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# ETHICS AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION

APRIL 1982

## THE NON-TOLERATION CLAUSE and the CADET HONOR CODE

Do you believe that...

*"the Non-Toleration Clause is the most effective element of the Cadet Honor Code?"*

Or, that...

*"the Non-Toleration Clause is counterproductive?"*

What sort of arguments can be offered to defend, or amend the Non-Toleration Clause?

Book Review:

**Mixed Company: Women in the Army**  
Helen Rogan

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## CHARTER

In April 1978 the United States Military Academy's Committee on Ethics and Professionalism began its publication of Ethics and the Military Profession. Since that first issue, the publication has presented topics such as "The NCO and the Professional Ethic," "Sports and the Military," and "Values and the Professional Soldier." The purpose of this journal is the stimulation of dialogue and research among West Point Staff and Faculty in topics that would assist in the integration of Ethics and Professionalism courses with the cadet experience. This is a tall order for an extracurricular effort. But the issues that we, as officers and NCO's, as role models for the cadets, discuss in and out of class do affect the cadet experience. These issues offer a target of opportunity that should not be ignored. If this publication can offer issues for discussion that are currently or inherently interesting to our audience, then this publication is likely to be read. Further, since the methods with which those issues are analyzed are those that we use as professionals in the unit or at the office, the articles in Ethics and the Military Profession are as suited to an officer from a staff agency, DPE, or Math because they are responsible, informed people as they are suitable to an instructor in DMI, BS&L, or English who is charged with the instruction of specific ethical systems. There are no experts in this field, or, rather, we are all experts in this field. These periodical offerings should be read critically; they are not statements of policy that require some acceptance. Each publication will offer a feature article, a book review, and a bibliography. Taken together these sections should provide several perspectives to the topic of that publication. There will also be a listing of scheduled events which are germane to the topics of Ethics and Professionalism.

## EVENTS

The following events on the USMA calendar contain topics that speak to issues of Ethics and the Military Profession. The editorial staff provides this guide for your information.

| DATE/TIME                | PLACE      | EVENT   | SPEAKER  |
|--------------------------|------------|---|--|
| 19-20 Apr/<br>Class Time | 344 TH     | NATO Issues (SS 483)                              | Dr. Michael York<br>Kennedy School of<br>Diplomacy                   |
| 20 Apr<br>1920 hrs       | SS Conf Rm | The Sino-Soviet American<br>Triangle (SS 371/475) | Dr. Donald Zagonia<br>Crugers, NY                                    |
| 20 Apr<br>1920 hrs       | 5041 WH    | The Institutional Media<br>(AI 479/SS 202)        | Mr. Ike Pappas<br>CBS News   |
| 28 Apr<br>1920 hrs       | TBA        | Tactics & Doctrine in the<br>20th Century         | GEN Dupuy  |
| 29 Apr<br>1920 hrs       | North Aud  | Russia, the United States, and<br>the Cold War    | Prof Norman Graebner<br>Visiting Professor,<br>Dept of History, USMA |

FOCUS

This issue tackles the Non-tolerance Clause. Given this topic, we expect some controversy in your response to the ideas presented in our three articles. To some extent we welcome that controversy. We welcome it not for the sake of the disputation, however, but for the reexamination of your position on this vital element of the Cadet Honor Code that is likely to accompany a strong reaction. The views stated in each of these articles are not and should not be considered official statements of policy for the United States Military Academy. At the same time, however, please recognize that the views stated within each article are consistent with the stated policy of USMA. Perhaps this qualification emphasizes not only the wide range of interpretation possible in a subject as important as honor, but it may also point to a need to review certain topics before new levels of understanding are possible.

This issue of Ethics and the Military Profession features three articles rather than one. Each article provides a view that focuses on a particular aspect of the Non-tolerance Clause. Although attempts to take all of this Clause in at once are beyond the scope of an article, this collection of three distinct statements should sketch some of the dimensions of that whole. MAJ Reitz's article, "The Non-Tolerance Clause--A Chance for Misperception," attacks the logic of those who claim that they should not try to judge the action of others. CPT Wilcomb's article, "An Objection to the Stool Pigeon Objection," removes the shadow of a charge sometimes directed at this institution in the light of close examination. MAJ Reitz's article, "Values and the Non-Tolerance Clause," offers a schema to explain how the Clause assists the cadets as they learn and adopt the values of the institution. In the final portion of this issue, CPT Falth reviews Helen Rogan's Mixed Company: Women in the Modern Army.

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The Non-Toleration Clause--A Chance for Misperception

Major Charles W. Ricks

Would it be right for you to cheat to remain "Pro"?  
Would it be right for Cadet X to cheat to remain "Pro"?

One would suppose that each of these questions addresses the same ethical issue. Yet I sense that there is a complexity which eludes us as we move from the first question to the second. As members of the USMA community, we should take satisfaction in noting that cadets generally know what, for themselves, is right and wrong. They seem to understand their responsibility to behave in accordance with ethical codes in general and with the Cadet Honor Code in particular. However, when faced with the second question, it appears that there is a reluctance to pass judgment on the behavior of others. It seems to me that it is not enough merely to know what is the moral thing to do. Each individual has a responsibility to ensure that ethical standards are developed, taught, adhered to, and enforced.

An inability to apply standards or to render judgments seems to imply an acceptance of diverse moral perspectives, regardless of their merit. In the classroom, ethical discussions which are geared toward determining responsibility often result in "conclusions" which claim that the imposition of any moral standard is impossible because the actor in a particular case "felt" he was right or because the actor did not mean to err. What such relativistic perceptions imply is that individuals who act are doing so only in the very narrow context of their own "moral" views and that it is uncomfortable, maybe even unjust, to come to a determination of right or wrong based on some sort of universal standard.

There is no doubt that the "non-tolerance" clause of the Cadet Honor Code seeks to address this problem of relativism. Yet many cadets see the clause as forcing them to impose personal ethical attitudes on others: "Sir, I find it very difficult to vote against a cadet on an Honor Board because I am concerned about the harsh consequences of my action. You see, when I vote, I am imposing my standards on someone else who may see right and wrong differently." Such a statement misses the point entirely. The "non-tolerance" clause exists to ensure the enforcement of standards which are supposedly held by all those subject to the Code. It is not the case that the clause obligates an individual to force a potentially unpopular moral standard upon an unwitting "victim." The man or woman who becomes a cadet (and later an officer) acquires the obligations for advancing his or her own personal development as well as for ensuring the universal application of the institution's moral standards.

What is more disturbing than a relativistic view of ethics (which claims equal value for all or almost all standards of behavior) is the nagging perception that cadets may not clearly understand the role of the Honor Code and may not understand its importance. Is it true that the values inherent in cadet honor training are applicable only to the limited acreage along the Hudson River? Recently, a cadet, freshly returned from Cadet Troop Leader Training (CTLT), came to me in some distress. He told of experiences with recent graduates of USMA and of ROTC programs. Both groups freely acknowledged exposure to extensive ethical training, and both groups argued that ethical ideals have little or no role in the "can do"/"struggle to survive" world of the junior officer in the "Real" Army. How widespread are such views? How are we to answer such claims? Is the Honor Code to be endured, or is it to be followed?

The seeds of ethical uncertainty are planted widely; they are not unique to West Point nor to the Army. Yet they seek to take root here, even before cadets are exposed to CTLT or any other extra-USMA activity. Consider: "Sir, I know that the act is wrong, but I can't judge Cadet X because he may sincerely believe that he is right, or he may have forgotten the regulation." "Sir, Cadet X has committed an Honor Violation, but no Honor Board would ever convict her because of the circumstances. There's no point in creating a hassle by making a report." "The ideals are great, Sir, but how do I survive outside the gate when everyone in the 'real world' lies and cheats and steals as a matter of course?" These comments reflect cadet-generated concerns; they are not hypothetical. They represent uncertainty about the extent of individual responsibility toward others and a fear that personal standards may eventually fail. What are our responses to be?

It is easy to understand how individuals who see value for themselves in the tenets of the Honor Code could feel threatened by other "standards" which seek to refute cadet honor training. Often it is lonely to do the right thing when, quite frankly, others simply act contrary to the norm. If everyone in the "real world" lies, cheats, and steals, how can I act in accordance with what I know to be morally correct? It is not so easy to teach that the responsibility for the enforcement of moral standards rests on the individual far more than on some sort of remote institutional framework. If people are behaving in ways which are contrary to accepted moral codes (such as the Honor Code at USMA), it may well be that the responsibility for such transgressions is shared by those who tolerate that behavior. An absolutely crucial aspect of cadet honor training has to be the point that the "non-toleration" clause is not intended to force a cadet to betray his peers. The clause exists to ensure that actions by cadets conform to standards which most cadets view as having significant personal value.

There are several ways to help cadets to understand the value of the "non-toleration" clause. "Self-interest" is often condemned as a form of personal motivation, yet we all are concerned about our own well-being and ought to recognize that we are so motivated at times. Our choices of educational institutions, careers, friends, and spouses are guided by what we perceive to be best for us. I will not lie, cheat, or steal; I do not want to be lied to, cheated, or stolen from. I do not want to fight next to someone who, if necessary, will betray his responsibility. I do not want to have to rely on an officer who misrepresents the status or condition of his or her soldiers and equipment. Allowing myself to be deceived is not in my self-interest; I cannot tolerate it. If I were to accept diverse and often disruptive patterns of behavior as being morally equal, I would diminish the value of my own ethical perspectives, views I have long struggled to develop. The automatic acceptance of diversity and, by implication, the denial of ethical absolutes erode the force of my moral efforts.

I have sworn an oath to a nation which has relied on individuals who have sought to merge their individual self-interests for the betterment of the common good. How can one justify the acceptance of deceitful, dishonest, and damaging behavior under the guise of false liberalism or because of simple timidity? Such negligence cannot but hurt the harmony and stability of a society dedicated to mutual trust and interdependence. I have a duty to the citizens of this country, and I have a responsibility not to tolerate those acts which would disrupt the functioning of the society.

The fact is that it is not acceptable for a person to act in ways contrary to ethical norms simply because he or she "feels" it is right to do so. We must divorce ourselves from emotional responses to human behavior, and we must emphasize the role of standards in evaluating such behavior. One does not promote honesty by lying nor by tolerating lying; fair dealing by cheating nor by tolerating cheating; rights to property by stealing nor by tolerating theft; order by committing acts which are contrary to accepted ethical norms nor by tolerating such behavior in others.

Too often the "non-toleration" clause becomes a mumbled addendum to the formulaic statement of the Cadet Honor Code. Those who see "non-toleration" as an unwelcome spur to force others to comply with unpopular moral standards are, quite simply, mistaken. It is simply not enough for an individual to behave morally. There also exist obligations to ensure that ethical standards are established and are followed by others. The "non-toleration" clause is an important means for cadets to assert their responsibility to enforce moral standards in environments where ethical relativism may be all too attractive or easy. Cadets should come to understand the value of ethical codes and of behavior done in concert with such codes. Otherwise, we have provided cadets with a short-term ethical view of the world whose only value is to ensure survival while at USMA. That, certainly, is not our purpose.

An Objection to the "Stool Pigeon" Objection

by

Captain Michael D. Wilcomb

"Rat!"  
"Turncoat!"  
"Traitor!"  
"Snitch!"  
"Tattletale!"  
"Informer!"  
"Judas!"  
"Spy!"  
"Stool pigeon!"

The betrayal of a trust is, all things being equal, a dishonorable act, and our language offers a wide choice of words well suited to a heartfelt condemnation of those who betray their fellows. Does the West Point Honor Code breed betrayal of one's fellows? Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, in their widely discussed 1978 book, Crisis in Command, argue that it does. Specifically, they argue that

The objection that the Academy's Honor Code, especially the Non-toleration Clause, turns all "brother officers" into potential stool pigeons is a real one.

They go on to say that the goal of the officer corps is to "inculcate within the individual officer a sense of what is to be done and what is not to be done." And this process of ethical development, conclude Gabriel and Savage,

most certainly does not require that every member of the Corps keep watch on the behavior of every other officer, or that an officer's non-ethical conduct be "betrayed to his superiors."

In support of their objection to the Non-toleration Clause, Gabriel and Savage cite the "uniformly good" experience of other service academies "in allowing the individual some discretion based upon individual choice in dealing with unethical conduct."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), p. 102.

In fairness to Gabriel and Savage, I must note that the "stool pigeon" objection is only briefly discussed in Crisis in Command. My target here may well be a straw one (and, in fact, Richard Gabriel later changes his mind and argues forcefully in favor of a stringent Non-toleration Clause<sup>2</sup>). My goal is to demonstrate that, upon reflection, the "stool pigeon" objection is seen to rest on conceptual confusion. But the confusion becomes apparent only after some questioning reflection, and, for that reason, the target, though perhaps made of straw, is a legitimate one.

I think that Gabriel and Savage are wrong in claiming that condemnatory terms like "stool pigeon" can be applied properly to a cadet or officer who reports the unethical conduct of a fellow. Their "stool pigeon" objection to the Non-toleration Clause is fundamentally mistaken. It distorts the concept of betrayal and tries to apply the term "stool pigeon" to a situation it does not fit. The act of reporting unethical conduct cannot meaningfully be called an act of betrayal, because the "authority" to whom the report is given is the unethical cadet's or officer's own peers. The "betrayed" person or group cannot be the one to whom the report is delivered. If the term "betrayal" is to be used at all, then the report must be rendered to some authority that is at odds with the betrayed person or group. (The Oxford English Dictionary defines "betrayal" as "A treacherous giving up to an enemy.") In other words, there must exist an adversary relationship between "us" and "them." With the West Point Honor Code, no such adversary relationship exists; hence, terms like "stool pigeon" cannot properly be used to describe a person who reports a dishonorable act.

Consider the following statements by Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, who spent some eight years as a POW in North Vietnam.

In a prison civilization, covert or overt, a person's most prized possession is his reputation with his peers.... Loyalty to the group; I have a reputation to uphold with them. I can't let them down. They are my country. They are my family.<sup>3</sup>

In the "prison civilization" of which Stockdale speaks, the adversary relationship is quite clear. Indeed, it is intrinsic to the situation. The prisoners must maintain solidarity in the face of their captors, and a prisoner who secretly reports to the camp commandant is properly labelled a stool pigeon. But his fellow prisoner who sees him go to the warden is not properly called a stool pigeon when he reports his wayward brother to their fellow prisoners. The cadet or officer who reports unethical behavior is more like the latter prisoner than like the stool pigeon.

The "stool pigeon" objection is plausible only if the Cadet Corps or the Officer Corps is somehow analogous to Stockdale's prison civilization. But any such analogy is a false one, just because the very clear adversary relationship intrinsic to prison (and necessary if terms like "stool pigeon" are to be properly employed) does not exist in the Officer or Cadet Corps. There is no "enemy" against which the group maintains solidarity on this issue of honorable behavior, for we speak only of relationships among peers.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup>"To Serve With Honor," Army, May 1980.

<sup>3</sup>"The Melting Experience," National Review, December 25, 1981, p. 1537.

<sup>4</sup>If a detailed description of some unethical episode, say a cheating ring, were to appear in a widely read newspaper or magazine, then terms like "traitor" or "stool pigeon" might be appropriately attached to the person who chose to "go public" rather than to report the violation of group norms to the group itself. The requisite sort of adversary relationship might well exist between the Corps or West Point and the muck-raking publisher. But such a scenario has nothing to do with the Non-toleration Clause.

It is, of course, ingenuous to suppose that various kinds of adversary relationships do not exist within the Cadet or Officer Corps. Sometimes the term "stool pigeon" is used in its proper context. The Inspector General is too often an adversary to the unit commander, for example, whether we like it or not (for the annual IG inspection is a measure of how well the commander is doing his job and might help to determine what sort of efficiency report he receives). An adversary relationship has been known to exist between the unit commander and the "race relations" officer. Draftees and "lifers" were sometimes at odds during the Vietnam era. One group of cadets (say, a company, an athletic team, or even people from Montana) may see themselves as a group distinct from and sometimes opposed to the rest of the Corps. Gabriel and Savage, with their comment "betrayed to his superiors," seem to imply that a similar adversary relationship exists also with regard to the enforcement of a standard of honorable conduct within the Cadet or Officer Corps. To the contrary, though, in speaking of adherence to a code of ethical behavior, it seems clear that such a "we-they" confrontation should not exist. A Non-toleration Clause is not supposed to set junior officer against senior officer, or some "Office of Professional Ethics Enforcement" against the rest of the Officer Corps (again, look at what we almost did to race relations), just as the Non-toleration Clause of the Cadet Honor Code is not intended to create an adversary relationship between the Honor Committee and the Corps, between the Corps and the Superintendent, or between one group of cadets and the rest of the Corps. Terms like "stool pigeon" simply cannot be used unless such an adversary relationship already actually exists. Gabriel and Savage seem to imply that "stool pigeon" is a meaningful label under normal, non-adversary, peer relationship circumstances. If this is their claim (and if it is not, then I have no idea what else they might mean to say), then they are wrong, for if the situation is such that condemnatory terms like "stool pigeon" can be accurately used to describe a cadet who reports an honor violation, then something is seriously wrong with the situation. An adversary relationship has come to exist where none should.

Values And The Non-Toleration Clause

by

Major John W. Reitz

"I think the Non-toleration Clause of the Cadet Honor Code violates the ideals of forgiveness and toleration."

"I disagree. A cadet agrees to meet certain standards. Requiring a cadet to apply those same standards to other cadets who made the same agreement is only fair."

Do either of these views express your thoughts on the Non-toleration Clause? They do represent two positions that are likely responses to that provision of the Cadet Honor Code. These two antithetical positions present an apparent dilemma. Should I choose a course that demonstrates my compassion or should I choose a course that refers only to a principle of action? This dilemma, however, is not real, because the claim that enforcing the Non-toleration Clause violates a reasonable standard of compassion is mistaken. When the behavior required of a cadet by the Non-toleration Clause is properly understood, it will be seen to be consistent with traditional concepts of forgiveness and toleration current in our society. More importantly, in view of the educational mission of the Cadet Honor Code, the motivation and willingness to act because of and in accordance with the Non-toleration Clause is an important building block in the construction of the professional sense of honor.

The Non-toleration Clause is not an optional addition to the Honor Code; it makes explicit the special status of the values that provide the foundation for the Cadet Honor Code. These values stimulate a variety of virtuous actions. Certainly, cadets experience the virtuous life of honest dealing and mutual trust when they observe the proscriptions: do not lie, do not cheat, and do not steal.

But cadets, and former cadets, may confuse the act with larger claims. We need to discover the precise relationship of particular acts to general concepts such as ideals, virtues, and values. The understanding that results from the discovery exists on two levels. The first level is formal. A particular act is judged right or wrong using a standard that expresses an ideal. A particular instance of honest dealing is right because it is an action that satisfies the standards of the ideal that might be called honesty.<sup>1</sup> A cadet could say that he values honesty. He values honesty by judging all of his actions and those of other cadets by the standard of honesty expressed in the Code. Knowing and acting in accordance with the Cadet Honor Code is an operation of the first level of understanding.

Using the first level of understanding, the Cadet Honor Code inculcates the habits of honest dealing and mutual trust. The cadet may not recognize the values that are the foundation of his virtuous life, but he does understand how to judge his acts using the ideals expressed in the Code. The Non-toleration Clause, in turn, obligates the cadet to extend this first order judgment from his own actions to the actions of others.

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<sup>1</sup>COL Peter Stromberg offered the suggestion that the Cadet Honor Code might more accurately be called an Honesty Code. This possibility caught my interest and led indirectly to this paper.

The Cadet Honor Code offers a way to the discovery of universal values.<sup>2</sup> This discovery results from a second level of understanding. When a particular cadet adopts the concepts explicit in the Cadet Honor Code, he opens himself to a new level of understanding that eludes formal description. In fact, cadets are told to consider the Code as a set of categorical minimums: they are told further to act within the "spirit of the Code." A cadet who discovers in the course of four years that Honor is important to him and is an important attribute in those he works with understands at the second level. He can talk about this level of understanding, but he cannot transfer this understanding to someone else. At the second (higher) level of understanding the values that might remain hidden in the first level become clear and vital. The difference between a cadet who understands the "spirit of the Code" and one who simply follows the rules is like the difference between a master violinist who creates music and a student of the violin who plays well technically but still needs an instructor to guide him.

The Code is a symbol. It contains and suggests many meanings. Its utility comes not from its immediate elements but from its ability in the context of West Point to take a cadet from the first level of understanding to the higher level of understanding, as new levels of meaning unfold in his apprehension of the symbol. A cadet soon learns that honor is more than not lying, cheating, or stealing. The cadet must still use the Code, however, and this use will normally lead to a recognition of its symbolic role as the cadet begins to discover the "spirit of the Code." Thus, the symbolic role of the Code is a vehicle that can transport a person from a sterile understanding of an abstract concept to a vital understanding of central values.

In the movement to the second level of understanding, the cadet uses the symbol not only to discover but also to employ his network of values. A cadet who asks himself what honesty requires could reasonably offer acting in accordance with the Cadet Honor Code as an answer. Thus, the Honor Code becomes the specific standard of judgment for his acts if he is to value honesty. But this same cadet may discover that this use of the Code leads to other values. For example, his experience of valuing honesty may lead to an awareness of moral courage which he may also begin to value personally. This development demonstrates the symbolic power of the Cadet Honor Code because it can continue to lead him to other discoveries. One lesson should be the discovery that honorable action becomes important not only as it reflects upon the individual, but also as it reflects upon and advances the interest of the group. The intensely personal experience of the Cadet Honor Code, ironically, brings the cadet to an understanding of the collective nature of the values behind the Code. The symbol causes the individual first to turn inward to find values, but then when the values are tested and found true, he turns those values outward. He now invests his actions with the values that are the bond of the Corps.

The willingness and ability to live the values of the Cadet Honor Code is a stipulation of membership in the Corps of Cadets. For each cadet, this stipulation extends beyond an individual responsibility to that of a responsibility held to everyone else within the Corps. The Non-toleration Clause expresses that collective responsibility. A cadet who does not tolerate the lying of another cadet, for example, upholds the standards that are held collectively by the Corps. At the first level of understanding, the obligation to respond to misconduct under the standards of the Code is clear even

<sup>2</sup> There are a number of philosophical positions that would take issue with the claim that there are universal values, or that we can know these universal values. My position is that there are a number of universal values. All rational persons are equally capable of discovering these universal values. Because length constraints do not permit an exploration of alternative arguments for or against the existence and nature of universal values, I cannot discuss them now. These other arguments are of interest, however, and deserve future consideration.

if the cadet does not support that obligation fully. At the second level of understanding, the obligation becomes a personal one. The judgment he applies to the acts of others issues not from some arbitrary standard but from a Code that has had and will continue to have the power to motivate the members of the Long Grey Line.

Knowing what ought to be done is only one piece of knowledge that must still compete with other types of knowledge. Although a cadet faced with the need to respond to an apparent violation of the Cadet Honor Code knows clearly what should be done, that does not mean that it is also easy to do. Suppose a cadet, let us refer to him as Jim, observes another cadet, Sheila, looking in her notebook during what is supposed to be a closed-book writ. Although Jim does not know positively at that moment that Sheila is cheating, he does have good reason to suspect that she may in fact be cheating. His obligation under the Cadet Honor Code is clear.

The fact that Jim suspects that an honor violation has taken place obligates him to determine the truth of the matter and, if Sheila has committed a dishonorable act, i.e., cheating, Jim is obligated not to tolerate that act. How to proceed? Clearly, Jim must determine the facts, and perhaps the best way to do so is to confront Sheila directly, telling her what he observed and explaining that he suspects her of having committed an honor violation. Such a direct confrontation accomplishes a number of things. First, it gets the incident out into the open and provides a way for the facts to be known, thus removing any doubt that Jim might harbor if he did not confront Sheila. Second, Jim places the burden for reporting the incident on Sheila; and third, by his actions, Jim fulfills his initial obligation of non-toleration. Of course, if Sheila fails to report the incident herself, Jim then has an obligation to make the report himself.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time there are other considerations that naturally arise. Jim might find the need to confront Sheila with his suspicions to be distasteful. He might worry about offending Sheila if she turns out to be innocent of any wrongdoing. He might also worry that accusing Sheila of an honor violation might cause other cadets to think ill of him. Now all of these are real considerations, but none of them refers to, let alone mitigate, the obligations and base values of the Non-toleration Clause. Jim must face the fact that the actions of a peer force him to enforce an obligation that the other person has evidently not met. Jim can meet his obligation if he is willing to value the standards of the Cadet Honor Code more than he values his personal convenience or his misguided consideration for someone else's feelings.

Jim faces a tough decision. Some people argue that the decision he faces is too tough. The reasons they offer for this claim are varied, but those reasons do seem to share an appeal to some form of obligation that is greater than the obligation Jim has to the Cadet Honor Code. For example, we would not allow a cadet to justify becoming a traitor or taking another's life because he must act in accordance with the Code. While these possibilities are extreme and easily dismissed, there is a possibility that in the application of the standards which proceed from the Code, Jim may distort the fundamental values in favor of something else. For example, if Jim were to take on the Code as a crusade and as a result terrorize the fellow cadets with accusations, we would condemn his actions as unfair. Our concern is one that logically precedes the procedural process of the Honor System. Cadets should not adhere to a system that values concepts above other human beings. Any system that does not place the highest value on the concept of human rights violates at the most fundamental level the traditions of our country.

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<sup>3</sup>This paragraph provided by LTC Douglas Verdier.

A careful examination of Jim's ethical decision-making process should demonstrate that the Cadet Honor Code does place the highest value on human rights. Jim may be dealing with actions and standards on the surface, but the importance of the individual is there even if it is not apparent. This may be shown by returning to an earlier distinction between particular acts and general concepts. Jim meets his obligations under the Code by referring to particular acts. When he observes Sheila doing something questionable, he makes a judgment about the act and the act only. If he judges Sheila's act to be wrong, then he must do something. This conditional response does not include a judgment of Sheila. The focus of the judgmental process is always on acts and never on individuals.

Certainly, the judgments we apply to the acts of an individual effect them. A man who is caught stealing and convicted of that crime may be sent to jail. A cadet who is caught stealing and found guilty will normally be removed from the Corps of Cadets. If Sheila is found guilty of cheating, then others are likely to think less of her because of that act. Our acts speak louder than our words. If we claim to be honest, we must perform honestly. If we credit Sheila and every other cadet with the ability to act in accordance with standards of honesty and honor, then surely we value them at least as much if not more than we value honesty. Holding a cadet responsible for her actions does not diminish her value as a person, it upholds it. A cadet who discovers the second level of understanding, "the spirit of the Code," holds the value of the free and autonomous individual as a precondition to the other values he experiences.

The Non-toleration Clause establishes firm connections with all the values a cadet comes to know as a part of that symbol. The Clause emphasizes the cadet's responsibility to the values he serves. If the cadet holds the values contained in the Cadet Honor Code to be universally binding for the members of the Corps, then he must require other cadets to observe that bond. In the hypothetical situation, Jim should be able to recognize the rational justification for applying the Non-toleration Clause to Sheila's apparent violation. This rational knowledge does not change the emotional factors that compete with the obligation to observe the Cadet Honor Code. The choice remains with Jim: he can choose the obligation to a set of enduring values or he can give in to the emotions of the moment. Jim, like any cadet faced with this same problem, will consider the problem very carefully; Jim can choose either one, but there are certain costs associated with either choice. If he chooses to confront Sheila with the apparent violation, then he must brave the emotional storm that could follow. Braving that storm, however, should show him that it can be done, and he should also learn that this choice is much easier to live with because he has not given up his self-respect and he has reaffirmed the group values. The other choice leads to a much different conclusion: among other things it should lead to Jim turning himself in for an honor violation.

The Non-toleration Clause imposes a heavy duty upon young men and women, many of whom are still in their teens. Most cadets go through four years without facing the need to call someone to task because of the Clause. Even without the actual need to act upon it, most cadets have surely considered what they might do if they were faced with that need. The answers they discover as a result of such introspection should lead to a knowledge of the universal values contained within the Cadet Honor Code that complements the values they discovered on a personal level when they learned to live honorably under the proscriptions of the Code.

Helen Rogan, MIXED COMPANY: WOMEN IN THE MODERN ARMY.  
New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1981. 333 pp.; \$14.95.  
Review by Captain Jonathan Mark Faith.

I approached this book with great misgivings, even for one who has had his consciousness raised on numerous occasions. For one thing, I commanded an integrated training company similar to the one in which the authoress trained as part of her research. For another, I was aide-de-camp to Major General Mary E. Clarke, the commander of Ft. McClellan, during the period Helen Rogan spent in basic training there. At the time, I clearly remember having doubts about her project. After all, how could a civilian understand what we are about based on such a short foray into the Army?

In one regard I was not disappointed. There is something here to outrage everyone. There are bold assertions and accusations by militant feminists (no pun intended) which are bound to bruise even the most liberal male ego, and there are stories of discrimination, sexual harassment, and outright cruelty that are sure to anger even the most rabid anti-feminist. Enough for the stereotypes.

Helen Rogan is a journalist, and what this book does best is record history. Not long past history, although it does some of this in a haphazard way, but rather history in the recent past and in the making.

Ms. Rogan is trying to make a case for women in the military. History is a major part of her argument. She is least effective when she is rambling through isolated historical examples of military women from ancient mythology to the present. She is most effective when she details the more recent history of the Women's Army Corps, the Army Nurse Corps, and the Army as it exists today. In these organizations she can point to vital contributions that women have made, and are continuing to make in service to the nation.

But perhaps the most valuable aspect of the book for those who have little firsthand experience with women in the Army, lies in her revealing interviews with individuals. If Ms. Rogan's own words seem weak by comparison, it is only because she has so successfully captured the force and depth of feeling on every side of the issue. Compare the words of the male captain who asks:

Do I want my daughter to become promiscuous and callous?  
Do I want her to become defeminized? And what about in  
war? Do I want my daughter to be taken prisoner and  
raped?

----to the female major at West Point who says:

West Point is twenty-five years behind the Army. I  
have a love/hate relationship with it, and I hope it  
will change. But the way it is here now, everything  
reinforces the male ego. Women are not welcome; they  
are tolerated. At every turn they have to justify not  
only their existence but their birthright.

----to the female lieutenant with prior service in the WAC  
who says softly:

In my head I know integration was the right thing,  
but in my heart I'm not sure.

These are expressions of pain and conviction that reflect, much better than any cool explanations, the depth of the problem.

Ms. Rogan has not avoided the hard issues, and her ability to deal with them is particularly refreshing. She takes great pains to be open, candid, and evenhanded in every instance. For example, she handles the difficult facts of the homosexual clique that existed in the Women's Army Corps delicately, yet without flinching from the truth. On the other hand, when she condemns what she sees as institutionalized discriminatory attitudes of officers and cadets at West Point, she does not hesitate to defend the values and motivations which are, however mistakenly, used as the basis for prejudices.

Most of Ms. Rogan's ideas in this book are clearly not her own. She borrows well from others. But in one area her insight is almost profound. After discussing at great length all the questions of physical strength and stamina, all the issues of sexual conduct and women in combat, all the surveys and tests meant to measure performance, she concludes that the basic issue is one of moral principle.

Furthermore, she quite accurately sees that once the moral question of principle has been decided, the implementation is a question of leadership. Her own evidence, following trainees whom she met in basic training into their units, indicates that it is the commander who makes the difference in whether men and women learn to function together in an environment in which all can achieve personal satisfaction from their jobs.

Perhaps we think we do not need to be told these things. At least we like to think that we do not, but there is much in our recent history to suggest that we do.

I recommend this book highly for the professional reading list of everyone who deals with women in the Army. And that, my friends, means all of us.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anyone desiring to pursue one or more of the ideas raised in this publication may use this partial bibliography as a start. Earlier issues of Ethics and the Military Profession contain more extensive listings.

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