


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THE INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND OF OPERATION TORCH

BY

MR. JOHN C. BRAN

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The author of this piece, a Foreign Service Officer, served in North Africa in both Morocco and Algeria. During his tours of duty in those countries, he became familiar with Operation TORCH and some of Colonel Eddy's men who had retired in Tangier. In addition, while posted in Algiers, the author played a small role in the research for General John Eisenhower's book Allies when he escorted the General to the site on the Algerian coast where Mark Clark made his famous submarine landing. These events plus a longtime respect for Robert Murphy and his abilities provided the inspiration for the narrative. Research for the article was carried out at the FDR Library in Hyde Park, New York and the National Archives in Washington, DC

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

THE INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND OF OPERATION TORCH

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Mr. John C. Beam

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
23 May 1983

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PREFACE

Operation TORCH was the first major allied operation of World War II and was the biggest amphibious operation attempted to that date and indeed up to that point in history. Its intelligence background is a story of civilian-military cooperation that was unique for its time. An American diplomat, Robert Murphy, together with twelve Reserve officers acting as State Department Vice Consuls, worked clandestinely to provide information for the invasion of North Africa and an underground network for the planners of TORCH.

Their efforts were a mixture of success and disappointment, but this collaboration between civilian and soldier set the example for future policy as the United States expanded its commitments throughout the world. This study summarizes a diplomat's experience with his military counterparts in an unfamiliar world of intelligence and military planning.

The author of this piece, a Foreign Service Officer, served in North Africa in both Morocco and Algeria. During his tours of duty in those countries, he became familiar with Operation TORCH and some of Colonel Eddy's men who had retired in Tangier. In addition, while posted in Algiers, the author played a small role in the research for General John Eisenhower's book Allies when he escorted the General to the site on the Algerian coast where Mark Clark made his famous submarine landing. These events plus a longtime respect for Robert Murphy and his abilities provided the inspiration for the narrative. Research for the article was carried out at the FDR Library in Hyde Park, New York and the National Archives in Washington, DC.



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Robert Murphy was a career diplomat who served the State Department for 42 years beginning in 1917 in Switzerland. In 1940, in the early days of World War II, he was Charge d'Affaires at the embassy in Vichy, France, following France's defeat in the spring of that year. Together with the then Naval Attache, Commander Roscoe Hillenkotter, he was reporting to Washington on conditions in Vichy and in French North Africa. He and Hillenkotter reported that the Nazis had left French Africa to its own devices and that it contained 125,000 combat trained men on active service. They reported also that if France was going to fight again anywhere in the war, North Africa would be the place.

The reports elicited no comments from Washington. Murphy did not know if they were of interest to anyone until he was abruptly summoned to Washington and told by Under Secretary Sumner Welles that his reports had been passed to President Roosevelt, that the President had read them carefully, and that he wished to talk to Murphy. Murphy himself best describes that meeting in November 1940:

There is no official record, so far as I know of that hour-long conversation which opened very informally. . . . This situation intrigued Roosevelt, who believed North Africa was the most likely place where French troops might be brought back into the war against Nazi Germany. Spread out on his desk was a large map showing all of French North Africa and West Africa, and the President told me that he had given much thought about how to help French officers who were operating in the relatively independent conditions prevailing in Africa. The President then said he wanted me to return to Vichy and work unostentatiously to get permission to make a thorough inspection tour of French Africa and to report my findings to him. The French African policy of the United States Government thus became the President's personal policy. He initiated it, kept it going, and he resisted pressures against it, until in the autumn of 1942 French North Africa became the first major battleground where Americans fought Germans. . . . As Roosevelt concluded his suggestions for my African

assignment, he said casually, 'If you learn anything in Africa of special interest, send it to me. Don't bother going through State Department channels. . . .' Thus I became one of President Roosevelt's personal representatives, assigned to carry out secret missions under his orders in World War II.¹

This was the opening of a new world for Murphy, the diplomat. It was to include, among various other things, secret meetings, use of a false name, and the clandestine reception of a submarine on the coast of North Africa. President Roosevelt did not hesitate to use his bureaucracy in imaginative roles.

Murphy made his inspection tour and sent his report to Roosevelt who used it as the basis of his African policy. At the President's direction, Murphy also made contact with General Maxime Weygand, the senior ranking official of Vichy France in Africa. Roosevelt had encouraged Murphy to cultivate him, even--as a fellow Roman Catholic--go to church with him. Weygand, despite the fact he had participated in the surrender to the Germans, was respected by both French and allied officials. Roosevelt considered this tough 74-year-old soldier a potential ally against pro-German elements in Vichy and even the Germans themselves.

Murphy had recommended in his report that he negotiate an agreement with Weygand under which the United States would provide essential food-stuffs and material to the population of North Africa. The President approved and the Murphy-Weygand Accord was signed in early 1941. Roosevelt's political and strategic motive behind the agreement was to counter German influence and retain the goodwill of the French and native population. It was also intended to encourage anti-Vichy, anti-Fascist sentiments among the French military in North Africa. Roosevelt could not do more than this in 1941. In the 1940 election he had assured American mothers that their boys would not be sent into any foreign wars. However, he wanted to block

any move that Hitler might make into the region which could close off the entire Mediterranean and endanger American interests in the South Atlantic and Southern Hemisphere.

The accord provided for an American Control Commission which Murphy headed in Algiers to oversee the distribution of the American goods and ensure they did not go to aid the German war effort. The commission, a reflection of both Murphy's skill and Weygand's basic pro-allied sentiments, called for the presence of twelve "vice consuls." Under a secret agreement initialed by Murphy and Weygand, these men would be allowed to use codes and employ couriers carrying locked pouches,

a privilege usually restricted to diplomatic missions and not extended to consular offices in French North Africa. . . . This secret understanding. . . (as Murphy described it) became the basis of one of the most effective intelligence operations of the war, for it provided that Americans not only could watch what transpired in French Africa, but also could get out uncensored confidential reports to our government.²

Information gathering of this sort was unfamiliar to the bureaucracy of Washington and created a great deal of discomfort in both the State Department and the War Department. A reflection of this was the fact that the State Department could not provide the specialized personnel called for by the project, "involving as it did a certain amount of irregular activity and danger. The Department turned to Army and Navy Intelligence for specialists who could appreciate objects and events of military significance."³ Murphy further related that

North Africa seemed almost another planet to military intelligence in 1940 and moreover it had no personnel qualified in Arabic. Additionally, the Services were reluctant to associate themselves with a State Department enterprise. After considerable discussion the chiefs of intelligence at length agreed to assign to Africa several reserve officers, commissioned as vice consuls, and to pay their other expenses. The men thus selected all had some experience in France and knowledge of the French language. Then somebody pointed out

that commissioned officers, if they performed civilian functions while on active duty, could be shot as spies if war broke out. Some of the officers who had been selected were discharged, so now who would pay them? The Services were operating on a financial shoestring. It was finally decided to pay them from the President's emergency funds.⁴

By mid-summer 1941, the twelve "vice consuls" were in Algiers, Tunis, and Casablanca reporting on harbor facilities, road and rail networks, order of battle information and attitudes of French officers toward fighting Germans. A sampling of the material sent to Washington shows they also provided detailed sketches and maps of the roads, airfields and port facilities in North Africa. In addition, the officers cultivated sources within the military establishment who provided them with copies of original documents from the military files. Murphy sent these back by cover letter using the State Department terminology of the day; e.g.,

Subject: Immediately Available Munitions Supplies Within Algeria. I have the honor to enclose copies of documents which were taken from the official archives of the 19th Army Corps Area (Algiers) which have been secured by Vice Consuls Boyd and Knox from a source we have found reliable. As in the case of the official effectives' list (see my dispatch No. 1572 of July 28, 1942, Military Effectives in Algiers), there is of course, a certain amount of secret supplies and depots which are not known to the Axis Armistice Commissions. Respectfully yours, (signed) Robert Murphy

The volume and quality of the information provided by these officers was later praised highly by Eisenhower, and their work was credited as a contribution to the eventual success of TORCH.

The Germans in North Africa, however, (or fortunately) did not have so high an opinion of the vice consuls. An intercepted German intelligence report of March 16, 1942, stated

All their thoughts are centered on their social, sexual, or culinary interests, petty quarrels and jealousies are daily incidents with them. Altogether they represent a perfect picture of the mixture of races and characters in that savage conglomeration called the

United States of America, and anyone who observes them can well judge the state of mind and instability that must be prevalent in their country today. . . . Lack of pluck and democratic degeneracy prevails among them, resulting from their too easy life, corrupt morals, and consequent lack of energy. . . . They are totally lacking in method, organization and discipline. . . . We can congratulate ourselves on the selection of this group of enemy agents who will give us no trouble.

One can imagine the Soviets writing similar reports about our intelligence operatives today.

Despite these unkind observations by the Germans, the vice consuls were active and, as we have seen, were working seriously at their duties. They were also in danger, however, of being misunderstood by their own masters when they expressed a need for discreet settings to meet their contacts who were providing them with information. In the days before OSS and its successors provided budgets for safehouses, the State Department had to be carefully approached for money for unorthodox purposes. Murphy sent the following letter in support of such a request:

In any propaganda effort from what I have seen in Europe through the years, I should say that personal contact with a few powerful individuals under favorable auspices is of the greatest importance. Among the elements composing 'favorable auspices' would be an appropriate establishment where contacts could be received, friendly meetings arranged and conversations carried on without surveillance. Under present conditions, hotels are utterly unsuitable and many contacts refuse point blank to meet our people in hotels or public places. . . . In Marrakech our Vice Consul was able to obtain the house of an American citizen which is suitable for this purpose. He fortunately obtains it at a low rental. . . . Aside from acquainting you with our small efforts along these lines, the purpose of the foregoing is to inquire whether the Department would be disposed to add a special allowance for, shall we say, propaganda at Marrakech and Fez. I hesitate to use the word 'propaganda' a much abused and naughty word, but it will serve in this case to describe activity in behalf of the allied cause. . . . If so I feel

that an allotment should be made out of the President's Fund of \$500 monthly for Fez and Marrakech.

Faithfully yours,
(signed) Robert D. Murphy⁷

Murphy did eventually receive his funds and was instructed to obtain from the officers in question subvouchers to support his accounts.

Information gathering was an important part of Murphy's task but he had also the greater mission of enlisting Weygand to take action to prevent a German invasion or, as events later developed, assist the allies in their takeover. As Dr. Arthur Funk described in his Politics of TORCH,

Murphy knew that his primary responsibility required a continuous relationship with Weygand--cautious, diplomatic, not so close as to alarm the Axis but sufficient to reassure the French that the United States would sooner or later help in defeating Hitler.⁸

Unfortunately, although Murphy did an admirable job of cultivating Weygand, he very likely caused the failure of this important part of his mission by his insistence on the use of the State Department cipher system.

From before World War I to the middle of World War II, the US diplomatic codes were open to any cryptanalyst in the world who wanted to make the effort to read them. State paid no attention to this area, and in 1941, a unit of the German Foreign Ministry, Pers Z, was reading the US diplomatic traffic. Murphy was sending to Roosevelt his most sensitive negotiations with Weygand, including a request from Weygand for military assistance and Roosevelt's assurance that it would be forthcoming. Murphy insisted on using the State Department codes to preserve his autonomy, even though American officers in Eisenhower's command pointed out their insecurity. He was certain that the Germans had not broken his codes. As early as August 12, 1941, the state secretary of the German Foreign Office could hand to von Ribbentrop fully solved copies of Murphy's telegrams of July 21 and August 2.⁹ The result was that on November 18, 1941, Weygand informed

Murphy that the Germans had told Vichy that unless Weygand was removed, they would occupy all of France and let the French population starve while the German Army lived off the land. Weygand was recalled and retired to southern France. He never again played a role in the war effort.

Murphy entered 1942 having to start again to find an individual like Weygand or construct an underground network which would accomplish the same purpose.

By then the United States had entered the war and OSS (or COI as it was then known) came to North Africa. The office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) was formed in July 1941 based on a suggestion from Churchill to Roosevelt that America needed an arm solely for intelligence and covert operations. General William Donovan was named its chief and one of his first steps was to submit a plan to Roosevelt for operations in North Africa. Like Roosevelt, Donovan had seen the Mediterranean as a potential battleground and had all along urged allied control of the African coast. Roosevelt approved the plan, and Donovan appointed Lieutenant Colonel William Eddy as Naval Attache at the US Legation in the International Zone of Tangier, Morocco, in December 1941.

Eddy had been born in Syria, spoke Arabic fluently, and had considerable experience in the Middle East. He had served in World War I and won five banks of decorations with the Fighting Fifth Marines. (In a briefing session which Eddy gave for General Strong, Chief of Army Intelligence, and General George Patton in July 1942, Patton noted the ribbons—two more rows than he had and grunted, "I don't know who he is, but the son of a bitch has been shot at enough.")¹⁰

The final decision to go ahead with the landings and serious preparation for them did not occur until late July 1942. But Eddy's arrival in

December 1941 brought to Murphy and his team a heightened sense of participation in a major enterprise. This came largely from the fact that North Africa was the first arena for OSS clandestine activity in the field. Donovan, a dynamic personality who wished to establish his new agency in the Washington bureaucracy, generated a great deal of activity with the generous budget he was allotted by Roosevelt.

At the same time, however, the arrival of Eddy and COI compounded the confusion in the command structure in North Africa. At this point it was chaotic and looked like this: Murphy was working for the State Department but was detached from it on verbal orders from the President. His salary came from State, and his expenses came from the President's emergency fund. His vice consuls, who were reporting to him, were being paid also from the President's emergency fund. Eddy's upkeep came from COI's budget. Eddy was assigned to the Legation in Tangier and was instructed to work with Murphy. Another military officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Solborg, was working for Donovan as assistant military attache in Lisbon. There he was responsible for organizing clandestine activities in both the Iberian peninsula and North Africa. He also was instructed to coordinate his activities with Murphy. Murphy was theoretically in charge.

This disorganization in the field was a reflection of the overall American approach to intelligence activities during this period. Historically, it was a subject the country's leaders did not want to deal with, but with the United States having been thrust into world affairs, men like Roosevelt saw the need for organized and discreet information gathering. Murphy's assignment was a beginning, and the formation of COI was the next step in the process. How this unfamiliar new arm was going to fit into the United States Government bureaucratic structure was a problem then, and for many officials, remains a problem to this day.

Eisenhower attempted to deal with the wartime command relationship by urging General Marshall to advise the President to make the COI directly responsible to the JCS. But the Army had a problem with its officers engaging in spying or subversive actions. Eisenhower recommended that such work in foreign countries "be conducted by individuals occupying a civilian rather than a military status." Despite their status, Ike recommended that they "be subject to the higher control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." In June 1942, Roosevelt changed COI to OSS and did place it under the JCS in the chain of command. Murphy's role was later clarified when, at his request, he was formally detached from the State Department to the Office of the President as his personal representative until after the landings when he was named adviser for civil affairs under Eisenhower. He became the first civilian in American history to serve on the inner staff of a military commander's headquarters in wartime.¹¹

Fortunately, in all this early confusion Murphy and Eddy, the men in the field, had the personalities and good sense to be able to get along and work together. Murphy became part of the overall plan for North Africa which Donovan had submitted to the President. It stated in part

that the aid of the native chiefs be obtained, the loyalties of the inhabitants cultivated, fifth columnists organized and placed, demolition materials cached, and guerilla bands of bold and daring men organized and installed.

As one of their first moves to achieve these noble goals, Eddy and Murphy set up a clandestine radio network across North Africa. The key station Midway at Tangier was located in a winepress overlooking the airfield; Lincoln was at Casablanca; Yankee was in Algiers; Pilgrim in Tunis; and Franklin in Oran.¹² But Murphy's intensified and untraditional activities troubled some of his more orthodox colleagues. He relates:

The transmitters were immensely useful to us. One of them was installed in the attic of the Casablanca consulate general, and this disturbed one of our senior consular officers who thought it might be contrary to regulations. He said rather dejectedly, 'Murphy, I hope you know what you are doing. But I should like to make it clear that I disapprove of espionage!'¹³

The State Department was not the only body which disapproved of unorthodox activities. Military minds were also not ready to accept them. Eddy had submitted a preliminary plan for subversive activity in connection with the landings, and Donovan set aside two million dollars for these secret plans. Most of the suggestions were accepted by the JCS with the proviso that control of all secret activities in connection with TORCH should be vested in the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower.

There was little enthusiasm on Eisenhower's staff for clandestine activities, however. OSS proposed that members of the Nazi military staff in North Africa (many of them Gestapo officers) be assassinated when the landings began. The assignment for this cold-blooded task had already been accepted by the father of a French boy shot by the Germans in Paris. Eisenhower's aides did not take the suggestion seriously and it was "squashed at a higher level."

A plan which eventually was carried out involved smuggling out of Morocco two experienced hydrographers (one the captain of a tugboat company; the other, chief pilot of Port Lyautey) who were familiar with the North African coastline. Eisenhower had not approved this plan and was furious when he heard of it. An investigation revealed that General Patton had approved the project but had neglected to inform Eisenhower's staff.¹⁴

Another project organized by OSS possibly provided the inspiration for the later British deception coup which they carried off in The Man Who Never Was. In this an officer of General De Gaulle's Free French Forces was to be assigned to the OSS team at Tangier. The Gaullist officer left

London in a British plane but it crashed or was shot down over Spain. The Frenchman was killed, and his papers, which contained highly classified information, were seized by the Spanish police (and undoubtedly made available to the Germans).¹⁵

These were only a portion of the activities OSS carried out in North Africa, but Murphy, still as the man in charge, found himself playing more unfamiliar roles after serious planning for TORCH got underway.

Washington needed a first hand appraisal of the situation in the unknown territory of North Africa. Murphy was called to Washington in August to describe his operational plan and discuss his selection of French military officers who could provide a friendly reception for the landings. His underground had chosen General Henri Giraud, a respected officer who had escaped from a Nazi prison, as the man who could take control of the French forces. After explaining his plan to Roosevelt and the JCS, Murphy was instructed to go to London and brief Eisenhower. In keeping with the overall need for complete secrecy, Murphy was put in a lieutenant colonel's uniform, given the name McGowan, and ferried across the Atlantic in a B-17 Flying Fortress. General Marshall had told him he would be disguised in a lieutenant colonel's uniform "because nobody ever pays any attention to a lieutenant colonel."¹⁶

In London he briefed Eisenhower and his advisers on North Africa and entered his role as war planner based on his knowledge and special experience in that area.

I was the only person at the London conference with prolonged experience in Africa itself, and from questions asked, I could see that Eisenhower and some of his officers had mental pictures of primitive country, collections of mud huts set deep in jungles. . . . Eisenhower then prudently inquired whether winter underwear would be necessary and I told him it was, especially

on the high plateau in eastern Algeria. Thousands of American soldiers appreciated that the following winter.¹⁷

Murphy admitted to his "appalling ignorance of military matters" and wrote that he was participating in the initial important offensive of World War II not knowing the first principles of military science. It was here, however, that he provided the contribution to military planning that his successors would follow in later years.

My interests had always been political and my professional experience was in diplomacy. But I took comfort in the knowledge that the expedition to French Africa would require political as well as military strategy.¹⁸

Eisenhower also gave credit to the political considerations of the military operations:

In discussions involving political possibilities. . . . Our concern over these affairs illustrates forcibly the old truism that political considerations can never be wholly separated from military ones and that war is mere continuation of political policy in the field of force.¹⁹

That much of the London meeting was devoted to this--the political side of military operations--came about because the United States was invading neutral territory. The preparations included covert political action which in this case meant organizing an underground network of individuals sympathetic to the allied cause.

In London it was decided that General Mark Clark should make a trip to Algeria to meet with Murphy and some of his French conspirators in order to reassure the French and obtain a firsthand assessment of the situation there.

The clandestine reception of Clark in North Africa, later well publicized, was arranged by Murphy who once again played more the role of an intelligence operative than a diplomat.

Clark and his party flew from London to Gibraltar and proceeded to Algeria by submarine. After arriving on the Algerian coast east of Algiers, they saw prearranged light signals from a house Murphy had borrowed for the occasion. The party rowed to the shore in kayaks and "from the darkness they heard a voice: 'Welcome to North Africa,' said Robert Murphy, alias Lieutenant Colonel McGowan. 'Damn glad we made it,' said Clark."²⁰ Clark had a long and successful meeting with the representatives of Murphy's underground, but afterwards while they were waiting for night to fall and return to the submarine, word came that the police were on the way. Clark's group divided up and hid in the cellar and upstairs. Murphy now played another (perhaps) unaccustomed role. He and his assistant received the police while the owner of the house explained that Murphy was an American diplomat at his house as a guest for a pleasant party. The party of course included some ladies who were upstairs. The scene of empty wine bottles and the hint of ladies were enough to convince the French police that they need not search further.

Clark made it back to the submarine with only minor additional mishaps in which he lost his trousers while trying to launch a boat in the surf, and Murphy returned to Algiers to complete preparations for the landings.

They took place on November 8th as scheduled, but there was opposition by units of the French military, especially the Navy. The result was 1800 casualties on the Allied side. What went wrong can be attributed to many factors, but the principal shortcoming was that after Weygand's recall, there was no officer in overall charge who could suspend French operations. Murphy had a group of officers up to divisional level who could sow confusion but the senior officer they brought in proved to be ineffective.

Eisenhower has described the preparations and results from his perspective:

From Mr. Murphy we learned the names of those officers who had pro-Allied sympathies and those who were ready to aid us actively. We learned much about the temper of the Army itself and about feeling among the civil population. . . . He gave us a number of details of French military strength in Africa, including information concerning equipment and training in their ground, air and sea forces. From his calculations it was plain that if we were bitterly opposed by the French a bloody fight would ensue; if the French should promptly decide to join us we would expect to get along quickly with our main business of seizing Tunisia and attacking Rommel from the rear. It was Mr. Murphy's belief that we would actually encounter a mean between these two extremes. Events proved him to be correct. On another point, however, he was through no fault of his own, completely mistaken. He had been convinced by the French Generals . . . that if General Henri Giraud could be brought into North Africa, the response would be immediate and enthusiastic and all North Africa would flame into revolt, unified under a leader who was represented as being intensely popular throughout the region. Weeks later during a crisis in our affairs, we were to learn that this hope was a futile one.²¹

In the end, however, TORCH was a strategic success. In military terms it was a host of firsts--largest amphibious operation to that time in history for one. First time for an invasion to be planned by commanders and staffs of two nations with different outlooks and military experience for another. The military organization was truly impressive, bringing together as it did an armada from widely separated points of the earth to rendezvous at a number of points on the African coast on target and on time.

In intelligence terms it launched OSS and provided experience in organization and planning for its future operations.

But the most valuable result was the degree of civilian-military cooperation and understanding it exhibited. This is perhaps less extraordinary now but still remains an important factor where men of different backgrounds have to cooperate on a single venture. An American diplomat pursuing his normal duties was suddenly and dramatically pulled from his

accustomed world to that of intelligence and planning for a large-scale military invasion. It shows the quality of the man by the fact that he could adapt, relate to his military counterparts, and earn the respect of all concerned. His lack of success in an important aspect of the operation was unfortunate. But in all operations there are many variable factors and there would have perhaps been key factors other than the one I chose. The fact remains that without Murphy's efforts the casualties would have been much higher.

The purpose of the foregoing narrative was an attempt to illustrate the interrelationship between military and civilian partners in operations, especially in those parts of the world with complex political situations. Having the resources of a man such as Murphy who is assigned to an area, knows the terrain, and especially the political scene is vital. Having an understanding on both sides of the contribution each makes to the operation is also essential.

It is revealing what Murphy stated in his book about his own ignorance of military matters. He said that Eisenhower and many of his brother officials had the benefit of previous instruction in political problems,

such as the excellent course given at the Army War College and other military schools, but I had no equivalent training in military matters. Nowadays (1964) we try to teach our diplomats a great deal more about military affairs, and we also try to teach our professional soldiers more about world politics and diplomacy. In 1942, American soldiers and diplomats alike had to contend with large areas of ignorance.²²

We may have come far since 1942 in mutual education on military and political matters, but we must be honest and admit that gaps still exist in mutual understanding.

In 1983, American soldiers are organizing again to go into unfamiliar parts of the world. The cooperation that Murphy and Eisenhower and Murphy

and Eddy achieved on their venture into unfamiliar terrain is an example from history we can all follow. This cooperation can be enhanced if future leaders of both the civilian and military establishments work together to make improvements in language training and knowledge of the cultural and political factors of the Third World--the new terrain in which they will have to operate. Here again we must be honest and admit the gaps that exist in our understanding of this area.

We know we have made progress since 1942--it was a good beginning--but we know also that we still have far to go to achieve perfection.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 67-70.
2. Murphy, p. 90.
3. Ibid.
4. Murphy, p. 41.
5. Dispatch No. 1573, July 28, 1942, from Murphy to the Department of State National Archives.
6. R. Harris Smith, OSS, The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, p. 39.
7. Letter from Murphy to G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, February 20, 1942, National Archives.
8. Arthur Layton Funk, The Politics of TORCH, p. 18.
9. David Kahn, The Codebreakers, pp. 497-98.
10. Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS, p. 157.
11. Murphy, p. 106.
12. Ford, p. 155.
13. Murphy, p. 108.
14. Smith, p. 59.
15. Ibid., p. 58.
16. Murphy, p. 102.
17. Ibid., p. 103.
18. Ibid., p. 104.
19. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 88.
20. John S. D. Eisenhower, Allies, p. 140.
21. Eisenhower, p. 86.
22. Murphy, p. 104.

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<p>→ Operation TORCH was the first major allied operation of World War II and was the biggest amphibious operation attempted to that date and indeed up to that point in history. Its intelligence background is a story of civilian-military cooperation that was unique for its time. An American diplomat, Robert Murphy, together with twelve Reserve officers acting as State Department Vice Consuls, worked clandestinely to provide information for the invasion of North Africa and an underground network for the planners of TORCH.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Con't</p>		