
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AVIATION LOGISTICS STRUCTURE FOR THE CORPS AND ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS (EAC)

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD G. LARSON TRANSPORTATION CORPS



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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

AVIATION LOGISTICS STRUCTURE FOR THE CORPS
AND ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS (EAC)

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Richard G. Larson Transportation Corps

US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvanis 17013 18 April 1983

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An examination of the Army's present structure for aviation logistics support at Corps and EAC reveals a fragmentation of responsibilities, a lack of flexibility, and a shortfall in aviation maintenance and supply support capabilities for a "come as you are" war. Restructuring of the aviation logistics units at Corps and EAC is necessary to insure the sustainability and supportability of our currently fielded systems and of the more sophisticated future aviation systems and support equipment. Adoption of a standard structure for the Corps Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) Battalion and a new organization for Theater Army aviation logistics support will provide total logistics management of Army aircraft and related support systems with aviation logistics units tailored, trained and structured for responsive and technically proficient support.

The latest edition of FM 100-5, Operations, dated 20 August 1982, sets forth Air Land Battle doctrine as the basis for how the Army will fight on the next battlefield. Since mortals are unable to predict when or where the next battlefield will occur, our major land fighting force, its units and soldiers, must be organized, trained and prepared for the "come as you are" war to insure success. Being prepared to fight on short notice is what we all refer to as readiness. However, FM 100-5 recognizes what Army logisticians have always known. Namely, that unit readiness cannot be a reality without logistical readiness -- the availability and proper functioning of materiel, resources, and systems to maintain and sustain operations on a fluid, destructive, and resource-hungry battlefield. Furthermore, commanders must plan tactics and logistics concurrently to insure that the tactical scheme of maneuver and fire support are logistically supportable.3 The recognized importance of logistical support on the battlefield applies to every combat force including Army aviation. The force modernization efforts which are scheduled for the 1980s will have a greater collective impact on aviation than any other single function in the Army. Army 86 with the new Division 86 and Corps 86 structure, the High Technology Light Division (HTLD), the Cavalry Brigade Air Attack (CBAA), and the Echelons Above Corps (EAC) round out the largest change in Army structure since the early 1960s (remember the Pentomic Division?). 4 The regimental system, the introduction of new aircraft systems (UH-60 Blackhawk, AH-64 Apache, CH-47D Modernization Program, Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP), upgraded OH-58 Kiowa, etc.), the new weapons systems such as the Hellfire, the new technology for target acquisitions, navigation, flight control enhancement, troubleshooting, and maintenance performance, coupled with a new air-to-air

threat called the Rind-D and the challenges of employing and sustaining a responsive aviation force make the old 11th Air Assault tests at Fort Benning in the early 1960s seem like a "piece of cake." While our aviation community has met and will continue to meet the many challenges of planned change, there is serious doubt that the present aviation logistical structure is sufficient to insure the reality of aviation unit readiness today and sustainability for the wide spectrum of future conflict.

The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a revitalization of Army aviation and the activation or reactivation of several new aviation units to reverse the near catastrophic dismemberment of our battle proven air mobility and aerial weapons systems after the Vietnam War. However, the logistics structure required to support this revitalization has seriously lagged behind our combat aviation structure. Activation of divisional aviation battalions, corps aviation groups, the CBAA, the Combat Brigade Air Cavalry (CBAC), and Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) Battalions have substantially improved the mobility, firepower, and surveillance capabilities of the Army but have concurrently imposed a greater responsibility on an aviation logistics structure which has seen little change in support capability.

While the recent trend has been to increase the number of combat and combat support aviation units to counter the growing Soviet armor and air mobility threat, active Army aviation combat service support (maintenance and supply support) has been replaced in several cases with contract support. The most recent example is Fort Riley, Kansas. Although each division aviation battalion possesses an organic Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) company, there are only two Corps AVIM battalions in existence and one AVIM battalion for a theater army (US Army, Europe). It is doubtful that these units are sufficient to sustain and support the active component aviation units responding to a short notice mid or high intensity conflict.

Before we continue to examine the shortfalls in the aviation logistics support, we need to briefly review the Army aviation logistics structure. The objective of Army aircraft maintenance and supply support is to insure safe, reliable, and maintainable aircraft. To obtain this objective, the Army aviation maintenance system operates under a three-level concept rather than the four levels (organizational, direct support, general support, and depot) used in ground maintenance management. The three levels are; Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM), Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM), and depot maintenance. Each aviation unit (company-sized or smaller) performs AVUM on its assigned aircraft. Company-sized aviation units' AVUM capability would equate to ground organizational maintenance plus limited DS functions. For aviation units less than company size, the AVUM capability would relate to only organizational maintenance functions. All AVUM units possess a Prescribed Load List (PLL) of aviation repair parts appropriate for the density of assigned aircraft. Divisional and nondivisional AVIM units provide functions equivalent to DS and GS maintenance support. The AVIMs also maintain an Authorized Stockage List (ASL) to replenish the supported units' PLL or other aviation repair parts as required. Divisional AVIM units provide support to the divisional aviation battalion while nondivisional AVIM units are employed on an area basis at corps or EAC. Depot maintenance is performed in CONUS and controlled by a National Inventory Control Point (NICP).6

Since the problems to be identified in the foregoing discussion are related solely to the structuring and organization of AVIM support capability, AVUM and depot maintenance will not be examined further. However, to fully appreciate the importance of AVIM support to our aircraft fleet and aviation units, we need to further examine the purpose and responsibilities inherent in any AVIM unit.


The primary purpose of AVIM units is to provide ground mobile, responsive "one step" maintenance and repair parts supply support to supported aviation units. Additionally, the primary responsibilities of AVIM units are:

- o Repair of equipment (aircraft, aircraft armament, avionics, aviation COMSEC, and aircraft--peculiar items of ground support equipment) for return to user.
- o Repair of certain components and parts in support of the Direct Exchange (DX) program.
- o Provisioning and stockage of aviation repair parts to support the AVUM operations of supported units.
- o Classification and repair of aircraft components (engines, transmissions, etc.) for return to the supply system.
- o Management and stockage of Aviation Intensive Managed Items
  (AIMI) as required.
- o Management of Operational Readiness Float (ORF) aircraft, components, or Line Replacement Units (LRU).
- o Perform weight and balance and other special inspections for supported units.
- o Provide aircraft recovery, air evacuation, and technical assistance as required.
- o Maintain collection and forwarding points as part of the Army
  Oil Analysis Program (AOAP).
- o Provide backup AVUM support as required for supported aviation units.
- o Nondivisional AVIMs provide backup AVIM support to divisional AVIM units.

o Act as terminal point for shipment of aircraft in and out of a theater of operations.

Although the responsibilities are numerous, there are four which are critical to The purpose of AVIM level support. First, sviation supply support and maintenance are interdependent. Operation of a DX point and support of the DX program requires close coordination between the maintenance function and supply support function. A responsive and effective DX program necessitates inspection of components or parts by a technically proficient quality control specialist, quick movement to the repair shop and close monitoring of stockage levels and stockage criteria. The second major responsibility is the stockage of repair parts required to support the AVUM maintenance operations and PLL of supported units. This function requires a Supply Support Activity (SSA) which is attuned to the readiness, safety, and operational requirements of aviation units. Third, the inherent mission to provide both backup AVUM and backup AVIM adds a production requirement often overlooked in the provisioning of an aviation logistics unit. Fourth, the aircraft recovery and evacuation mission demands highly trained and mobile teams with all of the resources required to properly evaluate a downed aircraft and determine the most effective method of recovery.

Figure 1 depicts the doctrinal concept for maintenance support of aviation units. Special note should be taken that AVIM level support exists at all levels from division through Theater Army (EAC). Aviation supply support passes from the aviation unit through the supporting AVIM to the appropriate Materiel Management Center (MMC) and on to the NICP using the Direct Support System. The only variance occurs with AIMI items which are normally managed manually by the supporting AVIM at Corps or EAC through the corresponding MMC. As figure 1 visually depicts, the workload on AVIM




units at Corps and EAC is substantial when you consider the number of aviation units employed at each level and the wide range of responsibilities for these AVIM units.

The initial observation that the aviation logistical structure (particularly at Corps and EAC) has not kept pace with the growth in the aviation structure is true for most combat service support units over the past ten years. The concern for improving the "tooth to tail" ratio has substantially reduced the active Army's capability to sustain itself in the early phases of a major conflict. Two-thirds of the total Army's CSS capability is in the reserve components. This reduction in combat service support (aviation logistics) is critical for aviation when there has been a concurrent increase in the materiel condition standards for Army aircraft, substantial increases in the sophistication and complexity of aircraft systems, the ever present safety requirements, and the dollar value of new aircraft and new aircraft subsystems. For FY 1983 alone, the Army budget request for procurement of aircraft was 2.746 billion dollars (15% of the total army procurement request), and over 600 million dollars was requested for aviation repair parts. 9 We need an in-place logistical support system which can maintain the readiness of our investment in peacetime as well as sustain it in combat.

Our present structure for AVIM support at the Corps and EAC varies from command to command and from CONUS to overseas. The Army's three non-divisional AVIM battalions are located in Germany where two support each of the US Corps and one supports the Theater Army (USAREUR). The Army's only divisional AVIM battalion supports the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The other Corps are supported by either contract maintenance support or single AVIM companies or a combination thereof.

Although the present structure has managed to efficiently support our aviation resources, it is fragile at the corps level and understated at EAC.

The fragile structure at Corps level is the result of several interrelated problems. The first and most significant problem is the absence of a workable base Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for nondivisional AVIM companies and battalions. The two corps AVIM battalions in USAREUR were activated in 1976 by combining the assets of existing DS and GS aircraft maintenance companies. The resultant modified TOE organization (Figure 2) separated the supply support function from the maintenance function. Additionally, it combined the headquarters commandant functions (messing, billeting, personnel accountability, etc.) and the supply support mission into a single company. This combination of two very different requirements forces the commander of Headquarters and A Company to be a Headquarters Detachment/Company commander on one hand (attempting to be responsive to the staff sections and provide the necessary training, accountability, and control functions) and on the other hand he/she must function as a line company commander responsible for the supply support to the numerous supported aviation units. This configuration not only causes the company commander to perform two very diverse roles but also seriously handicaps the battalion commander's flexibility. The battalion headquarters can not displace without moving the entire Headquarters and A Company (200 plus personnel, the entire ASL, the stock control ADP equipment, and all equipment and vehicles). The B Company is solely a maintenance company of over 400 authorized personnel without an integrated supply support function. This battalion structure not only limits the flexibility for the movement of the battalion headquarters but also violates the interdependence of supply and maintenance functions.



To rectify this cumbersome organization, the corps AVIM battalion should be structured as shown in Figure 3. This organization is a modification of TOE 55-456 and provides a flexible command and control structure which can deploy the organic AVIM companies without displacing the battalion headquarters. The organic AVIM companies must be structured as shown in Figure 4 which is a modification of TOE 55-459. One major addition to the headquarters platoon of the AVIM company would be an aerial recovery section with one CH-47D medium lift helicopter and one UH-60A utility helicopter. The addition of these two aircraft would serve several functions. The aircraft could rapidly transport mobile maintenance teams to any supported unit in the theater army, corps or division area. These mobile teams are essential to the combat service support doctrine of "fix forward." The aircraft could also deliver critical repair parts or aircraft components to any supported unit in the area of responsibility. This "supply forward" technique would free the supported unit's transportation assets for higher priority commitments. These same aircraft would complement the delivery of LRUs, DX items, and diagnostic test equipment. In many instances, aircraft or their subsystems are nonoperationally ready because of calibration requirements. Possession of organic medium lift and utility helica cer assets could reduce the ground transport time necessary to deliver and recover items from the calibration points. However, the most important role for the organic helicopter lift capability would be for the aerial recovery of nonflyable aircraft. In a mid or high intensity conflict, the majority of the ground and air transport assets will be committed to the movement of critical classes of supply (ammunition, fuel and lubricating products, food, etc.), personnel replacements, displacement of weapon systems, and medical evacuation. Since AVIM units do not presently possess





FIGURE 3



the required lift capability for the majority of the over 9,000 aircraft in the total army inventory, a request must be placed through command channels or to a Movement Control Center (MCC) for a medium or heavy lift helicopter.

Today's doctrine and policy place the responsibility for recovery and evacuation of nonflyable aircraft with the appropriate maintenance facility (the aviation support maintenance facility/unit). This responsibility includes determining if the aircraft should be repaired on site or recovered, the method of recovery (flyout after minimal repairs, surface recovery by wheeled vehicles or aerial recovery using the external sling load method), providing the rigging team, certifying the proper rigging for a sling load, and overseeing the recovery operation. The organization owning the aircraft is only responsible for securing a disabled aircraft, flyaway of the aircraft if repairs are within their AVUM capability, or submitting a request for recovery of the downed aircraft. 10

My intention is not to sell short the ability of our medium and heavy lift helicopter units to aerially recover downed aircraft but, rather, to emphasize the fact that the current lack of this capability in AVIM units reduces the responsive recovery of an expensive and combat essential asset. As previously noted, the medium and heavy helicopter transport units will be fully committed to the critical missions of resupply, unit/equipment displacement, medical evacuation, and repositioning of weapon systems. Aerial recovery will, therefore, receive low priority for use of these vital aircraft. Recovery of downed/disabled aircraft will allow repair for return to user or cannibalization of severely damaged aircraft. The present shortfall in strategic mobility assets, land and sea, requires that in-theater aviation assets be maintained, in the early days of the conflict, with existing resources. It will also require an expeditious turnaround of battle

damaged and maintenance faulted aircraft. Providing the subordinate companies of the corps AVIM battalion with organic aerial lift capability will certainly enhance the sustained operations of our combat aviation forces.

Once the recommended corps AVIM structure has been instituted, the only remaining question is who is responsible for command and control of the corps AVIM battalion. The logistics community is generally in agreement that the battalion should be assigned to the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) while others prefer assignment to the corps aviation group. Assignment to the aviation group would be rational if the group owned all of the aviation assets within the corps. In our armored, mechanized, and infantry divisions all organic aircraft (less the aircraft in the CEWI battalion) are located in the aviation battalion. Assigning the AVIM company to the division aviation battalion facilitates close logistical support of the division's aviation assets and enhances the self-sufficiency of the operating aviation units, provides close maintenance support, and insures concurrent tactical and logistical planning. However, the corps aviation group is not a parallel organization to the divisional aviation battalion. It does not own all of the aviation units within the corps nor does it always control EAC aviation units deployed within the corps area. The corps AVIM battalion is normally employed on an area basis and provides logistical support to nondivisional units and backup support to the divisions. Placing the AVIM battalion under the COSCOM rather than the aviation group prevents the splintering of logistical functions, maintains the control of all maintenance and supply management with the COSCOM MMC, and retains the centralized, integrated logistics support with the COSCOM which is responsible for the conduct of combat service support to the entire corps. 11 A strong argument for retention of the corps AVIM battalion within the COSCOM is the

critical interrelationship of the automatic data processing equipment and systems utilized for both maintenance management and supply support. The COSCOM MMC is the heart of the corps-level material management system and fully understands the management of maintenance and supply functions whether the functions are inherent to aviation logistics or ground systems support. 12

With a workable AVIM structure at the corps level which is resourced to provide the responsive, flexible, and mobile support necessary to sustain the combat effectiveness of the corps and divisional aviation units, we need to propose an organization which will provide effective aviation logistics support and management at EAC.

Although the concept of EAC is not completely clear in the minds of many of us and continues to be studied and examined, it is generally viewed as a theater army or joint task force operating in the Communications Zone (COMMZ). The COMMZ begins at the corps rear boundary and includes the area necessary to provide support for and sustain the forces in the combat zone. The combat service support units will be tailored (force structured) to perform the multitude of required support functions thus allowing the operational and tactical commanders to focus their attention on the battle, rather than on support activities deep in their rear. 13 The major organizations at EAC which manage or control aviation logistics are the Theater Army MMC and the Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). The MMC provides theater-wide inventory management for those items (less medical, communications security, and map) designated by the theater army for intensive management and allocation. This is only a management function as the storage of all stocks is accomplished by the TAACOM or COSCOM units. 14 The theater army MMC responsibility for maintenance management is less well defined but is generally limited to coordination with the subordinate commands of DARCOM for maintenance problems affecting the entire theater.

The TAACOM is a major subordinate command of the theater army and is the key logistics operator in the COMMZ. It provides logistical support to units passing through or located in the COMMZ and backs up the corps with specified support. It is also responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing rear area protection operations within the COMMZ. The TAACOM is assigned on a geographical basis and, therefore, is an area command tail-ored with only those units required to support two or more corps and the units located within its area of responsibility. 15

Like the theater army, the TAACOM possesses an MMC to perform the supply and maintenance management functions for materiel activities in the TAACOM. Aviation logistics management in the theater army MMC is located in the Troop Support/Aircraft Directorate. The same function for the TAACOM would be performed by the MMC's Aviation Division. AVIM units, under present doctrine, would only be assigned to a TAACOM. At first glance it would appear that the management of aviation logistics is centrally managed by the Troop Support/Aircraft Directorate of the theater army MMC and the Aviation Division of the TAACOM MMC. However, since Army aircraft are a composite of several subsystems (armament, avionics, electronics, missiles, life support equipment, ground support equipment, materiel handling equipment, etc.), a closer examination reveals that, in reality, the management of an aircraft system is shared by several management offices in both MMCs. For example, the TAACOM MMC has an Electronics Division responsible for managing electrical components of an aircraft, a Missile and Munitions Division concerned with the armament subsystems, and a Troop Support Materiel Division which would manage the ground support equipment for an aviation unit. Add to this division of management responsibility the staff elements of theater army and TAACOM where the operation element (DCSOPS or ACofS Opns and Plans) is today responsible for fielding new

aircraft and aviation subsystems while the logistics element (DCSLOG or AC ofS, Materiel) is responsible for planning the supply and maintenance support of the new system and the result is no single systems management element for aviation logistics in the theater.

The AVIM units planned for employment in the COMMZ would be assigned to the TAACOM to support COMMZ aviation units on an area basis and provide backup AVIM support to the corps AVIM units. Figure 5 depicts the proposed organization for what is termed an Aviation Support Battalion (AVIM). 16 This organization possesses some of the same shortfalls we identified earlier with the current corps AVIM battalion. The separation of the supply and maintenance functions again violates the interdependence of supply and maintenance so essential to an effective, flexible aviation logistics unit. The organization does not possess the organic lift capability necessary for rapid aerial recovery and evacuation of disabled aircraft. The reconstitution of aircraft resources in the COMMZ will be just as critical as in the combat zone when we consider the rear area protection operations that will be employed to counter the huge Soviet airborne and air mobility capability for deep strikes. To correct these shortcomings, the AVIM battalions planned for and employed in the COMMZ should be organized identical to the corps AVIM battalion structure proposed in Figure 3.

Even though restructuring the AVIM battalion will provide a responsive operator for aviation logistics support in the COMMZ, the division of responsibility for management of aviation systems needs to be rectified. To provide the total systems management, control, and organization required for Army aviation in the theater, we should begin now to institute an Aviation Support Group for the theater army. Figure 6 shows the proposed organization for the group. The group would be a functionally specialized subordinate





FIGURE 5



command of the theater army and would be similar to the Special Ammunition Brigade and the Petroleum Group now planned for employment in the theater army.

The group's Systems Management Center (SMC) would be the heart of the theater army aviation logistics support system and provide the total logistics system management so critical to a unique resource. It could prioritize support within the COMMZ (based on the theater army commander's directions), provide an open link between the corps and the CONUS aviation logistic elements (DA DCSLOG, subordinates commands of DARCOM, NICPs, depots, etc.), insure total systems management of all aircraft subsystems, and coordinate specific personnel, training, and funding requirements. It would allow a single management point for problems identified in aircraft and aviation unit status reporting, develop theater aviation logistic policy, and provide visibility of aviation maintenance or supply support problems. The SMC would not duplicate the supply management functions of either the theater army MMC or TAACOM MMC but would monitor aviation related classes of supply (particularly repair parts) to insure the necessary flow of supplies to the AVIM units.

Assigning the COMMZ AVIM battalions to the Aviation Support Group would enhance the ability of the theater army to rapidly shift priority of aviation logistics support to critical units or geographical areas. It would also complement the vertical maintenance management concept which forges a direct link from Department of the Army through the commodity management chain to the user. Multiple layers of management, control, and coordination would be reduced and it would develop the discipline and mechanism needed to maintain the focus on supporting the user. 17

We should not wait for a major conflict to institute the Aviation Support Group but, rather, get it in place now to insure the support is there if needed. Also, the group could facilitate the fielding of new aviation systems by acting as the single management point for material fielding plans, new equipment training teams, redistribution of replaced systems, and insure the peacetime logistics readiness of our fleet. Initially, we need to activate the first group in our forward deployed army in Europe. As a minimum we should activate a second group in our reserve structure. The two groups would upgrade our logistics structure and vastly improve the total Army's ability to sustain our aviation units throughout the spectrum of our global commitments.

The observations and proposals set forth here to improve the aviation logistics structure at corps and EAC are not intended to criticize our force developers or our doctrine for aviation logistics support but to bring to the forefront the fragile sustainability of our current system and to propose a few modifications which will strengthen our ability to responsively and effectively maintain a survivable aviation force. AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, dated 1 June 1981, alludes to our fragile sustainability when it notes that "many aviation units will not have sufficient resources to achieve a C-1 rating; however, most should be able to report C-2." We must act now to alleviate the doubt that our aviation structure may not be able to fully contribute as a combat multiplier.

Just as the proposals are not meant to criticize nor are they original. The proposed Aviation Support Group closely resembles the old 34th General Support Group (Aviation) employed during the Vietnam War; aviation support units at one time did possess organic helicopter lift assets for aerial recovery; other commodities (special ammunition, medical, communications security) are managed and controlled vertically; and aviation maintenance companies once did have an organic supply support element. However, we have

allowed our historically correct and operationally proven concepts to dissipate. The formation of a provisional aviation support battalion in the High Technology Light Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, is an early indicator that we are realizing our present aviation logistics structure may not be sufficiently resourced.

One of the greatest military strategists of the Twentieth Century, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, once noted:

Never in war shackle yourself to the absolute. Never bind yourself with irrevocable compacts or decisions. Like a game of chance, war has no predetermined end. Throughout, action should always be adapted to circumstances, and circumstances are always fluid. 19

We can reduce the game of chance and improve the odds for sustaining and supporting the current aviation systems and the more sophisticated future ones. We must initiate now the actions necessary to restructure our aviation logistics system at corps and EAC to provide units tailored, trained, and structured for responsive and technically proficient support. Action to adopt a standard structure for the corps AVIM battalion and a new organization for theater army aviation logistics support will prove the Army's concern for a viable aviation logistics support system designable to "keep them flying."

## ENDNOTES

- 1. US Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, p. 1-1.
- 2. Ibid., p. 1-3.
- 3. Ibid., p. 5-1.
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- 5. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 750-1, p. 4-5.
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  - 10. US Department of the Army, Field Manual 55-413, p. 3-3.
  - 11. FM 100-10, p. 3-6.
- 12. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, <u>Field Manual 100-16</u> (Coordinating Draft), p. 7-12.
  - 13. Ibid., p. 2-1.
  - 14. US Department of the Army, Field Manual 54-7, p. 3-3.
  - 15. FM 100-10, pp. 3-6 3-7.
  - 16. FM 100-16 (Coordinating Draft), p. 7-33.
- 17. LTG Richard H. Thompson, US Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, letter to the Commandant of the US Army War College, 22 September 1982.
  - 18. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 220-1, p. 3-12.
- 19. Major General John F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789-1961, p. 13.