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1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV


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
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FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIVISION



HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION
1941-1945
VOLUME SIX
RESULTS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

by

V.N. Andrianov, Z.A. Bogatyr', et al



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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 1941-1945. VOLUME SIX. RESULTS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

By: V.N. Andrianov, Z.A. Bogatyr', et al

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U. S. BOARD ON GEOGRAPHIC NAMES TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM

Block	Italic	Transliteration	Block	Italic	Transliteration
А а	<i>А а</i>	A, a	Р р	<i>Р р</i>	R, r
Б б	<i>Б б</i>	B, b	С с	<i>С с</i>	S, s
В в	<i>В в</i>	V, v	Т т	<i>Т т</i>	T, t
Г г	<i>Г г</i>	G, g	У у	<i>У у</i>	U, u
Д д	<i>Д д</i>	D, d	Ф ф	<i>Ф ф</i>	F, f
Е е	<i>Е е</i>	Ye, ye; E, e*	Х х	<i>Х х</i>	Kh, kh
Ж ж	<i>Ж ж</i>	Zh, zh	Ц ц	<i>Ц ц</i>	Ts, ts
З з	<i>З з</i>	Z, z	Ч ч	<i>Ч ч</i>	Ch, ch
И и	<i>И и</i>	I, i	Ш ш	<i>Ш ш</i>	Sh, sh
Й й	<i>Й й</i>	Y, y	Щ щ	<i>Щ щ</i>	Shch, shch
К к	<i>К к</i>	K, k	Ъ ъ	<i>Ъ ъ</i>	"
Л л	<i>Л л</i>	L, l	Ы ы	<i>Ы ы</i>	Y, y
М м	<i>М м</i>	M, m	Ь ь	<i>Ь ь</i>	'
Н н	<i>Н н</i>	N, n	Э э	<i>Э э</i>	E, e
О о	<i>О о</i>	O, o	Ю ю	<i>Ю ю</i>	Yu, yu
П п	<i>П п</i>	P, p	Я я	<i>Я я</i>	Ya, ya

*ye initially, after vowels, and after ь, ь; e elsewhere.
When written as ë in Russian, transliterate as yë or ë.

RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH TRIGONOMETRIC FUNCTIONS

Russian	English	Russian	English	Russian	English
sin	sin	sh	sinh	arc sh	sinh ⁻¹
cos	cos	ch	cosh	arc ch	cosh ⁻¹
tg	tan	th	tanh	arc th	tanh ⁻¹
ctg	cot	cth	coth	arc cth	coth ⁻¹
sec	sec	sch	sech	arc sch	sech ⁻¹
cosec	csc	csch	csch	arc csch	csch ⁻¹

Russian English

rot curl
lg log

GRAPHICS DISCLAIMER

All figures, graphics, tables, equations, etc. merged into this translation were extracted from the best quality copy available.

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PAGE 1

History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945.

Volume Six.

Results of the Great Patriotic War.

Page 4.

The collective of writers: V. N. Andrianov, Z. A. Bogatyr', Ye. Yu. Bogush, V. A. Vasilenko, V. V. Voronin [deceased], G. F. Zastavenko, S. N. Kozlov, B. P. Kravtsov, S. M. Krylov, V. M. Kulakov, M. Ya. Raskat, V. P. Seregin, M. D. Skurikhin, G. M. Sorokin, V. M. Khvostov, Ye. S. Chalik.

Особенно суровой проверке
подвергся советский строй в годы
Великой Отечественной войны —
самой тяжелой из всех войн, какие
когда-либо знала история. Победа
советского народа в этой войне
подтвердила, что в мире нет сил,
которые могли бы остановить
поступательное развитие социа-
листического общества.

Из Программы КПСС

"The Soviet regime was put to an especially rigorous test during the years of the Great Patriotic War - the gravest war ever known in history. The victory of the Soviet people in this war proved that there was no force in the world which could stop the forward march of the socialist society."

From a CPSU Program



THE SOVIET UNION'S VICTORY IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR.

Page 7.

Chapter One.

GREAT HISTORICAL VICTORY OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

1. World-wide historical significance of victorious outcome of Great Patriotic War.

1945 for the peoples of terrestrial globe became unforgettable: it returned by it the long-awaited world, strengthened their faith/belief in the celebration of democracy and socialism. During May 1945 ended the war in Europe, while during September - the Second World War as a whole. Heavy, bloody struggle with the strong and dangerous enemy of humanity - by German fascism and its ally in the east - by Japanese imperialism was completed by the victory of peaceful forces. The peoples obtained the possibility to return to the creative labor/work. And let this labor/work it was necessary to begin on the worried to death, covered with wounds earth/ground - people were inexpressible happy from the consciousness of the fact that their hands and brain will again build, create, create.

The whole world survived during those unforgettable days this

grandiose victory. And the looks of all humanity turned, first of all, to the Soviet people - people- hero, the hero-nation, a people-liberator. These are it, our people, and their armed forces completed under the leadership of the Communist Party feat unprecedented in the history, after gaining with the assistance of the peoples of other countries the victory over Hitler Germany and its vassals. The Soviet Union demolished, furthermore, the main striking power of Japanese imperialism - Kwantung army, after playing thereby the decisive role in the final rout of militarist Japan.

The course of world events placed our socialist native land prior to the exclusively difficult testing. The Second World War, generated by the monstrous system of imperialism, on its scope and stress/voltage, on the concentration of forces and technical equipment of struggle, on those colossal victims and destruction which it imply, it did not know to itself the similar within entire lifetime of class society. It lasted six long years and drew in its orbit almost all countries of terrestrial globe.

Page 8.

Is interesting the comparison of some data on the first and Second World War. In 1914-1918 the war flowed/occurred/lasted in essence on the European continent, while in 1939-1945 it encompassed

three continents - Europe, Asia and Africa. The arena of direct military engagements became the territory of 40 states, while in the First World War military activities occurred in the territory of 14 states. The total number of countries - the participants of the Second World War is calculated by an even greater number. Thus, if in 1914-1918 fought 36 states with the population of 1050 mln. people, then in 1939-1945 the belligerent states it was counted by 61 and lived in them 1700 mln. people, i.e., it is more than 75 percent of all population of the earth/ground. In the fields of battles acted multimillion-man armies. In the First World War by the armed forces it was mobilized to 70 mln. people, and the secondly - 110 million.

The Second World War caused the enormous stress/voltage of the material resources of the belligerent states, subordinated to its needs their economy. In 1914-1918 by the USA, England, France, Italy, Germany and Russia, together undertaken, produced 190 thousand aircraft, 9.2 thousand tanks, about 140 thousand artillery guns, 838 thousand machine guns even 33100 thousand rifles ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See world war in the numbers. M. 1., Gosvoyenizdat, 1934, p 33. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, in the second world war four main belligerent states - Germany, USA, England and USSR - produced military technology many

times more, namely: 652.7 thousand aircraft, 286.7 thousand tanks, are more than 1 mln. artillery guns, more than 4.8 mln. machine guns (without Germany), 53 mln. rifles, carbines and submachine guns ².

FOOTNOTE ². See A. Lagovskiy. Strategy and economy. Publ. 2. M., Voenizdat, 1961, 105 pp. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In this case it is necessary to keep in mind that in the last war considerably increased the firepower of combat materiel and sharply increased the role of aviation and tanks, which made a war still destructive. Destruction in the period of the Second World War in Europe is only calculated by sum into 260 billion dollars ³, which is almost 3.5 times more than during the First World War.

FOOTNOTE ³. See A. Claude. Where goes American imperialism. M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1954 121 pp. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The total number of means, absorbed by the Second World War, including straight/direct military expenditures/consumptions and harm from the material destruction, achieves astronomical number - 4000000000000 (4 trillion) dollars ⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. See M. S. Dragilev. General crisis of capitalism. The outline of development is capitalist of system in 40 years. M.,

Gospolitizdat, 1957, 121 pp. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Second World War was bloodiest. The total number of those been killed in it is approximately 50 mln. people ³, i.e., 5 times it is more than in the First World War.

FOOTNOTE ³. See the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. M., publishing house "Pravda", 1961, pp 29. ENDFOOTNOTE.

These enormous victims were burdened by those innumerable deprivations and sufferings which brought war to hundreds of million people. Truly monstrous bloody tribute put imperialism on the peoples
!

Thus, the Second World War brought to humanity enormous loss. At the same time this war unusually accelerated the course of social development. It to the limit strained the socio-political contradictions of bourgeois society, shook its foundation, deeply stirred the peoples of the capitalist countries, it contributed to their revolutionization.

Under the present conditions when is created nuclear weaponry unprecedented on its destructive force, world war no longer can serve as the booster of social development. On the contrary, it would bring



**ПОД ПРАВИТЕЛЯМЪ ЛЕНИНА
— ВПЕРЕДЪ КЪ ПОБЕДѢ!**

In the name of Lenin - onward to victory!
1941 poster - artist A. Voloshin.



We won in combat; we will win in labor. 1945 poster. Artist V. Klimashin.
KEY: (1) USSR. (2) VICTORY.

to humanity the greatest calamities, death of hundreds of millions of people, annihilation of the whole countries. Certainly, if imperialistic maniacs unleash new world war, capitalism will be swept from face of the earth/ground and buried. But in this case seriously will suffer and socialist the states, all peoples of the world. Even those countries, which will suffer war, will be rejected/thrown in their development to the decades, and sometimes centuries back.

The revolutionizing force of the Second World War on the masses was, first of all, the result of the participation in it of socialist state, which made a main contribution to the defeat of Fascist Germany and its allies.

Page 9.

But in what does consist the world-wide historical significance of the victory of the USSR? First of all in the fact that the Soviet people, after maintaining/withstanding the most difficult military testing, which threatened to it by death, was located its socialist fatherland - the stronghold of the laboring and operable masses of all terrestrial globe. To be or not to be to the first in the world socialist country - from the outcome of this historical lawsuit with the worst enemies of socialist state depended the fate of the Soviet people. By its heroic struggle with the German fascism and the

Japanese imperialism in 1941-1945 our people forever won this lawsuit.

The direct result of our victory were the rout of Hitler Germany and the damage/defeat of imperialistic Japan - striking powers of international reaction. The merciless military violence, to which the imperialists with run every time that they want to bar road to new and to annihilate him, it proved to be unfounded with respect to the Soviet state.

To attack in the USSR Fascist Germany enslaved almost entire Europe. International reaction did everything so that the same lot would understand the Soviet Union. But our people was selflessly located the great conquests of socialism. As during the years of civil war, it by breast shielded freedom and independence of its native land from the imperialistic aggressors. By this very were again proved powerful viability and indestructibility of socialism. Happened the prophetic words of V. I. Lenin, said to them from platform of the III All-Russian congress of the advice/councils: "Our socialist republic of advice/councils will stand solidly as the flame of international socialism and as an example before all laboring masses" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 26 429 pp. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War opened before the laborers of all world sublimity and the indestructible power of socialist state. In the person of the Soviet Union they saw the powerful stronghold of international socialist, democratic and national liberation movement. Our people by its devotion to the ideas of communism and by firm staying power/persistency in the war demonstrated to entire world the great significance of socialist conversions and indicated to millions of people output/yield from the blind alley of the contradictions of capitalist society.

The Soviet people tore away also the detachments of imperialists for the weakening by the USSR. The USA ruling circles and to England counted the fact that in the course of exhausting struggle the Soviet Union will be finally exhausted and then they will succeed in dictating to it its will.

It is known that the war cost our people of enormous victims. Victory in it was reached by the price of blood of millions of its sons and daughters. In the fire/light of war forever perished the innumerable material and spiritual values. Any bourgeois state, after sustaining such losses, for long could not be set right from the

consequences of war and would hit the servitude to large/coarse imperialistic powers. But of the Soviet Union of this it did not happen. It not only maintained its international positions, but significantly it strengthened them.

The USSR strengthened the safety of its boundaries. According to the peace treaty Finland returned to Soviet state the ancient Russian earth/ground - Pecenga region with the nonfreezing port Pecenga. Were attached new boundaries moved aside to the north of Leningrad with Finland on the Karelian neck. The northern unit of the eastern Prussia - this age-old Platzdarm of aggression of German militarists - with the ports Koenigsberg (now Kaliningrad) and Pillau (it is now Baltic) went to the Soviet Union. The Lithuanian people obtained the Klayped region torn away earlier by Hitlerites.

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According to treaty with Czechoslovakia into the composition of our state entered the Transcarpathian Ukraine how was completed the process of the recombination of all Ukrainian people into one Soviet family. In the Far East in accordance with the decision of the Crimean conference of three powers to our country was returned South Sakhalin and were transmitted the Kurile Islands.

At the same time the rout of Hitler Germany and imperialistic Japan led to the annulment of the territorial recutting of Europe and Asia, undertaken by Fascist states on the eve, also, in the period of the Second World War. Were restored/reduced state sovereignty and territorial completeness of Austria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and were regulated on the valid basis the borders of Poland and Germany. Japanese imperialists proved to be those banished from the territory of China and other Asian countries seized by them.

The boundaries, established/installed after war as a result of the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, and also by the force of contractual relations, are valid and emergency. The Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic and other socialist states solidly stand on the guard of their boundaries, fixed in the Potsdam agreement and protected by the united forces of the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

As a result of the victory of the Soviet Union sharply increased its authority and effect in the resolution of all world problems. The USSR, as the flame of international socialism, began to even more brightly elucidate to humanity route/path into the future.

Invincible vital forces placed in our formation/order allowed the Soviet people not only to successfully overcome the giant

difficulties of wartime, but also within the shortest period to restore/reduce the destroyed economy, to eliminate the consequences of war and to move with seven-mile steps on the route/path of the progress in all branches of economy and culture. Here especially distinctly pronounced the advantages of the socialist order over the capitalist, came to light its new internal sources of development.

The blood of Soviet people, which gave their life for the socialist native land, was not spilled in vain. After war our country achieved new historical line. As a result of the deepest conversions all regions of public life the Soviet people, driven/known by the Communist Party, entered the period of the started construction of Communist society.

One of the greatest services of our people lies in the fact that it freed many countries from the Fascist enslavement, saved world culture and civilization. The Soviet Union as the state of socialism, which presents the highest type of civilization, it showed itself by the loyal defender of the independence of the peoples, by the defender of democratic laws/rights and freedoms, earned in their time by masses and trampled by the Fascist-German aggressors. If would be carried out the plans of world imperialistic reaction, this would delay the progress of humanity to many decades. Fascist brown plague would be extended on entire light/world. National statemanship and

culture of the peoples would be trampled, and the laborers of mass were destroyed or converted into the slaves of German and Japanese imperialism. The inhuman policy of fire/light and sword Fascist Germany already conducted in the countries of Europe occupied and in the seized territory of the Soviet Union, and Japan - in China and in other countries of the southeastern Asia. The same lot expected the peoples of England, USA, India and other states. The rout of German fascism and its allies removed this danger, which threatened to entire world.

The significance of our victory consists also in the fact that the Great Patriotic War determined not only outcome of the entire Second World War, but also its most important international consequences. The victory of the Soviet Union above the bloc of Fascist states and course of social development further favorable for us radically changed the correlation of class forces in the world arena in favor of socialism.

Page 11.

Fascism was the most ardent, most rabid/most furious spokesman, the reactionary essence of contemporary imperialism. Fascist elements were literally in all capitalist countries. Hitler and Mussolini roughly and openly expressed the expectations of world reaction. This

is why smashing attack on the fascism was simultaneous and strike/shock on the imperialism as a whole. The rout of fascism indicated the serious weakening of entire capitalist system.

In order to attain the victorious completion of lethal struggle with the German fascism, for the Soviet people it was necessary to strain all its forces, to mobilize and to completely use rich economic, social, political, ideological and military possibilities of Soviet socialist formation/order. For this very reason the Red Army proved to be capable of holding in control the pressure of most powerful/thickest imperialistic army and of bringing to it such smashing attacks which led Hitler Germany and its allies to the catastrophe.

The unconditional surrender of the German armed forces attested to the fact that our victory over the enemy was complete, comprehensive. It indicated not only the rout of the Fascist-German army, but also the creation of bases for the elimination in Germany of militarism and development it as peaceful, democratic state.

The sublimity of the victory of the Soviet Union becomes especially visual, if we compare the results of the catastrophe of Germany in 1945 with its damage/defeat in the First World War. As is known, in 1918 the German people did not succeed in coming out the

war by revolutionary route/path on an example of the peoples of Russia. War ended by the signing of Versailles treaty. After the damage/defeat of Germany its army obtained the possibility to leave to the native land the weaponry in the hands at the head its officer corps and the general officers. Otherwise was matter in 1945 Hitler army was completely routed and captured. In the captivity proved to be almost all its Generals. The control apparatus by Wehrmacht was turned loose. In this case the rout and the capture of Hitler army occurred in the territory of Germany itself, and the signing of the historical Act about the unconditional surrender took place in the capital of Germany - Berlin, which symbolized by itself entire depth of the national catastrophe of the German people, responsibility for which bore German fascism and militarism.

Another distinctive characteristic of the rout of Germany in 1945 is the fact that as a result of our victory were eliminated together with the Fascist-German army the Hitler state and the Nazi party. The territory of Germany underwent occupation by the armed forces of the powers of anti-Hitlerite coalition. The laborers of East Germany embarked on the path of building the new life. Meanwhile in the First World War into the plans of entente did not enter a change in the political formation/order of Germany. The semi-absolute monarchy of Wilhelm II was overthrown by working class and substituted by the bourgeois Democratic Republic in spite of the will

of the German bourgeoisie and ruling circles of victorious nations.

The utter defeat of Hitler Germany it was possible to attain because the bloc of Fascist states opposed the socialist country, supported by the freedom-loving peoples of other countries, whereas in 1918 the fought states belonged to one capitalist system, and the war between them ended only by the military damage/defeat of Germany.

The fact that the conditions of the rout of Germany into 1918 and 1945 were essentially different, radically influenced also the decision of a question about the responsibility of military criminals. If this question, set by Versailles treaty, remained only declaration, good wish, then igniters and criminals of the Second World War appeared before the court of international tribunal and they were punished on the entire strictness of the law, which expresses the will of the freedom-loving peoples.

True, the hatred of the imperialists of the USA, England and France for socialism and to communism gave itself to know here. It negatively had effect on the sentence of tribunal as, however, and on the entire activity of our allies in the course of war and in the postwar period. On the Nuremberg process, in spite of the valid requirements of Soviet charge, Hitler government and General Staff of the German armed forces were not acknowledged criminal.

Page 12.

A similar policy even more distinctly was revealed, where repossessed the effect of our allies on the antifascist coalition - in their relations with devastated Japan. The surrender of Japan was carried out inconsistently; putting into practice of this Act in many respects resembled the ratio of union powers to Germany in 1918.

If Soviet state and its army completed the rout of imperialistic Japan without any compromises with it, then the U.S. Government and the commander-in-chief of union powers in Japan American General D. MacArthur, obligations taken upon themselves on the realization of the surrender of Japan, clearly attempted to safeguard Japanese militarism from the complete elimination. The surrender of the armed forces of Japan was involved/tightened, its conducting was begun already after the termination of military activities. The territory of Japan was occupied not completely, which allowed Japanese government to hide from the victors the unit of the munitions and to annihilate secret documents. Prisoners of war they dissolved on the houses. In other theaters the disarmament of Japanese military forces desirous was involved/tightened, and many soldiers and officers even were used for dealing with the people's liberation armies, especially

in China.

This antinational policy of the leading circles of the USA in Japan was in conflict with Potsdam declaration of 26 July, 1945, and it was directed toward the one-way control in the interests of American monopolies. It disregarded the legal requirements of the Soviet Union, which made the decisive contribution to the final rout of militarist Japan.

After demolishing Fascist Germany and after routing Japan, the Soviet Union thereby knocked out from the hands of international imperialism the powerful/thick weaponry of aggression and counterrevolution, directed against the USSR, the Communist and worker's movement, the national liberation struggle of the peoples.

Thus, the significance of the victory of the Soviet Union above Hitler Germany and imperialistic Japan emerges far beyond the frames/scopes of the simple annihilation of the military force of two largest capitalist powers. In the war suffered break-up political system and ideology of fascism, the being banner world imperialistic reactions.

The world-wide historical significance of the victory of the USSR lies in the fact that "the rout of German fascism and Japanese

militarism in the Second World War with the decisive role of the Soviet Union created favorable conditions for the over-throw of the authority of capitalists and landowners by the peoples of a number of the countries of Europe and Asia" ¹, it lightened and accelerated the education/formation of the socialist camp whose boundaries stretched from the coasts of ~~E~~lba to Pacific Ocean.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Program of CPSU, pp 19. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The emergence of world socialist system meant that the front of imperialism proved to be that again broken through on the great space, moreover not only in the West, but also in the east. The strongest strike/shock on the imperialism was national revolution in China with its 600-million at that time population. The imperialistic reaction, weakened by the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, not in the state was prevent powerful/thick national movement in the countries of central and southeastern Europe, or in Asia. Almost half of the inhabitants of these two continents arose under the banner of socialism.

Page 13.

In the imperialistic camp the basic social changes, which followed after the rout of fascism, were encountered with unconcealed

stimulation and spite. In the revolutionary upheavals, aggravated by war, reactionary ideologists saw lethal threat for the capitalist system. In connection with this among the bourgeois workers won acceptance false concept about the "expansion" of the Soviet Union, about the "export of revolution" from Moscow, moreover all internal processes, which occurred in the countries of national democracy, directly were connected with the results of war, with the stay in these countries of Soviet military forces. It is not difficult to understand that similar all attempts are slander in the Soviet Union and pursue the goal to slander socialist state.

Marxism-Leninism rejects the bourgeois and pseudo-revolutionary, leftist concepts, which exaggerate the role of violence and war in the historical development. War is not some self-contained they lie/rest the deep economic and political processes, which occur in one or the other countries. The connection/bond between the war and the revolution consists not of the fact that one phenomenon (war) calls into being another phenomenon - revolution. "Communists never counted and they do not consider that the route/path to the revolution is passed without fail through the wars between the states. The Socialist Revolution is not necessarily connected with the war. Although both world wars, unleashed by imperialists, were concluded by the Socialist Revolutions however revolutions are completely possible without the wars. The great goals of working

class can be realized without the world war" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Program of CPSU, pp 39. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This is why revolution in the countries of central and southeastern Europe, and also in Asia cannot be examined only as the consequence of war. Their uniqueness consisting in the fact that here the revolutionary struggle of working class and all laborers against capitalism for socialism merged with the people's national liberation struggle against the fascism and the imperialism for democracy, with the struggle of all freedom-loving peoples headed by by Soviet Union against the Fascist aggressors.

Carrying out a great liberating mission in Europe, the Red Army annihilated one for another the large/coarse grouping of Fascist military forces, demolishing the authority of Hitler occupationists and their proteges. Simultaneously strikes/shocks on the fascism deposited the laborers of those countries which were freed/released by our military forces. Under the united pressure of the Red Army and national masses collapsed the right through rotted through reactionary regimes, established/installed by Fascist Germany and its allies. Thereby were created favorable conditions for the democratic development of these countries, and their peoples obtained the possibility to independently solve their fate.

Consecutively/serially conducting the policy of democratization in the liberated countries, The USSR it solidly adhered to the principle of nonintervention into their internal affairs. To Soviet military forces were given the strictest directives, which ordered/prescribed not abolish those political installations and institutes which historically were formed in these countries, they were connected with their national and economic characteristics, national culture, etc. This was the bright confirmation of Marxist-Leninist situation about the fact that the revolutions not "are exported" and not "are imported", them it is not possible to impose on the peoples from without.

The basic reasons for revolutionary events in the countries of Europe and Asia in the period of the last war were laid in economy and policy of these countries, in those deep contradictions which existed in them. Imperialism, its economic and political oppression, which was merged with the oppression by national, hunger and deprivation - this is what pushed masses to combat with the reaction. War only deepened and strained these contradictions, it accelerated revolutionary explosion. The rout of the reactionary forces, which supported Hitler occupationists, lightened setting people's democratic orders/formations.

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The transition of national democracy to the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat as to its completed form, cannot be explained, if to pass past those deep social changes which occurred in the liberated countries for the length of the first postwar years. The attempts of the right grouping of the bourgeoisie, supported by western imperialists, to direct these countries on the capitalist route/path met the decisive resistance of workers and peasants. In class combat was solved a question about the character of further development of the people's democratic countries. The success of socialist forces in this struggle was facilitated by the fact that the most reactionary strata of the important bourgeoisie, which even earlier tied its fate with the fascism, were broken in the course of national liberation war with the direct aid of the Red Army. Thus, the fruits of our great victory are embodied in the development of the countries of national democracy, in the growing might of the world system of socialism.

The victory over the fascism inspired in the capitalistic countries the widest masses, and, first of all, the proletariat. Working movement rose to the new step/stage. Immeasurably increased

authority and effect of the Communist and worker's parties, which headed the struggle of the peoples against the foreign enslavers and their accomplices. This found bright expression in an increase in the world Communist movement. Thus, if in 1939 in entire world there was 61 Communist and worker's party which counted about 4 mln. people ¹, then to 1 September, 1945, of these parties it became 76, and their composition grew to 20 mln. people ².

FOOTNOTE ¹. Cm. International relations after Second World War. Vol. 1 (1945-1949). M. Gospolitizdat, 1962, 73 pp. ². IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, 861 pp. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the capitalist countries the strength of communists within this time increased more than 3 times (with 1500 thousand to 4800 thousand people) ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. Cm. International relations after Second World War, Vol. 1 73 pp. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In some European countries, for example in France and Italy, the Marxist-Leninist parties became the largest/coarsest and most influential political organizations.

In the course of war in many states arose the powerful/thick united trade-union centers. During September 1945 in Paris the congress of the trade-union organizations of 56 countries instituted the world-wide federation of trade unions, which already then represented 67 mln. organized workers. During November 1945 were created the International democratic federation of women and the World-wide federation of democratic young people, which combined tens of millions people.

The victory of the Soviet Union above Hitler Germany and militarist Japan accelerated the process of the elimination of shameful colonial system, it contributed to the aggravation of contradictions between the imperialistic powers, on one hand, and by the countries, which are found in the colonial dependence or liberated from it, on the other hand.

War drew in its whirlpool many countries of the colonial world, some of them becoming theater operations. The needs of military economy impelled imperialistic powers to force the development of the separate branches of industry in their colonies. The consequence of this was a comparatively rapid increase in the proletariat in the under-developed areas. During the war in many colonies and dominions were created mass armies, which consisted of the significant part of the workers and the peasants. The armies of the colonial and

dependent countries made a noticeable contribution to the struggle with the Fascist states and played important role in reinforcing of national liberation movement.

The heroic struggle of the Soviet Union with the German fascism and by Japanese militarism found powerful response among the oppressed peoples of colonies. As a result of the victory of the USSR in the Far East were created favorable conditions for the rapid development of the national liberation movement of the peoples of China, Korea, countries of the southeastern Asia. The struggle of these peoples against the Japanese imperialism contributed to an improvement in the political activity, national self-consciousness and organization of masses in the countries, which were the colonies of Great Britain, France, Holland and other western powers. Unprecedented raising of national liberation movement in Asia and Africa, connected with the rout of fascism and the subsequent then sharp weakening of the positions of imperialistic camp, was based on the traditions of a just war against the states of Hitler bloc.

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During our days colonial system suffered downfall. Problem now consists in forever putting an end to the remainders/residues of colonialism.

Thus, the enormous effect of the victory of the Soviet Union pronounced in all regions of international public life. The basic result of this victory was, on one hand, the considerable expansion of the base of socialism, colossal reinforcing of its positions and, on the other hand - the sharp contraction of the frames/scopes of imperialism, its further weakening. "In the course of the Second World War and the Socialist Revolutions, which occurred in the number of the countries of Europe and Asia, it is said in the program of our party, was developed the second stage of the general crisis of capitalism" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Program of CPSU, p 25. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Now capitalism entered the new, third stage of the general crisis whose uniqueness lies in the fact that it occurs under the peaceful conditions and it is not connected with the world war. Hence it follows that the victory of socialism and the damage/defeat of imperialism on the world-wide scale is already finally decided beforehand by entire course of social development.

How was already achieved the victorious outcome of the Great Patriotic War, which had so important world-wide historical a

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significance? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to, first of all, subject to analysis the Second World War as a whole and to open the decisive role in it of the Soviet Union.

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2. Political character of the Second World War, its composite/compound component parts.

The Second World War 1939-1945 encompasses the following composite/compound component parts: the armed struggle of the largest imperialistic states - England, France, the USA against Germany and its satellites in Europe and against Japan in Asia; the liberation movement of the peoples of the countries of Europe and Asia; the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against the Fascist bloc. The analysis of these component units requires the accounting of new arrangement of class forces, which was established in the period between two world wars, and also the political character of the Second World War, process of its conversion from the side of England and France from the predatory into the liberating.

If war 1914-1918 occurred under the conditions when capitalism completely dominated on terrestrial globe, then war 1939-1945 broke out in the situation of the crack of the world to two systems,

existences on the earth/ground of socialist state and with the presence of a deep political crisis of capitalist system. The Soviet Union became the center of the attraction of all revolutionary and progressive forces of peace. The axis of the world policy moved in the direction of the struggle of the capitalist countries with the young socialist state.

Under the conditions of the sharp aggravation of general/common/total capitalism, revolutionization of the laborers of masses the bourgeoisie of the number of the countries for retaining/preserving/maintaining of its authority and repression of revolutionary movement resorted to the Fascist form of dictatorship. In Germany and some other states won acceptance the monstrous ideology and the policy of the most reactionary circles of financial capital, which annihilated all elements of bourgeois democracy. "The arrival of Fascism at the authority, said G. Dimitrov at the VII Congress of Comintern, this not the usual replacement of one bourgeois government by another, but the shift/relief of one state form of class supremacy of the bourgeoisie - bourgeois democracy by its another form - by discovered terrorist dictatorship" ².

FOOTNOTE ². G. Dimitrov. Selected works. Vol. I (1910-1937). M., Gospolitizdat, 1957, page 378. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In foreign policy the fascism came forward as the strike vanguard of international reaction, main igniter of world war, instigator of a "crusade" against the USSR. However, German fascism, as emphasized the VII Congress of Comintern, it was the most barbarous variety of fascism.

Hitlerites did not hide their hatred for the Soviet Union. They spoke as the pioneers of struggle against communism, but at the same time under the covering of this struggle intensely they were prepared for the war for the new repartition/conversion of the world in favor of German monopolies.

The blinded by class hatred for the socialist country, ruling circles of bourgeois-democratic states considered that the imperialistic contradictions between them and fascist bloc can be overcome in the war against the Soviet Union. Therefore the USA, England and France actively aided the recovery of the war potential of Nazi Germany, conducted the policy of complicity to Fascist aggressor, pushing them to the attack in the USSR.

Hitler government extensively used an anti-Soviet course of its imperialistic rivals, searched for with them agreements, since did

not think the conquests of world supremacy without the rout of the Soviet Union. At the same time Hitlerites, in their entire underestimation of the power of the USSR, understood, that the war with it is necessary serious and a compromise in it cannot be. Therefore before misfortune in the Soviet Union, German Fascists decided to subordinate to themselves the countries of Western Europe whose governments forewent the defensive alliance with the great socialist power. Fascist Germany the first strikes/shocks directed against its western rivals.

Thus, war was begun not against the USSR, as planned Anglo-American and French imperialists. Their insidious plan was stripped because of the conclusion of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact. War broke out within the most capitalist world and it was wrong from both sides, being, regarding the executive committee of comintern, and also the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the continuation of the many-year imperialistic lawsuit of the ruling classes of England, France, USA of Germany for world supremacy ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See "Pravda", on 6 November, 1939. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In sharp contradiction with this definition/determination of the character of the Second World War on its first stage is I. V. Stalin's statement (November of 1939), in whom it to the aggressors

related England and France, and Germany it recognized as defender².

FOOTNOTE². See "Pravda", on 30 November, 1939. ENDFOOTNOTE.

A similar appraisal is right through subjectivist, since Stalin it one-sided, distorted presented the forces, which gave rise to the Second World War, and it did not consider dangerous strivings in the predatory policy of German fascism.

Late Stalin advanced directly opposite confirmation/assertion, as if the Second World War against the states of "axis" from the very acquired antifascist, liberating nature. Developing this thought in the speech before the voters on 9 February, 1946, Stalin said that the bloc of bourgeois democratic states (England, France) struggled with German-Italian fascism for the restoration/reduction of bourgeois democratic freedoms. In actuality the governments of England and France entered the war with Germany not in the interests of national masses, but in the interests of their own bourgeoisie, which was attempting to weaken/attenuate dangerous competitor and to strengthen their great-power situation.

Not conflict between the bourgeoisie democratic and Fascist forms of the dictatorship of monopolist capital was the main reason for the war of the imperialists of England and France with the imperialists

THE ENEMY HAS BEEN BEATEN; VICTORY IS OURS!




Nazi Germany has been overturned (May 1945).

Soviet sailors on the shores of the Lyadunsk Bay (August 1945).



WHOEVER COMES AT US WITH A SWORD SHALL PERISH BY THE SWORD!



Thus they began ...



... and thus they ended.



THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD CELEBRATE THE VICTORY.



Leningrad. National festival on Dvortsovaya Square.


Moscow. Red Square, 9 May 1945.



THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD CELEBRATE THE VICTORY.



Chicago. Workers at a mass-meeting on the victory over Fascist Germany.
London. How Parliament Square looked on Victory Day.



of Germany, but tendency toward the new repartition/conversion of the world, struggle for world supremacy.

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War was also convenient pretext/preposition for the offensive of capital to the working class, for the democratic movement the countries, which entered the war.

Thus, if in 1939 Stalin's subjectivism by the appraisal of war was evinced mainly in the embellishment of the position of the worst enemy of humanity - German fascism, then in 1946 it was revealed in overestimation and justification of the policy of English-French imperialists in the beginning of the Second World War. This impeded the correct understanding of the actual role of main imperialistic powers in the war and in carried confusion into the interpretation of the questions, connected with the character of the last war.

The Second World War, caused in essence by the same reasons, that also the first, had essential features. New in the military conflict of imperialistic groups was the fact that the bloc of Fascist states posed the problem of eliminating sovereignty and the national independence of many countries, including such great capitalist powers as France and England. The victory of Hitlerites

would indicate not only defeat of western imperialists, but also enslavement of the earned peoples.

In the First World War imperialists nothing similar intended. V. I. Lenin, speaking about the predatory goals of Imperial Germany in the struggle for world supremacy, he wrote: "let us assume Germans are taken even Paris and Petersburg. It will change from this character of this war? Not at all. By the goal of Germans and - this it is still more important: the attainable policy with the victory of Germans - will be then the removal of colonies, supremacy in Turkey, removal of foreign national regions, for example, Poland, etc., but completely not setting foreign national oppression above the Frenchmen or Russians" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 23, page 22. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This conclusion/derivation was based on what a question about colonies and spheres of effect in the First World War could be solved without the annihilation of sovereignty and national independence of great powers. So it was.

V. I. Lenin, however, foresaw another possibility of the course of events, namely: the possibility of national liberation war in Europe in the case of the emergence of such situation when could

prove to be enslaved the number of viable national states ².

FOOTNOTE ². See V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 22, page 296. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Under the peculiar conditions of Second World War this Leninist prediction/forecast completely justified.

The process of the nonuniform development of capitalism and its rotting after the First World War visited so far, and contradictions between the imperialistic states toward the end of the 30's so were deepened and were strained that the German fascists passed to practical carrying out of their plans of the enslavement of the peoples of Europe. After taking Czechoslovakia, France, they deprived these countries of sovereignty and national independence, introduced there the regime of occupational dictatorship, destroyed millions of people. And this was not random. Fascism to the limit bared the misanthropic essence of international imperialism. Of this consisted one of the chief characteristics of the Second World War in the course of which to the struggle against Hitler Germany rose all freedom-loving peoples. The consequences of this did not want - yes even we could not - foresee the imperialistic rivals of Fascist Germany.

Meanwhile there was a real possibility of converting the

predatory war, which they at first conducted England and France, in the war liberating, valid, antifascist. The main force, capable to realize this possibility, were the laborers of mass, and first of all the working class in avant garde of which went the Communist Parties. In spite of the fact that working class proved to be weakened due to the dissentient activity of right social democrats, its role, as the effect of national masses as a whole, in the Second World War grew considerably.

Page 18. True, the laborers of mass could not prevent the beginning of the Second World War, but under the conditions of the discovered struggle against the fascism, with the huge revolutionizing role of the USSR, they, as showed events, substantially they influenced the course of war and a change in its character.

Before the working class with the entire sharpness arose the problem - of shielding national independence of its countries, which were subjected to Fascist aggression. Only the proletariat could carry out this mission, because the bourgeoisie in majority its conducted line on the cooperation with the Nazi occupationists.

Increased for the working class and all laborers of the possibility to affect the course of war were located in the direct connection/bond with a sharp increase in the mass of people, drawn in

into the war, with the influence on them of the ideas of the great October Socialist Revolution, with an increase in their class self-consciousness and organization, and also with reinforcing of leading role of the Communist Parties in the struggle for democracy, against fascism and aggression.

If in the First World War only in Russia there was a revolutionary party, which conducted the consecutively/serially internationalistic policy in the war, then before the Second World War such parties were already in the majority of the capitalist countries. They leaned on the many-year experience of the antifascist struggle of the USSR, which it conducted before the Second World War, to that containing in the resolutions of the congresses of Communist International, the congresses and conferences of VKP(b) deep the Marxist-Leninist analysis of contemporary epoch as the epochs of the downfall of capitalism and transition to socialism. Sizable significance had also mastering the experience of nation-revolutionary war in Spain and the national liberation war in China. Before the wide national masses increasingly more distinctly was drawn the savage aspect of German fascism and Japanese militarism as the most reactionary and aggressive forces of international imperialism.

The Communist Parties outlined the correct line of the struggle

of working class under war time. Communists always spoke against predatory wars. When the dominant classes thrust to the peoples war, the Communist Parties attempted to turn it against the imperialists, in the interests of working class and all laborers. To turn the predatory war initiated by imperialistic powers in the interests of laborers indicated: in Germany - news course on the defeat of Hitler government and its army; in the countries enslaved by fascism - to in every possible way develop national liberation struggle against the occupationists; in England and France to mobilize the efforts/forces of masses for the conversion of predatory war into the liberating, the antifascist and those to activate/promote the armed struggle against Hitler Germany.

In the countries, occupied by the bloc of Fascist aggressors, arose the antifascist movement of resistance, directed toward the liberation from the aggressors. The forces, which rose to the liberating struggle, were very considerable from the very beginning of the Second World War. Thus, the attack of Fascist Germany on Poland met with the armed resistance of the Polish people. The resistance to aggressors showed/rendered the national masses of Czechoslovakia: at first it was concealed/latent and passive, and then it began to acquire ever more open and active character. However, From the first days of Italian-Fascist invasion was begun the selfless struggle against the national enslavement in Albania.

From in the spring of 1940 in Norway and Denmark after occupation by their Hitlerites also unrolled the movement of resistance. By uprising and by guerilla warfare answered Fascist aggression the peoples of Yugoslavia.

They heroically fought spoiling aggressors nation-revolutionary armies and the partisans of China, led by its Communist Party. This struggle flared up even prior to the beginning of the Second World War, in 1937 National liberation movement began to be developed also in Vietnam and in other countries, occupied with Japan.

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National anger against the fascism increased in France and England, the ruling circles which waged "strange war", attempting to use antifascist moods of masses for its imperialistic goals. Continuing the treacherous Munich policy, the English-French leading circles attempted to enter into the contact with Hitler in order to direct his aggression against the USSR, and actively they were prepared for the anti-Soviet war in Finland and in the Middle East. However, the course of events overturned their plans and forced to consider the antifascist requirements of masses.

The influence of laborers on the policy of its governments even

under the conditions of unjust war is alleviated by the fact that at the sharp/acute moments of the armed struggle the governments are forced to turn for the ~~support~~ to the people, to appeal to its activity and energy. V. I. Lenin as early as 1915 wrote: "... the further is dragged out and is intensified the war, the stronger governments themselves develop and must develop the activity of masses, drafting them to the excess stress/voltage of forces and the self-sacrifice" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. works, Vol. 21, page 191. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This Leninist instruction as cannot better relates to England first half of 1940, when above it hung the real threat of Fascist enslavement. This danger threatened not only to the people, but also to the quite English bourgeoisie, which forced it, although against its will, to resort to the active aid of laborers.

Specifically, from the summer of 1940, when noticeably was activated/promoted the antifascist activity of masses, for England and France was begun the process of converting the predatory war into the liberating, the valid. The basic content of this process in this stage of the Second World War was struggle for the national independence of England and countries of Europe occupied.

Is significant in this respect the movement of resistance in France. The French Communist Party, relying on the will of the people, posed the problem of changing the character of war, after indicating concretely/specifically/actually as this to achieve. Communists first called the people to the effective resistance to aggressors for France earth/ground. They required decisive struggle against the Hitlerism and treacherous government of vichy, supported all other organizations, which were struggling against the national oppression, although many of these organizations were not connected with the people. The persistent work of the communists of France on the association/unification of all patriotic forces gave its fruits: subsequently in the country was formed the wide national front of struggle with the Fascist occupationists and the government of Vichy.

For reinforcing the antifascist character of war great significance had also struggle of the national masses of Yugoslavia and Greece with the aggressors, being unrolled in spring and in the summer of 1941. The characteristic feature of national liberation movement in these countries were mass character and resoluteness.

Thus, the national liberation struggle of the peoples against the Fascist states during the first stage of war was already its important composite/compound unit. This struggle overturned the plans of Anglo-French enemies of socialism: they intended to conduct

anti-Soviet war, and they actually proved to be forced to wage war antifascist. True, neither government of England nor government of any other capitalist country could then advance and consecutively/serially defend the program of antifascist war. Therefore the complicated process of changing the character of war against the Fascist bloc to the attack of Hitlerite aggressors in the Soviet Union did not obtain and it could not obtain its completion.

The entry in the war of the USSR radically changed the situation and the prospects for the Second World War. Soviet government led the clear political purposes of the Soviet people in the struggle with the Hitler aggressors - utter defeat of German fascism and the liberation of the peoples of Europe from the Nazi tyranny. From now on Fascist aggressors opposed more powerfully the socialist state, which leans on the great people, capable of not only barring road to the military vehicle of German imperialism, but also of demolishing, of annihilating it.

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This meant that occurred the strategic rotation in the war. Simultaneously this was rotation, also, in the political character of war, which only now for the countries, which appeared against Germany and Japan, finally became valid, liberating.

During December 1941 into the struggle against Japan entered the USA, which enlarged the territorial boundaries of the Second World War and increased antifascist coalition. Against the bloc of Fascist states beginning actively to act the coalition of three forces: the Soviet Union, peoples of the occupied and enslaved countries of Europe and Asia, bourgeois states - England, the USA, etc.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union was poured as main flow into the general/common/total river bed of the Second World War, forming its new and decisive composite/compound component part. The struggle of the USSR for its content and goals differed significantly from the struggle of other forces of antifascist coalition, and, first of all, England and the United States. This is why during the analysis of the composite/compound component parts of the Second World War it is not possible to be limited only to the emphasis of their general antifascist, liberating character, as this was done by Stalin. Correctly asserting that the liberating character of war on the part of allies was that factor on basis of which was formed the anti-Hitlerite coalition, which played enormous role in the rout of Fascist Germany, Stalin little concerned a question about the reactionary side of the policy of the ruling circles of the Anglo-American imperialism.

As is known, in contrast to the Soviet Union neither England nor USA was posed before itself the problem completely annihilating German fascism, but they only attempted by the hands of the USSR to weaken/attenuate Germany and Japan as dangerous competitors on the world market. At the same time they strove strengthening and expanding their imperialistic oppression above the peoples, wanted to annihilate the political and economic conquests of working class, that are labored and it is serious to weaken/attenuate the Soviet Union by the hands of Fascist Germany. Particular activity in the realization of these insidious concepts displayed the imperialists of the USA, which possessed the great economic power which rapidly grew during the war.

However, for the imperialists of the western powers, which participated in the anti-Hitlerite coalition, it was impossible to direct war on the river bed desirable for them. This is explained, in the first place, by the might of the Soviet Union and its armed forces and, in the second place, by the increased role of the national masses of the West and east for which the war against the Fascist bloc was, first of all, war for its independence, for restoration/reduction and expansion of democratic laws/rights and freedoms, for the elimination of Fascist installations both in the

countries occupied and in Germany itself. National liberation movement, and first of all armed struggle partisan, played great role in the military damage/defeat of the powers of Fascist "axis" and it to a considerable extent contributed to the realization of national revolutions at the end of the war.

Because of the elevated goals of the Great Patriotic War, their international character the Soviet people acquired loyal allies in the struggle with the Fascist aggressors in face of the laborers of Europe, Asia and America. In their first numbers came forward the largest/coarsest, most progressive and united force - working class, including the working class of England and USA which extensively used antifascist moods of national masses in order to act on the policy of its governments.

After the perfidious attack of Fascist Germany in the Soviet Union in England and USA took place the mass meetings, which encompassed the largest strata of laborers. In the resolutions accepted at the meetings sharply was condemned aggression of German fascism against the USSR, advanced the requirements to activate/promote struggle with the Nazism and to render assistance the Soviet people in the rout of Hitlerism.

After the attack of Japanese aggressors in Pearl Harbor American workers were ready to forego their law/right with the strikes and to go for the education/formation of the united committees with the owners, provided expansion of military production and thereby to contribute to reinforcing of armed struggle with the Nazism and the Japanese imperialism. To 1944 of such committees in the USA were 5 thousand. In them was counted 50 thousand members, who represented 8 mln. workers ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See A. Kahn. High treason. Plot against the people. M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1950, page 302.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Communist Parties of England and USA, actively struggling the national independence of their countries and strengthening their unity, required so that the English and American governments would establish/install close cooperation with the Soviet alliance for the rendering to it of military and material aid. They did everything in order to more widely develop democratic activity in its countries and to draw to it working class as the most patriotic force. Communists insisted on the conducting of active struggle against the "fifth

column" - the secret service agency of Hitler. They were assured that the socialist state and its army not only will withstand under the strikes/shocks of the armored Fascist hordes, but also they will annihilate them.

In order to reveal essential differences in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union from the war of character, class direction of the war of socialist state against the fascism, role of national masses in it, and to also compare the social structure of the Soviet rear with the rear of the imperialistic states, which were struggling against Germany.

The character of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union was defined by the socialist nature of our social system, which made with its (as war with interventionists and White Guards in 1918-1920) most valid in the history. From the side of the USSR the war against Hitler Germany was consecutively/serially liberating. In the struggle with the Fascist aggressors was decided the fate of socialist conquests and state independence of the peoples of the USSR, since the fascism pursued not only clearly predatory goals, but also goal class - annihilation of the first in the world socialist state. This is why with the victory in the war Soviet people connected their vital ones, blood-interests, their future. Struggle in this war went not to the life, and to death between socialism, which represents the

future all humanity, and Fascism, threatened Soviet and other peoples not only enslavement, but also by almost complete destruction.

The irreconcilable class character of engagement of the USSR with Hitler Germany eliminated any compromise between them, which gave to military activities particular sharpness and resoluteness. Soviet state in the war imposed on it threw against the Fascist aggressor entire its material power, mobilized all spiritual forces of the people. History yet did not know such wars of liberation, in which the interests of the people, state and ruling party would pour so/such fully and harmoniously as in the Great Patriotic War. The peoples of the Soviet Union with the greatest enthusiasm struggled with the Hitler aggressors and were prepared for any victims into the name of the defense of the Soviet native land and fulfillment of their international duty. The Red Army composed one whole with the people.

Entirely differently was matter, for example, in capitalist England, even when it already conducted a just war against Hitler Germany. The interests of laborers in this war coincided with the interests of bourgeois state only in one, although main thing then, relation, namely: in the defense of national independence. But this in no way removed class contradictions within the country. V. I. Lenin as early as 1941 indicated that "and in wartime, and in war,

and by war they continue to exist and will appear the class contradictions, which tear up the peoples" 2.

FOOTNOTE 2. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 21, page 23.

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Destruction and impoverishment of the working masses which experience themselves all burdens of war, and the improbable enrichment on it of the small group of millionaires - this contradiction not only did not weaken, but increasingly more it was intensified in the course of war. This is why in the capitalist countries between the people, the state and the government it was not, yes even it could not be authentic unity. Under war time the state authority of USA and England, for example, especially widely resorted to the limitation, and that to the straight/direct repression of the most progressive elements within the country. At the same time the ruling circles were forced to lean on the patriotism of masses, using their antifascist moods, first of all, for the realization of its class goals.

Most reactionary internal forces of the European countries openly arose to the route/path of national treason and helped Hitler to establish/install Fascist regime. In other case dissatisfied by

fascism the important bourgeoisie, fearing, seemingly decisive struggle of national masses against the occupationists did not develop into revolutionary struggle against its capitalists and landowners, left and transmitted its people, oriented to the "aid" of the bourgeoisie of the large/coarse capitalist powers, which fought with Hitler Germany. Thus acted the ruling circles of Czechoslovakia, Poland and other enslaved countries.

It is understandable that the class structure of the rear in the USSR radically differed from the structure of the rear of capitalist states. In the war of the Soviet Union with the Fascist aggression the idea of the defense of the socialist fatherland united the laborers of our country into the strong/firm, inviolable collective. The Soviet rear was uniform and enduring/permanent, as it is earlier never. And precisely because Soviet people were uniform in the difficult hour of their history, war of the Soviet Union against the bloc of Fascist states was the truly Great Patriotic War of all our people, which fearless overcame incredible difficulties on the way to its victory.

3. Main role of the USSR in the rout of Fascist Germany and its allies.

After entering, actually, into the single combat with the Hitler

aggressors, the USSR became the center of the attraction of the antifascist forces of all peace. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union exerted such more powerful influence on the struggle of peoples and states of anti-Hitlerite coalition, which testified about the decisive role of the USSR in the Second World War.

This was expressed, first of all, in the fact that the process of converting the Second World War from the imperialistic into the liberating finally was completed after the entrance into it of the Soviet Union.

In the second place, in the countries, which were subjected to occupation, to the higher step/stage rose the movement of resistance. With each new victory of Soviet military forces it stopped with Fascist Germany. In the course of war the movement of resistance accepted giant scope, arose the all-encompassing national and international front against the fascism. Struggle with the occupationists became sharper/more acute and more effective. Guerilla warfare was conducted more purposefully and received wide acceptance, especially in Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria whose peoples made a great contribution to the victory over Hitler Germany. Under the severe conditions of Fascist regime struggled the foremost forces of Hungary, Rumania and quite German people.

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Thirdly, working class, laborers of the mass of the capitalist countries of anti-Hitlerite bloc more clearly began to understand the liberating war aims against the Fascist states, increased their role in the struggle with the fascism and was increased effect on the policy of its governments. At the same time were strengthened the connections/bonds of the Soviet people and its state with the peoples of other countries, and, first of all, with the peoples of Europe occupied, and also of England, USA and their governments.

This, further, found its expression in creation and strengthening of anti-Hitlerite coalition of the peoples and states in which the Soviet Union occupied the leading place. Highly valuing the aid of allies, the USSR decisively spoke against the reactionary strivings of the ruling circles of USA and England, after predetermining thereby the antifascist direction of their struggle up to the termination of war.

Finally, after mobilizing all its forces, the USSR brought to Germany and its allies the most powerful/thickest, smashing attacks which led to the utter defeat of aggressors. Struggling for the great liberating war aims, the Soviet Union most efficiently helped the peoples of Europe and Asia to get rid of Fascist IGA and had the

decisive effect on the course of the struggle of the freedom-loving peoples and countries, which appeared against the Fascist bloc.

All this convincingly attests to the fact that the socialist state played main role in the war with the bloc of aggressors. Especially vividly this was revealed in the armed struggle at the Soviet-German front.

The fate of entire world war depended, first of all, on the outcome of struggle between the USSR and Germany, since the Soviet Union was backbone of antifascist coalition, and Hitler Germany was main force of Fascist bloc.

Modern war envelops all sides of public life, including economic, political and ideological. But its specific content is the armed armed struggle. Directly the outcome of war is solved in the fields of battles. If as a whole war under the contemporary conditions wage the peoples, then in the theaters operations in it participate the armed forces, which concentrate in themselves the combat power of states.

During the years of the Second World War the armed struggle was conducted in the numerous fronts in Europe, Asia and Africa, and also in the ocean theaters. However, these fronts with respect to their

significance and scales were not identical. Appraisal their bourgeois and Marxist-Leninist historiography was and remains different. Especially many disagreements exist during the definition/determination of the role of the Soviet-German front and front of West.

Attempting to underestimate the role of the Soviet-German front in course and outcome of the Second World War and at the same time to exaggerate the effort of the Anglo-American military forces for its other theaters, bourgeois military theorists and historians conscious quiet the great victories of the Red Army and inflate the activities of the armed forces of USA and England. This became fashionable in the postwar bourgeois literature. In the preconceived treatment of the events of the Second World War surprisingly concur many American and English falsifiers of military history. Former Chief of Staff of American army General D. Marshall, for example, wrote that the "victory in this" world war depended on the successful conducting of operation "Overlord" - operation/process on landing of the Anglo-American military forces in France through English Channel and on further activities of these troops in Western Europe.

FOOTNOTE 1. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War. July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945. London, 1945, p 27. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The authors of the official multivolume American publication "Army of USA in the Second World War" develop the same thoughts.

The tendency of the deliberate buckling of the role of Western Front and vertical separation of the Soviet-German front is conducted also in the military history labor/works of the former Fascist-German Generals.

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Thus, the authors of collector/collection "World war. 1939-1945" assert, supposedly "western powers they attained the break-up of German state, after connecting up its strategic plan the combined bomber offensive with progress of ground forces" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. World war. 1939-1945. Collector/collection of the article. Publishing house of foreign literature, 1957, page 466.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Western Front, in their opinion, determined the resolutions of German command element, which concern operations/processes at the Eastern Front.

Without being limited to this, bourgeois ideologists attempt to give out for the second front in the war against Hitler Germany even insignificant combat operations. German General Tippel'skirkh considers that the second front was opened after landing of the Anglo-American military forces in Algeria and Morocco. Were done also the attempts to give out for the second front in Europe the military activities of Americans and Englishmen in Italy. Similar conjectures of bourgeois historians have as their goal to justify the policy of the Anglo-American ruling circles, having strived to tighten opening the second front. Beginning to these conjectures marked not who by different as Churchill. In the letter to Stalin he noted: "By the best form of the second front in 1942, operation/process the only possible considerable to the scale from the side of Atlantic Ocean it is "flame" ², i.e., the landing of the Anglo-American military forces in North Africa.

FOOTNOTE ². Correspondence of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Vol. I M., Gospolitizdat, 1958, page 59. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Unrestrained praising of this operation/process, tendency to

substitute by it the second front were straight/direct rejection of the serious aid to the Soviet Union into period of war most difficult for it with Fascist Germany.

The invasion of the allies into North France on 6 June, 1944, the falsifiers of history name the "decisive battle", which placed/assumed the beginning of the end of the Second World War.

It is necessary to lose the latter/last remainders/residues of objectivity in order with this zeal to praise incense to the Anglo-American armed forces and to extol their "services" in the Second World War. The apologists of imperialism do not consider the facts, but facts, of course, are stronger than any fabrications. It suffices to say that during the years of the war when the Red Army actually alone opposed Fascist Wehrmacht, exhibiting unprecedented courage and heroism, the leading workers of England and USA did not dare to go against the obvious truth and openly is recognized itself the fundamental importance of Soviet-German front.

The same Churchill, coming forward in the House of Commons on 2 August, 1944, i.e., soon after opening of the second front, said that the Russian army "played main role and depletes guts from the German army" .

FOOTNOTE 3. U. Churchill. Survey/coverage of military events. Speech in the House of Commons on 2 August, 1944. M., the department of press of British embassy, 1944, page 11. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The same thought it expressed even later. Thus, on 27 January, 1945, Churchill during the successful Soviet offensive wrote Stalin: "we were charmed by your glorious victories over the general/common/total enemy and powerful/thick forces which you advanced against it. Accept our warmest appreciation and congratulation on occasion of historical feats" 4.

FOOTNOTE 4. Correspondence of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the USA and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, Vol. I, page 306. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In other message of Churchill it is indicated that the armed forces of the USSR solved the lot of German militarism. "Future generations, noted English premier, recognize their duty before the Red Army so unconditionally, as this we make, that lived until, being the witnesses of these splendid victories" 5.

FOOTNOTE 5. Ibid., page 310. ENDFOOTNOTE.

His enormous admiration by the victories of Soviet military forces, by the heroic efforts/forces of our people expressed the President of the USA-F. Roosevelt '.

FOOTNOTE '. See *ibid.* Vol. II, page 72. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The otherwise statesmen of the West could not act. The national masses, which were struggling against Fascist aggression, would not understand and did not approve another relation to the USSR.


DEFENDERS OF THE HOMELAND - ETERNAL GLORY.



Volgograd. Mamay kurgan. "Stand to the death!" - one of the monuments commemorating the battle on the Volga.

71


PROTECTORS OF THE HOMELAND -



Leningrad. Obelisk-memorial to the participants in the heroic defense of Lenin's city.


ETERNAL GLORY.

17
Memorial museum erected in the village of Novyye Petrovtsy close to the capital of the UkrSSR in honor of its delivery from the Fascist invaders.




At the fire of eternal glory in the Piskarevskiy Cemetery in Leningrad.


Sevastopol'. Diorama of Sapun—gora assault and obelisk in honor of the glory of the heroic Soviet soldiers who fought for the city.




PROTECTORS OF THE HOMELAND - ETERNAL GLORY.



Odessa. Obelisk to the "Unknown sailor".



Minsk. Obelisk-memorial to Soviet soldiers and partisans.



Kishinev. Memorial to Komsomol members who were heroes of the Great Patriotic War.

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The Soviet people never forgot about the aid of allies in the struggle against the general/common/total enemy. But at the same time it is well known that our allies by all routes/paths and by means involved/tightened opening the second front in Europe and opened it if and only if war as a result of historical victories of the Red Army already approached toward the end. Actually, this meant that by opening the second front USA and England more pursued their own political purposes than fulfilled overall missions in the decisive rout of Hitler army.

The heroic struggle of the Soviet Armed Forces according to its scope, stress/voltage and results considerably exceeded the combat operations of allies.

According to Hitler military doctrine, the plans of world supremacy of German monopolies had to be carried out on the basis of continental strategy. On the views of the heads of Fascist Germany, the Soviet Union, as the strongest continental power, was for them

main obstacle on the route/path of the conquest of supremacy in Europe, and not only in Europe. The realization of their concepts they were seen as directly dependent on the outcome of war against the USSR. To this Hitler command element subordinated the construction of the armed forces of Germany, the main place in which occupied land forces and aviation. Bulk of Fascist surface/ground and air forces was cast against the Soviet Union.

Since the beginning of the deployment of the armed struggle at the Soviet-German front operated 153 German divisions, i.e., it is more than 70 percent of entire Fascist-German army. Together with ground forces of satellite countries the Hitlerites counted 190 completely manned and well equipped divisions.

Main material-technical resources of land and air forces - all four tank groups (3712 tanks), four air fleet of five (about 4 thousand aircraft), 1 thousand aircraft of the allies of Germany, are more than half of guns and mortars of Fascist Germany (44 thousand) and 6 thousand guns of its satellites - they were also cast against the USSR ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of great patriotic war, Inv. No 17936, p 52, 862. The data about the armed forces of Fascist Germany in comparison with the data, given in

the first volume of this edition, are refined. In the text of the sixth volume the specifications are produced and on certain others numerical data, that contains in the preceding/previous volumes of the "history of the Great Patriotic War". ENDFOOTNOTE.

Of the total number of active German armed forces of 5975 thousand people in the war begun against the USSR took part 4600 thousand, i.e., 77 of personnel '.

Ibid
FOOTNOTE '. ~~There~~, p 862. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Ground forces, isolated for the attack in the USSR, were 3300 thousand people ', or 82 percent of the total strength of operating land army.

Ibid
FOOTNOTE '. ~~There~~, pp. 42, 52. ENDFOOTNOTE.

For the length of all subsequent four years of the Second World War Soviet-German front continued to remain the main thing. This is distinctly evident from the given to p 26 tables of the distribution of the land forces of Fascist Germany according to the fronts of the Second World War and territories occupied. Table shows that to opening of the second front, i.e., prior to the middle of 1944, more

than of two thirds German-fascist divisions were located on the Soviet-German front. Into these divisions entered almost three fourths personnel of the land forces of enemy. Against the Anglo-American military forces it acted altogether only from 0.9 to 6.1 percent of the general/common/total composition of ground forces of Germany. Thus, during the first three years of the Great Patriotic War the Red Army fought, actually, face to face against the Hitler hordes.

The basic efforts/forces of USA and England at this time were concentrated in North Africa, and

then in Italy, at a distance of several thousand kilometers from the main thing, Soviet-German, front.

From the table it is also evident that after opening of the second front the number of ground forces of Germany at the Western and Italian fronts was raised to 25-37.8 percent of their general/common/total operating composition.

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However, the greatest number of Fascist-German divisions - from 55.6 to 57 percent - was as before riveted to the Soviet-German front.

If we to this add that besides the German military forces against the USSR it acted from 37 (during June 1941) to 72.5 divisions (during November 1942) of the allies of Fascist Germany², and on other theaters of war it was located to 8 Italian divisions (in Africa) and 9 Italian divisions (in Sicily), then will become completely obvious the immeasurably greater heat of struggle at the Soviet-German front.

FOOTNOTE². See the damage/defeat of German imperialism in the Second World War. Articles and documents. M. Voenizdat, 1960, p 89.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In this case one should consider that against the Soviet military forces acted the most combat-effective German large units/formations, whereas at other fronts and on the territories occupied it was found the less prepared, insufficiently manned and weakly equipped German-fascist units and large units/formations. Even at this front as Western according to of the chief of staff of this front of German General Z. Westphal, acted military forces weaker than on the Soviet-German front. "It was widely-known, indicates Westphal, that the combat efficiency of German military forces in the West already up to the moment/factor of invasion (on 6 June, 1944)

was considerably lower than the combat efficiency of our divisions in the east..."³.

FOOTNOTE ³. S Westphal. Heer in Fesseln. Bonn, 1950, S 264.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

And subsequently, after opening of the second front, the qualitative composition of Fascist military forces in the West was not improved, but it is faster, it deteriorated, since eastern Front absorbed newer and newer forces of Germans.

Distribution of the ground forces of Fascist Germany in 1941-1945 ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of great patriotic war, inv. NO 17936, pp. 763, 862-863. Composition, grouping and the regrouping of ground forces of Fascist Germany and Fascist Italy out of the Soviet-German front during the period of 1941-1945. Iss. first. M. 1963, pp. 14, 92, 216; composition, grouping and regrouping of ground forces of Fascist Germany out of the Soviet-German front during the period of 1941-1945. Iss. second. M. 1963, pp. 14, 66, 192. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Сухопутные силы Германии	(4) Дата					
	22 июня 1941 г.	1 мая 1942 г.	1 июля 1943 г.	1 января 1944 г.	1 июня 1944 г.	1 января 1945 г.
(6) Общее количество действующих сухопутных войск Германии (дивизий расчетных) ⁶ . . .	217,5	236,5	297	318	326,5	314,5
Из них:						
На советско-германском фронте	153	181,5	196	201	181,5	179
В процентах к действующим сухопутным войскам	70,3	77	68	63,3	55,6	57
(7) На других фронтах	2	3	8	19,5	81,5	119,2
В процентах к действующим сухопутным войскам	0,9	1,1	2,7	6,1	25	37,8
(6) На оккупированных территориях и в Германии	62,5	52	93	97,5	63,5	16,5
В процентах к действующим сухопутным войскам	28,8	21,9	31,3	30,6	19,4	5,2

Key: (1). Land forces of Germany. (2). June. (3). May. (4). Date.

(5). January. (6). Total number of operating ground forces of Germany

(divisions of estimated ones) ¹. (7). No key.

FOOTNOTE ¹. During the calculation of the forces of enemy with a number of divisions are connected the brigades; two brigades are equated to one division. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(8). From them: at Soviet-German front, in percent of active ground forces (9). At other fronts ... in percent of active ground forces. (10). In occupied territories and in Germany. (11). In percentages to operating ground forces.

FOOTNOTE ². From them 12 divisions acted against the people's liberation army of Yugoslavia. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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About this eloquently testifies the chief of staff of army group "G" former Hitler General F. Mellentin. Speaking about the events in the West European theater operations during September - October 1944, he writes: "military forces, which were being found under our command element, were improbably variegated: there were here soldiers from different air force units, policemen, old men and adolescents, were

even special battalions from the people, which suffer stomachic diseases or aural diseases/illnesses. Even the well armed units which arrived from Germany, actually passed no preparation/training and struck directly from the educational parade ground on the field of battle" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. F. Mellentin. Tank battles 1939-1945 M. Publishing house of foreign literature, 1957, p 262. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Deserves attention the fact that in the territories occupied and in Germany itself the Hitlerites kept to 30 percent of their military forces, which were in essence reserve for the Soviet-German front ².

FOOTNOTE ². IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 17936, pp. 862-863. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The unit of these forces was used resistance in the countries of Western Europe. Even after opening of the second front Germans forced were to keep in the territories occupied of approximately 20 percent of their military forces.

As far as combat materiel of Fascist army is concerned, it on entire duration of war was concentrated mainly at the Soviet-German front. Thus, guns and the mortars of enemy at our front it was

counted from 52 to 75 percent, tanks and assault guns - about two thirds, combat aircraft - from 50 to 60 percent '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, main and most combat-effective forces of ground forces and aviation of Fascist Germany were concentrated at the Soviet-German front, which retained also after the landing of allies in Western Europe its main thing, decisive importance. But the fronts, at which acted other participants in the anti-Hitlerite coalition, were the secondary directions/axes of the Second World War. Conclusion about the decisive importance of the Soviet-German front remains valid and with the evaluation of the role of the ocean theaters of the Second World War.

It is known that the combat operations of the Navies in the Mediterranean and in Atlantic were directly subordinated to the armed struggle at the land fronts. Combat operations in the basin of the Pacific Ocean as in other theaters, it depended on outcome of the struggle against the main enemy of antifascist coalition - Hitler Germany, i.e., from the events at the Soviet-German front. The defeat of the armies of Fascist bloc at the Soviet-German front in 1942-1943 and those victories of the USSR over Hitler Germany they contributed to the undermining of the political and strategic power of Japanese

imperialism. The final outcome of the tightening itself armed struggle on Pacific Ocean was solved as a result of the rout of Japanese ground forces, and, first of all, Kwantung army in the northeastern China. It is no coincidence Anglo-American ruling circles intensely strove the entrance of the USSR into the war against Japan.

How intense was the struggle at the Soviet-German front in comparison with other fronts? With the response to this question one should proceed from the fact that the activity of combat operations, their tension depend, first of all, on the resoluteness of the political purposes presented. Good volume as illustration serve military events in the West in the period of the so-called "phoney war." The tendency of the ruling circles of England and France to turn war against the USSR and absence in them of decisive goals in the struggle with Fascist Germany led them to a passive-defensive strategy. This did not fail to use German fascism. It increasingly more increased its forces.

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The direct dependence of the combat activity of army on the character of the political purposes in war especially vividly was revealed at the Soviet-German front. If the tendency of Hitlerites was reduced to annihilate the USSR and to convert Soviet people into

the slaves, after destroying their significant part, then before the Soviet people stood the problem - to eliminate Hitler fascism and its army, to help out from captivities of Soviet people, which fell under under the yoke of German occupation, and to render assistance the enslaved peoples of Europe. The diametric opposition of the goals of Germany and USSR gave rise to lack of compromise and maximum tension of the armed struggle between the Hitler and Soviet armies for the immense elongation/extent of front.

The Soviet-German Front existed much more prolonged time and on its extent considerably exceeded any another theater operations. The Soviet Armed Forces fought 1418 days at the front from 3 to 6 thousand kilometers, while at 300-kilometer Italian front the struggle lasted 663 days, and the western Front whose extent did not exceed 800 kilometers, there existed only of 338 days. At the Soviet-German front of the active combat days (i.e., the days when struggle it continued uninterruptedly in connection with offensive operations of one of the sides) were counted by 1320, in Italian - 492, while on West - 293 ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See damage/defeat of German imperialism in the Second World War, p 89. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The index of the high intensity of the armed struggle of the

USSR with Hitler Germany was the absence of seasonality in the conduct of combat operations. Our military forces solved important strategic problems not only in summer, but also in any other season: into the winter cold, into the spring mire, and in the autumnal slush. Of course this year-round conduct of operations/processes would be impossible, if Soviet socialist state did not supply front continuously, also, into entire the increasing sizes/dimensions with the necessary human and material resources.

Certainly, and the imperialistic states had the economic possibilities to ensure continuity and high activity of the armed struggle. As an example it is possible to give Germany. But these possibilities, as showed the experience of war, were not and we could not be completely used due to the competition of monopolies, existence of class contradictions, or because not one bourgeois army could maintain/withstand this prolonged physical and moral stress/voltage such as it was necessary to test the Red Army. As far as USA and England are concerned, here far not latter/last role played even the indecision of the strategic goals, set by the dominant classes of these countries in the struggle with Hitler Germany.

The most important index of the main role of the Soviet-German front in the Second World War are the enormous losses of the

Fascist-German military forces at this front. If we summarize data on the losses of enemy, then the total number of large units/formations only of Fascist Germany, annihilated and routed at the Soviet-German front for entire war, will compose 507 divisions of 587, with which the Red Army carried on a struggle in the different time. This ⁱⁿ 3.3 times exceeds strength of Fascist land army, which invaded within the limits of our native land '.

FOOTNOTE '. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, pp. 861, 864. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Furthermore, not less than 100 divisions lost at the eastern Front of forces of satellites of Germany. However, allies routed in North Africa, Italy and Western Europe 176 hostile divisions.

At the Soviet-German front were routed main forces of Fascist aviation. In 47 months of war the Germans lost in combat with the Red Army to 77 thousand aircraft '.

FOOTNOTE '. ^{ibid} There, p 864. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In Western Europe were annihilated about 8 thousand German aircraft, in Mediterranean theater - almost 9 thousand, on the Balkans - it is more than 7.5 thousand '.

FOOTNOTE 4. See "Military History Journal," 1959, No 9, p 53.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

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However, the total losses of Air Force of Germany in the Second World War comprise a little larger 100 thousand aircraft. Thus, on the the Soviet-German front are more than of all three fourths losses of the aviation of enemy. Furthermore, was here annihilated largest part of the artillery guns of fascist Germany (167 thousand) and tanks (48 thousand) 1.

FOOTNOTE 1. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, p 864. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Different scales and degree of the tension of the armed struggle determined the enormous difference in the human losses, carried by Hitler military forces at the Soviet-German front and at other fronts.

In the first two years of war against the USSR Germany lost in killed, wounded (not returning to their units), missing in action and

in prisoners of war 4126 thousand people. For the length of the third year of war the Germans lost 2400 additional thousand soldiers and officers. Thus, the total losses of the German armed forces in three years of war against the USSR comprise more than 6500 thousand people².

FOOTNOTE². See the Second World War 1939-1945. Military history outline. M. Voenizdat, 1958, p 840. ENDFOOTNOTE.

If we to this add losses of the Hitlerites in the subsequent months of war up to its termination, and also the loss, carried by personnel of German aviation and navy for entire war against the Soviet Union, then the human losses of Fascist Germany at our front will increase to 10 mln., which comprises more than 73 percent of all losses of Germany in the Second World War (13600 thousand people)³.

FOOTNOTE³. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, p 864. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Here is that price which paid the German people for the bloody adventure of German imperialism. It is important in this case to note that from 3600 thousand of soldiers and officers, lost Germans at other fronts, to the period up to 1944 are only 178 thousand people, or into 30 and the more of times it is less than during the same

period at the Soviet-German front '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The armies of European states - the satellites of Fascist Germany lost been killed more than 1580 thousand soldiers and officers and wounded 578 thousand, and militarist Japan killed and by prisoners of war lost about 2 mln. people, of them one third as a result of the rout of Kwantung army '.

FOOTNOTE '. Op. cit. No 18535, p 65. ENDFOOTNOTE.

For the completion/replenishment of losses the Hitlerites conducted the so-called total mobilizations, they re-formed and were restored the routed units and large units/formations, were created new formations. In the course of war at the Soviet-German front were newly hammered together 165.5 divisions '.

FOOTNOTE '. Op. cit., inv. No 17936, p 861. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In this case prior to the beginning of Kursk battle for Fascist-German command element still it was possible to complete

loss/depreciation in the manpower, but already in second half of 1943 of loss in the people, according to the data of German general staff, they were completed only by 60 percent '.

FOOTNOTE '. See "military history journal," 1960, No 5, p 87.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

To the Soviet-German front the Hitlerites forced were to continuously transport from the countries of Western Europe and others occupied by them states a maximally possible number of large units/formations, considerably weakening the forces, which acted against the Anglo-American military forces. Thus, in the years of war the Fascist-German command element directed toward our front from all other theaters operations and from the reserve of 268.5 divisions '.

FOOTNOTE '. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, p 861. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The movement of German troops to the Soviet-German front did not cease even when Englishmen and Americans activated/promoted their activities at Western and other fronts. For example, after the landing of allies in North Africa (November 1942 g) the Fascist-German command element continued to guide military forces from the West to the east.

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 02722

1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV


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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

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From November 1942 through April 1943 to the Soviet-German front it arrived from France of 20 divisions, from Holland, Norway, Denmark and Germany - 15. As a result a quantity of the Fascist-German military forces, acted against of the Red Army, in spite of rout and annihilation of the number of their large units/formations, it increased by 13 divisions ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See damage/defeat of German imperialism in the Second World War, p ⁹ 86. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the period of the initiation of the combat operations of the Anglo-American military forces in Italy from April through December 1943 Hitler command element directed from the West to the east to 40 divisions, which again led to an increase in the Fascist-German military forces at our front ².

FOOTNOTE ². IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, p 584. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Even opening of the second front in Europe did not prevent the

Fascist-German command element from continuing the transportation of reserves to the Soviet-German front. During half a year after the landing of allies in Normandy were relocated for dealing with the Red Army, on the whole, 66.5 German divisions. Within the same time from the Soviet-German front, mainly for the reorganization and the replenishment after rout, diminished into the countries of Europe 14.5 German divisions '.

FOOTNOTE '. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, p 741. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The forced transportation of large/coarse forces from other theaters of war to the Soviet-German front considerably complicated to Hitlerites conducting operations/processes against the Anglo-American military forces. "Intense, that absorb people and technology combat in the east, wrote the former chief of the General Staff of ground forces of Germany colonel general G. Guderian, adversely affected the equipment of western front to repel the invasion of allies" '.

FOOTNOTE '. Results of the Second World War. Collector/collection of the article. M. Publishing house of foreign literature, 1957, p 131. ENDFOOTNOTE.

All these facts convincingly tell about the decisive role of the Soviet-German front in the Second World War, about absorption by it of the main forces of German military forces, about its powerful influence on other theaters of war.

The victories, gained in the struggle with the Hitler Germany did not come easy to the to the Soviet Union. For our people the last war was heaviest of all known to history. This war cost us enormous losses. The USSR sustained the greatest loss in people (20 mln. people) '.

FOOTNOTE '. See "international life", 1961, No 12, p 8. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Half of them almost compose the peaceful inhabitants and prisoners of war, killed and tortured by Hitlerites on occupied Soviet territory '.

FOOTNOTE '. TsGAOR [99sp05 - Central State Archives of theOctober Revolution], f. 7021, op. 116, d. 246 "6", 1. 3. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Considerable victims carried the population of the Soviet rear in result of the blockade of cities and aerial bombings. Hundreds of thousands of our people were destroyed in the concentration camps in the territory of Germany.

Great losses in the struggle with the aggressors carried also China (10 mln. people), Poland (it is more than 6 mln. people), Yugoslavia (1706 thousand people) and other peoples of the countries occupied.

FOOTNOTE 7. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18535, p 65. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, the losses of allies on the anti-Hitlerite coalition, the long time avoiding from the active struggle with Fascist Germany, were comparatively small. Thus, for instance, England lost in this war 375 thousand killed, and together with the casualties of its loss are 744400 people. The USA at all fronts and in ocean theaters lost 1076 thousand people, including 405 thousand killed 8.

FOOTNOTE 8. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In comparison with other countries the war caused the Soviet Union greatest material loss. The Fascist-German aggressors destroyed on our earth/ground 1710 cities also of urban type settlements, converted into the ruins more than 70 thousand ^{Towns} villages and villages, after leaving without the roof of approximately 25 mln. people.

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They annihilated in full or in part almost 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 65 thousand kilometers of railway lines, ransacked 98 thousand kolkhozes, 1876 state farms and 2890 machine-and-tractor stations The material harm, caused to our country, is 679 billion rubles (in the prewar prices) ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the collector/collection of the statements to extreme state commission about the crimes of the Fascist-German aggressors. M. Gospolitizdat, 1946, pp. 429-430. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, from analysis of the various belligerentsinvolved in the Second World War and the scale and nature of their armed struggle, it follows that the Soviet Union played the decisive role in the rout of the main force of Fascist bloc - Hitler Germany and its allies. In the of the Great Patriotic War were annihilated main forces of ground forces and aviation of Fascist Germany, which involved the break-up of entire Hitler military and state vehicle both in Germany itself and in those occupied by it the countries. At the Soviet-German front occurred the main events of the Second World War, which had the decisive effect on the outcome of the struggle of the anti-Hitlerite

coalition against Fascist Germany and imperialist Japan.

The Soviet Armed Forces, after carrying out a basic break/fracture in the entire Second World War, after inflicting the destructive defeat of the Fascist-German army, freed the peoples of central and southeastern Europe from Fascist plague and saved humanity from the threat of Nazi enslavement. They routed also the main striking power of Japanese militarists - the Kwantung army and the fact they helped the peoples of China, Korea and other countries to begin the construction of new life.

In the war with the Fascist-German aggressors to the armed forces of the USSR great aid rendered Soviet partisans, who developed merciless national struggle with the enemy on by temporarily occupied by it territory.

Together with the Red Army actively fought Polish and Czechoslovak military forces, people's liberation army of Yugoslavia, and in the final stage of the war - Rumanian and Bulgarian units and of large unit/formation.

Important role in the rout of Fascist Germany and militarist Japan played the movement of the resistance of the peoples of Europe and Asia. It diverted the large/coarse forces of enemy,

weakened/attenuated the rear of Fascist bloc, blasted/undermined/blew up its moral and economic resources. In the course of combined struggle with the enemy was conceived and got stronger combat friendship between the peoples of the USSR and central and southeastern Europe, and also between the peoples of other countries of Europe and Asia.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Fascist Germany and its satellites rightfully occupies the main place in the Second World War. The Soviet people and its armed forces on their shoulders carried out the basic burden of the Second World War and attained world-wide historical victory. Somebody would want to become silent or to humble the significance of our victory. But this no one will succeed. The feat of the Soviet people will not fade in the centuries, as cannot fade anything that is truly great. It will always live in the memory not only of our contemporaries, but also coming generations, because by their feat Soviet people saved the future all humanity.

4. Laws governing the victory of the Soviet Union.

The victory of the Soviet Union above the forces of international reaction generated general/universal interest in the first in the world socialist country.

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Millions of people abroad are still more attentive than before, they began to be looked at our native land, desiring to obtain truthful response to the vital questions: why could Soviet state overcome this strong and dangerous enemy, as Fascist Germany; how it was caused the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War; in what consists the might of the USSR. Questions about the reasons, about the laws governing our victory it is the object/subject of sharp/acute ideological struggle.

In the beginning of the war when above our country hung lethal danger, many political and military men of the West openly prophesied the unavoidable and fast death of the Soviet Union in the single combat with Hitler Germany. When very life reversed these prophecies, especially after the rout of the Fascist-German military forces in Volga, the ideological armor-bearers of imperialism began in haste to be reformed/redisposed. Attempting to hide from the wide world community the authentic reasons for the victory of the USSR, its decisive role in the rout of German fascism, they addressed about the "mysteriousness" of Russian soul, about the "miracle", etc.

The majorities of bourgeois ideologists and political workers deny laws governing the victory of the Soviet Union, attempt the main reasons for the victory of the Soviet country and damage/defeat of Fascist Germany to reduce to unessential, secondary factors and different chances.

One of the ideologists of German militarism, G. Ritter, considers that the damage/defeat of Germany - "blind case of history", the fateful confluence of circumstances. Other bourgeois authors, including English and American (B. Liddel Hart, J. Fuller, O. Bradley), in the first place place the so-called "natural" reasons for the damage/defeat of Hitler Germany: the severity of Russian climate, weather conditions, great spaces of the Soviet Union, etc. It goes without saying, these and similar to them circumstances had on the course of war a known effect, impeding now and then the conduct of combat operations. But the supporters of such views not entirely in the harmonies with the logic: they for some reason forget, or more precisely to say, they do not want to see that these difficulties equally existed for both sides, which was necessary to overcome them not are only they were German, but also to Soviet military forces.

Possession by vast spaces is, of course, the definite advantage of our country. However, not space, but the Soviet Armed Forces

stopped and then routed the Fascist-German hordes. Indeed it is known that the Hitlerites, using in the beginning of war the unfavorably established for the USSR conditions, passed on our earth/ground many hundreds of kilometers, close approached Moscow and Volga coasts, but those remaining several ten kilometers (to Moscow) and even hundreds of meters (to Volga) overcome could not. And vice versa, the Red Army not only successfully crossed enormous distances, it forced the largest water obstacles - Dnepr, Danube, the Vistula, Oder, overcame the mountain arrays of Carpathians, but also routed enemy in his own territory, forcing Fascist military forces to the unconditional surrender. As it turns out, space is not at all the issue here. There are no on itself impervious/impassable terrains themselves and impregnable lines. They become impervious/impassable and impregnable, if them protect stable ones, strong by spirit military forces, supported by the entire power of the free people.

Are so/such groundless and unscientific attempts at those bourgeois historians and former Hitler Generals who to the foreground advance the personality of Hitler and search for the reasons for the damage/defeat of Germany mainly in his political and strategic miscalculations. Certainly, the miscalculations of Hitler, and sizable, were in the strategic planning, and they negatively had effect on waging of war by Fascist Germany. But this could not substantially influence the outcome of struggle against the Soviet

Union. References to Hitler's errors cannot explain that obvious fact that Fascist Germany, which possessed in the beginning of war enormous military and economic advantages, steadily lost them in the course of the armed struggle and was defeated, but the Soviet Union, which began war under the extremely severe conditions, from year to year increased its forces and it routed aggressors.

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← The issue here, therefore, not so much in Hitler's himself miscalculations, as in other, namely: in the superiority of the socialist order of the USSR and his army, or in the organic defects, inherent in capitalist to the formation/order of Fascist Germany, in the inability of its military-political leadership to evaluate the actual correlation of forces. To the correct understanding of a question about the correlation of forces were inclined some sensibly thinking representatives of the former Hitler general officers (for example, F. Paulus, V. Seidlitz, V. Mueller/Muller). But they were exclusion.

The ideologists of cold war least of all are concerned by the searches/scannings for the actual reasons for collapse of Hitler Germany in the struggle with the Soviet Union. Falling down fault for the damage/defeat of Germany to Hitler, they attempt to ~~whiten~~ ^{vindicate} robber

THE EPIC OF THE RED ARMY IS IMMORTAL.



Polish People's Republic. Memorial to Soviet and Polish soldiers who were lost in the battles to free Warsaw.



People's Republic of Bulgaria. Monument erected in Sofia in memory of the Red Army's mission of freedom.




Hungarian People's Republic. Memorial to Soviet soldiers in Budapest.

Rumanian People's Republic. In commemoration of the soldiers of the Red Army who died near Bucharest.



THE EPIC OF THE RED ARMY IS IMMORTAL.




Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic. Opening of monument to Soviet soldiers who freed Bratislava.



Norway. Memorial to Soviet soldiers who died in the Second World War (Oslo, "Vestre Gravlyund" Cemetery).



Chinese People's Republic. Opening of a monument to Soviet soldiers who died while freeing North-Eastern China.



Korean People's Democratic Republic. Memorial to freedom on the Moranbon mountain erected in honor of the Red Army.

Nazi army, to justify the Fascist General Staff whose activity was not separated from the Hitler leadership and it was completely forwarded by them.

At the same time the unit of the bourgeois workers and historians develops more radical views on the reasons for the damage/defeat of Hitler Germany. The West German historians of the Second World War G. Jacobsen, A. Hillgruber, Yu. Rover, R. Hoffman consider that the war of Germany against the USSR was adventure, that it was lost even before it were begun. However, during the explanation of this correct view the mentioned authors reduce entire work furthermore to the miscalculations, to the underestimation by the heads of Fascist Germany, and, first of all, by Hitler, the political, economic and military might of the Soviet country. It means, and they during the explanation of the reasons for the damage/defeat of Germany to the foreground advance subjective moments/factors, denying an objective-causal connection/bond of military-political events.

Depicting the course of war against the Soviet Union as fateful for the German imperialism the circuit of chances and miscalculations, its apologists try to conduct absurd thought, that with other confluence of circumstances this war could end by other entirely results. This is not than different as by the basis of the

policy of revanchism.

Thus, the political meaning of the bourgeois concepts, which deny laws governing the victory of the Soviet Union and damage/defeat of Hitler Germany in the Second World War, is reduced to diminish the might of the Soviet people and its armed forces, to minimize the role of the socialist country in the conquest of victory, to ideologically service the igniters of the new war, planned in the interests of monopolist capital.

The victory of the USSR on by Fascist Germany has deep social roots, comprehensive objective conditionality. It was most intimately connected with the correlation of the struggling forces in the war. The dependence of the successful outcome of war on the character of the social system and role of national masses in the system of state is the most important and being determining by conformity with the law victory. This conformity with the law is caused by the course of the development of society and it is directly connected with the activity of its fundamental laws. However, together with the general laws governing the victory there are a laws governing the armed struggle, which although depends on the first, it possesses its particular features.

Modern war, as testifies experience 1914-1918 and 1939-1945,

indicates particular state in the life of society. It is the greatest crisis, the critical moment/factor in its development. In the wars of states and classes of opposite social systems on the map/chart/card is placed the fate of political and economic formation/order. The armed struggle requires the mobilization of all material and spiritual forces of the people, in its interests is reformed/redisposed entire public life. This, of course, does not mean that the armed struggle becomes the fundamental and independent principle of all social development. no, it as other social phenomena, it is headed by the policy, the state, which finds its expression for the political purposes of the wars which, according to the thinking of V. I. Lenin, have on it the decisive effect. To this one should add that the armed struggle leans on the economic resources of the country, expended, first of all, to the maintenance/servicing of the needs of front. Thus, the outcome of the armed struggle is directly connected with the political purposes of war, with the economy of the belligerent state.

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All this is extremely important for the correct understanding of the objective conditionality of the victory of the Soviet Union and damage/defeat of Fascist Germany in 1945.

Specifically, in the fight of the USSR to Hitler Germany was formed and vividly was revealed this conformity with the law. In fact, in the first period of war German-fascist hordes moved far into the depth of our country. Soviet state of defensive capacity. At the same time in this most difficult period of war were created the necessary conditions for its basic break/fracture. The Soviet people, after converting its country into the uniform military camp, reflected under the leadership of the Communist Party the terrible danger, which hung over above our native land, brought to aggressors in the battle in the environs of Moscow the first large/coarse damage/defeat and attained a known change of the correlation of forces into its benefit. This to a considerable extent predetermined further course of the entire armed struggle.

It is no accident the second period of war was marked by basic break/fracture at the Soviet-German front. Because of the heroic efforts of the toilers of the rear was eliminated the superiority of the Fascist-German army in the military technology. Heavy damage/defeat in Volga seriously cracked the moral spirit of German soldiers and officers, undermined their faith/belief in the victory of Fascist Germany. In the Kursk battle was broken the ridge/spine of Hitler army. Germany increasingly more lost hope for the success in the war unleashed by it. However, enemy continued still bitter to oppose/resist, and struggle with it required from Soviet people of

great efforts/forces and victims.

In the third period of patriotic war the armed forces of the USSR already routed enemy on by it occupied the territory of Europe, also, in Germany itself. Having a presentiment unavoidable damage/defeat, Hitlerites took all measures to the fact that to increase the resistance of the Red Army, considering not what losses. This complicated the struggles of Soviet people. But all pangs of Fascist heads were vain. Soviet military forces routed the Fascist-German army and victoriously completed war. So objective laws governing our victory broke through to itself route/path in the lethal struggle with the enemy through the greatest difficulties and obstacles.

This regularity was determined by superiority of the socialist social system over the capitalist. Our victory in the war with Germany - this is, first of all, the victory of socialism above the most reactionary force of imperialism - fascism. The Soviet Union, being the stronghold of the laborers of all world, pursued in the war valid, liberating goals, defended socialism. However, German fascism, as the stronghold of world imperialist reaction, attempted to carry out aggressive, adventurist goals.

The Soviet Union gained the victory over Hitlerite Germany

because our people protected its dear fatherland, it struggled for its native authority whose policy was correct and it completely related to the interests of masses. Nations and nationalities of our country in the uniform formation/order protected socialist state and bore liberation to other peoples, which were being located under the yoke of fascism. The elevated, liberating goals of the Soviet Union in the war with Fascist Germany were completely real, feasible, they corresponded to the economic, political, ideological and military possibilities of our state. These goals found the unanimous support of the laborers of other countries. The presence of such objective prerequisites/premises made a victory of the Soviet Union above the fascism of deeply regular.

German fascism was itself the reactionary, misanthropic social system. The political purposes escape/ensuing from its essence were alien to the German people. Those drawn in by Hitlerites in the predatory war, laborers of Germany were forced to fight for the interests of capitalist monopolies, for the enslavement of other countries. However, the obedience of wide masses in any way did not testify about durability/permanence of Hitler regime.

End Section.

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
Moreover, German imperialism, after advancing the delirious plan of the conquest of world supremacy, excessively overestimated its economic, political and military possibilities. With the realization of this plan Hitler Germany unavoidably encountered new world factor - victoriously developing socialism and with the decisive resistance of all freedom-loving peoples. The rapacious strivings of German imperialism met also opposition on the part of stronger economically capitalist competitors, for example with the USA.

Should be noted still the circumstance that the German imperialists in their policy relied mainly on the force of weaponry and hard mass terror. Destroying millions in nothing not of guilty people, they wanted to suggest to the peoples fear in order to paralyze their intention of resisting and thereby to maintain and to enlarge its supremacy. But, as teaches the experience of history, by the force of weaponry it is not possible for a prolonged time to impose on the freedom-loving peoples slavery and political regime objectionable to them. Fascist yoke and unprecedented crimes of

THE RED ARMY - THE LIBERATOR.



Band given to the artillery guard regiment from the people of Czechoslovakia.




To Soviet troops - from the Bulgarian peasants.




To the 3rd Cavalry Division of the Red Army - from the residents of Radzin (Poland).

To Soviet soldiers and officers - from workers of Mishkolets (Hungary).



THE RED ARMY - THE LIBERATOR.




To the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front - from the workers of Belgrade (Yugoslavia).



To the Soviet troops - from the workers of Vienna (Austria).



Letter of thanks to the Red Army liberators written by many thousand Chinese citizens (Harbin, 1946).



To the Red Army - from the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers' Party.

Hitler monsters did not break the will of masses to the resistance. On the contrary, these crimes caused everywhere an even greater hatred for the Fascist enslavers and tendency to put an end to Nazism.

Thus, the damage/defeat of German imperialism was caused historically. In it were revealed general laws governing our epoch: the inevitability of the death of that become obsolete of capitalist system and victory of the new social system - socialism.

Objective laws governing our victory were realized by the Soviet people headed by the Communist Party, by its central committee. This is why deeply erroneous ones should be considered the explanation of our victories in the last war "brilliant leadership" one person - I. V. stalina. This explanation, widespread in the period of personality cult when Stalin extolled as the "greatest troop leader/general of all times and peoples", is right through subjectivist, it contradicts Marxism-Leninism, since it does not reveal objective laws governing our victory, will humble the role of the party and people.

Certainly, Stalin had an effect on the successful course of war. To it was charged great responsibility for the organization of the resistance to German aggressors - it headed the state committee of defense (GKO), he was the supreme commander-in-chief. Stalin, as

other party and statesmen, had services in the organization of the rout of enemy, to it believed Soviet people, since he and the people had one goal - to shield the Soviet native land. But at the same time Stalin misused by authority, he flagrantly violated the Leninist principles of collective leadership, subjectively was estimated international situation. As a result it did not note new phenomena in the development of the general crisis of capitalism, it committed large/coarse errors with the appraisal of the real threat of the attack of Hitler Germany in the Soviet Union, during training of the country and army for the defense.

The greatest difficulties of the first, heaviest for the USSR period of war were aggravated by the personality cult of Stalin and by the errors allowed by it. After several months the country lost Ukraine, Belorussia, Baltic States, Moldavia, number of the RSFSR regions. In order to somehow justify its miscalculations, Stalin declared these large/coarse failures unavoidable ones, after advancing in this case inaccurate situation about the fact that the aggressive nations allegedly are better they are prepared to the war than nation peaceful.

In the course of war Stalin committed other serious errors, connected with the underestimation of forces and possibilities of enemy, and also with the leadership by military forces, about which

they testify, in particular, the heavy defeat of our military forces in the environs of Kiev in 1941, the insufficiently matched deployment of in winter 1941/42 of strategic offensive in all most important directions/axes, catastrophe in the environs of Kharkov in the spring of 1942. These miscalculations and failures cost us great victims. Meanwhile it would be possible to avoid them, if Stalin correctly presented to himself situation at the front and greater he considered the propositions of General Staff and military councils of fronts.

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Although Stalin's errors very dearly managed to the Soviet people, they were not changed into the organic defect of political and military leadership and those they could not prevent the victorious outcome of the Great Patriotic War. Why? Yes because personality cult actually opposed establishing in the years of the Soviet regime the really democratic system of social and political organizations which enveloped under the leadership of the Communist Party entire our people and in every possible way encouraged its initiative. In the purposeful and matched activity of this system of organizations with the invincible power became apparent collective reason and collective will of the Leninist party and Soviet people, which in reality sharply limited the individual activities of Stalin.

"It is known, it is discussed in the resolution by the CC CPSU "overcoming of the personality cult and its consequences", that precisely in the period of war the members of CC, and also the outstanding Soviet military leaders took in their hands the definite/determined sectors of activity in the rear and at the front, independently made decisions their organizational, political, economic and military work, together with the local party and Soviet organizations provided the victory of the Soviet people in the war"

1.

FOOTNOTE 1. On overcoming of the personality cult and its consequences. Resolution of the central committee of CPSU. M., Gospolitizdat, 1956, page 17. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The socialist social system maintained/withstood in the war comprehensive testing and it completely regularly revealed/detected its superiority over Fascist-imperialistic formation/order in all basic regions - economic, political, ideological and military. But indeed from the relationship/ratio of forces and possibilities in these regions depends the outcome of the war between the struggling sides.

The foundation of the military power of state is the economy which in a determining manner acts on course and outcome of war. Of

this repeatedly reminded one classics of Marxism-Leninism. "... victories and damages/defeats, wrote F. Engels, find to be dependent on material ones, i.e., economic, conditions..."³.

FOOTNOTE K. Marx and F. Engels. Works publ. 2. of Vol. 20, page 175.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

The same thought developed V. I. Lenin. He, in particular, indicated that for achievement of the success in modern war the economic organization of society is decisive. Marxist-Leninist situation about the role of economy in the war is even more applicable to the present conditions.

Powerful/thick economy makes it possible to maintain first-class army and to most fully provide with all her with necessary for the armed struggle. The decisive role here plays that unit of the production which in the case of war can be transferred into the military rails and used for the direct maintenance/servicing of the needs of front, and also the rates of issuing of high-quality production necessary for the army.

In this respect the socialist system of economy, based on the public property/ownership and which has planned/planning character, possesses the enormous advantages over capitalist economy.

In fact, to the socialist economy of the Soviet Union in the last war opposed the powerful/thick and well-organized economy of Fascist Germany. In comparison with other capitalist rivals the economic organization of Germany was characterized by the higher concentration of production and by the considerable growth of the state-monopolistic economic associations/unifications. This gave the possibility to the military and political government of Germany to more widely use resources of the country for waging of war, on the large/coarse scales to develop the production of military technology. The at the same time unprecedented militarization of German economy sharply increased its internal contradictions.

Approaching setting of world supremacy, German militarists long before the war began to reform/redispose their economy to a military footing. However, up to the moment/factor of attack in the Soviet Union they subordinated to their aggressive goals the economy of almost entire Europe. As a result Fascist Germany together with those occupied by it by the countries, without considering satellites, had available the industrial base of of more powerful/thicker (1.5-2 times), than the industrial base of the USSR.

And nevertheless, in spite of superiority in the production of the basic forms of production (cast iron, steel, carbon/coal) and high readiness of industry for waging of great war, Germany suffered military and economic break-up, actually, in the single combat with the Soviet Union. The socialist economy of the USSR proved to be stronger and it is more viable than the capitalist economy of Germany.

This is explained, first of all, by the character of the economic structure of the USSR. It is not possible to estimate the economic possibilities of the belligerent states only by the simple comparison of quantitative indices. It is here important to consider not only same these indices, but also capability of state to rapidly mobilize its material resources and to effectively use them for waging of war. But the latter, as is known, depends on the nature of the economic and political organization of society, on the character and the war aims.

During September 1917 V. I. Lenin wrote that the defensive capacity of the country, which overthrew the yoke of capital, which gave the earth/ground to peasants, that placed banks and factories under the working control, would be many times higher than defensive

capacity of the capitalist country ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 25, page 335. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This was said about Russia which was located then on the eve the October Revolution. The more correctly this Leninist situation with respect to the Soviet Union - the socialist country of conquered.

The socialist type of the economic organization of society with its planning principle is characterized by the comprehensive advantages over the capitalist system, corroded by competition and anarchy. In this is hidden one of the basic reasons for military superiority of the USSR over imperialistic states, which was especially convincingly proved in the last war.

In the close connection with the socialist economy in the conditions of modern war are located science and technology. Scientific-technical progress - most important condition for production-engineering and military-technological progress. In the course of war because of the daily attention to the party and government in our country was provided the high level of military-technological development. As a result of this Soviet military forces from year to year received more and it is more than the newest combat technology. Soviet armament - artillery, tanks,

aviation, rocket weapon - continuously was improved and throughout many its models exceeded both the German military technology and the weaponry of our allies. First-class combat technology, workshop possession of it played important role in the achievement by the Soviet Armed Forces of the victory over the Hitler army.

On the basis of the socialist system of economy arose the new social structure of the USSR, were strengthened the alliance of workers and peasants and the friendship of the peoples of the USSR. The Great Patriotic War demonstrated the unusual fortress of the multinational working-peasant state whose activity served as the powerful factor of our victory. Force and durability/permanence of Soviet state are based not only on the colossal economic power, on the socialized means of the productions which it keeps in its hands, but also on political unity of our society.

The Fascist-German state was generated by monopolist capital, it betrayed served it and was the gun of the oppression of national masses. During the years of war, as to it, the all-class interests of German imperialism came in the sharp contradiction with the particular, self-interested interests of individual monopolies. This weakened/attenuated Fascist state, it broke away its attempts to plan/glide and to regulate the economy of the country.

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Extensively using the crack in the numbers of working class, which arose through the fault of the right leaders of social-democracy, Hitlerites eliminated the earned by masses democratic freedoms. They made violence on the progressive-minded people of German nation. Only in eight years of Nazi dictatorship from the terror suffered more than 3500 thousand Germans ¹, of them more than 1 mln. it was included in the prisons and concentration of camp ².

FOOTNOTE ¹. See I. P. Traynin. Mechanism of the Fascist-German dictatorship. Tashkent, the State Publishing House of the Uzb.SSR, 1942, page 133. ². See antifascist movement of resistance in countries of Europe during years of Second World War. M., SOTSERGIZ [- State Publishing House of Literature on Social Sciences and Economics], 1962, page 692. ENDFOOTNOTE.

More than 200 thousand people were killed or tortured for the political convictions ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. See I. P. Traynin. Mechanism of the Fascist-German dictatorship, page 133. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Tens of thousands of activists of working class, representatives of different Democratic Party and Trade-union organizations perished from the hands of Fascist hangmen during the years of war.

In contrast to the state of capitalist monopolies socialist state serves as laborer to masses. Its policy expresses and protects the interests of the people, and therefore it is the most democratic state in the world. Socialist democracy highly raises the good quality of man of labor/work.

Relying on masses, being their gun during the decision of primary tasks, Soviet state created during the years of war the powerful military economy and the multimillion armed forces, equipped with first-class combat technology.

War, as is known, was necessary to increase the measures for constraint and centralization in the control of the country. But these measures were always combined with the democratism of our public system, with the nationality of the organs of the Soviet regime. The initiative of masses in the support of front, the fulfillment by them of their patriotic duty were truly unprecedented. Because of the titanic labor/work of Soviet people the Red Army had all necessary for the utter defeat of enemy.

The Soviet people gained victory not only because it exceeded enemy in the economic and political organization of society, but also because entire/all his activity was lit up by the bright light of Marxist-Leninist ideas.

With the victory of socialism and the elimination of exploiter classes, with the bloom of culture and the confirmation/assertion of socialist ideology in our country grew new type person, selflessly betrayed to the ideas of communism and to his native land. In the just war which conducted our people, Soviet patriotism was the greatest efficient force. It was revealed in selflessness and mass heroism of Soviet people.

The struggle of our peoples for the socialist order was simultaneous their struggle for national independence and state self-reliance. In the course of war Soviet people on their experience ascertained that against them was directed the main attack of German fascism with the goal eliminate their statemanship, to destroy and to enslave the peoples of the USSR. This even more strongly joined all nations and nationalities of our country.

The war of Soviet state against Hitler Germany and its allies was conducted under the sign of great liberating mission. The party and the Soviet government posed the problem of helping the peoples of

Europe to overthrow Fascist yoke. This made our society even more monolithic and it contributed to strengthening the international connections/bonds of socialist state with freedom-loving peoples which hand to hand with the Soviet people struggled with the fascism.

Thus, socio-political and ideological unity of our society, Soviet patriotism and internationalism played during the war the role of the most important factors, which predetermined the regular victory of the USSR over German fascism and its allies.

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What could set against the Soviet people, its state, and also our great ideas and goals the Hitler aggressors? They did not have the progressive ideas, which unite into one whole state and people. Fascists drew the laborers of Germany in bloody slaughter house for the interests of capitalists and prussian landowners with the price of the hard repression of avant garde of working class - communists, and also by means of the inventive stupefaction of masses, especially young people, by spectral hopes for enrichment in the war, by the chauvinistic slogans of "great Germany", the conquest of "lebensraum", etc. In order spiritually to enslave and to rape the people, Hitlerites extensively used different German reactionary views, theories and teachings, speculating at the same time on the

close ones to laboring masses the ideas of socialism, on patriotic feelings of masses.

In the ideological the mixing of German fascists was a definite/determined pivot - anticommunism and racial theory, sermon of beast nationalism and chauvinism. All this was designed for the preparation of the wide masses of population and entire Hitler army for the war against the Soviet Union, for setting of Fascist domination over above other peoples. However, these detachments completely failed. Against the German imperialists rose not only the enslaved by them peoples of Europe, but also former vassals of Fascist Germany - Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. This once more confirms that into contemporary epoch the struggle of all peoples of the world for the freedom and socialism determines the course of historical development.

The direct gun of war are the armed forces. They personify by themselves the combat power of state, inseparably connected with its economic potential, with the characteristics of the political organization of society, with the dominant ideology and the moral spirit of population, and also with its cultural level and technical preparedness. All social and economic possibilities, which is arranged/located the state, realize in the armed struggle the fighting armies, and each of them is approached to break in enemy

will struggle and to attain victory. In this case the outcome of war depends not only on the correlation of forces between the states and the armies, but also from the ways of conducting of combat operations and skillful leadership by them, i.e., from military art. the Soviet Armed Forces, being the creation of the new social system, demonstrated in reality their superiority over the Fascist army.

The Red Army and the navy in the struggle with the enemy were the main armed support of our state. In the course of war became even stronger destroyed connection/bond between the people and its army, was increased support by all its laborers of the USSR, increased respect for the Red Army on the part of the peoples of other countries. All this could not but fortify the armed forces of the USSR.

The valid, lofty aims of the wars for which struggled our army, made it still more powerful. Entire/all activity of Soviet soldiers was stimulated by such spiritual factors as the idea of the defense of the socialist fatherland, a feeling of international duty, Communist ideals. Without a fundamental understanding of the role of these stimuli it is not possible to understand the selfless activities of our soldiers and officers, who did not spare their life in the struggle for the native land.

However, the Fascist-German army fought for the robbery, the oppression and the destruction of other peoples. This could not ensure Germany high morale of its people and armed forces during entire war. In the beginning of the second world and Great Patriotic War when Hitler army accompanied successes, the fighting spirit of her soldier and officers was located on the rise, and then, in connection with the large/coarse damages/defeats at the Soviet-German front, their will to the struggle was undermined. And if enemy continued still bitter to oppose/resist to the end of the war, this was the perseverance of those doomed, doggedness of people, moved with thoughtless obedience and fear before the retribution for the crimes committed.

Enormous role in the provision of a might of the Soviet Armed Forces plays our military science. The Great Patriotic War confirmed the correctness of the fundamental bases of Soviet military science and showed its superiority over military science of Fascist Germany. Based on the Marxist-Leninist theory, our military science arms cadres with the valuable knowledge, in which is generalized the enormous experience of the struggle of the Red Army and the critically mastered experience of other armies.

Conduct by the Red Army of combat operations in accordance with the objective laws governing the armed struggle is provided by its

command cadres.

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They strive the necessary proportionality between the goals and the forces used and the means, adapting the ways of struggle to the new types of weaponry and to the new qualities of soldier. Soviet Generals and officers showed higher ability to fight, than the acknowledged German general officers and officer corps.

Enormous advantages and the inexhaustable possibilities of the socialist country skillfully used in the interests of its defense the Communist Party - leading force of our society. VKP(b) directed the entire activity of the Soviet people in the rear and at the front. The power of the party consists in its unity with the people, what is the guarantee of all our victories. There was no such unity of the ruling party with the national masses and it cannot be under the conditions of antagonistic society. the Communist Party possesses this powerful/thick ideological weaponry as the Marxist-Leninist ideology, which imparts to Soviet people the unbending hardness of spirit and indestructible will to the victory.

In the years of struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors our party, carrying out the correct policy, it precisely determined the

goals of the Soviet people in the war imposed on it and developed the program of the mobilization of all forces of the country to the resistance to enemy. It raised Soviet people to the merciless struggle with the aggressors, changed entire work of the rear to a military footing, in every possible way strengthened front as the main sector of the armed struggle, developed in the rear of occupationists patriotic struggle, and, first of all, partisan movement. With its educational work the party tempered the people ideologically. The rebuilding of the consciousness of Soviet people in the spirit of wartime and the manufacture in them of the necessary military characteristics had fundamental importance for the rout of enemy. Because of the correct leadership of the Communist Party the Soviet country was converted into the indestructible combat camp.

Thus, the victory of the Soviet Union above Fascist Germany and militarist Japan is deeply regular. The reactionary formation/order of these imperialist powers with their armies, brought up in the spirit of racism and militarism, opposed new social formation/order - socialism, new military organization - the Red Army, the new ideology - Marxism-Leninism. In the war with Fascist Germany and its allies gained victory the Soviet people, which constructed socialism, organized into more powerful the socialist state and led by the Communist Party hardened/tempered in combat.

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Chapter Two.

NATIONAL ECONOMY OF THE USSR DURING YEARS OF WAR.

1. General/common/total characteristics of development of military economy.

The Great Patriotic War was the cruelest testing for the socialist national economy. For any of the fought states never was necessary to organize military economy under such exclusively severe conditions. Many foreign workers in the first months of war considered that the economic situation of the Soviet country is completely hopeless. However, they were mistaken.

The Soviet Union knew how completely, and besides within the exclusively short period, to change its economy in accordance with the requirements of modern war and to create the military economy which proved to be more powerful/thicker than the military economy of Hitler Germany. Historical experience with the unusual force confirmed that the socialist system of economy has the enormous advantages over the capitalist system of economy not only under the

conditions for peaceful development, but also under war time, while the people, free from the political oppression and the exploitation, is capable of unprecedented heroism both in the fields of battles and at the labor front.

The fact that Fascist Germany, which was one of the capitalist states most developed economically, which had available enormous war economy potential and which was in advance prepared for armed aggression, suffered in the war with the Soviet Union destructive damage/defeat, makes it possible to draw some important conclusions. The main thing of them consists in the fact that the socialist system of economy, which is the new, higher step/stage of the economic development of society, is capable of maintaining/withstanding the most severe military tests and of ensuring the rout of aggressor.

In its policy the Communist Party is guided by Leninist situation about the fact that the economy plays role of one of the main factors in modern wars. V. I. Lenin even in the beginning of the XX century, on the experience of Russo-Japanese war, arrived at the conclusion that "the connection/bond between the military organization of the country and entire its economic and cultural formation/order never yet was so/such close as at present" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 8, page 36. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In the period of civil war the defense of the Soviet republic under V. I. Lenin's leadership leaned on the mobilization of all economic resources of the republic. Subsequently the construction and the rapid development of socialist economy were invariably examined both theoretically and virtually as the basis of an increase in the defensive capacity of Soviet state.

The successes of the economic policy of the party during the years of the Great Patriotic War were prepared by the entire previous persistent work of the Communist Party and Soviet people in all regions of public life. As early as 1927, when at the XV congress of VKP(b) were determined the bases of the first five-year plan, the Communist Party indicated that the economic construction must be conducted in such a way that would be provided the economic stability and the independence of the country under any conditions, including in the case of war. Specifically, this served the plans worked out by the party of socialist industrialization and cooperation of peasant economies.

At the beginning of the Second World War the Soviet Union was

the powerful industrial cooperative socialist state, which provided in essence to all to necessary national economy and armed forces. from year to year grew/rose the industrial power of the country it was developed and it was fortified collective farm formation/order, rose the material and cultural level of laborers. The Communist Party foresaw the probability of the attack of imperialists on our country and therefore it took measures for the rapid development of defense industry. New enterprises before the war were built so that they would be located nearer to the sources of raw material, they contributed to the economic development of the eastern areas of the country.

This had great defense significance. The Soviet Union achieved the considerable successes in the development of science, it had available the numerous cadres of the qualified specialists.

Striving strengthening and development of socialist society, the Communist Party posed before the people the basic economic problem - to overtake and to outdistance the most developed capitalist countries on production per capita of population.

Thus, our country in the pre-war years because of the correct policy of the Communist Party rapidly increased its economic possibilities and it created thereby the necessary conditions for the

deployment in the case of the war of powerful/thick military economy.

Nevertheless up to the moment/factor of attack in the USSR Fascist Germany had available considerably greater war economy resources than the Soviet Union. The reason for this consisted not only in the fact that the German imperialists, being prepared for aggression against the USSR, in advance increased the production of the most important military-strategic materials and forms of armament. The war economy potential of Germany grew considerably after the occupation by it of many countries of Europe with the developed industry. At the disposal of Fascist aggressors were found carbon mines/shafts, mines, steel foundry and Machine Building Plants of France, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, oil-extracting enterprises of Rumania, Hungary, Austria, production resources of Fascist Italy. If we moreover, consider that as long ago as 1941 in the German industry it worked more than 3 mln. foreign workers forcibly mobilized in occupied countries then it will become even clearer, what enormous war economy possibilities had available Fascist Germany.

The relationship/ratio of the production of the most important strategic materials at the beginning of war in Germany and in the USSR is shown in the table ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of TsSU of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18881, 1. 1; inv. No 9605, page 6; inv. No 18535, page 184.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Germany had considerably more than the USSR, carbon/coal and steel. Although the Soviet Union exceeded Germany on the extraction of oil, Germany had available the well developed industry, which produced synthetic ones combustible and lubricating oils.

By itself of course not all resources of Hitler Germany were used in the war against the Soviet Union. Their unit went for the satisfaction of the needs of war with England and other states of anti-Hitlerite coalition. But in essence nevertheless they were applied for the support of military operations at the Soviet-German front.

Estimating the correlation of forces at the beginning of war, one cannot fail to accept into the attention and the fact that in the preparation of Soviet economy for the war together with the successes were weak sides. In its development there were disproportions. The extraction of oil, the production of metals, chemical industry lagged

behind the needs of national economy. The developed in the east country of industry electric power was not sufficient. The technical reconstruction of rail transport completed yet could not be. Was insufficient the capacity of railroads in some areas of the country. Did not obtain the necessary development motor transport. Industry and transport felt considerable deficiency in the trained work force.

One of the weakest places in the Soviet economy was agriculture. and although I. V. Stalin at the XVIII congress of VKP(b) stated about the successful resolution of grain problem, it actually was not solved. This, of course, also determined the state of the stock raising whose development lagged far behind. Livestock of large/coarse cattle and sheep in 1940 was less than before the First World War. The main reason for this situation in the agriculture consisting in the fact that for many years was violated the Leninist principle of the material interest of collective farmers and all workers of agriculture in an increase in the carrying out of agricultural production.

On development of socialist economy and its timely preparation/training for the war heavily had effect the illegal mass repressions, by which in the period of personality cult underwent many honest, betrayed parties and the Soviet regime the leading workers of all branches of national economy. Some important sectors

of national economy, many large/coarse enterprises were deprived of the experienced, qualified heads. The economic life of the country negatively influenced the incorrect methods of leadership spreading by I. V. Stalin of national economy. Were violated the requirements of objective economic laws, serious questions were occasionally solved subjectively, without the necessary scientific basis. As a result the enormous possibilities of socialist economy were used insufficiently. In the period, which directly preceded the beginning of war, sharply were retarded the rates of increase in the production of some leading branches of industry.

production of the most important strategic materials in Fascist Germany and in the USSR in 1940 (in mln. of tons).

Стратегические материалы (1)	Собственно Германия (в границах 1937 г.) (2)	Германия вместе с сателлитами и оккупированными странами (3)	Советский Союз (4)
Уголь (в пересчете на каменный) ⁽⁵⁾	251,9	391,2	153,7
Сталь ⁽⁶⁾	19,1	30,9	18,3
Нефть ⁽⁷⁾	1,1	7,7	31,1

Key: (1). Strategic materials. (2). Strictly Germany (in the range of 1937). (3). Germany together with satellites and countries occupied. (4). Soviet Union. (5). Carbon/coal (in conversion to stone). (6). Steel. (7). Oil.

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Thus, the average annual rate of increase in the production of electric power, that in 1935-1937 was 19.9 percent, in 1938-1940 was lowered to 10.1 percent; the average annual rate of increase in the smelting of cast iron fell from 11.6 percent in 1935-1937 to one percent in 1938-1940.

In connection with the beginning of the Second World War and reinforcing of military danger for the USSR the party and the Soviet

government began conducting of the supplementary measures, directed toward that in order to accelerate the reequipment of the Red Army by the more advanced combat technology. However, at the beginning of war the Red Army for equipment status by the newest armament was inferior to the Fascist-German army. The begun reequipment of military forces by new combat technology was conducted slowly and it was designed for several years. This situation was created in any way because the Soviet country did not have available production capacities for the more rapid execution of the selected plans of reequipment. Possibilities were, but they were not used completely. In this, first of all, pronounced underestimation by Stalin the ripened military danger.

Situation even was further complicated by the fact that as a result of the forced retreat of the Red Army in the first months of war retired from the formation/order many enterprises of the defense industry, located in the western and partly central areas of the country. Were lost also the enormous reserves of armament, technology and ammunition concentrated in the western areas.

However, as far as Hitler army is concerned, it had considerable advantages as the basic types of combat materiel. Moreover, the new means of armament, which equipped the Fascist-German military forces, even to the attack in the Soviet Union passed a sufficient combat

testing and only after this was begun their series production. The industry of Germany, in advance transferred into the mass production of the newest models of tanks, aircraft and another armament, prepared them at the beginning of war incomparably more than Soviet industry. The high level of the motorization of Hitler military forces provided their maneuverability and mobility. They did not feel deficiency, also, in the ammunition.

And nevertheless Soviet state even in similar unbelievably severe conditions could solve the problem of logistic support of the deployed by it mass army, and then exceed Fascist coalition in the equipment of military forces with all newest combat materiel.

Specifically, in the successful resolution of this most difficult problem of war especially vividly was revealed the organizing role of the Communist Party. the party knew how to attain this superiority, relying on the advantages of the socialist system of economy, the patriotic enthusiasm of national masses and their labor enthusiasm.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War entire national economy of the Soviet Union worked in the interests of the defense of the socialist fatherland, it was military economy.

The multimillion armed forces, the enormous scales of military operations/processes continuously required a colossal quantity of armament, ammunition, transport means, fuel, clothing/uniform and provisions army in the field, aviation and the Navy it was not possible to supply any long time due to the reserves available at the beginning of war. The decisive source of the supply of material of the Red Army became production.

The problem of the supply of the armed forces - these are the problem of the organization of military production, and its, first of all, leading branch - military industry. But in modern war military industry tightly is interwoven with other branches of national economy, which serve front, and pours with them into the uniform military economy. The task of organizing the military production becomes, thus, by the task of organizing the military economy as a whole.

The efforts/forces of the Communist Party and organs of the Soviet regime during the Great Patriotic War were directed toward creation and development of the mounted military economy, capable ensure the utter defeat of fascism.

end section.

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The very beginning of the armed struggle with Hitler Germany Soviet military economy was created purposeful. During the years of war, as in the years of peaceful construction, our economy was developed according to the national-economic plans, in accordance with the policy of the Communist Party.

The development of the military economy of Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War passed two stages: the first - rebuilding of national economy to a military footing and the second increase in the mounted military economy. In general view the route/path, passed by Soviet economy in the years war, is characterized by following data:

Basic indices of the development of the economy of the USSR during the years of war (in percent for 1940) ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, page

16-23; inv. No 18759, sheets 15-16. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Показатели	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Национальный доход	92	66	74	88	83
(4) Валовая продукция промышленности . .	98	77	90	104	92
(5) В том числе продукция наркоматов авиационной, танковой промышленности, промышленности вооружения и боеприпасов	140	186	224	251	...
(6) Валовая продукция сельского хозяйства	62	38	37	54	60
(7) Грузооборот всех видов транспорта . .	92	53	61	71	77
(8) Капитальные вложения государственных и кооперативных организаций (без колхозов)	86	53	53	72	89
(9) Численность рабочих и служащих (в среднем за год)	88	59	62	76	87
(10) Объем розничного товарооборота государственной и кооперативной торговли (в сопоставимых ценах)	84	34	32	37	45
(11) Доходы государственного бюджета . . .	98	92	113	149	168

Key: (1). Indices. (2). Year. (3). National income. (4). Gross output of industry. (5). Among other things production of people's commissariats of air, tank industry, industry of armament and ammunition. (6). Gross production of agriculture. (7). Goods freight turnover of all forms of transport. (8). Capital investments of state and cooperative organizations (without kolkhozes). (9). Number of workers and employees (on the average in year). (10). Volume of retail commodity turnover of state and cooperative trade (in comparable prices). (11). Income of state budget.

In second half of 1941 the gross output of Soviet industry was 76 percent of the production, prepared in the second half-year of

1940, and if we take only November and December of 1941 - only half of the production, produced in these months in 1940 ².

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid, inv. No 9605, page 70. ENDFOOTNOTE.

These numbers clearly show those exclusively severe conditions, under which occurred the military rebuilding of the national economy of the USSR.

Before the Soviet country stood the most difficult task - urgently redeploing industry from the areas, which proved to be under the threat of occupation, into the deep rear and to develop there military production. This caused the unprecedented displacement of transport flows, it unusually complicated the work of railroads. In the new places moved more than 1360 large/coarse enterprises.

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Along the railroads since the beginning of the war prior to the end of 1941 there was transported almost 1.5 mln. cars of the evacuated cargoes, are crossed into the service areas more than 10 mln. people ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of

Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18922, 1. 1. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Mass evacuation during war — the work undoubtedly extremely complicated. Certain bourgeois military and political workers generally denied the possibility of any considerable evacuation under the conditions of modern war. The former war minister/Secretary of State for War of Poland General V. Sikorsky considered that "complete... or even the partial evacuation of great cities is not completely attainable... the use/application of evacuation on a large scale it would prevent rapid mobilization and troop concentration, and it would also completely destroy the normal life of nation, considerably weakening/attenuating its resistivity during the war" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. Sikorský. Future war. Publ. 2. M, Voenizdat, 1936, page 158, 548. ENDFOOTNOTE.

On having to itself of the similar, the evacuation of Soviet industry during the great patronymic war proved to be possible only because of advantages of planned/planning socialist economy.

Of course the loss of . . . important in military-economic sense vast territories and the colossal scales of evacuation had effect on the development of national economy and extremely complicated its conversion to military footing. Nevertheless the rebuilding of our

economy was carried out clearly and took only a little more than a year.

All economic and administrative levers, all possibilities of the planned/planning system of economy were used in order within the shortest period to create the highly developed military economy. In the interests of the branches, which work directly for the needs of front, was redistributed production capacities, circulating capital, work force. Capital investments were concentrated on the most important units. Was rebuilt in accordance with the requirements of wartime control system by national economy.

Thus several numbers, according to which it is possible to compose representation about what truly universal character carried this rebuilding, as deeply it penetrated in all branches of national economy. In 1940 on the military needs were expended/consumed 15 percent of the national income, while in 1942 - 55 percent '.

FOOTNOTE '. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18863, page 47.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the industry the share of the production, utilized for the

military needs, was equal in 1940 approximately/exemplarily 26 to percent, in 1942 - 68 to percent, in the agriculture respectively - 9 and 24 to percent. With each day, with each hour grew/rose the flow of armament, ammunition, directed for the front. As long ago as 1942 the production of the people's commissariats of military industry exceeded prewar level by 86 percent, i.e., almost doubly.

Important result of the military rebuilding of economy was sharp reinforcing of military-economic potential of eastern areas. The gross output of entire industry in 1942 in comparison with 1940 increased in Urals 2.8 times, in Western Siberia - 2.4 times, in the Volga Region areas - 2.5 times. Within the same time the carrying out of military production increased in Urals more than 5 times, in Western Siberia - 27 times, in Volga Region - 9 times '.

FOOTNOTE *. Ibid, inv. No 9605, page 31, 99, 101, 103.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

There was accomplished the grandiose training program of new workers. In the course of war all important branches of military economy and basic did not feel deficiency in the work force.

Toward the end of 1942 the rebuilding of national economy to a military footing was completed. Military plants and enterprises of

heavy industry connected with them worked at full power. Was developed the construction of new enterprises. Was begun second development stage of Soviet military economy - increase in the mounted military economy.

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In 1943 occurred overall raising of military production. In this year ended the basic break/fracture in the work of our industry and transport, which was begun even in second half of 1942. The possibilities of an increase in the production by redistributing the material and labor resources were in essence exhausted. Most important significance acquired an increase in the labor productivity with the aid of improvement of technology and organization of production. At the same time increased the number of workers and employees in the national economy. As a result grew considerably the national income of the country, the gross output of industry and especially the production of military industry. Increased the income of state budget.

However, an increase in the military economy in 1943 was connected with overcoming of great difficulties. The country felt sharp/acute deficiency in the oil, fell the extraction of lead and zinc; sharply were shortened the production of building materials and

the procurement of lumber. Increasingly more was felt a deficiency in the rolling stock. Very heavy remained situation in the agriculture. In some areas considerably were shortened sowing areas and was lowered the productivity of grains, in the kolkhozes was decreased the livestock of horses and especially pigs. With great difficulty were satisfied the most necessary for the need populations for the objects/subjects of supply, the clothing, the foot-wear.

The successes of our military forces at the front and the state of military economy in 1943 were the guarantee further raising of military production and national economy as a whole. It is characteristic that during August 1943 was already accepted the plan of the development of industry and transport of Urals on 1943-1947, were examined the questions, connected with the production of pockets, turbines and generators for the forthcoming three or four years. In 1943 it were begun the preparation of the plans of development of national economy for the next years by the areas, liberated from the German occupation.

Culmination apex in the development of Soviet military economy became 1944. Military production in this year achieved the level highest within the time of war. Began to revive the peaceful branches of economy. In 1944 the industry gave production more than in 1940 the national income of the country in 1944 was 88 percent of prewar

income.

Large/coarse changes occurred in the structure of national economy. If in the beginning of war an increase in the military expenditures/consumptions led to the sharp reduction of the share of the national income, going to the storage and the personal consumption, then in 1944 the share of storage grew considerably on the comparison not only with the first period of war, but also since 1943. First in the years wars increased the share of consumption. The proportion of military expenditures/consumptions in comparison with the expenditures/consumptions in the first period of war a little was lowered, although in the absolute expression they grew. For the first time after the attack of Germany state budget is brought without the deficit.

Since 1944 began to be conducted in the great sizes/dimensions, upon the complete satisfaction of the needs of front, the work on the reactivation of the areas, liberated from the Fascist oppression. In 1944 capital investments into the economy of these regions comprised more than 40 percent of fundamental summations into entire national economy ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of

department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, page 13, 51. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In 1943 and into 1944 all branches of Soviet economy were especially developed more in concord. In particular, in accordance with the needs of military industry considerably was expanded its raw base: rapidly increased the production of metal, fuel, electric power.

To August 1944 was prepared the project of the long-range plan of restoration/reduction and development of the national economy of the USSR on 1943-1947. In 1947 it was proposed to exceed prewar level on the total volume of the national income, industrial production and the goods freight turnover of railroads. However, the volume of the carrying out of the production of agriculture was planned somewhat smaller than in the prewar time.

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In 1945 even more widely was conducted the peaceful rebuilding of national economy. In second half of the year, in spite of war with Japan, material resources rapidly were thrown to the satisfaction of civil/civilian needs, military enterprises converted/transferred to the issue of peaceful production.

In connection with the fact that of military production began to be released less, industrial output level as a whole was lowered. Then agricultural production, goods freight turnover of all of transport, capital construction and commodity turnover noticeably grew.

Summing up the totals to the development of Soviet military economy during the years of war, it is necessary to, first of all, note the extremely high rates of increase in the military production. Military economy from the month in month increased the issue of military production. Army received increasingly more armament, the means of motorization and mechanization, ammunition. Toward the end of the war air park of army in the field counted about 16 thousand combat aircraft. As arms of Soviet military forces were 115.1 thousand guns also of mortars (without the jet installations), are more than 15 thousand tanks and SAU. During the war Soviet military forces obtained powerful/thick jet, antitank and antiaircraft artillery, and also excellent automatic small arms. And although yet was not completed the motorization of military forces and they had few heavy-calibre guns, the Red Army in the course of war became first-rate on its armament.

It is necessary to emphasize in this case that socialist state solved the most difficult problem of reequipment and logistic support of a multimillion-man army, using its own economic resources.

Bourgeois propaganda in the postwar years spent numerous efforts/forces on that in order to convince world community of the fact that an increase in the technical equipment of the Red Army in the period of war was achieved to a considerable extent thanks to the deliveries of weaponry, technology, different materials by union countries - USA and England. Certainly, these deliveries were quite significant, especially in the provision of the military forces and their rears by motor transport, by the combustible and lubricants (from USA and England were obtained 401.4 thousand motor vehicles and 2599 thousand tons of petroleum products) ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 1647, sheets 22, 27. ENDFOOTNOTE.

But if we speak about an overall increase in the armament of the Red Army, then the aid of allies played in this very insignificant role.

Soviet industry in the war years produced 489.9 thousand artillery guns of all bores, 136.8 thousand aircraft, 102.5 thousand tanks of self-propelled-artillery installations ¹.

FOOTNOTE 2. Ibid, inv. No 7882, sheets 13, 15-16; inv. No 7883, sheets 30, 75. ENDFOOTNOTE.

From USA and England within the same time were obtained 9.6 thousand guns, 18.7 thousand aircraft and 10.8 thousand tanks 3.


FOOTNOTE 3. Ibid, inv. No 1647, sheets 19-20. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Consequently, the deliveries of allies occupied: on artillery guns - it is less than 2 percent, on the aircraft - about 12 percent and on the tanks - 10 percent of the total number of these combat devices, obtained by the Red Army during the war. Moreover, it occurred and so that the allies directed to us the already obsolete models of armament. For example, tanks and great aircraft component did not answer entirely those requirements such as were presented to the armament with the character of combat operations at the Soviet-German front.

One cannot fail to note that circumstance that the Red Army transmitted a considerable quantity of its armament to army Polish, to Czechoslovak military forces, national-liberation army of Yugoslavia, or to the partisans of the countries of central and

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Урал



ФРОНТУ

1942 poster. Artist P. Karachentsev. KEY: (1) Urals. (2) To the front.



1941 poster. Artist N. Avvakumov. KEY: (1) More metal - more weapons!

southeastern Europe.

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The attempts of the bourgeois propaganda to exaggerate the role of the military-technological aid, shown/rendered Red Army by union governments, cannot diminish the significance of that historical fact that the Soviet Union routed Fascist hordes, relying on his own economic resources, on the heroic the labor/work of its people. The Communist Party, successfully using advantages of socialist economy and after mobilizing all material and human reserves of the country, knew how to create powerful/thick military economy and to ensure in the course of war the Soviet Armed Forces by all necessary for achievement of victory.

Another characteristic feature of Soviet military economy, as already mentioned above, consisting in the fact that it was formed and was developed on the base of the completely new, in comparison with the prewar time, distribution of productive forces. Center of gravity of economy was shifted into the eastern areas of the country. In first half of 1945 the gross output of entire industry and service areas was 2 times, and on the enterprises of the people's commissariats of military industry - 5.6 times more than in first half of 1941 '.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, page 77.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

In 1944-1945 increased the significance of economy of the liberated territories. Hitlerites with the retreat barbarously destroyed, and often and completely annihilated cities and villages, industrial enterprises, state farms, kolkhozes, transport, dwellings, hospitals, schools, etc. They applied the so-called "tactics of the burned out earth/ground", performing in the seized territory enormous devastations. Population, labor and material resources of the areas, which were undergoing occupation, sharply were shortened.

The fast restoration/reduction of economy of the liberated areas the Communist Party and Soviet government they declared people's task. It was necessary within the shortest period to create for Soviet people, released of the Fascist servitude, standard conditions of life.

Already in the course of war in the liberated areas were in full or in part restored/reduced thousands of industrial enterprises, more

than 1800 state farms even 3 thousand machine-and-tractor stations, 85 thousand kolkhozes ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid, inv. No 18759, 1. 26. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Toward the end of the war industrial production in the liberated areas was possible to restore/reduce approximately/exemplarily to one third from the level of 1940. Restoration/reduction and construction of enterprises was conducted taking into account the requirements of new, foremost technology.

The gross output of agriculture in the liberated territory was in 1945 51 percent of the level of 1940 ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. Ibid, inv. No 9605, page 353, 361, 366. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the cities, which were undergoing occupation and then liberated by the Red Army, within the time of war were constructed and restored/reduced the habitable houses with a total area of 24.8 mln. square meters, while in the rural terrain - 1.4 mln. habitable houses ⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. Ibid., page 48. 50. ENDFOOTNOTE.

There is great interest in the comparison of the economic development of Soviet alliance in the period of struggle with Fascist-German aggressors and the developments of the military economy of Fascist Germany.

It is known that Germany began intensely to be prepared for the war since 1933. On Hitler's statement, in six pre-war years (1933-1939) it was spent to the preparation for the war of 90 billion Reich marks. This was approximately 24 percent of the national income of the country in 1933/34-1938/39 yr., which considerably exceeded the military expenditures of any other, state. After developing preparation/training for armed aggression in the beginning of the 30's, Germany expended on the military rebuilding of economy considerably more time, than the USSR, and accomplished it in much the more favorable situation. War economy prerequisites for the action against USSR were created in advance. To 1941 Germany obtained enormous supplementary resources due to the robbery of the countries occupied. All this greatly lightened the organization of military economy.

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Higher appraisal deserves the organization of military economy in the USSR. It was carried out by its own means, also, moreover, in

the situation of the large/coarse failures of the first period of war, in the conditions of incredibly difficult evacuation and enormous complications, connected with it.

The military economy, created with socialist state, proved to be more powerful/thicker than the military economy of Fascist Germany. Heads of Hitler Germany did not present to themselves might and the possibilities of socialist economy generally and Soviet military economy in particular. Already in the course some Nazi workers forced were to recognize that they incorrectly evaluated the war potential of Soviet alliance. But work not only and not so many in the acknowledgement of this error. Capitalist Germany generally on could economically exceed the socialist country - USSR. German imperialists on the objective reasons on were capable of creating this mounted military economy such as was completely regularly created in the Soviet Union. The military economy of Fascist Germany was constructed on the most cruel exploitation of German workers and peasants, on enslavement and robbery of the peoples of the countries occupied. Thereby at its basis were laid the irresolvable antagonistic contradictions which finally were revealed with the enormous destructive force.

The predatory, predatory policy of Hitler government in occupied countries blasted/undermined/blew up the organization of German

military economy. The peoples of those occupied by Germany the countries embarked on the path of irreconcilable struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors. They were opposed to the evacuation of economic resources from these countries, broke away the measures of German authorities for the development of production, they impeded the shipment of workers to the Fascist penal servitude.

German economy in many respects depended on resources of the countries occupied (oil, metals, rations, etc.) and removed them after the liberation of these countries, it became to feel huge difficulties. It could not overcome disproportion between an increase in the military production, on one hand, and the limited labor resources - on the other hand. Sharp/acute deficiency in the work force Hitler government attempted to compensate by total and supertotal mobilizations, and also by the use of foreign workers, forcible driven off into Germany from the territories occupied. However, the expropriation of fine/small manufacturers and the organization of forced labor/work could not ensure stability and an increase in the military economy. On the contrary, into the German industry in large quantities were poured people, which decomposed/expanded its work.

After incorrectly evaluating the war potential of the USSR, fascists proved to be in the difficult situation: was

revealed/detected the insufficient their military output level. Hitler Germany was forced to take extreme measures for an increase in the military production, but it was already late. First, fascists began to increase the issue of armament basically when the Soviet country already provided the Red Army with entire necessary armament. In the second place, under the strikes/shocks of the Red Army and union military forces was reduced the territory, subject to Hitlerites. Was begun the disorganization of German economy. From second half of 1944 the level of production of German military industry began catastrophically to fall.

Continuously decreased the production of the heavy industry of Germany, deteriorated the work of railroads. From March through December 1944 the extraction of carbon/coal was shortened by 42 percent, steelmaking - by 63 percent, the production of nitrogen - by 75 percent, synthetic rubber - by 86 percent. The daytime feed of railroad cars from July through December was lowered by 36 percent ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the results of the Second World War.

Collector/collection of the article, page 380; the industry of Germany into the period of war 1939-1945 M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1956, page 133, 141; IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18863, page 52. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In our readings/indications on the Nuremberg process the German minister of the armament Speer stated that Germany lost war in production-engineering and economic sense even in the beginning of the summer of 1944.

So on all joints crawled fascist military economy. Nothing it could save - either robbery of Europe, or slave labor of millions of people, driven away to the Fascist penal servitude, or the total and supertotal mobilizations of human and material resources within the country, or the high level of development of German science and technology.

Already to the middle of 1944 the war economy advantage of the USSR became obvious. But the final rout of Fascist aggressors by the Soviet Armed Forces showed complete bankruptcy of the economic organization of German state-monopolistic capitalism and superiority of the socialist system of economy over the capitalist.

The main thing, which caused the successes of Soviet military economy during the years of war, this the arrangement of socialist

economic system, political and moral unity of our people, the leadership of the Leninist party.

The Socialist social system, centralization in the hands of Soviet government of enormous material resources, their deliberate distribution and use in the interests of the fastest rout of enemy, the enormous patriotic enthusiasm of the people, headed and directed by the Communist Party, all this, in spite of the available difficulties, the errors and severe consequences of the personality cult of Stalin, it led our native land to the final victory over Fascist Germany.

2. Increase in the military production and the military-technological equipment of the Red Army.

Primary task of our economy in the period of war consisted of giving to the Red Army newest and most effective combat materiel, besides in such quantity which would ensure its superiority over the Fascist-German army. Without this could not be relied on the achievement of victory.

V. I. Lenin, generalizing the experience of the First World War, noted that in the war "is taken itself precedence that, in whom the greatest technology, organization, discipline and the best

vehicles..."¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 27, page 167. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Communist party, accurate to Leninist precepts, the main efforts of the toilers of the rear during the last war it guided to that so that within it is possible the short period to exceed Hitlerite Germany in the production of combat materiel and armament and thereby to create the decisive prerequisites/premises for the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The severe conditions in which placed Soviet military industry the attack of Hitler Germany, led to the fact that in the beginning of war the Fascist-German army had an advantage in the military-technological equipment, especially in the aviation and the tanks. But already in the first half-year of 1942, when it was possible in essence to fix the exploitation of the enterprises of military industry evacuated to the east, our military industry began to rapidly collect/compose the rates of production and increasingly more completely to satisfy the demands of army. About this speak the data, given in the table.

On the extent of the latter/last three years of war on the average per annum were produced more than 3 mln. rifles, about 2 mln. submachine guns, 100 thousand mortars, 450 thousand manual and heavy mounted machine guns ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, page 30. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In 1944 the Red Army had in the reserve so many rifles, carbines, submachine guns and other rifle/infantry armament, that became possible to somewhat shorten the issue of its many forms.

Ordnance plants developed the mass production of artillery guns. On the average in month were produced: in the second half-year of 1941 - 5124 guns of all types and bores, in 1942 -10591, in 1943 - 10858, in 1944 - 10207 in 1945(in the first 9 months) - 8567 ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid, inv. No 7882, sheets 12, 13. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Guns continuously were improved: were increased their bore and mobility, were improved ballistic data.

Tank industry ensured the mass production of tanks and self-propelled artillery. On the average in month in second half of

1941 were produced 696 tanks (self-propelled gun mounts in 1941 yet were not produced), in 1942 - 2060 tanks and self-propelled gun mounts, in 1943 - 2001, in 1944 - 2415 and in the first half-year of 1945 - 2570 tanks also of self-propelled gun mounts ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. Ibid, sheets 15, 16. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The military characteristics of vehicles year from the year became above.

The aircraft industry systematically increased the production of aircraft. Average monthly issue in second half of 1941 composed 1630 aircraft in 1942 - 2120, in 1943 - 2907, in 1944 - 3355 and in 1945 - 2206 aircraft ⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. Ibid, inv. No 7883, sheets 75 and 30. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Simultaneously was improved the quality of vehicles and their armament.

During entire war continuously grew/rose the production of ammunition and other military technology.

Thus, already to the first period of the Great Patriotic War to

Soviet state to decide very important task - to ensure the numerically increased area with the basic forms of armament and to bring together on no superiority of the enemy whom it possessed in the first months of war. This allowed the Red Army to switch over to decisive offensive operations and to finally wrest in enemy strategic initiative.

Specifically, a deficiency in the armament, technology and ammunition was one of the reasons, which restricted scope and results of the first strategic offensive of the Red Army in winter 1941/42. But the increase in the military production, that occurred from January through November 1942, gave the possibility to restore/reduce the losses carried by military forces, to arm new large units/formations and to create certain reserve of weaponry.

The issue of military production (in the percentages to 1940).

(1) Наркоматы военной промышленности	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Вооружения	145	191	200	206	156
(4) Танковой	112	184	234	296	276
(5) Авиационной	126	178	223	239	177
(6) Боеприпасов	152	218	264	310	171

Key: (1). People's commissariats of military industry. (2). Year.
(3). Armaments. (4). Tank. (5). Air. (6). Ammunition.

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Especially important significance had the circumstance that in 1942 the Red Army could begin the restoration/reduction of the large/coarse tank large units/formations, disbanded in the first months of war for lack of tanks. Within the time of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 a number of tank units and large units/formations increased 2.5 times ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the great Patriotic War, inv. No 9606, page 673.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

This considerably raised the offensive capability of Soviet military

forces, that it did not retard to have effect on winter campaign 1942/43. A rapid increase in military production was one of the main prerequisites/premises of the basic turning point in the course of war in favor of Red Army.

In 1943-1944 there was created numerous self-propelled artillery which earlier the Soviet troops did not have. Increased the firepower of rifle troops, equipped with a now great quantity of automatic weapon, by strong antitank and antiaircraft means, by powerful/thick artillery. If in basic offensive operations 1942-1943 to one rifle division of the Red Army it fell, on the average of 180-200 guns and mortars, 14-17 tanks, 13-20 aircraft that in 1944 - already 200-245 guns and mortars, 14-35 tanks, 22-46 aircraft ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid, inv. No 9608, page 773. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Toward the end 1943 was solved the problem of ammunition.

Fascist Germany in the course of war also increased the production of the armament whose increase continued up to the middle of 1944. During June 1944 German industry produced tanks 5 times, aircraft - 2.6 times, artillery-rifle armament - 3.2 times more than during January - February of 1942. But for Hitler Germany so it was impossible to exceed the rates of increase in the military

production, achieved in the USSR.

At the beginning of 1945 the armament of the Red Army and its technical equipment achieved level highest within entire period of war.

While the strength of personnel of army in the field increased into 1943-1944 in all by 6.7 percent, numbers of guns and mortars which it had available, it increased 1.4 times, tanks and the self-propelled guns - 1.9 times, aircraft - almost 5 times '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid, inv. No 17936, page 440-441, 756-757. ENDFOOTNOTE.

If in 1941-1942 the significant part of the armament, produced by industry, proceeded, first of all, with the equipment of new army formations, then subsequently its basic mass was headed into the field forces and not only completed losses, but also it increased the fire and strike power of military forces.

Enormous achievement of Soviet military economy was the fact that it it could supply the Red Army in the course of war ever more the advanced by the models of weaponry and combat technology. Almost all the armament of the Red Army underwent great qualitative changes. In the series production during the war were launched in essence the

newest models. Side arms of soldiers, the group automatic weapon of rifle troops, artillery and mortar armament, armored technology, materiel and weaponry of Air Force, the armament of air defense forces of the country continuously were improved. Toward the end of the war the armed forces of the USSR were equipped with the new or considerably modernized models of weaponry.

Concrete/specific/actual means of development and improvement of all types of armament and combat materiel were determined, first of all, combat practice, revealed/detected degree suitability, positive and disadvantages. The experience of the combat employment of weaponry and technology was emitted and was summarized by scientists and designers. They modernized existed models or were created new. This process which peacetime occupied was years, under war time occurred unusually rapid.

Especially serious changes underwent the armament of the infantry. Approximately/exemplarily half of the types of small arms which had available the Red Army to 1945, was created and started to the series production during the war. In the first months of war the rifle troops of the Red Army, as already mentioned, did not have antitank guns.

Meanwhile the enemy constantly threw in combat great quantity of light and medium tanks. It was extremely necessary as fast as possible to give to the infantry the sufficiently effective combat means with them. Already in the fall of 1941 Soviet designers, engineers and workers successfully solved this crucial task - there was organized the mass production of antitank guns. Their number in the military forces rapidly increased. It grew up to second half of 1943. Subsequently, in connection with reinforcing of the armor protection of German tanks, these guns became barely effective ones and their quantity in the military forces was sharply shortened. For the shift/relief by it arrived the more efficient artillery means of antitank combat. Toward the end of the war of antitank guns in the rifle troops it was approximately/exemplarily 3 times less than during the bit near Kursk.

Continuously grew/rose the proportion of automatic weapon, which made it possible to conduct the massed fire/light at near distances. Toward the end of the war the submachine guns became the greatest mass form of the armament of the infantry. Their number in the rifle division increased within the time of war almost 21 times ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See Development of tactics of Soviet army during the

years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). M., Voenizdat, 1958, page 34. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The submachine gun, which underwent essential qualitative changes, and carbine virtually extruded/excluded rifle of the armament of rifle troops. Rifle was maintained only as the sniper weaponry. A quantity of hand submachine guns in the rifle divisions increased in the years of war more than 2 times, and the total number of the heavy mounted machine guns in the army in the field, besides predominantly new, systems, it is more than 1.5 times ².

FOOTNOTE ². *Ibid.* page 34-35. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, in the course of war came to light tendency toward an increase in the proportion of portable automatic weapon, and rate of fire and maneuverability obtained the explicit advantage over sighting and range.

Continuous increase in the rifle units and the connections of the Red Army of the quantity of automatic weapon increased their firepower. Thus, the fire possibilities of the rifle company increased within the time of war 3 times, and the rifle division - 3.5 times.

Simultaneously with the saturation of rifle military forces by automatic weapon grew/rose a quantity of artillery means organically included in their composition and mortars. Toward the end of the war the rifle division had in comparison with the beginning of the war almost doubly of guns and mortars. Became heavy calibers of guns and mortars. Because of this the weight of the mortar salvo of the rifle division it increased for the war more than 7 times, and artillery salvo - almost 2 times '.

FOOTNOTE '. *Ibid.* page 41, 52. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Combat practice required reinforcing of the firepower, decrease of weight and increase in the mobility of artillery guns. Especially rapidly was developed tank and antitank artillery. The bores of its guns as long ago as 1943 grew in comparison with the bores of prewar guns 1.6-2.2 times. Because of an increase in the bores and the use/application of subcaliber and shaped-charge shells the armor-piercing ability became more 5 times. Antitank artillery as long ago as 1943 completely passed to the mechanical traction, which sharply raised its mobility.

The howitzer artillery of basic changes did not undergo. However, all are visible and the types of guns underwent more or less essential modernization. Were improved sight mechanisms and

ammunition.

Considerably increased the bore of mortars. The production of small-gauge (50-mm) mortars was ended. The battalion (82-mm) and regimental (120-mm) mortars accepted for the armament showed excellent military characteristics and structurally/constructionally virtually they were unchanged to the end of the war. In 1943 in the military forces appeared 160-mm division mortars, the best-calibre weapon of the rifle division.

end section.


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Mortar armament most rapidly was developed in first half of war, which was to a considerable extent explained by a comparative ease/lightness of its mass manufacture. In 1943 the mortars comprised more than half of all artillery means of the Red Army. Subsequently, when the basic form of the operations of Soviet military forces became offensive, this relationship/ratio changed in the use of artillery guns.

To the completing stage of war the rifle division of the Red Army, in spite of smaller in comparison with the German infantry division strength, exceeded it on the firepower of mortar and artillery armament. German division had mortars by bore 50 and 80 millimeters, Soviet division - mortars by bore 82, 120 and 160 millimeters. The quantity of antitank guns was almost identical, but German division had 37-mm guns, and Soviet - 45-mm and 57-mm gun. True, German division exceeded our according to a number of howitzers, but this did not give to it considerable advantage.

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MORE METAL, COAL AND PETROLEUM - MORE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO THE FRONT.



Kounradskiy ore mine in Kazakhstan. Copper ore was mined here during the war.

Workers of the Kuznetskiy Metallurgical Plant, which supplied the military industry with high-quality metal, worked intensely.





Restored Donbass mine. It produced coal again in 1944.

"Vtoryy Bak" petroleum industry created at the Tuymazinsk site in Priural'ye.



Special trains carrying Karagandinsk coal ran to all parts of the country.



Menacing weapons became during the years of war Soviet rocket artillery - new and effective variety of artillery pieces. Rocket artillery, being the weaponry of salvo fire, was weapons of mass destruction. At first it was applied in essence for the annihilation of manpower, and then successfully was used also for destroying the enduring/permanent defensive installations. The combat installations of Soviet rocket artillery - widely known "Katyusha rocket launchers" - combined multi-charge character and rate of fire with the self-propulsion and the high mobility.

Approximately/exemplarily three fourth of new models of the artillery pieces, available as arms of the Red Army toward the end of the war, Soviet industry mastered in wartime. There were created fully automated guns whose power exceeded the power of the automatic guns of prewar time 5 times. The production of the new models of artillery weapon industry mastered in the course of one - three months instead of one - two years in peacetime.

A quantitative increase in the Soviet artillery and an increase in its mobility made it possible to use artillery massed but points of decision of front. In the offensive operations in the environs of Moscow during December 1941 the military forces of Western Front supported 7985 guns also of mortars. In the counteroffensive in the period of battle in Volga 1942 it participated by 14200, in the Kursk

battle of 1942 - 34500, in the Belorussian operation/process of 1944 - 31679, in the Vistula-Oder operation/process of 1945 - 32143 and in the Berlin operation/process - 41600 guns also of mortars ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 17936, page 925-926.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

One of most important combat materiel, which found mass use/application during the Great Patriotic War and in many respects of the combat operations determined character, were tanks. They, as is known, appeared as far back as of war 1914-1918. It precisely in the Second World War, mainly in the grandiose battles at the Soviet-German front, tanks underwent the present battle test. Only in this war they became main striking power of ground forces and they fulfilled that role, for which they were intended. The experience of the Great Patriotic War convincingly showed that the greatest success in the creation of the new types of tanks, which satisfied all requirements of modern war, achieved the Soviet designers.

Even before the Great Patriotic War our industry ended the production of tanks with the bulletproof armor and began the production of tanks with the shellproof armor protection. In contrast to the German military theorists, who excessively exaggerated the

role of the mobility of tanks in damage to their armor protection and to armament, Soviet military theory correctly directed designers toward the harmonious combination of all they would satisfy the requirements of the contemporary armed struggle, in essence of maneuverable, but with the considerable elements of position.

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Soviet tank builders mastered the production of the tank engine, which works on the heavy fuel, and in a new way designed the running gear of the tank. Especially successful proved to be the layout of the basic assemblies of tank, and also the form of the housing and turret. Soviet average/mean and heavy tanks during the years of war were best in the world. They had the most enduring/most permanent armor, a good maneuverability, the necessary conveniences for the crew activity. Many former Hitler Generals consider that the superiority of Soviet tanks was one of the important factors, which accelerated the defeat of the Fascist-German military forces. In spite of the fact that German designers within the time of war three times changed the types of their tanks, so it was impossible to create the vehicles, similar to Soviet ones.

Our medium tank answered the requirements of combat practice and successfully was applied during the entire war without radical

changes in the construction/design. In second half of the war when in enemy appeared tanks with the stronger armor protection, industry began to produce tank T-34 with powerful/thick gun (85-mm). In this case the tank maintained a good maneuverability. Our heavy tank KV in the course of war was substituted by the more advanced vehicle (IS), which exceeded new German heavy tanks both on the armor protection and on the armament. In first half of war were created two new lungs of tank (T-60 and T-70). However, combat practice soon showed the inexpediency of their use/application, and toward the end of 1943 light tanks were non-current.

Very effective combat device were the self-propelled gun mounts (SAU), which escorted/tracked in the offensive the infantry and the tanks. As far back as the Soviet-Finnish war our military forces successfully applied the self-propelled gun, created on the base of heavy tank. However, self-propelled artillery did not obtain then acknowledgement, and the Red Army only to the middle of patriotic war began to be armed with the self-propelled gun mounts which completely themselves justified in the subsequent combat operations and they became the mass form of armament. They were created on the base of average/mean and heavy tanks with the guns from 76 to 152 millimeters. As long ago as 1943 Soviet industry produced 4 thousand self-propelled gun mounts. To May 1945 as arms of the Red Army were more than 7.5 thousand self-propelled gun mounts¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 7882, 1. 16; inv. No 17936, page 893. ENDFOOTNOTE.


During the hemlock of military years did not cease the struggle for qualitative superiority over the enemy in aviation equipment. Fascist aviation entered the war equipped with the newest combat aircraft. Soviet aviation had as arms in essence the obsolete vehicles. On the eve war our designers created the more advanced combat vehicles, but their mass production yet was not fixed. In first half of 1941 the aircraft industry produced about 2 thousand new fighter airplanes (Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3), 490 dive bombers P-2 and 250 attack aircraft of Il-2. These aircraft possessed technical indices completely contemporary for that time, and according to some data exceeded same-type German aircraft. However, at the beginning of war the aircraft of new constructions/designs comprised not more than 22 percent of strength of the aviation of western military districts.


With starting up of the evacuated plants, and then introduction to the formation/order of new ones our aircraft industry not only rapidly increased output of the vehicles, accepted in the series production, but also it continuously improved them, mastered the

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 03/22
1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH V N ANDRIANOV ET AL. 06 OCT 82
FTD-ID(R5)T-0668-82 F/G 15/77 NL

UNCLASSIFIED





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963 - A

manufacture of new types.

German industry did not maintain/withstand this competition. In spite of the relatively high level achieved by it of the production of aviation equipment, it proved to be unable to complete the enormous losses which the German aviation bore at the Soviet-German front.

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During the war our industry produced the fighter airplanes of Yak-3, Yak-76, Yak-9, La-5, the attack aircraft of Il-2, bombers P-2, Il-4 and other aircraft. Were launched into the series production new aircraft types: fighter airplane La-7, attack aircraft Il-10, bomber Tu-2. At the same time was improved the special armament of aircraft, their armament and ammunition to them. Fighter airplanes and attack aircraft began to be equipped with rocket weapon.

The greatest development in the war years obtained fighter aviation. And this is completely regular, since it was the basic means of struggle for supremacy in the air. The fighter airplanes, created by our aircraft constructors, exceeded on some tactical-technical qualities the fighter airplanes of enemy. They possessed the best qualities in comparison with the English and

American fighter airplanes, which the Soviet aviation received from the allies during the war.

In 1943 for the armament of Air Force of the Red Army acted the improved dive bomber P-2, the basic type of the bomber of front aviation. P-2 had high velocity, durability/permanence and more advanced control than the same-type German bombers Ju-88 and H -111.

The outstanding achievement of Soviet aircraft construction was the attack aircraft, intended for the direct assistance to military forces on the field of battle. The aircraft of Il-2 at the end of 1942 was considerably improved, and then, in second half of 1944, the attack aviation obtained new model - Il-10. A number of attack aircraft in air park of the Red Army continuously increased. In 1943 they comprised more than all third aircraft, released by the aircraft industry. There were no such vehicles in other armies. The German dive bombers could only partially carry out those missions such as were laid on the attack aircraft. Subsequently Fascist command element used for this purpose ordinary fighter airplanes. But as a result of the weak armament, the absence of armor and insufficient maneuverability under the effects on the ground targets German fighter airplanes could not replace attack aircraft.

One of the conditions for rapid development of Soviet air

technology was the fact that it was carried out it was purposefully and subordinated to the decision of three basic tasks, which were being fulfilled by Air Force of the Red Army, struggle for supremacy in air, assistance to ground forces and conduct of air intelligence. A deep study of the experience of the combat employment of aircraft helped designers to select the most accurate ways of further improvement of aviation equipment. It should be noted that our industry was not arranged a sufficient production capacity for the mass production of bombers. Within the time of war Soviet aviation obtained more than 59 thousand fighter airplanes, more than 37 thousand attack aircraft and only 17.8 thousand bombers ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18392, page 25.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

We did not have a good construction/design of long range bomber aircraft. Lagged the development of reconnaissance aviation.

Considerable attention was paid to the production of the military-engineering technology: by a pontoon-transport, bridge construction, mines, fortification. Were developed and accepted for the armament the more advanced wooden and metallic mines, were improved the explosive qualities of antipersonnel mines. Widely were

adopted electrical mine detectors and probes. Bridge-crossing technology was supplemented by new pontoon trains and landing means. The motorization of the pontoon trains made it possible to accelerate the movement of our troops through the water obstacles and laying heavy pontoon bridges. Because of the use/application of dismountable pile drivers, pneumo- and diesel-hammers, the electrified and mechanical instruments was mechanized a significant unit of the works on the construction of bridges. Use of finished constructions/designs and details from the reinforced concrete, the armor and the tree/wood, the typification of defensive installations, partial mechanization of labor-consuming works made possible to equip within the shortest periods the defensive lines of great extent. Within the time of war the engineers were almost completely motorized.

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The technical and combat power of the Navy changed also in essence in accordance with the combat needs. However, the first months of war revealed large/coarse deficiencies in the technical equipment and the armament of the Navy. Although on the very eve of war the Navy obtained certain quantity of new destroyers, submarines, mine sweepers, PT boats and other warships, constructed taking into account the latest achievements of naval technology, these means were not sufficient for the successful decision of those combat missions

which it was necessary to fulfill to the Navy. The Navy did not have sufficiently powerful/thick aviation, to its reinforcement arrived obsolete aircrafts. In the naval bases of the Navies at the beginning of war it was very little antiaircraft artillery. Although the Navy was prepared for conducting of landing operations, it did not completely have contemporary landing ships.

It is natural that these deficiencies could not be completely removed in the first period of war, until the country adjusted its military economy. But in the second period of war the Soviet Navy already obtained serious reinforcement - new submarines, the PT boats and other combat and auxilliary vessels, capable of successfully cooperating with ground forces and of acting in the coastal areas. Naval aviation obtained the aircraft of new types. Reinforcing of the Navy warships and by aviation, the supply of the available ships by the contemporary technical equipment (hydroacoustic, radar, etc.) raised the combat power of Navy. Only the problem of the creation of landing means so was not solved during the entire war.

The equipment of the armed forces with the newest combat means into entire the increasing sizes/dimensions is, however, only one of the basic tasks of military economy. Contemporary multimillion-man army consumes an enormous quantity of ammunition, fuel, etc. These needs sharply increase during the active combat operations. In the

first period of war Soviet industry yet could not completely satisfy all needs of front in the ammunition. It cannot be forgotten that to November 1941 many enterprises for the production of ammunition malfunctioned. Subsequently the provision of an army with ammunition considerably was improved, but also the needs of military forces for them continuously grew/rose. Therefore in some operations/processes military forces still felt serious deficiency in the ammunition. In recent years of war our industry in essence satisfied the increased needs of fronts for the ammunition.

In the month of war the Red Army expended/consumed on the average 17 mln. shells of all bores. In all in the years of the Great Patriotic War only ground forces and aviation used more than 8 mln. sink ammunition.

Successes of Soviet military industry during the years of the Great Patriotic War - one of the brightest and most convincing certificates of the might of socialist economy, remarkable moral qualities of the Soviet people, organizational genius of the Communist Party.

3. Development of the basic branches of national economy.

Heavy and light industry. Powerful/thick military production is

not thought without the highly developed heavy industry, i.e., ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, machine building, the industry of solid and liquid propellant, production of electric power, chemical industry. The heavy industry - basis, the foundation of military industry.

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Maintenance of the high level of its development - one of primary tasks of organizing the military economy. For the length of all years of war this task was in the center of attention to Communist Party, and Soviet state. Thus are data, which characterize the development of the basic branches of heavy industry during the years of war ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. These data include entire production of each branch (for example, on the petroleum industry not only the extracted oil, but also the converted products of oil, or the production of different subsidiary and auxiliary works). ENDFOOTNOTE.

As long ago as 1943 the majority of the branches of heavy industry attained a noticeable increase in the production. In 1944 the production of the enterprises of nonferrous metallurgy, chemical industry, machine building (going for the military needs) considerably exceeded prewar level. In 1945 the production of number

of the branches of heavy industry, directly connected with military production, was shortened in connection with the transition of these branches to the issue of civil/civilian production.

In the beginning of war as a result of occupation by the Fascist-German aggressors of important industrial areas in the south of the country our ferrous metallurgy was deprived to 71 percent of power on the production of cast iron, about 60 percent on the smelting of steel ³ and the greater unit of the power on the production of the heavy profiles/airfoils of hire, thick and average/mean sheet, wheels and axes for the rolling stock, the steel and cast-iron pipes.

FOOTNOTE ³. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18922, 1. 1. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The supply of the country by metal wholly lay on the metallurgy of eastern areas. In order to entirely evaluate the complexity of the tasks, which arose before ferrous metallurgy, it is necessary to accept into the attention and the fact that under war time it was necessary to change almost entire assortment of the production of metallurgical plants in order to adapt it to the needs of military industry.

the production of heavy industry (in the percentages to 1940) ².

FOOTNOTE ². According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18759, sheets 38, 39.

(1) Отрасли промышленности	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Черная металлургия (включая добычу руд)	105	62	70	88	89
(4) Топливная	94	53	59	71	75
(5) В том числе:					
(6) угольная	87	43	54	71	88
(7) нефтяная	102	61	63	72	68
(8) Производство электроэнергии и теплоэнергии	97	62	67	81	91
(9) Химическая и резино-асбестовая	115	79	104	133	92
(10) Машиностроение и металлообработка (включая производство вооружения и боеприпасов)	112	119	142	158	129
(11) Лесная и деревообрабатывающая	88	48	51	55	55
(12) Промышленность стройматериалов	79	26	29	35	41

Key: (1). Branches of industry. (2). Year. (3). Ferrous metallurgy (including extraction of ores). (4). Propellant/fuel. (5). Among other things. (6). carbon. (7). petroleum. (8). Production of electric power and thermal energy. (9). Chemical and rubber-asbestos. (10). Machine building and metal working (including production of armament and ammunition). (11). Forest and woodworking. (12). Industry of construction materials.

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Soviet metallurgists successfully satisfied the requirements of wartime. Rapidly were developed/processed and were mastered the new technological processes: the smelting of alloy steels in the open-hearth furnaces, the rolling of armor on the bloomings, the heat processing of special steels, the manufacture of new fine steel for the aviation, the pipes/tubes for the mortars, obtaining ferromanganese from the local ores, the ferrochromium in the blast furnaces, the production of alloy cast iron, and also smelting in the open-hearth furnaces of special steels. Was mastered the production of the substitutes of the scarce trademarks of steels and the alloys, which give the savings of nickel, molybdenum and ferrosilicon.

Metallurgists attempted to most fully use production capacities. The average coefficient of the use of a volume of blast furnaces during all years of war was above prewar. Daily mean steel output from one meter of the hearth of open-hearth furnaces, having been somewhat lowered in 1941-1942, then was retained without the changes.

With the price of great efforts/forces for metallurgists it was possible to considerably raise output of metal. If in 1942 the

smelting of cast iron composed 32 percent and issues of hire 41 percent of prewar level, then in 1945 ferrous metallurgy gave 59 percent of the prewar smelting of cast iron and 65 percent of the prewar issue of hire ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, page 16, 73. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The particularly necessary for the military industry forms of hire toward the end of the war was produced much greater than before the war.

However, although ferrous metallurgy met the demand of military industry and the urgent needs of civil/civilian machine building and transport, as a whole national economy during the years of war felt a sharp/acute deficiency in the metal.

At rapid tempo was developed during the years of war the production of nonferrous metals. In the beginning of war retired from the formation/order basic enterprises for the smelting of aluminum and the production of the hire of nonferrous metals. These losses were soon made up, and in 1945 the prewar output level of aluminum,

nickel, magnesium, tin, cobalt is considerably exceeded. Lower than prewar remained only the production of lead and zinc. However, in spite of increase in the production, import of some nonferrous metals and hard savings, nonferrous metallurgy to the end of the war remained one of the highly specialized places of the military economy of the Soviet Union.

War caused enormous loss to our fuel-energy industry. In 1941 Hitler military forces occupied the donets and Moscow coal fields which gave in peacetime 63 percent of the entire extraction of carbon/coal ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 168. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Fascists vomited to the Caucasian oil. In 1942 were completely failing petroleum trades in the Krasnodar territory, by half was lowered the extraction of oil in the Groznyy area. Southern petroleum areas proved to be in the especially heavy situation after enemy blocked Volga, cut the railroad main pipeline, which connects Baku with the areas of the center of the country, and took the oil pipeline Armavir - Trudovaya. In winter 1942/43 g. petroleum products from Caucasus into the central areas and to the east went by distant round about way - through Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Transport did not manage the removal of petroleum products. Several million tons of

oil it was necessary to pump over from the oil tanks of Baku and to retain it in the hollows of mountains. These reserves subsequently completely were used.

Greatly suffered in the beginning of war the energy base of the Soviet Union. since a great quantity of power stations was located in the southern and western areas of the European USSR, and these areas were occupied by the Fascist-German aggressors.

For the coal industry heaviest were 1942 when the extraction of carbon/coal fell to 75.5 mln. tons - it is more than doubly in comparison with the prewar level.

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The extraction of oil was lowered in 1943 to the smallest magnitude - 18 mln. tons, i.e., it is more than by 40 percent with respect to the prewar period. So was shortened in 1942 the manufacture of electrical energy (it were conducted only 29.1 billion kilowatt-hours). However, in last year of the war of carbon/coal were extracted already 149 mln. tons, either 90 percent of the prewar level, and oils - 19.4 mln. tons, or 62 percent of prewar extraction. Electric energy generation in 1945 was 43 billion kilowatt-hours, or 90 percent of the level of 1940¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, cornfields. No 9605, page 167, 171, 184. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The extraction of fuel increased because of the assimilation of new ones and expansion of the available deposits of carbon/coal and oil and putting into operation of new power stations in the east. In 1945 the extraction of carbon/coal increased in comparison with 1940 in the Moscow basin 2 times, in Urals - 2.1 times: in Karaganda in the years of war it increased by 80 percent, in Kuzbass - by 34 percent. Donbass destroyed by the Fascist-German aggressors gave in 1945 only 41 percent of prewar extraction ¹.

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 167. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the war began to be mastered the richest deposits of oil in Volga Region.

The measures, accepted for an increase in the extraction of fuel and production of electric power, made it possible to overcome one of the very bottlenecks in the work of industry and transport. If in

winter 1942/42 g. metallurgical plants, electrical stations and railroads felt great interruption in the fuel supply, then to the following winter it was possible to create even some fuel reserves. The petroleum-extracting industry managed the supply of the Red Army by liquid propellant, in spite of the fact that the need for the combustible and lubricants for the tanks, the aircraft, the motor vehicles continuously increased. It suffices to say that each refueling with of one army of combined arms was 500-600 tons ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18770, page 77.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Average/mean fuel consumption in the front offensive operation, that comprised in 1942 of 4-6 thousand tons, and in 1943 - 20 thousand tons, achieved toward the end of the war of 40 thousand tons ⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, providing the need of army, oil-extracting industry could not completely satisfy the needs of civil/civilian production, and therefore the consumption of oil in the rear it was necessary to sharply shorten.

During the years of war it was possible to solve the most difficult task of obtaining the minimally necessary quantity of electric power in the east of the country after the evacuation of a there great quantity of enterprises. And although in 1942 the unit of the enterprises forced was to stay for lack of electric power, nevertheless by the price of great efforts/forces (creation of new power stations, the severe limitation of consumption in all remaining branches) military and heavy industry in the east during the war received the necessary quantity of electrical energy.

In the chemical industry the production of many types of production in the war years considerably was shortened. The production of the mineral fertilizers and calcined soda decreased approximately/exemplarily to two thirds, sulfuric acid, synthetic dyes/pigments, synthetic rubber, automobile casings - nearly half, the sodas of caustic - to one third. But the chemical products, necessary to military industry, were produced in a comparatively great quantity. In 1944 of ammonia it was conducted only 14 percent less than before the war, and toluene and nitric acid - even it is more than in 1940 *.

FOOTNOTE *. There, inv. No 9605, page 194, 195. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Serious rebuilding during the years of war underwent machine

building. The large part of the production capacities of the Machine Building Plants was from the first days of war switched to the production of armament.

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Because of this, and also due to a sharp/acute deficiency in the metal many branches of civil/civilian machine building it was necessary to roll up. In the first war years completely ceased the production of hydraulic turbines, generators, carbon combines, diesel locomotives and electric locomotives, passenger cars, tractor seeders, granular combines, spinning vehicles and looms, to say nothing of the commodities of national consumption - photo cameras, sewing vehicles, bicycles. A comparatively high level maintained the production of the machine tools, bearings, forging presses. In 1940 in the USSR were prepared 58.4 thousand machine tools, in 1942 the production of machine tools fell up to 22.9 thousand, while in 1945 it achieved 38.4 thousand ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, page 203. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Only in second half of war began gradually to be restored the production of hydraulic turbines and generators, carbon combines, passenger cars. Increased the issue of vehicles and armament for the agriculture and the industry, which produces consumer goods. In 1944 began to be produced more tractors, tractor plows, was begun the restoration/reduction of the production of tractor seeders, granular combines. Since 1945 was renewed the production of spinning vehicles and looms. More than before the war, it was prepared in the war years of the horse agriculture inventory.

The important task of mechanical engineers became the carrying out of armament for the restorable and newly built metallurgy plants. Even in 1942 the carrying out of metallurgical armament was a little lower than the prewar, and in all subsequent years it exceeded it (carrying out of metallurgical armament was in 1940 23.7 thousand tons, in 1942 - 19.4 thousand, subsequently it continuously grew/rose and in 1945 achieved 26.9 thousand tons). Mechanical engineers satisfied also the urgent needs of propellant/fuel industry. In 1945 the production of cutters by 46 percent exceeded prewar level. Pick pneumatic hammers it was produced 2.1 times more than before the war. It is more than to they are milch, it was conducted deep-well pumps and turbine drills ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid., page 207. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the replenishment of the resources of some forms of armament, metallic and cable articles, chemicals and another production the significant role played the import, including of delivery on the lend-lease. Thus, in the years of war there were imported 44.6 thousand machine tools, 1860 steam locomotives even 11.3 thousand platforms, 517.5 thousand tons of nonferrous metals, 172.1 thousand tons of cable and wire/cable '.

FOOTNOTE '. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 1647, sheets 23, 25-26.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

For the development of Soviet industry during the years of war there was characteristically widespread introduction in the production of new engineering and technology, the use/application of the more advanced forms of the organization of production. This, first of all, relates to the military industry and machine-building. Here effectively began to be used the flow and conveyor methods of production, especially in the air and tank industry. The new methods of casting, welding, the replacement of forging by forging made it possible to accelerate the issue of armament and ammunition, contributed to an increase in their quality, lowered labor expense.

Mechanical engineers organized the production of the new types of highly productive single-purpose machines. In the total number of released machine tools the proportion of the machine tools of special ones, specialized and aggregate was raised from 11 percent in 1940 to 44 percent in 1942 *.

FOOTNOTE *. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, page 205. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In the coal industry began to be developed the most effective open pit mining of the deposits of carbon/coal. With the oil output was expanded turbine boring, was applied casing-less exploitation of holes, which gives the savings of pipes/tubes. On the power stations for the grinding of fuel were used simpler and more economical unit type mills instead of the steam ones. Were found the methods of application of fuel with the increased humidity and the ash content. On the pads of power stations were installed single-pass Ramzin boilers. It is remarkable, that, although at local exchanges the share of consumed low-grade local carbons/coals and peat was raised, the general/common/total expenditure of fuel, which goes for the

manufacture of thermal and electrical energy, during war was reduced.

Much of the fact that was for the first time introduced in the industrial practice during the war, on the even larger scales was adopted in the postwar time and was basis for the transition of industry to the higher step/stage of technical progress.

In the severe conditions it was necessary to work the industry, which generates consumer goods. Sharply decreased the raw resources of light and food industry. Many enterprises in these fields were transferred into the execution of front orders. Their significant part remained in the territory, seized by enemy. Of 10400 enterprises of Narkompishcheprom approximately 5500 were destroyed or seriously suffered ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the "planned economy", 1945, No 5, page 16.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The enterprises of the light and food industry, which released production for the population, with the interruptions were supplied with raw material, armament, spares, fuel, electric power. To the relatively greater degree, than the branch of heavy industry, they were deprived of the trained work force.

Output by light and food industry in the years of war is characterized by following data.

These are total numbers. But the production of the separate, very important forms of production was still below. In 1945 the production of sugar, linen jersey, hosiery goods did not exceed one fifth of prewar level.

the production of light and food industry (in the percentages to 1940) ².

FOOTNOTE ². According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and the materials of branch of the history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18759, l. 48. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Отрасли промышленности	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Легкая	88	48	54	64	62
(4) В том числе:					
(5) хлопчатобумажная	91	36	38	43	41
(6) шерстяная	74	32	35	40	42
(7) шелковая	77	41	50	55	50
(8) швейная	94	73	86	107	103
(9) кожаная, меховая и обувная	85	47	54	64	60
(10) Пищевая	80	42	41	47	51
(11) В том числе:					
(12) мясная	80	52	48	46	45
(13) рыбная	92	68	86	90	79
(14) масло-сыродельная и производство					
(15) прочих молочных продуктов	87	52	62	78	73
(16) сахарная	44	5	6	11	20

Key: (1). Branches of industry. (2). Year. (3). Light. (4). Among other things. (5). cotton. (6). wool. (7). silk. (8). sewing. (9). leather dressing, fur and shoe. (10). Food. (11). Among other things. (12). meat. (13). fish. (14). oil-cheese-making and production. (15). other milky/milk products. (16). sugar.

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The issue of leather foot-wear, vegetable oil, confectionery articles, soap was equal to approximately/exemplarily one third of issue 1940. The production of tissues, upper jersey, meat was 40-45 percent of prewar level. The production of oil of animal and canned foods was lowered doubly ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18759, sheets 48-49. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Industrial construction. The development of industry during the years of war required great capital investments. On the average in the year during the war into the most important branches of the heavy industry (ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, propellant/fuel industry and the production of electric power, chemical industry and machine building) were packed means more than in the prewar 1940. The concentration of efforts/forces in the construction of the enterprises of military and heavy industry made it possible shortly to increase the production of military technology and ammunition to

the sizes/dimensions, to the sizes/dimensions, necessary for the creation of the turning point in the course of military activities and wide deployment of offensive operations/processes.

The large part of all capital investments in industrial construction fell in the share of the eastern areas: Urals, Western and East Siberia, Far East, Central Asia, Kazakhstan.

In 1941-1945 as a result of the construction of new ones and restoration/reduction of the destroyed enterprises were put into operation the following production capacities in the most important branches of the heavy industry: the blast furnaces, designed for the issue of 6.2 mln. tons of cast iron per annum; the open-hearth furnaces with a total power of 8.2 mln. tons of steel; the rolling mills to 4.6 mln. tons of hire; battery of coke ovens with a power of 11.4 mln. tons of coke; mines on the extraction of 13.3 mln. tons of iron ore; mine/shaft the productivity of 114.9 mln. tons of coal; turbine power stations with the total power of 5 mln. kilowatts; cement works with the power of 1.9 mln. tons of cement. In this case putting into operation of open-hearth furnaces, rolling mills, power stations in the war years, as a rule, was considerably higher than prewar, and the addition of blast furnaces, battery of coke ovens, iron-ore enterprises, carbon mines/shafts and cement works into the first war years was inferior to indices of 1940, and then exceeded

them ².

FOOTNOTE ². There, inv. No 9605, page 376, 377. ENDFOOTNOTE.

War did not leave resources for the wide construction of the enterprises of light and food industry. In comparison with the prewar period capital investments into these branches were shortened in the war years approximately/exemplarily by 60 percent. Means were directed, first of all, to construction and restoration/reduction of bakeries, sugar refineries, for the cotton industry. In the eastern areas of the country within the very short period were constructed 8 sugar and 10 oil plants, 15 confectioner's shops and as many tobacco factories, 8 canning, 28 alcohol, 9 soap factories and other enterprises. In the liberated areas to 1 January, 1945, operated 1745 restored/reduced food enterprises ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. See the "planned economy", 1945, No 5, page 16.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the textile industry in 1941-1945 were established/installed about 900 thousand spinning spindles. The sugar refineries put into operation could process in a 24 hour period more than million centners of beet ⁴.

FOOTNOTE *. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, page 377. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Basic rebuilding underwent organization and construction technique. Construction norms were reviewed in connection with wartime conditions. Sometimes it was necessary to build temporary/time type structures/installations, designed for the relatively short term of service. From the projects were eliminated all unnecessary with construction, the excess areas of rooms, depots/dumps, etc. As a result the mechanical engineers began to accommodate machine tool not on 20-30 square meters, as it is earlier, but on 10-15 square meters.


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THE WORKING CLASS FORGES VICTORY.




Assembling Il-2 aircraft.


At one of the Urals plants.



In the ammunition shop of a weapons plant.



At the machine-building plant in Leningrad. Machine tools for new plants.



Manufacturing generators for hydroelectric power plants



Industry - agriculture. Assembling combines at the Krasnoyarsk Combine Plant.

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Previously accepted in the projects technical decisions were reexamined for the purpose of maximum simplification in the constructions/designs, decrease of the section of their elements, wide use in the construction of local materials.

Were considerably lowered the safety factors of constructions/designs, were increased allowable stresses. In connection with the deficit of glass to 2-2.5 times decreased the norms of glazing shops. It was permitted to accommodate everyday and office rooms directly in the shops. If before the war basic industrial shops were built in the form of the single-stage multispans buildings of great width, with the skylight through the lamps/canopies, with the internal drains and mechanical ventilation, then during the war were erected mainly shops by the width not of more than 48-60 meters, with spans/flights 6.9 and 12 meters, with the lateral light/world, by external drains and natural ventilation.

In the tasks/targets, which were being built under the wartime

conditions, were radically changed the carrying and enclosing units, extensively were used the lightened and wooden constructions. The place of reinforced concrete and concrete foundations occupied rubble, rubble concrete, brick and even wooden foundations; the carrying steel or reinforced concrete columns were replaced by brick columns, and by sometimes even wooden struts. The constructions/designs of covers/roofs/pavements, roofing, and also window and lamp interlacings, as a rule, made from the tree/wood. Hems were predominantly ground (earth, clay, crushed stone, gravel), processed the local binding/astringent materials. Roofings were laid usually single-layer, roll, and with the light construction and the width of the corps to 3 meters - pitch on the wooden base. In the woodless areas of Central Asia the overhead covers of tasks/targets from great spans/flights are obtained satisfaction in the form of the thin-walled brick arches/summaries of twofold curvature.

It is natural that many engineering decisions of wartime did not satisfy the requirements of the prolonged normal exploitation of industrial structures/installations. During the development of designs was provided for the replacement subsequently temporary/time constructions/designs by constants, more fundamental. It is unquestionable that precisely because of daring putting into practice of the construction work of new materials, constructions/designs, new procedures and methods of construction were achieved the remarkable

successes in acceleration of construction and reduction in its cost/value. All this in the final analysis helped to attain an increase in the military industrial potential of the country.

In all in the war years in the service areas, liberated from the occupation, are restored/reduced 7500 destroyed during the war large/coarse industrial enterprises ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of TsSU of SSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 9605, page 32. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Work under the wartime conditions enriched builders by the new experience of projecting and erection of buildings and structures/installations, equipment installation. Actually, the idea of projecting multi-purpose industrial buildings and disposition of armament on the open pads, which receives now increasing dissemination, was for the first time realized in our country in the war years. Under the wartime conditions very extensively were used reinforced concrete, predominantly composite constructions/designs, were used wooden and stone constructions/designs. For walls and covers/roofs/pavements of industrial buildings during the years of war for the first time were applied the constructions/designs from the reinforced cellular concretes which are at present spread both in

the industry and in the civil housing construction. During the years of war they began to use concrete in the constructions/designs, subjected to the influence of high temperatures. The practice of the construction of wartime gave many-sided initial data for the revision of the norms acted before the war and technical specifications of projecting of buildings and structures/installations.

Work experience under the wartime conditions showed that the presence of the permanent contract organizations and enterprises, which prepare for the constructions finished constructions/designs and details, is the decisive condition of accelerating of construction and increase in its quality.

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The rapid and successful restoration/reduction of the enormous complex of the enterprises of Donbass, Dnepr Region, Zaporozh'ye, Kharkov, Stalingrad (now Volgograd) and many other industrial centers proved to be possible only because of the fact that in these areas was preliminarily restored/reduced the necessary material and technical base and all works produced contract construction and assembling organizations.

The Great Patriotic War required from the builders of enormous

stress/voltage, forces, ability to maneuver with materials and technical resources, to rapidly develop works on the new pads, to apply the most effective methods of organization and carrying out of works. The builders of our country with the honor carried out these difficult missions, which was the visual result of the many-year work of the Communist Party and Soviet government for development and strengthening of construction industry and education of the qualified cadres of builders.

Agriculture. Enormous difficulties fell during the years of patriotic war in the share of agriculture. Vast productive soils of the Ukraine, southeast of the European unit of the RSFSR and other important in agricultural sense areas were in 1941-1942 occupied and completely ransacked by Hitlerites. Before the war in this territory were conducted 52 percent of grain, 86 percent of sugar beet, considerable quantities of sunflower, potatoes and meat ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 9605, page 47. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The loss of these areas and capture by the hostile military forces of the state reserves of rations, which were being stored in the western

regions, placed Soviet state in the heavy situation.

The general mobilization sharply shortened the labor resources of kolkhozes and state farms, and their especially qualified cadres. The significant part of those being in MTS, kolkhozes and state farms of tractors, automobiles, and also horses was withdrawn for the army, were shortened the deliveries of agricultural vehicles, fuel, chemicals, fertilizers, building materials, a material-technical base of agriculture was extremely weakened. Thus several numbers (for 1940 is taken entire territory of the country, for 1942 - territory without the areas, occupied by enemy). The fleet of tractors (in the conversion to 15-horsepower tractors) in 1942 decreased in comparison with 1940 by 44 percent, the motor pool of granular combines - by 34 percent and of trucks - by 80 percent. As a whole the energy power of agriculture in 1942 against 1940 were lowered more than doubly, the level of the mechanization of field works in the kolkhozes sharply fell ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 20, 276. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The difficulties, which arose in the agriculture since the beginning of the war, were complicated by the deficiencies, which were even from the prewar time. In the country there were numerous areas and kolkhozes, which lag on the production of grain, on the

stock raising. The main reason for this were the violations of the principle of the material interest of kolkhozes and collective farmers in the results of the public production, which were being allowed/assumed in the period of personality cult.

Hitlerites hoped for the fact that the collective farm formation/order will not maintain/withstand the tests of war and will be pulled down, that Soviet peasants, after using military situation they will annihilate kolkhozes, they will divide the earth/ground and the agricultural inventory, they will return to the private property and is left the Red Army without the cattle shed and the meat. But this it did not occur. Our kolkhozes and state farms with the honor maintained/withstood difficult historical examination, and only because of them our country during the entire Great Patriotic War had the necessary food base.

Enemy was not able to destroy the alliance of workers and peasants. Together with the workers the toilers of village selflessly protected their native land in the numbers of the Red Army, applied enormous efforts/forces for the strengthening and developments of military economy, went on material victims into the name of victory.

Given table shows the state of agriculture during the years of war.

Data for the years 1941-1944 show the agricultural production, which was being conducted in the territory of the USSR free from the Fascist occupationists, and they are given in the comparison with the production, which was being conducted in the entire prewar territory of the Soviet Union. They characterize the general/common/total loss which the war brought to agriculture. But the gross output of agriculture was shortened also by the areas which the enemy did not occupy. In these areas the gross output of agriculture in comparison with 1940 comprised: in 1941 - 98 percent, in 1942 - 78, in 1943 - 63, in 1944 - 69 percent and in 1945 - 71 percent ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 35. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The departure/attendance of the greater unit of the skilled workers themselves into the Red Army, the curtailment of the deliveries of agricultural vehicles and spare parts for them, and also chemicals and fertilizers involved the overall decrease in the level of agricultural engineering and the incidence/drop in the productivity.

As a whole in the country sowing areas considerably were shortened. This is reflected in the table.

Page 67. Agricultural production (in the percentages to 1940) ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 9605, page 18-21. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Виды продукции	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Вся валовая продукция	62	38	37	54	60
(4) Валовой сбор (амбарный урожай):					
(5) зерна	59	31	31	51	49
(6) сахарной свеклы (фабричной)	11	12	7	23	30
(7) хлопка-сырца	111	59	32	51	52
(8) льна-волокна	38	60	45	48	43
(9) подсолнечника	34	11	30	38	32
(10) картофеля	35	31	46	72	77
(11) Продукция животноводства:					
(12) мяса и сало (в убойном весе)	87	39	38	42	55
(13) молока	76	47	49	66	79
(14) шерсти	100	78	62	64	69
(15) яйца	76	37	28	29	40

Key: (1). Forms of production. (2). Year. (3). Entire/all gross output. (4). Gross assembly (storehouse harvest). (5). grain. (6). sugar beet (factory). (7). raw cotton. (8). flax fiber. (9). sunflower. (10). potatoes. (11). Production of stock raising. (12). meat and grease (in lethal weight). (13). milk. (14). wool. (15). egg.

Sowing areas (in the percentages to 1940) ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. Ibid., page 18-19. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Распределение посевных площадей	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Все посевные площади	72	58	63	73	75
(4) В том числе занятые культурами:					
(5) зерновыми	74	61	64	74	77
(6) техническими	68	50	62	63	65
(7) картофелем и овоще-бахчевыми	58	50	70	99,6	106
(8) кормовыми	71	53	51	58	56

Key: (1). Distribution of sowing areas. (2). Year. (3). All sowing areas. (4). Among other things occupied with cultures. (5). by grains. (6). technical. (7). by potatoes and vegetable-melon. (8). fodder.

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Substantially changed also the structure of sowing areas. Grew the proportion of grains (rye, corn, barley, millet), potatoes, vegetables, and was lowered the share of sowing areas under the technical and forage crops.

The productivity of cereal crops in 1940 composed 8.6 in 1942 - 4.4, in 1943 - 4.2, in 1944 - 6 and in 1945 - 5.6 centners from the

hectare ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 9605, page 291. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Fell the productivity of sugar beet, cotton, potatoes.

Great loss caused war to stock raising. Livestock in the years of war changed as follows:

Livestock (in the percentages to 1940) ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 325. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Виды скота	(2) К концу года				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Крупный рогатый скот	58	52	62	81	87
(4) В том числе:					
(5) коровы	54	50	59	77	82
(6) Свиньи	30	22	20	32	38
(7) Овцы и козы	77	67	69	77	76
(8) Лошади	48	39	37	47	51

Key: (1). Forms of cattle. (2). Toward the end of year. (3). Large/coarse cattle. (4). Among other things. (5). cow. (6). Pigs.

(7). Sheep and goat. (8). Horses.

Was lowered the productivity of cattle. Average/mean annual milk yield from one cow decreased from 1185 kilograms in 1940 to 1010 in 1943, 1094 - in 1944 and 1143 - in 1945. It sheared wool from one sheep before the war it composed 2.2 and in 1945 - 1.8 kilograms '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

A maximally possible expansion of sowing areas under the harvest of each war year, the retention/preservation/maintaining, and then increase in the livestock they were the combat missions of rural population, party and Soviet organizations of all service areas, regions and republics. Sowing areas and livestock of cattle increased in proportion to the liberation of the areas occupied. As long ago as 1943 total sowing area increased in comparison with 1942 by 6.4 mln. hectares, including sowings of grains increased by 3.3 mln. hectares. In 1944 total sowing area increased in comparison with 1943 on 15.8 mln., and sowings of cereal crops increased by 11.5 mln. hectares. In 1945 sowing areas were 113.6 million hectares, i.e., three fourths of prewar ones.

Began to be restored stock raising. Livestock of large/coarse cattle in 1945 achieved 47.4 mln. heads, either 87 percent of

livestock of 1940, and sheep - 58.4 mln. heads, or 73 percent of prewar level ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid., page 10-11, 19. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Since 1944 began to increase the deliveries to the agriculture of tractors and other vehicles, and also fertilizers. Were renewed the deliveries of trucks, was improved the fuel and lubricants supply. Toward the end of the war a number of tractors (in the conversion to 15-horsepower) was 72 percent in comparison with 1940, combines - 81 percent, trucks - 27 percent ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid., page 20-21. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In 1945 the gross assembly of grain increased in comparison with 1942 by 59 percent, the assembly of sugar beet increased 2.6 times, potatoes - 2.4 times. The production of meat and grease (in the dressed weight) within the same period increased by 44.4 percent ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of SSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 9605, page

10-13. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Considerable help in the food provision of workers were during the years of war the agricultural enterprises, organized with plant and factory ors [ors] (departments of working supply). Were encouraged landings of potatoes and vegetables by workers and by employees on the individual vegetable-gardens. The sowing areas of subsidiary agricultural enterprises in 1943 increased in comparison with 1940 2.2 times and were 3.2 mln. hectares. At the end of the war, in 1945, 18 mln. workers and using had individual vegetable-gardens with the total area of vegetable-melon cultures and potatoes of 1185 thousand hectares ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 310, 356. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The incidence/drop in the agricultural production during the years of war, naturally, led to the reduction of the state resources of rations and agricultural raw material.

The procurements of rations and agricultural raw material (in the percentages to 1940) ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. There, Inv. No 18863, page 73. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Виды сельскохозяйственной продукции	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Зерновые культуры	67	34	34	59	55
(4) Сахарная свекла	9,6	8,9	5,9	19,5	27
(5) Хлопок-сырец	111	59	32	51	52
(6) Лен-волокно	27	44	37	39	27
(7) Подсолнечник	32	8,5	27	37	33
(8) Скот и птица	73	60	59	54	59
(9) Молоко и молочные продукты	81	45	37	41	45
(10) Шерсть	99,2	67	54	54	56
(11) Яйца	71	25	19	32	43

Key: (1). Forms of agricultural production. (2). Year. (3). Cereal crops. (4). Sugar beet. (5). Raw cotton. (6). flax filament. (7). Sunflower. (8). Cattle and bird. (9). Milk and milky/milk products. (10)wool. (11). Eggs.

Thus, into 1942 and 1943 it was possible to prepare in comparison with 1940 only one third unit of grain, 60 percent of cattle and bird, 37-45 percent of milk ⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

And nevertheless, rigidly economizing the food and raw resources which gave the agriculture, systematically their using, Soviet state even with the available limited possibilities could without interruption supply front and satisfy the urgent needs of laborers, occupied in the industry, the construction and other branches of national economy.

Transport. In the beginning of war many bourgeois specialists in military and war economy questions gloatingly foretold, that the Soviet transport will not be able to maintain/withstand the difficulties of military years. This, however, it did not happen. The transport of the USSR managed the most difficult problems, which fell in its share during the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet transport had to provide military transportation for the hugest front. National-economic cargoes it was necessary to throw to considerably greater distances than before the war, since industry was redeployed into the deep rear.

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The medium distance of the transportation of one ton of cargo by rail transport composed during the years of the war of 730-790 kilometers instead of 700 kilometers in 1940 '.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 9605, page 391. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Especially difficult conditions were created for the rail transport in the first months of war. The Fascist-German aggressors came out into the areas, planned for concentration and unloading the Soviet military forces. Some very important railroads and waterways were intercepted by enemy, they underwent the strikes/shocks of hostile aviation.

During entire war the transport felt great difficulties in the fuel supply. Rolling stock was not sufficient, was felt a deficiency in the qualified cadres. Difficulties were complicated by the fact that also before the war in some areas, especially in Urals and in Siberia, the rail transport completely did not satisfy the need of national economy.

Negatively had effect on the work of rail transport stay for several years at the post of Peoples Commissar lines of communication. L. M. Kaganovich. Entire/all its activity at this high

post was penetrated by the unrestrained administration, so/such characteristic for the Stalin style of leadership. And if, in spite of all difficulties, rail transport managed the problems, set before it by war, decisive importance in this, as in other branches of national economy, had the enormous patriotic enthusiasm of Soviet people, organized and inspired by the Communist Party.

On the work of the separate forms of transport give representation such numbers.

Goods freight turnover of transport (in the percentages to 1940) ².

FOOTNOTE ². There, Inv. No 18863, page 74. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Виды транспорта	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Все виды транспорта	92	53	61	71	77
(4) В том числе:					
(5) железнодорожный	93	52	58	68	76
(6) морской	85	66	137	144	144
(7) речной	95	60	62	62	52
(8) автомобильный	70	31	31	39	56
(9) воздушный	74	61	78	148	275
(10) нефтепроводный	69	39	43	70	71

Key: (1). Forms of transport. (2). Year. (3). All forms of transport. (4). Among other things. (5). railroad. (6). naval. (7). river. (8). automobile. (9). air. (10). oil pipeline.

The main form of transport during the years of the Great Patriotic War it was railroad. In its share fell more than four fifths of all goods freight turnover of the country ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Important role played also naval and river transport. The significant part of the military cargoes was transported on the motor vehicles

and by airway.

Most difficult for the transport were 1942. In this year the goods freight turnover of all forms of transport was shortened in comparison with the prewar time by 47 percent. Since 1943 general/common/total goods freight turnover began continuously to grow/rise. In 1945 it achieved 77 percent of prewar level. The goods freight turnover of naval and air transport considerably exceeded this level. Interestingly this comparison. In 1943 the goods freight turnover of rail transport was 3.6 times more than in 1913.

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However, The extent of net/system (taking into account, that the significant part of the territory of the USSR remained still occupied) in both cases was almost identical ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 9605, page 7, 12; Inv. No 18759, L. 60. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The main place in the work of transport occupied, naturally, military transportation. And although the proportion of military

cargoes in the entire on-loading did not exceed 26 percent, military transportation had in entire work of transport a very great effect '.

FOOTNOTE ' . IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18760, page 46. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Each strategical operation required from the transport of the enormous concentration of forces and means in the determinate directions.

In the period of preparation/training and conducting the battle in the environs of Moscow on the roads, which adjoin Moscow, were unloaded 315 thousand cars with the military forces and the cargoes. The delivery/procurement of military forces, technology, ammunition, rations for three fronts, which participated in the battle in Volga, required about 300 thousand cars. During the preparation for defensive operation and offensive near Kursk according to the centralized plan only were delivered/brought and unloaded more than 313 thousand cars. In the period of preparation for Berlin operation to the roads of Poland and eastern prussia the railroad workers delivered 287 thousand cars. However, the total volume of military transportation in the years of war exceeded 18 mln. cars '.

FOOTNOTE ' . There, Inv. No 18770, page 29. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The work of rail transport greatly complicated a change in the goods traffics. The flows of military cargoes were fixed following the front line - to the West. By the main supply bases of the army and country by weaponry, by metal, by fuel, by rations and another industrial and agricultural production became the areas of Urals and Siberia. This caused one-way, mass and distant transportation westwards. But from the West towards the eastern cargoes went empty car. During the war arose the hyperdistant landing runs of empty car - from Moscow to Vladivostok (more than 9 thousand kilometers), from Moscow to Krasnoyarsk (about 4 thousand kilometers), from Kiev to Baku (2.2 thousand kilometers), etc. Clear maneuvering by the motor pool of empty cars became the necessary condition for the fulfillment of the plan of transportation. Railroad main pipelines received special tasks/targets with respect to the provision with the empty car of the areas of on-loading. In order to take care empty car for the most important cargoes. widely it practiced the formation of the special march routes, intended for the transportation of the most important military-strategic cargoes. Considerably was enlarged the use/application of the so-called circular march routes.

There were other great difficulties in the work of rail transport. War worsened/impaired situation with fuel. In 1942 of the

road of northwest and center they were transferred into firewood fuel. In 1943 firewood or mixed (carbon/coal, firewood) fuel used also the individual sections of Permian and Sverdlovsk roads. In essence on the firewood worked Pechorskiy road. Carbon/coal was supplied lower quality than to soldiers.

For the elongation/extent of entire the soldiers railroads felt sharp/acute deficiency in the production capacities for repairing the rolling stock.

The development of military operations/processes and military economy could not be carried out without considerable new transportation construction and rapid restoration/reduction of the destroyed railroads. The evacuation of a large number of factories and plants in Urals of willows Siberia required increase in the capacity of rear roads. Were intensified outputs/yields from Urals to the center, were developed Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Lower Tagilsk railroad junctions, was fastened/strengthened connection/bond with Central Asia areas in the directions/axes Kinel'-Krasnovodsk-Tashkent. In the central areas particular attention was paid by north, Yaroslavl, Gor'kiy, to Kazan' and other railroads. Were improved the railroad connections/bonds of these areas with Kuzbass, northern seaports, with the Far East.

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In the years of war were constructed 9 thousand kilometers of the new railroads of general/common/total use, including: Pechorskiy, Soroki-Obozerskaya, Sviyazhsk-Ul'yanovsk, Ul'yanovsk-were Vol'sk, Saratov-Stalingrad, Akmolinsk (now Tselinograd) - Kartaly, Orsk - Kandagach - Gur'yev, Kizlyar - Astrakhan'. In 1941-1945 yearly was commissioned almost doubly more railroad lines, than in the years of the prewar five-year plans ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18759, ll. 61-62. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Many forces required from the workers of transport and railroad military forces the restoration/reduction of railroads and bridges, destroyed by Hitler aggressors. Only the timely accomplishment of this mission could ensure the delivery that of all necessary for the advancing Soviet military forces. A main question was struggle for the high rates of reducing works. The average/mean rates of the restoration/reduction of railroad lines were 8-10 kilometers in a 24 hour period, and sometimes 15 kilometers. Great and average/mean bridges were restored in 1943 at average/mean rate 5.5 linear meter,

in 1944 - 9.7 meters in a 24 hour period ².

FOOTNOTE ². IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 13951, ll. 1-4. ENDFOOTNOTE.

By extremely high rates were rehabilitated a bridge through the large/coarse water obstacles, including through Dnepr, Volga, Danube, the vistula, Oder. For the time of war the workers of rail transport and the personnel of railroad military forces restored/reduced about 116 thousand kilometers of main and station routes/paths, about 3 thousand great and average/mean bridges ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. There, Inv. No 18770, page 46. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, as a whole transport workers proved to be weakly prepared to the enormous scales of reducing works. In 1942 military railroad units and construction-restoration formations NKPS [- People's Commisariat of Railroads] were subordinated to the main administration of military-restoration works of the NKPS. and although this made it possible to concentrated utilize forces and resources for the restoration works, the rate of the restoration/reduction of railroads on some sectors and directions/axes, especially in the conditions of the rapid offensive of the Red Army, it lagged behind the rate of progress of military

forces. Difficulties were complicated by the need for clearing mines railroads in the liberated territory. In 1942-1945 on these roads it was rendered harmless, it is taken/removed or it is annihilated about 1300 thousand mines and mines/fougasses '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Important role in the transportation of military cargoes during the years of war played motor transport.


At the beginning of war in the Red Army were more than 272 thousand trucks '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid., page 64. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This quantity only partially satisfied the need of military forces for the motor transport. True, in the course of war the motor pool of army considerably increased because of the transmission to it motor vehicles from the civil/civilian organizations, the production of new automobiles, their obtaining with the lend-lease and captured equipment undertaken by Soviet military forces. Toward the end of the war a number of trucks in the armed forces of the USSR increased to 665 thousand. And nevertheless front and army rear due to the deficiency of motor vehicles were to a considerable extent "tied" to

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IN THE REAR, LIKE AT THE FRONT: EVERYTHING FOR VICTORY!




It was often necessary to ship crops to the front region.

Bread - in the supplies of the Red Army.




Red wagon brigade organized by the wives of front-line soldiers (Kirgizskaya SSR).




Servicing tractors at the plant to be sent to the kolkhozes.

Preparing farming mechanizers. →



Transporting crops to the liberated territory.



the railroads. In the large units/formations and the units was applied the cartage. Motor transport transported cargoes from the stations of supply and nodes/units of railroads directly to the military forces. Within the time of war it transported 145 mln. tons of cargoes '.

FOOTNOTE '. There, Inv. No 9609, page 809. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In proportion to the expansion of the volume of the transportation of motor transport ever more important significance acquired the service of road provision. The extent of military-automobile roads, operated during the Great Patriotic War by road construction and maintainance troops of the Red Army, was 350 thousand kilometers. During the years of war the road construction and maintainance troops of the Red Army they restored/reduced and they repaired 97 thousand kilometers of roads.

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For the military transportation extensively was used the water transport. Naval and river ships transported the considerable number of military forces with their weaponry and technology, and also about 22 mln. tons of different cargoes.

Air transport was applied for the supply of military forces, in essence during the lack of roads and the slush, and for the transportation of patients and casualties.

Distribution of labor resources and the organization of labor/work. One of the most complex problems, which arose before the national economy of the USSR in the period of the Great Patriotic War, there was the problem of the distribution of labor resources and organization of labor/work. The labor resources of the country already in the beginning of war considerably decreased. The significant part of the able-bodied men left into the army. Enormous loss to labor resources caused occupation by the enemy of many densely populated areas of the country. In order to provide the military industry and other branches of national economy with work force, it was necessary to radically redistribute the remaining labor resources between the separate branches and economic regions. First of all labor resources were concentrated in the military industry, in the branches of heavy industry connected with it, in the field of transportation.

In 1945 in all branches of national economy were counted 27.3 mln. workers and using against 31.2 mln. people in 1940. In the branches most important in military sense the number of workers and employees decreased insignificantly. It very noticeably was shortened

in the trade ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War Inv. No 9605, page 414. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Maximum sharpness acquired questions of the provision with the work force of enterprises in the eastern areas of the country, order and supply of the workers arrived there. How a complicated were these questions, evidently from this comparison. In 1940 industrial workers and employees of Volga Region, Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia were 25 percent of the total number of industrial workers and employees, while in 1943 - 47 percent ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 419. ENDFOOTNOTE.

It was necessary to prepare millions of skilled workers. Which could replace those left by the front. It was necessary to radically reform/redispose entire labor regime.

Because of the efforts/forces of state, high consciousness and the patriotism of laborers these problems were successfully carried out.

For the resolution of the problem of labor resources for Soviet state it was necessary during the years of war together with the economic measures to resort also to the measures to administrative. The working military industries also of the enterprises cooperated with it were mobilized for entire period of war. Was forbidden arbitrary departure/attendance from the enterprises. In the field of transportation it was established/installed military discipline. Were introduced compulsory/necessary overtime works. The leaves of absence to worker and employees during the war were abolished. Kolkhozes raised the compulsory/necessary minimum of workdays for each collective farmer. For the purpose of the enlistment of supplementary work force it was permitted the mobilization of the inoperative population.

Very widely in the period of war was applied female labor/work. Considerably grew the proportion of women among the workers of those professions, in which before the war were occupied predominantly the men - metal workers, the firemen of steam boilers, smiths, punchers, chauffeurs, tractor operators. Heroically worked in the rear adolescents and people of old age.

The main principle of the organization of labor/work and under

war time it remained the socialist principle: from each - on capabilities, each - on the transactions. On this basis were built the wages, bonus system, supply of laborers by consumers' goods. At the same time was taken into consideration significance the top or another branch for the military economy.

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Thus, during May 1945 average/mean wages in the people's commissariat of tank industry in comparison with the average/mean wages of the working machine-building and metalworking enterprises was higher by 25 percent, in the people's commissariat of armament - 12, in the people's commissariat, the aircraft industry - by 17 percent. Explosion/burst on the average to the wages between the branches with the greatest and smallest wages increased from 2 times before the war to 3 times at the end of the war. Increased premium significance. In 1944 in comparison with 1940 their proportion in the wages of workers rose from 4.5 to 8 percent, and in technical-engineering workers - from 11 to 28 percent.

Successfully was accomplished the very important mission of training recently arrived to the production workers and those, who were assigned to the preparation of military production new for them. (During the) time of war on the average in the year in the production was

trained 5228 thousand people (into this number do not enter the students of schools and schools of manpower resources), while in the prewar 1940 - 3605 thousand people. Was raised the significance of the schools of factory and plant training and handicraft schools (manpower resources). These schools and schools prepared in 1941-1945 2475 thousand skilled workers ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 9605, page 423. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Military economy required also in large quantities of specialists of average/mean and highest qualification. For this it was necessary the significant part of the men - specialists and the most skilled workers - to free from the appeal at army and to armor after the production. At the same time the party and the government took measures for the retention/preservation/maintaining of the highest and secondary special educational institutions and continuing training in them specialists. It is remarkable, that from second half of war, a number of students of the highest and secondary special educational institutions began to grow/rise. Thus several characteristic numbers. In 1940 in the highest and secondary special educational institutions were trained 1787 thousand people, in 1941

this number was shortened to 728 thousand, in 1942 - to 543 thousand. But then a quantity of trainers in VUZ [- Institute of Higher Education] and technical schools increases to 903 thousand in 1943 , 1397 thousand - in 1944 and 1738 thousand - in 1945 ².

FOOTNOTE ². There, Inv. No 18759, ll. 69-70. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The best index of the effectiveness of one or the other system of the organization of labor/work is its productivity. Manufacture to one worker in the most important branches of industry grew/rose for the length of all years of war up to 1945, and then a little was lowered in connection with the transition from the military production to the peaceful. In the construction it was retained approximately/exemplarily on one, somewhat smaller in comparison with the prewar, level. On the railroads the manufacture descended up to 1944 and only since 1945 it began to rise.

Manufacture to one worker (in the percentages to 1940) ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. There, Inv. No 18863, page 78. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Отрасли народного хозяйства	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Промышленность	110	130	139	142	114
(4) Строительство	99,8	91	96	95	89
(5) Железнодорожный транспорт (на одного работника, занятого на перевозках)	98	79	74	67	68

Key: (1). Branches of national economy. (2). Year. (3). Industry.
(4). Construction. (5). Rail transport (to one worker, occupied on
transportation).

During the comparison of manufacture in the military and prewar periods it is necessary, of course, to have in mind that since the beginning of the war the operating time increased as a result of the introduction of overtime works and cancellation of leaves of absence.

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Do not be this, it would be necessary additionally to implicate in the production in 1942 of 1.5 mln. and in 1944 - about 2 million. man

¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18759, l. 71. ENDFOOTNOTE.

It is unquestionable that an increase in the manufacture reflected not only an increase in the operating time developed by each, but also, that especially should be emphasized, the grown/risen hourly labor productivity. It most considerably increased in military industry, ferrous metallurgy and in the chemical production. These are the brightest index of labor upsurge, which encompassed entire working class, the result of the mass introduction of new technology, best use of production capacities.

Supply with rations and by industrial goods of personal consumption. For entire duration of war Soviet military forces were regularly supplied with rations according to the established/installed norms, which provided completely satisfactory supply of all personnel. Some fronts had toward the end of the war their own secondary economies. This allowed them not only to completely provide its military forces with potatoes, by the vegetables and by others by products, but also to transmit the unit

of the agricultural products to state procurement organs for the supply of the population of front area.

Soviet industry completely satisfied the need of the armed forces for the clothing/uniform. Within the time of war the military forces of army in the field four times received new summer and winter uniform. Because of a good organization of maintenance of item equipment the expenditure/consumption of the basic objects/subjects of clothing/uniform and foot-wear per annum to one soldier proved to be in this war lower than in the Russian army during the First World War.

Besides leather and felt foot-wear, army clothing light industry supplied military forces with parachutes, saddlers-saddle articles, tents, tarpaulin, etc. Food industry produced for the military forces not only grain, to croup, meat, fish, canned foods, grease, sugar, tobacco, but also concentrates, vitamins, blocks.

Centralized market funds for the most important commodities (in the percentages to 1940) ².

FOOTNOTE ². There, Inv. No 18863, page 79. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Товары	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Мука	91	57	46	43	50
(4) Крупа	92	32	30	48	61
(5) Мясо	93	50	58 (6)	63 (6)	80 (6)
(6) Мясные консервы	164	231	В 13 раз	В 24 раза	В 46 раз
(7) Рыба	81	33	47	66	65
(8) Сельдь	63	36	29	27	22
(9) Рыбные консервы	55	29	47	83	99
(10) Масло животное	98	55	46	57	59
(11) Масло растительное	74	45	72	126	99
(12) Сахар	77	15	8	11	25
(13) Яйца	52	29	24	38	51
(14) Ткань	73	14	14	19	29
(15) Швейные изделия	61	10	10	11	18
(16) Трикотаж и чулочно-носочные изделия	74	16	16	16	18
(17) Обувь кожаная и резиновая	65	8	7	10	15

Key: (1). Commodities. (2). Year. (3). Torment. (4). Croup. (5). Meat. (6). Meat canned foods. (7). In. (8). once. (8a). time. (9). Fish. (10). Herring. (11). Fish canned foods. (12). Oil, animal. (13). Oil, vegetable. (14). Sugar. (15). Eggs. (16). Tissues. (17). Sewn articles. (18). Jersey and hosiery goods. (19). Foot-wear leather and rubber.

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Extremely complicated was the problem of the supply with rations and by other commodities of civil/civilian population. State was arranged/located the extremely limited commodity resources. It was necessary to introduce card system. In the industrial enterprises were created ors was enlarged the net/system of public dining halls. The total volume of state retail commodity turnover in the years of war sharply decreased. Consumption per capita of population was lowered.

During the years of war was shortened the market fund for the commodities which the state guided for sale to population, and increased stocks of directly allocated goods - resources which were used for the industrial treatment/processing for the purpose of the satisfaction of the needs of army, children's installations, hospitals, etc. In 1942 in comparison with 1940 the proportion of market fund was lowered in the commodity production of torment and graupel/groats from 85 to 73 percent, meat products - from 44 to 27, cotton fabrics - from 46 to 9 and leather foot-wear - from 80 to 28 percent ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR IML. Documents and the materials of the

department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18759, L.
72. ENDFOOTNOTE.

As changed over the years state market funds, evidently from the table (page 75).

These data show that most of all were shortened the market funds for torment, graupel/groats, herring, sugar, eggs. Considerably were lowered the market funds for meat. At the same time many times increased the market funds for meat canned foods. Certain significance for an increase in the funds for rations had deliveries on the lend-lease of meat products, grease and sugar.

Sharply decreased the market funds for industrial goods - tissues, sewn articles, jersey and hosiery articles, foot-wear.

As a result of these changes the volume of retail commodity turnover (in the comparable prices) into 1942 and 1943 was shortened in comparison with the prewar by two thirds. Changed its structure - share of food commodities in comparison with the industrial ones it increased. Increased the significance of public nutrition. It suffices to say that the proportion of the enterprises of public nutrition in entire retail commodity turnover rose from 13 percent in 1940 to 25 percent in 1943. The significant part of the commodity

turnover fell in the share of the departments of the working supply of enterprises. In the beginning of 1945 they sold a little less than one third of all commodities ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. There Inv. No 9605, page 427; Inv. No 18759, L. 74.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Card system was introduced from July 1941: to the grain - everywhere, and in the most important food commodities - in 43 largest cities and industrial centers. Since 1942 the most important industrial goods also began to be sold on the cards.

State centralizedly supplied with cattle shed the predominant unit of the population of the country. Thus some datum.

Population, which consisted on the state supply with grain (in thousand people) ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. There, Inv. No 9605, page 441. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Снабжение по нормам	(2) На декабрь			
	1942 г. (3)	1943 г.	1944 г.	1945 г.
(4) Городским	40 961	43 188	48 373	53 817
(5) Сельским	20 817	24 523	25 626	26 769
(6) Всего	61 778	67 711	73 999	80 586

Key: (1). Supply according to the norms. (2). On December. (3). g.
(4). Urban. (5). Rural. (6). In all.

end section.

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These numbers give visual representation about the colossal scales of the state supply with grain during the years of war. State provided with grain of workers and employees of industrial enterprises, constructions, state installations and organizations together with the members of families, and also children's houses, houses of invalids, hospital. Grain from the state received rural intelligentsia (teachers, doctors), workers of district enterprises and installations. To the state supply with grain was included the population, evacuated from the areas, which were subjected to occupation.

All state supply on the cards was differentiated. To the preferred situation were placed the workers and technical-engineering personnel of particularly important productions, and also workers and technical-engineering personnel of particularly important productions, and also workers, occupied on punishments. Toward the end of the war the relationship/ratio between the smallest and greatest supply rates of workers comprised: on the grain - 1:2.4, on

the meat, to fish, the grease, croup - 1:2.5, sugar and to confectionery articles - 1:1.25. Besides the differentiated rations the workers for the more productive labor/work received in the enterprises the second dinner.

Non-food stuffs to peasants were sold in the order/formation of "bartering" of the state procurements of agricultural products.

In 1944 was introduced commercial trade in commodities without the cards, but on the higher prices than card ones.

As a whole the state supply with rations remained firm; the norms of sale of commodities on the cards within the time of war did not decrease. However, these norms were very hard.

The nourishment of workers during the years of the war (is more domestic public nutrition on one member of family in the percentages; September of 1940 =100 to percentages)¹.

(1) Виды продуктов	(2) Сентябрь			
	1941 г.	1942 г.	1943 г.	1944 г.
(2) Хлеб и мука	96,9	98,0	98,0	83,5
(4) Крупа, бобовые, макаронны	95,4	73,0	91,0	114,0
(5) Картофель	128,2	131,6	198,7	234,1
(6) Овощи и бахчевые	66,1	41,4	44,7	40,9
(7) Молоко и молочные продукты (без масла животного)	90,4	58,3	67,3	69,5
(8) Мясо и мясопродукты	111,3	42,1	55,8	59,5
(9) Жиры животные и растительные	56,4	65,4	79,9	106,5
(10) Рыба и сельдь	87,3	78,4	105,6	111,6
(11) Сахар и кондитерские изделия	50,6	33,8	25,3	22,4

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18759, *l.* 78.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

Key: (1). Forms of products. (2). September. (3). Bread and flour. (4). Croup, bean, macaroni. (5). Potatoes. (6). Vegetables and melon. (7). Milk and milky/milk products (without oil of animal). (8). Meat and meat products. (9). Grease, animal and vegetable. (10). Fish and herring. (11). Sugar and confectionery articles.

The significant part of the products workers and employees of cities bought on the collective farm markets on the high price. In 1943 on the urban collective farm markets for the price 13 times exceeded prewar. True, in 1945 in comparison with 1943 they considerably were lowered, but they were nevertheless more than prewar ones 5.5 times. As far as the state retail prices in the normalized trade are concerned, they remained relatively low and did not change, with exception of the prices of the vodka, vodka

articles, wines, beer, salt. However, taking into account the prices in the commercial trade the general/common/total index of the retail prices in comparison with the prewar period was raised.

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Toward the end of the war it comprised against 1940 on all commodities of 205 percent, on the foodstuffs - 225 and non-food stuffs - 195 percent ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 9605, p 432, 435. ENDFOOTNOTE.

A deficiency in the rations, the industrial goods involved a considerable decrease in the level of the personal consumption of population. In the years of war it was lowered, as are shown the rough estimates of statistical organs, on the average per capita of population by 35-40 percent ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. *There*, Inv. No 18759, l. 77. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Certain representation about how deteriorated the nourishment of

workers, give the materials of the budgetary examinations/inspections (see tables on page 77).

Personal consumption by the collective farmers of grain products was lowered in 1943 in comparison with 1939 by 35 percent, meat and grease - by 66 percent; the consumption of potatoes was raised by 109 percent, vegetables - by 24 percent. Only the consumption of milky/milk products was maintained at the prewar level.

As a whole in the volume of food products consumed by population sharply was shortened the share of meat and milky/milk products, grease and sugar, fruits and vegetables, i.e., the highest-energy and rich in vitamins products.

Great deprivations fell to the lot of workers, peasants, intelligentsia during the years of patriotic war. To laborers sometimes most necessary food products, clothing, foot-wear were not sufficient. Were heavy housing conditions. And if the Soviet people overcame all difficulties and with the honor maintained/withstood tests of wartime, then in this, first of all, played role its selfless love for the native land.

Finances and money circulation. War lay heavy burden on state budget, it destroyed money circulation, it led to a descent in the

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purchasing power of ruble. Characteristics of the military budget of the USSR is given in the table.

Change in income and expenditures/consumptions of the state budget of the USSR in 1941-1945 (in the percentages to 1940)³.

(1) Доходы и расходы по отдельным статьям	(2) Год				
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
(3) Все доходы	98	92	113	149	168
(4) В том числе: от социалистического хозяйства . .	97	75	88	117	143
(5) Из них: налог с оборота	88	63	67	90	116
(6) отчисления от прибылей	108	71	93	99	78
(7) привлечение средств населения . .	110	222	313	405	360
(8) Все расходы	110	105	120	151	171
(9) В том числе: на народное хозяйство	89	54	57	92	128
(10) на социально-культурные меро- приятия	77	74	92	125	153
(11) на оборону страны	146	191	220	243	226
(12) на управление	75	63	77	108	135

FOOTNOTE 3. Ibid, sheets 79-80.

Key: (1). Income and expenditures/consumptions according to various articles. (2). Year. (3). All income. (4). Among other things: from socialist economy. (5). From them: turnover tax. (6). deduction from profits. (7). enlistment of means of population. (8). All expenditures/consumptions. (9). Among other things: to national economy. (10). to sociocultural measures. (11). to defense of country. (12). for control.

In the profitable unit of the budget of military years noticeably was lowered the significance of profits, since in many profitable branches (light, food industry, etc.) the production during the years of war was shortened.

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On the same reason occurred certain descent in the proportion of entries into the budget of turnover tax. Increased in the budget the share of the means, received from the population in the form of taxes

and loans. Successful subscription to the loans, the voluntary contributions into the fund for defense, into the fund for the Red Army - in all this vividly were displayed patriotic feelings of Soviet people, their participation in the national struggle with the aggressor.

In the budgetary expenditures/consumptions especially increased military assignments (including expenditures for military pensions). The means, which go for financing of the peaceful branches of economy and to the education, up to 1944 were reduced, and then they began to grow.

In 1941-1943 the budget was reduced with the deficit. However, deficit was comparatively small. With respect to the budgetary expenditures/consumptions it composed in 1942 9.8 and in 1943 - about 3 percent. Was covered/coated deficit due to the emission, an increase in the state duty and use of state material reserves and reserves. Since 1944 the budget became selfsupporting. In its stability was reflected the general/common/total stability of Soviet military economy.

The basis of Soviet budget and in wartime was the socialist socialized economy. During all years of the war of storage from the socialist economy they were approximately/exemplarily 70 percent of

all entries into the state budget ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18759, L. 81. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This high level of storages proved to be possible because of a systematic reduction in the prime cost of production. The prime cost of industrial production (in the comparable prices) was lowered in 1941 by 6.9 percent, in 1942 - to 5.9, into 1943 and 1944 - by 2.5 percent ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid. Inv. No 9605, p 90. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Serious tests during the years of war underwent money circulation. It influenced a number of factors. First of all pronounced a strong increase in the profits of urban population in second half of 1941 as a result of detachments according to the wages with those called in army and issues of manuals by worker and by employee, evacuated to the east. Profits of population continued to grow, also, during the subsequent years, moreover it is more rapidly than commodity turnover. This led to settling of money in population. Increased the turnovers of the disorganized market, which involved

the expansion of the sphere of the unplanned money address/circulation and increased the inflow of money into the village. For financing the military expenditures/consumptions state it was forced to use an emission. In 1945 to each ruble, which was being located in the address/circulation, according to the detachments of Gosplan and people's commissariat of finances, it fell commodities approximately/exemplarily 3 times less than in 1940. '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid. Inv. No 18759, L. 82. ENDFOOTNOTE.

But the most essential effect on the money circulation showed/rendered a more rapid increase in the profits of population (mainly rural) in comparison with the commodity turnover.

However, for Soviet state it was possible to maintain relatively firm money address/circulation because of the stable prices of the necessities, of the means of production and the military technology, to the solid procurement prices of the agricultural products, to the state planned/planning distribution of commodities, which was begun in second half of war, to the expansion of the production of commodities, to a reduction in the prime cost of industrial production.

As a whole money circulation in the USSR in the years of war

grew 3.8 times. This is, of course, considerable increase. Let us recall that the money circulation increased in England in 1945 in comparison with 1940 2.4 times, in the USA - 3.5 times and in France - 2.6 times *.

FOOTNOTE *. Ibid., ^{P.}L. 83./ENDFOOTNOTE.

But if we in this case consider the enormous stress/voltage which fell to the lot of Soviet economy during the years of war, stress/voltage is immeasurably greater than first, which tested other countries, then one cannot fail to recognize that also in the region of money circulation pronounced the advantages of Soviet economic system.

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4. The basic features of Soviet economy during the years of war.

Military economy is not the particular social type of economy similarly, for example, to capitalist or socialist economy. As is known, the social type of economy is determined, first of all, by the character of the social-production relations, by the form of ownership of the means of production. During emergence and development of military economy basic production relations,

characteristic to volume or to another social type of economy, completely are retained. Therefore in order to understand laws governing the Soviet military economy, to clarify to itself the characteristics of its reproduction, to generalize the experience of its creation and development, necessary to constantly remember the main thing - this was the economy of the socialist state of military years.

In the organization of Soviet military economy the decisive role belonged to the Soviet state, led by the Communist Party. Conducting the policy of the defense of the basic interests of all citizens of socialist society, managing the basic means of production and taking into account in its activities objective economic laws, Soviet state effectively guided the development of national economy during the years of war. Relying on the advantages of planned/planning socialist economy, Soviet state radically changed entire economy for the successful conduct of struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors, for organization and development of new type military economy. This is the first in the history experience of the all-encompassing and effective use of methods of the planning guide by socialist national economy in the conditions of great war.

As far as the organization of capitalist military economy is concerned, it is also impossible without considerable reinforcing of


state interference in the economic life. About this convincingly testifies the experience of the Second World War. Imperialistic state comes forward as owner and organizer of the unit of the military enterprises, it accommodates military orders among the particular owners, attempts to regulate - and to a certain degree it regulates - the consumption of raw material and fuel, are controlled foreign trade and transport, it increases the tax assessment, it introduces labor obligation, it normalizes consumption, etc.

However, the military economy measures of imperialistic states are conducted within the framework of particular ownership of the means of production, which remains sacred and emergency. The laws of the capitalist production, given rise to by the private property, the anarchy of production and competition continue to act, frequently inverting detachments and intentions of state organs. The measures of bourgeois state everywhere run into the particular interests. Buying the earth/ground and the materials for the construction of one or the other state enterprise or accommodating orders at the particular factories and the plants, government is always forced to consider the interests of owner and, of course, to guarantee to it the prices and profits that are becoming to wartime conditions, i.e., the considerably exceeding ordinary.

The magnates of capital, occupying the most important posts in

TRANSPORTATION IS RESTORED.

Restoring the
railroad track
to the territory
liberated from
the enemy



First train on
the rebuilt
track.





Train with fuel ready to send to the front.

Constructing a road near the front.



the governments of the bourgeois countries and conducting the economic policy on behalf of state, are guided first of all by their mercenary interests. Therefore the military deliveries, which bring the greatest profits, are obtained to their enterprises which moreover, are placed in the particularly favorable conditions in the meaning of the supply with raw material, with fuel, by work force. This type of "protectionist" activity cannot but cause decisive resistance from the side of those groups of the capitalists who do not have strong hand in the government apparatus.

The characteristic features of interference of bourgeois state in the economic life can be traced based on the specific examples of the Second World War.

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Hitler government was the protege of the most reactionary and militarist circles of German financial capital. Hitler, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, and other rulers of Fascist Germany betrayed served German banks and concerns. The organs, created by them for the leadership of German military economy, were obedient gun in the hands of the most powerful reactionary groups of monopolist capital.

When fascists arrived at the authority, the position of

monopolist capital in the German economy, even without that very strong, even more greatly they were strengthened. In the composition of temporary/time supreme economic advice/council, created immediately after setting of Fascist regime, entered, according to D. Allen's expression, "great moguls" of German financial capital - Krupp, Thyssen, Siemens, Fegler, Schroeder, etc. As writes Allen, the process of the splicing of the apparatus of monopolist capital and Fascist state apparatus was completed during the war when "merging/coalescence it became such complete that almost it was not possible to distinguish the boundary, which separated/liberated Hitler state apparatus from the hierarchy of trusts" ¹.

✓ FOOTNOTE ¹. D. Allen. International monopolies and *Peace* Mr. M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1948, pp. 15-16. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Specifically, German monopolist capital, raised on the American and English loans and the credits, was that force which led to the authority of fascists and unleashed by their hands the Second World War. On this it cannot be forgotten. In our time German monopolists with the support of American banks and corporations recreate in the center of Europe the dangerous center of aggression, which threatens peace and security of all peoples.

During the organization of German military economy extensively

were used non-economic constraint, violence. In connection with this the official and police apparatus of Hitler state, including with the apparatus of the Fascist party growing with it, swelled to the improbable sizes/dimensions and absorbed the significant part of the national income of Germany.

Conducting the military mobilization of economy, Hitler state extensively used dictatorial, terrorist methods. It applied violence for strengthening of the monopolies, connected with the government, it shamelessly expropriated in their interests the supplies of those strata of the German population which did not support fascism or stood in the route/path of Fascist monopolies.

Billions of marks gave to Hitlerites Jewish pogroms. Several were obtained monopolies from the expropriation of the overwhelming majority of the craftsmen on the basis of the policy of total mobilization. The source of enormous income was robbery in the vassal and occupied countries. Hitler state organs supplied to the military industry of Germany many millions of foreign workers and they cruelly exploited them. Entire/all force of government apparatus by a fascist of Germany was used for the content of giant military vehicle and provision to monopolies of colossal profits.

The economy of the USA in the period of the Second World War was

also wholly subordinated to the interests of the largest monopolies.

Competitive struggle pierced all sides of American military economy. Certain unit of the American monopolies, having a provided sale and a prospect for an increase in the profits without the basic breakage of production, was opposed to the military rebuilding of the economy of the country. Thus, motor vehicle industry could according to the technical specifications become the concentration point of tank and aircraft production, but even after proclamation by Roosevelt the program of national defense are continued to produce passenger motor vehicles. Many monopolies during the war conducted the policy of the limitation of production in order to create favorable conditions for maximally high prices with conclusion and renewal of contracts in the deliveries of military commodities.

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The resistance of owners to measures, the resistance of owners to the measures, directed toward the development of military economy, was in USA one of the reasons for realization by forces and means of the state of the great program of the construction of strategically important enterprises. However, creating these enterprises to the means, received from the loans and the taxes, government it was forced to transmit their exploitation to particular owners.

Owners collected enormous tribute from the laborers. The profits of American corporations (joint-stock societies) within the time of the Second World War (1945 in comparison with 1938) they increased 5.8 times ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics, March of 1963, p 94. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Enriching American capitalists, war increased the property inequality of classes, strained class contradictions. During the years of war in the USA increased the concentration and the centralization of capital, was increased the role of monopolies.

The experience of the "adjustable" military economy of all capitalist countries, which participated in the Second World War, again and again confirms the situation of Marxist-Leninist theory about the fact that within the framework of capitalism planned/planning management of economy is impossible. Bourgeois ideologists attempt to depict the military economy capitalist of the countries in the period of the Second World War as one of the forms from the forms of "planned/glide" capitalism. In fact the war not only did not change the nature of capitalist economy, but sharply she

increased and were deepened antagonistic contradictions inherent in it.

Soviet military economy had at its basis socialist property/ownership of the most important means of production. This would eliminate any possibility of competitive struggle and anarchy of production, it caused the deliberate organization of the military economy of the USSR. The military economy of the Soviet Union characterized the production attitudes of the comradely cooperation of people, off-duty. And in this is hidden the economic reason of political and moral unity of Soviet society, unity of front and rear, mass socialist competition of workers and collective farmers as the powerful motivating power of economic development.

The organization of Soviet military economy was based on heroic, creative labor/work of tens of millions of citizens of Soviet state, called by the Communist Party to the defense of its fatherland.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War all public production was subordinated to the great liberating goals into name of which with the weaponry in the hands struggled our people. War required from the Soviet people of enormous victims. It interrupted the process characteristic for the conditions of peaceful socialist construction of a steady rise in the standard of living of laborers,

sharply lowered the already achieved level of material welfare.

Main laws governing the Soviet military economy - deliberate and rapid development of military production and its ensuring raw branches of heavy industry and machine building. Military industry was that nucleus, around which grew military economy. In accordance with the rates of increase/growth and the volume of the production of the military branches of industry was formed entire structure of military economy. Thus, the proportionality of military economy was formed into the name of another goal, rather than the proportionality of peaceful socialist economy, and therefore differed from it. Many proportions of military economy from the point of view of peaceful economy were disproportion, and prolonged war reinforced them. Everything was subordinated to the requirements of the maximum expansion of military production. The possibilities of the satisfaction of personal and peaceful social demand of the members of society were very limited.

A number of characteristic laws governing the military economy of the USSR includes a continuous rise in productivity of the labor/work of the workers of military industry.

Soviet socialist military economy would not attain superiority over the economy of imperialistic Germany without a rapid and systematic rise in productivity of labor/work in its leading branches. This was not by chance or by the simple consequence of extreme state measures. A steady rise in productivity of labor/work depended on the basic characteristics of socialist society, on its economic formation/order. Because of the advantages of socialism Soviet state in the last war Fascist Germany, better than used achievements of science and technology for expanding the military production. The same one should speak about this distinctive features of Soviet military economy as a descent in the aggregate production costs in all branches of military industry.

However, with a rapid rise in productivity of labor/work and a descent in the production costs in the military industry in many other branches of national economy situation with the labor productivity and the prime cost of production in comparison with the prewar time deteriorated. The technical preparedness of labor/work in these branches was lowered, was lowered the qualification of workers. First of all this relates to the agriculture.

The law of distribution according to the labor/work during the war encountered the tendencies of equalizing distribution, caused by the limitedness of resources.

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 04/22

1941-1945 VOLUME 6 (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV


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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

During the years of war was increased the organizing role of Soviet state; however, it became apparent in the specific forms, characteristic to particular wartime conditions. Increased centralization in the system of state control, obtained great use/application the non-economic methods of organizing of production and distribution. Thus, were extensively used the non-economic ways of the mobilization of labor resources and organization of labor/work (mobilization to the labor front, the prohibition of arbitrary departure/attendance from the enterprises), the enlistment of raw, food and financial resources in the form of the taxation of population and enterprises by taxes, the organization of distribution according to the cards. Because of supremacy of socialist property/ownership and high consciousness of Soviet people, which selflessly supported these measures, Soviet economic centralization was much more complete and it is more effective than the centralization of the military economy of capitalist states.

As a whole the development of socialist economy during the years of war showed that also under the military conditions the socialist national economy has the enormous advantages over the capitalist economy. These advantages pronounced in a deeper and more consistent rebuilding of entire economy, more rapid increase in the military

production, in the best use of material, financial and labor resources for the needs of military economy, for restoring the areas, which were undergoing occupation, and also creation of prerequisites/premises for the successful postwar development of the country. These advantages were revealed also in the more rapid, comparatively lighter transition of the country to the peaceful economy.

Let us examine now some distinctive features of the reproduction of Soviet military economy.

As already mentioned above, under the military conditions socialist society can satisfy only the minimum peaceful needs of citizens and the large part of the resources is used in the interests of the victory over the aggressor. Military consumption reduces public riches and resources of reproduction. National economy is deprived of a colossal quantity of workers, drafted into the army, into the military industry, to the construction of defensive installations, etc. Fixed and reverse capital, and also working cadres are redistributed in favor of military industry and branches connected with it. This redistribution exerts the decisive effect on the structure of national economy and the type of reproduction. The branches, which generate armament, ammunition, munitions and necessary for this raw material and armament, occupy in the national

economy the dominant situation.

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In the composition of the first subunit of public (the production of the means of production) sharply increases the production of the means of production for the heavy industry. It decreases, and in certain cases ceases completely the production of the means of production for the light and food industry, the agriculture, the construction of the cultural-and-general services installations. The share of the second subunit (production of consumer goods) decreases, moreover to the greatest degree due to the branches, which use labor-consuming forms of agricultural raw material. In the distribution of the national income descends the share of storage and consumption and respectively grows/rises the share of military expenditures/consumptions. The absolute value of storage in comparison with the peaceful period falls.

The data about the storage have vital importance for the characteristics of reproduction. Increase in the fixed capital, incomplete construction, reserves and reserves during the years of war sharply was shortened. But work not only in the absolute reduction of storage. It was very unevenly distributed on the branches. This can be judged from data of the distribution of capital

investments according to the branches of national economy. Capital investments into the heavy industry in 1945 to one third almost exceeded enclosures 1940. At the same time capital investments into the industry, which generates consumer goods, into the agriculture, transport and connection/bond, housing construction and some other fields were considerably lower than the prewar level. Although for the length of all years of war fundamental global imbedding exceeded amortization sums and, which means, they gave the possibility to carry out the expanded reproduction of the fixed capital, these enclosures of necessity were concentrated in the leading branches of military and heavy industry. Meanwhile the capital investments in the agriculture did not compensate even the current wear of the fixed capital. Was not compensated also the current wear of rolling stock in the field of transportation and armaments in the light industry.

A change in the type of reproduction under the effect of the war is so great that the transition from the military economy to the peaceful and breakage of production proportions connected with this lead at first to the incidence/drop in the output level. As is known, in 1945 the volume of industrial production in the USSR also somewhat was shortened.

Any prolonged war exhausts national economy, detains the development of productive forces. So was also with the national

economy of the USSR during the Second World War. War caused to Soviet economy enormous harm.

Extreme state commission for setting and investigation of the crimes of the Fascist-German aggressors and their participants examined about 4 mln. Acts about the harm, caused by Hitlerites to Soviet citizens, to kolkhozes and to state within the time of the occupation of Soviet territory. According to these Acts, only straight/direct harm (losses from the annihilation of equipment) is calculated by the sum of 679 billion rubles in the state froths of 1941. This are approximately two thirds of cost/value of prewar equipment of the areas, which were undergoing occupation. By the heroic efforts/forces of the people the total volume of industrial production it was possible to restore/reduce in 1948, and on the number of the important branches of industry - late. For a long time undermined proved to be the productive forces of agriculture.

But however is great the straight/direct material harm, caused by the USSR by Hitlerites, it is only the unit of all harm, plotted/applied to our native land by German fascism during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Entire/all "cost/value" of Hitler attack in the USSR, counting straight/direct material harm, the military expenditures/consumptions of the Soviet Union, the temporary/time loss of income from the industry and the agriculture in the areas

THE HERO CITIES ARE REBUILT.



Volgograd. The heroic city on the Volga was completely destroyed by the enemy. Right - the V. I. Lenin Prospekt in 1960.



Leningrad during the blockade. At the water tower installed at the corner of the F. E. Dzerzhinskiy street and the Zagorodnyy Prospekt in the winter of 1941/1942. Right - the same place in the city in 1964.





Kiev. Kreshchatik on the day of the arrival of the Red Army in the city (1943). Right - view from the M. I. Kalinin Square to the restored Kreshchatik.



Minsk. Sovetskaya street. Buildings devastated by the Nazis. Below - the same street in 1961.



occupied, was 2 trillion 569 billion rubles. This many times exceeds the sum of the annual national income of the USSR in the prewar time.

What conclusions in the region of the economic policy can be drawn from the experience of the Great Patriotic War?

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Basis of the bases of the successful organization of Soviet military economy - socialist ownership of the means of production and planned/planning management of national economy, high socialist consciousness and the patriotism of the Soviet people, its indestructible political and ideological unity.

An indispensable condition for the creation of powerful military economy is leadership and the organizational activity of the Communist Party. The party armed Soviet people with the clear program of struggle with the aggressors, developed the scientifically substantiated plan of the military rebuilding of national economy and development of military economy, advanced the excellent cadres of the organizers of military economy, converted entire country into the uniform combat camp. In all sectors of war and military economy the communists showed a personal example of disinterested feat into the name of the victory over the enemies of the socialist fatherland.

The most important condition of the defensive capacity of the country is the timely preparation of national economy in the case of imperialistic aggression. In the Soviet Union within the shortest period was carried out giant work on the creation of the powerful/thick economy, independent from the capitalist world and capable arm the Red Army. Thus, was created the foundation of the victory over the the Hitler Wehrmacht. However, in the preparation of the country for the resistance to aggression were large/coarse errors and deficiencies, to a considerable extent connected with the personality cult of Stalin.

Technical progress requires so that in proper time would be determined the sciences and of technology deciding the directions/axes, was provided their development, conducted research-experimental and designing. They once indicated that the victories of prussian military forces were trained/prepared by school teacher. The Second World War showed that the effectiveness of contemporary military technology is nurtured in the laboratories of scientists. The groundless negation of the achievements of the science of the capitalist countries, the obtained dissemination under the conditions of the personality cult of Stalin, it is doubtless, it had effect also on the preparation of Soviet economy for the war.

Therefore one of the most important lessons, which escape/ensue from the experience of the Great Patriotic War, consists of the need for thoroughly considering and using all achievements of contemporary science and technology.

The stability of military economy is predetermined by durability/permanence of peaceful economy. The lag existing before the war of some branches of industry, agriculture and transport greatly hindered/hampered the organization of military production, it led to a sharp deterioration in the subsistence supply of population. The experience of the last war showed that the harmonious development of national economy is an indispensable condition of the high level of the defensive capacity of the country.

War came to light/detected/exposed the great significance of the correct distribution of productive forces. It showed the sagacity of the policy of the Communist Party, which was striving the intensive development of the economy of eastern areas - Urals, Siberia, Volga Region. But the experience of war revealed deficiencies in the development of these areas in peacetime: the lag of the fuel-energy base, the insufficient level of the development of metallurgy, the lag of agriculture, the weak capacity of transport main pipelines. The comprehensive development of large/coarse economic areas, i.e., such development of their economy, during which basic needs are

satisfied because of their own production, indispensable condition for the creation of firm and harmonious economy.

Large/coarse military production with the contemporary machine technology cannot manage without specialization and cooperation of enterprises. The cooperation of military machine-building and metallurgical enterprises in 1941-1945 had many deficiencies. Was manifested tendency toward the creation of the locked, independent productions. The timely organization of the flexible system of cooperation would make it possible to more completely use production capacities and to reduce the cost of military production.

The Great Patriotic War showed also, how great the significance of the widely spread professional-technical training in young people, which makes it possible to ensure military economy with the qualified cadres.

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It at the same time became clear that the radical resolution of the problem of cadres in wartime requires mechanization and the automation of labor-consuming and punishments.

After war the Soviet Union rapidly restored/reduced the prewar

level of economic development. The heroic labor/work of our people during the Great Patriotic War not only brought the victory over Fascist Germany, but also prepared the necessary prerequisites/premises for the restoration/reduction and further upsurge of the socialist economy.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state, planning/gliding the development of Soviet economy, completely consider the experience of the Great Patriotic War, one of main lessons of which is conclusion about the inadmissibility of complacency and carelessness under the conditions of military threat on the part of imperialists. The necessary prerequisite/premise further powerful/thick raising of socialist national economy is consistent putting into practice of Leninist principles and norms of party and state life.

The improvement of the control of national economy, the work, started by the party for overcoming the lag of agriculture, for the widespread introduction into the national economy of new technology, the fastest development of power engineering, chemical industry, fine mechanics, production of the means of automation, atomic and electronics industry, for the conquest of space, all these are most important teams in the strengthening of the economic and at the same time military power of our native land.

The XXII Congress of CPSU noted that, only creating the material and technical base of communism, we can win economic competition with capitalism, always support the defense of the country at the level, which makes it possible to demolish any aggressor. The execution of the historical problems, planned by the program of the Communist Party, steadily increases the economic and defense might of the Soviet Union.

end section.

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Chapter Three.

MIGHT OF SOVIET POLITICAL ORDER.

1. Socio-political bases of durability/permanence of socialist state.

Together with the national economy of the USSR, which composed the economic foundation of our victory over the strong and dangerous imperialistic aggressor, primary role in the war played Soviet socialist state with the branched system of public organizations, there is a Soviet political formation/order.

War is continuation of the policy by the means of violence. Politics pierces and are determined entire content of war - its goal, direction/axis, sources of strengths. As relation between the classes, the nations and the states, the policy, regarding V. I. Lenin, is the concentrated expression of economy, its generalization and completion. Specifically, in it, in the policy, the economic

interests of class find their most complete and comprehensive expression. Therefore the political formation/order, intended to protect the basic interests of the dominant class in all regions of public life, and, first of all, in the field of economic, exerts the direct and decisive effect on the character and the outcome of war. "Any war, wrote V. I. Lenin. - is inseparably connected with that political formation/order from which it escape/ensues"¹, and therefore its success most of all depends "on the internal order/formation of that country which enters the war..."².

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. works Vol. 24, p 364.

². V. I. Lenin. works, Vol. 30, p 131. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Hence it follows that in the country with the reactionary political formation/order it is much less chances to win war than in the country with the progressive political organization. Certainly, this objective conformity with the law must not be understood simply and rectilinearly. It is not possible, for example, not to consider the economic and military power of the belligerent state, or the degree of the participation of national masses in the war.

«ЗА РОДИНУ-МАТЬ!»



1943 Poster. Artist I. Toidze. KEY: (1) "MOTHERS - FOR THE HOMELAND!"

300



**КЛЯНЕМСЯ ЗАЩИЩАТЬ ДО
ПОСЛЕДНЕЙ КАПЛИ КРОВИ
ВЕЛИКИЕ ЗАВОЕВАНИЯ
ОКТЯБРЯ!**

WE VOW TO DEFEND THE GREAT OCTOBER ACHIEVEMENTS TO OUR LAST DROP OF BLOOD. 1942 poster. Artist N. Pavlov.

The experience of history teaches that the dominating classes reactionary states which are arranged/located powerful/thick economic resources, with the well organized and equipped armed forces and for which it was possible to spiritually enslave their people, they were capable of revealing great stability in the war with the progressive and strong state. However, this does not abolish the general rule: war in the final analysis wins strong state with the foremost political formation/order, which has constant enduring/permanent support in the national masses.

This all the more relates to the wars between the states of opposite public formations - socialist and capitalist, when military damage/defeat unavoidably entails and the break-up of political organization. In the war which is conducted with the decisive goals, tests itself the fortress of the belligerent state and will be carried severe sentence to the socio-political system eliminated itself.

Work, thus, is reduced to the viability of the state, which leads war, which in turn, depends on its social nature, class and national bases, from that how they relate to the state and to the war which it conducts, wide national masses. Along all these lines the Soviet Union had fundamental superiority over Hitler Germany and other states, which participated in the Second World War. For this

very reason the Soviet regime, which joined under the leadership of the Communist Party entire our people, could rout the antinational dictatorship of the most reactionary elements of financial capital in its Fascist form.

The power of Soviet socialist state lies in the fact that it concentrates in its hands not only of the gun of political authority, but also the most important means of production, which are people's property/ownership. While the state of Fascist Germany, similar to any imperialistic state, implicitly fulfilled the will of capitalist monopolies, Soviet state, relying on socialist property/ownership, came forward as the powerful/thick organizing force, which is systematically guided the development of economy in the interests of national masses, in the interests of the defense of the socialist fatherland.

V. I. Lenin, characterizing exploiter state as the organ of oppression and robbery of laborers, noted that his centuries-old activity gave rise to "the greatest hatred and the distrust of masses for entire state. To overcome this - the very difficult problem, within the power only of the Soviet regime, but also from it requiring prolonged time and immense persistence" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. works, Vol. 27, p 224. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the USSR was formed and became stronger the new type of relations between the people and the state in which all strata of society unanimously support their state in all its measures. In this force and durability/permanence of Soviet society.

In our country in the years of the Soviet regime was created the powerful/thick socialist state apparatus, which expresses will and protecting the interests of national masses. As the basis of its organization are assumed the Leninist principles of state construction. On the basis of these principles, the Communist Party and the Soviet government worry, first of all, that the laborers of the USSR independent of nationality actively would participate in the control of state and economic works, in strengthening of the defense of the country. the steady observance of the principle of the equality of rights of nationalities in the entire life of state serves strengthening the friendship of the peoples. The formation of state organs in the USSR is conducted on the basis of democratic centralism, which provides close connection of Soviet state with the national masses and their control for the activity of state apparatus.

V. I. Lenin indicated also the need to strictly observe the

socialist legitimacy, which eliminates any arbitrariness and ensuring the actual equality of rights of citizens, comprehensive guarantee of the laws/rights given to them and freedoms.

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Leadership of economy and of culture state organs are carried out by planning and inspecting/checking the fulfillment of plans.

The Communist Party, leading all teams of the state apparatus and military control, will mobilize masses to the struggle against any manifestations of bureaucratism and red tape and strives the continuous improvement of state organs.

These Leninist principles of the state construction, which escape/ensue from the character of our social relations, it testifies about the authentic democratism of the Soviet state organs, intended to control/guide the life of the country on behalf of the people, by the forces of the people, also, in the interests of the people.

Soviet state opposed the state of Fascist Germany. It, as any other imperialistic state, was the gun of monopolist capital, which is torn to world supremacy. The policy of this state most concentrated expresses the greedy strivings of the capitalist

monopolies for which war - main means of achieving its goals.

The Fascist-German state approached not only to create the numerous, obedient and well armed army for the predatory war, but also to draw national masses in the side of monopolies.

First of all, the Hitlerites relied on the conquest of middle, petty-bourgeois strata of society. Even to their accession to power they demagogically promised to the middle strata of the city of news struggle against the important merchants and the owners, to put an end to "percentage servitude", to remove any tax oppression, to forbid discovery/opening of new department stores. These promises found response in the fine/small bourgeoisie. However, as far as clerks and employees are concerned, it enticed the Fascist slogan of return to the medieval corporate structure of society, in which of the representatives of all strata of society would be created different associations/unifications (corporation), which organize headed by state class cooperation "in the interests of nation". As a result for Nazis it was possible to draw to its side the majority of craftsmen, fine/small merchants and employees, who presented imposing force. According to the data of inventory of 1933, in Germany only of the fine/small industrial enterprises where it worked from one to five people, were counted more than 3 millions ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Sm. G. L. roses. Germany under the rule of fascism (1933-1939). M. Publishing house IMO, 1961, p 153. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With the arrival of Hitlerites at the authority petty-bourgeois strata attempted to realize that which was promised to them by a national-socialist party. Thus, for instance, terms of the "combat alliance of trade average/mean class" began to rout and to rob department stores, magazines of the standard prices. However, many terms of this alliance were cast to concentration camp, and alliance itself was turned loose. Indeed in reality Fascist government served the interests of large/coarse monopolies. Only in six prewar years (1933-1939) about 430 thousand small and average/mean owners have to cover its enterprises ².

FOOTNOTE ². See *ibid.* p 166. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The ruined fine/small of bourgeois, workers having lost jobs, also declassed elements gushed out in the assault vanguards and other Fascist organizations in order to try to obtain something from the Hitler regime. But also here ~~then~~ it understood works into the industry or to the construction of motor roads. All dissatisfied they drove in in concentration camp. The left the obedience top of the assault vanguards on the night of 30 June, 1934, was arrested and shot, after which even more was strengthened the reactionary bloc of

Hitlerites, militarists and monopolies.

Course on war and war itself contributed to further increase in the German monopolies.

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Thus, in the coal and metallurgical industry four giant associations/unifications (steel trust, "G. Hering", "Krupp" and "Fr. heel cap") obtained in 1939 60 percent of coal in the stage and were melted 70 percent of entire German steel, occupying, thus, of leading positions in these branches heavy industries. Or to take this important index of supremacy of monopolies as the level of the concentration of work force in enterprises in the main fields of the industry of Germany. Only in six leading monopolies ("G. Hering", "Krupp", steel trust, "IG Faben Industrie," "Siemens", "AEG") were occupied 2300 thousand people of 7 mln. that worked in the industry in 1939 ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See I. M. Fayngar. Outline of the development of German monopolist capital. M. SOTSEKGIZ [- State Publishing House of Literature on Social Sciences and Economics], 1958, p 87.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In order to entice after itself peasantry and to draw it in bloody adventure, German fascists promised to peasants to eliminate their debts, which comprised more than 11.7 billion marks, to conduct land/ground reform, to allot the earth/ground the poor ².

FOOTNOTE ². See I. P. Traynin. Mechanism of the Fascist-German dictatorship, pp. 16. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Fascist bosses flatteringly named peasants "new nobility of the third empire". In this case peasants were considered the persons of "Arian origin", that mastered the sectors of the earth/ground by the size/dimension not less than 7.5 hectares. These prosperous, and also cadet economies were not subject to section and converted/transferred as the inheritance only to senior son. To the remaining members of peasant and cadet families it was proposed to obtain to itself "lebensraum" with the weaponry in the hands in the numbers of Wehrmacht.

In contrast to the kulaks the enormous mass of land-starved peasants and peasant-yeoman farmers was named in Fascist Germany by "rural masters". On them fell entire/all burden of Hitler agrarian legislation. Management of their economy strictly was regulated. Even when rural master could not sell without the resolution. Rural masters were deprived of the law/right of the use of the communal

earth/ground; 80 percent of these earth/ground were sold to
cans/fists for the creation of hereditary courts ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. See N. Segal. Agrarian policy of German fascism. M.
SOTSEKGIZ, 1938, pp. 36. ENDFOOTNOTE.

It is no wonder that in the period of Fascist supremacy in
Germany the process of destruction and impoverishment of lean and
average/mean peasantry and enrichment of its highest strata continued
by rapid rates. Only in six years (1933-1939) about 1500 thousand
rural masters and members of their families they were ruined also in
the searches/scannings for work either they left into the cities or
they became farmhands in cadets and kulaks. ⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. See I. M. Fayngar. the outline of the development of
German monopolist capital, pp. 341. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the same years in the German village a number of smallest
economies with the land/ground allotment from 0.05 to 2 hectares
increased by 21.5 percent, i.e., approximately/exemplarily to three
fourths of million. At the same time considerably decreased the group
of the economies, which had from 2 to 5 hectares, and a number of
kulak economies (from 10 to 20 hectares) invariably grew. In the
share of the latter fell 20 percent of the production capacity of the

agriculture of Germany '.

FOOTNOTE '. See A. Petrushov. Agrarian relations in Germany (according to the data of agricultural inventories 1882-1939). M. Gospolitizdat, 1945, pp. 41, 136. ENDFOOTNOTE.

So under the screen of "national commonality" Hitlerites gave into the complete authority of kulak and landowner of landless and land-starved peasants, guiding their looks to the east, to the side of the Soviet earth/ground and territories of other states.

To working class German fascists promised "a national-socialism". They conducted under the flag of anticommunism the policy of the brutal repression of the most active unit of the proletariat, attempting to behead and to cleave it, to undermine the effect of workers on the middle strata. Entire branched apparatus of the Fascist-German dictatorship was directed toward the merciless exploitation of working class, the annihilation of his parties, the subordination of laborers to large/coarse capital, toward the preparation for war.

After ~~the~~ ^{the} Hitlerites it was possible to weaken/attenuate working class, to ideologically subordinate middle strata and to muffle irreconcilable social antagonisms, they began to shout about the

elimination of all class contradictions in Fascist Germany, about "unity of the people", about the fact that any activity of owner and worker acquires from now on the character of service to "state and to the people".

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The capitalist economy of the country they renamed into the "national economy", where the owners supposedly were no longer complete owners, but they knew only partly this economies, being, however, the "leaders" of workers and employees in their enterprises. Furthermore, owners carried out their leading role through the "labor front organized by Hitlerites", where they, in the opinion of Fascist bosses, composed "one whole" with the workers, implicated there fraudulently.

Especially deftly used fascists for the purpose of social demagogy fact of the elimination of enormous unemployment (about 6 mln. people). To this left in them several years after the accession to power. Working hands in this immense quantity were required Hitlerites for the feverish inflation of military production and construction of motor roads. The Fascist way of operational provisions was dictated by the rapacious interests of financial capital. This route/path pushed the German people towards the new

war, the new burdens and led its to the national catastrophe.

The main nerve of Fascist state was the Hitler party. Raised by monopolist capital and militarist circles, it served as the basic instrument of the stupefaction of masses in the interests of the important bourgeoisie, as the gun of the preparation for aggressive wars and the brutal of violence with effective layers of working class and all laborers.

With Hitler's arrival at the authority the Fascist party became dominant in the country. It began rapidly to grow due to the dark/nonluminous elements which, pursuing the goals of profit and enrichment, were fixed into all teams of state apparatus. If before the capture of authority fascists declared, that in them 1400 thousand members of the party, then after 30 January of 1933 they already spoke about 3 mln., and then against 4 mln. members of the Fascist party ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See I. P. Traynin. Mechanism of the Fascist-German dictatorship, pp. 57. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the years of war in Germany were counted 5 mln. Nazis ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the Nuremberg process above the main German military

criminals. Collector/collection of materials in seven volumes. Vol. VI. M. Gosjurizdat, 1960, pp. 328. ENDFOOTNOTE.

After beginning in the authority, the Hitler party in the interests of capitalist monopolies imposed fascist methods German state and, actually, it merged with it. The Fascist state regime of lawlessness and arbitrariness could exist only with the aid of the wide net/system of criminal organizations, such, for example, as the guard vanguards (SS), the assault vanguards (SA), which were at the same time direct support and armed skeleton of the Hitler party.

The corps SS troops composed guards of Hitler. Into it entered the particularly taken away and specially trained cutthroats. The corps was intended not only for the pogroms and the murders within Germany, but also for annihilation of millions of people in the enslaved countries. To degenerates in SS form was guaranteed complete impunity for the crimes and constantly it was suggested, that precisely they are stratum that "full-valued in racial sense", which will compose the basis of "great German empire". In 1939 in the numbers SS were counted about 240 thousand people '.

FOOTNOTE '. See the Nuremberg process above the main German military criminals. T. VII. M. Gosjurizdat, 1961 pp. 422. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Their criminal work EN man conducted in the close contact with the Gestapo - political police, which consisted to three fourths of the same SS troops'.

FOOTNOTE '. See ibid. t. VI, pp. 167. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The assault vanguards were the greatest mass organization of the Hitler party. In 1939 their strength achieved 1500 thousand people '.

FOOTNOTE '. See ibid. Vol. VII, pp. 428. ENDFOOTNOTE.

These vanguards were striking power in the hands of Nazi heads, first mass military and terrorist organization, created by them as early as 1921. ~~There~~ ^{Here} assembled the most frantic revanchist elements and the acknowledged adventurers, interested in the pogroms and the robberies. The at the same time assault vanguards served as reserve for the political police, supplied cards for the universal military training: of them it was formed the guard of concentration camps.

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Fascist youth organizations Hitlerjugend, etc. enveloped more than 7 mln. youths and girls '.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See I. P. Traynin. Mechanism of the Fascist-German dictatorship, pp. 79. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With the aid of the misanthropic ideology the Nazis brought up of them the loyal servants of German imperialism. Fascist military drill converted the mass of young people into the thoughtless killers, who made their bloody work against the self-interest and concerning the blunt conviction in its racial superiority over the remaining peoples.

Using a state mechanism, fascists pitilessly destroyed in Germany all dissatisfied ones by Hitler regime, but in the territory of Europe - occupied in what not guilty peaceful population. A number of victims of Hitler criminal organizations staggering is great. Only in one concentration camp in Auschwitz SS troops annihilated not less than 4 mln. people ².

FOOTNOTE ². See the Nuremberg process above the main German military criminals, Vol. IV, pp. 369. ENDFOOTNOTE.

About 10 mln. people were killed and tortured in the territory of the USSR ³ occupied.

FOOTNOTE ³. See *ibid.* Vol. VII, pp. 54. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Furthermore, millions of people Hitlerites drove away into Germany to the hard labor works, which brought to monopolies legendary profits. Randomly therefore German monopolies encouraged the crimes of Fascist cutthroats and they widely financed their bloody works.

The political structure of Fascist Germany can be likened to the peculiar pyramid above by which was located the Fuehrer, who was leaning on his near encirclement from the ministers, Hauptleiter, Obergruppenfuehrer, etc. The center of this pyramid composed it comprised the Hitler party whose apparatus poured with the state apparatus. The Fascist party surrounded itself by the powerful/thick net/system of military and paramilitary type police and terrorist organizations, in jaws of which were stopped up the million-strong masses of the laborers of Germany.

Fascist political system in action - this is the terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary circles of financial capital, which were attempting by any price to maintain its class privileges, exploiter formation/order, authority above Millions of people. and however attempted Hitler propagandists to cover their regime by the fig leaflet of "nationality", "national commonality" and by the dummy flag of "socialism", Fascist dictatorship did not cease to be the

unlimited power of large/coarse capitalist monopolies, directed against the national masses. In this - the weakest and most vulnerable place of the dictatorship of German fascists. Their policy, right through adventurist was doomed to failure/dip/trough, since it was based on the predatory interests of monopolies and militarists.

In the war against the Soviet Union Hitler intended to deprive the peoples of our country of state independence and to keep them at the lowest level of development. Hitler suggested to his retinue that the peoples of the USSR have right to the existence only in one case: if they can be useful for the Germans economically.

Being guided by the statements of their head, German fascists wanted to eliminate Soviet state and to convert him into the colony of the "third Reich". In their plans it was directly indicated that entire territory of the USSR to Urals, although to the different degree, it was subject to Germinization. In Baltic States, for example, could live only the Germans. In the northwestern unit of our country it was planned to leave only 10-15 mln. Russians and Belorussians, rest Hitlerites intended to annihilate. From 20 to 40 percent of the basic inhabitants of the center section of Russia it was proposed to evict for Urals. Their place they prepared to occupy millions of German colonists together with the hangers-on from the

West European countries. In the territory, which was subject to Germinization, the Fascist-German bosses expected to create military settlements from the representatives of the "dominant race".

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The Gestapo in its blood-thirstiness reached the fact that was planned/glided to kill from 3 to 4 mln. Russians per annum in order not to allow increase in the basic population in the Nazi colonial empire. This is why the unlimited military-despotic authority of Fascist commandants was characterized by the use/application of the most unbridled repressions. For this in the seized areas of the USSR acted so-called "Sonderkommand" - the punitive detachments, which were under the jurisdiction of the Gestapo. In the annihilation of peaceful population wide part took - on the directives of the operations division of General Staff - and the regular military forces of Fascist Germany.

Military police violence were supplemented by the economic exploitation of the territories of the USSR occupied. For this purpose were created ministry for the works of eastern areas and about 200 different economic organs which mercilessly robbed and ruined the seized areas of the Soviet Union.

The success of its extravagant plans the ruling top of Fascist Germany connected with the hopes for the lack of strength of socialist orders/formations in our country. Meanwhile Soviet political formation/order in contrast to the political regime of Fascist Germany - these are really national formation/order, much more viably and more powerfully, than any bourgeois formation/order.

By the class basis of the might of Soviet political formation/order is the alliance of workers and peasants, led working class. This new public force, for the first time created in Soviet Russia, is a reliable guarantee of all successes of our country. Explaining the significance of the alliance of working class with the peasantry for the building of socialism and communism, for the victory over the enemies of the Soviet regime. V. I. Lenin spoke: "everything, what we achieved, shows that we lean on the force - to most wonderful in the world the force of workers and peasants" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, t. 33, pp. 93. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Great Lenin repeatedly indicated that the retention/preservation/maintaining and strengthening the alliance of working class with the peasantry is the highest principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Already in the years of civil war and foreign military intervention the alliance of working class and peasantry showed its insuperable power. In the course of the construction of socialism this alliance continuously was fortified and was developed, which contributed to strengthening the authority of advice/councils and to socialist rebuilding of agriculture.

With the victory of socialism radically changed the class composition of Soviet society. Was formed new, socially homogenous structure of society. About this testify following data.

Class composition of the population of the USSR (in the percentages)

2.

FOOTNOTE 2. See the USSR in the numbers in 1963. Short statistical handbook. M. "statistics", 1964, pp. 21. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Категории населения	(2) Годы	
	1925	1939
(3) Все население	100	100
(4) В том числе:		
(5) рабочие и служащие	17.6	50.2
(6) колхозное крестьянство и кооперированные кустари	2.9	47.2
(7) крестьяне-единоличники и некооперированные кустари	74.9	2.6
(8) городская буржуазия, торговцы и кулаки	4.6	—

Key: (1). Categories of population. (2). Years. (3). All the population. (4). Among other things. (5). workers and using. (6). collective farm peasantry and cooperated handicraftsmen. (7). peasant-individual peasants and noncooperative handicraftsmen. (8). urban bourgeoisie, merchants and kulaks.

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These numbers speak, that the victory of socialism in our country led to the elimination of exploiter classes and reasons, which give rise to the exploitation of man by man. Kulaks was

latter/last and numerous exploiter class in the USSR.

The elimination of parasitic classes had great historical value for confirming/asserting of socialism and strengthening of the defensive capacity of the USSR. First, it removed all economic and political obstacles which interfered with our country in the past to overcome its secular backwardness and doomed it to the bondage dependence on the West European capitalist powers. In the second place, with the elimination of exploiter classes radically changed the character of labor/work and were freed the creative forces of all people. Realization by the laborers of the USSR that great historical fact that they work now on themselves, to their society, played enormous role in the development of the economy of our country, in an increase in its might. Finally, the elimination of class antagonisms in the USSR led to strengthening of internal unity of Soviet society, which even more increased socialist state.

From given data evident also that the workers and employees in 1939 composed half of population, and collective farmers and cooperated handicraftsmen - are more than 47 percent. Thus, almost all the population of our country on the eve to war was connected with the socialist system of economy.

Changed the social nature of Soviet intelligentsia, which was

supplemented only by workers and peasants of our multinational country. Completely betrayed to its people, armed by a Marxist-Leninist theory, intelligentsia gave all its capabilities and talents to the construction of socialism.

The Soviet people after the victory of socialism composed the free toilers of city and village. Their previous appearance unrecognizably changed under the influence of three most important factors: first, the industrialization of the USSR, which was the great feat of the working class, all our people, which created the large/coarse modern industry: in the second place, the voluntary socialist cooperation of fine/small individual peasant farms, which indicated whole revolution in economic relations, in entire structure of the life of peasantry; thirdly, cultural revolution, which derived the laborers of mass from the spiritual servitude and the dark, it accustomed them to the riches of national and world culture.

A change in the social nature of workers, peasants, intelligentsia involved their even greater rapprochement and led to the formation of socio-political unity of Soviet society. "The commonality of two forms of socialist property/ownership drew together working class and collective farm peasantry, it strengthened their alliance, made their friendship of inviolable" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Program of CPSU, pp. 15. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With social unity of the Soviet people was inseparably connected its spiritual unity. The ideology of Marxism-Leninism - the quite foremost and singularly correct, scientific ideology, which united the laborers of the USSR, increasingly more widely and more deeply was spread in the masses. In their struggle for socialism Soviet people were guided by Communist morals. About unity of our society most vividly testified the socialist patriotism of national masses.

The might of Soviet state was based not only on the alliance of working class with the peasantry, but also on the friendship of the peoples of the USSR. It was formed not immediately. First this was the revolutionary alliance of Russian working class with the laborers of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Caucasus and other nationalities, created under the guidance of Bolsheviks even in the pre-October period. The efforts/forces of masses were directed toward that in order to overthrow in tsarist Russia, which was the prison of the peoples, exploiter formation/order and to establish/install the authority of the proletariat. During the years of civil war the alliance of laborers was further developed.

In the struggle against the internal and external counterrevolution was formed the military-political alliance of the laborers of different nations, which played immense role in the rout of the enemies of the Soviet republic.

In the struggle for the victory of socialism, for the elimination of capitalist and feudal aristocratic elements forged themselves the new, socialist nations, radically which differ from the bourgeois nations in their economic bases and public strivings, by their class composition and spiritual appearance.

The education/formation of socialist nations attested to the fact that in the USSR was formed the new historical commonality of people of different nationalities, which have general/common/total characteristic features and united into one whole - Soviet people. In this new historical unity radically changed the interrelations between the components by its nations. Former distrust was changed into cooperation, national dissension yielded the place for political unity of the peoples. Completely justified the prophetic words of Marx and Engels about the fact that under socialism together with the antagonism of classes within the nation will fall hostile relations of the nations between themselves.

In the capitalist society each nation is divided into the social

oppositions and is pierced by class antagonisms. However, in the socialist society of nation are internally uniform, since in them enter the workers and collective farmers (amicable classes), and also national intelligentsia. In socialist nations is inherent harmony of class interests which provides close cohesion, ideological and political unity of all their component social strata. under the guidance of the Communist Party of the nation of the USSR they act as unit, also, in the struggle for overcoming of internal difficulties, and before face of external enemy. This gives to them unprecedented viability in the period of military tests.

The material basis of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR composes public ownership of the means of production. If capitalist property/ownership, it was the source of the enrichment of exploiters, unavoidably gives rise to social and national oppression, hostility and collisions/encounters between the peoples, then socialist property/ownership, on the contrary, joins nations in the uniform system of public economy. "Socialism, wrote V. I. Lenin, organizing production without the class oppression, providing welfare to all members of state, thereby gives complete scope to "sympathies" population and precisely in view of this facilitates and giant accelerates rapprochement and merging/coalescence of nation" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, *vol.* 22, pp. 310. ENDFOOTNOTE.

To what extent is great the role of public property/ownership as the powerful lever of economic progress, evidently based on the example of the former outskirts of tsarist Russia which less than for one generation made enormous route/path in their development. In the past improbably backward, that were being located on the precapitalist steps/stages of economic development, they were converted at the beginning of war with Fascist Germany and the efflorescent socialist republics with the centers of the highly developed industry and the foremost agriculture.

The friendship of the peoples of the USSR cements the alliance of the laborers of the classes of different nations - workers and peasants, organized into the advice/councils of the deputies of laborers. This friendship has the enduring/permanent ideological base: it leans on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Its direct ideological source is proletarian internationalism. Expressing the solidarity of the peoples of all world, internationalism envelops both international relations of different states and relation between the nations within the framework of one state. Extended to the interrelations of new, socialist nations in the conditions of Soviet state, proletarian internationalism found its concrete/specific/actual expression in the friendship of the peoples

of the USSR.

The idea of the friendship of the peoples radically is hostile to nationalism in all its manifestations, especially in its extremely reactionary, Fascist form.

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To it is alien the spirit of the misanthropy, based on the chauvinism and the racism. It cultivates among the Soviet people respect for laws/rights, culture and independence of other peoples. The laborers of the USSR, brought up on this noble/precious, highly humane idea, attempt to live in the friendship with all peoples, which provides to the Soviet Union the expansion of international communication service and strengthening its foreign policy reserves. Political and moral unity of all Soviet society will signify its greatest advantage over the weakening capitalist society, torn up by class and national contradictions.

Thus, with the disappearance of exploiter classes and change in the social nature of workers, peasants and intelligentsia, with the bloom of the friendship of the peoples on the basis of the victory of socialism in our country considerably was enlarged the social base of Soviet political formation/order, proletarian democracy began to be

converted into national democracy. These enormous changes in the public and state life of our people found their reflection in the constitution of the USSR 1936. In it is fixed the fact of the existence of the socialist state of workers and peasants, the conversion of the party of the proletariat into avant garde of the laborers of the Soviet Union are formulated the basic principles of socialist democratism.

The world-wide historical successes of the Soviet people were achieved under the conditions when our country in connection with the ripening of the threat of the Second World War forced was to strain all forces for strengthening of defense, for dealing with the intrigues of hostile capitalist encirclement. The concepts of international reaction were by the fact more dangerous, that within the country for a long time went the bitter class struggle, and in the party were activated/promoted anti-Leninist trends - Trotskyites, the right opportunists and bourgeois nationalists, who denied the possibility of the victory of socialism in the USSR. This complicated international and internal situation required iron discipline, untiring increase in the vigilance, strictest centralization of guidance, that it could not but have effect negatively on the development of some democratic forms.

The forced limitations of Soviet democracy were aggravated by

the personality cult of Stalin, when separate situations and principles of Soviet constitution were not personified consecutively/serially into the life. Won acceptance the phenomenon against which prevented/warned V. I. Lenin, namely entrainment by administration.

Sometimes the methods of administration and constraint were spread by Stalin, also, to relations between the peoples of our country. V. I. Lenin in his time indicated the inadmissibility of the bureaucratic distortion of the idea of the association/unification of the Soviet republics, he emphasized the need for strengthening the sovereignty of each of them as the necessary condition of cohesion and fraternal friendship of the peoples of the USSR. Meanwhile the arbitrary activities of Stalin led to the depreciation of the sovereignty of the union republics, and during the war Stalin even arose for the method of groundless repressions with respect to the whole nationalities and the eliminations of the national autonomy of some of them.

The personality cult of Stalin led to the gross violation of revolutionary legitimacy and democratic laws/rights of Soviet citizens, it limited the activity of democratic institutes. Some limitations of Soviet democracy, to which the party temporarily went in connection with the complicated situation, Stalin raised then into

the norm of state life, roughly trampling the Leninist principles of guidance. Stalin advanced incorrect thesis about the aggravation of class struggle in proportion to our progress to socialism. This anti-Leninist situation served as basis for the mass repressions, directed against the Soviet people, betrayed socialism, but objectionable to Stalin.

Erroneous statements and activities of Stalin led to the inflation of the administrative organs of Soviet state, for the depreciation of the role of advice/councils as mass it contained an increase in activity and independent activity of the builders of communism.

End Section.

WHEN THE HOMELAND WAS IN DANGER ...



Strengthening the workers' resolution to repulse the enemy. Meeting at the "Serp i molot" Plant on the first day of the war (Moscow). KEY: (1) We are right. The enemy will be beaten. Victory will be ours.



In the national militia.

"I request that you send me to the front..." thousands of these announcements were sent to the military registration and enlistment office of the country as soon as the war began.



ON THE ADVANCE

Sniper in ambush.



Combat.

To a new firing position.



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But personality cult could not change either the socialist nature of the social relations (production, class, national), which were established in our country, or the deeply democratic nature of Soviet political formation/order. The main force of the construction of socialism and defense of the fatherland remained the laborers of masses, led the Communist Party. Their decisive role especially vividly was revealed during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors acquired truly national nature.

Having deeply realized the danger, which hung over above our native land, working class, collective farm peasantry, labor intelligentsia without tiredness worked in order to supply its army with all with necessary. In this great patriotic work participated all the population of the country - man and of the woman, old men and young people. All republics of our country, however far they were located from the front, untiringly forged the victory over the enemy.

During the years of war inside the amicable classes of Soviet society occurred significant changes. First of all, changed the strength and the composition of workers. More than third them it left in the numbers of the Red Army, and many, without having had time to be evacuated remained in the temporarily occupied with enemy territory. Among the new re-inforcement of workers and employees predominated the women and young people whose proportion in the production considerably increased. Thus, a quantity of women grew from 38 percent in 1940 to 55 percent in 1945 ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, p 421. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Young workers at the age from 16 to 25 years in the key branches of industry comprised on the average about half of the workers ² occupied here.

FOOTNOTE ². See A. V. Mitrofanova. The working class of the Soviet Union in the first period of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1942). M., the publishing house of the AS USSR, 1960, p 355. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In their majority these were people, which did not possess production

experience, but which had not had general education preparation/training. To the factories and the plants returned many pensioners, in connection with which the proportion of workers at the age of more than 50 years also it grew. The scales of the replenishment of working class can be judged from the fact that since 1942 through July 1945 into the industry and constructions, to the seasonal works and into the system of manpower resources only the committee on accounting and distribution of work force directed about 12 mln. people '.

FOOTNOTE '. Archive of state committee on professional-technical education/formation under the Gosplan of the USSR f. ^[collection] 37, list ^[inventory] 4, bundle 1, file 2, sheet 85-86. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Changed the geographical location of workers and employees. In connection with the evacuation of the industrial enterprises of 30-40 percent of cadre workers, occupied in these enterprises, from the European USSR they were redeployed for Urals and into Central Asia ' areas.

FOOTNOTE *. Ibid, f. 1, list 8, bundle 8, file 34, sheet 65.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

This raised the role of workers among the local population.

The changes occurred in the working class did not lower his labor and political activity. The Communist Party conducted enormous work on the education of the new re-inforcement of workers and employees. By the support of the party in this important work and the backbone of plant collectives were old cadre workers, who had a good revolutionary toughening, high qualification and great life experience. Under their guidance newly arrived to the production rapidly seized speciality and are shown the models of the selfless labor/work.

Soviet people worked without being considered in the course of time; they not depart from the enterprises by days and even weeks, giving all forces to fulfillment and overfulfillment of production schedules. In the frontal areas, in the hero-cities workers she was necessary to work under the hostile fire; frequently they took direct part in the defense of native plant or city.

By its devotion to communist cause, by patriotism and by organization, by the tendency to at any cost give to front the necessary armament our glorious working class it served as an example for all Soviet people.

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Substantial changes occurred also in the collective farm peasantry. The majority of the masculine population of village was mobilized into the army. Many collective farmers left to the factories and the plants. The total strength of able-bodied peasant population in 1944 was shortened in comparison with 1940 almost to 14 mln. people ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See Yu. V. Arutyunyan. Soviet peasantry during the years of the Great Patriotic War. M., the publishing house of the AS USSR, 1963, p 316. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Especially sharply decreased a number of tractor operators, operators, mechanics and other most qualified specialists. The proportion of men at the age of 18-54 years was lowered among the rural population from 21 percent in 1939 to 8.3 percent in 1945 ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, p 40. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The basic burden of work lay on the women, the adolescents and the

old men, who composed four fifths all of those worked in the kolkhozes and the state farms. Meanwhile the labor/work in the agriculture required enormous physical stress/voltage, since its technical preparedness in connection with the war became considerably more weakly.

The significant part of the Soviet peasantry proved to be in the territory seized by enemy. Already toward the end of 1941 under the occupation was found the territory in which at the beginning of war lived more than 74500 thousand people³, mainly collective farmers and the members of their families.

FOOTNOTE³. Ibid, p 39. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, strength of our peasantry during the war sharply was shortened, although then it gradually increased in proportion to the liberation of the areas occupied.

But also under these severe conditions collective farmers selflessly fulfilled their civic duty. The toilers of village understood well that not only the bayonet, but also the ear of enemy splits. However, from the first days of war among the collective farm peasantry was developed patriotic movement for premature delivery to the state of agricultural products and premature damping of

subscription along the state loans, while since 1942 burnt All-Union socialist competition between the kolkhozes, state farms and MTS.

In overcoming of the difficulties, connected with the war, and execution by the kolkhozes of production schedules enormous role played the mutual aid of workers and peasants. Important significance in connection with this acquired a basic improvement in the work of MTS, which remained the main technical base of agriculture and the decisive lever of the aid of city to village. To carry out this mission were called the political departments of vehicle-tractor stations and state farms, introduced by the party as the extraordinary measure during November 1941. Sending into the village the great vanguard of communists, the party pursued also the goal to raise there political work, to strengthen discipline and order/formation, to prepare mechanizer cadres.

Political departments much made for strengthening of state farms, MTS and kolkhozes. Machine-and-tractor stations, having small fleet of tractors, were processed - in the translation/conversion into the tillage - from one third (in 1942) to half (in 1945) of all lands usable for agriculture, processed in 1940 *.

FOOTNOTE *. Ibid, p 364. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With an improvement in the work of MTS became stronger the connections/bonds of working class with the collective farm peasantry.

Supervision of the village - important and efficient form of the connection/bond of industrial city with the village. It since olden times became the tradition of the working class of our country. The collectives of enterprises took upon themselves voluntary obligations on rendering aid to kolkhozes. At the plants outside the fixed time was overhauled agricultural machinery, were prepared spares, inventory. For repairing the agricultural vehicles for village were bound the brigades, which consisted of engineers, technicians and the skilled workers. Urban population built cattle-breeding farms/trusses, silo turret, it participated in field and other agricultural works.

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Collective farm peasantry in turn, helped city. This was expressed not only in the reinforcement of industrial enterprises by work force and in the accurate fulfillment of state obligations for the delivery of production. Collective farmers sent to workers rations from their personal reserves. Tens of thousands of convoys went into the city. This patriotic movement enveloped region behind

the region and found repercussion among the peasants of the areas occupied. Forever will be maintained in the memory of residents of Leningrad the exploit of the collective farmers of Leningrad region, which, being located in the rear of enemy, knew how to gather and to cross to the inhabitants of the beseiged city of Lenin 380 metric centners of wheat, 120 metric centners of fats and many other products.

In the period of the liberation of the Ukraine won acceptance the supervision of the kolkhozes of mines/shafts. Thus, in 1944 17 regions of the Ukraine they accepted supervision of 23 carbon trusts of Donbass ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See G. G. Morekhina. Working class - to front. M., SOTSSEKIZ, 1962, p 375. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Collective farmers supplied miners with rations, they contributed to the planned/planning provision of coal industry with work force.

The ardent patriots of the socialist native land gave to the noble/precious work of its defense not only their labor/work, but also personal maintenances, manifesting the enormous concern about the Red Army.

Unity of the activities of all strata of the Soviet people, the association/unification of the material and human resources of the Soviet republics, the centralized use of economic potential of the country - all this allowed our party and government to concentrate the basic efforts/forces of the rear and front on the accomplishment of the principal missions. Daily and ever more becoming stronger connections/bonds of front with the rear clearly attested to the fact that the army and the people of socialist state were uniform. This increased the moral staying power/persistency of soldiers, it fortified their confidence in the victory over Hitler Germany, poured into the soldiers new energy for the successful overcoming of difficulties both in the defense and in the offensive. Indissoluble unity of the Red Army and people was based on the alliance of working class and peasantry, on the class uniformity of our society, which consists of the laborers.

The Great Patriotic War subjected to the most cruel testing not only class abutment of our state, but also its national policy. At the same time in the war with the USSR underwent testing the national policy of fascism.

The armies of Hitler Germany and imperialistic Japan, by iron and by the blood laid to themselves route/path on Europe and Asia, bore to the peoples violence, death and enslavement. It is not

amazing therefore that Fascist aggression caused the powerful/thick wave of national liberation movement. In this fact with the entire obviousness was revealed/detected the following objective conformity with the law: political superiority receives that from the opposing sides, whose national policy most of all answers interests and expectations of wide national masses.

This conformity with the law especially vividly was revealed in the war of the Soviet Union against Hitler Germany. In the struggle of our people with the German fascism clashed two in principle different lines in a national question. Revolutionary on its spirit the politician of the cooperation of the peoples, Soviet regime escape/ensuing from the international nature, opposed the Fascist policy of beast nationalism, which preaches misanthropy. To this corresponded two completely opposite political results in the war. While the Soviet national policy, having highly raised the banner of liberation struggle, joined all nations and nationalities of the USSR into the uniform antifascist front, the chauvinism and the racial fanaticism of Hitlerites they sharply decreased the internal and external possibilities of Germany. Of this consists one of the concrete/specific/actual manifestations of political superiority of the Soviet formation/order over fascism.

Developing plan "Barbarossa", the heads of Fascist Germany

considered the USSR as the artificial and loose association/unification of an enormous number of nations as their kind the "ethical conglomeration", deprived of internal unity and therefore nonviable.

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Hitlerites were assured that with the organization of large/coarse political sabotages they will succeed in driving into the wedge between Russian and other peoples of the Soviet Union. In this respect of particular interest are the materials of the "green folder" of Hering, seized by Soviet military forces. "In the Baltic countries, it was indicated in one of the directives to occupational units and to subunits, to use in the interests of Germany contradictions between Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians and Russians.. In the south to use in our interests a possible presence of contradictions between Ukrainians and Great Russians:. In Caucasus to use in our interests of contradiction between the natives - Georgians, the Armenians, the Tatars - and Russians:.. "1.

FOOTNOTE 1. Foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the period of the Great Patriotic War. Vol. I. M., Gospolitizdat, 1946, p 252.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

For this purpose widely were drawn Ukrainian, Belorussian, Latvian, Estonian and other bourgeois nationalists, who found to themselves refuge in the numbers of hired Hitler secret service agency.

However, Hitlerites did not succeed in drawing to its side of honest Soviet citizens, who proved to be in the occupation or who caught to them into the captivity. The attempts of the Fascist command element to forcible create from the prisoners of war national battalions for their use for military purposes in the final analysis suffered crash. Many prisoners of war of non-Russian nationality, driven in to these battalions and other military units, refused to speak against the Soviet people and changed to the partisan methods of struggle, turning weaponry against the Fascist oppressors.

The policy of the instigation of the peoples of the USSR to each other and terrorist regime of Hitlerites they pursued the goal to undermine one of the basic abutments of our political system and thus to attain victory. However, life overturned the detachments of German aggressors. To fascists it proved to be not under the force to change the activity of the new conformity with the law, inherent in wars in defense of the socialist fatherland.

The peoples of our country together with the first among the equal ones - the great Russian people unanimously rose to the defense

of the native land. To each of them it was clear that to defend the conquests of socialism and to rout strong and dangerous enemy - Fascist Germany - is possible only with the combined efforts/forces of all national republics of the Soviet Union. Specifically, under these severe conditions when above the Soviet peoples hung the threat of enslavement, their friendship, which was established under the guidance of the Communist Party long before the war, was revealed especially clearly.

Very well about the friendship of the peoples of the USSR it is said, for example, in letter-address/circulation of the Uzbek people of 22 October, 1942, to soldier-Uzbeks. "... the Soviet Union, it is said in this letter friendly family, where each lives also in its house, but court and economy are uniform and indivisible. But in the friendly family of discord it does not occur, as it does not exist in the family of the Soviet peoples: . Unity of the peoples gave to us victory in the past; unity of the peoples is support in our today's power; unity of the peoples - accurate key/wrench to tomorrow victory" 2.

FOOTNOTE 2. The "truth of the east", on 22 October, 1942.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

By one additional convincing proof of the cooperation of our

peoples during the years of the Great Patriotic War serves the patriotic struggle of Soviet people on that occupied as the enemy of territory, that was expressed, first of all, in the enormous scope of partisan movement. Partisan movement appeared wherever not appeared Hitler aggressors. Its invincible power consisted in that support which is rendered partisans all strata of society, all nations and nationalities of our country. It suffices to say that in the partisan formations in the Ukraine fought the soldiers of the almost 40 nationalities of the Soviet Union. The combat activity of Soviet ones partisan during the first three years of the Great Patriotic War became for the Fascist-German military forces the present "second front", which caused to them enormous harm.

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"The true friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union, cherished in peacetime, noted M. I. Kalinin, by bright flame/blast it flared up during the years of war it astonished abroad not only of our enemies, but also friends. This friendship was tempered in the heavy military tests" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. M. I. Kalinin. On Communist education and military duty. Collection of the article and speeches. M., Voenizdat, 1958, p 588.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

In contrast to the wars of Fascist bloc and all other predatory wars, which lead to the aggravation of class and national contradictions and weakening of political formation/order, the war in defense of the socialist fatherland (most valid in the history) causes patriotic enthusiasm in the people, it activates/promotes its creative efforts/forces, even more greatly it joins the laborers of all nations around the Communist Party and it leads to the internal strengthening of the country. For this very reason in the course of the Great Patriotic War to the higher step/stage rose fraternal cooperation and mutual aid of workers, peasants and intelligentsia, still stronger became the friendship of the peoples, and our country - its rear and front - became uniform combat camp. The struggle of Soviet people against the Hitler aggressors was truly national. Each socialist republic made its worthy contribution to the rout of enemy.

Thus, class unity and friendship of the Soviet peoples, which built socialism, served as the most important bases of the indestructible might of Soviet state as the main gun of the national defense of the socialist fatherland.

2. Activity of Soviet state and public organizations under war time.

War with Fascist Germany interrupted the peaceful activity of Soviet state and placed before it completely different, extremely complex problems. It was necessary: to defend integrity, freedom and independence of our native land, i.e., to defend socialist order, to help the enslaved peoples of Europe in their struggle against the fascism, for independence and democracy; to save contemporary civilization and culture from the Fascist barbarians; in a most decisive manner to punish imperialistic aggressors.

In conformity with these historical problems Soviet state was intended to mobilize all forces of the people to the rout of enemy, to subordinate entire its activity to the achievement of the victory over Hitler Germany. Relying on consciousness, initiative and organization of the laborers of masses, our state it revealed itself in the war as the best organizational-political form of the defense of the people, forced to undertake weaponry. The need of the stress/voltage of all material and spiritual forces of the people for achievement of the victory over the enemy was necessary to subordinate all functions of state to the problem of the rout of the Fascist-German aggressors.

The many-sidedness of the functions of Soviet state was maintained also during the war. However, the relationship between them significantly changed. Fundamental importance acquired the

function of the military defense of the country. It became more widely in the content and directly was expressed in the activity of state in the logistics and the conduct of military activities at the fronts. The successful realization of this function depended on the guidance of the Communist Party and efforts of trade-union, cooperative, Komsomol and other organizations of the laborers of city and village.

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Advancement to the foreground of military function required first of all the most strained operational work of the Communist Party, Soviet state and public organizations for creation and development of the great and well mounted military economy. It is natural therefore that the military function of our state very tightly was interwoven with its economic-organizational activity, subordinating the work of all organs and installations of the Soviet regime to the interests of the defense of the socialist fatherland.

After the perfidious attack of Fascist Germany in the USSR the participation of all strata of society, all nations and nationalities of our country in the works of state, and, first of all, in the armed defense of the native land, became even more active and more decisive. Again was confirmed V. I. Lenin thought about the fact that

the working class, which exercises leadership by society possesses wonderful means to rapidly increase the power of its apparatus of authority by route/path not preceded the daring involvement of national masses in the state control ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 26, p 87. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Advice/councils as the political form of socialist state with the honor maintained/withstood the heavy tests of war. Being the really national organs of authority, they acquired an even greater authority in population. The public organizations of laborers - trade unions, komsomol, cooperation and other, counted in the years wars are more than 50 mln. people, in every possible way supported party and Soviet organs in their activity in the conquest of victory. The fact that the laborers of city and village possessed in the advice/councils the completeness of authority, served as the reliable guarantee of the political unity of the army and people for entire duration of war. And nothing - either the huge calamities of war or the connected with it colossal expenses and heavy victims - could shake this unity.

The Great Patriotic War, which required the rebuilding of the entire life of the country to a military footing, caused the number of substantial changes in the structure, the authorities and the

forms of the activity of the organs of the Soviet regime. The extremely great difficulties of war impelled state organs to search for such organizational methods and forms of the works which would make it possible to overcome these difficulties and to attain victory. The measures, which characterize changes in the separate sides of social and political life, included: the creation of the state committee of defense and its organs at the places; assignment to the military authorities of particular authorities in the region of the provision of defense of the country, social order and national security; the postponement of selection into the advice/councils of deputies the laboring and national courts; the limitation of the principle of collectiveness in the activity of the organs of authority and control; the irregular conducting of the sessions of local advice/councils; the decrease of publicity in the state work. Furthermore, was allowed/assumed the contraction of ordinary forms and methods of the activity of the legislative, actuating and judicial elements of state, and also the limitation of some laws/rights and freedoms of citizens. For example, was established/installed the particular regime of operating time, were abolished leave of absence for the laborers, the secret of correspondence, the inviolability of dwelling, the freedom of movement.

All this was caused by the conditions of the extraordinary

situation, especially in the terrains, declared on a state of war. But the partial limitations of democratism did not exclude the necessary functioning of the legislative, government and judicial organs of Soviet state.

By the highest organ of state authority during the years of war, as in peacetime, was Supreme Soviet of the USSR which, carrying out legislative activity, examined and asserted at its sessions the state budget of the USSR, it introduced the most important changes and additions into the constitution of the USSR, ratified various international treaties.

However, the activity of Supreme Soviet as legislative organ was insufficient started, since wartime conditions and personality cult of Stalin restricted the principle of collective guidance of state.

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Within the time of war it was carried out only three sessions of Supreme Soviet: one in 1942, two others - at the end of the war, into 1944 and 1945. At these sessions were examined questions of foreign policy and state construction, military economy plans and state budget.

As far as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is concerned, it published edicts on questions of economic life, defense construction and cultural and educational work, gave the interpretation of the in force laws and was determined procedure of their into the life, it appointed and freed/released from the post of the national commissars of the USSR, it determined the necessary reorganization of people's commissariats and departments, founded military orders and medals and decorated to them services, it established/installed honorable and service ranks, ratified international pacts and agreements, was introduced in the separate terrains a state of war and it declared, when this was required, general/common/total and partial mobilization.

Supreme Soviet of the USSR consisted of 1388 deputies. In Supreme Soviet of the union and autonomous republics were counted about 7 thousand deputies. Many deputies of Supreme Soviet occupied the leading state posts, and when began war, majority of them left into the army in the field.

In the terrains, not declared on a state of war, especially in the east the countries, the session of Supreme Soviet of the republics and local councils were called more regularly, here continued to function ordinary administrative and economic organs. However, the new problems, which arose before our state, required

significant changes in the separate teams of its apparatus. It was necessary to change the work of state organs in connection with the curtailment of peaceful economic and sociocultural construction and the contraction of the activity of the corresponding people's commissariats and departments, abolition of some of them and creation of others.

In this case the changes in the state apparatus, designed and fixed by the laws of wartime, pursued the twofold goal: first, to adapt the organs of state for conditions and problems of war; in the second place, to strengthen state apparatus on the basis of the experience, acquired in the course of war.

As a result of the created state of emergency also for the purpose of the rapid mobilization of all forces of the people to the resistance to enemy at the very beginning of war was formed the state committee of defense. As base for this served the article of 49 constitutions of the USSR, which gives to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to right declare state of war in the case of aggression against the USSR or because of the need for fulfilling international agreed-upon obligations on the mutual defense from aggression. The decision about the creation of GKO was accepted on 30 June, 1941. By Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, by the central committee of the party and by the government of the USSR ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the "sheets/tables/lists of Supreme Soviet of the USSR", on 10 July, 1941. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The state committee of defense obtained full weight of authority in the country. It published the decisions, which had the force of the laws of wartime. All citizens, all party, Soviet, Komsomol and military organizations were were obligated to implicitly fulfill decisions and commands of GKO. It exercised the general/common/total leadership of national economy in the interests of military production, he led the construction of the armed forces and their control, took measures for providing of social order and safety, were created if necessary the special committees and the controls on matters of military economy and defense construction in our country.

Basic problem of GKO (organization of the victory over the enemy) could be solved under the condition for the operational work of the highest and local organs of authority. For this purpose in all military industrial people's commissariats and departments, territories and regions, during the most important enterprises and the constructions of GKO had its authorized.

They took the necessary measures for putting into practice of the decisions of GKO, was controlled the activity of local state organs and officials, heads of enterprises in the military industry, military constructions, installations of transport and connection/bond for the mobilization of forces and means for the needs of war.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War GKO published up to 10 thousand decisions and commands on the most varied questions of economic life, state control and military construction. The decisions of GKO were rapidly put into practice by party organs, state apparatus and public organizations.

In 1941-1942 GKO created in many cities of frontal zone the local committees of defense (in Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Sevastopol, Odessa, Stalingrad, Voronezh, Kalinin, Rostov on the Don, etc.). They consisted of chairman (secretary of regional committee or city committee of the party), substituent (chairman of the executive committee of Oblast' Council or town soviet), of the the member military council commanding of district (front) of district (front), representative of the NKVD. The committees of defense carried out their functions in the close contact with the local advice/councils

and the public organizations. On the citizens and the installations was laid the responsibility to implicitly fulfill decisions and commands of these extraordinary organs of wartime.

It is known that in the period of civil war was created the advice/council of working and peasant defense headed by V. I. Lenin, which played exceptionally important role in the provision of a victory of the Soviet state above the internal and external counterrevolution. The state committee of defense, appearing as the advice/council of working and peasant defense in the new ones considerably it differed from it in its structure and authorities.

But of what did consist basic differences in these two organs? In the years of civil war and struggle with the foreign intervention when in the head of the Soviet state and its armed forces stood V. I. Lenin, the organization of the military control was characterized by wide democratic beginnings, collectivity of guidance and by strict observance of constitutional standards in the state and military construction.

The advice/council of working and peasant defense adhered to democratic order/formation in its activity and it was allotted by the completely definite/determined authorities. It had several internal organs which were named by committees or commissions (on rations,

production of armament, transport, formation and replenishment of the army and navy, on the struggle with the desertion, etc.). The quantitative composition of the advice/council into which entered mainly national commissars, reached to ten people.

The advice/council of working and peasant defense under V. I. Lenin's chairmanship called himself not less frequent than once a month, but his committees and commission - every week for examining the questions, entering their scope. At many meetings of advice/council with reports came forward V. I. Lenin. Questions were discussed and were solved collectively. Only in the case of emergency separate questions were solved on behalf of advice/council by its chairman and by the heads of commissions with an indispensable subsequent introduction of these decisions on the confirmation/assertion of the plenary meeting of advice/council ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. TsPA IML, f. 19, list 3. Record sheets of the advice/council of working and peasant defense for the years 1918-1920. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The advice/council of defense was accountable to the All-Russian congress of advice/councils and to its central executive committee, it matched its activity with the council of peoples commissars which exercised above it the general/common/total leadership. VTsIK [-

THE PEOPLE - OF THE BELOVED ARMY

Uzbekistan representatives visiting troops at the Leningrad Front.



Presents to fighters from workers.



THE PEOPLE - OF THE BELOVED ARMY.



Blood - for wounded soldiers.



In the hospital.

"So he will be warmer, my own ..."




TO MAKE THE ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY EVEN HARDER.

Collective farm mem-
bers sign a State
military loan (Mos-
cow Oblast').



To the country's
defense fund.

Sending the Red Army
tanks built with
Estonian workers'
money.



THE ENTIRE COUNTRY - A BATTLE CAMP.



Machine-building workers at lessons in the Universal Military Training program (Moscow).

At a training station in the Tul'skaya Oblast'.



Students of the infantry-machine-gunner school during exercises.



All-russian Central Executive Committee (1917-1936)] and SNK had right to abolish or to stop the resolutions of the council for the protest of people's commissariats and by their discretion.

During the civil war together with the advice/council of working and peasant defense functioned the constitutional organs of our socialist state.

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The All-Russian congresses of advice/councils were collected regularly: from 1917 through 1920 took place eight congresses. On them were examined and solved more than 70 questions of economic, sociocultural and military construction ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the congresses of the advice/councils of the RSFSR (II-XVII) in the decisions and the resolutions. Collection of documents. M., the publishing house of the "sheets/tables/lists of Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR", 1939, pp. 535-537. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the period between the congresses of advice/councils the highest legislative capable and controlling organ of state was VTsIK, which directed the activity of all organs of the Soviet regime, matched work on the legislation and the control, controlled putting

into practice of Soviet constitution and decisions of the congresses of advice/councils. The control of the current works of state carried out a council of peoples commissars.

In contrast to the advice/council of working and peasant defense the state committee of defense had the narrower composition (at first into it entered five, and then eight people). It was assembled irregularly. On behalf of GKO questions were frequently examined by its individual chairman, substituents or separate members. Even the most important questions of state life and military construction were often solved without the observance of democratic procedure, by interrogatory order/formation.

Interrelations of GKO with the supreme organ of socialist state - by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - were restricted to representation to it, for publishing the corresponding edicts, the separate important decisions of legislative nature. The reports of GKO into the supreme organs of the party and state did not enter, and its laws/rights and authorities were not clearly determined. In the activity of Stalin, who headed the state committee of defense, were committed serious errors.

Thus, during the years of war, in spite of the constitution and with the height difference of the authorities of GKO and the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, were deprived of national statemanship the Kalmyk, Balkans, Circassians, Chenchens, Ingush. Stalin, as the chairman of GKO, unjustifiably abolished socialist competition in the army, allowed mass repressions in the attitude of soldiers, who were returning from the hostile captivity.

During August 1941 GKO excessively enlarged the authorities of the People's commissariat of internal affairs in the region of the protection of social order. This used Beria's band, which, flagrantly violating socialist legality, made mass repressions above the innocent people. It is known, for example, that in the beginning of war appeared the edict about the responsibility for dissemination in wartime of the dummy hearing/rumors, which sow alert/alarm and panic among the population. However, to those, who fell under the activity of this edict, unjustifiably was adapted law about the punishment for the anti-Soviet agitation with the counterrevolutionary design.

The chairman of GKO Stalin individual sanctioned in 1943-1944 the introduction of ranks and ranks for the workers of different departments, and also of personal militarized ranks and shoulder board for the personnel of rail transport and workers of other people's commissariats and departments.

These and similar to them erroneous decisions, which testify

about the height difference by Stalin their authorities, were subsequently on the initiative of CC of the party abolished.

The absence of clear differentiation between the functions of GKO and other state organs led to the fact that also the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was called to the sessions very rarely, and its edicts usually signed only by several members presidium or were agreed by interrogatory order/formation. Even in the last/latter period of the war when the combat operations of the Red Army were developed in the territory of enemy, the supreme organs of authority were called irregularly. All this hampered the mobilization of wide masses for the execution of state decisions and measures.

Simultaneously with the extraordinary organs of our state during the years of war functioned its permanent constitutional organs - advice/councils and their executive committees. However, the practical work of advice/councils was maximally subordinated to the problems of waging war.

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The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR, being the highest actuating and capable element of state authority, during the war united and directed the work of the people's commissariats, which

knew by the carrying out of nonmilitary production, it was occupied by questions of civil/civilian, capital and housing construction, and also agriculture. Council of peoples commissars provided social order and protection of the laws/rights of citizens in the terrains, not declared on a state of war, it exercised the general/common/total leadership of relations with the foreign states, it led internal and foreign trade. It knew by the organization of the sociocultural construction, by the uniform system of national-economic accounting, it led credit and monetary system, coordinated the activity of the organs of state control of the union republics and local advice/councils in the service areas of the country.

In the union and autonomous republics the highest organs of state authority and control were built and functioned analogously.

Because of the need for the intensive carrying out of armament and creation of new combat technology before the war and in the beginning of it were created new organs for guidance of the military economy: the people's commissariats of ammunition, armament, tank industry, mortar armament and their control at the places. At the same time was considerably changed the structure of some existed people's commissariats and departments. For example, within the framework of the people's commissariats of lines of communication, social welfare, trade, connections/bonds, public health and others

were created the militarized controls and departments for servicing the armed forces (administration of military-road construction, the department of evacuation hospitals, Main Administration of Trade Establishments for Military Personnel, etc.).

During the war the state increased a number of controls and committees whose organization was caused predominantly by the needs of military economy and by the problems of restoring the victims of areas. Thus, were formed the main controls on the supply of national economy by petroleum products, by lumber, by fuel. Control on job placement of disabled war veterans, the main controls of local air defense and universal training of population in military science. Was created in the center advice/council for evacuation, and on the places - in the front area - evacuation commissions with the executive committees. Functioned also state committee on accounting and distribution of work force and its local organs.

As a result of the activity of all these organs, with the active participation of laborers and their public organizations, was fixed the materiel of the rear and front, was provided for evacuation and reevacuation of a great quantity of population. Millions of citizens were trained to military science, were conducted the labor and everyday construction of disabled war veterans, redistribution of tens of millions of workers and employees on the most important

branches of military economy.

In Soviet Union occupied areas the Hitlerites repaired mass crimes and robberies. In connection with this acted created during November 1942. Extraordinary state commission for setting and investigation of the crimes of the Fascist-German aggressors and their accomplices, and also harm, caused by them to our country.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government even in the course of war revealed the great concern about the return to the native land of Soviet citizens, forcible driven away by Fascist occupationists to Germany and other countries. The expression of this concern was the creation of the organs of repatriation. During October 1944 with the government of the USSR was created the central division in matters of repatriation headed by that authorized of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. AVP, f. 0514a, list 4, p. 55, file 2, p 118. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The groups of the representatives of authorized SNK USSR [-
Council of People's Commisars USSR] were located in all European countries (with exception of Spain and Portugal), in Egypt, Iran and the USA ².

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid, file 1, pp. 25-27. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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The departments of repatriation were founded with SNK RSFSR [- Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR the Ukraines, Belorussia, Moldavia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and with all operating fronts. With the provincial, county and district executive committees whose territory underwent hostile occupation, were also created the departments of repatriation and 249 receiving-distributive areas ¹. ENDFOOTNOTE.

FOOTNOTE

¹. AVP, f. 0514a, list 4, p. 55, file 2, pp. 32-33. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Foreign groups and front departments of repatriation were occupied by development/detection, material and medical and sanitary maintenance/servicing, and also by transportation of those repatriated. In the responsibility of the republican departments of repatriation and receiving-distributive areas entered the everyday and labor construction of Soviet citizens, who returned into the places of their previous residence.

Simultaneously with the work upon the return in the USSR of Soviet citizens our government during January 1945 laid on the organs

of repatriation the responsibility to assemble/collect and to send to the native land of those liberated by the Red Army from the Fascist captivities of the citizens of union and neutral states. For this were organized the assembly points and transit of camp ².

FOOTNOTE ². IBID, p. 56, file 7, p 127. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The scales of the work of our repatriating organs can be judged from following data. To 1 January, 1953, to the native land returned 5457856 Soviet citizens ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. IBID, p 157. ENDFOOTNOTE.

All expenditures/consumptions, connected with their repatriation. Soviet government accepted to itself. To the same time were repatriated 4059736 foreign citizens, liberated by the Red Army, and also the prisoners of war of Fascist Germany, its satellites and Japan the expenditures of our state for their repatriation were 2328456200 rubles ⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. IBID, p 142. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In connection with the war was reformed/redisposed the work of the local advice/councils of the deputies of laborers. Under the

leadership of the party they organized masses for the execution of the problems, connected with the defense of the country.

In the territories, the regions, the districts, the areas, the cities and the villages the advice/councils counted more than 1 mln. deputies who, working among the population, united around themselves about 7 mln. Activist-public workers. Hundreds of thousands of deputies and several million people of the Soviet assets were poured into the army in the field.

In the areas, not declared on a state of war, the activity of local advice/councils in essence flowed/occurred/lasted in accordance with the constitutional standards. Advice/councils led the command agencies subordinated to them, provided the protection of social order, the observance of laws and the protection of the laws/rights of citizens, led local economic and cultural construction, was established/installed local budget, they contributed to reinforcing of the military power of state. The actuating and capable elements of councils were the executive committees which conducted entire state idling, relying on support of tens of millions of citizens.

With the local advice/councils and their executive committees there were in accordance with the constitution departments: public health, culture, public education, social welfare, rural and

municipal services, financial, road construction, connection/bond, local industry and trade. They all acted in the reduced composition and they were converted into maximally operational organs, fitted out to the work under the wartime conditions.

In the period of war the structure of local command agencies underwent some changes. For dealing with homelessness and neglect of children in the front area and in the areas liberated from the enemy with the executive committees of councils worked the commissions for the construction of children, who remained without the parents. With the territorial, provincial and urban advice/councils there were commissions for job placement of disabled war veterans. Simultaneously with the provincial, urban and district advice/councils were created departments on the state provision and the everyday construction of the families of soldiers. These departments were occupied by the issue of grants and pensions to the families of soldiers, by their domestic service and legal defense, construction of children into the children's houses.

end section.

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In the terrains, declared on a state of war, the activity of advice/councils in many respects was regulated by the laws of wartime and was carried out in the close contact with the military authorities. Advice/councils developed enormous work on the mobilization of human and material resources, and also financial means. They helped military organs to form and to train replenishments for the front, to build defensive installations, to supply with rations and equipment army, to create local air defense, to adjust the universal military training of population.

By the very important sector of the work of local advice/councils was guidance agriculture. Under war time considerably was raised the role of rural advice/councils in performing of agricultural work. During March 1942. Chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. I. Kalinin turned to all chairmen of village soviets with the appeal, in which it was said: "On you does not lie/rest the responsibility directly by itself to lead spring field works. This is - the affair of the chairmen of kolkhozes, the

foremen, directors of MTS and state farms, land/ground organs. But it would be the incorrect understanding of the essence of the Soviet regime, nonfulfillment by the law of the charged responsibilities if the chairmen of rural advice/councils became to be removed from the sowing works" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. "Izvestiya" on 31 March, 1942. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the number of the eastern areas of the country before the advice/councils arose new crucial problems in the guidance of local economy and by cultural construction, since areas with the predominance of agriculture were enriched by industry, and industrial areas enlarged their agriculture.

Because of the many-sided active activity of advice/councils, led by the Communist Party, our country overcame enormous difficulties with the supply of population, many millions of evacuated citizens and disabled war veterans were well-organized. Was warned/prevented mass neglect of children, who remained without the parents, successfully was conducted the labor and military mobilization of population, became apparent the great concern about the families of front-line soldiers. Thus, all local Soviet installations both into the city and in the village as their strained, tedious work served the work of our victory.

The activity of state organs in the terrains, not declared on a state of war, was also rebuilt. It became clearer and more operational, was simplified office management. The attention of state organs was concentrated on the military economy problems, in connection with which executive-capable functions of these organs they were expanded. Were increased centralization and one-man command, especially in the military industry, in the field of transportation, in the installations of connection/bond and the defense construction.

One of the essential moments/factors, which characterize changes in the Soviet state in the period of war, was the delay of selection into the advice/councils and the national courts. This was caused by wartime conditions. The activity of state organs and public organizations was concentrated during the years of war completely on the problems of the defense of the socialist fatherland. The significant part of the Soviet citizens was located on the front or was occupied on the defensive works. Moreover, due to the hostile occupation the population of many areas of our country could not accept participation in the ordinary political life of state.

On these and other reasons the delay of selection into Supreme

Soviet of the USSR, Supreme Soviet of the union and autonomous republics, into the local advice/councils of deputies the laboring and national courts was completely clear. But since the activity of the highest and local organs of state authority had to continue, also, in wartime, the period of the authorizations of these organs regularly was extended.

In the situation of war, especially in the areas close to the front, one ought not to have operationally solved the problems of economic and defense construction.

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Therefore in the system of state control seriously changed the relationship/ratio between the principles of collectiveness and one-man command. In particular, were expanded the laws/rights of the national commissars of the USSR. They obtained the possibility to independently distribute the material resources between the individual enterprises and the constructions.

In connection with the organization of local air defense (MPVO) was conducted the compulsory/necessary training of citizens for this form of defense, acted the particular vanguards of MPVO and fire-fighting protection. It is more than into 3 thousand cities and

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 05/22

1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV


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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

of the working settlements of the country was regulated the conduct of citizens in the case of air alert, and also with the cargo handling on railroads and the siding tracks. Were provided for the responsibilities of population and administration during the air attack of enemy. In the front area and in the cities, declared on a state of siege, the population was organized into the groups of self-defense. In Leningrad, for example, with these groups were connected all inhabitants of city from 14 to 60 years. They heroic struggled with the fires and other consequences of the air raids of enemy.

For achievement of victory in the war was required the continuous replenishment of our army and navy by the numerous and well trained combat reserves. In order to prepare such reserves, the state committee of defense made a decision to introduce from 1 October, 1941, universal compulsory/necessary military training the citizens of the USSR ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No. 18816, page 85. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Following this in the composition of the People's commissariat of the defense of the USSR was created the administration of universal military training. CC of VKP(b) proposed to local party organizations

to ensure the rapid scanning of the organs of universal military training, to set up for them educational and material and technical base, to isolate the appropriate cadres. This problem was solved shortly.

In the years of war the organs of universal military training conducted seven bursts of paramilitary preparation/training according to 110-hour program. To the training were assigned the men and of woman at the age from 16 to 50 years. The total number of citizens, encompassed by universal military training, composed 9862 thousand people ².

FOOTNOTE ². Archives MO USSR, f. 57, list 34539, file 1, sheet 2.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

This almost one and a half times exceeded the strength of army in the field together with the reserves of general headquarters at the beginning of 1944. Thus, the organs of universal military training worked in all corners of the Soviet country, made a considerable contribution to the conquest of the victory on the enemy.

Great significance during the war acquired the construction of defensive installations. Only in the first two years of war our construction organizations created more than 50 thousand kilometers

of the fastened/strengthened defensive lines. In this case the overall length of trenches and communications passages achieved 100 thousand kilometers. Builders elevated to 1500 thousand fortifications of different designation/purpose: reinforced-concrete pillboxes, bunkers, etc. It was unearthed to 10 thousand kilometers of antitank ditches and escarpments. The volume of all earthwork during the construction of defensive lines was 223 mln. cubic meters

FOOTNOTE 3. Herald of the labor/works of the military engineering academy of name V. V. Kuybyshev No 125. M., 1958, page 44.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Furthermore, during the war was conducted large/coarse engineering work on the provision of a basing of front aviation, and also fighter air defense aviation.

This enormous volume of defensive works could be realized only under the condition of using all possibilities of civil/civilian and military construction organizations, clear guidance by them from the side of party and state organs, because of the selfless, hard work of Soviet people, which participated together with the regular units of the Red Army in the creation of defensive lines.

In war time it proved to be necessary to change the organs of public health and medical service, to enlarge the activity of the People's commissariat of public health and main army medical administration of the Red Army.

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These organs introduced into the life the effective system of the care of wounded soldiers at the front, ensured the qualified treatment of casualties and patients in the rear, they conducted numerous different sanitation measures, which allowed our country to avoid mass epidemic diseases. Was carried out also the wide training of the military medical personnel.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War enormous significance acquired the questions, connected with organization and strengthening of the rear of the country. The creation of powerful/thick military economy under the conditions of the transportation of a great quantity of industrial enterprises to the east and location of industry at the new places could not be achieved without the highly developed construction industry. Existed at the beginning of the Fascist-German invasion the branched net/system of construction and assembling organizations allowed Soviet state to successfully solve the most complex problems in the rebuilding of our

economy to a military footing.

Soon after the beginning of the war Narkomstroy published instructional instructions in accordance with the industrial construction. The new technical decisions of industrial buildings developed on their basis made it possible to considerably shorten periods and cost/value of construction, to decrease the labor intensity and the consumption of such scarce materials as metal, cement, glass, soft roofing and others. The consumption of metal, for example, was reduced 4 times, glass - 2 times, cement - 1.2 times. In the instructions of Narkomstroy were reexamined many technical norms, which acted earlier, and the experience of their realization entered into the arsenal of the Soviet construction technique of postwar years.

It was necessary to also create the mobile construction subunits with military discipline, which would completely answer wartime conditions. Such subunits became the particular construction-assembly units (OSMCh), created on the decision of GKO of 8 July, 1941, in the base of the construction trusts of Narkomstroy. On these units was laid the execution of the urgent targets of government for the structure/installation of the enterprises of defense industry, the restoration/reduction of the victims of units, and also the erection of defensive installations. To the situation of OSMCh were

transferred more than 70 construction ones and were assembling trusts of Narkomstroy. To national commissar on the construction it let right transport these particular units from some constructions to others, translate if necessary their personnel to the barrack situation, providing workers with free supply.

Creation of OSMCh, which were to a certain extent the militarized organizations, completely itself justified, since it gave the possibility via their transportation to concentrate the production capacities of construction and assembling organizations in those places where this was dictated by the interests of the country. In this case for OSMCh consolidated permanent technical-engineering cadres and skilled workers. The rapid concentration of forces and means in points of decision made it possible to raise the defense units of fundamental importance within the shortest periods.

Construction, as a rule, was conducted with an indispensable concentration of labor and material resources on the most important units of each construction. Works were carried out consecutively/serially, thanks to which the enterprise was commissioned by bursts, long before the completion of all its buildings and structures/installations. Frequently it was as follows: builders yet did not have time to finish laying walls and the construction of overhead covers, but already shop began to issue

production.

Enormous attention paid Soviet state to questions of the organization of labor/work. As in the peaceful years, in the days of war the socialist organization of labor/work was provided conscious discipline of the overwhelming majority of laborers. Thereby was completely revealed the characteristic feature of socialist production relations, noted already by V. I. Lenin in the period of civil war and foreign intervention ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 29, page 387. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In comparison with the pre-war time a quantity of workers during the years of war considerably decreased. Therefore it was necessary to draw to the labor/work of the citizens of senior ages, housewives, adolescents and invalids, who had partial ability to work. Before the state arose the problem of job placement of these categories of population. Their participation in public-productive labor/work in the years approximately/exemplarily was doubled. Corresponding preparation/training and re-training of these people was carried out through the system of courses and schools which gave the possibility shortly to acquire one or the other speciality. Pensioners continued

to receive pension independent of earnings. This encouraged their return to the work. They had right to enter the work or to convert/transfer in another enterprise in accordance with the state of their health and the inclinations. To the invalids of labor/work and war, who worked in the production, was granted leave or it revealed money compensation for the leave of absence according to the norms of the labor legislation of peacetime. The flexible system of state measures made it possible during the years of war to implicate in the productive labor/work the overwhelming majority of people which earlier were not systematically occupied in the public production.

In the period of war for all branches of national economy was organized mass training of the new skilled workers. It was conducted in the handicraft and railroad schools, the schools of factory and plant training, it is direct at the enterprises and the different courses in created with them, in the schools of the mechanization of agriculture. On the average in the year during the war were trained/prepared thus about 3 mln. workers ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18863, page 117. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The situation of wartime forced state to resort also to the

system of labor obligation. If in peacetime this obligation it was permitted to apply only in the case of struggle with the natural calamities and the epidemics, then during the years of war it was used for conducting of defense works, procurements of fuel, protection of the lines of communication, structures/installations and communications. Was respectively expanded the circle of the persons, assigned to the labor obligation.

In connection with the fact that in the period of war in the agriculture was felt a great shortage of hands, the local organs of state authority obtained right in the days of the strained agricultural works to assign on them all able-bodied population of the cities, and also the persons, who live in the rural terrain, but not occupied in the collective farm and state farm production. This made it possible to partially compensate loss/depreciation of millions of able-bodied collective farmers, called into the army in the field.

Sizable role in an increase in the consciousness, organization and activity of national masses in the struggle with the enemy played culturally-educational activity they were state organs. The most important measures of our state, which were being carried out before the war in the region of the sociocultural construction and education of Soviet citizens, retained their significance, also, in wartime. At

the same time it was necessary to organize the work of the cultural-educational installations of the country taking into account the difficulties of wartime. Thus, were created the evening and external schools of working and rural young people, which gave the necessary education/formation to adolescents without the disengagement from the production. War was necessary to change the numerical ratio between the trainers in the general education schools and in the schools of factory and plant training, the handicraft schools. The framing of young people into schools and schools of manpower resources in wartime many times exceeded prewar level.

Considerable attention paid Soviet state to scientific installations and training of scientific-technical cadres. Increased the issue of specialists in the field of technical, applied sciences and especially in those branches of the knowledge which had direct military significance. Were widely started the military-technological studies, which facilitate every possible reinforcing of combat power of military forces.

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Laws/rights and interests of the workers of science and technology, culture and art remained and the period of war emergency. For this category of the persons were retained all basic benefits and

advantages of peacetime.

During the years of war considerably was raised the role of Soviet state in the protection of socialist property/ownership and social order. Particular attention was paid to the strictest protection of the munitions and units of military economy, food and industrial goods, intended for the supply of the rear and front.

Was rebuilt the work of the organs of the court and prosecutor's office. Justice under war time was carried out by Supreme Court of the USSR, by supreme ships of the union and autonomous republics, by territorial and regional ships, national ships, and in the army and in the Navy - by the military tribunals.

By entire their activity judicial organs educated the citizens of the USSR in the spirit of devotion to the native land and to socialist cause, in the spirit of a precise and steady execution of laws of Soviet state, and, first of all, the laws of wartime, care of socialist property/ownership, honest and honest relation to state, public and military duty, the respect for rules of socialist intercourse.

In the war years, as in peacetime, justice was carried out on the principles of uniform and equal for all citizens court,

independent of their social, property and official situation, nationality and racial identity/accessory equipment. Was applied uniform and compulsory/necessary for all judicial organs legislation of the USSR, including the laws of wartime.

The resolutions of judicial organs could be appealed condemned, by their defenders and by other interested persons and were protested by the organs of prosecutor supervision in the higher courts of judicature.

Supreme Court and the prosecutor's office of the USSR carried out and war time the highest control after the observance of legitimacy and law and if necessary we could demand any work from any court and ensure its revision in the order/formation established/installed by law.

Under severe conditions of the Great Patriotic War Soviet state required from the citizens of the implicit execution of legal norms and commands of its organs, general/universal observance of order/formation, strict discipline in high organization as one of the important conditions of achieving the victory. Linden, that retreated from the legal requirements, were punished on the entire strictness of the laws of wartime.

The basic goal of judicial and prosecutor organs consisted of ensuring of the interests of socialist state for the purpose of the victory over the enemy. In accordance with this in the beginning of war the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR affirmed situation about the military tribunals in the terrains, declared on a state of war, and in the combat areas. According to this situation changed the order/formation of staffing military-law organs, and also the order/formation of the examination of judicial works and appealing of sentences.

The military tribunals as special courts were created with the fronts, the armies, the corps, the divisions and other large units/formations and with the militarized installations. In the terrains, being in a state of war, they examined the works about the crimes, directed against the defense, social order and national security, including of work on those, who worked in the military industry, in the field of transportation, on the construction of defensive installations and in the organizations, directly connected with the military department.

The order/formation of the passage of works in the military tribunals allowed/assumed the abbreviated/reduced periods of judicial consequence, the examination of works in the composition of permanent judges without the national assessors. The sentences of tribunals

OUR OWN HAVE RETURNED!

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In liberated Khar'kov. Soviet troops at the T. G. Shevchenko monument (August 1943).

ON LIBERATED LAND.



Soviet supremacy in Kherson has been restored! KEY: (1) UkrSSR. Kherson City Council.



In Odessa after expulsion of the enemy.

This is what some students did with a portrait of the "Führer".



COMING HOME VICTORIOUS!



Sons meet fathers.

Girls meet front-line soldiers
at the Oktyabr'skiy station
(Moscow, July 1945).



came into force from the moment/factor of their announcement and to cassation appeal they were not subject: they immediately were given for the performance.

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The military councils of fronts and armies, and front commander and armies also exercised the right to stop the realization of the sentence, which contains the highest measure of punishment - execution.

Many civil/civilian judicial organs in the terrains, declared on a state of war, and in the front area, and also the judicial organs of rail and water transport were militarized.

The works about the large/coarse embezzlements of national equipment and the disturbances of social order were subject to the conduct of special judicial organs, they were examined and were solved by the military tribunals. The increased punishments underwent those, who were exposed in damage and squandering of food products, in the embezzlement, irrational use or to the loss of the munitions. As a whole the cases of the embezzlement of state and personal effects in the period of patriotic war were qualified as the particularly dangerous activities, committed in the extreme military

situation. The guiltyies underwent serious punishments according to the laws of wartime. This completely related to the interests of the people and state.

Those who attempted to social order, national security and legal interests of laborers, they were punished especially strictly. Both administrative and judicial measures for all such works they were applied by predominantly military authorities and organs of military justice. The public judicial and administrative authority of state carried out its authorizations on these questions only in the terrains, not declared on a state of war, even then with the exclusion from its conduct of the sphere of military economy.

The changes caused by war in the domestic and external policy of the USSR caused wide introduction to the activity of the laws of wartime and extreme legal Acts. The uniqueness of the established situation consisting in the fact that these laws and Acts existed together with the fundamental laws of peaceful period. This is why during the years of war was conducted the redistribution of the scope between the state organs, were altered methods and the forms of struggle for are lawful and law in the rear and at the front. In the case of the mismatch of some laws of peaceful and military time the preference it goes without saying was given by the latter. The legal Acts, published by the organs of authority in the terrains, declared

on a state of war, had to be located in accordance with the rules/handspikes, established/installed by the military authorities¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the "sheets/tables/lists of Supreme Soviet of the USSR", on 26 June, 1941. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In contrast to the imperialist wars the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union was conducted into the name of the vital interests of laborers. Our laws of wartime contributed to the creation of the most favorable conditions for the rout of Fascist aggressors. They provided unity of the activities of army and people, merging/coalescence of the front and rear in the uniform combat camp. Conducting these laws into the life increased in Soviet people a feeling of duty, political and labor activity, responsibility for the execution of the responsibilities charged to the bottom.

The constitutional bases of Soviet state and law/right during the patriotic war were maintained. The constitution of the USSR remained during entire war the political-juridical base of the current legislation and state practice. The activity of basic principles and rules of Soviet law and the period of war was predetermined by the nature of socialist order, by the valid character of war itself, by struggle for honor and independence of

the socialist native land, for the freedom of the peoples.

As far as the Fascist countries which from the beginning also to the end conducted aggressive war, are concerned, there dominated the hardest violence and the arbitrariness. This is understandable, since the criminal goals of fascism gave birth to criminal means. Hitlerites elevated arbitrariness and violence into the rank of the state policy. From this they began their board, with this and ended.

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They usurped all democratic laws/rights and freedoms, trampled fundamental laws and customs of war, accomplished the unprecedented crimes against the humaneness. Their sole "law" both in the internal and in the international life was lawlessness.

In the Soviet state among the laws of wartime special position occupied the legislation, which regulated construction and activity of the armed forces. It provided for particular laws/rights and responsibilities of soldiers, set the order/formation of the bearing of military service under war time, gave the necessary benefits and advantages to soldiers, to disabled war veterans, to their families and to the equated to them persons, took shape and legalized principles and methods of the military control. Military legislation

was one of the bases of strengthening military discipline, legitimacy and law in the military forces. In the terrains, declared on a state of war, and in the combat areas the norms of military legislation applied to the considerable contingents of civil/civilian population, and also on the branch of national economy ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the legislative and administrative-legal Acts of wartime. Iss. 1. From 22 June, 1941, through 22 March, 1942. M., Yurizdat, 1942, page 38-39. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Some published in the period wars the legislative Acts, which relate to the armed forces of the USSR, act and at present, especially those of them, which concern the granting of benefits and advantages, state provision of soldiers, disabled war veterans, demobilized soldiers and the families of the persons, which was killed at the front. But a large part of the laws of wartime with the termination of patriotic war lost juridical force, since they were intended exclusively for the conditions of extreme situation. However, these laws have historical and theoretical significance, since they reflect the wide experience of construction and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of war.

The organs of justice under war time solved the problems charged on them in close cooperation with the military command element and

the political organs, they contributed to the provision of a high morale and political awareness of military forces, to strengthening military discipline, legitimacy and law in the rear and at the front.

Simultaneously it should be noted that in connection with the personality cult of Stalin the adventurist, careerist elements penetrated in the punitive organs practiced groundless repressions and gross violations of legitimacy.

In the favor of Stalin unfounded theoretical situations and harmful installations gave A. Ya. Vyshinskiy, who, into sojourn his by the prosecutor of the USSR, attempted to base and to justify the most rough violations of socialist legitimacy and mass repressions in the attitude of honest Soviet people. Running into the Soviet juridical science principles alien to it, Vyshinskiy asserted that for the enlistment to the penal responsibility it is sufficient one acknowledgement alone of that accused, without the significative readings/indications and other objective proofs. It required making answerable for the political crimes not only of guilties, but also members of their families and familiar ones, which in many instances even did not know about the crime committed.

These faulty at their basis and harmful installations of Vyshinskiy caused great loss to Soviet justice and extremely

negatively they pronounced in the period of the Great Patriotic War on the practical activity of the organs of military justice. After the decisions of XX Congress of CPSU about overcoming of the personality cult of Stalin and his consequences of law/right and the legal interests of the persons, unjustifiably punished during the years of war and to it, were completely restored/reduced.

Communist conducted great work on the restoration/reduction of Soviet state organs in the areas of our country liberated from the Fascist aggressors.

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By the law of wartime it provided that in the territory of the USSR freed/released from the occupation where there are no organs of state authority and control, their functions temporarily fulfilled the military authorities in the person of the military councils of fronts, armies and command element of troop formations. With the removal/distance of front line to the West in these areas gradually was restored the authority of local advice/councils. In this case the executive committees, the departments and the controls of regional, district, urban and rural advice/councils were formed from the deputies, remaining here, elected in the pre-war years. Their authorizations were prolonged by law to the termination of the Great

Patriotic War.

If in the territory liberated from the occupationists were partisan of territory, there continued to function the previous Soviet state organs, replenished/completed and expanded in accordance with their those goals which were provided for by the constitution of the USSR.

The legislative and government organs of such union republics as Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Moldavian, on the measure the liberation of their territories returned from the evacuation and took up the execution of their functions on the general/common/total constitutional base. In this case they leaned on the aid of all remaining republics and Soviet state as a whole.

The restored/reduced organs of authority energetically began the reactivation of economy and culture, overcoming of the aftereffects of war, they in every way possible helped the population, which suffered from the occupation. They lent also necessary support to front ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the directives of CPSU and Soviet government for economic questions. Collector/collection of documents. Vol. 2. M., Gospolitizdat, 1957, page 746, 751, 765, 816, 829, 843, 845, 854.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

Work on the mobilization of the forces of the people to the resistance to enemy was conducted by Soviet state with the active support of the mass organizations of laborers.

In the socialist country is very great the role of mass public organizations and voluntary societies. Being different manifestations of socialist democratism, they help the development of the political activity of citizens and their independent activity, involve the wide masses of laborers into the control of state. In the Soviet Union these organizations and societies possess the constitutional law/right to advance candidates in the deputies of advice/councils. The activity of public organizations in the USSR is carried out under the guidance of the Communist Party, which is advance detachment of the Soviet people.

During the years of patriotic war together with the socialist state as by the main gun of the defense of the country, great work conducted different mass public organizations and voluntary societies of the laborers: the trade unions, komsomol, cooperative associations/unifications, defense, scientific-technical, cultural, sport societies and others.

Organization numerous of these were trade unions. They were during all enterprises, constructions and in the installations of the country. Subordinating entire their activity to the interests of front, trade unions rendered great aid of the party and government in the rebuilding of all national economy to a military footing, they strove strengthening state and economic apparatus, organized workers and employees to the struggle for an increase in the labor productivity, the fulfillment of military economy plans, for the complete utilization of all reserves for the victory over the enemy.

Many forces and labor/work invested the trade unions in the organization of military production. They contributed to transfer of thousands of enterprises to the east of the country, was conducted the mass training of the new cadres of workers, especially from a number of women and young people. The All-Union socialist competition developed by the innovation of laborers for an increase in the issue of military production was directly headed by trade-union organizations. On 1 January, 1944, in the competition participated more than 80 percent of all workers and employees. As a result the labor productivity in the period of war in the basic enterprises was raised by 40-50 percent ².

FOOTNOTE ². TsA of VTsSPS [- All-Union Central Trade-Union
collection
Council], A "PM". Materials to the report to VTsSPS. May of 1947,

sheet 8, 10. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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For encouraging the competing collectives the trade unions together with the party and state organizations entrusted to the best of them ones Red Flag.

In connection with the mobilization of the forces of the people to the resistance to enemy the trade unions actively participated and conducting universal military training and to the preparation of military reserves, kV strengthening local air defense, in the organization for the supervision of the enterprises of military units, in the deployment of military hospitals. The majority of the sanatoriums belonged to trade unions and houses of rest was converted into the hospitals for the wounded and sick soldiers.

During the years of war, as in peacetime, the trade unions controlled the state of the industrial safety measures and safety engineering in the enterprises and in the installations, they followed the execution of legislation from labor/work and the use/application of progressive systems of its payment, they controlled/guided social insurance, they issued to workers and employees of manual on the temporary/time disablement, they strove an

improvement in the medical service of population. Millions of women, occupied and peacetime with housework, were involved into the production and public life; trade unions worried about an improvement in the conditions of their labor/work, they carried on a struggle with the children's neglect and homelessness.

Under war time the trade unions directly led the departments of working supply (ors), contributed to the deployment of secondary economies, collective and individual truck-farming. To the end of the war by truck-farming in our country were occupied more than 18 mln. workers and using ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the history of trade-union movement in the USSR. M., Profizdat, 1961, page 389. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Because of the collective and individual vegetable-gardens urban population obtained in 1942-1945 additionally more than 26 mln. tons of potatoes and vegetables ².

FOOTNOTE ². TsA of VTsSPS, ^{collection} A. "PM". Materials to the report to VTsSPS. May of 1947, sheet 40. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The activity of the trade unions in the period of war was closely related to other mass public organizations among which

especially great role belonged to Leninist komsomol. VLKSM [99sp05 - All-Union Lenin Young Communist League], which counted during the years of war is more than 9 mln. members, it gave to the Red Army and the navy of 350 thousand people '.

FOOTNOTE '. There, sheet 84, 85. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the Leningrad organization each of nine Komsomol members of ten fought at the front. From the Moscow organization to the front left 210 thousand Komsomol members, from Orel - 42 thousand '.

FOOTNOTE '. There sheet 187, 188. ENDFOOTNOTE.

And so it was everywhere. Young people composed the skeleton of new formations. Some units wholly were created from the Komsomol members.

In the army and for the Navy left both the private members of VLKSM and the leading workers. In 1941 to the military work it passed 30 percent of the secretaries of regional committees, city committees and district committees of VLKSM. Subsequently to the armed forces were directed the 1200 additional secretaries of regional committees, the first secretaries of city committees and district committees and it is more than 66 thousand secretaries of primary Komsomol organizations '.

FOOTNOTE *. There, sheet 187, 188. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Komsomol members went in the most difficult and most responsible sectors of struggle with the enemy. On the appeal of the Communist Party they selflessly fought with the aggressors at the front, in the guerilla detachments and in the underground. With the youths stably they on the level transferred all burdens of war and heroic struggled with the enemy our girls. To January 1942 in the numbers of the armed forces there were 350 thousand members of the Komsomol, and during the subsequent years their number grew considerably.

Leninist komsomol headed the patriotic movement of young people in the rear, which became apparent in most varied forms: in the organization of komsomol youth brigades, in the creation of the fund for aid to child-orphans, etc. Our youths and girls showed the miracles of labor heroism. Komsomol members entire Soviet young people introduced into the fund for the defense of the country of approximately 1 billion rubles.

Komsomol organizations thoroughly helped universal military training.

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In the process of training were created the komsomol youth subunits of snipers, submachine gunners, machine gunners, mortarmen and so forth, etc. These subunits gave more than 1700 thousand specialists. Furthermore, were created the special subunits from girl-members of the Komsomol, which prepared 214 thousand snipers, machine-gunners and other specialists ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Archive of CC of VLKSM. Materials to the report to CC of VLKSM to the XI congress of komsomol, sheet 86, 87. ENDFOOTNOTE.

From the Komsomol members and the nonunion young people were formed the cadres for dealing in the rear of enemy.

The native land highly evaluated the services of Leninist komsomol. 3500 thousand Komsomol members were rewarded with orders and by the medals of the USSR and 3 thousand of them were awarded the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union ².

FOOTNOTE ². *Ibid* sheet 94. ENDFOOTNOTE.

For the combat services in the struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors they are rewarded with orders and medals of 100 thousand

girls, 58 of whom obtained the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union '.

FOOTNOTE '. *Ibid*, sheet 96, 97. ENDFOOTNOTE.

War put its impression, also, on the activity of pioneer organizations. Pioneers and schoolboys helped adult ones in many works. First of all, they selflessly worked in the fields of kolkhozes and state farms. Fulfilling the resolution of government of 13 April, 1942, about the enlistment of the students of schools to the field works, more than 20 mln. schoolboys into the summer vacations 1942 worked out 757 mln. workdays '.

FOOTNOTE '. *Ibid*, sheet 155. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Pioneers participated also in the restoration/reduction of the destroyed schools and other buildings, together with the Komsomol members they emerged on voluntary Sunday work, giving the earned means into the fund for the Red Army. In many schools were created different workshops, which fulfilled the orders of front and national economy. For example, in the summer of 1942 in the school workshops of Moscow worked 17 thousand studying, which prepared output to 30 mln. rubles '.

FOOTNOTE '. *Ibid*. ENDFOOTNOTE.

On the initiative of CC of VLKSM the pioneers and schoolboys successfully gathered medicinal and other useful plants. It suffices to say that only in the summer of 1942 they collected more than half of all prepared/prefabricated in the country wild plants '.

FOOTNOTE '. Archive of CC of VLKSM. Report about the work of the organization of young pioneers, sheet 11. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Students actively managed above the therapeutic installations. They decorated with colors hospitals, read the casualties of the book, they helped them to write letters, is shown amateur artistic activity '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Important role during the years of war played consumer cooperation. To it was charged the supply of workers and intelligentsia in the rural terrain, procurement of some forms of raw material and contrary sale to the collective farmers of industrial goods. Through consumer operation was supplied the sixth unit of all population of village, including kindergartens, creche, the boarding schools of disabled war veterans, the evacuated citizens '.

FOOTNOTE '. See 40 years of Soviet consumer cooperation. M., the publishing house of Tsentrosoyuz [99sp10 - Central Union of Consumers' Societies], 1957, page 83. ENDFOOTNOTE.

War was necessary from the consumer cooperation to be occupied the production of foot-wear, clothing, transport and saddlers articles, etc. Cooperative organizations stored vegetables, wild plants and fruits, fur, etc. All this went for the satisfaction of the needs of the front and rear.

Like other public organizations, consumer cooperation actively helped national economy by supplies. Its solderers/shareholders acquired in the years of the war of bonds to 2600 mln. rubles. These money used for the needs of war. Furthermore, solderers/shareholders and workers of consumercooperation from their means and allotments from the profits introduced to the fund for the defense of 105, 2 mln. rubles '.

FOOTNOTE '. See ibid. page 95. ENDFOOTNOTE.

One of the mass voluntary societies, which made during the years of war great work, was the society of assistance to defense, to air

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and chemical construction (Osoaviakhim) '°.

FOOTNOTE '°. Since 1951 it bears the name "Voluntary Soc for Coop with the Army, air force, and navy" (DOSAAF [99sp06 - All-union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air force, and Navy).

ENDFOOTNOTE.

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At the beginning of the war of Osoaviakhim it counted in its numbers of 13 mln. members, united in 329 thousand primary organizations. These organizations in the pre-war years performed defense-mass work among all strata of society.

To the involvement in Osoaviakhim of young people contributed different clubs. To this contributed also exercises by sport. In the aviation clubs without the disengagement from the production it was trained simultaneously to 8 thousand youths and girls - future pilots. More than 30 thousand athletes mastered aerodnetics. In all at the beginning of 1941. Osoaviakhim it trained about 400 thousand pilots of reserve, glider-pilots, parachutists, aircraft mechanics, naval specialists, motorists, motorcyclists and different signalmen¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Archive of CC of VLKSM. Materials to the report to CC of VLKSM to the XI congress of komsomol, sheet 42. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Before the creation of the organs of universal military training responsibility for the preparation for population for the air defense it bore Osoaviakhim. The very same prepared instructors for the groups of self-defense in the habitable houses. As a result of this work already to the autumn of 1941 not only adult, but also many children had skills in the struggle with the consequences of air flights, in the rendering to the medical aid by victim. Was created the net/system of the district and urban schools PVKhO [- Air and Chemical Defense], which in the years of war prepared 987 thousand public instructors for training of population according to the programs of PVKhO ².

FOOTNOTE ². TsA of DOSAAF, f. "Osoaviakhim" pub. 16, arch. 41, sheet 80, 82. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The mass training of Soviet citizens for the air defense played very important role. Within the time of war they extinguished more than 1 mln. incendiary bombs. In this case 99 percent of all fires eliminated the groups of self-defense ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. Ibid. pub. 1, arch. 1, sheet 151. ENDFOOTNOTE.

After 17 September 1941, when on the decision of GKO was created the administration of universal military training,

Osoaviakhim organizations together with defense-mass work among the population continued to prepare reserves for the Red Army.

When was begun the mass expulsion/exile of enemy from the Soviet territory, local party organizations charged to Osoaviakhim to clean the freed/released earth/ground from the mines and the destruction. It is later, on 19 February, 1944, by the resolution of the state committee of defense to Osoaviakhim were charged the continuous mine clearing of the liberated territory, assembly by that remaining in the fields of the battles of combat materiel, weaponry and ammunition. For the execution of this target in the central advice/council of Osoaviakhim was instituted the department on mine clearing and assembly of the munitions. In each area were created the special commands, trained to art of mine clearing.

The miners of Osoaviakhim and those, who gathered armament, made truly colossal work. Armed by probes and mine detectors, they inspected/checked each meter of the liberated earth/ground and extracted from it the duds and the mines, which threatened the life of Soviet people. 1945 were decisive in the mine clearing. Subjecting itself to continual danger, our miners inspected 127078 populated areas, cleared from the mines the area more than 1.5 mln. square kilometers, gathered and annihilated about 55 mln. mines, aircraft bombs, shells and other explosive means. Was also assembled in the

fields of battles much armament and broken technology '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid. pub. 16, ARKh 41, 1. 3. ENDFOOTNOTE.

High activity during the years of war revealed the alliance of the societies of Red Cross and red demilune of the USSR. At the beginning of war this alliance counted 7900 thousand members, while toward the end of it - to 12900 thousand. The organizations of the Red Cross did entire possible so as to help wounded and sick soldiers rather to be made the formation/order. Furthermore, they participated in training of average/mean and junior medical staff. In the years of war they prepared about 300 thousand nurses, more than 500 thousand corpsmen, and, to 30 thousand aidmen '.

FOOTNOTE '. Archive of CC of VLKSM. Materials to the report to CC of VLKSM to the XI congress of komsomol, sheet 87. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The majorities of the graduates of the medical schools of the Red Cross were headed for the army in the field - into the companies, the battalions and the regiments. Therefore front and rear therapeutic and prophylactic installations did not feel deficiency in the average/mean and junior medical staff '.

FOOTNOTE '. See 40 years of the Soviet Red Cross. 1918-1958. M.,

Medgiz, 1959, page 38. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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During the organization of the Red Cross was charged also training civil/civilian population according to the program "it was ready to medical defense" (GSO). In four years of war they prepared 23 mln. badge holders of GSO, from whom were created the medical brigades and the posts, which were the active assistants of the organs of public health in taking of all preventive measures of the medium of population ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See 40 years of the Soviet Red Cross, page 38.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The society of the Red Cross much made also for organizing the blood donation. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of blood donation under war time. It became the work of enormous state importance. In the entire country were created donor areas. The numbers of people, which desired to give its blood for the wounded soldiers, constantly they grew. Blood donation during the years of war was the remarkable expression of Soviet patriotism, love for the Red Army.

After the expulsion/exile of Fascist aggressors the Red Cross conducted great counterepidemic work in the liberated areas. The counterepidemic vanguards in the year inspected more than 500 thousand courts, subjected to medical processing 400 thousand Soviet citizens, 74 thousand people they rendered medical aid and 10 thousand hospitalized, repaired 7 thousand wells and constructed about 2 thousand baths ².

FOOTNOTE ². See *ibid.* page 64. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The considerable contribution to the cause of the defense of the native land introduced the technical-engineering public, organized in all branches of national economy into the scientific engineer-technical societies. In them entered the best unit of the technical intelligentsia and many working - innovators productions. The leading nucleus of this branched system was the All-Union advice/council of scientific and technical societies of engineers (VSNITO), in which there were several branch committees, which united the related to branch of science and engineering. To each committee was charged resolving any complex problem. Committee usually developed/extended it on the separate themes, enlisting in their development branch societies, scientific-research and planning organizations, the most prominent scientists and practical engineers.

The technical societies of engineers guided their creative energy to the satisfaction of the demands of the armed forces and defense industry. VSNITO was the initiator of the creation of new special productions in the military industry, it developed/processed technology and was carried out technical consultation during entire the lead time of these productions. As an example of the useful initiative of the technical societies of engineers can serve many facts.

The Leningrad division of the society of mechanical engineers developed new technology the casts of mines, shells and high-speed/high-velocity series construction of small ships ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. TSA of VTSPS, f. 4447, file 84, sheet 23. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Propellant/fuel commission of VSNITO by assignment of Gosplan of the USSR developed the norms of the fuel consumption for the pockets of low and average/mean capacity on the thermal power stations, in the steam locomotives, in the production of cement, ceramic parts and the heating of living quarters. All this gave fuel economy from 10 to 15 percent ⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The technical society of engineers of lumber industry proposed to apply on the construction of the railroads of lightened type tie, which made it possible to increase the manufacture of ties by 53 percent. The society of light industry developed the complex of measures for the expansion of the raw base of leather dressing industry, in particular, was increased the manufacture of shoe kersey by 45 percent ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid. 1. 24. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The society of rail transport developed and injected the method of an increase in the capacity of railroads, and also the booster of the framing of water by steam locomotives. This gave the great savings of time and means.

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The society of water transport developed the new method of calculation of harbor hydraulic engineering facilities, designed floating berth from the wooden pontoons for the landing operations, proposed the new system of the exploitation of water transport, which raised the capacity of piers and ports ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. TsA of VTSSPS f. 447, file 84, sheet 56-57. ENDFOOTNOTE.

For four wars the technical societies of engineers injected in the production of approximately 2 thousand valuable propositions, prepared for the publication more than 500 handbooks and manuals ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid. sheet 53, 191. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Considerable attention in our country is paid to the gymnastics and the sport. In the pre-war years of 137 trade unions they had 88 voluntary sport societies, in which were counted 1274400 male physical culturists. In 55 trade unions, which did not have sport societies, there were 166500 male physical culturists ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. TsA of VTSPS. f. "PM". Materials to the reports to VTSPS. May of 1947, sheet 139. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Furthermore, gymnastics and sport occupied the considerable place in the mass work of Komsomol organizations and schools. The students of schools, technical schools, VUZ, the soldiers of the Red Army had in their numbers constant sport assets. In all to the country at the beginning of 1941 were counted 3105 thousand male physical culturists ¹.

FOOTNOTE 4. Archive of CC of VLKSM. Materials to the report to CC of VLKSM to the XI congress of komsomol, sheet 43. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the years of war the basic composition of instructors and male physical culturists of sport societies left to the front in order with the weaponry in the hands to struggle with the enemy. The athletes remaining in the rear were used in the subunits of universal military training and actively participated in the preparation for reserves. In three years of war the male physical culturists of trade unions prepared on 20- and 30-hour programs of military-ski training of 2527 thousand people. For summer 1943 and 1944 they trained on 25- and 30-hour programs to the receptions/methods of hand-to-hand fighting of 705 thousand and to cruising/sailing with the fighting equipment of 274 thousand people 5.

FOOTNOTE 5. TsA of VTsSPS, f. "PM". Materials to the report to VTsSPS. May of 1947, sheet 139. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The mountain-climbing sport organizations of republics and territories of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia formed from their composition of approximately 40 mountain-rifle vanguards which in the period of struggle in Caucasus in 1942-1943 played important role. Trained to mountain climbing and well trained, during the light equipment and the armament, the mountain vanguards boldly thrust to

enemy decisive struggles and annihilated him.

During the years of war continued work the international organization of aid to the champions of revolution (MOPR).

Together with the mass public organizations during the war they were created and functioned the antifascist committees of Soviet women, Soviet young people, Soviet scientists, All-Slav committee. Active activity developed the antifascist organizations of revolutionary emigrants from the countries, occupied by the Fascist-German aggressors (for example, the alliance of Polish patriots, the organization of Czech Democrats, national committee "free Germany"). Created on the initiative of communists and other political workers, these organizations united the patriotic forces of emigrants for the armed struggle against the Fascist-German aggressors. Many emigrants fought in the numbers of the first Polish army, Czechoslovak and Rumanian units and large units/formations.

Antifascist patriotic organizations conducted wide political education work among the numerous emigration to the USSR, provided the labor and everyday construction of their compatriots. The activity of these organizations continued to the very end of the war and had important revolutionary consequences for the countries, liberated by the Red Army from the Fascist enslavement.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN FOR THE FRONT-LINE SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES.

In the store for servicing invalids of the Great Patriotic War (Kazan').
KEY: We are surrounding the invalids of the Patriotic War with attention and concern.



Invalids of the Patriotic War studying at the pedagogical institute (Kutaisi).

During lessons on shoes at the hospital (Turkmenian SSR).





Children of front-line soldiers receive warm clothing at school.

This light, spacious home is being built for children whose parents were killed at the front (Krasnodarskiy Kray).



New home for the demobilized soldier (Gor'kovskaya Oblast').

As a whole, in spite of the difficulty of wartime, public organizations and voluntary societies of laborers in the period of war enlarged and strengthened relations with the masses, improved the methods of their activity and were enriched by new work experience. The role of public organizations grew considerably, and their participation in the life of the country became even more effective.

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In the years of the Great Patriotic War Soviet state and public organizations made colossal work in all regions of life and struggle of our people. They ensured guidance of economy, concentration of means for the needs of front and mobilization of masses for the achievement of victory. Many measures and conversions, carried out by the organs of state authority and control in the period of war, maintained the definite/determined significance, also, for the postwar peaceful construction.

Being greatest mass and democratic organizations of laborers, advice/councils with their control apparatus proved to be the form best in the history of the mobilization of masses to the rout of enemy. Hundreds of thousands of deputies and activist-public workers

helped Soviet state under the incredibly difficult wartime conditions to take measures, which enveloped all the population of the country. Our state used the selfless support of the Soviet people. In this - the listening post of its power and invincibility. War clearly confirmed the great rightness of Leninist thought about the fact that more democratic, in the true meaning of word, the more closely related to the laboring masses state in the light/world yet was not.

3. Military organization of socialist state.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was the bright certificate of superiority of socialist military organization over the capitalist, its development they are determined by the foremost character of the socialist social system, by its advantages.

Realizing the Leninist plan of the formation of socialism under the conditions of hostile capitalist encirclement, being guided by the Leninist principles of the construction of the armed forces, the Communist Party improved the military organization of Soviet state, untiringly fortified its defensive capacity.

In connection with the increase of the threat of war the Communist Party turned from a territorial-martial system, suitable to

the conditions of the firm world, and embarked on the path of building the regular army which would be constantly ready to the defense of the country. The law accepted in 1939 about universal military duty, the lowered call-up age, made it possible to increase a quantity of those drafted into the army and the militarily trained contingents of reserve, which favored a rapid increase in the armed forces.

Transition to the cadre system of staffing army and need for the preparation of the mass contingents of reserve required the reorganization of the organs of local military control - the creation of the territorial, regional and urban military commissariats, expansion and the premilitary training of young people. Was intensified the work of voluntary defense organizations on the military training for population. For the political guidance of the activity of the local organs of military control and mass defense work created the military departments of the Kray, regional, urban and district committees of the party. All these measures contributed to reinforcing of combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces.

But cadre was only the bones of the armed forces of wartime. Since the beginning of the war for us it was necessary within the shortest period to mobilize and to develop the mass and well armed army, capable of not only opposing strong aggressor, but also of

routing him.

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The decision of so complex problem would be impossible without the victory of socialism in our country. Socialist system made it possible to create such military economy which exceeded the military economy of Fascist Germany on quantity and quality of weaponry produced and combat materiel. This was one of the main conditions of the victory of the Red Army.

With the formation of socialism radically changed the social base of mass army. During the civil war the Red Army was predominantly peasant. Its working layer was approximately 15 percent, and peasant-individual peasants - 77 percent. To the time of the Great Patriotic War the social composition of the population of the USSR so changed that the Red Army began to recruit already exclusively from the workers, the collective farmers and the representatives of labor intelligentsia. Increased substantially the general education and technical training of draftees, which was the result of cultural revolution and mass mechanization of labor. The number of industrial workers among the draftees grew approximately/exemplarily four times in comparison with the period of civil war. Soviet village guided in the numbers of army a

considerable quantity of tractor operators, operators, chauffeurs.

By the armed forces came the people, which possessed the new moral qualities which were brought up by public labor/work for the good of socialism. They deeply understood the responsibility, which was being laid by the people on the Red Army as the defender of the socialist fatherland. This considerably increased the combat efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Changed in class sense command personnel of the Red Army. the Communist Party grew the numerous military personnel, which entirely answered on their social appearance the class nature of the Red Army. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War almost all officers of our armed forces were descendants of the medium of workers, collective farmers and employees. The majority of them (about 80 percent) were communists or Komsomol members. History yet did not know such army whose command cadres continuously would consist of the progressive-minded representatives of the working people.

The exact opposite to the command cadres of the Soviet Armed Forces was the officer corps of the Fascist-German army, which was the typical generation of capitalist system. In it were revealed all characteristics, inherent in German militarist state. Fascist general officers consisted predominantly of the privileged strata of German

aristocracy. In the course of war Hitler of cry supplemented general officers by Nazis - the loyal servants of monopolist capital. The significant part of senior officers supplied from its medium the important bourgeoisie. However, remaining commanding composition recruited mainly from the average/mean bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia, which unconditionally supported Hitler regime. The unit of the officer's rank, and also bulk of the junior commanders Wehrmacht drew from the numbers of the fine/small urban and rural bourgeoisie, most susceptible to the social demagoguery of Nazis. However, descendants from the laborers among the command cadres of Hitler army were few.

Between the private and command personnel in the Fascist-German army there was a class dissension, which did not give itself to know until works at front went successfully. In proportion to the increase of the difficulties of war this factor increasingly more strongly had effect on the combat efficiency of German military forces.

The morale of Hitler army deteriorated in the course of war in connection with the heavy damages/defeats and the growing losses. The proportion of cadre units and large units/formations of enemy, which passed solid ideological processing, continuously decreased. Those arrived by the front of replenishment were not sufficiently firm in moral sense. They imply the pacifist and antifascist moods which in

proportion to the tightening of war increasingly more enveloped the German people.

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In contrast to the bourgeois armies where relations between the commanding and privates/rank and file are built on the basis subordinate to Class authority, military subordination in the Red Army leans on the commonality of class interests and goals of all soldiers, on the realization by them its sacred duty before the people. "The Red Army, emphasized V. I. Lenin in 1919, created not preceded solid discipline, not from under the stick, but on the basis of consciousness, devotion, selflessness of workers themselves and peasants" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 29, page 226. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The moral force of our army even more increased with the victory of socialism to interests of which was betrayed entire personnel of the armed forces - from the private soldier to the marshal. The noble/precious idea of the defense of the socialist fatherland pierces all thoughts and feelings of Soviet soldiers, it is the basis of relations between the commanders and the subordinates. Class uniformity of the Soviet Armed Forces, their political and

ideological unity - decisive advantage of the military organization of socialist state.

The armed forces of the USSR, just as our state itself, are multinational by their composition. In the Red Army during the years of the last war there was not one troop formation, in which would not fight shoulder to shoulder the representatives of different socialist nations and nationalities.

The victory of socialism ensured the inviolable unity of the front and rear which with this force was revealed in the days of the Great Patriotic War. All Soviet people - and at the front and in the rear - were penetrated by one tendency: with any price to be located the most expensive for each of them - its socialist fatherland. Difficulties and tests of war even more greatly tempered their will, joined the forces of the people and army. This is why the conversion of the cadre Red Army into the mass, multimillion-man army of wartime did not weaken/attenuate her moral and political fortress.

The strength of the Soviet Armed Forces in connection with the build-up/growth of military danger, and then in the course of war itself increased with 1433 thousand (1937) to 11365 thousand people (to May 1945), i.e., 8 times ².

FOOTNOTE 2. "Pravda", on 15 January, 1960. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In spite of losses, the composition of the armed forces during the war continuously grew/rose, and their combat efficiency ever more and more became stronger. New contingents, being poured with the numbers of army, imply the same ideological staying power/persistency, the same moods such as lived all Soviet people.

Under the conditions for the strained combat actions against the Fascist-German aggressors Soviet government permitted to accept upon the military service of women. Women replaced men on such specialities which were it under the force. By them, first of all, were supplemented medical-medical service, the subunits of connection/bond, traffic control on military-automobile roads. However, patriotic enthusiasm among the Soviet women was so great that many of them produced its to right protect the native land, also, in the more powered phases of the armed struggle. Toward the end of the war of woman they comprised to 24 percent of the contingent of National Air Defense Forces, which made it possible to free from these units of thousands of men, suitable for the bearing of service in the field military forces 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18763, page 164.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Many our girls - flier, anti-aircraft gunners, tankmen, snipers - are known to the entire country.

However, in the first months of war on the initiative of the laborers of Moscow and Leningrad were formed 24 divisions of the people's militia *, hundred of fighter regiments and battalions.

FOOTNOTE *. IBID, inv. No 18816, page 79. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In these voluntary formations went the people of the different ages, sometimes physically hardly suitable to the activities in field conditions and weakly prepared in military sense. But these were the ardent patriots of the native land.

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In the course of war the laborers to their inherent means formed by Don the Cossack, Ural tank, particular Siberian rifle/infantry of the corps and other voluntary formations.

The advantages of the Soviet military organization, caused by socialist order and valid character of war, to themselves would not

lead to the victory. Was required another ability to correctly use these advantages that also it was achieved because of the unrelenting concern of the Communist Party about strengthening of the armed forces. Its guidance of the Soviet Armed Forces was the basis of the bases of all military construction.

Main attention the party guided to that in order mass, multimillion-man army to convert into the well mounted combat organism, capable of carrying out the missions, which arose before the Soviet state in the war imposed on it. Difficulty here consisting in the fact that this was necessary to make already in the course of the strained combat operations, which flowed/occurred/lasted under the conditions extremely unfavorable for the Soviet Armed Forces. It was necessary first of all to increase political work in the military forces, which tested the bitterness of damage/defeat, to raise their combat morale spirit.

Even in the period of the formation of the Red Army of M. V. Frunze it noted that the political work in our army gave to it "the new weaponry which on the greatest scale strengthened and increased its combat power" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. M. V. Frunze. selected works. Vol. II. M., Voenizdat, 1957, page 121. ENDFOOTNOTE.

From that time repeatedly increased the strength of communists in the Soviet Armed Forces, was raised the role of party organizations. The Communist Party grew and brought up and brought up the numerous cadres of the well prepared political workers whose numbers during the war were fastened/strengthened by thousands of leading workers from the party and Soviet organs.

On the eve war in our armed forces were counted more than 66 thousand political workers ².

FOOTNOTE ². Archives MO USSR. f. 32, list 11309, file 15, sheet 37.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

To the summer of 1943 their number increased to 240 thousand people of whom more than 140 thousand worked directly in units and subunits of army in the field ².

FOOTNOTE ². There, list 65607, file 12, sheet 463. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Together with the commanders the political workers conducted great political educational work among the personnel.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government paid during the war enormous attention to cultivation and to the education of the experienced military personnel, which are main organizing force of army. The complexity of this problem consisting in the fact that the contemporary army requires not only numerous command cadres. Motorization and mechanization of military forces, the use/application of varied new combat materiel cause the great need also for different technical cadres, the need for the assimilation of technology by entire commanding composition. The breaking out war on its scope and stress/voltage was so/such grandiose, that, naturally, military personnel in its course bore sizable loss. Therefore was required the great reserve of officers, in order to in proper time complete losses and to provide with the necessary cadres new army formations.

Growing and educating command cadres, the Communist Party worried that they would have not only good military-technological preparation/training, they skillfully mastered art of training and troop leading, but also would possess wide political view, they persistently seized Marxist-Leninist theory. Only under this condition commander could become full-valued head and educator of the military forces trusted to it.

However, considerable they are frequent the military personnel,

grown by the Communist Party in the years of peaceful construction, it became the victim of Stalin arbitrariness.

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From May 1937 through September 1938 underwent repressions about half of regimental commanders, almost all brigadier generals and divisions, all commanders of the corps and military district commanders, members of military councils and commanders/chiefs for the political controls of districts, the majority of the political workers of the corps, divisions and brigades, about third of commissars of regiments, many instructors of the highest and secondary military educational institutions ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18816, page 11-12; inv. No 18925, page 10-15. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The media of the innocently killed commanders and political workers were the most important military leaders, such, as M. N. Tukhachevskiy, V. K. Blucher, A. I. Yegorov, I. E. Yakir, I. P. Uborevich, A. I. Kork, Ye. I. Kovtyukh, I. F. Fed'ko, I. S. Unshlikht, P. Ye. Dybenko, R. P. Eydeman, Ya. B. Gamarnik (finished life by suicide) et al.

Thus, not long before the Great Patriotic War the Red Army was deprived of many prepared and experienced military heads. The Communist Party and for Soviet government it was necessary to urgently supplement military personnel, to advance to the leading command posts of the less prepared officers. At the beginning of the war only of 7 percent of our armed forces they had high military education, but 37 percent even did not pass the complete course of training in the secondary military educational institutions ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid, inv. No 18816, page 13. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The burden of the loss, carried by military personnel, was complicated by the fact that many of the punished officers were well familiar with the German school of military art, but its new cadres did not know. Moreover, approximately/exemplarily of 75 percent of commanders and 70 percent of political workers to the summer of 1941 they had a length of employment in the held the position of up to one year ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. Ibid., page 23-24. ENDFOOTNOTE.

All this negatively had effect on the combat efficiency of our army,

although before the war and in its first months the significant part of those punished was liberated and took active part in the struggle against Fascist Germany.

As a result of the mass repressions with the personality cult of Stalin Soviet military forces in the first period of war sharply felt deficiency in the experienced commanders, capable of skillfully leading operational formations and large units/formations. In this, it is doubtless, there was one of the essential reasons of the failures of the Red Army in the first period of war. But the excellent moral and volitional qualities of commanders and political workers, and also the well organized system of preparation/training and improving all categories of the commanding composition made it possible in wartime to overcome the difficulties of staffing army in the field by command cadres.

Meanwhile the Fascist-German command element during planning of "lightning war" against the USSR exactly is relied on the fact that the Soviet state will not be able to rapidly solve the problem of the provision of the Red Army with the necessary military personnel. In this connection it is not-without-interest to note that the chief of the General Staff of the land forces of Fascist Germany General F. Halder, after listening the statement of that returning from Moscow during May 1941 Colonel Krebs, made the following entry in his

journal: "the Russian officer corps is exclusively poor. It produces worse impression than in 1933 of Russia will be required 20 years thus far it it will achieve previous height/altitude" *.

FOOTNOTE *. Ibid, inv. No 13212, the recording of 5 May, 1941.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

One of the largest errors of the Fascist-German command element in that consisted, that it erroneously determined our possibilities.

Still on the eve war on the initiative of the party are accepted measures, to increase the strength of cadres of the commanding composition. To the summer of 1941 a quantity of cadets in the military schools of ground forces and Air Force grew almost 5 times in comparison with 1937, and a number of students in the military academies - 2 times in comparison with 1939 *.

FOOTNOTE *. Ibid, inv. No 18816, page 10. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, the first months of combat operations showed that present military personnel it will be insufficient for waging of great and prolonged war. The appeal of reserve officers provided less than half of the need of mass army for the command cadres. Therefore Soviet state took urgent measures for the expansion of the net/system of the

military educational institutions and organization of the numerous refresher courses and improvement of the commanding composition.

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In connection with the rebuilding of political administration only in 1943 into the command posts were transferred more than 122 thousand political workers, who passed the appropriate course of military training. They revealed themselves by combat commanders and by the experimental educators of soldier and officers.

In 1942-1943 on the post of platoon commanders and mouths in the rifle troops as the numerous, were advanced tens of thousands of private soldiers and sergeants, who revealed/detected in the progress of combat outstanding capabilities command subunits. Toward the end of the war in the Red Army they commanded the regiments of 126 officers, who began war with Privates and sergeants ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Archives MO USSR, f. 33, list 11454, file 395, sheet 293.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

As a result of the adopted measures to October 1943 not only was satisfied the need of army in the field and new formations for the command cadres, but also was created the reserve, which counted more

than 92 thousand officers of all branches of services ².

FOOTNOTE ². IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. 18816, page 117. ENDFOOTNOTE.

More than 200 thousand reserve officers continued to work in the national economy.

Thus, already in first half of war the problem of the provision of the Soviet Armed Forces with military personnel was solved. This made it possible subsequently to sharply improve the quality of training of officers in the entire net/system of the military educational institutions and courses, and to also organize the ordered system of the improvement of the military knowledge of all command cadres.

At the beginning of the third period the wars by the basic source of the replenishment of the armed forces by command and technical cadres were 31 higher military education establishment, 220 military schools and are more than 200 different courses of preparation/training and retraining of the commanding composition ³, which produced yearly 400-500 thousand officers.

FOOTNOTE ³. Ibid., page 216-225. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Toward the end of the war the Red Army, in spite of considerable losses, it had available a completely sufficient quantity of officers.

Training command-political cadres was based mainly on the study of the advanced experience, extracted in the fields of battles. Instructors in the military academies, the schools and in the courses they were, as a rule, Generals and officers - participants in the war, specially recalled from the front or left temporarily from the formation/order on the wound. Besides their personal combat experience they used manuals and materials of the General Staff and headquarters of the branches of the services, in which was summarized the experience of war. The overwhelming mass of students and cadets also possessed rich combat experience. All this provided training the qualified officers, capable of successfully leading military forces in the front situation.

The correct resolution of the problem of the raising of military personnel required great work on their study, selection and official progress. This work was conducted under the direct leadership of the party. To the leading command-political posts boldly advanced the young capable officers displayed themselves in combat.

The party and the Soviet government in the course of war did everything in order to raise and to strengthen the authority of officers, to encourage an increase in their skill in the training, the education and the troop leading. For this purpose was somewhat simplified the order/formation of the conferment of commissioned ranks. By the edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 18 August, 1941, to the military councils of fronts it let right award to those of the commanding composition, who distinguished themselves in combat, ranks to Major, and to the military councils of armies - to the Senior Lieutenant. By the resolution of GKO of 20 November, 1941, for the officers of army in the field were set the abbreviated/reduced lengths of service for obtaining the recurrent service rank.

In 1942-1943 were established/installed uniform service ranks for all command personnel and new ranks for the officers of military-technological and administrative personnel. For the highest command personnel of the arms of service were introduced supplementary ranks - marshal and the chief marshal of the corresponding arm of service.

For the successful execution of the combat assignments, the skillful troop leading and the personal heroism only in 1943 more than 1600 officers obtained the rank of General. Toward the end of the war in the Soviet Armed Forces there were 12 Marshals of the Soviet Union, 2 Admirals of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, 3 chief marshals and 11 marshals of the branches of services, 13 General of the Army, 5586 Generals and Admirals ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18816, page 144. ENDFOOTNOTE.

For an increase in the organizational capabilities of Soviet military personnel, education in them of will and resoluteness, initiative and feeling of responsibility enormous significance had persistently conducted by our party line for strengthening of one-man command as the most advisable way of the command by troops. V. I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that in military science, more than no matter where is necessary strict unity of activities, which is achieved by the subordination of will of hundreds and thousands of people to the will of one fully authoritative head - sole commander. This guidance in the army provides strict military discipline, centralized, flexible and reliable command by troops in the combat

situation.

One-man command exists also in the armies of capitalist states. But there it has completely different basis. Commander in the bourgeois army expresses the interests of the class of exploiters and subordinates to these interests will and activities of soldiers, who are descendants of the laborers of classes. However, Soviet soldiers in the command of commander see the command of the native land, the command of their people. This is why they without oscillating give entire their force - and when must, then life - to execution of command. Sole commanders in the entire practice of guidance and education of military forces conduct the policy of the Communist Party. In the Red Army the individual authority of commander does not enter and contradiction with the will of the led by them combat collective. Moreover, Soviet commander exercises his leadership, relying on constant support and aid of political administration, party and Komsomol organizations. All this ensures unity of will and activities of all complicated collective, successful fulfillment by it of the decision accepted by commander.

Socio-political and ideological unity of officer cadres and soldier masses, inherent in the military organization only of socialist state, was would be not thought without heroic efforts of millions of Soviet people, people of great patriotic soul, selfless

which were fighting into the name of the defense of freedom and independence of the socialist fatherland. Soldiers, sergeants and Chief Petty Officers it is persistent and systematically under the guidance of Generals and officers they learned to defeat enemy. In the exercises on the combat and political training, which were being conducted at the fronts and in the rear districts, they seized the weaponry trusted to them, became masters of their trade. By skillful, initiative activities soldiers and sergeants realized the daring intentions of Soviet commanders.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that the socialist state correctly solved the problem of the internal structure of the armed forces, which are under the contemporary conditions enormous and complicated organism with a multitude of army formations most diverse in their designation/purpose. Route/path to the valid solution of this problem indicated Marxist-Leninist theory, which revealed the regular dependence of ways and forms of the armed struggle, organization of the armed forces first of all on the level of development of military technology.

F. Engels indicated that the armament of army, her composition, the organization, tactics and strategy depend, first of all, on the step/stage of production achieved at the given moment/factor and on the means of statement. In connection with this it noted that not the

effect of brilliant troop leaders/generals leads to a change in the ways of waging war, but the appearance of new combat materiel and people themselves, which apply these means. The creative role of military men is expressed in the fact that they adapt the way of struggle to the new weaponry and to the new soldiers ².

FOOTNOTE ². See F. Engels. Elected military products. M., Voenizdat, 1957, page 11. ENDFOOTNOTE.

end section.

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On the organization of the armed forces an increasing effect had the improved combat technology. Its rapid development in the period between two world wars gave rise to different theories. Some of them overestimated the possibilities of aviation, others gave excessive significance to armored forces. Differently was determined the significance of navies and heterogeneous forces, entering their composition. War refuted these one-sided theories, which gave preference to one or the other form of armament to the detriment of other so/such necessary combat means.

Soviet military doctrine proceeded their need for the harmonious combination of all contemporary types of weaponry and combat materiel. With respect to this was developed the organization of our military forces both in the pre-war years and during the war. Soviet state improved all services of armed forces and basic of the arm of service in the presence of the retention/preservation/maintaining of this relationship/ratio between them, which satisfied the requirements of the armed struggle.

The experience of war clearly showed, as depending on the growth of the military of economies and Soviet state, raising the level of the technical equipment of army, change in the ways of conducting the armed struggle was improved the organization of military forces. However, the general/common/total structure of the armed forces of the USSR remained in essence unchanged. Into their composition entered ground forces, the Air Force and the Naval Navy three of the form of the armed forces. In the course of war was designed one additional independent branch of the armed forces - National Air Defense Forces which occupied an important place in the military organization of socialist state.

In each of the branches of the armed forces occurred qualitative changes, was changed one way or another their organizational structure. A change in the proportion of different branches of the armed forces on the strength of their personnel shows the following table (in the percentages) ¹:

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 886. ENDFOOTNOTE.

CONCERN FOR THE FRONT-LINE SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES.



Pupils of the Suvorov and Nakhimov military schools awarded orders and medals for their participation in the Great Patriotic War.



In the dining room of the Suvorov military school (Orel, 1944).

(1) Виды Вооруженных Сил	(2) К началу войны	(3) К 1 июля 1943 г.	(4) К 1 января 1945 г.
Сухопутные войска (5)	80,7	87	83,4
Военно-воздушные силы (6)	8,7	5,7	7,1
Военно-Морской Флот (7)	7,3	3,8	4,8
Войска ПВО страны (8)	3,3	3,5	4,7

Key: (1). Branches of the armed forces. (2). At the beginning of war. (3). To 1 July 1943. (4). To 1 January, 1945. (5). Ground forces. (6). Air Force. (7). Navy. (8). National Air Defense Forces.

As can be seen from given data, the greatest proportion in the system of the armed forces of the USSR during the entire war fell in the share of ground forces.

Ground forces occupied the leading place and the armed forces of Fascist Germany, being approximately/exemplarily 72 percent of their entire strength in the beginning of war. In the second place was the Air Force and military forces of the air defense whose total proportion achieved 19 percent. Toward the end of 1944 the proportion of ground forces in the Hitler army somewhat was lowered with a simultaneous increase in the relative strength of other branches of the armed forces.

During the war to many Soviet troop formations and to units was

conferred the honorary guards rank into the sign of the acknowledgement of their particular combat services. At first this rank obtained some rifle/infantry and tank large units/formations, and then other units and large units/formations - air, artillery, etc. Guardsmen were the carriers of advanced combat experience, the most combat-effective and disciplined soldiers. Isolation/liberation from the composition of the linear military forces of choice units and large unit/formation was dictated by the fact that in the course of war frequently it was necessary to solve such complicated and crucial problems for execution of which were required particularly reliable in combat sense, better equipped and prepared military forces.

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One of the important problems of military construction in the years of struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors was the organization of the ordered system of auxiliary organs and services, which knew logistic support of an army in the field. Under war time for logistical agencies it was necessary to make exclusively complicated, colossal work. This is understandable: after all multimillion-man army, which conducts the combat operations of giant scope, continuously expends/consumes an enormous quantity of the most diverse technical equipment, armament, ammunition, fuel, and also

rations, clothing/uniform and different equipment. Entire military production, created for the needs of armed forces, should have been in proper time delivered to front and distributed between the numerous army formations in accordance not only with their daily needs, but also with operational-strategic plans of command element.

In order to solve this most difficult problem, was required the clear and mounted work of all rear installations of the Red Army. However, meanwhile the first weeks of war showed the unreality of pre-war detachments for the fact that the headquarters of operational formations and troop formations will manage the responsibility charged on them on the organization of the activity of rear services. The headquarters, handled by the decision of operational questions, proved to be unable to simultaneously lead the numerous administrative services and supply.

During August 1941 V. accordance with the resolution of the state committee of defense was begun the basic reorganization of the entire system of the rear of army in the field. The control of material, transport and medical support was centralized in the hands of the commander/chief of the rear of the Red Army, commanders/chiefs of the rears of fronts and army. Supply of front by artillery ones. Armored and engineering means it remained after the commanders/chiefs for the corresponding controls of the people's commissariat of

defense. But also these services were guided by the instructions of the commander/chief of the rear in questions of the organization of delivery and construction of the rear.

Together with the reorganization of entire system of the rear of the Red Army for TsK the party it was necessary from the military councils of fronts, armies and navies to increase the political support of activity of rear installations and services. On the instruction of TsK VKP(b) was instituted the special post of the member of military council for the rear, to the execution of this responsibility usually were assigned the secretaries of party organs of those regions where acted military forces. This contributed so that in the supply of material of an army actively participated the party and Soviet organs of frontal zone. In some logistical units and installations were created the political departments. Political organs of army formations began daily to inspect/check, as are maintained/served military forces, in proper time they receive supply.

The centralization of the control of the rear in the hands of competent/equal organs made it possible to create the ordered system of the uninterrupted supply of military forces. The commander/chief of the rear of the Red Army, having direct coupling with the Gosplan and the people's commissariats, in proper time brought to them claims

for the necessary forms of allowance. With questions of the supply of army during entire war dealt the deputy chairman of the council of peoples commissars of the USSR A. I. Mikoyan, who was simultaneously the member of the state committee of defense. To the leadership of the being satisfied organs of the Red Army were drawn many prominent workers of national economy.

An increase in the quantity of cargoes for the front, the mass inflow of replenishments into the field forces and the need for in connection with this producing large/coarse operational transportation - all this immeasurably raised role and significance of military transport service. The strength of railroad military forces continuously grew and to 1945 composed 253 thousand people. War accelerated the development of the new kind of special troops - automobile whose personnel achieved in the beginning of 1945 of 165 thousand people.

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Motor transport it made it possible for Soviet command element of more bending to maneuver with troop formations, technology and supplies, which had particularly important significance in the large-scale offensive operations when were carried out the great regroupings of forces. With the expansion of the activity of motor

transport increased the role of the service of road provision. The anew created road construction and maintainance troops of the Red Army, which counted toward the end of the war are more than 250 thousand people, they fulfilled enormous work on construction, restoration/reduction, repair and content of roads and bridges, organization and traffic control on them, maintenance/servicing of the passed military forces and transport.

Increased the role of the military medical service. During the years of war very it was important to reduce to a minimum mortality and disablement among the casualties, to ensure with wounded and patient all conditions for the rapid recovery. For the treatment of soldiers were drawn the best forces of Soviet medicine, which indicated close connection/bond of the civil/civilian organs of public health with the organs of the military medical service. The first months of war showed, however, that these organs, military and civil/civilian, were not prepared for the medical service of mass army, which conducts active combat operations. At the front were not sufficient the means of the evacuation of casualties, were not started in the necessary volume and therapeutic installations both in the frontal zone and in the rear. These deficiencies it was necessary to remove already in the course of war.

The saturation of the armed forces by varied and complicated

combat technology led to the fact that in comparison with the past wars the military forces bore considerably greater loss. Under these conditions medical forces and means were maximally approximating combat areas in order on the field of battle to directly render urgent aid by casualty. This considerably raised the effectiveness of the military medical service. In the First World War of casualties they did not treat with evacuation. But in the Red Army there was a system of the step by step treatment when evacuation and treatment they were inseparably connected. Our army in the field had available the powerful/thick net/system of field and stationary therapeutic installations. Light wounded were not evacuated into the deep rear and after 30-60 days returned to the line.

Together with the army, army and front medical installations in the course of war was started the net/system of therapeutic establishments in the rear. Narkomzdrav [- People's Commissariat of Public Health] and local Soviet organs devoted under the hospitals the best buildings, they provided with their armament. Treated soldiers the most qualified doctors. To the care of soldiers and by officers were drawn the wide circles of Soviet community. TsK VKP(b), which paid enormous attention to the treatment of wounded soldiers, created special committee under A. A. Andreev's chairmanship. Committee led organization of hospitals in the rear, rendering aid by their wounded and sick, cultural

maintenance/servicing.

In the First World War in the Russian army to the formation/order returned not more than 40-50 percent of wounded soldiers. In the Red Army because of the well fixed medical aid and the effective system of evacuation it was possible to considerably lower mortality and to decrease a quantity of invalids. The made the formation/order soldiers from a number of casualties were 73 percent¹.

FOOTNOTE¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 969. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, the system of the rear of army in the field, actually anew created already in the course of war, made it possible to solve all problems of the material, transport and medical support of our military forces.

War placed the Communist Party and Soviet government before the need for changing the organs of the highest military leadership. In advance this important question was not solved, in spite of the explicit threat of Fascist attack.

It is known that even in the period of civil war was created the ordered system of centralized control of all armed forces, at basis of which lay/rested the Leninist principle of collectiveness, combined with the individual responsibility of heads for carrying out of the collectively accepted decisions. This principle by and large was retained before the Great Patriotic War and in its course.

At the very beginning of war, on the second day after the attack of Fascist Germany, was formed the general headquarters of high command under the chairmanship of the national commissar of defense. However, the latter was not appointed as the commander-in-chief of all armed forces. The joint character of general headquarters indicates that it had to be collective organ of military leadership. But virtually general headquarters at first as staff did not work, especially as Peoples Commissar S. K. Timoshenko's defenses soon departed into the military forces, to the Smolensk direction/axis, where was developed large/coarse German offensive.

With I. V. Stalin's designation/purpose supreme commander-in-chief (on 8 August, 1941) the general headquarters was reorganized and into it together with the representatives of the armed forces were connected several members of state committee the

defenses. But also in this composition it did not become really collective organ. High military leadership was completely concentrated in Stalin's hands, who was simultaneously the national commissar of defense. The directives of general headquarters, as a rule, were asserted not by entire this organ, but only by Stalin they were fastened by the signature of chief of the General Staff.

The association/unification of leadership of military construction and by the strategic use of the armed forces in the hands of one person, which moreover, was the secretary general of TsK of the party, by the head of the government and with the chairman of the state committee of defense unquestionably provided the maximum centralization of the control of the country and by its armed forces, so/such necessary under the conditions of modern war. But this concentration of authority into some hands had its negative sides. It, in particular, frequently detained the decision of questions of military construction. However, the distribution of responsibilities among the numerous substituents (only as Peoples Commissar defense Stalin it had 16 substituents) it did not change positions, because to any of them it was not given the right to make final decisions on important questions.

This style of leadership in certain measure was explained by military need. However, it is known that V. I. Lenin, being the

chairman of the advice/council of worker-peasant defense, daily guided the activity of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic and Glavkom, but it did not diminish their laws/rights and responsibility for the work assigned to them. However, the style of military leadership, inherent to Stalin, although it was characterized by the necessary hardness and high exacting demand of the executors/performers, in practice frequently led to the depreciation of the laws/rights of the subordinates of the persons. True, these people, deeply realizing their responsibility before the party and the people for the responsibilities charged on them, not only fulfilled the will of supreme commander-in-chief. Constantly studying the experience of military construction, catching the initiative of the subordinate military organs, they placed before Supreme High Command many important questions and they strove their resolution. Beginning from the battle in Volga, characteristic for the activity of general headquarters became the method of the development of operational-strategic plans on the basis of the preliminary considerations of General Staff and propositions of the military councils of fronts. The majority of the directives of Peoples Commissar defense and Supreme High Command on questions of military construction was trained/prepared by General Staff, main and central divisions of the people's commissariat of defense. These directives were the fruit of collective, and not individual creativity.

Already the first weeks of war showed that under the changing conditions the volume of the work of General Staff in comparison with the pre-war years grew considerably, and its functions were complicated. Therefore by the decision of GKO General Staff at the end of July 1941 was reorganized. On the new situation, affirmed to the supreme commanders-in-chief on 10 August, 1941, the General Staff of NKO was renamed into the General Staff of the armed forces and became actually/really central organ for preparation/training and using these forces for the defense of the country.

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It united the main headquarters of the forms of the armed forces and arms of service and it led their activity. General Staff besides the development of directives and commands of Supreme High Command for the combat use of the armed forces controlled the execution of instructions of GKO and general headquarters.

The enormous need for the fastest generalization of the experience of war for the purpose of its putting into combat practice of military forces caused to the life special organs for the study of combat experience and the development of regulations and manuals.

Important role played the institute created in the course of war of the officers of the General Staff with the command element of fronts and armies, which operationally informed Supreme High Command about the execution of its directives and commands.

In the system of the People's commissariat of the defense of the USSR was created the main administration of formation and manning of the military forces of the Red Army (Glavuproform KA). It was occupied by the formation of reserves, by the preparation for carrier units for the acting army, were conducted the appeals of reservist. The organs of formation and manning were in the Air Force, in the Navy, and also in the artillery and the armored forces. Glavuproform conducted its of work in the close connection with the universal military training.

The organs of formation and universal military training made the great work thanks to which our armed forces during the entire war systematically was provided with combat reserves.

Leadership of the party-political work in the armed forces carried out main political administration of the Red Army and main political administration of the Navy, the parties worked on the laws/rights of the departments of central committee. The commanders/chiefs of these political organs were the members of TsK

VKP(b), and also the substituents of the national commissars of the defense and the Navy. On both these controls was assigned a mission to provide conducting into life the policy of the Party in the armed forces and to lead the education of Soviet soldiers in the spirit of the fulfillment by them of the sacred duty on the rout of enemy.

Great work in the region of military construction during the war performed military councils, which existed in ground forces, Navy, Air Force, National Air Defense Forces military forces and organs of the rear. They answered for formation and manning of their form of the armed forces and arms of service, for their timely and comprehensive combat training, the headquarters of the forms of the armed forces and arms of service also had the special organs which they studied and generalized combat experience and brought it to their military forces.

In accordance with the Leninist principles of military construction the one-man command in Soviet armed forces was combined during the war with the collectiveness of leadership of fronts and by armies, and also the Navies and the flotillas. On the military councils were assigned a mission, connected with the solution of many problems of national importance. In these organs entered experienced party workers, members and candidates into members in TsK VKP(b), the secretaries of TsK of the communist parties of the union republics,

territorial committees and regional committees VKP(b). The members of the military councils of fronts were constantly connected with the central committee of the party and the state committee of defense.

By the main things in the activity of military councils was leadership combat operations at the front. They bore the full responsibility before TsK VKP(b) of GKO and Supreme High Command for training of military forces, their morale and political awareness and logistic support. Military councils daily led also the work of political organs and party organizations. By them it let right decorate soldiers to government decorations/awards, award the officer rank.

With the introduction of a state of war to the country to military councils belonged full weight of authority in the territory of fronts and armies, in the areas of basing and activity of the Navies.

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When the military forces of the Red Army freed our native land from the Fascist aggressors and entered within the limits of other states, military councils adjusted correct interrelations with the local population, they worried about its food supply, it took measures to

that so that would be renewed the normal work of industrial enterprises, transport and trade and was restored/reduced law thus, military councils allotted themselves by wide laws/rights and appeared as the plenipotentiary representatives of state, party and government.

The members of military councils in every possible way contributed to strengthening the authority fronts commander-in-chief of forces, navies and armies, in any way without substituting their responsibility both those, and others were strictly demarcated, which increased the personal responsibility of each made it possible to operationally solve all urgent problems. Commanders of military forces as the chairmen of military councils, led their entire work.

The correct, Leninist understanding of the principle of management did not free/release sole commander from full weight of responsibility for the solutions adopted and their persistent conducting into the life. The collective manufacture of solution, finding the best routes/paths of its realization, constant aid to commander and the distribution of the responsible functions between the members of military council provided the success of leadership. In the military councils found the best embodiment the principle of the combination of military and party-political leadership with entire life and activity of the subordinates of military forces.

Thus, the missions of construction, combat and political training of the armed forces in the process of war directly accomplished both the military councils of fronts, navies and armies and numerous controls of General Staff, people's commissariats of the defense and the Navy.

By the insuperable force, which penetrates entire military organization of Soviet state, cementing to its imparting Soviet military forces indestructible moral cohesion, staying power/persistency and the indomitable fighting spirit, were army communists. They were always in the very sediment of soldier masses and therefore is found route/path to the heart of each soldier. Combining valor and courage with the military skill, communists by the sincere word and by a personal example carried along non-party members to the glorious heroic feats. In the most difficult sectors of combat operations the party sent its loyal sons. The masterful execution of the operations orders was firm party law for each communist.

Directly leading the entire activity of political organs, the party and Komsomol organizations of the army and navy, fortifying and reinforcing our their, party attained that they became the untiring

assistants to commanders in the education of military forces, in strengthening of military discipline, in the mobilization of all personnel for the execution of combat missions. Unity of goals and problems of military command element, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, common direction of their efforts/forces provided the success of the combat operations of military forces even under the most difficult conditions.

In this consists one of the basic Leninist principles of Soviet military organization. The structure of the armed forces of the USSR permitted implementation of an organic connection/bond between the command element, the headquarters, the political apparatus and the party organizations in the interests of the utter defeat of enemy.

4. Work of the organs of the national security.

Besides the military organization, which opposed the Fascist-German army, Soviet state had at its disposal organs of state security (NKVD, NKGB and the organs of military counterintelligence "will measure" ¹).

FOOTNOTE ¹. On the eve and in the beginning of the Great Patriotic War missions in providing of the national security of the USSR were accomplished by the People's commissariat of the national security

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
HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 86/22
1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV

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(NKGB) and by the organs of military counterintelligence NKO and NKVMF. During July 1941 all these organs were united with the People's commissariat of internal affairs (NKVD), and from April 1943 they once again became independent. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Their problem in the war years consisted of inflicting of damage/defeat first of all to powerful/thick Hitler reconnaissance/intelligence which conducted against the USSR unprecedented according to the scales and bitternesses secret war.

Even long before the beginning of the Second World War of Fascist Germany they created the enormous apparatus of the universal blasting activity whose point was directed, first of all, against the Soviet Union. Rout by Germany the number of the West European countries in 1939-1940 in many respects depended on the activities of its reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance organs. Relying on its numerous agencies, using sabotages, murders, bribery, blackmail, this organs seriously weakened/attenuated the resistance of the peoples of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Greece and helped the fascistization of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. On the certificate of German General P. Leverkyun, the supreme command of Fascist Germany already at the very beginning of

war with Poland were completely known the organization of Polish army, the plan of strategic deployment and other important information of military and military geographic character. But in the war with France the Fascist-German command element was possessed precise reconnaissance data about the grouping of French military forces and about the defensive installations available in enemy. During the operations/processes on the Balkans Hitler military intelligence successfully cooperated with Hungarian, Bulgarian and partially Rumanian reconnaissance/intelligence ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the results of the Second World War, page 270, 272-273. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Being prepared for the war against the USSR, Hitler Germany increased the organs of reconnaissance/intelligence and counterintelligence, enlarged even without that the considerable scales of espionage, noticeably activated/promoted other forms of blasting activity. thus, for instance a quantity of Fascist-German secret service agency thrown into the Soviet Union increased in 1940 in comparison with 1939 almost four times ².

FOOTNOTE ². IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18918, 1. 71. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The military-political government of Fascist Germany required from its reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance organs even to the attack in the USSR gathering the comprehensive information about the war potential of our country for planning the war as a whole, preparing in reconnaissance sense the first operations/processes on the rout of the Red Army.

However, in spite of thorough preparation/training and great scope by the secret of war against the USSR, for the Fascist-German reconnaissance/intelligence it was impossible to gather the necessary information about the military potential of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet organs of the national security, realizing those enormous possibilities, which was arranged the socialist state for the suppression of the demolition of enemy, as early as the pre-war years they brought the number of strikes/shocks on the secret service agency of imperialistic reconnaissance/intelligence within the USSR, including on the Fascist-German secret service agency. The same Lewerkuhn laments, that "Soviet Russia even prior to the beginning of war presented with respect to reconnaissance/intelligence especially difficult problem ..." '.

FOOTNOTE '. Results of the Second World War, page 273. ENDFOOTNOTE.

But German Major General Von Butlar writes: "the particular conditions, which existed in Russia, strongly interfered with the extraction of intelligence information relative to the war potential of the Soviet Union and therefore these data were far from complete ..."

FOOTNOTE *. World war. 1939-1945, page 151. ENDFOOTNOTE.

And nevertheless our organs of the national security did not know how in the necessary measure to clear the country from the Fascist-German spies and the saboteurs. The significant part of the Fascist secret service agency was rendered safe already in the course of war.

Struggle with the hostile secret service agency in the prewar years would give, it is doubtless, the more perceptible results, if the organs of state security were not converted into the gun of mass repressions. Occurred this because the control over organs from the side of the party and government was it was gradually substituted by its individual solutions.

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Situation even more greatly was complicated, when at the head of

the organs of state security proved to be the criminal band of Beria. Being covered by the authority of Stalin, this band eradicated State Security Agent traditions, destroyed honest people, was introduced into the activity of the organs of state security the spirit of groundless distrust and suspiciousness alien to them for Soviet people, it encouraged lawlessness and careerist tendencies. The anti-Soviet group of Beria is guilty in the violence with the best unit of the workers, who passed the glorious school of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. Were punished many thousand State Security Agents ¹, including of the key personnel, that appeared against the lawlessness and the arbitrariness.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18918, L. 70. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Among them I. A. Akulov, Ya. K. Berzin, Ye. G. Yevdokimov, M. S. Kedrov, Ya. K. Ol'skiy, Ya. Kh. Peters, S. V. Puzitskiy et al. This seriously weakened/attenuated the organs of state security.

On the eve war the organs of the national security, cooperating with other organs of Soviet reconnaissance/intelligence, knew how to extract very important intelligence information about the preparation of Germany for the attack in the USSR.

On 10 April, 1941, to Stalin was reported about Hitler's conversation with Yugoslavian prince Pavel, in which Fascist dictator stated about his decision to begin military actions against the USSR at the end of June ².

Ibid
FOOTNOTE ². ~~There~~, Inv. No 18917, 1. 29. ENDFOOTNOTE.

On 5 May, 1941, Stalin obtained new statement about the preparation of Germany for the war with the Soviet Union. "Military preparations in Warsaw and in the territory of Poland are conducted openly, it was indicated in the statement, and about the forthcoming war between Germany and Soviet Union German officers and soldiers speak completely frankly as about the work solved already. War must be begun after the termination of spring field works" ³.

Ibid
FOOTNOTE ³. ~~There~~, Inv. No 18937, L. 1. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During May 1941 to Stalin was transmitted the information, obtained from the Soviet scout of Richard Zorge, who was arranged to the service into the German embassy in Japan and who had the access to the materials about a Japanese-German cooperation. Zorge reported about the fact that Hitler decided to attack in the Soviet Union and for this purpose concentrated at the Soviet boundaries 150 divisions. The most valuable information, obtained from R. Zorge, contained the

general/common/total plan of war against the USSR and a precise date of the beginning of military activities '.

Ibid
FOOTNOTE *. ~~There~~, Inv. No 18918, L. 69. ENDFOOTNOTE.

On 6 June, 1941, to Stalin were seemed intelligence information about the concentration on the Soviet-German boundary of German and Rumanian military forces strength about 4 mln. soldiers and officers. on 11 June to it they reported. that German embassy in Moscow it obtained on 9 June from Berlin instruction be prepared for the evacuation during seven days and that in the basement room of embassy are burned the archive documents *. On 17 June, 1941, the organs of state security and the command element of border forces notified Stalin about the fact that the attack of Fascist Germany in the USSR will occur 21-22 June. However, Stalin did not take into consideration the information of the organs of the national security, just as statement. come from the organs of military intelligence and from other sources.

Since the beginning of Hitler aggression against the USSR the Fascist-German secret service agency obligated was to continuously supply its military command element of the data about the Soviet military forces, and also about the work of Soviet industry and transport. Furthermore, Hitler organs by the secret of war approached

via mass sabotages, insurgent actions, sabotage, terror and defeatist agitation to demoralize our rear and thereby to undermine the combat efficiency of Soviet military forces at the front.

For achievement of these goals the Hitlerites concentrated on the Soviet-German front more than 130 reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance organs, created about 60 special schools for training of secret service agency '.

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FOOTNOTE '. ~~These~~, 1. 87. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The basic cadres of spies and saboteurs Hitler reconnaissance/intelligence recruited from a number of bourgeois nationalists, and also from the traitors and the traitors of the native land, who passed to the side of enemy.

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In the rear of Soviet military forces was cast the enormous army of spies, saboteurs and terrorists. In 1941 a number of enemy agents, directed to the rear of the Red Army, grew in comparison with 1939 almost 14 times, in 1942 - 31 times, while in 1943 - 43 times '.

FOOTNOTE '. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of

Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18918, L. 71. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The spies thrown into the Soviet Union and saboteurs were supplied with weaponry, explosives, special means for the completion of terrorist acts, short-wave transceiver radio sets, ciphers, military and civil/civilian documents.

To 1944 and 1945 a quantity of hostile agents directed into our rear was shortened, but increased the level of their preparation/training. If in the beginning of war German reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance organs counted the use of the numerous, but poorly prepared secret service agency, then during the subsequent years were taken serious measures for increasing her qualification. This was explained by the fact that the Soviet counterintelligence exerted the successful opposition to intrigues of Hitler reconnaissance/intelligence.

After attack of Fascist Germany in the USSR of TsK VKP(b) and SNK bound the organs of state security to concentrate entire their attention in, showing/rendering of every possible aid to the Red Army in the rout of Hitler military forces, increasing the protection of the rear from the blasting activities of enemy, decisively annihilating spies, saboteurs and parachutists, carrying on a merciless struggle with the deserters, the panic mongers, the

spreaders of provocative hearing/rumors. For dealing with the parachute landing forces and the saboteurs of enemy on the initiative of TsK VKP(b) were formed the fighter battalions, which, acting under the operative management of the organs of state security, suppressed hostile intrigues in the front area.

Since the beginning of the war increased the effect of the military councils of fronts and army on the military counterintelligence. Party organs at the places, especially in the areas where was introduced a state of war, obtained the possibility to guide the activity of the organs of state security. They increased control of their work.

However, as a result of the criminal activity of the murderous group of Beria Soviet State Security Agents proved to be insufficiently prepared to the accomplishment of their missions under war time. Especially great difficulties fell to the lot of military counterintelligence and territorial organs of the state security of the western areas of the country, the zone of the most active blasting activity of enemy. The necessary instructions about the rebuilding of work in the case of war the organs of state security did not have, since in peacetime to this question it was not given proper attention. Immediately came to light the sharp/acute deficiency of State Security Agent cadres. All this led to the fact

that is direct in the zone of the combat operations of ground forces and in the frontal areas where Hitler reconnaissance/intelligence and counterintelligence concentrated their main efforts/forces, hardly ever in the first period of war it was possible to suppress an espionage-diversionary activity of enemy.

Thus, in the beginning of war German saboteurs destroyed a considerable quantity of lines of communications, which greatly hindered/hampered the command by troops. The absence of the reliably operating connection/bond with the military forces deprived the commanders and the headquarters of all degrees, up to the General Staff and the general headquarters of high command, possibility to receive reliable information about the situation at the front and about the state of its military forces. This led to the large/coarse errors in the leadership of military activities on the part of General Staff and front commanders. In some areas of the country German reconnaissance/intelligence organized the armed actions of nationalistic bands. In 1941-1942 it assembled the definite/determined data about the fighting strength, the movement and the grouping of Soviet military forces at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. However, greater Hitlerites achieve could not. In the course of war for Fascist reconnaissance/intelligence it was impossible to any seriously destroy the activity of the operational rear of the Red Army and rear of the country.

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During 1941-1942 the organs of the national security in essence eliminated the defects in their work, caused by unpreparedness for the struggle with the blasting activity of enemy. Beginning from second half of 1942 their opposition to Hitler reconnaissance/intelligence sharply it increased. Hostile secret service agency did not achieve goal, but the attempts to develop a diversionary-terrorist activity rapidly stopped themselves. In 1943 reconnaissance/intelligence of the enemy no longer could achieve any considerable success not only in the internal areas of the country, but also in the very zone of combat operations, although precisely in this year the Hitlerites threw into our rear the quantity of their agents greatest within the time of war. Almost this entire secret service agency was rendered harmless by organs and military forces of state security. In the subsequent time, up to the termination of war, espionage-diversionary and other blasting activity of enemy in the Soviet rear was paralyzed. For our State Security Agents it was possible to take or to rout several German reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance organs. The overwhelming majority of the hostile secret service agency was annihilated immediately after its throwing into the territory of the USSR. Thus, weaponry the secret of

war was solidly blunted, and then knocked out from the hands of the Fascist-German leaders.

By the basic unit of the blasting activity of enemy during the years of war was the Red Army. It suffices to say that for 1941 from the total number of German spies, saboteurs and terrorists, thrown in the USSR, 55 percent were headed directly into the zone of the combat operations of the Red Army, in 1942 their number was 54 percent, in 1943 - 53, in 1944 - 63 and in 1945 - 88 percent ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18918, L. 71.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

These numbers show that the main efforts/forces of Hitler reconnaissance/intelligence were concentrated on ensuring of in reconnaissance sense the combat operations of its military forces. In proportion to the build-up/growth of the failures of Hitler army Fascist reconnaissance/intelligence the center of gravity of its activity increasingly more transferred in the zone the combat ones of activities.

The high activity of German reconnaissance/intelligence at the front, the refinement of forms and methods of its work required from

the organs of our military counterintelligence of the enormous stress/voltage of forces in order to protect the Red Army from the spies, the saboteurs, the terrorists, the traitors and the traitors. In spite of the difficulty of situation, particular departments successfully managed their problem. This became possible only because of the fact that to struggle with the blasting activities of enemy constantly paid considerable attention command element, the political organs, the party and Komsomol organizations of Soviet military forces. In the zone of fronts was created the ordered system of the struggle with the spies and the saboteurs, in which the visible place was assigned, in particular, to military forces on the protection of the rear, the special regime and army measures.

In the rear of the country and in the frontal areas of enemy rendered safe the territorial organs of the national security. They successfully counteracted not only Hitler, but also Japanese reconnaissance/intelligence, or persistent attempts of the intelligence agencies of other capitalist states to create in the USSR wide espionage net/system. Were opened and stopped themselves attempts at the German secret service agency and anti-Soviet elements to organize diversionary Acts in the industry for the purpose of the disruption/separation of the issue of defense production. In all for the territorial organs of state security it was possible to come to light/detect/expose several thousand hostile agents, which had

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espionage, terrorist and other tasks/targets. Some agent-parachutists alone were delayed 1854 people, of them 556 with the radio sets ².

Ibid

FOOTNOTE ². ~~There~~, Inv. No 18917, L. 88. ENDFOOTNOTE.

end section.

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In the last war the Fascist-German reconnaissance/intelligence and counterintelligence gave considerable attention by numerous diversionary Acts systematically rendering inoperable of the most important railroad communications. Thus, during training of the military forces of North Western Front for the offensive for the purpose of the elimination of the Demyansk grouping of enemy German reconnaissance/intelligence threw into the rear of this front to 200 saboteurs who had to interrupt the movement of trains in the sectors Bologoye-Staraya Russa and Bologoye-Toropets. On the night of 17 October, 1944, in the rear of the 1st Ukrainian front between Lanovtsy and Karnachevka were committed immediately ten sabotages. Movement on this main pipeline paused itself until 22 October. However, as a whole to prevent the normal operation of our transport hostile reconnaissance/intelligence did not be able. In this the sizable services of the transport organs of state security.

Extensive work was carried out on cleaning German spies, saboteurs, terrorists and cooperated with occupationists traitors and

traitors of native land from liberated territory of USSR. Attempting to strengthen their rear, Hitlerites fierce reducing resistance of Soviet people, they spread in the villages and the cities secret agent net/system, they encouraged the creation of different anti-Soviet organizations. Established in the seized areas "new order/formation", fascists leaned on the White emigre rabble, and also on the bourgeois nationalists of all stripes. With their retreat the Hitlerites in haste recruited and they left in our rear new secret service agency, formed the armed bands, hammered together different vanguards and groups for espionage and sabotage against the Soviet military forces. However, with the aid of the local population the organs of state security successfully exposed Hitler hangers-on and rendered safe them. To what extent was clogged/contaminated by hostile elements the temporarily occupied territory of our country, is evident from the fact that is more than 60 percent of secret service agencts exposed during the years of war by the territorial organs of state security, it fell to the areas of the Soviet Union¹ former in the occupation.

FOOTNOTE¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18918, 1. 56.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Particular attention the Fascist-German counterintelligence

organs ("Abwehr," the Gestapo, the security service and others) were given to the struggle with the partisans. They attempted to send into their medium of their agents for the purpose of the decomposition/expansion of guerilla detachments from within, the annihilations of heads, collection of secret information for the rout of partisan formations, created phoney partisan vanguards which robbed and killed local residents in order to undermine the Soviet people have confidence in national avengers. In view of this for the workers of state security jointly with the party underground it was necessary to render great aid guerilla detachments in the struggle with the hostile secret service agency, and also in the assimilation of the receptions/methods of conspiracy and concealed/latent struggle with the enemy under the conditions of the most cruel occupational regime.

Without being limited to repulsion of the attacks of hostile reconnaissance/intelligence, the Soviet organs of the national security transferred struggle with it into the rear of the Fascist-German army. During the years of war an operational-combat work in the rear of enemy occupied in the activity of our State Security Agents the sufficiently considerable place and gave high results. Thousands of patriots conducted in the territory of enemy reconnaissance, organizational and diversionary work. From them came the most diverse information about disposition and troop movement of

enemy, and also about his operational plans.

For example, on 17 June, 1942, the group of courageous State Security Agents, who were being found under M. S. Prudnikov's guidance, rapidly crossed into Moscow from the Fascist-German rear 23 top secret German maps/charts/cards with the operational situation plotted/applied on them. In the spring of 1943 the State Security Agent group of "Victors," which acted in the rear of enemy, is daring to extract information about the transportation by the Hitlerites of several infantry and tank divisions from France, Africa, also, from under Leningrad to the Kursk direction/axis.

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During May of the same year the operations group of the organs of state security seized in the rear of enemy the officer of the intelligence branch of air force headquarters army group "center", which gave exclusively valuable readings/indications about preparation/training by the German command element of large/coarse offensive in the area of Kursk projection ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18918, 1. 21.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the difficult days of the war when was begun battle for Moscow, Richard Sorge his friends reported that Japan is prepared for the war on Pacific Ocean and soon he will not complete attack in the USSR. This made it possible to move the unit of the Soviet divisions from the Far East in the environs of Moscow, where the Hitler army suffered its first large/coarse damage/defeat.

This type of reconnaissance information had enormous significance for the command element of the Red Army.

Acting in the rear of enemy, Soviet State Security Agents penetrated his intelligence and counterintelligence organs, were revealed/detected the plans of their subversive activity against the USSR, was set enemy secret service agency, prepared for drops into our rear. Only the operations groups NKGB of BSSR within the time of determination in the rear of enemy came to light/detected/exposed 22 intelligence and sabotage schools "Abwehr," 36 residents and 6642 agents of the Fascist-German reconnaissance/intelligence '.

FOOTNOTE '. There, 1. 54. ENDFOOTNOTE.

As a result of the work of the organs of state security the activity

of some reconnaissance schools of enemy as, for example, Breitenfurth (near Vienna), where were prepared agents for dropping into the deep areas of our country, was completely paralyzed, which forced Hitlerites to cover these schools.

The colleagues of state security penetrated in German intelligence agency "Abwehr Command-103," which carried out demolition on Moscow direction/axis, and extracted data on 127 agents of German reconnaissance/intelligence, prepared to the transportation or moved to our rear '.

FOOTNOTE '. There, 1. 72. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The given examples are far from being the only ones.

It should be noted that in the work of the organs of state security in the rear of enemy were many serious deficiencies. This work was initiated with the great delay and it was properly developed only in 1943. In a number of cases it was organized in a hurry and did not give proper results. There was no clear coordination between different organs of state security, or between them and military intelligence.

Much did during the years of the Great Patriotic War the organs

of state security for misleading enemy. In their practice were frequent the cases when Fascist spies sent into our country, whereas being found from the first days under the indefatigable observation of the workers of state security, soon were arrested also from their name periodically was transmitted dummy information by the questions, which interest Hitler reconnaissance/intelligence. Thus it happened, for example, with two German scouts, who arrived in Moscow during October 1942. After their arrest the colleagues of state security supported the constant radio communication with the enemy, which continued until May 1945. In the course this prolonged and of complicated "game" were arrested the 12 additional agents of Fascist reconnaissance/intelligence '.

FOOTNOTE '. *Ibid.* inv. No 18917, sheets 111-112. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The organs of state security, acting in the close contact with the General Staff of the Red Army and using different operational possibilities, systematically led enemy into deception relative to the plans of Soviet command element, troop movement, situation in the rear. Thus, in the period from 1 May through 1 August, 1942, to German reconnaissance/intelligence was transmitted the dummy information about the concentration in the different directions/axes of 255 rifle divisions, 3 tank armies, 6 armored corps, 53 tank brigades. of 80 artillery regiments, 6 cavalry divisions and 3 army

headquarters. During January 1943 Hitler reconnaissance/intelligence obtained the disinformation information about the formation in the city Gor'kiy of standby army, and also about the unloading in the northern ports of 1300 aircraft and 2 thousand it was such. In order to contain the forces of enemy on the north, to it were transmitted disinformation materials about the concentration of our military forces at the Karelian Front.

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From end 1941 through May 1943 for the transmission to the enemy of dummy data were used 80 radio sets of German secret service agency, seized by the organs of state security in our rear ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18934, 1. 1. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the struggle with the blasting activity of enemy the organs of state security leaned on the aid of frontier and internal military forces. Soviet border guards covered themselves with the unfading glory in combat with the Hitler hordes on the boundary. Together with the units of internal military forces they made a sizable contribution to the struggle with the blasting activities of enemy both in the front area and in the rear of the country. For entire

elongation/extent of the state boundary, not encompassed by the fire of war, our border guards day and night bore combat watch, suppressing the attempts of the hostile scouts to penetrate to the territory of the USSR.

During the years of war under the guidance of the organs of state security acted the special troops of connection/bond. On them was assigned a mission of ensuring with firm closed telephone communication of the heads of the party and government, General Headquarters of the Supreme Command with the fronts and with armies. Under difficult conditions of combat situation the signalmen of the organs of state security selflessly built constant air ones to cable lines, ably suppressed the attempts of the hostile saboteurs to destroy their work, frequently they entered in unequal combat with the subunits of enemy. From Volga coasts to Berlin and Vienna, from the Far-Eastern borders of the USSR to Port Arthur and Pyongyang passed soldier-State Security Agents, setting up special communication. Within the period of the Great Patriotic War they constructed and restored/reduced tens of thousands of kilometers of the constant lines of communications, thanks to which all fronts and armies were reliably connected with the heart of our with native land-Moscow. CC VKP(b), Soviet government, the prominent military leaders of the Red Army highly evaluated the operations of special troops of connection/bond in the combat operations at the fronts of

patriotic war.

The military situation, the terrible danger, which hung over above our country, seriously influenced the work of the organs of state security. Cruel, irreconcilable struggle with Hitler Germany subordinated to its requirements entire their activity.

One cannot fail to note that the main burden of struggle with the blasting activity of enemy during the years of war carried out particular departments of army associations/unifications and large units/formations, republican, territorial, regional and district equipment of the organs of state security, or Soviet State Security Agents, who acted in the rear of enemy. Led by party organizations, by political organs and by the military councils of fronts and armies, actively supported by the Soviet people, they by their selfless work considerably decreased the harmful consequences of errors and conscious bendings, allowed by the guidance of the organs of state security of those days in questions of struggle with the intrigues of Hitlerites.

The work of the organs of the state security of fronts and Navies, republics, territories and regions successfully led such State Security Agents, as I. A. Akhmerov, L. F. Galkin, I. S. Gudkov, Ya. A. Yedunov, N. I. Zheleznikov, V. M. Zarubin, B. G. Kumm, A. N.

Mikheyev, M. F. Orlov, D. G. Fedichkin, N. G. Khannikov et al.

The Great Patriotic War was severe testing for the Soviet organs of the national security. Was inspected/checked their capability to carry on a struggle with the mass, not preceded according to its scales and bitternesses, by the blasting activity of experimental and insidious enemy. Were felt the devotion of Soviet State Security Agents to their socialist native land, their courage and staying power/persistency, their skill. The overwhelming majority of the workers of state security these tests maintained/withstood.

By high price paid the Soviet people for the errors and the bendings in the work of the organs of state security which were the consequence of the personality cult of Stalin and criminal activity of the treacherous group of Beria. However, the fact that these organs knew how under the leadership of the party and with the support of all people to carry out their missions, is one additional certificate of the insuperable force of Soviet formation/order.

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For disrupting/separating the Hitler plans by the secret of war decisive importance had those enormous socialist conversions which were realized in the USSR in the pre-war years, and also the measures

of the communist party and Soviet government for strengthening of the safety of our native land. Fascist reconnaissance/intelligence did not find in the Soviet Union of social support for its blasting activity. All intrigues of Hitler secret service agency were divided/marked off against enduring/permanent political-moral unity of the Soviet people, its selfless devotion to their native land and high revolutionary vigilance.

During the severe years of the Great Patriotic War the political formation/order of the Soviet Union maintained/withstood historical examination. Although for Hitler state it was possible by bribery, by corruption and by deception to draw to its side the significant part of the German people for the realization of the aggressive plans of German imperialism, Fascist political formation/order did not maintain/withstand testing in the war with the Soviet state and suffered complete break-up. The military vehicle of German imperialism proved to be unable to prolongedly oppose the armed forces of the Soviet Union and it was broken. The at the same time political formation/order of the USSR, created under leadership of the Communist Party by the Soviet people, demonstrated its durability/permanence even under the conditions of heaviest of all wars such as sometimes knew history. The armed forces of the USSR with the honor shielded the great gains of the October Socialist Revolution.

In the course of postwar development Soviet political formation/order, and also class and national relations of our society acquired the new features which even more greatly increased the advantages of the USSR over the imperialistic countries.

In the period between the XX and XXII Congresses of CPSU was completed the process of the overgrowing of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the people's state. Soviet state became the organ, which expresses interests and will of all people - working class, collective farm peasantry, intelligentsia. In this socialist people's state the working class retains its situation of the quite foremost, organized force of Soviet society. However, the present leading role of working class differs from his role in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat - now it no longer has a character of class supremacy.

Further development of national relations on the routes/paths of fraternal mutual assistance and rapprochement of nations even more greatly strengthens the friendship of the Soviet peoples - one of the basic bases of our political formation/order.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state worry about the

comprehensive development of economy and culture of all our and the nationalities of our country, they carry on an irreconcilable struggle against any manifestations and vestiges of nationalism and chauvinism, they contribute the culture of each nation increasingly more would be enriching in the creations, which have international character. The party and the Soviet state pay particular attention to further mutual enrichment and to the rapprochement of national cultures, to strengthening their international basis.

"Comprehensive deployment and the improvement of socialist democracy, the active participation of all citizens in the control by state, in the guidance of economic and cultural construction, an improvement in the work of state apparatus and reinforcing of national control over its activity - such main trend in development of socialist statemanship in the period of the building of communism"¹, is said in the program CPSU.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Program of CPSU, p 101. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Socialist people's state is the main gun with the aid of which the Soviet people builds communism.

It is intended to set up the material and technical base of communism, to convert socialist relations into the Communist ones, to monitor the measure for labor/work and consumption, to increase the welfare of the people, to protect law/right and the freedom of Soviet citizens, socialist law and socialist property/ownership. Soviet state concentrates its attention on henceforth bringing up of national masses in the spirit conscious discipline and Communist relation to the labor/work, reliably providing defense and safety of the country, developing fraternal cooperation with the socialist countries, struggling for the celebration of the policy of peaceful coexistence, for the universal peace.

In the process of the started building of communism rises the role of public organizations. Especially grow/rise the significance of the trade unions as the schools of the control of state, the schools of management, school of communism. Rises the role of the Young Communist League. This amateurish public organization is intended to even more and initiative help the party to bring up young generation in the harm of communism, to involve young people into the construction of new society. Will be improved all forms of cooperation and other public unions of laborers, most important goal of which are every possible development of labor competition, increase in the activity of national masses in the building of communism.

The building of communism in the Soviet Union our party considers as the composite/compound component part of the creation of Communist society in all countries of socialist system. Soviet people solve problems of the building of Communism in the friendly family of the socialist peoples, united under the commonality of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, their basic interests and goals. Fraternal mutual assistance and cooperation between the socialist bloc countries lead to raising and strengthening of entire world socialist system. Therefore the economy of world socialism advances with rapid and firm rates.

Improving the work of Soviet state organs, cementing the inviolable alliance of socialist states, the party and entire our people will is as before untiringly secure the defense of the USSR, increase vigilance with respect to imperialistic aggressors.

Page 143. Chapter Four.

THE TRIUMPH OF SOVIET SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY.

1. Strengthening socialist ideology in the consciousness of the Soviet people.

The Great Patriotic War showed the world not only the might of economic bases and political formation/order of the Soviet Union, but also the unusual force of socialist ideas. For the length of military years went the bitter struggle of two in principle opposite ideologies - socialist and Fascist. Triumphed the ideology of socialism - spiritual weaponry of the Soviet people, the working class and laborers of the masses of all world. However, the ideology of fascism - the spiritual weaponry of the most aggressive circles of monopolist capital, most frantic international reaction - suffered break-up.

Fundamental importance for the rout of Fascist Germany had the fact that in the period between the great October Revolution and the Great Patriotic War in our country as a result of basic social and economic changes the socialist ideology solidly took root in the consciousness of Soviet people. This occurred because of the fact

that by their mind, by will and energy under the guidance of the Communist Party constructed socialism.

What views, ideas did become the property of the Soviet people for two and the more of decade, during which did grow new generation? These were, first of all, the socio-political views of the Leninist party, the foremost ideas about the valid construction of society. For the length of centuries ripened these ideas in the medium of the oppressed and operable masses, which dreamed about the worthy of man existence, about the happy life. The progressive teachings of past times included prerequisites/premises, grains of these views, ideas. But for the first time they obtained the completed, scientific expression in Marxism-Leninism, which is the international ideology of struggle for the complete conversion of social order on Communist principles.

The socio-political ideas of Marxism-Leninism are majestic and daring.

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They contribute to the annihilation of exploitation and national oppression, to the bloom of free creative labor/work, to setting fraternal cooperation between the workers and the peasants, to the

friendship of the peoples, to the defense of the socialist fatherland from imperialistic aggression, to every possible development of the international solidarity of laborers, to struggle for a lasting peace on the earth/ground, to the formation of socialism, and then communism. These ideas, as if powerful appeals, serve as guide to action for the laborers of all world, and in Soviet Russia after the great October Revolution, which placed in authority the proletariat, they became the giant material force, invincible as very course of history.

The Soviet people received the socio-political ideas of Marxism-Leninism, first of all, because in them directly they were reflected necessary to the need of working class and all laborers, were clear and clearly formulated their basic goals and final goal in the struggle for the best life. These ideas of our party, which compose the content of its policy, masses estimated as their own strivings.

The process of the perception of socio-political ideas occurred not spontaneously, but under the guiding influence of the Communist Party, with the increasing scope of its ideological work. "The deeper the conversion which we want to produce, taught V. I. Lenin, the more necessary it is to raise interest in it and conscious attitude, to convince of this need new and new million and tens of millions" ¹.

FOOTNOTE 1. V. I. Lenin. Works, vol. 31, p 467. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Very important role played the circumstance that in the struggle for the formation of socialism the party ideologically exposed "left" communists, Trotskyites, right opportunists, national-deviationists and other antiparty groups, which were attempting to poison the consciousness of Soviet people by the poison of disbelief by our own forces, by the poison of defeatism.

But accordance of the socio-political ideas of Marxism-Leninism to the basic interests of masses and daily ideological work of the party was still insufficient so that the political consciousness would become distinctive features of the overwhelming majority of the laborers of our country. It was necessary so that in the class struggle against the internal and external enemies of socialism laborers would acquire our own political experience. This experience of mass obtained with the conquest of authority, in the years of civil war and restoration/reduction of national economy, in the process of the industrialization of the country, the collectivizations of agriculture and cultural revolution, in the course of successful overcoming of all possible difficulties which were incredibly complicated by hostile capitalist encirclement.

Completely justified Marx's foresight, who considered that the Socialist Revolution will be the improbably complicated and agonizing process of the dying of old and birth of the new social system, new structure of life of tens of millions of people.

Especially important significance for strengthening of socialist ideology had the experience of the successful resolution of a national question on the basis of the correct national policy of the Communist Party. Exploiter classes infected the consciousness of masses by great-power chauvinism, and by local nationalism. These classes were vitally interested in kindling of international dissension and hatred, that disconnect and weakening laborers. In the bitter struggle against the landowners and the capitalists of different nations Lenin educated the laborers of mass in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. This struggle was completed by the elimination of exploiters and exploitation, repossessed and was tempered a feeling of fraternal unity and cohesion of all working people independent of their nationality.

But

unceasing struggle with the hostile capitalist encirclement, struggle in all its forms - military nonmilitary - led to the fact that millions of Soviet people solidly mastered the Leninist truth: "Capital is force international.

THE MEMORY OF HEROES LIVES IN THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE.




The defenders of the Brest fortress carry their battle flag like a sacred object (Brest, 1961).



Memorial plaque at the legendary Pavlov House in Volgograd.

KEY: (1) Pavlov's House - foremost bastion of defense. During September-November 1942, this house was heroically defended under the command of Sergeant Pavlov by a

group of soldiers of the 13th Guard Rifle Division.



Austria. Opening of monument to Hero of the Soviet Union General-Lieutenant D. M. Karbyshev at the former Nazi concentration camp Mauthausen (May 1963).



Monument erected in Krasnodon in memory of the heroic feats of the young guard members.

At the monument to the brave partisan, Heroine of the Soviet Union Zoye Kosmodem'yanskoy at the village of Petrushchevo, Moscow Oblast'.



At the home of Hero of the Soviet Union N. F. Gastello. Monument to the esteemed pilot in Rodoshkovichakh, Minsk Oblast'.



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

At the monument to nine Heroes of the Soviet Union - soldiers from seven different nationalities of the USSR (Ludza, Latviyskaya SSR).



Monument to Nazi victims near the city of Tartu (Estonskaya SSR).




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Top left: Memorial to soldiers of the 89th Armenian Rifle Division who died to free Sevastopol'.

Top Right: Memorial to soldiers of the 414th Gruzinsk Rifle Division who perished in battles to free Sevastopol'.



Memorial monument to victims of the Nazis in the region of the village of Trostenets (Minsk Oblast').

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In order it to conquer, are necessary the international alliance of workers, their international brotherhood" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, vol. 30, p 268. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus were strengthened a feeling of proletarian internationalism, a feeling of the international solidarity of laborers.

Formations/orders socialism, working people of the Soviet Union radically changed reality itself change for the better. The political consciousness of workers, and then peasants got rid of the inheritance of old representations and raised to the unprecedented of height/altitude. This fortified the Soviet state, which, as emphasized V. I. Lenin, it is strong by the consciousness of masses ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See V. I. Lenin. Works vol. 26, p 224. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, during almost fourth of century the large strata of the laborers of the USSR deeply perceived the socio-political ideas of the Communist Party, which were being successfully realized. Got stronger the capability of the multimillion-strong masses to overcome

any difficulties in the struggle for the communism. The devotion of the people to their socialist fatherland, confidence in the native party they became firm. Was formed the ideopolitical unity of the Soviet multinational society, inherent feature of which is the friendship of the peoples.

The political consciousness of Soviet people played the leading role in the complicated and the prolonged the process of the alteration of other regions of public consciousness. Under its powerful influence were reformed/redisposed morals and even psychology of Soviet people, i.e., their daily, ordinary, customary views, feelings and moods. It is necessary in this case to consider this objective factor as socialist production relations. Collective labor/work for the good of society was in the prewar years the determining material condition of the alteration of morals and public psychology.

In our country for the first time in the history occurred the elimination of quotient and setting public ownership of the means of production both in the city and in the village. Prevailed the comradely cooperation inherent in socialism and the mutual assistance of off-duty toilers, who participate in the production with the goal of ever more complete satisfaction of the growing needs of the Soviet people, Soviet society.

On this basis radically changed the character of labor/work. From the heavy and the unfree, what labor/work was under capitalism, it became free and creative. This is why in our country became substantially different view on the labor/work. Certificate to that was the socialist competition which assumed the forms of Communist subbotniks in the years of civil war, shock work - in the 20's and of Stakhanov movement - in the 30's. For the length of long years was worked out conscious, voluntary discipline of socialist labor/work, reinforced by material interest. Were discovered inexhaustible sources of the creative energy, enthusiasm, innovating, the initiative of the people. The history of humanity yet did not know so mass labor a heroism and labor valor. Was washed away the ground, which supplied bourgeois morals and private-property public psychology. Simultaneously was discovered wide route/path for the development of Communist morals and new public psychology - psychology of collectivism.

This deep historical process only the genius of V. I. Lenin could see in the embryonic form itself - in the organization of Communist Saturdays. Vladimir Ilyich estimated these subbotniks exclusively highly as great initiative as the "beginning of revolution, more difficult, more essential, more basic, that more

deciding than the over-throw of the bourgeoisie, since this is a victory over our own inertia, disorderliness, petty-bourgeois selfishness, above these habits which cursed capitalism is left into the inheritance to worker and peasant" 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. V. I. Lenin. Works, vol. 29, p 379. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Soviet socialist morals and new public psychology took root in the consciousness of the masses as a result of the prolonged experience of class struggle and many years of participation in the socialist labor/work. The economic structure of socialism annihilates the antagonism between the personal and public interests, characteristic for the bourgeois economic formation/order. Under socialism personal and public interests are located in the correct combination, they do not eliminate, but they supplement each other. This is why in the course of socialist construction continuously were developed such completely new phenomena, as a feeling of the responsibility of masses for common cause, a feeling of the master of the country, the concern of simple people about the interests of their plant, kolkhoz, their state. A little more than in two decades public interest substantially changed old psychology and morals of people, after finding expression in a new moral feature -

consciousness and a feeling of public duty. Thus, together with the ideopolitical unity and under its constant influence was formed also moral unity of the Soviet people. In connection with this on the basis of the victory of socialism was affirmed in its socialist quality the Soviet patriotism, which possesses enormous historical advantages in comparison with the patriotism of past times.

Soviet patriotism - a very deep public feeling of love for it is socialist the native land and the hatred for all its enemies, one of the most important indices of the ideological conviction of our people in the rightness of that work, for which it struggles. Soviet patriotism is the complicated result of influence on the consciousness and conduct of tens of millions of Soviet people, on one hand, our social system and the practice of its creation, and on the other hand - the socio-political views of the party, new morals and new public psychology. The main motive by which is guided the Communist Party in its activity - piously to observe and above in all to place the interests of the Soviet fatherland, became the basic stimulation of the activity of working class, collective farm peasantry, national intelligentsia, which unanimously support the policy of the party and government. Meanwhile with the bourgeois formation/order the patriotism of different classes (capitalists, workers, peasants) was heterogeneous even when this formation/order ripened in the interiors of feudalism and when it went in the line of

ascent of development.

Our patriotism is alien any manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism, it contributes to the inviolable fraternal unity of all nations of the USSR. Strengthening the friendship of the peoples, education of Soviet people in the spirit of the Leninist principles of the national policy, setting connections/bonds with the world liberation movement of the proletariat and oppressed peoples contributed to ever deeper penetration into the masses of the idea of the indivisibility of national and international goals in the struggle for socialism. Soviet patriotism is not separated from socialist internationalism, organically is encompassed a feeling of proletarian solidarity with the laborers of all countries. However, the patriotism of past times was not free from the chauvinism due to supremacy of the private property, which cleaved people into the irreconcilable hostile classes, to hostile states, nationality and nation.

Soviet patriotism is expressed in the concrete/specific/actual works, and, first of all, in readiness of the people by breast to rise to the defense of the socialist fatherland. It beneficially acts also on the remaining sides of public life, including to the field of production, waking up mass labor enthusiasm, is hotter the tendency untiringly to work in the name of sublimity and glory of its native

land. The historical limitedness of the patriotism of the past consisted also of the fact that it could not any noticeably affect the sphere of production furthermore due to supremacy of private property and exploitation of man by man.

The national character of Soviet patriotism testifies about the basic alteration of the spiritual appearance of the population of the whole country, about the unprecedented depth and the latitude of the effect of socialist ideology on the masses. Possessing hugest internal force, patriotism sets in motion mind, feelings, will, entire spiritual peace of Soviet person and directs his efforts, its activity for the good, thriving and defense of the socialist native land.

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Soviet patriotism - source of the disinterested self-rejection, which reaches the self-sacrifice. It is organically-bound with the heroic traditions of the national masses of past historical epochs. In it are laid the great revolutionary traditions of civil war. Characterizing the patriotism of the period of the civil war, V. I. Lenin said that this was the authentic "revolutionary patriotism" of Soviet laborers of masses, which they preferred "better three years starve how give Russia to foreigners", and it emphasized that

"without this patriotism we would not attain the defense of the Soviet Republic ..." ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biography. publ. 2, M., Gospolitizdat, 1963, p 519. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Enormous role in the process of the alteration of the public consciousness of masses played cultural revolution. The party and the people, being guided by the instructions of V. I. Lenin that illiterate stands outside politics, that cannot be constructed socialism without the vast and deep conversions in the region of culture and education, extended truly titanic efforts/forces for overcoming the terrible legacy of the past - illiteracy and the ignorance, for every possible development of science and technology. These majestic goals it was possible to solve within the historically compressed periods. Especially impressive were changes in the sister union and autonomous republics, which earlier were the colonies of tsarism.

On the eve the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union became the country of universal literacy. In the USSR occurred the emancipation of women, was undermined the adverse effect of religious prejudices on the masses. Continuously rose formation and cultural-professional level of the large strata of population. In the

country was formed socialist intelligentsia from the workers and the peasants, appeared new cadres in all regions of public activity, including military. From the dark/nonluminous ones and those oppressed with the old formation/order many millions of laborers grew into conscious builders of socialism, active participants for the state control.

Thus, the confirmation/assertion of socialist ideology in the Soviet country signified by itself the fact of exceptional importance, namely: the new spiritual forces of the Soviet people - political consciousness, socialist morals, psychology of collectivism, Soviet patriotism and internationalism, formation and culture - not only grew and got stronger, but also they became its enduring/permanent support, capable of maintaining/withstanding serious tests.

Nevertheless cannot be forgotten that the socialist society, as indicated K. Marx, "in every respect, in the economic, the moral and the mental, retains the still birthmarks of the old society interiors of which it came out" ².

FOOTNOTE ². K. Marx and F. Engels. Works, vol. 19, p 18. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Under socialism perceptibly they give itself to know the vestiges of

capitalism in consciousness and conduct of people. Among these of vestiges most tenacious and dangerous are the remainders/residues of old public psychology, which facilitate the retention/preservation/maintaining all other prejudices of the past. Specifically, in it, in old public psychology, was saved the heaviest latent cargo of especially individualistic, decomposing/expanding the human soul self-interested habits and traditions which were created with centuries-old supremacy of particular their own and therefore most difficultly they yield to overcoming.

Great jamming/interference during the confirmation/assertion of socialist ideology in the consciousness of the Soviet people was the personality cult of Stalin. Alien to Marxism-Leninism, to the Soviet form of life, personality cult in the ideological region was expressed, first of all, in the fact that Stalin's role as head was exaggerated, and the role of the people and party was understated. In the contradiction with the interests of the construction of socialism to Soviet people inspired by the false notion that all achievements of the people are provided by reason and will of leader. This decreased initiative and activity of masses.

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Under the conditions of personality cult were violated the norms of

new morals, won acceptance splendour and conceit. All this was incompatible with the high ideals of communism, is exerted negative influence on social consciousness. However, there was detrimentally the effect of personality cult, it could not stop the process of the basic alteration of the spiritual appearance of the Soviet people, generated by the objective laws of socialism and directed by our party.

The conversion of socialist ideology into that dominating did not completely mean that all Soviet people conformed their activities and conduct only to its requirements. New consciousness repossessed above the old; however, the latter was extruded/excluded far from completely and it continued to have an adverse effect on the Soviet people. Hostile elements within the country went to everything in order to support and to ignite in its interests the most diverse manifestations of political irresponsibleness (especially nationalistic prejudices), and also bourgeois morals and old public psychology. Our imperialistic enemies constantly waged against the USSR ideological war for the purpose to maximally weaken/attenuate the Soviet Union in the ideopolitical and moral sense.

Most hostile with respect to the socialist ideology became in the pre-war years the most reactionary and most dangerous variety of the bourgeois ideology - Fascist ideology. Its feed ground were the

economy and the policy of imperialism, conditions of the general crisis of capitalist system. It is no accident that Fascist ideology absorbed into itself inhuman, savage views and teachings of previous reactionary philosophers, politicians, racial leaders or prussian-cadet heralds of militarism and aggression. The randomly most impudent and inveterate ideologists of fascism raised German monopolist capital after its first failure in the struggle for the repartition/conversion of the world, i.e., after damage/defeat in the imperialist war 1914-1918.

The ideology of German fascism was penetrated by the tendency of the exploiter classes of Germany unleash and to win the Second World War for the purpose of setting its world supremacy. Based on this, fascists attempted by any ideological contrivances to justify the cruel repression of revolutionary and democratic movement within the country in order to make the German people the blind gun of the policy of capitalist monopolies. Fascists attempted by the means of ideological deception to support their criminal intention to take and to rob the so-called eastern earth/ground and to, first of all, eliminate the Soviet Union as the stronghold of socialism, democracy and world as the stronghold of international proletarian and national liberation movement. To fascists it was necessary to ideologically justify rout and deprivation of the national independence of those imperialistic states, which were undesirable competitors, and to also

base setting in all subjugated countries of "new order/formation", i.e., the regime of the merciless exploitation of masses, their most cruel repression and destruction.

This is why in the ideology of German fascism tightly were interwoven extreme chauvinism and racism with the frantic anticommunism, the utterly reactionary theory of "lebensraum" and the glorification of fighter war with the propaganda of the predatory idea of military profit and most shameless demagogy.

Fulfilling the will of their masters, Hitlerites in every way possible ignited revanchist passions, without stopping in this case before the falsification of history. With the special zeal they supported legend about the fact that the German army in the First World War was broken not in the field of battle, but it was defeated "due to the strike/shock by the dagger into the back", which supposedly would bring to it the revolutionary rear during November 1918.

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This "theory", on one hand, reinforced myth about the invincibility of German army, gave hope for gain in the Second World War, and on the other hand - it concealed anti-Communist sting, was created pretext for the bloody of violence with the Communist Party of Germany and the progressive political organizations. In order to justify the fierce terror, directed toward the repression of antifascist forces in the country, Hitler as maniac, it reiterated about the fact that November of 1918 no longer will be repeated.

And in foreign policy Fascist of cry was guided by revanchism and anticommunism.

Under the flag of anticommunism hammered together itself a common anti-Soviet front of imperialistic states, which was prepared war against the peoples of the USSR. Hitler always emphasized the ideological aspect of the "approaching conflict", i.e., attack in the Soviet Union.

The hatred for the communism, instilled in population persistent slander about the Soviet formation/order, about policy and goals of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had to become according to the concept of Fascist guidance of that ideological spring which will push the deceived German people for the route/path of thoughtless implementation of the aggressive plans of German imperialism, first of all to the route/path of war against the Soviet Union.

No less important element of Fascist ideology was extreme chauvinism and its colonialist variety - racism, which was the official state teaching of the "third empire". The unscientific theory of chauvinism and racism arbitrarily divides humanity into the "highest" and "lowest" nations and races; the designation/purpose of the latter - to be in the perpetual servitude in the "highest" nation or race. Being based on this fabrication, Hitlerites intensely inoculated to all Germans extremely reactionary chauvinistic and racist idea about that, as if Germany above in all, and Germans even within the white race present the highest human type, the particular race of gentlemen which must subordinate to itself other peoples by the force of weaponry.

It is known that the Nazis with the fierce hatred related to the Slavs. In particular, Russians they depicted as the people, deprived of state capabilities, and widely spread absurd thought about the

fact that for this very reason the USSR goes to its unavoidable break-up which must be accelerated by military interference of Germany. After subjugating Russia, asserted Hitlerites, Germans, as the best representatives of white race, will become there absolute masters and will obtain the innumerable riches.

Together with the chauvinism and the racial theory, that proclaimed right Germans to build their prosperity on the bones of all remaining peoples, the Hitlerites used the theory of "lebensraum". To it especially frequently and willingly resorted Fascist top. This theory is included in pseudoscience - geopolitics.

Not only in the book "my struggle" but also in the memorandum about the economic situation of Germany (September of 1936), in the speech at the conference of the highest command element of German army (May of 1939) and in other statements Hitler persistantly advanced thesis about the fundamental importance for the Germans of "lebensraum". He declared Germany the country of that overpopulated, asserted that she cannot feed itself, using only its own territory. Hitler considered that the Nazi party had to take Germans away from squeezed "lebensraum" on the scope of the new earth/ground, i.e., to come forward the organizer of the conquest of foreign states. To the population of Germany instilled the idea of the inevitability of aggressive war against the USSR, and also against England and France

with their colonies. The summit of the fabrications of geopoliticians were the proofs of the need for the creation not only of Nordic Europe", but also "Eurasia" and "Eurafrica," where the masters could be Germans, and only Germans.

The theory of "lebensraum", persistantly thrust to the population of Germany, to a certain degree helped Hitlerites to distract the attention of laborers from the true reason for their disastrous situation - capitalist exploitation, to disguise the fact that all basic riches of the country are located in the hands of German capitalists and landowners, to convince masses of the inevitability of predatory war, allegedly advantageous to each German.

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The idea of military profit was in every possible way propagandized by Hitlerites and became one of the efficient means of the corruption of the large strata of the German people in accordance with Goebbels's recommendation - "to appeal to the most primitive instincts of masses".

Very important role as the means of camouflage and deception of masses played in the ideology of fascism the most shameless and most

insolent social demagogy. This is evident at least from the fact that the Hitlerites - cursed enemies of present socialism, international in its essence, is named their counterrevolutionary party "national-socialist workers party" and themselves they declared champions for "German socialism". Even 1 May, the combat holiday of all working world, they declared the "national holiday of labor/work". The owners of factories Hitlerites named the "heads of enterprises". The specially created organization "force through the gladness" gave to the particularly distinguished Nazis, and sometimes also with worker the free places in the sanatoriums, organized gratuitous excursion journeys through the country. With the aid of such receptions/methods the fascists attempted to create in the German people impression that in Germany it was established/installed the class world.

The basic content of Fascist ideology and the degree of its effect on the masses are opened in the appeal of the Communist Party of Germany to the people on 11 June, 1945. "Our misfortune, it is said in the appeal, was the fact that tens of millions of Germans fell under the effect of Nazi demagogy that the poison of beast racial "theory", "struggles for "lebensraum"" poisoned the creation of the people.

Our misfortune was the fact that the wide strata of society lost

an elementary feeling of shame and validity and went after Hitler, when it promised to them satisfied life due to the conquest and robberies of other peoples" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. Ulbricht. To the history of the newest time. M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1957, page 343. ENDFOOTNOTE.

To ideological questions Fascist top paid very considerable attention. As can be seen from the most important official Nazi documents, Hitler attached fundamental importance to the ideological enslavement of the German people. Among the basic factors, from which was composed the might of Fascist Germany, he, first of all, named the spirit of the German people. Advancing in 1939 problem of developing within the shortest period of maximum according to the sizes/dimensions of army, Hitler required so that it according to the degree of combat training, the armament and, most importantly, on its ideological preparation/training would be the best army in the world ².

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the Nuremberg process, Vol. I, page 601-602.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Immediately after the arrival of fascists at the authority was created the powerful/thick branched system of agitation and

propaganda, which enveloped by its feelers actually all the population of the country. This system included the numerous apparatus of the Nazi party, the Ministry of Propaganda, Fascist trade unions, youth, female, children's organizations. The intensive ideological processing was conducted also in the vanguards of EN man, attack aircraft and in the army.

Not long before the beginning of the Second World War it was officially considered that Fascist Germany solved its ideological problems - for Nazis allegedly it was possible to attain the complete and comprehensive support of all population, blind confidence of the people to Fascist guidance and a nation-political cohesion of Germans. Further successes in this region were connected already with the war. Actually/really, in the first period of world war the effect of Fascist ideology on the consciousness of the population of Germany and Hitler army continued to be reinforced. Unprecedented chauvinistic carbon monoxide was extended among the wide strata of society of the country. Unexpectedly easy successes in the West finally turned head to fascist leaders.

During December 1940, conversing with army commander, Hitler stated whereas that the Russian army with the first strike/shock of German military forces will suffer an even more destructive damage/defeat, than French army in 1940.

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On this base, as notes K. Toppelkirch operational considerations were moved aside to the background of consideration were moved aside to the background by considerations psychological, detachment for the repression of the moral spirit of the Red Army and population ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the results of the Second World War, page 73.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Supreme High Command of the German armed forces during June 1941 sent out those signed by Jodl "Instructions about the use/application of propaganda according to the version "Barbarossa", where it was asserted that "the use/application of all means of active propaganda in the struggle against the Red Army promises greater success, rather than in the struggle with all previous enemies of the German armed forces" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Nuremberg process, Vol. II, page 575. ENDFOOTNOTE.

German fascism counted on the shadow, negative sides of our public consciousness, to private-property psychology, moreover the

degree of their effect on the Soviet people greatly was exaggerated. Hitlerites expected to use in their interests of politically and morally unstable, and also hostile to our formation/order people, especially bourgeois nationalists. Enemy was solidly confident, that under the conditions of the stunning perfidious attack in the USSR about the rapid advance of German forces into the depth of Soviet territory without fail will appear the numerous disorganizers of the rear and front, the Red Army will be scattered and annihilated without the particular labor/work, and the population of the occupied areas rapidly will prove to be in the captivity of Fascist propaganda and easily it will submit to aggressors.

The ruling political and military top of Hitler Germany revealed/detected the inability to correctly evaluate the spiritual forces of the Soviet people. It actually/really completely overturned the absurd detachments of enemy, despite even the fact that before the war in the ideological work, connected with the preparation of the Soviet Union for the repulsion of aggression, were serious deficiencies. Active activity in the disclosure of Hitler Germany as aggressor after the conclusion with it of pact almost ceased. The threat of possible war was discussed only in the general/common/total plan, without the direct indication of Fascist Germany as to the main enemy. The enormous difficulties, connected with the war, were understated, and very war of the Soviet people against the aggressor

was represented as rapid and light campaign/march. Was distorted representation about the moral appearance of enemy. Many our soldiers and commanders erroneously considered that the German soldiers, in the past workers, will not fight against the land of the Soviets and they will pass to the side of the Red Army. This contributed to appearance in the country of the moods of complacency.

And nevertheless war showed that our country was ideologically armed immeasurably better than any other country. Our great people, which constructed socialism and vitally interested in the preservation of peace, was at the same time full of terrible, firm determination under any conditions and by any price shield its native land and sternly punish aggressor.

2. Spiritual Make-up of the Soviet people - the people - victor.

However, from the first days of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union it was necessary to deal concerning the very serious enemy, who knows how to wage great modern war. The Hitler mechanized hordes, without considering the losses, lunged they forward and betrayed to fire/light and sword everything which was encountered on the route/path.

It was necessary to steeply turn entire life and consciousness

of Soviet people, to morally and ideologically mobilize them to the heavy and prolonged war with the Fascist aggressors. The decisive role in the realization of this rotation belongs to our glorious Communist Party, its central committee. Colossal, truly great work made the party in the first months of war. First of all, was declared decisive struggle with the complacency and the carelessness.

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The party did not hide from the people of the difficulties of war. It summoned Soviet people selflessly to overcome the deprivations generated by war and to use all possibilities for the prolonged and heavy struggle with the enemy.

The ideological work, which the party conducted in the masses, was directed first of all toward an improvement in the communist consciousness of Soviet people, their education in the spirit of socialist ideology and morals in connection with new, military conditions. The party leaned in this case on the Leninist ideas and the principles of the defense of the socialist fatherland, creatively applying and developing them in the complicated situation of war.

At the same time the party brought up masses in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, fraternal solidarity with the laborers

of all countries and irreconcilability to the enemies of the country of socialism, cause of peace and freedom of the peoples.

All means of spiritual influence on the masses: agitation and propaganda, mass political work, the press, cinema, radio, literature, art - were used for the explanation of goals, character and characteristics of war against Fascist Germany, for the accomplishment of military missions in the rear and at the front, for achievement the victories over the enemy.

As a result of the giant work, made by the party, in the fire/light of war in entire sublimity appeared before humanity the moral qualities of the Soviet people, its spiritual appearance.

The basic features of Soviet people were, first of all, high ideality, deep devotion to socialism, to the affair of the party, firm confidence in the victory over the enemy, in the celebration of Communist ideals. Ardent patriotism and internationalism pierced entire activity of Soviet people in the rear and at the front. Protecting its socialist native land, the Soviet people exhibited the unprecedented heroism.

Devotion to the ideas of communism, confidence in the victory especially vividly were revealed in the armed struggle of our people.

In the difficult ones, the now and then tragic ones, the moments/factors of war Soviet people not for the minute doubted the fact that under the guidance of the Communist Party they will break enemy. They inspired the clear understanding of the high goals of the Great Patriotic War: to be located the gains of the October Revolution, to shield the heroic achievements of peaceful years, to render assistance the peoples, enslaved by Hitler Germany, to save world civilization from the fascism.

Lenin taught: it is not possible to conquer the people, which knows that it struggles for the just cause. Soviet people solidly knew that they wage war against Hitler Germany for the just cause, for socialism. Soviet soldiers went into combat and defeated under the banner of great Lenin's ideas. Under the Leninist banner workers and the collective farmers selflessly worked in the rear. Lenin's form escorted/tracked Soviet people in all their heroic works. In the forests/scaffolding of the Demidov area near Smolensk young partisan Ludmila Kulakova, sculptor-self-taught person, skillfully cut out on the barrel of tree/wood the bas relief of Ilyich. Leaving in combat, partisans with the exposed head passed by this peculiar, unique memorial and they gave to the native land oath to be courageous and stable in the struggle with the enemy ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See "Soviet Russia", on 1 February, 1959. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the enormous portrait of V. I. Lenin, written by oil paints by engineer N. K. Shchuklin on the scale of mountain in Pyatigorsk, during August 1942 of 15 Soviet soldiers headed by Lieutenant Dubovik they stood to death, but they did not let pass enemy. Here, in "Leninist scale", departing to the particularly important task/target, it gave the oath of correctness to partisan Nina Poptsov's native land. It perished, but oath its it held in control - task/target was carried out. Fascists attempted to annihilate V. I. Lenin's portrait: they threw by his contamination, shot from the machine guns and the guns. Soviet patriots, being liable life, washed off contamination from the portrait. The damaged, covered with wounds portrait of Ilyich in by an even greater force called for combat.

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In powerless spite the fascists decided to explode scale, but this concept was stripped by the offensive of Soviet military forces.

The precepts of V. I. Lenin, idea of the party about the historical mission of the Soviet people in the war with the aggressors filled the hearts of the soldiers of the Red Army by a



DEFENDING SEVASTOPOL'.

From a picture by artist A. Deynek.

deep faith/belief in the celebration of validity. This faith/belief did not leave our people even in the hour of death. Were maintained the agitating documents - dying notes of some Soviet soldiers. The lines of notes raise before us in the entire beauty the appearance of people, courageous and infinitely betrayed to the native land and the party. Red Army man S. V. Volkov before combat for the village Ustinovo wrote: "going into the attack, I am forced to the latter/last sigh to strike for honor and independence of its mother-native land. Itself I non-party member. But if in combat is spilled my blood, consider as the its blood of communist. Death and universal contempt to Fascist hangmen, who defiled our sacred earth/ground" !
1.

FOOTNOTE 1. Speak the killed heroes. Dying letters of Soviet champions against the Fascist-German aggressors (1941-1945). Publ. 2. M., Gospolitizdat, 1963, page 85. ENDFOOTNOTE.

By the firm faith/belief in force and invincibility of the socialist native land penetrated the collective will of 18 members of the underground Komsomol organization of city it is donets: "Friends ! We perish for the just cause:. do not form hands, rise, strike enemy at each space:. Good-bye, the Russian people" 2.

FOOTNOTE 2. Ibid, page 294. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The greatest devotion to the socialist fatherland and to the party was the source of deep patriotic feelings and strivings of Soviet people. They stinted on neither forces nor life in order to draw nearer the hour of the victory over the enemy.

West European and American bourgeois workers, who did not desire or who did not know how to be dismantled/selected at the character of Soviet patriotism, started legend, supposedly during the years of the Great Patriotic War Soviet ideology began to lose its authority above the people and which therefore it was necessary "to support" by turning to the former sublimity of old Russia. So they explained revival in the memory of our people of the courageous forms of its great ancestors - Aleksandr Nevskiy, Minin and Pozharskiy, Suvorov and Kutuzov. prominent English journalist Ralph Parker writes in his book "plot against the world" about the views of English and American diplomats, accredited in the USSR during the war: "foreign diplomats in Moscow propogandized "theory advantageous because of them" about the fact that the Russian people protects not the Soviet formation/order, but its fatherland independent of its social formation/order and that the Red Army is obligated by its successes to "miracle", "natural properties of the character of Russian person"

FOOTNOTE ' . R. Parker. Plot against the world. M., the publ. of the "literary newspaper", 1949, page 58. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Speaking about the sources of the patriotism of Soviet people, it cannot be really not indicated the heroic traditions of Russian and other peoples of Russia, repeatedly of the defended the native land from the invasion enemies. The Soviet people piously honors these traditions and increases them. Immortal curled the Russian peasant of Ivan Susanin was repeatedly repeated during the years of the Great Patriotic War by Soviet people, which, similar to Susanin, started the hostile vanguards to the accurate death into the blind/dead/deaf ones of forest or the impervious/impassable swamps.

But the Soviet people have our own traditions, which were established in the course of the revolutionary struggle of working class for the Soviet regime during the fire years of foreign intervention and civil war. The basis of these traditions is the devotion to socialist order, which inspires the Soviet people to the great works. As the most important stimulus of the patriotic affairs of Soviet person serve the basic interests of the socialist fatherland. Specifically, by this, but not 'natural characteristics' of Russian character is explained the high moral of two Soviet

soldiers in the last war, that appeared one of the important factors of the victories of the Red Army.

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The essence of Soviet patriotism during the war remained the same as in the period of the peaceful life: love for the socialist fatherland, accurate service to its interests and burning hatred for the enemies of the native land, decisive struggle with them. Was maintained the combination of the best national and international features of Soviet patriotism. But the concrete/specific/actual forms of the manifestation of socialist patriotism changed, its content became many-faceted. In peacetime Soviet people were occupied with heroic creative labor/work and thereby is had an effect on international working class, on the laborers of all world. During the years of war the Soviet people self-rejected protected the native land and by its victories at the front and in the rear it affected the course of world history, it helped other peoples. This considerably enriched the concept of socialist patriotism, it increased its effectiveness. "Soviet patriotism, said M. I. Kalinin, is expressed now (i.e., during the years of war. - ed.) in the fact that the Soviet native land, the fatherland, the people, entire Soviet society, which is located in the danger, become for the citizen of our country acutely expensive, loved, by close one, and

struggle for the native land, in its entire many-sidedness, becomes the feeling which guides all its thoughts and activities" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. M. I. Kalinin. On the Communist education. Elected speeches and the article. M., "young guards", 1958, page 299.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

Love for the socialist native land became during the war the inexhaustible source of combat and labor feats. Therefore the Communist Party and the Soviet government could shortly mobilize masses for overcoming of the exceptional difficulties of wartime, and then lead the Soviet people to the victory.

The important feature of the spiritual appearance of Soviet people during the years of war was hatred for the enemy. They could not supply other feelings to the Hitler aggressors who wanted to annihilate the gains of the great October Revolution and to enslave the peoples of the USSR. Burning hatred toward the Fascist-German monsters raised Soviet people to the merciless struggle with the occupationists. And the more grew the hatred for the enemy, the higher became the combat efficiency of our military forces, and combat operations acquired ever more active character. Soviet soldiers waged war under the slogan "death to the fascist occupationists" ¹. Hitler aggressors constantly felt on themselves,

which means the hatred of all Soviet people, aggravated to the limit by their crimes and atrocities. Without the hatred for the enemy the victory over it would be impossible.

However, our hatred for the Fascist-German occupationists did not apply to entire German people. Neither at the beginning nor at the end of the war did the Red Army identify Hitler's faction with the people of Germany. After entering to the territory of Fascist Germany, Soviet soldiers continued to annihilate Fascist tyrants and at the same time humanely they related to the peaceful German population. Soviet military forces did not embark upon the route/path of vengeance against Germans for those caused to our people cruel sufferings. Our soldiers knew how to hold in control their anger, they revealed excerpt and dignity with respect to the inhabitants of German cities and villages, generously they turned with the prisoners. Because are so touching were touching the scenes, which occurred on the streets of Berlin when Soviet soldiers carried from the fire/light of German children, gave out to hungry inhabitants food from the Red Army kitchens, etc.

In the struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors was especially vividly demonstrated unity of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. Soviet soldiers earned during the years of the war of the sympathy of all world as the representatives of

army, brought up in the spirit of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR and respect for all peaceful peoples. Both at the front, and in the rear of people of all nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union was united a feeling of solidarity. In the uniform formation/order they selflessly struggled with the enemy. The leading role in this struggle played the Russian people.

The authentic brotherhood of Soviet people of different nations was revealed in their combat activity, at the front. The bright index of the combat friendship of peoples and national cohesion of soldiers are such data.

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Among the rewarded front-line soldiers in the years of war are representatives more than 100 nations¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See L. V. Metelitsa. The celebration of the Leninist national policy in the USSR. M., "higher school", 1962, page 46.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The ranks of Hero of the Soviet Union were awarded 7998 Russians, 2021 Ukrainian, 299 Belorussians, 161 Tatars, 107 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 90 Georgians, 89 Armenians, 67 Uzbeks, 63 Mordavians, 45 Chuvashs, 44

Azerbaijanians, 38 Bashkir, 31 Osetins, 16 Turkmen, 15 Litovtsevs, 15 Tadzhiks, 12 Kirghizs, 12 Latvians, by 10 Komi, 10 Udmurts, 9 Estonians, 8 Karelians, 8 Kalmyk, 6 Adygeytsevs, 6 Kabardians, 4 Abkhazians, 2 Moldavians, 2 Yakuts, 1 Touvinian and the representatives of still many nationalities ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Data are cited on the basis of the calculations of the reward department of the main personnel division of the Ministry of the Defense of the USSR. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The great friendship of the Soviet peoples was one of the most important factors, which determined course and outcome of war.

The soldiers of the Red Army defended and personified into the life of the idea of socialist internationalism, and this reinforced them spiritually, provided sympathy and support of the peoples, which were struggling against the Fascist oppression abroad. Fraternal solidarity inspired Soviet military forces to the heroic activities on the liberation of laborers, that proved to be under the yoke of German fascism and Japanese imperialism. Soviet soldiers participated in the struggle against the Fascist occupationists in the composition of guerilla detachments of France, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. And on the foreign territory they with fortitude fulfilled their duty before the Soviet native land - valiantly they

fought with the Fascist-German aggressors. The courageous sons of the Soviet people V. V. Porik and F. A. Poletayev became the national heroes: the first - France, the second - Italy.

The most concentrated expression Communist ideality, socialist patriotism and internationalism of our people and its army found in the heroic feats of Soviet people. These feats were not chance. Soviet heroism was the result of the definite/determined social relations. This was new type heroism, originated the epoch of proletarian revolution and formation of socialism.

The moral atmosphere of capitalist society with its competition and money grubbing, with the conflict between the personality and the society disfigures the soul of man. Supremacy of capital, according to the accurate expression of A. S. Makarenko, "poisons human feat, first of all, in the quite central idea, in the idea of goal" 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. A. S. Makarenko. Compositions in seven volumes. Vol. VII. M., the publishing house of the academy of pedagogical sciences, 1958, page 18. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Unjust wars with their predatory, predatory goals give rise to not heroes, but marauders and tyrants. In the extremely disgusting form this was revealed in the operations of the Fascist-German military

forces, which were fighting for the interests of blackest reaction.

The heroic feats of Soviet people were characterized by socialist consciousness, elevated and noble goals, blood connection/bond with the people, mass character. The heroism of military years even more greatly tempered spiritually and politically Soviet people, it opened entire riches and beauty of their appearance. The heroism of Soviet people was mass because it was born in the widest layers of the people and by its basis it had interests of all people. Workers, peasants, intelligentsia, people of all nations, which populate the immense scopes of our native land, everything from it is low to it is great they exhibited the miracles of heroism in the rear and at the front.

With the men shoulder to shoulder forged the victory over the enemy our glorious women. They with fortitude carried the incredible burdens of wartime, in entire sublimity opening before humanity the hardness of the spirit of Soviet people. Women were unprecedented toilers at the plants, in the kolkhozes, in the hospitals and the hospitals, in the school and house. and they, Soviet women, heroically fought at the front and in the guerilla detachments.

What hardness of spirit, courage and resourcefulness were required heroines Ye. G. Mazanik, N. V. Troyan and M. B. Osipovoy in order to select into the very lair of deputy Hitler in Minsk von Cuba, to carry out above it the sacred Act of justice and to happily return to the free Soviet earth/ground ! And similar examples there was set.

Mass heroism became ordinary phenomenon, norm of conduct of hundreds of thousands of our soldiers. From the heroic ones of the struggles of the frontier posts to the great battles in the environs of Moscow, in Volga and near Kursk, from the world famous defense of Brest fortress and hero-cities to the assault of Berlin and feats in the war with the Japanese imperialism continuously grew/rose the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, were fortified their staying power/persistency, virility and military skill.

By the foremost carrier of the heroic spirit of the Red Army, her color was Soviet guards, which arose in the first, heaviest months of the Great Patriotic War. Near Smolensk and especially in combat in the environs of Moscow became famous by their skillful and heroic activities many military units and large units/formations, among them - 100, 127, 153, 161 and 316-th rifle divisions. For the exceptional ones staying power/persistency, valor and courage they by the first were converted into the guards ones.

In the course of war a number of guards units and large units/formations continuously grew. Appeared guards tank units. Many guards units had aviation. Rocket artillery entire/all became guards. Guards rank was appropriated to many warships and to the units of the Navy.

The motto of guardsmen - to be always heroes - found bright embodiment in the immortal feat of 28 guardsman, which entered the single combat with tens of Fascist tanks in the environs of Moscow and which did not let pass enemy. An example of Panfilov's troops followed many other subunits and units, the air crews, tanks and ships.

In entire sublimity appears before us the legendary feat of amphibious landing force under the command element of Senior Lieutenant K. F. Ol'shanskiy. The vanguard the consisting of 55 seamen/sailors and 12 Red Army men during March 1944 completed audacious flight on the German garrison in the city Nikolayev. 18 bitter attacks reflected Soviet soldiers in the course of twenty-four hours, after annihilating 700 Hitlerites and after lining several tanks. But also landing force members sustained enormous losses, their forces were already on the outcome. By this time Soviet military forces, which attacked/advanced on Nikolayev in the turning movement, achieved the decisive success. City was liberated. All 67

participants in the landing force, of them 55 posthumous, are awarded the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See M. P. Bodrov. Feat of the vanguard. M., Voenizdat, 1964, page 3. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Mass feats pierced entire combat life of the Red Army. The party and the government for value/merit evaluated these feats. More than 100 thousand people obtained orders and medals for courage and valor, revealed in the battle on the Kursk salient, 60 to particularly distinguished soldiers was appropriated the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union ^{Footnote²}. See "Pravda", on 5 August, 1963. ENDFOOTNOTE.

After the successful assault crossing of Dnepr it is more than 2 thousand soldiers, officers and Generals became Heroes of the Soviet Union, and tens of thousands of soldiers were rewarded with orders and medals. In combat for the mastery of Berlin in the last three weeks of the war of 614 Generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers obtained the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the years of the war of this high rank they were awarded 11525 people, including of 104 people were rewarded with two medals "gold star" even 3 - three. More than 7 mln. people obtained orders and medals. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers are rewarded



HEROISM OF PRIVATE OF THE GUARDS ALEKSANDR MATROSOV.
From a picture by artist V. Pamfilov.

several times. In all it is produced rewardings by the orders of the Soviet Union of 5300 thousand, and by medals for the feats and the difference in combat - 7580 thousand. Among those rewarded - about 870 thousand Privates, sergeants and Chief Petty Officers, who obtained the order of glory, of them more than 46 thousand have two orders, and more than 2200 soldiers are the cavaliers of the order of the glory of all three degrees.

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Furthermore, more than 22¹/₂ mln. medals were entrusted by soldier for the defense, the taking and the liberation of cities, and also for the victory over Germany and Japan ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18816, page 379-381, 386. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In avant garde of the courageous defenders of the native land went the communists and the Komsomol members, who always served as an example for the remaining soldiers. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union the communists are approximately 75 percent, Komsomol members - 11 percent: among those rewarded with orders and with Medals for Valor and "for the combat services" - about 50 percent of communists and Komsomol members.

During the years of war more than 7500 large units/formations and the units of the Red Army and the Navy became decorated. Many of them were decorated by orders on several/somewhat times ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid, page 383-384, 386. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The enormous numbers of the rewardings of Soviet soldiers by orders and by medals convincingly speak, that our people, which completed the heroic feats revealed, were not lone persons. On the contrary, each of them encircled hundred and thousands of daring and courageous soldiers. The gold star of hero would appear as reflection of thousands of daring and courageous soldiers. The gold star of hero would appear as reflection of thousands of other feats. And these individual and group feats of Soviet soldiers and officers, being reiterated and multiplied, became mass and were poured into the general/common/total flow of the heroic dealings of the people.

One of the most important qualities of Soviet person is selflessness up to the self-sacrifice into the name of the interests of the people. This quality was highly estimated by V. I. Lenin: he wrote: "conviction into the validity of war, the consciousness of the need for endowing by its life for the good of its brothers raises the

spirit of soldier and forces them to transfer the unheard of burdens"

3.

FOOTNOTE 3. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 31, page 115. ENDFOOTNOTE.

"To conquer or to die" - thus stood a question in the war with the German fascism, and our soldiers understood this. They consciously gave life for the native land when this required situation. Legendary scout N. I. Kuznetsov, leaving for the rear of enemy with the task/target to annihilate the Fascist tyrant in the Ukraine Eric Koch, he wrote: "I love life, I am still very young. But because the fatherland, which I love as my native mother, requires from me endowing by life into the name of its liberation from the German occupationists, I will make this. Let it know the whole world, on that is capable Russian patriot and Bolshevik. Let memorize the Fascist heads, what to subjugate our people it is not possible, just as to extinguish the sun" 4.

FOOTNOTE 4. Speak killed heroes, pages 319. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With the same high consciousness of their duty fought with enemy thousands of Soviet soldiers. Striking example, which personifies the Herculean spirit of our soldiers, is the feat of the soldier of the marines of the Komsomol member of M. A. Panikakhya. During the

hostile attack on the routes of approach to Volga it, filled by flame/blast, rushed towards the Fascist tank and with bottle with the fuel it set fire it. Together with the hostile tank burned down the hero. M. A. Panikakhya's feat its comrades compared with the feat of Gor'kiy Danko. The light/world of the feat of Soviet hero became the lighthouse, to which were equal other soldiers.

But what force of spirit was revealed by those, who, without oscillating, closed with their body the gun port of hostile bunker erupted deadly fire/light ! Private Aleksandr Matrosov was one of the first, who completed this feat. Sailors he became world famous, truly legendary hero. Not spontaneous/elemental gust, but high consciousness of its duty before the native land, consciousness, which was formed with the Soviet form of life, under the beneficial influence of foremost Leninist ideas, led it, as other soldiers, to this great feat.

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The heroism, which despises death, was characteristic for the representatives of all peoples of our country. Russian soldier Aleksandr Matrosov's feat repeated tens of soldiers of other nationalities. Among them an Uzbek T. Erdzhigitov, Estonian I. I. Laar, the Ukrainian A. E. Shevchenko, Kirghiz Ch. Tuleberdiyev,

Moldavian I. S. Soltys, Kazakh S. B. Baymagambetov and many others. 175 Soviet soldiers completed the feat, similar to the feat of Matrosov. Following the Belorussian by Nikolai Gastello directed their burning aircraft toward the enemy Russian pilots L. I. Ivanov, N. I. Skovorodin, Ye. V. Mikhaylov, the Ukrainian I. T. Vdovenko, Kazakh N. Abdirrov, Jew I. A. Irzhak et al. 74 crews of combat aircraft repeated Gastello's feat during the years of war.

Such feats soldiers and officers Fascist army did not accomplish, yes even we could not accomplish. The spiritual motives of their activities were reactionary idene of the racial superiority and profit, and later - fear of valid retribution for the effected crimes and automatic, blind discipline.

The feat, connected with the self-sacrifice into the name of the Soviet native land, into the name of Communist ideals, characterizes spiritually mature/ripe, strong people, brought up in the socialist country. By completely groundless are the assurances of bourgeois historians and writers, who depict our soldiers fanatics, to which "inoculate" a feeling of spirit of sacrifice. Selflessness of Soviet people is distant of the wish beautifully to die. In their feats there is no also that predestination and blind spirit of sacrifice which is characteristic for the hero-loners of the past. The Western historians and writers, who raise to the shield of such heroes,

cannot or do not desire to understand that in the Soviet country was born the new soldier, whom he knows, for which it fights also for which the defense of the socialist fatherland - holy duty.

Death deducts in man the most expensive - life. "I here is precisely love for the life in the Soviet country, with the Soviet people, said M. I. Kalinin, when this life threatens the danger when for its retention/preservation/maintaining goes struggle not to the life, but to death, it forces the citizen of land of the Soviets to lose fear to death, it overpowers the tendency of man to maintain the life of the Soviet people thereby seemingly forever to maintain their life" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. M. I. Kalinin. On the Communist education and military duty, page 586. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, the feat of self-sacrifice, which accomplishes the Soviet soldier, is closely related to its love for the people and the life. Specifically, these feelings brings up the party in the Soviet soldiers, who at any time, at any moment, if the native land of this requires, are ready to give their life into the name of the happiness of the people.

Certainly, selflessness, contempt to death in the struggle with

the enemy they do not necessarily entail the loss of life. It is more than that, frequently these qualities of Soviet soldiers help them to mobilize all their spiritual and physical forces in order to find the way out from the difficult situation. The faith/belief in the people, the confidence in the victory into name of which Soviet person goes to death, without having frightened it, they inspire soldier, pour into it new forces. "In the heaviest times, said fearless champion for the communism Georgiy Dimitrov, at the most difficult moments/factors, into which for me it was necessary to strike, and I many times stood on the territory of death - because of this faith/belief in the truth, by the forces of the people, into the forces and the future of socialism and communism I remained live and healthy" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. G. Dimitrov. Selected works, Vol. II (1941-1949). M., Gospolitizdat, 1957, page 435. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Because of the same reasons, because of iron discipline and military skill millions of Soviet people, which looked deaths into the person, conquered and remained live. Among these heroes of 33 Soviet heroes who during August 1942 on the routes of approach to Volga gained the victory over 70 tanks of enemy and battalion of his infantry. It is almost improbable, but nevertheless the fact that this small group of Soviet soldiers headed by junior political

instructor by A. G. Yevtifeyev and substituent of political instructor by L. I. Kovalev, having only garnets, submachine guns, bottle with the combustible mixture even one antitank gun, annihilated 27 German tanks, also, about 150 Hitlerites, and itself came out this unequal combat without the losses.

End section.

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The people glorifies those, who brave fought and it perished by death of hero, after drawing nearer the hour of our victory, it glorifies those remaining into the live ones, that knew how to conquer enemy. Heroes do not die, their glory is immortal, their names are forever carried not only in the personnel rosters of the armed forces, but also into the memory national. On the heroes the people composes legends, it places to them excellent memorials, their names are named the best streets of its cities and villages.

During the years of war very vividly were revealed such qualities of our soldiers and officers as staying power/persistency and the unbending will during the performance of military duty, comprising an important element of authentic heroism. Even under the most difficult conditions of the initial period of war bulk of our soldiers is not hollow into despondency, it did not lose the presence of spirit, it maintained the firm conviction in the victory. With fortitude overcoming "fear of tanks", "fear of airplanes" inexperienced soldiers became the hardened/tempered soldiers.

To entire world is known the iron staying power/persistency of our soldiers in the days of the heroic defense of Leningrad, Sevastopol, Kiev, Odessa. Determination to strike with the enemy to the end was mass phenomenon and is found its expression in the oaths of separate soldiers and subunits, in the decisions of the party and general/common/total meetings of personnel which then piously were fulfilled. Thus one of such decisions, accepted by Soviet seamen/sailors in the days of the defense of Sevastopol: "for us slogan "not to space ago" ! it became the slogan of life. We everything as one, are firm. If among us proves to be the lurking labor/work or traitor, then hand our will not tremble - it will be annihilated".

By great staying power/persistency and courage noted the activities of Soviet soldiers in the historical battle in Volga. The innumerable forces of enemy vomited to Stalingrad. City burned. There was no forward edge in the essence - it was everywhere. The bitter bloody- struggle followed each meter of the earth/ground, for each house. But also under these improbably severe conditions Soviet soldiers withstood. They withstood and conquered, first of all, because here was formed the united military collective, soul of which were communists. Specifically, communists were that cementing force which united soldiers and made their staying power/persistency of truly iron. Words "not to space ago" ! For all soldiers and officers

they became requirement, command, meaning of existence. The defenders of Volga stronghold supported entire/all country. 140 days and the nights of continuous combat for the city in Volga - this is the authentic epic of national heroism.

The legendary staying power/persistency of city in Volga personify its renowned heroes. Among them sergeant Ya. F. Pavlov, who headed the handful of brave maces, who penetrated in one of the houses. This house, converted into the impregnable fortress, entered into the chronicle of war as Pavlov's house. Never will fade the memory about signalman V. P. Titayev's feat, who, perishing, stopped up by teeth the torn/broken wire ends and restored/reduced the disrupted connection/bond. It and dead continued to struggle with the fascists. Signalmen accumulated about Titayev the song, in which there were these words: "I commander himself through the body his command gave - in attack!..."¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See V. I. Chuykov. 180 days in the fire/light of battles. M., the publishing house of DOSAAF [All-union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy], 1962, page 116-117.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The heroism of Soviet people did not know boundaries. It seemed that our soldiers became immortal heroes and no force was capable of

holding down/retaining them from the execution of the command of the native land.

The firmness of spirit, the proud consciousness of their force and moral superiority over the enemy did not leave Soviet soldiers and officers even when they fell into the hands of Hitlerites and proved to be in the hopeless situation. Perishing, heroes remained unconquered. Fascist barbarians, powerless in their tendency to break the spirit of our soldiers, who fell into their hands, in rabid/furious spite subjected to their most cruel tortures and mockeries.

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They crucified soldier-Komsomol member Yuri Smirnov, after driving nails in his palm and soles; they killed partisan Vera Lesovaya, after breeding on her breast bonfire; they tortured captive General D. M. Karbyshev, his glazing in freezing weather by water. D. M. Karbyshev, remarkable Soviet patriot, in response to the proposition of Hitlerites to serve as them answered with the value/merit: "I Soviet person, soldier, and I remain accurate to my duty"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. "Izvestiya", 11 February, 1963. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Striking example of courage and unusual valor is the combat activity of the glorious communist-scout Hero of the Soviet Union V. A. Molodtsov and his combat comrades I. N. Petrenko, Yashi Gordiyenko and others. After basing by assignment of the organs of the national security in the catacombs of Odessa, occupied by enemy, and feeling the greatest difficulties (it was missing products, German fascists etched Soviet patriots by gas, immured the entrances into the catacombs, they poisoned water in the wells, etc.), the reconnaissance party of V. A. Molodtsov in the course of 7 months regularly transmitted to Moscow the valuable reconnaissance enemy data. V. A. Molodtsov and his combat companions-in-arms were seized by Gestapo men and sentenced to death. They remained to the end they were accurate to their native land. To the proposition tax application about the pardon V. A. Molodtsov on behalf of his comrades stated: "we on his earth/ground, in the enemies of pardon we do not request".

Legendary feats in the rear of enemy completed State Security Agent Hero of the Soviet Union N. I. Kuznetsov. Infinite devotion to the Soviet native land, courage and valor revealed during the years of war State Security Agents Heroes of the Soviet Union D. N. Medvedev, S. A. Vaupshasov, K. P. Orlovskiy, Ye. I. Mirkovskiy, F. F. Ozmitel', B. L. Galushkin, A. M. Rabtsevich and many others.

The special position in the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War occupies the heroic activity of the world famous Soviet scout of Richard Sorge, who together with her comrades reported to Soviet command element the priceless information about the plans of Fascist Germany and imperialistic Japan. R. Sorge was the educated marxist, betrayed by the son of the Soviet native land, by unusually daring and resourceful scout, who lustrously played the role of the convinced Nazi. Having its people in the large/coarse Japanese and German political and diplomatic installations in Tokyo, Sorge for almost ten years conducted error-free game with disciplined Japanese reconnaissance/intelligence.

R. Sorge did not have to break open safes in order to steal secret documents, them showed to it very owners of these documents. He did not fire/shoot the pistol in order to penetrate in the hiding-places of enemy. Doors politely opened/disclosed before it the masters of listening posts.

As a result of unforeseen circumstances R. Sorge was arrested. Several years he was weakened in prison. Japanese hangmen executed him 7 November 1944 and R. Sorge died a hero. It entered to the scaffold calm, with the consciousness of the completed duty. Its latter/last, dying words are now known to entire world: "yes it is in good health the Communist Party, the Soviet Union, the Red Army" !

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 87722

1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV


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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

On the experience of war Soviet soldiers and officers were convinced of the fact that with invincible makes soldier the bravery, based on conscious performance of duty and excellent combat training. Specifically, these qualities of Soviet soldiers most vividly were revealed in the thoroughly developed activities of our pilots. Komsomol member V. V. Talalikhin, defending Moscow, one of the first in the history of aviation completed night ram, which required from it enormous will and outstanding skill. Communist A. K. Gorovets in 1943 completed near Kursk the feat similar to which it was not and no, it shot down in one combat nine hostile aircraft.

Military skill extremely reinforced the staying power/persistency and other morale qualities of Soviet soldiers. This is why into the mastery of weaponry, by technology, by the new receptions/methods of combat our soldiers packed entire soul. It is known, what wide acceptance at the front acquired sniper movement. Was how much here the glorious names, which obtained the distinguished reputation ! V. G. Zaytsev, L. M. Pavlichenko, A. I. Chekhov, V. I. Medvedev and hundreds of others.

THE GUARDS' GLAT - THE FLAG OF HEROES.



Famous Soviet pilots take the Guards' flag (active Army, 1943).

Tank drivers of a formation at the solemn time of raising the Guards' flag.



The Guards' flag was raised by these sailors.

HEROIC WORKERS OF THE COUNTRY - TO THE FRONT.




Steel - to the front. At the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine. KEY: (1) We give high honors to the initiators of the all-union competition of metallurgists. We are first in competition.



After a shift. The shining stars indicate the successful completion of the plan by miners of the "Kuzbassugol'" Combine.

Flag of the State Defense Committee (GKO) raised by the shops of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine for eternal preservation.



IDEALOGY OF NAZIISM IN ACTION.

575



Hitler and Himmler inspect the Zaksenhausen concentration camp.

Osventsim prisoners.



Mass annihilation of the world population.



AFTER LIBERATION.



Sign of the Göring German company at a Soviet enterprise in Zaporozh'ye.

End of Krupp management at the Kramatorsk Machine Building Plant (September 1943).



Home from Nazi captivity (region of Koenigsburg).



"Beaten - to the ground!" - this is how the Soviet people dealt with the notices of the German military administration after the occupied regions has been liberated.

KEY: (1) Notice! Departure from village without permission is strictly forbidden. Violators will be shot.

In the close connection with an increase in the military skill was located the emergence of guards units and large units/formations. The force of guardsmen of that consisted, that they fought boldly, with the initiative, they knew how with the maximum effect to use weaponry.

With every day grew the military skill of our soldiers, in the battles in Volga and the Kursk salient it became already completely mature/ripe. Russian sharpness, that beat by key/wrench initiative and creativity, organically-bound with military skill and discipline, gave rise to many new forms of combat operations. Thus arose assault teams in the offensive combat under the conditions of city. Much new appeared in the tactics of assault crossing rivers, in the use/application of tanks, artillery, aviation and other types of combat materiel. All this was then generalized and it entered into regulations and manuals of the Red Army.

One of the most characteristic features of the spiritual appearance of our soldiers - feeling of collectivism and comradeship.

Collectivism and comradeship one way or another were inherent in the soldiers of old armies, but in the Red Army they acquired new quality. Socialist property/ownership, uniting people, serves as the most favorable ground for the collectivism and the mutual assistance.

Under socialism the people became accustomed everything to do conjointly, each Soviet person feels the elbow of comrade, and this into one hundred times multiplies his forces, stimulates the development of mass heroism. Collectivism and comradeship at the front became apparent in the mutual support in combat, the earnings/assistance of comrades, who caught into the misfortune, in the transmission be soldiers of their experience to young soldiers, etc.

Examples of army comradeship of thousand. Thus one of them. With assault crossing of the vistula in the summer of 1944 tens of our motor vehicle-amphibians, which transported soldiers, the torrents of in the middle river to the sand-bar. Enemy opened on them artillery and mortar fire. To the aid to the caught into the misfortune comrades arrived the sappers/combat engineers. In spite of hurricane fire/light, they on the boats crossed the infantry to the opposite shore and thereby they ensured with it the execution of combat mission. In this case especially differed sergeant P. I. Demin, who crossed the vistula of 12 times.

Mutual assistance and friendship were characteristic not only for relations between the soldiers, but also for relations between soldiers and toilers of the rear. The Soviet rear supported front with people, technology, ammunition and provisions. Successes and

national economies created material base for the successful conduct of combat operations. However, successes at the front inspired the toilers of the rear to the new labor feats. Thus, between the rear and the front there was indissoluble unity. A feeling of continuous connection/bond with entire Soviet people was constantly given to the soldiers of the Red Army and navy of force for dealing with the enemy.

During entire war progressive-minded workers, the collective farmers, technical-engineering workers and scientists, overcoming the greatest difficulties, exhibiting enormous staying power/persistency, selflessly forged the weaponry of victory. "All for the front, everything for the victory" ! "In the labor/work - as in combat" ! "To work not only for itself, but also for the comrade, who left on the front" ! - under such slogans worked our people in the rear. The Soviet people, supplying a deep love for the Red Army, provided it with all they were necessary for the victory. The strained labor working days of Soviet people were present feat.

And actually/really, perhaps not feat was the fact that the workers under the hostile fire and the bombing did know how to evacuate hundreds of large/coarse enterprises from the frontal areas to the east? The very fact of the transfer of enormous material values, productive capital, armament of whole enterprises up to the

great distances, and besides within the maximally short period, is worthy admiration. At the new place workers, the engineers technology rapidly installed and started the evacuated enterprises. Giant plants were actuated through 1.5-2 months. True, the first time many shops did not have a cover/cap, but machine tools worked, and workers were fulfilled on them on several/somewhat norms. In Siberia, Kazakhstan, Volga Region, Uzbekistan grew new industrial areas.

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At all plants and factories of the country rapidly was mastered the production of the new forms of production, necessary for the creation of contemporary weaponry and technology. This required sizable efforts/forces. Ordinary were the cases when large/coarse plants produced the complicated rebuilding of production processes within the shorter period than in peacetime. Here is characteristic for that time fact. At the plant "sickle and hammer" in the war years the assimilation of the new profiles/airfoils of hire occupied two-three weeks. Before the war to this it departed 9-10 months.

Ardent patriotism and heroism of the toilers of the rear very vividly were revealed in the powerful scope of socialist competition, which played enormous role in strengthening of the Soviet rear and successful waging of war. Our party widely propagandized the Leninist

idea of the development of national creativity. In 1942 competition first began the workers of Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, Gor'kiy. Toward the end of 1944 the competition achieved the greatest scope.

Movement for highly productive socialist labor/work became truly national. The leading place in the competition occupied the collectives of the foremost enterprises of ferrous metallurgy, air and tank industry - collective-heroes in the authentic meaning of this word. A number of enterprises, which exceeded production schedules, grew from year to year. This can be judged at least from following data. In 1942 Red Flag of VTsSPS [All-Union Central Trade-Union Council] and people's commissariats was entrusted 326 to enterprises - participants in the All-Union socialist competition, in 1943 - 605, in 1944 - 828, in 1945 - 1041 to enterprise. Within the time of war the banner of the state committee of defense was entrusted to Uralmashzavod [Ural Heavy Machinery Plant im. Sergo Ordzhonikidze] 27 times, to plant the name of Kirov (Leningrad) - 29, plant "red proletarian" - 32, plant No of 183 transport machine building - 34, to Moscow auto works - 36 times¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. TsA of VTsSPS, f. "PM". Materials to the report to VTsSPS May 1947, 1. 9. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Workers strove an increase in the labor productivity not only by the route/path of the stress/voltage of physical efforts/forces, but also because of the development of creative thought, rationalization. In the war years in the enterprises arrived many new workers, in essence of woman and young people. In order to replace those left by the front, for them it was necessary to master two-three new specialities, to work simultaneously on several machine tools. All this required creative approach to the work.

In the rear, just as at the front, there was its guards. Already in the days of battle in the environs of Moscow on the initiative of the Komsomol members of Moscow, Urals and city of Gor'kiy they arose and received wide acceptance front komsomol youth brigades. The organizer of this first brigade in Urals M. F. Popov recalls: "During those severe, alert days each felt itself by soldier.... Specifically, in these days was born in children the thought to be named by front brigade. We everyone was grasped for this idea"².

FOOTNOTE ². Guards of the rear. M., Gospolitizdat, 1962, page 85.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

A number of youth brigades toward the end of 1944 achieved more than 145 thousand³.

FOOTNOTE 3. Archive of TsK of VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League], d. 54 (1944), l. 60. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Progressive-minded workers, applying the innovatory methods of labor/work, fulfilled on two even three - five norms. There were such heroes of labor/work, as gave on ten even more than norms. Wide reputation obtained the labor affairs of the initiator of the movement of the thousand-percenters of the notable milling machine operator of plant in lower Tagil D. F. Bosy, machinist N. A. Lunin, driller of the Bakal mines A. I. Semivolos and many others.

Selflessly working in the rear, Soviet people considered their work the combat assignment. The former machinist of depot Novosibirsk Lunin recalls: "we considered steam-locomotive brigade as the fighting compartment of front-line soldiers. After its locomotives cared with this love as tankmen after the terrible vehicles"4.

FOOTNOTE 4. Guards of the rear, page 212. ENDFOOTNOTE.

For this very reason numerous steam-locomotive brigades wonderfully managed their problems.

Remarkable labor feats completed during the years of war builders - workers, technology, engineers. In spite of enormous difficulties, they created powerful/thick defensive lines around our cities, raised in the rear new plants, installed the redeployed enterprises, were restored the destroyed centers of industry in the liberated territory. For the masterful execution of the targets of government for the erection of defense plants, enterprises of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, machine-building and other plants many construction trusts were rewarded with the Order of Lenin.

Enthusiasm and ability provided the success in all branches of industry and construction. The more skilled workers transmitted their experience by another, less experienced worker. Very important in this respect was the innovation of the turner of Uralmashzavod P. K. Spekhova, who trained to its skill tens of novices. This initiative caught its many followers, which helped to bring up the new generation of working class.

Great feat it completed during the years of war and the collective farm peasantry. In spite of the fact that our country was deprived in the beginning of the war of important agricultural areas, kolkhozes and state farms provided the army and the country with the necessary rations, and industry - by raw material.

Struggle for the grain was the important condition for the provision of a victory, and Soviet peasantry understood well this. Struggle was necessary difficult. Agricultural machinery was not sufficient, the available technology it is also difficult it was difficult to use, since the majority of tractor operators, operators and other specialists left to the front. The resolution of the problem of mechanizer cadres took upon itself young people, especially girl. Sev for the rudder of tractor and combine, girl and youth they worked without tiredness, with weeks they did not return from the fields home. Excellent results were achieved foremost tractor brigades D. M. Garmash, by P. N. Angelinoy, M. I. Brovko, operator A. I. Os'kin, cotton grower Khamrakul Tursunkulov and many others. Struggle for the high harvests was conducted in the eastern areas of the country - to Siberia, in Altai. The production of grain were occupied even such republics, in which earlier in essence grew the knock. In the competition for the high harvests actively participated the collective farmers of the frontal Cherepovets area, Vologda region (occupied one of the first places toward the end wars), the collective farmers of Kalinin, Novosibirsk and other regions. In the Ukraine was initiated the movement of the 500, which provided the high harvests of beet.

The enormous contribution to the cause of the victory over the enemy introduced Soviet intelligentsia, which gave all forces and

knowledge of the socialist fatherland. When enemy occupied the territory of Belorussia, Ukraine and Donbass with their tractor, Machine Building Plants, Dneproges and carbon mines/shafts, on the initiative of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR scientist-patriots, and after them and many engineers technology took part in the giant constructions in Transvolga region, in Urals, in Siberia, in the Far East and in Central Asia. By the selfless and creative labor/work our scientific-technical cadres contributed to the rapid creation of new enterprises, put into production the newest scientific achievements. Thus, for instance, scientific institute, headed by academician Ye. O. Paton, taught Ural tank builders in the world practice to for the first time apply the method of the automatic welding of tank armor under the conditions of mass production. Designers and engineers worked on the fact in order to arm Soviet soldiers with the most technology committed. Instruments were not sufficient raw material. Frequently it was necessary to replace one materials by others, to introduce the new receptions/methods of labor/work, to go by the risk. By inexhaustible key/wrench struck creative thought of thousands of innovator-engineers, and also representatives of other professions of multimillion Soviet intelligentsia.

The Soviet people feels a deep commendation to the enormous army of medical workers, who saved life to millions of soldiers and returned them to the labor and combat fronts.

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The loyal assistants of the party in the education of children and youth in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, in the mobilization of population for overcoming of difficulties were the workers of education. Thousands of Soviet teachers took active part in the work of underground organizations and in the activities of guerilla detachments.

Our writers, artists, workers in the cinema, artists, musicians at the front and in the rear during the entire war by their artistic creativity fortified and developed in the Soviet people ardent love for the native land, burning hatred for the aggressors, constant tendency toward the feats in the struggle with the enemy.

Is great the role of intelligentsia in development and propaganda of Marxist-Leninist ideas, in the propaganda of the resolutions of the party, directed toward the education in Soviet people of high combat morale qualities.

The labor, creative feats of workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia of our country are explained, first of all, by the

fact that Soviet people solidly believed in the wisdom of the Leninist party and they knew - the party will lead them to the victory. At the most difficult moments of the armed struggle when to many abroad it seemed that war we have lost, the Soviet people found in himself forces to repulse the pressure of enemy and to bring to it serious losses.

In it is not occurred before the severe conditions of the blockade, which was lasting of 900 days, feeling hunger, cold, under the continuous bombings, they stood to death laborers of Leningrad. They withstood and conquered because they were selflessly betrayed to the ideas of communism. Their patriotism and heroism do not have to equal in the history.

Unprecedented courage of Muscovites, residents of Leningrad, Kievians, Volga-region natives even more fortified the faith/belief of Soviet people in the victory. Foreman of one of the tractor brigades of Novosibirskaya Oblast S. S. Asheko recalls: at the same time that occurred furious fighting in Volga and around Lenin city was compressed the ring of blockade, "we named our harvest the harvest of victory, since they solidly believed that equally or late it will arrive"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Guards of the rear, page 409. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Soviet people did not fear difficulties, they with fortitude and worthily transferred deprivations. Refusing to itself in many respects, they guided to heroic soldiers to the front entire necessary - from the product and item messages to air squadrons and tank columns, created to working capital for defense.

Tambovo collective farmers first gathered and introduced 43 mln. rubles to the construction of tank column. Their example followed the peasants of Saratov region, which assembled 33.5 mln. rubles to the construction of military aircraft. This patriotic gust encompassed entire country. Money into the fund for defense introduced not only the collectives, but also the individual persons. Thus, to the money of the glorious patriot of collective farmer of Saratov region A. S. Selivanova were constructed three aircraft. These aircraft transmitted into the air unit where served its husband. In all at the front were 2565 aircraft, constructed to the maintenances of laborers.

Soviet people exhibited patriotic feelings very multilaterally: was rendered material and moral aid the families of front-line soldiers, they managed above the rear hospitals, were created new kindergartens and creche, they arranged child-orphans into the

children's houses, supported regular connection/bond with the front (they conducted correspondence, sent to the front of delegation, concert brigades).

The party and the government highly evaluated the heroic activity of the toilers of the rear. Soon after victory over Fascist Germany, on 6 June, 1945, was instituted medal "for the valiant labor/work in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945". This medal noted the labor feats of more than 16 mln. people².

FOOTNOTE ². IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 6336, 1. 1. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In order to more completely visualize the spiritual appearance of Soviet person during the years of war, it is necessary to recall also about those people which, after proving to be in the German captivity or in the Fascist prisons and the concentration camps, exhibited great courage, valor, will did entire possible for approaching the victory over the enemy.

Are worthy admirations and feats of hero-underground workers. Many of them Hitlerites gripped and tortured in the torture chambers.

The left by patriots letters, will, verses, short labels on the walls of cells and barracks speak about the exceptional spiritual beauty of these people, their unbending faith/belief in the triumph of communism.

Did not cease struggle with the occupationists those Soviet people which the Hitlerites by force drove away into the rear for the unfree work.

A fundamental understanding by Soviet people of the interests of the socialist native land, passionate tendency under any circumstances - at the front, in the rear, in the lair of enemy - to give entire their energy to the work of victory were that decisive force which gave rise to the mass heroism, so/such characteristic for the spiritual appearance of the Soviet people. In the course of war the moral spirit of our people it did not weaken, for what counted the Hitlerites, but, on the contrary, it was strengthened.

The valid goals of the Great Patriotic War, the cohesion of Soviet people even above raised the ideological level of our people, even more greatly they tempered him morally. Only the most insignificant unit of the population, predominantly in cities and villages of the western regions of the country, occupied by Fascist aggressors, proved to be morally unstable. Here Hitlerites applied

all forces to rape the Soviet people: they were generous to the different promises, they in every way possible encouraged speculators and tradesmen, sowed infamous anti-Soviet slander. But fascists could not achieve any considerable success. To the overwhelming majority of Soviet people were alien views and intentions of enemy. With contempt they related to the small group of traitors, to all facts, who yielded to Goebbels' propoganda and effect of a Fascist-nationalistic secret service agency.

The general/common/total ideological-political level of Soviet people was so/such high, that they are comparatively easy sand bar to the side entire alien to them. Even those Soviet people which at first suffered indecision or yielded to a feeling of fear - and then there was not too much, in the course wars became courageous and gave their forces to struggle with the enemy. Without the exaggeration it is possible to say that each Soviet person - whatever work he fulfilled - solidly knew that he introduces his contribution in defense of the socialist fatherland.

Socialist ideology with the honor maintained/withstood severe testing of war, after demonstrating its might and invincibility. Inspired by the ideas of the defense of their fatherland, by noble/precious aims of war, the people and the army with the increasing force and the energy carried on a struggle with the

aggressor, doubled and tripled the power of their strikes/shocks on the enemy.

Others was the state of the spiritual forces of enemy. Neither in the Fascist-German army nor in the rear of Germany it was, yes even could not be increasing spiritual raising, the growth of moral forces in the course of war, since Hitlerites did not have for this of the necessary social sources.

True, for fascists it was possible to poison consciousness of millions of Germans and to chase the peoples of some states against the land of the Soviets. However, they could not attain strengthening the moral spirit of army and bulk of the population of Germany in the course of war with the Soviet Union. This was caused by the reactionary character of social formation/order and ideology of fascism, by the incongruence of Nazi ideas with the basic interests of laborers. Life showed the validity of Leninist situation about the fact that the predatory war of imperialists cannot be solidly supported by national masses. "... it is not possible to cause heroism in the masses, wrote V. I. Lenin, without breaking with the imperialism ..."¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 25, page 337. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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The activities of the Fascist-German army at the Soviet-German front were defined by the instructions of the Fuehrer about the character of war with the Soviet Union as to the irreconcilable struggle of opposite ideologies as to the war of ideologies¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the Nuremberg process. Vol. I, page 357, 483.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Fascist heads, the leadership of Hitler army required from soldiers being maximally cruel to the enemy, to his army and population.

The beast appearance of the Fascist-German army - the army of killers, tyrants and aggressors - it is sufficiently precisely reflected in the reminder with which German soldiers entered the war against the Soviet Union. This is what told in this reminder.

"Remember and fulfill:

1. In the morning, in the daytime, at night, always think about the Fuehrer, let other thoughts not disturb you, know: he thinks and it makes for you. You must only act, nothing not fear, you, German

soldier, it is invulnerable. Not one bullet, not one bayonet will touch you. There are no nerves, heart, pity - you is made from the German iron. After war you will again find new soul, clear heart - for the children of your, for great Germany. But now act decisively, without the oscillations/vibrations.

2. You do not have heart and nerves, in war they are not necessary. Annihilate in itself pity and compassion - kill any Russian, Soviet, do not stop, if before you old man either woman, girl or boy, kill, by these you will save yourself from the death, you will ensure the future your family and will become famous forever.

3. Not one world force will keep balance before German pressure. We will place on the elbows the whole world. German - absolute master of the world. You will solve the fates of England, Russia, America..."².

FOOTNOTE ². Cited in the book: M. I. Kalinin. On the Communist education and military duty, page 572-573. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This reminder - concrete/specific/actual embodiment of that robber "morals", which preached the fascists. Reminder is not random document. The same cannibalistic "ideas" are expressed in the command

of Hitler of 17 June, 1941, which solved to soldiers and officers to rob and to destroy Soviet people, to completely burn villages and cities, to select/take in the population rations and cattle, to drive away the citizens of the USSR to the hard labor works into Germany. Thus, from the very beginning of war Hitlerites legalized on our earth/ground monstrous atrocities and crimes.

Letters and journals of German soldiers and officers do not remain in doubt of the fact that reminder to soldier and other similar documents of Hitler command element pedantically were put into practice. The soldiers of the Wehrmacht, especially the SS troops, imply death, hunger and misery to millions of people. In our villages and cities, occupied by Germans, went brutal violence with the peaceful population. Robbed entire Fascist army, asked and killed all fascists.

However, the morals of gangsterism, subjugation of peoples and capture of strange territories could not serve as enduring/permanent moral basis, since it contradicted the authentic interests of German laborers. Very it is characteristic that already the first strikes/shocks, plotted/applied by the Red Army for Fascist military forces, had a serious effect on their moral and political state. Hitler command element began to be harassed for the combat efficiency of separate large units/formations and even armies. During December

1941 the corps commanders reported to H. Guderian, that the state of military forces causes alert/alarm, military forces lose confidence in their command element and they began to doubt even the capabilities of supreme command. Corps commanders expressed the fear that the military forces cannot reflect the offensive of enemy³.

FOOTNOTE ³. H Guderian. Erinnerungen eines Soldaten. Neckargemuend, 1960, p 239. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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The defeat of Fascist military forces in the battle in the environs of Moscow depressing acted on the German people and delivered the first strike/shock on its faith/belief in the invincibility of Hitler army. In the army in certain unit of the soldier advanced the cooling to the so-called "great ideals" of a national-socialism. This was expressed, first of all, in the tendency of individual soldiers under any pretext/preposition to deviate from combat and thereby to save its life. Appeared deserters.

The begun process of moral decline in the army greatly perturbed Hitler leadership. During October 1941 the general headquarters of supreme command published special directive about the spiritual education in the army. In the directive it was indicated that "with

an increase of the duration of war the combat efficiency of army into entire of the increasing degree depends on spirit and internal flexibility of military forces" and that therefore "to the education of ideology, together with the combat training, should be attached in the advancing/attacking winter special importance"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Archives MO USSR, f. 32, pub. 11306, d. 55, l. 2.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

As a result of the wide application of punitive and propagandistic measures and with unstable and that varying for the Fascist-German command element it was possible to raise discipline and to ensure the sufficiently high offensive spirit of its army in 1942. And nevertheless in the German soldiers already disappeared insolent self-confidence and "enthusiasm", who characterized them in the first months of war. Grew a number of soldiers, critically adjusted with respect to the Hitler government and the "optimistic" predictions/forecasts of Nazi propaganda. In essence these were the soldiers of senior ages, especially workers, and also those, who returned to the front from the hospitals and after leave of absence.

And the rear of Hitler army was not such enduring/permanent, as it it presented official propaganda. In spite of the intensive ideological perfecting of the population of Germany, among certain of

its unit were observed pacifist and antifascist moods. They found their expression in the creation of antifascist underground organizations, in conducting of sabotage and strikes at the military plants, and also in the separate discovered pacifist actions of workers.

However, from the first days of war the Communist Party of Germany, which was being found in a deep underground, developed struggle for its cessation/discontinuation.

Hitler authorities rigidly were straightened with antifascists and enemies of war. Thus, on 7 May, 1942, in Hamburg and Stuttgart were executed 19 people, who spread pacifist appeals, and 12 days after this in Essen Gestapo it shot 100 inhabitants, who supported the immediate cessation/discontinuation of war. In Hamme the fascists arrested more than 40 antifascists, many of whom then they shot. On 23 May, 1942, in Mannheim they were sentenced to death of 14 members of underground pacifist organization.

Heavy damage/defeat in Volga cracked the moral spirit of Fascist military forces. The German soldiers and officers, who participated in the battle in the environs of Stalingrad, no longer dreamed about the victory. Many of them rout in Volga estimated as the criminal work of Hitler command element, their situation was considered

hopeless and they came to the conclusion the fact that "period to all more or less sober-minded Germans to curse the rashness of this war..."².

FOOTNOTE ². "In defense of the world", 1961, No 12, page 35.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Increasingly more frequent in the military forces were heard conversations about the superiority of Russian combat technology, especially artillery and tanks. Noticeably shook the authority of officer and noncommissioned officer composition. The sufficiently extended phenomenon became arguings, and sometimes also the late execution of commands/instructions.

The defeat of the army of F. Paulus produced heavy impression also on the population of Germany. After the unsuccessful attempts to hide catastrophe German leadership it was forced to declare three-day mourning. Funeral ringing was heard during these days over shaken Germany. Instead of the former optimism and the confidence in the victory now in many Germans appeared the moods of decline and disbelief by their forces.

The main concern of Nazis at this time was maintenance in the army of the faith/belief in the infallibility of the Fuehrer. In this them helped itself Hitler. Thus, on 15 January, 1943, he turned on the radio to the military forces with the speech in which he drafted them to keep and to continue struggle, even if they consider it its senseless. "Let soldier at this moment thinks about that, said Hitler, that it leads Fuehrer himself. Let he say to himself: the Fuehrer knows, as proceed works, the Fuehrer will make, which is necessary. My problem presenting the question, my problem - blindly obeying".

At the same time in Fascist-German propaganda began to slip defensive notes. Soldiers increasingly more frequently began to indicate about the protracted/delayed war, the need for bringing new victims. Actually this was the acknowledgement of the large/coarse defeats of Hitler army at the Soviet-German front. Simultaneously propaganda undertook new maneuver - it began to intimidate the soldiers of the Wehrmacht by the "vengeance of enemy in the case of the damage/defeat of Germany". Hitlerite clique attempted to suggest army, that the life of soldier and their families, all population of Germany is inseparably connected with the fate of Nazi regime.

Again appeared to the light/world thesis that that the Red Army was capable of attacking/advancing only in winter, that summer -

"element of Germans". Soldier tried to convince, then Fascist-German army will again begin successful offensive operations. Was widely propagandized also the "demolishing force of new German weaponry", in particular heavy tanks.

Preparing to open attack on the eastern Front in the summer of 1943, Hitler command element took measures for further reinforcing of ideological perfecting of soldier. In the German army was introduced the institute of the officers of "spiritual provision".

German propaganda attempted to suggest to soldiers thought about the fact that the total mobilization will ensure the victory of Germany. At the same time fascists increased the use/application of punitive measures. Hitler published command "About the pursuit of political crimes in the army". Was introduced the extreme field court-marshal, which rapidly dismantled the works about the political crimes, directed toward the undermining of confidence toward the Hitler leadership. The guilties expected either capital punishment or hard labor works.

Desiring to take revenge as the damage/defeat in Volga and to turn the course of war into their benefit, Hitlerites undertook offensive on the Kursk salient. There was how the disappointment of soldier and officers of Fascist army, German population when

offensive suffered complete failure/dip/trough! Without the exaggeration it is possible to say that the defeat of Germans in the Kursk battle and the subsequent offensive of the Red Army rocked Hitler Germany to its foundations. These events had the serious demoralizing effect not only on soldiers, but also on the non-commissioned officers and the officers of Hitler army. Were increased in frequency the cases of delivery into the captivity singly and by groups.

Many officers of the Fascist-German army arrived at the conclusion that the military capabilities of Hitler were distant from those, about which reiterated Fascist propaganda. Wholly sharing the political views of the Fuehrer, these officers at the same time considered that it was guilty in the failures of German army.

In the secret collector/collection of the judicial sentences in 1943, carried out to officers, are given the descriptions of their crimes. These crimes in essence consisted in the manifestation of defeatist moods. In the same document are enumerated the facts, which testify about the incidence/drop in discipline and the moral degradation in the officer medium.

In 1943 considerably deteriorated the political-moral state of German population. Enormous losses at the front, the air raids, food

difficulties - all this forced Germans to doubt the victory of Germany. At the same time among the pro-Fascist adjusted population grew fear before the damage/defeat and the unavoidable retribution. Letters to the front were filled with entreaties conquer at any cost.

end section.



Illustration for "Story of Modern Man" by B. Polevyy. Artist N. Zhukov.

Illustration for V. Katayev's story "Son of the Regiment"
Artist V. Shcheglov.





Illustration for A. Fadeyev's story "Young Guardsman".
Artist V. Shcheglov.

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However, an increasing number of front-line soldiers lost the faith/belief in the victory of Germany. And although the majority of Hitler soldiers still persistantly opposed/resisted, were increased in frequency the cases of irregular retreat, and sometimes also the straight/direct rejection of soldier to fulfill the commands of command element.

Assault crossing by the Red Army of Dnepr and her successful progress to the West seriously undermined the hopes of German soldiers and officers for the tactics of "elastic defense", refuted the chatter of Fascist propaganda about the "new weaponry" and the "inaccessability of eastern shaft". At the end of 1943 the soldiers already with the irony related to this to the fables of official propaganda. Coming forward before Reichsleiters and Gauleiters of the Nazi party, the chief of staff of operative management OKV General A. Jodl, already 7 November 1943, forced was to state: "in all directions in the country marches the illusion of decomposition/expansion"¹.

FOOTNOTE 1. "Military history log/journal", 1960, No. 10, p. 77.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The nearer approached the hour of the death of Nazi regime, the more desperate attempted the Hitlerites to stop the offensive of the Red Army. The Fascist-German army still could exert strong resistance. This was explained, first of all, by fear before the responsibility for the crimes, committed on the Soviet earth/ground, and also by cruel terrorist regime in the army. Was manifested the fact that bulk of the soldier of Hitler army continued to obey to the commands of officers.

Subsequently on a descent in the moral spirit of Hitler military forces and German population serious effect showed/rendered transfer of military activities on the territory of Germany, decomposition/decay of Fascist bloc (output/yield from the war of Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland), the landing of allies in France and the aggravation of the crisis in the ruling circles of Fascist Germany.

The successful offensive operations of the Red Army in 1944 contributed to an even greater dissemination in the Fascist military forces of "defensive moods". Many soldiers strove to act according to the formula: "acc - it means nearer to the house". Hitler command element intensely campaigned military forces to continue active

struggle, published the strictest commands in which it was necessary holding position by any price. In order to stave off the incidence/drop in discipline in the army, Fascist-German command element resorted to ever more severe measures. With command of 26 February, 1944, Hitler permitted to officers, to non-commissioned officers it is simple to brave soldiers in the extreme situation without the court and the consequence to shoot on the spot all those who did not "obey" and "not disciplined".

Every day in the army grew a number of mortal sentences. Even according to clearly underestimated data of the criminal statistics of the Wehrmacht, within the time of wars in ground forces were only executed 27 thousand people, it is included in the hard labor prisons for the period more than year to 110 thousand people¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No. 16154, p. 2-3.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Prisons overfilled soldiers, condemned for the desertion, mutilation and absences without leave.

Increasingly more frequent for German fascists it was necessary by force to chase in combat of its allies - Rumanian and hungarians.

Hitlerites doomed to the death whole military large units/formations, requiring from them to at any cost hold the occupied positions.

In 1944 Nazi leadership attempted to enlarge in the military forces the effect of the Fascist party. In all teams of Hitler Wehrmacht was introduced the institute of officers on a National-Socialist leadership by military forces. The most responsible functions were transmitted to leadership of the SS, in the units and the subunits were created special Fascist groups, military salutary address was replaced by party.

During August 1944 the soldiers obtained permission to enter into the Fascist party. Thereby it openly acknowledged that the army is political instrument in the hands of the dominant class and cannot stand "outside policy".

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Those officers who asserted that they must not be occupied by the policy, they considered traitors and traitors. Membership in the Hitler party became main condition for progress on the official staircase.

Hitler faction, without considering the enormous losses,

continued to throw into the meat-chopper of war newer and newer replenishments and still kept army in its hands. Standing on the territory of precipice, fascists flattered population and soldier by hopes for the compromise world with America and England. Great propagandistic sensation raised Nazis all around the so-called "Volkssturm", into which were mobilized the old men and 16-year-old youths. Propaganda blew about the fact that the "Volkssturm" is witness to the participation of the large strata of the people in the war. On "Volkssturm" were laid enormous hopes, as for the force which allegedly will ensure the turn of events in favor of Germany. After conducting in the middle of 1944 repeated mobilization Glick's Hitler it knew how to scrape together 50 new divisions whose combat efficiency it goes without saying was low.

Under the powerful strikes/shocks of the Red Army increasingly more was destroyed Hitler military vehicle. Fascist Germany irrepressible rolled to its ignominious end. During January - May of 1945 the military forces of the 2nd Belorussian front took in the captivity of approximately 118 thousand German soldiers and the officers, of them were put without the resistance of 37.5 thousand and crossed to our side more than 22 thousand people¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Archives MO USSR, f. 32, pub. 11306, d. 596, ^{sheets} A 114, 176. ENDFOOTNOTE.

On 3rd Belorussian Front of 230 thousand prisoners were put without resistance to 105.5 thousand and crossed to us more than 4350 people¹.

ibid
FOOTNOTE ². ~~there~~, d. 91., l. 212; d. 92, *Sheet* ~~z.~~ 70. ENDFOOTNOTE.

At the 1st Ukrainian front were captured 151 thousand people, of them who were put without the resistance it proved to be more than 28 thousand and deserters it is more than 5600¹.

ibid
FOOTNOTE ³. ~~there~~, f. 236, pub. 2675, d. 344, *Sheets* ~~z.~~ 43-44.

The population of Germany encompassed fear. It began to deviate from "total" mobilizations, sometimes refused during the evacuation to leave its dwellings. Wide national masses - and this especially importantly - did not respond to the appeal of Hitlerites to launch guerilla warfare when the Red Army transferred combat to the territory of Germany.

Besides passive struggle the advance unit of the German people conducted the active antifascist operation which headed TsK of the Communist Party of Germany, its heads - stable and tested champions

for the work of the working class: E. Thalmann, V. Pik and V. Ulbricht. The struggle of German communists during the years of war is connected also with the names of such prominent organizers of underground antifascist movement in Germany as A. Zefkov (Berlin), T. Neybauer (Thuringia), G. Schumann (Saxony). Among the numerous antifascist groups by their activity were allotted also the group of Schulz-Boysen, which consisted of members of KPG and SDPG and the closely related to the workers, and group of R. Urikh, who united mainly industrial workers.

Heroic activity of German patriots, martyr death of many of them attested to the fact that even in the years of fascism - in the years of the gravest disgrace for the Germans - the best sons of Germany did not stain the honor of their people. Some of them carried on an active struggle against the fascism together with the Soviet people. After all, for example, acted German antifascist Fritz Shmenkel', who passed in the fall of 1941 to side 1951 to the side of Soviet partisans. Fulfilling its international duty, it revealed bravery and selflessness in the struggle with the Hitlerites. In the vanguard "death to fascism" it with the respect was named Ivan Ivanovich. By the edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to Fritz Shmenkel' is posthumous awarded the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Great role in the struggle with the Fascist regime and its

ideology played national committee "free Germany", which was the nucleus of antifascist movement.

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The initiator of his creation was TsK KPG. Committee, which consisted of the political emigrants, among whom there were the most prominent German communists, progressive writers, trade-union workers, and prisoners of war in the USSR, conducted work among the German soldiers at the Soviet-German front, and also among the population of Germany. Its activity committee conducted on the basis of manifesto to the German people which published in the summer of 1943. In the manifesto she was indicated the inevitability of the rout of the Fascist-German army by Soviet military forces and advanced the concrete/specific/actual program of struggle with the Nazism for free, democratic and peaceful Germany.

Did not maintain/withstand testing the last war the reactionary ideology of Japanese imperialism, which was leaning on the principles of a monarcho-fascism, anticommunism and racial superiority of the Japanese over other peoples.

In the course of war the ruling circles of Japan by the means of the press, cinema, radio and church preheated in the people

chauvinism, bellicosity and awe before the monarch. Extensively were used such attributes of monarchy as the "godly" origin of emperor and "perpetual" devotion to it.

On the basis of these reactionary ideas brought up themselves the Japanese army and the navy in composition of which was a considerable number of the so-called "vanguards of condemned men". "condemned men" were characterized by extreme fanaticism, we could complete any crimes and they were always ready they were ready to blindly give its life for the sacred person of emperor. The predatory campaigns/marches of Japanese army were escorted/tracked by cruelty, maraud and violence.

However, rout by fascist, Germany, the military failures of Japanese imperialism, especially in first half 1945, and also a sharp deterioration in the economic situation of laborers bared the reactionary character of the predatory war of Japan and led to the dissemination of pacifist and defeatist moods among the national masses. As noted during June 1945 in his official report the secretary general of office Sakomidza, "appeared the ominous signs/criteria of the decline of the moral spirit of population"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. D. I. Goldberg. Foreign policy of Japan into 1941-1945 M., SOTSSEKIZ [State Publishing House of Literature on Social

Sciences and Economics], 1962, p. 242. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Was increased pacifist movement, also, in the Japanese army of occupation in China.

The Japanese ruling circles attempted to hide from the people truth about the outcome of war at the Soviet-German front, about the successes of USA and England in the war against Japan on Pacific Ocean. In order to soften dissatisfaction of masses with the discovered military-fascist dictatorship, they promised to restore/reduce some previously abolished parliamentary institutes, nullified anti-Comintern and other pacts, which connected Japanese government with Hitler Germany. This advances with the people the ruling circles of Japan escorted/tracked by the appeal to wage war to the victorious end.

After taking course on the tightening of war, Japanese militarists expected to use possible disagreements between the union powers. But no maneuvers no longer could save imperialistic Japan. Its final rout was solved by the entrance of Soviet state into the war in the Far East.

The high goals of the Soviet Union in the war against imperialistic Japan - providing the safety of our people and

shortening the periods of war, the rendering of every possible aid to Chinese, to Korean and other peoples of Asia, a precise fulfillment of allied duty before the antifascist coalition - were clear to the freedom-loving peoples. The smashing attack of Soviet military forces on imperialistic Japan inspired the peoples of Asia, served for them as signal to the decisive struggle against reacting forces.

Soviet military forces, which exceeded enemy on their combat morale qualities and technical armament, shortly completely routed choice Kwantung army, suppressed the possibility of villainous use/application by Japan bacteriological weapon, fulfilled to the end their liberating mission.

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Serious damage/defeat suffered monarcho-Fascist ideology. After rout and surrender of Japan its emperor officially forewent the dummy concept of his godly origin and from the opinion that the Japanese are the privileged nation and are intended to control/guide the world.

Thus, war with the merciless force unleashed the beast appearance of Hitler army and revealed the groundlessness of the reactionary ideology of fascism. German and Japanese armies, which

fought under the flag of racism and anticommunism, were the armies of marauders and tyrants, which fulfilled the will of monopolist capital.

At the same time war showed depth, foremost character and at the same time unprecedented mobilizing role of the socialist ideology, which determined the spiritual force of the Soviet people. In the severe time of war in entire sublimity was revealed the spiritual power of Soviet people, selflessly betrayed to the socialist native land, persistent in combat for the just cause, untiring in the labor/work, ready on any victims and deprivation into the name of the thriving of the socialist fatherland.

Under the banner of the great socialist ideas, which opposed the reactionary ideas of racism and anticommunism, was gained near leadership of the Communist Party our historical victory over Hitler Germany and imperialistic Japan.

3. Heroism of Soviet people - basic theme of literature and art of military years.

The moral appearance of Soviet person, his rich spiritual world found worthy reflection in the best products of Soviet literature and art, created into 1941-1945. By their creativity in these years

writers and workers of art laid the enduring/permanent bases of the artistic chronicle of the Great Patriotic War, which must forever maintain for the descendants of the picture of great battle for honor and freedom of the native land and narrate about selflessness and mass heroism of Soviet people at the front and in the rear.

During the years of war very vividly were revealed commitment to the Party, the Communist ideality of Soviet literature and art, their offensive character, close connection with the life, with the people, faithfulness to the principles of socialist realism.

The content of all forms and genres of Soviet artistic creativity was penetrated by the patriotic idea of the defense of the socialist fatherland. Inviolable socio-political and ideological unity of the Soviet people, the friendship of socialist nations, Soviet patriotism and wise leadership of the Communist Party - here are those sources, whence drew our artists of theme for their creativity.

During the years of war the writers, artists, workers of cinema, theater and music were the active assistants of the party. The pen of the writer, the chamber/camera of projectionist, the brush of artist, the cutter of sculptor in reality were equated to the bayonet. From the direct publicistic response to the events, from the essay



LETTER FROM THE FRONT. From a picture by artist A. Laktionov.

sketchings, the short motion pictures, characteristic for the first months of war, our masters of literature and art soon passed to a deep comprehension of phenomena of war, to the creation of large/coarse artistic products.

Soviet writers and workers of arts depicted war with a deep feeling of admiration by the force of national heroism. In the center of the attention of writers and artists was located the spiritual world of man - the defender of the socialist fatherland.

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All products revealed, created during the years of war, show different fates of the actively struggling Soviet people. Their characters are imprinted in the products of art as the typical reflection of mass heroism as the particle of soul, reason and inexhaustible creative energy of the people.

The severe reality of war prompted to our writers and workers of arts the forms of their creations. The heroes of many products revealed became the actually existed people - 28 soldier-Panfilovites, members of underground Komsomol organization "young guards", pilot Aleksey Mares'yev, infantryman Aleksandr Matrosov, partisan Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya, the commander of the

battalion Bourdzhhan Momysh-Uly. The legendary Kazakh hero Tulegena Tokhtarova sang the national akyn of Kazakhstan Nurpeis Bayganin, to the remarkable son of Azerbaijan to Hero of the Soviet Union Israfil Mamedov dedicated his verses outstanding poet Samed Burgun.

Relying on the intimate knowledge of life, writers and workers of arts created, furthermore, the bright and typical forms of the fictitious heroes, allotted by high spiritual qualities and psychological features, which correspond to real reality. Are such the characters of the "stories of Ivan Sudarev" of A. Tolstoy, Taras Yatsenko from "those not subdued" of B. Gorbatov, the commissar Bogarev from the narrative "people is immortal" V. Grossman, the head of guerilla detachment Kochet of the film "secretary of district committee" and many others.

Works of literature and skill were filled with vital truth they glorified selflessness, heroism, sublimity of feat.

In the realistic image of the heroics of struggle the leading role belonged to artistic literature.

War brought up the whole generation of writer-front-line soldiers. The majority of them, working as the war correspondents of the central and front newspapers, were located in the hottest, most

responsible front sectors.

Exclusively vividly was revealed during the years of war the gift of our poets. At the front of poetry worked many poets, good and different, who belonged to different generations. There were here and old, experienced foremen, who embarked on the path of creativity as early as the years of civil war, and the young poets of the prewar period, to which during the war arrived poetic maturity. Revived poetry gifted young people, which undertook fin during the severe military days.

Poetry of all peoples of the Soviet Union drafted to the selfless defense of the socialist fatherland and hatred for the Hitlerites into the name of the rescue of humanity from the threat of Fascist enslavement.

Very fruitful was the creativity of poet-singers V. Lebedeva-Kum, A. Surkov, M. Isakovskiy, Ye. Dolmatovskiy and many others. Their songs, which played great role in the mobilization of all forces of the country at the resistance to enemy,, until now, are fervently loved by the people.

Our poetry was enriched during the years of war and by large/coarse products. To them they relate S. Shchipachev's poem

"Little house in Shushenskoe", that glorifies the immortal form of V. I. Linina; the poems, dedicated to the heroic defense of Leningrad: "Kirov with us" of N. Tikhonov, "residents of Leningrad, children my" Dzhambul, "Pulkovo meridian" V. Inber; the poems, which draw the heroic characters of the Soviet soldiers: A. Prokofiev's "Russia", the "son" of P. Antokol'skiy, the "burials of the friend" of P. Tyshiny, the "banner of the brigade" of A. Kuleshev et al.

Among the poetic products of military years the authentic pearl of Soviet poetry was the national epic "Vasiliy Terkin" of A. Tvardovskogo.

In the world of the artistic forms, created during the years of war, to Vasiliy Terkin's form belongs one of the first places. Vasiliy Terkin - person, brought up by socialist order, the carrier of the best traits of Russian national character. It became nominal character, who personifies clear mind, moral force, cordiality, love of life of our people, its hatred and contempt for the enemy. In Terkin are inherent provocative humor, warm-heartedness and delicate melancholy.

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It does not pronounce high words about the patriotism, but all works

of Terkin are penetrated by passionate love for the native land, firm confidence in the victory. It is brave, it skillfully masters weaponry, it is clever in any work, it is cheerful in heaviest situation. These quality are characteristic for the Soviet soldier - toiler, person, who left the sediment of the people. Vasiliy Terkin is capable to test fear, he is shamed neither bitter nor glad tears. The features of Soviet person are embodied by poet in the live and complicated character. They are typical, and each front-line soldier found in Terkin particle himself.

The author conducts Terkin along the difficult roads of war. Narrative verses are relieved by lyric ones, merry genre scenes - by dramatic pictures. In the poem great, which is revealed skillfully is interlaced with the common.

In the final unit of the poem, concluding story about the great combat harvest-time and the victory, the author speaks about superiority of the Soviet people over the enemy:

Force to force demonstrated:

Force to force - no equal.

There is a metal strengthen metal,

There is a fire/light of more terrible than the fire/light!'

FOOTNOTE ¹. A. T. Tvardovskiy. Collected works in four volumes. Vol. II. Goslitizdat, 1959. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Is deeply national poetic style and lingual riches of the book about the soldier. In it the author used expressiveness of wise Russian word, remelted the treasures of folklore, front soldier humor.

Among the poetic products of military years should be especially noted "soldier poetry" of A. Surkov. In it in the lyric form were reflected the most important events of military years, thought and expectation of the defenders of the native land. Poet did not varnish/lacquer reality, he did not hide bitter truth and now and then tragic situation from the reader, it did not attempt to comfort it. In his books "December in the environs of Moscow", "roads conduct on the West", "soldier heart", "Russia punishing", "I sing victory" A. Surkov it draws the detailed pictures of war, is shown the spiritual world of Soviet person.

Wide reputation during the years of war used the verses of D.

Bedny, K. Simonov, M. Svetlov, A. Malyshko, M. Bazhan, M. Tank and other Soviet poets.

The model of the heroic feat of writer is remarkable Tatar poet-communist Musy Dzhilil's creativity. Being wearied in the dark torture chambers of Fascist prisons, under the superhuman conditions of captivity, Dzhilil' wrote its lyric verses and songs, completed of the passionate love for the native land, the man, the life and the burning hatred, proud contempt to the Fascist hangmen. In the verses of the poet before the reader arises the live form of the unbending soldier-communist:

I sang, spring freshness after sensing,

I sang, coming out in favor of the native land in combat.

Thus and latter/last song I write,

Seeing the axe of the hangman above itself.

Song me learned to freedom,

Song by champion to die me orders.

Life my by song rang in the people,

Death my by the song of struggle will sound'.

FOOTNOTE 3. Musa Dzhallil'. Moabite notebook. M., Goslitizdat, 1957, p. 14. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The main hero of the products of artistic prose during the years of war, just as poetry, was the soldier of armed SI.

The impressive forms of soldiers and commanders created M. Sholokhov at their heads from the novel "they they fought for the native land". Writer depicts war without the colorings, as such such as it was in actuality. Those tormented by continuous combat, by heat, by sleepless nights, will withdraw soldiers and commanders into the depth of the country to the new positions.

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They succeeded in maintaining only banner, several machine guns and antitank guns. The actions of heroes Sholokhov leads a remarkable feeling of the fusion of its fate with the fate of the socialist native land. These are people of great patriotic passion. Especially

vividly writer draws the characters of soldier-communists of the leaders of masses. In the heavy situation of retrograde combat the communists sharply feel their patriotic duty before the native land. They stably maintain/withstand the attacks of enemy and there is no doubt of the fact that, if it is required, they will not be sorry and life into the name of victory. Untreated after contusion soldier communist Strel'tsov departs from the hospital back into its unit. Explaining the motives of this action, he tells friend Lopakhin:"... I simply could not remain. Regiment was in the very heavy situation, you it remained a little:. How I could not arrive? Thus I arrived. To fight next to the comrades indeed is possible and blind/dead/deaf. It is correct, Pete"?

Is very expressive the form of communist Lieutenant Gerasimova in M. Sholokhov's story "science of hatred". The author especially emphasizes the Communist commitment to the Party of Gerasimov as the strongest ideological and moral support of the man in the face of lethal danger. Heroes M. Sholokhov the antitank rifleman Lopakhin, the soldier Strel'tsov, the Lieutenant Gerasimov and other soldier-communists fight with the enemy to the latter/last drop of the blood. In their conduct they found their expression of the features, inherent in the communists: to take upon itself difficult work, to give to struggle entire fever of soul, to be constantly together with the people and to conduct its to the victory.

Among the positive forms of the literature of the period of the Great Patriotic War to the forms of communists belongs central place. Communists - private soldiers, commanders, political workers, partisans, underground workers, the toilers of the Soviet rear - show the miracles of bravery and heroism, they inspire by their example of comrades, carry along them after themselves to the feat, is united entire collective for achievement of common goal.

Passionately and with feeling described A. Fadeyev in the "young guards" about the immortal feat of Komsomol heroes. M. Sholokhov noted: "Fadeyev it possesses wonderful characteristic deeply and emotionally to write about the young people, and in the "young guards" into the complete measure was opened this feature of its great talent"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographical reading. Vol. I. M, Gospolitizdat, 1956, p. 586.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The novel "young guards" is one of the most products of Soviet and world progressive literature revealed. As its basis is assumed the authentic history of heroic struggle and tragic death of

underground Komsomol organization in that occupied by Hitlerites city Krasnodon.

Writer glorifies heroism and moral beauty of the young generation, which grew in the Soviet country as the generations of excellent people, created with new life. These are the live, thinking, loving and suffering people. The character of each hero becomes apparent in its own way. The head of the Krasnodon Komsomol members Oleg Koshevoy by entire his life and by education is prepared to the feat. This is courageous, wise and at the same time childish naive youth. From it proceeds the sensation of freshness, force, kindness and sincere clarity, that forces those surrounding to be penetrated to it by confidence. Obayatelen Sergey Tyulenin. This youth dreams about the feat. He wants to be such, as M. V. Frunze, S. M. Kirov as progressive-minded working people. He total energy and undertakes in the days of occupation the most dangerous works: he accumulates weaponry, rescues wounded soldiers, throws with the night of bottle with the combustibile mixture into the German headquarters. The example of Ul'yana Gromova draws by large internal force of champion. Sustained and calm, after mature/ripe thinkings the girl enters to the difficult and dangerous route/path of female underground member. "I swear by my mother, she says, that to the last breath I will not roll up from this route/path". Its oath it held in control. Completely different on the depot/dump of character is Lyuba

Shevtsova. This daring, mischievous as boy, and at the same time completed of feminine charm girl.

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The remarkable qualities of the heads of national struggle with the fascism - communist-underground workers are embodied in the novel in the forms of the secretary of the regional committee of the party Ivan Fedorovich Protsenko and the secretary of the district committee of the party Philipp Petrovich Lyutikov. These are the clever and farsighted leaders of masses, different in the character, the temperament, the life experience, but is uniform in its conviction and purposefulness.

The selfless struggle of the Komsomol members of Krasnodon, worthily carried relay race fathers, it is shown in the novel as the team of the general/common/total front of struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors. "... "young guards" from a novel-document grew in a novel-generalization ... - wrote K. Fredin. - typicalness of the heroes of literary work is scooped deeply from typicalness of the heroes of our Soviet life. The facts of Krasnodon could be repeated, also, in reality one way or another they were reiterated in hundreds of Soviet cities and settlements where the Komsomol members, following the Bolsheviki and protecting the native land, accomplished

feats, without sparing its blood"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. K. Fedin. Aleksandr Fadeyev. Entrance to the collected works of A. Fadeyev in five volumes. T.I.M, Goslitizdat, 1959, p. 9.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

The high political, moral and military characteristics of Soviet people are well shown in the products and other our outstanding writers.

As if live arise from the pages of the books the agitating forms of the Soviet patriots: the courageous tankman of Yegor Dremov ("Russian character" A. Tolstoy); the soldiers of the heroic detachment of "Vorob'yev battery", which caused to themselves the fire/light of our heavy artillery in order to annihilate enemy, who was burst to the firing position ("Naval spirit" L. Sobolyev); the courageous pilot Lieutenant Sviridov, who selflessly annihilates Fascist aggressors on the north ("in the snows" S. Sergeyev-Tsenskiy); the defender of the Volga stronghold of captain Saburov ("days and of night" K. Simonov) and many others.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War the theme of struggle for the freedom and the independence of the native land became the main thing, also, for the greatest mass from arts -

cinema. Changed in comparison with peacetime the significance of the separate forms of cinematography.

In the first place was advanced the newsreel, as the most operational form of cinema, which campaigns by facts, the capable of rapidly informing national masses about all most important events at the front and in the rear. Chronicle newsreels were created on the basis of the materials, which came from front projectionists. The same materials made it possible for directors to make thematic short and full-length documentary films. Newsreel and documentary films truthful reflected the course of war, showed exceptional courage of Soviet soldiers, partisan and the toilers of the rear, the monstrous crimes, the destruction, produced by fascist by army on our earth/ground.

If newsreels first of all contained the current information about the course of military activities, then thematic documentary films were the unique chronicle of struggle and victories. Some of them were devoted to the large/coarse events of patriotic war (" the rout of German military forces in the environs of Moscow", directors L. Varlam and I. Kopalin; "Leningrad in the struggle", directors R. Carmen, V. Solovtsev, Ye. Uchitel', N. Komarevtsev et al.), others (" the day of war", director M. Slutskiy) gave the wide picture of the life of the entire Soviet country, which became military camp. On the

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DURING MINUTES OF CALM...



SOVIET ART.




Scene from A. Korneychuk's play "Front" given at MKhAT [Moscow Academic Art Theater of the USSR im. M. Gor'kiy] (Moscow, 1942).



Showing of military movie collection at "Tsentral'nyy" movie theater (Moscow, 1941).

KEY: (1) Movie. (2) Behind us.



First performance of D. Shostakovich's 7th symphony in liberated Leningrad.

screens went the films, dedicated to the courageous struggle of Soviet people in the rear of enemy. Was such, for example, film the "national avengers" of director V. Belyayev. It is interesting that this film almost wholly photographed projectionist-partisans. In the documentary documentary films were reflected such events, as the liberation of Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, France. About the victories, gained by the Red Army in the territory of enemy, it was told in the films "Berlin" of directors Yu. Rayzman and Ye. Svilovoy and the "rout of Japan" of the directors A. Zarkhya and I. Heifitz.

Some of these films, because of the inspired work of their installed director-documentors, found the enormous force of emotional influence.

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Similar were, for example, great military-documentary films: the "rout of German military forces in the environs of Moscow" (directors L. Varlam and I. Kopalin), "battle for our Soviet Ukraine" (directors A. Dovzhenko, Yu. Solntsev and Ya. Avdeyenko), "liberated France" (director S. Yutkevich). As a whole the significance of all chronicle and documentary films about the Great Patriotic War was exceptional. They moved into the Soviet people the faith/belief in the victory

over the fascism, clearly proved to entire world, that the decisive contribution to the rout of Hitler Germany introduce the peoples of the Soviet Union. And now, when from the moment/factor of the termination of war it passed many years, these films continue to agitate Soviet spectators, are filled their hearts by pride for our native land, for the Communist Party.

In spite of particular difficulties, with which was connected the organization of artistic films under war time, these films nevertheless were created.

Creation of artistic film - complicated and prolonged creative and production process. Meanwhile it followed as fast as possible to arrange the issue of artistic motion pictures. Output/yield found the chief/leading foremen of the cinema, which began to remove/take the short film novellas, simple in theatrical sense, united in the "combat film symposiums". In the year, from August 1941 through August 1942, on the screens came out 12 such "combat film symposiums", each of which usually consisted of three-four artistic short stories of the dramatic or satiric content. Some short stories greatly caught the fancy to spectators. These are, first of all, patriotic short story about the old woman to peasant woman, who repeated Susanin's feat, "feast in Zhirmunka", set by V. Pudovkin on L. Leonov's subject, the short story "Antosha Rybkin" (director K.

Yudin), in which B. Chirkov created the form of merry and resourceful soldier, and short story about gallant soldier Shveyke, the prisoner of Hitler concentration camp (director S. Yutkevich). On the basis of two latter/last short stories were then made full-length comedies about Antosha Rybkin and Shveyke - best comic films of the period of patriotic war.

The difficulties of designing of artistic films were complicated by the fact whereas that in the first months of war all studios of the artistic films of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk were evacuated to the east. The unit of the creative workers of these studios began to work on the small motion picture studios of Tashkent, Dushanbe and Baku, whereas majority was directed to Alma Ata, where was organized the new central united motion picture studio.

The first filmings in the Alma Ata motion picture studio conducted simultaneously with the equipment installation. Directors, operators and actors worked on the completion of the films, initiated even in peacetime, above the organization of short short stories for the "combat film symposiums" and above the new full-length artistic pictures.

First-born was film "Mashenka" director Yu. Rayzman on Ye.

Gabrilovich's scenario whose surveys were conducted also before the Great Patriotic War. The film based on the material of the Soviet-Finnish armed conflict with its content was not connected with the events of patriotic war. However, the central form of the modest girl of Mashenka, which captivates by spiritual staying power/persistence and cleanliness, infinite devotion to the native land, naturally it was associated with the forms of those Soviet women who protected the native land from the Fascist aggressors. In "Mashenka" to director, scenario and actress V. Karavayeva succeeded in showing the best features of Soviet person. This film, which appeared on the screen in 1942,, until now, uses the distinguished success.

The considerable achievement of the Soviet cinema of military years was I. Pyr'yev's film "secretary of district committee", enthusiastically accepted by spectators. It is dedicated to those people which carried on a struggle with the enemy in the territory occupied. In this film is truthful shown the work of the party for the cohesion of the people for dealing with the Fascist aggressors. Basic achievement of film - form of head partisan, the secretary of the district committee Kochet.

In the remarkable performance of V. Vanin Kochet daring and restrained, simple and efficient. It the same person as his comrades on partisan warfare, is only in it embodied will and the wisdom of the party, the experience of Bolshevik - the organizer of masses.

The excellent form of Soviet partisan Praskov'i Luk'yanova created actress V. Maretskaya in the film "It protects the native land" (director F. Ermler, A. Kapler's scenario). Fascist aggressors deprived collective farmer to Lukyanov in all - husband, child, the dear work. By it there is nothing to do but - lethal struggle with the enemy. Maretskaya unusually precisely and vitally truthful transmits the experiences of Praskov'i, its spiritual increase/growth, is shown, as simple collective farmer it is converted into the partisan leader.

Two artistic films were created on the basis of the considerable literary works of military years - "rainbow" (on V. Vasilevsky's narratives) and "invasion" (on L. Leonov's play). To directors M. Donskoy ("rainbow"), to A. Roy ("invasion") and for actors, who participated in these films, were able not only to retain the merits of literary primary sources, but also to enrich by their means of their art. Special success achieved the producer of film "rainbow". A feeling of pride for his people causes in spectators the form of heroic Soviet woman Olena Kostyuk in execution of the outstanding

Ukrainian actress N. Uzhviy. Film "rainbow" successfully was demonstrated not only in the Soviet Union, but also abroad and had a beneficial effect on progressive cinematography of the West.

Considerably less succeeded for Soviet artistic cinematography the image of the feat of our army. The form of the people in war did not find wide elucidation in artistic cinematography. Most successful proved to be the picture, placed by director L. Lukov on L. Slavin's story "two soldiers", heat narrating about the soldier friendship.

During the years of the war of the foreman of cinema they described in their films and about the heroism of the toilers of the rear. Particular success fell to the lot of the films: the "mainland" (1944) about the feat of the working class, set by S. Gerasmov, and "native fields" (1945) - about the life of kolkhoz (directors B. Babochkin and A. Bosulayev, M. Papavy's scenario).

Similar to literature and cinema, Soviet dramaturgy and theater made their contribution to the artistic image of the life of the Soviet people in the war years. War gave to dramatists unusually sharp/acute conflicts, richest material about the heroism of the people, its unity, high moral qualities and spiritual riches.

The dramatic products revealed were plays "Russian people" of K.

Simonov, the "invasion" of L. Leonov and "Front" of A. Korneychuk, all created into 1942 and gone around almost theaters of the country. The first two plays are the shining examples of psychological drama. Positive heroes in them - people of great moral cleanliness. Love and duty, personal sympathies and public responsibilities, love for the life and readiness to give it for the native land - here are those feelings which agitate the heroes of these products.

Severe masculinity and poetic spirituality of play "Russian people" made possible to the theaters of the country to create the impressive forms of patriots - commander of the vanguard, which trampled into the encirclement, captain Safonova, military medical assistant Globa and others.

The foremen of scene understood, that the organization of play about the courageous simple Soviet people must be characterized by artistic simplicity, feeling of measure, truthfulness, realism and sincerity of performance. All these qualities were inherent in the play of Moscow artistic theater, set by the remarkable foreman of the scene V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko.

The depth of the sufferings, caused to our people by Fascist occupationists, the process of spiritual courage of Soviet person with the exceptional psychological depth and by artistic force opened

L. Leonov in the play "invasion".

Among the best stage readings of play there was the play of state low academic theater in director K. A. Zubov's organization.

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The role of Talanova fulfilled P. M. Sadovskiy, role of the wife of doctor Talanova Anna Nikolaevna - V. N. Pashennaya, the role of Dement'yevna - V. O. Massalitinova. These remarkable actors created the forms of enormous force. Especially succeeded the form of the "iron old lady" of Anna Nikolaevna V. N. Pashennoy. Subsequently actress recalled: "... playing Talanova in the play "invasion", I it glorified the feat of the struggle for the native land of many Russian women in the Great Patriotic War"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. By its weaponry. M., Gospolitizdat, 1961, p. 253.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The most important vital problem - the collision/encounter of progressive-minded gifted people with the inert ones, the backward ones and the celebration of new military art being born in the course of war - reflected in the sharply publicistic play "Front" A. Korneychuk. After creating young Soviet military leader Ognev's form,

which combined in itself high moral qualities with the authentic military culture, with a feeling of new, the author set against it the brave, distinguished, but limited, getting puffed up narcissistic General it was throat and his toadying encirclement. Dramatist sharply ridiculed adherence to the routine, extremely ruinous under the wartime conditions complacency. Play caused passionate disputes. Many readers and spectators greeted it as the product, which touches on important questions of the present.

The organization of "Front" in the largest theaters of the country confirmed the urgency of that touched upon by the author of theme. The political sharpness of play obtained especially strong sounding in the play of theater im. Vakhtangov, set by director R. N. Simonov. Carried out well role it was throat A. D. Dikiy and role of Ognev - A. L. Abrikosov.

In the course of war the Communist Party drafted dramatists to create the products, which intensify the offensive spirit of army, advanced new themes - reactivation of life on the earth/ground liberated from the occupationists, creative labor/work on the restoration/reduction of cities, industrial centers and villages. But this important problem dramatists could not completely solve. In the majority of new plays as before discussion centered on the defense, the evacuation, the blockade, the sufferings which caused to the

Soviet people the aggressors.

In 1943-1944 appeared the plays, dedicated to the feat of the defenders of the hero-cities: the "Stalingrad residents" of Yu. Chepurin, "in the walls of V. Viwnyovskiy's Leningrad", "they lived in Leningrad" O. Bergholts and Yu. Makogonenko, "canto about the Black Sea sailors" B. Lavrenev. These plays at the basis of dramatic activity had not fates of individual people, but the fate of national masses - soldiers, seamen/sailors, inhabitants of the beseiged cities.

Unity of front and rear, spiritual growth of Soviet soldiers are shown in A. Kron's play "officer of the Navy", set by many theaters country. In the play are opened the fates of people of the most varied psychological depot/dump. All characters are carried out by the author through the heavy tests of war. A feeling of civil/civilian conscience and military honor, truthfulness and courage, correctness in the love and the friendship are asserted as the norms of the conduct of each Soviet person. In this play about commander-Balts and residents of Leningrad, who stably protected native city from the Fascist barbarians, was reflected inviolable socio-political and ideological unity of Soviet society.

On many products of Soviet literature and art of military years

lies/rests the impression of the personality cult of Stalin, which, it is doubtless, considerably decreases their ideological and artistic value. In the poetry, for example, running the verses, in which excessively were exaggerated Stalin's services and thereby was underestimated the role of the party and people in the struggle with the Hitler aggressors. Personality cult noticeably had effect on the motion pictures of the historical and historico-revolutionary content, in particular on such, as "Kutuzov", "Georgiy Saakadze" (two series), the "defense of tsarina's" and some others. Especially unsuccessful was the film "oath", which distorts and the history of Soviet state, and the event of the Great Patriotic War.

end section.

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The ruinous effect of personality cult was reflected also in the organizations of historical plays on the scenes of theaters.

In spite of this, the works of literature and skill of military years revealed are penetrated by inexhaustible optimism and life-asserting Communist ideas, firm conviction in the victory of the Soviet people above the Fascist-German aggressors. Artists realistically imprinted the appearance of the heroes of the severe working days of war. These heroes appear as the continuers of the glorious deeds of Gor'kiy Pavel Vlasov, Furman commissar Klychkov and legendary division commander Chapayev, Fadeyey^{skiy} Levinson, hardened/tempered as steel of the ward of the Lenin komsomol of Pavel Korchagin, Bolshevik Maxim from a film- trilogy about Maxim, professor Polezhaeva from the motion-picture film "deputies of the Baltic". With entire diversity of individual characters, national characteristics, mental/psychic depot/dump, personal fates the heroes have typical features. These are, first of all, ardent socialist patriotism, devotion to the Communist Party, limitless courage and authentic humanism.

From many heroic forms of the best products, created during the years of the Great Patriotic War, is formed the monumental form of the Communist Party. It perceived and impressively lives in the poem of Damien Bedny "Lenin with us", in the legendary appearance of S. M. Kirov whose terrible name the "regiments of residents of Leningrad conducts", in Sholokhovian Lieutenant Gerasimov with his holy hatred for the enemy, in the forms of party heads Protsenko and Lyutikov, paternally worrying about hero- young guards, in the bright figure of the partisan leader of the secretary of the district committee Kochet and in many other heroes of the works of literature and skill of the peoples of the USSR.

During the years of war the workers of Soviet literature and art with the particular force showed that they do not have other interests, except the interests of the socialist native land. Our writers and workers of arts wholly dedicated their creativity to the affair of the people and the Communist Party. They understood, that the force of socialist state in the unity of the party and people, and they created on the command of the heart, which belonged to the Soviet native land.

The last war confirmed that literature and art are the powerful

means of the education of the people.

Truthfulness and high artistry were given to literature and art of military years the enormous force of influence on the masses, on the formation of the spiritual appearance of Soviet person. Works of literature and skill helped the party to raise the multinational Soviet people to the sacred war, to inspire the toilers of the rear to the labor ones, and soldiers - to the military feats into the name of the socialist fatherland.

High appraisal obtained Soviet literature and art of military years in progressive writers and workers of arts of the West European countries. Thus, for instance, friend of the Soviet Union outstanding American writer Theodore Dreiser in 1944 in the "letter to the Soviet young people" wrote: "I want to say that Russia for me - the greatest country in the world on its intellectual, artistic, aesthetic and practical achievements...."¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. T. Dreiser. Collected works in twelve volumes. Vol. 12. M., publishing house "Pravda", 1955, page 258. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The most important Danish writer- antifascist Martin Andersen Nexø, comparing the contribution of literature and art of the western countries and the Soviet Union to the victory over the fascism,

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MOTHER. From a picture by artist B. Nemenskiy.

arrived at the conclusion that the contribution of Soviet literature and art is considerably more. "How this is explained"? - he asked. And he answered: "I think that writers and the artists of old world, with rare exception, spectators and the monitors of events, whereas the force of their associates in the Soviet Union - this try activity, force being militant.

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As the skalds of old times, they fight and go ahead military forces, inspiring it to the struggle ... Soviet art and literature several they made for approaching the victory of democracy in entire world"
1.

FOOTNOTE 1. "Soviet art", on 19 December 1944. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The heroic forms of Soviet people, created with our literature and art during the years of war, generated enormous interest in progressive people of all world, they became their dear heroes and they entered into the treasure-house of world progressive art.

Not one war in the history required from the masses of this stress/voltage of spiritual forces, what was required from the Soviet people in order to rout very strong Hitler army, which attacked on us

suddenly and fighting with the enormous bitterness. This was the lethal struggle between the socialist and capitalist countries. It is necessary to still have in mind that Fascist Germany achieved unprecedented under the conditions of the aggressive war of stability level of military forces and population, level highest for its time such as only could attain imperialistic state by the means of the ideological deception of masses.

However, to any deception must come end. The experience of the Second World War confirmed the situation of V. I. Lenin, expressed by it in connection with the analysis of the results of the First World War. "It is obvious, wrote V. I. Lenin into 1919, not only for Russia, but also for all countries there is a limit. For the different countries different limit, but - the limit it is further which to wage war, for the interests of capitalists, is cannot"².

FOOTNOTE ². V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 29, pp. 46. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The results of the Great Patriotic War especially vividly showed that the truth is stronger than any deception. The valid ideas and the goals into name of which struggled our people, exceeded on the force of influence on the masses wrong, extremely reactionary ideas and the goal of German fascism. The defense of the socialist native land gave rise to the moral stability of the front and rear

impregnable for the enemies, since the possibilities of socialism in the ideological region are incomparably more than the possibility of any imperialistic state.

This conformity with the law especially distinctly was revealed in the first months of war. The Fascist-German army fought then in the situation very favorable for itself, and Fascist ideological thorn apple exerted the strongest influence on the military forces. However, Red Army carried on a struggle under the extremely severe conditions and nevertheless it revealed/detected unexpected for the enemy, struck the whole world staying power/persistency. Specifically, it - the unbending staying power/persistency - played then main role, since it helped us to be gathered with the forces and to rid from the Soviet country lethal threat. Justified V. I. Lenin's words about the fact that the difficulties of war in defense of the socialist fatherland cause the solid determination of masses to oppose enemy and that, the the great danger it threatens to the great conquests of laborers, the more grow/rise the cohesive forces, the closer the people is joined around its party and government.

During the years of war ideological struggle acquired enormous scope and sharpness. Marxist-Leninist ideology was one of the most important factors of the victory over Hitler Germany. The peoples of terrestrial globe constantly were convinced of dignity and humanity of

socialist ideology, its foremost character. Very course of military events overturned lie about the Soviet Union and the Red Army, that was being piled up by bourgeois propaganda for many prewar years. Millions of deceived people of the capitalist countries with their own eyes were convinced of the might of the USSR. Socialist ideology conquered to itself newer and newer positions, it accumulated under its banners more and more than people, while Fascist ideology gradually lost effect on the masses.

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Its influence on them is slow, but steadily it weakened. It continuously exposed itself, until it suffers break-up together with the break-up of Hitler state.

Summing up in their time the results of the Second World War, prominent Fascist military leaders G. Guderian and H. Manteufel arrived at the conclusion that the USA is the latter/last stronghold of capitalism. Guderian warned the ruling American circles from the repetition of that fateful error, which allowed the political and military government of Hitler Germany, i.e., from the underestimation of the technical, economic, military power of the Soviet Union and especially the force of its political ideas. "The main thing, he wrote - this the latter, the force of idea which provides to the

Soviet system of the sympathy of wide indigent masses, it provides even in the heavy times when success becomes doubtful"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Generaloberst Guderian. Kann Westeuropa verteidigt werden? Goettingen, 1950. p 63. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This, is at first glance, the sober advice/council of deep-rooted militarist completely does not have in the failure type of the war, but, on the contrary, it is appeal as good as possible to be prepared for the new war and to at any cost annihilate socialism. But the real correlation of the forces of the progress and reaction in the international scale is such, which to demolish by the force of weaponry world socialist system is impossible, and political ideas, by which is until now guided the world imperialistic reaction, this the internally faulty ideas of anticommunism and chauvinism.

General Manteufel, having reluctantly recognized bankruptcy of Fascist ideology during the years of war against the USSR, expressed thought about the fact that "into the century of ideological wars, in the predicted struggle against the military force, who, as jaw, was impregnated with Communist ideas, success can have only such army, which in turn, to the end is convinced of the value of those ideas and moral principles which it is intended to protect"².

FOOTNOTE 2. Results of the Second World War, pp. 616. ENDFOOTNOTE.

After this general/common/total statement is hidden practical recommendation to create such armed forces which in ideological and moral sense at least would not be inferior to the armed forces of the Soviet Union. That itself without noting, Manteufel, as Guderian, in earnest proposes to solve irresolvable problem.

It goes without saying, the last war learned us to more sensibly estimate the ideological possibilities of its enemies. We excellently understand, that the contemporary imperialism (especially American), speculating on patriotic feelings of the peoples, igniting unrestrained chauvinism, in every possible way using the corrupt ideology of anticommunism, the inventive slander and demagogy, resorting to the police pursuits and the terror, is still capable to poison the consciousness of the wide masses of laborers, to create the armed forces, which are the obedient gun of its reactionary policy.

However, it is completely clear that any bourgeois ones, and it means, ideas (as not to camouflage them) antinational in their essence cannot successfully oppose the ideas of scientific socialism and communism. Under the banner of these are invincible ideas the laborers of our planet they carry on a struggle for the new, that

corresponds to their deepest expectations the social system, against capitalism.

Our party constantly improves ideological weaponry, it reinforces ideological work. In accordance with resolutions of the XXII Congress of CPSU primary task of the ideological and educational work of the party at present lies in the fact that to ideologically ensure realization into the life of the program of CPSU, creation of the material and technical base of communism, formation of Communist social relations, education of new person, and also in increasing of political vigilance, conducting the started offensive against the imperialistic ideology, against the vestiges of the past in the consciousness of people.

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In the center of the entire educational work of our party are located the labor education of Soviet people, the development of Communist relation to the labor/work in all members of society. At the same time are brought up such important qualities, as the concern about retention/preservation/maintaining and multiplication of public riches as a feeling of collectivism, which leads to the fortification of the basic abutments of socialism and the creation even of more favorable conditions for the started building of communism.

Especially responsible is now an improvement in the ideopolitical education of young people, an increase in her activity in all regions of public life.

The party considers one of its most important problems formation in all Soviet people of scientific ideology and Communist morals. To solve this problem make it possible the successes revealed, achieved in all regions of our life. The increased economic, political cultural possibilities of our country created the conditions, favorable for complete overcoming in the consciousness of people of the vestiges of the past.

In the consciousness of Soviet people socialist patriotism is closely related to internationalism. For them characteristically a fundamental understanding of international duty before the countries of socialism, the laborers of the capitalist countries, before all peoples, which struggle for their social and national liberation. Soviet person considers for himself dishonourable any manifestations of nationalism, which weakens friendship between the peoples of the socialist countries, international unity of laborers.

Fundamental importance has irreconcilable ideological struggle

with the enemies of communism, the enemies of the cause of peace and freedom of the peoples.

This is why it is necessary to keep in the cleanliness and the combat readiness our ideological weaponry, to carry on a decisive offensive struggle with the ideological sabotages on the part of imperialists, with their attempts to poison the consciousness of Soviet people by the poison of bourgeois ideas, disbelief into our own forces and final victory of communism. Contemporary epoch, increased scales, complexity and importance of the new political tasks, set before us by the course of historical development, including problem of further strengthening of the defensive capacity of the country, require the continuous sharpening of ideological weaponry, constant concern about an increase in the political vigilance of Soviet people, untiring struggle with the reactionary ideas of capitalist society.

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Chapter Five.

VICTORY OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES.

1. General questions of armed struggle.

The victory over Fascist Germany required the matched efforts/forces of the Soviet people both in the rear and at the front. The rear of the Soviet country was the source of the material and spiritual might of the Red Army, and directly the outcome of war into our benefit solved the armed forces. Their victory, thus, was the regular consequence of comprehensive superiority of socialism over imperialism - superiority of economic, political, ideological and military.

The last war again confirmed the correctness of Marxist-Leninist situation about the direct dependence of the combat power of army, her capability to defeat on the social system, which it represents, from the economic potential on which it leans, from the political character of war and ratio to it of the people.

The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces was simultaneous and the celebration of our military art. Both in the theory of the armed struggle and in the practice of its conduct it proved to be above German military art.

After the termination of war have passed narrower than twenty years. But bourgeois military historians in any way cannot correctly determine the reasons of the victory of the Red Army. They hush up about those basic socio-political reasons which served as the basis of our victory. These authors attempt to in every way possible diminish the role of Soviet military art in the combat successes of the Red Army. They continue to assert that the victories of our armed forces were achieved only because of the overwhelming superiority in a quantity of military forces and combat devices. However, the numerical comparison of the forces which were arranged/located both sides at the Soviet-German front, does not give grounds for such confirmations/assertions.

Its first large/coarse victory - in the environs of Moscow - the Red Army gained, without having superiority over the enemy in forces and combat materiel. It achieved the success, first of all, because of the heroism of military forces and the ability more effectively to utilize available forces and resources in the difficult conditions of the advanced winter.

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1950 poster. Artist N. Smolyak.

KEY: (1) To the soldier - the liberator of glory!

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1945 poster. Artist V. Shcheglov.

In the table it is shown, what quantity of military forces and armament were arranged/located both sides at the Soviet-German front in the subsequent periods of war.

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The numbers given in the table attest to the fact that offensive operations in winter campaign 1942/43, which began the basic turning point in the course of war, the Red Army developed, without having numerical superiority over the enemy. Subsequently the relationship/ratio of forces and means steadily changed in favor of Soviet military forces. But this superiority was small, exception was aviation. true, in the completing stage of war our army in the field had considerably more military forces and armaments, than enemy. It has triply more than tanks and self-propelled artillery units, almost four times - artillery means, also, eight times - combat aircraft. However, the Fascist-German command element at this time still was arranged/located the sufficiently large/coarse reserves, which were being located within Germany.

If we speak about operations/processes 1943-1945, then it is necessary to note that in the majority their Red Army actually/really

had a superiority in the forces. Especially considerable this superiority was in the decisive directions/axes. It was created by daring and skillful maneuvering by military forces, by combat materiel, massed by their use. This testified about an increase in Soviet military art.

The experience of the Second World War gave numerous examples, which show that the superiority in the forces and the means by itself yet cannot ensure victory. It is possible to achieve only because of the skillful use of this superiority. The Anglo-American command element had in Normandy in the summer of 1944 2.5 times of more than military forces and the overwhelming superiority in the tanks and the aircraft. Nevertheless main forces of German military forces could avoid decisive damage/defeat and walked away from France. When Hitlerites undertook offensive in the Ardennes, the Anglo-American military forces proved to be in the extremely heavy situation, although they had available considerably greater forces than enemy.

Soviet military art constantly was improved in the course of war because of the creative energy of bulk of our military personnel, to the foremost character of Soviet military science.

Relationship/ratio of forces and means of army in the field at the Soviet-German front into 1942-1945¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 17936, pp. 460, 519, 534; history of Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Vol. 4. M., Voenizdat, 1962, pp. 20, 125; there, Vol. 5, 1963, pp. 27.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Силы и средства	(2) Ноябрь 1942 г.	(3) Июнь 1943 г.	(4) Январь 1944 г.	(5) Июнь 1944 г.	(6) Январь 1945 г.
(5) Численность войск (в млн.)	$\frac{6,1}{6,1}$	$\frac{6,4}{5,2}$	$\frac{6,2}{4,9}$	$\frac{6,4}{4,0}$	$\frac{6,5}{3,1}$
(6) Танки и САУ (в тыс.)	$\frac{6,9}{6,6}$	$\frac{9,9}{5,9}$	$\frac{5,4}{5,4}$	$\frac{7,8}{5,2}$	$\frac{12,9}{4}$
(7) Орудия и минометы (в тыс.)	$\frac{77,7}{70,0}$	$\frac{103,1}{56,3}$	$\frac{92,6}{54,6}$	$\frac{92,6}{48,6}$	$\frac{108,0}{28,5}$
(8) Боевые самолеты (в тыс.)	$\frac{3,2}{3,5}$	$\frac{8,4}{3,0}$	$\frac{8,5}{3,1}$	$\frac{13,4}{2,8}$	$\frac{15,5}{2,0}$


Note. In the numerator are indicated the forces and the means of the Soviet army in the field, in the denominator - Fascist-German. Data on the Fascist-German army are not final.


Key: (1). Forces and means. (2). November. (3). June. (4). January. (5). Strength of military forces (in mln.). (6). Tanks and SAU (in thousand). (7). Guns and mortars (in thousand). (8). Combat aircraft (in thousand).

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 88/22
1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH V N ANDRIANOV ET AL. 86 OCT 82
FTD-ID(R5)T-8668-82 F/G 15/7 NL

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963 - A

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The Communist Party, preparing the armed forces for the defense of the socialist fatherland, paid considerable attention to the development of military science whose bases laid V. I. Lenin. In the Soviet Union even in the beginning of the 30's were developed the principles of the conduct of deep offensive operations with the massed use/application of the tank, mechanized and airborne troops. These achievements of military science were reflected in the construction of the armed forces. In the middle of the 30's in the Red Army were large/coarse mechanized and airborne large units/formations. Their combat capabilities repeatedly were inspected/checked on the military maneuvers.

Soviet military science in proper time evaluated the significance of the new combat devices, which were being rapidly developed after the First World War. It outlined the accurate ways of building different forms of the armed forces and arms of service, in essence correctly it determined receiving and the methods of their combat use. Their concrete/specific/actual expression these achievements of secular military theory obtained, in particular, in the Field Service Regulations of the Red Army of 1936. It was more

contemporary for that time, than regulations of foreign armies. German military organs during the development of official leadership for the Hitler army used many situations of this manual/regulations, characteristic bases of all-arms combat and principles of its conduct.

However, in the development of our military science in last pre-war years ruinous effect showed/rendered the circumstance that many prominent military theorists, who made a great contribution to resolving of the problems of military art, became the victim of Stalin arbitrariness. The creative development of military theory paused itself. From the experience of combat operations in Spain were made inaccurate conclusions/derivations, in particular with respect to the use of armored forces and aviation. The combat practice of the Fascist-German army into 1939-1940 seriously and in depth was not studied.

Soviet military science correctly considered that the war will take highly maneuverable character, that it will take the shape of a prolonged combat competition in course of which will be used the different methods of the armed struggle.

Correctly giving preference to the offensive way of activities, Soviet military doctrine, however, did not attach proper significance

to questions of strategic defense. This one-way approach to a considerable extent determined entire subsequent activity of military organs for development and practical resolution of the problems of the strategic use of the armed forces. Was forgotten warning/prevention of V. I. Lenin about the fact that "the one who learned to attack/advance and did not learn under the known severe conditions, being applied to them, to retreat, that war will not finish victoriously. Such wars which would begin and were finished by continuous victorious offensive, it did not occur in the world-wide history, or they occurred as exclusions"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 33, pp. 74. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The oblivion of this Leninist instruction led to that, then the significant part of our military personnel was not thoroughly prepared to the decision of the practical problems which placed before them the combat reality in the first months of war.

The experience of war showed that the selection of the ways of conducting the armed struggle depends not only on the strategic problems, which escape/ensue from the political purposes of war, but also from those of the real possibilities which are arranged/located the armed forces of the country.

The strategic problems of the Fascist-German army were determined by those political purposes which Hitler of cry attempted to achieve in the war against the Soviet Union. German imperialism, being the striking power of world reaction, pursued in this war not only the predatory, but also decisive class goal - to annihilate the first in the world socialist state of workers and peasants.

However, Hitler of cry overestimated its possibilities. The armed forces, which had available Fascist Germany, proved to be sufficient in order shortly to take the low countries of Europe, to force to the surrender France and to inflict the serious damage/defeat of England.

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Preparing war against the Soviet Union, the Fascist-German strategists considered that here to them it is necessary to deal concerning the enemy, who has available strong army, and by powerful/thick economy, and by vast territory. Therefore they considerably increased the strength of their military forces, raised their strike power, urged to participate in the war against the USSR of the army of their allies. Basic general headquarters Fascist aggressors made to the surprise attack and the destructive rout of the Red Army before it will know how to develop its main forces.

But the doctrine of "lightning war", which ensured light victory in the West, proved to be unsuitable in the war against the Soviet state, which possesses the capability to rapidly mobilize all forces of the country to the resistance to enemy. The Fascist-German army brought considerable loss to Soviet military forces. However, it could not solve the most important problem, which placed before it the Hitler strategy, - to break down resistance of the Red Army.

Thus, already in the first months of war appeared sharp contradiction between the strategy of Fascist aggressors and the military possibilities of Germany. Although for Hitler faction it was necessary then to radically change its strategic plans, to mobilize all material and human resources, it continued blindly to believe in the reality of its political concepts. Only after catastrophical damage/defeat in the battle in Volga Fascist heads began to understand that the political purpose for which they undertook war against the USSR, is already unattainable. The Soviet Union by this time had time to develop and to introduce into the activity such forces about existence of which German of the policy and the strategists even did not suspect. At the conference in its general headquarters during February 1943. Hitler forced was to recognize that the "possibility of the termination of war in the east by means

of the offensive more does not exist"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. "Military history log/journal", 1963, No 1, pp. 82.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

And if Hitler command element nevertheless decided to undertake offensive near Kursk in the summer of 1943, then it saddled this for the purpose to mainly support its political prestige and to stave off the disintegration of Fascist bloc. After damage/defeat near Kursk the Hitlerites mobilized all their military and economic possibilities already only in order to avoid complete break-up.

The Fascist-German strategists, using for the realization of the plan of "lightning war" against Soviet Union the in advance prepared forces, forced were subsequently to limit the scope of their offensive operations. When their army finally lost superiority in the forces and the means, it was completely deprived of the capability to conduct the offensive operations of strategic significance. Defense and retreat became the basic forms of its combat operations.

Failure/dip/trough of German strategy in the war against the USSR was not the result some miscalculations alone, allowed by Hitler military heads in the course of war. this failure/dip/trough depended on the adventuristic nature of the policy of German imperialism,

problem placed before the strategy which did not correspond to the military possibilities of Germany.

The strategic problems of the armed forces of the USSR were determined by other, directly opposite on their social essence political purposes. The Soviet people forced was to enter the lethal struggle with the enemy in order to be located its right on the free, independent existence, to shield the socialist state created with it. Furthermore, following international duty with respect to the laborers of other countries, it attempted to render by aid the peoples of Europe in their liberation from the oppression of German imperialism. For achievement of these goals it was necessary not only to banish the Fascist-German army from the limits of the USSR and occupied by it the countries of central and southeastern Europe, but also to annihilate the armed forces of Hitler Germany in order to remove the possibility of new aggression from the side of German imperialism.

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The noble/precious political purposes, set by the Communist Party before the Soviet people, were the powerful source of their combat and labor enthusiasm. "... realization with the masses of goals and reasons for war has great value and provides victory",

indicated V. I. Lenin.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 115. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Soviet strategy, carrying out its missions, considered the solid determination of all Soviet people to attain complete victory in a just war, it leaned on the planned/planning, highly organized economy of socialist state, on the great human resources which had available our country.

The powerful/thick military economy of socialist state, its inexhaustible human reserves made it possible not only to complete the losses which bore the army in the field in the course of the strained battles, but also to continuously increase its combat capabilities. Steadily rose the level of the technical equipment of the Red Army, were improved the means of armament used by it. It is characteristic that the strength/of personnel of our army in the field at the beginning of last year of war increased only by 6.7 percent in comparison with November 1942, a quantity whereas of the artillery-mortar means which were arranged/located the Soviet military forces, grew within the same time approximately/exemplarily 1.4 times, tanks and self-propelled gun mounts - into 1.9, combat aircraft - 4.8 times².

FOOTNOTE ². IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 17936, pp. 440, 441, 756, 757. A continuous increase in the forces of the Red Army made it possible for Soviet strategy to solve ever more complicated combat missions.

Soviet strategy skillfully used this important form of struggle as mass partisan movement. In the course of war it became the most active means of influence on the operational rear of hostile army. Operating on the expanded communications of enemy, after attacking to his rear installations, garrisons, the headquarters, breaking away the economic measures of Hitler administrative and military authorities in by them the Soviet territory occupied, partisans deposited the sizable loss of the Fascist-German army and forced her command element to allot considerable forces for the protection of the rear.

In proportion to an improvement in the leadership of partisan movement and its increase/growth it acquired ever more organized character. The activity of guerilla detachments became more purposefully; increasingly more frequent with it were placed the problems, matched with the operational-strategic plans of Supreme High Command. Strikes/shocks partisan on the communications, which maintained/served the decisive strategic directions, caused the sharp shortening of the rail transportation of enemy when it most of all

them required, and thereby in many respects they contributed to the success of the operations/processes of the Red Army. In proportion to the approximation/approach of the attacked/advanced Soviet military forces to zones of active operations partisan in their activity ever more considerable place began to occupy the armed struggle with the field hostile troops, which they conducted in the cooperation with the attacked/advanced units and the large units/formations of the Red Army.

Partisan movement - regular form of the armed struggle of the people, which leads war of liberation against the imperialistic aggressors. But not in one of the wars of the past it had this mass character and wide scope as in the Great Patriotic War. The Communist Party, inspiring and directing partisan movement, converted it into the well organized and effective operating force, capable of carrying out the missions of operational-strategic significance.

Our advantage over the enemy consisted also of the fact that the liberating goals into name of which fought the Red Army, provided with it the support of all peoples, which were struggling against the fascism. They understood, that only the Soviet Union was capable to inflict the defeat of Hitler army.

The Soviet Union, being the most active term of anti-Hitlerite coalition, justified the hopes of the peoples of the world - the Soviet Armed Forces played the decisive role in the rout of Fascist aggressors.

Into anti-Hitlerite coalition together with the Soviet Union entered strongest powers of the capitalist world - USA and England. Their enormous war economy potential made it possible for them to create the well equipped multimillion-man armies. The armed forces of USA and England toward the end 1942 counted about 7 mln. people, had numerous aviation and large/coarse navies. Anti-Hitlerite coalition had available considerably large military forces and economic resources, than Fascist Germany and its allies.

If by the USA and England soon after the attack of Germany in the USSR were used their armed forces for the accomplishment of more active and more decisive strategic objectives, the armed struggle against the Fascist aggressors would not be so/such prolonged and did not require such enormous victims from the Soviet people. But the powerful/thick armed forces of these states prior to middle 1944 carried out such missions which seriously are not changed strategic situation at the Soviet-German front where was decided the fate of

entire war. For the opposition to union military forces in Africa Hitler command element used 1.5 percent of the forces of its land army. After the invasion of allies into Italy against them acted about 6 percent of ground forces of the Fascist-German army. However, its main forces remained at the Soviet-German front. Since the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union and until June 1944: in the German army in the field it was counted from 217 to 326 divisions of ground forces. From them from 153 to 201 division they acted at the Soviet-German front. Here they were located from 37 to 72 divisions of the allies of Hitler Germany¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 17936, pp. 862-864. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The education/formation of the second front in Europe and June 1944 seriously complicated strategic situation for Fascist Germany. It it was now necessary to distribute its military forces between two actively operating fronts. For the defensive actions against the Anglo-American military forces at the Western Front and in Italy Hitler command element it was forced to use already 25-37 percent of its divisions. The abstraction/distraction of these forces by the Anglo-American military forces was the real military aid of the Red Army. Nevertheless and after the landing of the Anglo-American military forces in France the Fascist-German command element the

basic efforts/forces of its army as before concentrated on the Soviet-German front. True, the total number of hostile divisions, which opposed the Red Army, decreased with 239 during June 1944 to 195 during January 1945. But this occurred in any way due to opening of the second front, but as a result of the enormous losses of those carried by Hitler army in the summer-autumn campaign 1944.

Furthermore, from its composition retired Finnish and Rumanian large units/formations in connection with the output/yield from the war of Finland and Rumania. For the completion/replenishment of the carried losses Hitler command element in second half 1944 only moved to the Soviet-German front more than 66 German divisions, moreover some large units/formations were undertaken from the Italian and Western fronts.

For Hitler faction it succeeded with the aid of the reactionary rulers of Italy, Finland. Rumania and Hungary to draw the army of these countries for waging of war against the Soviet Union. But this coalition was not, yes even could not be enduring/permanent. It constantly tore up the impregnable contradictions, characteristic to any aggressive bloc. These contradictions were complicated by the chauvinistic policy which conducted the ruling top of Germany. And it is completely regular, that the Fascist coalition did not maintain/withstand the tests of war and under the strikes/shocks of the armed forces of the USSR and its allies was pulled down.

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In the composition of the armed forces of the USSR fought the 1st and 2nd armies the military forces of Polish, Czechoslovak army corps, French air regiment "Normandy-Niemen", Yugoslavian voluntary brigade, large units/formations of the national armies of Rumania and Bulgaria. In the completing stage of war together with the Soviet military forces in combat against the Fascist-German army participated Polish, Czechoslovak, Rumanian and Bulgarian large units/formations - only 31.5 divisions¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 759.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the operations/processes in the Far East jointly with the Soviet soldiers fought the military forces of Mongolian national-revolutionary army.

The selfless struggle of Soviet people, their fraternal

solidarity with other peoples contributed to the rapid development of antifascist movement in the countries of Europe, which in turn, rendered efficient aid the armed forces of USSR in their struggle against the Fascist-German aggressors.

The armed forces of Fascist Germany could not rely on the support of national masses in the countries occupied. Hitler army caused the burning hatred of all freedom-loving peoples. The mass movement of resistance in many countries developed into the organized armed struggle against the occupationists. The national liberation forces of France, Italy, Belgium and Balkan countries by their active operations pinned down the significant part of the Fascist-German military forces.

There is no doubt that the military operations/processes, carried out by the armies of the USA and England, the armed struggle of the national liberation forces of the countries occupied contributed to the rout of the Fascist-German army. However, Soviet command element during the strategic planning of combat activities at the Soviet-German front could count basically only on those possibilities, which had available the Red Army.

For the armed forces of the USSR it was necessary to carry on a prolonged and persistent struggle, in order to carry out the assigned

to them most difficult strategic tasks. The Great Patriotic War, which was continuing four years, consisted of nine military campaigns. Only in two of them initiative belonged to enemy, whereas in the rest Soviet strategic leadership mastered the initiative of the conduct of military activities.

2. Strategic defense of Soviet military forces.

The perfidious attack of Hitler hordes in the Soviet Union placed the Red Army in the very heavy situation. Soviet military forces, caught by surprise, forced were to begin war from the retreat and defenses, also, during the long time of news the bitter armed struggle in their territory, step by step freeing/releasing it from the enemy, who penetrated in the depth of our country.

This turn of events was, actually, not expected for the command element of the Red Army. It did not have previously prepared plans of repulsion of the surprise attack of the large/coarse forces of Fascist Germany. By the reason for this to a considerable degree they were subjectivist appraisal Stalin the international situation of on the eve war, underestimation by them the military danger, which threatened our country, and the military possibilities of the our most probable enemies, the unjustified hope for the inevitability of rapid revolutionary explosion in the rear of imperialistic states in

the case of their attack on the Soviet country, the exaggeration of the degree of readiness of the Red Army for the successful struggle with the aggressor.

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All this gave rise to the underestimation of the increased threat of war and complexity of those problems which could arise before the Red Army and the Soviet people in the case of war. Party, state and military organs, entire personnel of the armed forces were oriented to easy victory in the possible struggle with the enemy, which introduced into their activity certain complacency.

This could not but be reflected by negative form in state and combat efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Should be also had in mind considerable expansion and restoration of all teams of the commanding composition of the army and navy which occurred in the pre-war years and it was caused by both the quantitative increase in the armed forces and by heavy loss, carried by military personnel as a result of the unjustified repressions 1937-1938 with respect to a large number of prepared and experienced leading military personnel. Communist Party selected and advanced to the leading work in the army and in the Navy new cadres. But at the beginning of war many commanders yet did not

have adequate experience and we could not successfully carry out the missions charged on them.

However, the main reason for the exceptionally unfavorable situation, which was established for for the Red Army in the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, consisting in the fact that the Soviet military forces were not in proper time brought to full combat readiness. It is known that in connection with the aggravation of military danger the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces considerably grew and to 1941 achieved 4207 thousand people. As long ago as 1939 the Red Army completed transition to the cadre system of personnel procurement and organization of military forces. Army had available powerful/thick artillery. Although our armored forces and aviation were situated in the stage of reequipping and reorganization, they had a considerable quantity of tanks and aircraft. Soviet military forces, which was included in western military districts, were inferior on their strength of Fascist invasion army. Nevertheless they had sufficient forces and means in order to repel the first attacks of enemy and to hold in control his pressure.

The heads of the people's commissariat of defense and General Staff knew that at the Soviet boundary are concentrated the large/coarse military forces of Germany and its allies; however, necessary conclusions/derivations for the provision of combat

readiness of the Soviet military forces for the reflection of hostile attack did not make.

All this was the result of the inadmissible miscalculation in the appraisal of the military-strategic situation, which was established on the eve war. Attaching excessively great significance to the included with Germany nonaggression treaty, without taking into account insidiousness and perfidy which no longer repeatedly exhibited the Hitler top with respect to other countries, Stalin did not allow/assume the possibility of the attack of fascists on the Soviet country. He persistantly did not desire to listen to the opinion of some military heads, who more sensibly estimated the situation. It is known that even to the attack of Fascist Germany on our country the chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov proposed to keep within the framework of old state boundary after the line of the powerful/thick fortified areas main forces of near-boundary districts, and into the new, liberated regions of Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine, and into Baltic States to also advance only units of protection, able in the case of the surprise attack of enemy to ensure the deployment of main forces. But this reasonable proposition of experimental military leader was not accepted. As a result up to the moment/factor of the attack of the Fascist-German military forces in the Soviet Union the military forces even of western military districts were not brought to full

combat readiness. Our border forces showed/rendered the persistent resistance to the avant-garde units of the enemy, however, having available only light armament, we could not withstand the pressure of its enormous forces.

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In the first months of war many situations prewar regulations and manuals, the correctly determined forms and the ways of combat operations, could not be applied in practice for lack of present forces and means, and also due to the lack of preparation of command cadres to the decision of combat missions under the such complicated conditions. The elimination of this explosion/burst between the theory and the practice required considerable time and sizable victims. The heavy fighting of the first period of war were at the same time severe school for the command and political cadres, for all personnel of the Red Army. The experience acquired by high price played great role in the provision of a success of those following military operations of Soviet military forces.

Strategic problems in the second and third periods of war the Red Army solved already by the predominantly offensive operations, scope and power of which increased in proportion to an increase in forces and means, which were being located at the disposal of Supreme

High Command.

The strategic defense to which the Red Army forced was to resort in 1941 and 1942, was conducted under the dissimilar conditions. Because of this different were the character of defense, its scope and results.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 Soviet military forces conducted defensive actions against the Fascist-German army simultaneously at the front by the elongation/extent of 3 thousand kilometers. Enemy had the overwhelming superiority in the forces and the means in the main directions/axes. In this complicated situation Soviet command element, without having known how to effectively realize the potential combat capabilities of the military forces of near-boundary districts, it was forced to in a hurry advance forces from the interior of the country. However, it used them not for the creation of enduring/permanent defensive front in the rear of the fighting military forces, but predominantly for deciding the offensive missions. In the summer of 1941 Supreme High Command directed toward the fronts more than 324 divisions, but only 68 of them were intended for the timely organization of defense on the rear lines ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See military strategy. Publ. 2. M., Voenizdat, 1963,

page 196. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Situation frequently required the conclusion of military forces from under the strike/shock of enemy in order to maintain them, to be fastened on rear lines and to pull reserves. But the command element of the Red Army frequently was late with making of a decision about withdrawal/departure and organization of defense on the rear lines, and the been suitable reserves were used for conducting the particular offensive operations which under the established conditions did not give, yes even we could not give any strategic result. Strategic defense in the first months of war carried the character of short-lived struggle for the retention of the weakly equipped defensive lines, cities and communications centers with the subsequent retreat of military forces into the depth of the country.

The bitter semimonthly battle on the approaches to Moscow was the most important event of entire summer-autumn campaign of 1941. German strategy suffered here the first decisive damage/defeat. The main strategic grouping of the Fascist-German military forces before which stood the problem of holding the Soviet capital, was solidly exhausted by the Red Army. Hitler command element lost the strategic initiative, seized in the beginning of war.

In spite of the fact that in summer and in the fall of 1941 our



Death to the Nazi invaders!


691



Sub-machine gunner Guardsmen blow away sections of the enemy's railroad.


Advance of the infantry under the cover of tanks.






Artillery soldiers support an attack from an open position.

Tanks with an infantry landing.





Tanks, self-propelled weapons and jet-propelled devices before the attack.



Antiaircraft gunners vigilantly protect the Leningrad sky.



Mortar men lead the fire.



Heavy self-propelled weapons in position.

armed forces sustained large/coarse losses and forced were to leave to enemy vast territory, they nevertheless carried out the missions of strategic defense. The Fascist-German army, after losing in the first offensive at the Soviet-German front of approximately 750 thousand soldiers and officers (without taking into account the armies of the allies of Germany), i.e., is 2.5 times more than during entire first period of the Second World War ¹, it did not achieve the decisive strategic success.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 254; see "military history log/journal", 1962, No 12, page 72. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Characterizing the results of this campaign, the former Hitler General K. Tippelskirch could not but recognize that, although the operations/processes of three army groups, and especially in the direction/axis of main attack - in the center of general/common/total front, passed successfully, it led neither to the rapid annihilation of all armed forces of enemy nor to the repression of moral spirit and courage of the military forces of the Red Army, for which Hitler thus it hoped ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the results of the Second World War, page 74.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Soviet Armed Forces, after tearing away the detachments of enemy to the success of "lightning war", at the same time won the necessary time for the mobilization of the human and material resources of the country, rebuilding of its national economy, preparation/training and concentration of forces for the transition into the counteroffensive.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 the Red Army applied strategic defense under other conditions. By this time our country mobilized its main forces. Soviet military forces accumulated considerable combat experience. They had now more than artillery means and small arms, than enemy. Only losses in the tanks and the aviation were still not completely restored/reduced. But army in the field received tanks and aircraft, which possessed the more advanced combat and technical qualities.

The Fascist-German command element although increased its field forces, to gather sufficient forces for the offensive along entire front not could. An increase in the combat power of the Red Army forced enemy to restrict the scope of its new offensive.

The loss of strategic initiative by Soviet command element was

the consequence of the serious errors in the appraisal of strategic situation, the planning and organizing the combat operations of Soviet military forces. Supreme High Command during planning of combat operations on the summer of 1942 proceeded from the fact that the Fascist-German army already to a considerable extent wasted its offensive power. This was the explicit underestimation of the military possibilities of enemy.

Fascist Germany after failure/dip/trough of the plan of "lightning war" began the urgent mobilization of its economic and military resources for waging of prolonged war. Its land army to March 1942 in actuality lost a little more than 1 mln. soldiers and officers ².

FOOTNOTE ². IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 347.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

These losses were rapidly made up for. Moreover, to May 1942 Hitler command element even increased its forces. It had now at the Soviet-German front 227 divisions (in the beginning of their war there were there 190). The Fascist-German military forces were arranged/located a greater quantity of artillery means, than in the first summer campaign. Talc losses in the tanks and the aviation

Hitlerites could not compensate for. Nevertheless German aviation still continued to hold strategic supremacy in air.

Soviet command element, planning to conduct in the summer of 1942 offensive operations in all main trends, at the same time considered that also the enemy can develop offensive. It assumed that main attack the enemy, most probably, would be made in the central front sector. Therefore were accepted measures for reinforcing of central grouping of Soviet military forces. Meanwhile the Fascist-German command element, retaining large forces in the center of strategic front, prepared powerful/thick offensive in the south, after intending subsequently to only deliver the strike/shock on our central grouping.

Miscalculations in the appraisal of forces and intentions of enemy were the basic reason of the large/coarse failures of the Red Army in the beginning of the summer of 1942 in the south of the Soviet-German front. The General Headquarters of the Supreme Command and the commander-in-chief of the southwestern direction/axis did not take all measures, necessary for the provision of the southwestern front sector. Hitler command element used the established situation, took initiative into its of hand and developed here powerful/thick offensive. The Red Army sustained great losses and it again proved to be forced to switch over to defensive operations.

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Strategic defense this time was better organized than in the preceding/previous summer campaign. Soviet forces skillfully combined stubborn defense on the advantageous lines with timely output/yield from under the strikes/shocks of superior forces of enemy. In the decisive direction/axis, in the curve of Don, the defense leaned on the previously prepared lines, in advance occupied with the advanced there strategic reserves. Only in the North-Caucasian direction/axis where the possibilities of the reinforcement of Soviet military forces by strategic reserves were extremely limited, for enemy it was possible to achieve high rates of advance. The purposeful use of strategic reserves by Soviet command element made it possible to give to defense active character. From July through November 1942 our military forces undertook 17 front counteroffensives.

Striking example to increased organization of defensive operations and resisting force of the Red Army were heroic combat in the defensive period of battle in Volga. In these combat our military forces brought enormous loss to enemy, contained his main strategic grouping and created conditions for its complete annihilation.

Thus, the Soviet Armed Forces and this time tore away the strategic concept of enemy. In spite of the fact that the zone of front in which the Fascist-German army conducted its second strategic offensive, was twice more narrowly than in the summer of 1941, enemy lost during the new offensive approximately/exemplarily as much military forces, as in entire first year of war on the Soviet-German front.

The characteristic of use/application by the Red Army of the defense in the summer of 1943 consisting in the fact that the Soviet command element auto elected this way of conducting the armed struggle for achievement of the nearest operational-strategic goal. The relationship/ratio of forces and means at the Soviet-German front by this time already changed in favor of the Red Army. Its field forces, possessing insignificant numerical superiority, had more artillery means and tanks, than enemy. Light tanks now comprised not more than 30 percent of the tank park of the Soviet army in the field. Our front aviation had available a great quantity of aircraft, and these were the vehicle of predominantly new models. However, the strength of German aviation continued continuously to descend, since German industry did not manage to restore its loss. Because of this to the summer of 1943 our aviation had considerable superiority over the enemy.

Soviet command element, thus, was arranged/located all necessary in order to begin summer campaign of 1943 with offensive operations. But to it it became known that also the enemy, after intending to take revenge for the damage/defeat in Volga and Caucasus, also prepared powerful/thick striking force for the offensive in the central front sector. Our command element considered it more advisable at first to exhaust and to bleed white this grouping by the well organized defense, and already then to develop decisive attack at the wide front. The course of combat operations confirmed the correctness of this strategic decision.

The organization of defense now passed to completely different conditions, than in the first period of war. Its preparation/training was carried out in advance, with the the deliberate distribution of forces and means. If one of defence problems of the summer-autumn campaigns 1941 and 1942 consisted of gaining of time for preparation/training and concentrations of the strategic reserves without which the defended military forces could not pass into the counteroffensive, then now this problem disappeared. For reinforcing of defense and subsequent transition into the counteroffensive the Supreme High Command in advance prepared large/coarse reserves.

In the defensive battles in the environs of Moscow and in Volga of the Red Army it was necessary to repel the attacks of enemy, who

had superiority in strength especially in the tanks, and this was one of the main reasons, which forced our military forces to combine defense with the withdrawal/departure into the depth of the country. In the battle near Kursk the enemy no longer had a superiority in the technology.

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And although its striking forces, which had available a large number of tanks, attacked/advanced at the narrow front, they could not break through our defense in one direction/axis. The latter/last strategic offensive of the Fascist-German army failed in an unheard of short period (12-15 days), in this case was not achieved even operational success.

Inasmuch as before the war our military theory did not develop/process the basic problems of organization and conduct of strategic defense, it was necessary to solve them already in the course of combat operations. In proportion to gaining of experience, reinforcing of the combat efficiency of military forces, increase in the quantity of reserves Soviet command element received ever larger possibilities for improving of procedures and methods of organization and conducting of strategic defense, provision of its insuperability.

The experience of the defensive operations of the Red Army showed that the skillfully organized strategic defense was capable of exhausting and of bleeding white the advancing/attacking enemy. One should note in this case that the Red Army assumed the defense not only when this way of the armed struggle due to the unfavorably established situation was the only possible. Soviet command element applied strategic defense and as the way of activities, which makes it possible to create more advantageous prerequisites/premises for deploying the offensive with the decisive goal and at the great depth.

The success of strategic defense in many respects depends on the timely definition/determination of those directions/axes on which the enemy concentrates basic efforts/forces for conducting the offensive. Only under this condition that defending can correctly and with the greatest effect to introduce into the activity its the strategic reserves whose presence is decisive for the provision of a success of defense.

Soviet command element used reserves both for restoring of strategic front broken through by the enemy as well as for giving an active nature to defensive operations. It is completely clear that with a reduction of the total front of offensive of enemy our command element it could more purposeful apply its strategic reserves. But in all cases it attempted basic part of the accumulated reserves to retain for the transition into the counteroffensive.

The success of defensive operations to the decisive degree depends also on the moral and combat staying power/persistency of military forces. The insufficient moral stability of the Fascist-German army, which was invariably becoming apparent under the severe conditions of defensive battles, was one of the basic reasons for the fact that its strategic defense did not maintain/withstand the powerful/thick pressure of Soviet forces. The Red Army, which possessed exceptional moral staying power/persistency, on the contrary, strove by the strategic defense of this change in the correlation of forces which allowed for it from the defensive operations directly to assume the offensive.

3. Strategic is an offensive-basic way of the activities of the armed forces of the USSR.

Strategic offensive was the decisive way of conduct by the Red Army of combat operations. Offensive operations were carried out either in the most important directions/axes or simultaneously at entire strategic front. The main strategic goal of offensive was the annihilation of the large/coarse grouping of enemy.

Exceptional purposefulness, decisive character are inherent in

almost all offensive operations of Soviet forces. In the course of war power and the scope of these operations/processes continuously they grew/rose. The majority of them was completed by the rout of the strong grouping of enemy.

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The damage/defeat of these grouping led not only to the liberation of the large/coarse, economically important areas of the Soviet Union, but also to the liberation of the countries (Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) enslaved by Fascist Germany, to the military pullout of the allies of Fascist Germany (Rumania, Finland, Hungary), to the involvement in the anti-Hitlerite coalition of the countries, formally neutral, but which helped Germany in the war (Bulgaria). As a result of such operations/processes sharply were changed the military-political conditions of waging war.

It is known that the Anglo-American command element also had in the last war the multimillion well technically equipped armed forces. But for the elongation/extent of the greater unit of the war it avoided collisions/encounters with main forces of Hitler army. Attempting to find to this justification, English military writer B. Liddel Gart even makes theoretical the conclusion that "the strategy will be most committed, if it ensures achieving the goal without the

serious combat operations" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. B. Liddel Gart. The strategy of indirect actions. M, the publishing house of foreign literature, 1957, page 446. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Only the possibility of the rout of Germany by some armed forces of the USSR forced the Anglo-American strategists finally directly to enter the struggle in the West European theater of war.

The characteristic of the strategic offensive of the Red Army in the first period and in the beginning of the second period of war was the fact that it was developed after the strained strategic defense, connected with the withdrawal/departure of Soviet military forces into service of the country. For Soviet command element it was necessary to solve the most difficult problem - simultaneously with the conduct of defense to accumulate and to prepare forces for the counteroffensive.

The first experiment of organization and conduct of the offensive operations of strategic scale our command element acquired in winter 1941/42 in the counteroffensive in the environs of Moscow. This counteroffensive was prepared under the severe conditions. The Red Army only developed its main forces, and the military forces acted at the front sustained enormous losses. In the

established situation Soviet command element had the opportunity to use the strategic reserves in haste trained/prepared in the rear for the final stabilization of front and to gradually accumulate forces for the retaliatory attacks on the enemy. But this would not remove the threat, which hung over above Moscow. After regrouping friendly troops and after pulling reserves, the Fascist-German army could again pass into the offensive in this direction/axis. After the detailed analysis of situation our command element arrived at the conclusion that under the created conditions only the powerful/thick strike/shock on the main forces of enemy can lead to the turning point in the course of the armed struggle.

This decision escape/ensued from active character of Soviet strategy. Its realization into the life caused the great success of the Red Army in the winter campaign 1941/42 Hitler army at the beginning of December of 1941 did not possess superiority in the forces in the central direction/axis. Its attacked/advanced military forces were solidly exhausted and exsanguinated. By finished strategic reserves for the continuation offensive the Fascist-German command element did not arrange/locate. Furthermore, it yet did not have time to organize stable defense on the seized lines.

In spite of the confirmations/assertions of some bourgeois historians, in the counteroffensive in the environs of Moscow Soviet

military forces achieved success, without having a superiority in strength. So, the Western Front, which solved primary task, even after into the zone of its activities were advanced several standby armies, it possessed superiority over the enemy neither in the strength of military forces nor in the tanks nor in the artillery. And nevertheless the military forces of front achieved great success. The basic reasons for this success were the purposeful and effective use of strategic reserves, the skillful selection of the areas of their concentration and directions/axes of main attacks, and also transit time into the counteroffensive. The centralized use/application of aviation in the main direction/axis made it possible to reliably cover the attacked/advanced military forces from the air strikes.

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To the success of offensive operation PDO by Moscow contributed also the active operations of Soviet military forces in the environs of Tikhvin, Rostov and landing operation in the Kerch peninsula, carried out in accordance with the uniform strategic concept.

Enormous role in the counteroffensive in the environs of Moscow played the combat morale superiority of the Red Army. The Fascist-German military forces in proportion to reinforcing of Soviet

defense increasingly more noticeably lost their combat spirit. The advanced winter even more greatly undermined their moral stability, capability for active operations. and work here not in the fact that the German technology proved to be not fitted out to the severe Russian winter, as assert the former Fascist Generals. The basic types of weaponry of both sides were of the same type. But different proved to be the degree of readiness of people to surmount difficulty of the armed struggle in the complicated climatic conditions. It was not by chance that Hitler army not one time within the time of combat operations at the Soviet-German front attempted to undertake offensive in winter. Only the military forces of the Red Army with their high combat enthusiasm could successfully conduct winter offensive operations.

As a result of counteroffensive and general offensive of our military forces subsequent after it in the western direction/axis the German army group "center", with activities of which Hitler command element connected its detachments for the successful execution of the concept of entire campaign, it was defeated. Strategic initiative passed into the hands of Soviet command element. It used it for deploying the offensive and in other directions/axes. Supreme High Command set before the armed forces as a decisive goals - to rout the grouping of hostile military forces in the most important directions/axes: northwestern, central and southern. For the

accomplishment of this mission were drawn the military forces of eight fronts.

However, Soviet military forces could not to the end carry out the missions assigned to them, since yet they did not have for this sufficient forces and means. Nevertheless they brought serious loss to the enemy: more than 50^{of} his divisions sustained heavy losses, including 38, the entered into army group "center" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 299, 336.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Besides a deficiency in the forces and means on the limitedness of the results of the first strategic offensive a considerable effect had serious miscalculations in the appraisal of the situation, which was established as a result of counteroffensive in the environs of Moscow, and in planning of the subsequent offensive operations, and also absence in the Soviet command element of the experience of organization and conducting of large-scale offensive operations simultaneously on several directions/axes. Supreme High Command overestimated the success, achieved by counteroffensive in the environs of Moscow. It assumed that after damage/defeat in the central front sector the enemy and in other strategic directions no

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Both sides they had available a now approximately/exemplarily identical quantity of military forces, artillery, tanks and aviation. The Fascist-German army still retained certain quantitative superiority in combat materiel. Then Soviet command element had considerably larger strategic reserves. But even taking into account the reserves, concentrated for the offensive, it was possible to achieve only equal relationship/ratio in the rifle troops and insignificant superiority in the artillery and the tanks.

Success was caused not only by the irrepressible offensive spirit of Soviet military forces, but also by the increased level of their combat skill. Furthermore, the moral superiority of our military forces was now reinforced by more powerful/thicker technical equipment. In the composition of fronts acted the large/coarse tank and mechanized large units/formations, thanks to which it was possible to achieve high rates of advance and to develop it at the great depth. Soviet command element more daringly applied the principle of the massed use of forces in the decisive directions/axes. Therefore in the directions/axes of main attacks it was possible to ensure the necessary superiority in the forces. In order to contain hostile troops and to prevent it from transporting them to the southern wing of front, the Red Army simultaneously

Unfinished remained offensive operations in other directions/axes. It would be more correct to concentrate all efforts/forces on the annihilation of the main strategic grouping of the enemy, which, it is doubtless, would give possibility to be achieved more considerable results.

And nevertheless the success, achieved by Soviet military forces in the first strategic offensive, created the serious break/fracture in the military-political situation and had a great effect on entire further course of war. The experience of organization and conducting of this offensive became combat school for the Red Army and it was used in the offensive operations of the subsequent campaigns.

Its second strategic offensive, during November 1942, the Red Army also began with transition into the counteroffensive after prolonged defense. By this time the forces of our army in the field considerably grew. However, enemy also increased a number of divisions at the Soviet-German front. If during January 1942 he had their 194.5, then during November 1942 - already 266 ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials department of the history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 450.

longer will be able to show/render the organized resistance to offensive of the Red Army. Therefore Soviet command element decided to develop the success achieved by offensive in several directions/axes. This led to the pulverization/atomization of the accumulated strategic reserves.

The Fascist-German command element knew how to comparatively rapidly restore/reduce the combat efficiency of the large units/formations, which was defeated in the environs of Moscow. It continuously pulled to the Soviet-German front extra forces. To January 1942 against the Red Army acted narrower than 194.5 divisions².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 303. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Under these conditions simultaneous occurrence undertaken by Supreme High Command against the main forces of enemy was clearly unsuitable. The Red Army did not succeed in completely routing the main forces of the Fascist-German military forces. When appeared the possibility to surround basic part of the forces of army group "center", in Soviet command element no longer it proved to be reserves in order to complete this operation/process.

conducted several particular offensive operations in other strategic directions.

All this, together undertaken, and it ensured the grandiose success, achieved in the battle in Volga. If in the environs of Moscow for Hitler command element it was possible to rid the significant part of its military forces, then this time its main and most active strategic grouping was almost completely eliminated - of its 50 divisions avoided annihilation only the remainders/residues of 16 divisions. This catastrophical damage/defeat a German-Fascist army yet did not know.

Soviet strategy gained remarkable victory. In the course of the bitter defensive battle it was prepared, and then is successfully carried out the strategical operation, the classical model of contemporary offensive operation. True, Soviet military forces did not succeed in immediately eliminating the surrounded grouping. Battle with it drew away the considerable forces which could be used for the more rapid development of offensive. But grouping was reliably isolated/insulated and deprived of possibility actively act on the course of combat operations in the south.

The second strategic offensive of the Red Army accepted the greater scope than the first one, and it proved to be more

successfully/fruitfully. Entire/all southern strategic grouping of enemy (army group "A" and "B") suffered heavy damage/defeat. Hitler army lost more than 1300 thousand soldiers and officers, and together with the military forces of allies - it is more than 1900 thousand people. The Red Army routed more than 113 hostile divisions, moreover 68 of them were completely the failing (annihilated, captured or disbanded as lost combat efficiency).

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To in the spring of 1943 for Hitler command element was possible to move fresh divisions from Germany and Western Europe, to undertake counteroffensive in Donbass and in the Kharkov direction/axis and to somewhat make room here our military forces. The Red Army could not renounce withdrawal route to the North-Caucasian grouping of enemy and attain its complete defeat. But this did not diminish the significance of the damage/defeat of Fascist-German army in the winter of 1942-43 it carried enormous and already irreplaceable loss. This number of military forces, what Germany had at our front at the beginning of winter campaign (279 divisions together with the operational reserves), it already no longer could set against the Red Army.

Very considerable proved to be the losses of a German-Fascist

army, also, in the technical equipment of the struggles which Germany not in the state was restore/reduce. The operating military forces of the Red Army each month month received increasingly more guns and mortars, tanks, aircraft and other means of the armament of the most committed models. All this led to the change in the correlation of forces and caused that basic break/fracture in the armed struggle, beginning to which marked the victory of Soviet military forces in Volga.

The basic turning point in the course of war was completed by the strategic offensive of our military forces in a summer-fall campaign of 1943. By the main event of this campaign was the rout of the powerful/thick grouping of enemy, which acted on Kursk front sector. Already in the course of defensive battle near Kursk vividly was revealed the increased strike and firepower of Soviet military forces. In the composition of the fronts, which passed into the counteroffensive, acted 5 tank armies, 25 separate tank and mechanized corps, artillery corps and the division of penetration, self-propelled artillery. Soviet aviation, having by this time 2.8 times of more aircraft, than enemy, earned supremacy in air at entire strategic front.

As a result were created more favorable, than in the preceding/previous campaigns, conditions for the counteroffensive. In

the battle near Kursk defensive battle and counteroffensive were in advance provided by the necessary forces and means. Strategic reserves supported general/common/total defense system stability, and main forces were retained for the counteroffensive. Furthermore, to the rout of the Orel and Kharkov grouping of enemy were drawn the military forces of the neighboring fronts, which did not participate in the defensive battle.

The victorious outcome of offensive near Kursk completed the prolonged struggle for the strategic initiative which now finally switched over to Soviet command element. It used it for deploying the general/common/total strategic offensive at the wide front from Velikiye Luki to Novorossisk. In the course its Red Army again brought enormous loss to the armed forces of enemy. In all in the summer-autumn campaign were routed 118 divisions of enemy. The irrecoverable losses of ground forces of Hitler army composed 1413 thousand people, furthermore, it is more than 3 thousand tanks and the assault guns, about 10 thousand aircraft ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 583-584.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the course of war the Red Army three times assumed the

counteroffensive, moreover under varied conditions of situation and with the dissimilar correlation of forces. But each time result was one - rout of the main strategic grouping of enemy. This created the break/fracture in the situation not only in the strategic direction where was developed counteroffensive, but also at entire Soviet-German front. Since the course of combat operations at this front determined the development of the armed struggle against the Fascist bloc, each counteroffensive of the Soviet Armed Forces acquired the significance of the important military-political event of the entire Second World War.

End Section.

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Each time transition into the counteroffensive preceded enormous organizational work at the front and in the rear. Especially considerable it was during the preparation of the first two counteroffensives when it was necessary restoring forces and to reinforce military forces, which participated in the prolonged defensive battles, to regroup them, to form and to concentrate on the directions/axes of main attacks powerful/thick strategic reserves. Political organs the party organizations of the Red Army utilized all resources of a mass-political and educational work in order to ensure the high combat morale spirit of military forces, their readiness to switch over from the defensive ones to decisive offensive operations. Party organizations, Soviet and economic organs of the rear performed many-sided work on the mobilization of production resources for the creation of the necessary levels of combat materiel, armament, ammunition, equipment and subsistence.

Counteroffensive was carried out in the form of strategical operation, conducted by forces from three to six fronts in the zone

of 600-1000 kilometers. In the offensive near Kursk actively participated not only the fronts, which directly repelled the attacks of enemy (central and Voronezh), but also neighboring (Bryansk, Western, steppe and southwestern). Simultaneous with the counteroffensive against the main hostile grouping were undertaken the particular offensive operations in other sectors of strategic front, which had secondary importance.

The great achievement of Soviet strategy was the correct selection of the directions/axes of main attacks and transit time of military forces into the counteroffensive. These strikes/shocks were deposited on the weakened flanks of the grouping of enemy for the purpose of the encirclement of its main forces (battle in Volga) or splitting up and rout them in parts (Moscow, Orel and Belgorod-Khar'kov operations/processes). Because of the timely concentration of strategic reserves Soviet military forces usually assumed the offensive even before the Fascist-German command element was convinced in the impossibility to continue offensive operations and managed to take measures for the enduring/permanent strengthening of the occupied lines. The ability of Soviet command element to correctly determine the moment/factor of the crisis of hostile offensive and with the greatest effect to use this favorable possibility for the retaliatory attacks by reserves was the bright certificate of superiority of Soviet strategy over the Fascist-German

strategy. As a rule, Hitler command element with the great delay took the measures of the opposition to counteroffensive of Soviet military forces.

The experience of war showed that the counteroffensive, undertaken in one strategic direction, during the skillful use of a favorable situation grew over into the general offensive on the significant part of all strategic front. Before the completion of struggle for the strategic initiative the main efforts/forces of the Red Army in the offensive operations were concentrated on that strategic direction where was created the most emergency. After attaining the break/fracture to strategic situation and after mastering initiative, Soviet command element obtained complete freedom in the selection of directions/axes and time for the application of strikes/shocks on the enemy.

To the successes of the armed forces contributed a sharp increase in the war economy possibilities of Soviet state. The military industry of the USSR as long ago as 1942 began to produce more than aircraft, tanks, guns and rifle/infantry armament, than the industry of Germany. Soviet command element could create the new and new army formations of all arms of service. At the beginning of the third period of war our army in the field exceeded enemy in the strength of military forces, a quantity of guns, mortars, tanks,

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
Bomb strike on enemy resistance group.




Pilots of the Tamansk Aviation Regiment after a successful combat flight (2nd Belorussian front).




Combat mission fulfilled. Submarine safely returned to the base.





The enemy is repulsed into the sea.

Nazi German troops captured by the Red Army in Berlin.



The path of victory has been completed. Soviet tanks at the gates of Brandenburg.



SOVIET TROOPS IN BERLIN!



These inscriptions on the walls of the reichstag have gone down in history.


At an intersection of Berlin streets.
KEY: (1) Reichstag. (2) Berlin Center.




THE GUNS OF WAR CEASED TO FIRE.



After the flight of the Nazis.



Sentry guarding guns which were sent from Leningrad to the Island of Ryugen on the Baltic Sea.



self-propelled gun mounts and combat aircraft.

Strike and firepower of the grouping of Soviet military forces, concentrated on the main directions/axes in the offensive operations of the third period, sharply increased, especially in comparison with the first period of war.

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For example, military forces, which participated in the Belorussian operation/process (July 1944), had in comparison with the military forces, which participated in the Moscow operation/process (December of 1941), 6.8 times it is more than artillery guns and mortars, into 8.5 - armored means and 6.6 times - aircraft ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18767, page 94-95. ENDFOOTNOTE.

To an increase in the rate and to an increase in the depth of the development of the offensive operations of the third period of war, their combat effectiveness contributed an increase in the combat skill of Soviet military forces, the improvement of military art, improvement in the quality of the party-political work in the military forces, clearer, mount work of the organs of army and front

rear with respect to the supply of material of military forces in the course of offensive.

The possibilities of Hitler strategy for the opposition to the Red Army continuously were reduced. As a result of repeated total mobilizations, and also maximum use of military contingents of its satellites for Hitlerites were possible into the first one-and-a-half year of war not only to complete the carried human losses, but also to increase the strength of their military forces at the Soviet-German front. To November 1942 it achieved maximum number - it is more than 6 mln. people. However, to June 1944 the number of the Fascist-German military forces, which acted at the Soviet-German front, sharply was shortened and comprised already about 4 mln. people. During the battle in Volga Hitler command element had in its command 72 Rumanian, Finnish, Italian and Hungarian divisions. To 1944 their number was lowered to 58. In connection with the begun disintegration of Fascist bloc reinforcing of Hitler army by the military forces of allies soon almost entirely ceased.

The Red Army in the third period of war developed offensive no longer on one or two strategic directions as this was, until now, but consecutively/serially along entire front. Each strike/shock was completed by the rout of the large/coarse grouping of enemy. During the winter campaign 1943/44 g. Soviet military forces delivered

powerful/thick strikes/shocks on the northwestern and southern grouping of the enemy. Even more effective according to its results was the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. In the course all its most important grouping of the Fascist-German army suffered cruel damage/defeat.

In two campaigns of 1944 the Fascist-German army lost completely annihilated or undertaken into captivity 141 division. In the year of combat operations the human losses of Fascist army at Soviet-German front composed 2.6 mln. soldiers and officers. For the completion/replenishment of these losses for Hitlerites it was necessary to conduct the so-called supertotal mobilizations, drafting into the army of 16-17-year-old youths and elderly men. Attempting to hold down/retain the shortened front, Fascist command element increased it in 1944 by 127 divisions², after moving them from Germany, Italy and from the West European theater.

Ibid

FOOTNOTE ². ~~These~~, Inv. No 17936, page 654, 743, 744. ENDFOOTNOTE.

As a result of victories, gained in 1944, the armed forces of the USSR fulfilled one of primary tasks, set before them by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, they knocked out the Fascist-German aggressors of the limits of the Soviet Union. After restoring/reducing western state boundary, the Red Army began the

expulsion/exile of Fascist aggressors from those occupied by them the countries of central and southeastern Europe. Soviet military forces, after entering to the territory of eastern prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, occupied advantageous strategic situation for the invasion into the depth of Germany and completion of the rout of its army. Hitler of cry at this time had available also sufficiently large/coarse military forces.

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Germany had under the gun to 7500 thousand people, its army in the field counted more than 5340 thousand soldiers and the officers of whom more than half were located on a Soviet-German front. Furthermore, against the Soviet military forces still operated 16.5 Hungarian divisions ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 762, 763. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The utter defeat of enemy the Red Army carried out in the course of the completing campaign of 1945, when the offensive power of Soviet military forces achieved the highest level within entire time of war. Although in the latter/last strategic offensive participated approximately/exemplarily the same forces, as in the

preceding/previous campaign, they acted now on doubly smaller in their extent front. This made it possible to create in the directions/axes of main attacks the powerful/thick grouping, which possessed large striking power. Offensive operations were conducted at the high rate and at the great depth.

By rapid offensive at 720-kilometer front the Red Army routed the central, east Prussian and eastern-Pomeranian strategic grouping of enemy. It inflicted also heavy damage/defeat to its southern grouping, which was attempting to pass into the counteroffensive in the area of lake Balaton. And then as a result of Viennese, Berlin and final, Prague, operations/processes Soviet military forces completed elimination basic of the forces of the Fascist-German army. This led to the complete break-up of Hitler state. Less than four months were required our military forces in order to annihilate or to captivate those acted against them 154 German and Hungarian divisions. 93.5 German divisions accumulated weaponry with the surrender.

The strategical operations most effective according to their results of the completing stage of war in Europe they were Vistula-Oder, east Prussian and Berlin. In each of them the Red Army completely routed or it took in the captivity to 80 percent of the German divisions opposed it.

Combat operations at the Soviet-German front continued 47 months. Within this time Hitler command element in addition to 153 German divisions, which composed invasion army, directed toward the Soviet-German front 268.5 additional divisions. At the front were directly formed 165.5 divisions. The losses of many divisions were restored/reduced due to the carrier units. From June 1941 through May 1945. The Red Army annihilated 214 and are taken in the captivity 56 German divisions (without considering 93.5 divisions, which was put with the surrender); 143 divisions Hitler command element it was forced to disband, since they completely lost their combat efficiency².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 861, 864. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, the main forces of the Fascist-German army were annihilated by Soviet military forces. Only because of the decisive and active strategy of Soviet command element anti-Hitlerite coalition could gain so complete military a victory over Fascist Germany. The significant characteristic of this victory was the fact that the Red Army, which invested enormous efforts/forces into the rout of Fascist Germany and the main burden of struggle carried out on itself with it, in the course of war became strongest army in the

world.

Relying on the enormous economic, moral and military possibilities of socialist state, the Soviet Armed Forces after the victory over the Fascist-German army successfully carried out one additional military-political mission, set before them by the Communist Party and the Soviet government. Jointly with the military forces of the Mongolian People's Republic they eliminated the powerful/thick strategic grouping of the armed forces of Japanese imperialists, which was being located in the northeastern China, which led to the termination of the entire Second World War.

The participation of the Soviet Armed Forces in the war with Japan was short-term.

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The Red Army it was required on the whole of 25 days in order to completely rout Kwantung army. This rapid victory was also, first of all, the result of the decisive strategy of our command element, which knew how to very effectively use high strike power of Soviet military forces and accumulated wide experience of the conduct of large-scale offensive operations.

The strategic offensive, which was being carried out by the forces of three fronts and Pacific Ocean navy, was developed simultaneously at the front by elongation/extent about 5 thousand kilometers. Soviet military forces had certain numerical superiority over the enemy. The decisive role in this operation/process played the high combat enthusiasm of the attacked/advanced military forces, the superiority of their armament and technical equipment, skillful planning and clear organization of operation/process by Soviet command element. The average/mean rate of progress of the military forces of Transbaikal Front was 50-60 kilometers in a 24 hour period. By powerful/thick and fast strikes/shocks entire/all hostile grouping was separated and then routed in parts.

The success of the armed forces of the USSR in the final campaign radically changed strategic situation in the Pacific Ocean theater operations. Japanese imperialists lost the most combat-effective grouping of their land forces, and also the war economy base, created by them in the northeastern China. Further waging of war became for them impossible, and they forced were to surrender.

Thus, strategic offensive was the basic way of the combat operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Specifically, strategic offensive gave to them the possibility to successfully carry out the

missions assigned to them. It was the aggregate of strategic offensive operations, consecutively/serially or simultaneously conducted on one or several directions/axes and united under uniform concept.

The organization of each strategic offensive no longer could be limited to planning and preparation only for one initial strategical operation. The concept of offensive had to consider further development of combat operations. In it were determined the main trends in which it was proposed to concentrate main efforts/forces in the beginning of offensive and in its course. Otherwise it was not possible to organize the grouping of forces and means necessary for the realization of concept and purposeful to prepare the reserves, necessary for the offensive of this scope.

The preparation for the first two offensives Soviet command element conducted in the course of strategic defense. In the subsequent stages of war preparation/training was conducted during the operational lulls, but predominantly already in the process of the preceding/previous offensive. The first operations/processes of strategic offensive were planned/glided in detail, that follow - mainly. However, human and material and technical resources were accumulated and were concentrated in advance.

During the organization of strategic offensive in the first period of war in the decisions of Soviet Supreme High Command became apparent the tendency toward the dispersal of efforts is still insufficient the powerful/thick army in the field for the simultaneous conducting of operations/processes for several strategic directions. Such problems exceeded the real combat capabilities of army, and it could not completely fulfill them.

Subsequently, especially when Soviet command element completely mastered initiative, planning strategic offensive was that more advanced. In proportion to gaining of experience the Supreme High Command already more correctly estimated the state of enemy, possibility of its military forces and usually posed to them feasible operational-strategic problems.

In the second and third periods of war the principle of the massed use of forces and means in the most important direction/axis became the basic principle of Soviet strategy. This to a considerable degree caused the decisive strategic results of offensive operations in 1943-1945.

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By the massed use/application of forces and means was achieved

superiority necessary for the successful offensive over the enemy in the directions/axes of main attacks. The degree of this superiority, as is shown the experience of war, depended not only on an increase in forces and technical equipment of the Red Army, but also on art of Soviet command element, which boldly carried out considerable troop regroupings, moreover sometimes due to weakening of grouping in other strategic directions.

One of the important conditions for the provision of a success of offensive was presence and skillful use/application of large/coarse strategic reserves. Soviet command element is better than the command element of enemy, it solved the problem of reserves, were applied them more purposeful and successfully/fruitfully. To opening of the second front in Europe the grouping of the Fascist-German military forces located on the West was used by Hitler command element as peculiar strategic reserve. There were devoted the large units/formations, routed by Soviet military forces, there they were supplemented and was restored their combat efficiency. Many new divisions, which were being formed in Germany itself, were headed for France where is passed the accelerated combat training. Then the Fascist-German command element transported them to the Soviet-German front. Due to the distance of distance the Hitlerites, naturally, could not introduce these reserves into the work simultaneously by major masses, yes even they arrived to the Soviet-German front, as a

rule, with the delay. Those comparatively small reserves which were located directly on the Soviet-German front, they were usually introduced in the activity in parts, by separate divisions or by the corps, which proved to be barely effective, since in the majority of the cases this only completed losses, but it did not create the break/fracture in the situation.

Soviet Supreme High Command constantly had at its direct disposal the large/coarse reserves which it could rapidly advance to the most important strategic directions. This made it possible to create powerful/thick grouping in the main directions/axes during the organization of strategic offensive, to increase in the course its impact force, to reflect counterstrike of enemy. This use of reserves gave the possibility to conduct offensive at the high rate, to develop it on the great depth.

In the first period of war strategic reserves were the new troop formations mainly formed in the rear. They were created in haste, under their those severe conditions it was difficultly completely ensure with the necessary human contingents and especially armament and technology. As a result many troop formations were weakly manned. In the second and third periods of war Soviet command element stopped to another, more advisable route/path of the formation of strategic reserves. The large units/formations of army in the field, suffering

losses, were ejected into the rear even before they completely lost their combat efficiency. Here they were brought up to strength, were armed and then as needed they were transmitted to the operating fronts.

Soviet command element not only advanced reserves to the decisive directions/axes of strategic offensive, but also transported major army masses from one direction/axis to another as during preparation/training, so sometimes, also, in the course of offensive. For the summer-autumn offensive of 1944 were regrouped to the main directions/axes of 63 percent of all armies of combined arms and five of six tank armies. During April 1945 during the preparation for offensive in the Berlin direction/axis whole front (2nd Belorussian) was moved from the area of danzig to the lower flow of Oder.

Strategic offensive, as has already been spoken, it consisted, as a rule, of several large-scale operations/processes, carried out by groups of fronts. The character of these operations/processes depended on situation and possibilities which possessed the operating fronts. With the limited forces and the means the operation/process was undertaken in one strategic direction.

An increase in the war economy possibilities of the country allowed Soviet command element in the second period of war to carry out an offensive by the consistent conducting of two-three strategical operations. In 1944 the Red Army conducted strategical operations both consecutively/serially and simultaneously in several directions/axes. And finally, in the campaign of 1945, when front line was shortened, strategic offensive was developed almost simultaneously at entire Soviet-German front. Thus, the Soviet Armed Forces gradually converted/transferred from the offensive in one direction/axis to the strategical operations, conducted consecutively/serially on several directions/axes, and then simultaneously at entire front.

The forms of strategical operations were different. By predominant form, especially in the third period of war, became operations on the encirclement of large/coarse hostile grouping. Encirclement was achieved by the application of strikes/shocks in the converging directions (counteroffensive in the battle in Volga, Yassy-kishinev, Korsun'-Shevchenkivskiy, Prague, Manchurian operations/processes), by the simultaneous penetration of front in several directions/axes with the subsequent development of the strikes/shocks into the depth and by output/yield to the flanks and into the rear of the main forces of enemy (Belorussian and Berlin operations/processes), by the combination of frontal and enveloping

attacks for the purpose to force hostile grouping against difficult ground or to sea (east Prussian operation/process).

Large/coarse hostile grouping were encircled by forces not less than two fronts, which attacked/advanced in the converging directions. In some operations simultaneously with the encirclement of the grouping of enemy was carried out its fragmentation to the isolated/insulated units. The sequence of activities on the elimination of the surrounded grouping was determined by concrete/specific/actual situation.

In proportion to gaining of experience the number of forces, isolated for the elimination of the surrounded grouping, was decreased. Remaining military forces, which participated in the operation/process, were used for the reflection of the counteroffensives of enemy, which were being delivered from without, and the development of offensive at the external front of encirclement. The rapid elimination of the surrounded grouping usually created the great breaches in the defensive front of enemy, which were used by Soviet military forces for the rapid development of offensive into the depth.

However, before the Soviet strategy from the first days of war arose the complicated problem of the organization of cooperation

between the fronts. This problem could not be solved for Russian command element in the campaigns 1914-1917. It did not obtain the proper decision, also, during the years of civil war. The comprehensive experience of the cooperation of fronts gave only the Great Patriotic War. In its course it was carried out both operational-strategic and strategic cooperation between fronts and groups of fronts.

Operational-strategic cooperation was organized between several fronts, which solved uniform strategic problem in one direction/axis. In the coastal zones in the operations/processes participated and military Navies. Is most characteristic an example of the operational-strategic cooperation of four fronts in the Belorussian offensive operation.

Strategic cooperation was carried out between fronts or groups of fronts. For example, in the campaigns of 1944 it was expressed in the consistent conducting of offensive operations in different directions/axes. Consistent operations/processes shook loose entire strategic front of enemy, forced him premature to expend/consume their strategic reserves, to redispense troops from one front sector to another. In this case hostile reserves usually did not manage to be advanced to the threatened directions/axes. The at the same time left by them front sector proved to be weakened. Specifically, here

Soviet military forces delivered new strike/shock.

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The accomplishment of important strategic objective simultaneously by several fronts, but that more with the groups of fronts required from the Supreme High Command not only of the careful organization of cooperation between them during the preparation of offensive, but also of continuous coordination of their activities in the course of operations/processes, specification of missions assigned to them, regrouping of forces between the fronts, the timely advancement of reserves from the depth. The forms of organization and realization of the cooperation of fronts continuously were improved. Creatively mastering the experience of operations/processes, Soviet command element solidly mastered art of organization and conduct of strategic offensive.

4. Use/application of forms of the armed forces and arms of service.

During the Great Patriotic War Soviet strategic leadership expediently used different branches of the armed forces.

Main role in the fields of battles as foresaw our military theory, it belonged to ground forces. Therefore they were the

numerous branch of the armed forces. Remaining branches of the armed forces together with the accomplishment of independent objectives their basic efforts directed to the combined operations with ground forces.

The basis of ground forces composed rifle/infantry, artillery, armored and engineering forces. The significance of artillery, armored and engineers in the course of war steadily rose. The mass kind of ground forces were rifle/infantry, rest they acted in their interests both in the offensive and in the defense.

Rifle troops created the continuous front line of the armed struggle. Within the time of war their strength grew more than in time ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 886. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The armament of this arm of service continuously was improved and in essence it made it possible for them to successfully carry out their missions in the cooperation with other arms of service. However, mobility and maneuverability of rifle/infantry large units/formations were insufficient as a result of their weak motorization.

Artillery maintained its role of the main fire weapon of destruction of enemy. The experience of war did not justify the assumption that in connection with reinforcing of the role of tanks and aviation the significance of artillery decreases. On the contrary, the mass use/application of armored forces and combat aviation increased the need for the artillery.

A number of artillery means which were arranged/located field forces of the Red Army, after approximately/exemplarily twofold descent in the first months of war began rapidly to grow and to 1945 increased more than triply in comparison with December of 1941 ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 897. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In this case the greatest quantitative increase/growth was observed in the antitank and rocket artillery. The rapid development of reagents sharply raised the firepower of our artillery.

The problems, which were being laid on the artillery, its qualitative and quantitative increase/growth caused the need for use and new forms of its organization. Were created the tank destroyer brigades, the artillery divisions and the corps of penetration, brigade and division of rocket artillery, air defense artillery divisions, etc.

Soviet command element from the very beginning of military activities attempted to have at its disposal strong artillery reserve for its centralized use.

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To June 1941 in the composition of the artillery of the reserve of Supreme High Command (RVGK [- Reserve of the Supreme Command]) were only individual antitank brigades, cannon and howitzer regiments. Subsequently began to be created the large/coarse artillery large units/formations of different designation/purpose. If in the beginning of war artillery RVGK counted on more than 5 percent of all artillery means, then to 1945 in its composition it was already to half of the entire artillery of ground forces ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 894. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The large/coarse artillery means, available at the direct disposal of Supreme High Command, made it possible for it to create high artillery densities in the directions/axes of the main attacks in the strategical operations, facilitated maneuver by artillery means.

Exceptionally important role in the combat operations played the armored and mechanized troops. Being main strike and maneuverable force of ground forces, they exerted the decisive effect on the forms and the ways of conducting the combat operations. Their massed use/application gave to entire war maneuverable character, made it possible to carry out offensive operations of enormous scope, also, at the high rate. Because of the great mobility of the armored and mechanized troops our command element successfully conducted operations/processes on the encirclement not only of the operational, but also strategic grouping of enemy. Such operations/processes, rare in the past, received in the last war wide acceptance.

However, the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army immediately could not make their designation/purpose. In the first strategic offensive, as a result of a deficiency in tanks and deactivation of the large/coarse large units/formations of armored forces available before the war, the tanks were used in essence for the execution of tactical missions.

In the beginning of the war of 83 percent of the tank park of our army in the field comprised light type tanks '.

FOOTNOTE 3. Ibid., page 156-157. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, their significant part in the first months of war was lost. To June 1944 the tank park of our army had other qualitatively combat vehicles - predominantly medium tanks. Approximately/exemplarily 25 percent of all armored means fell to the self-propelled artillery units which it was in no way in the beginning of war. To May 1945 self-propelled artillery units were 35 percent of armored means 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. Ibid., page 893. ENDFOOTNOTE.

A rapid increase in the tank park and its qualitative changes allowed already in the spring of 1942 to begin transition to such organizational formation of the armored and mechanized troops which was provided for by Soviet military doctrine in the prewar period and it entirely corresponded to the character of war. In the composition of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army appeared the tank units, intended for the direct support of the infantry (NPP), and the large/coarse formations (corps and army), capable of carrying out operational missions in the cooperation with the combined arms units and the aviation. However, the tank park of army in the field remained nevertheless insufficient. During entire war the rifle troops felt the great need for the direct tank support.

In the Great Patriotic War found combat employment and such service as cavalry. However, if in the civil war cavalry played the role revealed, carrying out the missions of the mobile groups of operational-strategic significance, then in the last war these missions accomplished the armored and mechanized troops, incomparably more fitted out to the conditions for contemporary combat operations. The participation of the cavalry in the combat operations was very limited.

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The increased power of artillery fire, the mass use/application of tanks and aviation sharply shortened the possibility of using the cavalry generally, and all the more its large/coarse formations. The retention/preservation/maintaining this arm of service and its combat employment were explained mainly by a deficiency in the tanks in the first period of war.

Considerable development in the war years underwent engineers. Sappers/combat engineers correctly deserved the glory of the "toilers of war". Without their constant, frequently barely noticeable, but extremely necessary work impossible there would be the successes of other arms of service.

The equipment of engineers with mine layers, by mine detectors and by sweeps enriched engineering technology, raised the mechanization of works on installation and rendering safe of mines. Engineers of the Red Army established/installed within the time of war of approximately 14 mln. antitank and 150 mln. antipersonnel mines, and with the mine clearing of the territory liberated from the enemy collected and destroyed approximately 40 mln. mines of different constructions/designs ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. TsGANKh, f. 4372, pub. 4, d. 1750, lines . 203-204.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Use/application of dismountable pile drivers, pneumo- and diesel hammers, the electrified and mechanical instruments made possible to mechanize the significant part of the works on the construction of bridges. The use of finished constructions/designs and details from the reinforced concrete, the armor and the tree/wood, the typification of defensive installations, the partial mechanization of labor-consuming works helped to accelerate the construction of defensive lines. Within the time of war the engineers were almost completely motorized and was obtained at their disposal the powerful/thick machine technology, which made it possible to mechanize the unit of the works on terrain organization, laying of roads, for the construction of the bridges and other

structures/installations.


The mass use of mine-explosive obstacles raised the role of engineers in combat and operations/processes in which they began to participate no longer as auxiliary, but as one of the combat arms of service. Organizationally engineers were divided into three basic groups: engineering subunits and units, which organically was included in combined-arms, tank and mechanized large units/formations; engineer units and the large unit/formation subordinate to Army and Front authority; engineers of RVGK. Greatest development underwent engineer units and large units/formations subordinate to Army and Front authority, and also the engineer brigades of different designation/purpose, which were being located at the disposal of Supreme High Command.

Increased the role of the military forces of connection/bond. Communications, which were stationed troops at the beginning of war, were not adapted to the reliable servicing of the control system under the conditions for maneuver combat operations. Moreover, these means it was missing. The obsolete radio aids could not provide the command by the troops when was violated wire communication. Only during May 1942 the front commanders and by armies obtained at their disposal personal radio sets. The military forces of connection/bond were in a sufficient measure prepared to the maintenance of

continuous connection/bond in the tactical level of control. Questions of the organization of connection/bond into army, but that more in the front operation were not developed even theoretically. As a result in the units of the connection/bond there was very few specialists, who possessed knowledge and experience, necessary for the provision with the connection/bond of operational formations.


All these deficiencies it was necessary to remove already in the course of war. In the second and third periods of war grew considerably a quantity of units and subunits of connection/bond in the fronts, the armies and the large units/formations. Military forces were equipped with new radio sets, was obtained the more advanced telegraph and telephone equipment, increased a number of radio aids in the large units/formations of all arms of service. Radio became the most important control means in the operations/processes 1944-1945.

The strength of military forces of connection/bond within the time of war grew 4 times. In proportion to gaining of experience, assimilation of new technical equipment the signalmen ever more successfully managed the execution of complex problems in the provision of the uninterrupted control by military forces.



Combat training of missile specialists.

Strategic missile.




Ground forces missile.



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


Navy missile carriers on training missions.



Missile-carrying boats.

Cruising submarine.



Airborne troops were not widely applied in the Great Patriotic War, although to its beginning in the composition of the Red Army were airborne corps, which were subordinate the direct of Supreme High Command. One of the basic reasons for the fact that these large units/formations were not used according to their straight/direct designation/purpose, consisted of a deficiency in the air facilities for their transportation. Some airborne large units/formations participated in the separate landing operations (for example, in the environs of Vyaz'ma and in the area of Cherkass). During the Far-Eastern campaign the airborne troops landed in Harbin, Shen'yane (Mukden), Tszilin (Girin), Chanchun, Port Arthur and Dayren and by their activities contributed to the acceleration of the surrender of Japanese military forces.

Considerable role in the achievement of the victory over the Fascist-German and Japanese armies belonged to Air Force. The mass use of aviation had a great effect on the outcome of the armed struggle in the land and ocean theaters.

By the most important problems to execution of which were directed the main efforts/forces of Soviet aviation, were assistance to ground forces, struggle with the hostile aviation for supremacy in

air and conduct of air intelligence. Combat practice, thus, confirmed the correctness of the installations of the Soviet military doctrine, even before the war which considered that Air Force must be used in close cooperation with ground forces. German aviation from the very beginning of war took supremacy in air and for long held it after itself. Soviet Air Force was required long time, in order to earn supremacy in air and thereby to ensure more favorable conditions both for the operations of ground forces and for our own combat activity.

Struggle for supremacy in air continued during the entire war. In 1941-1943 our aviation repeatedly conquered it in the decisive directions/axes where was developed the offensive of Soviet military forces. To finally fasten to itself the advantage above the aviation of enemy for Air Force of the Red Army succeeded in the summer of 1943. By this time they were completely rearmed by new materiel, considerably increased a quantity of combat aircraft.

The experience of war came to light/detected/exposed different routes/paths of gaining air supremacy. Fascist-German strategists expected by massed attacks on the Soviet airfields to immediately annihilate basic part of our aviation. However, this detachment of enemy as his entire plan of "lightning war", failed. The surprise strikes/shocks of German aviation on the airfields actually/really brought serious loss to the air units of the Red Army, located in the

western military districts. But Soviet state knew how within a short period to restore/reduce and even to increase the forces of their aviation. At the same time the strength of German aviation, which acted at the Soviet-German front, in the course of war continuously descended and to 1945 decreased approximately/exemplarily 2 times.

The especially perceptible losses sustained at the Soviet-German front Fascist aviation in the flying personnel, which indicated the qualitative superiority of our air cadres. To compensate for these losses Hitlerites completely were unable, and a number of pilots in the German Air Force to 1944 was reduced more than doubly (with 45 thousand to 21 thousand people). However, Soviet aviation during entire war did not feel deficiency in the flying personnel. Its strength toward the end of the war increased approximately/exemplarily one and a half times.

In the combat aviation of enemy, which acted at the Soviet-German front, in the beginning of war the predominant place occupied the bombers (52.5 percent). A number of fighter airplanes did not exceed 32 percent, reconnaissance aviation was 15.5 percent¹. In the course of war for the Fascist-German command element it was necessary to radically change the relationship/ratio between the air arms.

FOOTNOTE¹. IML. Document and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936 page 52. END FOOTNOTE.

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The forced transition of Hitler army from the offensive operations to the strategic defense, the enormous losses, carried by bomber aviation at the Soviet-German front, the continuous increase of the combat activity of Soviet aviation - all this led to the fact that a number of bombers in the German Air Force decreased toward the end of 1944 4 times. In connection with this Fascist command element attempted by all measures to increase fighter aviation. Toward the end of 1944 the fighter airplanes counted to 68 percent of the fighting strength of Air Force ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 675. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Fighter aviation in the Soviet Air Force at the beginning of war was 56.2 percent, and to the middle of 1944 - 42 percent. A quantity of bombers also was lowered (from 38.8 to 25 percent). This change in the relationship/ratio of the basic air arms, with an absolute increase in the strength of each of them, was the consequence of the rapid development of the new air arm - assault. Already at the beginning of 1944 of ground-attack planes were approximately 30 percent of all combat aircraft of army in the field ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid., page 157, 609, 667. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Soviet fighter aviation was the decisive force in the struggle for supremacy in air. Specifically, it brought the maximum loss of hostile aviation in the air combat. Our fearless fighter pilots broke up the bomber attacks of enemy on the military forces of the Red Army, reflected the flights of his aviation to the Soviet cities and other units of the rear, covered the activities of their bombers and attack aircraft on the field of battle.

In the struggle for supremacy in air participated the bomber aviation, which delivered strikes/shocks on the hostile airfields. Combat practice showed that for annihilation of one and the same quantity of hostile aircraft the strikes/shocks on the airfields require considerably less missions than struggle in air. Unfortunately, our Air Force did not have sufficiently powerful/thick bomber aviation. Yes even Soviet military command element underestimated this way of activities. Therefore strikes/shocks on the hostile airfields did not play great role in gaining air supremacy. The losses of Hitler aviation on the airfields were only 17 percent of all its losses at the Soviet-German front ².

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid., page 936. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The basic form of Air Force, which rendered direct assistance to ground forces, was front aviation. Our Air Force within the time of war produced more than 3808 thousand combat missions, of them 76 percent fall in the share of the aviation of fronts '.

FOOTNOTE '. There, Inv. No 18932, page 12. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Its main problems were the support of ground forces and struggle for supremacy in air. Furthermore, it delivered strikes/shocks on the units of operational rear, the hostile reserves, the communications and conducted air intelligence. Sometimes for this were drawn also the considerable forces of long-range aviation, naval (in coastal directions/axes) and fighter air defense aviation of the country.

Most fitted out to the combined operations with ground forces on the field of battle proved to be attack aviation. It carried out other very crucial missions: it broke away the railroad and motor transportation of enemy, were delivered strikes/shocks on his reserves and near airfields.

For the combat employment of bomber large units/formations of front aviation were characteristic their massed activities in the directions/axes of main attacks of ground forces. The greatest quantity of missions of bombers fell to the strikes/shocks on the

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hostile military forces and other units on the field of battle and in the nearest operational depth.

end section.

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In connection with a quantitative increase in the Soviet aviation a number of aircraft, directly supported ground forces, it increased from year to year. If in counter attack in the environs of Moscow participated more than 1170 aircraft (significant part their them obsolete types), then in counter attack near Kursk (in both directions/axes) - already about 2900, in the Belorussian operation/process - 5.3 thousand (without the long-range aviation) and in the Berlin operation/process - 7.5 thousand aircraft.

Soviet aviation brought several strikes/shocks on the military industrial units in the deep rear of enemy (flights on Koenigsberg, danzig, Berlin, etc.). Operations/processes were carried out by long-range aviation. However, on the accomplishment of this objective it expended only about 4 percent of all missions. Soviet command element was not arranged the necessary forces for conducting such operations/processes, since our industry did not produce then good long-range bombers.

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Fascist-German aviation, especially into the first of war, undertook the repeated attempts to deliver the massed attacks on the large/coarse cities and industrial centers of the USSR: to Moscow, to Leningrad, to Minsk, to Kiev, to Odessa, Sevastopol, etc. But they did not give the expected strategic result and brought with them great losses for the Fascist aviation.

Powerful/thick bomber aviation created England and USA, which were alloted to "bomb" Germany from the war. Their aircraft discarded to the territory of Germany and occupied by it the countries of approximately 2 mln. tons of aircraft bombs ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the Second World War 1939-1945, page 879.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

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However, this did not have the decisive effect on the course of war. German industry is continued to increase the production of weaponry prior to the middle of 1944 Air Force of the USSR they discarded within the time of war half aircraft bombs. But they delivered bomb strikes mainly on military forces and combat materiel of enemy, which directly contributed to the annihilation of the armed forces of enemy.

A quantitative and qualitative increase in the Soviet aviation

during the war allowed it to continuously reinforce its combat activity both in the struggle for supremacy in air and in the assistance to the success of ground forces.

In the course of war the organizational structure of Air Force of the Red Army was improved and acquired ever clearer forms. Basic part of the bomber, fighter, assault and reconnaissance aviation during the entire war organizationally entered into the active front associations/unifications. But at first it was atomized on the armies of combined arms and was not united by general/common/total command element. In summer and in the fall of 1942 in the fronts were created air armies, which ensured the centralized use main forces of aviation. Together with the air armies the Air Force included long-range aviation ¹, fighter air defense aviation and aviation of the Navy.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Long-range aviation was transmitted into the subordination of the commander of Air Force of the Red Army during December 1944. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, as far as German aviation is concerned, being completely independent branch of the armed forces with the direct subordination to supreme high command (OKV), it organizationally was divided into the air fleets which although supported the

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 09/22

1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV


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
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definite/determined army groups, they were not subordinate to them. The activities of the aviation of Hitler army, initially projected/designed in the form of independent "air warfare", were very soon directed toward the accomplishment of tactical operation missions in the interests of ground forces. However, the successful accomplishment of these objectives impeded the excessively centralized system of leadership of aviation, detached from the command element of land forces.

Thus, Soviet strategy proved to be more farsighted than the German in questions of development and use of aviation. It more actually considered the character of war and problem which it was necessary to solve in it aviation.

The Navy also actively participated in the rout of the armed forces of Fascist Germany and imperialistic Japan. During entire war it conducted the strained combat operations in our basic ocean theaters, in frontal lake and river basins.

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The operational and combat activity of the Navies and flotillas was determined by the overall strategic missions which fulfilled the Soviet Armed Forces, and by that situation, in which them it was

necessary to fight in different stages of war. The character of the activities of the Navy in many respects depended also on the fact that primary tasks of the armed struggle in the Great Patriotic War were solved in the land theaters.

Fascist Germany had sufficiently large/coarse Navy. But for waging of war against the USSR she used only a unit of these forces. Hitler command element it counted, that its ground forces independently, without the aid of navy, will take the naval bases of the USSR on the north, Baltic region and in the Black Sea will deprive the Soviet Navies of the possibility to conduct combat operations ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See F. Ruge. War at sea. 1939-1945. M., Voenizdat, 1957, page 206-207. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In spite of the fact that the begun war did not make it possible to complete that planned by the Communist Party and the Soviet government the program of the complete reequipment of our Navy, it had available the necessary forces and means for the accomplishment of the objectives charged to it. The surface ships and the submarines, constructed in the pre-war years, completely satisfied the requirements of that time and on their combat and technical qualities were not inferior to the same-type ships of the foreign

Navies. Fleet aviation counted about 2 thousand aircraft. But at the beginning of war these were the combat vehicles of the predominantly obsolete types.

The entrance into the composition of the USSR of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Republics considerably enlarged the operational zone of our Navy. This required further deployment of coast defense, construction of naval bases, airfields, taking of many other measures for the stabilization of the new system of the basing of the Navy in the Baltic sea. The surprise attack of enemy tore away these works, initiated before war itself.

Considerable difficulties for the activities of the Navy created the geographical characteristics of our ocean theaters. Their disconnection deprived the Soviet command element of the possibility of strategic maneuver of Navy. None of our Navies during the war could rely on considerable reinforcing of its composition warships, drawn from another ocean theater. The naval forces were supplemented because of the completion of the ships, placed in the pre-war years, and to the new construction, started in the course of war. These were the predominantly light forces of the surface navy and different auxiliary ships. The state committee of defense soon after the attack of Germany on our country stopped the construction of large/coarse surface ships switched the efforts/forces of ship-building industry

for the creation of the light forces of the surface navy, the need for which sharply increased.

The combat training of the Navy in the pre-war years was conducted in accordance with the requirement to be found in constant readiness for the activities in high sea, air, in coast and bases of enemy. The greatest attention was paid to the offensive operations of all forms of Navy. In the documents of those years, which set forth official views on the operational and combat activity of the Navy, the combined defensive operations of the Navy with ground forces did not find underlying reflection. Surface ships were considered as the basic kind of naval forces. The submarines were intended predominantly for conducting the struggle on sea communications of enemy. Aviation was considered as the important means of the provision of operations/processes and daily activity of the Navy.

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Combat experience, after confirming many accurate situations of our military doctrine in the field of application of Navy, rapidly revealed and helped to reject the separate situations, which did not correspond to the actual conditions of war. The mass heroism of personnel of the Navy, the ability of its command and political cadres to creatively use combat experience contributed to the

continuous improvement of the methods of application of all kinds of Navy.

To the first period of war the basic efforts/forces of the Navy were directed toward that in order to reliably cover the seaside flanks of ground forces and to actively contribute by them in conducting of defensive operations. Especially great role played the Navies in the stubborn defense of the naval bases: Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol, Tallin, Hango, islands Moonzund archipelago, Murmansk. At the same time the submarines, naval aviation and surface ships acted on the communications of enemy and were carried out missions in the defense of their sea communications.

In the subsequent periods of war the main attention of the Navy as before was concentrated on the assistance to ground forces. But the character of the together fulfilled problems changed. Main naval forces now were used for the participation in the offensive operations of the Red Army in the coastal zones. Became strained struggle on sea communications of enemy.

Great assistance ground forces showed/rendered the flotillas, entering into the composition of the Navies, and the flotillas, which acted independently in lake and river basins. Cooperating with the attacked/advanced military forces, they actively participated in the

rout of the riverside and lake grouping of enemy.

The Navy, carrying on a struggle under the exclusively complicated conditions, successfully managed the problems, which were being laid on it in the combined ones of activity with ground forces. Coast and naval artillery of the Navy lent support to military forces, continuously improving the methods of firing at coast and coastal goals. Especially considerable was the role of ship and coast artillery in the defense of Leningrad, Sevastopol and other naval bases. The Navy supplied the korskies bases (Tallin, Hango, Odessa, Sevastopol) beseiged from the dry land. Sometimes for this were used warships, including the submarines.

While conducting of joint operations with ground forces were landed more than 100 operational and tactical landing forces on the flanks of hostile grouping and in their rear. The largest/coarsest landing forces the Navy landed during a Kerch-Feodosiysk (1941) and Novorossisk (1943) operations/processes, in coast of Kerch peninsula (1943), to the islands of Moonzund archipelago (1944), coast of north Korea and Kurile Islands (1945). One should note, however, that in this case were felt a deficiency in the means in the transportation and the landings of military forces, and also the absence of special landing ships.

In the first period of war the Baltic and Black Sea Navies conducted several operations/processes on the evacuation of military forces from the isolated/insulated sectors of coast and islands. Largest of these operations/processes they were the evacuation of the 10th rifle corps from Tallin, naval base of Hango, seaside army from Odessa and Sevastopol. In these operations/processes participated main naval forces.

In the joint operations with ground forces acted the marines. It showed well itself in the defense of Murmansk, Lipai, Tallin, Hango, Moonzund islands, Odessa, Sevastopol, and also in the landing operations carried out by the Navies. The naval rifle units, formed from the personnel of ships and coast defense, heroically fought on the near routes of approach to Leningrad, in the defensive actions in the environs of Moscow and in the battle in Volga.

Within the time of the Great Patriotic War the Navy transmitted to land fronts 42 naval rifle brigades several separate battalions - in all together with the carrier units it is more than 405 thousand seamen ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. TsvMA, f. 11, pub. 001442, d. 12, l. 47; f. 4, pub. 00191, d. 50, lines. 202-204. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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From them about 390 thousand people arrived in the fronts in the heaviest and most responsible for the native land first period of war. The greatest number of rifle/infantry large units/formations formed the red-banner Baltic Navy. Many sailors directed toward the land front and the Pacific Ocean Navy. As a rule, into the naval brigades were selected/taken the best sailors, commanders and political workers.

Violating sea communications of enemy, our Navies acquired the great and many-sided experience which gave to them the possibility to continuously improve the ways of offensive operations mainly on coastal sea communications in the cooperation with ground forces. Sometimes they conducted independent operations on the sea communications.

In the struggle on the sea communications of enemy participated the aviation, submarines and surface forces (predominantly PT boats). In the separate areas of Varanger-fiord for the violation of coastal sea communications was used the coast artillery.

Aviation of the Navy in the pre-war years it was considered as the means of the support of operations/processes, conducted by other

kinds of Navy. In actuality it became main striking power of the Navy. In its share falls more than half of the general/common/total tonnage of the sunk transport means and it is more than 60 percent of the annihilated combat and auxilliary vessels of enemy.

In the first period of war naval aviation did not have available a sufficient number of forces and, furthermore, it actively was used in the land directions/axes. Therefore struggle on the hostile communications was usually conducted by single aircraft or small tactical groups. Beginning with 1943 Air Force of the Navies, already equipped with new types of combat vehicles, switched over to activities by the larger/coarser grouping, which consisted of the aircraft of different air arms (assault, bomber, torpedo carrying and fighter). Subsequently the composition of the striking and ensuring forces continuously increased. In the third period of war the fleet aviation delivered massed attacks on the discovered convoys of enemy, and also according to his ports and naval bases. Special importance in the struggle on sea communications acquired the activities of torpedo aviation, which annihilated more than transports and warships of enemy, than all remaining forms of aviation. In all within the time of war the aviation of the Navy produced 384 thousand missions and annihilated about 5 thousand hostile aircraft ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of

Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 940, 947. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Second on its effectiveness means of the conduct of struggle on sea communications were the submarines. Their missions they usually carried out independently and only sometimes they cooperated with the aviation and the surface forces.

In the first period of war the basic method of using the submarines it was position, connected with the passive duration of enemy. Under the effect of the accumulated experience subsequently began to be applied position-maneuverable and maneuver activities. A change in the method of using the submarines contributed to an increase in the effectiveness of their attacks. This made it possible to redirect the submarines in those sectors of sea communications where reconnaissance/intelligence detected the most intense movement of hostile ships. Combat practice prompted also the need for enlarging the initiative of the commanders of the submarines, which were being located in sea, to grant to them right to exceed the limits of position for the damage/defeat of important units. The submarines produced torpedo attacks predominantly during the day. The experience of war, after confirming the most important role of the submarines in the activities on the sea communications, at the same time came to light/detected/exposed the exceptional difficulty of their use in the limited according to the sizes/dimensions and

crossed ocean theaters.

From the surface forces in the activities on the sea communications in all ocean theaters participated mainly the PT boats and only rarely - fleet torpedo boats, destroyer escorts and mine sweepers.

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By the basic method of applying the PT boats up to 1943 was the search/scanning for enemy under the conditions of poor visibility single motor boats or by small groups. Then the composition of these groups began to increase. The PT boats, covered by fighters, began to act and during the day.

The development of technical observation facilities, increase in the velocity of the aircraft, utilized for conducting reconnaissance, and improvement of radio communication contributed to the reduction of "dead gap/interval" (moment/factor between the detection of enemy and the application of strikes/shocks on it). New technology lightened the search/scanning for the objects of damage/defeat with any appearance. The appearance of a radiolocation provided the continuity of observation.

In the composition of German Navy in our ocean theaters there was no constant nucleus of great and average/mean surface warships. Only in the Barents sea in 1942-1943 acted the large/coarse surface ships of the German Navy. The advantage of enemy in the aviation into the first and in the second period of war partially created unfavorable conditions for our surface forces in the high sea. Furthermore, our Navy was deprived of large/coarse naval ones without both in Baltic region and in the Black sea.

As a result of all these circumstances the use/application of large/coarse ships was sharply limited. Within the time of war it occurred not one combat in sea or in the coastal area between the large/coarse large units/formations of surface forces. Our surface warships were used predominantly for the execution of the problems, connected with the defensive and offensive operations of the seaside grouping of ground forces, by providing the safety of their, mainly coastal, sea communications. In certain cases surface forces were applied for conducting the struggle on sea communications, and also for the shore activities on the naval bases and the basic points of enemy. During the entire war very actively acted the mine sweepers, destroyer escorts and motor boats.

Although the combat activity of our Navy in the Great Patriotic War had relatively small scope, it successfully managed the problems

standing before it. During the war the hostile Navy lost 708 warships also of auxiliary ships. Furthermore, it was deprived of 792 transports with the general/common/total displacement of 1 838 thousand gross weight-register tons ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 13893, page 602-604. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Primary task, which fulfilled Soviet Navy, consisted in the assistance to ground forces, which were fighting in the coastal zones, in the riverside and lake areas. Furthermore, our Navies, especially northern, successfully protected their sea communications. Within the time of war in the northern ports of the Soviet Union arrived on external sea communications of 1624 convoys in the composition more than 4400 different ships. The red-banner Baltic Navy ensured wiring/run by 3223 ², and Black Sea - 6644 transport ships ³.

FOOTNOTE ³

FOOTNOTE ². Cm. Military strategy, page 205-206. ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18773, page 571. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the years of patriotic war are undergone considerable development and this branch of the armed forces as National Air Defense Forces. They carried out air defense of large/coarse political and industrial centers, separate industrial areas and units, rear and frontal communications.

However, the need for the existence of this branch of the armed forces with its particular problems and by the uniform centralized command element came to light in the first months of war. Meanwhile Soviet state did not have this air defense system of the country, which could successfully counteract hostile aviation. Organization and realization of the air defense of the rear were charged to the command element of the military districts.

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The main means of air defense - fighter aviation proved to be organizationally detached from the remaining forces PVO it was used, first of all, in the interests of ground forces. The command element of the near-boundary military districts, converted into the fronts, occupied with leadership of the combat activity of military forces, could not pay the necessary attention to the air defense of the units of the rear.

At the same time rapid progress of enemy into the depth of Soviet territory increased the threat of the strikes/shocks of his aviation on many large/coarse industrial centers. The state committee of the defense during July 1941 adopted the resolution about the air defense of Moscow, Leningrad and other most important industrial cities and units. However, this it proved to be insufficiently. It was necessary to create the independent centralized system PVO, not dependent on the military districts and the fronts. The difficulty of resolution of this problem consisting in the fact that system PVO was required to provide with combat and technical equipment (fighter aviation, antiaircraft artillery, etc.), in which the Soviet country felt then sharp/acute deficiency.

On 9 November, 1941, the state committee of defense adopted the resolution "about reinforcing and strengthening of the air defense of the territory of the Soviet Union". On the basis of this resolution was produced the basic reorganization of air defense system: is created the command element of National Air Defense Forces at disposal of which was allotted the fighter aviation unit of Air Force, and were formed corps and division air defenses area for the defense of industrial and other important areas of the country.

The isolation/liberation of the air defense of the country into the independent system contributed to strengthening

general/common/total defensive capacity. Soviet state. The creation of the large units/formations of National Air Defense Forces with the appropriate command agencies made it possible to more fully use combat capabilities of all forces and means of air defense in the interests of the decision of primary tasks. It now became possible to distribute these large units/formations by air defenses area depending on the importance of the protected units and character of the activities of hostile aviation.

The analysis of combat operations shows that in the first period of war main forces PVO of the country (60-85 percent of fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery) were concentrated for the defense of large/coarse political and industrial centers. National Air Defense Forces repulsed the massed flights of hostile aviation in Minsk, Kiev, Voronezh, Dnepropetrovsk, Groznyy, Leningrad, Moscow, and also to the separate units, which were being located near these cities. In the summer-autumn campaign of 1942. National Air Defense Forces in the cooperation with the air defense weapons of fronts repulsed the flights of hostile bombers in the areas of Voronezh, Stalingrad, Groznyy and Ordzhonikidze.

Subsequently, after our Air Force earned supremacy in air and thereby they deprived the Fascist-German aviation of the possibility to deliver strikes/shocks on the large/coarse industrial centers,



1941 poster. Artists N. Avvakumov, V. Shcheglov.
KEY: (1) The October achievements. (2) We will not give up.



Panfilov fighters. Artist N. Zhukov.

basic efforts/forces PVO began to be concentrated on covering of front positions. In 1944 in the areas of the operations of air defense forces were noted only 24180 overflights of the hostile aircraft (2.6 times less than in the second period, and 8.3 times it is less than in the first period of war) ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18767, page 274; Inv. No 18765, page 561. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The main units of the flights of German aviation at this time were railroads and crossings through the water obstacles in the front area.

The Fascist-German aviation, after delivering strikes/shocks on the communications, concentrated its basic efforts/forces on the lines of communication in 250-300 kilometers from the front line. In the years of war the National Air Defense Forces repulsed about 20 thousand flights of hostile aviation in railroad units ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid, Inv. No 18767, page 437-438. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In spite of the great activity of German aviation, by it not for time the time of war could not upset the operation of the railroads of the

USSR for the prolonged period.

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The fighter aviation, isolated for the air defense of the territory of the country, in the first months of war had to 90 percent of the obsolete aircraft. This could not but have effect on the results of its activities. At the end of 1941 for the armament began to enter new combat vehicles. In the second period of war entire aircraft inventory Air Defense Forces was renovated. Fighter aviation was decisive means of the reflection of hostile flights on the most important industrial and political centers of the country, the railroad junctions, the seaports, and also the coverings of the areas of unloading and troop concentration in the front area. Air defense aviation frequently was drawn for conducting reconnaissance in the interests of ground forces, their covering on the field of battle, application of assault strikes/shocks on the hostile military forces and the airfields. Within the time of war the pilots of fighter air defense aviation shot down in the air combat 3930 hostile aircraft. More than 73 percent of missions air defense aviation of the country produced in the first period of war ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17936, page 949. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The strikes/shocks in the hostile aviation of air defense forces reflected, furthermore, by the massed fire/light of antiaircraft artillery. However, its activities in the beginning of war were not sufficiently effective, first of all, due to the absence of the means of search/scanning and guidance of guns committed to the target. In proportion to a qualitative increase in the antiaircraft artillery increased the density of its fire/light. The use/application of radar equipment made it possible to conduct direct fire at the not observed into the optical instruments goals, or it ensured the possibility to direct fire under the severe weather conditions. Antiaircraft artillery within the time of war shot down 2654 hostile aircraft ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

By their active participation in the defense of the political, administrative and industrial centers of the country, most important rear military objectives from the strikes/shocks of hostile aviation the military forces of air defense made a serious contribution to the achievement of the victory over the Fascist-German aggressors.

One of the most important problems of strategy in the last war was the material and technical support of combat activity of military

forces. The prolonged and bitter struggle, which was developed at the Soviet-German front, required that not preceded in the history of the wars of the use of material and technical equipment. For the army in the field continuously was headed an enormous quantity of armament and combat materiel. Furthermore, it consumed for the time of the war of 19.7 billion cartridges to the small arms, 260 mln. artillery shells, 222 mln. mines, 695.5 thousand tons of aerial bombs, 13 mln. tons of fuel and 34 mln. tons of rations '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid., page 968. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Only because of the unrelenting concern of the Communist Party about the mobilization for the needs of the front of all resources of the country, about organization and improvement of its military economy the Soviet Armed Forces could obtain those necessary for them armament and technology, ammunition and combustible, rations and clothing/uniform.

In the first months of war was rebuilt the system of the rear of army in the field for the purpose of the greatest centralization of the control of all organs and of the services of the material and technical and medical support of our military forces. Therefore in the second period of war Soviet command element had at its disposal the powerful/thick and branched military economy apparatus, capable

of ensuring delivery/procurement to the military forces of those enormous material and technical equipment which the Soviet rear gave to front.

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During the first year of war the supply of material of a front depended not so much on the needs of field forces, as from the possibilities of military economy. Received by military forces armament and technology yet did not complete the carried losses, ammunition were not sufficient. But also after the break/fracture, achieved in the activity of the rear of the country, were supplied with all with necessary, first of all, those fronts which solved the most important strategic problems. The correct distribution of those supplied by the rear of armament, technology, ammunition, combustible and other means of logistic support was one of the most important problems of strategic planning. from timely obtaining and delivery/procurement to the points of destination of material and technical equipment in many respects depended the character of strategic problems and the sequence of their execution. Strategic leadership, planning the prospects for the development of the armed struggle, had to worry also that the organs of military economy in proper time would prepare the necessary reserves of material and technical equipment for the support of operations/processes.

5. Leadership of the Armed Struggle.

Soviet strategy successfully solved the basic problems of the conduct of the armed struggle. It could do this because its goals and problems were determined by the correct and farsighted policy of the Communist Party. Exercising direct leadership of the entire struggle of the Soviet people, the party leaned on the scientific knowledge of basic laws governing modern war. Planning the ways of achieving the victory, it considered the characteristics of waging war in defense of the socialist fatherland.

Modern great war is no longer the work only of the armed forces of the belligerent states. It requires the efforts/forces of all people, mobilization of all material resources and spiritual forces of the country. It is natural that also the leadership of war under these conditions cannot be the goal only of military organs. Its universal character led to the close weave of the functions of political, military and economic leadership. This leadership can be carried out successfully only in such a case, when it is concentrated in the hands of the highest political authority, capable of organizing and of using for waging of war all forces of the country.

However, from the first days of the Great Patriotic War unity of political and military leadership, mobilization and the purposeful use of economic and human resources of the country in the interests of armed struggle provided the state committee of defense.

Strategic leadership by the armed forces was located in the hands of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command. It posed strategic problems, planned/glided the combat activity of all branches of the armed forces, distributed forces and means between the fronts. General headquarters was the organizer of the strategical operations, which were being conducted by the groups of fronts. At its direct disposal were located the strategic reserves, which it distributed depending on the selected plans and role, intended to one or the other front in this operation/process.

During entire war general headquarters it headed supreme commander I. V. Stalin. The strategic decisions made by general headquarters were not the fruit of the individual creativity of supreme commander-in-chief. In the preparation of these decisions participated the commanding and military councils of fronts, and also the central military organs on which leaned the general headquarters: General Staff, command element and headquarters of the forms of the armed forces and arms of service, the main and central divisions of the people's commissariat of defense. At the head of almost all these

organs were located the military councils, which fulfilled the functions of military and political leadership. Furthermore, the most important strategic concepts were examined by state committee. Defenses and by the central committee of the party. All this provided the constant effect of the Communist Party on all regions of strategic leadership, organization, preparation/training and combat activity of military forces.

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The decisions of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command on basic questions of strategy, as a rule, were the result of collective creativity. The plans of the largest strategic operations/processes of the second and third periods of the wars to conducting of which were assigned simultaneously the military forces of several fronts, they were developed/processed most frequently together by the military councils of these fronts, by the General Staff and the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command. The centralization of leadership did not interfere with the military councils of fronts to display initiative during planning of combat operations also in the course of the fulfillment of the strategic plan affirmed by general headquarters.

The obvious case to the combined creative activity of the

highest command echelons of command was planning strategic offensive operation for the purpose of the annihilation of the large/coarse grouping of German-Fascist military forces in the interfluvium of Volga and Don in winter 1942/43. It is known that in the period of the personality cult of Stalin in our military history literature widely was popularized the confirmation/assertion, that the concept and the plan of counteroffensive in Volga area belonged to personally supreme commander-in-chief. In actuality the development of concept and especially plan of operation/process on the route of the grouping of the Fascist-German military forces in the interfluvium of Volga and Don was the result of the collective creativity of general headquarters, General Staff and military councils of the southwest, Stalingrad and Donskoy fronts. Even during September 1942 the representatives of general headquarters in the escort/tracking of the group of the officers of General Staff visited the area of battles, specified the arising situation and reported about it into the general headquarters. The General Headquarters of the Supreme Command made a decision to conduct large-scale operation/process as the forces of three fronts for the purpose of encirclement and annihilation of hostile troops in the environs of Stalingrad, the military councils of these fronts made the valuable propositions which were taken into consideration by General Staff and general headquarters during the final development of the plan of operation/process.

The military councils of fronts took creative part in planning also of other strategical operations. So it was, for example, during planning of operations/processes to the summer of 1943. Presenting on the requirement of general headquarters their considerations during April 1943, the military councils of central and Voronezh fronts proposed summer campaign to begin with conducting defensive operation in the sector between Orel and Belgorod, to exhaust and to bleed white the concentrated there striking forces of enemy and only after this to pass into the decisive attack. The propositions of the military councils of fronts were taken into consideration in the plan of combat operations, developed by General Staff and then affirmed by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command.

However, a similar method of planning was used also with the preparation of the offensive of Soviet military forces in the Belorussian front sector in the summer of 1944. The military councils of fronts (1st Baltic, 3, 2, and the 1st of Belorussian ones), fulfilling the task/target of general headquarters, even in first half of May represented their propositions relative to conducting of Belorussian operation/process. On the basis of these propositions and instructions of general headquarters the General Staff developed the preliminary plan of operation/process. Then this plan was examined at the conference in the general headquarters, in which participated commanding and the members of the military councils of fronts

indicated above. After comprehensive discussion was finally determined the concept of operation and the concrete/specific/actual plan of its realization. The results of this collective creative work assumed then the form of the directive of general headquarters.

So actively participated the military councils of fronts in planning of Yassy-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder. East Prussian and Berlin operations/processes. The plans of some of them were discussed in the general headquarters with the participation of the front commanders. In the remaining cases the military councils, after obtaining the preliminary trunion caps of General Staff, presented then to it their considerations. These considerations were generalized by General Staff and were considered during the development of the directive of general headquarters for conducting of operation/process.

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To the participation in the creation of the plans of operations/processes the general headquarters and General Staff drew also the command element of Air Force, of Navy, branch commanders and their headquarters. All this to the sizable degree contributed to the success of the largest operations/processes of the second and third periods of war.

However, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command did not always in proper time consider the completely substantiated propositions of General Staff and military councils of the fronts which better knew situation, and the real possibilities of their military forces.

Is exponential in this respect the activity of the general headquarters in the summer of 1941. Toward the end of August hostile military forces came out to Dnepr. Only small bridgehead/beachhead in Kiev area was located in the hands of the military forces of the southwestern Front. Was created the threat of their encirclement. The military councils of front and direction/axis solved, that the sole way out - this is the immediate withdrawal of military forces to the rear line. This proposition was directed to the general headquarters, but it it rejected, on 15 September enemy surrounded entire Kiev grouping of Soviet military forces.

In the first months of 1942 in the General Staff was formed the solid opinion that the basic goal of our fronts on spring and principle of summer must be the temporary/time strategic defense, which will make possible to break up the attack trained/prepared by enemy, to exhaust his force and to create the most favorable

conditions for the transition of our military forces into the decisive attack. This opinion chief of the General Staff reported to general headquarters. However, general headquarters made halved decision - simultaneously with the transition to the strategic defense offensive operations in the environs of Leningrad, in Demyansk area, in Smolensk, by 16govsko- Kursk directions/axes and in the environs of Kharkov. Carrying out of this decision of general headquarters led to scattering of forces, which was one of the reasons for the serious failures of the Soviet military forces in the summer of 1942.

In 1943-1945 for the activity of general headquarters were characteristic the in-depth analysis of the situation at the fronts, collectivity in the manufacture of plans, reality of these plans. But nevertheless and in these years there are the cases, when general headquarters made the decisions, which did not correspond to situation. About this testifies, for example, the planning of combat operations in the central sector of the Soviet-German front in the beginning of 1944.

Planning to deliver main attacks in the northwestern and southwestern strategic directions, general headquarters simultaneously decided to develop offensive, also, in the western direction/axis. Meanwhile the fronts acted there were not arranged

the necessary forces for the execution of missions assigned to them. However, to increase these fronts in a sufficient measure Supreme High Command did not have the opportunity, since basic part of its reserves it had to direct in the Leningrad and Ukrainian front sectors. As a result our military forces, which opened attack on central front sector, although contained the considerable forces of enemy, to carry out its missions they were unable.

The study of the work experience of general headquarters shows that the decisions of the Supreme High Command, being the result of collective creativity, more objectively considered the situation and correlation of forces, posed to military forces the feasible strategic problems. The decisions which the supreme commander-in-chief accepted on the basis of the subjective evaluation of situation, without the accounting, and sometimes also in spite of the considerations of General Staff and military councils of fronts, frequently remained incomplete and even they led to the damage/defeat.

The centralization of strategic leadership contributed so that the military activities were subordinated to the uniform strategic concepts, in accordance with which were used the accumulated reserves and material resources.

In the first months of the war when the Red Army suffered damages/defeats and was forced to retreat into the depth of the country, for general headquarters it was frequently necessary to be occupied by the questions, which did not enter in the function of Supreme High Command. But this carried the forced character, it was the consequence of the unfavorable and rapidly changing situation, absence of the experience of leadership of combat operations under difficult conditions of modern war. As soon as situation it was stabilized, in the work of general headquarters was established/installed the definite/determined system which in essence was maintained to the end of the war.

end section.

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Soon after the beginnings of the military activities when even on it was possible to fix cooperation between the separate fronts, but the connection/bond of general headquarters with their command element did not always prove to be reliable, were formed high commands of North Western, Western, southwestern, and later also North-Caucasian of directions/axes.

Such intermediate organs of strategic leadership could considerably lighten general headquarters, ensure more flexible to concrete/specific/actual leadership of the combat activity of military forces. But for this commander-in-chief of directions/axes had to possess the necessary laws/rights and have at their disposal reserves for the direct effect on the course of operations/processes. This would not diminish the laws/rights of supreme commander-in-chief. However, Stalin did not go to this separation of the functions of strategic leadership. He did not consider the commanders-in-chief of directions/axes and gave orders to the directly front commanders. As a result of the high command of

directions/axes they did not fulfill role, which by them was intended. To the summer of 1942 they all were abolished.

Meanwhile the need of approaching the strategic leadership directly to army in the field was not eliminated. It began especially sharply to be felt when the Red Army switched over to conducting of the large-scale offensive operations, in each of which simultaneously participated several fronts. For the successful conduct of such operations/processes it was required, that strategic leadership would render concrete/specific/actual aid in the organization of combat operations, it operationally coordinated the efforts/forces of fronts, were introduced the brought about by the situation changes in the accepted plan of operation/process in the course of its conducting, was monitored the execution by the fronts of those set to them problem.

Beginning from the second period of war for this purpose into the combat areas they left the representatives of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command. With them usually was located small operational group, which consisted of representatives of general staff and officers of the various kinds of military forces. The activity of the representatives of general headquarters was very successful/fruitful in the battles in Volga and near Kursk, and also in the offensive operations of 1944. They fulfilled

approximately/exemplarily the same functions, as abolished Supreme Commands of directions/axes. But the representatives of general headquarters were also limited in the laws/rights and basic their instructions to fronts usually gave only after coordination with the supreme commander-in-chief. Their activity frequently was reduced to the transmission of information to the general headquarters, to the excessive control of the activities of front command element. There were the cases and the straight/direct substitutions of commander. In the final stage of war some strategical operations were conducted already without the representatives of general headquarters. Leadership of operations/processes was carried out directly from the center. This became possible because of a considerable improvement in the system of communications and technical equipment used by it.

In the war KS Japan in connection with the remotness and the particular conditions of this theater operations assigned the commander-in-chief of all armed forces (land, naval and air), which participated in the campaign in the Far East which they led them with the aid of the small headquarters.

Thus, the strategic leadership of armed struggle was realized by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command. Operative management of the armed struggle in the fields of battles directly provided the front commanders and by armies. Of the usually front commander, being

guided by the instructions general headquarters accepted the decisions in which they clearly determined the goals of the forthcoming operation/process, problem of armies, distributed forces and means. The accepted decisions in the form of the started plans of front operations were represented on confirmation/assertion into the general headquarters. After the confirmation/assertion of these plans the headquarters developed/processed the operational directives or commands with the presentation of specific problems for each army and all units, subordinated to front. On the basis of these commands the military councils of armies plan of army operations/processes.

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Front commander and by armies, the members of military councils and the commanders/chiefs of political organs regularly were in the military forces. Jointly with the subordinates they determined expedient forms of combat operations, established cooperation with the neighbors, organized the party-political work, etc.

During combat front and army command element was located there, whence it was possible more to purposefully lead military forces. Besides the command posts, equipped by all by necessary for the uninterrupted leadership by military forces, were created the auxiliary posts in immediate proximity of those military forces which

solved primary tasks. To these auxiliary posts usually left commanding and the member of military council, the commanders of the arms of service and chiefs of a service, staff officers and political workers. Frequently commanding, their deputies and members of military councils left to the foremost positions where was rendered concrete/specific/actual aid military forces. Directly in the fields of battles perished General of the Army front commander I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, N. F. Vatutin, I. R. Apanasenko, colonel general M. P. Kirponos, army commander lieutenant generals V. N. L'vov, M. G. Yefremov, the chiefs of staff of fronts lieutenant general P. I. Bodin, Major General G. D. Stel'makh, party-political workers the secretary of TsK KP(b) U M. A. Burmistenko, division commissars D. A. Lestev, Ye. P. Rykov, I. P. Shchelkanov and many others.

It is known that one of the important reasons, which impeded operative management the combat operations of our military forces in the initial period of war, was the absence of the well fixed and without interruption operating connection/bond of General Staff with the fronts, and their command elements - with the subordinate armies. The forced withdrawal/departure of our military forces interfered with using the signal communication net, prepared in the pre-war years, intended for the care of the developed fronts and armies. In the subsequent periods of war the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the General Staff, the commanders-in-chief of VVS and VMS,

their headquarters had clearly operational communication system with the fronts, the armies and the navies, which was based in essence upon the means of state telephone and telegraph and radio communication.

In its activity the general headquarters leaned on the General Staff of the armed forces in which worked the highly skilled officers and Generals. General Staff assembled information about the situation, which was being formed at entire front, thoroughly analyzed it, were drawn the appropriate conclusions and it reported to their general headquarters. In this tedious work great aid General Staff rendered the headquarters of fronts, armies and troop formations, the headquarters of the commanding of forms armed forces ~~et~~ of the branch commanders. By assembly and by processing political information were occupied central and army political organs.

Receiving the instructions of general headquarters. General Staff developed/processed the general/common/total plans of the combat use of armed ^{forces} ~~et~~ the plans of strategical operations, directive and the commands of Supreme High Command, gave in connection with this concrete/specific/actual instructions to military forces. In accordance with the planned strategic plans the General Staff and the organs of the rear prepared requests for the industry to the issue of military production and solved many problems, connected with the

military transportation.

For the continuous study and generalizing the operational and tactical experience of war, its dissemination in the military forces there were created special organs in the General Staff and the headquarters of all forms of the armed forces and branches of services, fronts and armies.

The controls of the People's commissariat of defense during the patriotic war developed both from a distance new regulations and manuals, and also different official leadership and manual, handbooks and instructions, many all possible reminders. During March 1942 was published the manual on the field staff duties. In the same year were published the Field Manual of the infantry. Regulations contained clear recommendations regarding the conduct of the basic forms of combat operations, it indicated the most committed methods of the cooperation of the infantry with other arms of service.

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The generalized experience of first half of war was reflected in the project of Field Service Regulations which was published during November 1943. It helped to inject in the practice of the combat use of combined arms units many valuable conclusions from the accumulated

experience of the armed struggle. But the appearance of the project of this manual/regulations proved to be somewhat overdue.

In the beginning of second half of war the character of combat operations in connection with the transition of enemy to the positional defense sharply changed. Therefore in 1944 it was necessary to additionally publish several manuals (manual on the penetration of positional defense, manual on the penetration of fortified areas, etc.).

Very important work made during the war military science cadres of the special branches of services and services. They generalized the accumulated experience and on its basis developed/processed leadership on the use/application of artillery, aviation, armored and engineers, and also on questions of organization and activity of the rear. Particular attention was paid to the creation of numerous leadership on the use of new means of combat materiel, which came into military service.

The general headquarters, the headquarters of the forms of the armed forces and arms of service prepared and published in the war years the collectors/collections of materials, dedicated to the separate operations/processes of the Red Army, bulletins with the description of the combat employment of various kinds of military


forces and forms of arme forces. Great aid in this work rendered military academies. The combat practice of military forces, examples of their military skill found wide reflection in the numerous periodic military publications. All this contributed so that the most valuable experience rapidly became known to all military forces.

The Great Patriotic War showed that created by the central committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government the system of strategic leadership on the whole satisfied the requirements of modern war. It ensured unity of leadership by entire course of the armed struggle. Relying on enormous economic resources of the country and moral and political unity of the Soviet people, our of supreme command could successfully guide the combat activity of the armed forces.

Soviet military strategy completely corresponded to the political purposes of the just patriotic war. Our military leadership skillfully applied diverse ways and forms of the armed struggle, skillfully effectively were used all branches of the armed forces in their cooperation.

The Fascist-German strategists could not carry out the missions charged on them, although the military economy and the armed forces of Germany were considerably better prepared for the war.

COMBAT TRAINING OF AVIATORS.



Before a training flight.




Missile carrier aircraft.

Parachute landing preparing for take-off.



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
ON TACTICAL TRAINING MISSIONS.



Tank subunits and motorized infantry advance.



Battle alert.



Use/application of decisive forms of the armed struggle, the comprehensive planning of the use of human and material resources, careful organization and the skillful realization of the cooperation of fronts and groups of fronts, all branches of the armed forces, the correct use/application of strategic reserves, the skillful combination of the operations of regular military forces with the partisan movement in the rear of enemy - such the basic characteristics, characteristic for the Soviet strategy in the last war.

6. The operational formations of army in the field.

Purposeful and active character of Soviet strategy, quantitative and qualitative increase in combat materiel and armament of the Red Army, constant tendency of her command cadres to improve forms and ways of the armed struggle caused the continuous development of operational art and tactics in the course of war.

Soviet military thought as early as the pre-war years created the ordered theory of the contemporary ones of operation/process and combat, developed the problems of a deep offensive operation.

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But at that time the Red Army had very limited experience of the combat employment of new means of combat - tanks and the aviation whose mass use was begun only in the battles of the Second World War.

Our military theory in essence it correctly determined those routes/paths on which had to be developed the operational art and the tactics of Soviet military forces. A main deficiency in the situations developed by it consisting in the fact that at their basis lay/rested the detachment predominantly to the offensive operations of Soviet military forces, possessing superiority in the forces and the means. Completely it was not considered the possibility of the fact that for the Red Army it is necessary to conduct prolonged strategic defense. This ruinously had effect on the combat activity of Soviet military forces at the very beginning of war. Without having forces and means, envisaged by theoretical situations, and without possessing sufficient skills into the organization of defense, the command element and the headquarters of operational formations frequently we could not effectively use the available they have limited possibilities.

The German military personnel, which several borrowed from the Soviet theory of operational art, could verify all this and master in

the combat practice earlier than our cadres. The Soviet military thought, contained by the adverse effect of personality cult, did not know how to extract the proper lessons from the combat operations in Western Europe.

The serious advantage of the Fascist-German army in the beginning of war against the USSR was the fact that it had the formed, completely manned and well technically equipped operational formations (army and army group) with the previously prepared headquarters. The operational formations of the Red Army (army and fronts) at the beginning of combat operations were not completely formed and manned, since this process it was proposed to complete during the deployment of military forces according to the mobilization plan. As a result the fighting strength of our operational formations in the first months of war proved to be considerably weaker, than it was provided for by pre-war theoretical detachments, and their command element and the headquarters - insufficiently prepared to the command by troops.

The highest operational formation of Soviet military forces during the war was the front, which consisted of combined-arms, tank and air armies, large units/formations and the units of the various kinds of forces. If the fighting strength of armies of combined arms was approximately/exemplarily identical and it was determined mainly

by the presence of human and material resources, then a quantity and a composition of fronts depended, first of all, on character and scale of the combat missions laid on them, on the importance of direction/axis, on which they acted.

It is known that in the First World War Russian military forces, which acted in the North-Western, Western and southwestern theaters where unfolded the combat events and the Great Patriotic War, they were united into three or four fronts. In the civil war here there were also three or four front associations/unifications of the Red Army. These front associations/unifications were intended for the independent accomplishment of strategic missions, and the zone of their activities enveloped one of the main strategic directions of this theater. On the armies of combined arms, which was included in such fronts, were laid operational, and frequently also operational-strategic problems.

Soviet command element during the first days of war formed five fronts. Furthermore, on some directions/axes were located independent armies, which were being subordinated to directly Supreme High Command. Toward the end of 1941 the number of fronts was doubled. This was explained by the expansion of the zone of active military operations, and also by the fact that for the countering of the powerful/thick strikes/shocks of enemy it was necessary to advance

fresh operational formations, to create the supplementary operational-strategic grouping which were converted into the new fronts. In the subsequent periods of the war quantity of fronts varied from 10 to 15, depending on length of strategic front and character of the activities of the Red Army.

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Creating this considerable number of fronts, Soviet command element considered an increase in the forces and means, assigned to the participation in the large-scale operations/processes. In the First World War to front association/unification for deciding the strategic ones the problem it was sufficient of having 50-60 infantry and cavalry divisions. Now for conducting the strategical operation were required considerably large forces. For example, during the first stage of Belorussian operation/process (1944) in the combat operations participated about 300 heterogeneous large units/formations (rifle/infantry, cavalry, tank, mechanized, artillery, air, antiaircraft engineering, etc.). In this grouping was counted more than 1250 thousand people (without the personnel of front and army rear), about 24.5 thousand guns and mortars (76-mm it is above), more than 4 thousand tanks and SAU, it is more than 5.3 thousand aircraft. In the course of operation/process the strength of military forces even more increased, a quantity of guns and mortars

composed 45 thousand, tanks and SAU - more than 6 thousand, aircraft - about 7 thousand ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Cm. "Military History log/journal", 1964, No 6, page 75-78. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Military forces, taking part in the Belorussian operation/process, entered in the composition of four fronts.

Of the operations/processes of strategic significance Soviet command element was usually conducted by forces of the group of fronts. In this case the front in the majority of the cases carried out the missions of operational-strategic significance, acting sometimes in one operational direction.

The Soviet military doctrine before the Great Patriotic War considered that the front must consist of 60-75 rifle divisions, 4-5 mechanized and 2-3 cavalry corps and 15-30 air divisions. However, in the first months of war Soviet command element on could provide fronts with such forces and means. Subsequently their combat power continuously increased. If in the second period of war in front were included on the average 20-30 rifle divisions, 500-800 tanks and 700-1000 aircraft, then in the third period primary fronts had on 30-60 rifle divisions, 1-2 thousand tanks and so many aircraft. The

fronts, which attacked/advanced in the main strategic directions, were arranged/located the even more considerable forces: 70-75 rifle divisions, 2-3 thousand tanks and so many aircraft.

The command by troops, which consisted of numerous units and large units/formations, very heterogeneous according to their armament and combat designation/purpose, required great art of their command element and mounted work of all command agencies. Meanwhile in the course of war, especially in the first period, the commanders of operational formations greater than others underwent the negative influence of the Stalin style of leadership. It found its expression, for example, in the frequent shift/relief of the army commanders and by fronts, which in many instances was not caused by need. This interfered with to commander to master the experience of leading of military forces, it blasted/undermined/blew up in them the faith/belief in its capabilities, limited their creative independence.

Basic the operational formation of Soviet military forces was army of combined arms. According to the prewar detachments, the army, which acted in the main direction/axis (the so-called shock army), had to consist of 3-4 rifle/infantry ones, 1-2 mechanized or one cavalry corps, 3-4 air divisions and different reinforcing means (10-12 artillery regiments, several tank regiments, etc.). But in

connection with the fact that the plan of mobilization deployment of Soviet military forces actually proved to be torn away, in the Red Army in the first months of war there was not one army of combined arms of this composition.

For supreme command it was necessary in the beginning of war to give the composition of armies of combined arms in accordance with the real possibilities of personnel procurement and armament of the formed military forces. The large part of the armies at the beginning of winter campaign 1941/42 g. had from 4 to 6 rifle divisions, 1-2 tank brigades, and some - still even 1-2 cavalry divisions. The rifle divisions, as a rule, the abbreviated/reduced composition felt sharp/acute deficiency in the armament, the motor transport, and frequently also in the people.

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Artillery was not sufficient. Since army found it necessary to operate on a wide front, in her command element frequently it was not necessary reserves.

The majority of the German armies located on the Soviet-German front usually consisted of 3-4 army corps (8-16 infantry divisions) and several tank and motorized divisions. Into army, solving

defensive problems, sometimes it entered to 25 divisions, which actually made her for a quantity the military forces of the Red Army equivalent to front association/unification.

Only toward the end of the first period of war the composition of our armies of combined arms began to change. Army, which acted in the main direction/axis, had 6-8 divisions and 2-4 brigades of rifle troops, 1-3 tank brigades even 2-3 tank regiments, fighter antitank brigade, 5-8 mortar regiments.

Subsequently the operational possibilities of army of combined arms increased mainly because of a qualitative change of the rifle/infantry, artillery, armored and engineering large units/formations entering into it. Was restored/reduced the corps system of the organization of rifle troops. Since 1944 in the composition of army were 3-4 rifle corps (9-12 divisions), 1-3 tank brigades, artillery, antitank, anti-aircraft large units/formations, engineer-sapper and other special units ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18767, page 502. ENDFOOTNOTE.

While conducting of the operation/process of army was given the tank or mechanized corps.

If during the first days of war we have 14 armies of combined arms, then subsequently their number continuously grew. Was reinforced their fighting strength. In the years of war were formed about 80 armies of combined arms, moreover 40-50 of them, including of 11 guards ones, constantly they were located on the front. Guards armies were formed from the most combat-effective large units/formations and fought in the decisive directions/axes. In 1941-1942 the general headquarters of Glavnokomandov created five shock armies. They were also stronger than ordinary armies.

The Fascist-German command element kept at the Soviet-German front on the average 12-15 armies of combined arms. During entire war their fighting strength considerably exceeded the forces of Soviet armies of combined arms.

During the first year of war the Red Army did not actually have operational formations of armored forces. In 1940 there were formed 9 mechanized corps, which were being intended for the accomplishment of operational objectives. During February - March of 1941 was begun the formation of 20 additional such corps. But in the beginning of war for lack of technology they were disbanded. At the disposal of the

command element of armies of combined arms were situated the individual tank regiments and brigades, by which it usually reinforced rifle/infantry large units/formations. As a result the tanks acted separately, carrying out only the missions of the direct support of the infantry (NPP).

However, the first strategic offensive of the Red Army in winter of 1941/42 ~~g~~ showed that for the development of offensive at the great depth were necessary powerful/thick mobile groups of military forces. Use/application for this purpose of large/coarse cavalry large units/formations gave the limited success, since they proved to be powerless against the artillery fire and the counterattacks of German tanks. The cavalry bore great losses, also, from the hostile aviation. Using the more favorable possibilities, which were created for the technical equipment of the military forces in the spring of 1942, Soviet command element began the formation of the tank and mechanized corps.

During April - June 1942 were formed the first important operational formations of armored forces - two tank armies. They were created on the base of armies of combined arms and at first they consisted of three armored corps and two rifle divisions each. The experience of winter campaign of 1942/43 showed that the tank army whose large units/formations possess different mobility, is the

difficultly guided and insufficiently mounted combat organism.

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Therefore at the beginning of summer-autumn campaign of 1943 Soviet command element reorganized tank armies. Now into their composition entered two tank and one mechanized of the corps, the tank destroyer, motorized artillery, antiaircraft, mortar and engineer units. The combat capabilities of tank armies sharply increased. In the third period of war these armies (their number increased to six) were considerably intensified by artillery and engineer units. As arms of each army for state/staff were 620 tanks and 189 self-propelled gun mounts ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18767, page 29. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In contrast to the German tank armies the composition of our armies was in essence constant. Improvement of their organization had as a goal to raise the possibilities of tank armies for conducting the independent operations in the operational depth. They became the powerful/thick and well mounted operational units, which possessed large striking power and we could accomplish a deep maneuver at the high rate. This caused their important role in the offensive

operations. The rapid advance of tank armies into depths of hostile defense contributed to its rapid destruction, encirclement of the grouping of enemy and to their rout.

Thus, in the course of war Soviet military theory and the practice embarked on a way of organizing the armored forces, which made it possible to use a unit of their forces (tank regiments and of brigade) for the activities in the all-arms combat together with the infantry and the artillery, and bulk of tanks (tank and mechanized corps and tank army) to apply as the mobile groups, capable of carrying out independent missions in the army and front offensive operations.

The Fascist-German army up to the moment/factor of attack in the USSR had four tank groups (subsequently renamed into the tank armies). Their composition was not constant. Besides the tank and motorized corps into tank armies sometimes entered army corps. If Soviet tank army was commonly used for the completion of the penetration of defense, carried out by forces of armies of combined arms, and for the development of penetration, then German tank army frequently received independent sector for the offensive and used for the penetration of front not only the entered into its composition infantry divisions and artillery, but frequently and tank large units/formations.

This method of using the associations/unifications of tank military forces allowed German-fascist army to achieve the rapid success in the battles in France, where it did not meet persistent resistance. This method was effective, also, in the initial stage of combat operations on the Soviet-German front. However, in proportion to the increase of the resistance of Soviet military forces to German tank armies was necessary to spend increasingly more efforts/forces to the penetration of defense. Tank divisions, acting separately from infantry large units/formations, could not attack/advance at the high rate and bore great losses. Field armies, remaining without the support of the large/coarse forces of tanks, also lost the capability to rapidly advance. Because of this for Hitler command element it was necessary together with an increase of the number of infantry large units/formations at tank armies to reinforce field armies by armored corps and divisions. With the transition to the strategic defense German tank armies, created for achievement of the strategic success in the "blitzkrieg" became combined-arms type ordinary field armies.

However, the combat practice of the first months of war showed that also the organization of aviation, accepted in the Red Army (Air Force of fronts, armies, corps of aviation), was not adapted to that so that the Air Force could be used massed in the decisive

directions/axes.

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Their dispersing on all cooperative associations/unifications although created favorable conditions for the direct cooperation with ground forces, it at the same time deprived command of the front of the possibility to concentrate the effort of entire its aviation for gaining air supremacy for the decisive direction/axis and to lend support to military forces by the massed air strikes. However, the first experience of this concentrated use of aviation in the battle in the environs of Moscow gave good results. After this Soviet command element it recognized as advisable the separate air forces of fronts to bring together to the air armies. Toward the end of the first period of war the air armies were created in all fronts.

The fighting strength of air armies in the course of war continuously increased. To the summer of 1943 in the armies, which were being located in the central front sector, were counted 1000-1200 aircraft. In the third period of war in some air armies a number of aircraft exceeded 2 thousand ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 18392, page 59, 62, 65. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The air armies of fronts, which acted in the main directions/axes, were usually reinforced by air force units of the reserve of Supreme High Command. Frequently to the decisive directions/axes were drawn the forces of the air armies of neighboring fronts, and also long-range aviation.

The highest combined-arms tactical large unit/formation in the Red Army during the war was the corps. In the first months of combat operations rifle corps temporarily disbanded. However, already in first half of 1942, when the technical equipment of our military forces increased, and the command cadres acquired adequate combat experience, Supreme High Command decided to restore/reduce rifle corps. This process in essence ended in 1943, moreover the combat capabilities of rifle corps in comparison with 1941 considerably were increased. In the second period of war the corps usually consisted of three rifle divisions, artillery and other special units. Was intensified corps artillery. This sharply raised the firepower of the corps, and its commander obtained the possibility more effectively to act on progress of combat.

Basic the tactical large unit/formation of rifle troops was division. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in the Red Army

was introduced the structure of the rifle division, which corresponded to the requirements of modern combat of that time. Our rifle division counted less people than German infantry division, but it exceeded it in a quantity of weapons. However, in connection with the surprise attack of Fascist Germany in the Soviet Union our military forces entered combat, without having the quantity of people and armament envisaged by state/staff. Great losses in first months of combat operations required large/coarse changes in the structure of division for the purpose to adapt it to the conditions of waging modern war. The organization and staffing structure of division within the time of war changed six times, moreover five times - in the first one-and-a-half year of combat operations. These changes did not introduce fundamental innovations into the states/staffs of the rifle division. They depended in essence on the possibilities of the personnel procurement of military forces by personnel and the provision with their armament. In this case was considered the character of combat operations. The strength of personnel of division, envisaged by the state/staff, affirmed during December 1942, was lowered to 9435 people, and the State schedule, accepted during December 1944, already determined strength of the rifle division into 11706 soldiers and officers ¹.

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FOOTNOTE ¹. There, Inv. No 17936, page 888. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, the officially accepted states/staffs did not reflect the actual state of the large units/formations of our army in the field. In it there were almost no completely manned rifle divisions. In 1942-1945 only one one fourth of the divisions counted to 8 thousand people, whereas rest had from 5 to 7 thousand and even from 3 to 5 thousand soldiers and officers '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid., page 887. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In 1945 strength of the manned rifle division achieved 8-9 thousand, while in the course of operations/processes it was supported at the level of 5-6 thousand people.

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Meanwhile German divisions had much larger number of people, the Soviet the divisions. Even in 1944, i.e., when Germany already felt sharp/acute deficiency in human resources. German divisions counted on the average to 10 thousand people each.

During entire war the Red Army had at the operating fronts considerably larger of divisions, than enemy. However, comparing only a quantity of divisions, it was not possible to judge the actual correlation of forces, since German divisions 1.5-2 times exceeded

Soviet ones on their strength.

Somewhat stronger than ordinary ones there were guard rifle divisions of the Red Army. In 1944 for them were introduced the new states/staffs to which toward the end of the war began to be converted all rifle divisions. In the third period of war some rifle divisions of the Red Army possessed higher firepower than German.

A constant increase in the quantity and an improvement in the quality of the armament of rifle/infantry large units/formations and units had the decisive effect on their combat activity.

7. Character of operations of fronts and armies.

To armies of combined arms and for front associations/unifications in the course of war it was necessary to carry out diverse missions. They depended on situation and were determined by the strategic goals which advanced the Soviet command element before the ^{active} armies field in different stages of war.

Primary task of armies and fronts in the first months of military activities consisted in organization and conduct of defense. In the created situation the command element of armies and fronts was not arranged/located sufficient forces and means in order to organize

the defense, capable of opposing the massed attacks of Fascist military forces, intensified by a great quantity of tanks and by powerful/thick aviation.

Before the war it was considered that this defense the army of combined arms is capable of organizing in the zone with a width of 80-100 kilometers, after creating two basic defensive zones - tactical and operational - with the general/common/total depth of 40-60 kilometers. In the first months of war the army usually was defended in the zone from 80 to 115 kilometers, having in this case doubly, and sometimes also triply less forces than it was provided for by prewar detachments. Defense, as a rule, it was necessary to create in a hurry, under the conditions when could not be been detached away from the advancing/attacking enemy. Needs for acting at the wide front forced the command element of operational formations to dilate/extend forces. This was complicated by the tendency to evenly cover all directions/axes. Only in the most important strategic directions for covering of which the Supreme High Command advanced the significant part of the formed reserves, had the opportunity to organize more enduring/more permanent and more active defense.

Operational defense in this stage of war in essence was shallow, with the even distribution of military forces according to entire

front. Defensive battles carried primarily maneuverable character. Persistent combat for the retention of defensive zones were most frequently completed by withdrawal/departure to the subsequent lines. The defended units and large unit/formation yet were not arranged/located means in order to successfully repel the powerful/thick attacks of tanks and aviation. And nevertheless Soviet military forces, in spite of the considerable superiority of enemy in the forces, they exerted it ever more stable resistance. However, this build-up/growth of resistance of defense was achieved not so much by art of organization and conduct defensive operations/processes, as by persistent struggle of military forces for the retention of tactical positions. Great role here played the reserves, advanced from the rear.

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They were used for the creation of defensive borders in the depth, and they delivered the counterstrokes which, true, did not frequently give decisive results, since isolatable for them forces were committed to battle in parts. And nevertheless these active defensive operations slowed down an advance of enemy, harassed him, and in some front sectors forced the Fascist-German military forces to assume the defense.

In 1942 operational defense became more advanced. In the battle in Volga the armies of combined arms, which acted in the main direction/axis, obtained the possibility to allot the second echelons and reserve. Front also had two echelons and reserves. As a result the depth of the defenses of front achieved 120, and armies - 30-40 kilometers. The density of the formation of military forces in the main line of defense also increased. To the participation in the antitank defense began to be drawn almost entire/all artillery. The widely used maneuver by artillery means made it possible more reliably to cover tank-threatened directions.

The most shining example of successful defense was battle near Kursk during July 1943. But this defense was not ordinary. The correlation of forces was here in favor of the defender. Such it was not in one of other defensive operations, carried out by Soviet military forces. The insuperability of defense in this case was ensured by fact that the fighting strength of operational formations, their technical equipment by that time considerably grew. The command cadres and the headquarters of all degrees already accumulated great combat experience. Important significance had that the fact that the command element of fronts and armies in advance and thoroughly prepared military forces and lines occupied by them for repulsion of the attacks of enemy. As a result was created the deeply distributed in depth defense, which had available powerful/thick and mobile

reserves.

The main fire force of defense near Kursk was artillery. During the battle in points of decision of defense it acted to hundred and more than guns and mortars to the kilometer of front.

The large units/formations of armored forces not only delivered counterstrokes on attacked/advanced groupings of enemy, but also for the first time successfully they were applied for the defense of borders jointly with the combined arms units and independently.

Active support ground forces lent the aviation of fronts. It covered the main forces of the defended military forces, it delivered strikes/shocks on bursting open tank groupings of the enemy provided the counteroffensives of movable units, conducted air intelligence. Air armies concentrated basic efforts/forces in the directions/axes of the main attacks of the attacked/advanced hostile troops. Depending on situation the aviation withstood its activities of the zone of one army of combined arms in another.

Further development in the battle near Kursk underwent the antitank defense the basis of formation by which became the system of antitank strong points and areas, distributed in depth into the depth to 30 kilometers in the directions/axes of the possible attacks of

hostile tank forces. For dealing with the tanks were drawn, first of all, the tank destroyer regiments and artillery brigades, and also tanks and self-propelled guns, density of the concentration of which achieved 20-25 combat vehicles to the kilometer of front in the directions/axes of the main attacks of enemy. The important means of antitank defense became also mobile vanguards of obstacle. Density of antitank mine laying was 1500-1700 mines to kilometer in the tank-threatened directions. This organization of antitank defense ensured not only the reflection of the attacks of large/coarse tank forces of enemy, but also the mass annihilation of his tanks.

In the depth of the defenses were large reserves, which by their active operations and by powerful/thick counteroffensives created the turning point in the course of struggle. For delivering the counteroffensives the front commander planned two or three directions/axes, planning/gliding including the army counteroffensives. Battlefield maneuver was carried out first of all by an advancement of the tank and mechanized large units/formations, artillery antitank reserves. This made it possible to rapidly change ratio in the forces in the threatened directions/axes in favor of the defended military forces.

end section.

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The development of the operational defense of Soviet military forces was determined mainly by an increase in the military and economic possibilities of our country, by reinforcing on this basis of the fighting strength of fronts and armies. Simultaneously with change in the material and technical conditions, assimilation of combat experience was improved art of organization and conduct of operational defense.

All this, together undertaken, and also the high combat staying power/persistency of our military forces, their mass heroism they ensured an increase in strength and stability of operational defense, made its capable shortly to bleed white the most powerful/thickest offensive grouping of enemy and to create conditions for the transition of our military forces into the offensive.

In spite of the fact that operational defense took up the very important place in the combat operations of the Red Army, the leading role in them belonged to offensive operations. They were the basic

way of the execution of the decisive problems which the strategy placed before operational formations.

It is natural that in the operations/processes conducted came to light the great variety of the forms of the operational formation of military forces, grouping of forces and means, ways of the realization of penetration and its development into the depth. This gave the richest material for further development and the improvements of the theory of offensive operation.

On the character of offensive operations, first of all, had an effect those changes which occurred in the overall strategic situation in the course of war. In its first period when yet was not completed struggle for the strategic initiative, and the Fascist-German army did not waste its offensive power, the Red Army undertook offensive operations under the unfavorable conditions. It had available comparatively limited forces. It did not have the large/coarse tank and air formations without which it was not possible to rapidly develop the tactical success achieved.

Secondly and especially into the third periods the situation for conducting the offensive operations radically changed. The Fascist-German army at entire front switched over to defensive operations. For Soviet military forces it was necessary to overcome

the strongly fastened/strengthened defense of enemy. But they now had available for this considerably larger possibilities.

In the winter campaign 1941/42 the attacked/advanced fronts and armies, as a rule, applied the single echelon formation with the weak reserves. As the mobile group was used the cavalry corps, intensified by the tank battalions or brigade. During this formation the front could not increase the strike/shock by fresh forces, operation/process was not developed into the depth and rapidly it attenuated.

In the winter campaign 1942/43 the single echelon formation of the attacked/advanced military forces was maintained, but they had usually stronger reserves. Furthermore, the mobile group of front already composed the tank or mechanized corps. Change in the character of hostile defense coincided with sharp reinforcing of combat power of Soviet military forces. Therefore for overcoming the strongly fastened/strengthened and deeply distributed in depth defense the Red Army could already distribute in depth striking forces and create higher operational densities in the directions/axes of main strikes. In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 the offensive grouping of the fronts, which acted in the main strategic directions, usually had two-echelon formation. Armies of combined arms also sometimes allotted the second echelon.

Thus, in the course of war the depth of the operational formation of military forces for the offensive consistently increased because of the creation of the second echelons, front and army reserves. But this occurred not due to weakening of the first echelon, but as a result of a general/common/total increase in the composition of fronts and reinforcing by their reserves of Supreme High Command.

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A deep operational formation of offensive grouping increased their strike power, it made it possible to increase impact force in the course of operation/process, to successfully repulse a counterstroke of enemy, to retain superiority over it during all offensive. This created conditions for the realization of the penetration of the entire system of hostile defense, development of offensive at the great depth and at the high rate.

The bright manifestation of an increase in our operational art was daring massing of forces in the directions/axes of main attacks. Reinforcing of the fighting strength of fronts and armies made it possible to create higher operational densities in the entire zone of

attack. However, only decisive use/application of principle of the massing of forces gave the possibility to achieve considerable superiority in the direction/axis of main attack.

In the front offensive operations of the first period the wars strikes were made simultaneously in several directions/axes one of which was considered the main thing. This led to the dispersal of the efforts/forces of the attacked/advanced military forces. By those The tempo of the breakthrough was slow. After consuming their forces in the struggle for overcoming of tactical zone, the attacked/advanced armies, which did not have moreover, of large/coarse tank large units/formations, could not develop the success achieved. But if by them this succeeded, then the low rates of operations/processes made it possible for enemy to pull his reserves, and offensive attenuated, without having achieved decisive goals.

Subsequently the fronts began to concentrate their basic efforts/forces on one and it is thinner/less frequent by two directions/axes, creating on the main thing of them the powerful/thick striking force, capable of carrying out and of developing penetration into the depth. At the remaining front were undertaken particular activities for the purpose to contain enemy. The creation of powerful/thick striking forces was necessary to concentrate the efforts of several armies for a comparatively narrow

front sector. Each army of the striking force of front penetrated the defenses of enemy in one sector.

Because of this changed the role of the command element of front in the realization of operational penetration. If in the offensive operations of the first period of war the problem of the command element of front consisted, first of all, of distributing of reinforcing means between the armies for the provision of a penetration and coordinating their activities in the course of operation/process, then beginning from the winter offensive in 1942/43 with the direct function of the command element of front became the organization of the penetration of defense and its development.

The command element and the headquarters of front acted on the basis of the plan of operation/process, affirmed by Supreme High Command. Since the front operation, as a rule, was the unit of the strategical operation, conducted by the group of fronts, general headquarters indicated the direction/axis of main attack and the basic problems of each front.

Front became the basic organizer of penetration. In the majority of front operations the penetration was conducted by the forces of two-three armies in the adjacent sectors. This strike group depending

on its fighting strength was concentrated on the front from 15 to 40 kilometers. This width of penetration was a sufficient for the input/introduction mobile group of front and forces of the second echelon for the purpose of exploitation. In some operations/processes when this required situation, front (1st Ukrainian - in the Kiev operation/process, the 1st and 3rd Belorussian - in the Belorussian operation/process, 1st the 2nd Belorussian - in Berlin operation/process, etc.) accomplished a penetration simultaneously on two, and sometimes also in three sectors. In these cases were created several striking forces. However, army carried out the missions only of operational-tactical significance. In the campaigns 1944-1945 it accomplished a penetration in the sector not into 10-20 kilometers as this was in first half of war, but already in the sector into 6-14 kilometers.

In the operations/processes 1943-1945 Soviet command element more daringly resorted to the massed use of the available forces and means in the main direction/axis, without fearing to weaken/attenuate remaining front sectors. In the zone of penetration whose width comprised usually from 5 to 15 percent of the general/common/total zone of attack of front, were concentrated half also of more all rifle/infantry large units/formations, the large part of the artillery, almost all tanks and aircraft, which is disposed in line abreast for this operation/process. Thus in the direction/axis of

main attack was provided high operational density that it contributed to an increase in the rate of penetration.

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In the first period of war the rate of operational penetration, as a rule, was 5-8 kilometers in a 24 hour period. Subsequently, in spite of considerable reinforcing of hostile defense, it increased for the rifle troops to 15-20, and for the movable units - to 20-40 kilometers. This was achieved not only by the massed use/application of forces and of combat devices, but also by a change in the way of the realization of penetration. In the operations/processes 1941-1943 predominated the method of the consistent capture of the defensive lines of enemy, his basic points. However, in the campaigns of 1944-1945 the military forces of the first operational echelon were not delayed for the repression of the garrisons of basic points and separate strong points, which exerted especially stubborn resistance. They blocked by their specially chosen forces, and they themselves continued to press home the attack into the depth. The resistance of these centers of defense suppressed the military forces of the second operational echelon.

The penetration of tactical defense zone was one of the most important stages of each offensive operation. Frequently it

determined its success. Only as a result of the accomplishment of this objective were created conditions for the development of the strike/shock into the depth, for the operational maneuver for the purpose of the complete destruction of defense and annihilation of hostile grouping.

Main role in the development of the penetration of tactical defense zone performed the mobile group of front. In the operations/processes of the first period of war the mobile group, which consisted of the intensive cavalry corps, was usually the means of exploitation in the zone of attack of army. When cavalry large units/formations acted together with the tanks and the aviation, they enjoyed success. But frequently commanders of armies of combined arms used the cavalry in the foot formation for the penetration of defense. She bore great losses, and her activities did not give the necessary combat effect. With the creation of the tank and mechanized corps mobile groups began to possess greater maneuverability, increased their strike power. As the mobile group of front in many operations/processes acted the tank armies and the mechanized cavalry groups.

Soviet command element considered that the mobile group of front must be introduced into the penetration, realized by armies of combined arms. However, nevertheless in the number of

operations/processes it was used into the battle during the first day of the offensive when rifle/infantry large units/formations achieved the area of the artillery positions of enemy. In the completing stage of the war of the army of the first echelon of front, intensive by tank large units/formations, could in many instances independently penetrate the defenses at entire tactical depth. The now mobile group of front most frequently entered into the battle at that moment/factor when the military forces of the first operational echelon went deeply into defense on all 8-10 kilometers, and its effort/force it led to the development of the success achieved. It was the basic means of front for the realization of operational penetration. The decisive activities of mobile group helped the attacked/advanced military forces to rapidly overcome operational defense zone. As a result in two-three days of offensive they developed penetration at the depth of 50-70 kilometers and simultaneously expanded it along the front. To the armored and mechanized large units/formations belonged the leading role, also, in the operational pursuit.

To the successful penetration of enemy defenses and to an increase in its rate contributed the saturation of operational formations all the large quantity of artillery and the improvement of the ways of its combat use. The massed use/application of artillery means in the breakthrough sectors raised the effectiveness of

artillery preparation. The artillery whose mobility in the course of the war it is considerably grew began to persistent accompany the attacked/advanced military forces, actively contributing to their progress.

Not less important significance for the provision of a success of the offensive of ground forces had a development of art of combat application of Air Force. The small number of aviation which could be assigned to the participation in the offensive operations of the first period of war, limited its operational possibilities.

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During this period our aviation conducted battle with the aviation of enemy, it accomplished the air preparation for the attack of the infantry and tanks and supported their activities at the penetration of tactical defense zone.

Beginning from the counteroffensive near Kursk, when relationship/ratio in the forces finally changed in favor of Soviet aviation, its activity in the offensive operations they acquired another character. Simultaneously with gaining air supremacy it accomplished the air preparation for the offensive of the infantry and tanks, supported them at the penetration of enemy defenses,

provided input/introduction into combat of mobile groups and second echelons, it helped them to develop success.

Main forces of front aviation were used for deciding two primary tasks: the support of ground forces (35-50 percent of missions) and struggle for supremacy in air (30-40 percent of missions). The first mission carried out by the main things by form assault and bomber large units/formations, the second - predominantly the large unit/formation of fighter aviation. To the effectiveness of combat use of aviation contributed improvement of forms and methods of its cooperation with combined-arms and tank armies. However, this cooperation in some operations/processes was violated. Due to the late preparation of airfield network air formations lagged behind fast attacked/advanced ground forces. In connection with this the air armies in certain cases could not retain supremacy in air before the complete completion of offensive operation, but ground forces were deprived of the necessary air support during the development of offensive.

And nevertheless our operational formations could accomplish the rapid penetration of enemy defenses, in spite of its reinforcing in the course of war. Was solved the problem of the rapid development of offensive in the depth of the defenses. It was provided not only by timely commitment to battle of mobile groups, but also by skillful

use/application of armies of combined arms of the second echelon of front. At first they were used for expanding of penetration and strengthening of the lines, captured by the military forces of the first echelon. Gradually the circle of the problems, solved by the second echelons, was expanded. Depending on situation they were used in order to increase impact force in the course of offensive, to provide the flanks of striking force, to repulse a counterstroke of enemy, to complete the encirclement of the defended military forces and to annihilate them.

Usually the Fascist-German command element attempted to restore/reduce operational friendly troop status, transporting into the area of penetration reserves. The reflection of their counteroffensives composed one of the most important problems of the attacked/advanced military forces. In the first period of the war when our military forces, as a rule, attacked/advanced in one operational echelon, by them it was not always possible to solve this problem. But in the subsequent operations/processes they already successfully reflected hostile counteroffensives. To the direction/axis where was deposited counteroffensive, our command element rapidly transported forces from the neighboring directions/axes or supported military forces, which passed to the defense, with its reserves.

Beginning from the summer offensive of 1943 the character of struggle with the hostile reserves it changed. In some operations/processes our advance was developed so/such fast, that the Fascist-German command element did not manage to pull reserves for delivering of counteroffensives or exercise of rear defensive lines. Furthermore, front now contained powerful/thick mobile group and strong second echelons. And when enemy managed to pull reserves, their counteroffensives were frequently reflected by the encounter attacks of the movable connections of the attacked/advanced front, supported by aviation.

The penetration of defense and its development along the front and into the depth created conditions for achievement of the main goal of operation/process - the annihilation of the opposing enemy. The most decisive way of the accomplishment of this objective was the encirclement of main forces of the defended grouping. In the first period of war this way of activities was repeatedly applied by the Fascist-German army. Having available powerful/thick tank large units/formations, it knew how to surround several operative groupings of Soviet military forces.

In the remaining campaigns these operations/processes for enemy did not succeed.

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The Red Army in the course of the first offensive campaign in winter of 1941/42 attempted to surround some operational grouping of Fascist military forces (in the areas of Demyansk, Rzhev and Vyaz'ma, Lyuban', Tikhvin, etc.). But these attempts did not give decisive results mainly because the attacked/advanced military forces had at that time limited forces and means and did still not acquire the experience of the accomplishment of such operational objectives.

In the subsequent periods of the war when the Red Army had available large/coarse large units/formations and associations/unifications of the armored and mechanized troops, operation/process for the purpose of the encirclement of enemy they became the basic form of its offensive operations. The encirclement of the strategic grouping of the Fascist-German army was carried out by several fronts. Encirclement and annihilation of operational grouping was made by the forces of one front (Voronezh Front - in Ostrcgozhsk-Rossosh' operation/process of 1943, the 1st Belorussian front - in the Bobruysk operation/process of 1944, the 1st Ukrainian front - in Lvov-Sandomir operation/process of 1944, etc.).

Were improved in the course of war and the ways of the elimination of the surrounded grouping. Usually this made the

military forces of one front. In the winter campaign 1941/42 Soviet command element attempted to carry out this mission by the consistent compression of the ring of encirclement. But this way was prolonged, especially as for the elimination of the surrounded grouping could be allotted the limited forces and means. As a result for enemy it was possible to pull his reserves with the aid of which main forces of his grouping escaped from the encirclement. So it was, for example, in Demyansk area. More effective proved to be splitting up of the surrounded grouping and annihilation of it in parts. Especially rapid success this way gave when hostile grouping was cut on the unit immediately after its encirclement or even before its completion. The annihilation of the strong garrisons of enemy, surrounded in the large/coarse cities (Poznan', Breslau, Budapest, etc.), was work more complicated and required considerable time. But also this problem was successfully made by our military forces with the active assistance to aviation.

Brilliant results operational art achieved in the resolution of this complicated problem as assault crossing water obstacles. It is characteristic that Soviet military forces in many cases assault crossing river, without stopping offensive. Even such large/coarse rivers, as Dnepr, Pripet, Western Dvina, Yuzhnyy Bug, Dniester, etc., were overcome without deliberate preparation/training and at the wide front.

Assault crossing river barrier/obstacle on the move deprived the enemy of the possibility to solidly secure on the opposite shore. Using this, Soviet military forces captured a bridgehead on the hostile shore, which then were used for the concentration of forces and means for the purpose of the deployment of the subsequent offensive operation. Struggle for retention and expansion of bridgeheads/beachheads sometimes acquired the very strained nature. Many operations/processes 1944-1945 were begun precisely from the bridgeheads/beachheads, seized in the preceding/previous operations/processes.

Enormous significance for the success of offensive operations had timely and sufficient logistic support of military forces during preparation for operation and in its course. Some offensive operations of the first period of war did not give the expected results only because the military forces, especially artillery, felt deficiency in the ammunition. The organs of front and army rear proved to be little fitted out to the accomplishment of the objectives of the material and technical supply of military forces in the conditions of mobile warfare. As a result even those comparatively limited material-technical resources, which at that time the Soviet rear guided into the army in the field, did not enter

military forces in proper time. The reason for this was the sharp/acute deficiency of motor transport, and also the poor state of road net in the entire frontal zone. In winter 1941/42 was begun the mass formation of the horse convoys which helped to overcome the difficulties of the delivery of supply military forces. Subsequently a quantity of motor transport means in the army increased, but their deficiency was felt during entire war.

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Motorization and mechanization of military forces were carried out many times more rapid than equipment with the motor transport of operational and immediate rear.

To the middle of 1943, when fronts and armies already had the mounted and clearly worked logistical agencies, the supply of material of operations/processes considerably was improved. To this contributed the fact that the military councils of fronts and armies, the political organs and party organizations began more to worry about the timely supply of military forces. Specifically, in the course of offensive operations especially vividly it was revealed expediently the organization of the delivery of supply into the military forces according to the principle "on top - down" by the means of the higher command echelon of command. Increased the

responsibility of front and army command element for logistic support of subordinates of military forces.

All this, together undertaken, caused increase in the course of the war of the scope of front and army offensive operations. If in the first two offensive campaigns of the Red Army the depth of the development of offensive in the majority of front operations did not exceed 150 kilometers, then in 1944 it achieved on the average of 250-300 kilometers. Sometimes the depth of progress was 450-500 kilometers (1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts in Vistula-Oder operation/process). It is natural that the decisive use/application of principle of the massed use of forces and means led to the contraction of the zone of attack of army; however, this did not lower the scope of army operation/process. Its depth varied from 50 to 180 kilometers.

Thus Soviet operational art obtained the richest experience both in the realization of the penetration of contemporary positional defense and its destruction and in the rapid development of the offensive operations at the great depth, which were completed in many instances by encirclement and annihilation main forces of the opposing grouping of enemy.

The Red Army successfully conducted offensive operations not

only in summer, but also in winter, in the spring and autumnal slush, under the varied conditions of terrain. Each of these operations/processes had their characteristics. However, in their majority were inherent the common features: the resoluteness of goals, the courage of operational concept, the skillful selection of the directions/axes of main attacks, the massed use of the available forces and means, the continuous growth of forces due to the second operational echelons and the reserves, the skillful use/application of the armored and mechanized large units/formations for the accomplishment of operational maneuver different in its forms, the enduring/permanent strengthening of the success achieved. The great scope of operations/processes, the high rate of their development were achieved also because of the clear interaction of operational formations with each other and with the movable connections and the aviation.

Was improved the command by troops. The operational and army headquarters, thoroughly studying the accumulated experience, applied ever more flexible forms and methods of the control of subordinate connections and with units, provided steadiness in the leadership by military forces. This would be impossible without a continuous improvement in the communications. Front commander and by armies, the commanders of the corps and divisions obtained at their disposal personal radio sets. Radio communication increasingly more widely was

applied also in the military forces. For example, in the Belorussian operation/process the connection/bond of the command element of fronts, armies, large units/formations, units and subunits they provided 27 thousand radio sets. The military forces of the connection/bond of front and army significance in the course of war were completely motorized.

Enormous role in the successful conducting of operations/processes belonged to political organs and party organizations. Specifically, they together with the command element created and supported in the military forces that indomitable offensive spirit which contributed to continuity and rapidity of offensive, to overcoming any difficulties.

The highest level the operational art of the Red Army achieved in the campaigns 1943-1945, when fronts and armies had available the necessary forces and means for the accomplishment of any operational missions. By this time their command element and headquarters studied well the experience of organization and conduct of defensive and offensive operations and they learned to skillfully use it.

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8. Improvement of the tactics of all-arms combat.

The successful conducting of operations/processes by armies and by fronts became possible and because of the high level of the tactics of our military forces, its constant development during the years of war.

It is known that in the tactical activities of all armies are inherent the general/common/total features, caused by objective laws governing combat, by uniformity of many means of armament, by the similarity of the organization of military forces.

The success in modern combat to a considerable degree depends on the will of personnel to the victory, on the skillful, creative use/application of varied tactical receptions/methods. These qualities were inherent in our army in the field in the greater measure than army German-fascist. Hitlerite military forces were capable to the authentic moral enthusiasm. Our military forces exceeded them, also, in the improvement of forms and ways of conducting the combat operations.

The unprecedented staying power/persistency and moral excerpt helped the Red Army to maintain organization and capability to conduct persistent defensive actions with the enemy, who possessed

considerable superiority in combat materiel. The rifle division, having available into first period of war the limited forces, fought, not having, moreover, sufficient means for dealing with the tanks and the aviation, in the zone with a width of 25-50 kilometers. To the autumn of 1941 the defense zone of division was shortened and on the routes of approach to Moscow amount on the average to on 10-15 kilometers.

Under the effect of the accumulated combat experience changed the character of the engineering armament of defense. Pre-war regulations, considering trenches the element only of positional defense, were recommended to use the individual or group trenches, not connected. In the course of struggle on the routes of approach to Odessa, Sevastopol and Leningrad on the initiative of soldiers and commanders began to be broken away continuous trenches on the forward edge with the communications passages into the rear. This increased defense, it raised its resistivity.

The military forces of the Red Army in the first period of war acquired the wide experience of struggle on the near routes of approach to those large/coarse populated by areas and the conduct of defensive action within the great cities. Attempting to at any cost master such cities as Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Odessa, Fascist-German command element it subtended to them the mass

of military forces, achieving similarly considerable superiority in strength and nevertheless for Hitlerites so could not be broken into Moscow and Leningrad. More than two months Soviet military forces successfully reflected the attacks of enemy close to Odessa. 200-thousandth grouping of Fascist-German military forces, which attacked/advanced in Sevastopol, were required 250 days in order in order to overcome 16- kilometer defensive belt/zone, which covered city. About 20 full-blooded German divisions, which contained more than 600 tanks almost two months conducted combat directly in Stalingrad area. Hostile divisions attacked our military forces in the very narrow sectors (1-1.5 kilometers to the division). By the price of colossal losses enemy broke into the city, clove the defended grouping on the unit, forced it against Volga and deprived the possibility of any maneuver. However, to master city Hitlerites nevertheless were not able.

Defensive actions for the hero-cities were the bright certificate of the indestructible will of Soviet soldiers to the victory. Unprecedented courage, selflessness, consciousness of their duty before the native land composed the basis of their firm staying power/persistency. At the same time these combat were the model of the organization of the stable defense, which had the uniform trench system and communications passages. The experience of combat for Odessa and Sevastopol gave remarkable examples of the execution of

tactical missions by the combined efforts/forces of ground forces and Navy under the general/common/total operational command element.

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In the defensive actions of the first period of war Soviet military forces, their command cadres too much learned. But the complete realization of the conclusions/derivations, extracted from this experience, became possible only if combat power the combat power of units and large units/formations grew considerably.

In the battle near Kursk tactical defense was already multiposition with a deep distribution of forces and means, which made it possible to exert the increasing enemy opposition not only in the struggle for the main (first) zone, but also in the depth of the defenses in the case of penetration them this zone. Defense system lost focus character and consisted now of battalion strong points and company basic points, connected with the developed trench system and communications passages. This made it possible to more freely maneuver with forces and weapons, more reliably to conceal military forces from the artillery fire and the bomb strikes of aviation and to camouflage combat formations.

Thus, forms and methods of organizing of defense and conduct of

defensive action continuously were improved. Soldiers and officers of the Red Army, seizing its weaponry and combat materiel, mastering the acquired experience, learned to create stable defense and to successfully repulse any, even strongest blows of enemy. Indeed in the furious attempts to precisely break through the tactical defense zone of Soviet military forces in the narrow front sectors near Kursk wasted their forces both striking forces of enemy (50 divisions), in which were included more than 2700 tanks and the assault guns of the newest models. The characteristic of the developing here defensive actions consisted not only of the fact that Soviet military forces revealed impregnable staying power/persistency and activity. They showed also the ability to use all possibilities of their armament and combat materiel in order to reflect the powerful/thick pressure of enemy and to annihilate his main forces in the limits of tactical zone of defense.

For the combat experience of Soviet military forces there was the characteristically rapid and comprehensive development of the tactics of offensive combat. This development was determined not only by quantitative and qualitative increase in the armament of our military forces. The decisive effect on forms and methods of conducting combat, for the formation of combat formations exerted a change in the character of hostile defense. If during the first two years of war Fascist-German military forces had weakly developed and

most frequently in a hurry organized defense of focus character, then subsequently they began to create ever more enduring/more permanent multilines by the great number of long-term type fortifications. In proportion to the approximation/approach of the front of the armed struggle to borders of Germany on the route/path of Soviet military forces began increasingly more frequently to strike the in advance created powerful/thick fortified zones and areas. The varied character of hostile defense caused different tactical receptions/methods of ^{ITS} overcoming.

In the conditions of the first half of war for the penetration of defense it was not required maximum massing of forces in the narrow front sectors, use/application of multi-echelon combat orders. Combat practice showed that for the penetration of shallow focus defense most effective is the single echelon formation of units and large units/formations, which makes it possible to use for the application of initial strike/shock the greatest quantity weapons of the attacking military forces.

In the offensive combat in the environs of Moscow our military forces during this formation of combat formations achieved considerable successes. On the basis of this experience was made the conclusion/derivation that in modern offensive combat to more expediently have single echelon combat formation. This view was

reflected in the Field Manual of the infantry of 1942. In it was recommended the single echelon formation of combat formations from the platoon to the division. In the project of Field Service Regulations of 1943 this situation was extended also to the rifle corps.

Offensive operations occupied the considerable place also in the combat practice of the Fascist-German army. But it conducted offensive only in first half of the war when Soviet military forces proved to be forced to in a hurry organize defenses, shallow by its formation and weakly saturated by artillery and by anti-tank means.

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
When for Hitler military forces it was necessary to overcome a deeper and more powerful/thicker defense, they spent on this such efforts/forces, that many attacked/advanced units and large units/formations lost their combat efficiency, without having fulfilled missions assigned to them. It is known, what catastrophic defeat suffered hostile striking forces during the attempt to overcome the contemporary positional defense, in advance prepared by Soviet military forces near Kursk.


However, enemy after damage/defeat in the environs of Moscow and

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 10/22
1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH V N ANDRIANOV ET AL. 06 OCT 82
FTD-ID(R5)T-0668-82 F/G 15/7 NL

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

in Volga began to change his defensive tactics. Already in the beginning of 1943 for Soviet military forces in some directions/axes it was necessary to carry on a struggle with the hostile defense which was built according to the principle of a deep troop dispositions and weapons. This it was necessary to change the tactics of offensive combat. The unit commanders and large units/formations began to allot not only reserve, but also second echelons in order by putting fresh forces into operation to develop the success of the first strike/shock. In the summer of 1943 the Fascist-German military forces passed in all most important directions/axes to the formation of multiline defense with the use/application of continuous trenches. The depth of the tactical zone of their defense now achieved 12 and more than kilometers.

Offensive under such conditions required echeloned formation of military forces, which would give possibility to ensure the continuity of offensive with the growth of impact force before complete overcoming of the entire depth of tactical defense. Reinforcing of the fighting strength of military forces, their fire and technical equipment made it possible to introduce into the combat formations of the corps and divisions the new component elements: corps and division artillery groups, antitank reserves, mobile vanguards of obstacle. Corps commander could from now on have more powerful/thicker combined-arms, and sometimes even tank reserve. In

the composition of the first echelons of units and large units/formations usually it was allotted to two thirds of their forces and means. The regiments of the first echelon of division were reinforced by tanks NPP. The large unit weapons of the second echelons (artillery, mortars, tanks) was used for supporting the attack of the first echelons. This formation of combat formations gave considerable force to the first strike/shock and at the same time it allowed for the commander of large unit/formation, committing to battle fresh forces, to act on progress of combat.

An increase in the depth of the battle formation was combined with the continuous decrease of the width of the zones of attack of rifle/infantry large units/formations and units. In the first period of war, in spite of the limited strength of the rifle divisions, by it were usually devoted the zones of attack into 6-8 kilometers. With an increase of the quantity of divisions in the fronts and armies and their massed use in the directions/axes of main attacks the zone for the offensive of division began to decrease. This tendency especially vividly was revealed in the third period of war. On how during the war changed the width of the zones of attack of rifle/infantry large units/formations and units, which acted in the directions/axes of main attacks, it is possible to judge by the following table:

(1) Период войны	(2) Ширина полос наступления в км		
	(3) стрелковой дивизии	(4) стрелкового полка	(5) стрелкового батальона
(6) Первый	8-6	4-3	2-1
(7) Второй	6-2	2-1	1-0,5
(8) Третий	2,5-1	1-0,5	0,7-0,3

Key: (1). Period of war. (2). Width of zones of attack in km. (3). rifle division. (4). rifle regiment. (5). rifle battalion. (6). First. (7). Second. (8). Third.

In the first offensive operations the rifle division frequently received the problem of attacking/advancing on the depth from 20 to 25 kilometers. But combat practice made it necessary to restrict the depth of offensive. In the campaign of 1942/43 it did not exceed 10 kilometers. However, subsequently, with an increase of the combat capabilities of division and contracting the zone in which it acted, the planned/glide depth of its offensive began to increase and toward the end of the war was already usually equal to 10-20 kilometers.

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An increase in the fighting strength of military forces, reinforcing of their armament and technical equipment, massed use/application of forces and means in the directions/axes of main attacks made it possible to create high tactical densities in the

breakthrough sectors and thus to provide the superiority necessary for the success of offensive. The experience of war showed that the penetration of the strongly fastened/strengthened positional defense requires considerable superiority in the artillery and the tanks. In the third period of war it was usually four - six-fold in the breakthrough sectors with complete supremacy in air of Soviet aviation.

The basic problem of military forces during the first day of offensive was the penetration of tactical defense. Only after this it was possible to completely rout the defended grouping of enemy to the bringing up of his reserves. For achievement of this goal were massed the forces and means, were improved forms and methods of application of artillery, tanks and aviation in the offensive combat, was improved their cooperation with the infantry.

In the first period of war the large unit of the guns, after finishing the fire training for attack, transferred fire/light into the depth of the defenses ceased the direct support of the attack of the infantry and tanks. In the second period of the war when was improved the supply with shells, artillery began more actively to provide offensive.

The new principle of the use/application of artillery was

necessary to introduce changes in the organization of fire control. In the operations/processes 1941-1942 in the divisions were created the artillery groups of the support of the infantry according to a number of regiments of the first echelon. However, to regiments they were not given. In 1943-1944 began to be created the division and corps artillery groups, which supported unit and large units/formations of the first echelons. Furthermore, regimental, division and corps artillery was intensified and it is quantitative, and it is qualitative. At the same time entire division and significant part of regimental artillery they transferred to the mechanical traction. These changes contributed to an increase in the fire and strike power of combined arms units. Artillery, supporting the attacking military forces, created ahead those attacking the infantries and tanks barrage fire at the depth to 1.5 kilometers. In 1944-1945 Soviet military forces frequently attacked/advanced already after the dual barrage fire, which had the depth of 2-2.5 kilometers. Simultaneously artillery suppressed the most powerful/thickest basic points of enemy by the method of the successive fire concentration of fire/light.

Considerable changes occurred also in the ways of the combat employment of aviation. It, just as artillery, passed from the incidental support of the attacking military forces to the continuous assistance by it in overcoming of tactical defense zone. Carrying on

a struggle for supremacy in air in the area of penetration, aviation its basic efforts/forces concentrated on the annihilation of manpower and of enemy technique on the field of battle, his nearest reserves, destruction and repression of the nodes/units of resistance, command and observation posts. Until the summer of 1944, when attack aviation was not yet sufficient, air support was carried out by a consistent transfer of the efforts/forces of air force units from one defensive position to another. An increase in the forces of air armies allowed aviation to pass to the simultaneous influence on entire depth of tactical defense zone. Special importance under these conditions acquired the organization of cooperation with the attacking military forces. To the accomplishment of this mission contributed the isolation/liberation of representatives from the holding aviation to the command posts of combined arms units.

Were improved the ways of the combat employment of tanks, intended for the direct support of the infantry. In the operations/processes of the first period of their war it was very little. Acting atomized, by small groups, they were frequently broken away from the rifle units and did not exert them immediate aid. In the second period of war after all they were adopted more massed. Tank brigades and the regiments no longer were broken up but were given to rifle corps and divisions and acted in the main direction/axis their offensives. At the same time at the disposal of

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
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corps commander was retained the tank reserve, which it could use at the decisive moment of combat.


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MISSILE TROOPS ON THE RED SQUARE.


864



Missile specialist subunits.




Formidable naval missiles.



ENGINEERING TROOPS.



Bridge-builder in action.



Tank with mine-sweep for annihilating mine fields.

Powerful machine (ditch digger) replaces the work of hundreds of men.

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Together with the improvement of the ways of the combat employment of basic branches of services and methods of their cooperation Soviet command element considerable attention gave to training military forces for the offensive, to reconnaissance/intelligence of the defense of enemy, to armament for initial positions, organization of the mounted command by troops in combat.

Practice showed that for achievement of the success in the offensive combat is very important the careful training of military forces for the execution of those specific problems which for them one must solve with the penetration of defense. In the offensive operations 1941-1942 it was conducted usually within the limited periods. In 1943 system and methods preparation/training solidly changed. Appeared the possibility to eject the large units/formations of the first operational echelon into the service areas for the combat training. In the educational fields were created the same fortifications such as were discovered in the hostile defense. Units

and subunits were trained in that composition, in which for them it was necessary to act in combat. This system of combat ones required from the military forces of considerable efforts/forces, but it completely itself justified.

Experience showed also that in those units and subunits where the political training of personnel was conducted purposeful, in accordance with the specific combat problems of the forthcoming offensive, the success in combat was achieved with the smaller expenditure of forces and means. Entire personnel of such units and subunits acted as friendly collective. Political organs and party organizations took measures to that so that in each combat subunit during the offensive would be full-blooded party and Komsomol organizations, which would support the offensive spirit of all personnel.

Change by the enemy of the character of its defense was necessary from the Soviet command element not only to increase the activity of reconnaissance units, but also to more widely apply reconnaissance in force. In some operations/processes for this purpose from each rifle division were allotted foremost battalions. They helped to specify the system of hostile defense, weapons, the grouping of forces.

Reconnaissance in force was necessary still and because frequently the enemy since the beginning of our artillery preparation ejected his units from the first position in order to maintain them for the reflection of attack and to at the same time force our artillery fire/light on the not occupied with military forces position.

All these measures contributed to successful decision by the Soviet military forces of the most important problem of offensive combat - to penetration of strongly fastened/strengthened enemy defenses. However, beginning from the second period and to the very end of the war the rate of the penetration of tactical defense it remained approximately/exemplarily identical. In the operations/processes 1941-1942 the penetration of the main zone of the hostile defense whose depth did not usually exceed 2-3 kilometers, was carried out during two-three days. And only in the battle in Volga, where the depth of this zone achieved 5 kilometers, for Soviet military forces because of the massed use/application of forces it was possible to overcome it during 24 hrs. This rate of the penetration of main line of defense was maintained also in the subsequent periods of war. The penetration of the entire zone of tactical defense during the first day of offensive rifle troops could produce only with the aid of the tank and mechanized large units/formations.

Paying in the system of its defense considerable attention to strengthening cities and large/coarse populated areas, the Fascist-German command element converted them into the powerful/thick nodes/units of resistance. In the first offensive operations the struggle for them most frequently acquired protracted nature. Our military forces frequently attempted to master them by frontal attack. In the subsequent campaigns when was accumulated the necessary experience, the tactics of struggle for the cities and the large/coarse populated areas became more advanced. Experience showed that primary task is the insulation of the defended garrison from the remaining forces of enemy. In this case the most rapid success is achieved during its complete encirclement.

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The following task usually consisted of cleaving of the system of hostile defense and consecutively/serially annihilating the isolated/insulated groups of forces. Our subunits and units acted in this case with the great independence; extensively were used the assault vanguards and the groups.

Soviet military forces successfully mastered and they constantly

improved the tactics of offensive combat with assault crossing of water obstacles, in the mountain, swampy and wooded country. They conducted combat under the most difficult conditions of winter, spring and autumnal slush, and not only in the daytime, but also at night. All these circumstances, just as different character of hostile defense, had a direct effect on the ways of the operations of the attacked/advanced military forces. Combat usually accepted wide scope along the front and into the depth, in it participated the units and the large units/formations of the different arms of service, which required the organization of clear cooperation between them, the well fixed command by troops.

Leadership of all-arms offensive combat in the course of war greatly was complicated. Now with this dealt not only the command element of units and large units/formations. The direct organizer of combat in the direction/axis of main attack they became army commander and his headquarters. The restoration/reduction of the rifle corps somewhat simplified this role of the army commander, but did not belittle it. It determined the direction/axis of the strikes/shocks of those been included in the army of the corps, their task and the grouping of forces and means. However, this in no way decreased the roles of the commanders of the corps and divisions. On their initiative depended the execution of operational and tactical missions with the smallest expenditure of forces and means.

9. Experience of the last war and further development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The historical characteristic of the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War lies in the fact that in it obtained its expression the highest level of the development of military art of first half of the XX century. The major carriers of this valuable experience are Soviet military personnel, which in most diverse situation led the combat operations of military forces. This multilateral experience have the cadres not of one contemporary army.

The innovatory character of Soviet military art with the enormous force was revealed already in the battle in Volga. But the summit of development it achieved in second half of the war when Soviet military forces had the necessary technico-material possibilities for applying of the most effective forms and ways of the armed struggle.

To the first period of war the creative efforts of commanders at all levels were directed mainly toward that in order to find ways and means which would help successfully to fight with the enemy with a deficiency in the military technology. And the success in these

conditions most frequently was achieved because of the high combat morale qualities of Soviet forces. Subsequently the task of command cadres it consisted of most fully using of combat capabilities of varied technical equipment of struggle, which came into military service of army. Grandiose victories now were achieved because of the skillful combination of the high offensive spirit of our military forces with the workshop use/application in the fields of the battles of combat materiel.

The richest experience, acquired by our military forces in cruel combat, its creative use contributed to the rapid development of military art. In armed struggle underwent severe testing its theoretical bases. Practice rejected those of them, which did not correspond to actual conditions for combat operations, and at the same time it made it possible for military science to even more completely open objective laws governing the armed struggle with the mass application of technology and, taking into account them, to find the most rational ways of using of the available forces and means.

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the continuous chain of the victories, gained by the Soviet Armed Forces in 1943-1945, testified about irrefutable superiority of

our military art hell by German military art.

In the Great Patriotic War for the first time in the history the armed struggle with the strongest imperialistic aggressor carried on the army of socialist state, equipped with combat devices most committed for that time. In its organizational formation, preparation/training, ways of combat operations thoroughly were revealed the characteristics and the advantages, inherent in the military organization of socialist society. Therefore the experience which acquired our military forces in the last war, has great significance for further construction not only Soviet Armed Forces, but also armed forces of all socialist countries.

In spite of the appearance of new means of combat, which had a revolutionary effect on the ways of conduct combat operations, many principles of military art retain their significance, although their specific application can change. Furthermore, some conformities with the law, which determined the development of the armed struggle. Finally, the appearance of contemporary combat devices does not exclude the possibility of using together with them the previous combat means.

Before military science stand very serious tasks. The main thing of them - the development of forms and ways of the armed struggle,

which correspond to the requirements of modern war, which will be conducted with the mass use/application of the nuclear rocket means.

Soviet military thought, being guided by Marxist-Leninist methodology, must extract from the accumulated combat experience all that which can be fruitful used for further development of military theory, military construction, preparation/training and education of the armed forces of the USSR, provision of their combat readiness.

During daily combat practice gave abundant material for the enrichment of military theory. And our military-scientific thought already then much made in the field of study and generalizing this valuable material. The fruits of this creative activity as has already been spoken, is found their expression mainly in different official leadership, which guided all combat operations of military forces. The numerous works, which were being published at that time in the military press, naturally, had predominantly descriptive and applied character. The rapidly developed military events, a continuous change in the character of combat operations did not make it possible to create fundamental scientific transactions on the most important questions of military science. Nevertheless and under war time, especially in its latter/last period, were made numerous attempts theoretically develop some important problems of military science.

The serious deficiency, characteristic for the majority of the military-theoretical works of the period of war and especially several postwar years, was the exaggerated appraisal of role and significance of the leadership activity of Stalin and his statements in the region of military science. All best creations of military science thought, all brightest achievements of foremost Soviet military art, which were the fruit of collective efforts/forces, were presented as the result of the creativity of Stalin "genius". Excessive praising of Stalin's services in the development of military art diminished and impoverished the role of our military personnel in the organization of the majestic victories of the Soviet Armed Forces. Under the conditions of personality cult the important problems of military science did not receive the necessary development, since the authors of military-theoretical works most frequently were limited popularizations of the situations, expressed by Stalin.

The negative effect of personality cult on the Soviet military theory was expressed not only in the artificial limitation of its development.

Page 244. The creative efforts of military science cadres, especially

for the first postwar years, were headed for the study of such problems which diverted military-theoretical thought from the accomplishment of urgent missions. N. A. Bulganin's action into 1948, dedicated to a 30-year-anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces in which was contained the Stalin definition of the subject of Soviet military science, generally confused our military personnel in the understanding of the very essence of military science and its interdependence with military art. It is known that military science was always and is, until now, the theory of military science. Stalin unfoundedly enlarged the content of Soviet military science. In his treatment it became the science, which envelops not only questions of military science, but also the economic and moral potentials of our country and countries of imperialistic camp.

Sizable confusion Stalin introduced into the military theory by his other statements. For example, in the response to Ye. A. Razin's letter in 1947 he, characterizing the significance of counteroffensive, defined it as the "particular form" of offensive. This became base for the creation of the number of the works whose authors attempted to reveal some special shapes and ways of offensive operations, allegedly inherent only in counteroffensive. Meanwhile it differs from ordinary offensive only in terms of the fact that it is organized and is prepared under the particularly complicated conditions - in the process it is defensive of battle. Military

theory to this Stalin statement never counted the counteroffensive by the particular form of strategic offensive. It was considered only as transition from the defensive way of activities to the offensive, and this is correct.

Very posing of the question about the counteroffensive was not random. It is known that Stalin, characterizing the activities of Soviet command element in the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, defined them as the strategy of active defense. In the response to Ye. A. Razin's letter it referred to historical examples, in particular to Kutuzov's strategy which allegedly withdrew into depth of the country in order "to entice" enemy and then, after gathering forces, to rout him.

But indeed when Kutuzov accepted command element by the operating Russian army, it already walked away for Vyaz'ma. It this made not for the "luring" of enemy, but because I could not hold in control the offensive of French army, which had great superiority in the forces. Already K. Marx and F. Engels in their time emphasized that the retreat of Russian army was the work not of free selection, but "severe need" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. K. Marx and F. Engels. Works, Vol. 14, page 92-93.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Kutuzov not at all was inclined to retreat. Russian army in the Borodino battle bled white enemy, and only a deficiency in the forces it prevented to it from completing the rout of Napoleonic military forces. After withdrawing from Borodino, Kutuzov intended to give new battle in the environs of Moscow. This plan could not be fulfilled, since tsarist government did not ensure army in the field with replenishments. and only because Kutuzov did not have available sufficient forces and attempted to maintain Russian army for the assumption of the offensive, it on its own will forewent the new battle and ~~is~~ left Moscow.

One cannot fail to mention also one of Stalin's statements, made during the war, in which he emphasized that the peace-loving states usually are less they are prepared to the war than the aggressive countries. Hence was made the conclusion/derivation that the defense and the retreat to which for the Red Army it was necessary to resort in the first period of war, were regular and even unavoidable phenomenon.

In the response to Ye. A. Razin's letter especially bright expression obtained the constant tendency of Stalin to exaggerate his role in the development of military science and military art and to

at the same time to decrease the significance of the military activity of V. I. Lenin, his military-theoretical legacy.

Personality cult did sizable damage of our military theory. However, it could not stop its development.

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The XX and XXII Congresses of the Communist Party, and also the subsequent resolutions of its central committee, the exposed personality cult of Stalin and opened a wide scope for the creative work in all fields of social sciences, created conditions also for the rapid development of Soviet military science. Being freed/released from the personality cult pinning down effects, dogmatism and pseudo-erudition, our military thought made a great contribution to the creation of the scientific bases of further construction and preparation of the armed forces of the USSR. It began in a different way to approach the study and the generalization of the experience of the Great Patriotic War. The blind admiration before this experience, characteristic for the first postwar years, was changed into its critical perception, tendency to correctly combine the extracted from it lessons and conclusions/derivations with those requirements which are presented by new weaponry and changing character of the armed struggle to construction and

preparation of the armed forces, to military art.

Soviet military science, studying the contemporary problems of the conduct of the armed struggle, considers also the achievements of other sciences. This helps it more profoundly and to thoroughly understand those new conditions under which can flow/occur/last modern war, and find the ways corresponding to them of conducting the combat operations.

Relying on the outstanding achievements of science and technology, using creative successes of our military theory, the central committee of the party and Soviet government developed the ordered military doctrine, which is determining the concrete/specific/actual ways of further strengthening of the armed forces of the USSR and provision of their readiness for the accomplishment of any objectives according to the defense of the Soviet state and countries of socialist camp.

The political essence of Soviet military obtained its expression in the new program, accepted by the XXII Congress of the Communist Party. "The party proceeds from that, it is said in this historical document, that, until is retained imperialism, will remain the danger of aggressive wars. By the CPSU are examined the defense of the socialist fatherland, strengthening the defense of the USSR, power of

the Soviet Armed Forces as sacred duty of the party, all Soviet people as the most important function of socialist state. The Soviet Union is considered its international responsibility to provide together with other socialist countries the reliable defense and the safety of all socialist camp ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Program of CPSU, page 110-111. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Communist Party, actually estimating the possibility of new imperialistic aggression, recognizes that the important significance for the preservation of peace has further reinforcing of military might of our state. Strengthening the armed forces of the USSR not only necessarily for the defense of our native land and other countries of socialist camp, but also relates to the interests of all peoples, providing with them the possibility of peaceful existence.

Soviet military doctrine considers that the new war, if the reactionary forces of imperialism will succeed in it unleashing, will become the decisive armed struggle of two opposite socio-political systems. In this war will be used the newest combat devices - atomic and thermonuclear weapons, which possesses the colossal damaging and destructive force. The wide use of these qualitatively new means will introduce basic changes in the ways of conducting of combat operations and war as a whole.

In wars of the XX century, including in the Second World War, basis armed of forces were ground forces. The Navies and the aviation, although undertook the independent operations of strategic significance, nevertheless main attention gave to the assistance to ground forces. For this very reason the largest/coarsest battles occurred in the land theaters of war.

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Weapons of destruction, which were arranged/located the belligerent armies, in spite of their considerable improvement in the Second World War, they did not possess the lethal and destructive power, sufficient in order shortly to deliver the decisive attack on the enemy. use/application of different strengthening gave possibility to the defended military forces to one or another degree to protect itself from the fire/light of the advancing/attacking enemy. Field forces retained their combat efficiency and because the deep rear of the belligerent country did not undergo the destructive influence. This made it possible for the fought states to use their material and human resources, which were being located in the rear, for restoring the losses. The long-range bombardment aviation of USA and England delivered numerous strikes/shocks on war economy and

other units of the German rear. But it did not have a weaponry of this destructive force, which could have the determining effect on the course of the armed struggle against Fascist Germany.

The Second World War acquired the nature of prolonged struggle mainly between the operating land armies which was conducted on continuous fronts. Decisive strategic goals it was possible to achieve only by the consistent rout of the main forces of ground forces. For overcoming of their resistance and destruction of the strongly fastened/strengthened defense created by them it was necessary to concentrate the enormous masses of military forces, artillery, tanks and aviation on the small front sectors. The massed use/application of tanks and aviation, supported by the concentrated fire/light of artillery, permitted implementation of a penetration of the defense of enemy and gave the war a maneuverable character.

Combat operations occurred also in the ocean theaters, but they were limited to their scales and they had only secondary importance for achievement of the final goals of war. The most serious role Navy played in the war between USA and Japan in the Pacific Ocean theater. Here for the damage/defeat of enemy fleet was used the firepower of large/coarse surface ships. However, the wide application of aviation and submarine forces sharply increased the vulnerability of surface ships and changed the character of the naval battles.

In the very end of the Second World War, after Fascist Germany surrendered, and the outcome of struggle against Japan was already decided beforehand, American militarists decided to test the effectiveness of the activity of new weapon of destruction - atomic bomb. As a result of explosion of two such bombs, dropped by the aviation of the USA on the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were killed and mutilated 447 thousand peaceful Japanese inhabitants. This barbarous act of American imperialists did not play deciding roles in the damage/defeat Japan. Yes it was undertaken with other goals. American imperialism, after obtaining at its disposal new terrible weaponry, attempted to demonstrate military superiority over other countries, and, first of all, above the USSR.

In the last war for the first time were applied the rocket weapons relative to long-range - Fascist-German V rockets (V-1,V-2). But this weaponry was still inadequate. Furthermore, Fascist Germany, which was being located on the face of damage/defeat, could not organize the mass production of these rockets/missiles. As a result their use/application by the Hitlerites of England did not give strategic result.

The appearance of atomic bomb and long range rockets/missiles

signified by itself the beginning of the basic break/fracture in the development of the means of armed struggle. The achievements of science, technology and production in the largest countries made it possible to rapidly improve auto both the nuclear weaponry itself and means of its delivery/procurement to the objects of damage/defeat.

American imperialists for several years only remained the sole possessors of atomic bomb. The Soviet Union, attempting to maintain the world earned by high price, to restrain imperialistic aggressor and to reliably shield its people from the new military attack, rapidly achieved superiority in assimilation and development of the nuclear rocket combat materiel. Soviet scientists following the atomic bomb created an even more powerful/thicker weapon of destruction - hydrogen bomb. The Soviet Union passed the USA, also, in the missile industry.

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Testing of our superlong-range rockets/missiles, which cover in the short time distance into thousands of kilometers, that the distance of their flight does not decrease the accuracy of incidence/impingement. Soviet rockets/missiles can in this case bear the nuclear charges of enormous power.

The new type of weaponry possesses the almost unlimited range. The presence of sufficient reserves of rockets/missiles of different range makes it possible if necessary to deliver the strikes/shocks of enormous force for the simultaneous mass destruction both of the military forces in the areas of their basing and units of deep rear. The divisions between existed previously the front and the rear lose any significance. Moreover, it is very probably, that the vital centers of the country on which depends it depends its military and economic power, will become the first objects of damage/defeat by long range nuclear rocket means. Under these conditions for achievement of the strategic war aims can not be required the prolonged armed struggle.

All these characteristics of the nuclear rocket weaponry cause its leading role with respect to all other types of weaponry. Strategy obtained the powerful/thick and effective means of waging war, which allows with the damage/defeat of the armed forces to simultaneously annihilate the basic sources of their supply of material, to destroy entire control system in enemy country. Introduced in all forms armed of forces new weaponry composes the basis of their combat power. The new way generated by nuclear rocket weaponry of conducting the armed struggle changes many principles, inherent in military art in the period of the Second World War.

Soviet military doctrine considers that in contrast to the past wars when basic strategic tasks usually were laid on ground forces, the now decisive role will belong to new branch of the armed forces - nuclear rocket strategic military forces. They will be used for the accomplishment of strategic objectives, and, first of all, for the application of strikes/shocks on the areas of the disposition of the launchers of the strategic missiles of enemy, the main forces of his land, air and naval forces, on the vital units of the enemy rear, to the largest communications centers. The simultaneous massed attacks on these goals will create favorable possibilities for the activities of all other branches of the armed forces. At the same time they will ensure conditions also for the defense of their country from the nuclear attacks of enemy.

Ground forces, using the success, achieved by the use/application of the nuclear rocket strategic means, had to in the cooperation with the air force and Navy complete the rout of the armed forces of enemy, seize the important areas of his territory. Ground forces retain at present some forms of its previous armament, but only considerably improved. Main weapon of destruction which they now have available, is the nuclear rocket weaponry of operational-tactical designation/purpose. The higher level of mechanization, the widespread introduction of radio electronics and other technical control means sharply increase mobility and

maneuverability of ground forces.

Especially important significance under new war time acquires anti-aircraft defense of the country. It must effectively counteract both the flights of hostile aviation and nuclear missile attacks of enemy. For the successful accomplishment of these missions the system PVO is equipped with the anti-aircraft rocket weapons, which possess the considerably greater accuracy of incidence/impingement in the flying goals, than anti-aircraft artillery, by the new types of fighters, by more advanced detection equipment of the goals and control of air defense weapons.

The appearance of the nuclear rocket weaponry changed the role also of Air Force which during the Second World War were the long range weapon of destruction of ground forces and the sole type of weaponry, capable destroy units in the deep rear of enemy. Now these tasks will more successfully make the nuclear rocket strategic military forces. Contemporary system of PVO will sharply restrict the possibilities of bomber aviation in the application of massed attacks on the grouping of ground forces and the units of the rear.

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Nevertheless the Air Force, equipped with the newest jet

aircraft, including supersonic bombers of long-range, will have extensive application, especially for deciding the combined problems with ground forces and naval forces. Contemporary missile-launching aviation can use its powerful/thick nuclear rocket weaponry from long distances, remaining out of the zone of action of air defense weapons.

The nuclear rocket armament considerably increased the combat capabilities of the Navy. Already during the Second World War the decisive role in the damage/defeat of the Navy of enemy passed to the submarine fleet and the aviation. This determined the subsequent development of Navy. At present the main form of naval forces are the nuclear powered submarines. The nuclear powered submarines with the torpedo armament can carry on a struggle with the surface and submarine forces of enemy, acting at the great removal/distance from the areas of its basing. In the presence of rocket weapons with the nuclear charges they are capable of delivering effective strikes/shocks on the naval bases and for the important units, arranged/located on the territory of hostile state. The submarine fleets will carry out their missions in the cooperation with the missile-launching aviation.

Rapidly are developed radar equipment. Although in the past world war they yet did not obtain sufficiently wide application,

nevertheless already then they had a sizable effect on the character of the combat operations of air defense forces, air force and Navy. The rapid development of radioelectronics and also the appearance as arms of the armies of new high-speed/high-velocity combat devices caused rapid development also of radar technology. In the future war it will be used extensively not only in the system PVO, in the air force and Navy, but also in ground forces.

The development of the armed forces of the largest states in recent years shows that in modern war will find use/application the most decisive ways of military activities with the mass use of different types of the nuclear rocket weaponry. The surprise and massed use/application of this weaponry will make it possible to rapidly deprive the enemy of the most important sources of his military power. The rout of the armed forces of enemy will complete ground forces in the cooperation with other branches of the armed forces.

The program of the Communist Party, determining the basic directions/axes of our military construction, he indicates: "Soviet state will worry that its armed forces would be powerful/thick, they had available the most contemporary protective means of the native land - by atomic and thermonuclear weaponry, with the rockets/missiles of all radii of action, supported at the proper

height/altitude all types of military technology and weaponry" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Program of CPSU, page 111. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The central committee of CPSU and Soviet government consider this instruction of the program of the party not as the task of the future. The armed forces of the USSR must always be in the state of combat readiness. This is why the central committee of the party, its presidium pay constant attention to military construction, to strengthening the armed forces, to the provision with their newest means of weaponry and technology, to the improvement of their organizational formation.

Great services in an increase in the combat power of the armed forces belongs to Soviet scientists. They not only reinforce the military characteristics of the existing types of military technology and weaponry, but also are created themselves powerful/thick weapons of destruction. The successful starting/launching of Soviet satellites and of space rockets, the successful tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear bombs of colossal power vividly demonstrated the real achievements of Soviet science and technology.

Under the direct leadership of the central committee of the party is carried out extensive work on the reorganization of the

armed forces.

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In their composition now there is a new branch of the armed forces - strategic missile forces. Soviet industry already ensured rocket forces with the necessary quantity of launchers, nuclear and thermonuclear charges, different types and designation/purpose.

In recent years are completely reorganized the National Air Defense Forces. The basis of their combat power now compose anti-aircraft-missile means and missile-launching fighter-interceptors. Air defense forces are arranged/located the radio-electronic technology committed, which gives to them possibility the aerial target at great distance, to identify it, to ensure timely and precise target designation for the actuating of the means of its annihilation. They are capable to destroy high-speed aerial targets, which fly at the maximally low and high altitudes, and of also annihilating any ballistic missiles of aggressor at enormous removal/distance from the protected units.

Sharply increased the combat capabilities also of other branches of the armed forces. Soviet aviation is now equipped with the newest jet vehicles, including supersonic long-range bombers. The velocity

of contemporary combat aircraft considerably exceeds the velocity of the aircraft, which acted in the completing stage of the Second World War. Increased the height/altitude (ceiling) of their flight. Cannon-machine-gun armament of aircraft is substituted by rocket.

The Navy, after obtaining for the armament atomic submarines and missile-launching aviation, can successfully solve combat missions far beyond the limits of coastal waters of the Soviet Union.

Increased the combat capabilities also of our ground forces, in spite of the decrease of their strength. In the past war their main fire force was the artillery. Now this role switched over to the rocket forces of operational-tactical designation/purpose, which have its nuclear means. Ground forces are arranged/located the strong motorized artillery - cannon, howitzer, tank destroyer, by the more advanced mortars and by rocket artillery, and also by the guided antitank projectiles.

In the composition of ground forces are powerful/thick tank large units/formations, armed by the newest tanks, capable of successfully acting in the terrain, casualty by nuclear means. Motorized rifle large units/formations are equipped with the armored vehicles of high passability, with automatic weapon and effective anti-tank means. The more advanced technology are arranged/located

engineers.

Air defense weapons are capable in the cooperation with the fighter aviation of reliably covering the military forces and their rears from the air strikes. The wide application of radio communication and all possible electronic equipment increases the possibilities of the provision of the flexible and uninterrupted control by military forces.

All this will allow ground forces to successfully use results of applying the nuclear rocket strategic means and to conduct operations/processes with the most decisive goals, developing them at the high rate and at the considerable depth.

Great significance gives Soviet military doctrine to the development airborne troops which did not have extensive application in the past war. Under the conditions of thermonuclear war the role of this arm of service will increase. The rapid development of Soviet transport aviation in the postwar years creates the necessary conditions for transfer into the very distant areas of large/coarse troop formations together with their technology and armament.

Very important significance acquires the civil defense which must ensure conditions for the normal operation of the most important

branches of national economy and maximally possible defense of population from the nuclear attacks of enemy. Civil defense provides for the creation of special services and formations and also the preparation of population for the independent defense from the mass weapons of destruction.

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The Communist Party and the Soviet government take all necessary measures to that so that our armed forces constantly would be in the state of full combat readiness. The surprise strike/shock, plotted/applied by Hitler Germany during June 1941 by the forces of land army and aviation, placed the Soviet country in the heavy situation. The surprise massed attack by nuclear weaponry is much more dangerous. Namely for the application of this strike/shock in the Soviet Union, the countries of socialist camp are prepared imperialistic aggressors.

Remembering the lesson of past war and taking into account the combat capabilities of thermonuclear weaponry, the party and the government consider that the most important task of the armed forces of the USSR at present lies in the fact that to constantly retain full combat readiness for the immediate repulsion of the surprise attack of any aggressor in the Soviet Union and countries of

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socialist camp. To this primary task is subordinated entire system of combat training and education of military forces.

A continuous increase in the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces serves as the reliable guarantee of preservation of peace.

end section.

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Chapter Six.

STRUGGLE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE IN THE REAR OF ENEMY.

1. Mass character of struggle.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War a heroic struggle with the Fascist aggressor carried on not only the soldiers of the armed forces and the toilers of our rear, but also the population of those occupied by the enemy of areas. Selflessly betrayed to socialist order, to their native land, millions of Soviet people entered the hard struggle with the Hitler aggressors and conducted it in most varied forms. Fire/light of patriotic struggle with the occupationists blazed everywhere - from Carpathianto Donets mountain ridge, from forests/scaffolding and Karelia lakes to the Black Sea coast of Caucasus. This was the organic unit of the national struggle in defense of the socialist fatherland.

The leadership of the Communist Party, socio-political and ideological unity of our people, Soviet patriotism - here is that the inexhaustible spring from which the laborers of the USSR drew forces for the selfless activities in the rear of enemy.

However, from the first days of war the party gave to the struggle of masses the goal-directed character. In its resolution of 18 July, 1941. "About the organization of struggle in the rear of the German military forces" CC VKP(b) indicated to party organs that the task now "consists in creating of the intolerable conditions for the German interventionists, disorganizing their connection/bond, transport and military units themselves, breaking away all their measures, annihilating aggressors and their accomplices, in every possible way helping the creation of horse and foot guerilla detachments, diversionary and fighter groups, developing the net/system of our Bolshevik underground organizations in the seized territory for the leadership of all actions against Fascist occupationists" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16579, 1. 1. ENDFOOTNOTE.

After occupying the areas of the USSR richest economically, enemy established/installed in them cruel, inhuman regime.

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Occupational policy of the Fascist-German authorities, developed even to the attack in the USSR and found reflection in the cannibalistic plan the "East", pursued not only the goal of the capture of our territory, but also elimination of socialist state, enslavement and mass annihilation of Soviet people.

For the realization of their criminal concepts the Hitlerites used methods of social demagogy. They also attempted to sow national dissension, widely they resorted to all possible provocations and political deception. At the same time the aggressors applied violence and cruel mass terror. Where they passed, remained gallows and mountains of the twigs/rods of Soviet citizens.

Playing the master in the territory occupied, Hitlerites accomplished the gravest crimes in which participated not only the bands of SS man, but also regular military forces. As the General Staff of the land forces of Fascist Germany documentary established/installed, introduced into the activity such manuals and instructions for its military forces which sanctioned any crimes in the attitude of peaceful inhabitants. Fascist soldiers and officers

pitilessly annihilated prisoners of war, destroyed Soviet people, including women, children and old men, they burned villages and villages ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See documents about the crimes of Adolf Khoyzinger against the world, the military crimes and the crimes against humanity. M., Gospolitizdat, 1962, p 8. ENDFOOTNOTE.

General Staff through the operations division led also the repression of partisan movement and manning units specially intended for this purpose. On 16 December, 1942, Keitel published for the military forces of Hitler army directive about merciless struggle with the population, which offers resistance to the occupation authorities. He required from the soldiers of the use/application of the most cruel measures without the limitation, including against the women and the children ².

FOOTNOTE ². See criminal goals - criminal means. Documents about the occupational policy of Fascist Germany in the territory of the USSR (1941-1944). M., Gospolitizdat, 1963, p 119. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Resorting in the occupied regions to the demagogy, to provocations, to violence and to atrocities, the Fascist-German occupationists wanted to suppress in the population the will to

resist, to corrupt Soviet people, to convert them into the uncomplaining slaves. In this the Hitlerites leaned on the aid of nationalists and other traitors of the people who tightly cooperated with the occupational authorities, working in the Fascist installations and actively participating in savage violence with the Soviet patriots.

However, the general headquarters of Hitlerites to the traitors of the people failed. Soviet people conducted bitter struggle not on the life, but on death both with the occupationists and with the nationalists.

The model of high consciousness, organization and self-rejection in the struggle with the occupationists showed workers, who remained in the territory seized by enemy. They joined Soviet people around the Communist Party, they were the leading force in the partisan movement and the underground. In the cities and working settlements, in the large/coarse plants and the fine/small enterprises the laborers in every way possible broke away the execution of the jobs. What did not only make, for example, working coal industries, in order to deprive the fascists of carbon/coal: fell drifts, they removed/took on the mines/shafts motors and electrical equipment, hid instruments and sharply deficient materials, immersed mines/shafts. Metal-workers, damaging machine tools, hiding important details, and

also instruments and tools, did not give to the occupationists the possibility to completely use enterprises for their needs. Railroad workers involved/tightened the repair of locomotives and all rolling stock, rendered inoperable mechanisms, they violated the technical requirements of the formation of trains, broke away the timely arrival of echelons at the station, was arranged to sabotage on the roads.

Soviet employees and technical-engineering personnel conscious introduced confusion and muddle into economic and administrative measures of enemy, misinformed occupationists, undertook entire possible so as to maximally decrease the capacity of the existing enterprises and to lower labor productivity on them.

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By patriotism, love for the native land dictated all activities of our peasants in the rear of aggressors. The inhabitants of village disrupted food and raw deliveries to enemy, they deviated from the mobilization to the defensive and road work, they struggled for the retention/preservation/maintaining of collective farm property/ownership.

Annihilation of soldiers and the officers of Fascist army, the

arson of different materiel depots of enemy, the damage of the lines of communications and the disorganization of the control, the dissemination of panicky hearing/rumors among the occupationists and their myrmidons - all this was mass phenomenon in the territory occupied.

Laborers broke away, to what extent it was possible, all activities of occupationists on plunder and export in Germany of Soviet national property. The selfless struggle of our people for the rescue of public property/ownership eloquently testified about their deep faith/belief in the victory over the enemy, their conviction in the advantages of the socialist formation/order over the capitalist.

Wide scope acquired struggle for the disruption/separation of the intentions of Hitlerites to ensure the industry of Germany with gratuitous work force from the areas of our country occupied. By assignment of underground party organizations many Soviet patriots were arranged on the post of those controlling/guiding houses, went to work on the exchanges of labor/work, into the Fascist settings, the certified/rating tables, deportation of camp and even in the police; doctors were sent into the polyclinics and the elimination medical boards of the exchanges of labor/work. Patriots, who worked in the Fascist installations, supplied local residents with fictitious references about the disablement, gave incorrect medical

conclusions, declared typhoid/typhus quarantine in the areas where there were no epidemics whatever. All this gave the possibility to free many Soviet citizens from the mobilization to the hard labor works.

Sabotage of millions of Soviet people, incessant sabotages, having been accompanied by the annihilation of manpower and supplies of enemy, entire/all heroic struggle of our people created for the fascists the intolerable situation, undermined their moral spirit.

The struggle of Soviet people in the enemy rear flowed/occurred/lasted in extremely complicated conditions. On the great spaces of the occupied land of condition these were formed differently, in the dependence on many circumstances.

Very serious base for the national struggle with the aggressors they were partisan of territory and zone. Partisan of territory were the territories, completely purified from the Hitler military forces. Here actually there was a Soviet regime and a population of vein/strand on the Soviet laws and the traditions. Partisan zones differed from territories in terms of the fact that in them were situated the occupation military forces, but the local population actively struggled with the aggressors. Often in such zones fascists held only the most important important main points, leaving in them

its strong garrisons, not always connected with each other due to the disruption of the communications by partisans.

In the first period of war the vast partisan of territory and zone arose and were strengthened in Leningrad, Pskov, Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel and other regions of the RSFSR, in the Ukraine and in Belorussia. Particularly should be noted education/formation in the middle of 1942 of powerful/thick partisan territories in the Bryansk forests/scaffolding. It was here liberated from the occupationists to 500 populated areas. These of territory existed to the large unit/formation in 1943 partisan with the Red Army ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See A. I. Zalesskiy. In the partisan territories and the zones. M., SOTS'EKGIZ [- State Publishing House of Literature on Social Sciences and Economics], 1962, p 68. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Considerable role played partisan of territory and zone in the Ukraine, that were being created predominantly in the timbered unit of the republic and on the earth/ground, which border on Belorussia. But vastest they were partisan of territory and zone in the Belorussian USSR; they there existed here longer than in other republics. Toward the end of 1943 more than half of the territory of Belorussia was controlled by partisans ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See "Pravda", on 3 July, 1964. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Not randomly during the years of war in the Belorussian people walked the winged phrase: "Land peasant, forest partisan, highway German, but authority Soviet".

As a result of the heroic struggle of Soviet people in the rear of enemy from the northwest of our country to the south, through Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel and other regions of the RSFSR, through Belorussia and Ukraine was lengthened the powerful/thick zone of partisan territories and zones, which were reliable bastions, whence Soviet patriots delivered sensitive strikes/shocks on the aggressors. This seriously harassed occupationists. Thus, characterizing the situation in Rossony area, partisan territory, the Hitlerite service of the safety noted: "In the course of activities for partisans it was possible to so seize area that they converted it into the impregnable tactical base, serving for the preparation for further activities...The existence of the partisan area of Rossony is the growing danger. It is the source of serious threat to entire supply of the northern unit of the central front sector. Over that, this possible initial point for the most significant operations/processes of the Red Army in the rear of German front" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 7746, sheets 3-5.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Partisan of territory and zone in the course of combat operations were expanded and became ever more enduring/more permanent base of national struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors. In the summer of 1943 more than 200 thousand square kilometers in the rear of enemy were under the control partisan. This comprised the territory, equal to England, Denmark and Belgium, by together undertaken. Many millions of Soviet people on these earth/ground together with the partisans heroically struggled for the expulsion/exile of enemy from the limits of our native land and his utter defeat.

It is important that the temporarily occupied territories, even those of them, which were located under the rule of aggressors for three years, were not detached neither politically nor spiritually from the Soviet country. This inspired our people, decupled their forces in the struggle with the hateful enemy. Relations with the country became apparent differently.

Attempting to constantly listen to the vote of their native land, the laborers greedily trapped/caught radio transmission from the mainland, in spite of the fact that for this they threatened the capital punishment. Only in the partisan territories Moscow transmissions obeyed discovered. To conduct from the native land which the Soviet patriots learned on the radio, they rapidly became the property of all inhabitants of surrounding villages and cities.

Widely were spread in the areas of leaflet occupied other publications, which were being delivered here from the Soviet rear. People not only read these materials, they multiplied them, often copying/rewriting by hand, they transmitted that read of the mouths into the mouths. However, in the partisan territories and the zones, furthermore, were conducted reports and conversations, were arranged meeting, meetings, the concerts of amateur artistic activity.

In an individual manner were noted in the enemy rear Soviet holidays. During these significant days the partisans and underground workers reinforced strikes/shocks on the enemy, mercilessly routed his garrisons, annihilated military objectives.

As expensive to heart relics were saved in the territory seized by fascists Red Flag, flags, images of state coat of arms. With the particular heat and the love stored Soviet people portraits, busts,

bas reliefs of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

Attempting to accelerate the rout of Hitler enslavers, Soviet patriots, who were being found in the occupation, gathered sufficiently considerable sums to the construction of tanks, aircraft and crossed these means into Moscow. They actively participated in the subscription to the military loans, moreover money introduced present. Through the "gates", which were being formed in the front line (for example, Surazh gates, Rudobel', etc.), to the mainland occurred the replenishments for the Red Army.

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Peculiar situation was created in the Baltic republics. They, as is known, only not long before the Fascist attack they reunited with the Soviet state. Before the war yet was not here completely eliminated the bourgeoisie, did not end the rebuilding of economy to the socialist harmony and in the life of population did not have time to be formed enduring/permanent socialist relations. It is natural that the struggle against the occupationists in these territories passed to more complicated conditions. However, here from the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War the significant part of the laborers, and, first of all, workers, showed/rendered effective resistance to Hitler aggressors.

By the main form of the patriotic struggle of Soviet people in those occupied enemy areas was partisan movement. The Communist Party headed this movement, which arose on the initiative of the people himself.

Even in the period of the preparation for the Socialist Revolution the party, on the basis of F. Engels's instructions, estimated partisan warfare as the "elusive, the ceasing, the again appearing, but always created obstacle for enemy, uprising of the people" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. K. Marx and F. Engels. Soch., vol. 17, p 203.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

V. I. Lenin during the revolution of 1905, and then in the years of civil war and foreign intervention gave high appraisal to partisan warfare of laborers, emphasizing its nationality, regular character and great effectiveness from a purely military point of view.

Partisan movement during the years of patriotic war was the bright manifestation of Soviet patriotism. It was deeply national and it was completely guided by the great ideas of the party, by its

policy, it used the constant and wide support of all laborers of our country, personifying their creative genius and high moral spirit, their ardent love for the socialist fatherland. In the guerilla detachments and the large units/formations fought the representatives of all peoples of the Soviet Union, and also the laborers of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, France, Belgium and other countries of Europe.

Never even in the history of wars became apparent with this completeness the national character of partisan warfare, never it was so/such persistent, organized and closely related to the operations/processes of regular military forces as during the years of the Great Patriotic War. "Partisan movement, said M. I. Kalinin, is national, politically it is closely related to all laborers of the Soviet Union. It grows from the simple visual comparison by the people of Fascist regime with the Soviet formation/order where Soviet citizenry felt and feels itself master. But how can free active person, be it man or woman, to be reconciled without the bitter struggle not to the life, but to death with the Fascist servitude? This never was in the past in Russia, those more there will not be this now, in the free Soviet country" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. "Izvestiya", on 16 May, 1942. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Great scope partisan movement was obtained in Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel and other regions of the RSFSR occupied, in the Ukraine and in Belorussia.

According to incomplete data, in the seized by fascists regions and the RSFSR territories some partisan alone acted more than 260 thousand people ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. NoNo 16050, 16051, 16053, 16054, 16057-16060, 16063, 16064, 16067, 16068; Crimea in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Simferopol', Krymizdat, 1963, p 121.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thousands of patriots were found in the underground party and Komsomol organizations.

In the Ukraine were counted by 220 thousand partisan. More than 34 thousand people worked in the underground. In all of active participants in the struggle with the occupationists, who was included in partisan formations, underground organizations and the concealed/latent reserves, were counted 1933 thousand people.

In the territory of UkrSSR [99sp5 - Ukrainian SSR] during the years of war were created 1807 separate partisan groups, 2145 vanguards whose large part entered into 53 large units/formations ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16052, 1. 2. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In Belorussia acted about 374 thousand partisan and it is more than 70 thousand underground workers ².

FOOTNOTE ². Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of Belorussia, f. 4, list 33a, file. 633, sheet 54; f. 3500, list 3, file 77, sheet 96; list 4, file 331, sheet 2; list 12, file 10, sheet 8; Ibid, the department of accounting. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the territory of the republic fought 108 guerilla detachments whose majority was included in 199 brigades ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. See "Pravda", on 3 July, 1964. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The concealed/latent reserves of partisan forces in Belorussia were

approximately 400 thousand people '.

FOOTNOTE '. Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of Belorussia, f. 3500, list 12, file 10, sheet 187. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Was widened partisan movement in Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR. True, due to the specific conditions in Baltic States mass it became only in 1943, when average/mean peasantry the urban fine/small bourgeoisie, the Red Armies inspired by victories, passed to the more active struggle with the occupationists. Began to be created brigades. During November 1942 was organized the headquarters of the partisan movement of Lithuania, while during February 1943 this headquarters appeared in Latvia.

At the end of 1943 against the occupationists fought 5 thousand Lithuanian partisan '.

FOOTNOTE '. See Soviet partisans. Collector/collection of the article. Publ. 1. of M., Gospolitizdat, 1963, p 614. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In all in Lithuania acted 90 vanguards '.

FOOTNOTE '. See "Pravda", on 18 July, 1964. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In Latvia in the first period of war there were 1300 partisans, in 1943 - 1725 and in the third period of war - 4940 '.

FOOTNOTE '. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16066, sheets 2, 3.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

In 1944 here operated 3 partisan brigades and 20 vanguards '.

FOOTNOTE '. See V. P. Samson. Partisan movement in northern Latvia during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Historical outline. Riga, Latgosizdat, 1951, page 154; Soviet partisans, p 592.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the years of war in the territory of Estonian SSR were 3 partisan brigades, 6 vanguards and 54 groups. In them were counted about 1500 people '.

FOOTNOTE '. Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of Estonia, ^{Collection} A. 4, list 1, file 46, sheet 3.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

The patriots of the Baltic republics were closely related to partisans and members of the underground of Russian federation and Belorussia, receiving from them the aid of every kind and the support. In this fact was reflected the Leninist principle of the fraternal solidarity of the peoples.

In partisan and underground warfare with the German fascists participated all strata of our people. Thus, for instance, composition of combat partisan forces by the questionnaires, assembled by the central headquarters of partisan movement until 15 January, 1944, was the following picture: workers there were 30.1 percent, collective farmers - 40.5, that use - 29.4 percent. Men among partisan were counted 98.7 percent, women - 9.3 percent ¹⁰.

FOOTNOTE ¹⁰. TsPA IML, f. 69, list 1, un. of storage 793, sheet 35.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

Women played the role revealed in the struggle in the rear of enemy. They showed themselves daring partisans and members of the underground excellent female communications workers and militia medical aids, courageous demolition men and intelligence women. Such patriots as the intelligence woman of grassland partisan Hero of the Soviet Union A. V. Petrova, messengers - Heroes of the Soviet Union Mary Melent'yeva and Anna Lisitzina, the head of party underground

AT THE REAR OF THE ENEMY.

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Secretary of the TsK [Central Committee] of the CP(b)B [Communist Party (bolshevik) of Belorussia P. K. Ponomarenko talks with partisans (Belorussia).



Meeting of leaders of Komsomol workers of Belorussia at the rear of the enemy (1943).

Residents of a Belorussian village listen with interest to an agitator from the Pinsk underground regional committee of the Party.



THE PEOPLE'S AVENGERS - THE TERROR OF THE NAZI GERMAN INVADERS.



Messenger of a partisan detachment sends the commander's order.

On a combat mission.



Partisans wage war.



group in the city Vitebsk Vera Khoruzhaya, the leader of Komsomol underground organization at the station Obol' Ye. S. Zen'kova, active underground member Poltava the member of the Komsomol Lyalya Ubiyvovk, the loyal daughter of the Lithuanian people Marite Mel'nikayte and many others, personified in itself staying power/persistency and courage, devotion and limitless love for the native land. Such women heroines there were thousands.

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Partisan movement during entire war used the unanimous support of population. And in this there was its great force. "If the people props up by shoulder - it is nothing to us",: said partisans. In them were always located millions of betrayed and energetic assistants. In the sediment of national masses the partisans had the inexhaustible reserves for replenishing their numbers.

Population exerted partisans most diverse by aid. Its most effective form in the beginning of war were the groups of assistance to partisans, or as them still named, the supporting/reference groups, created by underground party organizations, individual communists or non-party members. These groups helped partisans by rations, by clothing, transmitted by them the reconnaissance enemy data, provided national avengers with messengers and by guides,

spread leaflets, etc.

In proportion to for increase/growth and strengthening of the partisan movement of the group of assistance they began to convert/transfer to the armed struggle, they arranged sabotage, ambushes, annihilated Hitlerites and if necessary defended from the occupationists their populated areas. Thus it appeared the more advanced and efficient form of the organization of national forces for dealing with the enemy - vanguards of self defense, or national guards. They supported the close connection with the partisans and they exerted them every possible aid. In turn, the command element of partisan formations, taking into account the enormous political and military significance of such vanguards and militia, is also exerted them by aid guiding there commanders and political workers. These vanguards and militia were the concealed/latent reserve partisan, who was being calculated in the entire occupied territory with many hundreds of thousand people.

Population, especially woman and young people, actively helped partisans in all their works. Peaceful inhabitants made the most varied work for the guerilla detachments and the large units/formations: they maintained/served economic bases, they worked in the leather dressing, shoe and tailor's workshops, they handled casualties, they helped to lay crossings during the redislocation and

to build airfields in the rear of enemy.

Partisans received from the Soviet people, which were being located in the rear of enemy, and great material by aid, first of all by food products. This aid proved to be everywhere. Its scales can be judged at least from the example to Belorussia. Only one Yel'sk partisan brigade of Polesian region obtained in 1943 from the inhabitants of six village soviets of Yel'sk area 4 thousand poods of grain, 7 thousand poods of potatoes, 2500 poods of meat ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of Belorussia, f. 3500, list 4, file 225, sheet 69. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In Leningrad region the population took upon itself all concerns about 35-thousand army of Soviet partisans, providing with their rations, by clothing and by foot-wear ².

FOOTNOTE ². See Soviet partisans, p 74. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the years of war a large part of the rations our partisans obtained from the local population.

The million-strong masses of the Soviet people suffered in the

occupation the most cruel oppression. Hitlerites attempted to impose on the laborer of the USSR their bloody, colonialist "new order/formation", to suffocate in the Soviet person his socialist ideals. But enemies proved to be powerless. Similar even the greatest storm/gale cannot affect the depths of the sea, so no, even most desperate efforts/forces of occupationists could shake the patriotism of our people, its faith/belief in the final victory over the fascism. Facts show that Soviet people, which were being located during the years of war on the territory occupied, selflessly defended the native Soviet regime, the socialist order. The mass character of this struggle vividly expressed inviolable socio-political and ideological unity of Soviet society, socialist patriotism and friendship of the laborers of our country, their internationalism, devotion to great Leninist precept to protect the socialist fatherland to the victorious end.

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2. Ways of the armed struggle of partisan and underground.
Organization of partisan forces.

Partisan movement, as movement national, was characterized by organization and high level of combat skill. In the course of combat operations were revealed/detected the most effective ways of the

armed struggle the partisan and the advisable forms of the organization of their forces.

To the ways of partisan warfare, on the structure of partisan formations had an effect the all-political and military-strategic situation, which was being formed during the war, the tasks, set by command element, armament partisan, the strength of hostile troops and their equipment, the density of population and the degree of his activity in the struggle with the enemy, the economic and natural conditions of combat area and other factors.

An extremely great effect on scope and ways of partisan warfare had the successes of the Red Army. With the approximation/approach of the attacked/advanced Soviet military forces to areas of activities partisan the participation of the guerilla detachments and the local population in the struggle with invaders became especially mass and active.

Combat activity partisan and underground workers, its result in many respects they depended not only on quantity and quality of their armament, but also on the scales of use/application in partisan warfare of such means as aviation and radio communication. Aviation delivered to national avengers the necessary supplies from the rear of the country, evacuated to the mainland of casualties and patients

partisan, and also children and women, who were being located with the guerilla detachments, it made it possible to rapidly and successfully transport into the rear of enemy the cadres of military specialists and to guide at the disposal of the command element of the Red Army of the seized prisoners and the important documents of enemy.

Having available radio aids from the second period of war, partisans had the opportunity to support coupling constant with the military forces and the rear of the country, to in proper time inform Soviet command element about the measures of occupationists, to aim aviation to the concentration areas of their military forces and different hostile units. Because of the radio communication the partisans could conduct large-scale joint operations on vast territory, and their organs of leadership - bending control/guide their multithousand grouping, concentrating strikes/shocks on the most important units of enemy. Radio communications made it possible to also considerably improve cooperation partisan with the Red Army, is more purposeful to use their forces in the interests not only of separate combat, but also large-scale strategic operations/processes of our military forces.

Substantially affected the ways of partisan warfare the character of terrain. Vast of forest and the mountains, covered with

vegetation, impeded enemy the use/application of military technology in the struggle with the partisans and served as the basic areas of the basing of partisan forces. Not randomly in these areas were created partisan of territory and zone and extensively were used the different methods of activities. However, in the steppe areas large/coarse partisan large units/formations could successfully conduct struggle with the enemy only in the course of raids, and the small vanguards and the groups which constantly were stationed here, they were occupied in essence by reconnaissance/intelligence and sabotages, resorting sometimes to the ambushes and the flights.

As an example that the character of terrain did not always favor partisans, can serve Crimea. Its physicogeographical characteristics (peninsular situation, the insignificance of territory and the absence of large/coarse forest tracts) limited the possibilities of maneuver partisan and facilitated enemy struggle with them. Here Soviet patriots frequently have to conduct prolonged, persistent defensive actions and to accomplish blockade break-through, which led to the sizable losses.

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Essential effect on the ways of partisan warfare and on its result is especially exerted this purely subjective factor as the

personal qualities of partisan heads. From the organizational and military capabilities of command personnel in many respects depended the success of work.

The general/common/total military-strategic leadership of partisan warfare on the basis of the instructions of CC of VKP(b) exercised the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command. on the basis of the concrete/specific/actual situation, it defined basic problems partisan in each stage of war and in the separate strategical operations, organized the strategic cooperation of the Red Army with the partisans. However, direct leadership of the combat activity of all partisan was charged to the central headquarters of partisan movement - TsShPD (commander/chief P. K. Ponomarenko, the commander/chief of political administration V. M. Malin), organized on 30 May, 1942, with the general headquarters of VGK.

For the centralization of leadership of combat activity partisan it was possible to attain not immediately. In the first period of war many partisan formations, which acted in zone of one and the same front, led the regional committees of the party and the headquarters of partisan movement, and also political administration created by them and the military councils of fronts. This leadership was is often insufficiently insufficient to effective ones. The subordination of partisan formations to different organs negatively

had effect on combat activity partisan, frequently it led to the unjustified expenditure of forces and means, complicated the development of uniform measures for the deployment of partisan warfare, did not provide the timely and clear connection/bond of front command element with the guerilla detachments, interfered with the adjustment of their interaction with the military forces of the Red Army.

All these deficiencies were caused by the surprise of hostile attack on our country, by the absence of the experience of struggle in the rear of enemy under the conditions of modern war, nondevelopment in the pre-war years of the problem of leadership of partisan movement and by many other reasons, connected with the consequences of the personality cult of Stalin. Only after the beginning of war began to in practice be carried out the thought-out system of leadership of combat activity partisan.

Discordance and parallelism in the leadership of partisan warfare were removed by summer and in the fall of 1942, when after creation of TsShPD were formed republican, and for territory of the RSFSR - regional headquarters of partisan movement occupied. These headquarters became effective command agencies. however, separate shortages in the leadership of partisan warfare continued to remain, also, subsequently.

The central headquarters of partisan movement developed/processed and it put into practice of measure for the deployment of partisan warfare, established connection/bond with the partisans, it provided with all their with necessary for the activities in the rear of enemy, generalized the experience of partisan movement, guided the training of personnel. It also guided and controlled the work of the republican and regional headquarters, organized cooperation between the large/coarse grouping partisan, planned/glided the most important operations/processes, it ensured the rapid fulfillment of all instructions of general headquarters of VGK on questions of partisan warfare.

Direct leadership of combat activity partisan exercised the republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement which in operational sense were subordinated to the central headquarters.

In such cases when in the territory of the republic or region acted several fronts, the corresponding headquarters of partisan movement (republican or regional) guided into the military council of each of these fronts its representations, or the operations groups which led combat operations partisan in the zone of this front.

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Thus, for instance, Leningrad headquarters (commander/chief M. N. Nikitin), exercising the general/common/total leadership of partisan warfare in the territory of entire region and direct leadership in the zone of Leningrad Front, had its operations groups with the military councils of Volkhov and North Western fronts. The same groups allotted Ukrainskiy (commander/chief T. A. Strokach) and Belorussian (commander/chief P. Z. Kalinin) the headquarters of partisan movement.

The majorities of our partisan formations fought in the rear of enemy in the composition of the definite/determined grouping. Each of them usually encompassed many guerilla detachments and large units/formations which acted in the vast territory, which stretched to hundreds of kilometers along the front and into deep rear. The combat activity of such grouping, which had uniform operative management, fell outside tactical frames/scopes and depended on the conformities with the law, inherent in operational art.

Each partisan formation made combat missions, applying the tactics of partisan warfare. This tactics carried active, offensive character and was characterized by the ability partisan to rapidly change the ways of its activities in the dependence on the situation.

Skillfully maneuvering, violating connection/bond and supply of enemy, unexpectedly appearing in the places most vulnerable for it, after depositing on enemy short surprise strikes/shocks, harassing Hitlerites and placing them before new difficulties, partisans disorganized the rear of fascists, they deposited on them sensitive losses, diverted to themselves the large/coarse forces of enemy and thereby was not given to it the possibility to use these forces against the Red Army.

However, national avengers did not immediately master this tactics. The wars created in the beginning guerilla detachments burned by the wish to strike enemy, but to them yet was not sufficient experience for the successful conduct of struggle, it is small the weaponry and other combat devices. Partisans badly/poorly knew enemy, they did not study his insidious receptions/methods. But gradually, from the month in month grew their skill, was improved tactics.

Partisans solved their problems both by direct combat actions against enemy (ambush, flights, defensive and offensive combat) and without entering in the direct collision/encounter with it (sabotage).

In the first period of war the discovered combat actions against

Hitlerites occupied the main place in partisan warfare. But their result was now and then low, and loss partisans bore more. Weak reconnaissance/intelligence of the forces of occupationists and area of their disposition, poor cooperation between the subunits, inability to ensure the surprise of attack on the enemy, the disorganization of advancement and withdrawal/departure - all this did not often make it possible for partisans to achieve the intended targets. Subsequently as a result of the acquisition of experience these deficiencies were to a considerable extent eliminated.

With the accomplishment of missions by combat the basic ways of struggle were the ambushes and flights. By them attached much importance. Surprise and rapidity of activities in the ambushes and the flights usually so paralyzed fascists that they lost capability for the organized resistance and underwent the utter defeat, although the partisans in many instances were inferior to them in the strength.

Offensive combat against the enemy, who occupied defense under the field conditions, were applied by partisans on leaving from the area blocked by Hitlerites and during the combined operations with the military forces of the Red Army.

Defensive actions conducted most frequently with the punitive

grouping of enemy. In this case the characteristic feature of tactics partisan was the fact that they conducted usually maneuver defense, without attempting to for long hold the occupied terrain. But sometimes, reflecting the offensive of Hitlerites to the partisan ones of territory, national avengers applied hard defense. Frequently defensive actions tied themselves in the interests of the advancing/attacking units of the Red Army in order to hold down/retain for them the crossings through the water obstacles, passes, road centers, populated areas on the withdrawal routes of enemy, etc. In this case the partisans attempted to at any cost maintain for themselves the definite/determined area of terrain to the large unit/formation with the military forces.

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Sabotages, as the way of struggle with the enemy, occupied in partisan tactics one of the central places. They made it possible to do to the enemy of loss material damage, without entering with it in the military engagement. With the explicit superiority of Fascist military forces in the maneuverability and the combat means frequent military engagements with the enemy led to the great losses, partisans burdened themselves by casualties, which decreased their mobility and impeded the conduct of active actions against aggressors.

However, the partisan vanguards which widely resorted to the diversionary struggle, did not usually have great losses, they retained maneuverability and we could continuously act on enemy, placing him in the heavy situation. As far as underground workers are concerned, in their combat practice of sabotage they always stood first and foremost. The incessant sabotages diverted attention and forces of Hitlerites to the protection of numerous units, undermined their moral spirit and combat efficiency.

The experience of war showed that technical the well prepared sabotage, committed by small group partisan (for example, the downfall of the troop train), frequently gave much greater effect, than combat of whole partisan large unit/formation with the hostile troops. But the systematic and goal-directed sabotages, carried out by partisans and underground workers on a mass scale, frequently led to the large/coarse operational results.

In the first period of the war when the majority of the vanguards yet did not have mineblasting techniques, partisans and underground members applied the simplest forms of the sabotages: were inflicted mechanical damages on railway lines, they destroyed and fired wooden bridges, dug "wolf pits" on the main and dirt roads, etc. However, this required, as a rule, considerable efforts/forces and much time and did not give proper effect.

Therefore on the instruction of the party and government our industry at the end of the first period of war mastered the production of several models of the mineblasting technology which provided the high effectiveness of the diversionary activity of Soviet patriots. Already in the second period of the war when in the rear of enemy was begun the mass use/application of mineblasting

means, sabotage began to play in partisan and underground warfare extremely great role. It suffices to say that the significant part of the losses in manpower and material the enemy bore as a result of sabotage partisan.

In the practice of partisan warfare the sabotages frequently were combined with the ambushes and the flights and were applied also in the course of defensive actions against the chastisers.

Orientating partisan and underground to the wide application of the most advisable ways of the struggles, which lead party organs at the same time determined those basic units whose breakdown could render most perceptible assistance of the Red Army. Such units were, first of all, communications of enemy, especially railroads.

The work of rail transport partisans and underground workers violated by the different methods: they arranged the downfall of trains, destroyed bridges and rail track, rendered inoperable of communications and water-supply system, they made obstacles on the railroads, fired on the passing trains, etc.

Taking into account the high effectiveness of sabotages on the railroad main pipelines, the Ukrainian headquarters of partisan movement in June 1943 directed to all its vanguards and to large

units/formations the directive in which it was emphasized that "the most accurate and most available way of the disruption of the work of the most important communications - railroads is the downfall of trains" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of the Ukraine, f. 105, list 1, un. of stor. 8, sheet 61. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Analogous installations in the course of war were evaded by other headquarters of partisan movement.

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Carrying out the instructions of their headquarters, Ukrainian partisans, and also underground workers increased strikes/shocks on the railroad communications of enemy. While in 1942 they derailed 233 echelons, then in 1943 such echelons was counted 3666 ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of the Ukraine, f. 62, list 1, un. of storage 3, sheet 55, 62. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, a quantity of trains undermined in the year, in spite of the

increased protection of railroads, it increased almost 16 times.

Increased a number of downfall of hostile trains, also, in other areas of the country occupied. In first half 1942 Belorussian partisans released under the slant on the average to 20 echelons in month, and in second half of year - to 150-160. In all within the time of the Great Patriotic War in Belorussia were annihilated and damaged more than 11 thousand echelons of enemy ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CP of Belorussia, f. 4, list 20, file 214, sheet 15; list 33a, file 368, sheet 67-69; f. 3500, list 3, file 38, sheet 29; file 77, sheet 176. ENDFOOTNOTE.

As a result of the downfall of trains the enemy lost numerous his soldiers and officers. Moreover, this form of struggle others, more strongly than affected a descent in the capacity of railroads. Interruptions in the movement along the railroads of the Ukraine for entire war were caused to 70 percent by the downfall of trains ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of the Ukraine, f. 62, list 9, un. of storage 1, sheet 89. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Among other ways with the aid of which the partisans and underground workers upset the operation of the rail transport of enemy, especially great effect gave the undermining of large/coarse and average/mean bridges, which for a long time rendered inoperable steel main pipelines. Thus, for instance, undermining by the Belorussian partisans of 110-meter bridge on Drissa river caused interruption in the movement to 16 days '.

FOOTNOTE '. See Soviet partisans, pp. 689. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Combat activity partisan and underground workers on the railroads grew over tactical frames/scopes and on its scope acquired operational-strategic significance. For the first time in the history of wars Soviet partisans, being guided by uniform concept, carried out several large-scale operations/processes on to the breakdown of railroad communications of enemy. These operations/processes were closely related to the activities of the Soviet Armed Forces. In them simultaneously participated ten thousand partisan, and they were conducted in the enormous territory.

Thus, during August - September 1943 according to the plan of central the headquarters of partisan movement in the areas of Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel regions and Belorussia occupied was carried out the largest operation/process "rail war" which was

developed at the front of approximately 1 thousand kilometers and into the depth more than 750 kilometers. In it participated by 95 615 partisan * and tens of thousands of Soviet people, which did not enter into partisan formations.

FOOTNOTE *. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9609, pp. 571. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In this operation/process only Belorussian partisans undermined more than 120 thousand rails, produced 836 downfall of hostile echelons and armored trains and destroyed 184 railroad bridges. In the fall of 1943 Belorussian and Lithuanian partisans conducted large-scale operation/process on the disruption of the work of railroads - "concert". By the acknowledgement of Fascist command element, these two operations/processes shortened the transportation of enemy by 35-40 percent *.

FOOTNOTE *. Ibid: party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of Belorussia, f. 3500, list 3, file 119, sheet 190, 192; list 4, file 1, sheet 108, 111. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Combat activity partisan on the railroad communications diverted to their protection the considerable contingents of the Fascist-German military forces. Thus, for instance, in Leningrad

region in the areas of active operations partisan the Hitlerites in the summer of 1943 forced were each 100-kilometer sector of railway lines to protect by forces to two regiments (according to the data of enemy) ⁷.

FOOTNOTE ⁷. Archives MO USSR, f. 235, list 2076, file 58, sheet 114-115. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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During entire war for the Fascist-German aggressors so could not secure their communications. According to the certificate of Hitlerites themselves, partisan miners always improved ways of sabotages and each time placed hostile protection "before new unpleasant unexpected contingencies" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Results of the Second World War, pp. 147. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Exceptionally important significance had the reconnaissance activity partisan and underground workers, which they conducted for themselves and for the Red Army. Reconnaissance/intelligence "to itself" in the tactics of partisan warfare was one of the forms of engineer support. As far as reconnaissance/intelligence, which was being carried out in the interests of the Red Army, is concerned, it

was particular and extremely important region in the entire combat activity partisan. They widely conducted not only the army, but also the secret service. In their vanguards and large units/formations acted a great quantity of specially prepared scouts. However, in reconnaissance/intelligence actual participated all partisans. Not one soldier, whatever task/target it made, never he forgot the holy rule: you want victory - enemy reconnoiter.

In the first period of war reconnaissance activity partisan was fixed weakly and did not give proper results. The vanguards did not have an experience of a similar work, did not have specialists, capable of organizing well reconnaissance/intelligence in the rear of enemy. All this was complicated by the absence of radio aids in the majority of the vanguards. The headquarters of partisan movement and for the command element of the Red Army it was necessary to support connection/bond with the partisans with the aid of the messengers. Thus, for instance, in the fall of 1942 in the 22nd army for the connection/bond with the Kalinin partisans were 15 people who walked into the rear of enemy at the depth to 300 kilometers ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Archives MO USSR, f. 213, list 2016, file 79, sheet 49-50. ENDFOOTNOTE.

These soldiers, constantly being liable life, brought to their

command element the important information about the political situation in the rear of the Fascist-German aggressors, about the mood of Soviet people, about the morale of hostile troops, about his military, economic and administrative measures. However, during this organization of connection/bond many information of military character which it was possible to extract for partisans, frequently lost their value, since they with the great retardation reached the command element of the Red Army.

In the second and third periods of war to the guerilla detachments was directed a considerable number of specially trained scouts. In all partisan formations were created the reconnaissance units. Was increased training of specialist-scouts for the work in the rear of enemy. Into the vanguards considerably greater it began to enter radio sets. All this led to the fact that already in the summer of 1943 reconnaissance activity partisan became much more advanced, indeed by profession not only of daring ones, but also skilful.

Partisan reconnaissance/intelligence penetrated the military and administrative organs of enemy, in the sphere of its activities was located entire territory of the country occupied. Courageous patriots constantly transmitted to the command element of the Red Army the valuable enemy data: about his measures, defense and grouping of

forces. Thus, at the end 1943 - beginning 1944 by reconnaissance/intelligence only of 11th partisan brigade, which acted in Leningrad region, was fixed location and movement of units and headquarters of 20 Fascist-German divisions and 1 brigade; it was possible to also learn the surnames of commanders and number of these units and large units/formations. Was simultaneously established/installed the disposition of the headquarters of the 38th army corps, headquarters of the 18th army with its departments, and also the location of many separate units and four airfields of enemy '.

FOOTNOTE '. Party archives of the Leningrad regional committee of CPSU, f. 0-116, list 2, un. of storage 169, sheet 49-50. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Frequently partisan reconnaissance/intelligence obtained and in proper time communicated to the mainland the extremely important information of military and political character. For example, to reconnaissance/intelligence partisan and underground workers, that acted in the Ukraine and in Belorussia, were possible to obtain the data about the location of Hitler's general headquarters in Vinnitsy area, about the intention of Germans to undertake near Kursk in the summer of 1943 offensive.

The force of partisan reconnaissance/intelligence consisted in the close connection with the population of the territories occupied. The active assistance of local residents made it possible for partisans to follow the enemy and his measures immediately in several areas. This helped Soviet command element to distinguish the many concepts of enemy even when to the secret service nothing was possible to establish/install.

Combat missions partisans solved, acting not only from the constant or temporary/time areas of basing, but also in the course of raids. Raid as the form of struggle was the aggregate of combat, diversionary-reconnaissance and mass-political activity, conducted by partisans in the route, when their vanguards and large units/formations departed for a prolonged time from the areas of their basing or they left them generally.

The well prepared raid made it possible to solve many military-political problems. National avengers routed the military garrisons of enemy, police sectors, destroyed Fascist occupational administration and traitors, which were found on the service in Hitlerites, mined main and railroads, exploded bridges, they arranged the downfall of hostile trains, annihilated storages and airfields.

In the frontal areas the raids of partisan formations were conducted for the rendering of direct aid to the advancing/attacking units of the Red Army.

Together with the combat activity the partisans conducted in the course of raids great political work. Establishing connection/bond with the local underground workers and the guerilla detachments, they created new underground organizations and groups, spread spy system, conducted conversations, meetings and meetings, spread the newspapers and the leaflets, organized the collective hearing of the transmissions of Soviet radio, involved into the guerilla detachments new forces.

The tasks of raids in the different stages of struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors were different. Their basic goal in the first period of war consisted of organizing of partisan movement in the new areas and establishing/installing connection/bond with the local partisans, raising the spirit of population, mobilizing it to even the more active struggle with the enemy. Were conducted these raids by predominantly small forces.

In the second period of war the raids were accomplished by already more considerable forces. Their most important goal was the disruption of the work of the enemy rear.

The characteristic of the raids of the third period of war consisted in the fact that they are more frequently than before, they began to be carried out in the close operational cooperation with the attacked/advanced units of the Red Army. In 1944 some partisan formations, which possessed the greatest combat experience, were conducted successful raids beyond the limits of our native land in order to help the peoples of Poland and Czechoslovakia to develop partisan movement.

By the unfading page in the heroic chronicle of the struggle of the Soviet people in the rear of enemy entered the raids of partisan formations under the command element of V. A. Andreyev, I. N. Banov, I. F. Borovik, T. P. Bumazhkov, P. P. Vershigory, A. V. Herman, I. A. Grigoryev, S. V. Grishin, F. F. Kapusty, V. A. Karasev, S. A. Kovpak, V. Z. Korzh, Ya. I. Mel'nik, M. I. Naumov, N. A. Prokopyuk, V. V. Razumov, A. N. Saburov, V. P. Samson, A. F. Fedorov, A. K. Flegontov, V. P. Chepigya, M. I. Shukayev et al.


Raids on the rears of enemy gave to partisan warfare an even greater scope. They testified about the remarkable combat morale qualities of Soviet patriots, the high level of leadership of partisan movement and maturity of partisan tactics.

THE PEOPLE'S AVENGERS - THE TERROR OF THE NAZI INVADERS.



Partisans learned how to do demolition work

...and not without success.



These orders were posted by the Nazis who were afraid of the courageous actions of partisans. KEY: (1) Danger of action, partisan! Use of this road is strictly forbidden. Anyone caught on this road in an unpopulated area or near an area restricted by the German administration will be shot! (2) Save for history.





Partisans develop a combat operation plan.

At a stopping place.



Conferring awards on partisans.

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By their combat activity partisans and underground workers exerted considerable by the aid of the Red Army. The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that most effective this aid was during the skillful organization of cooperation partisan with the military forces.

To a question of cooperation partisan with the Soviet military forces the command element of the Red Army and the leading organs of partisan movement always paid considerable attention. However, in the first period of war this question did not find its complete resolution. Under the conditions of defense and withdrawal/departure of the military forces of the Red Army, especially in the beginning of war, the cooperation could not be sufficiently close and wide. One of the reasons for this was the low experience of the control the growing partisan forces. The absence of reliable connection/bond with the majority of guerilla detachments excluded the possibility of systematic organization by it combat missions in the interests of the operations/processes, conducted by military forces. It suffices to say that even during June 1942 of 387 vanguards, which was registered of the headquarters of partisan movement, only 91 it supported radio

communication in with the mainland ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9609, pp. 528. ENDFOOTNOTE.

All this, understands himself it interfered with the adjustment of cooperation partisan with the regular units. However, certain experience of this cooperation was nevertheless, especially in winter campaign 1941/42. In defensive battles 1941 combined operations partisan with the military forces of the Red Army were carried out predominantly within the tactical frames/scopes. Thus, for instance, Ostashkov vanguard of Kalinin partisans from 9 to 22 November 1941 together with the units of the 249th rifle division conducted combat, having a defense sector with a length of 3-3.5 kilometers ².

FOOTNOTE ². Party archives of Kalinin district, f. 479, list 1, file 35, sheet 36; f. 147, list 10, file 1049, sheet 1-3. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the course of the offensive of the Red Army in winter 1941/42: cooperation partisan with the regular military forces somewhat was improved, and the circle of the tasks solved by them noticeably was widened. In accordance with the concept of some operations/processes of the Red Army the partisans reinforced strikes/shocks on the communications of enemy, laid aviation at the

enemy units, contributed to the landing airborne troops, they exerted them aid in the conduct of combat operations, etc.

However, in spite of certain experience of the first period of war, cooperation partisan with the Soviet military forces carried incidental character. In connection with this at the conference of the commanders of some partisan formations with the heads of the party and government, which was taking place in the Kremlin during August - September 1942, and in the command of NKO of 5 September of the same year one of the most important became the task of the provision of regular cooperation partisan with the military forces of the Red Army.

The creation of the headquarters of partisan movement and the acquisition by them of the experience of leadership of large/coarse grouping partisan in the second period of war, the provision of reliable radio communication with the majority of formations, an improvement in the material and technical supply partisan made it possible to place before them more crucial combat missions. Specifically, during this period, especially from in the spring of 1943, begin systematically to be developed plan of the operational use of large/coarse grouping of partisan forces both for the more prolonged periods and within the framework of the definite/determined operations/processes of Soviet military forces.

In the second period of war the cooperation partisan with the armed forces radically was improved. Was carried out regular operational cooperation partisan with the military forces of fronts; for deciding the combat missions, which stood before the soldiers of the Red Army, began to be drawn larger/coarser forces partisan; they increasingly more frequently delivered the effective massed attacks on the communications of enemy, and in particular along the railroads, in the interests of offensive operations at the front.

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In winter offensive 1942/43, in the battle near Kursk, during the Smolensk operation/process, in the battle for Dnepr, in the operations/processes on the liberation of the eastern areas of Belorussia our partisans considerably activated/promoted their activity in the enemy rear and purposefully solved problems in the interests of the advancing/attacking Red Army.

The offensive of our military forces into 1944 was conducted also in the close contact with the partisans who took active part almost in all large/coarse campaigns of this year. Their cooperation with the armed forces during this period underwent its further

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 11722

1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV


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
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development. Leadership of combat activity partisan even more was approximated in to fronts. More widely began to practice the regrouping of partisan forces in the interests of the attacking military forces. Increased scope and was raised the purposefulness of operational cooperation. Partisans better began to carry out tactical cooperation with the military forces, which contributed to the high rates of progress of the Red Army under the difficult natural conditions of the northwestern unit of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Baltic States, Leningrad and Kalinin district.

In 1944 headquarters of partisan movement and military councils of fronts they placed to the partisans of task even prior to the beginning of the offensive operations of the Red Army. In this preparatory period was provided for the considerable making more active of partisan forces, in order to lower the defensive capacity of enemy, to disorganize his rear. to contain reserves. By their energetic activities partisans and underground workers skillfully solved these problems, creating the necessary conditions for the offensive of Soviet military forces. Thus, on the eve Belorussian operation/process partisans according to the previously developed plan produced simultaneous attack on the hostile communications in the rear of army group "center". The commander/chief of the military statements of this group Colonel G. Teske gave to activities partisan the following appraisal: "... before the general offensive of

Russians in the sector of army group "center", at the end of June 1944, the powerful/thick distracting partisan flight on all important roads on several days deprived the German military forces for any control. Statement along many highways due to the flights partisan could be carried out only in the daytime and only in the escort/tracking of the armed convoy" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Results of the Second World War, pp. 407. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the offensive the conditions for the activities partisan were formed, as a rule, it is more favorable. During this period enemy no longer can throw against them considerable forces. But the successes of our military forces undermined the moral spirit of enemy and contributed to the wide involvement of the local population in the active struggle with the occupationists.

In the course of offensive operations the headquarters of partisan movement more precisely formulated to large units/formations and to the vanguards previously assigned missions and, on the basis of the folding situation, placed to them new ones. At the same time to the commanders of partisan formations was given wide initiative in the activities.

The basic goal partisan since the beginning of the offensive at

the front consisted in creating of the conditions, which are favorable to rapid and successful progress of our military forces. When the Red Army approached areas of activities partisan, they exerted it direct aid within the framework of tactical cooperation. Partisans reinforced strikes/shocks on the enemy from the rear, they helped our soldiers to break through on the move defensive lines, to repulse a counterstroke, to overcome the rivers and other natural obstacles. They contributed to the Red Army in encirclement and annihilation of Fascist grouping, in the mastery of the populated areas (including large/coarse), together with it they pursued enemy, provided the exposed flanks of the advancing/attacking units, etc.

Leading struggle in the rear of enemy, the Communist Party helped partisans to create such forms of organizations which corresponded to the changing situation conditions and increased the result of combat activity.

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All partisan forces, which existed during the years of war, can be divided into three basic groups. The first group composed the vanguards, which were being formed directly in the rear of enemy. They were created by underground party organizations, soldiers, who caught into the encirclement, or even on the initiative of individual

Soviet citizens. Very process of the personnel procurement of these vanguards, their armament and training, creation of material bases, adjustment of connection/bond with the local population proceeded in the situation of the most cruel Fascist repressions and atrocities, in the absence of the necessary military-technological means for conducting the struggle.

Into the second group entered the vanguards, created by local party and Soviet organs in the course of war in advance, i.e., before the occupation. After obtaining of task they either remained in the assigned areas to the capture by their enemy, or they were transported into the enemy rear.

Finally, third group composed the vanguards, formed by the leading organs of partisan movement, by the military councils of fronts and armies and Hitler aggressors moved into the rear across the front line. In the majority of the cases the personnel of such vanguards was trained in the special partisan schools.

To partisan warfare frequently converted/transferred the fighter battalions, created in the frontal areas for the annihilation of the spies thrown by enemy and saboteurs and those remaining then in the territory occupied.

In the first period of war into the rear of enemy frequently were crossed the organizational groups, which helped at the places to create the guerilla detachments and units. Especially great role these groups played in western regions of the country where due to rapid progress of the Fascist-German military forces local party organs did not have time to make the necessary work on the deployment of partisan movement. As a rule, the organizational groups and the guerilla detachments, transported into the rear of enemy, very soon "outgrew" and became the nucleus of new, larger/coarser formations.

Frequently partisan formations were formed from the saboteur parties. So it was, for example, with the group of the Hero of the Soviet Union K. S. Zaslunov, which during November 1941 - February 1942 headed the combat underground organization created with it on the Orsha railroad junction. Subsequently covering detachments he led partisan brigade.

Composition and organization of partisan combat forces in different areas and in the different periods of war were very diverse.

In the beginning of the war when Soviet people yet did not have enough experience of struggle in the rear of aggressors, in the organization the partisan existed discordance. At this time they were

united into the groups, the vanguards, the battalions and the regiments of different strength. However, the most typical form of organization was the vanguard. To winter 1941/42 the vanguard system of the personnel procurement of partisan forces was affirmed almost in all areas occupied. The vanguards were small: each counted usually several ten people. The same time very many partisan formations of the type of regiments and battalions due to the absence of sufficient preparation/training, experience of struggle in the rear of enemy and connection/bond with the mainland were decomposed into the individual vanguards and the groups.

In 1942, when partisan movement accepted wider scope, quantity and strength of guerilla detachments began rapidly to grow. Appeared the vanguards on 150-200 and more than men. At the same time into 1942 in view of the established situation and the need for solving problems with common efforts many vanguards, concentrated in one and the same areas (usually in the forests), began to be united in the partisan large units/formations which bore different names: brigade, regiment, large unit/formation, division. Thus, for instance, in the Kalinin district during June - August 1942 almost all vanguards were combined into nine partisan brigades ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Party archives of Kalinin district, f. 479, list 1, file 272, sheet 61. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Different types of large units/formations were created in Smolensk and Orel regions, in the Ukraine and in Belorussia.

At the same time for the purpose of the coordination of the activities of guerilla detachments and large units/formations, which were being based in one and the same areas, began to appear the united organs of leadership of the partisan forces which were named the united headquarters, operational centers, military councils, headquarters of bushes, sectors/arcs. However, subsequently, in connection with the creation of central, the republican and regional headquarters of partisan movement, these organs in the majority of the cases were abolished.

In the second period of patriotic war in the concentration areas of large/coarse forces of partisans their basic mass was combined in the partisan brigades (in Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk and Orel regions, in Belorussia and in Crimea) and the large units/formations (in the Ukraine). In this case in Belorussia the brigades and the individual vanguards, which acted in the limits of several adjacent areas or whole region, were united in turn, in the large

units/formations, which led the regional committees of the party.

In 1943 the CC of KP(b)B distributed the present forces of the vanguards and brigades within each region by the administrative areas. Almost after each of such areas consolidated the partisan brigade, by commander or commissar of which was the secretary of the district committee of the party. As a result by partisan activities was enveloped entire territory of Belorussia, which made it possible to much more operationally break away concepts and measures of the occupational authorities of authorities and more reliably to protect local residents from the Fascist robbery.

The division into districts of partisan forces became possible because of the mass inflow of population in partisans and a sharp increase in connection with this in the number of their vanguards and large units/formations. In turn, it opened/disclosed even wider prospects for an increase in the partisan formations, moreover everywhere, in each area of Belorussia.

A serious effect on the organization of partisan forces had natural conditions. Thus, for instance, absence in the central and southern zone of UkrSSR of vast natural covers did not make it possible to have here until the specific time - thus far was not acquired the necessary experience of struggle - permanent

large/coarse guerilla detachments and large units/formations. The majority of such large units/formations was deployed in the northern zone of the republic where there were many forests, and in the steppe and forest-steppe areas acted in essence the small vanguards (predominantly with strength from 10 to 50 people) and the separate partisan groups ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9609, pp. 516-517. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Large/coarse detachments and large units/formations of Ukrainian partisans appeared in the steppe terrain only in the course of raids, after which they returned to the forest areas to the partisan bases.

The analogous effect of terrain had effect also on organization of partisans of the Kursk, Voronezh, Rostov, Stalingrad regions where acted the small vanguards and the separate groups.

During the definition/determination of the forms of the organization of partisan forces party organs did not allow/assume template/pattern, they proceeded from the concrete/specific/actual situation in each this area, taking into account and generalizing the experience of struggle in order to most effectively solve combat missions in some stage of war.

Thus, in Latvia in summer and in the fall of 1943 for deploying the partisan movement in the northern unit of the republic was used the new form of the organization of partisan forces - system of suborders. On the instruction of CC of KP(b) of Latvia several already acted in the territory of the republic the vanguards directed into the northern areas the small groups of its organizers. They studied these areas, established connection/bond with the local residents and organized with their aid food base for partisan. When this work was completed, the leadership of the vanguards guided into the "mastered" area new groups, until there was created strong/firm nucleus for deploying the partisan movement.

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This suborder with strength to 50 people had demolition men, group of the experimental soldiers, that were becoming then the commanders of subunits, and even headquarters. Actually, this was the guerilla detachment in the miniature whose cadres could organize partisan movement in the area. In the process of an increase in the suborders the "maternal" vanguard exerted them comprehensive aid, and they in the course of time were converted into the independent formations. This system completely itself justified and made it

possible in short periods to widely develop partisan warfare in northern Latvia ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. ^{See} ~~Sm.~~ V. P. Samson. Partisan movement in northern Latvia during the years of the Great Patriotic War, pp. 118-121.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Rapid transition to the new forms of the organization of forces in connection with a change in the situation is visible based on the example to the combat activity of Moldavian partisans. The swift offensive of the Red Army in winter and in the spring of 1944 led to the fact that two large/coarse Moldavian large units/formations proved to be in the liberated territory. Soon front line was stabilized on the line of Dniester river, also, in the northern unit of republic. . The attempts partisan to burst open into the rear of enemy success did not have. In connection with this, taking into account the high density of hostile troops and the absence of vast forests on the territory of the republic occupied, CC of KP(b) of Moldavia made a decision to disband large units/formations and to create the vanguards on 20-30 people. Shortly were organized six vanguards which at the end of July - beginning of August 1944 were successfully neglected/deserted into the rear of enemy by air into the Kishinev, Bender and Kagul' districts ².

FOOTNOTE 2. Archive of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of Moldavia, f. 3280, list 1, bundle 2, un. of storage 32, sheet 60, bundle 6, un. of storage 109, sheet 88; bundle 7, un. of storage 132, sheet 1, 10, 12; un. of storage 133, sheet 5, 7; un. of storage 138, sheet 18, 19, 35, 37, 41, 43, 51, 53. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In spite of great variety in the organization, guerilla detachments and large units/formations by their composition and structure had much in common. Each individual vanguard and large unit/formation they headed commander and, as a rule, commissar, with them there was a headquarters. In the vanguards there were party and Komsomol organizations. In the raiding large units/formations, including important partisan brigades, were created political departments. Commanders had substituents on reconnaissance/intelligence, assistants on the supply, and from 1943 - and substituents on diversionary work. With headquarters were located subunits of communication (company, platoons or the group of connection/bond, radio centers) and headquarters platoons. In many large units/formations and large/coarse vanguards there were their hospitals, repair shops of weaponry and different equipment, platoons of ammunition supply, and also cavalry subunits and subunits of heavy weaponry. In the partisan formations there were separate reconnaissance and diversionary platoons (companies), which were being subordinated directly to deputy commanders on

reconnaissance/intelligence and to sabotages. Large unit/formation encompassed usually several vanguards whose number was variable. However, the vanguard consisted of companies, it seted up a howl or combat groups, dependind on its strength.

A quantity partisan in the vanguards varied from several ten to several hundreds of people, and in the large units/formations - from several hundred to 3-4 thousands. Were encountered larger/coarser formations. Thus, in the 5th Leningrad partisan brigade under the command element of Hero of the Soviet Union K. D. Karitskiy during January 1944 were counted more than 5 thousand people '.

FOOTNOTE '. Party archives of the Leningrad regional committee of CPSU, f. 0-116, list 1, un. of storage 222, sheet 7-8. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Armament of partisans was sufficiently diverse. In the subunits predominated the light weaponry: the light machine guns, submachine guns, rifles, carbines, grenades. In many vanguards and large units/formations there were mortars and heavy mounted machine guns which were reduced into the particular subunits or were located as arms of partisan companies and platoons. Some large units/formations, and sometimes also the vanguards, had available artillery.

Was especially valued by partisans the mineblasting technology which made it possible for them to effectively carry out diversionary activity. Sometimes patriots used in the rear of enemy even tanks, left by military forces in the fields of battles.

Despite the fact that great quantity of weaponry for partisans was possible to capture in combat with the occupationists and many military-technological means they received from the rear of the country, nevertheless in the period of a violent increase in the partisan forces frequently was felt sharp/acute deficiency in the submachine guns, the light and heavy machine guns, in the ammunition and especially in the explosives.

With entire diversity of structure, strength and armament of guerilla detachments and large units/formations their organization was always subordinated to the interests of the successful conduct of the armed struggle. The need for the fast and concealed/latent movements, rapidity of the strikes on the enemy, capability to rapidly disperse and to gather forces in the definite/determined place, ability to act by fine/small groups in the vast territory - all these and many other tactical requirements found their reflection in the organization of partisan formations.

Struggle in the rear of enemy required from the partisan of exceptional concentration and organization, high combat skill, iron staying power/persistency. Therefore in the guerilla detachments, as a rule, was established strict military discipline, which provided for the unquestioning execution of the commands of commanders and commissars. All, who entered into the vanguards, took the oath. In the time free from the combat operations were conducted the exercises on the combat and political training. By the resolution SNK USSR [- Council of People's Commisars USSR] to the most distinguished commanders and commisars of partisan large units/formations were appropriated general ranks. All this contributed to strengthening discipline and increasing the combat efficiency partisan.

3. Leadership of the Communist Party of struggle in the rear of enemy.

During entire war the Communist Party paid considerable attention to leadership of the struggle of the Soviet people in the rear of enemy.

Directive of CC of VKP(b) and SNK USSR of 29 June of 1941, the

resolution by CC of 18 July of 1941. "About the organization struggles in the rear of German military forces" were the basic documents, which determined the wide circle of tasks in the deployment of national struggle in the rear of aggressors. In these documents the party and government indicated the enormous political and military significance of struggle with the occupationists, defined concretely the tasks, confronting the party and Soviet organs of the republics, regions and regions whose territory was occupied by enemy or was located under the threat of occupation.

CC of VKP(b) required that the party heads at the places would personally head work on the organization of the struggle of the Soviet people in the rear of enemy, would exert all efforts/forces to that so that this struggle would acquire wide scope and thereby she served as support to the Red Army, which fights at the front with the German fascism ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16579, sheet 4. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Making the instructions of CC of VKP(b), the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, regional, urban and district party organizations conducted great work on the creation of party underground, formation of guerilla detachments, selection and

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arrangement of command-political cadres and logistic support of
partisan forces.

end section.

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Rapid progress of the Fascist-German armies into the depth of the Soviet country extremely complicated work on organization and deployment of struggle in the rear of enemy. But because of the leadership of VKP(b), the bubbling activity of communists, the patriotism of Soviet people and their limitless faith/belief in the victory all difficulties by this method were overcome. Party organs became the really combat headquarters of the organization of the wide masses of population to the resistance to fascists. Communists and non-party members, men and women, old men and adolescents - everyone gave themselves at the disposal of the party, desiring to make largest possible contribution to the struggle against Fascist invaders. Communists, who proved to be in the territory occupied, formed guerilla detachments, they created in them party organizations, activated/promoted combat activity of partisans and undergrounds.

Prominent role in the deployment of struggle in the rear of the Fascist-German military forces played army communists. After catching

into the encirclement and without having the opportunity to pass front line, the soldiers of the Red Army headed by communists - officers or Privates - whole subunits took part partisan warfare. Being poured into the local guerilla detachments, army communists strengthened in them fighting spirit and discipline. Independent of service rank, they made the most diverse commissions. Possessing remarkable moral and volitional qualities and combat skills, soldier-communists were model in the execution of the combat assignments, they acquired authority in the partisan medium and they were frequently appointed by commanders or commissars of partisan formations.

Sizable assistance to partisan movement and underground rendered the party and Soviet organs of frontal areas. They intensely prepared the cadres of the most varied specialists, formed guerilla detachments, saboteur parties and crossed them through the front line.

Together with the organized underground and the guerilla detachments in the territory occupied spontaneously appeared combat patriotic groups, and frequently into the struggle with the enemy entered even lone persons. These people, overcoming enormous difficulties, persistantly searched for connections/bonds with the party underground and the partisans in order to be poured into the

powerful/thick flow of national struggle against the Fascist enslavers.

The making and development of the struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy rear irrefutably testified about the ideological maturity of Soviet people, the unquestionable authority of the Communist Party and its giant organizational and educational work.

On the deployment of struggle in the rear of the Fascist-German military forces negatively had effect the prolonged absence of uniform center on the leadership of this struggle. True, in the beginning of war during the main political administration of the Red Army, the political administrations of fronts and the political departments of armies were created the departments and branches on the party-political leadership of partisan movement. But they were occupied only by oral and printed propaganda among the population of the territories occupied.

Later with the headquarters of directions/axes, fronts and armies appeared the operational organs in which besides military representatives were included also secretaries of the regional committees of the party of frontal regions. These organs formed guerilla detachments and groups and crossed them through the front line. But their activity was limited to the front area of the enemy

rear and was conducted insufficiently in concord, and leadership of the struggle of the people in the entire territory occupied as before remained separated.

Only during January 1942 with the organization section TsKVKP(b) was formed the operations group into which entered the representatives of the leading party organs of the frontal republics. The creation of this group was space toward reinforcing of the centralization of party leadership by entire patriotic struggle in the rear of enemy.

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The absence of the centralized leadership of partisan warfare in the first months of war was partially completed by the active work of party organs at the places. With CC of CP of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Baltic republics and Moldavia, in the frontal regional committees of VKP(b) of Russian federation were created the operations groups of the party, Soviet and Komsomol workers, which led the activity of underground and partisan movement.

The close connection republican party organs with the party organizations in the rear of enemy, the intimate knowledge by them of situation in the territory occupied, the encouragement/award of wide

initiative and independence of communists in the decision of combat and political missions - all this to a considerable extent removed those organizational gaps/spacings which were at first in the leadership of partisan and underground warfare.

The organizational difficulties, which arose in the first months of war, were the consequence of underestimation by Stalin the threat of the attack of Fascist Germany on our country and ignorings by them the possibility of occupying the Soviet territory. And when the surprise attack of fascists in the USSR became fact, Soviet people proved to be unprepared to the struggle in the rear of enemy, to them it was necessary to overcome improbable difficulties and to bear excess victims on the way to victory.

As early as the 20's, following the instructions of V. I. Lenin about the defense of the socialist fatherland and strengthening of his defensive capacity, the party gave much attention to preparation/training for the possible struggle of the Soviet people in the rear of enemy. Was conducted the accounting of the cadres of Leninist toughening, which passed the great school of underground and partisan struggle in the period of civil war and foreign intervention, were created the bases of logistic support and the depots/dumps of weaponry. The party constantly followed the fact that this preparatory work would satisfy the requirements of time. For

this purpose were taken the measures for an improvement in the ideological-theoretical level and special knowledge of supervisory personnel, was improved armament, were supplemented food and item reserves.

However, in the 30's this important work of the party on strengthening of the defensive capacity of the country ceased. Due to the unjustified political suspiciousness of Stalin the training of personnel for the underground and partisan struggle was stopped. It is more than that, the significant part of those betrayed to the affair of the party of those been partisan and underground workers - together with other leading party, Soviet and military workers - was punished. All this caused to our country sizable loss and hindered/hampered the deployment of the struggle of the Soviet people in the territory occupied.

The important measure of the Communist Party, as it was already said, was creation in 1942. Central, the republican and regional headquarters of partisan movement as the organs of direct operative management of partisan warfare. With the military councils of fronts were operations groups, or representations, for the coordination of operations of partisan forces with the combat operations of the Red Army.

The central headquarters of partisan movement existed until January 1944 and in connection with the liberation of the greater unit of the territory occupied it was disbanded; direct leadership of partisan forces is continued to carry out the party organs of regions and republics, and also the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian headquarters of partisan movement. Enormous ideopolitical and organizational work of TsKVKP(b), the party organizations of the republics and regions brought its fruits: the powerful/thick wave of the patriotic struggle of our people whipped the enemy rear.

In proportion to a quantitative and qualitative increase in the underground organizations and partisan formations, making more active of their combat and political activity, complication of the tasks standing before them, improvement of tactics and ways of the struggle against occupationists more flexible and more purposeful became the party leadership of this struggle. Communists were always inseparably connected with the wide masses of population. In this consisted the force of party leadership.

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The necessary condition for the successful deployment of partisan movement was the many-faceted work of the party

IN PARTISAN KRAYS AND ZONES.



Kolkhoz' members send bread to partisans.

Hay-making time in a partisan kray.

Fresh news about the situation at the front came from the partisan.



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Oath of the
partisan on
the grave of
a dead
comrade.

Memorial
plaque in
the village
of Klichev,
which was
liberated
by partisans
and became
the center
of partisan
action in
the Mogilev-
skaya Oblast'
during the
war years.



organizations of guerilla detachments and large units/formations. In the center of the attention of communists in all stages of struggle there were questions of ideological education the partisan, strengthening of their morale and political awareness and military discipline, observance of constant vigilance, daily improvement of the combat skill and conducting of wide party-political work among the population. The execution of party commissions and combat assignments, the vanguard role of communists in combat situation, the work of stirrers, domestic-material provision and medical service partisan - all this also was located in the field of the view of party organizations. They constantly worried, also, about an increase in their numbers. In the members and the candidates of VKP(b) were accepted best of the best, shown in combat models of personal bravery, discipline, staying power/persistency.

The structure of party organizations depended on the organizational structure of partisan formations.

In the local vanguards there were all-detachment primary party organizations. In many instances with the vanguards were located the underground district committees of the parties, which hence led underground party organizations in the territory of all area. One of the secretaries of district committee was, as a rule, the commissar of the vanguard. It headed here the party-political work and in its

activity was reported before the district committee.

In the brigades were created party bureaus headed by secretary. The composition of bureau was selected at the brigade party conference. In the exceptional cases when conditions did not make it possible to conduct conference the composition of bureau it was selected and he was asserted by the commissar of brigade. Almost always the secretary of Party bureau was simultaneously the substituent of the commissar of brigade from the party-political work.

In the vanguards, which entered the composition of brigades, at the head of party organizations stood the party organizers, who were being selected at the all-detachment party meetings. But in the special subunits (in scouts, miners, horse submachine gunners, executives) were created party groups and were appointed Party group organizers.

Where there were regional underground committees of the party, the work of party organizations in the partisan formations led these regional committees, and in operational sense partisan forces were subordinated to the regional headquarters of partisan movement, which in turn, was the organ of the regional committee of the party. In those places where there was no regional headquarters,

military-operational leadership of combat units was wholly located in the hands of the underground regional committee of the party.

Regional committees supported close connection with CC of the communist parties of the union republics and corresponding headquarters of partisan movement. This structure was formed in the course of struggle in the Ukraine and in Belorussia.

In many regions of Russian federation, and also in near-Baltic republics there were underground district committees of the party, which led the activity of underground and partisan in the limits of several administrative areas.

In the territory of the RSFSR, in the Ukraine, in Belorussia - mainly in the second and third periods of war - acted the large/coarse raiding large units/formations. They were not subordinated to local party organs, but were guided by instructions TsK of the republican communist parties and corresponding headquarters of partisan movement. It is understandable that in such large units/formations the structure of party organizations, form and the methods of their work had their characteristics which escape/ensued from the exterritoriality of these large units/formations and character of the combat tasks performed by them. In the party organizations of the raiding large units/formations were

inherent some functions of district party organs.

The activity of commanders and political workers of guerilla detachments and large units/formations was discussed at party bureau or general/common/total party meetings with the carrying out of compulsory/necessary appraisal. This increased the personal responsibility of workers for the assigned work.

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If one or another commander or political worker did not answer their designation/purpose, the party organizations solicited before the highest echelons of command about his replacement.

Direct leadership of the work of party organizations and political organs of the vanguards and large units/formations exercised commissars, clothed by great confidence and wide authorizations. They remained in the partisan formations even after was abolished the institute of commissars in the armed forces. Being the representatives of the Communist Party in the numerous army partisan, they virtually put into practice the line of the party. Commissars not only headed entire party-political work in the vanguards and the large units/formations, but also actively they participated in development and putting into practice of the plans of

combat operations. On the level with the commanders they bore responsibility for the execution of the combat missions, which stood before the formations, for the morale and political awareness of subunits, for the provision partisan by weaponry, by ammunition, by explosives, by rations, by drugs, etc. The commissars of large units/formations and brigades used great authority among partisan and population. Because of the institute of commissars it was possible to successfully overcome numerous difficulties, which escape/ensued from the uniqueness of situation and characteristics of struggle in the rear of enemy.

Strong by spirit and by their ideological training, party organizations were that skeleton in the partisan formations around which were joined nonpartisan masses. Beginning from the commander, commissar and ending with the private soldier, communist-partisans were a model in the fulfillment of combat duty, the example to high political consciousness and moral staying power/persistency. By their selfless devotion to the work of the party and people, by impregnable will victory, by constant readiness for the self-sacrifice they served as an example for all rest partisan and even more greatly they fortified the authority of the party among the population.

Party organizations paid particular attention to leadership of komsomol. The daily work of Komsomol members was directed toward that

in order to multiply its numbers, to increase ideological level and combat toughening of the fiefs of VLKSM [- All-Union Lenin Young Communist League], their vanguard role among the young people, involving composure, they transferred all difficulties of partisan life. They completed numerous heroic feats. Many youths and girls gave their life in the struggle with the fascism, but their immortal works will always serve as an example for the young people of present and future generations.

The Party spirit-Komsomol layer in the guerilla detachments was sufficiently considerable. Thus, of 107132 partisans, that acted in the territory of Moscow, Leningrad, Kalinin, Tula, Orel, Kursk, Voronezh and Rostovskaya provinces in the first period of war, 18.5 percent were communists 13.2 percent - by Komsomol members ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No. 16048, 16051, 16054, 16057, 16058, 16063, 16064, 16067. ENDFOOTNOTE.

According to the data on 25 August, 1943, in six large/coarse partisan large units/formations of the Ukraine under the command element of S. A. Kovpak, A. F. Fedorov, A. N. Saburov, S. A. Oleksenko, V. A. Begmy and N. M. Taranushchenko the total strength of 10130 people were more than 20 percent of communists ¹.

FOOTNOTE 3. Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of the Ukraine, ^{collection} 1, list 9a, file 52, sheet 238-239. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the entire war among the partisan of the Ukraine communists were counted 14875 people, either about 7 percent, and Komsomol members - 26 thousand people, or almost 12 percent 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16052; N. I. Suprunenko. Ukraine in the Great Patriotic War, pp. 362. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the numbers of Belorussian ones partisan were located 9 percent of communists and more than 19 percent of Komsomol members 4.

FOOTNOTE 4. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 15905. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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The inestimable significance in the struggle of the Soviet people in the rear of enemy had party underground. Creating it,

TsKVKP(b) required of the local party organizations untiring performance of the party-political work in the masses, to join them for the active struggle against the Fascist-German occupationists.

On the appeal of the party in all seized by enemy territories of the Russian federation, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Karelian-Finnish republics was developed the untiring activity of the thoroughly conspired, underground party organizations. Their work led 26 secretaries of regional committees, 539 secretaries of city committees and district committees of the party ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, pp. 565. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Communist-underground workers raised Soviet people to the struggle with the occupational regime, mobilized them for the disruption/separation of the measures of Fascist authorities, joined the laborers into the combat groups and the vanguards, armed them, organized partisan movement. They exerted partisans aid by rations and by clothing, created for them the concealed/latent reserves, Weyls reconnaissance/intelligence, they worried about the casualties and the families of the killed patriots.

Great scope work on the creation of party underground achieved in the Russian federation. Heroically struggled under the most difficult conditions of occupation the underground workers of Leningrad region. In the second period of war here there were 2 neighborhood underground committees of the party and 11 inter-district party centers. Under the leadership only of the six inter-region centers worked 140 underground party and Komsomol organizations even 258 antifascist organizations and the groups, in which there were 1500 communists, 2500 Komsomol members and non-party members ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16058, sheet 1-2.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In Smolenskaya Oblast during the years of war in the underground acted 28 district committees of the party, 16 district committees of komsomol even 141 primary party organization. Smolensk regional committee VKP(b) directed for organizing of underground work and partisan movement in the region of 3060 people. In all in the Smolensk underground were counted about 5 thousand people ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid, inv. No 16053, sheet 5-7. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Actively was conducted work in the territory of Kalinin district occupied. In the third period of war here functioned 12 underground district committees even 77 primary party organizations into which entered more than 3 thousand communists. Under their leadership they developed energetic activity of 12 district committees of komsomol and 76 Komsomol organizations '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid, inv. NO 16064, sheet 4. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In Orel region intensely were created the vanguards of the local self defense, which composed the reserve of Orel ones partisan. In the territory of region worked 26 neighborhood, urban and district underground committees VKP(b), 13 neighborhood and urban committees of VLKSM '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid, inv. No 16068, sheet 4. ENDFOOTNOTE.

A great contribution to the struggle with the occupationists made communists and other occupied regions and the RSFSR territories.

Much attention to the creation of underground was given TsKKP(b)U. In the first months of war in the Ukraine were organized 23 regional committees, where entered 115 leading workers, 67 city committees, 564 district committees even 4316 primary party

organizations. More than 26500 communists cemented the numbers of champion-underground workers '.

FOOTNOTE '. Party archives of the institute of the history of the party with CC of CP of the Ukraine, f. 1, list 9a, file 52, sheet 1-3. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The struggle of Ukrainian patriots against the Fascist aggressors headed experienced workers of the party, including secretaries of the underground regional committees: Dnepropetrovsk - N. I. Stashkov, Kharkov - I. I. Bakulin, Kirovograd - P. K. Vasilina and M. M. Skirda, Chernigov - A. F. Fedorov and N. N. Popudrenko. Poltava - S. F. Kondratenko, Zhitomir - G. I. Shelushkov, Kamenets-Podol'skiy - S. A. Oleksenko, Donets - S. M. Shchetinin, Luganskogo - I. M. Yakovenko and S. Ye. Stetsenko, Sumy - P. F. Kumanek, Rovenskogo - V. A. Begm, Nikolayevskogo - V. A. Lyagin, secretaries and the members of the urban and district committees of Kiev V. I. Kudryashov, A. S. Pirogovskiy and many others.

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As the loyal assistant to Ukrainian communists appeared komsomol. Young patriots created 9 their underground regional committees, 213 city committees also of district committees '.

FOOTNOTE 1. See Soviet partisans, pp. 305. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With immortal glory covered themselves the underground Komsomol organizations, led by S. G. Matekin, S. V. Skoblov and B. I. Orlov (Donetskaya), N. M. Reshetnyak (Krivorozhskaya), by P. I. Grebenyuk (Druzhkovskaya), Ya. P. Batyuk (Nezhinskaya), and also the Komsomol organizations of many other regions, cities and Ukraine areas.

Under the severe conditions was conducted the work in the western regions of the Ukraine where the Soviet regime was established/installed not long before the war. But, in spite of difficulty, for communists it was possible to create in L'vov the actively operating underground organizations which used the support of the local population. Underground workers spread their influence on the surrounding areas and played important role in the deployment of the struggle of the laborers not only of the L'vov, but also Ternopol'sk and Drohobych regions.

Sizable difficulties in the organization of underground were also in Belorussia. But because of the efforts/forces TsKKP(b)b here in the years of Hitler occupation actively acted 9 underground regional committees, 174 urban and district the committee of the

party, 184 territorial underground party organizations and 1113 primary organizations in the partisan formations.

At the head of party organs stood the experienced workers of the party. Prominent role among them played the secretary of Minsk underground regional committee V. I. Kozlov, Gomel regional committee - I. P. Kozhar, Polesian - F. M. Yazykovich and I. D. Vetrov, Pinsk - A. Ye. Kleshchev^{VILEYSK} - I. F. Klimov, Baranovichskogo - V. Ye. Chernishev et al.

Party committees daily led partisan formations and underground. For the rendering of practical aid to the local party organizations into the rear of enemy periodically left the secretaries TsKKP(b)B N. Ye. Avkhimovich and I. P. Ganenko. More than 25 thousand communists headed the struggle of the Belorussian people in the rear of enemy ².

FOOTNOTE ². See the Communist Party in the period of the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - 1945). Documents and materials. M. Gospolitizdat, 1961, pp. 593. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The inestimable aid in this is exerted them more than 73-thousand army of Komsomol members ².

FOOTNOTE ². See Soviet partisans, pp. 521. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Komsomol members showed the models of valor and courage. Many of them were found on command-political work. The majorities of the secretaries of the underground regional and district committees of komsomol were simultaneously the substituents of commissar on the komsomol in the large units/formations, the brigades or the vanguards. Among them the secretary of Minsk regional committee Ye. N. Konoplin, Vileyskogo - P. M. Masherov, Gomel - A. D. Rudak and many others were the present leaders of young people. The central committee of the komsomol of Belorussia in every way possible helped Komsomol organizations in their works. The secretary of TsKLKSM of Belorussia M. V. Zimyanin repeatedly left into the rear of enemy, and secretaries K. T. Mazurov and F. A. Surganov constantly they were found on the territory occupied and actively conducted underground work.

Of extremely great difficulties felt party underground in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Soviet regime here existed before the war of altogether only year. The remainders/residues of exploiter classes, nationalists, who was the clerks of bourgeois state, reactionary clergy, supplying hope for the restoration of capitalism and to the return of the lost privileges, willingly went into the service to the Hitlerites and their skins/leathers they climbed there

in order to help them to put on on the laborers the yoke of Fascist servitude. The fine/small urban bourgeoisie and the average/mean peasantry, intimidated by the unprecedented terror, did not show/render the at first decisive resistance to occupationists.

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However, workers, peasant-poor people and progressive-minded intelligentsia actively were included/connected in the struggle with the enslavers. This struggle, headed by communists, gradually increased, thus far not Stull mass. It cost the Soviet patriots of the great victims which were brought into the name of the socialist native land, into the name of the victory over the enemy.

The central committees of the Communist Parties of the Baltic republics knew how to create in their territories the net/system of underground organizations. In Latvian SSR there were 2 regional (Vidzemska and Latgalian) and 3 county party committees, and also 11 urban and county Komsomol and antifascist committees and organizations. In them it was counted 654 people, including of 168 Komsomol members ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16066, sheet 5-7.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In Lithuanian SSR were created the northern and southern regional committees of CP of Lithuania, 20 county and urban committees of the party. There were also numerous Komsomol organizations and groups in Vilnyus, Kaunas, Shvenchensk, Utensk and Raseynsk districts which helped well the local party organizations in the diversionary activity and in the work among the population '.

FOOTNOTE '. See questions of the history of the Communist Party of Lithuania. Collector/collection of the article. Vilnyus, Gospolitnauchizdat, 1961, pp. 157, 160. ENDFOOTNOTE. "

Underground party committees leaned in their work on the party organizations of guerilla detachments, on conspired underground party-nuclei or groups and on communist-lone persons. Headed by experience, using the confidence of the people communists, these organs became the really combat headquarters on the mobilization of the wide masses of population to the struggle against the Hitler occupationists and their participants. Those district committees of the parties which were located with the partisan formations, was exercised simultaneous leadership both by the partisans and by underground.

Underground party organizations had their characteristic features. In Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Simferopol' and other cities, in the Baltic republics, in Leningrad, Kalinin, Orel regions and in other places they differed from each other in terms of the forms of conspiracy, in terms of quantitative composition, system of leadership and in terms of character of their activity. Thus, for instance, of Kiev the urban underground committee of the party consisted of 8 people. In the case of its failure/dip/trough was by spare an underground city committee of 4 people. Were also organized 9 basic and 9 spare district committees. They led 37 underground party and Komsomol organizations, created in the enterprises and in the installations of city '.

FOOTNOTE '. See P. Dubina. In the years of heavy tests. Kiev regional book- newspaper publishing house, 1962, pp. 32-33. ENDFOOTNOTE.

According to the same productive-territorial principle, but with some organizational characteristics, was constructed underground party organization in Minsk. "For the basis was accepted cell headed by secretary, into which entered not more than five people, who worked in this enterprise or in the installation. Cells were completely conspired from each other. The work of cells they guided and coordinated bunched (zonal) committees. Through their members and the specially chosen messengers they supported with the cells

constant organizational-operational connection/bond.

For the leadership by bunched committees were created the underground urban district committees of the party. At the head of party organization stood townspeople underground center - the committee KP(b)B, which built the practical work of all underground according to the functional (branch) principle" '.

FOOTNOTE '. The "communist of Belorussia", 1960, No 6, pp. 75.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Somewhat simpler the structure of underground was in Simferopol' where around the urban committee of the party during February 1944 were united more than 400 patriots, organized into 42 underground groups '.

FOOTNOTE '. See I. Kozlov. In the Crimean underground. Simferopol', Krymizdat, 1958, pp. 306. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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However, in spite of the diversity of structure, almost all underground party organizations had a leading party center and a net/system of the party and underground groups subordinated to them

or cells, constructed according to the territorial or productive-territorial principle.

The constant pursuits of Hitler counterintelligence, Fascist atrocities and mass terror required of the underground workers of skillful conspiracy, that also was provided by the organizational formation of the underground, which consisted in essence of fine/small groups. However, this did not completely eliminate the existence of the larger/coarser underground organizations, which contained ten and hundreds of people, selfless which were struggling with the fascism, especially in such great cities as Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, etc.

Mastery of art of conspiracy, penetration into all teams of occupational apparatus for the purpose to decompose it from the inside, skillful use of the least legal possibilities for the strikes/shocks on the enemy ensured the success of the struggle of the fearless heroes of underground.

Hitlerites entire force of their terror brought down to the underground workers who constantly were located under the threat of death. For Gestapo men it was possible to inflict heavy strikes/shocks on the party underground. In this them helped the spies and traitors. Grippped patriots underwent in the torture

chambers of the Gestapo terrible tortures, after which them they annihilated. Enormous loss in the first period of war carried the underground workers of the RSFSR, Ukraine and Belorussia. Especially suffered the underground of Kiev, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Minsk and other cities. Several large/coarse failures/dips/troughs led to the fact that of 23 underground regional committees of the party, created in the Ukraine, actively acted only 14. Were arrested and brutally tortured the secretaries of regional committees I. I. Bakulin, N. I. Stashkov, P. K. Vasilina, V. A. Lyagin, V. A. Molodtsov, the members of the Kiev city committee V. I. Kudryashov, A. S. Pirogovskiy. The party and the people highly evaluated their heroism, after appropriating to majority of them the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union. Many patriots - communists and non-party members - were tortured in the Minsk Gestapo. The loyal sons of the Leninist party perished, but to the latter/last minute they maintained the faith/belief in the victory over the enemy.

Communist-underground workers gave many examples of firm courage and passionate love for the native land. So, in its dying letter, transmitted from the torture chambers of the Gestapo, V. I. Kudryashov wrote: "In the casemates of the Gestapo I kept itself as it becomes communist. I will die with the solid faith/belief, that the liberation from the hateful fascism will be soon and that the Soviet people will celebrate victory" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Outlines of the history of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Publ. 2. Kiev, Gospolitizdat of UkrSSR, 1964, pp. 519.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

But here are words from the letter of I. Kh. Kozlov's communist-mincanin, which it wrote not long before the execution to its comrades at liberty: "real patriot the one who boldly looks into the eyes of death. It is not must tears. It is not must desperation. Our blood will not be spilled by gift... to live ! To live ! This is how it wants ! Yes not to hide for the back of comrades, but with the weaponry in the hands, in the daily struggle with the hateful jackals - in this entire/all charm and entire/all goal and its freedom - in this entire/all charm of life, this at the given moment/factor the ideal of life" ².

FOOTNOTE ². Speak the killed heroes, pp. 242-243. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In spite of the unprecedented terror, occupationists did not succeed in routing underground. In the place of many heroes, who fell in the cruel struggle from the enemy, stopped new courageous soldiers, and the struggle of Soviet people continued with the an even greater scope.

The activity of underground party organizations was many-sided. Considerable labor/work they invested in the creation of guerilla detachments and into the leadership of their combat works. They sent into the vanguards new replenishments of the communists, Komsomol members, and non-party members.

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Much attention was given to reconnaissance/intelligence which was conducted in the interests partisan and by red Army. Thousands of scouts obtained the valuable information about the work of transport, strength and the armament of Hitler military forces, which follow to the front, about the local garrisons and the airfields of enemy, about the character of his defensive installations and the much by friend.

Great significance attached the underground workers of diversionary activity. They organized sabotage in the enterprises, spoiled armament, brokedown power system management, arranged downfall on the railroads, etc. Furthermore, together with the partisans and the population they seriously impeded the use of economic riches of the seized territory for the needs of Fascist

Germany.

Numerous glorious deeds under the leadership of communists completed underground Komsomol members. About this, in particular, testifies this example from the life of Riga komsomol, on 13 November, 1943, Hitler authorities in the Latvia occupied they planned to conduct over Domska area in Riga meeting-demonstration of devotion to Fascist Germany. At the meeting was assembled to come forward Reich commissar Loze. Urban underground organization decided to tear away this undertaking of occupationists and to charge to the head of the Riga city committee of komsomol to Imant Sudmalis, subsequently Hero of the Soviet Union, and also to his combat comrades to explode during the meeting the platform on which had to be located the representatives of occupational authorities together with the hangman to rod. Komsomol members, being liable life, at night laid mine under platform and it they thoroughly disguised. Explosion occurred to half-hour earlier. Hitlerites remained whole, but meeting was stripped. For courageous patriots it was possible to be hidden ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See Soviet partisans, pp. 589-590. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, underground workers - communists, Komsomol members, non-party members - carried on the most decisive and most active

struggle with the occupationists. After mobilizing and joining masses to the resistance to enemy, carrying out reconnaissance/intelligence and sabotages, they rendered inestimable aid of the Red Army and partisans.

Together with the leadership of the armed struggle of the people in the rear of enemy the party attached enormous significance to mass-political work among the population of the areas occupied. With it close dealt party organizations partisan and underground workers. They arranged reports, lectures especially widely conducted the group and individual conversations, which were being escorted/tracked by the reading of the newspapers and leaflets. Mass political idling was conducted continuously, it was concrete/specific/actual and purposeful, ideological saturated, it carried combat, offensive character.

Special radio sets from the mainland systematically transmitted for the population and partisan information about the international and internal situation, about the course of military activities at the fronts, about the heroic feats of the toilers of industry and agriculture, about bravery and valor of the soldiers of the Red Army and partisan. The same radio sets transmitted materials for the newspapers, which were being printed in the rear of enemy.

Wide scope acquired printed agitation and propaganda. Literature for populating the territory occupied produced on the instruction TsKVKP(b) all large/coarse publishing houses of the USSR and union republics, and also publishing house of the armed forces. Hundreds of millions of newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets were extended during the years of war in the rear of enemy. This literature was delivered with the aid of the aviation or through the "gates" in the front line. In 1941 the aviation only of civil air fleet discarded into the rear of the enemy of 393 tons of leaflets ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18792, sheet 2. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Much literature for the areas occupied published the main political administration of the Red Army. From August 1941 until in the spring of 1944 Voenizdat produced 526750 thousand thematic leaflets, including the name "News from the Soviet native land" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 18798, sheet 4. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the Ukraine within the time of war over the instruction

TsKKP(b)U it was published and extended in the areas occupied of approximately 400 mln. leaflets, newspapers, pamphlets ².

FOOTNOTE ². See the outlines of the history of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, pp. 513. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The content of literature spread in the rear of enemy was diverse. In it was exposed Hitler fascism, were revealed its beast appearance, refuted the deceitful propaganda of aggressors. The newspapers, pamphlets and leaflets engaged Soviet people in the selfless struggle with the occupationists, explained that it is necessary to make in order to help the Red Army in the rout of the Fascist-German hordes: not to give to the enemy of rest not at night, to annihilate his manpower and supplies, to destroy communications. In this literature it was told about the heroic working days of the Soviet people, about the combat successes of our armed forces, about the heroes of front and rear, partisan and underground warfare.

In the territory occupied underground regional committees and district committees, guerilla detachments and large units/formations produced many newspapers and leaflets which were printed on the typographical machine tools, seized in enemy or obtained from the mainland. In one Belorussia alone were published more than 160 underground newspapers. Underground party organizations and the

partisans of Leningrad region for two and one-half of year extended among the population of approximately 3 mln. copies of the urban and district newspapers, more than 2 mln. different addresses/circulations and appeals. In 1942 our industry produced portable printing house for partisan and underground workers. Entire/all printing house was placed in the locker which could be carried after the shoulders '.

FOOTNOTE '. See Bolshevik newspapers in the rear of enemy. Leningrad newspaper-magazine and book publishing house, 1946 pp. 7-8.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the newspapers and the leaflets, which were being published in the territory occupied, was contained much local material, were named the surnames of enemies - different gauleiters, commandants, burgomasters, chastiser-gestapo, discussion centered on their criminal activity, they were stamped with the shame of traitor. The newspapers and the leaflets told about the feats of Soviet patriots, who did not stint on their life into the name of the native land.

Was spread literature by the different methods. In this work great aid to partisans and underground workers rendered the population. Through the special agent-spreaders, who had countersunk postal lockers, through partisan-stirrers and scouts and by many

other routes/paths of the newspaper and leaflet they reached the readers, they were transmitted from the hands to the hands.

Particular activity in this exhibited children, women and people of elderly age. They penetrated with the literature even the locations of German garrisons and in camp for the prisoners of war '.

FOOTNOTE '. See ibid. pp. 9. ENDFOOTNOTE.

To powerful national movement in the territory occupied proved to be constant support. In the Soviet rear were formed the guerilla detachments and saboteur parties. Their almost entire personnel passed short-term preparation/training on technology and tactics of partisan warfare. At first this preparation/training was conducted during 5-7, and that 2-3 days. Then, after the creation of special schools, the training centers and areas, the periods of preparation/training increased to 15-30 days, and in certain cases to two months; in this case were prepared miner-demolition men, radio operators-cypher clerks, party workers. From the transportation to the rear of enemy, and also the transportation of separate diversionary and reconnaissance parties continued entire war. In all within the time of war special schools educational areas produced for partisan tens of thousands of different specialists. Furthermore, to the rear of enemy were directed the numerous instructors, who helped the command element of guerilla detachments and large units/formations to fix training the necessary technical cadres.

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**КЛЯНЕМСЯ МСТИТЬ
ГИТЛЕРОВСКИМ ЗАХВАТЧИКАМ !**

1943 poster. Artists N. Zhukov, V. Klimashin.
KEY: (1) We vow to avenge the Nazi invaders!

1010



WITH THE PARTISANS. Artist N. Zhukov.

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The party gave also much attention to material and technical supply partisan and underground workers. They received weaponry, ammunition, explosives, explosive devices/appliances, drugs, and sometimes supply and clothing/uniform. For this purpose was used the aviation. In the years of war our military and civil/civilian pilots completed more than 109 thousand missions into the rear of enemy¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No. 18792, 1. 9. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The comprehensive provision of our partisan and underground workers sharply raised the effectiveness of their activities, gave to them the possibility to bring to occupationists great irreplaceable losses and to render essential assistance of the Red Army in the rout of the Fascist-German aggressors.

The armed struggle partisan and underground, headed by the Communist Party, played important role in the rout by the fascist of Germany and forever it entered into the history of the Soviet people

as the bright certificate of its selflessness and patriotism, revealed with the defense of the socialist fatherland.

Partisans and underground workers, with the active assistance of the population of the temporarily occupied territories, brought to fascists enormous loss. The partisans only of Leningrad region in 32 months of struggle in the German rear destroyed more than 104 thousand hostile soldiers and officers, annihilated much combat materiel, derailed 1106 echelons with the military forces and the cargoes², exploded 1381 bridges on the rail, main and dirt roads, destroyed 1704 kilometers of the lines of communications, undermined 326 different depots/dumps³.

FOOTNOTE ². Party archives of the Leningrad regional committee of CPSU, f. 0-116. of pub. 1, SV 28, un. khr 225, l. 24.

³. See battle for Leningrad. 1941-1944. M., Voenizdat, 1964, p. 565.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

On the count the partisan of the Ukraine in the years of war - about 465 thousand killed and wounded Hitlerites, 467 routed garrisons and headquarters of enemy, the almost 5 thousand downfall of echelons⁴.

FOOTNOTE 4. Party archives of TsK KP of the Ukraine, f. 62, pub. 1, un. khr 1. 11. 140, 141. ENDFOOTNOTE.

According to the data of the Belorussian headquarters of partisan movement, in three years - from June 1941 through June 1944 - the partisans of Belorussia rendered inoperable of approximately half million of Hitler occupationists and their accomplices, derailed 11128 hostile trains, undermined and annihilated 18700 motor vehicles, they shot down and burned on the airfields 305 German aircraft, they lined 1355 tanks also of armored vehicles, annihilated many guns and depots/dumps³.

FOOTNOTE 5. See unsubdued Belorussia. M., Voenizdat, 1963, p. 11. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In all in the territory occupied partisans and underground workers annihilated, wounded and captivated one-and-a-half million Hitler soldiers and officers, the clerks of occupational apparatus and their accomplices from a number of traitors. They produced more than 18 thousand downfall of hostile trains. Diversionary activity partisan on the railroads at times came to nothing work of Fascist transport and it did not make it possible for Hitlerites to fix uninterrupted military transportation.

After depositing on enemy human and material losses, upsetting the operation of his transport, partisans pinned down large/coarse police forces and guard units of the enemy, and also the considerable number of regular military forces. Hostile military forces, which acted against partisan, from summer 1942 comprised on the average of approximately 10 percent of all land forces of Fascist Germany, which were being located on the Soviet-German front'.

FOOTNOTE '. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No. 17936, p. 954.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The situation in the rear of aggressors was formed such, which in the first period of war already became obvious: found Fascist sand bar to the partisan stone. Randomly Hitler Generals, after clashing with the powerful/thick partisan movement in the territory of the USSR occupied, addressed about the "illegality" of this struggle, about its "illegality", about the fact that this allegedly "war not according to the rules/handspikes".

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But by them whether, who from the beginning also to the end violated all laws and customs of war, to speak about this ! The patriotic war

of the Soviet people, one of manifestations of which is the patriotic struggle of Soviet people in the rear of enemy, therefore it entered into the history as great, that this were the valid, sacred war for the honor, the freedom and the independence of our socialist native land, war for the rescue of humanity from the threat of Fascist servitude. The methods and means, with the aid of which was conducted this war, were completely legal and legitimate.

By entire its noble/precious patriotic activity in the rear of the Fascist-German armies our people entered the bright page into the history of the Great Patriotic War. The Communist Party and the Soviet government highly evaluated services partisan and champions of underground before the native land. More than 184 thousand people were rewarded with orders and medals of the USSR. The rank of Hero of the Soviet Union obtained 190 people, and the commanders of partisan large units/formations S. A. Kovpak and A. F. Fedorov were awarded this honor twice.

The experience of war showed that the successful conduct of partisan warfare would be impossible without the patriotism of all Soviet people and wise leadership of the Communist Party. Furthermore, enormous significance had operative management of this struggle from the side of the headquarters of partisan movement, provision of partisan forces with all with necessary, and also their

high politico-moral state and combat skill.

Struggle in the rear of the Fascist-German military forces clearly showed that to heroism, to courage and the staying power/persistency of Soviet people there is no limit. By their selfless activities they laid fear at the occupationists and helped our valiant armed forces to rout Hitler aggressors. This struggle showed also, is how deep and indomitable was the faith/belief of the Soviet people in the victory of our just cause, to what extent was great and was his support, exerted to partisans and to underground workers. In all this was revealed the patriotism of Soviet people on that occupied by the enemy of territory.

The struggle of Soviet people in the rear of the Fascist-German aggressors is the convincing certificate of the fact that the national masses, united around the Communist Party, deeply realized the liberating goals of the Great Patriotic War and by entire their selfless by activity they contributed to the victory over Hitler Germany.

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Chapter Seven.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

I. Foreign policy of the USSR on the eve Great Patriotic War.

In the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union important role played its Leninist foreign policy. It in many respects contributed to the achievement of our victory. In turn, the victory of the USSR above the Fascist aggressors prepared the new successes of Soviet foreign policy and earned by it sympathies of hundreds of millions of people in all countries.

The international situation, in which was begun the Second World War, radically it differed from the situation, which gave rise to the First World War. Basic difference consisting in the fact that capitalism ceased to be the all-encompassing world system. The fact that on the earth/ground now there was more powerfully a socialist state, which untiringly struggled for the preservation of peace, it had world-wide historical significance. International relations felt the beneficial effect of the Soviet Union. The course of events

confirmed the correctness of V. I. Lenin's words about the fact that "our peaceful policy approves the huge majority of the population of the earth/ground"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 30, p. 365. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The peaceful policy of the USSR escape/ensued from the very essence of socialist order. Beginning with 1917 our party it invariably adhered to the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of two opposite public systems.

However, in the period, which preceded the Second World War, the correlation of the forces of socialism and capitalism, forces of peace and war was formed not in favor of the peoples. Great Soviet power, although it had available already enormous power, was lonely in the capitalist encirclement. Besides it to the route/path of socialism arose only one country - the Mongolian People's Republic. This correlation of forces extremely impeded the struggle for peace. but meanwhile an increase in the fascism in the capitalist countries created the real danger of war. International working class was divider by the right leaders of social-democracy, it was weakened by the reformist illusions which mastered its significant part.

The foreign Communist Parties were also too weak so as to overcome the forces of war and aggression. In many countries the vote of the proletariat was damped by fascism, and working movement is suppressed.

At the beginning of the Second World War the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples achieved narrower than the high stage of development. But nevertheless the under-developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America with all their resources still remained the important reserve of imperialism and we could not incline scale to the side of the world.

As soon as arose the threat of Fascist aggression, the government of the USSR concentrated its efforts/forces during the organization of the resistance to it. As the effective means. Soviet government proposed to create collective security system. Basis it had to become close cooperation between the great European powers - USSR, England and France with the support of the United States of America. If the efficient collective security system, proposed by Soviet government, was created, Hitlerites and their allies would not be decided to the unleashing of war.

However, the consistent efforts/forces of Soviet state, directed toward the creation of collective security system, did not lead to the positive results. The reason for this was the unwillingness of western powers to establish/install cooperation with the socialist country for the combined struggle against aggression. To the policy of the collective safety the ruling circles of London, Paris and Washington preferred the policy of agreement with the fascism. Hence - the actual support by them of Fascist intervention in Spain, the American law about the neutrality, which indicated under those conditions the encouragement/award of Hitler aggressors. Hence - active complicity of western powers to the armament of Hitler Germany, remilitarization of Rhine region, the captures of Austria. Culmination point the policy of agreement with the aggressors achieved at the Munich conference in 1938.

The same course of the USA, England and France adhered to with respect to the aggressive activities of Japan and Italy. Entire/all their political line was directed toward the disruption/separation of the organization of the collective resistance to aggressors. Specifically, the absence of the cooperation of western powers with the USSR was one of the most important reasons, which allowed Fascist states to unleash the Second World War.

The reactionary ruling circles of the western countries searched

for solidarities with the imperialistic grouping hostile to them on the ground of general/common/total hatred for the communism. Their anticommunism, unwillingness to cooperate with the USSR and the tendency to set to it Fascist aggressors impeded the acceptance of efficient measures for preservation of peace. The hatred of the reactionary bourgeoisie of the USA, England, France for the communism seriously prevented the prevention of Fascist aggression.

But if peaceful forces could not stave off war, then for the advocates of the Munich policy could not use contradictions between the capitalist world and the socialist country, in order to direct Fascist aggression completely against the USSR. The tendency of the Munichites to solve due to the Soviet Union the international contradictions, which were strained in the thirties within the capitalist system, was not carried out. Imperialistic contradictions proved to be sharper/more acute and it is deeper than thought the Munichites. However, the Soviet country, although it could not stave off war, became by that time sufficient strong in order to foil the plans of the western powers: its power repulsed in Hitlerites hunting to begin war from the attack in the USSR. Fascist Germany rushed first to those enemies who due to their class limitedness and myopia rejected defensive alliance with the USSR.

Soviet government because of the correct policy and the tactics

avoided the involvement of our country in the war in the extremely unfavorable situation of 1939. If then the USSR was drawn in into the war, it it would be necessary to conduct immediately on two fronts: not only in the West, but also in the Far East, since actually in the summer of 1939 already occurred military actions against Japanese aggressors, who attacked on MNR by which the Soviet Union arrived to the aid.

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This war our state would wage in the state of diplomatic insulation, without the allies. England, France and USA refused in that period to go together with the USSR. Under such conditions Soviet diplomacy, on the basis of the Leninist principles, successfully used the substantiated fears of the Fascist aggressors before the power of the USSR. After agreeing to conclude with Germany nonaggression pact, Soviet government staved off danger of war threatened to our country to two fronts without the allies and ensured with it preservation of peace still almost for two years.

This was the important success of Soviet foreign policy. In situation 1941 when the USSR underwent attack, it already could rely on the appearance of allies. By that time England fought with Germany and it was interested in becoming the military ally of the USSR, from

what it earlier deviated. the USA, true, yet did not fight. But contradictions between them and Japan, and also Germany so were strained that the agreement with these aggressive powers became is almost impossible. Japanese militarists already directly threatened the United States, and to deviate from the struggle against Fascist aggression was for America in the summer of 1941 considerably more difficult than into 1939. Through several months as a result of the attack of Japan in the USA their participation in the Second World War became the achieved fact.

Thus, the prolongation of the world up to 1941 freed the USSR from the political insulation. The Great Patriotic War against the Fascist aggressors our country conducted in the composition of powerful/thick anti-Hitlerite coalition, into which together with it entered the strongest powers of the capitalist world. In practice was carried out cooperation for the purpose of the collective resistance to aggressor, what the Soviet Union strove even before the war.

But this were not confined to the successes of our foreign policy. During April 1941 Japan proved to be forced to sign with the Soviet Union pact about the neutrality¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See "Pravda", on 14 April 1941. ENDFOOTNOTE.

True, the neutrality of Japan was unstable and unreliable. Japanese imperialists threatened us with attack, they flagrantly violated pact. But to invade to the territory of the USSR they decided neither in 1941 nor later.

Reason to that was the total change in the international situation in East Asia, which advanced in 1939-1941. Great significance had also an increase of Japanese-American contradictions and the deployment of Japanese aggression in the area of the South seas: here Japanese imperialists expected to receive extraction with the much smaller expenditure of forces, rather than in the war with the Soviet Union. Exerted the restrictive influence and the serious lesson, obtained by Japanese military forces in Khalkhin-Gol. It clearly showed Japanese militarists, what danger presents for them attack in the Soviet Union.

Thus, second success of Soviet foreign policy, achieved as a result of the delay of the entrance of the USSR into the war, there was the provision of the world in the Far East.

By the third great success of our foreign policy of on the eve war, that contributed to the victory over the enemy, was recombination with the Soviet Union of the western regions of Belorussia and Ukraine, and also Baltic republics and Bessarabia. In

these areas was eliminated the oppression of capital and foreign imperialism. Happened the hopes of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples - to live in the uniform Soviet republics: UkrSSR [Ukrainian SSR] and BSSR. The peoples of the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia, Baltic States and Bessarabia accustomed themselves to the construction of new society. The military significance of their recombination with the Soviet Union consisting in the fact that the departure lines for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of Germany and its allies proved to be moved aside far to the West. Because of this the attack of German military forces on the USSR in the summer of 1941 it were begun not from the river Narva, i.e., in immediate proximity to Leningrad, but from the boundaries of eastern Prussia, not of the vicinities of Minsk in the shortest direction/axis through Smolensk in Moscow, but from the line of river Neman.

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The fourth success of foreign policy of the USSR consisted in the fact that our country gained time for further strengthening of its defensive capacity. The Soviet Union obtained additionally almost two years, during which was a great deal done for strengthening of the industrial base of the country.

It can seem that the delay of the involvement of the USSR in the war had the negative sides: during 1940 Hitler Germany broke France and eliminated in Western Europe all fronts on which was conducted the armed struggle against it. From now on, besides partisan, on the continent of Europe actually remained only one army, capable of conducting military actions against Germany, the army of the Soviet Union.

However, in actuality the possibility of struggle against Fascist aggression in the alliance with France for our country was absent, in spite of Franco-Soviet treaty 1935. In 1939 France wholly it passed into the fairway of the Munich policy, and this confirmed the course of our negotiations with England and France in the summer of 1939. Consequently, the simultaneous conduct of struggle against Fascist Germany on east - Soviet and on West - English-French fronts was excluded as a result of the Munich policy of western powers. Their treachery with respect to Czechoslovakia and the complete passivity with which the English-French armed forces met the rout of union Poland, they again showed that France into 1939 on the favor of its rulers could not be actual ally even for the country, connected with it with allied contractual relations.

The bourgeois states of Europe dearly paid for the rejection of the cooperation of the USSR. The anticommunism of the dominant

classes cost the peoples of the horrors of Fascist occupation, flows of the blood, inhuman tortures in the Hitler concentration camps, mass murders, hunger and destruction.

England was one of the countries, which the anticommunism of the Munichites placed on the territory of precipice. After leading to the disruption/separation of cooperation with the USSR into 1939, when strong/firm antifascist alliance - be it it is created - could stave off war, the policy of anticommunism was the reason of the defeat of English military forces at the Western Front. Specifically, it led Englishmen to dunkirk, to the aerial bombings of their cities, to the enormous economic losses. For France this extremely reactionary policy and rejection connected with it of the cooperation with the USSR cost still more expensive - damage/defeat, the Fascist-German occupation, destruction, national humiliation and disgrace. To the United States the policy of anticommunism also managed not cheaply. Japan would not decide to attack in America, if the alliance between the USSR and the western powers against the aggressors was created not in the course of war, even before it was begun. Catastrophe in Pearl Harbor was the indirect consequence of anti-Communist psychosis, rejection of the cooperation with the USSR.

Soviet foreign policy on the eve of the Second World War proposed to western states entire diverse arsenal of the diplomatic

methods worked out by it of the preservation of peace and resistance to the aggressor: the idea of the collective safety, the treaties about the mutual assistance, the wide international discussion of the ways of struggle with aggression at the appropriate conferences. But all this was rejected. The hatred of the dominant classes for the communism took precedence, and this laid to aggressor route/path and to the unleashing of world war.

Signing by the Soviet government on 23 August of 1939 nonaggression pacts with Germany was in that situation singularly correct step. However, preservation of peace for two more years, provided to the Soviet country because of the conclusion of this pact, was not in the proper measure used for the completion/replenishment of gaps/spacings in the military training, for increasing the defense power of the USSR.

It would be incorrect to consider that Stalin erred relative to the aggressive intentions of Hitler faction.

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In the known publication "falsifiers of history", that left into 1948, it is said: "consisting a Soviet-German pact of nonaggression during August 1939, the Soviet Union not for the minute it doubted,

that sooner or later Hitler will attack in the USSR"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Falsifiers of history (historical reference). M., Gospolitizdat, 1948, p. 56. ENDFOOTNOTE.

But Stalin allowed rough miscalculation in the definition/determination of the periods of Fascist attack. Being it is informed about the feverish preparations of Hitler Germany, in particular about the mass military transportation and the concentration of enormous forces at the Soviet boundary, it most of all worried about not yielding to the provocation and not giving to the German fascists of any occasion for the attack on our country. However, Stalin, as the head of government, did not ensure timely preparation for the reflection by the fascist of aggression. But meanwhile Hitler already 21 July 1940 gave order about the preparation of attack in the Soviet Union.

2. Foreign policy of the USSR in the struggle for creation and strengthening of antifascist coalition.

After Hitler Germany perfidiously gave to the USSR, all efforts/forces of the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, were concentrated on one great goal - achievement the victories over the Fascist aggressors. On the service to this sacred work the party

completely placed foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

The development of foreign policy of our state during the years of the Great Patriotic War to a certain extent depended on the course of military activities. The thus far Red Army retreated, and then, after attaining the break/fracture in the war, it began to free/release the territory occupied with enemy, in the center of the attention of foreign policy of the USSR it stood the problem of developing of antifascist coalition and fastest opening of the second front. These problems prevailed in the first and second periods of war, i.e., prior to the end of 1943.

But in proportion to enemy suffered damages/defeats, was freed/released from the aggressors the Soviet earth/ground and before the Red Army arose the problem of liberating the countries of Europe enslaved by fascism, to the first place were advanced other foreign policy problems. Their number included general/common/total problems of future peaceful settlement, questions about relation to the enslaved countries, freed/released from the Fascist dominion, and to the satellite countries, breaking with Hitler Germany. From the basic foreign policy problems, which stood from the very beginning of war, completely maintained fundamental importance the activity of Soviet diplomacy in strengthening of antifascist coalition.

However, from the first days of war Soviet foreign policy set as its goal to ensure the most favorable international conditions for the fastest rout of Hitler Fascist bloc and shortening of the periods of war. It was necessary, on one hand, to create wide antifascist front and constantly to worry about its strengthening, with another - to weaken/attenuate and to cleave hostile camp.

Struggle against the fascism dictated the imperative need for the education/formation of the antifascist coalition of the states, which were being at war with the aggressors. The creation of wide antifascist front required the association/unification of the democratic forces of all countries and their mobilization against the Fascist tyranny. Cooperation between the USSR, England and USA was established/installed as a result of the fact that all three powers participated in the war against the general/common/total and very dangerous enemy - Fascist Germany. England already fought with it up to the moment/factor of the entrance of the USSR into the armed struggle, and the USA was actually the ally of England; and although in the summer of their 1941 entrances into the war still and it did not take place, was objectively it already decided beforehand.

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In USA and England there were influential reactionary forces,

which did not desire cooperation with the USSR even under war time against the general/common/total enemy, who threatened the independence of England and the vital interests of the USA. These representatives of extreme imperialistic reaction preferred to cooperation with the socialist state humiliating transaction with the enemy. For Soviet foreign policy it was necessary to expend numerous efforts/forces in the struggle against the reactionary circles, which were attempting to tear away Anglo-Soviet-American cooperation. The dangerous concepts of these political circles were exposed and could not be carried out, since too powerful/thick became the gust of the national masses, which required decisive struggle with the fascism. The peoples persistently strove creation and every possible strengthening of alliance with the land of the Soviets, correctly perceiving in this alliance the reliable means of bringing/finishing struggle with the fascism to the victorious end.

It is not possible to discount and the extreme aggravation of imperialistic contradictions. The tendency of Hitler Germany and militarist Japan toward world supremacy threatened not only with the laborer of England, USA and other countries which in the case of the victory of aggressive powers would undergo Fascist enslavement. In the claims of Fascist aggressors to the world dominion was hidden great threat, also, for most ruling classes of both great imperialistic powers. The correlation of forces was such, that

England and USA themselves would not manage the Fascist states. and this understood well the governments of Churchill and Roosevelt. This is why they could not deviate from the education/formation and the support to antifascist coalition with the participation of the Soviet Union. The tendency to be located its great-power situation, enormous colonies, and also imperialistic interests and positions repossessed within the English and American bourgeoisie above the hatred for the communism. Moreover, of the government of Churchill and Roosevelt they understood, that the peoples, enriched by political experience, will not allow under the wartime conditions of the repetition of Munich. Working class and the progressive unit of the intelligentsia they imperatively required cooperation with SSR, and their requirements found sympathy in the large strata of the people.

The failures of the Red Army at the fronts in the first months of war impeded creation and strengthening of coalition. The retreat of Soviet military forces made it possible for the enemies of the USSR to prophesy to it the unavoidable death under the strikes/shocks of fascists, to sow the doubts of the value of the USSR as ally. All this extremely complicated the activity of Soviet diplomacy. But already the victory of the Red Army in the environs of Moscow corrected situation.

If we speak about the juridical and diplomatic formulation of

antifascist coalition, then it occurred into several stages. The basic documents which designed the creation of coalition, were the Soviet-English agreement of 12 July of 1941 about the combined operations in the war against Germany ¹, the declaration of the Soviet government of 24 September of 1941 ² and the declaration of the United Nations of 1 January 1942³.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the period of patriotic war. Documents and materials. Vol. 1. M, Gospolitizdat, 1946, pp. 130-132.

². See *ibid.* pp. 163-166.

³. See *ibid.* p. 194. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Soviet-English treaty of 26 May 1942 about the alliance in the war against Hitler Germany and its participant in Europe and about the cooperation after war⁴, the Soviet-American agreement "About the principles, applied to the mutual aid in waging of war against aggression"⁵ fastened the cooperation of the USSR with its allies from the capitalist world in the struggle against the aggressors.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. See *ibid.* pp. 270-273.

3. See *ibid.* pp/ 278-2828. ENDFOOTNOTE.

It is characteristic that the USA so did not conclude with the USSR the formal agreement about the alliance.

Within the antifascist coalition there were contradictions.

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Trying to in every possible way join this combat alliance, Soviet foreign policy systematically gave the resistance to all those reactionary elements which attempted to undermine cooperation between the USSR and its allies. Our foreign policy attempted to give coalition maximum effectiveness and effectiveness in the struggle against Germany. By the best and most complete expression of this could become fast discovery/opening England and USA the second front in Western Europe. This not only would lighten to the Soviet people the difficult and bloody struggle against the general/common/total enemy whose basic burden from the summer of 1941 fell in the USSR, but also would considerably accelerate the termination of war in entire world, drew nearer the victory over the fascism and the release of humanity from Fascist barbarism.

Struggle for opening of the second front was for Soviet foreign

policy work to the highest degree difficult. The leading circles of western powers, first of all Churchill and its adherents, strove as it is possible to longer wage war against Germany and its allies by the hands of the USSR. In this case Churchill and its supporters expected to kill immediately even not two, but three birds: first, to take care their own forces: in the second place, to sharply weaken/attenuate the Soviet country; thirdly, to break Germany - the most dangerous imperialistic rival of England - mainly by the forces of the Soviet Union.

Before the war Munich circles, the representatives of extreme reaction in England and USA, tried to provoke a German-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet war. In this case themselves they expected to remain aside, until the USSR, Germany and Japan elapse by the blood. From the policy of the Munichites of the politician of governments Roosevelt and Churchill it differed in terms of the fact that they forced were to take part in the war against Fascist Germany. However, in the English and American ruling circles predominated the workers, who wanted to fight by predominantly strange hands, and, first of all, by the hands of the Soviet people.

In this consisted the main meaning of the efforts/forces to maximally tighten opening the second front in Western Europe. Allies did not stop even before a straight/direct violation of the

obligations accepted to themselves. In 1942 second front was not discovered in spite of the statements, made in the Soviet-English and in the Soviet-American communique of 12 June 1942¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the period of patriotic war, Vol. 1 p. 283-285. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the memorandum of 10 June 1942 English government formally was obligated before the government of the USSR in the case of the impossibility to discover the second front in France into 1942 to without fail discover it into 1943. To this obligation was connected the U.S. Government in the combined message of the President of the USA and the prime minister of Great Britain to the chairman of SNK USSR [Council of People's Commisars USSR] at the end of January 1943².

FOOTNOTE ². See the correspondence of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the USA and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, Vol. 1, p. 84-85. ENDFOOTNOTE.

But given by England and USA word was in a most rough manner disrupted: the second front and into 1943 was not discovered.

Together with the straight/direct violation and the cynical rejection of our allies of the fulfillment of its obligations, for foreign policy of the Soviet Union it was necessary to clash also from the different kind by turning maneuvers. Instead of undertaking of military activities in France, i.e., in that theater of the Second World War where lay the most important strategic directions, which lead from the West to the heart of Fascist Germany, our allies planned/glided to land military forces in different secondary theaters: on the Balkans, in North Africa, in Italy. However, in one of these areas it was not possible not only to bring to Germany lethal strike/shock, but also it is any essential to lighten the situation of the Red Army, which carried on a bloody struggle with the main forces of the Fascist-German military forces. Then on the Balkans it was possible our army to anticipate/lead - to prevent by it from freeing the Balkan countries and from having time to its arrival to mount that, in spite of the will of the peoples, the reactionary regimes, dependent on England and USA. Specifically, by this was explained the particular interest of Churchill in the landing of union military forces in the Balkan peninsula.

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But in order to understand the insignificance of combat in North Africa, it suffices to say that at the end 1942 and into 1943 there

there was all not more than 10 Fascist divisions, while at their Soviet-German front there were 197.

For the second front the allies attempted even to give out their air operations which at entire their significance could not it goes without saying distract from the Soviet-German front of one infantry and tank division of Germans. So/such unfounded were the statements of the official representatives of USA and England about a deficiency in the forces for opening of the second front. Not only into 1943, but also by 1942 forces in them it was sufficient.

The government of the USSR exposed the intrigues of reactionary circles and insisted on the execution by our allies of its obligations about opening of the second front in France. It depended with on the unanimous support of all Soviet people, which persistently required from England and USA more active participation in the general/common/total struggle. Soviet government depended also on the support to the wide democratic public of the USA, England and other countries which strove from the great powers of the West of the making more active of struggle against the fascism and required the fastest opening of the second front in the main theater operations. Insisting on the discovery/opening by the allies of the second front in France, Soviet foreign policy thereby spoke in favor of strengthening and activating the antifascist coalition.

In the course of war, in proportion to the build-up/growth of the successes of the Red Army, the position of allies began to be changed. In London and Washington appeared the fears that USSR one will manage Germany, will attain complete victory and will free entire Europe from the Hitler aggressors without the participation of the armed forces of England and USA. This prospect completely did not arrange ruling circles of both these powers. They feared, that they will not have time to arrive to the aid to the reactionary forces of the countries of the Fascist coalition and countries, occupied by Germany. In view of this government USA and England undertook finally the organization of the second front - in France. At the conference of the heads of three governments in Teheran the USA and England again was obligated to discover the second front. This time they fulfilled (with the delay of one month) their obligation: during June 1944 took place the landing of the Anglo-American military forces in coast of North France.

The by this time Soviet Union already less needed military aid from the side of USA and England. The victory over Germany and its allies in Europe was already decided beforehand by the powerful/thick strikes/shocks of our heroic armed forces. At the beginning 1944 final outcome of war not in whom was caused doubts. One cannot fail

to agree with West German historian Ricker, who stated that "Germany lost the Second World War even before the invasion of the West"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. K Ricker. Ein Mann verliert einen Weltkrieg. Frankfurt am Main, 1955, p 11. ENDFOOTNOTE.

After opening of the second front the main burden of war as before continued to bear on itself the Soviet Union. Nevertheless antifascist coalition, and especially Soviet-American and Soviet-English cooperation, played important role in the achievement of victory. Opening the second front, although considerably overdue, made it possible to somewhat shorten the periods of war. Coalition pinned down the forces of Japan, interfering with to it to come forward against the USSR in the Far East. Participating in the coalition, the USSR had the opportunity to receive from USA and England certain economic and military aid. But the significance of deliveries to the USA and by England armaments, military materials and rations to the Soviet Union on no account was decisive. During the years of war even American leading circles themselves examined these deliveries only as small compensation from the side of the United States for that enormous contribution which introduced the Soviet Union into the general/common/total struggle with the German fascism. The secretary of state of the USA E. Stettinius wrote; "for entire this aid Russians already paid by the price which does not

yield to measurement in the dollars or the tons. This millions of Nazi soldiers, killed or undertaken into the captivity by Russians:.

Russians paid with high price for the victories which they gained, protecting the earth/ground of its native land from Germany.

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But they caused irreparable loss to Nazi military vehicle. ~~A~~ And this will considerably shorten war!'.¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Edward R Stettinius. Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory. New York, 1944, pp. 228-229. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Widely also the known following statement of Roosevelt: "... we on considered never that the deliveries on the lend-lease were main factor in the damage/defeat of Germany. This attained the soldiers of the Red Army which gave its life and blood in the struggle with the general/common/total enemy"².

FOOTNOTE ². Robert Sherwood. Roosevelt and Hopkins by the eyes of eyewitness, Vol. 2, p. 613. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With what dissonance to these authoritative acknowledgements

resound the statements of some statesmen of the USA after the Second World War! Thus, B. Baruch reached the absurd confirmation/assertion, as if without the lend-lease the Red Army "could not banish Germans from Russia"³.

FOOTNOTE ³. American Military Policy. Its development since 1775. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1955, p 432. ENDFOOTNOTE.

A question about the second front was the very serious object/subject of the disagreements between the USSR and its allies during the war. In the first and second periods of the Great Patriotic War it composed one of the most important problems of Soviet foreign policy.

There were in the antifascist coalition other disagreements. They concerned the war aims. In proportion to the forces of enemy ran low and approached victory, this question acquired increasing significance. In the third period of patriotic war it occupied one of the central places in relations between the allies.

For the USSR the war aims consisted in completely routing of fascism, clearing from the aggressors the temporarily occupied Soviet areas, freeing from the Fascist oppression the peoples of Europe and granting to them the possibility by itself to solve the problems of

state and public construction. The Soviet Union, thus, consistently struggled for that so that the war would carry valid character. He wanted to establish/install after war the enduring/permanent democratic world, based on the law/right of each people to independently determine its fate.

Another goal of the USSR in the war was the complete exclusion of the possibility of repeating new aggression from the side of Germany. The provision of conditions necessary for this was one of the basic problems of Soviet foreign policy. Negotiations on this question played very great role in relations between the allies and they conducted, in particular, at the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences of the heads of three governments. Soviet government was considered necessary radically to annihilate fascism, to conduct consistent demilitarization and democratization of Germany.

The goals of capitalist participants in the anti-Hitlerite coalition radically differed from the goals of the Soviet Union, true, the Governments of USA and England also wanted to break Germany, but in this case they thought only about the weakening it as their imperialistic rival. They nurtured the projects of the agrarianization of Germany, which indicated misery, emigration or extinction for millions of Germans who could not feed themselves in the case of the considerable shortening of German industry. In London

and Washington were built also the plans of the separation of Germany.

The imperialistic circles of USA and England attempted to use a war for the dissemination of their effect on the larger possible number of countries in all units of the light/world. The Governments of USA and England strove setting the Anglo-American world supremacy. These were the purely imperialistic goals which the Soviet Union decisively rejected.

Difference for the purpose of war explains many other disagreements between the USSR and its western allies. Sharp disagreements, in particular, were in a question about how relate to the countries, freed/released from the Fascist occupationists. Earlier anything such disagreements appeared with respect to of Poland, Italy and France, then - Yugoslavia. Soviet government insisted on the granting to the peoples, spared from the Fascist yoke, complete freedom of the independent democratic development.

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When in Poland in the course of antifascist struggle was established national democratic authority headed by the Polish committee of national liberation and was assembled Rada's Krayova Narodova (democratic representative meeting), then the government of the USSR without delay recognized new authority. Soviet command element transmitted to Polish organs all functions of civil/civilian administration in Poland out of the zone of direct military action of the Red Army.

The Governments of USA and England took other entirely position. They did not want liberated Poland to decide its own fate, and they insisted on authority in Poland transmitted to the reactionary emigrant government compromised in the eyes of the Polish people. This would indicate far going interference in the internal affairs of Poland, to what Soviet government always objected.

Approximately/exemplarily so brought themselves the Anglo-American occupational authorities in Italy (AMGOT) '.

FOOTNOTE 1. Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory - union military government in the territories occupied. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, from the first days of their settlement in the country they in every way possible attempted to stave off basic democratic conversions in the life of the Italian people. The policy of USA and England was directed toward the transformation of Italy into the dependent, secondary country and toward the support in it of reactionary elements. The Anglo-American authorities did not stop before straight/direct interference in the internal affairs of Italy, trying to suppress progressive forces objectionable to them.

The Soviet Union in its policy with respect to Italy pursued only the goals of the eradication of fascism and rendering aid to the Italian people in its struggle for the complete restoration/reduction of national independence, for the democratic freedoms.

Almost the same situation was created also in France. USA and England attempted to strengthen their positions in the French colonies. They wanted and itself France to go in the fairway of their policy. In relations with this country the USA and England also took part of interference in its internal affairs. The USA for a long time

openly disregarded the organization of De Gaulle. They attempted to place at the head of the French movement of the resistance of their people. but the government of Great Britain, although is recognized De Gaulle, made efforts/forces to subordinate to its his effect. However, the Soviet government searched for no advantages for itself in relations with France. It wanted one: to maximally ensure the participation of France in the war with Germany and to help the French people to again occupy the fitting place in the postwar world.

In the memorandum of 7 July, 1941, entrusted to Narkomindel by English ambassador, it was said that the government of Great Britain "would prove to be in the constrained situation, if Soviet government went in the attitude of De Gaulle to the great degree of acknowledgement, than that, to which went the government of its majesty" ².

FOOTNOTE ². Franco-Soviet relations during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Documents and materials. M., Gospolitizdat, 1959, page 511-512. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In response to this statement the Soviet Union, taking into account the need for alliance with England under the conditions when at the Soviet-German front continued the offensive of Fascist hordes, forced was to establish/install her relations with the organization of De

Gaulle on the same juridical basis, as England. On 26 September, 1941, the government of the USSR recognized De Gaulle "as the head of all free Frenchmen wherever they were located" and expressed readiness to show/render the patriots of France comprehensive aid assistance in the general/common/total struggle with Hitler Germany and its allies. Soviet government it stated about its solid determination after the rout of fascism "to ensure the complete restoration/reduction of independence and sublimity of France" 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. Ibid., page 47. ENDFOOTNOTE.

De Gaulle at that time in essence correctly evaluated international situation.

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He understood, that for liberation and reactivation of France to it was important the support of the Soviet Union, that both countries were interested in not allowing the repetition of German aggression. De Gaulle did not build illusions in the attitude of the Anglo-American allies. Speaking radio on 20 January, 1942, he spoke: "to the general/common/total misfortune, too frequently for the length of centuries on the route/path of the Franco-Russian alliance they were encountered jamming/interference or opposition, generated

by intrigues or incomprehension. Nevertheless the need for this alliance stops obvious during each new rotation history ..." ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Franco-Soviet relations during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, page 56. ENDFOOTNOTE.


The representative of the national committee of free France in the USSR Garro, developing this thought of De Gaulle, stated during March 1942 that "a question about the liberation of France is solved in the Russian fields of battles" ².

FOOTNOTE ². *Ibid* There, page 64. ENDFOOTNOTE.

On 3 June, 1943, was created the French committee of national liberation (FKNO). USA and England did not hurry with its acknowledgement, about which testifies the memorandum of the embassy of Great Britain to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR of 15 June, 1943, ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. See *Ibid*. page 151-152. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In contrast to England and USA the Soviet Union decisively supported the immediate acknowledgement FKNO, since the postponement of this question "in any way cannot serve the facilitation of the



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

work of the cohesion of anti-Hitlerite French forces" '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid., page 164. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In connection with this position, occupied with Soviet government, against it was undertaken present diplomatic attack from the side of England and USA. However, on 26 August, 1943, acknowledgement of FKNO took place. In this case the USSR recognized it as the temporary/time government de facto '.

FOOTNOTE '. See ibid. page 195. ENDFOOTNOTE.

and Great Britain and the USA - only as the organ, which operates "in the limits of the definite/determined limitations during the war" '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid., page 190, 191. ENDFOOTNOTE.

At the conference, which passed to Moscow 19-30 December of 1943, delegations of USA and England were opposed to the inclusion of the representatives of FKNO into the European consultative commission (EKK). In this case to wine they attempted to load in the USSR, although the precisely Soviet Union introduced proposition to include/connect France as the fourth member of EKK. Most vividly the position of the USSR for this question was reflected in the

memorandum of Soviet government, directed to Great Britain and USA during October 1944. In it it was proposed "now to invite French representative to take part in the discussion of German works in the commission", "to examine a question about the constant participation of France in the affairs of European commission" '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid., page 318. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the note was contained the first official acknowledgement of the law/right of France to the participation in all European works on the level concerning other three great powers.

Disregarding FKNO, USA and England at the end 1943 - the beginning of 1944 advanced the plan of setting in the territory of France occupational regime '.

FOOTNOTE '. See *Ibid.* page 27. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Against this decisively came forward Soviet government.

In the period decisive for the fates of French nation only the Soviet Union supported with FKNO, about which repeatedly declared its heads. Especially important was the position of our country in connection with the acknowledgement of FKNO as the temporary/time

government. Without this France could not participate together with other great powers in the decision of questions of the postwar construction of the world. In spite of the fact that FKNO of already 2 July 1944 it accepted the designation of the temporary/time Government of the French republic, USA and England they continued to disregard this fact.

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And only under the pressure by the USSR these powers on 23 October, 1944, jointly with the Soviet Union stated about the acknowledgement of French temporary/time government. Our state showed/rendered important support to the French people at the moment of the creation of the United Nations, after proposing to grant to France the place of the constant of the Security Council ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See Franco-Soviet relations during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, page 299. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Combined struggle with the German fascism led France and USSR to the conclusion on 10 December, 1944, of the treaty about the alliance and the mutual aid. This was the first treaty, signed by the temporary/time government of France with another great power on the equal conditions. It could become basis for the development of

amicable free- Soviet attitudes and important team in the postwar European collective security system.

The heads of the temporary/time government of France in that period with the entire force emphasized the vital significance of Franco-Soviet alliance for both countries. In this connection De Gaulle spoke: "for France and Russia to be united - it means to be strong, to be disconnected - means to be located in the danger. Actually/really, this is - indisputable condition from the point of view of geographical situation, experience and common sense" ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid., page 395. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The presence in Italy and France of the enormous contingents of the Anglo-American military forces to the extreme impeded violent raising of democratic movement begun in these countries, directed toward deep social changes. But the most violent forms military interference of allies in the internal life of the peoples assumed in Greece. Here work reached the bloody repression by the British armed forces of democratic movement.

English and American governments insisted also on interference in the internal affairs of the peoples of Yugoslavia. They strove so that the Soviet government would show/render influence on the

Yugoslavian partisan movement for the purpose to subordinate to its Mikhaylovich, who sullied itself by cooperation with the Fascist occupationists. In other words, they wanted to subordinate partisan to the emigrant royal government, member of which was this traitor. But the USSR and in Yugoslavia to the government, member of which was this traitor. But the USSR and in Yugoslavia supported the people's rule, which arose in the course of struggle against the fascism, while the Governments of USA and England they supported king and emigrant reaction, attempting to introduce its representatives into the composition of Tito's government.

By itself of course Soviet government energetically impeded the Anglo-American interference in the internal affairs of the Yugoslavian people. Its policy here consisted in showing/rendering of entire possible by aid to the partisans of Yugoslavia, who were heroically fighting against the German and Italian aggressors.

Soviet government solidly and consistently adhered to the principle of nonintervention into the works of other states - be it the countries, earned by Fascist Germany, or its former satellites, freed by the military forces of anti-Hitlerite coalition. It pursued in these countries only one goal - their liberation from the fascism, complete liquidation of Fascist regimes and all Fascist organizations, restoration/reduction of democratic freedoms.

Contemporary imperialistic propaganda, striving substitute the traces of the Anglo-American policy of interference in the strange affairs and imposing to the peoples of reactionary emigrant regimes, brings down fault from the sick head to the healthy. The defects, which suffered the policy of USA and England, she wants to ascribe to the Soviet Union, charging it with interference in the works of the liberated peoples. In this case is allowed/assumed the rough distortion of the historical truth: the USSR not only itself did not interfere in the internal life of the freed/released countries, but also everything were done in order not to allow such an interference from the side of other powers, in whatever form it was planned.

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Specifically, on this basis occurred in the USSR conflicts with USA and England, that were concerning relations with Poland, France, Yugoslavia and other countries.

Soviet state, invariably approaching strengthening of antifascist coalition, made sizable efforts/forces mutually to settle with its allies of the disagreements, which appeared in the course of combined struggle against the Fascist bloc. And here the government

of the USSR in the necessary cases compromised - in the interests of more successful cooperation with other participants in the antifascist coalition.

The goal of strengthening anti-Hitlerite coalition was not easy. This process is passed to the highest degree contradictorily and it is complicated. Thus far Germany remained still strong enemy, durability/permanence of antifascist coalition was provided. Although in the bourgeois circles of USA and England were numerous supporters of transaction with the German fascism, the governments of Roosevelt and Churchill did not go to this. They understood, that this transaction with strong Germany would lead only to their considerable weakening as large/coarse imperialistic powers. But the Governments of USA and England were felt neither the least wish to give to Hitler their colonies or to act with their interests and positions in any nor unit of the light/world.

Situation changed after German imperialism carried several destructive damages/defeats under the strikes/shocks of the Red Army. In proportion to its weakening in the course of war Germany ceased to be for the American and English dominant classes the same dangerous imperialistic rival such as it was earlier. At the same time among these circles grew unrest in connection with an increase in the revolutionary moods in the national masses of the liberated countries

and raising of Communist movement. This is why in the ruling circles of USA and England toward the end of the war was increased tendency toward the agreement with Germany.

Great hopes were laid, in particular, for "people on 20 July" in Germany, which, after maintaining reactionary regime, but after removing the figure of Hitler having become offensive, could, it seemed, considerably lighten the realization of this agreement. By this is explained the appearance of a known command of Churchill about the retention/preservation/maintaining of captured German weaponry for the German military forces in the case of their use against the USSR. All this speaks, that the imperialistic strivings of our allies created at the end of the war serious threat for durability/permanence of antifascist coalition. However, Fascist Germany break-up renounced in that stage all routes/paths to the transaction between both Anglo-Saxon powers and German government.

The realization of the concepts, directed for the disintegration of coalition, impeded increased might and authority of Soviet state. Not latter/last role here played also the tendency of the ruling circles of USA and American command element to ensure participation by the USSR in the war against Japan. Perceptible assistance Soviet foreign policy in its struggle for the retention/preservation/maintaining of unity of anti-Hitlerite

coalition rendered peaceful forces in entire world. They did not allow/assume the rotation of the governments of imperialistic states - the enemies of Germany - from the war against it to the separate agreement with it. Democratic forces in the capitalist countries required the maintenance of the closest cooperation in the USSR. They understood well, as much means for the entire antifascist coalition the fruitful cooperation of the United States of America, Great Britain and France with the USSR.

In proportion to approached the victory over the common enemy, coalition, in the opinion of Soviet government, it had to fasten cooperation in questions of the creation of the reliable guarantees of lasting peace and prevention of new aggression. Our government developed the valid program of the postwar construction of the world.

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This program provided for:

- liberation of the peoples of Europe from Fascist ~~IGA~~^{yoke} and assistance by them in the reconstruction of their national states;

- granting to the liberated peoples of the complete law/right to solve the problem about the state construction of its countries;

- severe punishment of Fascist military criminals;
- creation of the necessary conditions, which eliminate any possibility of new aggression from the side of Germany;
- provision of prolonged economic, political and cultural cooperation of the peoples of Europe.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew how in the struggle of extremely contradictory forces and tendencies to ensure the retention/preservation/maintaining anti-Hitlerite coalition up to the very end of the war. This was the great success of foreign policy of the USSR, and at the same time great gain for all humanity: the transaction of USA and England with the German fascism even in the latter/last stage of war could extremely hinder/hamper achieving its liberating goals and halt the release of the peoples from Fascist barbarism.

3. Disintegration of the bloc of Fascist states. Policy of the Soviet Union with respect to the neutral countries.

The victories of the Soviet Armed Forces convinced even the

ruling circles of Hitler satellites of the hopelessness of further struggle on the side of Fascist Germany. The defeats of German military forces gave rise to in these states tendency toward the output/yield from the war and the explosion/burst with Germany. Sizable role here played the confidence of the working masses of the countries union with Germany in the fact that the explosion/burst with the Fascist bloc will ensure with them the widest prospects for free democratic development. This strengthened their forces and is made itself struggle against the local reactionary regimes, which entered the alliance with Hitlerism, even more decisive.

The confidence of national masses in the success of its struggle was drawn in the heroic activities and the victories of the Red Army. Consistent conducting by the Soviet Union of the political course, penetrated by the high, humane ideals of the Communist Party, to a considerable extent contributed to the rout of fascism. The peoples knew that the policy of our state - this is the policy of liberation from Fascist IGA. It proceeded from the acknowledgement after each people of law/right to the self-determination, to the sovereign decision of all questions of its political and public construction. Because of this foreign policy of the USSR was one of the important levers, which facilitate the decomposition/expansion of aggressive Fascist bloc.

When the Red Army began to approach boundaries of states - the satellites of Fascist Germany, the government of the USSR officially proclaimed one of the basic and constant principles of its foreign policy - complete nonintervention into the internal affairs of other peoples.

The victory of the Red Army above the Fascist-German military forces on the southern wing of front during August 1944 caused the possibility of victorious national uprisings in Rumania and Bulgaria. Fascist regimes in these countries were deposed by the people. In Finland extreme reactionary-pro-Fascist proved to be forced to transmit authority to the more moderate elements. Somewhat later the same happened also in Hungary. Both there and here this occurred under the influence of two factors: the successes of the armed forces of the USSR and pressure of national masses.

For the purpose of the fastest achievement of victory and termination of war it was necessary to attain the disintegration of Fascist bloc and political insulation of Germany.

Foreign policy of Soviet state was directed toward that in order to accelerate the surrender of the satellites of Germany. Deeply humane terms of truce which declared the government of the USSR, finally opened eyes to the national masses of country-satellites.

MILITARY COOPERATION OF THE ARMIES OF THE ANTI-NAZI COALITION.



Meeting of Soviet and American troops on Elba (April 1945).
 KEY: Toasting the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American military union
 over the Nazi German invaders!

Soldiers of the 2nd Belorussian front talk with soldiers serving in
 the English Army (May 1945).



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
THE BROTHER NATIONS HELP THE RED ARMY T. OPS.

Soldiers of the Polish Forces join battle with the Red Army against the common enemy.




Cavalry units of the Bulgarian Army are sent to the front (October 1944).

Tanks of the 1st Rumanian Army on the road. This army participated in battles with Nazi German troops (December 1944).



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BERLIN CONFERENCE OF COUNTRIES OF THE ANTI-NAZI COALITION.



Potsdam. Room where conference took place.

At the round table.




THE PEOPLE'S COURT.



The Soviet representative makes charges.

Overall view of room in which the sessions of the International Military Tribunal were held in Nuremberg.



Infamous end. The main war criminals at the bar.



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It it became clear that the Soviet Union rejects any policy of vengeance and, disregarding of all crimes, committed by fascists in its territory, bears liberation to the peoples even of those countries which fought against the USSR. The Leninist principles of foreign policy of the USSR served as the guarantee of retention/preservation/maintaining states - the former allies of Germany - the completeness of national sovereignty and independence at the termination of war.

Under the effect of the Soviet Union of the condition for armistice agreements with the former allies of Hitler Germany in essence they provided the independence of the peoples, the respect for their state sovereignty, nonintervention to the internal affairs of these countries. Because of the USSR the armistice agreements opened new page in the history of diplomacy, being an example of humane relation to those conquered. These agreements laid on them only minimum burdens, only those which were absolutely necessary for the success of the still continuing struggle against the main aggressor - Fascist Germany.

Consisting armistice agreements, the USSR attempted to prevent USA and England from converting these agreements into the gun of the imperialistic enslavement of the conquered countries. USA and England constantly was added/interfered in the works of these countries, frequently openly violating terms of truce. This occurred in spite of the Soviet Union.

Soviet government, formulating the conditions for armistice agreements, proceeded of the tendency to rather derive the states, which were the satellites of Germany, from the war, to free their populating peoples from Fascist supremacy and to contribute thereby to the fastest termination of bloodshed, liberation of Europe and to achievement of universal peace. Realizing of these goals of Soviet foreign policy was facilitated by the activities of the foremost strata of the laborers of those countries which were the allies of Germany. National masses removed there from the authority of the supporters of alliance with Germany, demolished the pro-Fascist elements, which were attempting to tighten war. The government of the USSR greeted the voluntary entrance of the former participants in the German bloc into the antifascist coalition.

Reactionary circles in the conquered states counted on contradictions within the anti-Hitlerite coalition - between the USSR and the capitalist powers. But events showed entire groundlessness of

these hopes in conditions of the continuing war against Germany and Japan and enormous raising of antifascist liberation movement.

As soon as the countries, liberated by the Red Army, they ceased to be direct area of operation, entire leadership of matters of the civil/civilian control Soviet command element transmitted into the hands of national authorities. This corresponded to the constant principle of foreign policy of the USSR - to nonintervention into the internal affairs of other states. So it was in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, etc. Subsequently, after the termination of war, the government of the USSR within the shortest period derived friendly troops from Norway, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, from Danish island Bornholm. In Poland, and also in Rumania and Hungary our military forces remained on basis of inter-union agreements for the protection of communications of Soviet occupational forces in Germany and Austria. To all peoples, liberated the Red Army, gave the complete freedom of self-determination. Subsequently the government of the USSR consistently appeared (it continues to speak) in favor of the removal of all foreign military forces from the strange territories. The policy of the Soviet Union with respect to freed union states, and also the former satellites of Germany gained to it great respect and love of the peoples of these countries. In their face of the USSR it acquired loyal friends and allies.

The interests of entire antifascist coalition entirely served the policy of the USSR with respect to the neutral countries. To the neutrality of those states which it declared and actually/really they retained, Soviet government exhibited greatest respect. Even to its involvement in the war the Soviet Union helped Sweden to maintain neutrality, after freeing it from the invasion of German-Fascist hordes.

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Our country in proportion to its possibilities attempted to hold down/retain from the assistance to Fascist aggressors neutral states, to impel them to strictly observe the conventional norms of neutrality.

Nevertheless during the years of the war of the USSR repeatedly encountered the facts of the violation of neutrality by some of its proclaimed states. Explicit hostility, for example, exhibited with respect to the USSR in the beginning of war the government of Iran. Japan not only carried on the armed struggle against the allies of the USSR, but also with respect to its very was conducted the sharply hostile policy. It concentrated large/coarse forces in the

northeastern China, at the Far-Eastern borders of the Soviet Union, and is accomplished the direct preparation for the attack on our country - into the straight/direct breach of the Soviet-Japanese treaty about the neutrality of 13 April, 1941.

In a number of cases Soviet government proved to be forced to undertake the appropriate measures in response to the violation of neutrality by one or the other states. Thus, for instance, as early as 1941 it accepted the proposition of England about the combined introduction of military forces to Iran. This helped to secure the rear of the USSR Transcaucasia's from the side from the possible sabotages of Fascist Germany with the complicity of Iranian government. Subsequently, taking into account the shift/relief of government occurred in Iran, the USSR entered with this country union relations, which contributed to struggle with the fascism, providing one of the communication lines, which connected the USSR with its allies.

Systematic violation by Japan the treaty with our country about the neutrality, the hostile anti-Soviet position, occupied with Japanese government and command element of Kwantung army, the interests of Chinese people and other peoples of Asia, which were struggling against the Japanese imperialism for its freedom, imperative requests of our allies, especially the U.S. Government

finally the tendency of Soviet government to rather put an end to bloodshed - all this impelled the USSR to enter the war against Japan. Our government considered this as necessary both for the provision of state interests of the Soviet Union and for the fastest setting of universal peace.

The participation of our country in the struggle against Japan became possible only after the termination of war with Germany, when was freed basic part of the Soviet Armed Forces. The USSR, as always, precisely fulfilled its allied duty. Its action against Japan ensured the lightning rout of Kwantung army, considerably hastened the end of the war in the Far East and of the Second World War as a whole.

4. Failure/dip/trough of detachments is international of reaction for weakening and insulation of the USSR. Increase in authority and international effect of Soviet socialist power.

During the years of the Second World War entire/all international imperialistic reaction expected that the Soviet Union will be if it is not annihilated, then, in any case, it is considerably weakened and will lose independence. To this made general headquarters Munich circles in the western states. The policy of the tightening of the USA and by England openings of the second front expressed, actually, the same tendency. According to the

concepts of the ruling circles of these two powers, which were approaching world supremacy, victory over Germany and simultaneous exsanguination of the Soviet Union in the war against it it had to give to them the unknown result. Delay with the landing of English and American military forces in France pursued precisely this far going political purpose.

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In this case USA and England hoped without the particular labor/work to suppress revolutionary moods in the countries, liberated from the Fascist aggressors, and to mount there reactionary regimes. This had to ensure the political insulation of the Soviet country and place it after war in the dependence on the USA and England.

The imperialistic policy, designed for the weakening and the subordination of USSR, proceeded from the rapacious, mercenary interests of large/coarse monopolies. It attested to the fact that the bourgeois statesmen due to their class prejudice were capable of considering the actual force of socialist order. Before the war class limitedness interfered with Muenchenites to evaluate the true role of the USSR in the world policy and those immense potential possibilities, which it had available for waging of war. After the war broke out, the same reason interfered with reactionary

politicians to understand that, in spite of the hugest victims, the USSR it will come out the struggle with the honor and in the postwar period will move by forward with seven-mile steps.

Failure/dip/trough of the detachments of world reaction for weakening of the Soviet Union was caused by historical advantages of socialist order. Foreign policy of the USSR also introduced its mite into a matter of strengthening the might of socialist power, contributing to an even greater increase in its international authority and effect.

Is especially great was great the role of foreign policy of the USSR in the provision to the liberated peoples of the possibility of development on the route/path of democracy and socialism. Our foreign policy helped laborer in the majority of such countries not to allow interference of USA and England into their internal affairs. It impeded both imperialistic powers to thrust to the liberated peoples reactionary regimes.

The damages/defeats, plotted/applied to Fascist military forces by the Red Army, the approximation/approach of the complete break-up of Hitler Germany caused unprecedented raising of liberation movement in the countries, enslaved by fascism. Masses not could and they did not want to more live as before, to their patience arrived end.

German occupational authorities in these countries ran together with the retreated Fascist armies. Reactionary regimes in the satellite countries compromised themselves in the eyes of the people by cooperation with the Hitler aggressors. The emigrant regimes of those occupied by the fascists of union states were located usually not in the best situation. Thus, objective laws governing the social development led to the fact that in the enslaved by fascism countries as in the countries, previously union with Germany, occurred the revolutionary situation. The role of the Red Army in the life of these states consisted in the fact that it broke German aggressors and thereby it created favorable conditions for the development of the revolutionary movement, which was begun even in the course of the struggle of the peoples against the fascism.

But the rout of Germany of very on itself it was is still insufficiently in order to ensure the freed countries unimpeded democratic development. It was necessary to prevent imperialists from making in these countries of the operations/processes, similar to that which the Englishmen undertook in Greece, when they by the armed route/path suppressed national movement, after drowning it in the blood. It was necessary to protect the liberated peoples from interference of western imperialists in their internal affairs. There and said its weighty word foreign policy of our state. Entirely to remove foreign interference was possible only, where were located the

Soviet military forces whose presence eliminated the repetition of the "feats" of the English General to clamp, committed by it in Greece. However, for Soviet foreign policy it was possible to have the powerful/thick restrictive effect on the revelry of reaction and in the remaining unit of Europe, where there was no Red Army. As an example can serve Albania to territory of which our military forces never entered and which without the support of the Soviet Union easily could become the unit of interference of USA and England. Without the restrictive effect of the USSR many countries could divide the sad unit of Greece.

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In the countries liberated from the fascism where it did not occur imperialistic interference for the purpose of the bloody repression of revolution, was established/installed the formation/order of national democracy. Subsequently these countries fell from the system of capitalism and they embarked on the path of socialist development, thanks to which the USSR it acquired in their face of reliable allies. To the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union arrived end.

Between the USSR and the people's democratic states were formed really fraternal relations. In the world appeared new type

international relations, about which before the war it was possible to judge only by the amicable Soviet-Mongolian connections/bonds. The now Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism became the basis of the state interrelations between the USSR and the countries of East and southeastern Europe. Previously included Soviet-Mongolian pacts and agreements were supplemented toward the end of the war by the new diplomatic Acts of fraternal cooperation and friendship. These were the treaties of the USSR with Czechoslovakia (on 12 December, 1943) ¹ Yugoslavia (on 11 April, 1945) ² by Poland (on 21 April, 1945) ³.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the period of the Great Patriotic War, Vol. 1, page 430-432. ². See *Ibid.* Vol. 3, page 175-178. ³. See *Ibid.* page 197-201. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Failure/dip/trough of the policy of the insulation of the USSR as a result of the creation of powerful antifascist coalition and in connection with the education/formation of people's democratic states was especially the greatest success of the Soviet Union, its foreign policy. and this is not by chance: as entire/all our victory in the war, the celebration of foreign policy of the USSR was caused by historical laws governing the epoch of transition from capitalism to the communism. The achievements of foreign policy of the USSR testified about superiority of the new formation/order over the old,

declining formation/order. While Fascist Germany in the course of war lost all its allies and remained isolated/insulated, the Soviet Union in the years of the Great Patriotic War multiplied the numbers of its friends.

By the important success of foreign policy of the USSR and the index of an increase in its international effect was also the expansion of relations of Soviet state with the capitalist countries. Considerably grew the circle of the countries with which the USSR entered diplomatic relations. During the years of war such relations were established/installed with Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Iraq, Iceland, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Lebanon, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Syria, Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, Ethiopia *. The number of countries with which the USSR maintains trade ties also increased.

FOOTNOTE *. With some of the enumerated states of Latin America the actual exchange of diplomatic representatives it did not occur.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The victories of the Soviet Armed Forces over the Fascist aggressors riveted on the USSR the looks of all humanity. An enormous number of people in the most varied countries learned the truth now conscious hidden from them about the socialist state. They were the witnesses of that how the high principles of its policy

consecutively/serially they were put into practice.

An immense increase in authority and effect of the Soviet Union in the international arena was achieved because of the wise leadership of the Communist Party. To it the Soviet people is obligated by its foreign policy successes and successes at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and in the national economy.

The enormous efforts/forces of the USSR for maintenance and strengthening of antifascist coalition testified about its constant tendency toward the international cooperation with the states of capitalist system. The activity of antifascist coalition serves as the bright confirmation of the correctness of the basic condition/position of foreign policy of the Soviet Union - the possibility of the close and mutually useful cooperation of the countries, which belong to different public systems.

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Foreign policy of Soviet state was orientated toward that in order and after war to strive the prolongation of close cooperation between the allied countries. To these were designed the union treaties of the USSR included in the period of war with England, France and other states. The main goal of this cooperation in the

postwar time, in the opinion of Soviet government, consisted of ensuring of universal and lasting peace. This had to serve the inter-union agreements, concluded at the end of the war and the forthcoming peaceful settlements established/installed bases. The principles, proclaimed in the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam conferences and in other inter-union agreements of wartime, were accepted by union powers unanimously. They could become enduring/permanent base for the close postwar cooperation between the victorious nations in the most important international questions, and, first of all, in the work of peaceful settlement concerning Germany.

Great possibilities for the provision of cooperation of allies after war had to grant the United Nations. The basic provisions of the manual of United Nations union powers developed in the latter/last stage of war. Then regulations were accepted at the international conference in San Francisco. The cornerstone of new organization was the principle of the unanimity of the constants of the Security Council. This principle could become the reliable guarantee of universal peace and cooperation of the great powers on which lies/rests basic responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. It provides for the decision of the disputable/debatable questions, which threaten peace and security of the peoples, not otherwise as on the mutual agreement of great

powers, i.e., by negotiations and achieving the mutually acceptable agreements. This principle eliminates attempts at the dictates and any claims of one or the other power to individual supremacy, it eliminates the use of ones majority - the constraint of minority.

During the war the ruling circles of England and USA agreed with the need for continuing cooperation with the USSR in the postwar period. "Our intention, wrote Churchill Stalin on 22 November, 1941, lies in the fact that to wage war in the alliance and in the constant consultation with you:. When war is won, in what I confident, we expected, that Soviet Russia, Great Britain and USA will be encountered at the table of the conference of victory as three main participants and as those, whose activities annihilate Nazism. Naturally, the first task will consist of preventing Germany and in particular Prussia from attacking us a third time. The fact that Russia is Communist state and that the Britain and USA are not such states and they are not desired them to be, is not any obstacle for the compilation by us a good plan of the provision of our mutual safety and our legal interests" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Correspondence of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the USA and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, Vol. 1, page 33. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the same spirit was voiced President Roosevelt with name of whom was connected considerable bright pages in the history of the Soviet-American relations of the 30th and first half of the 40's. "We must not only conclude the world, he said not long before its death, but the lasting peace, such world with which the large countries will act into unison, preventing wars with the aid of the use/application of force. But four of us (USSR, the USA, England, China. - ed.) must be friends, confer with each other, this the source of the knowledge of each other" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. "Pravda", on 26 August, 1944. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, our allies recognized the possibility of close cooperation and peaceful coexistence of the states, which belong to the opposite public systems. This could be only greeted, and the Soviet Union actually/really greeted any readiness for the cooperation in the postwar period.

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However, the USA ruling circles and England, declaring about readiness to cooperate with the USSR, counted, that the war will lead

to weakening of Soviet state and will place it in the dependence on them. Cooperation with the Soviet Union of the USA and England thought in any way on the principles of equality of rights.

In spite of their detachments by the USSR it came out the war not weakened, but even stronger. Its international authority increased never as. All peoples of the world see in the Soviet Union the reliable stronghold of their freedom and safety. The USSR proved to be main obstacle on the route/path of the realization of the American plans of world supremacy.

At the end of the war of the USA and England agreed to form the basis of inter-union agreements the principles of peace and international cooperation, which was explained by the persistent and consistent struggle of the USSR for realizing of these principles. In this case Soviet foreign policy could use the fact that England and especially the USA remained connected with war against the Japanese aggressor. They considered extremely as necessary military aid from the side of the Soviet Union for achievement of victory in the Far East. Needing this aid, they to the autumn of 1945 did not dare openly to turn from the policy of cooperation with the USSR to the imperialistic policy of struggle for world supremacy. When Japan surrendered and the Second World War ended, situation changed. USA and England considered it possible actually to forego further

cooperation with the USSR, began against it "cold war" and embarked on the path of the preparation for the third world war.

After the termination of the Second World War not one important international problem already impossibly it began to solve without the participation of the Soviet Union. An increase in the effect of the USSR on the world arena was the consequence of the bright victories of the Soviet Armed Forces. After maintaining/withstanding the gravest tests of war, Soviet state demonstrated to entire world its indestructible power. But especially raised the international popularity of the USSR the circumstance that this most powerful state conducted the policy, based on the ideas of the world, democracy and progress.

An increase in the might of the USSR in the postwar period, the great successes of world socialist system played the decisive role in a basic change in the correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism, and thereby also in favor of the world. Appeared real possibility during the association/unification and the proper mobilization of all peaceful forces to stave off new world war. Under these conditions Lenin foreign policy of the Soviet Union gains newer and newer victories.

End section.

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Chapter Eight.

GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR MOVEMENT OF RESISTANCE IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND ASIA.

1. Reasons and the character of the movement of resistance.

The movement of resistance was the regular response of national masses to the occupation of their countries by the Fascist-German and Japanese aggressors. History knows numerous examples when national masses raised to the struggle against the aggressors. Their will to the defense of its native land from the foreign conquerors nothing it could break. This is why right the peoples to the resistance to aggressors it was attached even by international laws of waging war, in particular by the Hague convention of 1907. During the years of the Second World War the movement of resistance against aggression accepted the truly mass, unprecedented thus far in the history scope.

The war of Fascist Germany against the European states, just as the war of Japan against the peoples of Asia, was the war wrong, aggressive. Occupying almost entire Europe, Hitlerites established/installed there the regime of the most cruel arbitrariness and violence. The monstrous crimes of German Nazis were realization into the life of the previously developed plan of the enslavement of the peoples, creation of enormous colonial empires, complete physical destruction of some nations. For setting of Fascist "new order/formation" was developed the whole system of measures. With the particular cruelty the aggressors spread their supremacy on those occupied by them the territories of the Slav countries of East and southeastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union.

The same inhumanity was characterized by in the course of the Second World War and the policy of Japanese imperialists. The creation of colonial empire they depicted as the formation of "new order/formation" in Asia, which they declared the "sphere of mutual prosperity."

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Proclaiming itself by the liberators of Asia from the European and American colonizers, Japanese imperialists in reality attempted to

subordinate the colonial and semi-colonial peoples to their supremacy. "For the more convenient exploitation of the peoples of Asia, it is said in the official publication, dedicated to liberation movement in Burma, Japanese gangster allotment the mask of the liberator of yellow race" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Burma's Fight for Freedom. Rangoon, 1952, p 30.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Japanese occupation proved to be the heaviest period in the history of the countries of East and southeastern Asia. The Asian peoples, after being convinced on its own experience of the fact that imperialist-colonizers the color of skin/leather are independent of the most evil enemies of national masses, they brought decisive struggle against the Japanese aggressors. On the side of occupationists remained to the end of the war only vendible marionette cries.

Between the Fascist-German and Japanese conquerors, on one hand, and by the enslaved peoples - on the other hand, arose such antagonism, which could be eliminated only as a result of the rout of the aggressive bloc of Fascist powers and liberating the peoples from IGA of occupationists.

Against the Fascist "new order/formation" in Europe rose wide strata of society. The movement of resistance, caused by the invasion of Hitler aggressors, reflected one of the characteristics of our time - the mass participation of the peoples in the struggle for its liberation - and acquired the nature of the powerful, organized and conscious movement, which regularly arose in the course of war. In spite of the intentions of Fascist-German and Japanese aggressors the terror and mass atrocities intensified and reinforced the struggle of masses against the oppression. The general headquarters of Hitlerites to the submissiveness of the population of the earned countries proved to be the same unfounded as the analogous general headquarters of Japanese imperialism in China and other Asian countries.

Being response to the foreign occupation, the movement of resistance was prepared by at the same time entire course of previous events. Between the struggle of masses against the Fascist danger in the pre-war period and the movement of resistance rapidly it was developed and acquired the wide scope in those countries where the people even before the war carried on an active struggle against the pro-Fascist regimes of the type of the government Tsvetkovich-Machek in Yugoslavia or the dictatorships of Metaksas in Greece. The movement of resistance preceded such events, as the action of Parisian proletarians, who tore away the attempt of the fascists to take authority, and the especially heroic epic of civil war in Spain,

the school of preparation/training and toughening hundreds of thousands of champions against the fascism. The example of mass resistance to foreign aggressors gave the Chinese people, which created wide anti-Japanese front.

Enormous significance in the life of the peoples had strengthening the Soviet Union - the first in the world socialist state and the stronghold of the progressive forces of all peace. The USSR carried on a heroic struggle against the fascism, it untiringly exposed the aggressive policy of Fascist states and the policy of the ruling circles of England, France and USA, which supported aggressor.

All this put a deep impression on the development of public forces in the world, it contributed to an increase in the political maturity of national masses and their mobilization to the struggle against the Fascist-German and Japanese aggressors.

The movement of resistance was, first of all, the struggle of the freedom-loving peoples against the Fascist aggressors. Specifically, therefore it exerted substantially influence on the character and outcome of war, and also for the postwar development of Europe and Asia.

Resistance was the wide all-democratic movement in which took

part the laborers of city and village, the intelligentsia, the fine/small and partly average/mean bourgeoisie. It showed in action all classes and strata of society, all political parties. Especially important role belonged to workers.

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The proletariat, led by the Communist Parties, revealed exceptional staying power/persistency, authentic patriotism, understanding of national interests, irreconcilability in the enemy and his accomplices.

In spite of the unbridled terror of Fascist aggressors, the proletariat of Europe resorted to its tested class weaponry - strike struggle. Thus, as long ago as 1940 the wave of strikes was given a ride on Czechoslovakia occupied. "Strike combat in the first years of occupation, writes Czechoslovak historian. V. Kral', they were the political school of working class which helped it to understand that only by active struggle it is possible to earn the democratic laws/rights, trampled by Nazi occupationists" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

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(1) Освободим Европу



(2) ОТ ЦЕПЕЙ ФАШИСТСКОГО РАБСТВА!

1945 poster. Artist I. Toidze.

KEY: (1) We will free Europe. (2) From the bonds of Nazi slavery.



ГОДИ
 ВОССТАНИЕ НАША ОБОРОТ ПРАВА 1945. УСТАНОВИТЕ СЕБЕ ПРОСВЕЩЕНИЕ НАША 1945

1945 poster. Artist Melantrikh.
 KEY: (1) Welcome. (2) To the Red. (3) Army. (4) Central Council of Trade Unions of Prague, 1945.

During February 1941 into the sign of protest against the racist policy of the Fascist-German aggressors struck the proletariat of Amsterdam and another industrial cities of Holland. During May - June of the same year rose to fight themselves the miners of the northern departments of France. In the fall of 1942 flared up the universal strike of Luxemburg miners, which was their combat response to the decision of Hitlerites to connect Luxemburg to Germany and to mobilize the call-up ages into the Fascist-German army. Strike with lightning speed was thrown into the agricultural areas of the country. 1943 were marked by the mass actions of the proletarians of Denmark, Holland, Greece and especially Italy. In 1944 and 1945 strike movement accepted an even wider scope.

The actions of the working class of the countries occupied had enormous political significance. The majorities of the strikes, which passed even under the economic slogans, were protest against the regime of national and social oppression, against the occupationists and their predatory policy. This understood Fascist rulers themselves. Thus, after the strike of the French miners during June 1941 the chairman of German commission for the truce of Fogl' stated to the representative of the marionette regime of the Vichy: "A question about the departments of burrows and Pa-de-Calais - this is

political problem. In Berlin they know well, that the recent strike was the strike of political and that from it should be drawn political conclusions" ².

FOOTNOTE ².

² La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice. T. IV. Paris, 1957, p. 523.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Deep political consequences caused the powerful/thick strike movement, which was developed in Italy. "Mass strikes in Italy in the spring of 1943, writes L. Longo, led to reinforcing of the activity of all Italian movement of resistance and inspired by its new hopes. They created prerequisites/premises for the revolution on 25 July (1943 - ed.) and directly caused it. These strikes were finally the first large/coarse contribution of the Italian people to the war of liberation which conducted the union peoples and their armies" ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. L. Longo. People of Italy in the struggle. M., the publishing house of foreign literature 1951, page 10. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In such countries as Holland, Denmark, Luxemburg, the strikes were the basic form of the movement of resistance. In the countries of Asia where working class was weakly organized, strike movement did not acquire considerable scope in the struggle against the Japanese

aggressors.

The vanguard role of working class became apparent not only in conducting of strike struggle. Great harm to occupationists caused sabotage in the industry and in the field of transportation, and also the evasion of workers from the compulsory/necessary labor obligation. A remarkable example showed the proletariat of Greece which by its decisive struggle, by mass street demonstrations and by strikes forced occupational authorities to abolish edict about the mobilization to the work into Germany of 80 thousand Greek workers ⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. See.

⁴ Cm. E. D e p o s. Un témoignage de la Résistance grecque: les manifestations contre la mobilisation civile. «Cahiers Internationaux de la Résistance», mars 1961, p. 129.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Especially considerable was the role of the proletariat in the armed struggle. Already during the Hitler invasion to Poland during September 1939 in Warsaw and other industrial cities began to be created voluntary working battalions.

The most widely used form of the armed resistance was partisan movement. The proletariat was its nucleus in many countries. In some

partisan formations, for example in the French vanguards partisan and French patisans, in the Italian partisan brigades im. Garibaldi, the workers were the leading force. Insurgent struggle on the north of Italy, which obtained in 1944-1945 enormous scope, the services first of all Italian working class. Some cities of Italy as, for example, Milan, were liberated by the working vanguards¹.

FOOTNOTE¹. See. P Secchia. Aldo dice: 26x1. Cronistoria del 25 aprile of 1945. Milano, 1963, p 90. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The proletariat of occupied Europe and Asia could with honor to carry out the mission, which lay/rested on it as not the foremost class of society, because of the fact that at its head stood the Communist Parties, armed by Marxist-Leninist theory, hardened/tempered in the fire/light of class struggle. The vanguard role of communists in the movement of resistance was prepared by their entire previous activity. Long before the war they appeared as the most consistent and most irreconcilable champions against all forms of the oppression of laborers, against the fascism and the war. The Communist Parties everywhere became organizers and heads of the armed resistance to fascism. To the tactics of duration, proclaimed the bourgeois workers of the movement of resistance, they set the immediate deployment of active struggle, including against that armed. This line answered the vital problems of the liberating

struggle of the laborers of masses.

Communists were the initiators of the cohesion of all forces of nation, interested in the expulsion/exile of aggressors. Is considerable the services of the Communist Parties in the creation of the uniform national fronts of national liberation in the countries of Europe and Asia. Communists proposed alliance by all, who was ready to struggle for the freedom, independent of their party and social identity/accessory equipment, political and religious convictions.

The leading role of the Communist Parties in the movement of resistance was revealed also in the fact that they headed the struggle of national masses not only for the national, but also for the social liberation.

Is shone brightly the standard/criterion of the correctness of program and tactics of communists in the national liberation struggle it was a steady increase in the strength of their numbers and authority during entire war.

Active participation in the movement of resistance accepted peasantry which with the national liberation connected its they were reliable to obtaining of the earth/ground. Peasants composed the

numerous vanguard of laborers almost in all countries of Europe. Especially considerable was the role of peasantry in national liberation movement in the countries of Asia.

In China the peasants were main force in the war against the Japanese aggressors. Peasantry was 80 percent of all population of the country. The eighth and new 4th national armies, and also numerous guerilla detachments were formed from the peasants. The Communist Party of China consisted predominantly of peasants and descendants from the peasants. Proletarian layer in the party in those years did not exceed 3-4 percent of all its strength. Taking into account the role of peasantry, as the numerous class of the country in the anti-imperialist struggle, the Communist Party of China as early as 1927 concentrated its basic activity in the rural terrains. Only in 1949, not long before the victory of national revolution, the party made a decision about the transference of the center of gravity of work into the cities ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See. Mao Chew-Xuan. Short History of the Communist Party of China. M., Gospolitizdat, 1958, page 244. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In essence of peasants consisted led by communists anti-Japanese

army "Khukbalakap" in Philippines and Malay anti-Japanese national army. On the peasantry mainly leaned partisan movement in Indochina. Active role in the antifascist league of national freedom played Burmese peasants.

In Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece the peasants undertook weaponry from the very beginning of Fascist occupation. However, so it was not in all countries of Europe. This was explained by the uniqueness of social and economic and political conditions in one or the other country, and also by different degree of the effect which used in the peasant masses at the beginning of war the Communist Parties. In France, for example, the rotation of peasantry to the active struggle against the foreign aggressors occurred somewhat later, under the influence of the events at the Soviet-German front and of the attempts of the occupational authorities to extend to the rural inhabitants decree about the total mobilization to the works in Germany.

The alliance of working class and peasantry with the leading role of the proletariat was basic of the national antifascist fronts, which arose in the countries of Europe and Asia occupied.

Participated in the resistance the fine/small bourgeoisie whose strength there was in some countries of considerable, and also the

average/mean bourgeoisie. With setting of occupational regime the national bourgeoisie proved to be that pinched in economic and political sense. The measures of occupational authorities for the concentration of production and the "release" of work force led to the forcible annihilation of the set of fine/small ones and unit of the average/mean enterprises and to the destruction of their owners.

The national bourgeoisie supplied cadres for many organizations of the resistance, basic problems of which were anti-Hitlerite propaganda, aid by the run prisoner of war and assembly of intelligence information for the allies. Is characteristic in this respect the activity of the so-called civil/civilian and military organization in North France. This group supplied English command element of the information about the location of the Fascist-German military forces and the strengthening in the Atlantic coast of France. The same work conducted bourgeois banks of resisters in Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark and some other countries.

However, the participation of the national bourgeoisie in the movement of resistance was limited since most frequently it followed narrow class goals. The reflection of the class position of the bourgeoisie in the anti-Hitlerite struggle was, in particular, the policy of the emigrant governments, which based themselves in London after the occupation of their countries by Fascist Germany. The fear

of the bourgeoisie before the actions of masses was revealed in the unwillingness to arm the most active banks of resistors, especially those of them, at head of which stood the communists.

During entire war the representatives of the bourgeois emigrant governments repeatedly attempted to persuade the peoples of their countries to abstain from the armed struggle, "to accumulate forces" and to passively expect the hour of liberation. Thus, already on 22 July, 1941, London radio transmitted the statement of emigrant Yugoslavian governments, which drafted the population of Yugoslavia to pattently carry occupation and on no account to undertake weaponry "without the signal from London". With the same addresses/circulations repeatedly appeared the head of the French committee of national liberation (FKNO) De Gaulle, the prime minister of Belgian emigrant government P'yerlo and other workers of bourgeois emigration.

In the territory of most countries occupied emigrant governments conducted their policy through the command element of the "secret armies" and of other armed formations, which were being subordinated to these governments.

Command element contained the patriotic tendency of private soldiers and unit of officers toward the active operations, it refused the cooperation with the partisans or agreed to it unwillingly, only under the pressure of masses. An example of this class policy were the activities the command elements of the Polish army of Krayova which gave order "to stand with the weaponry at feet".

The same line on refusal from the cooperation with the partisan movement against the Japanese aggressors adhered to the emigrant governments of some countries of Asia. Thus, in the spring of 1942 the Americans moved from Philippines of the heads of the Philippines administration, which created in the USA emigrant government. Leaders of this government not only did not support contact with the army "Khukbalkap" that was struggling with the Japanese occupationists, but through their secret service agency in Philippines in every way possible they tried to prevent patriotic forces.

The same was also in Indochina. Soon after creation in 1941 under the leadership of the Communist Party of the democratic front of struggle for the independence of Vietnam (Viet-Min) were activated/promoted reactionary emigrant circles. They created in the Chinese province Guansi the party of Don-Min-Xoy into which entered the representatives of the important Vietnamese bourgeoisie. This party unsuccessfully attempted to pull out from the hands a Viet-Min

leadership of anti-Japanese resistance. In the final analysis the party of Don-Min-Xoy was decomposed, and a Viet-Min for entire duration of war completely led the resistance to Japanese aggressors in the country.

The leaders of Korean bourgeoisie-landowner emigration headed by Li Syn Man also attempted by all measures to prevent the deployment of the national liberation struggle of the Korean people under the leadership of communist party. Through their secret service agency they attempted to give to the resistance to Japanese aggressors in Korea pro-American character.

Refusal from the combined combat activity with the partisans it was dictated in any way by the interests of waging war against the general/common/total enemy, but by fear before it revolutionizing by effect. Emigrant governments and their secret service agency in the countries occupied most of all feared "to prove to be not in works" at the moment of liberation. History showed that such fears were not without foundation: in many countries of Europe and Asia with the aid of the Soviet people and its army the movement of resistance came out beyond the frames/scopes of national liberation struggle and became the struggle of laborers for the annihilation of supremacy of exploiter classes and setting of people's democratic formation/order.

The collision/encounter of two directions/axes in the movement of resistance - people's democratic and bourgeois - acquired the character of struggle for the hegemony in a national-liberating movement. If people's democratic direction/axis headed by communists mobilized masses to the active struggle with the aggressors and the reactionaries, it required in its programs of national and social liberation, then bourgeois direction/axis limited its problems by restoration/reduction in the liberated countries of old, bourgeois landowner orders/formations.

In the fairway of the bourgeois direction/axis of resistance went the right leaders of the social-democratic parties which broke away cooperation with the communists. Some of them, for example the right leaders of the Polish socialist party, carried on the bitter struggle against the authentic champions of resistance. But if the right leaders of the social-democratic parties even participated in the movement of resistance, then they attempted to subordinate the struggle of national masses to the interests of conservative bourgeois elements. This policy of the right leaders of the socialist parties was in conflict with the interests of the people, to the interests of the deployment of national freedom struggle against the German fascists. The enormous masses of population supported the program, advanced by communists.

The significant part of the important bourgeoisie, economically connected with Germany or Japan, openly embarked on the path of cooperation with the occupationists, expecting with their aid to be located its privileges and to suppress the class struggle of laborers.

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Together with the important monopolist bourgeoisie the enemies of the movement of resistance and the accomplices of occupationists were the landowners, reactionary officialdom and officer's rank. Specifically, from the representatives of these social strata were recruited quislings, which betrayed the national interests of their peoples, were formed the marionette governments, which served occupants. Thus were formed the "government" of a Hacha-Khvalkovskiy in the protectorate Czechia and Moravia and Tiso--Tuka in Slovakia, Petena-Laval-Darlan in France, Quisling in Norway, King Leopold III in Belgium, Nedich and Pavelich in Yugoslavia, Cholakoglu in Greece, Van Tszin-Veya in China and etc.

The democratic character of the movement of resistance became apparent the more distinctly, the more widely were involved into it the national masses. The main goal of the movement of resistance to the end remained the restoration/reduction of national independence

and the conquest of freedom. This determined the national character of the struggle, which reflected the expectations of the overwhelming majority of the peoples. Only on this basis could arise the wide patriotic fronts, which played this important role in the struggle with the Fascist "new order/formation".

With entire its national uniqueness in each country the movement of resistance as a whole was not purely national phenomenon. The fact that it was developed almost simultaneously in all countries of Europe and Asia, that were subjected to foreign occupation, testifies about its deeply international essence. The peoples spoke as united front against general/common/total enemies - German fascism and Japanese imperialism - and strove the realization of uniform goals - national and social liberation.

The international essence of the movement of resistance became apparent in most varied forms. It is characteristic that in the struggle for the national liberation of one or the other country participated people of different nationalities. In France shoulder to shoulder with the French patriots fought against the Fascist occupationists the representatives of many peoples of the Soviet Union, Poles, Germans, Italians, Spaniards and others. In Poland struggle with the aggressors conducted the representatives 34 peoples: the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, England,

France, Italy, Belgium, Rumania, Hungary and other countries.

Internationalism became apparent also in the combat comradeship of Soviet ones, Polish and Czechoslovak partisan, in the coordination of the armed struggle of Italian and Yugoslavian patriots, in the combined operations of the guerilla detachments of South France and North Italy.

It is significant, that the international significance of the movement of resistance realized already in the course of struggle its participants themselves. Thus, during May 1944 Italian and French partisans signed the political agreement in which it was emphasized that between their peoples there are a "complete solidarity and a brotherhood in the struggle against the fascism and the Nazism" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹.

¹ Les accords entre résistants français et italiens dans les Alpes Maritimes. Mai 1944. Coni, n. d., p. 2.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The bright manifestation of the international character of the movement of resistance was the international solidarity of the prisoners of Fascist concentration camps. Stable champions for the freedom understood, that under the superhuman conditions of camp regime they can resist Fascist hangmen only in such a case, when they

will act conjointly. An example of wide international unity of the prisoners of the Hitler camps of death is the activity of underground patriotic organization "fraternal cooperation of prisoners of war". This organization, created in 1943 by Soviet people in the deep rear of Germany, counted several thousand people of different nationalities and spread its effect in entire South Germany².

FOOTNOTE². See. ~~the~~ "new world", 1964, No 6, page 258-276.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

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The movement of resistance acquired international character, first of all, because of the vanguard role of working class - the carrier of the idea of proletarian internationalism. It is significant, that, as a rule, the initiative of the agreements between the partisan large units/formations of different countries belonged to communists, who rejected nationalistic bourgeois approach to the movement of resistance and who considered this movement as the composite/compound component part of the antifascist, democratic struggle of the peoples of all world.

The movement of resistance was characterized by the diversity of forms and methods of struggle, which depended on many internal and

ambient conditions: the correlation of class forces in the country; the character of occupational regime; the degree of organization and level of the political consciousness of the laborers of masses, especially the proletariat; strength and the effect of the political parties, first of all of the Communist Party; situation on the fronts of war.

Wide acceptance obtained this form of underground activity as propaganda among the population of the countries occupied and in the hostile army. Groups and organizations of the movement of resistance produced hundreds of thousands of newspapers, leaflets of pamphlets.

Toward the end of the war in Italy emerged 5 thousand different illegal publications ¹, in Poland - about 1300 ², in France - is more than thousand ³, in Belgium - 300 ⁴, in Denmark 265 ⁵.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See.

¹ Cm. *La Resistenza in Italia. 25 luglio 1943—25 aprile 1945. Saggio bibliografico a cura di Laura Conti. Milano, 1961, p. VII.*

². See. ² Cm. S. Okęcki. *La Résistance polonaise et les Alliés. European Resistance Movements. Vol. 2. London, 1964, p. 444.*

³ See. ³ Cm. *Catalogue des périodiques clandestins diffusés en France de 1939 à 1945. Paris, 1954.*

⁴. See. Cm. H. Michel. *Les mouvements clandestins en Europe. Paris, 1961, p. 67.*

*. See *ibid.* page 57. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Some of them had a print run of 400-500 thousand copies. Issue and dissemination of such enormous the number of publications required great organizational work, in particular the adjustment of underground printing houses. In some countries there were even underground publishing houses, which published the books of author-antifascists. Thus, French illegal publishing house "Edison of de Minyui" published the products of L. Aragon, P. Eluard, Vercourt and other progressive writers.

The underground press and radio they informed population about the actual military-political situation of Germany and its allies, explained the vital problems of liberating struggle.

Exposing Hitler propaganda, underground the press and the radio contributed to strengthening moral spirit of the peoples of the countries occupied and inspired them to the struggle against the Fascist enslavers.

Various forms of struggle were closely interconnected and they mutually supplemented each other. The highest and most effective form of the movement of resistance was the armed struggle. To the armed struggle should be related the activity of the groups of the

protection of the spreaders of the illegal press, the annihilation of soldier and officers of armies of occupation and the traitors, the armed sabotages, directed against different units of the Fascist-German aggressors, partisan movement, activities of the large/coarse large units/formations of internal forces, which were developed mainly in the completing stage of war, and finally the national armed uprisings.

The movement of resistance passed in its development several stages, the content and frames/scopes of which are determined by the general/common/total periodization of the Second World War, that it does not eliminate the specific character of the handling of traffic of resistance in the individual countries. In all stages of its development it carried the character of the national liberation, antifascist movement of the peoples for the independence and the freedom of its countries.

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2. Effect of the Soviet Union on the handling of traffic of resistance.

The movement of resistance arose from the first days of the Second World War, but in its first stage, to the attack of Hitler

Germany in the Soviet Union, it still was weak and insufficiently purposeful. After the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war was created the new deployment of political forces in the world arena, was begun new stage in the history of the movement of resistance. The peoples of the countries occupied with good reason saw in the first socialist country that real force which could free them from the foreign enslavers. This is why the peoples of Europe and Asia connected their fate with the struggle of Soviet people, they wanted to be their worthy comrades on the weaponry.

Soviet government from the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War stated that the aim of this war is not only the elimination of the danger, which hung over above the Soviet Union, but also aid to all peoples of Europe, which struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors, elimination of Hitler "new order/formation" the liberation of the enslaved nations and the restoration/reduction of their sovereign laws/rights.

The great and noble/precious aims of the war of the Soviet Union inspired the peoples of the foreign countries to the struggle with the fascism. These goals gave rise to sympathies even in those, who before the war were located under the effect of the anti-Communist propaganda of their bourgeois governments. Is very characteristic conservative Dutch historian L. De Yong's acknowledgement, whom,

estimating the situation in Holland in the first months of the Soviet-German war, he writes: "Hitler's attack in the Soviet Union caused a deep change in the negative position with respect to this country. People understood that in the fields of battles in East Europe was decided to a considerable extent their fate. By the Soviet Union they were admired as by the first country, capable of holding in control the pressure of German armies" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. L. de Jong. The Dutch Resistance Movement and the Allies 1940-1945. European Resistance Movements Vol. 2. London, 1964, p 344.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

Especially strong influence exerted the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the Fascist aggressors to the masses of laborers, first of all to the working class. It strengthened positions and the authority of the Communist Parties, which were the most active impetus of resistance.

Speaking about the reasons, which impelled the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to call the people to the uprising after the attack of the Fascist-German army in the USSR, Yugoslavian historian D. Plencha writes: "... It (KPH. - ed.) considered the fact that the large part of the German divisions, which participated in the war against Yugoslavia, was moved to the east and what entrance of the USSR into

the war was the important moral and political factor, which had the decisive effect on the fighting spirit of the largest strata of the Yugoslavian people and which discovered the prospects for victory in the struggle against the occupationists and the local traitors - reactionaries" ².

FOOTNOTE ². D Plenca. La mouvement de Liberation nationale en Yougoslavie et les. Allies. European Resistance Movements. Vol. 2. London, 1964, p 467. ENDFCOTNOTE.

The handling of traffic of resistance to a considerable degree favored the creation of the anti-Hitlerite coalition of the states and peoples. The leading role in this coalition played the Soviet Union. It accepted to itself the main burden of struggle against the German fascism and introduced the most significant contribution to the development of the program of antifascist bloc and its realization into the life. The cohesion of states into the anti-Hitlerite coalition fortified the confidence of the peoples, which were struggling against the fascism, in the final victory over the enemy.

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However, powers - the participant of coalition differently

related to the movement of resistance.

The Governments of England and USA examined it exclusively as auxiliary force and considered that it has as a limited goals, completely subordinated not only to the military, but also political interests of the ruling circles of England and to the USA. As a result these governments, on one hand, are exerted the movement of resistance certain support, and on the other hand - they attempted to prevent its reinforcing and overgrowing into the mass armed struggle which could involve deep social changes.

Especially characteristic was in this respect the activity of the so-called control of the special operations/processes (USO). That created with the English Ministry of the Economic War, USO had its agents in all countries of Europe occupied and was occupied by the encouragement/award of sabotage and sabotages in the rear of Hitler Germany and by the organization of reconnaissance activity in favor of allies. USO of necessity unwillingly and only lent support to the armed struggle of participants in the movement of resistance. This is understandable. As frankly stated the historians M. Grane and A. Michel, in the eyes of allies "the armament of the great masses of people was dangerous from all point of view" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. M Granet et H Michel. Combat. Histoire d'un Mouvement de

Resistance de juillet 1940 a juillet of 1943. Paris, 1957, p 289.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

At the basis of this policy of allies lay/rested the distrust to the national masses, the fear of their political activity. Frequently to the detriment of the interests of national liberation struggle and anti-Hitlerite coalition as a whole England and the USA were a guardian the reactionary armed organizations, attempting to set against their national forces. The Anglo-American ruling top supported occupying itself with cooperation with the German and Italian fascists of the organization of "Bali Kombetar" in Albania, supporters of Mikhaylovich in Yugoslavia, the so-called army EDES in Greece and others. As the proof of the tendency of union command element to stave off the expansion of the armed struggle of masses and main thing - to avoid uncontrollable by it national uprisings serves the attempt to attain the breaking up of the Italian partisan army of in winter of 1944/45, and also the analogous steps taken in Belgium and France.

On the contrary, the Soviet Union saw in the peoples, which struggle with the fascism, competent/equal allies and was devoted to the movement of resistance independent role in this struggle.

The movement of resistance composed the organic unit of the

great antifascist struggle of the peoples and states, and, naturally, the events, which occurred the fronts of the Second World War, directly influenced it.

A decisive effect had the events, which were being developed at the Soviet-German front which was principal front of the Second World War. Here were located main forces of the Fascist-German military forces, and precisely here were decided the fates of the peoples.

The strikes/shocks of the Red Army for German-Fascist aggressors weakened/attenuated their positions in Europe, forcing to draw off from there forces in order to complete the losses, carried at the eastern Front. Thus, for instance, after the defeat of Fascist military forces in the environs of Moscow for the Tiglerov command element it was necessary to move from the West during December of 1941 - April of 1942 to the Soviet-German front of 39 fresh divisions and 6 brigades.

News about the victory of the Red Army in the Moscow battle the peoples of Europe accepted with the enormous enthusiasm. "In the countries occupied... - writes J. Fuller, grief was changed into joy. Colossus was stopped, and although, perhaps, its head was from the iron, legs proved to be clay"¹.

AGAINST A COMMON ENEMY.

1118

Sofia, 9 September 1944 -
on the day the peoples' power
was established.



Barricades on the streets of
Prague during the last days
of the war (May 1945).

Albanian partisans enter
Tiran (November 1944).



Troops of the National Libera-
tion Army of Yugoslavia full
of resolve to repulse the
enemy.

1119



Czech partisans of the Brigade imeni Shtefanik load ammunition and weapons delivered by Soviet aircraft.

On the Czechoslovakian border. A Soviet officer welcomes Czechoslovakian soldiers to the homeland (1st Ukrainian front, October 1944).



Partisans lead captured German officers through the streets of Paris.



Paris. Barricades around the building of the TsK [Central Committee] of the Communist Party (Autust 1944).

1120



Monument to Ernst
Telman, who was bru-
tally killed by the
Nazis in Buchenwald.

Monument to V. I. Lenin in
Eisleben (GDR). This monument
was removed by the Nazi invaders
from the Leningrad Oblast' to
be melted down. Together with
the Soviet people settled in Ger-
many, anti-Nazi Germans hid and
preserved the monument.



Anti-Nazi German who
helped save the monu-
ment to V. I. Lenin
shares his memories
with young people.

1121



Handing the document of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR stating that F. A. Poletayev has been named Hero of the Soviet Union to his family.

Soviet medals - participants in the anti-Nazi battle in Czechoslovakia are given the "Partisan Star" medal.



Grave of Hero of the Soviet Union V. V. Porik in the French city of Hénilietard.

Military collaboration of Soviet and French pilots. The pilots are discussing the successful battle of the "Normandy-Neman" aviation regiment.



1122

FOOTNOTE ².

J. Fuller. The Second World War. 1939-1945 M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1956, page 234.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Is interesting former commanding Greek national liberation army (ELAS) General Sarafis's statement. "Partisan movement, it notes, was not developed in the beginning of the occupation when occupational forces were numerous and the armies of Axis Powers gained everywhere victories. It began to be developed, when appeared the first hopes for the victory in the winter of 1941 when the operation/process of Germans against Moscow and Leningrad they ended by failure/dip/trough. Thus, in the spring of 1942 were formed the first guerilla detachments" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. S Sarafys. Greek Resistance Army. The Story of ELAS. London, 1951 p 275. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Hitler occupational authorities, attempting to suppress the growing movement of resistance, reinforced terror. But this only just more greatly ignited rage of the peoples and drew in active struggle with the fascism before passive strata of society.

The great victory of Soviet military forces in Volga and the

rout of Hitlerites near Kursk marked the decisive break/fracture also in the handling of traffic of resistance. The death of choice Fascist divisions forced Hitler command element to transport from the West to the east all new large units/formations. From November 1942 through April 1943 from France, Holland, Denmark and Germany to the eastern Front arrived 35 German divisions, including of 20 divisions only from France. From July through December 1943 from Europe were moved 18 additional divisions and 2 brigades².

FOOTNOTE². See "military history log/journal". 1960, No 1, page 23-24. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Simultaneously with the decrease of the strength of occupation forces was reduced their combat efficiency. Therefore in the majority of the countries of 1943 enslaved by fascism were marked by the large/coarse actions of resisting forces. Is sufficient to mention about such events as liberation by the French patriots of island Corsica, operation/process of Polish ones partisan against the Hitler communications, the strike of protest against the terror of Fascist authorities in Holland, speeches of sailors and port workers of Denmark, who stirred up occupationists to take Danish Navy, and finally the over-throw of fascism in Italy and the beginning of the war of liberation of the Italian people. Rout at the Soviet-German front in 1943 of the 8th Italian army shook Italy helped national

masses to realize entire disastrous nature of route/path, to which them pushed Fascist government. Italian historian E. Collotti draws the conclusion/derivation that "in Russia the Italian soldiers finally matured for the complete psychological and moral explosion/burst with the Fascist regime and with the Nazi war" 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. E Collotti. L'amministrazione tedesca dell'Italia occupata 1939-1945. Studio e documenti. Milano, 1963, p 21.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The basic break/fracture in the war caused further cohesion of the impetus of resistance in different countries. In particular, during this period they were formed. National advice/council of resistance in France, the committee of national liberation in Italy, the "advice/council of freedom" in Denmark and other organizations, joining of the champions of resistance.

The enormous losses, carried by Hitler Germany in the east, forced its heads in 1943 to declare the so-called total mobilization and to send to the front the significant part of the German workers, occupied in the branches of industry, which maintained/served front. In connection with this the Fascist-German authorities introduced compulsory/necessary labor obligation for the wide strata of society of the countries occupied. This also led to the expansion of the

movement of the resistance: to it began to be connected the people, evading the mobilization to the work into Germany.

In 1944 the situation of a Nenez-Fascist army even was further complicated. The grandiose offensive operations of the Red Army required from the Hitler command element of shipment to the eastern Front of an enormous quantity of soldier and officers. Only the army group "center" in the summer of 1944 was supplemented by 18 divisions even 4 brigades, which arrived from Germany, Poland, Hungary, Norway and other countries of Europe '.

FOOTNOTE '. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, Inv. No 17963, page 699. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Weakening the rear of Germany considerably lightened the operations of the union military forces landing on the West and created conditions for further handling of traffic of resistance in Europe.

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Thus, the Soviet Union made the decisive military, economic and diplomatic contribution to the struggle of all peoples of Europe against the fascism.

Without the rout of Hitler military forces at the Soviet-German front, without the cruel damages/defeats of Wehrmacht in the battles in the environs of Moscow, in Volga, near Kursk, in Dnepr, in Belorussia and in Baltic States the liberation of Europe from the oppression of fascism would be impossible.

However, the Soviet Union helped the peoples of the countries of Europe occupied not only by its struggle against the Hitler military forces. It lent them serious moral and political support. In the policy of the Soviet Union found its expression the principle of the strict defense of the independence of other peoples. It is possible to note, and details, such foreign policy Acts as signing during July 1941 of a Soviet-Czechoslovak and Soviet-Polish treaties about the military cooperation. Conclusion of these treaties confirmed, on one

hand, readiness of the Soviet Union to support all forces, which opposed fascism, and on the other hand - the invariable concern about the restoration/reduction of those trampled by the Hitler occupationists of the sovereign rights of the peoples of Europe. Population of Czechoslovakia and Poland estimated these diplomatic measures as the great moral and political support of their struggle. "The peoples of Czechoslovakia, it is said, for example, in the labor/work about the results of the work of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia between the VII and VIII congresses, with delight received statement about the treaty with the USSR. Izvestia, which was quieted by the entire Nazi press and radio, it was spread so rapidly, that next day it was not already in entire world of man whom on it would know about it" ¹.

FOOTNOTE

¹Od VII. do VIII. Sjezdu KSC. Deset historických let v dějinách Strany a republiky. Praha, 1946, str. 13.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Conclusion of treaty with the Soviet Union being a small contribution to the struggle against the German occupationists.

During entire war Soviet government repeatedly appeared in support of the movement of resistance.

Soviet government greeted the decisions of the second session of the antifascist meeting of the national liberation of Yugoslavia, which was taking place at the end of November of 1943, about the creation of legislative and actuating elements of authority and the acceptance of the federal principle of the construction of new Yugoslavia. In its statement of 14 December, 1943, the government of the USSR evaluated these decisions "as the positive facts, which facilitate further persistent struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia against Hitler Germany" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the period of the Great Patriotic War, Vol. 1, page 436. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Soviet Union attached much importance to the liberating struggle of the Albanian people. The Great Patriotic War inspired Albanian patriots to the struggle for the freedom of its native land. During October 1942 the Communist Party of Albania gave an address/circulation in which on behalf of the Albanian people it gave the oath of solidarity with soldiers of the Red Army: "the defenders of Stalingrad, it was said in the address/circulation, are the defenders of the civilized world, and their living example inspires the enslaved peoples to the association/unification and the resistance.... and we here, in enslaved Albania, firmly believe in fast liberation and we speak, raising the cam/fist: "Defebders of

Stalingrad! Your struggle inspires and us... our antifascist struggle is valid and holy: with blood we began it and in the blood will sink barbarous fascism in order to construct free, democratic, national Albania ..." '.

FOOTNOTE

³Buletin i Universitetit Shteteror të Tiranës. Seria shkencat shogërore. Tiranë, 1958, n. 3, f. 20.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The statement of Soviet government about independence of Albania, published during December 1942, enthusiastically met all Albanian laborers. It contributed further raising of antifascist struggle of the Albanian people.

Soviet people with the hot sympathy related to the French movement of resistance. After the education/formation during June 1943.

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The French committee of national liberation (FKNO), into which entered the representatives of all largest organizations and parties of the movement of resistance in France, the Soviet Union unconditionally recognized it as the "representative of the state

interests playing the dandy of Hitler tyranny" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Franco-Soviet relations during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, page 195. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, the Governments of England and USA for a while abstained from the acknowledgement of FKNO. And only the solid position, occupied in this question with the Soviet Union, impelled western powers finally to recognize FKNO.

Relation France - is far not the sole example, which clearly shows basic difference in the approach itself to the movement of resistance from the side of the Soviet Union and western powers. Thus, the "legal" government of Denmark for the elongation/extent of three years of war, to the forced departure/attendance into the resignation in the summer of 1943, actively cooperated with the Fascist-German occupationists. However, this did not prevent England and USA in the spring of 1944 from stating about its readiness to establish/install connections/bonds with those circles which bore responsibility for the shameful policy of Danish ruling top. On the contrary. The Soviet Union not only refused to enter into any negotiations with these circles, but also confirmed by many Acts that considers as the sole legal representative of Danish people (Concil of freedom", that headed Danish movement of resistance. To the

representative arrived in Moscow of the "advice/council of freedom", notes Danish historian I. Khestrup, from the very beginning they gave to understand that in its face Russia recognized the "advice/council of freedom" "as the government de facto, leading battle and that Moscow will begin to support relations not with whom with others in Denmark" ². ENDFOOTNOTE.

². J Haestrup. Denmark's Connection with the Allied Powers during the Occupation. European Resistance Movements. Vo. 2, London, 1964, pp. 294-295. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Soviet Union and its consistent policy of the support of the peoples struggling with the fascists had a great effect on the handling of traffic of resistance and Italy and Poland.

Soon after the downfall of the Fascist regime of Mussolini Hitler military forces occupied almost entire country. For the Italian people a question about the struggle against the Fascist-German aggressors and the Italian myrmidons became the main thing. "By the decisive factor which gave a powerful impetus to the development of partisan movement both in Italy and in entire Europe, write the former heads of partisan movement in Italy, there was struggle of Soviet alliance. A noble/precious example of youth, women, old men, all population of the Soviet Union, which did not

incline head, it did not despair, it did not tremble and everywhere were delivered strikes/shocks on its enemy, caused enthusiasm and admiration of the peoples, which were struggling against the fascism ..." 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. P. Secchia, Ch. Moskatelli. Monte-rose went down into Milan. From the history of the movement of resistance in Italy. M., Gospolizdat, 1961, page 6. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The heroic feats of Soviet people inspired to the struggle and the Polish people. Polish historians note: "The Soviet-German war elicited the strongest response in the Polish community. The powerful/thick resistance of Soviet army contributed to strengthening the faith/belief in the possibility of the victory over the Hitlerism and created the real prospects for liberation. Under the effect of events at the Soviet-German front in the country were increased the moods of readiness for the armed struggle with the occupationists" 4.

FOOTNOTE

4T. Rawski, Z. Stapor, J. Zamojski. Wojna Wyzwolencza Narodu Polskiego w latach 1939-1945. Wezlowe Problemy. Warszawa, 1963, s. 218.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The support of the Soviet Union helped the movement of resistance in Poland to successfully overcome the serious

difficulties, caused by the absence of communist party and by the considerable effect of the circles, connected with the emigrant government in London.

With the education/formation of the Polish working party (PPR) in the beginning of 1942 the resultant pressure in the country began gradually to be moved to the organizations, which were joined around PPR, which as the final result occupied leadership in in the national freedom struggle of the Polish people.

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The aid of the Soviet Union to the movement of resistance was not limited only to moral-political support. In spite of that even number war against the bloc of Fascist ones state required from the Soviet people of the breaking stress of forces and mobilization of all resources, the Soviet Union sent people and allotted considerable means to help to the peoples of other countries, which were struggling against the Hitler servitude.

With progress of the Red Army to the West the Soviet Union smog to show/render the movement of resistance this serious aid as reinforcing by its partisan large units/formations and by units. Soviet partisans accumulated by this time enormous experience of the

armed struggle in by enemy and they attempted to transmit to his patriots of Poland. Czechoslovakia and other countries.

On the sizes/dimensions of aid, which the Soviet Union gave to Poland, can be judged by that fact that in 1942-1945 here fought more than 80 Soviet partisan formations by general/common/total number of 12 thousand soldiers ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹.

¹Cm. S. Okecki. La Résistance Polonaise et les Alliés. European Resistance Movements., Vol II. London, 1964, p. 449.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The greatest scope joint operations partisan, that were being conducted, as a rule, in close cooperation by the Polish people's army acquired in spring and in the summer of 1944, when to the territory of Poland came out the first Ukrainian partisan division of the name of S. A. Kovpak and other partisan large units/formations. The output/yield of Soviet ones partisan to the Polish territory, it was indicated at the 2nd international conference of historians in Poland, opened "particular chapter in battle against the occupationists, which was developed on the Polish earth/ground" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

An example of the successful cooperation of Soviet and Polish guerilla detachments in combat, carried out during June 1944 in the forests of Lyublin voivodeship. "Estimating progress of combat in Lips and Yanov forests/scaffolding and in the Sol'sk forest, writes the Polish researcher of partisan movement V. Tushin'skiy, it should be noted that they were completed by the great success of the united guerilla detachments which for two weeks pinned down in combat three regular divisions of Hitler military forces and a number of police units at the moment of the extremely strained situation at the Soviet-German front, on the eve the Belorussian operation/process of Soviet army ..." 3. ENDFOOTNOTE.

3. Combat operations of national military forces of Polish. 1943-1945 M., Voenizdat, 1961, page 80. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Polish historian V. Gur indicates that the Soviet partisans played a considerable role in the strengthening of friendship between the Polish and Soviet peoples, in the disclosure of the deceitful anti-Soviet propaganda, which was being spread by Hitlerites and reactionary organizations. "Soviet partisans, writes V. Gura, bore to the Polish people of the word of truth about the great Soviet country by which fell the most responsible role in the war against the fascism ..." 4.

FOOTNOTE *. Combat comradeship of Polish ones and Soviet partisan. M., SOTS'EKGIZ [- State Publishing House of Literature on Social Sciences and Economics], 1959, page 67-68. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Several well armed guerilla detachments were formed in the Soviet Union of the Poles on the request of Polish emigration in the USSR and in the fall of 1943 were moved to the territory of Poland. The vanguards of Polish patriots, which received from the Soviet partisan center equipment and weaponry, acted also on that occupied by the Hitlerites of the territory of the Ukraine and Belorussia.

Soviet partisans helped the peoples of Czechoslovakia in their liberating struggle. In the summer of 1944 to the aid by the slovakian brothers arrived 10 Soviet partisan large units/formations also of the vanguards. Shortly with the support of local party organizations they created several larger than guerilla detachments Ci of brigades, which began soon large/coarse operations against the slovakian and German fascists. Evaluating the role of Soviet ones partisan in the development of partisan movement in Czechoslovakia, Clement Gottwald in the letter to central committee KP(b) U noted: "Soviet partisans showed the Czech and slovakian peoples, as it is necessary to strike Fascists, they showed also that in this struggle must take part the wide national masses" *.

FOOTNOTE ¹. History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. M., Gospolitizdat, 1962, page 514. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Partisan movement in the foreign countries felt sizable difficulties, in particular for lack of experienced cadres, armament and ammunition. Therefore on the request of the representatives of the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, of Rumania and Bulgaria in USSR there was organized training the national cadres of partisan movement. Together with the national cadres for the line were bound the experienced Soviet organizers of partisan movement. In 1944 were moved 12 Soviet-Rumanian partisan groups into Rumania and 12 Soviet Hungarian organizational partisan groups into Hungary ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Sm. V. I. shreds. Struggle of the peoples of the Slav countries against the Fascist enslavers (1939-1945). Kiev, the publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of Ukrainian SSR, 1961, page 250. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the USSR obtained preparation/training for the leadership of partisan movement several ten Czechoslovak soldiers, who then together with the Soviet partisans were neglected/deserted on the aircraft into Slovakia. by the acknowledgement of Czech historians,

sending of the almost 700 experiment and politically trained organizers rendered inestimable assistance reinforced partisan movement" 2.

FOOTNOTE 2. History of the party of Czechoslovakia, page 514.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the armed struggle of the peoples of the countries occupied they actively participated also many thousands of Soviet people, neglected/deserted for the line by the events of war. The majority of them composed the escaped from German concentration camps officers and soldiers. Those brought up on the ideas of Marxism and Leninism, in the spirit of brotherhood and friendship between peoples, Soviet people, after proving to be far from the native land, considered their sacred responsibility to take part in the struggle against the general/common/total enemy.

The foreign Communist and worker's parties in every way possible contributed to the flight/escape of Soviet people from the captivity and to their involvement in the active struggle against the occupationists. By their heroism and by selflessness Soviet soldiers gained to themselves the glory of fearless champions against the Fascist aggressors.

Soviet people were almost in each guerilla detachment in Poland, Czechoslovakia and some other countries. Many of them headed the vanguards. But some guerilla detachments wholly consisted of the former Soviet prisoners of war.

Soviet soldiers were considerable percentage in the first vanguards of the people's guards especially in the first period of its formation '.

FOOTNOTE '. See the combat comradeship of Polish ones and Soviet partisan, page 67. ENDFOOTNOTE.

According to far not complete data, together with the Italian partisans fought not less than 2 thousand Russian partisan. In the decisive stage of movement, in the days of April uprising 1945, their quantity grew considerably '.

FOOTNOTE '. See G. S. Filatov. Italian communists in the movement of resistance. M., the publishing house of "Mysl'." 1964, page 112. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With the unfading glory it covered itself "Russian battalion" in Aemilius, in whom were combined more than hundred Soviet people under the command element of V. Pereladov '.

FOOTNOTE '. See ibid. page 113. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Courage of the soldiers of this battalion they were limitless. According to the writer Sylvia Michele, "when was heard their three-fold hurray, it seemed - they are stronger and it is numerous than in actuality. SS troop they brought into the horror" '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

"Freedom does not have boundaries" - it is written on the memorial, erected by Italians on the spot for the death of the Russian partisan of Nikolai Buyanov who fell by death of hero, covering the retreat of guerilla detachment in the place of Kastel' Nuovo in Toscany. '.

FOOTNOTE '. See Ibid. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The courageous son of the Soviet people F. A. Poletayev (Poetan), who fought in one of the Italian guerilla detachments, was awarded the highest government decoration/award to an Italy-gold medal.

Italian patriots highly evaluated the participation of Soviet people in the movement of resistance.

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In turning of Italian ones partisan in connection with the 27th anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution to Soviet citizens, who acted in province of Rejio-Nel'-Aemilius, it was said: "during this historical day we especially want to express feelings of a deep gratitude to you, which, without oscillating, undertook weaponry in order to help us in our armed struggle Russian patriots, victory it smiles at us, and our sufferings come toward the end. We will be persistent in the struggle in order to tomorrow say to the people "we fulfilled its duty". Russian patriots, the Italian people knows about that aid, which you showed/rendered and you exert now and the accomplishment of his great objective" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. "International life", 1960, No 1, page 156. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Heroically fought Soviet citizens against the Fascist-German occupationists and in the territory of France. With the fraternal aid of TsK of the French Communist Party during October 1943 in France was created the central committee of the former Soviet prisoners of war ², by which then was performed its work under the leadership of

FKP.

FOOTNOTE 2. Cm "questions of history", 1960, No 3, page 93-98.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

To the middle 1944 g in France acted 32 Soviet guerilla detachments, counted 1440 people. Furthermore, according to incomplete data, 900 Soviet citizens fought in French guerilla detachments 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. See What was not discussed in the reports/summaries. Recollections of participants in the movement of resistance. M., Gospolitizdat, 1962, page 425-426. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The French people experiences the feeling of a deep commendation to the Soviet people, which, without sparing life, struggled for freedom and independence of France. The glorious son of the Soviet people V. Porik became the national hero of France.

Soviet people took also active part in the movement of resistance in Belgium. In 1943-1944 there there were several guerilla detachments, which consisted of soldiers and officers of the Red Army, which escaped from Hitler captivity. The largest/coarsest formation of Soviet ones partisan was brigade "for the native land",

educated in province Limburg in the middle of 1943. In the territory of Belgium a struggle against the Fascist-German aggressors carried on not less than 500 Soviet citizens '.

FOOTNOTE '. See the materials of Soviet committee of war veterans. Documents about the rendezvous in g. ghent. page 2. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Many Soviet people fought in the guerilla detachments of Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway.

The participation of Soviet citizens kV the European movement of resistance was one of the manifestations of its international character, contributed to the rapprochement of the peoples of different countries, to strengthening friendship between them. "The blood of Soviet ones partisan, that watered French soil, wrote one of the leading workers of French resistance G. Larosh, the cleanest and most enduring/most permanent cement, which forever strengthened the friendship of the French and Russian peoples" '.

FOOTNOTE '. The "literary newspaper", on 25 August, 1959.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Soviet Union rendered great aid the peoples of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the creation of national military formations. From

in the spring of 1943 in the Soviet Union began the formation of the new Polish large units/formations, which then took part in combat against the Fascist-German aggressors. On the base of these large units/formations was created the first Polish army. After the liberation of the significant part of the territory of the country the first Polish army was joined with the people's army into the national army Polish. In the spring of 1945 in completing combat on the rout of enemy participated the 1st and 2-nd army the military forces Polish, fighting strength of which it achieved 200 thousand soldiers and officers; total strength military forces of Polish exceeded 400 thousand people .

FOOTNOTE

⁶Cm. M. Spychalski. Dwadzieścia lat budownictwa ludowej obronności. "Nowe drogi", 1963, nr. 10 (173), s. 11.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Soviet government granted gratis to army Polish armament, ammunition, fuel, rations, clothing/uniform, transport means.

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Army Polish obtained in the course of war from the Soviet Union of approximately 700 thousand rifles and the submachine guns, more than 15 thousand heavy mounted machine guns and mortars, 3500 guns, 1

thousand tanks, 1200 aircraft, are more than 1800 motor vehicles ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the combat operations of national the military forces of Polish. 1943-1945, page 35. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the numbers the military forces of Polish was directed a large number of Soviet officers for training of personnel of Polish large units/formations and transmission by it the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Polish community highly evaluated the contribution, introduced by the Soviet Union in the creation of the armed forces of Polish national Republic. "Polish soldier, indicates Marian Spykhal'skiy, by which as a result of the antinational policy the prewar bourgeois government of Poland in the solitude he came forward in 1939 to the defenses of its native land from the Hitler aggressors, it finished war by victory in the alliance with the Soviet army. This became possible because of the correct policy, planned and embodied into the life by Polish revolutionary worker's movement, because of the creation with the aid of the Soviet Union of national the military forces of Polish with the new class appearance, brought up and led by the Polish working party and the having powerful ally in the person of Soviet army" ¹.

FOOTNOTE 1. Ibid., page 349. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the process of the creation in the territory of the USSR of Czechoslovak military formations were overcome the considerable difficulties, connected with the policy of Czechoslovak bourgeois emigrant circles in London. President Benes and its encirclement, writes L. Svoboda, "never they believed in the force of the USSR, they hated it and they did not in any way desire so that precisely it would free Czechoslovakia. When to them nevertheless it was necessary to agree with the creation of our military units in the territory of the USSR, they started to brake their formation and training, were decisively opposed to the creation in the USSR of large/coarse Czechoslovak military units and to their participation in combat at a Soviet-German front" 1.


FOOTNOTE 1. L. Svobod. From Buzulka to Prague. M., Voenizdat, 1963, page 80. ENDFOOTNOTE.


In the Soviet Union was first formed one military unit. In 1943-1944 in the USSR appeared the new Czechoslovak formations, brought then to the 1st Czechoslovak corps. Armament, equipment and transport means to Czechoslovak soldiers gratis granted the command element of the Red Army. In the corps were directed 250 Soviet officer-instructors for the aid the supreme command in the

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 13722
1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH V N ANDRIANOV ET AL. 06 OCT 82
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963 - A

organization of the combat training of personnel. This corps became the basis of the national army of Czechoslovakia.

Those created with the fraternal aid of the Soviet Union army Polish and Czechoslovakia national army were tempered in combat for the liberation of its countries from the Fascist-German occupationists and they subsequently became the armed support of new, socialist formation/order.


Soviet state rendered great aid foreign partisans by armament. It especially increased in 1944, when the line of the Soviet-German front considerably moved to the West and appeared the possibility to use for these purposes aviation. Thus, only into Poland from 27 May, 1944, through 16 January, 1945, with support of the headquarters of Polish ones partisan were committed 70 air raids in which participated 99 aircraft *.

FOOTNOTE *. See the combat comradeship of Polish ones and Soviet partisan, page 66. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Sizable role played Soviet aviation in the supply of the rebels of Warsaw. For second half of September of 1944 our pilots flew 2243 missions into Warsaw area discarded a considerable quantity of armament, ammunition and rations.


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IN MEMORY OF THOSE WHO DIED AT THE NAZIS' HANDS.




German Democratic Republic.
Monument to Buchenwald prisoners.


Polish People's Republic. Opening
of monument to prisoners who were
killed by Nazi executioners at the
death camp in the small town of
Rogozhnits (Silesia).



Austria. Monument to
Soviet citizens who were
killed at Mauthausen.



1148



Lithuanian SSR. "Mother" - monument to those who died at the hands of the Nazis erected near the village of Pirchyupis, which was burned by the Nazis along with its residents.

Much armament and ammunition obtained from the Soviet Union the partisans of Czechoslovakia. Only during the slovakian national uprising from the USSR were delivered tens of tons of weaponry, technology and ammunition.

Enormous material and technical assistance rendered Soviet state the peoples of Yugoslavia.

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Under the difficult conditions when distance from the line of the Soviet-German front to the liberated territory of Yugoslavia exceeded thousands of kilometers, Soviet pilots after several months from the beginning of 1944 completed thousands of missions and delivered to the people's liberation army of Yugoslavia (NOAH) of a significant quantity of different cargoes ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the combat comradeship of Polish ones and Soviet partisan, page 47-48. ENDFOOTNOTE.

After the conclusion of the agreement between the Governments of the USSR, England and USA about the organization of Soviet military

base in Bari (Italy) the transportation of the military materials to Yugoslavia acquired especially great scope. On I. Tito's request during September - October of 1944 the government of the USSR armed, outfitted and supplied with all forms of fighting equipment several divisions, which acted mainly in central Serbia and in the Belgrad direction/axis. Soviet government isolated to Yugoslavia from the composition of the Red Army of two air divisions, several battallions of airfield service, air units and air defense units. As a result to November 1944 at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of NOAH was an air group under the command element of Soviet General. In 1944-1945 the Soviet Union transmitted to Yugoslavia a large number of guns, mortars, machine-tool and light machine guns and much other armament.

Another position took the ruling circles of England, which made in Yugoslavia general headquarters to the war minister/Secretary of State for War of the royal emigrant government D. Mikhaylovich. In spite of the obvious facts of the cooperation of supporters of Mikhaylovich with the enemy, the government of England helped these traitors of the Yugoslavian people by armament and by ammunition up to the end of 1943. However, course of events forced Englishmen to change its policy with respect to Yugoslavia. The antinational activities of supporters of Mikhaylovich seriously weakened/attenuated their positions in the country. The at the same

time liberation movement of the peoples of Yugoslavia accepted enormous scope. Taking into account this, English government in the beginning of January of 1944 it ceased to render military aid Mikhaylovich it began to help with the armament of the people's liberation army of Yugoslavia ² in order to have the opportunity subsequently to influence the course of events in Yugoslavia and other countries of Balkan peninsula.

FOOTNOTE ². See the correspondence of chairman Sovey the ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the USA and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, Vol. I, page 183.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

The U.S. Government occupied analogous position.

In 1944 the movement of resistance in the countries of Europe occupied, with the comprehensive support of the Soviet people, became more massive, organized and decisive.

This found expression, in the first place, in the creation of the national fronts, in which were combined the wide masses of the population and different parties - from the communists to the representatives of the bourgeois parties, which appeared against the fascism. The leading place in the movement of resistance occupied

left-wing forces headed by Communist ones and workers of the parties. In the second place, in all countries were occupied are created the mass armed forces, led by experimental and authoritative military leaders. Thirdly, the armed struggle became the dominating form of the activities of the champions of resistance. The greatest scope it achieved in Yugoslavia. Regular units NOAH and guerilla detachments toward the end of 1943 controlled more than half of the territory of the country where it was established/installed the national organs of authority.

The mass armed struggle was developed in Albania, Greece, Italy, Poland, France and Czechoslovakia.

The output/yield of the Red Army to the territory of the countries of the southeastern and central Europe occupied with the entire sharpness raised a question about the direct liberation of the peoples enslaved by Hitlerites.

Discovery/opening by Englishmen and by the Americans of the second front in northern France and the powerful/thick offensive of the Soviet military forces in the summer of 1944 they radically changed the situation in the countries of Europe. This sharply worsened/impaired the situation of Germans and played positive role in the struggle of the peoples against the fascism.

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The movement of resistance entered its completing phase, which was marked by mass national ones armed by uprisings. The time of emergence and the scope of uprisings, their goal and outcome were different. In some countries insurgent struggle encompassed considerable territory, in others, on the contrary, it was developed in the relatively small areas.

Uprising in Yugoslavia arose, for example, in the beginning by a German-fascist of occupation and took the shape of a prolonged revolutionary war not only for the liberation of the country from the foreign aggressors, but also for the basic social changes.

The majority of uprisings occurred in the completing period of war and was the culmination of resistance. In these uprisings, which occurred in essence in very organized manner participated ten and even hundreds of thousands of people.

One of the most important prerequisites/premises of the success of uprising during the Second World War was the preliminary weakening of enemy, who possessed considerable superiority in the armament. And

this prerequisite/premise created by their heroic activities of the Soviet Armed Forces. This note, in particular, the authors of the book "history of the Communist Party of France" "weakened by losses in the people and the technology, they write, Hitler Germany increased the scales of the robbery of the countries occupied at the moment/factor when it it was necessary to draw off from there increasingly more military forces.... The victories of Soviet army changed the material and moral conditions of anti-Hitlerite struggle" and opened the prospects for organizing the national uprising in France ¹.

FOOTNOTE

¹Histoire du Parti communiste francais (manuel). Paris 1964, p. 411.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the individual countries the armed uprisings occurred in the period of the liberation of these countries by the Red Army. The working class, the Communist and worker's parties successfully used this favorable situation. Communists appeared main organizing force of uprising, which was leaning on the antifascist parties, in which there were representatives and bourgeois circles. Thus, uprising in Rumania prepared the Communist Party jointly with the anti-Hitlerite patriotic front, which included in its composition (besides communist party) the front of farmers, the alliance of patriots (antifascist

organization of intelligentsia), Mados (democratic organization of the laboring hungarians) and other antifascist organizations. This cooperation proved to be possible in the conditions of the increased sharp/acute military-political crisis when occurred delimitation in the ruling Fascist circles of Rumania. The patriotic Front joined the progressively adjusted officers.

The organizing force of uprising in Bulgaria became the Bulgarian working party (communists, that occupied the leading positions in the Soviet Front into which entered besides communists national agricultural alliance, the organization "team", which united the foremost circles of officer corps and intelligentsia, and other democratic antifascist organizations. Direct leadership of the preparation for uprising was charged to the main headquarters of people's liberation army.

The Communist Parties of Rumania and Bulgaria developed great work in the armies. As a result many soldiers and officers took active part in the armed struggle against the reaction, and in particular in the national uprisings.

As direct prologue to the national uprising in Rumania served Yassy-kishinev operation/process. Up to this moment/factor was timed the national uprising in Bucharest, which encompassed then other

areas of the country. Signal to the uprising in Sofia and other centers of the country was entrance to the territory of Bulgaria of the Red Army. This circumstance ensured the rapid success of national uprising.

Without the powerful support to the Red Army the national masses of Bulgaria and Rumania could not so rapidly and radically solve a question about the historical fates of their countries.

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The expulsion/exile of fascists by the Red Army from the eastern areas of Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria drew nearer the hour of the liberation of the Czechoslovak people. The beginning of a national-democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia was slovakian uprising (on 29 August - the end of October of 1944). Against the Hitler occupationists and their slovakian accomplices rose workers, the peasants, the representatives of intelligentsia and other strata of society at head of which stood national committees, which was the organs of the people's rule. The combat force of uprising were partisans, who restored slovakian military units and soldiers of the subunits of new Czechoslovak army. Struggle went under the slogan "for the new Czechoslovak republic". The leading force of uprising were communists, which drew a line of the leadership KPCh, which was

being located in Moscow, and underground leadership of the communist party of Slovakia. The leading military-political organ was slovakian national advice/council.

Supreme command of the Red Army helped the restored armament and ammunition, and she also increased by their Czechoslovak airborne brigade, formed in the USSR. For the direct support of uprising the command element of the 1st Ukrainian front during September - November of 1944 conducted a Carpathians-Duklinskaya operation/process. Together with the large units/formations of the Red Army in it participated the soldiers of the 1st Czechoslovak army corps.

Uprising in slovakia showed/rendered great influence on raising of liberating struggle in Hungary, Czechia and Moravia. Prague uprising (5-9 May of 1945) occurred, when the large part of the country was freed from Fascist occupants and on it was established/installed the authority of the government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks. Uprising was concluded by victory because of the powerful/thick support of units and large units/formations of the Red Army, which completed lightning march from Berlin area through the ore mountains to Prague. Prague uprising was the highest area of a national-liberating struggle in Czechoslovakia. It revealed to the peoples of this country

possibility for the construction of life on new, democratic principles.

The special position in the history of the movement of resistance occupies Warsaw uprising (August - September of 1944). In it participated the significant part of the working Polish population of city, but the organizing force were the reactionary command element of the regional army and delegation of emigrant government, which stood on the anti-Soviet positions.

Uprising in Warsaw - brightest manifestation of antinational policy of Polish bourgeois-landowner circles during the years of the war: the organizers of uprising attempted to establish/install in the capital the political and administrative authority of emigrant government.

Without the support to the Red Army the command element of the regional army could not rely on success. Meanwhile the large units/formations of the Red Army, developing on 23 June, 1944, grandiose operation in Belorussia, to 1 August moved to 500 kilometers and they approached the vistula. Here they were stopped for the replenishment by people, by technology and by ammunition. The leadership of the regional army decided to use this pause and to master the capital of Poland. It not only did not want to obtain

Soviet aid, but even it did not establish/install contacts with the command element of the Red Army.

In spite of the anti-Soviet position of the leaders of uprising, our command element took measures for rendering aid to the rebels. As a result of the offensive of the Soviet units on 14 September was liberated Prague (area of Warsaw on by law/right to the coast of the vistula), where next day it entered the large unit/formation of the 1st Polish army. Were developed bloody combat for Warsaw of the 1st Polish army with the participation of large units/formations and units of the Red Army. But the command element of the regional army deviated from the combined operations with them.

Polish patriots from different military and civil/civilian underground organizations selflessly fought against the enemy.

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However, Hitlerites, who possessed superiority in the forces and the means, brought to them damage/defeat. Uprising was suppressed. Perished 18 thousand soldiers and the officers of the organizations of resistance. The enormous losses (about 200 thousand people) sustained civil/civilian population. The capital of Poland was destroyed. By this high price paid the Polish people for the

monstrous adventure, undertaken by reactionary by circles in the name of the achievement of the political purposes, nothing in common had with the interests of the national masses of Poland.

Large/coarse uprisings occurred at the end of the war in France and Italy. General/common/total, which connected them between themselves and with the struggle of the peoples of other countries occupied, this combat antifascist character. The motivating power of uprisings were workers and peasants.

The national actions in France and Italy occurred simultaneously with military operations of union military forces. The Anglo-American command element, although was considered the force of French and Italian resistance, attempted to restrict its scope and to subordinate to its political and military control. It is more than that, it attempted to prevent the mass armed uprisings, especially in North Italy. the ruling circles of England and USA feared the revolutionary initiative of national masses and their arrival at the authority after war.

However, the movement of resistance continued to grow. Uprising in France accepted gigantic sizes/dimensions. To the middle of July 1944 it encompassed 40 departments. In other departments the Germans and traitors also lost their authority. The champions of resistance,

acting on the communications, destroyed a great quantity of roads, annihilated many communications, disorganized progress of German large units/formations to the front of invasion.

Forced to render proper to the French champions of resistance, General D. Eisenhower indicated that they considerably lightened to allies the achievement of the success in the operations/processes in Normandy and Brittany. Partisans and partisans distracted to themselves more than 250 thousand Germans. They detained often more than by week the arrival of German divisions to the Norman Front, freed from Hitler IGA tens of cities and were controlled whole departments in the central array ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See M. Torez. Selected works. Vol. I (1939-1944). M., Gospolitizdat, 1959, page 639. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the opinion of D. Eisenhower, the military efforts/forces of the champions of resistance were equal to the activities of 15 regular divisions ².

FOOTNOTE ². See Sh. Tiyon. French partisans and partisans in the struggle against the Fascist-German occupationists. M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1963, page 540. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Important work made the champions of resistance on the assembly of the reconnaissance enemy data. One of the heads of the liberating struggle of the French people, Sh. Tiyon, he writes: "there is no doubt that never also any command element could gather such complete and detailed enemy information, what had available before the landing Eisenhower. By this he was obligated to the resistance which on the scales of the entire country rendered aid allies" 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. Ibid., page 539. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The summit of the struggle of the French people against the Fascist-German aggressors was uprising in Paris 19-26 August. Uprising flared up when the Anglo-American military forces moved far into the depth of the country, but they did not hurry with the liberation of Paris. Meanwhile Hitler command element intended "to convert Paris into the bastion of German resistance which could hold in control the forces of allies and ensure to Germany time gain" 4.

FOOTNOTE 4. Ibid., page 454. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Above Paris hung the threat of destruction.

The organizers of uprising were French communists, who stood in the avantgarde of the patriotic forces of the country. The

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reactionary bourgeois circles of France dreamed about the fastest disarmament of internal forces. first of all of those formations which were found under the leadership of communists.

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However, the French Communist Party, relying on the support of national masses, upset these plans, which corresponded to the interests of USA and England. The capital of France was liberated even to the approach of union military forces.

The victory of national uprising in Paris contributed to the acceleration of expulsion/exile from the country of the Fascist-German aggressors. The Hitler plan of the transformation of the capital of France into the supporting/reference center of German defense was stripped. The victorious outcome of national uprising in Paris even more greatly joined the democratic forces of France and strengthened their positions.

National uprising in Italy occurred in the very end of war, on 25 April, 1945, when the complete liberation of the country from the occupationists was already decided beforehand. However the Hitler command planned to destroy with the retreat the industrial centers of North Italy, which would cause to the Italian people enormous harm.

Taking into account the created situation, the command element of resisting forces in Italy developed the plan of the armed uprising. Difficulty of the realization of this plan consisted not only in the presence of large/coarse hostile forces, but also in the position of union command element, which in every way possible pinned down national initiative. Even at the end of 1944 main command the Anglo-American military forces in Italy General G. Aleksander turned to the partisans with the appeal to be radiated on the houses "into the waiting of new instructions" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. R. Battal'ya. History of the Italian movement of resistance (on 8 September, 1943, - on 25 April, 1945). M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1954, page 524. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The basic goal of uprising consisted in delivering of smashing attack on the enemy, not giving to it the possibility to destroy industrial enterprises on the north of Italy and to place to the removal of the Fascist-German military forces from the country.

The armed uprising in North Italy carried people's character. In Torino it was combined with the universal strike. Hitler military forces, which were attempting to pull out from Italy, proved to be

blocked. With the support of population the guerilla detachments rapidly put an end to Mussolini's regime, by the so-called republic grease, and they cleared from the enemy North Italy to the arrival of the Anglo-American military forces. The large part of the Fascist-German military forces accumulated weaponry before the partisans even to the signing of the statement of surrender.

By uprising in North Italy was completed the almost biennial struggle of the Italian people against the Nazi occupationists and their Fascist allies in Italy. Italian participants in the resistance introduced the large/coarse contribution to the liberation of their country and the rout of German imperialism.

The movement of resistance and mass national uprising in Italy were the democratic revolution of enormous scale, from which was born the republic. In Italy, just as in France, appeared real possibility for the transition to the really democratic formation/order. However, this possibility did not become reality, since Italy and France were occupied with the Anglo-American military forces, which rendered great aid conservative forces in their struggle against the national masses. Actually, England and USA became the exporters of counterrevolution. They attempted to suppress national movement and to maintain capitalist orders/formations.

By the most extreme manifestation of the class policy of western powers were the repression by them of the liberating struggle of the Greek people, setting in the country the force of the weaponry of reactionary, monarchist regime ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Initiative and main role in the armed intervention belonged to England, which met understanding and support from the side of the USA, which granted their aircraft for the movement of English troops to Greece. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This Act of rough arbitrariness, realized under the pretext/preposition of struggle with the "Communist danger", it showed the authentic essence of the policy of the English and American ruling circles with respect to the movement of resistance.

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According to the prominent public worker of Italy L. Basso, the repression of the liberating struggle of the Greek people "gravitated as the nightmare above the Italian resistance" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Report of Lelio Basso at the international conference on the history of the movement of resistance. "Cahiers Internationaux de la Resistance", mars 1963, p 81. ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, the movement of resistance had a nevertheless considerable effect on the postwar development of Italy, France and Greece. Democratic forces came out of the war those more organized and mature/ripe and is continued to carry on a persistant struggle against the reaction, for the world, democracy and socialism.

The participation of the Soviet Union in the Second World War created favorable conditions for deploying the national liberation struggle and in Asia.

All authentic patriots in the countries of Asia understood, that the decisive role in the struggle with Hitler Germany belongs to the Soviet Union. "on 22 June, 1941, stated the Communist Party of India, Hitler fascism hit into its mortal bell. This was funeral ringing also on the world imperialism" ².

FOOTNOTE ². Communist Reply to Congress Working Committee Charges. Bombay, 1945, p 5. ENDFOOTNOTE.

News about the feats of Soviet people in the war with the Hitler aggressors they reached the most distant areas of East and southeastern Asia. They moved into hearts of millions of Chinese,

Koreans, Vietnamese, Philipinos, Burmeses, Indonesians, Malays a feeling of confidence in the victory over the general/common/total enemy. Even this reactionary Indonesian politician, as Khatt, recognized: "Soviet Russia protects the independence of the colonial countries... the struggle of the Russian people against German aggression it testifies about a great feeling of patriotism... "3.

FOOTNOTE 3. N'oto. The October Revolution in Russia and August revolution in Indonesia. M., Gospolitizdat, 1958, page 17.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Especially strongly felt the continuous connection/bond of patriotic war with their struggle participants in the national liberation war in China, which the USSR helped during entire war. Most efficient aid was heroic struggle at the Soviet-German front against the Hitlerites - the main allies of Japanese aggressors. Feeling the calamities of war, noted Chinese historian Pyn Min, the Chinese people received the "disinterested aid of the Soviet people" and "deeply he understood, that the interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples were uniform" 4.

FOOTNOTE 4. Pyn Min. Short history of the friendship of the peoples of China and Soviet Union. M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1957, page 103. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Immediately after the attack of Hitler Germany in the USSR the Communist Party of China advanced the slogan: the "defense of the Soviet Union is aid to China, just as the defense of China is aid to the Soviet Union" '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid, page 104. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Emphasizing close interdependence between the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and the war of the Chinese people against the Japanese aggressors, CC of the communist party of China on 7 July, 1941, stated: "our people must know that the war, which conducts the Soviet people, is directed not only toward the defense of the USSR, it is directed also toward the defense of China, toward the defense of freedom and independence of all peoples" '.

FOOTNOTE '. M. S. Kapitsa. Soviet- Chinese relations. M., Gospolitizdat, 1958, page 302. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The same position took patriotic forces, also, in other countries of Asia. This was reflected in the resolution of the antifascist congress of the peoples of the east, which was taking place during October 1941 in Xiayang city. At the congress were

present more than 130 representatives Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, Indonesian, Burmese, Philippines, Malay, Vietnamese and other peoples. In the resolution of congress it was indicated that "all peoples of the Far East must by their struggle against the Japanese fascism render aid the Soviet Union, must create international uniform antifascist front" '.

FOOTNOTE '. Pyn Min. Short history of the friendship of the peoples of China and Soviet Union, page 105-106. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the course of war the connection/bond between the Soviet people and the resisting forces in the countries of Asia became stronger every day.

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The patriots of China and Korea, Vietnam and Burma gladdened the successes of the Red Army in the environs of Moscow, on Volga coasts, also, in other battles with the Fascist-German aggressors. During February 1942 Chongqing newspaper of "Sinhua Zhibao" organized the assembly of signatures under the salutatory letter to Soviet troops. "We from the soul worship, it was said in the letter, before your incomparable staying power/persistency, before your infinite courage, by your determination to fight to the utter defeat of enemy, by your

spirit of patriotism in the work of the defense of the native land"

1.

FOOTNOTE 1. Pyn Min. Short history of the friendship of the peoples of China and Soviet Union, page 106. ENDFOOTNOTE.

CC of the Communist Party of China in the congratulatory telegraph message to the Soviet people in connection with the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution noted: "the victories of the Red Army they deeply inspire the Chinese people, which leads war against the Japanese aggressors, since they not only fortify our courage and faith/belief, but also in reality they are decisive strike/shock also on the Japanese imperialism" 2.

FOOTNOTE 2. "Sinhua Zhibao", on 7 November, 1942. ENDFOOTNOTE.

These words confirm entire significance of that contribution revealed which by their heroic struggle with the German occupationists introduced Soviet people, also, into the struggle against the Far-Eastern aggressor.

An especially great effect the Great Patriotic War had on the movement of resistance in Asia from the moment/factor of the beginning of the military activities of the Soviet Armed Forces in

the Far East. This space of the Soviet Union have long ago expected participants of the anti-Japan resistance in Asia. In the political report to CC of KPK to the VII Congress of the Communist Party of China on 24 April, 1945, "about the coalition government" said that "without the participation of the Soviet Union the final and complete resolution of Pacific Ocean problems is impossible" 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. Mao Tsze-dun. Selected works. Vol. 4. M., publishing house of foreign literature, 1953, page 552. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This opinion shared other fraternal parties.

The entrance of the USSR into the war in the Far East created for the oppressed peoples exclusively favorable conditions for the liberation not only from Japanese IGA, but also from the old masters - French, English, Dutch, American colonizers. And occurred this because of the fact that the Soviet Union was required for the completion of war the very insignificant time. The end of the Second World War began not in a year - one-and-a-half after the surrender of Germany, as supposed the Anglo-American military heads, but through four months. It is understandable that within this short period the western allies did not know how to move friendly troops from Europe to Asia in order to be positioned of the Japanese.

The utter defeat by the Soviet Armed Forces of Kwantung army created especially favorable situation for the completion of the war of liberation of the Chinese people. On 10 August, 1945, national military forces passed into the strategic counteroffensive. Was begun the latter/last stage of many-year struggle against the Japanese aggressors.

Main role in the final rout of imperialistic Japan belonged to the Soviet Union. After the Second World War the correlation of forces in Asia, as in entire world, it changed in favor of progressive camp. This allowed the democratic forces of China to victoriously complete struggle with feudal-imperialistic regime Chang Kai Shi.

The entrance the USSR into the war in the Far-Eastern theater was signal to the latter/last struggle with the Japanese aggressors and for the resisting forces in Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaya and other countries, occupied by Japan.

Exclusively successfully used the established situation the Vietnamese people, led by the Communist Party of Indochina. The armed uprising of the Vietnamese people which occurred during August 1945, was concluded by the proclamation on 2 September of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Mass liberation movement was developed also in Indonesia. On 17 August, 1945, was here also proclaimed the independent republic.

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To supremacy of Japanese aggressors everywhere arrived end. The "great east asian sphere of combined thriving" understood the same shameful lot, as Hitler "new order/formation" in Europe. In this sizable role played the resisting forces of the countries of Asia. With the honor fulfilled its international duty and Soviet Union.

3. Historical role of the movement of resistance.

The movement of resistance was not historical chance and not episode in the history of the struggle of the peoples against the fascism. It was the inherent, regular unit of the Second World War, war of all freedom-loving peoples against the fascism.

Many reactionary bourgeois historians do not hide their negative relation to the movement of resistance. They assert that this movement did not have a meaning, that the victory would be earned, also, without it.

Certainly, only some champions of resistance could not rout German and Japanese imperialists. For this were required the giant united efforts of the peoples and the prolonged combat operations of the armed forces of many countries, and, first of all, the Soviet Union. In this grandiose struggle such as was war against the fascism, the total is achieved by merging/coalescence of the results of many activities.

The movement of resistance made a worthy contribution to the common cause of the conquest of the victory over the enemy. The vanguards of the armed patriots caused to aggressors great loss in the manpower and the technology, pinned down hostile military forces, freed/released from them enormous territories. The movement of resistance contributed to the disruption/separation of the plans of Fascist aggressors, attempting to use the economy of the seized countries and to establish/install there savage "new order/formation". Even some Hitler Generals and West German military historians recognize the significance of the movement of resistance, partisan warfare. Thus, for instance, General L. Rendulich writes: "the history of wars knows not one example when partisan movement would play the same great role such as it played in the latter/last world war. According to its sizes/dimensions it is something

completely new in military art. On that colossal influence which it showed/rendered to the front military forces and to the problems of supply, work of the rear and control in the areas occupied, it became the aspect of the concept of total war. Partisan movement, with the years gradually increased in Russia, in Poland, on the Balkans, and also in France and Italy, influenced the character of the entire Second World War" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Results of the Second World War, page 135. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The movement of resistance fulfilled its historical mission in the confirmation/assertion of the valid, liberating character of war against the Fascist states. It was the great school of the civic duty, internationalism, courage, comradeship. In it were opened the sincere beauty of many millions of people, their irreconcilability to foreign oppression.

In the movement of resistance very vividly was revealed the role of the people as the direct creator of history. Specifically, national masses showed during the years of war the unbending will to the freedom and the national independence.

National liberation struggle in Europe and Asia flowed/occurred/lasted in different situation. The peoples of Europe

fought for the retention/preservation/maintaining of the long ago established national states, the peoples of Asia struggled for the creation of the independent national states. This struggle everywhere acquired unprecedented scope. The resistance of the peoples of Europe and Asia merged into the uniform powerful flow to stop which aggressors no longer could.

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The movement of resistance was severe examination for different classes and public groups, political parties and flows. Was explained the degree of their readiness to go on victim for the rescue of the native land, for freedom and democracy, national independence.

War tore away all coverings and bared that the fact that the long time remained concealed/latent. Thus, for instance, before the war the representatives of reactionary bourgeoisie-landowner circles much talked profusely about their devotion to the native land. They insolent calumniated to the communists, unproved charging them with antipatriotism, in the absence of a feeling of duty and responsibility, disregarding by national interests. When came the severe day of historical inspection/check, inspection/check by fire/light and by sword, precisely, these circles came out the most contemptible traitors, the servants of fascism, who passed to the

side of foreign aggressors and together with them those annihilated patriots.

At the same time the Second World War showed that the communists are the most consistent and selfless defenders of freedom and national independence. In all countries where the national masses raised to the struggle with the aggressors, communists were in the first ranks of resistance, and precisely they entered in its history the most remarkable pages.

The decisive role in the struggle against the Fascist-German aggressors belongs to the Soviet Union. The Great Patriotic War had an exclusively strong effect on the movement of resistance. The Red Army ground at the Soviet-German front basic part of the Hitler armed forces, and also the armies of the satellites of Germany. The Non/without-peridimensional heroism of Soviet soldiers inspired the patriots of other countries. Even at the heaviest moments of war Soviet government invariably lent diplomatic, moral and political and material support to the struggling peoples.

In the national liberation movement in the countries of Europe occupied active part took Soviet people. These were predominantly the soldiers of the Red Army which could escape from the Fascist captivity. The peoples of the countries occupied highly evaluated

their courage and heroism.

In the course of moving the resistance the struggle with the foreign aggressors tightly was interwoven with the struggle for the social changes. But there were among participants in the movement of the resistance and such, which attempted to restore/reduce in their guards previous, capitalist orders/formations. Considering that by itself they will not succeed in managing powerful revolutionary raising, they counted the export of counterrevolution with the Anglo-American imperialists. Life dictated to participants in the resistance the need for the greatest vigilance during the definition/determination of the ways of postwar development. They understood well that after the expulsion/exile of Fascist occupationists it is not possible to allow again to arrive at the authority those classes and the political parties which long years encouraged Fascist aggressors, and then betrayed the native land. In the hearth of liberation movement in many countries of Europe and Asia was born the new form of state authority - national democracy. The formation of the democratic organs of authority was the result of the great revolutionary creativity of the wide national masses, led by the Communist and worker's parties. Thus, struggle with the occupationists was inseparably connected with the struggle against the internal reactionary forces and their regimes, for the new organization of society.

The Soviet Union protected from export of counterrevolution from the USA and Great Britain the country of East and southeastern Europe, and also North Korea. The peoples of these countries, liberated the directly Soviet Armed Forces, proved to be in the favorable foreign policy conditions, which allowed them to successfully carry out revolutionary conversions.

Because of the USSR were contained the counterrevolutionary activities of American imperialists and Koumintang supporters in northeastern China, liberated by the Red Army. This had enormous significance for further development of revolution in China and its victories.

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After concluding on 14 August, 1945, the treaty about the friendship and the alliance with the Chinese republic, the USSR prevented Koumintang supporters from setting up in the northeastern China the military bases. The people's rule after the surrender of Japan soon extended its effect on this unit of the country with the population of 40 mln. people. The military forces of the Peoples' liberation army could use the available there considerable quantity of weaponry

and ammunition of the former Kwantung army and army of Manzhou-Guo, routed by the Soviet Armed Forces. This in the enormous measure contributed to the success of the operations/processes of national armies against the Koumintang supporters military forces, supported by the United States of America.

After playing the decisive role in the liberation of China from the Japanese aggressors, the Soviet Union derived its armies from the territory of the northeastern provinces. By the solemn wires/cables of Soviet military forces the Chinese people expressed its deep commendation to our state for the great liberating mission. On 7 April, 1946, consisted the send-offs of Soviet soldiers of the capital of the northeastern China - the city of Changchun. At the meeting were present about 250 thousand people, on 13 April, 1946, solemnly sent off its liberators the inhabitants of Girin city. Everywhere the send-offs of the units of the Red Army were converted into the bright demonstration of Soviet-Chinese friendship, into the demonstration of love for the Soviet soldiers and the officers, who arrived to the Chinese earth/ground in order to help its heroic people forever to get rid of the Japanese aggressors ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. The evacuation of Soviet military forces from the northeastern China completely was completed on 3 May, 1946. In accordance with the agreements on 14 August, 1945, Soviet military

forces remained only in Port Arthur. From there they were derived in the spring of 1954. All structures/installations in this area the Soviet Union gratis transmitted to the People's Republic of China.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Communist Party of China during the years of the Second World War constantly emphasized the fundamental importance of cooperation and friendship with the USSR for liberating China. It specifically, in this cooperation saw the main source of strength and successes of the national liberation movement of its people against the Japanese aggressors.

The third civil revolutionary war in China (1946-1949) was closely related to the resistance of the period of the Second World War. The organs of the people's rule and military forces, which were tempered during the years of war with Japan, began the decisive assault of reactionary Koumintang supporters regime. Koumintang, which was being considered in 1937-1945 participant, although in essence and formal, uniform national anti-Japanese front, after the surrender of Japan it went to the complete explosion/burst with the communist party. Government of Chang Kai Shi unleashed civil war. The USA, which were the ally of Chinese resisting forces during the Second World War, now became their main enemy.

In connection with the new deployment of forces within the country and in the international arena changed the composition of uniform anti-imperialist front in China. From it left the comprador bourgeoisie, which was being orientated in the USA, and the landowners. The national bourgeoisie after serious oscillations/vibrations entered into the new front, and its leaders stated about their acknowledgement of the leading role of communists in the revolution. With the resolution of the problem of interrelations with the national bourgeoisie also of other most complex questions of revolutionary struggle the Communist Party of China used the enormous experience of the movement of the resistance of 1937-1945.

Besides China, North Korea and Vietnam where after the Second World War conquered the Socialist Revolution, events terrible for the imperialism were unfolded also in other countries of Asia. Because of further exploitation of the movement of resistance was begun the decomposition/decay of colonial system. On the spot of previous colonies and semi-colonies arose the new states, the national republics.

The unfading lighthouse, which elucidated route/path to freedom and independence to all enslaved peoples of Asia, were as before the Soviet Union, its richest experience of the construction of new life,

its selfless struggle with the imperialistic aggressors.

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The careful study of Soviet experience and its use in their activity became the vital need not only of communists, but also many progressive bourgeois Democrats. It is not by chance, for example, A. Sukarno, requiring from Japanese occupationists to immediately grant to Indonesia independence, it considered necessary in this case to refer to the experience of the Soviet Union. "Perhaps Lenin, it did state Sukarno on 1 June, 1945, when it did create independent Soviet Russia, did already have at its disposal Dneproges? ... Perhaps it did have at its disposal of radio set with the masts outgoing to the sky? Perhaps at its disposal it was already sufficient railroads, which cross/intersect the spaces of Russia? Perhaps each Russian person already did know how to read and to write, when Lenin did create independent Soviet Russia? No, the respected gentlemen ! Only according to other side of the bridge, erected by Lenin, were constructed radio sets, were created schools, were organized children's creche, was constructed Dneproges ! Therefore in I please you, gentlemen, do not fear and do not think that before shape independent, we should complete similar measures ..." ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. A. Sukarno. Indonesia charges. Collector/collection of

the article and speeches. M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1957, page 252. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the years of the war Jawaharlal Nehru arrived at the conclusion that "the Soviet revolution considerably advanced human society and lighted the bright flame/blast which cannot be extinguished. It laid the foundation of that new civilization which can move the world" ².

FOOTNOTE ². J. Nehru. Discovery/opening India. M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1955, page 24. ENDFOOTNOTE.

It is known that this opinion adhered to many public and political workers of Asia even long before the Second World War. But their number grew considerably under the effect of the self-rejected struggle of Soviet people against the Fascist enslavers.

The end of the Second World War was marked, therefore, by reinforcing of revolutionary process which subsequently led to the victory of the Socialist Revolution in many countries of Europe and Asia, to the creation of world socialist system. To the new step/stage rose movement of international workers. Simultaneously the colonial system of imperialism under the strikes/shocks of national liberation movement entered the period of its decomposition/decay.

Was strained the general crisis of capitalism. Were activated/promoted imperialistic forces. At the same time on the experience of war millions of people were convinced of the continuous connection/bond between the safety of the peoples and their independence.

In the struggle for the independence the special importance acquires association/unification and strengthening of the great forces of the present - world socialist system, the international working class and national liberation movement. Being joined in the anti-imperialist front and helping each other, these forces are capable of suppressing the aggressive activities of imperialism and colonialism, of attaining strengthening peace and creation of conditions for the free development of the peoples.

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Chapter Nine.

The Communist Party - inspirer and the organizer of the victory of the Soviet people.

1. Celebration of the policy VKP(b) during the years of war.

Entire meaning of its activity in the period of the Great Patriotic War the Communist Party saw in bringing of the Soviet people, interiors of which it came out, to the victory over the Fascist-German aggressors. The party solidly knew that the laborers of the USSR, who constructed socialism, are located their greatest conquests, despite what difficulties and victim. But the titanic power of national masses should have been skillfully directed toward the rout of very strong enemy. And the party with the honor fulfilled this its duty before the people.

During the years of war against the Hitler aggressors VKP(b) proved to be at elevation because within the time, which passed after the October Revolution, supervisory personnel and the rank-and-file communists, carrying on a persistant struggle with the internal and

external enemies, reforming/redisposing on socialist principles social relations, accumulated enormous experience of initiative, creative work. For two with the small of decade the parties laboring under the leadership not only broke White Guards and interventionists, but also raised their country of the ruins, they converted it, in the past backward, into the powerful power with the developed industry and the foremost agriculture.

In the years of class battles and basic social and economic conversions our party gave the destructive resistance to flows hostile to it and to the grouping of left opportunists, Trotskyites, right capitulators, different kind of nationalists and achieved complete unity of its numbers. Increasingly more converging with the masses, being converted from avant garde of the proletariat into avant garde of all Soviet people, VKP(b) grew quantitatively, after supplementing its numbers with the best people from the workers, peasants, intelligentsia.

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If in the period of the preparation for the October armed uprising (1917) in the Bolshevik Party were counted 240 thousand people, and at the height of civil war (1919) - 350 thousand, then to the time of the first five-year plan (1929) in it there were more than 1 mln.,

and at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War (1941) - 3965 thousand people ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16574, sheet 20, 31, 32. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, less than for quarter of century the party grew 16.5 times; for each of 27 people in the adult population of the Soviet Union fell one member or candidate of the Communist Party ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the results of the All-Union inventory of the population of 1959. USSR (compound volume). M., Gosstatizdat of TsSU of the USSR, 1962, page 49. ENDFOOTNOTE.

At the beginning of 1941 in VKP(b) were counted 657 thousand people with secondary education and 241 thousand - with the highest, that comprised 23.2 percent of the entire party. Favorable was the relationship/ratio between the old and young members of the party: not long before the war of communists at the age from 18 to 30 years were counted 36.7 percent ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16574, sheet 13, 38. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In its activity the Communist Party was guided by Marxism-Leninism by represented by itself the one-piece/entire system of philosophical, economic and socio-political views. Marxist-Leninist ideology forces to take activity such as it exists, to follow the objective laws of social development, strictly taking into account and in every possible way using them. It also forces to proceed from the world-wide historical goal of the formation of socialism and communism, i.e., from the basic interests of working class and laborers of all countries. This harmonic combination in Marxism-Leninism of authentic scientific nature with the highest revolutionary character predetermines its complete agreement to the requirements of the violent epoch of transition from capitalism to the communism, gives the possibility to find responses even to the most complicated questions of internal and international life. "The theory of Marxism, illuminated by the bright light of new, world-wide-rich, the experience of revolutionary workers, wrote V. I. Lenin, helped us to understand entire laws governing occurring" '.

FOOTNOTE '. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 28, page 456. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Our party in the pre-war period was located fully armed with the Marxist-Leninist teaching, it had available the richest theoretical legacy of V. I. Lenin and it thoroughly developed him.

Exceptionally important significance had the system of the party leadership of the country, which provided for, first of all, the realization of political, ideological and organizational functions. The correct interdependence of these functions ensured successful fulfillment by the Soviet people of the role conscious creator of the history, most powerful motivating power of public progress, irreconcilable champion against the internal and international counterrevolution. VKP(b), relying on its revolutionary theory, developed the policy, designed for the rout of White Guards and interventionists, for the restoration/reduction of national economy, in industrialization of the country and collectivization of agriculture, to the realization of cultural revolution. The party inspired masses to the struggle for these great goals. It took all necessary practical, organizational measures for the realization of these goals. The laborers of all world based on the example to the USSR were convinced of the fact that workers and the peasants, after taking authority in their hands, can without the capitalists and the landowners successfully to build their socialist state.

Our country would achieve even greater successes, if not the personality cult of Stalin who arose in the thirties and caused serious loss to normal life and to the work of the party. However, personality cult could not destroy the system established in the years of the Soviet regime of the leading activity of the Leninist

party after shoulders of which there were historical accomplishments - first Socialist Revolution, the victory in the civil war, the formation of socialism under the conditions of hostile capitalist encirclement.

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Internal structure of VKP(b) before the Great Patriotic War was such: our party had 184238 primary organizations, including 13799 in the army and in the Navy, 424 district committees in the cities and 4075 - in the rural terrain, 416 urban, 16 neighborhood, 133 regional and 6 Kray committees, 15 CC of the communist parties of the union republics and central committee VKP(b) ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16574, sheet 41. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This structure made it possible to envelop by party influence all sides of the life of socialist society and to guide its development.

On the eve the Great Patriotic War the forces of the party were distributed as follows: in the industry were occupied 910 thousand communists, in the agriculture - 623 thousand, in the field of transportation and in the installations of connection/bond - 325

thousand, on the construction - 43 thousand, in the remaining branches of economy - 65 thousand, in the municipal services, to trade and on the enterprises of public nutrition - 249 thousand, in the field of science, art, the press, public education and public health - 364 thousand, in the financial installations - 54 thousand, in the administrative organs - 373 thousand, in the leading organs of the party - 119 thousand, in the leading organs of the trade unions and other public organizations - 43 thousand. In the Red Army and the Navy were located 654 thousand communists, 143 thousand communists were counted among the students and the pensioners ².

FOOTNOTE ². Ibid, sheet 20, 30, 39. ENDFOOTNOTE.

These numbers show that before the war main forces of the party were occupied in the national economy, and also in the organizations and the installations, which serve the domestic-material and cultural needs of laborers. The party in a most serious manner prepared the people, also, for the defense of the socialist fatherland - it isolated the necessary number of forces for strengthening of the defensive capacity of the country, after concentrating in the Red Army and the Navy of approximately 17 percent of its composition.

Thus, the Communist Party at the moment of the attack of Hitler Germany in the USSR was the hardened/tempered and united political

organization, capable of taking upon itself entire responsibility for waging of begun war and its successful outcome.

Fascist aggression the Soviet Union answered by a liberating, just war. Determining the political purposes of the Great Patriotic War, VKP(b) called the Soviet people to be located freedom and independence of its native land, conquest of socialism, to completely rout enemy, and to also fulfill international duty with respect to the laborers of other countries - to render fraternal by aid to the peoples of Europe in their struggle for the liberation from Fascist supremacy.

The party considered that the achievement of the expressed goals in the war with this strong enemy as Hitler Germany, will require from the people of the stress/voltage of all forces. But V. I. Lenin learned communists to believe in the forces of the people, learned them to exercise correct political leadership of the country both under the conditions of the world and under war time. The party remembered the rule/handspike formulated by V. I. Lenin which it followed in its policy and which ensured the success in the struggle with the White Guards and the interventionists. "This rule consists in the fact that once the work reached before the war, the everything must be subordinated to the interests of war, entire internal life of the country must be subordinated to war, not least

oscillation/vibration on this score is inadmissible" 3.

FOOTNOTE 3. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 31, page 111-112. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Therefore the general line of the policy VKP(b) and, consequently, also Soviet state for a second time became the organization of the national defense of the socialist fatherland.

Nationwide status - concept political, it it cannot be approached with one quantitative measure, being limited to simple indication of the fact that in the war participate the enormous masses of people. The war of aggression in which for Hitlerites it was possible to draw the large strata of the German people, was nevertheless antinational in its most extreme expression.

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Imperialistic power, even if it conducts the just war (for example, England, beginning from the second period of the Second World War), is not capable of carrying out principle of nationwide status. Reason to that are capitalist system, its exploiter nature, mercenary interests of the imperialistic bourgeoisie.

The principle of nationwide status is organically inherent in

the policy of the defense of the socialist fatherland. It found its complete expression in 1941-1945. At the beginning of war in our country was already constructed socialism, and the Communist Party could concentrate on the conquest of the victory of the effort/force of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, all Soviet people.

The Leninist policy of the national defense of our fatherland was based on the use of historical advantages of socialism over capitalism in the wartime conditions. This policy guided the activity of the factors, which determined the victorious outcome of the Great Patriotic War. These factors they were: the socialist economy, transferred into the military rails; the Soviet political formation/order, fitted out to the needs of war; the socialist ideology, which served the work of the defense of our native land; the Soviet Armed Forces; the struggle of Soviet people in the rear of enemy. Together with the internal factors important role in the achievement of victory played the factor external - antifascist coalition of the states and peoples, where together with the Soviet Union entered England, USA and other capitalist powers, and also movement of the resistance of the peoples of Europe and Asia.

VKP(b), as in their time required V. I. Lenin, rebuilt entire their work to a military footing. The leading activity of the party was first of the factors, which determined the victorious outcome of

the Great Patriotic War. This activity was carried out during the years of war as in peacetime, in three interdependent/interconnected directions/axes.

The policy of the defense of the socialist fatherland was spread both to the separate regions of public life, subordinated to war, and to waging of war as a whole. The manufacture of the correct policy supposed not only the careful accounting of the real correlation of its forces and forces of enemy, but also the knowledge of the general/common/total correlation of the forces of the progress and reaction in the world scale. Marxist-Leninist teaching would guarantee under the condition of creative approach to it a precise analysis of all possible situations such as complicated they not were, and it provided in the struggle against the Fascist-German aggressors the success of the political leadership of the party, i.e., its most important function.

It is small, however, to work out the correct policy. It is must also that it they would realize and would share the million-strong masses. In connection with this second main trend of the leading activity VKP(b) during the years of war there was continuous ideological operation. The strong/firm daily ideological connection/bond of the party with the Soviet people led to the fact that he understood well basic goals and tasks, which stood before the

rear and the front, it was convinced of the correctness of the party policy, selflessly and selfless it supported it.

The third main trend of the leading activity of the Bolshevik party was organization work. Its essence consisted in attaining realizing of the policy of the party by practical use by a Soviet state and by the public organizations of all forces and means, necessary for the decisive rout of Hitler Germany. The creative realization of the policy of the party lay on the shoulders of the organs of Soviet state, which operationally solved all crucial problems which were placed before them in the course of war. Enormous role in the mobilization of the labor efforts/forces of working class, in the rendering of comprehensive aid to front played the trade unions. On Soviet peasantry the party had an effect through the kolkhozes, which united million toilers of village. The combat assistant of the party during the war as always, was the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League.

End section.

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It with the honor fulfilled the sacred duty before the native land. In its organizational work of VKP(b) it leaned on the inviolable confidence and the patriotism of the Soviet people.

Of the parties, its multifaceted leading activity we are obligated by the fact that during the years of war consistently was put into practice the principle of the nationwide status of the defense of the socialist fatherland and was in reality provided unity of the rear and front in the struggle against the Fascist-German imperialism.

The work of the party in the period of war would be still more fruitfully, if not the personality cult of Stalin. Although during the war the individual activities of Stalin were sharply limited to the independent decisions of the members of TsK VKP(b), which headed the individual sections of state, political, economic and military work, and also to the active activity of local party and Soviet organizations, the nevertheless Leninist principle of the

collectivity of party and state leadership and the Leninist norms of party life were violated as in the pre-war years. During war, for example, it was not convoked not one congress of VKP(b), not one conference and only once took place the plenum of TsK. This negatively had effect on the leading activity of the party, but it overcame the difficulties, connected with the personality cult, and it proved to be at elevation.

Determining the economic policy to the period of war, the Communist Party proceeded from the fact that the Red Army with entire its moral and political superiority over the enemy will not be able to achieve victory, if it will not be provided into entire the increasing sizes/dimensions by first-class military technology. Therefore the developed on the directives parties plans provided for this development of military economy, who would afford the possibility to rapidly exceed Hitler Germany on the production of material-technical resources of the conduct of combat operations.

The largest success of the economic policy of VKP(b) was creation in the deep rear, in the east of the country, the new centers of defense industry. Many areas of Volga Region, Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia were converted into the powerful arsenal of the Red Army. In the adjustment of giant military production, in the use for this purpose of the achievements of

science and technology, in realizing of economic and technical policy of the party important role played its economic cards, Soviet scientists, the designers technology, local party organs and the primary party organizations.

For the greatest economic difficulties it was necessary to overcome during the organization of agricultural production. And nevertheless because of the collective farm formation/order for our state it was possible to ensure the supply with rations of army and population.

VKP(b) considered it necessary already in the course of war, in proportion to liberation from the Fascist aggressors of Soviet territory, not only to begin the restoration/reduction of the destroyed national economy, but also to systematically increase the volume of reducing works, or to translate an increasing number of enterprises to the output of peaceful consumption.

Socialism gives the possibility all public production to subordinate to the noble/precious goal of the defense of the Soviet native land. The skillful and flexible policy VKP(b) made it possible to most fully realize this possibility in the heavy years of struggle with the German imperialism.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War convincingly demonstrated that the Soviet state, at disposal of which are located the means of production, which are people's property/ownership, capably with the effectiveness, inaccessible for the capitalist state, to use economic service lives of the country in the interests of the victory over the enemy.

So it was also in all remaining regions of our life, because Soviet political formation/order was the best form of realizing of the policy of VKP(b). The branched net/system of the party, state and public organizations, fitted out to the needs of war, made it possible with the maximum purposefulness to guide patriotic energy, initiative and activity of the Soviet people to the merciless struggle about by Fascist aggressors.

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Because of the Soviet political formation/order, which was directly leaning on the alliance of working class and collective farm peasantry, to the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, their ideopolitical and moral unity, our country could appear against the enemy as the united combat camp.

In the sphere of ideological the party strove, first of all,

that the noble/precious idea of the defense of the socialist fatherland would solidly master the consciousness of the Soviet people, would become for it the source of all patriotic activities. It was importantly also that the Soviet people even more deeply would be penetrated by the humane idea of equality of rights and friendship of all peoples, international solidarity of laborers in the struggle against the Hitler enslavers. These basic ideas, which passed testing in the fire/light of war, they showed their great vital force. They successfully opposed the low, savage ideas of fascism, which reflected the tendency of monopolist capital toward the conquest of foreign territories, to the annihilation of the socialist country, to enslavement and to the destruction of other peoples.

The Communist Party in every possible way fortified in the Soviet people such spiritual qualities as love for the native land, confidence in the victory, tendency to conquer enemy, etc. These qualities helped our people to withstand under incredibly difficult war time with Hitler Germany and to attain its utter defeat.

The policy of the party in the ideological region provided for also systematic and persistent struggle with the negative phenomena in the spiritual life of Soviet society. War, as noted V. I. Lenin, some hardens, others it breaks. The Great Patriotic War broke partly people politically and morally unstable, with the powerful vestiges

it passed in the consciousness and the conduct. However, hostile elements, mainly from the former exploiting classes, used war in order to in every possible way harm us and to help fascists. However, the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people was betrayed to socialism. Therefore negative phenomena did not receive any wide acceptance.

The basic line of the military policy VKP(b) consisted of in the course of war planning and conducting of such system of measures in the region of construction, training, education and combat use of the Red Army and the Navy, which would ensure the utter defeat of the Fascist-German military forces. active wires of the policy of the party in the armed forces they were the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command. People's commissariat of defense with the General Staff, the main political controls of the Red Army and the Navy, the worked on the laws/rights of the military departments of TsK VKP(b), military councils of fronts and armies, navies and flotillas, command and political cadres, army and naval political organs and the party organization.

The flexibility of the military policy of the party is well visible based on the example of the temporary/time limitation of one-man command. From the middle of July 1941 through October 1942, in the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War, in our armed

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BEFORE THE BATTLE. From a picture by artist V. Kuznetsov.

forces, as is known, there existed the institute of military commissars. Specifically, under the conditions when the Red Army suffered serious damages/defeats, but command personnel, especially in the tactical team, did not often have a sufficient military training and yet did not have time to acquire combat experience, military commissar, as the representative of the party and government, together with the commander bore full responsibility for execution by troop unit, partly, by the large unit/formation of combat mission. But when the heaviest time remained behind, the institute of military commissars, introduced as extreme measure, it was abolished and the party restored/reduced the one-man command, which provided for the full responsibility of commander for military and political leadership by the military forces trusted to it.

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BKP(b) concentrated in the Red Army and by military-Morse the Navy it is more than half of its composition. It fortified in the course of war leadership of life and by the combat activity of the armed forces. The political organs and the party organizations constantly improved forms and methods of the party-political work, bending and operationally applied them in conformity with situation at the front and character of combat operations, skillfully replaced some forms and methods by others, more expedient and effective.

Conducting the untiring work in the military forces, communists expanded and reinforced their connections/bonds with the soldiers, the sergeants and the officers.

The political organs and the party organizations, carrying out the policy of the party, had a daily effect on all sides of life and combat activity of military forces and brought up in each communist a feeling of responsibility for the state of their unit, subunit.

Particular attention turned for the unconditional and precise execution of the commands of command element, to the provision of organization and order/formation in the military forces. The solid support of the commanding composition were communists and Komsomol members. They conducted great explanatory work, were the example to attentiveness and to discipline, courage also of heroism.

The important place in the work of political organs occupied the organization of aid to command element in the combat training of military forces. The Communist Party required from its organizations in the army and in the Navy so that they would in every possible way contribute to the dissemination of positive combat experience and decisively they struggled with the manifestations of ignorance, inertia and complacency in those commanders who preferred to act in the old ways. The party required so that the new combat technology,

with which the Red Army in sufficient quantities it supplied the rear, would be mastered within the shortest periods and skillfully would be applied in combat. Organizing work on the study of new weaponry, commanders received the support of the political organs and party organizations. Communists and Komsomol members attempted first to master combat materiel and they helped to master its remaining soldiers.

On the instructions of the party was conducted persistent struggle with the deficiencies in the command by troops and the organization of their cooperation, in the use of military technology on the field of battle, in the work of the headquarters, etc. Simultaneously the political organs and the party organizations strictly followed the fact so that all soldiers in proper time and completely would receive that placed to them contentment and clothing/uniform, they worried about evacuation of casualties and patients, about the way of life of soldier and the conditions for their rest in the interruptions between combat.

This entire multilateral work of political organs and party organizations which they fulfilled jointly with the command cadres, cemented the numbers of the defenders of the native land and it contributed successful realizing of military policy VKP(b). Not randomly in the welcoming speech of the CC CPSU to the main political

administration of the Soviet Armed Forces in connection with its 40-year-anniversary it was noted: "in the world-wide historical victories of the Soviet army and the Navy the worthy place it occupies the combat organizational and ideopolitical work of political organs and party organizations".

The policy of the national defense of the socialist fatherland provided for the most decisive opposition to enemy from the side of the Soviet population, which proved to be after the front line. Central committee VKP(b) called all Soviet people to show/render the persistant resistance to invaders, to create for them the intolerable conditions, to break away all their measures for exploitation and plunder of the occupied areas, to mercilessly annihilate themselves both the aggressors themselves and their accomplices. Considerable attention was paid to the organization of party underground and to the development of partisan movement as the most effective form of struggle in the rear of enemy.

The enormous success of the policy of the party was the fact that the multimillion national masses, which were being found on the territory occupied, remained accurate to socialist cause. Fascist occupationists by all means - from the ideological processing to the most cruel terror - attempted to enslave Soviet people, to force them to renounce the Soviet regime and the socialist views.

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But the laborers of the mass of the areas seized by enemy, in spite of the persistent efforts of bourgeois nationalists, together with entire Soviet people they spoke against occupationists. The armed struggle partisan was the peculiar second front, discovered by Soviet people in the territory occupied with Hitlerites.

The most important and complex problem, which arose before the party during the years of war, consisted in closing of together the efforts/forces of the rear and front for the purpose of the rout of Hitler enslavers. For this was organized the planned/planning military economy, which made it possible continuously supply front with all supplies, necessary for the successful introduction of the armed struggle. For these purposes under the unremitting control by TsK VKP(b) and local party organizations effectively acted the system of the military training of adult masculine population, the system of personnel procurement and preparation for new army formations, which was the source of the constant replenishment of front by human reserves. Was also fixed the close interdependence of front with the rear, as a result of which strategic planning became the organic composite/compound component part of the state planning. The rear

knew the real needs of front and in proper time them it satisfied, and front, receiving from the rear of force and means, skillfully used them in the armed struggle with the enemy.

The theoretical weaponry of our military personnel was Soviet military science, called consider objective laws governing the armed struggle and to develop/process on this basis the ways of conducting the military activities. Its fundamental advantage over the Fascist-German military science depended on the fact, than our socialist formation/order, which had available planned/planning national economy, powerful/thick military economy, it gave possibility virtually, in the fields of giant battles, to carry out in the most complete volume an idea of unity of the army and people. The large-scale strategical operation of Soviet military forces exactly was such way of conducting the armed struggle, which in each this interval of time to the greatest extent concentrated the combined efforts/forces of rear and front of our country for the rout of Fascist army. In the battles in the environs of Moscow, in Volga, in Kursk area, in Dnepr, in the Belorussian, Yassy-kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin operations/processes Hitler aggressors completely tested on themselves sacred anger of the people, which defended socialism. Each large-scale strategic offensive operation was, figuratively speaking, in the destructive sword of the policy of the national defense of the socialist fatherland.

Thus, as a result of the correct policy of ~~UKP~~(b), which ensured the maximum mobilization of the forces of the Soviet people and their skillful use both in the rear and at the front, entire/all Soviet country became the belligerent country.

To the achievement of the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War to the sizable degree contributed foreign policy of Soviet state. Determining the main trends of this policy, the Communist Party attempted to ensure such international conditions which would favor the rout of enemy and the restoration/reduction of the lasting peace. Soviet diplomacy, acting in accordance with the instructions of the party, tried to, first of all, attain the creation of the wide antifascist front which would combine the efforts/forces of socialist state, capitalist powers, which appeared against Germany, Italy and Japan, and also the effort/force of the liberation movement of the peoples of Europe and Asia. Primary task of our foreign policy consisted of maintaining and strengthening of the anti-Hitlerite coalition of the states and peoples, contributing the Soviet Union is the smog to the end to fulfill its liberating mission in a just war.

The accomplishment of this mission was harness with the great

difficulties. The USA ruling circles and England, forced in the established situation to go to the cooperation with the Soviet Union in the struggle against the general/common/total enemy, did not forego, however, their imperialistic plans.

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They sabotaged the fulfillment of the most important obligations which took upon themselves as participants in the coalition. From the Communist Party and the Soviet government were required numerous efforts/forces, in order to bring together on no concepts of American and English reaction, to maintain coalition, to give to it maximum effectiveness. At the same time the experience of the Second World War gave examples of fruitful cooperation between the USSR, USA, England and by France on many all-political and military questions.

The Communist Party even in the course of war revealed enormous interest in the manufacture of documents and the creation of the international organizations, which guarantee after war preservation of peace. However, a difference in the political purposes which pursued in the war participants in the anti-Hitlerite coalition, caused their dissimilar relation also to the basic problems of postwar construction. The party understood, that the American and English ruling circles during the definition/determination of the

postwar construction of Germany and other countries will try to use the fruits of the victory achieved for their mercenary goals.

VKP(b) vividly demonstrated its solidarity with all peoples, which were struggling for the freedom and the independence, for democracy and world. The Soviet Union showed/rendered complete support to the movement of resistance, which was widely developed in the countries of Europe and Asia which underwent aggression from the side of German and Japanese imperialism. At the same time the USSR adhered the policy of nonintervention into the works of other states. It condemned the line of the ruling circles of USA and England, their spread regimes welcome to them in liberated countries in spite of will peoples. The policy of the Communist Party consisted of after the annihilation of Fascist oppression granting to the liberated peoples authentic independence and giving to them the possibility to independently determine further development of its countries.

Foreign policy of the USSR during the war attested to the fact that the socialist state, led by the Communist Party, solidly stands on the positions of proletarian internationalism and is the consistent defender of peace and public progress.

The policy of the national defense of the socialist fatherland opposed, first of all, the Fascist-German doctrine "Blitzkrieg" and

of total war, and also to the doctrine of waging war with others hands, by which they adhered to the Government of England and USA.

The policy of German fascism, deprived of scientific basis, was maximally reactionary by nature. Hitler aggressors planned shortly to annihilate the country of socialism - main stronghold of international working and national liberation movement. They did everything that they could in order to attain the realization of its concept. For the purpose of the rapid rout of the USSR was carried out most careful and most comprehensive preparation/training, to attack us the strike/shock of unprecedented force. In accordance with the principle of totality the war was planned/glided, which pitilessly was destroyed. When the doctrine of "blitzkrieg" suffered break-up and this they understood Fascist heads, occurred transition to the policy of total war in its complete volume. The ruling top of Nazi Germany declared the total mobilization of forces and means of the country for waging of prolonged war, and which it will be completed by victory. In the maximum degree were used the economic, political, ideological, military, diplomatic possibilities of German imperialism, the ideological, military, diplomatic possibilities of German imperialism, in order to stave off rout and annihilation of Fascist political formation/order. However, nothing Hitlerites it helped.

The policy of our allies on the antifascist coalition carried dual character, it was not and could not be consecutively/serially valid. One of the basic lines in the policy of the dominant classes of USA and England expressed their tendency to wage war so that the Soviet Union as a result of bloody struggle with Hitler Germany would prove to be extremely weakened and it became the secondary power, incapable to influence the course of world events.

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The policy of the national defense of the socialist fatherland, which conducted our Leninist party in 1941-1945, was really scientific and consecutively/serially valid. The most success of this policy revealed consisting in the fact that because of it the Soviet Union played in the Second World War the decisive role. As a result were created the favorable conditions for the over-throw of the authority of capitalists and landowners by the peoples of many countries of Europe and Asia, occurred a basic change of the correlation of world forces in favor of socialism and democracy, to the detriment of the imperialism and the reaction. The objective need for the victory of the new above the old, expressed in the policy (VKP(b), opened to itself the route/path through all obstacles.

2. Organizational activity of the Communist Party.

Politics VKP(b) determined its organizational and ideological functions which, in turn, provided conducting the party policy into the life. At the basis of the organizational function of our party lay/rested the Leninist idea: "the Soviet republic was besieged by enemy. It must be uniform military camp not in the words, but in reality. Entire work of all installations to adapt to the war and to change militarily" ! ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works vol. 29, p 403. ENDFOOTNOTE.

For the realization of this idea the party extensively used organizational forms and methods of operation, worked out by it under V. I. Lenin's leadership in the period of civil war. Again acquired in the party timely significance the greatest centralization, strictest, adjacent to the military discipline, maximum operational efficiency in the work and personal responsibility of each communist for the assigned work. These requirements escape/ensued from the objective conditions, from the need of reinforcing the leading role of the party in the defense of the socialist fatherland.

The center of gravity of the organizational activity of communists was postponed by leadership of the armed forces and by

military economy. Organizing the defense of the native land, the party directed its best cadres toward the front and into the key branches of economy. They had to strengthen the combat efficiency of the army and navy, ensure the creation of powerful/thick military economy, fix the uninterrupted supply of military forces with all with necessary for the rout of enemy.

Active participation in the leadership of the party, by the country and by army received prominent party and statesmen, members of TsK VKP(b): A. A. Andreev, N. A. Voznesensky, K. Ye. Voroshilov, A. A. Zhdanov, R. S. Zemlyachk, M. I. Kalinin, A. N. Kosygin, O. V. Kuusinen, D. Z. Manuil'skiy, A. I. Mikoyan, M. A. Suslov, N. S. Khrushchev, N. M. Shvernik, A. S. Shcherbakov, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy et al.

Members and candidates into members in TsK VKP(b), the members of central audition comission headed local party, Soviet and public organizations. Especially revealed themselves as skillful political heads and organizers I. P. Boytsov, G. A. Borkov, N. I. Gusarov, P. I. Doronin, V. G. Zhavoronkov, S. B. Zadionchenko, Ya. E. Kalnberzin, N. S. Patolichev, P. K. Ponomarenko, D. M. Popov, M. i. Rodionov, P. I. Seleznev, N. A. Skvortsov, A. Yu. Snehkus, which worked during entire war by the first secretaries of TsK of the communist parties of the union republics, territorial commitees and regional committees

of VKP(b).

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Communists, important organizers of economy, headed the most important people's commissariats. By tank industry, for example, led V. A. Malyshev, air - A. I. Shakhurin, by the industry of armament - D. F. Ustinov, ammunition - B. L. Vannikov, by heavy machine building - P. S. Zazakov, by machine-tool construction - A. I. Yefremov, by ferrous metallurgy - I. F. Tevosyan, by nonferrous metallurgy - P. F. Lomako, by electrical industry - I. G. Kabanov, by coal industry - V. V. Vakhrushev, by the petroleum industry - I. K. Sedin, by the production of electric power - D. G. Zhimerin.

Immediately after the attack of Fascist Germany in the USSR to the military work on the decision of the Politbureau of TsK VKP(b) were directed 54 members candidate for memberships in TsK and 13 members of central audition commission. By the armed forces from the local party organizations arrived 120 secretaries of the Kray and regional committees of the party, and also TsK of the communist parties of the union republics.

To the leading posts in the Red Army and the Navy the party advanced the remarkable cadres of military leaders, which it helped

to reveal in full weight their leadership talent. Multiplying combat traditions and glory of Soviet weaponry, these cadres of communist-military leaders ensured bright preparation/training and conducting the operations/processes, which were completed by the utter defeat of the Fascist-German and Japanese armies.

In art of troop leading were especially characterized by commanders of the fronts and the Navies: I. Kh. Bagramyan, A. M. Vasilevsky, N. F. Vatutin, L. A. Govorov, A. G. Golovko, A. I. Yeremenko, G. K. Zhukov, I. S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K. A. Meretskov, F. S. Oktyabr'skiy, I. Ye. Petrov, K. K. Rokossovskiy, V. D. Sokolovsiy, f. i. Tolbukhin, V. F. Tributs, I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, I. S. Yumashev. Together with these troop leaders/generals, fostered by the party during the years of patriotic war, one cannot fail to mention the representatives of "old guards", whose names were entered even into the heroic chronicle of civil war - S. M. Budenniy, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. K. Timoshenko, B. M. Shaposhnikov.

To the posts of the members of military councils and commanders/chiefs of the political organs of fronts, navies, armies and flotillas the party advanced prominent political heads and organizers. In their number they were: L. I. Brezhnev, M. A. Burmistenko, S. F. Galadzhev, K. A. Gurov, A. A. Yepishev, A. S. Zheltov, M. A. Kozlov, K. V. Kraynyukov, A. A. Kuznetsov, D. S.

Leonov, D. S. Lestev, M. V. Mzhavanadze, I. V. Rogov, Z. T. Serdyuk, N. Ye. Subbotin, I. Z. Susaykov, A. N. Tevchenkov, G. L. Tumanyan, I. V. Shikin et al.

In the leadership of the armed struggle, by the largest strategical operations the visible place belongs to communists - the chief/leading workers of General Staff, heads of the headquarters of fronts, which command of branches of the armed forces and by the arms of service.

In preparation/training and conducting the operations/processes very important role belonged also to commanders of combined-arms, tank, air armies and to flotillas. Many of these military leaders earned wide popularity in the party and in the people.

During the years of war the party brought up the remarkable cadres of the commanders of the corps, divisions and separate special units. They were the disciplined and conscious executors/performers of operational concepts and plans of command element. These were creative military specialists, who made a great contribution to the development of our military art.

War required basic change in the arrangement of all party cadres. This is evident from the table on page 342.

Thus, already in the first six months of the Great Patriotic War the party concentrated in the armed forces more than 40 percent of its composition. but in one-and-a-half years of war in I stand in beauty army and the Navy, to the guerilla detachments and the underground party organizations of the areas occupied were directed 1532 thousand communists. In spite of enormous losses among the communists, in the military party organizations at the beginning of 1943 were counted 1938 thousand members and the candidates of the party, or almost 3 times more than in the beginning of war with the Fascist-German aggressors.

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TsK VKP(b) and the local party organizations carried out whole system of measures for strengthening of political organs and party organizations of the Red Army and the Navy. The party conducted one for another several mobilizations of communists of the key personnel of the party, Soviet economic, trade-union and Komsomol organs for the political work in the armed forces. As a result of these mobilizations at the leadership of political organs and by the party organizations of the Red Army and the Navy arrived tens of thousands of politically mature/ripe and experienced communists. Only Leningrad

and Moscow Bolsheviki gave army and phot of 20 thousand political workers ².

FOOTNOTE ². TsPA IML, f. 17, pub. 48, d. 1173, l. 124; Inv. No 8826, l. 1. ENDFOOTNOTE.

For reinforcing in the regiments of the party-political effect of the Politbureau at the end of June 1941 decreed to send in the special order/formation to the front as "political warriors" more than 132 thousand active and comparatively well prepared in military sense communists and Komsomol members. First 24 thousand "political warriors" during July arrived to the front ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. Archives MO USSR, f. 32, pub. 11296, d. 264, ll. 73, 74. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This Communist replenishment played exceptional role in strengthening of the Red Army, especially in the beginning of the war when in some units was observed instability. Political "warriors" by their selfless devotion to the native land and by courage in the struggle with the enemy raised the fighting spirit of soldiers, cemented subunits and units. About this testified numerous reports from the army in the field. this is what, for example, communicated in the main political administration of the Red Army the military

council of the Western Front: "the Communist replenishment poured in the unit strengthened the morale and political awareness of personnel, revived the party-political work in the subunits. Discipline and their combat readiness was raised" '.

Ibid
FOOTNOTE ' . ~~There~~, 11. 85, 86. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The central committee of the party and the main political controls of the Red Army and the Navy, and also the military councils of the fronts and Navies paid constant attention to the activity of military commissars and political instructors. To these posts were selected/taken the communists most experienced in the party work and in military science. For the re-inforcement of the contingent of military commissars and commanders/chiefs of the political departments of the divisions during November 1941 were mobilized on the decision of the Politbureau 2600 leading party and Soviet workers of Moscow, Leningrad and other largest centers of the country '.

Ibid
FOOTNOTE ' . ~~There~~, 1. 39. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Allocation of workers of the party ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Information for 1941 is given on 1 July, i.e., on the principle of war. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Годы (на 1 января)	(2) Всего комму- нистов (в тыс.)	(3) В том числе		(4) В процентах к общему количеству	
		(5) в террито- риальных парт- организациях	(6) в военных парторганиза- циях	(5) в террито- риальных парт- организациях	(6) в военных парторганиза- циях
1941 ¹	3965	3311	654	83,5	16,5
1942	3064	1764	1300	57,6	42,4
1943	3854	1916	1938	49,7	50,3
1944	4918	2216	2702	45,0	55,0
1945	5760	2729	3031	47,4	52,6
1946	5513	3472	2041	63,0	37,0

Key: (1). Years (on 1 January). (2). In all communists (in thousand). (3). Among other things. (4). In percentages to total number. (5). in territorial party organizations. (6). in military party organizations.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Information for 1941 is given on 1 July, i.e., on the principle of war. ENDFOOTNOTE.

After brief preparation/training in the military educational institutions these cards obtained designation/purpose into the army in the field.

The restoration/reduction of complete one-man command during October 1942 was the measure of the Communist Party and Soviet government for further strengthening of the Red Army and the Navy. One-man command raised the role of commanders, increased their responsibility for entire life and combat activity of military forces. At the same time it made it possible to concentrate entire attention of political organs in reinforcing of party-political work, in the education of personnel of the army and navy.

For strengthening of the armed forces of TsK VKP(b) extensively were used not only party cadres, but also mass youth Communist organization, loyal assistant of the party - VLKSM [99sp05 - All-Union Lenin Young Communist League]. Together with the communists Leninist komsomol composed the combat nucleus of the Soviet Armed Forces. On the eve war in the Red Army and the Navy were located more than 1726 thousand Komsomol members, or about third of all personnel of the army and navy ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Archive. of MO SSSR [99sp07 - Ministry of Defense of the USSR], f. 32, pub. 22795, d. 2, l. 12. ENDFOOTNOTE.

As a result of mobilizations, carried out by TsK of VLKSM, and also recurrent appeals the numbers of army and naval komsomol during the years of war supplemented 3500 additional thousand people ².

FOOTNOTE ². Archive of TsK of VLKSM. Materials to the report to TsK of VLKSM to the XI congress of komsomol, ll. 46, 84. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Fighting in the most responsible and most dangerous sectors of combat operations, Komsomol members earned the enormous love of soldiers. Their authority was so it was great, that each young soldier and commander considered for themselves as the great honor to be the member of the Young Communist League. In all within the time of war VLKSM entered more than 5 mln. soldiers, sergeants and officers ³.

Ibid
FOOTNOTE ³. ~~These~~, l. 98. ENDFOOTNOTE.

TsK VKP(b), fortifying the effect of the party in the Red Army and the Navy, attained that party party actives grew by the large force. Thus, toward the end of the first year of war in the army were counted about 100 thousand political workers, more than 70 thousand members of the Party bureau of primary organizations, 73 thousand

party organizers of company party organizations, 500 thousand communists from the command and commanding personnel. Party layer on the arms of service comprised: in the aviation - 50 percent, in such military forces - 45, in the artillery - 18, in the rifle troops - 8-9 percent '.

FOOTNOTE '. Archives MO USSR, f. 32, pub. 11309, d. 136, ll. 103, 104, 116. ENDFOOTNOTE.

As a whole the communists and Komsomol members comprised not less than 40 percent of the entire strength of armed forces. This meant that each second or third soldier was communist or Komsomol member. In all combat subunits and auxiliary services there was an organized in the Party spirit-Komsomol nucleus. "In face of communists and Komsomol members, is said in the turning TsK of the party, Soviet government and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the soldiers of the armed forces in connection with the 40th anniversary of Socialist Revolution, soldiers saw the most stable, most fearless and disciplined soldiers, that stinted on either forces or life itself for the victory of just cause, in whom they themselves firmly believed and inspired by this faith/belief of others" '.

FOOTNOTE '. CPSU about the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

Collector/collection of documents 1917-1958. M., Gospolitizdat, 1958,

p 400. ENDFOOTNOTE.

It is characteristic that among the Soviet soldiers, rewarded for courage and valor, revealed in combat with the Fascist-German aggressors and Japanese imperialists, half compose the communists and Komsomol members. Characteristically also that that the communists and Komsomol members bore at the front the greatest losses.

Political organs and party organizations of the army and navy, fulfilling the instructions of TsK VKP(b), the directive of the main political controls and the commands of military councils, attempted to improve work in the military forces, to give to it wide scope, to make its continuous and efficient. However, in the party-political work there were shortages. Together with the objective reasons here to the sizable degree pronounced the deformed manifestations of formalism.

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In some units and large units/formations, as showed the checking, carried out by the central committee of the party, the method of conviction was moved aside to the background. Individual commanders and political workers daily explanatory work under difficult conditions for combat substituted by administration.

Formalism in army party-political work went on top. TsK VKP(b) discussed on 12 June, 1942, a question about the state of the party-political work in the military forces and recognized the activity of the main political administration of the Red Army of unsatisfactory. Main disadvantage was the bureaucratic style of leadership. Therefore, planning the routes/paths of an improvement in the political education of military forces, TsK of the party particular attention paid to the need of changing the style of the work of political organs. The apparatus of the main administration was supplemented by new workers. The commander/chief of the main political administration of the Red Army instead of L. Z. Mekhlis became the secretary of TsK VKP(b) A. S. Shcherbakov.

Was created the advice/council of military-political propaganda. Into its composition entered the members of TsK: A. S. Shcherbakov (chairman), A. A. Zhdanov, D. Z. Manuil'skiy, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, i. V. of horns (commander/chief for main political administration VMF) and others. Being consultative organ during the main political administration of the Red Army, advice/council was was intended to generalize the experience of party-political work in the military forces and to give recommendation regarding its improvement.

At its first conference on 16 June, 1942. The advice/council of military-political propaganda examined concrete/specific/actual measures for the realization of the resolutions of TsK VKP(b). Previous style in the activity of main political administration underwent sharp criticism. D. Z. Manuil'skiy, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy and other members of advice/council in their presentations showed that the brisk many-faceted work with the people was frequently substituted by paperwork. Political workers were overloaded by office responsibilities. The commissar of regiment, for example, had to write to 80 political reports in month ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Archives MO USSR, f. 32, pub. 11309, d. 157, l. 5.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The flow of the directives of the main political administration limited the initiative of political organs, trained them to await instructions on top. Advice/council recognized imperatively as necessary "to break these methods" it recommended to the main administration to place by the basic purpose of its work the education of soldier, to draw to the care of Red Army men the best propagandistic cadres of army ².


FOOTNOTE ². *Ibid* ~~There~~, 11. 13-20. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The advice/council of military-political propaganda had a beneficial effect on the activity of political organs. Its members left into the military forces and became acquainted with the work of party-political apparatus on the spot. For the examination of advice/council were carried the most diverse questions. Thus, for instance, in 1942 on it they discussed the work of the political administration of Western Front and political department of the 20th army among the military forces of the enemy, report of press bureau during the main political administration of the Red Army, state of party-political work at the Kalinin and Karelian fronts, and also in the 7th independent army, measure for political work among the population of the temporarily occupied areas. In 1943 the advice/council examined questions about the leadership of political organs of party organizations and about the deficiencies in the work of military-political organs on the domestic-material maintenance/servicing of the soldiers of the Red Army. In 1944, when the Red Army conducted the combat ones of activity already beyond the limits of our native land, the advice/council of military-political propaganda discussed the state of party-political work in the military forces of the 2nd Ukrainian front.

Regarding all discussed questions were worked out the qualified recommendations, which served as basis for the appropriate directives of the main political controls of the Red Army and the Navy.

EVERYTHING FOR THE FRONT, EVERYTHING FOR VICTORY!

Handing the flag of the GKO [State Defense Committee] to a Leningrad plant for successfully filling orders of the front (1942).



Meeting of railroad workers at the depo of the Likhobor station in order to give them the flag of the GKO (Moscow area railroad, (1941).

This women's team has something to be proud of: they have exceeded the plan for extracting petroleum (Baku).




1235

UNITY IN THE WHOLE COUNTRY AND AT THE FRONT.



Weapon and tank builders take on increased production obligations.

Letter to the front.



Meeting in a tank section. The idea of a collective of the Kirovskiy Plant turning to Soviet tank specialists to appeal for better mastery of military technology is being considered (Western front, 1942).



After a battle (towards Vitebsk).

Father and son were killed together. Party organizer of the Guard's regiment Captain S. V. Tagil'tsev and his Komsomol organizer son of the same regiment, Sergeant-Major Yuriy Tagil'tsev before a battle.



It is interesting to listen to one of our own agitators in a break between battles.



PARTY-POLITICAL WORK AT THE FRONT AND WITHIN THE COUNTRY.



President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. I. Kalinin gives awards to Soviet troops (Western front).

Red Army meeting in the N-th section. Member of the TsK [Central Committee] of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of bolsheviks)] Yem. Yaroskavskiy.



Plant workers familiarize themselves with the Statement on Elections in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (Donbass, 1945).

In 1944-1945 before the armed forces of the USSR stood the crucial problem of the final rout of Fascist Germany and liberation of the peoples of Europe from the Hitler tyranny. The accomplishment of this mission required from all our soldiers of new moral and physical stress/voltage. At the same time in the latter/last stage of war unprecedentedly increased the political activity of Red Army and seaman masses, was raised their interest in theoretical, economic, military-political and international questions.

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This is why entire/all party-political work in the military forces was conducted with similar by detachment so that each of waves would especially deeply realize the great goal of the liberating mission of the Soviet Armed Forces and, being located abroad of the native country, with the value/merit it bore the high rank of the citizen of the USSR.

In order to fulfill the role of political head in so complicated a situation, the communists of the army and navy had to reveal themselves even by the more mature/riper and more hardened/tempered leaders of masses. Specifically, toward this there was directedly

accepted during October 1944 the resolution by TsK VKP(b) about reinforcing of ideopolitical education of army communists and observance of the Leninist principle of individual selection to the party. In accordance with this resolution of TsK was radically improved the ideopolitical education of the communists whose number in 1944-1945 increased in the armed forces to 3 mln. people.

The organizational activity of the Communist Party in the Red Army and the Navy gave its results. The Great Patriotic War was a deep and comprehensive checking of the Soviet Armed Forces, their combat efficiency, valor, staying power/persistency, devotion to the people and to correctness to military oath. The army and the navy of socialist state maintained/withstood the severe tests of bloody and difficult war.

In every possible way strengthening the armed forces, the Communist Party simultaneously developed giant organizational activity in the creation of military economy.

The increased scales of an economic-organizational work of the party and the complexity of problems, raising of creative activity of laborers in the period of war required the higher level of leadership of the works of the country. In order to actuate all economic levers, to organize and to direct to the uniform goal the initiative of

masses, TsK VKP(b) it changed its apparatus and apparatus of TsK of the communist parties of the union republics, territorial committees, regional committees, city committees and district committees of the party. Were first of all fastened/strengthened old and were created new branch departments on the defense industry. Under the Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Gosplan of the USSR appeared the departments, sectors/arcs and groups on the leadership of the branches of military economy. In the industrial centers and in the largest defense enterprises acted authorized GKO Gosplan. The Gosplan where the party concentrated the best cadres of organizers and scientists, became the authentic headquarters of military economy. Were formed the new people's commissariats: tank industry, mortar armament and others. The heads of union and republican economic people's commissariats obtained wider laws/rights.


Were fastened/strengthened also the primary party organizations of defense enterprises and constructions, rail and water transport, was enlarged the institute of the party organizers of TsK VKP(b) at the plants and the factories. In order to increase an in the Party spirit-politicesuh work among the collective farmers, working MTS state farms, during November 1941 on the decision of the Politbureau of TsK VKP(b) were created the political departments with MTS and state farms.

All these measures raised the role of the party in the leadership of the defense of the country.

The operational efficiency of the central and local organs of the Leninist party, the political maturity of its cadres with the particular force were revealed in the region of the development of military economy - the basis of the bases of our victory in the patriotic war.

Relying on the planned/planning system of national economy, the party and the led by it state and public organizations successfully carried out the following missions: the transfer of military plants and enterprises connected with them from the northwestern, central and southern areas of the country into the deep rear (in Volga Region, in Urals, into Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia); the translation/conversion of civil/civilian enterprises into the output of military production and materials, necessary for the defense plants; the forced construction of new enterprises both for the carrying out of military production and for the provision of industry with fuel, by metal, by electric power; the provision of basic branches of military economy with work force.

end section.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

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These tasks, set by the Leninist party before the country, before the Soviet people, were truly grandiose to their scales. They determined the outcome of the single combat of the USSR with Fascist Germany, which possessed much greater economic resources than the Soviet Union. And only socialist formation/order, titanic organizational activity of the party in the people could ensure and they ensured the successful accomplishment of these missions under the such difficult conditions.

Especially clear and operational was the activity of the party, connected with the evacuation of industry and the renewal of production at the new places. Led the dismantling of enterprises and their redeployment local party organs and industrial people's commissariats. The difficulty of this problem was complicated by the fact that the majority of the evacuated plants and factories produced military production. It sharply required the army in the field, the formed units, and it was very important so that these plants would not cease their work. In view of this many enterprises evacuated

armament not immediately, but by bursts, in stages. This required the well thought-out planning of all process of evacuation. Frequently dismantling and on-loading of armament were conducted with the continuous flights of hostile aviation.

But still more complicated proved to be the problem of rapid input/introduction into the formation/order of the evacuated enterprises. Here much depended on energy and initiative of the party and economic organs of the eastern areas of the country. Indeed it was necessary to place more than 1500 plants and factories, to ensure with dwelling and supply of hundreds of thousands of evacuated workers and employees with their families. The arrived armament was installed in the existing enterprises, and also in the buildings of clubs, educational institutions, in the storage and commercial rooms.

The evacuation of industrial enterprises destroyed their previous connection/bond with the supplier plants, with the adjacent enterprises. The party organizations together with the Soviet and economic organs rapidly, on the spot, searched for raw material, the semi-finished products and other materials for the provision of uninterrupted production of armament and ammunition. They adjusted mutual aid between the enterprises in order to as soon as possible fulfill the orders of front.

Under the leadership of the party it was possible not only to carry out an evacuation of the great production power, but also to rapidly restore/reduce the disrupted military production. To the summer of 1942 almost all military plants, which were redeployed to the east of the country, worked at full power. In Urals of 703 evacuated plants renewed production 500, including in Sverdlovsk - 200, in Chelyabinsk - 200 and in Permian period/Perm' - 100. In this case on many restored plants was improved technology of production, which made it possible to sharply increase a quantity of released production.

The translation/conversion of civil/civilian industry into the preparation of military production also required sizable efforts/forces. In many instances it was necessary to radically change technology of production, to organize new production cooperation, to ensure enterprises with qualitative materials. Party organizations conducted great work on mobilization of internal reserves of enterprises, persistently struggling for the strictest savings of scarce raw material, fuel and electric power which were not sufficient in connection with the accelerated increase in the military production.

Struggle for the investigation of local resources gave satisfactory results, but this nevertheless could not satisfy the

needs grown/risen with each day for most important raw material and electric power. Deployment in the east of the country of the mass production of armament and combat materiel placed before the Communist Party the complicated problem of new construction. ^{It} ~~They~~ had to to a considerable extent compensate for the loss of southern metallurgy, carbon resources of Donbass, cover deficiency in the liquid propellant due to the limited possibility of using the petroleum resources of Caucasus.

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In connection with this in Volga Region and in Urals, in Siberia and Central Asia was developed the enormous construction of new enterprises, conducted large/coarse work on expansion and reconstructions of plants, mines/shafts, mines, power stations, it was created ~~ny*~~ in the prewar years.

In the accomplishment of this mission great services belongs to Soviet scientists and technical-engineering workers. The commission organized by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR headed by President V. L. Komarov rendered serious assistance in study and use of resources of eastern areas. The party did everything possible so as to create the necessary conditions for the work of scientists, designers, rationalizers. The creative large unit/formation of the

labor/work of workers and scientists contributed to the successful decision of the great questions, connected both with the defense of the country and with the long-range/most promising development of socialist economy.

Local party organizations at the end of 1941 discussed the first results of their work under war time. Everywhere took place the expanded plenums of party organs and party economics assets. In the enterprises, in the kolkhozes and the state farms, in the installations, scientific research institutes are passed party and Komsomol meetings, and also general/common/total meetings of laborers. Reports, actions and decisions adopted on these meetings were penetrated by the greatest concern of Soviet people about the defense of the socialist fatherland. Each did ask itself, everything it did in order to help front, what other reserves remained unused.

In the service areas of the country - in Urals, in Siberia, in the Far East, in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, in middle Volga, and also in the Kirov, Gor'kiy, Vladimir, Ivanovo, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Tambovo, Penza and Ryzanskayas province. By Chuvash, Mordvinian and Mari ASSR - party organizations under the most difficult conditions they achieved considerable successes. The carrying out of military production - aircraft, tanks, armament and ammunition - increased in these areas in 1941 in comparison with prewar 1940 almost 2 times¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. TsGANKh, f. 4372, list 4, file 890, sheet 188.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Urals and Western Siberia became the main base of high-quality metallurgy. Was mastered the production of special steels in the ordinary open-hearth furnaces, phosphorus and ferrochromium in the blast furnaces, the hire of armor plate on the bloomings. Enthusiasm and the creative inspiration of working class, scientific and technical-engineering workers truly they did not know limit.

Understanding their responsibility for the defense of the country, the party organizations of service areas took measures for an increase in the issue of military production. The results of this did not retard to pronounce. Gor'kovchane exceeded the tasks/targets of GKO with respect to the issue of regimental and division guns, tanks and automobiles, ammunition and chemical production. Service areas increasingly more produced aircraft, especially the attack aircraft ^{al} ~~11~~- 2, which, as noted in one of the telegraph messages of CC of VKP(b) to the regional committees of the party, were necessary to the Red Army as air, as grain ².

FOOTNOTE ². TsPA IML, f. 17, list 48, file 1090, sheet 153.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Uralians strove to double and to triple the issue of tanks and armor for them, to exceed plans with respect to the carrying out of chemical production, artillery and ammunition. Siberians attempted to increase steelmaking and extraction of carbon/coal, the issue of aircraft and ammunition, the production of grain and meat. The laborers of Kazakhstan struggled for that, in order as much as possible to give to the native land of nonferrous and rare earth metal, carbon/coal, and also grain crops, meat and oil.

The local party organs and the party organizations of industrial enterprises, relying on the active aid of trade-union and Komsomol organizations, expended many efforts/forces to that in order shortly to raise the qualification of new workers arrived to the production. Was widely started individual training. were created the small circles of the technical minimum, short-term schools and courses. Through the individual and brigade apprenticeship, the system of courses and short term schools was obtained the qualification of 4112 thousand workers.

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Furthermore, 2475 thousand skilled young workers prepared for the

years of the war of the school of factory and plant training and the handicraft schools ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the achievements of the Soviet regime in 40 years in the numbers. Statistical handbook. M., Gospolitizdat, 1957, p 262, 264. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government worried also about preparation/training for the national economy of technical-engineering cadres. In spite of the difficulty of wartime, exercise in the highest and special secondary educational institutions did not cease. Although the quantity of students in 1941 was shortened more than doubly, nevertheless training engineers, technicians and other specialists continued. Subsequently a number of students in VUZ [99sp4 - Institute of Higher Education] and technical schools continuously grew and in 1944-1945 approached the prewar level. Within the time of war schools of higher education gave to national economy 302 thousand specialists ².

FOOTNOTE ². According to the data of TsSU of the USSR, IML. Documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, p 449, 450. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the spring of 1942 in response to the first-of-May appeals of

CC of VKP(b) on the innovation of the innovators of air, tank and metallurgical industry was developed All-Union socialist competition for better execution of the orders of front, for the mobilization of internal reserves, the savings of raw material and materials, a reduction in the prime cost of production. The party hotly supported this patriotic movement. Central committee of VKP(b) jointly with GKO and VTsSPS [- All-Union Central Trade-Union Council] instituted the challenge banners for the victors in the competition. Party, trade-union and Komsomol organizations headed All-Union socialist competition, and soon it encompassed tens of millions of toilers of city and village.

Socialist competition was the expression of a deep patriotism of national masses. In the course its laborers revealed the reserves for production, broke the previously established/installed norms which frequently were considered as limit. Communists and Komsomol members showed the models of organization and high labor productivity. Their example followed rest. Each considered itself as that obligated to work as much, as it was necessary for achievement of victory, and to give the production only of excellent quality.

Party, trade-union and Komsomol organizations used the most diverse forms and the methods of mass-political work in order to implicate in the socialist competition as much as possible laborers.

Competition went not only between the enterprises, but also between the shops and the brigades. At the same time was developed the competition in professions. While the skilled workers struggled for the overfulfillment of production norms, the novices, which recently arrived in the enterprises, attempted to rather master profession. the party organizations, catching the initiative of workers, strove that in the competition was included the overwhelming majority of laborers. And in this there was its force.

All-Union socialist competition indicated the organization of labor/work in a new way, the rationalization of the technological processes, correct division of labor in the production, release of highly skilled workers, occupied on the secondary preparatory robots, the best organization of the work site and as result all this, rapid rise in productivity of labor/work. Socialist competition was the bright expression of the unprecedented patriotic enthusiasm of all toilers of the rear.

Central committee of VKP(b) and local party organs unremitting dealt with leadership of industry. Bureau the branch departments of CC of VKP(b) systematically heard the reports of the secretaries of regional committees, territorial committees and CC of the communist parties of the union republics, national commissars, commanders/chiefs of central boards and directors of large/coarse

plants. The resolutions of CC of the parties, accepted on these reports, were discussed then at the boards of economic people's commissariats, bureau and the plenums of local party organs, at the party economics assets and the meetings of working industrial enterprises.

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Local party organs for the purpose of the operational accomplishment of economic missions took upon themselves direct leadership of economy. The branch industrial departments, manned by experienced cadres, with the knowledge of work were occupied by the work of industrial enterprises, rail and water transport. Secretaries on the industry and the transport, as a rule, knew well that it is done in the enterprises, regularly they were on them, were interested in the activity of the corresponding people's commissariats. The workers of branch departments helped enterprises and people's commissariats to fulfill plans and resolutions of the party for industry and transport, systematically they inspected/checked, as these decisions they are realized, revealed deficiencies in the organization of production and strove their elimination.

Questions about the work of industry were discussed at bureau and plenums of party organs, at the party economics assets and in the

Party spirit-technical conferences, plant party and trade-union meetings. About which considerable attention local party organs gave the industry, it is possible to judge by the following fact. In ten largest industrial rear regions of the RSFSR in four years of war at the plenums of regional committees of VKP(b) and regional party economics assets there was considered more than 150 reports about the state of industry.

During the first year of war many economic, and sometimes also party heads forgot questions of the economy of production. This is understandable. In connection with the military mobilizations substantially changed the composition of working and technical-engineering workers. Occurred the known weakening of the economic, party, trade-union and Komsomol supervisory personnel. Toward the end of 1942 the situation became already different, new cadres by that time sufficiently were tempered in the production, they acquired the necessary experience and qualification. Industrial enterprises mastered the new forms of military production and they began to receive firm jobs. Party and Komsomol organizations considerably supplemented their numbers with progressive-minded workers. Was expanded the propaganda of economic knowledge and was increased exacting demand of the economic heads. In the examination of the production activity of enterprises party organs began to analyze not only the execution of plan, but also the prime cost of

production, the profitableness of enterprise.

Investigating the economy of production, CC of the communist parties of the republics, territorial committees and regional committees of VKP(b) guided the attention of the urban and district committees of the party, primary production party organizations to every possible improvement in the control of the economic activity of the administration of enterprises. The party control, which leans on the criticism of masses, became ever more efficient. The experience of economic heads was supplemented by the experience of masses.

Enormous organizational work conducted the party among the toilers of agriculture.

The unsuccessful course of war and occupation by the enemy of the most important agricultural areas considerably worsened/impaired food situation in the country. Entire/all burden of the supply of army and population by rations, and industry agricultural raw material lay on kolkhozes and state farms of the central and eastern regions of the country.

The party and the government posed before the service areas the problem of enlarging sowing areas to raise the productivity of granular and industrial crops, and also potatoes and vegetables. The

most important significance for organizing the agricultural production during the war had the resolutions of CC of VKP(b) and the council of peoples commissars of the USSR about the increase for the collective farmers of the compulsory/necessary minimum of workdays, the material encouragement/award of the front-rank workers of agriculture, the introduction of premiums for the workers of MTS, the mobilization of the able-bodied population of cities and working settlements by the agricultural works. Putting into practice of these resolutions raised the labor activity of collective farmers, strengthened their discipline, raised the labor productivity of workers of MTS and state farms.

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Constant attention in the places was paid to the training of personnel for the agriculture, in which was felt sharp/acute deficiency in connection with the military mobilization mf. In the republics, the territories and the regions was started the net/system of small circles and courses in which hundreds of thousands of people, mainly woman and the adolescents, mastered the specialities of mechanics, tractor operators, operators, livestock breeders, etc. Women and adolescents, after replacing the men departed by the front, torrents for the tractors and the combines.

An economic-political strengthening of kolkhozes and state farms helped political departments of MTS and state farms. After existing of up to years of 1943, political departments together with the district committees, the primary party organizations of kolkhozes and state farms conducted great organizational and political work in the village.

The central committee of the party, leading agriculture, heard the reports of the secretaries of CC of the communist parties of the republics, territorial committees and regional committees of VKP(b) about the state of the agricultural production and the execution by the republics, by territories and by the regions of state deliveries. Revealing deficiencies in the work of local party and Soviet organs, CC of VKP(b) planned the ways of their elimination and took measures for increase in agricultural productivity. In all within the time of the war of the Politbureau and bureau of CC of VKP(b) heard more than hundred reports of local party organs about the leadership of agriculture. Some committees of the party were heard twice. The resolutions of CC of VKP(b) by the reports of the secretaries of regional committees, territorial committees and CC of the communist parties of the union republics widely were discussed at the places - in the party organizations, at the meetings of collective farmers and workers.

In the agriculture, as in the industry, the party in every possible way contributed to the development of socialist competition. In the kolkhozes, MTS and state farms were created komsomol youth front brigades and teams. The front-rank workers of agriculture strove high indices in the labor/work.

In spite of enormous difficulties, collective farm peasantry with each year increased deliveries to agricultural production. Besides compulsory/necessary State establishment of kolkhozes the collective farmers dropped from the roll from their modest reserves into the fund for defense grain, meat, oil and other products. In all in the years of the Great Patriotic War kolkhozes and state farms placed to state 4312 mln. poods of grain, 5048 thousand tons of meat¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv.... No 9605, p 286.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

But in pre-revolutionary Russia in the First World War it was prepared/prefabricated and stocked up grain of altogether only of 1399 mln. poods².

FOOTNOTE ². See N. Voznesenský. Military economy of the USSR in the period of patriotic war, p 89. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Because of the socialist production method and the leadership of the party collective farm village in essence managed the most difficult problem of the provision of an army and urban population by rations, and industry by agricultural raw material. Collective farm formation/order maintained/withstood severe testing, in reality after demonstrating its great vital force. At the same time heavy, destructive war strongly undermined the material and technical base of kolkhozes and state farms. Sufficient to say that in the areas, which were undergoing occupation, the enemy ransacked more than 90 thousand kolkhozes, or 37 percent of all collective economies of the country, are more than 3 thousand MTS, all been 43 percent machine-and-tractor stations of the Soviet Union.

Unremitting attention for the length of all military years the party gave to the transport, on clear work of which depended the successes of national economy and armed forces. The activity of political departments and party organizations of the transport, first of all railroad, which fulfilled basic part of the national-economic and military transportation, was aimed at the introduction of the socialist methods of labor/work and the education of cadres. Communist-railroad workers mobilized their comrades for the execution

of the graphs/curves of movement, high-speed/high-velocity working of trains, investigation of internal reserves, fuel economy, metal, forest and other materials, conducting of repairing the rolling stock by the forces of train brigades.

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Great organizational work conducted communists on the creation of the steam-locomotive columns of particular reserve NKPS [99sp4 - People's Commissariat of Railroads]. These columns played exceptionally important role in the support of offensive operations of the Red Army. They were the mobile independent groups, which consisted of 15-30 steam locomotives, after each of which consolidated train repair teams. Columns showed a good mobility. The preparation of steam locomotives for the work occupied not more than 24 hrs. If necessary the steam locomotives maintained/served the sectors of the roads with a length of 800-1000 kilometers without the approach in the depot for shifting/relieving of brigades and repair. In 1942 on the front and rear roads acted 35 columns, which had 750 steam locomotives. Toward the end of the war a quantity of columns increased to 85. In them entered 2 thousand steam locomotives, and their personnel counted more than 22 thousand people.

On an example of industrial enterprises in the field of

transportation widely was developed socialist competition. Party, trade-union and Komsomol organizations in every way possible attempted to extend advanced methods of operation. Slogan - to contain mechanisms and armament in the same order/formation, in which soldier contains his weapon - became motto of tens of thousands of railroad workers. They strove height difference 2-3 times of the norms of the noncirculating run of steam locomotives, they increased the maneuverability of trains and the capacity of sectors and stations, provided uninterrupted formation and progress of the troop trains, and also the echelons with the national-economic cargoes. Trains frequently were formed at the transit exchanges, at the ends of the sorting routes/paths, etc. Extensively was used the formation of straight/direct march routes. Railroad workers (each at their post) strove high indices. In spite of the enormous difficulties of wartime, Soviet railroad workers successfully managed the responsibilities charged on them.

④ One of the central problems of the party was the restoration/reduction of national economy in the areas liberated from the German occupation. Still in winter 1941/42, as soon as Red Army it routed the Fascist-German aggressors in the environs of Moscow, Soviet people began the restoration/reduction of Moscow Coal Basin, ferrous metallurgy, chemistry and power stations in the Tula industrial area, the Machine Building Plants, power stations and the

textile factories of Moscow, Moskovskoy and Kalininsk regions.

During August 1943, when was begun the mass expulsion/exile of enemy from Soviet territory, CC of VKP(b) and SNK USSR [99sp08 - Council of People's Commisars USSR] they adopted the special resolution by "On the necessary measures for the restoration/reduction of economy in the areas, liberated from the German occupation". Not in a long time before this, during July, in the central committee of the party took place the conference of the secretaries of regional committees of VKP(b) and the chairmen of the executive committees of the regions, which were subjected to German occupation. The conference in detail examined needs and problems of each region.

In the liberated areas the party directed the best cadres of party, Soviet, economic, trade-union and Komsomol workers. The restoration/reduction of industry, agriculture, housing fund and sociocultural installations led the prominent workers of the party and state. In the areas injured/damaged from the occupation were redeployed from the east the largest construction-assembly organizations of Narkomstroy, Glavvoyenpromstroy and NKPS. In the restoration/reduction of Donbass, southern metallurgy and machine building of UkrSSR [99sp5 - Ukrainian SSR] were recalled many specialists from the active army. In the construction organizations in 1943 were counted 100 thousand working and technical-engineering

workers, in 1944 their number increased to 500 thousand, while in 1945 - to 700 thousand people ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. According to the data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 9605, p 48.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

The reactivation of the liberated areas the party declared people's work. There was no such meeting in the rear and at the front wherever did not deal discussion with fraternal aid to cities and to the villages, which suffered from the Fascist-German occupation.

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These questions were discussed at bureau and plenums of local party organs, on the military councils of fronts, districts and armies, at the plenums of VTsSPS, the sessions of Supreme Soviet of the union and autonomous republics, urban, regional and territorial councils of the deputies of laborers.

Organizing the restoration/reduction of the enterprises destroyed by enemy, the party and the government proceeded from the prospects for the postwar development of national economy. Therefore,

in spite of the difficulty of wartime, enterprise they were restored taking into account the latest achievements of science and technology. In Leningrad and to Rostovve-^{on-the-}Don, in Kiev and Minsk, in Riga and Voronezh, in Zaporozh'ye and Kharkov - everywhere from the ashes and the ruins arose industrial giants. Exceptionally important significance was given to the restoration/reduction of southern coal-metallurgical base. Toward the end of the Great Patriotic War in the areas liberated from the Hitler aggressors there was restored 7500 plants and factories ¹. ~~ENDFOOTNOTE.~~

FOOTNOTE¹. From data of Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. IML. Documents and Materials of the Department of the History of the Great Patriotic War, Inv. No. 9605, p. 32.

Revived agriculture. Enemy exerted all forces in order to annihilate kolkhozes. and he succeeded in solidly undermining the economy of Soviet village. But Hitlerites could not shake the devotion of peasants to collective farm formation/order. Immediately after liberation from Fascist IGA collective farm peasantry energetically undertook the restoration/reduction of collective economy.

Entire/all Soviet country helped the liberated areas to raise agriculture. The collective farmers of eastern regions took care for these areas the evacuated cattle, and they also transmitted to them the unit of our own herd. Was rendered aid agricultural machinery. As

a result in the liberated territory even in the course of war were restored/reduced 84700 kolkhozes, 3093 machine-and-tractor stations even 1883 state farms ².

FOOTNOTE ². *Ibid* There, p 353, 361, 366. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Only socialist state with its planned economy could develop on such large scales revived works even to the termination of war. Only the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, could simultaneously fight and build, rout enemy and fortify its economic independence.

The Communist Party together with the military economy problems the closest attention gave to the way of life and the life of the people and army. For the years of the war of CC of VKP(b) and the SNK USSR they accepted on these questions numerous resolutions. Soviet soldiers were provided at the front by good-quality clothing/uniform, substantial hot food. Fulfilling the instructions of the party, military councils, commanders and political workers systematically dealt with an improvement in the way of life of soldiers. The party constantly worried also about the material and everyday needs of the toilers of the rear, about the supply of cities by rations.

For an improvement in the party leadership of commercial organizations in CC of the communist parties of the union republics,

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FLAGS OF THE TsK [CENTRAL COMMITTEE] OF THE VKP(b) [ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (OF BOLSHEVIKS)] AND THE GKO [STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE] FOR THE ALL-UNION SOCIALIST COMPETITION



Transient Red Flag of the TsK VKP(b) (instituted on 21 May 1942). KEY: (1) Everything for the front. (2) To the winner of the All-Union socialist competition of weapons and ammunition plants.

Transient Red Flag of the State Defense Committee [GKO] (instituted on 13 May 1942). KEY: (1) USSR. (2) To the winner of the All-Union socialist competition.



BATTLE FLAGS OF THE RED ARMY.



Flag of the Guard sections and formations.

KEY: (1) For our Soviet motherland. (2) USSR.



Flag of sections and formations of the Red Army.

KEY: (1) For our Soviet. (2) Motherland.

territorial committees, regional committees and VKP(b) city committees were created the departments on the trade and the public nutrition, headed by special secretaries. Relying on the wide party, Komsomol, Soviet and trade-union active, these departments strove the correct and uninterrupted supply of population with standardized products and with the industrial goods, they helped to search for at the places food resources.

The organizational activity of the Communist Party during the years of war was all-encompassing. It contributed to putting into practice of the policy of the national defense of the socialist fatherland. V. I. Lenin named war testing not only the economic, but also organizational forces of each nation '.

FOOTNOTE '. See V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 30, p 133. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union convincingly showed that the organizational forces of our party, state and people successfully maintained/withstood this severe testing.

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3. Ideological work of the party.

Ideological work of VKP(b) during the years of the Great Patriotic War was directed toward strengthening of the spiritual forces of the Soviet people, toward further increase in the political consciousness and responsibility of each citizen of the USSR for the fates of the native land, toward the struggle against the Fascist ideology - the ideology of anticommunism, imperialistic robbery, beast nationalism and racial hatred. Without the ideal toughening of laborers and soldiers, with which the party dealt every day during entire war, our victory would have been impossible.

V. I. Lenin on the experience of the struggle of the young Soviet republic against the internal and external counterrevolution very highly evaluated the role of consciousness, moral spirit of the masses, which mobilize their creative energy, their will to the struggle. He spoke: "in any war victory in the final analysis depends on the state of the spirit of those masses which in the field of battle spill their blood" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 31, p 115. ENDFOOTNOTE.

By this Leninist situation the party was completely guided in its ideological activity. The education of the moral staying

power/persistency, which overcomes all difficulties and deprivations, infinite loves for the native land and the burning hatred for its enemies, education of mass heroism at the front and in the rear became the main content of the ideopolitical work of the party. The most important team of the entire ideological work of communists was mass political agitation and propaganda.

Agitators and propogandists brought up in the Soviet people confidence in their forces, feeling of pride for their great native land, exposed the plans of enemy, they spoke about his unavoidable rout. They approached that, in order to, as taught V. I. Lenin, to make for each person "known truth most convincing possible of more easily possible of available, as is graphic as possible and harder than imprinted" ².

FOOTNOTE ². V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 17, p 304. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Ideological work was conducted taking into account the problems, which stood before the Soviet people in the rear, at the front and on that temporarily occupied by the enemy of territory. Through the multimillion-man army of stirrers and propogandists, the press and the radio the party explained by worker, to peasants, intelligentsia and to soldiers, what problems are worth before the country as opposing hostile military forces as to better and more rapidly

fulfill production schedules in the industry and in agriculture, on what must direct their efforts/forces the workers of science and culture, in order to maximally help the defense of the socialist fatherland.

To the first period of war the ideopolitical work of the party was directed toward that in order to bring to the consciousness of all people the program of struggle with the enemy. It was necessary to change not only the forms of educational work, but also its content, to supplement the numbers of propagandists and stirrers with hundreds of thousand new people and to train them in practice to art of mass political actions. However, not all leading organs of the party considered the changing conditions and knew how, as that required situation, to adapt the ideological and educational work to the new problems. Somewhere this work in the first months of war not only was not increased, but, on the contrary, it weakened.

CC of VKP(b) paid the attention of local party organs to the danger of the underestimation of mass political work. "Pravda" several times came forward on questions of party-political work, agitation and propaganda.

Thus, in the article "agitation to the service patriotic war" the newspaper wrote: "during these terrible days when above our dear native land hung serious danger, our agitation must bear into the mass the igneous word of Bolshevik truth, ignite in hearts of millions of people the sacred hatred for the Fascist monsters and the enslavers, to join and to mobilize Soviet people to the struggle with the enemy, to the aid to front:. The word of stirrer must resound during our days as alarm appeal to the defense of the native land, to the annihilation of enemy" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹ "Pravda", on 17 July 1941. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Fulfilling the instructions of CC of VKP(b), party organizations and political organs discussed the problems of the party-political work under war time and took concrete/specific/actual measures for strengthening of the departments of propaganda and agitation, lecturer and propagandist groups of district committees, city committees, regional committees, territorial committees and CC of the communist parties of the republics, political departments of divisions and armies, ships and flotillas, political administrations of fronts and Navies, military districts. For conducting of political agitation and propaganda were drawn new cadres. 2-3 Times in comparison with peacetime grew not on the staff propagandist and lecturer groups with CC of the parties of the union republics, with

the territorial committees and the regional committees, the city committees and the district committees. In all teams of the party organizations were created the groups of not on the staff stirrers from the party, Soviet and trade-union active, from the intelligentsia. The numerous groups of not on the staff stirrers from the public workers, the scientists and the writers were formed during the main political controls of the Red Army and the Navy.

Focusing the attention of the leading organs of the party in the center and in the places for questions of ideology positively had effect on entire party-political, military and organizational-management work. CC of the communist parties of the republics, territorial committees, regional committees, city committees, district committees of VKP(b) and the political organs of the armed forces became daily more qualified to lead propaganda and agitation. With the live Bolshevik word appeared in the rear and at the front prominent workers and leading workers of the party and state, army and navy, trade unions and komsomol, science and culture. The secretaries of CC of the communist parties of the republics, territorial committees, regional committees and district committees of the party, the members of military councils, the commanders/chiefs of political organs and commissars in the majority of the cases personally led the instructional conferences of stirrers and propagandists, they informed them about the most important questions

of domestic and international policy, about the situation at the fronts.

Constantly worrying about strengthening of the rear, the Communist Party required from all party, Soviet and cultural-educational organizations so that the ideopolitical work in the industrial enterprises, in the field of transportation and construction, in kolkhozes state farms and MTS, in the installations and the economic organizations tightly would be connected with defence problems of the country and would give the perceptible practical results.

Especially considerable attention was paid to the working class - the foremost and leading force of Soviet society. Party organizations proceeded from the instruction of V. I. Lenin about the fact that "continuous relation with the mass of workers, the ability constantly to campaign in it ... to respond to any demand of mass, this main thing for the Communist Party" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 29, p 521. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The ideopolitical work in the enterprises was decisive for the rebuilding of industry and transport and contributed to the timely execution of state plans.

Was developed the ideological and educational work, also, in the village. Rural intelligentsia - teacher, agriculturists, zootechnicians, doctors explained to collective farmers the political and economic tasks, told them about the situations at the front, were conducted the readings of the newspapers. Sizable aid rural communists rendered the party organizations of city. They sent into village thousands of propagandists and stirrers. With reports at the current moment/factor before the collective farmers came forward regional, territorial and republican workers.

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In the period of patriotic war great ideopolitical work conducted Soviet information bureau. It daily transmitted for the entire country and the army of statement about the internal and international events, about the course of military activities, provided with information the press and the broadcasting of the union and neutral countries, conducted counterpropaganda against the ideological sabotages of enemy.

Under the conditions when millions of Soviet people, fighting with the Hitler aggressors, were detached from the native places,

from their families, exceptional significance had letters from the rear to the front and from the front into the rear. Worrying about the accurate and timely delivery/procurement of these letters, CC of VKP(b) repeatedly within the time of war made special decisions about the military field post office/mail.

Actively conducted the party the ideopolitical work among the population in the rear of enemy. Underground party organizations and guerilla detachments were supplied with the means of press propaganda and agitation. To the territory occupied were delivered the newspaper, leaflet, literature, were here sent the most experienced and stable communists. The ideopolitical work in the rear of enemy was conducted for the purpose of the disclosure of the deceitful propaganda of Hitlerites, mobilization of population to the merciless struggle with the Fascist occupationists.

Developing political activity in the masses, the party constantly worried about the ideopolitical growth of stirrers themselves and propagandists. New cadres received theoretical preparation/training in the regional and inter-regional courses. Concrete/specific/actual aid to stirrers and propagandists rendered the Communist party study centers of city committees and district committees of the party, party committees of large/coarse enterprises and installations. They developed/processed thematics of lectures,

reports and conversations, they arranged thematic exhibitions, organized public lectures and reports through the timeliest themes, were conducted the seminars at which the agitators and propagandists have exchanged the experience of their work.

The content and the forms of the ideological and educational work in the armed forces were defined concretely and changed in the dependence on the conditions and the tasks, which stand in one or another the period before the military forces.

In the beginning of war the party threw the call: "to stop lever, to reject/throw and to rout it" ! Commanders, political workers, all army communists explained to soldiers, that in the fields of battles is solved a question about whether there is to be or not to be to Soviet socialist state, will remain the peoples of the Soviet Union free or they will be the slaves of German fascists. The numerous army of stirrers and propagandists in a word and by a personal example strove an increase in the combat activity and skill of military forces, their vigilance, staying power/persistency, discipline and organization.

To reinforcing of political educational work in the armed forces enormous effect showed/rendered accepted CC of VKP(b) during October 1941 the resolution "about the facts the substitutions of educational

work by repressions", in which central committee was necessary from the military councils, political organs and military commissars not to substitute daily explanatory work by administration. Being guided by this resolution, the main political administration of the Red Army during December 1941 published the directive which forced the military councils of fronts and armies, political departments and all commissars to radically improve in units and subunits of army in the field oral propaganda and agitation.

For the conduct in the armed forces of the mass qualified agitation during June 1942 was created the institute of stirrers. In the Army and the Navy as the authorized stirrers of political administrations of fronts and Navies, political departments of armies, divisions, flotillas and regiments the party sent its best propagandistic cadres, which had comprehensive theoretical preparation/training and wide experience of practical work. Mass political agitation accepted unprecedented scope, became more purposeful and concrete/specific/actual. In each platoon, in each company and subunits equal to them were groups of stirrers from the most courageous and most authoritative soldiers and the officers.

The heavy situation, which was established at the front in the summer of 1942, when for the Red Army again it was necessary to retreat into the depth of the country, required from the military

forces of strictest discipline and enormous moral staying power/persistency. Commanders and political workers were intended into those terrible days to pour into the military forces the indestructible Bolshevik hardness of spirit.

end section.

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The task of propaganda and agitation then consisted in explaining to all soldiers, what to retreat further nowhere, that the command of commander "not to space ago" ! - this is the command of the native land.

The political work in the military forces, which was being conducted in diverse forms and directed toward one target - to stop enemy, helped the Red Army to maintain/withstand the new pressure of enemy, and then, after accumulating pitchforks, to bring to it the smashing attack in the historical battle in Volga.

The basic purpose of the ideopolitical work of the party in the second period of war was further increase in the labor activity in the rear and breeding of high offensive spirit at the front. The appeal of the party to avenge the Fascist-German aggressors for all their crimes on our earth/ground found unanimous response in the hearts of Soviet people and mobilized them to the rout of enemy. The rebuilding of political administration, structure of the party and

Komsomol organs of the Red Army and the Navy, carried out in 1943, even more greatly raised level and effectiveness of agitation and propaganda. Almost each communist in the army and in the Navy was stirrer and propagandist.

The political organs and the party organizations helped commanders to provide complete readiness of units and subunits for the execution of assigned combat missions. The party and Komsomol organizations of units after obtaining of the operations order arranged short party and Komsomol meetings, meetings of soldier and officers. In the subunits the communists conducted group and individual conversations, striving clear understanding by each soldier of its task - to fast attack the enemy and to annihilate him.

Increasingly more widely developed the party the ideological and educational and cultural and educational work in the areas, liberated from the Hitler aggressors. Here were bound, the qualified propagandists, artists of science and culture. In the cities and the villages were restored the theaters, cinemas, Communist party study centers, libraries, village reading rooms. Much fruitfully worked among the population, helped out from the Fascist captivities, political organs and party organizations of military units. Agitators and propagandists acquainted laborers with the resolutions of the party and government about the measures for the restoration/reduction

of the economy in the liberated areas, told them about the international situation, about the successes of the Red Army and the operations of the military forces of allies. Military units provided the population with newspapers and logs/journals. The aid which is exerted military forces peaceful inhabitants, strengthened the connection/bond of front with the rear, was caused in the population an even greater love for the liberation army. Soviet people in turn, strove by all, than only they could, to help the attacked/advanced units and the large units/formations of the Red Army.

In the course of war the great place in the ideological work of the party occupied the education of hatred for the Fascist-German occupationists. The soldiers of the Red Army, freeing/releasing from the enemy the native earth/ground, with their eyes saw the monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites: the burned cities and villages, twigs/rods of hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens, brutally tortured by fascists. Materials of extreme state commission for setting and investigation of the crimes of the Fascist-German aggressors and their participants who widely were published in the Soviet press, agitators and propagandists used in their actions, showing based on specific examples, that fascism - these are predatory war, servitude, annihilation of millions of peaceful citizens and that the rout of Hitler aggressors is the task of all progressive humanity. The disclosure of the countless crimes of Hitlerites on the Soviet

earth/ground and in other countries reinforced the hatred of Soviet people for the enemy, increased labor enthusiasm, it contributed to offensive rush of military forces.

In the third period of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Armed Forces, after clearing the native earth/ground from the Fascist-German aggressors, began the direct execution of their liberating mission in Europe.

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The ideological work of the party during this period was directed mainly toward the explanation of the tasks of the final rout of fascist Germany and its allies, and also questions of the postwar construction of the world.

Under the conditions of the greatest victories of the Soviet Armed Forces the special importance in the ideological work acquired the instruction of V. I. Lenin about the fact that in the war the "most dangerous, this to underestimate enemy and to rest on what we are stronger" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 31, page 150. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The party deeply explained at the front and in the rear this Leninist situation, after mobilizing Armiya and Flot to the final rout of enemy, and laboring - to the comprehensive aid to military forces, to the rapid restoration/reduction and raising of national economy. Commanders, political organs, all communists taught personnel to sensibly estimate the forces of enemy, not to become arrogant, to exhibit unremitting vigilance.

Bringing up hatred for the enemy, political organs particular attention focused on the need for humane relation to the peaceful population of Germany and its allies. Political organs explained to soldiers, that the Red Army entered to the strange territory, including to the territory of Germany, not as conqueror, but as the liberator of the peoples.

Soviet soldiers fulfilled their international duty not only by the route/path of the armed struggle, but also by means of the powerful ideological influence. They bore to the peoples the great ideas of socialism, explained by it the policy of Soviet state with respect to of their countries, task of the Red Army, which carries by laborer liberation from Fascist IGA, informed population about the most important events on fronts and in the international life.

Commanders and political workers of the Red Army and the Navy by

entire their ideological and educational work strove that each soldier and sailor, each officer, from beyond the limits of our native land, would be an example of masterful conduct. "Pravda" wrote in those days, that the Soviet person abroad appears as the carrier of the high beginnings of the Leninist policy of the equality of rights of the peoples, their cooperation and friendship. "This superimposes great responsibility on the Soviet person abroad of his native country. It must be worthy the noble/precious liberating mission, which fell in its share. With the honor must it carry the highest, honorary rank - the rank of the citizen of the USSR" ².

FOOTNOTE ². "Pravda", on 26 March, 1945. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With the entrance of the Soviet Armed Forces to the strange territory even more widely was developed mass-political work among the private and noncommissioned officers. This was especially necessarily because by that time the Soviet military forces were considerably supplemented by contingents of the liberated areas of the USSR. It was necessary to politically temper people, to help them to deeply understand the significance of the liberating mission of the Red Army.

In order to expose the deceitful confirmations/assertions of Hitler propaganda, as if the Red Army entered to the territory of

Germany for the purpose to destroy the German people, it was necessary to increase counterpropaganda among the military forces and populations of Germany, and also occupied by it the countries. During May 1944 with the soviet information bureau it was created by bureaus for propaganda to the hostile ones and those occupied by the enemy of the country. This bureau, which consisted of the well prepared party and military workers, organized efficient counterpropaganda. In the press and on the radio was given wide information about the military-political situation, about the humane goals of the Soviet Union in the war of liberation. In the territory of Germany and in by it the countries occupied were spread the literature and the leaflets, which expose Fascist propaganda.

In proportion to the war approached toward the end, to the foreground increasingly more advanced questions of economic and cultural construction. In connection with this CC of VKP(b) considered it necessary to increase ideological work in the rear regions and in the territory, liberated from the aggressors.

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In 1944-1945 were accepted the following resolutions: "about the state and the measures of an improvement in a mass-political and ideological work in the Tatar party organization", "about the initial

missions of the party organizations KP(b) of Belorussia in the region of a mass-political and cultural and educational work among the population", "about the organization of scientific and educational propaganda", "about the deficiencies in the political work among the population of western regions of USSR", "about the political work of party organizations among the population of the western regions of BSSR", "about the state the measures of an improvement in the agitation and propaganda work in the Bashkir party organization" and others.

The resolutions of CC of VKP(b), in which were revealed large/coarse deficiencies in the ideological work and it was indicated, as it to improve in order to solve the new tasks, which arose at the end of the war, the party organization they met with the great satisfaction. The taking place plenums of CC of the communist parties of the republics, territorial committees, regional committees, city committees and district committees of VKP(b) were dedicated to questions of ideological work. These questions were actively discussed also in the primary party organizations, at the conferences of ideological workers. The Tatar regional committee of the party during August 1944 critically examined its activity and took the appropriate measures for raising of ideological work in the republic. During October 1944 the Moscow urban committee of the party heard the reports of proletarian and Kuybyshev of district committees about the

state of propagandistic work. Noting weak sides in the theoretical training of personnel and in the political education of the working people of largest areas of Moscow, city committee outlined the concrete/specific/actual ways of eliminating the deficiencies in the ideological work of capital organization. During January 1945 the plenum of Leningrad regional and urban committees of VKP(b), after hearing the reports of the secretaries of the Kirov and Volodarsk district committees of Leningrad, the grassland and Kingisepp district committees of region, bound party organizations to improve mass- political and theoretical training of the leading party and Soviet cadres, and also the young members of the party. Questions of ideological work were discussed also in other places: in Ivanovo, Kuybyshev regions, in Bashkirya, etc.

In the Ukraine the resolutions of CC of VKP(b) riveted the attention of the communists and all workers of ideological installations and organizations. In the western regions of the republic for reinforcing the ideological work in the village were created the special groups of propagandists. CC of KP(b)U directed toward the constant work into these regions the highly skilled propagandistic cadres.

During February 1945 the plenum of CC of KP(b) of Belorussia recognized as necessary to more widely develop the ideopolitical work

in the masses, involving into it intelligentsia, for the purpose of an even greater cohesion of the Belorussian people around the Leninist party, the mobilization of all its forces to every possible aid of the Red Army, for the successful restoration/reduction of national economy and culture ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. TsPA IML, f. 17, list 45, file 154, sheet 44, 45.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Close attention gave the party to the Baltic republics where the political situation had its of characteristic. Here yet were not eliminated exploiter classes, the significant part of the intelligentsia did not have time to be freed from the bourgeois ideology. Peasantry yet did not embark on the path of collective management of economy, but kulaks actively spoke against the Soviet regime. The content and the direction/axis of ideological work in these republics was determined in the resolutions of CC of VKP(b) in 1944 about the deficiencies and tasks of the political work of the party organizations of Lithuanian and Estonian SSR. In these resolutions by primary task was placed the Marxist-Leninist education of communists, first of all of the leading workers and intelligentsia.

Fulfilling the instructions of CC VKP(b), party organizations

more actively began to involve intelligentsia into the socialist construction. In the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia, in Lithuania, Latvia and the Estonias took place meetings and the congresses of the representatives of scientific and artistic intelligentsia.

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For the teachers, the doctors, the writers, the artists, the agriculturists, the scientists were created the evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, lecture agencies, were arranged theoretical seminars.

Great place in the activity of the party occupied work with the repatriated citizens. In its resolution "about the organization of political-educational work with the repatriated Soviet citizens" (August of 1944) CC VKP(b), explaining the national and political importance of repatriation, was necessary from the party organizations to isolate for this work of the best propagandists, to mobilize the party press and the radio, to widely take cultural-educational measures among those returning from the Fascist captivities of Soviet people.

Work with those repatriated enveloped the great masses of

people. Within the time of war the fascists drove away into the servitude of approximately 5 mln. Soviet citizens¹; a considerable quantity of prisoners of war they kept in the camps of death.

FOOTNOTE¹. See the Nuremberg process. Collector/collection of materials in seven volumes. Volume 1. M., Gosyurizdat, 1957, page 126. ENDFOOTNOTE.

All these people, after suffering the horrors of the Fascist-German servitude, attempted as soon as possible to hit to the native land, in order to with entire people participate in the creative, creative labor/work. There, where this work was fixed, repatriated, returned into countries, they were immediately included in the labor life. However, the effectiveness of repatriation descended because under the conditions of the personality cult of Stalin many Soviet people, which returned from the Fascist drying ovens, were undertaken under suspicion, and the unit of the former prisoners of war was declared traitors of the native land and illegally punished.

The elimination of the heavy consequences of war and the adjustment of normal life in the country required a great quantity of new cadres of technical intelligentsia, workers of science and culture. During this period as, enormous role played never the higher school, which prepares from our young people these cadres. Therefore

the central committee of the party turned particular attention to the ideological-theoretical preparation/training and political education of students, since only on the basis of the intimate knowledge of Marxism-Leninism they could become the full-valued builders of communism.

However in many VUZ of the country the study of Marxist-Leninist theory was organized weakly. Thus, for instance, at the Saratov state university im. N. G. Chernyshy^hskiy lectures were given drily and uninterestingly, at the low theoretical level. Seminar studies were constructed primitively, in the form of questions and responses. Insufficiently fully was revealed the basic opposition of bourgeois ideology and proletarian, weakly were explained the advantages of the Soviet socialist formation/order over the capitalist ².

FOOTNOTE ². See propaganda and agitation in the decisions and the documents VKP(b). M., Gospolitizdat, 1947, page 484-485. ENDFOOTNOTE.

CC of VKP(b), after revealing these deficiencies, bound All-Union committee on the affairs of higher school and Narkompros of the RSFSR, party organizations at the places to ensure the teaching of Marxism-Leninism on with salting the ideological-theoretical level, to attain a deep mastering by the students of the history of the Communist Party, products of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism,

envisaged by program VUZ, to improve the methods of teaching, to put an end to formalism and lack of originality.

The decisions of CC VKP(b) on ideological questions, accepted in 1944-1945, determined entire ideological and educational work, also, in the armed forces. On the basis of these decisions, the main political controls of the Red Army and the Navy guided the attention of political organs and party organizations of military forces to further improvement in the ideological work among the personnel. It, as before, consisted in deeply explaining of to soldiers the policy of the party and government, bringing up them in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalism, strictest observance of military discipline, steady execution of the commands of commanders and requirements of oath, bringing up the soldiers and the officers have courage and heroism.

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The most efficient form of agitation in the combat situation were group and individual conversations. The warm, sincere word of commander, political worker, stirrer, communist, their personal courage and valor in combat as nothing another, they inspired the Red Army to the military feats. The agitation and propaganda work with the soldiers of non-Russian nationality was conducted in their native

language and in many respects contributed to strengthening the combat comradeship of the soldiers of different nationalities.

For the ideological work of the party the inestimable significance had the press. During the years of war to 40 percent of all print run of the produced books comprised military-political and military-technological literature. Great attention was given to the publication of the products of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism. Important educational significance had a series of the popular books about the great patriots of the native land, prominent military and the public workers. Mass dissemination received the books and the pamphlets about military activities of the armed forces, about the hero-cities, legendary feats at the front and in the rear.

Together with the literature on the military and social and political theme were produced the books on questions of science, textbooks and artistic products. In four years of war came out more than 50.4 mln. scientific books, about 111 mln. textbooks, the almost 170 mln. products of artistic literature and 60 mln. children's publications ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the press of the USSR in forty years of 1917-1957. Statistical materials. M., Glavizdat of the All-Union National Registry of Printed Matter, 1957, page 12. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The immense mobilizing role performed the newspapers, the posters and the leaflets which were published by the millionth print runs.

During the years of war, as in the period of peaceful construction, the press connected the party with the masses. Communists used the press in order to set in motion millions of people in the rear and at the front, to organize and to inspire them to the victory.

CC VKP(b) in all its resolutions on questions of ideological work emphasized the enormous significance of the press in the work of the mobilization of masses for the accomplishment of economic and military missions. Were given special instructions in accordance with questions of the press. They include, for example, the letter of the administration of the propaganda and the agitation about the work of the district newspapers, decision of secretariat about the work war correspondent OV at the front, about the tasks of the district, regional, territorial and republican newspapers in connection with gathering of harvest and procurements of agricultural products, about deficiencies in the newspapers in the elucidation of work of industrial enterprises and other instructions.

Daily attention was paid to the front press, which was the strongest gun of the party in the education of personnel of the Red Army and the Navy. With the aid of the press military councils, the political organs and the party organizations successfully struggled for strengthening of military discipline, they widely propagandized the heroism of soldier and officers, educated soldiers in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and burning hatred for the Fascist-German aggressors.

In the elucidation of events at the front the most important role belonged to special war correspondents. To this of work the party sent the best writers, poets, journalists. Among the war correspondents of "Pravda", "Izvestia", "Red Star", "Komsomolskaya Pravda" there were such writers, as V. Vasilevsk^{aya}, A. Gaydar, B. Gorbatov, A. Korneychuk, B. Poleva, K. Simonov, L. Sobolyev, A. Tvardovskiy, N. Tikhonov, M. Sholokhov and many others. Military correspondents printed in the newspapers not only materials about the military life of military forces, but also art products in which the war was reflected as a whole as socio-political phenomenon.

During May 1943 CC of VKP(b) in one of its resolutions it indicated the need for "improving the front, army and division newspapers, in every possible way raising their role in the political, military and cultural education of personnel of the Red

GROWTH OF THE RANKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.



Handing out a Party card.

A VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League] Office gives a Komsomol soldier a recommendation for entrance in the Party (active army).



Acceptance in the Party (3rd Belorussian front).



MASS POLITICAL WORK WITHIN THE COUNTRY.

Political talk at the
Moscow Passenger
depot.



By a map of military
actions on a Tallin
street (Estonian SSR).

Kolkhoz' members listen
to a message from the
Soviet Information
Office (Kirgizskaya
SSR, 1941).



Army and making by their most important center of political work" ².

FOOTNOTE ². CPSU about the armed forces of the Soviet Union, page 378. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In the same resolution central committee paid the particular attention of commanders and political organs to the importance of the timely delivery/procurement of the newspapers into the army in the field. But the people's commissariat of defense each case of prolonged nonreception of the newspapers and letters by military units required to investigate the guilties to make to answer as for the disruption/separation of the supply of military forces. In the summer of 1943 took place the all-Army and front conferences of the workers of the front, army and division newspapers.

In proportion to restoration in the liberated areas of paper and printing trade increased a number of produced newspapers. In 1945 in the USSR were published 6455 printed newspapers. Their single print run composed 23.2 mln. copies ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the press of the USSR in forty years of 1917-1957, pages 123. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The newspapers emerged in all languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union. In the armed forces were published 4 central, 19 front and sailors, 103 army and navy newspapers by general/common/total print run about 3.5 mln. copies. The main political administration of the Red Army monthly guided into the military forces 19.3 mln. central newspapers also of 1 mln. logs/journals. On the average to every two-three soldiers fell one newspaper. For the soldiers of non-Russian nationality were published 50 newspapers in their native language: on the Kazakh - 10 newspapers, Uzbek - 11, Tatar - 8, Turkmen - 5, Kirghiz - 1, Bashkir - 1 newspaper, etc.

During the years of war the combat vanguard of the Soviet press, as in peacetime, headed a "Pravda" - the loyal standard-bearer of the Leninist party. Its passionate combat vote, which expressed public opinion, resounded everywhere: at the factories and the plants, in the kolkhozes and the state farms, in the army in the field and the guerilla detachments. Around "Pravda" were united prominent propagandists, journalists, writers and artists. Worthily fulfilled their duty of the newspaper "Izvestiya", "labor/work", the "Red Star", "Komsomolskaya Pravda" and other central and local organs of the press. The press was the herald of the ideas of the party, the irreplaceable efficient and operational means of the mobilization of

Soviet soldiers, toilers of the rear and partisan for the achievement of victory.

Persistently struggled for the celebration of socialist ideology Soviet intelligentsia, inspired by the Communist Party. During the war several times were assembled the session of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. They occurred under the sign of the mobilization of all scientific forces of the country to the rout of enemy.

During May 1942. The presidium of the AS USSR discussed the tasks of social sciences in the struggle of the Soviet people against the Hitler aggressors and accepted the concrete/specific/actual plan of development and propaganda of the theoretical problems, which facilitate more a fundamental understanding by Soviet people of goals and characteristics of the Great Patriotic War.

One of the central tasks, which stood before the scientists of humanities, was resolving the theoretical and practical problems of military economy and restoration/reduction of national economy, ideological-theoretical bases of the defense of the socialist fatherland. Especially widely was studied and was propagandized a question about the valid and unjust wars, about character and nature of the Soviet Armed Forces, about the sources of the might of

socialist state.

Important role in the Communist education of the people during the years of war continued to play art and literature. Worrying about the correct development of literature and art, the party through the public organizations and the creative alliances helped writers, workers of art of directing its forces and talent toward the creation of the high-principled artistic products, which have enormous educational significance.

Party organizations at the places conducted the untiring organizational and educational work among the artistic intelligentsia. Thus, for instance, M. Shaginyan, characterizing the activity of the group of writers in Sverdlovsk during the first year of war, she wrote: "great role in the fact that our group knew how to be included/connected in the defense work, played the department of agitation and propaganda of Sverdlovsk regional committee ... the educational role of regional committee was involuntarily given to the most writer collective the ability to act, to bring up" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. "Literature and art", on 9 May, 1942. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Writers, artists, workers of theater, cinema and music answered the appeal of the party persistent creative labor/work, giving all its capabilities and knowledge to the work of the defense of the native land. Of thoughts and feeling of Soviet writers, their devotion to patriotic duty expressed well in his action at the meeting of the writers in Moscow on 22 June, 1941, A. A. Fadeyev: "the writers of the Soviet country know their place in this decisive struggle. Many of us will fight with the weaponry in the hands, many will fight by fin ... all our forces let us give to the defense of the Soviet fatherland, we will strike to those about, until enemy, who laughed misfortune to our country, is broken" ! '.

FOOTNOTE '. "Pravda", on 24 June, 1942. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During the same difficult for the native land days the outstanding worker of Soviet theatrical art V. I. Nemirovich-Dan completed the party, that "the Soviet theater will do everything so that its work would be useful and necessary in the accomplishment of the national tasks opened before it of the defense of the native land, every possible aid of our valiant Red Army in the rout of hateful enemy" '.

FOOTNOTE '. "Pravda", on 22 July, 1941. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thousands of Soviet writers, artists, projectionists, artists,

musicians were located in the numbers of army in the field, the people's militia and the guerilla detachments. And everywhere, in any situation, be it at the front or in the rear, their main weaponry in the struggle with the fascism was inspired art, which called Soviet people for the sacred war, for the heroic service to the socialist native land. The artists of word appeared in the rear and at the front as stirrers, participated in the radio transmission, they helped political organs to conduct agitational work among the hostile troops.

The powerful means of ideological enrichment and moral education of the people was Soviet cinematography. Especially wide acceptance during the war received newsreel. In the creation of documentary films and front newsreel accepted the participation of more than 150 projectionists. In the years of war they photographed 3.5 mln. meters of film. Such films, as "Maydanek", exposed atrocities of Hitlerites, sounded by terrible accusatory document on the Nuremberg process.

There was great influence on the masses and artistic cinematographies. The workers of cinematography created 103 artistic films, of them more than 60 are devoted to the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet cinematography of military years entered into the history of cinema as one of his brightest pages.

Much saddled for the education of our people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, for the victory over the enemy theatrical workers. more than 42 thousand artists were in soldier-front-line soldiers. Were organized 3685 theatrical brigades which gave more than 1300 thousand plays and concerts, of them about 500 thousand are direct at the front *.

FOOTNOTE *. See the outlines of the history of the Russian Soviet dramatic theater. Vol. 2. M., the publishing house of the AS USSR, 1960, page 716. ENDFOOTNOTE.

All their forces, entire their talent gave to the work of the rout of enemy Soviet artists and sculptors. Within the time of the war only of central publishing house produced more than 800 posters by the print run of more than 34 mln. copies. The products of machine-tool graph/curve, painting and sculpture forever imprinted the heroic feat of our people, the severe truth of war.

The patriotic enthusiasm, which encompassed the Soviet people in the years of struggle with the Fascist aggressors, found its reflection, also, in musical art. Soviet composers created remarkable patriotic and lyric songs, symphonies, operas, cantata-oratorios. Best of these products, that are characterized by large artistic force, signified by themselves further development of our musical

art.

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Soviet literature and art in the days of war were the vote of the heroic people. Truthful depicting as the method of socialist realism caused by war to mountain and sufferings, writers, artists, artists, composers figuratively and deeply opened the humanism of Soviet people, the ideological sources of their unprecedented heroism at the front and in the rear. Randomly the works of literature and skill of military years thus caught the fancy to Soviet people and became the integral part of their life. In one of numerous letters of front-line soldiers Mikhail Sholokhov captain N. I. Khondochiy wrote apropos of his book "they they fought for the native land": "your book I burden just as my comrades, always with themselves in the bag. It us helps to live and to fight" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Writers in the patriotic war 1941-1945. M., the publ. Goslitmuzey, 1946, page 32. ENDFOOTNOTE.

But Red Army man I. F. Loginov, after reading "Vasiliy Terkina" of Aleksandr Tvardovskogo, did express this thought: "... the moments/factors, described by you, are very close to the truthfulness and do make it necessary involuntarily to think: And noTwhether

actually among us are Terkins? And it really are located ... in each unit, in each subunit ... "2.

FOOTNOTE 2. Ibid., page 114. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Great work on the education of Soviet soldiers and organization of their leisure between combat conducted the cultural-educational installations of the army and navy. With the divisions were created march army clubs, while with the political administrations of fronts and the political departments of armies - house of the Red Army which were arranged/located agitation trucks with the means of visual agitation, libraries, portable film projectors, radio receivers, musical instruments, table games. Within the time of war for the army were sent more than 255 mln. books and pamphlets, more than 250 thousand specially manned march libraries.

With the agitation trucks into the front units left the agitators and lecturers, groups of amateur artistic activity, artists of front ensembles, workers of arts. Before the concerts or the demonstration of motion-picture films appeared the political workers, who told about the current events, the situation at the fronts, the life and the work of the Soviet people in the rear, about the atrocities of Hitler aggressors in the territory occupied.

The party utilized all resources in its ideological work and it achieved great results. However, in the ideological life of the party during the years of war was created this situation, when, on one hand, excessively extolled the article, speech, Stalin's reports, with another - was humbled the great theoretical legacy of K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin, and also the collective thought of the entire party. This negatively had effect on the educational activity of the party.

The ideology of personality cult allowed/assumed the mixing of the Leninist idea of the defense of the socialist fatherland with the "installation" to the correctness and the devotion of the defenders of the native land personally to Stalin. Thereby this idea was distorted. But, in spite of the great harm, plotted/applied by personality cult, the party as a whole was guided in its activity by Marxist-Leninist theory, transforming it into the life under difficult conditions of war.

The Communist Party, using the richest experience of ideological work, skillfully united political education and formation of masses with their organization to the accomplishment of political, economic and military missions. The success of this work was achieved because of the initiative and creative activity of the primary party organizations, district committees, city committees, political organs

and party organizations of the Red Army and the Navy. Fruitful results it was possible to be achieved still and because the masses deeply mastered the ideas of the Bolshevik Party in the fire/light of struggle itself.

By its daily and saturated ideopolitical work the party joined and inspired the people to the victorious struggle with the Fascist-German aggressors and the Japanese imperialists.

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4. Strengthening the Communist Party.

One of the most important tasks of the Communist Party during the years of the Great Patriotic War was further strengthening of its numbers. The increase of the leading role of the party as inspirer and the organizer victory was necessary from it to radically change inner-party work and to subordinate to its work of the defense of the socialist fatherland. In the period of the war CC of VKP(b) and the local party organs undertook all measures for an increase in the combat efficiency of party organizations, to cohesion and education of communists.

Under the conditions of extreme military situation, as it is

earlier never, the party attempted to draw nearer its leadership in the rear and especially at the front the life of the primary party organizations, which compose the basis of the party, to continuously supplement its numbers by the leading toilers of the rear and by the soldiers of the Red Army, to advance young communists to the leading party, economic and military work.

By the most important condition for successful execution the Communist Party of its great role of avant garde of the people, which leads and directs force of Soviet society was its ideological and organizational unity. The heavy situation of war not only did not shake this unity, for what counted the enemies of the Soviet Union, but even more greatly it strengthened it. During entire war the party did not know internal disagreements, it acted as monolithic organization as the combat alliance of adherents, united under the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

Ideological unity of communists, the Leninist understanding by them of its responsibility for the fates of the native land, the inviolability of party discipline - all this became the cementing force which ensured the organizational fortress of the party. During the severe years of war as, was revealed never the ability of communists to embody into the life the policy of the party, also, in reality to carry out its vanguard role.

Understanding by the communists of the entire complexity of military situation increased their organization, increased the responsibility of party organizations for the clear and strict execution of directives and instructions of the higher organs of VKP(b). The rapid rebuilding of work in connection with new tasks testified about the organizational flexibility of the party.

During entire war the highest leading organ of the Communist Party was its central committee, elected as the XVIII congress and replenished/completed then at the XVIII All-Union party conference. During the war the congresses and the conferences of the party were not called. During October 1941 the members of CC VKP(b) were called to the plenum. However, plenum did not take place, since the secretary general of CC Stalin did not want to carry it out, referring to employment by leadership by army. Only in 1944 was assembled first and sole for entire war plenum. But the questions, directly connected with the war, and the economic tasks, which stood before the country, on it were not discussed.

Rejection of conducting of congresses and conferences of party and regular convocation of the plenums of its central committee was not caused by war time. It is known that in the years of civil war

and foreign intervention the party solved its problems in the more complicated situation. And nevertheless at that time not only regularly were conducted the plenums of central committee, but also were called the Party Congresses, at which collectively were discussed questions of the conduct of war and socialist construction. In three years of war took place three Party Congresses and two party conferences. The VIII congress of RKP(b), called during March 1919, at the very height of war, accepted the program of the party, which determined its tasks for entire period of the construction of socialism.

But then the party headed great Lenin, for whom the collective decision of questions was the highest principle of leadership. V. I. Lenin adhered this principle independent of the complexity of situation, in which proved to be the party.

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It simply did not consider it possible to lead the party without the regular convocation of its congresses, at which CC is reported before the party and taking into account the experience of masses, work of the entire party collectively develops further policy.

However, Stalin misused the given to him authority. Without

possessing the Leninist qualities of political leader and organizer, it exhibited the tendency inherent in it toward the individual leadership. Its rejection of the periodic convocation of the highest leading organs of the party, of collective discussion of the most important questions of its policy was the gross violation of the Leninist norms of party life. This negatively had effect during the years of war both on combat operations and on the national economy, since it prevented the complete manifestation of the initiative of party, Soviet, economic and military organs.

Nevertheless the party acted true to life and powerful organism. After maintaining correctness to V. I. Lenin, faithfulness to his ideas, it brought up numerous mature/ripe and hardened/tempered cadres for which selfless service to the socialist native land was the highest duty. Hundreds of thousands of ardent patriot-communists, and together with them millions of Komsomol members and non-party members without the oscillations/vibrations gave their life for the fatherland, for the Communist Party. There was united the commonality of ideas and goals. Therefore it is not by chance, going into combat, many non-party members they declared: "if I perish, I please to consider me communist". The all-conquering ideas of the Leninist party, after mastering masses, became the greatest material force.

The vitality of the Leninist party with the unusual brightness

was revealed in an increase in its numbers. Membership in the party - one of the basic questions of party construction. On the composition of the party depends the successful execution by it of the responsible role of the leader of national masses, its combat efficiency and fortress.

Within the time of war the total losses VKP(b) exceeded 3 mln. people ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16574, sheet 9-11, 19-21, 31-32.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

But these great losses did not weaken/attenuate the party. It continuously was supplemented. For the shift/relief by that left came new champions. Since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War through 31 December, 1945, were accepted by candidates into members VKP(b) in 5319297 people and into the members VKP(b) - 3615451 people. In the years of war our party it entered candidates 2.4 times and of terms 2.6 times more than during the corresponding period before the war ².

FOOTNOTE ². *ibid*, sheet 9, 20-21. ENDFOOTNOTE.

A quantity of communists, accepted in VKP(b) by the territorial

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and military party organizations from 1 July, 1941, through 31 December, 1945, it is shown in the following table.

numerical increase in the party '.

FOOTNOTE '. Ibid, sheet 20-21. ENDFOOTNOTE.

(1) Годы	(2) Принято в кандидаты ВКП(б)			(7) Принято в члены ВКП(б)		
	(3) всего	(4) в том числе		(3) всего	(4) в том числе	
		(5) территори- альными парторгани- зациями	(6) военными парторгани- зациями		(5) территори- альными парторгани- зациями	(6) военными парторгани- зациями
1941 (второе по- лугодие) . . .	198 303	52 433	145 870	145 212	84 513	60 699
1942	1 368 160	194 893	1 173 267	573 606	132 402	441 204
1943	1 787 735	355 273	1 432 462	1 006 174	168 580	837 594
1944	1 336 350	358 710	977 640	1 124 853	262 843	862 010
1945	628 749	273 644	355 105	765 606	299 290	466 316
(9) Итого . . .	5 319 297	1 234 953	4 084 344	3 615 451	947 628	2 667 823

Key: (1). Years. (2). It is accepted in candidates of VKP(b). (3). in all. (4). among other things. (5). by territorial party organizations. (6). by military party organizations. (7). It is accepted into terms VKP(b). (8). (second half-year). (9). Altogether.

end section.

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The inflow of fresh forces into the party from the very beginning of war occurred by the increasing rates. Thus, in the second half of 1941 it was accepted in the candidates of VKP(b) of 198303 people and into the members - 145212 people, then in the first half-year of 1942. in the candidates of the party entered 555898 people, also, the members - 238732 people, and in the second half-year respectively - 812262 and 334874 people. During 1942-1944 in the candidates of VKP(b) on the average were monthly accepted 125 thousand people, including as territorial party organizations of 25 thousand and by military - 100 thousand. The highest level an increase in the party achieved during August 1943, when into it were accepted 201130 candidates and 110026 members¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. documents and the materials of the department of history of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16574, ll. 10, 20-21.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

The party not only compensated for the losses carried by it, but also multiplied its numbers. If at the beginning of war in it were

counted about 4 mln. people, of them 579 thousand women, then to January 1946 in VKP(b) there were more than 5500 thousand people, including more than 1 mln. women².

FOOTNOTE ². There, 11. 14, 20, 32. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Communists were 6 percent of all adult population of the Soviet Union. In other words, of every 16 people one was communist³.

FOOTNOTE ³. See the results of the All-Union inventory of the population of 1959, pages 49. Detachment is produced taking into account the losses, carried by the USSR in the years of war, calculated into 20 mln. people. ENDFOOTNOTE.

A continuous increase in the Leninist party testified about its inviolable unity with the people, about its authority in the wide masses of laborers. In this there was the force VKP(b). In this - the source of the invincibility of communism. The tendency of the best people of working class, peasantry and Soviet intelligentsia to inseparably tie its fate with the party was the expression of patriotism, devotion of national masses to the socialist social system and to the cohesion of the Soviet people around the Bolshevik Party.

To mass inflow into the party of fresh forces contributed the accepted by the XVIII congress regulations VKP(b), which, after establishing for all the uniform conditions of reception/method and identical candidate period, independent of social situation, it lightened laboring the entrance into the party. Under the conditions of the victory of socialism and established moral and political unity of the Soviet people this measure was necessary. Enormous significance for an increase in the party had also the resolutions by TsK VKP(b) of 19 August and on 9 December, 1941, lightened the entrance into it soldiers, who particularly distinguished themselves in combat.

In the Great Patriotic War, i.e., in the period of the tests heaviest for our country, each entered into the Leninist party proved its devotion. To native land in the fire/light of struggle. the party, widely opening/disclosing its doors, did not promise to those entering into it any advantages and privileges. It called into its the numbers of the most loyal supporters of communism, not fearful difficulties, ready to go on victim and to give all its forces, but if it is required, then life, to defense the fatherland. the party followed the instructions of V. I. Lenin, who spoke: ~~The~~ display members of the party to us is not must and by gift".

And in VKP(b) went the actually/really most betrayed, progressive-minded, progressive-minded Soviet people. Connecting their life with the party, they burned by one wish, by one tendency - it is active and it is selfless to struggle into the name of communism.

Being supplemented by fresh forces, the party not only numerically expanded its composition, but also improved it qualitatively. First of all, was raised the proportion of workers. Thus, among accepted during the years of war in the candidates of VKP(b) it increased in comparison with the prewar ones with the time from 24.4 to 32.1 percent⁵.

FOOTNOTE ⁵. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16574, 1. 12. ENDFOOTNOTE.

At the same time continued the healthy process of the rejuvenation of the party, combination in it of old and young cadres.

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Communists at the age of up to 24 years, i.e., Komsomol age, toward

the end of the war were counted more than 1008 thousand people, or 18.3 percent. On the eve their war there were 345 thousand or 8.9 percent of all composition of VKP(b)¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16574, l. 13. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Komsomol, helping the party in the state, military and economic construction, was one of its powerful/thick reserves. Within the time of war Komsomol organizations prepared for the entrance into VKP(b) 2484564 their member, including civil/civilian organizations - 715106 people and military - 1769458 people².

FOOTNOTE ². There, l. 12; inv. No 8828, l. 19. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the composition of the party occurred further increase in the proportion of communists with highest and secondary education. This process, caused by cultural revolution and creation in the country of national intelligentsia, was begun, as is known, after cancellation with the XVIII congress of VKP(b) of limitations on the reception/method into the party. A number of communists with highest, secondary and incomplete average/mean education increased within the time of war from 39.8 to 57.4 percent. In 1945 in the Soviet Union there were more than 1200 thousand people with higher education,

among them 404513 communists. Consequently, not less than all one third persons, who had higher education, consisted of VKP(b)³.

FOOTNOTE ³. *Ibid* inv. No 16574, 1. 13. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the party much greater it became women. In the years of war their number increased with 579 thousand to 1033 thousand, or by 78.4 percent. In 1945 the proportion of women in VKP(b) was 18.7 percent⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. *Ibid* 1. 14. ENDFOOTNOTE.

This great increase in the number of women in the party is explained by the fact that in the period of war they were the decisive force not only in the agriculture, but also in the industry, in the field of transportation and in the construction. At the same time hundred thousand women together with the men bore heavy military service. On the active role of Soviet women in the armed forces speaks the fact that among accepted in the candidates of VKP(b) on the Red Army and the Navy were counted more than 189 thousand women⁵.

FOOTNOTE ⁵. *Ibid* 1. 23. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The national composition of the party toward the end of the Great Patriotic War clearly shows further strengthening by the

fraternal of the peoples of the Soviet Union, although to it was plotted/applied by personality cult the sizable harm. Numbers VKP(b) were supplemented by the best representatives of the laborers of all our, nationalities and the national groups, which live in the USSR.

Into the Leninist party which from its quite onset was built as international, they entered: Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, Azerbaijanians, Armenians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Moldavians, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Abazines, Abkhazes, Adygeys, Assyrians, Balkars, Bashkirs, Bulgarians, Buryats, Veps, Greeks, Dargyins, Jews, Ingushes, Iranians, Kabardians, Kalmyks, Karakalpaks, Karachayevs, Karelians, Chinese, the Komi, Koreans, Kumyk, Kurds, Laks, Lezghians, Magyar, Maris, Mordvinys, Germans, Nens, Nogays, Oirotiens, Osetins, Poles, Rumanians, Rutiles, Serbians, Tabasarans, Talyshes, Tatars, Tats, Turks, Udmurts, Uigurs, Finns, Khakasses, Tsakhurs, Gypsies, Czechs, Chechens, Chuvashs, Evens, Yakuts and others - representatives with higher than hundred nationalities, nationalities and national groups.

Each people made its feasible contribution to strengthening of the Communist Party. Nationalities comparatively small on the strength had toward the end of the war more communists, than on the eve it. Thus, for instance, the communists of Maris in 1940 there were 4330 people, and in 1945 of them became 7527, Buryats

respectively - 4633 and 9509, Estonians - 5011 and 7976, Yakuts - 2992 and 5058 people'.

FOOTNOTE ' *Ibid* 1. 40. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Being guided by the manual/regulations of the party and by the resolutions of TsK VKP(b), party organs in the rear and at the front conducted great work on the expansion of the ranks of the party.

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Because of the continuous replenishment by fresh forces the territorial and military party organizations within the time of war not only did not decrease their strength, but, on the contrary, they became still more full-blooded.

At the same time in the work on the expansion of the ranks of the party were serious errors and deficiencies. Thus, some party organs orientated the party organizations toward the pursuit of a quantity of those taken into the party, decreasing requirements for those entering in VKP(b) and accepting almost each, who fed statement. The army in the field the political organs frequently spread established/installed TsK VKP(b) of benefit for the particularly distinguished soldiers on all soldiers, who entered into

the party. In the territorial organizations insufficiently actively were involved into the party workers, the tractor operators, operators, agriculturists, zootechnicians, rural teachers, etc.

TsK VKP(b) repeatedly focused attention of the local party organizations and political organs of the Red Army and the Navy to the need for individual approach with the reception/method into the party.

During October 1944 of the bureau of TsK it was necessary from the political organs to radically improve work on the education of communists. In the directive of the main political administration of the Red Army, affirmed to TsK VKP(b), it was said: the "main attention of party organizations to concentrate on the problem of the ideopolitical education of communists"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Archives MO USSR, f. 240, pub. 2839, d. 14, 1. 3.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

For these purposes it was proposed to more widely organize study by the communists of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and history of the Communist Party, to render by them comprehensive assistance in the political training, to systematically conduct lectures, reports, consultations.

During December 1944 of the bureau of TsK of the party, after discussing a question about the results of reception/method in VKP(b) during the period of patriotic war, bound regional committees, territorial committees and TsK of the communist parties of the union republics "to turn its attention to an in the Party spirit-organizational and party-political work, decisively to put an end to the underestimation of educational work among the communists and to exhibit the constant concern that the communists, who newly entered the party, would more rapidly master entire responsibility of transition from nonpartyship to Bolshevik organization, would receive the traditions of our party and would seize bolshevism"².

FOOTNOTE ². TsPA IML, f. 17, pub. 44, d. 2072, l. 109. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Resembling that the terms VKP(b) receive Communist education, first of all, in their primary organizations, the bureau of TsK required from all party organs "to restore/reduce the role of party meetings as the schools of the Communist education of members and candidates of the party, to ensure organization for their discussion of reports about the military-political and international clause of the country, most important questions of the domestic policy of party and party life of this organization"³.

FOOTNOTE 3. *Ibid* 1. 110. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Bureau was recommended for party organs to thoroughly prepare meetings and to conduct by their in such a way that in them actively would participate all communists on the basis of the wide deployment of criticism and self-criticism as the basic method of the Bolshevik education of cadres'.

FOOTNOTE 4. *Ibid*. ENDFOOTNOTE.

A question about the results of reception/method into the party and the measures of an improvement in the educational work with the new communists was discussed at the conference of the secretaries on the propaganda and of the heads of organizational-instructor departments of regional committees and territorial committees of the party, called by TsK VKP(b) on 29 December, 1944. Participants in this conference exchanged the experience of their work on reception/method and education of new members and candidates of VKP(b) and introduced many valuable propositions, taken into consideration then both by the local and central organs of the party.

The measures indicated positively had effect on an organizational-political work of the party. TsK VKP(b) steeply turned the attention of party organs and all communists toward strengthening the primary party organizations, improvement in their activity in the education of the young communists who composed of two thirds entire parties. By this it was explained, that primary task of inner-party work became the Bolshevik education of young communists, their involvement in the active party and public life.

During entire war, striving an improvement in its leadership, the party improved the net/system of its local organs and primary party organizations. In order to draw nearer party leadership the lower work, for TsK VKP(b) created in the period of war 21 new regional committee, 81 city committees, 96 district committees of the party in the cities and 188 - in the rural terrain. Considerably greater it became the primary party organizations. Toward the end of their Great Patriotic War there was by 243258, whereas in 1940 - 184238. On the territorial party organizations their number increased within the time indicated from 170439 to 181388, while on the military - from 13799 to 61870¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of the Department of the

History of the Great Patriotic War, inv. No. 16574, ll. 41-42.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, the expansion of the net/system of primary party organizations during the years of war occurred mainly in the armed forces. This was explained first of all by the fact that in the Red Army and the Navy a quantity of communists increased almost 5 times. The attention of the central and local organs of the party in the territorial organizations was concentrated in strengthening of the primary ones of organization, first of all, in the industry and in the field of transportation.

For strengthening of the ranks of the party enormous significance had a creation of shop party ones of organization, selection them bureau in the presence in these organizations is not less than 15 members VKP(b), but at the large/coarse plants - education/formation of shop party committees. To the Red Army were created, according to the resolution of TsK VKP(b) of 24 May, 1943, the primary party organizations in the battalions and the subunits equal to them, and in the companies, the batteries and the squadrons - company party organizations. After setting of this new structure of army party organizations its basic link became the party organization of battalion. The Party bureau of regiment now worked on the laws/rights of party committee.

The role of primary organizations, even those more gotten stronger and grown, considerably was raised in the organizational and ideological work both in the rear and at the front. Being daily found in the sediment of the people, they solved the most varied vital problems of economic, cultural and military construction. In the primary organizations, which are the basis of the party, was formed each communist as the ideological, conscious and active soldier of the party. Through these organizations VKP(b) it led masses, were put into practice its policy, its decisions. From the level of the organizational and political activity of the lower teams of the party in many respects depended the success of work.

TsK VKP(b) and local party organs constantly worried about an improvement in the work of the primary party organizations, informed communists about the most important questions of the domestic and external policy of Soviet state, about the internal life of the party, international Communist and worker's movement. For an improvement in theoretical knowledge of the secretaries of primary organizations and their familiarization with the practical experience of party work with the city committees, the district committees and the political organs were called the seminars and conferences.

Numerous efforts/forces undertook TsK VKP(b) and local organs of the party, in order to restore/reduce party organizations in the areas, liberated from the Fascist-German occupation. Within the most compressed periods were here created the leading party organs and was restored/reduced in essence the branched net/system of the primary party organizations.

At the end of the war the communist party of the Ukraine had in its numbers more than 320 thousand communists, either 57 percent with respect to the prewar time, the communist party of Belorussia - is more than 48 thousand or 66 percent of previous composition. In the Russian federation regions, which were undergoing occupation, strength of party organizations was close to the prewar, while in certain cases even it exceeded it.

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Only in four regions - Pskov, Smolensk, Bryansk and Rostov - a quantity of communists varied in comparison with the prewar ones by period from 73 to 81 percent. However, as far as the party organizations of the Baltic republics and Moldavia are concerned, in them in the beginning of 1946 of communists it was counted 3-4 times more than in 1940¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. IML. Documents and materials of department of history of Great Patriotic War, inv. No 16574, ll. 43-47. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Successful restoration/reduction and strengthening of party organizations in the areas, liberated from the Fascist-German aggressors, was explained, in the first place, by the fact that was here maintained the basic nucleus of supervisory personnel; in the second place, here by TsK VKP(b) it directed thousands of workers from the eastern areas of the country and from the armed forces; thirdly, party organs they developed in these areas active operation on the selection into the party of new members and candidates from the people which demonstrated their political maturity and devotion to the socialist native land in the severe struggle against the occupationists and their hangers-on.

How considerable was the reinforcement of the party organizations of the liberated areas by new communists, it is possible to see based on the example of the Ukraine and Belorussia. For the years 1942-1945 into the members KP(b)U were accepted 111837 people and into the members KP(b)B - 16693 people. Young communists as a whole comprised in the Ukraine toward the end of 1945 of 58.3 percent, and in Belorussia - 63 percent of the entire strength of these republican organizations¹.

FOOTNOTE 2. *Idid* 11. 45-46. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Particular attention to TsK VKP(b) was focused on strengthening of party organizations in the Moldavian, the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Soviet republics. These republics were formed and became part of the structure of the USSR not long before the Great Patriotic War, and here was necessary enormous work on strengthening of formation/order, and, first of all, on the alterations on the socialist principles of village. Taking into account that the party organizations of Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia they were still insufficiently strong/firm and by few also before them stood extremely great and complex problems. Central committee VKP(b) for rendering aid by it created during November 1944. Bureaus of TsK VKP(b) of Moldavian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR as the temporary/time organs of the party. In the decision of the Politbureau of TsK for this was said the following: "the bureaus of TsK VKP(b) are created in all young Soviet republics. In the history of our party of this type the organs were created repeatedly. In its time there was Central-Asian bureau of TsK VKP(b), the Caucasian bureau of TsK VKP(b). These organs, after fulfilling their role, first of all on cultivation and creation of local national cadres, strengthening of party and Soviet organizations and increasing their political activity, then are eliminated"³.

FOOTNOTE 3. TsPA IML, f. 17, pub. 44, d. 886, l. 196. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, primary task of the bureaus of TsK VKP(b) in the young Soviet republics was advancement and education of local national cadres, than, strictly, and was determined the temporary/time character of these organs.

Extremely considerable attention was paid to the functional check of local party organs. Beginning with 1942 and prior to the end of 1945 in TsK VKP(b) it was heard 167 reports of the secretaries of regional committees, territorial committees and TsK of the communist parties of the republics. Many party organs within this time were heard on 2-3 times. Local party organs were reported in TsK for the most diverse questions: about the state of idling, preparation/training and education of supervisory personnel, about organization and content of ideological work, about the inner-party activity, the style of the party leadership of industry and by agriculture, etc.

Functional check of local party organs and their listening in TsK VKP(b) acquired special importance under the conditions when the plenums of TsK regularly were not called and when the periodicity of the reports of the party organs before the communists was disrupted, but many of these organs worked more than that period for which them

authorized the party conferences and the congresses.

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It suffices to say that in four years of the Great Patriotic War only in one territory even 23 regions, mainly in those newly formed, took place the party conferences, of them 6 - in 1944 and 18 - in 1945.

On the reports of the local party organs of TsK VKP(b) it accepted the comprehensive solutions, in which were revealed the reasons for deficiencies, were indicated the measures for their elimination and were planned the prospects for work. This was criticism on top. Its effectiveness was provided than that it was supplemented by criticism from below. The wide discussion of the resolutions of TsK VKP(b) in the local party organizations contributed to the deployment of criticism and self-criticism, to an increase in the responsibility of party organs and all communists for the common cause of the party.

Thus, for instance, discussion in the Kemerovo party organization of the resolution by TsK VKP(b) of 24 September, 1942. "About the measures of an improvement in the party work in the carbon areas of the Kuznetsk Basin" and the resolution GKO of 15 June, 1943. "About the measures for urgent aid to the mines/shafts of the

Kuznetsk Basin" it caused the enormous activity of communists. Their valuable admonitions and propositions made it possible to improve the party leadership of the work of carbon mines/shafts, to raise the vanguard role of communists and Komsomol members in the face/bottom/slaughter. As a result the Kuznetsk Basin in 1943 gave to the country of carbon/coal almost to 4 mln. tons more than in 1942¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Party archive of the Kemerovo regional committee of CPSU, f. 75, pub. 1, d. 17, ll. 4, 5. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the Penza party organization only at the plenums of regional committee, city committees and district committees of the party, which were taking place during January - February of 1944, in the discussion of the resolution of TsK VKP(b) "About the work of Penza regional committee VKP(b)" accepted the participation of 7240 communists, of them in the debate came forward more than 900 people. It is characteristic that if earlier at the plenums appeared mainly the regional, urban and district workers, then at the plenums, dedicated to the resolution of TsK of the party, came forward 90 secretaries of the primary party organizations, 200 chairmen of kolkhozes, 60 chairmen of the rural advice/councils of the deputies of laborers and 55 directors of machine-and-tractor stations².

FOOTNOTE ². TsPA IML, f. 17, pub. 8, d. 327, l. 3. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Local party organs, fulfilling the resolutions of TsK VKP(b) and being guided by the manual/regulations of the party, attempted to improve entire their in the Party spirit-organizational work. In spite of the contraction of inner-party democracy, the most important political, economic and military questions were always discussed collectively. Thus, in eight TsK of the communist parties of the republics and 46 Kray and regional committees VKP(b) of service areas from 1941 through 1945 took place 2851 conferences of bureau, 851 plenums even 89 meetings of republican, territorial and regional party party actives. In this case the plenums and the meetings of party party actives in a quantity of participants were more representatively than before the war. For example, in such large/coarse rear organizations as Yaroslavl, Gor'kiy, Tatar, Kuybyshev, Saratov, Chelyabinsk, Bashkir, Altai, Kemerovo, Permian, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, at the plenums of regional committees, territorial commitees and TsK of the communist parties of the republics frequently participated from 150 to 250 people, and on the party party actives - from 800 to 1000 and more than communists.

For strengthening of the ranks of the party, raising of entire organizational and political work great significance had the

report-and-election meetings in the primary party organizations, carried out twice for the time of war, and also the district and urban party conferences, which were taking place in the majority of organizations at the end 1944 - the beginning of 1945. Meetings and conferences, as a rule, were conducted under the sign of healthy criticism and self-criticism. In the summary reports of party organs and in the actions of communists the attention was concentrated not on what was already made, but on what was to be done.

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
The report-and-election meetings and party conferences showed the high activity of communists, their political maturity, ability to reveal and to remove deficiencies in the work, ability to see the prospects. Communists boldly criticized those leading workers who exhibited conceit and bureaucratism.


The delegates of the Alapayev urban Party Conference, which was taking place during January 1944, criticized the secretaries of city committee for the fact that they did not associate with the workers - with those, who solved the fate of government tasks/targets and plans. Old communists, who arrived in Urals with the evacuated Leningrad enterprises, appearing at the conference, told about the style of the work of S. M. Kirov who, attending plants and factories,

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conversed and was advised not only the heads, but also the workers.

At the party conference of the Ordzhonikidze district of the city of Sverdlovsk the delegates criticized district and urban committees VKP(b) for their insufficient work on carrying out of decisions of the XVIII All-Union party conference. Communists from Uralmashzavod noted that the district committee did not organize a deep study of their experience of an organizational-political work and did not extend it in other enterprises of area.

In a word, the fire/light of criticism was directed against in all, which hindered forward movement, interfered with the conquest of victory. Communists sharply raised the question about the improvement of the methods of the party leadership of economy, about the skillful combination of economic work with the political, about the approach to the people, to the cadres, about an improvement in the domestic-material conditions of laborers. They with the knowledge of work discussed such complicated problems of industrial and agricultural production as planning, automation, prime cost, storage of means, capital investment, productivity of grain crops and industrial crops, the productivity of stock raising, etc.

It is remarkable, that together with the old Bolsheviks in the discussion of the activity of party organs actively participated the

young communists. It suffices to say that more than half of the delegates of urban and district Party Conferences for the first time they were selected to such meetings, and about fourth of delegates were the members of the party, who joined its ranks during the years of the Great Patriotic War. This attested to the fact that the party was supplemented by the hardened/tempered people which rapidly grew on the party work, that the party organizations boldly, like Lenin inspected/checked young communists on the practical work. V. I. Lenin wrote: "art of experienced party workers in the center and at the places must be revealed in intensely using of new fresh party forces..."¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works t. 30, pp. 55. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Communists electing their leading organs, decisively devoted the candidatures of those workers who did not justify their confidence. After selection considerably was renewed the composition of Party bureau and party committees, district committees city committees of VKP(b). Thus, in Chelyabinsk were elected almost two thirds of new secretaries of the party bureaus of primary organizations².

FOOTNOTE ². TsPA IML, f. 17, op. 8, d. 367, l. 9. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In Moscow into the composition of district committees entered more than 40 percent of the communists who for the first time were selected into the leading party organs. In the Ukraine at the leadership of party organizations, by district committees and by city committees arrived many new capable people'.

FOOTNOTE '. See: Notes from the History of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, p. 543. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The report-and-election meetings of the primary party organizations, urban and district party conferences were the serious inspection/check of supervisory personnel, the school of the education of communists. They convincingly showed that the party organizations within the time of war even more got stronger, even more closely they were joined around TsK VKP(b) and there were ready were ready to overcome any difficulties for the fastest rout of Fascist aggressors, for raising of national economy and culture the countries. Specifically, by this tendency were explained those high requirements which presented the communists to their leading organs.

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Fortifying its numbers, the party paid unremitting attention to selection, to education and to the advancement of the cadres, which

are the decisive force of party leadership. Under war time the resolution of this problem was conjugated/combined with the enormous difficulties.

First, it was necessary to translate tens of thousands of workers from a number of supervisory personnel from different civil/civilian work on work in the army, moreover they was to be rapidly trained them military science. For this purpose was started the wide net/system of the corresponding courses and schools, and the highest military educational institutions passed to the abbreviated/reduced programs and the accelerated issues.

In the second place, in connection with the increased need for the cadres, which felt the army and national economy, it was necessary to organize the mass advancement of new workers, to help them to rise as to heads, to bring up in them a feeling of great responsibility before the party and the people for the assigned work.

In spite of all difficulties, connected with the war, the party widely organized preparation/training and retraining of cadres. The Politbureau of TsK VKP(b) as long ago as 1942 made a decision in which was contained the program of training of personnel not only to the period of war, but also for the postwar period.

Party organs in the center and at the places systematically dealt with selection and advancement of cadres. The scope of this work can be judged from the example to the seaside territorial party organization of the Far East. In the pre-war years this organization usually received supervisory personnel from the central regions of the Soviet Union. However, during the years of war it itself advanced to the leading posts more than 6 thousand people¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. TsPA IML, f. 17, pub. 8, d. 329 l. 43. ENDFOOTNOTE.

But in the work with the cadres there were large/coarse deficiencies. Thus, were observed the cases of the unjustified shift/relief of workers. In the activity of the personnel division of TsK VKP(b), and also the corresponding departments of many local party organs and people's commissariats predominated the spirit of administration. Secretariat and the bureau of TsK VKP(b) repeatedly are turned on this attention.

During April 1944 central committee condemned the Irkutsk regional committee of the party for the administration and the groundless imposition of party penalties on the workers and was necessary from it to rapidly eliminate the faulty methods of leadership².

FOOTNOTE 2. *Ibid*, pub. 45, d. 510, l. 71. ENDFOOTNOTE.

During February 1945 of TsK VKP(b) subjected to sharp criticism Novosibirsk regional committee for the lag of agriculture in the field, which in many respects was explained by disdainful relation to the cadres. In one of the largest/coarsest and most important granular areas of the region - Kupin - the regional committee changed during the war 14 secretaries of the district committee of the party, including of five firsts, three second and six secretaries on the cadres'.

FOOTNOTE 3. *Ibid* pub. 48, d. 1369, l. 54. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The instructions of TsK VKP(b) helped party organizations to amend the allowed errors and to conduct work with the cadres like Lenin, in the spirit of the manual/regulations of the party.

Solving in the period of war the political problems of enormous importance. The Communist Party took measures to correctly place the Marxist-Leninist education of supervisory personnel, all communists. For this purpose the enormous army of the qualified propagandists, which counted many tens of thousands people, unceasingly conducted ideological work in the rear and at the front. Educational work within the party was directed toward that in order to render

assistance each communist in the mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Together with the independent study by the communists of theory and history of the Communist Party was fortified and was expanded the net/system of political schools and party small circles for the young communists. The party organizations arranged the reading of lectures specially for the young members of the party. The party organizations arranged the reading of lectures specially for the young members of the party both occupying in the small circles, and working independently. The party press, publishing the propagandistic articles on questions of the current policy, theory and the history of the party, exerted communists aid in a Marxist-Leninist education/formation.

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In the Ukraine in 1944 in all fields were almost created three-month courses on training of the party and propagandistic cadres, functioned 912 evening party schools, in which it was trained to 28 thousand party, Soviet and Komsomol workers of the regional centers and the primary party organizations¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See the outlines of the history of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, pp. 527. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the Moscow party organization in 1944 were about 5 thousand small circles on the study of the history of the party and current policy².

FOOTNOTE ². Party archive MK and MGK of CPSU. f. 3, pub. 66, d. 24, l. 4. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the Gor'kiy urban party organization in the house of party education worked evening university. In its seven departments - history of the party, philosophy, political economy, international relations, history of the USSR, universal history, Russian and European classical literature - were occupied more than 2300 people, including of 163 secretaries of primary party organizations³.

FOOTNOTE ³. TsPA IML, f. 17, pub. 8, d. 174, ll. 6, 7. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In Kamensk-Ural organization urban committee conducted in 1944 with those independently studying the history of the party of 143 theoretical discussions and conferences in which participated 3200 people⁴.

FOOTNOTE ⁴. There, pub. 45, d. 1520, l. 93. ENDFOOTNOTE.

In 1944 with TsK of the communist parties of the union republics, territorial committees and regional committees VKP(b) acted 55 annual party schools for 10 thousand leading workers. Renewed work the highest party school with TsK VKP(b). At the beginning of 1945 in the country were counted 5 thousand evening party schools and it is more than 20 thousand political schools, in which were trained more than 520 thousand communists'.

FOOTNOTE '. See "propagandist", 1945, No 24, pp. 11. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The constant concern of the party about the spiritual growth of its members and candidates activated/promoted ideological life in VKP(b), strengthened in it discipline, increased the consciousness of communists. It suffices to say that during the years of war, in spite of the difficult conditions in which it was necessary to work the party, and on the fact that its composition was renewed by two thirds, sharply decreased a number of breaches of party discipline.

The heavy tests of war did not weaken/attenuate the Communist Party, but even more greatly they tempered it. The years of struggle with the German fascism and the Japanese imperialism were marked by further increase in the ranks of the party. In it went the best people of the Soviet country - soldiers of the Red Army and navy, valiantly fighting at the front, progressive-minded workers,

collective farmers and representatives of intelligentsia, it is selfless working in the rear, glorious partisans, who boldly acted towards that occupied by the enemy of territory. Violent increase in the ranks of the party in the days of terrible military testing - bright certificate of its increased authority, its continuous connection/bond with the people, love and the confidence for it of all Soviet people.

The peoples of our country maintained/withstood this testing as the Great Patriotic War, first of all, because by inspirer and the organizer of their struggle against the Fascist aggressors was the Communist Party - leading and directing force of Soviet society.

The greatest stress/voltage for our native land it was necessary to suffer in the first period of the war when military superiority was on the side of enemy. But the party, after heading struggle with the enemy, gave unity and purposefulness of the entire activity of Soviet people at the front and in the rear, converted entire country into the tightly united combat camp. The Soviet people revealed the unprecedented moral staying power/persistency which allowed the Red Army to stop aggressor. The greatest services of the party consisting in the fact that precisely in this improbably heavy time the heroic efforts/forces of the Soviet people created economic and military prerequisites/premises for the basic break/fracture in the struggle

with the aggressors.

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In the second period of war this turning point came, and the course of events decisively changed in favor of the Soviet Union. Energy of the people and army the party directed now toward that in order to confirm success achieved and to even more decisively continue the begun mass expulsion/exile of Hitlerites from the Soviet territory. During this period vividly were revealed the results of the titanic work of the party on the organization of powerful/thick military economy. Fascist Germany lost its superiority in the production of material and technical combat materiel. The Soviet Armed Forces, which grew quantitatively, began to exceed enemy both on their technical equipment and on the ability to fight.

The third period of war was characteristic even by the more considerable changes in the military-political situation, in connection with which before our country arose new political problems. In 1944 the Red Army completed liberation from the Fascist aggressors of the entire territory of the Soviet Union. But our people, in spite of enormous victims and deprivations, it did not end struggle. It completely supported the policy of the party which considered it necessary to render assistance the enslaved peoples of

Europe, to complete the historical liberating mission of the Red Army by the utter defeat of Hitler state. And victory was achieved.

However, the unconditional surrender of the strongest and dangerous aggressor - Fascist Germany - yet did not indicate the end of the Second World War. Aggressive imperialistic Japan continued persistently to oppose/resist. The military activities which conducted against it the USA, England, the national liberation forces of China and other Asian countries, they did not promise the fast world. The party called the Soviet people to be included/connected in this struggle for the final rout of Japan. As a result USSR strengthened its safety in the Far East, helped the peoples of China and other countries of Asia to be freed from the imperialistic oppression, accelerated the offensive of the world, which related to the interests of all peoples, which tested the unprecedented military burdens.

One should particularly emphasize that in the struggle against the Fascist-German aggressors was widely used the thoroughly generalized by V. I. Lenin experience of party leadership in the years of civil war and foreign intervention. As then, the party solidly and steadily adhered to line - to concentrate all forces in war and to do everything in order to conquer. As then, the party constantly turned to the people, seeing in it the source of its

strength. Being invariably guided by Lenin's legacy, it is vein/strand in the sediment of masses, it knew their moods, it knew how to approach the masses and to earn their absolute confidence¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See V. I. Lenin. The complete works, Vol. 44, pp. 497.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

On the call of TsK VKP(b) to the struggle with the enemy rose millions of people. The authority of the party united all departments and installations. Centralization and discipline were combined with the greatest self-sacrifice of the national masses, inspired to the feats by communists².

FOOTNOTE ². See V. I. Lenin. Works, t. 30 pp. 415-416. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Leninist party, which indicated the accurate routes/paths of the realization of the liberating goals of the Great Patriotic War, closely related to the Soviet people, led our country to the world-wide historical victory.

In the postwar years the Communist Party directed energy of masses toward the peaceful creative labor/work, together with the Soviet people it attained the complete and final victory of socialism. At present the laborers of the USSR successfully build

Communist society. The principles of proletarian internationalism, struggle for the prevention of new world war, for the confirmation/assertion of the world and friendship between all peoples are the basis of the entire foreign policy activity of CPSU. Our party consistently conducts the policy, directed toward strengthening of unity and cohesion of the socialist countries, support of liberating revolutionary movements and development of cooperation with the independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

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It decisively struggles for strengthening of peace, detente of international tension and peaceful coexistence of states with different social system.

The XX Congress of CPSU, after exposing the personality cult of Stalin, began the restoration/reduction of really Leninist democracy in the life of the party and state. Important post/stake on the path of the realization of the decisions of XX Congress were the plenums of the CC CPSU, which were taking place during October and November of 1964. Decisions of these plenums, which obtained approval and support of all people, the new certificate of the concern of the party about the strict observance of the Leninist norms of party and

state life.

In the program of CPSU accepted at the XXII congress was further developed the Marxist-Leninist teaching about the party, is given the theoretical basis of its increasing role in the life of the Soviet people in the period of the started building of communism. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which arose as avant garde of working class, became now the party of all people. In this become apparent might of socialist society, its ideological and moral and political unity.

When in 1903 the party accepted its first program, into it entered the small groups of progressive-minded workers. When in 1919 the party accepted the second program, after it already went the working class and bulk of the working people. The now Communist Party - mind, honor and conscience of our epoch - counts in their numbers of almost 12 mln. people, and after it goes entire Soviet people.

In its activity the party proceeds from the Marxist-Leninist situation about the fact that the people - creator of history, that the formation of communism - work of the hands of the people, its energy, its reason. "The victory of communism, is said in the program of CPSU, depends on people, and communism is built for the people. Each Soviet person by his labor/work approaches the triumph of

communism"¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographical report. Vol. III, pp. 334. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The experience of the Soviet people in the building of socialism and communism, the disinterested support to them of all other peoples in the struggle for peace and better future gained by the laborer of the USSR the gratitude of all progressive forces of our planet.

The political and organizational activity of CPSU, her selfless service to the people, consistent Leninist international policy of our party highly raised its authority in the ranks of world Communist and worker's movement.

Our Leninist party solidly and steadily conducts the Soviet people to the great goal - to the communism. And in the world there is no such force, which could stop this forward movement.

end section.



CONCLUSION.

FOR THE LASTING PEACE ON EARTH

To annihilate wars, to affirm the perpetual world on the earth/ground
- historical mission of communism.

From the program of CPSU.

1. War it is possible to prevent!

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War entered into the history as the event, which has the enormous, permanent significance for all real and future humanity. Soviet socialist state not only successfully reflected the strongest armed pressure of Fascist aggressors, but also inflicted serious damage/defeat to international imperialism. The rout of German fascism and Japanese militarism, achieved by the united efforts/forces of the freedom-loving peoples, and, first of all, the peoples of the USSR, giant accelerated the process of the downfall of capitalism, this eliminated itself antinational social system, which periodically plunges the world in the bloody wars. The victory of antifascist forces strengthened the basic base of the basic social restoration of the world - Soviet Union. It contributed to the celebration of the democratic and Socialist Revolution in the number of the countries of Europe and Asia, which, in turn, led to formation of world socialist system. Therefore before humanity was discovered

even the wider prospect for the celebration of socialism and communism on the world-wide scale, and setting the lasting peace on the earth/ground became the actually feasible problem for the present generation of people.

The Second World War taught to humanity heavy lesson. the monstrous crimes of Fascist aggressors, which caused to the peoples the innumerable calamities and suffering, clearly testify about the criminal essence of imperialism, about the enormous danger, which conceals for the national masses further supremacy of monopolist capital. Gor'kiy the experience of the last war cannot be forgotten, since, until there is an imperialism, which has available the newest means of the mass destruction of people, the threat of new military catastrophe remains real.

The Second World War, unleashed by fascism, dearly managed to the peoples. It took away tens of millions of human lives, caused colossal destruction, for long years it delayed the economic development of many countries. This war was heavy crime of imperialism, to the especially clearly revealed its irreconcilable hostility basic interests of all peoples. It required from humanity of the greatest efforts/forces in order to overturn the plans of Fascist aspirants for world supremacy.

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The memory about heroes and victims of war with the fascism is revered for all peoples of the world. and for this very reason no one has a law/right to forget, what price achieved world-wide historical victory of just cause in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and in the Second World War as a whole.

The connection/bond of results and lessons of the last war with the problem of preservation of peace under the contemporary conditions is obvious for all sober-minded people. In our time the character of war itself, and also the ratio of humanity to it radically changed. The means of destruction and annihilation existing now make modern missile and nuclear weapons warfare with folly.

Questions of war and peace - these are questions of life and death of millions and millions of people. From their decision to the enormous degree depends the future of the peoples and the possibility of an improvement in the conditions of their existence. This is why these questions are the focus of attention to world community and agitate all peoples. Masses require so that the state, political figures and the governments would be penetrated by a feeling of great responsibility for the fates of the world.

The mutual conditionality of the problems of peace and social progress found its reflection in the theoretical and practical activity of the communists of all countries, in the historical resolutions of the XX, XXI, and XXII Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in the program of CPSU accepted at the XXII congress, in the documents of the conferences of the Communist and worker's parties, which were taking place in Moscow in 1957 and 1960 in the resolutions of the congresses of many fraternal parties.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the history for the first time placed the problem of war and peace on the enduring/permanent theoretical and practical basis. Led by CPSU, the Soviet people by its grandiose converting economic activity, by political and ideological struggle makes the most ponderable contribution to the resolution of this burning problem of the present.

The largest event in the activity of our party and all international Communist and worker's movement, that marked new historical space in the struggle of the peoples for peace, was the XX congress of CPSU, which took place in 1956. The congress indicated that the emerging of socialism for the frames/scopes of one country and its transformation into the world system composes the main feature of our epoch. Capitalism it proved to be powerless to prevent

this world-wide historical process, and the compatibility of two world systems - capitalist and socialist - became indisputable fact. In the person of socialist camp the peoples found not only moral, but also supplies for dealing against the military danger.

Under these conditions, as it is said in report of CC CPSU to the XX congress, remains valid Leninist situation about the fact that, since there is an imperialism, is retained economic basis for the outbreak of wars. This is why it is necessary to exhibit greatest vigilance to the intrigues of imperialistic aggressors. "But there is no fatal inevitability of wars. Now there are powerful/thick public and political forces, which are arranged/located serious means in order not to allow the unleashing of war by imperialists, but if they attempt it to begin, to give the destructive resistance to aggressors, to foil their adventurist plans" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. XX congress of CPSU, Vol. 1, pp. 37-38. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Thus, the XX Congress of CPSU noted great critical moment/factor in the struggle of the peoples for peace: as a result of a basic change of the correlation of forces in favor of socialism for the first time in the history of humanity the war ceased to be the inevitable evil. Thereby before millions of champions for the world was discovered the encouraging prospect of the release of humanity

from the threat of nuclear destruction.

The historical resolutions of the XX congress of our party inspired all people of the good will, all champions for the world and progress increased their activity, moved in them the firm conviction in the victory of the noble/precious work of defense of peace. After the congress the struggle of the Soviet Union for the complete and universal disarmament, for the peaceful settlement of the unresolved international questions was developed with the new, increasing force.

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The Soviet Union advanced the wide concrete/specific/actual activity plan, which ensures retention/preservation/maintaining and strengthening universal peace, the release of humanity from the dangerous and burdensome armaments race, the elimination of the remainders/residues of the Second World War, the elimination of barriers/obstacles on the way to the normalization of international situation. The Communist Party and the government of the USSR use all possibilities for the softening of the tension existing in the world, for setting of contacts and expanding economic political and cultural relations with all countries. The active, offensive character of the peaceable foreign policy of the Soviet Union contributes to exposing of the enemies of the disarmament and peace.

Further large/coarse space in theoretical resolving of the problems of war and peace and practical struggle for peace made the XXII Congress of CPSU, which was taking place in 1961. Program of our party accepted by this congress examines a question about war and peace as the most burning, most basic question of the present. In the program is indicated the main goal of the foreign policy activity of CPSU - to ensure peaceful conditions for the formation of Communist society in the USSR and developments of the world system of socialism and together with all peace-loving peoples to free humanity from the fighter nuclear missile war.

For the resolution of all basic problems of our time there is no need whatever for new world war. It is necessary neither for the successful accomplishment of socialist and national liberation revolutions nor for the victory of the socialist system above the capitalist and the triumph of communism in world-wide scale. Therefore in proportion to to the route/path of socialism will stop all new n the new peoples, the necessary prerequisites/premises for the life under the conditions of the world and authentic freedom will grow/rise, in the possibility for conducting the aggressive wars they will become narrow. The steadily changing correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism contributes to strengthening

peace. Hence it follows that in the contemporary epoch, even to the victory of socialism and communism on terrestrial globe, is unavoidable should be formed this international situation and this correlation of the forces of progress and reaction under which world war it will be possible to eliminate from the life of society.

This most important situation of the creatively developing Marxist-Leninist theory is based on the in-depth analysis of the forces, which operate in the international arena in the postwar period.

Imperialist wars were unavoidable, until the imperialism remained the all-encompassing world system and thus far to the arena of history come out the powerful social forces, not only not interested in the wars, but also capable to stave off them. In the period of undivided supremacy of capitalism on terrestrial globe these forces were weakly organized and separated both in the national and on the international scale. They did not have at their disposal of the means which would give to them the possibility to set their will against the concepts of aggressors. So it was before the First World War when the international proletariat, which appeared in avant garde of struggle against the military danger, proved to be disorganized as a result of the treacherous activities of leaders of the II international.

The Second World War also became possible because peaceful antifascist forces, although considerably grown in the period between two world wars, were nevertheless not in the state to resist war and to fascism. Their weakness and disconnection they prevented the creation of actual conditions for preventing the moved catastrophe. Capitalism remained the dominating public system. The efforts/forces of one Soviet Union alone, which was struggling against the war, it was insufficient in order to stop aggression.

The VII congress of comintern taking place in 1935, after revealing entire reactionary essence of fascism, outlined the concrete/specific/actual routes/paths of struggle against it and against the threat of war. Primary task at that time it was sew the world, democratic freedoms and national independence.

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Setting Fascist dictatorship was staved off, where the forces of democracy proved to be sufficiently united in order to stop the offensive of reaction. Antifascist movement in entire world into 1935-1939 could become powerful/thick barrier/obstacle in the path of war, if it was not seriously weakened by the absence of unity among

the democratic forces. For this to a considerable extent bear responsibility right social-democratic leaders.

The need for active actions against the threat of fascism and war realized ever wider masses. Reinforcing of antifascist struggle caused fear in the reactionary bourgeoisie. Therefore it by all means attempted to disorganize, to weaken/attenuate the democratic movement of the peoples. And this for it succeeded, since the forces of war and peace were unequal at that time.

Now situation radically changed. Imperialism no longer can return its former power, to it increasingly with more difficulty it begins to influence the course of world events, although it attempts to delay the revolutionary process. In certain cases the imperialistic groups, hostile to the cause of peace and freedom of the peoples, succeed in achieving temporary/time successes. But no separate successes of reaction can establish/install public progress. The thicket of the weights of history increasingly more is inclined in favor of socialism, democratic and peaceful forces. Now the process of world development is determined by the activities of antiimperialist front. The closed alliance and the mutual aid main motivating powers of the present - world socialist system, the international working class and national liberation movement - create all necessary prerequisites/premises, in order to paralyze the

intrigues of aggressive imperialistic circles and to ensure peaceful conditions for the progressive development of human society.

The first historical space toward the world without the violence and the wars was creation and strengthening of Soviet socialist state. The emergence of world socialist system, the rapid socio-political and economic development of all socialist countries, the especially economic, scientific and military-technological progress of the Soviet Union, will signify by itself the new largest step in this direction.

The most important result of the development of the USSR are the complete and final victory of socialism, the entrance of our country into the period of the started building of communism. This result, entire matter of the building of Communism in the USSR the Leninist party and the Soviet people consider as the fulfillment of their international duty before the laborers of all world as the composite/compound component part of their revolutionary struggle.

Carrying out its main economic mission - the creation of the material and technical base of communism, our people giant expands the scales of conversions in all spheres of economic and public life. While industrial production in the USA increased from 1913 through 1963 less than 6 times, in England - a little it is more than 2 times

and in France - is less than 3 times, in our country during the same period it grew 52 times.

and
[this in spite of the destructive wars, which fell in the share of Soviet state. Now on its industrial might the Soviet Union - second power of the world, which confidently follows the path of conversion into the first industrial state on terrestrial globe.

The converting activity of Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, exerts the enormous revolutionizing force on the peoples of the world. *The* force of our example appears as the powerful booster of the world revolutionary process. V. I. Lenin emphasized: "... we they spoke and we say: "socialism has the force of an example":. It is necessary to show virtually, based on example, the significance of communism" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Complete collected works, Vol. 42, p. 75.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

And this practical demonstration of the role of the building of Communism is carried out by the Soviet Union. Our people demonstrated that socialism was capable to develop and it actually/really develops economy with more rapid rates than capitalism. Socialism incomparably more completely satisfies the spiritual and cultural demands of the

members of society.

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It is regular, that precisely the socialist country of conquered of the first discovered the era of the peaceful use of atomic energy, the first it laid road into outer space and solidly holds superiority in the peaceful space research.

The selfless labor/work of Soviet people created that powerful material force, economic and defense, which is the most important factor of preservation of peace. The Soviet Union is arranged/located all types of contemporary weaponry, including thermonuclear. It has the powerful/thick rockets/missiles, capable of delivering destructive charge into any given point of terrestrial globe. If weaponry in the hands of imperialistic powers serves the purposes of aggression and blackmail, then in the hands of the Soviet Union it is the means of effective defense of peace. Even the most acknowledged supporters of imperialistic aggression cannot but understand, that if they unleash war, then to their countries not to avoid destructive retaliatory attack. This circumstance plays the role of the most important restrictive factor, real force of the prevention of new world war.

By the basic conquest of international working movement, that signifies the greatest triumph of Marxism-Leninism, was the formation of the world system of socialism. Specifically, because of the world system of socialism occurred basic changes in the correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism and communism, to the detriment of capitalism. The struggle of working class abroad, democratic and national liberation movements would not achieve such successes and this scope, if they did not lean on becoming stronger with every day of camp of socialism.

World socialist system - this ¹⁴ ~~13~~ states in share of which fall 26 percent of the territory of terrestrial globe, 35.6 percent of population, 38 percent of world industrial production. But the international role of the system of socialism is much higher than its proportion. It is here appropriate to recall the wholly confirmed by life words of V. I. Lenin about the fact that the force of working class is considerably more, *than its share in the* ~~i will eat its fraction in the~~ population. The socialist countries exert ever increasing influence on the world economy and policy, to entire system of international relations.

Decisive importance for strengthening main forces of the present, which intercept to war, has a realization into the life of the economic plans of the socialist countries. The creation of a

material-technical base of communism in our country sharply increases the economic and defense power of world socialist system. The more is fortified the camp of socialism, the more considerable it acts on world development not only by its growing moral and political authority, by economic might, but also by direct economic and political aid to the peoples, which struggle to the national liberation, for the peace and the social progress. Strengthening world socialist system and increase in its effect create favorable conditions for the international revolutionary movement. Inspired by an example of socialism, the peoples raise to the revolutionary struggle. They have the opportunity with the reflection of the attempts of the export of counterrevolution to lean on the disinterested support of the socialist countries and to obtain from them the necessary aid in the construction of new society.

Great responsibility for the prevention of new world war history laid on the international working class which by its nature and its situation in the society serves as the natural and inflexible carrier of the ideas of the communism and perpetual world between the peoples.

The world-wide army working class counts in its numbers of hundreds of millions of people. In the socialist countries of 150 mln. workers they head the struggle of the peoples for the formation

of new society About 200 mln. proletarians in the industrially developed capitalist countries, relying on its glorious combat traditions and powerful/thick class organizations, carry on a persistent struggle against capital, against the exploitation, for the world, democracy and socialism.

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Tens of millions of working former dependent and colonial countries personify in themselves the hope and the future the national masses of these countries. International working class - most important force in the struggle of humanity for peace, against the military intentions of imperialists.

The proletariat stands in the center of our epoch as the class, which is quite foremost economic, political and ideological force as the sole class of contemporary society, which has its one-piece/entire, really revolutionary theory of basic transformation of the world on Communist principles, the scientifically developed strategy and the tactics of Communist revolution. Immeasurably increased its feeling of responsibility for the fates of its peoples and all humanity. There is no more reliable defender of the world on the earth/ground, than international working class and his creation - world socialist system, its combat avant garde - Communist and

worker's parties. Active operations in favor of the world attracted on the side of worker's movement in the capitalist countries of new allies, narrowed the mass base of reactionary forces. The struggle for peace goes hand to hand with the struggle for socialism, since masses on their own political experience are convinced of the authentic role of monopolist capital as the main carrier of military threat, they come to the conclusion that the precisely capitalist system is the source of predatory wars. The struggle for peace feeds the laborers of capitalistic countries to the struggle for socialism.

Cause of peace defends this powerful force of the present as the world national liberation movement, which blasts/undermines/blows up the abutments of imperialism. Because of the enormous effect of the system of socialism and world development, because of its aid to the peoples, that struggle for its liberation, from under the colonial oppression was freed in the postwar years of one-and-a-half billion people, and there appeared more than 60 independent national states.

The world system of socialism not only ensured the possibility of the rapid national liberation of colonies. It created also all necessary ambient conditions for their successful development and free election of the ways of building the new life. The world system of socialism makes it possible for the peoples to move over the noncapitalistic route/path, if it them is elected. Contributing and

in the international, both in the economic and in the technical plan to the successful development of the national-democratic revolutions, the camp of socialism fulfills the functions of proletarian avant garde with respect to many peoples of young national states.

All countries, which attained national independence, are vitally interested in the preservation of peace, because only under this condition they can successfully eliminate the consequences of colonial supremacy and follow the path of economic cultural and social progress.


Imperialists wonderfully understand the significance of the international solidarity of revolutionary forces, especially the countries of socialist camp. They in every way possible attempt alienate and quarrel between themselves young national states, to sow distrust between them and with the socialist countries, to introduce disorder into the socialist bloc. The international duty of all Communist and worker's parties, all of revolutionary forces lies in the fact that to fortify unity of its numbers, to conjointly defend the cause of peace and social progress.

The idea of the prevention of world war unites the peaceful forces, different by their class composition and social interests. Struggle for peace, for the prevention of war serves as the uniting




XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the meeting hall.

XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the meeting hall.




ELECTRIFICATION AND CHEMICALIZATION OF THE USSR NATIONAL ECONOMY.




Machine room of the Volga GES [hydroelectric power plant] imeni the XXII Congress of the CPSU [Communist Party of the USSR].

Novovoronezhskaya atomic power plant. Overall view of machine room.



Chemical production complex of the Novolipetskiy Metallurgical Plant.



beginning already because the atomic bombs are capable of annihilating millions of people, independent of their class identity/accessory equipment. Speaking about forces, which struggle for the world, progressive German writer Stephan Heim noted: "these forces are interesting and they were diverse - from the organized governments of the powerful countries to the concerned housewives in the unimportant cities:.

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From those, who protest, some have white skin/leather, others - black; some are the highly qualified scientists with the world name, others still walk after the ~~wooden~~-wooden plow^u; some sit in the halls of United Nations, patiently advancing one after others the plans of the softening of inveterate tension, others they protect hamlet in the jungle, containing the constant sorties of potential aggressors; some even do not realize, that their words or activities help to stave off ... war ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. "foreign literature", 1964, No. 8, pp. 235-236.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Ever more active in all countries becomes the movement of the supporters of the world - widest movement of our time. It support

such mass international democratic organizations, as the world-wide federation of trade unions, the international democratic federation of women, the world-wide federation of democratic young people, which count in its numbers of hundreds of millions of people of the good will.

World-wide congress for the universal disarmament and peace, which was taking place during July 1962 in Moscow, was the unprecedented forum of the peoples whose ambassadors (it is more than 2 thousand people) they were driven into the capital of the Soviet Union of 121 country. There were here the representatives of different classes and social groups, the supporters of different political convictions believing and atheists. They discussed the sharpest/most acute question of the present - as to bar road to war. In the unanimously accepted message for the peoples of the world the congress called all people of the good will to the active operations in order to stave off war, to attain disarmament.

"From all us, it is said in this message, it depends, when advances the day of the liberation of humanity from the threat of nuclear death. Those of us who wish for peace, there are many. If we all will act and if everything, who acts, they will act harmoniously, we can to lay route/path to carry out of our common goal: to the preservation of peace".

Thermonuclear war would be irreparable tragedy for all population of terrestrial globe. On its destructive power thermonuclear weaponry does not have to equal. It possesses such properties as colossal explosive force, that incinerates thermal radiation, the highly penetrating radiation, that dazzles luminous radiation, the infinite range, accuracy and the lightning-like character of the destruction of targets, possibility of using on land and at sea, in air and outer space, complete independence from meteorological, climatic and other natural conditions. On the catastrophic consequences of thermonuclear war prevent/warn humanity many most prominent representatives of science. John Bernal in his book "^{World} ~~War~~ Without the War" wrote: "nuclear war will not indicate the simple and defined end of the civilization, as could this happen from explosion in the sun. Faster this there will be agonizing slipping away ago to some form of the life of the mutilated and reckless remainders/residues of humanity in the least casualty areas, such, as Tristan da Cunha or Tierra del Fuego, which are at the same time, apparently, the least adequate/approaching areas for retaining/preserving/maintaining the creative possibilities of civilization. This indicates delay in the development of civilization on moan, and there can be, to thousands years" '.

FOOTNOTE ². D. Bernal. World ~~Without the~~ War. M., the publishing house of foreign literature, 1960, p. 26. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The struggle of the socialist countries and all peaceful forces for the prevention of new world war is struggle for the man, for his life, for the material bases of civilization and the cultures, accumulated by labor/work of tens of generations. The policy of imperialism - these are reckless game by the fates of the whole peoples, the tendency of the dying public classes to attract after itself into grave of hundreds of millions of people. not randomly the slogan of the apologists of new world war became the words: "it is better to be dead than red".

The Soviet people, who dashed off in the Second World War the heaviest victims, all tested on himself horrors of Hitler occupation and the incredible burdens of four year old war, excellently understands, that can be the third world war. For this very reason entire our people is uniform in its tendency to stave off nuclear catastrophe.

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Soviet people distinctly see that the military danger danger continues to exist, that in the world they are retained and even grow

the dark/nonluminous forces, which want "to re-play" the results of the last war. Impregnable barrier/obstacle in the path of these forces must become the will of all peoples to the world.

Victory in the struggle for peace is completely attainable. It depends on peoples themselves, from their organization, determination and active operations.

2. Peaceful foreign policy of the USSR.

After the victory of the great October Socialist Revolution for the first time in the history the banner of the world is confidently taken in its hands the proletariat, facilitated by state authority. From this time the decision of a question about war and peace ceased to be the monopolistic affair of detached from the people, hostile to it imperialistic governments.

The authority of workers and peasants, which was affirmed in our country, placed, as indicated V. I. Lenin, "to the beneficial ground the great cause of peace of all peoples ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 26 p. 472. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Already by first its decree - Leninist decree about the world Soviet

state proclaimed fundamentally new, deeply national on its goals, international foreign policy. Decree about the world declared the discovered and irreconcilable class struggle to imperialistic foreign policy with its methods of violence and oppression, after affirming the great principles of the world and friendship between the peoples.

Advancing and developing the principle of peaceful coexistence, the idea of continuous socialist construction, V. I. Lenin. the Communist Party they always drafted the Soviet people to the high revolutionary vigilance, worried about strengthening of the defensive capacity of country and readiness of the armed forces of the USSR for the resistance to aggressors. But never our party counted the military force as to the means of the dissemination of socialism. V. I. Lenin taught that "any world will discover one hundred times more and it is wider road to our effect" ².

FOOTNOTE ². V. I. Lenin. Works, Vol. 30, p. 422. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Entire/all history of Soviet state confirms the peaceful character of foreign policy of the USSR. About this, in particular, testify the active operations of the Soviet Union in defense of peace and security of the peoples of the on the eve Second World War.

Immediately after emergence in the Far East and in the center of

Europe the centers of imperialistic aggression the Soviet Union of beginnings to persistently defend the idea of the creation of system of the collective safety, drafting all peaceful states to give the decisive resistance to warmongers.

1934 The Soviet Union entered the league of the Nations where it advanced the propositions, directed toward the restraint of Fascist aggressors. However, the idea of the association/unification of peaceful forces for the purpose of defense from aggression met with resistance not only of most potential aggressors, but also ruling circles of the western powers, which arrived in the role of their patrons. The encouraged by the policy "pacifications" and "nonintervention", fascists already in the beginning 1938 began the recutting of the map/chart/card of Europe. Attempting to insulate the USSR and to direct against it German aggression, western powers went for the shameful agreement in Munich. These are agreement as nothing is another, it contributed to the unleashing of the Second World War.

The Soviet Union appeared as the next supporter of the creation of antifascist coalition. However, coalition was created only in the course of the already begun war. Fault for this lies/rests on the ruling circles of the western countries of those days.

After war some bourgeois political workers and historians openly recognized that the basis of foreign policy of the USSR before face of Fascist aggression was the collective safety and that the cooperation with the Soviet Union could to a considerable extent change the course of events favorable for Germany. The prominent statesman of England L. Amery wrote in his memoirs, that USSR "persistently supported the idea of the collective safety - the creation of the alliance between Russia and western allies for the reflection of the growing danger from the side of Germany" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. L Amery. My Political Life. Vol. 3. London, 1955, p. 293.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

In the opinion of English historian G. Jones, the pre-war political course of Great Britain, France and USA "deposited harm on the attempts of the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to struggle for the common cause concerning western democracies against the igniters of the Second World War" ².

FOOTNOTE ². G Jones From Stalin to Khrushchev, London, 1960, p. 31.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

Former English premier ^W~~S~~. Churchill also confirms that in the emergence of the threatening situation of those years great role played the "ignoring of the doubtless wish of Russia to be connected to the western powers ..." '.

FOOTNOTE '. W.Churchill. The Second World War. Vol. 1. London etc., 1955, p. 311. ENDFOOTNOTE.

At present the Soviet peaceful policy completely answers character and content of contemporary epoch, its urgent problems, and first of all to the problem of setting the lasting peace. To the ideals common to all mankind, drawn by the program of our party, is completely alien war and even thought itself about the armed violence in relations between the peoples. War for the purpose of the dissemination of socialism to the whole world would be the export of the Socialist Revolution, against what the communists decisively appeared and appear. Marxism always denied the boost of the revolutions which are developed in proportion to the ripening of class contradictions, giving rise to revolutions '.

FOOTNOTE '. See V. I. Lenin. Works Vol. 27, p. 49. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Many important scientists and the political workers of the bourgeois countries are forced to recognize that foreign policy of

the USSR is peaceful. Thus, American historian and diplomat J. Kennan writes: "I do not know such case if Soviet government desired this conflict (military conflict of the states of opposite social systems. - ed.), it planned/glided it it began or it connected its hopes and waitings of the victory of world socialism with the results of this collision/encounter. The central place in the Soviet view on that, as socialism it must conquer on the world scale, was always assigned to the activity of social and political forces within the capitalist countries. Moscow ... sometimes did not manage to achieve its goals by the traditional way of the discovered and straight/direct military actions" '.

FOOTNOTE '. G Kennan. Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin. Boston-Toronto, 1961, p. 389. ENDFOOTNOTE.

With the considerations of Kennan agree with the statements of well-known American banker, past ambassador to the USSR A. Harriman, which it emphasizes: "one of my first and strongest impressions from the Soviet Union - aspiration to the world" '.

FOOTNOTE '. A Harriman. Peace with Russia? London, 1960, p. 161. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Aspiration to the world is organically characteristic not only

Soviet Union, but also to all other countries of socialist camp, creating new life. The conference of the representatives of communist and working parties (1960) in its turning to the peoples of all world stated: "historical struggle between the old and new formation/order, between socialism and capitalism it must be solved not via world war, but in peaceful competition, in the competition for what social system will attain the higher level of economy, technology and culture, will ensure to national masses the best conditions of life"

FOOTNOTE 7. Programmed documents of struggle for peace, democracy and socialism. M., Politizdat, 1964, p. 87. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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In complete agreement with Lenin's legacy our party into the concept "peaceful coexistence" packs the following basic principles: rejection of the war as the means of the resolution of disputable/debatable questions between the states, resolution by their course of negotiations; equality of rights, mutual understanding and confidence between the states, the accounting of the interests of each other; nonintervention into the internal affairs, the acknowledgement after each people of the law/right to independently solve his own problems; a strict respect for

sovereignty and territorial completeness of all countries; the development of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual advantage.

Peaceful coexistence is the specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In the course of this struggle regularly grows/rises the might of the new, socialist system, intended to replace the latter/last exploiter formation/order, barrier/obstacle for further public progress and dangerous threat for the entire civilization. Humanity is vitally interested and the peaceful coexistence of two systems.

Being the specific form of class struggle in the international arena, peaceful coexistence supposes ideological struggle between the opposite systems. Speaking against wars as the means of resolution of disputable/debatable questions between the states and the peoples, communists at the same time do not refuse the criticism of capitalism, the disclosure of the aggressive policy of imperialists, which push the world to the thermonuclear catastrophe. Ideological concessions are incompatible with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, since these concessions lead to the creeping on the position of the enemies of socialism.

The Soviet Union attempts to live in the world with all

countries. It willingly goes towards those states which desire to collaborate with it. However, the wish to develop relations with the Soviet Union is incompatible with conducting of aggressive course against other socialist countries. The idea of the cooperation of different states is in every possible way supported by Soviet foreign policy, but as the USSR it decisively speaks against arbitrariness and lawlessness in the international affairs.

However, the Soviet Union, solidly and consecutively/serially carrying out Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence, from the first days after the termination of the Second World War persistently struggles for strengthening of peace. The repeated propositions of Soviet state, directed toward the settlement of disputable/debatable international problems, the prohibition of nuclear weaponry, the universal and complete disarmament, obtained the wide acknowledgement of the public. The Soviet Union in one-way order/formation conducted large/coarse reduction of its armed forces in 1956 and 19~~5~~⁶ into 1958 it ended all types of the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapon. During September 1959 Soviet government proposed to the general assembly of United Nations the full-scale program of universal and complete disarmament. At the XXII Congress of CPSU the achievement of universal and complete disarmament was declared one of the most important problems of Soviet state in the region of international relations.

The serious success of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence was the signing on 5 August 1963 in Moscow between the USSR, USA and Great Britain the treaties about the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Overwhelming majority of the states of Europe and America, of Asia and Africa were connected to this treaty whose conclusion indicates the large/coarse victory of all people of the good will, which were actively struggling for the length of many years for the cessation/discontinuation of nuclear tests.

Soon after the signing of the treaty about the prohibition of nuclear tests in three media was achieved the understanding between the USSR and the USA about the inconclusion in orbit of units with the nuclear charge and agreement between the USSR, USA and England about reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. These spaces testify about the new victory of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The problems of foreign policy of the USSR for further easing of international tension were formulated in the memorandum, introduced for examination of the XIX session of the general assembly of United Nations in December 1964.

The Soviet Government guided in their foreign policy by the principles of peaceful coexistence, it drafts to agree about putting into practice in the nearest time of the measures which can derive states on the new lines of the struggle for enduring/permanent and inviolable peace. The Soviet Union proposes to shorten the military budgets of states by 10-15 percent, which would make it possible to restrict armaments race and to free sizable means for the development of the peaceful branches of economy and improvement in the welfare of all peoples.

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Considering that the presence of foreign military forces in the strange territories seriously mixes/prevents the sanitation of relations between the states, the government of the USSR proposes to conclude agreement about the conclusion of all foreign military forces within the limits of their national boundaries. The Soviet Union, it speaks in the memorandum, is ready to shorten the strength of its military forces, which are found on the territory of GDR and other European states, if we western powers consonants make the same in the FRG and other countries. In the memorandum of Soviet government it is proposed to also eliminate the military bases in the strange territories. The Soviet Union speaks in favor of that in order to conclude international agreement about the nondissemination of nuclear weaponry and to call international conference for the signing of the convention about its prohibition. In the memorandum it is discussed also the need for the creation of nuclear-free zones, especially in such areas of the world where concentrated a considerable quantity of nuclear weaponry is great the danger of the emergence of military conflict.

The Soviet Union, furthermore, it proposes to agree about the annihilation of bomber aviation, to forbid underground nuclear tests, to conclude nonaggression pact between the states - participants in NATO and Warsaw Pact, to take measures for the prevention of surprise attack and to reduce the total strength of military forces of governments.

It is completely obvious that the realization of these measures would be the perceptible contribution to strengthening of peace and would draw nearer the accomplishment of the mission of universal and complete disarmament.

The idea of universal and complete disarmament advanced by the Soviet Union earned this widest support, that even enemies of disarmament forced were to recognize it. They cannot deny, that the tendency to free humanity from the threat of nuclear war, from the giant burden of military expenditures/consumptions - one of the highest manifestations of human spirit, but they simultaneously in every way possible impede disarmament, since this to deprive the imperialistic monopolies of enormous profits.

The Soviet Union decisively speaks in favor of the

cessation/discontinuation of armaments race, for the agreement about the disarmament, expressing readiness to put an end to nuclear weaponry and generally with any weaponry, if to this go other states. It proposes to take measures, at first at least which limit armaments race, to conclude the agreements which, similar to Moscow treaty, to decrease the possibility of further improvement of nuclear weaponry.

The Soviet Union categorically requires to prevent spread of nuclear weapons and to forego the plans of the creation of the multilateral nuclear forces of NATO, which open/disclose to West German Bundeswehr access to the weaponry of mass annihilation.

Important place among the unresolved international problems occupies a problem of the safety in Europe and the question connected with it about a question about the peaceful settlement with Germany. The elimination of the remainders/residues of the Second World War and the conclusion of German peace treaty is extremely necessary for the provision of a peaceful life of the peoples of Europe. Creation of multilateral nuclear forces will be new barrier/obstacle in the path of strengthening the safety of the European peoples, unsurmountable obstacle for achievement of the understanding between two German states.

The resistance of the government of the FRG and governments of

other imperialistic powers to the conclusion of nonaggression pact between the NATO alliance countries and the countries of the Warsaw Pact attests to the fact that these governments in any way did not forego the plans of attack on the peaceful states, from the plans of the third world war.

The Soviet Union supports the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America for to right freely manage its fate. Together with other socialist countries and non-aligned states it decisively requires the complete elimination of colonialism and neocolonialism. The Soviet people condemns strange interference in the works of other peoples. It speaks in favor of that so that would be placed the end to any attacks in revolutionary Cuba, for the reunification of Taiwan with the People's Republic of China, the suppression of imperialistic intervention in the Congo and South Vietnam, the cessation/discontinuation of provocative actions against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Soviet government supports the decision of the Cairo conference of the non-aligned states about the convocation of new international conference on Indochina in order peacefully to regulate problems emergent in this area of terrestrial globe.

To ensure the peaceful labor/work of the peoples, to stave off thermonuclear war, to decide disputable/debatable questions via

negotiations, to strive international cooperation in the area of economy, science and technology - these are the goals of peaceful foreign policy of the Communist Party and Soviet government.

With overcoming of the personality cult of Stalin Soviet foreign policy acquired new force. Foreign policy of the USSR characterize hardness in settling/standing of fundamental positions, deeply responsible approach to the most important problems of world development, readiness to speak and agreements on a mutually acceptable basis, flexibility with the resolution of practical questions. Carrying on a consistent struggle against the intrigues of world reaction, our foreign policy contributes to an increase in the international authority and effect of the Soviet Union as the standard-bearer of the world.

Foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other countries of socialism plays ever more considerable role in the provision of universal peace. The force of this policy consists in the fact that it leans on the objective laws governing the contemporary social development, to the activity of wide national masses, the might of world socialist system. Humanism, pacifism, authentic validity and nationality of socialist foreign policy provide its superiority over the aggressive policy of imperialism. Entire/all history of postwar years attests to the fact that consistent putting into practice by

the socialist countries of Leninist foreign policy principles creates enduring/permanent basis for the mobilization and associations/unifications of all progressive public forces, capable to actively and selflessly defend the world.

The present course of imperialistic powers, and first of all the USA, cannot but push the public against the alert comparisons. Again, as after the First World War, which rule the circles of the West increasingly more and more willingly they go towards the demands of the heads of Western Germany and in spite of their previous obligations, actually, encourage their revanchist strivings.

The policy of support to Nazi Germany, the pursued goal to direct its aggression against the USSR and the countries of eastern Europe, placed West European states on the face of national catastrophe. The heroic struggle of the Soviet people, which made the greatest contribution to the victory over the fascism, saved these states from the enslavement. However, many western political workers, apparently, did not make from this lesson of the history of the necessary conclusions/derivations. It is clear that in our time the policy of the "pacification" of aggressors is fraught with even more dangerous consequences for nations of all world.

As a result of conducting by the imperialistic powers of present

political course in international relations, until now, there are many unsolved questions, which exit by its roots to the history of the Second World War. Moreover, the ruling circles in the West converted these disputable/debatable questions in "fuel", which in the great measure explains the tension of international situation.

To intercept to war and to shield the world - complicated, but feasible task. In order to successfully solve it, it is necessary to untiringly fortify socialist system, to in every possible way contribute to the development of national liberation movement and to the struggle of international working class, and also all peaceful forces on the earth/ground, to decisively speak against imperialism, his aggressive intentions and activities, which blast/undermine/blow up the international safety, to struggle in favor of the celebration of the policy of peaceful coexistence of the countries with different social formation/order, for the resolution of disputable/debatable international problems via negotiations.

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3. Vigilance - guarantee of the safety.

Did not have time to die down the salvoes of the last war, as imperialists they began to plan new military adventures. The rout of

German fascism, its complete military and moral downfall, the growth of might and international authority of the Soviet Union, the revolutionizing force of socialist power on many countries of terrestrial globe - all this frightened the bosses of the capitalist world, and first of all the imperialists of the USA, who saw in the outcome of the Second World War threat to the very existence of capitalist system. After war American imperialism became the main force of aggression, after embodying in its policy the ideology of the militant reaction. After beginning quite important international exploiter, the imperialism of the USA openly proclaimed as a goal of the conquest of world supremacy and subordination to its will of all peoples of the earth/ground. Its hatred for the USSR and other socialist countries, which are basic obstacle on the route/path of the realization of the plans of world supremacy, finds concrete/specific/actual expression in theory and practice of anticommunism.

Until now, in the leading capitalist countries is not taken/removed from the agenda a question about the military response to the "call" of communism. Until now, there are developed/processed the prescriptions with the aid of which it is proposed by force to strike "international communism". Among the ruling circles of imperialistic powers there are the influential groups which draft to struggle not only with the Communist ideology, but also with

socialism as public system. These groups consider that between the capitalist world and the socialist camp there cannot be the reconciliations and authentic coexistences and that only the force will help to stop the movement of communism forward ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. See "Orbis", vol. VI, No 2, Summer of 1962, pp. 187-204.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The policy of capitalist powers, activity of their governments is not left the doubt of the fact that the source of military danger continues to exist. The aggressive provocative activities of American imperialists in recent years show, how they would want to create "new international order/formation". The basic means of the realization of expansionist concepts is the military vehicle of the USA.

The purposes of the imperialists of the USA serve the aggressive military blocs which must give to them the possibility to use in the interests of the United States human and material resources, territory, the airspace and the water area of their allies. This fact do not hide Americans themselves.

The policy of the creation of militarist blocs, hypocritically named the policy of the "collective safety", by the acknowledgement of American military leaders, composes the foundation of the military

strategy of the USA. Such main bloc is North Atlantic alliance - NATO. In the system of NATO the United States count basically on the West German revanchists and they in every possible way contribute to strengthening the military power of the federal republic of Germany which is considered as the most important strategic bridgehead/beachhead of future war in Europe. Within NATO is formed an American-West German bloc of aggressors.

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In this case the USA ruling circles and other western powers unceremonious violates their previous obligations with respect to the elimination of German militarism and its organizations.

In the declaration of the Crimean conference of chapters of three powers (USSR, USA and England), which passed during February 1945, it was indicated: "our inflexible goal is the annihilation of German militarism and Nazism and the creation of guarantee in the fact that Germany never more will in the state violate the world of all world. We are full of the determination to disarm and to dissolve all German armed forces, once and to forever annihilate the German General Staff which repeatedly contributed to the reactivation of German militarism ..." 1.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the period of the Great Patriotic War, Vol. III, pp. 102-103. ENDFOOTNOTE.

As showed further events, our western allies on the anti-Hitlerite coalition, signing Crimean declaration, completely did not intend it to fulfill. They considered that the German General Staff, which was during many decades the personification of the most aggressive strivings of German militarism, still will be required by them for the accomplishment of the tasks of their foreign policy.

1 October 1946. International military tribunal in Nuremberg carried out sentence on business of main German military criminals. Hering, Keitel, Ribbentrop and other culprits of Fascist aggression, which plunged the world in the bloody, destructive war, were sentenced to death through the hanging. The distinguished retribution was achieved. The Nuremberg process above the Hitler military criminals was the judgment of the peoples above aggression and aggressors, above the German fascism and its heads. And for this very reason it has enormous historical significance.

However, valid punishment carried only the small group of military criminals. The majorities of culprits and participants in the Hitler robbery remained unpunished. Many of them are still live and find reliable refuge in the FRG. Using the patronage of the

ruling Bonn top, these Nazis form the nucleus of numerous militarist alliances and societies, they are prepared for the new, revanchist war against the USSR and other socialist countries.

On 20 November 1964 government of the FRG declared about its decision to end from May 1965 the legal prosecution of Nazi military criminals after the "outflow of the period of the remoteness" of the crimes committed by them. This decision caused everywhere, including in Western Germany, a deep indignation of all honest people which correctly consider amnesty of Fascist killers as mockery above memory of millions of people, the victims of the bloody crimes of Hitlerism as the attempt to encourage those forces which nurture the plans of revenge for the lost war.

Hitler criminals, who unleashed Second World War, human blood spilled sea, must carry the distinguished punishment wherever and as for long they not were concealed from justice. This requires the conscience of the peoples, this require the interests of the preservation of peace and calm on the earth.

The Pentagon considers West German revanchists the most reliable ally in the struggle against the socialist countries. Bonn militarists fight for the unlimited nuclear armament, openly they are prepared for the missile and nuclear weapons world warfare, and also

for the local wars. The militarists of the FRG set before themselves as a goal to make Bundeswehr the most combat-effective army in Europe and the main force of North Atlantic bloc. Route/path to this they see in the multilateral nuclear forces of NATO, which open/disclose to Bundeswehr the access to the atomic and hydrogen weapon.

At the end 1964 world learned about the development in Bonn of new ominous plans. The Minister/Secretary of Defense of the FRG von Hassel and the general inspector of Bundeswehr General Tretner introduced for the examination of the Parisian session of NATO the plan of creation in the territory of the FRG, along the boundaries with GDR and Czechoslovakia, "atomic mine belt/zone".

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The realization of this monstrous intention would considerably increase the danger of outbreak of the missile and nuclear weapons warfare. The plans of Bonn militarists affect the vital interests of many European peoples. They cannot therefore but alert the peaceful public. Proposing to create "atomic mine belt/zone", Bonn militarists shuns by no means in order to force the realization of its program of military preparations and to create conditions for the revision/examination of the results of the Second World War. The ruling circles of Western Germany whose policy already openly begin

to define the Generals of Bundeswehr, again exposed themselves as the enemies of the world.

In the USA, FRG, England, France the armaments race accepts ever wider scope. Grow assignments for the military goals. From year to year is increased nuclear potential and increases the production of the ordinary forms of armament. Particular attention is paid to the development of the nuclear rocket weaponry. The leading imperialistic powers keep under the gun the millionth armies.

But against whom are directed all these enormous masses of the armed people, for which goals are accumulated them under the banners of armies and the flags of the Navies? Militarists do not think to hide that their military vehicle is aimed against the USSR and other countries of socialism, against the "international communism".

The tendency of the militaristic circles of the West to annihilate with the aid of the total nuclear war not only socialist states, but also very ideas of communism is the extremely adventurist policy of the perishing class which does not want to leave from the historical arena. Specifically, "dying is the fury of the bourgeoisie", about which spoke V. I. Lenin, her "rabid/furious throwing" call into being the most adventurist, dangerous plans of the decision of disputable/debatable international questions, the

most inhuman military strategy, based on the mass destruction of people.

The essential feature of the Second World War involved the fact that the United States - main capitalist country, strongest in economic and military sense - they did not undergo the invasion of hostile armies and air raids. The strategic rear of Americans on entire duration of war was located in complete safety. The monopolies of the USA obtained from the war colossal profits, but the American people as a whole did not carry great victims. But now situation radically changed and that that there were twenty - thirty years ago, irretrievably it receded into the past. The nuclear rocket weaponry eliminates such separation of the burden of the war between the states, which was possibly as far back as of the Second World War. It cannot be forgotten that the atomic sword is double-edged. If sense leaves the imperialists of the USA and they will unleash aggression, the bloody moloch of war does not pass/avoid and American continent.

Radically would differ and the situation of the classes of the capitalist countries under the conditions of the nuclear rocket conflict. Previous imperialist wars brought to the bourgeoisie the unprecedented profits, and masses were doomed to military penal servitude and death in the fields of battles. This completely arranging imperialists "distribution of roles" now narrower is

impossible. In the case of nuclear conflict under the lethal threat will prove to be not only laboring, but also exploiter classes with all their riches and values. A similar prospect, naturally, entails the sharp contraction of those social strata which are interested in the war.

The aggressive policy of imperialism does not consider the real correlation of forces in the world. Therefore it suffers failure/dip/trough after failure/dip/trough, and its initiators prove to be before the need to constantly search for the new ways of its realization. Some militarists, who fight for further reinforcing of armaments race, are forced to recognize that the great military-technological achievements of the Soviet Union brought together on no strategic theories of western powers. Loss by the United States of America monopoly to the atomic weapon, noted French General Gallua, and especially "Soviet experiments with the long range ballistic missiles changed the hierarchy of force".

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Strategic situation "was sharply changed, when ... at the end of August of 1957 Soviet technical experts launched long range ballistic missiles, capable bear nuclear warheads. This deprived of the USA the advantage of their geographical situation ... and destroyed the

foundation of American "geostrategy" 1.

FOOTNOTE 1: "Foreign Affairs" Oct. 1960, pp 67-68. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The military doctrine of the USA undergoes the continuous evolution: for the armament of American militarism are accepted ever more aggressive and more dangerous for the cause of peace strategic concepts.

With the aid of the strategy of the "massed reciprocal attack" it was proposed "to contain" and "to throw back" communism, i.e., to stop progressive development in entire world, and then, relying on superiority in the nuclear weaponry and the bomber aviation, to force the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to surrender. This adventurist doctrine did not bring, however, to the imperialists of the desired results. The colonial system of imperialism continued to decompose ever more rapidly. From capitalism fell one additional country - revolutionary Cuba. The "restrictive nuclear power" proved to be unable to stop the victorious step of the powerful national forces, liberated by the Socialist Revolutions. The established world system of socialism began to be converted into the decisive factor of social development.

In accordance with their aggressive policy capitalist states

develop/process all possible versions of the military doctrines and strategic concepts. In this plan the United States of America exert strong influence on other capitalist powers, connected with the USA with military treaties. The doctrines of the allies of the USA in their political unit coincide with American.

For the shift/relief of the theory of the "restrictive nuclear power" in the official military doctrine of the United States arrived the theory of "flexible reaction". Its essence is reduced to the fact that the USA must be ready to wage war of any type - universal or local, nuclear or ordinary. The new version of doctrine, making it is persistent the priority development of the nuclear rocket weaponry, requires also the growth of the ordinary forms of armament, necessary for waging of "limited wars".

The military doctrine of the USA is pierced by the ideas of anticommunism. It is aimed against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, against all peace-loving peoples and progressive forces. Its reactionary character escape/ensues from the aggressive foreign policy course of the USA. In the principle the political content of this doctrine is not changed, since very nature of American imperialism remains invariable.

Being characterized by adventurism, by the underestimation of

the forces of anti-imperialist front and by the overestimation of its own forces, the doctrine of the USA in its military-technological unit possesses a sufficient flexibility and takes into consideration the political, economic, military and technical changes, which occur in the world. It should also be noted that the American military doctrine is based on the powerful/thick material and technical base whose basis composes the nuclear rocket weaponry. Therefore it conceals serious threat for the cause of peace.

Basing the strategic concept of the USA, American General Taylor wrote that the military program of the United States must provide the possibility of waging any war, "in order to achieve our national goals and after the successful completion of military activities to construct the best world" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. M. Taylor. Unreliable strategy. M., Voenizdat, 1961, pp. 26. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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What content do pack American militarists into the concept "best world", created with the aid of the military activities? Specialist in questions of the military doctrine of the USA Robert Tucker, the former consultant of the State department and the White House, very

frankly expressed himself in regard to this: "this can be only the world, in which our will actually/really will triumph, and therefore we must recognize ... the international association which is based not on the agreement, but on the constraint, on the fullest constraint". This there will be the world in which the existing order/formation is supported by the threat of the complete annihilation of the countries, entering "group of dissatisfied ones" and humanity constituting "significant part" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹The Just War. A Study in Contemporary Doctrine. Baltimore, 1960, pp. 191-193.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

But "who can expect to control/guide this world in which our will will remain forever triumphant"? - are placed an in any way not academic question Tucker himself not it answers:. "Certainly, not that, who can harbor the doubts of the dignity of our goals So that the threat of annihilation would be by completely effective, it must proceed from the will, which does not allow/assume the doubts of the justification of this perpetual threat" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Ibid., pp. 195. ENDFOOTNOTE.

Is such the "logic" of the aggressive military doctrine, which

reflects the tendency of American multi-millionaires to enslave the whole world, to sink in the blood human freedom. Who did not forget the bloody revelry of fascism during the years of the Second World War, he knows that precisely the Nazis, these so-called strong personalities", were the carriers of beast "will" to the mass destruction of the peoples. Certainly, people, which stand in authority in the USA, name themselves Democrats and Republicans. But this does not interfere with to them to adhere to the military doctrine, which carries on itself the press of Fascist ideology.

Not randomly in the United States of America ever more unbelt pro-Fascist elements. Political conspirators from their camp organized during November 1963 villainous violence President of the USA Kennedy, who represented the sensibly thinking unit of the dominant class and he attempted by means of the negotiations to find the ways of resolution of the international problems, which share the world. The murder of the President of the Kennedys was the previously thought-out action of the pro-Fascist forces, those ultra-right and racist circles which the people baptized "rabid/furious" and which will braid the nets/systems of plot against the world, trying not to allow the detente of international tension and to kindle thermonuclear war.

The composite/compound component part of the aggressive plans of

the Pentagon are the so-called unannounced limited wars. Have already long ago been prepared the "military forces of special designation/purpose" for the activities in the territory of the liberated from the colonial oppression countries and in the countries of socialist camp, and also for waging anti-guerilla war in those areas of terrestrial globe where the peoples raise to the struggle with the colonizers.

National liberation movement in all its forms is the struggle of national, valid. However, imperialism declares this struggle of illegal and requires not recognizing its results. Anti-guerilla war is considered as the means which will help to stop the process of anti-imperialist struggle and to delay decomposition/decay of colonial system. Imperialists undertake all measures to maintain old regimes in the countries which want to earn national independence. This is why they consider that anti-guerilla war must become the "necessary object/subject of military science" ³.

FOOTNOTE ³. O. Hellbrunn. Partisan Warfare, New York, 1962, pp. 170 ENDFOOTNOTE.

Based on this, USA and England attempts to adapt their armed forces for conducting the struggle with the national liberation movement. One of the reasons, which impelled these powers to reorganize the armed forces, was the fact that their previous

organization proved to be ineffective in the conditions of anti-guerilla war.

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In order to maintain and to strengthen its "overseas military-strategic positions", the Governments of USA and England continue to develop/process strategy and tactics of irregular military activities, increase the mobility of the armed forces, train personnel of special troops for the ways of struggle with guerillas, they create to the Navy of the large units/formations whose basis compose the attack aircraft carriers and the assault helicopter carriers. In the army of the USA is counted 344 special commands which in 49 countries train local military "foremost ways of conducting the struggle with the blasting activities" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

The Ministry of the Armed forces in Africa. After shortening their strength and after situating these military forces in the important strategic areas, it poses before them the problem of holding airfields and ports in order to ensure landing and deployment main forces, transported from the metropole in the case of "threat" to French positions in this or another the area of Africa. The role

of striking power in the struggle with the national liberation movement on the African continent is assigned the 11th French division, which obtained the experience of war in Algeria. Placed in Lorraine, this division can be moved for several hours into any point of Africa.

Ever larger role in the struggle with the national liberation movement plays West German Bundeswehr. It already supplies Israeli extremists and Portuguese colonizers with weaponry, and mercenaries from its numbers participate in the repression of national uprisings in the Congo, Angola, Mozambique.

in the West increasingly more are audible the votes, which condemn the antinational activities of imperialistic governments and which draft to forego the export of counterrevolution. Thus, U. Lippman wrote: "we used money and weaponry in the prolonged, hopeless efforts/forces to affirm the local governments which into the name of anticommunism will be opposed to all important social changes" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. W. Lippmann. The Coming Tests with Russia. Boston, etc., 1961, p. 36.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

However, the overwhelming majority of bourgeois military and

political workers still thinks by categories eliminating itself the policy from the position of force.

Recently under the conditions for certain increase in the international tension are observed the phenomena, which call the alert/alarm of world community. In the leading imperialistic states, and, first of all, in the USA and FRG, noticeably were activated/promoted blackest reacting forces, which have an increasing effect both on the internal and on foreign policy of these states. Goldwaterism, the fascistization of the internal life of the number of the countries, reinforcing of course on the export of counterrevolution involuntarily force to recall, to what led the same dangerous tendencies in the 30's of our century.

Understanding the danger of thermonuclear war for the very system of imperialism, western political workers want to achieve their goals with the aid of the limited wars. However, under the known circumstances the dangerous game of imperialists can become the spark which will cause the thermonuclear fire, disastrous for the most imperialistic formation/order. Thus, division between the limited war and the world thermonuclear war is very vacillating.

Would be at the same time to unrealistically identify any attempt of the imperialism to probe the forces of peace, provoke

military conflict in this or another the angle of terrestrial globe since the beginning of the world thermonuclear war. Not any temporary/time armed conflict must with the inevitability pour out into the thermonuclear catastrophe. In the contemporary world situation, as confirm the events of latter/last time, there are real political forces and means, which can restrain imperialism, stave off local aggression and the "export of counterrevolution" and suppress military adventure even when it has already been begun.

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In the plans of the preparation for new war against the socialist countries the imperialists visible place assign to their intelligence agencies and activities of "fifth column". "The fate of the contemporary armed forces, which possess enormous might, writes visible military theoretician E. Kingston-MacLory's West, to the considerably greater degree, than in the past, it will depend on the effectiveness of the intelligence service. But in the future this service will become even more important" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. E. Kingston-MacLory. Leadership of war. M., 1957, pp. 302. ENDFOOTNOTE.

The increased role of imperialistic reconnaissance/intelligence

is explained, first of all, by the character of modern missile and nuclear weapons warfare. The global character of war, as is emphasized this in the West, requires global reconnaissance/intelligence. "The extraction of information cannot be limited by several countries, asserted the former head for the central intelligence division of the USA (TsRU) A. Dalles.-Bes6 the world is the arena of our conflict. In our century of the nuclear rocket weaponry even Arctic and Antarctic became the areas, which have strategic significance ... "2.

FOOTNOTE 2. A. Dulles. The Craft of Intelligence., New York etc., 1963, p. 50 ENDFOOTNOTE.

Considering reconnaissance/intelligence as the most important gun of preparation/training and waging modern wars, imperialists require of it the collection of comprehensive information about the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Thus, one of the prominent theorists and the heads of American reconnaissance/intelligence Sh. Kent considers that the USA ruling circles must possess with "total" knowledge about the socialist countries, beginning from their physicogeographical conditions and ending with the state of art, sciences and technology.

Imperialistic governments expend/consume on the activity of intelligence agencies enormous means. Intensely are prepared the

cadres of spies and saboteurs, are developed/processed new technical equipment of reconnaissance/intelligence and sabotages, are improved forms and methods of blasting activities.

In the book of the American journalists D. Wise and T. Ross "invisible government" is given the statement of the present head of TsRU J. Makkoun to the highly-ranked representatives of army, from whom it follows that the yearly expenditures for all forms of reconnaissance/intelligence, including to reconnaissance/intelligence with the aid of the electronic means, are 4 billion dollars. Only in TsRU are counted more than 40 thousand cadre colleagues. But this control is the sole intelligence agency of the United States of America. According to the certificate of American specialists, in the USA to 1964 there were 22 departments, occupied reconnaissance work. The important expert of American external politicians AS the D. Macks considers that all government installations of the USA, directly or indirectly connected with realizing of foreign policy, participate or must participate in the accomplishment of the missions of reconnaissance/intelligence. Such installations it counts several ten.

In the expansion of reconnaissance and blasting activity behind the American imperialists do not lag their allies on the aggressive military blocs. In the FRG is revived reconnaissance/intelligence of

the Fascist-German Germany, which correctly serves the adventurist purposes of West German revanchists.

The intelligence agencies of the imperialistic countries attempt to enmesh by the web of espionage entire terrestrial globe. They will braid the nets/systems of plots, incite government revolutions, organize the dangerous provocations, which place the world on the brink of war. Reconnaissance/intelligence do not stop before the physical annihilation of the political and statesmen of those countries which conduct the policy objectionable to imperialists. "Whatever strained moments/factors of international situation we took - plot against the legal government of Cambodia, event in the Congo, the activity of rebels in Laos, the mutiny of "ultra ones" in Algeria, the dispatching of the espionage aircraft U-2 to the territory of the USSR, the intervention against revolutionary Cuba, the resignation of President Kuadros in Brazil, the provocations in Western Berlin, are everywhere visible the trails of the central intelligence division of the USA" ³, it was noted at the XXII Congress of CPSU.

FOOTNOTE ³. See the XXII Congress of CPSU, Vol. II, pp. 400.

ENDFOOTNOTE.

Camp of imperialists, headed by the aggressive militarist

circles of the USA, the strong and insidious enemy of the socialist countries.

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Although the peoples terrestrial globe do not desire war and increasingly more actively they struggle for peace, the decision of questions of war and peace in the capitalist countries yet did not become the work of wide masses, it, until now, remains in the hands of the ruling circles. At the disposal of militarists is found enormous military power that gives to them the possibility to keep the world under the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Therefore the greatest vigilance, highest readiness and combat efficiency of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and all socialist countries must serve as the constant counterbalance to the aggressive policy of imperialistic camp.

World socialist system confidently goes to the decisive victory in the economic competition with capitalism. Grow our possibilities to in the best way satisfy the needs of defense, and also, therefore, to bar road to war.

However, the danger of war still exists. Imperialists do not cease the preparation of aggression against the socialist countries.

They continuously conduct against them ideological sabotages in order to undermine the cohesion of socialist camp and to weaken/attenuate the moral and political unity of the Soviet people. Imperialistic reconnaissance/intelligence inspire all possible provocative hearing/rumors and slanderous fabrications, provoke different conflicts, are created "critical situations". All this is used then by a propagandistic apparatus of USA and other imperialistic countries for the malicious anti-Soviet propaganda.

Ideological war is conducted under the flag of the anticommunism, basic content of which are slander about the socialist order, falsification of policy and goals of the Communist Parties, teaching of Marxism-Leninism. being covered by this black flag, imperialistic reaction pursues entire avant-garde and revolutionary, the aim is to introduce crack into the numbers of laborers, to paralyze their will to struggle. Under the decrepit banner of anticommunism were combined now all enemies of social progress, all ideological and political accomplices of imperialistic reaction.

From a foreign policy point of view anticommunism - these are the main weaponry of "cold war" and the means of psychological preparation/training for the "hot war". Therefore it is hostile to the basic interests of humanity. Anticommunism is generated by the fear of those become obsolete of the classes before the powerful

social forces which create new, classless society.

The militarist circles of the USA constantly appear with the threats directed to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. American militarists, actually, discovered discusses a question about the preventive war against the USSR. All this makes it necessary to recall the experience of the last war and to draw the necessary conclusions most important of which consists in not giving to the enemy the possibility to find our country by surprise.

The nature of contemporary technical weapons of mass destruction is such, that, if aggressor knows how to suddenly deliver the massed nuclear attacks, and the state, which was subjected to aggression, will not in advance ensure the necessary conditions for repulsion of these attacks, the attack of enemy can lead to such losses in the military forces and in the rear, which will place the country and the people in the exclusively heavy situation and will solve the outcome of war in favor of aggressor already in its initial stage.

This is why the law of life and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces and all our people is the programmed requirement of the Communist Party "to observe high vigilance with respect to the aggressive circles, which attempt to destroy the world, to in proper time expose the instigators of military adventures, to take all

necessary measures for the provision of safety and inviolability of our socialist fatherland, all socialist camp" ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. Program of CPSU, pp. 61. ENDFOOTNOTE.

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Vigilance with respect to aggressive circles intends the capability to foresee the possible ways of the unleashing of war by imperialists and to in proper time paralyze the forces of aggression, and if necessary to deliver on them decisive retaliatory attack. The higher our vigilance, those more difficult for the imperialists to kindle the fire of world war. The armed forces of the USSR must be they are ready to give the destructive resistance to enemy, strong on land, at sea and in the air, to the capable of using any means of mass annihilation.

The significance of combat readiness and vigilance of military forces especially grows/rises during the sharp aggravations of international situation, caused by the provocative activities of the militarists who place the world on the brink of war. Under these conditions the central committee of CPSU and Soviet government they require of the armed forces to be in the state of the highest combat readiness.

Enormous responsibility for an increase in the vigilance of Soviet people and the disclosure of the insidious intrigues of imperialists lies down on the organs of the national security. In accordance with the requirements of the party the organs of state security, accurate to State Security Agent traditions, expand and strengthen connections/bonds with the people, with the public organizations. In this the source of their strength.

To be vigilant - it means to know how to distinguish the demolition of hostile secret service agency, however thoroughly it was camouflaged, to close for it any access to the secret information, to strictly store military and state secret. For this it is necessary to know forms and methods of the blasting activity of reconnaissance/intelligence of imperialistic states. It is necessary to always remember that the enemy extensively uses in his espionage work the newest achievements of science and technology. Around the Soviet Union of the USA they situated 2 thousand posts of electronic reconnaissance. After failing in the use of aircraft U-2, the USA developed and launched into space the whole family of the "spy satellites", from which is carried out the aerial photography of the territories of the socialist countries.

However, however are great the possibilities of obtaining the secret data with the aid of the scientific-technical means, imperialistic reconnaissance/intelligence as before count the espionage. "The secret assembly of reconnaissance information (espionage) must remain one of the most important aspects of reconnaissance activity", teaches A. Dulles his associates ¹.

FOOTNOTE ¹. A. Dulles. The Craft of Intelligence, P. 58.
ENDFOOTNOTE.

Struggling against the threat of new war, it is necessary to always be on the alert, to suppress the intrigues of hostile reconnaissance/intelligence, to expose their role in the preparation of military conflict. Struggle with various forms of the blasting activity of imperialistic reconnaissance/intelligence - this is the struggle for peace between the peoples.

On the eve of 20th anniversary of the termination of the Great Patriotic War was formed the new situation, which threatens the safety of European and all other peoples. Some states (members of NATO) persistently attempt to create multilateral nuclear forces with the participation of the FRG. If for them this will succeed in carrying out, the worst enemies of the world - Bonn revanchists will obtain nuclear weaponry. But the peoples, which remember well the beast appearance of fascism, do not want so that the heirs of Hitler

could threaten the world with weapons of mass annihilation. Therefore states - participants in the Warsaw Pact - before face of so serious imperialistic a threat are ready to carry out the necessary protective measures for the provision of their safety.

The Groznyys as warning/prevention for the amateurs of adventures must serve the instructive result of the Great Patriotic War, which lies in the fact that the aggressor was banished from the limits of our native land and completely routed, and the Red Army with the honor carried out its liberating mission and it erected above the capital of the devastated Fascist state the banner of victory.

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The Soviet people, which paid victory of the price of heavy victims and enormous destruction, is full of the inflexible determination not to allow in the future of new terrible bloodshed. In the name of the realization of this great humane goal the Soviet Union in concord with other socialist countries and with the support of all peace-loving peoples carries on the untiring struggle against the igniters of world war, for the lasting peace on the earth/ground, for the celebration of the Leninist policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social formation/order.

However, world imperialistic reaction and its main force - the imperialism of the USA - sometimes succeeds in causing reinforcing of international tension. Violating the elementary norms of international law and United Nations Charter, the USA became the way of expanding of aggression and organization of military provocations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and other independent states of Indochina.

The Soviet Union (standard-bearer of the world) drafts all peaceful countries to be joined for the resistance to the imperialistic policy of the use of military force against the peoples, which protect their independence, and not to pass by the facts of imperialistic aggression. Otherwise the independence of any of the young states of Asia, Africa, Latin America will be located under the constant threat. To the encroachments of imperialism of the laws/rights of the peoples must be placed end - such imperious command of time, which expresses the basic interests of the laborers of masses.

And no matter how raged the counterrevolutionary forces of old society, by it not to extinguish the sacred fire/light of human progress, because now it bear in their hearts hundreds of millions of

free and struggling for the freedom people. The ideas of peace and progress acquire all large force as the Soviet Union and other socialist countries achieve the new and new successes in the construction of Communist society. The victory of new social formation/order in entire world is unavoidable. on terrestrial globe there are no such forces which would be in the state prevent international working class from fulfilling their liberating mission.

Communism frees all people from the social inequality, oppression and exploitation, from the horrors of war asserts on Mir earth/ground, the labor/work, freedom, equality, brotherhood and the happiness of all peoples. After fulfilling its historical mission, working class will convert these highest general human ideals into the indisputable laws of further development of society, in which there will be the places for no wars.

SOCIALISM BRINGS PEOPLE CLOSER.



President of the CSR Antonin Novotny opens the Czechoslovakian section of an oil pipeline.

Soviet and Polish electrical welders finish the last stages of the "Druzhba" oil pipeline.



Soviet oil flowed over the oil pipeline. There was a festive meeting in a shop of the Schwedt Petroleum Refining Combine (Schwedt, GDR, 1963).



Leaders of the Polish Peoples Republic V. Gomulka and Yu. Tsirankevich inspect shops of a petroleum refining combine built in Plotsk based on the "Druzhba" oil pipeline. Foreground (second from the left) - Vice-President of the Council of Ministers USSR M. A. Lesechko.



ЗАКОН О ЗАЩИТЕ МИРА

ВЕРХОВНЫЙ СОВЕТ СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК, РУКОВОДСТВУЯСЬ ВЫСОКИМИ ПРИНЦИПАМИ СОВЕТСКОЙ МИРОЛЮБИВОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ, ПРЕСЛЕДУЮЩЕЙ ЦЕЛИ УКРЕПЛЕНИЯ МИРА И ДРУЖЕСТВЕННЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ МЕЖДУ НАРОДАМИ,

ПРИЗНАЕТ, ЧТО СОВЕСТЬ И ПРАВОСОЗНАНИЕ НАРОДОВ, ПЕРЕНЕСШИХ НА ПРОТЯЖЕНИИ ЖИЗНИ ОДНОГО ПОКОЛЕНИЯ БЕДСТВИЯ ДВУХ МИРОВЫХ ВОЙН, НЕ МОГУТ МИРИТЬСЯ С БЕЗНАКАЗАННОСТЬЮ ВЕДУЩЕЙСЯ АГРЕССИВНЫМИ КРУГАМИ НЕКОТОРЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ПРОПАГАНДЫ ВОЙНЫ И СОЛИДАРИЗИРУЕТСЯ С ПРИЗЫВОМ ВТОРОГО ВСЕМИРНОГО КОНГРЕССА СТОРОННИКОВ МИРА, ВЫРАЗИВШЕГО ВОЛЮ ВСЕГО ПЕРЕДОВОГО ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСТВА В ОТНОШЕНИИ ЗАПРЕЩЕНИЯ И ОСУЖДЕНИЯ ПРЕСТУПНОЙ ВОЕННОЙ ПРОПАГАНДЫ.

ВЕРХОВНЫЙ СОВЕТ СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК ПОСТАНОВЛЯЕТ:

1. СЧИТАТЬ, ЧТО ПРОПАГАНДА ВОЙНЫ, В КАКОЙ БЫ ФОРМЕ ОНА НИ ВЕЛАСЬ, ПОДРИВКАЕТ ДЕЛО МИРА, СОЗДАЕТ УГРОЗУ НОВОЙ ВОЙНЫ И ЯВЛЯЕТСЯ ВВИДУ ЭТОГО, ТЯЖАЙШИМ ПРЕСТУПЛЕНИЕМ ПРОТИВ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСТВА.

2. ЛИЦ, ВИНОВНЫХ В ПРОПАГАНДЕ ВОЙНЫ, ПРЕДАВАТЬ СУДУ И СУДИТЬ КАК ТЯЖКИХ УГОЛОВНЫХ ПРЕСТУПНИКОВ.

ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬ ПРЕЗИДИУМА ВЕРХОВНОГО СОВЕТА СССР И. ШЕРНИН
СЕКРЕТАРЬ ПРЕЗИДИУМА ВЕРХОВНОГО СОВЕТА СССР А. ГВРИН

МОСКВА, КРЕМЛЬ, 12 МАРТА 1951

War propaganda in the USSR - against the law.
[Translation on following page].

1430

LAW IN DEFENSE OF PEACE

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the high principles of the Soviet peace-loving policy, pursuing the goal of strengthening peace and friendly relations between nations, decrees that the conscience and sense of justice of the nations which have endured the disasters of two world wars during the lifetime of one generation, cannot reconcile itself to the lawlessness of the war propaganda which is being spread by the aggressive circles of certain states, and is expressing solidarity by calling a second international congress of the proponents of peace, expressing the will of all of modern mankind to prohibit and condemn criminal war propaganda.

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees that war propaganda of any form be considered to interfere with peace and create the threat of a new war; thus, it is a most serious crime against mankind.

2. Individuals guilty of spreading war propaganda should be tried and judged as hardened criminals.

President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
N. Shvernik

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
A. Gorkiy

Moscow, Kremlin, 12 March 1951

1431

UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT - THE WAY TO PEACE.



Moscow. Concluding session of the International Congress for Universal Disarmament and Peace (July 1962).

International forum to declare solidarity of young people and students in Moscow (1964).



1432

"DOWN WITH IMPERIALIST WARS AND FASCISM" - DEMAND THE PEOPLE.




← Torchlight procession in Essen (Ruhr) in defense of peace, against atomic weapons in West Germany.

Demonstration in Le Havre (France) against the creation of a nuclear "strike force", for joining the Moscow agreement on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests and for disarmament.

Mass meeting in Sasebo (Japan) in defense of world peace.




At the grave of those who died from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.



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"WE ARE GIVING WARNING!" Sculpture by G. Postnikov.
(Studio of Military Artists imeni M. B. Grekov).



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963 - A


1434

THE SOVIET PEOPLE - THE SUBJUGATOR OF SPACE.



Monument in honor of the outstanding achievements of the Soviet people in mastering outer space.

Soviet cosmonauts on the Red Square in Moscow, 7 November 1964.



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BRIEF HISTORIC AND GEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF
THE GREAT PATRIOTIC AND SECOND WORLD WAR

1436

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CHAPTER ONE

SOVIET GEOGRAPHIC HISTORY

DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

The historic and geographic description of the Great Patriotic War is a part of the Soviet geographic history which analyzes all aspects of different theories, investigating the most important problems in the history of the war and giving them the Marxist-Leninist evaluation. The subject matter of the geographic history is the whole history of the war. Our geographic history which is primarily concerned with the study of the Soviet historical science, also investigates in parallel the state and development of the historical science regarding the past war as described by all other socialist countries as well as the capitalist countries.

In order to characterize the ways and stages in the development of the Soviet historical science regarding the Great Patriotic War, it is necessary to analyze the historical literature already published, to evaluate the objective and subjective factors either accelerating or retarding the development of this science, and also to take into account the practical needs in the study of specific questions.

The first stage of the geographic history of the Great Patriotic War encompasses the period from the beginning of the war to the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the second stage - from the year 1956 to the present time.

*Numbers in the margin indicate pagination in the foreign text.

The main features of the first stage were the narrowly circumscribed subject matter, a comparatively thin and monotonous historical base and the absence of extensive studies of a general nature.^{1*}

The creation of the history of the Great Patriotic War has begun essentially prior to the time when the last shot was fired at the battlefields. Already at that time, attached to the various scientific organizations, the commissions were created charged with the study of the war and various monographs have been published. Many participants of the great struggle for the socialist Fatherland have entertained the idea to rethink and reflect in the historical literature the events of the Great Patriotic War. Some of these individuals after the war have become authors of the military and historical studies and memoirs.

The publications during the wartime were devoted primarily to the description of isolated stages and events of the military struggle. But even at that time there were studies attempting to unfold the causes of the war, its just character as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the heroic deeds of the Soviet people at the front and rear lines, the animalistic essence of fascism and the inhuman "new order" established by the Hitlerites on occupied territory of the USSR. The questions regarding the restructuring of the national economy on the war footing were defined by the authors in describing the main experiences of the industrial enterprises, of the state industrial concerns, of the collective farms and primarily, of the national socialist competition. The Party activity was described using examples of the specific organizations regarding the specific questions at hand. A significant attention has been devoted to the description /404 of the international relationships, the struggle of the peace loving nations against fascism, and their specific demands directed at the

* Numbers of footnotes correspond to the numbers of footnotes in the foreign text.

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governments of the countries belonging to the anti-Hitlerite coalition to promote active assistance to the Soviet Union.

At the same time, a number of small brochures and articles have been published which have presented sequentially the facts and events. To be sure, these were not historical studies in the academic sense of the word. But this was already the very beginning of the soviet geographic history of the Great Patriotic War which, based on the best traditions of our historical science, even at the very first stage of its development, has properly evaluated numerous problems associated with the war from the Marxist-Leninist positions.

However, the creative activity of the historical science at that time was hindered by the cult of personality of Stalin. One of the consequences of this cult of personality in historical sciences was the lack of availability of the archive documents, narrow circumvention of the historical base and the limitation of subject matter which could be used in these studies. As a basic source of the great majority of the historical studies was the book by I. V. Stalin, "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union" which contained both the correct and erroneous assumptions.

The Party program, in organizing the resistance to the German-fascist occupation forces, was based on the Lenin teachings regarding the protection of the socialist Fatherland. Stalin utilized many theoretical postulates of this teaching: the just character of the war of the soviet people, the political goals inherent in our struggle for liberty against the imperialist invaders, the transformation of the whole country into a unified military camp, the role of the unity between the working class and the peasants, the role of the friendship between people to overcome the enemy, the unity of the army and of the people, etc.

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However, the conditions during which the Great Patriotic War has begun and was conducted required the development of the Lenin teachings as applied to a concrete situation. One had to discover and evaluate totally new phenomena. And here Stalin has allowed some errors. Precisely in this area, the erroneous opinions of Stalin have been extensively propagandized as a valuable contribution to Leninism. This happened, for example, with the postulates regarding the extensive preparedness to conduct the war of the "aggressive" nations, the postulates regarding the constantly active factors deciding the fate of the war and some others.

Being influenced by the cult of personality of Stalin, the historic and geographic description of the Great Patriotic War has acquired a descriptive nature with subjective and dogmatic interpretation of the historic events, ignoring the documents and facts. All successes of the Soviet people and of the Communist Party in achieving victory over fascism have been ascribed to the "wise leadership of Stalin," who has been described in lofty terms as "the greatest military leader of all times and peoples."

The course of the military struggle of the Red Army with the fascist Germany, at the most difficult time period of the Great Patriotic War was viewed in terms of an imagined position as to the deliberate enticement of the enemy to penetrate deeply into Soviet territory in order to exhaust and eventually defeat it by combining "active resistance" with counter attack. The military art and the military science of a strong and dangerous enemy, fascist Germany, was looked upon with condescension.

In particular it must be pointed out that Stalin belittled the role of V. I. Lenin as a military personality. Therefore, in the historical studies the Lenin historical and theoretical heritage has been understated in spite of it being the foundation for the proper understanding of the unfolding sequences related to the Great Patriotic and to the Second World War.

In the presence of the cult of personality, the researchers were losing such invaluable qualities as the initiative and creative approach as applied to the scientific problems. The historians were imbued with the idea that all basic evaluations of the historical process are either already available or may be presented only by Stalin.

In pointing out the shortcomings in the scientific development of the Great Patriotic War history at its first developmental stage, one cannot discard, however, everything which has been created by the historians led by the Party on the basis of Lenin postulates and in spite of the effect of the cult of personality.

For example, during these years there were written a number of special studies not designed to be published openly. These studies were of great importance for the investigation of the history of the Great Patriotic War. Even at this first stage in the development of the historical and geographic description of the Great Patriotic War, the investigation of specific problems was gradually becoming more extensive in depth.

After the war, a number of general studies embracing the war as a whole have made an appearance. These studies, based on published material and containing both correct and erroneous evaluations and conclusions, were trying to add up the accumulated knowledge and to make a summary of the course of the development of such a complex and important subject matter. The events of the war began to be viewed in their total content, taking into account their effect on further social development.

The beginning of the second stage of the historical and geographic description of the Great Patriotic War was the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR (February 1956) which was the turning point in the life and the activity of our Party and of the whole country. The decisions arrived at by the XX Congress of the

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Communist Party of the USSR and the Directive of the Central Committee dated June 30, 1956, regarding the termination of the cult of personality and its consequences, has freed the historical science from the retarding effect of the cult of personality, creating the necessary preconditions for the further development of this science. After the XX Congress a number of new historical magazines¹ began publication which also contained material regarding the history of the war.

In incorporating the decisions of the XX Congress, the Soviet historians have carefully reviewed the directions and results of their studies. In a short time period the scientific review of the Great Patriotic War has been carried out with a careful restatement of the historical realities regarding many specific questions, thus beginning the liquidation of the "blank spaces" in the military history of these years. All this has created a favorable atmosphere for the issuance of the six-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945." By the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR dated September 12, 1957, within the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, a section was created for the history of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet historians were faced with the following problem: to investigate all aspects of the military history 1941-1945, the internal processes of the economics, social and political life of the country and also the external policies of the USSR at that time period. /405

In the six-volume historical work it was necessary to produce a general review and characterize the preparation of the aggression against the USSR by fascist Germany and some other imperialistic countries, to show the heroic struggle of the Soviet people at the front and in the rear lines, to describe the most important operations of the Red Army and of the navy, to describe the might of the military forces of the USSR and the advantages of Soviet military art and also to define the main questions related to the Second World War, its origin and its character, the basic military operations

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on the other fronts, taking into account that the Patriotic War was the main component of the Second World War.

The collective authorship of the historical work "History of the Great Patriotic War" was faced with the task to unfold the role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a leader and organizer of the national struggle with the enemy, describe its many-sided activity in leading the action at the front, in the guerilla warfare behind the front lines, as well as in the industrial and political life of the whole country.

It was necessary to show the many-sided advantages of the economic and social structure of the socialist society, its strength, the friendly relationship between the peoples of the USSR, Soviet patriotism, the just character of Soviet external policies and also the global and historic meaning of the victory over German fascism. The collective group of authors had to present the reader with a detailed answer to the question why the Soviet Union came out to be a victor from an extremely difficult war, and what are the sources of the unconquerable power of the Soviet Union and its military forces.

The six-volume historical work had to be based on the achievements, already available in the soviet historical science, in the historical science of the Great Patriotic War. By correcting the previous errors in the description of the war, it was necessary to create a substantial scientific study of the history of the most difficult and at the same time most heroic military struggle of our Fatherland.

The publication had to refute the claims of the falsifiers of the war history; this had to be based on a series of scientific and many-sided analyses of the facts and documents which would show the true picture of the war.

The creation of such a complex and elaborate historic work had

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to be the result of the collective efforts of all historic scientific organizations in our country, of all historians within the soviet society and, of course, in the first place of those historians who are involved in developing and studying the history of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole.

During the five year time period (1960-1964) five volumes of the "History of the Great Patriotic War" had been issued. This is the sixth volume of this work which is the last one. The Soviet and foreign press have published numerous positive reviews regarding this publication.

But the "History of the Great Patriotic War" was not the only effort associated with the new stage in the development of soviet historical science regarding the past war. During the time past since the XX and XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a number of significant historical works made their appearance; these are devoted to the systematic analysis of the military and theoretical heritage of V. I. Lenin and his practical activity related to the protection of the socialist Fatherland.¹ The work which has been done by the authors was of great importance for the future scientific investigation of the problems associated with the Great Patriotic War since the main theoretical basis of the historical geography of the Great Patriotic War is a comprehensive concept developed by V. I. Lenin regarding the protection of the socialist Fatherland, the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and of the army. Utilizing in a creative fashion the conceptual ideas of Lenin, one can liquidate completely the subjective approach to the history of the Great Patriotic War, the dogmatism and the generalized description, all of which are the methodological sidestepping of the Marxist concepts which were the result of the whole situation associated with the Stalin cult of personality and which were difficult to overcome.

A broad offensive has been unfolded in the struggle against the bourgeois falsifiers of the history of the Second World War and of the

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Great Patriotic War. The scientific works published which have attempted to distort the causes of the Second World War have been decisively criticized, the attempt to besmear the policies of the USSR prior to the beginning of the Second World War and the justification of the attack of Hitler's Germany on the Soviet Union have been thoroughly decimated. The attempts to degrade the role of the Soviet Union in the destruction of German fascism, explaining the defeat of Hitlerite Germany by the personal miscalculations of Hitler, by the "fate" of accidents, etc. have been laid to rest.²

The approach in evaluating the bourgeois literature regarding 406 has also been gradually changing. Continuing an active struggle against the bourgeois falsifiers of the history of the Second World War, the Soviet historians began to produce a more accurate picture of the development of geographic history of the Second World War as viewed from abroad.

The scientific efforts of the soviet writers in print in several recent years are free of prejudice toward the evaluation of the bourgeois geographic history. These writings do not subdivide the bourgeois historians merely in terms of reactionary and progressive. The subject matter of criticism, in addition to the criticism of specific writings, the general concepts of the bourgeois schools and directions and the criticism itself, become more substantive and convincing.

Among the studies devoted to the foreign geographic history of the war, one must mention a large section found in the "History of International Relations and External Policies of the USSR"¹ where one finds an objective analysis of the bourgeois international relationships during the time period of the Second World War which have been reflected in the scientific works of historians in the United States, England, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan.

In the year 1964 a digest was published with the title "Against the Falsifiers of the History of the Second World War"² in which, using extensive material, the basic distortions of the history of the

war as described abroad have been shown. This digest differs appreciably, to its advantage in terms of its content, from the digests devoted to the same subject matter which have been published earlier.

The increased number of publications on the same subject matter proves once again the extensive achievements of the soviet historical science regarding the Great Patriotic War after the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. During the ten years after the war there were about 1200 books, brochures and magazine articles³ which have been published. During the five year period, from XX to XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR (1956-1961) there were more than 2000 books, brochures and magazine articles which have been published.

The subject matter of the publications become more varied. There were a considerable number of studies of general overview type (instead of 14-73). The historians began to develop in depth the questions regarding the character of the Second World War and the decisive role played in it by the Soviet Union. After the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, there were more than 30 publications devoted to these problems and prior to 1956, there were only 10. In particular, the number of publications regarding the activity of the Communist Party of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War has increased quite significantly. During the years 1946-1955, there were more than 50 publications of this type and during the five years after the XX Congress - there were more than 160. The description of the activity of the Communist Youth Organization during the wartime have been improved somewhat (67 publications instead of 28). The great historical victory of the Soviet people over Hitler's Germany has been elucidated in almost 50 publications. More attention has been devoted to show the mass heroism of the soviet people.

In the years 1956-1961 there were more than 100 books, brochures and magazine articles published regarding the economy of the USSR

during the wartime. In the preceding 10 years the number of such publications has barely reached 50. The number of books and articles devoted to the military struggle of the Red Army has increased almost by a factor of two (from 372 to 726). In particular, the number of publications has increased regarding the history of the military activity of the Soviet armed forces during the most difficult initial time period of the Great Patriotic War (35 publications in the years 1946-1956 and 118 in the years 1956-1960). The number of books and articles regarding the history of the guerilla activity has increased by a factor of more than two (155 instead of 80) and regarding the history of the foreign policy of the USSR - by a factor of three (44 instead of 15). The Soviet historians have devoted a considerable time to the study of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe, Asia and Africa against the imperialist invaders. In five years (1956-1960) there were 36 publications devoted to this subject. There were about 100 publications devoted to the military activity on the secondary military fronts during the Second World War, the greatest number of which were written in 1956-1961. During the same time period the publication of various memoirs has increased quite considerably.

However, during the time period between the XX and XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, the geographic history of the Great Patriotic War still suffered from a number of serious shortcomings. The main weakness lies in the fact that the events of the war appeared in the form of a literary descriptive nature.

The analyses of these publications indicate that the subject matters regarding the organizing and leading role of the Party, of the role of the soviet state in the destruction of the fascist aggressors, of the activity of the Soviets in mobilizing the efforts of the whole country to protect the socialist Fatherland, have not been developed quite satisfactorily. The role and activity of the labor unions and other voluntary societies and organizations has been understated.

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Many publications could not free themselves as yet from the formulas of the past and the new scientific period descriptions of the war result in the contradiction of the ordinary points of view, in which the evaluation of the events was based on the erroneous postulates of Stalin. Also unfinished to a considerable degree is the critical review of the serious errors which are contained in the book by Stalin "On the Great Patriotic War" and his post war opinions regarding the questions of military theory.

The XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR has opened up a new and important stage of the struggle of the Soviet people for communism. The decisions of the Congress and its magnificent ideas exert a powerful effect, not only on the development of our Fatherland, but also on the course of world history. The XXII Congress of the Party has introduced a creative contribution to the development of the Marxist-Leninist theory and has contributed to the understanding of some essential moments in the history of our party and of our country. The program of the Communist Party of the USSR rates very highly the importance of the social sciences, indicating that they represent the scientific basis of leadership and development of our society. The program of the Communist Party of the USSR and the decisions of the XXII Congress of the Party have defined the basic directions to be taken by the scientific studies in the domain of the social sciences, establishing the first stage in the development of the geographic history of the Great Patriotic War. 407 The program of the Communist Party of the USSR based on the positions of V. I. Lenin, that the contemporary wars test all material and spiritual forces of the warring nations, is an example of an extremely brief and very deep generalization regarding the experiences of the Great Patriotic War. This general concept contains in it the most important summary and the most important lesson learned in the struggle of the Soviet Union against the Hitlerite Germany, which was the decisive collision of opposing social systems. It depicts not only the general nature and character of our victory, in

1941-1945, but also the invincibility of socialism in general which is based on the fundamental advantages of the socialist regime as compared to the capitalist one.

On the initiative of the Central Committee, after the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, an All-Union Conference was organized regarding the questions of the ideological work (December, 1961) which was attended by about 2700 Party workers of the central and local ideological organizations and also the All-Union meeting of faculty chairmen of the social sciences in the schools of higher learning (February, 1962). In December, 1962 an All-Union Conference took place regarding the question of improving the preparation of the scientific and teaching personnel involved in the studies of historical sciences. This conference was attended by almost 2000 historians.

The February and December conferences in 1962 have set a number of serious tasks to be discharged by the people involved in the social sciences. One of the most important ones was the task to overcome completely in historical science the remnants of the cult of personality. At these conferences it was duly noted how important are the studies of the Great Patriotic War which are to be done in parallel with such subjects of primary importance as the universal historical role of the Communist Party and of the soviet people in realizing the socialist revolution and in the building of socialism.

The XX and XXII Congresses of the Communist Party of the USSR have unfolded for researchers all available possibilities to develop the history of our people, of the Soviet society, of the history of the Party and of the general history which are in complete accord with the requirements of Marxism-Leninism. Being guided by the decisions of the Party congresses, and also of the October plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR (1964) the Soviet historians are to overcome the remnants of the subjective approach in describing historical events and the

role of one or another particular personality within such a history. In these studies they are supported by actual facts, using extensively numerous sources and investigating the specific rules of the historical processes.

PUBLICATION OF THE DOCUMENTS ON THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

One of the indicators as to the degree to which each particular historical problem is being investigated is the state of publication of the documents regarding a given problem.

The documents regarding the past war are being published in the Soviet Union by the Military-Scientific Bureau within the General Staff of the Soviet Military forces, the Main Political Bureau of the Soviet Army and Navy, the commission attached to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR responsible for the publication of diplomatic documents, the Foreign Relation Board attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR - Department of the Great Patriotic War, the Main Archive office attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and also the Party, State and Informational Archives, scientific and research institutes and various social organizations. The documents are being published both, in periodic literature and in separate digests, according to the subject matter. Numerous documents have been published during the war and immediately after it when they were published by the Soviet Bureau of Information, the executive state commission charged with the investigation of atrocities by the German-fascist occupation forces and other special organizations.

In investigating the history of the Second World War, one of the most important questions is always the question as to its causes and its character. The documents which disclose in greatest detail the causes of the war are, in the first place, the materials and decisions of the VI and VII Congresses of the Comintern, XII and XIII Executive Sessions of its Executive Committee and XVII and XVIII Congresses of

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the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks.¹ All these materials and decisions have characterized the fascism as a realization of the most reactionary and aggressive essence of the imperialism, 408 indicating the danger of a new world war, the causes of which are rooted in the system of imperialism itself.

The official documents disclose the policy of the leading circles in the capitalist countries in the direction of unleashing the war and are compiled in a two-volume publication "Documents and Materials Related to the Eve of the Second World War."¹ This publication includes the documents and materials obtained from the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the years 1937-1939. The first volume contains the transcriptions of conversations between Hitler, Ribbentrop and other members of the fascist government with foreign political personalities, the reports of German diplomatic representatives abroad and some other documents related to the negotiations of the German government with the governments of foreign countries. The second volume contains the documents found in the archives of Dierksen, the former German ambassador in Moscow, Tokyo and London.

As a chronological continuation of the publication of documents describing the foreign political activity of the Hitlerite Germany on the eve of the Second World War and during its first years, is the publication series "Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany" contained in three separate issues² and unfolding the policies of Germany in Hungary (1937-1942), in Turkey (1941-1943) and in Spain (1936-1943).

The correspondence between the leading personalities of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the German embassies are of the greatest interest.

The peaceful policy of the Soviet Union on the eve of the war and its effort directed to preserve peace and strengthen the defenses

of the country and the struggle to contain the aggressors during the first period of the Second World War are reflected in the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks documents of that time period, in the state laws and decisions.³

Speaking of documents related to the eve of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, it is necessary in particular to note the bulletin of TASS dated June 14, 1941, published one week before the treacherous attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet State. The TASS statement claimed that the declarations appearing within recent days in the foreign, and in particular in the English press, regarding the war preparations of Germany against the USSR contain no valid grounds since Germany faithfully adheres to the Soviet-German agreement of non-aggression. "In the opinion of Soviet circles," continued the statement, "the rumors regarding the intention of Germany to break the agreement and attack the USSR are totally without foundation."⁴ This document was published during the time when the war was practically at hand, improperly orienting the soviet people and weakening the alertness of the people and of the armed forces.

At the very first day of the war the Soviet government informed the soviet citizens by radio about the treacherous attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union and called upon the citizenry to protect its Fatherland. The Presidium of the State Supreme Council of the USSR issued an order regarding the "mobilization of all individuals subject to military draft."⁵

The peaceful socialist construction within our country was disrupted. The whole national economy was put on a footing ensuring the victory over the enemy. This new war footing of the national economy and the role played by the soviet socialist state in this process was reflected in the main laws issued by the USSR, in the directives of the Presidium of the Supreme State Council of the USSR,⁶ related to most important decisions with respect to the specific branches of the national economy and, in particular, with respect to agriculture.⁷

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These materials make it possible to trace some of the stages of the economic life within our country during the war. Unfortunately, the compiled information sometimes contains the same type of materials.

Toward the end of the first and the beginning of the second stages in the development of the Great Patriotic War, the Central Bureau for Statistics attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued two publications: "National Economy of the USSR" and "Industry of the USSR."⁸ The documents in these publications describe the general state of our national economy in prewar times and during the war.

It is impossible to study the economic life of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War without studying the periodic literature and in particular, the magazine "Planned Economy."

Some of the questions related to the national economy of specific regions and cities are described in digests prepared by the local archive organizations, by the institutes and by the commissions charged with the study of the war history.⁹ These publications also contain the materials regarding military activity. On the basis of the communiques of the Soviet Information Bureau, the materials of the regional and central press and a comparatively small number of documents found in archives, the publications recreate the basic events which took place within a given territory. But they all have the imprint of the cult of personality which is reflected in the selection and in the presentation of the material. The only value of these publications is the systematic compilation of the material. /409

The same shortcomings are inherent in the digests of documents devoted to the important subject matter - the military struggle of the Red Army.¹

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From the very first day of the Patriotic War the periodic press began to publish the communiques from the Soviet Information Bureau which were compiled at a later date in a separate eight-volume work.² The documents in this publication disclose in chronological sequence the military struggle on the Soviet-German front and also the military activities on the secondary theatres of war. To be sure, the "Communiques of the Soviet Information Bureau," which during the first stage in the development of the geographic history of the Great Patriotic War were the basic source for the study of the war events, are not free from some errors (the exaggeration of enemy losses, chronological inaccuracies, etc.) which may be explained by the wartime conditions. The publication also contains incorrect postulates which were widely accepted at that time in connection with the Stalin cult of personality.

The compiled documents issued by the Military-Historical and Military-Scientific Bureaus of the General Staff and the archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, are of great scientific importance. Even during the wartime the General Staff had begun to issue regularly the compiled information and tactical examples based on the experiences of the Great Patriotic War. The publications prepared by the Archive Division of the Defense Ministry of the USSR contain the orders, instructions, military reports and operational summaries which characterize the activity of specific divisions.³

The publications of the General Staff and of the Defense Ministry Archives, which were of purely military type, were being issued and were accessible only to a narrow circle of military specialists. Nonetheless, they were of practical value in studying the military activity of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The publication "Officer's Atlas" created by a large group of military historians and cartographers was a unique source and valuable manual related to the history of the Great Patriotic War.⁴ For a

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good many years "Officer's Atlas" was a one of a kind reference book regarding the Second World War.

The atlas devotes particular attention to the military events of the Great Patriotic War, but it also contains the maps depicting the activities of the Allies. A large section of this work is devoted to the first period of the Great Patriotic War. The atlas contains maps indicating the defense of Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol, Moscow and other cities. The military advancing operations of the soviet armies are described in great detail. The scientifically developed description of the combat activity occurring along the front of many kilometers makes it possible to recreate a general picture of the battles and define the characteristic features of soviet military art. The atlas was publishing for the first time the maps depicting the great scale and results of guerilla warfare of the soviet people and also the struggle of the Resistance Forces in the occupied countries of Europe.

In spite of the fact that the interpretation of some war events and the time period description, as well as the military and historical maps found in the "Officer's Atlas" contain significant shortcomings inherent in all geographic history of that time, even at the present time the atlas has not lost its value.

Many compiled documents and materials issued during the Patriotic War unfold its national character. The digests "Letters from the Front"⁵ and "Letters to the Front"⁶ tell about the unity of the front and rear lines, the uninterrupted contact of the people with its army.

During the first stage in the development of the geographic history of the Great Patriotic War there were a number of publications which included the proclamations and leaflets calling upon the Soviet people to struggle against the enemy and its hirelings.⁷

Prior to the year 1956 there were also digests and publications of documents devoted to the foreign activity of the Soviet Government

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during the patriotic war. Among these we should mention the three- 410 volume publication "Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union During the Great Patriotic War."¹ This publication contains the documents describing how the anti-Hitler coalition was created and strengthened, defining the relationships of the USSR with the neutral countries and the policy of the Soviet State in unmasking the occupation goals of Hitlerite Germany and its vassals. The three-volume publication contains no new material, but merely compiles systematically the documents which were previously published in the periodic press.

The second publication of the same type is the multi-volume issue "Operative Pacts, Agreements and Conventions Concluded by the USSR with the Foreign States." The XI edition incorporates the documents which came in force between June 22, 1941 and September 2, 1945.² They contain for the first time the protocols of the Yalta and Berlin conferences.

In the year 1946 a digest was published compiling primarily previously available materials related to the activity of Moscow, Teheran, Yalta and Berlin conferences, and of the European consultative commission.³

During the first stage in the development of the geographic history of the Great Patriotic War there were very few documents being issued which reflected the activity of the Party during the wartime. Many important Party documents of the wartime were issued in a descriptive format. This was the case, for example, even with the directives of the USSR People's Commissariat and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, dated June 29, 1941, which represent the party program directed toward the destruction of the enemy. For quite some time the researchers were obliged to use only the descriptive format of this document based on the speech of Stalin on July 3, 1941. But in 1947 and 1954 there were

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already two publications which incorporated the published documents and materials reflecting the ideological work of the Party.⁴

In summarizing the general state of the publication of documented sources related to the history of the Great Patriotic War during the first stage in the development of the geographic history, it must be recognized that this state was not quite satisfactory. Only a limited number of documents were being published and this meant that only a few of them were incorporated in the scientific work. The investigations lacked the necessary historical foundation. As has been properly pointed out, during the All-Union Conference on the measures to improve the preparation of the scientific and teaching personnel associated with the historical sciences (December, 1962), "The scientific value of the sources and of archive material was in doubt. As a rule, the archive materials were used only to illustrate generally known facts. Respect for the actual facts was lost and history as a science without it is simply unthinkable."⁵

The unjustified secrecy attached to the archive documents inflicted a great harm to historical science.

In many publications related to the questions of the history of the Great Patriotic War one could observe a considerable repetition of the published material. As a rule, this material had already been published. The publications contained first of all, all the documents which would illustrate the postulates prevailing at that time within the geographic history.

The historical science of the Great Patriotic War was also seriously harmed by the inadequate utilization of the documents of the enemy which were taken as trophies from them. Only an insignificant fraction of these documents have been published in limited and closed editions.

The military memoirs representing a unique and very interesting

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type of historical source were not published at all.

After the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR a qualitatively new stage in the study of the history of the Great Patriotic War was begun. The periodic press and other specific publications began to utilize many new documents. These documents have shed light on many aspects of the Second World War and of the Great Patriotic War.

In 1958 the documents related to the history of Munich were published describing the Munich policy of the leading circles in the Western leading countries and directed to unleash the fascist countries in starting the Second World War.⁶ These documents show once again the struggle which was led by the Soviet Union to prevent the war and to restrain the aggressors.

The publication of the most important materials from the Nuremberg Process published in seven volumes has been of great political importance.⁷ The documents contained in the publication unfold not only the plans of fascists, but also their monstrous crimes and damages inflicted by them on the human race.

The main archive bureau of the USSR, the Foreign Relation Division at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Central State Archive of the October Revolution and of the socialist construction in the USSR have compiled publications devoted to the struggle of the working people with fascism, aiming to prevent the Second World War and fighting for peace and complete annihilation of fascism in Europe and Asia.⁸

Quite recently there were a number of German documents being published in the Soviet Union characterizing the war preparation and planning of Hitler's Germany against the USSR, and containing information regarding the human resources and numerical might of the military forces of Germany during the Second World War.¹

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Although this information is incomplete (only from November 1942 through March 1945) nonetheless they give us a general idea regarding the human resources of Germany during the past war.

During the second stage in the development of the Soviet geographic history of the Great Patriotic War a number of publications indicating the leading role of the Communist Party and of the Soviet government in organizing the resistance to the enemy, have also increased. There were several compilations of documents devoted to the leadership in the national economy and in the Armed Forces.

In 1957 a publication was issued "Directive of the Communist Party of the USSR and of the Soviet Government Related to the Economic Questions"² which contains the most important decisions of the party and of the government in putting the national economy on a war footing, rebuilding the economic enterprises which were destroyed, building new enterprises, etc.

In the next year, there were several publications containing the decisions, directives and orders of the party and of the government regarding the specific branches of the national economy.³ These publications, embracing a broad time period, contain the documents of the wartime which are of particular interest.

The publication "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" shows the concern of the party regarding the Red Army and its development during the 40 year time period.⁴ This work published for the first time the excerpts from the directive of the USSR Council of People's Commissariat and of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, dated June 29, 1941. A large part of this document can be found in the publication mentioned below, "The Communist Party During the Period of the Great Patriotic War" and its complete text is contained in the compiled documents "Kiev During the Years of the Great Patriotic War."⁵

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The attempt to compile schematically the material regarding the activity of the Communist Party during the wartime was undertaken by the authors of a digest "The Communist Party During the Great Patriotic War (June 1941-1945)."⁶ The bulk of the material and documents in this digest are the publications of V. I. Lenin, the decisions of the party and of the government, the speeches of the leading personalities of the party and of the government, all of which were already published previously. The book also contains the materials regarding the front and rear line work of the party organizations and the documents of the party organizations in the city-heroes.

On the basis of local materials collected by the regional commissions charged with the study of the history of the past war, the local archives, the regional Communist Parties and the institutes are printing the digests of documents and materials. These publications may be subdivided, in terms of character and types of documents published in them, into two groups: the publications regarding areas which have been occupied by the enemy and the distant regions of the country in the rear. As a rule, the publications of the first group are devoted to the beginning of the war, to the occupation regime and to the guerilla warfare, to the military activity of the Red Army at a given regional territory and the liberation of this territory and reconstruction of the national economy.⁷ The publications of the second group tell the story of heroic toil of the working class and of the peasantry, the glorious military deeds of the compatriots at various war fronts, and the help which has been given by the working people of this region to the population of the regions liberated from the occupation.⁸ The publications of both groups contain the materials describing the activity of the party and soviet organizations during the war.

The collection of documents published by the local press and devoted to the life of various regions during the period of the Great Patriotic War are of tremendous interest, not only for the

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Soviet, but also for foreign researchers and general readers as well. For example, the French magazine "Review of the Second World War" says the following regarding these publications: "...they are enabling us to learn more about the life of the Soviet people during the time period 1941 - 1945."¹

The national character of the war is described rather completely in the publications devoted to the guerilla movements in different regions of our country. In 1961 the collection of articles was issued reflecting the activity of the guerillas in the Moscow region. The publication contains the letters, reminiscences, the documents of party organizations and some other materials.² The publication of the same character has been issued in regard to guerilla warfare in the Bryansk and Smolensk regions.³

The publication of materials regarding the party underground during the war period is of great importance. For example, the publication "The Party Underground in Minsk in the Years of the Great Patriotic War" has been devoted to this subject.⁴

Many events of the Great Patriotic War are reflected in the leaflets. In terse, but lively language, they tell us about the daily events, carrying to the masses the word of the Bolshevik truth, propagandizing the experience of heroes, unifying and inciting the Soviet people to fight the enemy. In 1958 a digest of leaflets of the Great Patriotic War was issued. All documents in this digest are published for the first time.⁵

During the wartime the Soviet people have displayed deep patriotic feeling, moral steadfastness and loyalty to socialism. One can not read calmly the publication "The Fallen Heroes Are Speaking"⁶ in which these qualities of the soviet individual are vividly disclosed. This publication contains the letters of the Soviet people, written

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by them during the last minutes of their lives, incarcerated by the Gestapo in jails and concentration camps, in fascist dungeons. The farewell lines written by the guerillas, by the underground workers, by the soldiers and officers of the Red Army, by the people living in the areas occupied by the enemy, by the young men and women driven into fascist slavery, all this recreates before us the features of the Soviet man, his spiritual beauty, faith in victory, hatred toward the enemy, love of Fatherland and the loyalty to the Communist Party and his own nation.

In the beginning of the sixties there were several compilation of documents which were published devoted to the foreign activity of the Soviet State.⁷ These publications show the role of the USSR in creating and strengthening the anti-fascist coalition, in establishing the liberation character of the Second World War, in creating favorable conditions for the national war of liberation of the people of Europe and Asia.

The complete text publication of the correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War, are of great importance for that time period, if one is to study the history of relations between the USSR, USA and England. The documents touch upon all most important questions of the relationship of the Allies in 1941-1945. The documents ascertain the fact that both Washington and London clearly recognize the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the war. However, the correspondence clearly shows a consistent policy conducted by the leading circles of the USA and England calculated to exhasut the USSR in the war against Germany. This becomes particularly apparent if we familiarize ourselves with the letters in which one speaks about a second front. The materials emphasizing the loyalty of the Soviet Union in regards to its Allied commitments, are quite convincing. The correspondence is clear proof

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as to the positive effects of the cooperation between the countries having different social organization.

The addition of a complete text of the correspondence between the heads of states of the USSR, USA and England has put an end to all kinds of falsifications and biased utilization of these materials.

The Soviet-French relations have been reflected in the publication prepared by the Foreign Ministry of the USSR. The publication consists of the archive documents and open statements of the Soviet government regarding the questions of the relationship between the USSR and France in 1941-1945. The documents unequivocally prove that the Soviet Union was always a reliable friend of France and had a great respect for her national interests.

The deep friendship binding the soviet and Czechoslovak people is being substantiated by the publication of new documents and materials characterizing the relationship between the USSR and Czechoslovakia in 1941-1945. This digest publishes for the first time the archive documents of the political negotiations, the materials showing the assistance given by the USSR to the Slovak rebels which had risen against the occupiers. The documents describe in detail /413 the early history of the agreement between the USSR and Czechoslovakia regarding the Trans Carpathian Ukraine.

In 1960 volume II of "Digest of Modern History"¹ was published which contains the documents regarding the history of the foreign countries during the Second World War and also the materials characterizing the activity of soviet diplomacy and the effect of the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces on the future development of the historic events resulting in the leading role of the USSR within the anti-Hitler coalition.

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The magazine "International Life" publishes systematically the interesting and important documents related to international relations during the wartime and the materials are ordinarily from the archives of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR. These publications, the subject matter of which is quite varied,² describe many important subjects. In 1961 the magazine "International Life" published documents related to the Teheran Conference of the chiefs of state of the USSR, Great Britain and the USA.³

Within recent years the number of published military memoirs has increased quite considerably. The nihilistic attitude toward this type of literature which, is of scientific interest and which is quite educational, has been overcome. The numerous Soviet military leaders, including the marshals of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov, A. I. Yeremenko, V. I. Chuykov, Senior Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, Marshal of Aviation S. A. Krasovskiy, the Army Generals P. I. Batov, A. V. Gorbатов, I. V. Tulenev, I. I. Feduninskiy, Admiral A. G. Golovko and other participants of the war have shared their reminiscences with the readers.⁴

Of great political importance are the collected documents disclosing the policies of the German-fascist occupiers, the "new order" which they were trying to establish within the occupied territories, their monstrous crimes against humanity. Almost half of all publications and documents related to the history of the Great Patriotic War and a large number of memoirs of the concentration camp inmates are devoted to this subject.

The Soviet press has published numerous documents of the fascist government of Germany reflecting the program of the occupation regime. These documents were printed in periodic publications and also were incorporated into the digests unfolding the monstrous crimes of fascism. A large number of documents has also been published which characterized the German-fascist policies in action. Even during

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the Great Patriotic War about 30 digests of such documents and materials were devoted to this subject matter. Among these, the two-volume publication "The Documents Accuse" are of greatest interest. This publication describes the monstrous atrocities of the German authorities in the occupied Soviet territory.⁵

A complete picture of the fascist "new order" in the occupied territory of the USSR is given in the "Information Digest of the Executive State Commission on the Atrocities of the German-Fascist Occupiers."⁶ This publication contains 27 items which only partially disclose the crimes committed by the Hitlerites on the Soviet soil. At the end of the digest a document is attached containing the information regarding the material losses inflicted by the German-fascist invaders to the state enterprises and organizations, the collective farms, to the social organizations and to the citizens of the USSR.

The collected material regarding the German-fascist occupation regime have also been published in Ukraine, in Byelorussia and in some other republics which were subjected to the fascist invasion.⁷

The documents of the German High Command and of the other fascist authorities indicating the policies of the German invaders in the occupied territory of the USSR can be found in the digest "Criminal Goals-414 Criminal Means."¹

In 1957 the work was finished in publishing the materials regarding the composition, grouping and regrouping of the land armies of fascist Germany and of the armies of its satellites on the Soviet German front.²

In 1963 two publications came into print in regard to the composition, grouping and regrouping of the land forces of Germany and Italy outside of the Soviet-German front.³

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These publications prepared by the Military-Historical Division of the Military-Scientific Bureau within the General Staff made it possible to investigate in chronological sequence the basic changes in the composition of the military forces of the enemy.

The tables are compiled in terms of years, months and days of the war. The data is subdivided in terms of the army groups and within each group - in terms of the armies. In creating these publications, the German captured documents and also the materials available to the Military-Historical Division of the General Staff have been used.

A significant achievement of the Soviet military and historical science was the addition of the Volume III of "Maritime Atlas."⁴ A large number of military historians and the editorial personnel of the "Maritime Atlas" participated in the development and preparation of this work.

Compiled on the basis of a thorough study of numerous printed sources and archive documents, the atlas reflects quite objectively the military events of modern history. The main subject of Volume III in this atlas is the Second World War. Within the framework of this subject matter, a particular attention is devoted to the struggle of the Soviet people against Germany and its allies. In describing the events of the war and the time periods associated with it, the editors of this work took a new path which took root in the Soviet historical sciences on the basis of the decisions of the XX and XXII Congresses of the Communist Party of the USSR.

The atlas unfolds in front of the readers the general picture of military activity on land and at sea, enabling us to visualize clearly the general course of the military struggle. The sea battles are described in great detail. A significant attention has been devoted to show various forms of the military interaction between the

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army and navy. The most important operations on land during the Second World War are characterized not only in terms of the independent types of military forces, but also in terms of the specific kinds of ground forces.

The atlas contains several military and political, as well as military and economic maps based on the documented and statistical materials. The numerous tables of the forces, their relationships and losses incurred by both sides and the different explanatory statements make this atlas invaluable in scientific and informational terms.

A brief chronicle of the Great Patriotic War prepared by the Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, USSR, in terms of its character, resembles the above-mentioned documents.⁵ The authors have made an attempt to accumulate the facts recreating day by day the whole picture of the life of the Soviet people during the wartime. The authors have directed their main efforts to depict clearly and vividly the leading role of the Communist Party and of the Soviet government in organizing the victory over the enemy and the decisive role of the people as a whole played in the destruction of the Hitlerite invaders.

ORIGIN AND THE CHARACTER OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The origin and the political character of the Second World War is one of the most important subjects in the geographic history. In investigating the origin and character of the war, the Soviet geographic history is based on a deep analysis of the essence of imperialism as defined by V. I. Lenin. V. I. Lenin has emphasized that the "war is inseparably connected with the political structure which generates it" and represents an inseparable part of the policies of the exploiting classes,⁶ being the continuation of such a policy using the means of military force.⁷ Since the policy is a concentrated expression of economics⁸ it is necessary first of all to consider

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the economic basis of the wars generated by imperialism.

A long time before the beginning of the Second World War the Communist International and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in evaluating properly the situation as it had been developing in the imperialist countries, have shown in the appropriate documents the process leading to the ripening of the war state and gave the scientific, Marxist-Leninist evaluation of its origins. The German fascism was recognized as the initiator and primary cause of the world war. In defining the goal of the approaching war, the Comintern and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks have pointed out that this will be an imperialist war. In conjunction with this fact, the Communist International advanced the task to unify all efforts of all progressive patriotic forces in the capitalist countries to create a unified anti-imperialist national front of the workers against the fascist invaders. /415

When, in September of 1939, the Second World War began, the international Communist movement evaluated it as an imperialist war on both sides, in other words, as a continuation of the imperialist policies of the German and Anglo-French-American monopolies. This was the definition of it given by the executive committee of the Comintern in its address on the 22nd anniversary of the great October socialist revolution: "The ruling classes of England, France and Germany are conducting the war for world domination. This war is the continuation of the imperialist court case within the capitalist camp which is pending for many years... This is the true meaning of this war, the war which is unjust, reactionary and imperialistic."¹

The magazine "Communist International" has published an article by G. Dimitrov, "War and the Working Class in Capitalist Countries" in which he analyzes the aggressive character of the war, pointing out the ways in which the working class may counteract this imperialist war. "In its character and its essence," wrote G. Dimitrov, "the present war on both sides is a war which is imperialistic and

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unjust in spite of the deceitful slogans which the ruling capitalist nations are using to hide from the people their actual goals... At the present time, just as in 1914, the war is being conducted by the imperialist bourgeoisie."² The magazine "International Economy and International Politics" has published several articles by Ye. Varga.³ In one of his articles Ye. Varga wrote as follows: "In Europe, a purely imperialist war is taking place. The war in Asia is, from Japan's side, an imperialist war or an attempt to forcefully resubdivide the world at the expense of China, and as far as the Chinese people are concerned this is a just war of national liberation."⁴

The question regarding the origin of the war became the subject matter of many articles and brochures by some of the soviet writers.⁵ However, in all articles and brochures of 1939-1940 time period, the analysis of the liberation trends which took place in Europe, was absent.

While the origin of the Second World War, basically, was properly elucidated by the Soviet writers, in the definition of the character of the war a number of significant inaccuracies were permitted which were due to the simplified interpretation of the whole question by Stalin. Stalin did not want to see any deep changes which took place during the course of the war and the accentuated development of its liberation trends. The whole process of changes in the character of the war, as far as the opponents of fascist Germany were concerned, has not been elucidated in our press. The Soviet press of that time interpreted the war as an imperialist one on both sides, up to the moment when Germany attacked the USSR.

After the Soviet-German non-aggression agreement had been signed on August 23, 1939, Stalin and Molotov radically changed their point of view regarding the policy and ideology of fascist Germany. In one of the declarative statements of TASS in November, 1939, the main instigator of the aggressive war - fascist Germany - was recognized as a defending party.⁶ The extensive work which has been

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conducted in unmasking the class nature, the policy and ideology of the German fascism, has been terminated. These facts manifest the erroneous application by Stalin and Molotov of the Lenin principle of peaceful coexistence. They, in essence, have extended this principle, the manifestation of which was the Soviet-German treaty, into the area of ideology, weakening the struggle with the ideas and postulates of the Hitlerites.

Only after the treacherous attack by Germany on the USSR the extensive material already accumulated could be utilized. In a brief time period a number of brochures, books and articles were written and published showing the animal face of the enemy.⁷ Many soviet scientists, publicists and writers have related the witness stories regarding the atrocities of the German-fascist occupation forces. These efforts have facilitated bringing about in the Soviet 416 people the hatred toward the fascist aggressors and the preparedness to use all efforts in protecting the socialist Fatherland.

The exposure of the aggressive plans and actions of the German imperialism - this force strangling freedom and national independence of the people, was tied closely together with the definition of the character of the war against Germany. The guiding document which is to be used in evaluating the Great Patriotic War as the war which is justivied, the war of liberation, was the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks dated June 29, 1941. In his **speech** of July 3, 1941, Stalin has stated that the struggle of the Soviet people will merge with the struggle of all working people of Europe for its freedom, its national independence and democracy. However, Stalin has not mentioned the liberation movement which had already started in the occupied countries. In his subsequent **speeches** Stalin continued to underrate the role of the Resistance, not mentioning the influence on the Resistance of the struggles of the soviet people.

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The question of the just and liberating character of the Great Patriotic War has been further developed in the articles and brochures by Yem. Yaroslavskiy, G. Alexandrov, P. Fedoseyev, M. Mints, M. Mitin, and V. Komarov.¹ Unfortunately, all these works, and in particular the books by G. Alexandrov, bear the imprint of the Stalin cult of personality.

After the end of the Second World War, in his speech of February 9, 1946, Stalin reverted back to the question regarding the origins and character of the war. But now he went to the other extreme by declaring that the Second World War has acquired right away the anti-fascist, liberating character. The evaluation of the character of the Second World War as a just war from the very beginning as far as all opponents of Germany were concerned, does not unfold the whole complexity of the imperialist contradictions, the acute nature of which has resulted in a war, thus masking the imperialist essence of the policies of the major capitalist countries. At the same time such an evaluation did not take into account the concrete conditions and the tasks with which the communist and working parties were faced, all those parties which were leading the struggle of the working masses against the preparation and unleashing of the war by the imperialists of France, England, USA and other bourgeois democracies.

The statement of Stalin regarding the liberation character of the war from its very beginning has introduced confusion into the study of this question and has delayed for quite some time the scientific development of the problems associated with the Second World War. Some writers have attempted to justify the policies and military strategy of one of the sides participating in the military conflict which commenced in the fall of 1939 between two groups of the imperialist countries. The other ones, either tried to circumvent the important principle questions or are found to be in a hopeless contradictory state. For example, L. Leont'yev in his brochure

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"Origin and Character of the Second World War" has written as follows: "The character of the Second World War is determined in all its aspects by the internal and external policies of the fascist aggressors, the direct continuation of which was war."² Regarding the policy of the opponents of Germany L. Leont'yev chose to be silent. In conclusion he makes the following statement: "The Second World War from its very beginning has acquired the character of the anti-fascist war of liberation."³ In writings of M. Gurevich it was pointed out that the Second World War has acquired the liberation and anti-fascist character because in the countries opposing Germany the decisive factor from the very beginning was the "policy of the masses led by the working class directed toward the destruction of fascism."⁴ In reality the policy of the masses did not play any decisive role in the course of the "odd war." It would be totally absurd to ascribe to the working masses the war which, from the point of view of the ruling classes of England and France, was the continuation of their anti-Soviet Munich policy. Precisely the opposite was the case, that is, the "odd war" has contradicted the will of the working masses which, during all its duration, have fought to change the character and the direction of the war as far as England and France were concerned so that the governments of these countries would break up the policy of the agreement with fascism and would proceed with the fight against it.

In the publication of "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" Stalin has interpreted the first period of the Second World War as the collision of two imperialist coalitions fighting for the markets with the desire to drown their competitors."⁵ Here we have the contradiction between this position and the preceding attempt of Stalin to define the war against Germany as a just war of liberation from the very beginning.

Only after 1956 it was possible to investigate objectively the problems related to the origin and character of the war.

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By freeing themselves from the dogma of the cult of personality, Soviet historians have reverted to the investigation of the whole complex of the problems which were of decisive importance in the Marxist analysis and definition of the war essence, its causes and its character.

On the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Propaganda Bureau attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, have 417 published the thesis in which it was stated that the Second World War has transformed from the "imperialist war" into an anti-fascist war of liberation" ¹ Such a statement has become the initial starting point for any future development regarding the character of the Second World War. In 1957 at the editorial meetings of the magazine "Communist" and in the historical section for the Great Patriotic War at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, a number of specific steps were undertaken to elucidate objectively this whole question.

In a number of articles and brochures of the Soviet writers published in 1958-1964, ² the concept is convincingly entertained that the "odd war," as far as the governments of England and France were concerned, meant the continuation of their Munich policy using different means. The first stage of the Second World War was represented as a collision between two imperialist groups, each of which has pursued its own egotistic goals. The Soviet historians have shown that the reactionary imperialist character of the war, as far as the fascist countries were concerned, has continued and has remained the same and even become more accentuated, especially after the attack of Germany on the USSR. But the character of the war as far as the opponents of Germany were concerned has begun to change. From the second half of 1940, as a result of the increasing struggle of the people for their national independence and against fascism, the war began gradually to transform into an anti-fascist war of liberation. This process was completed as the Soviet Union

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entered the war.

In precisely such a fashion the question regarding the character of the Second World War is elucidated in the "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945."

The causes and character of the Second World War have begun to be analyzed in greater detail in some other publications of the war history, in the special studies investigating specific problems associated with the first period of the Second World War and also in the studies devoted to the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

To summarize then, the Soviet historical science, on the basis of an analysis in depth of all phenomena associated with the Second World War, and the circumstances in which it took place, has given the Marxist-Leninist answer to the question as to its origin and its character. This in turn has made it possible to elucidate correctly a number of other questions related to the history of the Second World War and in particular, of its main part which was the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.

WARTIME ECONOMY OF THE USSR

The process of reshaping the national economy of the country to put it on a war footing and the economic development have been described during the wartime in the periodic press. The well known representatives of the party, the leaders of commissariats, the well known representatives of the national economy, the innovators in production, and the scientists - economists, historians, the representatives of the technical and natural sciences as well as the writers, have been featured in our newspapers and magazines with appropriate articles, comments and opinions on economic subject matters. As a result of this work,

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day by day, bit by bit, the chronicle of current events and happenings has been created.

The newspaper and magazine publications of the wartime contain a rich factual material which even at the present time is quite invaluable for the study of work in the rear lines and the development of the wartime economy. These publications written in "hot pursuit" of the events retain the sensation of real times, adding precious bits of experiences of the national economy in the time of a severe test. But their operative character naturally made it impossible for the authors to make the generalized reviews in depth. But the practical interests of the national economy which had been expanding each day as the Soviet territory was liberated from the German-fascist invaders, made such generalized reviews mandatory, calling for a theoretical approach in developing the questions of economics. In conjunction with this, and after the presentation of the State Plan of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks made the decision on April 3, 1944, to reestablish the edition of the magazine "Planned Economy" which had been interrupted in September, 1941. One of the main tasks of this magazine involved the development of "questions related to the socialist economy and technology, and in particular the questions of military economics and reconstruction of the economy."

The very first issues of the magazine "Planned Economy" of 1944 contained articles which have responded in all essence to the outlined program.³ These articles written primarily by the

functionaries of the State Plan of the USSR, by well known scientists and by the leaders of the national institutions make it possible, to some degree, to trace out the organization of the wartime economy and practical realization of the military and economic plans concerning almost all the most important branches of the national economy. The articles have presented the experience

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of the reconstruction in specific branches of the national economy and in particular, the organization of rearmament production.

The article of G. Kosyachenko is of particular interest, appearing in the first issue of the magazine "Planned Economy" in 1944. For the first time in this article an attempt was made to produce a well-founded economic base as applied to the concept of "well tuned military economy."¹ The author considers the basic economic factors which, in their totality, represent a well tuned military economy. The most important factors, he believed, should first of all be a high growth rate of heavy industry, on the basis of which the military production should be developed.

A more detailed description as to how to create a cohesive military economy was presented in the brochure by B. Sukharevskiy which appeared at the end of the war.²

After the war it was necessary to summarize theoretically the experiences of the socialist economy of the wartime and to disclose the reasons of the economic victory of the Soviet people.

A first large effort, a lucid and unique publication, was the book of one of the outstanding representatives of the Communist Party and of the Soviet state, N. A. Voznesenskiy, "The Wartime Economy of the USSR During the Time Period of the Patriotic War."³ It is noteworthy that the author does not restrain himself within a narrow framework of a special economic study, but makes use of the extensive factual material and clear examples in order to show the greatness of the work effort exerted by the working masses behind the front lines and led by the Communist Party and the scope of the organizing activity of the Central Committee and of the Soviet government in creating a cohesive military economy. The scientific value of the book lies in the fact that the author analyzes the

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concrete facts making use of a broad historical background and makes theoretical conclusions substantiated by extensive statistical data. This effort of the writer must be emphasized in particular because during the Stalin cult of personality, as is well known, the economic publications were totally separated from the concrete practical aspects of the national economic reconstruction period.

By analyzing in depth the course of the restructuring of the whole national economy and its specific branches, N. A. Vosnesenskiy has unfolded for the first time in the Soviet scientific press the specific features of the wartime economy. By retaining all its inherent advantages of the socialist system of economy as compared to the capitalist one, the author writes, "the wartime economy of the USSR is characterized by unique economic factors and set rules in the area of production and distribution."⁴

The concluding chapter of the book is devoted to the postwar socialist economy. N. A. Voznesenskiy points out that the advantages of the socialist system in the economy made it possible to proceed from the wartime economy to the peacetime economy without any crises and depressions, enabling the country to convert, in a well planned manner, the wartime economy to the peacetime needs.

The specific feature of the work of N. A. Voznesenskiy, which advantageously separates it from the majority of the economic studies of that time period, is the summation of an extensive factual information as well as the new statistical material which is treated scientifically and presented in a clear and convincing form. However, the book also contains some erroneous postulates advanced on Stalin's instructions, who, after reviewing the manuscript, introduced several addenda which did not correspond to the historical truth.

On the whole, the book of N. A. Voznesenskiy represents a

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serious contribution to the study of the national economy of the USSR during the time period of the Great Patriotic War. It justifiably is rated very highly and positively in an extensive circle of readers. However, the tragic fate of the author who, during the cult of Stalin was sacrificed as a result of some unfounded accusations, has been tragically reflected in the fate of the book - it has been taken off the shelf. This has retarded the investigative work in the domain of the wartime economy for several years.

There were two other publications appearing shortly after the publication of the book by N. A. Voznesenskiy, one by Ye. A. Granovskiy, "The Soviet Industry During the Great Patriotic War" and another one by P. A. Belov, "The Questions of Economy During the Contemporary War." Both of these books were primarily based on the book by N. A. Voznesenskiy and did not contain any new factual material or statistical data. These monographs are not free from the erroneous evaluations of the wartime economy which were the result of Stalin's cult of personality. In these two books the role of Stalin as an organizer of the wartime economy has been unjustifiably exaggerated, although during the course of the whole war, in all speeches and orders, Stalin touched upon the questions of economy only obliquely and in a most general form. /419

One of the first publications in which the questions related to the evacuation of the industrial enterprises is being considered, was the book by L. M. Kantor, "Industrial Base Transfer in the USSR."¹ Unfortunately, this book which is full of some new archive data, was published in an incomplete form.

Among large publications, particular attention is due to a substantial work by G. D. Bakulev, "Development of the Coal Industry in Donets Basin"² in which the author considers the specific branches of the economy. A considerable section of the fourth chapter in the book is devoted to the coal industry and the wartime reconstruction in the Donets Basin. The author reviews the fuel problem within the

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framework of the wartime economy as a whole and presents a rather complete characterization and discussion of the economic importance of all major coal basins in the country.

The decisions of the XX Congress of the USSR and the subsequent activity of the Party attempting to overcome the results of the cult of personality of Stalin, have brought about a favorable climate for the development of the studies associated with the wartime economy.

Beginning from the second half of the 50s, appreciable attention has been devoted to the studies related to the wartime economy. The fundamental work of P. I. Lyashchenko, "History of the National Economy of the USSR,"³ has one whole chapter devoted to the wartime economy. In a number of studies the economic questions related to the time period of the war are considered at this time from a much broader point of view than before. Due to the fact that the historians were able to utilize the documents from the sources of the central and regional archives which previously had been off limits, the historical base in these new studies has been expanded.

During a comparatively short time period the questions related to the wartime economy have been described in several large collective studies of a general nature, in the monographs and articles of several historians and economists.⁴ The attempt to combine the experience of the national reconstruction during the wartime has been undertaken by G. I. Shigalin in his book "National Economy of the USSR During the Great Patriotic War"⁵ and G. S. Kravchenko in his "Wartime Economy in the USSR, 1941-1945."⁶

The book of G. I. Shigalin is saturated with the numbers and tables extracted from many articles which were published at different time periods in the periodic press. By not taking care to

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verify the reliability and making use haphazardly of the statistical material, the author has published an immature compilation of the material in which independent thought is absent. The scientific circles have justifiably criticized the book quite severely.

G. S. Kravchenko has attempted to trace out the state of the wartime production during all stages of the war. The need of such a study in investigating the history and development of the wartime economy is beyond any doubt. However, the term wartime economy implies not only the military production but also the totality of all branches of the national economy - industry, agriculture, transportation and communication and trade, all of which were serving the front needs, and also the organization of supplies to the military and to the population behind the front lines. However, the author, while devoting considerable attention to the the problem of heavy industry and transportation, barely touches upon the questions of agriculture, let alone the other aspects of the economic life of the country. Everything which refers in the book to the description of non-military production and transportation has no independent scientific meaning. The bulk of the archive data presented in this book in relation to these questions has already been published previously by other writers in the multivolume edition of "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" which, unfortunately has not been spelled out by G. S. Kravchenko. The book makes use for the second time of the foreign sources, too.

G. S. Kravchenko just as P. A. Belov, divides the development of the economy of wartime into two periods. The first period, in the opinion of G. S. Kravchenko ends at the end of the first six months of 1942 and the second period covers the remaining three years of the war. Such an assignment of the time period the author bases on the fact that during the first period, the necessary reshaping of the whole national economy on the war footing was taking place, and during the second period we are witnessing the gradual

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development of already well atuned military economy of the country.⁷ One could hardly agree that the reconstruction of the industry on a war footing completes the creation of a cohesive war economy. This would require time and in addition, the task of this nature was coupled to the tremendous difficulties associated with the new 1420 advances of the German-fascist armies during the summer and fall of 1942.

P. A. Belov subdivides the development of the wartime economy into two periods based on the dynamics of the GNP. In his opinion, "one detects in such dynamics two separate periods, one - from the beginning of the war to 1943 and the second one - from 1943 to the victorious end of the war."¹ P. A. Belov bases his opinion on a well known conclusion of N. A. Voznesenskiy in that in 1943 there was a temporary break in the GNP balance which was reflected in particular in the growth of the national production as compared to 1942 in the presence of an absolute increase in consumption accrual and military expenditures.²

It must be pointed out that generally speaking, the questions related to the time periods associated with the development of the wartime economy have not been developed in depth, neither in the economic nor historical publications.

The chronological compilation of the most important events in the economic life of the Soviet Union in 1941-1945 edited by the "Soviet Encyclopedia" in 1961,³ must be rated quite highly. It was a useful effort and one must merely regret that the individuals involved in the data compilation have made use, in some cases, of information sources which were not completely reliable (in terms of accuracy of dates and facts).

Among the publications wholly devoted to the development of the specific branches of the national economy during the wartime one

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must single out the book which is one of a kind by N. P. Lipatov, "Non-Ferrous Metallurgy of the Urals During the Years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)."⁴ This book considers only the questions related to the capital investment in the construction of the non-ferrous metallurgical enterprises in the Ural region during the wartime. This narrows somewhat the scale of the study but at the same time it enables the author to concentrate his attention on such an important area of the economic activity of the Soviet state as capital construction, which in historical publications related to the wartime economy is very lightly touched upon.

The book by N. P. Lipatov gives a clear picture as to the tremendous efforts which have been made by the Party and by the Soviet people to create and activate within the time span unthinkable, even in peacetime, the giants of the non-ferrous industry - the blast furnace^{No. 5} in Magnitogorsk which is the largest one in Europe, Chelyabinsk steel works and some others, all of which was done during the acute shortage of construction materials, of equipment and of qualified personnel. The author has shown quite convincingly how the Soviet people, by overcoming the tremendous difficulties, had firmly and steadfastly realized the program developed by the Party in creating the military-industrial base in the eastern part of the country. The book contains a huge amount of factual material incorporating for the first time a large amount of information from the archives which is then scientifically treated. At the same time, one can not disagree with the fact that, as stated in the magazine "History of the USSR," "the material accumulated by the author made it possible to draw a larger number of extensive generalizations and conclusions."⁵ Nonetheless, on the whole this book is an example of a meticulous and persistent investigative work.

One should also mention the book by A. V. Mitrofanova, "The Working Class of the Soviet Union in the First Period of the Great Patriotic War."⁶ On the basis of an extensive material, the author

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shows the tremendous effort expended by the Communist Party and by the Soviet government to procure for industry the necessary personnel and to train them within the framework of the production line work and operational reserves. Such chapters as "Changes in the Composition of the Working Class in the USSR in 1941-1942" and "Political Growth and Productivity Increase Achieved by the Working Class in 1941-1942" are a significant contribution to the Soviet geographic history related to the questions of the work behind the front lines. The detailed analysis of the statistical material procured from the archives of the Central Bureau of Working Reserves, the Central Archives of the All-Union Central Party Proceedings and the archives of the specific industrial ministries, are of great scientific interest. On the basis of this material, the mobilization of the population in 1942 was shown as well as the distribution of the mobilized personnel among the most important branches of industry.

The process of preparing the new working cadres is correlated in the book by A. V. Mitrofanova with the struggle to increase productivity. But in order to analyze fully all these problems the author should have also reviewed the questions related to the turnover of the personnel, since in not doing this "one can not obtain a complete picture of the situation of the working masses during the wartime."⁷

Among the studies of the same subjects one should mention the articles by V. B. Tel'pukhovskiy, "Ensuring the Availability to Industry of the Working Personnel During the First Period of the Great Patriotic War"⁸ and "Changes in the Composition of the Industrial Working Personnel in the USSR During the Great Patriotic War."⁹ The statistical data presented in the second article supplements the exposure of the problems touched upon in the book by A. V. Mitrofanova, but the size of the article made it impossible to analyze all aspects of the interesting figures and data.

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In the book by G. G. Morekhina, "The Working Class - To The Front" there is a special chapter devoted to the preparation of the cadres or qualified personnel. Although the book embraces the whole time period of the war, the author limits her studies essentially to the years 1941-1942. As the initial material for the statistical analysis, some data from the book by N. A. Voznesenskiy is being used as well as some other works by the authors mentioned above. The problem of preparing the working cadres during the years of the Great Patriotic War occupies the central place in the book "The Working Class - To The Front." But the idea of the writing, as the author mentions herself in the Preface, is broader, namely to show the great deed of the working class during the wartime in all its greatness. Unfortunately, this idea which should be applauded has not been completely realized by G. G. Morekhina. Compared to the material previously published, there is no new up-to-date and interesting actual material or any principally different conclusions to be found in this book.

In addition, the questions related to the preparation of the work force to satisfy the national economy during the period of the Great Patriotic War are touched upon in the studies devoted to the glorious deeds of the working class. The books published based on the archives of the allied and autonomous republics, as well as the specific regional areas, are of particular interest.¹ These books show the specific features of the economic development in each particular republic or region, the activity of the Party in preparing and educating the national cadres in the industry, transport area and in agriculture. The concrete material used in these publications unfolds the deep lying origins of the unalterable brotherhood and friendship between the people of the Soviet Union which have been forcefully manifested in the effort to create a cohesive military economy.

The questions of mobilization, the proper utilization, teaching and utilization of labor resources do not exhaust the whole

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problem of the cadres during the wartime. Its other aspect which is not less important, is the political and labor education of the newly arriving production workers. The most extraordinary school in educating the Soviet people, both in peacetime and wartime, was the mass participation of the workers in all branches of the national economy, in the socialist competition. The All-Union socialist competition which commenced in 1942 has embraced, by the year 1944, more than 80% of the industrial and transport workers.²

The Soviet historical publications so far have no significant books regarding the All-Union socialist competition. Among the specialized studies published on this subject one might cite the article by S. R. Gershberg, "All-Union Socialist Competition Among the Industrial Workers in 1942."³

The publications appearing in recent time on this subject matter indicate that the research is being developed in the right direction. The various rich forms acquired during the All-Union socialist competition during the wartime are being considered here in interaction with the concrete production tasks with which the workers in all branches of the national economy were faced.

In the digest of articles, "Communist Party - The Inspirer And Organizer Of The National Socialist Competition In The USSR"⁴ a serious attempt is made to show the meaning of the All-Union socialist competition in the life of the Soviet society and an attempt is being made to understand the specific features of this movement in conjunction with the requirements of the wartime. The digest, "In Labor As In Combat,"⁵ prepared by the Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, USSR, and by the Museum of Revolution, the reminiscences of the organizers and members of the front brigades are being presented. In 1962 the State Political Press issued an interesting, in content and conception, digest "Guard of the Rear Lines"⁶ in which a number of reminiscences of workers in different branches of the national economy have been collated.

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Unfortunately, so far our historical literature does not have too many digests of such a type. The development of the memoir publications regarding the labors behind the front line have significantly expanded the historical base of the Soviet geographic history and in particular in reference to the questions of organization and planning of the production during the wartime, the evacuation of the industry and agriculture, the capital construction within specific branches of the national economy, etc. The need in having such materials can be shown at least by the fact that the development of numerous questions related to the wartime economy has just begun. This refers, for example, to the questions regarding the evacuation and reestablishment of the evacuated enterprises at new sites, the events which are considered only in isolated articles.⁷

Practically speaking, the only publication devoted to the 422 evacuation of the material resources of agriculture in the initial period of the war, is the article by M. B. Pogrebinskiy which appeared in 1959.¹ Utilizing the abundant archives, the author shows the gigantic effort undertaken by the Party organization in the Ukraine, associated with the evacuation of the collective farms, State-owned farms and Motorized Tractor Pools and the exceptional role played by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, which has been played in solving this task.

Generally speaking, the Soviet historical and economic literature devotes much less time to agriculture than in the case of industry. The small brochures printed during the war and soon after its end regarding the specific collective farms and state-owned farms are primarily of a descriptive nature.² The publications containing an analysis and summary of some of the processes in the agriculture of the wartime are represented predominantly by the articles of specific historians which have been published in the scientific digests and historical magazines,³ by the small

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brochures and some sections of the collective publications.⁴ Quite recently the Soviet historical science has been enriched by serious study of Yu. V. Arutyunyan, "The Soviet Peasantry in the Years of the Great Patriotic War."⁵ For the first time this subject has appeared in the form of book.

Subjecting to a valid criticism the attempt of some writers to make the actual situation in the countryside during the wartime look rather pretty, A. V. Arutyunyan writes as follows: "The main shortcoming of these studies consist in the fact that even up to now they are still propagating the standard and incorrect concepts which took hold in literature at the wartime. The war which is the greatest national calamity looks, in many of these studies, almost as a benevolent event in agriculture. One might think that all problems associated with the increase of productivity, the problems in which our party is involved up to the present days, had already been successfully resolved at that time." Further, the author points out as follows: "The origin of such concepts is quite apparent. For reasons quite understandable during wartime the attention was not concentrated on the difficult situation of the agriculture. The press, more often than not, cited the example of the extremely successful development in the economics of the collective farms, expansion of production and increase of productivity. In the postwar years, at the time of the cult of personality, one could not expect that these concepts will be reviewed."⁶ In explaining the cause why such old concepts are still viable, the basis of which is the attempt to make the actual situation look pretty, the author writes, "...lies in the fact that quite frequently we are continuing to equate the working effort of the peasantry and the results obtained in the development of agriculture. One senses that it is as if we are afraid that the recognition of the serious lagging of agriculture will to some degree belittle the work efforts of the peasants and its contribution to victory. In reality, the collective farm workers need no such 'support'."⁷

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The author, of course, is right in the sense that to show the shortcomings in the work of the agriculture and the negative aspects appearing in the life of the soviet farm during the war-time would by no means belittle the great historical role which had been played by the collective farms in achieving military and economic victory over fascist Germany by the Soviet Union. The book contains some postulates which may be argued. For example, the author subjects to a doubt the tendency at that time to expand the arable lands in the eastern regions. It is known, however, that this was due first of all to the tremendous losses of the territory and the actual situation which had been created at that time at the front line.⁸ There are also several deficiencies in the analysis of some of the theoretical positions contained in the book by N. A. Voznesenskiy. The claim of the author that the "action of the laws for expanded production was circumscribed primarily by the military production"¹ is not substantiated in the /423 theoretical sense since the military production under all circumstances takes no part in agricultural production. On the whole, the publication of Yu. V. Arutyunyan is an original study of the social and economic problems on the Soviet farm. As has been properly pointed out in the review by V. M. Selunskaya, the book not only summarizes the studies on this subject matter, but also is a great step forward in developing the whole question, it poses and answers new questions, it attracts attention to the new types of sources and recommends methodology to be used in working with statistical materials.²

The Soviet geographic history depicts rather weakly the transportation problem and its role during the Great Patriotic War. The majority of publications on this subject available to the popular reader are predominantly of descriptive character. The actual material contained in these publications is excerpted from the newspapers and magazines. The role of railroad transportation workers

is shown better than any other and the role of some other types of transport have hardly been touched upon. A number of studies have appeared within recent years which are devoted to the activity of transportation along the waterways.³ These studies however can not supplement the existing breach.

The brochure of former minister of transportation, I. V. Kovalev, gives a general review in the development of the Soviet railroad transportation during the last 30 years, but the whole wartime period is presented extremely briefly and schematically.⁴ In his small brochure issued in 1943, as well as in a somewhat later work issued in 1945, T. S. Khachaturov⁵ considers the basic problems of the railroad transportation during the wartime. He devotes, however, little attention to the fact that in addition to the objective reasons which made the work of the railroads difficult, the significant drawbacks and shortcomings tolerated at that time by the former People's Commissar of Transportation, L. M. Kaganovich, also had a negative effect. This was precisely the reason why L. M. Kaganovich had been replaced from the position of People's Commissar (in 1942 and 1944) by the decision of the State Defense Committee.

The academician V. N. Abramtsov in his studies has investigated the most important questions related to the operation of the railroads and its role in servicing the front and rear lines.⁶ The publication in 1963 of a book by a young researcher, G. A. Kumanev, shows that the interest of Soviet historians in the problems of the railroad transportation has not abated, even at this time.⁷ The book written on the basis of rich archive material, discloses the greatness of the efforts exerted by the railroad men, convincingly substantiating the well-known position of V. I. Lenin in that, without the railroads, the "modern war is just an empty phrase."⁸

The analysis conducted by the author describing the changes in the composition and preparation of the transportation cadres during

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the wartime is a significant contribution to the study of the processes involved in the cultural and technical growth of one of the most advanced and steadfast groups of the working class in the Soviet Union.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC AND SECOND WORLD WAR

The study of the military experience of the Soviet Armed Forces had begun already during the Great Patriotic War. The foundation of our successes in the armed forces was the critical selection of everything which was valuable in terms of military art. The special sections and groups were formed within the staffs of the armies and of the fronts which were charged with the study and general summation of the war experiences. On the basis of the army and front reports, the General Staff created the operational and tactical resumes. In spite of the specifically military character, some of them have been available to an extensive number of ordinary readers.⁹ The military academies also have carried out significant work in the study of the 424 military activity. The academies have published manuals which were distributed during the lectures and seminars regarding the most important operations and campaigns on the Soviet-German front and also on the other battlefields of the Second World War. All military and social and political periodic publications have regularly published articles and materials regarding the Great Patriotic War. The most valuable articles were printed in the magazines "Military Thought" and "Military Digest."

Extremely valuable actual material regarding the military activity was compiled by the commission attached to the Academy of Sciences, USSR, which was created in December 1941. This commission chaired by I. I. Mints has compiled the materials regarding the Patriotic War. The members of the commission have conducted numerous discussions with the soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army who have distinguished themselves in battles. All these discussions were

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transcribed. At a later date, all these materials were transferred by the commission to the manuscript section of the Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, USSR.

Taking into account the great significance of the military subject matters, the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, had created in December, 1943, under the auspices of the Institute of History, the military and historical section which was comprised of two groups - the history of the army and history of the navy.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, in spite of the difficulties in developing the military and theoretical, as well as the military and historical problems associated with the effects of the cult of personality (prior to the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR), the study and accumulation of war experiences has continued. At that time period the historians investigated first of all the theory of the military art, primarily of the operational art and of tactics. Just as in the wartime, the specific military operations were studied, but in this case much more extensive material was relied upon.¹ On the pages of the military magazines the articles of critical nature began to appear, describing the causes of the unsuccessful action of some Soviet forces during some operations, which have not been finished. This criticism, however, was at that time quite timid and one sided. The articles aired only the errors of the intermediate and lower commanding personnel without any critical analysis of the actions related to the work in the General Staff of the Red Army and the Supreme Command Headquarters. After the war several books were published in which the military action of the Red Army was considered as a whole.² But they were of popular character and were written under the strong influence of the cult of personality, and Stalin's book "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union." The Second Edition of the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" has incorporated more than 100 articles about the Great Patriotic War. The following extensive articles were of greatest interest: "Moscow Battle 1941-1942,"

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"Defense of Leningrad 1941-1943," "Defense of Odessa 1941," "Defense of Sevastopol 1941-1942," "Battle of Stalingrad 1942-1943," "Leningrad Blockade Breakthrough 1943," "Caucasus During the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945," "Battle of Kursk 1943," "Byelorussian Operation 1944," "Berlin Operation 1945," "Soviet-Japanese War 1945." Many articles contain extensive factual material. Some articles describe for the first time the military operations. However, the serious drawback of almost all military articles found in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia prior to the XX Congress of the Party was the fact that they were only weakly connected with the internal and external policies of the Soviet Union. One could detect in them a strong influence of Stalin's cult of personality. This particularly refers to the article "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945."

The first attempt to combine and describe the military activity and operations behind the front lines during the Patriotic War based on the published sources, was undertaken in the book "History Essays of The Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)."³ The book has summarized in a scientific and popular form all information accumulated during the ten year period since the end of the war but has retained the drawback inherent in the geographic history at this first stage, and therefore has been subjected to justified criticism. The reviews have pointed out that the "Essays" disclose only superficially the general situation and depict in a simplified manner the conditions at the beginning of the war, not showing the difficulties of the war to a sufficient degree, and the tremendous efforts and sacrifices born by the soviet people and its armies which were needed to destroy the enemy.

The whole series of operational and tactical essays published prior to 1956 make it possible to elucidate the specific features which were inherent in the military and historical studies of that time: the absence of a full and objective description of the first 425 period of the war, complete silence in regards to specific errors

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in planning and conducting specific operations which did not correspond to the historic realities of the war time periods, the characteristic for that time period formulations and postulates. All these features have been manifested most vividly in the four-volume historical materials on military art during the time of the Great Patriotic War prepared by K. Voroshilov Main Military Academy. This publication contains excerpts from the books, brochures, magazine articles, lectures and articles found in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia.

After the XX and XXII Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the Soviet military historians reverted back to the facts and documents, and using concrete materials, began to describe the specific steps associated with the victory of the soviet people, the decisive role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in organizing the armed forces and exerting leadership in their action and began actively to denounce the bourgeois falsifiers of the history of the Second World War. There were several summary publications in regard to the history of the military action during the Great Patriotic War and a publication devoted to the largest military operations. In all these publications, the military struggle is being investigated in close conjunction with the work behind the front lines, convincingly showing the role of the masses being led by the Communist Party and resulting in the victory.

In 1956 a digest of articles "The Most Important Operations of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945"² made its appearance. The main emphasis here was devoted to the questions of strategy and operational skills associated with the preparation and realization of the most important operations of the Red Army. After considering each operation, the conclusions regarding the military art are being made, emphasizing the specific moments in the military activity of the Soviet armed forces which are to be remembered. The drawback of this publication is its descriptive character.

The digest does not disclose the causes of the temporary

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misfortunes of the Soviet armed forces during the first period of the war and also the specifics and lessons of this time period. There are no conclusions regarding the importance of the experience in war. The digest at the same time is not free of the shortcomings inherent in the literature during the first stage in the development of the Soviet geographic history of the war.

In terms of the subject matter, the study prepared by the military historical section of the Military and Scientific Bureau of the General Staff,³ is quite similar to the digest mentioned above. The main task of its authors was to show the basic and the most characteristic features of military art, with the background, giving a brief military and historical description of the most important events occurring during the Great Patriot War. This publication describes the improvement in the organizational methods and in the conduct of the military combat by small and large units of the Red Army and also the means and methods used to alleviate the basic shortcomings in this area in the course of the war, and in particular during its first period. This book does not have many deficiencies which were inherent in the preceding digest. By describing objectively the causes of misfortunes of the Red Army during the first period of the war, the authors describe the following combat activities using the generally accepted time periods associated with the Great Patriotic War.

Since this edition was directed primarily at the military reader and the tasks set out to be achieved, one might add, did not require anything else, the part of the book describing the activity behind the front line appears to be somewhat meagre.

Among the publications describing the military combat as a whole, one should single out the collective work of the military historians, "The Second World War 1939-1945" edited by S. P. Platonov, N. G. Pavlenko and I. V. Parot'kin.⁴ The authors have set out to produce a brief military and historical essay of the Second

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World War. Using concrete facts they show the preparation of fascist Germany on the road to aggression against the Soviet Union, evaluate the character of the Second World War and its main stages and define extensively the course of military activities on all fronts and theatres of war. Naturally, particular attention has been devoted to the main front of the struggle, the Soviet-German front.

The publication discloses the causes of the misfortunes of the Soviet armed forces at the beginning of the war, it analyzes the most important operations of the Soviet armed forces, including the battles near Moscow, on the Volga River and at Kursk. The military operations of the American and English armed forces are also being considered. On the basis of documents the scope and intensity of the battles which were undertaken by our armed forces at all stages of the Great Patriotic War have been extensively described. The authors convincingly prove that the Soviet-German front was the decisive front of the whole Second World War and that the Soviet Union played the main role in defeating fascist Germany and its allies. The book describes in detail the liberation mission of the Red Army which saved humanity from fascist enslavement.

The main advantage of this publication is the fact that it investigates the development of the Soviet military art. In parallel with the description of the course of the war, the authors show the development, means and methods of the military struggle, the improvements in the organization of the military forces and the methods used to control them. At the end of the book the authors present the military and political results of the Second World War and the conclusions regarding the development of the strategy, operational art and tactics of the Soviet armed forces. In addition, some features of the military art of capitalist countries participating in the Second World War are also being considered.

However, this publication also is not free from some shortcomings.

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The authors do not disclose fully the planning of the military operations of the Soviet armed forces and do not show that the plans leading to the destruction of the German-fascist armed forces in all the largest battles were the results of the collective work. 1426
The book characterizes only superficially the joint military action of the air force and of the navy, although during almost all large strategic operations involving our armed forces a close cooperation of the different branches of the armed forces was quite characteristic. The battles leading to the liberation of the western part of Ukraine and the Berlin operation are described very briefly and incompletely. Nonetheless, in spite of the existence of these shortcomings, this work represents a considerable contribution to the scientific development of the history of the Great Patriotic War.

In 1959 a book was published by B. S. Tel'pukhovskiy, "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945."¹ On the basis of some published sources and new archive materials, the author produces a much more objective evaluation of many events of the Great Patriotic War compared to other researchers who have considered all these questions during the first stage in the development of the geographic history of the war. The praiseworthy deed of the author also lies in the fact that in addition to the military activity he describes the work behind the front lines, the struggle of the Soviet guerillas behind the enemy lines and shows the leading role which the Communist Party played in organizing the destruction of fascist Germany. The book also touches upon the questions related to the strategic planning of the military action by the Supreme Headquarters. This publication, however, contains several arguable and erroneous positions which are characteristic for the geographic history in its first developmental stage.

In 1960 a book was published with the title "The Military Road of the Soviet Armed Forces,"² which bears the collective authorship

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generated by M. V. Frunze Military Academy. Its main part is devoted to the description of the military action of the Soviet armed forces during the Great Patriotic War. This book should be cited among the number of studies in which the aftermath of the cult of personality is reflected in the geographic history of the Patriotic War. The military and historical analysis is substituted by declarative phraseology.

The Soviet military historians are thoroughly investigating the questions of military art. The book "Development of Tactics in The Soviet Army During the Great Patriotic War"³ is devoted to this subject matter. This book also bears the collective authorship and its origin is M. V. Frunze Military Academy. By analyzing the concrete historical material, primarily the military action of the rifle divisions and corps, the book investigates the most important questions related to the development of tactics used by the military in the battles of advancing or retreating nature. In considering the whole totality of the factors affecting the development of tactics by the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, the authors devote particular attention to the individual, describing the importance of the military experience of the soldiers and of the officers and correlating the theory of military art with actual practice of combat. Unfortunately, the book does not disclose to a sufficient degree the relationship between tactics and operational art and also the analysis in depth of the tactical operations of the German-fascist armed forces is absent.

The important collective works published, "Military Strategy"⁴ and "History of the Military Art"⁵ have supplemented to a considerable degree the investigation of the questions related to the development of the military art during the wartime.

In the collective publication "Military Strategy" prepared by a group of military historians with the chief editor being Marshal

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of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, all the most important questions of strategy are considered, with a brief description of the general state and development of the Soviet military strategy.

The section "Soviet Military Strategy in the Years of the Great Patriotic War" emphasizes that during the war and in parallel with the development of the Soviet military art as a whole, its main thrust -the strategy has been developed and improved and this has been reflected first of all in the area of organization and in the conduct of strategic advances. The book reviews the strategic utilization of several types of armed forces during the war. By investigating concrete examples from the history of the Patriotic War, the study points out that the victory in war may be achieved only by the joint efforts of all the branches of the armed forces. At the same time, during the past war, the role and importance of a specific branch of the armed forces, its type and consequently its specific weight among the armed forces was not inflexible. The specific weight depended on our military and economic potentialities, on the development of science and technology and on the tasks which the armed forces had to fulfill.

The publication of the second volume of the "History of Military Art" prepared by the collective of teachers at the Academy of Armor and edited by the Grand Marshal of Armor P. A. Rotmistrov, is a considerable contribution to the description of the general course of the military struggle during the Second World War from the point of view of the development of military art. The book reviews the military art during the whole period of the Second World War. A large section of it is devoted to the description of the military art of the Soviet armed forces, but the objective analysis of the military art of the major capitalist countries is also presented.

During the second stage of the development of the geographic history of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet historians have continued to study the specific operations of the Soviet armed forces,

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the role during the war of various types of armed forces and some other concrete questions related to the military activity.

Attention is being drawn in particular to the appearance of the studies which are specifically devoted to the first period of 1941 Patriotic War. Nowadays one finds that this subject matter is being aired more extensively in the publications of a general type. The objective analysis of the causes resulting in the misfortunes of the Soviet armed forces is contained in a number of articles published in the historical and special military magazines.

The military and historical assay of the war events commencing on June 22 to the middle of July 1941 is presented in the book by V. A. Anfilov.¹ On the basis of studies already published and of some archive investigations the author reviews in detail a brief, in terms of time, but the most tragic period of the war. V. A. Anfilov sets out a goal to describe the military activity during the first days of the war, to show the steadfastness, persistence and mass heroic action of the soviet warriors and to uncover the causes of our misfortunes. In analyzing the state of the armed forces at the beginning of the war in the regions adjoining the boundaries of our country, the author points out that they were not prepared to repulse the first strike of the enemy.² However V. A. Anfilov points out the German-fascist command was unable in the initial period of the war to achieve completely its strategic goals. They did not succeed in destroying the Soviet armed forces to the west of the border rivers Western Dvina and Dniepr. If one is to take into account the rather unfavorable conditions when the Great Patriotic War was begun, the results of the military struggle were not all that bad for the Red Army. It proved the inordinate firmness and heroism of the soviet people and their capacity not only to stop the fascist armed forces, but also to destroy them.³

The battle near Moscow which took place in an extremely difficult situation as far as our country was concerned, has been reflected in

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many articles and investigations, but up to the present time this extensive subject has not been described with the necessary scientific depth.

In 1958 a publication by A. M. Samsonov made an appearance in which, on the basis of already published literature and archives, the battle near Moscow is being described in a scientific and popular form.⁴ The collective publication "Great Battle Near Moscow," prepared by the Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, USSR, unfolds this subject in greater detail.⁵ Using the documented materials and literary sources, the authors review the military action in the direction of Moscow, describing the role played by the Soviet people behind the front line, resulting in victory at Moscow. It also describes the activity of Moscow Party organizations and the selfless struggle of the Muscovites.

During the twentieth anniversary of the destruction of the fascist armed forces at Leningrad, a military and historical work was published, "The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944."⁶ The book recreates the general picture of the participation of the Soviet people in one of the greatest battles of the past war. Precisely near Leningrad, the heroic armed forces of the Northern (Leningrad at a later time) and North-West fronts and of a separate 7th Army, for the first time in the course of the developing war with Nazi Germany have stopped the Hitler forces and the army of Finland, have exhausted and bled the best divisions of the German-fascist army group "North" at the approaches to Leningrad and have forced the enemy to revert to defensive action. The authors review in detail the military struggle at the Leningrad front and describe its effect on the outcome of the battles at some other sectors of the front. The book shows the leading role of the Communist Party and in particular of the Leningrad Party organization which was played in defense of the city and the invaluable help given by the population of Leningrad and of the whole region to the forces of the Red Army.

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Of considerable scientific interest is the historical essay of A. M. Samsonov describing the Stalingrad battle.⁷ The book describes the general course of the defensive action and the counter attack of the soviet forces between the rivers Volga and Don. The book includes many examples of praiseworthy military episodes and great deeds. The main shortcoming of this book is the absence of conclusions and summations regarding military art. Also the role of the Don and the South-Western fronts during the defensive action at the approaches to the Volga is described rather weakly.

The books by I. Markin and F. Selivanov are devoted to the description of the great summer battle in 1943.⁸ In the book by I. Markin the material accumulated by the Soviet historical science during the past 15 years since the battle at Kursk took place, is being collated. The author discloses all stages of this battle, showing in broad terms the mass heroism of the Soviet armed forces. The publication of I. Markin, however, is not free from some erroneous postulates which took root in the historical science in the time period prior to the XX Party Congress. For example, the author underestimates the role of the military Soviets at the army and front level during the Kursk battle. The insufficient familiarity with the documents of the German-fascist command has interfered with the author's correct evaluation of the enemy's intentions during different stages of the battle. The significant drawback of the book is the fact that the Kursk battle is being presented here as an event of purely military nature, having no connection with the general military and political situation at hand.

The publication by M. M. Minasyan reviews the military activity of the Soviet Armed Forces in south-eastern Europe, on the territories of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia.⁹ The author has concentrated all his attention on the events which are chronologically limited by the beginning of the Iași-Kishenev operation and terminates with the liberation of the territory of Hungary by the Red Army (August 20, 1944-April 5, 1945). The military actions

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in this publication are described much more fully than in the studies published earlier (see for example the book by V. A. Matsulenko¹). The author has defined some facts and removed some specific "blank spots" which have existed in the scientific development associated with the events of this period of the war.

The book by Minasyan gives a full description of the operations of the second Ukrainian front and the liberation of Romania and Bulgaria, describing in detail the Debrecen operation of the armed forces of the second Ukrainian front conducted in conjunction with the armed forces of the 4th Ukrainian front and introduces some corrective descriptions of the Iași-Kishenev, Budapest and some other operations. One of the specific features of the Minasyan book consists in the fact that it investigates the operations of the armed forces at the South-East of Europe, coupling them with the political and economic analysis of the warring states. In the book one encounters some statements which would require more precision and some terms which were inherent in the literature of the first stage in the development of the Soviet geographic history related to the Great Patriotic War.

The liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is described in the book by D. M. Proektor.² This book shows the heroic struggle of the Soviet military men who came to assist the Slovak people who had risen and who had initiated the beginning of the expulsion of the German-fascist invaders from Czechoslovakia.

The digest "Soviet Armed Forces in the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Yugoslavia" and the book "Belgrade Operation"³ describe the military activity of the Red Army and the National Army of Liberation of Yugoslavia struggling against the common enemy. The latter publication devotes much more time to show the joint military action of the Soviet and Yugoslav forces on the Yugoslav territory.

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Of a certain value are also the publications describing the military action near Tikhvin, the battles for the Caucasus, for Crimea, Byelorussia, South-Sakhalin, the Kuril Island operation and others.⁴ However, the largest military operations have not been investigated thoroughly enough so far. In particular, there is no fundamental publication devoted to the battle for Berlin.

The military and historical science investigates the combat experience of all kinds of armed forces and types of combat units. The greatest success has been achieved in the study of the combat activities of the Navy. There are several books which have been published describing the military activity of specific fleets during the Great Patriotic War.⁵ Unfortunately, up to the present time, there are no significant studies which would summarize the combat experiences of the Navy as a whole, although the publication of special studies has laid a good foundation to generate such work. This blank space can not be filled by the book issued in 1964, "Combat Road of the Soviet Navy."⁶ This book represents a brief history of the Soviet Navy with particular attention to the period of the Patriotic War.

Among the published works devoted to the military activity of the armored divisions, one should note the publication by P. A. Rotmistrov "Armored Battles at Prokhorovka."⁷ This book not only describes the military actions of the armor but also gives the analysis of the basic questions relating to the operational art of the armor. The author considers theoretical postulates, including such as the role of the large armored groups in combat and the principles of combat application of such groups. The combat encounters of the armor is described quite well, using the documented material, as well as the introduction of reserves, flank action and the interaction during combat of all kinds of armed forces. The publication cites many examples of the initiative and bold action on the part of the soldiers, NCOs and officers.

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A book which was quite needed regarding the military action of the artillery has been written by I. S. Prochko.⁸ One of the chapters in this book is devoted to the artillery during the Great Patriotic War.

The questions of the military use of the Air Force are being considered in the study by I. V. Timokhovich.⁹

On the basis of archives the author shows quite well the preparation and engagement of the Soviet Air Force in the combat action, both in the defense and in counterattack, and the heroism of our pilots. I. V. Timokhovich makes valuable conclusions and generalizations regarding the tactics of the Soviet Air Force in the battle of Kursk.

The book "Stars on the Wings"¹ contains a published article by A. I. Pokryshkin, "New Tactics Born in Combat," which tells about the continuous improvement in the combat mastery of the soviet pilots in the course of the war.

The book of Major General I.I. Lisov, "From the Air - Into Combat,"² is dedicated to the airborne landing forces. The main portion of this book is occupied by the description of the heroic action of the paratroopers at Vyaz'ma and at the gathering point beyond the river Dniepr. The author describes in detail the tactics of the paratrooper units during the combat period.

The fighting activity of the combat field engineering units is reflected in the digest "Combat Engineering Units of the Soviet Army in the Most Important Operations of the Great Patriotic War."³ The collective work shows skillfully the character and tasks of the combat engineering units in the course of different stages of the military struggle, and in particular the combat application of such units in all kinds of engagements, in various circumstances and different times of the year.

The combat experience of the communication units is related in the studies by P. D. Kislyakov⁴ and K. M. Plestsov.⁵

Of considerable interest is the book written by the collective group, "Units of the Antiaircraft Defenses of Our Country."⁶ This book contains the information describing the destruction of combat gear and personnel of the enemy by the pilots and the antiaircraft personnel in defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kiev and some other cities.

The book of Ya. Kekalo⁷ is devoted to the combat activity of the antiaircraft personnel. Their heroic deeds are particularly vividly described in the battles at Moscow, at Kursk perimeter, in the advancing operations in 1944 and in the fight for Berlin. It is a pity that the authors do not consider the action of the antiaircraft personnel during such large operations as the battle at the river Volga and describe only superfluously their heroic deeds in fights for Odessa, Kiev, Khar'kov, Voronezh and other cities.

The publications describing different kinds of armed forces and their participation in combat are coupled closely to the publications describing the combat of specific units and military detachments which are of great importance in the study of the combat activity of the Red Army during the wartime. The authors not only consider the questions of tactics and operational art during the war, but, which is particularly important, familiarize the reader with the people who are actually creating the history of those years.⁸ Sometimes the authors investigate the combat activity of one specific unit during one specific operation. For example, S. I. Blinov in analyzing the action of the 60th Army in the Sandomir-Silesian operation in January 1945, shows that by maneuvering the forces in the course of the advance, it was possible to obtain more significant operational results.⁹

The role of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War is

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shown in the studies describing the whole subject in its historical and philosophic aspects. To the publications of this type belong the books by L. Gatovskiy, M. Leont'yev, M. P. Skirido and the collective group of authors of the V. I. Lenin Military-Political Academy.¹⁰ The authors of these publications, in their different ways, describe the importance of the moral factor in war, but all of them claim that the moral factor is the state of the spirit of the combatants, their belief in victory, steadfastness during the combat and their resolution to suffer through all tests and difficulties of the wartime. This moral factor has ensured the advantage of the USSR in its war against Germany, playing an important role in the achievement of victory.

A considerable part of the historical literature regarding the Great Patriotic War belongs to the studies devoted to the heroism of the Soviet people. In terms of its content and form, these studies are quite different. The heroism of the combatants fighting with the enemy was closely related to the heroism of the working people who, by the selfless labors behind the front lines, have been forging the victory. The high moral spirit of our people was clearly manifested in the mass heroism of the soldiers and of the people working behind the front lines. The authors present concrete examples of the heroism of the Soviet people at the front lines and behind the front lines during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The articles and brochures by S. G. Kolesnikov, S. Batishchev, M. Luk'yanov, M. Sverdlin and P. Rogachev analyze the Soviet patriotism.¹¹ Each of these publications discloses the essence of the Soviet patriotism as a patriotism of a new and higher type, based on a deep loyalty to the socialist Fatherland. The authors point out that the patriotism has acquired in our country a truly national character. Using factual material, they show the concrete manifestations of the Soviet patriotism during the war years proving its great effective force.

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However, the publications regarding the role of Soviet patriotism which are quite valuable in terms of its concept, suffer in having significant shortcomings. The authors present very few examples and numerous facts are rewritten from one book into another. The publications by S. G. Kolesnikov and M. P. Skirido suffer particularly in having such shortcomings. The books "Moral and Political Factor in the Modern War" which utilizes new facts obtained from archives differs from the publications mentioned above in an advantageous fashion.¹

There is a large volume of publications regarding the city-heroes. The publications devoted to the inimitable deeds of the workers of the city of Lenin are of considerable interest.² The majority of the authors here were themselves participants of the heroic defense of Leningrad.

The study of the heroic deeds of the Soviet people at the front during the patriotic war occupy an important place in the historical literature.

The authors show the mass heroism of the defenders of the Fatherland which was based on the great conceptual ideas of the Communist Party and on the fact that the purposes in the Patriotic War were noble and just.

The article of Ye. S. Chalik, "The Soviet Army - The Army of Mass Heroism"³ presents an extensive statistical material regarding the military men who received from the Soviet government the orders and medals of the Soviet Union or have been named Heroes of the Soviet Union for their outstanding combat activities during the Patriotic War.

The descriptions of first hand witnesses describing the deeds of the Soviet soldiers are quite important. For example, the publications of memoirs, "The Road of Struggle and Glory,"⁴ "Of Courage,

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Great Deeds and Glory"⁵ and in the publications of "Military Memoirs" series, contain many valuable facts.

Local editions have been printed of a large number of books and brochures dedicated to the deeds of the soldiers of various nationalities. This series, which began to be published already during the wartime, could be called "Our Compatriots."⁶ During the recent years the number of these publications has increased quite considerably.⁷ The books of this series become more meaningful.

The two-volume work "The People of Undying Great Deeds" collates the description of about 104 most distinguished soldiers who were twice the Heroes of the Soviet Union.⁸ The digest "Always in the Military Lineup"⁹ contains the material regarding the soldiers who gave their lives for the freedom of our Fatherland and by the order of the Defense Minister have been placed in perpetuity into 431 the roll call of the military unit in which they served. The commanding officers and their comrades as well as the writers and journalists, most of whom knew personally the fearless combatants, sharing with them the difficulties of military life, personally write about these people.

In order to say a new word regarding the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, a great and thorough effort is required. In search of the heroes, such an effort is always manifested by the writer S. S. Smirnov, who is not only a talented literary man but also a thoughtful researcher of the historical events. He has literally discovered for our nation numerous heroes who fought steadfastly at the front lines and in the rear of the enemy. Due to the publications by S. S. Smirnov, the whole world knows the names of the heroic defenders of the fortress of Brest, the names of numerous soviet people who joined and fought in the ranks of the Resistance Movement in the European countries (F. A. Paletayev and others¹).

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The books, numerous articles and speeches by S. S. Smirnov on radio and TV have awakened in the broad social strata the interest in searching for heroes.

Within recent years historians devote a considerable attention to the studies describing the formation and activity of the volunteer military formations (people's defense units, the battalions for the annihilation of the enemy and the guerilla warfare detachments)² the appearance of which was a clear manifestation of Soviet patriotism.

Publications of the Struggle of the Soviet People Behind the Enemy Front Lines.

The fearless struggle of the soviet people behind the front lines of the fascist invaders is an integral part of the Great Patriotic War. It was unfolding in quite different forms, including the highest one - the guerilla warfare in the rear of the occupation forces. Historical literature so far describes much more extensively the activity of the guerillas and to a lesser degree the other forms of the struggle on the occupied territories.³

The literature describing the guerilla movement discloses the specific ways of its appearance and its national character in the struggle behind the enemy front lines. The mass display of the guerilla movement was the expression of the moral and political unity of the socialist society, of the Soviet patriotism and of the proletarian internationalism of our people and their loyalty to the idea of communism.

The unified purposes of the party and of the people resulted in the tremendous scope of the guerilla movement, its high organizational structure and its purposeful activity. The guerillas and the population comprised a single combat collective, all forces of which were directed toward the active struggle with the occupation forces for the speedy destruction of the enemy and expulsion of

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the enemy beyond the boundaries of our Fatherland. The daily and various assistance rendered to the guerilla combatants by the population has ensured that the fight will be successful. The Soviet authors unmasked the historical falsifications appearing in the reactionary press in the West attempting, in spite of the facts, to place in doubt the role of Soviet patriotism as related to the appearance and development of the guerilla movement in the occupied territories of the USSR.⁴

Our publications convincingly show that the guerilla movement led by the Communist Party was a truly national movement.

The role of the Communist Party in organizing the guerilla movement is described in the historical, party and special types of studies.⁵

The studies attempting to present the general picture of the struggle of the guerillas and of the underground during the whole war period on the territories of specific republics and regions make a valuable contribution to the Soviet geographic history.⁶

The book "Soviet Guerillas"¹ contains articles devoted to the appearance, development and results of the guerilla movement in the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel, and Moscow regions, on the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Karelia. The book is based on documents from the party and state archives on the official reporting files and on the specific scientific publications. The book unfolds in depth the activity of the Communist Party in occupied territories, showing the whole process of the organization of the struggle behind the enemy front lines. The transition from isolated activities to operations involving dozens of thousands of guerillas and people from the underground is described quite vividly. The authors have succeeded in showing convincingly the political unity of the masses and of the party leadership, the authority of the party within the masses and the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

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However, some articles in this book contain significant shortcomings. For example, the absence of a centralized and well planned leadership by the High Command Headquarters in directing the guerilla warfare during the first period of the war, is being justified. The heroic struggle of the underground is shown rather weakly. Some others exaggerate the guerilla successes in specific regions. For example, the article by P. R. Sheverdalkin, "The People Took Up Arms" says that the Belebelkov guerilla unit in the Leningrad region in 1941 has "paralyzed all the most important communication lines of the enemy, striking continuously at its transportation lines."² S. F. Rudich in his article "The Unconquered Ground of Smolensk" overrates the role of the guerilla patrols in the fall of 1941.³

Of great educational value are the publications describing the organization of the guerilla movement and the struggle of the guerillas and of the underground during the brutal fascist terror.⁴ Under such circumstances, all the best qualities of the Soviet people have been disclosed in all their clarity: the rigid steadfastness, the unbending will in the struggle with the enemy, the loyalty to the Fatherland and to the Communist Party which was matchless, and the unshakeable faith in victory. P. Ignatov, using the example of the guerillas in the Kuban Region proves that it is possible to carry out the successful operations of guerilla formations in large urban areas, in the regions which have no large forests.⁵

A considerable number of books is devoted to the description of how the regions of guerilla dominance were created, describing the life in such regions and the continuous struggle.⁶ These books show how the guerillas, being actively supported by the population, have liberated extensive regions from the occupation forces in which the Soviet Government was reestablished and was functioning. The publication of A. I. Zalesskiy,⁷ analyzes the struggle of the soviet peasantry behind the enemy lines to preserve the socialist land.

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The combat deeds of the renowned guerilla units which conducted deep raids behind the enemy lines are quite vividly and truthfully described in the books by S. A. Kovpak, P. P. Vershigora, D. Bakradze, Ya. Shkryabach and others.⁸ The former guerilla commanders, using the example of their own units, show how menacing a force were the guerillas who successfully resolved the complex military tasks in regions unknown to them, far from the areas where their units were created and based.

Many books are devoted to the scouting activity of the guerillas which played an extremely important role in the guerilla warfare.⁹ A well known patriot, the commander of the guerilla unit, D. I. Medvedev, in his book "Of Strong Spirit"¹⁰ describes comprehensively and truthfully all difficulties associated with the organization and conduct of the reconnaissance behind enemy lines, emphasizing the prevailing qualities of our guerilla reconnaissance as compared to the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance of the enemy. Throughout the whole book an idea is entertained that no other reconnaissance force in the world had such firm support as the Soviet one, being actively supported by the broad masses of the people.

Among the publications devoted to the heroic activity of the underground, the book of an old Bolshevik, I. P. Kozlov "In the Crimean Underground" is of great interest.¹¹ The book emphasizes the lack of success in the attempts of the Hitlerites to suppress the active resistance of the Soviet people and to strangle the Bolshevist underground even in the cities which were filled with Gestapo men, 433 police, fascist functionaries and enemy armed forces.

A considerable place in the literature describing the guerillas and underground is occupied by the subject of the activity of the glorious Lenin Young Communist Organization.

The struggle of the guerillas and of the underground was also reflected in the publications devoted to the events of the Great

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Patriotic War as a whole or its specific parts.

Publications Describing the Military Activity at the Fronts During the Second World War.

The Soviet military and historical science was not limited by the analysis of the military activity only on the Soviet-German front. Our historical literature contains the publications devoted to the first period of the Second World War and the subsequent operations on the fronts of secondary importance.

The book of V. A. Sekistov describes the combat activity in Europe and in Africa during 1939-1943.¹ The author investigates the preparation and unleashing of the Second World War describing sequentially the attack of the German-fascist armies on Denmark, Norway, Poland, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Yugoslavia and Greece. He also describes the military activity of the English and American armed forces in the Mediterranean Basin. Using historical material, V. A. Sekistov shows why the leading circles of the USA and England procrastinated with the opening of the second front in Western Europe, conducting a strategy of "little action."

The book also considers the effect of the victories of the Red Army at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk on the general situation existing in North Africa and on the general course of the Second World War. The actual role of each country which was a participant in the anti-Hitler coalition resulting in the destruction of fascist Germany, is disclosed. However, the book has a number of significant drawbacks. The main one is the expansion of the chronological framework related to the "odd war." Too much attention is devoted to the military activity in North Africa at the expense of more important events in Europe. The work contains several errors associated with the evaluation of specific military events.

The course of the military struggle in the European theatres of war on land, starting from September 1, 1939 through June 1941, is

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described, utilizing numerous documents, in the publication by D. M. Proektor.² The author reviews in detail the question as to how, during this period of the Second World War, the military art of the German fascist armed forces was improved and what were the weak aspects of their military doctrine. D. M. Proektor notes that the first period of the Second World War produced quite a bit of material for the necessary consideration of the operational and tactical problems of that time. In the course of the military events in 1939-1941 a rapid deterioration of the old tradition and concepts was taking place.³ "...We are faced here with the beginning of a new qualitative state in the activity of the armed forces," - writes the author - "with the historical break in the life of the states, with the transition from peace to war. We are witnessing the collision of the armed forces and groupings created originally as a result of a thorough and lengthy preparation, the first collision of the armed forces, the military and technological achievements, the military concepts, systems of leadership, all of which were developed in peace time. In that sense, the initial period of war not only in the historical but also the operational framework, is the first verification of the prewar points of view and the degree of preparedness of the armies of the warring nations."⁴ The German militarists point out that D. M. Proektor had begun to view the victory in Poland "as something quite normal and regular." They came to the conclusion that the "Blitzkrieg in Poland is the general sample and form for any future campaign."⁵

Consequently, tracing each stage of the events in Europe, the author concludes that "the occupation of Poland meant the creation of the jump-off area against the Soviet Union in the central direction, the occupation of Norway - in the northerly direction, of the Balkans - in the southerly direction and the war against the Western European countries enabled Germany to ensure to a considerable degree its strategic Hinterland. The resources of the occupied countries were placed in the service of the anti-Soviet war."⁶

In his book D. M. Proektor believes that the national struggle of liberation of the people in the first period of the Second World

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War was the factor affecting the changes in the character of war.

The operations and military art of the armed forces of the USA and England in Western Europe in 1944-1945 are thoroughly analyzed in the book by V. M. Kulish.⁷ The author is the first of the Soviet historians who describes in detail the military events occurring in Western Europe in 1944-1945, subjecting these events to detailed analysis and giving the characteristics of the military art of the armies of the USA and England. The book makes an attempt to disclose the sharp imperialistic contradictions existing between the USA and England in the years of the past war. However, the author did not show the influences of the class goals and purposes of the leading circles in the Western countries on the planning and conduct by them of the military operations. V. M. Kulish is mistaken when he explains the incomplete encirclement and destruction of the main forces of the 5th Tank and 7th German Field Armies in the regions of Falaise only by the military mistakes, not emphasizing the causes of a political nature. By analyzing the military activity of the Soviet Armed Forces and military operations of the western allies, Kulish proves that the Red Army played a decisive role in the destruction of Hitler's Germany. /434

Some specific features of the military art of the armed forces of the USA, England, France, Germany and Japan during the Second World War are disclosed in the book by A. D. Bagreyev.¹ The author describes in detail the planning and the preparation of the most important operations, showing the specifics of the strategy of each party. However, the questions of tactics are rather weakly described in the book. Unfortunately, A. D. Bagreyev makes the main emphasis on considerations of the military art of Hitler's army on the secondary fronts of the war, not devoting sufficient attention to the Soviet-German front where the outcome of the whole Second World War was to be decided. The author ascribes without any foundation, to the English and American armed forces, achievements in the military art which truly belong to the Red Army (the break-through of the deep

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defense lines, repulsing of the mass attacks of large tank formations, creation of the defense in depth).

A more correct methodological approach in describing the character of the military activity on the secondary fronts during the Second World War is contained in the book by E. I. Rybkin.² The author reminds us that the war is one of the forms of political struggle and that the study of politics is the only means by which one could explain the character and specifics of the war. He proves that during the whole time of the Second World War the imperialist goals of the leading circles in the USA and England were always in close relationship with the methods used in the conduct of the war. The English and American monopolists did not attempt to obtain the devastating destruction of the German imperialism. This approach has defined the strategy and tactics of the American and English armed forces, the military activity of which were of passive character. The political considerations, rather than a military one, of the reactionary forces in the USA and in England explain the procrastination in opening the second front in Europe by replacing it with "little action," "Balkan strategy," etc.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR

The publications of the Soviet historians devoted to the questions of the international relations and foreign policy of the USSR in the prewar and wartime, on the eve of and during the war, is represented primarily in the form of the newspaper and magazine articles, stenographic lectures and brochures, the purpose of which was to tell the Soviet people about the foreign policy of the Communist Party and of the Soviet State, to strengthen the ranks of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, helping the progressive decay of the fascist block, and to describe the influence of the victories of the Red Army on the general course of international relations, etc.³

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After the war a more systematic and comprehensive study of the problems associated with international relations and foreign policy of the USSR began to be employed. Prior to 1956, one of the basic sources in evaluating the foreign policy of the USSR during the war was the book by Stalin "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union." The book was valuable in spite of all its shortcomings which were /435 due to the cult of personality, since it contained a number of statements made by the Soviet Government reflecting Soviet foreign policy during several specific stages of the war. This book contains several subjective and erroneous positions which are far removed from Marxism, in the absence of a serious criticism of which it would be impossible to continue further development of Soviet historical science. Stalin had not understood the essence of the "peaceful" maneuvers of Hitler which followed after the destruction of Poland and had transferred the responsibility for the continuation of the war on England and France. He completely miscalculated the changes occurring in the policy of England after the "odd war" and the processes which resulted in the changes of the character of the Second World War. He also erroneously evaluated the course of German foreign policy, which was becoming more and more aggressively anti-Soviet. Stalin ignored numerous signals regarding the preparation of Germany to attack the USSR and the Soviet Union was placed in an extremely difficult position.

In order to justify his underestimation of the threat that fascist Germany might attack the Soviet Union, Stalin in his speech of November 7, 1941, declared that the Hitler party becomes imperialist only at the moment when it commenced to occupy foreign lands. "Until the Hitlerites," said Stalin, "were engaged in unifying German lands, bringing back to the union the Rhineland, Austria, etc., they could have been considered with a certain justification as nationalists."¹ In this fashion, Stalin, backdating the events, had actually justified the occupation of Austria - this flagrant act of highway robbery of the Hitlerite aggression against an independent state which caused at that time the angered protest of the Soviet Union. The separation of the fascist policies into two stages, the nationalist and imperialist, has nothing to do with Marxism. The fascism from its very beginning was an open bloody dictatorship of the reactionary

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financial circles. The "nationional" slogan of "gathering the German lands" was a conscientious deception of the masses by imperialists hiding its goals of a pure robbery by the "national" phraseology.

The division of the Hitler policies into two stages is being used as a tool of the modern bourgeois geographic historians who are attempting to explain the lax attitude of the leading circles in England and France toward Hitler's aggression, stating that Hitler supposedly in the beginning had pursued the "national" goals.

The study of Soviet foreign policy during the war had also been retarded prior to 1956 by the scarcity of the historical research base. During the years of the cult of personality the documents which were published were primarily those which represented the final result of the diplomatic negotiations and diplomatic squabbles.

In describing the policies of the Western countries the Soviet historians were under less pressure (which was due to the erroneous theoretical postulates of Stalin), than in investigating the problems of Soviet foreign policy. In addition, a significant effect in directing the activity of the Soviet historians was the publication in 1945 of the third volume of "History of Diplomacy" in which, with a complete fullness for that time period, the history of international relations during the twenty year period between the two great wars had been described.²

All these events have facilitated the development of the situation during the second half of the 40s and in the beginning of the 50s, so that the attention of the Soviet historians was concentrated primarily on unmasking the deplorable policy of "noninterference" and "motions to find peace," which were conducted by the leading circles of the USA, England and France regarding Hitler Germany and reflected in the most shameful form in the Munich Agreement. The historians also concentrated on the study of the military period in international relations.

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The difficulties encountered by the Soviet historians who were trying to draw a general picture of international relations and of the foreign policy of the USSR during the wartime are particularly apparent in the book of academician L. N. Ivanov "Essays of International Relations During the Second World War."³ The author did not have sufficient material available to analyze the problems of international relations, and in particular the foreign policy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Therefore he could not fully describe the struggle of the Soviet Union in creating and strengthening the anti-Hitlerite coalition and of the opening of the second front and also the role of the Soviet-German front and its affect on the development of international relations. The book circumvents the question of the character of the Second World War.

After the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, several publications made an appearance in a very short time period which have contributed considerably to the Soviet geographic history of international relations and the foreign policy of the USSR.

The publications by L. V. Pozdeyeva, V. A. Matveyev, M. Gus and A. M. Nekrich have been devoted to the unmasking of the role of the Western countries in preparing and unleashing the Second World War.⁴

The book of L. V. Pozdeyeva presents a broad picture of cooperation between the English and German monopolies in the reestablishment and development of the military-economic potential of the German imperialism. It is known that this question is being stubbornly not talked about by the bourgeois historians. The detailed analysis of /436 cooperation between the English and German monopolies has enabled the author to show convincingly the economic reasons for the policy of "noninterference" and "peace-seeking action."

The book of V. A. Matveyev reviews in detail the early history of the conclusion of the Munich Agreement and also all new variants

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of the Munich policy which had been attempted by the Western countries when Hitler did not fulfill his side of the bargain agreed upon in Munich. The author has shown that in parallel with the attempts to conclude the anti-Soviet agreement, the imperialist contradictions began to grow, terminating with the collision between two imperialist camps. However, the positions aired in the book by V. A. Matveyev may not be passed by without any objections. In particular, the author claims without any foundation that presumably one of the reasons that England and France had declared war on Germany was the calculation to protract the German-Polish war and utilize this time period for the preparation of understanding with Hitler Germany.¹ It is known that neither England nor France had done anything in order to protract the resistance of Poland, since the rapid liquidation of this "geographic obstacle" separating the Soviet Union from Hitler Germany had been planned in advance by Munich politicians and was the part of yet another variant of the "channeling" of the German aggression in an easterly direction. One cannot agree also with the explanation which the author gives regarding the period of "odd war." He writes that the Western countries had high hopes for the economic blockade and therefore, during the period of "odd war," there was in existence only one front - the front of economic and trade war."² If the question is interpreted in this fashion, the imperialist and anti-Soviet character of the "odd war" will disappear.

The book of M. Gus embraces not only the prewar but also the war years and contains a considerable material unmasking the role of American imperialism in preparing, unleashing and engaging in the Second World War. However, in terms of depth of the scientific investigation, the study of M. Gus is considerably weaker than the other books of the Soviet authors on the same subject matter.

The first study of A. M. Nekrich published in 1955,³ is devoted to the description of the Munich policy fiasco incurred by English imperialism. The book discloses true causes of the so-called "turn"

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in the foreign policy of England which manifested itself in offering the "guarantees" to the small countries and initiating the negotiations with the USSR. This "turn" had ensured the conductance of the former policy in approving the Hitler aggression but in some other forms. The author describes in detail the double-faced role of the English diplomats who simultaneously in discussing the negotiations in Moscow were conducting secret negotiations with Hitlerites in London. The second book by A. M. Nekrich is the continuation of the first one and embraces the period from September 1939 to the attack of Hitler Germany on the Soviet Union.⁴ The author shows here the interwound trends of various, quite often contradictory nature, in the foreign policy of England in the initial period of the Second World War: the gradual transition from the anti-Soviet policy of "noninterference," from the attempts to obtain an agreement with the Hitlerite Germany behind the back of the USSR to the understanding of the necessity to ally itself with the USSR. The book discloses primarily the European aspect of English policy, but at the same time it reviews the problems of the Anglo-American relations and the policy of England and America at the Far and Near East.

The role which was played by American imperialism in the preparation of Hitler aggression is being told in the publication of N. Inozemtsev. "The American Imperialism and German Question."⁵

The Far Eastern problems of the Second World War are described in the publication by V. Ya. Avarin "Fight for the Pacific Ocean"⁶ and in the collective work "The International Relations in the Far East."⁷

One of the first attempts to produce a political review of the Second World War was undertaken by G. A. Deborin in his book "The Second World War."⁸ The author proves that the victory of socialism and of democracy, the liberation of the people from fascism during the Second World War represents not an accidental but completely predetermined and historical reality and that in the modern times the

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military adventures of imperialism will unavoidably turn against itself. The book traces out the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations the disruption of which by the Western powers had forced the Soviet government to sign the nonaggression treaty with Germany. The author tries to describe the errors and miscalculations of Stalin in evaluating the prewar general political situation and how these errors affected the fortunes of the Red Army during the first stage of the war. In considering the question of the allied relations, G. A. Deborin shows that from the very beginning of the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition the Western allies have understood quite differently the goals of the war and the projected future of the world which had to be reestablished after the war. ¶ In analyzing in detail the negative aspects of the policy of the Western countries in regard to the USSR (the sabotage involved in opening the second front, the multiple disruption of the supplies available to the Soviet Union, the attempt to protract the war in order to exhaust the USSR to a maximum degree, preventing the complete destruction of German fascism) the author devotes very little attention to the im-437 portance of the coalition resulting in the destruction of the enemy and the victory of the peace loving people. The shortcoming of this book is also the absence of a clear definition of the time periods of the war. For example, the whole second part of the publication embracing the period from the beginning of the war to the attack on the Soviet Union, has the heading "Odd War." This unjustifiably expands the period of the "odd war," the result of which leads to the distortion in the process of changes in the political character of the Second World War. The fifth chapter in the second volume has the title "Imperialist Struggle After the Capitulation of France." It is known, however, that the events following the capitulation of France were not limited only to the imperialist struggle. Precisely at that time period the inception of the Resistance began to be manifest and this resulted in a change in the character of the war. All this has not been properly reflected in the book.

The book by V. L. Israelyan is devoted to the description of the diplomatic history of the Great Patriotic War.¹ At the center

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of this study lies the question regarding the cooperation of the three great powers - USSR, USA and Great Britain during the wartime. The book considers in detail the formation of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, its meaning for the Soviet Union and for the struggle of the democratic forces in the USA and Great Britain against reactionary activity. The book also describes the effect of coalition on the development of the Resistance in the countries occupied by German fascists. The conferences of the "Big Three" in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam and the importance of these conferences for the coherent military planning and for the development of a basis of cooperation after the war is described quite fully. The author notes the disagreements and struggle within the coalition which were the result of the imperialist desires manifest in the leading circles of the USA and England and also points out that the durability and the fruitful results obtained from the Anglo-Soviet-American cooperation was due to the Soviet Union and its foreign policy.

Although the book of V. L. Israelyan, as he himself writes in the preface, does not pretend to be a comprehensive study of the whole history of the diplomatic period during the Second World War, nonetheless, many questions, and in particular the foreign policy of the USSR could be described more fully. In some cases the author describes only schematically the basic trends of the Soviet foreign policy. The foreign policy of the USSR is presented rather obliquely, not disclosing its importance as one of the major factors in foreign relations, and also affecting the policy of the Western allies.

In 1962 a collective publication "History of International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR" had been issued.² This extensive work describes fully for the first time in the Soviet literature the basic problems of international politics during the wartime. The authors used a large number of foreign references and sources, describing in detail the foreign policies of the USA and Great Britain.

In attempting to overcome the results of the cult of personality

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in historical science, the authors chose to almost completely ignore not only the speeches of Stalin, but also the diplomatic documents which were signed by Stalin or Molotov. As a result, the foreign policy of the USSR lacks richness in this book and is presented only schematically. Such a simplified approach to overcome the results of the cult of personality in historical science encounters serious objections. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union was always the policy not of Stalin and Molotov, but the policy of the socialist state. In similar ways, in that the cult of personality could not change the socialist nature of the Soviet State, it could also not change the socialist character of the Soviet foreign policy. The fight with the consequences of the cult of personality must be manifested by not omitting the foreign political activity of Stalin and Molotov, but it should rather describe completely and comprehensively all the problems of the foreign policy of the USSR, including the criticism of detrimental consequences of the cult of personality.

The initial chapters of the first volume of "International Relations After the Second World War"³ briefly consider the causes of the Second World War and the main trends of the foreign policies of the capitalist countries and of the Soviet Union. The book gives an analysis in depth of the international and political results obtained after the Second World War and shows the changes in the relationship of the forces on the international arena in favor of peace, democracy and socialism.

Chapters describing the international relations and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the prewar and during the war years can be found in the book by I. F. Ivashin, who presents the history of Soviet foreign policy from 1917 through 1957.⁴ The scientific-popular essay of V. M. Khvostov, describing the history of the Soviet foreign policy, reviews the questions of international relations during the war years.⁵

The brief sections characterizing international relations and

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the foreign policy of the USSR during the war can be found in the publications devoted to the Second World War and to the Great Patriotic War as a whole.

The diplomatic history of the "Odd War" is reviewed in detail in the book by A. M. Nekrich.⁶ The author, in analyzing the diplomatic moves and maneuvers undertaken by leading circles in the unfriendly imperialist coalitions, to terminate the war and create unified anti-Soviet front. The book shows how the growing acute contradictions between imperialists disrupted all attempts to obtain an agreement. /438

The foreign of the USA prior to and during the war years is considered in the studies by N. N. Inozemtsev and N. N. Yakovlev.¹ The book by Yu. M. Melnikov is devoted to the policy of the USA in regards to Germany from the moment that Hitler came to power to the beginning of the European war.² Using a considerable factual material the author has shown that German-American contradictions and the policy of appeasement to obtain an understanding with Hitler Germany which was conducted by the leading circles of the USA, has played an important role in the starting of the Second World War.

The questions of foreign policy of Great Britain are developed in the studies by V. G. Trukhanovskiy. His book "Foreign Policy of England at the First Stage of the General Crisis of Capitalism (1918-1939)"³ is the first Soviet publication devoted to the foreign policy of Great Britain between the two world wars. A large section of this book is devoted to the English policy in regard to Germany after the fascist putsch. The author has established that in spite of the prevalent opinions, the main initiator of the "pact of four" was the English diplomacy. V. G. Trukhanovskiy carried out a detailed analysis of the double play in which the English diplomacy was engaged during the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations. In addition he has shown (for the first time in Soviet literature) that one of the causes forcing England to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1939 was the fear that the Soviet-French pact could interfere with Hitler aggression

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against the Soviet Union. The book criticizes the basic concepts of the English bourgeois geographic history, showing its inability to differentiate the real causes of the failure in English policy.

The other study "Modern History of England"⁴ also by V. G. Trukhanovskiy analyzes the economy of England and its close relation with the policy. The author, using figures, shows the sharpening of the imperialist contradictions which resulted in war. The book unfolds deep contradictions existing between the character of the war (when it became a just war of liberation) and the imperialist designs of the leading circles in Great Britain.

The questions of the foreign policy of England during the war-time are touched upon in the study by V. G. Trukhanovskiy who reviews in this book the foreign policy of the English imperialism after the war.⁵

The disgraceful role of the English diplomacy in preparing and realizing the Munich agreement is unfolded in the book by V. G. Polyakov, "England and the Munich Agreement."⁶

The study by V. N. Egorov is devoted to the Far Eastern problems of English policy from the beginning of the war in Europe to the beginning of the Pacific war.⁷

The publication by G. N. Sevast'yanov⁸ gives a comprehensive analysis of the policies of the largest imperialist countries in the Far East on the eve of the Second World War. It shows how, in the course of the struggle of imperialists for mastery in eastern Asia, the relationships between forces among the participants had been changing. The main attention is devoted by the author to the Japanese-American contradictions, being the most important imperialist contradictions for this region of our globe, disclosing simultaneously the reasons of the "peaceful resolution" of the Japanese question by the leading circles of the USA. The author considers the interrelationship of the events between the Far East and Europe

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and in particular shows the effect of Munich on the acuteness of the international situation in the Far East.

Of great scientific interest are two publications by L. N. Kutakov⁹ devoted to the foreign policy of Japan and the Soviet-Japanese relations. Both of these books are not within the framework of the eve of the Second World War or the time period of its duration, but each of them gives a detailed analysis of the foreign policy of the Japanese imperialism and the Soviet-Japanese relations preceding the Second World War and the years encompassing it. Using a tremendous amount of documented material, L. N. Kutakov investigates the conclusion of the "anti-Comintern pact," the negotiations of Japan with Germany, Great Britain and the USA, the intrapolitical struggle of the Japanese political circles and the neutrality agreement involving the Soviet-Japanese pact. The books disclose the following facts: the unfriendly policy of Japan toward the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, the assistance rendered by Japan to Germany and Italy, the persistent attempts of Hitlerite Germany to instigate the Soviet-Japanese conflict. The author describes broadly the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the final defeat of Japanese imperialism.

The foreign policy of Japan is also reviewed in detail in the studies by D. I. Goldberg.¹

The questions of the foreign policy of Hitlerite Germany are investigated in the publications by V. B. Ushakov² and V. T. Fomin.³ The book of V. T. Fomin shows the development of German-fascist aggression, disclosing the economic, political and ideological preparation of Hitlerite Germany in starting the war and establishing global mastery. Considerable attention is devoted to the foreign policy preparatory steps and the very first steps of Hitler's aggression directed toward the unleashing of the Second World War. The last chapter of this publication is devoted to the German-fascist aggression against Poland. The book of V. T. Fomin utilizes a large number of

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sources. The materials of the Nürnberg trial where the major war criminals were tried is presented within a particularly broad scope.

The foreign policy of Hitlerite Germany is reflected also in the popular books by G. L. Rozanov⁴ and L. A. Bezymenskiy.⁵

A. I. Poltorak, in his study "From Munich to Nürnberg,"⁶ based on the analysis of a large number of documents from the Nürnberg trial, has drawn a vivid picture of the war preparations in Hitler Germany and the crimes of German fascism during the wartime. Simultaneously, the book is an act of accusation of the English, American and French promoters of Munich.⁷ The plot against Hitler of July 20, 1944, and the contact of the plotters with reactionary circles in the USA and Great Britain are presented in the publications of V. S. Koval' and D. ~~U~~^U Mel'nikov.⁷ The history of relations between the Soviet Union and France during the Second World War is presented in the digest of articles,⁸ in the books by Yu. ~~B~~^B Borisov⁹ and N. N. Molchanov.¹⁰ The fight of Soviet diplomacy to obtain the independence of Austria is reflected in the study by A. ~~U~~^U Efremov.¹¹ S. A. Gonionskiy, in his study,¹² investigates the international relations between the countries within the Western Hemisphere. The author shows the expansionist policies of the American imperialism in the countries of Latin America carried out under the pretext of protecting these countries from fascist threat and the gradual displacement by American capital of some other competing parties, thus capturing the dominating positions in the Latin American countries.

After the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, the activity of the periodic press and the historians-internationalists has also been enlivened. The magazines published a considerable number of articles devoted to the specific problems related to the international relations and foreign policy of the USSR.

I. Zemskov, in his article "About the So-Called 'Division' of Yugoslavia into 'Spheres of Influence,'"¹³ unmasks the Churchill version that the head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, has

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agreed presumably with his suggestion to divide the Balkan countries, including Yugoslavia, into "spheres of influence." The article shows the actual policy of the Soviet Union regarding Yugoslavia during the wartime: the political support rendered in the struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia, the respect for their independence and sovereignty.

The article by D. Mel'nikov¹⁴ reviews in detail the plans of the dismemberment of Germany which had been nurtured by the leading circles in the USA, England and France. These plans were not realized only because of the decisive counteraction of the Soviet Union. The addendum to the article by D. Mel'nikov is an article by K. Tsybina.¹⁵ In this article it is noted that the Soviet government, while sharing the desire of the interim government of France to ensure the security of this country from the aggression of German imperialism, at the same time has never supported either the English-American or the French plans of German dismemberment.

A large article "The Fate Which Has Been Prepared for England" by A. Leonidov disclaims the version that presumably the Hitlerite Germany "did not pursue any particularly evil plans against England" and that "Hitler in essence was always an Anglophile" widely spread in the Western and in particular English geographic historical press. The author writes as follows: "The plan of the German invasion of England in 1940 was not a bluff but a military undertaking within the projected goal of its political subjugation."¹⁶

A. Leonidov points out that the plan of the military conquest/⁴⁴⁰ of England had been connected by the Hitlerites with the organization of a political uprising in which the main role would be played by English collaborators and also by the Duke of Windsor. ^PThe struggle of the Soviet Union in protecting the neutrality of Sweden, based on interesting and to some degree new materials, is contained in the articles by K. Dmitriyeva and M. Andreyeva.¹ In the article by the same authors "On the Roads Toward the Second World War,"² on the

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 17/22

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
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
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basis of previously unpublished documents, some new details of the Munich policy carried out by the English government are presented, as well as the cooperation given by England in assisting German rearmament.

There are quite a few other articles which are of interest for the study of international relations.³

THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND ASIA

The Resistance Movement exerted a tremendous influence on the course and outcome of the Second World War. It affected the character of the war: from the imperialist and unjust war, it gradually was transformed into the antifascist and just war of liberation carried out by the countries opposing Germany.

Prior to 1956 there were only a few small brochures and articles which were to be found in magazines and newspapers devoted to the Resistance Movement.⁴ These publications ordinarily characterize the specific countries and describe the general course of the national liberation struggle of the enslaved people against the German-fascist invaders. The majority of these articles are written on the basis of already published materials which have become antiquated. The factual material contained in them must be reassessed.

In addition to the narrowness of the historical base, the scientific values of these articles is also lowered by the erroneous postulates. For example, some of these studies devoted to the Polish national liberation movement explain incorrectly the reasons for the disbanding of the Communist Party of Poland in 1938.⁵ The disbandment of the Communist Party is explained by the impossibility of cleansing the Party ranks from unfriendly elements, when operating in extremely conspiratorial surroundings. In reality, the Polish Communist Party was disbanded as a result of the direct influence of the Stalin cult of personality and the atmosphere of suspicion

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and the mania about spies which was created.

Some of the Soviet historians describe quite weakly the role the masses played in the battle of liberation against the German-fascist invaders. In particular, this shortcoming is manifest in 1944 the study by A. Ya. Manusevich, "Struggle for Democracy in France."¹ In addition, the book lacks clear connection between the events on the Eastern front and the development of the resistance movement in France. The author also keeps silent about the effect of the defeat of Hitlerites at Moscow and the Volga, as it relates to the elevation of spirit in the French resistance movement.

Unfortunately, similar shortcomings are found in other studies associated with the questions of the Resistance Movement.²

The value of these publications lies in the fact that they posed a number of problems which have been expanded and properly defined at a later time.

The decisions of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR have created conditions favorable to the comprehensive study of the Resistance Movement and the great liberation struggle of the people against fascism. The question of the liberation movement occupy significant space in the comprehensive publications regarding the history of the Second World War and of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. These books show the role of the masses of people and in particular of the working class led by the Communist Party, played in the liberation struggle against the German-fascist occupation, disclosing the effect of the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces on the rising spirit of the resistance fighters in the occupied countries.

The first attempt to present in a scientific popular form a comprehensive picture of the Resistance Movement in European countries was made in 1962 in the publication "Anti-fascist Resistance Movement in the European Countries During the Second World War."³ By

summarizing already published materials the authors review the common problems existing in the Resistance Movement and note some specifics of the inception and development in this powerful international movement in various countries of Europe. The chapters-essays written according to a unified concept, devote particular attention to the activity of the Communist and Worker's Parties as the organizers and leaders of the liberation struggle against the fascists and as the initiators in creating the national front in Poland, Hungary and Romania and the national-liberation fronts in Albania and Yugoslavia and the Patriotic Front in Bulgaria.

The authors show that a sharp class political struggle was taking place within the broad antifascist movement. The representatives of bourgeois circles who joined the Resistance Movement attempted to subjugate it to their own control. The associates of De Gaulle in France, Mihajlovic in Yugoslavia, Papandreou in Greece and others like them, have dreamed to reestablish in their countries the pre-war bourgeois order.

The book, however, has a number of significant shortcomings. The chapters differ in terms of their scientific value. The best chapters are those which are devoted to Italy, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and France. The chapters describing Romania and Bulgaria are, for no reason, terminated by the people's uprising on August 23 and September 9, 1944. The structural concept of the book also causes some bafflement. The authors have not introduced anything new in the time periods associated with the Resistance Movement. It is not clear why the authors have decided to limit the third stage of the resistance which had commenced in January 1943, by the end of the same year. The book also contains many factual inaccuracies.

The question of relations between the representatives of the Resistance Movement and the governments of the capitalist countries - the participants of the anti-Hitlerite coalition is reviewed in the article by E. Boltin and Yu. Red'ko.⁴ The authors show how the leading

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circles in England attempted to utilize the activity of the people which increased during the war, and use it in their own interest.

The Resistance Movement in European countries is also described in the studies concerned with the specific questions of the Second World War.⁵

Of specific scientific interest are the studies which consider the questions related to the Resistance Movement within the specific countries. One must mention here the book by V. I. Klovov, "Struggle of the People in Slavic Countries Against the Fascist Enslavers (1939-1945)."⁶ The author describes the activity of the Communist Party and of the Worker parties, being the leading force of the Resistance Movement, showing the difficulties encountered in the national fronts which were due to the participation in this movement of the bourgeois elements. The study discloses a narrow class policy of the leading circles in England and the USA in their attempt to reestablish in the occupied countries the old, bourgeois-landlord order and to prevent the forces on the left to come to power. At the same time, the author unmasks the antinational role of the emigree governments of /442 Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia who have attempted to subjugate the Resistance Movement to their own control and utilize it in their own interests.

The book by V. I. Klovov also has some significant drawbacks. The author did not disclose all specific features of the national liberation movement of the Slavic people which was then merged with the revolutionary struggle toward the liquidation of the capitalist order and the creation of a new social order. It is known that this has resulted in the gradual transformation of the antifascist struggle into the democratic revolution of the people. A significant shortcoming in the book is the absence in it of an analysis related to the program documents of the Communist and Worker's Parties and the social measures undertaken by the representatives of the people in

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the course of the national liberation movement occurring in all Slavic countries.

The development, moving force and results of the resistance are described quite fully in the collective studies regarding the history of Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, prepared by the Institute of Slavic Studies, Academy of Sciences, USSR.¹

For example, "History of Bulgaria" reviews in detail the following questions: distribution of the class forces in the country during the Second World War, increase in the military and political crises and the revolutionary situation on the eve of the revolution, September 8-9, 1944, the moving force of the people's democratic revolution, the leading role of the Bulgarian Communist Party in the liberation movement against the internal reactionary forces and against the German-fascist invaders. The liberation mission of the Red Army is particularly emphasized. The entrance of the Soviet armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria has created within the country a new situation, playing an important role in the victory of the masses over the internal and external reactionary forces.

In the "History of Poland" the complexity of conditions in which the liberation movement was developing is told quite convincingly. The characteristics of the forces counteracting the liberation movement of the Polish people are also presented. The activity of the Polish Worker's Party, being the organizer of the national movement of liberation, is presented in detail. The book shows the struggle of the Polish people for national liberation and the coupling of this struggle with social liberation. The study related to the activity of the People's Council and of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the organs of authority for the people created during the liberation struggle, is of particular importance.

The publication of the second volume of "History of Yugoslavia," one part of which is devoted to the revolution of liberation in

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Yugoslavia (1941-1945), fills to a considerable degree the existing gap in the study of this question by the Soviet geographic history. In analyzing the stages of the struggle of the Yugoslav people, the author of this section, G. M. Slavin reviews the reactionary regime, the national character of the Resistance Movement. He investigates the distribution of the class forces within the country and the birth and gradual strengthening of the new revolutionary power. Slavin emphasizes the leading role of the Yugoslav Communist Party played in the heroic struggle of the Yugoslav people, showing the friendly assistance rendered by the USSR to the Yugoslav people and unmasking the double policy of England and the USA.

The Soviet historians are investigating the appearance of the Resistance Movement and its development in specific countries. They characterize the Resistance Movement as a broad-based patriotic movement in which the democratic forces headed by the Communist Party are taking part, counterposed by the bourgeois conservative elements who were attempting to reestablish the prewar order.² Quite frequently the Resistance Movement is reviewed in conjunction with the whole history of a specific country during the years of the Second World War. This enables us to understand in depth the specifics of the movement in each particular country.

The numerous publications of the Soviet historians are devoted to the victory of the Resistance Movement in the countries of Eastern and South Eastern Europe. They show quite vividly the gradual and unalterable development of the current epoch - the transition of humanity from capitalism to socialism.³

A large place is allotted to the literature regarding the Resistance Movement describing the cooperation between the people of the Soviet Union and the countries of Europe¹: the formation of combat units on the territory of the USSR, their joint combat activity with the Red Army, the participation of Soviet people in the

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guerilla movement of the European countries, the material assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to the people fighting against fascism. The Soviet geographic history reviews the work of the progressive individuals who were forced to leave the occupied and fascist countries and to emigrate to the USSR.²

The problems of the liberation struggle of the people occupied by Japan in eastern and southeastern Asia during the Second World War, in contrast to the description of the European Resistance Movement, so far have been described in the Soviet historical literature to a much smaller degree. The process of development of this struggle is presented briefly in the collective publication "International Relations in the Far East (1870-1945),"³ and also in the article "The Resistance Movement" published in the "Soviet Historical Encyclopedia."⁴

Unfortunately, up to the present time the materials of the Tokyo International Trial of the major Japanese criminals of war, which took place in 1946-1948, have not been published. Only small excerpts from the decision of the International Military Tribunal considering the case of the major Japanese war criminals have been published in our press,⁵ and in the appendix to the book by M. Yu. Raginskiy and S. Ya. Rosenblit.⁶

The situation is quite different with the description of the liberation movement in specific countries occupied by Japan. In particular, there are quite a few books, brochures and articles which have been written describing the struggle of the Chinese people led by the Communist Party, the activity during the war of the democratic leadership operating in the liberated regions, the general course of military action in China and the policy of the USA in regard to the national struggle of liberation of the Chinese people.⁷

Several chapters and sections of the books regarding the history of these countries have been devoted to the description of the

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struggle against the Japanese invaders in several countries of Eastern and Southeastern Asia.⁸ This information can also be found in the teaching manuals⁹ and in the studies related to the crisis of the colonial system of imperialism.¹⁰

The main feature of all these studies is the fact that they all are impregnated with the concept of the friendship of the people and 444 their solidarity in the struggle against the colonial persecutors, both European, American and Japanese. Soviet researchers have analyzed the complex process involved in the liberation of many stratas of the population in the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Asia from the concept and influences propagated intensively by the Japanese imperialists of the "unity" of all people of Asia, based on the race (yellow) factor. At the same time, one can not say that the Soviet historians, up to the present time, have subjected the "new order" of the Japanese imperialists known by the name "sphere of mutual blooming of the great Eastern Asia," to a comprehensive and thorough study.

The Soviet historical science has revealed the complex character of the liberation study of the Asiatic people against the Japanese aggression, it has shown the heroic role played by the Communist Party in this struggle, their cooperation with the other political parties and organizations, as well as the activity of the national liberation fronts. But the Soviet geographic history of the Second World War has been influenced for quite some time, in a negative fashion, by the partisan approach toward the role of the national bourgeois circles during the anti-imperialist struggle. In spite of the fact that the national bourgeois circles of Burma, Indonesia, Indochina and some other countries occupied by the Japanese armed forces took part in the struggle against the aggressors, our historical science, up to 1955-1956, has underestimated this fact.

The studies appearing after the XX Congress of the Communist

Party of the USSR take into account the historically progressive role of the national bourgeois circles in the Eastern countries during the struggle against imperialism and in particular against Japanese imperialism. This has been reflected in all volumes of "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945."

The Soviet historical literature describing the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Asia reviews the effect of the Great Patriotic War on the liberation struggle of the peoples of these countries against the Japanese invaders. Of particular interest here is the question regarding the decisive importance of the victory of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East in 1945 which successfully completed the struggle of the people of Asia against the Japanese occupation forces. This subject is reviewed more or less in detail in the book by L. M. Demin,¹ A. P. Shiltova and V. F. Mordvinov,² and also in the article by A. M. Dubinskiy.³

In emphasizing the basically correct position of the Soviet geographic history describing the Resistance Movement, one should nevertheless state that the concrete problems associated with the Resistance are clearly insufficiently developed by the Soviet historians. Not one of our scientific and historical organizations is involved specifically in the study of this subject. Even the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences, USSR, does not do much research devoted to the Resistance Movement in Europe during the Second World War. Some attention is devoted to the study of this question by the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences, Ukrainian SSR. The topic of Resistance is reflected only casually in the works of the Academy of Social Sciences and in some other central scientific organizations. One should probably say that this subject is being investigated most thoroughly by the Institute of Slavic studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, but it investigates the Resistance only in the Slavic countries - in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

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The natural consequence of such a situation was the fact that during many years the questions related to the history of the Resistance are described from time to time predominantly in magazine articles. So far, there are very few large publications devoted to the Resistance Movement.

ACTIVITY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The thorough and comprehensive activity of the Communist Party during the war years has been reflected in many of our books, in brochures and digests of the wartimes. All of them describe the operational experience of the party organizations at the front and behind the front lines.⁴ These publications are not studies in depth as yet. One finds in them a lack of historical analysis and the prevailing tone is that of a description of the labor and combat deeds of the Soviet people. The publications of the wartimes devoted to the activity of the Communist Party were executed with the specific propagandistic goal in mind and represented merely the very beginning of the scientific investigations related to this question. /445

Prior to the end of the Great Patriotic War, a need arose to present a summary of experiences of the party organization and its activity during the difficult wartimes. In the first published materials, the attempts were made to resolve this question by using examples of the local and regional party organization.¹ Then books began to be published describing the activity of the party as a whole.²

But during the first ten years after the war there was not a single, and to any degree serious, study which would describe the role of the Communist Party of the USSR as a leader of the Soviet people and organizer of victory during the Great Patriotic War.

The cult of personality has also been reflected in the studies describing the activity of the local party organizations and the specific aspects of the party work during the wartime. For example,

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in the books by G. Abishev³ and A. Shoshenko⁴ all conclusions are reduced to several declarative statements. The study of K. H. Gulyamov contains quite a bit of interesting material regarding the life of the republic, but almost nothing is said about the work of communists in Uzbekistan.⁵

After the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR the works began to be published in which the activity of the party during the Patriotic War was clearly defined and the indomitable unity of the party and of the Soviet people has been described. From that moment on the study of the military, national and ideological work of the party began, with the study in depth of the activity of the local party organizations.

In five years after the XX Congress, the number of studies devoted to these questions have increased more than threefold, as compared to the preceding ten years.

The decisions of the XX Congress have enabled the historians to make the first steps on the road to liquidation of the cult of personality, as it relates to the activity of the party during the war-time. This can be traced out on the example of the collective works "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union"⁶ and "Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Inspirer and Organizer of Victories of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War."⁷ The role of the party during the wartime is described most thoroughly in the book "Communist Party of the USSR, the Inspirer and Organizer of the Victories of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War."⁸ The authors have succeeded in disclosing the gigantic organizational and educational work of the party being carried out at the front lines and behind them, connected organically with the heroic effort of the Soviet people and the armed forces. The utilization of extensive documented materials made it possible to describe the activity of the Central Committee and of the local party organizations directed toward the mobilization of the Soviet people and of all the resources of the country for the destruction of the enemy.

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Not in a declarative fashion, but on the basis of factual and documentary information, the book convincingly shows that the correct and flexible leadership of the Communist Party of the USSR was the main source of the might and strength of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces, and that the importance of this leadership grew in presence of the increased difficulties and complications of the situation at hand. The clear examples presented in this publication disclose the avant-garde role of the Communists at the front and in the rear lines and the unbreakable connection between the party and the masses of people.

The advantage of this book is the fact that it shows the restructuring of the party work in accordance with the requirements of war, the organizational restructuring of the army party organizations, the new flexible and effective forms and methods used within the party and among the people, coupling the enhanced centralization with the development of the democratic methods in leadership and mass initiative. This publication, however, insufficiently discloses the complex mechanisms of the party leadership, from the decision taking to its realization. It does not show the methods used in guiding the mass organizations of the workers (the work of Soviets, Unions, Communist Youth Organizations, etc.). The question related to the methods used in the party leadership of the armed forces during the war are not described with sufficient clarity. The activity of the 446 military Soviets at the fronts and at the army level, as the organ of party leadership in the Armed Forces, is presented quite poorly.

In 1958 a scientific-popular book by I. M. Shlyapin, ^M N. A. Shvarev and I. Ya. Fomichenko was published with the title "The Communist Party During the Great Patriotic War,"¹ presenting to some degree a comprehensive and new archive material. But the book is overloaded with facts of purely military character and does not delve deeply into the subject at hand, and in particular into the party political work with the Armed Forces and the activity of local party organizations during the wartime.

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In parallel with the comprehensive studies appearing after the XX Congress, publications started to appear in which the special aspects of the Party activity were considered. There is a comprehensive study of the ideological work of the Party at the front, the book "Ideological Work of the Communist Party of the USSR at the Front."² The book shows that the Communist Party, from the very first days of the war, began ideological work at the front in denouncing the animalistic race policy of German fascism, in educating the Soviet people using the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary traditions of the peoples of the USSR and the combat traditions of the Red Army. Using rich factual material, the close relation between the educational work of the party in presenting the proper ideas and the military successes of the armed forces are disclosed. The publication also describes the change in content and methodology used in the educational work with the appropriate ideas as a function of the general situation at hand and the military tasks which had to be achieved. The convincing facts characterize the specific features of the party political work among the soldiers during retreat, defense and attack.

The authors emphasize the great importance of the personal example of the communists in bringing about the mass heroism of the combatants, the unshakeable steadfastness and the unstoppable desire to advance during the combat. The book shows quite well the political work in terms of ideas which was executed when the Red Army acquired the liberation mission abroad. The role of the army communists being the fiery agitators and skillful propagandizers of the party ideas during combat, is also described. Unfortunately the book suffers from some descriptive tendencies and the lack of conclusions and comprehensive summaries.

The brochure of A. P. Mares'yev relates the quite interesting forms and methods applied in the party political work in the Air Force contingents during the Kursk battle.³ The book by P. I. Edemskiy describes the experience of the party and political work

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during the fights for Berlin.⁴

The front press played an important role in the party political work. In one of the chapters of the historical essay devoted to the Soviet wartime press,⁵ the work of the military press during the Great Patriotic war is described. The book tells us how, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the front press was achieving the purposes of political nature in terms of ideas, efficiency in operation and viability. The meaning of the decision of the Central Committee of the Party dated May 24, 1943, about the enhancing role of the front, army and division newspapers, transforming them into most important centers of the political work in the army, is being told.

The historians are investigating also at the present time the subject of the persistent struggle of the party to create the military cadres in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The study of D. Voropayev and A. Iovlev,⁶ presents valuable facts indicating the tremendous efforts exerted by the party organizations in preparing and educating the professional military men.

Some historical and party problems are considered in articles in various magazines and digests. Among these are the articles of general nature and the articles which describe the measures undertaken by the Communist Party and by the Central Committee in strengthening the party organizations in the military units. The latter publications contain valuable material regarding the redistribution of the efforts, the composition and growth of the army party organizations, the distribution of the communists in various branches of the military, the government awards issued to the communists, etc.⁷

Up to the present time, the question of the heroic deeds of the communists in the countryside is described very poorly. One of the attempts to fill this gap is an article by V. Ya. Ashanin in regards to the work of the political sections attached to the Machine-Tractor complexes during the Great Patriotic War.⁸

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It is necessary to emphasize the importance of such subjects as the activity of the party organizations in utilizing the intra-production industrial reserves during the wartime,⁹ the struggle of the party organizations at the railroads to ensure the military and evacuation transport,¹ etc.

The scientific and popular studies of the party history during the wartime published after the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR are written predominantly on a high level of theory and ideas, containing new factual and documental data.²

Almost every publication investigating a specific aspect of the history of the Great Patriotic War shows the leadership of the Party associated with the resolution of practical tasks involved.

In recent times the Soviet historians began to study thoroughly the activity of the local party organizations during the Great Patriotic War.

The primary party organizations, the organizations at the local level, the regional organizations and the organizations on the level of republics have executed a tremendous effort in preparing and mobilizing the human reserves for the front, participating in the evacuation of the largest industrial objects and reestablishment of these objects at the new sites, in putting the whole national economy on a war footing and in reconstruction of the national economy in the regions and districts liberated from the Hitlerites.

The activity of local party organizations is shown in the studies of the history of the Communist Parties in various republics, regions and sectors.³ On the basis of the study and comprehensive assimilation of the huge amount of material, these studies consider the specifics of the activity of each particular organization, once more proving convincingly that the victory in war was won by the efforts of the millions of people led by the party.

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The work of the local party organizations in the territories near the front lines differed in some specific features. This was also reflected in the literature.⁴

A small book by P. I. Kurbatova⁵ shows the tremendous work carried out by the regional party organization in Smolensk in rendering comprehensive assistance to the Red Army in evacuating the material goods and the population, in initiating the guerilla warfare and in the reconstruction of the national industry. I. Ya. Omel'yanenko⁶ reviews in his book the activity of the regional communist underground and the guerilla units at the Donets Region and then tells us about the efforts of the party organization directed toward the reconstruction of the regional industry. The book by G. ~~Ye~~ Emchenko⁷ is also devoted to the work of the party organizations in the Donets Basin during the Great Patriotic War. The author shows great valor in the struggle of the underground and of the guerillas led by the party members of the Communist Youth organization and during the occupation - by the Communist Youth underground organizations. The second part of the book tells us about the activity of the party organization in the liberated Donets Basin.

V. I. Fil'kin⁸ tells in his book how, being led by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, the party organization has transformed "Grozniy Oil" into one of the supply sources for the Red Army, of the fuel, motor oil and other oil products. The book relates the combat and work activities of the Chechen-Ingush people. The shortcoming in the work of V. I. Fil'kin /448 is the excessive desire to present the facts from the life of the working people of this region during the wartime and the absence of necessary descriptions of the intraparty work, its specific characteristics for the wartime.

Interesting studies have been published regarding the activity of the party organizations located deep behind the front lines. For example, the book of B. Kolchin,¹ using examples of the work of the Penza party organization, shows how the party mobilized the people

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in giving a full-fledged assistance to the front. The author considers different questions which the party organizations had to resolve: the draft of political workers, of reserves into the ranks of the Red Army, guarding the socialist property of the collective farms, state-owned farms and Machine-Tractor complexes, the relocation and placement of the evacuated factories, the transport movement with the evacuated personnel, the procurement of the work force for the industrial enterprises, etc.

The brochure by D. F. Frolov tells us about extensive work in the regional party organization in Saratov during the war, the selfless labor of the workers, collective farm workers and intelligensia in strengthening the rear lines and ensuring the availability of materiel and technology needed for the front.² The author describes the development of the socialist competition in industry and in agriculture reviewing in detail the patriotic movement of the regional workers in rendering assistance to the front. A serious shortcoming of the book is the fact that it does not show the tremendous efforts exerted by the party organizations in conjunction with the regional natural gas production industry and construction of the natural gas pipeline.

One of the most important aspects in the activity of the local party organizations in the eastern regions was the struggle in the development of industry. The role of the Communist Party in Uzbekistan played in the development of industry in that republic during the war is described in the book by Zh. Kalymbetov.³

The mobilization by the party of the people's efforts directed toward the destruction of the enemy is reviewed using the example of the work of Perm' communists in the book by A. G. Naumova.⁴ In the chapter devoted to the efforts of the party organization in mobilizing the industry for the needs of the front, the author points out that already in October, 1941, all the machine-building and metal processing enterprises in the region were converted to produce the items

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for defense and in the spring of 1942 the placement of the whole national regional industry on a war footing was completed. Using clear and concrete material, A. G. Naumova tell us about the organization of the mutual assistance efforts between the city and countryside.

The basic problems which had to be resolved by the Khabarovsk communists during the Patriotic War are reviewed in the book by N. A. Gogolev.⁵ The author brings to the attention of the readers the fact that the party organization has done a great job in activating the enterprises the construction of which had begun before the war.

The organizing activity of the party organizations in the eastern regions is also described in a number of articles.⁶ All the authors note the tremendous patriotism of the workers in our country which manifested itself clearly in the tremendous increase during the war of the number of party members.

From the very first few days of the war the local party organizations devoted quite a bit of attention to mass propaganda work. This is substantiated if one reads the articles characterizing all activities of the local party organizations and the articles devoted primarily to this question.⁷

A number of books and articles tell us about the activity of 1449 the party organizations on the territory occupied by the enemy, the role of the party leadership in reconstructing the national industry is described.¹

The party organizations have carried out a tremendous task in preserving the lives of the working people in the cities subjected to the blockade.²

The analysis of the literature devoted to the activity of the party during the wartime which was published after the XX Congress

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clearly ascertains the fact that the historians did overcome quite successfully the cult of personality of Stalin in the area of party history. It is gratifying that all these studies expand the historical base. This makes it possible to study in greater depth the question at hand and to analyze objectively the multifaceted activity of the party during the wartime period. However, the aftermath of the cult of personality has not been completely overcome as yet.

The studies of that time period lack extensive historical summaries, the presentations quite frequently are schematic and repetitious, and this is particularly true of the studies devoted to the local party organizations.

After the XXII Congress which set out for itself the task to liquidate completely the detrimental results of the cult of personality on the ideological front, the party historians proceeded with the continuation of their activity in that direction.

In the XV chapter of the new edition of the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union"³ devoted to the Great Patriotic War, one finds an extensive description of the party work during the wartime, much more than in the first edition.

In 1963 a book was published with the title "Party Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces During the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945."⁴ The whole book is permeated with the idea that the base and substance of the military build-up is the leadership of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces. The collective authorship describes the party political work at various stages of the Great Patriotic War. By noting the shortcomings which had a place in the party political work during combat, the authors, however, do not produce an analysis in depth as to the causes of these shortcomings. In some cases, speaking of the party political work during specific operations, the authors limit themselves to declarative considerations, not showing the methods used in conducting the political party work, especially

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the political party work within the specific branches of the armed forces.

The book by Yu. P. Petrov, "The Party Constructive Build-Up in the Soviet Army and Navy,"⁵ shows the constant care that the party exerted in strengthening the military party organizations, enhancing its activity. In considering the party organization of the Armed Forces as an integral part of the whole Party, the author discloses the specific features of the party constructive build-up in the Armed Forces. He notes that the organizational forms and methods of the party work were changing, depending on the situation and on the tasks assigned to the army and navy.

In analyzing in detail the general state of the party organizations in the prewar period and speaking of damages inflicted to the party growth by the repressions in the army, Yu. P. Petrov emphasizes that these repressions placed the Soviet Armed Forces, during the first period of the war, in an extremely difficult position. In the section devoted to the war, the author has shown that "the daily leadership of the Party in the Armed Forces, which was the deciding factor in the destruction of the German-fascist hordes during the Great Patriotic War. Precisely the leadership of the party, its titanic organizational and political work made it possible to overcome the serious misfortunes in the initial period of the war, to rearm the army and navy, to supply them with a sufficient quantity of new technological equipment and armaments and then to destroy the strongest imperialist army in the world, that of fascist Germany, and the armies of her allies."¹

Yu. P. Petrov describes the development of the Communist Youth organizations in the armed forces. The activity of the Communist Youth organization, emphasizes the author, played an important role in strengthening the armed forces.

By investigating a large number of archive documents, the author researches in great detail all the changes occurring within the

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party build-up of the Red Army during the war period.

The publications describing the work of the party during the war years have also reflected some questions related to the activity of the reliable helper and the basic Party reserve - the Communist Youth Organization. There is a special and sufficiently extensive literature regarding the Communist Youth Organization during the Great Patriotic War. The publications regarding the Communist Youth Organization consist of two studies of a general character reflecting the history of the All-Union Communist Youth Organization as a whole and the specific periods of its activity,² and the publications describing the local Communist Youth Organizations.³

In 1960 a digest has been published with the title "Grand Traditions."⁴ In one of its five sections we find the documents, brief descriptions and reminiscences telling us about the heroism of the Communist Youth and of the youth in general in the struggle against the fascist invaders and the great labor deeds of the young patriots. The book contains a lot of interesting material. It is a pity, however, that the people compiling this digest have included in it primarily only the facts which are already well known to our readers.

The literature regarding the local Communist Youth Organizations differs in terms of style and variety which unquestionably is one of its positive points. The brief descriptions, stories, novels, reminiscences, letters and diaries describe the history of the Communist Youth Organizations in the republics, the cities, villages and factories, from their inception through the postwar period.

It should be noted that among the books and brochures regarding the local Communist Youth Organizations there are some which describe their activity only during the wartime,⁵ and there are books (the volume of these is considerably greater) in which only one or two sections are devoted to the war.⁶

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During the postwar period there were attempts to describe the history of the Communist Youth Organization and its heroic deeds during the Great Patriotic War.⁷ However, so far we have only very few serious investigations of this subject matter. The whole published literature available to us regarding the Communist Youth Organization during the war years is merely the beginning of the Soviet geographic history related to this important question.

To summarize, the Soviet geographic history, removing the shortcomings and errors in the description of the events of the Great Patriotic War, moves unhesitatingly forward. The Soviet historians have done very much for the objective study of the great effort of the Soviet people, strictly and scientifically disclosing the laws governing the victory of the socialist order during the past war. The labors of the Soviet historians are facilitated by the spiritual growth of the Soviet people, and in particular, by the patriotic upbringing of the youth based on the heroic traditions of the past.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

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1. One can not recognize as correct the following evaluation of the state of Soviet historical science which was presented in the article "Problems of period description in Soviet historical science," by M. E. Naydenov, which state as follows: "Precisely in the years 1946-1956 a full scope and the greatest advantages in the Soviet historical science have been defined, resting firmly on the rock-solid foundation of the Marxist-Leninist methodology." "History of the USSR," No. 1, p. 95, 1961.

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1. "On the questions of the history of the Communist Party of the USSR," "Military-historical journal," "History of the USSR," "New and current history."

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1. I. I. Vlasov. V. I. Lenin and the build-up of the Soviet Army, Voennoye Press, Moscow, 1958; D. Grinishin. Military activity of V. I. Lenin. 2nd Edition, Voennoye Press, Moscow, 1960; N. F. Kuz'min. V. I. Lenin in charge of the defense of the Soviet land. Voennoye Press, 1958; Marxism-Leninism about the war and army. 2nd Edition, Voennoye Press, Moscow, 1961; The military-theoretical heritage of V. I. Lenin. Voennoye Press, Moscow, 1964.

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1. History of international relations and the foreign policy of the USSR. Volume 2, 1939-1945, publication of the Institute of International Relations, Moscow, 1962.

* Page numbers listed above correspond to the page numbers of the foreign text; footnote numbers correspond to the numbers given in the foreign text.

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2. Against the falsification of the history of the Second World War. Digest of articles, "Nauka Press," Moscow, 1964.

3. The figures are based on the bibliographic information from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, section of the history of the Great Patriotic War.

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2. Documents from the German foreign ministry. Excerpts I-III. Moscow, Gospolit Press, 1946.

3. Communist Party of the USSR, resolutions and decisions of the meetings, conferences, and plenary sessions of the Central Committee. 7th Edition. Part 3, 1930-1964. Gospolit Press, Moscow, 1954; The laws related to the defense of the USSR. The systematic digest of laws, decisions and orders. Voennoye Press, Moscow, 1939; The law of general military duty service. Voennoye Press, Moscow, 1939.

4. Foreign policy of the USSR. Compilation of documents. Vol. IV (1935-June 1941). Moscow, 1946, p. 556.

5. "Pravda," June 23, 1941.

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1. See "Battles for Crimea." Compilation of articles and documents. Symferopol, "Red Crimea," 1945; Battle for Tula. Compilation of materials and documents. 3rd Edition. Tula Book Press, 1957; The heroic Odessa. Regional Odessa Press, Odessa, 1945; Heroic defense of Sevastopol, 1941-1942. Compilation of documents and materials. Krym Press, Symferopol, 1946; Heroic Stalingrad. Compilation of documents and materials. Books 1-2. Astrakhan, 1948; Liberated Tikhvin. Compilation of documents and materials describing the destruction of the German-fascist armies near Tikhvin in December 1941. Leningrad Press, Leningrad, 1943.
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GEOGRAPHIC HISTORY IN THE FRATERNAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

INTRODUCTION

The victory of revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries has created rich opportunities for the development of historical science. At the present time the historical science in the countries of the socialist camp is on a steep rise and the road will be an arduous and not an easy one.

The past historical science in these countries was at the service of the leading bourgeois-landlord circles. It had to glorify their policies, hiding the truth regarding the real course of the historical process. In the geographic history of that time the subjective methodology prevailed, the role of the people was distorted or overlooked and the most important problems of the world history were not studied.

In essence, previously in such countries as Albania, Indochina (Vietnam, Mongolian People's Republic) there was no historical science at all. In Albania for example, there were almost no scientifically prepared historians and the scientific institutes and schools of higher studies which would investigate and develop the questions regarding the national history, were absent.

After the victory of the socialist revolutions the position of historical science in a number of countries was quite difficult. The remaining qualified historians of the old school were supporting the bourgeois-nationalist points of view. The first serious obstacle in the development of historical science in the young socialist countries was lack of a qualified personnel, the historians-Marxists.

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The second obstacle retarding the development of the investigative work of the historians was the absence of sufficiently well documented base. The archives in the majority of countries embarking on the road to socialism turned out to be in a chaotic state. Numerous valuable documents and materials were either destroyed, scattered in various places or hidden by different individuals.

Stalin's cult of personality inflicted a great harm to the historical science in the socialist countries. The distorted description of the history in the socialist countries has been extensively applied and the subjectivism and arbitrary approach regarding the evaluation of the historical events and the role of the political personalities participating in them, has been quite manifest. The situation was created to administrate and apply an unfair criticism which confined the creative initiative of the historians, retarding the development of important scientific problems. The denouncement of Stalin's cult of personality and vigorous struggle against its consequences was one of the most important prerequisites for the development of historical science in the socialist countries.

At the present time the socialist countries have the institutes of Party history, the Party schools of higher learning attached to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties, the military and historical institutes, the institutes of history attached to the 1452 Academy of Sciences and other scientific research institutions which conduct the scientific studies investigating in particular the historical problems of the Second World War, preparing the qualified ranks of historians.

The institutes of Party history attached to the Central Committees of the Communist and Worker's Parties (in the German Democratic Republic - the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the Social Unity Party of Germany) study the history of the antifascist Resistance Movement, the creation and activity of

underground communist organizations and the military struggle of the people in the occupied countries against the German-fascist occupation forces. The institutes publish special magazines which include the studies of the history of the national-liberation struggle and the Resistance Movement.

The Central Committees of the communist and worker's Parties in all socialist countries have undertaken a number of measures directed toward the development of the Marxist historical science. The archives of the institutes of the Party history have compiled a valuable documentation and materials regarding the occupation regime, the activity of the communist and worker parties, the national antifascist struggle for liberation, sabotage, strike movements and various demonstrations. From the point of view of researchers, the numerous documents of the illegal communist organizations, their leaflets and appeals are of considerable interest as well as the materials pertaining to the illegal radio stations.

At the present time the state archives of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the German Democratic Republic, the Chinese People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia contain a large number of documents and various historical materials. The most important documents and materials are to be found in the archives of the historical military institutes of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Primarily these documents are related to the military operations and the military activity of the guerilla detachments and various other groups.

The military historical institute attached to the defense ministries and also the military academies are involved predominantly in the study of military history.

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An important incentive in the development of the historical science in socialist countries is the cooperation between the historians of the USSR and of the other socialist countries. The historians of the socialist countries utilize quite extensively the experience accumulated by the historians of the USSR. In particular, one must point out the role of the Soviet schools of higher learning and the scientific-research institutions in preparing the ranks of the historians-Marxists. Numerous historians of Czechoslovakia, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries have upgraded their scientific qualifications in the Academy of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, at the Advanced Party School of the CC CPSU, in the Moscow and Leningrad State Universities and some other Soviet Schools of higher learning.

The creative conferences of historians invariably facilitate the successful resolution of the most important problems. The scientific session of the commission of historians of the German Democratic Republic and the USSR which took place in Leipzig in the fall of 1957 has considered the question regarding the basic directions taken by the bourgeois reactionary geographic history during the Second World War, and this has helped to enhance the struggle against the falsification of the most important events which took place during the Second World War. At the conference called by the commission of historians of the German Democratic Republic and the USSR, which took place in Berlin in December, 1959, and which was attended by more than 500 historians from 21 countries, the question "German imperialism and the Second World War," was discussed. The materials of this conference are a significant contribution to the study of the German history during the fascist dictatorship and the most important problems associated with the Second World War.

One of the forms of cooperation between the historians of the socialist countries is the joint publication of documents reflecting various aspects of the liberation struggle of the peoples of these

countries against the Hitlerite invaders.

The historians of socialist countries also cooperate with the bourgeois historians. The examples of such cooperation are the international conferences on the history of the Resistance Movement. These conferences took place in Milan (1961) and in Karlovy Vary (1963) where the following questions were considered: the allies and the Resistance Movement in Europe, the fascist "New Order" in Europe.

A serious retarding factor in the development of the Marxist historical science in the new socialist countries was the bourgeois-nationalist conceptions which were prevailing in the geographic history of these countries prior to the victory of the socialist revolution. The creation of the Marxist historical science has been realized in the face of an acute struggle against such bourgeois points of view.

The publication in the socialist countries of the works of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and V. I. Lenin and the study in depth of the revolutionary theory supplied the historians with the appropriate Marxist-Leninist methodologies. The decisive factor in the victory of the Marxist-Leninist methodology in the social sciences in the socialist countries was the daily leadership of the communist and worker parties involved in the ideological work. The numerous fundamental questions related to geographic history were discussed in the central committees and even at the plenary sessions of the central committees of the communist and worker parties in the socialist countries. The important stimulus for the creative work of the historians were the presentations of the leading representatives of the communist and workers parties who had presented the Marxist-Leninist evaluation of the historical events and other phenomena.

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At the present time, the Marxist historical science in the new socialist countries has been established. This fact contributes significantly to the common cause of the struggle against the re- /453 actionary bourgeois ideology and the complete victory of the Marxist-Leninist historical science.

The main efforts of the historians of the socialist countries are directed toward the investigation of the prerequisites for the victory of the people's democratic and socialist revolutions, the internal and external factors which resulted in the transition of these countries toward the road of building socialism. The role of the communist and worker parties in organizing the liberation struggle against the German-fascist invaders is being studied with particular attention. The historians also resolve some other important problems associated with the specifics of the economic and political development of each particular country. In the countries which were subjected to the fascist occupation, an extensive investigative work is being conducted to unmask the atrocities of the "New Order" committed by the German-fascist occupation forces and also the criminal policies of the former governing classes.

The Albanian geographic history devotes its efforts primarily to the question of the national liberation struggle against the German-fascist occupation forces. [#] The Bulgarian geographic history pays particular attention to the people's uprising (September 8-9, 1944) which turned a new page in the history of Bulgarian people. A particular attention is being paid in the Bulgarian geographic history to the denouncement of the antinational policy of the fascist rulers of Bulgaria which turned the country into a satellite of fascist Germany. One of the fundamental questions attracting the attention of the Bulgarian historians is the description of the participation of Bulgarian armed forces in the war against Germany at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War.

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The Hungarian historians carry out an extensive study of the Resistance Movement against the Horthy regime and the German-fascist occupation and the denouncement of the antinational role of the Horthy clique.

The historians of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are investigating primarily the national struggle of liberation against the Japanese invaders.

A particular attention is being devoted in the geographic history of the German Democratic Republic to the struggle of the progressive forces of the German people against fascism and against war, to the activity of the Germany communist party, being the organizer and leader of the antifascist struggle, to the denouncement of fascism and its adventurous policy which resulted in the German national catastrophe.

The geographic history of the Chinese People's Republic is emphasizing the history of the creation of a unified national front against Japanese imperialism and the military struggle of the Chinese people for liberty and independence as well as the unmasking of the antinational role which was played by the reactionary leaders of the Kuomintang.

The geographic history of the Korean People's Democratic Republic makes an emphasis on the study of the Resistance Movement against the Japanese invaders and the unmasking of the Japanese occupation regime.

The Mongolian historians devote their main attention to the study of the economic assistance rendered to the Soviet Union by the Mongolian People's Republic during the war and to the direct participation of the armed forces of the republic in the combat against the Japanese invaders.

The Polish historians investigate in depth the September catastrophe of 1939, the consequences of which was the liquidation of the Polish state and the enslavement of the Polish people by the German-fascist invaders. They also unmask the antinational policy of the Polish emigree government in London. The Polish historians pay particular attention to the question related to the military struggle of the Polish people and the participation of the Polish armed forces in the war against Hitler Germany in 1943-1945.

The geographic history of the Romanian People's Republic devotes considerable attention to the people's uprising of August 23 1944. A significant space is devoted in the Romanian geographic history to unmask the antinational policy of the Antonescu fascist regime which involved the country in war against the USSR. The Romanian historians also review in their studies the participation of their armed forces in the fight against Nazi Germany during the concluding stages of the Great Patriotic War.

The Czechoslovak geographic history is characterized by a thorough investigation of the Munich agreement, the consequences of which was the dismemberment of the country, its occupation and the enslavement of the Czechoslovak people by the German-fascist invaders. In parallel, the historians study the Resistance Movement, the role of the Czechoslovak emigrees who attempted during the war to reestablish the republic of pre-Munich type and attempted to prevent the mass armed resistance in the country. Great attention is also being devoted to the liberation mission carried out by the Soviet Armed Forces.

The work of historians of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia concentrate primarily on the military struggle of the Yugoslav people against the German-fascist invaders. A considerable amount of space is being devoted by the Yugoslav geographic history in unmasking the antinational policy of the King's government of the emigrees and its war minister Mihajlovic who cooperated with the German-fascist occupation forces.

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The majority of socialist countries investigate quite thoroughly the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and its decisive role in the destruction of fascist Germany and of the militarists of Japan. The publication "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" in six volumes (translation from Russian) is being printed in the German Democratic Republic, /454 Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. In addition, the socialist countries publish translations of the war memoirs and some other books related to the history of the Soviet Union during the years of the Second World War.

The historians of socialist countries have created a considerable number of works related to the Second World War. In this they have made a considerable contribution to the development of the Marxist-Leninist geographic history and to the struggle against the bourgeois falsifiers of the history of the Second World War.

ALBANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The Albanian historians make the main emphasis on the national liberation movement of the Albanian people. The documents reflecting this struggle are to be found primarily in the State Historical Archive of the Albanian People's Republic and in the archive of the Central Committee of the Albanian Labor Party.¹

The State Historical Archives contain the documents of the central and grass root organizations of the Albanian Communist Party, the directives of the General Staff of the National Army of Liberation (after the war - the People's Army). They also contain the documents of the Central Council of the antifascist national liberation front, etc. The documents describing the course of military operations are represented quite fully. Also of considerable interest are the materials containing the rebuff given by the National Liberation Front to the English and American High Command which

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attempted, under the pretext of "assistance" to the liberation movement in Albania, to land their armed forces in the south of the country. The archives also contain the documents of the Italian local overlord authorities which disclose the policy of the Italian government and of the Albanian puppet governments during the Italian-fascist occupation, the reports of local and regional police authorities, the file of the Ministry of Interior, of the Foreign Ministry, of the Ministry of National Economy, etc. The archives also contain the materials regarding the activity of the reactionary organizations "Balli Kombetar" and "Legalitet."

The archive of the Central Committee of the Albanian Labor Party contains documents reflecting the policy of the party during the wartime.

Albanian historians have published several digests of the documents. In the beginning of the sixties a first volume, "Basic Documents of the Albanian Labor party," has been published.² In parallel with the documents of the party build-up, the digest contains materials describing the policy of the communist party during various stages of the national struggle of liberation. The digest contains the documents reflecting the tremendous importance which has been attached to the historical victories of the Red Army in liberating Albania from the German-fascist invaders.

Numerous analogous materials are presented in the digest "Documents of the Albanian-Soviet Friendship."³

The digest of documents "Leaflets and appeals of the Communist Party of Albania, 1941-1944"⁴ contains materials which enable us to judge the policies of the party regarding the various classes of Albanian society and the main directions taken by the communists at various stages of the antifascist liberation movement. The digest also contains documents regarding the work of the Communist Party of Albania among the soldiers of the occupation forces and among

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the prisoners of war.

The publication "Documents of the Higher Authorities of the Revolutionary National Liberation Power (1942-1944)"⁵ describes the creation of a new state and the policy of the national liberation front on the question of the struggle against the fascist occupation forces.

The digest "Pages of the Glorious Road of the National Army"⁶ contains excerpts from the most important documents related to the history of the National Army of liberation.

The digests "Documents and Historical Materials on the Struggle of the Albanian People for Liberty and Independence, 1917-1941," "Protocols of the National Assembly (October 16-November 10, 1943)," "The National Bank of Albania, the Albanian Economy from April 1939 through March 1943,"⁷ give us a general idea regarding the internal situation within the country during the war, the policy of the occupation forces and of the puppet government, the resistance of the people prior to the moment when the National Liberation Front had been created. Valuable material regarding the history of the national liberation struggle is contained in the periodic publications of the 1945 wartime and in the first place, in the newspapers and magazines which were representing the Communist Party ("Voice of the People"), the National Liberation Front ("Bulletin of the National Liberation Struggle"), ("Call to Freedom") and the Union of the Antifascist Youth ("Unity").

The position of the enemies of the national liberation movement is reflected in the official government publications of that time - the newspapers "Tomori," "Unity of the Nation," "Freedom of Albany," and also in the publications of the reactionary organizations, "Balli Kombetar," "Legalitet," "National Guard," and others.

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Among the memoir literature, of greatest interest is the book by Major General Sh. Peci "Reminiscences and Documents about the National Liberation Struggle."¹ Sh. Peci, who started as a leader of a guerilla unit, ending up as the Chief of Staff of the 3rd, 5th and 24th brigade within the military operation zone Kosovo-Meto, presents a documented review of the military activity in which he personally took part.

The small books by M. Shehu written in 1945 when the events were quite fresh, "On the Eve of Liberation," and "Reminiscences from the Life of the First Combat Brigade,"² describe some of the episodes in the concluding stages of the national liberation struggle.

The memoir literature also includes the diary by H. Xhelo "860 days of Struggle," the book by Major General N. Rino "Plot of Sand and Blood," and the digest of reminiscences of the participants in the national liberation movement "The Guerillas Relate."³

The books by P. Bedo "From Kuci to Vishegrad," "In the Heart of the Mountains," the book by G. Kollumbi "Diary of a Guerilla," by S. Andoni "Guerilla Warfare," and by K. Rafaili "The Unit of Rebels in Action,"⁴ represent the descriptive literary diaries. The book by S. Andoni presents some concrete data regarding the joint action of the Albanian and Greek guerillas, the struggle which took place in the national liberation councils, the relationship between the people and "Balli Kombetar" units and the political duplicity of the governments of the USA and England.

In 1958 a small but well documented book was published in Albania prepared for publication by L. Kasneci and R. Janushi, "Tempered in the Fire of War,"⁵ which contained an analysis of the military activity taking place on the territory of Albania.

The scientific articles and popular material devoted to the national liberation movement of the Albanian people are presented

quite frequently by N. Plasari. His studies are of historical-party character, but at the same time they contain a considerable amount of concrete material regarding the national liberation movement.⁶ Plasari shows the role of the Albanian Communist Party in organizing the resistance to the fascist invaders, its place in the national liberation movement, and also considers the strategy and tactics of the Albanian Communist Party at different stages of the national liberation movement.

A large amount of material is devoted to the national liberation movement, which can be found in the popular book "Teaching Manual of the History of the Albanian Labor Party."⁷

In all the most important documents of the Albanian Communist Party the decisive role of the Soviet Union in destroying fascism and the effect of the victories of the Red Army on the successes of the Albanian National Liberation Army are duly noted. In numerous instances the Party also has emphasized a great significance of the military cooperation between the Albanian patriots and the peoples of other Balkan countries, in the first place, the peoples of Yugoslavia and Greece.

However, the interaction between the armies of liberation has not been extensively developed in the studies of the Albanian historians. The study of the Second World War is limited in Albania within a strict national frame of reference.

BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

During the years of the power of the people in Bulgaria a large amount of material and various documents have been collected and systematically compiled. The documents and materials reflecting the leading role of the Bulgarian Worker's Party⁸ in organizing the

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antifascist people's struggle for liberation and the Patriotic War of the Bulgarian people are concentrated in the Central Party Archive at the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

The military historical archives of the Defense Ministry /456 of the Bulgarian People's Republic (BPR) contain the most important documents related to the participation of Bulgaria in the Patriotic War. Of considerable interest are the archives from the Main Command of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Armies and of specific units which took part in combat. The orders, reports, diaries and other documents ascertain the multifaceted activity of the Bulgarian people and the Bulgarian army during the Patriotic War. In parallel, they also describe the joint combat activity of the Soviet, Bulgarian and Yugoslavian units and the comprehensive assistance given by the Soviet High Command to the Bulgarian People's Army.

Rather interesting documents regarding the Patriotic War (primarily in the form of the accusative material in conjunction with the people's court action during the process of the Bulgarian fascist and criminals of war in 1944-1945) are being kept in the archive of the Ministry of Interior of BPR and to some extent in the Central State Historical Archive of BPR.

The originals of the documents and materials devoted to the history of Bulgaria during the Second World War, and the participation of the Bulgarian people in the Patriotic War are being collected in the State Central and District Historical Archives of the BPR newly created after 1951. One of the most extensive ones is the Central State Historical Archive. Among the documents involved one should mention in the first place the documents of the People's Assembly, of the Council of Ministers and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A considerable number of interesting documents are also kept in the archives of the Museum of the Revolutionary

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Movement in Bulgaria, in Sofia, and in the district, state and party archives.

The publication of digests containing such documents was begun immediately after the victory of September 9, 1944. In 1944 a new digest called "Guerilla Warfare"¹ was issued which contained the articles and materials from the illegal guerilla newspapers: "Chetnick Struggle" (publication of Kocho Chistemenskiy rebel detachment and "Uprisers Struggle" (publication of the 1st Rodop Georgiy Dimitrov rebel brigade). In the same year the readers were able to familiarize themselves with a documentary digest "People's Voice."² This digest incorporated articles, appeals, orders, informational bulletins and other materials published in June-August 1944 in the newspaper "People's Voice" (publication of the 1st Khristo Botev intermountain guerilla brigade." In 1945 a documentary digest "Struggle for the 9th of September"³ was issued which contained the documents and other materials published from October 1943 through July 1944 in the newspaper "Voice of the Fatherland" which was the publication of an illegal committee of the Plovdiv home front. In 1947 a digest was issued, "Friend of the People,"⁴ containing the materials which were published under the same heading from 1943 through August 1944 in the newspaper which was the publication of the staff of the VI guerilla operational zone.

The great scientific value of these first documentary publications is beyond any question. However, they reflect the revolutionary struggle of the people only on a local scale and do not present any revolutionary activity in the whole country. This shortcoming was, to some degree, compensated by a book "Armed Resistance against Fascism in Bulgaria, 1923-1944,"⁵ which contained a number of reviews and documents. The documents presented in this book illustrate the situation of the working people, the fascist terror and the people's liberation movement in Bulgaria during the Second World War.

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In 1954 a digest was published "Illegal Appeals of the BPR,"⁶ which contains the documents of the party during the whole period of its illegal activity from 1923 through 1944. The years 1941-1944 are represented by a comparatively small amount of documents: the leaflets of the Central Committee of the BPR and of the local party organizations, the materials of the National Committee of the Home Front and of the specific guerilla detachments and brigades.

Of considerable interest is the digest of articles and materials published in 1954 by the central mouth piece of the worker's party - the newspaper "People's Work," and embracing the time periods from 1927 through September 9, 1944.⁷

The documentary digest regarding the operation of the Bulgarian communists in the army⁸ includes the leaflets, appeals, letters and articles from illegal publications, "Khristo Botev" radio station broadcasts of that time and also the letters and reports of the fascist army command and of the police regarding the activity of the party in military detachments. The digest contains the appeals to the soldiers and officers and some other documents of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Worker's Party, of the National Committee of the Home Front, of the Union of Worker's Youth, of the Main Staff of the People's Liberation Army, of the district committees of the party and the guerilla detachments and brigades, etc.

The digest of documents published in Sofia in 1960 is devoted to the operation of the capital city BPR organization in 1941-1944.⁹

The Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the BPR has published a large documentary digest reflecting the revolutionary movement in the country from June 22, 1941 through September 9, 1944.¹⁰

The digest contains the most important documents of the

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Central Committee of the BPR, of the National Committee of the Home Front, of the Central Committee of the Worker's Union of Youth, of the main staff of the People's Liberation Army, of the district committees of the Bulgarian Worker's Party, of the numerous guerilla detachments, brigades, etc. The digest is separated into three sections: 1. Organization of the people's resistance, the military struggle and creation of the home front (June 1941-January 1943); 2. Creation of the People's Liberation Army and increase in the antifascist struggle (February 1943-May 1944); 3. Extensive spread of the struggle and the military uprising for the people's democracy (May 1944-September 9, 1944).

In 1962 in Berlin a digest of documents was issued in German regarding the military struggle of the Bulgarian people against fascism in 1941-1944.¹ The digest was prepared by the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the BPR and by the Institute of History of European Countries in People's Democracies at Karl Marx Leipzig University and contains the introductions by the Bulgarian and German editors P. Georgiev and B. Sieru, as well as a meaningful forward.

The common shortcoming of all digests published up to the present time is the fact that they contain very few documents reflecting the economic situation in the country. The majority of published digests lack the documents from the beginning of the Second World War through June 1941 and the documents which showed the participation of the army of the Bulgarian People's Democracy during the Patriotic War against fascist Germany (September 1944-May 1945).

In recent years the archive materials regarding the Second World War are being published systematically in Bulgaria in "News of the State Archives,"² "News of the Institute of BPR History at the Central Committee of BPR,"³ and in some other periodicals.

The works of Georgiy Dimitrov and some other leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party and of the People's Republic of Bulgaria are of great interest for those who study the history of Bulgaria during the Second World War. The publications of G. Dimitrov referring to the participation of the Bulgarian people in the anti-fascist struggle and in the Patriotic War against the German fascist invaders, have been compiled in the last four volumes of his 14 volume work published in Sofia. His main works are published in Russian in the second volume of the Selected publications by G. Dimitrov.⁵

Among the publications by G. Dimitrov one should mention the radio broadcast transmitted by Christo Botev radio station on July 17, 1942, which represented the program of the home front with the articles "Which way for Bulgaria?" and "Crisis of Bulgaria" (published in "Pravda" on September 16 and December 27, 1943). The broadcast also contained the order issued to the chief of staff of the guerilla detachments to start forming the first guerilla people's liberation division and dated August 27, 1944, the letter from the Central Committee of the BPR "Everything for the front!" (September 28, 1944), "Political report of the Central Committee of the BPR presented at the V Party Congress" (December 19, 1948).

The memoir literature is a valuable source in the study of the struggle of the Bulgarian people against fascism in the Second World War. Such memoirs began to be published in the Bulgarian periodic press from the very first days when the people's democracy was established in the country. After that, a number of digests and reminiscences as well as several books of memoir character have been published.⁶ Then there are several special bibliographies and studies which were issued regarding the memoir literature.⁷

The memoirs truthfully describe the heroic struggle of the

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Bulgarian people against fascism and the leading role of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The authors emphasize the mass character of this struggle, the unity of the party and of the people, the organic relationship between the successes of the Red Army and the increase in the guerilla warfare in Bulgaria, resulting in the victory in the people's uprising of September 9, 1944.

In 1957 the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the BPR issued a digest of reminiscences devoted to the people's uprising of September 9, 1944.⁸ The materials in this digest tell the story of the military antifascist struggle and how, inspired by the victories of the Red Army, the Bulgarian working people led by the Communist Party have stood up for the last fight with fascism and for the first time in Bulgarian history had established its own government - the government of The Home Front.

A valuable contribution is the publication prepared by the Institute of the Party History at the Central Committee of the BPR "History of the Bulgarian Communist Party."⁹ The Institute of History of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences has published "History of Bulgaria," the third volume of which embraces the wartime.¹

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Among a number of serious publications and studies regarding Bulgarian history during the Second World War are the books by N. Gornenski "Military Struggle of the Bulgarian People for Liberation from Hitler's Occupation and from the Monarchy and Fascist Dictatorship (1941-1944)"² and by V. Bozhinov "Political Crisis in Bulgaria in 1943-1944."³ N. Gornenski investigates the struggle of the people of Bulgaria continuing several years against Hitler's occupation forces and against the Bulgarian monarchists and fascists. In writing his book he made use of a considerable number of primary sources of information, of party documents and of already available publications. He has also systematically compiled comprehensively the extensive material available to him. The book sequentially

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unfolds a general picture of the people's struggle, of the mass people's uprising and of the establishment in the country of a people's democracy.

The book of V. Bozhinov tells us about the events of the last year of the monarchy and fascist dictatorships's existence, and of the Hitler rule in Bulgaria - from September 1943 through September 1944. The author discloses the main reasons for the crisis which had arisen during this time period, embracing all aspects of the state, social, political and industrial life in the land. The central subject matter in Bozhinov's book, which is developed particularly meticulously, is the international situation in Bulgaria. The continuation of this work by Bozhinov is his new book "Protection of the National Independence of Bulgaria, 1944-1947"⁴ in which he speaks about the participation of the country in the Patriotic War against the fascist Germany.

The publication by S. Petrova "Struggle of the BPR to establish the People's Democracy, May-September 1944" is of considerable interest.⁵

A number of historical studies have been devoted to the Patriotic War of the Bulgarian people against Hitler's Germany. The most important ones are the three-volume collective work "National War of Bulgaria, 1944-1945" which has been edited by the military historical department of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense. In 1961 the first volume of this publication made its appearance.⁶ It embraces the period from 1941 through October 8, 1944 (the beginning of the advancing activities of the Bulgarian army). It considers the struggle of the Bulgarian people against the monarchist and fascist dictatorship during the Second World War, the victory of the people's uprising of September 9, 1944, the decisive role played by the USSR in liberating Bulgaria and preparation for the Patriotic War of the Bulgarian people. The main emphasis in this volume is devoted to the

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preparation of Bulgaria to participate in the Patriotic War and also the creation of the Bulgarian People's Army.

The second volume of this publication has been issued in 1963.⁷ It is devoted to the combat activity of the Bulgarian People's Army during the first period of the Patriotic War of the Bulgarian people (October 8 through the end of November 1944). During this time period the 1st, 2nd and 4th Bulgarian Armies participated in the Nisa, Stracinsko-Cumranovsk, Bragalnicko-Strumiskiy and Kosovo advancing operations on the territory of Yugoslavia, inflicting heavy losses to the Hitlerites in the Balkans. The same volume points out that by advancing to the valley of the southern Morava and the Vardar and also reaching Kosovo district, the Bulgarian People's Army cut off the German fascist armies located in Greece, making their retreat impossible in the northern and north-western directions. In doing this, it also secured the left flank of the Soviet armies of the 3rd Ukrainian front which were conducting the Belgrade operation.

The collective authorship consisting of Shch. Atanosov, L. Danailov, M. Alexiev, P. Khadzhivanov, B. Cholpanov, has published a book "Brief History of the Patriotic War."⁸ The authors describe the combat activities of the Bulgarian People's Army and the contribution of it to the liberation of Macedonia and the expulsion of the Hitler armies from the Balkan Peninsula, noting the valuable assistance rendered by the Army protecting the left flank of the Soviet armies of the 3rd Ukrainian front, as well as its participation in the operations of liberating Hungary and Austria.

The Patriotic War of the Bulgarian people and its specific operations as well as the development of combat friendship between the Bulgarian and Soviet people, are also investigated by other authors.⁹

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The Bulgarian geographic history contains the studies which 1459 are specially devoted to the Bulgarian-Soviet cooperation during the war against Hitler's Germany in 1944-1945. These are the article by G. Ginchev regarding the assistance of the USSR in strengthening the rear lines of the Bulgarian People's Army during the Great Patriotic War of the Bulgarian people,¹ the article by I. B'chvarov about the utilization of the Red Army experiences and assistance given by it during the creation of the Bulgarian People's Army,² the articles of I. Filchev regarding the Bulgarian-Soviet combat friendship during the Great Patriotic War,³ the reminiscences of prominent military individuals regarding the assistance rendered by the Soviet Military Advisers to the Bulgarian army in 1944-1945.⁴

In the publication devoted to the Second World War, the Bulgarian historians allocate a significant space in describing the deciding role played by the Soviet Union in the destruction of the German fascism and in the liberation of the Bulgarian people from the German-fascist yoke.

Some authors present the material which shows that the development of the people's liberation movement in Bulgaria made use of the revolutionary experiences of the Russian people, using the example of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against fascist aggression. ~~The~~ The latter facts were of great importance. For example, N. Gornenskiy speaking about the events in the beginning of September 1944 writes as follows: "If the armed forces of the fascist dictatorship were scattered by one single blow, then the exceptional merit should belong to the Soviet army which, by its rapid advance, caused complete confusion in the ranks of the enemy, paralyzing its will to do anything."⁵

The Bulgarian historians note that the Soviet Union has shielded the People's Democracy of Bulgaria from occupation by the Western

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imperialist countries, rendering brotherly help in concluding the armistice.

In his book "Political Crisis in Bulgaria in 1943-1944" V. Bozhinov reviews the course of negotiations regarding the armistice between the states of the anti-Hitler coalition and the People's Democracy in Bulgaria. Pointing out the importance of the decision to conduct the negotiations in Moscow and not in Cairo, as was suggested by the English representatives, or in Ankara, something that the Americans were insisting on, Bozhinov writes as follows: "This was the victory of the Soviet policy which was of tremendous positive value also for the Bulgarian people. The Bulgarian national interest could be considered and understood in the fraternal Moscow, since the Soviet Union actually played a decisive and leading role in preparing the armistice with Bulgaria."⁶ The author compares the armistice conditions of bondage proposed by the American and English representatives in Cairo with the armistice conditions signed in Moscow. The latter has recognized that Bulgaria took part in the war against Hitler's Germany and has guaranteed the existence of Bulgaria as a free and independent state.

HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The main emphasis that the Hungarian historians make involves the investigation of the problems associated with the participation of their country in the war against the USSR and the Resistance Movement against the Horthy regime and the German-fascist occupation forces.

The Hungarian geographic history of the Second World War has a considerable primary source base.

The documents and materials regarding the history of the worker's movement during the Second World War are concentrated in the archives of the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the

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Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP). These archives also contain the reports of the committee chairman, of the police, of the militarized police and of the Office of Social Safety, to the minister of foreign affairs, which contain the reports regarding the economic situation and the struggle of workers to satisfy their needs and also the struggle against the German occupation forces and their Hungarian accomplices.

The valuable information regarding the struggle of the working class and of some other progressive forces in the country against the Horthy regime and against war are also found in the files of trials directed against communists. In particular, the most important value of these materials is the fact that they complement to some degree the history of the communist party underground activity in Hungary.

The archives of the Institute of Party History also contains the shorthand reports of the meetings of the Social-Democratic party and the materials of local construction and steel unions. These materials contain the correspondence with the Labor Union Council /460 regarding the strike movement and working wages, disclosing the treacherous activity of the union leaders of the right.

In investigating the history of Hungary during the Second World War, the documents and materials collected in the All-Hungarian State Archive in Budapest are of great interest. These archives contain the proceedings of the meetings of the Hungarian Council of Ministers which disclose the essential antipeople, antinational essence of the policies of the leading Horthy clique. The reactionary Hungarian leaders devoted a great attention to the fulfillment of the agricultural deliveries for Germany, squeezing out as much profit as possible for its own bourgeois class, guarding the interests of the large capitalists and landlords. The archives of the Prime Minister Chancellery contain a large number of documents and materials reflecting the position of the workers and peasants and their struggle for its own class interest.

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The proceedings and protocols of meetings of the government and of the King's Council disclose some aspects of the Horthy foreign policy. The most important documents regarding the Hungarian foreign policy during the Second World War are concentrated in the archives of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among these materials are the correspondences which are only partially preserved between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Horthy's Hungary and the diplomatic representatives abroad. These documents are supplemented by the materials which were in the diplomatic missions of Berlin, Tokyo, Washington, London and other capitals. These materials disclose the true secret thinking of the Hungarian leaders and their partners in aggression - the Nazi Germany and Italy and also of the western imperialist states. The files of the Hungarian embassy in Rome contain the conversations between the Hungarian Prime Ministers Bardosy and Kallay and Hitler and Mussolini, Pope Pious XII and also the recordings of closed sessions of the foreign ministry commissions of both chambers of the Hungarian parliament. The materials found in the Hungarian embassy in Istanbul and in the consular services at Ankara contain the information regarding the negotiations conducted by the Hungarian diplomats with the representatives of England and the USA.

The archives of the Foreign Ministry also contain important documents. Of great interest are the unpublished materials of the Hungarian trials of the war criminals which enable us to study in detail the policies and practical actions of the main leading groups and stratas of the Hungarian governing class.

The valuable documents and materials are also accumulated in the military-historical archive of the Defense Ministry of the Hungarian People's Republic. Among these are the documents of the Chief of the General Staff, the documents of the War Minister, the documents and materials of the armies of the Carpathian Group and of the 2nd Hungarian Army and also the documents related to the guerilla

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movement and memoirs. From the memoirs one must mention in particular the memoirs of the Chief of Military Intelligence D. Kadar and of the former Prime Minister G. Lakatosz.

Hungary has also published several digests of documents related to the history of the Second World War.

Of certain interest is the digest of documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Horthy's Hungary from 1933-1944.¹ The digest publishes for the first time numerous proceedings of the meetings of the Council of Ministers, the special report of the responsible dignitaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the reports of ambassadors, ministerial communications, etc. The position of Horthy's Hungary with respect to the Anschluss is described in detail, as well as the participation of Hungary in splitting Czechoslovakia, in the attack on Yugoslavia and the 1st and 2nd mediations in Vienna. The digest also contains the reports of the ambassadors in Berlin regarding the preparation to embark on "Barbarossa plan" and the development of Hitler's plans regarding the colonization of the Soviet Union. At the center of the attention of the individual compiling the digest was the development of Hungarian-German relationships. The documents and the introductory articles preceding each chapter recreate the picture of a general transformation of Hungary, led by its fascist rulers, from the ally of Hitler's Germany into its subservient state and then into the colony occupied by the German armies.

The Hungarian People's Republic has initiated the publication of a six-volume work containing the diplomatic documents and materials related to the eve of the Second World War and the whole Second World War time period. The two volumes, the first and fourth, have already been published.² The fourth volume, edited by G. Juhasz embraces the years 1939-1940.³

In the study of the history of the foreign policy during the

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Second World War, of great interest is the personal archive of Horthy which contains the correspondence of the Hungarian regent with Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and other heads of state and governments and also with Horthy Prime Ministers Daranyi, Teleki, Bardosy, Kallay and Stojai regarding the main questions of external and internal policies of Hungary. The documents in this archive reflect in particular the attempts of the Horthy clique to save its regime utilizing the leading circles of England and the USA. Some of the documents speak of contradictions between Hungary, Romania and Slovakia which have been extensively used by the German rulers. The main documents of this archive have been published in the digest "Secret Documents of Miklos Horthy."⁴

The compilation of the documents edited by Miklos Horvath /461 is devoted to the subject of one of the most important operations during the Great Patriotic War - the destruction by the Red Army of the 2nd Hungarian Army on the river Don in January 1943.¹ The documents from the former Foreign Ministry, from the army command and from specific military units referring to the time period April 1942-March 1943, describe comprehensively and in great detail the unsatisfactory military preparedness, the old fashioned military equipment of the 2nd Army which was not up to its strength and which had been sent facing certain destruction. The papers describe poor morale and complete demoralization in the armed forces, inept leadership, the details of sudden Soviet attack and rapid destruction of the 2nd Army, the duplicity of the German "allies" who did not fulfill their responsibility to supply the Hungarian Army, forcing the weakly armed Hungarian soldiers to cover the retreat of the German armies. The digest contains the materials containing reluctant admissions of the Hungarian High Command regarding the combat, materiel and moral advantages of the Red Army.

The final destruction of Horthy Hungary, the liberation of the country by the Red Army and the establishment of the democratic regime are described in the documents of a large digest published on the

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tenth anniversary of Hungarian liberation.² The materials in this digest describe all aspects of this historical event: the combat activities on the territory of Hungary, the stepped-up resistance movement, the policy of the leading circles and special classes, the first steps in organizing a new regime and the activity of the Debrecen temporary national government, the economic and political assistance of the Soviet Union, the reestablishment of the communist and of some other organizations of workers.

The extensive documental materials regarding the activity of the underground Communist Party and the Resistance Movement during the wartime is contained in the fifth volume of the documents on the history of the Hungarian worker's movement published by the Institute of History of the Hungarian Worker's Movement (at the present time, Institute of the Party History at the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party).³ The digest contains the police and military police reports, the communist leaflets, the articles from the underground publications of the Hungarian Communist Party, transcriptions of broadcasts beamed from Koszut radio station originated by the Hungarian Foreign Bureau at the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party located in the Soviet Union, etc. The documents are also being published which unmask the deviational, quite frequently openly treacherous activity of the right wing Social Democrats. The documents in such digests clearly show the growing hatred among the workers and other population strata toward fascist Germany, increased influence of the Communist Party and the popularity of the USSR and the attempt of progressive forces toward unification which resulted in the organization of the active Resistance Movement.

In 1954 in Hungary a special edition was published of the underground periodical issue of the Communist Party newspaper "Szabad Nep"⁴ of the wartime and some leaflets in which the party was marking the way out of this war, struggling to create the national independence front and expell from its country the German-fascist occupation forces. The party assumed to reach this goal in joint action with the Red Army.

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The monstrous atrocities of German fascism and its Hungarian collaborators are presented in the first two volumes of the documents describing the persecution of Jews in Hungary and the destruction of the larger part of the Jewish population in Hungary during the last year of the war.⁵ This publication is unquestionably one of the most valuable compilation of documents regarding the Hitler race policies and the fascist "New Order" in the occupied Europe. Unfortunately, the published volumes also contain details which are of no interest and at the same time some of the most important documents are missing, for example, the reports of Ferenzi who was the Hungarian liaison man between the militarized police and Eichmann, which pertain to the expulsion of Jews, sending them to the concentration camps. There are also two volumes of documents compiled by E. Karsai pertaining to Horthy's race policy. These documents tell the story of the fate of Jews mobilized into "worker's squads" who were sent to the front lines and annihilated in the mine fields.⁶

The leaders of fascist parties and the state leaders of the Horthy regime, responsible for crimes committed by Hungarian fascists during the Second World War, went to trial in Hungary in 1945-1946. The materials of three major trials are published in the series "Judgement of History." The published trial material referring to the case of the former prime minister and the foreign minister, one of the leaders of the government "Hungarian Party of Life," L. Bardossy,⁷ show how he dragged Hungary into the Second World War by organizing an attack on Yugoslavia, with which Hungary had signed an agreement four months before about the "eternal friendship and permanent peace." Bardossy was one of the organizers of the provocation committed by the fascist pirates by instigating a make-believe "Soviet attack" on the city of Coszice (which was at that time part of Hungary) and this was used by the Hungarian government as a reason to start the war against the Soviet Union. The materials of the B. Imredy trial,¹ who was the organizer and leader of the "Hungarian

Party of Renewal" and former prime minister of Horthy's Hungary, unmask him and his cronies as a group of adventurers attempting to tie Hungary closer with Hitler's Germany. The materials of Nilafashists trial who were led by F. Szalasi² and who took over the power on October 15, 1944, disclose the plans of the most reactionary personalities of fascist Hungary in their attempt to establish the bloody totalitarian regime and close cooperation with Hitler Germany.

The Hungarians issued many memoirs. The memoirs of General N. V. Nagybaczoni, the former war minister in 1942-1943, present the facts unmasking the policy of Horthy-Kallay.³ The author describes in detail his meetings with Hitler, Göring, Keitel, Horthy and others. The book also contains several documents from the Hungarian general staff and from the Ministry of War.

A rather interesting information is contained in the reminiscences of the leaders and participants of the Resistance Movement. An outstanding activist in the Hungarian Communist Party, L. Feher, in his memoirs⁴ describes in detail the combat activity of the guerilla unit commanded by him. This unit fought the occupation forces in Budapest from September 1944 through January 1945. It is the basis of reminiscences of the active participants of the guerilla movement, the history of the guerilla unit active in the fall of 1944 and winter 1944-1945 in Ujpesti - the workers suburbs of the capital.⁵ The industrial and mining districts of the country were the centers of the military resistance against fascism. In the memoirs of S. Nogradi one reads about the combat activities of the unit led by him in the Salgotarji coal basin.⁶ The book of M. Fekete speaks about the struggle of the guerillas in the industrial region of Miskolecz-Dioszder. The book contains in particular rather interesting information regarding the newly created entity for the antifascist struggle, the so-called MOKAN committee (Hungarian Communist Anti-Nazi Committee).⁷ The book by I. Dekan "On the Guerilla Trails" is devoted to the reminiscences regarding the activity of his guerilla unit.⁸

The memoirs of a well known progressive writer, the outstanding representative of the left wing National Peasant Party, J. Darvas⁹ and also the memoirs "Confession and History" (two volumes)¹⁰ of the former left wing leader of the party of the small peasantry, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic, I. Dobi, contain a large amount of interesting information regarding the Resistance Movement, the creation of the national front and the strengthening of the Communist Party influence among the antifascist intelligentsia. I. Dobi pays particular attention to the position and struggle of the agricultural workers and poor peasantry for its vital interests during the Second World War.

In 1946 a digest of reminiscences and sketches regarding the activity of the Hungarian guerillas on the territories of the USSR Slovakia, Yugoslavia, France, and Spain has been published which also describes the combat activity of specific guerilla units in Hungary and of the participation of guerillas in liberating Budapest.¹¹ Finally, amongst the memoir literature one should note a digest of materials regarding the history of the Social Democratic Party during the war which has been published by the Party leadership in 1945.¹² The digest describes for the first time the activity of the Party's left wing, led by A. Sakaczic and D. Marosan in 1941-1942 and the underground work of one of the leaders of the Communist Party, E. Sagvari. However, on the whole the book should be critically assayed since it draws no clear line between the left and right wings of the Social Democracy.

The Hungarian documentary publications and memoirs contain a rich material for the study of the participation of Horthy Hungary in the Second World War. The Hungarian historians have already expended considerable effort in describing comprehensively various problems of the country's history on the eve and during the Second World War. There is a whole series of books and a considerable number of articles found in magazines which are either being prepared or are already published.

The several articles by G. Ranki describe the diplomatic history preceding the war and consider the participation of Horthy Hungary in unleashing the war. The first article¹³ embraces the period from the fall 1937 to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, describing in detail, on the basis of foreign information from Germany and England, the foreign policy of Hungary, the participation /463 of Hungary in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and also analyzes the contradictions existing between the large imperialist plunderer and his greedy for spoils but weak Hungarian ally. The second article¹ which makes use of some unpublished archive documents and materials from the trials of the Hungarian war criminals, describe the role of Hungary in preparing the attack on Yugoslavia and the cowardly entrance of Hungary into the war against the USSR. The article convincingly shows that in spite of the contradictions existing between various groups in the Hungarian leading circles, they had no disagreement regarding the attack on the Soviet Union.

The German economic expansion in Hungary during the Second World War is being considered in the articles by I. Berend and G. Ranki.²

At the end of 1962 in Budapest there were several newspaper articles published by G. Ranki³ which include some previously unknown documents from the Hitler Ministry of Foreign Affairs which were kept in the London archives. Among these documents are the reports of the Nazi diplomatic representatives in Budapest regarding the foreign policy of Horthy Hungary and its internal situation, the reports regarding the activity of the German intelligence organizations in Hungary, etc.

L. Zsigmond has published in 1953 the very first study in Hungary⁴ which presents systematically the foreign policy of Hungary during the wartime. E. Karsai in the second part of his book "The Country's Boundary Extension - the Loss of the Land,"⁵ using the

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materials of the Nürnberg process has shown comprehensively the foreign policy of the leading circles of Hungary during the Second World War.

An interesting study by M. Korom, "The Fall of Fascism in Hungary," is the actual history of the Hungarian participation in the Second World War.⁶ Utilizing extensive materials from archives, press, and the trials of war criminals, the author proves the responsibility of Horthy fascism in participating in war against the USSR. The main part of the study is devoted to events beginning in 1943 and ending with the destruction of fascism. The book discloses the deeply antipeople and antiSoviet essence in the foreign policy duplicity of the M. Kallay government which led to the attempts to conclude a separate peace with the Anglo-Saxon government, continuing simultaneously an aggressive war in the East. In his study Korom also describes in detail the Hungarian Resistance Movement.

The participation of Hungarian soldiers in the struggle against Hungarian and German fascism is described in the article by S. Toth.⁷ One of his articles presents the history of the regiment of the Hungarian volunteers participating jointly with the Soviet armed forces in the siege of Buda fortress. In the second part of his extensive study S. Toth, writing about the organization of the Horthy army,⁸ includes detailed information regarding the combat preparedness, the organizational structure, armament and the mobilization of the Hungarian army during the wartime. S. Orban⁹ considers a quite important question regarding the participation of the Catholic Church in unleashing the war against the Soviet Union. ~~¶~~ On the basis of documents available in the German archives, J. Kun investigates the preparation for the occupation and the occupation of Hungary by Hitler's armed forces in March, 1944.¹⁰

The interesting article by I. Pinter "Information on the History of Hungarian Liberation Committee of National Uprising,"¹¹ describes

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the activity of the committee led by E. Baici-Szilinski and created by the representatives of the Hungarian Front in November 1944 to organize the struggle against the German occupation forces and against the Nilafascists. The article, however, contains a number of inaccuracies and claims based on unreliable sources.

T. Szamuel has published a work regarding the military doctrine and organization of the Wehrmacht¹² which is a section of the book he is preparing about the history of the Second World War.

In 1962 the second edition of the well illustrated book by E. Karsai "From Berchtesgaden Eagle's Nest to the Berlin Bunker,"¹³ has been published, which describes the main questions of the history of the Second World War. The author concentrates his main attention in showing the policy of German imperialism during the war and in particular during its last stage.

The Hungarian historians are thoroughly investigating the key historical questions for their country - the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet armed forces. The work of D. Nemesz¹⁴ considers in detail the combat activity of the Red Army and in particular the liberation of Budapest and the Balaton operation, the responsibility of the Horthy clique for the conversion of Hungary into a vassal of fascist Germany, the fake resistance of Horthy against the Hitlerites and the terrorist policy of the puppet regime of Szalasi, the underground struggle of the Communist Party in creating the broad anti-fascist national front and the Resistance Movement. /464

A digest of articles published to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary devotes its material to these events. The digest is called "Studies of History of the Hungarian People's Democracy."¹ The main emphasis in this digest lies in the political sphere. The digest also contains a comprehensive review article by S. Toth regarding the military activities on the territory of Hungary and is written almost exclusively on the basis of published

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Soviet sources. The reminiscences of I. Revesz regarding the formation and the first days of the existence of the Debrecen interim government is of interest. B. Balazh reviews in his richly documented article an important question which almost has not been investigated so far, that is, the activity of the National Committees in liberated Hungary, their cooperation with the Red Army and the assistance rendered to them by the Soviet authorities.


A. Rozsnyoi wrote a comprehensive study about the Szalasi uprising of October 15, 1944,² to which the western bourgeois historians pay great attention. On the basis of an extensive archive material the author analyzes in detail the preparation and conduct of the uprising, showing the Horthy policy of duplicity and his attempt to get out of the war. A. Rozsnyoi rejects the inventions of the bourgeois writers regarding the "resistance" of Horthy to the plans of this uprising.


The Hungarian historians investigate in depth the activity of the Communist Party and the Resistance Movement. In 1955 a book was published by G. Kallai regarding the Hungarian independence movement.³ The center of the author's attention is the creation by the Communist Party of a broad Antifascist National Front based on the leading role of the worker's class which has accepted as a party slogan "For free independent democratic Hungary!" Kallai described in detail the attitude of the Communist Party toward the Social Democratic Party, toward the party of small farmers and the National Peasants Party. He describes the appearance within these organizations of a strong left wing. The creation of the first organizations of the National Front and the increase in their influence. The organization of the armed resistance movement. The activity of the Hungarian communists-emigrees and the work among the prisoners of war. The book contains numerous facts proving the selfless valor of the underground communists and the resistance fighters joining them and describing the

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HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 18722
1941-1945 VOLUME 6. (U) FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIV
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assistance given to them by the Red Army.

Of great scientific value is the article by Janos Kadar,⁴ which shed light on one of the most important and complex questions of the history of the Hungarian Communist Party during the wartime. Janos Kadar describes the events associated with the decision of the Central Committee in the summer of 1943 to relinquish the Communist Party and create in its place the Party of Peace. The article shows that the communists viewed this measure as a step directed toward the expansion of the party people's base. The illegal Communist Party was represented for a while then under the name of Party of Peace. However, the formal decision to relinquish and disband the Communist Party which had a twenty five year history of historic struggle was an erroroneous one since it caused temporary confusion in the antifascist camp.

In the years 1959-1960 the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party had issued the volume "History of the Worker's Movement in Hungary,"⁵ which contains a well documented analysis of the political and practical activity of the Communist Party during the wartime, and in particular its struggle for the National Front. The appendix which comprises almost half of the volume, presents the documents from archives.

Within recent years a number of scientific studies have been published devoted to the history of the Communist Party, to the struggle of the workers and peasants against the Horthy regime. It is necessary to single out the study by E. Zagoni in which the author reviews the struggle of communists for the unity of the working class in 1939-1942⁶ and in a number of articles written by D. Orosz and I. Pinter regarding the communist movement and the general state of the Social Democratic Party.⁷ In these articles the authors have undertaken an attempt to show the organizational activity of the Communist Party on the basis of the compiled and recorded reminiscences of the active supporters of the party.

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The Hungarian historians have undertaken a considerable task in investigating the economic history of Hungary during the wartime. The book by I. Berend and G. Ranki which was written after a thorough study of an extensive archive and statistical materials, reviews in detail the development of the Hungarian production industry in the time period preceding the war and during the wartime.⁸ The book contains valuable information regarding the internal and external policy of Hungary, it reviews the situation existing in the heavy industry, the situation in some specific branches of heavy industry and the economic policy of the leading circles. The authors concentrate their attention on the questions of the militarization of the industry, on the development of the military-State monopolistic capital, on the participation of Hungary in rearming Germany and the structural changes in the economy of the country associated with this fact. The book devotes some attention to the general situation of the working class and the authors describe this situation in somewhat rosy terms.

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VIETNAM DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The Marxist geographic history began to be developed in Vietnam at the end of the 20s in the XX century. It has acquired appreciable development prior to the Second World War, when after the victory of the National Front in France the Vietnamese communists had acquired some possibilities to carry on legal and semi-legal activity.¹

The party was able to utilize extensively its legal means of publication for the political enlightenment of the masses. Such papers as "Zan Toung" (People's Masses), "Tin Tyk" (News) and other papers published by the Communist Party of Indochina (CPI) and by the Democratic Youth Union in Vietnamese and French, have shown the rotten state of the colonial semifeudal state existing in Vietnam and called upon the population to fight against the threat of fascism and war and for the improvement of living conditions and the realization of democratic reforms in the country.

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The Indochinese Communist Party has published various books and brochures in which it familiarizes the people with Marxism-Leninism, with the policy of the CPI in regard to the national liberation movement.

In the spring of 1939 a brochure was published by the General Secretary of the CPI, Nguyen Van Ci, which has been called "Self Criticism."² The brochure presented an analysis of the general situation which had been created at that time in Indochina, pointing out the successes of the revolutionary movement and has explained the reasons for temporary setbacks of the party, indicating that the insufficient struggle against the Trotskyist influences was one of the factors which led to the left wing tendencies within the party. The representatives of this tendency had interfered with the creation of a broad anti-imperialist front and the concentration of all efforts to be directed against the main forepost of imperialism - the fascism which unleashed the world war. The brochure of Nguyen Van Ci also criticizes the right wing tendencies within the Indochinese Communist Party which called upon "unity of all parties of all social classes of Indochina" without taking into account the either progressive or reactionary character of specific parties and political groups. The work of Nguyen Van Ci generalizes the total experiences of the party of the working class accumulated by 1939.

In conjunction with the signing of the non-aggression agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany, the Communist Party of Indochina, faithful to its proletarian duty, began its work in explaining this agreement. On September 29, 1939, a brochure was published "On the Contemporary Politics,"³ which was prepared by the Central Committee of the CPI. After that another brochure was published "The Soviet Union is Firmly Faithful to peace"⁴ in which the international situation was discussed in detail as well as the problems associated with the global progressive movement in the struggle against fascism and war, and the consistency of the Soviet Union's

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policy directed toward the preservation of peace. The same brochure has defined the tasks of primary importance, as far as the Communist Party of Indochina was concerned at this stage of the game.

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people gave a great impetus to the development of the struggle of the Vietnamese people for the liberation from the imperialist oppression.

The published declaration of the Communist Party of Indochina in the very first few days of the Great Patriotic War in which the complete support of the Soviet Union was declared, is of great importance.⁵

During the wartime the important source in the study of the revolutionary events in Vietnam were the newspapers published by the Communist Party and by the Viet Minh national front of liberation. From the end of 1941 the following publications started to make their appearance: the newspaper "Ko Zai Faung" ("Banner of Liberation"), the magazine "Kong Shan" ("Communist") which were the publications of the Central Committee of the CPA and the newspaper "Kyu Kuok" ("Rescue of the Fatherland") which was the publication of the Viet Minh.

Not a small role in mobilizing the revolutionary forces during this time period was played also by the newspapers "Vietnam Dok Lap" ("Independent Vietnam"), "Zai Faung" ("Liberation"), the latter being the publication of the Party Committee of North Vietnam, "Bye Sieng Shat" ("Let us Break the Shackles") which was the publication of the Party Committee of Central Vietnam and the newspaper "Tien Len" ("Forward") which was published by the Party Committee of South Vietnam.

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In the severe times for the Vietnamese people, when in the land the cruel terror of the Japanese occupation forces against /466 the participants of the liberation movement was rampant, the newspaper "Banner of Liberation" called upon the undying examples of the heroic history of the Soviet Union.¹ In the article by Chyong Tin "Long live the unconquerable Soviet Union," printed in the newspaper "Banner of Liberation" of October 10, 1942, the following was said: "The Soviet Union will win since it is being supported by all revolutionary movements of the proletariat and by all oppressed nations of the Earth." "The Soviet Union is fighting," as was said in the article, "protecting not only itself. The Soviet Union struggles for the fate of the whole working and progressive humanity, for the fate of all people who are at the present time suppressed under the iron yoke of international fascism."

The strikes inflicted by the Soviet Armed Forces on the German-fascist armies found deep and sympathetic response in distant Vietnam. "We declare without hesitation," as was written in the same issue of the newspaper "Banner of Liberation," "that the Red Army conducting at the present time the fight at Rzhev and Stalingrad, also has shed its blood for the peoples of Indochina. It is our duty to support the struggle of the Soviet Union and contribute to the international revolutionary movement developing at the present time."²

Soon after the extraordinary victory of the Red Army at the river Volga on February 25-28, 1943, a plenary meeting of the permanent bureau of the Central Committee of the CPI took place. In the resolution of this meeting it was emphasized that the Vietnam fighters for liberation must fulfill their international duty, "... to mobilize the masses in the revolutionary attack on the fortress of international fascism and with that purpose in mind, to support the struggle of the Soviet people and to make thier contribution to the struggle of the democratic camp against the fascist aggressors."

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The great victories of the Red Army facilitated the development of the Vietnam liberation movement. In conjunction with this, the February Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPI advanced a slogan to create the Democratic Antifascist Indochinese Front. This organization had to involve in the liberation struggle also the antifascist foreigners residing in Indochina.

In the fall of 1944 the General Committee of the Viet Minh Front published a comprehensive program. The program emphasizes the just, liberation character of the war conducted by the antifascist camp pointing out the unavailability of its victory. "The situation in the world, as was stated in the program, creates exceptionally favorable climate in our revolutionary national movement of liberation."³

The news of the Japanese capitulation served as a signal for a general uprising of the Vietnamese people. On September 2, 1945, on Ba Dinh Square in Hanoi, the Chairman of the Interim People's Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, presented the Declaration of Independence, a constitutional act declaring to the whole world the creation of an independent state of the Vietnamese people. "Our people, as has been pointed out in the Declaration, have broken the yoke oppressing us for almost a whole century, creating finally an independent Vietnam. Our people have at the same time tumbled the monarchy existing for several dozen centuries and have established a republic."⁴

After the victory of the August revolution in 1945, a rapid development of the young historical science in the VDR has begun and we are witnessing the accumulation and systematic organization of the factual materials, we see for the first time the comprehensive studies regarding the history of the national liberation movement during the Second World War. In 1946 two digests of actual materials were published, "Broken Chains"⁵ and "Banner of Liberation"⁶ which

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contained a number of important party resolutions and documents as well as other valuable materials regarding the struggle of the Vietnamese people in preparing the August revolution.

Of great importance in unmasking the colonizers was the digest "French Documents about Colonization in Vietnam,"⁷ which contains unrefutable proofs of the inhumanity of the colonial regime. In the appendix one finds documents of the Communist Party of Indochina and of Viet Minh Front which define the goals and purposes of the Vietnam liberation movements during the Second World War. Of particular interest during the first years of the existence of the VDR were the works of Chyong Tin "August Revolution"⁸ and of Vo Nguyen Giap "Liberated Zone" and "Army of Liberation."⁹ These books analyze the basic questions of the antifascist liberation struggle in Vietnam during the Second World War indicating the internal and external reasons for the August revolution victory, its character and specific features as being the national and democratic revolution of the people. These works, which underwent many editions, remain to the present time as valuable sources facilitating the understanding of events in Vietnam during the past war.

During the liberation struggle against the French colonizers which developed after the Second World War, one finds in Vietnam political literature and in particular, the brochures on the history of the national liberation, workers and union movements and also the 467 speeches of leading representatives of the party of the worker's class and of the government of the VDR in which, in one way or another, the comprehensive events of the Second World War were reflected.

With the creation in December of 1953 of the Committee for the study of literature, history and geography, and then in 1958 of a separate Institute of History at the State Committee of Sciences in VDR and in 1959 - of the Committee for the Study of Party History at the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Worker's Party (VWD), there began a purposeful and systematic work of the study of Vietnam

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history, including the years of the Second World War.

The extensive historical materials have been colated, processed and published in the 12 volume "Modern History of Vietnam."¹

The three last volumes of this publication² reflect the events of the Second World War, the Japanese occupation in Vietnam and the liberation movement of the Vietnamese people. The materials and the documents included in this publication describe the preparation and conduct of the general people's uprising in August of 1945 with the final declaration of the creation of the VDR. The statements and opinions of Ho Chi Minh during the Second World War are of great importance in the study of Vietnamese history. They include the evaluation of the liberation movement of the Vietnamese people and of the role of the Soviet Union in achieving the victory during the Second World War.³

A valuable source of the history of the wartime is the two-volume publication "Materials for the Study of the August Revolution"⁴ published in 1960 by the State Committee of Sciences in VDR. It contains considerable actual material and the description of events during the Second World War with respect to each province of Vietnam which makes it possible to analyze the revolutionary process on the scale of the whole country.

A number of important books on the history of the time period under consideration are of the memoir type. They have been written by the immediate participants and the leaders of the liberation movement in Vietnam during the Second World War. Among such reminiscences are the memoirs of Vo Nguyen Giap, Khoang Kuok Viet, Fan Khung,⁵ Nguyen Khang,⁶ Chu Van Tan,⁷ the reminiscences of some other participants of the national liberation movement in Vietnam, etc.

A large number of books referring to the Second World War have been published on the eve of the celebration of the 30th anniversary

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of the Vietnamese Party of Workers. Among these are the digests "Thirty Years of the Party Struggle"⁸ and "On the party Leadership on the Ideological and Cultural Front, 1930-1945."⁹ Among the most valuable in this series of books one should consider the digest "Documents and Resolutions of the party, 1939-1945,"¹⁰ including the complete texts of the plenary decisions of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party which took place during the Second World War, the leaflets and appeals of the Vietnamese Communist Party and also various materials generated by the Viet Minh Front. This digest makes it possible to comprehend more fully the tremendous directing and organizing role of the Vietnamese communists during the world war and the comprehensive activity of the unified national front in preparing the August revolution.

Among the books describing the events of the Second World War one should mention the substantial work of Professor Tran Van Giau, "Working Class of Vietnam," which traces out the process of the formation in the organizational unity of the most advanced class of the Vietnamese society, its struggle for national and social liberation for the whole Vietnamese people. The third volume of this publication¹¹ is devoted to the events of the wartime in Vietnam and it is valuable because it shows the social, economic and political processes in the land and their relationship with the basic global historical events.

The questions of national liberation movements are described in detail in the book by Professor Tran Huy Lieu "80 Years of Struggle Against France," the second part of the second volume of which also embraces the period 1939-1945.¹² The book contains also an actual extensive documentation regarding the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people.

The Vietnamese historians pay particular attention to the August revolution. This is shown by the studies which appeared in recent years in which the authors time and again revert to the case of the

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August revolution and the struggle of the peoples in different regions of the land. Among these studies one should mention "Uprisings in Bacson, Namky and Doluong,"¹³ written by Tran Huy Lieu and Van Tao, "Uprising in Nam-bo"¹ by Duong Bach Mai, "Guerillas of Ba-to"² /468 written by Binh Hai, "Calendar of Important Historical Dates of the Vietnamese Worker's Party"³ written by Nguyen Kien Giang, "Hanoi, Hue, Saigon in August 1945"⁴ written by Minh Trinh, Quoc Quang and Nguyen Van Tran, "The Second World War and the National Liberation Movement in Vietnam"⁵ by Nguyen Kien Giang, "History of the August Revolution"⁶ by Van Tao, Than The Vy and Nguyen Gong Binh.

In March of 1963 the Committee for the Study of the History of the Worker's Party in Vietnam organized an extensive discussion on the question of the character and specific features of the August revolution which were described on the pages of magazines of the Central Committee of VWP "Khok Tap" ("Learning") and in the magazine "Nguyen ky lit-tse" ("History Study"). The materials of all these discussions were published in the digest "Investigation of the Character and Specific Features of the August Revolution,"⁷ published in 1963 by the Committee for the Study of Party History. The central place in this digest is occupied by the Committee editorial article and by the article of the member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the VWP, the chairman of the permanent committee of the National Assembly in the VDR Chiong Tinh. This article presents his speech to the audience of Nguyen Ay Quok Party School.

The main task of this discussion was the determination of the form of the August revolution. The editorial article points out that this revolution "is the forceful action of the whole people, the armed uprising to take power, but this uprising was of a relatively peaceful kind, relatively bloodless."⁸ In the articles of the participants in these discussions one finds significant disagreements in the evaluation of the form which the August revolution took.

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Of considerable interest is the article by Le-Duan "Once Again About the Leading Role of the Worker's Class of Vietnam"⁹ which is devoted to the 12th anniversary of the August revolution. This article analyzes an extensive number of questions related to the preparation and conduct of the people's uprising, defining the moving forces, character and specific features of the August revolution. The article emphasizes that the worker's class was always in the front lines in the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

In the postwar time period the studies and speeches by the Vietnamese leaders point out the tremendous effect of the favorable political situation which was a result of the destruction of the aggressive fascist block, for the victory of the August revolution.

On the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution Chiong Tinh wrote as follows "The greater were the victories of the Soviet Union over fascism, the faster was the development of the Vietnamese revolution. Being exposed to the double yoke of the French and Japanese occupation forces the Vietnamese people were following with excitement the military operations of the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. Each victory of the Soviet Army inspired the Vietnamese people, strengthening their faith in the victory and steadfastness during the struggle."¹⁰ This evaluation properly reflects the great influence of the Soviet Army victories on the rising liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The German Democratic Republic has several scientific research institutes which investigate German history during the Second World War. Among these are the Institute of Marxist-Leninism at the Central Committee of the Social Unity Party of Germany (GSUP), the

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Institute of History at the German Academy of Sciences, the Institute of German Military History in Potsdam. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the GSUP has begun the study of the German worker's movement. The department of military history at the Institute of Military History at the German Academy of Sciences investigates the economic and political questions during the Second World War. The Institute of German Military History in Potsdam is involved primarily in the studies of the military and historical problems associated with the Second World War.

The main bulk of Hitler government documents and of the documents of the fascist party were captured by the occupation forces of 1946 the Western powers. Great efforts by the local people have been required to create the GDR archives. Gradually it was possible to accumulate a considerable number of archive materials on the history of Germany on the eve and during the Second World War.

The largest depositories of documents on German history of the Second World War time period are the Central State Archive in Potsdam and the Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the GSUP in Berlin. The Central State Archive contains the documents and materials from various ministries of the fascist Germany and in particular from the Ministry of Economy, some materials from the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production, Ministry of Propaganda and others. The Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the GSUP contains the documents on the history of the workers and the antifascist movement in Germany. Among these are the large quantity of propaganda materials of some illegal communist and other antifascist organizations, the trial procedures against antifascists, the reports of the Gestapo regarding the activity of illegal organizations, etc.

Of considerable interest are the documents and materials of the local state (regional) archives in Potsdam, Dresden, Weimar and other cities. They contain not only the materials of the local authorities,

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but also some documents from the German state ministries. Valuable documents are also to be found in the archives of large private companies. For example, the archives of the former company Zeiss in Jena contain important materials disclosing the role of this company in the war preparations.

The basic documents for evaluation of the historical process in Germany are the decisions of the Central Committee of the GSUP. Among these one must note the Program of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany adopted by the VI Congress of the GSUP in January 1963,¹ the decision of the Central Committee of the GSUP of September 1958 "November Revolution of 1918 in Germany" (presentations on the 40th anniversary)², the letter of the Central Committee of the GSUP on the 15th anniversary of German liberation from fascism,³ the articles on the 15th anniversary of the unification of the Communist Party and the German Social Democratic Party "Establishment of the German Socialist Unity Party - an Historical Victory of Marxism-Leninism."⁴

In 1963 in Berlin a book was published "Historical Review of the German Worker's Movement"⁵ which was written by the Central Committee of the GSUP with the participation of the scientific social representatives of the GDR. The review presents a periodic history of the German worker's movement indicating the specific features in its development during each historical stage. The publication devotes considerable attention to an analysis of the development of the worker's movement in Germany during the fascist dictatorship and during the Second World War. The German fascist imperialism had unleashed the war to subdivide anew the world and realize its plans to establish the global domination. The only political force in Germany which from the very first day of the war had unmasked the aggressive policy of fascism and had organized resistance against the Hitler regime and its policies of plunder was the Communist Party of Germany. The authors of this review define the movement "Free Germany" as a German

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anti-Hitler coalition. They disclose the specific features in the development of the German worker's movement in modern conditions.

Of great importance in the study of German history are the publications, speeches and articles of the leaders of the GDR and GSUP. They contain the fundamental evaluation of the most important questions of German history in general and its history during the Second World War in particular.

It is necessary first of all to point out the publications by Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht which are related to German history during the fascist dictatorship and during the Second World War.

The selected works of W. Pieck⁶ contain the articles and speeches from 1907 through 1956. A considerable number of those were written during the fascist dictatorship and during the Second World War. In his printed and verbal declarations W. Pieck evaluates the essence of the fascist dictatorship, indicating the aggressive policy of the German fascist imperialism. W. Pieck has emphasized on numerous occasions the adventurous character of the policy of the German fascists and the possible new national catastrophe. A number of articles and speeches by W. Pieck review the questions of tactics and strategy of the GCP in accordance with the decisions of the Brussels and Bern Party conferences, the purpose of which was the unification of the most extensive strata of the German people, toppling of the fascist dictatorship and creation of a democratic republic. The speeches and articles by W. Pieck are permeated with a deep internationalism, the understanding of the meaning of the armed struggle of the Red Army and of other progressive forces against fascism. After the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, W. Pieck stated "The rescue of the German people lies in the victory of the Red Army."⁷

A large number of studies devoted to various problems of German history during the fascist dictatorship and during the Second World

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War belong to W. Ulbricht. In the second volume of the publication "On the History of the German Worker's Movement" one finds all of his publications from 1933 through the time when the GSUP was formed (1946).⁸ All of them reflect the struggle of the German Communist Party against fascism and against the war, for the unity of action /470 of the German workers and the unification of all antifascist forces in creating a unified democratic Germany.

In his publication "German Fascist Imperialism (1933-1945)"¹ W. Ulbricht analyzes and evaluated the essence of fascism, unmasking the fascist myth of German socialism which was used as a cover for the dictatorship of large financial capital and the landed gentry. His publication "On the History of Modern Times"² reviews the reasons for the military defeat of Hitler's Germany and the establishment of an antifascist state in Eastern Germany. The book devotes a large place to the antifascist movement in Germany.

Of considerable value for the historical science are the opinions of W. Ulbricht as to the regularity of events leading to the defeat of German imperialism and militarism in both world wars.³

Of particular importance for the German geographic history is the unmasking of German imperialism as a main instigator of the Second World War. The German geographic history devotes considerable attention to this question. Soon after the war a book was published in the GDR by A. Norden "Lessons of German History."⁴ By analyzing the facts of German history of the XX century, the author made conclusions regarding the moving forces of German imperialism, the international role of the German monopolists and landed gentry which pushed the country by their adventurous policies into the abyss of national catastrophe. The book reviews in detail the ominous role of the German monopolists in the plunder of Europe during the war. The continuation of this book is the book by A. Norden "The Way Wars Are Made."⁵ The book shows the circumstances at the beginnings of the First and Second World Wars. In the chapter "On the Road Toward the Second

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World War," A. Norden discloses the increase in imperialist contradictions on the eve of the war, the role of monopolists of Germany, England and the USA in preparing the war, the events in Spain, the occupation by Germany of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The author pays particular attention in the clarification of immediate reasons which led to the Second World War. The book presents some facts which show how the SS men dressed in Polish uniforms had attacked the radio station in Gleiwitz, giving a reason for the Nazis to attack Poland.

The book by G. Förster, G. Otto, G. Schnitter "Prussian-German General Staff 1870-1963"⁶ is devoted to the political role of German militarism in the history of Germany. The book briefly shows the role of the German General Staff in preparing and executing the Second World War.

Of great interest is the book by H. Kühne "Fascist Colonial Ideology and the Second World War."⁷ On the basis of a scientific analysis the author discloses the moving forces of the colonial expansion of German fascist imperialism and its specific features. He shows the ideological foundation of the Nazi colonial propaganda (the "theory of living space", "racism", "anticommunism"). The study notes that in order to substantiate its colonial aspirations, the Nazis have used extensively various historical falsifications, attempting to propagate by all means the myth of "civilizing mission" of the colonial policy of German imperialism. The book also describes the organization of Nazi colonial propaganda.

In conjunction with the fact that the German imperialists and militarists are exerting tremendous efforts at the present time to occupy the leading position in NATO, the necessity to unmask the so-called policy of peacemaking conducted by the Western countries on the eve of the Second World War and which had reached its apex in the Munich agreement, is of particularly great importance at the present time. The problems of the Munich policies and the re-birth at the present time of German imperialism were discussed in detail at the two scientific conferences of the Commission of Historians of the German Democratic Republic and the USSR,⁸ and also at

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the International Scientific Conference in Prague devoted to the 20th anniversary of Munich events.⁹ The materials of both of these conferences unmask the new "Munich" plan of the West German revenge seekers.

In a number of speeches and presentations made during the scientific conference of the commission of historians of the USSR and the GDR in December 1959 in Berlin¹⁰ the German historians have disclosed various aspects of the aggressive policy of the German imperialism directed toward the preparation for and unleashing of the 19471 Second World War. These questions were addressed by the presentation of L. Stern "Unavoidable Regularity and Historical Eventuality of the Defeat of German Imperialism in the Two World Wars,"¹ the presentation of K. Oberman "On the Role of the 'Special Mission' of Pappen in the Preparation and Occupation of Austria (1934-1938),"² by I. Petzold "The Importance of the Myth About the Stab in the Back for Political and Ideological Preparation of the Second World War,"³ by A. Anderle "Antibolshevism as a Means for the Preparation of the Second World War"⁴ and by G. Lindner "Conspiracy of the German and French Reactionary Forces on the Eve of the Second World War."⁵

The preparation by the German imperialism for the Second World War and its general course is reviewed also in a number of other digests and books.

The digest "September 1939" contains articles disclosing the preparation of fascist Germany in its aggression against Poland. The article reviews the questions of political preparation before the attack, the activity of the "fifth column," it unmask the myth about the "Bloody Sunday in Bromberg"⁶ which was used as a justification for Hitlerites in their policy of terror in regards to the Polish people.

Of considerable interest is the book "June 1941"⁷ which contains

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articles devoted to the history of the preparation of Hitler's aggression against the USSR. The article "Road Toward June 22, 1941" by A. Anderle discloses the aggressive plans of German imperialists directed toward the annihilation of the Soviet State and the capture of its territory. An important place in the article is devoted to the ideological preparation in the war against the Soviet Union. In conjunction with this, it shows the revolting role which was played by the German "scientists - East Specialists" who supplied the fascists with "scientific arguments" to justify their aggressive plans. V. Basler devotes his article to an analysis of foreign policy of German imperialism with regard to the USSR in 1917-1941. The article by G. Schaaf speaks of the effects of the battles near Moscow and on the river Volga which resulted in strengthening of the antiHitler coalition and the decay of the fascist block.

The role of the German monopolistic capital in preparing the Second World War has so far not been exhaustively reviewed in the studies by German historians. Some isolated questions of this problem are considered in the studies by G. Radant.⁸ The author proves that the fascist state was representing the interests of monopolists, emphasizing the responsibility of the monopolies and of the capital in preparing and unleashing the Second World War. The same is being stated in the studies by F. Günther⁹ and W. Schumann.¹⁰ They disclose the activity of Zeiss Company as an enterprise of military production, the leaders of which actively participated in preparing and conducting the Second World War. The study of W. Schumann in particular shows the aggressive plans of the Zeiss Company representatives in regard to the USSR.

An interesting supplement to these studies is the article by S. Quilitzsch "On the Question of the Criminal Role of I. P. Farben Industry During the Rascist Aggression Against the Soviet Union."¹¹ The author shows, primarily on the basis of archive materials, that the company set up all its production and research for the war effort.

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The article discloses the annexation plans of the company's leaders on the occupied territory of the USSR. G. Hass has devoted his book to the "odd war" in Europe.¹² In its scientific and popular form the author briefly presents the basic questions of the history of the Second World War beginning from the attack of fascist Germany on Poland (September 1, 1939) through the beginning of the attack on the western front in May 1940. G. Hass clearly shows the causes of the "odd war" at the basis of which were the calculations to unleash the German aggression against the USSR. The facts presented in the book ascertain that England and France could have conducted successful activity against Germany during the German-Polish war and also in the subsequent time period when the German forces had flooded Belgium, Holland and France.

The digest of documents and materials "Second World War"¹³ prepared by G. Paulus is of particular interest. This rather small book contains documents and materials from various sources and is designed for teachers and students. In terms of its character, the digest resembles a teaching manual.

The historians of the GDR unmask the Nazi occupation policy, /472 the conduct of which was an integral part of the Hitlerites planning in establishing the global mastery of Germany. There are several digests which have been published by the German Democratic Republic unmasking the atrocities of the fascist authorities on the occupied territory. The digest "SS in Action"¹ contains the secret orders and directives of the Nazi leaders, the official documents of various SS organizations, the materials of the trials of the major criminals of war, the orders and reports of the officers of the SS units and the witness statements. These documents disclose the animalistic features of the German fascism. The appendix contains the file of documents regarding the criminal path of the fascist executioner Oberländer.²

Documents from the digest "Buchenwald"³ show the German fascists as the most vile enemies not only of the people in the occupied countries, but of the German people themselves. In the foreword to the

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German edition it says that this digest is being published so that the people would never forget the true essence of fascism.

Of great interest is the work of J. Kuczynski,⁴ "Barbarism as an Exterme Expression of the Mastery of Monopolies in Germany." On the basis of convincing facts the author shows that the mastery of monopolies is tightly connected with barbarism. The author discloses the criminal role of Eichmann as a representative of the German fascist imperialism and the domineering role of the I.G. Farben Industry within the system of the barbaric fascist regime.

In a well documented study by C. Drobisch "The Circle of Himmler's Friends"⁵ the role of cooperation between the German monopolies, Himmler and the SS authorities is being discussed. The author shows that the most important representatives of monopolistic capital were actively supporting the criminal policy of the SS leadership on the occupied territories, generating huge profits by exploiting the millions of people who were sent to Germany to work.

The questions of the military economy of fascism are reviewed in the study by E. Engelberg.⁶ The author gets into the polemics with the West German historians and economists who claim that Hitler could have been victorious in defeating the Soviet Union if he would have accelerated the development of the military industry in 1940-1941. E. Engelberg proves that the fascist military economy, subject to many objective factors, could not have developed at that time at faster rate. On the Second Scientific Conference of the Commission of Historians of the GDR and the USSR, E. Engelberg⁷ and V. Köller have presented some new data regarding the fascist wartime economy.

In the study of German history during the fascist dictatorship, of great importance are the digests "On the History of the Communist Party in Germany"⁹ and "On the History of the Worker's Youth Movement in Germany."¹⁰ These digests include valuable documents and materials reflecting the heroic struggle of the Communist Party and of some

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other antifascist forces against the fascism and against war.

From the documents of the prewar time period it is necessary to note first of all the decisions of Brussels and Bern conferences of the Communist Party of Germany. The resolution of the GCP at the Bern conference which took place in January-February 1939, called upon the working people to unite, forming a unified national front, based on the joint program of action for the communists and for the social democrats, to remove the fascist regime and create an independent democratic republic.

During the Second World War the communist organizations have published a large number of documents and materials which unmask the aggressive character of the war as far as Germany was concerned, showing the inevitability of the defeat of German imperialism.

The digest "On the History of German Antifascist Resistance Movement 1933-1945"¹¹ contains a large amount of material regarding the resistance of the antifascists in the prisons and in the concentration camps.

The compiled documentation about Ernst Thälmann and of Wilhelm Pieck¹³ reflect some moments in the activity of these outstanding fighters on behalf of the German working class, closely related to the whole history of the German people. /473

The letters of Ernst Thälmann,¹ written in January 1944 to one of his friends from the prison days show the steadfastness and unbending will of the author. Based on the general situation in Germany and the lessons of the struggle against fascism Thälmann poses the question as to the necessity of unifying communists and social democrats in the struggle against their common enemy, to fight for the viability of interests of the German people. ¶ A significant contribution to the development of history regarding the antifascist movement was the book by O. Winzer² which is a brief review of the history of the German Communist Party during the time period from

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1933 through 1945. This is the first book in which, in great detail, the questions of the history of the German Communist Party during the fascist dictatorship are being researched. In writing this study the author used some new and previously unknown documents, among which were the materials from the Gestapo archives and from the fascist tribunals. The author did not set a goal to produce a comprehensive description of the operation of all underground organizations and has researched the activity of only the main ones.

In 1956 a book was published written by W. Gartel, "Germany During the Fascist Dictatorship 1933-1945."³ The book devotes considerable time to the description of the antifascist movement in Germany. At the same time the author unmaskes the role of the German monopolies in preparing and unleashing the Second World War and the war against the Soviet Union. W. Bartel presents the facts characterizing the policy of plunder carried out by the German-fascist invaders on the occupied territory of the USSR.

Quite valuable material regarding the history of the antifascist struggle during the Second World War is contained in the speech by L. Einike at the conference in Berlin in December 1959, "The Antifascist Resistance Movement and the People's Liberation Struggle - Important Factors in the Defeat of German Imperialism in the Second World War."⁴

A large number of biographical publications and memoirs are devoted to the antifascist struggle. Of particular interest are the biographies of the antifascists which were edited by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of GSUP.⁵

It is necessary to mention the studies of the following authors related to the struggle of various antifascist groups in the Resistance Movement: G. Nitzsche,⁶ G. Glondajewski and H. Schumann,⁷ U. Puls,⁸ J. Krause⁹ and also the book "Never to Forget! from the

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Antifascist Student Resistance Movement in Europe."¹⁰ The Resistance Movement in the concentration camps is described in the studies by B. Baum "Resistance in Auschwitz" and "In Sachsenhausen at that Time."¹¹

In spite of some successes resulting in the investigation of the antifascist movement, the studies being published up to the year 1961 have a number of essential drawbacks. The main shortcoming is the underestimation of the leading and guiding role played by the communist party organizations within the resistance groups and also the incomplete demonstration of the leading role of the Party Central Committee.

After exposure to Party criticism, the studies of the history of the antifascist movement which were published in the GDR within recent times devote considerably more attention to the leading role of the Communist Party of Germany and of its Central Committee, leading the people against the fascism and against the war.

The book published in 1963 by G. Rossmann "Struggle of the GCP for the Unity of all Enemies of Hitler"¹² is devoted to the problems which have already been touched upon by numerous authors. Nevertheless, the book by G. Rossmann is the first publication in which the questions of communist tactics and strategy in 1943-1945 are considered using the example of the activity of the communist organizations in Berlin-Brandenburg region. In writing this book the author used both published and new unpublished documents and materials. He analyzes in great detail the question regarding the struggle of the GCP for a unified national front of the working class, for the involvement of the soldiers in the antifascist struggle, for the creation of a much closer viable unity with the peasantry, with the middle class population in the cities and intelligentsia, for the cooperation with

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the patriotic forces of bourgeois and Christian circles. At the same time, G. Rossmann describes the struggle of the GCP in establishing the viable union with the prisoners of war and with the foreign workers. The author points out that the development of the movement "Free Germany" has shown the correctness of the GCP policy directed toward the creation of the National Front. The book also emphasizes that the antifascist Resistance Movement led by the GCP represents the highest stage of national liberation struggle of the German people against militarism, fascism and against the imperialist war. /474

In 1963 a small book by H. Laschitza has been published "Germany and the German Worker's Movement."¹ The book presents in scientific and popular form, with the background of military and political events, an analysis of the worker's movement during the Second World War. The author considers the basic postulate of the German Communist Party in the domain of strategy and tactics. At the end of the book one finds documents and materials including the German losses during the Second World War, the expansion of the wartime production and the anti-fascist movement. The shortcoming of the book is the fact that the author does not analyze in depth the worker's movement in Germany.

The historians of the GDR express substantial interest in the study of the activity of the national committee "Free Germany" created in 1943 in the Soviet Union by the antifascists representing the soldiers and officers who were prisoners of war and the representatives of the progressive German emigree circles. The role of the national committee "Free Germany" which has been played in the development of the antifascist movement in Germany has been spoken about many times by W. Ulbricht. In conjunction with this, one should note in particular his speech during a solemn meeting in July 1963 commemorating the 20th anniversary of the committee's organization.² The documentary report of E. Weinert³ describes the activity and purpose of the national committee "Free Germany." Being one of the organizers and

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the chairman of this committee, E. Weinert together with W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht and W. Florin and some others, had actively defended the existence of the patriotic movement "Free Germany" in his conversations with the prisoners of war, at the front lines and in Germany. The book of Weinert includes the "Manifesto of the National Committee" which is a documented program of the "Free Germany" movement.

The digest published in 1959 "They Fought for Germany"⁴ is a valuable supplement to the book by E. Weinert. It contains the documents and materials regarding the activity of the representatives of the national committee "Free Germany" on the first Ukrainian front. Among the documents are the presentations of the former participants of the movement "Free Germany," its work on the first Ukrainian front, numerous leaflets of the committee "Free Germany" and of its representatives at the front lines and in the armies, the reports of the committee representatives as to the conduct of the propaganda operations in the Korsun'-Shevchenkivsk region and others.

Of considerable interest are the materials of the conference commemorating the 20th anniversary of the creation of the "Free Germany" committee which took place at the Institute of German Military History in Potsdam at the end of March 1963.⁵ The presentation of the director of the Institute, Colonel R. Brühl, "The National Committee Free Germany" and its Military and Political Meaning" and the speeches of the participants of the conference contain interesting material regarding the activity of the committee both in the Soviet Union and in other countries (Germany, France, etc.).

In recent years a number of articles have been published which are devoted to the leading role of the Communist Party in Germany and of its Central Committee in the antifascist movement. Among these one should note the articles by H. Matern,⁶ W. Schumann⁷ and

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B. Löwel.⁸

In 1963 a book of reminiscences was published by the Air Force Major E. von Frankenberg "My Decision."⁹ Being captured in May 1943, E. von Frankenberg had soon joined the "Free Germany" movement. In his book he cites many facts from the history of the national committee of "Free Germany" and of the Union of German Officers, denouncing the ramifications of these organizations and their viability falsified by the historians of the German Federative Republic. The book shows the different way of thinking among the German generals and officers who were prisoners of war, which was due to the defeat of the German armies at the front lines. Even Field Marshal F. Paulus came to the conclusion that Germany lost the war and in August 1944 declared his desire to join the Union of German Officers.

The book by S. Dernberg¹⁰ is devoted to the victory of the people's democracy and the revolution in Eastern Germany. By analyzing the causes of the fascist state debacle, the author considers in detail the deep social and economic transformations which resulted in the destruction of all roots of imperialism and militarism in East Germany and led to the creation of a new state, the German 475 Democratic Republic, which was the state for the first time in German history, of the workers and peasants who set out toward the road of a successful socialist reconstruction.

Numerous historians in the German Democratic Republic study the question of the unavoidable regular trend reflected in the defeat of Hitler's Germany which has an actual political and scientific meaning. They denounce the West German historians sympathetic to the goals of imperialism who claimed that the defeat of German imperialism during the Second World War was presumably caused by accidental factors and that if one could have avoided the past mistakes in a new war, Germany would be victorious.

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One of the most important tasks of the historical science in the GDR is the unmasking of the West German falsifiers of the history of the Second World War. The following publications are used for this purpose: L. Schtern,¹ R. Graf,² O. Winzer,³ A. Ackermann,⁴ G. Lozek, H. Syrhe,⁵ W. Schumann, G. Lozek,⁶ L. Berthold, G. Lozek, H. Meier,⁷ and W. Berthold.⁸

The articles and publications which appear in the magazines are the integral part of the geographic history of the GDR. The articles regarding the history of the Second World War are predominantly of methodological character and represent therefore a particular interest for historians. These articles are being published in the magazine "Einheit"⁹ (the theoretical publication of the Central Committee of the GSUP). The largest number of articles on historical subjects are published in the magazine "Journal of Historical Science"¹⁰ published by the Institute of History at the German Academy of Sciences and by the Institute of Modern History. Within recent years this magazine has published many articles devoted to the history and geographic history of the Second World War. The questions of history of the antifascist and worker's movements are being published in the magazine "Presentations on the History of the German Worker's Movement,"¹¹ which is the publication of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the GSUP. A certain amount of space devoted to the world war is being allocated by the magazine "Military Affairs"¹² published by the GDR Defense Ministry. A large number of articles and memoirs denouncing the aggressive policy of German imperialism and the subversive work of the Hitlerites on the eve and during the Second World War are being published in the magazine "News Magazine of the Worker's Society of the Former Officers."¹³ Starting in 1962 the GDR published the magazine "Magazine of Military History"¹⁴ which is generated by the Institute of German Military History in Potsdam. The magazine systematically publishes the articles, reminiscences, reviews and documents related to the questions of the military history in general and to the history of the Second World War in particular.

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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The main emphasis in the Chinese geographic history of the Second World War is being laid on the national war of liberation of the Chinese people fought against the Japanese invaders who started in July 1937 the "Great war" against China. Rising to fight the Japanese imperialists, the Chinese people for more than eight years led a heroic national war of liberation. During the Second World War they contributed, together with other people, to the cause of defeating the fascist and militarist forces.

The national war of liberation of the Chinese people against Japanese aggression is reviewed in China in numerous documents and extensive literary sources. The most important documents are the decisions, declarations and directives of the Communist Party of China (CCP) who were the leaders and organizers of the people's war in China. These documents of the CCP are being published in PRC in several special publications.¹⁵ It must be pointed out that the Soviet Union laid great emphasis on translating into Russian the documents and materials of CCP. There are two digests of documents /476 translated into Russian which characterize the activity of the CCP on the eve and during the first months of the national war of liberation: "Documented Programs of the Chinese Soviets" and "The Struggle for a Unified National AntiJapanese Front in China."¹ The most important documents of the CCP of the Second World War time period are included in the book published in 1960-1961 in Moscow "Teaching Manual of Modern History."²

The documents of the CCP devote considerable attention to the questions related to the organization of the national war against the Japanese invaders, denouncing the defeatist policies of the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek.

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The CCP notes that the government of Chiang Kai-shek acting on the directives of Anglo-American imperialists who were counting to channel the Japanese aggression against the Soviet Union, has conducted with respect to Japan the "policy of peace seeking." The Chiang Kai-shek clique allowed the Japanese imperialists to annex in 1931-1936 the north-eastern China (Manchuria) and a number of strategically important regions in North China. As a result, the Japanese army was able to approach the borders of the USSR and of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). After the "great war" started, the Chiang Kai-shek government continued to pursue the defeatist policies, conducting passive military activities.

The Chinese Communist Party from the very first days of the war called upon all compatriots to rise and defend the Fatherland. The documents of the CCP outline the course directed toward the unification of all patriotic forces of the Chinese nation into a unified national anti-Japanese front. On July 15, 1937, the CCP published a manifesto in which it called upon the Kuomintang to direct all its efforts in organizing the resistance to the invaders. Under the pressure of the masses, the Chiang Kai-shek government was forced to cooperate with the CCP and to recognize the legal position of the Communist Party and of the armed forces led by it. According to the agreement between the CCP and the Kuomintang, the armed forces led by the communists were reorganized into the 8th and New 4th army which were included into the national armed forces.

The experience accumulated by the CCP during the years of the national war of liberation had been comprehensively collated in the materials of the VII Congress of the CCP which took place in April-June 1945 and were also analyzed in detail in the studies of the history of the Communist Party of China.³

~~A~~ The political report of the Central Committee of the CCP presented at the VII Congress of the Party by Mao Tse-tung has summarized the results of the national war of liberation of the Chinese

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people and has outlined the basic tasks in completing the struggle with the Japanese invaders and the democratization of the postwar China.⁴ This political report emphasizes that the "Soviet people who have become a great force, played a main role in the destruction of fascism," and that "the destruction of the Hitlerites will be followed immediately by the destruction of the Japanese aggressors."⁵ The report of Chou-de presented at the VII Congress of the CCP "Military Staging Area in the Liberated Regions" presented briefly the course of combat operations of the People's Army of liberation. It described a comprehensive experience of the CCP in the creation and leadership of the armies during the wartime and the concretely developed measures which were to be used in preparing the counter attack against the Japanese armed forces in China.⁶

The war against the Japanese invaders by the people's armed forces and their heroic deeds are described quite fully in the digests of materials "Chinese People's Army of Liberation During the War Against the Japanese Invaders,"⁷ "The Situation in Liberated Regions During the National War of Liberation."⁸ The military and political situation in the liberated regions is reviewed in the book by Dun Be-you, "Situation in the Liberated Regions of China"⁹ and in the study of Huan-Tao "30 Years of Chinese People's Army of Liberation."¹⁰ A large place in the press describing the national war of liberation of the Chinese people is to be found in the general historical studies and in particular in the books by He Han-chi "History of the Modern Chinese Revolution,"¹¹ by Hu Hua "The History of the New Democratic Revolution in China"¹² and "New and Modern History of China."¹³ Some of these publications are translated into Russian.

The above-mentioned books note also that the economic and military advantage of the Japanese imperialism over China and the defeatist policies of Chiang Kai-shek's government enabled the Japanese army to occupy within a short time period a considerable part of the country with the most developed industrial regions. Under these circumstances the CCP proposed to conduct a protracted guerilla warfare with the Japanese invaders. According to this

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policy the people's army of liberation proceeded with the organization and expansion of the territories previously occupied by the Japanese armies and later liberated, and the creation of the guerilla strongholds. In this fashion, one could observe during the whole length of the war in China the existence of two fronts of military activities: the Kuomintang front and the front in the liberated regions, the latter inflicting the main strike against the Japanese invaders.

The book "Chinese People's Army of Liberation During the War Against the Japanese Invaders" using a rich factual material discloses the tactics of combat activities of the 8th and New 4th armies (the war of maneuvering action behind the enemies front line, the attacks of separate units, the surprize strikes against communication centers and the strongholds of the enemy).

During the very first few months of the war the Chinese people's army of liberation, by inflicting several painful strikes against the Japanese armed forces, destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the Japanese army. One of the most important operations was the defeat of the Japanese in the mountain pass Pinsinhuang. The local population rendered great assistance to the units of the people's army of liberation operating behind the enemy's front lines. The army command set up in the liberated regions the appropriate authorities with the people's representatives in power, creating guerilla units and home guard. The 8th army operated primarily in North China. The New 4th army operated in the regions of the lower and central basin of the Yangtze river and on the Eastern seashore. In the south of China, in the delta of the Hsi-Chiang river and on Hainan island, the operational guerilla units were active which were incorporated into the antiJapanese formation of South China.

The successful activity of the people's army of liberation had disrupted the plans of the Japanese command who counted to win the war in China in a short time period. The Japanese were forced to

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halt their advances on the Kuamintang front and to direct their main forces against the liberated regions. In 1941-1942 the Japanese command, by carrying out the tactics of "scorched earth" had a strangle hold around the liberated regions, decimating considerably its territory. However, the people's army of liberation not only withstood the attack of the enemy, but starting in 1943 had begun to prepare an advancing operation against the Japanese invaders.

The most striking tactics of the combat activities of the 8th and New 4th army were rapid and surprize attacks on the most weak links and units of the enemy, the flexibility and maneuverability. For example, when the Japanese invaders were conducting the reprisal actions against one specific liberated region, numerous regular army units were scattered in the villages and together with the people's resistance fighters they organized the struggle against the enemy, annihilating the enemy bit by bit. In the regions where the Japanese had constructed numerous strongholds, the tactic of "underground war" was carried out (via the construction of tunnels and underground bunkers). The soldiers of the people's army of liberation were destroying the enemy forts by digging tunnels under them and then effecting explosions. In protecting the villages and countryside from the enemy, they conducted underground guerilla warfare.

During the wartime the people's army of liberation carried out more than 122,000 fights with the Japanese invaders, in which they lost about 1 million people killed and wounded, capturing numerous trophies. At the end of the war, on the territory of China occupied by the Japanese armed forces, there were 19 large liberated regions with a population of about 100 million people. The numbers of people in the 8th and New 4th armies had increased from 45,000 soldiers in 1937 to 910,000 in 1945. In addition, a powerful people's home army was created, numbering 2.2 million combatants.¹ China has an extensive bibliography reflecting the history of the creation and the development of the specific liberated regions. It is necessary to

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point out the following books: "Review of the AntiJapanese Bases Behind the Enemy Front Line,"² "Along the Shansi-Chahar-Hebey" by Chou Er-fu,³ "War in Shansi-Hebey-Shandun-Honan Border Region,"⁴ "Eight Years of Guerilla Struggle in Tsiaodun Region,"⁵ "About the Creation of One Revolutionary Base" by Tse-You.⁶ Almost all these books were published in 1946 in the liberated territories. In spite of the descriptive character, they contain a large amount of interesting factual material.

The directives of the Central Committee of the CCP to the party organizations and also the books "Situation in the Liberated Regions During the National War of Liberation," "On the Creation of One Revolutionary Base" by Tse-You and others, disclose the economic policy of the CCP in the liberated regions during the war. The CCP was attempting to increase in the liberated regions the agricultural and industrial production needed to fight the Japanese invaders. With this purpose in mind they introduced in the Chinese villages the first forms of cooperatives - the collective groups of functional mutual assistance. By lowering the rents and interest, the CCP attempted /478 to lessen the exploitation of the farmers by the landlords and to make their burden caused by the wartime somewhat easier.

A general idea about the CCP policy on the road to construction of the democratic power base in the liberated regions is given in the "Digest of Documents of the People's Political Council in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region."¹ The democratic authorities in the liberated regions (the political people's council) were established by popular elections. To strengthen the unified national antiJapanese front, the participation in the power structure was not limited to the workers and peasants only, but the representatives of the Chinese bourgeoisie and patriotically inclined landed gentry were also involved. The leading role in these organizations belonged to the CCP.

Among the books devoted to the history of the national war of liberation one should mention the forceful literary publications of the Chinese historian and economist Chen Bo-da "Four Families in China,"

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and "Chiang-Kai-shek - the Enemy of the Chinese People."² Chen Bo-da draws a picture of an antinational Kuomintang regime, showing the causes of retreat or inaction of a large Kuomintang army at the front line, disclosing the secret plans of the Chiang Kai-shek clique which was attempting to get some agreement with the Japanese invaders at the expense of the Chinese national interests, Chen Bo-da points out that the main culprits of the national Chinese catastrophe were the representatives of the leading Kuomintang clique ("Four Families" - Chiang Kai-shek, Kun Sian-si, Sun Tse-weng and brothers Chen Ho-fu and Chen Li-fu). These families, being supported by the political powers and by military force, have concentrated in their hands the economic and financial control of China, utilizing the state of war with Japan in carrying out the accentuated plunder of the Chinese people.

The economic study of Chen Bo-da "Reviews of the Land Rents in China"³ discloses the character and form of the semi-fuedal exploitation of the farmers during the war in the Kuomintang regions. He proves convincingly that the main financial and material burdens for the conduct by the Kuomintang of the war with Japan, let alone the human losses, lay on the Chinese peasants. ¶ The national war of liberation of the Chinese people was conducted in very specific circumstances. And it is quite proper, that the CCP, taking into account the circumstances at the front line, the rise of the national sentiment in the national movement of liberation of the people, and considering the extensive territory of the land, has proposed to conduct a protracted guerilla warfare. The policy to conduct the protracted guerilla war was developed in the hope for an international support and the support by the Soviet Union in the first place. The Chinese Communist Party made here a basic assumption that without victory in the Second World War by the antifascist forces led by the Soviet Union, the victory of the Chinese people was impossible.

There are no special publications in the PRC about the Great Patriotic War with the exception of separate articles in the scientific

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and popular magazines.⁴ The heroic struggle of the Soviet people during the Second World War is being described primarily in the books devoted to the history of the CCP and the struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders, in the history of the people's army of liberation, etc.

The numerous books, brochures and magazine and newspaper articles have emphasized that during the difficult days for China after July 7, 1937, the Soviet Union was the only country which extended its helping hand to the Chinese people. As has been pointed out in the book by Miao Chu-huan "Brief History of the Communist Party of China," "The Soviet Union has expressed its sincere compassion toward China which became the prey of Japanese aggression and in August 1937 has concluded with the Chinese government the non-aggression treaty and also has rendered China a tremendous military and financial assistance."⁵

The Chinese communists considered the attack of the German-fascist hordes on the USSR as a strike against the international revolutionary movement, the strike against the national struggle of liberation of the Chinese people against the Japanese imperialism. Emphasizing the global historical meaning of the struggle of the Soviet people with German fascism, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in its directive of June 23, 1941 to the party organizations within the country has stated as follows: "In the holy war which is being conducted by the Soviet Union resisting the fascist aggression, the Soviet people protect not only their own country but all people who carry on the war of liberation against fascist enslavement."⁶ The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believed that the outcome of the struggle of the Soviet Union with fascist Germany would define the future of the Chinese people and of the people of many other countries in the world. "Depending on the fact whether the Soviet Union will win or not," as

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was stated in the declaration of the Central Committee of the CCP /479 dated July 7, 1941, "will hinge the victory of China, the victory of freedom, independence and liberation, the victory of truth and justice, of the science and light for all nations."¹

The Chinese communists have responded to all important events which took place on the Soviet-German front by means of the newspaper and magazine articles and also by sending the congratulatory telegrams to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Soviet government. These materials are an important source for the study of the Soviet-Chinese friendship during the Second World War.

In 1942 when the battle on the Volga was at its peak, the central publication of the Central Committee of the CCP, the newspaper "Tsevan Zibao" published an editorial "Turning point in the course of the Second World War."² The article analyzed the situation at the fronts in the Great Patriotic War, pointing out that the Volga battle is the turning point in the Great Patriotic War and of the whole global war. The Volga battle, as was stated in the article, presented Hitler Germany and together with it the militaristic Japan, with a projected future unavoidable and complete defeat. On June 22, 1944, the newspaper "Tsevan Zibao" summarized the three years of battles of the Red Army. In particular, the effect of victories won by the Soviet armies near Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk on the changes in the general situation in the Far East, has been emphasized. The article pointed out that the successes of the Red Army have conclusively buried, as far as Japan was concerned, the possibility to be victorious during the Second World War, and that the defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan will result in the toppling of the Kuomintang clique of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Chinese Communist Party rated quite highly the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In explaining to the Chinese people the peaceful attitudes of the Soviet foreign policy on the eve of the Great

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Patriotic War, the CCP approved the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. The Communist Party emphasized that "conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty, if one would consider the general situation created after that fact, has inflicted a strong damage to Japan, assisted China and strengthened in China the positions of the advocates of war against the Japanese invaders, inflicting also a strike against appeasers."³ The Chinese communists have responded with appropriate understanding to the signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, believing that it reflects the "interests of both, Soviet and Chinese peoples" since this treaty, as stated by Pin Mingh, made it possible for the Soviet Union after the beginning of the Great Patriotic War to "concentrate all its forces for the destruction of German fascism."⁴ The CCP, using its periodical press, noted the efforts of the Soviet Union in strengthening the antifascist coalition and has emphasized that the creation of the military alliance between the USSR, USA and England guaranteed the fastest defeat of fascism in Europe and in the Far East, criticizing the English and American policy in protracting the creation of the second front.

The victory of the Soviet Union over fascist Germany gave new impetus to the Chinese people in their struggle with the Japanese invaders. This has been pointed out in the editorials of the newspaper "Tsevan Zibao," "Happy holiday for the whole human race"⁵ and "We greet the victorious conclusion of the antifascist war in Europe."⁶ The CCP has explained to the Chinese people that the final defeat of the Japanese army in China would be accomplished with the decisive participation of the Red Army. After the Soviet Union entered the war in the Far East, the communist party called upon the Chinese people to render assistance to the Red Army in order to facilitate the final defeat of the Japanese aggressors.⁷ The CCP believed that the declaration by the Soviet Union of war on Japan was an utmost manifestation of the fraternal friendship toward the Chinese people. The entrance of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan in the Far

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East, disrupted the plans of the Japanese government to organize a protracted and stubborn resistance in the North-Eastern China and in Korea. In evaluating the contribution of the Soviet Union to the national struggle of liberation of the Chinese people, Mao Tse-tung stated in August 1945 as follows: "A few days ago significant changes took place in the general situation in the Far East. The capitulation of Japanese imperialism is predetermined. The decisive factor determining the Japanese capitulation was the entrance into the war of the Soviet Union. Once the multimillion Red Army, this undefeatable force, has entered the North-Eastern China, the Japanese imperialism could not carry on with the war any more and the war of liberation of the Chinese people, which is so difficult, finally will be victorious."⁸

After the victory of the Soviet Union in the Second World War, the creation of the socialist camp generated favorable conditions for the further victorious development of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people and of the peoples of other countries. This has been emphasized many times in the publications of the Chinese historians and literary men after the formation of the PRC.

The most detailed description of the Great Patriotic War is found in the book by Pin Mingh "History of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship," translated into Russian. The book briefly presents the most important international events preceding the Great Patriotic War, pointing out the basic turning points during the war and gives the proper evaluation of the Soviet Union foreign policy actions. Pin Mingh speaks with great warmth about the strengthening of the friendship between the Soviet and Chinese people during the war. The book emphasizes that the Soviet Union has rendered significant assistance to the national war of liberation of the Chinese people. Only in the years 1938-1940 the material assistance to China from the Soviet Union, according to the incomplete data, was about 450 million American dollars. The Soviet pilots-volunteers who arrived in China, achieved the turning point in the air combat in favor of

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the Chinese Air Force. The Soviet Union never ceased to assist China even in the most difficult years of the Great Patriotic War. Pin Mingh also points out that the Chinese people consider its successful fight against Japan as being an active assistance to the Soviet Union. The front page articles and editorials of the newspaper "Tsenmin Zibao" "Glorious pathway of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,"² "It is necessary to increase the struggle for the preservation of peace in Europe,"³ "Historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat,"⁴ "Once again on the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat"⁵ and many others as well as numerous messages and telegrams of the Central Committee of the CPP and of the central national government of PRC sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Soviet government, have emphasized the merit of the Soviet people serving all humanity and destroying the German fascism and Japanese militarism. For example, the editorial article "On the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat" pointed out that "During the Second World War the Soviet Union, which became the main force instrumental in the destruction of fascism, saved the European civilization and assisted the people in the East in the destruction of the Japanese militarism. All these splendid successes show to humanity the bright future of socialism and of communism, undermining the mastery of imperialism and thus making the Soviet Union the first and most powerful stronghold in the struggle for a long lasting peace in the whole world."⁶

KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The liberation of Korea by the Red Army opened up for the Korean people extensive opportunities for the development of science, including the historical science.

In 1947, by the decision of the People's Committee of North Korea, a permanent commission was created to write the history of Korea, which then became the scientific and organizational center for

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all Korean historians. The commission has published a number of studies, in particular, "Digest of Research of Historical Articles." From 1948 through 1950 the Koreans published a magazine "Eksa Che Munge" ("Question of History").⁷

The Korean historians never ceased the scientific activity even in the most difficult days of the war of liberation. The KPDR Academy of Sciences created in 1952 was of great importance for further development of both natural sciences and the humanities. The work of the Korean historians is coordinated and directed by the KPDR Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences and by the Institute of History of the Worker's Party of Korea at the Central Committee of the Worker's Party as well as by the faculties of history in the schools of higher learning.

In their studies of the modern history of the Communist Party the scientists of the KPDR review the problems of the Second World War and of the Great Patriotic War. Of particular interest are the studies "History of Korea"⁸ and "History of the National Liberation Movement in Korea" by Li Na-ing⁹ and also the articles "Liberation of Korea by the Great Soviet Army and its Historical Importance,"¹⁰ and "The Meaning of the Democratic Base Created in North Korea for 481 the Development of Korean Revolution after Liberation."¹

Some Korean historians properly evaluate the "Munich policy" which was conducted by the leading circles of England, France and the USA in the prewar time period and which was calculated to redirect the Hitler Germany aggression against the USSR and utilizing German hands to "destroy the first socialist state in the world."²

In the studies which were derived from and based on the Marxist methodology, the historians of the KPDR unmask the policy of duplicity of the leading circles in the USA and England during the Second World War: the sabotage in creating the second front in

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Europe and the plans to conclude a separate peace agreement with the Hitlerites. Such policy, as stated in the second volume of the "History of Korea," was defined by the attempts to weaken both, the Soviet Union and Hitler Germany, thus ensuring the possibility to be able to dictate to both of them the conditions of the after war reconstruction of the whole world.³

The Korean historians note the liberation character of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against the German-fascist invaders. The Soviet people who rose in the national war, not only were fighting for the first socialist state in the world, but also to save world civilization from the fascist barbarians. Faithful to its international duty, the USSR carried out its mission of liberation and extended its hand in assisting all people fighting against fascism.

The Korean geographic history pays particular attention to the role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of the imperialist Japan and liberation of Korea from colonial yoke. The Korean historians convincingly prove that without the participation of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan, the USA and Great Britain would have to fight Japan for a protracted time period and would have incurred great losses in men and materiel.

Emphasizing the decisive role of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the Korean historians write that the victory of the Soviet Union has changed radically the relationship between the political forces on a global scale in favor of democracy and socialism, being a powerful catalyst of the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries directed toward the decay of the imperialist colonial system and facilitating the creation of the necessary preconditions for the transition in various countries toward socialism.⁴ In their studies they particularly note the importance of the Volga battle on the final outcome of the Second World War. "The decisive

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victory of the Soviet armed forces at Stalingrad in 1943, "has been stated in "History of Korea," "not only disrupted the Japanese plan of the attack on the Soviet Union but also exerted a great influence on the course of events in the Pacific Ocean basin."⁵ Precisely because of the defeat of the German-fascist armed forces in the battle on the Volga which was the turning point of the Second World War, the American armed forces, after a number of serious misfortunes, undertook for the first time the advance operations on the Pacific theatre of war.

The Korean historians lay the blame and shame on the American imperialists who, without any military necessity, dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁶

The geographic history of the KPDR describes in detail the national liberation struggle of the Korean people during the Second World War, reviewing the most critical conditions in which this struggle took place. The Korean historian Li Na-ing writes: "The international situation was shaping up in a favorable direction for the development of the national liberation movement of the Korean people generating in its course the final victory. This was due to the fact that the Soviet Union, by participating in the Second World War, has predetermined the unavoidable defeat of the Japanese imperialism. And now it is only a matter of time. In contrast to this, the internal situation shaping up at that time period in the country, was extremely difficult and unfavorable for the development of the resistance movement because of the vicious fascist regime and extreme suppression. In addition, almost all revolutionary organizations active within the country were destroyed and the people's movement ran temporarily into a blind alley."⁷

A large amount of space in the Korean historical literature is occupied with the questions regarding the liberation of Korea by the Soviet armed forces. This event, as is justly pointed out by the Korean historians, has opened the door for a new epoch in the history

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of the Korean people. Due to the liberation of the country, the Korean people had a bright future of national rebirth and socialist/482 development.

The Soviet Armed forces not only expelled the Japanese colonizers but by staying in North Korea prevented the possible intervention of the American imperialists. "The very fact of the Soviet armed forces stay in North Korea, as has been emphasized in the "History of Korea," "was already a sufficiently reliable guarantee of the protection of the liberated Korean people from the new aspirations of the imperialist states, being a favorable and decisive factor in the struggle for the creation of the new democratic Korea."¹ The Korean progressive forces valued quite highly the assistance of the Soviet Union which was permeated with the spirit of internationalism. In the very first appeal of the Soviet command to the Korean people it was stated: "Citizens of Korea! Remember that fortune is in your hands. You have acquired freedom and independence and now your fate depends only on yourselves. The Soviet army has created all the preconditions for the free creative work of the Korean people. The Korean people must become the creators of their own happiness."²

Within recent years the studies of some Korean historians include some nonobjective treatment of the question regarding the Korean liberation. Some historians are attempting to represent the case as if the Red Army played a secondary role in the struggle against the Japanese imperialism. For example, in the book, "History of the Korean Revolutionary Movement in Modern Times," the role of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army has been overstated. Regarding the latter, it has been stated that it, "In cooperation with the units of the Soviet army, proceeded with the last strategic attack which was in itself the greatest event associated with the liberation of the country." "The Korean National Revolutionary Army," as has been stated further in the same book, "by interacting with the units of the Soviet army, began activity in extensive regions of the north-eastern part of Manchuria and in Korea itself..."³

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by undertaking the landing operations in the Unggi and Chongjin regions, it occupied the eastern shores, extending its successes..."³

The question regarding the Korean liberation is being viewed in the same vein in some other studies.⁴

It is known that the Korean people during the whole time period had resisted the Japanese occupation forces quite valiantly, thus making their contribution to the liberation of their Fatherland. However, the expulsion of the Japanese invaders from North Korea was accomplished directly by the Soviet armed forces. The KPDR chairman of the Council of Ministers Kim Il Sung, at the reception honoring the Soviet delegation on February 11, 1965, stated: "The Korean and Soviet people are bound together by the unbroken ties of friendship. The Soviet people have liberated our people from the colonial mastery of Japanese imperialism and are rendering us a great material assistance and moral support."⁵

MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The main emphasis in the geographic history of the MPR during the Second World War is being concentrated on the assistance rendered by the Mongolian people to the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War and the immediate participation of the People's Army of MPR in the military struggle against the Japanese militarists in 1945 on the territory of Manchuria.

The documents and materials related to these questions are to be found in the Central State Archive in Ulan Bator and in the archive of the Ins/titute of Party History at the Central Committee of the Mongolian Communist Party as well as in the local and regional archives.

In regards to the study and publication of the official documents and archive materials, very little has been done so far in this area. At the end of 1945 a book was published "The Great

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Victory,"⁶ prepared by the department of propaganda at the Central Committee of the Mongolian Communist Party. It contains some official materials published for the first time in the newspaper "Unen" which has to do primarily with the destruction of the armed forces of fascist Germany and of imperialist Japan.

In 1954 a digest was published "MPR During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union."⁷ It contains the resolutions and decisions of the party and of the MPR government to render assistance to the heroic Soviet people and their Red Army. It contains the speeches and statements of the Party and State representatives of the MPR regarding the reactionary colonial policies of fascist Germany and of imperialist Japan, and the general character of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. It contains telegrams exchanged between the leading representatives of the MPR party and 483 state representatives and the Soviet Union. It contains the response of the collectives of the workers and the peasants in the MPR which had been called upon by the Party to render the fraternal assistance to the Soviet people, etc.

The important documents reflecting the history of the MPR during the Second World War are published in the digest containing the laws and basic governmental decisions during 1939-1946.¹

Quite valuable sources of the MPR history during the Second World War are the protocols of the Party congresses, of the Party conferences, of the plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the Mongolian Communist Party² as well as the materials associated with the meetings of the MPR leaders of national industry, the collated laws and decisions of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly, of the MPR Council of Ministers and also the speeches, articles and statements of the State and Party leaders.³

Interesting information regarding the contribution of the people of the MPR to the destruction of the states within the fascist block can be found by the researcher in the anniversary publications

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and in some statistical digests published during the war and after it.⁴

In the study of the questions of Mongolian history during the wartime, the Mongolian historians revert to the periodical press of the MPR. The newspapers and magazines were publishing materials reflecting the life of the country, of its separate regions and the patriotic actions of the Mongolian people. In parallel with this, they published a large number of articles devoted to the deeds of the working class of the USSR, of the farmers from the collective farms and of the Soviet intelligentsia.

The Mongolian historians devote considerable attention to the study of questions related to the foreign policy of the Republic. The magazine "Modern Mongolia" has published an extensive article by B. Lhamsuren "On the History of the Foreign Relations of the MPR."⁵ The article analyzes some concrete measures undertaken by the MPR government regarding the peaceful settlement of boundary conflicts which were provoked in 1935-1936 by the Japanese imperialists. It also unmaskes the reactionary colonial policy of the militarist Japan in regard to the MPR. The article emphasizes that the Soviet government has rendered on numerous occasions the assistance to the MPR in order to protect its national independence from the imperialists claims. In particular, of great importance in strengthening the national independence and sovereignty of the country was the agreement concluded between the MPR and the USSR in 1936 and the victory at Khalkhin Gol. The article points out the great importance of the declaration signed by the representatives of the Soviet Union and of Japan in April 1936 regarding the mutual respect and inviolate state of the territories of the MPR and of Manchu Ho and the notes which were exchanged between the ministers of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union and China in August 1945 regarding the question of Chinese recognition of the MPR independence.

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Beginning from the very first days of the war, the central publication of the party and of the government, the newspaper "Unen," the magazine "Namyn Bayguulalt" (the theoretical publication of the Central Committee of the Mongolian Communist Party) and some other periodicals published in the Republic, have explained the just liberation character of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, familiarizing the people with the heroic struggle of the Soviet people at the front lines, showing the great efforts of the Mongolian people and their participation in the military struggle against imperial Japan.

The department of propaganda at the Central Committee of the Mongolian Communist Party has organized the publication of a series of brochures on the following subject matter: "Traacherous attack of German fascists on the USSR and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War,"⁶ "Failure of "Blitzkrieg" plan against the USSR,"⁷ "The debacle of the fascist plan of encirclement and the capture of Moscow,"⁸ "The counterattack of the Red Army against the German invaders,"⁹ "Stalingrad battle as the greatest battle in the history of wars,"¹⁰ "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,"¹¹ "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people and the creation of the antiHitler coalition,"¹² "Death to the German invaders,"¹³ "German robbery and imperialism,"¹⁴ "Instability of the fascist invaders rear lines in Europe and in Germany itself,"¹⁵ "USSR as a unified combat camp,"¹⁶ "Guerilla warfare of the Soviet people /484 against the German invaders,"¹ "Summer advance activity of the Red Army in 1943,"² "Role of the militayy technology in modern warfare,"³ etc. All these brochures were primarily of propaganda type.

During the war a number of books, brochures and digests of articles were published which were devoted to the broad-based movement of the Mongolian workers responding to the decisions and resolutions of the Central Committee of the Mongolian Communist Party and of the Council of Ministers of the MPR regarding the assistance to the Red Army and the Soviet people. For example, in 1942-1944

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several digests of articles were published. Among these were "Gifts of the Mongolian people to the combatants of the Red Army who are on the front of the Patriotic War,"⁴ and "Delivery of gifts by the representatives of the MPR to the military men of the Red Army."⁵ The articles included in these digests tell us about the strengthening of the friendship between the Mongolian and Soviet people during the war. The digest "Mongolia for the Front"⁶ published in 1944 occupies a special place. This digest was published by the Central Commission for the organization of Gifts on the MPR governmental level. It contains 41 letters from the collectives of governmental and social organizations, from the military units and from individuals in the MPR addressed to the soldiers, officers and High Command of the Red Army. The digest also contains the letters from the army fronts addressed to the collectives of Mongolian workers and individuals. Part of these letters were published at that time in the periodic press. The study of these letters gives a general idea as to how the people of two fraternal countries were living during the wartime, indicating their indomitable faith in the justness of their struggle against the fascist invaders and the deep understanding of their international duty.

In August 1945 the Mongolian People's Republic had engaged in a just war against the militarist Japan. In connection with this a number of brochures and articles were published unmasking the reactionary policy of enslavement displayed by the Japanese imperialism with respect to Mongolia, showing the just, liberation character of the antiJapanese war and in particular the active participation of the MPR in this war. It is necessary to note here the brochures by Sh. Luvsanvandan, "Struggle for the independence of Mongolia and Japanese imperialism,"⁷ Ch. Lodoydamb "Our just war against Japanese imperialism,"⁸ B. Tseden "Our independence and the Hulunbuir Mongols who are under the Japanese yoke."⁹ In addition, the periodic press systematically published the informational bulletins about the advance operations of the units of the MPR army.

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In the postwar time period one finds in Mongolia the expansion of the studies and scientific comprehensive work related to the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and to the struggle of the Mongolian people during the wartime. Several books and articles of scientific and research character were published. In 1946 a book by L. Toyv was published "25 years of Revolutionary Army."¹⁰ This historical review about the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army makes an attempt to show the birth and development of the MPR armed forces. The last three chapters of the book tell us about the measures undertaken by the Party and by the government in strengthening the Mongolian armed forces during the Second World War. The author describes in detail the military activity of the Soviet and Mongolian armed forces in Khalkhin-Gol region in the summer of 1939 and pays great attention to the participation of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army in the war against imperialist Japan in 1945.

In 1960-1961 two articles were published written by L. Bat-Ochir, "Participation of the MPR in the Second World War"¹¹ and "Mongolian Communist Party as the leader and organizer of the struggle of the Mongolian people resulting in the destruction of the common enemy during the Second World War."¹² In these articles using concrete facts, the author shows how the Mongolian Communist Party led the development of the national economy during the wartime. The wartime years were the years of considerable industrial growth in the MPR. This is described rather fully in a special chapter devoted to the Second World War in the book by B. Tudev "From the History of the Working Class of the MPR."¹³

An important event in the social and political life of the Republic was the one-volume publication in 1954 of "History of the MPR"¹⁴ which was collectively prepared by the USSR Academy of Sciences and by the MPR Committee for Science. The third part of the "History of the MPR" incorporates two chapters: "MPR during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Hitler Germany" and "Participation

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of the MPR in the destruction of the armed forces of Japanese imperialism." On the basis of studies and comprehensive collation of a large number of materials the Mongolian and Soviet historians have clearly shown that the Mongolian people have actively engaged /485 in the great antifascist struggle of all progressive humanity, contributing all within its power to the destruction of German fascism and Japanese imperialism. These two chapters in "History of the MPR" may be considered as being a substantial first attempt to study and develop the Mongolian materials related to the Second World War based in the Marxist historical science.

In 1964 a book was published "Brief History of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party" prepared by the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the Mongolian Communist Party. The book contains a chapter "Mongolian Communist Party, the organizer and inspirer of the common struggle of the Mongolian people against German fascism and Japanese imperialism (1940-1945)."¹ The book shows the measures undertaken by the Mongolian Communist Party in guiding the internal and foreign policies of the MPR during the wartime, the organization of the national assistance to the Soviet people and the role of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party as inspirer and organizer of the Mongolian people in its struggle against the most evil global reactionary forces - German fascism and Japanese imperialism.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND

Great attention is being paid by the Polish geographic history of the Second World War to unmask the causes of the September 1939 catastrophe, to disclose the face of the regime of the German-fascist occupation and in particular to show the liberation struggle of the Polish people.

The large publications which made an appearance in recent years in Polish historical science which are the first comprehensive studies of the history of the national war of liberation 1939-1945, are based

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to a considerable degree on a solid archive foundation created in national Poland. The German-fascist occupation forces destroyed numerous archives in the country. The national representatives were forced to collect by bits the archive information related to the national liberation and class struggle of the Polish people during the past war.

At the present time there are several state historical archives, of central and branch type, which are to be found in provinces and large cities and directed by the Main State Directorate for Archives. Also the Polish Workers Party archives in the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the PPR, and the provincial historic and revolutionary museums which in all scientific, methodological and administrative respects are responsible to the PPR. There are such special archives as, for example, the archive created in 1945 at the Ministry of Justice which is the branch of the Main Commission for Investigation of Hitler (prior to 1950 - of German) atrocities, the military and historical archives which are within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense, the archives of Unified Peasants Party and others. All these archives contain the information regarding the history of 1939-1945 time period.

A part of the documents and materials, and in particular those which concern the bourgeois-landlord camp and created by it the Regional Army and also the Polish armed forces which were incorporated within the Western allied forces, ended up in the archives of the emigree politicians in England (General Sikorski Institute) in the USA (Pulsudski Institute) and in France (Polish Library in Paris). The documents from these archives (particularly in the USA) in essence are not available to the researchers representing the Polish Republic.

The largest files of documents on the 1939-1945 history are in

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the State Archives of the New Acts in Warsaw and in the Central Party archive at the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the ~~PPR~~ Polish United Workers' Party [PWRP]. The first source contains mostly the materials starting from 1944 of a general political and state administrative type related to the history of the first year of the people's power. The second one contains the materials regarding the history of the worker's movement and the activity of the PPR, the documents from the People's Guard Army and People's Army, of the Regional People's Council and local people's councils, of the Central Bureau of Polish Communists in the USSR, of the union of Polish patriots in the USSR and of the Staff of Polish guerillas at the Polish Committee for National Liberation. The latter source also features the largest collection in Poland of the underground publications of various parties and groups in 1939-1944 time period (862 titles) and also the file of microfilms with more than 500 thousand frames. The Institute of Party History has in safe deposit some materials from other archive sources (in particular from the sources of the government in exile and of the Regional Army) and a part of the archives related to the occupation forces.

The materials related to the history of the regular Polish armed forces are concentrated predominantly in the Central Military Archive which also contains documents of the guerilla movement. The largest number of documents related to the history of the peasants movement and of the peasant battalions is to be found in the archive at the Institute of History of the Peasants Movement. The archive of the Ministry of Interior contains rather interesting materials regarding some units and reactionary underground organizations.

The Polish People's Republic carries on a great work in the study of the problems associated with the history of the country during the Second World War. The development of these tasks involves the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of 486 the PPR, the Military and Historical Institute at the Defense Ministry of the PPR, the Department of History of the Second World War at the Institute of History attached to the Polish Academy

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of Sciences, the Institute of History of the Peasants Movement and some other organizations. The questions of the history of the Jewish population in Poland, and in particular the years of the Second World War are being investigated by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. A considerable work in the study of the occupation policies of the Hitlerites in Poland and of German-Polish relations is being carried on by the Western Institute in Poznan'.

There were various digests being published in Poland containing documents of the history of the Second World War. The documents related to the activity of the Polish Worker's Party during the Second World War are to be found in the digest "Formation and Foundation of the PPR Programs in 1942-1945."¹ The digest also contains the materials of the Union of Polish Patriots, of the Regional People's Council and of the left wing of the Polish Socialist Worker's Party.

In 1962 the first volume of "Selected Publications of the PPR During the Occupation Years"² has been published which contains the materials up to the year 1942 and in 1964 - the second volume was published³ which contains the materials of the year 1943. The appendix to the first volume also presents the materials of the revolutionary groups which preceded the formation of the PPR and the materials generated by the press of the antifascist block in the Warsaw ghetto. It also presents the list of the publications of the PPR and the organizations connected with it.

The PPR press during the fascist occupation has popularized the program and slogans of the Party, fighting for the ideas and organizational strengthening of its ranks, expanding its influence among the people. The Party press has called upon the people to initiate the active struggle with the occupation forces, it called upon the creation of the National Front and for the establishment of Polish-Soviet cooperation for the joint struggle against the common enemy. The informational materials regarding the history of the national

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liberation movement in Poland are contained in the book "Polish Worker's Party. Chronology of Events. January 1942-May 1945"⁴ which describes in detail the activity of the PPR, of the People's Guard Army and of the People's Army.

On the 10th anniversary of the PPR formation, a digest of documents and materials has been published⁵ about the PPR, the Union of Polish Patriots, the People's Guard Army, the People's Army, the Resistance Youth Union and other organizations. As a supplement to this digest, there is a volume of publications regarding the great helper of the party in the struggle - the Resistance Youth Union which was formed in March of 1943.⁶

Two large publications are being devoted to the national armed forces - the People's Guard Army and the People's Army: "Headquarters Communique of the People's Guard Army and of the People's Army" and "People's Guard Army and People's Army in Lublin Region in 1942-1944."⁷

These publications are of extreme value for the study of the military struggle of the Polish people which took place under the leadership of the PPR. The first book includes the organizational diagrams of the People's Guard Army and of the People's Army, the calendar of the most important events and battles, the lists of sources and literature. The authors present extensive commentaries attempting to disclose all names, pseudonyms of the participants, places where the battles took place and the results obtained. The book includes the documents prior to June 1944. The second book is the first volume of a multivolume publication of documents and materials "Resistance Movement in Lublin Region in 1942-1944." This publication reviews a broad number of questions, starting with the inception of the very first guerilla units to the time of the establishment of the people's power.

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In 1962 the second volume of this publication was in print, the "Khlopsk Battalions in Lublin Region."⁸ This volume contains documents regarding the activity of the armed forces created by the Peasant's Party. A considerable part of these units cooperated with the People's Guard Army and in 1944 joined the People's Army created by the Regional People's Council. In 1963 the third volume was published "Calendar of Events, the Battles of the People's Guard Army and of the People's Army in Lublin Region (1942-1944)." In 1964 the fourth volume was issued, "I am the Son of Polish People" (a digest of reminiscences of PPR members and of the soldiers of the People's Guard Army and of the People's Army operating in Lublin Region).

A multivolume publication "Organization and Combat Activity of the Polish Armed Forces in 1943-1945"¹¹ is devoted to the creation of the Polish army in the USSR and the Polish Armed Forces. Up to this moment the following volumes have been published: the first volume which reviews the organizational problems, the first part of the second volume embracing the activity up to January 7, 1945 and the fourth volume containing the documents and materials regarding /487 the activity of the political and educational apparatus.¹ The documents and materials in these volumes tell us about the formation and development of the whole armed forces and also about the specific armies, including the First Army of the Polish Armed Forces.

Of great importance to characterize the occupation regime in Poland are the documents and materials of the trials of the major German criminals of war and also the trials which took place in Poland. A particular place among these is held by the "Diary" by H. Frank, the former General-Governor of Poland. The 38 volumes of this diary presented at the Nürnberg criminals of war trial contain the protocols of the meetings of the highest dignitaries of the General-Government, the Nazi party meetings, the stenographic records of Frank's speeches, his daily notes about the directives

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received, his daily activities and instructions. The excerpts from this "Diary" disclose the criminal activity of Frank and are published in Poland by S. Piotrowski.² Of great interest also are the book of the Polish prosecutors at the Nürnberg trial T. Cyprian and J. Sawicki³ and also of some other Polish historians and lawyers, all of which are based on the materials of the Nürnberg process.

One should also note the book by J. Gumkowski and K. Lescinski, devoted to the situation in Poland during the Second World War.⁴ The authors unmask the gangsterism and aggressive essence of the Nazi "new order" in Europe, showing the plans of Hitler directed toward the enslavement and annihilation of the slavie people. The work considers in detail the terrorist policies of the Hitlerites with respect to the Polish population, it shows the mass annihilation of people in the Nazi death camps in Oświęcim (Auschwitz), in Treblinka and in Chelmo. One of its chapters is involved in the description of crimes committed by the Hitlerites during the Warsaw uprising in 1944. The great value of this book lies in the fact that it is based on the official Nazi documents.

Of great importance are the publications of documents and materials as well as the results of investigations related to the atrocities of the German-fascist invaders in Poland, and contained in "Bulletin of the Main Commission for the Investigation of Hitler's Atrocities in Poland."⁵

A great job in unmasking the Hitlerite atrocities with respect to the Jewish population is being conducted by the Jewish Historical Institute which has published a considerable number of documents characterizing the regime established by the German-fascist occupation forces in ghettos and the Resistance Movement.⁶

The Polish historians devote considerable time to the foreign policy questions of Poland in the prewar time. In 1960 a large study by M. Turlejska "One Year Before the Catastrophe"⁷ has been

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published which was the result of an extensive study of the Polish archives, of numerous foreign publications and of literary sources. The author considers the policy of the Polish leading circles several years prior to the war, concentrating in particular on the characteristics of the Polish foreign policy starting from the Munich days to the beginning of the war. "The anti-Russian complex," the claim of being a big power, the fear of its own people, the attempt to find a compromise with Hitler Germany - these are the factors defining the policy of the Polish leading circles the result of which was one of the greatest national tragedies of the Polish people.

On the basis of the archive materials the book shows that the greater part of the Polish people were against this fateful course in the foreign policy. But the struggle of the people was not well organized. In 1938, without good grounds, the Polish Communist Party was disbanded and the so-called opposition parties (the Polish Socialist Party and Peasant's Party in the first place) could not and would not lead the people's opposition against the government. However, the true Marxist-Leninist evaluation of this antinational policy exhibited by these small bourgeois parties was not given in this book.

S. Stanislawska in her book "Great and Small Strategy of J. Beck" considers the policy of the legal parties of opposition. The author shows that the leaders of these parties cooperated with Beck in conducting the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, being in collusion with Hitler. Within their own country these parties assisted in strengthening the small-bourgeois dictatorship. "The opposition party and the small-bourgeois circles," writes Stanislawska, "bear a great responsibility for the further course of events which in less than one year after Munich resulted in the defeat of Poland in the fall of 1939."⁸

The Polish historians investigate the question of the English

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guarantees given to Poland. Professor K. Lapter, who investigated the Polish-German relations in his article "English Guarantees Given to Poland in 1939"¹ on the basis of the documents generated by the 488 Nürnberg process, comes to the conclusion that the decision of Hitler to attack Poland was taken only after the English guarantees were secured. Prior to that time Hitler had an idea to convert Poland into its satellite. The questions of the preparation of Hitler's aggression are reviewed by B. Czarnecki in his work "Fall Weiss. The Genesis of the Hitler Aggression Against Poland."²

A well known Polish military historian, General J. Kirchmayer in his book "1939 and 1944. Some Polish Questions"³ notes quite justifiably the inconsistency between noisy and solemn promises given Poland by England and France and the complete refusal to render actual assistance. Kirchmayer shows all the maneuvering, including even deception that the English and French politicians employed in order not to undertake any concrete responsibilities to render military and economic assistance to Poland. In this manner they were attempting to prepare the judicial "reasons" to abandon Poland to its fate at the moment of the German attack. Kirchmayer notes that the refusal of assistance to Poland was an integral part of the antiSoviet policy of the leading circles in England and France.⁴

The questions of the Polish foreign policy of prewar times are also in the center of the discussion among Polish historians. In 1956-1958 the Polish historians-Marxists generated a fundamental struggle with the revisionist tendency within the country according to which an attempt was made to justify the foreign policy of the prewar Poland, of the emigree government, its representatives and the leadership of the Regional Army.⁵ The overwhelming majority of Polish historians spoke out decisively against the revisionist tendencies on the historical front. By showing the lack of substance in attempts to excuse the reactionary politicians of prewar Poland, the secretary of the Central Committee of the ~~Unified PPR~~ *United Polish Workers Party*, Z. Kliscko,

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wrote in 1957 that "The process of socialist democratization implies in the domain of science the freedom of creative scientific searches, in the case of scientists the freedom of scientific research and the establishment of objective truth. To be sure, all of this has nothing to do with the unabashed freedom of the reactionary literary individuals who are attempting to justify the pre-September policy ending with the national catastrophe, the policy which, as we all well remember, was condemned unanimously by the whole society in times of occupation. One cannot agree to rehabilitate the policy of setting fire to one's own house."⁶

In the course of running discussions, a number of reactionary myths existing from Pilsudski times, have been overturned. For example, the deceptive claim of the defenders of the bourgeois policies that Pilsudski in 1933 proposed to France to organize a preventive war against Germany has been disproven.⁷ It is necessary to mention a book by M. Turlejska which created acute debates, "About the War and Underground" which is primarily a digest of articles written mainly during 1956-1958 discussions in which some of the reactionary myths regarding the policies of the emigree government and its representatives in Poland during the Second World War are being unmasked. One of such legendary inventions was the version that the Regional Army was a monolithic entity in ideological and organizational sense. The idea of such a myth was an attempt to depict the reactionary leadership of the Regional Army as being a spokesman for the national interests of the Polish people in their struggle for freedom and independence of their country. The whole Polish social strata has decidedly condemned these attempts as having no real basis, disorienting deliberately the whole society with respect to the activity of the Regional Army leadership, which was the representation of the Polish reactionary bourgeois, landed gentry and emigree circles.

The historian revisionists have ignored frequent deep disagreements between the soldiers and a segment of officer corps within the

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Regional Army and its reactionary upper command which attempted to make use of the patriotic tendencies found within a broad strata of the Polish people and put them to their own use which had nothing in common with the national interest of the Polish people.

A considerable place in the Polish geographic history is occupied by the tragic events of September 1939 which resulted in the establishment in the country of a ruthless German-fascist regime of occupation.

The general review of the Polish-German war is presented in the book by J. Kirchmayer "September Campaign"⁹ published in 1946. At the present time this work in many respects has outgrown its use. The main shortcoming of this book lies in the fact that the bourgeois-nationalist position of the author made it impossible for him to re-search objectively and fully all causes of the September catastrophe.

A short review of the war activities in September 1939 and the analysis of causes which resulted in the complete deterioration of 489 the Polish bourgeois-landed gentry State, is contained in the materials used for political studies "On the History of the War of Liberation of the Polish People. 1939-1945."¹ published by the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Armed Forces.

The Polish historians also study the specific stages of the September campaign, and in particular the heroic defense of Warsaw and Westerplatte. One should mention here the work by L. Głowacki "Defense of Warsaw and Modlin as a Background of the September Campaign"² and the book by M. Porwit "Defense of Warsaw. September 1939."³ Both authors consider primarily the questions of organization and of the struggle of the regular military units in defense of the capital. The heroic deeds of the worker's class and of the population in defense of Warsaw, the organization and activity of the volunteer-worker battalions and the leading role in them of the Polish communists are reflected in the book by M. Malinowski.⁴

The book of P. Dubiel "September 1939 in Silesia"⁵ tells us

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about the struggle of the population of Silesia against the advancing German-fascist armed forces. The memoirs of the commanding general of the armies "Lodz'" and "Warsaw," J. Rommel are also of interest.⁶

The great efforts of Westerplatte defendants is reviewed in the study by M. Wańkiewicz, "Westerplatte," in the reminiscences of the T. Dąbrowski, the second in command of Westerplatte garrison and in the digest of reminiscences of the Westerplatte defenders prepared for print by Z. Flisowski.⁷ A serious historic and military study of one of the largest battles during the Polish-German war is the work of the commanding general of the army "Poznan," T. Kutrzeba, "Battle at Bzura."⁸ A special chapter about this battle can also be found in the book of J. Kirchmayer "1939 and 1944."⁹

A particularly important place in the Polish geographic history of the Second World War is occupied by the questions regarding the occupation regime and the liberation struggle of the Polish people against the German-fascist invaders. A great work in researching the occupation policy of the Nazi authorities is being conducted by the Western Institute in Poznan. The books published on that subject matter review the economic, political and administrative aspects of the German-fascist occupation, showing the brutal disregard by the Hitlerites of the standard of international justice, the clear manifestation of which was the brutal terror against the population. One of the coworkers in the Western Institute, Professor K. Pospieszalski has published several books, numerous articles and substantial documentary digests¹⁰ related to the questions of the occupation policy of the Hitlerites.

Hitler's plans regarding the General-Government are researched in the study by Cz. Madajczyk.¹¹ This book characterizes the point of view of the Hitlerites regarding the Polish questions during the Second World War. Particularly valuable is the third part of the book unmasking the general plan "East" - the plan of annihilation

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of the slavic people. A unique appendix to the study by Cz. Madajczyk is the four-volume edition of materials on the history of the Zamosc Region during the war (1939-1944) prepared by Z. Klukowski and the diary of Klukowski.¹²

Of considerable interest is the "Chronicle of Wartime and the Occupation"¹³ which was written in Warsaw in 1939-1944 by the Polish economist and historian L. Landau and also the materials of trials which took place in Poland of the German war criminals.

Of great importance in the study of the history of the war of liberation of the Polish people against the German-fascist occupation forces, of the history of the Polish worker's party, its struggle for a unified national front against the reactionary groups of the "London camp" is the first volume of articles and speeches made by W. Gomułka,¹⁴ embracing the 1943-1945 years. In 1962 an expanded version of the first volume of articles and speeches by W. Gomułka were published, prepared by the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the Unified PPR. The volume contains the most important works of the author in 1943-1945, including those which were not published before. W. Gomułka gives the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the political situation in the country and the goals set out for the Polish people in its struggle for liberation with the background of the struggle of the democratic forces led by the Soviet Union against Hitler Germany and its satellites. The article of W. Gomułka "On the Twentieth Anniversary of the Formation of the PPR"¹⁶ contains a brief analysis of the history of the Polish worker's /490 party creation and its role in the liberation struggle of the Polish people against the German-fascist occupation forces. As pointed out by W. Gomułka, the PPR from the very beginning declared in its essential program outlines the formation of a new Poland as a people's democracy and a firm alliance with the mighty Soviet state.

In creating the history of the Marxist-Leninist party of the Polish working class, a great job is being done by the Institute of

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Party History at the Central Committee of the Unified PPR. The preliminary summary work of the history of the Polish worker's movement in 1939-1944 are the brochures published in 1960-1961 under one title "Reviews of the History of the Worker's Movement During the Years of the Hitler Occupation."¹

In one of the first brochures written by M. Malinowski the initial period of unification of the revolutionary organizations within Poland itself and the activity of the Polish communist emigres in the USSR in reforming the party, is being investigated. V. Poteranski and M. Wilusz have developed the questions of the first periods of the PPR activity, the creation of the local organization's network. From these brochures one learns about the creation of the People's Guard Army and its military struggle against the invaders from January 1942 through March 1943. A. Przygonski devoted his study to the investigation of the activity of the PPR in unifying all forces of the Polish people into a single national front of struggle against the invaders and the creation of the leading center of this front - the People's Regional Council. The brochure of J. Pawlowicz reviews the questions faced by the party from the beginning of 1944 when the national struggle for liberation led by PPR grew into the people's democratic revolution and the PPR was preparing the masses, creating the new power of the people at the moment when Poland was liberated by the Red Army and by the units of the 1st Polish Army.

On the basis of these four brochures a book was written "Polish Worker's Movement During the War Years and the Occupation, 1939-1945."² The authors took into account the comments made during the discussions which took place after the "Reviews of the History of the Worker's Movement During the Years of the Hitler Occupation" was published. The book contains some new data regarding the relationship of the political forces within the country, regarding the occupation regime, the international situation and its effect on the situation in Poland. At the center of the author's

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attention is the formation and struggle of two political trends - the camp of the Polish bourgeoisie and the camp of the revolutionary worker's movement around which all revolutionary and democratic forces were uniting. The book shows the actions of the worker's class and its front liners - the Polish Worker's Party, the strengthening of alliance between the worker's class and the peasantry.

In January 1962, in connection with the 20th anniversary of the PPR, several books were published regarding the activity of the PPR in various parts of the country, both, in the General-Government, and in the provinces which were attached to Germany.

The Polish historians research the activity of the Resistance Youth Union. The available literature regarding the Resistance Youth Union is predominantly of memoir format. The books about the first leaders of the union, H. Szapiro-Sawickiej and J. Krasicki - member of the Central Committee of the Communist Worker's Party of Poland, are of the same character.³

The Jewish Historic Institute has published a book of B. Mark about the resistance movement in Białystok⁴ and Warsaw ghetto.⁵ The author shows this movement with its background as being an extensive struggle of the whole Polish people against the invaders. The book by A. Eisenbach "Hitler's Policy of Annihilation of Jews"⁶ considers the problems of the race policy of the Hitlerites not only as applicable to Poland, but also to some other occupied countries.

The digest "Modern History of Poland" (the materials and publications from the Second World War) contains rich factual material and the articles related to the social and economic processes during the wartime, the class struggle and the relationship between the class forces.

The creation of solid scientific studies regarding the military

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history is being done by the Military Institute of History and the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the Unified PPR. The preparatory work carried out by these organizations has been reflected to some degree in the materials of the first scientific session of the Polish Academy of Science (October 1958) at which the events of the war of liberation of the Polish people in 1939-1945 have been considered⁷ and during the second scientific session (October 1963) which was to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the People's Polish Armed Forces. Key Problems."¹

On the 20th anniversary of the People's Polish Armed Forces the Military Institute of History published a book "War of Liberation of the Polish People in 1939-1945. Key Problems."¹ /491

◆ This is the first comprehensive historical study of the struggle of the Polish people against the German-fascist invaders. It is based on the study of the Soviet and Polish archive documents, of the Polish, Soviet, English, German, American, French and other publications and on the literary works related to this question. The publication incorporates scientifically some new facts and numbers, interpreting differently many events. It shows in detail, using strong arguments, the activities of the guerilla units of various persuasions in Poland itself, and also the activity of the Polish units incorporated within the Red Army and within the allied forces in the West. The book is permeated with the idea that the struggle of the Polish people against fascism was not only the war for national independence but also a deep social process which had a revolutionary meaning for future Poland. The main emphasis in this study is the demonstration of the formation, development and victory of the people's revolutionary strong currents within the national liberation movements led by the Polish worker's party.

In 1963 in Warsaw a large publication of reference and information type was prepared by a member of the Military Institute of History, J. Garas, "Units of the Guard Army and the People's Army."² The author thoroughly collated all available information

regarding the formation, composition and combat activities of the units of the Guard and of the People's Army. The book presents information regarding the structure and High Command of the Guard and of the People's Army, it describes the personalities of the commanding officers in the guerilla movement, of the representatives of the Central Committee of the PPR and the secretaries of the regional committees of the PPR.

The combat activities of the People's Guard and of the People's Army in Kielec province is being described by B. Hillebrandt.³ The book embraces the period from the time of the formation of the first units of the People's Guard and of the People's Army to the liberation time of Kielec by the Red Army. The combat activity of the People's Army at the end of 1943 - in the beginning of 1944 is analyzed with special thoroughness. This was the time period when Kielec province became the nearest rear line of the German-fascist armed forces, turning into an active zone of guerilla activity.

The book by V. Tuszyński is devoted to the largest battle in Poland of the Polish and Soviet guerillas with the 30 thousand German-fascist army in June 1944 at Lipsk and Janowsk forest and in Puszcza Solska.⁴

Of great value in the study of the liberation movement of the Polish people is the extensive literature of memoir type.

There are many important facts which are to be found in the digests "Reminiscences of Soldiers from the People's Guard Army and the People's Army"⁵ and "Brotherhood."⁶ Quite interesting is the book "People, Fact, Thoughts"⁷ which is the transcribed conversations with the military and political leaders of the guerilla movement: M. Moczar, J. Korczyński, H. Chelchowski, Z. Duszyński and others. The book "Reminiscences of the Members of the Warsaw PPR Organization"⁸ contains a selection of articles regarding the political activity of the PPR and the military struggle of the Polish patriots with the Hitlerites during the German-fascist occupation.

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In the reminiscences by E. Rozlubirski⁹ and J. Ptasinski¹⁰ some unknown facts are being disclosed regarding the liberation movement in the areas of Poland which were incorporated within Hitler's Reich. In his memoirs G. Alef-Bolkowiak,¹¹ the commander of one of the units of the People's Army in Lublin Region and M. Moczar,¹² the commander of the People's Guard Army and the People's Army in Lublin and Kielec districts, tell us about the combat activities. Some valuable materials are contained in the memoirs of the commanders of the Soviet-Polish and of the Polish guerilla units created on the territory of the USSR and then transferred to be at the disposal of the Polish guerilla command. A particular place in the Polish geographic history describing the liberation movement is the question of the Warsaw uprising. The uprising instigated for a number of selfish reasons by Polish reactionaries, resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of Polish patriots and the destruction of Warsaw, leaving a deep wound in the consciousness of the people.

The reactionary Polish emigree press published a large number of books and articles devoted to this uprising. The only task which the authors have set out to achieve (many of them are themselves guilty in this tragedy) lies in the attempt to justify the leaders of this uprising, blaming the Soviet Union for its failure. Such an attempt was made by the former leader of the Bureau of Information and Propaganda at the Regional Army High Command, Lieutenant Colonel Rzepiecki¹³. A proper response was given to Rzepiecki by J. Kirchmayer¹⁴ and by A. Skarżyński.¹⁵

On the whole, however, the Warsaw uprising has not been thoroughly researched as yet. The books published on that subject matter do not fill the gray area in the objective description of the history of the Warsaw uprising. The book by A. Borkiewicz analyzes primarily the fighting. The author deliberately avoids making any political conclusions or evaluating the actions of the leaders of the uprising. However, one senses that his sympathies are on their side.

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J. Kirchmayer in his book not only considers the military activities but also devotes considerable attention to the political aspect of the whole question, trying to analyze critically the action of the Regional Army leadership and the antiSoviet myth propagated by it. The author shows that the leaders of the uprising consciously undertook this adventure in order to take power in the capital city before the arrival of the Red Army, and therefore were refusing to coordinate its actions with the Soviet High Command.

A considerable contribution to the history of the Warsaw uprising has been made by the historians-Marxists. In thier studies they emphasize primarily the political side of the story, how the political parties viewed the uprising, the role of the people who fought heroically the German-fascist invaders.

In 1962 in Poland two books were published regarding the Warsaw uprising which were written on the basis of archive materials. The book by A. Skarzynski "Political Causes of the Warsaw Uprising"² and by A. Przygonski "Some Problems of the Warsaw Uprising."³ In his book Skarzynski investigates the whole complex political and military problem so as to answer the question of why the Regional Army command decided to issue the order for the uprising. The book shows the criminal adventurist policy of the Regional Army command and of the Polish emigree government, attempting to achieve their antiSoviet antipeople goals at any price. Przygoński has devoted his study to the combat activity of the People's Army near the capital in the Volia district during the first days of the uprising. The book presents important documents related to the Warsaw uprising. Skarzynski and Przygonski, in their studies, enter into an argument with some postulates proposed in the books by Borkiewicz and Kirchmayer.

The Polish historians devote appreciable attention to the question of the Polish armed forces participation in the war against the German-fascist invaders on the Soviet-German front and on the

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other fronts during the Second World War.

The Polish literature contains the publications regarding the specific branches of the armed forces, for example, the tank units and the air force. The book by J. Blum⁴ reviews the question of development and the formation of the political apparatus within the armed forces of the Polish Peoples Republic. The book contains the documents of the Guard Army and of the People's Army as well as that of the Polish Army. The book by F. Zbiniewicz "Polish Army in the USSR"⁵ analyzes the political work within the Polish party related to the organization and formation of the Tadeusz Kosciuszko 1st Infantry Division, of the 1st Polish Corps and of the 1st Polish Army in the USSR in 1943-1944. There are also several popular publications and various books regarding the outstanding combat operations of the Polish armed forces at the fronts during the Second World War. It is necessary first of all to mention here the collective publication describing the military exploits of the Polish Army⁶ and the digest "On the Question of the Development of the National Polish Army."⁷

Polish historians study the battle at Lenino where the combat christening of the Kosciuszko Division (the 1st Polish division mustered in the USSR) took place. One should also mention the military historical publication by St. Szulczyński "Battle at Lenino"⁸ and the documentary story by H. Hubert "Lenino."⁹ The analysis of operations in capturing the beachheads on the left side of the Vistula river in Warsaw and the evaluation of these operations is contained in the study by J. Margules who writes about the combat activities of the 1st Army of the Polish Armed Forces.¹⁰

The book "Combat Activities of the People's Polish Armies"¹¹ contains the articles devoted to the main operations of the Polish Army in the last years of the war. Of considerable interest is the book published in 1961 "From the History of the National Defense of Poland"¹² prepared on the basis of the article of the Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic, M. Sychalski, "On the Polish-Soviet Combat Friendship"¹³ and also on the basis

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of his presentation "Formation and Development of the National Defense of Poland" presented at the A. Zapotocky Military Academy in the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic on February 14, 1960.

The Polish army is proud of its participation in the breakthrough of the German-fascist defense line on the shores of the North Sea /493. This operation is described in the book by A. Jasiński "Breakthrough at the Sea Shore Defense Wall" and the book by Colonel E. Jadziak "Liberation of the North Sea Shore."² These two studies analyze the combat activities of the Red Army and of the Polish army during the liberation of the North Sea shore in 1945. There are also studies describing the activity of the First Army of the Polish Armed Forces, its participation in combat in April-May 1945³ and the participation in the Berlin operation of several units of the Polish Armed Forces. There are also several books describing the combat activity of the Second Army of the Polish Armed Forces and of its participation in the liberation of Czechoslovakia.⁴

The Polish military-historical literature devotes considerable attention to the combat activity of the Polish units on the Western front which were a part of the Allied forces, and the participation of Poles in the Resistance Movement in some other countries, in particular in France.⁵ There are studies regarding the combat activities of the Polish soldiers at Narvik,⁶ in Italy⁷ and also the participation of several Polish units in military operations in the Near East,⁸ in the "battle for England"⁹ and in the fight for the liberation of France, Belgium and Holland.¹⁰ By fighting against the German-fascist invaders on the Western front and in the Near East, the Polish soldiers and officers have contributed appreciably to the common cause of the countries and people within the anti-fascist coalition. However, the reactionary upper crust of the Polish officer's corps attempted to exploit the participation of the Polish soldiers in the war against Germany for their after-war diplomatic machinations. The political face of these officers

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is disclosed in the memoirs of the former aide-de-camp of General Anders, S. Klimkowski and in the writings of S. Strumph-Wojtkiewicz¹² who has spent some time in Anders army.

The problems of the national liberation struggle and its transformation into the revolution and the study of the character of the new government created on July 22, 1944, are investigated by the scientific session of the Academy of Sciences of the Polish People's Republic. The results of these studies are summarized in the book "Problems Associated with the Appearance and Development of the Polish People's Republic."¹³ The digest "PPR in the Struggle for Independence and for the Power of the People"¹⁴ published in 1963 contains the materials of the scientific session of the Polish Academy of Sciences commemorating the 20th anniversary of the PPR. This session took place on June 14-15, 1962. The digest contains speeches by: A. Zawadski, "PPR in the Building of the State Apparatus in the People's Poland," E. Kowalski, "Party of the Working Class - Party of the People," Z. Dyszyński, "Problems Associated with the Formation, Strategy and Tactics of the Polish Worker's Party," J. Zamojski "PPR - the Organizer of the Military Struggle of the Polish People in the War of Liberation" and some others.

In studying the political development of Poland during the occupation years, the Polish historians pay the greatest attention to the problems associated with the creation of the underground national leadership. There are several brochures describing the creation of the national councils: by A. Weber "The Underground People's Councils in the Struggle for National Poland," by H. Wolikowska "At the Threshold of Freedom," by J. Pawlowicz, "From the History of Illegal KRN."¹⁵ An interesting book by Cz. Madajczyk shows the incipient concepts with regards to the agrarian reforms in liberated Poland which made their appearance in occupation times.

The subject of Soviet-Polish friendship is to be found in all publications describing the struggle of the Polish people, of the

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guerilla movement and of the history of the Polish Army. It found its reflection in numerous reminiscences of the leaders of the guerilla units and of the ordinary combatants. The digest "Brotherhood"¹⁸ and the study by W. Gora¹⁷ describe the participation of the Soviet citizens in the Polish guerilla movement and the reminiscences of the Poles who were the participants of the guerilla warfare in the USSR are presented in the publication "Through the region of Poles'ye and Wolin."¹⁹

The extensive material about the liberation struggle of the Polish people during the German-fascist occupation is to be found in the anniversary issues of the historical magazines "From the Field of Battle"¹ and "Military and Historical Review"² commemorating the 20th anniversary of the creation of the Polish Worker's Party and also in the issue of the magazine "Military and Historical Review"³ commemorating the 20th anniversary of the National Polish Army. /494

ROMANIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The archives of the Romanian People's Republic contain numerous documents and materials on the history of the Second World War.

The materials related to the Romanian Worker's Party (PMR) are concentrated in the archives of the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the PMR and in the archives of the Central Committee of the PMR. These contain the decisions on the most important questions related to the situation in the country, the underground leaflets, newspapers, brochures, various declarative programs developed by the party (platforms) directed toward the struggle against fascism and against the war, the declarations, letters and some other materials.

The documents of the central archive at the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the PMR show the increase during

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the war of deep dissatisfaction in the country, they show the bloody suppression by the authorities of the antiwar sentiments. A substantial place is occupied by the documents referring the struggle of the communist party to unify the antifascist forces, and in particular the documents characterizing the preparation and conduct of the military uprising of August 23, 1944.

The Archive of the Ministry of Armed Forces contains the documents related to the moral state and combat preparedness of the Romanian King's armies, indicating the growing antiGerman tendencies within the Romanian Army and a sharp drop in the ability to fight in the Romanian units, particularly after the defeat of the German-fascist armies at Stalingrad and on the river Don. The reports of the commanding officers in the majority of regiments which were at the front in 1944 indicate clearly a lack of desire to fight found among the soldiers and officers and lack of desire to continue the war against the USSR. Of great interest are the materials regarding the plans of the military uprising of August 23, 1944.

A considerable number of documents found in the above-mentioned depositories reflect the participation of Romania in the anti-Hitler war. A special department contains the Soviet documents with the expression of gratitude directed toward the Romanian armed forces participating in the anti-Hitler war. The archives of the Military Museum contain documents describing the heroic struggle of the Romanian soldiers and officers against the Hitlerites.

The archives of the Council of Ministers contains the stenographic recordings of the meetings, various governmental decisions, informational bulletins, statements and other official documents which are a valuable source for the study of the democratic government led by Dr. P. Groza which came to power on March 6, 1945. Of great interest are the documents related to the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to Romania in these times so difficult for that country.

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The material of informational and local value kept in the archives of various ministries, of regional and city people's councils, supplement the documents which are in the central archives and are related to the questions of the Romanian participation in the Second World War.

The stenographic files of meetings of the National Tribunal carrying out the trial of the Antonescu government,⁴ the trial of the leaders of the National-Zaranistrian Party of Maniu, Michalache and others⁵ contain extensive denunciative material regarding the criminal policies of the leading Romanian top representatives who have dragged the country into an aggressive war against the USSR started by Hitler. The depositions of the accused and of the witnesses, the statements of various parties and numerous denunciative documents fully elucidate the treacherous role of the National-Zaranistrian Party and the National-Liberal Party which supported the Antonescu government in the antiSoviet war. The stenographic recording of the trials of the major Romanian war criminals yields extensive material regarding the bloody dictatorship of the Romanian fascists, plunder of the country by the Hitlerites, and the participation of Romania in the antiSoviet war, with the catastrophic consequences which this adventure bore.

A part of the materials on the history of the Second World War has been published in the digest of documents on the history of the Romanian Communist Party prepared by the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the PMR in 1953 (second edition)⁶ and in the separate issues of the historical magazines.

The digest contains the documents on the history of the Romanian Communist Party, 1917-1944. Among these documents are the declaration "Struggle of the Romanian people for freedom and national independence," the platform of the Romanian Communist Party dated September 6, 1941, in which the position of the communists in regard to the war is presented and which contains the

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concrete appeals to take Romania out of the war, the decision of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party of June 1943 regarding the creation of the anti-Hitler patriotic front and some other documents.

There are several files of documents compiled by subject matter which reflect the struggle of the people and the activity of the Communist Party during the wartime. These were published in the magazines "Analele" and "Revista Archivelor."

Of great importance in the study of the Romanian history during the Second World War are the presentations, speeches and articles of the representatives of the Romanian worker's party and of the First Secretary of the Central Committee, comrade G. Gheorghiu-Dej. They express the party's point of view on the most important questions of the state and social and political life of the country during these years. A large amount of space in the Romanian geographic history is occupied with the questions of the Romanian participation in the anti-Hitler war. The first considerable contribution on Romanian history during the Second World War was published in 1958 by the military publication in RPR with the title "Contribution of Romania to the Destruction of Fascist Germany."¹ The book embraces the time period most important for the country during the war, from August 23, 1944, when the Romanian people had toppled the fascist dictatorship of Antonescu, had turned its arms against Hitler's Germany and participated in the war against Germany up to May 9, 1945.

The book was prepared by the collective of scientific workers at the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the PMR and by the officers of the Main Military Academy. The book is based on a rich documentary and factual material obtained from the archives of RPR and various Romanian and foreign references and publications. The authors describe in broad terms the events preceding the military uprising and also analyze the political circumstances which favored its preparation and successful completion.

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For the first time in Romanian geographic history one finds the sequential presentation and detailed description of combat activities in which the Romanian army took part. Fighting with the Red Army as an integral part of the 2nd Ukrainian front, the Romanian soldiers fought selflessly until the fascist invaders were completely annihilated. The book pays particular attention in showing the military Soviet-Romanian cooperation which was the result of the struggle against the common enemy.

All branches of the Romanian armed forces took part in the anti-Hitler war. The articles by I. Huza "Contribution of the Romanian Sailors to the Destruction of German Fascism"² and by E. Ursache "Romanian Air Force in the Struggle Against German Fascism"³ describe the activities of the Romanian sailors and airmen who, by interacting with the other branches of the armed forces and in cooperation with the Soviet navy and its air force, contributed heavily to the final annihilation of the German-fascist armies.

The fight of separate units and subunits against the Hitlerites on a comparatively limited segment of the front lines are described in the book by L. Loghin "Combat Activity of the Romanian Army Between Nitra and Vah"⁴ and in the article by I. Leonida "Heroic Episode During the Anti-Hitler War. The Combat at Paulis."⁵

The military Soviet-Romanian cooperation is described in many comprehensive studies regarding the war and in the popular brochures published in Romania on this subject matter. This question has been investigated most thoroughly in the study by N. Ciachir and L. Loghin "Romanian-Soviet Brotherhood in Arms" published in 1959.⁶ The book was published commemorating the 15th anniversary of Romanian liberation from the fascist domination and embraces the period from 1917 through 1945. The basic attention is paid by the authors here to the Second World War, and in particular to the events of August 23, 1944 through May 9, 1945 when the Soviet-Romanian fraternal friendship in arms was clearly manifested in the joint battles against fascism.

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The chapter "Romanian-Soviet Combat Cooperation in the Struggle to Liberate the Fatherland" shows the heroic underground activity of the Romanian Communist Party during the fascist dictatorship to popularize the just, liberation goals of the Red Army in the war and to denounce the unjust asperations of the fascist army. The same book analyzes numerous clear examples of combat friendship, and of the mutual cooperation between the Soviet and Romanian soldiers and officers in specific military units during the battles resulting in the destruction of the common enemy.

The article by N. Ciachir and L. Loghin⁷ devoted to the Soviet-Romanian military cooperation, contains interesting materials from various Romanian and Soviet publications and also from the military reports which are kept in the archives of the RPR Ministry of Armed Forces.

The book of L. Loghin "They Did Their Duty"⁸ published in Bucharest in 1959 describes the heroic traditions in a just anti-Hitlerite war of the Romanian soldiers and officers who gave their lives for the victory over fascism.

The people's masses have actively supported the Romanian participation in the war against fascist Germany. Thousands of young workers, peasants and middle class functionaries have volunteered to be sent to the front lines. The article by V. Bîrză describes the activity of the battalion of volunteers led by the representatives of the Communist Youth Organization.¹

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The Communist Party came up with an appeal "everything for the front, for the victory!" which found great response among the workers. The selfless toils of the workers, their heroic efforts directed toward the increase in the military production, overcoming the sabotage of the reactionary forces, is being described by M. Lundjanu in his article "Struggle of the Mass of People Led by the Romanian Communist Party in Support of the War Against

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Hitler Germany"² and by V. Anesku in his article "Communist Party of Romania - the Leader and Organizer of the Struggle of the Whole People in Support of the Anti-Hitler Front."³

Various articles on the most important problems of the Romanian history from 1939-1945 are published in magazines "Analele" of the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the PMR and "Studii" which is the publication of the department of historical sciences at the Institute of History, RPR Academy of Sciences. The articles on historical subject matters are being published also in the theoretical and political publication of the Central Committee of the PMR "Class Struggle" and in some other party and special periodicals of the RPR.

The publications of Romanian historians touch upon numerous important problems related to the Second World War. Considerable time is being spent to elucidate the causes of the participation of Romania in the war against the USSR. The works of RPR historians show that joining of the bourgeois-landed gentry Romanian class with the fascist block was a logical consequence of the antiSoviet policy conducted for many years by the leading classes within the country.

There are various studies devoted to the Romanian siding-up with Hitler's Germany, showing by use of documents that Romania was also pushed into the German iron embrace by the imperialist circles of England, France and the USA. The same subject is partially described in the article by E. Neamu and A. Fedotova, "Struggle of the Romanian Communist Party Against the Involvement of Romania in the AntiSoviet War."⁴

The government of Romanian monarchy, kept on a string by the fascist Germany, in sacrificing the national interest of the country, refused assistance offered to it by the Soviet government.⁵

The antinational policy of the leading clique in Romania was

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particularly apparent in the separation of Northern Transylvania from Romania. This was discussed in detail in the article by E. Campus "Diplomatic Negotiations on the Eve of the 'Vienna Award'"⁶ written on the basis of an extensive number of documents.

The studies of Romanian historians disclose the general situation in the country during the military-fascist dictatorship. In the article "Main features of the political regime in Romania during the military-fascist dictatorship and Hitler's aggression" by I. Popesku-Puturi, the close relationship is shown between the leading circles of Romania and the chieftans of Hitler Germany. The author notes the antifascist struggle of the people led by the Romanian Communist Party. After the military uprising, Romania engaged in the struggle against Hitler Germany. Its army, exceeding 360 thousand men, was active at the front, operating together with the Red Army during a period of eight months.⁷

The publications printed in the RPR which are devoted to the economic situation in the country during the war contain many facts of the plunder of Romania by Hitler's Germany, the pitiful results associated with the domination of the German and Romanian monopolies in the economy of the country and of the Romanian participation in the antiSoviet war.

The questions of economics have been researched quite fully and comprehensively in the seventh chapter of the solid publication "History of the Economy in Romania" published by the V. I. Lenin Institute of Economical Sciences in Bucharest in 1961.⁸ This chapter discloses the decisive role in the monopolies which was manifest in preparing and embarking Romania on the path of war. The large conglomerates and banks tightly interconnected with foreign capital and controlled by it, were determining the life of the 1497 country and its internal and foreign policy. By showing the prevailing influence on the eve of the Second World War of the English, French and American capital in the most important branches of the

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Romanian economy, the authors thoroughly trace out the penetration into the economic life of the country of the German capital. The chapter unmasks the cooperation of English and American monopolies during the war with German-Romanian capital and the treacherous means by which these monopolies generated large profits. These questions are also considered in a number of other studies by the Romanian authors.¹

In the "History of the National Economy in Romania" and in the article "Exploitation and Plunder of the Romanian Economy by Hitler's Germany in the Time Period 1939-August 1944"² published in the magazine "Analele," by N. N. Constantinescu, the author thoroughly investigates the question of the economic plunder of Romania by Hitler's Germany, the character and scale of this plunder and the catastrophic consequences related to the participation of the country in the war against the USSR. The article emphasizes that "On the eve of the military uprising on August 23, 1944, as the result of enslavement by Hitler's Germany, the Romanian industry was in a totally decayed state, the agriculture in the state of degradation and the financial situation totally confused. The losses incurred by the national economy during these years were on the order of 10 billion Lei (in the currency of 1945) comprising the 12 year national budget."³

The Romanian Worker's Party has unmasked the treacherous anti-national policy of the bourgeois and landed gentry parties, primarily the National-Zoranistrian and Liberal parties, conducted in the pre-war and wartimes. At the first Party Congress which took place in October 1945, in the presentation by G. Gheorghiu-Dej he quoted the letters addressed to Antonescu and written by Manu Bratianu which show that these parties supported the Antonescu government and had approved the involvement of Romania in the antiSoviet war.⁴

The historical literature of the wartime convincingly shows that the only political force in Romania which firmly was resisting fascism and the antiSoviet war was the Communist Party. The role

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of the Communist Party as a leader and organizer of the people is described most fully in the digest "Lectures to Assist Those Who Study the History of the Romanian Worker's Party"⁵ prepared by the Institute of Party History at the Central Committee of the PMR and published in 1960. This digest uses quite extensively the documents related to the history of the Romanian Communist Party and the first edition was realized in 1951.

The military uprising of August 23, 1944 was the turning point in the life of the Romanian people and was of extremely great importance for its future. It is to be found in the center of the attention of the Romanian historians who are involved in the study of the Second World War.

The destruction of fascist armies between the rivers Volga and Don exerted great influence on the general situation in Romania. This is shown in many studies devoted to the war. This question is specially reviewed in the article by B. Beltanu "Effect of the Stalin-grad Battle on the Political Situation in Romania."⁶ The article contains materials which substantiate once again that the defeat on the Volga of the 3rd and 4th Ramanian armies had caused panic and confusion in the fascist camp. As Antonescu said, "After the defeat of the 3rd and 4th armies the Romanian state began to wobble."⁷ Quite interesting documents are presented in this article regarding the attempts of the diplomats of fascist Romania and the leaders of the National-Zaranistriian and Liberal parties to conclude after the battle on the river Volga a separate agreement with England and the USA, directed against the USSR.⁸

The eighth chapter of the digest "Lectures in Assisting Those Who Study the History of Romanian Worker's Party" which has a subtitle "CPR as the Organizer and Leader of the Struggle to Topple the Military-fascist Dictatorship and Turning of Arms Against Hitler's Germany"⁹ considers in great detail the preparation and conduct of the uprising. Using concrete material, it shows the measures taken by the Communist Party to organize the combat ready patriotic groups,

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to reactivate the guerilla movement and to create a unified labor front. The activity of the party within the army is also shown. The authors emphasize that the success of the uprising was facilitated by the advance of the Soviet armies in Iasi-Kishenev direction which started on August 20, 1944. However, the author of this digest, just like the authors of some other publications belittles somewhat the importance of the powerful advance of the Red Army in Iasi-Kishinev direction which played a decisive role in ensuring the proper conditions for the victorious uprising of the people. At the same time they exaggerate the forces of the insurgents. The book draws a vivid picture of a joyful meeting between the Soviet armed forces and the Romanian people.¹⁰

Various questions of the underground antifascist struggle during the wartime and also the preparations and successful conclusion of the armed uprising are reviewed in the articles by N. Goldberger and G. Zaharia "National and International Character of the Resistance Movement in Romania,"¹ the article by N. Goldberger "Resistance in Romania and the Allies"² and by P. Constantinescu-Jasc "Liberation of Romania from the Fascist Yoke and Its Historical Meaning."³ There are also articles by G. Matheu and B. Beltanu "Struggle of the Romanian Communist Party in Preparing and Realizing the Armed Uprising of August 23, 1944"⁴ and the publication of Z. Zacaresku and M. Condurace "Activity of the Romanian Communist Party in Drawing the Army on the side of the patriotic Forces in Conducting the Armed Uprising with the Turning of the Arms Against Hitler's Germany,"⁵ by V. Zacaresku "Strengthening of the Party and its Connections With the Masses as a Decisive Factor in the Struggle to Organize and Conduct the August Armed Uprising of 1944."⁶ By N. Muntanu "Mass Action led by the Romanian Communist Party During the Time Period of the Preparations of the Armed Uprising,"⁷ by R. Florian "Armed Uprising of August 23, 1944 as a Beginning of the National Revolution in Our Country,"⁸ by K. Nicolae, A. Lupestanu and V. Birza "Heroic Episodes During the Armed Uprising and the Struggle for the Liberation of the Fatherland (August 23-October 25 1944)"⁹

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by M. Kovac "Participation of workers in Prakhovye valley under the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party in the struggle against the fascist dictatorship and the destruction of Hitler's armies"¹⁰ and in many other articles published in different digests and magazines.

CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

The socialist Czechoslovakia has reared its own Marxist historians-specialists, economists and philosophers. Several scientific and research centers were created, the Institute of Czechoslovakian Communist Party (CPC) History in Prague, the Institute of the CPC History in Bratislava, in the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences in Prague and Bratislava, at the faculties of the CPC History, Philosophy, Political Economy and in the schools of higher education. At the Central Committee of the CPC a party school of higher learning was organized. In the whole country the extensive research studies have begun, investigating various aspects of the historical process related in particular to the Second World War. At the present time, there is already available an extensive Marxist literature regarding these questions.

The Czechoslovak archives possess valuable files regarding the history of the Second World War. The largest centers where these documents are kept are: the State Central Archive, the Slovak Central State Archive, the Archive of the Institute of CPC History, the Archive of the Institute of CPS History, the Chancellery Archive of the President of the Republic, the Archive of the National Assembly, the Archive of Military-Historical Institute, the archives of central state agencies and departments and also the local and regional archives.

The Archive of the Institute of CPC History has an accumulation of collated most important documents regarding the activity of the Communist Party as it pertains to the antifascist liberation movement.

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Of particularly great interest are the documents of the Central Committee of the CPC from the underground, the leaflets and appeals published separately and by the party organizations and by the guerilla units, the illegal newspapers and magazines and also the broadcast texts of the radio stations "For National Liberation" and "For Freedom in Slovakia." The archive also contains some other documents and in particular the documents which disclose the activity of the Social-Democratic party and the party of National Socialists. The archives of Klecanda and Smutny contain many interesting documents pertaining to London emigrees.

The Archives of the Institute of History of the Slovakian Communist Party (at the present time, a branch of the Institute of History of the CPC)¹² contains a large number of important documents describing the activity of the CPS, the selfless struggle of the communists against the fascist-clerics regime in Slovakia. The same archives contain interesting materials regarding the antifascist movement and about the guerilla warfare, about the Slovak people's uprising and about the activity of the national committees. The archive has a good file of illegal press and of the newspapers which were published during the period of the people's uprising. Of great value are also the chronicles which were compiled in many urban areas of Central Slovakia. These chronicles, in a rather unique literary form, reflect the events of the people's uprising and the liberation of the country from the fascist invaders.

The Archive of the Military-Historical Institute¹³ possesses important materials regarding the military struggle of the Czechs and Slovaks against the invaders inside of the country and beyond its borders.

The Central State Archive,¹ the Archive of the Chancellery of 1499 the President of the Republic² and the Archive of the National Assembly³ contain a great volume of various documents which one can study to learn the activity, policy and tactics of the Czechoslovak emigree

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governmental organizations, the chancellery of the president, the government, the State Council and various ministries. Of particularly great importance are the governmental documents from the Chancellery of the President of the Republic, of the Foreign Ministry and of the Ministry of National Defense. The documents from these most important sources of the bourgeois emigrees make it possible to unmask the partial policy and antinational plans entertained by Benes supporters, the policy of appeasement toward Gakhov tendencies, the tactics of passive waiting and the desire to reestablish in the country, after its liberation from the occupation, the pre-Munich order.

There are also documents pertaining to the government of the Protectorate and its department and also the archives from the banks, from the union of industrialists, from various monopolistic organizations which were active during the occupation time.

Many documents pertaining to the history of Czechoslovakia during the Second World War were published in numerous digests. There is a digest, for example, published by the Institute of the CPC History "For Freedom of Czech and Slovak Peoples."⁴ The digest contains the documents describing the policy and tactics of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party during the occupation and during the war, the party attitude toward the most important problems related to the antifascist Resistance Movement, the struggle for the unification of all democratic forces around the working class and its leading role in a comprehensive democratic coalition. The digest also contains important directives from Moscow CPC leadership, directed to the illegal party organizations active on the occupied territory and also the directives, appeals and exhortations of the underground Central Committee of the CPC and CPS, the articles from the underground newspapers published in Czechia and Slovakia ("Rude Pravo," "Pravda," "People's Voice," and others).

The documents in this digest convincingly show that the Communist Party fought selflessly on behalf of the basic interests of

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the people, leading the broad masses of the people, creating the National Front, achieving the leading role among the working class people in the national liberation movement and had ensured the successful development in the country of the general democratic revolution.

The Munich deal between the Western countries and Hitler's Germany at the expense of Czechoslovakia and also the spirit of capitulation of the Czech and Slovak bourgeoisie, including also various supporters of Benes (Grad group) is being denounced in the two-volume publication "Munich in Documents."⁵ The digests "New Documents from Munich History"⁶ prepared jointly by the USSR Foreign Ministry and the CSR Foreign Ministry show that the Soviet Union, faithful to its responsibilities, was prepared to render the military assistance to the peoples of Czechoslovakia in 1938 as they were fighting against the German-fascist invaders. The digest convincingly shows the antiSoviet tendencies of the Munich policy as promoted by the Western allies.

The unselfish struggle of the Communist Party, of the broad masses of people and of all progressive forces in defense of the republic against the fascist aggression in 1938 was reflected in two volumes of documents published by the Institute of CPC History commemorating the 25th anniversary of the forced Munich agreement.⁷

Among the publications regarding the Soviet-Czechoslovak relations during the Second World War, we find of particular interest the jointly prepared publication by the foreign ministers of the USSR and of CSR "The Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations During the Great Patriotic War."⁸ This publication contains the important documents related to the Soviet-Czechoslovak relations on the governmental plane and also various documents indicating the friendly relations between the USSR and the CSR and their mutual assistance in the struggle against the fascist aggressors as well as the liberation mission undertaken by the Soviet armed forces.

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The Soviet-Czechoslovak relations during the Second World War are also described in the digests "Friendship of the Peoples of the CSR and the USSR," "Documents of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship," "For the Army of the People" and in the book "To the Assistance of the Czechoslovak people."⁹

Of great importance are the publications from the trials of Hitler's criminals of war and their collaborators: the digests "Czechoslovakia and the Nürnberg Process," "Czech People in Judgment of K. H. Frank," the multivolume publication "Being Tried by the People," "Tiso and the Uprising"¹⁰ and some others. The materials of these trials present the researchers with a large volume of new information, enabling them to understand correctly the whole system of the economic plunder to which the occupied nations /500 were exposed, the methods and forms of the national and social enslavement of the working people, the ugly face of the criminal traitors, the supporters of Hacha and Hlinka and some other collaborators.

Several digests and documents were published in Czechoslovakia denouncing the arbitrariness and atrocities of the German-fascist invaders: "Atrocities of the Nazis During the Occupation and the Liberation Struggle of Our People," "They Wanted to Annihilate Us," "Opava and Northern Moravia During the Occupation," "SS in Action."¹

An important source in the study of the activity of the Communist Party, of the liberation movement, of the guerilla activity, of the activity of the Czechoslovak military units, of the policies and points of views of some specific bourgeois emigree organizations are to be found in the books in which the authors who were the participants of these events, on the basis of their own experiences, observations and preserved documents, describe and explain specific aspects of each historical process. Among the memoir publications one should mention first of all the reminiscences of the participants of the party underground and the guerilla movement. In the book

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"Under the Leadership of the Party"² one finds the reminiscences of the illegal work of the communists during the war on the territory of Slovakia. In the books "Destination Prague," "Combat Friendship," and "How the Eternal Friendship Was Born"³ one finds the reminiscences of the former soldiers and officers of the Czechoslovak corps who fought on the Soviet-German front and who were the participants of the guerilla movement and of the Slovak people's uprising, the reminiscences of the Soviet citizens who, together with Czechs and Slovaks, fought in their country against the Hitlerites.

Of specific interest are the memoirs of V. Kopecky "Gottwald in Moscow" and "CSR and CPC,"⁴ both of which are useful in the study of some questions related to the Second World War and the policy and tactics of the CPC during those years.

Quite informational are two volumes of memoirs written by Z. Fierlinger "In the Service to CSR."⁵ The first volume analyzes the international events, the foreign and internal policies of Czechoslovakia from the eve of Munich days to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The second volume takes us through the end of the war and the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Red Army. In addition to the general characteristic of the events and the description of the insincere attitude of the London emigree government toward the USSR, the memoirs contain a large amount of information regarding the unselfish assistance which was given by the Soviet Union to the Czech and Slovak people in their struggle against the invaders, it tells us about the Czechoslovak military units in the USSR, about the national liberation movement, etc.

The study by B. Laštovička, "In London During the War"⁶ to some degree may also be referred to as of memoir type. This book describes in great detail the London bourgeois Czechoslovak emigrees, their government, the state council, the specific emigree undercurrents and trends. The author describes the activity of the Czechoslovak communists who were in England during the wartime, their struggle against the people collaborating with Benes for the victory

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of the national democratic revolution. The formation of the Czechoslovak military unit in the USSR and its combat activities jointly with the Red Army, the friendly relationship between the Czechoslovak and Soviet soldiers and the substantial and unselfish assistance given by the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia to create military combat units, are being described by the former commander of the very first Czechoslovak battalion and then, a brigade and corps, L. Svoboda, in his memoirs "From Buzuluk to Prague."⁷

Among the extensive memoir literature of bourgeois politicians, their speeches, articles and appearances related to the Second World War, one should mention first of all the publications by E. Benes and in particular "The World Crisis, Jurisdictional Continuity and the New Revolutionary Justice," "Six Years of Exile and the Second World War," "The New Slavic Policy" and "From Munich to the New War and New Victory."⁸ Just like the memoirs of his sympathizers, the memoirs of Benes attempt to justify the position of the part of the Czech bourgeoisie who, on the eve and during the Second World War, was orienting itself toward England and the USA.

The basic evaluation of the Second World War, the internal political situation in Czechoslovakia in those years, the Resistance Movement in the country and abroad, the attitudes of the specific social groups and directions, the economic situation in the country during the occupation years - all these facts as viewed during the wartime are to be found in the party documents, articles and speeches made by the leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, K. Gottwald, 501 J. Sverma and others.¹ The party documents, articles and speeches were resolving from the Marxism-Leninism point of view, the various important theoretical questions, comprehensively combining the experiences of the antifascist struggle for the national and social liberation and the development of the national democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak historians devote considerable attention to

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the study of the communist party activity which, during the wartime and during the occupation, was the organizer, inspirer and leading force of the antifascist liberation movement, and a consistent and steadfast champion of the basic interests of the people.

In 1946, on the eve of the VIII Congress of the CPC, a book was published "Ten Historic Years in the History of the Party and the Republic"² which describes the role of the communists in the anti-fascist struggle, telling us about their activities in the specific regions of the land. The brochure of V. Koucky "Underground CPC and the Prague Uprising"³ reviews the work of the party on the eve of and during the Prague uprising. In the collective work "CPC in the Struggle for Freedom"⁴ one finds an analysis of the party activity during the whole time of the occupation. O. Krajňák has analyzed thoroughly the work of the party organizations and the communist struggle against fascism in 1938-1942, in the Bratislava region.⁵

In the subsequent years, there were several more thorough publications which were in print describing the exceptional role of the CPC and its struggle with the German-fascist invaders.

An important event in the historical science of Czechoslovakia was the publication of the "History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia" prepared by the Institute of CPC History. In the chapter "CPC as a Leader of the National Liberation Struggle of the Czech and Slovak Peoples (1938-1945)"⁶ one finds the comprehensive analysis of the party activity during the wartime, showing its leading role in the struggle against the fascist invaders and the farsighted policy as well as flexible tactics which were always closely connected with the people. "History of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia" emphasizes the tremendous effect on the liberation movement of the Czech and Slovak people associated with the great victories of the Red Army and the valorous struggle of the Soviet people behind the enemy lines in the territories occupied by them.

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Numerous studies have been devoted to the social and economic situation of Czechoslovakia during the occupation and during the war-time. Let us mention some of them. In the three-volume research study "Review of Economic and Social Development in the Czech Lands, 1938-1945"⁷ V. Král, using a large number of sources and archive materials, reviews the economic situation in the country, the system of occupational regime, the methods used by the German monopolistic capital to penetrate the Czechoslovak economy, the militarization of the national economy and means used to exploit the working classes as applied by the occupation forces and their collaborators from the bourgeois classes, and the struggle of the working class against the German-fascist invaders. The economic situation during the occupation is described in the books by K. Malecek "Economic Dictatorship of Conglomerates"⁸ and by L. Chmel "Economic Occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Means and Consequences."⁹

The social and economic situation in Slovakia during the war-time is reviewed in the studies "Slovakia in the Tenets of the German Financial Capital," "Agriculture in the Time Period of the Slovak State"¹⁰ and others.

There is also an extensive literature regarding the antifascist movement on the territory of Slovakia during the Second World War and in particular the description of the Slovak national uprising in 1944 which was the greatest event of the national liberation movement which initiated the beginning of the peoples democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia. The book by B. Graca "March 14, 1939"¹¹ shows how the "Slovak State Was Formed" and how the communist party initiated the struggle against the clerical-fascist regime.

There were a considerable number of studies devoted to the uprising which were published to commemorate the 10th, 15th and in particular the 20th anniversaries of the Slovak national uprising in Czechoslovakia. These include "Digest of Materials from the Scientific Conference"¹² which took place in May 1959 with the presentation of several informational speeches, the book by J. Doležal and

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J. Hrozienciak "International Solidarity in the Slovak National Uprising"¹³ and others.

The book "Participation of Soldiers in the Slovak National Uprising"¹ by M. Kropilak, on the basis of archive and some other materials, analyzes the work of the communists among the soldiers, showing the role played by the military units in the national uprising as they went on the side of the rebels.

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The unfolding of guerilla warfare in Slovakia is described in the study by S. Falt'an.² His other book considers the question of the Slovak participation in the guerilla movement in the USSR.³

The guerilla war on the Slovak and Czech territories is described most comprehensively in the fundamental book prepared by the collective of military historians.⁴ This publication is written primarily on the basis of the archive materials and the guerilla movement in the country is being viewed as an integral component of the antifascist struggle of the Czech and Slovak people and the main moving force of the Slovak and Prague uprisings.

It must be noted that in the majority of books regarding the Slovak uprising published prior to 1963, one finds an incorrect evaluation of the position of former leaders at that time of the Slovak Central Committee of the Communist Party, who were unjustifiably accused of the bourgeois nationalism.

The position papers of the Central Committees of the CPC and CPS published on the 20th anniversary of the Slovak uprising,⁵ the speeches of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC and of the President of the Republic A. Novotny⁶ are of extremely great importance for the proper understanding of the historical role that the uprising played in the national liberation movement and in the revolutionary movement of the Czech and Slovak peoples. On the 20th anniversary of Slovak uprising the following books were published: "Historical Turning Point" (collective publication),⁷

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"Position Statement about the Slovak National Uprising" by G. Husak,⁸ "About the Slovak National Uprising" by S. Falt'an,⁹ "Uprising from Afar and Close By" by E. Friš,¹⁰ "By Pen and Blood."¹¹ There are also quite a few articles in the magazines. All these works contain more objective and in depth evaluations of several questions regarding the history of the uprising if one is to compare them with the studies published earlier.

The book by B. Lomsky is devoted to the combat comradery of the Czechoslovak and Soviet soldiers during the fight for Dukla Mountain Pass.¹² In 1955 a book by J. Sykora was published, "Glorious Military Road of the Czechoslovak Combat Unit in the USSR"¹³ in which the author reviews the main stages in the formation of the Czechoslovak military units and their combat activities. O. Janecek in his book "With Military Means in Hands"¹⁴ tells us about the attitude of the London emigree Czechoslovak government toward the military units being formed in the USSR. The book contains a significant archive material unmasking the attitudes of the bourgeois emigrees, showing the exceptional role played by the Communist Party in organizing the liberation struggle in Czechoslovakia. A large book by J. Kren reviews the situation of the Czechoslovak bourgeois emigrees in 1938-1939.¹⁵ This valuable publication is based on the comprehensive study of the archive documents. The three-volume comprehensive publication "For Freedom of Czechoslovakia"¹⁶ written by a collective of military historians, considers in all details the combat activity of the military units incorporated into the Czechoslovak army corps who fought on the Soviet-German front.

A large book "On the Western Front"¹⁷ reviews the combat activities of the Czechoslovak military units against the fascist invaders in Poland, France, England and in the Middle East. The activity of these units is reviewed in conjunction with the close association with the Resistance Movement abroad.

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The Czechoslovak historians also study such problems as the antifascist movement in specific regions of the country, the development of the guerilla movement in the Czech lands, the gradual transformation of the antifascist struggle into the victorious people's democratic revolution and the liberation by the Red Army of the Czechs and Slovaks from the fascist occupation forces.

The studies by C. Amort, J. Doležal and some other historians are devoted to the guerilla movements in the Czech lands.¹⁸

The May uprising in Prague is described in detail in the book by K. Bartošek.¹ On the basis of a comprehensive study of the archive materials, the author recreates the whole course of events, evaluates the role and importance of the Prague uprising for the national democratic revolution. Bartošek describes the participants of the uprising, the policy of specific groups and organizations, the outstanding role played by the communists in keeping together the ranks of the rebels. He denounces the intrigues of the bourgeois politicians and also the devious maneuvering of the occupation forces and of the leading circles in the camp of the Western allies. /503

The liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Red Army is being reflected in all studies of the antifascist liberation movement. A substantial attention is being devoted to this question in the literature describing the joint combat activity of the Czechoslovak military units and of the Red Army. There are studies which are specifically devoted to this subject matter.² The combat activities of the Soviet armies directed toward the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the fascist invaders is being reviewed by the Czechoslovakian historians in conjunction with the development in the country of the people's revolution and the establishment of the people's democratic regime. It is known that the approach of the Soviet armed forces to the Czechoslovak borders has accelerated the sweep of the liberation movement within the country, with the gradual transformation of it into the people's democratic revolution.

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A great role in the development and description of the problems associated with the Second World War, of the antifascist liberation movement within the country and abroad, of the guerilla movement, of the development of the national-democratic revolution, belongs to the Czechoslovak magazines. Such magazines as "New Thought,"³ "Czechoslovak Historical Journal,"⁴ "History and Military Art,"⁵ "Articles on the History of the CPC,"⁶ "Historical Journal"⁷ and others are systematically publishing articles on this subject matter contributing greatly to the development of historical science.

SOCIALIST FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

The most complete file of documents related to the history of the liberation war in Yugoslavia is to be found in the Archives of the Military Historical Institute of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). One can find here the documents enabling us to trace the development of events after the attack of Hitler's Germany on Yugoslavia, during the April war of 1941.

The basis of the Archive of the YPA Military Historical Institute are the files of documents of the guerilla units, of the detachments of the Yugoslav people's army and its Supreme Command. There are also some materials characterizing the activity of the Yugoslavian Communist Party during the war of liberation.

Of considerable interest are the documents from the occupation and the Quisling military units which were captured by the guerillas and by the YPA. The largest file of documents is related to the armed forces of the so-called "Independent State of Croatia," of the Chetnik units led by the collaborationist and traitor of the Yugoslav people Draza Mihajlovic and the Quisling formations of General Nedic.

The documents regarding the national liberation war in Yugoslavia are also compiled in the archives of the main cities of all

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
Yugoslav republics, in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Skopje, Titograd and also in the archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Union of Yugoslavia and in the Party archives of various republics.⁸

The Military Historical Institute of the Yugoslavian People's Army is also involved in the publication of documents related to national war of liberation.

The largest publication from this institute "The Digest of Documents and Materials Regarding the National Liberation War of the Yugoslav Peoples"⁹ consists of nine volumes, each of which consists of several books. The digest contains documents and materials of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, of the Supreme Command of the National Army of Liberation, of the Yugoslavian guerilla units, of the Navy Staff and also the documents describing the work of the Party organizations in preparing the national uprising and the creation of the army. A considerable number of documents describe the combat activity of the guerilla units. The digest also includes materials from the occupation and Quisling military units which were operating on the territory of Yugoslavia, the documents regarding the activity of the authorities /504 and of the old Yugoslav army command, the documents of Allied armies and various institutions which had some relation to the national liberation war in Yugoslavia.

The documents and materials of the Communist Party and of the guerilla press 1941-1945 are to be found in the digests "Historical Archive of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,"¹ "The Archive of the Communist Party in Bosnia and Hercegovina,"² "Documents on the History of the Communist Party in Croatia"³ and the "Historical Archive of the Communist Party in Macedonia."⁴

The books "Slovene Informer in 1938 and 1941,"⁵ "Delo," the



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publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Slovenia 1941-1942"⁶ and "People's Truth," - publication of the Communist Party of Slovenia"⁷ have published materials and documents from the communist and guerilla publications which appeared in Slovenia in 1941-1945.

The documents and materials about the creation and activity of the highest state authorities in Yugoslavia are to be found in the books "The Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, First Session,"⁸ "The Second Session of the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia,"⁹ "Third Session of the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia."¹⁰ The second session of the Antifascist Council of the national liberation is described in addition in the book "This is How New Yugoslavia Was Born."¹¹

The youth movement in the liberation movement in the country is described in "Documents on the History of the Youth Movement in Yugoslavia."¹²

The state commission of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) empowered to investigate the crimes of the occupation forces and their collaborators, has published a series of informational reports which contain facts regarding the monstrous atrocities of the fascists in Yugoslavia.¹³ There is also a publication "Information Regarding the Italian Crimes Against Yugoslavia and its People."¹⁴

A part of the higher Catholic hierarchy led by the Archbishop A. Stepinac has actively cooperated with the fascist occupation forces in Yugoslavia. The material regarding the crimes of the reactionary clergy are to be found in the book "Documents About the Antinational Activity and Crimes of a Part of the Catholic Clerics."¹⁵

The digest "Documents Regarding the Treason of Draza Mihajlovic"¹⁶

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prove beyond any doubt that the Chetnik units were operating in the interest of the occupation forces and were in direct contact with them. The trial of Draza Mihajlovic gave new materials regarding the reactionary activity of the Chetniks and their atrocities.¹⁷

Some of the fascist criminals and traitors of Yugoslav people could not escape a just judgement. The reports of trials¹⁸ show that the Yugoslav emigree government located in Cairo and London in 1941-1944 and supported by England and the USA, was the enemy of the national liberation movement. Some protocols and files of this government regarding several important questions related to the military activities in Yugoslavia show the position of the emigree government.¹⁹

The following books are devoted to the description of the heroes of the national liberation movement: "National Heroes of Yugoslavia,"²⁰ "I am not Asking for Mercy"²¹ (about Rada Koncar, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Croatian Communist Party who was executed by the fascists), "Commander Sava"²² (about Sava Kovacevic, the outstanding guerilla commander) and some others.

In the book by F. Saje "Letters of those Condemned to Die"²³ one finds the documents describing the valor and unshakeable steadfastness of the communists, communist youth, workers, peasants, the representatives of the intelligentsia who were captured by the fascists and who did not sway even facing death.

The articles and speeches by J. Broz Tito from the time period 1941-1945 are published in the book "The Struggle for the Liberation of Yugoslavia"²⁴ and also in the first volume of the book "Creation and Development of the Yugoslav Army."²⁵ The articles and speeches of E. Kardell, A. Rankovic, I. Gosnjac, S. Vukmanovic, B. Kidric and other leaders of the CPY and of the national liberation struggle /505 in Yugoslavia are to be found in the second and third volumes of the

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book "Creation and Development of the Yugoslav Army."¹

Yugoslavia also possesses an extensive memoir literature regarding the national liberation struggle. J. Ribar who was elected in 1942 as a chairman of the executive committee of the Antifascist Council of liberation of Yugoslavia, has published the book "Reminiscences About the National Liberation Struggle."² A broad picture of the struggle of the people of Yugoslavia is to be found in "Brief Notes About the War of Liberation"³ written by R. Cholakovic. The extreme tests of endurance which fate dealt to the participants of the national liberation struggle and their heroic deeds are described in "Diary"³ by the guerilla D. Dudic who perished in 1941 and also in "Diary" by V. Dediđer⁵ which embraces the years 1941-1944.

The outstanding Yugoslav novelist V. Nator, who, although an old man, sided with the guerillas and had to share with them the burdens of a life of combat. V. Nator was soon elected as a chairman of the Antifascist Council of the national liberation of Croatia. In his memoirs⁶ he describes the guerilla's way of life, creating true and vivid pictures of national heroes.

In June 1943, in the valley through which the Sutjeska river flows and on the Selengora mountain ridge some bloody battles took place with the occupation armies which were attempting to encircle and annihilate the main forces of the national army of Yugoslavia. The battle at Sutjeska river valley was one of the most significant events which took place during the national liberation war in Yugoslavia. It is being described most comprehensively in the digest containing the reminiscences of several participants of this battle, "Sutjeska."⁷

Among the most comprehensive digests of memoirs of the participants of the national war of liberation are "Military Reminiscences" (in three books)⁸ and also a well documented publication

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"Uprising of the People of Yugoslavia, 1941."⁹

The development of questions related to the modern history of Yugoslavia is being engaged by a newly created Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade. In the digest published by it "History of the XX Century"¹⁰ the authors of numerous articles describe the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia on the eve of the Second World War. Of great scientific interest is the article by Z. Avramovski "Competition Between Great Britain and Germany in the Balkans on the Eve of the Second World War."¹¹ Using the archive documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Yugoslav monarchy, Z. Avramovski shows the double dealing game which was conducted by the foreign policy leaders in Yugoslavia and the vicious struggle between two imperialist camps for the Balkan region.

A group of coworkers from the Military Historical Institute of the Yugoslav People's Army have prepared a collective work "The Second World War."¹² The first volume of this publication, printed in 1957, embraces the time from the beginning of the Second World War through June 22, 1941. It presents a review of the most important events preceding the war and also the operations during its first period. In the review of the prewar events, the authors note that the imperialist reactionaries had rendered a comprehensive support to Hitler's Germany, trying to use it as a strike force against the Soviet Union. However, at the same time the book gives an erroneous evaluation of the Munich agreement. The authors claim that the Western Allies sacrificed Czechoslovakia assuming that in doing this they will "preserve the peace and their own colonial positions." The book is also not objective regarding the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty.

Of considerable interest in the first volume of the publication "Second World War" is the chapter describing the preparation and realization of the fascist aggression on the Balkans in 1940-1941.

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A particular attention is devoted in this chapter to the attack of the German and Italian armies on Yugoslavia and the military activities on its territory. While showing the unprepared state of the country to conduct a war, the authors emphasize the decisiveness of the Yugoslav people to protect their freedom and independence.

The second volume of "The Second World War" was published in 1961. It reviews the military activities on all fronts from June 1941 (after the attack of Hitler's Germany on the USSR) to the end of 1942. The authors note that the fascist leaders had miscalculated the strength of the socialist social and economic system, of the patriotism of the Soviet Union and of the strength of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although the German army was a military mechanism of the first class, together with its satellites, it could not defeat the Red Army and annihilate the socialist regime.

The book reviews in detail the military operations in Yugoslavia, showing the development of the national uprising, the successes of the guerilla warfare and the creation of the National Army of Liberation in Yugoslavia.

In 1964 a book by Colonel General (retired) V. Tersic, was published, "Yugoslavia in the April War 1941."¹

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This is the first scientific publication in the Yugoslav geographic history which describes in detail and analyzes the course of all military operations on the territory of Yugoslavia after the attack of the fascist aggressors. During the April war in 1941, the author was a captain in the Yugoslav army. In addition to personal observations Tersic made use of numerous documents characterizing the situation in the Yugoslav army on the eve of and during the war. The author concludes that the army of the Monarchy could not successfully resist the attack of the overwhelming forces of the fascist aggressors.

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The elucidation of the causes of the rapid annihilation of the bourgeois Yugoslavia can be found also in the book by F. Culinovic.² It shows the decay of the Yugoslav monarchy, the treason of the leading upper strata and of the military command. The archive material cited by Culinovic and in particular the unpublished memoirs of General D. Simovic, contain important facts characterizing the struggle of the imperialist forces for the domination in Yugoslavia.

Among the books devoted to the history of the national war of liberation in Yugoslavia one should first of all mention "Liberation War of the Peoples of Yugoslavia 1941-1945" (two books)³ and "Final Operations in the Liberation of Yugoslavia in 1944-1945."⁴

The book "Liberation War of the Peoples of Yugoslavia" analyzes the combat activities of the National Army of Liberation of Yugoslavia and of the guerilla units on the whole territory of the country, taking into account the specifics of these activities in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro (Crna Gora) and Macedonia. It also shows how the guerilla warfare against the occupation forces was gradually merging with the people's war against the exploiting classes of Yugoslavia, the latter becoming collaborators of the invaders and how during the course of this war the social and economic transformations were realized with the victory of the national revolution.

The Soviet Union had created a favorable climate for the victory of the Yugoslav national revolution by playing a decisive role in the destruction of fascism and ensuring the change in the relationship between forces on the world arena in favor of socialism. However, the authors of the book "Final Operations in the Liberation of Yugoslavia in 1944-1945" while noting that the Soviet-German front was the main front of the Second World War, underemphasize the importance of the events on this front, with the resulting development of the national liberation movement in Yugoslavia. The analysis of facts and documents,

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however, should unavoidably result in the conclusion that the struggle of the Soviet Union against fascism is closely connected with the struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia for their freedom and independence.

Some Yugoslav historians incorrectly describe the Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the wartime. For example, D. Plenča in his book "International Relations of Yugoslavia During the Second World War"⁵ sometimes equates the Soviet policy of the support of Yugoslav patriots and the policy of the Western Allies, who on behalf of the Chetniks were trying to secure the capitulation of the guerillas.

On the whole, so far in Yugoslavia there are not too many comprehensive publications devoted to the national war of liberation. The book by J. Marjanović and P. Morača "Our War of Liberation and National Revolution 1941-1945" published in 1958, is a general review of the events.⁶ The book by V. Strugar "War and Revolution of the Peoples of Yugoslavia"⁷ devotes its main attention predominantly to the combat activities of the guerilla units and of the National Army of Liberation.

There are considerably more publications which are devoted to the specific problems associated with the liberation struggle. Among these one should mention the book by J. Marjanović "Uprising and the National Liberation Movement in Serbia in 1941."⁸ By utilizing an extensive archive material and statements by the participants, the author shows the birth and growth of the national liberation struggle in Serbia, disclosing the basic class clashes and contradictions between the guerillas and the Chetniks. J. Marjanović also wrote several other books regarding the national revolution in Yugoslavia.

The book of P. Morača "The Turning Point Year"⁹ analyzes the development of the national liberation struggle in Yugoslavia in

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1942. This was the year of severe tests for the Yugoslav guerillas. The occupation forces and their collaborators had twice undertaken an attack against the guerilla units inflicting serious damage at the main points of the national liberation movement. But the Yugoslav patriots, overcoming significant difficulties, were able to undertake at the end of 1942 the formation of the National Army of Liberation of Yugoslavia and the creation of the All-Yugoslav political organization - the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia. In his study P. Moracha has shown how the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in 1942, overcame difficulties and became successful in facilitating the national liberation movement.

In 1943 the fascist armies jointly with the armies of the Yugoslav traitors tried three times to destroy the main forces of the 1507 National Army of Liberation and of the guerillas. An extensive material regarding the combat operations of the Yugoslav guerillas during the extensive attacks by the enemy in 1943 is presented in the books by General D. Kladarin¹ and P. Tomać.² P. Tomać describes in detail one of the most difficult time periods of the national liberation struggle, from the middle of May through the middle of June 1943. D. Kladarin undertook in addition a special study of Sutjeska battle.³ The book by P. Babać and A. Božović is devoted to the description of the so-called Split operation, the struggle of the guerillas for the port on the Adriatic Sea, after the capitulation of Italy in 1943.⁴ The guerilla action on the Adriatic Sea shore has been reviewed in a larger framework by J. Vasiljevic.⁵

The Yugoslav historians developed the historical questions related to the national liberation struggle on the territory of the ~~specific republics of the UFRY~~ ^{Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)}. There are several publications in which, with the background of the struggle on the national Yugoslavia scale, the specifics of this struggle are shown pertaining to Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia.

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The geographic history of socialist countries is represented by numerous literary works describing the history of these countries during the Second World War. The publications devoted to the Second World War describe the applicable unchanging rules of the liberation struggle of the peoples against the German-fascist invaders.

By describing objectively the role of the people's masses in the struggle against fascism, the Marxist geographic history of the socialist countries refutes the falacious thinking of the bourgeois historians and literary writers who are trying to show that the national liberation movement was presumably the result of the external pressures and that the main force in the Resistance Movement was the national bourgeoisie. The success achieved in the socialist countries in the domain of geographic history is a pledge for a future development of the Marxist historical science.

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HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE PRINCIPAL CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

Introduction

The comprehensive study of the history of the war would be impossible without making use of not only the achievements of historians in socialist countries and Marxist authors in capitalist countries, but also the research of bourgeois historians. Proceeding according to its class goals, bourgeois historiography pays a tremendous amount of attention to World War II--a fact reflected in the large number of publications on war-related subjects.

The elaboration of the history of World War II in bourgeois historiography follows a definite system. A resource base is created: collections of documents and an extensive memoir literature are published. Official or semiofficial descriptions of a country's participation in the war are published under the direction of governmental agencies, as are assessments of the principal wartime events. The official standpoint may be reflected both in government publications and in works by the predominant group of historians in the country who are close to the ruling cliques. Among bourgeois historians there is no unanimity even within a country, not to mention between different countries. But there is something in common which they all share to some degree.

In our era, when the further development of society is no longer compatible with capitalism, bourgeois historiography either rejects this development or replaces the concept of "social progress" with the notion of "technical progress." Rejecting the objective laws of social development, bourgeois historians ignore, and often deliberately reject, the regularity and causality of historical development and fail to see the basic reasons for the

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changes that have occurred and are occurring in the world. Therefore, the many bourgeois schools and fields of historical science are united by a single feature: they cannot give scientific answers to the main questions raised by the historical process.

The methodological foundation of bourgeois historiography predetermines the solution of fundamental problems of history in the spirit of an idealistic world view. Bourgeois definitions of history as a science are striking in their arbitrariness. Most bourgeois historians believe that history cannot be an objective science, that "considerations of national interest" prevent this. But in fact, the reason here is hidden in the mercenary interests of the ruling class of monopolists.

Up until now a profoundly erroneous point of view, according to which war is a natural phenomenon that is ineradicable for human society,¹ has prevailed in bourgeois historiography. The widely used definitions of war generally do not take into account the main factor--its social roots, and do not place war in relation to specific historical conditions.² But without this it is impossible to give a proper evaluation of any war as a whole and to determine its influence on the course of historical events.

Incorrect methodological directions have an adverse effect on the results of research. For example, bourgeois historiography investigates individual topics without establishing the interrelationship among them. In particular, this is characteristic of the multivolume official publications on the history of World War II that are published in the United States and England. The inability of bourgeois historians to grasp all aspects of the war in terms of their interrelation and mutual conditioning has been commented on by many historians in the West.³ As some bourgeois historians state, as yet bourgeois historiography has not created its own concept of the war as a whole and has not given a clear picture of the importance of the war in the course of world history.⁴

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Comparing Marxist and bourgeois views of the study of historical experience, the American historian W. Kulski writes: "While we are inclined to break up the course of events of our day because of the lack of a conceptual explanation, communists tie all events into a logical chain. We speak in the language of the status quo, they think in categories of long-range revolutionary changes."⁵

As the ideological-political foundation of reactionary bourgeois historiography, anticommunism exerts a strong influence on the historical works of many Western scholars. The English historian H. Seton-Watson has expressed the position of anti-Soviet historians, declaring that he is not "neutral" in the conflict between East and West. "I do not share," he writes, "the point of view widely held among radicals in the West that a serious scholar must be dispassionate."⁶ The bias and even the open falsification of important questions of the history of World War II by bourgeois historiography become understandable in light of such statements.

In describing bourgeois historiography, one should take into account the conditions in which most professional historians find themselves in capitalist countries. Even the son of a former prime minister of England, the journalist Randolph Churchill, has spoken of the difficulties faced by investigators who try to cover events objectively. "Of course," he wrote, "I understand full well that the general point of view of the wealthy is that practically nothing should ever be written about social events, so that no one will be irritated."⁷

The ruling cliques in the West use every means to try to exercise control over scientific research. For example, the Rockefeller Fund provides funding for the "patronage" of scientific research, and thus is enabled to influence scientific institutions and individual researchers not only within its own

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country, but also abroad. The political credo of the Fund's directors is clear. As reported in an American newspaper, as early as 1947 the Rockefeller Fund and the American Foreign Relations Council intended to "prevent a repetition of what they call in their language the 'journalistic expose' that followed World War I. Translated into precise English," wrote the newspaper, "this means that the Fund and the Council don't want journalists or anyone else to investigate too closely or criticize too freely official propaganda or official statements related to 'our main goals and activities' during World War II."⁸

Bourgeois historiography is a complex and contradictory phenomenon. In contrast to Marxist historiography, it is not a unified entity. Despite the existence of numerous schools in the bourgeois historiography of World War II, we may distinguish three main fields. Naturally, this division is arbitrary, like any broad classification. It is underlain by the attitude of various representatives of bourgeois historiography toward the problem of war and peace with consideration for the lessons of World War II and the revolution that has occurred in military affairs. This essentially is a question of the attitude toward war as a means of solving disputes between countries having different social orders.

The activity of representatives of the extreme right wing has two interconnected aspects: open worship of the capitalist order, and a fierce campaign against "international communism." The representatives of this wing have an entirely arbitrary interpretation of the facts and events of World War II, since they treat them only as material for anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda and for white-washing the policy of the ruling classes of their countries during and after the war. These are the "rabid" of historiography who have not drawn the appropriate lessons from World War II and the events of the postwar period. They do not condemn war as a means of resolving disputes between two camps. In some countries the representatives of this wing, while relying

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on the support of the ruling cliques, lay claim to a leading role in the field of ideology and are extremely active.

Another branch in bourgeois historiography of World War II, the largest branch, brings together historians who also hold a hostile position toward socialism and the forces of progress, but who use "objectivity" to cloak their anti-Soviet orientation and their defense of imperialism. This branch is extremely non-uniform: we can identify a center and right and left wings in it. In recent years the numerical growth of the left wing and the strengthening of its positions have become more noticeable. In contrast to representatives of the extreme right wing, historians of this branch reckon with the facts, but try to interpret them in favor of their country's ruling classes. They wage the struggle against Marxist coverage of the war and associated problems more subtly and skilfully than representatives of the "rabid." They succeed in imparting the appearance of scientific objectivity to their reasoning and the appearance of impartiality to the exposition of the history of the war.

The third branch unites bourgeois historians who realistically evaluate the problem of war and peace under modern conditions and who advocate peaceful coexistence. This group is characterized by an aspiration toward realistic depiction of historical events.

The development of bourgeois historiography demonstrates that the interpretation of some problems of the history of the war changes in conjunction with changes in the political situation and with the needs of propaganda. At the same time, there exists among a sizable segment of representatives of bourgeois historiography the desire soberly to assess the past war and the problem of war and peace at present.

The more World War II recedes from us, the more distinctively the trend (chiefly among representatives of rightwing groups

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and schools) to take a different view of the events of the war years can be seen. For example, the American historians C. Black and E. Helmreich believe that "every generation must interpret history anew, and the profound political and ideological problems that faced the world as a result of World War II make a reevaluation of the first half of the 20th century all the more necessary."⁹

However, for most bourgeois historians the desire for a reevaluation does not at all indicate a desire objectively to analyze the events of the war. The American historian W. Newman openly declared: "International sympathies and antipathies influence the writing of national histories: a change in the international setting requires a reexamination of the past according to the needs of the present."¹⁰ Viewed broadly, this trend has the goal of setting Marxist interpretation at odds with its own interpretation of the war, of opening new means of working against Marxism, and of making a contribution to the notorious "counter-challenge." Attempts are made to give a new interpretation to the origin of the Second World War that could lift the responsibility for the war from fascist Germany.¹¹ And, as some rightly note in the West, would be "support for the neo-Nazi movement in Germany and would undoubtedly find a sympathetic response among analogous groups in other countries, including the United States."¹² Assessments of German fascism are changing. For example, some historians in the West go so far as to declare the fascist putsch in 1933 and the ensuing events a revolution.¹³ More and more often Roosevelt is said to be the person responsible for the postwar failures of the United States and its current allies.

The aggravation of the struggle against Marxist historiography could not prevent the appearance among bourgeois historians of a branch whose representatives are working toward a sober evaluation of historical facts and who believe peaceful coexistence

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of states having different social orders to be possible. The fact of the matter is that the major shifts in the balance of class forces in the world that have occurred in the postwar period have caused a deepening of the contradictions inherent in bourgeois ideology. Noting that an "age of reappraisal" is beginning in Western historiography, the American historian Woodward attributes the factors behind this reappraisal in particular to the fact that the "triumphs of Russia and her allies overturn convenient traditional interpretations of history."¹⁴

Some bourgeois authors have begun to approach more realistically the problem of international politics and the study of events present and past. The works of D. Sommerville, D. Fleming, R. Mills, J. Morrey, F. Shuman, W. Williams, M. Crouset¹⁵ and some other historians say that these historians have broken with shameless anticommunism and advocate peaceful coexistence. The stratification among bourgeois historians that has become especially noticeable in recent years will grow deeper as socialism makes further progress throughout the world, and will alter the form of bourgeois historiography even more.

In examining bourgeois historical thought, one should take into account both different viewpoints that exist in the historiography of different countries, and the general assessments of the basic problems of the war that are characteristic of bourgeois historiography as a whole. These general assessments result from a common goal: that of ascribing a decisive role in the defeat of the "axis" powers to capitalist powers that participated in the coalition, and thus of underscoring that capitalism can have a positive influence on the course of history. Class solidarity also forces West German historians to exaggerate the contribution of the Western allies to Germany's defeat.

In every capitalist country the literature on World War II has its own characteristic features which are explained by the

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degree of the country's involvement in the war, the political conditions during the rise of historiography, and, what is the main thing, the results of the war for the given country.

The amount of Marxist literature on the war varies in the main capitalist countries. It is represented most extensively in Italy, France, and Japan. Far fewer Marxist works on the war have been published in the United States and England. In the FRG, where the communist party is banned, Marxists are unable to publish their work at all.

The peculiarities of historiography in different capitalist countries are manifest in the interpretation of the most important problems of the war from the standpoint of the contemporary "national interests," as the ruling classes understand them. For example, the idea of revanchism is the most characteristic feature of West German historiography. Most works on the war have been written from precisely this angle. The specifics of the historiography of different bourgeois countries also lies in the preferred elaboration of various subjects: the actions of armed forces, the role of the resistance movement, the successes and failures of diplomacy, and so forth. For example, the occupation of France and the resistance movement have become the main subjects for French historiography.

This is why it is advisable to consider the status of the historiography of World War II separately for each of the main capitalist countries: the United States, England, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan.

Official histories that generally do not go beyond the framework of describing the operations of national armed forces have been put together in other capitalist states whose armed forces took part in the war. The value of these publications, which

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have been published in Canada, India, Australia, and South Africa, lies in the detailed coverage of certain operations.

We do not consider these publications here, since they add nothing new to assessments of the most important events of the war that are given in the historiography of the main capitalist countries.

THE UNITED STATES

In the United States much attention is paid to the historiography of the Second World War. The United States is indisputably the world leader in the number of publications written about war-related subjects. Not only individual authors, but large organizations that use government subsidies or money from various "funds" created by the largest monopolies work on the history of World War II. The State Department, the general staff with its division of historical research, and many universities and institutes are such organizations.

While displaying a tremendous amount of interest in the history of World War II, the ruling cliques in the United States are pursuing a fully defined goal: that of extolling the operations of US armed forces and thus of belittling the role of its partners in the antifascist coalition, especially the USSR, in the victory over Hitler's Germany. The desire to discredit socialism and to prove the superiority of the capitalist system (especially in its American version) over the socialist system is one of the main tasks of American falsifiers of history.

In the United States work on problems of World War II has been set up on a wide footing.

The US State Department has systematically published diplomatic documents since 1861 (at present the series has been carried

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through 1943),¹⁶ and it publishes subject-oriented publications devoted either to individual international events or to arbitrarily selected calendar periods.

In accordance with State Department instructions on the publication of documents, the compilers of collections have been directed to omit entire documents or to cite them with cuts in order to "avoid publications on subjects that might interfere with current diplomatic negotiations or other affairs," to "preserve the confidence which individuals and foreign governments have vested in the State Department," and to "avoid unnecessary offense of other peoples or individuals."¹⁷ As we can see from the stipulations listed above, these instructions leave much room for the arbitrary selection of documents for publication.

Characteristically, the US government still considers many captured German documents related to the Soviet-German front to be secret and does not allow their publication.¹⁸ Familiarity with the series titled "German Documents Microfilmed at Alexandria"¹⁹ makes possible the conclusion that before publication the documents had undergone careful selection.

A bias is especially noticeable in subject-oriented collections, since they are issued for political and propaganda purposes. We may mention in this regard the collection Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941,²⁰ which was published in 1948 by the US State Department in conjunction with the British and French ministers of foreign affairs. Even the chronological framework of the collection was supposed to create the impression that the events that led to the Second World War only began to develop in 1939, after the signing of the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty. The meaning of the pact thus was represented in distorted form. The American journalist W. Lippman gave the following assessment of the collection: "This publication is a classic example of bad propaganda.... It will inevitably be turned against us,

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[and] will cause us and our friends more harm than the Russians against whom it is directed.... That the State Department book is the work of propagandists rather than scholars is clear from first glance."²¹

During the war the troops of the Western allies captured a large number of documents from various ministries and departments in Germany. After the war the governments of the United States, England, and France decided to publish the documents of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²² It was officially stated that materials of the war years would be published in addition to documents pertaining to the prewar period. In 1964 it became known that the joint publication of the documents by the three Western powers would end with a document spanning the period from July to December 1941. Despite previous pledges, documents from the period 1942-1945 will not be published because of pressure from the West German government, which does not want to promulgate revealing materials.

After extreme American reactionaries advanced the thesis that lend-lease aid to the USSR and the US assent to a number of Soviet proposals during the war were purportedly an "arch-betrayal" of US interests, the State Department published collections of documents devoted to conferences of the heads of state of the USSR, the United States, and England in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam in order to explain US cooperation with the Soviet Union.²³ By revealing the motives behind military cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the compilers of the collections documented that in the period 1939-1945 Washington zealously defended the imperialist interests of the United States. However, the distinctive feature of the situation was that the United States of America had to move toward an alliance with the USSR to support these [imperialist] interests and national interests. Moreover, the victories of Soviet forces, by changing the balance of forces within the anti-Hitler coalition, made

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extremely dangerous the openly hostile course toward the Soviet Union that some American reactionaries would like to adhere to.

A letter from Admiral Legi to the State Department, dated May 16, 1944, is cited in one of these collections. On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Legi drew the attention of the department's leadership to the phenomenal growth of the Soviet Union's military and economic might which was of "epochal significance for future political and military interrelations in the world." Noting that after the completion of combat operations three first-class military powers would remain, namely the United States, England, and the USSR, the Joint Chiefs warned that in case of a conflict with the Soviet Union the United States and England would only be able to defend the British Isles, but not to "defeat Russia." "In other words, we will find ourselves in a war that we can't win,"²⁴ wrote Legi. Therefore, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that the government continue its cooperation with the USSR.²⁵

The Joint Chiefs presented the same recommendations to the State Department just before the Yalta Conference. These considerations also were reflected in the instructions that the American delegation received at the Potsdam Conference.²⁶ In other words, the image of the actions proposed by the general officers was approved by the government and made the basis for US foreign policy.

For example, the documents irrefutably indicate that the gigantic strength of the Soviet Union that had become manifest during the Great Patriotic War not only enabled it to crush the enemy, but also ensure that unity was preserved in the anti-Hitler coalition until the end of combat operations. The tremendous military potential of the USSR was responsible for the fruitful cooperation among the great powers.

Hence, documents that enable an objective historian to draw important conclusions can sometimes be found in the State

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Department collections. But this does not change the general orientation of State Department publications, which are distinguished by bias and an anticommunist attitude.

The large section of the West Point Atlas²⁷ devoted to World War II is a unique source for studying the course of military operations conducted in various theaters by US military personnel. According to D. Eisenhower, who wrote the foreword to the atlas, this work should be the factual basis for the construction of an analysis of comprehensive rules of war.²⁸

A peculiarity of the atlas is that every map is commented on in rather extensive text which gives an evaluation of the military and political situation. A map generally gives the front lines that characterize the main stages of a battle. The largest battles involving allied troops are illustrated in considerable detail. The commander's concept of the operation often is analyzed on the maps and in the accompanying text. The display of troop concentrations and regroupings, systems of defensive constructions, the most important geographic features of the theater of war, and others helps create a graphic picture of the development of the combat operations.

Mainly the operations of ground forces are unfolded in the atlas. There is weak coverage of combat on sea lanes and the operations of naval fleets, even on maps and charts that relate to the war in the Pacific.

The events in the Western theaters of the war are separated from actions on the Soviet-German front. This system of presentation accords the authors extensive opportunities to ignore facts that characterize the impact of the Red Army's victories on the operations of American-English forces. If one uses the maps, it is difficult to compare the numerical strength of the German fascist armies operating in Eastern and Western Europe, it is

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impossible to trace the transfer of German troops from the western fronts to the eastern one, and so forth.

In the atlas the armed struggle of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War is represented by an extremely limited number of maps (of 168 maps on World War II, only 23 are devoted to operations on the Soviet-German front). Many of the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War are omitted, and those which are included in the atlas are given extremely one-sidedly. For example, the protracted defense of Sebastopol is reduced to the events of the last days of the struggle (June 7 to July 7, 1942).²⁹ As for the battle on the Volga, its defensive period is considered in the most detail. The counteroffensive of Soviet troops is combined with the offensive in the Northern Caucasus and is given so generally that it is impossible to gain a graphic idea of the characteristic features of the conflict that heralded the start of the fundamental turn in the course of the war.³⁰

In the atlas the vast battles on the Soviet-German front in the final stage of the war are shown only in passing.

The memoir literature is even more biased and unobjective. Nearly all American political and military figures who held leading posts during the war have published their memoirs. The sharp intensification of the aggressiveness of American imperialism in the postwar period has affected their interpretation of problems of the Second World War.

The memoirs of H. Truman and the diaries of politically like-minded A. Vanderberg and D. Forrestal,³¹ and also of J. Byrnes, who was at odds with him on a number of questions,³² are permeated with hatred for the Soviet Union and democratic forces. Manipulating slanderous, malicious fantasies about the Soviet Union and its policy, they justify US policy during the war and in the postwar period. Books by former US secretaries C. Hull, E.

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Stettinius, H. Stimson, and especially H. Ickes,³³ three volumes of whose "secret diaries" span the period 1933-1941, basically are devoted to defending US policy during the war years. Here one sometimes encounters sober opinions regarding the Soviet Union. For example, E. Stettinius emphasizes that at Yalta "the Soviet Union made a greater concession to the United States and England than these countries made to the USSR."³⁴ F. Roosevelt's closest comrades-in-arms, R. Sherwood and S. Rosenman,³⁵ defend his policy in paying special attention to the activity of the president himself.

The memoirs of American generals and admirals discuss in detail the combat operations of US armed forces. The books by D. Eisenhower, H. Arnold, O. Bradley, and W. Krieger³⁶ are the most significant in terms of covering events, revealing commanders' intentions, and unfolding the "grand strategy" of the Western allies. While not concealing their hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union and exaggerating the United States role in the war, the authors of these books nonetheless display elements of a healthy understanding of the balance of forces. They refrain from the review of American war strategy that is currently fashionable in the United States, and do not invent speculative plans for destroying the Soviet Union.

In contrast, A. Wedemeyer, I. Dean, M. Clark,³⁷ and others apparently believe that an American general's honor binds them to unconditional solidarity with the wild views of the extreme reactionaries. In memoirs bearing the sensational title Wedemeyer Reports!, A. Wedemeyer presents a line of action that he came up with, by means of which the United States purportedly could have prevented the strengthening of democratic forces in the world during the war and, what is the main thing, could have broken the might of the Soviet Union. This warrior's prescriptions do not shine with innovation: he merely develops the thesis advanced by H. Truman on June 23, 1941, that the United States should

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exhaust the USSR and Germany. A. Wedemeyer asserts that the United States should have stayed out of the war until its intervention "could ensure a valid and hence a lasting peace" (on American terms--Ed.) "instead of providing unconditional aid to communist Russia."³⁸

D. Dean, who headed the US military mission to the USSR during the war, anathematizes Soviet-American military cooperation, calling it a "strange alliance." M. Clark, the American commander in Italy during the war, was distressed because a "Balkan version" of the second front was not implemented.

The memoirs of H. Butcher, Eisenhower's aide, are of considerable interest.³⁹ They contain information on the military and political aspects of the actions of the Western allies.

Even during the war American historians worked to prepare a description of combat operations by US armed forces. In early 1942 F. Roosevelt assigned Professor S. Morison, a major historian, to the active fleet, instructing him to collect material for a history of US naval forces. After the war a large group of professional military historians was brought in to study and describe the operations of the army, air force, and navy during World War II. Gigantic publications whose very size is intended to attest to the "decisive contribution" of the United States to the Second World War are being created through the efforts of these historians. Some 96 volumes (publication is incomplete) are devoted to operations of the US Army,⁴⁰ seven volumes to the US Air Force (publication is complete),⁴¹ and 13 volumes to the US Navy (publication is complete).⁴²

In 1959 the Office of Military History of the US Army put out a collection of papers titled Command Decisions.⁴³ The goal set for the team of authors of the collection was to review certain assumptions in the published volumes, and to give a goal

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for subsequent volumes of the series. The authors described the collection as a work about "20 command decisions that determined the outcome of the war." The views of American official historians regarding the Second World War are concentrated in this collection.

The biased nature of this work by American military historians is perfectly obvious. It does not contain a single chapter devoted to the Soviet-German front.⁴⁴ However, much is said about the fact that shipments from the United States and England to the Soviet Union purportedly had a decisive influence on the course of military operations on the Soviet-German front in 1942. For example, the authors list among the decisions that "directed the swift race of history"⁴⁵ the US president's order to evacuate persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast in 1942, General MacArthur's order to withdraw American forces to the Bataan Peninsula two weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and some others.

Nor have the decisions made by fascist leaders gone without attention. For example, they plan to invade Norway and Denmark in 1940 is examined in detail. Deeming this plan an "example of decision-making in a changing situation," the authors do not hide their admiration for the "boldly conducted" Wehrmacht operation.⁴⁶

A number of chapters in the collection are devoted to disagreements between the American and English leadership regarding strategy in the European theater. American historians condemn the English leaders for trying to deal with the Balkans first of all, and in this case indisputably display a sober understanding of the military situation at the time. They believe that "if the Western partners had dealt with the Balkans, the Russians could have made their way to La Manche, possibly taking the strategic Ruhr en route."⁴⁷

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The question of Eisenhower's decision to reject attempts to take Berlin and Prague before the Red Army is examined in detail in the collection. The authors write: "A careful analysis of the actions of the Supreme Allied Commander indicates that he held up his troops not far from Berlin and Prague only on military considerations," but they then state that an evaluation of Eisenhower's actions would be beyond the framework of their book and bore on the field of foreign policy.⁴⁸ This assessment is given in the foreword to the collection by military observer H. Bolduin. After examining the influence of military and political goals on the conduct and final results of the war, Bolduin concludes that a "war, if it is to have any logical meaning, must have a political goal, and not simply a military goal."⁴⁹

Repeatedly returning to the question whether the possibility existed during the war of influencing its results so that they would meet the interests of US ruling cliques, the authors of the collection ultimately reach the not too comforting conclusion that there was no such possibility.

All these studies of the history of the war are being made to provide combat preparation and training of US armed forces. The experience of the past is studied for battles that the American military clique intends to wage in the future. Here attention is paid mainly to tactical topics considered without sufficient relation to strategy, much less to policy. R. Greenfield, the first editor of the 96-volume edition of the history of the American army during World War II, commenting on his official function, wrote: "In the history of the Second World War the army wants to obtain a summarization of its experience for leadership in the future, and to this end a complete and frank history is needed."⁵⁰ In this sense the multivolume editions are a sort of training aid for a narrow range of officers and military specialists.

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The description of combat operations on the Soviet-German front in the series of reviews published by the staff of the US Army pursues a specific task: to take into account the experience of Germany's war on the Soviet Union in technical and operational regards. This is why surveys of the strategy and tactics of German armed forces in the Second World War, as written on the basis of captured documents, are being published in the United States.⁵¹

Furthermore, the United States encourages work on military history in the FRG and Japan. This work often is done in close contact with official American sources, under their direction or on assignment from them.

In the foreword to a collection of articles by German generals, Rokovyye resheniya (Fatal Decisions), which was prepared at the request of American military agencies, the American historian S. Marshall notes that the book was written on the basis of special studies that German generals who were prisoners of war began to conduct in 1946. "This was the start of a new system for studying the experience of the war," writes S. Marshall, "which subsequently was used by all higher German commanders who were captured by the Western allies.... We, the Americans, must draw benefit from the unfortunate experience of others."⁵² In publishing the English translation of the book Srazheniye y atolla Miduey (The Battle for Midway Atoll) by the Japanese officers M. Fuchida and M. Okumiya, the US Naval Institute revised the entire text, with the authors' consent, "with consideration for the needs of American readers."⁵³

The utilitarian approach of official American historians to problems of the Second World War was especially noticeable in the study of the resistance movement. Official publications do not examine the history and political significance of the resistance movement. They are devoted to just one subject: the search for the most effective methods of fighting the national

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liberation movement based on a study of the partisan movement in the USSR and on German experience in fighting partisans. Bourgeois sources do not hide the fact that they are faced with a task that "consists in developing the doctrine of antipartisan warfare as an element in the broad political-military strategy of counterrevolutionary warfare."⁵⁴ They believe that the doctrines of antipartisan warfare and counterpartisan operations "can be drawn from the experience of the Second World War."⁵⁵

It should be noted that these works, which were written as a practical guide for armed forces, often contain sober evaluations. The book The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944,⁵⁶ edited by E. Howell, gives a high appraisal of the partisan struggle of the Soviet people against the occupiers. The authors write: "The Soviet partisan movement, which was created in the rear area of the German armies that invaded the USSR in 1941, was the greatest irregular resistance movement in the history of war in both conception and scale. It combined all classical elements of the resistance movements of the past with modern communications facilities, transport, and weapons...."⁵⁷ In Howell's book,⁵⁸ "popular support" is called one of the basic conditions for the existence and growth of a partisan movement. In addition to the sober appraisals presented above, one also finds the American authors making statements about forced recruitment for partisan detachments, about a lack of coordination of partisan actions with Red Army operations, and about other imagined "weaknesses" of the partisan movement.

American bourgeois historiography contains several trends in coverage of the history of World War II. The most significant are the official trend or branch, and the "critical" branch. Adherents of the former try to prove that the United States adhered to "lofty motives" in its policy, while supporters of the latter try to show that the United States always relied solely on force and used references to moral considerations only to substantiate the use of force.

The official branch, as its name demonstrates, brings together in its ranks historians engaged in work on problems of World War II according to traditional views approved by the government. It is not without cause that the opponents of this group call its representatives "court historians." Indeed, the official branch is a direct tool of the government and the State Department which bolsters the policy of the ruling cliques with historical arguments. The historians of this school have a privileged position in the United States: the doors of all archives and private collections of documents are open to them, and they willingly are granted consultations and clarifications by the country's leading political and military figures. As a result, the official historians have practically monopolized all sources of historical facts in the United States. The most prominent representatives of this branch are W. Langer, S. Gleason, H. Feis, W. McNeill, H. Trefousse, B. Rauch, and D. Perkins.⁵⁹

The views of the "court historians" are in complete agreement with official statements by the American government. Underlying these views is an assertion that contradicts the actual course of the historical process: that the United States has always worked for peace. Thus, these historians assert, for example, that in the 1930s the American government was concerned about the threat from aggressive powers and tried to organize resistance, but "isolationists" who caused a "neutrality" law to be adopted prevented the implementation of needed steps in the foreign policy field. The concept of the origin of war that is advanced by the "court historians" reduces to subjectivistic reasoning about the activity of governments and individuals, above all the leaders of Hitler's Germany. The true causes of the war are neglected.

The historians of the official group present the policy of the Soviet Union in a distorted light, especially the Soviet-German nonaggression pact signed August 23, 1939. The desire

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of the Western powers to organize a "crusade" against the USSR is consciously glossed over.

Official American historians claim that in the period 1941-1945 the American government assisted the Soviet Union not for its own interests, but out of "magnanimous" motives. H. Feis depicts the events as follows: after June 22, 1941 the English and American governments decided "Let bygones be bygones" and rushed to save the USSR. For Great Britain this was an act of self-preservation. For the United States it was a direct extension of its then-current policy of assisting any country fighting against the "Axis" powers "with any means except participation in war."⁶⁰ To force the reader to believe the validity of this assertion, H. Feis resorts to manipulations of documents. From a note from the United States to the Soviet Union dated August 2, 1941, he quotes: "The US government has decided to render all feasible economic aid in order to strengthen the Soviet Union in its struggle with armed aggression," but he deletes the subsequent explanation of the motives behind this decision by the US government, according to which aid to the Soviet Union "promotes the national defense interests of the United States."⁶¹

The historians of the official group present the further history of interrelations among the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition in a light such that the United States seemingly only had in mind the fastest possible defeat of the enemy. In contrast to the English government, these historians assert, in Washington military operations never were subordinated to political considerations,⁶² and the American government therefore supposedly rushed to create a second front and provided the USSR considerable material aid through its deliveries. The importance of these deliveries is greatly exaggerated.

Some American historians who do not agree with the official interpretation of events acknowledge that these deliveries did

not play a significant part in the course of battles on the Soviet-German front. For example, D. Fleming notes: "Many Americans believe that Russia would have been defeated if not for our lend-lease aid." However, as D. Fleming points out, "the Russians achieved a turning point at Stalingrad before our aid began to arrive in significant volumes, and throughout the entire battle their industry produced all basic war equipment."⁶³

In describing the events of the final stage of the war, historians of the official group assert that the US government was faithful to the allied pledges until the end, strove to establish a strong peace, and, if there was a deterioration of Soviet-American relations upon the conclusion of combat operations, the fault lay with the Soviet Union. For example, T. Bailey states that the USSR did not want to cooperate, J. Pratt that cooperation with the USSR was impossible, and D. Perkins even finds a corresponding "explanation": the secret lies in the psychology of the Russians, who want to "rule" the world.⁶⁴ As for the United States, H. Feis claims that "Truman remained true to the ideas and ideals of the military leader from whose shoulders he lifted the burden. He drew confidence from the fact that he was acting in accordance with the opinion of Admiral Legi, Secretary of War Stimson, General Marshall, and other military advisers whom he trusted."⁶⁵ The chapter of Feis' book which contains this stunning discovery is called "The Continuity of the Roosevelt-Truman Policy." Feis seemingly does not notice the facts that indicate that Truman, breaking with Roosevelt's course, sharply turned US policy against the USSR. Having scarcely occupied the president's chair, in April 1945 he explained to leaders of the American government at the White House that he intended to be "firm" toward the USSR; "if the Russians do not want to join us," he stated, "let them go to hell."⁶⁶ The new president tried to talk with Soviet representatives, to use D. Pearson's apt expression, "in the language of a Missouri mule-driver."⁶⁷

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The historians of the official school were so successful in their crude falsification of history that they won the approval of US ruling cliques. The views that they propounded were the basis for voluminous academic courses designed for young students.⁶⁸ The works of historians of the official school are fully consistent with current propagandistic treatment in the United States not only of the history of the war, but also of problems of postwar American foreign policy.

Even during the Second World War a school which was critical of the official point of view and which came to be known as the "school of realists" in the late 1940s arose in US bourgeois historical science.

The peculiar manifesto of this school was a book by Prof. H. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: the United States and the Balance of Power, which was published in 1942. Spykman's philosophy reduces to the idea that strength is the basic principle of international affairs. "A statesman in charge of foreign policy," insisted Spykman, "may deal with categories of right, validity, and tolerance only to the extent that they promote or work against the goals of the policy of strength. They can be used as a justification of the policy of strength, but they must be rejected when application weakens them." Even during the war the American professor demanded that the military strength of Germany and Japan, which the United States needed, be preserved on "balance-of-power" considerations.⁷⁰

Spykman's views were seized on by many American reactionaries. Their number increased especially after the war, when American imperialism took up an open aggressive policy aimed at establishing a "Pax Americana." The black flag of Spykman, who died in 1943, was taken up by H. Morgenthau, who has cultivated German fascist ideas of geopolitics on American soil. As S. Hoffman noted in 1959, "the theory that has been at the center

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of attention in the United States in recent decades is Prof. Morgenthau's 'realistic' theory of the policy of strength.... The basis of the theory is the concept of national interest, expressed in terms of strength."⁷¹ The influence of the "realist" school remains significant in the United States even today.

The "realists" caustically deride the holy of holies of the official school--the idea that in 1941 the United States took up arms in pursuit of "lofty" goals. Morgenthau and like thinkers⁷² believe that the United States joined the side of the anti-Hitler coalition because the actions of the "Axis" powers altered the "balance of power" in a direction unfavorable to the United States, creating a mortal threat to the very existence of the United States. As Morgenthau emphasizes, the "noncorrespondence between the requirements of the new order and the defense of the old led to World War II."⁷³ While the historians of the official school shed tears over the decisive change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism and see the reasons for this in the imaginary big-heartedness and idle thinking on the part of US and British leaders, on the one hand, and in the perfidy of the USSR, on the other, the "realists" say that this reasoning is childishy naive and suggest that we look at the root of the matter--that we make a sober appraisal of the balance of power within the anti-Hitler coalition. Whereas the supporters of the official school exaggerate in every way possible the contribution of the Western allies to the war and the aid that they provided to the USSR, the "realists" openly declare: "The USSR defeated Germany with its own forces."⁷⁴ "There are no grounds to believe," writes G. Kennan, "that if we had behaved differently with respect to both lend-lease and the military conferences, the outcome of military operations in Europe would not have differed in any at all appreciable way from which actually occurred."⁷⁵ Examining the question of the war against Japan, Kennan asserts: "Statements to the effect that Soviet forces would not have entered Manchuria

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if Roosevelt had not reached the corresponding agreement with Stalin at Yalta are blatant nonsense. Nothing could have prevented the Russians...."76

For all the diversity of the views of the representatives of the two main schools of American bourgeois historiography, their ultimate conclusions agree. Both try to justify the aggressive policy of American imperialism, its creation of military blocs, and its preparation for a new world war. The only difference is that some allude to some "lofty" ideals which supposedly guided American policy, while the others openly state that the balance of power in the world has shaped up adversely for implementation of United States plans for a world state, and that ways must be found of changing the situation. The "realists" propose to direct all efforts toward the creation of a bloc that would have forces equal to those of the socialist camp and whose existence would enable the United States to implement its traditional policy of setting some peoples against others. D. Graber, a student of Morgenthau, writes: "It is vitally important for American security that a balance of power be created in Europe and Asia such that equal forces exist for two or more groups of powers."77

The detachment of "revisionists" is on the extreme right flank of the "realists." These sources claim that the United States entered World War II as a result of an ominous conspiracy of "reds" who "built a nest" in high government agencies in Washington. These views were particularly evident in the dispute over the causes of the stunning success of the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor. The passions that flamed up during this dispute were due to many factors. Among these a prominent factor was the desire of former American commanders in the Hawaiian Islands who had been guilty of criminal dereliction of duty to dump responsibility for the disaster on politicians in Washington.78 When the group of professional historians headed by Ch. Beard entered the fray, the central question turned out to be that of

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the responsibility of the United States for the Second World War. Beard proved that under the conditions of American "democracy" decisions can be made behind the back of the people and congress,⁷⁹ and that the policy of United States encouragement of fascist aggression turned against the United States itself. However, Beard's students such as A. Barnes, Ch. Transill, and F. Sanborn⁸⁰ have begun to prove that the Axis powers supposedly did not threaten the United States, but the American government "forced" them to attack the United States to gain a pretext for entry into the war. Hence the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was used as bait in Washington and was deliberately placed at threat.

In the vicious book The Yalta Betrayal,⁸¹ openly accused F. Roosevelt and American wartime leaders of "communism." In the book Roosevelt's Road to Russia, D. Crocker claims: "We find Franklin D. Roosevelt almost invariably acting in conjunction with Soviet Russia. His support essentially was a necessary condition for this attack. He soundly carried out his mission: he placed weapons in Stalin's hands, and, using American might, destroyed all the dams that restrained the flow of communist expansion in Europe and Asia. To prevent the average American from understanding what was going on, his attention was diverted by igniting hatred for Hitler and Togo."⁸²

The writings of Hitler and those like him, which have nothing in common with historical science, indicate that mercenary service of monopoly interests led reactionary American historiography to its natural conclusion: justification of the fascist German and Japanese aggression, and condemnation of all who resisted this aggression.

Progressive historiography in the United States does almost no special work on problems of World War II. This is due above all to the fact that historians of the official school have scooped

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up all historical sources, preventing others from gaining access to them.

Coverage of a number of important fundamental problems of the history of World War II and US policy in that period from Marxist-Leninist positions can be found in the penetrating studies done by W. Foster, the calm chairman of the US Communist Party.⁸³

In his works on the history of America and the international communist and workers movement, Foster examined some important problems related to the history of the Second World War. Foster's merit is that, in contrast to most American historians, who study the war as an isolated phenomenon, he analyzed the history of the war from Marxist-Leninist positions as a definite stage in the life of society which has its own peculiarities and which at the same time obeys the general objective regular patterns of social development. This approach enabled Foster correctly to explain the question of the origin and political character of the war, and to show how this character changed in relation to the participation of the masses and the first socialist state in the world.

Foster subjected the dual policy of the allies during World War II to a thorough Marxist analysis, emphasizing that while they were fighting against Nazi Germany as a competitor, at the same time they were trying to weaken the Soviet Union. Wall Street capitalists, Foster pointed out, were ready to make a compact with Hitler at the expense of the Soviet Union.

ENGLAND

English bourgeois historiography of the Second World War is largely similar to the American, both in its interpretation of the basic problems of the war and in its ideological

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orientation. However, the status of the junior partner in the war period and the results of the war could not help leaving an impression on official English history and on the works of individual authors.

World War II raised a serious problem for British historians: how to explain that British positions turned out to be strongly undermined despite the victory of the antifascist coalition.

Not wishing to understand that the weakening of imperialism in general and of English imperialism in particular is due to the most deep-seated regularities of the development of human society, the ideologists of British imperialism try to explain the fundamental changes that have occurred in the balance of power on the international scene. This explanation is supposed to perform the task that is most important from the standpoint of English ruling cliques: that of proving that the decline of English imperialism is not due to objective factors.

The desire to justify English imperialism permeates all publications of documents. After the war the English Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertook a multivolume edition of documents on the prehistory of World War II.⁸⁴ The compilers make every effort to justify British foreign policy. They therefore did not include in the published volumes documents that reveal the true causes of the war and the responsibility of the English government for its occurrence. For example, in particular the most important documents of the 1939 English-American negotiations are omitted.

Numerous memoirs of government, political, and military figures, diplomats, and journalists have been published in England in the postwar period. Despite their bias, the memoirs sometimes contain valuable information concerning various aspects of English life during the war.⁸⁵

1800

Among the abundant memoir literature penned by bourgeois British figures, the six-volume edition of the memoirs of former English Prime Minister W. Churchill⁸⁶ is of particular interest. The value of these memoirs is that they present a large number of previously unpublished official English documents. But, as Churchill's biographer L. Broad notes, even [Churchill] "cannot be relied on for a complete and dispassionate presentation of the events." Broad points out that Churchill's foreknowledge and his devotion to the Anglo-American alliance forced him to make many "omissions."⁸⁷ Despite this, Churchill's work sets the tone for coverage of the war not only in England. Its influence is felt in all bourgeois literature on World War II.

Material of considerable interest can be found in the diaries and memoirs of English military figures.⁸⁸ In particular, they contain much additional proof of the incontrovertible fact that the entire military strategy of English imperialism during World War II was aimed at dragging out the war and was based on the desire to achieve a mutual weakening of the Soviet Union and Germany. The diaries of Alanbrooke and the memoirs of B. Montgomery, F. Morgan, and H. Ismay give some idea of the nature of the disagreements between the ruling cliques of England and the United States on problems of military strategy.

The memoirs of former English diplomats B. Lockart, F. Maclean, W. Strang, A. Kirkpatrick, S. Hoare, Knatchbull-Hugessen, and others⁸⁹ are of definite interest for characterizing English foreign policy. The English intelligence officer and diplomat B. Lockart tells of British imperialism's plans in Central Europe, while F. Maclean discusses English policy in Yugoslavia.⁹⁰ English ambassadors (Knatchbull-Hugessen to Turkey and S. Hoare to Spain) reveal secret communications between English and American diplomats on the one hand and representatives of the fascist powers on the other.

1801

An extensive official publication devoted to England's participation in World War II was undertaken to fulfill the tasks that English ruling cliques set for historiography of the Second World War. Preparatory work on this publication began during the war. In all, some 82 volumes are to be released (over 50 have now appeared) in two large series: a military series (32 volumes) and a civilian one (50 volumes). The military series includes three parts. The first is devoted to general problems of strategy,⁹¹ the second to the largest military operations of British armed forces,⁹² and the third to individual naval and air battles.⁹³

The civilian series includes the works British War Economy by W. Hancock and M. Gowing, British War Production by M. M. Postan, Problems of Social Policy by R. M. Titmus, and Statistical Digest of the War, which was published by the Central Bureau of Statistics.⁹⁴ Some volumes of the civilian series cover certain problems of the domestic policy of the English government or describe the activities of various sectors of the British economy.⁹⁵ Finally, the civilian series contains a part devoted to the English medical service in the Second World War.

It should be noted that English historians working on the official history and their American colleagues from the US Army's Office of Military History exchange information and critique each other's work. As Dzh.* Butler, head of the English edition, has remarked, "we do not hope that our interpretations of facts will always agree, but, what is the main thing, we hope to establish to the extent possible a common factual base and to learn each other's point of view."⁹⁶

The authors of the official edition use the documents and materials in the archives of various British ministries and departments, defense enterprises, and military institutions, as well

* Translator's note: items marked with an asterisk have been back-transliterated from Russian and may not reflect correct spelling.

as the testimony of those directly involved in the events. Moreover, the authors of some volumes have access to the American archives and the archives of German ministries and departments. The open volumes of the history generally are an abridged, simplified version of the parallel closed edition.

Dzh.* Butler and Dzh. Erman,* the authors and editors of the bulky volumes of Bol'shaya strategiya (The Grand Strategy), see their task as being to give a presentation of the general course of the war that would serve as the "basis for works devoted to individual campaigns or to such special topics as the war at sea, the defense of the United Kingdom, and the strategic air offensive."⁹⁷ As the authors of this publication note, problems of the conduct of individual military operations were touched on in Bol'shaya strategiya only to the extent necessary, in order to demonstrate "how central government agencies exercised higher direction of the war."⁹⁸ Although the works of Butler and Erman devote much space to covering the factors behind various strategic decisions, the true goals of the English government in World War II are concealed in every way possible. It can be seen from the "Grand Strategy" series that the English government, using its own insignificant resources and relying on the military operations of its allies, wanted not only to achieve victory in the war, but also to conserve until the end of the war sufficient power to influence the postwar situation in the world.

The official edition also includes one volume by L. Woodward that is devoted to English foreign policy during World War II.⁹⁹ The importance of this work is diminished by the limited number of sources used by the author, and by its bias, which is especially obvious wherever he discusses Soviet foreign policy. For example, Woodward tries to assure the reader that England's hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union was due to the Soviet government's position regarding the formation of a Polish government. However, Woodward's work itself contains much evidence to the

effect that this attitude, which existed in the Churchill government toward the USSR, corresponded to the anti-Soviet sentiments of the country's ruling cliques.

It should be noted that the most varied views of the history of World War II exist in English bourgeois historiography. However, most historians abut on the official position in interpreting the basic problems of the war. But this position is as follows: British imperialism must be whitewashed, the guilt for World War II must be lifted from it, and it must be proven that it had a positive effect on the events during the war.

In the volumes of the official history of the war, investigation of the true causes of the start of World War II, which was an outcome of the imperialist system and a result of the extreme aggravation of the imperialistic contradictions between the two groups of capitalist powers, is replaced by a description, often biased, of the diplomatic prehistory of the war. The version that has become the official version of Germany's aggressive actions and of its encroachment on the independence and freedom of other peoples¹⁰⁰ essentially gives only the formal pretext for England's entry into the war and does not explain the problem of the war's origin. There also exists the version of the "fatal role" of the 1939 Soviet-German pact. The supporters of this version cannot deny that in the prewar period the USSR insistently strove to create a collective security system, but they nonetheless believe that the pact alone led to the war. And still it is clear to many English historians that the war could not have resulted from some single act. Moreover, some English historians and politicians believe that the policy of the Western powers in the prewar period, especially the Munich agreement, forced the USSR to conclude its treaty with Germany.¹⁰¹

The desire to draw lessons from the prewar events explains the extensive belief in the "thesis" that the Western powers were

responsible for World War II.¹⁰² Advocates of this "thesis" confirm that the governments and some politicians of the Western powers actively helped restore Germany's military and industrial potential, hoping that they would be able to direct German aggression against the USSR. But since the policy of "appeasement" turned against its initiators, and since the governments of the Western powers proved incapable of diverting the threat from their own countries and could not "amicably" share a sphere of influence with Germany, they were responsible for the "unnecessary war."¹⁰³ As we can see from this unambiguous conclusion of the advocates of the "thesis," their goal is to have a more sober analysis of the prewar period in case analogous conditions arise [once more]. Furthermore, the "thesis" also carries a propaganda load: by assigning responsibility for the war solely to governments and individual political figures, bourgeois historians thus accomplish their main task: they defend the capitalist order which has been and remains the main cause of wars in our time. Additionally, English bourgeois historians limit the role of the economic factor in the origin of the war merely to various forms of "competition between states."¹⁰⁴

Attention should be drawn to the fact that some bourgeois historians try to lift guilt for the Second World War from fascist Germany. In this regard, the publication of the book The Origins of the Second World War¹⁰⁵ by A. Taylor, who is well-known for his progressive views, cannot help be surprising. In this work Taylor, propounding this idea, plays into the hands of the Bonn militarists. As might have been expected, Taylor's book produced approving responses in West Germany's neofascist press.¹⁰⁶

Some English authors, such as B. Lockart and J. Fuller, state that England waged an "ideological war" against the fascist bloc. Undoubtedly, it would not occur to anyone to equate the ideology of fascist Germany with that of the "Western democracies" during the war. However, attempts to seek out the fundamental difference

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between the ideologies of the two capitalist coalitions are groundless. The ideology of the ruling cliques of the capitalist states of both coalitions that took part in the war was the imperialist ideology. The difference lay not in the essence of the ideology, but in the forms in which it was manifested. The central idea of the ruling cliques of all imperialist states was that of winning world rule through force of arms. It is a different matter that English imperialism, in confessing its own weakness, hoped to attain its cherished goal by means of and in conjunction with the ruling cliques of the United States, unconcerned about what its true position in the Anglo-American bloc would be.

The English official historical literature does not contain a single work devoted to the role of the masses in the war. The failure to note the role of the masses becomes especially obvious when we speak of the resistance movement. This is typical of such historians as Ch. Dickson, O. Heilbrunn, R. Seth, H. Seton-Watson, and others.¹⁰⁷ They all treat the resistance not as a broad mass movement, but only as the aggregate of the scouting, diversionary, and terrorist activity of individual groups directed from without. This is why these historians pay considerable attention in their works to the activity of the English administration of special operations. They claim that this organization was not interested in policy. However, the materials cited by English authors attest that in all occupied countries Churchill's government supported the most reactionary elements and everywhere tried to preserve a reactionary, monarchic order. Herein lay the task of the special operations administration, which was, as the compilers of the collection Special Operations admit, the "creation of a large group of bankers and businessmen who had both international ties and the gift of foresight."¹⁰⁸

Problems of strategy and the history of military operations are covered in works by J. Fuller, B. Liddel Hart, P. Fleming, and others.¹⁰⁹ One of the principal tasks of English

historiography is to justify the strategic concept of the English government, which was to try to avoid an encounter with the enemy's decisive forces, and to let the other participants in the anti-Hitler coalition engage the enemy. English historians try to prove that the "strategy of indirect operations," the diversionary operations in secondary theaters of the world war, and the delay in opening the second front were such strategic decisions which played positive part in the course of World War II.

W. Churchill, one of the main inspirers of the war, especially tries to justify English military strategy in his memoirs. The idea that the military strategy selected by the English government was the only proper one and that it met the interests of the coalition as a whole runs through all six volumes of his memoirs. The question of the second front also is presented from this standpoint. Churchill cites various data to confirm the imagined impossibility and infeasibility of opening a second front before 1944, but he omits some important documents that bear on this subject. For example, while pronouncing his faith in allied duty and principle, Churchill prefers not to mention that his notorious diary note of June 10, 1943, concerning the second front contained the firm promise of the English government to carry out an invasion of the European continent with large-scale English and American forces in 1943. The English government is known subsequently to have broken this promise.

English bourgeois historiography belittles the Soviet Union's role in winning victory over the fascist bloc, and at the same time exaggerates the contribution of the Western powers to this victory. To this end they give a distorted, incorrect evaluation of the Red Army's military operations and attempt to attribute its successes to various chance circumstances. For example, Liddell Hart believes that "if a judicial investigation were held on the failure of the German campaign of 1941, the sole finding would be 'defeat due to natural causes.'"¹¹⁰ Liddell Hart also

crudely distorts the reasons for the defeat of the fascist German troops in the battle on the Volga. He places foremost not the selfless heroism of Soviet soldiers and the brilliantly executed Red Army operation of surrounding and liquidating a large enemy group, but the "moral condition" of the German forces and the overall strategic situation, which was changed by the English offensive in North Africa in 1942.¹¹¹ The belittling of the battle on the Volga and the exaggeration of the importance of allied operations in North Africa are extremely characteristic of English bourgeois historiography. Most military leaders--Alanbrook, Montgomery, Kennedy, Ismay--consider the North African campaign of 1942 to be the start of the turn in World War II, and not the Red Army's victory in the winter of 1942/43. Many authors say nothing about the tremendous impact of Red Army operations on the military operations of allied forces in the West.

Some political and military figures, and behind them historians, express regret that all the opportunities the Western allies had were not utilized in the course of military operations. Montgomery writes: "If the political leaders of the West had managed the war correctly and if the supreme commanders had received appropriate instructions,"¹¹² English-American forces would have been able to take Berlin, Vienna, and Prague before the Red Army. He is seconded by J. Fuller, who believes that allied forces could and should have captured Berlin; he lays blame for the fact that this was not done mainly on Eisenhower.¹¹³ However, the supporters of this point of view "forget" the tremendous might of the Soviet Union, which forced the governments of the United States and England to set aside their already prepared treacherous and adventurist plans.

Contemporary English historiography pays much attention to Anglo-American military collaboration. It tries to intensify the differences that existed between English and American strategic concepts. English authors try to dump the blame for both

1808

individual unsuccessful allied operations and the general political results of the war on American military and political leaders; in turn, their American colleagues lay responsibility for all this on the English. The assessment of the Italian campaign by English and American authors is extremely typical in this regard. "The capture of Sicily and the Italian campaign that followed," writes the English author A. Bryant, "were just one aspect of Brook's strategy and the British Mediterranean strategy; if Brook's American colleagues had been able to appraise his arguments instead of objecting to them, then there would have been no need for the English-American army to make its way across the difficult Apennines, since the landing vessels and aircraft carriers that Brook had requested could have landed superior forces in the enemy rear and lured enemy troops into a trap in Italy, as was done in Africa."¹¹⁴ In contrast, the American author sarcastically writes: "If the strategic ideas of Sir Arthur Bryant (I doubt that these ideas belonged to Lord Alanbrook) had prevailed, then military operations in the Pacific would have stopped, and the crossing of La Manche [the English Channel] would have been postponed indefinitely in order to make Alanbrook's 'little war' the main campaign of the Second World War."¹¹⁵ Alanbrook himself vividly discusses English-American disagreements in his diaries.

There undoubtedly were disagreements between English and American military leaders regarding the time for and the nature of military operations in Western Europe, the prospects for the Italian campaign, and the conduct of the war in the Pacific Theater, but they were not fundamental in character. These disagreements were determined by the desire of English and US ruling cliques to establish their own rule. The imperialistic goals of the English and American ruling cliques underlay the disagreements. However, despite these differences, the English and US governments were able to work out a general strategic line during the war that was aimed at forcing rather than dragging out the conflict.

This is why we cannot agree with Morison that there were two entirely different strategic concepts: the American, which provided for a "massed blow to the very heart of the enemy," and the English, whose advocates proposed to carry out flank attacks "in order to drain the enemy of blood, like jackals wearing down a lion before seizing him by the throat."¹¹⁶

Among the English historians who study military operations on the Soviet-German front, we should take note of R. Seth and J. Erickson as investigators who do not try to make their living on anticommunism. Seth wrote the book Stalingrad--Point of Return,¹¹⁷ which was written in particular on the basis of documents in the Stalingrad Defense Museum. "No matter what you think of communism," the author writes in the foreword, "if you are honest you cannot help admiring the Russians and their military leaders for the bravery, staunchness, and skill with which they held off the Germans near Stalingrad in 1942, or admiring Stalingrad as the beachhead on which they ultimately turned the course of the war in their favor, and moreover in favor of the Western allies."¹¹⁸ J. Erickson, the authors of The Soviet High Command 1918-1941, a large volume on the history of the Red Army, discusses how Soviet commanders quickly learned to fight under the trying conditions of the Great Patriotic War, and gives a high rating to the command personnel of the Red Army.¹¹⁹

Among works by bourgeois historians, special note should be made of A. Werth's book Russia at War.¹²⁰ This was the first truthful, honest book in the West about the war that the Soviet Union waged to be written by an objective eyewitness to the events. The book emphasizes that the Soviet people "bore the main burden of the war against Nazi Germany, and this was precisely what saved the lives of millions of Americans and Englishmen."¹²¹ A. Werth calls the Great Patriotic War a "truly popular war," and notes that the patriotic feat of the Soviet people "has few parallels

1810

in human history."¹²² The author's good knowledge of life in the USSR during the war and his sincerity made the book quite popular in the West.

The Royal Institute of International Relations in England deals with the analysis of international relations during the war. This institute has published several large works edited by A. Toynbee.¹²³ The works of L. Namier, G. Wheeler-Benett, M. Beloff, H. Carr, H. Seton-Watson, and others¹²⁴ also are devoted to problems of the international relations and foreign policy of individual countries. Most of these works have much in common. This includes underestimating the importance and role of the anti-Hitler coalition, attempts to distort the Soviet position on the most important problems of interally relations, and exaggerating the role of deliveries.

A sober assessment of the direct results of the war for Great Britain is characteristic of many historians. In the book The Price of Victory, military historian R. Thompson tries to answer the question of the reasons for England's loss of status as one of the great powers. Confining his analysis of wartime events mainly to the actions of England and the United States, Thompson shows that England gradually lost its power during the war by proceeding "not side by side or hand in hand with its great ally, but under its wing, and ultimately at its direction."¹²⁵ The author concludes that England paid dearly for victory by becoming a secondary power.

Progressive English historians are put in a difficult position above all because access to historical sources is closed to them almost entirely. Nonetheless, progressive authors such as A. Rothstein, D. N. Pritt,* and A. and Z. Coates¹²⁶ have published scientific works that truthfully depict England's political and economic life during World War II.

1811

The materials and documents of the Communist Party of Great Britain, especially the materials of its 16th, 17th, and 18th congresses,¹²⁷ and the works of H. Pollitt, W. Gallacher, R. Palm Datt, and other English communist leaders¹²⁸ are of primary importance for a proper understanding of English domestic and foreign policy during World War II. These materials make it possible correctly to analyze the arrangement of political forces in England during the war, help ascertain the true nature of the policy of the Churchill government, and make it possible to gain a complete idea of the sentiments of the English people and their attitude toward an ally--the USSR.

Palm Datt's book Krizis Britanii i Britanskoy imperii (The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire)¹²⁹ was a penetrating Marxist investigation of the results of the Second World War and its consequences for social development, especially English imperialism. The author draws the fully substantiated conclusion that the myth of the military invincibility of Western imperialism was shattered and that the Soviet Union is primarily responsible for this. This book gives a clear picture of the bankruptcy that English imperialism experienced in World War II. This bankruptcy, Palm Datt points out, was brought about by deep-seated social factors that also have been evidenced in the treacherous Munich policy of prewar England, in its colonialism, and in the desire of the ruling cliques to suppress the workers, democratic, and national liberation movement. The war just accelerated the crisis of British imperialism and the process of colonial liberation. Britain's crisis, the author says, is the bankruptcy of imperialism. American nuclear-war strategy creates even more threatening prospects for England. Under these conditions there can be just one way out: its people must move toward the development of democracy and socialism and make a contribution to the cause of universal peace and socialism throughout the world.

1812

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG)

In terms of the volume of literature published on the history of World War II, the FRG follows the United States and England. The published works are written mainly by representatives of the reactionary wing, a large number of whom are former Nazi generals and officers, fascist leaders, and highly placed bureaucrats.

Propagandizing of the revanchist ideas that underlie Bonn's official policy is facilitated by the fact that old personnel who served fascism play a major part in all areas of the country's political affairs. In 1962 the publisher of the revanchist newspaper Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung und National-Zeitung stated that at that time the press organs of West Germany were under the control of those who "created the social opinion of the Great German State in the period 1933-1945."¹³⁰ Moreover, 14 neofascist parties, 19 attached youth organizations, and 49 other associations of kindred spirit now operate in West Germany and West Berlin. These neofascist organizations have at their disposal 24 publishing houses which put out "right-radical" magazines, journals, and newspapers in tremendous numbers.¹³¹

Former SS personnel also want to make a "contribution" to literature on the history of World War II. In 1963 the Ring-Verlag Helmut Kramer publishing house undertook the publication of a series of books under the general title "For Germany! Military Stories of Participants in the SS Forces."¹³²

It also is demonstrative that W. Hubatsch, former official historiographer to Hitler's high command, is once again able to support openly Bonn's revanchist foreign policy. In the book Die Deutsche Frage, he states that "the 1937 borders are the basis of Germany's political existence."¹³³

This stream of militarist and revanchist literature is being resisted by an unfortunately small number of printed statements by West German historians and publicists. The well-known historian H. Mann, who reflects the views of sober-minded West German intelligentsia despite some erroneous historical assessments, comes out against atomic war, for recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and settling of relations with Germany's eastern neighbors, and for elimination of the cold war on an international scale.¹³⁴ Using extensive historical material, the progressive West German publicist K. Hirsch reveals the full perniciousness of the anti-communist course in social affairs in the Federal Republic of Germany. In his book Die Blutlinie he writes: "No other people of our era have made such monstrous sacrifices of property and blood to this immense folly of our time. Many now babble about liberation: for the German people there is but one liberation--which is reasonable and necessary--the liberation from this morbid anticommunist complex! ...We must not lose any more time: Hitler's generals already are reentering politics!"¹³⁵

In no other capitalist country has the interpretation of the events of World War II been subjected so frankly to the demands of the ruling class as in West Germany. Numerous official institutions and departments are elaborating the history of the Second World War in the spirit of the political situation that exists in West Germany.¹³⁶ The following deal with this: the military history division of the Ministry of Defense, the "internal control" division of the same ministry, the Munich Institute of Modern History, the Mainz Institute of European History, the Tübingen Institute of Occupation Policy (which existed up until 1961), and over 60 institutes involved in studying the history of the East that are financed by the West German government.

In addition to the large number of official institutions, problems of the history of the world war are dealt with by organizations founded by former Nazi generals and officers, and by

the "working group for military research" and the "society for military knowledge," which have received special thanks from former FRG Minister of Defense Strauss for "strengthening military thought among the people."¹³⁷ The revanchist orientation of the activity of the "society for military knowledge," which has branches in 165 cities in the FRG, is attested to by a statement made by Nazi General Reinhardt, its calm representative, who has remarked that the society has the function of "keeping ready for the future the tested experience of the past."¹³⁸ There are numerous associations and unions in West Germany, including over 1300 so-called "soldiers' unions,"¹³⁹ which have published numerous descriptions of the operations of individual units [chasti and soyedineniya] that extoll the combat spirit of the personnel of Hitler's plundering army.

A large share of the responsibility for working out the military ideology of contemporary West German militarists and revanchists rests with US ruling cliques. Immediately at the end of World War II, the American military command brought in over 400 of Hitler's generals and officers to study the experience of the war with the Soviet Union, with a view to using this fascist German experience for their own goals. The former participants in the war quite willingly began to share their knowledge with their American colleagues. F. Halder, formerly chief of the general staff, ground forces, was awarded the highest military order for civilians in the US Army for passing on his "valuable experience." One work published with the blessing of the American command was prefaced with Halder's words about the importance of using the experience of World War II for a future thermonuclear war.¹⁴⁰ In the foreword to a collective work by West German and American military historians, Entscheidungs-schlachten des zweiten Weltkrieges, published in 1960, General Speidel emphasizes the importance of this book for the "political and military training of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Pact."¹⁴¹ The studies done by Hitler's generals and officers

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who underwent special retraining at the Pentagon comprise a significant fraction of the West German literature devoted to the Second World War.

The publication of collections of documents on World War II has not taken on the scope in the FRG that it has in the United States and England. This is due to the fact that many documents wound up in the hands of the US and British governments as spoils of war.

Therefore, only those collections of documents that were published by the governments of Western powers that belonged to the anti-Hitler coalition were published in German in the FRG for several years after World War II.¹⁴² Collections of materials from the archives of the High Command of the German Armed Forces which contain documents with an operational-tactical content have only appeared quite recently.¹⁴³

The West German literature on the history of World War II includes a host of memoirs written by industrialists, generals, and admirals of the fascist German army, and by major political and military leaders of the Third Reich.¹⁴⁴ Hitler's person holds a prominent place in the memoirs. Many of those close to the fascist leader have published their notes of his statements and pronouncements.¹⁴⁵ Hitler's so-called "second book"¹⁴⁶ (the first was Mein Kampf) has been brought to light and published. Friendly feelings toward England, France, and the United States are ascribed in retrospect to Hitler, whose forces destroyed France and prepared to invade England. Not to mention that the "historical inquiries" of West German revanchists, which find support in other NATO countries, are an undisguised mockery of the conscience and honor of the peoples who, at the cost of heavy casualties, put an end to the fascist pretenders to world rule.

West German publications on the history of World War II have much in common with analogous works by bourgeois American and

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English authors. But West German historiography also has its own specifics--it justifies the fascist aggression against Eastern European countries, especially the USSR. West German historians use the same false arguments to which the Nazi leaders--Hitler, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg--resorted in the past, and often even quote them. West German historiography attributes Germany's defeat in World War II to a combination of unrepeatable circumstances, emphasizing that if a third world war should be unleashed, we would not have to deal anew with these circumstances. To confirm this, they advance the thesis that the management of military operations by Hitler was incompetent. West German historians refer to the fact that Germany had to conduct war not only against the USSR, but also against the United States and England. They thus justify the current military alliance between the FRG and the United States and England, which they consider a favorable opportunity for revanchism. To explain the expediency of the bloc with the United States and England, West German historiography resorts to yet another procedure. It asserts that although the United States and England formally are among the victors in World War II, they actually suffered a defeat, since they lost in the organization of the postwar arrangement of peace.¹⁴⁷ Finally, attempts to justify the general staff and the military clique and to lift from them the responsibility for preparing for the war and its final outcome occupy a major position in the works of West German historians.

West German historians are making considerable efforts to whitewash one of the principal parties responsible for the Second World War: German monopoly capital. For example, reactionary historians deny the fact that Hitler was placed at the head of Germany in 1933 precisely at the behest of the magnates of capital. Thus, Görlitz and Quint write: "It cannot be asserted that Hitler was 'made' by German heavy industry to implement its expansionist plans in deed."¹⁴⁸

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Refusing to analyze the true causes of the Second World War, the falsifiers of history make extensive use of the theme of Hitler's "individual responsibility" for preparing for and unleashing the war. F. Meineke, a German historian of the older generation, wrote soon after the war that Hitler's dictatorship was "one of the most prominent examples of inexplicable and strange personal power in history."¹⁴⁹ There is no doubt that all who write about Hitler's "mysteriousness" and "phenomenality" essentially continue to honor the raving "Fuehrer" who implemented the will of monopoly capital. It is not by chance that the West German historian L. Dehio claims: "One cannot imagine that without a satanlike genius Germany could once again attain such giddy heights."¹⁵⁰ H. Herzfeld, one of the pillars of West German historical science, writes that the war was "consciously unleashed by a single individual."¹⁵¹ But if H. Herzfeld or M. Braumbach merely note in their researches the role that social and economic contradictions played in the inception of the war,¹⁵² a large number of their colleagues generally speak only of Hitler's "guilt" or "personal responsibility."¹⁵³


Statements by West German historians, journalists, and politicians in connection with the 20th anniversary of the start of World War II indicate that they are, as before, far from uncovering the historical truth of its true causes and origin. For example, E. Schramm called his article "Adolf Hitler Wanted War," and G. Krausnik,* director of the Munich Institute of Modern History, also made a statement regarding "Hitler's personal responsibility" for the Second World War.¹⁵⁴


In 1964 the "Hitler problem" was raised once again in the pages of the Hamburg weekly Der Spiegel by E. Schramm, former historian of the OKV [expansion unknown]. In Schramm's opinion, the "riddle of Hitler," who "bewitched people with the stare of his clear blue eyes," cannot be solved by using "conventional notions or moral categories."¹⁵⁵

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1818

The timid attempts of some authors, particular the very same E. Schramm, to mention fascist Germany's guilt even in terms of Hitler's "personal responsibility" immediately provoke a malicious reaction by the revanchists. For example, the journal Nation Europa wrote that "as a result of their interpretation of history," Schramm and like-thinkers have "automatically become accomplices of communism."¹⁵⁶

The thesis of Hitler's "personal responsibility" is used to justify the fascist general officers who were directly involved in implementing the predatory plans of fascist Germany. Especially zealous in this regard is W. Görlitz, who made the absurd assertion that Hitler's generals took no part in war preparations¹⁵⁷ and had no idea of the fascist crimes.¹⁵⁸ Also typical is a book by G. Meinck, published in the FRG in 1959, in which the author tries to represent the Wehrmacht generals as "cabinet strategists" who were only engaged in drawing up Germany's defense plans.¹⁵⁹ In a book about Keitel published in 1961, Görlitz tries to justify this faithful servant of Hitler, to represent him as a "victim of soldiers' duty" who blindly followed orders.¹⁶⁰

West German historiography, like American and English, ferociously attacks Soviet foreign policy on the eve of the war, especially the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939. Laying the guilt for the conclusion of this treaty on Hitler, W. Hofer calls Hitler the "greatest accomplice of Bolshevism in Europe."¹⁶¹ H. Krausnick believes that the treaty contributed to the start of World War II. Beyond the intent of these writers, these attacks attest to the importance of the treaty, which prevented the creation of a unified anti-Soviet front of capitalist powers. Indirect acknowledgement of this fact leads H. Buchheim to a conclusion formulated in the same malicious tone: the pact "opened the gates for Bolshevism in Europe."¹⁶² Of course, reactionary historians do not condemn Hitler's government for his treachery, which was expressed in his attack on the USSR in contravention

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of the treaty, and attempt to justify this attack. Claims about the preventive nature of the war against the USSR serve this end. For example, H. Seraphim believes that in 1941 there existed a serious "threat from the East," which was averted by Hitler.¹⁶³

The question of the contribution that the participants in the antifascist coalition made to the victory over Germany occupies a significant place in the works of West German historians.

The works of West German historians have no shortage of acknowledgements that characterize the significance of military operations on the Soviet-German front. The battle for Moscow, they write, "shattered the myth of the German army's invincibility."¹⁶⁴ Former Wehrmacht general A. Philippi, one of the authors of a special study, writes the following description of the morale of fascist German troops following their defeat near Moscow: "The fear prevailed over the German command that the troops, shaken by the defeat, impotent before the even growing strength of the enemy and the natural elements, demoralized, on the even of death and failure, might become disobedient."¹⁶⁵ West German historians consider the defeat in the battle on the Volga to be one of the largest defeats ever suffered by the German army.¹⁶⁶ The failure of the offensive by fascist German troops near Kursk, according to F. Heim, "had severe consequences, nearly all German armored forces... were so depleted that it seemed impossible to restore them and the initiative conclusively shifted to the Red Army."¹⁶⁷ The defeat of the German "Center" group of armies is described as a "catastrophe" in the military historical literature.¹⁶⁸ In his investigation of World War II, the West German professor M. Freund notes that "no one believed it possible to defeat Hitler without a tremendous military contribution from the Soviet Union."¹⁶⁹

Nevertheless, most historians try to match the incompatible: to say that the fascist German army suffered its worst defeats

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on the Soviet-German front, and at the same time to belittle the importance of this front. For example, the well-known military historian Jacobsen claims that the defeat on the Volga "was not the sole crushing blow on a strategic scale," and considers the allied landing in Algeria and Morocco, Rommel's retreat from El Alamein, and the failure of the submarine warfare plans in the spring of 1943 to be events that also brought about the break in the war.¹⁷⁰ Jacobsen writes: "From 1943 the center of gravity of the conduct of the war shifted from dry land toward air strategy."¹⁷¹ General Speidel writes that only the landing of Anglo-American troops in Northern France, "by taking a great deal of pressure off the Soviet Union, made possible the successes of the Red Army in 1944 and 1945."¹⁷²

One of the favorite techniques of falsifiers of history is to identify the significance of the largest battles on the Soviet-German front with insignificant operations in other theaters of the war. Demonstrative in this regard is the book Entscheidungsschlachten des zweiten Weltkrieges, which won high praise in the West German press.¹⁷³ In this book decisive significance is attributed to 12 battles, of which only three took place on the Soviet-German front. Among the others we find the battle for Crete in 1941, the battle of Midway Island in 1942, the battle at Leite Island in 1944, etc.¹⁷⁴ A curious technique of falsification was employed by the publishers of the diary of military operations of the OKV, who interpret military operations at sea and in the air as being equal in importance to the war in ground theaters.¹⁷⁵ After two decades the compilers of the OKV diary resort to arguments that representatives of English and US reactionary forces have used. We know that during the war the Western allies tried to delay the opening of the second front, claiming that naval operations and air raids on German cities were equal in importance to the opening of the second front.

Attempting to use any means to belittle the Soviet Union's role in the war against Germany, West German authors assert that

it is "useless to try to answer the question, precisely who among the participants in the coalition invested the largest efforts in the military victory over the Axis powers," ¹⁷⁶ and that none of its participants separately would have been able to achieve victory. Thus, after suffering defeat on the battlefield, the German generals are trying to take the victory away from the Soviet Union by means of ink and paper.

Denying that Hitler was put in power by German monopolists and acted at their will, West German historiography tries to represent major German industrialists and bankers as enemies of the fascist regime. It is precisely for this reason that it tries to extol in every possible way the conspiracy against Hitler and the attempt on his life on July 20, 1944. ¹⁷⁷ It is perfectly clear, however, that while some German monopolists and the military were disenchanted with their recent idol by the summer of 1944, this cannot serve as proof of their noninvolvement with Hitler's regime. The July 20 conspiracy was not directed against this regime, but only called for the replacement of one bankrupt dictator with another or with others.

But the praise for the conspiracy and its conspirators has yet another goal. Against the facts, West German historians assert that there was only one opposition to Hitler in Germany--the bourgeois opposition. They try to strike from history the heroic struggle of German antifascists, which was inspired and directed by the German Communist Party. Moreover, reactionary authors slander the German Communist Party, accusing it of supposedly obeying the fascist regime. This slander is actively supported by historians from the ranks of the Social Democratic Party. ¹⁷⁸ The rightwing social democrat P. Löbe, former president of the Reichstag, even claims that the communists, without even a struggle, obeyed fascism after the fashion of the "Steel Helmet" and the supporters of Gugenberg's party. ¹⁷⁹ Thus, he turns out to be in the same ranks as blatant anticommunists.

1822

G. Weisenborn views the antifascist movement in Germany from a different standpoint. He tries to give an objective portrayal of the scope and diversity of the German resistance movement¹⁸⁰ and condemns the attempts of reactionary historiography to limit the resistance movement to the conspiracy of July 20, 1944, and to the activity of the "Munich students."¹⁸¹

Even such an open anticommunist as H. Rothfels acknowledges that the Germany Communist Party was the first to take up the active illegal antifascist struggle, while all other parties in the Weimar Republic "indulged themselves for some time in self-deception regarding a possible move to the camp of legal political opposition."¹⁸² Rothfels says that many German communists "gave an example of great resolution."¹⁸³ It should be noted that this passage is omitted in the latest edition of his work."¹⁸⁴

On the whole, however, reactionary historiography tries in every way possible to slander the activity of German communists and to belittle the importance of their heroic struggle against Hitler's dictatorship. West German historians also take an anti-communist position on the subject of the role and importance of the partisan movement. Despite the fact that the partisan struggle against the aggressor was recognized by international law as a legitimate measure of popular self-defense, the reactionaries will not stop trying to place this form of armed struggle by the masses outside the law. According to L. Rendulich,* for example, a people may resist an aggressor only "until the country is occupied by enemy forces...."¹⁸⁵

The wordy reasoning of some historians as to the "illegality" of the partisan movement hides the desire not only to justify the fierce measures of terror and violence taken by the fascist occupiers toward the peaceful population, but also to whitewash the occupation regime in general. For example, V. Redelis writes: "Villages were destroyed and burned by the Germans solely because

there was no other possibility for dealing with the partisans."¹⁸⁶
 It is not surprising that the most reactionary historians use terminology taken from the orders of SS punitive squads: they call the partisans "bandits" and partisan detachments "bands."¹⁸⁷

Despite the facts of the fascist crimes known to the entire world--mass extermination of the peaceful population, executions of hostages, enslavement, punitive expeditions¹⁸⁸--West German authors claim that, for example, "the rules of war were observed during suppression of the uprising in France."¹⁸⁹ In their desire to belittle the severity of the fascist crimes, they agreed to claim that inhumanity is a general phenomenon of the modern era and is not at all characteristic of Hitler's regime alone.¹⁹⁰

However, the crimes of German fascism are so obvious that it is difficult even for representatives of reactionary West German historiography to pass over them in silence. Nonetheless, attempts are being made at the present time openly to rehabilitate the criminal organizations of Hitler's Germany. For example, Görlitz protests the verdict of the international court at Nuremberg, which condemned the SS as a criminal organization.¹⁹¹ In works that examine questions of the partisan movement, the inhuman actions of the fascist punishers are justified by references to "military necessity,"¹⁹² "blind fulfillment of duty,"¹⁹³ etc. According to these historians, the responsibility for the crimes committed against the peaceful populace rests not with the Nazis, but with those who waged the partisan war.¹⁹⁴

H. Rentsch, the author of a special study of the partisan war, referring to the competent opinion of "experts," made the absurd claim that the partisans supposedly waged their struggle in order to provoke repression in response by the occupation authorities.¹⁹⁵ H. Rentsch, of course, also approves of the activity of the armed forces of fascist Germany in suppressing the partisan movement, especially in the Soviet Union and Southeastern Europe.¹⁹⁶

At the same time, most historians have had to admit that despite cruel terror and repression, the fascist German invaders were unable to break the will of the peoples to resist. V. Redelis, one of the direct participants in the punitive expeditions against the partisans, notes, for example: "During World War II underground and partisan activity posed complex problems for the German armed forces which remained unsolved to the end of the war."¹⁹⁷ H. Dahms writes in his book that the partisan struggle in the Soviet Union contributed to the successes of the Red Army.¹⁹⁸

On the whole, West German historiography has been unable to uncover the true objective patterns behind the rise and development of the national liberation movement against the fascist enslavers. Even the authors of the latest publications on this subject deal, as before, in the old thesis of an "incorrect policy in the East." H. Jacobsen, a representative of official historiography, writes: "The occupation policy, with its theory of living space and races, caused events to develop in the East in such a way that they ultimately had a decisive influence on Germany's defeat."¹⁹⁹

West German historiography pays much attention to the question of the reasons for the defeat of German imperialism in the Second World War. However, here too scientific analysis is replaced by pseudoscientific arguments. Many of Hitler's former generals and many civilian historians search for the causes of Germany's defeat in various chance factors, especially unfavorable climatic and geographic conditions, incorrect management of military operations by Hitler, etc.²⁰⁰

However, these explanations, which were devised soon after the war, did not elicit a sympathetic response among the West German public, especially youth.²⁰¹ At that time H. Jacobsen and the group of historians who share his point of view advanced

a new "explanation" of the causes of Germany's defeat in World War II. These historians dismiss the clumsy allusions to the Soviet Union's geographic and climatic conditions and the thesis that "Hitler alone was guilty of everything." Instead, they now assert that Hitler and his regime never would have been able to win this war, that they lost the war in a political sense even before the first shot sounded; therefore, arguments concerning "missed changes" or "lost victories" are superfluous.²⁰² Thus, the center of gravity of research shifts from the purely military field to the political. Here the blame for defeat is assigned to Hitler and his regime. In the opinion of these historians, Nazi Germany, through its incorrect policy of alliances, did not ensure the balance of power required by the German aggressors. Thus, the new thesis also fails to uncover the objective regularities underlying the defeat of German imperialism in World War II. West German historians essentially palm off on us the old explanation, which is just concealed more carefully. The conclusion that suggests itself from the new thesis is that, given a correct foreign-policy concept, victory can be won in a third world war.

The revanchist essence of reactionary historiography can be seen especially clearly in the reasoning of West German historians concerning the lessons of the war. Most historians reject fascist Germany's guilt for World War II and consider natural the "Third Reich's desire for world rule." Both former generals and civilian historians believe that only the means used to attain this end were wrong.²⁰³ They even reproach the leaders of Western countries for not moving to collude with Germany and for continuing a policy aimed at the conditional capitulation of the Third Reich. They represent Roosevelt as the "gravedigger of a stable new order," since he did not reject the "unnatural alliance" with the Soviet State.²⁰⁴

1826

In summing up the Second World War and West Germany's chances in a new war, West German historians emphasize the increased consolidation of member countries of the North Atlantic bloc. Admiral E. Raeder, former commander of Hitler's naval forces, writes with satisfaction in his memoirs, for example: "We (West Germany--Ed.) are a member of the free world, a world to which we belong by essence. And as a result, we are in a tight community with the great naval powers. In two wars they have been our enemies, and we yielded to their pressure. But now, because we work together with them, new prospects for the future are opening up."²⁰⁵

It is perfectly obvious that in drawing lessons from the experience of World War II, Bonn's historians are guided by the idea of revanchism. J. Barnick, the author of the book Die deutsche Trumpfe, which caused a sensation in West Germany, openly writes that "a third world war, despite the unimaginability of its consequences, is in any case the only possible way of resolving the problem of the reunification of Germany."²⁰⁶ It therefore is not surprising that the works of West German historians "that have the goal of summing up the experience of World War II" also contain a "look ahead." The views of historians of the prevailing orientation regarding the relation of the lessons of the war to the future reduce to the following. The forces that prevail in our age require the creation of a new European order. Thus far it has not proved possible to settle European affairs through peaceful means and to establish such an order. This can only be accomplished through war. Despite the defeat in World War II, not all is lost. New attempts are needed. After Europe "deals with Bolshevism," it will become unified. The attainment of these goals will be "impossible without the ideological and political participation of the German people in European affairs--herein lies the historical experience of not only recent decades, but the entire history of Europe...."²⁰⁷

1827

Just as the ruling cliques of the FRG lay claim to the leading role in NATO, revanchist historiography in this country claims to have the leading role in bourgeois historiography. For example, G. Ritter, accusing bourgeois historiography of "indecision," urgently recommends that bourgeois historians improve their methods of battling Marxist historiography. "It seems to me," writes Ritter, "that for a number of reasons German historical science has an especially important task here."²⁰⁸

The works of West German historians leave no doubt that those who stand behind these historians are interested only in revanche and view the Second World War only as an unsuccessful experiment. At the same time, the experience of the war, especially on the Soviet-German front, should have served as an ominous warning for those who want to plunge the German people into the catastrophe of thermonuclear war.

FRANCE

The study of problems of the Second World War holds one of the leading positions in French historiography. Systematic work in this area, which began immediately after the liberation of France, is largely linked to the activity of the committee on the history of the Second World War,²⁰⁹ in which prominent historians, political figures, and participants in the resistance movement collaborate. The committee publishes Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale,²¹⁰ a journal of military history and the only periodical in the world devoted entirely to problems of World War II. The committee also publishes a series of monographs called L'Esprit de la Résistance.²¹¹

To date about 15 studies, chiefly on the activity of bourgeois organizations of the French resistance, have been published in this series.

1828

The directorate of military history of the army general staff and the war history society also work on the history of the Second World War.

The number of official publications, including documents bearing on the history of World War II, is comparatively small in France.

Foreign policy on the eve of the war is partially reflected in Livre jaune français, published by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of 1939. The book basically contains the correspondence of G. Bonnet, the minister of foreign affairs, with Ribbentrop and the French ambassadors in Berlin. The importance of the book is reduced, however, by the fact that the documents included in it were selected in a biased way in order to justify the policy of collusion with fascist Germany that French ruling cliques implemented.

The most significant documentary publication devoted to the prewar years and to the early period of the war is the materials of the parliamentary commission to investigate the causes of France's defeat in 1940; the commission was created in 1946.²¹³ The commission presented its conclusions in a two-volume report, to which are appended nine volumes of testimony by political and military figures whom it questioned. Some of these materials, such as the testimony of Pierre Kot,* Paul Reynaud, and others are of considerable interest for describing the situation in France on the eve of and in the early period of the war. However, neither the documents nor the conclusions of the commission fully uncover the secret springs behind the political course of prewar France that led the country to war and to the ignominious defeat in 1940.²¹⁴

The period from July 1940 to the invasion of the unoccupied part of France by German troops in November 1942 is represented

by a five-volume collection of documents of the French delegation to the German Armistice Commission.²¹⁵ A large portion of these documents, which were prepared for publication by the committee on the history of World War II, reflect the economic plunder of France by fascist German occupiers and their repression of French patriots. Of considerable interest are the conference reports of the leaders of the delegation to the Vichy government, which portray some aspects of the fascist German government's policy in the period 1940-1942, such as preparations for the aggression against the Soviet Union.²¹⁶ The publications also include documents that show that the defeat of the fascist German armies near Moscow significantly undermined the positions of the Nazis in occupied France.²¹⁷

In the period 1945-1947 the directorate for investigation of enemy war crimes published several collections that included some materials on the crimes of German fascists in France. One of the collections contains documents on the brutal extermination of the residents of the Normandy village of Oradour by the SS on June 10, 1944.²¹⁸ Another collection brings together data on the forced germanization of the populace of the northeastern departments of France by the occupying forces.²¹⁹

In the period 1947-1951 the so-called consultative commission on damage and reparations published nine volumes of collections of documents on the damage incurred by France during the war and the occupation.²²⁰ In addition to data on the undermining of the French economy by rapacious exploitation by the fascist German authorities, the collections included materials that characterized the policy of the occupying forces on ideological matters: the destruction of French culture, attempts to shape public opinion through the collaborationist press and radio, etc.²²¹

It is demonstrative that all official publications of documents that show the true face of the occupation regime and the

1830

treacherous role of the puppet Vichy government were made in the first years after the war. In recent years not a single such collection has been published, and the publication of a number of publications started previously has been halted.²²²

Apart from the official publications listed, some documents from the war years have been published by certain publishing houses and by the authors of monographs in the form of appendices to these monographs. For example, in 1948 the Parisian publishing house Gauchet published as Pétain et les Allemands the reports of O. Abetz, Hitler's "ambassador" to occupied Paris, regarding the situation in France and Franco-German relations.²²³ The progressive journal La France intérieure has published the so-called Paris protocols, the agreement to bolster "collaboration" between the fascist regime and Nazi Germany²²⁴ that was signed in May 1941, and documents concerning the plundering of France by the Nazis under the guise of "economic cooperation."²²⁵

Documents of the national liberation movement, which have been collected by the historians H. Michel and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch in the book Les Idées politiques et sociales de la Résistance,²²⁶ have been published only to a very small extent. The book includes valuable, previously unpublished documents such as the draft program of the resistance movement, which was drawn up in late 1943 by the underground socialist party, and the comments of the French Communist Party on this draft. However, the documents that reflect the goals of the French Communist Party in the national liberation struggle are few in number and do not give the correct idea of the true state of affairs. For example, the program documents of the French Communist Party that attest to the fact that the party hoisted the banner of the struggle against Hitler's invaders from the first days of the occupation of France, particularly the call of July 10, 1940 and the call to create the National Front (May 15, 1941), are missing. The fact that such gaps reflected the position of the compilers

of the collection is indicated by a statement made by one of them --A. Michel, who believes that the Communist Party commenced the struggle against the occupiers only after the Soviet Union entered the war.²²⁷

Some social organizations also work on the publication of documents and studies of problems of the Second World War. We should mention the works of the "Center for Modern European Documentation," which are devoted mainly to the fascist terror in the territories occupied by Nazi Germany.²²⁸ The inventory of documents collected by this center, which was published in Paris in 1963, is of considerable interest. The first volume gives a detailed description of the archive of A. Rosenberg, one of Hitler's ministers.²²⁹ The fourth part of the volume--"Occupation Policy in the USSR," which contains abstracts of some 200 documents, draws attention to itself.

Lists of literature published in France and other countries that are compiled by the Paris Library of Modern International Documentation and which are regularly published in the journal Obozrenie istorii vtoroy mirovoy voyny (Review of the History of the Second World War), are the main bibliographic aid on the history of the war. A small number of bibliographic guides that cover the literature on individual problems also have been published. Among them are the Bibliographie critique de la Resistance,²³⁰ which was put together by A. Michel but which is, however, incomplete and especially deficient in its coverage of Marxist literature on the history of the French resistance.

The extensive memoir literature is of some interest to the study of the history of France during the war. After the war the memoirs of many French figures who played more or less noticeable roles in the country's political affairs were published. Most of the memoirs are characterized by subjectivism and bias; some were written solely to achieve political rehabilitation.

1832

Characteristic in this regard are the books by former commanders in chief of the French army (1939-1940), generals Gamelin²³¹ and Weygand,²³² who try to prove that the French high command and they personally bear no responsibility for France's defeat.

At the same time, some memoirs contains important information, disclosing material, and confessions that shed light on certain aspects of French foreign and domestic policy. Of the greatest value are those which contain documents in the text or appendices.

The memoirs of former political figures of prewar France--ministers, members of parliament, and leaders of political parties²³³--comprise the largest group of reminiscences. Of particular interest are the memoirs of Paul Reynaud, who recognizes the responsibility of English and French ruling cliques for the breakdown of negotiations with the Soviet Union in August 1939 and who confirms the unflagging desire of the USSR for peace and collective security.²³⁴

The Military Memoirs²³⁵ of General De Gaulle in three volumes stand out among the memoirs of figures of "France at War." They include a large number of documents on the activity of the French national liberation committee, the relations between the "free French" and England and the United States, etc. Attention is drawn to the materials in these memoirs that attest to the negative, often hostile attitude of the ruling cliques in England and especially the United States toward the resistance movement in France and their desire to restrict its scope in every way possible. At the same time, these memoirs contain practically no documents from which one could evaluate the consistent support of the Soviet government for the French people's struggle against Hitler's oppressor's.²³⁶

French bourgeois historiography of the war is not united in assessing the main questions of World War II. In it there are various orientations.

Historians of a moderate republican bent hold the leading position in French bourgeois historiography. J. Chastenet, P. Renuven,* M. Baumont, and A. Michel are prominent representatives of this branch. This group of historians often acts under the banner of "objectivity," construed as indifference to politics. Prof. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, the author of several works on modern history, asserts, for example, that a historian is wrong in taking a specific political position, but "can only observe and explain facts."²³⁷ In the preface to his work Histoire du mouvement ouvrier de 1921 à nos jours, E. Dolléans also voices the opinion that a historian must speak out "against any claims to exclusivity on the part of any single school, party, or form of rule."²³⁸ But in fact, while proclaiming "party nonaffiliation," these historians examine the historical process from the standpoint of the liberal bourgeoisie. While condemning fascism, at the same time they agree in some evaluations with reactionary historians, distort the position and role of the French Communist Party, belittle the contribution of the working masses to the struggle against fascist Germany, and unobjectively examine the policy of the Soviet Union in a number of cases.

French reactionary historians, among whom J. Benoit-Meshen* and G. Bonnet stand out, set the goal of "rewriting" the history of the war to meet the political needs of French ruling cliques. Here they try to belittle the Soviet Union's role in every way possible, to prove that Germany supposedly lost the war "by chance" because of Hitler's mistakes and that the USSR was "saved" by deliveries of American weapons, and so forth. Underlying this crude falsification is the desire to justify the current alliance of de Gaulle's France with German militarism. On the whole,

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reactionary historiography is characterized by militant anticommunism and hatred for countries of the socialist camp and for the masses in their own country.

Despite its small number of representatives, the Marxist orientation in French historiography of the Second World War has strong positions. French Marxist historians are waging an active struggle for objective study of World War II.

The problem of the origin of the war has not been given extensive coverage in French bourgeois historiography. In the early postwar period some of its representatives try to attribute the occurrence of the war to "mistakes" of the great powers. Characteristic in this regard is a book published in 1946.²³⁹ Its author, J. Bourdon, asserts that the Second World War could have been avoided if Western democratic states had pursued a more energetic policy after 1918. By this he means strengthening the military and economic might of France, chiefly by bolstering its colonial empire.²⁴⁰ In Bourdon's mind, after World War I France should have retained its position as the "first power on the European continent," which would have allowed it to dictate its will to defeated Germany.²⁴¹

But as the ruling cliques of postwar France became increasingly oriented toward an alliance with West German revanchism, a tendency to find justification for fascist Germany's aggressive policy could be seen in reactionary pro-Vichy French historiography. At length, the historians of this orientation seized upon the notorious contention of Hitler's propaganda that there was a shortage of "living space."²⁴² The viewpoint is reflected most completely in the work Le phénomène guerre by the sociologist G. Bouthoul, who actually gives justification for aggressive wars (including the world conflict unleashed by Hitler's Germany) as a method of solving the "problem of overpopulation."²⁴³

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Most researchers of the moderate republican orientation look for the causes of the war in the foreign policy of the great powers; some of them recognize that the war was brought about by the contradictions among the imperialist powers.²⁴⁴ At the same time, the importance of the subjective factor is exaggerated, especially the role of Hitler, who is depicted as the sole political figure in the prewar period who was responsible for unleashing the war.²⁴⁵

The liberal historian M. Crouzet has attempted to uncover the economic and political preconditions for war. In the seventh volume of Histoire générale des civilisations, he analyzes the impact of the world crisis of 1929-1932 on the development of the events that ultimately led to the war. Crouzet sees the fundamental evil in the fact that "in democratic countries the struggle against the aftermath of the crisis absorbed the strength and energy that should have been used to resist the aggressor."²⁴⁶

French bourgeois historiography actually lacks the concept of the political nature of the war. Most authors confine themselves to rather nebulous references to the "struggle of democracy versus totalitarianism," without analyzing the factors that caused the war against fascist states to grow into a war of liberation.²⁴⁷ Herein we can see first the attempt to disparage the decisive importance of the involvement of the masses in the war, and second to gloss over the fact that in declaring war on Germany, England and France were concerned with protecting their imperialist interests. It is instructive that the Catholic historian A. Latreille sharply criticizes Soviet investigators for even raising the question of the political nature of the war.²⁴⁸

Among the problems of the prehistory of the war, Munich and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet-German pact of 1939 have been covered most extensively in French historiography. Several contradictory trends can be seen in the evaluation of the policy of

the great powers during the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938. Some historians of the moderate republican school resolutely condemn the Munich policy as profoundly flawed and as speeding up the start of the war.²⁴⁹ A. Scherer severely criticizes the position of the Western powers. Analyzing Franco-German relations in the period 1938-1939 in his study "Le problème des 'Mains libres' à l'Est," he arrives at the conclusion that the ruling cliques of England and France tried to resolve their contradictions with Hitler's Germany at the expense of the Soviet Union.²⁵⁰ Scherer emphasizes that the Munich policy of appeasing fascism led directly to the war.

A considerable number of French historians emphasize the fact that the Soviet Union was the only great power that held a consistent antifascist policy and that was prepared to repulse the aggressor. For example, Academician M. Baumont remarks that "in 1938 the official position of the USSR was beyond reproach."²⁵¹ Of interest in this regard is a work by the well-known publicist H. Noguères, Munich ou la drôle de paix, in which, relying on official documents, he convincingly proves that in 1938 the balance of power was not taking shape in favor of fascist Germany, and that the main factor that induced England and France to "make an agreement" with Hitler was their hatred of the Soviet Union. "In fact," writes Noguères, "the Western powers... feared just one thing: finding themselves embroiled in a European war against Nazi Germany and fascist Italy... on the side of bolshevist Russia."²⁵²

Not bothering with proof, another group of historians claims that the USSR supposedly did not intend to fulfill the obligations stipulated by the Soviet-Czech pact of 1935. For example, Mourin writes: "At the time when a strained situation had been created in Europe because of the Sudetan question, the USSR did not intend, and was not prepared, to participate in a European conflict."²⁵³

Because of the general course of official French policy toward an alliance with German militarism, in recent years there has been an intensification of attempts to revise the notion, now established in bourgeois historiography, of the Munich agreement of 1938 as a capitulation by England and France to Hitler's Germany. Extremely typical in this regard is the reasoning of G. Bonnet, former French minister of foreign affairs and a participant at Munich, who declares that "without the compromise reached in Munich, war would have erupted in 1938."²⁵⁴ Chastenet, the author of the seven-volume Histoire de la troisième république, actually takes the same position. He calls the Munich agreement an "ignominious but probably wise step in view of the balance of power that existed...."²⁵⁵

The history of the conclusion of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact is covered in an even more biased fashion. Attempts are made to shift to the Soviet Union the responsibility for the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in August 1939. Some bourgeois historians try to make out the Soviet-German pact to be the cause of World War II.²⁵⁶

The preconceived anti-Soviet position of reactionary historians who substitute unsubstantiated claims for analysis of specific facts and documents can be seen clearly in the treatment of this subject. "This pact," declares Chastenet, "made an armed conflict inevitable."²⁵⁷ A participant at Munich, A. Daladier, former prime minister of France, is especially active in spreading this version to whitewash himself. As early as 1946 he stated: "From May (1939--Ed.) the USSR simultaneously conducted negotiations with France and Germany. It preferred to divide Poland rather than defend it. This was the direct cause of World War II."²⁵⁸

The groundlessness of such assertions is recognized by historians of the moderate republican orientation, who believe that

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in the situation that had taken shape in the summer of 1939, signing the pact was a reasonable step on the part of the USSR, since it enabled it to "avoid war at that time not only with Germany, but also with Japan."²⁵⁹ The Soviet-German pact could not have influenced fascist Germany's decision to attack Poland simply because this decision had been made much earlier.²⁶⁰ However, historians of this moderate group refuse to recognize the obvious fact that the ruling cliques of England and France were not interested in creating a collective security system and hoped to the very last that fascist Germany would attack the Soviet Union.

The efforts of reactionary historians are aimed at depicting France's defeat in 1940 as unavoidable and at extolling the traitor Pétain and his clique, who supposedly saved France from the "communist threat."²⁶¹ The notion of the "hopelessness" of French resistance also is confirmed by some investigators of the moderate republican orientation.²⁶² The political significance of this assertion lies in the attempt to prove that today, as in 1940, France has no choice but to cooperate closely with German militarism. It should be noted that some historians, especially military historians, prove that France's position was not hopeless.²⁶³

For all this, bourgeois historiography does not uncover the true causes of the disaster that befell France, and does not show that it was a consequence of the flawed course of French ruling cliques, which was expressed above all in their refusal to form an alliance with the USSR and in their implementation of the policy of appeasing the fascist aggressors even after the war had started.

In the spirit of justifying the treachery of the French ruling clique, reactionary historians cite the activity of the Vichy government. Through the efforts of Pétain's supporters, the

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stenographic records of the trials of former Vichy officials were supplied with biased commentary whose purpose was to depict the Vichy policy as one that met French interests.²⁶⁴ The innumerable memoirs of Vichy political figures pursue the same goal.²⁶⁵ In the three-volume collection La Vie de la France sous l'occupation 1940-1944,²⁶⁶ the treachery of the Vichy officials is cynically equated with the resistance movement against Hitler's invaders. "The real resistance," it is claimed in the collection, "was that which took place in the interior of the Vichy government and its administration."²⁶⁷

Historians of the Gaullist orientation also have joined the campaign to rehabilitate Vichyism. R. Aron's monograph Histoire de Vichy, 1940-1944 is especially typical in this regard. Aron actually tries to justify the Vichyists, depicting the situation as if the Vichy regime's cooperation with German fascism was only outward, while in secret Vichy offered major resistance to the occupiers.²⁶⁸ Reactionary historians portray the anticommunist and anti-Soviet orientation of the activity of the Petain-Laval clique as a merit. J. Mordal, for example, praises the "valor" of the soldiers of the so-called antibolshevist legion²⁶⁹ which the Vichy government sent to the Soviet-German front. Even some historians of the moderate republican school, such as P. Renuven,* interpret the Vichy regime's policy not as pro-German, but as "neutralist."²⁷⁰ Clarifying the position of these authors, the Marxist historian Germain Villar* writes: "In essence, we are speaking of a political operation. The need arose to resurrect the alliance of ruling cliques directed against the national democratic movement, in order to implement antinational and antidemocratic policy. To do this, it also was necessary to whitewash this portion of these classes which had 'backed the wrong horse' all the way."²⁷¹

The resistance movement is one of the most pressing and acute problems of French historiography. Bourgeois historians grossly

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exaggerate the role of individuals, especially De Gaulle, in the national liberation struggle, and denigrate or gloss over the role of the masses, particularly the workers and their avantgarde --the French Communist Party. "The entire history of the underground struggle in France," asserts A. Michel, for example, "is the history of the gradual rallying of various forces of the foreign and domestic resistance around and under the authority of General De Gaulle."²⁷²

Bourgeois historians do not confine themselves to ascribing to De Gaulle the entire organization of the resistance. They transform the Gaullist movement into the only force of the national liberation struggle. The monograph Histoire de la Liberation de la France,²⁷³ written by the same Aron, can serve as an example of such a distortion of actual events. In this thoroughly falsified booklet, which abounds in clumsy fabrications and slander addressed at the French Communist Party, the assertion is made, for example, that the popular uprising in Paris in August 1944 was prepared by the directors of De Gaulle's intelligence service, Passi* and Sustel',* to whom all resistance organizations supposedly were subordinate.

Another version that is zealously propounded by pro-De Gaulle historians is the assertion that De Gaulle "saved" France from a civil war that the communists purportedly intended to unleash.²⁷⁴

Reactionary historiography slanders the French Communist Party, claiming that it allegedly entered the struggle against the occupying forces only after Hitler's Germany attacked the Soviet Union and acted wholly "at Moscow's direction." This long-since bankrupt version also is supported zealously by some historians of the liberal wing who claim to be objective but who change it every time communists come under discussion. Germain Tillon, the author of an article on the sources of the resistance in Northern France, claims, for example, that in the first

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underground groups "all parties were represented--from extreme leftwing socialists to monarchists, except the communist party."²⁷⁵ M. Baudot, R. Hostache, and R. Fawtier make similar claims.²⁷⁶

Representatives of the moderate republican group usually reduce the resistance movement to the activity of bourgeois organizations and groups,²⁷⁷ glossing over the decisive role of the masses, especially the workers, in the national liberation movement. The works of these historians do not reflect the activity of such mass organizations as the National Front, which encompassed broad layers of the French people and participated actively in the armed struggle,²⁷⁸ and deny the decisive contribution made by the French proletariat to the antifascist liberation movement. On the whole, the resistance is depicted as an apolitical movement.²⁷⁹

Denying the decisive role of the masses, bourgeois historiography tries to justify after the fact the fallacious policy of "attentism," i.e., the refusal to take up the armed struggle against the fascist occupiers, and to represent those who waged this struggle as "subversive elements" who resisted the "forces of order." The progressive journal France d'abord has written in this regard: "We can only pity those 'historians' who try to force the facts to fit their notions and as a result move further and further from the historical truth."²⁸⁰

In recent years the number of works devoted to the events that occurred on the Soviet-German front has decreased appreciably in France. This is due to the desire of bourgeois historians not to speak of the Soviet Union's role in the defeat of German fascism.

However, a high assessment of the Soviet Union's contribution to the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition is characteristic

of some military history works published in the first years after the war. For example, in his book La guerre germano-soviétique (1941-1945), General A. Guillaume, a prominent military figure and historian,²⁸¹ emphasizes the international significance of the Red Army's victories. "The victory at Moscow," he writes, "was not simply a Soviet victory. Won by the Red Army using Soviet weapons, it was the first revenge for all of us."²⁸² The author evaluates the importance of the defeat of the fascist German troops on the Volga just as highly. "In Europe and throughout the entire world," he writes in the book, "Stalingrad just after Moscow conclusively shattered the myth of the invincibility of the German armies."²⁸³

Guillaume's second book, Pourquoi l'Armée rouge a vaincu?,²⁸⁴ is devoted to the factors that brought about the victory of the Soviet armed forces over the armies of fascist Germany and its satellites. In particular, much space in the book is devoted to the moral factor--the patriotism and selflessness of the Red Army. Typically, other authors such as L. Chassin and M. Mourin²⁸⁵ also underscore the importance of the moral factor in the victories won by Soviet troops.

At present the effort to falsify the events of the war for political purposes is growing in French bourgeois historiography. The economist L. Laurat writes: "Since Soviet propaganda does not cease to assert that it was the USSR which won the war and liberated Europe from Hitler's nightmare, this legend must be shattered."²⁸⁶ Such authors borrow the methods of falsification from West German historiography. For example, the journalists Pierre and Rene Gosset insistently claim that fascist Germany lost the war exclusively because of mistakes made by Hitler, who did not heed the sober advice of his generals.²⁸⁷ The most absurd claims, which can be explained only in terms of blatant anticommunism, are made. "The Red Army," declares the military

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publicist M. Garder, "was... a bluff which, through psychological errors, the Germans transformed into a terrible reality."²⁸⁸

The most stunning example of how some French authors sing in harmony with the West German revanchists is the openly pro-fascist book by G. Aubrée on Hitler's army, which extols the "patriotism" of Hitler's troops and lauds Hitler himself as a "superman."²⁸⁹

The false assertion that American weapons won victory for the Soviet Union is widely encountered in literature of this kind. For example, J. Darcy writes: "At the end of 1941 the USSR was close to military defeat and probably avoided it only because of deliveries of American military equipment that arrived at the decisive moment."²⁹⁰ L. Laurat goes even further: "The Soviet Union," he declares, "was wholly unable to win the war and could clamp down the fatal vise only because of American aid and the allied offensive in the West."²⁹¹

In more solid historical works the tendency to belittle the importance of the Soviet-German front is veiled. The two-volume Le deuxième conflit mondial can serve as a typical example. Its authors assign a very modest place to the actions of the Red Army, whereas operations of secondary importance in the West and Far East are described in every detail.²⁹²

French bourgeois historiography is looking for a way to treat the Second World War so that France's participation in contemporary aggressive alliances and blocs would be justified. The basic contention is that France was unable to defend itself with its own forces.²⁹³ This argument is aimed pointedly at countries of the socialist camp, above all the USSR, and not at the revival of German imperialism--the only force that actually could threaten France's independence.²⁹⁴

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The number of Marxist works on the history of the Second World War has increased significantly in recent years. A Marxist analysis of the basic problems of the war can be found in a number of documents of the French Communist Party and in the reports and other works of its leaders. Special note should be made of Histoire du Parti Communiste française (manuel), which was prepared by a team of authors led by Jacque Duclos and Francois Biyu,*²⁹⁵ the Thèses pour le 40-me anniversaire du Parti Communiste Française,²⁹⁶ the speeches and articles of Moris Thorez, published in volumes 19 and 20 of his works,²⁹⁷ and the works of Jacque Duclos, secretary of the Central Committee.²⁹⁸ These works are the most important sources for studying not only the history of the party, but also the events of the war period. For example, in his report at the 10th Congress of the French Communist Party in June 1945, Moris Thorez analyzes such topics as the Soviet-German Pact of 1939, the "strange war," the treacherous policy of the Vichy regime, fascist Germany's aggression against the USSR, and the preparations for the armed uprising in France.

An important role in the spread of Marxist views of history belongs to the journal Recherches internationales a la lumiere du marxisme. In recent years the journal has addressed the problems of the Second World War on several occasions. Papers by French, Soviet, German, and Polish historians on such pressing subjects as the nature of the war, its periods, the battle for Moscow, the Warsaw uprising of 1944, France during the war years, and others were published in one issue specially devoted to this subject. The Gestapo documents on the underground activity of the French Communist Party at the start of 1941²⁹⁹ printed in the same issue are of considerable interest. A separate issue of the journal was devoted to the publication of documents that describe Soviet-French relations during the war, and of protocols of negotiations of the military missions of the Soviet Union, England, and the United States in the summer of 1939.³⁰⁰

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A scientific coverage of the history of the war is given in the series of monographs K istorii Frantsuzskoy kommunisticheskoy partii (Toward a History of the French Communist Party).³⁰¹ To date three monographs have come out: 'Strannaya voyna' i predatel'stvo Vishi (The 'Strange War' and the Vichy Betrayal) by Germain Willard³⁰² and monographs by Jacque Chambaz and Claude Willar on the Popular Front and on the struggle against the fascist threat in France in the early 1930s, which were published in one volume with a foreword by Jacque Duclos.³⁰³ These works summarize extensive factual material and give an analysis of the internal situation in France on the even of and during the early period of the war. Exceptionally important is the exposure of the role of big French capital in encouraging the activity of fascist organizations and in the antinational policy of appeasement of Hitler's Germany.

Marxist historiography has paid much attention to the study of the problem of the nature of the war. "Marxist historians," writes G. Badia in Histoire de l'Allemagne contemporaine (1917-1962), "have discussed extensively whether the Second World War was a just war. There is no doubt that when it broke out it was an imperialistic war of the classical type, but with the gradual enslavement of European countries it became a war of liberation, a national war of oppressed peoples against the fascist oppressors."³⁰⁴ G. Willard, using material on French history, specifically reveals this situation in the monograph 'Strannaya voyna' i predatel'stvo Vishi. "The author convincingly uncovers the imperialist nature of the initial period of the Second World War, when the conflict was mainly between Hitler's Germany, on the one hand, and France and England on the other,"³⁰⁵ Francois Biyu,* secretary of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, points out in the foreword to the book. He emphasizes the changes that later occurred in the nature of this war for France from the time when the enemy invasion of the country began.

The works of Marxist historians reveal the reactionary anti-popular essence of the policy of French ruling cliques during the "strange war," which was directed not against Germany, but against their own working class and other democratic forces in the country, and also against the Soviet Union.³⁰⁶ Marxist historians believe that the main reason for France's defeat in the war was the antinational course of its ruling clique, which preferred shameful capitulation to Hitlerism over the collective security system proposed by the Soviet Union.

Questions linked to the French people's resistance movement are at the center of attention of Marxist researchers. The attempts of bourgeois historians to depict the resistance as a movement of an insignificant minority, born through the will of a single person, are countered by a scientific analysis of its motive forces and by examination of the decisive role of the broad working masses in the struggle against Hitler's occupation regime. This is demonstrated quite graphically in two brochures by the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, L'Insurrection parisienne 19 août 1944³⁰⁷ and La Libération, oeuvre d'un peuple et non d'un homme,³⁰⁸ which also disclose the importance of the organizing and directing activity of the French Communist Party. The French Communist Party was the only political party that did not give up the struggle against fascism for even a single day, that rallied the best forces of the French people around itself, and that uplifted them to war against Hitler's invaders.

The interest of Marxist investigators is concentrated on showing the popular masses as the true creators of history whose intervention in the war was one of the decisive factors in the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. Of interest in this regard are the books by G. Tillon on the actions of French partisans³⁰⁹ and by M. Choury on the armed uprising on Corsica in the fall of 1943.³¹⁰ G. Tillon's work also gives a substantive analysis

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of the nature of Gaullism and the goals that were pursued in the resistance by the segments of the bourgeoisie who spoke against the Vichy policy of collaboration with Hitler's Germany and who united under De Gaulle's leadership.

On the basis of documents and incontrovertible facts, Marxist historians expose the fantasies of bourgeois historiography concerning the position and activity of the French Communist Party before the Soviet Union entered the war.³¹¹ The analysis of such fundamental documents as the Manifesto of the French Communist Party, dated July 10, 1940, which was the first specific program for rallying all the people under the banner of the national liberation movement, takes on considerable importance in this regard. The Marxist historian J. Hugonnot emphasizes in his article "Ideas and Programs of the Resistance Movement" that this was "not merely a call to arms, but above all an invitation to unite on the basis of a common program, a program for all the French. The goals of the war are embodied in it in three key words: freedom, independence, the restoration of France."³¹²

Of great importance is the disclosure by Marxist historians of the international character of the liberation struggle, one manifestation of which was the participation of representatives of different nations in the resistance.³¹³ The struggle of Soviet citizens in France is discussed in detail in G. Laroche's paper "The Soviet people in the French Resistance Movement."³¹⁴ The author shows with what heroism and selflessness Soviet patriots fought shoulder to shoulder with French fighters for the freedom of France against the common enemy--Hitlerism.

The memoirs of communists and other progressive figures who were active participants in the antifascist struggle are very important for understanding the sources, character, and motive forces of the resistance and the role that the communist party played in it. Among the most meaningful works we should list

the books Vot kak eto bylo (This Is How It Was)³¹⁵ and Geroi Shatobriana (The Heroes of Chateaubriand)³¹⁶ by F. Gren'ye,* and Sem' raz po sem' dney (Seven Times in Seven Days)³¹⁷ and Bogi i lyudi. 1943-1944 (Gods and Men. 1943-1944) by E. D'Ast'ye.*³¹⁸

The memoirs of Ch. Debarge³¹⁹ and P. Cribellet,³²⁰ communist leaders of partisan detachments, are devoted to the heroic actions of French fighters against fascism. The stories of the operations of these combat subunits, which appeared in the early period of the occupation of France by the German fascists, convincingly confirm that French communists were initiators and organizers of the popular armed resistance to Hitlerism.

Marxist works truthfully shed light on the decisive contribution the Soviet Union made to the victory over fascism, and emphasize the tremendous influence that the actions of Soviet troops and the struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy rear had on the growth and strengthening of the resistance movement in all European countries occupied by Hitler's troops, particularly France.

On the basis of a study of the events of a war, Marxist historians draw the very important conclusion that the war confirmed the strength of the Soviet order and the solidarity of the peoples of the Soviet Union and helped increase further the authority of the CPSU. J. Bruhat notes in a popular history of the USSR: "The Soviet system successfully withstood the test.... The result was further strengthening of the ties among the peoples of the USSR, an increase in the authority of the Soviet government, and enhancement of the prestige of the bolshevist party."³²¹

The book Histoire parallèle. Histoire de l'U.R.S.S. de 1917 à 1960, written by Louis Aragon, is the most significant Marxist work that covers the course of the war on the Soviet-German front and the basic results of the war for the Soviet Union. This

communist writer emphasizes that the war overturned all the contrived notions that were held in the capitalist West regarding the Soviet Union's "internal weakness." "It took the Second World War," writes Aragon, "to measure the gulf that lay between what was said of this creative country and reality."³²²

Thus, Marxist historians are helping to restore an objective picture of the events of the Second World War by actively speaking out against the falsification of the war's history by reactionary bourgeois historiography.

It should be pointed out that on the whole, the number of works by French Marxists on the history of the war is still small and does not correspond to the overall steadily growing influence of Marxism in France, which even its foes have had to recognize. For example, Colonel M. Devaux writes in the journal of the French Ministry of Defense that Marxist-Leninist ideology has "taken root in the French working class and... in some circles among the intelligentsia."³²³ The general strengthening of Marxist positions in France cannot help influencing both certain bourgeois historians and their appraisal of the events of the Second World War. "On a number of questions," acknowledges G. Castellan, "Marxist positions... are closer to those of non-Marxist French historians than what their West German colleagues write."³²⁴

Marxist investigators set themselves the task of creating in the near future a Marxist work on the history of France during the Second World War. "This history," points out Germain Willard, "can be written. Of course, some sources have been destroyed, and others that are stored in the archives are still inaccessible. But we already have at our disposal a multitude of diverse, nearly unused documents and eyewitness testimony. Shedding light on these problems is an urgent task."³²⁵

1850

ITALY

Italian historiography of the Second World War differs appreciably from that of other capitalist countries. Most works by Italian historians were written from antifascist positions. Marxist literature on the war holds a significant place in Italy, especially in comparison with such countries as the FRG, the United States, and England. Furthermore, Italian historians, more so than others, have a characteristic desire to confine themselves to the description and analysis of the events related mainly to the participation of Italy itself in the war.

Three schools can be discerned in Italian historiography of World War II: the bourgeois-democratic, the profascist, and the Marxist.

Most historians belong to the bourgeois-democratic orientation. Among its representatives we may list F. Chabod,³²⁶ L. Salvatorelli and G. Mira,³²⁷ G. Gigli,³²⁸ A. Tosti,³²⁹ and U. Muraldi.³³⁰

The profascist literature includes a number of books by Italian generals and diplomats, as well as the voluminous work of the Italian nationalist historian A. Tamaro, which is devoted mainly to the period 1943-1945.³³¹

The contribution of Italian Marxists to working out the problems of World War II has been significant. A Marxist analysis of a number of problems of the world war can be found in a collection of articles and documents published under the editorship of P. Toliatti on the 30th anniversary of the Italian Communist Party.³³² The well-known historian R. Battaglia has published a book in which he covers the main junctions of the world conflict, from the Munich agreements to Japan's surrender.³³³ Note also should be made of the book by P. Secchia and F. Frascati.³³⁴

The history office of the Italian general staff publishes official collections devoted to the participation of the Italian armed forces in military operations on various fronts. These collections include various documents of the Italian command.³³⁵

Many memoirs of former leaders of the Italian army, diplomats, and political figures are published in Italy. However, this literature cannot serve as reliable material for characterizing Italy during the war years. Although most authors of memoirs claim to paint an "objective picture," in fact they try to justify and laud themselves.

The authors of military memoirs may be conditionally divided into two groups. The first consists of those who, for a number of reasons, usually their own devotion to the monarchy, are inclined to take hostile positions toward fascism and toward Mussolini personally. The second group includes generals who continued to serve or to sympathize with Mussolini even after July 25, 1943 (i.e., after the German occupation of Italy and the creation of the neofascist republic).

The authors of the first group generally adhere to historical concepts that are characteristic of conservative Italian historians. They reduce the reasons for Italy's entry into the war to the personal will of Mussolini, and attribute the defeats of the Italian army to the fact that Mussolini did not trust the military and tried to direct military operations himself. Marshal Badoglio, who was chief of the general staff at the start of the war and who headed the government after the fall of Mussolini's dictatorship, is the most prominent representative of this group. The basic thesis behind Badoglio's book L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale³³⁶ is that Italy was technically poorly prepared for military operations and Mussolini made a gross mistake in not listening to the warnings of the generals in general, and in particular to him, Badoglio. Mussolini knew well that the

Italian armed forces, with the exception of the navy, were totally unprepared for the war and that their preparation could not be completed before 1943. General Armellini,³³⁷ who was in the high command of the Italian army, and General G. Zanussi,³³⁸ a former army chief of staff, paint roughly the same picture in their memoirs.

The second group of authors consists of people who linked their fate to fascism to the very end and who came out as its followers. These authors try to justify Italy's participation in military adventures. They see the principal cause of the Italian army's defeat in the "treachery" of Badoglio and his supporters. The most prominent military representative of fascism is Marshal R. Graziani, who commanded the Italian forces in Africa and who led the army of Mussolini's neofascist "republic" after the revolution and the German occupation of Italy. In his book, which bears the characteristic title Ho difeso la patria (I Defended the Homeland),³³⁹ he fiercely attacks Badoglio, who, according to him, became a defeatist and the main culprit behind the decay of the Italian army. The best form of service to the homeland, writes Graziani, was loyalty to fascism, and "Italy's honor" could have been saved if not for the treachery of a band of conspirators.

General E. Canevari, Graziani's closest colleague, propounds the same views in his two-volume work.³⁴⁰ Another book by this author, which was devoted to the history of the creation of the army of the neofascist republic,³⁴¹ also is full of the clumsiest claims. Canevari asserts that the "Italian nation always supported the undertakings of fascism" and only the treachery of the conspirators led to a situation in which the "mob became the decisive element in national affairs." Canevari endeavors to prove that Mussolini's puppet republic was independent of the Hitlerites and purposed a policy of appeasement, and only the

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"partisan bandits," with their attacks on peaceful citizens, forced the fascists to move in their defense.

The diplomatic side of Italy's participation in the war is reflected most completely in the diaries of G. Ciano, who was minister of foreign affairs until the spring of 1943.³⁴² These diaries are of interest to the study of not only Italy's involvement in the war, but of the entire war as a whole. Ciano examines in detail the inception and implementation of Mussolini's aggressive plans. He shows how the plans to wage a "parallel" and "independent" war failed, since all of Mussolini's attempts to act independently of Hitler fell through. The result was the growth of Italy's comprehensive dependence on Germany and the gradual transformation of Mussolini into an ordinary gauleiter.

The relations between the leaders of Italy and Germany also are covered in books by D. Alfieri, former Italian ambassador to Berlin, and R. Guariglia, who was appointed minister of foreign affairs after the revolution of July 25, 1943.³⁴³ Both these authors develop the idea of the lack of promise for Italy's participation in the war on Germany's side after 1943.

Alfieri shows that the motive force behind Mussolini's actions during the period of German successes was his fear of being late for the division of the loot. Alfieri uses precisely this notion to explain Mussolini's desire to take part in all of his ally's campaigns. Hitler, who held a low regard for the combat traits of the Italian army, initially was opposed to sending Italian divisions to the Soviet-German front. However, Mussolini not only insisted on slow preparation of an expeditionary corps, but later continually tried to increase the number of Italian troops on the Eastern front. Alfieri lays the blame for the failures of the Italian army on Hitler's command. For example, he says that Hitler's men refused to help the Italian Eighth Army in Russia when it began to suffer defeat on the Don, and then

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laid most of the blame for the defeat on the behavior of the Italian divisions. Moreover, Alfieri claims that, under contrived pretexts, the Germans refused to send antiaircraft subunits to Italy, and as a result Italian cities had no air cover.

In terms of the extent of its coverage of events, the most extensive work devoted to the operations of Italian troops on the Soviet-German front is that by Marshal G. Messe, the commander of the Italian expeditionary army in Russia.³⁴⁴ Messe attributes the failures of the Italian divisions to two factors. First, the actions of Mussolini, who sent still untrained contingents to the front, hoping to ensure that Italy would have the largest number of troops against Russia compared with Germany's other allies. Second is the fact that the German command, to which the Italian forces were subordinate in an operational sense, constantly "slighted" the Italians, forcing them to carry out the most thankless tasks.

The memoirs of rank-and-file participants in the military operations on the Soviet-German front make an interesting supplement to the fascist marshal's book. The memoirs are an indictment of not only Mussolini and the Hitlerites, but also of the entire fascist regime.³⁴⁵ The authors of the memoirs demonstrate that the Italian soldiers did not understand why they were supposed to fight the Soviet Union, whose population embraced them sympathetically. Dissatisfaction not only with the German allies, but also with the worthless fascist generals reigned in the ranks of the expeditionary army. The soldiers openly were upset over the army's unpreparedness for winter warfare, with the lack of warm clothing and transport, and with the poor food. All this resulted in low combat morale among the Italian divisions. The authors admit that the Hitlerites and the Italian blackshirts committed all sorts of acts of violence against the population. At the same time they underscore the high patriotism and humane-

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ness of Soviet citizens, admire the combat qualities of Soviet troops, and emphasize the superiority of Soviet military equipment.

In Italy there is no official compilation on the history of the Second World War. There are only descriptions of individual stages of Italy's participation in the world conflict.

The history office of the Italian Ministry of Defense has published a special work devoted to the Italian-French war of 1940.³⁴⁶ The book was based on operations documents of the Italian command and is basically informational in character. At the end of the book, however, the authors draw a number of conclusions regarding the reasons for the military impotence of the Italian alpine army. They see the main factor in that all operational plans drawn up before the start of military operations provided for the conduct of a defensive war against France. The abrupt transition to offensive operations that was carried out in a terrible rush at Mussolini's insistence caused universal confusion. Moreover, the authors complain of adverse weather conditions that prevented the effective use of aviation and artillery, and of the poor equipment and weak psychological preparation of the soldiers.

Two official publications of the history office of the ministry of defense that are based on official documents of the Italian army are devoted to fascist Italy's participation in the aggression against the Soviet Union.³⁴⁷ In both books much space is given to a description of the Italian army's lack of preparedness for operations under the severe climatic conditions of the Russian winter, to which the authors largely attribute the failures of the Italian forces. Furthermore, they believe, the German command extended the Italian divisions over too long a front; hence the Russian troops, who had superior equipment, did not have much trouble breaking through the front on the Don in December 1942. One of these books, which is devoted to the defeat

of the Italian army, contains much critical material on the behavior of Germany's allies. It follows from the cited reports of Italian headquarters that the Germans seized transport facilities and fuel, while trying at the same time to cover themselves with Italian units so as not to become surrounded.

The question of the origin of the war, military operations in Italy, and the resistance movement in the country have been covered most completely in Italian historiography.

Most Italian historians comment on the aggressive initiative of the fascist states, especially Hitler's Germany, in unleashing the world conflict. They generally attribute the start of the war to German fascism's desire to expand, and the main role in setting up the war is allotted to Hitler. Such, for example, is the opinion of Salvatorelli and G. Mira, Chabod, and others. G. Gigli writes that the war occurred because Hitler wanted to attain his goals in Europe by force; he adds that the war was above all ideological in character with respect to the Soviet Union.³⁴⁸ A. Tosti pays more attention to the economic objectives that Hitler pursued, emphasizing that the idea was for not only political expansion, but also to achieve economic gain. Tosti draws a parallel between the First and Second world wars, considering the latter a continuation of the former. Both were born of pan-Germanism, which provoked a response by Russia, England, and France.³⁴⁹

Profascist historians generally avoid analyzing the causes of the Second World War. For example, A. Tamaro, like most historians who try to conceal their reactionary views, writes that he does not want to join some camp in evaluating events. However, by considering war a "natural" means of defending national and state interests,³⁵⁰ he thus joins supporters of the right-wing camp.

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Bourgeois historians have nothing to say about the responsibility of the Western powers for war preparations, and write nothing about how the policy of the United States, England, and France created a favorable situation for the implementation of Germany's aggressive plans. For example, Gigli considers the Munich agreements a run-of-the-mill episode of diplomatic history.³⁵¹ Although A. Tosti does remark that "some call these agreements the West's surrender," he refrains from making his own assessment.³⁵² Gigli inaccurately depicts Soviet foreign policy, stating that the Soviet-German pact of 1939 "decided Poland's fate," and that Soviet deliveries of raw materials helped Hitler prepare for war.³⁵³

In contrast to the bourgeois historians, Italian Marxist historians do not confine themselves to simply pointing out the aggressiveness of the fascist bloc. Analyzing the causes of World War II, R. Battaglia writes that its roots should be sought in the world economic crisis, which intensified the imperialist tendencies of world imperialism. At the same time, Battaglia emphasizes, German imperialism would not have been able to disrupt peace in Europe if the most reactionary circles of the bourgeoisie in the other major capitalist states had not been its allies and coparticipants.³⁵⁴

In explaining the reasons for the initial successes of Hitler's Germany during the war, Italian bourgeois historians assign the leading place to the technical military superiority of the German army. At the same time, Gigli, for example, notes that in the first stage of the war the German general staff also proved far superior to the French and English in the area of strategy. For example, the French army, Gigli writes, had fair military equipment, but the French general staff was prisoner to the concepts of 1914--it built all its plans on the assumption of a protracted war of position. Furthermore, the hopes that the Maginot Line would be impregnable turned out to be

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groundless. History teaches, Gigli remarks, that just as the Pamir and the Hindukush did not protect India from invasions, no defensive lines of the "Maginot" type could save the country from a military invasion.

All more or less objective Italian historians acknowledge the decisive importance of the Soviet-German front to the fortunes of the war, and take note of the Red Army's role in the defeat of Germany. Gigli writes, for example, that the Soviet-German front occupies the "leading place in the history of the war." In attacking Russia, Hitler clearly underestimated not only his enemy's military-economic potential, but also the high military spirit of the people, who came out entirely on the side of the new order.³⁵⁵ The Russian campaign put an end to Hitler's "blitzkrieg" and commenced a war of attrition that Germany inevitably had to lose. The Russian command, notes Gigli, skillfully combined counterattacks that wore down the enemy, with the use of territorial resources. Another Italian historian, A. Tosti, chronologically divides his La seconda guerra mondiale into two parts--the period of German superiority, and the period of the allied counteroffensive; he considers the battle on the Volga to be the start of the latter period and the turning point of the entire war.³⁵⁶

Even some reactionary Italian authors recognize the decisive importance of the Red Army's victories. For example, D. Alfieri, who was Italian ambassador to Berlin until 1943, notes that the end for Germany came at Stalingrad.³⁵⁷

An exaggeration of the US role in the war is characteristic of most Italian bourgeois historians. Gigli writes that the US entry into the war was of decisive importance, for "the economic might of the United States exceeded that of all other countries combined." While taking note of the significance of the battle

on the Volga, at the same time he emphasizes that before then the Americans had already won a number of successes in the Pacific.³⁵⁸

As noted above, Italian historiography treats most completely its own country's participation in the world conflict. Bourgeois antifascist historians condemn Italy's participation in the war of aggression. However, they generally assign the basic guilt, if not exclusive guilt, for this participation to Mussolini. For example, F. Chabod very clearly draws his main idea, namely that the gap between fascism and the country, which had gathered momentum long before the war, took final shape in 1939, when the entire population of Italy was attuned against the fascist war. Totally ignoring the difference in the attitude of various classes toward the war and fascism, Chabod places special emphasis on the fact that the entire Italian bourgeoisie was against the war. He points out the complete lack of volunteers in the army, though this phenomenon has been characteristic of Italian history.³⁵⁹

Analyzing the Second World War more comprehensively and thoroughly, L. Salvatorelli and G. Mira emphasize that Mussolini drew the country into a criminal adventure by linking Italy's fate to Hitler's Germany, which was attaining absolute hegemony in Europe.³⁶⁰

Italian Marxists do not confine themselves to condemning Italian fascism. They demonstrate the responsibility that the Italian ruling groups bore to the nation. R. Battaglia writes that Italy's aggressive policy was not an expression of Mussolini's "free will," but reflected the class interests of the big Italian monopolies which had placed fascism in charge and which inspired its entire policy. Analyzing the reasons for Italy's defeat, the author emphasizes that they cannot be reduced to insufficient military and technical preparation of the Italian army, since

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the hostile attitude of the Italian people toward the fascist war was of the greatest importance.³⁶¹ The technical backwardness of the Italian army itself was a consequence of both the autarkic policy foisted on the Italian economy by fascism, and the insatiable desire of the monopolies to make a fortune on military orders.

The authors of the collection Tridtsat' let zhizni i bor'by Ital'yanskoy kommunisticheskoy partii (Thirty Years of the Life and Struggle of the Italian Communist Party)³⁶² show that the military collapse of Italian fascism was a bankruptcy for the entire ruling-class, which nourished and supported fascism to its last breath. In an article titled "Fascism and the Army in the War Years," A. Trombadori writes that the military unpreparedness of the fascist army was a consequence of the crisis of Italian imperialism which inevitably had to be paid off with national independence for participation in the struggle to redivide the world. The adventuristic views on the conduct of the war, which Mussolini planned as a "blitzkrieg" campaign, writes Trombadori, were shared by the royal court, the general staff, and all industrial and financial cliques. No Italian political figure has showed that he recognizes the danger threatening the country, and only the complete support of the ruling cliques can explain the fact that, despite the unpreparedness of the armed forces, fascist Italy entered the war so brazenly and rashly.³⁶³

Italian historians elaborate very consistently and completely the problems of the resistance movement that unfolded in the period 1943-1945. Marxist historians are making an important contribution to the examination of the resistance movement in Italy. The first work of a generalizing type was a book by L. Longo,³⁶⁴ one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Northern Italy, and Storia della Resistenza italiana, written by R. Battaglia and published in 1953, remains by universal acclaim the basic study on this subject.³⁶⁵ Marxist historians have given a clear

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idea of the scope of the popular struggle and the social roots of the national liberation movement, and have demonstrated that the main force of the resistance movement was the Italian working class, led by its avantgarde--the Italian Communist Party, which rallied around itself broad segments of the public. The Marxist approach to problems of the resistance enable L. Longo and R. Battaglia to show the popular character, validity, and legitimacy of this movement.

Relying on a large number of sources, R. Battaglia emphasizes the military importance of the activity of Italian partisans, who diverted to themselves up to one-third of the German divisions in Italy. His book contains an analysis of the strategy and tactics of the partisan war in Italy, and graphically demonstrates that the partisan detachments led by the Italian Communist Party made the main contribution to the development of strategy and tactics. The tactic of delivering swift strikes, combined with skilfull maneuvering when superior enemy forces are encountered, proved in deed its superiority over the battle system characteristic of a regular army. Former officers of the Italian army tried to instill this system mechanically in some partisan detachments. Battaglia pays much attention to the international character of the movement and to demonstrating the relations between Italian partisans and French and Yugoslavian partisans. He notes that among the foreigners who fought in the ranks of the Italian resistance, most were Soviet citizens. Battaglia was the first to describe the feat of Soviet citizen F. Poletayev (F. Poetan), who became an Italian national hero. He was the only foreigner awarded the highest Italian military order--the "Gold Medal."

Battaglia's book, like Longo's, demonstrates the hostile attitude of Anglo-American ruling cliques to the national liberation movement in Italy. The Anglo-American command endeavored to limit the scope of the partisan struggle and to reduce it to

the actions of small diversionary and scouting groups under the direct control of English and American officers. Marxist historians expose the myth of the decisive role that aid provided by air to Italian partisans by the Anglo-American command supposedly played. They show that this aid came in insufficient quantities and that, what is the main thing, the distribution of weapons and ammunition was governed by purely political designs--the Western allies tried to equip first those detachments which were hostile toward leftist political parties. Battaglia pays much attention to analyzing the strategy of the Anglo-American command, emphasizing that the Western allies did not at all make full use of the opportunities for offensive operations in Italy that were created in particular by the partisan movement.

Among the books by communist authors devoted to certain problems of the resistance movement, we should take note of the work by P. Secchia and C. Moscatelli.³⁶⁶ The authors convincingly demonstrate the history of the rise of the partisan movement and provide good coverage of the leading role of the communists in the formation of the partisan army and the strengthening of the united front of antifascist forces. The originality of the book lies in its innovative approach to the creation of a historical study: not confining themselves to an analysis of the documents of partisan headquarters and staffs, the authors conducted extensive interviews with direct participants in the events. This enabled them to sketch a more complete picture of the partisan battles and to check the accuracy of the facts described. Another valuable source on the resistance movement is the works of L. Longo and P. Secchia, in which, using their own articles printed in the underground, they recreate the history of the armed resistance in the mountains and the struggle of the working class at enterprises.³⁶⁷ Italian socialist historians are actively involved in work on problems of the resistance movement. The socialists M. Giovana and F. Catalano have written two works that analyze the activity of the major centers of the movement's

leadership in Northern Italy--the national liberation committees of Milan and Turin.³⁶⁸ The socialist R. Carli-Ballola has written Storia della Resistenza,³⁶⁹ which chronologically spans the entire period of the partisan movement but which is mainly devoted in content to the contribution made to the movement by the socialist party.

The largest number of works by bourgeois authors devoted to the resistance has been contributed by antifascist democrats who participated actively in or sympathized with the resistance. Most historians of this group consider the resistance not only as a partisan war, but also as a social and political movement whose basic content was the demand for a democratic revolution. True, among them the very concept of democratic revolution has an extremely vague meaning. Although the bourgeois democrats do pay much attention to the role of the popular masses, they emphasize in every way possible the services rendered by bourgeois groups and belittle the ability of the masses to act independently. For example, F. Chabod writes in his L'Italia contemporanea³⁷⁰ that all classes and all parties rendered the same services in the resistance movement, but the bourgeoisie was the historical bearer of the traditions of the struggle for freedom. P. Piere, a professor at the University of Turin, says even more definitely that the "morally renewed bourgeoisie" took the lead in the resistance movement.³⁷¹ F. Parri, the president of the Milan Institute on the History of the Resistance Movement, emphasizes that his evaluation of the motive forces of the resistance differs from the Marxist in that he considers the contribution of intellectual forces decisive compared with the contribution of the working masses.³⁷²

Historians of the bourgeois democratic orientation highly rate the historical significance of the resistance movement. For example, G. Salvemini writes that it is the most outstanding event in the history of modern Italy.³⁷³ At the same time, some of

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these historians overemphasize the social aspect of the movement and ignore the national liberation factors behind the struggle. This causes them to interpret the resistance movement as "unsuccessful" or as "a failed revolution"; the reasons for the failure sometimes are seen not in the objective conditions of that period, but in the "lack of sufficient revolutionary spirit" in the parties of the working class. The notion of the resistance as a "failed revolution" is reflected most completely in the voluminous collection 10 anni dopo, which was published in connection with the 10th anniversary of the end of the resistance movement.³⁷⁴

The hostile attitude of the Anglo-American command toward the mass partisan movement in Italy is recognized in the works of many bourgeois democrats and radicals. For example, F. Parri writes that from the very start the Italian resistance movement did not follow the path that the English and Americans would have liked to pick for it. Here Parri has in mind their desire to confine the partisan movement to the framework of operations by uncoordinated reconnaissance groups operating on the orders of the Anglo-American command.³⁷⁵ Most historians of this group point out that the English and Americans not only gave insufficient support to the Italian partisans, but actively opposed the deployment of partisan units as a powerful army.

The government's interpretation of the resistance movement is reflected in the works of General R. Cadorna, whom the Anglo-American command sent to the German rear in 1944 with the mission of leading the partisan movement. Cadorna tries to prove in every way possible that, despite the attempts of leftist political parties to "divert" the resistance movement from its "true path" and to make it a civil war, most partisans were far removed from politics and fought for the traditional ideals of "God, homeland, and family." Cadorna places primary emphasis on the participation in the movement of former Italian army officers and detachments which declared themselves autonomous and which were not

subordinate to the national liberation committees. At the same time, he is forced to acknowledge that the Italian Communist Party made a decisive contribution to the movement in terms of both the number of fighters and the correct tactics for the partisan war.

Catholic authors who have devoted their works to the resistance movement try to prove the priority of the spiritual aspect of the movement. They want to represent the war of national liberation as a spontaneous outburst that was not prepared for or organized by the political parties, and as a special state of spirit of individuals who acted independently of each other. Books of this type extol the importance of a "bloodless" resistance, and the decisive role in the leadership of the movement is ascribed to the clergy. This notion is reflected, for example, in the work Il fascismo e la Resistenza³⁷⁷ by the Catholic author G. Rossini. The Catholics P. Malvestiti and A. Marazza write in the same spirit.³⁷⁸

The most complete Italian bibliography of the Second World War is Saggio bibliografico sulla seconda guerra mondiale,³⁷⁹ published by the history office of the Italian army staff. The book contains about 2,500 titles of works, for each of which a brief summary is given. However, the survey has some serious omissions, and in many cases it is clearly biased. For example, it contains no references to the works of Soviet authors, and materials from war crimes trials are not indicated among the sources. Therefore, the extensive, systematic bibliography in R. Battaglia's book on the Second World War, mentioned above,³⁸⁰ should serve as a necessary supplement to the survey.

JAPAN

The postwar occupation of Japan by American forces and the "security treaty," which essentially converted Japan into an

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American military base, has left a deep imprint on all areas of the country's social, political, and scientific life. This also has affected the development of the historiography of the Second World War. In the early years after the war (up until the San Francisco treaty of 1952), very few works on the war were published in Japan. The dependence of Japanese historiography on the United States also was manifested in the fact that absolutely no works were published that contained critical remarks aimed at the United States.

In the last days of World War II, on the eve of the landing of allied forces, Japanese authorities were able to destroy some secret documents and to burn documents that exposed the role of Japanese ruling cliques in the preparation, unleashing, and conduct of the war of aggression and in organizing the seizure of foreign territories. In particular, the operational plans of the Japanese army's general staff were burned, as were a number of records of meetings of the secret council at which questions of military strategy were discussed; some records and decisions of the Japanese government; a large fraction of the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and others. Many documents were confiscated by the American occupation authorities.

Of interest in this regard is the opinion of S. Nishiura, director of the military history research section, regarding the status of Japanese historiography of the Second World War: "The destruction of documents, the confiscation of materials by the occupation authorities, and the suppression of any independent study and investigation of military history by the Japanese side ... have created a tremendous vacuum in Japan in the study and investigation of the history of the Second World War."³⁸¹

To eliminate this gap, the section, which Nishiura has directed since its inception, was created in 1955 under the national defense directorate. The section does much work to collect and

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study historical materials bearing on the Second World War. At present it has at its disposal about 100,000 documents. The section's main task is to study the history of the Japanese army during the war. Its personnel also keep track of the achievements of the historiography of the Second World War in other countries. The directors of the section believe that this study is of "especially great value for understanding the essence of the war and for instilling soldierly qualities."³⁸²

Despite the lack of many documents, the historical resources bases of Japanese historiography cannot be called scanty.

The documents and materials of the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, held in the period 1946-1948, are the most important sources for the study of Japan's foreign and domestic policy during World War II and problems of military strategy and the conduct of the war. This is a tremendous collection of documents--over 100,000 pages, not counting dozens of volumes that contain the preparatory materials for the trial. During the sessions of the Tokyo trial numerous documents were made public which, when compared with other sources, make it possible to gain some idea of many previously unknown actions taken by the Japanese military and diplomatic corps. They enable us to recreate the picture of the secret Japanese-German negotiations in 1938-1939 on the conclusion of a military alliance. At that time Japanese diplomats were trying to get Germany and Italy's agreement that the Soviet Union would be the main object of aggression from the very start, while Western countries would remain in the background. Of particular interest among the documents is the secret military agreement among Japan, Germany, and Italy dated January 18, 1942 concerning the division of spheres of military operations on a global scale. According to this agreement, the territory of the Soviet Union (roughly the entire region from the Ural Mountains) was included in Japan's region. Also of interest are the materials on the conduct of joint military operations at sea in 1943.³⁸³

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The materials of the trial of Japanese military personnel that was held in 1949 are very valuable to researchers.³⁸⁴ In particular, they contain information on Japan's preparations to attack the USSR using bacteriological weapons.

In 1952 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the collection Historical Documents on the End of the War,³⁸⁵ which spans the events of 1941-1945. It included documents of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, materials of the secret council, and excerpts from the memoirs of Japanese political and military figures and diplomats. The collection was published under the direction of M. Shigemitsu, minister of foreign affairs, who wrote an introductory article for each section.

The collection was published to a specific end--to whitewash Japanese diplomacy, the royal court, and the upper clique of the financial and industrial bourgeoisie and to dump the blame for the start of the war and for Japan's defeat on military circles. The compilers try to sketch the idea that as early as the end of 1941 Togo and Shigemitsu, the Japanese ministers of foreign affairs, were taking every step to pull Japan out of the war. There is special emphasis on the activity of the so-called "peace party" (which formed in the period 1943-1945), which included former prime ministers and other ministers: Konoe, Hiranuma, Okada, Kido, etc. Despite the biased selection of documents, the materials in the collection make it possible to investigate the secret negotiations of the Japanese with representatives of the United States in Sweden and Switzerland in 1945. It can be seen from these materials that Allen Dulles, the head of American intelligence, actually released to the Japanese in June 1945 the secret decision of the Yalta conference of the three great powers concerning the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan following Germany's defeat.

Among the sources we also should mention the official announcement of Japan's defeat in the Second World War,³⁸⁶ which

was published immediately after Japan's surrender; the materials contained in the official report on the debates in the Japanese Diet in connection with the so-called "Great East Asian War"³⁸⁷; and the four-volume collection that contains memoirs and documents devoted to military operations in the Pacific.³⁸⁸

Japan's defeat, the aggravation of social contradictions, and the upturn of the democratic movement in the country have given rise to a stream of memoir literature. State and military figures, leaders of political parties, and diplomats rushed to justify their activity and to save the prestige of the ruling cliques at any price, stooping to a crude distortion of the facts. Shielding themselves and arguing with their foes, the authors of the memoirs often disclose interesting facts.

S. Togo, former ambassador to the USSR and Japanese minister of foreign affairs, has published two books.³⁸⁹ Togo gives a distorted picture of the conflict at the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939, attempting to attribute its origin to deficiencies in the border demarcation line. The memoirs are of interest because they contain some information on Japan's position during the negotiations with the Soviet government in 1940-1941 regarding the neutrality pact, the position of military circles on questions of war and peace in 1941-1942, and Japan's attempts to pull out of the war in 1945.

M. Shigemitsu, a prominent Japanese diplomat and minister of foreign affairs during the war and in the postwar period, has published three volumes of memoirs³⁹⁰ in which he examines the main foreign-policy events in the period from 1931 to 1945. Shigemitsu's memoirs contain no criticism of England or the United States, and Japanese-Soviet relations, especially the most critical times in these relations, are covered in an anti-Soviet spirit. In particular, Shigemitsu states that the USSR supposedly provoked the conflict at Lake Khasan to wreck the Japanese

offensive on Hankow. Thus, he attempts to depict the Japanese aggression at Lake Khasan as a "defensive measure."

The memoirs of N. Sato,³⁹¹ former Japanese ambassador to the USSR who began his diplomatic work in Russia even before the revolution, attempt to view the Soviet state's foreign policy as an extension of the foreign policy of tsarism. In describing Soviet-Japanese relations during the Second World War, the author tries to prove that Japan loyally fulfilled the conditions of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of 1941.

During the war K. Kido held the post of minister-keeper of the press. This post enabled him to know well the problems of Japan's domestic and foreign policy and of national affairs. He directly conveyed to the Emperor all information received from the prime minister and the other ministers of the government. Kido's Diaries³⁹² contain numerous facts concerning the struggle of various groups in Japanese ruling cliques, the determination of the direction of Japanese expansion in 1938-1940, the attitude toward the Soviet-German war, etc.

Also of some interest is the eight-volume work by K. Harada,³⁹³ which was based on the materials and diaries of Prince Saionji, former prime minister and the last genro (the Emperor's closest adviser). Saionji enjoyed considerable influence among both civilian officials and military leaders.

Some details that characterize the actions of the Japanese military and the policy of Japanese imperialism can be found in the memoirs of Arita, Okada, Shimomura, Tanaka, Suzuki, and others.³⁹⁴ In them much space is devoted to the last months and days of the Second World War.

Few monographs devoted directly to military subjects have been published. Among them we should list the books of Hayashi

and Tanemura, which are devoted mainly to a description of the land battles of the Japanese army³⁹⁵; the books of Takagi, Toyoda, Fukutomi, and Mazaki, which examine both individual operations at sea and all operations of the Japanese navy in the Pacific³⁹⁶; and the books by Iwase, a supporter of the "imperial way" group, and Takamiya, a supporter of the "control group."³⁹⁷

Typically, in the interpretation of some problems of the war in the Pacific, the opinion of Japanese bourgeois historians largely coincides with that of their American and English colleagues. In particular, this is true of their gross exaggeration of the importance of the battle for Midway Atoll and the battle for Guadalcanal in 1942. Both Japanese and many Western historians depict these battles as the turning point in the Second World War.³⁹⁸

Official Japanese historians claim that the USSR supposedly always pursued a hostile policy toward Japan. These views are reflected most clearly in A Brief History of Japanese Diplomacy over 100 Years,³⁹⁹ which was prepared by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The authors of this book try to attribute the Soviet government's concern for the security of its borders due to Japan's aggressive policy, to the desire of the USSR to ensure a "balance of power," and the cause of the numerous conflicts on the Soviet border to the "inaccuracy of the border line."⁴⁰⁰

Major shifts took place in Japanese historical science in the mid-1950s. The situation in the country allowed progressive trends to be evidenced. The events of the Second World War were covered from objective positions in the work History of Japan⁴⁰¹ by the progressive Japanese historian Izu Kimio, and in the collective work History of Modern Japan by Inoue Kiyoshi, Okonogi Shinzaburo, and Suzuki Shoshi.⁴⁰²

Of special interest is the five-volume History of the War in the Pacific,⁴⁰³ which was prepared by a group of progressive professors and instructors at Tokyo University, the institute for China studies, the political-legal institute, the institute for research on historical materials under Tokyo University, and others. At the authors' center of attention is Japan during the period of the war in the Pacific (1941-1945). Recalling the lessons of the recent past, the authors call on the Japanese people to prevent a repetition of the disastrous path of militarization toward which reactionary forces once again are pushing Japan. "We are confident," write the authors, "that only a truthful history of the war can be of major benefit in the situation that has now taken shape, when we want to unleash a new war."⁴⁰⁴

In contrast to reactionary historians, progressive Japanese researchers uncover those historical regularities which led to World War II, and convincingly prove that not only the military, but especially Japanese monopoly capital was the culprit behind the aggression. As the authors of A History of the War in the Pacific note, it was precisely the monopoly circles in Japan which drew up the plans of aggression and carried out war preparations. Using rich documentary material, progressive Japanese historians show that the war in the Pacific was a collision of the imperialist powers for supremacy in Asia and for the monopoly right to plunder the peoples of Asian countries.

Progressive historians expose the essence of the Japanese-American "bargaining" that occurred as a result of the US desire to direct Japanese aggression in a "northerly direction," i.e., against the USSR.⁴⁰⁵ Assessing the American-Japanese negotiations of 1941, the authors of A History of the War in the Pacific write: "The American government tried in every way possible to avoid a direct conflict with Japan. As before, it hoped, if possible, to turn Japanese aggression 180 degrees. Since the ultimate goal of the Japanese government was aggression against the Soviet

Union, the advance to the south was only a means of providing itself with strategic resources to start the anti-Soviet war. For its part, the Japanese government also wanted to avoid an armed conflict with the United States if possible. Herein lies the true reason for the Japanese-American negotiations."⁴⁰⁶

The authors of A History of the War in the Pacific believe that the "anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of Asian countries, which grew more acute after World War I, ... began to widen rapidly."⁴⁰⁷ The Second World War, they point out, led to a deepening of the general crisis of world capitalism. According to them, "Japan's defeat signified not only the downfall of the supremacy of Japanese imperialism," but, because of the growth of the national liberation movement, this defeat "threatened to overturn the rule of all imperialist powers in Asia."⁴⁰⁸ Asia became a "junction of growing contradictions between two camps, between imperialism and the peoples of colonial and semicolonial countries, and also among the imperialist powers themselves."⁴⁰⁹

Hence there are two clearcut lines in Japanese historiography of the Second World War: falsification of the history of World War II, and the disclosure of the true nature of this war. The falsifiers of history try to justify Japan's participation in the Second World War. They understand that the war and Japan's defeat engendered among the Japanese people deep-rooted antimilitary sentiments which hinder Japanese reactionary forces from setting course toward embroiling Japan in preparations for a new war. The falsifiers of history try to belittle the significance to Japan of the military catastrophe to which the policy of the Japanese ruling cliques led in its day. The works of these historians have the goal of facilitating Japan's entanglement in preparations for a new war and of justifying the creation of the Japanese-American military alliance.

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In contrast, progressive Japanese historians reveal the full danger of the course toward preparations for a new war to the national existence of Japan. They are trying to show the Japanese people that their security and well-being are possible only in time of peace.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

An analysis of the Marxist and bourgeois historiography of the Great Patriotic War and World War II makes it possible to draw certain conclusions.

1. As a result of 20 years of work toward studying the problems of the war, Soviet military and civilian historians have achieved considerable success. They have solved the most important problems: the origin and political character of the war, the periods of the war, the place of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War in the Second World War and its decisive importance in the defeat of fascism, the role of secondary theaters of military operations, the antifascist coalition and international relations, the role of the masses, and the results and lessons of the war.

Soviet historians always have focused special attention on studying the history of the Great Patriotic War. Their main contribution is that only they have investigated comprehensively the main component of the Second World War--the Great Patriotic War, and the decisive theater of military operations--the Soviet-German front. The pivotal question of the history of the Great Patriotic War--the legitimacy of the victory of the socialist state--has been elaborated in Soviet historiography. A qualitatively new stage in the development of Soviet historiography commenced after the 20th and 22nd congresses of the CPSU. Gradually freeing itself of the cult of the individual, the investigation of the history of the war is becoming more comprehensive

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and thorough. In their works Soviet historians not only have showed how the party's leading role, the heroism of the Soviet people, and their boundless devotion to the cause of socialism were evidenced during the years of armed struggle against the fascist invaders, but they also have uncovered the mistakes made on the eve of and during the course of the war, and have told of the difficulties in achieving victory that the Soviet people endured during the year.

It would be difficult to overestimate the role of Soviet historiography of World War II in fulfilling the most important ideological task--that of installing in the people the spirit of Soviet patriotism and constant readiness to defend the socialist Fatherland.

Despite the rapid development of new means of armed warfare in the postwar period, the critical study of the experience of World War II and many conclusions drawn from this experience have not lost their significance to our time. By helping to reveal the regularities behind armed struggle on the basis of the experience of the war, military historical science thus contributes to the further development of methods of armed struggle. The achievements of Soviet historiography of the Second World War are especially valuable in this regard. The experience that has been summarized in Soviet historiography helps enrich military theory with new conclusions and positions concerning the initial period of a war, the struggle to seize and hold the strategic initiative, the forms and methods of strategic attack, the use of branches, arms, and services, and so forth.

In noting the contribution of the historiography of the Second World War to military science, we must not fail to mention official works, which gradually are becoming available to an increasingly broad range of investigators. Their importance is

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that, together with archival materials, they essentially are the basis on which military operations on the Soviet-German front and in other theaters of the war are described and analyzed.

2. The development of Soviet historiography of the Second World War has not been a uniform process. Stalin's cult of personality, which long was an obstacle to the creative solution of many problems of the history of the war, caused major damage to this development. Under the cult of personality, historians had to find confirmation for the theoretical precepts advanced by Stalin. As a result, documents were replaced by quotations. Archives often were made top-secret without justification. Against their will, historians had to avoid addressing acute issues.

The assessments given by Soviet historians of bourgeois historiography in the period of the cult of personality were poorly substantiated, and the methods used to combat the falsifiers of history were insufficiently flexible. All works by bourgeois historians were declared "reactionary writings." The diverse phenomena that have occurred in bourgeois historiography and that are related to the new balance of power on the international scene have been fitted to the general scheme created previously.

This situation in Soviet historical science also caused harm to the Soviet reader--it disoriented him, and to the prestige of Soviet historiography--it enabled our ideological enemies to accuse Soviet historians of prejudice.

The party uncovered the harmful consequences of the cult of personality that were manifest during the Soviet people's struggle against Hitler's Germany, and criticized the inaccurate theoretical positions advanced by Stalin. However, the consequences of the cult of personality long continued to exert an influence on historical studies even after the party had condemned this phenomenon. The eradication of deep-rooted work

habits and of errors in the approach to historical facts could not be a painless process and required a great deal of time. The adverse effects of the cult of personality have now been eliminated for the most part in Soviet historical science.

The party's decisions put an end to distortions of the methodological foundations of historical science. By overcoming the contrast between the party principle of science and the objectivity of science that existed during the period of the cult of personality, the party helped historical science become a reliable weapon in the struggle against ideological foes and an important means of education.

3. The successes of Soviet historiography that have been achieved since the 20th Party Congress are so obvious that even our ideological foes cannot help noticing them. For example, the American historian A. Dallin* notes that such subjects as the Second World War, Soviet foreign policy, and the supreme organs of the party have now ceased to be "ticklish and forbidden" and the scientific level of Soviet works has risen considerably in the last 10 years.⁴¹⁰ The American investigator M. Galagher believes that since the 22nd Party Congress Soviet historiography has achieved "real advances" in depicting the war.⁴¹¹

Many bourgeois historians note that a new stage has begun for Soviet historiography of the Second World War. They especially emphasize this idea when they review the six-volume Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 (The Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945), which is a summarization of the entire experience of Soviet historical thought on the history of World War II. J. Erickson, an English specialist in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces, has called this publication the "most important phenomenon in Soviet historiography in a long time."⁴¹² It has been noted in the English press that the volumes of Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (The

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History of the Great Patriotic War) contain invaluable material "for all future historians of the Second World War."⁴¹³ The American historian Dzh.* Armstrong says that this monumental Soviet study "is the most significant work on Soviet history of all the histories published in the last 30 years."⁴¹⁴ The Japanese historian D. Uesugi calls Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny a monumental publication.⁴¹⁵

4. Marxist-Leninist historical science plays a tremendous part in the life of socialist countries. Together with the other social sciences, it comprises the scientific foundation for managing society both in time of peace and in time of war. By investigating the experience of social development, Marxist historiography provides very valuable material for drawing up a scientifically substantiated party policy. Marxist historians therefore see their task not only in describing facts and events, but also in providing theoretical generalization of these facts, in searching for and establishing connections between events, and in determining the regularities of social development under different conditions and in different countries.

Historians of the USSR and other socialist countries and Marxist historians in capitalist countries, while pursuing a common methodology, study the war in close relation to the economic development of society and the class struggle. This approach enables them to draw conclusions that are of significance not only for assessing the most important events of history, but also for the future development of society. These conclusions are as follow. The Great Patriotic War confirmed once again that there are no forces in the world capable of halting the development of socialism through the use of arms. In World War II, which was the most severe test of all the material and spiritual forces of the states involved in it, the Soviet social order demonstrated its great vital force and its indisputable advantages over the capitalist order. The second stage of the general crisis of

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capitalism began during this war and the socialist revolutions that have occurred in a number of European and Asian countries. Under contemporary conditions the attempts of world imperialism to resolve by war the dispute between the opposed systems will end in the death of the capitalist system.

Special emphasis should be placed on the services rendered by the historiography of the Second World War in socialist countries. By overcoming the major difficulties created by the serious legacy of the cult of personality, the historians of fraternal socialist countries are making a significant contribution to the Marxist interpretation of the history of World War II. Because of the specific conditions that existed in these countries during the war years, the main subjects of research for the historians of these countries have become the problems of the resistance movement and revolution, and the merger of the struggle for national liberation with the struggle for social transformations.

5. Marxist historians cannot agree with many evaluations of facts and events of the war period or with the conclusions given in bourgeois historiography. However, Marxists do not try to reject bourgeois historiography entirely, or the positive element to be found in studies by bourgeois authors. The value of bourgeois historiography, mainly official documented works, lies in the rich factual material that is needed for a comprehensive investigation of the experience of the Second World War. The range of problems that bourgeois historiography touches on is quite broad, though they deal principally with that portion of the war which was waged in Africa, Western Europe, and the Pacific. These subjects are the course of the war and allied strategy, the relations between the Western partners in the coalition and "Axis" countries, the organized of armed forces in various theaters of military operations, the planning and execution of campaigns and operations, the resistance movement and

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conduct of campaigns and operations, the economics and the material and technical support of the troops, and others. The importance of materials on these subjects is not exhausted by their cognitive value. They often make it possible to ascertain the true intent behind the operations of participants in the war and to draw conclusions which the authors could not or did not want to draw.

At the same time, note should be made of the extremely small number and the inferiority of works dealing with the main component of the Second World War--the Great Patriotic War, and the decisive theater of military operations--the Soviet-German front.

6. Anticommunism and flawed methodology have led bourgeois historiography of the Second World War to a deep crisis. "The 'decline' of military history," bourgeois ideologists grieve, "obviously is a phase of the broader decline of all types of historiography."⁴¹⁶ The most important index of this crisis is the fact that bourgeois historiography cannot carry out its own principal tasks satisfactorily.

The bourgeoisie wants to draw lessons from the events of the Second World War. The ruling cliques of capitalist states listen attentively to the appraisals and conclusions that professional historians make. Bourgeois historians believe that a generalization of the experience of the Second World War should conform to the current development of military and political measures in the West, promote the "security" of the West, and help avoid "mistakes" in the future.⁴¹⁷ Therefore, recommendations for the elaboration of "security" questions are expected from bourgeois historiography (especially its official representatives).⁴¹⁸ The question arises in this regard: can bourgeois historiography give a correct analysis and assessment of the war?

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The critical attitude toward military history of the persons most responsible for creating military doctrine attests to the fact that bourgeois historiography has been unable to draw conclusions from the experience of World War II that would contribute to the successful actions of the political and military figures of imperialism. For example, during a discussion of the tasks and organization of research on subjects of military history, the leaders of the American war institute sharply criticized the state of military historical science in the United States and concluded that "military historical science is in decline even in countries that have been leaders in the field: England, Germany, and France."⁴¹⁹

The denial of the regularity of social development in the examination of the world historical process leads bourgeois historians to the false conclusion that the successes of socialism and the weakening of capitalism, especially as a result of World War II, are a temporary phenomenon. Disagreeing with the fact that the unswerving strengthening of the positions of socialism ultimately is determined by the objective laws of the development of mankind, these historians do not see the main causes of the events that have occurred and are occurring in the world. The limited class perspective of their world view prevents them from rising to a scientific understanding of the objective laws of war as a sociohistorical phenomenon. Therefore, bourgeois historiography cannot give a correct, objective analysis or assessment of the war as a whole, and hence it is unable to draw accurate conclusions from its results.

All of the above does not mean, however, that bourgeois historiography is incapable of scientific research in the field of military history or that works on the history of World War II that have been oriented toward military personnel or other specialists (e.g., official history in England and the United States) do not contain sober assessments and do not generalize the military

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and political experience of the war for utilitarian purposes. The fact that the evaluations and conclusions of bourgeois historiography are at odds with the Marxist interpretation of the war because of the former's class approach does not at all imply that Marxist historians can ignore either the treatment of the war or the conclusions that bourgeois historians draw on the basis of their study of the past. It also should be taken into consideration that many bourgeois historians are extremely logical thinkers. Marxist historians must make critical use of everything that Western literature contains on the Second World War.

The second task facing bourgeois historiography is propagandistic. Historians must provide an explanation of the events of the Second World War that would justify the political course of the Western powers on the eve of and during the war. In the opinion of bourgeois ideologists, such an explanation above all should help attract to the capitalist side states that gained independence after the war. However, it is believed in the West that this task too is far from a satisfactory resolution. As G. Kennan writes, the problem is that the explanation given by Soviet historians seems to be "verisimilar and accurate" to the peoples of countries that gained independence after the war.⁴²⁰ The task of Western historians, continues Kennan, is to create a picture of historical development that might also "exert an influence on the young generation in Russia." Thus, bourgeois historians should "make an important contribution"⁴²¹ to the international power struggle.

Finally, to judge by the scope of antiwar statements in the capitalist countries, the military literature in the West also is failing to fulfill another requirement, which C. Barclay, the editor of the English journal Army, has defined as "preparing the general reader to understand the need for heavy defense outlays at present."⁴²²

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7. Despite the antagonism between the concepts of adherents of the two opposite world views, the possibility exists for international cooperation among historians who study the Second World War.

The importance of joint work by historians of different countries becomes clear in view of the numerous conferences devoted to problems of the resistance movement.⁴²³ As the experience of these conferences has demonstrated, such collaboration promotes the further elaboration of problems of the history of the Second World War.

In recent years historians of the Soviet Union and socialist countries have been increasingly active in international conferences. Typically, the first conference on the resistance, held in Liège, brought together only representatives of capitalist countries. But now representatives of the USSR and socialist countries themselves often are the initiators of international meetings (such as the conferences in Warsaw and Karlovy Vary).⁴²⁴

The influence of the Marxist explanation of the events of the war is increasing as a result of the active participation of representatives of Marxist historiography at such meetings. Furthermore, the reports of representatives of the USSR and other socialist countries published abroad make it difficult to falsify the history of the Second World War.

Despite the acute ideological struggle between the adherents of Marxist and bourgeois notions, the overall result of conferences involving historians from the USSR and other socialist countries should be recognized as positive. These international meetings have demonstrated the feasibility and benefit of scientific collaboration among historians. The role of such conferences also is to ensure that their materials remind mankind of the monstrous cast of mind and crimes of fascism. Conference materials

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also can and should play a positive role in the struggle to prevent a new war.

8. The Second World War has left a deep trace in the consciousness of peoples of the world. Millions of people are imbued with a hatred of fascism and the capitalist order that gave rise to the war, and, moving to combat imperialism in order to create a new social order in their own countries, they have achieved tremendous results: the world socialist system has arisen and grown stronger, and the colonial system of imperialism was undermined and then collapsed. A large fraction of mankind, taking into consideration the experience of World War II and the development of missile-borne nuclear weapons, are waging an energetic struggle for peace and against new imperialist aggression.

In the modern era the struggle between communist and bourgeois ideology is one of the most important forms of the class struggle in which the struggle between the two systems is reflected. The Second World War was a military conflict whose course and results were determined decisively by the participation of the first socialist state in the world. It therefore is not surprising that the history of the Second World War has become the setting for an acute ideological struggle.

Bourgeois ideologists understand that the "struggle for the minds of the people in the age of the nuclear deadlock is the greatest battle, on which the very existence of the Western world may depend."⁴²⁵ They therefore are conducting a fierce struggle against the Marxist explanation of the war and try to overturn the conclusions that Marxist historiography draws from the experience of the war. The ruling cliques of imperialist countries, while not rejecting other forms of battle against socialism, place emphasis on ideological diversions with respect to socialist states. "Russia must be attacked from within," preaches Dzh.* Fuller.⁴²⁶

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Bourgeois ideologists do not hide the fact that they are not interested in the development of historical thought in the USSR. They only study Soviet works because, in their own words, "Soviet historical works provide an important key to the present political balance of forces"⁴²⁷ in the Soviet Union. Bourgeois historians thus set for historiography the tasks that usually are handled by strategic intelligence.⁴²⁸

In addressing the experience of the Second World War, many bourgeois historians try to substantiate the impossibility of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between capitalist and socialist states, and thus to prove the unavailability of a Third World War. Representatives of the extreme right, the anti-Soviet group, which is the dominant one in some capitalist countries, show particular zeal in this area. The monopolies generously finance their ideological henchmen, since the rejection of peaceful coexistence corresponds to the political line of reactionary international imperialist forces. At the same time, in some countries those historians "who are in disagreement with the opinions in official textbooks and with their interpretations are viewed as agents of 'communist imperialism.'"⁴²⁹ This is why the struggle against bourgeois historiography is needed not only in the interests of restoring historical truth, but also in the interests of the struggle for peace and for ensuring the security of the peoples of the world in the age of thermonuclear weapons.

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FOOTNOTES

1. See J. Fuller. The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence upon History, vol. 1, London, 1957, p. XI.
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18. Slavic Review, September 1962, p. 7.
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21. Cited after the book: D: Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, vol. 1, London, 1961, p. 106.
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23. See F. R. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington, 1955; F. R. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Washington, 1960; F. R. Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, vols. 1-2. Washington, 1961.
24. F. R. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 107-108.
25. Ibid.
26. See F. R. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. 1, pp. 263-265.
27. The West Point Atlas of American Wars, vols. I-II. New York, 1959.
28. Ibid., vol. I, p. IV.
29. See Ibid., vol. II, p. 30.
30. See Ibid., p. 34.
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65. H. Feis. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 599.

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203. See F. Meinecke. Die deutsche Katastrophe, p. 160.

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205. E. Raeder, Mein Leben, vol. II, p. 332.

206. J. Barnick. Die deutsche Trümpfe [The German Trump], Stuttgart, 1958, p. 27. By "reunification" the author means the forced annexation of the territory of the GDR to West Germany and the restoration of Germany to the 1937 borders--editor's note.

207. Itogi vtoroy mirovoy voyny [The Results of the Second World War], a collection of articles, Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishers, 1957, pp. 21-23, 35-36.

208. Historische Zeitschrift, 1955, vol. 180, No. 3, p. 662.

209. In October 1944 the commission on the history of the occupation and liberation was set up under the French Ministry of National Education. In 1950 it was reorganized as the committee on the history of the Second World War under an office of the council of ministers. At present, Academician M. Beaumont is the chairman of the committee, and A. Michel is the general secretary and editor in chief of the printed organ. The main orientation of the committee's activity is the collection, study, and publication of documents and monographs on the history of the resistance in France during the years of the fascist German occupation.

210. Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale [Review of the History of the Second World War].

211. L'Esprit de la Resistance [The Spirit of the Resistance].

212. Livre jaune français [French Yellow Book], Paris, 1939.

213. Assemblée nationale, première législature, session de 1947. Les Evénements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945 [The National Assembly, First Legislature, 1947 Session. The Unexpected Events in France from 1933 to 1945], Paris, n.d. Rapport de M. Charles Serré, député au nom de la Commission d'enquête parlementaire Report by M. Charles Serré, Deputy, in the Name of the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, vols. 1-2; Témoignages et documents, recueillis par la Commission d'enquête parlementaire. Annexes (Dépositions) [Testimony and Documents Collected by the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission. Appendices (Depositions)], vols. 1-9.

214. "After the First World War," writes G. Tillon, former commander of French partisan forces, "the governments of France, England, and Germany very quickly published the correspondence of their ministers of foreign affairs and other archival documents useful, from their standpoint, for a history (or justification) of the war.... By contrast, after the Second World War, these governments seem to have adopted the rule of hiding until the end of the century documents from the eve of the events of 1940 and the following years" (Sh. Tiyon, * Frantsuzskiy frantirery i partizany v bor'be protiv nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov [French Franc-Tireurs and Partisans in the Struggle Against the Fascist German Occupying Forces], Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishers, 1963, p. 27).

215. La Délégation française auprès de la Commission Allemande d'Armistice. Recueil de Documents publié par le Gouvernement français [The French Delegation Before the German Armistice Commission. Document Collection Published by the French Government], vols. 1-5. Paris, 1947-1959.

216. Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 503-505.

217. Ibid., vol. V, pp. 379-385.

218. See Crimes ennemis en France. L'Oradour sur Glane. Archives for Research on Enemy War Crimes, Paris, 1947.

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221. Emprise allemande sur la pensée française [German Influence on French Thought], monograph, P.F. 1-5, Paris, 1947.

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225. See "Four German documents on the economic collaboration imposed on France," La France intérieure, October 15, 1946, pp. 1-6; "Final report to the Reich government by Dr. Michel, head of the A. M., on Franco-German collaboration (1940-1944)," La France intérieure, November 15, 1946, pp. 4-13; December 15, 1946, pp. 3-19.

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227. Ibid.

228. J. Billig, Le Commissariat Général aux questions juives (1941-1945) [The General Commissariat on Jewish Questions (1941-1945)], vols. I-III, Paris, 1955-1960; J. Weill, Contribution à l'histoire des camps d'internement dans l'Anti-France [Contribution to the History of the Internment Camps in Anti-France], Paris, 1946; M. Mazor, Le phénomène nazi (documents commentés) [The Nazi Phenomenon (Documents with Commentary)], Paris, 1957.

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233. J.-P. Boncour. Entre deux guerres. Souvenirs sur la III-e République [Between Two Wars. Memories of the Third Republic], vol. III, Sur les chemins de la défaite 1935-1940 [On the Road to Defeat 1935-1940], Paris, 1946; G. Bonnet, Défense de la Paix [Defense of the Nation], vols. I-II, Geneva, 1946; G. Bonnet, Le Quai d'Orsay sous trois républiques [The Quai d'Orsay Under Three Republics], Paris, 1961; P. Reynaud, Au cours de la mêlée 1930-1945 [During the Mêlée, 1930-1945], Paris, 1951; P.-E. Flandin, Politique française 1919-1940 [French Policy, 1919-1940], Paris, 1947; A. Lebrun, Témoignage [Testimony], Paris, 1945; P. Faure, De Munich à la V-e République [From Munich to the Fifth Republic], Paris, n.d.; L. Blum, Mémoires: La Prison et le Procès. A l'échelle humaine, 1940-1945 [Memoirs: Prison and Prosecution. On the Human Scale, 1940-1945], vol. 1, Paris, 1955; V. Auriol, Hier. Demain [Yesterday. Tomorrow], Paris, 1945; A. François-Poncet, Souvenirs d'une ambassade à Berlin [Memories of an Embassy to Berlin], Paris, 1946.
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268. See R. Aron, Histoire de Vichy, 1940-1944 [History of Vichy, 1940-1944], Paris, 1954, pp. 737-738.

269. See J. Mordal, "External interventions in the German-Soviet war," Miroir de l'histoire, July 1956, p. 56.

270. See Histoire des relations internationales [History of International Relations], vol. VIII, part II. Les crises du XX-e siècle de 1929 à 1945 [The Crises of the 20th Century from 1929 to 1945], Paris, 1958, p. 282.

271. See G. Willard, "On some studies of France during the Second World War," Recherches internationales à la lumière du marxisme, September-December 1958, p. 96.

272. H. Michel, Les Mouvements clandestins en Europe (1938-1945) [The Clandestine Movements in Europe (1938-1945)], Paris, 1961, p. 71.

273. See R. Aron, Histoire de la Libération de la France. Juin 1944--mai 1945 [History of the French Liberation, June 1944 to May 1945], Paris, 1959, p. 249. De Gaulle himself helped spread the myth to a large extent. In his Mémoires, he exalts himself in every way possible, reducing the resistance to the role of an obedient implement in his hands. "I led France to freedom," declares De Gaulle, "and the resistance was the means to this end" (Ch. de Gaulle, Mémoires, vol. 3, p. 5).

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275. G. Tillon. "First resistance in the occupied zone," Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, No. 30, 1958, p. 6.

276. M. Baudot. L'Opinion publique sous l'occupation. L'exemple d'un département français [Public Opinion Under the Occupation. The Example of a French Department], Paris, 1960; R. Hostache, Le Conseil National de la Résistance [The National Council of the Resistance], Paris, 1957; R. Fawtier, "Preface," Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, No. 30, 1958, p. 2. A number of bourgeois historians also speak of the complete groundlessness of such contrivances about the French Communist Party.

277. M. Granet and H. Michel. Combat. Histoire d'un Mouvement de Résistance de juillet 1940 à juillet 1943 [Combat. History of a Resistance Movement from July 1940 to July 1943], Paris, 1957; M. Granet, "Défense de la France." Histoire d'un Mouvement de Résistance (1940-1944) ["Defense of France." History of a Resistance Movement (1940-1944)], Paris, 1961; A. Calmette. "The OMC (Civil and Military Organization)," Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, July 1959.

278. Detachments of French franc-tireurs and partisans created at the initiative of the French Communist Party were the military organization of the National Front. Workers with no party affiliation comprised most of the soliders in the partisan detachments.

279. Emphasizing the "apoliticality" of the resistance, A. Michel states: "The fact that nearly all participants in the resistance were antifascists at the same time nowise changes the situation" (H. Michel, Les Courants de pensées de la Résistance [The Trends of Thought of the Resistance], Paris, 1962, p. 1).

280. France d'abord, December 1963.

281. In the period 1945-1947 General Guillaume was the French military attaché to the Soviet Union. In the period 1954-1956 he held the post of director of the French general staff.

282. A. Guillaume. La guerre germano-soviétique (1941-1945) [The German-Soviet War (1941-1945)], Paris, 1949, p. 28.

283. Ibid., p. 60.

284. A. Guillaume. Pourquoi l'Armée rouge a vaincu? [Why Did the Red Army Win?], Paris, 1949.

285. See L.-M. Chassin, Histoire militaire de la seconde guerre mondiale, p. 230; M. Mourin. Histoire des Grandes Puissances,

Paris, 1958; M. Mourin, Histoire des nations européennes pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale (1939-1945) [History of European Nations During the Second World War (1939-1945)], vol. II, Paris, 1962, pp. 207-208.

286. L. Laurat, Bilan de vingt-cinq ans de plans quinquennaux (1929-1955) [Results of Twenty-Five Years of Five-Year Plans (1929-1955)], Paris, 1955, p. 119; see also J. Nobecourt, Le dernier coup de dés de Hitler. La bataille des Ardennes [Hitler's Last Throw of the Dice. The Battle of Ardennes], Paris, 1962, pp. 406-407.

287. See P. and R. Gosset, La deuxième guerre. Les Secrêts de la Paix manquée [The Second War. The Secrets of the Peace That Failed], Paris, 1954, p. 152.

288. M. Garder, Histoire de l'Armée soviétique [History of the Soviet Army], Paris, 1959, p. 273.

289. G. Aubrée, L'Armée allemande dans le tourbillon de la politique et de la guerre The German Army in the Whirlpool of Politics and War, Paris, 1960; see also R. Cartier, Hitler et ses généraux. Les secrets de la guerre [Hitler and His Generals. The Secrets of the War], Paris, 1962.

290. J. Darcy. Histoire de la guerre [History of the War], p. 136.

291. L. Laurat. Bilan de vingt-cinq ans de plans quinquennaux (1929-1955), p. 119. A partial refutation of these contrivances can be found in the work of Academician P. Renouvin, who writes, citing some data on American lend-lease deliveries in the fall of 1941: "Thus, this aid arrived too late to determine the fate of the battle of Moscow" (Histoire des relations internationales, vol. 8, part II, Les crises du XX siècle de 1929 à 1945, by Pierre Renouvin, Paris, 1958, p. 298).

292. Brégeault and others. Le deuxième conflit mondial, vol. I, part III, Paris, 1947.

293. G. Prételat, Le destin tragique de la ligne Maginot, p. 252.

294. L.-M. Chassin, Histoire militaire de la seconde guerre mondiale; J.-B. Duroselle, De Wilson à Roosevelt. Politique extérieure des Etats-Unis 1913-1945. p. 152.

295. Histoire du Parti Communiste française (manuel) [History of the French Communist Party (Manual)], Paris, 1964.

296. Thèses pour le 40-me anniversaire du Parti Communiste Française [Essays for the 40th Anniversary of the French Communist Party], Paris, 1960.

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298. J. Duclos, Izbrannyye proizvedeniya [Selected Works], vols. I-II, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1959.

299. "The Second World War," Recherches internationales à la lumière du marxisme, September-December 1958.

300. This publication is a reprint of the Soviet journal Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'. See Recherches internationales à la lumière du marxisme, March-April, 1959.

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302. Germain Willard. "Strannaya voyna" i predatel'stvo Vishi [The "Strange War" and the Vichy Betrayal], Moscow, Sotsekiz, 1962.

303. J. Chambaz, Le Front populaire pour le pain, la liberté et la paix [Popular Front for Bread, Freedom, and Peace]; C. Willard, Quelques aspects du fascisme en France avant le février 1934 [Some Aspects of Fascism in France Before February 1934].

304. G. Badia. Histoire de l'Allemagne contemporaine (1917-1962) [History of Modern Germany (1917-1962)], vol. II, Paris, 1962, p. 218.

305. Germain Willard. "Strannaya voyna" i predatel'stvo Vishi, pp. 5-6.

306. See Florimon Bont, * Doroqa chesti [Road of Honor], Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishers, 1949.

307. L'Insurrection parisienne 19 août 1944 [The Parisian Insurrection, August 19, 1944], preface by Jacques Duclos, Paris, n.d.

308. La Libération, oeuvre d'un peuple et non d'un homme [The Liberation, Work of a Nation and Not of One Man], Paris, 1958.

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314. G. Laroche. "The Soviets in the French Resistance," Cahiers du communisme, No. 3, 1960.

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318. E. D'Astier, Bogi i lyudi. 1943-1944 [Gods and Men, 1943-1944], Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishers, 1962.

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320. P. Cribeillet, Vie et combats de partisans. Carnet de route de souvenirs du capitaine Grillon [The Life and Combat of Partisans. Logbook of the Memories of Captain Grillon], Paris, 1947.

321. J. Bruhat, Histoire de l'U.R.S.S. [History of the USSR], Paris, 1962, pp. 114-116.

322. L. Aragon, Histoire parallèle. Histoire de l'U.R.S.S. de 1917 à 1960 [Parallel History. History of the USSR from 1917 to 1960], vol. 2, Paris, 1962, p. 346.

323. M. Dévaux, "On the Principles of War," Revue de défense nationale, May 1963, pp. 803-811.

324. G. Castellan, "Present orientation of historical studies," Revue historique, October-December 1962, p. 425.

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332. Tridtsat' let zhizni i bor'by Ital'yanskoy kommunisticheskoy partii. Sbornik statey i dokumentov [Thirty Years of the Life and Struggle of the Italian Communist Party. A Collection of Articles and Documents], Moscow, Foreign Literature Publishers, 1953.

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
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425. The Army Quarterly, October 1963, p. 89.

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428. This is confirmed by W. Platt, an American specialist on the informational work of strategic intelligence. Platt directly says that an important place is allotted to history in the work of strategic intelligence. "Exaggerating somewhat," he writes, "One may say that if an intelligence researcher has unraveled

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
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ABBREVIATED NAMES OF ARCHIVES ENCOUNTERED IN FOOTNOTES

Arkhiv MO SSSR--Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense

TsGAOR SSSR--Central State Archives of the October Revolution,
Higher Organs of State Authority, and Organs of State Control
of the USSR

TsGANKh SSSR--Central State Archives of the National Economy
of the USSR

TsPA IML--Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee

AVP SSSR--Archives of Foreign Policy of the USSR

TsVMA--Central Naval Archives

Arkhiv TsK VLKSM--Archives of the Central Committee of the All-
Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth (Komsomol)

TsA VTsSPS--Central Archives of the All-Union Central Trade Union
Council

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