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



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Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000

Georgetown CSIS

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The Americas

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OPERATIONS AND PLANS

LONG-RANGE PLANNING GROUP

STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY

TO THE YEAR 2000

THE AMERICAS

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Provides global and regional requirements which will contribute to development of Army long-range doctrine, manning, force design and materiel requirements. Determines a range of environments which will likely confront the nation and the Army and identifies factors that will have major implications for the Army. Develops Army-wide strategic requirements and recommends general directions that the Army can take to meet strategic requirements. Region-specific to the Western Hemisphere, both North and South America, excluding the U.S.

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The Americas

INTRODUCTION

For the purposes of the this study, the Americas are taken to be co-extension with the Western Hemisphere, i.e., they encompass all the countries of North, Central and South America, the island nations and European dependencies in the Caribbean and Atlantic, including Greenland, and the Eastern Pacific. This paper will also address the national security challenges and opportunities presented by the two polar regions. Altogether we are talking about 36 independent countries, plus numerous French, British, Dutch and American dependencies, with a total population including the United States, of about 580 million.

Geostrategically, the Americas may be defined as made up of three subregions (again excluding the United States): 1) The Caribbean Basin region, including the Caribbean, Central American and Mexican theaters; 2) The South American region, including the overlapping Brazil/Southern Cone/South Atlantic theater and the Andean/Pacific Rim theater; and 3) the Canada/Arctic region.

Up to the 1960s, there was no credible external military threat to the Hemisphere. Internal conflict was endemic and wide-spread, often erupting into civil wars of low to medium intensity. Only the United States managed a high intensity civil war. Less frequently, there were minor local wars between nations, triggered by anything from dissatisfaction over the results of a soccer game to conflicting territorial claims. But the region as a whole, resting between two great oceans, felt reasonably immune from European or Asian aggression against the heartland. That left the "other Americans" free to focus their

fears, jealousies and rancor on each other, and more particularly on their own in-house superpower, the United States, that infuriatingly rich, condescending and self-centered collossus which seemed to understand so little and do less about their needs and aspirations.

Much has changed in the past two decades. The Soviet Union now has the capability of delivering total nuclear war to any part of the hemisphere. Canada, no longer a secure backwater of the world's most powerful empire, now finds itself a buffer on the most direct route between two lethal and mutually hostile superpowers. A Soviet proxy (Cuba) and at least one sub-proxy (Nicaragua) are spreading their alien cancer in the Caribbean Basin. The British, of all people, have demonstrated that the Atlantic is no longer proof against a conventional surface attack.

One might expect that these new external dangers would serve as a unifying force for the Americas and encourage our nervous neighbors to coalesce around us, their powerful friend. Far from it, our relations with the other countries in our hemisphere have never been worse. The Canadians see their independence threatened by U.S. economic domination and their lives threatened by our cold war bellicosity. The Mexicans, Argentines, and Brazilians are in hock to their eyeballs and consider us part of their problem. There are elements of the local population who see Cuban-style communism less of a threat than a promise of delivery from poverty and social injustice.

In the early 1980s, the simple fact is that the United States can no longer assume, or easily compel, conformity to its own preferences with the Americas. Rather, cooperation in the political and security areas must now be achieved through positive policy initiatives taking into full account the preferences of increasingly important (by global standards) and diverse neighbors. In view of our historical relationship with both Latin America and Canada, this need to incorporate new realities has proved extremely difficult to recognize, much less to act upon. But in turn, these realities will affect our relationships with the rest of the hemisphere through the 1990s.

In tandem with these political/security factors, we must build on our Hemispheric economic, trade, and technological exchanges. Trade with the rest of the Americas accounts for about 30 percent of U.S. imports and exports. Of U.S. trading partners, three of the eight largest sources of imports and four of the thirteen most important destinations of U.S. exports are found within this hemisphere. In this regard, ties with Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil are especially important. These relationships have a significant qualitative dimension, too: the United States remains heavily dependent upon Hemispheric sources for such critical raw materials as petroleum, bauxite, manganese, tin, nickel, tungsten, and copper. In addition, a substantial share of American investment of capital and technology abroad is found in Canada and Latin America.

Likewise, human and cultural exchanges have markedly expanded the more objective, observable, and obvious links between Latin America and the United States. At present, Latin

American influence in particular, has increasingly permeated this nation's social fabric, via the influx of immigrants from Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and other Spanish-speaking cultures. In the early 1980s, the reality of the situation is that Spanish-speakers now constitute the largest linguistic minority group in the United States, and a significant component in U.S. military forces enlistments. The numbers of new Spanish-speaking immigrants, the circumstances of their entry into the United States, the strong residual bonds and sentiments with their country of origin, their concentration in certain areas of this country, and the Spanish-speaker's cultural sensitivity -- all these factors underscore the unique and profound subjective dimension of transnational links within the Hemisphere. Their consequences have been difficult to determine, and are equally difficult to forecast. Yet they will certainly play a role in shaping U.S. responses to Latin American contingencies in the 1990s.

The Soviet strategy, and thus the main Soviet threat, in the Americas is focused on Central America and the Caribbean basin. This is the soft underbelly of the United States. Although most of its nations are technically American allies (through the OAS), they are also part of the Third World - economically vulnerable, politically receptive to radical philosophies, suspicious of "yankee imperialism" and disgruntled about being taken for granted by successive American administrations. They are thus promising targets for Soviet economic and political penetration.

Yet this is a region of vital strategic importance to the U.S. In World War II over 50 percent of American supplies to Europe and Africa departed from gulf ports. The Caribbean today serves as a transition point for raw materials flowing from the Middle East, Southern Asia, and Africa to the Western Hemisphere. Its heavily-traficked oil routes carry half of U.S. oil imports. About a quarter of U.S. imported oil is refined abroad, mo[illegible] than half of it in Caribbean refineries. Two of the main sou[illegible]s of imported oil share the Caribbean: Mexico and Venezuela. the year 2000, the aggregate strategic and economic significance of the Caribbean may come to rival that of the Persian Gulf. The Panama Canal is as vital as ever to maritime traffic between our east and west coast ports; and until we have a two-ocean navy it will remain militarily vital (only 13 of the navy's 475 ships are too large for the canal).

Soviet writers have recognized publicly that "in military strategic terms (the Caribbean) is a sort of hinterland on whose stability... freedom of U.S. action in other parts of the globe depends."[1] Soviet advances in the region do not signify an independent threat to U.S. security but are more serious precisely because they are components of and subordinate to the U.S.S.R.'s global strategy. From this perspective, the chief Soviet objective in the region is not the acquisition of Mexico's oil (as is frequently alleged) but to promote a state of turmoil which would divert American resources and permit the Soviets a freer hand in the areas that we have seen are more central to their global strategy.[2] Thus the Soviets have backed low-cost Cuban harassment of the United States by funding and supporting

Cuban intervention in the Caribbean and Central America.[3] There can be little doubt that Soviet-Cuban activities will continue into the 1990s. The Soviets are not, as some analysts believe, seeking a "bargaining chip" to preserve their "spheres of influence" in Poland and Afghanistan.[4] They respect "spheres of influence" only when it is a question of their own spheres or if, as until recently in Latin America, they were unable to project power in the adversary's sphere of influence. With propitious conditions continuing to develop in Central America and around it, the Soviets will step up their efforts. Their presence in the region in the 1990s will almost certainly be greater than it is today.

The Soviets are conducting, in effect, a "Troika" campaign to achieve their ends in the region. First, U.S.S.R. and other COMECON countries (which now includes Cuba) are developing close commercial and industrial ties with countries like Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico and Grenada. Second, they are exporting, directly and through the Cubans, a revolutionary ideology along with the material resources needed to destabilize established governments. Terrorist networks are appearing in the region, including Panama, and insurgencies are on the rise.

Finally, there has been a significant increase in the Soviet naval presence in the region. Having failed in their dramatic attempt to place strategic missiles and strike aircraft in Cuba, the Soviets began in 1962 to establish a low-level naval presence in Cuba. Less provocative elements of Soviet seapower were gradually introduced in the Caribbean, including oceanographic

vessels. This gave the Soviets access to Cuban ports for logistical purposes.[5] These first quiet measures were followed by the gradual deployment of warships in small but significant and carefully timed steps. By 1975 more than a dozen separate Soviet Naval deployments to the Caribbean had occurred and over 30 submarines had called at Cuban ports. These were coupled with Soviet "Bear-D" reconnaissance flights off the American East coast, taking off and landing from Cuban airfields. By 1975 the Soviet and Cuban navies were routinely exercising together.[6] The visits gradually became longer and larger. The average of the first 17 deployments were 30 days, while the two in 1978 lasted 65 and 82 days.[7] These visits have made the Soviet naval presence a normal and persistent feature in the Caribbean. Moreover, this presence has been accompanied by a similarly incremental Soviet buildup of Cuba's own naval and air forces.

The combination of the direct Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean with a burgeoning Soviet-supplied Cuban navy regularly participating together in naval exercises, has created a major coordinated and integreated offensive interdiction capability for Soviet bloc power in the Caribbean.[8] In addition, Soviet Navy Fleet Admiral Gorshkov visited Grenada in 1980 and there have been unconfirmed reports about Soviet intentions to build naval facilities there as well.[9] With the increasingly tight control being exercised by the pro-Soviet Bishop regime in Grenada, it is not unlikely that Grenada will become a sea (and air) port for Cuba and the Soviet Union by the 1990s.

This projection of Soviet/Cuban power has already been instrumental in the successful Nicaraguan revolution. This has

been followed by a series of military agreements between Nicaragua and the Soviet Union.[10] Furthermore, "soft evidence" strongly suggests that the Nicaraguans are preparing for the arrival of Soviet MIG fighters. The Soviets are operating their "floating workshop" for ship repairs off the Nicaraguan Pacific Coast,[11] and have obtained fishing privileges in Nicaraguan waters. In other countries concessions like these have permitted the Soviets to conduct naval surveillance and have led eventually to naval facilities and bases. Unconfirmed intelligence reports of the transfer of Soviet tankers from Cuba to Nicaragua suggest that the Soviets are taking in Nicaragua their customary "incremental" steps, coordinating economic, political and security elements in an integrated strategy of penetration. As in such previous efforts, East Germany, Bulgaria, Vietnam and other Soviet bloc states are participating in the Nicaraguan buildup. By the 1990s a well-consolidated pro-Soviet regime is the most likely prospect for Nicaragua. Its totalitarian tendencies, however, will have generated a broad opposition movement with links to the opposition movement in Cuba and elsewhere in the Soviet empire.

Recent disclosures of Cuban activities in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Columbia and elsewhere indicate that this Soviet strategy is now being implemented in and around Central America.[12] Its incremental nature suggests that through the 1980s the region will be in for increased turbulance and the present Soviet threat to Western shipping may be complemented by new Soviet bases.

From all this it is clear that the Soviets have an aggressive grand strategy for the Americas that is, in a sense, deeper and more pointed than the U.S. counter-strategy. They are not at this juncture interested in a direct military confrontation with the United States in the region and will seek to avoid such a confrontation in this century. They are probably not interested in taking on expensive new client states in the Cuban pattern. But they are seeking to develop a politico-military relationship which could threaten our safe use of the Caribbean and Panama Canal in the event of a global superpower conflict. In the meantime, by posing the threat, they are seeking to divert our political and military attention from higher priority Soviet targets elsewhere in the world.

In approaching our own strategy for the Americas, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Organization of American States (OAS) is, among other things, a military alliance. We are obligated to provide military support and assistance to our partners in the event of an external attack and this commitment is mutual. The United States and Canada or co-members of NATO and we have a member of cooperative arrangements in place, most notably the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), to detect and deter hostile encroachment from the north by air. Our strategy should build on, and seek to strengthen, this existing mutual security structure. A reasonable degree of peace and stability in the Americas is an essential precondition to the effective projection of American power elsewhere in the world. We cannot fight a bear with our feet in quicksand. But we are not the only force committed to the defense of peace and

stability in the Americas. Friendly forces in the hemisphere, excluding our own, total about 1 million and most of them have been trained and/or armed with U.S. help. We must ensure that they pull their weight in their own defense and, where possible, in the deterrence and containment of aggression against the region as a whole.

ASSUMPTIONS

o The US-USSR Relationship: Global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union will continue. Each will seek countervailing political, military, and economic strength vis-a-vis the other. Each will also seek to consolidate, protect, and advance its strategic position regarding the other in relations with third parties.

o U.S. Commitments: American mutual security commitments in the Americas will not be significantly reduced.

o Natural Resource Links: Though US dependence on hemisphere suppliers for some critical resources (e.g., fossil fuels) may decline somewhat, the nation will continue to rely heavily on the Western Hemisphere to augment its own supply of minerals and other resources.

o Development Links: The desires of our hemisphere partners for stable and secure economic and political development, and for material progress and growth, will continue at least at present levels, as will their desire and need for help from the United States and other more advanced nations.

o Economic Conditions: These will be no worse globally than in 1982.

o Demographic: Population increases and trans-national migration flows will continue as a major social reality.

o Increased Military Capabilities: The 1980s and 1990s will see the proliferation of military technologies and capabilities within the Hemisphere. Argentina and Brazil are

clear candidates for eventual emergence as nuclear powers. Mexico and Venezuela will be able to follow in the same direction.

o Resources for Defense. U.S. defense capability will grow moderately but significant resource constraints (e.g., force mobility shortfalls) will continue substantially as at present.

o The American "Mood": American popular readiness to play an interventionist role in the hemisphere will be somewhat greater in the 1990s than it is today.

U.S. INTERESTS THROUGH THE 1990s

Vital Interests

- The maintenance of all bases and other facilities in the region essential to the military defense of the United States and its dependencies and to hemisphere security and stability.
- Assured U.S. military access to the airspace and waterways of the hemisphere.
- The containment of Soviet and Soviet proxy efforts to destabilize and subvert friendly governments in the region.

Important Interests

- The United States is concerned to maintain Canada's meaningful defense contribution within and beyond the North American theater. The U.S. also has considerable interest in continued access to Canada's resource and market potential, and more broadly, in continued economic partnership with Canada.
- In Central and South America, the United States needs peace, prosperity, and stability to minimize the political violence that derives from socio-economic unrest.
- The United States must either find alternatives to dependence on, or pacific ways to guarantee access to, the 30% of U.S. imports and exports which flow to and from Latin America. Especially important to maintain are supplies of critical materials such as petroleum, bauxite, manganese, tin, nickel, tungsten, and copper.

o The U.S. must also be prepared to protect residual and essentially symbolic U.S. enclaves, e.g., the Panama Canal or Guantanamo Bay, against local irridentist or terrorist violence.

o The United States must maintain the cooperative framework of inter-American relations, while continuing to foster standards of economic and social justice essential to tranquility, stability and growth.

REGIONAL ANALYSIS

Latin America and Canada have always been and will continue to be fundamentally important to the security interests of the United States. But the tendency of United States foreign and security policy to focus on dramatic, episodic situations has tended to obscure the steadily evolving long-term course of this nation's relationship with its hemispheric neighbors. The result has been a marked inability to recognize and act upon most trends involving the other nations of this hemisphere and a consequent divergence of direction between the policies of the United States, Canada and the increasingly heterogeneous states of Latin America.

With policy inevitably lagging behind crises, as in the El Salvador situation, the United States often finds itself belatedly attempting to understand the course of regional events and their implications and imperatives for the defense posture of this nation. Through the end of this century, Latin America and Canada may well prove to be the most recurrent "new" items on our policy agenda.

What are the major trends which will have transformed, and are already beginning to change, the environment of the Americas? Our analysis must begin by noting three of the most important trends as background for more detailed discussion. First, the states of Latin America have themselves evolved (economically, politically, socially, etc.) in the past decade, and this is likely to continue at an increasing pace. Second, the relative power of the United States has declined considerably and its basic interests have become universally more dependent on the

nature of the sociopolitical and diplomatic environment beyond its borders -- including that of the Western Hemisphere. Finally, major, and in some cases hostile, extra-hemispheric powers have already assumed significant roles within the Americas -- the Caribbean Basin most notably.

The final part of this Regional Analysis (entitled "Possible Futures" outlines the most salient conflict scenarios likely to confront the U.S. Army. A full appreciation of those scenarios requires much more detailed analysis of background factors, however, and this is provided in the intervening sections addressing the three major sub-regions.

The Caribbean Basin and Central America

The history of the region is written in slave riots, coup d'etats, assassinations, revolutions, riots, and most significantly, in a unique American presence. In the 1940s the Caribbean Legion helped Pepe Figueres take over Costa Rica. In the 1950s the CIA engineered the ouster of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. In late 1958 Fidel Castro overthrew Cuba's corrupt government. In the early 1960s both Cuba and the Dominican Republic sent agents to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela. In 1962, Nicaragua instigated the overthrow of the Honduran government. In 1965, the 82nd Airborne Division was sent to restore order in the Dominican Republic. In 1970, the Black Power movement almost succeeded in overthrowing the Eric Williams government of Trinidad and Tobago. The 1970s saw the elimination of a one-family dynasty in Nicaragua, and the maintenance of another in Haiti. It also saw the first coup d'etat in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Grenada). Ideologically, the decade was also characterized by the growing Cuban influence in regional affairs. Such instability and violence is in a sense "traditional" in the region and is unlikely to come to a quick end.

With the major exceptions of Mexico and Venezuela, and perhaps Trinidad and Tobago (all three oil producers), the Caribbean basis is made up of poor nations. Even in those three relatively wealthy countries, considerable income inequities still exist. Few of the countries in the region are

industrialized. Although socio-economic modernization has resolved some problems, it also has created new ones.

What should make this problem particularly acute in the 1980s and 1990s is the likelihood that modernization may not be matched by the ability of the state to satisfy the growing demands of increasingly urbanized societies. Rapid economic growth will not be adequate to ameliorate the social problems and tensions. In addition, governmental institutions will steadily assume more and more responsibility for running society. The political process itself will therefore increasingly be an issue. Social service, demand-oriented overload will continue to be endemic. Taking the Caribbean Basin as a whole, urban riots, terrorism, and coups will occur along with various levels of insurgency, particularly in Central America. Rapid population growth throughout the region and worrisome internal and external migration will complicate the problems of political rule.

Thus, much of the Caribbean Basin will continue to be faced with the interrelated problems of poverty, limited resources (including land), and expanding needs and demands. In addressing the future of this critical area a distinction needs to be made concerning the nature of political challenges in the Caribbean and Central America:

o Over the next two decades, Central America will face profound political instability and will be preoccupied with a search for new political, social, and economic institutions. With perhaps the exception of Costa Rica, existing political structures are not so much weak as they are archaic and socially inequitable. With the current degree of political violence and

the trends towards violent regime change, Central America governments and institutions will continue to operate within very narrow political margins.

o The Caribbean problem will be quite different: how to try to arrest decay in established democratic and parliamentary infrastructures created during a recent colonial experience. The contingency at issue will be the maintenance, or even the strengthening, of these polities. Obviously, there are and will be two major exceptions to this model: Cuba and Haiti.

Although parts of the Caribbean Basin are among the more developed areas of the Third World and possess some resources important to the United States, the nations of this region are not by any standards well-endowed. This economic reality will undoubtedly affect conditions in the Caribbean and Central America well into the 21st century (Mexico is a special case to be discussed shortly). With few exceptions the region as a whole will continue to share unique geophysical weaknesses -- as essentially insular territories, a lack of infrastructure, a limited resource base, and particularly for Central America an extreme vulnerability to the vagaries of the global economy in the commodity area.

The region does have a few assets that are geopolitically important and will remain so during the next two decades. About 20 percent of the world's bauxite reserves are found in Jamaica, Suriname, and Guyana, with Jamaica accounting for more than half of that amount. There are also commercial deposits in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Cuba is among the world's top five

nickel producers, and with expansion of facilities could well become one of the leading producers. But the Central American states remain traditional agricultural producers (sugar, coffee, bananas, and cotton), and their export sector will likely be modernized over the coming years. Looking to the future, there are significant proven deposits of oil and gas in the Southeastern Caribbean area particularly off the coast of the Guianas. There are also probably offshore deposits in the Western Caribbean and in the Gulf of Honduras. In addition, very large oil and gas reserves in Mexico and Venezuela (and to a lesser degree in Guatemala, perhaps Belize, and possibly Honduras) remain important alternatives to a very vulnerable Middle East energy supply picture.

In spite of these assets, much of the Caribbean proper will continue to experience a host of common problems and structural debilities. Even with high levels of external financial assistance, local economies are not likely to significantly reduce their reliance on the export of a narrow range of primary products and on selected types of service industries, mainly tourism for the Caribbean islands. Internal development will be to that extent retarded.

Sustained "export-led" economic growth and modernization in parts of Central America has already altered the social structures there. The peasantry has reached an advanced state of decomposition -- leaving in its wake landless laborers, an urban working class, a hypertrophic poor and widespread internal migration. In spite of unprecedented economic growth induced by "import substitution industrialization" and the operation of the

Central American common market (accompanied by a doubling of per capita income and a 5 percent annual GNP growth), the economic growth has not always been a force for stability. In response to rising sugar, coffee, and banana prices, the agricultural export sector has modernized. However, while the medieval landscape of Central America has recently acquired some of the appurtenances of the 20th century, not all sectors of society have seen improvements in their living standards.

In the early 1980s, regional economic growth has slowed to a standstill. Given falling monetary reserves, a rising external debt, and the existence of a now typical "price scissors" of the non-petroleum underdeveloped, this situation must inevitably decline still further. The dependent nature of Central American economies makes them highly subject to the influence of a stagnating world economy. A sluggish international economy coupled with high interest rates and protectionism in the advanced countries will accentuate the region's political instability. Economic constriction and political radicalization may well form a devastating spiral.

Continuing from these trend lines, these narrow economic sectors will in all probability be subject to severe demand and price fluctuations and changes in the economic futures of the industrialized countries, particularly those of Western Europe and the newly industrialized counties of Latin America (including Mexico), the Middle East, and the United States. Over the next two decades the Caribbean Basin's continued dependence on imports of processed foodstuffs and huge quantities of manufactured goods

will also present significant obstructions to the area's economic viability. Even those nations with a potential for an industrial base (Cuba, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic) presently have massive trade imbalances that must be financed by external assistance.

Trinidad and Tobago is a unique exception to this due to its oil and gas reserves, and is likely to remain so. Puerto Rico is another unique example due to its integration into the U.S. domestic market. But the Puerto Rican economy could in the future be perceived as an unacceptable social burden for the federal government of the United States.

The next few years will be crucial for Mexico, determining whether the country enters the 1990s as an "oil economy" or as "an economy with oil."

Mexico's major problems of today will endure: its population, its poverty, and its economic growth. Income distribution is now perhaps the most inequitable in all of Latin America, in spite of the high visibility of "revolutionary" sentiments. Almost half of the potential workforce is unemployed or underemployed, especially in urban areas. To cope with the need for new jobs to absorb a rapidly expanding population (expected to reach 120-130 million by the year 2000, at a 2.8 percent rate per annum), Mexico will continue to make real GNP growth its number one objective. Aside from inflation, this will most likely further drive up the foreign debt (already at about $60 billion) and will test the risk-taking limits of the international financial community. Objectively, unless the Mexican governments of the 1980s bite the economic bullet, the

competitiveness of the economy will probably decline, further complicating government efforts to develop a viable domestic industrial base and promote non-oil, manufactured exports.

As a worrisome long-term omen, these conditions have already created the prospect in the minds of Mexican economic planners of descent into a vicious circle of inflation and petroleum dependence. The threat of overdependence on petroleum certainly appears to be real in the early 1980s, with oil and gas accounting for about 65-70 percent of all exports. Some economists envision a future in which an overheated economy, already totally dependent on oil and gas exports, may confront the exhaustion of its hydrocarbon reserves by the turn of the century without having built up an industrial and agricultural base, and without having provided for alternative energy sources (coal would appear to be the only viable alternative). Under these circumstances, Mexico might enter the 1990s without having made a dent in either of its two major economic headaches: (1) employment or rather the prospect of surplus labor -- a need for about 700-900,000 new jobs a year, of which only 1/3 to 1/2 of that are actually being created, and (2) agricultural/rural stabilization as presently embodied in the so-called Mexican Food System.

Any downturn in the Mexican economy will intensify the flow of undocumented workers into the United States. This is an extremely touchy area of public policy for both countries. As employment opportunities remain limited, we can expect future high migration flows into the United States. As noted above,

there is no reason to believe that the socioeconomic conditions precipitating these flows will change dramatically between now and the end of the century.

The point cannot be overstated that the Caribbean Basin has an endemic historical pattern of external migration, partly rooted in labor migration. British West Indians were instrumental in building the Panama Canal. Between 1900 and the 1930s, an estimated 100,000 Jamaicans migrated to Cuba, Panama, and Central America. Some 45,000 came to the United States. While the United States has always attracted Caribbean migration, it has never done so in as great numbers as in the last two decades. Between 1900 and 1960, almost 500,000 migrants from the region entered the United States legally. By comparison, about 900,000 entered the United States from the Caribbean in the 1960-78 period. This was roughly 18 percent of the total number of immigrants into the U.S.

The Caribbean and Central American countries have an enormous stake in American immigration (and refugee) policy. Emigration looms large in the tenor of the region. For countries with severe economic pressures (Jamaica), for societies with unsettling political forces (Cuba), and for others with almost environmental destitution (Haiti), emigration to this country serves as an escape valve. With the exception of Cuba, this generally represents migration in search of economic opportunity. In the Cuban case, the political factor is added. Between April and September 1980, 125,262 Cubans came to the United States, and even the Cuban authorities estimated that another 375,000 wanted to come and may find a way.

The scale of recent immigration flows into the United States has speeded up an already complex regional debate -- one that is likely to bloom during the 1980s and early 1990s into a national concern. The issue will uneasily span domestic, and foreign and security policy areas, and may well be treated therefore as neither fish nor fowl, falling through artificial jurisdictional cracks in the policy process. Meanwhile, Florida will likely become increasingly "Caribbeanized", and the Los Angeles-San Diego corridor will likely be further "Mexicanized." Given the generally unchanging socioeconomic parameters of Caribbean Basin nations themselves, migration flows will continue through the end of the century and beyond. With the additional likelihood of political violence in the Central American area, episodic increases can be expected. Hardened U.S. attitudes on immigration limits -- an apparent likelihood -- inevitably will imply more extensive Coast Guard and border security capabilities. These immigrations flows could, of course, be halted, and even reversed, by an economic revival in Latin America and better employment possibilities in the source countries.

At present, the entire Caribbean region is heavily dependent on external assistance for both development and expanding budgetary support. Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Barbados, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala all have some potential for diversified economic growth to the point where external assistance could be drastically reduced. However, given current trends in these economies, there are no clearly defined

projections that dependence on external financing will in fact decrease in the foreseeable future. With the exception of oil-rich Trinidad and Tobago and perhaps Guatemala, the rest of the region will most likely remain aid recipients of some sort through the end of the century. As the demand for external assistance increases, it is likely that the number of political donors and actors in the Caribbean will increase as well. Aside from the obvious and unique Soviet bloc presence in Cuba and Nicaragua, and to a lesser degree Grenada, Mexico, and Venezuela, involvement in the Jamaican, lesser Eastern Caribbean, and Central American economies is already significant. Mexican participation in oil and gas in Belize will most likely increase. Partly for security reasons, Venezuelan participation in the Eastern Caribbean will further expand as will its participation in the Netherlands Antilles (most likely, independent states before the early 1990s). However, political and economic uncertainties in Mexico City and Caracas will constrain their search for regional economic linkages. To that degree, the United States will still remain the principal economic actor in the region in the foreseeable future.

The leadership of individual Caribbean island countries in the 1990s will be generally moderate in spite of major challenges by the left-wing. By Third World standards, there will remain a considerable degree of pragmatic policymaking dictated in great part by the continuing dependence on external sources of financing.

But in stark contrast, the Central American political order will most likely have opted for ideologies drawn from a wide

spectrum. Democratic institutions will not have had a particularly noteworthy record. The confrontations between Marxism-Leninism and quasidictatorial, conservative regimes will underwrite much political turmoil and violence, as it has since the late 1970s.

A new generation of leaders (of which Maurice Bishop of Grenada and Daniel Saaverda Ortega of Nicaragua are the prototypes) will have emerged during the 1980s. In contrast, more moderate regimes in Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago, the more conservative ones in Jamaica, and the almost reactionary Haitian government will have been maintained. Consolidation of those contrasting approaches to political control and economic management will most probably increase the polarization of Caribbean regimes. Strong personal rule will likely be the regime-model, with both an authoritarian left and an authoritarian right.

No doubt, the most important ideological contender in the Caribbean into the mid-1990s, and perhaps beyond, will be Fidel Castro's Marxist regime. With Castro dominating all major aspects of Cuban activity, the issue of political and personal succession will become a significant one. Born in the 1920s and 1930s, the Cuban leadership, while comparatively young and vigorous today, will begin to reach an age where physiological risks will translate into political uncertainties. Today's heir apparent, Raul Castro, simply does not have the leadership profile equal to the task of maintaining Cuba's domestic balance and international diplomacy. By the 1990s, the genuinely Marxist

and pro-Soviet wing of the leadership will probably have clashed several times with the regime's pragmatic wing over both domestic and foreign policy. To that extent, the denouement of post-Castro scenarios will depend immeasurably on the status of the superpower rivalry at the time, on Cuban involvement in that context, and on the progress of American efforts designed to improve economic, political, and social inequities in the region.

Uncertainties about regime-change in Cuba are ameliorated somewhat by the formalization of the revolution since the early 1970s. In 1972, there was a reorganization of governmental machinery at the top, with the establishment of the Executive Committee over which Castro has since presided. In 1976 a new constitution was adopted, decentralizing public administration if not actual political control. This is not to suggest, however, that regime-change in Cuba will be operative only within a "constitutional" context. Other factors will be important, too.

Domestic dissatisfaction with public administration, if not Fidelismo, may grow throughout the 1980s unless socioeconomic aspirations are met. The December 1981 domestic price rises, and their subsequent hasty rescision, are indications both of real difficulties faced by the Cuban economy and of the inability of the government to continuously satisfy public needs and perceptions. As the regime ages, other miscalculations are likely to arise in unpredictable ways, and these can shape the prospects of both current and future regimes.

Likewise, Castro's long-term future is dependent on his continued acceptance of the broad outlines of the Soviet vision of international dynamics and consequent policy thrusts. Castro

has resisted any explicitly subservient role, but at the same time the poor performance of the Cuban economy has made him even more dependent upon Moscow. The regime which exists now in Cuba, and will most likely endure well into the 1990s, is in its domestic configuration and international orientation anti-American and pro-Soviet. The degree to which that balance shifts, if only gradually, will be the by-product in part of unilateral advantages perceived by the Cuban leadership within the context of regional and global geostrategic opportunities.

For U.S.-Cuban relations, this could produce Cuban policies more moderate in tone and less injurious to vital American interests in the region and elsewhere. If such a thaw has not occurred during the 1980s, most likely due to Cuban rejections of unilateral American initiatives (though it could be the reverse), the death or passing from the scene of Fidel Castro could well precipitate a series of efforts toward a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement in the 1990s. But without regime-change it is difficult to imagine that such a rapprochement would take place (particularly in light of continued Soviet leverage over the Cuban economy) if it was not clearly known how such actions would be viewed by the Kremlin. Without Soviet consent, such a course would markedly strain Soviet-Cuban ties and perhaps diminish the international image of the Cuban regime. Under prevailing circumstances in the early 1980s, unless a direct military collision occurs with Washington over Caribbean/Central American interests or elsewhere -- leading to the destruction of Cuba -- actual change in the Cuban regime will probably only result from an essentially

undramatic transfer of power in the wake of Castro's death -- perhaps in the mid-1990s. And from this could evolve a transitional period of more pragmatic U.S.-Cuban interaction.

In the interim, the Cuban regime will to varying degrees remain an ideological inspiration and example for left-wing tendencies throughout the Caribbean (and Central America). There will be swings from social democracy to Marxism within the Jamaican People's National Party (PNP) once Michael Manley's influence fades. Almost by default, there will be into the early 1990s a continued radical tone to Guyanese and Surinamese politics. The institutionalization of the People's Revolutionary Government in Grenada, tied to Cuban and European socialist diplomacy and economic resources, will most likely gain momentum, also by default. A strong destabilizing left-wing presence will remain a constant force in the Eastern Caribbean. Finally, pro-independence subversive groups in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Puerto Rico will contain an unmistakable Marxist component and probably Cuban and also Middle Eastern terrorist links.

Finally, the Caribbean environment, and how it is perceived by the United States, will be greatly affected by leadership and ideological developments in Puerto Rico. At this juncture, neither of the two principal political forces on the island are inclined toward radical policies. But that very absence of ideological thrust could lay groundwork for the partial radicalization of Puerto Rican elites. Unable to gain entry into the Union, dissatisfied with the inability of the federal government in Washington to effectively take care of the island's socioeconomic problems, and encouraged by radical groups on the

outside, the Puerto Rican independence movement may ultimately gain momentum, reaching its climax after the year 2000.

The Central American subregion will continue to experience change as long-established social orders are reworked or replaced by the institutionalization of new power structures. Specific outcomes and timing will be the product of what will probably have been a decade of perennial violence in the 1980s. Thus, Central America to the end of the century can be viewed through a telescope with lenses colored by the events of yesterday's Nicaraguan revolution, today's Salvadorian upheaval, and perhaps tomorrow's Guatemalan war.

Until recently, despite Central America's rich history of internal conflict, the region had been geopolitically stable. That stability rested on the following pillars: a relatively immobile socioeconomic structure, authoritarian military governments monopolizing armed power, the allegiance of the Church, export dependency on the United States, and, in the last instance, recourse to U.S. power.

The crisis which built through the 1960s and 70s and erupted in the past several years will probably elude total resolution in the 1980s. While the multiplicity and complexity of its components make a straight-line projection of tendencies hazardous, one thing is clear: the status quo in Central America is gone forever.

The factors contributing to the conflict atmosphere are multiple and complex. They include the world economic crisis, a regional economic crisis, the crisis in local political and

ideological structures (the state, the military, the church), rising Central American nationalism, the entrance of new international actors to the region, the decline of American hegemony and last, but hardly least, the hegemonic ambitions of the Soviet Union and its Cuban client.

Undoubtedly, deep sociopolitical cleavages will continue to be the main cause of the pressures for system-change, most particularly in the countries of Central America's northern rim: Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Those on the southern end of the region will face less the results of revolutionary change as the pronounced pressures of severe economic difficulties -- particularly for Costa Rica and even Panama. While all countries in the region, including El Salvador and Nicaragua, have a fair chance by the late 1980s of stabilizing toward a relative equilibrium, their histories and the present situation give ample ground for doubt that reliance on revolutionary change to reach power will have ended.

There will likely emerge a spectrum of regimes whose ideological variety will for a while be without precedent in Central American history. In Nicaragua, a Cuban-oriented pro-Soviet regime will have consolidated itself, despite several attempts from the outside to overthrow the Sandinista government. The presence of the military, ruling in conjunction with the Party (the outcome of several purges of the Sandinista National Liberation Front) will have become a conspicuous and dominant feature of Nicaraguan life. Significantly, this political and ideological presence will have sought to impose its will over its neighbors. The most directly affected will have been Costa Rica

to the south, and Honduras to the north. In the interim, persistent efforts to dominate El Salvador with the backing of the Soviet bloc will have produced several conservative/moderate reactions followed by a series of counter-reactions from increasingly popular-based left wing/progressive political forces. But Nicaraguan and Cuban belligerence will have stiffened Guatemalan resistance, with some U.S. assistance, at least through much of the 1980s. But coupled with a strengthening of left-wing forces in El Salvador and increasing domestic friction in Mexico, a period of extensive violence will engulf Guatemala, along with Belize, and the southern border regions of Mexico. The major strategic significance of this upheaval will be the damage done to those three countries' producing oil fields, the ensuing danger to the security of U.S. energy supplies, and the implied but nonetheless real threat to U.S. territorial security.

Few developments could be more disastrous for the United States than a serious deterioration of Mexico's prosperity and ensuing stability. Yet, there is a distinct possibility that the significant changes Mexico will be undergoing in the 1980s in its economic sector, coupled with uncertainties in foreign policy, could lead to serious domestic political fissures by the end of the decade and into the early 1990s.

The governing revolutionary coalition (as organized within the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)) is a varied grouping of political actors and competing socioeconomic interests held together by an overarching consensus on political action,

behavior and broad socioeconomic policy. At present, the coalition has a record of proven ability to adapt to crises, co-opt elite and popular competition, and maintain an economic modernization program.

The central question over the coming decade will be whether the course of events will render the gap between myth and reality too wide to be sustained. One suspects that the Mexican political leadership will, indeed, have trouble in this regard. There will most likely be increasing confrontations between a conservative pragmatic tendency (probably led by the incoming Miguel de la Madrid administration, 1982-1988) and the more populist-nationalist perspective that could vie for control of the 1988-1994 presidency. This could lead to serious problems domestically and would imply important changes in Mexico through the end of the century.

Political threats to the regime could be considerably heightened by the aftershocks of radicalized Central American ideology. After all, the Mexican "revolutionary" environment may not be immune from outside contagion. Mexico's traditional support of radical governments has been a complex game aimed at disguising sociopolitical realities in Mexico and deflecting criticism of the Mexican system from the far left. But it is questionable whether this unique approach can be maintained through the 1980s and the early 1990s if potentially hostile political influences become strong throughout the Caribbean Basin.

If in response the Mexican system were to move to the right, an authoritarian regime of the Brazil variety could possibly

emerge in the 1990s. But this would imply a major upgrading and restructuring of the role of the armed forces in Mexican society. On the other hand, a move further to the left would likely usher in a turbulent period in U.S.-Mexican relations involving perhaps the nationalization of American investments, suspension of oil and gas exports, and worse, the fomenting of frictions within the United States' own hispanic social fabric. This last point has subtle but profound implications.

Today, there already is a nation within a nation in areas of Texas and the Southwest. Demographers predict that California will have a hispanic majority by 1990. Radical Chicano movements would find fertile ground among an unassimilated immigrant population. Attention could be directed both toward fomenting civil strife in the United States akin to that in Northern Ireland and toward radicalizing Chicanos and illegal immigrants returning to Mexico. The revitalized Mexican Communist Party, with Cuban ties, has recently already begun to engage in organizational activities, agitation and propaganda in towns along the Texas border.

The nature and magnitude of Cuban activity, with its Soviet backers and Caribbean Basin proxies, will be one measure of the security threat facing the United States through the early 1990s. But it is also true that security interests will be affected by indigenous social problems and profound economic strains. These two dimensions of the regional security problems will seriously test American contingency and defense planning.

Low-intensity conflict juxtaposed with violent flashpoints will continue to be the norm in the region. With often totally overmatched military forces, intense ideologically-inspired violence will harrass the remaining democratic political institutions as well as pro-American governments, most likely further diverting American attention and possibly resources. The stark reality is that through the end of the century these developments will force a reassessment of the United States' traditional "southern flank" strategy.

With propitious conditions for revolutionary activity in Central America, the Soviet Union will probably step up its efforts. Soviet presence and influence in the region, that of its allies, and that of vacillating "neutralist" regimes will almost certainly be greater in the late 1980s and early 1990s that it is today. What will be in question will be the character of that presence. As is already the case now, Eastern Bloc military facilities and related advisory and training roles anywhere in the Caribbean Basin will further complicate key U.S. security-related functions -- increasing the cost of American activities in Panama, Puerto Rico, Guantanamo; hampering the communications, tracking, and navigation facilities located throughout the region but most particularly in the Eastern Caribbean; endangering the security of the Panama Canal in any prolonged conventional conflict; threatening the movement of ships, weapons, and troops to Western Europe and the Middle East; and menacing the oil-production, transportation, lightering, and oil-refining capabilities of the entire Caribbean Basin area.

A cluster of radical regimes could provide the base to support insurgency, in the form of terrorism in Puerto Rico and other nonindependent societies, and in the form of guerrilla warfare throughout Central America, perhaps Panama and Mexico, and most likely in an increasingly unstable Colombia. If the Cuban and Nicaraguan examples serve as models, radical regimes associated with the Communist bloc will most likely build up their own conventional forces for internal control and external projection. Under these circumstances, the United States will probably be called upon for massive assistance to redress the balance, to do battle, or to co-opt the opposition. For American society, and its military forces, these will be excruciating choices and painful tasks. Perhaps the American people will have to accept a new definition of "winning" in military events which would countenance vague and ambiguous results short of a clear-cut victory.

Simultaneously, various forms of low intensity strife will appear -- civil unrest, terrorism, sabotage -- overlapping with the above forces of open conflict. This will be significant in French and U.S. held islands. There will be cases of "creeping" expropriations against U.S. interests and persons. There will also be friction and violence stemming from migration and refugee flows (possibly severe in the Mexican case; continuously dangerous for all of the Caribbean Basin as the ebb and flows of instability and poverty move across the region). This will directly affect American communities in the Florida-Gulf coast area, Texas and California, and major urban centers as New York City. There will be territorial and resource disputes driven by

nationalism rather than ideology, particularly in the Guianas, the former Dutch Antilles, and possibly Belize. Resolution of these less conventional conflicts in ways serving U.S. security interests will depend as much on the surgical application of U.S.-controlled or -inspired force as on diplomatic initiatives. Thus, to stem the ascendance of hostile governments, America and its allies must develop their capabilities for both quick-reaction diplomacy and military action. Whether they do or not, however, the Caribbean as locus both of conventional armed conflict and more diffuse low-intensity flash points, will remain a region of utmost strategic salience.

Caribbean conflict patterns will significantly be affected by disparities in local military capabilities. At present, Cuban air, sea, and land power outclasses any single or combined Caribbean and Central American force and now has the capability to strike parts of the eastern U.S. In sophistication, training, and numbers, Cuba's military preponderance has been and will continue to be countered principally by United States force projection capabilities, with declining British and French involvement, increased Venezuelan participation, overrated Mexican capabilities, localized Central American strength and -- possibly by the mid-1990s -- selective Brazilian presence. Material development and force capabilities of the lesser states of the region will evolve from political and security relationships established with outside powers. To that extent, serious Caribbean Basin conflict will probably involve advanced

weapons systems, with nuclear capability a long-shot possibility for one of the Soviet Union's client states.

Violence in Central America and in the Caribbean proper will, significantly, force a strengthening in the security postures of comparatively unmilitarized Commonwealth Caribbean societies. In conjunction with a perceived need for strong leadership in the face of socioeconomic difficulties, the increased regional political and ideological polarization will spark a small-scale upgrading of Jamaican, Eastern Caribbean, Guyanese, and Surinamese military force. The United States will be called upon to provide both material and financial support.

Finally, the role of the traditional regional powers will have affected and been affected in varying ways by politico-security developments. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the concerns of Caracas over violence in neighboring Colombia, confused radical politics in Guyana, and sabotage in the former Dutch Antilles will, on one hand, lead to increasingly conservative Venezuelan regimes and, on the other hand, will increase the military profile of that country within the Caribbean. Mexican capabilities will expand but their actual projection into the Caribbean will be very limited; first, because of more pressing concerns in Central America; and secondly, because of increasing friction between Mexico's civilian leadership and an increasingly influential military officer corps. Brazil's interests in the Caribbean will most likely evolve from increasing concerns over shipping through the Panama Canal and concerns over political instability, and growing Venezuelan influence in all three Guianas.

In contrast, French and British (and Dutch) presence will have been generally on the decline since the 1970s. By the 1990s, Britain will have escaped any security function for the defense of the Caribbean. This will have been a source of further friction within the NATO alliance, with U.S. analysts suggesting that their resupply capabilities in event of a war in Europe would be severely restricted without Allied support. British presence in Belize will have been reduced, thanks in part to a bilateral defense arrangement struck with the United States during the 1980s. American policy will have been influenced by concern over the protection of oil and gas fields in neighboring Mexico rather than by an increasingly unrealistic threat from Guatemala.

French presence in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guiana will come under extreme pressure from a violent radicalization of local politics. Paradoxically, any effective French policy will have been paralyzed by the contradictory thrusts of maintaining a political and cultural presence in its Caribbean possessions while attempting to support Third World progressive politics in Central America. Political instability in neighboring Dominica, and a revolutionary regime in St. Lucia in alliance with Grenada would add further fuel to the fires. Counterforces could likewise emerge with backing from conservative business groups in the Caribbean and some U.S. political support. Only the reappearance of a more conservative French government in the 1990s would arrest what could have become a serious political and economic hemorrhage. Such a new government would stabilize the

security situation and attempt to negotiate its way out, in a model resembling de Gaulle's action in Algeria in the early 1960s.

The foregoing analysis of socioeconomic and political pressures at work in Central America and the Caribbean Basin suggests that there is a real potential for at least low intensity conflict before the year 2000 among and within the middle tier states of Central America, i.e., Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Belize, and Guatemala. This could spill over into the oil fields of Southern Mexico. It is likely to be instigated by Nicaragua with direct Cuban and indirect Soviet support, and take the initial form of communist guerrilla activity and subversion directed against Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica. If the first phase is successful and radical regimes take over in Honduras and/or El Salvador, Guatemala could be squeezed between these countries and left-wing dissidents in Southern Mexico. This would threaten the Guatemala, Belize and Mexican oil fields. But even phase one would be intolerable to the United States because it would endanger our vital economic and political interests in Central America. If friendly host government forces should prove incapable of containing the insurgency, the intervention of U.S. or other OAS military forces would probably be requested.

As this paper was being drafted (October 1982), the Reagan administration had under study a joint Mexican-Venezuelan proposal to defuse Nicaraguan expansionism through more

forthcoming U.S./Nicaraguan negotiations at the policy level. The administration, however, will probably prefer to pursue ongoing talks with Nicaragua's neighbors to isolate Nicaragua politically and economically.

A second potential arena of violence in the Caribbean highlighted above is Puerto Rico. While this contingency is more remote, it would certainly involve U.S. forces and probably Army forces, from the outset.

South America

The South American continent has long made a significant, but often unrecognized, contribution to the world power position of the United States. Since the beginning of this century the area has been an important U.S. economic partner, a secure strategic bastion, and generally, a source of political support. These favorable circumstances to the south greatly facilitated American assumption of wide-ranging global responsibilities, particularly in the wake of World War II.

During this period, South America was largely isolated from the impact of global security trends and was not subject to substantial and continuing influence from exogenous powers hostile to the global position of the United States. Moreover, the area itself was comprised of generally weak, dependent and seemingly homogeneous nations having scant influence on world events. Although sometimes unstable domestically, their capabilities and conduct were certainly of no great concern to the United States. This comfortable state of affairs has allowed American foreign policymakers to ignore the area and take it more or less for granted.

During the past two decades, however, these circumstances have begun to change. Continuing socioeconomic development has steadily heightened the region's importance to the world economic system. At the same time, this process has transformed the actors to be found there, with significant consequences. In some cases, we have seen the disintegration of traditional power structures, leading to turmoil, instability and the prospect that

radical anti-American regimes may emerge. In other cases, we have witnessed the emergence of newly capable and confident international actors, increasingly bent upon playing their own role in regional and wider global affairs.

Meanwhile, the relative decline in the world (and hemispheric) power position of the United States, the rise of the Soviet Union to truly global superpower status, the emergence of the Third World, and heightened interdependence among the components of the international system have all served to increase the relative importance of the South American nations, particularly to the United States.

The 1980s and 1990s will witness a continuation of these trends within the region. During these years, two progressively clear-cut geopolitical zones will coalesce. In addition to Brazil in the Southern Cone, there will emerge a constellation of increasingly diverse and competent international actors engaged in balance of power competition among themselves and disporting considerably heightened influence beyond the confines of the continent. The Andean region, in contrast, will only gradually be emerging from the intense domestic sociopolitical contention which will characterize the forthcoming decade. These processes will be accompanied, and in many respects complicated, by an enhanced Soviet-Cuban involvement in the region as well as a growing role for other industrialized powers, particularly in the economic sphere.

As is characteristic of developing societies in general, and Latin American societies in particular, modernization and population growth will bring sharp social polarization in the

short run. Even in the longer term these societies are unlikely to approach the degrees of socioeconomic equality which have characterized the United States and Europe in the post-industrial period.

Rising expectations and premature urbanization will aggravate the impact of these developments. Conservative intransigence, the rising appeal of radical doctrines, and outside influence may accompany social polarization. These all will have important political implications. Generally, in Latin American societies, the process of social polarization will continue to force a political showdown between neoconservative interests and emerging radical forces. History indicates that if these societies have advanced to the point of possessing both a substantial middle class and a strong institutionalized military, the result is usually an authoritarian, neotraditionalist political structure and the continuation of organic socioeconomic development. The earlier the showdown comes in the development process, the greater the chances of civil war and a radical political victory.

By and large, the nations of the Southern Cone have already traversed this critical flash point. Their institutionalized militaries and their large and sophisticated middle classes militate strongly against radical political forces gaining power. These nations will evolve along their own lines, which if not precisely congruent with the precepts of North American democracy, will at least be largely compatible with the international interests of the United States.

In the Southern Cone, there are irridentist issues which could generate occasional smoke, if not fire. Argentina and Chile have a disputed maritime boundary and conflicting claims in Antarctica. There is border tension between Chile and Peru, and Bolivia wants access to the sea through Chile. Brazil, backed by South America's strongest military establishment, has pretensions toward the exercise of greater influence in the whole South Atlantic area. But what beat there is in these conflicting ambitions is merely nationalistic, not ideological. They are, after all, all military dictatorships with a common distaste for Soviet/Cuban shenanigans to their north (and for their own internal left wings), and they have lived with these issues for decades. There seems little likelihood that they resort to violence over the rest of this century. If they should, it is almost inconceivable that U.S. military support would be sought or granted.

In contrast to the nations of the Southern Cone, the majority of the Andean states will only be entering the critical socioeconomic development period during the 1980s. Social forces will thus predispose the Andean states heavily to domestic conflict. Under current international circumstances, potential domestic conflicts will attract the attention of external actors -- the Soviet Union, Cuba, their more powerful regional neighbors, and the United States.

Being far less developed and much weaker institutionally, the Andean states may experience far greater political difficulties during the forthcoming decades. Current experiments with liberal democracy will tend to be ground between the

millstones of conservative socioeconomic power and the military, on one hand, and mass-based aspirations tending toward radicalism and terrorism (also inviting external intervention), on the other. As a result, the 1990s may be characterized by growing instability in Peru and Ecuador, outright civil strife in Colombia and growing disaffection with democracy in Venezuela.

By the mid-1980s, the course of Colombia's political development could become a major item of concern to American foreign policy. The currently antique and corrupt sociopolitical system may stumble through elections in the 1980s but may soon thereafter begin to falter. As in other cases the tinder for this flashpoint is provided by unmet social aspirations in a developing society. The spark is provided by growing Cuban-Soviet attention to northern South America, which will occur in the context of heightened contention in the Caribbean and Central America by the mid-1980s. Colombia could provide a most fertile field for Soviet-Cuban efforts to widen the scope of regional conflict and to disperse American efforts to contain it. By the mid-1980s a serious insurgency could develop from Cuban subversive efforts already underway. The conflict will have many of the attributes of the El Salvador situation today and many of the aspects of the anomic violence which has traditionally characterized Colombian society. The possible descent of the nation into civil strife could result in a military coup and the demise of Colombia's antique democratic politics. This struggle could be bitter and of long duration, lasting into the early

1990s. It could only be brought under control if Soviet-Cuban interest in the conflict declines and with substantial assistance from the United States and the conservative powers of South America. The possibility of U.S. military intervention in such a conflict is small. The Colombian armed forces would presumably prevail over the long haul and U.S. intervention would probably play into the Soviet/Cuban hands.

Canada

In the 1990-2000 time frame, a Canadian government will likely find itself beset by more fundamental policy challenges than at any other time since World War II. Historically, Canada has faced four major policy problems:

- the prosperity and political health of Canadian industrial society: i.e., assuring economic prosperity, trade and commerce, equality of opportunity, and civil and political liberties;
- the Quebec problem and English-French relations in general;
- strains in the Canadian federal structure and federal-provincial relations;
- Canadian-American relations -- particularly the political, socioeconomic, and strategic implications of the separatist debate.

In the 1990s all four problems will plague Ottawa and three of them: economic prosperity, English-French relations, and federal/provincial relations will be particularly vexing, with major implications for U.S. domestic and foreign policy in general and U.S.-Canada relations in particular.

Among the internal and external dynamics and characteristics which will greatly influence Canadian policies in the coming decades are: (1) an enormous and relatively unexploited resource potential; (2) a strong nationalist sentiment that cuts across most domestic lines of division; (3) a general desire for greater independence from the U.S. (culturally, economically, politically, and to some extent strategically), and (4) at one

and the same time, a desire to retain all of the benefits of the U.S.-Canada relationship without making any sacrifices.

The changing nature and strength of Canada in North America, Canadian economic problems in the 1990s (high unemployment, inflation, a declining Canadian dollar, a weak manufacturing sector, poor balance of payments, declining productivity) combined with possible radical solutions to these problems, and the obvious impact of all this on U.S. political, economic and security interests will produce a heightened American awareness of our resource-rich northern neighbor. Economically, the U.S. will have to react to a probable rise of Canadian economic nationalism. Politically, the U.S. faces the prospects of a separatist debate that may presage the birth of two or perhaps three Canadian states (Anglo-Canada, Francophone-Canada, and perhaps an American-Canada). Consequently, Canadian political and socioeconomic developments will be of major consequence for U.S. strategic planning, both in terms of North American security and of Canada's changing role in NATO.

Both Canada and the U.S. will be seeking in the Eighties to address major economic challenges evidenced in high inflation, unemployment and the relative stagnation of productivity and real income, and depressed savings and investment.

In Canada, this will take the form of efforts to implement a comprehensive "industrial policy." One key element will be the National Energy Program (NEP), which will seek to shift traditional ground rules governing the future development of this sector. This tendency in Canada toward more radical economic

thinking will derive in part from, but also give more impetus to, a greater preoccupation with Canadian national interests. Thus, efforts of a Canadian government to "canadianize" its energy sector under the NEP will stiffen further the government's resolve to more stringently apply and extend the functions of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), in order to require more beneficial performance from foreign-owned firms in Canada.

This growing "radicalization" of policy in Canada, coupled with the development of an overall policy framework couched in terms of Canadian confederal and "national" interests, will constitute the stage on which Canadian-American relations will be played out in the 1990-2000 time frame.

In the 1990s, the struggle to decide the shape of the Canadian confederation will continue. Successive regimes in Ottawa will have little choice but to continue the showdown with the nation's highly independent provinces over energy and constitutional issues, seeking to halt the drift of power from Ottawa to provincial governments. While Washington may recognize the precariousness of Canada's federal union if the trend toward regional autonomy is not halted, it is clear that if Ottawa is successful, Canada's economic growth pattern, its industrial configuration, and its trade and investment relations with the United States might be profoundly remolded.

In the 1990-2000 time frame, the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States will be in another of its almost constant transition phases. Both nations will recognize that there must be accommodation to changes that reflect domestic as well as international trends and forces. The specific issues,

however, that will arise in this process of change will largely be the result of Canadian initiatives to redirect the bilateral relationship. Continually concerned with shaping an identity distinct from that of the United States, the Canadian Government in the 1990s will find it necessary to adopt some rather radical policies designed in great part to override natural and integrating regional market forces. At the same time, the Canadian Government will find itself in a position of having to devise domestic policies designed in part to counter disintegrating tendencies at the federal-provincial level.

During the Eighties, Americans will become increasingly disturbed by actions of the Canadian federal and provincial governments in the pursuit of independent economic, political, and cultural objectives. Canadians, on the other hand, will feel they have reason to be concerned about "foreign control" especially a growing American appetite for resources. Some of the outstanding issues in Canadian-American relations, fueled by Canadian nationalism, will cause alarm and suspicion, if not downright hostility, in certain American quarters. Indeed, if the two governments do not successfully grapple with a number of outstanding bilateral issues in the Eighties, then the 1990s may witness the development of a majority view in the U.S. that Canada is no longer a friendly ally, or even a friendly country that can be trusted.

Any consideration of Canadian-American relations in the 1990s must take note of a number of multilateral issues that will likely bring the North American countries to the bargaining table

but may also result in controversies among them. This in turn requires an appreciation of the larger context within which Canadians and Americans will develop their foreign policies in the 1990-2000 time frame.

The search in the 1990s for some modicum of East-West detente will depend primarily on the ability of the superpowers to define their interests, but its impact on other nations and on the solidarity of alliances may be profound. All allies of the United States, including Canada, will be subject to the vagaries of superpower contention. Canada, in particular, however, will be at once more secure and less secure, given its geographical contiguity with the U.S. and location between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Canadian approach to both deterrence and detente will attempt to steer some semblance of a sovereign course by interjecting its voice into the superpower councils and especially those of the United States.

The fundamental Canadian defense goal in the 1990s will be the protection of Canadian sovereignty against foreign incursions. This is of course the basic defense goal of any nation, but in Canada, given limited national resources, it may undercut any meaningful defense contribution to the Western alliance. Indeed, American defense officials in the 1990s are likely to grow increasingly concerned that Canada's vigilance concerning national sovereignty, which might be welcomed to the extent it ennanced North American defense, will come at the expense of Canada's other contributions to the alliance. Those contributions likely to received even less attention in the 1990s will include Canada's NATO inputs to the central region and

Europe's northern flank and its maritime role of shipping protection in the North Atlantic. It is also likely that little progress will have been made by the 1990s in re-equipping Canada's forces. If Canada's approach in the 1990s toward deterrence is likely to have an inward orientation rather than a greater European emphasis, Canada's approach to detente will be distinguished from that of the U.S. by her effort to use detente as a counterweight to U.S. influence. The political and military issues affecting Canadian security are largely external and to a considerable extent outside Canadian ability to influence. Canadian policy is best characterized by a persistent reduction to questionable levels of Canadian capabilities: 80,000 men and women in uniform, a defense budget in the early Eighties some two billion dollars below the amount allocated by the U.S. for its anti-submarine warfare program alone, and representing expenditures of $177 per head or 1.7 percent of Canadian GNP, second to last within the alliance after Luxembourg. In late October, 1982, the Canadian government announced a $230 million and in projected defense expenditure over the next three years. These numbers reinforce the view that world security trends are hardly a function of Canadian contributions.

The first aspect of Canada's marginal status that will become increasingly evident in the 1990s will be her increased security dependence vis-a-vis the U.S. and NATO. As far as Canada is concerned, the issues will stand out among many for their crucial impact on Canadian defense in the 1990-2000 time frame are: (1) the superpower nuclear balance, and (2) the

dilemma of Canada's position between U.S. defense interests and those of European NATO members.

Because of Canada's geographical vulnerability, it believes that it has a major stake in reducing the potential for war between the superpowers. In the 1990s, Canada can be expected to adopt a more critical attitude toward what it perceives as an American search for technological answers to security problems. In particular, Canadian officials will be concerned about American efforts to match Soviet "technical superiority" in ways that could bring important strategic turnabouts with impacts on Canada.

Although Canadian officials suggest that deployment of MX missiles in the western U.S. might actually reduce Canadian collateral damage in the event of a limited Soviet counterforce strike, it might also lower the nuclear threshold and make nuclear war more likely, and thus Canada ought to be concerned about the actual qualitative jump the U.S. may make in an effort to remedy its ICBM vulnerability. Canadians are already expressing concern that their country might be asked to participate in a reactivated ballistic missile defense if the ABM treaty is revoked or significantly modified. Canadian officials worry that the country might become an aspect of the "defense-in-depth" of North America and provide some attractive counterforce targets for the Soviet Union.

Shifting attitudes toward the U.S. role in the world will contribute to altered Canadian attitudes toward the bilateral relationship in the 1990s. The Canadian disposition will be toward more independence in foreign policy, and the shift in

emphasis toward economic issues will fix attention on areas where there is more conflict. In the 1990s there will be less confidence in both Ottawa and Washington that the benevolence of an ally or a priority accorded to the common interest will prevail over a perceived national interest.

The priority once accorded to the alliance was less in a continental than in an Atlantic context. However, in the 1990s, the broader transatlantic spirit could sour as appreciably as the North American partnership. If so, more of a bilateral partnership of sorts could be thrust upon North Americans by the exclusiveness of the West Europeans. Moreover, it would be wrong to suggest that Canadians as a whole might be inclined to abandon their reliance on North America as a bastion in a volatile world. NORAD was recently renewed, with little of the controversy that surrounded the issue in the 1950s. Unless and until overseas challenges look more menacing to Canadians, or the cost escalates dramatically, NORAD is likely to appear in the 1990s more like one of the many sensible structures for handling transborder problems than the political commitment to common causes at home and abroad that it represented a few decades ago. It may be all the more soundly based in the 1990s for being regarded as a practical mechanism and enduring convenience than as a gesture of solidarity dependent on shifting calculations of threat.

POSSIBLE FUTURES

The scenarios of violence that the Army must plan for in the Americas over the next 18 years are derived from 1) our assumptions, 2) our vital interests and 3) the likely course of politico-economic events in the region. All this has been covered above, but the salient points merit review here before we get into the scenarios themselves and a strategy to address them.

Our main <u>assumptions</u> are that:

- The U.S./U.S.S.R. global confrontation will continue
- U.S. political and military commitments will remain unchanged
- The U.S. will continue to rely on hemisphere raw material resources
- The Americas will continue to rely on U.S. development aid
- Global economic conditions will remain reasonably stable
- The military strength of our hemisphere allies will grow both qualitatively and quantitatively
- U.S. military strength will grow, but there will continue to be significant resource shortfalls, notably in trooplift assets
- The American public mood will be at least as receptive to an interventionist military strategy as it is today.

Our <u>vital interests</u> in the region are:

- The maintenance of all bases and other facilities in the region essential to the military defense of the

United States and its dependencies and to hemispnere security and stability

- o Assured U.S. military access to the airspace and waterways of the hemisphere
- o The containment of Soviet proxy forces

The main, and indeed the only, credible threat to the United States homeland is posed by the Soviet Union. A Soviet military attack on the American homeland would imply the beginning of World War III. It would probably take the form of preemptive nuclear strike across the North Pole and Canada and be accompanied by a concurrent attack, also nuclear, on NATO Europe. The ground force confrontation, if any, would come in Central Europe, not this hemisphere. This is thus for the Army a NATO contingency to be addressed in the NATO context and falls outside the parameters of an Army strategy for the Americas. In any event it is judged by this study to be the least likely form of East-West conflict in this century.

By the 1990s, South America will clearly be presenting the United States with two quite distinct sets of foreign policy problems. The traditional type of problems -- instability, terrorism, and the threat of left-wing, communist-supported takeovers - will continue, particularly along the northern tier of the continent. By the mid-1980s a deteriorating situation in this subregion will have emerged with the similarly volatile situation which already exists in Central America and the Caribbean. This will require Washington to perfect and

dramatically expand its approach to questions of regional security and nation-building within the Hemisphere.

With respect to the Southern Cone, on the other hand, the United States will be faced with an unprecedented prospect of having to learn to live with the existence of other consequential power contenders (particularly Brazil and Argentina) within the confines of the region. This will be a complex task requiring adjustments in the political, economic, and security realms. It will also mean coming to terms with states which, while basically compatible with American purposes, do not necessarily share U.S. interests or values. Long-term planning will be required to integrate these emergent states into an effective U.S. regional and wider international strategy. Serious problems should be anticipated in adjusting to their escalating demands and capabilities. On the other hand, there will also exist the prospect of harnessing these increased capabilities, at least in part, to the service of U.S. interests, both within the region and elsewhere in the international system.

For its part, shifting attitudes toward the U.S. role in the world will contribute to altering Canada's attitudes toward Washington in the 1990s. The Canadian disposition will be toward more independence in foreign policy, and the shift in emphasis toward economic issues will fix attention on areas where there is more conflict. In the 1990s, there will be less confidence in both Ottawa and Washington that the benevolence of an ally or a priority accorded to the common interest will prevail over a perceived national interest. None of this is to suggest, however, even the remotest chance of an armed conflict between

the United States and Canada. Our societies and leadership are too mature for that and the friction between us is picayune when set beside the common bonds and values we share. If there is any violence near our Canadian border, it will be on the Canadian side and be initiated by Quebec separatist extremists. It is unlikely to happen, and if it happens it is unlikely to be of great intensity or duration. U.S. property and lives might be at risk, but this would be a problem for the Canadian authorities to address.

That leaves us with Central America and the Caribbean Basin. This is by far the most likely zone of conflict in the Americas. Although historically a U.S. Marine Corps theater, contingencies could arise to which the right kind of Army force would be better equipped to respond. Such conflict situations are most probable in Central America, Colombia and Puerto Rico. Violence in these areas would almost certainly be Cuban-instigated and would threaten, directly or indirectly, vital U.S. interests. They would thus be part of the broader matrix of East-West confrontation.

Antarctica (outside the Americas, but within the scope of this paper) has long been a bone of contention because of its potential rich resources. The scramble for territorial allocations will heat up when the 1959 Antarctica Treaty expires later in this decade. Argentina, Brazil and Chile may all be in the competition, along with the U.S. Army conflict, however, will be at the diplomatic level. If force is projected to drive home a diplomatic point, it is not likely to be an Army force.

Specific Conflict Scenarios

- o Central America: Nicaragua, with covert Soviet/Cuban support, arms, trains and inserts teams of left-wing guerrillas of Costa Rican, Salvadoran and Honduran origin back into their home countries to attack foreign plantations and government outposts, interdict LOC's, and assassinate influential anti-communists. Host government forces, unable to defend everywhere all the time, withdraw gradually to the population centers. With the countryside undefended, the guerrillas proclaim provisional governments, invite in Nicaraguan or Cuban "volunteers" to help them cement the victory and (from Honduran and El Salvador) move up to the Guatemalan border to repeat the process. If the victims of this aggression are unable to contain it, they will almost certainly request OAS military support. U.S. Army units are likely to be part of any OAS force.

Conflict Probability Factor: 60 Percent

- o Colombia: A breakdown of Colombia's socioeconomic environment toward the end of the 1980s precipitates a deep political crisis. Colombian guerrilla forces, reinforced by rebelling Army units and Cuban advisors, launch an attack on Barranquilla, thereby threatening Venezuelan petroleum complex at Maracaibo. OAS or U.S. intervention on behalf of the Colombian government might not be requested or granted, depending upon

contemporary perceptions of the people in charge in Bogota, but a serious threat to Venezuelan oil would affect a vital U.S. interest. Insertion of a U.S. force along the Venezuela-Colombia border would thus be likely and the Army might well participate in it.

Conflict Probability Factor 60 percent

- Puerto Rico: Continued economic stagnation could strengthen the left-wing groups pushing for independence from the U.S. This could polarize the whole population on the issue of independence vs. statehood and bring violent confrontations. If these could not be contained by the police and national guard, Army reinforcement from the mainland would be likely.

Conflict Probability Factor 30 percent

STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

American Moods up to 2000

The "Moods" paper in this study suggests that the isolationist, or "introvert" phase in American public opinion with regard to U.S. involvement in external conflict hit its Nadir in the mid-1970s, and that by the late 1980s the majority of Americans will begin to show more appetite for an interventionist American military role in world affairs. It is concluded that the 1980 Reagan mandate for a stronger defense establishment was an aberration from the secular trend and will not long survive. Thus, the Army (and the other services) will probably not get in the 1980s all the funding for advanced weapons systems and manpower that it will need for the 1990s when the popular mood is expected to be more adventurist. On the other hand, the paper also points out that public enthusiasm for actual conflict, as opposed to the peaceful projection of power, tends to reach its peak only after the apex in the "mood curve" has passed -- in this cycle after the year 2000. It can be extrapolated from this that while Americans may be evincing in the 1990s a rising willingness to project power in the world and to use it to smother outbreaks of low-intensity violence, they will not be psychologically ready to risk a major war before the turn of the century.

This mood scenario is of critical importance because a decision to interject Army forces into a foreign conflict is based more on political than military considerations. The Army's mission is to take and hold ground. That implies a commitment of indefinite duration. It also implies casualties. It implies

action that can be videotaped and projected into every American home night after night. Such a commitment, however small the force involved, can only be made by the President of the United States, and ideally he would want Congressional support. Neither the Administration nor the Congress would wish to take such a step unless it felt that the American voter - and the American press - would understand and accept the need for it.

Army planners should recognize that the insertion of American ground troops into a conflict situation is close to the bottom of the Presidential option list, because it is political dynamite. Consider the alternatives from the White House perspective. In order of escalation they are:

1. Bilateral diplomatic pressure
2. Multilateral (OAS/UN) diplomatic pressure
3. Naval show of force (all potential conflict zones in the Americas are costal states)
4. Military support airlift
5. Deployment of military advisors
6. Naval overhead fire support
7. Air Force tactical support
8. USMC landing to evacuate American nationals
9. Army force deployment
10. Strategic bombing
11. Higher escalation

Obviously, the President will seek to smother the conflict, if possible, at the upper end of this list of alternatives. He would be reluctant to go beyond step 3 in the Americas without a

formal request from the beleaguered host government and without some semblance of support from the OAS and American public opinion. The only caveat is that step 8 would always be an American decision, and would rarely be criticized by the American public.

The American "mood", however, will inevitably be conditioned by perceptions of social justice. A security assistance-type operation to support a democratically elected government against Cuban-supported communist guerrillas is one thing. A similar operation in relief of a military dictatorship against an outraged majority of the populace, even if Cuban-supported, is something else again. The Presidential will presumably recognize this nuance.

There is another side to this coin. There may be times when the American mood will demand a military action, even when it has no host government or multinational mandate, and even when it is of dubious military feasibility. The abortive attempt to liberate the American hostages in Iran is a case in point. It is at lease arguable that President Carter gained as much politically from the attempt than he lost from its tragic failure. The point is that an Army deployment into a theater of violence will normally be more a product of American public opinion, as perceived at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, than of professional judgments reached in the Pentagon.

U.S. Interests: Will They Change?

U.S. interests in the Americas, as articulated earlier in this paper, are not changing - and will not change in this century - in their nature; but they are already assuming a new priority at the top political level of our government. The reasons for this are complex, but the trend seems clear and persistent. Ponder the following:

- The Atlantic Alliance is in trouble. Most Americans are coming to view NATO Europe, rightly or wrongly, as a self-centered, pacifist bloc, more interested in its material well-being than in defending itself against attack from the East. The nation that the front line of western defense against the U.S.S.R. lies in Germany is losing currency. There is a growing feeling that World War III may start, and perhaps end, with a Soviet nuclear strike on the United States itself
- More and more Americans are disaffected by the intractability of the Middle East conflict. Perceptions of Egyptian malleability and Israeli intransigence, coupled with Christian and Moslem savagery in Beirut, have blurred what seemed to be black and white into a uniform shade of grey
- Our Japanese friends are blamed for massive unemployment in Detroit, and our intriguing love affair with China has been cooled by recent rebuffs from Beijing

- o The inundation of immigrants from Latin America is a constant reminder that something is amiss to our south. The Falklands war has drawn our attention to the fact that numerous unresolved territorial disputes exist in the South Atlantic and Antartica, and that Argentina promises to continue destabilization efforts in the region.
- c Our national banking system is threatened by possible default from Mexico, Argentina and Brazil
- o Our widely publicized role in El Salvador has awakened us to the fact that Central America is inhabited by something more than bananas
- o The Caribbean has now become the number one foreign playground for American tourists
- o An increasing percentage of our imported energy is coming from (or via) Venezuela, Mexico and Canada
- o A large percentage of our narcotics imports are coming from Colombia

All these factors, and more, are drawing American popular attention to the "other Americans". Most of our citizens are aware that we have in Cuba an uncomfortable Soviet proxy gnawing at our entrails and a few are worried about Nicaragua. The NATO alliance is irrelevant to, and largely aloof from, these problems. They are hemispheric American problems, they are dangerous, and they require a pan-American solution.

Our vital interest in the bases, mobility and natural resources needed to assure a peaceful, stable, economically

viable, and mutually supportive western hemisphere remains unchanged, but its importance to the national security of the United States in the face of an altered and more subtle Soviet/Soviet-proxy threat will noticeably increase between now and the year 2000.

If resource restraints in the 1990s make it impossible to contain Soviet imperialism everywhere in the world, then we must allocate what we have on the basis of a schedule of priorities set by a national concensus. Proximity to the national heartland will be an inescapable criterion. By that measure, at least, it is important that the Caribbean become a mare nostrum, and that Canada be a full and willing partner in defense of the North American continent from air or missile attack over the pole.

For the Army planner, an ennanced attention to hemispheric defense will require not only some geographic refocusing, but also some adjustments in force mobility, force design, and doctrine and concepts, which will be put forward in the ensuing sections.

Probable Missions

The current U.S. military missions in the Americas, as defined by the JCS, are:

1. Preclude the establishment in Latin America of military bases hostile to U.S. interests
2. Maintain access to regional resources
3. Assure the security, availability and use of the Panama Canal
4. Avoid intra-regional hostilities
5. Provide for U.S. internal security

The Army carries an important share of the responsibility for Mission 3 and has primary responsibility for Mission 5. With the changes in force mobility, force design, and doctrine discussed later in this paper, the Army could also play a role in Missions 1, 2 and 4.

The Army's only major forces forward-based in Latin America are the 193rd Infantry Brigade and 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (about 3,500 troops) in the Panama area. This force can, however, be rapidly reinforced by USSOUTHCOM using custom-tailored and Panama-trained augmentation packages from CONUS. Howard AFB in Panama can accommodate any aircraft in the USAF inventory. There are also some 500 school troops in Puerto Rico working with local ARNG units and personnel.

The fact is however, that the great bulk of the 466,000 Army AD personnel in CONUS are earmarked and trained for contingencies outside the Americas, i.e., in NATO, Southwest Asia and Korea. These same troops are, of course, available for U.S. internal

security contingencies. The Army's Jungle Operations Training Center in Panama has a number of alumni still on active duty, but they are not all consolidated into coherent units with a jungle fighting capability.

With a 60 percent probability of at least low intensity, and possibly medium intensity, conflict in Central America and Colombia/Venezuela before the year 2000, it would appear prudent for JCS to reexamine the assignment of reaction responsibility for such contingencies as between the Army and USMC, to determine whether the type of fighting likely to emerge might not be more suitable for the Army. There are at least four premises on which such a reexamination might be based:

1. It is unlikely that the deployment of a U.S. force in a Central or South American contingency would require forcible entry. The force would be there on the invitation of the host government and would presumably arrive while there was still a secure seaport or airport for debarkation.
2. The host government service most heavily engaged would almost certainly be the Army. The U.S. Army will have participated in the training and equipping of that force and will be more familiar than the USMC with its doctrine and concepts. Combined operations will be easier.
3. Much of the combat may be remote from the coast, posing terrain and logistical problems which the Army is better equipped to overcome.

4. The U.S. role in the conflict may be more one of medical, logistical and overhead fire support and helicopter reconnaissance and trooplift than actual infantry engagement. Here again the Army is better equipped.

On the other hand, if the mission is a quick-light interjection to evacuate American nationals, a seaborne, airmobile USMC force might be more appropriate.

The existing Army force in Panama is probably adequate to discharge its counter sabotage mission. A serious insurgency in Puerto Rico, however, might leave our Army and ARNG elements there hard-pressed. Perhaps a CONUS-based Special Operations Force in the Key West area should be trained and earmarked for deployment in Puerto Rico if needed.

Manpower

Even if the JCS should assign greater responsibility to the Army for reaction to conflict contingencies in the Americas, it would not appear necessary to expand total AD strength for that purpose alone. It is unlikely that more than a reinforced infantry brigade would be needed in Central America or Colombia, and this could be drawn from CONUS-based RDJTF units. Only if the commitment gave evidence of being protracted in time, or if there was simultaneous conflict in Southwest Asia, would it appear prudent to reactivate AR personnel or National Guard units to maintain our ready-deterrent force level.

If the Army does get new missions in the Americas, however, it should address these with units specifically trained for operations in the Spanish-speaking tropics. This implies a heavy emphasis on small unit operations in combination with larger friendly forces, on jungle warfare against VC-type hit-and-run guerrillas, and on logistical support of both U.S. and allied forces. All officers and senior NCO's should receive intensive language and area training and be made aware of the social and political dynamics at work in likely combat zones. Every opportunity should be seized to bring them into contact with Latin American officers visiting CONUS for training. The enlisted ranks should include a generous sprinkling of native hispanic speakers.

Since these Special Operations units will probably be working closely with both the U.S. Navy and Air Force they should continue to be exposed to frequent joint maneuvers, particularly

with tactical air and riverine forces. They should also have a civic action capabilities with personnel specifically designated and trained for the purpose.

In this type of unconventional warfare, perimeter and LOC security assumes special importance. Training should thus focus on sophisticated surveillance, detection and demolition hardware and techniques, and indeed on all aspects of guerrilla warfare. Since the enemy will be Cuban-trained, a thorough familiarity at all ranks with Cuban tactics and concepts for irregular warfare will be a must.

Technological Considerations

The technology paper in this study offers little promise of significant breakthroughs before 2000 in Army hardware for tropical or irregular warfare. We therefore recommend that Army planners canvass friendly armies and police forces for potentially useful equipment and techniques. The UK, Israel, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong are the most likely prospects.

As far as future R&D is concerned, the rising importance of the Americas to our global national security strategy, and the propensity for conflict in the Caribbean basin, dictates that we continue to upgrade our tropical and counter-guerrilla warfare technology. This is needed not only for the Army itself, but also for allied and friendly armies in the hemisphere and in other parts of the world. Here are a few, rather dirident, suggestions for possible exploration:

- Something better and more mobile than Rome plows for the rapid clearance of fields of fire in jungle territory
- Airborne or satellite systems for detecting manpower concentrations at night
- Better river and swamp-crossing equipment for light vehicles, prererably something that can be organic at the battalion level
- Simple and cheap techniques for temporarily upgrading roads and trails

- o Better insect controls and repellents
- o Time-fused mortar shells that will penetrate light foliage on the way up without detonating
- o Light, airmobile off-the-road vehicles that can mount or tow substantial fire power.

Force Employment Characteristics

Development of sensible Army force employment characteristics is complicated by the lack of an overarching strategic concept force structure decisions made today will constrain Army force employment capabilities into the next century. Yet these decisions are not the product of coherent strategic planning; rather, they reflect the interactions of military plans, civilian policy goals and resource constraints.

The Army of the 1990s will evolve from the force structure and posture of the Army today. The pace of military development in the United States is not rapid; development of the Abrams tank spanned twenty-two years. This point about realistic rates of technological development is well made in other papers of this series. Therefore, what the Army looks like now will dominate what it can look like in the 1990s.

Around sixty percent of the current Army's fighting strength is concentrated in the brigades and divisions which form the strategic reserve. Since the Army of the 1990s must evolve from this force, it is important to recognize that these strategic reserve units have neither a clear mission nor a coherent force structure today. In fact, the Army's strategic reserve is a loose aggregation of active and reserve units in varying configurations and states of combat readiness. About one third of the active combat units are committed to Central Europe; another third are oriented mostly toward Central Europe and the remaining third try to look toward Asia and the Caribbean while maintaining some capability to deploy to Europe. Some reserve component combat units are also oriented toward Central Europe.

War in Europe has thus been the focus of the Army's structure, doctrinal development and employment capabilities for 36 years. The Vietnam experience is not held responsible for problems ranging from personnel turbulence to the gap in armored vehicle technology. Nevertheless, the NATO commitment has diverted the Army's energy from less serious but more likely conflicts outside Europe. The political, economic and strategic momentum of the NATO commitment has been so strong that around 75 to 80 percent of the Army is located in, or ready to move to Europe. Not surprisingly, doctrine, tactics, weapons development and training reflect this orientation. Only the budget has kept the majority of active and reserve components from completely organizing and equipping for high-intensity sustained combat against the Soviets in Europe.

While the U.S. Army has been focused on NATO, other demanding threats have begun to develop. Southwest Asia will, between now and the year 2000, require the Army to prepare to fight as part of a joint, air-land force. The quicker that force can respond, the smaller it need be. Given the North Korea military buildup closer to the DMZ, Northwest Asia can go from the extant armed truce to hot war in fairly short order. The demand in Korea is likely to be for a force which could raise the level of tactical violence to high intensity and sustain the South Koreans logistically.

In Central America and the Caribbean, on the other hand, there could be a need for a wide spectrum of military capabilities. Cuban ground force intervention in the region

could trigger a quick-light deployment or may require combat at a fairly high level of intensity. Short of such intervention, internal defense and training requirements could be as large as the early years of the Vietnam conflict. Such a force will need the following characteristics:

- o It must be strategically mobile to a degree approaching that of the airborne division, and capable of being supplemented and sustained by available sealift
- o It must be tactically mobile to a degree approaching that of the Air Assault division
- o It must be able to survive on a battlefield whose lethality will approach that of the European battlefield
- o The force and its supporting echelons must be acclimatized to the physical, political and cultural environment of Latin America. The Strategic and tactical intelligence systems must be in place and must contribute to they year-in, year-out training and orientation of the force
- o The force must contain the units and equipment to make precise applications of military force, from interposition to confrontation to full-scale combat operations
- o The supporting echelons should include logistical elements capable not only of sustaining the U.S. Army force itself but also of contributing to the resupply

of host government forces, whose inventory base and distributive assets are unlikely to stand up to the demands of a lengthy conflict of medium intensity

- The organic and supporting administrative and logistics requirement must be geared to realistic levels of sustainability by programmed lift.

The crux of the problem in the Americas is the role the Cubans might play. If they have their own units in the conflict in some strength, then we may need upwards of a brigade with heavy and sophisticated fire power and both naval and air support. We are talking here about a joint expeditionary force. On the other hand, if the foe consists merely of Cuban proxy irregular forces and terrorists, a smaller and lighter force with plenty of airmobility would probably suffice. It would, in effect, be a security assistance force for low intensity conflict. An AD division earmarked for reactive missions in Latin America must thus be a very flexible force indeed.

Mobility

The trooplift requirement for an Army expeditionary force in Central America or Colombia will be substantial. The direct air distance from Miami to Honduras is about 1,000 miles; to Colombia about 1,500. But to avoid overflying Cuba another 500 must be added to each segment. Sealift would take about 2-1/2 and 4 days respectively. Organic airmobility assets could presumably reach both conflict areas under their own power, particularly if Jamaica were available for refuelling. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands might serve this purpose for Colombia but are more remote than Miami from Central America. If Air Assault Division units are used, they could be airlifted to a friendly airport by CRAF and reload there onto UHGO or AH equipment flown down empty from CONUS.

Once on the ground, the force would have a heavy and compelling need for both helicopters and surface transport. Ground LOC's particularly in Central America, are limited and easily interdicted. The host governments mobility assets will already be hard-pressed, though civilian trucks could be commandeered for rear-echelon movements of material. There are enough navigable rivers in Colombia, Honduras and Nicargua (plus a large lake in Nicaragua) to suggest the utility of riverine forces. The Honduras/Nicaragua border is a substantial river-canal system that is navigable by small craft from coast to coast.

Since there are abundant small airstrips in all these countries, it may be feasible to use suitable fixed-wing

aircraft for some troop and material movements. Since the C-130 could not be used on small, unpaved airstrips, the Army and USAF should be looking at other aircraft, such as the Heron or Caribou, which could bring in smaller loads. The perimeter security of these facilities, however, will consume manpower.

Prepositioning of mobility assets in potential conflict zones is not considered a viable, or cost-effective option, as discussed later in this paper. But it might be prudent to discuss with friendly host governments the desirability of stand-by truck, ship, and aircraft mobilization plans. This could contribute substantially to force mobility, at least for movements of material.

If ground conflict should develop in the north or south polar regions, an extremely complex and unique set of mobility requirements would emerge. Such conflict is considered highly unlikely in the 1990s, but it is worthy of contingency planning. Our north slope oil complexes in Alaska are, for example, vulnerable to a Soviet demolition strike from Siberia in the event of a conventional World War III; and any scientific or extractive projects we may pursue in Antarctica would also be vulnerable in that contingency. If direct conflict with the U.S.S.R. should assume a high probability, we may need to move Army deterrent forces rapidly into both regions.

Mobility concepts are also discussed below under Army Doctrine.

Overflight and other air movement rights are not a problem in Latin America. All likely conflict zones are readily reachable over international waters, and the country of destination will almost certainly be an ally who has requested our forward deployment. Cuba lies directly athwart the shortest air and sea routes to the likely conflict theaters, but must simply be by-passed. It is difficult to visualize any combat contingency in the region for which interusion into Cuban airspace would be either authorized or prudent.

With regard to forward basing in the Caribbean basin, the Senate Committee Foreign Relations report on United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations (April 1979) probably says it best:

> "Given the absence of a significant outside threat or a substantial Soviet military presence in the region, the United States has not seen the need for countervailing military power. It has not dedicated specific U.S. forces of any magnitude for the defense of its southern flank and has not undertaken major forward defense deployments in the region. With the exception of the few military installations remaining in the Caribbean, the United States has judged military bases to be essentially irrelevant, and most likely inimical, to U.S. security interests in Latin America."

We see no reason to quarrel with that judgment. Any troops used in a Caribbean basin or Central American contingency will

probably be earmarked also for Western Europe or Southwest Asia and should be based in CONUS. Given the uncertainty over the size and nature of the force needed, to say nothing of its precise destination, forward basing would create more problems than it would solve. It would, however, make sense for our Caribbean reaction force, if any, to be based in coastal South Florida, Alabama, Louisiana or Texas to shorten distances, facilitate acclimatization, and permit training in an appropriate environment.

Prepositioning

In light of some of the same factors which militate against forward basing, prepositioning in the Caribbean basin does not appear to be a viable or cost-effective option. Prepositioning in the likely combat theaters themselves would be politically provocative and simply provide a target for pilferage or sabotage. Some equipment would quickly deteriorate in a tropical, maritime climate. The units concerned may already have other equipment prepositioned in Europe or Southwest Asia. The distance from CONUS is not great, and it will be important that any reaction force be inserted at the right time, in the right place, and with the right equipment. Prepositioning at an interim point, such as Guantanamo or Jamaica, would not result in significant air or sealift savings.

Force Design

Forces earmarked for Latin American contingencies should be flexible enough in design to deploy either as small, independent units in a low intensity irregular conflict situation or in brigade or division strength as an expeditionary force against a similarly configured enemy. In most situations they will need an overhead fire capability, plenty of mobility and air reconnaissance and possibly naval and/or tactical air fire support. They will need a strong logistical component for their own and host government force resupply. The most sophisticated enemy detection and surveillance equipment available would be a big plus.

It is not anticipated than any supra-conventional (e.g. BW/CW or BNW) capability would be needed. The most formidable likely foe would be Cuban regulars for whom vertical escalation, even if they had the capability, would quickly prove counter-productive.

Sophisticated C^3I will clearly be needed for U.S. units operating in the Caribbean basin or Central American environment. The American force is unlikely to surpass the division level and will probably be much smaller, but if it functions under NCA micro-management it will need sophisticated command and control facilities.

The main challenge will be effective coordination with friendly host government forces of rudimentary sophistication. For this a few competent Spanish-speaking officers with the right local experience and political awareness will be essential.

Army Doctrine

The Doctrine paper in this study emphasized the imperative need for Army flexibility to respond to a wide spectrum of conflicts under severe environmental and battlefield conditions and against a wide variety of threat from terrorism upward.

These strictures clearly apply in the Americas. The conflict threatening this region in the 1990s should not escalate to the supra-conventional level in this century but it could certainly encompass both conventional and unconventional warfare. The key distinction between the two lies in the type of opposing force and the nature of the tactics necessary to effectively counter that threat. In conventional war, the emphasis lies on formally organized, military forces composed of heavily-equipped and professionally trained units. The destruction or neutralization of these forces causes the enemy to concede certain political objectives as a means of restoring peace. Unconventional war is more political in nature, and is conducted against well, but informally, organized insurgent forces within a particular socio-economic environment. In this instance defeat of the enemy is based not so much on their destruction but on denying them the access to the population and removing their means of defeating the lawfully constituted governments of an allied nation. In the Caribbean basin, the definition of victory is likely to be the enemy's abandonment of military force as an option, rather than his decisive defeat on the battlefield.

While this implies an emphasis on static defense combined with substantial deterring firepower, it does not follow that

warfare in the Americas will be devoid of maneuver. On the contrary, the mission of defending not only fixed infrastructure facilities but also the population at large from enemy political exploitation and military harassment will require an extraordinarily high measure of mobility. Irregular warfare in Central America, for example, could, if we are not careful, be very reminiscent of Vietnam, with host government and U.S. forces thinly spread to defend everywhere while the enemy is left free to attack anywhere.

This fatal, no-win pattern must be assiduously avoided, at least by the American force. If an essentially defensive posture is imposed on us either by political considerations or by resource limitations, we must keep ourselves disengaged in a secure base for quick-light airmobile reaction strikes wherever the enemy commits himself. Host government forces probably will not have that capability.

If the balance of forces permits a more active posture, the U.S. force should concentrate on search and destroy missions against enemy base areas, with a maximum use of surprise and firepower. If the enemy is foolhardy enough to concentrate his forces, he should be appropriately punished.

Either way, the U.S. force will used abundant air and surface mobility and the most sophisticated detection and surveillance equipment available. Either way, organized cooperation with friendly elements in the local population will be highly important.

While recognizing the limited tactical lift resources available to American forces, and the distances and environmental

obstacles which confront them, it is important that commanders at the operational level recognize that mobility is more affected by the manner in which troops are organized and employed than by the technological and geographical constraints imposed upon them. In other words, mobility is a means to an end, and many units can be configured literally to go anywhere either quickly or slowly. Mobility represents only one of several factors which must be considered in calculations of force employment. It can be achieved at the tactical level through the appropriate use of vehicles for both combat and support activities, through the intelligent use of terrain (to block the enemy, but not as an anchor to which friendly forces are inevitably tied), by maintaining equipment and supplies in an uploaded state, and by focusing forces to achieve defined military and political objectives which are limited in scope. Mobility assets often cause difficulties or imply costs of their own. For example, armored vehicles, while enhancing mobility in some environments, in fact reduce it in others. The bottom line is simply that mobility is critical to maneuverability, and commanders must possess the ability to achieve it in all situations in order to enhance combat power. While mobility assets husband certain resources (such as troop energy and rest) they are often wasteful of others (such as MOGAS, JP-4 and other POL)

To understand the total environment, the enemy, his objectives and capabilities, specialists trained and sensitized to the political dimensions of limited war must exist or be created within the Army. They are more than counter-terrorists,

and uncoventional warrare operators; rather, they are area experts and linguists capabile not only of identifying and exploiting enemy weaknesses through psychological operations and detailed intelligence collection, but who are also adept at civic action and other means of winning popular support, recruiting allies, and procuring host nation support. While special units are necessary, these skills must be present at all levels of planning and force structure, to develop appropriate plans and design forces adequate but not excessive to mission requirements.

The Army cannot plan to use or depend on surrogates, as it appears the Soviets have been doing. But it must possess the capability to exploit such opportunities where and when they are presented, either through security assistance, combined operations or coalition warfare, with a minimal amount of delay and friction. The Army needs to be able to fight alone, if necessary, or cooperate in combat with virtually any potential source or assistance that furthers mission accomplishment. These are assets which are not created overnight. Like other "modern weapons" they have long lead times, require research and development, and demand sophisticated, constant maintenance.

The foregoing doctrinal principles, while valid in any Third World environment, are particularly applicable to Latin America.

Role of Force in the Americas

The likelihood of violence in parts of the Americas during the next two decades is high. Most of it will be inspired, or at least abetted, by the Soviets and Cubans. Where that is the case, the real target will be the United States itself. The purpose will be to deprive us of allies, deny us access to vital raw materials, and threaten our vital logistical facilities, particularly the Panama Canal.

It it does not necessarily follow that every hostile action against us or our allies in the region will justify an American military response. An ill-conceived or inappropriate response could be far more damaging than beneficial to our longer term interests.

There is not a single Latin American country that does not harbor some measure of jealousy and suspicion against the United States. We are seen universally south of the Rio Grande (and to some extent north of the 47th parallel) as a self-seeking, condescending, uncaring, and often inept colossus, and as a constant threat to the national pride and self-determination of our hemisphere partners. Many Latin Americans long for relief from oppressive right wing regimes, applaud Cuban tweaking of the yankee proboscis, and consider us the main champion of social injustice in the hemisphere. Most Latin American (and many Canadian) politicians consider anti-Americanism to be the most useful arrow in their quiver. Even when they might tacitly approve of an American police action against communist

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

subversion, they will publicly deplore it as a manifestation of gringo imperialism.

We are thus damned if we do and damned if we don't; and we must pick the causes we militarily espouse in Latin America with exquisite care. Fortunately for the Army, such no-win decisions are necessarily made in the White House, but they will be based in part on JCS assessments of military feasibility. As we have emphasized earlier in this paper, the interjection of ground troops into a hemispnere conflict will be near the bottom of the Presidential "druther lost", but a situation may force us either to act or sufrer a compromise of important national interests. If the Army has the right kind of force ready to move, it will be one of the viable options.

If whatever we do is wrong anyway, then we must seek to do it with economy of force, surgical efficiency, and breathtaking speed. The faster we can get in and out and smother the conflict with minimum civilian casualties and property damage, the better it will be tolerated by all. If the Army plans for prolonged conflict, that is probably what it will get. And if it overrates its capabilities for a quick victory, the nation and the West will pay the price. If we get bogged down we lose, if not on the battlefield then in the media. That would strengthen the Cuban case, damage our global reputation, detract from the credibility of our global deterrent posture, and make the planet a more dangerous place.

CONCLUSIONS

- The United States has a vital interest in maintaining its free access to Western Hemisphere air and sea space and essential strategic resources.
- The Soviet Union, working primarily through Cuba and Cuban-supported proxy forces, constitutes a growing threat to those vital interests.
- The most likely arenas of low to medium intensity conflict in the region up to the year 2000 are in Central America, Colombia/Venezuela, and possibly Puerto Rico.
- Vertical escalation of this conflict beyond the conventional level is unlikely.
- The Army's mission in the hemisphere, though presently focused on U.S. and Panama Canal security, could logically be broadened to include peacekeeping.
- The Army has well-trained and reasonably well-designed and equipped forces in Panama and CONUS for such a peacekeeping role, but there appears to be no broader national strategy to define that role in addressing likely conflict scenarios or the Soviet/Cuban strategy in the Americas.

STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR THE ARMY

The Army should:

- Seek from the Commander-in-Chief and JCS, a renewed definition of the Army's role and mission in the Americas in the context of a global national strategy to counter an ennanced Soviet threat to the peace, stability and political orientation of this hemispnere, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America.
- If an Army peacekeeping role is assigned, designate, design, equip and train a suitable force - probably an adaptation of the Air Assault Division - to fulfill it in joint operation with the other services under USSOUTHCOM.
- Develop a doctrine for the rapid deployment of small, self-contained units to meet a broad spectrum of low to medium intensity conflict contingencies in a supporting assistance role in cooperation with Spanish-speaking host governments.
- Explore new concepts of airlift and ground mobility in harsh climatic conditions over rough jungle and mountainous terrain.
- Explore troop support systems and concepts that will foster small unit survivability on remote battlefields over extended periods of time.
- Concentrate in training programs on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations against irregular forces.

- Continue, and if feasible expand, the supply of appropriate equipment and training to friendly host governments, particularly in the Caribbean/Central America region.
- Develop a cadre of officers at all levels specialized in the language, politics, social values and terrain of the region, and assign them to functions where they can constantly up-date and up-grade those skills.
- In cooperation with USAF, seek to develop contingency access to friendly bases in and around the Caribbean for use as forward staging areas in the event of an emergency.
- Focus intelligence assets on incipient conflict situations which could lead to an army involvement.

NOTES

1. International Affairs 2 (Moscow, 1967): 67.

2. For discussions of Soviet strategy in Latin America, see Leon Goure and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration of Latin America (University of Miami, 1975); James D. Theberge, The Soviet Presence in Latin America (New York: Crane and Russak, 1974); Robert Moss, "Soviet Ambitions in Latin America," in The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World, ed. Patrick Wall (London: Stacey International, 1977); W. Raymond Duncan, "Moscow and Latin America: Objectives, Constraints and Implications," in Soviet Policy in the Third World, ed. W. R. Duncan (Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 262-291.

3. cf. Margaret Daly Hayes, "United States Security Interests in Central America in a Global Perspective," paper presented to the workshop of "International Aspects of the Crisis in Central America," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., April 2-3, 1981, p. 11.

4. Richard Sims and James Andersen, "The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum," Conflict Studies 121 (August 1980): 3.

5. James D. Theberge, Russia in the Caribbean (CSIS, Georgetown University, 1979), p. 80.

6. Mickey Edwards, "Soviet Expansion and Control of the Sea Lanes," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1980.

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8. Air Force Magazine (December 1979): 118; The Christian Science Monitor, October 11, 1979, p. 9; David C. Jordan, "The Turbulent Caribbean," Stategic Review (Fall 1980): 42; Baltimore Sun, August 4, 1981, p. 4.

9. Radio Paris, January 21, 1981, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, January 21, 1981.

10. Diario Las Americas, "2 Helicopteros Prestara Rusia a Nicaragua," April 25, 1981, p. 6; Diario Las Americas, "Asesores Sovieticos Adiestran a Sandinistas en Helicopteros," June 6, 1981, p. 6; Ronald Richards, "Soviets 'hinted' copter training in Nicaragua," Providence Journal, June 9, 1981, p. 1.

11. Managua Radio, March 27, 1981 (FBIS Latin America, March 30, 1981) as cited in Jiri Valenta, "The USSR, Cuba and the Crisis in Central America," Orbis (Fall 1981).

12. "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in the Hemispnere," a research paper presented to the Subcommittee on Western Hemispnere Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by the Department of State, Washington, D.C., December 14, 1981.

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