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THE MYTH OF OMNISCIENT CYBERNETICS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

THOMAS B. GIBONEY, CPT(P), USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1972

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This study attempted to determine a command and control pattern of the NCA to the tactical commander during direct and rapid military intervention due to a crisis. A case study was made of five crises: Congo-1964, Son Tay Raid-1970, Mayaguez Incident-1975, Operation Paul Bunyan-1976 (Korean tree cutting incident) and the Iran Raid-1980. A comparison of the preferred solution developed from the predetermined apparatus (operational implementation) and the actual command and control of men and organizations of men (cybernetics) of each case developed a cybernetic pattern.

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The NCA perceives it has "omniscient cybernetics" enabling it to effectively and efficiently control operations of any U.S. military force anywhere in the world. Omniscient cybernetics is a defective myth. During a direct and rapid military intervention in response to a crisis the increased involvement of the higher levels of command in tactical planning and execution severely lowered the chances of success of the operation. Conversely, the closer the similarity between the system, operational implementation, and the process, cybernetics, the greater chances of success. Three paramount ingredients narrow the gap and enhance success: the principle of unity of command, the principle of simplicity and <u>coup d'oeil</u>.

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Name of candidate Thomas B. Giboney

Title of thesis   The Myth of Omniscient Cybernetics

Approved by:

_____ , Thesis Committee Chairman
LTC E. C. Ray, M.B.A.

_____ , Member, Graduate Faculty
MAJ D. F. Borresen, M.A.

_____ , Member, Consulting Faculty
COL W. B. Eberhard, PhD

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ABSTRACT

THE MYTH OF OMNISCIENT CYBERNETICS, by CPT(P) Thomas B. Giboney, USA, 131 pages.

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THE MYTH OF OMNISCIENT CYBERNETICS

Executive Summary

The United States has militarily responded to over two hundred crises within the last three decades. The crises are external, unanticipated threats to important values with restricted decision times. However, only a few crises have resulted in direct and rapid military intervention with the anticipation of hostile fire. The National Command Authority has exercised its legal authority and responsibility during a crisis by micro-management to the tactical commander in the field.

Crisis management must be studied as the system: how the crisis should be solved, and the process: how the crisis was actually solved. Operational implementation is the predetermined apparatus of standard operation procedures, programs, roles and equipment. They can be grouped and studied as Command, Control and Communications. But the actual use of the apparatus is the cybernetic process.

Cybernetics - communication and control of men and organizations of men - is the actual resolution of the crisis. Cybernetics is an encompassing science accompanying the electronic age. The U.S. military does not have a definition of cybernetics while the U.S.S.R. presents cybernetics as a paramount concept for modern warfare. The battlefield has been immutably altered by technology. Authority and responsibility at all levels has been disturbed and distorted. Cybernetics is the key framework for evaluation of military solutions to crisis management.

What is the cybernetic pattern of crisis management by the National Command Authority during a direct and rapid military intervention? The NCA perceives it has "omniscient cybernetics" enabling it to effectively and efficiently command and control operations of any U.S. military force anywhere in the world. The myth of omniscient cybernetics has very real consequences regardless of its original validity. Prophecies based on initial perceptions can produce conditions which really exist. Men will react with real behavior.

Direct command and control of persons absent from the battlefield has been examined and forewarned by ancient and contemporary military philosophers: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, S.L.A. Marshall. Recent articles have emotionally responded to omniscient cybernetics. This thesis, a comparative analysis and case study of Congo Rescue-1964, Son Tay Raid-1970, Mayaguez Incident-1975, Operation Paul Bunyan-1976 (Korean tree cutting incident) and the Iran Riad-1980 developed a cybernetic pattern.

Omniscient cybernetics is a defective myth. During a direct and rapid military intervention in response to a crisis the increased involvement of the higher levels of command in tactical planning and execution severely lowered the chances of success of the operation. When the top levels of command became inordinately involved as the crisis became the "only game in town," there was a greater propensity for failure.

The closer the similarity between the system, operational implementation, and the process, cybernetics, the greater chances of success. Three paramount ingredients narrow the gap and enhance success: the principle of unity of command, the principle of simplicity and coup d'oeil. Unity of command assures responsibility is commensurate with authority and establishes boundaries for the unique roles of the various actors

throughout the chain of command. Simplicity enhances the plan's flexibility to respond against unknowns of the enemy and situation and clarity of purpose when developed under severe time constraints. The coup d'oeil is the critical leverage available only to the field commander. It is the sense of the battlefield with the inherent friction of war. This sense is the intuition gained by professional experience and study. This can only be felt, evaluated and acted upon by the field commander; the qualities of battle cannot be understood nor relayed through the electronic medium to air conditioned conference rooms of the CINC's, Pentagon, or White House. The coup d'oeil and the personal dynamics of leadership of the field commander can successfully shape the battlefield and the military resolution of the crisis.

Direct and rapid military intervention during a crisis has met with success in the post-World War II period. The principles and theories of ancient and modern military philosophers should not be abandoned for technological novelties. The vast improvements in electronics are only tools to enhance the system and insure an efficient and effective cybernetic process. Without rational analysis of the cybernetic process, the misapplied lessons of history may be more harmful than an ignorance of the past.

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GENERAL

Introduction

Crises have been a recurring phenomenon for the United States since World War II. Over two hundred crises have required U.S. military action ranging from prepositioning of forces and supplies to direct intervention. The top levels of civilian government have participated in crisis management because of the high threat to national values. The National Command Authorities (the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense) have only rarely had to exercise command and control during a direct and rapid military intervention as a response to a crisis. They have done so with the unprecedented ability to communicate directly and immediately with the military field commander at the crisis focus.

An entirely new system and process of crisis management has evolved out of the technological revolutions since World War II. Operational implementation and cybernetics are, respectively, the system: how the crisis should be solved, and the process: how the crisis was actually solved. However, a pattern of the system and process has not been developed sufficiently from analyses of the few incidents of direct and rapid military intervention.[1]

One of the hypotheses of modern crisis management is that the National Command Authorities perceive they have the capability of "omniscient cybernetics" - to effectively and efficiently see and direct the tactical battle anywhere on the face of the earth.

The myth of omniscient cybernetics has very real consequences regardless of its original validity. Prophecies based on initial perceptions can produce conditions which really exist. Men will react with real behavior.[2] But the ability to overcome spatial and temporal limitations by modern communications may violate the principle of sensing the battlefield, the coup d'oeil, so frequently enumerated by military philosophers such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and S.L.A. Marshall.[3]

A pattern must be developed to assist in the success of future military interventions during a crisis. The misapplied lessons of history may be more dangerous than an ignorance of the past.

Thesis Question

What is the cybernetic pattern of crisis management by the National Command Authority during a direct and rapid military intervention?

Scope, Limitations and Assumptions

This thesis encompassed a selected survey of five U.S. crises from the post-Korean War period through the conclusion of the Iranian Raid, April 1980. There have been numerous crises requiring military responses during this time period. The Brookings Institution listed 215 political uses of military forces during crises between 1949 and 1976 by the United States.[4] The vast majority of uses of military forces did not require direct intervention at the tactical level. Examples of military responses included the prepositioning of supplies, advanced altering of forces, and/or a show of force. Tactical confrontations were rare.

The five surveyed crises involving direct and rapid military intervention were the Congo, 1964; Son Tay Raid, 1970; Mayaguez, 1975; Operation Paul Bunyan, 1976 (Korean tree cutting incident); and the

Iranian Raid, 1980. The National Command Authority exercised direct op-
erational implementation through modern cybernetics in each incident.[5]
The exchange of hostile combat fire was anticipated.

This thesis was limited to unclassified material. Many pertinent
publications are still classified. To incorporate classified material
would severely restrict the use and distribution of this thesis, in part
or whole. The use of unclassified sources in lieu of classified material
did not weaken this investigation. Public sources contain approximately
the same information as classified documents. Public information pro-
vided accuracy to the degree required to describe the pattern of modern
cybernetics during crisis management.

Modern cybernetics involves a large volume of verbal transactions
between levels of authority, both in the conference room and over elec-
tronic communication equipment. Instant communications may not be docu-
mented and conversations that are documented often do not include verba-
tim transcripts. Accuracy is degraded by time, even if the lapse is only
a few hours.[6]

Crisis management is not a game of solitaire. The United States'
view of a crisis involving direct and rapid military intervention is only
one side of a two-sided scenario. The United States' antagonists are
closed societies. Our country's perceptions of their actions are as true
and factual as our honesty, perception, and personal bias will allow.
The United States' truths could be totally invalidated by the opposition's
actual physical situation, tactical execution or strategic aims. For
example, the disclosure of the Allied code breaking successes during
World War II may require a total reevaluation of the conduct of US
strategy and tactics during that conflict. All free world public, private

and governmental records of the surveyed crises are conjectures until the total disclosure of both sides.[7]

There is no such thing as an intrinsically good or bad system or technology. The relative merit of a system is determined by what we consciously or unconsciously do with a system balanced against our anticipated outcomes. Sharpened metal has given civilization the Statue of David and the Pieta while it has also supplied swords of slaughter. The current use of modern communications is no different.[8]

Definition

Basic definitions must be presented to adequately understand and develop the thesis question.

Strategy is the combined political, economic, psychological and military power of a nation during war and peace. It is used by the national leaders as a means of securing national goals and ideals. In ancient times the sovereign was responsible for the development of strategy. Within modern democracies the elected civilian authorities are responsible for strategy. Usually civilian authorities in a democracy will seek military advice, but they are not required to follow it.[9]

Tactics is the art of handling troops in the presence of the enemy for immediate objectives. In ancient times this was done at the range of a length of a sword. Modern tactics have increased the range of the killing zone between opposing forces. But the basic principle of the definition remains unchanged.[10]

A common error is the failure to distinguish between strategy and tactics. Both terms are loosely used in and outside the military. Strategy tends to denote the higher levels of battle and tactics the lower level. Tactics is concerned with doing the job right and strategy is

concerned with doing the right job.[11] Within the context of this thesis, strategy will be considered the responsibility of the National Command Authority. Tactics is the responsibility of the field commander during direct military intervention.

Cybernetics is the process of communications and control of men and organizations comprised of men in actual operation in complex environments.[12] There is no U.S. military definition of cybernetics. The U.S.S.R. does have an official definition of military cybernetics which presents it as a paramount concept for modern warfare:

> Military cybernetics deals with the structure and laws of operations of systems for the control of troops, weapons and also defines the tactio-technical requirements which the technical equipment of such systems must meet.[13] (emphasis added)

It is the process that serves as the conduit between national strategy and military tactics during our surveyed crises.

Operational implementation is the predetermined apparatus of standard operation procedures, programs, roles and equipment. It is divided into (1) command, the roles of the Commander in Chief and field commander, (2) control, plans, available forces and (3) communications, technical capabilities, use.[14] It is the system established to solve a crisis.

A crisis is an external, unanticipated threat to important values with restricted decision time.[15] A crisis may be the result of a commission or omission of strategy, or it may have developed in a strategic void.[16] It is the event to be analyzed.

The National Command Authority (NCA) is designated by the legal statutes of the United States.[17] It is the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the nation's highest

military officials, are not a part of the NCA but may be involved in the execution of the general and specific desires and orders of the NCA.

A <u>field commander</u> is the lawfully designated military officer in charge of forces. He may assign tasks to his forces to accomplish his assigned mission.[18] He commands and controls all forces at the tactical focus of the direct and rapid military intervention.

Methodology

As the United States assumed the mantle of world leadership at the end of World War II, the U.S. government developed a large and complex civilian and military bureaucracy to handle domestic and foreign affairs. Studies have been conducted to analyze the decisionmaking and policy development of the U.S. government. Initially, the rational or analytical paradigm was used. The analytical paradigm is based upon the assumption that the decisionmakers understand the problem in its total complexity. The decisionmakers will consider the full range of possible outcomes of all courses of action. All information is accurate and will be used to make their judgements. Finally, elaborate and detailed calculations can be made for the optimum outcome. However, past U.S. government performance with complex decisions, procedures and varied outcomes has not fully supported the analytical paradigm.[19]

Contemporary studies have contested the analytical paradigm and proposed new forms of viewing decisionmaking, policy formulation and implementation. <u>The Nerves of Government</u> (1963), by Karl W. Deutsch, was a significant initial study of complicated decisionmaking through the large government bureaucracy.[20] The decisionmaking primer for the nuclear age is Graham T. Allison's <u>Essence of Decision</u> (1971). Allison's Model I, the analytical approach, failed to accurately describe the events of the

Cuban missile crisis. Models II and III were the Operational Process and the Bureaucratic Politics. These two models better described the milieu of decisionmaking and policy enforcement. Allison's study was not a conclusion but a commencement for future studies in the new arena of political science. "We shall have to find ways of thinking harder about the problem of 'implementation,' that is, the path between preferred solution and actual performance of government."[21] "What we need is a new kind of 'case study' done with theoretical alertness to the range of factors identified by Models I, II, and III (and others) on the basis of which to begin refining and testing propositions and models."[22]

John D. Steinbruner's The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (1974) expanded into new dimensions of political analysis based upon Allison's models. The analytical paradigm was incomplete in describing the politics of nuclear sharing, 1956-1964. Instead, the cybernetic paradigm and cognitive process gave a better picture of inputs, processes and outcomes. The cybernetic paradigm is based upon the assumption of uncertainty control. The decisionmaker is facing a world of endless knowns and unknowns. The cybernetic paradigm possesses procedures for processing information which in fact generate decisions and outcomes. Cybernetics is potentially useful in understanding how men and organizations actually operate in complex environments. The cognitive process places more emphasis on the decisionmakers' ability to process information prior to and independent of conscious decision. The mind possesses logical operations of considerable power to augment the cybernetic process.[23]

The methodology of this thesis was a comparative case study based upon the cybernetic process of Steinbruner and Models II and III of

Allison. It builds a micro-analysis of separate crisis into a comparison of multiple crises. It was done in three phases. Initially, common definitions of the new concepts were established (Chapter 1). The historical development of cybernetics and operational implementation assisted in understanding the rationale for current use during analysis of crisis management (Chapter 2). Each surveyed crisis was presented with a synopsis, analysis of cybernetics and outcome (Chapter 3). Finally, comparative analysis of the five crises established a cybernetic pattern (Chapter 4). A heuristic paradigm was constructed to assist the continuing search for solutions during crisis management.

The three elements of crisis management--event, system and process--form a simple model. The model describes the thesis question more concisely. This tends to make the overall thesis more comprehensible. It helps reveal the pattern of cybernetics by examining each crisis and as a framework for comparative analysis.

```
                            System
          \  _____
 Event     |
           |                Process
           |
           |
```

This simple model translates further into the specific definitions of the thesis question.

```
                  Operational Implementation
           _____
          |
Crisis #1 |
Crisis #2 |
Crisis #3 |              Cybernetics
Crisis #4 |
Crisis #5 |
          |
```

However, an objective analysis of crisis management cannot be performed by using this model. Further resolution of detail is required.

Operational implementation was divided into its three distinct elements: command, control and communications. Each are parts of the current predetermined apparatus. But they are static elements. In order to study the dynamic events, specific questions of the system were asked. These questions provided the finite resolution of the individual elements as the questions inquired into observable, specific actions. Answers to the questions illustrated the cybernetic performance of the system against its anticipated or prescribed behavior.

Command

Was the chain of command clearly established and understood by all forces during the direct and rapid military intervention?

Was the field commander able to competently execute command and control over all assigned forces located at the tactical site?

Control

Was the field commander an essential member of the planning process?

Was the ground tactical plan of the field commander the focus for development of the overall plan, to include deployment, training and selection of all combat, combat service and combat service support forces?

Communication

Did command elements higher than the field commander refrain from direct contact with the field commander or other forces at the tactical site during the execution of the military intervention?

The outcome of each crisis was added to complete the framework of the model. Each crisis used direct and rapid military intervention to accomplish a specific mission. The optimum criterion for success would be accomplishment of the assigned military mission without casualties, friendly or enemy.[24] Failure would be anything less. But these are too idealistic. Both success and failure are subject to degrees in the real world. A third catalogue, a draw, is possible. The outcome of each crisis

was evaluated in terms of its assigned mission and its casualties - the human price.

The model is complete:

Operational Implementation   Outcome

	Command	Control	Communication	Success	Draw	Failure
Crisis #1						
Crisis #2						
Crisis #3		Cybernetics				
Crisis #4						
Crisis #5						

Figure 1-1

Cybernetic Analysis Model

Source: Author

Final analyses cannot hold up to rigorous scientific standards. A definitive, verifiable series of experiments in crisis management cannot be conducted. There are limits of evidence and proximate cause.[25] However, a "Scotch verdict" is attainable by the case study. In the legal system of Scotland there is a choice between guilty and not guilty-- that is: "not proven." The jury can believe the prosecution but evidence has not met the legal requirement of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Opponents will find analyses too plausible to argue it false.[26]

CHAPTER 1

NOTES

[1]Graham T. Allison, <u>Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis</u> (1971), 273, began an excellent analysis of a single event using three models. He acknowledged the need for a new kind of "case study" to refine and test new propositions and models. More recent analyses have been too broad: Robert B. Mahoney, "Analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Crisis Management Experiences" (1979), Leo A. Hazlewood and John T. Hayes "Planning For Problems In Crisis Management" (1976) and Richard Ned Lebow <u>Between Peace and War, The Nature of International Crisis</u> (1981), or too narrow: Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane, <u>Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decisionmaking in the Mayaguez and Korea Confrontations</u> (1978).

[2]Harry G. Summers, Jr. <u>On Strategy: The Vietnam War In Context</u> (1981), 38.

[3]Theodore Ropp, <u>War In The Modern World</u> (1959), 52: Frederick the Great described the skill of coup d'oeil as to conceive in a moment all the myriad of details of the battlefield and, from a hundred possible different orders, issue the best one to defeat the enemy. This skill is arcane to the Profession of Arms.
Sun Tzu, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, <u>The Art of War</u> (1963), 64, 81.
Carl von Clausewitz, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret <u>On War</u> (1976), 177-8.
S.L.A. Marshall <u>Men Against Fire - The Problem of Battle Command in Future War</u> (1947), 100-122.

[4]Guy J. Parker, <u>Military Implications of a Possible World Order Crisis in the 1980s</u> (1977), 86-87.

[5]Robert B. Adams, et al, "Command and Control Systems Evaluation and Management in DOD" (US Army War College, 31 May 1974), 30-31.

[6]Head, <u>Crisis Resolution</u>, 29, 95.
Ole R. Holsti, <u>Crisis, Escalation, War</u> (1972), 42-43.
Russell F. Weigley, "General Dwight D. Eisenhower," S.L.A. Marshall Lecture at the USACGSC, 8 Feb 1983.

[7]Mahoney, "Analysis of Crisis Management," 1-5.
Harold Deutsch, "ULTRA" and "Ludendorff", S.L.A. Marshall Lecture delivered at the USACGSC, 18 Jan 1983.

[8]Head, Crisis Resolution 47.
Herman Kahn, The Coming Boom (1982), 46.
Herbert A. Simon was awarded the 1978 Nobel Prize for his work in decisionmaking: "Anything as revolutionary as the computer is bound to take a long time before we understand its implications." In Barbara Ettorre, editor, "Faces Behind the Figures," Forbes (20 Dec 1982), 150.

[9]Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1979), 217, 228, 329. The US military breaks down the overall definition of strategy as presented in this paper into two distinct subgroups: National strategy and military strategy. The difference is the elimination of military forces from strategy to form national strategy; and military forces exclusively comprising military strategy.
U.S. Army, Field Manual - Operations, FM 100-5 (1982), 2-3.
Lawrence B. Tatum, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Policy Formulation," Air University Review (May-June, July-August 1966) 11-20, 40-45.
William O. Staudemaier, "Strategy" lecture delivered at the USACGSC 14 April 1983.

[10]Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary, 343.
Clausewitz, On War, (1976), 128.
John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme (1977).
Wallace P. Franz, "The Character of Modern War: Theory, Doctrine, Practice at the Operational Level" (Strategic Studies Institute, 1981), 10.

[11]Dennis M. Drew, "Strategy Process and Principles: Back to the Basics," Air University Review (May-June 1980), 40.

[12]Dirk Hanson, The New Alchemists (1982), 51.
Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (1963), 76.

[13]William A. Stofft, David M. Glante, and Phillip W. Childress, editors, War and Doctrine (1982), 445. Reprinted from the USSR Dictionary of Basic Terms.

[14]Head, Crisis Resolution, 40-41.

[15]Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War, p. 9.
Lawrence S. Falkowski, Presidents, Secretary of State, and Crises in U.S. Foreign Relations: A Model and Predictive Analysis (1978), 55.
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Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights From Behavioral Research (1972), 13.
Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War, The Nature of International Crisis (1981), 10-12.

[16]Lebow, Between Peace and War, 93-97.

[17]John L. Brisbee, "Command Line For Combat Forces," Defense/81, (August 1981), 11-12.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary, 227.
Russel F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1967), 493-495.

[18] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary, 73, 341.

[19] Allison, Essence of Decision, 246-263.
    John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (1974), 4-12, 25-46.

[20] Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, (1963).

[21] Allison, Essence of Decision, 267-8.

[22] Ibid., 273.

[23] Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory, 13-21, 47-139: Further cybernetic analysis of governmental systems, specifically nuclear deterrence, can be found in Steinbruner's National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability (1980) and "Nuclear Decapitation" Foreign Review (Winter 1981-82), 16-28.

[24] Roderick Lenahan, "Handling the Non-War Crisis" Defense/82 (December 1982), 10.

[25] Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making (1977), 3-44.
    Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory, 9-11: The paradigm of rational choice is less powerful than those of natural science but as equally effective in providing a basic framework. Observable and verifiable theories and models may be developed from a paradigm although the paradigm cannot be validated by deductive scientific investigation.

[26] Kahn, The Coming Boom, 19-21.
    Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, 14: No knowable object can be radically unique as it could be neither observed nor recorded. Everything should be modeled and rational investigation would be precise and not a "Scotch verdict."

CHAPTER 2

THE LINEAGE OF CYBERNETICS AND OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

General

Tracing the history of cybernetics and operational implementation will assist in the understanding the rationale for their use during analysis of modern crisis management. It is generally understood that technology: satellites, computers, improved radios, have dramatically altered the command and control of the battlefield. Less understood is the overall effect in the balance due to this new electronic technology between authority and responsibility for strategy and tactics from the National Command Authorities to the field commander. The simple model of the methodology will use cybernetics and operational implementation to develop the pattern of direct and rapid military intervention in response to a crisis by the National Command Authority.

Cybernetics - the process of communication and control of men and organizations of men - is the linchpin between strategic aims and tactical executions. Before antiquity the small size of tribes, villages and city-states plus the immense difficulty in overcoming distance and time constraints forced the union of strategy and tactics. As exercised by the leader or sovereign, strategy and tactics were one in the same.

STRATEGY =

TACTICS

14

As vast empires grew, strategy and tactics were separated due to the sheer distances involved and the lack of the ability of the sovereign to be at all possible trouble spots. Strategy became a political art that involved leading the body politic as well as managing the myriad resources of the state. Immediate tactical control was impossible. Cybernetics was used by the sovereign to control his military captains at the tactical battlefield.

The collapse of the vast empires of Egypt, Persia, Rome and China and the return to relatively small nations forced the union of strategy and tactics. Once again the sovereign could simultaneously exercise absolute domain over strategy and tactics.

The Twentieth Century brought the advent of electronics, a new medium of information exchange that would revolutionize the world at peace and war. The worldwide distances that would normally insure the separation of strategy and tactics was compressed by the use of electronics. The world's perspective was to leap from allowing continents to talk to each other to a man on earth talking to astronauts on the moon. Militarily "omniscient cybernetics" was perceived as a reality by the time of the Korean War. The National Command Authority could talk to anybody on the earth. Strategy and tactics were blurred.

Figure 2-1

Omniscient Cybernetics

Source: Author

Operational implementation describes the system of crisis man-
agement that allows the National Command Authority to direct the detailed
operations of a military commander during a crisis.   It was designed as a
response to the fear of expansion of local conflict into nuclear holo-
caust.   Under President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara, a
standard planning system was developed: The Joint Operation Planning
System.   It provided a flexible and controlled response to a variety of
political and military contingencies.

Crisis responses are organizational outputs.   The desires of the
National Command Authority must be processed through the organizational
structure.   The paradigm of organizational process must be further re-
fined for successful rational analysis.   Operational implementation is
the predetermined apparatus of standard operating procedures, programs,
roles and equipment.   It can be more effectively grouped and studied as
Command, Control and Communications.

Cybernetics

Cybernetics, from the Greek kybernetes for steersman, is com-
munication and control in any organization.   Cybernetics was developed
as a concept to study ballistics, machines and messages for the scientific

contribution to World War II. Information was presented in precise mathematical terms. Practical cybernetics combined with the new vacuum tube technology to make the large Project COLOSSUS computer that cracked the supersecret German cryptographic ENIGMA.[1] In the post-war period, the use of cybernetics as a framework for precise description and prescription rapidly expanded into the many fields of health, business and government.

The military has always practiced cybernetics. In ancient history, groups of men were hastily organized into fighters and controlled by tribal and spiritual power.[2] Communication was limited to voice, horns and wearing apparel. Tactics was rather simple: collision of armed men.[3] Tactical battles were a line-of-sight death dance. The social, religious, economic, and political evolution to city-states and nations promoted the expansion of battle from a contest of individuals into combat of large formations. A new concept of fighting had to be developed for the successful conduct of a war that was fought simultaneously on multiple, extended fronts. Strategy evolved apart from tactics. Strategy became the combined political, economic, psychological and military power of a nation during war and peace to achieve national objectives. The sophisticated ancient strategy of the Roman Empire would rival the best imagination and skills of modern political scientists, statesmen, and diplomats.[4] But a brilliant strategy could be invalidated by a single critical tactical defeat. Communications and control were needed between strategic aims and tactical battles. The sovereign could not always be physically present at all tactical battles, and ancient technology did not permit omniscient cybernetics. The coordination for strategy and tactics had to be articulated. Military theorists attempted to resolve the dichotomy of centralized control and decentralized execution by the use of precise cybernetics.

In the 3d-4th Century BC Sun Tzu developed a total theory for war beyond the physical clash of armed forces. Armed force was the final and ultimate arbiter of interstate conflict after the exhaustion of all other elements of national strategy. States would have separate and precise strategic and tactical goals during war.[5] Each arena required different skills essential for success.[6] These different skills were interdependent and had to be completely coordinated. The key to the success of the war was the coordination of strategic and tactical policies between the national leader and the tactical generals. A field commander was not indiscriminately directed upon the enemy. First, the sovereign selected the appropriate person.[7] Then, a precise understanding had to be established between the two arenas. Great consultations and deliberations were held among the sovereign, the military generals, the priests, and the state ministers. *The broad spectrum of the campaign was considered:* moral influence, weather, terrain, command, and doctrine. A concensus was reached. Potential cybernetic problems were resolved before initiation of armed conflict.

Once the troops had crossed the border, the command of the military leader was absolute.[8] Spatiotemporal restrictions limited communications in the Chinese expanses. Sun Tzu was repetitious, emphatic and exact in his resolutions against further interference from the strategic level to the tactical level: "No evil is greater than commands of the sovereign from the court" when ignorant of the field commander's problems. The sovereign should not exercise in tactical responsibility.[9] The only exception would be if the sovereign took to the field for personal command of engaged forces.

Sun Tzu influence was profound on the Eastern philosophy of war, especially in Japan. Many of the shoguns of Japan were well versed in his literature and frequently quoted him to their subordinates. Sun Tzu was initially published in 1772 in France and temporarily enjoyed widespread distribution in contemporary journals. However, he returned to obscurity in the Western world after the French Revolution.[10]

Warfare remained relatively simple and small scale for the two millennia following Sun Tzu. Rapid communication was a fast horse. The implements of war slightly enlarged the tactical battlefield but still necessitated a range small enough to recognize the enemy's facial features before engaging in battle. Battlefield control was limited to about three kilometers - the control by horseback. The horse provided the same limiting strategic control.[11] The goals of combat were destruction of enemy units. Cities, ports, and fertile land were to remain intact as spoils to the victor. War was a contest of aristocracies rather than masses of people. Command in the tactical battlefield was normally executed by the actual sovereign: Xerxes at Salamis, Alexander the Great at Gaugamela, Henry V at Agincourt, Charles I at Naseby and Napoleon at Austerlitz.[12] The sovereign at the battlefield merged strategy, tactics, and cybernetics within the mind of one man.[13]

Strategic thought in the Western mind was lame since the fall of the Roman Empire. It was limited to tactical engagements for limited goals. Napoleon, perceived as the paramount military genius of Western culture, won brilliant battles but never had a comprehensive strategy effectively combining political, economic, psychological and military power to maintain his conquests.[14]

Von Clausewitz, in writing on the art of war for his sovereign after the Napoleonic wars, attempted to better articulate the conduct of war. Strategy was the "use of engagements for the objective of war."[15] Its elements were the moral, physical, mathematical, geographic and statistical military might of a nation.[16] Successful strategy was the combination of winning tactical battles and, unlike tactics, required no special technical knowledge.[17] The strategist had only to draft the plan of war, shape individual campaigns and decide on individual engagements.[18] However, he warned it was very simple to chart a course but required great courage to maintain it.[19]

The limitations of cybernetics remained as obstinate in Clausewitz's era as throughout antiquity. The strategist, who was the sovereign of the state, needed the success of individual engagements to insure success of the war. The sovereign had to maintain control. Since detailed orders could not be given for every engagement and communications were prohibitively slow, Clausewitz decided the strategist (sovereign) must go to the field himself.[20] Even at the battlefield the sovereign saw only one half of the tactical engagement at any one time.[21] The sovereign had to guard against ineffective and inefficient reports distorting the battlefield he could not see.[22] The speed, accuracy and scope of battlefield reports was about to change in a manner undreamed by von Clausewitz, who died in 1831.[23]

Tremendous changes in warfare began with the advent of the industrial revolution. Military power received exhilarating potency with the application of the telegraph, rifled firearms and railroad. The U.S. Civil War was the first modern war.

The U.S. Government recognized the potential for the telegraph from observations during the Crimean War.[24] A rudimentary telegraph

increased the span of a commander's influence on the battlefield up to two thousand kilometers. Time considerations decreased from days to minutes.[25] Strategy was radically altered. Improved cybernetics permitted the immediate coordination of tactical battles. The Union's Secretary of War appreciated the critical leverage the telegraph would give in the execution of grand strategy and battlefield control; he insisted on moving the telegraph center from the Union Army Headquarters into the War Department.[26]

But the new technology of the telegraph had limits in its cybernetic enhancement of warfare. The field portable telegraph was delicate and cumbersome with a short range and slow transmission. Actual combat tactics were too swift and rugged. Combat tactics were not changed by the telegraph. Close order drill persisted on the Civil War battlefield even with the increased lethality of rifled guns.[27] The contribution of the science of communications to the art of war was barely beginning.

On March 27, 1899, a young scientist named Marconi successfully sent a message across the English Channel from Boulogne to Dover.[28] Electricity had already brightened the night with thousands of sparkling lights. Now ominous electronic revolutionary leaps were being formed by a small group of visionaries. For example, in 1905, the Wardencliff Vision projected a World System power plan. Based on successful experiments, not dreams or fantasies, the Vision designed telegraph and telephone exchanges covering the world, universal distribution of general news, music and time, establishment of a universal navigation system and the reproduction of photographic pictures anywhere in the world.[29] Electronics was to make the successive World Wars of the 20th Century the wireless wars.[30]

War, abhorred by civilized peoples, became odious beyond the capacity of the human mind and spirit. Wars were rare in the history of conflict that were fought to annihilate or completely defeat the enemy. By the turn of the 20th Century, improvements of communications, transportation and weapon lethality made war a struggle of peoples. Nations became involved in total warfare. Civilians were as vulnerable and likely a target as combatants. Victory would be achieved through the wholesale destruction of property and life. Cities that took centuries to build and were the repository of the culminations of a peoples' cultural achievements and heritage were vulnerable to total destruction. Casualties were measured in gross slaughter.[31]

The advent of the telephone, telegraph and radio have prompted the effective and efficient use of cybernetics for civil and military authorities. During World War I, cybernetics gave flexibility to the initial strategies and tactics. But, like the U.S. Civil War, other elements of war were to negate the initial strategic and tactical flexibility that communications would give to battle.[32] Trench warfare of World War I was to parallel the massed tactics and death of the Civil War.

Additionally, cybernetics during World War I between the strategic goals and tactical execution by the United States was restricted by personal preference rather than technological limitations. General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, was to receive basically two orders from civil authorities: one to go to Europe; one to return.[33] The American President perceived the declaration of war as a failure of his total strategy to prevent warfare. He absolved himself of the tactical and strategic execution of World War I.[34]

World War II foreshadowed the development of omniscient cybernetics connecting strategy and tactics. Initially only the theater commander could deal in near real-time information and directives.[35] Intertheater communications and control was severely restricted but not impossible. The U.S. NCA exercised strategies by declaring policy through allocation of resources to various theaters and appointing commanders. Most of the coordination between strategy and tactics was developed by several meetings among members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Allied Powers, the American and British Joint Chiefs, and the theater commanders. The theater commander was responsible for conduct of war.[36]

Naval communications in the expanses of the Pacific Ocean gave clues to the future of war. Senior naval commanders habitually only monitored naval battles. During the battle of Leyte Gulf, the maneuvers of the tactical commander, Halsey, were so unorthodox to the overall situation that Nimitz, the Commander in Chief Pacific, broke his tradition of silence from Hawaii during a battle. Nimitz radioed to Halsey: "Where is Task Force 34. The world wonders." Halsey eventually made the appropriate tactical changes. The battle continued without further messages from Hawaii.[37] The specter of long range immediate control began to take form.[38]

Germany in World War II made extensive use of modern cybernetics to control its conquests and to disrupt their enemy's communications. The Nazis enjoyed an advantage during the first two years of the war with their advanced technology and procedures for radio intercepts. But their failure to monitor and eliminate cribs, errors of transmission by equipment operating personnel, and the work of the Poles on ULTRA permitted the degradation of this advantage. The loss of advantage permitted the first strategic victory for the Allies--the Battle of the Atlantic.[39]

Hitler used modern communications to permit his command of all German units throughout Europe. Hitler had relatively short distances, compared to the Allies, plus continually shrinking interior lines. Military successes were negated by his inflexibility, exemplified by El Alamein and Stalingrad.[40]

Theorists conducted limited investigations into the communication technology of modern warfare based upon experiences in World War II. S.L.A. Marshall reflected on the communications spatial collapse of the battlefield and its effect on command and control. He saw a growing diabolical effect of communications: the telephone may come to control the commander. Commanders had a propensity to remain at headquarters not for want of courage, but of the fear of the failure to resolve the riddles of combat by missing important information. Commanders would then not have the opportunity to project their personal leadership to their subordinates on the battlefield when it was needed the most. Commanders would not see the reality of the battlefield unfiltered by technological aids or the observation errors of subordinates.[41] Information and its evaluation of the field could be erroneous during battle. All commanders are subject to similar technical and sematic problems of communication. Modern technology cannot totally clear the fog of war. The added danger is that the higher commander, with tactical information of dubious value, may make decisions not commensurate with the reality of the battlefield. Those decisions may bring disaster.[42]

The distinction of national strategy and military tactics in the modern world was shattered by events in Korea before sufficient academic debate of the impact of communication could be pursued.[43] President Truman at the White House committed troops to the defense of South Korea

after a direct telephone conference with the U.S. Commander in Japan. The national leader, or sovereign of yesteryear, was not at the battlefield, but was making tactical decisions through a new and improved communications medium. Omniscient cybernetics was perceived as real. National and tactical distinctions were blurred. Operational implementation, which had not been specifically articulated by either theorists or practitioners, was born.

Operational Implementation

Operational implementation became a conscious goal of a nuclear capable United States after World War II. The United States was the leader of the free world in direct conflict with the Soviet Union. Any crisis could possibly result in nuclear war. Tactical responses not specifically in accordance with national directives, goals, policies or desires were unacceptable. The resulting violence may pursue a logic of its own beyond the desire of either protagonist.[44]

The National Command Authority conducts the formulation and execution of strategy through a political and bureaucratic process. The normal affairs of state in the formulation and execution of strategic goals and programs are not time-sensitive. The decision-making process involves great deliberation and the quest for consensus. The President is accessible to only a few of the members of the free world at any time.

A crisis causes an abrupt change in the conduct of the affairs of state. A crisis is time sensitive and a threat to the values of a nation. The resolution of a crisis must be quick and effective. Time is not a luxury. The President, to gain the best and quickest advice, cuts across all political and bureaucratic boundaries for information and recommendations.[45] (Figure 2-2).

Figure 2-2

Sources of Advice Available to the

President During Crisis Decisionmaking

Source: Head, Crisis Resolution, 60.

The political success of a crisis requires that the President make the final decision and monitor proper execution in order to control the outcome.[46] The President has the ability through instant communications to personally and intensively manage the execution of all agencies during crisis management. In the military, he is capable of rapidly eliminating procedures and command levels and directly talking to the field commander.[47]

Operational implementation is a system with identifiable parts:

*Command
 The role of the Commander in Chief
 The role of the field commander

*Control
 Plans
 Availability of forces

*Communications
 Technical capabilities
 Use

Command

The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. However, such a simple statement is the result of philosophical debates and old grievances at the beginning of the new republic and continuing litigation for over two centuries.

The Declaration of Independence articulated numerous wrongs by the King of England. The use of military might against the colonies and the abuse of representative government were paramount in the Declaration submitted to a candid world -

He has kept among us in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures--
He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power--
He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already

begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled
in most barbarous ages and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized
nation.[48]

The American fear of standing armies was not limited to the ex-
perience of the redcoats of Great Britain. The colonial soldier provided
ample and reasonable fear of the power of a standing army. Problems were
encountered beyond the bureaucratic errors and political intrigue in form-
ing and maintaining a large force. The militia rioted and mutined.
Threats of coup d'etat were numerous among the officers and the ranks.
The Army declared it had "its alternatives" in 1783 if Congress should
not favorably address grievances of pay, food and clothing. Washington
acted promptly by assembling the officers and, through an emotional and
logical appeal, deplored the threatened actions as unmilitary and un-
reasonable. Washington was confident the Congress would be reasonable
and just in the eventual resolution of the grievances. The Army's search
for "alternatives" temporarily ended.[49]

The preliminary peace of the Revolutionary War accelerated the
demands of the Army and the fears of Congress. On June 17, 1783, rioting
soldiers barricaded Congress and the Executive Council of Pennsylvania in
the State House. Demands again were for the redress of all grievances.
Congress eventually faced down the riotous (and now drunk) soldiers.
Within a month the Continental Army disbanded amid threats of mutinies and
coups. It was disgruntled over unresolved grievances.[50]

The dangers of the redcoats and the Continental Army were not lost
on the framers of the Constitution of the United States. They would not
substitute the evils of an American Army for the departed British troops.
A compromise between the desire of a standing army for national defense
and the fears of its unchecked power had to be arranged. James Madison's

"Notes on the Convention Proceedings" records the intense debate. The choice between the two simple statements, "to make war" or "to declare war," invoked an emotional clash among the framers of the Constitution that is probably beyond our empathy after two centuries. The concept that resolved the debate was that a sudden attack needed instant response of which the legislature was incapable of doing. Only the executive could respond within the needed time.[51]

The framers of the Constitution guarded against military despotism of either an executive or legislature army. The military force of the United States was a shared power; the army was responsible to and depended upon the President and Congress.[52]

Congress had the power:

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and to make Rules concerning the Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces;[53]

The President of the United States was to be the executive power. He was to be "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."[54]

The President has rapidly expanded his executive department within the last four decades in order to manage the complexity of his capacity as Commander in Chief. The decisionmaking of the executive had to adapt to a world where the President may only have a few minutes to decide to blow up the Northern Hemisphere.[55] Policy formation and execution had to be rapid, efficient and effective.

The 80th Congress of 26 July 1947 created by statute the National Security Council. The National Security Council (NSC) was "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security." The NSC was to be the principal instruments in both formulation and implementation of foreign policy.[56]

The National Security Council statutory members are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency have historically attended all NSC meetings. The Presidents have exercised great latitude in the use of the organization and its members.[57] Presidents would expand or contract its size and use in both normal policy formulation, or in crisis management. Regardless of its composition, the NSC has participated in detailed operational direction in most crises since its inception.[58]

The 1947 National Security Act did not create the effective and efficient military desired by the designers of the legislation. The 1949 amendment to the 1947 law created the Department of Defense to replace the National Military Establishment. The Secretary of Defense had direct control over the three services which were now formed as military departments.[59] Administration of the service greatly improved, but the services were still not organized to respond immediately to the directions of the Commander in Chief.

The President needed to insure rapid response to threats to the national security both in accordance with the political realities of the nuclear era and also within the philosophical desires of the framers of the Constitution. President Eisenhower solved command and service support

problems in 1958 as he developed the operational line from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combat commands.[60] The National Command Authority (NCA) was clearly the President and the Secretary of Defense for all military matters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, legitimized by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal military advisors to the President, could now be within the chain of command.[61] The President or the Secretary of Defense can delegate the authority and responsibility for execution of national military policy.

The War Powers Act of 1973 was passed in response to the Vietnam conflict. The Constitution permitted Congress to declare war and the President, as Commander in Chief, to wage war. However, the Twentieth Century brought a type of war that the framers of the Constitution had not envisioned. The War Powers Act answered the political realities of a nuclear era and the challenge of communism at all levels of conflict. The President could commit forces to combat but must respond to Congress in writing within forty-eight hours. Forces could be committed for only sixty days. Congress must pass an approval for extension of the time.[62]

The role of the tactical commander is determined by established or ad hoc command relationships through the military chain of command to the NCA. He is legally responsible for the execution of all orders and missions assigned to him from anyone in the chain of command. He has the legal authority to assign tasks to forces under his command to accomplish his assigned missions.[63]

The civil command structure of the U.S. military was initiated by philosophical debate and evolved over two centuries. The principle concept was to provide a rapid response to threats. The technological advances and political challenges of the modern world refined and modified

the execution of this philosophy. The President as Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense compose the National Command Authority. The NCA may use military forces to counter any threat. But Congress must grant ex post facto approval of the deployment of forces within sixty days. The responsibility of the armed forces is still shared without impeding the flexibility of the executive to rapidly respond to a crisis.

Criticism of the command structure is based upon philosophical conjecture and practical analysis. The predominant theme is the dichotomy between the strategic responsibility of the President and the micromanagement of execution by the National Command Authority.

The NCA has made an extraordinary effort to supervise the implementation of decisions during a crisis. In a comprehensive study by Hazlewood and Hayes, "Planning for Problems in Crisis Management," a President was directly involved in seventy-three percent of the forty surveyed crises while his participation was legally required only twenty-two percent of the time.[64] The NCA habitually skipped layers of command and issued detailed guidance.[65] In August 1961 President Kennedy took personal command from within the Oval Office of a military convoy moving from West Germany to Berlin.[66] President Johnson became involved in the minute tactical details of targeting for air strikes in North Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, sitting in the Pentagon in June 1976, personally directed the movements of a launch dispatched to carry Americans from the Lebanese shore. He almost directed the launch into rocky shoals. Disaster was averted at the last moment by an emphatic interruption by a very low member of the military staff of the Pentagon.[67] The National Command Authority has taken an active part in operational implementation and will probably continue to do so.

Micromanagement by the NCA may result in subtle or overt resentment by the military.[69] The most famous overt conflict is the McNamara-Anderson exchange in the Flag Plot during the Cuban missile crisis. Anderson, in his capacity as Chief of Naval Operations, saw himself as executing the broad policy of the quarantine. He positioned ships, especially the submarines, where they could best monitor Russian ships and be prepared for hostilities. McNamara interpreted this action as not complying with the President's spirit of premeditated control[70] or, at worse, blatant disobedience of the President. The two men participated in a harsh verbal conflict regardless of the honest intent of either.[71] Over a wider range of crises, Hazlewood and Hayes observed a tendency of the NCA decisionmaking and bureaucratic coordination to increase crisis management problems in a substantial number of cases.[72] Internal conflict seems inevitable.

The civilian participants of the national decisionmaking process are criticized as lacking a mastery of military skills and not effectively seeking or using military advice. The Presidents, except for Eisenhower, since World War II have had little or no military experience. The Department of Defense is only 35 years old, but it has had 15 different Secretaries. Additionally, the policymakers within the Department of Defense remain for an average of only 28 months.[73] This quantitative deficiency is supposedly offset by increased quality of knowledge gained in their positions.[74] The Joint Chiefs of Staff are habitually outside strategic policy formation.[75] Strategy is devoid of analysis of the military impact during its conceptualization. The JCS review military options dictated in each diplomatic strategy. The military option is the beginning for the military and the end of diplomacy. An extraordinary faith is placed

in the military solutions to political problems.[76] The military is the last resort.

Finally, the tactical commander may be confused about the priority or even the legitimacy of his orders because of modern communications and the many echelons of command. Messages received over the multitude of communication channels may be from different and possibly unauthorized sources. The command is perceived as legitimate although it may conflict with a command from another source. Each message therefore carries an intrinsic authority. It is weighed in comparison to the other messages. Tactical action will be based upon messages with the highest intrinsic authority.[77]

Control

The military controls operations through a predetermined planning system to anticipate various threats to national security and objectives. Planning is a very deliberate system involving all levels of command and requiring information from multiple staffs and agencies. The final product is an optimum course of action translated into an operation order with material, personnel and time constraints to meet an anticipated threat. Should a threat develop without a predetermined or applicable plan, as is normal in the case of a crisis, the system will conduct rapid, time-sensitive planning. The system will operate in an abbreviated but orderly manner to develop an effective and efficient plan.[78]

The U.S. military has used the Joint Operation Planning System for over three decades. President Kennedy expressed a desire for a more flexible and responsive command and control system.[79] Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the military to establish standard planning systems and develop common computer hardware and software for use by all commands.[80]

The resulting Joint Operational Planning System paralleled Kennedy's decisionmaking while in the White House. There must be a precise definition of the problem, a canvassing of all possible solutions and consequences, a selection of the optimum choice and finally the communication of the selection and provision for execution.[81] (Figure 2-3)

The Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) provides for the identification of a threat, the search for the optimum solution and the implementation of the final decision. As a control system it encompasses the facilities, equipment, communication, procedures and personnel essential for planning, directing and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to missions. JOPS has two basic features: the deliberate planning and time-sensitive planning.[82]

The deliberate planning system applies to peacetime. It provides for the total participation and support of all levels of commander and staff. The detailed work may take as long as a year to eighteen months to complete.[83] The time invested will facilitate expedient deployment in an undetermined future time of conflict.

The deliberate planning process follows five precise phases. In phase one, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assign tasks and identify major combat assets available to the supported commander (CINC). The tasks assigned by the JCS to the appropriate unified and specified commands are based upon the anticipation of the threat. The supported CINC conducts mission analysis. Feedback is solicited from all service component commanders, and supporting CINCs. In phase two the supported commander issues planning guidance and the staffs develop tentative courses of action. Detailed staff estimates are prepared. The service component commanders and supporting CINCs are part of the refinement of the courses of action. The

Figure 2-3

Crisis and Deployment Management Overview

Source: U.S. Department of Defense. An Executive Overview of the Joint Operation Planning System, the Crisis Action System, and the Joint Deployment System (1980), 1.

best course of action is recommended to the supported commander. The
supported commander will make his decision. The decision of the commander
is expanded into the concept of operations. The concept is forwarded to
JCS for approval.[84] The final three phases deal with very detailed plan
development and review by the supported and supporting CINCs.

The final result of the deliberate planning process may be either
an OPLAN, operational plan in complete format, or a CONPLAN, operational
plan in concept format. The OPLAN requires the full spectrum of detailed
planning and support. The CONPLAN is only a plan in concept format. It
follows the same general format as the complete plan but does not require
the detail and annexes of the OPLANs.[85] Fully developed OPLANs have been
developed for only a handful of the potentially worse situations. More
CONPLANs have been made for broader and smaller situations which may
occur.[86]

The deliberate planning process cannot cover all events requiring
a military response. The NCA, JCS and CINCs have had to respond to crises
which did not conform to any plan. A formalized system was instituted in
the early 1970's: The Crisis Action System (CAS).[87]

The CAS provides a logical progression from event recognition to
execution of the operation order. Due to the time sensitivity of the
operation, steps may be accomplished out of sequence or simultaneously.
The first step is the identification of an event by the CINC of the uni-
fied command closest to the situation. A report is submitted to the JCS.
Action may be directed by the JCS to increase monitoring of the event.
It is not until the second phase that the event is presented to the
President. Only the President may determine that a crisis exists that
may warrant a U.S. response. He would request the development of options

including diplomatic and military courses of action. In the third phase the JCS sends out a warning order to the responsible CINC. It contains guidance from the NCA pertaining to the crisis, objectives, missions, and constraints. The CINC will search for a suitable OPLAN or CONPLAN. If a plan is found it is evaluated for its application to the situation. If no plan is found, the CINC must develop his own courses of action. The courses of action and the CINC's recommendations are forwarded to JCS.

The fourth phase is the decision by the NCA. The NCA may elect to go with the CINC's recommendation, modify it or select another alternative. Once the President has made a decision to proceed with a course of action involving the military, the execution planning phase is initiated by the issue of a JCS alert order to all military commands involved. It will indicate the specifics of the operation based upon the approved course of action. Detailed planning will be intensified in this phase commensurate with the time available.

The final step is the execution phase. Based upon the decision of the NA, the JCS issue an execution order instructing the CINC to execute his OPORD.[88]

The JCS Joint Operation Planning System is not a panacea. Using deliberate planning, JOPS provide a logical approach toward anticipated threats. Detailed planning is based upon extensive and constant communications between the myriad of commanders, staffs and agencies essential to mission accomplishment. Under severe time constraints imposed by a crisis, CAS provides a basis of action for all actors while the precise phases are not sacrosanct.

Communications

Communications provide the catalyst that allows the command and control systems to act throughout the world. In 1962, the Department of Defense Directive 5100.30 established the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).[89] The basic elements of WWMCCS are designated command and control facilities, data collection and information networks, special communications network capabilities, warning systems and executive aids. As a two-way medium, WWMCCS provides the "what" to the NCA of an incident plus the "how" of execution.[90] WWMCCS has habitually supported the NCA by receiving information for decisions applying military resources, assigning military missions, and providing command and control of specific missions of unified and specified commands.[91] However, after a decade of use, WWMCCS is one of the most misunderstood management tools within the Department of Defense.[92]

WWMCCS is composed of three parts: WWMCCS unique, WWMCCS-related and non-WWMCCS. (Figure 2-4).

WWMCCS unique systems are centered around the Honeywell 6000 computers.[93] The National Military Command System (NMCS) provides support to the National Command Authority to direct and control military forces. The NMCS is composed of three operational centers: National Military Command Center (NMCC), Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) and National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP). The most common usage of WWMCCS is to the unified and specified commands and the theater nuclear forces. The Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Net (MEECN) provides command and control of strategic forces during a nuclear attack.[94]

Figure 2-4

Worldwide Military Command

and Control Network

Source: U.S. Department of Defense. Report of Secretary of Defense Donald
H. Rumsfeld to the Congress (1976), 173.

The defense Communication System, composed of WWMCCS-related sys-
tems, is the management and information system that supports the other
military departments, services, Department of Defense agencies, and
embassies. The most commonly used Defense Communication Systems are the
Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON), the Automatic Secure Voice Network
(AUTOSEVOCON) and the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN).[95]

Non-WWMCCS are all other systems that provide support and inter-
face with WWMCCS but do not belong to the WWMCCS. These are the Tactical
Communications Systems.[96] They are mobile and transportable facilities
and tactical networks that link with the Defense Communication System to
the NMCS. They "allow NCA to communicate with unified commanders in
crisis spots and then to the on-scene commanders."[97] The strength of
WWMCCS is its redundancy and flexibility. But redundancy and flexibility
have provided weaknesses because of the lack of a predominate architect
of the system.[98]

WWMCCS has experienced failures in actual use and practical ex-
ercises. Deficiencies have been enumerated by government and independent
studies. Perhaps optimistic illusions about the communication network
cannot help but inflate the expected value.

Messages sent to alert U.S. military forces using WWMCCS were
sometimes never received resulting in tactical or strategic reverses.
Four very high priority alert messages were sent to the U.S.S. Liberty
hours before it was attacked by Israeli Forces on 8 June 1967. Two mes-
sages were misrouted to the Pacific Command, one message was misdirected
to the Pentagon and one message broadcast nine hours after the attack.[99]
During the Yom Kippur War, information essential to the deployment of U.S.
forces was in the data base but the operators either did not know it

existed, or how to get to it.[100] WWMCCS experienced a sixty-seven per-
cent abnormal termination rate during the 1977 Prime Target Exercise.
WWMCCS has repeatedly been unable to cope with the information require-
ments during Proud Spirit and Nifty Nugget, both large command post ex-
ercises.[101]

Congress and independent studies have taken the WWMCCS to task.
The House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the 92d Congress
in May, 1971, reported the system required seventy minutes to process a
high priority message while electronic transmission was only five min-
utes.[102] The Mollohan Committee Report, 1969, was critical of the com-
partmentalization of intelligence from operations and the lack of clear
command and control lines of authority and responsibility.[103] Rand Paper
P-5602, February 1976, indicated the entire system was less sensitive to
user requirements, especially upper echelon requirements.[104] As late as
1978, a survey of the BDM Corporation indicated the DOD WWMCCS still
needed explicit functional requirements and objectives.[105]

Illumination of the noted deficiencies is not designed to condemn
the entire system. As with any technology intense system, some errors
are bound to occur. Taken in the perspective of the system's vast use,
WWMCCS has been highly successful. Action is being pursued in areas that
need improvement. Through the years, WWMCCS has maintained one prevail-
ing strength. It has always provided direct communication from the Na-
tional Command Authority to any U.S. military commander in the world.
This unique capability has been used during crisis management. After
the Gulf of Tonkin incident the Secretary of Defense talked to the skipper
of the U.S.S. Turner Joy. This was an unprecedented use of capability.[107]
Direct communications were to continually improve with technological

advances. During the Lebanese evacuation of June 1976, the Secretary of Defense personally supervised the launch designated to carry Americans.[108] Modern satellite systems provide single and multichannel links directly to the NCA.[109] An example of the current capability is the NN/WSC-3: a small, highly mobile satellite transceiver for radio, teletype and security equipment. It has been effectively and efficiently used in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Africa, South America and the seven seas.[110]

WWMCCS is an effective and efficient system for command and control. The technical ability for voice control has undoubtedly existed since a U.S. President talked to the first men on the moon. The communication ability exists and continually improves for direct real-time communications between the National Command Authority in the nation's Capitol and the tactical commander regardless of the location.[111]

CHAPTER 2

NOTES

[1]Hanson, The New Alchemists, 51-56.

[2]Genesis XVI: 14-15.

[3]Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 30.

[4]Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy Of The Roman Empire (1976).

[5]Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 12.

[6]Ibid., 40.

[7]Ibid., 81-83.

[8]Ibid., 64.

[9]Ibid., 81.

[10]Ibid., Appendix II & III, 169-183.

[11]Keegan, The Face of Battle.
    Ropp, War, 29-30, 50: Instructions not to fire until you see
the whites of their eyes is less a call of bravado than an acknowledge-
ment of the extremely limited range of muskets. Forty yards was the
normal musket range. A longbowman was more accurate at 100 yards than
a musketeer.
    Allen Smith III, "Erosion of Senior Command Initiative: Myth
or Reality" (US Army War College, 1972), 12.

[12]Melville Bell Grosvenor, ed., Greece And Rome (1968), 150-159,
212.
    Richard Humble, Famous Land Battles (1979), 16-29.

[13]Ropp, War, 36-37: Charles V of Spain wandered around Europe
and lost control of his Kingdom at home. His son, Philip II, tried to
direct events from the center. He issued illogical orders owing to the
local conditions of which he was ignorant when writing his orders.
    Smith, "Erosion of Senior Command Initiative."
    Staudemaier, "Strategy" lecture, 14 April 1983.

[14]Will and Ariel Durant, The Age of Napoleon, The Story of Civiliza-
tion Part XI (1975), 776-778.
    Ropp, War, 98-139.

Contemporary views supporting the strategic brilliance of Napoleon are numerous. Franz, "The Character of Modern War," credits Napoleon with strategic perspectives. The confusion is due to the inarticulate use of "strategy," "national strategy" and "military strategy." (See Chapter 1, Note 10). The Durants, Ropp and this thesis use "strategy"; Franz should be using "military strategy."

[15]Clausewitz, On War, 128.

[16]Ibid., 183.

[17]Carl von Clausewitz, edited and translated by Hans W. Gatzke, Principles of War (1942), 45.

[18]Idem, On War, 177.

[19]Ibid., 178.

[20]Ibid., 177.

[21]Ibid., 178.

[22]Idem, Principles of War, 62-63.

[23]Clausewitz's theories are controversial today as viewed against modern technology. John W. Campbell, "Evolution of a Doctrine, The Principles of War," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1970, reprinted in William A. Stoff, ed., War and Doctrine (1982), 279-283, discounts Clausewitz's book Principles Of War as a memoranda, not a studied exposition of a concise set of principles. Campbell believes the memoranda written for the crown sovereign by Clausewitz was a hasty discussion.

Walter von Hobe, "Clausewitz," Military Review (March 2, 1981), 56-61, believes Clausewitz principles are still valid even with the immense impact of modern weapons, communication and transportation.

Luttwak, The Grand Strategy Of The Roman Empire, xii, views that the emergence of new technologies of mass destruction have invalidated Clausewitzian approach to strategy.

Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimension of Strategy" Foreign Affairs (Summer 1978), 975, criticized Clausewitz for not discussing high or nation strategy for war.

[24]Weigley, Army, 233.

[25]Smith, "Erosion Of Senior Command Initiative," 35.

[26]Weigley, Army, 247.

[27]Ibid., 234.

[28]Hanson, The New Alchemists, 3.

[29]Ibid., 25-26.

[30]Ibid., 32.
Ropp, War, 13: ". . . only in modern times has technological innovation been so rapid, so conscious, and so continuous that scientists have become as important in warfare as politicians or soldiers." ". . . Industrial Revolution and twentieth-century applied science--in Alexander Herzen's phrase, 'Ghenghiz Kahn with the telegraph'--now threatens to obliterate Western civilization."

[31]Will and Ariel Durant, The Lessons Of History (1968), 82.
Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (1979), 1-2.
Ludendorff, one of the senior German officers during World War I, did not believe the total effort of his nation was commited to World War I. He advocated the philosophy of total war in a post-WWI book: Total War. Harold Deutsch, "Ludendorff" lecture, 18 Jan 1983.

[32]Lebow, Between Peace and War, 233.

[33]Weigley, Army, 377.

[34]Ibid., 378, 455.

[35]Ibid., 6.

[36]Ibid., 6.
Weigley, Army, 457.
Smith, "Erosion Of Senior Command Initiative," 43.

[37]Samuel Eliot Morison, History Of The United States Naval Operations In World War II, Volumn XII, Leyte (1958), 288-296.
Idem, The Oxford History Of The American People (1965), 1035-1036.

[38]Hanson, The New Alchemists, 292: "c^3 stands as the most convincing demonstration of the trend toward cybernetic warfare first set in motion during World War II."

[39]Harold Deutsch, "ULTRA" lecture, 18 Jan 1983.

[40]Mellenthin, F. W. von, edited by L. C. F. Turner and translated by H. Betzler. Panzer Battles (1956), 238.
William L. Shirer, The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich (1960), 656-659, 903-934, 1036-1041.
Smith, "Erosion Of Senior Command Initiative," 46.

[41]Ruprecht Haasler and Hans Goebel, "Uneasiness About Technological Progress in the Armed Forces" reprinted from Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau (March-April 1981), Military Review (October 1982), 69-70: A commander may miss the "information landscape" of the battlefield through a total reliance on electronic means.
S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, 100-122.
Ropp, War, 52.

[42]Marshall, Men Against Fire, 85-100.

[43]Davis B. Bobrow, "Communications, Command and Control: The Nerves of Intervention" in Ellen P. Stern, ed., _The Limits Of Intervention_ (1977), 102.

[44]Lebow, _Between Peace and War_, 330.
Osgood, _Limited War Revisited_, 4-5.
Phillip Maynard Williams, _Crises Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age_ (1976), 96-97.
Criticism of the actual system of nuclear deterrence's command, control and communication by cybernetic analysis can be found in Steinbruner's _National Security_ (1980) and "Nuclear Decapitation" (Winter 1981-82).

[45]Head, _Crisis Resolution_, 60.

[46]Ibid., 246.
Dean Rusk, et al, "The Lessons of the Cuba Missile Crisis," _Time_ 27 Sept 1982, 86.

[47]Lloyd D. Bryant, James E. Trinnamar and William O. Staudemaier, "Contemporary Problems of the Unified Command System" (Strategic Studies Institute, 1978), 24.

[48]U.S., _The Declaration of Independence_.

[49]Weigley, _Army_, 76-77.

[50]Ibid., 78-79.

[51]U.S. Congress, _The War Powers Bill_ (1972), 4-6.

[52]Weigley, _Army_, 87.

[53]U.S., _Constitution_, art I, sec 8.

[54]U.S., _Constitution_, art II, sec 1, 2.

[55]John C. Ausland and Hugh F. Richardson, "Crisis Management: Berlin, Cyprus, Laos," _Foreign Affairs_ (January 1966), 291.

[56]R. Gordon Hoxie, "The National Security Council," _Presidential Studies Quarterly_ (Winter 1982), 108-109.

[57]Ibid., 109-110: NSC from Truman to Reagan.
Head, _Crisis Resolution_, 48-50, 240.
Williams, _Crises Management_, 71.

[58]Adams, et al, "Command And Control Systems," 30-31.

[59]Frisbee, "Command Line," 10.
Weigley, _Army_, 493-495.

[60]Frisbee, "Command Line," 11-12.
David C. Jones, "What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," _The New York Times_, 7 Nov 1982, Section 6, 78.

[61] Morton H. Halperin, "The President And The Military," Foreign Affairs (January 1972), 310-324.

[62] Head, Crisis Resolution, 283-290.
Pat M. Holt, The War Powers Resolution (1978).

[63] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary, 74, 341.

[64] Hazlewood, "Planning For Problems," 3-12.
Lebow, Between Peace and War, 285.

[65] Paul R. Schratz, "On Military Advice And Dissent," Strategic Review (Winter 1981), 44.

[66] Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises (1977), 10.

[67] Lebow, Between Peace and War, 286-287.

[68] Bryant, "Contemporary Problems," 24.

[69] Williams, Crises Management, 100.

[70] Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (1966), 48.
Alastair Buchan, "Crisis Management: The New Diplomacy" in Alastair Buchan, ed., Political and Strategic Studies (1971), 322-323.
Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (1967), 213.
Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War, 182-184.
Lebow, Between Peace and War, 285.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; John F. Kennedy in the White House (1965), 808.
Hugh Sidey, "History on His Shoulder," Time (8 Nov 1982), 26.

[71] Abel, The Missile Crisis, 155-156.
Allison, Essence of Decision, 130-131.
Head, Crisis Resolution, 15.
Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 215.
Lebow, Between Peace and War, 154-156.

[72] Hazlewood, "Planning for Problems," 3-12.
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 808.

[73] Jones, "Defense Establishment," 76-78: GEN David C. Jones, United States Air Force, retired, was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1978 to June 1982.

[74] Roderick Lenahan, "Handling The Non-War Crisis," Defense 82, (December 1982), 9: COL Lenahan completed a three year tour with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, plans officer in the Operations Directorate, in 1981. He has had extensive experience on crisis management teams at the joint task force, unified and national levels. He believes the "average American official, military or civilian, has not been trained" to handle a non-war crisis.

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[75] John R. Baker, "Civilian Crisis Management Of Military Operations: Implications For The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)," (MMAS Thesis, USACGSC, 1982), 13.
Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War, 214-215.
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Halperin, "The President And The Military," 310-324.

[76] Schratz, "On Military Advice And Dissent," 48.

[77] Deutsch, The Nerves Of Government, 152, 179.

[78] Osgood, Limited War Revisited, 10-11.
U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, General Methodology for Performance Evaluation of the Air Force Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems (AFWWMCCS) (1975), II-4.

[79] Adams, et al, Command and Control Systems, 36.

[80] C. G. Gerard, "Joint Deployment Planning, Part I," Marine Corps Gazette (March 1981), 64-5.

[81] Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making In The White House (1963), 18-23.

[82] The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary, 74.
U.S. Army, Army Mobilization And Operations Planning System (U) (AMOPS) Vol I (1981), 3-5,-10.

[83] Armed Forces Staff College, Joint Staff Officers Guide AFSC Pub 1 (1982), 5-1, -2.

[84] Ibid., 5-1 to 5-36.

[85] The Joint Chiefs of Staff, An Executive Overview of the Joint Operation Planning System, The Crisis Action System and the Joint Deployment System (1980), 4.

[86] C. G. Gerard, "Joint Deployment Planning Part II", Marine Corps Gazette (April 1981), 43.

[87] Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub 1, 5-37.

[88] Ibid., 5-37 to 5-44.
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[89]Adams, et al, "Command and Control Systems," 40.
U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, "General Methodology," IV-1.

[90]Head, Crisis Resolution, 86.
Lebow, Between Peace and War, 287.

[91]Cathcart, et al, "WWMCCS," 6.

[92]Ibid., 4.

[93]Gerard, "Joint Planning, Part I," 65.
David K. Saffle, "An Investigation of WWMCCS With A View Towards
Identifying Marine Corps Requirements In The Long Range (Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, 1981), 16.

[94]Cathcart, et al, "WWMCCS," 46.
U.S. Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Donald
H. Rumsfeld to the Congress, (27 Jan 1976), 172-4.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Head, Crisis Resolution, 93
John Morgenstern, "Strategic And Theater Command And Control
Systems," Signal (Nov/Dec 78), 114.

[97]U.S. Department of Defense, Rumsfeld, 174.

[98]Gerald Green, "C^3I: The Invisible Hardware," Sea Power (April,
1983), 114: Donald Latham, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for C^3I:
"Understanding how plethora of current C^3I hangs together is mind bog-
gling."

[99]Head, Crisis Resolution, 88
Cathcart, et al, "WWMCCS," 81-2: The Mollohan Committee Report,
1969, of Congress investigated similar problems in the Pueblo and EC121
crisis.

[100]Ibid., 87.

[101]Hanson, The New Alchemists, 294-6.
Saffle, "Marine Corps Requirements," 54.

[102]Head, Crisis Resolution, 89.

[103]Cathcart, et al, "WWMCCS," 81-2.

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Problems," Military Review (Sept 1982), 38-39.

[105]U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, "General Methodology," II-2, -3.

[106]Secretary of Defense, Annual Report To The Congress Fiscal
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[107] Cathcart, et al, "WWMCCS," 29.

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[110] Michael L. Helferd, "Joint Communications Support Element: A Voice Heard 'round the World," Army Communicator (Summer 1982), 35-6.

[111] Cathcart, et al, "WWMCCS," 6.

CHAPTER 3

CRISIS CASE STUDIES

General

Every participant in a crisis knows when it occurs. They are en-
gulfed in it to the point of saturation and abandonment of all other
pursuits. However, rarely can the participants describe succinctly how
the crisis came about, how the crisis functioned or how it was solved.[1]

Crisis is from the Greek word krino, which is to decide. It means
a turning or decision point. The Chinese ideogram for crisis connotes
both danger and opportunity.[2] Both interpretations correspond to the
contemporary interpretation of crises.

Crises are a recurring phenomenon of modern statescraft. Since
World War II, the United States has averaged between ten to fifteen crises
per year. Crises have become such a recurring reality that McNamara, the
Secretary of Defense during the Cuban Missile Crisis, declared there is
no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management.[3] Is crisis
management a contradiction of terms given the confusion and tension of a
crisis?[4]

The end results of a crisis management are not inevitably good or
bad. Some events labeled as crises were poorly managed by all participants:
Russia-Japan, 1903-4; U.S.-Korea, 1950; and India-China, 1962. On the
other hand some crises were resolved to the mutual advantage of the an-
tagonists: Fashoda, Dogger Bank and Cuba.[5] A model of crises must be
developed in order to analyze the past events and, more importantly, to

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serve as a predictive element to successfully avoid crises or gain a peaceable solution.

Crisis management involves problems in technology, procedures, programs, roles and policies. Analysis that would isolate the elements can show areas that need improvement. Currently no single model exists that satisfies all the scholastic views of a crisis.[6] However, sufficient commonality exists in the models to highlight salient parts.[7] A crisis is an external, unanticipated threat to important values with restricted decision time.

A crisis is normally perceived to be "other inspired," originally initiated by actors outside the United States. This avoids the dialectics of a planned crisis.[8]

A crisis is a surprise to the civil and military leaders.[9] The perception of surprise is real to the participants even if post analysis indicates sufficient warning by the antagonists. The element of surprise is not only due to a commission or omission of a national strategy. The crisis may have even developed in a strategic void.[10]

A crisis is a threat to important values of the state. The action of the protagonist is against concrete national interests, the country's reputations or the policy-makers ability to remain in power.[11] No matter how abstract and exaggerated terms such as prestige, dignity and integrity are in decisionmakers' statements, they are as real and important to states as they are to individuals.[12] The military, political or moral issue is a <u>Machtfrague</u>, a test of the real power of a nation. Is the country a great power or does it just have the trappings of one? The failure to meet the challenge of a <u>Machtfrague</u> is a serious loss of prestige and status and an invitation to further tests.[13] In one study,

U.S. prestige and dignity was found to be the U.S. policy goal with the greatest secondary relevance to U.S. crises.[14] Crisis resolution by military forces is an extention of national strategy.

A crisis is characterized by short decision time in order to resolve the threat to national values. Even if the events leading up to the crisis point were prolonged, the crisis, once recognized, must be resolved quickly. The crisis will change the dynamics from its conception. Crisis stress will increase the shrinking perception of time available for the decisionmakers.[15] During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy said "the deadline defined the strategy."[16] The pressure became so great on Kennedy's cabinet that several sincerely doubted their chances of survival.[17] The time constraints will also change the manner of crisis resolution. Strategic ends are played out through tactical actions.[18] Decisions become more centralized as local diplomats and military commanders are given less autonomy.[19]

The crises surveyed complement the definition contained in the previous paragraphs. Additionally, they involved direct and rapid military intervention where the exchange of hostile fire was anticipated. They are presented with a synopsis and a cybernetic evaluation of each of the subsets of operational implementation. Finally, the outcome was evaluated against mission success and cost in the irreplaceable asset - human lives.

A. CONGO RESCUE, 1964

Dragon Rouge

"Operation Flagpole"

"Operation Task Force LEO"

"Operation Golden Hawk"

"Operation High Beam"

24 November 1964

Synopsis

The news of the spread of the revolution in the Congo during the middle of 1964 was intentionally suppressed by the highest levels of the U.S. government. The increasing stories of atrocities were downplayed in the theater of the world as centerstage was occupied by the unfolding and growing conflict in Southeast Asia. By November 1964 joint direct military intervention was undertaken by the U.S. and Belgian governments to end the sporatic slaughter of whites in the Congo. After much planning and many false starts for the final plans, Dragon Rouge was initiated. American airplanes and Belgian paratroopers freed more than two thousand hostages after 111 days of captivity and terror.

United Nations troops were withdrawn from the Congo after four years. In June 1964, a tenuous calm had been maintained by U.N. troops over the tribal factions within the Congo. Within a month anarchy resulted from the hostile actions of competing forces. Non-Congo nationals were taken as "prisoners of war." The vast majority of the hostages were Belgian nationals; however, the U.S. Consulate with five officials was occupied.[20]

The U.S. Ambassador immediately attempted to rescue his officials. The officials were temporarily safe within the compound while rebel

efforts to get them were flamboyant but pressed without resolve. The rebels had time on their side to get the five officials. Operation FLAG-POLE was unilaterally planned by U.S. Embassy personnel. While airplanes of the central government were to strafe the area, a helicopter rescue team would land inside the Consulate next to the flagpole and rescue the besieged officials. With a recent increase in the number of rebels at the Consulate, the U.S. Ambassador called off the rescue attempt.[21]

The attention of the American public and government officials was concentrated on the rapidly escalating war in Vietnam and the racial violence at home. The Congo crisis was evolving slowly within the perspective of other spectacular events. President Johnson wanted to maintain the Congo as "low key" as possible while quietly forming a small group to monitor the crisis. Secretary of State Rusk outlined to a wife of one of the hostages the President's goals: Don't give in to the rebels, don't do anything drastic and keep the wild stories out of the press. The President selected a trusted official to "pay particular attention" to Africa while he kept an eye on more prominent foreign and domestic events. For the next few months Averel Harriman was to be the principal actor for the National Command Authority in the search for a solution to the hostage crisis.[22]

The U.S. military was equally fragmented by the multitude of military operations and contingencies during the summer of 1964. More than sixteen thousand troops were in Vietnam and the U.S. air war over North Vietnam was beginning. The Congo was not a top priority with the Pentagon or the White House. Planning for a rescue would go through an evolutionary phase with multiple false starts.

The U.S. Strike Command, STRICOM, at MacDill Air Force Base be-
gan monitoring the crisis system at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. STRICOM has an existing plan, OPLAN 515/1 (Ready Move 2) which
would assist in the evacuation of U.S. nationals. With the minor modifi-
cation of the addition of an airborne rifle platoon to the helicopters
the plan was approved by the President. TF LEO became operational. How-
ever the rules of engagement were to severely limit its overall effect-
iveness.[23]

The Secretary of Defense reinforced the specific lack of direct
military action by TF LEO in a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to the Congo.
TF LEO would not be used in a rescue attempt and there would be no armed
guards on the mercy helicopter flights. The U.S. Ambassador fought to
increase the freedom of action of the task force. Finally, the decision
was reached in Washington D.C. that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would approve
a case by case basis, upon the recommendation of the U.S. Ambassador, to
allow helicopters to fly with armed escorts. The case by case approval
of the JCS was rare. Even when an American colonel was believed captured
by rebels the JCS disapproved a rescue attempt. TF LEO was very success-
ful as it caused a resurgence of confidence in the Congo central govern-
ment with its mercy flights but rescue attempts that would result in
direct military action were never approved.[24]

The situation in the Congo deteriorated by September to such an
alarming degree that Harriman asked the Secretary of Defense what the
military could do to correct the situation. The U.S. had a known total
of over twenty missionaries and five officials held as hostages; hundreds
of other foreign nationals were also hostage. STRICOM developed several
plans in three days that ranged from covert Special Forces rescue teams,

Operation Golden Hawk, to an overt rifle airborne brigade attack, Operation High Beam. The preliminary plan, Golden Hawk, declared the plan would show that the U.S. would not allow its citizens "legitimately in a country to be harassed, imprisoned, or otherwise molested." JCS approved the series of plans with the caveat that the plan would be approved for execution if the precise location of the hostages was determined. Operation Golden Hawk was to be disregarded as too hard plus not sufficient reasons existed to rescue American diplomats being harassed, imprisoned or otherwise molested. Operation High Beam was rejected two weeks before the Presidential election as too heavy exposure for U.S. troops in Africa.[25]

By November concensus was gained in both Washington, D.C. and Belgium that only direct military action would end the violence and free the hostages. The Joint Chiefs of Staff required initial planning from STRICOM. STRICOM forwarded two plans to the JCS. As the rescue was to be a combined Belgian and U.S. operation, the JCS directed detailed planning and coordination be executed by the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, USCINCEUR.[26]

The final rescue plan, DRAGON ROUGE, was only 22 pages long but it contained the detailed tactics of a long range combined airborne operation conceived under guidance from two leaders of sovereign nations. A small group of U.S. representatives from JCS and USCINCEUR and the Belgian paratroop command finalized the plan. The most critical elements throughout the plan was the system of go/no-go approvals and command of the operation. The combined operation was to require the approval by both governments for the operation. The U.S. was to maintain tight control of its forces throughout the operation. The Belgian government, once the overall decision to execute the plan was made, allowed the

Belgian commander to give final approval. The U.S. was initially displeased because the relationship was felt to be too loose. However, the CINCEUR pushed for overall control of the operation to be invested in the Belgian commander much earlier than in the initial plan. The commander with final decision authority should be a Belgian: "He's the guy who may have to die." The Belgians received command of the total operation from the final staging area.[27]

On 23 November 1964, the JCS ordered the execution of Dragon Rouge. Despite fears of disaster everything went like clockwork. Surprise generated success. The paratroop drop at the Stanleyville golf course met weak, sporadic resistance. The Belgians cleared the airfield and began landing the support aircraft. A telephone call from the temporary command post in the control tower confirmed the location of the hostages. The Belgian paratroopers rushed to the scene. The rebels had fled before they could complete the massacre. The city was cleared in rough house to house fighting with little quarter given by either side. In the end, over fifteen hundred foreign nationals were evacuated along with one hundred fifty friendly Congolese. The human price for the rescue was thirty-three hostages killed by the rebels.[28]

The tremendous success of the rescue offered an opportunity to continue rescue operations in Congo for the other hostages. The recommendation for continued operations by the Belgian commander was approved in Washington D.C. President Johnson was to go along with whatever the Belgians wanted as they had the most people to save and suffered the actual military casualties. Operation Dragon Noir was conducted on 26 November with U.S. air crews supporting Belgian paratroopers. Surprise was again on the side of the rescue force as they were to save another

three hundred seventy-five nationals. STRICOM wanted to continue the raids
but the on-scene commander recommended disapproval. The Belgian troops
were too tired and too small a force to carry out the extensive and ex-
tended operations. The U.S. Air Force extracted the tired Belgian para-
troopers; Operation Dragon Rouge and Noir saved the vast majority of
hostages from the rebels.[29]

Command

Was the chain of command clearly established and understood by
all forces during the direct and rapid military intervention?

Was the field commander able to competently execute command and
control over all assigned forces located at the tactical site?

Yes. The command and control of a combined airborne operation
was very complicated. One goal, as expressed by the CINCEUR, was to in-
sure unity of command. The man who may have to die would be the one in
control. In the final plan the U.S. maintained control over the forces
from deployment to the final assault position. From the assault position
the Belgian paratroop commander gained final command and control once the
airplanes were launched on the actual raid. At the tactical site the
Belgian paratrooper maintained control over his organic forces and the
attached U.S. aircraft.

Control

Was the field commander an essential member of the planning
process?

Was the ground tactical plan of the field commander the focus for
development of the overall plan, to include deployment training and
selection of all combat, combat service and combat service support forces?

Yes. The U.S. had developed several operation plans that would
allow for flexibility in the size of the deployment of forces. Once the

combined planning group assembled in Belgium, the Belgian ground tactical commander selected the appropriate size of forces from the various plans. The deployment of the forces was modified by the political constraints of overflight permission from third countries. This did not modify the ground tactical plan.

Communication

Did command elements higher than the field commander refrain from direct contact with the field commander or other forces at the tactical sight during the execution of the military intervention?

Yes. Both the U.S. and Belgian governments were kept abreast of the events during the actual military execution by the sophisticated communication assets provided by the U.S. Neither goverment directly interfered with the military raid. The ground tactical commander was to initiate contact with the two sovereign governments to request permission to continue the rescue attempts. The first one, Operation Dragon Noir, was approved. Later, further operations were not recommended by the ground tactical commander because his troops were exhausted and the unlikelihood of further success.

Outcome

Success. Over two thousand hostages were rescued by a force of six hundred men with only three soldiers killed and seven wounded.

B. SON TAY RAID, 1970

"KINGPIN"

"IVORY COAST"

21 November 1970

Synopsis

The headlines were to read "Operation Successful, Results Nil" for the Son Tay Raid. A nation's paradoxical mixture of pride and powerlessness greeted the Congressionally proclaimed heroic raiders.[30]

The plight of the American prisoners of war held in North Vietnam was the single common denominator of the nation during the end of the Vietnam conflict.[31] The North Vietnamese brutality toward the downed American pilots had inflamed the world community.[32] The Paris peace negotiations were intolerably slow. The American military in the south had already begun withdrawing. The POWs were the single purpose left in the war.[33] One secret event was to crystalize the prevailing emotions into military action: A positive identification of a very lucrative POW target. Intelligence photos revealed pictures of POWs around a compound. The code letters "SAR" and "K" were tromped in the ground: A "search and rescue mission," "come and get us." Son Tay was the target.[34]

The idea, concept and planning of the raid was to be the responsibility of SACSA, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A small special group was formed to plan and execute the raid.[35]

President Nixon was enthusiastic about the mission. At the end of September, Nixon approved the rescue - in principle. He wanted the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

brief Kissinger before he would make the final decision of _when_ the rescue should be made. Later the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, JCS were informed the raid would be postponed until after October. Unknown to them the President of the United States was conducting secret and sensitive negotiations to break the diplomatic stalemate.

Communist China was being discreetly solicited to end the stalemate. A raid conducted in October would be disastrous to national strategy. Final approval was to come eight days before Thanksgiving. When briefed on the possibility of a cancellation Nixon expressed the concern of "let's not let that happen. I want this to go." The specific date of execution was to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS.[36]

The POW targets were the most illusive element in the complex _and detailed raid. All events pertaining to the raid could be antici_-pated. Contingency plans were available from the national to the tactical level for every possible event. But the combined scientific and military strength of the nation would hinge on a final human analysis. Positive identification of POWs was made early and prompted the initial planning of the raid. Further detailed intelligence gathering by the drones and planes had to be balanced against alerting the enemy. John Hugher, the famous photo interpreter who identified Russian medium range missiles in Cuba, 1962, for President Kennedy, had personally coordinated the collection and surveillance of Son Tay.[37] The CIA had determined the camp was "active."[38] But active with whom - the North Vietnamese or the POWs? In the end, the Chairman, JCS was briefed on the latest and conflicting intelligence. Two envelopes were held up. One said the POWs were there; one said the POWs were gone. The JCS decided the high chances

of success plus the high pay off of gaining the freedom of the POWs warranted the decision to go. The Secretary of Defense concurred.[39] Son Tay was still a go.

The Red Rocket message was sent from the JCS to the Commander, JCTG on 18 November.[40] Ultimate go/no-go was in the hands of Brigadier General Manor. All superior headquarters would monitor the radio communications initiated by Commander, JCTG.

The largest night operation of the Vietnam war was to begin. The Navy diversion was to launch into Hanoi the flight wings of Task Force 77, comprised of three carriers. No missions had been flown in the two years over North Vietnam. Now, American planes were to go into the heaviest air defense in the world to drop flares.[41]

The helicopter raid was launched from Thailand. The diversion had lit up Haiphong Harbor like the Fourth of July with flares. The assault team's helicopter made an unprecedented planned crash into the Son Tay compound. The team leader used his most important equipment first: the bullhorn to alert the POWs of the rescue. The few guards were dead or wounded within minutes. The raiders broke into one cell after another. Ten minutes into the smooth, efficient assault the leader radioed over the command net: "Negative items at this time." No POWs were in the compound.[42] The raiders returned: Operation successful, results nil.

Command

Was the chain of command clearly established and understood by all forces during the direct and rapid military intervention?

Was the field commander able to competently execute command and control over all assigned forces located at the tactical site?

Yes. On 10 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the concept of the raid from SACSA. After probing questions and discussion by the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the concept was approved. More detailed planning would be needed and then the training of a joint task force to conduct the raid. Simultaneous efforts began on gaining the approval of the NCA and the establishment of the joint task force chain of command.[43]

The command of the joint task force would not be formed around the members of the JCS staff who had begun the planning and fought the bureaucratic battles to gain its initial approval. Both ranking members of SACSA were not available for the job, much to their understanding and natural disappointment. Because of previous assignments and special knowledge they were restricted from traveling in high risk areas. Their absence from their duties in Washington, D.C. would undoubtedly be noticed and cause too much friendly and enemy speculation. Finally, they would be needed to complete the overall plan at the JCS level. SACSA was able to pick their own commanders. An Air Force brigadier general, Manor, was to command the joint task force and an Army colonel, Simons, was to be the deputy commander and to lead the raid. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent out a message to all unified and specified military commands: The Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG) was formed at Eglin Air Force Base. The operation would be under the code name "Ivory Coast." There was no hint what Ivory Coast was about. The commanders were Manor and Simons. The point of contact for JCS coordination would be SACSA.[44]

BG Manor was given total command and control over all units that would be located at the tactical site. Once the final plan was approved by the NCA, the ComJCTG held "go-no go authority and operational control over all forces with authority to make all tactical decisions."[45]

Control

Was the field commander an essential member of the planning process?

Was the ground tactical plan of the field commander the focus for development of the overall plan, to include deployment, training and selection of all combat, combat service and combat service support forces?

Yes. SACSA, JCS had initiated the planning at the highest military level. The ground plan of Manor and Simons immediately took precedence for all planning. Manor, in his after action report, praised the freedom and priority he had been given. The task group had the freedom to develop optimized concepts for the situation at hand. Whatever Ivory Coast needed they would receive the highest priority the JCS could provide. Once the raid was approved, the Commander JCTG had operational control over all tactical decisions. All forces trained together at Eglin Air Force Base. In a short period the team conducted over 170 training missions, mostly at night. Aviation training of the team was over 697 flight hours and 268 sortie missions.[46] The Commander, JCTG retained broad latitude and decision authority for this intense training.[47]

The largest night operation encompassing joint operations required higher coordination and planning than was within the capability or desire of the Joint Contingency Task Group. The two members of SACAS had been retained at the JCS level specifically for that purpose. In conjunction with the detailed timing and tactics of the actual Son Tay raid, the JCS would personally write and direct the complicated attack of the air might of a three-carrier task force.

The National Command Authority had controlled the raid only to the extent of coordination of the military operations with national strategy. President Nixon had delayed the execution of the raid past

October. This was in keeping with a bold but precarious plan to solicit aid from Communist China. The lack of success of the diplomatic maneuvers prompted Nixon to give the approval for the raid during November.

The NCA had not established any constraints on the raid. During one briefing for Kissinger, Manor referred to the minimum use of fire. Kissinger retorted that "no one in the White House is concerned about enemy casualties. Use whatever restraint is appropriate, but whatever is essential for the most efficient operation."[48]

Communication

Did command elements higher than the field commander refrain from direct contact with the field commander or other forces at the tactical site during the execution of the military intervention?

Yes. The NCA and JCS had pushed down through the chain of command the authority over all aspects of the missio: to the Commander, JCTG. Future communication was inferred from the bottom to the top. Higher headquarters would only monitor the events. The Chairman, JCS had promised Nixon a communication hookup from the assault forces through the JCTG command post to the Pentagon. The White House situation room was to be informed within minutes of all events. The command and control network in place at Southeast Asia was augmented by two special circuits to the Pentagon. The circuits terminated at the Commander, JCTG command post. Immediate direct control through Manor to the raid leader, Simons, was practically impossible without ad hoc arrangements. The raid force maintained three hours of radio silence until the men were in the Son Tay compound. No messages originated down from the NCA or JCS level during the raid.[49]

Outcome

Success. Although the raid could initially be unfavorably viewed as a quixotic mission without success, it had many immediate, prolonged and subtle rewards.

The operation was the most complex and intricate in the Vietnam conflict. The raid gave new meaning to military precision. The POWs were an illusive target. Intelligence was based upon patterns and trends sighted from remote sensors, satellites and planes operating at over eighty thousand feet. Any guarantee, however fragile, would be speculation. A calculated risk combined with precision training to gain the freedom of sixty POWs and to break the diplomatic impasse warranted the execution of the mission.

The POWs were immediately herded together in Hanoi. Comradeship, the most precious commodity of the POWs was to increase under the "blissfully" crowded conditions. Treatment of the POWs by their captors, never good at any time, improved after the raid. Secondly, the resolve of the nation to regain the POWs was firmly put to the North Vietnamese government by the Son Tay raid. The diplomatic stalemate in Paris was broken.[50]

C. SS MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT, 1975

14 May 1975

During the Spring of 1975, Cambodia and Vietnam fell to Communist control. The question of the resolve of the United States to continue its predominate role in the free world or to withdraw into Fortress America was debated abroad and home. The SS Mayaguez incident was to draw the line by showing that in spite of setbacks in Indochina, the United States would not allow itself to be intimidated.

The SS Mayaguez was a small container ship which had been servicing Asian waters since January, 1975. During a routine trip with undistinguished commercial cargo, it was seized by Cambodian gunboats. Before the ship could be boarded it sent out a general distress signal. The "Mayday" was received in Jakarta, Indonesia by civilian commercial authorities. It was to generate immediate U.S. diplomatic and military action.[51]

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, CINCPAC, received the information within two hours of the capture of the Mayaguez. The message was simultaneously received at the White House, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon. The military began its alert notification procedures in accordance with its JCS Crisis Action System. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff was notified at 0646 hours. Reconnaissance aircraft were dispatched to the scene of the incident at 0730 hours. President Ford was briefed at 0730 hours.[52]

The first National Security Council meeting on the Mayaguez incident was held that Monday. The President received all available information from the Director of the CIA. The President was concerned with the location of the crew, and how much U.S. military force was

available in the area. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, said the need
to respond to the issue was beyond the simple loss of a vessel. The U.S.
power and will were questioned in the world arena. U.S. resolve must be
firmly comprehended by all world powers, especially by North Korean Pres-
ident Kim Il Sung as well as by the Cambodians in Southeast Asia. Kissinger
was emphatic on the use of force. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense,
urged that the U.S. should prevent the perception of over-reacting. If
necessary, only the minimum force should be used to get back the vessel
and the men. The first meeting of the National Security Council on the
Mayaguez crisis generated the consensus that force would have to be used.
The only remaining question was the degree needed.[53]

The end of the first NSC meeting was to establish the pattern for
the search for a solution to the Mayaguez crisis. Diplomacy was to be
exercised and military preparations were begun. A protest was to be
issued to the Cambodians through the Peoples Republic of China. A formal
public statement was issued. An aircraft carrier was ordered to the area.
An amphibious task force was to be assembled in the Philippines. Contin-
uous reconnaissance was to be maintained. And President Ford was taking
personal command of the crisis.[54] He said there was no time for multi-
layer analysis. The crisis demanded the attention of the President. In
addition, President Ford said he would draw on his recent experience with
the withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Vietnam and his Navy experience in
World War II on board an aircraft carrier.[55]

The NSC was to meet next on Tuesday morning. Earlier that morning
President Ford was informed that the Mayaguez had been found by reconnais-
ance aircraft and was being towed to Kompong Som. Ford remembered think-
ing that the new government of Cambodia would be tough and uncompromising.

The NSC meeting was to offer no new diplomatic advances towards a solution. The military options were reviewed. Ford was to personally decide the basic strategy to retake the Mayaguez and recover the crew. All ships were to be stopped between the island and the mainland. The fighters were to use whatever legitimate means necessary to isolate the island from the mainland.[56]

Three hours after the morning meeting, U.S. fighter aircraft observed boats with possible crew members of the Mayaguez being moved toward Kompong Som. Several of the boats without Caucasian personnel were attacked. The pilots' verbal radio message was picked up at the White House and rushed to President Ford. The President faced a tough decision. On Ford's orders, the boat was allowed to proceed. The fighter aircraft returned to refuel.[57]

The NSC was to meet again late Tuesday night. President Ford decided to attempt a rescue. Ford was offered eight options, seven of which were military (six of them predicated on possible violence). He elected to combine continued diplomacy with a combined military rescue. Because forces had to be assembled within striking distance of the Mayaguez, at least one day's delay was needed. Should there be no diplomatic breakthrough the rescue would be conducted on Wednesday, 14 May.[58]

The military had been continually refining its various options since the initiation of the crisis early on Monday morning. The local on-scene commander, Commander, U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force in Thailand, assumed the responsibility for planning and directing operations to recover her crew. On Monday afternoon a message to his subordinate and supporting units said:

. . . The international implications of this operation make restraint imperative. Complete command and control must be maintained by COMUSSAG/7AF, who will be acting upon direction from the National Military Command Center. . . .[59]

This directive was overruled by CINCPAC three hours later. The command and control of the operation would be maintained by CINCPAC, who will be acting under direction from JCS. COMUSSAG/7AF would be used for initial planning guidance. Any final rescue plan would be under CINCPAC. COMUSSAG/7AF would direct Mayaguez operations on the scene. Air Force and Marine assets were under the operational control of COMUSSAG/7AF. Navy assets were held under CINCPAC although they were directed to respond to directions and tasking from the on-site commander.[60]

The initial operation concept of the on-scene commander was to use a small element of Air Force security police to make a helicopter assault directly on the Mayaguez at first light on 14 May. However, one of the helicopters crashed due to mechanical failure in the prepositioning phase. CINCPAC then directed that COMUSSAG/7AF substitute a U.S. Marine Corps Security Force for the Air Force security police and emphasized that command and control would be maintained by CINCPAC.[61]

Because of directions by "higher authority," JCS directed CINCPAC to plan for and execute operations involving the seizure of the Mayaguez using the USS Holt, augmented by Marines. The island was to be taken by Marine forces supported by Air Force helicopter assets. All Cambodian small craft were to be sunk in the target area. B-52 strikes were to be directed against local ports and airfields on the mainland of Cambodia.[62]

CINCPAC further directed COMUSSAG/7AF to provide the detailed plans required by the JCS. Participating units provided input to the plan. The major disagreement was the specific method to board the Mayaguez.

The Marine task force commander wanted to board the Mayaguez by helicopter directly in a manner similar to COMUSSAG/7AF's previous plan. CINCPAC overruled this plan. The Mayaguez would be boarded by the USS Holt.[63]

The final approved concept for the rescue of the Mayaguez called for the simultaneous two-phase assault at sunrise. Marines would use eight helicopters to combat assault the island. Three Air Force helicopters would insert Marines on the USS Holt. The USS Holt would close with the Mayaguez to board and secure her. Close air support and area coverage against all Cambodian small craft would be provided by Air Force and Navy tactical air. Naval gunfire and B-52 strikes would be directed against possible reinforcing mainland Cambodian targets.[64] The plan was ready for the execution order.

The efforts to use diplomacy were not successful Wednesday. Neither the United Nations nor the Peoples Republic of China would or could assist the United States.[65] By 1645 hours President Ford issued the final orders to begin the rescue operation. Within a half an hour the troops began to move.[66]

The rescue was to disintegrate into two very different and independent battles. The Marines boarded the Mayaguez met no resistance. There were no Cambodians on the ships nor were there any bombs or booby traps. The Marines hoisted a U.S. flag on the freighter's fantail and awaited towing by the USS Holt. Their fellow Marines attacking the island were not to be so lucky.[67]

The assault on the island became a pitched and furious battle that would last all day and into the night. The two hundred and ten Marines attacked under the cover of fighter aircraft. At the beachhead they were confronted by an estimated one hundred to two hundred Cambodians.

Three U.S.   helicopters were shot down and two others damaged. Close
air strikes could not be coordinated by the Marine commander because one
of the downed helicopters contained his radios to contact the aircraft.
An air, land and sea battle was being conducted without effective communi-
cations at the combat site. It wasn't until the arrival of a slow for-
ward air controller with loitering ability were friendly positions pin-
pointed for effective close air support. By the time the order to with-
draw was executed a total of fifteen U.S. personnel were killed, forty-
nine wounded and three Marines missing in action.[68]

The events leading to the termination of all hostile action were
to generate the biggest controversy of the rescue operation. The Mayaguez
recovered but the crew was still missing. Marines at the island were
under heavy fire. Direct communication with the Cambodian government was
lacking. Events would unfold themselves until the crew was recovered.

The USS Wilson was on station observing the fierce Marine fight.
From the north the USS Wilson observed a light boat approaching. The
captain of the USS Wilson realized he would have to request through the
airborne command post permission from CINCPAC to engage the light boat
(or support the Marines by gunfire). Members of the approaching boat
were observed waving white cloth. Within minutes the crew of the Mayaguez
was taken aboard. Word was flashed to Washington, D.C.[69]

The controversy rose because the United States continued combat
operations while attempting to confirm that all the crew was recovered.
The Mayaguez crew was taken aboard the USS Wilson at 2249 hours,
Washington, D.C. time. At 2257 hours the second strike from the USS
Coral Sea hit Ream Airfield, destroying seventeen Cambodian aircraft.
Additional damage was done to support facilities for the airfield. Upon

final confirmation of the crew's recovery, President Ford ordered a halt to all offensive operations at 2316 hours. Ford told Schlesinger to continue support of the beleaguered Marines on Koh Tang island. Ford left to change from his formal clothes into a suit to address the nation on television of the conclusion of the crisis.[70]

The third strike had not been executed. Upon a query from the Pentagon whether to continue or disengage, Kissinger responded "tell them to bomb the mainland. Let's look ferocious." U.S. jets bombed and destroyed an oil depot near Kompong Som, some thirty five miles across the sea on the mainland from the Marines on Koh Tang island. The oil depot was destroyed in support of the Marines.[71] (Figure 3-1, Mayaguez Time Sequence)

At 2355 hours, the JCS notified all participants in the Mayaguez operation to immediately cease all offensive operations against the Khmer Republic. All forces were to be withdrawn as soon as possible consistent with safety and self-defense. By 0915 hours, 15 May the last Marines were pulled off Kohn Tang island. The crew of the Mayaguez was rescued and the U.S. had made an important diplomatic and military stand at the price of fifteen killed, forty-nine wounded and three missing in action.[72]

Command

Was the chain of command clearly established and understood by all forces during the direct and rapid military intervention?

Was the field commander able to competently execute command and control over all assigned forces located at the tactical site?

No. The initial on-scene military official exercising command and control over all units at the tactical site for the recovery operation was the Commander, U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force in Thailand.

EST, WASHINGTON, D.C.	EVENT
2009	Marines assault island*
2025	Mayaguez recovered; crew still missing*
2029	Ford informed of 2025 msg*
2045	Time on target, 1st strike*
2208	Recovery of Mayaguez crew confirmed by CINCPAC**
2229	CINCPAC report to NMCC that Mayaguez crew told "a condition for release (was) air strikes would stop"**
2257	Time on target, 2d strike*
2316	Ford orders halt to all offensive operations***
2350	Oil storage site hit on mainland***
2355	JCS orders halt to all offensive operations**
2400	3d strike complete*
0915	U.S. Marines extracted*

Figure 3-1

Mayaguez Time Sequence

Source:

*Head, Crisis Resolution
**U.S. Navy, CINCPAC, History
***Rowan, Four Days. "A Strong but Risky Show of Force." Time
(26 May 1975).

CINCPAC later rescinded this authority. CINCPAC would retain command and control while USSAG/7AF would direct operations. USSAG/7AF would have some responsibility for the operation but not control some of the participating forces. Navy sea and air assets in the area reported directly to CINCPAC although they were directed to provide all assistance to the on-scene commander.[73]

The field commander was unable to competently execute command and control over all assigned forces at the tactical site due to unusual command relationships and lack of communication assets. Both CINCPAC and USSAG/7AF exercised command over forces simultaneously in the tactical site. Control of the forces was hampered by the immense distances from the site to the two commands. CINCPAC received operational communications ahead of USSAG/7AF. "There was some difficulty correlating operations and intelligence reports because of this time differential."[74] It was not until the arrival of the slower forward air control aircraft that air, land and sea assets at the tactical site could effectively communicate with each other without resorting to passing information through CINCPAC or USSAG/7AF.

Control

Was the field commander an essential member of the planning process?

Was the ground tactical plan of the field commander the focus for development of the overall plan, to include deployment, training and selection of all combat, combat service and combat service support forces?

No. The tactical plans of the Marine Task Force Commander and COMUSSAG/7AF were overruled by CINCPAC and from "higher authority" relayed by JCS. The helicopter assault of the Mayaguez would not be executed although desired by the on-site commander and the Marine commander. The Marine commander was not permitted a good aerial reconnaissance of the

island because of minimum altitude restrictions. This critical error was

determined to be a local restriction in CINCPAC's after action report.

However, the restriction was much earlier dictated by CINCPAC to COMUSSAG/

7AF for all reconnaissance aircraft. Due to the lack of a single on-site

commander, the CINCPAC restrictions continued.

The ground tactical plan was pushed from the various command levels

senior to the COMUSSAG/7AF. The selection of the forces was done by

CINCPAC in regard to CINCPAC's concept of operations.

Communication

Did command elements higher than the field commander refrain from
direct contact with the field commander or other forces at the tactical
site during the execution of the military intervention?

No. All higher levels were constantly communicating with the

various forces at the tactical site. CINCPAC repeatedly overrode or

ignored COMUSSAG/7AF by communicating with forces.[75] President Ford

talked to the aircraft attempting to isolate the island. The NCA con-

tinued the micro-management of the Mayaguez operation during the assault

of the Koh Tang island. The NCA asked the helicopter pilot approaching

the island if he was being fired upon. The affirmative answer given by

the pilot was "unprintable."[76]

Outcome

Draw. The will and resolve of the United States was demonstrated.

The thirty-nine man crew was freed at a cost of fifteen killed, forty-

nine wounded and three missing in action. The loss of members of the

rescue force was a price of battle. But the price was pushed higher by

constant violation of the principles of unity of command.

All nations did not interpret the message of our actions as desired by the NCA. In little more than a year, North Korean President Kim Il Sung created a confrontation with the U.S. at Panmunjom, Korea by killing two American officers. President Ford would face the Korean tree cutting crisis on 20 August 1976.

D. KOREAN TREE CUTTING, 1976

Operation "Paul Bunyan"

20 August 1976

Synopsis

The peace of the cold war has never cooled down the most continuous "hot spot" since the Korean War: the U.N. Joint Security Area (JSA), Panmunjom, Korea. The eight hundred meter circle within the Demilitarized Zone houses the Military Armistice Commission Headquarters. A thin veneer of precise negotiation and restraint covers hostility, provocation and verbal abuse. A cessation of hostilities has legally existed since 1953, not a declaration of peace. Violence has repeatedly broken out. In August 1976, the violence was to leave two American officers dead by bludgeoning with axes, iron bars and boots. Such blatant provocation would cause President Ford to act with calculated restraint and massive visible military potential: Operation Paul Bunyan.[77]

The crisis event that would cost two men their lives and cause the movement of massive U.S. forces is a trivality when taken on its face value: the pruning of a tree within the JSA compound. However, any conflict in the JSA has the potential of becoming a casus belli--a cause justifying war. The U.S. military commander at Panmunjom was alerted to the potential problem when the small maintenance crew was initially prevented by the North Koreans from performing their job. Within the daily life of tension and bluff this was a routine event. The JSA commander took nothing for granted as he prepared for the worse in the second attempt.

A reinforced work detail of fifteen men were to be assigned the mission of completing the trimming of the tree. The American security force of ten men would be staffed by two U.S. Army officers, three enlisted and four South Korean enlisted guards. The interpreter would be a South Korean army captain. They were to be reinforced by the remainder of the duty platoon from six hundred sixty yards away. Additionally a backup platoon was put on alert. The entire event would be monitored by telephone and radio; cameras at two observation posts would record any unuaual events.[78]

The rules of engagement at the tree were established before the work detail departed. The American officer in charge was instructed by the JSA commander to continue working if the Americans encountered the usual harassment. If a real confrontation developed, he was to disengage and withdraw. The difference was up to the discretion of the officer in charge. The decision point was never reached.[79]

The attack came without the usual North Korea provocation. The North Korean guards were unusually congenial. More North Korean guards gathered until they held a three to one advantage over the American and South Korean work detail. The North Korean lieutenant instructed the American captain to stop. Work continued in the face of a routine confrontation. The routine stopped when the North Korean lieutenant yelled the military order to "kill them all."[80]

Two American officers would die before the reinforcing platoons could arrive. Cameras indelibly recorded the officers being kicked and beaten with clubs and axes. The fight was over in two minutes. Information of the incident was flashed to the United Nations Command in Seoul, and the National Military Command Center (NMCC), in Washington, D.C.

The National Military Command Center began its alert notification and crisis assessment system within an hour of the incident. The Watch Officer's Net in the NMCC linked the operation centers of the Defense Department, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House Situation Room. The Secretary of State alerted President Ford. The President, at the Republican convention in Kansas City, was upset at the brutality of the killings. President Ford directed that the options be developed for a U.S. response to the crisis.[81]

Options were to be developed by the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) composed of representatives from the State Department, Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency. Secretary of State Kissinger keyed to the redressing of a premeditated act of brutality. Action was the consensus; specifics were undetermined.

General Stilwell, the U.N. Commander in Korea, analyzed the situation and the options developed by his staff and dispatched a concept of operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Stilwell recommended a plan to enter the JSA and cut the tree down: Operation Paul Bunyan. The remaining question was the no-notice versus prior notice. The advantages and disadvantages of each was outlined by the U.N. message. The Commander, Korea, opted for the first course. However, he indicated that he would understand that broader considerations by the National Command Authority might dictate the selection of the choice of prior notice.[82]

The second meeting of the SWAG approved the tentative plans of a diplomatic and military response. General Stilwell's plan was tentatively approved. The no-notice version was accepted. President Ford was personally briefed by Kissinger at Kansas City. Ford approved the recommended

military deployments but would withhold final approval for Operation Paul Bunyan until the details of the plan arrived.

The detailed plan was finished by the U.N. Command and forwarded to JCS. Both JCS and, subsequently, the SWAG approved. President Ford personally approved the plan. Operation Paul Bunyan was to begin at 0700 hours, Korean time.[83]

The tactical goal of the plan was to cut down the tree and to provide a secondary task force to provide cover and reinforcement as necessary to counter any North Korean actions. The tree would be cut by a force of one hundred and ten U.N. personnel under the command of the JSA commander. The secondary task force was under the Commander, U.S. Second Infantry Division in twenty utility helicopters and seven Cobra attack helicopters. More combat reinforcement was provided by airborne jet fighters and B52's south of the DMZ.[84]

At the prescribed time the task force moved into the JSA area and began cutting the tree. The North Korean did not respond. The task force was unmolested. The tree fell in forty-two minutes. The immense task force, tailored to meet any contingency, withdrew.[85]

Command

Was the chain of command clearly established and understood by all forces during the direct and rapid military intervention?

Was the field commander able to competently execute command and control over all assigned force located at the tactical site?

Yes. The chain of command was clearly established in Korea before the crisis event. General Stilwell was the commander of U.N. and U.S. forces in Korea. Subordinate to him in the military intervention were the Commander, I Corps, the Commander, Second Infantry Division (U.S.) and the Commander, JSA.

General Stilwell was able to competently execute command and control of all forces at the tactical site through the established chain of command and excellent communications. The plan of Operation Paul Bunyan allowed enough flexibility for each subordinate commander to meet any North Korean response. The Commander, JSA would initiate any action to protect his force during the tree cutting. He deviated slightly from the plan by repositioning a security platoon without the need to gain authorization from higher echelons of command. Aided by excellent communications, General Stilwell was instantaneously aware of all moves by forces within the tactical site. By his monitoring silence he concurred with the decisions of the Commander, JSA.[86]

Control

Was the field commander an essential member of the planning process?

Was the ground tactical plan of the field commander the focus for development of the overall plan to include deployment, training and selection of all combat, combat service and combat service support forces?

Yes. General Stilwell crossed the bounds of a normally peripheral actor when he initiated the basic plan for Operation Paul Bunyan in accordance with JCS procedures.[87] The additional combat power of the F4's, F111's, and B52's was supplied by the National Command Authorities to round out the ground tactical plan as those forces were not within the command of General Stilwell.

Communication

Did command elements higher than the field commander, refrain from direct contact with the field commander or other forces at the tactical site during the execution of the military intervention?

Yes. During the cutting of the tree General Stilwell established himself as the critical link of communications between the task force and

END

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

the National Command Authority. Messages would not flow between the
levels without his authority. He even eliminated the requirement that
the task force report to the I Corps operation center.[88]

Outcome

Success. The tactical objective of the task force was accomplished
as the tree was felled without violence. The U.S. had demonstrated its
resolve that its legitimate rights would be observed in the JSA.

E. IRAN RAID, 1980

24 April 1980

Synopsis

Shortly after 7:30 p.m. on April 24, 1980, eight helicopters were launched from the U.S. Carrier Nimitz to rendezvous with C130 Hercules transport aircraft at Desert One, one hundred miles southeast of Tehran, Iran. Their mission was to force the release of 53 hostages held for six months in the U.S. Embassy. Within hours eight U.S. servicemen would be dead, one C130 destroyed and six helicopters with classified plans abandoned in the wind swept field at Desert One. American hostages were to endure a total of 444 days of captivity.[89]

The fall of the Shah of Iran and the assumption of total power by Khomeini resulted in the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran and holding the diplomatic staff hostage by revolutionaries beginning 4 November 1979.[90] An immediate overt and covert search for solutions was begun in both diplomatic and military channels. Nonbelligerent options were to use the United Nations, negotiate through former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, blacklist Iranian ships and aircraft, or adopt an international telecommunications embargo.[91] Covert diplomatic efforts included the Iranian proposition of a UN commission on the crimes of the Shah and the assassination of the Shah by the Central Intelligence Agency.[92] Initially, President Carter was viewed as showing restraint and self control; in Democratic polls Carter won a marked increase in his margin over Senator Kennedy during the presidential primary campaign.[93] However, secret consultations had begun on the use of a covert military operation to break the diplomatic impasse.

Two days after the seizure of the Embassy the planning for a rapid and direct military response was set in motion at the NCA level by Brezezinski, President Carter's national security advisor. Months of spirited debate and meticulous planning inevitably drew in the President as diplomatic efforts proved unsuccessful. President Carter's initial guidance was to free the hostages and get them out alive without one American shot; then we could "punish" the Iranians.[94] However, the President would remain aloof of military plans until 7 April when he decided that the time had come for the United States to act more assertively.

The U.S. military plan was initiated as a contingency plan in case some of the hostages were sentenced to death or were simply murdered by their kidnappers. The largest two problems were the lack of intelligence regarding the hostages and the enormous complexity of logistics.[95] No U.S. agents were in Iran at the fall of the Embassy. The intermission of agent intelligence was filled by satellite photos of the Embassy compound that kept planners aware of the change in habits and composition of terrorist guards. By the day of execution, U.S. agents had infiltrated and knew the precise location of each hostage and the schedule of the guards.[96] The final assault at the tactical sight could be planned based upon facts and not conjecture. Logistically, the target was remote from any U.S.-controlled facilities. Land base positions would be used without the knowledge of countries in the area. The military advantages were to outweigh the diplomatic risks and consequences. On 11 April the military option was viewed as the best way out of a situation that was becoming intolerably humiliating; Carter instructed the military to proceed without delay.[97]

On the day of the raid the President remained in the Oval Office, and Brezezinski was at his office in the White House. The Secretary of Defense, Brown, was at the Department of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, would "conduct" the operation itself from the National Military Command Center.[98] The most complex amphibious raid in military history was launched from a strike force in the Indian Ocean totaling four aircraft carriers (one more than faced the Japanese at the Battle of Midway), four hundred aircraft, thirty-three support vessels, a Marine landing force of eighteen hundred and over thirty-two thousand airmen and seamen.[99] Hours after the launch of the raid, Brown reported to Brezezinski that two helicopters were unable to rendezvous at Desert One. The remaining six could proceed with the mission. An hour later an "abort situation" developed because one helicopter at Desert One had a hydraulic problem. The President concurred with the field commander on the abort situation. During the refueling in order to extract from Iran, tragedy struck at Desert One. One helicopter blinded by the dust and under total blackout conditions, flew into the refuel C130. The force abandoned the remaining helicopters and left eight dead in the inferno.[100]

Command

Was the chain of command clearly established and understood by all forces during the direct and rapid military intervention?

Was the field commander able to competently execute command and control over all assigned forces located at the tactical site?

No. President Carter had remained aloof from the planning process until further diplomatic effort seemed fruitless. However, the NCA had exercised its authority to establish constraints for the planning process.

The foremost constraint adversely effecting command was the numerous
complicated go/no-go decision at each stage of a long complex mission.[101]
This intricate management phenomena would not singularly be a total
hindrance to execution however, when combined with command problems at
lower levels, it instilled an abort mentality, at best, and a prelude to
disaster, in fact.

President Carter had examined every aspect of the mission but
emphasized he would not interfere with operations.[102] The NCA would direct
the Commander, Joint Task Force (ComJTF) to execute, delay or cancel on
24 April.[103] Go/no-go decisions would be from the top to the bottom along
the chain of command. The command control was excellent at upper echelons
but "tenuous and fragile" at intermediate levels. Below the Commander,
Joint Task Force, relationships were not clearly established and subject
to misunderstanding under pressure.[104] One month prior to the mission
execution, a deputy commander was appointed who was one military grade
senior to the ComJTF. One week before mission execution ComJTF designated
an on-site commander at Desert One with the change of command to the
Ground Force Commander after refueling operations.[105] To compound the
"tenuous and fragile" command relationship at Desert One, the ComJTF was
too far from the scene. While Desert One had adequate strategic communi-
cations, the procedures did not allow the ComJTF to effectively influence
the forces at the tactical site.[106]

Control

Was the field commander an essential member of the planning process?

Was the ground tactical plan of the field commander the focus for
development of the overall plan, to include deployment, training and
selection of all combat, combat service and combat service support forces?

Unfavorable but incomplete determination. Numerous events of an overall ill-fated execution indicate poor military planning but data is unavailable to finitely determine the field commander's role and the effects of the ground tactical plan.

Numerous events have been documented in public sources that indicate an unfavorable determination. The NCA had built in constraints that limited the tactical freedom of action of the ComJTF. The constraints were the safe rescue of all hostages, numerous complicated go/no-go abort decisions at each stage of a long complete mission, avoid harming any Iranians and the requirement for self extraction capabilities of the rescue force at every stage of operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had an existing JCS Conplan for actions to counter terrorism directed against the US interests, citizens or property in other nations. The Conplan would have built upon developed procedures, established commands and maintained communications security requirements.[107] An independent review of the feasibility of the final plan would have been accomplished within established JCS crisis management.[108] Finally the prolonged ad hoc arrangements and extreme emphasis on operational security severely limited coordination, resulting in tasking from different sources and confusion at the operating level.[109] As a result only six joint rehearsals were held for the most complicated amphibious raid of the nation's history.[110]

Communication

Did command elements higher than the field commander refrain
from direct contact with the field commander or other forces at the
tactical site during the execution of the military intervention?

No. President Carter had repeatedly indicated he would take no action in the tactical operations. However, the NCA would exercise go/ no-go approval throughout the raid. Communication between the rescue

team and the Pentagon would be instantaneous by using satellites and other facilities. Carter would receive phone reports from General Jones. Late in the afternoon the President was advised of the problems at Desert One and the ocean-site commanders "intention to abort." President Carter approved the no-go decision. These numerous go/no-go decisions at each stage of the operation by echelons above the ComJTF adversely affected overall mission execution.[111]

Outcome

Failure. The mission did not meet its objectives of releasing the hostages.[112]

CHAPTER 3

NOTES

[1]William, _Crisis Management_, 20.

[2]Lebow, _Between Peace and War_, 309.

[3]Ibid., 291.

[4]William, _Crisis Management_, 4.

[5]Lebow, _Between Peace and War_, 270.

[6]Head, _Crisis Resolution_, 25.

[7]Ibid., 4-11.

[8]Falkowski, _Presidents, Secretary of States_, 55
Hazlewood, "Planning for Problems," 2-5.

[9]Falkowski, _Presidents, Secretary of States_, 17.

[10]Lebow, _Between Peace and War_, 93-97.
Hazlewood, "Planning for Problems," 2-5.

[11]Head, _Crisis Resolution_, 30.
Lebow, _Between Peace and War_, 10-12.

[12]Mahoney, "Analysis of Crisis Management," 4-24.

[13]Kahn, _The Coming Boom_, 151.

[14]Mahoney, "Analysis of Crisis Management," 6-60.

[15]Holsti, _Crisis, Escalation, War_, 22.

[16]Schlesinger, _A Thousand Days_, 808.

[17]Abel, _The Missile Crisis_, 203.

[18]Davis B. Bobrow, "Communications, Command and Control: The Nerves of Intervention" in Ellen P. Stern, ed., _The Limits of Intervention_ (1977), 104.

[19]Buchan, "Crisis Management," 331.

Congo

[20]Fred E. Wagoner, <u>Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo</u> (1980), 5-14.

[21]Ibid., 19-22.

[22]Ibid., 22-27, 70, 201.

[23]Ibid., 30-31, 201.

[24]Ibid., 31-33, 39-40, 73.

[25]Ibid., 54-69, 199.

[26]U.S. Army, United States Strike Command. <u>JTF LEO Historical Report (U)</u> (1965), 6-9.

[27]Wagoner, <u>Dragon Rouge</u>, 130-137, 147-8, 160.

[28]Ibid., 177-182.
U.S. Army, <u>JTF LEO</u>, 7.
"The Congo: Killing Ground" <u>Newsweek</u> (7 Dec 1964), 47-48.

[29]Wagoner, <u>Dragon Rouge</u>, 185-189.

Son Tay Raid

[30]"Operation Successful, Results Nil," <u>Newsweek</u> (7 Dec 1970), 26-28.

[31]Benjamin F. Schemmer, <u>The Raid</u> (1976), 132.

[32]Ibid., 10-25.

[33]Ibid., 132-135.

[34]Ibid., 31-35.

[35]Ibid., 37-80.

[36]Ibid., 3, 134-5, 140-160.

[37]Ibid., 60-61.

[38]Leroy J. Manor, "The Son Tay Prisoners of War Rescue Operation" (1976), C-7.

[39]Schemmer, <u>The Raid</u>, 176-8.

[40]Manor, "Son Tay," J-6,-7.

[41]Schemmer, <u>The Raid</u>, 195-199.

[42]Ibid., 200-215.

[43]Ibid., 68-72.

[44]Ibid., 72-76, 81-82, 90.

[45]Manor, "Son Tay," v-vi.

[46]Schemmer, The Raid, 139.

[47]Manor, "Son Tay," iii-v: BG Manor also included a strong warning that it would be "unwise to project concepts or tactics precisely tailored to (the Son Tay raid) into a different environment." There is a strong similarity between the Son Tay Raid and the Iran Rescue (Chapter 3, Section E).

[48]Schemmer, The Raid, 138.

[49]Manor, "Son Tay," J-1, 77-79.

[50]Schemmer, The Raid, 273-284.

Mayaguez

[51]"A Strong but Risky Show of Force," Time (26 May 1975), 9-17.
Head, Crisis Resolution, 101.
U.S. Navy, Commander In Chief, Pacific. Command History 1975 (1976), 3.

[52]Head, Crisis Resolution, 106-7, 236.
US Navy, CINCPAC, History, 3.

[53]Head, Crisis Resolution, 110.
Roy Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez (1975), 141.
Ron Nessen, It Sure Looks Different From the Inside (1978), 122.

[54]Head, Crisis Resolution, 109-111.
Rowan, Four Days, 90.

[55]Head, Crisis Resolution, 109.
Rowan, Four Days, 70, 90-1.

[56]Ibid.

[57]U.S. Navy, CINCPAC, History, 16-17.
Nessen, Looks Different, 122.
Rowan, Four Days, 138-9, 143.

[58]Head, Crisis Resolution, 114, 116-7.

[59]U.S. Navy, CINCPAC, History, 5.

[60]Ibid.

[61] Ibid., 21-22

[62] Ibid., 23.

[63] Ibid., 24.
"Mayday for the Mayaguez," Proceedings (Nov 1976), 100-104.

[64] U.S. Navy, CINCPAC, History, 24-25.
"Mayday," 104-108.

[65] "A Strong but Risky Show," 13.

[66] Head, Crisis Resolution, 131.
Nessen, Looks Different, 123.
Donald E. Carlile, "The Mayaguez Incident - Crisis Management,"
Military Review (Oct 1976), 9.

[67] U.S. Navy, CINCPAC, History, 25-6.
"Mayday," 100-104.

[68] U.S. Navy, CINCPAC, History, 26.
"Mayday," 104-108.

[69] Ibid., 108.
Nessen, Looks Different, 125-6.
Rowan, Four Days, 199.

[70] Ibid., 202-205, 217.

[71] Nessen, Looks Different, 129.
Rowan, Four Days, 219.
"A Strong but Risky Show," 14.
U.S. Navy, CINCPAC, History , 27.
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Mayaguez Incident (U)" 9 June
1975, (Airstrike damage photos, CARL, CGSC).

[72] U.S. Navy, CINCPAC, History, 28.

[73] "Mayday," 97.

[74] U.S. Navy, CINCPAC, History, 20.

[75] "Mayday," 94, 97.

[76] John R. Baker, "Civilian Crisis Management of Military Operations:
Implications For the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)" (MMAS
Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), 61.

Korea

[77] Head, Crisis Resolution, 149-159.

[78] Ibid., 161-2.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid., 183: General Stilwell felt the fundamental principle was to insure protection of our forces at JSA, "although it was only a damn tree."

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid., 194.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid., 195
Wayne A. Kirkbrich, Timber - The Story of Operation Paul Bunyan (1980), 35, 92.

[87] Head, Crisis Resolution, 245.

[88] Kirkbrich, Timber, 39, 77: Communications from General Stilwell's headquarters and the task force was still open and vulnerable to radio operator or low level staff officer interference. Yongsam asked SJA how old was the tree. "Unknown" was the task force's response. Yongsam then directed the task force to "count the rings" of the tree. It is believed the task force did not complete that impromptu task.

Iran

[89] Zbigniew Brezezinski "The Failed Mission" The New York Times Magazine (18 April 1982), 30.
Jimmy Carter, "Keeping Faith - Part II," Time (18 Oct 1982), 57.

[90] Brezezinski, "Mission," 28.

[91] Ibid., 61.

[92] Hamilton Jordan. "Crisis - The Last Year of the Carter Presidency," Newsweek (27 Sept 1982), 50-61.

[93] Theodore H. White. America in Search of Itself (1982), 16.

[94] Ibid., 15.

[95] Brezezinski, "Mission," 28.

[96] Carter, "Faith - Part II," 57.

[97] Brezezinski, "Mission," 31, 62.

[98] Ibid., 69-71.

[99]Robert L. Earl. "A Matter of Principle," Proceedings (Feb 1983), 34.

[100]Brezezinski, "Mission," 64.
"Iran Rescue Mission" (text in 3 issues) Aviation Week and Space Technology (15 Sept 1980), 69.

[101]Ibid.

[102]Brezezinski, "Mission," 64.
Carter, "Faith - Part II," 57.

[103]"Iran Rescue Mission" (15 Sept 1980), 69.

[104]Ibid. (15 Sept 1980), 63; (29 Sept 1980), 91.

[105]Earl, "Principle," 34.

[106]"Iran Rescue Mission" (15 Sept 1980), 69.
Edward N. Luttwek "On the Need to Reform American Strategy" in Phillip S. Kronenberg, ed., Planning U.S. Security (1981), 25.
Schemmer, The Raid, 176-7: Son Tay raid had 56 soldiers with 92 radios plus a backup of 234 radios. The command and control at Desert One disolved to shouting at each other in the noise, dust and darkness.

[107]"Iran Rescue Mission" (15 Sept 1980), 70-71.

[108]Ibid., (29 Sept 1980), 90.

[109]Ibid., (15 Sept 1980), 70-71.

[110]"Operation Successful, Results Nil," Newsweek (7 Dec 1970), 26-28: The Son Tay raiders held over 150 live fire, joint rehearsals.

[111]Brezezinski, "Mission," 78.
"Iran Rescue Mission" (15 Sept 1980), 69.

[112]Alexander Scott (pseud.) "The Iran Raid: The Lessons of the Iran Raid for American Military Policy" Armed Forces Journal International (Jun 1980) 26-73: The failure was not combining the tactical objectives with a comprehensive, coherent national strategy.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Everything is very simple in war,
but the simplest thing is difficult.

Clausewitz

General

Crisis behavior is understood by the process which decisions are

reached and implemented. Each case study presented an investigation into

the cybernetic resolution of the crisis by the men and the organizations

of men following prescribed means of operations. The path between the

preferred solution and actual performance ranged from superior similarity

to a sham episode. The comparisons of the actual events and outcomes of

the five case studies gave a more precise formulation of the concept of a

cybernetic pattern and an indication for refining and testing further

propositions and models for assistance in future operations.

Analysis

The model developed in the methodology of Chapter 1 provided a

framework to accurately develop a cybernetic pattern. Each criterion re-

quired a finite resolution of the individual parts that was observable

by specific actions. Determining the outcome of each crisis was the

most subjective part of the analysis. The different complexity of each

crisis stated tactical and implied strategic mission plus the human price

of success or failure makes the outcomes even more subjective.

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If the observable, specific actions were answered in the affirmative an indication was made by a "+"; the operational implementation system was very close to the cybernetic process. If the system and the process were not similar, an indication was made by a "-". The outcome was indicated by an "X" in the appropriate column.

	Operational Implementation			Outcome		
	Command	Control	Communications	Success	Draw	Failure
Congo	+	+	+	X		
Son Tay	+	+	+	X		
Mayaguez	-	-	-		X	
Paul Bunyan	+	+	+	X		
Iran	-	(-)	-			X

Figure 4-1

Cybernetic Pattern

Source: Author

Command

The emphasis of command is exclusively unique to the military. Command is the entity that combines supreme responsibility with supreme authority. The President as the civilian elected official is held accountable to the body politic. But as the Commander-in-Chief of the military forces he retains supreme responsibility and authority. To control the vast military bureaucracy and to meet the myriad of threats to national interests and security, he has legally delegated responsibility with its commensurate authority through the chain of command. During the normal state of affairs, this is the standard procedure. However, during a crisis, with its external, unanticipated threat to important values with

restricted decision time, the President has taken extraordinary employ-
ment of the chain of command. The Presidential initiative will effect
command relationships down to the lowest field commander.

During the Congo, Son Tay and Paul Bunyan crises the command struc-
ture was precisely established, and effectively and efficiently used. Each
structure during the three crises was significantly different. But each
individual in the chain of command from the President down to the field
commander knew his specific responsibilities and authorities. The Presi-
dent and the chain of command did not needlessly limit or interfere with
the actions of subordinates.

During the Mayaguez incident and the Iran raid the chain of com-
mand was never completely and unequivocally articulated. Roles of re-
sponsibility and authority were vague. The field commanders were not
able to competently execute command and control over all assigned forces
at the tactical site.

Control

Control is the predetermined planning system. It develops a sound
tactical plan that is coordinated, executed and supported throughout the
chain of command. The modification of each plan during its critical ex-
ecution is not an unanticipated reality. Instead it is a critical necessity
that can change adversity into opportunity during the battle.

The military has codified the planning system for both peace and
war. These are the deliberate and the time-sensitive planning systems.
The time-sensitive planning is an abbreviated but orderly manner to develop
an effective and efficient plan. The field commander is an essential
member of this planning process. He must be the focus for the overall
development and execution of the plan.

Control was exercised along the predetermined system in the Congo rescue and Operation Paul Bunyan. The Son Tay raid deviated from the predetermined planning system. But the deviations were precise and augmented the existing command and control networks. Son Tay worked with and not against the predetermined control apparatus.

The Mayaguez incident was attempted initially within the established planning system, but because of the inability to establish and maintain effective command, control was an exercise in futility.

The analysis of the use of control of the Iran raid gives an unfavorable but an incomplete determination. Numerous events of an overall ill-fated execution indicate poor military planning but data is unavailable to finitely determine the field commander's role and the effects of the ground tactical plan.

Communication

Once the events were set in motion by the command and control apparatus, communications provided the catalyst that allowed the system to function. Communication should proceed through the chain of command to insure control can function effectively and efficiently.

During the Congo rescue, Son Tay raid and Operation Paul Bunyan higher command elements refrained from direct contact with the field commander. The original plan was allowed to proceed. When correction was necessary, it was initiated by the field commander commensurate with the tactical situation.

During the Mayaguez incident, communication was so prolific and the chain of command so vague that there was no single field commander. CINCPAC was the only common commander of the assembled forces. And CINCPAC was repeatedly skipped as a command echelon as the NCA directed

the assembled forces at the crisis focus. The control of communications from the NCA was itself vague and misleading. After President Ford ordered a halt to all offensive operations, the Secretary of State ordered the continuation of the attack of the oil depot. Messages received over highly sophisticated and secure communication equipment carries an intrinsic authority. Even CINCPAC would assume the order to continue the bombing must have originated with the National Command Authority.

Outcome

Three of the crisis resolutions were classified as successes: Congo rescue, Son Tay raid and Operation Paul Bunyan. The Congo rescue was able to accomplish its mission with fewer friendly casualties. The Son Tay raid and Operation Paul Bunyan had no friendly casualties. However, the Son Tay raid did not accomplish its primary mission of the rescue of the POWs. The Son Tay raid prompted better treatment for all the American POWs, probably a greater national interest than the few targeted American POWs at the Son Tay compound. In addition the raid and the subsequent bombing of the north were credited with being the primary stimulus to break the stalemate of the Paris Peace Talks.

The Mayaguez incident was a draw. The American ship crew was released but the degree of U.S. military action that prompted the release has been contested. Hindsight can permit the speculation of timidity while the pressure of execution normally calls for intrepid action. President Ford committed the U.S. Marines to search the island for the location of the American crew. The resulting inordinately high casualties probably were due to the poor command relationship and control apparatus. The price was simply so high that the rescue of the Mayaguez was not a success but a draw.

The Iran raid resulted in casualties plus no rescue of the hostages. The explicit tactical mission was a failure. And probably more unfortunately, the raid was an exercise in a strategic void. Any military action should be an element of a well orchestrated national strategy to protect U.S. national interests. The Iran raid operated in a strategic vacuum. Only the rescue of the hostages with minimum friendly casualties could have been a success. All else was to be a failure of the entire military and national strategic spectrum.

Conclusions

> use of force . . . should be wielded by the
> brave but governed by the wise
> Theodore H. White

Improvements in communications technology have immutably altered the battlefield. Authority and responsibility at all levels has been distributed and distorted. The NCA has established more precise objectives and limits on theater commanders due to the potential serious impact in the world political arena of tactical actions. The need for real-time communications and the technological advances have given the National Command Authority the myth of omniscient cybernetics. A myth, no matter how constructed, may have very real consequences. Prophecies based on initial perceptions can produce conditions which really exist. Men will respond to symbols of the myth by real behavior.

Thesis Question

What is the cybernetic pattern of crisis management by the National Command Authority during a direct and rapid military intervention?

Omniscient cybernetics is a defective myth. In the cases examined, during a direct and rapid military intervention in response to a crisis the increased involvement of the higher levels of command in tactical

planning and execution severely lowered chances of success for the operation. When the top levels of command became inordinately involved as the crisis becomes the "only game in town," there was a greater propensity for failure.

Comparative analysis of the five case studies indicates the key leverage for success was the establishment and maintenance of the command relationships. This sets the roles for the participants in the crisis resolution. Boundaries of authority and responsibility were established. Control, even in a time-sensitive environment, can then effectively and efficiently function. Communication will follow suit by enhancing combat operations and not being a detraction from crisis resolution.

The personal attention of the President of the United States permeated the entire command, control and communications of each military intervention. If the President was personally involved, even relatively insignificant changes had devastating effects down the chain of command to the field commander. If the President was not personally involved, the entire process proceeded along the efficient and effective predetermined apparatus for crisis resolution.

President Nixon was concerned with the Paris Peace Talks and the covert process of diplomatic recognition of Communist China. He approved the principle of the Son Tay raid but remained above the details. President Ford had witnessed the deterioration of U.S. prestige by the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia. The detention of the Mayaguez provided the United States with an event to regain U.S. honor. He and the entire chain of command inordinately participated in the "crisis." A year later, when President Ford was faced with the tree cutting incident in Korea, he was fighting for his political life at the Republican Convention in Kansas City.

He let the JCS develop the crisis response in accordance with predetermined time-sensitive planning procedures. President Carter was consumed with the Iran hostage crisis. He viewed military intervention as a symptom of the failure of the White House to adequately resolve the crisis. He would not dictate the details of a military raid but he would demand inhibiting constraints.

Operation Paul Bunyan was a superior example of crisis management. The chain of command was firmly established and used. Control procedures produced realistic alternatives that could be subjectively analyzed. Communications was used to enhance the successful execution of the tactical commander moving his forces against the unknowns of the battlefield. The Congo rescue was a more complex operation because it required the intense coordination of both the civil and military forces of the United States and Belgium. Again, command lines were established and all elements of command adhered to predetermined control procedures. Communication was an enhancement, not a detractor, of the operation.

The Son Tay Raid did not deviate from the success principles of the resolution of the Congo rescue. Command and control procedures were firmly established. Any deviations from the predetermined planning process were precise and augmented the existing command and control networks.

The Mayaguez incident and the Iran raid are close contenders for the prominent sham of direct and rapid military intervention in response to a crisis. The path of the preferred solutions as outlined by predetermined command, control and communications were far from the cybernetic procedure of actual performance. Contrary to the popular adage that success has many fathers but failure is a bastard, the failings of the Mayaguez incident and the Iran raid host a large pedigree.

Test for sensitivity

The foregoing analysis used both objective and subjective determination. The elimination of a crisis event or the modification of a result would not significantly alter the overall conclusions if analysis was done objectively and critically.

The determination of the outcome was the single most subjective analysis. The complexity of each crisis, the stated and implied tactical and strategic missions plus the critical price of the military intervention in the terms of human casualties strains rational analysis.

The clear success of the resolution of the Congo rescue and Operation Paul Bunyan is simple. The Congo rescue lost three soldiers and saved over two thousand hostages. No men were lost in Operation Paul Bunyan. The price of the Mayaguez battle, fifteen killed and three missing in action for the freedom of thirty-nine crewmen was labeled a draw. Finally, the Iran raid failed in its tactical mission without the recovery of hostages and with loss of lives, equipment, and just as important, national honor. It must be classified as a failure.

The Son Tay raid is the most instable case within the thesis. The Son Tay raid has raised two significant questions: Was the perfect execution of the military operation without the rescue of the POWs a success or a draw? And, was the original mission of Son Tay raid a ruse?

The Son Tay raid had no friendly casualties and no rescued hostages. The Mayaguez incident, on the other hand, had significant casualties but did rescue the hostages. The Son Tay was labeled a success because of the lack of casualties and strategic gains while the Mayaguez incident was a draw due to inordinate losses that might have been prevented. An alternate evaluation could classify the Son Tay raid as a draw like the

Mayaguez incident. This leverage within the comparative analysis was taken into initial consideration; a draw as the outcome of the Son Tay raid does not change the final analysis and conclusions of this thesis.

The Son Tay raid raised persistent questions of its primary mission, the rescue of the POWs. Was it a ruse for the destruction of air defense command and control facilities for the subsequent bombing of North Vietnam? Or, was it both a rescue mission and a destruction mission? This cannot be determined by unclassified material. If the Son Tay raid is eliminated from the thesis due to its possible nature of an exclusive ruse, the re-maining crises further strengthen the final analysis and conclusions.

Heuristic Model

The changing nature of world power, specifically the emergence of the third world or non-alligned nations, has proliferated lethal weapons and diminished U.S. omnipotential power. The increase of U.S. interests and objectives because of the interdependency of a complicated world has increased the potential for crises. Military thinking, for many advantageous reasons, has tended to be conservative. But conservative methods has many times been overtaken by complacency with the past. New military perspectives of crisis modeling should be formed and investi-gated to meet the challenge of future crisis resolution.

Models serve as reflections of reality. They have four functions: Organizing, heuristic, predictive, or measuring. The heuristic model is presented as a result of the development and analysis of the cybernetic pattern of this thesis. It should provide a stimulus for future investi-gations and discovery.

$$\text{Chance of success of military intervention} = \frac{\text{Military power projection}}{\text{NCA tactical involvement}} + \frac{}{\text{Perceived national interests}}$$

Figure 4-2

Heuristic Model

Source: Author

Direct and rapid military interventions in response to a national crisis are perilous. Solutions are developed under severe time constraints and the challenge to national interests is large. The chances of success can be roughly measured against the factors of military power projection, NCA tactical involvement and perceived national interests. Some elements are predetermined at the time of the crisis and cannot be altered. Others can be significantly changed to increase the chance of success of the direct and rapid military intervention.

Military power projection is a function of existing military capability. It has little flexibility. Forces and equipment cannot be significantly altered within the time frame of the crisis. But military power projection is not only a question of mechanical limits. The professional experiences and knowledge of the decisionmakers must take into consideration the myriad of military techniques to employ the tools of war.

Direct communication by the NCA to the field commander can rapidly become part of the problem and not of the solution. The field commander will become hampered in his ability to effectively fight the battle at the crisis location. New technological capabilities have influenced the increased involvement of the President. The trends of the Mayaguez and the Iran raid plus the Arab-Israeli War, Lebanese evacuation and the

Ethiopian evacuation have reinforced the NCA command and control of the field commander regardless of intermediate command echelons. Other studies have revealed that the direct participations of the NCA has led to command and control problems during a crisis.

Perceived national interests are the most subjective evaluation within the heuristic model. By declaration of the President of the United States an event becomes a crisis. Even a single tree can become a casus belli or a Machtfrague. The relationship between prestige and power of a state is critical to the declaration of a crisis. Prestige is to power as credit is to cash. National goals, objectives and interests must be articulated by a comprehensive development of national strategy. Otherwise, a declaration in haste may be worse than diplomatic silence.

Prognosis for Success

> . . . there are a small number of fundamental
> principles of war which may be disregarded
> with greatest danger and application of which
> has been crowned in nearly every case with
> success
>
> Jomini

The closer the similarity between the system--operational implementation--and the process--cybernetics--the greater the chances of success. Three paramount ingredients narrow the gap and enhance success: the principle of unity of command, the principle of simplicity and coup d'oeil.

Unity of Command

> For every objective, insure unity of effort
> under one responsible commander.
>
> FM 100-5

Unity of command assures responsibility is commensurate with authority and establishes boundaries for the unique roles of the various actors throughout the chain of command. To avoid paralysis, primary power must accompany primary responsibility. It also avoids dissipation of energy in frustration. All actors can orient towards success.

Each actor must maintain self discipline within the agreed roles of authority and responsibilities. Whenever an event is about to take place that would significantly influence the other actor's arena, communication is essential between the actors. The President has a high responsibility during the crisis to both the military and political arena. He also has superior intelligence gathering capability. Conversely, the President should recognize the competency of the field commander to manage the myriad elements of the battlefield. Any event that would cross from the tactical to strategic or strategic to tactical levels should be the prime reason for direct communication between the NCA and the field commander. Otherwise, as Sun Tzu said centuries ago, "no evil is greater than commands of the sovereign from the court" when ignorant of the tactical problems.

Simplicity

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear,
concise orders to insure thorough understanding.

FM 100-5

Simplicity insures the mission is understood by the entire chain of command and by the soldiers who will commit their lives. Also, simplicity enhances the plan's flexibility to respond against the unknowns of the enemy and situation when developed under severe time constraints. In a crisis, the field commander will meet the critical unknowns on the

battlefield. The clear mission statement will guide the commanders during high-tempo operations where any attempt to consult may be suicidal or a waste of American lives.

Coup d'oeil

> The coup d'oeil of a general is the talent which great men
> have of conceiving in a moment all the advantages (in a
> battle) . . . This is the result of experience.
>
> Frederick the Great

The coup d'oeil is the critical leverage available only to the field commander. It is the sense of the battlefield with its inherent fog and friction of war. The fog of war will certainly never be completely eliminated from war given the human factor and information overloads of modern technology. And during special operations, such as a direct and rapid intervention due to a crisis, the fog of war will be five times as thick. Only the field commander will have the ability to gain the information landscape of the battlefield. The sense of coup d'oeil will form order and purpose from the battlefield terrain, friendly troops and enemy plus the myriad of tactical operation possibilities. Based upon the clear, uncomplicated plans and orders generated by predetermined planning apparatus, the battlefield commander will select the optimum course of action. This can only be felt, evaluated and acted upon by the field commander; the qualities of battle cannot be understood nor relayed through the electronic medium to air conditioned conference rooms of the CINC's, Pentagon, or White House.

Coup d'oeil will combine with the personal leadership of the battlefield commander. The primary function of leadership is to inspire and to motivate soldiers to do difficult things in trying circumstances. Leadership in battle where death is imminent is a shared bond among men.

It does not come from a radio but from the man moving forward with his comrades.

Epilogue

The National Command Authority cannot exercise omniscient cybernetics during direct and rapid military interventions. Predetermined command, control and communications will establish the favorable milieu for the military intervention. Once the battle is engaged, ancient principles overshadow modern management techniques and technological novelties. Successful resolution of the crisis that has degenerated to the clash of arms is the final responsibility of the battlefield commander schooled in the Profession of Arms.

> . . . in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly
> understood no captain can do very wrong if he places
> his ship alongside that of an enemy.
>
> Admiral Nelson

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

RECOMMENDED FURTHER RESEARCH

The study of the myth of omniscient cybernetics was a journey
through several old and new, connected and seemingly remote fields. Ad-
ditional implications and issues were uncovered that require further re-
search. The resolutions of the critical issues will fill voids of our
perceptions or correct misperceptions of crisis management involving
direct and rapid military intervention.

1. <u>Lack of a comprehensive study of modern military raids</u>.
Military solutions to a crisis in modern times have not received the
comprehensive analytical study they merit. Individual studies of each
modern and pre-1950 military raid have not been collated. The U.S. mil-
itary does not have an effective conceptional and tactical institutional
memory in crisis resolution. Participants in the operational implementa-
tion of the surveyed crises of this thesis appeared surprised at their need
to resolve the crisis by military means. Consequently, the proverbial
wheel was continually reinvented with few lessons learned from the previous
operations. A single document examining raids of World War II to a more
detailed analysis of modern raids would institutionalize lessons learned.

For example, Bull Simons' early career set a pattern for his very
successful Son Tay raid. After the raid, Simons realized the critical
need of HUMINT for success. He modified his pattern for the successful
Perot Iran rescue. After the failure of the U.S. Iran raid for the
hostages a distinguished panel analyzed the reasons for failure. The

after action report of the failed U.S. Iran raid parallels BG Manor's JCS after action report on the successful Son Tay raid. One could deduce that the after action report of the Son Tay raid was directly and un- imaginatively applied to the Iran raid. The form of the critical aspects of the Son Tay raid were possibly consciously applied to the Iran raid but they were applied in form and not substance. OPSEC was an accolade for Son Tay while it was a deficiency in the Iran raid. The warnings of BG Manor's after action report were unheeded and Simons died before he could provide consultations for the Iran raid.

Tactical resolutions by the field commanders to different crisis situations concentrated on the use of air assault. The pattern never ap- peared to have been identified or analyzed in current literature. The initial solutions to the Congo hostage problem was to land the helicopters into the compound. Son Tay crash landed into the POW compound. The Mayaguez was to be assaulted by helicopter. Helicopters were the prin- ciple quick reaction force for Operation Paul Bunyan. Iran was also to put helicopters into the embassy compound.

Finally, technological assets received an inordinate confidence over human systems. SIGINT increased while HUMINT decreased. This appears as a dangerous reversal when the situation is unknown, especially during a hostage situation. Simons remarked after the Son Tay experience that satellites cannot see in a building. He corrected for that during his Perot Iran rescue. Implications of HUMINT during raids should be further studied. An obvious suggestion would be the automatic introduction of HUMINT assets at the identification of an event by the CINC during Crisis Action System of JOPS.

2. <u>Cognitive study of decisionmakers during a crisis</u>. The highest level decisionmakers were subject to predetermined concepts of crisis resolutions that significantly effected the military resolution of the crisis. A study of the actions and thoughts of the few continuous players in the surveyed crises and other crises would be academically valuable and help clarify or modify current operational implementation systems.

President Johnson, having perceived the contribution of the JCS and CIA during the Bay of Pigs, appointed an ad hoc group to resolve the Congo hostage crisis. Ford, based upon his personal admission of his experience as a naval officer in World War II, decided to take personal command of the Mayaguez rescue. Kissinger, affected by the Pueblo incident, was initially for restraint in the EC 121 incident in the early part of Nixon's administration. He modified his stance during the Son Tay raid. During the Mayaguez incident, Kissinger wanted a show of force and to appear ferocious. As Secretary of State his advocation of extreme violence is incongruent with the office he holds. (Secretary of State Rusk pushed against immense psychological pressure for a nonviolent alternative to the Cuba crisis.) General Jones was the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Mayaguez rescue. The affair turned sour at the continued involvement of CINCPAC and the NCA. During the Iran raid, Jones was the Chairman, JCS. The raid was planned at the highest levels and without use of an established CINC.

3. <u>Cybernetics as a concept</u>. The U.S. military needs to recognize the importance of an overall concept of cybernetics. The lack of a controlling concept has encouraged the unstructured architect of strategic and tactical systems. We have a plethora of acronyms: C^2, C^3, C^3I and C^4IS. Currently we have superior strategic communications systems but

tactical systems predate the Vietnam war. The communications systems through the chain of command during a direct and rapid military response are only as good as the weakest link. The Mayaguez incident is a prime candidate for study of the interface of strategic and tactical systems using cybernetics.

4. <u>Lower commander inertia</u>. The over communication by higher levels into the tactical theater may be creating inertia in lower commanders. As higher commanders cross the predetermined roles of responsibility, lower commanders may not unhesitatingly take the initiative. During a fast breaking pace of a military raid in a situation with significant unknowns, this attitude for seconds or minutes may be disastrous. If this attitude, yet unmeasured, grows and permeates our military forces, we would easily fail on any battlefield against a technologically equal enemy with jamming or vectoring assets.

The captain of the Hold during the Mayaguez incident was unsure of his direct role in the Marine assault of the island. His momentary hesitations even to think of who to ask in order to support the Marines during the intense battle is a symptom of a growing disease within the command and training of U.S. forces. Isolation of the tactical battlefield was a conscious and vigorous effort during the successful Korean tree cutting incident and the Entebbe raid.

5. <u>Intrinsic authority messages</u>. The strategic nuclear forces have a precise system to insure compliance with the orders of the NCA. But no systems exist during a military raid in response to a crisis when the NCA may directly participate. CINCPAC's attempt to control the battlefield during the Mayaguez incident was chaotic. Yet pilots were to receive direct verbal orders to which CINCPAC quietly deferred.

Finally, during an incident exercising instant communications, Ford's
message to cease offensive operations was either delayed or blatantly
overruled by Kissinger, the Secretary of State. Messages from a specific
source over sophisticated communications systems will carry an intrinsic
authority. The potential for bureaucratic error or deliberate ommission
is immense and must be resolved.

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