

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA
RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IN EUROPE. (U)
MAR 82 B HOFFMAN
RAND/N-1856-AF

F49620-82-C-0018
NL

UNCLASSIFIED

RAND/N-1856-AF

100

END

DATE _____

FISHES

5

OTIC

A RAND NOTE

AD A114129

Prepared For

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IN EUROPE

Bruce Hoffman

March 1982

N-1856-AF

The United States Air Force

DTIC FILE COPY

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406

DTIC
ELECTE
MAY 5 1982
S D A

82 05 05 006

The research reported here was sponsored by the Directorate of Operational Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff/Research, Development, and Acquisition, Hq. USAF, under Contract F49620-82-C-0018. The United States Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation hereon.

The Rand Publications Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

Published by The Rand Corporation

A RAND NOTE

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IN EUROPE

Bruce Hoffman

March 1982

N-1856-AF

Prepared For

The United States Air Force

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER N-1856-AF	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-114 129	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Interim	
	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER	
7. AUTHOR(s) Bruce Hoffman	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) F49620-82-C-0018	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS The Rand Corporation 1700 Main Street Santa Monica, CA. 90406	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Requirements, Programs & Studies Group (AF/RDQM) Ofc, DCS/R&D and Acquisition Hq USAF, Washington, DC 20330	12. REPORT DATE March 1982	
	13. NUMBER OF PAGES 31	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified	
	15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release: Distribution Unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) No Restrictions		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Europe Terrorism Political Science		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) See Reverse Side		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

→ This Note presents an analysis of right-wing terrorism in Europe. It considers the phenomenon of right-wing terrorism--its methods, aims, and prospects. It examines the right-wing or neo-Nazi/neo-fascist organizations presently active in Italy, West Germany, and France. It analyzes the origins of recent violent right-wing activity and touches on the recent historical background of these groups, their ideology and mindset, targeting and modus operandi, international connections, and their possible effect on U.S. interests. The likely future actions of right-wing terrorists cannot be predicted, but it can be said at this time there seems to be no danger that right-wing terrorists can actually "take over" anywhere. But they can--and do--create a climate that has destabilizing effects on the countries in which they operate and therefore on the NATO alliance as well; thus, they pose an indirect danger to the security of the United States. 31 pp.

↑

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

PREFACE

The analysis of right-wing terrorism reported in this Note was performed under Project AIR FORCE as part of a concept development effort within Rand's National Security Strategies Program. The information contained herein should be of particular interest to Air Staff planners and intelligence analysts concerned with the phenomenon of global terrorism.

Incidents that occurred after the completion of the research that led to this Note, such as an incident at Antwerp on October 20, 1981, have not been included here. The Antwerp incident was considered by some to have been the work of right-wing terrorists because of the nature of the target. But, like the 1980 bombing of a synagogue in Paris, it may instead have been the work of Palestinians.



Accession For	
NTIS - GPO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Spec

SUMMARY

This Note presents an analysis of right-wing terrorism in Europe. While left-wing terrorism is much better known to most observers and has been much more prevalent since World War II, in the past few decades the distinction between "right" and "left" has become somewhat hazy and controversial. Both Hitler and Stalin contributed to that obscuration, the former by calling his political organization the National-Socialist Party (into which quite a few "leftists" actually found their way), the latter by setting up a one-man tyranny of such intensity as to make a shambles out of Marxist and even Leninist theories.

Nevertheless, despite these semantic uncertainties, the meanings of the terms left and right, or socialist and fascist, at least as used in the Western world, are generally clear. Right, on the whole, means opposition to Communism and everything "socialist." Left means opposition to the democratic capitalist state. In Germany, the Baader-Meinhof gang (Red Army Fraction) and its offshoots, the Revolutionary Cells and the 2nd of June Movement, were clearly leftist, as are the Red Brigades in Italy. In contrast, there are right-wing terrorist groups which, instead of fighting the democratic capitalist state, attempt to "go it one better" in fighting leftist influences. Finally, right frequently has a racist connotation, while left does not; and right is nationalist, whereas left is not.

This Note considers the phenomenon of right-wing terrorism--its methods, aims, and prospects. More specifically, it examines the right-wing or neo-Nazi/neo-fascist organizations presently active in Italy, West

Germany, and France. It analyzes the origins of recent violent right-wing activity and touches on the recent historical background of these groups, their ideology and mindset, targeting and modus operandi, international connections, and their possible effect on U.S. interests.

Throughout the 1970s, terrorism in Western Europe was mostly a left-wing phenomenon. But in the summer and fall of 1980, bombings at the Bologna train station, the Munich Oktoberfest, and a synagogue in Paris signaled a resurgence of right-wing terrorism. A series of unrelated events in other parts of the continent similarly pointed to a revival of right-wing extremism and violence: In Turkey, the unimpeded escalation of fratricidal terrorism between right- and left-wing extremists prompted the Army to overthrow the democratically elected civilian government in September 1980 and place Turkey under military rule; in Spain, the historical conflict between reformists and reactionaries provoked an unsuccessful attempt by ultranationalists in the military to seize power in February 1981; in May 1981, a known Turkish right-wing militant--who was already wanted for the assassination of a newspaper editor in Turkey--tried to murder the Pope in St. Peter's Square; and during the summer of 1981, a chain of destructive riots spawned by the vitriolic racism of right-wing extremists belonging to organizations like the National Front spread through Great Britain.¹

The Bologna, Oktoberfest, and synagogue bombings were the most serious and alarming manifestations of this trend. Unlike left-wing terrorism, which has almost always been targeted against specific individuals or institutions, the right-wing operations appeared to be aimed at deliberately killing and injuring large numbers of "innocent" people. Whereas left-wing terrorists have selectively kidnapped and

assassinated persons whom they blamed for economic exploitation or political repression in order to attract publicity and promote a Marxist-type revolution, the right-wing terrorist tactic of bombing public gathering places appeared to be designed to attract attention to the terrorists and their cause and to produce a climate of disorder and despair amenable to an authoritarian, or fascist, takeover.

Left-wing terrorist tactics are like those of sharpshooters who carefully pick specific victims, while right-wing tactics are more like those of bombing aircraft, which aim at larger numbers of people but still are not indiscriminate in the selection of their targets. Both sides seek targets that are lucrative from their point of view--left-wing terrorists kill a Moro or a Schleyer, while right-wing terrorists bomb a synagogue or a train station. The difference is that the right-wing terrorist incidents result in larger numbers of victims.

The ultimate political aims of the two types of terrorism are opposite: Right-wing terrorism appears directed toward bringing about a form of government similar to the fascist regimes of Italy, Germany, and Japan before and during World War II (and to some extent, France under Laval and Petain), whereas the aims of the leftists range from promoting socialism to bringing about a millennialist society.

The origins of right-wing terrorism are also quite different from those of left-wing terrorism. Left-wing terrorism has primarily been founded and carried forward by politically engaged intellectuals, whereas right-wing terrorism has sprung from militarist, totalitarian sources left over from the post-World War II remnants of fascist forces.

However, there also are similarities between right- and left-wing terrorism. Neither commits actions randomly or senselessly. Both want

maximum publicity to be generated by their actions, and both aim at intimidation and subjection.

We cannot predict the likely future actions of right-wing terrorists or how much or what kind of danger they represent to the countries that may be involved. We can only say that at this time there seems to be no danger that right-wing terrorists can actually "take over" anywhere. But they can--and do--create a climate that has destabilizing effects on the countries in which they operate and therefore on the NATO alliance as well; thus, they pose an indirect danger to the security of the United States.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his appreciation for the assistance he received from Brian Jenkins, Konrad Kellen, Geraldine Petty, and Alan Platt.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
SUMMARY	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
Section	
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	1
Italy	1
West Germany	6
France	8
II. TARGETING AND MODUS OPERANDI	12
III. IDEOLOGY AND MINDSET	15
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS	20
V. CONCLUSIONS	23
Significance of the Emergence of Right-Wing Terrorism	24
Potential Threats to U.S. Interests	25
FOOTNOTES	27

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The series of right-wing bombings that occurred in Italy, Germany, and France during the summer and fall of 1980 came as a surprise to many, but indications of the reemergence of the violent right had begun to appear well before that time. This section presents an examination of the recent background of the right wing in these countries.

ITALY

The neo-fascist movements in Italy are the oldest in Western Europe. They are descended from the Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Socialist Movement), or MSI, which was founded shortly after World War II by Giorgio Almirante. After Mussolini's fall, Almirante, a disciple of Mussolini and a cabinet minister in his fascist government, built the MSI into a powerful and respectable political force. Its membership consisted of the same national socialists, militarists, and conservatives that composed Mussolini's original fascist party. However, since postwar Italian law forbids the public espousal of fascism, the MSI was fashioned as a deeply traditionalist and conservative political party, advocating the advancement of its goals and programs through democratic change and constitutional procedure.² Its platforms stress commitment to the strengthening of family, church, and nationalist values, while denouncing and working against divorce, abortion, rock music, and especially Communism.³ The MSI is a constant parliamentary gadfly to whatever government is in power, assailing all incumbents for weak and inept leadership, inability to maintain public order and eliminate leftist terrorism, and--the greatest sin of all--

toleration of Communists in local and national government. The MSI, which claimed to have 400,000 members in 1975,⁴ presently has the support of 7 percent of the Italian electorate; in the last general election, it received over 2 million votes, making it Italy's fourth largest party.⁵

Despite the MSI's declared commitment to democratic principles, its critics allege that it is a dangerous enemy of Italy's liberal-democracy. The movement has been described by one critic as

still advocat[ing] an organic, corporate state under a charismatic leader who would neither seek nor need an electoral consensus but rather would express the "spirit" of his people. Such a state would be governed by an "aristocracy of quality," not an old-fashioned nobility of blood but a leadership class that establishes its superiority precisely by seizing power.⁶

The MSI also is accused of behaving moderately in public, while secretly working to overthrow the Italian government and replace it with an authoritarian regime, organized along fascist lines.⁷

This effort is supported by various neo-fascist paramilitary formations and terrorist organizations which are descendants, at least ideologically, of the MSI. Their strategy is based on Mussolini's time-proven prescription for seizing power: "During times of crisis, violence should be employed to arouse and polarize the public."⁸ The neo-fascist terrorists are dedicated to inciting violence and disorder so as to create a state of anarchy, from which public demand for the restoration of law and order will spring and enable the neo-fascists to assume power and govern Italy as a totalitarian state.

The first of these groups was the Ordine Nuovo (New Order), which has been termed the "precursor and prototype of fraternal organizations

elsewhere in Europe."⁹ Ordine Nuovo was founded in 1953 by an MSI deputy, Giuseppe "Pino" Rauti, allegedly as "a Nazi fighting force oriented toward German drill and blind obedience."¹⁰ Italian police suspect that this group was responsible for the 1969 bombing of a bank in Milan that killed 16 people and injured 81 others. In April 1973, Ordine Nuovo members attempted to sabotage the Rome-Turin rail line, and in November 1973 the group was banned by the government.¹¹ At that time, MSI severed its ties with Ordine Nuovo,¹² apparently fearing the repercussions of continued association with an outlawed terrorist group.

The government ban, however, was only a minor inconvenience to the rightists, who simply reorganized Ordine Nuovo into Ordine Nero (Black Order). A number of smaller, similarly oriented right-wing groups, including Avanguardia Nazionale (National Vanguard), Lotta di Popolo (People's Struggle), La Ferrice (Phoenix), and Squadre d'Azione Mussolini (Mussolini Action Squads), merged with Ordine Nero as well.¹³ In May 1974, the group bombed an antifascist rally in Brescia, killing eight people and wounding 85. A month later, Ordine Nero terrorists planted a bomb on the Italicus express train as it traveled from Florence to Bologna. Twelve persons died and 48 were wounded in what the police believe to be the bomb's premature explosion: The terrorists' actual target is thought to have been the Bologna train station.¹⁴ A statement issued by the Ordine Nero afterwards declared, "The Nazi flag did not die in Berlin in 1945. It still lives for a powerful Nazi Italy. Nazism will return for the salvation of a renaissance Italy."¹⁵

Between 1977 and 1978, Ordine Nero attempted to blow up a train carrying then-Prime Minister Andreotti, and it successfully bombed

Rome's Parioli Theatre and a police station in Palermo. Today, Ordine Nero operates alongside such like-minded groups as Movimento Armato Rivoluzionario (MAR, or Armed Revolutionary Movement), Rosa dei Venti (Compass Card), Movimento Popolare Rivoluzionario (MPR, or Popular Revolutionary Movement), Terza Posizione (Third Position), and Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR, or Armed Revolutionary Nucleus). Many of these groups exist in name only: Like their counterparts on the left, right-wing terrorists stage different operations under different names in order to give the impression of size and strength.¹⁶

The NAR is the most active right-wing terrorist group in Italy today. The group first appeared in December 1977, when its members bombed the Rome offices of both the Christian-Democratic and the Italian Communist parties. Since then, Italian police have attributed 25 acts of terrorism to NAR, including the June 1980 assassination of a Roman judge, Mario Amato, and the August 1980 bombing of the Bologna train station, which killed 86 persons and injured 270.¹⁷

Very little is known about the NAR. For three years prior to his assassination, Amato had been conducting a personal investigation of right-wing terrorism in Italy and, in particular, of the NAR. While some reports have suggested that the NAR is either an offshoot of the Ordine Nero or a coalition of several smaller neo-fascist groups,¹⁸ Amato believed that it was the terrorist arm of Terza Posizione, a semilegal, right-wing political entity believed to have been conceived and organized by Paolo Signorelli, a high school teacher and "long-time fascist militant." Amato had uncovered evidence linking Signorelli (who was suspected, but never convicted, of assassinating Amato's predecessor), Professor Aldo Semerari, a criminal psychologist from the

University of Rome, and other prominent right-wing sympathizers with the NAR and Terza Posizione. This evidence, along with Amato's conclusion that the neo-fascist groups have "connections and branches everywhere" in the Italian government, police, and judiciary, were submitted in April 1980 to the head prosecutor of the Rome judiciary, Giovanni De Matteo.

De Matteo did nothing.¹⁹ His own rightist sympathies, his friendship with Semerari and others like him, and his membership in an ultra-rightist masonic lodge (Propaganda 2, also called P-2) undoubtedly contributed to subsequent allegations that "under De Matteo, investigations of right-wing extremists were constantly thwarted; dossiers on their activities never seemed to get off his desk."²⁰ Disconcerted by De Matteo's inaction, Amato went to the Superior Council of the Judiciary on June 13, 1980, detailing his charges. He had also learned that Signorelli and Semerari had been alerted to the evidence that he had uncovered implicating them with the right-wing terrorists. Amato complained of the difficulties he had in trying to obtain an armored car and his fear of assassination. Ten days later, Amato was shot twice in the head while he waited at a Rome bus stop. In September, in spite of--or regardless of--Amato's charges, De Matteo was promoted to head of the Appellate Court.²¹

Italian judicial and police officials have been accused--probably rightly--of consistently ignoring or underestimating the rightists' threat. Only two out of 150 indictments of right-wing extremists in Milan have resulted in conviction and imprisonment.²² It has also been charged that, "In 1976 and again in 1978, judges in Rome, Turin, and Milan fell over each other in their haste to absolve 196 neo-fascists of

crimes ranging from murdering a policeman to 'reconstituting Fascism'.... When it comes to fascist terrorism, Italian authorities seem to be a bit blind in the right eye."²³ When Italy's Interior Minister, Virginio Rognoni, was interviewed on this subject, he denied accusations of police collusion or apathy, arguing that "the ministry and police do not apply different standards of scrutiny to the different stripes of terrorism."²⁴

WEST GERMANY

Various neo-Nazi organizations have existed in Germany since the early 1960s. The largest of these was the National Democratic Party (NPD), which was founded in 1964 as an umbrella organization for a number of smaller entities. The NPD was never successful at the polls and was dissolved in the early 1970s after it failed to win any seats in the national assembly and suffered widespread defections to the extremist wing of the Christian Democratic Party. Toward the end of the 1970s, two new--and more extreme--neo-Nazi groups appeared: the Deutsche Aktionsgruppe (German Action Group) and the Hoffmann-Wehrsportgruppe (Hoffmann Military Sports Group).

Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, right-wing terrorism amounted to very little in West Germany. As the German news magazine Der Spiegel observed, the neo-Nazis were "more or less content with calling attention to themselves by wearing uniforms, hoarding weapons, and using Nazi slogans. Most of the time, it all amounted to nothing more than brawls, vulgarities, and smeared slogans."²⁵ But in 1979, right-wing terrorists were responsible for eight bombings or acts of arson, 24 desecrations of Jewish cemeteries, and 41 other acts of violence and vandalism.²⁶ Officials of the Bundesamt fuer

Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), or BfV, estimated that during 1979 some 1400 neo-Nazis were responsible for 1,483 felonies, 117 of which involved violence.²⁷ The May 1979 issue of Executive Risk Assessment observed that

One of the most interesting yet least noted developments in Western Europe during the last 24 months has been the steady increase in terrorist operations by neo-Nazi groups in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Whereas terrorism in the mid-1970s was carried out almost exclusively by radical Marxist organizations, today the largest and most active groups are fascist in political outlook.²⁸

There does not appear to be any explanation for this sudden activity.

Even with this upsurge in neo-Nazi violence, German police did not expect the series of bombings that shook Germany during 1980, culminating in an explosion at the Munich Oktoberfest on September 27. In July 1980, the BfV announced that "a clear falling-off of activities" of the German neo-Nazis had been discerned by its analysts, who confidently predicted the continuation of this trend.²⁹ But the analysis ignored three bombings by the Deutsche Aktionsgruppe during the spring of that year. All three targets were in some way related to assisting or settling foreign guest workers in Germany. The group bombed a fourth target on August 17, a foreigners' hospice in Loerrach, injuring one woman; and in their fifth attack, on a shelter in Hamburg, two Vietnamese refugees were killed. But these attacks pale in comparison to the Oktoberfest bombing, which killed 13 persons and wounded 215. Police suspect that the "Hoffmann Military Sports Group" (which had been banned by the government in January 1980) was involved in the Oktoberfest bombing. One of the victims was a member of the group who apparently planted the bomb, which police believe exploded

prematurely. Other members, including Hoffmann, were arrested but were later released when no evidence linking them to the blast could be discovered.³⁰

FRANCE

The origins of the French right-wing terrorists are considerably more obscure than those of either the Italian or German groups. They first came to public attention in January 1978, when a group claiming to belong to "The Charles Martell Club" attacked a camp of foreign guest workers in Nice. On May 7, the "Club" struck again, bombing the headquarters of the North African Moslem Students Association. Four days later, it bombed the Algerian Consulate outside of Paris. In June, a group calling itself the French National Liberation Front (FNLF) bombed the Paris headquarters of the international travel organization Club Méditerranée. This attack was justified by the FNLF as "an act of resistance to [the] Jewish occupation" of France. The group went on to explain that they were also anti-African and anti-Arab, stating, "We didn't fight German occupation to be subjected to one million Jews, Arabs, and Negroes."³¹

It is not clear why these groups suddenly appeared in 1978. Unlike right-wing terrorists in Italy and Germany, the French neo-fascists do not appear to have gone through a transition from marginal respectability and nonviolent extremism to outright terrorism. The roots of French neo-fascism extend back to the Croix de Feu (Cross of Fire) and Cagoulards (Hooded Men), two paramilitary organizations that were active in France during the 1930s, but no intermediate links can be discerned between these two bodies and present-day right-wing extremists. The Charles Martell Club and the FNLF both mysteriously

disappeared after their 1978 attacks. In 1979, they were succeeded by The Fighters Against Jewish Occupation and "Odessa."³² A variety of similarly oriented neo-fascist groups have since emerged, all bearing cryptic (and ominous) names.³³

As was the case in Germany, France's right-wing terrorism did not attain alarming proportions until 1980. But in the nine months before the bombing of the Paris synagogue, French police recorded 122 incidents of violence and arson perpetrated by neo-fascist groups and another 66 "serious threats and acts of vandalism."³⁴ In fact, 21 of the 150 anti-Semitic or racist incidents that have occurred in France since 1976 took place between July and October 1980. During that summer, the Federation Nationale Europeene (FANE, or the Nationalist Front for European Action in France) sent death threats to 67 prominent Jews in southern France. In September 1980, following attacks on a Parisian anti-racist political movement and a Jewish-owned clothing store, FANE was banned by the French government. The group, headed by an anti-Semite named Marc Fredrickson, simply dissolved itself and regrouped as the Faisceaux Nationalistes Europeens (FNE, or European Nationalist Fascists) under the leadership of 81-year-old Robert Petit--the former director of Vichy's "Center for the Study of Jewish Questions."³⁵

A week before the bombing of the synagogue on Paris' Rue Copernic, five Jewish institutions in Paris were sprayed with machine-gun fire. Then, on October 4, the synagogue was bombed, leaving four persons dead and 12 injured. It was immediately presumed that the neo-fascists were involved, given their recent violently anti-Semitic activities, and indeed, telephone calls were made to news agencies after the bombing, claiming that FNE was responsible. But this has yet to be proven, and

it is now believed that Palestinian terrorists were behind the bombing.³⁶

Various French Jewish organizations, as well as the secretary-general of the French detectives union (SNAPC), Inspector Jose Deltron, accused the French police of deliberately hindering investigations of the neo-fascists. Deltron stated that the Interior Minister, Christian Bonnet, had the names of 150 policemen who were active in right-wing groups.³⁷ He also quoted from the September issue of Notre Europe, FNE's newsletter, which claimed that "For the first time, it is no longer the police who are infiltrating the Nazis but the Nazis who are infiltrating the police."³⁸ Others have alleged that policemen comprise up to one-third of FANE's membership.³⁹

One of Notre Europe's prolific contributors is, coincidentally, a former inspector on the Nice police force named Paul-Louis Durand. In one issue of the newsletter, Durand wrote, "No, Hitler was not a monster. The Jews were not victims of genocide. Race is the basis of a nation.... The gas chambers did not exist." In another issue, he wrote, "Hitler's thinking is in line with a global vision of the world which is where the great strength of our school of ideas lies."⁴⁰ Durand was dismissed from the Nice police force after Italian police presented evidence linking him with the Italian neo-fascists. He was reported to have visited a right-wing training camp in Abruzzi, Italy, shortly before the Bologna attack,⁴¹ and he was seen in Nice with a known Italian neo-fascist who is a suspect in the Bologna bombing.⁴²

The most likely explanation for the failure of Italian, German, and French police forces to anticipate the resurgence of right-wing terrorism is that they were preoccupied with leftist violence and

underestimated the threat from persons they regarded as harmless eccentrics who were simply having fun dressing up in Nazi regalia and playing soldier. Given the sustained level of leftist violence throughout the 1970s, it is perhaps not surprising that the police ignored the right-wing's activities. But these explanations are not entirely satisfactory, in view of the fact that right-wing terrorists had caused a number of deaths and injuries as well as a significant amount of property damage well before the bombings in Bologna, Munich, and Paris. It does not seem unreasonable to suspect that the organs of the state in these countries may indeed be somewhat "blind in the right eye."

II. TARGETING AND MODUS OPERANDI

The bombings in Bologna, Munich, and Paris seemed to be the start of a new wave of terrorism in western Europe, with the terrorists seeking symbolic targets and attempting to cause as many deaths and as much injury and destruction as possible. Some Italian analysts described the right-wing terrorists in Italy as Manichean, as a way of explaining their choice of targets and remorseless use of violence. But in the year since the bombings, these analyses have not been confirmed by events.

First, there has been no sustained campaign of right-wing terrorism. Although membership in neo-fascist groups has increased greatly,⁴³ there has not been a commensurate increase in rightist violence. In fact, during the first half of 1981 there were no significant right-wing operations. This is not to suggest that the threat has subsided; the neo-fascists may simply have paused to reorganize and to process new recruits, marshalling their strength for a new offensive. On the other hand, after the outcry that followed the bombings, they may be reassessing their tactics and developing different strategies.

Second, although right-wing terrorism is at times indiscriminate, it is not always so. Except for the Oktoberfest bombing, neo-fascist terrorism in Germany has been directed against specific targets--primarily refugee shelters and immigrant workers' hostels; and in France, every attack has been directed against either Jewish-owned property or businesses or Arab and African student or workers' associations. Italy's record is less consistent: Neo-fascists there

have attacked primarily leftist targets,⁴⁴ but they have also carried out operations against banks, police stations, political party offices, and--what appear to be their favorite targets--trains and train stations.⁴⁵ But even in the 1980 Bologna station bombing and the 1974 explosion on board the Italicus express train traveling to Bologna, the target was a city that is both strongly leftist and administered by a Communist mayor. Conclusions regarding right-wing terrorist targets are clouded still further by questions that remain regarding the three major bombings. The explosives used in Bologna may possibly have been in transit to another city and may have been detonated inadvertently; and the Oktoberfest bomb exploded prematurely, killing the suspected bomber. Thus these cities may not in fact have been the intended targets of the operations. The bombing of the Paris synagogue is now suspected to have been the work of Palestinians, not of French right-wing terrorists.

Third, right-wing terrorism is not perpetrated randomly or senselessly. Like almost every other form of terrorism, right-wing terrorist acts are designed to attract attention and obtain publicity. Terrorists want "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of people dead."⁴⁶ Terrorism is meant to foment fear and insecurity in the target audience, to create widespread disorder that will wear down a society's will to resist the terrorists, and to focus attention on the terrorists themselves.⁴⁷ Thus, the neo-fascist strategy is based not on some pathological obsession to kill as many innocent people as possible, but on a deliberate policy of intimidating the general public into acceding to specific demands.

The right-wing terrorists' favorite weapon is the bomb. This may be an indication that the terrorists are still at a somewhat primitive

stage--unable, because of lack of expertise, organizational skills, or logistical deployment, to carry out more sophisticated operations (e.g., kidnappings and assassinations).⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the bomb serves the needs of the right-wing terrorists well. It is easy to conceal, extremely destructive, and guaranteed to generate publicity. The selective bombing of large public gathering places or the offices and institutions of the terrorists' enemies is designed to manipulate and intimidate the masses into acquiescence.

III. IDEOLOGY AND MINDSET

The ultimate goal of right-wing terrorists is the destruction of the liberal-democratic state to clear the way for a fascist one. But apart from this goal, they do not appear to have any specific program of reform, preferring, instead, to espouse vague national socialist slogans of nationalism, racial purity, and governmental strength. The democratic state is assailed by the rightists for its weakness--its alleged tolerance of Communists in parliament, dark-skinned immigrants in the labor force, and Jews in positions of power and influence. The neo-fascists believe that the nation's survival is dependent upon the exorcism of these three elements; only by becoming politically, racially, and culturally homogeneous can the state recover its strength and again work for its natural citizens and not a variegated collection of interlopers.

The terrorist right in Germany and France is drawn almost exclusively from the lower classes. Its members are mostly young, uneducated common laborers who lack the skills necessary for employment in their countries' highly technical industries. The lack of access to desirable jobs and the attendant lack of opportunity have created a climate of frustration and disaffection among them. "Disillusioned with the gray demeanor of welfare capitalism and the slow pace of liberal social change,"⁴⁹ they seek scapegoats to blame for their unsatisfactory lives and simple solutions to their problems. As a result, they are easily susceptible to the facile answers and emotional dogmas of fascism. The youthful converts to neo-fascism have been described by a

Paris police inspector as "'political punk rockers,' searching for comrades, simplistic answers to their dilemma, scapegoats, and a good fight."⁵⁰

A recent study of the attitudes of young people in Germany revealed that 18 percent of those polled believed in the need for authoritarian rule, while 38 percent favored the expulsion of foreign workers and Arab and Asian immigrants.⁵¹ The favorite scapegoats of the right wing in France are the Jewish capitalists and North African laborers; in Italy, the scapegoats are the Communists and socialists in government and, to a lesser extent, the Jews. The sort of person attracted by the neo-fascist groups embraces terrorism as the ultimate translation of thought into action; of hatred and frustration into cathartic destruction. Violence thus becomes an end in itself, as well as a means of hastening the destruction of the loathsome "system."

Unlike Germany and France, where right-wing terrorism began as recently as 1979, Italy is in the midst of a resurgence of neo-fascist violence that has been gradually gaining strength since the early 1970s. Thus it is not surprising that Italy's terrorist right has been the subject of more political and psychiatric analyses than its German and French counterparts. Studies of right-wing terrorist organizations in Italy describe the socioeconomic composition of those groups as "bipolar,"⁵² that is, composed of persons from both the lower and upper classes of Italian society. This curious mixture of persons from entirely dissimilar, and even opposite, backgrounds is explained as follows by an Italian psychiatrist: "Not by chance have the greatest recruitment of fascists been from the upper middle class, a social class characterized by a notable crisis and by a progressive loss of identity,

and the low (bottom) proletariat, which cannot live out, by its very definition, any class identity."⁵³ According to this theory, the loss of identity among the discontented members of both the upper and lower classes provides the principal reason for joining neo-fascist groups.

Individual loss of identity may indeed provide one explanation for the neo-fascist groups' problems in defining a clear and precise communal ideology. In the view of one analyst, Italian "rightist extremist attitudes most often lack a systematic doctrinal structure and range rhapsodically from nationalism to anti-Communism, from racial superiority to anti-capitalism, and from law-and-order to romantic adventurism."⁵⁴ An example of this ideological confusion and capriciousness is the "Nazi-Maoist" doctrine espoused by groups like Terza Posizione. Nazi-Maoism is based on the work of neo-fascist theoretician Franco Freda,⁵⁵ who sought to create a single, new ideology from the disparate doctrines of as diverse a collection of leaders as Hitler, Mao, Peron, and Qaddafi.⁵⁶ This idea was adopted by Paolo Signorelli for Terza Posizione, whose motto became, "Neither capitalism nor communism, neither the reds nor reaction." Similar Terza Posizione slogans like "Long live [the] Fascist dictatorship of the proletariat" and "Hitler and Mao united in the struggle"⁵⁷ reflect this strange mixture of political thought that is characterized by another neo-fascist intellectual, Mario Guido Naldi, as "a revolutionary of whatever stripe [i.e., "red" or "black"] is closer to us than a conservative." The success of Nazi-Maoism as a political movement is still unclear, although Italian police report recruitment drives in "proletarian neighborhoods" and the discovery of "circumstantial evidence" indicating the formation of joint "red-black" terrorist cells.⁵⁸

Problems of identity and ideology may also explain the psychological proclivity of neo-fascists toward hero worship, Manichean⁵⁹ distinctions of good and evil, and excessive drug use. Franco Ferracuti and Francesco Bruno, psychiatrists at the University of Rome Medical School, have extensively studied both left- and right-wing Italian terrorists. Their experiences have led them to conclude that right-wing terrorists are considerably less stable than their counterparts on the left.⁶⁰ "In right-wing terrorism," Ferracuti and Bruno point out, "the individual terrorists are frequently psychopathological and the ideology is empty; in left-wing terrorism, ideology is outside of reality and terrorists are more normal and fanatical."⁶¹ Right-wing terrorists, apparently as a result of their instability, are prone to abuse drugs⁶² and to use drugs more often than left-wing terrorists.⁶³ The right-wing terrorist, Ferracuti and Bruno argue, is motivated by

the search for identity and ... the search for the superman or the Hero; their conception of the world reality is fantasy-oriented and Manichean, sharply dichotomized into all "bad," as represented by the enemy, and all "good," personalized by the "Hero".... The utopian goal is toward a mythical and reassuring past, or toward a future conceived as a New Order in a static society, rigidly structured into classes and corporation, beyond capitalism and communism, and capable of offering the masses the certainty of authority.⁶⁴

This sort of reasoning is illustrated by the neo-fascists' obsession with "strength" (and its equation with nationalism) and "weakness" (Communism itself, or the state's tolerance of Communists in government), as well as by their affinity for fantasy worlds. The weakness of the state is the focus of the terrorist's attention and the

stimulant of his aggression.⁶⁵ Redemption will occur through purification: The terrorist believes that the state must be "cleansed" of its enemies (the Communists and their sympathizers) if it is to reacquire its mythical strength and national character. In this context, the terrorist regards his "enemy" as worthless and subhuman, a target that shall be remorselessly attacked. As one Italian psychiatrist explains, "The fascist kills or attacks because the other person does not deserve pity; he is a useless worm in a putrid society. Communism is [thus viewed as] the living nightmare of the country."⁶⁶

J.R.R. Tolkien, in The Hobbit, The Lord of the Rings, and The Fellowship of the Rings, created a fantasy world populated by mythical creatures waging an unending struggle against evil. His books, apparently, are the favorite reading of young right-wing militants who spend their summers in paramilitary training camps. At Pino Rauti's Ordine Nero "Camp Hobbit" in Italy's Abruzzi Mountains, Tolkien is read as a "mythical prolegomenon" to Adolph Hitler's Mein Kampf.⁶⁷ The language Tolkien created for his fantasy characters has also been adopted by right-wing groups: Meeting places, for example, are referred to as "Hobbit fields."⁶⁸ Rauti's book, Ideas that Moved the World, contains another kind of mythology, "present[ing] the knight of medieval chivalry--in his current incarnation, the SS soldier--as the model of citizenship in the organic state that [Rauti] would model on the Holy Roman Empire."⁶⁹

All these examples of neo-fascist mindset support Ferracuti's and Bruno's convincing conclusions that Italian right-wing terrorists suffer from serious personality abnormalities that explain, at least in part, their thinking and actions.⁷⁰

IV. INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

The right-wing terrorist groups in Western Europe maintain a loose alliance with one another, exchanging information, sharing intelligence, engaging in training exercises, and perhaps trading in arms as well. During the summer of 1978, a high international neo-fascist conference was held in Brazil at which representatives of 480 different groups met to discuss common problems and to organize an umbrella organization to coordinate various international projects. A follow-up meeting was held the following fall in Barcelona where, it was reported, "agreements and contacts were perfected, [and] decisions were made mainly to intensify the collaboration with groups of the extreme left who have identified their points of view with the major part of the programs established by the 'Black International'."⁷¹

There is no information available on whether or not this decision was ever implemented. However, in June 1981, evidence of a connection between the Hoffmann Military Sports Group and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was uncovered in Lebanon. At a press conference in Beirut, the Lebanese Phalange⁷² introduced two West German youths who claimed that they were members of the Hoffmann group. The two young men said that they had come to Lebanon to train and fight with the PLO, but they became disillusioned with this scheme when they had to spend more time in the PLO's motor pool repairing vehicles supplied by Hoffmann than on the rifle range. After being repeatedly punished for disciplinary infractions and prohibited from fighting, the two defected and escaped into the Christian quarter of Beirut, where they were

captured by the Phalangists. The PLO then held its own press conference with two other West German youths it claimed were right-wing terrorists who had been fighting beside the Phalange but had become discontented with that organization and had defected to the PLO. Under questioning by journalists, however, the two were unable to offer a convincing account of their experiences (one of them, for example, could not describe the Phalange flag), which suggested that the whole incident had been created by the PLO.⁷³ Nevertheless, in an interview published in the Beirut newspaper As Safir on September 18, 1980, eight days before the Oktoberfest bombing, Abu Ayad, a senior official in the PLO, told of the capture of several Hoffmann group members in late 1979 by the PLO in Lebanon. According to Ayad, the Germans confessed that they had been trained by the Phalange, along with 30 other European neo-fascists, at a camp in Aquru, Lebanon. They also revealed that the Italian rightists were planning to "begin their operations with a major terrorist attack in the city of Bologna, because it is run by the left."⁷⁴

The PLO denies that it has any relationship with the neo-fascist groups, but a wealth of evidence has been discovered by the West German security services contradicting those denials. The Bavarian Interior Ministry, for instance, has information that Hoffmann visited Damascus in July 1980 to forge links with the PLO and also with East German intelligence agents.⁷⁵ In addition, Hoffmann is believed to have a lucrative business providing the PLO with second-hand trucks. It is alleged that there are at least 20 Hoffmann group members in the PLO in Lebanon, and Hoffmann himself was arrested in June 1981 in Frankfurt as he prepared to leave for Beirut. Other noted West German neo-Nazis, including Manfred Roeder, the founder of the Deutsche Aktionsgruppe,

Oedfied Hepp, the founder of the "Black Forest Militant Unit," and Udo Albrecht, another known terrorist, are thought to have visited, or to have remained, in PLO camps in Lebanon.⁷⁶

There is a strong fraternal relationship among the neo-fascist groups of Italy, Germany, France, and Belgium. In the summer of 1979, the Vlaamse Militantenorde (VMO, or Flemish Militant Order), a neo-fascist group based in Antwerp, Belgium, sponsored a training camp for members of similarly oriented groups in other countries. Seventy-five representatives of various right-wing paramilitary/terrorist organizations participated in joint maneuvers and lessons in underground warfare in the Ardennes Woods on the Belgian-German border.⁷⁷ The depth of these transnational bonds is evident in the statement of the VMO's international liaison officer, Michel Graisse, after the Oktoberfest bombing: "I am also a member of the Defense Sport Group Hoffmann." As Der Spiegel observed, "It is clear ... that the various neo-Nazi groups are in contact with one another, [and] that some of their actions and attacks are planned and executed on an international scale."⁷⁸ Proof of this may be found in the case of Paul-Louis Durand, the detective who was dismissed from the Nice police force after it was learned that he was a member of FANE, that he had visited an Italian neo-fascist camp shortly before the Bologna bombing, and that he had later been seen in Nice with an Italian suspect in that bombing.

It is also alleged that an international right-wing prisoners' aid and funding organization exists and that there is a worldwide arms network, managed by groups like the Paris-based Occident. Finally, ties have been found to exist with various extremist groups in the United States, including the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan.⁷⁹

V. CONCLUSIONS

Studies conducted by psychiatrists in Italy have shown that right-wing terrorists are psychologically considerably more troubled than their left-wing counterparts. These differences may also explain differences in strategy, targeting, and ideology. The radical Marxists, for instance, always distinguish between their target and their target audience. Their self-styled crusade for social justice is typically directed against commercial institutions or persons whom they believe represent capitalist exploitation and repression. Their strategy is, in part, to educate their fellow countrymen about the evils of capitalist society and to demonstrate that only by violence can these wrongs be redressed and a new, more "democratic" system be created. The neo-fascist terrorists, on the other hand, are working toward the long-term goal of establishing a fascist state, based on authoritarian rule, intense nationalism, and racial purity. In the short term, their strategy is simply to cleanse their respective countries of Communists, social democrats, and their liberal sympathizers, and to expel the foreign immigrants and refugees whom they regard as interlopers and parasites.

It is impossible to explain the decline of rightist terrorist activity since 1980 or to predict the dimensions of future operations. In all likelihood, right-wing terrorism will continue, but it is by no means certain that attacks like those in Bologna or Munich will be repeated. One explanation for the terrorists' relative inactivity after these attacks may be that in the aftermath of the carnage and

destruction caused by the two bombings, they are reassessing their strategy and preparing for a new and different sort of offensive. Neither of the organizations suspected by police of planting the bombs has ever admitted responsibility. Shortly after the Bologna explosion, a caller claimed that the NAR was responsible, but when the magnitude of the bombing became known, another caller denied NAR involvement.⁸⁰ In Munich, the Hoffmann Military Sports Group has repeatedly denied any role in the Oktoberfest bombing--even though a member of the group was killed by the blast and is thought by police to have planted the bomb.⁸¹ It may be that the right-wing terrorists, having succeeded in attracting attention to themselves and their cause, now believe that additional operations of this type would be counterproductive, provoking massive police efforts to suppress their organizations. Accordingly, future terrorist attacks may be on a smaller scale than either the Bologna or Munich bombings.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EMERGENCE OF RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

The significance of the emergence of right-wing terrorism in those European countries that are also most plagued by left-wing terrorism is simple: The range of terrorism and its targets is thereby doubled, not just quantitatively but also in the sense that other terrorists and other targets have emerged. Whereas leftist terrorists may wage an attack on the Fiat works because Fiat epitomizes capitalism and its evils, right-wing terrorists attack the train station in Bologna because Bologna's leftist municipal government epitomizes Communism and its evils. In France, and perhaps elsewhere, rightist terrorists have made "the Jews" a target--thus adding something to the spectrum of targets pursued by terrorists. By having "the Jews" and "the Communists" as

targets, right-wing terrorists inflame different passions and seek to attract different constituents from those sought by the leftists. Thus, the emergence of right-wing terrorism makes overall terrorist activity broader, harder to assess, and more difficult to counter. There is also a possibility that right-wing terrorists may attract Communist-fearing people from the most conservative elements in the establishment and obtain their hidden or even overt support, including the kinds of financial support and leniency in the courts that conservatives obtained during the rise of Mussolini and also of Hitler.

For these reasons, right-wing terrorism increases the threat to political stability in those countries where it has made its appearance. Left-wing terrorism, although a hazard for individuals and a plague on nations, has not so far actually jeopardized government operations in any of its target countries. However, where there are terrorist activities from both the right and the left, destabilization of governments has a far greater chance of occurring. Together with current unrest in Europe aimed at nuclear activities and weapons and the American military presence, right-wing terrorism may be weighing somewhat more heavily against the stability of European countries, and therefore the security of the United States.

POTENTIAL THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS

It should be remembered that despite wide differences between right- and left-wing terrorism in terms of targets, methods, members, and constituents, both types of terrorists are hostile to the United States as a country, the U.S. presence in Europe, and U.S. aims in the world-- the leftists because they oppose "imperialist" and "militarist" pursuits of the United States, as they see them, the rightists for reasons of

nationalism and of sovereignty. In addition, the widespread hidden hostility that always seems to be directed to a strong but nevertheless alien protector makes right-wing terrorism, in combination with other elements in the political equation, a strong indirect threat to the U.S. presence in Europe. The problem is aggravated by the fact that, on the whole, right-wing terrorists appear to be more willing to shed blood, thereby creating greater terror, and they may attract more constituents than the left-wing terrorists. They certainly do not have the magnetic attraction their predecessors had in the Hitler-Mussolini-Laval days. But, due to the possible "blindness in the right eye" of some European leadership groups, right-wing extremist groups may operate in a fairly favorable climate and may thus become a significant threat locally and therefore indirectly to NATO and the United States.

FOOTNOTES

1. Right-wing extremists also have been active in Japan, and occasionally they have engaged in acts of violence.
2. Thomas Sheehan, "Italy: Terror on the Right," New York Review of Books, January 22, 1981, p. 25.
3. Leonard Weinberg, "Patterns of Neo-Fascist Violence in Italian Politics," Terrorism, Vol. 2, 1979, p. 243-245.
4. Weinberg, "Patterns," 232.
5. "Anatomy of a Movement," World Press Review, December 1980, p. 39.
6. Sheehan, "Italy," p. 25.
7. Weinberg, "Patterns," pp. 245-246.
8. "Anatomy of a Movement," p. 39.
9. "Long Live Fascism," Der Spiegel, Hamburg, October 6, 1980, pp. 46-53.
10. Ibid.
11. George Armstrong, "Timetable of Terror," The Guardian, August 10, 1980.
12. Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "The Structure and Dynamics of Italian Terrorism," Clandestine Tactics and Technology, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., Gaithersburg, Md., 1980, p. 6.
13. Ibid., p. 6.
14. Armstrong, "Timetable," August 10, 1980.
15. Paul Wilkinson, "Still Working...", Across the Board, January 1981, p. 27.
16. Henry Tanner, "June Murder of Magistrate Tied to Bologna Bombing," International Herald Tribune, 23 September 1980, and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Cossiga Comments in Senate on Bologna Massacre," WEU-80-152, August 5, 1980.
17. "Death Takes No Holiday," Time, August 11, 1980, p. 41.
18. Tanner, "June Murder," September 23, 1980, and Pisano, "Structure and Dynamics," p. 6.

19. Tanner, "June Murder," September 23, 1980, and Sheehan, "Italy," p. 24.
20. Sheehan, "Italy," p. 23.
21. Ibid., p. 24.
22. "Long Live Fascism," Der Spiegel, pp. 46-53.
23. Sheehan, "Italy," p. 25.
24. "Coming Out of the Tunnel: Interview with Minister of the Interior, Virginio Rognoni," Panorama, Milan, September 15, 1980, pp. 46-47.
25. "Bomb and Tirades," Der Spiegel, Hamburg, September 8, 1980, pp. 111-114.
26. "A Wave of Neo-Nazi Terrorism," Newsweek, October 13, 1980.
27. "Development of Neonazism, Rightist Terrorism Examined," Der Spiegel, Hamburg, October 6, 1980, pp. 37-46.
28. Risks International, Inc., Executive Risk Assessment, Vol. I, No. 7, May 1979, p. 3.
29. "Sources, Causes of Terrorist Attacks Debated," Le Point, Paris, October 13, 1980, pp. 59-61.
30. "6 Suspected Neo-Nazis Released After Arrest in Munich Bombing," The New York Times, September 30, 1980.
31. Executive Risk Assessment, May 1979, pp. 3-4.
32. Wilkinson, "Still Working," p. 27.
33. Other French neo-fascist groups are Order and Justice for All the Friends of Inspector Jacques Mazel, the National Front, the French National Liberation Front, DEVA, La Nouvelle Acropolis (The New Acropolis), Totenkopf (Death's Head), Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, Enraged Sheep, Peiper Combat Group, Nouvelle Droit (New Right), Fighters Against Jewish Occupation, European Nationalist Falangists, and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement.
34. Jan Van Den Beld, "Rightist Extremism Increasingly Oversteps Bounds," Elseviers Weekblad, Amsterdam, October 18, 1980, p. 11.
35. "A Wave," Newsweek, October 13, 1980.
36. An anonymous telephone call to Agence France-Presse claimed responsibility for the bombing by FNE. However, subsequent

investigations, as reported in the French press, raised doubts that the bombing was the work of French right-wing extremists. In sifting through the debris of the blast, French authorities determined that the bomb had been attached to a moped--the only unclaimed item. From the engine number, the moped was traced to an Arab, believed to be a Palestinian, who had entered the country on a false passport along with four other known Palestinians. The five Palestinians, later identified as members of an extremist wing of the PLO, left France on a flight to Beirut on October 4, 1980.

37. "Sources," Le Point, pp. 59-61.
38. Ibid.
39. Sheehan, "Italy," p. 23.
40. Christian Colombani, "French Lead Fades Out," The Guardian, August 24, 1980.
41. "Rightist Extremists," Elsevier, p. 11.
42. "Bombs," Der Spiegel, pp. 111-114.
43. "Terrorism From Right Growing Stronger," Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, June 26, 1981, p. 3.
44. Weinberg, "Patterns," pp. 247 and 254.
45. Pisano, "Structure and Dynamics," pp. 5-6.
46. Brian M. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), International Terrorism and World Security, Croom Helm, Ltd., London, 1975, p. 15.
47. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
48. Pisano, "Structures and Dynamics," p. 7.
49. "Wave," Newsweek, October 13, 1980.
50. "Bombs," Der Spiegel, pp. 111-114.
51. "Wave," Newsweek, October 13, 1980.
52. Description coined by Franco Ferracuti, M.D., Professor of Criminological Medicine and Forensic Psychiatry, University of Rome Medical School.
53. Anonymous, "Notes for the First Analysis of the Phenomenon of Terrorism of The Right" (study commissioned by the Italian secret services).

54. Pisano, "Structure and Dynamics," p. 5.
55. Ibid., p. 7.
56. Sheehan, "Italy," p. 24.
57. Ibid.
58. Pisano, "Structure and Dynamics," p. 7.
59. A reference to an obscure third century (A.D.) Persian religious order that believed in philosophical dualism, of extremes of good and evil with no intermediate gradations.
60. Franco Ferracuti and Francesco Bruno, "Psychiatric Aspects of Terrorism in Italy," pp. 17-20. Italian right-wing terrorists, they conclude, exhibit the following traits: "(a) ambivalence toward authority (submission-aggression unbalance); (b) poor and defective insight; (c) adherence to unconventional behavioral patterns with poor ability to criticize and a tendency toward emulation and repetition of attitudes and behaviors; (d) emotional detachment from the consequences of their actions; (e) disturbances in sexual identity, with role uncertainties; (f) superstition, 'magic' and stereotyped thinking; (g) etero and auto destructiveness; (h) low-level educational reference patterns; (i) weapons perceived as fetishes and adherence to violent subcultural values" (p. 20).
61. Ibid., p. 20.
62. Anonymous, "Notes," p. 2.
63. Ferracuti and Bruno, "Psychiatric," p. 18.
64. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
65. Anonymous, "Notes," p. 5.
66. Ibid.
67. Sheehan, "Italy," p. 26.
68. Anonymous, "Notes," p. 2.
69. Sheehan, "Italy," p. 26.
70. Ferracuti and Bruno, "Psychiatric," pp. 17-20.
71. "'Black International' Terrorist Spokesmen Discuss Plans," L'Europeo, Milan, January 18, 1979, pp. 14-17.

72. The Lebanese Phalange was founded in 1936 to work for Lebanon's independence and to foster Lebanese nationalism. It is composed mostly of Maronite Christian Arabs and Greek Catholics. It is a political party organized as a paramilitary force.
73. John Kifner, "Foes in Lebanon Accuse Each Other in Neo-Nazis," New York Times, June 26, 1981.
74. Sheehan, "Italy," p. 23.
75. David Fouquet, "Europe Sees Network Masterminding Rightist Bombings," Christian Science Monitor, October 15, 1980.
76. "Terrorism," Der Tagesspiegel, p. 3.
77. "Long Live Fascism," Der Spiegel, pp. 46-53.
78. "Anatomy of a Movement," World Press Review, December 1980, p. 38.
79. "Long Live Fascism," Der Spiegel, pp. 46-53.
80. Risks International, Inc., Quarterly Assessment, July-September 1980.
81. "6 Suspected Neo-Nazis," New York Times, September 30, 1980.
82. Sheehan, "Italy," p. 24.
83. Executive Risk Assessment, May 1979, p. 4.