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STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY
TO THE YEAR 2000

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA

Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University
Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000: Middle East and Southwest Asia
Volume V

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that the Army can take to meet strategic requirements. Analysis of
Middle East and Southwestern region.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper covers a region certain to be critically important to the United States through the end of this century. Treated as a whole, the "Middle East and Southwest Asia" stretches from Egypt in the west through the "fertile crescent" and Arabian peninsula, north of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, to Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent. Except for Egypt, it excludes the continent of Africa. It stops short of Turkey in the north and excludes China and Southeast Asia in the east. The region is geostrategically positioned on the Soviet Union's southern flank, and constitutes Moscow's "stepping stone" to positions elsewhere, especially in Africa. But the region's chief importance is less the states themselves than what lies beneath them, for Southwest Asia holds a substantial portion of the world's proven oil reserves.

Politically, culturally and socially, this region is marked by enormous diversity. Islamic religion and society prevails everywhere except India and Israel. Islam has many colors, and is as often a source of conflict as it is a source of unity in the region. Arab language and culture is a fairly comprehensive feature of the region yet Arab countries are sharply distinguishable from Persian-speaking Iran and Afghanistan and these, in turn, are distinct from the countries of the Indian subcontinent. Israel also stands apart. Politically, the region contains radical socialist states, military regimes, centuries-old conservative monarchies and one revolutionary Islamic regime, to mention only the most notable.

From the U.S. point of view, however, the region is given
unity by the extent to which perturbations in one area have repercussions elsewhere. It is difficult if not impossible to separate events in the Arab-Israeli conflict from political decisions throughout the region, a revolution in Iran from political turbulence in the sheikdoms, Egypt's position in the Arab world from the security of other, smaller and weaker states in the area. This gives the region an inordinate degree of complexity likely to test U.S. diplomacy and military policy to its fullest in the years to come. It also makes it impossible to break the region into smaller subsections for ease of analysis.
II. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE REGION IN THE 1990S

American interests in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, simply stated, are oil, influence, and Israel.

- Oil: About a third of the world's oil comes from the Persian Gulf, and Saudi Arabia alone has by far the largest proven oil reserves in the world.

- Influence: The region is, as its title implies, in the middle of the Eurasian land mass and on the way to everywhere. The U.S. thus has an interest in extending its influence into the region, and in containing Soviet influence there because a position there would be a stepping-off point for movement elsewhere. The capability to extend U.S. influence and operations into the area to contain the Soviet position there would be important geopolitically even if the region had no oil at all.

- Israel: The U.S. commitment to Israel's survival seems to rank as high as any other interest it has, although there is some argument about what Israel's security entails.

These interests are likely to be substantially the same in the 1990s. To assume American interests will change must presuppose fundamental changes in the structure of world politics, different identities of major adversaries, negligible strategic importance of petroleum deposits, or a character transformation of the region in question. General war or dramatic technological breakthroughs could produce fundamental changes of
this sort but general war cannot be a presupposition of this analysis while a far-reaching technological breakthrough that would alter U.S. interests in the region does not seem imminent.

From these three basic interests can be derived more specific and operational statements of U.S. interests in the region, divided here into "vital," "important" and "other":

(1) **Vital Interests**

- deter strategic nuclear conflict, general war, or overt hostilities with the Soviet Union, but if deterrence fails, terminate conflict on terms favorable to overall U.S. interests.
- deny Soviet military expansion, political control over the region, or vantage points to threaten NATO's southern flank.
- safeguard Western access to oil.
- control proliferation of nuclear weapons and other capabilities for mass destruction.

(2) **Important Interests**

- assure security of allies and friendly states of the region.
- deter regional warfare, but when deterrence fails, restore peaceful conditions on terms favorable to overall U.S. interests.
- achieve progress towards an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.
o promote political stability to the maximum extent feasible in the region as a whole.

o advance social and economic development, trade expansion and material prosperity.

o encourage adoption of democratic institutions and values and respect for human rights.
III. ASSUMPTIONS

This paper proceeds on the following general assumptions about trends, continuities and conditions of this region over the next two decades:

1. Domestic political instability in key countries of the region will grow. In some, like Syria, Iraq and Iran, the instability is well-known and will continue to derive from ethnic, sectarian and cultural divisions within each country. Formerly stable states, most importantly the Gulf sheikdoms, are likely to experience instability as the bedouin populations from which these regimes grew are replaced by technocratic elites, an educated and well-moneyed middle class, and perhaps a small, largely expatriate "proletariat." Political radicalism is likely to grow in these states, as may nationalist loyalties and rivalries.

2. Soviet interest in the region, always high, also will grow as the communist bloc nations begin to import OPEC oil sometime in the 1980s. Whether the Soviets will choose to express this increased interest through traditional political and subversive means or through the use of military force is unclear though both methods are distinct possibilities. Whatever the case, it is fair to say that the principal opportunities for expanded Soviet influence will arise more from the internal dynamics of the region than from Soviet planning.
Activist movements representing Pan-Arab unity or Islamic fundamentalism will not successfully unite the region, or even major parts of it. Historical divisions between the Nile and Mesopotamia, between branches of the Islamic faith, and between the political ideologies will continue to undermine unity efforts through the end of the century. Nonetheless, Pan-Arab and Islamic forces will continue to affect elites in regional states, making them susceptible to various kinds of intra-regional cooperation, sensitive to the appearance of dependence on foreign powers, and vulnerable to criticism referring to the Arab-Israeli problem. In general, divisions between moderate and radical states or coalitions will persist though the identities of particular states may exchange and the political reference of terms like moderate and radical probably will change over time.

The pace of economic development and modernization of the oil-producing states will probably be slower as even more cautious policies are adopted in the wake of Iran's revolutionary experience. Oil revenues will fall behind public expenditures for most producer states, though Saudi Arabia could remain a prominent exception in the 1990s because of the magnitude of its untapped reserves.

The dependence of Western Europe and Japan on the region for energy supplies will remain, though probably diminishing in severity by the 1990s as alternative
energy technologies develop and energy efficiency improvements slow growth in energy-import demand in the industrialized world. The oil market will see cyclical trends in demand but the long-term trend will be toward increasing tightness as the oil import requirements of the late-industrializing countries mount steadily in the 1980s and 1990s. Eastern European demand for oil in the international market also could grow steadily in these decades.

Military technological changes are likely to increase the levels of domestic and interstate violence by enhancing the capabilities to inflict violence or physical destruction. Today, these capabilities are largely the result of external supplier transfers of large quantities of increasingly sophisticated conventional weapons, primarily for ground and air forces. By the late 1990s, several countries will be producing and fielding indigenously manufactured nuclear weapons. Some states fearful of neighboring nuclear threats but incapable of developing their own nuclear response may resort to the production of CBW capabilities as a surrogate for nuclear deterrence.
The factors that make this region simultaneously of vital importance to the West, inordinately unstable, difficult to defend, and physically much more accessible to Soviet military power also make this region the most likely theater for confrontation or actual military hostilities with the Soviet Union now and in the late 1990s.
IV. REGIONAL TRENDS

The Middle East/Southwest Asia region has been exceptionally volatile and is likely to be more so in the 1990s. Some of the sources of this volatility lie within the states of the region themselves. All are undergoing the strains and distortions of modernization. Some have traditional political institutions unlikely to be compatible with emerging social classes. Others are subject to a pattern of one-man rule that is likely to make them vulnerable to sudden change by assassination or coup. Many of these states also house ethnic and religious minorities for whom the nation has no special attraction, and which generally have been sources of harassment and discontent within the larger political entities. Many of these states are trying to come to terms with the West, which is at once the source of technology and modern culture but also an alien culture and a scourge to Islamic ideals.

Yet, often it is difficult to separate domestic sources of instability from regional trends and political forces. For most of the region (excluding only India and Israel which are neither Islamic nor Arab), Islamic and Pan-Arab ideologies justify the involvement and interference of one country in the politics of another and, in any case, create region-wide forces with which each country must come to terms. Incredible disparities of wealth and power across the region also encourage this interconnectedness. The Gulf sheikdoms are weak militarily, for example, but rich from oil revenues. They are thus the objects of much regional (not to mention world) attention, but also feel
compelled to dabble in regional politics to mitigate potential threats they cannot handle on military terms. For all these reasons, the links between international and domestic politics are more completely intertwined in this region than anywhere else in the world.

A country-by-country survey will give a good idea of how domestic and regional forces interact and this, in turn, can provide some idea of how events in the region are likely to proceed into the 1990s.

COUNTRY STUDIES

Egypt

The authority of government institutions in Egypt is better established than in most neighboring countries. As a relatively homogeneous nation, more detached than Syria or Jordan from the leverage of other Arab states, and strong enough to survive in its own right, Egypt has been highly stable. Since the 1952 revolutions, there has not been, in Egypt, one full-scale coup attempt or nearly-successful uprising, in contrast with the pattern in Syria and Iraq. Despite President Sadat's assassination, then, and some real increase in Moslem fundamentalist forces, it would be wrong to overestimate the likelihood of Egyptian instability.

The worst possible challenges to political legitimacy were weathered by Egypt when President Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem and concluded the Camp David peace agreements. The smooth Mubarak succession is evidence of the institutional strength of Egyptian government. Future difficulties are highly
likely, however, over economic problems. Egypt's economy is caught up in a "vicious circle." Serious obstacles to generating capital for development are present. A large proportion of national income is spent on (a) the military; (b) the oversized bureaucracy, and (c) subsidies for consumer goods. Even though this is not "rational" in economic development terms, it seems unavoidable for political stability.

Egypt's economic burdens seem overwhelming. Population growth rates remain high, the administration of Cairo verges on breakdown, and inefficiency discourages foreign investment. But there have been some bright signs: increased oil production, the reopening of the Suez Canal, high levels of U.S. aid, and large flows of remittances from Egyptians working abroad in Libya and the oil fields. The domestic difficulties are great but, partly for that reason, the expectations of Egyptians are not so excessive as to make a massive social explosion inevitable.

Yet, economic grievances are not the sole source of political upheavals. The strength of militant Islamic opposition forces is a serious factor. A distinction between growing interest in Islam on a socio-cultural level and the congealing of Islamic radicals who seek to remake Egypt by overthrowing the government is in order. The radicals are vocal but a distinct minority. They can harass those who are in power -- even succeed in assassinations -- but are unlikely to muster enough mass support or military organization to overthrow the regime.

The armed forces remain the real fulcrum of power in Egypt, and keeping them satisfied is thus a major preoccupation of any
government. The development of a long-term supply relationship between Washington and Cairo is extremely important for Egypt's stability in this respect. Yet, on this point, the Egyptian's themselves are ambivalent: they want a firm security relationship with the United States, both for prestige and for armaments, but they also want to preserve their own freedom of action by buying arms from a host of suppliers. Because too visible a supply relationship with the United States could make the U.S. a target for concerted agitation by the regime's opponents, the U.S. should accept Egypt's need for independence.

In foreign policy matters, Egypt needs to reconcile the tripartite objectives of maintaining good relations with the United States, keeping a peaceful border with Israel, and restoring business-like relationships with the modern Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Significantly, it seems to be fulfilling all three objectives at the moment. Perhaps the major threat to these foreign policy objectives comes from Israel itself which fears Egypt's rapprochement with the moderate Arabs and, in the recent past, has been willing to embarrass the Mubarak regime in an effort to sustain its isolation in the Arab world. Perhaps the major threat to Egyptian political stability over the next two decades will emerge from the coincidence of continuing failure in the economic realm combined with continuing or growing embarrassment from its relationship with Israel. At worst, this could lead to the abrupt emergence of a radical, anti-Israeli regime which, while perhaps not pro-Soviet in orientation, would probably not be pro-U.S. either.
Barring this event, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship may well grow in strength, but is likely to encounter periodic tests or challenges, the most severe of which would ensue from any major war between Israel and its neighbors. In any case, over the short- and medium-terms, a more substantive U.S.-Egyptian military relationship seems unlikely; the U.S. will simply have to be content with ill-defined "access rights" rather than basing at places like Ras Banas. Should the Soviets acquire a stronger position in the region -- for example, a strong position in Iran -- the Egyptians might be more forthcoming on this issue. But for the moment, their sense of nationalism makes them fearful of too large a relationship with the U.S. while it encourages them to see themselves, rather than the U.S., as the real source of an "RDF" for the area.

Jordan

Jordan is a relatively poor and vulnerable country surrounded by more powerful neighbors. Though its armed forces are well-led, disciplined and potent on a unit-for-unit basis, its four divisions are stretched thin against threats from Israel and Syria. Jordan's economic development has shown surprising success in recent years but the state's greatest asset remains King Hussein, an astute, energetic and popular monarch. The king witnessed the assassination of his grandfather and early understood the dangers to political and personal survival in the region.

Hussein's survival strategy rests on two principles: first, to have at least one relatively powerful protector in the Arab world at all times, and second, to preserve the loyalty of his
Bedouin constituency. At one point, Jordan's external Arab protector was Syria; by the early 1980s, it was Iraq. But Hussein has been careful to avoid coming under the sway of those who furnish military supplies and technical training. His wariness of foreign friends suggests that development of a Soviet connection, even in terms of supply, will not bring a major change in the king's policies.

The second key element in Hussein's strategy has been his base among "East Bankers," i.e., Jordanians of Bedouin background who see Hussein as their tribal leader and who tend to keep their distance from the Palestinian part of Jordan's population. Many Palestinians are integrated into Jordanian society and have advanced economically but have little real loyalty to the Hasemite regime. A West Bank Palestinian state might pose some direct and indirect threats to their loyalty.

King Hussein would probably like to regain the West Bank, lost to Israel in 1967, most likely under a federated arrangement akin to that outlined in the recent U.S. peace initiative. Presumably, the return of Jordanian authority to the territory would simplify the Arab-Israeli conflict and possibly provide a partial resolution of the Palestinian problem. At the moment, course, Israel has rejected all talk of its giving up the West Bank, while the Arab states continue to see the PLO, rather than Hussein, as sole representative for the Palestinian people.

Should the peace plan succeed, a federated Jordan would create a major internal security problem for Jordan. Thus, in addition to providing aid to the Jordanian Army, the U.S. Army
might become involved in a national crisis if the king were to be assassinated or simply ousted. The main task would be to forestall Syrian or Iraqi military intervention. It is important to note that in this event, the U.S. would probably have excellent help from the Israelis, who supported Amman in 1970 when Syria threatened to intervene in Jordan's civil war. Significantly, Hussein's death would not emasculate his Army which, within the limits of its size, would be able to defend itself against intervention quite respectably. Thus, the requirement for U.S. forces might be small indeed.

The fall of Jordan's Hashemite family would have major consequences for long-term stability elsewhere in the region, especially in the Arab Gulf. Jordan is too small to provide an "RDF" for major contingencies in these countries. Yet its advisors, commandos, and seconded officers are positioned in key slots throughout the Gulf states, and are highly respected there. Moreover, for smaller contingencies -- another coup attempt in Bahrain, for example, or a resurgence of the Dhofar rebellion in Oman -- Hussein's commandos might be a most useful force favoring domestic stability. Significantly, Jordanian forces would be much more politically acceptable for these contingencies than would those of Egypt, which is larger (and potentially, more threatening) and whose soldiers have a reputation for arrogance that has made them unpopular throughout the region.

**Syria**

The Syrian government must be viewed on two levels: first, there is the Ba'ath party domination of the country which has been in place since 1963. Second, there is the leadership of a
specific group around Hafez al-Assad. Termination of the latter is not necessarily identical with an end to the former, which would give the regime more continuity and limit somewhat the different policy it might follow.

Of the major Arab countries today, Syria has the most intimate relationship with the Soviet Union. This does not mean that Syria is a Soviet puppet or client state -- for Damascus seeks its own interest and works carefully to avoid excessive Soviet influence within the country. Under any Ba'ath party regime, however, with or without the current leadership circle, the state is too locked into its alliance with Moscow to change direction in the foreseeable future.

For the U.S. military, then, the question will be what military purpose Syria might have to Moscow and what facilities Syria might furnish to Soviet naval, air, and ground forces in future contingencies. In the latter connection, Syrian ports furnished to the Soviets may have less relevance to a Middle Eastern scenario than to events on NATO's southern flank.

Aside from Syrian participation in an Arab-Israeli war, the two most likely places where Syrian troops may act are in Jordan (see above) and in continued occupation of Lebanon. North of the Litani river, Lebanon has already become a Syrian sphere of influence. This does not necessarily provide the U.S.S.R. with any clear advantage; as a matter of fact, Moscow was critical of Syria's Lebanon policy. Ironically, the effect of Syrian intervention was to prevent a leftist victory in Lebanon; in other words, Syria acted against Soviet interests there.
While any government in Damascus will try to limit Soviet political influence within Syria, it is likely that the Russians are in a position to get any air and naval bases or transshipment rights they demand in an emergency. In return, the Syrian government is likely to continue to seek large amounts of Soviet arms for its own purposes. Since the Syrians are unlikely to recover the Golan Heights, the chance of Syrian-Israel peace is even more remote than that of an Israel-PLO accord. The Syrian situation itself probably precludes any major initiatives toward peace.

If Egypt can be described as a homogeneous society in which political power tends to become centralized, Syria represents a contrary pattern. Several religious and sectarian communities -- including the Sunni Moslem majority, the Alawites who are a splinter of the Shi'a sect, and the Druze who have a distinct religious tradition -- vie for power. There are also regional rivalries, such as that of Homs and Hama against Damascus, which overlap, in certain respects, with the territorial distribution of the communal groups. The Moslem Brotherhood, which represents the Sunni urban population, has been central in the Homs/Hama conflict with Damascus and responsible for a campaign of assassination against the regime, which is disproportionately Alawite in complexion. Because of this element, this agitation suggests that Syria faces a far more serious Islamic fundamentalist political threat than other principal Arab countries. These groups, however, are generally hostile to the Soviet presence. Hence, it is possible that Syria could become both a Soviet problem and opportunity similar to that presented...
by post-revolution Iran, given the protracted conditions of internal strife.

If President Hafez al-Assad and his brother Rifaat, who control the regime's internal security forces, are overthrown, the successor regime probably still would be a Ba'ath coalition, perhaps weighted with greater Sunni representation but probably reflecting some power-sharing continuity in terms of the minorities.

If the Ba'ath movement itself is displaced from power, however, then the possible changes in Syrian policy would be wider. Nonetheless, it is difficult to envisage a Syrian regime that enjoys cordial relations with Iraq or even Jordan. An overtly pro-Western Syria also seems unlikely, though a regime that seeks a more pragmatic balance between East and West should not be discounted over the long haul.

In the case of instability within Syria, the United States probably will have relatively few assets to work with, while the Soviets undoubtedly will have certain advantages for the foreseeable future. Soviet influence would not be decisive except possibly in the event of war between Syria and Israel or greatly intensified conflict in Lebanon which puts Syria on the defensive. The Saudi-Kuwaiti financial subsidies, moreover, should give these states some leverage over Syria's future course.

Lebanon

Lebanon has been a regional anomaly, an Arab state with multiple religious communities engaged in power-sharing that left
Christians with the upper hand, and which functioned as a constitutional democracy and showplace of private commercial enterprise until its descent into a savage, recurrent civil war, which erupted in 1975. There are 17 recognized religious and sectarian communities in the country, of which five are particularly important:

- The Maronite Christians are particularly concentrated in the central hills ("The Mountain") and, though nominally Arab in language and culture, have had strong affinities for and extensive commercial and political contacts with the West. As a practical matter, Maronites dominated Lebanese politics from 1944 until 1975, but their numbers have shrunk through emigration while the Moslem population has expanded through natural increase and higher birthrates, leading to challenges to the original confessional powersharing compact. Maronites have been ambivalent about Arab nationalism and have been responsible for a Lebanese foreign policy that was militarily neutral on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

- The Sunni Moslems who are native to Lebanon tend to be concentrated in the coastal cities and in the eastern strip of the country. They are generally more responsive to Arab nationalism, the Palestinian cause, and the pull of the rest of the Arab world. Traditionally, Sunnis have been the main forces of the Lebanese "left," although few are expressly Marxists. In large part, their knowledge of the population shift
from a majority of non-Moslems to a Moslem majority in the country, which probably occurred in the 1960s, prompted the challenge to the Maronites.

- The Shi'a Moslems tend to be concentrated in the south, though many have moved northward to escape the fighting in southern Lebanon. Generally, the poorest of Lebanon's social groups, and the last to become politically active, they have finally become organized in the Amal movement, which sympathized with the Khomeini regime in Iran, but are distrustful of the Palestinians.

- The Druze are a distinct religious sect which has some Islamic derivatives, and are concentrated in the south-central mountains. Tribally-organized and reclusive in their mountain redoubts, they have a reputation for military ferocity. Though socially conservative, their political leaders have tended to cooperate with Sunni and, therefore, leftist forces in Lebanese domestic politics.

- Orthodox Christians are concentrated in the north and in the main eastern city, Zahle. Having been relatively scattered throughout the country, they sometimes have attempted to bridge the sectarian political conflicts. The northern group has also sometimes collaborated with the Ba'athists in Syria, and a number of the orthodox leaders are Marxist radicals.
Syria's intervention in Lebanon may have placed certain bounds on the disintegration of Lebanese politics, but it also had its own divisive effects. The effects of the more recent Israeli intervention are difficult to discern at this point, but it is doubtful that Syrian or Israeli influence will or can be used to reconstitute anything resembling the pre-1975 normalcy of Lebanese politics. The Maronite/Sunni conflict, with its range of complicating factors, has created a whole new set of vested interests which thrive on the country's de facto partition, and which are being supported by Israelis and Syrians.

In the near-term, a tripartite Lebanese state with Israeli, Syrian and "free" sectors is likely and this arrangement may have a surprisingly long life. Even a Syrian and Israeli withdrawal is likely to mask continuous covert intervention by both countries in Lebanon. This may lead to "stability" but not of a sort enforced by the Lebanese themselves. Lebanon thus is likely to be a tinderbox throughout the rest of the century.

Small and isolated to one side of the region under consideration in this paper, Lebanon, nonetheless, may be the scene for U.S. military action. Historically, including during the very recent Beirut crisis, U.S. ground forces, generally U.S. Marines, have gone into Lebanon in short-term "peacekeeping" roles. Israel has suggested that the U.S. might provide peacekeeping forces of a more durable sort in southern Lebanon and were the U.S. to agree to this idea, the U.S. Army might have to man part of an "MLF" like the one in the Sinai today. This would be a more dangerous and demanding assignment, however, for the presence of Palestinians and Lebanese factions plus the
possibility for renewed fighting between Syrians and Israelis would confront these units with the possibility for intense, if brief, fighting.

Israel

Israel has the greatest domestic stability of any of the states under consideration. The earlier predominance of the Labor Party, ended by Menachem Begin's 1977 victory, will probably not be quickly restored although it should be remembered, Begin's majority has been relatively small. Demographic trends favor a more nationalistic, Oriental Jewish dominance in Israeli politics, and this is likely to perpetuate control by more hawkish forces.

In rejecting the recent Reagan peace initiative, the incumbent Likud government made clear, once again, its preference for annexation of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Annexation would create long-term demographic and internal security problems for Israel, and make the recurrence of Arab-Israel wars more likely despite the peace agreement with Egypt. Indeed, over the long run, continued Israeli intransigence on the issue may cause serious domestic problems in Egypt and may well lead to the violent emergence of a hostile regime there. Israel may be willing to accept these risks; the U.S. is less likely to do so. Hence, U.S.-Israeli relations may suffer in the years to come.

On a strategic level, Israel probably will go to great lengths to avoid calling for direct American troop support in a crisis. Like Egypt and, to some extent, Saudi Arabia, Israel
would like the United States to depend on it as a surrogate actor in the region rather than to resort to direct U.S. intervention, except perhaps in dire circumstances.

A serious question is whether time is on Israel's side in its continuing conflict with the Arabs. As Arab oil producers accumulate increasingly large amounts of money and develop their country's military and economic strength, the present capability gap may begin to close. This is more likely to occur on the diplomatic level, where the Arabs are pursuing greater influence in the West through economic relations, investment, and more sophisticated public relations programs. Indications are, so far, that more conservative Israeli governments will depend primarily on an enhancement of their strategic positions and physical capabilities to meet these challenges. Pursued as an alternative to seeking peace, these policies are likely to isolate Israel further than it already is. Israel's possession of atomic bombs might, under these conditions, serve as an essential guarantee of the country's security.

Israeli emphasis on self-reliance is not likely to force a break in its relationship with the United States, but it would certainly make U.S.-Israeli relations problematic. It also would prevent Israel from ever becoming a U.S. client state, or as subject to American leverage as many in Washington might expect.

The Palestinians

Israel's recent ouster of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon does not appear to have eliminated either the organization itself, or the Palestinians it
claims to represent, as additional forces that must be considered in the Middle East. The PLO is an umbrella organization whose largest group, Al-Fatah, is headed by Yasir Arafat, who also leads the organization as a whole. Historically, Arafat has been constrained in his actions by the many splinter groups that comprise the PLO, by Arab states who have sought to control the organization, often by subsidizing him or his opponents, and by factions within Al-Fatah itself. He has had little room to maneuver and, not surprisingly, has gained a reputation for ambiguity and cunning. Significantly, the PLO's ejection from Beirut, its fragmentation to several states in the Arab world, and Arafat's rise in stature in recent months may work to increase his freedom of maneuver, though it will be some time before he and the United States will be on speaking terms.

Yet the PLO is certainly not a Soviet puppet group. Much of Al-Fatah consists of nationalists who want to be subject to nobody else's interests, but many in the smaller organizations see the alliance with the U.S.S.R. as essential. Saudi Arabia also funds the PLO, however, largely to maintain solid Arab credentials, but also to limit Soviet power in the organization.

No matter what happens in the region, the PLO will remain an important paramilitary and diplomatic force within it. At the extreme, it may yet become the leading force in a Palestinian state located either on the West Bank or in Jordan as the Israelis prefer. There is fear that should such a state emerge it would turn immediately to the Soviet Union and ultimately
become a threat to the region. Yet, it is difficult to see how this could happen most notably because Israel simply would not acquiesce to its happening. A more likely form of threat would be a return to terrorism in the wake of the recent invasion of Lebanon. This obviously would create a problem of potential importance to the U.S. Army.

One must distinguish the PLO from the Palestinian issue. The former is people; the latter is largely an idea, a symbol -- indeed, perhaps the most compelling symbol in the Arab world today. Seeking justice for the Palestinians has become part of the legitimacy formula for all Arab governments, whether or not their states host a large contingent of Palestinians. The Arab failure to effect a solution to the Palestinian issue, and especially their repeated defeats at the hands of Israel, hardly sits well with their populations. The Palestinian issue may well do some of these governments in over the next two decades. In the meantime, it will be a major source of friction between the U.S. and its regional friends.

One trend here is especially important because it involves Saudi Arabia, the key oil state and U.S. friend on the Arabian peninsula. The increased importance of oil to the industrialized world, the increasing size of Saudi subsidies to the PLO and the "confrontation states," and the increasing sophistication of the Saudi military all served in the 1970s to drag Saudi Arabia closer to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Given their wealth and position in the Islamic and Arab worlds, the Saudis simply cannot avoid this. Unfortunately, it tends to exacerbate the tensions between the country's support of Palestinian rights and its close
relationship with Israel's ally while, in a purely military sense, it has put the Saudis in a position only slightly removed from the confrontation states. Indeed, in the late 1970s, Israelis spoke ominously of the need to conduct preemptive strikes on Saudi Arabia's growing air and ground forces should a future war occur in the region. Such a strike is likely to have major consequences for both the stability of Saudi Arabia and the U.S. relationship to that country.

**Saudi Arabia**

Saudi Arabia is increasingly assuming a diplomatic leadership role in the region, both among Arab countries and the Islamic world more generally. Saudi influence is based on oil and related financial assets, guardianship of the Islamic holy places, moderate politics and diplomatic skill -- but not on raw military power, except in one peculiar sense. The unstated military dimension of Saudi influence is primarily a function of the special security relationship with the United States, which could be the critical channel in emergencies for large U.S. military deployments in the Gulf region. Through Saudi Arabia, the American shield implicitly covers the smaller Gulf littoral states -- Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. The reassurance provided by the American shield helps the recipients not only by deterring overt military threats but also by improving their capacity to cope with internal vulnerabilities, including those susceptible to external exploitation.
The essential questions are whether the constructive Saudi leadership role and the special U.S. security relationship will continue and whether they will be sufficient to provide stability, assured oil supply, and freedom from Soviet domination for the region. There are many reasons why unequivocally positive answers to these questions cannot be postulated for the 1990s with high confidence, though there is, at least, a modest chance that such conditions will be preserved. But the odds are much more favorable for the fulfillment of minimum U.S. strategic requirements, i.e., that the principal Gulf oil-producing countries (with Iran possibly an exception) will retain substantial independence; oil production and exports will increase slightly and be immune to total or protracted interruption; Western influence will outweigh long-term increases in Soviet influence in the states of the region; and the U.S.-Saudi special relationship will survive, at least in attenuated form.

It is now reasonably well understood that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to undergo a revolutionary political upheaval analogous to that of Iran because of the striking differences in the social, political and religious makeup of the two countries. The Saudi regime is comparatively resilient, fully incorporates Islam, and adopts comparatively prudent approaches to social, economic and military modernization. Still, it is a monarchy, a traditional form of government based on hereditary principles, in an era when monarchies seem anachronistic and have short life expectancies.
The regime could be threatened by coup-making dissidents within the royal family or the military, or could be challenged more fundamentally by organized agitation to install a totally new system of government. Such challenges are more likely to occur than to prevail in the 1980s, but may be more likely to prevail in the 1990s. It is conceivable that the regime could forestall such challenges; however, by additional anticipatory modifications of the composition and style of government. So far, it has shown only limited willingness to do so, however.

It is difficult to see how the current Saudi regime (or any of the other Gulf sheikhdoms, for that matter) can survive intact through the end of the century. These are Bedouin institutions in countries where the Bedouin is fast being replaced by urban technocrats and laborers. So we should expect sudden political changes in the countries, whether or not they lead to fundamental changes in the flow of oil or the U.S. relationship to the region.

We should also expect gradual changes from the current Saudi regime. At the moment, these are likely to stem from Saudi frustrations with the Arab-Israeli peace process, their embarrassment with growing ties to Israel's major ally, and their fear that U.S. military contingency planning is aimed primarily at taking their oil. A major increase in Soviet influence in Iran could put the Saudis and their neighboring sheikhs in a very tight position, forcing them to accept a larger U.S. presence that might be lethal to their regime in the long run.

It should be clear that so-called "domestic" problems in Saudi Arabia often connect to regional issues; its growing
involvement in the Arab-Israeli dispute and the tension between this and its relationship with the U.S. are two good examples. There are more regional threats, however, that threaten the Saudis more directly, and that may be of relevance to the U.S. Army. On the Arabian peninsula itself, the Saudis worry most about the Yemenis, primarily as a source of subversion or a haven for radicals, but also as a source of embarrassing military incursions that test Saudi capabilities and will. In general, the Saudis try to spend their money wisely beforehand to head off a confrontation. Still, when confrontations have occurred in the past, the Saudis have been quick to call for help. So far, their needs in this area have been small; they used British pilots for air strikes against a Yemeni border incursion on 1969, and U.S. AWACS aircraft during the Yemeni border conflict in 1979. It seems possible, however, that a more pressing threat from either or both Yemens, or a threat reinforced by Soviet or Cuban help, would force the Saudis to call for major forms of U.S. military help.

A more worrisome set of scenarios emerges when we look beyond the peninsula. Today, Iran is the major military threat in the region; its Islamic "messengers" are also a source of potential subversion. Over the past twenty years, however, first the Egyptians and then the Iraqis have played similar roles. All three are military giants compared to the peninsular states, and any one of them could dominate the peninsula if it were free to do so. That they have not been free to do so bears witness to the
adroitness of Saudi diplomacy, which has balanced these states off against one another with great success.

The danger here is that over the next twenty years, it may become increasingly difficult to manipulate this balance. Should the balance ever collapse, the Saudis might be faced rather abruptly with a military threat they would have no hope of meeting. At this point, the Saudis would turn to the United States, a country whose forces they would otherwise prefer to keep at arms length. Short of a major confrontation with the Soviet Union in Iran, a U.S. confrontation with Iranian or Iraqi forces would be perhaps the most demanding the nation could face, and would be fraught with danger of escalation as well.

With luck, Saudi Arabia will orchestrate oil production and exports from its huge reserves to prevent intolerable price escalation or severe international shortages, and continue to cooperate in recycling the massive petrodollar balances. Western technical assistance will enable Saudi and smaller Gulf oil producers to diversify their economies, to permit stable transitions as oil and gas resources become depleted. Military modernization in Saudi Arabia enables it to cope independently with conventional military threats from North or South Yemen -- unless Soviet proxies (Cuba and East Germany) enlarge their local operations significantly. But Saudi Arabia will never be capable of resisting determined assaults by Iran, Iran, Egypt, or Israel, not to speak of the Soviet Union.

Iraq

Iraq has been the "odd man out" among Gulf oil producers, a radical confrontation state in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a
heavily armed Soviet client state. The war Iraq initiated with Iran was intended to be a low-risk venture, a prophylactic against the export of Iran's Islamic revolution -- which threatened to ignite agitation in Iraq's Shi'ite majority against the domination of Sunnis in Baghdad's Ba'athist regime. Instead, the war is turning out to be a high-risk venture and could backfire by producing the very thing it was intended to prevent. If there is a major regional state susceptible to political upheaval comparable to what Iran has experienced, it is more likely Iraq than Saudi Arabia.

The odds of a sweeping political revolution in Iraq resulting from military defeat at Iran's hands are probably lower than 1 to 4 in the early 1980s. It is much more likely that the present strong men will be discredited, or that one or more limited coups would occur to reconstitute the Ba'ath regime, in the near-term. Over the long-term, perhaps in the 1990s, the Shi'ite exclusion from power almost certainly will be contested. In the meantime, the present leadership will seek to defend Iraq from any Iranian counter-invasion: significantly, Iraq's military forces have performed surprisingly well in defending its territorial borders. The war is more likely to subside with a defacto armistice than to be terminated by a mutually acceptable treaty arrangement, which means fresh hostilities could erupt periodically.

The setbacks of the war have tarnished Iraq's military image as a formidable regional adversary, and undermined the bid for regional leadership that the decline of Iran seemingly made
feasible. It has also forced a significant, though not necessarily irreparable, rupture in relations with the Soviet Union. By the same token, the cost of prosecuting the war and the need for alternative arms supplies has driven Iraq to reestablish close relations with Jordan, pursue rapprochement with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and even adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the United States. It has neutralized for some time to come Iraq's opportunities to pursue expansionist claims among the Gulf littoral. This reorientation may, for the moment, be tactical, but it could be reinforced for the long term by Iranian gravitation toward the U.S.S.R. and failure fully to resolve the war or to satisfy the objectives for which it was launched in the first place.

A full transition by Iraq towards close relations with moderate Arab states and the West could also be forestalled by further deterioration in Arab-Israeli relations. Unilateral military attacks by Israel, such as those launched periodically against Lebanon and Syria, or the attack on Iraq's nuclear research facilities in June 1981, tend to block confrontation state rapprochement with the United States and complicate the prospects for Arab-Israeli reconciliation.

Iraq is vulnerable to continued Kurdish agitation for autonomy or separation, particularly when its military forces are tied down in war. While the Kurdish movement may weaken Iraq, it is unlikely to partition the country.

For all its apparent disabilities, Iraq is one oil producer that already has a fairly prosperous agricultural sector, substantial measure of industrial diversification, and
significant accumulation of technical manpower. Unless its vitality is sapped by chronic instability, Iraq, by the 1990s, is likely to be a fairly vigorous contender once again for regional influence.

Iran

Iran's immediate preoccupation is twofold; to sort out a new, post-revolutionary political system, and to terminate the war with Iraq on favorable terms. In the meantime, Iran probably will have difficulty defining its long-term relationships with the Soviet Union, the neighboring states of the region, the industrialized West, and the larger international community, but these will have to be addressed in due course and the process may still be incomplete by the end of the 1990s.

The current internal political struggle in Iran probably will continue for several years, possibly into the next decade, even though this may prevent the recovery of oil and gas exports to economically optimal levels. The dominant clerical elements in the Khomeini regime may prefer to curtail the modern sectors of the economy which depend on oil revenue, in any case, as part of their strategy of Islamic revitalization. Iran recently has adopted lower prices to boost oil sales and currently exports over 2 million barrels of oil per day (bpd), far below the 5 million bpd level prior to the revolution, but a substantial recovery from the low points of the revolution and initial states of the war with Iraq. These levels probably are sufficient to permit a gradual pace of economic development in peacetime. It
is doubtful that the revenue is adequate, however, to finance indefinite prosecution of war against Iraq.

Iran's determination to avoid direct U.S. arms supply, financial difficulties, ostracism in most of the Arab world, and opportunities to widen the Iraq-Soviet rift all suggest that Iran may turn to the Soviet Union as a major alternative arms supplier. The Soviets may be receptive to the opportunity to play both sides of the field or to switch, if necessary, as they demonstrated in the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict in the late 1970s. This would measurably increase Soviet influence over Iran.

Iranian military successes in pushing Iraqi forces back to the Iraqi border have not been matched on Iraqi territory. Still, Iran may continue to push on its borders with Iraq while it hammers at Iraqi public opinion. If it succeeds in collapsing Iraq, Iran will once again pose a military and ideological threat to the Gulf Sheikhdoms of major proportions. In any case, Iran's brand of fundamentalism backed by subversive "messengers," is likely to be a source of threat to individual regimes around the Gulf until a new phase of the revolution turns Iran's energies inward.

Military successes and an expansionist foreign policy could help restore Iranian military morale and organization, but not necessarily the army's capacity or inclination to contest for political power. The Revolutionary Guards (paskan) and other paramilitary forces will be used to check political intervention by the military. A centrist military coup is conceivable in the 1980s or 1990s, but there are many impediments to successfully implementing a coup plan against the Islamic fundamentalists.
The prospects for a successful military coup would improve if, in a showdown between the fundamentalists and Marxists, the mullahs backed the army.

The successive purges of technocrats and political moderates since 1980 will make it difficult for the Khomeini regime to establish economic order but, evidently, this price will be paid. The questions are whether and how rapidly popular disillusionment with the domination of the mullahs will set in and which of the alternative political groups will make headway. Khomeini's death may intensify the power struggle, but it is unlikely to cause a decisive supercession of clerical power. Since the Islamic socialist Mujahadin-e-Khalq went into opposition with Bani Sadr's exit, it has been suppressed rather effectively. Meanwhile, the current revolutionary government has moved slowly but surely to isolate and suppress the communist Tudegh party and the Marxist Fedayin-e-Khalq, which had chosen to align themselves assiduously with the Islamic revolution.

One suspects that the Soviets are supremely concerned about events in Iran, but wary lest they be dragged into a local conflict they cannot handle (as in Afghanistan) or wind up in a confrontation with the United States. Iran is on their borders, its Islamic population once had ties with Soviet Moslems, and the country remains the major land buffer between the Soviet Union and the Gulf. It is obviously a strategic prize. Yet, while the Soviets have the capability to mount an invasion of all, or far more likely part, of Iran, a "bolt-out-of-the-blue" attack on a hostile Iran is most unlikely, partly because of Iran's rugged
terrain partly because of Iran's surprisingly effective army, and partly because of fear of some U.S. reaction. Far more likely is a continuing low-key Soviet effort to subvert the state, to control or manipulate Iranian politics, if not for its own ends, then to deny Iran to the West.

Ethnic and regional pressures for balkanization in Iran will recur but are unlikely to prove insuperable for the regime, unless there is major external instigation and support for secession. The most serious potential problems of this kind probably are in the areas contiguous to the Soviet Union, particularly in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The Baluchi problem could become serious, but largely as a function of Soviet/Afghan-Pakistan relations. 26 Soviet support for secessionist movements would compromise its efforts to ingratiate itself with Tehran and probably would not be unleashed in the absence of a Marxist-fundamentalist showdown with Iran. The date of any such showdown, therefore, could be a major turning point.

**Afghanistan**

The motivations for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 may have some bearing on how policies might be designed to convince the Soviets to withdraw (if that is even possible now), or to deter a repetition of the intervention pattern elsewhere. But the strategic repercussions of the invasion can be regarded as independent of Soviet intent; future Soviet intent in or nearby Afghanistan, moreover, may have more to do with new strategic opportunities resulting from the invasion than with original motivations.
The invasion had four major corrosive effects:

1. It degraded the perceived credibility of U.S. security commitments in Southwest Asia and, in conjunction with the loss of Iran as a buffer, contributed to a strategic U.S. setback;

2. It put the Soviets in a position to exert pressure on the internal vulnerabilities of Pakistan and to intensify those on Iran;

3. It gave the Soviets a territorial base for air and military operations only 300 miles from the Arabian Sea; and

4. It complicated the Indo-Pakistan rivalry and undercut nuclear nonproliferation opportunities in South Asia.

The invasion did not reverse the crumbling of the Afghan army, or produce spontaneous support for the reconstituted Kabul regime. Instead, it directly engaged the Soviets in a protracted low-intensity conflict with significant cumulative costs. The Soviets probably will persevere in Afghanistan, absorb the costs (which, at this stage, appear to be manageable), and wear down the resistance through attrition and forced emigration until the conviction takes root that Soviet defeat is impossible. It is highly likely that the Soviets will be able to consolidate political control under a client regime in Kabul by the early 1990s, though it could take that long to accomplish. Eventually, tacit and perhaps even formal acceptance of that regime by neighboring countries can be expected. Under those conditions, Soviet withdrawal might follow.
There is some evidence that the Soviet Union may have a somewhat different plan for Afghanistan's future; possible partition of the country or something short of partition that would entail the consolidation of ethno-linguistic distinctions in a conferal devolution of power. Soviet administration agencies have been encouraging shifts in linguistic, cultural and educational policies that may indicate an intent to play the Tadjik, Hazara and Pashtoon ethnic groups off against each other in a strategy of "divide and rule." A complementary objective could be the Soviet absorption of Uzbek, Turkomen, Tadjik, and Khirgiz populations in northern Afghanistan into the cognate central Asian republics of the U.S.S.R. The culmination of such a policy could neutralize Afghanistan as a national entity and set the Pashtoon population against Pakistan in a fresh wave of irrendentism. This would also, if it could be brought about, neutralize the insurgency in the base areas of southeastern Afghanistan where it has been most potent.

Neither Pakistan nor Iran is likely to see major external arms support for the Afghan resistance as in their own national interests at this stage. Only a limited flow of support could be accomplished without active collaboration by one or both of them.

South Asia

India's glacial evolution towards a middle ranking military power will continue through the 1980s, and be recognized as an established fact by the 1990s. Its military preponderance over its neighbors in the subcontinent, including Pakistan, is already indisputable and will be overwhelming by 2000.
In the course of the next two decades, Indian politics will suffer increased strains from redistributionist pressures on national resources that are growing measurably but slowly. The long-term response to that trend probably will entail shifts toward a more authoritarian, centralized rule and elements of a command economy. This evolution will be erratic and punctuated by periodic unrest originating in the demands of minorities and lower income groups for increased influence over policies and institutions that affect their future, by labor unions for higher compensation as well as greater power in the party and electoral processes, and by regional groups which resist greater centralization or nationally-imposed austerity measures.

Robust pluralism will impede the success of efforts to regiment Indian society and will probably perpetuate elements of a democratic process into the 1990s. Violent revolutionary activities will be manifested intermittently, but particular revolutionary organizations will not be able to develop a national following. The restraints on political intervention by the military may survive into the 1990s, but domestic discontent could discredit civilian leadership and tempt a younger generation of military leaders to move against the regime.

India's dependence on overseas energy imports and consequent international indebtedness will increase. Energy difficulties will exacerbate internal social and political pressures. They will also increase India's sensitivity to developments in the Middle East and her responsiveness to the interests of oil exporters. India will expand its already substantial technical,
commercial and political relations with energy exporters, particularly in the Middle East, to gain concession, offset import costs and improve reliability of supply. It is highly probably that India will also seek to become a supplier to other developing countries of military training and hardware, and could make some headway in Africa, the Middle East, parts of Southeast Asia, and some of its own neighbors. Similarly, India has begun to offer nuclear technology cooperation or assistance to other developing countries in a limited way, partly as a means of increasing its political influence and commercial opportunities, and this pattern may be well established in the 1990s.

The doctrine of non-alignment has been an essential feature of Indian foreign relations since independence. While the philosophical commitment to non-alignment remains strong in India, its abridgment in practice became common after Nehru's death in 1964. Indo-Soviet official relations have grown in importance, while those with the United States have deteriorated over the last two decades. During that time, the Soviet Union became the primary external supplier of advanced military equipment, and now rivals the U.S. as a trading partner of equal importance. In 1971, as a prelude to India's "liberation of Bangladesh, the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty was signed strengthening cooperation in various fields including security.

Indo-Soviet cooperation, it should be pointed out, is largely official and businesslike. It is not sentimental nor rooted in strong popular feelings of affinity. Neither is it paralleled in India by significant communist party or trade union involvement. It bears no resemblance to the kinds of ties that
exist personally and institutionally between Moscow and Hanoi or Havana. Moreover, there is little disposition in India to become bound to the Soviet Union in that fashion. Yet, there is a measure of practical Indian dependence on the Soviet Union and quite noticeable deference to Soviet positions in international affairs that is in no way present in relations with any Western power. By the late 1970s, India's pro-Soviet tilt had become so controversial in domestic politics that Morarji Desai's short-lived Janatda government felt the need to attempt to restore balance in India's foreign relations. Desai's initiatives have been continued in certain respects, albeit with less conviction, after Indira Gandhi's return to power early in 1980.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has faced India with a profound dilemma. Heretofore, the explicit external threats to the subcontinent had come exclusively from China, beginning with its occupation and annexation of Tibet, and invasion of India in 1962. That threat, the rivalry with Pakistan, and U.S. security assistance to Pakistan between 1954 and 1965 all provided incentives for India to cultivate the seemingly innocuous Soviet relationship. But Moscow's recent political penetration and invasion of a country neighboring the subcontinent has punctured its benign reputation in Indian elite circles, who find the invasion impossible to reconcile with India's traditional conception of its security requirements. The dilemma is because India is now accustomed to perceiving Pakistan as the more immediate threat and remains uncertain about long range Soviet
intentions with respect to South Asia while there are elements of real commercial, energy and security dependence on the Soviet Union.

The fundamental question for India to grapple within the next decade is whether it will accommodate the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and tacitly collaborate with Soviet Union in the security management of the region or, instead, resist Soviet expansion and attempt to conduct the security management of the region on its own. So far, the Indian position on this question is ambiguous. To adopt the latter approach would be difficult without some form of reconciliation with Pakistan and improvement of relations with China. Interestingly enough, India recently has made new overtures in both directions, but it is unclear whether they are based on a fundamental change in perceptions, and even if they are, whether they will be reciprocated or otherwise withstand the test of time. While India has unequivocally reaffirmed its interests in the stability and integrity of Pakistan, should the Soviets move to fragment that country, the Indian's might go along simply to take advantage of a dismemberment process it could not prevent unilaterally.

Although India helped Bangladesh achieve independence, its relations with Bangladesh have deteriorated. Disputes over riparian issues and demarcation of offshore territorial boundaries have been sources of friction. Internally, Bangladesh has experienced a series of violent political changes which have shattered the legitimacy of the Awami League, undermined respect for parliamentary institutions. Although the leadership of Zia-ur-Rahman offered a glimpse of something better, his
assassination in 1981 suggest that recurrent breakdown of domestic political order is likely to be a continuing affliction. India's underlying concern in 1971 was to head off the development of a revolutionary East Bengali movement that might stimulate appeals in West Bengal for greater autonomy or even secession to join a larger, independent Bengali state -- a concept that could invite Chinese interference in the subcontinent. Serious long-term difficulties in Bangladesh may still present difficulties for India in resisting external influence in the subcontinent, and this source of tension could be pronounced in the next two decades.

Pakistan's political history has been turbulent, with alternation between civilian and military rule, and the erosion of parliamentary institutions. Islamic fundamentalist forces have gained considerable momentum, but a durable core of organized, Marxist and socialist opposition also exists, virtually guaranteeing further political polarization of society. The conflict-ridden relationship with India, which produced a dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, has left the remainder of Pakistan theoretically more defensible, at least in physical terms, but psychologically even more insecure. While the loss of the eastern province was followed by much closer ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia -- which offered Pakistan a great deal of compensatory energy, financial and potential security support in the 1970s -- the Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have removed the Iranian props, stimulated fresh currents of Islamic political activism, and placed a direct
Soviet political and military threat on Pakistan's borders. Pakistan's security dilemmas thus were vastly enlarged in the space of one year. The drive in Pakistan for a nuclear option began much earlier, essentially as an aftermath of the Bangladesh defeat, but these recent events have strengthened the incentives for a consensus underlying the nuclear military program.

In the next decade, Pakistan will attempt to reconcile several external policy requirements:

1) To fortify itself in conventional military terms, with supplementary nuclear military option -- as a guarantee against Indian military attack;

2) To develop the security assistance relationship with the United States, Saudi Arabia and others both to obtain the equipment needed to make conventional military defense possible and to gain sufficient commitment of U.S. support to deter overt Soviet/Afghan high-intensity aggression;

3) To avoid acts that the Soviets might regard as provocative and warranting retaliation;

4) To maintain multilateral pressure on the Soviets to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan; and

5) To improve the relationship with India so as to avert military hostilities and permit coordinated arrangements for the security management of the subcontinent, on terms that accept Pakistan as a full partner, not as a subordinate state.

The test will be whether Pakistan can resolve these external requirements and successfully integrate them with internal
policies that effectively promote the unity of the country, maintain a satisfactory level of political stability, and permit continuation of economic growth and social development. This is an extremely tall order, and it is doubtful that it can be accomplished under military rule.

Pakistan's domestic vulnerabilities, secessionist tendencies of Baluchistan and other centrifugal provincial pressures, as well as the ideological polarization of the society, will be difficult to cope with even if there is no external interference. Since it is evident that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is likely to be a lasting one, it appears nearly inevitable that the Soviets will lend support, as part of a low-intensity conflict strategy, to secessionist organizations in Baluchistan and to leftist opposition parties in Pakistan. By a process of mixing backdoor subversion, military intimidation on the frontiers, and offers at the government-to-government level of material and economic, and perhaps even military assistance, the Soviet Union may even be able to make limited progress in co-opting Pakistan into a larger sphere of influence during the 1980s. This danger to Pakistan -- the most count-intuitive of the various threats -- is well understood by India and contributes sharply to its own dilemmas concerning future Soviet influence in the subcontinent.

The Indo-Pakistan nuclear rivalry will be a source for serious concern in the next two decades. India's nuclear military program has been developed at a leisurely pace to hedge against potential Chinese nuclear threats. But the apparent
development by Pakistan of a nuclear explosive capability has been a stimulus in India to put its own strategic program on a fast track that would neutralize the near-term Pakistan threat without compromising India's future capability to deter threats from China. The developments in Pakistan have also generated within India consideration of preventive strikes to destroy nuclear material production facilities within Pakistan before they are made fully operational. Since Pakistan could retaliate (even with its current aircraft inventory), and probably would retaliate, possibly against India's primary nuclear research facility compound on the coast near Bombay, the risk of an escalating conventional conflict within the next few years has become high. Such conflict certainly would disrupt the 1972 Simla Agreement and the partial normalization of Indo-Pakistan relations which was achieved in the 1970s and reinforced in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In the event near-term military hostilities are averted, it is nearly certain that Pakistan and India both will deploy nuclear weapons against each other, probably in limited numbers, by the turn of the next decade. Theoretically, at least, there will be a risk of nuclear military conflagration in the subcontinent in the 1990s. While it no doubt is true that nuclear deployments would be sobering to the military establishments of both sides, with powerful incentives to attain stability in a mutual deterrence relationship, the large variety of sources of potential instability within the two countries and in the neighboring region makes the outbreak of nuclear hostilities a realistic contingency that will not be overlooked.
by the Soviet Union or China and which cannot be ignored in American military planning.

One other military trend that deserves notice is the incremental expansion and modernization of Indian naval and tactical aircraft forces. In quantitative and qualitative terms, this development could be quite impressive by the 1990s. It represents a future capability for presenting risk to naval and island-based contingency forces of the major powers operating in the Indian Ocean. For the United States, which designs maritime forces against Soviet threats, this Indian development poses only marginal added complexity for planning, provided Indo-Soviet military relations remain arms-length and Indian naval facilities are not extended to Soviet warships for anything more than routine peacetime reprovisioning, refueling and minor repair. But if, in the next two decades, joint Indo-Soviet operational planning or arrangements akin to Soviet naval bases in India materialize, the added risks from Indian military capabilities would have to be taken into account. The alleged Soviet provision of satellite intelligence to Argentina in the Falklands crisis of 1982, and the possible utility of this intelligence in the successful Argentine destruction of the British destroyer Sheffield by an air-launched anti-ship cruise missile, is a thought-provoking precedent.

FUTURE REGIONAL TRENDS

Having discussed the situations of individual countries, it is useful to look at present and future conflicts and alliances in the region as clues to U.S. military requirements and
missions. Since the United States is particularly concerned with its superpower adversary, special attention will be paid to local relationships with Washington and Moscow.

It is helpful to group this regional overview around three centers of conflict or concern within the region. On the Western side of the region lies the Arab-Israeli confrontation, in which the U.S. interest in Israeli security is at stake. In the region's center lie the critical oil states of the Arabian peninsula, surrounded by the regional giants of Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. To the east lies the south Asia balance of Pakistan and India, with Afghanistan and Iran closely tied into what happens in these states. These centers overlap. Egypt is at once part of the Arab-Israeli confrontation but also potentially relevant to security on the Arabian Peninsula. Iran threatens the Gulf states, but also is affected by the Soviet position in Afghanistan and the relationship between Pakistan and India. The point needs to be made again about how difficult it is to separate part of this region from the rest; here the separation is admittedly artificial but useful for analysis.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Egypt's departure from the Arab camp in 1979 substantially reduced the possibilities for a full-scale Arab-Israeli war, though recent events illustrate that the possibility for violence remains high. Egypt has good incentives to stay out of future conflict; over thirty years of warfare, it lost many lives and much of its wealth to military failures. Egypt is strong enough, and its location insulates it sufficiently from inter-Arab pres-
sures that, barring a change in regime there, it is likely to stay out of the confrontation. Hence, the prospects for full-scale war between Israel and the traditional "confrontation" states remains low.

In any case, the U.S. role in these conflicts is likely to remain as it has been; that of balancing the Soviet Union, effectively insulating the conflict from superpower involvement, and supplying arms. With the superpowers out of the action, Israel is likely to continue to dominate the military dimension of this conflict, obviating any need for direct U.S. military involvement.

Thus, direct U.S. Army intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict is unlikely. The army will be a part of the overall U.S. security relationship with friendly states. It may have to provide peacekeeping forces for Lebanon, as described in the preceding sections. Beyond this, the relevance of the Arab-Israeli disputes to the U.S., and more specifically, to the U.S. Army, will lie in the impediments it creates for smooth relations between this country and Arab friends in the region. The Army will experience this primarily as an inability to locate bases near potential crisis points until crises have broken out. At worst, however, the U.S. relationship to Israel could cost it some friends in the region, or could contribute to the political turbulence in one of those countries.

On the Soviet side, it is worth noting that Soviet influence, once achieved by exploiting the Arab-Israeli conflict, seems to have reached a new low in the region as a whole, and, in particular, in the region around Israel. The Soviet trump always
was Egypt. With Egypt out of its orbit, Moscow has been left with Syria (increasingly isolated from other Arab states) and the PLO (now defeated militarily, though not politically). Yet even the Syrians and Palestinians have complained lately of Moscow's obvious refusal to back them with more than arms in the recent Lebanon invasion. They also are unhappy with the inferior performance of the arms Moscow supplies as compared to Western systems used by the Israelis. Moreover, in Egypt, as elsewhere in the region, Soviet soldiers have a reputation for arrogance that combines with their atheism (not well-liked in Islamic countries) to make them less than welcome. We can expect Moscow to continue to affiliate itself with the Palestinians, though with mixed success.

Of the major discontinuities that could appear in this part of the world, three are worth noting. One would be the appearance of a major threat to Israel. This is difficult to image in 1982: Israel seems more confident of itself than ever; Egypt has left the confrontation states in disarray; Iraq is distracted by Iran, and the rest of the Arabs seem more interested in peace than in war. Nor is time necessarily on the Arab side, despite their enormous population advantage. Rather, the danger here stems from Israel's genuine lack of strategic depth. Legitimately fearful of being surprised, the Israeli's have successfully preempted or otherwise taken the war to the enemy's homeland over thirty-five years of conflict. If Israel should fail to do so once, alas, it could be placed in grave
danger. The U.S. might then face a real military contingency in Israeli's support, or the possibility of Israel's use of nuclear weapons.

A second major discontinuity would be the emergency of a Palestinian state. Such a state would probably be dominated by the PLO. There would then develop a two-level conflict for control over the state. On the domestic level, Yasir Arafat and most of Al-Fatah (though it might itself split) would battle the smaller groups which want a revolutionary state. The likelihood is that both sides will be friendly toward the U.S.S.R., both because of their past close relations and because any deviation by Arafat would encourage Soviet support of his rivals as true revolutionaries.

The second conflict would be among the Arab states for influence on the new regime. Certainly, the Saudis would use their money to try to shape its policies, but the Palestinians would be well aware that the Saudis and other oil producers would have little choice in supporting them, no matter what they did at home and in terms of foreign policy. On the other hand, Syria, Iraq, and Libya probably would have relatively little influence on the new state unless they managed to back the winning parties in the probably civil war.

The Soviets would certainly try to become major backers of the emergent state. Were they to succeed, however, the advantage of their position would have less to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which the new state probably would be a loser, than with the geostrategic implications of moving down closer to the
Gulf states. Jordan is better positioned than Syria, after all, for pressuring Saudi Arabia.

What makes this scenario difficult to imagine is that the Israelis also would be well aware of the likely outcome and, therefore, are most reluctant to agree to such a state. If they were to do so, conditions over boundaries and such things as demilitarization would be advanced, and probably would not be acceptable to the Arabs.

A third possible discontinuity would be a coup in Egypt that replaced the present moderate regime with a more radical one willing to reheat the confrontation with Israel while it cooled its relationship with the United States. Again, while this could have dire consequences for the Arab-Israeli conflict, it also might threaten the Saudis, much as Nasser threatened them in the 1960s. While losing an ally, the U.S. thus might gain an adversary on two fronts: toward Israel, and also toward the Arabian Peninsula. The effect would be felt first on its arms transfers to Israel, and possibly to the Saudis as well. Further, as discussed in the next subsection, this could ultimately lead to major increment in U.S. military requirements around the Gulf.

Saudi Arabia and the Surrounding Giants

Inevitably, U.S. interests in this region come to be identified with specific countries. In the case of oil, that country is clearly Saudi Arabia, with OPEC's largest production capacity and the world's largest reserves. At present, the U.S. is well situated with the Saudis, and that position is likely to improve if the Reagan peace initiative leads to positive steps toward a
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the Saudis are well-situated on the peninsula, and effectively dominate the security concerns of countries on their border.

Under these conditions, requirements for U.S. military forces are minimal. The Saudis have a wide range of "lesser" friends to call on in emergencies. They have used British pilots, Jordanian commandos, and French advisors for their own security, and have facilitated the deployment of Egyptian, Jordanian and Iranian forces to countries on their border in an effort to preserve stability on the peninsula as a whole. There are good reasons for the U.S. to stand back from these activities, it being the largest Western nation, the most symbolic of Western imperialism, and also closely aligned with Israel. Should this "business as usual" scenario extend into the future, it is likely that such things as terrorism in the oil fields, a renewal of the Dhofar rebellion, another coup attempt in Bahrain or in the U.A.E., or perhaps even border skirmishes with the Yemens can be "managed" by the Saudis, using British, French and Jordanian forces or, at most, small contingents of U.S. ground and (more likely) air forces.

Two major discontinuities are worth noting. In the first, Saudi Arabia and the surrounding sheikhdoms somehow manage to retain power over the next decade or two, but lose control of the balance among the military giants on their borders -- Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. Possibly a coup in Egypt could set this off, or perhaps Iran ultimately will defeat Iraq and replace one country in the balance with a pro-Iranian splinter state that effectively
"flanks" the Gulf states. However it arises, this scenario would confront the Saudis with a potential military threat they could not possibly handle, even with the help of regional friends. Here the United States would be faced with the very serious requirement to augment Saudi forces, or to be prepared to do so, over the long-haul. Moreover, the balance of the giants could shift rather suddenly -- an Iranian victory in Iraq, for example, could shift the power equation above Saudi Arabia rather quickly -- leading to the additional requirement on U.S. forces to move quickly as well as in substantial numbers.

The second discontinuity stems from the long-term potential for domestic instability in Saudi Arabia and the other sheikhdoms. Here the first requirement is simply good intelligence, both to be able to help the Saudi regime, but also to understand what forces are coming into play. Although the United States may not have the political will to get involved in domestic violence, from a purely military point of view the limited population resources of these countries and their open terrain would seem to make them "manageable" -- certainly more so than Iran (with a population four or five times that of Saudi Arabia) or Vietnam. Indeed, fast moving light forces injected at the proper moment might be all that would be required.

South Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran

Over the long haul, perhaps the biggest question in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region as a whole has to do with the internal stability of the oil states. In the near and medium terms, however, the largest uncertainties lie on the eastern side of the region. Many of these uncertainties have to do with the
Soviet role there and the future direction of Soviet policy. It is on this side of the region that some of the most demanding planning scenarios for the use of U.S. military forces arise.

At the moment, this portion of the overall region seems to have stabilized. The regime in Iran would appear to have the political institutions to retain power for some time to come. Meanwhile, its army has proven itself capable of defending the nation's security. The Soviet position in Afghanistan remains a small but bleeding sore, and is likely to remain that way for the foreseeable future. So far, the Soviets have made no major move to destabilize Pakistan and, thus, the Pakistanis remain ensconced, unhappily, between India and the Soviets.

It is virtually impossible to imagine this stability lasting into the 1990s, or even much longer into the 1980s. The most likely problem is an increase in domestic turmoil in Iran, set off, perhaps, by army personnel or left-wing forces in the cities. Here the danger, from the U.S. point of view, stems less from what happens in the country itself -- our position there could hardly be worse -- but rather from the problem the Soviets would confront under these conditions. It is doubtful that the Soviets really want to invade Iran; it is a populous, rugged country that probably would give them the same problems they face in Afghanistan and, in addition, it is close to the West's key interests in the region and thus a high-risk target. Faced with either instability or the prospect of a pro-Western government rising on their border, however, the Soviets may feel forced to take preventative action. This most likely would involve action
in the northern part of the country only, although improvements in the Soviet position in Afghanistan might allow them to move forces southwest out of that country to screen their action to the north.

This is precisely the "worst case" scenario for which the U.S. RDJTF should be designed -- not for defeating Soviet forces in Iran, this being unlikely in any case, but rather for promising to so raise the risks and costs of Soviet action there that Moscow is deterred from moving at all. It is crucial to note that although U.S. interests in the region stem primarily from the oil found there, oil wells themselves are not crucial military objectives in this scenario; at stake is geostrategic position, and the Soviets improve theirs dramatically by taking even the northern half of Iran. Moscow can control the flow of oil without seizing any wells.

Obviously, there are better ways to take Iran than by means of an invasion, and the Soviets will continue to insinuate themselves into the country as best they can. So far, they are not having much luck on this score, but the rise of another phase of Iran's revolution could change their fortunes dramatically. Should the Soviets suddenly find themselves in a strong position with the regime in Iran, the U.S. can be sure they will take advantage of it, as they did in Egypt in the 1960s. There is probably no military method of deterring them from doing so; here the problem for the U.S. is one of the long-term repositioning in the region as a whole.

Still, part of that repositioning is likely to involve military forces. A Soviet position in Iran drastically shifts
the balance of power around Saudi Arabia as well as in the region as a whole, and would require redressing from the only power capable of confronting Moscow, namely, the United States. Over the long-haul, this scenario would seem likely to involve major deployments of U.S. forces to the region on a more-or-less permanent basis, if not in Saudi Arabia itself, then perhaps in Egypt and Jordan. In effect, this scenario amounts to an extension of the division of Europe south through the Persian Gulf. Hopefully, both superpowers can see the long-term disadvantages of this situation and avoid getting involved.

Moving east from Iran, once again the Soviets have at least an option of toying with the Baluchi area of Pakistan in hopes of breaking it off from the rest of the country and providing themselves with a strategic salient to the Indian Ocean. This is risky business and the Soviets know it. The salient would lie at the end of a very long logistics train that would run through Afghanistan, where it probably would never be wholly secure. Moreover, breaking up countries is itself risky, both because the Soviets would have to deal with the fragment (and, in this case, Baluchis may be no easier to deal with than Afghans), and also because they would have to face U.S. and world opposition. In this regard, it is worth noting that the scenario would unfold before U.S. carriers in the Indian Ocean, perhaps the most visible and strongest in-region presence the U.S. has.

Again, the military mission of the U.S. here is deterrence. If the scenario nonetheless unfolds, it seems likely to cause a beneficial counter-reaction from regional powers. India would
probably begin to find its association with the Soviets a bit too
dangerous, and even Iran might reconsider its non-aligned
position. Thus, if it had a sufficient presence in the area, the
U.S. might be able to reposition itself reasonably well.

The final scenario involves Pakistan and India, both of
which are likely to "go nuclear" by the end of the 1980s. This
scenario has already been discussed in the section on South Asia.
Here it can be said that, while this event will have serious
diplomatic consequences for all nations in the regions, it is
unlikely to affect U.S. planning for military contingencies to
the West in the region. These are likely to remain conventional
in nature, with the proviso that any confrontation with the
Soviet Union will have behind it the threat of nuclear war.

CONCLUSIONS: WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT?

In a region this large, heterogeneous and volatile, it is
impossible to single out two or three "most likely" futures. We
have no way of knowing the future here, just as we have done a
very bad job of predicting it in the past. From a military point
of view, a more useful approach is to outline plausible scenarios
that call starkly for the use of fundamentally different kinds of
military forces. By outlining the range of possible force
postures required to deal with potential contingencies in the
region, such a process can give military planners some sense of
the overall force they ought to have in mind.

In this regard, there are three scenarios, all implicit in
the discussion of preceding sections, worth considering briefly
in this conclusion. The first might be called "business as
usual," meaning that there are no fundamental alterations in the overall regional balance of power through the 1990s. There is perhaps a 30 percent chance that the U.S. will indeed face business more-or-less as usual in this region in the years to come. Significantly, "business as usual" does not imply a lack of threats and potential uses for U.S. military forces. Indeed, several general Army missions can be derived from it.

First, there is likely to be a certain level of terrorism, rising and falling over the years, which may be handled by local forces, but which might also require deployment of U.S. counter-terror units. Second, U.S. force may be called upon in relatively small components to support local friends; to help the Saudis counter a coup, to keep peace in Lebanon, to support Hussein in Jordan and, finally, to help the Saudis deal with Yemeni border action. These "active" uses of force will take place against a background in which U.S. Army advisors continue to be involved in training and support activities within friendly regimes.

But the major force requirements stemming from a "business as usual" future stem from the need to rebalance Soviet power in the region. This is a requirement the U.S. has faced since the Shah left Iran, and it is one that will probably become more demanding as Soviet conventional and strategic forces improve. One might say that the prerequisite for keeping business as usual is that the United States restore a military umbrella over the region that at once deters the Soviets and keeps local powers feeling reasonably secure. This demands an RDF capable of
deploying U.S. air, ground and sea assets in a way that deters the Soviets at their borders with Iran. It also demands mobilization planning sufficient to support such forces should deterrence fail and their use is required.

The second scenario, with a 35 percent probability attached to it, would involve the emergence of a fundamental imbalance at the local level, as discussed above, in relation to Saudi Arabia and the military giants that surround it. Here U.S. military requirements would be substantial, and would change as the military forces of major local powers, especially Iran, Iraq and Egypt, improved over the next decade. The U.S. must plan to meet these forces alone or in coordination with local allies, probably in harsh terrain, and still defeat them. More important, scenarios involving these local giants would probably force the U.S. to get more intimately involved with the regime it was seeking to defend. Hence, the exercise of force would have a substantial political component associated with it.

The third scenario, again with a 35 percent probability attached to it, would stem from a growing Soviet position in Iran or perhaps in the Indian Ocean by means of the "Baluchi salient" out of Afghanistan. Here U.S. military forces would not be called upon to fight (necessarily), but rather would face a requirement to take up positions in the region to balance the enormous increase in Soviet power and presence that would accrue to its new position. It may be hard to imagine U.S. troops deployed elsewhere than in Europe or Korea, yet surely this region is important enough to warrant consideration of this possibility, and the American people must be prepared for it.
This scenario would involve a major increment in the overall U.S. force posture and supporting infrastructure. It would depend less on speed and lift than the preceeding scenarios, and would involve "occupation" duties not unlike those the U.S. now has in Western Europe. But, of course, the political problems of a position like this in the Arab world would be larger than those encountered in Europe.

It is worth noting, in conclusion, that virtually any one of these scenarios contains within it a wide range of threats and possible conflicts, demanding a variety of army forces trained to meet them. Even "business as usual," after all, can be pretty demanding at all levels of conflict. If a fundamental imbalance of power emerges, either at the local or superpower level, then the overall requirement for forces will increase, perhaps substantially. But the range of possible conflicts is likely to remain wide under virtually any circumstances.
V. STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE U.S. ARMY IN THE 1990s

What are the implications of the wide range of conflicts outlined in the preceding section for U.S. Army force planning through the 1990s? At least two kinds of general army missions are different enough in their demands on Army planning to merit consideration in detail:

1. The need for "RDF-like" forces capable above all of deterring or dealing with the Soviet threat, but also capable of handling lesser conventional war contingencies arising from imbalances in the regional framework. This mission is more-or-less "conventional" in nature. But operations in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region would take place at the end of an exceptionally long logistics train, would occur in uniquely harsh terrain, and would always have attached to them a local political dimension that would separate them from conventional missions in, say, Europe.

2. The need for forces to handle a range of "low-level" conflicts, ranging from regime-support through counter-terrorism to advisory responsibilities. The political dimension of this set of missions is still larger and more delicate than in the previous mission. Moreover, combat in these cases is far more likely to be thoroughly unconventional in nature, involving built-up areas, oil field facilities, and other special circumstances.
The purpose of this section of the paper is to assess in some detail the implications of the preceding regional study and these differing mission requirements. The section will treat each of the above missions separately, attempting to derive the implications of each for Army manpower policies, research and development, force mobility, mobilization and prepositioning requirements, and doctrine (including force structure and organization). It will try to tell the service where it should be headed over the 1980s to prepare itself for the decade that follows.

POWER PROJECTION TO SOUTHWEST ASIA: THE RDF IN THE 1990S

One clear mission that the U.S. has faced since the Shah fell from power in Iran, and one that it will continue to face through the end of this century, is the need to balance Soviet power in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region. Given Moscow's limited ability to gain entry to the western side of the region, this amounts to a requirement to project power to deter the Soviets from moving from behind their common border with Iran and closer to the Persian Gulf. Such a force also will find itself tasked with confronting the larger of the regional forces. While the U.S. Army may face a bewildering array of threats worldwide, here is an important one that is likely to remain stable for some time to come.

This section takes up the issues involved in designing Army forces for these RDF contingencies. It first examines the threats such a force would have to confront, and turns next to the constraints affecting the Army's ability to bring its power
to bear in the region. Out of the interaction of the threat and the constraints the Army faces, the paper finally derives implications for force and weapons design, and manpower policy.

**The Threats**

Four things can be said about the Soviet military threat the Army must plan to counter in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region. First, it is close. At the moment, Soviet forces lie just above Iran and in a flanking position to the east in Afghanistan. In the future, they may occupy portions of Pakistan, taking at worst (from the U.S. perspective) a salient reaching down to the Indian Ocean. Second, this military threat is large. Above Iran, the Soviets deploy some 25 divisions, while they have 5 to 7 divisions in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Soviets would be able to draw on forces in the Central Region to reinforce these units.

While these two factors tend to portray the Soviet military threat as worrisome, the other two mitigate that threat somewhat. The third factor is that, while large, these forces are relatively low in quality. Most are Category III in readiness, and are manned at the moment by local ethnics whose loyalties might be in doubt. The divisions in Afghanistan are obviously combat ready but, at the moment and into the medium-term at least, these forces have more than enough to keep them busy in Afghanistan. The Soviets have the potential to deploy a large body of armored and mechanized units into Iran, but it would take them some time -- weeks, but possibly months, if they expected to meet strong resistance -- to bring in troops, repair old
equipment, and train units whose members have not trained together often in the past.

Finally, these forces are separated from the region by rugged terrain. The most obvious case is the mountains of Iran, which are likely seriously to constrain the application of the Soviet Army's "blitzkreig" doctrine, cause severe logistics problems, and limit the range of Soviet tactical air power, dependent as it is on ground control radar. Should the Soviets develop an offensive posture in Afghanistan in the future, they would have access to smoother terrain, though the high plateau country of southeastern Iran is as hot as any in the world, is marked by few roads, and has dust and wind likely to wreak havoc with armored forces. Significantly, the easier terrain is also furthest from the Soviet Union and closest to U.S. carrier power. This is even more true for the strategic salient through Pakistan, should the Soviets acquire it.

These factors suggest that a Soviet invasion of Iran is possible, but would be a major undertaking that would take time to prepare and would roll rather slowly down through the mountains toward the coast of the Gulf. Those mountains, plus the technical limitations of Soviet weaponry, are likely to give that invading force serious vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries. The Soviet Union's ability to get all of its massive force structure down to the Gulf is quite limited.

These are not the only forces the RDF is likely to have to deal with, however. The relatively large forces of local powers like Iran, Iraq and Egypt have somewhat easier access to the oil regions around the Gulf. These forces are not as large as the
Soviet forces, to be sure; they amount to 8 to 12 division forces, at best. Moreover, they are not as well-trained or competent as Soviet divisions, though the Iranian case suggests that the zealotry of their soldiers can make up for the many deficiencies. Finally, these forces are all currently in a degraded state, the armies of Iran and Iraq as a result of their ongoing war, Egypt’s army as a result of its ongoing conversion from Soviet to U.S. weaponry. By the mid-1980s, however, these forces are likely to be heavily armored with the latest equipment (some of it U.S.) and will probably get more heavily armored, if not larger, in the 1990s.

Of these forces, Iraq's are the only ones with direct access to the Gulf oil states. Iran must either attack through Iraq, as it has been trying to do in recent months, or cross the Gulf, presumably in the hovercraft the Shah purchased for this task. Egypt faces much the same problem, exacerbated by the truly daunting task of attacking Saudi Arabia overland only through Israel. All but Iraq thus are going to have serious vulnerabilities associated with the movement of their forces into the region where U.S. interests lie exposed.

The Constraints

With this region nearly 7,000 miles away by air, 12,000 miles by sea around the Cape of Good Hope, it makes no sense to discuss force design without first confronting the constraints the Army would face in getting its forces to the region, or in prepositioning them there to begin with. In both cases, the
Army's ability to perform its missions in this region is handicapped by political or technical realities.

To take force mobility first, it has become a commonplace to note that the U.S. has consistently neglected air- and sea-lift assets in favor of line equipment like tanks, fighter aircraft, and ships. Currently, the nation's airlift assets are sufficient to close a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division in about 48 hours, and deliver the whole division, including about 15 days' supplies, in two weeks. The Defense Department also has purchased 8 SL-7 fast sealift vehicles which, when converted to roll-on/roll-off configuration, will be able to deliver a mechanized division to the region in about three weeks, assuming it takes 5 days to load another 5 to unload the ships. If the issue is moving armored units, these times increase and force sizes decrease substantially.

There are two issues here; how much lift can the nation buy between now and the 1990s, and what kind should it buy? Sealift may be slow, for example, but if the nation is prepared to exploit warning sealift has several advantages. It delivers an entire unit and its equipment to the theater all at once. It is relatively less provocative in deployment and hence easier to alert than airborne units. Sealift is generally cheaper and more easily obtainable. Finally, ships can carry the kind of tanks the Army has developed far more easily than aircraft, of which only the C-5 can carry any tanks at all. While the U.S. clearly needs to augment its airlift capability, the time and expense involved suggest that beyond a certain point it would do better to concentrate on sealift.
In either case, however, it seems unlikely that the nation will augment its current lift forces substantially by the 1990s. In part, this is a technical matter. Even the current C-5B will not produce new and improved airlift until the end of the present decade, and then in relatively small numbers. It is also partly a political matter, however; the current budgetary feast is likely to subside by the middle of the decade, and with budgetary fasting will come cuts that historically have been aimed at lift assets. The latter problem is a matter of political will, of course, and can and should be changed. Even if it is, however, the nation's lift assets will be limited through the end of the century.

In Europe, the U.S. has sought to compensate for its lift deficiencies by prepositioning full sets of divisional equipment. Such is not likely to be the case in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region, however. For the foreseeable future, states in the region are, at best, going to give the U.S. "access rights" to their own bases only in emergencies, and while they will entertain a limited amount of prepositioning at those bases, the notion of divisional sets is far beyond what they have in mind. Rather, the U.S. Army should count for the moment on being able to preposition consumables like ammunition, TOW missiles, spare parts and the like. It may be able to preposition a limited number of infantry vehicles or, better yet perhaps, use those which it has sold to the local military forces.

This could change substantially if there were a major change in the sense local states have of the Soviet threat, although
even under these conditions their domestic political constraints are likely to limit the U.S. ability to preposition. Certainly the Army should seek to exploit these possibilities, gently and with sensitivity to the local political sensibilities. But prudent Army planners cannot count on being able to preposition in the region, barring a major change in the strategic situation there.

This means that the Army's contingent of the RDF will have to carry most of its fighting equipment with it to the region which, in view of the probably future size of U.S. lift assets, suggests strongly that Army RDF forces be as light and as self-supporting as possible. Note that the issue of force size is bound up in this set of assumptions: simply put, the lighter and more supportable the force, the more of it can be carried to the region for major contingencies. Thus, there is simply no sense talking about an augmentation in the U.S. force posture to meet Southwest Asian contingencies until the Army, as well as the other services, comes up with units light enough to be taken in large numbers to the area.

**Doctrinal, Organizational, and Technical Issues**

It has become popular to argue that the problems outlined above can be solved by employing maneuver in warfare. What is never clear is just what maneuver actually is, besides that which successful commanders have in the past practiced in winning engagements and wars. It seems clear that the U.S. will indeed have to employ some form of maneuver, given the limitations placed on the size and weight of the forces it can bring to bear in the Gulf. But it is necessary to relate the word "maneuver"
to more specific assertions concerning terrain, likely enemies, and available firepower.

Alas, under most foreseeable conditions, the Army's component of the RDF will face two rather different kinds of terrain. Deterring the Soviets in Iran forces the Army to plan on confronting Soviet forces in the mountains, though in the future it may also require the Army to meet those forces on the flatter plateau land of Iran. Meeting local armored forces, by contrast, is likely to involve operations on much flatter terrain. These two kinds of terrain demand fundamentally different operational styles: mountain warfare is an art unto itself, while desert operations fall more generally into line with operations on open terrain.

The Army now has a mountain doctrine, part of the doctrinal repertory of its light infantry units. There may be a need to modify and improve on this doctrine, but the more important goal is simply to train units more fully in its application. This doctrine places heavy responsibility on small and medium size units and their leaders; it stresses lightness and mobility; and it calls for as much self-sufficiency as possible on the part of all units. It is worth noting that, while some Soviet units above Iran are equipped and trained for mountain warfare, many are heavily armored, and thus are likely to be at a disadvantage in mountains, since their armor ties them to existing road networks and severely limits their ability to maneuver. To the extent that this aspect of the Soviet military threat remains stable in the future, it would be useful for RDF units focused on
Southwest Asian contingencies to modify general mountain doctrine to take advantage of specific shortcomings of Soviet units.

The doctrinal and organizational aspects of mountain warfare have implications for weapons technology. Clearly, heavy armor is out of the question, not simply because it cannot be lifted to the region in sufficient quantities, but because its presence in the mountains probably would be dysfunctional. Jeeps and other light vehicles are best suited for travelling mountain tracks and trails. Just as clearly, however, weapons carried by these units must be capable of dealing with Soviet armor, which is to say, they must be high in firepower. Weapons that meet these structures already exist -- the TOW, Dragon, LAW and the new generation of anti-tank devices now coming into the Army's inventory. Given the length of time required to perfect these technologies (the TOW took nearly ten years to move from "bread-board" prototype to production item), it would be better to improve what is now, or will soon be, available rather than to attempt to generate entirely new technologies. In any case, in mountainous terrain, simple tools like explosives can help cut off and block Soviet armor.

Perhaps one exception to the general argument for lightness and relative simplicity advanced here has to do with the helicopter. Intuitively, attack helicopters would seem to have precisely the mobility and firepower required for mountain warfare. But they pose a substantial burden on strategic lift assets and will drastically increase the logistics requirements for supporting Army units in mountainous terrain. Finally, they pose a maintenance problem likely to be much more complicated
than that posed by other equipment (except perhaps communications equipment) carried by these units. In any case, at the moment, the best helicopter for the job -- the Army's new Apache -- has yet to make its way out of development, and may never be purchased in quantities sufficient to support both Europe and Southwest Asia.

It has taken the Army over a decade to reach this point in the Apache's development: the Congress is not likely to fund another helicopter development for some time to come. As with anti-armor devices, the Army is, for the most part, going to have to make do with that which is available in its inventory, coming on-line over the next decade, or available off-the-shelf. On this point, the service can go two ways. It could adapt a fleet of Apaches or advanced Cobras to operate in the mountains. Given the logistics burden inherent in this effort, these aircraft would best be consolidated in combat regiments or brigades held at Corps or higher level and passed to small units in the field as requested. Such units would have to be based along the coast of the Gulf, where they could be supported by ship and perhaps by local oil facilities. Alternatively, the service could adapt one of its smaller and simpler helicopters to the more vigorous needs of flight in hot weather or at high altitude and attach these to lower level units at the outset. There would still be a requirement for supporting these aircraft from major bases along the coast of the Gulf, but much of the time, they would be spread out across the terrain in which actual fighting was occurring.
A general word needs to be said about the Army's weapons acquisition process. In general, the service has been justly criticized for taking longer and spending more in the development of weapons than common sense suggests is good practice. A large part of the problem lies with the Army's penchant to design every piece of its equipment to go anywhere and fight any enemy. If the service were willing to accept the need for specialized weapons for special terrain and missions, the development time, cost and complexity of its new systems would decrease. Indeed, under these circumstances, it would perhaps be realistic to talk of starting now to develop new equipment for the 1990s.

So much for mountain warfare: what about warfare against the armored forces of Iran, Iraq or Egypt on smoother terrain? Indeed, should the Soviets acquire a position in Iran or Iraq, the U.S. may have to deal with their armored forces as well, under circumstances in which the firepower of these forces will be less constrained than it would be in Iran's mountains. A number of factors must be introduced here that mitigate some of the problems of these scenarios. First, judging from Iraq's performance in its war with Iran, some of the local forces (apparently those trained by the Soviets, or those whose armies have become so politicized as to undermine stability in and training of its officer corps) are incapable of using the armor they have. Given the extent to which the political nature of the armies of these countries helps account for this fact, there is no compelling reason to assume that their abilities will improve in the years ahead. Adroit maneuver against these foes may be very effective indeed.
Second, it must be remembered that the mountains of Iran are perhaps as far from the U.S., and from the nation's ability to supply its forces, as any terrain in which it is likely to fight over the next two decades. Scenarios that unfold closer to the coast of the Gulf also unfold closer to U.S. lines of supply and communication, closer to local bases to which U.S. forces are likely to have access, and closer to local sources of POL. This is not to say that the logistics problem is easy; but it is substantially easier than supporting units several hundred miles north of the Gulf itself.

Third, friendly local forces, also increasingly heavily armored, will be available to help. Better still, U.S. forces could take over U.S. equipment in the hands of local forces for use in these scenarios. This consideration should inform U.S. arms transfer policy as well as its doctrine and tactics for force employment in these areas.

Finally, to the extent that the Soviets are positioned closer to the region than is now the case, the U.S. should try to increase its own presence there. Failing that, it should try to increase its ability to preposition equipment and support teams in the area on a full-time basis. A Soviet infestation in Iran, for example, might create political conditions elsewhere in the region suitable for the introduction of a sizable U.S. presence. Under these circumstances, the lift problems outlined earlier in this section may not affect the Army's ability to deploy armor in the region, even on short notice.
Still, prudence demands that for the foreseeable future the Army plan on facing local armored forces with limited amounts of its own armor available. Again, the need for flexibility and maneuver is paramount. Again, such flexibility demands, among other things, smaller units than the usual division. Again, it demands heavy emphasis on command and control arrangements. And again, it is going to demand the highest training and competence of junior leaders and NCO's.

In the terrain conditions of this scenario, the need for firepower is higher than that required in mountains. Without armor (or at least unable to plan for its availability), the Army has two options. First, it can devise "field expedients" from what it now has or will have available in the coming decade. The M2, for example, may not have the M1 tank's armor, but it is clearly an anti-armor weapon of considerable firepower. Although it is fairly heavy, it is far easier to deploy to distant theaters than the M1 or the M60. And it has the advantage of carrying troops. Alternatively, the Army might pay close attention to the U.S. Marine Corps' Light Armored Vehicle program to discover the capabilities of off-the-shelf equipment currently available. Both the LAV and the M2 are carriers capable of accepting a variety of presently available anti-armor systems.

A second approach to raising unit firepower at the end of long supply lines again involves the helicopter. Under the conditions of this scenario, the use of helicopters in direct support is considerably more feasible than it is in mountains, since they could be based along the shores of the Gulf (or even on carriers in the Indian Ocean, should the scenario involve
Soviet action in southeastern Iran). The Air Cavalry Combat Brigade seems a logical choice to fill this role.

Constraints arising from a shortage of strategic lift assets, the need to fight in harsh terrain and, indeed, the need to deploy units to very different kinds of terrain in the same region, all combine to produce a requirement for smaller, lighter, independent units capable of operating on a fairly lean support base. Such units would differ substantially from the increasingly heavy units being deployed to Europe at the moment. They would be on the order of a regiment or a small independent brigade, and each would have sufficient staff to oversee what are likely to be far-flung and disjointed operations over rugged terrain. Given differing kinds of terrain, they would have to be armed and trained differently as well. They also would have to be light on logistics, able to sustain themselves for two or three weeks without major resupply.

Obviously, the command and control requirements of such operations make it necessary to equip these units with substantial C3I mechanisms. These could be standardized across all units. Indeed, perhaps the ideal approach is to standardize a division-like headquarters and staff with the bulk of C3I equipment, and attach to these command headquarters the regimental units appropriate to specific missions. This has much in common with the "tailoring" currently a part of the ROAD concept, although in that context tailoring is a matter of moving battalions, where here the regiments as a whole would be assigned to a division-like command center.
Special Intelligence Requirements

Projecting military power into Iran, especially, will place U.S. forces in a special situation. Unless U.S.-Iranian relations take a sharp turn for the better, it is likely that U.S. forces inserted into Iran will go in "blind": they will have no in-place intelligence assets, like HUMINT networks or existing military intelligence facilities, on which to draw to gauge the strength or location of the ongoing Soviet attack. The Iranians may simply elect to be neutral, providing no information. Or they may provide information, but to U.S. commanders who have no way of judging the reliability of various Iranian sources. U.S. forces will be fighting outnumbered in this theater in any case; lack of in-place intelligence assets makes their situation even worse.

There are two kinds of solutions to this problem. On the one hand, U.S. commanders will have to rely on traditional intelligence collection methods -- the use of patrols and cavalry screens to locate and perhaps even force deployment of enemy forces, and the use of their limited air assets for observation. On the other hand, the nation as a whole has a wide range of fairly sophisticated means for gathering intelligence about Soviet forces in Iran. Some of this lies in such agencies as the National Security Agency, the CIA's imagery interpretation facility, and so forth. Some of it is in the possession of other military services like the Air Force. Very useful intelligence thus might be available somewhere in the overall national intelligence system.
Will Army commanders have rapid access to this second kind of intelligence? They will not, unless there are direct links between relatively low-level field commanders and relatively high-level, and in some cases exceptionally sophisticated, intelligence sources. In general, these links can be fostered in two ways. On the one hand, the service can design technologies -- communications equipment and intelligence gathering devices -- that allow it access to much of the rest of the nation's intelligence collection methods. Radios that are compatible with those of other U.S. services, or still more sophisticated devices that give the field commander a more direct link to high level U.S. intelligence assets might be well worth exploring, provided these items of equipment can be made rugged and reliable for field use. On the other hand, the service can modify its organization, as it has often done in the past, to place organizational components in direct tough with higher-level intelligence sources. The Army's MI company, with an imagery interpretation component that usually is stationed with the nearest air force contingent, is a modest example of this kind of organizational modification. Given the expense of modern technology and some of the problems associated with making it reliable, the organizational route may be easier and more secure. It also could be implemented much faster.

**Manpower and Training Issues**

Three related manpower issues deserve treatment in the context of a general discussion of RDF-like missions in the Middle East/Southwest Asia. They are how many people the Army wants,
what kind of people it wants, and how it intends to train them. It makes no sense in this paper to deal with national, political, and demographic issues as they affect the Army's manpower potential. Rather, the effort here is to move in the other direction, focusing on the implications of the analysis here for these broader manpower concerns.

Beginning with training first, it seems clear that the general implication of creating specialized units on a larger scale than previously is that training itself must be more focused. Basic and Advanced Individual Training may remain universal parts of the service's training regimen; beyond that, individual and unit training must concentrate on probable missions in specific parts of the world and in specific kinds of terrain. The same can be said for specialty training, most importantly in Arabic and Persian. Given the disadvantages of reassigning individuals so trained to other parts of the Army, as is the present practice, training requirements alone favor a substantial increase in personnel stability in units. At the moment, the Army is experimenting with the "regimental system" in hopes of improving unit morale and effectiveness. Should the Army actually create special units, the regimental system will have to be adopted in any case, with added benefits in morale and effectiveness.

As for what kind of people the Army wants, the issue here concerns intellectual and technical capacity. Since World War II, the Army has sought to use technology to increase effectiveness and simplify the operation of its weapons. TOWs are simpler to use than 106mm recoilless rifles, just as laser
range-finders on tanks are simpler and more accurate than the older parallax system in the M60A1. This has created major logistics and maintenance problems, however, and a complementary reliability problem, all of which seems in recent years, to have gotten out of proportion to the obvious advantages technology has to offer the service.

Against this general background, the relative austerity imposed on RDF units by the nation's lack of mobility assets, combined with the genuine need for simplicity and flexibility in operations, promises to alleviate the requirement for highly trained, technically qualified personnel. At the very least, it reduces the problem to reasonable proportions, suggesting that the requirement for fairly sophisticated manpower evident in that portion of the Army's forces oriented toward Europe is not so pressing with regard to RDF requirements in the Middle East/Southwest Asia.

This is not to say that the Army should recruit less-qualified people. In general, smarter soldiers do better - in combat, as well as in maintenance positions - than dumber soldiers. Moreover, while sophisticated maintenance operations may be diminished in RDF units, the overall maintenance burden may well be increased by the sheer harshness of the operational environment in Southwest Asia, and by the need for units to sustain themselves for from supply bases for extended periods. In this sense the maintenance burden may be more evenly spread across all members of each unit. It may be less demanding technically, but nonetheless daunting in full scope.
The question of race is relevant here as well. The proportion of blacks in the Army, as a whole and especially in the combat branches, has risen over the past decade. Given demographic trends, it is likely to continue to rise or to stabilize at a level higher than the national average in Vietnam, where the racial character of the war came increasingly to the fore as opposition to the war grew, the racial composition of line units also became a matter of national debate. Whether or not this might happen again is unclear. What is clear, however, is that in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region the U.S. Army is likely to find itself again fighting people of another race. Thus, the potential for intra-service, and perhaps national debate, will be present.

Finally, there is the question of force size. It should be clear at the outset that this depends very much on strategy. If the U.S. wishes to defeat the Soviet Union in the mountains of Iran, for example, its personnel requirements will be much larger than if it merely seeks to confront them there, slow them down, hopefully deter them, and, at most, hope to stalemate their drive somewhere closer to the coast. It is fair to say that the U.S. does not now have forces capable of defeating the Soviets in Iran's mountains and, although it seemingly can buy any force it wants, it is unlikely ever to have enough money to buy a force sufficient for this mission. Against the Soviets, a more realistic strategy is one of deterrence at the Soviet border with Iran, coupled with a requirement to defend further south. Force size should be based on the requirement to stabilize a front at
the southern base of the Zagros mountains and along the coastal regions of Iran.

It should also be clear that the question of force size is related to the issue of mobilization and to the overall division of labor between active and reserve components of the service. These issues, in turn, are related to the issue of time. Unfortunately, time may well be of the essence in these scenarios. Hence, this assessment of the Middle East/Southwest Asia region reinforces conclusions derived from other portions of the Army 2000 study in favoring the use of reserve forces in the European environment, while the rapidly deployable portion of the Army be composed primarily of units from the active components.

Finally, it should be clear that there is no sense discussing force size if assets are not available to carry and support larger forces. Long before it spends money to create new forces, in other words, the service should allocate dollars to combat service support elements and to infrastructure development within units presently in being. The Defense Department as a whole must allocate money to strategic lift. Given previously stated assumptions about lift, this would appear to be the single most pressing constraint on force size.

With these caveats as background, the issue of force size becomes more manageable, if only because the problem is artificially constrained from several directions. At the moment, the "RDJTF" is probably a good deal stronger and potentially more effective as a fighting force than is generally perceived. If the Army portions of that force are reconfigured, retrained and rearmed as suggested in this study, the effectiveness of that
force should rise substantially. Should the Soviets leave their border divisions at relatively low readiness levels, the demand for a larger force for deterring the Soviets, while ever-present, should not be allowed to overwhelm higher priority items. As Soviet forces improve, the requirement on U.S. forces will rise. Assuming no major change in the Soviet position in the region, therefore, but continuous improvement in the quality of Moscow's southern divisions, by 1990, the Army's RDF components will simply have to be expanded in size, perhaps by 2 or 3 divisions -- equivalent of the recommended regimentally-constructed force.

Should the Soviet position change radically -- should Moscow's forces acquire positions in Iran, for example, or in Iraq, then the need for forces would grow demonstrably. At the same time, however, lift requirements might diminish in importance as the U.S. itself gained a stronger foothold in the region. Were the U.S. Army actually to be based in the region, constraints on force size would arise from the larger problem of how to buy or draft people from the population at large.

This suggests a strategy for the service. At the moment, force size should be held to a priority lower than that given to the development of support and infrastructure, not to mention the procurement of new weaponry currently entering production. Indeed, the service should take advantage of the relatively high budgets of the current period to buy materiel and to take care of the people it now has. Should future events dictate, the service may have to raise the priority on buying more forces. But it
will do so in the context of a much larger national debate over national, rather than purely Army policy issues.

On Cooperating With Friends

One final set of issues deserves attention in this discussion of RDF-like Army forces. This concerns the demand on the Army to cooperate with non-Army elements, be they members of other U.S services (from the U.S. Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy) or services of countries in the region. The obvious requirement for firepower in the scenarios discussed here suggests that tactical air power from Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy elements, will have to be integrated into the planning of relatively small Army units, operating perhaps independently in Iran's mountains. Technically, there is a requirement here for C3I arrangements that facilitate communications between all of these elements. Practically, there is an absolute necessity for exercises in peacetime that bring these elements together under realistic circumstances.

While we might expect the U.S. services to operate alone in confronting the Soviets (although they might receive help from Iranian units), in scenarios involving local forces it is likely that the U.S. will deploy forces alongside friendly forces from, for example, Saudi Arabia. The U.S. needs to consider C3I compatibility with these partners when it sells them arms. There is a practical side here, too, involving the need for continued practice in cooperation. Significantly, the presence of U.S. advisors with many of these forces is likely to alleviate language problems, and it may attenuate problems of style in handling combat arrangements as well.
The need for international cooperation is perhaps more pressing for the smaller units to be discussed in the next subsection. Still, the point remains that the constraints under which Army units will be operating will make it necessary to tap every possible source of firepower and help. The Army of the 1990s will not be able to "go it alone," at least in a region as distant, volatile and close to the Soviet Union as the Middle East/Southwest Asia.

CONFRONTING LOW-LEVEL REGIONAL CONFLICT

Perhaps the most challenging mission the Army will face in the 1990s will be the management and control of low-level violence in the developing world, and especially in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region. Low-level conflict covers a multitude of scenarios, ranging from the need to insert small but effective combat units to preserve the integrity of a friendly regime, through the need to counter terrorism, to the need simply to advise and coordinate with friendly forces and regimes. This presents the service with a set of organizational challenges different from those of the early post-Vietnam years, and a lot different from those discussed in the previous sections of this paper.

This subsection will take the same approach as the previous one. It will focus first on the range of potential threat forces and scenarios. Rather than focus on constraints, however, it will focus on sources of help available to U.S. forces in these missions, and on the requirement for cooperative operations. It
will turn next to doctrinal, organizational and technical issues, and focuses finally on issues of manpower and training.

The Range of Low-Level Threats

Low-level conflict does not confront the Army with a single problem, but with a variety of them. Across the range of threat scenarios there are discreet problems that pose substantially different demands on the service, as well as on the U.S. policy as a whole. Indeed, it is important to note at the outset that these are not primarily military problems at all, but rather political problems with military aspects to them. Consider the following three scenarios, representative of the range of possible conflicts in which Army forces could be called into play:

- A coup or civil war in, say, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, involving elements of the armed forces of that country, or armed commando units (for example, Palestinian units). Although this conflict would probably involve relatively small numbers of units, it would be as close to conventional combat, in terms of the actual application of countervailing military power, as any in this range of scenarios. It is important to note, however, that this conflict may involve fighting in built-up areas as well as open fighting between conventional forces.

- Terrorism, either in cities or directed at key assets, notably oil wells and associated installations. There probably will not be much "conventional" about these scenarios. Terror units will be small, as will be
those that counter them. Speed of deployment, flexibility of operation, and political sensitivity will mark the actual run of these operations. It should be clear that the military will rarely "run" these operations; they will be controlled in large part by political leaders.

o Advising local forces, both in peacetime and in low-intensity conflict. U.S. forces might be called upon to help Sultan Qaboos' forces deal with a resurgent threat from the Dhofar, for example. Or U.S. soldiers might both advise local forces and help deploy other U.S. assets -- tactical air power, or electronic warfare capabilities, for example -- as the need arises.

Cooperative Arrangements

The challenge of meeting threats along the continuum is alleviated somewhat by the fact that U.S. forces will rarely have to meet them alone. Some, it may have the luxury of avoiding entirely. Precisely because these conflicts are relatively low in intensity, local powers may feel themselves capable of dealing with them, in whole or in part. Moreover, in a political sense, they will probably feel compelled to do so. In addition, they will be able to call on support from a variety of other states whose forces are likely to be politically more acceptable than U.S. forces. During the Mecca Mosque incident in Saudi Arabia, for example, French advisors, Jordanian commandos and possibly some Moroccan troops appear to have been involved alongside Saudi
National Guard forces. Likewise, in countering the Dhofar rebellion in Oman in the early 1970s, Sultan Qaboos enjoyed the help of Jordanian commandos and engineers plus several thousand airborne soldiers from Iran. His forces were officered, for the most part, by seconded British officers, and many of his own soldiers were Baluchis.

These considerations apply to terrorism in the oil fields as well. It is worth noting, for example, that British SAS troops already practice oil-well alerts with soldiers from Qatar and the U.A.E. Both the British and French have special counter-terror squads likely to be available for such action. And the countries of the region itself are wasting no time in developing similar forces, often with Jordanian advice.

Given its other mission demands, the U.S. Army should welcome the opportunity to pass responsibility for such conflicts to friendly nations whose intelligence in the region is as good or better than our own, and whose forces either live there or have been trained there, as is the case with many British troops. To the extent that allied interests are at stake in the region, it makes good sense to allow allies to get involved in regional security; better said, it makes sense to recognize, bless, and try to compliment the involvement they already enjoy. Since allies are likely to play a modest role at best in countering the Soviet threat, their contribution to dealing with low-level conflict seems most appropriate.

To the extent that U.S. Army units nonetheless get involved in these operations, the presence of allied forces, or the forces of host countries, obviously adds a complicating factor for all

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involved. There is little sense in seeking to rationalize arms for the NATO states who themselves seem incapable of doing this. A more realistic approach would be to give each nation's forces a wholly different combat sector. At the very least, of course, there will remain a requirement for coordination between sectors. Hence, the need to cooperate cannot be escaped.

Doctrinal, Organizational, and Technical Issues

It makes no sense to discuss doctrine here as one would discuss doctrine relating to maneuver and firepower in conventional warfare. For one thing, insofar as there are several kinds of threats that fall under the general rubric of "low-level conflict," there are several doctrines required to meet them. Even this is too narrow a focus, however, for these are as much political as military threats, and the application of force in meeting them will thus be heavily shaped by the political exigencies of the moment. Finally, to the extent that the U.S. probably will meet many of these threats in coordination with other forces, its share of the operation, and hence its doctrine, will be shaped by the division of labor on the scene of action. Under these conditions, that well-used word "flexibility" gains still more importance.

Moreover, military doctrine for low-level conflicts cannot be pushed very far in the absence of reference to the region and countries in which the threats are likely to unfold. The political nature of the threats themselves, as well as the large political dimension inevitably in the response, strongly suggest that, at the operational level, doctrine be shaped by a strong
sense of politics in the area under consideration. While this holds true generally, it is all the more true in the region under consideration here, where Islamic and Pan-Arab issues make the issue of U.S. intervention in the region a very delicate one under all but extreme circumstances.

Nor can doctrine be developed without coordination with other U.S. services as well as local friends. In this sense, force design and the development of doctrine must overcome a series of structural gaps in U.S. security assistance and low-level conflict planning that are likely to assume critical importance in the 1990s. Gaps in the planning infrastructure separate operational security assistance forces of the various services, and further separate these forces from peacetime security assistance and foreign policy planning. This creates a lack of continuity in planning military operations in low-intensity environments. Ironically, the Army is, in some cases, better prepared to cooperate with the armies of regional friends than it is to deal with other of the U.S. services. In any case, as a first step in improving the situation the Army should consider pushing for the establishment of a joint command capable of integrating the low-level conflict planning staffs of the U.S. services. Out of this can grow joint exercises in which doctrine can be tested and further developed.

As for unit organization, it goes without saying that the kinds of conflict under consideration here require relatively small units. In the case of terrorism, for example, squad or, at most, company size units are likely to be sufficient. In counter-coup operations, the kind of separate brigade or regiment
discussed in the previous section would appear to be appropriate. In domestic violence situations generally smaller units lying somewhere between these two in size are probably about right. In most cases, these units should be staffed heavily enough to give the commander support in dealing with the political as well as the military aspects of the situation.

Significantly, many of these smaller units already exist, not only in the Army, but across the U.S. services. Moreover, given the small size of such units, adequate regionally-expert manpower is probably already available to man and staff them. Certainly the acquisition of such manpower is not likely to strain Army resources.

Over the wide range of conflict in these scenarios, weapons requirements will vary. At the high end of the scale, the technologies appropriate to RDF units are likely to be appropriate, especially if the threat comes from small contingents of the local armed forces. At the other extreme, however, the need to engage in paramilitary, urban or other forms of conventional warfare places significantly different demands upon technology to multiply manpower effectiveness. Here the demands are most likely to focus on such matters as personal armor, guaranteed inter-squad radio communications in a city environment (subways, tunnels, buildings), anti-personnel weapons of graduated lethality (with emphasis on crowd control without trauma), surface and airborne personnel carriers able to operate in very cramped quarters and detectors of all types (e.g., movement, personnel, selective material). Examples of the
problems faced by such forces include the British in postwar Palestine and today in Northern Ireland, the French in postwar Algeria, and the occasional U.S. recourses to martial or militia police forces in the face of riot or natural disaster. This class of military or paramilitary activity combines typical civil emergency skills -- firefighting, evacuation, medical support, police work -- with more conventional military capabilities of firepower, mobility, command-control, and discipline. The "police" army is, more than most, manpower-intensive; it is also expected to be in operation against a relatively circumscribed physical region and supported externally by a friendly population and government. High value is placed on holding physical damage and fatalities to a minimum, on isolating and controlling dissidence rather than killing dissidents.

The technical requirements that flow logically from this probable future military function show only a little overlap with those imposed by the more conventional missions. Because the police army's battlefield lies inherently in the midst of a continuing civil society, the manpower multiplier effect of technology must focus more on providing some invulnerability to the individual soldier than on increasing the soldier's destructive capabilities, and this means providing him defenses ranging from physical body armor to multi-detector intelligence about his adversary. It may be that new biological, chemical, and sonic incapacitation devices and psychological warfare will be critical to success in this role, with almost equal importance given to spoof-proof sensors and communication.
Here the need for "special" weapons is carried to the extreme; small units may actually find it useful to examine weapons used by U.S. police departments, or the weaponry of counter-terror or small elite units of other countries. All that can be said in defense of a policy of arming units in this way is that at stake is a fairly small (but important) part of the Army, one capable of being dealt with outside standard channels for procurement and supply. The service has functioned in this way in the past; given the regional assessment on which these recommendations are based, it should continue to function this way in the future.

**Manpower and Training Issues**

Although the service may expect to confront low-level conflict situations more frequently in the 1990s than it has thus far, it is doubtful that manning the units for these missions will raise the larger issues of national policy raised in a discussion of the RDF or forces for Europe. To be sure, the Army may need more units trained in low-level conflict, each with a regional orientation. But, the numbers involved will never be as large as is the case in these other scenarios.

Rather, the issue here is training of two general kinds. One brand of training must focus on creating specialists in the region to which these units will be deployed; the other should focus on gearing these units to deal with "special" kinds of violence. The first training should be directed at officers primarily, and should include language training. The current FAO program accomplishes many of these requirements. The second kind of training is for all unit members.
ARMY REQUIREMENTS AND THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC MOOD

The requirement to structure Army forces as described in preceding sections, and the additional requirement to use them are both likely to depend on public mood in the United States as a whole. In the first case, the need to buy more and varying kinds of material, and even more so the potential requirement to expand the Army's active components, are likely to require major infusions of funds and, in the latter case, consideration of conscription. Both are to be very contentious nationally no matter when they are introduced to the American public. At the same time, the whole question of using these forces in anything more than an advisory role will provoke an entirely different but equally heated debate in the public at large.

Mood theory suggests that, by the end of the present decade, the United States will have swung back toward an attitude favoring extroversion; that is, intervention in world affairs. Presumably, this says something about the public's willingness to support higher defense budgets as well. Perhaps it can even be taken to mean that a return to conscription would be less contentious at the end of the decade than it certainly would be now.

The underlying premise of "mood" theory is that no one has much control over large swings in public mood. To the extent that this is true, there is little sense in discussing the subject. In a narrower sense, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the nation's leaders can acquire some leverage over specific defense issues, if not broader public attitudes, if they
have a clear sense of priorities and the time to prepare the nation for what is ahead. The draft is a good example. It is difficult to imagine that the Army's current size will remain suitable over the next 20 years; indeed, many would argue that the revolution in Iran alone made U.S. security requirements difficult, if not impossible, to meet with the current force. Surely political leaders of vision should begin in the near future to prepare the public either for major increases in defense dollars devoted to buying manpower, or for the national debate that is sure to accompany any move to reinstate some form of conscription.

The Army will play an important role in a debate over conscription, as it will in so many of the national debates that ultimately affect its ability to accomplish its mission. What the service should do is think through its future problems now and ensure that its priorities are clear and in order. Consistency may be the best tool it has to ensure its ability to meet future threats to the nation's security.

As for public moods concerning the actual use of force, the Army ideally should again have a large role to play, for on its professional judgements should rest a good deal of the decision-making related to commencing military action. All that can be said here is that publics like success. Well-trained and professional officers can give it success both by recommending against actions whose military success is doubtful, and by producing victory, by whatever definition, should the service be committed.
While this paper suggests that national debates on defense issues like these are unavoidable in the future, it also suggests that the Army has a great many tasks to accomplish that do not involve major infusions of defense dollars or the prospect of conflict. Many of the recommendations in the preceding sections have to do with organizational and conceptual changes in the way the Army deals with itself. These promise to improve the Army's capabilities within current manpower allocation. They also promise to be difficult issues to implement organizationally. Perhaps the Army leadership should let the public mood take care of itself; it has more than enough to do that will require very little additional money but a great deal of time and energy.
VI. GENERAL STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR THE ARMY

For much of its history, the U.S. Army has sought to unify itself organizationally and technically. It has sought to arm all soldiers with one rifle, to use one bullet in as many weapons as possible, to find one tank for all seasons and all terrain. While it trains soldiers in various skills, it "standardizes" them by assuming they can be assigned to virtually any unit. And while it has units of varying kinds -- "leg," mechanized and armor to cite the current variety -- it has tried to fit these into a single "ROAD" division concept that has been the basis for Army divisions since 1963. This penchant for unification makes especially good sense from a logistics and training standpoint.

In the 1970s, the Army's tendency to unify itself was given new force, perhaps because of its unhappy experience in Vietnam. Beginning in 1972, the Army seems to have decided to focus almost exclusively on the European battlefield, on the (correct) assumption that Europe was crucially important to the United States. Infantry divisions were "heavied-up" to become mechanized units, while mechanized units were converted to armor units -- a process actually begun in the 1960s. A new tank was developed for the high intensity of European battlefields, a tank so heavy as to be almost incapable of deployment anywhere else in the world. An infantry fighting vehicle was developed at equally impressive weight, and an expensive all-weather attack helicopter was designed to counter the Soviet armor threat on European battlefields.
Significantly, this process stopped in 1979, when the U.S. Army's 9th Infantry Division, scheduled to become a mechanized unit, was instead converted into a test-bed for light, easily deployable equipment useful in contingencies that have been the subject of this paper; that is, those likely to occur in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region. If this paper has an overall conclusion, it is that the unification process that has so long a history in the Army has probably stopped at the right moment, and that by the 1990s the Army would do well to have discarded the concept. For out of the study emerges the urgent need to fight in a variety of kinds of conflicts, using forces that deserve a certain amount of "individuality" within the service as a whole.

The unification tendency described here has a long history, however, and the Army is a large organization that carries much of its past within itself, generally for good reasons. Thus, however intuitively plausible and logical the recommendations made here may seem, we should not understate their "radical" nature in terms of the Army's organizational norms. An Army composed of heavy elements focused on Europe, considerably lighter regimental-sized units trained for a variety of contingencies in other parts of the world, and smaller units trained and armed for low-level conflict is radically different from the current Army, just as an Army with a high degree of individual stability within units would be operating from a radically different personnel philosophy than underlies the current organization. Getting from the current organization to the recommended one will not be easy.
Strategy, former Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer once noted, is nothing but priorities. Having a clear sense of its priorities is absolutely critical for the service if it is to move in the directions recommended here. This applies to the Army's position in the national political system and national debates about such things as the draft and larger defense budgets. It also applies in its dealings with itself. The worst approach would be to try to do everything at once; this will produce very little but sound and fury. Only if the Army's leadership has a sense of priorities among what is commended here can it concentrate most of its energies on what is most important.

What are the priorities that emerge from this study? The top priority is one the Army has already taken up, one that provides the necessary basis for the reorganization recommended here. That is the need to introduce personnel stability into Army units. Creating the conditions for closer ties among unit members has payoffs in unit morale and effectiveness. As mentioned above, unit stability also will be necessary if the service is to field more-or-less "special" units trained for specific regions or kinds of conflict. Within a class of unit, the need for reorganization alone does not prohibit a certain amount of personnel transfer. Perhaps a half-way house between the current system and a fully "regimental" system along British lines is one in which unit transfers are permissible within classes of units.

On this kind of a personnel base, so-called special units like the RDF units described above can be created virtually by
fiat. The problem lies in making them "lean and mean," as the saying goes. Here top priority must go to the technical problem of fielding high firepower weapon systems that nonetheless can be transported to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. This problem has the longest lead-time and promises to cost the most money. Both time and money can be spared if field expedient methods are employed, although the suitability of such equipment is uncertain enough to encourage starting early with test, experimentation and exercising. Presumably the 9th Division test-bed has this process underway. Expanding that effort, but moreover implementing the results, are essential.

Improvements in training for military skills to some extent will fall out of changes in the personnel base and the integration into the inventory of suitable technologies. But training in political skills will have to receive special focus. One of many ways to conduct such training will fall out of cooperative exercising with local friends as well as with European allies with small forces in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Obviously two major priorities lie outside the service but nonetheless will involve its interests. One of these has to do with conscription, which seemingly lies in the future as an increasingly unavoidable choice the nation's leaders will have to face. To the extent that this is true the service can do nothing more than be certain of its manpower requirements and express them clearly in terms of threats to the nation's security. The other concerns strategic lift, which does not come under the
Army's budget, but on which it clearly depends. Here the Army can alleviate problems by moving toward lighter and smaller units. Still, it must reaffirm the importance of lift within the Defense Department as a whole.

As difficult as some of these organizational changes may be to achieve, there is one major factor relating the region under study here that works in the service's favor. This is that the interests at stake in the Middle East/Southwest Asia are likely to remain crucially important to the nation's security through the end of the decade, and most likely through the end of the century. There is some question here, to be sure: an Arab-Israeli peace agreement might ease threats on the western side of the region, while a technological breakthrough or the discovery of new oil reserves outside the region might lessen the dependence of the United States and its allies on Persian Gulf oil. These factors should perhaps make the nation willing to accept a higher degree of risk in seeking to meet strategic requirements in this region than it is willing to accept, for example, in the defense of Europe. But for the moment, and most likely over the next two decades, the interests the nation seeks to protect in Europe will also lie at stake in the Gulf. It makes no sense to defend them in one area while they lie exposed in another. The Army can count on facing a potential defensive mission in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region for some time to come, and thus has some stability for planning, and for implementing new ideas.
NOTES


"Defending the Gulf: A Survey," The Economist, June 6, 1981, pp. 1-38. There are some who are skeptical this is any longer feasible; see, for instance, Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980, pp. 999-1015.

4. See generally Louis A. Dunn, Controlling The Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1982); Michael A. Pajak, Nuclear Proliferation


31. Ibid.

43. Sheer engine power is an important issue, given the problems associated with helicopter operations at high altitude, in hot weather, or under both conditions simultaneously. The Apache maybe better suited for use in Southwest Asia, at least from this perspective, than any other helicopter in the U.S. inventory.


45. See again Epsteen, "Soviet Vulnerabilities and the RDF Deterrent."


Tucker, Robert W. "America in Decline: The Foreign Policy of 'Maturity'" *Foreign Affairs* America and the World, 1979, 1980.


