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	REPORT DOCUMENTATION PA	GE	BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
• •	EPONY NUMBER	OVT ACCESSION NO	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
		D-A128	143
1. 1	TITLE (and Subtitie)		S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
			Master's Thesis
	A Retail Level Inventory Model for	or Naval	March, 1983
	Av.ation Repairable Items		5. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
. 7	NJ THOFY A	·····	S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(+)
	Mark Leonard Mitchell		
		·	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK
			AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
	Naval Postgraduate School		
	monterey, california 93940		
1.	CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE
	Naval Postgraduate School		March, 1983
	Monterey, California 93940		13. NUMBER OF PAGES
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			154. DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING
•	NSTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
	Approved for public release, dist	ribution unli	mited
. !	Approved for public release, dist	ribution unli	mited
. !	Approved for public release, dist	ribution unli	mited
	Approved for public release, dist DESTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Bit SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (EY WORDS (Continue on reverse olds if necessary and iden Inventory model; repairable invent queueing model applications; RIMAT model application. SETRACT (Continue on reverse olds if necessary and iden The inventory model used by the U. items was analyzed and found to be	ribution unli eek 30, 11 different fro niffy by block number) tory model; r IR model anal hiffy by block number) . S. Navy for 2 deficient i	etail level inventory; ysis; M/M/1 queueing aviation repairable n two major areas.



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Simulation with data obtained from the USS RANGER 1983 deployment supports the contention that the proposed model does a superior job of estimating inventory requirements.







SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)

S-N 0102- LF- 014- 6601

Sec. 1.

Approved for public release; distribution unligited.

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#### A Retail Level Inventory Model for Waval Eviation Repairable Items

by

Mark Leonard Mitchell Lieutenant Commander, Supply Corps, United States Navy E.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March, 1983

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#### ABSTRACT

The inventory model used by the U.S. Navy for aviation repairable items was analyzed and found to be deficient in two major areas. The method in which input data is used is found to be overly conservative. The underlying theoretical model was identified as an M/M/oo queueing model. The assumption of unlimited repair capacity in this model is not valid for application to Navy maintenance activities.

An alternate inventory model is developed which substantially improves on these deficiencies. The proposed model theorizes two parallel repair processes differentiated by the existence or absence of awaiting parts time. Each of the repair processes is modelled with an M/M/1 queueing model.

Simulation with data obtained from the USS RANGER 1983 deployment supports the contention that the proposed model does a superior job of estimating inventory requirements.

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## I. THE PROBLEM

#### A. SUPPORTING NAVAL AVIATION AT THE BETAIL LEVEL

## . 1. Repairable Items are the Key to Success

Iwenty four hours a day, in most corners of the world, aircraft of the United States Navy are being launched and recovered as they undertake their missions in support of national objectives. The effective accomplishment of each mission is dependent upon having sufficient numbers of aircraft ready to fly and to perform at their fullest capability. To support this goal, the Navy has built an extensive system of maintenance facilities and supply points. Their only purpose is to ensure that the readiness of the Naval Air Force is kept high.

The key concept in minimizing the downtime of degraded aircraft is the philosophy of "remove and replace". This program is designed to maximize the availability of aircraft by quickly identifying any malfurctioning unit, removing it, and rapidly installing another unit that has been positioned at the support base for that purpose. The malfurctioning unit may then be disposed of or repaired, as appropriate.

As technology has advanced, the level of complexity (and the associated cost) of the avionics and weapon systems has been increased. This has led system planners and designers to the decision to repair as much of each unit as can possibly be done, and to support this repair at the maintenance organization closest to the operating site.

The repair of the repairable malfunctioning units (henceforth called "NRFI repairables", meaning "not ready for issue" repairable units) becomes a critical task. Identifying the fault, fixing or replacing subunits, and certifying the item RFI (ready for issue) before it is needed to replace an item on another aircraft becomes a challenging logistics task. If the repair takes too long, or if parts needed to repair it are not available, the next failure on an aircraft may cause the entire aircraft to be left in a degraded mode, and the capability to perform a mission may be denied. Providing an adequate support system for repairing the NEFI repairables, and for maintaining sufficient EFI inventories to meet expected demands, is the key to mission readiness.

# 2. Surces, Cycles, and Forecasting

The system today has some significant problem areas that periodically cause concern at various levels of management. Each ship and air station supporting Naval Aviation has experienced situations in which the available support has seemed inadequate. These periods may be characterized by the occurrence of gany inventory shortages and backed-up repair lines. Fleet exercises, sudden unanticipated commitments, or new surveillance targets have all caused increased demand that seems to strain the system to the limit. As the duration of this heavy demand period lengthens, ACLS extracrdinary measures are undertaken: cannibalization of cowned aircraft and cf NRFI items becomes necessary, and extra quantities of critical items are demanded from other support activities. It becomes extremely distressing to those in command when this situation exists, especially when they realize that the new mission, exercise, or task at hand may be a close realization to the level of commitment required by the operating forces if they had to mobilize for a war.

The inventory level and repair capability is supposedly designed to support full mobilization operations. The shortcomings displayed when actually required to approach that operational tempo are cause for sericus The inability to anticipate demand, concern. and to adequately provide a system to meet this demand, exists to some extent in any military logistics system. Failures are random, and the ability to forecast accurately is the subject of considerable research. Howevez, the surge problem is not one of predicting failures for any given item, but rather of anticipating increased demand across the entire inventory, and thereby providing enough maintenance capacity (with associated sub-units and piece parts) or an expanded inventory so that the aircraft can be kept flying and the missions fulfilled for the duration of the heavy demand period.

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## E. HCW BUCH INVENTOBY?

### 1. Repairable Inventory System Objectives

As the current system has evolved, management of the repair facilities and the supporting supply points has become increasingly more complex. Costs of inventories, test facilities, technical documentation, and the training and retention of maintenance personnel have all been growing with the costs of the systems to be supported. Each of these areas has to compete with each other and with other programs for funding in a scarce resource environment. It is absolutely vital then that planners and analysts be able to make tradecff decisions between the various logistic elements requiring funds and to build the overall system to provide the needed support at the lowest cost.

Analysis techniques for evaluating level of repair [Ref. 1], and logistics support [Ref. 2], have been established by the Department of Defense. In such a planned system estimates must be made of inventory requirements and maintenance capabilities long before the first system is operational in the fleet. Significant problems can arise, however, if the planning assumptions for funding or manpower are incorrect, or if the operators of the system are ignorant of the planning and do things their own way. Both of these situations affect the current method for maintaining the regainables invertories so vital to mission success.

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The current procedures used for establishing the allowances of repairable items to be stocked at a giver support site do not consider the capacity or configuration. of the maintenance activity, the levels of sub-components and piece parts being stocked, or any cost-tradeoff clan for determining what is the best mix for adequate support. Despite these shortcomings, the existing system has been made to work through the dedicated efforts of many supply and maintenance personnel, both military and civilian. These personnel have had to cope with periodic severe material shortages, extraordinary expediting, and numerous stopgap measures in order to provide support. It is mandatory that those who design the system recognize the shortcomings and work towards improvement. Just such an effort has been underway for the last five years.

2. RIMSTOP

In 1974, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, W. P. Clements, directed that a study be undertaken to examine the stockage policies that had evolved within the various services and the Defense Supply Agency. That study was issued in 1976 and became known as RIMSTOF, an acronym for the DCD Retail Inventory Management and Stockage Policy. Its

furpose was to examine the way that retail level surrert was actually being provided by the military services, and to attempt to sat some overall quidelines that should be followed for these inventories. Out of RIMSTCF came specific policy guidance in the form of DOD Directive 4140.44, and DOD Instructions 4140.45 (for consumable items) and 4140.46 (repairable items). Some of the recommendations for repairable inventories, as listed in DODI 4140.46 [Ref. 3], were:

Levels of reparable items shall be determined as a func-tion of maintenance replacements and shall be tailored to individual item characteristics related to conditions existing at the individual intermediate level supply point....

The following levels will be computed for each reparable iter to be stocked at the intermediate level on a demand-supported basis:

- (1) Repair Cycle Level (RCL)
- (2) Crder and Shipping Time Level (OSTL)
- (3) Safety Level (SL). The SL is a function of the prob-abilities that the repair cycle time will be exceeded, the order and shipping time will be fixceeded, the maintenance replacement rate will be higher than forecasted, and a number of maintenance replacements, anticipated for repair at the activity, will require resupply from external sources. The SL considers the degree of risk of stockout and is computed as

 $SI = t \times s(RLD)$ ,

where:

t = safety level parameter

s(RLD) = Standard deviation of maintenance replacement during the leadtime which is the weighted average of RCT (repair cycle time) and OSI (order and shipping time).

The safety level parameter t will be selected by the DcD Component concerned, and may not exceed three standard deviations of maintenance replacement during leadtime.

- (4) Operation Level (OL)
- (5) Replaishment

The Navy has used this guidance as a springboard for examining current inventory support procedures and has been successful in obtaining funding through the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) process for initiatives based upon this review. The basic approach, however, has been to put additional band-aids on the current system in attempts to make it work better, rather than starting over from scratch to try to develop a system that will do a better job of estimating the system needs. The purpose of this thesis was to take the latter approach, searching for a better method to do the job.

A number of areas of investigation are explored in this thesis. The current model for computing inventory levels assumes that there will not be any capacity constraint. An alternate model is proposed to attempt to explicitly deal with capacity constraints. The current system uses only a small number of data elements available in the aviation 3-M data collection system, and what it is allowed to use is censored rather severely. The effects of censoring such data is examined, and the use of other available data elements is explored.

The following sequence will be used in presenting the analysis in the rest of the thesis. Chapter II discusses the present system and the underlying model at some depth and analyzes the theoretical assumptions of the model. Chapter III proposes an alternate model. Chapter IV compares the existing and proposed models, and includes some examples of how they behave. Chapter V presents a simulation using real data obtained from the USS RANGER (CV-61). Chapter VI provides a summary of results, conclusions, and recommendations for continued research.

## II. THE CURRENT MODEL

### A. AILOWANCE DETERMINATION

Allowances of material to be stocked at any given aviation support point are largely determined through a process called AVCAL (Aviation Consolidated Allowance List), which is managed by the Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASC), Fhiladelphia, Pennsylvania. The process of generating a complete AVCAL is quite complex, but the basic underlying model used for repairable items is fairly straightforward.

### 1. Forscasting Usage

First, all available maintenance and supply data on repairable usage for the previous support period are gathered. This data may come from a variety of sources. In the case of an aircraft carrier, for example, analysis will include gathering and comparing data from the Aviation 3-M data base (maintained by the Navy Maintenance Support Office (NAMSC), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania), supply usage data provided by the ship, and usage rates that have been develcped for specific items as the result of various logistic conferences. Once this data has been accumulated and validated, it is converted into aggregate usage rates by dividing total demand by the total number of flying hours that generated the demand. These rates are then used to forecast demand for the next support period by multiplying them by the total number of flying hours that WSPD's (Wearon System Planning Documents) call for. Separate forecasts are generated by this process for the expected number of successful repairs (Equation 2.1) and for actions where

repair has been declared beyond the capability of the local maintenance activity (BCM) (Equation 2.2).<sup>1</sup>

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Iat		
NR	2	actual number of successfully repaired units, from the reporting period data base;
NB	*	actual number of units declared BCM, from the reporting period data base;
FH	3	flying hours accomplished during the reporting period;
PH •	2	flying hours forecast for a future support period;
NR *	3	repair fcrecast, in number of units; and
NB I	#	ECM forecast, in number of units.
Then		

$$NR' = NR \cdot \frac{FH'}{FH}, \qquad (2.1)$$

and

$$NB' = NB \cdot \frac{FH'}{FH} . \qquad (2.2)$$



## 2. <u>Repair Turnarcund Time</u>

In the case of repairs, additional data is gathered on the average length of time that an item is in the repair cycle. This is also done through the use of the 3-M data tase, with data elements collected as shown in Figure 2.1. Data for each of these is taken from the Aviation 3-M Visual System/Maintenance Information Display Action Form the basic source document (VIDS/MAF). for most aviation mainterance data reporting. All of the time data for measuring the repair cycle turnaround time (TAT) is collected as an integer number of days, simply by noting the difference in julian dates between key events in the repair process. Total TAT for each repair action is simply the sum of the Each of the four TAT element limits is four element times. applied to each repair action in the data base; the limit for total TAT is applied against the average TAT for all actions of a given item.<sup>2</sup>

At this point, a few observations about this process are appropriate. In order to develop an effective inventory system, it would seem necessary to measure the period of time between the removal of an RFI item from inventory, and the recaipt of a replacement. By using the times from the repair cycle, two important assumptions are being rade. First, it is assumed that the removal of the NRFI unit from an aircraft occurs on the same date that the RFI unit is This may be generally true when the supported issued. customer and the supporting supply department are located near each other, and when they adhere to the stated philosophy cf "cne-for-one" exchange. There are, however, many

Freedural guidance provided to the operating forces refers to the TAT limits as "constraints". The limits are not constraints in the technical sense. They are truncation values that are applied so that any TAT element observation greater that the specified limit is reduced to that limit fefore being used for allowance computation. A. Key events in the repair process are as follow: E1 : Date of removal of the NRFI unit from the aircraft. C2 : Date of receipt of the NRFI unit at the INA (intermediate maintenance activity). unit at the D3 : Work start date at the IMA work center. DA1: Date work stops because unit nust await the arrival of material before completion of the repair. Unit is declared to be in "awaiting parts" (AWP) status. DA2: Date unit clears AWP (material received). D4 : Repair completion date. B. The repair turnaround time elements are defined by the above dates in the following manner: TAT element From date To date IP : In-process time SKD: Scheduling time RFR: Fepair time less AWF time AWF: Awaiting parts time D2 D3 D1 D2 D3 D4 DA1 DA2 DA2 DA1 Although AWP time is shown above as being defined by dates DA1 and DA2, in reality a unit may go AWP a number of times; in that event, total AWP time for a unit is computed by summing the times reported for each occurrence of AWP status. NOTE: Although C. Data collected through the aviation 3-M system is limited to a maximum value as follows: TAT element Limit (days) IP : In-process time SKD: Scheduling time FFF: Fepair time 3 RFR: Fepair time AWF: Awaiting Farts time 8 2Ŏ TAT: Total time 20 (unit average)

Figure 2.1 Repair Turnaround Time Blements.

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instances where this assumption is not valid. Supply departments are frequently called upon for off-station support in which they may be required to send material to activities hundreds or thousands of miles away. In these cases, the removal date and the issue date may be very different, depending on the situation. Additionally, there are classes of items for which the "one-for-one" exchange principle is waived because of the nature of the repair to be undertaken. For example, remain-in-place (RIP) items are specifically exempted.

The second implicit assumption is that a unit will be available from inventory as soon as it is made RFI. Again, this may be valid for many items, but the administrative process of identifying the item to a national stock number, updating records, and storing the unit is not automatic. Unfortunately, the data base does not include these supply times, and the exact extent of the effect is unknown. However, it is fair to assume that the period measured by the repair cycle is a conservative estimate for actual off-the-shelf time experienced by the supply activity.

Existing policy provides that turnaround time elaments for every repair action and for every repairable item be compared to limits, or maximum allowable values, before being considered in the allowance determination process. The use of these limits presents a different problem in the development of an effective inventory.

The limits currently in use were shown in Figure 2.1 and were developed at ASO in a study conducted in 1977 [Ref. 4]. In that study, TAT data for a small group of items were collected. The TAT elements were assumed independent, so each element was analyzed separately. An input data censor, or limit, was determined at approximately the ninetieth percentile of the cumulative distribution function for the data element times. The times given in Figure 2.1 were the results. The reason for the use of limits is not provided in available instructions or other documentation. However, there have been two informal reasons provided in discussions with senior personnel. First, that it is necessary to protect against erroreous values entering the data base and significantly increasing average the TAT. This is a legitimate concern with the 3-M system. The other reason is to "not reward the bad actors". Lack of proper management of aviation repairables could conceivably cause lengthened TAT's, and consequently larger allowances. To what extent the current limits prevent this is unknown.

In either case, however, it is reasonable to question the validity of the current limits as applied to all items. One problem is that intermediate maintenance activities (IMAs) routinely repair items as diverse as engines, avionics, rotor blades, airframes, and instruments. By taking only a small sample of items, and by lumping the data together, it is possible that there are classes of items or certain types of repair processes that are more restricted by the limits than are others.

Even if we accept the premise that all items have the same universal mean TAT, there is another way in which these limits inhibit proper support. If the underlying distribution of each TAT element is exponential, acceptance of only the bottom ninety percent of the data has the effect of reducing the mean to 90% of its original value. This point can be easily shown. Let S be the level of data accepted (e.g., 0.90). Then solve for the value T that will provide that level using:

 $S = \int_{a}^{T} \lambda e^{-\lambda y} dy$  $= 1 - e^{-\lambda T}$ 

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Solving for T gives:

$$T = -\frac{1}{\lambda} \ln (1-s)$$

Next, find the mean of the distribution that is cansored at point T as follows:

$$\mu = \int_{0}^{T} \lambda y e^{-\lambda y} dy + (1-s)T$$

which sclves as:

$$\mu = \frac{1}{\lambda} \left[ 1 - (1 + \lambda T) e^{-\lambda T} \right] + (1 - s) T$$

Substituting:

$$e^{-\lambda T} = 1 - s,$$
  
 $1 + \lambda T = 1 - ln(1 - s), and$   
 $(1 - s) \overline{1} = -\frac{1}{\lambda}(1 - s) ln(1 - s),$ 

yiəlds:

$$\mu = \frac{1}{\lambda} \left[ 1 - (1 - s)(1 - ln(1 - s)) \right] - (1 - s) ln(1 - s),$$
  
$$\mu = \frac{1}{\lambda} S;$$

and the proportion of the original mean  $(1/\lambda)$  represented by  $\mu$  is:

$$\frac{\mu}{\gamma_{\lambda}} = S .$$

Setting the TAT limits at the 90th percentile has the effect of only accepting data within 1.3 standard deviations of the true mean of the underlying distribution. (The 90th percentile of an exponential distribution occurs at a value approximately 2.3 times the mean, or 1.3 standard deviations greater than the mean, since the mean and standard deviation are the same.)

The RIMSTOP repairable instruction, [Ref. 3], specified that the repair cycle time could be protected at a level no greater than <u>three</u> standard deviations, which would te a little higher than the 98th percentile. It is impossible to do this if the TAT observations for the underlying process are limited using the current values. Again, the current system of developing allowances uses a deliberately conservative approach.

3. Current Range Rules

Varicus range rules are in use to determine if any allowance for an item is justified. Table I provides these

			یہ نے جنہہ کھی ہے کی کرا کرادے ا	
		TABLE	I	
	Existing	Allowance	Model Range R	ules
A. Local	l Repair C	Cycle Requi	rement (LRCR)	
	alify for a forecas the repar- slates to ther con ther con days/mor	tr an LRCR tror the a minimum kimum of tw bination or greate th).	allowance, expected num of at least of two repai of two repai of repairs x of repairs x	an item must ber of units 0.111. This IS per year rage TAT, cr average TAT days/year
B. Attri	ition allo	twance		
IC nust	qualify for satisfy o	r an attr me of the	ition allowan following:	ce, an item
IRCE qu author	lantity cized	Unit price	Minimum BCM r	fcrecast ate
Yes	2	A11	1 per 3 (.333/	months month)
No		> \$5000	1 per 6 (.167/	months month)
No		< \$5000	1 per 9 (.111/	months month)

rules, which are published by ASO [Ref. 5]. Some of the more astute operators in the field have pointed out that

these range rules are not always consistent with good support. It has been noted that it is to a customer's advantage to ensure that a moderate demand repairable with low TAT has at least two BCM's during a year in order to assure that an allowance of at least one is maintained at the station. Alternately, it might be to their advantage to lengthen the TAT in some way, again to ensure that an allowance of one is justified. A zero allowance forces every failure to become a situation degrading an aircraft; increased support is provided if an item satisfies the range rule.

#### E. BCDELS USING THE POISSON DISTRIBUTION

1. The Current Model

The following procedure is used for determining the final allowance quantity, given validated input data.

 a) A forecast for the expected number of units in the repair cycle at any given time is computed using the forecast from Equation 2.1 as follows: let

t: = length of forecast period; NR' = total forecast repairs over (0,t'); TAT = average experienced turnaround time (after limits applied); and PR' = forecast number of units in the repair pipeline.

Then:

$$PR' = NR' \quad \frac{TAT}{\epsilon'}$$
(2.3)

b) This quantity is used as the parameter in a Prisson distribution to find the number of units (QR) that need be stocked so that the CDF of the distribution at QR is closest to the policy safety level (currently set as C.90).

1) Find the smallest Qu that satisfies:

$$0.90 < \sum_{i=0}^{Q_{u}} e^{-(PR')} \frac{(PR')^{i}}{i0}$$
 (2.4)

- 2) Let Q1 = Qu 1
- Compute the protection lavel afforded by Q1 and Qu.
- 4) If the protection level at Ql is closer to 0.90 than that at Qu, let QR = Ql; otherwise, QR = Qu.
- c) A quantity of one is then added to QR for operating level (OL), and this becomes the LRCR: LRCR = QR + 1.
- d) Separately, a quantity of material to support expected attritions from the repair cycle (BCM's) is computed. This quantity is determined using the BCM forecast for the endurance period (t') from Equation 2.2 (Rounding for all allowances is at the 0.5 level, except for the first unit added in accordance with the range rules.)

Attrition guantity = NB'.

 e) The attrition quantity is added to the LRCR quantity to provide the final allowance:

Allowance = LRCR + NB'.

2. The RIMAIR Pipeline Model

As previously indicated, RIMSTOP provided an impetus for examining the existing repairable model, and a number of deficiencies were found. It was recognized that the quantity provided as an attrition allowance, which was theoretically provided to support wartime mobilization operations with resupply delayed or out off, was in fact supporting the number of items in the wholesale resupply pipeline during normal operations. Additionally, the attriallowance was being computed deterministically. tion Consequently, efforts were made starting in 1978 to obtain funding through the POM process: first, to support the number of items actually in the wholesale resupply pipeling so that the endurance level would not be drawn down, and secondly to provide protection to this wholesale pipeline to account for the stochastic nature both of the failures which cause the BCM's, and of the resupply time itself. These efforts to obtain funding coincided with the development of a model to be used in computing allowances under the RIMSIOP auidelines. This model is called the RIMAIR pipeline model.

The RIMAIR pipeline model attempts to alleviate some of the shortcomings recognized in the previous model. **T**includes the addition of stock to the attrition portion of the allowance to support the expected order and shipping time experienced during peacetime, and the addition of a wholesale resupply pipeline to the repair cycle pipeline for the purpose of providing Poisson protection to the entire pipeling. Investigations into the use of variable range and depth techniques for providing better overall performance for the dollars invested in inventory are also being pursued. As of March 1983, however, none of the RIMAIR additives have actually been added to any activity's AVCAL, and caly the attrition portion additives have been approved and funded. Significantly, however, the basic model, with the established limits on TAT observations and the use of the Prisser distribution for the computation of the safety level, has not been changed.

The computations involved with the RIMAIR pipeline model are more complicated than with the current model because of the way that the wartime mobilization requirement

is computed. Shortly after the RIMSTOP instructions were published, DOD provided additional guidance on the computation of that mobilization requirement in the form of DODINST 4140.47, [Ref. 6]. The actual pipeline model developed at NAVSUP took this into account, and consequently became considerably more difficult to deal with. For the purpose of this thesis, however, it is the underlying repair process model that is being examined, and the complications of the mobilization additive will be ignored. A greatly simplified pipeline model results, which can be explained as follows.

a) Compute the expected repair pipeline quantity (PR\*) as in Equation 2.3 above:

$$PR^{*} = NR^{*} \times \frac{TAT}{z^{*}}.$$

b) Compute the forecast wholesale resupply pipeline (PE\*)
as follows:
let
WTAT = expected wholesale resupply time;
then
WTAT

$$PB^{*} = NB^{*} \times \frac{WTAT}{1}$$

c) Define the total forecast pipeline quantity (P\*) as the sum of these,

 $P^{\dagger} = PR^{\dagger} + PB^{\dagger}$ .

- d) Compute the protected pipeline quantity by using P<sup>\*</sup> in Equation 2.4 above. Find the quantity QF that provides protection closest to 0.90.
- a) The final allowance (QT) is the quantity QP plus one for operating level (OL), plus any additives that may te allowed for wartime mobilization (QM):

QT = QP + OL + QM.

This model has explicitly allowed for the wholesale resurply cycla, and provides protection to the entire pipeline, not just to the repair pipeline. Funding to support the allowances that it provides should greatly enhance fleet support.

3. Example Allowances

a. The Current Model

The following example is provided to illustrated how the current system works, followed by the changes made as a result of using the RIMAIR pipeline methodology.

1) Input data is collected, and the following data is provided for a three month period (parentheses indicate the value used after the TAT limits are applied):

	BCMS: BCM BCM BCM	123			I			SX 1 0	D			R P 1 1 7	R			A 1	A P				1	2 2 1 19	T		_	
			1234567891	0			1)		(3	3)		1730119002	(8	)		3	1 (	20	)			1950347528	() {}	28) 29) 3)	)	
	Aveia Raw Limi	ge: te	s: 1 ==:	ž 22	0 0		Z 2 3	1. 1.	4	===	5 3:	2. 2.	4 3	: 2 :	=	5 4 ==	• 8 • 3 ==	= 3	: = :	= =	1(	). 3.	4 3 =:	= = =	2 2	
	Notes	: (	1)	Ta po ai	ı b.	le te	d a en	tri for ifi	es e	i he i a	a ac		.01 10.	t) Te	hə əsj	n po	um nd	ba in	ġ	0 T	f All	r d	3	ys Iei	ne I	e- nt
		1	b)	A	re:	r a	ges	21	e	ba	as	ed	l u	P	on	Γ	e p	ai	.IS	5	01	1	y.	•		
		(	C)		is! Ld ht	ь 5	mar ot and	ks occ	fo		A a f	WP S A W	o op IP	00.9	lui os ta	an sd tu	s D	ea o th	n 3! 9	n s	Al a	I P Le Le	ណ៍	sta ge đaj	et 01 y.	us ng
I	n aðð	it:	io	n,	÷!	h€	fo	110	w S	lng	g	da	itā	. :	is	P	ΓO	٧i	de	€đ	:					
		-	-																						-	

TAT element data, in days

- 2)
  - a) Wholesale system resupply time (WTAT) is 26 days.
  - b) Total flying hours (FH) were 1453 hours.

c) Endurance period (t') is 60 days. d) Program flying hours are 850/mon+h, therefore FH\* is 1700 hours. 3) Compute the LRCE as follows: = NR x (FH'/PH) = 10 x (1700/1453), = 11.7 units. NR' PR. NR' x TAT/t' 11.7 x 8.3/60, 1.62 units. Ħ -= Prissen probabilities for a mean of 1.62 are: f(1) F(n) n 0 0.1979 U. 1979 23 5 ÃÃ \* n = 3 provides protection closest to 0.90. Therefore QP = 3 units: and LRCR = CP + 1,= 4 units. 4) The attrition allowance is computed as follows: = NB x (F4'/FH) = 3 x (1700/1453), = 3.51= 4 units. NB! 5) The final allowance (QT) is: = LRCR + NB\*, = 4 + 4, = 8 units. QT

b. The RIMAIR Pipeline Model

The procedure presented above is modified when the RIMAIR pipeline model is used. Poisson protection is applied to the attrition pipeline as well as to the repair pipeline. The RIMAIR model procedure is as follows:

1) Collect and limit the input data as in steps a.1. and a.2. above.

2) Compute the repair pipeline (PR') as it was done in step a.3, PR! = 1.62 units. 3) The number of items expected to be in the wholesale pipeline (PE\*) are computed as follows, using the BCM forecast developed in step a.4: NB • = 3.51 units: = NB' X WTAT/: = 3.51 x 26.0/60, = 1.52 units. FB\* 4) Ictal pipeline allowance (P') is: = PR<sup>1</sup> + PB<sup>1</sup> = 1.62 + 1.52, = 3.14 units. **C1** Frisser protabilities for a mean of 3.14 are: f(n) n F(n) 01 :04 .39 234567 <u>.6159</u> Ś ā 9949 \* n = 5 provides protection closest to 0.90. Therefore QP = 5 units. 5) The final allowance (QT) is obtained as follows: = OP + OL + QM, = 5 + 1 + QM, = 6 + QM units. OT

It can readily be seen that this computation is in agreement with the RIMSTOP guidelines for retail inventory levels quoted in Chapter I. The various levels are equated in Table II For the purpose of this thesis, it will be assumed that any acbilization endurance quantity provided will be the same regardless of whether the underlying peacetime model based on the current Poisson approach is used, or whether the model proposed in Chapter III is adopted. Consequently, Qe shall be assumed to be zero, and will not be discussed further.

TABLE II									
Existing Vs. RIMAIR Model Allowance Levels									
RIMSIOP (1) Mo Level Var	del iable E	Quantity comp Xisting R	uteđ IMAIR						
Repair cycle	FR•	1.62	1.62						
Crder and shiffing time	FB.	0.0	1.52						
Tctal pipeline	₽∎.	1.62	3.14						
Safety Q	F - P'	2.38	1.86						
Cperating	CL	1.00	1.00						
Replenishment	(2)	(2)	(2)						
Endurance (1)	NB 1	3.00	-						
Mcbilization (1)	QM	-	QM (3)						
Ictal	QT	8 units	6+QM units						
NCIES: (1) McLilization DCCI 4140.47	/ endurance vice the RIMS	levels are a TOP instruction	dåressed in ors.						
(2) NAVSUP has su principle as from the who replemishment allowance in	ccessfully de the rule for lesale system quantity all cases.	fended the "o replenishing . This estab as one less	ne-for-che" repairables lishes the than the						
(3) Although doc mobilization understood th nct be any le will be highe	umentation fo quantity is at the final ss than the r in many cas	r the computa not availa RIMAIR all CUITENT allo ES.	tion of the ble, it is owance will wance, and						

## C. THEOBETICAL EASIS FOR THE EXISTING MODELS

# 1. A Queueira System Model

No justification for use of the Poisson distribution is provided in the literature available on the current system. However, a model presented in elementary queueing theory provides exactly the structure that is used in the existing model, and this will be presented here as a basis for comparison to the proposed model. This model is for the M/M/oo queue.

(0) 3,~ <u>مر</u> 4 (n+1) JL na Parameter Name Assumptions Independent arrivals Constant rate Exponential interarrival times Arrival rate λ Exponential service times, identical for each server Each service is independent μ Service rate (repair rate)  $\rho = \frac{\lambda}{\mu}$ ٩ Traffic rate Mean number in system (pipeline)  $P = \rho$ 2  $T = P_{\lambda} = 1/\mu$ Mean time in system Т Mean waiting time (By specification, there are enough servers to serve each unit as it W  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$ enters.) Probability cf being in state n **π**(n)  $\mathcal{T}(\mathbf{n}) = e^{-\mathbf{r}} p^{\mathbf{n}}$ n 9

Figure 2.2 H/M/OO Queue Characteristics.

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The M/M/co queueing model assumes that the number of demands in an interval is Poisson, repair times are exponential, and that there are "infinitely many" servers. In practical terms, the specification for infinitely many servers may be assumed to be the same as saying that the expected waiting time for any item entering the system is zero. Consequently, the physical queue may display characteristics similar to that of an M/M/co system even if there is only one server when the probability of having two units in the system at the same time is effectively zero.

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The state diagram at the top of Figure 2.2 provides the basic characteristics that will be used to compare the M/M/cc model with a model to be proposed in Chapter III. (The current model and the RIMAIR pipeline model both use the Poisson distribution in computing allowances, so the discussion of the assumptions that its use implies apply to both.) Given the state diagram, it is easy to determine the probability of being in any given state, n, as follows:

$$\lambda \Pi (o) = \mu \Pi (o),$$

**S**0

$$\Pi (i) = \frac{1}{\mu} \Pi (o), 
 \Pi (i) = \rho \Pi (o);$$

$$(\lambda + \mu) \pi (\cdot) = \lambda \pi (\circ) + 2 \mu \pi (2)$$

so

$$\pi(z) = \frac{\lambda}{2\mu} \pi(i),$$
  

$$\pi(z) = \frac{1}{2} e^{\pi(i)},$$
  

$$\pi(z) = \frac{1}{2} e^{2\pi(i)};$$

and in general,

$$(\lambda + n\mu) TI(n) = \lambda TI(n-1) + (n+1),$$

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$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{T}(n+1) &= \frac{1}{n+1} e^{-\overline{T}(n)}, \\
\overline{T}(n+1) &= \frac{1}{(n+1)!} e^{n+1} \overline{T}(0).
\end{aligned}$$

With the requirement that all state probabilities must sum to one,

$$\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \pi(i) = 1;$$

the state probabilities are than determined to be:

and for n>0,

$$\pi(n) = e^{-\beta} \frac{e^n}{n^2}.$$
 (2.5)

The mean number in the system, average queue length, expected time in system and other system parameters can be derived this result and from Little's formula ( $P = \lambda T$ ). Any book that includes elementary queueing models, such as Kleinrock [Ref. 7], Ross [Ref. 8], or Turban and Meredith [Ref. 9], provide these relationships, and they are listed in Figure 2.2.

An inventory model that has the characteristics listed in Figure 2.2 would use Equation 2.4 in solving for GP. In application, as indicated before, the existing system computes the quantity QP that provides protection closest to the desired level, then adds one for operating level.

# 2. Implications of Adequately-many Servers

The Foisson model has a number of very nice features that make it attractive, given that the assumption of adequately many servers is acceptable. First of all, there is only one parameter to the distribution, which makes maintenance of a data base simple. This parameter is the forecast of the expected number of items in the repair pipeline at any given time. This is easily done with the 3-M data base because both the number of items repaired during any given period and their average turnaround time are readily available. Additionally, expanding the size of the pipeline to include the wholesale resupply pipeline is accomplished simply by adding the two pipeline quantities.

Another nice feature is that saturation of the queue can never docur: by assuming that there are always adequately many servers, demand can never cause backups or waiting times. Forecasts for increased demand periods (wartime mobilization) are done simply by multiplying the expected number in the system by an appropriate constant. Because saturation never occurs, there is always a finite steady-state solution available. This is not the case with a limited-server queueing model.

### III. A PROPOSED MODEL

#### A. PBELIMINARY RESEARCH

The preliminary work for the proposed model was accomplished at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California as a class project for a course on Stochastic Models given by Prof. Paul Milch. The results provided in that study, [Ref. 10], are presented here because they provided a major step in the development of the proposed model.

The study was done from July to September 1982 using a data base obtained from NAMSO (Navy Maintenance Support Office, Mechanicsburg, PA) of data collected throughout the Navy from January through March 1982. Due to the nature of the data base, it had already been processed using the TAT constraints listed in Figure 2.1. Because the entire data base included over 3CO,000 records, the study was done on selected classes of repair actions and equipments in order to keep it to a manageable size. The equipments chosen were radar navigation units repaired ashore (2055 records), radar navigation units repaired afloat (587), and held rotor systems repaired ashore (187). Despite the wide disparity in these three classes, the results were extremely similar.

One of the major findings of the study was that times reported for the repair and awaiting parts processes were not independent. It was noted that longer repair (RFR) times tended to be associated with significant awaiting parts (AWF) time, and the maintenance actions with short RPR time generally had no AWP time. This was expected because experience at Navy repair facilities had shown that repairs are not homogeneous; some types of in-depth repair tend to

take more time for fault isolation, require more parts, and take longer for checkout than others in which an adjustment or the replacement of a gasket is all that is required.

A second key finding was that times associated with the TAT elements were not all distributed in an exponential manner. The distribution for the RPR and AWP TAT elements were generally too exaggerated to be exponential; any exponential fit to the low end of the distribution failed to account for the large number of data points in the tail. Conversely, any distribution fit to the tail came far short of including the large number of observations with TATS of zero or one day.

The dependence of the RPR and AWP times lead to the establishment of a new variable for repair cycle time. Its distribution had the same general shape as the RPR and AWP distributions, but on inspection it appeared to decompose into two exponential distributions with different means. This fostered the concept of treating the repair cycle as two parallel repair processes, one in which the repair rate was very fast (on the order of one day), and the other in which the repair process took ter to twenty times longer.

The last key result of the early project was the idea of modelling the repair queue with a capacity constraint. This was not explicitly brought out through analysis of the data, but rather was considered because experience with Navy repair activities has provided many examples of instances in which capacity was limited, forcing inducted material to wait for a technician or test bench. This situation has been addressed more formally in the recently concluded RAND CADAL study, [Ref. 11], which is quoted in part.

With the exception of VAST (Versatile Avionics Shop Test), loading on the most highly used piece of equipment in each evionics shop rarely exceeded 60 percent. This means that, given full operational availability, most shops have sufficient wartime capacity. VASI, on the other hand, showed a wartime utilization rate of 160 percent -- the wartime workloads exceeded VAST capacity by 60 percent.

Under a sustained wartime scenario with all aircraft flying continuously at programmed rates, the backlog for VAST continues to grow. The important issue is what impact this growing backlog will have on aircraft availability. A number of factors tend to partially alleviate the impact over a limited time horizon. The on board stock of spare parts will be consumed as the backlog grows, so backlog does not directly equate to holes in aircraft (or backorders against supply). To the extent that backorders can be consolidated on the fewest number of aircraft through the cannibalization of components, the impact is further reduced. Finally, priority repair management, which controls the induction of components into the VAST shop based on aircraft needs, will also

In sum, the present VAST capacity is probably sufficient only for those wartime scenarios where carrier aircraft are required to operate at programmed rates for limited periods of time, followed by periods when the carrier is able to stand down and thus has time to work off the VAST backlog. If, however, the carrier is required to operate its aircraft for longer periods of time when the average flying rate is equal to or exceeds the programmed rates, as the VAST backlog grows aircraft capability will begin to degrade. Priority scheduling for VAST provides only a short-term remedy for the caracity shortfall.

While the RAND people only discuss VAST in terms of inadeguate capacity, their study was to some extent a "best case" analysis; the projection for capacity constraints for other test benches was based on complete bench availability, full gualified manning, and adequate piece-part support. Given real-world support shortcomings, there is a chance that non-VAST facilities can also become saturated.

The model developed in the earlier study has been expanded upon in this thesis, and is illustrated in Figure 3.1 in its simplest form. The remainder of this chapter describes the new sample data base, provides validation for the underlying assumptions, presents the theoretical basis for the M/M/1 queue, defines the proposed model in operational terms, and provides an example of how it works.

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Figure 3.1 The Proposed Model (Simplified).

### E. THE GANGER DATA FASE

The data base used for the study was obtained from NAMSO and consisted of maintenance data, supply system identification, and unconstrained turnaround time measurements extracted from the April-October 1982 WESTPAC-Indian Ocean Deployment of the USS RANGER (CV-61). This data base contains 18,278 records for all material inducted into the IMA aboard FANGER during the cruise.

The model proposed in the earlier study assumed limited repair capacity, unlike the model currently in use of the RIMAIR pipeline model. In order to evaluate the impact of that assumption, moderately fast moving items were analyzed; slow movers offer little hope of discriminating between models even if only a single test facility is available. Consequently, only aviation repairable items that had exhibited twenty or more actions during RANGER's six-month cruise were selected for analysis. There were 79 such items. The following summaries present the basic characteristics of the entire data base, and contrast them with the characteristics of the selected sample. (Appendix A provides more complete statistics on the data.)

## 1. Supply System Identification

Table III provides the breakdown for the entire RANGER data base and the selected sample for three key supply system identifiers: the cognizance code (cog), the material control code (MCC), and the special material identification code (SMIC). Although the national stock number (NSN) is the prime identifier for any given unit or part, it does not carry much information about what an item is and what it may be used for; the three identifiers listed in the table are usually associated with the NSN in order to convey this information.

Complete descriptions of the codes are provided in the appendices of Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) P-485 [Bef. 12]. Brief descriptions for the codes listed in the table are as follow:

- a) The cognizance code (cog) designates the inventory manager who exercises supply management over specified categories of material [Ref. 12: Appendix 18].
  - 1) '1R' designates ASO-managed consumable material.

TABLE III						
RANGER Data Base Supply Data Summary						
Category/ Key value	/ 25	Num Entire Data	ber of RANGZR base	actions (%) Selected Sample		
log 1R: ASO cors 2R: ASO depo	sumable st-level	1149 8171	(6.3) (44.7)	105 ( 3.6) 1859 (64.5)		
8R: ASO dero	ot-level	1132	( 6.2)	920 (31.9)		
Other None TC	DTAL	881 6945 18278	$\begin{pmatrix} 4 & 8 \\ 38 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$	0 { 0.0} 7 { 0.0} 2884		
CC D: field-lev repairat	rel ble	1235	(6.8)	105 ( 3.6)		
E: CLAMP I er H: Nol-CLAMP	pairable Piepor-	5144 4350	$\binom{28}{23}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1527 & (52.9) \\ 1252 & (43.4) \end{array}$		
Other None TC	DITAL	328 7221 18278	(39:5)	0 { 0:0} 2884		
EMIC CS: S-3A air CY: AWG-9 ra FA: A-6 airc FE: EA-6B ai F2: GFF proc	rcraft Idar Sraft Ircraft Ircaft	1818 994 760 750 606	(9.9) (5.4) (4.2) (4.1) (3.3)	247 ( 8.6) 653 ( 22.6) 1566 ( 5.4) 1755 ( 8.4) 242 ( 8.4)		
PF: 7-14A a SZ: ASN-92	rcraft (CAINS)	1186 454	6.5	$     \begin{array}{c}       143 \\       331 \\       (11.5)     \end{array} $		
Cther None IC	DTAL	4363 7347 18278	(23.9) (40.2)	937 (32.5) 2884		

7,

- 2) \*2R\* and \*8R\* designate ASO-managed repairable material.
- Cther' represents a number of other cogs with few relatively few demands each.
- b) The material control code (MCC) is designated by the inventory manager to segregate items into manageable groupings [Ref. 12: Appendix 9.F].

1) 'D' designates a field-level repairable.

- 2) 'E' designates an intensified-management depotlevel repairable, managed under the Closed-Lcop Aeronautical Material Program (CLAMF).
- B\* is a depot-level repairable not otherwise designated.
- 4) 'Other' represents items with any other MCC assigned.
- c) The special material control code (SMIC) is assigned to an item to ensure its technical integrity [Ref. 12: Appendix 9.1]. ASO generally assigns SMIC codes for material under their cognizance to identify the weapon system to which the item applies, to identify the function if more than one weapon system is involved, or to identify a special program the item is managed under.
  - CS' items apply to the S-3A antisubmarine patrol aircraft.
  - 2) 'CY' applies to the AWG-9 radar system on the F-14A.
  - 3) 'FA' applies to the A-6 attack aircraft.
  - 4) 'FE' applies to the EA+6B electronic warfare aircraft.
  - 5) 'FZ' apples to a special project for government furnished equipment.
  - 6) 'FF' applies to the F-14A fighter aircraft.
  - 7) 'SZ' applies to the ASN-92 (CAINS) Carrier Airborne Inertial Navigation System.
  - Cther \* represents more than forty other SMIC\*s, each having relatively low demand.

Each of the above codes also had many observations listed as "none" for the entire RANGER data base. The 38% listed as "none" for the cog codes indicates that 38% of the manufacturer's parts numbers listed on the VIDS/MAF maintenance data forms could not be matched to any NSN (every NSN in the Navy Supply System has a cog, and vice-versa.) The slightly higher quantities listed as "none" in the MCC and SMIC categories include these 38% plus some other items for which an NSN and cog were available, but for which that code was not assigned. Some maintenance actions listed as 'none' may reflect actions for non-stock-numbered items, but certainly many are the result of poor data entry procedures.

It is obvious that the sample used for this thesis is not a representative sample, nor was it intended to be. The 79 items in the sample experienced about 16% of the total demand for the RANGER deployment, yet the 920 '8R' actions, for example, represent more than 31% of the 8R actions in the data base. Only maintenance actions matched to NSN's are included in the sample, however; it is likely that the RANGER data base includes data for items used in the sample, but which were not credited to the correct stock number because of data input problems. One missed digit in the long part number block will cause a mismatch to occur.

Euring development of the proposed model, many decisions were made with the idea that the model might actually be applied in real-world situations. Choices available ar decision points were considered in accordance with the degree of simplicity and practicality that they offered. Thus, analysis was restricted to TR D, 2R, and BR cognizance material because it is for these categories of material that the current model is used, and to which the RIMAIR model should be applied.

### 2. Data Base TAI Characteristics

Turnaround time analysis is at the heart of the inventory modelling problem, and it is important to recognize the structure within which the TAT elements are reported. As stated briefly in Chapter II, TAT and the elements that make it up (IP, SKD, RPR, AWP) are reported into the data collection system indirectly by use of the VIDS/MAF source document; the values for the various TAT

elements are computed by NAMSO based upon the dates that various key events in the maintenance cycle cccur, as recorded in Figure 2.1.

There is an important limitation inherent in this Quick actions, in which two or more of the events system. cccur on the same date, will be computed to take zero days. It is not possible to have a failed item removed from an aircraft and complete the repair cycle in zero time, yet the sample revealed that 35.2% of all turnaround times were reported as taking 0 days. The inability of the data collection system to measure the bulk of the actions any more accurately than as zero or one day caused a considerable problem when conducting independence tests and in simulating the system. In some applications of their allowance model. ASO uses a minimum TAT of one day when this situation occurs. An important point for future consideration, as the maintenance data system evolves, will be to attempt to provide greater resolution in TAT's.

Table IV presents a comparison of the TAT elements reported in the entire RANGER data base with those in the sample. There are two important observations to be made from this TAT information. First, the average time reported for most of the TAT elements are low because many of the observations reported for the TAT elements were 0; this was the case for 2427 of the 2884 in-process time observations (84.2%), 2202 of the scheduling time observations (76.4%), 1790 of the repair time observations (62.1%), and 1016 of the TAT observations (35.2%). The aforementioned inability to measure times in less than whole day intervals may affect any model that is very sensitive to estimation of the repair rate.

Second, there is a considerable amount of time spent in attempting to repair and obtain parts for units that are later BCM'd. The BCM action portion of the table shows that

TABLE IV	
Data Base TAT Sum	lbary
A. All successful repair actions.	
Entire data base IAT # Mean Standard Element (days) Deviation (days)	Selected Sample # Mean Standard (days) Deviation (days)
IP 12524 0.72 13.1 SKD 12524 1.29 4.6 RPR 12524 1.67 5.6 AWP 12524 1.93 7.2 AWP* 1763 13.69 14.3 TAT 12524 5.61 17.0	2502       0.55       4.6         2502       0.53       2.1         2502       1.23       4.2         2502       1.31       5.4         304       10.79       11.7         2502       3.62       9.1
B. All BCM actions.	
Entire data base TAT # Mean Standard Element (days) Deviation	Selected Sample Mean Standard (days) Deviation
$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
C. All actions.	
Entire data base TAT # Mean Standard Element (days) Deviation	Selected Sample * Mean Standard (days) Deviation (days)
IP 18278 0.91 13.4 SKD 18278 1.27 8.6 RPR 18278 1.73 9.5 AWE 18278 2.32 8.2 AWP* 2657 15.95 15.7 TAT 18278 6.23 20.7	2884       0.65       5.2         2884       0.56       2.2         2884       1.34       4.7         2884       1.90       7.3         399       13.71       15.3         2884       4.44       11.2
* AWP average for those action	is that experienced AWP.

5754 of the 18278 maintenance actions documented resulted in ECM action, and that these actions had an average TAT of 7.57 days. If these actions were spread out evenly over the course of the 178 day deployment, it would mean that, on average, there were 244.7 non-RFI units on board ship in the repair cycle on any given day that would later be BCM\*d. The

BIMAIR model will not take these items into account when developing allowances to support the repair cycle.

Although the RIMAIR model ignores the time that units declared BCM spend in the repair cycle (the bCH TAI), the ECM TAT could be included in either the repair pipeline (by assuming that all inductions are attempted repairs) or as part of the order and shipping time. Ignoring the BCM maintenance cycle time, especially for units held in anticipation of praining parts, can seriously hamper support for these items.

### 3. Maintanance Lata Characterization

The factors used to classify maintenance actions into one repair process or another should exist within the maintenance data base, which is described in oreat detail in the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) manual. CPNAVINST 4790.2E [Ref. 13]. The aviation maintenance data collection system is used for manhour accounting, -iccumenting aircraft utilization, failure data reporting, and many other purposes. Some of the data elements directly concern repair of failed components removed from aircraft, and these data elements have been analyzed to determine if they provide the capability to distinguish between the type one repair process, which is conceptualized as a guick test-and-check type of repair, and the type two repair, which is thought to be a more in-depth repair that generally takes longer and requires more part support. The following data elements are the ones that have been analyzed. AL example of the type of information provided by each code is listed for each category; complete explanations for each of the various codes are too long for inclusion in this thesis. The interested reader is referred to the descriptions that are provided in the NAMP appendix indicated.

- a) The action taker (AT) code classifies repair actions as to their result, and what maintenance action brought about the result [Ref. 13: Appendix H]. For example, AT code 'C', for repair, is listed as "Repair includes cleaning, disassembly, inspection, reassembly, lubrication, and replacement of integral parts; ...", etc.; its use indicates that the repair was successful.
- b) The malfunction (MAL) code specifies the type of defect found by the maintenance person attempting repair [Ref. 13: Appendix M]. '290' for example, is listed as "fails diagnostic/automatic tests"; guidance from higher authority and experience will dictate to a maintenance technician when use of this entry is more appropriate than any other.
- c) The type maintenance (TM) code specifies the maintenance action or inspection that took place in terroving the defective item from its installation [Ref. 13: Appendix K]. TM code 'B' is listed as "Unscheduled maintenance. Used... for all maintenance actions except the following:". Four detailed exceptions are then listed: two types of inspections, calibration for a specific category of equipment, and maintenance of transient aircraft.
- d) The when discovered (WD) code specifies the operation or maintenance action that led to the discovery of the defective item. [Ref. 13: Appendix V]. WD code 'W' is described as "used when a need for maintenance is discovered during in-shop repair and/or disassembly for maintenance."

The category 'Other' is used for these codes to reflect actions where the number of observations was too few to warrant inclusion in the table. For example, there were 89 different MAL codes used for actions related to items in the sample; a number of these were used only once. Table V provides a summary of the data available in the RANGEF data base for these four maintenance codes and contrasts this with data used in the sample. This data is presented for two reasons. First, it helps to illustrate the variety and richness that is available in the aviation 3-M data base for characterizing maintenance actions. Although there are relatively few codes listed here, there are hundreds of malfunction (MAL) codes and many more in the other categories.

The second reason for presenting this data is that these maintenance data codes should provide a means of differentiating repairs into the theorized process one and process two of the model. This will be shown in the following section.

#### C. ADALYSIS OF THE TAT ELEMENTS

As was noted carlier, the establishment of the repair system as two parallel processes is an important element of The following procedure was used to develop this model. this concept. First, the lack of independence of the current TAT elements is shown. Based upon this result, a new variable structure is developed. It is then shown that the IAT data for the regain processing time are not distributed in an exponential manner. The repair process is analyzed with the result that there are actually multiple repair processes cccurring simultaneously. A simple model is then hypothesized which classifies all repair actions into two subsets, depending solely on the existence or absence of AWP time. These two underlying processes are shown to be independent of each other and to have exponential distributions. Finally, revised TAT limits for use with the new variables are presented.

TABLE V				
BANGER	Data Ease Maint	enance Charact	eristics	
Cate K≘y	gory/ E Values D	Incire RANGER Data base (%)	Selected Sample (*)	
Action Tak	en (AT)			
A: NC rep C: Sepair J: Calibr Cther rep RE	al: required ated airs PAIR TCTAL	$\begin{array}{c} 2413 \\ 8488 \\ 1207 \\ 398 \\ 12.503 \\ 68.4 \end{array}$	1980 (68.7) 0 (C.0) 19 (0.6) 2502 (86.7)	
1: ECM-re	pair not	2435 (13.3)	134 ( 4.6)	
autror 4: ECM-la 5: ECM-la 7: BCM-be	ized ck of parts ils check&test yend authorized	822 ( 4.5) 650 ( 3.6) 1212 ( 6.6)	87 ( 3.0) 47 ( 1.6) 106 ( 3.7)	
Cther BCM EC	S M TOTAL	635 (3.5) 5754 (31.5)	$382$ $\{13.2\}$	
Other act	ions TAL	18 ( 0.1) 18278	0 ( 0.0) 2884	
falfunctio	n Code (MAL)			
070: Breco 1279: IFACII 1425: ATE 1425: ATE 2979: No 2979: No 2079: No 2079	en physically oper adjustment rfect voltage s to operate utput test failure rnal failure efect efect, scheduled	$\begin{array}{c} 842 \\ 1691 \\ 571 \\ 2031 \\ 731 \\ 4.0 \\ 4.0 \\ 4.0 \\ 4.0 \\ 811 \\ 1803 \\ 1575 \\ 8.6 \\ 8.6 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 105 \\ 555 \\ 1227 \\ 149 \\ 555 \\ 149 \\ 149 \\ 551 \\ 1227 \\ 129 \\ 122 \\ 122 \\ 122 \\ 122 \\ 122 \\ 122 \\ 122 \\ 124 \\ 122 \\ 124$	
Cther	TOTAL	4222 (23.1) 18278	756 (26.2) 2884	
Lype Maint	enance Performed	(TM)		
E: Unsche D: Taily P: Calend S: Condit Cther	duled Inspection ar Inspection ional Inspection TOTAL	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	
then Disco	vered (WD)			
E: Inflig H: Eetwee Ly gro W: In sho Cther	ht, no abort n flights, und crew p	$\begin{array}{c} 4076 \\ 4083 \\ 22.3 \\ 4320 \\ 5799 \\ 31.8 \\ 31.8 \end{array}$	$ \begin{array}{c} 1187\\891\\30.9\\\\625\\2625\\21.6\\\end{array} $	

### 1. Independence of the TAT Elements

Chapter II provided the current procedure for limiting TAT element observations. The 1977 ASO study that developed the current limits, [Ref. 4], assumed the TAT elements to be independent. This is not a valid assumption. Chi-square tests of independence with *c*-levels of 0.01 lead to the following conclusions:

- a) In-process time (IP) is independent of the other three elements. This was expected because IP measures the time required for administration and transportation functions performed by the operational level (squadron) maintenance personnel and the local supply activity, and is not related to the repair process itself.
- b) Scheduling time (SKD), repair time (RFR), and awaiting parts time (AWP) are not independent variables. These three variables measure the functions most closely related to the actual repair, and their relationship to each other is not surprising.

Table VI provides the results of the independence tests which tested each of the four TAT elements for independence from each of the others. Part A provides a brief definition for each of the elements; part B summarizes the results of the chi-square independence tests; and independence tests using Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) are presented in part C of the table. Both sets of tests indicate that the hypothesis that IP is independent of SKD, RPR, and AWP cannot be rejected. The significance levels of the tests range from 0.207 to 0.340. The tests for independence between the SKD, RPB, and AWP elements are all rejected at the 0.01 level.

A derived variable, called repair-cycle time (RCT), is now formally defined as the sum of the scheduling, repair, and awaiting parts times for a given maintenance action.

TABLE VI						
	TAT	Element Inde	pendence Tes	t Results		
<b>.</b> 1	Definitio TAT eleme	ns nt	Time pario From	d measured   Until		
IF SKI EF	:In proc D:Schedul R:Repair Less AWP F:Awaitin	ess rem ing rec time g parts wor	oval eipt at IMA k starts k stoppage	receipt at IMA work starts completion work resumes		
3. (	Chi-squar cn the da alements cell wou cbservati	e tests for the elements were grouped ld have less on. Test res	independence using SPS into catego s than 3 ults are lis	were performed S. Data for the ries so that no for an expected ted as follows:		
C)	hi-square VA	: VA test R1 (1) sigle	R2 Value f.) evel			
•		ISKE	REA	I AWP I		
•	IF	2.6 (2) p=.26 ó	5.9 (4) p=.209	3.4 (3) p=.335		
	SKD		26.7 (8) p=.0003	24.3 (6) p=.0005		
	REP			372.8 (12) p=.0000		
2. (	Correlati	ons using Pa	arson's r.			
		I SKE	RPR	1 AWP 1		
	12	-0.0077 (2884) p=.340	-0.)116   (2984)   p=.266	-0.3111 (2984) p=.275		
	SKD		0.0853 (2884) p=.000	0.0477 (2894) p=.005		
	RFR			0.2311 (2984) p=.000		

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RCT = SKD + RPR + AWP

(3.1)

A test of independence between RCT and IP yielded a chisquare value of 3.5 with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance level of 0.628, leading to a conclusion of independence between RCT and IP.

The use of RCT as a key variable in a simple model is dependent upon the assertion that it is exponential. A statistical test of this assertion results in rejection of the expenential distribution. The mean of RCT is 3.793; an exponential distribution with this same mean would have approximately 32.7% cf its observations for 0-1 days. and 8.2% for 10 or more days. The empirical distribution for RCT has scre weight in both these categories: 71.(? (2048 of 2884 cbservations) for D-1 days, and 10.43 (299 of 2884) for 10 days or more. A formal test for the exponential distritution was performed with the Lilliefors test for exponential distributions. The resulting value was 0.383 with 30 degrees of freedom, which leads to the rejection of the hypothesis that the distribution is exponential at the 0.01 level of significance.

Similar conclusions were reached in the earlier study [Ref. 10]. In that study the data were split into two parts each roughly approximated by an exponential distribution. The empirical distribution of the RANGER RCT lends itself to a similar conclusion: if two separate exponential processes with different mean times were occurring simultaneously, their joint distribution could exhibit the characteristics that the RCT distribution does. The factor or factors that facilitate classifying items into one or the other of the underlying processes must now be identified.

### 2. <u>Decomposition of RCT</u>

Table VII presents a summary of RCT time observations broken down by the maintenance data elements previously listed in Table V . The table provides the number of cases listed in each category for each code, the average value for RCI for that category, and the standard deviation. All times are listed in days. The results of separating the data in this genner are to indicate that there are differences in BCT for different values of the codes. For the AT code, AT 'A' (no repair required) had an average ECT value of 0.79 days; AT 'C' (successfully repaired) had a rean of 3.52 days; and AT '4' (BCM for lack of parts) had a mean time of 26.77 days. The breakdown by MAL code was equally enlightening: MAL 1799! (no defect) had mean RCT of 0.78 days, but MAL '290' (fails dignostic/ automatic tests) and MAL '255' (no output) had mean values of PCI of 9.07 and 11.09 days, respectively. The IM and WD codes also showed differences between their values, but not to the same extent.

The existence of absence of AWP time was also used as a Bernoulli variable for the purpose of differentiating the repair processes. This was done on the belief that certain types of repair action are more likely to result in AWP time, and therefore the existence of AWP may be a key to differentiating the processes.

ANOVA tests were run on the variables using RCT values as the dependent variable in an attempt to differentiate the processes. Using the existence of AWP to differentiate between the processes is biased because RCT includes AWF time within it. Therefore, additional tests were run on RCT without AWP time included. Table VIII provides the results of these tests. Part A of the table provides the results of separate tests for significance in

TABLE VII RCT Values for Selected Data Elements				
Category/ Key Values	N	Mean (days)	Standard Deviation (Jays)	
Action Taken (AT)				
A: No repair required C: Repair Cther repair actions FEPAIR TOTAL	503 1980 19 2502	0.79 3.52 16.05 3.07	2.10 9.34 7.92	
1: BCM-repair net	134	0.26	1.60	
4: ECM-lack of parts 5: ECM-fails check&test 7: ECM-beyond authorized	37 47 106	26.77 0.98 7.53	23.70 211 17.70	
Cther ECMs ECM TOTAL	382 382	6.88 8.54	17.97	
TOTAL	2384	3.79	a.94	
Malfurction Code (MAL)				
070: Bicken physically 127: Improper adjustment 169: Incorrect voltage 242: Fails to operate 255: No oitput 290: AIE test failure 374: Internal failure 799: No defect, scheduled maiorerates	105 5255 127 143 151 351 372 126	2.59 1.11 5.153 1.43 1.09 5.09 0.78 1.47	5.58 4.21 11.18 10.11 16.62 2.330 1.50	
Cther TOTAL	756 2884	3.70 3.79	9.56	
Type Maintenance Performed	(TM)			
E: Unscheduled D: Daily Inspection F: Calendar Inspection S: Conditional Inspection Cther TOTAL	2737 130 14 2884	3.88 1.90 1.50 3.71 5.79	10.20 5.60 0.71 10.02	
When Discovered (WD)				
I: Inflight, no abort H: Eetween flights, by ground crew W: If shop	1187 891 181	4.27 3.29 2.09	11.04 9.25 5.46	
Cther TOTAL	625 2884	4.10 3.79	9.98	

explaining the variability of RCT when using the four maintenance codes (AT, MAI, TM, and WD) and the presence of AWP separately to try to explain the variance. The test revealed that all of the codes except TM were significant in explaining the variability. The sum of squares explained by WD, even though significant, was small compared to the sum of squares explained for the other three variables. Consequently, when testing for the significance of the variables wher used together in the ANOVA test, only AT, MAL, and AWP were used. The result of this test is provided in the bottom of part A, and indicates that AWP is the best single indicator for explaining the variability of RCT.

Fart B of the table shows the results of performing the same tests, but using the sum SKD+RPR as the variable to te explained; the reason for doing this is to minimize the bias inherent in using the presence of AWP to indicate the variability in a variable that includes AWP time. The results are similar: MAL, WD, and AWP are the best indicators when tested separately, but this time MAL turns cut to te a slightly better indicator when the three variables are tested jointly.

Ic summarize, the ANOVA tests revealed that the best variables for use as factors to differentiate the repair processes were the MAL code, the AT code, and the existence/absence of AWP. These were all significant at the 0.001 level whether AWP time was included in RCT or not. The AWP code provided the greatest ability to explain variations in RCT, which includes AWP time, and the MAL code provided the greatest ability to explain variations in the RFR+SKD times (i.e., RCT without including AWP time.)

Use of the MAL code for differentiating repair processes is probably the most logical choice, but there is an inherent problem. It is easy to accept that the type of repair action necessary for a unit depends upon the exact

	TABLE	YIII	
1	RCT ANOVA	Results	
A. Results of separ using RCT with .	AWP includ	A tests on the variables ded.	•
Variable Sum ( Squa)	cf D.F Ces	Mean P Signific Square Level	ance
MAL 36122 TM 1133 AT 60525 WC 4860 AWE (Y/N) 9946C TCTAL 289865	8 88 4 7 4 10 4 19 5 1 8 2883	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
Using the best in teduced number c: a three-way ANOV plus other), AT	ndicators f categor: A was run (repair/BC	from the above tests, we ties due to size constrait on MAL (9 specific code CCM), and AWP (Y/N).	ith nts, s,
Main Sum Effects Square	of D.F es	Mean F Sig Square Level	
All 109192 MAL 6041 BCM/Tep 5256 AWF(Y/N) 69947 Fesidual 180677 TOTAL 289865 ICTAL 81380	1 11 8 9 0 1 3 2872 8 2883 2 2883	9926.6 157.79 .0000 671.3 10.67 .0000 5256.0 83.52 .0000 69947.3 1111.86 .0000 62.9 28.3	
B. Recognizing the using the value	AWP bias SKD+RPR.	, the same tests were ru	n
Variable Sum ( Squa	of D.F tes	Mean F Signific Square Level	ande
MAI 5888 TM 302 AT 3513 WD 595 AWE(Y/N) 3731 TOTAL 81380	8 88 4 7 7 10 2 19 5 1 2 2883	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	
Main Sum ( Effects Squar)	of D.F	' Mean - F Significan Square - Level	Ce
All 6321 MAL 2459 BCM/T@P 332 AWE(Y/N) 1640 Residual 75058 ICTAL 81380	9 11 1 9 5 1 9 2872 2 2883	574.7 21.99 .0000 273.2 10.46 .0000 332.5 12.72 .0000 1640.9 62.79 .0000 26.1 28.3	

malfunction it has. There are, nowever, 89 different malfunction codes used for various items in the sample. It is not practical to define a simple model for each MAL code, and grouping codes became too complex a task within the time available. Consequently, the existence or absence of AWP, which is the second-best discriminator, was used to define the two repair processes shown in Figure 3.1.

The following definitions will be used for the two repair processes, modifying Equation 3.1 :

a) for actions without AWP time:

RC1 = SKD + RPR;

RCT = RC1.

b) for actions with AWP time:

RC2 = SKD + RPR;RCT = RC2 + AWP. (3.2)

It is desirable to maintain a distinction between the AWP time itself and RC2, even though it is the existence of AWP that is used to differentiate RC2 from RC1.

The proposed model will assume capacity constraints on the repair process, which would normally affect only the scheduling and repair functions. AWP time is actually time out of the process, and there is no physical reason to expect a capacity constraint on the AWP process. Statistics for RC1 and RC2 are listed in Table IX. Part A shows the number of cases, average SKD+RPR value, and standard deviation of the SKD+RPR value for the two groups of maintnenance actions defined by the existence or absence of AWP. Testing the hypothesis that the groups are from the same population results in rejecting this hypothesis at the 0.001 level.

		TABLE IX	
Bepair	r Cycle Value	es for the T	wo Piocesses
A. Analysis provides	of the exist the followi:	tence or abs ng values fo	ence of AWP time r (SKD+RPR):
Categ	gory	N	Mean Standard (days) Deviation
RC1: RC2:	No AWF time AWP occurre ICTAL	2485 399 2384	1.44 4.73 1.90 5.19
In approx estimates p=0.00.	ximate t-tes yielded a v	st using s alue of 7.04	eparate variance with 425.2 d.1,
B. Analysis provides	of the exist the following	tence or abs ng values fo	ence of AWP time r RCT:
Cate	gory	N	Mean Standard
RCÍ (=RC RCÍ (=RC	C1, no AWP) C2+AWP) ICTAL	2485 399 2884	1.44         4.21           18.45         19.13           3.79         10.03
An appro: estimates F=0.00	ximate trees yielded a va	st using s alue of 17.6	eparate variance 4 with 404.2 1.1,
C. Correlat:	icns of RC1 a	and RC2 with	IP and AWP.
	I F	I AWP	1
FC1	C 130 (2485) E=.259	no Awp	
FC2	. C 189 ( 399) p=.353	.1733 (399) p=.300	

Fart B of the table provides the same basic information as part A, but includes the AWP time in with the SKD+RFR observations. The result is that the mean and standard deviation for the observations that include AWP is considerably higher. Testing the hypothesis that both groups are from the same population is again rejected. Fart C provides the Pearson correlation coefficient (R) test for independence of RC1 and RC2 from IP and AWP. RC1 and RC2 are accepted as being independent from IP, but testing RC2 results in rejecting the independence hypothesis, as expected.

The following figures illustrate the breakdown of RCT into the decomposed cycles. Figure 3.2 provides the distribution of repair cycle days (SKD+RPR) for all actions in the selected sample. These same observations are plotted as two separate distributions, based on AWP, in Figure 3.3. The plot of RC1 is seen to have a very small tail, 25 RC2 has a long tail, and includes most of the expected. The reduction in the mean and standard longer actions. deviation of process one times over the aggregate times is the result of removing most of the slow moving maintenance actions. The fact that the standard deviation is still too high for the distribution to be a true exponential is partially due to a few very large numbers, which are censcred when data limits are applied.3

Fesults of formally testing the distributions of RC1 and RC2 with the Lilliefors goodness-of-fit test for the null hypothesis that each is an exponential distribution are as follows: variable RC1 has a test value of 0.078 with 30 degrees of freedom, which results in the conclusion that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; variable RC2 has a test value of 0.088 with 30 d.f., which also results in the conclusion that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

<sup>3</sup>Although the data base contains observations for RC1 or RC2 that are large compared to the mean (e.g. 10-30 days), there are also 6 observations in excess of 50 days. These data observations are not considered to be representative of the actual underlying repair process. Observations like these, which may have resulted from poor data entry procedures, force the use of upper limits (constraints) on the data used to compute allowances.









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# 3. Fevised TAT Limits

Chapter II discussed some problems of using TAT limits but recognized the need for some limit to be applied. Analysis of the sample data revealed that applying the existing limits had a very serious effect on the statistics generated by the data, particularly for in-process time. The existing one day limit reduced the mean value for IP from 0.646 days to 0.158 days, a reduction of more than 75%. SKD, limited at 3 days, has its mean value reduced from 0.557 days to 0.339 days, a 39% reduction. RPR and AWP are similarly reduced, and the final reduction on TAT is from 4.44 days down to 2.74 days, a 38.3% reduction. Ev using these values to compute allowances, it is in fact implying that the next deployment will have 38.3% fewer items in the repair process on any given day than the deployment being used as a data base had.

Because these reductions seem quite severe, modified limits were developed using approximately the 98th percentile of the empirical distributions for the various TAT elements. Table X presents the results of this analysis. Fart A of the table shows each TAT element, the existing limit, the raw (unlimited) and limited average times, the number of observations in the sample that were limited, зnđ the percentage of observations limited. Part B provides the same information, but with revised TAT limits developed through analysis of the sample data. The result of using these revised TAT limits is to reduce TAT from 4.44 days to 3.80 days, or a reduction of 14.4%, which is much less severe. These modified limits will be used when developing allowances with the proposed model, and their effects on both the existing and proposed models will be shown in the simulation results. Their use is not meant to imply that they are correct values for the aviation 3-M system as a

TABLE X						
	Revi	sed TAT	Limits			
A. Effect	of existing	limits	on sampl	e data.		
TAT Elegent	Existing Limit	Aver Raw (days)	age Limited (days)	Cases a: #	ffected (१)	
IF SRDR Awf Awf TAT	1 day 3 day 8 day 20 day 20 day	.646 .557 1.34 1.90 13.7 4.44	.158 .339 .886 1.36 9.85 2.74	125 91 93 93 359	(4.33) (3.16) (3.40) (3.22) (3.21) (3.31) (23.35)	
*AWP ave	rage for the	399 10	tions tha	t had Ai	1 P	
B. Effect	of new limit	s cn sai	mple data	•		
TAT Element	New Limit	Aver Raw I (days)	age Limited (days)	Cases a: #	ffectad (%)	
IP	6 days	.646	.309	53	(1.84)	
RC1 (units	12 days without AWP)	1.44	1.18 53	of 2485	(2.13)	
RC2 (units	35 days with AWP)	4.73	4.45 J	of 399	(2.01)	
AWP* (units	60 days with AWP)	13.7	13.5 7	of 399	(1.75)	
TAT	-	4.44	3.80	120	(4.15)	

whole to use, but rather that some relaxation of the current limits is warranted.

4. IAT Analysis Summary

It has been shown that the TAT elements are not independent, that repair cycle time is not exponential, and two independent subprocesses can be defined based upon the existence or absence of AWP time that are acceptably exponential in distribution.

The existence or absence of AWP time is itself a condition dependent upon a number of factors. The complexity of a malfunction, the inability of test equipment or technicians to isolate the fault, or the nonavailability of the correct repair parts may cause an item to go AWP. No simple inventory model can take all of these into account; the SPECTRUM large scale simulation system developed at the Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, PA, is probably the only system that encompasses such a level of complexity. However, any allowance development model of the magnitude of SPECTRUM is too large for day-to-day use. Consequently, the simple approach of recognizing the inherent differences between repair actions that cause AWP and those that do not is the chosen method for defining the two separate repair processes.

### D. THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE PROPOSED MODEL

### 1. <u>MZMZ1 Queue Characteristics</u>

The M/M/1 queue is the simplest elementary queueing model which provides the capability to examine a queueing system as it approaches saturation. It assumes interarrival times are exponential, repair times are exponential, and there is only one server. In practical terms, an IMA may have a number of test benches or technicians capable of repairing an item, but other jobs, down benches, shift work, etc. may reduce the effective number of servers to one. Consequently, the physical queue may display characteristics similar to that of ar M/M/1 system.

The state diagram (Figure 3.4) provides the basic characteristics that will be used to compare the M/M/1 model with the existing model. The state probabilities are easily determined from the state transition diagram as follows:



Figure 3.4 M/M/1 Queue Characteristics.

50

$$\lambda \Pi(\circ) = \mu \Pi(\circ),$$

$$\Pi(\circ) = \frac{\lambda}{\mu} \Pi(\circ),$$

$$\Pi(\circ) = \rho \Pi(\circ);$$

$$(\lambda + \mu) \Pi(\circ) = \lambda \Pi(\circ) + \mu \Pi(2),$$

$$\Pi(z) = \frac{\lambda}{\mu} \Pi(c),$$

SO

$$\pi(z) = \frac{\lambda}{\mu} \pi(i),$$
  
$$\pi(z) = \rho \pi(i),$$
  
$$\pi(z) = \rho^2 \pi(i);$$

and in general,

$$(\lambda + \mu) \pi(n) = \lambda \pi(n-i) + \mu \pi(n+i)$$

so

$$\pi(n+i) = \rho \pi(n),$$
  
 $\pi(n+i) = \rho^{n+i} \pi(o).$ 

With the specification that all state probabilities must sum to one,

$$\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \pi(i) = 1,$$

the probabilities are determined to be:

 $\pi(\circ) = 1 - \rho, \qquad \circ < \rho < 1;$ 

and for n > 0,

$$\pi(n) = (1 - p)p^n, \quad 0$$

Since the desired quantity is the quantity Q such that the probability that there are Q or less in the system equals the safety level parameter (SL), Q is found as follows:

$$SL = \sum_{i=0}^{Q} \pi(i),$$
  
= (1- p)  $\sum_{i=0}^{Q} p^{i},$   $O$ 

so

and Q solves as

$$Q = \frac{l_m (1-SL)}{l_m p} - 1$$
(3.3)

An inventory model that satisfies the assumptions listed in Figure 3.4 is restricted in that it is possible to quickly saturate the system when the service rate is less than the arrival rate ( $\rho > 1$ ); at that point both the number in the system and the waiting time of an item entering the system grow without bound. There is no steady-state solution in this case, and it is necessary either to redesign the system for greater repair capacity or to specify an endurance period during which saturation will be allowed to coour, causing the number of units awaiting service to build up. The endurance period must then be followed by a period having a demand rate lower than the repair rate, thereby allowing an activity to work through the packlog.

## 2. Securation Considerations

The specification that the tatio of the arrival rate to the service rate of a single server  $(\rho)$  be less than one was not necessary for solution of the  $M/M/\infty$  queue model because there were always enough servers available to provide service to arriving units. This is not the case in the M/M/1 queueing model, where the assumption that there is but a single server leads to the possibility that the system will become saturated when the arrival rate equals or exceeds the service rate. A queueing model with a capacity constraint was chosen specifically to model this situation.

When the M/M/1 queueing model is applied to a situation where the number of units that may require service is infinite, the expected number in the system,  $P = \frac{P}{P}$ ,

increases without bound as the value of  $\varrho$  approaches unity. For  $\varrho \ge 1$ , there is no steady state solution for the number of units in the system.

In the actual situations to be modelled, however, the population is finite, though generally large with respect to the number in an unsaturated queue. This situation is more formally referred to as a M/M/1//K system, indicating that the arrival rate, service rate, and single server assumptions of the M/M/1 queueing model hold, but with the additional specification that there are only K units that may fail and enter the system for repair. This system has been analyzed separately from the M/M/1 model in available literature, and the formulae for the expected number in the system as approaches or exceeds unity are quite different. The formulae provided in Figure 3.4 were obtained from Morse [Ref. 15: p. 18], and are as follows:

let P = number in the repair system, and

K = number in the population.

Ther

$$P = \begin{cases} e^{+} e^{2} & e^{<1} \\ \frac{k}{2} + \frac{k(n+2)(e^{-1})}{12} & e^{-1} \\ \frac{k}{e} & e^{>>1} \end{cases}$$

(3.4)

The formula for  $\rho <<1$ ,  $\rho + \rho^2$ , is a second order approximation for the steady state formula used in the infinite approximation case. The formulae for approaching or exceeding one are significantly different. The number of items that can fail in the infinite population case is assumed to be infinite regardless of the number of items that have already failed, and the arrival rate is constant. With a finite population, however, the number of items that can fail decreases as the number in the repair system drows
and the number in the system can never exceed the population size K. Consequently, the steady state formula for  $\rho = 1$ solves as P=K/2, and the limit as  $\rho \rightarrow \infty$  is P=K. The nature of the system to which the model is being applied, primarily air staticns and aircraft carriers, makes the finite population model considerably more appropriate than the infinite population model.

Che additional comment about applying this model to Naval Aviation activities is appropriate at this point. It has been assumed that the service rate is constant; in tractice it will vary screwhat with the number of units awaiting service. Some units experience improved repair rates as the number of backlogged units increase because of priority repair. Some items requiring piece-parts observe shorter AWP times when cross-cannibalization with items already AWP There is in fact a degree of extra repair capacity cccurs. that becomes apparent during high demand periods, keeping the system below saturation unless it is physically not possible to improve service times (as seems to be the case with VASI). Regardless, the point made earlier in the CAEAL study, [Hef. 11: p.38], that either time must be provided to work off the backlog or readiness degradation will result must be taken to heart by those who design the system, and by these in command.

The RANGER data base obtained for analysis did not include the populations of the items that failed. From experience, it is known that the populations may range from as few as four, for an E-2C specific item, to more than a hundred in the case where there are multiple installations on different aircraft types. Consequently, attempting to estimate K for the different items being studied was not considered feasible. Additionally, the exact numbers and configurations for some weapons systems are classified information. In order to perform the simulation desired to

test the model, therefore, it was necessary to use two other approximations for the number of units in the system. The first approximation estimates the number of items that will buildup in a saturated (p>1) queueing system over time.

The second approximation was adapted from the first (buildup) approximation to allow application when  $\rho \leq 1$ . These are presented here, and were programmed into the simulation allowance computation routines to allow for the computation of "reasonable" allowance quantities when K was not known and  $\rho$  was in the region (1-6,00) (6 small).

The buildup rate approximation was presented in Newell [Bef. 14], and obtains a solution for a transient state by estimating the rate of buildup of the queue in an infinite population. His formula was adapted as follows: let

μ	=	service rate;
λ	=	demand rate, with $\lambda > \mu$ ( $\rho > 1$ );
T	=	expected time in system;
Ро	11 11	expected number in the queue at time 0, prior to saturation, $\lambda$ T:
3(**)	* *	Expected backlog increase during $(0,t^*)$ $(\lambda - \mu) \times t^*;$
QB (**)	=	the number for which the value of the CDP of a Pcisson distribution with mean B(t) is closest to the required safety (SL); and
2(++)	z	number in the queue at time t'.
Then		

$$Q(\epsilon') = P_{\epsilon} + QB(\epsilon'). \tag{3.5}$$

This expression for the buildup rate is only a first-order approximation in the case of a finite population because the observed demand rate from such a population will decrease as the number of items from the population waiting in the queue grows. The failure rate per unit may remain

constant, but the number of RFI units will steadily decrease, thus lowering the observed demand rate.

The second approximation was adapted from the buildup approximation to allow for computation of allowances in the region  $(1-\delta, 1]$ ,  $(\delta \text{ small})$ . In this region the buildup approximation is not applicable because there is no buildup expected:  $\lambda \neq \mu$ . The finite population approximation of the number in the repair system for small  $\rho$ ,  $P = \rho + \rho^2$ , grows steadily worse as  $\rho$  approaches one because third order and higher terms become significant. As previously stated, the expected number in a system with an infinite population increases without bound as  $\rho$  approaches unity. The finite population approximations for  $\rho$  close to one would provide values close to K/2, but the value of K is not There is a need during simulation, however, to available. establish allowances for a few items which have o just less than one. Consequently, the following simple approximation for the number in the system was developed.

In theory, an inventory model attempts to provide an allowance quantity by estimating the distribution of the number of units in the repair system, then finding a quantity such that the value of the CDF at that quantity is equal to the safety level. The approximation chosen for  $\rho$  in the interval (1-6,1] ( $\delta$  small) was to assume the number of demands during a transient interval were Poisson with rate  $\lambda$ , but that repairs were deterministic with rate  $\mu$ . The following formula was actually applied:

T = mean experienced process time; t' = length of endurance period; Pc = the expected number in the system at time 0, =  $\lambda \times T$ ; SL = desired safety level;  $\lambda \times t'$  = expected number of demands in (0,t');

 $QL(t^*) =$  the number for which the value of the CDF of a Foisson distribution with rate  $\lambda x t^*$  is closest to SL;  $ER(t^*) =$  expected number of repairs in (0,t\*),  $= \mu x t^*$ ; and  $Q(t^*) =$  desired allowance.

Then

$$Q(\epsilon') = P_0 + QL(\epsilon') - ER(\epsilon'). \tag{3.6}$$

Equation 3.6 will be referred to as the deterministic repair approximation, and the quantity  $Q(t^{*})$  will be used as the allowance when the following conditions are met:

- a) p < 1,
- b)  $CL(t^*) > ER(t^*)$ , and
- c)  $Q(z^{*}) < p/(1-p)$ .

The use of  $\lambda x$  T as the expected number in the system at time 0 is straightforward; it is the number expected to be in the system at any given time. Arrivals are a Poisson process, so the number of arrivals in the period (0,t\*) is distributed as a Poisson random variable. Assuming repairs to be deterministic allows the expected number of repairs in (0,t\*) to be computed simply as  $\mu \times t^*$ , with the understanding that there is always something in the system to be repaired. When  $\rho$  is greater than one, the buildup approximation is used.

### E. A CAFACITATED MODEL

The inventory model proposed for use with naval aviation repairable items is provided in Figure 3.5. The following provides a detailed lock at how an allowance can be computed with it.



Figure 3.5 The Proposed Hodel (Operational).

1. Application of the M/M/1 Model

Application of the M/M/1 queue model to the available data necessitates making some assumptions and manipulating the equations listed in Figure 3.4 . Available data provide the information needed to compute the process rates as follows: a) Demand rate  $(\lambda)$ : le-NR1 = number of repairs without AWP: NE1 = number of BCM's without AWP: NR2 = number of repairs with AWP; NE2 = number of BCM's with AWP: and t = length cf data collection period. Than process one demands =  $\lambda_1 = (NB1 + NB1)/2;$ process two demands =  $\lambda_{\infty}$  = (NB2 + NB2)/7;  $\lambda = \lambda_1 + \lambda_2$ = total demand b) Service rate (µ): average time in the system is known from the TAT data base, allowing the service rate to be computed. The subscripted variables ( $\mu_1$ ,  $\lambda_1$ , Ti) stand for the appropriate variable in either process one or twc:  $Ti = 1/(\mu_{1} - \lambda_{1});$ ΞC  $\mu_i = \lambda_i + 1/Ti.$ c) Traffic intensity (p) is obtained directly from:  $P_{i} = \lambda_{i} / \mu_{i}$ Once the forecast for the demand and service rate has been determined, the allowance for the repair process is computed as follows: a) Compute the quantities QLi(t') (the SL percentile of the number of demands to be received in  $(0,t^{\dagger})$ , where t' is the endurance period), and ERi(t') (the expected

number of repairs in  $(0,t^{\prime}), \mu_{\ell}, t^{\prime})$ .

- b) Compute the allowance from one of the following three cases.
  - 1) If  $\rho$ i< 1, and QLi(t') < ERi(t'), use the infinite population formula (Equation 3.3):

$$Q_i = \frac{\ln(1-SL_i)}{\ln p_i} - 1.$$
 (3.7)

2) If Pi< 1, GLi(t') > ERi(t'), use the deterministic repair approximation (Equation 3.6):

$$Q_{i}(\epsilon') = (\lambda_{i} \cdot T_{i}) + Q_{L_{i}}(\epsilon') - ER_{i}(\epsilon')$$
(3.8)

3) If (i> 1, use the buildup approximation (Equation
3.5):
 let

$$Q_i(\epsilon') = \lambda_i T_i + QB_i(\epsilon')$$
(3.9)

These equations allow the proposed model to be used in the simulation despite the lack of population size information for the sample items.

## 2. Allowance Computation Procedure

Data needed to compute an allowance with this model is essentially the same as the data needed for the Poisson model, but must be analyzed differently. The steps are as follows:

```
a) Gather information from the 3-M data base; apply TAT element limits where appropriate.
```

```
b) Compute the following quantities:
```

- 1) NR1 number of repairs without AWP;
- 2) NB1 number of BCM's without AWP;
- 3) NR2 number of repairs with AWP;
- 4) NB2 number of BCM\*s with AWP;
- 5) E(IP) expected value of admin (in-process) time;
- 6) F(RC1) expected value of SKD + RPR time for all actions which had no AWP (NR1 + NB1);
- 7) E(RC2) expected value of SKD + RFR time for all actions that had AWP time (NR2 + NB2);
- 8) E(AWP) expected value of AWP for those items that had AWP (NR2 + NB2);
- 9) E(OST) expected value of off-station order and shipping time for items BCM'd (NB1 + NB2);
- 10) t time period over which the data was gathered;
- 11) FH flying hours for the data period t; and
- 12) FH\* flying hour forecast.

c) Compute the flying hour forecast factor (F),

```
F = (FH^{*}/\tau^{*}) / (FH/\tau).
```

- d) Compute the demand rates:
  - $\lambda_1 = (NB1 + NR1) / t;$
  - $\lambda_2 = (NB2 + NR2) / \tau;$  and
  - $\lambda = \lambda_i + \lambda_z.$
- e) Compute the uncapacitated pipeline quantity.
  - 1) Administrative pipeline forecast (PA\*):  $PA^* = P \times \lambda \times E(IP)/t$ .
  - 2) Awaiting parts pipeline forecast (PP'):
    - $PP^* = F \times \lambda_2 \times E(AWP) / \tau.$
  - 3) Wholesale resupply pipeline forecast (PW'):
     PW' = P x (NB1 + NB2) x E(CST)/+.

21(t') = 2c + 231(t').

- h) Repeat step g above using the appropriate variables for process two to compute the repair process two allowance (Q2).
- i) The final allowance is the sum of the individual allowances (Q), plus the allowed operating level (OL) of cne.
  - 1) If neither the buildup approximation nor the deterministic repair approximation had to be used in computing the allowances for processes one and two, the final allowance (QT) is a steady state allowance, and is computed as follows: let \_\_\_\_\_\_CS = Q1 + Q2 + QP;

then

QT = QS + OL.

2) If either of the repair processes used one of the approximations, then the steady state allowance is not available. The allowance for the endurance period is: let CS(t') = {Q1(t') or Q1} + {Q2(t') or Q2} + QS; then

QT(t') = QS(t') + OL.

## 3. Computing the Safety Lavel

The proposed model requires that safe+y level parameters be established for the uncapacitated (admin, AWP, and wholesale resupply) pipeline, repair process one, and repair process two. There are numerous ways to combine the three safety level settings to provide an overall safety level equal to the specified safety level. The simplest method would be to let all three equal the specified level, but flexibility in varying the safety level settings for the two

repair processes is extremely desirable. Consequently, the safety level parameter for the admin, AWP, and wholesals resupply pipeline is set at the specified safety level, and the safety levels for the two repair processes are combined to meet the specified safety level based on the total number of days that items had actually been in each process during the data collection period. The number in the repair process is the product of the demand rate and the average time in the process. Therefore, let

SL = specified safety level; SL1 = process one safety level; SL2 = process two safety level; P1 = average number in process one =  $\lambda_r \times E(RC1)$ ; and P2 = average number in process two =  $\lambda_r \times E(RC2)$ . Then the following relationship must be satisfied:

SL (P1 + P2) = SL1 + P1 + SL2 + P2.

(3.10)

SL is set by higher authority and P1 and P2 are obtained from the data base; to specify SL1 or SL2 before the fital allowances may be computed. For computation pulposes, SL will be fixed at 0.90.

It was found in tests of sample litems that setting SL1 at about 0.97 or 0.98 generally gave the best results in terms of overall protection. It was necessary to modify this in cases where the linear relationship established in Equation 3.10 could not hold. There were a few litems for which no maintenance action resulted in AWP time; the safety level was set to 0.90 in these cases.

# 4. An Example of the Proposed Model

The following example should help to demonstrate how the model works in computing an allowance. The same basic data used in the Chapter II example is utilized to facilitate comparison.

a) Gather TAT data.

		TAT	'elema	ent dat	ia (da	yε)			
	ECMS: BCM 1 BCM 2	I P OC	RC 1 2 1	RC2	<u>eka</u>	TAT 2 1	NB1	= 2	units.
	BCM 3	ĩ		8	15	19	NB2	= 1	unit.
	R = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =	( = c r d C C 1 1 0 1	1÷=ed): 5 02 3 5 1			1 5 0 3 4 5 2 -	NE 1	= 7	units.
	Repair 2 Repair 7 Repair 10	1 4 C = = = = = =	-	9 5 =======	31 24 3 ======	39 37 8 =====	NE 2	= 3	units.
b)	Compute the fo	ollowi	ing fro	om the	data	(rev	ised	TAT	limits
	used):								
	Action		Var	Total	.(lays	}	lear	2	
	Administrativ Process one Process two Awaiting part Order and shi Data period Forecast peri Flying hours Forecast flying hours	re Ip Lod Lng	INCORE I	145 175	9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	155	27.00 17.00	2	
ວ)	Compute the fo	orecas	st fac	tor (F)	:				
	א ד ע	= (F9 = (17 = 1.7	20/60 55	/铅	i/90),				

d) Compute the demand rates:  $\lambda_i = 18B1+8R1)/t$ ,  $\lambda_i = 9/90 = 0.10$  units/iay. = (NE2+NE2)/-= 4/90 = 0.0444 units/day. λ2 λ2 =  $\lambda_1 + \lambda_2$ = 0.1444 units/day. ۲ ۲ e) Compute the uncaracitated pipeline allowance. 1) Aimin pipeline forecast (PA'): PA' = F x  $\lambda$  x E(IP) + = 1.755 x .444 x .692, = 0.175 units. 2) Awaiting parts pipeline forecast (PP'):  $PP' = F x \lambda_x x E(AWP),$ = 1.755 x .0444 x 17.0,= 1.325 units.3) Wholesale resupply pipeline forecast (FW\*): PW' = F x ((NE1+NB2)/t) x E(OST), = 1.755 x (3/90) x 26, = 1.521 units. 4) Provide Poisson protection for this pipeline: PT' = PA' - PP' + PY' = .175 + 1.325 + 1.521, = 3.021 units. Prisson propabilities for a mean of 3.021 are: £ (:) 0438 1473 F (128 a R01234567 ว. 0.1960 0.4185 0.6425 0.8117 0.9140 ŭ: 0 0 3 0 ö... 9654 9876 9960 0515 0222 0084 0 ģ \*n = 5 provides protection closest to 0.90, SC QE = 5 units. f) Compute the quartity expected to be in repair process cie. Compute megain rate ( µ,):  $\lambda_{,}$  + 1/E(RCT) .10 + (1/2.22), 0.55 units/day. = ×

```
2) Compute the expected number of repairs in (0,+*):
             ER1(t') = \mu, x t',
          SC
                 ER1(90) = .55 \times 90
= 49.50 units.
       3) Compute the protected number of demands in (0,:"):
          let
             SL1
                         = 0.98:
          then
             <u>OL1(:')</u>
                         = 98th percentile of the CDF of a
Poisson (F x \lambda_1 x t') distribution;
             F \cdot \lambda_i \cdot t^* = 1.755 \text{ x} \cdot 10 \text{ x} 90,
= 15.795 units;
          therefore
                 QI1(90) = 24 units.
      4) Project future traffic intensity (\rho,') as:
                     e, = = x λ, /μ.
                           = 1.755 x .10 / .55,
      5) Solve for the protected number in repair process
          one.
           \rho_c <1, and EE1(90) > QL1(90), therefore compute Q1
          33:
                        Q1 = (ln(1 - SL1)/ln(p_i)) - 1,
                            = (ln(.02)/ln(.319)) - 1,
= 2.42 units.
g) Solve for SI2:
                     P1 = \lambda, x \in (RC1) = 0.222 \text{ units};
                     P2 = \lambda_{1} \times E(RC2) = 0.322 \text{ units; and}
         SL x (P1+P2) = SL1 x P1 + SL2 x P2,
            .90 \times .544 = .98 \times .222 + SL2 \times .322,
    and
                     SL2 = 0.845.
```

h) Repeat the above using the appropriate variables for process two:  $\mu_{2} = \frac{\lambda_{2} + 1/E(RC2)}{0.0444 + 1/7.25},$ = 0.182 units/day.  $EF2(t) = \mu_{1}t'$ so  $ER2(90) = .182 \times .90,$ = 16.38 units;  $B2(t^{1}) = F \cdot \lambda_{1} t^{1};$ 50  $B2(90) = 1.755 \times .0444 \times 90,$ = 7.013 units; QL(90) = 84.5th percentile of the CDP of Poisson(7.013), = 9 units;  $P_{2} = F \times \lambda_{2} / \mu_{2},$ =  $1.755 \times .0444/.182$ , = 0.428; and  $\rho_{\nu} < 1$ , and ER2 (90) > QL2 (90), so find Q2 as:  $22 = (\ln (1 - SL2) / \ln (\rho_2')) - 1,$ = (ln (1 - .645) / ln (.428)) - 1, = 1.20 units.i) Compute the final allowance (QT) as: QS = Q1 + Q2 + QP, = 5 + 2.42 + 1.20= 8.62 => 9 units; and QT = QS + OL, = 9 + 1, = 10 units. Table XI provides a summary of the values computed

by this model versus the RIMSTOP levels. Comparisons between the RIMAIR model and the proposed model will be provided in Chapter IV.

RI MS TO	TABLE P - Proposed M	Al Model Allowanc	es
RIMSTOP Level	Model Expressio	Example Quantit	Y
Repair cycl Administr Frecess o Process t Awaiting	e ative PA! ne P1! wo P2! parts PP!	2.72 0 0 1	• 18 • 47 • 75 • 33
Crder and shipping t	PW⁴	1.52	
Tctal pipel forecast	ine p•	4.24	
Protected allowances	Q <b>1</b> Q2 QP	2.42 1.20 5	
Total prote- guantity (	cted QS rounded)	9	
Safety Leve	1 QS-P'	4.76	
Operating L	evel OL	1.00	
Final allow	ance QT	10	

ъ,

85

3: 3

### IV. COMPARING THE MODELS

#### A. QUEUE CHARACTERISTICS

### 1. <u>Theoretical Lifferences</u>

The M/M/OO queueing model, which is the theoretical tasis for the RIMAIR allowance computation model, and the M/M/1 queueing model, which underlies the repair process allowance computation in the proposed model, were presented separately in Chapters II and III, respectively. Figure 4.1 summarizes their characteristics. The M/M/1 queueing model is distinguished from the M/M/OO model by the limit that exists on its service capacity. The assumption of a single server introduces the possibility that a unit entering the system will find the server busy, and therefore must wait for service. Use of the M/M/OO model presumes that there will always be an empty server, implying that waiting time will be zero.

The difference becomes most apparent when the demand rate approaches or exceeds the service rate. Even under these conditions, there is still no waiting time experienced in the M/M/co system; whereas the number of units awaiting service in the M/M/1 system grows significantly. When the demand rate exceeds the service rate, the M/M/1 system becomes saturated and the only bound that exists on the number awaiting service in the system is the number in the population itself.

This basic difference brings about every other difference between the systems. For the same traffic intensity  $\rho$ , the number expected to be in the M/M/1 system is higher because of the presence of units waiting for service. For the same reason, the total time that a unit is expected to be in the M/M/1 system is higher. Farameter Symbol Name Assumptions 8/8/00 M/M/1 Independent arrivals Constant rate Exponential interarrival times Arrival rate λ Same Same Same Service rate Exponential service times, single server Exponential service times, identical for μ each server Each service is independent Same  $\rho = \frac{\lambda}{\mu}$  $\rho = \frac{\lambda}{\mu}$ Iraffic intensity P Mean # in 2 = 6 0<q<1 P  $P = \varrho / (1-\varrho)$ (piceline quantity), infirite population e = 1P undefined  $\rho > 1$  $2 \rightarrow \infty$  $P = \rho + \rho^2$ p<<1 finite F = K/2+K(K+2)(q-1)/12 $\rho \rightarrow 1$ population K  $P \rightarrow K - 1/\rho$ p>>1 Mean time in system Т  $T = P/\lambda = 1/\mu$  $T = 1 / (\mu - \lambda)$  $W = T - 1/\mu$ Mean wait W = 0W time Frob of The being in the state n. infinite pop  $\pi(n) = \underbrace{e^n e^n}_{n 0} \quad \begin{array}{c} \rho < 1 \\ \rho \ge 1 \\ \end{array} \\ \left( \begin{array}{c} \pi \\ n \end{array} \right) = \underbrace{(1-\rho) \\ \pi \\ r = 0 \\ (1+r) \\ r = r = 1 \\ \end{array}$ T (n) (transient) Prob of being in state n, finite pop K  $e \neq 1$   $\pi(n) = (1-e) e^{n}/(1-e^{k+1})$  $\rho = 1 \quad T(n) = \frac{1}{k+1}$ 

Figure 4.1 Queue Characteristics, 5/8/00 vs 8/8/1.

ALL COLOR

1.1.1.1

# 2. <u>Differences in Application</u>

Application of the data base to both models starts with the same information: demands per unit time and average service time. The major difference in the models shows up in the computation of the service rate,  $\mu$ . In the M/M/GO model, the service rate is the reciprocal of the average service time (P = 1/1), which is also the mean time in the system. In the M/M/1 model, however, the mean time in the system is the reciprocal of the <u>difference</u> between the service rate and the arrival rate, (P =  $1/(\mu - \lambda)$ ). This expression is valid only when the service rate exceeds the demand rate. In order to compute allowances, therefore, it is necessary to assume that on the average the system is not saturated over t (the data collection period). This allows the service rate to be computed as  $\mu = \lambda + 1/T$ , and the actual service rate used in the M/M/1 model will be higher than that in the M/M/00 model given the same values for demand rate ( $\lambda$ ) and average time in the system (T). Consequently, the traffic intensity  $\rho$  is lower in the M/M/1 formulation, and the assumption that the system is not saturated during the demand period leads to a traffic intensity value (p) that is less than one. By contrast, the p value in the M/M/00 queue can assume any value because the queue cannot become saturated.

The fact that both models assume that average past experience did not result in saturation is a key point. If a model is developed without knowing any more about the service facility than the fact that it had never been saturated, a modeller would be hard pressed to decide on the appropriate model; both of the queueing models detailed here could be used. The key difference between the two models lies in the ability to forecast the effects of future demand increases. Use of the M/M/OO model in forecasting implies a

telief that the system will never become saturated, no matter how much demand increases; use of the M/M/1 model allows for the possibility that the system can become saturated if demand increases sufficiently. It was belief in this latter condition, limited repair capacity, that led to the development of the proposed model.

#### 3. Theoretical Allowance Comparison

The allowances that would be calculated by each theoretical model, given the appropriate traffic intensity (or pipeline quantity) and protection level are provided in Tables XII and XIII. (Table XII was computed by listing the allowance quantity that is closest to the specified SL.) The differences generated in an infinite population queueing situation by the underlying theoretical models are worth noting.

The situation in which there is no forecast depand increase is considered first. In this situation, both models use the same pipeline quantity computed as  $P = \lambda T$ , as explained in the previous section. Table XII indicates that the M/M/1 model will generate an allowance of 4 units if the pipeline quantity is 1.5 units (traffic intensity 0.60) and the protection level is 0.90. By comparison, Table XIII shows that the M/M/co model will generate an allowance of cally 3 units when the same pipeline quantity and protection level is used.

If the forecast factor (F) is used to anticipate increased demand, then the difference between the allowances computed by the models becomes larger. If F=1.33, the allowance computed by the M/M/1 model given the input data from the previous example would be 9 units: the forecast traffic intensity would be 0.80 (1.33 x 0.60), which leads to an average pipeline quantity of 4 units, and a protected guartity of 9. The M/M/OO model allowance would not increase

ffic	Average Pifelire			P T O	tection	lėvel (S	r)	
٩	Quantity	0.5	0.75	0.85	0.9	0.95	0.98	66.0
0.05	0.053	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
0.1	0.111	0	0	0	0	-	٦	-
0.2	0. 25	0	0	0	•	-	2	2
0.3	0.429	0	0	-	-	2	2	Ē
9-4	0.667	0	٢		2	2	3	7
0.5	1.00	0	-	2	2	'n	2	9
0.6	1.50	0	2	æ	4	ŝ	٢	8
c. J	2.333	-	٣	t	6	7	10	12
о. Е	4.0	2	S	9	6	12	17	20
5.0	0-6	9	12	17	21	27	36	43
0.95	19.0	13	26	36	44	57	75	89
9-58	49.0	33	68	63	113	148	194	228
55.0	99.0	68	137	188	228	297	388	457

(\*\*\*\*

Average Eifeline			Prot	ecticn I	jevel (SL		
	0.5	0.75	0.85	0.9	0.95	0.98	66 0
0.1	0	0	0	0	-	-	-
0. 2	0	0	0	0		L	٦
0. 3	0	0	0	-	-	2	2
0. 4	0	0	Ļ	-	-	2	2
0.5	0	Э	-	-	2	5	2
0.6	0	-	٦	-	2	2	ß
0.7	0	-	-	٢	2	3	£
0.8	0	-	۲	2	2		æ
0.9	0	-	-	2	2	<b>e</b> n	ŝ
1.0	0	-	2	.7	£	e	Ţ
1.5		1-	5	ŝ	c.	ŧ	S
2.0		2	e	£	7	5	9
3. 0	5	4	Þ	ß	9	٢	æ
5.0		Q	7	æ	ж	10	10

at all: the 0.90 protection level allowance for a traffic intensity of 2.00 (1.33 x 1.5) is still 3 units. The effect of having adequately many servers is guite substantial; assuming that units will not have to wait for service will cause allowances to be significantly lower than if only a single server is available.

4. Applied Allowance Differences

The RIMAIR and the proposed model allowance computation procedures can be directly compared if the following conditions are met:

a. all actions are repairs without AWP,

- b. none of the TAT observations is limited,
- c. the average IP value is 0.0,
- d. the demand rate  $(\lambda)$  is specified, and
- e. the M/M/1 system is not saturated.

In other words, direct comparison can be made only if the data provide the same SKD+RPR times after the differing TAT element limits are applied, and all other TAT element observations are zero. In this restricted case, both models use the same values for demand rate ( $\lambda$ ) and process time (T). Consequently, both processes have the same expected pipeline (P),  $F=\lambda$ T. The service rates will be higher for the M/M/1 queue, as explained previously. The M/M/00 model has service rate ( $\rho$ ) equal to P, while for the M/M/1 queue,  $\rho$  can be expressed in terms of P as follows:

$$P = \rho / (1-\rho)$$

50

Using this relationship, it is straightforward to compare the process rates and allowances generated by the two roles for any specified level of demand. Table XIV provides two examples.

The top example (A) compares allowances computed by each model when the forecast demand rate is the same as the experienced demand rate. There is no difference in the allowances generated when the average pipeline quantity is 1.0 unit or less. As P indreases, however, the proposed model computes allowances that are greater than those computed by the BIMAIR model. At P=5.0, the difference in allowance is 4 units: 8 is the allowance computed by the RIMAIR model, and 12 is computed by the proposed model. For larger values of P, the deterministic service approximation (for the three month endurance period) provides allowances at least as large as those computed by the RIMAIR model, but less than would have been computed by the infinite population formula for the expected number in the system. If that formula had been used, the allowances would have been much higher: 23 for P = 10 units and 35 for P = 15.

The bottom table shows the results of using the proposed model and forecasting a 25% increase in demand, but with no increase in the repair rate. For all values of P' equal to or greater than 1.25, the proposed model computes a higher allowance, even when the approximations for the three month endurance period are used.

The endurance period approximations provide a capability to project requirements that are more "reasonable" than the unbounded solutions in the infinite population case, but they are still not bounded as they would be if the number in the population were known and the finite population model used. The allowances provided by the two endurance period approximations can grow without bound because there is no limit on t", and it is important to note that they do not provide steady state solutions.

A. Cc	mpar Safe	isc																											
:	Safe		ħ	<b>W</b> (	it	ħ	no	Ę	03	ze	ca	51		de	n	aı	e d		ir	c	Ξŧ	ea	se	•					
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2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2		ے۔						12	00112335840					000000000000	012356678999	a composition on		-			1112		c t						~
* in ap	dica FIOX	195 13 a		a: 01	39	5 10	w 5 11	er th	9 6 7	e	he rd	u 2	d a	97 20	, e , e		ni De	1111		at d	1 1 -	s wa	39	u u	V : 29		-	•	-
B. Cc pr	mra: cces	iso s r	n at	;əs	18	in ar		th Íc	e I 9	эc	ab as		re L	j j	n 1	p: nc	1t 22	€	ia as	t	a d	t ad		c ŝ			i	5-	
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2. 2. 4. 10. 2. 3. 4. 10. 30.		(nO			125725805505			12	-01112346974						1 (Vrv )07 80011	10872533437		-			1 123		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			1	0305132		-
* : a	ndic ppro	ate xia	s a t		as Dn	es	N OI	he	r e h e	9	th en	a dr	ır	de an	t	e i	- <b>1</b> 1	10	ni eI	5.1	ti	ic I	Mg	55	et V	215 15		9	

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State -

The steady state solution for the M/M/GO model is provided by the Poisson distribution, and time to reach steady state is never at issue. Allowing the M/M/1 system to become saturated, however, requires that an endurance period be specified in order to compute allowances for the transient states. Ever if the system is not saturated, the steady state approximation using  $SL=1-(e^{P+1})$  provides the same allowance whether  $\lambda=0.01/day$  or  $\lambda=10/day$ , as long as the ratio  $\lambda/\mu$  is constant. The time to reach this steady state is considerably longer in the case  $\lambda=0.01/day$ . however, and the allowance necessary to support a 90 day operational period is lower.

#### B. SENSITIVITY TO INPUT DATA

## 1. Laza Base Problems

The data base used as input to either model has numerous problems, particularly in the identification of manufacturer's parts numbers to national stock numbers. Escause of these problems, ASO personnel are required to manually massage the received data prior to the computation of allowances. As a minimum, they compare at least two sets of data covering similar usage periods at similar sites before accepting any single set of inputs for allowance computation. Large differences in TAT, percentage of ismands repaired, and demand rates are common. The current model is reasonably stable in that it requires fairly substantial changes in one of these factors before an increased or decreased allowance is computed; the RIMAIR model should be just as stable.

The high price of most components; the usual tight funding constraints on transportation, repair, and procurement hudgets; and the long lead times necessary for both budgeting and procurement all create a strong influence for





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establishing an item's allowances once only when the item first enters the supply system. Frequently identical allowances are established for a group of sites, such as all aircraft carriers, and are considered fixed unless extraordinary conditions arise. Allowances <u>are</u> changed, of course, primarily as unanticipated demand forces increases. Poor initial provisioning, lower than expected reliability or maintainability, lack of repair parts, and numerous other situations cause these increases. The environment remains, however, to minimize change as much as possible.

Proposing the use of a new model requires that an estimate of its effect on the established system be made. In the case of the model proposed in this thesis, the effect could be significant. The use of relaxed TAT limits causes higher allowances to be generated for many items. The inclusion of BCM TAT in the pipeline also increases allowances. The use of the capacity-constrained model would cause allowance increases for items with 2 values above about 1 None of these effects is necessarily bad: in fact, unit. establishing the validity of the proposed model might create a vehicle that would help justify additional funds for needed support. Certainly the existence of very real capacity constraints on the VAST system is well documented. Establishing a legitimate cost for the allowances needed to support this system at a mobilization tempo could provide Flanners with information for making a better costeffectiveness tradeoff on system support. It remains to be shown, however, whether the model is useful on a cruise-tocruise or site-to-site basis, or whether it is too sensitive to small changes in input data.

# 2. <u>Selected Examples</u>

The relative sensitivity of the RIMAIR model compared to the proposed model can be demonstrated using the sample input data used previously. In order to compare allowances on a fair basis it is necessary to use the same input data in each model. Consequently, the RIMAIR model will be modified to include BCM TAT and to use the relaxed TAT limits developed in Chapter III. The result of doing this is shown in Table XV. Part A of the table provides the input data, which is applicable to all examples in this section. Part B shows the allowance computation with both the original and revised inputs to the RIMAIR model, and the allowance computation for the proposed model.

Inclusion of the BCM TAT and use of the relaxed TAT constraints increases the pipeline quantity used in the RIMAIR model from 3.14 to 3.98 units. The pipeline is somewhat higher in the proposed model because of the forecast factor. If the forecast factor were 1.00, both models would have the same total pipeline; with a forecast factor greater than one, the number in the repair processes of the proposed model grow faster than the forecast factor because of the increased number of units awaiting service. The major difference between the allowances computed by the two models, however, is the increased safety level quantity computed by the proposed model.

The following examples are provided to illustrate the effect that different input data would have on the allowances generated by the RIMAIR model and the proposed model. In each case, the results of the allowances computed will be compared to the allowances shown in Table XV Allowances computed for the RIMAIR model include the BCM TAT and use the relaxed TAT limits. The example cases are:

	T	ABLE I	v		
RIMAIR - Pro	posed M	odel A	llowand	e Com	parison
A. Input data	TAT IP	eleme: RC1	nt data RC2 A	(day	s) TAT
BCM 1 BCM 2 BCM 3	0 0 1	21	8	10	2 1 19
Repair 1 Repair 2 Repair 3 Repair 4 Repair 5 Repair 6 Repair 7 Repair 9 Repair 9 Repair 10	0 1 0 1 1 4 0 1 0	1 5023 51	7 - - 9 - 5	31 24 3	1 39 5 0 3 4 37 5 28
Action Administrative Frocess one Process two Awaiting parts Order and shi Data period Forecast perio Flying hours Flying hour f	e I R R F O F O F O F O F O F O F O F O F O	ap 1 22 WST ttH H	Total (0 29 68 90 1453 1700 1.755	hours hours hours	Mear. .692 2.22 7.25 17.00 26.00
B. Allcwance Comp RIESTCF Level	utation Var O:	AIR Mo rig # nits	dəl Rey # Units	Pro Va	posed Mcdel
Repair cycle	FRº 1	.62	2.03	PA' P2	+P1*+ 2.72
OSI Total pipeline Safety Q	FB <sup>4</sup> 1 P <sup>4</sup> 3 E-P <sup>4</sup> 1	. 52 . 14 . 86	1.95* 3.98 2.02	PW P' QS-	1.52 4.24 P' 4.76
Operating Total	OL 1 CT 6	. 00	1.00	OL QT	1.00

· · · · ·

- a) The percentage of successful repairs is increased to 100% (same TAT observed).
- b) The percentage of successful repairs in decreased to 46%.
- c) The flying hour factor (F) is 1.00.
- d) The flying hour factor (F) is 1.25.
- e) No AWP time is experienced.

These are the type of differences generally observed when sites with similar aviation support missions are compared. These cases are "what if" cases, using the TAT data from the 13 maintenance actions listed in Table XV to compute allowances as if the number of successful repairs were different in cases a) and b) , as if the future demand forecast were different in cases c) and d), and as if the piece-part support were improved in case e).

The case (a) assumption, that all 13 inductions resulted in successful repair, has the same effect on the allowances computed by both models. Table XVI A presents the results in the following format. The RIMAIR model and the proposed model are shown on the left and right side of the table, respectively. Two sets of output are presented for each model. For the RIMAIR model, the output from the Table XV example (in the column labeled "Rev") and th∋ cutput that results from the change being illustrated by the current case (column labeled "Now") are provided. The columns labeled "Orig" and "Now" for the proposed model represent the Table XV example and the current case, respec-Within each set of output, the data are grouped to tively. help illustrate the pipelines that are computed by the and the allowances that are generated by the models, ripelines.

Table XVI A shows that the allowance that would result if all of the 13 units inducted had been successfully repaired would be 5 units using the RIMAIR model, and 8

	Nodel	Compat	TAB ison: Va	LE IVI rving Repai	I Perce	ntage	
	A. 100% cf	itens	inducted	are repair	ed.	-	
	RIM Variatle	AIR Mod Rev	el Nov	Propo Var Ori	sed Mod	lel Ncw	
		1 95	0.0	PA 18 PP 1.33 PW 1.52 PT 3.02	-	.18 1.33 0.0 	
	E 2 -	1.53		->QP P1' .47 ->Q1	5 2.42	3 • 47 2• 42	
	PR •	2.03	2.46	P2* .75 ->Q2	1.20	.75 1.20	Ì
J	P٩	3.98	2.46	P* 4.24		2.72	
	SL	2.02	1.54	SL 4.76		4.28	
ł	ÇF	6	4	QS	9	7	
ł	CI	1	1	OL	1		
I	Tctal	7	5		10	8	
	B. Cnly 4	6% of it	ems indu	icted are r	spaired	•	
	RI Variable	MAIR Mod Orig	lel Now	Prop Var Or	osed Mo	del Now	
				PA: .18 PP: 1.33 PW: 1.52	-	. 18 1.33 3.55	
Ì	PB*	1.95	4.87*	PT 3.02 ->QP	5	5.05	
				P1' .47 ->Q1	2.42	.47 2.42	
ļ	FR.	2.03	1. 13*	P2' .75   ->Q2	1.20	.75	1
	<b>P</b> 1	3.98	6.01	P 4.24		6.27	
	- S1	2.02	2.99	SL 4.76	i i	5.73	
	QP	6	9	QS	9	12	ļ
	OL	1	1	OL	1	1	
	Total	7	10	1	10	13	

units if the proposed model were used. These allowances are both two units less than the comparable allowances generated in Table XV This is the result of eliminating the wholesale resupply pipeline.

The case (b) results are shown in Table XVI B. The number of successful repairs to is reduced to 6 of the 13 units inducted (46%). The starred (\*) quantities for the SIMAIF model actually depend on which maintenance actions (high TAT, low TAT, or whatever) resulted in BCMs; the total RIMAIF pipeline will be the same in either case. The allowance computed by the RIMAIR model increases 3 units to a total of 10 units when the number of BCMs increase. The allowance computed by the proposed model also increases 3 units, to a total of 13. In both models, the increase is due to the larger wholesale resupply pipeline that results when fewer units are repaired locally.

If BCM TAT had not been included in the RIMAIR pipeline, the allowances that would have resulted would have teen lower. In the case of 100% repair, the allowance would decrease from the original 6 to 5 units. In the case of fewer repairs, however, the final allowance depends on knowing specifically which of the maintenance actions listed in Table XV A resulted in units being declared BCM. If the units with the highest TAT had been declared BCM, the resulting allowance would be only 6 units; there would be no increase from the original allowance because the increased resupply pipeline is offset by a reduced repair pipeline. If the 6 units with the highest TAT had been repaired, however, the increased repair pipeline causes the resulting allowance to increase to 8 units.

This helps to illustrate the need for including the ECM TAT in the pipeline. The expected number of units in the total pipeline does not change in these two cases, but the allowance computed varies by two units because in the

first case (where the allowance remains 6), the BC4'd items had substantial TAT that was ignored; in the second case (allowance 8), they had relatively little TAT, so the deficiency was minimal.

Cases (c) and (d) illustrate the effect demand forecasting has on the allowances. In the first of these, presented in Table XVII A, the allowance is computed directly from the input data, without any forecasted demand increase; the pipeline quantities for each model are the same. In case (d), a forecast factor of 1.25 is used.

The allowances computed by the proposed model are still greater than the allowances computed by the RIMAIR model in cases (c) and (d), but the amount that it is greater has decreased. In case (c) (F=1.00), the proposed allowance quantity is reduced two in the uncapacitated pipeline and two more in the repair cycle because the traffic intensities have been significantly reduced. The resulting allowance of 6 units is now only one unit higher than the allowance of 5 computed by the RIMAIR model. The reduction in allowance in the proposed model that results from lower traffic intensity can be used as an argument that increased repair capacity for some items would result in lower allowance quantities. In reverse, it shows the allowance increase necessary when forecasting higher demand rates without an increase in repair capacity.

Increasing the forecast from 1.00 to 1.25 raises all of the rates by 25%, as shown in Table XVII B. The expected number in the repair pipeline of the proposed model increases slightly more than this. Both models exhibit lower allowances than in the original case where F=1.755, but each increased the allowance one unit over the case where F=1.00.

		TAF	BLE XVII
Bod	el Compa	Tison: N	Varying Forecast Factors
A. Demand	forecas	t factor	r (P) is 1.00.
RI Variatl∈	MAIR Mod Rev	el Now	Proposed Model Var Ofig Now
	** * * * *		PA         .18         .10           PP         1.33         .75           PW         1.52         0.87
FE.	1.95	1.11	PT' 3.02 1.72 ->QP 5 3
			p1'     .47     .22       ->Q1     2.42     1.30
PR *	2.03	1.16	P2' .75 .32 ->Q2 1.20 .32
<b>p</b> •	3.98	2.27	P 4.24 2.27
SL	2.02	1.73	SL 4.76 2.73
QF	6	4	25 9 5
CI	1	1	OL 1 1
Tctal	7	5	10 6
B. Demand	forecas	t factor	r (F) equals 1.25 .
RI Var	MAIR Mod Rev	el Now	Proposed Model Var Orig Now
	1 95	1 20	PA .18 .12 PP 1.33 .94 PW 1.52 1.08
PL	•• 75	1.35	->QP 5 4
			P1' .47 .29 ->Q1 2.42 1.65
PR •	2.03	1.45	P2* .75 .44 ->02 1.20 .57
<b>p</b> •	3.98	2.83	P 4.24 2.88
SI	2.02	2.17	SL 4.76 3.12
QF	6	5	QS 9 6
OL	1	1	OL 1 1
Total		6	10 7
In cases (a) and (b), both the RIMAIR model (with ECM TAT included and using revised TAT constraints) and the proposed model showed the same relative change between allowances; in cases (c) and (d), the proposed model exhibited larger decreases in allowance because the traffic intensities were lower. The last case, case (e), shows the effect when no AWP time is experienced. Table XVIII provides

	TABLE XVIII Model Comparison: AWP Eliminated									
RI Var	RIMAIR Model Proposed Model Var Rev Now Var Orig Now									
PB •	1.95	1. 11	PA PP PW ->QP P1 ->Q1	1.18 1.33 1.52 3.02 5 .47 2.	.18 0.0 1.52 1.70 1.63	3 3.79				
PR' F' Si	2.03 3.98 2.02	1.16 2.27 1.73	P2 • ->Q2 P• SL	.75 1. 4.24 4.76	.20 3.33 3.67	0.0				
QP	6	4	QS	9		7				
OL Total	$-\frac{1}{7}$	1  5	0 <b>L</b>	- <mark>1</mark> 10	<b>.</b> .	1 8				

the results. The proposed model again exhibits the same decrease in allowance (two units) that the RIMAIR model does. With no AWP time experienced, all of the units are assumed to go through the same repair process in the proposed model, and the expected number in the system (at

F=1.755) is higher than it was when there were two separate repair processes occurring in parallel. This is a flaw in the proposed model; the expected number in the system should not rise this much.

The proposed model did not exhibit any more variability in cases a), b), and e) than the RIMAIR model with revised input data did. In cases c) and d), which examined the effect of forecasting, the changes in the proposed model were larger, which is exactly what it was designed for. In the case of F=1.00, the proposed model computed an allowance that was only 1 unit higher than the RIMAIR allowance. At F=1.25, the proposed model allowance was still one unit higher. In the original case, however, with F=1.755, the proposed model computed an allowance that was three units higher, because the traffic intensities in the tepair processes were increased significantly, without any expected increase in the repair rate.

These few examples help to illustrate the changes brought about in a single item when input factors are changed. In Chapter V, the complete sample of 79 items is examined to show the effects some of these same factors have when the models are applied across part of the inventory.

#### V. MODEL SINULATION

#### A. USS RANGER DATA FASE

The data base provided by NAMSO was used in a simulation to test the hypotheses that evolved during the modelling process. The processing dates for each action (i.e. removal, induction, etc.) were used to simulate the performance of the allowance levels developed t both the RIMAIF model and the proposed model.

Simulating with real-world data has both adv lages and serious drawbacks. The key advantage is that the comptions that were developed about the distribution of the TAT element times did not have to be used in generating random numbers, as would have to be done in developing a Monte-Carlo simulation. The only statistics that were drawn from the data were the average TAT element times and the number of transactions of each type that occurred; all repair cycle actions were assumed to happen on the date indicated in the data base. •

There are two disadvantages to using real-world data in simulating the performance of the models. First, it does not allow for multiple tests of any given hypothesis. No confidence interval for the results can be obtained, whereas repeated trials of a Monte-Carlo simulation with different

Wholesale resupply time was not included in the data base. This time interval was set deterministically as 20 days, which was computed as the expected value of wholesale resupply time when 95% of required items are supplied in 15 days, and the remaining 15% are delayed an additional 74 days. These times are the NAVSUP goals for wholesale resupply of aviation activities. Lack of actual resupply times is not considered a serious deficiency because the proposed model was built to model the repair process and affected.

rander numbers would allow the construction of confidence intervals. Consequently, results from the various simulations may be accepted as an indication of how one model performs against the other, but are in no way conclusive.

Another disadvantage of using real-world data is that it The actual TAT's experienced by the RANGER is tiased. reflect not only their own repair capabilities, but also the number of RFI units in inventory. There are three repair priorities used on most ships: low for normal stock retlenishment, medium for high-demand repairables when they fall to 25% FFI on hand, and high for units needed immediately for irstallation. These latter units are known as EXEEP's (expeditious repair units), and all efforts are made to complete EXFEP's quickly. Cross-cannibalization of farts is common in this situation if there are any AWP units from which to obtain parts, and off-ship parts expediting is used to the maximum degree possible. The important point, therefore, is that RANGER TAT data reflects repair actions required by both descand and inventory position. The data base provides the demand history, but tracking inventory position over time is considerably more difficult.

It was noted in chapter II that the model used for past AVCAL's was not the RIMAIR model but an clier model that provided Ecisson protection to the repair pipeline and also added an attrition portion equal to the 90 day BCM forecast. Although these quantities can be obtained, the number of units actually on board at any given time would not be known because actual inventory levels may not have agreed with the allowances, i.e., part of the inventory was off the ship supporting detachment operations and/or dates for material received from the wholesale system are not available. The bottom line is that the ship has to manage with a given number of units and the TAT observations must reflect this. Consequently, the simulation cannot forecast how the RANGER

might have done with different allowances; it can only compare the performance of the allowances computed by the RINAIR and proposed models when applied to the PANGER's data.

#### E. MEASURE OF REFECTIVENESS

The desired inventory goal is to provide a specified minimum aircraft availability for the least inventory investment possible. This is not possible in this simulation because there is no simple method for relating the availability of components to aircraft availability. Additionally, the unit prices for the items were not included in the sample data specifically to avoid the possibility of a few extremely high-priced items influencing the results. In application, unit price considerations can be taken into account by varying safety levels (or by some other method) and would probably have similar effects or either the RIMAIR or proposed model allowances.

An inventory effectiveness goal can always be reached if enough items are added to inventory. Budgets for inventory procurement and rework are limited, however, so investory models must also be reasonably efficient in terms of the number of units they stock to reach the goal. The measure of effectiveness (MCE) for this simulation, therefore, should reward an allowance model that comes close to meeting the stockage goal (assumed to be 90% in accordance with the safety level setting) and penalizes a model that computes too high an allowance in doing this. The difficulty in applying such an MOE is in deciding an appropriate balance between the reward and the penalty. In order to rate the results of the simulation, then, both the achieved effectiveness figures for each model under a given set of conditions, and the total number of units computed by the model for allowances will be provided.

### C. SINULATION RESULTS

The simulation results show the relative values for a number of policies that have been recommended. First, the RIMAIE and proposed models are compared in the form in which they are presented in Chapters II and III, respectively. Comparison is made between the protected pipeline and repair cycle quantities that each model computes, without adding any operating level or mobilization additives. The RIMAIR model is then made comparable to the proposed model by applying the revised TAT limits (Table %) to the input data, and by including the BCM TAT in the pipeline. Both models are then enhanced by stipulating a minimum one day TAT for any action to help compensate for the lack of time discrimination in the data base. Next, the results of adding the operating level of one each is shown. Examples of line items where each model seems to perform better are then presented and analyzed in an attempt to distinguish characteristics that make one model or the other perform better.

The last two simulations explore two different aspects of the models. In the first of these, different safety level sattings for the proposed model are compared. The proposed model presents more flexibility for safety level development because of the tradeoff between safety levels set for repair process one and two, and the effect of different sattings is shown. Finally, both models are used to predict allowances with flying hour factors in the type 1.00 to 2.00. The use of increased flying hours is supported by analysis of the RANGER's deployed operations.

# 1. Faseline Simulation

The baseline simulation results presented in table XIX provide the results of the BIMAIR and the proposed models as they would perform without considering operating

levels in either model, without setting TAT to a minimum of one day, and without including the BCM TAT in the PIMAIR pipeline model. Additionally, each model uses its own TAT constraints. This comparison is presented as a "worst case" analysis.

Each simulation table provides the parameters used in that simulation and the results of the simulation, which are the summaries of the model performance for the 79 sample items. Information provided includes the number of simulated issues made off-the-shelf, the number of EXREPs that had to be processed to satisfy the remaining demands, off-the-shelf effectiveness, and the sum of the allowances for all items. The 'Delta' column in Table XIX indicates the number of additional off-the-shelf issues provided by the proposed model over those provided by the RIMAIR model, and the additional number of units in allowance required to make those issues.

The baseline results are biased against the RIMAIR model because it is hampered by the current conservative TAT limits and by the exclusion of TAT for items declared BCM in the pipeline. This is, however, the basic model that will scon to applied to AVCAL's and other aviation cutfitting. It is surprising to note that it would have provided less than half of the effectiveness goal of 0.90 protection. The points made in Chapter II are repeated: the current TAT limits are too restrictive, failure to use BCM TAT in the pipeline is a serious deficiency, and the underlying assumption of unlimited repair capacity is not valid.

The proposed model also falls short of the desired performance of 0.90, but to a lesser degree. The model is very sensitive to repair rates, and the inability to measure repair times in hours may affect these results. Similarly, the model assumes that demand and repair times are constant; significant changes in the rates over the course of the deployment are likely to diminish the model's performance.

TABLE XIX Simulation: Baseline Comparison								
Purpose: To provid model as and on the Chapter	ie basel: it is he propos III.	ine fi presen Sed mo	Jures o ted in del as	on the Chap prese	RIMAI ter II nted i	R 		
Parameters: Flying hour fact	tor (F)	= 1.00	•			• • -		
TAT limits:	IP S	SKD	APR 1	RC 1	RC2	AWE		
(days) RIMAIR Ficposed	1 6	_3	-8	12	35	20 60		
Minimum TAT: O	days fo	or bot	h model	ls.				
Safety levels: RIMAIR PIOPOSEd	Uncapac: pipe 0.	itated line 90 90	Hax 0.9	pair p 97 m	Two Two ax C.9	5 9 0		
Cperating levels Results: Ictal demands Ictal issues Ictal EXBEPS Cverall effectiv Ictal allowance	s: not in Veness (units)	RIMAI 2884 1257 1627 43.6 ====	d in a Mode R	110 wan 2884 1970 914 58.3 236	ces.	)elta 713 75		

Further comparison of the RIMAIR model with the proposed model on the basis presented above is not very enlightening. To achieve a more meaningful comparison, the input data for the RIMAIR model is made comparable with the proposed model, and the results are shown in Table XX. The results of four separate simulations are presented in that table. First are the baseline RIMAIR model results shown in Table XIX. Next are the results of adding the BCM TAT to the pipeline before computing the RIMAIR allowances. The

		TABLE	XX	
Si	ulation: 1	RIMAIR Bas	seline Improv	esent
Purpose: T n t	o provide odel that he propos	baselina will be c ed model.	figures on t comparable to	he RINAIE those of
Parameters Flying h	i our facte	r (P) = 1.	00.	
TAT limi (days)	ts:	IP SKD	RPP RC1	RC2 AWP
Crigin Revise	al	$\frac{1}{6}$ - $\frac{3}{-}$	- 12	- 20 35 60
Liniaua	TAT: 0 da	ays.		
Safety 1	evels: 0	.90		
Cperatin Results:	g levals:	not inclu	1ded.	• • • • • • •
	Crigin baseli	RIMAI al W/BC ne inc.	Nodel I TAT W/re Luded TAT	vised With Cons. both
Demands Issues	2984 1257	26	384 28 159 14	94 2884 82 1673
EXREP'S	1627	11	25 14	02 1211
Effectiven	ess 43.6	5	.47. 51	.4% 58.9%
Allowance	161	2 2 2 2 2		83 206
Delta from	; original	RIMAIR mo	del:	
Issues Allowances	-	:	202 +2 23 +2	25 +416 22 +45
Conclusion	: Includi: constra improve are use	ng BCM T ints deve the RIMA d in furt	AT and using toped in cha IR model res her compariso	the TAT oter III sults and mas.

third gives the results of using the revised TAT limits. The fourth gives the results of combining both of these enhancements. Below the listings for the latter three simulations are the differences between the results using the revised inputs and the original RIMAIR baseline results. The effect of changing the TAT constraints and including the BCM TAT in the pipeline is quite substartial. The 33% improvement in effectiveness is the benefit achieved by using as much information as possible about the underlying process in developing allowances. Both of these changes should be implemented when the BIMAIR model is applied to the AVCAL process. All further simulations in this chapter include these enhancements to the original RIMAIE model.

The next table presents the effects of using a minimum 1 day TAT with both the RIMAIR model and the proposed model (Table XXI A), and provides the results of including operating levels of one unit to each allowance generated by the models (Table XXI B). Again, for each of these cases, the difference that the change makes in each model is provided as the delta quantity.

Use of a minimum one day TAT helps both models and will be used for both in the following simulations. Inclusion of the operating level, however, raises the effectiveness of both models past the 0.90 gcal, and the additional units added to inventory exhibit "diminished returns" in terms of improved effectiveness. The operating level will not be included in the allowances computed in the following simulations.

The operating level result is very significant for two reasons. It supports the contention that inclusion of the operating level unit helps to mask the ability of the underlying model to provide an appropriate allowance in support of the repair process. Using a good underlying model, with safety levels adjusted to provide the desired overall effectiveness, seems to be a more rational approach than using a poor model and adding 1 unit to each allowance.

Simula	ation: Bini	TABLE XXI inum TAT and	Operating Level
.Purpose:	To show th TAT of one	ne effect of day.	setting a minimum
Farameter Flying	hour facto	r(P) = 1.00	).
Minimum	n TAT as sh	nown for both	n models.
Safety <u>F</u> INAI	levels: ( [R	Inca pacitated pipeline 0.90	A Repair process One Two
Free	osed	0.90	max 0.97 max 0.90
Operati	ing level of	quantities a	ce not included.
Results:	RIMAIR Minimum 1 O days	Model NT Delta   I da y	Proposed Model Minimum TAT Delta O days 1 day
emands ssues	2 98 4 1 67 3	2884 1790 +117	2884 2884 1970 2169 +199
XREPS	1211	1094	914 715 ==== === (0.0)
llowances	5 <b>c.</b> 0% = ==== 206 = ====	213 + 7	00.3% 75.2%   ==== ====   236 256 + 20   ==== ====
Conclusio	on: Includ helps relativ invento	ing a minimu both models ( vely little - bry.	im of one day mar considerably, with extra investment in
.Furpose:	Tc shcw th of one eac	he effect of the to the all	f adding the OL lowances.
Besults:	RIMAIR NC OL	Model ( W/OL )	Proposed Model No OL W/OL
)emands Issuas	2884 1790	2884 2679 +889	2894 2884 2169 2784 +615
XREPS	1094	205	715 100
llowances	62.1% ===== 213 =====	92.9% ===== 292 +79	/5.2% 95.3% **** **** 256 335 + 79 **** ***
Conclusio	on: Includ: both mo	ing the oper dels_achiev	cating level halrs ve better than 90%

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It is appropriate to mention that many repairable items carried in AVCAL have the operating level automatically added to their allowance. This will definitely increase overall effectiveness, but it is not likely to provide cost effective results when applied to the invertory as a whole. The benefit of adding the unit operating level to allowances for high-demand items is significant, but there may be many low-demand items for which the addition of a unit operating level may not improve effectiveness at all. Further analysis should be done to determine both the benefits and the costs of automatically adding the operating level, especially when it is applied to the medium- and low-demand items in the inventory.

Examples of specific items for which each model performed best are presented in Tables XXII and XXIII . The statistics reflect the inclusion of SCM TAT in the RIMAIR model, use of the revised TAT limits, and the use of a one day operating level. In the example provided in Table XXII, the proposed model computes an allowance of 2.40 for process one, which includes almost two units for safety level. The administrative, AWF, and resupply pipeline allowance includes almost another unit of safety level. The extra unit safety level obtained by computing the allowance in this manner instead of with the PIMAIR model enabled an additional 18 demands to be filled off-the-shelf: this is a 28.6% improvement over the results obtained by the enhanced RIMAIR model. This item has characteristics that are exactly what the proposed model was designed for, as most units go through a quick repair and then return to the shelf. This example is but one of many items in which setting the safety level for repair process one to 0.97 provided an extra unit or two in safety level, and the extra unit made a significant difference in the ability to meet the demand.

#### TABLE XXII

Simulation Allowance Comparison #1

Comparison of simulation results for NIIN\* 00-140-1775 Item data: 94 actions avg. IP = 0.06 days avg. TAT= 8.00 days avg. TAT= 3.89 days 1 BCM (w/AWP) 93 repairs 71 actions w/o AWP avg. RC1= 1.39 days 23 actions w/AWP avg. RC2= 2.65 days avg. AWP= 8.87 days Proposed Mcdel Quantity SI RIESTCE RIMAIR Model Level Quantity ST Repair cycle Administrative 2.032 2.075 .032 .555 .342 1.146 FICCESS CNE PICCESS two Awaiting Parts .970 0.146 Order and shipping time 0.191 +2.223 2.221 Total pipeline 1.728 2.779 Safe\*y 4 5 Total 31 (33.0%) 13 (13.8%) EXREPs (%) \*NIIN is the National Item Identification Number that uniquely identifies each item carried in any portion of the federal supply catalog. +OST figure for RIMAIR model includes BCM TAT.

Cf the 79 items in the sample, in only one case did the proposed model yield a lower allowance than the RIMAIR model; this item is presented in Table XXIII. The proposed model computed an allowance of 0.44 for process one, and 0 for process two. Adding five for the remaining pipeline and rounding yields the final allowance of 5. The RIMAIR model adds the entire pipeline together, and this results in 6 as

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				TAB	LB	III	II										
S	inu	lat	ion	<b>A</b> 11	044	Ince	C	0 8 (	p <b>a</b> 1	[1	50	D	•2	2			
Comparison	of	sim	ulat	ion	26	sul	.ts	<u>.</u>	<b>)</b> :	N :	II	Ņ	33	- 1	93	3-	-730
tem data:	23	act	icns	i			av	g.	I	2.	E	J.	09	)	1a	Уs	
	23	BCM	s (0	¥/	AWE	?)	av	y.	T	T		2.	34		đa	γε	
	23	act	icns	w/	0	WP	a۷	J.	3 (	1		1.	95		da	уз	
IESTCE Level			RIN	AIR	No tit	ođel :y	•	,	2 : 2 u :		pņ ti	se ty	đ	Ħ	5đ	ŧl	SI
lepair cycl Administra Frocess cn Process tw Awaiting P	e tiv e o art	7 <b>e</b> :s		0.	0				0.	. 20	55	00		1	23		<b>C.</b> 90
order and shipping t	ina	3		3.	623	}*			3.	. 36	50						
ctal pipel	ine	3		3.	623	3			3.	62	25						
Safety				2.	377	7			1.	. 37	75						
Ctal				6					5								
EXREPs (%)				6	(26	5.1%	5)		9	(	39	. 1	¥)				
#OST fin	11 🕋 4		T RT	MAT	Έrπ	nade		i na	~1,	1.4	- e	R	CY		πa	Ŧ	

the allowance quantity. This is the example for showing the possible deficiency in treating the repair processes as separate from the administrative, AWP, and wholesale pipelines. Lack of the extra unit of safety level caused 3 additional EXREPs when the proposed model was used, 17.6% worse than the RIMAIR model.

The differences caused by applying the proposed model to each item in the entire inventory are shown in Table XXIV. The effect on the entire sample is described in terms of the number of additional units of allowance computed by the proposed model, the number of items in the

category, the number of EXREPS avoided by having the additional units, and the average number of EXREPs avoided per

	c :	1	TROLS XXIV	_
	SINU	Lation	Altowance comparison Summary	
Delta (units	≡)   #	items	# EXREP'S   Average # EXE avoided   avoided per u	EP's Init
-1 ) +1 +2 +3		1 41 32 3 2	- 3 - 3 0 0 285 8.9 48 8.0 49 8.2	
Total (	+43 u	nits	379 1 8.8	
NCIES:				
1) "1 ¤:	Celta Inus	" repro	sents the proposed model all AIR allowance.	.cwaice
2) "	tens try a IMAIR	ns" re in the s the c allowa	presents the number of the fample that have the delta ifference between the proposinces.	9 line quan- ed and
3) 11 11 11	ne ne Avera Corcs han t	gative ge EXI ed mode he RIM	sign in the "EXREPs avoide EPs" columns indicates th l allowance allowed more IR model allowance did.	d" and at the EXREPS

unit of increase. These summary results indicate that more than half of the items were provided the same allowance by the proposed model as by the RIMAIR model, and all but 5 of the 79 items had allowances within one unit. Considering the fact that the 79 items analyzed in the sample represent 16% of the total demand experienced on the RANGER cruise, by increasing the allowances the few additional units recommended by the proposed model seems a small "cost" for the resulting performance improvement.

## 2. Simulating Proposed Model Safety Levels

The flexibility provided by the proposed model for setting safety level combinations can also be a liability. It is not intuitive what settings will provide the best overall support. The search for process one safety level settings was made simple by constraining the uncapacitated pipeline and overall repair process levels to 0.90 to compare most closely with the RIMAIR models. There is additional research that can be done in this area, however, in attempting to find the optimal parameter settings for a given application.

Table XXV shows the results of successive simulation runs in which the maximum safety level setting for repair process one was varied. Increasing process-one safety level improves the performance of the model, despite the fact that every increased process-one safety level is ralanced with a decrease in process-two safety level in order to meet the overall gcal of 0.90.

The results provided in Table XXV provide additional support for the validity of the proposed model. The overall effectiveness of the inventory increases as the process-one safety level increases. This supports the contention that sufficient support for repair process one is essential for the success of the system as a whole.

The process-one traffic intensities  $(\rho_1)$  for the 79 items in the sample are graphed in Figure 5.1. Only four of the items have  $\rho_1$  above 0.4; the high was 0.533 for NIIN 00-804-5803, based on 96 process-one actions with an average RC1 value of 2.11 days. The median  $\rho_1$  value was only 0.176; the minimum was 0.053. Consequently, the allowances did not increase much when the safety levels were increased in Table XXV; some would have increased substantially if the traffic intensities had been in the neighborhood of 0.9.

		TABLE XX	V	-
Si	imulation:	Proposed Mo	del Safety L	saet
Purpose:	To show t levels fc model.	he results o r process o	f <b>v</b> arying th ne in the	e safety proposed
Paramete: Flying	bour fact	cr (F) = 1.0	0.	
TAT COL	straints:	IP SKD	APR RC1	RC2 AWP
נעמ	731	6 -	- 12	35 60
Binimun	n FAT: 1	day.		
Safety	levels:	0.90 for the pipeline; O repair proce	admin, AWP, .90 overali sses.	resupply for the
Results:	Maximu 0.90 0.	m safety lev 95 0.96	el for proce	ss or e J.98
Demands Issues	2884 28 1889 20	84 2884 25 2106	2884 2169	2884 2257
EXREFS	995 8	59 778	715	627
Effect.	65.5% 70	== ==== .2% 73.0	<b>75.2%</b>	==== 78.3%
Allow.	220 2 	<b>37</b> 249	256 2===	==== 272 ====
Delta fro Issues Allow.	om next lc +1 +	wer case: 36 +81 17 +12	+63 +7	+84 +16

# 3. Forecasting Increased Demand

The stated purpose for developing a capacitated model was to to provide more realistic requirements forecasts for periods of increased demand. The simulations presented so far, however, have not shown this. The RANGER data base provides an excellent opportunity to test this. Their deployment included a thirteen week period of operations in the Indian Ocean during which the experienced demand was 25% higher than for the deployment as a whole.



Figure 5.1 Frocess One Traffic Intensities.

Figure 5.2 provides a graph of the aggregate demand experienced by the 79 sample items during the deployment and highlights the Indian Ocean period. The Indian Ocean portion of the deployment represented approximately 65% of the demand for the entire deployment (1870 of 2884 demands). Because this is such a substantial portion of the deployment, use of a forecast factor (F) of 1.25 may be appropriate when computing allowances with rates based on the entire deployment period. Weekly Demands 210 \* \* \* 180+ \*\*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\* -\* \* \*\*\*\*\* 150+ \* \* \*\*\*\* \* \* \* Deployment -\*-average \* \*\*\*\* \_ \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* 120+ \* \* \* \* \* \* \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* \* \* -0 \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \*\*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* \* \*\*\*\*\* -\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* 9 C+ 6 O+ 3 C+ 0+ \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* \* \* \* \* \*\*\*\*\*\*\* \* \* \* \* \*\*\*\*\*\*\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* 000000000000000000 \* \* \* \* \* \*\*\*\*\*\*\* \* \*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\* \* \* \* \* \* 0000000000 00000000 \* \*\*\*\*\*\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* 000000000 \*\*\*\*\*\* 00000000 0000 \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* 10 15 20 |<Indian Ocean Operations>| + 0 4 Ś 25 Week of Deployment Кеу: с WestPac deployment, not in Indian Ocean Indian Ocean operations (approximate)

1.

#### Figure 5.2 Weekly Demand for Sample Items.

In order to support this increased demand period, which is probably a closer approximation to mobilization operations than the average deployment demand figures, the

flying hour forecast factor was used. The results of various setting of this factor, for both the RIMAIR and the proposed models, are provided in Table XXVI.

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Increasing the flying hour forecast improves the effectiveness achieved by both models, but the effect of "diminishing returns" for increased effectiveness per unit added to inventory can be seen in both models, but is more extreme in the proposed model. It is possible that use of the finite population approximations would improve the results in the proposed model, but this cannot be tested.

The fact that the proposed model was able to achieve 0.857 effectiveness when using a forecast factor of 1.25 (which is the factor for the RANGER's heavy demand period) is very satisfactory considering the model was set for 0.90. Even with the benefit of including the BCM TAT, and using the relaxed TAT limits, the RIMAIR model could provide only 72.9% effectiveness at the same setting. The svidence strongly favors the proposed model as being a better model of the underlying repair process than is the RIMAIR model.

Simulation: Forecasting Increased Demand Purpose: To show the results of varying the flying hour factors for both models. Parameters: TAT limits: IP SKD RPR &C1 RC2 AWP (days) Ecth models 6 - 12 35 60 Finimum TAT: 1 day. Safety levels: 0.90 for the RIMAIR model: 0.90 for the admin, AWP, and resurply pipeline; 0.90 overall for the repair processes: and 0.97 for repair process one in the proposed model. REMAIR Model 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 (F) 2.00 Demands 2894 2884 2864 2884 2884 ESSUES 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 EXFERS 933 781 595 4486 249 Effect. 67.6% 72.9% 79.4% 84.5% 91.4% HILCW. 234 259 288 318 386 Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Demands 2894 2884 2864 2884 2884 ESSUES 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 EXFERS 933 781 595 4488 249 Effect. 67.6% 72.9% 79.4% 84.5% 91.4% HILCW. 234 259 288 318 386 ESSUES 2300 2473 2579 2702 2792 ESTREPS 584 411 305 182 92 Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 89.4% 93.7% 96.8% ESSUES 281 329 374 438 589			TABLE	IXVI
Purpose: To show the results of varying the flying hour factors for both models. Tar limits: IP SKD RPR &C1 RC2 AWP (days) Ecth models 6 - 12 35 60 Finimum TAT: 1 day. Safety levels: 0.90 for the RIMAIR model: 0.90 for the admin, AWP, and resurphy pipeline: 0.90 overall for the rebair processes; and 0.97 for rebair process one in the proposed model. Hesults: Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Pemands 2894 2864 2884 2884 SSUES 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 CXFEFS 933 781 595 448 249 Effect. 67.6% 72.9% 79.4% 84.5% 91.4% Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Pemands 2894 2984 2884 2884 2884 SSUES 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 CXFEFS 933 781 595 448 249 Effect. 67.6% 72.9% 79.4% 84.5% 91.4% Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Perands 2384 2984 2884 2884 2884 SSUES 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Perands 2384 2984 2864 2884 2884 SSUES 2300 2473 2579 2702 2792 CXREPS 584 411 305 182 92 Effect. 79.8% 35.7% 39.4% 93.7% 96.8% HIGW. 281 329 374 438 589	Si	mulation:	Forecast	ing Increased Demand
Parameters: TAT limits: IP SKD RPR &C1 RC2 AWP (days) Ecth mcdels 6 - 12 35 60 Minimum TAT: 1 day. Safety levels: 0.90 for the RIMAIR model; 0.90 for the admin, AWP, and resurply pipeline; 0.90 overall for the repair processes; and 0.97 fcr model. Results: Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Demands 2894 2884 2884 2884 2884 Issues 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 EXFERS 933 781 595 448 249 Effect. 67.0% 72.9% 79.4% 84.5% 91.4% Allcw. 234 259 288 318 386 Issues 2300 2473 2579 2702 2792 EXREPs 584 411 305 132 92 Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 39.4% 93.7% 96.8% Allcw. 281 329 374 438 599	Purpose:	To show t hour fact	he results crs for be	of varying the flying oth models.
Image: Constraint of the second se	Parameter TAT lin	s: its:	IP SKI	RPR AC1 RC2 AW
<pre>Minimum TAT: 1 day. Safety levels: 0.90 for the RIMAIR model: 0.90 for the admin, AWP, and resurply pipeline: 0.90 overall for the repair processes: and 0.97 repair process one in the proposed model. Results: Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Demands 2894 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 Issues 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 EXFERS 933 781 595 448 249 Effect. 67.6% 72.9% 79.4% 64.5% 91.4% Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Demands 234 259 288 318 386 Issues 2300 2473 2579 2702 2792 EXREPs 584 411 305 132 92 Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 39.4% 93.7% 96.8% Tablew. 281 329 374 438 589</pre>	Ecth mo	dels	6 ~	- 12 35 6
Safety levels: 0.90 for the RIMAIR model: 0.90 for the admin, AWP, and resurply pipeline; 0.90 overall for the repair processes; and 0.97 for repair process one in the proposed model. Results: Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Demands 2894 2884 2884 2884 2884 Issues 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 EXFERS 933 781 595 448 249 Effect. 67.6% 72.9% 79.4% 84.5% 91.4% Hissues 234 259 288 318 366 EXFERS 234 2984 2884 2884 2884 249 Effect. 67.6% 72.9% 79.4% 84.5% 91.4% Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 89.4% 93.7% 96.8% Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 89.4% 93.7% 96.8% Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 89.4% 93.7% 96.8% Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 89.4% 93.7% 96.8%	Minimum	TAT: 1	day.	
Results: Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Demands 2894 2884 2884 2884 2884 Issues 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 EXFERS 933 781 595 448 249 Effect. 67.6% 72.9% 79.4% 84.5% 91.4% Allow. 234 259 288 318 386 Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 Flying hour forecast factor (F) 1.10 2.00 Demands 2384 2984 2884 2884 2884 Issues 2300 2473 2579 2702 2792 EXREPs 584 411 305 182 92 Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 89.4% 93.7% 96.8% Allow. 281 329 374 438 589	Safety	levels:	0.90 for for the a pipeline; repair propair pro- model.	the RIMAIR model; 0.9 dmin, AWP, and resuppl 0.90 overall for th processes; and 0.97 fo process one in the propose
Demands 2894 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 2884 Issues 1951 2103 2289 2436 2635 EXFEFS 933 781 595 448 249 Effect. 67.6% 72.9% 79.4% 84.5% 91.4% Allow. 234 259 288 318 386 Effect. 71.10 1.25 1.40 1.60 2.00 Demands 2384 2984 2884 2884 2884 2884 Issues 2300 2473 2579 2702 2792 EXREPs 584 411 305 182 92 Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 39.4% 93.7% 96.8% Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 39.4% 93.7% 96.8% Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 39.4% 93.7% 96.8%	Results:	1.10 Fly	RIM. ing hour 1.25	IR Model Orecast factor (F) 1.40 1.60 2.00
Proposed Model     Flying hour forecast factor (F)     1.10   1.25   1.40   1.60   2.00     Demands 2384   2884   2884   2884   2884   2884   2884     Issues   2300   2473   2579   2702   2792     EXREPs   584   411   305   182   92     Effect.   79.8%   85.7%   89.4%   93.7%   96.8%     Allow-   281   329   374   438   589	Demands Issues EXFEFs Effect. Allow.	2894 1951  933 ==== 67.6% ==== 234	2884 2103 781 72.9% 259	2884   2884   2884   2884     2289   2436   2635     595   448   249     79.4%   84.5%   91.4%     288   318   386
Demands   2384   2984   2884   2792		1.10 Fly	Proposing hour 1.25	sed Model forecast factor (F) 1.40 1.60 2.00
EXREPS 584 411 305 182 92   Effect. 79.8% 85.7% 99.4% 93.7% 96.8%   Allew. 281 329 374 438 589	De <b>r</b> ands Issues	2384 2300	2984 2473	2864 2884 2884 2579 2702 2792
	EXREPS Effect.	584 ==== 79.8% ==== 281	4 11 ==== 85.7% ==== 329	305 182 92 305 182 92 39.4% 93.7% 96.8% 374 438 589
	Issues Allew.	+349 + 47	+370 + 70	+290 +266 +157 + 86 +130 +203

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## VI. SUNNARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The support problems experienced by Navy activities during periods of heavy demand for aviation repairables may be partially due to the model being used for computing inventory allowances. The current model and the RIMAIR model that is soon to be implemented share some serious deficiencies. The deficiencies fall in two general categories: the method of using input data, and the model which results from assuming an unlimited-capacity repair process. Analysis of the data from the 1983 deployment of the USS RANGER (CV-64) led to development of an alternate model that corrects some of these deficiencies.

#### 1. Input Data

Ecth the current and RIMAIR models use the aviation 3-M maintenance data base extensively for computing allowances. This data base has a number of deficiencies that hamper the affectiveress of any model. The two major problem areas addressed in this thesis are the lack of time discrimination in the measurement of repair turnaround time and the upper limits (constraints) that are applied to turnaround time observations before using them for allowance computation.

The lack of TAT discrimination is inherent in the current mechanized data collection system in that the time that actions occur is recorded only with the resolution of 1 day. The result is that 35% of the maintenance actions in the sample were recorded as taking zero days to complete. This obviously understates the actual time needed for

processing, resulting in understated allowances. The capability exists to correct this: man-hours and flight-hours are both documented because the need to provide that level of time discrimination was recognized. Repair-processing-hours could likewise be provided. Use of a one-day minimum TAT is a simple way to compensate for the problem; this proved to have a positive effect during simulation. The effectiveness of the RIMAIR model was improved 7% when the one-day minimum TAT was used; the proposed model showed a 10% improvement.

The current model and the RIMAIR model both use TAT limits that are overly conservative and which cause forecast repair times (and the associated repair pipeline quantities) to be significantly less than those that were actually experienced. The current limits are so severe that they inhibit the ability of the inventory model to provide adequate support. The RIMAIR model performance improved more that 175 in the simulation when relaxed limits were applied.

#### 2. Repair Process Assumptions

The current model and the RIMAIR model both use the Poisson distribution to compute allowance quantities, using the repair pipeline quantity or the total pipeline quantity, respectively, as the distribution parameter. The reason for using the Poisson distribution in this fashion is not documented in any available paper, study, or other source. The assumption that the repair process is an M/M/00 queueing process leads to exactly the same distribution for the number of units in the queue, however, and it is therefore assumed that the M/E/00 queueing model is the underlying model on which the current and RIMAIR models are based. This model is not appropriate for use with the existing Navy INA repair facilities because the assumption of unlimited repair capacity is not valid. The limited capacity of the VASP

system is well documented; capacity constraints on other systems exist as well.

The current and RIMAIR models also assume then itims that are declared BCM and returned to the wholesale system sound no appreciable time in the repair system. This assumption is false: the 382 inits in the sample that were declared ECM spent an average of 9.8 days in the repair cycle: the 5754 BCM units in the entire RANGER data base spent an average of 7.57 days in the repair cycle. The exclusion of TAT for units declared BCM in the allowance computation procedure systematically discriminates against activities that attempt to fulfill their mission to repair as many units as possible.

3. A Different Kodal

Analysis of the sample data provided many insights into the repair process. Among the important results were proof that some of the time elements currently used to compute TAT were not statistically independent and that repair actions were not homogeneous. These two results and the fact that capacity constraints do exist in the repair process led to development of an alternate allowance computation model. The proposed model hypothesized two separate repair processes distinguished by the existence or absence of awaiting parts time and modelled by the M/M/1 queueing model. Simulation results indicated that the proposed model provided botter protection than the RIMAIR model for the 79 high-demand invertory items strifted.

#### E. CCNCIUSICNS

## 1. The RIMAIR Mcdel

The RIMAIR model is a better model than the model currently in use in that it provides some measure of protection for attrition items. It is deficient in the exclusion of BCM TAT in the pipeline. The manner in which the Poisson distribution is used to compute allowances also causes allowances to be understated because of the implicit assumption that there are always adequately many servers available, regardless of forecast increases in demand. Last, the current method for truncating recorded turnaround times seriously reduces the estimated average TAT values which are model inputs.

The RIMAIR model was used in the simulation without the one unit operating level so that the ability of the underlying model, which uses the Poisson distribution to provide protection to the pipeline quantity, could be examined. The result was that the RIMAIR model only provided allowances sufficient to fill 43.6% of the 2884 demands in the sample from off-the-shelf RFI material. This poor performance is masked when the one unit operating level is The addition of the one unit operating level to applied. the allowances for the high-demand items was shown to provide effectiveness above 90% for both models. The automatic addition of a unit operating level to allowances for medium- and slow-moving items may not be warranted, however.

2. The Froposed Model

The proposed model attempts to correct the major problems with the RIMAIR model by including BCM TAT in the repair cycle time and by explicitly considering limits on the available repair capacity. While the malfunction code is probably the best discriminator to indicate the complexity

of the repair an item undergoes, the existence of absence of AWP time was found to be an acceptable substitute. Two separate repair processes ware defined by the existence or absence of AWP time. Allowances computed by the proposed model were generally equal to or greater than the allowances generated by the RIMAIR model. This is the expected result of assuming limited repair capacity.

Allowances generated by the proposed model provided better performance in simulations for forecast demand rates up to 25% higher than the observed lemand rate. Degraded performance was obtained when demand increases of 40% or higher were forecast because the demand rates of some items approached or exceeded the capacity of the repair process. This result revealed the necessity for using finite population formulae for calculating queue size when the traffic intensity approaches or exceeds unity. Lack of population size for the sample items significantly hampered this research effort; further studies should include it in the data base.

#### C. RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 1. <u>Lata Base Protlems</u>

Considerable work is currently being done on the aviation 3-M data collection system to improve the accuracy and completeness of the data base. Additional work is required to ensure data necessary for proper supply support is collected. The current system records dates appropriate to managing a unit's physical location in the maintenance system, but this is not necessarily the information required for measuring support factors. Data for off-the-shelf time, repair capacity, repair rate, and expected waiting time are all needed if improvements are to be made in the support system. Additionally, it is important to record the changes

that occur in these factors as demand increases in order to forecast mobilization requirements. Therefore, three improvements in the data base are recommended based on the lessons learned in researching this thesis. First, the data tase used for allowance computation must be expanded to include time off-the-shelf for RFI repairable components and not just the maintenance time associated with NRFI units. Second, the data base must be able to discriminate repair process times in hours instead of days. Third, the data collection system must record information about tepair capacities, repair rates, and waiting times.

The existing turnaround limits must be changed if adequate support for the operating forces is to be achieved. There are many ways to detect atypical observations in a data base; the invertory models in use for consumable items have demand filters to test the data observations. Each demand observation can be accepted or rejected as an outlier if the demand observation is significantly different from the item's recent history. There is no reason why a similar filter for retail repairable items, which are more directly associated with readiness, could not be developed.

The idea that TAT limits should serve as management goals is not acceptable if for no other reason that the current TAT limits are routinely exceeded specifically because of operating policy provided by higher authority. Operators are frequently required to provide off-station support, thereby exceeding the one day in-process time limit. Operators are required to attempt time-consuming fault isolation and repair for extremely difficult malfunctions in order to minimize the number of units returned to wholesale repair depots, and they are also frequently required to hold AWP material thirty lays, sixty days, or longer in attempts to obtain piece-parts that may not be available. The operators' reward for performing these

tasks, and doing them well in many cases, is to find that somecre at ASO disregarded much of the data reflecting what really occurred in order to comply with the mandated limits.

## 2. Non-homogeneous Repair Processes

The data base showed that there were significant differences in the times necessary to perform various types of repairs, particularly with respect to the type of malfunction that occurred. It may be possible to significantly improve on the results obtained in this thesis if malfunction codes can be subclassified into groups that would facilitate the identification of the theorized type-one and type-two repair processes. Alternately, each inventory item might have only two or three malfunction codes normally applied to it. Identification of these might also provide the capability to identify the two repair processes. In either case, classification by malfunction appears to provide a more acceptable model for use in allowance computation and in logistics support analysis.

The absence or existence of AWP is recognized to be a function of both the malfunction and of the piece-part support that exists at an activity at a given time. Consequently, the percentage of items likely to go AWP will probably vary considerably for the same item from one activity to another. The percentage of malfunctions of any one type generated by similar flight operations should not vary as much. Additionally, the identification of problem malfunctions and the impact they have on inventory support and readiness could aid level of repair analysis and help to identify other maintainability problems.

## 3. Further Study

Further study of the Navy's intermediate maintenance system and the supply support it requires is both strongly recommended and vitally needed. Intermediate maintenance does not receive much visibility primarily because individual activities are small compared to the deport rework sites. In aggregate, however, they are larger than the depots and are more closely telated to day-to-day aviation readiness. Study of the maintenance system, the inventory models, the management interface, and the applications and implications of modern information technology are all open areas. This thesis attempted to examine a small portion of the system, and in doing so raised many more questions than it could answer. The models examined and proposed are all very simple. They can be improved in a number of ways. It is hoped that they will be.

# APPENDIX À USS RANGER SAMPLE DATA

The following tables provide more complete information about the sample data used in the thesis.

TABLE	<u>Title</u>
XXVII	Sample Item List
XXVIII	Special Material Identification Code
XXIX	When Discovered Code
XXX	Type Maintenance Code
XXXI	Action Taken Code
XXXII	Malfunction Code
XXXIII	In-Frocess Days
XXXIV	Scheduling Days
X X X V	Repair Lays
XXXVI	Awaiting Parts Days
XXXVII	Turnaround Time
XXXVIII	Repair Frocess One Cycle Time
XXXIX	Repair Frocess Two Cycle Time
XL	Crosstabulation of BCM and AWP Actions

# TABLE XIVII

1.

# Sample Item List

cog	NIIN	<pre># of actions</pre>
D D D D D D	$ \begin{array}{c} c \\ c$	260488410344430363472531774611289449435222200488824370313040 236282222222222222243432222243514422223332222222222

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cog

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- D

NIIN

# of actions

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- 176108864724756551470 262322493616624335462 1

- 135

Water States

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# TABLE XXVIII

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Special Material Identification Code

CATEGORY LAPEL	CO D E	ABSOLUTE FREQ	R ELA TI VE Freq (PCT)	CUM FFEQ (PCI)
SPC FROJ:AMIS S-3A AWG-S <f-14a> PROJECT SHCEHORN E-2C COMMCN ELECTRONICS A-6E <pxcap> COMMCN ELECTRONICS SPC FROJ-GFE A-7 SH-2F, 3 <iamps> ARC-159 F-4 F-14A APN-153 A-6E SPECIAL SUFFORT ASN-92 <cains> A-7E SPC FROJ-TACAN APN-194 ALQ-126</cains></iamps></pxcap></f-14a>	ACCDEEFFPFGHJMPPRSSFFW2	1077 24536 5366 1575724 1332338 1441616147 2924 13326 1447 11336 257 2924	3.7 22.6 1.2 2.8 5.4 1.3 4.8 2.4 5.4 1.3 4.8 2.4 5.4 1.3 4.8 2.4 5.4 1.3 4.8 5.4 1.3 4.8 5.4 1.5 3.1 8.5 3.1 2.2 6 5.3 1.8 2.4 5.4 1.5 5.5 1.5 1.5 5.5 1.5 1.5 5.5 1.5 1.5	73963600376342297047870
	TOTAL	2884	109.0	0.001

136

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#### TABLE XXIX

#### When Discovered Code

RELATIVE PREQ (PCT) CUM ABSOLUTE FREQ FREQ (FCT) CATEGORY LABEL CODE CATEGORY LABEL BEF FIIGHT-AC-ABORT BEP FIIGHT-AC-NO ABORT INFLIGHT-ABCFT INFLIGHT-NO ABORT AFT FI, BETW FL-AC PILOT-NFO WEEKLY INS ACC-TEANS INS BETW FL-GROUND CREW DAILY INS PRE FL.PST FL.TA INS SPECIAL INS CALENCAR INS FUNC CHECKFIIGHT CONDITIONAL INS CUALITY ASSURE INS SCHEDULEC CALIB RELATED MAINT ACT IN-SHCP RER OR MAINT RCPT, WITHE FM SUFPLY ADMIN 7 10 9 4 0 118 7 0.37423109323060101 400000300000000 204599998136623445855 2456666678811244445855 444477785886888990 1 ABCDRFGHJKLMPORTV 921 89 91855199 9199 199 Ű. 1 2 181 135 0.1 WYO 131 4.5 -\_ \_ \_ \_ ----TOTAL 100.0 2334 100.0

TABLE XXX

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Type Maintenance Code

CATEGCRY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
UNSCHED MAINT DAILY, PSI FL INS ACC-TRANS INS PHASED INS LOCAL MANUFACTURE CYCLE, EVENI SPEC INS CALENDAF, MAJOR INS CONDITIONAL INS	BDEGLNPS	2737 130 1 3 7 1 2	94.9 4.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1	99999999999999999999999999999999999999
	TOTAL	2884	100.0	100.0

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## TABLE XXXI

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# Action Taken Code

CATEGCRY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE Freq (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
NO FER ECD REPAIR WORK STCF CORRCSICN TREATMENT LOOK INS, CICSEOUT BCM-RER NOI AUTH BCM-IACK ECUIP BCM-IACK PARTS BCM-FAILS CHK, TEST BCM-BEYCND AUTH CAP BCM-ADMIN	AUDZ0124578	503 1980 11 7 134 87 47 106	17.4 68.7 0.2 0.0 4.6 0.1 3.0 1.6 3.7 0.2	17.4 16.57 866.78 914.55 994.18 994.80 994.18 990.0
	TOT AL	2884	100.0	100.0

# TABLE XXXII

# Malfunction Code

CODE	FREQ	ADJ CU FCT PC	M T	CODE	FREQ	ADJ CU PCT PC	M T	
	00000000000000011111111111111111111111	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	00000040000000000004400001000004000000	999997111155555599997444444444445559999767777777700000111115555559999966665555974420000711115555555666	33333344444455666666667777777777777888888889999999999	518911102411111311449411414204264811111798618 1321102411111311449411414204264811111798618 31	004110000000011000000000000000000000000	66022223333333455556788888999992777777888899000 111

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#### TABLE XXXIII

# In-Process Days

# of days	FREQ	ADJ FC T	CU M PC T	# of days	ADJ CUM FREQ PCT PCT
0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12	2427 3322 13 10 110 13 54 252	8421 000000000000000000000000000000000000	899777 88999999999999999999999999999999	135 18 202 27 38 49 100 101	3       0       99         3       0       99         3       0       100         1       0       100         1       0       100         1       0       100         1       0       100         1       0       100         1       0       100         1       0       100         2       0       100
A. Sta	atistic	:s: 0	Inconstr	ained	
MEAN STD I KURTC MINII	CEV CSIS UM	296 296	.646 .200 .265 days	M EDIAN V ARIANC S KEWNES M AX IMUM	0.094 E 27.038 S 16.385 101 days
E. Sta	atistic	:s: 0	Currect	Constraint	1 day
MEAN STD I KURTC MINII	CEV CSIS MUM	001	).158 ).365 1.504 ) days	M EDIAN VARIANC S KEWNES MAXIMUM	0.094 E 0.133 S 1.872 1 day
C. Sta	atistic	s: F	roposed	Constrain	tó days
MEAN STDI KURTC MINIK	CEV CSIS UN	2 1 2 1	).309 1.010 1.578 ) days	M EDIAN V ARIANC SKEWNES MAXIMUM	0.094 E 1.020 S 4.548 6 days

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Start Start and a start of the

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## TABLE XXXIV

Scheduling Days

# of	FREÇ	AD J	CUM	# of	ADJ CUM
days		FCT	FCT	days	PREQ PCT PCT
012345678901123 10123	2202 565 280 180 166 445 1 33	71211010000000	7999999999999999	14 15 16 17 18 20 23 20 23 26 27 30 31 32	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
A. S1	tatisti	cs:	Uncon	strained	
MEA	N	9	0.557	M EDIAN	0.155
STD	CEV		2.167	V ARIANCE	4.694
KUR	ICSIS		2.198	S KEWNESS	8.597
MIN	IEUM		0 day	S MAXIMUM	32 days
E. S	tatisti	cs: (	Curre	nt constraint 3	days
MEA	N		0.339	HEDIAN	0.155
STD	CEV		0.713	VARIANCE	0.509
KUR	ICSIS		5.584	SKEWNESS	2.417
MIN	I MUM		0 day	S MAXIMUM	32 days

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12.

## TABLE XXXV

## Repair Days

# of days	FREQ	ADJ FC T	CU M PC T	# cf days	ADJ CUI FREQ PCT PCI	1 C
01234567890112345678901	1040781320692445447353 7616663221111	<b>236211100000000000000000</b> 00000000000000000	689999999999999999999999999999999999999	223456790126912368360662	$\begin{array}{c} 2 & 0 & 99\\ 1 & 0 & 99\\ 1 & 0 & 99\\ 1 & 0 & 99\\ 1 & 0 & 99\\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 100\\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 100\\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 100\\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 100\\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0\\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0\\ 1 & 0 & 0 $	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
	atisti	 cs:	Unconst:	rained		-
MEAN STD Kuri Mini	CEV CSIS IMUM	7	1.339 4.670 8.221 0 days	MEDIAN VARIANCE SKEWNESS MAXIMUM	0.305 21.811 7.790 72 days	i
E. St	tatisti	cs:	Current	constraint (	e days	
MEAN STD KUR MIN	N CEV ICSIS IMUM		0.886 1.798 7.915 0 days	M EDIAN V ARIANCE SKEWNESS MAXIMUM	0.305 3.234 2.867 9 days	5

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#### TABLE IXIVI

## Awaiting Parts Days

<b>#</b> đa	o Y	f s			F	R	E	ç	P. 1		JT		CI E(		I								# da	o ay	f				F	RE	5	ļ		J	1	20 20	I M CT	I				
U0000000000000000000000000000000000000					2	4	8821111111111	5253525976511079966446643333642		2	-163434544433322222112211111211																				223273232424242424244444444444444444444			1111N111010100000000000000000000000000		<u>221</u> 000%6%0006%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%	789912233445556667778888899999000					
No	t	e	:	P	٥	I	C	er	t	а	g	6	S	đ	LI	е	]	p q		:c	Ð	n	t3	١g	j a	s	f	0	I	3	C	÷.	.c	n	s	6	r <u>:</u>	÷ }	ı	A	IP	•
TC TC	たー	a a S		a	i i	In Litit	iii t				W -	i U			ג - הכ	1 1	F t:	- ra	28	88 99 9	49-e	a	-	-	a	-	- ti	.0	- n	-	v	- i:	 : 'n	•	- A 1	- W E		-				
		A D R N	N IC I		VIM	s					1	3551	•		14 19 19	•					M V S M	EI A K A		LA LA WN IM	N N I E U	C) S: M	ES			2	3 9	8. 4. 1. 8	5.090	957 7 a	467 Y	5						
8.	,	S	ti	at	i	5	t	10	23	5:		¢	CI	19	5t	I	a	ir	1 ·	f	2	0	ć	la	y	S	-	•	a	ct	i	01	s		w,	/ 1	1 M	P				
	ETUI	A D R N	N IC I		I M	S					-	9 7 1 1	• 8 • i		50 86 99						NV SM	E A K A			N I E U	C S M	ES				5 2	8400	5520	9 5 2 a	4 5 1 7 9	5						
c.		S	ta	9t	i	5	τ	ic	: 5	5:		С	CI	28	st	I	a	ir	1 1	t	6	0	ć	la	y	S	-	•	a (	22	i	or	s		W,	/ A	l iii	P				
	ETUI	A D R N	N TC I I		VI	S					1	34 1 1	• 4 • 4	45 20 70	; 9 ; 8 ; 8 ; 9 ; 9	) 					M V S M	El Al Ki Al		E A E A E N	N N E U	CI SS	ES			2	0 6	8 3 1 0	5540	9 7 9 a	4 0 3 Y 9	E						

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#### TABLE XXXVII

#### Turnaround Time

# of days	FREÇ	AD J FCT	CUM PCT	# Of days	A Freq P	DJ C CI P	UN CT
012345678901234567890123456789012345678 1111111111122222222223456789012345678	1897972359471238433467826487797528514112.1 1892 1892 1992 11111111111111111111111	331 331 	3678888888999999999999999999999999999999	40 41 423 445 456 455 555 555 555 555 555 555 555	6331311313213233121151121121111111341 		998899999999999999999999999999999999999
MEAN STD C KURIC MINIM	EV SIS UM	127	.439 .225 7.767 days	MEDIAN VARIANCE SKEWNESS MAXIMUM	0 126 105	982 011 755 day	s
E. Sta	tistic	:s: (	Current	constraints	(TAT=I	P+SK	D+RPR+AWP)
MEAN STD C KURTC MINIM	EV SIS UM		2.743 5.363 9.286 days	MEDIAN VARIANCE SKEWNESS MAXIMUN	28 32	.959 .757 .058 .ay	s
C. Sta TAI MEAN STD D KURTC MINIM	tistic = IP EV SIS UM	24 (	2:0 pose 1 cr 3.804 9.059 1.069 days	d constraint: TAT = IP MEDIAN VARIANCE SKEWNESS MAXIMUM	s + RC2 + 0 92 4 88	AWP 982 068 492 day	S

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#### TABLE XXXVIII

9.

# of days	FREQ	AD J FCT	CUM PCT	<pre># of days</pre>	FREQ	ADJ C PCT P	UM CT
012345678901234567	172 199666697 1972 1972 1979 1979 186224 936	539311110100000000	58899999999999999999999999999999999999	1891224567902316126 2223333556666	45111201120112111	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	999999900000000000000000000000000000000
Iotal	action	s vi	Lthout	AWP 2485			
A. Sta	tistic	:s: (	Jncons	trained			
MEAN STD D KURIC MINIM	EV SIS UM	9	1.440 4.210 5.114 0 days	M EDIAN VARIANCE SKEWNESS MAXINUM	e	0.497 17.727 8.377 56 day	s
E. Sta	tistic	s: I	Propos	ed constraint	12 d	iys	
MEAN STD D KURTC MINIM	EV SIS UM	1	1.181 2.265 1.784 ) days	M EDIAN V ARIANCE SKEWNESS MAXIMUM		0.497 5.131 3.333 12 day	5

Repair Process One Cycle Time

-

* of days	FREQ	AD J FC T	CU M FC T	# o day	f S FREQ	ADJ CUM PCT PCT	
0123456789011234567890	195211079234321113413	8447433221111110001101	25677888888899999999999999999999999999999	12345678912360136883	331271173	110100000100000000 1101000000000000000	
A. Sta	tistic	:s: (	Jncon st	rained			
MEAN STD D KURIC MINIE	EV SIS UM	12	4.734 3.786 8.509 0 days	M EDIAN V ARIAN S KEWNE M AXIMU	CE 14 SS 9 M 73	.431 .337 .992 days	
B. Sta	tistic	:5, 8	actions	W/AWP: Pr	oposed Co	nstraint	35 jays
MEAN STD D KURTC MININ	EV SIS UM	4	4.446 7.714 6.103 0 days	M EDIAN V ARIAN S KEWNE M AX IMU	CE 59 SS 2 N 35	.431 .509 .565 days	

## TABLE XXXIX Repair Process Two Cycle Time

RCW PCT CCL FCT IOT PCT	NO AWP Time	AWP Time Occurred	RCW TOTAL
Successful Repair	2198 87.8 88.5 76.2	304 12.2 76.2 10.5	2502 86.8
Unit Declared ECM	287 75.1 11.5 10.0	95 24.9 23.3 3.3	382 13.2
COLUMN TOTAL	2485 86.2	399 13.8	2384 100.J

TABLE XL

## Crosstabulation of BCH and AWP Actions

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## LIST OF REPERENCES

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8.	Ross, Acadei	S. mic P	M. Iess	; 1 <sup>1</sup>	<u>n-</u> 80.	oduc	<u>tica</u>	<u>:0</u>	<u>Ficba</u>	<u>bili</u> t	<u>Y 10</u>	<u>dala</u> ,
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12.	Naval P-485) Sefter	Supp	1y Af10 197	Syst 3 1	ems upp	Com <u>1</u> ¥	mand Proce	Publ adure	icati <u>s</u> ,	.cn <b>4</b> repri	85 (N nt 1,	AVSUP 24

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