total ceiling to \$452 million.

December 19	Defense Minister Thappan Nginn resigns citing reasons of health.
December 20	Clandestine radio affirms that if the UN Secretary General accepts Lon Nol's invitation to visit Cambodia he would be encouraging both the U.S. "imperialists" and GKR "traitors" and the Khmer people "decline responsibility" for what might happen during a sojourn.
<u>1975</u>	
January 1	KC forces launch "New Year's" Offensive in a series of attacks designed to strangle Phnom Penh.
January 26	Last Mekong convoy arrives Phnom Penh.
February 3	Mekong River convoy hit returning to South Vietnam from Phnom Penh. Four ships lost, the biggest loss in shipping in the Cambodian War. This was the first time returning vessels were hit.
February 5	KC effectively close Mekong River, preventing any convoys from reaching Phnom Penh.
February 6	KC 107mm rockets hit a Phnom Penh elementary school, killing 14 children and wounding 25. Since the beginning of the New Year's Offensive an estimated 700 107mm rockets have struck Phnom Penh.
February 7	Notification that all funds under the authorized CB-MAP ceiling of \$275 million were exhausted.
February 19	USG states that U.S. has tripled its airlift of supplies to Cambodia to try to overcome the effects of the KC blockade of major routes and Mekong.
February 21	In Battambang, students riot and demand the suppression of Chinese businesses. Approximately 100 students arrested. Students kidnap the Battambang airbase commander and hold him hostage demanding release of the arrested students. Later that day the government releases the arrested students and agrees to consider the student demands.
February 26	KC forces capture Oudong, former Royal Capital located 18 miles northwest of Phnom Penh.

March 11 President Lon Nol asks Premier Long Boret to form a new cabinet. General Sosthene Fernandez removed.

March 13 Sihanouk warns all foreign embassies in Phnom Penh to close and evacuate their staffs immediately for their own safety. He adds that this will ensure the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with his government when it takes control. He excludes the governments of Israel, Nationalist China, South Korea and South Vietnam, saying his government will not have diplomatic relations with them.

March 17 President Ford says that events in Southeast Asia tend to validate the so-called "domino theory." He also states that a non-Communist Cambodian government is vital to U.S. security, noting that the "very serious" military situation in Cambodia is linked to recent moves in Thailand and Philippines to review their relations with the U.S.

March 22 U.S. suspends the airlift to Phnom Penh after two U.S. planes are hit by rockets at Pochentong airfield.

March 25 U.S. airlift resumed.

March 28 Soviet Union orders GKR to close its embassy in Moscow.

April 1 President Lon Nol leaves Cambodia, via Indonesia. Senate President Saukham Khoy replaces Lon Nol as acting president. Cabinet sources concede that Lon Nol's departure is to bring about a more conducive climate for negotiations with KC, as well as to possibly encourage U.S. to grant increased military aid.

April 8 Premier Long Boret holds talks in Bangkok with KC representatives; no details are announced.

April 12 U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh conducts evacuation during "Operation Eagle Pull." Acting President Soukham Khoy departs with U.S. remaining staff and civilians. U.S. Liaison Mission Chief in China, George Bush, sends Sihanouk a note asking him to return to Phnom Penh immediately in order to take power and obtain a cease fire. Sihanouk replies he will not betray the Khmer Rouge or "rob them of so well-deserved a victory."

April 15 Takhmau, Pochentong airfield and the dike running east-west to the north of Phnom Penh, all of which formed the last ring of defense around Phnom Penh, fall.

April 16

MEDTC arranges and controls from rear base in Thailand, six aerial resupply missions into Phnom Penh.

April 17

KC enter Phnom Penh. KC begin evacuation of capital. Thailand closes border with Cambodia. International Red Cross establishes an international "neutral" zone. U.S. Military Assistance to Cambodia and MEDTC mission ends.

ANNEX B

ANNEX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACPER	Assistant Chief of Staff Personnel (FANK).
ADE	Aerial delivery equipment.
AMEMB	American Embassy.
AO	Area of Operations.
AOCC	Air Operations Control Center.
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier.
APS	Aerial Port Squadron.
ARG/MAU	Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Aviation Unit.
ARVN	South Vietnamese Army.
ASR	Authorized Supply Rate.
AWADS	Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System.
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment.
BFM	"Battalion Fusiler Marine" (Naval Infantry Battalion, Khmer Navy).
CB	Cambodia.
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit.
CCT	Combat Control Team or Combat Crew Training.
CDS	Containerized Delivery System.
C-E	Communications-Electronics.
CHMEDTC	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia.
CII	"Centre Instruction Infanterie" (National Training Center).
CINCFANK	Commander-in-Chief, FANK.

CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations.
COMUSMACHTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
CONUS	Continental United States.
COUNTRY TEAM	A counsel comprised of the Senior Representatives of all U.S. agencies operating in a country. The Ambassador is head of the Country Team.
CRA	Continuing Resolution Authority.
DAO	Defense Attache Office.
DASC	Direct Air Support Center.
DATT	Defense Attache.
DGI	Director General of Instruction (FANK).
DGL	Director General of Logistics (FANK).
DIRMAT	Director of Material (FANK).
DN	"Defense Nationale", Ministry of National Defense.
DOD	Department of Defense.
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).
DS	Direct Support.
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency.
DSU	Direct Support Unit.
DTL	Directorate of Training and Logistics (USMACHTHAI).
DX	Direct Exchange.
EIUI	End Item Utilization Inspection.
EMG	"Etat Major Generale" (Khmer General Staff).

FAC	Forward Air Controller.
FANK	"Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres" (Khmer Armed Forces, including Army, Navy, Air Force. The term is often used when referring only to the Army).
FAO	Foreign Assistance Office.
FDC	Fire Direction Center.
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center.
FSN	Federal Stock Number.
FY	Fiscal Year.
GKR	Government of the Khmer Republic.
GS	General Support.
IAW	In accordance with.
ICC	International Control Commission.
IRAN	Inspect, Repair as needed.
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JLO	Joint Liaison Officer (MEDTC Rear, Thailand).
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution.
KAF	Khmer Air Force.
KC	Khmer Communists.
KI	Khmer Insurgent.
LCI	Infantry Landing Ship.
LCM	Landing Craft Medium.
LNO	Liaison Officer.
LOC	Line of Communication.
LOCC	Logistics Operations Control Center.
LOG	Logistics.
LSIL	Infantry Landing Ship.


MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
MACTLN	Training and Liaison Section (USMACTHAI).
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
MAE	MAP Administrative Executive Funds.
MAP	Military Assistance Program.
MAP-CB	Military Assistance Program, Cambodia.
MAPEL	Military Assistance Program Element.
MAPEAS	Military Assistance Program Equipment Authorization System.
MAPEX	Short Title for Transferable assets excess to PACOM needs.
MASL	Military Articles and Services List.
MC	Maintenance Control.
MCM	Central Material Depot (FANK).
MEDT	Military Equipment Delivery Team.
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia.
MFR	Main Force Regiment.
MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisitioning and Issuance Procedure.
MIMEX	Short Title for transferable property excess to military department needs.
MMS	Munitions Maintenance Squadron.
MNK	"Marine Nationale Khmere" (Khmer Navy).
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty.
MR	Military Region.
MSCFE	Military Sealift Command, Far East.
MSM/MSR	Minesweeper, River

M/T/DAY	Metric Ton Per Day.
MTT	Mobile Training Team.
NEMVAC	Emergency Evacuation Plan.
NKP	Nakhon Panom (Town located in NE Thailand. HQ USAAG and 7th Air Force at airbase at the same location).
NN	MASL Code which indicates DSAA approval required for MAP Programming.
NORS	Not Operationally ready for supply.
NVA	North Vietnamese Army.
PACOM	Pacific Command.
PAMEX	Pacific Area Excesses.
PARA	Paratroop/Parachute.
PATMA	Pacific Command Transportation Movement Agency.
PBR	Patrol Boat River.
PC	Patrol Craft.
PCF	Patrol Craft Fast.
PL 480	Public Law 480.
POI	Program of Instruction.
POL	Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants.
POL MIL	Political Military (Sub Element of US Mission).
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong).
RDD	Required Delivery Date.
R&D	Research and Development.
RIEL	The Khmer Monetary Unit.
RMS	Special Military Region.
RN	National Route.
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade.

RSR	Required Supply Rate.
RTA	Royal Thai Army.
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force.
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base.
RTG	Royal Thai Government.
RTNAB	Royal Thai Naval Air Base.
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
RVN	Republic of Vietnam.
SACSA	Special Assistant for Coordination and Special Actions, MEDTC.
SA/POM	Security Assistance/Program Objectives Memorandum.
SCHQ(F)	Supreme Command Headquarters (FWD) (Thai)
SCOOT	Support Cambodia Out of Thailand.
SCOOT/T	Support Cambodia Out of Thailand/Transshipment.
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense.
SIMEX	Secondary Item Excess.
S/T	Short Ton.
SRMA	Senior Representative for Military and Security Assistance Matters.
SSG	Special Support Group
SVN	South Vietnam.
TCN	Third Country National.
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment.
UITG	U.S. Army Vietnam Individual Training Group - Redesignated FANK Training Command, Army Advisory Group.
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly.

UNOFFICIAL AMERICANS	U.S. Citizens who were not employed by the U.S. mission (Cambodia).
USAAAT	U.S. Army Ammunition Activity Thailand.
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development.
USARSUPTHAI	U.S. Army Support, Thailand.
USARV	U.S. Army, Vietnam.
USG	U.S. Government.
USMACTHAI	U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
USMACTHAI SPT GP	U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, Support Group.
USN	U.S. Navy
USSAG	U.S. Security Assistance Group.
VC	Viet Cong.
VNAF	South Vietnamese Air Force.
VNN	South Vietnamese Navy.
WESTPAC	Western Pacific.
WIA	Wounded in Action.
ZSM	"Zone Speciale Mekong" (Mekong Special Zone).

ANNEX C



ANNEX C

Award of Unit Meritorious Unit Commendation
to U.I.T.G./FANK Training Command

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam/MACV Support Command
APO San Francisco 96375

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 738

15 March 1973

AWARD OF THE MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION

TC 439. The Following AWARD is announced.

By direction of the Secretary of the Army, under the provisions of paragraph 203, AR 672-5-1, the Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to the following named unit of the United States Army for exceptionally meritorious achievement in the performance of outstanding service during the period indicated:

UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM INDIVIDUAL TRAINING GROUP (UITG)/FORCES ARMEE' NATIONALE KHMER (FANK) TRAINING COMMAND and assigned and attached units:

Headquarters, USARV Individual Training Group, 24 February 1971 to 14 May 1972. Redesignated Headquarters, FANK Training Command, Army Advisory Group, Vietnam (AAGV) 15 May 1972.

Headquarters, FANK Training Command, AAGV, 15 May 1972 to 30 November 1972. Lon Hai Training Battalion, UITG, 24 February 1971 to 14 May 1972. Redesignated Long Hai Training Battalion, FANK Training Command, AAGV, 15 May 1972.

Long Hai Training Battalion, FANK Training Command, AAGV, 15 May 1972 to 30 November 1972.

Chi Lang Training Battalion, UITG, 24 February 1971 to 1 September 1971. Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion, UITG, 1 September 1971 to 14 May 1972. Redesignated Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion, FANK Training Command, AAGV, 15 May 1972.

Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion, FANK Training Command, AAGV, 15 May 1972 to 30 November 1972.

Dong Ba Thin Training Battalion, UITG, 24 February 1971 to 14 May 1972. Redesignated Dong Ba Thin Training Battalion, FANK Training Command, AAGV, 15 May 1972.

Dong Ba Thin Training Battalion, FANK Training Command, AAGV, 15 May 1972 to 30 November 1972.

GENERAL ORDERS NUMBER 738, dated 15 March 1973, DA, Headquarters United States Army Vietnam/MACV Support Command, APO San Francisco 96735 (Con't)

The citation reads as follows:

The USARV INDIVIDUAL TRAINING GROUP (UITG)/FORCES ARMEE' NATIONALE KHMER (FANK) TRAINING COMMAND, ARMY ADVISORY GROUP, and assigned units distinguished itself in support of military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the period 24 February 1971 to 30 November 1972. The members of this unit continually demonstrated extreme diligence, extraordinary aggressiveness and consummate skill in the conduct of training operations with Allied forces throughout the combat zone. From its conception the USARV INDIVIDUAL TRAINING GROUP/FORCES ARMEE' NATIONALE KHMER TRAINING COMMAND provided training to seventy-eight Cambodian battalions located at three sites. In addition to the demanding efforts of improving and upgrading two of those sites, one site, complete with training areas, weapon ranges, billets, and other facilities, had to be built from the ground up. When tasked with the requirement to organize, re-equip and train Vietnamese Armed Forces units which had been badly mauled during the Spring 1972 Offensive, members of this unit formed highly skilled Mobile Training Teams (MTT). This MTT concept and the implementation of this program has significantly increased the fighting effectiveness and morale of over sixty Vietnamese battalions. Maintaining the highest caliber of professionalism and superior demonstrated ability, members of this unit successfully rendered the finest possible training. The remarkable proficiency and devotion to duty displayed by members of the USARV INDIVIDUAL TRAINING GROUP/FORCES ARMEE' NATIONALE KHMER TRAINING COMMAND are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon themselves, their unit and the Armed Forces of the United States.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL

P.B. WELCH
Colonel, GS
Acting Chief of Staff

/signed/
JAMES C. GRIFFITH
COL, AGC
Adjutant General

ANNEX D

ANNEX D

Status of Army Training FY 74-FY 75 (As of 7 Mar 75)

<u>STATUS OF ARMY TRAINING</u>				
LINE	UNITS/INDIVIDUALS	FY 74	FY 75 TNG OBJ	FY 75 TNG TO DATE
1	Infantry Bns	22	90	0
2	Recruit	32,396	31,200	21,537
3	NCO Training	1,957	8,283	1,676
4	Ranger Training	269	1,591	140
5	Mortar Training	222	480	18
6	Specialty Training			
	a. Ordnance	758	1,335	211
	b. Engineer	990	2,000	879
	c. Signal	1,006	1,956	653
	d. Transportation	1,924	2,887	713
	e. Armor	1,123	942	374
	f. Medical	174	631	231
	g. Artillery	498	910	746
7	Special Schools			
	a. Intelligence	142	720	120
	b. C&GSC	320	630	446
	c. OCS	686	3,324	936
	d. Psywar	657	960	439

Source: MG Cleland's Briefing Charts, 1974 MAAG Chief's Conference.

ANNEX E

ANNEX E

In-Country Training Data for FY 74 and FY 75 and Qualitative Evaluation

In-country training data for FY 74 and FY 75 is as follows:

(1) Training Center Capability.

TRAINING CENTERS	ANNUAL OUTPUT CAPABILITY		FY OUTPUT		QUALITATIVE EVALUATION	
	FY 74	FY 75	FY 74	FY 75	FY 74	FY 75
Kampol	7,200	7,200	5,400	5,000	Good	Good
Prey Sar	12,000	12,000	9,000	9,000	Good	Fair
Kompong Speu	18,000	12,000	13,500	2,000	Excellent	Good
Sisophon	30,000	24,000	22,500	12,000	Excellent	Good
Ream	12,000	12,000	9,000	6,000	Good	Good
Longvek	6,000	-----	4,500	-----	Fair	-----

(2) Service School Capability

SCHOOLS	ANNUAL OUTPUT CAPABILITY		FY OUTPUT		QUALITATIVE EVALUATION	
	FY 74	FY 75	FY 74	FY 75	FY 74	FY 75
Officer Candidate	1,600	1,800	710	500	Good	Fair
Command and Staff	750	750	500	400	Good	Good
English Language	480	500	380	250	Excellent	Fair
Intelligence	936	720	400	20	Good	Fair
PSYWAR	1,200	1,200	670	300	Good	Good
Airborne	1,500	1,500	300	300	Fair	Fair
Armor	2,972	900	1,816	300	Fair	Fair
Engineer	2,146	2,000	989	650	Good	Good

Signal	1,720	1,720	1,575	420	Excellent	Good
Ordnance	1,335	1,335	1,175	50	Good	Poor
Medical	300	600	200	200	Fair	Poor
Transportation	2,240	2,800	1,975	350	Good	Fair
Artillery	1,660	700	1,000	500	Fair	Poor

Source: End of Tour Report. BG Palmer, p. B-63.

AD-A133 443

CAMBODIA: ANALYSIS OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
CAMBODIA 1970-1975(U) ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF
COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS K R BOWRA 03 JUN 83

4/4

UNCLASSIFIED

SBI-AD-E750 844

F/G 15/7 NL

END



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

ANNEX F

ANNEX F

FANK FORCE STRUCTURE

DEVELOPMENT OVER TIME

I. INTRODUCTION. On 18 March 1970, at the time of Prince Sihanouk's ouster and the establishment of the Republican government, the Khmer Armed Forces (FANK) consisted of approximately 35,000 men. This included: a 32,000 man Army, with 32 battalions, armed with mixed weapons; a 1,600 man Navy, with 11 boats; and a 1,300 man Air force, with 15 aircraft.

a. The first Khmer officers had graduated from the Royal Military Academy in 1946. From this meager force structure and leadership base, the growth of the MAP supported Khmer Armed Forces has been as follows:

End FY 71. 68 BNS, 69 aircraft, 49 boats, 79,500 men.

End FY 72. 117 BNS, 139 aircraft, 87 boats, 142,000 men.

End FY 73. 166 BNS, 192 aircraft, 144 boats, 181,000 men.

End FY 74 to date. 186 BNS, 208 aircraft, 171 boats, 192,597 men.

b. The planned force structure objective is to achieve a balanced force of 220,000 MAP supported personnel, out of a total Force Structure of 253,000. (The remaining 33,000 personnel being in headquarters and operational units which receive payroll assistance only.) FANK development toward this planned force structure objective is described below as it relates to each of the three services. The discussion of the Army is essentially limited to force structure. The Army's performance is discussed in the basic report. The Navy and Air Force portions of this annex do not contain qualitative assessments.

2. ARMY.

a. Expansion. The Army's development since 1970 was not without turbulence, particularly in its initial stages. The survival of the Khmer Republic (GKR) during its first year of existence was to a great extent the result of emergency recruitment and massive rallying to a popular cause. U.S. equipment provided for newly formed units consisted of Soviet AK-47 rifles captured in RVN and cast off U.S. cal 30 carbines. Many infantry units literally sprang into existence during this time frame. Individually recruited by local commanders, themselves newly

appointed, the units lacked both training and equipment. Uncontrolled strength increases occurred, reaching their zenith in December 1972 when FANK consisted of approximately 561 battalions subtended under a diverse array of "command" headquarters. Units were not standardized in either organization, strength, equipment or training. Uncontrolled personnel strength reporting and the "phantom" problem was an inevitable outgrowth of such turmoil.

b. Reorganization. Three directives were issued in December 1972 to correct the situation. They were issued by the newly appointed FANK Chief of Staff with the full support of MEDTC. The first limited FANK strength for 1973 to 250,000; suspended individual unit recruitment programs; and directed a manpower reapportionment. The second promulgated a standard TO&E for both intervention and territorial battalions. The third specifically spelled out how manpower was to be reapportioned and abolished all regiments, "brigade group" headquarters and numerous ineffectual brigades. The result was a paring done of the unwieldy FANK force structure and the reassignment of excess personnel to flesh out those FANK units within the approved MAP force structure.

(1) The Army MAP force structure had been previously worked out by a FANK/MEDTC Force Structure Coordinating Committee during July 1972. The plan designated the following number and type units to receive MAP support:

<u>Inf. Bde's</u>	<u>Inf. Bn's</u>	<u>Territorial Inf Co's</u>
32	202	465

(2) Within the above totals, 128 of the battalions formed the maneuver elements for the 32 brigades, of which 20 were independent and 12 were organized into 4 separate divisions with appropriate supporting arms, i.e., a 155 battery and an armored cavalry squadron. Each of the brigades is to have an organic 105 battery. In addition, a separate artillery and armored brigade rounded out the combat elements of the force structure. The bulk of the Army's 202,000 man slice of the MAP approved FANK force structure of 220,000 personnel are located within the above units.

c. Problems. Implementation of the above force structure has not been without difficulties. The first problem was resistance within MAP itself as to the need for four divisions, the use of armored cavalry, and the inclusion of heavy artillery within the planned structure. The most telling argument in favor of such units proved to be the evolution of the enemy into a main force organization and the combat effectiveness of the units themselves. These factors prompted an initial increase in division bases from 2 to 4 and the accelerated formation through 1973 of both artillery and armored cavalry units. In addition, experience showed that the Territorial Companies did not fare well on the battlefield during 1973, often being isolated and overrun. FANK therefore began consolidating these companies into Territorial Battalions and a similar move to integrate

some of these battalions into existing but incomplete brigade organizations may develop.

(1) A more difficult, and continuing problem with the implementation of the planned force structure, was the lack of staff coordination within EMG/FANK and its resulting inability to establish priorities and allocate materiel and manpower resources. Throughout the reporting period, brigades and battalions identified as being within the MAP approved force structure would be dissolved and their men and equipment assembled into other units, some MAP designated, others not. Some of this could be attributable to the exigencies of combat/and or shortcomings of CRA/MAP funding. Much of it, however, was the result of political maneuvering on the part of "favorites" within the FANK officer political maneuvering on the part of "favorites" within the FANK officer corps and/or the almost total lack of middle level staff coordination between the FANK J1, J3, and J4. Even within the J3, coordination between the operations personnel and the force structure planners only occurred when MEDTC officers acted as the catalyst. While such "management by exception" proved adequate for forcing through a commonly agreed upon set of TO&E's and a definitized force structure, it was not and could not be an adequate replacement for competent, day to day middle management. "Capturing" the force structure in the sense of maintaining an accurate current estimate of the status of designated MAP supported units thus became a daily challenge.

d. Rounding Out the Force Structure. While the previously addressed combat units constitute the bulk of the Army force structure, additional combat support units to include an Engineer, a Signal and a Transportation Brigade were also formed, equipped and became operational during the reporting period.

(1) Logistical support units were given second priority to combat/ combat support units during 1972 and the first part of 1973. Logistical support did receive increased emphasis in the latter half of 1973 however, with the equipping of an Ordnance Depot, two Ammunition Depots, a Quartermaster Depot, a POL storage facility, two ambulance companies, a 400 bed hospital, a Collection, Classification and Salvage Company, and a Terminal Service Company.

e. Summary. In summary, the Khmer Army, following the events of 18 March 1970, was first greatly and haphazardly expanded while being equipped with a varied assortment of obsolete and/or excess equipment immediately available to CB MAP. During 1972 and the first half of 1973, the emphasis was on the training and equipping of standardized infantry battalions, and the reorganization of the FANK force structure into four divisions comprising 12 brigades, 20 independent brigades, 74 separate territorial infantry battalions, and 465 territorial infantry companies. In early 1973, the emphasis was on accelerating the delivery of artillery and the introduction of armored cavalry troops into the force structure. Finally, in the latter part of 1973, increased emphasis was given to bringing in equipment for logistical units in order to maintain the large influx of equipment that had occurred in the past

two years. (N.B. Increased and/or unprogrammed ammunition costs will necessitate significant slippage in the rounding out of this political portion of the Army force structure.) The end of 1973 thus saw the Army force structure 80% complete, with the primary deficiency being in some programmed but undelivered logistical units.

3. NAVY.

a. Expansion. At the commencement of the war against the KC, the Marine Nationale Khmer (MNK) had two primary missions. These were surveillance and protection of the Khmer coastline and patrol and protection of the Tonle Sap-Mekong River axis. MNK did not have sufficient assets to effectively perform either mission and its primary efforts were restricted to the lower Mekong River from Phnom Penh to the RVN border. Occasionally MNK would make a show of force into the Tonle Sap River and the Great Lake. Like its sister services, MNK underwent a significant expansion following the events of 18 March 1970. From a base of approximately 1,600 men and 11 boats, MNK first increased to some 5,000 men and 69 boats by February 1972 and then, during the time frame 1972-1974, more than doubled its strength to 11,500 men and 171 boats. These increases were related directly to increased mission responsibilities as discussed below.

b. Maritime Coastal Zone Responsibility. In early 1972 MNK was ill-equipped to execute the surveillance of the GKR's 400 kilometer coastline. The only craft available to prosecute this mission were two ancient PC's, one LSIL, one LCI and a few armed junks. Additionally the Ream Base was in a run-down condition, boasted one small pier in decrepit condition, had little internal repair capability and completely lacked an effective logistical support system. Surveillance of the coastline from Ream to the border with RVN was consequently passed to the VNN on the recommendation of the Tripartite Deputies. The coast from Ream to the Thai frontier was patrolled haphazardly at best by the craft referred to above. Protection of the deep water port of Kompong Som and Ream Naval Base itself was largely ignored because of the unavailability of assets.

(1) This state of affairs has largely been corrected by implementation of the following actions: Procurement of 20 new construction, radar equipped PCF's; stationing of 4 PBR's in the Kompong Som port area; accomplishment of overhauls of all four of the heavy craft noted above; procurement of a newly overhauled floating drydock at the Ream Naval Base; substantial upgrade of the Ream Repair Facility equipments; installation of an effective supply support system; and the commencement and majority completion of a modern pier facility and support complex at Ream Naval Base. Three major improvements are still required. These are completion of the pier complex, completion of the Ream electricity generating project and procurement of a larger, fast, well-armed patrol craft with good sea keeping qualities to extend the seaward range of surveillance beyond that which can be performed by the smaller PCF's. The above actions are being actively prosecuted. In the interim the patrol and surveillance of the Khmer coastline has been effectively assumed by the FANK.

c. Riverine Responsibilities. Despite the importance of coastline surveillance it is protection and control of shipping within and on the 1800 kilometers of navigable rivers and upon the Tonle Sap Lake which represent the most critical mission of the MNK. There is no more important task than the escort and protection of merchant convoys carrying rice, petroleum, and ammunition up the Mekong River from the RVN border to Phnom Penh. The Mekong River LOC is the lifeline of the Khmer Republic and it is here that MNK has proven its combat effectiveness.

(1) Before February 1972 MNK was poorly equipped to provide the armed craft needed to escort convoys up the Mekong. They did have some prior U.S. MAP Craft, a few, old French craft of varying description and approximately 35 MAP furnished PBR's. Prior to this time convoy escort was provided primarily by the VNN. An energetic procurement effort was launched to provide MNK with additional numbers of fast patrol craft and more importantly, with some heavily armed and armored assault craft which could provide the heavy direct fire support vital to effective convoy escort. Thirty-five heavies including 6-105 monitors, 17 ATC's, 5 MSM/MSR and 2 CCB's were procured to beef up the MNK firepower on the Mekong. An additional 25 new construction PBR's were also provided and 14 LCM6/8's were added to the MNK inventory to handle increased logistic support. Fifty-seven more craft of the same types will arrive shortly.

(2) In early 1972 a secondary support base was established at Kompong Chhnang at which the MNK stationed a small number of craft to expand its influence on the Tonle Sap River. From this base increased numbers of patrols were also launched into the Great Lake to interdict enemy troop movements and to deny this food-rich area to his uninterrupted use.

(3) During the early part of 1973, MNK was formally assigned the protection and defense of the waterborne approaches to Phnom Penh. To accomplish this mission MNK assigned approximately 15 craft of various types to the environs of Phnom Penh. Protection was provided to areas such as Prek Phnou (FANK petroleum reserve) Tak Mau and the Monivong Bridge.

(4) In late May of 1973 the largest mission expansion took place. At this time the FANK high command assigned the responsibility of the Mekong Special Zone to the MNK. MNK was tasked to provide physical security of the Mekong River banks to an average distance of eight kilometers of either side of the Mekong from Phnom Penh to the RVN border. MNK thus underwent another force structure expansion in order to establish a ground presence at key locations along the Mekong corridor. A total of 3,000 infantry troops from the Army were reassigned to MNK and organized into Naval Infantry Battalions (BFM). An eventual force of 30 such battalions is planned.

(5) The battle of Kompong Cham in September-October 1973 also resulted in an increase of MNK mission responsibility. The enemy attempt to seize this provincial capital was thwarted thanks in part to a MNK

amphibious operation that transported a relief force from Phnom Penh to the besieged city. Following the battle, MNK was given the responsibility to keep the Mekong River open and to resupply the city in a year round basis. A relocation of MNK riverine assets was required with a concomitant reduction in the numbers of craft assigned to the lower Mekong.

(6) It was because of this increased riverine responsibility on both the Mekong and the Tonle Sap that the decision was made to achieve a force level of 250 craft and to reorganize the MNK five riverine task forces of 50 craft each.

d. MNK Leadership. Prior to the war, the MNK was a small ill-equipped organization. The MNK did have one important resource. MNK leadership is and has been the best in FANK.

(1) Headed by Commodore Von Sarendy, Chief of Naval Operations, MNK has a competent and well-trained cadre of officers who have been able to assume increased mission responsibilities without faltering.

(2) During this period the MNK trained all their own boat crews, provided their own logistical support, has increased logistical and naval gunfire support to the FANK, and upgraded their repair and supply capability of Chruai Chang War while maintaining a 65% or better operational status for all riverine craft. More importantly the MNK insured by thorough planning and aggressive execution that an interrupted supply of ammunition, oil and foodstuffs reached Phnom Penh despite determined enemy efforts to choke-off the Mekong LOC.

4. AIR FORCE.

a. Background. Prior to the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in 1970 the Khmer Air Force (KAF) was aptly described as the Phnom Penh Royal Flying Club. It possessed a few MiG fighters and a varied assortment of other aircraft of all types and origins. Maintenance support of this aerial museum was a best haphazard. The pilots were drawn from the extensive branches of the royal family, the lesser nobility, and the wealthier families. Command of the air force was a political plum and was rewarded based upon personal loyalty. Inefficiency was tolerated, both because the air force lacked a real mission, and because an efficient air force could pose a threat to the palace.

b. Initial Problems. Following the events of 18 March 1970, the Khmer Air Force, unlike its sister services, was not called upon to play a decisive role in the unfolding battle for control of Cambodia. Air power, when and where needed, was provided by the U.S. Air Force. While KAF underwent some expansion, particularly in the development of a basic inventory of common type aircraft, its overall development as a self-sufficient military organization was not fully addressed. From the U.S. mission viewpoint, time and cost factors were prohibitive. U.S. airpower was more than adequate. In addition, the new Khmer government, like the old, viewed airpower as a potential direct threat to the head

of state and treated any proposed reorganization of KAF and its command structure accordingly. KAF, to a greater degree than either of her sister services, has thus consistently suffered from inept leadership.

c. Situation - 1972. In February 1972 KAF consisted of 72 aircraft, only 19 having firepower capabilities. It possessed one squadron of prop driven fighter-bombers, one squadron of jet power transport helicopters on loan from MACV resources, and assorted transport aircraft. Total personnel, including trainees, numbered only 3,853 men to support a headquarters, one operating base, and some forward operating detachments at civilian airports. Less than 100 active pilots were filling operational assignments. Heavy maintenance was accomplished out of country, restricting the number of sorties available for combat missions. Qualified maintenance personnel were few and had been educated by the former French Military Mission. They did not possess the required proficiency level in English necessary to learn the maintenance procedures of the U.S. aircraft then coming into the KAF inventory. In addition, neither adequate maintenance facilities nor a functioning supply system existed.

d. Development - February 1972 to August 1973.

(1) The original premise in the equipping of the Khmer Air Force was to provide it with the simplest, easiest to fly and maintain aircraft that could accomplish its missions of close air support for ground and naval forces and limited air transport. Accordingly, the T-28 was furnished as the basic fighter-bomber, the C-47 and AC-47 as the basic cargo aircraft and fixed wing gunship, and the O-1 as the FAC aircraft. Transport helicopters were included in the inventory with helicopter (XM93) gunships arriving in March 1973. Because of their availability, other aircraft have been added from time to time. A squadron of AU-24's were added when they were declared excess to U.S. needs during the phasedown of the U.S. Vietnam involvement.

(2) KAF expansion and development as an effective force prior to 15 August 1973 was hampered. Reasons were the reliance on U.S. combat air support thus making a truly efficient KAF unnecessary, a shortage of skilled pilots and trained support personnel; lack of adequate airfields; a lack of effective leadership which was exacerbated by frequent changes in key personnel and KAF failure to organize itself.

(3) MEDTC and KAF had taken steps to correct many of the deficiencies prior to 15 August 1973. Training programs had been established in the Khmer Republic, Thailand, and the U.S. to train pilots and other personnel. An airfield construction program was launched to upgrade the airfields at Pochentong, Battambang, and Ream. The C-123 aircraft was introduced to increase the airlift capability and to add the ability to conduct airdrops as well. A DASC was established in Phnom Penh to facilitate control of airstrikes.

(4) In mid-1973, shortly before the cessation of U.S. combat air support, KAF had within its inventory the following aircraft:

T-28	32
O-1A/D	28
C-47	15
AC-47	12
C-123	8
UH-1H	30
UH-1H(G)	6
AU-23	14

e. Progress since August 1973.

(1) It was evident however that KAF was still a very poor substitute for U.S. combat air support. Steps were taken at several levels to improve KAF's capabilities. Additional aircraft were brought into country including seven UH-1H's under the accelerated delivery project Nimble Voyage. Studies were conducted as to means to increase KAF's abilities in the near term and to eventually make it self-sufficient. The outgrowth of one of those studies was the Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia (TAIP) which is designed to accelerate KAF development so that it can perform effectively in the 1973-74 dry season. This program encompasses expedite delivery of AC-47, T-28 and O-1 aircraft; accelerated training programs and expanded support maintenance arrangements.

(2) Prior to the implementation of TAIP, the assumption of command of KAF by BG Ea Chhong in November 1973 saw the varying efforts as improvement of KAF begin to bear fruit and created a fertile ground for further improvement. The sortie rates of T-28 aircraft, in particular, have increased markedly. There is much greater cooperation and coordination between air/ground and naval forces. This can be attributed to the improvement of leadership brought by the new commander.

(3) As of February 1974, the Khmer Air Force possessed the following numbers of aircraft:

T-28B/D	63
O-1A/D	35
C-47	13
AC-47	11
C-123	8

UH-1H	34
UH-1H(G)	10
AU-24	14

Personnel strength as of the same date was 9,684, of which 298 were pilots. This represents a 220% increase in qualified pilots since 1972.

MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT BY SERVICE BY YEAR

<u>MAJOR ITEM</u>	<u>JAN 72</u>	<u>JUL 72</u>	<u>DEC 72</u>	<u>JUL 73</u>	<u>DEC 73</u>
1. <u>ARMY</u>					
Rifle M-16	41,351	53,619	69,224	112,346	158,115
Carbine, Cal 30	52,616	83,515	83,515	83,515	83,515
Machine Gun M-60	18	18	18	859	859
Machine Gun Cal 30	2,278	3,357	4,531	6,128	6,220
Mortar 60 mm	815	912	1,170	2,041	2,223
Mortar 81 mm	97	102	196	196	503
Grenade Launcher M-79	6,971	7,019	7,735	18,707	20,481
Recoilless Rifle 106 mm	7	7	33	61	121
Howitzer 75 mm	20	47	47	57	57
Howitzer 105 mm	69	69	134	164	208
Howitzer 155 mm	0	0	0	8	24
Ambulance 1/4T & 3/4T	41	42	139	338	380
Truck Dump 2 1/2T & 5T	0	0	24	34	76
Truck 2 1/2T Cargo	496	733	982	1,576	1,838
Truck 3/4T Cargo	0	108	441	676	758
Truck 1/4T Utility	220	527	647	1,239	1,264
Personnel Carrier M113	21	45	46	95	185
Personnel Carrier M106	2	6	7	11	17
Telephone TA1 & TA 312	1,037	1,318	4,298	9,024	9,629
Radio AN/PRC 10	2,206	3,891	4,750	4,750	4,843
Radio AN/PRC 25	1,975	2,920	3,207	4,762	5,023
Radio AN/URC 46, 47	85	152	152	264	320

<u>MAJOR ITEM</u>	<u>MONTH/YEAR</u>		
	<u>FEB 72</u>	<u>FEB 73</u>	<u>FEB 74</u>
2. <u>NAVY</u>			
Patrol Boat River (PBR)	39	43	64
Armored Troop Carrier (ATC)	2	14	14
ATC (Refueler)	0	2	3
ATC (Recharger)	0	1	1
Command & Communications Boat (CCB)	0	1	2
Monitor with Flamethrower (ZIPPO)	0	1	1
Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB)	0	4	4
Minesweeper River (MSR/MSM)	0	6	5
Monitor	0	5	6
Landing Craft Medium (LCM6)	19	22	30
Landing Craft Medium (LCM8)	0	5	5
Combat Salvage Boat (CSB)	0	1	1
Landing Craft Utility (LCU/YFU)	1	4	4
Patrol Craft Fast (PCF)	0	4	20
Floating Crane (YD)	0	1	1
Mobile Support Base (MSB)	1	2	2
Infantry Landing Ship (LSIL/LCI)	2	2	2
Patrol Craft (YTL)	2	2	2
Yard Tug Light (YTL)	2	2	3
Drydock	1	1	1
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total Craft	69	123	171

	<u>MAJOR ITEM</u>	<u>JAN 72</u>	<u>JAN 73</u>	<u>JAN 74</u>
3.	<u>AIR FORCE</u>			
	T-28B/D	16	48	64
	O-1D/A	17	31	37
	AU-24	0	14	14
	AC-47	3	6	14
	C-47	10	15	11
	U-1A	16	7	1
	C-123K	0	0	8
	UH-1H	14	19	34
	UH-1GS	0	0	10
	T-41	0	14	18
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	Total Aircraft	76	154	211

ANNEX G

ANNEX G

MEDTC RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

1. CINCPAC.

a. CHMEDTC serves under CINCPAC's military command and is immediately subordinate to CINCPAC.

b. As the next higher headquarters in the chain of command, CINCPAC is the medium through which MEDTC communicates with the outside world. Virtually all action traffic is addressed to CINCPAC which reviews and either approves it, disapproves it, acts on it or passes it with recommendations or directions to other headquarters and agencies.

c. Members of MEDTC coordinate with staff members at CINCPAC on an almost daily basis. This coordination is done primarily with the J8 section but also frequently with the J4 and J5 sections on matters of logistics or force structure.

d. The J8 section is responsible for monitoring the Military Assistance Program. The two action officers within this section monitor the Cambodian Program. Since they are the only officers within CINCPAC who have fulltime duties watching Cambodia and are quite familiar with the problems of the program, they are in frequent communications with members of MEDTC, particularly the programmers and certain of the logistical managers. Since they are personally known to many of the action officers at MEDTC, these staff officers also serve as the MEDTC point of contact with other CINCPAC agencies.

2. DOD, DSAA, JCS. MEDTC contacts with DOD and JCS are normally accomplished through CINCPAC. Quite often final action on MEDTC requests/program changes are accomplished at DOD level by DSAA which manages the Military Assistance Program worldwide for the Secretary of Defense. The actual data base for CB MAP is held at DSAA. It is the final approving authority on all program changes. There is little direct contact on a day-to-day basis between JCS, DSA and MEDTC. There have, however, been several field visits by DOD personnel to Cambodia for coordination and update. JCS passes on force structure changes and is the approving authority on JSOP submissions. JCS also periodically becomes involved in capabilities studies, such as the late 1973 study on KAF self-sufficiency, which require CINCPAC and, ultimately, MEDTC input.

3. MACV. When it was first formed, MEDTC maintained extremely close ties with MACV. The original MEDTC terms of reference directed CHMEDTC to "closely coordinate all matters pertaining to U.S. and third country

Military Assistance to Cambodia with COMUSMACV." COMUSMACV was designated as the coordinating authority to insure compatibility of U.S. Military Assistance to Cambodia with the Vietnamization Program. This coordinating authority included planning of force structure, programming of materiel, and storage and delivery of equipment, as well as all other actions which affected the planning and orderly execution of U.S. and third country military programs in the RVN and Cambodia.

4. USAAG. USAAG has been closely involved with the support of Cambodia since its formation. Prior to 15 August 1973 it was responsible for coordination of U.S. combat air support for the Khmer Armed Forces. It also provided other support and assistance, including conducting studies of problem areas in the Khmer Republic which, because of the limitations on its staff and mission, are beyond the capability of MEDTC. USAAG's role was expanded recently when it was recognized that the level and complexity of the support to Cambodia out of Thailand required that one single U.S. commander be assigned responsibility for planning and coordinating all support operations from Thailand. CINCPAC tasked USAAG with that responsibility.

5. USMACTHAI. Much of the support of Cambodia from Thailand is accomplished by USMACTHAI or its subordinate commands. MEDTC interfaces primarily with MACTHAI Headquarters in Bangkok on training matters and with USARSUPTHAI at Camp Samae San for administrative and logistical support. The MACTHAI Training and Logistical Detachment has begun to play a major role in the implementation of the Tactical Air Improvement Plan - Cambodia.

6. U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh.

a. CHMEDTC functions under the supervision of the Chief, U.S. Diplomatic Mission, Cambodia, as required by law and in accordance with executive orders and such other instructions as the President may from time to time promulgate. CHMEDTC cooperates closely with the Chief, U.S. Diplomatic Mission, Cambodia, and assures that he is kept fully informed concerning current and prospective Military Assistance Plans and Programs and MEDTC activities.

b. The relationship between the divisions of MEDTC and other sections of the U.S. Mission is primarily one of mutual assistance, coordination and information.

c. (1) The Economic Section of the Embassy and the MEDTC Plans and Programs Division work very closely on matters of MAP/AID interface. The MEDTC action officer serves as the focal point within MEDTC for development of counterpart funding projects and preparing them for approval by CHMEDTC, the Economic Counselor and the Chief of Mission. After they have been approved they are passed to FANK for inclusion in the GKR defense budget. Following this, the Comptroller, MEDTC drafts a Project Agreement between the two governments outlining the conditions of the agreement.

(2) MEDTC action officers also work closely with those in the Economic Section on matters such as rice, POL, construction, etc., which affect both the civil and military sectors.

d. The Political-Military Section: The Political-Military Section of the Embassy and elements of MEDTC coordinate very closely on matters that affect both the civilian and military spheres. Typical of such actions is the equipping of the auto-defense forces. The Political-Military Section is the primary action office for monitoring these forces. However, many of their equipment is provided by MAP and MEDTC assisted in determining the level of that support when the concept was being developed. Other areas in which there is a frequent exchange of information are those concerning FANK personnel management.

e. DAO Phnom Penh.

(1) The relationship between MEDTC and the DAO is one of mutual cooperation and exchange of information. As the working level officers from the two agencies are often of great assistance to each other especially as sources of force structure information. The Plans Liaison Officers and officers on End Item Utilization Inspections also often develop information of interest to the members of the DAO staff.

(2) CHMEDTC and the DATT both report directly to the Chief, U.S. Mission. They are coequal members of the Coordinating Committee for Security and Military Affairs.

(3) The Naval Attache is charged by CINCPAC with responsibility for coordinating Mekong Convoys.

f. The Director of Construction, Khmer Republic is responsible to the Officer in Charge of Construction Thailand for accomplishment of construction authorized in the Military Assistance Program. CHMEDTC as administrator of the Military Assistance Program in Cambodia is the customer for whom DIRCON and OICC perform the construction service.

g. Coordination of DOD elements. In recent message traffic DOD and State have iterated the position that in each country, there should be one single authoritative individual to serve as the senior defense representative. According to CINCPACINST S3020.2E, 24 May 1971, CHMEDTC as the senior military officer in country is the Single Senior Military Representative. As such he is responsible for coordination of DOD elements attached to the U.S. Mission. There is, however, no designated senior defense representative in Cambodia. Other DOD agencies are not under operational or administrative control of CHMEDTC, their persons in charge are not rated by him; and they operate independently and/or report directly to the Ambassador. It is recognized that the term "single authoritative individual" is subject to interpretation. However, if single authoritative individual equates to command authority, the DOD is not represented to the U.S. Ambassador and to the host military departments by a single authoritative individual; nor is there a single authoritative point of

control for common DOD personnel administration operation and other local problems. In effect, the U.S. Ambassador and the host country military departments deal with the Department of Defense through multiple and equally authoritative points of contact. Close country team coordination and informal recognition of the role of CHMEDTC as SSMR here provide for a common effort but the fact remains there is no single responsible DOD point of contact/interface/coordination. Thus, while CHMEDTC is the Single Senior Military Representative, he does not have the authority or the responsibility to act as a single responsible DOD point of contact/interface/coordination in Cambodia.

Source: End of Tour Report. MEDTC 1972-1974. Major General John R.D. Cleland, 20 February 1972, pp. B-1 - B-3.

ANNEX H

ANNEX H

ACCELERATED DELIVERY PROGRAMS

Accelerated deliveries of MAP equipment to the Khmer Republic, in anticipation of periods of increased combat activity, have had a significant and favorable impact upon the fighting capability of the Khmer Republic's armed forces.

Project Lima Delta Echo (LDE) had a required delivery date of 31 December 1972 and consisted of delivery of one armored cavalry troop, three 105MM howitzer batteries and selected undelivered funded items.

Concurrent with the cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Vietnam, two additional accelerated delivery projects were instituted. These were Project Lima November Seira (LNS), RDD 20 February 1973, and Project Lima Juliet Romeo (LJR), RDD 28 February 1973.


Project LNS major items included twelve UH-1H helicopters, and 35,337 small arms. Equipment delivered under Project LJR consisted of items required to MAP support the Second and Seventh FANK Divisions.

More recent accelerated programs were code-named Nimble Thrust, RDD of 15 August 1973, and Nimble Voyage, RDD of 15 December 1973. Nimble Thrust deliveries coincided with the termination of USAF combat air support in Southeast Asia. Major items in this project were one armored cavalry troop, six mine plows, thirty-six 105MM howitzers, eight C-123 aircraft, fifteen T-28 aircraft and four 155MM howitzers. Project Nimble Voyage provided additional equipment to FANK in anticipation of increased hostilities during the Dry Season Offensive commencing December 1973. Delivered equipment consisted of items required to MAP support two FANK division headquarters and subordinate support units. In addition, eight naval craft, three armored cavalry troops, twelve 155MM howitzers, seven UH-1H helicopters and two mobile surgical units were included.

In each case, the success of these acceleration projects depended upon the ability of the Khmer Armed Forces to absorb newly delivered equipment and the capability and willingness of the Technical Services to rapidly issue this equipment to designated units. With each delivery project, the flow of equipment through the FANK logistical system was closely monitored by MEDTC to insure timely issues. In some instances equipment was issued directly to the gaining unit to expedite employment in combat.

Source: End of Tour Report. MEDTC 1972-1974. MG John R.D. Cleland, 20 February 1974, p. D-2-1.

ANNEX I



ANNEX I

MAP-CB CARGO TOTALS TRANSPORTED OVER CAMBODIAN LOC'S

1. AIR

a. 1972

- (1) Average Sorties per month: 24
- (2) Average per month in S/T: 305
- (3) Total S/T Aug-Dec 72: 4118

NOTE: Statistics maintained only after air LOC shifted from RVN to Thailand.

b. 1973

- (1) Deliveries to Phnom Penh
 - (a) Average Sorties per month: 290
 - (b) Average per month in S/T: 5305
 - (c) Total in S/T: 51,656
- (2) Deliveries USAID Rice - (2 Oct-1 Nov) Battambang to Phnom Penh.
 - (a) Average Sorties per day: 8
 - (b) Average S/T per day: 110
 - (c) Total in S/T: 3,309

c. 1974

- (1) January
 - (a) Average Sorties per day: 12
 - (b) Average S/T per day: 210
 - (c) Total in S/T: 6,507

(2) February

- (a) Average Sorties per day: 9
- (b) Average S/T per day: 138
- (c) Total in S/T through 13 February: 1,794

2. WATER

a. 1972

(1) Kompong Som/RN4. First MAP-CB cargo delivery May 1972.

- (a) Average S/T per month: 6,184
- (b) Total S/T: 49,472

(2) Mekong LOC. Statistics available only for May-Dec.

- (a) Average S/T per month: 3,601
- (b) Total S/T: 28,809
- (c) No MAP-CB cargo lost to enemy action.

b. 1973

(1) Kompong Som/RN4

- (a) Average S/T per month: 1,982
- (b) Total S/T: 23,786

(2) Mekong LOC

- (a) Average S/T per month: 3,118
- (b) Total S/T: 37,418
- (c) Three MAP-CB ammo barges lost to enemy action, 16 Feb, 15 Apr, and 11 Aug.

c. 1974

(1) Kompong Son (RN4 closed except for one convoy in Jan)

- (a) January: 1,685
- (b) February: None to date

(2) Mekong Loc

(a) January: 7,648

(b) February: 5,689 through 14 Feb

(c) One MAP-CB ammo barge lost to enemy action, 18 Feb.

3. HIGHWAY. First shipment of MAP-CB ammo over RN5 from Thailand to Battambang July 1973.

a. 1973

(1) Total convoys: 6

(2) Total S/T; 1,976

(3) Average S/T per month: 299

b. 1974. One convoy in January (250 S/T ammo)

ANNEX J

ANNEX J

REPRESENTATIVE WEAPONS DENSITY INCREASES


	<u>JAN 73</u>	<u>JAN 74</u>
M-60	545	1,578
M-79 Grenade Launcher	12,638	22,373
81 mm Mortar	250	1,192
4.2" Mortar	7	37
105 mm Howitzer	110	227
106 mm Recoilless Rifle	41	121
155 mm Howitzer	0	24

Source: End of Tour Report. MEDTC 1972-1974. MG John R.D. Cleland,
20 February 1974, p. M-1-1.

ANNEX K

ANNEX K

MAP-CB Ammunition Issues (Tons).



See Annex L for amounts of ammunitions delivered to Cambodia by all modes in FY 74.

Source: End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1972-1974. MG John R.D. Cleland, 20 February, 1974, p. M-2-1.

ANNEX L

ANNEX L

FY 74 Ammo Deliveries to Cambodia (thru Feb 74)

AMMO DELIVERIES TO CAMBODIA

FY 74 TO DATE

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AIRLAND</u>	<u>AIRDROP</u>	<u>MEKONG</u>	<u>HIGHWAY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
JUL	3687	1371	3050	103	8211
AUG	8737	1331	1844	265	12177
SEP	5527	1345	2372	224	9468
OCT	6366	688	4924	138	12116
NOV	4051	419	5005	371	9846
DEC	4827	761	8683	411	14682
JAN	5225	567	7648	0	14615
TOTAL	38420	6482	34701	1512	81115

Source: End of Tour Report. MEDTC 1972-1974. MG John R.D. Cleland,
20 February 1974, p. M-3-2.

ANNEX M

ANNEX M


MEDTC ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. GENERAL FUNCTIONS. The Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) functioned similar to a MAAG. With a Brigadier General as Chief (CHMEDTC) it planned, programmed, ordered, and monitored the shipment and distribution of MAT material. As a tri-service organization it came under the command of CINCPAC. However, CHMEDTC was a member of the Cambodia Country Team and therefore directly responsible to the Chief of US Mission, Phnom Penh, as well. MEDTC assured the proper utilization of MAP materiel by conducting end item utilization and inspections (EIUIs). MEDTC also arranged for CONUS, third country and in-country training of members of Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (FANK). In contrast to a MAAG, MEDTC was legislatively prohibited from advising or instructing.
2. ORGANIZATION. Assisting CHMEDTC with management of MAP-CB and accomplishing Liaison with DOD agencies outside of Cambodia were four divisions and two principal staff offices (see Appendix 1).
 - a. Office of Deputy Chief. This office was responsible for the internal management of MEDTC. Typical activities with which it was concerned were: administration, administrative budget, transportation, security, evacuation, protocol for CHMEDTC functions, and supervision of the Joint Liaison Office, Camp Samae San, Thailand (Appendix 2). The latter office accomplished administrative support functions which could not be performed in Cambodia.
 - b. Special Assistant for Coordination and Special Actions (SACSA). The SACSA was principal assistant to CHMEDTC in the management of MAP-CB. SACSA maintained daily liaison with the FANK High Command to assess materiel requirements. This office coordinated planning and programming of a joint service nature and reviewed all operational and policy correspondence for CHMEDTC. It was also the focal point of coordination for all audits by GAO and DOD, inspections by State Department Inspectors and visits by congressional and other delegations.
 - c. Ammunition and Services Division. This division provided MEDTC's logistic management for ground, air, and naval munitions. It evaluated FANK management and utilization through EIUIs. In addition, it managed the movement and distribution of MAP materiel to include general cargo, ammunition, and POL. The division also provided commodity management for POL and monitorship of river convoys, highway convoys, airland, and airdrop operations.

d. Other Divisions. The three separate Army, Air Force, and Navy Divisions planned, programmed, ordered, and arranged the delivery of MAP materiel for their respective service components of FANK. Through regular EIUIs, each division assessed the utilization of MAP-CB materiel. The chiefs and other division members at all levels also accomplished personal liaison with their respective service components as a means of assessing the needs of FANK. The divisions also arranged for CONUS, third country, and in-country training. Under the responsibility of the Army Division there was a Liaison Office, Bangkok, Thailand which provided detailed coordination and liaison for the third country training program (Appendix 3).

Source: Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report, BG Palmer, 30 April 1975, pp. A-1 - A-3.

Appendix 1 to Annex M.



ANNEX N

ANNEX N

Monthly Cargo Tonnages Delivered to the Khmer Republic
January 1974-April 1975MONTHLY CARGO TONNAGES DELIVERED TO THE KHMER REPUBLIC
January 1974 to April 1975

	JAN 74	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN 75	FEB	MAR 75	APR	12 APR
April																	
Alpham	5,000	2,192	196	79	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,147	11,310	7,627	2,037	
Alpham	676	694	992	3,400	2,046	2,216	1,122	679	592	527	605	571	301	342	2,026	950	
Alpham	1,640	20,030	15,040	19,995	5,962	6,512	13,515	0,920	10,810	7,429	12,483	10,991	6,493	0	0	0	
Alpham	0	302	504	652	695	715	1,000	1,003	2,192	964	320	667	1,275	504	1,006	193	
May																	
Alpham	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	944	10,540	7,949	
Alpham	740	237	781	1,051	1,108	859	594	300	307	390	346	245	141	0	610	1,022	
Alpham	27,491	11,051	27,000	25,012	42,006	37,316	16,076	12,478	6,441	20,722	25,495	17,472	7,444	0	0	0	
Alpham	106	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
June																	
Alpham	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	452	864	7,759	2,556	
Alpham	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Alpham	17,540	20,491	16,490	10,102	22,171	19,267	19,855	12,006	16,447	10,000	20,007	15,968	5,322	0	0	0	
Alpham	0	2,102	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
July																	
Alpham	196	547	107	261	219	168	162	190	271	167	221	153	352	612	1,620	651	
Alpham	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Alpham	1,070	1,910	4,107	8,474	6,171	13,541	12,633	8,190	10,810	9,513	9,145	9,976	0	0	0	0	
Alpham	106	0	0	0	0	0	1,003	94	0	0	0	120	0	0	140	224	
August																	
Alpham	13,796	21,477	17,532	23,010	8,643	9,501	15,720	10,452	13,590	8,924	13,400	12,234	10,296	12,276	11,049	3,900	
Alpham	28,507	33,208	27,701	26,451	41,114	30,175	18,620	12,770	6,950	21,012	26,041	37,777	7,505	944	19,182	8,991	
Alpham	17,550	21,075	16,441	10,102	22,171	19,267	19,855	12,006	16,447	10,000	20,007	15,968	5,322	864	7,759	2,556	
Alpham	4,645	2,405	4,200	8,717	6,452	13,209	14,620	8,074	11,057	9,600	9,360	10,249	352	612	1,772	1,075	
September																	
Alpham	5,416	2,919	170	102	279	160	165	190	231	167	223	150	2,951	13,730	35,502	14,013	
Alpham	1,716	0	1,271	4,650	1,194	1,095	1,716	919	899	817	951	876	522	362	3,040	1,932	
Alpham	5,659	75,721	61,955	81,753	16,214	16,716	64,029	41,724	40,210	56,552	67,130	74,407	19,259	0	0	0	
Alpham	715	2,604	549	652	695	715	2,911	1,097	2,192	964	320	707	1,275	504	1,240	017	
October																	
Alpham	63,000	102,775	66,045	109,406	101,102	101,714	68,023	41,990	48,057	50,504	68,024	76,170	24,007	14,696	39,062	16,402	

Source: Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report,
BG Palmer, 30 April, p. E-41

ANNEX 0

ANNEX 0

AMMO DELIVERIES TO CAMBODIA (SHORT TONS)

FY 74-FY 75

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AIRLAND</u>	<u>AIRDROP</u>	<u>WATER</u>	<u>HIGHWAY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
JAN 74	5,020	628	7,648	0	13,296
FEB	2,392	694	20,039	302	23,427
MAR	196	992	15,840	504	17,532
APR	79	3,608	19,495	652	23,834
MAY	0	2,086	5,862	695	8,643
JUN	0	2,236	6,612	735	9,583
JUL	3	1,122	13,515	1,080	15,720
AUG	0	679	8,970	1,003	10,652
SEP	4	592	10,810	2,192	13,598
OCT	0	527	7,429	968	8,924
NOV	0	605	12,483	320	13,408
DEC	5	571	10,991	667	12,234
JAN 75	2,147	381	6,493	1,275	10,296
FEB	11,310	382	0	584	12,276
MAR	7,627	2,426	0	1,096	11,149
1-17 APR	2,837	960	0	203	3,990
TOTAL	31,620	18,479	146,187	12,276	208,562

TOTAL \$ VALUE: \$445.9M

Source: Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report,
BG Palmer, 30 April 1975, p. E-9.

ANNEX P

ANNEX P

REPRESENTATIVE WEAPONS DENSITIES

	<u>JAN 73</u>	<u>JAN 74</u>	<u>MAR 75</u>
M-79 Grenade Launcher	12,638	22,373	18,522
81-MM Mortar	250	1,192	724
4.2" Mortar	7	37	36
105-MM Howitzer	110	227	260
106-MM Recoilless Rifle	41	121	130
155 Howitzer	0	24	22

COMBAT INTENSITY FACTOR*

Jan 74	2.8	Jun	5.5
Feb	3.7	Jul	4.8
Mar	3.1	Aug	3.2
Apr	2.9	Sep	4.2
May	3.5	Oct	5.2

* The Combat Intensity Factor (CIF) was developed by Headquarters, USAAG in 1974. It was derived using the following formulation:

(ABF-Attack by Fire)

$$\text{CIF} = \frac{\text{Total Casualties}}{\text{Friendly Strength}} \left(\text{Total Contacts} + \frac{\text{Enemy AFB's}}{3} \right)$$

NOTE: Calculations using this formula were discontinued in October 74; however, the combat intensity continued to escalate, especially during the period January-April 1975.

Source: Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report, BG Palmer, 30 April 1975, p. E-8.

ANNEX Q

ANNEX Q

Ammunition Issues by Month (From In-Country Receipt Deposits)

AMMUNITION ISSUES BY MONTH*

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>QTY (SHORT TONS)</u>	<u>\$ VALUE (MILLIONS)</u>
JAN 74	18,538	33.4
FEB	18,116	32.6
MAR	15,593	28.1
APR	14,100	28.2
MAY	13,714	27.4
JUN	13,500	27.0
JUL	13,206	29.1
AUG	13,888	30.6
SEP	14,100	31.0
OCT	9,238	21.7
NOV	10,350	24.3
DEC	9,610	22.6
JAN 75	17,019	40.0
FEB	11,200	26.3
MAR	15,585	38.9
1-17 APR (EST)	<u>8,500</u>	<u>21.2</u>
TOTAL	216,256	\$462.2 MILLION

* From in-country receipt depots:
Phnom Penh Depot Complex
Battambang
Siem Reap
Kompong Som

Source: Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report.
BG Palmer, 30 April 1975, p. E-10.

ANNEX R

ANNEX R

CONSOLIDATED LISTING OF AIRDROPS FOR PROJECT SCOOT

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AMMO TONNAGE</u>	<u>RICE TONNAGE</u>	<u>TOTAL TONNAGE</u>
1974			
JAN	638	730	1,358
FEB	694	237	931
MAR	992	781	1,773
APR	3,608	1,051	4,669
MAY	2,086	1,108	3,194
JUN	2,236	857	3,095
JUL	1,122	594	1,716
AUG	679	300	979
SEP	592	307	899
OCT	527	290	817
NOV	605	346	951
DEC	571	255	826
	<u>14,340</u>	<u>6,858</u>	<u>21,198</u>
1975			
JAN	381	141	522
FEB	382	0	382
MAR	2,426	614	3,040
APR (1-17)	950	1,022	1,972
	<u>4,139</u>	<u>1,777</u>	<u>5,916</u>

Source: Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report.
BG Palmer, 30 April 1975, pg. E-26.

ANNEX S

ANNEX S

MEKONG LOC AND MNK OPERATIONS

1974 Wet Season - April 1975

(1) During the 1974 Wet Season, the enemy had been successful in closing the principal land LOC's. This created a heavy burden on the MNK to satisfy ever-increasing logistic lift and escort requirements. Although both material and personnel assets were overtaxed, ninety-two percent of all commodity imports to the Khmer Republic during 1974 were transported via the Mekong. The average monthly commodity shipments in thousands of metric tons were:

AMMO	9.8
RICE	22.4
POL	18.1
GEN CARGO	6.8
	<hr/>
TOTAL	57.1

(2) Intelligence reports had indicated that the enemy's objective in 1975 was to seriously threaten the survival of the GKR capital through the closing of the Mekong LOC, by exercising control over key stretches of river banks and by serious harassment of the convoy ships/barges. Realizing the increased criticality of the Mekong LOC, EMG tasked the CNO (RADM Sarendy) to develop and implement a plan for the Mekong Special Zone (ZSM). The plan, Opening of the Lower Mekong, dated 5 January 75, was developed but not implemented because of the critical shortage of FANK personnel and equipment. The plan specifically called for ground sweep operations, including M-113 squadron and 105-mm battery support, to be launched against located/suspected enemy positions on the river banks. In addition, security operations would be launched in the proximity of known choke points to deny their eventual use by the enemy for attacks against the convoy. The helicopter lift capability was included to permit the leap-frogging of security forces ahead of the convoy, thereby off-setting shortages in personnel and increasing coverage. Special Forces elements would be utilized to conduct ambush operations and artillery would gain increased importance, thereby reducing the air support requirement. Once the requisite forces were assigned in accordance with the ZSM plan, they would be tasked to patrol these areas of responsibility in an aggressive manner and seize the initiative

from the enemy and deny him sanctuary along and behind the river banks. Based on prior experience, convoy passage times would be adjusted to enable transit through dangerous areas and/or choke points during hours of darkness. While darkness effectively impeded the KC ability to spot and train weapons on the convoy, passage through these dangerous areas at night reduced the KAF capability to provide the badly-needed suppressive fire against the enemy. On the plus side for night convoy movement, muzzle flashes from the Khmer Communists guns enabled the MNK riverine craft gun crews to sight their machine guns and adjust the 106-mm batteries more accurately for suppressive fire. Huey gunships were to remain on station over the convoy to provide responsive suppressive fire. The plan was an excellent piece of staff work from a U.S. Staff College viewpoint; however, for the Khmer, it was simple a gradiose "joint plan", beyond their level of sophistication to implement.

(3) Early in their 1975 Dry Season offensive, the KC gained and maintained control of critical choke points South of Neak Luong which enabled them to fabricate and emplace barricades across the navigable river channels and mine at least two of them.

Investigation of the barricades by MNK indicated that they were constructed of either nylon line or wire rope, supported by bamboo floats at intervals to provide the proper catenary to prevent passage of the heavy riverine craft. The nylon line and wire rope used in these barricades was presumed to have been salvaged by the KC from tugs sunk during earlier Mekong convoy operations. Although there was no evidence to substantiate it, MNK officers were of the opinion that the bamboo floats supporting the barricade nylon/wire ropes also supported contact or command-detonated mines to deter any attempts to breach the barricades. Mines had been responsible for the sinking of six convoy tugs and, therefore, as of February 1975, command-detonated mines in the Mekong River were considered the number one threat to convoy tugs and barges, the last of which transited the Mekong River on 26 January 1975.

The MNK mine countermeasure capability was oriented against the command-detonated mines. Power-actuated cutters were procured to cut wire rope/cable or nylon line barricades. Enemy action in the vicinity of Dei Dos caused the situation to deteriorate even further. The Khmer Communists gained control of and heavily fortified the high river banks, from which they fired with devastating effect on riverine craft attempting to resupply Neak Luong, the GKR's only downstream logistical base.

Without doubt the KC 1975 Dry Season offensive was well-conceived, well-planned and more importantly, extremely well-executed. The KC closed the Mekong in a methodical manner, meeting only minimal resistance. On 13 February 1975, EMG relieved MNK of responsibility for the Mekong corridor and established the Mekong Special Zone as a Joint Headquarters under Army command, and directly responsive to EMG. Regrettably, the subsequent capture of Neak Luong by the Khmer Communists on 1 April 1975 precluded further consideration of regaining control of the Mekong. This event marked the end of even limited Mekong convoy operations by the GKR

and made inevitable their complete dependence on air for resupply by Phnom Penh.

(4) MNK craft losses had been extremely heavy during this period. In the first three years of the war, MNK lost 7 craft and in all of 1973, only 5 craft were sunk. During February 1972, MNK lost 1 LCM-6 to enemy action and then suffered particularly heavy losses in March and April in the resupply and defense of Kompong Luong, when 2 LCM-8's, an Armored Troop Carrier (ATC) and a PBR were sunk. Two craft were lost during the months of June and July, one PRK at Prek Tamerk and 1 LCM-6 at Kompong Luong. Another period of heavy losses was August and September 1974 when, on two separate convoys to Kompong Cham, a total of 6 craft were lost. During one operation, a PBR was sunk and a Monitor exploded when its ammunition supply was hit. In a subsequent convoy, an ATC, an LCM-6 and a PBR were lost. One Monitor (AC-8) was lost to enemy action in November 1974. This brought the MNK loss to 15 craft in 1974, for a total of 27 craft since the commencement of hostilities. During these operations, the enemy used to good advantage B-40 and B-41 rockets and 75-mm recoilless rifles. A contributing factor to the losses suffered on the Mekong was the strong current during the Wet Season, which reduced the forward speed of craft to about 1 knot at the time of engagement.

During the month of January 1975, 3 LCM-6's, 1 Monitor, an Armored Troop Carrier (ATC), and 2 PBR's were lost. February was a most disastrous period for the MNK, when 4 Armored Troop Carriers (ATC), 6 to enemy action. During the month of March, MNK continued night convoys to deliver ammunition and rice to Neak Luong. Shuttle convoys using riverine craft for resupply were also conducted between Neak Luong and downstream FANK positions S1 and S2 until their capture by the KC on 7 March 1975. The urgency of FANK-directed daily convoy resupply operations on Neak Luong kept the pressure on MNK for maximum lift capability. During these efforts in March, the enemy sunk 6 PBR's, 3 LCM-6's, 2 ATC's, 2 AC's, and 2 MSR's. The KC also destroyed Mobile Support Base #2, located at Neak Luong, during the attacks against that city. Khmer Communist fortifications along the Mekong river banks at Dei Dos, including another barricade, restricted the passage of MNK riverine convoys between Phnom Penh and Neak Luong. The majority of convoys running this gauntlet of fire sustained severe battle damage and high personnel casualties, including experienced boat crews. During the month of April, 4 PBR's, and 1 LCM-3 were known lost to enemy action.

(5) Post Mekong Operations. With the cessation of convoy operations and the deteriorating military situation around Phnom Penh, MNK reorganized daily operations into five significant categories to meet priority requirements, as follows:

a. Mekong Gunfire Support (FS) and Patrol Unit. 1 Monitor, 3 Armored Troop Carriers, and 3 PBR's. This unit operated between parallels 65-70 and provided gunfire support to FANK Army units along the river banks; interdicted Route 1 running parallel to the west river bank and denied the KC use of the Mekong north of Dei Dos (parallel 59).

b. Tonle Sap Gunfire Support Unit. 2 Monitors (1-105-mm and 1-40-mm), 1 Armored Troop Carrier and 1 PBR. The unit operated in proximity to Prek Phnou and provided GFS to Army units in the area.

c. Chrui Chang War (CCW) Defense Unit. 2 Monitors, and 2 Armored Troop Carriers stationed in the center of the Mekong between CCW and the east river bank to provide GFS and defense against swimmer attacks. A PBR was assigned during hours of darkness to provide additional anti-swimmer protection.

d. Medical Evacuation Unit. One PBR maintained on station on the Tonle Sap River to provide MEDEVAC support to the FANK 5th Brigade at Prek Phnou, one of whose battalions was positioned on the east bank.

e. Upper Bassac Patrol Unit. 3 PBR's in vicinity of Route 1 bridge to prevent sapper attacks; and 2 PBR's at Takhmau to provide support to FANK Army units.

These units were actively operating on 12 April 1975 when MEDTC departed Phnom Penh.

(6) Final MNK Craft Status. The following listing is of MNK craft status and location as of 12 April 1975. With the exception of the craft located at Ream and at An Long RVN, it is assumed that all remaining craft fell to Communist control.

	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>	<u>INOPERATIVE</u>
<u>Chrui Chang War</u>		
PBR	30	8
AC (105-mm)	2	1
AC (40-mm)	2	0
ATC	9	2
ASPB	3	2
MSR	1	0
MSM	2	0
LCM-8	5	3
LCM-6	5	3
ZIPPO	1	0
SALVAGE BARGE	1	0

LUC/YFU	2	0
YTL	0	3
YD	1	0
AFDL	1	0
MOBASE	1	0
<u>Kompong Chhnang</u>		
PBR	2	0
<u>Kompong Cham</u>		
PBR	2	0
ATC	1	0
<u>Ream Naval Base</u>		
PC	2	0
LSIL	1	0
LCI	1	0
LCU/YFU	3	3
PCF	16	3
LCM-6	4	2
PBR	3	1
<u>An Long, RVN</u>		
PBR	4	0
AC (105-mm)	2	0
ASPB	1	0

SUMMARY OF MNK CRAFT LOSSES PRIOR TO 12 APRIL 1975

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>PBR</u>	<u>LCM-6</u>	<u>LCM-8</u>	<u>MONITOR</u>	<u>MSM/R</u>	<u>ATC</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1970	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	3
1971	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
1972	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
1973	1	0	2	0	1	1	0	5
1974	4	4	2	2	0	2	1(PCF)	15
1975	18	11	1	4	2	7	*2(MSR)	45
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	24	20	5	7	3	10	3	72

* Plus Mobile Support Base II at Neak Loung.

Source: Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia, End of Tour Report.
 BG William W. Palmer, 30 April 1975, pp. C-4 - C-8.
 Summary of MNK Craft losses, p. C-20.

ANNEX T

ANNEX T

SUMMARY OF KAF OPERATIONS 1974-1975

1. Airlift.

Ten C-123s, the backbone of KAF airlift resources, performed both airland and airdrop missions, with supplemental airlift provided by C-47s and UH-1H helicopters. The KAF was to have been self-sufficient in in-country airlift operations by 1 July 1975, and the programmed increase of the airlift assets from 12 to 18 C-123s was considered adequate to handle the normal daily requirements. In pursuit of the self-sufficiency goal, a USAF Mobile Training Team was established at Udorn in January 1975 to train ten more C-123 crews and one hundred additional C-123 mechanics. These additional aircrews and maintenance personnel were to provide the needed manpower to support the six additional C-123s delivered in early 1975.

The self-sufficiency program suffered an initial setback with the loss of two C-123s in aircraft accidents in the fall of 1974. This reduced the number of KAF C-123s to ten, two of which were usually in Bangkok undergoing major repairs. The average number of C-123s available daily was three to five. This number was inadequate to support all the KAF commitments, and EMG was continually concerned about the shortage of available airlift sorties. Other problem areas were lack of adequate aerial port facilities at Pochentong and a shortage of qualified riggers. The rigger problem was solved by training thirty-nine Army riggers in Thailand, but the lack of airframes and adequate aerial port facilities continued to be a problem until the end.

Despite these problems, KAF was able to provide support for the FANK enclaves until March 75, when contract C-130s took over a major portion of out-station resupply. KAF air delivery techniques were simple yet effective. Air drops using visual references were flown at 4500 to 5000 feet. This technique provided a cargo recovery rate of about 98 percent and reduced the exposure to ground fire. No KAF aircraft flying airdrop missions were lost to enemy ground fire. By the end of August 1974, the KAF provided total ammunition supply to Takeo, Kampong Thom, Svey Rieng, and Das Kanchor.

With the increase in C-123 capabilities, the importance of the C-47 continued to diminish. In January 1974, C-47s flew 256 missions; by January 1975, the total was down to 33. In January 1975, six C-47s were theoretically available; however, of the two in-country, only one was available on an average day. By October 1974, the missions flown by C-47s dropped below fifty a month, and the C-47 had ceased to be a significant factor in KAF airlift.

The UH-1H played an important role in the short haul, small landing zone, resupply effort. However, by the second quarter of 1974, the UH-1H fleet's operational readiness rate had declined to an unacceptable average of 49 percent. Lack of adequate maintenance and a weak preventive maintenance program caused the helicopter fleet to deteriorate rapidly. "Operation Rotor Head Express," a one-time repair of the KAF helicopter fleet by a U.S. Army Team, was undertaken in June 1974 at Utapao AB, Thailand. As a result of training maintenance personnel, an internal reorganization, and a number of personnel changes, KAF was able to bring the UH-1H in-commission rates up to acceptable standards.

Aside from operational problems, the KAF airlift mission suffered greatly because of the high incidence of aircraft misuse and graft. On return from tactical missions, aircraft often were used to haul contraband and paying passengers. Rice, cement, and fish were just a few of the favorite cash-producing loads. MEDTC attempts to curtail these practices were never-ending. Abuses would decrease after strong warnings from MEDTC, only to reoccur a few weeks later.

All in all, the KAF airlift self-sufficiency program was progressing satisfactorily until the beginning of the 1975 Dry Season Offensive. Eventually the increased rocket attacks against Pochentong and the deteriorating military situation forced KAF airlift to reevaluate the priorities. In-country training and other long range plans for self-sufficiency were shelved in favor of day-to-day tactical operations. In spite of a steadily mounting toll of aircraft to enemy rockets, KAF airlift continued to function until the fall of the Republic. Even after the fall, KAF airlift was able to evacuate numerous KAF personnel and their dependents to Thailand.

2. Strike.

Khmer air strike operations were conducted by T-28Ds, AU-24s, AC-47s, and UH-1H Gunships. The antiquity and limited fire power of these weapon systems were constraints with which the KAF learned to live. The tactical situation and lack of enemy heavy AA defenses during February 1974 to April 1975 allowed for essentially unrestricted employment of all the Khmer strike aircraft. If the enemy had introduced the SA-7, heavy caliber weapons (i.e. 23-mm or above), or radar-controlled AA, KAF would not have been able to operate effectively in areas defended by such weapons.

The majority of KAF air strike operations were conducted out of Pochentong Air Base. A limited strike aircraft capability was available from Battambang, Kampong Cham, Ream, and Kampong Chhnang; however, due to limited maintenance and support facilities, these bases were essentially forward operating locations.

One of KAF's significant weaknesses was in the area of night and all-weather operations. The T-28 did not fly at night and it had a KAF-imposed 3,000-foot minimum altitude for delivery. These restrictions greatly reduced KAF's effectiveness. The brunt of night air support was

provided by the AC-47s. The AU-24s and UH-1H gunships were also available for night operations, but limited ordnance loads and loiter time restricted these aircraft to close-in targets.

Combat tactics was another area needing further improvement. The majority of the T-28 pilots were not familiar with advance combat tactics. For the most part, they flew the classical, scoreable-range box pattern, using high-angle delivery techniques. Mutual fire support and random roll-ins were seldom practiced. The preference for high-angle deliveries of all munitions affected accuracy and reduced the destructive effects of napalm and other lay-down ordnance.

To correct these problems, training courses were organized at Udorn to provide instruction to the Khmer T-28 pilots in advance tactics and instrument flying. A course in night operations was programmed to start in FY 1976.

Notwithstanding these problems, the KAF continued to grow in strength, capability and effectiveness. The enhanced capability of KAF in tactical operations was one of the most significant improvements in the Khmer military posture during 1974. The Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia (TAIP-C) began in January 1974 as a concerted effort to bolster areas of logistics, training, maintenance, support equipment, resource management, and command and control. The most visible success of the program was the training of the FACs and fighter pilots at Udorn to transform what had previously been called a flying club into an aggressive, relatively effective, and professional team operation. T-28 strike sorties jumped from a monthly average of 1,487 for the first four months of 1974 to 2,711 sorties in July. The effectiveness of the strike force also grew as fighters worked with FAC's trained in visual reconnaissance techniques. By January 1975, 60 percent of all T-28 strike sorties were under direct FAC control.

It was recognized from the onset of TAIP-C, however, that to exploit the improved KAF capability would require better planning, coordination, and cooperation between all military services. In addition, just at the time when KAF was starting to flex its new muscles, funding limitations dictated an ammunition conservation program. As a consequence, the monthly T-28 sortie average fell to 1,362 for the last three months of 1974 in order to comply with air munitions expenditure guidelines of \$82,000 per day. When the 1975 offensive posed an immediate threat to Phnom Penh, the T-28D sortie rate increased to an average of 1,832 for January, February, and March 1975. Ammunition conservation restraints were waived in the face of lucrative enemy targets and numerous tactical emergencies.

New ordnance was introduced to counter the firm entrenchment of the enemy in rocket-launch areas and Lower Mekong River choke points. The CBU-55 was especially effective against the bunkered positions in these areas. Initially procured to suppress interdicting fire on the Lower Mekong, this munition was employed in the rocket belt for the first

time on 31 January 1975 after 107-mm rockets destroyed or damaged five aircraft and effectively curtailed KAF maintenance efforts. Battle-damage-assessment (BDA) was usually not available and, for most CBU-55 strikes, no BDA was reported. However, in a rare instance when the Khmer Army did examine the area of a strike, over 500-killed-by-air were reported from one CBU-55 expended on 10 April.

Ordnance with long-delay elements, such as the CBU-49 and the FMU-72B fuze, also proved effective on a day-to-day basis in temporarily curtailing 107-mm rocket fire. CBU-25 and MK-81 bombs were introduced on the AU-24 aircraft, adding a new dimension of firepower to night operations. Finally, spurred by early success and in an attempt to find a way to deliver hard bombs at night, the "B-123" concept was enthusiastically pursued by KAF. During March 1975, thirty-four C-123 bombing sorties were flown, primarily at night, carrying MK-82's or 25-pound fragmentation bombs.

The MK-82s were loaded one, two, or three to a pallet, with arming wires attached to the pallet. Upon exit from the aircraft, the bombs separated from the pallet, pulling the arming wire and arming the MK-82s. The 25-pound fragmentation bombs were stacked flat, nineteen to a pallet. Upon exit, they were thrown clear and dispersed by the tumbling pallet. Twenty-two MK-81/MK-82s or 190 fragmentation bombs would usually be carried on each B-123 mission.

3. Final KAF Aircraft Disposition.

Aircraft in Thailand April 1975

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PRIOR 16 APR 75</u>	<u>EVACUATED 17/18 APR 75</u>	<u>TOTAL 18 APR 75</u>	<u>REMAINING IN CAMBODIA</u>
T28B	15	0	15	0
T28D	28	7	35	22
AC47	4	3	7	6
C47	1	0	1	1
AU24	2	1	3	9
UH1H/G	5	8	13	24
T41	0	1	1	12
C123K	8	2	10	7
O1G	7	0	7	1
O1D	5	0	5	13
O1F	0	0	0	1
O1A	0	0	0	3
UTA	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
	75	22	97	100

Source: End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1975-1975. BG William W. Palmer, 30 April 1975, pp. D-28 - D-35.

ANNEX U

ANNEX U

OPERATION "EAGLE PULL" - THE EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN

1. BACKGROUND. In February 1972, the U.S. Mission in the Khmer Republic complied with State Department regulation which require every U.S. Mission overseas to have an Emergency Evacuation Plan. As combat around the Phnom Penh perimeter intensified, the evacuation plan for the U.S. Mission in Cambodia came under continual review and reevaluation. MEDTC assumed responsibility for a major portion of the evacuation planning with the approval and under the direction of the Chief of the U.S. Mission. A detailed operations plan for joint State-Defense execution was prepared, approved and coordinated with commands and agencies outside the Khmer Republic who would assist in the evacuation.

2. NEMVAC PLANNING. Essentially, the Emergency Evacuation Plan for the U.S. Mission in the Khmer Republic recognized three possibilities:

- a. Departure by commercial aircraft in an orderly and planned manner.
- b. Departure by military fixed wing aircraft (C-130) on short notice but unimpeded by GKR or enemy interference.
- c. Departure by emergency helicopter pickup from designated emergency landing zones throughout the city, recognizing the possibility of hostile reaction from government forces, the civilian populace, or from insurgent activity in or around the city.

More detailed planning was concentrated on this latter situation, since it represented the worst case. The city of Phnom Penh was divided into wards. War rosters, maps, and the mechanisms for rapid notification, assembly and departure were established. The emergency evacuation organization included a warden system, dedicated communications, airlift liaison teams, emergency assistance teams, destruction teams and a command and control element to oversee the operation.

3. OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. United States Air Force assets stationed in Thailand were tasked to provide airlift in the event that the Emergency Evacuation Plan was executed. Since Air Force helicopter assets were insufficient to provide a single-lift capability, Commander Seventh Fleet was tasked with providing an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with integral Marine Aviation Unit (MAU) to assume various reaction times, dictated by the tactical situation, in order to provide both Landing Zone Security and the desired single lift capability. The decision to reduce the reaction time of the ARG/MAU to conform to the military situation in the Khmer Republic was a continuing problem, since it limited

the freedom of action and scope of the training activities of the forces designated for, and dedicated to, the Emergency Evacuation Plan.

4. COORDINATION AND EXECUTION. Members of prospective supporting agencies were brought into Phnom Penh on a continuing basis to conduct liaison, familiarize themselves with the landing zones, communication facilities, and the command and control organization. Following an extensive draw-down on the U.S. Mission population by fixed-wing aircraft between 3-5 April, Operation Eagle Pull, the NEMVAC Plan was executed during the morning of 12 April 1975 using the option outlined in paragraph 2c. Neither of the other options was considered feasible for reasons which follow:

a. Unavailability of ground security of sufficient size to secure Pochentong Airfield.

b. Possibility that Pochentong would be under severe enemy attack, precluding fixed-wing operations.

c. Probably necessity to employ extensive tactical air to secure Pochentong.

d. Massive vehicular evacuations to Pochentong would likely have caused general panic in the city.

e. If either of these options failed of successful completion because of pandemonium at or enroute to Pochentong, it would then have been impossible to move the Marine Ground Security Force (GSF) and evacuees back to an LZ in the city, a distance of some 9 KM.

LZ "Hotel" was selected because of its proximity to the embassy, protection from direct and most indirect fire, its ease of defense and its remoteness from heavily populated areas. Evacuees could have walked to LZ "Hotel" if it had been necessary and the entire LZ area was enclosed, providing added control and security.

5. CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION.

a. The GSF of 360 marines was deployed around LZ "Hotel" and formed a double ring of troops along the fence line. One marine squad helped secure the Embassy compound. One company of marines was earmarked to secure the 700-meter route from the back gate of the Embassy compound to the entrance of LZ "Hotel".

b. The U.S. Mission was evacuated in an orderly manner, even though all but four personnel originally having NEMVAC duties had departed Cambodia in the massive drawdown prior to Eagle Pull. All NEMVAC Wardens, assistant wardens, airlift teams, emergency assistance teams, destructors, deputy chief wardens, NEMVAC Command and Control Center (NCCC) Duty Officers and NCO's, and all but one communicator were evacuated before 12 April. With the U.S. Mission reduced to 58, the original geographic

ward system could be discarded and a new system was formed, with personnel who remained in the skeleton U.S. Mission being named as warden and assistants. The NEMVAC Command and Control Center (NCCC) operated with a reduced staff. Airlift teams were formed using the GSF advance party. Fortunately, the destruction of most classified material had been accomplished the day before Eagle Pull, and was not a problem on the actual evacuation day.

c. The notification of evacuees was accomplished by several means: radio, telephone, and personal contact. The radio transmission of "Battery Charger" notification messages and other NEMVAC code words was not used. Evacuees were assembled in the Embassy compound by personal groupings; U.S. Mission, Press, Registered/Unregistered U.S. Citizens, Khmer employees of the U.S. Mission and key indigenous personnel (KIP). All evacuees were identified and tagged using a four-part exchange tag. This tag served as a boarding pass and as a quick means of identification and accountability.

d. The only major problem area concerned initial accountability for certain resident U.S. citizens and press, some of whom were unwilling to be evacuated until the very last minute, and, in some cases, who refused to be evacuated.

e. Signal operations. Original NEMVAC planning envisioned six duty personnel/radio operators in the NCCC. The severe reduction of U.S. personnel which commenced on 3 April 1975 left only two duty officers available. However, arrival of the GSF command and control element about a week prior to the evacuation and the decision to evacuate from a single LZ reduced command and control requirements, and facilitates airlift operations on the LZ so that the Mission of the NCCC was manageable with the reduced staff of three.

- 6. The evacuation operation was executed flawlessly. Its success was due primarily to complete surprise and the use of helicopters in an area known only to those personnel involved in Eagle Pull.

Source: End of Tour Report, MEDTC 1974-1975. BG William W. Palmer, 30 April 1975, pp. G-1 - G-3.

ANNEX V

ANNEX V

1975 MEDTC MERITORIOUS UNIT CITATION NARRATIVE AND PROPOSED CITATION

NOTE: MUC was awarded to MEDTC by General Orders Number 56, 1974, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. for the period 1 January 1971 to 15 April 1973, and later amended to cover the period until 12 April 1975.

NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION:

The Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia, was an organization with a unique mission, tasked with assisting the development of the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic so that they would be capable of defending the Republic from insurgency and of providing their logistics, training, and maintenance support. Throughout its existence, but particularly during the period cited, the Team carried out its assignment in a singularly noteworthy manner, for which recognition, in the form of a Meritorious Unit Commendation, is especially appropriate.

Precluded by Congressional restraints from functioning as a normal Military Assistance Advisory Group and severely restricted to austere manning and a limited scope of activity, MEDTC succeeded in carrying out its task in the face of almost unimaginable obstacles, among them, the following:

- a. An extremely small and only marginally capable cadre of Khmer career officers. Entrusted with management of the seven-fold expansion of the Khmer Armed Forces, this cadre proved largely incapable of decisive leadership, personnel and training management, or joint staff action.
- b. A host government seeking popular support at home and abroad while simultaneously attempting to counter a determined, well-trained and equipped enemy force. This government was unwilling or unable to fully mobilize its national resources.
- c. An in-country logistics base incapable of efficiently receiving and distributing greatly increased quantities of military hardware and support equipment, because of the need to continue offensive and defensive operations against an aggressive NVA-supported enemy.
- d. Frustrating Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding. Under Continuing Resolution Authority, funding levels were uncertain, tardy, and then drastically reduced. Coupled with inflationary prices, these levels did not allow the attainment of the planned force structure,

particularly with respect to combat service support units and replacement of attrition losses.

e. The psychological impact of uncertain MAP-Cambodia funding, highlighted by public debate on its merits, which permeated the Khmer Armed Forces from the highest to lowest leadership level, with considerable adverse impact on morale.

f. Restrictions on the number of MEDTC personnel and their activities so that it was impossible for the Team either to monitor completely the use of MAP supplied assets or to apply its professional expertise in providing advice or leadership to the Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (FANK).

Despite the difficulties, problems, restrictions, and conditions described above, the accomplishments of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia, have been impressive. They include:

a. Management of a MAP program which expanded during this period from an average FY 71-73 level of \$161 million to an FY 74-75 average level of \$325 million, with substantially no increase in MEDTC personnel strength.

b. Expansion of the MAP-CB ammunition program from an average of \$76 million for FY 72-73 to a level of approximately \$424 million for this sixteen month period. Tasks included planning, programming, supervision of deliveries, and maintenance of up-to-date stock status on an average of 12,000 short tons of ammunition per month.

c. Planning, programming, and monitoring measures to effectively enhance Khmer Armed Forces Self-Sufficiency to offset the effects of cessation of USAF direct air support. These measures included:

(1) Completion of the restructuring of Khmer Army Forces to include expansion from two to four divisions, increase from 41 to 66 (76 planned) 105-mm Artillery Batteries, addition of 155-mm Howitzer Batteries, and increase from 4 to 8 armored cavalry squadrons, with commensurate increases in other combat support and combat service support units.

(2) Expansion and reorganization of Khmer Naval Forces from 160 to 180 craft, to include doubling the number of Marine Infantry Battalions.

(3) Expansion of Khmer Air Forces from 86 to over 200 aircraft and implementation of ambitious and highly successful programs to develop KAF tactical air and airlift self-sufficiency.

d. Establishment of regional logistics centers capable of providing country-wide logistics support in spite of frequently interdicted land lines of communication.

e. Coordination of USAF, civilian contract, and Khmer Air Force aerial resupply missions to numerous isolated enclaves.

f. Expansion and continuous improvement of Khmer medical support facilities capable of providing professional care for ever-increasing numbers of casualties.

g. Establishment and continuous refinement of highly effective ammunition control and conservation measures, providing significant savings in ammunition costs in spite of an ever-increasing tempo of combat.

While the accomplishments listed above are significant and noteworthy, they do not present a complete picture of MEDTC efforts, although they would in themselves justify the award of a Meritorious Unit Commendation. The men of MEDTC have accomplished this mission while operating under unusually trying conditions which included:

a. The constant threat of attack by terrorists, rockets, and shelling.

b. The knowledge that physical protection for MEDTC personnel living and working in widely dispersed and unprotected locations throughout a sprawling and refugee-swollen city was provided solely by marginally effective Khmer Army and civilian guard forces.

c. The requirement to perform frequent visits to units and enclaves to gather operational and planning information by air and ground modes of transportation in constant threat of hostile enemy activity.

d. The awareness that MEDTC efforts aroused little interest or respect in the American people generally and considerably less than enthusiastic support from the Congress of the United States.

That the Khmer Republic failed to survive should not be a determining factor in deciding whether or not a Meritorious Unit Commendation is appropriate for MEDTC. The sole question that the awarding authority is constrained to ask is whether MEDTC, operating as it did within the strict guidelines and restrictions imposed by Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, carried out its assignment in a manner deserving of the award of the Legion of Merit, had such service been performed by an individual.

Proposed Citation

The President of the United State takes great pleasure in presenting the Meritorious Unit Commendation to

THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM, CAMBODIA

For service as set forth in the following:

"For extremely meritorious achievement while assisting friendly forces engaged in armed conflict against Communist insurgent forces in the Khmer Republic from 16 August 1973 to 31 December 1974. During this period of intense combat following cessation of US Air Force tactical air support for Khmer Armed Forces, the Team was charged with planning for and providing sufficient military equipment and logistics support to permit the government of the Khmer Republic to increase its military strength and self-sufficiency in order to enable it to counter domestic insurgents. Operating under extreme difficulties in terms of manpower limitations and under constant threat from enemy activity, the Team managed a Military Assistance Program averaging in excess of \$325 million per year and succeeded in achieving significant improvements in Khmer Armed Forces capabilities in tactical air support, airlift and air drop operations, maintenance and logistics support, medical service support, mechanized operations, and personnel and logistics management. As combat intensified, leading to the disruption of key lines of communications, the Team was further tasked with coordinating US Air Force, Khmer Air Force, and civilian contract aerial delivery of critical supplies to isolated garrisons, once again achieving dramatic result in successfully sustaining ten separate enclaves through periods of siege ranging from one to seven months. The Team's collective heroism, devotion to duty, and steadfastness under constant threat from enemy activity, combined with outstanding professionalism, contributed to the achievement of a significant defensive capability for the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic, and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Armed Forces of the United States.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Source: LTC David K. Riggs, former member MEDTC, Army Division.

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