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THE U.S. MILITARY COMMISSION TO THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1855-1856

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
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B.A., University of Utah, 1974
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1983

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

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A133 315	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE *(and Subtitle)* THE U.S. MILITARY COMMISSION TO THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1855-1856		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Frame, Arthur T., MAJ, USA		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Author/Instructor, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS HQ, TRADOC, ATTN: ATCS-D, Fort Monroe, VA 23651		12. REPORT DATE 3 June 1983 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 96
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS *(if different from Controlling Office)*		15. SECURITY CLASS. *(of this report)* Unclassified 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT *(of this Report)*

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT *(of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)*

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

19. KEY WORDS *(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)*

Military Commission; Observers, European warfare; Crimean War;

20. ABSTRACT *(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)*

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE *(When Data Entered)*

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In a time of rapid national expansion and minimum military manpower resources, the three-man commission was sent to study the art of war as it was being practiced in Europe. It was to study the "new" technology in fortifications, and armaments, and the organization of European armies to see if there might be some application to improve the effectiveness and capability of the U.S. Army in defending the vast new territory. Although extensive reports were written by the commission, little was incorporated until well into the Civil War.

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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Title of Thesis: The U.S. Military Commission to the Crimean War, 1855-1856

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Accepted this 2nd day of June 1983 by Philip J. Brookes,
Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the forgoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE U.S. MILITARY COMMISSION TO THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1855-1856, by Major Arthur T. Frame, USA, 98 pages.

This study examines the U.S. Military Commission sent by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis to observe the Crimean War in 1855 and 1856, to determine why the commission was sent, where it went, and the results it achieved.

A survey of the literature on the U.S. involvement in the Crimean War in general, and the Military Commission specifically, indicates that little has been written on either. It is shown that while the official policy of the United States was strict neutrality, many private citizens involved themselves in the conflict. The nation was able to use the conflict to realize one of its age-old goals: recognition of the rights of neutrals on the seas. The U.S. Military Commission was the only official involvement in the conflict.

In a time of rapid national expansion and minimum military manpower resources, the three-man commission was sent to study the art of war as it was being practiced in Europe. It was to study the "new" technology in fortifications and armaments, and the organization of European armies to see if there might be some application to improve the effectiveness and capability of the U.S. Army in defending the vast new territory. Although extensive reports were written by the commission, little was incorporated until well into the Civil War.



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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

At the conclusion of his second term of office as President of the United States, George Washington issued a caution to the American people and their future governments. In what has become known as the Farewell Address, Washington encouraged the nation to avoid entangling alliances that would embroil it in the conflicts of Europe. Separated geographically from the continent and dutifully obedient to its "father", the young republic set upon a course, interrupted occasionally by armed strife, that attempted to avoid European affairs and allowed it to develop into a great nation and the world power it has become.

Though the course may have been correct, the concept it engendered developed into one of the myths of American history. Throughout the nineteenth-century the United States practiced a policy of relations with other nations that has been described by statesmen and historians alike as isolationism. Although nineteenth-century statesmen and historians used the term, it was not until immediately after World War I that it was popularized by those who advocated a return to that policy as a description of the traditional non-alignment of the past. Isolation may have been a correct description of their desire relative to post-war alliances, but it was a misnomer in describing the American experience.

It was, however, a misnomer that even influential modern diplomatic historians such as Samuel Flagg Bemis, Thomas A. Bailey and Dexter Perkins perpetuated in their works.[1]

What has been called isolationism was in fact an aggressive policy of neutrality that often took advantage of European conflicts and machinations to further the interests of the United States. This effort was not part of a preconceived plan, but was more the work of various administrations taking advantage of the opportunities that surrounded them. One episode that is seldom studied in American history that provides an example of this opportunistic process is that which encompasses the activities of the United States during the prosecution of the Crimean War by the great powers of Europe.

The purpose of this work is to study that episode in official and unofficial American foreign relations, and more specifically, to study the work of the United States Military Commission sent to observe the Crimean War in 1855. To do this, I will examine current literature and primary sources in an effort to determine the relationships between the United States and the Crimean War belligerents; and the events surrounding the commission's efforts, why it was sent, and the results of the commission's efforts. By way of introduction and background, a brief discussion of the causes and consequences of the Crimean War is appropriate.

The Crimean War was one of a long series of events

that fell under the generic description of the "Eastern Question". The Eastern Question can best be introduced by a statement attributed to one of the ministers of Catherine the Great, Empress of Russia (1762-1797): "That which stops growing beings to rot."[2] The defeat of the Osmanali or Ottoman Turks at the gates of Vienna in 1683 brought the growth of the Ottoman Empire to a halt and began the decline that would last for over two-hundred years.[3] For almost two-and-a-half centuries the Turks, pushed westward by the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth-century, had been the scourge of Christiandom and had seriously threatened the security of Europe. Now as the years passed and the empire began to weaken and "rot", the question became: Who will inherit the estate of Europe's "Sick Man"? From about 1702 until about 1820, it appeared that Russia would be the heir.[4]

Russian expansion in the direction of the Ottoman dominions began conceptually with the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1533-1584) when he vowed to return control of traditional Russian rivers - to their mouths - to the Muscovite state.[5] While Ivan began his expansion along the Volga-Caspian route[6] into the Central Asian Khanates, actual expansion into Ottoman lands did not begin until the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) whose conquests gained for Russia a piece of the northern coast of the Black Sea.[7] Under Catherine the Great, the Russian Empire threatened Constantinople, and by the close of the eighteenth-century,

Russia, along with Austria, had conquered vast territories across the Danube and further along the north shore of the Black Sea, to include the Crimean Peninsula.

The Anglo-Russian rivalry that eventually developed in the Middle East was not initially apparent and the two countries had in fact assisted one another on occasion. British merchants in search of a northeast passage to the east in the 1550s landed in Russia and were encouraged to stay and trade. The Muscovy Company[8] attempted to establish through Russia overland trade with Persia, and in 1734 a treaty of commerce was concluded to do just that.[9] In 1770 the British assisted the Russian fleet's passage from the Baltic into the Mediterranean, the goal being to put pressure on the Turks and foment a Greek revolt.[10]

By 1815 this cooperative attitude of the two powers h[illegible] dwindled and disappeared. The British had gained sole commerical dominance over India and expanded their empire there by defeating the French during the Seven Years War (French and Indian War of American history). In the aftermath of that war, the British were more concerned with an attempted French comeback in India than with Russian expansion. This preoccupation with the French would soon give way to other concerns, for while Peter the Great and his successors were expanding at the expense of the Sultan, they were also nibbling away at the domain of the Persian Shah in the direction of India.

Before 1815, a Russian defeat of France's Turkish ally strengthened the British position in the Levant. After 1815, Russian expansion became a threat to the British lines of communication with India. For Britain, there was

> ...no topic which attracted more attention than the security of India, no trade was more valuable, no area offered more scope for military, political or commercial advancement. There was no threat to India which was too fanciful to command some attention and no pains were spared to secure the routes of communication between Britain and India.[11]

India was the keystone of the British Empire, and a weak Ottoman control of the lines of communication was infinitely better than a powerful Russian control. The distance from England to India via the Suez[12] or the Euphrates-Persian Gulf route was only a third the distance of the Cape of Good Hope route. With the growing momentum of the industrial revolution, Britain's interest in maintaining these Middle Eastern trade routes grew correspondingly.

The Napoleonic wars had brought a serious threat to British imperial efforts when Napoleon invaded and occupied Egypt (1798-1801) and later (1806-7) attempted to draw the Russian Tsar and Persian Shah into an alliance designed to remove India from British clutches.[13] The end of those wars brought about the balance of European power through the concert system and recognition by all concerned that the squabbles generated by the European heirs after the "Sick Man's" demise should favor no one nation. Each power had its reasons

for coveting the Ottoman domain and for preventing another from gaining sole dominance. The French had its age-old rivalry with the Austrian Hapsburgs, allied to Russia, and the desire to expand their trade in the Levant. Russia sought access to the Black Sea where the trade routes of the great Russian rivers, the Kuban, the Don, the Dnieper, the Bug and the Dniester converged, and egress into the Mediterranean via the straits was paramount to Russian economic potentialities. Austria and Russia also sought imperial expansion to collect their slavic and germanic brethren to their bossoms. The British concerns have already been discussed, and they were ready to swing their power to any side to preserve the status quo of the Ottoman state.

The nineteenth-century Russian advance at the expense of the Ottoman Porte is said to have begun with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774). This treaty, which ended Catherine the Great's first Turkish War (1768-1774), brought such concessions from the Ottoman Porte that it allowed the Russians an undeniable influence in external and internal Ottoman affairs and became the starting point for all future treaties and diplomatic agreements between the two empires.[14]

The treaty gave the Russians territorial concessions that allowed them greater access to the Black Sea; maritime and commercial concessions that allowed freedom of navigation and trade in the Black Sea and Turkish Straits; the right to erect a Russian administered Orthodox church in Constantinople

with the right to intervene in favor of the new church; and a protectorate over the Christian population of Moldavia and Wallachia.[15] These last two concessions provided a backdrop for subsequent Russian claims to the right to intervene on behalf of all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. From this time on, Russian pressure was relentless in advancing its ambitions southward.

As the Napoleonic wars drew to a close in Europe, the concepts of national and popular rights born in the French Revolution, and spread unintentionally by the French army, spread to the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Porte. One by one these peoples, particularly those grouped in the Balkans, began the struggle to emancipate themselves from Ottoman rule. Russia's role in this period was one of providing opportunity and encouragement to the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire through diplomatic pressure and wars with the Turkish overlords. These Christian efforts to throw off the Ottoman yoke also drew the interest and often the intervention of the other European powers and led to an abiding sense of Russophobia in Western Europe.[16]

The first of many episodes in this struggle was the Greek war of independence (1821-1829). Although the European powers attempted to remain aloof from the Greek situation, public sentiment was on the side of the Greek Christians fighting against the Turkish heathens. When an Anglo-French-Russian attempt to mediate the conflict was rejected by the

Ottomans, a combined European fleet sent the Turko-Egyptian fleet to the bottom of Navarino Bay (1827). In 1828 the Russians declared war on the Ottoman Empire and advanced as far as Adrianople, only 150 miles from Constantinople. The Treaty of Adrianople (1829) confirmed the Russian protectorate over the Danubian principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), brought new territories to the Russian state, and secured Turkish agreement to the proposed solution of the Greek crisis.

The next major opportunity for Russian intervention came not through the action of the Porte's Christian subjects, but through the efforts of his vassal, Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt. Mohammed Ali had provided the services of his able son Ibrahim Pasha to assist the Sultan in quelling the Greek revolt in exchange for Greek territorial concessions. When the loss of Greece prevented collection of these debts, Mohammed Ali demanded the pashalik of Syria and sent Ibrahim to seize it. With the defeat of the Turkish army and the British denial of aid, the Porte was desperate enough to seize upon the assistance offered by the Russian Tsar. The result was the temporary halting of Ibrahim and the ceding of Syria to him, and the signing of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833). A secret article of that treaty provided for the closing of the straits to foreign vessels in the event of war, while Russian vessels had free passage during peace or war. The Russians also gained the right of prior consultation in

in Ottoman affairs - virtually making the Russian Ambassador the Sultan's primary advisor.

When the news of the secret article leaked, the British protested vehemently. Suddenly they realized that not only were the Russians threatening to replace weak Ottoman with a strong Russian control in the Levant, but the long arm of Mohammed Ali, through his son Ibrahim, held control over the two vital passageways to India - the isthmus of Suez and the upper Euphrates.

As a consequence of this realization, the British took action when Ibrahim Pasha began to threaten Constantinople again in 1839. A joint Anglo-Austrian naval blockade and the landing of Turkish, Austrian and British troops brought Mohammed Ali's threat to an end. Although the French withheld support for the allied intervention, they supported the final solution in 1840 under which Syria was returned to the Ottoman Sultan in exchange for Mohammed Ali's hereditary governorship over Egypt. They also supported the Straits Convention of 1841 which ended the Russian protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. The London agreement of 1840 and the Straits Convention of 1841 marked the decisive point at which Europe, under British leadership, decided not to allow the enfeebled Ottoman Empire to be replaced by a stronger power - neither Mohammed Ali nor Russia - and a European protectorate over Turkey was established.

Between the Straits Convention of 1841 and the

outbreak of war in 1853, there were several peripheral events that increased the entanglements leading to open conflict. After the defeat of Mohammed Ali, whom the French had openly supported and for whom they had nearly gone to war with England, the concern over possible conflict with France caused an Anglo-Russian entente. In 1844 Tsar Nicholas I of Russia entered a gentleman's agreement with British foreign minister Aberdeen to the effect that, if the Ottoman Empire collapsed, Russia and England would not act without mutual consultation and Russia's army would come to British aid if attacked by France. These good relations may have caused the Tsar to act more confidently in 1852-1853 than he should have.

The Anglo-Russian entente remained intact during the revolutions and unrest that swept Europe from 1848 to 1851 and the British foreign minister, Count Nesselrode, even urged the Tsar to assist in putting down the Hungarian revolt against Austria. But when Austria and Russia demanded the return of Hungarian revolutionaries that fled to Turkey, the British and French conducted a naval demonstration near the Straits in support of the Porte's refusal to do so. Later, however, Britain remained silent when Russian forces occupied Moldavia and Wallachia to suppress a revolt against the Sultan. The entente was strengthened again in 1852 when Britain feared a French invasion over differences in western Europe and sought closer Anglo-Russian relations.

The treaties ending the Napoleonic wars (1815) banned

the Bonapartes from the French throne. By the 1850s the French were itching to refute the 1815 treaties and were willing to go to war to do so. In 1848 Louis Napoleon had been elected to the presidency of the Second Republic and, in December 1851, seized absolute power through a coup d'etat, declaring himself emperor and proclaiming the Second Empire in May 1852. In spite of the treaties' ban, only Russia stood out in opposition to the Second Empire, while the other powers were willing to make concessions and accept Napoleon's pledges of good faith. Even the Prussians and Austrians, who had initially taken the strong Russian position, eventually weakened in their resolve. With these conditions in being, the final steps were taken toward the Crimean War.

Louis Napoleon felt that Tsar Nicholas I needed to be humbled for an affront given by addressing the new emperor as "my friend" rather than "my brother", as befitting one who ruled by divine right. The age old dispute over control of the Holy Places in Palestine, renewed by French demands as protectors of the Latin Church, provided the spark. French demands and threats, and Russian counter demands in support of the Orthodox Church, resulted in Turkish vacillation in declaring one or the other in control until the arrival of the French ambassador, Lavalette, on a large French battleship, and a change in the Turkish ministry to men anti-Russian in their outlook, caused the Porte to decide for the Latins. The Russians protested on behalf of the Orthodox Christians,

whom they protected under Kuchuk Karnardji, and dispatched a special diplomatic mission under Prince Alexander Menshikov. Menshikov bluntly demanded concessions regarding the Holy Places and a treaty giving Russia a protectorate over Orthodox churches in the Ottoman Empire. The Turks agreed to some minor concessions but refused the treaty, recognizing a Russian protectorate as an enfringement on the sovereignty of the Sultan.

By the end of May 1853, Russia had broken relations with Turkey, and France and England, through a change of British government personalities, were supporting the Turks. In June the British and French fleets joined outside the Straits, and in July the Russians occupied the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Turks declared war in October 1853, and in February 1854, Britain and France called for the Russian evacuation of the Principalities. On March 28, 1854 Britain and France declared war on Russia and the Crimean War was on.

None of the powers were prepared for war and the results were greater losses to disease than to enemy action. Poor leadership and disorganization added to the unnecessary loss of life and waste of material. Prussia and Austria remained aloof from the conflict while Britain, France, and later Piedmont aligned themselves with the Turks against Russia. The ultimate Allied success was due more to Russian technical inferiority and greater incompetence than to Allied

competency. Corruption in the Russian bureaucracy, a poor supply system, and a shortage of equipment eventually overcame the efforts of the valiant Russian soldier. After the death of Nicholas I in 1855, in view of their exhausted finances and physical losses, the Russians sued for peace.

Peace was concluded at Paris in 1856. Russia's frontiers were pushed back, her warships were removed from the Black Sea and her shore fortifications were scrapped. The loss demonstrated serious weaknesses internally in the Russian state which brought about the internal reforms introduced by Alexander II in 1861. The era of Russia as the Gendarme of Europe was over.

NOTES

[1]See: Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 1959) p. 364; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People. (1st ed.; New York: F.S. Crofts and Co., 1940) pp. 755, 757; and Dexter Perkins, The Evolution of American Foreign Policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 40, 53, 54.

[2]Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967. (New York: Frederick Prager, 1968), p. 5.

[3]J.A.R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy. (London: Oxford University Press, 1917) p. 5.

[4]Ibid., p. 6.

[5]This account of Ivan's coronation address is found in a USAF film on historical themes in Russian history called Tsar and Commisar, produced by Air Force Intelligence Service Soviet Awareness Team.

[6]Robert G. Wesson, The Russian Dilemma. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974) pp. 6-7.

[7]Russian assaults on the Crimea in 1687 and 1689 in response to concessions made by the Holy League, were abortive. See: L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958) p. 173.

[8]Rose L. Greaves, Britain, Persia and India, 1722-1922. (Unpublished monograph prepared for the Cambridge History of Iran series.) p.3.

[9]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[10]Op. cit., Stavrianos, p. 173.

[11]Paul Hayes, The Nineteenth Century 1814-80, Malcom Robinson, gen. ed., Modern British Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975) p. 238.

[12]The Suez Canal had not yet been constructed, so the route was overland across the isthmus for a distance.

[13]Op. cit., Marriott, pp. 175-177: John B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) p. 44.

[14] Op. cit., Marriott, pp. 150-151.

[15]See: George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs. (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1952; 4th ed. 1980) p. 33; and Stavrianos, p. 191, for discussion of treaty details.

[16]An in-depth discussion of these episodes is not possible within the confines of this work, so only a broad discussion of key events will be attempted. This general review is a summary of events taken from the works of Marriott, Stavrianos, Lenczowski, John Shelton Curtiss, Brinson D. Gooch, Albert Seaton, and Philip Warner.

CHAPTER 2

America and the Crimean War: A Historiographical and Bibliographical Survey

A review of general works in American history and, more specifically, works on American diplomatic history, in search of information concerning American attitudes toward the Crimean War usually reveals little. Even such prestigious works as Thomas A. Bailey's A Diplomatic History of the American People[1] and Robert Ferrell's American Diplomacy: A History[2] only touch the topic tangentially as they discuss the seemingly unrelated episodes of the period (1853-56). To determine the interests and involvement of America and Americans in the Crimean War, it is necessary to search out separate works dealing with the general and specific aspects of American involvement. What were the interests of Americans that led them to become involved in the Crimean conflict?

Commerce has always been of major importance to the United States and its citizens. The period of the 1850s is no exception. The opportunity to ply their trade wherever and whenever they pleased was of prime importance to Americans. The United States needed recognition of the rights of neutrals on the seas for its merchant shipping. The United States had sought recognition of this concept since the War for Independence. Linked to the peddlers urge was the desire to expand.

Expansion yielded new markets. It also satisfied "manifest destiny" and provided security on America's borders with the colonies of the European nations. These expansionist tendencies brought the United States into conflict with Old World interests in Canada, Oregon, Texas, Mexico, and the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), and even Russian America (Alaska). These conflicts continued during the Crimean War period, both in Cuba and Central America. In nearly every case where New World interest conflicted with Old, Great Britain played the role of primary antagonist or closely shadowed the efforts of that nation which was the primary concern. Many of these conflicts of interest, as has been noted, carried into the Crimean War era and flavored relations between the United States and the Crimean belligerents.

One factor should be remembered when considering the topic of American interest: there is a difference between official policy and actions of the United States and the actions of its private citizens. In a democracy the private sector will almost always affect the public sector through elections, lobbies, and special interest while the opposite is not always true. The frontier or free spirit of Americans often led official America to accept a fait accompli. A review of official and unofficial American activity during the period is necessary, but before beginning it might be helpful to look at the internal condition of the United States.

In the five years prior to 1850, in an expansionistic

frenzy, the United States had nearly reached the limits of its continental growth. On the north, the Maine boundary dispute with Britain had been settled in 1842, and the division of the Oregon territory along the 49th parallel was decided in 1846. After unofficially supporting Texas' war for independence, the United States annexed Texas in 1845 and fought in the following year a war with Mexico over that annexation and Texas boundary disputes. As an aftermath of that war, all of present day California and Texas and the majority of New Mexico and Arizona became United States territory. To these vast acquisitions the United States added the Gadsden Purchase in 1853.

All that remained was to settle the middle regions of the nation and to determine whether they would be slave or free. The slavery issue created severe divisions in the nation and in national politics as well. The Compromise of 1850 had brought a temporary lull, but the issue was never far from the surface in internal and external politics.

One other aspect of the internal situation that influenced private American actions during the Crimean period was that the nation was suffering one of the economic depressions that plagued the United States periodically throughout the Nineteenth Century. Such conditions have often been the catalyst for American "free spirits" to try their luck in some adventure and as we shall see, this period was no exception.

Private opinion concerning the war primarily took the

form of public opinion expressed in the nation's press. Most sources seem to agree that public opinion waivered initially between the warring sides, but finally fell decidedly in favor of Russia following the axiom that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend".[3] Russia had not always been the focus of American good will, even though relations over the years since American independence could be generally described as friendly, and at least were more friendly than those with Great Britain.

Most works dealing with Russo-American relations at least mention the attitude of the American people during this period. Such sources include: Eugene Anschel's The American Image of Russia: 1775-1917; Thomas A. Bailey's America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations From Early Times to Our Day; and a lengthy article by Benjamin Platt Thomas, "Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867".[4] These generally point out that the nations were linked primarily by common cause. Since the American War for Independence, when Catherine the Great initiated the League of Armed Neutrality of 1780, both the U.S. and Russia had sought recognition of the rights of neutral ships to trade freely with belligerents. England had, at the same time, been the primary opponent of the concept of "free ships make free goods". By going to war in defense of those rights in 1812, the United States had joined the Russians as champions of the rights of neutrals.

Friendly, but distant, relations ensued until Russian designs on Spanish America (California) and expansion in the

American northwest[5] brought Monroe's famous dictum in 1823 and eventually a treaty setting forth respective spheres of interest in the northwest in 1824. In 1834 the two nations signed a commercial agreement, uncommon to the Tsar's government of that day. Later, in the thirties and forties, unfavorable U.S. press concerning Russian actions with the Polish and Hungarian revolutions caused the two nations to drift apart. American public opinion during this period was openly hostile toward Tsarist suppression of the Hungarian revolt, particularly when the Hungarian revolutionary leader, Louis Kossuth, visited the United States.

There were demonstrations supporting Hungarian independence and denouncing Russian despotism and intervention. America's heart went out to the Hungarian victims of oppression. It is interesting to note that a resolution to the U.S. Congress urging it to acknowledge Hungarian independence and denouncing Russia's involvement in crushing the revolt was drafted by a young Springfield, Illinois lawyer by the name of Abraham Lincoln - the same Lincoln who as President of the United States nearly two decades later welcomed a visit by the Russian navy as a sign of friendship at a time when the threat of European intervention in the American Civil War was possible. Lincoln's 1848 resolution to Congress was not totally anti-Russian, however, since it also denounced British oppression in Ireland.[6]

By the decade of the fifties, Anglo-American rivalry

in the Caribbean and England's opposition to Russia in the Crimea made the champion of republicanism and the exemplar of depotism strange bedfellows. In this instance public opinion coincided with government sympathies, although U.S. policy was officially neutral. A search of the memoirs and published papers of American ministers to England and Russia indicate that they, James Buchanan, George M. Dallas and Thomas Seymour, were in agreement with public opinion.[7]

Alan Dowty devotes almost a full chapter of his book, The Limits of American Isolation: The United States and the Crimean War, to the subject of public opinion. He contends that it, "like official policy, tended to reflect the country's international position...."[8] Even though emotional sentiments, like being for the "underdog" and against those supporting "heathen" Turkey against Christian Russia, were expressed; a belief that the British-French alliance against Russian expansion could be turned against United States expansionism[9] was sufficient reason to be anti-British if not pro-Russian. Pro-Russian sympathies of American citizens were also the result of anti-British sentiment of Irish immigrants and the imaginary brotherhood felt between American slave owners and Russian serf-masters.

Horace Perry Jones' "Southern Opinion On the Crimean War"[10] supports almost all of Dowty's claims, particularly where Southern opinion reflected the international position. Deeper than the kindred spirit of dealers in human bondage,

Southerners were keenly interested in the acquisition of Cuba. Not only were they interested in Cuba as essential to expand slavery, but they were concerned that, under British influence, Spain would "africanize" Cuba by freeing the Negro slaves there and thereby set a dangerous precedent. British support of the abolitionist movement was also despised in the South.[11]

One other place where Dowty and Jones agree is in the belief that private opinion in the South agreed with official government opinion that the British-French alliance could be turned against the United States. In support of this, both sources quote Lord Clarendon, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a speech to the House of Lords on January 31, 1854:

> Your lordships will be glad also to hear that the union of the two Governments is not confined to the Eastern question, but that the habit of a good understanding between them has become general on all matters of policy, and extends to all parts of the world; and that on the question of policy, there is no part of the world, in either hemisphere, with regard to which we are not entirely in accord.[12]

Although the two quotes differ in wording, their meaning is the same.[13] Perhaps their differences can be explained by the fact that they were both translating from English.

Both Dowty and Jones make extensive use of the newspapers of the day to support their appraisal of public opinion. "Pro-Administration, Democratic, expansionist, and Southern newspapers and magazines...." supported the Russian cause, while pro-Allied periodicals were "...Whig periodicals...".[14]

The number of pro-Allied newspapers were "...disproportionately large in relations to public opinion...", according to Dowty.[15]

One additional sidelight concerning the news media during the period is interesting to note. Ironically, during the period of the Crimean War, from 1853 to 1856, Karl Marx wrote a series of articles for the New York Tribune concerning his thoughts on Russia vis-a-vis the West. He was strongly anti-Russian and anti-Tsar, as the bulwark of counter-revolution. As the discord grew between Russia and the Allies, he felt that the Western politicians were back-peddling in the face of Russian aggression. This was not necessary, he claimed, since Russia was really weak and only bluffing while attempting to expand east. The story of Marx's dispatches is found in an article by Joseph C. Baylen, "Marx's Dispatches to Americans About Russia and the West, 1853-1856."[16]

Private involvement with the belligerent powers during the war took several forms, as might be expected. Commerce has already been mentioned as important - not only private trade but also American vessels carrying belligerents' cargoes. In addition to peddlers and seamen, mechanics and those who volunteered for service in the armed forces of the warring parties were also involved on a private level. Even though public opinion rested decidedly in favor of Russia, not all private involvement was on the Russian side.

Three hundred Kentucky riflemen volunteered to go to

the Crimea to aid in the Russian defense of Sebastopol, but never sailed.[17] Some Americans volunteered to join the British Foreign Legion to fight in the Crimea during the enlistment controversy, to be discussed later, but not enough to make it worth the British effort.[18] Motivation for such actions may have been for sympathetic reasons, but were more probably as a result of the depression spoken of above. There were, however, thirty-odd young American doctors that joined the Tsar's army. "They volunteered; they actually sailed; they worked in the Russian hospitals through most of that conflict."[19]

Albert Parry tells the story of these young doctors, ten of whom died in the war, in an article appropriately titled, "American Doctors in the Crimean War".[20] There were four basic reasons, according to Parry, that prompted these young doctors, fresh out of medical school, to volunteer. The first was the opportunity to gain surgical experience; the second was a hankering for adventure; money was the third; and anti-British sentiment was the fourth. The first two reasons were the most important and, according to Parry, the most rewarding in the doctors' eyes. Of those who died, all were victims of "...such diseases as typhus fever, cholera, and small pox, diseases that swept away more human lives than were lost on the battlefield."[21] Several of those that survived returned to use their experience in the westward expansion of the United States and for both sides in the Civil War.[22]

In the category of peddlers, several sources mention the activity of Samuel Colt, the inventor of the revolver that bears his name, who went to Russia to offer his improved arms to the Russians.[23] "Americans in the Crimean War" by Eufrosina Dvoichenko-Markov,[24] details the presence of several men like Colt. Accompanying Colt, for example, was an American "...expert in mechanical matters..."[25] named Dickerson. In September, 1855, about fifteen American mechanics arrived in Russia to work in the workshops of the Moscow railroad, and Americans with experience in smelting iron were sought to work in a factory supplying railroad rails. American steamships were ordered by the Russian government with ship timber.[27] These American efforts may have been purely for economic reasons and not out of support for the Russian war effort, but could only have been interpreted as such by the Allies.

As evidence that commerce paid no heed to public opinion, one "original" source book written by a participant is An American Transport in the Crimean War, by Captain John Codman.[28] Codman claimed to have commanded one of the first American steamships plying the Mediterranean trade in 1854. He set out with his family intending to carry passengers, but ended up carrying troops and supplies first in the Mediterranean and then in the Black Sea from Constantinople to the Allied forces besieging Sebastopol. His steamer was the first American boat, so he claimed, chartered by the French government. While Codman carried for the French and eventually,

the Turks, he had no love for the British - perhaps reflective of the opinions at home.

Before leaving the realm of unofficial American activity, it may be appropriate to discuss American relations with the Ottoman Empire. What official Ottoman-American relations that did take place during the decades before the Crimean War were primarily a result of the unofficial relations of traders, philanthropists and missionaries, and the American government's attempt to protect its citizens involved in those activities.

The Anglo-American colonies conducted commercial activities in the Mediterranean under the protection of British men-of-war until the American revolution cut off that protection. After the revolution, the Mediterranean appeared to hold the greatest promise but it also held obstacles in the form of pirates from the Barbary states of the North African littoral. American vessels had been seized and citizens held for ransom. Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, argued that raising a navy to protect our shipping would be less expensive than tribute, while Vice President John Adams favored tribute. Eventually, it was a combination of both that brought, and maintained, treaties with Algiers in 1794, Tripoli in 1796, and Tunis in 1797.[29]

Jefferson's navy had begun with an appropriation for six frigates in 1794 for use against Algiers.[30] These and additional vessels eventually made up the initial Mediterranean

Squadron that kept the treaties in force and renegotiated them "from the mouth of a cannon" whenever Barbary trouble flared.[31] This squadron has been in the Mediterranean, with brief exceptions, since that time.

Tribute was expensive, paid in gun powder, field pieces, small arms, and naval stores, but trade increased.[32] The Mediterranean Squadron protected commercial traffic until it had to be withdrawn in 1807, when the European war brought increased pressure on the United States. As soon as the squadron was gone and the merchant men were on their own, piracy flared and continued through the War of 1812.[33]

Less than a week after the Senate ratified the Treaty of Ghent (1815), President James Madison asked Congress for authority to move on the Barbary states. Within a few days after the Mediterranean Squadron's arrival in the Mediterranean, the fighting was over and treaties of a "liberal and enlightened" nature were negotiated.[34]

> At the far end of the Mediterranean lay the empire of the Ottoman Sultan, ostensible overlord of the regents of Barbary, custodian of the riches of the Levant, and guardian of the entrance to the Black Sea, and here again the prospect was promising. (Commodore) Bambridge, bringing tribute from Algiers, had been flatteringly received; in Egypt, Eaton had been given helpful assistance by the Ottoman authorities. Consuls and naval officers had repeatedly urged the commercial and political desirability of a treaty of amity and commerce with the Grand Signior, while diplomatic reports from St. Petersburg, information from merchants in the Levant, and the observations of the Navy in the Mediterranean

uniformly indicated a receptive attitude on the part of the Ottoman government.[35]

The way was opened to the Ottoman Empire. Everything pointed to a willingness to trade and negotiate a treaty.

The Turks wanted a commercial and political treaty with the United States, and American agents had been periodically sent to investigate possibilities. However, the disruptions of the Napoleonic era and the turmoil of the Greek Revolution caused the U.S. to fail to negotiate successfully until 1829 when newly elected President Andrew Jackson sought to expand trade. President John Quincy Adams had earlier sent negotiators but these efforts failed when the Ottoman Porte tied a treaty to obtaining U.S. built ships. Adams' instructions were to negotiate a commercial treaty only - there was to be no compromise of American neutrality. Jackson's instructions also allowed no compromise of neutrality, but the Sultan was anxious for a treaty and Russian support outweighed British intrigues.[36]

The treaty was signed on 7 May 1830 and contained a most favored nation clause, a provision for extraterritoriality for American citizens, and a secret article requiring the American ministers to help the Ottoman government make shipbuilding agreements with the U.S. and acquire ship timber. The treaty was ratified by the Senate on 1 February 1831 without the secret article because it was said to violate the policy of non-involvement advocated by the American government.[37] By August of the same year, Commodore David Porter arrived in

Constantinople as the first American Charge d'Affairs. In addition to the rejection of the secret article, the Sultan's government was disappointed by the lowly rank of the American representative. The fact that he was able to gain access to the Sultan himself attests to the high regard in which America was held.[38]

Philanthropists had played a major role already in American-Ottoman relations with their actions during the Greek revolt of 1821-1828. It was unofficially America's first sustained overseas philanthropic venture. Philhellenism swept America while the public and members of Congress agitated for direct government involvement. Though the government expressed sympathy for the Greek cause, it avoided involvement out of fear that it would provide the Holy Alliance with an excuse to assist Spain to regain her lost colonies in South America.[39] American citizens raised funds and volunteers served with Greek forces, causing the Ottomans difficulty in comprehending the difference between acts of citizens and those of government. American relief sustained the Greeks until European intervention at Navarino in 1827 insured independence.[40]

Although primarily secular, this philanthropic activity took on the crusader's zeal against the unholy Turk.[41] Later philanthropic activity was intermingled with the missionary effort until the period of professional philanthropies in the later decades of the century. This took the form of medical care and education in both cases. Although the primary

official interest in the Middle East was trade, the most influential factor in sustaining relations was the missionary effort and the requirement to protect them.

By 1823 missionaries were in Beirut and in 1824 missionary wives opened a class for a small number of Arab children. By year's end this had expanded significantly.[42] Since their religion was scripturally based, a literate audience was necessary. As such, wherever missionaries went, schools were soon to follow.

Between the signing of the American-Ottoman Treaty and the Mexican War, there was a rapid expansion of missionary work. Permanent stations were established in Constantinople and Urmia, and the Syrian effort was renewed. In 1833 the mission presses were moved from Malta to Smyrna and in 1834 the Arabic section was moved to Beirut. Additional missionary couples arrived to augment all stations. In 1836 a school was opened in Urmia.

The missionaries in Constantinople opened schools for Greeks and Armenians, and in 1833 they were asked to set up schools to teach Turkish officers writing, ciphering, and topography. By 1834 the number of these schools had grown to seven.[43] Eventually schools and printing presses were reaching all areas of missionary activity and missionaries began to meet with persecution from the leaders of the Christian sects and from the empire.

The era of the Crimean War brought little change to

the official relations between the Ottoman Empire and the United States. Although public opinion, we have seen, was decidedly with "Christian" Russia against "heathen" Turkey, peddlers continued to ply their trades, missionaries continued to preach and teach, and official America tried not to get too deeply involved in the conflict.

As a bridge from the unofficial realm of individual actions to the realm of official United States government relations, it may be appropriate here to address the endeavors of three individuals sent to observe the military conflict in the Crimea. This three man commission of military officers was sent under the orders of the Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, in an official capacity, but the officers were left to their own devices to complete their mission. Little has been written about the commission so some basic facts, such as who they were; where they went; and what were the results of their trip, should be provided.

The commission consisted of three commissioned officers, each selected for excellence in some field of military endeavor. The chief of the commission was a Major Richard Delafield, Corps of Engineers, who was serving on the Board of Engineers on Armament and Fortifications and was later to become the Chief of Engineers during the Civil War. Next was Major Alfred Mordecai, Ordnance Corps. Mordecai was probably the foremost expert on artillery in the United States. Captain George B. McClellan, later of the Army of the Potomac

fame, was the junior man on the commission. McClellan had recently distinguished himself by surveying American northwest railroad routes and naval bases in Santo Domingo before transferring from the Engineers to the Cavalry. He was also the only one on the commission to have seen active combat in the Mexican War.[44]

The commission departed Boston on April 11, 1855 and sailed to London, where they were graciously received and given passes to inspect British forces in the Crimea. They were not as lucky in France, where permission to visit French forces would not be given unless the commission agreed not to go on to the enemy camp. The commission could not agree to that arrangement and departed, intending to go by way of Berlin and Warsaw directly to the Crimea. In Warsaw they found the Russian commander unable to grant permission to travel to the Russian camp. Only the Tsar in St. Petersburg, where they traveled next, could provide that permission and he procrastinated until the commission set out to enter the Crimea from Constantinople. They arrived too late to witness the final storming of Sebastopol, but were allowed to inspect the ruins.[45]

In the Crimea the British, Turks, and Sardinians allowed the three officers to inspect camps, depots, parks, and workshops. After leaving the Crimea, the commissioners traveled back through Austria where they were allowed to inspect various military installations. While their efforts to visit French and Russian encampments in the Crimea were not

successful, they had been able to inspect extensively in France and the area around St. Petersburg as well as Prussian and Polish sites. In the spring of 1856, the commission returned to the United States.[46] This commission was the only official government involvement during the war. Every other activity involving the conflict seemed, on the surface, to be in reaction to foreign efforts.

While official policy of the United States during the Crimean War was strict neutrality, in actual fact the government seemed to favor Russia. Frank A. Golder, in the article "Russian-American Relations During the Crimean War",[47] states, like Alan Dowty and others,[48] that this "...war of friendship..." between the two nations "...was based almost altogether on antagonism towards England and on self-interest."[49] Dowty's work, one very closely related to his Ph.D. dissertation,[50] seeks to show that America was not the isolationist "half-pint" that it is often portrayed as, but an aggressive, self-interest-seeking nation that used the Crimean War to twist the great powers' tails when they were least likely to return the favor. He emphasizes the Pierce administration's expansionistic tendencies and its appointment of like minded politicians, such as Pierre Soulé, noted for his advocacy of the seizure of Cuba, to ambassadorships in Europe. He suggests that the Pierce administration sought to gain the advantage in its quest for expansion into Cuba and Central America by playing on the friendship with Russia.

Relations with Russia prior to the war have been previously described, so it will not be necessary to reiterate them here. What is important is that, according to Golder, the first thing Russian diplomatic representatives did was attempt to draw the United States into the conflict by stirring up commercial rivalries with England. They offered reduced tariffs on goods traditionally carried in English bottoms, knowing that "...Americans will go after anything that has enough money in it...".[51] They also quietly attempted to discover the American stand on privateering, the granting of "letters of marque" to private vessels commissioning them to seize vessels of the enemy or neutrals carrying contraband items. Since this activity was in conflict with American neutrality laws, Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, advised his representatives to back-off and do nothing that would endanger Russo-American friendship.[52]

During the war, Russia acquiesced to the American desire to annex the Sandwich Islands; assisted the United States in procuring a commercial treaty with Persia, in rivalry with English interests; and agreed to sign a treaty covering the rights of neutrals in time of war. The United States had pressed for this last concession almost from the beginning of Russo-American diplomatic relations. As a sign of goodwill, the United States offered to mediate the Crimean conflict, but Russia refused, fearing that if the offer were to come from pro-Russian America it would be taken by the Allies as a sign of Russian weakness.[53]

American relations with the Allies were primarily dealing with the British and these reflected the unharmonious past. Conditions between the mother-country and her ex-colony were seldom agreeable and occasionally flared into armed conflict, as in 1812. The surprising thing is that the rivalry did not erupt more often. The decade of the thirties was particularly volatile when American citizens involved themselves in the Canadian rebellion of 1837. There were also problems concerning American states defaulting on British loans during the financial panic of 1837. The Maine boundary dispute also flared occasionally until its settlement in 1842.

British support of the abolitionist movement has been mentioned previously, but the physical attempt to curb the slave trade by trying to establish the right to search American merchant ships in peacetime came near to wrecking the Webster-Ashburton Treaty negotiations. This treaty not only solved some of the minor but explosive situations described above, but also paved the way for solutions to future controversies in the 1840s, such as the Oregon settlement.

With the receipt of its share of Oregon, all of California, and the discovery of gold in Californa, the United States renewed its interest in an Isthmian canal. The Americans gained a toehold in Central America and the Isthmus of Panama by signing a treaty with New Granada (later Columbia), granting the United States transit rights in exchange for U.S. guarantees of the "neutrality" and free transit of the route

across the Isthmus. The British, already concerned with the outcome of the Mexican War, feared that this United States expansion into Central America would conflict with their own interests there. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 was to have solved this source of concern for both parties by establishing that neither would attempt to expand in Central America. Since both sides showed little inclination toward living up to the agreement, the treaty itself became a source of bickering during the decades of the fifties and sixties. British disinclination to give up its Mosquito protectorate on the coast of Nicaragua or the Honduran Bay islands, and unofficial American support for filibusterers, nearly caused conflict.[54] These difficulties, and the Anglo-American conflict of interest in Cuba, mentioned above, were significant reasons for the anti-British feelings in America.

During the time of the Crimean War, there were two British policies that affected official relations with the United States. The first regarded the rights of neutrals, and the United States' determination to protect its right as a neutral to carry on legitimate commerce. The second policy concerned the recruiting of American citizens for the British Army in violation of American neutrality laws.

The British policy concerning neutral rights agreed that the neutral flag would protect the cargo, except for contraband. This policy suited America's needs.[55] At the end of the war in 1856, the famous Declaration of Paris concerning

the rights of neutrals on the seas was signed by the European powers and the United States was invited to sign. The document declared that: "1. Privateering is and remains, abolished; 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception of contraband of war; 3. Neutral goods with the exception of the contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag; 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective."[56] The United States was in full accord with articles two, three, and four, but felt that giving up privateers would put its comparatively weak navy at the mercy of stronger maritime nations - namely England. Secretary of State William Marcy attempted to have a fifth article added that would limit maritime warfare to armed ships, leaving commerce free from interference and making privateers useless. The European powers, led by Great Britain, felt that was not in their interest. Without this article, which the powers would not accept, the United States could not accede to the declaration.[57]

The other British activity that caused active American official response concerned the enlistment controversy mentioned above. In the early stages of the war, staggering losses of soldiers due to mismanagement caused the British parliament to pass a bill known as the Foreign Enlistment Act. This authorized the enlistment and commissioning of foreigners into the British army. Resultant attempts to enlist those soldiers in the United States in contravention to the U.S. Neutrality Laws of 1818, caused the eventual dismissal of the

British Minister to Washington, John F. Crampton, and two lesser officials, charged with violation of these laws.

The story of this controversy developed into a controversy of sorts itself. It was originally told by Henry Barrett Learned in Samuel Flagg Bemis' American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy.[58] Learned contended that Crampton, asked by his government to check into the possibility of recruiting in the United States and basically poorly informed on the extent of the Neutrality Law, over-zealously began a recruiting scheme, that netted mostly out of work rif-raf. Learned portrayed Crampton as the prime mover in the efforts to recruit and accused him of providing scant information on the situation to the British government.

A few years after publication of Learned's work, J. Bartlet Brebner, in an article titled "Joseph Howe and the Crimean War Enlistment Controversy Between Great Britain and the United States",[59] produced further evidence, using Howe's papers, that Crampton may not have been fully to blame. In Brebner's article, Howe, an important figure in Nova Scotia, is portrayed as the real zealot and deviser of the recruiting scheme.

Still later, Richard Van Alstyne authored an article titled "John F. Crampton, Conspirator or Dupe".[60] Using Lord Clarendon's papers, Van Alstyne expanded on his predecessors' works and showed that Crampton had his hands full trying to control Howe, but did keep the foreign office

informed. Clarendon's papers indicated that he approved Crampton's methods in carrying out an urgent foreign office request to provide recruits for the army. Wherever the fault, the fact still remains that the situation caused such a stir as to nearly precipitate an armed conflict over the dismissal of the British Minister and the two consuls. Fortunately for the United States, Britain had not been prepared for the war they were already involved in let alone a second, so cooler heads prevailed.

As was stated in the beginning, there is a paucity of general works covering American involvement in the Crimean War. This chapter has identified some that deal with specific aspects of American involvement, but as we have seen, even these are few. These works have shown that, for a variety of reasons, American sympathy was with Russia. Offically, the government remained uninvolved in the conflict, but managed to use it to gain the neutral rights it so desired. Unofficial America, on the other hand, was involved in nearly every aspect of the conflict - both for commercial gain and for the spirit of adventure - on both sides of the conflict. America was neutral, but America was not isolated nor uninvolved.

One topic on which little has been written is the work of the official U.S. Military Commission to the Crimean War. The remainder of this work will be to consider the efforts of that commission and attempt to discover the purpose of its going and what its value was to the United States.

NOTES

[1]Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice - Hall, Inc.) 10th ed; 1980.

[2]Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: A History. (New York: W. W. Norton) 1959.

[3]America's enemy then being England.

[4]Eugene Anscel, ed. The American Image of Russia 1775-1917. (New York: Frederich Ungar Pub. Co.) 1974; Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations From Early Times to Our Day. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press) 1950; and Benjamin P. Thomas "Russo-American Relation, 1815-1867", John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, XLVIII, No. 2) 1930.

[5]"American" in the Canadian sense, meaning the North American Continent

[6]Albert A. Woldman, Lincoln and the Russians. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co.) 1952.

[7]See the collections of Papers and Memoirs of these Diplomats in: G. Tichnor Curtis, Life of James Buchanan, 2 Vols. (New York: Harper and Bros.) 1883; Susan Dalles, ed. Diary of George Mifflin Dallas: While U.S. Minister to Russia 1837 to 1839 and to England 1856 to 1861 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co.) 1892; George M. Dallas, Letters From London: Written from the Year 1856-1860, Julia Dallas, ed. (London: Richard Bently) 2 vols., 1870; Andrew D. White, Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White, vol. 1 (New York: The Century Co.) 1905.

[8]Alan Dowty, The Limits of American Isolation: The United States and the Crimean War. (New York: New York University Press) 1971, p. 85.

[9]Ibid., p. 57.

[10]Horace P. Jones, "Southern Opinion On the Crimean War", The Journal of Mississippi History, Vol. XXIX, No. 2 (Jackson: Miss. Hist. Society) May 1967. This seems to be a shortened version of his 1969 Ph.D. dissertation of the same title.

[11]Ibid., pp. 100-101.

[12]Ibid., p. 100.

[13]Dowty, p. 57.

[14]Ibid., p. 86.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Joseph O. Baylen, "Marx's Dispatches to Americans About Russia and the West, 1853-56", The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Duke Univ. Press) January 1957.

[17]Albert Parry, "American Doctors in the Crimean War", The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 4, October 1955, p. 478; Frank A. Golder, "Russo-American Relations During the Crimean War", American Historical Review, Vol. 31, May 1926, p. 462; Jones, p. 105.

[18]See discussion on enlistment controversy later in paper.

[19]Parry

[20]Ibid.

[21]Eufrosina Dvoichenko-Markov, "Americans in the Crimean War", The Russian Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 1954, p. 141.

[22]Parry, p. 490.

[23]Dowty, p. 84; White, p. 454.

[24]Dvoichenko-Markov

[25]Ibid., p. 139.

[26]Ibid., p. 140.

[27]Ibid., p. 105.

[28]Captain John Codman, An American Transport in the Crimean War. (New York: Bonnell, Silver and Co.) 1896.

[29]James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World 1776-1882 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) p. 38.

[30]Ibid, p. 37.

[31]Ibid., pp. 47-55 contains excellent discussion of these conflicts.

[32]Ibid., p. 42.

[33]Ibid., pp. 56-57.

[34]Ibid., p. 58.

[35]Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[36]Ibid., p. 149.

[37]Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East 1784-1975: A Survey (N.J. Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1977) p. 18.

[38]Op. cit., Field, p. 165.

[39]Partially in response to Greek requests for aid, the Monroe Doctrine was pronounced in December 1823. Ibid., Bryson, pp. 11-12.

[40]Ibid., pp. 8-15; and op. cit., Field, pp. 121-129; also see Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East 1820-1960 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1970) pp. 1-12.

[41]Op. cit., Field, p. 129.

[42]Ibid., p. 102; and op. cit., Daniel, p. 36.

[43]Ibid., Field, pp. 168 and 177-178.

[44]Richard Weinert, "The Year McClellan Studied War in Europe", Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1963, p. 39.

[45]Colonel R. Delafield, Report on the Art of War in Europe, U.S. Congress, House, 36th Congress, 2nd Session 1861.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Golder, p. 462.

[48]Dowty, Thomas, Dvoichenko-Markov

[49]Golder, p. 462.

[50]Alan Dowty, The United States and the Crimean War: A Reappraisal of Nineteenth-Century U.S. Isolation (Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ. of Chicago) 1964.

[51]Golder, p. 465.

[52]Ibid., pp. 465-469.

[53]Ibid., pp. 467-471.

[54]Bailey, pp. 199-278.

[55]Golder, p. 465.

[56]Senate, Cong. Record, 34th Congress, 1st Session, 1856, p. 3.

[57]Ibid., p. 4-14; Thomas, pp. 118-119.

[58]H. B. Learned, "William Learned Marcy", The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Samuel F. Bemis, ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 1928.

[59]J. Bartlet Brebner, "Joseph Howe and the Crimean War Enlistment Controversy Between Great Britain and the United States", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. XI, No. 4, Dec. 1930.

[60]Richard W. Van Alstyne, "John F. Crampton, Conspirator or Dupe", The American Historical Review, Vol. XLI, No. 3, April 1936.

CHAPTER 3

THE U.S. MILITARY COMMISSION

Although the official policy of the United States government was one of strict neutrality during the Crimean War, many private American citizens became involved in that conflict either for profit or for the want of adventure. The single group that was involved in the conflict under the official sponsorship of the U.S. government was the Military Commission sent by the Secretary of War. It is important to study the Commission by discussing the conditions under which it was dispatched, the membership of the Commission, where the Commission went, and what it saw. This discussion may indicate the reason why the Commission was sent and the results of its journey.

CONDITIONS IN THE U.S.

The mid-nineteenth century was a period when the United States expanded territorially to the continental limit and established its northern and southern boundaries by diplomacy and conflict. It was a time when settlers moved across the Great Plains into the newly acquired territories and began to fill in the middle regions of the nation. Migration to Texas, California, and the Oregon country had started earlier and with the boundary settlements in those areas,

more settlers flooded there. In 1847 the Mormons, fleeing religious persecution in Illinois and Missouri, began to settle the Great Basin, while gold discovered in 1849 at Suttlers Mill opened the floodgate of California emigration. In all of this expansion and settlement, the U.S. Army played an important role. Not only in the traditional roles of opening new territory and keeping the peace, but in mapping the new territories and surveying the roads and railroads that would prove significant in the settlement of the expanding nation.

The Army of the 1850s had just emerged from the Mexican War and had, as usual, been reduced to a peacetime footing. The annual reports of the Secretary of War from 1853 to 1856 show an authorized strength of the Army varying from 13,821 to 17,894, with an actual strength consisting of from 75 to 85 percent of these figures respectively.[1] Of the 10,417 men in the Army in 1853, 8,378 were posted to the frontier departments.[2] These limited manpower resources were charged with the defense of a vast territory. In the 1855 annual report of the Secretary of War, an abstract from the report of the Quartermaster General put the Army's mission into this perspective:

> Our small army covers more ground, and its operations are more extended, than the armies of all the nations of continental Europe, west of Russia, including all the colonies of those nations, in addition to their European territories.

> No army in Europe can keep the field a single week, fifty miles from the seacoast, unless it obtains the greater part of its supplies by daily contribution upon the country in which it operates, while our troops operate for many months many hundred miles from the source of supply, and in portions of country with no resources than a scanty crop of wild grass.[3]

How was the Army, with its limited resources, to fulfill its mission of defending this vast territory? In the Quartermaster General's analysis, technology was the answer.

> To retain our vast territories, and successfully defend them, there is only one measure by which the expense can be materially reduced: that is, to adopt a system of railroad communication in our exposed territories outside the States. Such a system is required not only for the economy and efficiency of our Indian operations and frontier defense, but to secure us from European combination and aggression.[4]

Obviously, the threat was from hostile Indians inhabiting four of the five military departments or divisions of the United States, but a foreign threat could never be discounted. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, in reporting to the President and Congress in 1854, described the threat in this way:

> We have a sea-board and foreign frontier of more than 10,000 miles, an Indian frontier, and routes through the Indian country, requiring constant protection, of more than 8000 miles, and an Indian population of more than 400,000, of whom, probably, one-half, or 40,000 warriors, are inimical, and only wait the opportunity to become active enemies.[5]

In Secretary Davis' evaluation the force was

"...entirely inadequate to the purposes for which we maintain any standing army..."[6] and he urged expansion. But the size of the force was not the only problem that the Secretary of War saw. In addition to problems of pay, rank structure, the structure of the General Staff, and the system of frontier and coastal fortifications, Secretary Davis saw the U.S. lagging behind in the development and production of armaments.[7] A quote from his 1854 annual report gives an indication of the Secretary's opinion on the latter.

> Though our arms have heretofore been considered the best in use, recent inventions in Europe have produced changes in small arms, which are now being used in war, with such important results as have caused them to be noticed among the remarkable incidents of battles, and indicate that material modifications will be made in the future armament of troops.[8]

With these facts in mind, it is not surprising that under the enlightened leadership of Secretary Davis, himself a West Point graduate, and with the full support of President Franklin Pierce, a former general, a commission was formed to go "...to Europe and study the latest developments in military thought and to witness their application in the Crimean War."[9]

THE MILITARY COMMISSION

As previously stated, the Commission consisted of three commissioned officers, each selected for excellence in one or another field of military endeavor. Major Richard Delafield, Corps of Engineers, was the chief of the Commission

and, at the time of his appointment to the Commission, was serving on the Board of Engineers on Armament and Fortifications, and was Superintendent of the defense of New York Harbor. He had attended West Point and had graduated first in his 1818 class. The second officer assigned to the Commission was Major Alfred Mordecai, Ordnance Corps. He also graduated at the top of his West Point class in 1823 and, at the time of his selection to the Commission, was commandant of the Washington Arsenal. At the time, Mordecai was probably the foremost expert on artillery in the U.S. Army and in 1841, had published a book, Artillery for the Land Service of the United States.[10] Finally, the junior member of the Commission was also a West Point graduate of the class of 1846. George Brinton McClellan graduated second in his class the summer before his twentieth birthday (1826). McClellan distinguished himself during the Mexican War, earning both a brevet first lieutenantcy and a captaincy for gallantry in action. Having been commissioned in the Engineer Corps, he conducted extensive surveys of railroad routes in the northwest territories and inspections of possible naval bases on Santo Domingo. Immediately prior to his appointment to the Commission, he transferred to the Cavalry.[11]

How did the Secretary of War come to select these men for the Commission to study the war in the Crimea? Obviously Secretary Davis knew, or at least knew of these three men, or

he would not have appointed them to this important task. A review of the Secretary's correspondence verifies that he had at least corresponded with Major Mordecai,[12] and had personally assigned Captain McClellan to survey and construct "...the military road from Walla-Walla to Steilacomb, Puget's Sound...",[13] and to obtain information on the "...practicability of a rail road from the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean...."[14] With the Secretary's interest in these affairs, it seems logical that Mr. Davis would have known of Major Delafield through the latter's assignment to the Board of Engineers on Armament and Fortifications.

Although the order appointing the Commission and providing its mission was issued over the signature of the Secretary of War, it is apparent that the President had either directed its promulgation or had at least heartily approved the Commission's formation and task. Each of the Secretary of War's annual reports from 1853 through 1855 expresses the need for better pay, a more equitable rank and command structure, and improvement in fortifications and armaments.[15] It is difficult to believe that the former general, now president, would turn a deaf ear to such logical reasoning as: "Happily we may profit by the experience of others without suffering the evils that attend the practical solution of such problems."[16] More conclusive evidence that the President at least approved of the Commission and its efforts comes from a letter from

Secretary of War Davis to James Buchanan, United State Minister to Great Britain, in April 1855. The letter states that the "...important military operations in the 'war of the East', ...induced the President to dispatch..." the Commission.[17] Second, in his report to the President and Congress of 1856, the Secretary speaks of sending the commission with the President's "approbation".[18]

The order appointing the officers to the commission (reproduced at Appendix A) and providing their instruction, was issued under the date of 2 April 1855. After addressing the three by name, the order began:

> You have been selected to form a commission to visit Europe for the purpose of obtaining useful information with regard to the military service in general, and especially the practical working of the changes which have been introduced, of late years, into the military systems of the principal nations of Europe.[19]

Specifically, the Commission was instructed to study the "...organization of armies...", the "...kinds of arms, ammunition and accoutrements used in equipping troops of the various branches of service...", the "...practical advantages and disadvantages attending the use of the various kinds of rifled arms...", and the "...construction of permanent fortifications, the arrangement of new systems of sea-coast and land defenses, and the kinds of Ordnance used in the armament of them...."[20] They were also instructed to study the "...use of camels for transportation, and their adaptation to cold and mountainous countries."[21]

As an aside, this last item of study indicates the desire and willingness of Jefferson Davis to search out and try innovative ideas to improve the capability of the U.S. Army. After receiving a report "...on the use of Camels and Dromedaries for transportation and Military purposes..."[22] prepared by Major Henry C. Wayne, 21 November 1853, in his next annual report in December 1853, Davis suggested that "...provision be made for the introduction of a sufficient number of both varieties of this animal, to test its value and adaptation to our country and our service."[23] The President and Congress must have approved the scheme, for on 10 May 1855, Secretary Davis, speaking of a law of Congress, assigned Major Wayne the task of going to the Middle East for the purpose of importing camels for military testing.[24] To assist Wayne in his efforts, Lieutenant David D. Porter, U.S. Navy, and the storeship "Supply", were detached from the Navy to transport the beasts.[25]

Major Delafield mentions in his report of the Commission that the two officers were in the Crimea during his stay,[26] so we know they must have sailed. A letter from Secretary Davis to Major Wayne on 5 July 1856,[27] and the annual report of 1856,[28] indicate that thirty-two of the animals arrived in Texas in June 1856. These were moved inland for testing, and Lieutenant Porter was sent back for forty more.[29] The experiment eventually faded and the reason, whether due

to the failure of the camels to adapt climatically or to the diversion of the Civil War, is beyond the scope of this work.

WHERE DID THEY GO AND WHAT DID THEY SEE

The officers constituting the Commission to the Crimean War were gathered to Washington where they received their instructions. They also received letters of introduction from all but the French government representatives there. The Commission sailed from Boston on 11 April 1855 and arrived in Great Britain on 27 April 1855. The British government, very hospitably, provided them with introductory letters to the commanders of the fleet in the Baltic and in Constantinople. The French, on the other hand, would not provide the passes necessary to inspect their camps in the area of the conflict unless the Commissioners would agree not to go to the enemy camp thereafter. This the Commission could not agree to. The Commission was allowed, however, to inspect military and naval establishments in France.[30]

On the 28th of May, the Commission left Paris for Berlin, with the intention of going through Prussia to the Russian camps in the Crimea. Like the British, the Prussians were very hospitable, and made arrangements for the Commission to "...visit all such places as the Commission would name on its route into Prussia on returning from St. Petersburg, it having been explained...the intention of first going to the Crimea, via Warsaw, and thereafter St. Petersburg...."[31]

The Commission also visited the Russian minister in Berlin and received his "indorsement" to proceed to the Crimea, via Warsaw and Kiev.

Upon arriving in Warsaw on the 4th of June, 1855, the Commission found some confusion and delay. The Russian military commander was away from the city at the time and no one else could give permission for the Commission to proceed with its mission. Upon his return to Warsaw on 9 June, he gave the Commission authority to visit the fortification of Warsaw and Modlin, but informed the Commission that he could not give them the authority to go from Warsaw to the Crimea. The Commission would have to travel to St. Petersburg, "...where all necessary authority rested..." to get permission from the Tsar.[32] The only compensation the Commission felt in the delay faced by going to St. Petersburg rather than directly to Sebastopol, was the "...probability of witnessing a bombardment of the works of Cronstadt by the allied fleet,... together with the fact of our instructions requiring a study and examination of these important sea-coast defenses...."[33]

The Commission arrived in St. Petersburg on 19 June, and met with the Russian Prime Minister, Count Nesselrode, on the 25th. The Commission informed the Count of their "...desire to see the defenses of Cronstadt and other military establishments about St. Petersburg, as also of Helsingfors, Sweaborg and Revel...."[34] They also asked permission to go

to Sebastopol, to examine the works there, and visit the armu in the field, as well as any other place they might pass through, such as Odessa, Nicholaev or Pericop. The answer to their request was a long time in coming.[35]

The next day, 26 June, the Commission met Tsar Nicholas and with him reviewed some "...thousands of troops...."[36] While they waited for permission to proceed to the Crimea, the Commission examined Cronstadt, visited some other military establishments around St. Petersburg, and received permission to visit Moscow to examine the Kremlin and other sites there. Finally, after waiting some 25 days, the Commission was informed that their request to visit Sebastopol and the army in the Crimea, as well as Sweaborg and Revel, was denied. After a few days revisiting Cronstadt and observing some cavalry drill, on 19 July the Commission departed for Moscow.[37]

From Moscow the Commission traveled back to St. Petersburg, then to Konigsburg, in Prussia, and then to the fortified city of "Dantzig", where the three officers examined the old and new defenses of the continental engineers. By mid-August the Commission arrived at Posen, and then went on to the mouth of the Oder River to see some sea coast defenses under construction. By 25 August the Commission was back in Berlin where they waited until 8 September before receiving permission to inspect eleven military establishments in Berlin and Spandau,

and being provided with drawings of barracks, the arsenal at Spandau, and books of regulations.[38]

By this time, according to reports from the scene, the seige at Sebastopol appeared to be coming to a crisis and the Commission decided to go there with all possible haste. Having received no authorization from the French, they decided to rely on the letters already received for the English commanders. Passing through Vienna, Dresden, Laibach, Trieste, and Smyrna, the Commission arrived at Constantinople on 16 September 1855. Catching the first steamer provided by the British navy, they arrived at Balaklava on the 8th of October, having missed the final storming of Sebastopol.[39]

The Commission remained in the Crimea until 2 November when it returned to Constantinople. The entire time in the Crimea the British army made every effort to assist the Commission with its mission. The French commander, on the other hand, would not see the commissioners, even after receipt of the authorization from the French government. "The result was, that the Commission confined its examination to the camps, depots, parks, workshops, etc., of the English, Sardinian, and Turkish armies, never entering the French camps in the Crimea, except on visits of courtesy."[40]

After inspecting the Allies' hospitals and depots in Constantinople, the Commission departed for Vienna, via Trieste, on 13 November, arriving there on 16 December. In

Vienna the Commission visited military and naval facilities as well as those in Venice, Verona, Mantua, and Milan, staying until 25 January 1856. Passing back through France, with authority to inspect facilities there, and Britain, visiting naval and land facilities, the Commission embarked to return to the United States on 19 April 1856.[41]

REPORTS

Upon their return to the United States, each of the Commission's members wrote an extensive report covering a portion of Secretary Davis' instructions. These reports were delayed somewhat due to the "...necessity of assigning some of the officers to other duty...."[42] Just what duty, the Secretary does not elaborate, but Delafield wrote a letter to the Secretary in August 1856, from "Fort Richmond, Harbor of New York". His detailed report of the Commission's itinerary is dated 19 November 1860, and his "signature block" indicates his assignment as "Colonel of Engineers, Superintendent of Military Academy" at West Point.[43]

Mordecai's report is also prefaced by a letter to Secretary of War John B. Floyd, Davis' successor, dated 30 March 1858, and written at Watervliet Arsenal--near Albany and Troy, New York. He does state that upon the Commission's return to the United States, he was "...first assigned to special duty in the War Office, and then to the command of this, the principal arsenal of construction."[44] Mordecai

also provides the insight that the Commission's "...observations of that remarkable seige (at Sebastopol) were limited to the results which were apparent a month after the evacuation of the place by the Russians."[45] His observations were diminished even more by an illness that confined him to camp during the latter part of their stay in the Crimea.[46]

McClellan's report is dated 14 January 1857, but gives us no clue as to his assignment upon returning from Europe.[47] His principal duty may have been writing the report, since he was to resign his Army commission shortly thereafter.[48] Where he wrote the report, however, is undefined.

Because of the comprehensive nature of Secretary Davis' instructions, it appears that the Commission members each took a portion of what they had seen, relating to those instructions, to report on. Each of the reports were subsequently published by Congress and probably provided the most comprehensive guide to European military science in the mid-nineteenth century.

To the Commission's chief, Major Delafield, fell the task of reporting the overall narrative of its travels. After a prefatory letter to the Secretary of War, of which more will be said later, Delafield jumped right into a discussion of armaments, both field pieces and individual weapons. He stated that:

> The introduction of the long gun to fire shells horizontally, both for land and sea service, with a tendency to increase the calibers; and of the rifle, with various modifications for all small arms, may now be considered as the settled policy and practice of all the military powers of Europe.[49]

According to Delafield, it was the introduction of these long guns and heavier field pieces that allowed the Russians to hold out so long at Sebastopol. After some seventeen pages discussing the size of guns, and the size and shape of the various projectiles experimented with, Delafield concluded that even though the use of rifled armaments was the accepted policy and practice of the Europeans, no single type or system had been accepted as best.

Delafield then turned his discussion to European fortifications in general, and those at Cronstadt and Sebastopol specifically. He discussed the specific design and construction of these fortifications in terms probably understandable by other engineers, and seemed to conclude that the design and construction of Cronstadt, Sebastopol and Cherbourg were the best in Europe.[50] Cronstadt had held out against the allied fleet, and although the Russians evacuated Sebastopol, the allied fleets inflicted little damage to the fortifications there.[51] Delafield thought that the U.S. could learn much from these examples in the defense of its harbors.

Delafield's letter to the Secretary of War contains some interesting insights into his perception of warfare and

the military arts in Europe, and specifically, the mission the Commission was sent to fulfill (his letter has been reproduced at Appendix B). He began the letter with this interpretation of the results of the Commission's mission:

> The contest that commenced, in 1854, between the principal military and naval powers of Europe, gave rise, during its progress, to the belief that the art of war had undergone some material changes since the days of Napoleon and Wellington, and that new principles of attack and defense had been resorted to, in the prolonged defense by the Russians of the land and sea fronts of Sebastopol, and in the great preparations made by the allies for reducing the sea-defenses of Cronstadt and Sebastopol.
>
> On examination, this change will be found mainly in the increased magnitude of the engines of war, and the perfection to which they have been brought by the unceasing application of talent and skill to their improvement, accomplished by the accuracy and rapidity of workmanship by the machinery of the arsenals of the present day, and that few new principles have been introduced with much success in the late contest.[52]

Delafield goes on to comment on the warlike footing the European powers had taken on, and how the art of war had become an avocation of the sons of the nobility and the reigning families of Europe. Since the form of government engendered by that militaristic tendency was antagonistic to our own, and since the U.S. was surrounded by the colonies of these powers, Delafield concluded that America could never let its guard down and should make every effort to improve its capability in the art and science of war.

Of the three reports, Major Mordecai's was the least analytical and offers little by way of conclusion. It was a straight report of technical facts, seeming to allow the reader to draw his own conclusions. The initial portion discussed the military organization of each of the five great powers of Europe - Russia, Prussia, Austria, France and England. It then moved quickly into Mordecai's field of specialization--ordance and armament. In each area of armament that he discussed, he did so by each of the nations listed above, sometimes adding one or two and/or deleting one or two. For example, only while discussing "Field Artillery" did he stick to the original five, while under the topics "Arsenals of Construction and Manufacturing Establishments" and "Spherical Case Shot and Fuzes", he added the United States. His discussion of "Garrison Artillery" deleted England. Sections that did not discuss the topic by nation were: "Rifle Cannon", "Cannon of Large Caliber", and "Fuzes for Common Shells". He also included a section on "Miscellaneous" when he discussed "Small Arms" by nation.

Included in Mordecai's report, in addition to a special section on "Ordnance at the Seige of Sebastopol", were three other special sections that were of importance to officials of his day, and are of interest today. The first was a listing of books, drawings, maps, and "Specimens of Arms and Equipments" that the Commission brought back from

Europe. Books were in English, French, German, and Russian, and included a "Russian and English Dictionary" as well as regulations and instructions on widely varied military topics (See Appendix C).

The second special section of Mordecai's report was titled, "Report of the French Minister of War to the Emperor, on the Administrative Arrangements for the War in the East". As the title implies, this report provided information on the personnel figures--number sent out, number killed, wounded, missing, etc.; materiel--ammunition, fuel, food, clothing, etc.; and the means of sea transportation. Besides being of interest to the French emperor, the information could have been of some use to the military planner of the day; not only to know what units were deployed, but what were the effects of disease and new weapons on personnel losses.

The final special section of Mordecai's report is a translation of a book by a Prussian officer on rifled infantry arms used by European armies. It is interesting to note that, according to Mordecai, even though rifled arms had drawn much interest and experimentation in Europe, "...the great body of the infantry of all the armies engaged used the ordinary musket...."[53]

Captain McClellan began his report with a narration and analysis of operations in the Crimea. As the point of reference for his analysis, he used his own experience in the

Mexican War and considered the investiture of Sebastopol by the allies somewhat poorly done when compared with the U.S. operation at Vera Cruz.[54] His criticism was not directed solely at the Allies, however. McClellan evidenced no favoritism when he charged that the Russian commander failed to be sufficiently aware of events under his control.[55]

Recognizing that it is infinitely easier to criticize after the operation is over than it is to "...direct them at the time...", McClellan criticized, he said, "...with the hope that it may serve to draw the attention of our officers to the same points, and, perhaps, assist in preventing similar errors on our own part hereafter."[56]

With his background in both fields, it next fell to McClellan to report on engineer troops and cavalry--to include the United States cavalry. Concerning the latter, with his report, he submitted a set of "...regulations for the field service of cavalry in time of war...", which he claims to have translated from the original Russian.[57] McClellan's report on the European nations' use of cavalry, the adapted Russian regulations, and his own recommendations, according to Richard Weinert, probably played a major part in the reorganization of American cavalry underway at the time.[58] One thing is sure, the McClellan saddle adopted later by the U.S. cavalry, was of Hungarian design that he saw used by Prussian cavalry.[59]

Finally, McClellan's report contained a detailed discussion of the entire Russian army and a report on the French, Austrian, Prussian, and Sardinian infantry.

RESULTS

The Commission spent one year in Europe inspecting military establishments and fortifications, and studying the "new" weapons of war and their use in the Crimean conflict. This, then, was the purpose for which the Commission was sent: to study the art and science of warfare in Europe to determine if there might be some applicability in the United States Army. The American type of government purposely kept the army small even though its mission was vast. The only thing an enlightened Secretary of War, like Jefferson Davis, could do was to see if the new "engines of war" that had been experimented with, and were now under test in Europe, could reduce the problem of quantity by increasing the quality of arms--a subject not unknown today.

Upon their return, each member of the Commission primarily reported on what they saw within his own area of expertise. Collectively, these reports probably provided the most comprehensive guide to European warfare of the period. Many of the Commission's findings and recommendations had been overtaken by events--such as the use of limited numbers of rifled small arms--and many more probably would have been implemented

eventually, had it not been for the immediate needs of the Civil War. For the most part, many of the Commission's findings were inconclusive, since even though rifled arms, both individual and cannon, improved range and accuracy, they were little used in the conflict in the Crimea. It is ironic that the first real test they should receive in this country was in civil strife. The only immediate change influenced by the Commission seems to have been McClellan's in the reorganization of cavalry, and that was in progress already.

NOTES

[1]See the annual "Reports of the Secretary of War" for 1853-1856 in Dunbar Rowland, ed., Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, His Letters, Papers and Speeches, Vol. II (New York: J. J. Little and Ives Co., 1923) pp. 292, 389, and 552; and Vol. III, p. 68.

[2]"Report of the Secretary of War, 1853," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 292.

[3]U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 34th Congress, 1st Session, 1855.

[4]Ibid.

[5]"Report of the Secretary of War, 1854", Rowland, Vol. II, p. 393.

[6]Ibid.

[7]See annual "Reports of the Secretary of War" for 1853-1856, Rowland, Vols. II and III.

[8]"Report of the Secretary of War, 1854," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 410.

[9]Richard P. Weinert, "The Year McClellan Studied War in Europe," Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1963, p. 39.

[10]Ibid., p. 39.

[11]Rowland, Vol. II, N2, p. 219-220; Weinert, p. 39.

[12]"Jefferson Davis to Major A. Mordecai," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 14.

[13]"Jefferson Davis to George B. McClellan," Rowland, Vol. II, pp. 219-220.

[14]"Jefferson Davis to George B. McClellan," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 381.

[15]Reports of Secretary of War, 1853-1855, Rowland, Vol. II, pp. 292, 389, and 582.

[16]Rowland, Vol. II, p. 410.

[17]"Jefferson Davis to James Buchanan," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 451.

[18]"Report of the Secretary of War, 1856," Rowland, Vol. III, p. 85.

[19]"Jefferson Davis to R. Delafield, A. Mordecai and George B. McClellan," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 446.

[20]Ibid., p. 447.

[21]Ibid.

[22]"H. C. Wayne to Jefferson Davis," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 288.

[23]"Report of the Secretary of War, 1853," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 321.

[24]"Jefferson Davis to Henry C. Wayne," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 461.

[25]"Jefferson Davis to D. D. Porter," Rowland, Vol. II, p. 464.

[26]Colonel R. Delafield, Report on the Art of War in Europe, U.S. Congress, House, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, 1861, p. xx.

[27]"Jefferson Davis to H. C. Wayne," Rowland, Vol. III, p. 52.

[28]"Report of the Secretary of War, 1856," Rowland, Vol. III, p. 93.

[29]Ibid., p. 94.

[30]Delafield, pp. XII and XV.

[31]Ibid., p. XVI.

[32]Ibid., p. XVII.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid., pp. XVII-XVIII.

[36]Ibid., p. XVIII.

[37]Ibid., p. XVIII-XIX.

[38]Ibid., p. XIX.

[39]Ibid., p. XIX; Major Alfred Mordecai, Military Commission to Europe in 1855 and 1856, U. S. Congress, Senate, 36th Congress, 1st Session, 1860, p. 3.

[40]Delafield, p. XX.

[41]Ibid., pp. XXI-XXIV.

[42]Rowland, Vol. III, p. 86.

[43]Delafield, p. XXIV.

[44]Mordecai, p. 3.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Captain George B. McClellan, The Seat of War In Europe, 1855 and 1856, U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Session, 1857, p. 24.

[48]G. S. Hillard, Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1864) p. 81

[49]Delafield, p. 5.

[50]Delafield, p. 26.

[51]Delafield, p. 24.

[52]Ibid., p. 1

[53]Mordecai, p. 176.

[54]McClellan, p. 5.

[55]Ibid., p. 7.

[56]Ibid., p. 5.

[57]Ibid., p. 284.

[58]Weinert, p. 41.

[59]Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

In a period of rapid national growth, and concerned about the small U.S. Army's ability to defend the nation, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis began a period of modernization. Feeling that it would be difficult to get congressional approval to enlarge the force, he determined to make the small force as effective as possible by sending a military commission to Europe "... to study the latest developments in military thought and to witness their application in the Crimean War."[1] The reports written by the Commission provided insights into the conduct of war, and the new developments in fortifications and armaments. The reports also provided insights on the perspective from which war was viewed by the monarchies of Europe and American democracy. To quote from Major Delafield's letter to the Secretary of War:

> For a long period, the continental powers had been occupied in preparing large quantities of munitions of war, on which they had bestowed all the skill and intelligence that could be commanded from the fruits of the various theoretical and practical seminaries, established in every kingdom.... To such an extent has it been carried on the continent, that the military profession is not only indispensable for the protection of the existing governments against each other's encroachments, but places the profession first in importance in the estimation of the sovereign power, taking rank and receiving honors the highest in the gift of the monarch to bestow upon a subject.[2]

This superior position of the military was not the case in the United States where reduction of the force, in status as well as personnel, was the rule after any conflict. In addition, this experimentation with armaments and building of forces had a spiralling effect.

> The continental nations are compelled to keep large standing armies on foot, and great military resources prepared, from their apprehension of each other. As one power increases its military efficiency, whether by the invention of the new weapon, or by men and fortresses, the neighboring nations, as a means of self-preservation, are compelled to do likewise.

Delafield goes on to explain how the military art was in the hands of the nobility and monied class, and even the European monarchs were trained soldiers. "We should not be indifferent spectators of this perfection of the military art and its concentration in the command of the few,"[3] he warned. So long as American democratic principles were "antagonistic" to the European forms of government, "...we can have NO FRIENDS POLITICALLY in the governing powers of the Eastern World...."[4] The same "combination" put together to restrain the growing power of a neighbor could as easily be put together to restrain the growing influence of an expanding America, and her ideals.

> In this unprepared state, on our part, [referring to America's lack of military preparedness] several of the powers of Europe have steam transports and munitions, with fleets superior to our own, ready at any moment to throw on our coast, in no longer time than is

> necessary to steam across the Atlantic, disciplined armies that could land in six hours after anchoring, do us injury and cripple our resources to an extent that would require a long time to restore.[5]

At this point, Delafield went on to answer the question of the effect the Commission had on the country's military establishment, and to prophetically describe this nation's position in the several wars it would yet face.

> ...yet with a blind indifference, professing at the same time to be all powerful, our people neglect the many calls and statements of those they appoint to study this subject, leaving us at the mercy, in the first years of a conflict, of either of the naval and military powers of the Old World.[6]

Even that conflict that would tear at the internal foundation of the nation that errupted in the same year Delafield's report was published (1861), found the nation ill-prepared. It was not until well into the conflict that many of the "engines" seen in Europe, such as rifled cannon and artillery, were put to use here. It is also ironic that McClellan would face the same type of earthworks at Yorktown in a few years that he examined at Sebastopol. The most visible effect the Commission had on developments before the Civil War was the adoption of the McClellan saddle and the incorporation of many of McClellan's recommended changes in the reorganization of the United States cavalry.[7]

In bringing this work to a close, it may be of interest to see what became of the three officers after the

Commission did its work and returned home. Immediately upon his return from the European continent, it appears that Major Delafield was posted to "Fort Richmond, Harbor of New York", since that is where his letter to the Secretary of War was written from. Later, in 1860, his report on the Commission's itinerary was signed as "Colonel of Engineers, Superintendent of Military Academy" and was posted from West Point, New York.[8] During the Civil War, Delafield rose to the rank of brigadier general and served as Chief of Engineers from 1864 to his retirement in 1866 with a brevet of major general.[9]

As we have seen previously, Major Mordecai was first assigned to the War Office upon his return from Europe, then took command of Watervliet Arsenal.[10] In 1861, torn between his dedication to the army of the United States, to which he had dedicated so much of his life, and his native state of North Carolina, Mordecai resigned his commission and went to Mexico to sit out the brothers' war.

Of the three, Captain McClellan became the most well known. Shortly after writing his report of the Commission's work, he resigned his commission and became chief engineer and, shortly thereafter, vice-president of the Illinois Central Railroad. It was in this capacity, responsible for the business of the company, that he became acquainted with Abraham Lincoln, a practicing Springfield, Illinois lawyer, who occasionally provided his professional services to the

company. In August 1860, he resigned his position with the Illinois Central to become president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad. He held that post until the Civil War broke out and he returned to active service.[11]

At the outbreak of hostilities in 1861, McClellan, at the age of 34, was appointed major general of the Ohio Volunteers, and given command of the Department of the Ohio, consisting of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. After some rapid success in western Virginia against inferior odds, McClellan was commissioned major general in the regular army and, in November 1861, was given command of the armies of the United States. As such he created and trained the Army of the Potomac, but his indecisiveness and inability to move rapidly against Richmond brought dissatisfaction with his command and he was relieved in November 1862.[12]

In 1864 McClellan ran as the Democratic nominee against Abraham Lincoln and was defeated. He later served as Governor of New Jersey from 1878 to 1881. McClellan died at Orange, New Jersey, October 29, 1895.

The Crimean War was but a single event in American diplomatic and military history. Although that war is not a topic generally associated with United States history, events relating to that conflict had some significance in the diplomatic relations and military development of the nation.

The United States was not an isolationist "half-pint", as some historians and statesmen have portrayed her to be, but an aggressive, self-interest-seeking nation that used the great power conflicts to achieve its own ends. The conflict in Crimea, between the great powers, provided the backdrop for the United States to press for recognition of the rights of neutrals on the sea, and to nearly drag it into a conflict with Great Britain over the enlistment controversy.

Although the official policy of the United States was strict neutrality, private American citizens involved themselves in the conflict in the Crimea for profit and adventure. The single official involvement of U.S. citizens was the U.S. Military Commission sent to observe the conduct of the war.

In a time of rapid national expansion and minimum military manpower resources, the three-man Commission was sent to study the art of war as it was then being practiced in Europe. Sent in April 1855, the Commission studied fortifications, improved armaments, and organization of armies in an effort to identify ways to improve the effectiveness and capability of the United States Army in its role of defending the vast new land. Although a great deal of effort went into the Commission's work and reports on their findings, it should be remembered that McClellan's report was presented in 1857, Mordecai's in 1860, and Delafield's--the most comprehensive of the three--was not written until 1858 and 1860, and not

published until 1861. It is not surprising that so few of their findings and recommendations were implemented or even considered before the Civil War erupted some few months after the last report was published. When the bombardment of Fort Sumter began on 12 April 1861, the nation was no more prepared for war than ever.

NOTES

[1]Richard Weinert, "The Year McClellan Studied War in Europe," Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1963, p. 39.

[2]Colonel R. Delafield, Report on the Art of War in Europe, U.S. Congress, House, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, 1861, p. 1.

[3]Ibid., p. 2.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., p. 3.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Weinert, p. 41.

[8]Delafield, pp. 1 and XXIV.

[9]Weinert, p. 41.

[10]Major Alfred Mordecai, Military Commission to Europe in 1855 and 1856, U.S. Congress, Senate, 36th Congress, 1st Session, 1860, p. 3.

[11]G. S. Hillard, Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1864), pp. 81-82; a second source, Dunbar Rowland, ed., Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, His Letters, Papers and Speeches, Vol. II (New York: J. J. Little and Ives Co., 1923) N2, p. 220, indicates McClellan was president of the St. Louis and Cincinnati.

[12]Hilliard, pp. 86-133; Rowland, Vol. II, N2, p. 220.

[13]Ibid., Rowland.

APPENDIX A

THE SECRETARY OF WAR'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MILITARY COMMISSION

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, April* 2, 1855.

GENTLEMEN: You have been selected to form a commission to visit Europe, for the purpose of obtaining information with regard to the military service in general, and especially the practical working of the changes which have been introduced of late years into the military systems of the principal nations of Europe.

Some of the subjects to which it is peculiarly desirable to direct your attention may be indicated as follows:

The organization of armies and of the departments for furnishing supplies of all kinds to the troops, especially in field service. The manner of distributing supplies.

The fitting up of vessels for transporting men and horses, and the arrangements for embarking and disembarking them.

The medical and hospital arrangements, both in permanent hospitals and in the field. The kind of ambulances or other means used for transporting the sick and wounded.

The kind of clothing and camp equipage used for service in the field.

The kinds of arms, ammunition, and accouterments used in equipping troops for the various branches of service, and their adaptation to the purposes intended. In this respect, the arms and equipments of cavalry of all kinds will claim your particular attention.

The practical advantages and disadvantages attending the use of the various kinds of rifle arms which have been lately introduced extensively in European warfare.

The nature and efficiency of ordnance and ammunition employed for field and siege operations, and the practical effect of the late changes partially made in the French field artillery.

The construction of permanent fortifications, the arrangement of new systems of sea-coast and land defenses, and the kinds of ordnance used in the armament of them—the Lancaster gun, and other rifle cannon, if any are used.

The composition of trains for siege operations, the kind and quantity of ordnance, the engineering operations of a siege in all its branches, both of attack and defense.

The composition of bridge trains, kinds of boats, wagons, &c.

The construction of casemated forts, and the effects produced on them in attacks by land and water.

The use of camels for transportation, and their adaptation to cold and mountainous countries.

To accomplish the objects of your expedition most effectually in the shortest time, it appears to be advisable that you should proceed as soon as possible to the theater of war in the Crimea, for the purpose of observing the active operations in that quarter. You will then present yourselves to the commanders of the several armies and request from them such authority and facilities as they may be pleased to grant for enabling you to make the necessary observations and inquiries.

You may find it practicable to enter Sebastopol and to proceed through Russia to St. Petersburg, with the view of visiting the works and seeing the operations which may be carried on in the Baltic. Should it not be possible or advisable to enter Russia in this way, you may be able to accomplish the same object by passing through Austria and Prussia. In returning from Russia, you will have an opportunity of seeing the military establishments of Prussia, Austria, France, and England.

The arrangements of your journey must be regulated in a general measure by the state of affairs existing on your arrival in Europe and the information you may acquire there.

Letters are herewith furnished to you for our *Ministers in Europe*, requesting them to afford you the aid in their power in accomplishing the objects of your mission.

Funds for defraying the expenses of your journey are placed in the hands of Major Mordecai, who will disburse and account for them. You are authorized to use a portion of these funds in purchasing for this department new books, drawings, and patterns of arms and equipments, which you may consider of sufficient value in our service to warrant the expenditure.

Reserving until your return to the United States a full account of your expedition and the information you may obtain, you will report to the Secretary of War from time to time, as opportunity may offer, the progress of your journey, and remarks on the subjects within the scope of your instructions which you may wish to communicate.

All correspondence of this kind, proceeding either from the Commission jointly or from any member of it, will be forwarded, according to military usage and regulations, through the senior officer present. (Major Delafield was the senior member of the Commission.)

It is desirable that you should return home by the 1st of November, 1855. If you should find it essential for effecting the objects of your mission in a satisfactory manner to remain longer than that time, you will report the circumstances, so as to give time for an answer, in due season.

Reliance is placed on your judgment and discretion to conduct your movements in such a manner as to give no reasonable ground for suspicion or offense to the military or other government authorities with whom you may have intercourse.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Secretary of War.

Major R. DELAFIELD,
Major A. MORDECAI,
Captain G. B. MCCLELLAN,
United States Army.

APPENDIX B

DELAFIELD'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR

FORT RICHMOND, HARBOR OF NEW YORK,
August 11, 1856.

SIR: I desire now to lay before you a general outline of the notes and observations, with other information collected by me as a member of the Military Commission to the Crimea, &c., instituted by your special order of the 2d April, 1855, with the hope you may not be disappointed in the expectations then formed of deriving therefrom some advantages for our military service and general welfare of the country.

The contest that commenced, in 1854, between the principal military and naval powers of Europe, gave rise, during its progress, to the belief that the art of war had undergone some material changes since the days of Napoleon and Wellington, and that new principles of attack and defense had been resorted to, in the prolonged defense by the Russians of the land and sea fronts of Sebastopol, and in the great preparations made by the allies for reducing the sea-defenses of Cronstadt and Sebastopol.

On examination, this change will be found mainly in the increased magnitude of the engines of war, and the perfection to which they have been brought by the unceasing application of talent and skill to their improvement, accomplished by the accuracy and rapidity of workmanship by the machinery of the arsenals of the present day, and that few new principles have been introduced with much success in the late contest.

For a long period the continental powers had been occupied in preparing large quantities of munitions of war, on which they had bestowed all the skill and intelligence that could be commanded from the fruits of the various theoretical and practical seminaries, established in every kingdom. Like attention was given to the personal of their armies. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers, as well as the auxiliary branches of the profession, such as the medical, veterinary, transport, commissariat, ponton, topographical, engineer, and other branches of service, were, as a general rule, all provided with SPECIAL SCHOOLS of instruction, both theoretical and practical. To such an extent has it been carried on the continent, that the military profession is not only indispensable for the protection of the existing governments against each other's encroachments, but places that profession first in importance in the estimation of the sovereign power, taking rank and receiving honors the highest in the gift of the monarch to bestow upon a subject.

It is important we should understand this in connection with its bearing upon the welfare of our country in a political as well as military point of view. The continental nations are compelled to keep large standing armies on foot, and great military resources prepared, from their apprehension of each other. As one power increases its military efficiency, whether by the invention of a new weapon, or by men and fortresses, the neighboring nations, as a means of self-preservation, are compelled to do likewise. The tendency is thus constantly to increase; although clearly and well understood by the various governments to be impoverishing the

nation, by withdrawing so much industry from the soil, manufactures, and commerce, while it increases the expenses of the State, at the same time that it diminishes its ability to create wealth to fill its coffers.

We must for a long time to come look to this continued preparation in the art of war as an established fact, and study its consequences in our relations with the Eastern World. We must bear in mind, that so important is the military profession, or the art of self-defense, as it has now become, with the neighboring powers of Europe, that the youth of the nobles, as well as the princes of the reigning families, receive military educations. As a consequence, the reigning monarchs are professionally educated soldiers, with ability to judge understandingly of the merits of any improvements proposed in the art of war, and capable of commanding either as infantry, cavalry, or engineer officers, with a talent and skill equal to any of their generals, only surpassed by such as possess that genius with which nature alone gifts the mind.

The three Emperors of the continent at the present time, to wit: of Russia, Austria, and France, are unquestionably highly educated statesmen and soldiers. One of them is a writer, and inventor of military science and art. They are not mere instruments of royalty, controlled by counselors of state of superior intellect, but hold in their hands the power and resources of their respective nations, governed only by their best judgments and council of ministers of state.

This great preparation and resources for war exist, and must continue to exist, as a precautionary measure, with a tendency to increase by all that art and science can bring to its aid, directed by the minds of a few individuals, with power to apply it with all the celerity that singleness of purpose can effect, wheresoever the governing spirit may be influenced, either by interest, the blind infatuation and wickedness of the human mind, or self-defense.

We should not be indifferent spectators of this perfection of the military art and its concentration in command of the few. The moneyed interest, as a general rule, is in the hands of the nobles and aristocracy. Their welfare and happiness is that of the monarchy. Every principle upon which that form of government exists is antagonistical to our own. Every political letter, or friendly and social one, written from our country to an European, carries information of the privileges and rights of man and property, as here understood and practiced, entirely at variance with those governing the nations of Europe.

The foundation of their system, and the prosperity and happiness of the wealthy classes, is constantly warred upon by our individuality of thought, and its expression in the freedom of our press. It must not then be surprising that we can have NO FRIENDS POLITICALLY in the governing powers of the Eastern World, and it requires no stretch of the imagination to look forward to a combination of the powers of those antagonistic forms of government to attempt to check the growing influence that constantly, though slowly, tends to crush the ruling principle, and with it involve the governors, nobles, aristocracy, and monarchs in ruin. Their self-preservation must always cause them to look with anxiety and apprehension to our growth, and ere it becomes all powerful to combine in some way to protect themselves.

The peaceful arts are a counterpoise to the disturbance of amicable relations, yet they did not suffice to prevent the combination of several monarchies to restrain the growing power of one of their neighbors, and may have no stronger influence to prevent a combination against our Republic when its growth in like manner endangers their prosperity.

Our resources are unquestionably great, and equal to several of the powers of Europe combined, but our preparation in material, equipment, knowledge of the art of war, and other means of defense, is as limited and inefficient, as theirs is powerful and always ready.

As a nation, other than in resources and general intelligence of our people, we are without the elements of military knowledge and efficiency for sudden emergency; while no nation on earth can more certainly put itself in a condition to set any hostile force at defiance.

We possess a nucleus of military knowledge in the country barely sufficient for the wants of our army in time of peace, without facilities for practicing the arts of the several arms, or

means of forming, creating, or instructing any of the personnel than the officer. The auxiliary branches are not provided for. Our sea-coast defenses are not conducted with as much energy as an individual bestows in building a residence for his family; the latter, in many instances, expending more in a year on his dwelling than our people will authorize to be expended in the same time for the defense of a city. It is undeniable that of the number of guns needed for the defense of our sea-coast the nation does not contain, including the whole standing army, men enough that know how to fire hot and hollow shot to provide a single man for a sixth part of the guns.

In this unprepared state, on our part, several of the powers of Europe have steam transports and munitions, with fleets superior to our own, ready at any moment to throw on our coast, in no longer time than is necessary to steam across the Atlantic, disciplined armies that could land in six hours after anchoring, do us injury and cripple our resources to an extent that would require a long time to restore.

The late European contest has shown how rapidly the continental powers could march to the coast and embark detachments of from ten to twenty thousand disciplined troops in steam transports, accommodating a thousand men each, with supplies for a voyage equal to crossing to our shores; yet with a blind indifference, professing at the same time to be all powerful, our people neglect the many calls and statements of those they appoint to study this subject, leaving us at the mercy, in the first years of a conflict, of either of the naval and military powers of the Old World.

Viewing the subject in all its bearings, I am more impressed than ever with our comparative want of preparation and military knowledge in the country, and that the Secretary of War will do a great good service to the nation by increasing the matériel and munitions, means of defense, and the diffusion of military information in every possible way that our institutions will permit, without creating any more of a standing army than the growth of the country calls for, preparatory to that great struggle which sooner or later may be forced upon us, and to resist which, with our present means, we are comparatively unprepared.

With the hope that what it may be in my power to lay before you may conduce to such end, I herewith communicate the information collected by me under your instructions of the 2d April, 1855.

RICHARD DELAFIELD,
Major of Engineers.

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Secretary of War.

APPENDIX C

LIST OF BOOKS, DRAWINGS, MAPS, AND SPECIMENS BROUGHT BY THE COMMISSION

LIST OF BOOKS, DRAWINGS, ETC.,

OBTAINED BY THE COMMISSION IN EUROPE.

English Books.

Douglass on Naval Gunnery	1 volume.
Edinburgh Review, April, 1855	1
Queen's Regulations for the Army, and Addenda	2 volumes.
Fergusson's Fortification	1 vol. and atlas.
Cavalry Outpost Duty	1 volume.
Cavalry Regulations	1
Nolan's History and Tactics of Cavalry	1
Nolan's Cavalry Remount Horses	1
Quartermaster General's Instructions	1
Thackeray's Manual of Rifle Firing	1
Instructions for Musketry Firing	1
Platoon Exercise for Musket and Rifle	1
Pendergrast's Law for Officers of the Army	1
Memoir on Crimean Expedition, (translated from French)	1
The Malakoff, Inkerman, and Kilburn	1
Army List, 1856	1
Navy List, 1856	1
Reports of Sebastopol Committee of House of Commons	6 parts.
Report on the Army in the Crimea, and Appendix	2
Report on the Capitulation of Kars	1 volume.
Commissary General Filder's Letter	1
Letters of Lords Cardigan and Lucan	1
Report on Sandhurst Military School	1
Report of Small Arms Committee, and Index	2 parts.
Report of Commission on Manufacture of Ordnance on the Continent of Europe—Presented by Hon. Mr. Monsell	1 volume.
Report of Commission on Machinery in the United States—Presented by Hon. Mr. Monsell	1
Russel's Letters from the Crimea	1
Napoleon's New System of Field Artillery	1
Shirley on Transport of Cavalry	1
Cavalry Sword Exercise	1
General Orders of the Army in the East	1
Straith's Fortification	2 vol. and atlas.
Specification of a Fort on the Isle of Wight.	
Report on Barrack Accommodation	1 volume.
Report on the Paris Exposition of Industry	1
Duckett's Military Dictionary, (German and English)	1
Pamphlet on Ambulances	1
Guide Book of Germany	1
Guide Book of Russia	1
Guide Book of Greece and Turkey	1
Guide Book of Northern Italy	1
Guide Book of France	1

French Books.

Ordonnance de Cavalerie	3 volumes.
Service Intérieure des Troupes à Cheval	1 volume.

Siége de Bomarsund	1 volume.
Louis Napoléon—Manuel d'Artillerie	1
Vauchelle—Cours d'Administration	3 volumes.
Ordonnance sur le Service en Campagne	1 volume.
Instruction sur le tir du Fusil de la Garde Impériale	1
Bégin—Etudes sur le Service de Santé	1
Maillot et Puel—Aide-Mémoire Medico-legal de l'Officier de Santé	1
Des Plaies d'Armes à Feu	1
Boudin—Opérations Medicales de Recrutement	1
Saurel—Chirurgie Navale	1
Roubaud—Sur les Hôpitaux	1
Papillon—De la Ventilation Appliquée à l'Hygiéne Militaire	1
Boudin—Etudes sur le Chauffage, &c., des Édifices Publics	1
Annuaire Militaire, 1855	1
Système d'Ambulances	1
Boudin—Ventilation des Hôpitaux	1
Verdu—Mines de Guerre	1
Projet de tir des Carabines d'Infanterie	1
Instruction sur le tir des Chasseurs à Pied	1
Ordonnance sur le Service des Places	1
Ordonnance sur le Service Intérieur	1
Essais sur la Fortification Moderne	1 vol. and atlas.
Instruction sur le tir d'Artillerie	1 volume.
Instructions et Circulaires sur le Service des Subsistances	1
Mangin, Mémoire sur la Fortification Polygonale	1
Rapport sur l'École Polytechnique	1
Journal Militaire Officiel—Années 1851, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1855	9 volumes.
Maurice de Sellon—Etudes sur les Fortresses de Mayence et Ulm	1 vol. and atlas.
Défense Nationale de l'Angleterre	1 volume.
Ponts de Chevalets	1
Notice sur les Fusées	1
Examen du Système de Cavalli	1
Mémoire sur Rastadt	1 vol. and atlas.
Mémorial de l'Engénieur	1 vol. and atlas.
Mémorial de l'Officier du Génie—Tomes 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, et Table de Matières	6 volumes.
Baucher—Oeuvres Completes, Equitation, &c.	1 volume.
Curmieu—Science Hippique	1
D'Aidéguier—Tactique de Cavalerie	1
Lamoriciére—Rapport sur les Haras	1
Carriére—Force Militaire de l'Autriche	1
Guillot—Legislation et Administration Militaires	1
Paixhans—Constitution Militaire de la France	1
Duparcq—Etudes sur la Prusse	1
Bonet Villaumez—Batailles de Terre and de Mer	1
Robert—Siéges Remarquables	1
Duparcq—Armées des Puissances engagées dans la question de l'Orient	1
Laisné—Aide-Mémoire du Génie	1
Mémorial d'Artillerie—Tomes 5, 6, 7, et atlas	4 volumes.
Louis Napoléon—Etudes sur l'Artillerie	2
Programme de l'Enseignement pour l'Ecole Polytechnique	1 volume.
Emy—Affuts de Mortiers, &c.—Lithographie	1
Bouches à Feu en bronse. do	1
Réglement sur les Manœuvres d'Artillerie, 1847	1
Mémorial de l'Officier d'Infanterie and de Cavalerie	1
Bibliothéque du Sous Officier	1
De Rouvre—Aide-Mémoire d'Etat Major	1
Haillot—Equipages de Ponts	1 vol. and atlas
Birago do	1 volume.
Cavalli do	1
Andréossy—Opérations des Pontonniers Français	1
Manuel Réglementaire de l'École d'Etat Major	1
D'Arenberg—Défense des Places	1
Zacconi—Fortification	1 vol. and atlas.

Grivel—La Marine Dans l'Attaque des Places	1 volume.
Navez—Application de l'Électricité à la Mesure de la Vitesse des Projectiles	1
Expériences de Bapaume—Mines, &c.	1
Zoller—Eprouvette Portative	1 volume.
Martin de Brettes—Projet de Chronographe	1
La Fay—Aide-Mémoire de l'Artillerie Navale	1
Mangeot—Traité du Fusil de Chasse	1
Chertier—Feux d'Artifices	1
Documents Relatifs au Coton Détonant	1
Remond—Armes à Feu Portatives	1
Anquetil—Pistolets *Tournants*	1
Cours Abrégé d'Artifices	1 vol. and atlas.
Bormann—Sur les Shrapnels	1 volume.
Delobel—Révue de Technologie Militaire	2 volumes.
Decker—Experiences sur les Shrapnels	1 volume.
De Massas—Mémoire sur les Cuivres, &c	1
Experiences d'Artillerie, faites à L'Orient	1
Marion—Receuil des Bouches à feu les plus remarquables—125 planches et texte.	
Bismark—Tactique de Cavalerie	1
Emploi de la Cavalerie à la Guerre	1
Saint Ange—Cours d'Hippologie	2 volumes.
Cardini—Dictionnaire d'Hippiatrique	2
Mussot—Commentaires sur l'Equitation	1 volume.
Guérin—Ecole de Cavalerie au Manège	1
D'Aure—Cours d'Equitation Militaire	1
Livret du Soldat d'Infanterie, de Chasseurs à Pied, de Cavalerie, d'Artillerie	4 volumes.
D'Arboval—Dictionnaire de Médecine et de Chirurgie Vétérinaires	6 vols. and atlas.
Instruction en Natation	1 volume.
Escrime à la Baionnette	1
Favé—Cours à Vincennes	1
Haxthausen—Etudes sur la Russie, (translated from the German)	3 volumes.
Force Militaire de la Russie, (translated from the German)	1 volume.
Paskiewitch—Prise de Varsovie	1
Teliakoffski—Fortification permanente, (translated from the Russian)	1 vol. and atlas.
Burg—Dessin Géometrique	2 volumes.
Zastrow—Mémoire sur la Fortification, traduit par De Sellon	1 volume.
Deuxième Mémoire sur l'Expédition en Crimée	1
Martin des Brettes—Etudes sur les Appareils Electro-Maguétiques	1
Artifices Eclairantes	1
Fonton—La Russie en Asie Mineure	1 vol. and atlas.
Manuel du Commis au Vivres	1 volume.
Gillion—Cours sur les Armes Portatives	1
Instruction sur le Matériel de l'Artillerie Belge	1
Reglement sur les Exercises de l'Artillerie Belge	1
Thierry—Mémoire sur le Chevalet Belge	1
Dessins du Matériel de l'Artillerie Belge—*Presented by the Minister of War.*	
Mémoria Sobre la Fabrica de Armas, Liége, (in Spanish)	1
Memorial de Ingenieros, (Spanish—from 1846 to 1855.)	
Le Blanc—Atlas Vétérinaire	1
Boulay et Raynal—Dictionnaire Vétérinaire	1
Cours de Maréchalerie	1
Dilwart—Medecine Vétérinaire	1
Jacquinot de Presle—Cours d'Art Militaire	1
Block—Dictionnaire de l'Administration	10 parts.
Mémoires sur l'Hygiénie Vétérinaire	6 volumes.
Emy—Fabrication des Armes Portatives, lithog.	1 volume.
Prieux—Manuel de l'Artificier	1
Bellencontre—Tir à Richochet, lithog.	1
Artifices de Guerre de la Marine, lithog.	2 volumes.
Poncelet—Cours de Mécanique Appliquée, lithog.	1 volume.
Jourjon—Cours d'Art Militaire, (fortification,) lithog.	1
Ardant—Cours de Constructions, lithog.	1
Culman—Sur les Chaux et Mortiers, lithog.	1

Cours de l'École Polytechnique, lithog., viz:	
Cours de Physique	2 volumes.
Sommaire des Cours de Physique	1 volume.
Cours d'Astronomie et de Géodésie	1
Cours d'Art Militaire	1
Cours de Mecanique et de Machines	1
Cours de Topographie	1
Mémoire sur le Tir Convergent des Vaisseaux	1
Chevet—Système de Musique Vocale	1
Nouvelles Annales de Constructions, 1855, 1856	24 numbers.
Cours de Gymnastique	1 vol. and atlas.
Cours de Commandes	1 volume.

German Books.

Prussia.

Kameke—Description and Drawings of the Prussian Artillery	Text and plates.
Description and Drawings of the New Field Artillery of 1842	1 vol. and plates.
Hoffman—Course of Instruction for Officers, on Ordnance and Small Arms	1 volume.
Diobeck—Engineers' Aide-Mémoire	1
Six Memoirs on the Manufacture of Gunpowder, (translated from the French)	1
Wittich's Forufication	1
Schwinck's Fortification	1
Prussian Army List	1
Prussian Arucles of War, (in French)	1
Regulations for the Government of Hospitals	1
Handbook for Hospital Assistants	1
Schiffer—Circulars of the Surgeon General	2 volumes.
Bernhardi—Medical Service in the Field	1 volume.
Graf—Artillery Horse Equipments	1
Handbook of Cavalry Field Service	1
Marus—Aide-Mémoire for Cavalry	1
Buschbeck—Field Pocket-book	1
Regulations for the Clothing of the Troops	1
Infantry Tactics	1
Cavalry Tactics	1
Fleck—Punishments by Courts-Martial	1
Friccins—Military Laws from 1835 to 1850.	
Busch and Hoffman—Pyrotechny	1
Seidler—On Equitation	1
On Breaking Bad Horses	1
Kameke—On Percussion Arms	1
Kletke—Explanation of Arucles of War	1
On Military Punishment	1
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