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

THESIS

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY OFFICERS

by

Mark M. Gettys
and
Arthur G. Maxwell, Jr.

December 1981

Thesis Advisor: R. T. Harris

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Organizational Effectiveness: A Comparative Analysis
Between Army and Navy Officers

by

Mark M. Gettys
Captain, Adjutant General's Corps
United States Army
B.S., University of Virginia, 1972

and

Arthur G. Maxwell, Jr.
Captain, Signal Corps
United States Army
B.A., Presbyterian College, 1973

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1981

Authors: Mark M. Gettys

Approved by: Reuben T Harris
Thesis Advisor

Co-Advisor

Chairman, Department of Administrative Sciences

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. WHAT IS EFFECTIVENESS?

A high degree of effectiveness is normally associated with successful or profitable organizations. Organizations and companies that have low degrees of effectiveness continually strive to improve this organizational measure because a high degree of effectiveness reflects the successful attainment of established performance standards. The military must also concern itself with effectiveness if it is to be prepared to meet its mandated standards for providing for the national defense. However, there is no clear answer as to what effectiveness means to the military. How does the military leadership of today view effectiveness? This is the question the authors will attempt to answer by sampling four groups of military officers. The composition of this sample and a discription of the instrument utilized to obtain the responses will be provided in Chapter IV.

The term effectiveness as it relates to organizations lacks a universally accepted definition--as do many terms within the organizational theory field. To some organizations it may refer to profit, to others it may refer to a share of the market, and to others it may just mean survival. Components that may determine effectiveness in organizations often depend upon the functions, environments,

individual personalities and the value systems of that organization. (Kirchoff 1976)

Kirchoff defines effectiveness as the measurement of organizational performance relative to its goals. Amital Etzioni (1964) views effectiveness as simply the degree of goal achievement. Webster (1965) provides two succinct definitions: 1) production of desired results and 2) readiness for service or action. The thread of commonality among these is the linkage of effectiveness to a set of prescribed goals. The authors argue, however, that effectiveness must be considered utilizing a system theory approach due to the interaction of such components as the environment and the complexity facing the respective organization. Such factors as increasing inflation, foreign competition, equal rights, automation, and the changing labor force influence the organizational perspective and often alter, or even entirely change, the goals and purpose of the organization. Effectiveness can be measured in terms of its goals--but only after the organization has taken into consideration its people (personalities, skills), the structure (communication, chain of command), the technology (degree of mechanization), the environment (political, economic), and the value systems (tradition) which are inherent in the organization.

The system approach referred to above can be applied to most organizations and the military is no exception. For this study, the dimensions that will be considered regarding

effectiveness include organizational climate (communication, decision making, motivation), supervisory leadership (support, team emphasis), peer leadership (support, team emphasis), group processes (group coordination and discipline), and satisfaction (needs, influence). This approach focuses on people factors and not so much on the state of technology or physical structure. Elements such as economics, politics, and population-ecology as determinants of effectiveness are utilized in more detailed models. The former model will be used for this study because the current surveys used by the Army and Navy are theoretically based within this model. However, as a point of contrast, the authors will discuss both of these models in greater detail in Chapter II.

This study is aimed at evaluating effectiveness as seen by four different groups of officers within the Army and Navy. For the purposes of this study, effectiveness will be viewed as what these officers think an effective organization should look like. The groups include Army Organizational Effectiveness Management Consultants (OEMCs), Navy Human Resource Management Specialists (HRMSs). Army combat arms officers, and Navy surface-line officers. The rationale for these particular groups of officers will be presented in Section E below.

B. IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVENESS TO THE ARMY AND NAVY TODAY

The Army and Navy must concern themselves with effectiveness because of the numerous threats they currently face.

Sophisticated technology of weapons systems, the questionable quality of the All Volunteer Force, retention problems at the mid-manager level, continued efforts to reduce manning levels, and the decline of sufficient numbers of personnel in the future labor market seriously strain the capability of the Armed Forces to meet their Congressional mandate for a high state of military readiness in the interest of national defense. If indeed the services are tasked to continually do more with less, while concurrently being required to meet the threat, then they too must reconsider other factors which affect goal accomplishment and, in turn, effectiveness. Factors to consider may include people and their respective skills, the structure and the esprits de corps it fosters, and the type of leadership and teamwork that results.

Examples and elaboration of the importance of effectiveness to the Army and Navy are appropriate. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), for instance, has gone on record to say that he considers manning of the force to be his most important goal. The continued loss of mid-level officers and noncommissioned officers represents a serious loss of experience and expertise. The effects of these losses are often counteracted by moving junior, less experienced personnel up to fill these shortages. By doing this the services have in effect placed underqualified individuals in positions demanding higher levels of responsibility and expertise--without the benefit of training in many instances. The net effect has

proven to be frustrating both to the junior individual (self-doubt, greater demands) as well as to the supervisor who is still expected by his superiors to maintain the same quality and volume of service/technological expertise. In some instances, a unit cannot even afford the luxury of filling these positions due to existing shortages at these lower levels also. These personnel shortages rarely, however, result in decreased mission and goal requirements. Units are expected to do more with less and this has created reduced capabilities and unrealistic demands.

Personnel shortages reflect numbers of people to do the job, but quality of personnel is just as important, if not more important. The All Volunteer Force, concurrent with its declining medical and pension benefits, has had difficulty providing the expertise the service needs to provide the desired state of national defense. The services are not able to attract needed professional (doctors, nurses) nor technical (radar, missile repairmen) personnel that the cross-section of the draft provided. Standards, such as number of high school graduates, are often lowered during the recruiting effort so that quotas may be more readily achieved. But numbers are not the real answer to the problem of manning a force that requires increased skill competencies.

The threats are real and pervasive throughout the military complex today. Accordingly, the authors content that it is

time to examine the philosophies of organizations held by key personnel within the services with an aim toward counteracting these same threats.

C. THE ARMY AND NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The Army and Navy are highly complex, formalized/centralized organizations operating in a dynamic environment. The Navy's effort toward organizational development was primarily a result in a change in the top management. In 1971, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, wanted to find ways to improve the management of Navy personnel resources and to increase the Navy's organizational ability to understand and communicate with them. Other factors which influenced the Navy's move toward organizational development include social change pressures (racial incidents on some ships) and the political pressure at the time for the All Volunteer Force. The Navy also wanted to have a descriptive instrument to assess the state of organizational functioning of the fleet and detect the sort of unrest that was actually occurring on the ships in the fleet.

The Navy approach used survey-guided development. The survey was an adaptation of Rensis Likert's work at the Institute of Social Research of the University of Michigan. The survey attempts to measure the current state of organizational effectiveness by looking at the following dimensions: organizational climate, supervisory leadership, peer

leadership, group processes and satisfaction. The eighty-eight question responses are based on Likert's scaling technique of one to five, with five being the best. After the survey is given, it is computer scored and consultant analyzed. The summarized information is fed back to the organization's top management for interpretation, relevancy and meaning. After problems and needs of the organization are identified, workshops and consulting services are provided as the organization deems necessary.

The Army consulted with the Navy and other civilian agencies in its development and implementation of a survey-guided approach to organization development in the mid 1970s. The same Likert framework was selected because the Army saw it as useful, comprehensive and strongly tied to a theoretical base (Likert's System 4 Management). The Army was also impressed with the empirical data that had been produced with the survey in civilian industry and hoped for a similar predictive capacility of future organizational states.

The survey adapted by both the Army and the Navy contains a built-in normative bias. The Likert framework argues (assumes) that organizations are more effective the closer the organization is to System 4. System 4 espouses a participative management style, upward and downward communication, group decision making, etc. For example, explicit in Likert's theory is that a supervisor should be friendly and easy to approach. But is this desirable and/or

necessary in military organizations? For the military to accept and use this survey is to implicitly state that System 4 management is appropriate and useful in the military complex.

D. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Given the broad missions of national defense that the Army and Navy have, it is necessary to determine what their philosophies and strategies are in order to achieve that end--particularly in light of the threats to effectiveness that we mentioned earlier. We need to know what the "military is after." To analyze this the authors plan to use a modification of the Navy Human Resource Management Survey. Briefly, the modification asks experienced officers (O-3 promotables and O-4 thru O-6) to conceptualize an effective organization in their minds and then to respond to the questions with this personalized concept in mind. In contrast to the current survey, this modification also asks officers what their organizations should look like, not their present state. The authors plan to address the following questions: Are the Army and Navy command climate surveys, with their inherent values and bias toward System 4 Management, congruent and consistent with the values and concepts of experienced Army and Navy officers today? Additionally, we will analyze similarities and differences of values among the four groups.

E. STUDY APPROACH

Four groups of officers were selected for this study. They include the OEMCs, the HRMSs, Army combat officers and Navy surface-line officers. The rationale for these groups follows:

1) The authors tested the theoretical base of the current survey against personal theories of experienced officers which resulted in the selected rank structure. These officers have most likely had the time and the experience to formulate, at least implicitly, their own personal theories.

2) Operational leaders (combat arms/surface-line) were selected because these individuals are representative of the military leadership of the future.

3) The HRMSs/OEMCs were selected because they provided the theoretical base for the survey; since, these officers have been most strongly socialized by Likert's theory.

Profiles and descriptive findings concerning these four groups of officers will be presented in Chapter V. Several issues will be addressed. A comparison of the OEMCs and the combat arms officers will be made to see if similar values are held by the organizational development practitioners and the Army community for whom it is intended. The same type of comparison will be examined for the Navy HRMSs and the surface-line officers. Additional questions include: Are the values of the organizational development officers consistent with the values explicitly stated in Likert's survey?

Is there a difference in the values held by the OEMCs and the HRMSs? Do experienced officers in the Army and Navy communities share the same views on what an effective organization should look like?

The introduction has provided a brief, historical overview with a statement of the problem to be studied. Chapter II will present a literature review of the theories expoused by Likert and Price. A recap of the Army and Navy organizational development programs will also be provided. In Chapter III the authors will present an analysis that links the military concepts to the theoretical concepts of Rensis Likert's System 4 Management. A comparison of Likert's explicit values will be made with those values that are seemingly important to the military. Chapter IV will be a presentation of the methodology highlighting how the data were collected, the composition of the sample and rationale therefore, and how and why the survey was modified. Chapter V will be a descriptive chapter and will present the results to include the profiles of the officer groups, percentage return of the survey, the quality of the data, and a comparison of the profiles. Chapter VI will deal with conclusions and implications as well as considerations for further study and analysis.

The next chapter will present the history of two models of effectiveness as well as a look into the historical development of the Army and Navy organizational development programs.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. RENSIS LIKERT'S SYSTEM 4 MANAGEMENT

As noted in Chapter I, there are many definitions and ways of looking at effectiveness. Organizational effectiveness as a construct has no direct operational definition. The authors contend that one should view organizational effectiveness from a model or theory perspective so as to be able to explicitly identify the key variables which impact on effectiveness. Given these variables, one must then look to see how they are interrelated or how they should be interrelated. Without an explicit model or theory, it is virtually impossible to say which variables should be viewed as indicators of effectiveness and which should not. It is, therefore, necessary for leaders and managers to attempt to make their theories as explicit as possible. Two such models will be presented to provide the reader with multiple perspectives as well as a point of contrast.

One of the most extensive research efforts regarding organizational systems and theory was conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The main objective of this effort was to discover more effective ways for an organization to efficiently achieve their prescribed objectives. The study collected data from more than 20,000 managers and 200,000 employees with an aim

toward discovery of the organizational structure and methods of leadership and management that resulted in the best performance. These types of variables would then be measured against those businesses with the poorest performance. The Office of Naval Research, along with such institutions as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and the National Institute of Health, helped to fund this program from its onset. The central group of researchers and practitioners who carried out this research at the Institute for Social Research included Floyd Mann, J.R.P. French, Stanley Seashore, David Bowers and Rensis Likert. Although Likert was obviously not the sole contributor of this particular model of effectiveness, he has written the most influential and renowned statement of the model. Accordingly, it became known as the Likert-ISR Model in 1961 and, more recently in 1967, has been referred to as the System 4 Theory of Management.

In 1967, Likert referred to the standard healthy and effective organization as a System 4 organization. The state of the organization was measured via a questionnaire to provide survey-feedback regarding the perceptions of the people in the organization. The questionnaire focused on eight principal organizational characteristics:

1) Leadership Processes. This characteristic looked at the trust and confidence that existed in superior-subordinate relationships.

2) Motivational Practices. Of prime importance here was whether people at all levels of the organization felt jointly responsible for achieving the organization's goals.

3) Communication Processes. Factors included the frequency, accuracy, and flow of communication as well as the extent to which the communication was genuinely received.

4) Interaction/Influence Processes. Are the interactions of people friendly, extensive and cooperative?

5) Decision Making Processes. This characteristic looked at the degree to which subordinates are involved in the decision making process, how the technical and professional knowledge of the organization is capitalized on, and to what extent decisions are integrated throughout the organization in a system of overlapping groups (linking pin theory).

6) Goal Setting. Are goals carried out by group participants and are the goals widely accepted by the organization members?

7) Control Processes. This characteristic measured the degree to which control is widespread throughout the organization, how it is shared by various levels of management, and the extent to which it is supported by subgroups within the organization.

8) Performance Goals/Training. Are performance goals high and is individual job training thorough and proficient? For the purpose of easy reference and clarification, Figure

2.1 presents these System 4 characteristics with a comparison of the classical design organizations.

Likert conceived four different systems of management which can be measured using the dimensions listed above. According to Likert, the System 4 type of organization is the most advanced and also the most effective. Likert's four systems of management that describe various management styles are System 1: Explicitive-authoritative; System 2: Benevolent-authoritative; System 3: Consultative; and System 4: Participative. Characteristics which highlight these four systems are outlined for the readers in Figure 2.2

Likert refers to System 1 as reflective of classical design theory. He further contends that this system is ineffective because it does not take into consideration the changing nature of the environment within which the organization must operate. The System 1 theory reflects a managerial attitude and tendency toward conservatism and maintaining the status quo. Environmental factors which merit consideration include increasing competition from foreign countries, a generally higher level of education which has led to increased willingness for responsibility, increasing development of complex technologies, and a trend in American society toward greater individual freedom and initiative. These types of changes have created pressures on managers to adapt to these developments within their respective organizations. Likert states that the most productive and

PROCESS	CLASSICAL DESIGN	SYSTEM 4
Leadership	Confidence and trust low. Subordinates uncomfortable discussing problems with superiors. Superiors do not solicit ideas from subordinates.	High confidence and trust. Subordinates feel free to discuss problems with superiors. Superiors solicit ideas from subordinates.
Communication	Information flow is primarily downward.	Information flow is upward, downward, and lateral.
Interaction	Subordinates have little effect on unit's goals and methods.	Subordinates and superiors affect goals and methods.
Decisions	Decision making is relatively centralized.	Decision making is mostly decentralized.
Goal Setting	Group participation in goal setting is discouraged.	Group participation in setting objectives is encouraged.

Figure 2.1. Organization Characteristics

SYSTEM 1: EXPLOITIVE-AUTHORITATIVE.

Managers have little confidence and trust in subordinates.
Subordinates do not feel free discussing problems with superiors.
Motivation occurs through punishment, fear and threat.
Little communication takes place as information flow is downward.
Managers have little understanding of subordinates' problems.
Decisions are mostly made at the top.
Little to no cooperative teamwork exists.

SYSTEM 2: BENEVOLENT-AUTHORITATIVE.

Managers have condescending trust and confidence in their subordinates.
Subordinates do not feel free discussing their problems with their superiors.
Motivation is through rewards and punishment.
Most communication is downward.
Managers have some understanding and knowledge of their subordinates' problems.
Some decisions are made at lower levels.
Relatively little teamwork exists.

SYSTEM 3: CONSULTATIVE.

Managers have substantial, but not complete, trust and confidence in subordinates.
Subordinates feel rather free to discuss matters with superiors.
Motivation occurs through rewards and occassional punishment.
Communication is both upward and downward.
Managers know and understand the problems of subordinates quite well.
Broad decisions are made at the top. More specific decisions are made at the lower levels.
A moderate amount of teamwork exists.

SYSTEM 4: PARTICIPATION.

Superiors have complete trust and confidence in their subordinates.
Subordinates feel completely free to discuss their matters with superiors.
Motivation is through economic rewards.
A lot of communication is upward, downward and horizontal.
Managers know and understand problems of subordinates very well.
Substantial amounts of teamwork exists.
Decision making is widely done throughout the organization via overlapping groups.

Adapted from Likert's The Human Organization, copywright 1967. McGraw Hill Book Co.

Figure 2.2 Likert's Four Management Systems

profitable organizations have adapted by moving closer and closer to the System 4 management style. The System 4 theory encourages greater utilization of its human assets by tapping the full range of human motivations sharing the goal-setting processes, and by insuring that upward, downward, and lateral communications exist. Figure 2.1 outlines those organizational practices which depict effective organizations. The basic assumption of System 4 Management is that an organization will be optimally effective to the extent "that the leadership and other proccesses of the organization are such as to insure a maximum probability that in all interactions and in all relationships within the organization, each member, in the light of his background, values, and expectations, will view the experience as supportive and one which builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and importance." (Likert 1961)

From a structural perspective, Likert views the organization as groups linked together via managers. In this model, some managers are members of two groups. This dual capacity role is referred to as the linking pin theory--that is, these managers connect each group with its immediate supervisor's group. These managers are responsible for representing their groups to groups higher in the hierarchy and for coordinating their groups with other dependent groups in the organization. In this framework, the superior in one group is a subordinate in another group.

Likert states that an organization will function best when people function not as individuals, but as members of highly effective work groups. If these work groups are well knit and have high interaction, communication is enhanced, individuals develop greater attraction and loyalty to the group, and group members will implement goals and decisions that are seen as most important to the group.

Likert's research provided strong evidence that organizations had much higher levels of achievement with respect to individuals and the long run goals of the organization when the manager exhibited a high degree of supportive relationships, utilized group decision making and supervision, and instilled high performance goals. Likert further introduced the concept of causal, intervening, and end result variables.

The causal variables are those characteristics that identify the four different management systems (Figure 2.2). End result variables are such goals as sales volume, low costs, profit, and high quality. The intervening variables are determined by the causal variables and include such things as loyalty, degree of conflict versus cooperation, willingness to help others, attitudes toward the organization, job and superiors, and motivation. Likert admits that an authoritative approach (Systems 1 and 2) may initially improve the end result variables, but the intervening variables will gradually begin to concurrently deteriorate. For example,

if communication is all downward and there is little interaction between superiors and subordinates, the quality of products or volume of sales is likely to be adversely affected. Likert believes that the participative approach will lead to a gradual upgrading of the intervening variables and long run improvement in the end result variables. Likert argues that participation is one of the most important ingredients to obtaining employee commitment and that this commitment can result in less need for formal authority, discipline and pressure in order to get the job done.

In summary, of Likert's four systems, we agree that the group participative system holds the most long-run potential for the long-range development of the human assets of the organization. The focues is on "people" factors and not so much on the state of the technology or the organization's structure. Characteristics that the System 4 organization, or the "optimal" organization, should exhibit include superiors having complete trust and confidence in their subordinates; communication channels that are upward, downward, and horizontal; extensive, friendly interaction; substantial teamwork; decision making via a linking process of overlapping groups; subordinates involved fully in all decisions related to their work; goals established by group participation; subordinates feel free to discuss things with their supervisor; and managers always try to get ideas and opinions from subordinates. This is but one of many

organizational effectiveness theories. A different approach will not be presented to provide a point of contrast and multiple perspectives.

B. JAMES PRICE'S APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The objective of Price's study was to "present the core of what the behavioral sciences now know about the effectiveness of organizations: what we really know, what we nearly know, what we think we know, and what we claim we know." (Price 1968)

Price surveyed fifty different published studies on organizational behavior which included at least some consideration of the notion of organizational effectiveness. In Price's view, effectiveness is the degree of goal achievement. Price proceeded to conduct a comparative analysis of the fifty studies with the aim of explaining what he refers to as the determinants of effective goal achievement.

The studies included various types of organizations: business firms, mental hospitals, prisons, universities, colleges, general hospitals, and governmental agencies. The analysis of these studies led Price to develop what have become known as propositions regarding organizational effectiveness. The determinants that Price views as impacting upon the organization are the economic system, the external and internal political system, the control system, and the population-ecology system. In this model Price includes five intervening variables which he assumes are positively

correlated to effectiveness: 1) productivity, 2) conformity, 3) morale, 4) adaptiveness, and 5) institutionalization. The schematic diagram which depicts the relationship of the determinants, the intervening variables, and effectiveness is displayed at Figure 2.3.

Effectiveness in Price's terms is equivalent to producing output. All the variables which Price uses in his findings are compatible with systems theory; however, Price's theory shows effectiveness as being reflected in only one element of systems theory, that being output. Effectiveness then becomes the dependent variable and the independent or intervening variables are those of productivity, morale, conformity, adaptiveness, and institutionalization.

It is appropriate for understanding of the Price model to define the intervening variables. Productivity is defined as the ratio of output to input. This can be considered to be the same as efficiency. Conformity is the extent to which the members of the organization adapt to and accept its norms, procedures and rules. Morale is defined as the extent to which the expectations and motivations of an organization's employees are satisfied. Adaptiveness can be defined as an organization's flexibility. It is the extent to which an organization is able to respond to internal and external changes. Institutionalization can be viewed as the extent to which an organization's activities are accepted within the environment. For example, a business which has



Adapted from Price's Organizational Effectiveness, copywright 1968. Richard D. Irwin Inc.

Figure 2.3 Price's Organizational Effectiveness Model

established rules for hiring and firing that are deemed to be fair and equitable by the community members has successfully institutionalized those same policies. The policies have become an accepted norm within the community. This institutionalization variable includes the activities of satisfying personal interests, acquiring resources, and observing rules, procedures, and norms.

One could not do justice to Price's theory without a discussion of the major determinants also. Within the control system, the mechanisms of division of labor, specialized departmentalization, mechanization, and continuous assembly contribute to effectiveness in different ways. For example, a routinized division of labor, which generally leads to repetitive role performance, usually results in low morale. Mechanization lowers morale by taking the work control away from the workers.

The internal political system can be viewed as those components which lead to organizational decisions and the resulting acceptance and support for these decisions in the environment. The mechanisms which operate in this determinant of effectiveness are legitimacy (socially approved behavior), rational-legal decision making, and centralization with respect to tactical and strategic decisions. Price contends that these mechanisms regulate the struggle for power and increase the amount of behaviors that are directed toward goal achievement.

The external political system considers the respective boundaries of organizations. For businesses, customers and stockholders would be viewed within the external political system. The mechanisms which Price includes within this determinant are autonomy (freedom to make decisions with respect to the environment), ideology (publicly expressed beliefs intended to influence others), congruence (degree of compatibility with the culture's components), priority, conformity, cooptation (ability to recruit members who can increase the institutionalization), and representation (members joining outside groups to strengthen their own system). As an example, Price states that the greater the organizational autonomy, the greater the likelihood the organization can pursue its goals with a high degree of adaptiveness and hence, greater likelihood of increased effectiveness.

The control system can be viewed as the organization's ability to motivate conformity toward its norms. The major mechanisms of this determinant include sanctions (physical force, praise) and communication. Price states that a large supply of sanctions promotes high degrees of morale and conformity. He further states that an organization will increase its effectiveness the greater the degree of vertical and horizontal communication. Communication increases coordination which in turn increases effectiveness. A high degree of horizontal communication decreases misunderstanding which in turn increases conformity and hence, effectiveness.

The final determinant in Price's model is that of population-ecology. The major mechanisms within this determinant are size (assets, profit, employees, etc.) and spatial mobility (job rotation, transfers). Price states that organizations most likely to have a high degree of effectiveness will be those larger in size, except when there is a large degree of professionalization. Large size in this case reduces the relative importance of the professional. In general, Price believes that a high degree of size strengthens motivations to support organizational decisions. Spatial mobility is deemed to increase morale.

Price has emphasized effectiveness as a single factor, output. He tried to show that there is indeed one best way to organize in order to achieve a high degree of organizational effectiveness. For example, one of Price's propositions postulates that organizations that have a high degree of division of labor are more likely to have a higher degree of effectiveness than organizations that have a low degree of division of labor. This type of prediction may have been acceptable and palusible at the time, but since 1968, new realizations have come to pass. Specifically, the authors argue that the development of the contingency model refutes Price's claim. That is, an effective organizational structure will depend on what the organization is trying to do, how it is trying to do it, and what measures of effectiveness are most appropriate for that particular organization.

In summary, Likert professes that the most effective organizations are those which engage in participative practices and methods with its employees. In this model, participative leadership and work group processes improve the effectiveness of the organization. Price's model, on the other hand, does not deal so much with the interactions of leadership, goal setting, and participative decision making. Price contends that there is one best way to organize a unit's activities so as to improve the one critical element which he claims is output. The focus of Likert's system is primarily on people factors (to insure participation, teamwork) while Price's model focuses on organizing in a specific way to achieve the goal of improving output. The authors of this thesis argue that there is no simple model that clearly explains all the elements which contribute to effectiveness. We believe effectiveness is the degree to which prescribed goals and objectives are attained. The proper measurement of this effectiveness is dependent upon the interactions and congruencies of the organization's mission, people, structure, technology, and environment. Each organization is unique and accordingly, warrants careful thought and analysis when evaluating the effectiveness of that particular organization.

The next section will detail the history of the Army and Navy efforts to improve the effectiveness of their respective organizations.

C. HISTORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MILITARY

Organizational Development (OD) is a systematic, planned effort to improve the functioning and effectiveness of the organizational unit. OD examines personnel and their interrelationships and then works to improve the commitment, readiness, motivation, and development of individuals as well as units. Between WWII and the late 1960s the military made very little effort in OD. In 1948 President Truman issued his Executive Order desegregating the military, but segregation continued, e.g., the mess corps of the Navy was entirely black or Filipino. The Air Force and Army conducted studies on a multitude of human factors that contribute to the effectiveness of an organization, but little emphasis was placed on this field of study. In the mid 1960s the Department of Defense published a human goals statement stating that everyone in the military would be treated equally. Still the problems that plagued the country during this time frame were affecting the values held by the military.

The late 1960s and the early 1970s truly marked a change in these traditional values. No longer could the military leaders simply tell his subordinates what to do. People wanted to know why they were told to perform specific duties. Probably the most significant contributor to this questioning of authority was the Vietnam War. The draftees were coming from a population that could not understand why

the United States Government was sacrificing American lives for a conflict that the government did not even appear intent on winning. Additionally, the minority members of the military looked for representation of their race/creed in the upper echelons of the services and saw none. With the increase of racial awareness throughout the country it is not hard to understand why there was unrest in the military, especially when one realizes that the Department of Defense was, and still is, nothing more than a fair approximation of a representative sample of the entire population.

These two problems, coupled with retention problems and the realization of the All Volunteer Force concept, led the senior military officials to embark on a plan to increase the effectiveness of the military. The manner in which the Army and Navy viewed and attacked these problems and the ensuing plans differ substantially and will be examined in the following two sections.

D. NAVY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (HRM)

In 1970 ADM Zumwalt stated that his objective was to improve the management of human resources by enhancing our understanding of and commmunication with people. (Butler 1981). This pronouncement by Admiral Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations in 1970, indicates the direction and scope of the HRM program as developed by the Navy. Prior to 1970, little was done by the Navy in the field of human resources. Zumwalt's first action in this field as CNO was

to formulate a study group to examine the reasons for and provide solutions to the retention and racial problems that plagued the Navy at the time. He had the group review and study all Naval management practices and policies. He felt that the human element was the Navy's greatest resource and that an application of behavioral science methods should produce effective management.

In 1971 the group provided the Admiral with four options to implement an organizational development program. The first was based on the Blake/Mouton Grid Management and Organizational Development System. The principle of this concept was to place the leader's style of management on a grid that ranked from one to nine. The elements measured on the grid were the leader's concern for his personnel and his concern for mission accomplishment. The ideal leader, according to Blake and Mouton, was to be ranked nine, nine.

The Instrumental Survey Feedback established at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan was the second option offerred to Admiral Zumwalt. This model recommended the use of a survey to be issued to everyone in the command in order to obtain data on the organization. The data would then be analyzed and fed back to the commander.

The third option was Team Development. This model utilized a consultant led process that developed the sense of being part of a team with personnel having similar goals,

tasks and relationships. The central values of this model come from McGregor's Theory Y. The key to success of this model was ownership of the problem regardless of individual status.

The final option provided was the Laboratory Learning Method. Much like Team Development, this model was consultant led, but instead of team building, it allowed the participant to experiment with his role in the organization. These "T" groups were intended to allow individuals an opportunity to examine their true, internal behaviors by encouraging a lowering of all defense mechanisms.

The first effort of the Navy into the OD field combined, in a military staged process, all four of the models provided by the study group. They called the program Command Development. At one time or another the experts would either go to the fleet or vice versa, and provide the training or collect the data of the above mentioned models. In addition, this training provided the leader with a leadership guidebook called the N-Man Concept which gave the managers a "cookbook" on management styles.

This initial program was not totally successful. While it provided the necessary training as dictated by the CNO, there were quite a few problems. The entire process was too long and time consuming for both the leaders and the sailors. In addition, there was resistance to the consultant who came on board to administer the training. In an attempt to ease

the natural tension between consultant and client and to get the client to "tell it like it is," the consultants who worked in the drug rehabilitation centers wore civilian clothes and had their hair longer than the traditional cut. These actions were viewed as scandalous by the conservative senior personnel and resulted in less than full cooperation.

1972 saw the advent of more racial tension in the Navy. Riots erupted on both the Kitty Hawk and the Constellation. (Wright 1975). In an attempt to combat the continuing racial situation and in keeping with his basic premise of the Navy's most valuable resource, Admiral Zumwalt instituted the Understanding Personnel Worth and Racial Dignity Program (UPWARD). These seminars were mandatory training for all Naval personnel. Much like the "T" groups, these seminars had the participants "let it all hang out." Whatever was on anyone's mind in regard to racial prejudices was brought to the group's attention. This program provided a valuable tool for release of frustrations built up by the minorities of the Navy, but there was a severe consequence. The UPWARD seminars were not viewed as assisting the commander in organizational effectiveness. This, coupled with the liberal appearance of the HRM consultants, resulted in Navy managers being "turned off" by the HRM program.

Still the program continued to grow under Admiral Zumwalt's direction. Four HRM centers were established to provide the fleet (Atlantic and Pacific) with expert assistance. In

addition, centers were placed in Washington, D.C., and London, England, to provide shore commands with this same expert advice. To train the experts a school was established in Memphis, Tennessee, to provide these individuals with the skills necessary to interact with their operational clients. The goals of the HRM program were ambitious. They were:

Increased awareness of the Navy's Human Goals Credo.
Improved unit readiness.
Improved communications throughout the chain of command.
Improved image of the Navy as professionals.
Improved leadership and human resource management.
Improved job satisfaction.
Total involvement of the chain of command in increasing productivity of the Navy.
Insurance of equality in all administrative action.
Increasing acceptance of host country culture by Naval personnel and their dependents.
Recognition of alcoholism as an illness.
Reduction of alcohol and drug related incidences.
Development of Human Goals Action Plan.
Retention of quality people. (Butler 1981)

In 1973 the "HRM Cycle" was established to accomplish the goals listed above. Each command was scheduled for this nine staged cycle. This cycle included: initial visit, data gathering, data analysis, feedback to the client, planning for actions to be taken, implementation of plans by consultants, unit action, follow-on activities provided by the consultants to the client, and follow-up visit. This cycle, with minor refinements to the models described earlier, is the system used by the Navy today.

The problems that plagued the establishment of this field are still prevalent. While there is general consensus among Naval personnel that increased effectiveness is in part a

function of work relationships and individual job satisfaction, the method of accomplishing that effectiveness is still in question. The HRM cycle being used is still extremely time consuming. In addition, the previously held beliefs by the operational personnel regarding the sometimes liberal consultants and the UPWARD type seminars which had been conducted, still result in less than full cooperation and support of the HRM program.

E. ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The Army's approach to OD differs significantly from the Navy; although, the Army utilizes many of the same tools for data collection/intervention. The Army's effort in this field started in 1969 at Fort Ord, California.

The Commanding General of this basic training facility wanted to reduce the cost of training without reducing the performance of the soldiers. He foresaw the end of the draft and wanted to have his unit prepared to put out quality soldiers with fewer assets. The Training Management Evaluation Committee that he established studied the problem at hand and recommended several measures by which the satisfaction level of the trainees and cadre could be measured. It was felt that high satisfaction would result in better performance for the lower cost. In 1972, Fort Ord began week-long training that included self-awareness seminars, group problem-solving workshops, and inter-communication exercises. Based on the success of this program, Fort Ord

implemented an OD plan that had the following goals: better organizational communication and flexibility, greater commitment to Army goals, more personal motivation, and job satisfaction. Simultaneously, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Westmoreland, started his own study group at the Department of the Army level to determine how to broaden the Army's use of behavioral science methods so that organizations could become more effective.

After being briefed on the available expertise in the field, General Westmoreland decided to fund five projects to determine the feasibility of OD in the Army. These five projects were survey feedback, conducted in United States Army Europe; OD in a staff environment, conducted at MILPERCEN, Washington, D.C.; an assessment center conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia; skills in management, conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas; and OD at an installation, conducted at Fort Ord, California.

The pilot test at Fort Ord began in 1972 and was named the Motivation Development Program. The goals of this program were to determine how behavioral science methodologies could best be incorporated into the Army's educational system, to determine the minimum staff requirement to perform OD functions at other installations, to refine OD techniques for the military, to measure the effects of OD on a typical organization, and to develop educational material for incorporation into the educational system. Fort Ord's mission was

further expanded in 1973 when it was placed in charge of the Army's Leadership and Management Development Course. While this was not originally considered to be a function of OD, the Army realized the potential of training the future leaders with the behavioral science methods required for OD.

Like the Navy's first attempt into OD, the Army's initial program at Fort Ord encountered problems. There was little support from top level managers with the familiar complaint of not having enough time to devote to this "nice to have" program. In addition, the original client of this program was larger than first requested. The coordinators had hoped for a very small unit to work with in order to work the bugs out of the program. Instead, they were directed to consult with a 550 man organization. The size of the unit was too prohibitive to effectively accomplish the desired goals. In an attempt to make the organization manageable, the pilot test was broken down into three separate company size units (120 personnel each). The first was the leadership and management development (L&MD) company that utilized the L&MD training program of instruction. The second was the OD company that utilized behavioral science techniques such as surveys and interviews to determine the climate of the organization. The third company was used for control. In an attempt to minimize the Hawthorne Effect, the commander of this unit was told that his unit was "next in the barrel" for the program. The test results indicated a positive correlation between the training in both units and the overall job satisfaction of the personnel.

With the scheduled end of the pilot programs in sight (1975), Department of the Army coordinated with Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) to establish the U.S. Army Human Resource Management Training Activity at Fort Ord, California. This activity combined the inputs of the five originally funded projects to formulate the Army's first organized unit for organizational effectiveness.

Soon after the establishment of the activity, the name was changed to the U.S. Army Organization Effectiveness Training Center. The Army called their new technology organization effectiveness (OE) for two reasons. There was concern by the founders regarding senior officer acceptance of the term OD, especially since this was a "civilian" terminology. Human Resource Management was ruled out due to the fear of being identified with the Equal Opportunity and Drug/Alcohol Programs. The term OE seemed to have the correct connotations of unit effectiveness that the training center was trying to portray.

The OE program is tailored to the individual unit commander. It can use any or all methods available for data collection/analysis and interventions. The purpose of the program is to assess the situation, assist in action planning by the chain of command, implementation of the plan, and feedback/evaluation. The program itself is designed for organizational improvement. It is not a one shot attempt

at improvement, but rather a long-range plan for increased effectiveness. It is a data based, systems approach looking at the entire organization with the goal of improving effectiveness. (Hewitt 1980)

As previously stated, the Army's OE program and the Navy's HRM program have taken different paths to the same goal, i.e., improved unit effectiveness. While the Navy's program encompasses a larger variety of issues, both services utilize the survey-feedback method of collecting and analyzing data. The data is then passed on to the commander for action. Both services work with the commander in developing action plans and implementation procedures. Then feedback is provided to assist the commander in future actions. The goal and purpose of each organization is to increase the effectiveness of the respective services.

The next chapter will present and examine the compatibility between the values espoused by Likert as being important when considering effectiveness and the values that we, the authors believe, are important to the military today.

III. LINKAGE OF LIKERT AND MILITARY VALUES

A. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS AND VALUES

Just as effectiveness has no universally accepted definition, so is the case with professional military ethics and values. The military has no explicit formal code of ethics and values. The closest guide may be that as expressed by officer manuals and the motto of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York--that of duty, honor, country. There is a code of conduct for prisoners of war and a Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for legal matters, but little else that explicitly dictates those values that should be shared as important by all military officers.

The military professional ethic does not arise from a single cause nor can it be explained by any one single model. However unique the military may seem, it is by no means isolated from the social, political, and economic currents of the larger American society. The military derives its identity from the ideals of the society for which it serves. Thus the professional military ethic can be viewed as a set of expected behaviors that results from the trust and confidence that is vested in the military by the American society. It also cannot be overlooked that the civilian society is the entity which maintains the military's strategic direction, budgetary support, and personnel input.

So to the extent that the military is but a suborganization of American society, perhaps the values of this society are those of the military. But here contradictory values can be shown to exist that portray a certain uniqueness to military lifestyles.

The American society espouses such well known values as liberty, democracy, freedom, humanism, equality, and peace. A case can be made that the military emphasizes a need for authority, hierarchial control, obedience, loyalty, patriotism, and a disciplined force capable of waging war. The military society is to a certain degree self-sufficient. It has its own traditions, customs, legal system and support systems (transportation, education, engineer, medical, etc.). The authors believe the military is unique and that its professionalism can be defined in terms of expertise, responsibility, and association. The values that relate to these professional traits would be the degree to which the military officer adheres to the unlimited obligation of service to his country and allegiance to duly constituted authority (Constitution, UCMJ), the degree to which he acquires and applies the requisite competence to meet his duty requirements, and the conformity to which he shares values that are essential to honoring the trust and confidence placed in him by his country.

The problem with the aforementioned values are two-fold. First, it is easy to find acceptance with broad values, but

it is extremely difficult to translate these same values into specific guidelines for behavior. On the other side of the coin though, it would be extremely difficult to specifically and explicitly cite all expected values such that they would encompass all possible situations. This broad-narrow argument is perhaps the very reason that no explicit code has ever been developed for the military officer. Secondly, the mere size and diversity of the peacetime force make it inherently difficult to establish a total commitment to any one set of values. The services, just as in American society, are made up of human beings who are subject to mistake, misunderstanding, and temptation. This becomes more evident as one reflects on the recent revolutions that have taken place in American society that serve to challenge the values of patriotism and authority. There have been economic, political, social, educational, youth, and sexual revolutions that have challenged the moral, philosophical, and ideological grounds of many traditions and policies. These changes have resulted in changed behaviors of people and accordingly, changed and different value systems. Hence, the inherent difficulty in establishing commitment to any one set of values.

Another element which impacts on professional military ethics and values is the environment. The services are large in size, increasingly complex and increasing substantially in developing personnel transfer potential to the civilian sector. These are but a few of the problems associated with the external environment. The internal environment is just

as explosive. The military services maintain increasing expectations of perfection (officer efficiency reports, equipment maintenance standards); create attitudes of "ticket punching" as criteria for success; display behaviors and actions just to "please the boss"; use fear as a motivator; and promote careerism--advancing one's career at the cost of one's integrity. These internal and external constraints further diminish the military's ability to establish commitment to a given set of values.

A study conducted in 1970 by the U.S. Army War College on military professionalism was designed to assess the professional climate of the Army, to identify any problem areas, and to formulate corrective actions. The data was obtained from interviews, seminars, and questionnaire responses from 450 officers from six Army schools at the advanced and staff course levels. The study involved an elite cross section of the officer crops and indicated the concerns of the aspiring leadership of the Army. The study revealed that the ideal climate was characterized by individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence, unselfish motivation, technical competence, and an unconstrained flow of information. However, the existing professional climate was perceived as selfish behavior, distorted priority setting, careerism, cover-ups due to organizational pressures, looking upward to please superiors rather than fulfilling legitimate needs of subordinates, inadequate technical and managerial competence,

and incomplete communications between juniors and seniors. This study certainly revealed dissatisfaction within the officer corps concerning what is and what should be the military professional climate.

As there are no well defined nor accepted explicit set of values for the professional military officer to internalize, the authors will present the following set of values that we believe to be important to the military officer today:

Personal integrity.
Obedience.
Commitment.
Role modeling for subordinates.
Dedication.
Loyalty.
Technical competence.
Open communications.
Selflessness.

Values from this list can easily be added or deleted. It is not the gospel, but we do believe it to be as acceptable in lieu of any yet to be published set of military values and ethics.

B. LIKERT'S VALUES

As stated in Chapter 2, Likert believes that the most productive and most effective organization is the System 4 type of organization. The System 4 organization is characterized by a high degree of participation, by leadership practices that exude trust and confidence between superiors and subordinates, by a free flow of information upward, downward, and lateral throughout the organization, by group decision making that is basically decentralized, and by group

participation in goal and objective setting procedures. Participation is the key ingredient to Likert's model and value system. Likert contends that participation enhances employee commitment and that this commitment can then result in a lessened need for formal authority and discipline to get the job done.

The values that are explicit to Likert's theory can best be outlined in the five dimensions used within the questionnaire. The first dimension is that of organizational climate. Values important in this dimension include the free flow of information, a listening and responsive leadership, decisions made at the level where the most information exists, personnel motivated for efforts through rewards and career enhancing duties, and a perceived concern for the human element.

The second dimension is that of managerial leadership. Some of the values explicit to this dimension include a high feeling of subordinate worth and dignity due to support from approachable and understanding supervisors, a high degree of teamwork problem resolution through subordinates and superiors working together. The third dimension of peer leadership is very similar to the aforementioned supervisory leadership. It is characterized by the same degree of positive support to enhance personal worth, close cooperative teamwork, and mutual problem resolution.

The fourth dimension of work group processes is characterized by members of the organization mutually coordinating

and supporting each other, by a capability to respond effectively to crisis situations, by exhibiting high standards of discipline and decorum, and by groups working cooperatively with each other. The fifth dimension of satisfaction reflects the degree to which individual members are satisfied with their superior, job, unit effectiveness, and fellow workers. It also reflects the degree to which fair and equitable treatment is afforded all members in such areas as promotion, education opportunities, and assignments.

As can be easily surmised, Likert espouses the promotion of an organizational climate that is highly participative, cooperative, has a listening and responsive leadership, promotes open communication and discussion, exhibits a high degree of concern for the human element, and insures fair and equitable treatment of all its personnel. Since these values and dimensions are descriptive of Likert's System 4 management style, it is necessary to compare these values with those of the military to see if in fact, Likert's values are congruent with those of the military.

C. LIKERT-MILITARY VALUE LINKAGE

Although the Likert System 4 management style was actually tested and validated within civilian industry, the Army and Navy determined that the Likert instrument was useful, comprehensive, and capable of predicting future organizational states in the military. The use of the adapted Likert survey by the military is to implicitly state that the System 4

management style is appropriate for use within the military society. But are the values espoused by Likert similar to or desirable given the value system of the military?

The authors contend that there are many values within the Likert model that are congruent with military values, particularly if we consider the Army War College study mentioned in Section A above. The ideal climate perceived by these senior, aspiring officers was characterized by personal integrity, unselfish motivation, free and open communication flows, and mutual trust and confidence. These desired values are easily correlated with values critical to the Likert model. For instance Likert strongly supports upward, downward, and lateral communications, an understanding and supportive leadership (avoidance of carreerism), teamwork and cooperation (requiring trust and cooperation), and commitment to the organization and its goals (unselfish motivation). These values which are perceived as the ideal climate for the military are certainly supported by the values inherent in the dimensions of Likert's model.

Despite these apparent congruent values, there are some military practices, vested in its own traditions and customs, that may not have strong ties to the value system of System 4. For example, there is a strong and legitimate basis for the existence of hierarchial control and authority. This positional power, derived by rank and based within the UCMJ, is often the means by which military discipline and

obedience are obtained. This method of obtaining commitment is in some ways different from the participative, cooperative, supportive method inherent in Likert's theoretical base.

Decision making in the military is not commonly made utilizing the group problem solving process. Policies are often made for a military unit by the person in the power seat based on his/her personal experiences and prejudices. Often times when problems are continually handled using group or committee action, the leader is often perceived as indecisive or "wishy-washy." In the same vein, though open communications and discussion may be helpful, after a decision has been made it is not readily accepted that people will then sit down and negotiate that same decision. The point to be made is that traditions and expectations dictate that a military leader be powerful and decisive in order to gain the requisite respect and discipline. Likewise a supervisor who gains a reputation of being friendly and easy to approach may not be held in the highest regards by his immediate supervisor.

We believe that given a wide range of values and ethics which can be cited, there are sufficient similarities and congruencies between Likert's values and the broadly stated values of the military to warrant and justify the application and utilization of the respective surveys.

D. RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES

Given these similarities and differences the following four groups were surveyed to determine the relevance of Likert's System 4 to the military. 1) Army Organizational Management Consultants (OEMCs), 2) Navy Human Resource Management Specialists (HRMSs), 3) Navy surface-line officers, and 4) Army combat arms officers. The OEMCs and HRMSs have received formal training in theories and philosophies related to managerial practices. To provide a point of comparison, we surveyed the line officers and combat arms officers because they deal with the day-to-day operations of the combat force for the respective services and typically have not received formal training in managerial theory for the express purpose of carrying out their duties more effectively.

The OEMC trained individuals attend a sixteen week course at Fort Ord, California, in order to prepare themselves for the methods and practices that the Army espouses as being functional and effective for use in the field. The course does not solely preach Likert's model, but also exposes everyone to the latest in managerial strategies, theories, and philosophies. The school provides a system theory approach for these newly trained consultants to internalize that is similar to the components that the authors mentioned in Chapter I as being important in the consideration of effectiveness. These components include consideration of

people, structure, technology, processes, and the environment. After receiving such broad yet intensive training, we believe that this type of individual will more likely reflect an organizational management approach that is similar to Likert's System 4. These individuals then go on to Army commands and dedicate their services to that particular command in the capacity of an internal consultant. The authors hypothesize that these individuals should believe in such practices as upward, downward, and lateral communications and participation in decision making and goal setting by virtue of this training.

The individuals who are trained by the Navy to become HRMSs normally attend a twelve week school at the HRM School in Memphis, Tennessee. The training is similar to that received by the OEMCs with the exception that these officers do not go on a four week exercise to practice their newly acquired skills and talents. They are exposed to different management styles and the interaction of the components that are a part of the system theory. The HRMSs are then sent to one of fourteen HRM Centers/Detachments. They then provide services to any local shore units, air squadrons, or ships that may be in the area at the time. By virtue of their specialized training, we believe that these officers should also reflect Likert's System 4 management as that which is the most effective.

The combat arms officers and the surface warfare officers do not as a practice receive specialized training in human

resource management areas. These officers are trained in the conduct of combat and retain the mission of being prepared to win the first battle of the next war. These officers are not generally asked by their superiors if they have conducted participative decision making or whether there is effective lateral communication in their respective organization. The primary concern in these units is whether the mission is accomplished as directed. Emphasis is on mission accomplishment rather than methodology. Assuming that these officers are results oriented, we hypothesize that these groups of officers will lean more toward the authoritative style described by Likert as Systems 1 and 2.

These groups are different because of the training they receive, the missions they are given, and also because of commonly accepted traditions and customs of the military. The nature of organizational effectiveness training is new to the services and, as of yet, has not been totally accepted and supported by all hierarchial levels. Resistance to this new concept has been, and still is, prevalent throughout the military. Professionally trained combat officers do not feel that they need to be told how to communicate with their men nor how to make decisions. History has shown that aggressive, forceful, demanding officers have succeeded within the military profession without a school-trained management consultant to assist them. Given these differences and resistances, we, the authors, plan to test the following hypotheses through the administration of a survey to the types of groups mentioned above:

1) The OEMCs will report a higher mean score than their operational counterparts. (Army Combat Arms Officer)
2) The HRMSs will report a higher mean score than their operational counterparts. (Navy Surface Line Officer)
3) The OEMCs and HRMSs will report similar means.
4) The combat-arms officers and surface-line officers will report similar means.

The methodology employed to administer and collect the survey data will be presented in the following chapter. A separate section will detail the modification of the survey for this study.

IV. METHODOLOGY

A. SURVEY ADMINISTRATION AND DATA COLLECTION

As previously stated, the survey (Appendix A) utilized was a modification of the Navy's Human Resource Management Survey (Fleet). The major modification of the survey was the number of questions added and deleted rather than the type of question. The primary goal of the survey was to have the respondent imagine the "ideal" working conditions and to describe these conditions with the answer categories provided. The intention was to describe the ideal, not the current state. The key phrase in the administration of the survey was "In an effective organization." From this perspective the respondent characterized the five basic dimensions of effectiveness inherent within the Likert framework.

Data were solicited from four major groups. These groups included the HRMSs, the OEMCs, the combat arms officers, and the surface warfare officers. The rank structure for the categories ranged from O-3 to O-6. The basis for this selection of officers was to solicit the responses of the officers who have been in the service a sufficient period of time to have developed some "personal theory of management." In addition, these officers are most likely to have been closely associated with soldiers and the basic organizational element of the Army (company) or Navy (department). Therefore,

the combat/surface warfare officers could adequately represent the views of the operational side of the military while the OEMC/HRMS officers represented the "experts" in the field of Human Resource Management. These selected groups obviously are not the only people who have the experience to provide valuable data. However, it must be noted that this study is merely the first stage of a newly conceived research effort and will serve to provide baseline data and recommendations for further study and analysis.

The survey was mailed to one hundred OEMCs in the grades of O-3(P) through O-6, stationed in the continental United States and Europe, whose names were obtained from the OE School at Fort Ord, California. Officers below the specified ranks were not surveyed because we wanted to limit the scope of this initial effort. In addition, time was a limiting factor for the purpose of this study.

Sixty surveys were sent to the following HRM centers: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; San Diego, California; Washington D.C.; and Norfolk, Virginia. These centers in turn sent copies to detachments at Alameda, California; Charleston, S.C; Whidbey Island, Washington; New London, Connecticutt; Mayport, Florida; Yokosuka, Japan; and Subic Bay, Phillipines. Oversea centers were not selected due to the limited time and scope of this initial research effort. The obvious difference in sample size between the Army and Navy is a result of the Navy's smaller community of senior HRMCs.

The size could have been increased by including junior officers and Chief Petty Officers, but the data would then represent a different sample population. These two groups then provide the basis for comparing formally trained officers in human resource management strategies with the following two groups of officers: the combat arms officers and the surface warfare officers.

One hundred surveys were distributed throughout the three major brigades in the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California. The surveys were then sent down to battalion and company size units for completion. The return rate was probably affected by the substantial amount of training these units were undergoing at the time. Additionally, the surveys were forwarded to the units for completion rather than assembling the respondents as a group to complete the survey. The authors opted for this method because of time constraints and realization of the heavy workload these units of the division had at the time.

In order to obtain a comparable group for the HRMSs as we did for the OEMCs, we surveyed seventy-five Naval officers currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School. These officers were selected because of ease in survey administration and time constraints. These officers were all O-4s and above and all in the surface warfare community. These officers have spent at least one tour at sea and had sufficient time and experience to internalize a personal theory of effectiveness.

B. SURVEY DIMENSIONS

Of the original eighty-eight question survey administered by the Navy, the authors selected sixty representative questions. The following is a breakdown by dimension of the exact number of questions presented to the sample population:

Command Climate - All questions.
Supervisory Leadership - All questions.
Peer Leadership - Eight out of twelve questions.
Work Group Processes - Five out of nine questions.
End Result Measures - Twenty out of forty questions.

The reason for the deletion of the twenty-eight questions was the length of the survey. It was the opinion of the authors that the addition of these questions would not significantly add to the study and might result in less than a total effort by the respondents.

The survey was broken down into these dimensions to evaluate key elements in any organization. The first dimension described was that of command climate (Questions 1-14). This portion of the survey refers to the procedures, policies and conditions within which a group performs the mission of the organization. These conditions and policies are typically created by the command hierarchy. The following are aspects of climate that were evaluated: communications flow, decision making, motivation index, and human resource emphasis. The critical element in this dimension was the evaluation of how the group reacts to policies placed on them and procedures utilized by higher headquarters.

The next dimension examined was supervisory leadership (Questions 15-27). This index evaluates the behavior of the supervisor toward his subordinates as well as the characteristics of an effective leader. The various sub-categories are support, team coordination and team emphasis, goal emphasis, and work facilitation. The thrust of this section was to evaluate the degree of support and guidance the supervisor gives to his subordinates. In addition, this indice examined actions of an effective leader as determined by the respondent.

The same sub-categories for supervisory leadership were then utilized to evaluate peer leadership (Questions 28-35). This dimension examined the behavior of work group members toward each other. Support, coordination, and work facilitation are major areas of interest. The emphasis of this section was teamwork, the degree to which peers cooperate with each other on mission accomplishment, and the level of confidence subordinates have in each other.

The fourth dimension examined was work group processes (Questions 36-40). The way in which group members share information, make decisions, and solve problems determines the group's productivity and quality of its outputs, i.e., its effectiveness. Key elements evaluated were work group coordination, bureaucratic practices, and work group discipline.

The fifth dimension meshes several components together to examine end result measures (Questions 40-59). These questions evaluate the degree of self-satisfaction of individuals within the command toward supervisors, group members, and the job. In addition, lower level influence and training were measured to determine the degree of influence that the lower levels of command have on the organization and the amount of training provided for upward mobility. Finally, equal opportunity questions and drug abuse/alcohol prevention questions were asked to determine the effective organization's position on these issues. It should be noted that these questions are not the only dimensions that impact on equal opportunity and/or drug/alcohol prevention. Command climate also indicates the organization's ability to deal with these areas. The reasoning for placing these questions in the survey was to gather explicit information on these highly visible areas rather than implicit information gathered from other parts of the instrument.

In addition to the five dimensions of the Likert survey, the authors added leadership style (Questions 61-100) as a major determinant of an effective organization. These forty questions were adapted from the Fleishman Leadership Opinion Questionnaire and concentrated directly on the style of leadership exhibited by the manager. Key areas of interest are the leader's rapport with his subordinates, communications with the subordinates and the method of decision making by the leader.

The final portion of the survey (Questions 101-103) asked the respondent to evaluate his/her experience with the HRM/OE programs. The thrust of this section is where has the HRM/OE program been the past three years, where is it today, and where will it be in the future. The data was then compiled and analyzed bycomparing the various dimensions of the survey by the corresponding groups that were selected for survey.

C. SURVEY RETURN

Table 4.1 displays the data regarding survey distribution and return. The overall return rate of over 50% is perceived to be good for a survey of this type. The higher percentage return rate for the HRMS category is believed to be a function of the rapport that these centers and detachments have with the Naval Postgraduate School. The equally high return rate for the Naval surface warfare officers is believed to be a result of the fact that these officers saw the survey as an opportunity to help fellow graduate students with their thesis requirement. The Army return rate is believed to be relatively lower because of the method of survey administration and training requirements on the post at the time of the survey distribution. The fairly good return rate of the Army OEMCs is believed to be a result of assisting fellow Army officers in the field of organizational effectiveness.

D. SURVEY ANALYSIS PLAN

In reporting the data, the authors utilized the five dimensions of the Navy's survey described above as the major

Table 4.1 Survey Distribution and Return Rate

CATEGORY	SURVEYS DISTRIBUTED	SURVEYS RETURNED	RETURN RATE
Naval HRMS	60	43	72%
Army OEMC	100	56	56%
Surface-Line	75	43	57%
Combat Arms	100	42	42%
TOTALS	335	184	55%

categories for comparison. The reported sub-categories were derived from a minimum of two-thirds of the questions from the original survey being presented in this instrument. If the number of questions did not meet this two-thirds criterion, then the results were reported as part of the major category. For example, Peer Leadership (Support) has three questions on the original survey. Two of these questions were utilized in the administration of this survey so Peer Leadership (Support) was established as a reported sub-category. On the other hand, only three of the thirteen questions regarding equal opportunity were utilized; therefore, the results are not reported separately, but rather as a part of the total category--end result measures. The leadership opinion survey is broken down and reported in two major categories. Twenty questions relate to personnel, concentrating on the leader's rapport with his subordinates. These questions are reported as "personnel considerations." The other twenty questions evaluate the leader's emphasis on mission accomplishment and the actual operating procedures of the unit. These questions are reported as "structure orientation." The final three questions of the survey are presented separately to evaluate the respondents' views of the OD effort in the military. This category is referred to as program satisfaction.

The data was then analyzed by comparing the mean responses of the HRMSs versus the OEMCs; the Navy surface-line officer

versus the Army combat officer; the HRMSs versus the Navy surface-line officer; and the OEMCs versus the Army combat officer. A "t" distribution analysis was run to determine the significance of the reported differences of the means.

The next chapter will present the results of the data analysis.

V. RESULTS

A. DATA QUALITY

Before discussing the significance of the collected data, it is appropriate to address the perceived quality of the data. The percentage return rate presented in Chapter IV, Section C shows an overall survey return rate of 55%. However, there is a 35% difference between the lowest category (combat arms) and the highest category (HRMS). Accordingly, the authors find it necessary to present a discussion regarding the data collected from each category.

The HRMS return rate of 72% was significantly higher than the other three categories. We believe this high response rate was in part due to personal contact between the advisor of this study, Dr. Reuben Harris, and the commanders at the respective HRM centers and detachments. A personal letter was sent to each commander to advise him of the forthcoming survey and to request his support in this embryonic research effort. The high response rate from the Navy HRMSs may also be attributed in part to their desire to be an integral part of Navy sponsored research that relates directly to the nature of their duties. The authors do not believe that the seventeen surveys that were not returned would significantly alter the mean responses of this group.

The OEMC return rate of 56%, though not as high as the Navy's counterpart, is considered high by the authors.

Surveys were mailed by name to officers in grades O-3(P) to O-6 who were serving as OEMCs in the continental United States (CONUS) and Europe. Names were obtained from the latest updated roster at the OE School at Fort Ord, California. Officers who did not return the surveys may have changed assignments or may not have arrived at their next duty station in time to complete the survey. Despite these possible reasons for the non-return of forty-four surveys, it should be noted that this sample may be biased if in fact only officers interested in the program returned the survey. Lower responses from these forty four people could in fact substantially change the mean responses for the given categories. Readers of this study should keep these facts in mind when evaluating and analyzing the presented results.

The return rate of 57% for the Naval surface warfare officers is considered high. These officers, who are currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, were selected in the interest of time and ease of data collection. Surveys were sent through the student mail center to the seventy-five surface warfare officers who are in grades O-4 and above. The officers' addresses were obtained from the NPS Personnel Office. This sample may also be biased if one assumes that the Navy sends its proven and most promising officers to NPS. Despite this possible bias, this sample is indeed appropriate for this

study in that these officers are a fair representation of the Navy's officer leadership of the future in the surface community. Additionally, these officers have been to sea for at least one tour and have had the necessary managerial experience with which to form a "personal theory of organizational effectiveness."

The return rate of 42% for the Army combat arms officers is disappointingly low. The 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, was selected as the installation to provide the Army's data input because of its proximity to NPS. This facilitated survey distribution and data collection. However, the three major brigades at Fort Ord were heavily inundated with additional training requirements at the time. The personnel officers who distributed the surveys within the respective brigades also emphasized the voluntary aspect of their completion. It should also be recognized that this group of officers is different from the Naval surface warfare group. Captains in the Army (O-3s) represent the largest group of the officer ranks within brigades. These officers, who average between six to eight years of service, do not have as much time in service nor the experience of the Naval officers. Even with the inherent difficulties mentioned above, these officers should be a fair representation of the Army's leadership of the future. They have also had some time to react to, reflect on, and formulate personal theories of organizational management and effectiveness.

B. DISCUSSION OF GROUP MEAN DATA

Before subjecting the data to statistical analysis, it is appropriate to look at the mean scores of each of the surveyed groups for each category and sub-category. We will look for any possible trends, commonalities, or noticeable differences that may exist. The group mean data by category and sub-category are depicted at Table 5.1.

The authors developed twenty-seven categories and sub-categories from the 103 core questions of the survey. As noted in Chapter IV, Section D, some questions that were used to comprise sub-categories, were later grouped to form categories. For example, the sub-categories of communication flow, decision making, motivation, and human resource emphasis were later grouped together to form the category represented as command climate. The five main categories of Likert's survey that are used by the Army and Navy are those of command climate, supervisory leadership, peer leadership, work group processes, and end result measures. The authors added the three categories of personnel considerations, structure orientation, and program satisfaction in order to look solely at the dimensions of officer leadership and satisfaction with the OE and HRM programs. To determine this level of satisfaction the respondents were asked to evaluate the programs' performance in the past, the present and the future. Therefore, program satisfaction will be reported as three separate categories in Table 5.1. These additional categories will be elaborated on below.

TABLE 5.1 Group Mean Data

Organizational Indices	HRM	OEMC	Surface	Combat
Command Climate	4.333	4.220	4.235	4.197
Communication Flow	4.356	4.310	4.294	4.302
Decision Making	4.357	4.274	4.063	4.062
Motivation Index	4.426	4.254	4.397	4.233
Human Resource Emphasis	4.191	4.054	4.186	4.191
Supervisory Leadership	4.354	4.223	4.249	4.221
Support Index	4.244	4.134	3.952	3.913
Team Coordination	4.314	4.286	4.262	4.081
Team Emphasis	4.453	4.411	4.488	4.535
Goal Emphasis	4.605	4.375	4.512	4.512
Work Facilitation	4.155	3.911	4.032	4.062
Peer Leadership	4.184	4.020	4.067	3.895
Support Index	4.000	3.786	3.881	3.605
Team Emphasis	4.174	4.027	4.131	4.035
Goal Emphasis	4.395	4.179	4.155	4.209
Work Group Processes	4.186	3.886	4.015	3.794
Discipline Index	4.279	4.045	4.274	4.305
End Result Measures	4.063	3.934	4.018	4.013
Goal Integration	4.151	4.089	4.405	4.280
Satisfaction Index	4.287	4.232	4.222	4.098
Lower Level Influence	3.105	3.375	3.095	3.488
Training	4.171	4.167	4.190	4.230
Personnel Considerations	3.578	3.670	3.401	3.463
Structure Orientation	3.227	3.201	3.425	3.402
Prgm. Sat. Past	3.634	3.593	2.357	3.095
Prgm. Sat. Present	4.619	4.426	2.929	3.333
Prgm. Sat. Future	4.408	4.148	2.405	3.000

The majority of the twenty-two categories and sub-categories that were developed from the first sixty questions of the survey reveal means of around 4.0. The lower level influence sub-category was consistently reported in the 3.1 to 3.5 range. This is not too surprising as these questions asked officers to indicate the degree to which non-supervisory personnel affect what takes place in an effective organization. All officers appeared to believe that participation at the lowest levels is not necessarily very important to an "effective organization."

Although the differences are not much greater than tenths in most categories and sub-categories, it is interesting to note several comparisons. For instance, the OEMC means are all lower than the HRMS means with the exception of only one sub-category, that of lower level influence. At first glance, this would seem to indicate that the OE officers are generally less inclined to espouse participative management, ala Likert than are the HRMS officers. This may be a reflection of the type of training that these two groups of officers receive from their respective service schools.

The surface warfare officers reported means that were lower than their HRMS practitioners in nineteen of twenty-two cases. The surface warfare officers only had higher means in the sub-categories of team emphasis, goal integration, and training. This would seem to indicate, on the average, that surface warfare officers are less System 4 oriented than the

Navy's HRM consultants. This would appear to be reasonable since the HRMSs attend school for twelve weeks and specifically learn about the value of different management styles and situational leadership practices.

As opposed to the Navy operational officers, the Army's combat arms officers reported lower means than their OEMC practitioners in half of the twenty-two possible cases. This would seem to indicate that there might not be a significant difference between the philosophies espoused by the OEMCs and the combat arms officers. This might also indicate a closer fit of "effectiveness philosophies" between the Army's operational officers and OEMCs than that between the Navy's operational officers and the HRMSs.

There do not appear to be any obvious trends nor differences between the means reported by the surface warfare officers and the combat arms officers. At first glance, this may prove to show that there may be consistent and congruent philosophies of organizational effectiveness between the Army's operational officers and the Navy's operational officers.

Five additional categories were included in this study. The two categories of personnel considerations and structure orientation are descriptive categories of Fleishman's Leadership Questionnaire. This questionnaire was also modified to include the statement "In an effective organization . . ." before each question. These two categories were included in

an attempt to identify what the officer leadership of today felt was the most effective leadership style. The original Fleishman survey was scaled from 0 to 4. This scale was changed to read from 1 to 5 for the purpose of this study to correlate with the sixty Likert scaled questions at the beginning of the modified survey.

The personnel considerations category reflects the degree to which the respondent believes that the human resource element of an organization is important. The structure orientation category reflects the degree to which the respondent believes that the leader should be task- or mission-oriented as opposed to people-oriented. It is interesting to note that in these categories the only group which reported a higher mean for structure than for personnel was the surface warfare group. This would appear to indicate that accomplishing the job or mission may be more important to the surface warfare officers than attending to the needs of their people.

The program satisfaction categories reflect how the various groups of officers view the success and future potential of the OE/HRM programs. In reporting the data the questions were not combined in any manner in order to provide the reader an opportunity to view the perceptions of the respondents concerning the past, present and future of the established programs. One can readily see from the mean scores that there is a general level of dissatisfaction among

operational officers with the past performance of the programs. Surprisingly the practitionaires of the OD program share this opinion of the past performance.

The opinions of the various groups change when the time frame of the questions shift to the present and the future. The combat/surface-line officers maintain their rather bleak view of the overall worth of the HRM/OE programs, with mean responses of between 2.4 and 3.3. On the others hand the specialist see themselves as a current success and with potential for the future. Their mean scores ranged from 4.1 to 4.6.

In comparing the results presented and the philosophy of Likert it appears that all of the officers tend toward a System 4 management style. However, there are occasions when the responses definitely indicate a more authoritative style of leadership. Possibly the most descriptive word for the responses would be consultative, or Likert's System 3. In any case, these respondents seem to be departing from the traditional military role of "damn the people and just get the job done," to a more open form of management.

C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP MEAN DATA

Having discussed apparent trends, differences, and commonalities of the group mean data, it is appropriate to subject the data to statistical analysis. The t-test with an alpha level of .05 was utilized to determine if there were significant differences between means. The pooled variance

estimate was used instead of the separate variance estimate because it is the more critical test by virtue of its use of greater degrees of freedom. The four comparisons that were made include HRMS versus OEMC, HRMS versus surface-line, OEMC versus combat arms, and combat arms versus surface-line. Each comparison (Table 5.2) warrants a separate discussion.

1. HRMS Versus OEMC

The t-test analysis that compared the HRMS officer results to those of the OEMC officer shows significant findings in two sub-categories (supervisory leadership-goal emphasis and work facilitation) and one category (Work Group Processes). In all three cases the HRMS officers reported higher means than the OEMC officers. This would appear to indicate that the HRMS officers are more inclined to support the participative style of management in these areas of supervisory leadership and work group processes than are the OEMC officers. This significance may be attributed to a difference in training that these two groups of officers receive, but the authors have no explicit explanation for these differences. In fact, we did not expect any significant differences from this comparison group.

2. HRMS Versus Surface Line

The comparison of the HRMS officers with the Navy's surface-l officers resulted in five significant differences between the means. In the decision making sub-category

TABLE 5.2 Statistical Significance

Organizational Indices	HRM	OEMC	Surface	Combat	Significance
Command Climate	4.333	4.220	4.235	4.197	
Communication Flow	4.356	4.310	4.294	4.302	
Decision Making	4.387	4.274	4.063	4.062	2,3
Motivation Index	4.426	4.254	4.397	4.233	
Human Resource Emphasis	4.191	4.054	4.186	4.191	
Supervisory Leadership	4.354	4.223	4.249	4.221	
Support Index	4.244	4.134	4.952	3.913	2,3
Team Coordination	4.314	4.286	4.262	4.081	
Team Emphasis	4.453	4.411	4.488	4.535	
Goal Emphasis	4.605	4.375	4.512	4.512	1
Work Facilitation	4.155	3.911	4.032	4.062	1
Peer Leadership	4.184	4.020	4.067	3.895	
Support Index	4.000	3.785	3.881	3.605	
Team Emphasis	4.174	4.027	4.131	4.035	
Goal Emphasis	4.395	4.179	4.155	4.209	
Work Group Processes	4.186	3.886	4.015	3.794	1
Discipline Index	4.279	4.045	4.274	4.305	
End Result Measures	4.063	3.934	4.018	4.013	
Goal Integration	4.151	4.089	4.405	4.260	
Satisfaction Index	4.287	4.232	4.222	4.098	3
Lower Level Influence	3.105	3.375	3.095	3.488	4
Training	4.171	4.167	4.190	4.230	
Personnel Considerations	3.578	3.670	3.401	3.463	2,3
Structure Orientation	3.227	3.201	3.425	3.402	2
Prgm. Sat. Past	1.634	3.593	2.357	3.095	2
Prgm. Sat. Present	4.619	4.426	2.929	3.333	2,3
Prgm. Sat. Future	4.408	4.148	2.405	3.000	2,3,4

1=HRM vs. OEMC
2=HRM vs. Surface-Line
3=OEMC vs. Combat Arms
4=Combat Arms vs. Surface-Line

and the supervisory leadership-support index the HRMS officers reported higher means than the Navy's operational leaders. These higher means appear to show that the Navy trained HRM specialists are more System 4 oriented than the operational leaders in the fleet. One explanation for this difference is that the operational officers may feel that those people affected by decisions should not necessarily have a say about those decisions. When decisions are made, they are to be followed and not questioned.

The supervisory leadership-support index is interesting for it is here that the survey asks how important it is for the supervisor to be friendly and easy to approach as well as understanding when it comes to the problems of subordinates. The surface-line officers reported significantly lower means than the HRMSs (3.952 versus 4.244) indicating a more authoritative style. The authors believe this difference can be attributed in large part to the tradition and image of the military. The typical noncommissioned officer is expected to be professionally tough and demanding, a Sergeant Rock as opposed to a sympatico. The surface-line officers appear to continue to support this unwritten, but commonly accepted image and tradition.

Within the leadership indices of Fleishman's modified questionnaire, this comparison group displayed significantly different means for both categories, personnel considerations and structure orientation. As expected, the HRMSs reported a higher mean for personnel considerations and the surface-line officers reported a higher mean in

structure orientation. The HRMSs are predictably more people oriented because of the specialized training they receive in organizational development and human relations. Likewise, the higher structure mean for the surface-line officers is indicative of their concern with accomplishing the task and mission as directed from within the hierarchy: Mission first, people second. Tradition and competition within the officer crops probably drive the surface-line officers to concentrate on accomplishing the mission despite any obstacles and handicaps that may exist.

This comparison group had one more interesting difference, that of program satisfaction. The HRMS officers felt that they were doing a good job providing services and were equally optimistic of providing continued good service in the future as indicated by their scores of 4.6 and 4.0. The surface-line officers, however, have a different opinion about the HRM past successes and future potential as they reported means of 2.9/2.4. This appears to indicate that there are some contradictory opinions regarding the acceptance of this "people-oriented" program within the Navy. This significant difference would appear to be disheartening for the Navy leadership of today as well as for the future HRMSs of the Navy.

3. OEMC Versus Combat Arms

The comparison between the OE officers and the combat arms officers is very similar to the HRM and surface-line comparison. Four of the five areas that this comparison group

reported as being significantly different were the same as those of the HRM and surface-line comparison. Those four include decision making, supervisory leadership-support index, personnel considerations, and program satisfaction. Using the same rationale for this group as the previous group, the authors believe that tradition, custom, and image dictate obedience, discipline, and mission accomplishment. Hence, the differences in the decision making and supervisory leadership-support sub-categories.

This comparison group also showed a difference in the sub-category of satisfaction. The OE officers reported a mean of 4.232 and the combat arms officers reported a mean of 4.098. This sub-category asked the respondents to imagine an "effective organization" and to indicate how satisfied they were with their work group, supervisor, duties, and past and future progress in the military. The school trained theorists apparently believe that there should be a higher degree of individual satisfaction in an effective organization than the combat arms officers. The combat arms officer may believe that it is not necessary that an individual like his job and supervisor, only that he perform his job and perform it correctly.

This comparison group also showed significant differences between means in the personnel considerations and program satisfaction categories. The OE officers reported higher means in both categories than the combat arms officers.

In the personnel considerations category the combat arms officer is much like the Navy surface-line officer in that both operational officer groups are less "people-oriented" than their school trained practitioners who provide the HRM/OE services. This was to be expected in the study as the authors contend that the socialization of the HRM and OE officers result in these officers being more people conscious than the operational officers to whom they provide service.

The program satisfaction categories are very significant. The OE officers consistently report a higher mean than their operational counterparts. This would seem to indicate, much as in the HRM/surface-line comparison group, that there is not total agreement and acceptance between the practitioners and recipients of the value and worth of these organizational development programs. The operational leaders appear to be less confident of the program's past successes as well as the prospects for the future. The practitioners, however, appear to be content with their services to date and apparently have high hopes for this continued success in the future. This blatant dichotomy of opinions would appear to be a challenging obstacle for current and future practitioners to overcome.

4. Combat Arms Versus Surface-Line

This comparison group was studied to see if the operational leaders of the Army and Navy had similar views regarding organizational effectiveness, leadership styles,

and the acceptance of the OE and HRM programs, respectively. There were only two cases in which this comparison showed significant differences, in lower level influence and program satisfaction. It is interesting to note that in these two cases none of the reported means even approaches 4.0. The lower level influence questions asked the respondents the degree to which lower level supervisors and nonsupervisory personnel influence what goes on in the command. Although there was a significant difference between the means on this comparison, it should also be noted that all means were low in this sub-category. Accordingly, all officers in this study apparently believe that it is not very important that lower level supervisors and nonsupervisory personnel should influence the activities of the command.

There also was a significant difference between the means regarding how these officers viewed the HRM/OE programs. Although both reported relatively low means, the surface-line mean was significantly lower than the combat arms means. This apparently shows that both operational groups have not totally accepted the worth of the HRM and OE programs and perhaps the Navy less so than the Army. This presents a real challenge to the practitioners in the field, for they are the ones who must attempt to change these negative attitudes if they expect acceptance of the programs and methods in the future.

In summary, when significant differences did exist between operational officer and practitioner in people oriented categories, it was the practitioner who generally reported the higher means. The authors believe this is attributed to the socialization process that takes place as a result of attendance at the specialized schools for the practitioners. Additionally, it appears that the attitudes of the operational officers regarding the worth of the HRM and OE programs are very negative. If the acceptance of these programs by the operational leaders is indeed that negative, then the senior leadership and practitioners of the programs must do something to change these perceptions.

The summary and conclusions of the study will be presented in the next chapter. Additionally, recommendations for further study will be presented.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMARY

Figure 6.1 provides the reader with a pictorial display of the statistical analysis of the major categories of Likert's survey discussed in Chapter V. While it does not provide exact mean response scores, it does indicate the relative position of each group to the other as well as relative to Likert's System 4 management style.

The overall scores are lower than originally expected especially for the HRMSs and the OEMCs. The authors' hypothesis was that these scores would reflect a closer acceptance of Likert's System 4 style. While the responses indicate a move toward the ideal of System 4, it does not appear that the emphasis to measure "5" in every category is as paramount to the practitioners as one would expect by their very use of the survey. The responses of all four groups were similar with everyone agreeing that lower level influence tends toward System 2 (3.265) while the sub-category of goal emphasis under supervisory leadership had the highest degree of System 4 (4.501).

The rank order of the groups is the same in the first four categories. The Army combat officer is least inclined to adopt the concept of total participative management. This group was followed by the OEMC, the Naval surface-line



Figure 6.1 Group Means Reported by Likert's Dimensions

officer and finally the HRMS. The original hypothesis proposed by this study reflected the authors belief that the specialist in the OD field would score higher than their operational counterparts. It is logical to assume that the practitioners of the HRM/OE programs would lean more toward a participative style of management in comparison to their operational counterparts, since these personnel have received formalized training in the field.

In the fifth category, End Result Measures, the only change in the relative order of the groups is an exchange of positions between the OEMCs and the Army combat officer. This appears to be a direct result of the belief of some OEMCs that a participative style of management is not required for goal integration and lower level influence, both sub-categories of End Result Measures. The only conclusion that can be ascertained from this data is that when it comes to finalizing and implementing the goals of an organization, the responsibility for these actions rests solely with the leader. According to the OEMCs, the leader should make the final decision.

It is interesting to note that the Army OEMCs report consistently lower scores than the Navy surface-line officers. While a direct comparison (t-test) was not conducted, one would intuitively feel that the exact opposite would be true, i.e., the OEMC would more likely be System 4 oriented. One can conclude that the surface-line officer

has been socialized by the Navy's HRM program, a program that is heavily based on the Likert model. On the other hand, the OEMC, while a firm believer in participative management, is still closely associated with his operational counterparts.

In each of these five categories, the mean response is in the 4.0 range with the low being 3.794 and the high 4.354. The responses differ significantly in the following five categories of personnel considerations, structure orientation, and program satisfaction. The first two categories provide the responses to Fleishman's Leadership Opinion Survey and the last three are the respondents' perceptions of the success of the OD program within their respective service. It must again be noted that these categories were modified to be placed on the Likert scale to provide a point of comparison with the other categories. This scale was not utilized by Fleishman in his original survey, but the authors believe that similar scaling facilitates data comparisons for the reader.

Despite the differences noted within Fleishman's categories of personnel considerations and structure orientation, there are little differences when one combines these respective scores. The results of adding the two categories to form a new score reflect the following totals: HRMS 6.80; OEMC 6.87; Surface-Line 6.82; and Combat Arms 6.86. Although this is a nonrigorous test, it does highlight an interesting proposition. Should the emphasis of leadership

style be placed upon process (personnel considerations) or upon objectives (structure orientation)? The authors have no clear-cut answer for this question, but rather surface it as an issue to be considered when considering the important elements of "effective leadership."

It is immediately evident that the perceptions of the four groups significantly differ from the previous categories analyzed. There is a difference in relationship between each group and a difference in the range of the mean scores. The drop in the mean score response range, 3.8-4.6 to 3.2-3.6, can be attributed to two factors. First, the answer categories changed. In the first section of the survey (sixty questions), the best answer was "to a very great extent." However, in the second section of the survey (forty questions), the best answer was "always" in over half of the questions. The authors believe that the respondents were less inclined to select "always" because it is such an absolute response. Accordingly, we believe that the officers hedged their answers which in turn lowered the mean responses. Second, the survey really addresses two different targets. The first section of the survey emphasizes the organization as a whole and asks the respondents about various aspects of the unit. The second section concentrates on an individual, "the leader" within an organization. Noting this difference, the authors believe that the data support a participative organization style and a consultative leadership style.

The rank order of the four groups is interesting for these categories when compared to the previous five categories. The relative positioning of the groups changes noticeably. The operational officers score lower than the practitioners when it comes to the people of the organization. The direct opposite occurs when the actual mission of the organization is taken into account. This appears to show that the operational officer is more concerned with the overall accomplishment of the mission while the HRM and OE practitioner is more concerned with the people of the organization. This would seem to imply that the training received by the practitioner is a major factor in the higher mean being reported by the OE and HRM officers. Likewise, the emphasis placed on accomplishing the mission for the operational officer forces him to place more emphasis on the structure or task element of his job.

The final category examined was the satisfaction of each group with the OE and HRM programs. The ranking of the groups regarding this category was also placed on the one to five scale in order to provide easy and quick reference for the reader. The measurement of this category is not identifying the style of management, but rather the success of the HRM and OE programs in the past, the present, and the future. This section had the most divergent views of all the categories. The Navy surface-line officers responded with the lowest mean responses in all the categories in this

section with the Army combat officers next. Finally, the practitioners of the OE/HRM programs responded typically for personnel who are both proud and confident of their respective programs. The obvious conclusion is that the operational personnel do not believe that the program is working at all. They view this as a nice to have people program that may deserve attention after the rest of their required work is completed. On the other hand, the practitioners see it as a very positive program that has potential to be of assistance to the leaders and the organizations.

B. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the data gathered from the one hundred and eight-four respondents, the following conclusions are made in regard to the four original hypothesis.

1) The OEMCs did in fact report a higher mean than their operational counterparts in over half of the categories/sub-categories; the number was expected to be higher. This indicates that there might be a basic agreement between the two groups in regard the most effective style of management, i.e., a consultative style of management.

2) The HRMSs also scored higher than their operational counterparts on the survey. The difference in the results of this comparison is the gap between the two groups. Unlike the Army, the Navy HRMSs reported higher means in twenty-three of the twenty-seven categories/sub-categories. This definitly

indicates a broader divergencie of perceptions among the specialist and the operational prersonnel.

3) The next hypothesis tested was that the OEMCs and the HRMSs would score similar means. While the trends were similar, the actual scores were not as close as we had originally hypothesied. It should be noted that the differences were rarely significant and in fact were numerically close; however, the HRMSs reported higher scores in every area with the exception of 'Lower-level Influence' and 'Personnel Considerations.' Since these scores were so close very little can be concluded from the data. It does appear that the HRMSs are more closely aligned to Likert's model than the OEMCs.

4) The final hypothesis was that the operational officers of both services would report similar means. As with the specialist of the field these two groups reported virtually the same means for every category/sub-category. Unlike the HRMSs/OEMCs, no conclusions can be made about the data since each group scored higher in one-half of the answers.

In summarising the conclusions, we believe that the data reflect an optimal response other than Likert's optimum of '5'. Though the mean scores are close to 5 in most cases, it does not appear that these officer groups who were surveyed believe that effectiveness is dependent upon attaining this optimum in all sub-categories; therefore, reconsideration of how the survey data are used and interpreted may indeed

be appropriate for the services to consider. In fact, these data appear to show that the practitioners and operational officers are currently inclined to reflect a more consultative style of management (System 3) rather than participative (System 4); although, as previously stated, there appears to be a movement on each groups part toward System 4. Weighing this fact against the values and ethics of the military, the appropriate management style for today's officer might be consultative rather than participative. In any case, the survey reflects the degrees of either style.

Overall, there were few categories which reported significant differences; however, some patterns were evident. The practitioners generally reported higher means than the operational officers. They were more personnel oriented and felt that decisions should be made using the participative approach. Additionally, all groups generally felt that effective organizations do not require influence and participation from lower level and non-supervisory personnel. These patterns and trends appear to indicate that participation may not be the ideal state for the military organization of today.

The program satisfaction results appear to show cause for some concern. There are drastic differences between the perceptions of the practitioners and the operational officers regarding the value of the organizational management programs in the Army and Navy. These contradictory views pose a serious

challenge to the top leadership of the services as well as to the current and future practitioners in the field.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are recommendations based on the data collected and the conclusions drawn while conducting this study.

1) Expand the study. While the data collected are valuable in evaluating the perceptions of the military leadership regarding organizational effectiveness, the relative size of the sample is not adequate. To accumulate more meaningful data, a larger sample size should be sought to incorporate a wider cross section of the military population. There are other groups of personnel that have a meaningful impact on the policies and directions of the armed services. We specifically feel that the senior non-commissioned officers and more senior officers should be surveyed to ascertain their perceptions and philosophies regarding organizational effectiveness and leadership.

2) Reassess the Use of the Survey. The responses generated for the purpose of this study include one hundred and eight-four officers in the Army and Navy. A little over one half of the responses come from the actual trained specialist in the field of organizational development. Consequently, the results cannot be easily ignored. The tendency for the four groups to answer the various categories and sub-categories in the 4.0 range should be an indication that

"5" might not be the ideal for the military environment. The results appear to indicate that a different norm may be appropriate. Perhaps this study is an indication that the participative style of management is not truly the ideal style for the military.

3) Program Satisfaction. There is a significant difference between what the operational officers believe and what the practitioners believe regarding the acceptance and the worth of the organizational development programs. To remedy this situation, the OE/HRM personnel must do a better job of selling their respective programs to the operational units. The key appears to be not in pursuing the people aspect of the program but in concentrating the OD efforts in the structural aspect and mission accomplishment aspect of the operational officer's duties.

APPENDIX A

Survey

Note: Read these answer choices over carefully. Then answer each of the following questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you want to give.

	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent
1. In an effective organization, to what extent is the amount of information shared among work groups adequate to meet job requirements?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
2. In an effective organization, to what extent does the command do a good job in "putting out the word" to all hands?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
3. In an effective organization, to what extent is the chain of command receptive to ideas and suggestions from members of the command?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
4. In an effective organization, decisions are made at the level of command where the most adequate information is available.	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
5. In an effective organization, information is widely shared so that those who make decisions have access to available know-how.	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
6. In an effective organization, when decisions are made, to what extent are the people affected asked for their ideas?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
7. In an effective organization, to what extent do people in the command feel motivated to contribute their best efforts to the command's mission and tasks?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
8. In an effective organization, to what extent are there things about this command (people, policies or conditions) that encourage you to work hard?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
9. In an effective organization, to what extent do people who work hard receive recognition from the command?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
10. In an effective organization, to what extent does the command have a real interest in the welfare and morale of assigned personnel?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
11. In an effective organization, to what extent are work activities sensibly organized in the command?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5

Note: Read these answer choices over carefully. Then answer each of the following questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you want to give.

	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent
12. In an effective organization, to what extent does the command have clear-cut, reasonable goals and objectives that contribute to its mission accomplishment?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
13. In an effective organization, workload and time factors are seriously considered in planning work group assignments.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
14. In an effective organization, people at higher levels of that command are aware of problems at all levels of the chain.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
15. In an effective organization, to what extent are supervisors friendly and easy to approach?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
16. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors pay attention to what subordinates say?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
17. In an effective organization, to what extent are supervisors willing to listen to subordinates' problems?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
18. In an effective organization when things are not going as well as supervisor expects, to what extent is it easier for subordinates to tell him/her?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
19. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors attempt to work out conflicts within their work group?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
20. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors encourage the people in their work group to exchange opinions and ideas?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
21. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors encourage the people in their work group to work as a team?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
22. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors stress a team goal?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
23. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors encourage the members of their work group to give their best efforts?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐
24. In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors expect high standards of performance from the members of their work group?	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐

Note: Read these answer choices over carefully. Then answer each of the following questions by placing an X in the number box under the answer you want to give.

		1 Very little extent	2 Little extent	3 Some extent	4 Great extent	5 Very great extent
25.	In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors help subordinates to improve their performance?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
26.	In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors provide the assistance their subordinates need to plan, organize and schedule their work ahead of time?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
27.	In an effective organization, to what extent do supervisors offer subordinates ideas to help solve job-related problems?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
28.	In an effective organization, how friendly and comfortable are work group members with each other?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
29.	In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members listen to each others' problems?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
30.	In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members take responsibility for resolving disagreements among themselves working out acceptable solutions?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
31.	In an effective organization, how much do work group members encourage each other to work as a team?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
32.	In an effective organization, how much do work group members stress a team goal?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
33.	In an effective organization, how much do work group members encourage each other to give their best effort?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
34.	In an effective organization, to what extent do work members maintain high standards of performance?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
35.	In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members offer each other ideas for solving job-related problems?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
36.	In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members plan together and coordinate their individual efforts?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
37.	In an effective organization, to what extent are work group members expected to make decisions and solve problems?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
38.	In an effective organization, to what extent are work groups expected to handle non-routine or emergency situations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Note: Read these answer choices over carefully. Then answer each of the following questions by placing an X in the number box under the answer you want to give.

	1 Very little extent	2 Little extent	3 Some extent	4 Great extent	5 Very great extent
39. In an effective organization, to what extent do members of the command maintain high standards of courtesy, appearance and grooming?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
40. In an effective organization, to what extent are high standards of order and discipline maintained within the command?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
41. In an effective organization, to what extent is the command effective in getting you to meet its needs and contribute to its effectiveness?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
42. In an effective organization, to what extent does the command do a good job of meeting the needs of its members?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Note: Read these answer choices over carefully. There are different answers from the previous choices. Then answer each of the following questions by placing and X in the numbered box under the answer you want to give.

	1 Very dissatisfied	2 Some dissatisfied	3 Neither	4 Fairly satisfied	5 Very satisfied
43. In an effective organization, how satisfied are members with the people in their work group?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
44. In an effective organization, how satisfied are members with their supervisor?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
45. In an effective organization, how satisfied are members with the command?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
46. In an effective organization, how satisfied are members with their individual job assignments?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
47. In an effective organization, how satisfied are individuals with the progress that they have made in the military up to now?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
48. In an effective organization, how satisfied are members with their perceived chances of getting ahead in the military in the future?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Note: Read the answer choices carefully. They are different from the previous choices. Then answer each of the following questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you want to give.

		1 To a very little extent	2 To a little extent	3 To some extent	4 To a great extent	5 To a very great extent
49.	In an effective organization, to what extent do lower level supervisors influence what goes on in command?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
50.	In an effective organization, to what extent do non-supervisory personnel influence what goes on on in command?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
51.	In an effective organization, to what extent does the command emphasize training which helps personnel performing their assigned tasks?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
52.	In an effective organization, to what extent does the command emphasize training which helps personnel leadership responsibility?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
53.	In an effective organization, to what extent does the command emphasize training which helps personnel to accept increased technical responsibility?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
54.	In an effective organization, to what extent does the command ensure that all personnel have equal opportunity for advancement in rate, rank, or grade?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
55.	In an effective organization, to what extent is the chain of command willing to take action on known or alleged racial/ethnic issues?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
56.	In an effective organization, to what extent is the chain of command willing to take action on known or alleged sex discrimination issues?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
57.	In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members discourage drug abuse?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
58.	In an effective organization, to what extent do personnel feel free to talk to their supervisor about a drug problem in their work group?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
59.	In an effective organization, to what extent do personnel feel free to talk to their supervisor about an alcohol problem in their work group?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
60.	In an effective organization, to what extent do work group members discourage the abuse of alcoholic beverages?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Note: Read the following choices carefully. For each item choose the alternative which most nearly expresses your opinion of an "effective leader". Always indicate what you, as a manager in an "effective organization", sincerely believe to be the desirable way to act. Please remember--there are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are interested only in your opinions.
Mark an "X" in the box that best expresses your opinion.

61. In an effective organization, the leader places the welfare of his unit above the welfare of any person in it.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

62. In an effective organization, the leader gives in to his subordinates in discussions with them.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

63. In an effective organization, the leader encourages after duty work by personnel in his unit.
- ☐ A great deal
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ To some degree
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

64. In an effective organization, the leader utilizes his own new ideas in the unit.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

65. In an effective organization, the leader supports the actions of his subordinates.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

66. In an effective organization, the leader readily criticizes poor work.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

67. In an effective organization, the leader asks for more than the personnel under him can accomplish.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

68. In an effective organization, the leader refuses to compromise a point.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

69. In an effective organization, the leader insists that persons under him follow standard routines to the letter.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

70. In an effective organization, the leader helps his subordinates with their personal problems.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

Note: Read the following choices carefully. For each item choose the alternative which most nearly expresses your opinion of an "effective leader". Always indicate what you, as a manager in an "effective organization", sincerely believe to be the desirable way to act. Please remember--that there are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are interested only in your opinions.
Mark an "X" in the box that best expresses your opinion.

71. In an effective organization, the leader is slow to adopt new ideas.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

72. In an effective organization, the leader gets the approval of his subordinates on important matters prior to implementation.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

73. In an effective organization, the leader resists changes in ways of doing things.
- ☐ A great deal
- ☐ Fairly much
- ☐ To some degree
- ☐ Fairly little
- ☐ Not at all

74. In an effective organization, the leader personally assigns tasks to be done to individuals in the unit.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

75. In an effective organization, the leader speaks in a manner which implies he is not to be questioned.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

76. In an effective organization, the leader stresses the importance of being better than other units.
- ☐ A great deal
- ☐ Fairly much
- ☐ To some degree
- ☐ Fairly little
- ☐ Not at all

77. In an effective organization, the leader criticizes a specific act rather than a particular member of the unit.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

78. In an effective organization, the leader lets subordinates do their work the way they think is best.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

79. In an effective organization, the leader does personal favors for his subordinates.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

80. In an effective organization, the leader emphasizes the meeting of deadlines.
- ☐ A great deal
- ☐ Fairly much
- ☐ To some degree
- ☐ Fairly little
- ☐ Not at all

Note: Read the following choices carefully. For each item choose the alternative which most nearly expresses your opinion of an "effective leader". Always indicate what you, as a manager in an "effective organization", sincerely believe to be the desirable way to act. Please remember--there are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are interested only in your opinions.
Mark an "X" in the box that best expresses your opinion.

81. In an effective organization, the leader demands that he be informed of decisions made by his subordinates.

- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

82. In an effective organization, the leader offers new approaches to handling of problems.

- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

83. In an effective organization, the leader treats all of his subordinates as his equal.

- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

84. In an effective organization, the leader is willing to make changes in his unit.

- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

85. In an effective organization, the leader talks about the amount of work that he feels should be done.

- ☐ A great deal
- ☐ Fairly much
- ☐ To some degree
- ☐ Fairly little
- ☐ Not at all

86. In an effective organization, the leader waits for subordinates to offer new ideas.

- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

87. In an effective organization, the leader rules with an iron hand.

- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

88. In an effective organization, the leader rejects suggestions for change.

- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

89. In an effective organization, the leader changes the duties of his subordinates without first talking it over with them.

- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

90. In an effective organization, the leader decides "in detail" what shall be done and how it shall be done by his subordinates.

- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

Note: Read the following choices carefully. For each item choose the alternative which most nearly expresses your opinion of an "effective leader". Always indicate what you, as a manager in an "effective organization", sincerely believe to be the desirable way to act. Please remember--there are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are interested only in your opinion.
Mark an "X" in the box that best expresses your opinion.

91. In an effective organization, the leader sees to it that his subordinates are working up to their capacity.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

92. In an effective organization, the leader stands up for his subordinates even though it makes him unpopular with others outside of his unit.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

93. In an effective organization, the leader puts suggestions made by his subordinates into operation.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

94. In an effective organization, the leader refuses to explain his actions.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

95. In an effective organization, the leader asks for sacrifices from subordinates for the good of the unit.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

96. In an effective organization, the leader needles his subordinates for greater efforts.
- ☐ A great deal
- ☐ Fairly much
- ☐ To some degree
- ☐ Fairly little
- ☐ Not at all

97. In an effective organization, the leader acts without consulting subordinates.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

98. In an effective organization, the leader insists that everything be done his way.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

99. In an effective organization, the leader encourages slow working subordinates to work harder.
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Fairly often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Once in a while
- ☐ Very seldom

100. In an effective organization, the leader meets with subordinates at regularly scheduled times.
- ☐ Always
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Seldom
- ☐ Never

Note: Read the answer choices carefully. Then answer the questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you wish to give.

	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent	Do not know
	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6

SUCCESS OF OE IN THE ARMY

101. Over the past three years, to what extent, in your opinion, has OE been successful in assisting this command to become an effective organization?

102. In your opinion, to what extent does OE currently have the potential to be successful in assisting this command to become an effective organization?

103. Over the next three years, to what extent, do you expect OE to be successful in assisting this command to become an effective organization?

DEMOGRAPHICS

1. What is your rank?

☐ 1 O-6

☐ 2 O-5

☐ 3 O-4

☐ 4 O-3

☐ 5 Other (specify) _____

2. What is your sex?

☐ 1 Male

☐ 2 Female

3. How many years of active duty have you served?

_____ years

4. Have you held command?

☐ 1 Yes

☐ 2 Selected, but have not yet assumed command

☐ 3 No

If so, at what level? (Indicate highest echelon of command held/selected).

☐ 1 Company

☐ 2 Battalion

☐ 3 Brigade

5. When did you complete the OE school?

_____
month/year

6. What is your current duty assignment? (e.g., OESO, FORSCOM HQ, OE Instructor, OECS, Ft. Ord)

_____

_____

Note: Read the answer choices carefully. Then answer the questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you wish to give.

SUCCESS OF HRM IN THE NAVY

	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent	Do not know
101. Over the past three years, to what extent, in your opinion, have HRMC/D's been successful in assisting commands you've served in to become effective organizations?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6
102. In your opinion, to what extent do HRMC/D's currently have the potential to be successful in assisting Navy commands in becoming effective organizations?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6
103. Over the next three years, to what extent do you expect HRMC/D's to be successful in assisting Navy commands in becoming effective organizations?	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6

DEMOGRAPHICS

1. What is your rank?

☐ 1 O-6

☐ 2 O-5

☐ 3 O-4

☐ 4 O-3

☐ 5 Other (specify) _____

2. What is your sex?

☐ 1 Male

☐ 2 Female

3. How many years of active duty have you served?

_____ years

4. Have you held command at sea?

☐ 1 Yes

☐ 2 Selected, but have not yet assumed command

☐ 3 No

5. Have you held command at a shore establishment?

☐ 1 Yes

☐ 2 Selected, but have not yet assumed command

☐ 3 No

Note: Read the answer choices carefully. Then answer the questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you wish to give.

	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent	Do not know
	1	2	3	4	5	6

SUCCESS OF HRM IN THE NAVY

101. Over the past three years, to what extent, in your opinion, has your HRMC/D been successful in assisting its client commands in becoming effective organizations? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

102. In your opinion, to what extent does your HRMC/D currently have the potential to be successful in assisting its client commands in becoming effective organizations? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

103. Over the next three years, to what extent, do you expect your HRMC/D to be successful in assisting its client commands in becoming effective organizations? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEMOGRAPHICS

1. What is your rank?

☐ 1 O-6

☐ 2 O-5

☐ 3 O-4

☐ 4 O-3

☐ 5 Other (specify) _____

2. What is your sex?

☐ 1 Male

☐ 2 Female

3. How many years of active duty have you served?

_____ years

4. Have you held command at sea?

☐ 1 Yes

☐ 2 Selected, but have not yet assumed command

☐ 3 No

5. Have you held command at a shore establishment?

☐ 1 Yes

☐ 2 Selected, but have not yet assumed command

☐ 3 No

6. When did you complete the HRM school? _____ month/year

7. What activity (e.g., HRMD Mayport, HRMC Pearl Harbor) are you currently assigned to?

_____

_____

Note: Read the answer choices carefully. Then answer the questions by placing an X in the numbered box under the answer you wish to give.

	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent	Do not know
	1	2	3	4	5	6

SUCCESS OF OE IN THE ARMY

101. Over the past three years, to what extent, in your opinion, has OE been successful in assisting this command to become an effective organization? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

102. In your opinion, to what extent does OE currently have the potential to be successful in assisting this command to become an effective organization? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

103. Over the next three years, to what extent, do you expect OE to be successful in assisting this command to become an effective organization? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEMOGRAPHICS

1. What is your rank?

☐ 1 O-6

☐ 2 O-5

☐ 3 O-4

☐ 4 O-3

☐ 5 Other (specify) _____

2. What is your sex?

☐ 1 Male

☐ 2 Female

3. How many years of active duty have you served?

_____ years

4. Have you held command?

☐ 1 Yes

☐ 2 Selected, but have not yet assumed command

☐ 3 No

5. If so, at what level? (Indicate highest echelon of command held/selected).

☐ 1 Company

☐ 2 Battalion

☐ 3 Brigade

APPENDIX B

Code Book

1. The following gives a description of how the questionnaire was coded for use in the SPSS systems packet.

2. One thru five were the numerical values given to the responses on questions 1-100. On questions 101-103 these responses were also provided with the addition of number six. The descriptive value for each question is provided in the survey itself. Any answer that wan not marked was coded zero and treated as a missing value in the analysis.

3. With the addition of the demographic data, two computer cards were utilized for entry into the system. Each set of cards was given a 4 digit code at the beginning of each case to identify which category (HRMS, OEMC, etc.) and survey were being analyzed.

3. The section below provides a breakdown of the coding of the survey. This procedure will permit easy coding for any additional information in the future.

CARD COL	QUESTION	ITEM/CODE	VARIABLE NAME
1-2	-	Respondent No.	Person
3	-	#1 (First card of each case) *	Person
4	-	Category	CATEG
5-7	1-3	Command Climate Communications Flow	COMCLCF 1-3
8-10	4-6	Command Climate Decision Making	COMCLDM 1-3
11-13	7-9	Command Climate Motivation Index	COMCLMI 1-3
14-18	10-14	Command Climate Human Resource	COMCLHR 1-5
19-22	15-18	Supervisory Leadership Support Index	SUPLDSI 1-4
23-24	19-20	Supervisory Leadership Team Coordination	SUPLDTC 1-2
25-26	21-22	Supervisory Leadership Team Emphasis	SUPLDTE 1-2

CARD COL	QUESTION	ITEM/CODE	VARIABLE NAME
27-28	23-24	Supervisory Leadership Goal Emphasis	SUPLDGE 1-2
29-31	25-27	Supervisory Leadership Work Facilitation	SUPLDWF 1-3
32-33	28-29	Peer Leadership Support Index	PEELDSI 1-2
34	30	Peer Leadership Team Coordination	PEELDTC 1
35-36	31-32	Peer Leadership Team Emphasis	PEELDTE 1-2
37-38	33-34	Peer Leadership Goal Emphasis	PEELDGE 1-2
39	35	Peer Leadership Work Facilitation	PEELDWFI
40-41	36-37	Work Group Processes Coordination Index	WRKPRCI 1-2
42	38	Work Group Processes Readiness Index	WRKPRRI 1
43-44	39-40	Work Group Processes Discipline Index	WRKPRDI 1-2
45-46	41-42	Goal Intergration Index	ERMGOAL 1-2
47-52	43-48	Satisfaction Index	ERMSAT 1-6
53-54	49-50	Lower Level Influence Index	ERMLLI 1-2
55-57	51-53	Training Index	ERMTRA 1-3
58-60	54-56	Equal Opportunity Index	ERMEO 1-3
61-64	57-60	Drug/Alcohol Index	ERMDA 1-4

END OF FIRST CARD

CARD COL	QUESTION	ITEM/CODE	VARIABLE NAME
1-2	-	Same as first card	-
3	-	#2 (second Card)	-
4	-	Same as first card	-
5-44	61-100	Leadership Opinion Index	LI 1-40
45-47	101-103	Satisfaction with the existing HRM/OE Programs	PRGMS 1-3
48	-	Rank of Respondent	Rank
49	-	Sex of Respondent 1=Male 2=Female	Sex
50-51	-	Years spent on Active Duty	BASD

CARD COL	QUESTION	ITEM/CODE	VARIABLE NAME
52	-	Have you held command** 1=Yes 2=Selected but have not assumed 3=No	CMD
53	-	What is the size of*** the Command held 1=Brigade 2=Battalion 3=Company	CMDSIZE
54-57	-	Completion date of formal education at HRM/OE school	SCHDATE
58	-	Major Military Command****	MACOM

END OF SECOND CARD

* Category 1=HRMS
2=OEMC
3=Navy Surface-Line Officer
4=Army Combat Arms Officer

** On the questionnaires sent to the Naval Officers, this question refers to command at sea.

*** On the questionnaire sent to the Naval Officers, this question asks the officer if he/she has held command at a shore billet.
1=Yes
2=Selected but have not assumed
3=No

****

	Army	Navy
1=	FORSCOM	San Diego
2=	TRADOC	Washington
3=	USAREUR	Mayport
4=	MEDCOM	Charleston
5=	-	Pearl Harbor
6=	-	Norfolk
7=	-	Surface Warfare
8=	Ft. Ord	-

4. The following section provides the coding and method of computation for the categories and subcategories utilized for comparison in the study. This information does not represent data placed on cards but rather a manipulation of the section above.

VAR NAME	VAR LABEL	COMPUTATION
C1	Command Climate Communications Flow	COMCLCF 1+COMCLCF 2+ COMCLCF 3 ÷ 3
C2	Command Climate Decision Making	COMCLDM 1+COMCLDM 2+ COMCLDM 3 ÷ 3
C3	Command Climate Motivation Index	COMCLMI 1+COMCLMI 2+ COMCLMI 3 ÷ 3
C4	Command Climate Human Resource Emphasis	COMCLHR 1+COMCLHR 2+ COMCLHR 3+COMCLHR 4 ÷ 4
+ C18	Command Climate	C1 + C2 + C3 + C4 ÷ 4
C5	Supervisory Leadership Support	SUPLDSI 1+SUPLDSI 2+ SUPLDSI 3+SUPLDSI 4 ÷ 4
C6	Supervisory Leadership Team Coordination	SUPLDTC 1+SUPLDTC 2 ÷ 2
C7	Supervisory Leadership Team Emphasis	SUPLDTE 1+SUPLDTE 2 ÷ 2
C8	Supervisory Leadership Goal Emphasis	SUPLDGE 1+SUPLDGE 2 ÷ 2
C9	Supervisory Leadership Work Facilitation	SUPLDWF 1+SUPLDWF 2+ SUPLDWF 3 ÷ 3
+ C19	Supervisory Leadership	C5 + C6 + C7 + C8 + C9 ÷ 5
C10	Peer Leadership Support Index	PEELDSI 1+PEELDSI 2 ÷ 2
C11	Peer Leadership Team Emphasis	PEELDTE 1+PEELDTE 2 ÷ 2
C12	Peer Leadership Goal Emphasis	PEELDGE 1+PEELDGE 2 ÷ 2
+ C20	Peer Leadership	PEELDTC 1+PEELDWF 1+ C10 + C11 + C12 ÷ 5
C13	Work Group Processes Discipline Index	WRKPRDI 1+WRKPRDI 2 ÷ 2
+ C21	Work Group Process	WRKPRCI 1+WRKPRCI 2+ WRKPRRI 1 + C13 ÷ 4

VAR NAME	VAR LABEL	COMPUTATION
C14	End Result Measures Goal Integration	ERMGOAL 1+ERMGOAL 2 ÷ 2
C15	End Result Measures Satisfaction Index	ERMSAT 1+ERMSAT 2+ ERMSAT 3+ERMSAT 4+ ERMSAT 5+ERMSAT 6 ÷ 6
C16	End Result Measures Low Level Influence	ERMLLI 1+ERMLLI 2 ÷ 2
C17	End Result Measures Training	ERMTRA 1+ERMTRA 2+ ERMTRA 3 ÷ 3
+ C22	End Result Measures	ERMEO 1+ERMEO 2+ERMEO 3+ERMDA 1+ERMDA 2+ ERMDA 3+ERMDA 4+ C14 + C15 + C16 + C17 ÷ 11
+ C23	Personnel Considerations	LI 2+ LI 5+(LI7)+(LI8)+ LI 10+(LI11)+ LI 12+ (LI13)+(LI15)+LI 17+ LI 19+ LI 23+LI 24+ (LI28)+(LI29)+ LI 32+ LI 33+(LI34)+LI 37+ (LI38) ÷ 20
+ C24	Structure Oriented	LI 1+LI 3+LI 4+LI 6+ LI9+LI 14+LI 16+(LI 18)+ LI 20 + LI 21+LI 22+LI 25+(LI26)+ LI 27+LI 30+ LI 31+LI 35+(LI36)+LI 39 +LI 40 ÷ 20

+ = Major Categories

( )= Reverse order questions (i.e., 1=5, 2=4, 3=3, 4=2, 5-1)

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