

AD-A110 596

ARMY WESTERN COMMAND, FORT SHAFTER HI
PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR IV, HELD AT HONOLULU, HAWAII,--ETC(U)
NOV 80

F/G 15/7


UNCLASSIFIED


SBI-AD-E750 178

NL

1-2

2 0000





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

LEVEL *II*

Q

ADDENDUM TO FINAL REPORT


12 (161)

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR IV

3 - 7 NOVEMBER 1980

AD A110596

DTIC
ELECTRONIC
FEB 8 1982
S H



DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC FILE COPY

DERUSSY HALL, HALE KOA HOTEL
HONOLULU, HAWAII

82 02 04 049

111 311

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
"ARMY 86: ORGANIZATION" LTC Richard D. BELTSON, USA.....	1
"ARMY 86: EQUIPMENT" LTC John B. ZIMMERMAN, USA.....	28
"INTRODUCTION TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT" LTC Gary A. DE BAUCHE, USA.....	44
"COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES" COL Cirilo O. OROPESA, Philippines.....	49
"INTERNAL DEFENSE OF A NATION" LTC CHARN Boonprasert, Thailand.....	57
"INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS" MAJ James G. MEIKLE, USA.....	66
"MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE ARMY IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT" COL ADAM SALEH, Indonesia.....	76
"COUNTERINFILTRATION TRAINING AND COASTAL SECURITY" COL NAM Hyung Wook, Korea.....	88
"THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE" LTC NG Jui Ping, Singapore.....	99
"INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT: DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS" MAJ (Ret) Stanley HYROWSKI, USA.....	109
"THE VANUATU OPERATION" COL Tony HUAI, Papua New Guinea.....	130
"ADP IN SUPPORT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE" COL David G. RHOADS, USA.....	137
"THE MILITARY AS A MODERNIZING FORCE" LTC Gary A. DE BAUCHE, USA.....	141
"INSURGENCY: THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE" COL Mohd KALAM Azad Bin Mohd Taib, Malaysia.....	145
"THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE IN RHODESIA" LTC David W. S. MOLONEY, New Zealand.....	154

*This presentation was inadvertently not listed on page 72 of the Final Report

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3 NOVEMBER 1980

"ARMY 86: ORGANIZATION"

Accession For	
NOV 1980	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC	<input type="checkbox"/>
DTIC on file	<input type="checkbox"/>
Approved for Release	
Date	
A	

DTIC
COPY
INSPECTED
2

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD D. BELTSON

UNITED STATES ARMY

ARMY 86: ORGANIZATION

Good morning, my name is LTC Beltson and the purpose of this briefing is to discuss the proposed structure of the US Army as it will appear in 1986.

The US Army is on the brink of the most ambitious reorganization plan in modern history. That plan is a result of a family of studies which began in 1978.

This family includes both heavy and light divisions, a heavy corps, a contingency corps and an organization referred to as echelons above corps or EAC. In its entirety this is Army 86--a doctrinal and organizational blueprint for the modernization of the Army in the field.

After an overview of Army 86, I will present the organization structures of the heavy and light divisions followed by a brief look at the heavy corps, echelons above corps, and the status of Army 86 to include transition planning.

In the late 1970's the TRADOC Commander directed that a study be conducted to more precisely describe how the central battle would be fought. This study, called the battlefield development plan or BDP, provided a net assessment of the US Army's capability to perform critical battlefield tasks. In addition, the BDP noted that there was a large influx of new equipment scheduled for fielding in the 1980's and the need to take advantage of that equipment. The BDP force structure recommendation cited the need for new organizations designed to meet the threat. The threat postulated by the intelligence community for the BDP was 1986 and hence the phrase "Army 86" was adopted. The BDP pointed out some critical differences associated with that time frame used on the projected threat and the capabilities postulated for the US Army.

These include a more intense battle, enhanced capability from sophisticated weapons, increased responsibility at division level and finally an allocation of choice problem.

The Army 86 studies were initiated with the heavy division or Division 86. The Commander of TRADOC and his school and center commanders were the architects and they used the BDP critical tasks as a management tool.

Task forces were formed and aligned by BDP critical tasks such as target servicing, air defense, battle support and reconstitution. These task forces were responsible for the operational concepts and organizational structure of all organizations from division through corps.

In essence, the Army 86 charter was to take full advantage of the new equipment capabilities by integrating advanced battle concepts while optimizing human resources.

Basic design precepts, such as threat force tactics, are key to Army 86 operational concepts. For example, see deep and attack in depth refers to the second echelon threat.

By echeloning his forces, the enemy hopes to achieve momentum and continuity in his operation. Each level of command consists of two echelons. The first echelon normally consists of one-half to two-thirds of the force and most of the supporting artillery. The second echelon is organized to maintain the momentum of the attack and seize subsequent objectives. Because of the depth of the battlefield, commanders must view the battlefield in terms of area of interest and areas of influence.

The commander's area of interest is defined as that area in which there are enemy forces capable of affecting future operations. The area of influence is that area in which a commander is responsible for engaging enemy targets in order to delay, disrupt or destroy them. However, it is important to note that the factor of time, not distance, is the overriding consideration of whether or not an enemy force is inside a commander's area of influence.

Accordingly, commanders must think in terms of the time and space necessary to defeat enemy forces before actual engagement of their forces occurs. From a corps commander's perspective, any uncommitted enemy formation which can close on the frontline battle within a 72-hour period can impact upon his plans. Similar planning considerations apply to divisions as they must be prepared to operate within a 24-hour planning horizon. As you can see, areas of interest overlap and the corps commanders must be able to pass enemy forces information for those elements about to enter the division commander's area of interest. To provide the division commander with the time and space necessary to win his battle, the corps commander must interdict follow-on forces. In order for the areas of interest and influence to be effectively used, commanders at all levels must have access to, or control of, reconnaissance and target acquisition systems, and weapons systems which together are capable of locating and engaging the enemy's follow-on echelons.

The ability to finish rapidly, support forward, reconstitute forces and have the capability to operate 24-hour battle staffs is interwoven into both the operational concepts and organizational structures.


With this very broad overview of Army 86 as a backdrop, let me turn to one of the Army 86 products, the heavy division or Division 86.

The division is expected to defeat the enemy's 1st echelon division while also attacking follow-on forces within its area of influence. Before I show you Division 86, here is the current division for comparison.


The H-series division totals 18,471 with a standard grouping of division troops to include a cavalry squadron, three brigades with six tank and five mech infantry battalions, a standard division artillery to include a target acquisition battery, an aviation battalion, and a conventional division support command.

Significant changes in Division 86 include consolidation of all aviation assets into an air cavalry attack brigade to include the division cavalry squadron, three brigades with six tank and four mech battalions for armored divisions and five tank/five mech battalions for mech infantry divisions, and a significantly remodeled division support command. The division numbers 19,966 soldiers and has the following characteristics.

H-SERIES DIVISION



DIVISION 86



96

It is comparable in size with the C-series division which is what our current division will grow to if new equipment is added without any reorganization. Redundancy and robustness have been structured into the division, thus permitting sustained unit operations to include two shifts for combat staffs and two shifts for critical equipment such as ammo, fuel, and recovery vehicles, as well as mobility-counter mobility equipment.

The integration of high technology, and the structuring of the division to increase the ratio of combat battalions, has resulted in improved command control.

The creation of the air cavalry attack brigade provides a unity of command for all division aviation assets. Aviation maintenance has also been consolidated in this organization. Enhancements in the DIVARTY expand the division commander's area of influence through improved target acquisition and greater firepower. Proliferation air defense weapons throughout the division area will improve divisional air defense.

Finally, the Division 86 DISCOM, in conjunction with the COSCOM, is more capable of adequately supporting the combat elements of the division.

I will present a more detailed review of the units within the division to include major items of equipment, significant organizational characteristics, and comparison data with the H-series unit. First the maneuver battalions.

Note that a common base exists between the tank and mechanized units with larger battalions but smaller companies and platoons.

The number of battalion staff members is increased for the purpose of a continuous operations capability. A common support base, coupled with maintenance consolidation in the HQ companies, is expected to improve the sustainability of the maneuver battalions. The mech battalion also has an antitank company featuring the improved TOW vehicle.

The ACAB is as shown. It includes two attack helicopter battalions, a combat support aviation battalion (CSAB) and the cavalry squadron. The ACAB consolidates all division aviation assets into a brigade structure and takes advantage of the benefits of organic direct support aviation maintenance.

The CSAB is comprised of a general support aviation company, a combat support aviation company, a special electronic mission aircraft company, and a transportation aircraft maintenance company. The cavalry squadron consists of two air and two ground troops. Note that reconnaissance and attack elements have been separated to avoid the complexities of dual-mission concepts.

The DIVARTY changes include a target acquisition battalion in place of a battery to improve the commander's ability to see and strike deeper. In addition, the general support battalion was revised to include two 8-gun eight-inch howitzer batteries and one multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battery of nine launchers.



TARGET SERVICING MANEUVER BATTALIONS

CHARACTERISTICS

- INTEGRATION OF COMBINED ARMS NORMALLY AT BATTALION
- LARGER BATTALIONS--SMALLER COMPANIES AND PLATOONS
- BATTALION STAFF CAPABLE OF CONOPS
- COMMON SUPPORT BASE
- MAINTENANCE CONSOLIDATED IN HQ COMPANIES

DIV 86/H-SERIES COMPARISON


- BN TANKS: 58 vs 54
- TANK COMPANIES: 4 vs 3
- TANKS PER PLATOON: 4 vs 5
- BN MORTARS: 6 vs 4 (MECH COMPANY MORTARS ELIMINATED)



TARGET SERVICING ACAB


CHARACTERISTICS

- DIVISION AVIATION CONSOLIDATED
- DS AVIATION MAINTENANCE ORGANIC
- RECONNAISSANCE AND ATTACK ELEMENTS SEPARATED
- CSAB—TWO LIFT COMPANIES
- CAVALRY SQUADRON
 - TWO AIR TROOPS
 - TWO GROUND TROOPS (LAWCV'S)



218

CLOSE SUPPORT/ COUNTERFIRE/INTERDICTION



CHARACTERISTICS

- DIVARTY PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR CLOSE SUPPORT OF MANEUVER ELEMENTS AND COUNTERFIRE
- TARGET ACQUISITION LOCATES ASSAULT AND FOLLOW-ON ECHELONS, SYSTEMS ARE INTEGRATED WITH DIVISION ISTA NETWORK
- 105/155 DUAL GUN FLEXIBILITY
- INCREASED INDIRECT FIREPOWER

DTAB	WEAPONS
3 TPQ-36	72 M-198
2 TPQ-37	9 MLRS
3 FAMAS	
5 PADS	
5 RPV	
30 PPS-15	

The air defense artillery battalion and some of its characteristics are shown here. Each maneuver brigade will have a DIVAD/Stinger battery in direct support. The division rear will contain two Chaparral/Stinger batteries and the entire division area will have an improved sensing and queing capability with the addition of improved forward area alerting radar (FAAR).

Seventy-three Stinger teams have been proliferated throughout the division area. Each maneuver company and artillery battery will have one 3-man team in direct support.

Next the engineer battalion. It is equipment intensive and the focus is on providing engineer support forward with engineer equipment at the lowest possible level with mobility equal to the supported unit. Bridging has been increased and consolidated in this battalion to improve command control as well as training and maintenance.

The combat electronic warfare intelligence or CEWI battalion is responsible for centralized management of electronic warfare and the Division All-Source Analysis Center, or ASAC, provides the division commander with a theater intelligence systems data link. Increased capabilities are also derived from the increased numbers of Quicklook and SOTAS aircraft as shown.

This leads to the last critical battlefield task: battle support. The division support command has been structured to provide a support battalion to each maneuver brigade. Contained with each brigade support battalion are maintenance, supply, and medical companies. This represents a new concept in supporting the maneuver elements. A new addition to the division is a heavy equipment transporter company containing 24 HETS. The addition of this organization, coupled with corps assets, provides the division with an 8.4 to 1 ratio of tanks to HETS. As a matter of reference, the current US Army tank to HET ratio is 60 to 1.

Combat service support effectiveness has also been enhanced by: forward deploying POL tankers, placing ammunition transfer points in both the brigade and division support areas, consolidating water supply and distribution in the supply and transportation battalion, providing a medical holding capability in the division support area, and assigning dedicated maintenance support teams to each combat battalion.


Clothing exchange and bath, graves registration, patient decontamination, and personnel replacement are also responsibilities of the DISCOM, but these services will be provided by augmentation units from the reserve components.

This concludes a glimpse at the heavy division and I will now present the infantry division or ID 86.

ID 86 has two basic mission requirements which impacted heavily upon its design.

It must be able to fight in Europe while retaining the capability to deploy to worldwide contingency areas. Accordingly ID 86 must be able to fight Soviet or non-Soviet forces on all types of terrain while retaining the traditional capabilities of foot mobile infantry.

AIR DEFENSE ADA




18 LT GUN
12 ICHAPARRAL
66 STINGER
0 FAAR

CHARACTERISTICS

- ONE GUN/STINGER BATTERY IN SUPPORT OF EACH BRIGADE
- ONE ICHAP/STINGER BATTERY
 - GS IN DIVISION REAR
 - POSSESSES ORGANIC SENSING CAPABILITY

73 R

MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY ENGINEER



CHARACTERISTICS

- ENGINEER BN
 - CONTAINS BRIDGE COMPANY
 - PROVIDES MINE LAYING CAPABILITY
 - PROVIDES MOBILITY,
 - COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY CAPABILITY
- ORGANIC BRIGADE ENGINEER COMPANY
 - PROVIDES DS MOBILITY,
 - COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY CAPABILITY TO MANEUVER BRIGADES
 - PROVIDES ASSISTANT BRIGADE ENGINEER
 - PROVIDES MINE CLEARING LINE CHARGE

The ID 86 design objectives are shown on your right. All but strategic deployability are combat-effectiveness related, but all have a significant impact upon the ability of the division to be strategically deployable. I will return to this point later. Let me emphasize also that ID 86 is not as mature in its design stage as Division 86 and many of its features will be incorporated in the 9th Infantry Division Test Bed for evaluation and validation.

This is the infantry division. Division strength is 17,773 and features eight motorized infantry battalions, two mobile protected gun battalions and organic brigade engineer companies.

Many of the division units are similar to those presented in the heavy division and I will not elaborate on those.

These are the maneuver battalions.

A key feature of the motorized infantry battalion is a light armored wheeled combat vehicle (LAWCV) which mounts a direct fire cannon and carries 11 infantrymen.

The battalion contains a headquarters company with a mortar platoon containing six improved 81mm mortars mounted in a LAWCV derivative and a scout platoon mounted in high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV's) with cannon.

There are three motorized rifle companies in each battalion containing three platoons with 11-man squads.

As in the heavy division the TOW company is a new structure. In ID 86 this company features four platoons of four TOW's increasing the number of TOW's from 12 to 16.

The mobile protected gun battalion also incorporates both a scout and mortar platoon in the HHC.


The four gun companies are organized with three platoons. Each platoon consists of four gun systems. The gun is envisioned as a light anti-armor vehicle with a 2-3 man crew and rapid fire cannon. The requirements document for this system is currently under development.

The ACAB is similar to the heavy division but it has two lift companies in the CSAB to provide additional support and airmobile capability. The ground troops are equipped with a LAWCV derivative.

The DIVARTY is equipped with three battalions of M198 155mm towed howitzers and one battery of MLRS. In addition, the DIVARTY will store 105mm howitzers for strategic deployment to areas without an armored threat thus providing the division with its dual-gun capability.

The air defense battalion incorporates a gun/missile mix.

INFANTRY DIVISION 86



The batteries which support the maneuver brigades contain six light air defense guns and 14 Stinger teams. The Chaparral/Stinger battery is in general support in the division rear. It contains 12 Chaparrals and 24 Stinger teams.

The light air defense gun requirements document is under development. It is envisioned that product-improved Vulcans will be used until a light air defense gun is available.

The division engineer organizations include a battalion with bridging capability and organic brigade engineer companies. In order to focus on and improve survivability it was deemed appropriate to provide engineer capability immediately responsive to the maneuver brigades. These engineer companies are equipped with excavators to provide the maneuver elements with a greatly enhanced capability to "dig in."

The balance of units in ID 86 has the same basic capabilities and organizational structures as the heavy division and will not be shown. While ID 86 has significantly increased capability over the current infantry units, additional effort is required to improve its strategic deployability. Additional work is necessary to improve its capability to deploy to contingency areas and that work continues. As stated earlier several of the division organizations and operational features are scheduled for testing in the 9th ID Test Bed. Unfinished light division business includes the air assault and airborne divisions and they will conclude the light division studies.

Corps 86 was developed based on a European scenario which allowed it be forward deployed and to mature over time. This is the required organization at D-day.


These organizations, with a total strength of 85,118, are required to support a NATO corps of three divisions. Note that new corps organizations include an aviation brigade, an NBC brigade, an ADA group and a rear area combat operation (RACO) brigade. There is negligible change in the first 30 days. After D+30, the corps increases from three to five divisions: four heavy and one light.

TRADOC has the responsibility to design forces to meet and defeat a threat. The required force you just saw meets that responsibility. However, there are 24 divisions in the force structure and the required force to support that number of divisions almost doubles the US Army's ceiling in manpower and the projected equipment available in 1986. The constrained force was developed to provide a corps structure more affordable than the required force for planning purposes. In addition, a major consideration of the TRADOC combat developments personnel in structuring the corps was to balance the capabilities of the force against its requirements. This insures that all functions and requirements are addressed and maximum support is provided across the spectrum of the force.

Total strength is 59,750. Its basic structure is unchanged from the required force except that there are three brigades vs four in corps artillery, an ADA battalion vs a group, and will not have a RACO brigade at D-day.

CORPS 86

D-DAY REQUIRED FORCE



D-DAY TO D+30

In the first 30 days there is a small increase in the corps HHC and COSCOM. There are reserve component elements for both HHC and COSCOM. Also the reserve component RACO brigade is added. Currently there are no RACO brigades in the force structure. This is a new corps organization that will be structured in the reserve components. It will be scheduled to arrive in the corps no later than D+15 but as early as possible. The corps total manpower strength is now 64,128. The active/reserve distribution is as shown.

The corps, up to D+30, is a 3-division structure. As the scenario progresses, a light division and fourth heavy division are assigned to the corps and they arrive after D+30.

The support requirements for the two additional divisions are again the reasons for the large manpower increase at D+60.

Two additional artillery brigades have been added and the the ADA battalion has expanded to a group. The corps strength has increased over 33,000 to a total of 96,948. There is negligible change after D+60. The corps has matured and the strength is unchanged at D+180.

The D+180 strength and active/reserve distribution are as shown. Reserve component elements or units are incorporated in every major command except the ACR.

The ACR is mature at D-day and there are no additions to it. Characteristics are as shown. Noteworthy changes in the organization are pure platoons as in the heavy division, consolidation of the artillery into a battalion, and the addition of an organic air defense battery, a CEWI company, and an NBC company.


The corps aviation brigade is organized as shown on D-day. Major design changes are the addition of a dedicated artillery aviation company and the consolidation of command/control aircraft into support aviation companies. By D+60 the aviation brigade has reorganized internally due to additional units arriving to support a 5-division force.

At D-day the air defense organization is a battalion. It is equipped with 24 IChaparral and 90 Stingers. This is in addition to the current corps structure and provides air defense for corps rear assets based on priorities established by the corps commander. The battalion operates in accordance with the air defense rules and procedures which are promulgated by the area air defense commander. With this framework, air defense engagement is decentralized to the maximum extent possible.


The battalion expands to a group at the D+60 time frame. There is now a battalion of Chaparral which has six improved FAAR's. These radars assist in early warning, target location and identification. Two gun batteries have been added to the Stinger batteries to form the Gun Stinger battalion.

CORPS 86

D-DAY REQUIRED FORCE



ACR



CHARACTERISTICS


- SELF CONTAINED
- COVERING FORCE
- ECONOMY OF FORCE
- STD SCT/TK PLTS IN CAV TRPS
- ARTY CONSOLIDATED INTO BN
- FSEs/FISTS w/GLLDs EA SQDN
- AIR DEF BTRY (GUN-STINGER)
- CEWI CO
- NBC CO

MAJOR EQUIPMENT

CFV	108	AH	26
MBT	129	SCT	26
DIVAD	12	UH	18

D-DAY TO D+180

AVN BDE




CHARACTERISTICS

- INTERNAL SEPARATION OF FIGHTERS AND SUPPORTERS
- FA AVN CO ADDED
- CMD & CNTL ACFT CONSOLIDATED

D-DAY TO D+30

2672

AVN BDE




CHARACTERISTICS

- TWO CBT AVN CO'S ADDED - BN
- ONE MDM HEL CO ADDED - BN
- ONE SPT AVN CO ADDED

ADA GROUP

CHARACTERISTICS

- I CHAP BN WITH 6 I-FAAR
- GUN/STINGER BN
- ID SHORAD BN ADDED




D+60 TO D+180

32R

ADA BN

CHARACTERISTICS

- ADDITION TO CORPS FORCE
- OPERATES IN CORPS REAR
- FOLLOWS AADC RULES



D-DAY TO D+30

The COSCOM support groups provide on an area basis all classes of supply, laundry, bath, direct support maintenance for nondivisional units, backup for DS for divisions, and all general support maintenance.

As the corps matures, a support group and a petroleum supply battalion are added along with manpower increases in all other COSCOM units. The organization now totals 45,571.

Another addition to the corps force structure is a reserve component brigade dedicated to rear area combat operations. The organization is as shown. The corps rear area operations center (or RAOC) plans for rear area protection and has staff responsibility of the RACO brigade.

The three RACO infantry battalions are similar to the light division motorized battalions, and are the fighting force of the brigade. Each battalion has an 181 mortar platoon in HHC, and each company has a 60mm mortar section to compensate for the lack of organic artillery. The organic cavalry troop is employed to avoid surprise in meeting engagements and movement to contact. The engineer company is designed to assist the brigade in overcoming obstacles and to erect obstacles to aid in containing the threat force.

Corps 86 was designed and structured for the European battlefield of 1986. A building block process has been used as much as possible. This process permits force tailoring of the corps to support a flexible number of divisions. In addition to Corps 86, TRADOC is currently designing a contingency corps for worldwide deployment. That study will not be completed until next summer.

This concludes a look at Army 86 organizational structure. To complete this overview here is the current status of Army 86.

Where are we in the decision process? The armor and mechanized infantry were approved by the CSA for implementation. The Army staff is currently developing the transition plan with inputs from TRADOC and the necessary documentation will be provided in order of HQDA priority.

Corps 86 was also approved for transition planning and will be implemented in accordance with the transition plan.


ID 86 is approved for planning and testing and will undergo continued refinement by TRADOC with input from the 9th ID Test.

Contingency Corps 86 will complete its study and a decision briefing to the CSA next summer.

Transition planning for Army 86 is currently underway.

Army staff responsibility rests with the DCSOPS. The planning group charter includes integration of the TRADOC force design balanced against total Army resources requirements and MACOM considerations.

RACO BDE



CHARACTERISTICS


- RACO PLANS RAP
- BNS POSITIONED ON OR NEAR LIKELY OBJECTIVES
- CONTROLLED BY DIVISION OR RACO
- COMMITTED AS BDE OR BY BN
- COMMITTED AFTER LOCAL FORCES AND/OR MP'S CAPABILITY EXCEEDED
- 3 MOTORIZED BNS
- CAVALRY TROOP AND ENGR CO ORGANIC
- ARTY SPT FROM CORPS

D+30 TO D+180

COSCOM

COSCOM XXXX
25471


- CHARACTERISTICS
- RESTRUCTURED GENERAL SPT ORGANIZATIONS
 - AMMUNITION TRANSFER POINTS INCORPORATED
 - CONSOLIDATION OF ALL POSTAL AND FINANCE AT CORPS



D-DAY TO D+30

COSCOM

XXX
45571
COSCOM



CHARACTERISTICS

- RESTRUCTURED GENERAL SPT ORGANIZATIONS
- AMMUNITION TRANSFER POINTS INCORPORATED
- CONSOLIDATION OF ALL POSTAL AND FINANCE AT CORPS

D+60 TO D+180

The transition plan must consider those items listed and, accordingly, the implementation of Army 86 is an extremely sensitive and complex task which will require the coordination and cooperation of all involved parties. It is anticipated that the first iteration of the transition plan will be completed by mid-January 1981 and be available for worldwide staffing shortly after.

This concludes a very rapid look at Army 86. It must be emphasized that Army 86 is a continuous process. TRADOC will continue to develop and refine Army 86 organizations to meet changing doctrine, equipment capabilities and threat. This briefing has provided a snapshot of the Army 86 process.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3 NOVEMBER 1980

"ARMY 86: EQUIPMENT"

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN B. ZIMMERMAN

UNITED STATES ARMY

ARMY 86: EQUIPMENT

Good morning sir, I am LTC Zimmerman and in this briefing I will provide you with an overview of some of the significant weapon systems that have been recently developed and provided to our troops. I will also discuss some weapon systems that are now in the development process that will support Army 86.

Before I begin my discussion I would like to briefly explain the Army's materiel development process, how we generate materiel need requirements and the process by which DARCOM fulfills this need.

Our understanding of the threat posed to us by potential enemies, leads to the creation of specific requirements to overcome that threat. We often speak of the user and the developer, or the combat developer and the materiel developer. In the Army we have many commands that are users of equipment, such as USAREUR/FORSCOM/WESTCOM and EUSA. This is unlike the USAF for example, where TAC speaks for fighter aircraft while SAC speaks for strategic needs and capabilities. In the Navy your proponents are usually divided along the lines of sea and air. Because of our distribution of forces, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) represented here by LTC Beltsen has been designated the "user representative" and hence speaks for the user in all materiel development matters. The mission then falls to TRADOC to develop the materiel need requirements and address the needed capability in terms that engineers and scientists can translate into solid hardware. Of course the commands I have previously mentioned as well as DA and DARCOM participate in this process. Now, when the requirement can be stated precisely--that is, when we know exactly the capability we need to counter the threat--DARCOM, as the materiel developer, takes over.

This brings me to the second important point. You see on the chart a requirement normally leads to some kind of weapon system. But, it is very important to realize that does not always mean the beginning of a new development program.

In fact, a new development is the last thing we want to do. The first thing we look at is whether or not we can improve an existing weapon system. We also survey other potential sources that might allow us to obtain the needed equipment without a development program. We look at our industry to see if they are producing equipment for the private sector that we can use. We look at commercially available equipment and military equipment produced by our allies and, of course, we look at the other services. Once we have determined that we cannot satisfy the requirement with equipment that has already been developed, we then determine whether or not we can modify a piece of existing commercial equipment. If we can, and if that turns out to be less expensive than a new development and satisfies the requirement, that's the way we would go. Of course, if none of these things will satisfy the requirement, then we will initiate a new development. A good example of where we are doing this is the 9th ID high technology test bed equipment where many commercial and/or foreign produced pieces of equipment will be tested for adoption or adaption by US Army.

I would now like to discuss the individual systems.

XM1 Tank

The US Army's main offensive weapon in the 1980's will continue to be the XM-1 Main Battle Tank. It is in production and will bear the name "The Abrams Tank" to honor the distinguished tanker and former Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams. Significant improvements are increased speed/agility; improved lethality; and improved survivability.

The 60-ton Tank has high road speed and high cross-country speed. It is our first tank with a turbine engine which develops over 1,500 HP. Its advance suspension system, permits it to move over rough terrain at twice the speed of other tanks.

The lethality has been increased by improving the accuracy of the 105mm Main Gun in conjunction with new KE ammunition which I will discuss next. This is aided by using a solid-state computer, a laser range finder and a thermal imaging night sight, and a stabilized platform concept.

To improve survivability the XM-1 uses the improved armor which will easily defeat a variety of weapons and projectiles that have stopped tanks in the past. In addition the silhouette has been lowered.

The ammunition is compartmentalized, with most of the 55 Main Gun Rounds carried on board stored, behind blast-resistant doors. It also has an automatic fire detection and fire extinguishing system.

To increase the suppressive and antipersonnel firepower, the XM-1 has two 7.62mm machineguns and a 50 cal. machinegun at the commander's station.

In the mid-1980's, we plan to start producing XM-1 Tanks with the 120mm Main Gun.

The XM-1 is to begin DT/OT 111 testing at Ft Hood early next year. The first battalion-size unit is now being fielded. Tanks are arriving, being processed and prepared for troop issue. The main purpose of this testing is to answer some questions that still remain concerning reliability and maintainability. In addition, approved maintenance concepts will be tested. Following successful completion of this testing, full-scale production will be initiated.

M60 Series Tanks

Since we cannot replace our entire M60-series tanks with Abrams tanks, we are continuing to upgrade the currently fielded M60-series tanks, converting them to the M60A3 model.

The main improvements are:

-Introduction of a solid-state computer and a laser range finder, both advances not found on the M60A1, and

-Replacing the passive night sight of the M60A1 with a thermal imaging sight.

This product improvement program has been going on for several years, and has been incorporated in new M60-series tanks off the production line. These tanks will be fielded to replace M60A1's and eventually the fleet will be converted.

This may be an example of where we have evolved a piece of equipment over time into a modern fighting vehicle. We cannot afford to replace instantly all tanks with XM-1 and have to modernize our current fleet to defeat the threat.

Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Since World War II there has been an increasing trend towards mechanized infantry. This gives the infantry the same mobility as tanks, as well as considerable protection. The Infantry Fighting Vehicle M-2 is the battlefield companion of the Abrams tank. It is not an improvement on the M113--our current personnel carrier. It is a true fighting vehicle that is a tank killer itself.

The M2 is a heavily armored vehicle with a 25mm automatic cannon (Bushmaster), the TOW antitank missile, the M240, 7.62mm machinegun and six firing ports for infantrymen mounted inside.

It is fast (44 mph/20 mph x-country) and agile, with excellent protection of troops inside. It is aluminum hull, with a steel bottom for better mine protection.

Production was initiated in 1980.

NOTE:

- Armor - Aluminum-sloped surfaces and aluminum laminate on vertical slides.
- Steel anti-mine bottom.
- Fight while mounted.
- Firing port weapon is cut down M16/450/miss.
- 23.5 tons/clint 3' wall/negotiate 60% grade/cross 8.3' trench.

Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV)

In another step to meet a massed tank threat we have adopted our standard armored personnel carrier, the M113 to fire TOW missiles.

Normally, we fire TOW from a launcher mounted on a tripod as well as from a variety of vehicles, including the infantry fighting vehicle.

The improved TOW vehicle greatly improves the survivability of TOW and its crew by providing additional limited armor protection against small caliber fire.

Another great advantage is that we can reload the TOW missile while being protected by armor. We can reload in 40 seconds.

The TOW system in this vehicle uses the standard TOW day and night sights.

In addition to firing more rapidly the improved TOW vehicle permits us to launch two missiles instead of one in the other configurations. We can fire them in 20 seconds.

You will notice that the TOW missile launcher extends above the roof of the vehicle. It can extend to 4 feet. This means that only the launcher head needs to be exposed, while the vehicle remains hidden. This makes it a very difficult target to see and attack and provide improved survivability to the TOW system.

This system is being fielded. Delivery started in March 1979.

NOTE

- Carries 12 TOW missiles.
- Procurement goal - 1,000 ea.
- Range to 3,000M.

VIPER

In addition to the TOW which is in the field, I would like to show you the VIPER. VIPER is the new light antiarmor weapon designed for use against enemy armored targets at close ranges, of 250-300 meters. It contains an improved propellant which provides for increased penetration. VIPER can be issued to any soldier. It weighs only 3.2 kg and, once fired, its fiberglass launch tube is discarded. VIPER's accuracy, simplicity of operation, and the overall effectiveness will make it a capable successor to the current light antitank weapon - LAW.

The Army intends to award the first production contract for VIPER in 1981.

105mm Kinetic Energy Rounds

The Army has developed several new tank cartridges using the long rod penetrator concept to defeat the current threat tank. Shown is the M735 round which uses a tungsten core penetrator. This item entered production in 1979 and is being fielded.

An improved penetrator round is the XM774 which uses a monobloc design staballoy penetrator. This item is scheduled for production in 1981.

Because of the tremendous velocity of these penetrators, they carry long distances, often exceeding the capability of the firing range. Therefore, the Army is developing a training cartridge which will be a ballistic match to the M735 and XM774. This cartridge will use an ablative nose projectile that will eventually break-up down range at distances 3,000-8,000M from the tank. This is designated the XM797, is in full-scale engineering development, and is scheduled for production in 1982.

Dragon

Dragon is a 32-pound guided antitank missile that can be carried and fielded by one man. It will provide antitank defense to platoons and companies and has a range out to 1,000 meters. Dragon employs a guidance system which requires the gunner to keep the cross basis of his sight on the target while the missile is in-flight.

Dragon is effective in both day and night conditions.

Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH)

The Advanced Attack Helicopter shown on this slide is a twin-engine, two-man helicopter that can attack armor under the cover of darkness and in bad weather.

This helicopter is fast and highly maneuverable.

We expect the Advanced Attack Helicopter to be very effective against large tank formations. It is the fastest way to mass effective fire against tanks so as to help ground forces that are under attack.

The helicopter will fly a few meters off the ground using nap of the earth flying techniques. It will pop up from cover, fire, drop down and move laterally to different cover.

For attack "soft" targets such as trucks, lightly armored vehicles, and troop formations, this helicopter carries 2.75-inch (7CM) free-flight rockets and a 30mm chain gun (1,200 rounds).

The main armament of the Advanced Attack Helicopter is the Laser Guided Hellfire Missile System. The helicopter has four platforms, that hold four Hellfire missiles each, for a total of 16, or combinations of Hellfire missiles and rockets. I will discuss Hellfire in more detail.

We have improved the survivability of the Advanced Attack Helicopter by equipping it with armor and redundant systems. It can take hits from guns up to 23MM, and not only stay in the air but continue to fight.

This aircraft provides for a cool air plume that reduces the IR signature and of course makes it less vulnerable to heat-seeking missiles.

The AAH also incorporates the TADS/PNVS system which will provide day and night target acquisition and laser designation for Hellfire and hand-off capabilities in support of Hellfire and other Laser guided munitions such as Copperhead.

Facts

- Weight 17,800 lbs (8,100 kg)
- Ordnance load - 2,650 lbs (1,200 kg)
- 76 - 2.75mm rockets
- 30mm - Chain Gun -1,200 rounds
- 16 ea Hellfire missiles
- 45 knots to rear/lateral

TADS

- Low light TV
- Direct view telescopic optics
- Laser range finder
- Laser designator
- FLIR

PNVS

- Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR)

Integrated Helmet and Control System (IHACS)

- Pilot
- Display - right eye - same view as gunner
- Can override gunner
- Aims 30mm gun electronically

Hellfire

Let me now describe more fully the Hellfire missile. As I mentioned earlier the current Hellfire is a Laser guided missile. It homes in on laser energy, that can be supplied by the Advanced Attack Helicopter itself, or by other aircraft, or by troops on the ground.

Hellfire can be fired in two different ways. In the autonomous mode, or direct fire mode, the laser in the helicopter paints the target, the missile locks in on the target before firing and flies directly to the target.

In the indirect fire mode, when the laser designation is supplied by another laser, either on the ground or on another aircraft, the helicopter can stay totally hidden, behind the trees, hills or buildings and lob its missiles in the general direction of the target. The missile picks up the reflected laser energy, and guides itself to the target.

We are also working on a fire and forget Hellfire, which will use different seeker technology and eliminate the requirement for a target designator.

Hellfire is currently in the full-scale engineering development phase, undergoing DT/OT II testing in California. Production decision and contract award is scheduled for late 1981.

Facts

- 40.8 kg launch weight (90 lbs)
- Uses two or more targets and designators
- Can do transition firing
- Pass from aircraft designator to ground designator
- Range 5 km direct; 8 km indirect

Cobra - TOW (AHI-S)

The Cobra TOW, which has been modified since Vietnam is our current attack helicopter.

The modified Cobra is highly maneuverable and has a speed of about (22 km/hr). It carries eight TOW missiles which have an effective range to 3,500 meters. It also has a 20mm 3-barrel gun, and new fire controls for increased accuracy. Both the engine and the air frame have also been improved.

While the Cobra represents a lesser capability than the Advanced Attack Helicopter, because the TOW is wire guided while Hellfire is laser guided, and also because of performance and survivability, it remains a very effective attack helicopter until the AAH is in production.

S Model

- Eight TOW missiles
- Universal turret (can take 30mm gun)
- New fire control
- Increased accuracy

T53 - Turboshaft engine

Modified airframe

Black Hawk

The UH-60A Black Hawk is a new twin-engine utility helicopter that will replace the Huey helicopter in air assault, air cavalry, combat support and medical evaluation. For the first time, Army ground commanders have a true airmobile squad carrier. It can carry a fully equipped 11-man squad, and three crew members, at a cruising speed of 269 km/hr (145 knots).

The Black Hawk is much more capable than the Huey under all weather conditions. The engine, fuel system and seats have been designed to be as crash worthy as possible. Particular emphasis has been placed on reliability, maintainability and survivability in combat operations.

Black Hawk is much less likely to be shot down by rifle-caliber fire, and is much more able to survive cannon and heavy machinegun fire.

With a sling load of 3,650 kg, Black Hawk is able to resupply ground troops, under varied field conditions.

Black Hawk was fielded in 1979 and is fully operational today in the Aviation Battalion of the 101st Airmobile Division at Ft Campbell, KY.

-T700 engine

-11-man squad, 1,197 kg (2,640 lbs)

-Speed - 269 km/hr, 145 knots

-Ceiling - 1,615 meters (5,300 ft)

M198, 155mm Towed Howitzer

The M198 howitzer is the Army's newest cannon. It is a lightweight (approx 7,000kg), rugged weapon intended for use in Army infantry divisions. It is air transportable with the CH47C helicopter. Initial production began in 1977, and the first battalion was fielded in 1979 at Ft Bragg, NC. Additional quantities are in production at this time.

This M198 was designed to be ballistically similar to the new trilateral TOWED howitzer, the FH70, which is being produced as a joint effort among UK, Germany, and Italy. These three countries along with the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1978 which prescribes ballistic parameters to which the cannon and its associated new ammunition will be designed. We therefore enjoy a considerable degree of ammunition interoperability with our European allies. The maximum range of M198 is more than twice that of the M114A1 howitzer it replaces. With the new rocket-assisted projectile the M549 and the new family of propelling charges it has a range of 30 km. It is air transportable in C-130 type aircraft making it very suitable for worldwide strategic deployment.

M109A2/A3 Self-Propelled Howitzer

The M109A2/A3 howitzers are improved versions of the M109 series of howitzers, currently deployed with Army forces worldwide. Major modifications to the recoil mechanism and the breech mechanism enable these weapons to fire new ammunition such as rocket-assisted projectiles and the copperhead guided projectile. The range is increased to approximately 22 km with rocket-assisted projectile. This weapon remains the direct support howitzer for armored mechanized divisions.

There is an ongoing R&D technology program today to develop a new self-propelled howitzer for the 1990's called ESPAWS. The effort is still in the early concept development phase so it is unclear what the final systems will look like. Concurrently we are monitoring closely new weapons being developed by allied nations to see if we can use them for US forces or exploit their technology. We have an extensive technology exchange program.

8-Inch Self-Propelled Howitzer

We have also been able to increase the range of our 8-inch Self-Propelled Howitzer. We took the basic M110 howitzer and increased the barrel length by 3.1 meters. The accuracy has been retained, but we have increased the range with an unassisted projectile from 16 to 21 km. With a muzzle brake and a new rocket-assisted projectile, and the heaviest charge, we get more than 28 km range.

- Weight - 31 tons
- Fires one round every 2 min
- Speed - 9 mph x-country (14.5 km/hr)
34 mph (55 km/hr)

Copperhead

Copperhead is a 155mm guided projectile that has the same kind of laser-seeking capability that is described for the Hellfire missile. Copperhead is fired from either the M198 or M109A2 howitzer in exactly the same way as any other projectile. It is fired into the target area and its seeker then locks in on the reflected laser energy resulting from either the air or ground laser designators. It enables the artillery to attack hard point and moving targets such as tanks and fighting vehicles at ranges from 3,000 to about 16,000 meters.

The Copperhead targets can be designated with ground or airborne designators, such as helicopters or the remotely piloted vehicle. This projectile entered production early this year (1980) and will begin production testing in Jan. Fielding to operational units will be late 1981.

Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS)

The newest weapon in the artillery arsenal is the Multiple Launch Rocket System. This is an unguided, multiple launch, surface-to-surface rocket system.

The system is designed to increase the firepower available to corps and division artillery commanders during intense battlefield situations, by providing massive counterbattery fire. Other missions include air defense suppression, and light materiel and personnel neutralization capabilities.

-The Multiple-Launch Rocket System is a highly mobile weapon. With its three-man crew and using the shoot and scoot principle, this system will rapidly deliver dual purpose submunitions upon targets at ranges in excess of 30 km. These submunitions cover the target with steel splinters, kill crewmen and penetrate the top of weapons themselves. This weapon can be reloaded rapidly, and can operate in all weather conditions.

-The system consists of two launch pods containing six rockets each. The self-propelled launcher loader is a variant of our infantry fighting chassis and ammunition resupply vehicles.

-To improve the capability against armor, follow-on warheads containing mines and terminally guided munitions may be developed. The United States is a partner along with the UK, Germany, and France in future development of the weapon system. A joint MOU was signed in 1978. The Germans have undertaken the task of developing the mine warhead.

Firefinder - TPQ-37 (Artillery) - TPQ-36 (Mortar)

While improving our cannon artillery and introducing such innovations as Multiple-Launch Rocket System and Copperhead, we also realized that we needed a greater capability to counter the enemy artillery threat and locate precisely enemy artillery.

The artillery locating radar, shown here, has been designed to track artillery projectiles while a computer automatically plots and calculates the location of the firing position. The system can pick up an artillery shell out of a background clutter at 10,000 meters. Also, it can track a large number of incoming shells at the same time including volley fire. The data that is acquired and analyzed by the computer is automatically passed to a fire and control system such as TACFIRE, which can relay the information to either cannon or rocket units and have counterfire on the way in a timely fashion.

We have also developed a smaller mortar locating radar with similar characteristics.

By applying current technology, we are overcoming the shortfalls in artillery fire support. It has been normal in the past for artillery to adjust the fire onto the target before firing for effect. Now, we have equipment that gives us accurate target location, more accurate range finding, up-to-the-minute meteorological data and other essential firing data. This information will be processed in small field computers and will provide data to the artillery firing batteries so that the target can be engaged immediately with fire for effect.

Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS)

To locate enemy targets well beyond the forward edge of the battle area we are developing an all weather target detection and locating system that uses an airborne radar. The SOTAS has the ability to accurately locate moving targets and can observe moving target activity across an entire division front. SOTAS provides near real time targeting information on moving vehicles such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery, and predicts their future position.

Information pinpointing enemy combat formations is relayed in digital form, to ground stations behind the forward edge of the battlefield. This permits the massing of various types of fire on the enemy without him being aware that he was under surveillance. Once identified, these targets can be entered into the TACFIRE control system, and can be engaged by cannon artillery, Multiple-Launch Rocket System, or attack helicopters.

Area Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM)

The ADAM is our first artillery delivered mine system and provides the capability to deliver a mine field quickly, behind enemy lines. We can deny terrain, or cannalize an attacking enemy into well-defended avenues. The system is simply a 155mm projectile that contains 36 wedge-shaped antipersonnel mines. This slide shows you a pictorial sequence of the system in action. The 36 wedge-shaped mines are ejected from the projectile base--this starts the arming cycle. It is completed when the mines hit the ground. Seven 20-foot long trip wires are then ejected from the mine. Contact with any of the trip wires or tilting of the mine more than 12 degrees causes the kill mechanism to pop up to a height of 5 to 8 feet and detonate. This system also has a factory set self-destruct mechanism. Because of this feature, we can use these mines to provide suppression in an enemy location. Drop them on an artillery battery and cannoneers won't move. The ADAM has been in production for several years and is being distributed using normal ammunition procedures based on priorities established by DA.

Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM)

A similar system, which deploys nine antitank/anti-vehicle mines from a 155mm projectile has also been developed. It is called the RAAM which stands for remote anti-armor mine. These nine mines are activated on the ground, and do have a factory set, self-destruct mechanism. This projectile is also production.

Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System (GEMMS)

The Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System can be operated while towed behind a wheeled vehicle over both roads and cross-country terrain.

The system is capable of dispensing both antipersonnel and antitank mines at a rate of two mines per second at a pattern width of 30 to 60 meters. The mines can be dispensed separately or concurrently permitting the laying of a mixed minefield in a predetermined ratio.

Patriot

Patriot is the Army's advanced air defense system. It will replace Nike Hercules and HAWK, and perform each of their functions much better. It will also require fewer personnel to operate it.

We believe Patriot will be able to defend against the air blitzkrieg that would accompany an enemy attack. The system is designed to cope with an air threat that is increasing steadily in numbers, sophistication of aircraft and quality of electronic countermeasures designed to protect them. The kill probability of the system is high and a single Patriot platoon can engage and destroy a large number of high performance aircraft. Other advantages include high mobility, simplicity of operation and reliability.

The major elements of Patriot include an electric power plant, several remotely located launch stations (each containing four ready-to-fire missiles which require no maintenance in the field); a single-phased array radar designed to perform all tactical radar functions and an engagement control station containing a high speed digital computer.

Division Air Defense Gun System (DIVAD)

The Division Air Defense Gun System will provide a mobile, radar-controlled, all-weather gun system. It will replace Vulcan, and provide close-range, low-altitude air defense for armored and mechanized units.

Two candidate gun systems are being developed by industry in competition. One has a twin-mounted 35mm and the other a twin-mounted 40mm gun. Point-detonating and proximity-fuzed ammunition will be used.

On the Ford version there are separate search and tracking radars while the General Dynamics version includes a radar that combines the search and tracking functions.

The guns will be mounted on a M48A5 tank chassis and will have a 360 degree traverse capability.

Roland

US Roland will protect corps area vital targets, with all weather, day and night, short-range air defense. It has significant capability against low-flying aircraft.

The system can autonomously carry out the total engagement process, including search, acquisition, track and attack. The fire unit can perform the search function while moving, and can rapidly halt and fire at attacking aircraft within seconds after target detection. It is mobile enough to run with maneuvering divisional units, and can fire ten missiles in a very short time.

Facts

-Range - 500-6,000 meters

-Target Acquisition Search - 15-18 km. Low frequency - Band Pulse Doppler Radar

-All Weather - Optical sight

- Infra-Red missile tracker - day

2-channel tracking radar - night

-Weight - 63 kg

-Length - 2.9 meters

-Speed - Mach 1.6

Stinger

Stinger is a single short, shoulder-fired antiaircraft missile which replaces Redeye. It has demonstrated a consistent ability to destroy high performance targets under a variety of conditions. Stinger provides air defense coverage to even the smallest of units. Its major improvement is that it can be fired at approaching, receding or passing aircraft while Redeye was essentially a stern chase missile.

It also has increased range and lethality. Stinger also has an identification-friend or foe device.

Facts

-Weight - 15 kg on shoulder weight (includes IFF)

-20% longer than Redeye

-Range - 5,500 meters

-Gen dynamics

-Greater resistance to countermeasures

Improved HAWK

The Improved HAWK system is a mobile, all weather, day and night, low to medium-altitude air defense guided missile. It can operate effectively in an electronic countermeasures environment. The Improved HAWK adds improvements to the basic HAWK system in the areas of: (1) reaction time, (2) lethality and effectiveness, and (3) electronic counter-countermeasures.

RPV

The RPV is a very small inexpensive airplane equipped with a television, laser designator, and a variety of other possible payloads.

The RPV relays a real time television picture of the enemy back to a monitor behind the forward edge of the battle area. If a suitable target, such as a tank, is spotted, the controller can place cross hairs on the target, and the RPV will designate for Copperhead.

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)

The 1½-ton High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) concept/requirement has evolved from a TRADOC tactical-wheeled vehicle study. It will be a multi-member family with a common chassis to satisfy joint-service requirements. It will be the replacement for the mule, gamma goat and the M792 ambulance, and will selectively replace the M151 jeep and the M880 utility truck. Body configurations will be:

Utility Truck
Ambulance
Personnel Transport

Weapons Carrier
Command and Control

It will be diesel powered with an automatic transmission. With pending Congressional approval, contracts will be awarded in March 81 for three prototype versions for competitive evaluation. Initial fielding will be in 1984.

PLRS/JTIDS

The basic communications architecture for the 1986 Division will be essentially the same as it is now, but with one major exception. That exception is the introduction of an automated data communications capability. This capability will be provided by a system known as PLRS/JTIDS Hybrid, or position location reporting system/joint tactical information distribution system. The

PJH as it is known, is a computer-based system which provides real time, secure data communications, identification, and position location and reporting information. It emphasizes rapid response times, resistance to jamming, security, low levels of mutual interference, and freedom from contention with voice communications. The system will support existing and programmed automated systems for command and control, air defense, field artillery, intelligence, and logistics. A typical PJH system in the division will consist of five net control units. One will be located in each brigade area and two of the division command and control centers. These perform automated net management and control of the system. The facility is an assemblage of general purpose digital computers, display control station, JTIDS terminals and transcriber systems to address PLRS and JTIDS communications. There may be up to 1,000 user units scattered throughout the division. Thus unit is lightweight with an integral COMSEC capability. It automatically provides position location information and interfaces with collocated user units for passing data communications. The JTIDS terminals can be used as a separate terminal or as part of the net control unit. They support high volume users (air defense, field artillery, etc.) or support users required to interoperate with joint service and/or multinational elements possessing compatible terminals.

SINGARS

Coming into the division in this time frame also is a new family of VHF-FM combat net radios that will provide the primary means of command and control for infantry, armor and artillery units. The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, or SINGARS, radios will be capable of transmitting voice, tactical data, and record traffic. The outstanding features of this new family are high reliability and ECCM capability by way of automatic frequency hopping techniques.

TACSATCOM

This portion of the briefing would not be complete unless I mentioned tactical satellite communications. By 1986 we can expect to see the placement of some line of sight radio terminal sets and radio repeater sets by ground mobile forces tactical satellite communications terminals. These terminals will be located at division main, support command and each of the three brigade CP's to provide secure voice and record traffic communications. These will necessarily be a multichannel super high frequency (SHF) high data rate system. In addition, beginning in 1983 ultra high frequency (UHF) vehicular terminals AN/MSS-65 will be fielded to replace selected command radios currently being used in low data rate high frequency (HF) radio teletype nets from battalion up to theater-Army level. The mode of operation in structured nets will be similar to the HF systems they replace. The division command net provides the traffic between div HQ and the three brigades, air defense artillery battalion, division artillery and the division tactical CP.

Battery Computer System

The BCS employs both hardware devices and software programs, with the appropriate combination of both depending upon the use at rocket/missile battalions or cannon batteries. The BCS DT II hardware includes a battery computer unit (BCU) located at cannon battery and missile battalion headquarters and a gun display unit (GDU) at each weapon assigned to a cannon battery. The BCU will be operated by the normal complement of headquarters personnel, while the GDU will be utilized by the weapon crew without addition or deletion of personnel. The BCU will interoperate with TACFIRE and the DMD over field wire and contemporary radio nets, and with the GDU over field wire in the battery area. The GDU will display individual firing commands at each weapon within the battery.

The BCS software functional characteristics shall provide fire direction computations using stored programs for cannon, missile or free rocket systems, depending on the application.

In the cannon application, the BCS will provide firing data for all standard munitions and sheafs, corrected for individual weapon displacement from the battery center. It will also perform survey computations, predict moving target locations based on laser input from the DMD, and relay DMD messages to the battalion FDC when a forward observer is out of communication range of the FDC.

In the missile/rocket application, the BCS will compute firing data for all standard missile warheads, perform survey calculations, and provide a complete set of fire commands for the missile batteries.

The BCS entered production in 1979 and will begin first article testing in early 1981. In all applications the BCS will provide for the receipt, input, editing, processing, storage and secure transmission of designated messages.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

4 NOVEMBER 1980

"INTRODUCTION TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT"

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GARY A. DE BAUCHE

UNITED STATES ARMY

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

It's a pleasure for me to be able to discuss internal defense and development at this conference and it is equally pleasurable to be in Hawaii.

It's impressive that so much time, energy, and effort is being devoted to the discussion of low intensity conflict and insurgency. Some experts claim that we are presently engaged in the third World War. These experts do not envision WWII as an exchange of nuclear weapons by superpowers, but rather as: (1) a sophisticated Soviet threat in Central Europe; (2) political pressures against the US and its allies; (3) Soviet adventurism around the world; (4) proxy warfare, that is low intensity conflict; (5) the use of surrogate forces; (6) international terrorism; (7) separatist struggles; (8) and general sponsorship of wars of national liberation. It is therefore fitting that the topic that we are going to focus on this morning is Internal Defense and Development and the insurgency environment.

When I began to formulate this presentation, I came to the conclusion that it would be difficult to outline insurgency conditions or the potential for insurgency in each of the countries which are represented here. Besides that fact, each representative is well aware of those factors that pertain to his own country and may not be greatly interested in the problems of another country. Accordingly, I would like to start by focusing on some of the international conditions which can create a vulnerability to insurgency in each of our countries.

There are a number of changes in the international environment which cause instability and internal discord in nations. This phenomenon exists in the older nations as well as in the "new nations." However, the problems are perhaps exacerbated in the new nations because of their limited social and political institutions and structures which are well established in the older countries. These structures or organizations are useful to augment governmental efforts, and to replace some of the traditional structures which have fallen as societies have changed and family relationships have been disrupted or broken. These organizations also can help to articulate citizen's demands and raise them to the government level; and in this respect, act as a safety valve and a means to diffuse tense situations.

It has been pointed out that over the past fifty years, the world has been involved essentially in three types of revolution. Political, ideological, and technical. Let's take them one at a time.

First, the elements of the political revolution include decentralization of international power which accompanied the breakup of the European colonies. That is, the decentralization of power to the new nations and to international organizations such as OPEC. There has also been a drive for self determination and an emphasis on nationalism and self determination. Then too, population growth has resulted in a more youthful and a change-minded world. There are also conflicts between some of the industrial and the supplier nations. All of these international conditions have heightened internal tensions within many nations.

Concerning the technical revolution, rapid modernization within a single generation has resulted in dislocations, especially in the traditional societies. Transportation and communication improvements have also made

inequalities much more apparent. These stark differences within a country as well as between countries, have become more troublesome because of the ability of the populace to see some of these things, to experience them first hand through travel, to be able to see them on TV, through movies, or read about them in the papers. Improvement in the media capability also facilitates transmission of radical views; whereas in an earlier time these dissenting views could be stifled, or were not readily available to many of the people. But, with new innovations in communications these are now available on a much wider basis. Modernization and urbanization which has accompanied the technological era, has disrupted many of the old social relationships and caused serious dislocations. Then too, the fact that people are coming into contact more readily has increased the potential for conflict. Technological advances have also fostered the concept that anything is possible now. The technology that can put a man on the moon certainly can solve problems such as lack of water for farming, seasonal flooding, or shortages of potable water, etc. People are no longer willing to wait for another generation, or for their sons or their grandchildren to reap some of these benefits. What they are looking for is results here and now. These things of course raise demands upon the government to a much higher level.

Factors of the ideological revolution include of course: the press toward Communism, contrasted with the desire for democratic freedoms; the appeal of capitalism and free enterprise; and the trend towards socialism in order for governments to exert some type of central direction to sustain progress and improvement in the country. Then, attendant upon modernization of the country and breakup of old traditional social structures, nations also experience a retrenchment in old religious customs in order to stem erosion of the value system and preserve the society.

Now some of the new problems. In the last ten or fifteen years, the international community has been forced to cope with several new and pressing issues. These can be summed up in just a few sentences. High energy costs have created severe problems in the new nations and throughout the world. Shortages of petroleum products, kerosene, gasoline, and even fertilizers exist. Rapid inflation is another serious problem and of course affects the poor much more than the rich. Another related issue is the high rate of interest charged on major investment items purchases. These are among the most serious. There are more, but time prevents discussing all of them. These factors then have caused unrest, dissatisfaction and discontent. These factors also raise the level of frustration of the general populace, makes them dissatisfied with the government's efforts in their behalf, no matter how great the government efforts are, and they reduce the government's ability to be able to respond to the demands of the people. All of these elements have had significant impact on the social, political and economic sectors in the new nations.

We will examine each of these sectors. In the social and economic category there is a great deal of residual tribal and minority group loyalties that must be dealt with in the new nations. There is competition among ethnic and religious groups for benefits, extreme sensitivity to uneven distribution of resources and assets and perhaps even a distrust of the central government, its officials, and motives. Many nations also are faced with a growing populace which creates

greater demands on the central government. Attendant upon rapid population growth is the fact that with a younger populace, more pressure is placed on the government to provide resources, goods, services, and larger expenditures for health, education, welfare. Then too there is a higher ratio of dependents to workers. With the trend towards urbanization, there is a lower living standard for new arrivals and a demand for urban development programs which again strain the government's resources.

As far as political considerations are concerned, there is a shortage of experienced leaders and managers in government and industry. There is also an emphasis within the government for meeting the demands of the people, a stress on integration and wide participation in government, for drawing people in and getting them to participate actively in the government and to co-opt them into the government's sphere. Yet there is great difficulty in fine-tuning the mechanism of central government concurrent with trying to meet all the demands of the people placed upon the government. The final result of all these problems is a distraction from pressing national and international problems due to a preoccupation with internal discord. To go on with political factors, there is of course a need to de-centralize some governmental functions in order to satisfy minority demands for greater participation and self-determination within the nation; but, the government is faced with the requirement to maintain a strong central government and direction in order to insure economic progress, a sense of upward mobility, order and consensus during a period of rapid change. Herein lies the dilemma of the new nations; the pressure to de-centralize but yet the need to retain some type of central consolidated control. The sum total of these factors may result in unpopular government decisions for at least some elements of the populace no matter what the government does. Whatever the government does, it is not going to be able to satisfy all the people. All of this of course creates a more vulnerable populace polarizing issues for the dissidents and it offers propaganda themes for the insurgents. Some of the strategies employed by the dissidents or the insurgents include strategies which are known as the left, the right or the mass. Another term for the mass is of course, united from below, or the Maoist model, or wars of national liberations. These are the three general strategies that are used. When I use the term right I do not mean correct. I mean the utilization of the elective system as a strategy for revolution. The left is the most radical. All of us with a knowledge of Asia are very familiar with the mass model. I will deal with each of these strategies separately.

Note that these models have been utilized by other than communist governments. It is my personal belief that the communists are not able to ferment all the revolution and unrest in the world; however, they are opportunists and will try to capture a revolution when it meets their needs or interests. Another thing that I should point out is that these models are seldom found in their pure form. There is usually variations, or perhaps utilization of segments of each of these models in a given insurgency.

Another factor that makes it difficult to determine which strategy is being followed is that the dissidents will often change them as the situation dictates. They may start off with the left strategy, find out that it does not work and begin to incorporate elements of the mass strategy in their insurgencies.

The left strategy calls for the least amount of preparatory, organizational work. Often activists with common grievances may band together to protest against the government. They may decide that radical action is the only way to achieve results, and in many cases you find that radical action really precedes ideology. The people who participate in this may not really want power for themselves. But they do want to change the existing order. Emphasis here is on action by force, and for this reason the left strategy is the most violent. In the left strategy it is not really necessary to mobilize the masses because it stresses action of a strong cadre force. Emphasis is generally on urban guerrilla activity because of course they are looking for the short win and a short victory; and accordingly will aim at the seat of power. They use terrorism to force the government to overreact, to take away the people's civil liberties, and in this way the government will eventually bring itself down by its own hand. Since the left model does not feature a long organizational period, the dissidents may use existing organizations such as student groups or labor organizations. The labor group and student groups are often used to cripple the economy and the government, and subsequently cause its downfall. A recent example of the use of this strategy would be the revolution in Nicaragua. Even in that case it was not an example of a pure left strategy; it exhibited elements of the mass strategy as well.

The right strategy or the right model attempts to achieve change through establishment of a coalition government which over time assumes control of the country. It is slower and much more subtle. It is a rather creeping form of control. It emphasizes legal action and political activity. However, if the political party is outlawed, then the party will go underground and continue its operations. The right strategy may use terrorism and force, but generally it will disavow any violence because the dissidents are interested in being perceived as a legitimate political party. The people's organization are only important in the right strategy because of the necessity to keep the political apparatus in office through votes. Of course, the people may be used as pressure groups against the government in order to highlight the ineffectiveness of some policy or to force the government to modify its position on an issue.

The last strategy that I am going to discuss is the mass strategy; or as I said before the Maoist or united front below. Most of us are well familiar with this model. Usually it is rural based; however, it also can be urban. It features coordinated, reinforcing military political action. It erects a shadow government which acts as though it is the real government. The shadow government collects taxes, performs marriages and other legal functions. It apprehends, tries, and punishes wrong doers. It persists in these type of actions until the defacto government simply becomes irrelevant, and the people are willing to displace it because it serves no real purpose. The military arm or the guerrillas in this model generally attempt to discredit the central government through activities and actions which highlight the weakness of the government. The guerrillas attempt to sever communications and the control mechanism between the people and the central authority. It also forces the populace to support the shadow government; and in the final analysis it may even combat the authorities if the insurgency reaches that stage.

This generally encompasses a sketch of the Internal Defense and Development environment. It highlights the competing demands that are placed on the government; the limited resources at hand in order to meet these demands, and outlines the strategies of the dissidents or insurgents who are ready to capitalize on government problems. Generally, insurgent advantages include: government weaknesses; and a lack of responsibility, in that the insurgents do not have to administer or govern, only critique. Many of the insurgent groups have good leadership, good internal discipline, and they are devoted to their cause. Of course, the insurgents have the spirit of the offensive or the choice of the time and place to act. Generally, the insurgent modus operandi is to convince the people that the desires of the people and the insurgents are the same. In the political arena they attempt to discredit the government, in the economic arena, they seek to subvert the government's economic system; and in the social arena they attempt to increase tensions between religious and ethnic groups.

Now in a successionist environment or in a successionist insurgency, the strategies that I outlined may be slightly different. Here the insurgents wish to discredit the incumbent government; they want to force the government to react harshly and to overrepress; they want to mobilize the uncommitted segments of the minority groups in the populace behind the insurgent organization; and they want to prove their capability to govern. Not only to the people, but to the international community as well so that they can win the acceptance and approval of other nations for their cause. That is what they are looking for, legitimatization.

Now from all of those factors that I have outlined for you, it may appear that nations facing insurgencies are doomed to defeat; that is not true. Insurgencies have been defeated in the Philippines and Malaya; and other nations have held them to a manageable level for many years. Now if this presentation seems to be lacking in solutions it is merely because I set out to outline the nature of the problem in order to set the scene for subsequent presentations which will outline solutions and techniques that can be followed to help defeat insurgencies. There is of course much doctrine on combating insurgencies, but hopefully some new and innovative solutions will grow out of our panel discussions where we can learn from the experiences of others.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

4 NOVEMBER 1980

"COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES"

COLONEL CIRILO O. OROPESA

PHILIPPINES

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES

In view of the awesome nuclear capabilities of the superpowers, and the trend towards more sophisticated weaponry, as evidenced by worldwide escalating military buildup of armed forces; one type of warfare has emerged as the possible answer to counter superior combat power - "people's war."

Insurgency or "popular" wars, as fostered by communist philosophers, with Mao Tse Tung as the foremost exponent in Asia, have been resorted to in overthrowing established governments and ostensibly superior armed forces. A more recent experience, the Vietnam war, was an example of the present-day development and evolution of this type of warfare. Asian experiences such as these have created an impact on the Philippine Government and its armed forces.

Today, very few nations exist without a trace of insurgency in their history.

Indeed, the changing face of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare in the recent decade has necessitated the acceptance of counterinsurgency warfare as a "total war."

A valuable lesson learned from the Vietnam war and previous Philippine counterinsurgency campaigns is that there can be no decisive victory achieved only through military means. Realizing that in a war of attrition, a war of annihilation is an alternative not worth considering, a more humane strategy must be used. This decision was not hard to arrive at by Philippine leadership when one has to fight his own people.

A study of communist-inspired warfare reveals that an effective ploy in fighting an established and militarily superior government is the "protracted struggle." In the long run, the generally inferior military force of insurgents aims to overthrow the established government by guerrilla warfare tactics thereby forcing the established government to expend its resources in fighting a long drawn-out struggle.

Taking a closer look at the present international political situation, it is evident that insurgency somehow is the root of troubles in different parts of the world. The Philippines, a member of the third world and an agrarian country itself, is not spared by the claws of insurgency. A study of Philippine history reveals that insurgency in our country can be traced as far back as the latter part of the 19th Century.

Insurgency in the Philippines: A Historical Perspective

There are no hard and fast rules for counterinsurgency because different countries have different people characterized by varying values, traditions, forms of government, and life styles. Whatever strategy a government adopts to eliminate insurgency depends largely upon the country's economic, political, psycho-social stability.

The Spanish Period

Political as well as scientific developments in Europe brought about changes in the other continents. An awakening in Europe of an interest in the orient led to territorial expansion and the Philippines fell into the hands of the Spaniards in the 16th Century. The Spaniards then attempted to completely control the Philippines through traditions and institutions which later led to oppressions and abuses of the Filipinos. Eventually, in 1896, to protect their rights and sovereignty, the Filipinos rose up in revolt. In this case the Filipinos were the insurgents.

On June 12, 1898, the Proclamation of Philippine Independence was made by General Emilio Aguinaldo at Kawit, Cavite. In the early part of 1899, the constitution was promulgated and the Philippine Republic was inaugurated. Meantime however, Spain had ceded the Philippines to the United States under the Treaty of Paris of 1898. The Americans, refusing to recognize Philippine independence and with superior arms, wrested the reins of government from Aguinaldo.

The American Period

The first 2 years of American rule in the Philippines were characterized by Filipino-American hostilities. Prominent Filipino revolutionary leaders were arrested and others died in battles. Due to mounting Filipino opposition to American rule, the latter implemented a policy of repression. The people continued to wage a determined war of attrition against the Americans. Guerrilla resistance became widespread and clearly showed a national movement to overthrow American sovereignty.

In November 1935, the Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated. The reins of government were turned over to the Filipinos.

The Japanese Occupation

The Commonwealth Regime was interrupted when Japanese naval bombers attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941. As a consequence of the war declared by the United States against Japan, the Philippines was occupied by the Japanese forces. The Filipinos suffered the rigors of war as thousands were imprisoned and executed. Civil liberties were suppressed by the enemy and the economy was geared to the demands of the Japanese war efforts. Two years after the outbreak of the war, the Japanese-sponsored republic was proclaimed. Guerrilla units had already been formed to launch a resistance movement.

In central Luzon, a powerful guerrilla organization known as "HUKBALAHAP," an acronym for Hukbo Ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon (anti-Japanese Nationalist Army), operated against the Japanese Imperial forces. Other guerrilla units were organized in other parts of the Philippines, and continued the fight until Japan surrendered in 1945.

By mid-1946, the Philippines was granted independence by the United States. The Huk movement remained and became the problem of the government. With adequate support of the peasants, the Huks intensified their militancy and later fought skirmishes against the government forces. Such a situation posed a serious threat to the peace and order in central Luzon which led the administration to wage pacification campaigns.

Counterinsurgency Strategies: 1950-1971

The start of the 1950's was characterized by frequent armed clashes between the Huks and the government forces. It was rumored that the Huks were capable of taking Manila, the seat of national government. Meanwhile, the Secretary of National Defense adopted a policy of attrition in order to win the dissidents to the side of the government. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), backed by its military intelligence service (MIS), intensified efforts to track down the nerve center of the Huk politburo. The arrest of the members of the politburo in 1954 was the effect of both the "right and left hand" efforts of the government.

With the turn of a new decade, the 1960's saw the growth of labor unions in the country. Through united action, labor made significant gains. Various labor laws were enacted to safeguard the welfare of the laborers from unscrupulous employers.

The signing of the Manila Pact of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) indicated recognition of the relentless march of communism in Asia.

In 1967, to meet the challenge of the social, economic, and cultural conditions of the Southeast Asian region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded.

As the decade of the sixties neared to its end, student activism began to gather its momentum. This period witnessed the holding of massive and often violent student rallies, strikes, and demonstrations. Student organizations, labor unions, and peasant organizations were exploited by the radicals and became the front of subversive organizations. Intelligence reports confirmed the tie between the New People's Army (NPA) - the military arm of the communist party of the Philippines - and the students' groups. To complicate the situation, fighting erupted in Mindanao between government troops and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

The administration had no choice but to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in some parts of the Archipelago and to resort to the "mailed fist" policy. This then was the deteriorating socio-political atmosphere in the early years of the seventies.

Rationale of Present Strategy: 1972-1980

The resurgence of subversive insurgency in the Philippines between the late sixties and early seventies posed a serious threat to national security. The government identified two major internal threats to its stability, progress, and continued existence - the communist-inspired New People's Army (NPA), successors of the Huks, in the north and the secessionist MNLF in the south.

At that time, the subversives had gradually gained the upper hand in the battle for popular support. This was abetted by a government that had atrophied into inefficiency, bureaucratic incompetence, and rampant graft and corruption.

Insurgents dominated the underdeveloped countrysides, while urban terrorists disrupted government-owned utilities and facilities, adversely affecting business, trade and industries, and endangered innocent human lives.

Meantime, agitators for a secessionist movement in the southern Philippines, the MNLF had succeeded in inciting the Muslim minority to seek segregation, and a declaration of independence by force, of the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. Some 16,000 armed soldiers of the Bangsa Moro Army (Muslim Nation Army), the military force of the MNLF, had been trained and supported by external sources for this purpose.

The potentials for success of the subversives then was great, however, they failed. What were the dominating factors which led to the failure of the movement? What strategy did the government utilize in crushing the backbone of the insurgents?

The Government's Counterinsurgency Strategy

Among the members of the third world, the Philippines has achieved relative stability today, a far cry from the brink of a revolution in the early seventies. Success in this national endeavor may be attributed to certain factors ranging from attitudes of the people to the unique geographical configuration of the Philippines.

Certainly, a major contributing factor was the ability of the present leadership to analyze the real roots of discontent among the masses and remedy the problems through meaningful development programs.

A look back to the late sixties seems to confirm that the pervasive social cancer then was incurable. However, when President Ferdinand E. Marcos, declared martial law on 21 September 1972, it was the beginning of a new era in Philippine history.

The strategy which evolved to cope with the internal threats to the nation necessitated a relatively high degree of coordination. This requirement was more readily fulfilled under martial law. The first few years of martial law saw the buildup of the small armed forces, and the army, to a size capable of containing and neutralizing those threats.

The Philippine Army's Role in the Government Effort

The Philippine counterinsurgency drive escalated after the declaration of martial law. The Philippine Army, then only some 17,000-strong, committed all its available maneuver forces to stem the tide of armed insurgency. A limited mobilization of reserves was needed to support the rapid expansion of the Army. An integrated concept for new battalions put up was effected. These units were a mixture of regular and reserve Army troops. They played a vital role in stability campaigns that ensued.

Having neutralized insurgent leadership and halted the influx of foreign-trained cadre, the civilian government sought to render ineffective the ideology under which the insurgents were guided. This was done by a massive program aimed at awakening the nationalistic tendencies of Filipinos. A "new society" was proclaimed.

The armed forces instituted the TANGLAW program for its soldiers. TANGLAW, an acronym for "Tanod At Gabay Ng Lahi At Watawat" (protector and guide of the people and the flag) was a compulsory module of all training courses. Troop motivation and enlightenment sessions, a follow-through program of TANGLAW, was a weekly affair for all soldiers to include those in the combat zones. TANGLAW stressed the role of the soldier as a protector of the people and a paragon of good citizenship. Civic action programs went hand in hand with reeducating the masses. The national motto, "Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa" (one nation, one spirit) became the battlecry of this massive effort to politicalize the people "for the Philippines."

As a result of concrete steps towards progress, popular support for the government was sufficiently restored. During counterinsurgency campaigns, the Army always sought to initiate relief and rehabilitation programs for the displaced residents in the area of operations.

In coordination with civilian government agencies, Army engineers built roads, resettlement houses, bridges, schools, dams and irrigation canals. The Army also became instrumental in providing education to areas affected by the fighting. Often, teachers, afraid for their lives, had evacuated when fighting erupted. Soldiers with adequate educational qualifications, stepped in to fill the shoes of mentors for the less privileged and this program was later institutionalized as the Army literacy patrol program.

Conclusion

The acceptance of a "protracted struggle" and the commitment of the nation's resources to a total counterinsurgency effort are the main reasons for the Philippines success in its continuing struggle for internal peace.

Previous counterinsurgency campaigns against the Huks, and a history of being insurgents against Spaniards in the late 19th Century and against the Americans and then the Japanese in the first half of the 20th Century, may have provided useful insights to the national leadership into the techniques of counterinsurgency warfare.

Hand in hand with this military solution was the determined commitment of Philippine resources to development. Infrastructure projects were accelerated and socio-economic development programs were prioritized.

By not falling into the trap of expending resources for a predominantly military solution, and instead attacking the causal bases of the insurgency, the government succeeded in defusing an explosive political situation. Towards this end, the total government program was formulated and fitted in an acronym called PLEDGES.

Intensified intelligence activities resulted in the capture of dissidents, while the proven sincerity of the government caused the surrender of a great number of rebels. The Philippine Government was also successful in neutralizing the external support factor of insurgency by establishing diplomatic ties with communist and socialist countries.

These moves further crippled the insurgent movement in the country. Utilizing the soldier as a defender and partner for progress further strengthened the faith of the people in the national leadership.

The Overall Military Strategy

The nature of contemporary insurgency in the Philippines necessitates a strategy that is adaptable to both secessionist and subversive insurgency. In line with the government's socio-economic development strategy to neutralize insurgency is the Armed Forces of the Philippines counterinsurgency effort.

The four major services of the AFP are tasked and organized to accomplish their objectives in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations by phases.

Phase I is the latent and incipient stage of insurgency. Phase II sees the emergence of organized guerrilla warfare. During phase III or war of movement, the President, who is the Commander-in-Chief, through the Ministry of National Defense and the AFP Chief of Staff exercises overall coordination and control over all aspects of operations.

The ever-present economic pressure and the optimal utilization of limited resources dictate the degree of success of the overall counterinsurgency strategy.

The Philippine Army's Role in the Government Effort

The Philippine counterinsurgency drive escalated after the declaration of martial law. The Philippine Army, then only some 17,000-strong, committed all its available maneuver forces to stem the tide of armed insurgency. A limited mobilization of reserves was needed to support the rapid expansion of the Army. An integrated concept for new battalions put up was effected. These units were a mixture of regular and reserve Army troops. They played a vital role in stability campaigns that ensued.

Having neutralized insurgent leadership and halted the influx of foreign-trained cadre, the civilian government sought to render ineffective the ideology under which the insurgents were guided. This was done by a massive program aimed at awakening the nationalistic tendencies of Filipinos. A "new society" was proclaimed.

The armed forces instituted the TANGLAW program for its soldiers. TANGLAW, an acronym for "Tanod At Gabay Ng Lahi At Watawat" (protector and guide of the people and the flag) was a compulsory module of all training courses. Troop motivation and enlightenment sessions, a follow-through program of TANGLAW, was a weekly affair for all soldiers to include those in the combat zones. TANGLAW stressed the role of the soldier as a protector of the people and a paragon of good citizenship. Civic action programs went hand in hand with reeducating the masses. The national motto, "Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa" (one nation, one spirit) became the battlecry of this massive effort to politicalize the people "for the Philippines."

As a result of concrete steps towards progress, popular support for the government was sufficiently restored. During counterinsurgency campaigns, the Army always sought to initiate relief and rehabilitation programs for the displaced residents in the area of operations.

In coordination with civilian government agencies, Army engineers built roads, resettlement houses, bridges, schools, dams and irrigation canals. The Army also became instrumental in providing education to areas affected by the fighting. Often, teachers, afraid for their lives, had evacuated when fighting erupted. Soldiers with adequate educational qualifications, stepped in to fill the shoes of mentors for the less privileged and this program was later institutionalized as the Army literacy patrol program.

Conclusion

The acceptance of a "protracted struggle" and the commitment of the nation's resources to a total counterinsurgency effort are the main reasons for the Philippines success in its continuing struggle for internal peace.

Previous counterinsurgency campaigns against the Huks, and a history of being insurgents against Spaniards in the late 19th Century and against the Americans and then the Japanese in the first half of the 20th Century, may have provided useful insights to the national leadership into the techniques of counterinsurgency warfare.

The close coordination between the military and civilian government, facilitated by having one man as both President and Commander-in-Chief, minimized duplication of efforts and insured complementary action programs.

Tangible results of government development programs have restored popular support for the government. The growth of a national consciousness and identity as well as a strong national leadership have hampered entrance of inimical foreign-based ideology.

Today, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Army in particular, continues its efforts to bring peace to the countrysides. The enemy has been contained and the struggle continues to eradicate the remaining pockets of terrorists and bandits, both through a government policy of attrition and socio-economic development, and judicious use of armed force when required. The insurgents have gradually come to realize that the Filipinos as a people abhor the use of violence to achieve reform, and would rather have it done through peaceful means on the Filipino "bayanihan" (cooperative) spirit. The growing number of surrenderees attests to this.

With the goal of a better and more peaceful life of freedom and progress, the Filipino soldier strives to fulfill his dual role as a protector of the people and a good citizen of the republic.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

4 NOVEMBER 1980

"INTERNAL DEFENSE OF A NATION"

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARN BOONPRASERTH

THAILAND

INTERNAL DEFENSE OF A NATION

Thailand is presently confronted with internal and external threats. However, the immediate and utmost importance to the national security and stability is the internal threat which is unconventional in nature. We perceive the Communist Party of Thailand or the CPT as the primary source of the mentioned internal threat which takes form of subversion and incites insurgencies.

Insurgency is a form of political violence that is essentially an intrasocial conflict defined as an attempt by a dissident element to organize the population of a country and incite it to forcibly overthrow its existing government. While Thailand has been plagued by an active insurgency since the early 1950's not until 1961 did the Communist Party of Thailand adapt a line of armed revolution. The goal of this revolution is the seizure of power from the Thai government through Maoist political and military techniques. Even through this insurgency has received some fragmented success in battle with the Royal Thai Government, it has not been able to attain its ultimate goal. The reason for its failure to achieve this goal is that the communist appeals for revolution have not been capable of penetrating the deep rooted traditional values held by the Thai villager. With the presence of social, political and economic discontent in the country experiencing ethnic tensions and external pressures, the insurgent may be able to readjust his appeals and create an atmosphere conducive for revolution.

Thailand's insurgency varies in intensity and scope according to its geographical area, however, historically the Northeast has been the center of movements opposing the government. The communist clandestine bases were established during the period from 1927 to 1929, when the Kua Mintong swept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) out of Mainland China. Leading members of the Chinese - Communist Party took asylum in Thailand and Malaysia and began their subversive activities among the local Chinese inhabitants who originally came to Thailand as construction workers. Communism in Thailand was not originated by the Thais themselves but it was rather introduced into the country by cadres from abroad. As time passed, they were able to organize the Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT) in the Northeast province. The first committee meeting was held on 1 December 1942 in which a policy was laid down and the election of the committee members was made. Through the transitional period following World War II the party changed its name to Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and was forced to go underground when the government passed the Anti-Communist Act in 1952. The CPT's organization is closely aligned to that of the Maoist organizations. They have extended themselves from the heavy jungle areas to the remote villages and are now attempting to expand to the urban areas and population centers. The general concept, as it is applied on the ground, is best summed up by a phrase of MAO Tse-tung's in which he states that "the jungle must be used to encircle the villages, the villages must be used to encircle the towns," and to make the government forces over-extended.

The communists' main objectives are to invalidate the legitimate government, undermining its popular support, and separating Thailand from its Free World

Allies. To carry out these aims there is a joint political and military organization, with the military always subordinate to the political. Support for the political aim of gaining control over the population by continuous subversion and terror is always the primary task of the communist guerilla units. To achieve the final success for the revolution, the communist made it clear during the third committee meeting in 1961 that they would need three basic functional elements-PARTY or the command and control element, MASS ORGANIZATIONS and ARMED ELEMENTS.

The communists, follow MAO's Strategy, have infiltrated the communist political organization into the mass of population, with the help of armed military units outside the population, for expanding control over the population and finally the villages. They first would incite the people in the remote and rural areas with empty promises and deliver continuous attacks on the administration and certain government officials. Then the people were mobilized and organized. The party would give them intensive indoctrination and training in MARXISM/LENINISM and, later on, arm them. Many had joined the movement voluntarily but many were forced to.

This situation had prevailed for approximately 23 years, since the establishment of the Communist Party of Thailand, before the first armed conflict between the communist armed insurgents and the Royal Thai Government forces broke out for the first time in 1965 at Nakae District, Nakhon Phanom Province. This incident caused the government to recognize the communist armed threat and to react with a forceful sweep-up operations. Since that time the CPT has been using propaganda, coercion, and terrorism against local officials and limited military operations. Military operations are carried out by "The Thai People Liberation Armed Forces (TPLAF)." It proclaimed the policies that the communist insurgency in Thailand would enter a new phase, that of an offensive and protracted in nature against the Royal Thai Government. Later on, in November of the same year, the armed struggle broke out in the South at Nasan District of Surat Thani province. The first armed insurgency incident in the Central part in November 1966 at Kuiburi District of Prachuab Khirikhan province, and finally, the first armed struggle in the North appeared at Tungchang District of Nan province in February 1967.

At present, the military activities of the CPT are still in the Defensive Phase of the people war and the insurgency movements appear in every part of the country. The insurgents threaten and assassinate those who are uncooperative, assassinate government sympathizers, conduct mass propaganda and seek opportunities to attack government officials. It seems that both the political and military actions directed towards the people and the officials as well as the operation bases in some areas are decreased. Several reasons could be the conflict's between the CPT and other communist parties, the problems of dual approaches namely Chinese and Soviet lines, the Democratic questions, the problem of unimpartially Thai-Chinese nationality and the problem of communist struggle in Kampuchea.

In any explication of insurgency in Thailand, we must have thorough knowledge and understanding of the nature of the threat to include the types of struggles and the strategy and tactics implemented by the communists before the correct and appropriate measures to defeat the insurgency can be formulated.

The type of struggle that the communist generally used can be categorized as the Peaceful Struggle and the Armed Struggle. The Peaceful Struggle is further divided into People Uprising, Parliamentary Struggle and Mass Movement, while the Armed Struggle is comprised of War and Armed Uprising which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union successfully used for the revolution in 1917.

War may be classified as National and Internal or Civil or Revolutionary or Liberation or People's in nature. Thailand is presently confronting with both types of struggle in which the main thrust of the CPT focused on the Revolutionary or the People's war. The principles of the Revolutionary or the People's War in the Chinese Communist Party or MAO Tse-Tung's line of thoughts can be cited as follows:

Must be in accordance with people's needs.

Must be offensive right through the victory.

Beginning with political offensive and must be continuous.

The war will be decisively won by military or armed forces (Offensive Strategy).

Will be quickly defeated when destroyed by political offensive (Defensive Strategy).

The Communist Party of Thailand is the strategic command and control headquarters for the Political and Military forces. The Political forces or the United Front will instigate the revolutionary or the people's war in order to launch a Strategic Political Offensive through the use of democratic tactics and united front tactics with the purpose of destroying the democratic system, establishing the conditions for National War and forming the National-Democratic United Front. The National-Democratic United Front which is comprised of farmers, laborers, educators, intelligentsias, students, and capitalists who love the country and democracy, will lead to the revolutionary or the people's war eventually toppling the Government and seizing State Power.

In couple with the Political forces, the Military forces will initiate armed struggle through the use of the Thai Peoples Liberation Army Forces namely Main forces, Guerilla forces and Militia or Popular forces in order to achieve the following strategic stages consecutively:

Defensive Strategy: To accumulate own forces step by step and destroy the opposing forces through the implementation of Protracted-War strategy. At this state, Guerilla War is primary and Regular War is secondary.

Counter-Offensive Strategy: To change from Guerilla War to Regular War.

Offensive Strategy: To crush the opposing forces and seize the country through the use of Quick-War Strategy. At this state, Regular War is primary and Guerilla War is secondary.

When the opposing forces are destroyed, the situation will automatically lead to the revolutionary or the people's war toppling the Government and Seizing the State Power. Once the state power has been seized, the national-democratic revolution, socialist revolution, and complete communist revolution will be carried out. The purposes are to change the existing administrative system to a Proletariat Dictatorship and to change the economic system from Capitalism to Socialism.

The Royal Thai Government has assigned the overall counter-insurgency mission to the Internal Security Operations Command or the ISOC. The Internal Security Operations Command is the specified command organized at national level which consists of the Civil, the Police and the Military officials of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. It is established in accordance with the Anti-Communist Act of 1952 with the missions of command and control the civil-police-military forces, coordinating the activities and directing the efforts of all government agencies in internal security or internal defense operations.

The Directors of the Internal Security Operations, are appointed from the Commanding General of the four Army Areas. The Internal Security Operations, Province (ISOP) is the provincial level organization, subordinate to a regional headquarters, responsible for internal security or internal defense operations as well. At district level, the Internal Security Operations and Coordination Center, subordinate to ISOP, is formed.

In order to quickly terminate the communist revolutionary war situation which is of the utmost importance and is dangerous to the security of the nation, the Royal Thai Government promulgated the "POLICY OF FIGHTING TO DEFEAT THE COMMUNIST" on 24 April 1980. The general policy in the field of counter insurgency is to fight and quick defeat the communist essentially with continuous political offensive weighting the emphasis on all operations that will neutralize and destroy the united front and the armed forces movement; stop national war situations with the policy of neutrality; and change their types of struggle from armed struggle to peaceful struggle.

At present, the basic strategy of fighting to defeat the communist of the Royal Thai Government is to employ the political measures and internal development as the primary means, and to employ the military measures as the secondary means. Military-type operations must always support the political actions and use only

when necessary; political measures are those actions taken in the field of government, economics, social, psychological operations, and others which are not military in nature. On the other hand, the military measures involves the employment of military, police, para-military and volunteer or popular defense forces.

The government's efforts to combat insurgency have been implemented through the complex mix of political and military measures ranging from peace to war and propaganda to tactical operations. Although this strategy can be employed in all areas, regardless of the intensity of conflict, it does not mean that the political measures always take precedence. The relationship between the political and military measures is not simply to straight-forward arithmetic calculation, but it must be carefully judged objectively and subjectively.

The basic principle is to defeat the Communist Terrorists (CTs) at the village which implies the actions take to firmly gain local popular support for the government officials. It is now the battle between the government and the communists to take the common objective, the "POPULATION." This concept can be achieved through the following steps:

STEP I: To conduct psychological operation and let the danger and cunning tricks of the communists be known to the population.

STEP II: To destroy the CPT infra-structures which include insurgent axis, supporter, sympathizer, etc., through clandestine operations, defectors, and local intelligence.

STEP III: To educate, train and organize volunteer defense forces with the village.

STEP IV: To organize self-defense villages in accordance with the government total people defense concept.

The purpose of counter insurgency in urban areas is to stop, disorganize and neutralize the united front of various forms which normally organize movements within the city or large community. The action taken can be accomplished by organizing and educating the resistant groups, government officials and the united fronts through the strategy of BUILDING THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM THAT HAS HIS MAJESTY THE KING AS SYMBOLIC HEAD; make sure that the government mechanisms thoroughly understand the rooted causes of insurgency and willing to act accordingly.

In order to make the Democratic Strategy most effective, the following political measures must be taken:

Correction of national-level social conditions , such as:

Corruption among the government officials and population.

Oppression and tyrannization by government officials and power groups.

Jobless, landless and poverty within the population.

Social and economic justice.

Insurance of economic development especially in the field of agriculture and industry.

In concert with the political operation, the military measures must be continuously taken in jungle and mountainous areas to insure maximum impact and losses upon the communist insurgent forces and base camps through the deployment of small but effective military units in conjunction with close air support from our Air Force. Such operation will at all times keep the communist forces off-balanced and limit their capability to mass for military operations. We should always keep in mind that the military operation must support the political objectives.

We have previously cited of defeating the communist terrorists at the village; therefore, the villages must be our targets to basically aim for decisive victory. These villages are classified, according to the degrees of the communists' influence, as "TARGET VILLAGES."

Target Village is the forum of fighting ring which we select to contest and defeat the CPT.

The importance of target village are:

To serve as common objective for CIVIL-POLICE-MILITARY operation.

To establish priorities of operation.

To economize the government budget and prevent repetition of responsibilities.

Economy of forces.

To Synchronize and insure close coordination with military operation.

To serve as the basic consideration in determining the intensity of conflict which is normally shown by colors.

Classification of Target Village

The target village can be classified as DEFENSE and CONTEST.

• Defense Village is the one that has not been infiltrated by the communist terrorists but is rather remote, isolate and risky to the communist infiltration or within the offensive direction of the communist movement, however, it may be approached periodically but has not reached axis organization.

Contest Village is the one that has been under the influence of the communist terrorists and the axis organization is firmly formed.

The relationship of the target villages can be sub-classified into six categories: A, B, C₁, C₂, D and E.

Category A is the village that has not been infiltrated by the communist terrorists but is rather remote, isolate and risky or within the offensive direction of the communist movement.

Category B is the village that has been periodically approached by the communist terrorists.

Category C₁ is the village that the communist terrorists has organized.

Category C₂ is the village that has been organized and has avillage committee.

Category D is the village where some political and military organizations have been established.

Category E is the village that the communist terrorists completely controls and has organize strong political and military mechanisms.

Once the target villages have been identified, the political measures can be consecutively launched as follows:

STEP I: Psychological operation.

STEP II: Destroy communist terrorists' infrastructure at village.

STEP III: Educate and train populace resistant groups, such as the Thai Volunteer National Defense.

STEP IV: Establish the Volunteer Self Development and Defense villages.

The Internal Security Operations Command, in accordance with the general policy guidelines, has established the CIVIL-POLICE-MILITARY concept or the CPM to defeat and isolate the insurgents from the population both physically and ideologically through intensive Internal Defense and Internal Development (IDAD) operations which involve the total government efforts in the field of political, economic, cultural, psychological and military powers.

The CIVIL component has the primary responsibility of looking after the welfare and security of the people and the development of local areas.

The POLICE component is mainly responsible for severing the relationship between the villagers and the communist insurgents in the jungle or remote area and eliminating the communist networks within the villages and communities.

The MILITARY component is responsible for destroying the communist insurgents in the jungle or remote areas which are normally inaccessible to the civil and police forces. The military unit will locate the communist insurgent units, based camps, training camps, food cache's, etc., to capture and destroy them. This is done by:

Removing the conditions that insurgents exploit to foster an insurgency.

Establishing a relatively secure and stable environment within which organizations are free to implement and administer government programs.

Mobilizing, popular support, and cooperative behavior.

Balancing development and unifying the people.

Neutralizing and/or eliminating the insurgent leadership and the insurgent organization.

In achieving the desired objectives in counter-insurgency which involve the people directly, the Internal Security Operations Command has formulated numerous programs, each of which has its own unique objective. Some of the more important programs are:

THE VOLUNTEER SELF DEVELOPMENT AND DEFENSE (VSDD) is the national program designed for safety and security of the villagers in the provinces. This program will improve their standard of living and give them the opportunity to learn and train how to project themselves from the communist aggression.

THE THAI VOLUNTEER NATIONAL DEFENSE (TVND) is the collective program to promote the unity of the villagers especially in the communist terrorists' zones. Once the villagers are properly organized, they will be able to provide useful information to government officials and sever the logistic supports from the villages to the insurgents. The program has caused the communist terrorists low morale, starvation and defection.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM (PP) is aimed to alert and promote understanding of the villagers concerning the government position, terrorist situation, roles of officials, civic action programs, propaganda, etc.

THE DEVELOPMENT FOR SECURITY PROGRAM (DSP) is the political program designed to counter the communist directly. This program will promote and foster the population with happiness, peace, job opportunities and income. The villagers will love their homes and will keep them from falling to others.

THE AMNESTY OR KAROONYATHEP PROGRAM is aimed at rehabilitating of the former insurgents. Through this program, they will become harmless individuals and be able to acquire an occupation of their choice normally in the field of handicrafts or household agriculture.

THE HILL TRIBE PROGRAM is the program aimed at the hill tribes in the North. The actions taken toward the hill tribes has had considerable success. Many have accepted the status of being part of the Thais.

Another important program is to provide an education to the government official and the population concerning the danger and strategies of the Communist Party of Thailand.

Preventing and defeating the communists is a very difficult task, however, this difficulty can be overcome if we thoroughly understand the communists and ourselves. We must understand their strategies and plan our war against them objectively and subjectively.

In order to defeat the communism and win the revolutionary or people's war, we must achieve the followings:

Change the strategic concept from "ANTI-COMMUNISM" to "FIGHT COMMUNISM."

Raise the problem to national level under single and united national headquarters.

Political measures must be primary and military measures must support political measures and used only when necessary, however, political measures do not always take precedence.

Communism can be only defeated by democracy.

This is the end of our presentation, thank you for your attention.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

4 NOVEMBER 1980

"INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS"

MAJOR JAMES G. MEIKLE

UNITED STATES ARMY

IDAD INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

I would like to begin my presentation by relating two separate incidents that took place miles apart in the not so distant past. The first was in Vietnam in 1966, where I served as a platoon leader with the 9th Infantry Division. During my incoming briefing by the company commander, he told me that several school teachers from a school near our battalion base camp had been abducted and killed by Vietcong terrorists. I remember that he felt a sense of helplessness to prevent that kind of terrorism. Then, several years later in Frankfurt, Germany in the early 1970's I was going to school at night. One evening as I approached the building where classes were held, an explosion ripped through the lobby shattering windows. Luckily no one was seriously injured, however, another explosion in the nearby Officer's Club resulted in a death.

Both of these acts of terrorism, one in a rural area of a developing nation, and the other in a large city in an industrial state, have one striking similarity. They were well planned and well executed. The leaders, organization, and plans of these terrorists might have been discovered and neutralized through intelligence/counterintelligence operations.

In discussing the role of intelligence in internal defense and development, I will concentrate my remarks this afternoon on insurgent activities and how intelligence plays a key role in defeating this type of threat. In a broad sense, intelligence has three major responsibilities in internal defense and development. First, it provides an accurate picture of the situation. Second, intelligence supports the government programs and operations designed to prevent or defeat insurgency. Finally, intelligence provides advance warning of insurgent potential and plans for escalation.

Intelligence operations are concerned with the collection, processing, and dissemination of available information concerning all aspects of the area of operations susceptible to insurgency. Of particular importance are the intelligence operations devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure and establishing a data base in preparation for whatever roles the military is required to play in defeating the insurgent movement.

Defining requirements, planning intelligence operations, collecting and analyzing information, and disseminating the results all require a professional, organized approach in order to provide accurate and timely intelligence. With that thought in mind then, let me say a few words about the intelligence system that supports IDAD operations. The stress here is on the need for a centralized intelligence system consisting of all military and civilian intelligence organizations. Planning must be established so that there is a continuous flow of information into the intelligence pipeline leading through subnational centers, if established, into the national level intelligence center. This intelligence center, can be either a single organization, or part of a national internal

defense coordination center (or similar organization). The important point is that the national level intelligence center, and any major subnational level centers should have these characteristics (1) a single directorship, (2) integration of all civil and military intelligence, (3) a professional staff of intelligence personnel, (4) a secure rapid means of communication. The intelligence center functions to review all local activity and external influences that may effect the security of the area or country and the campaign against the insurgents. The center also provides intelligence assessments of insurgent programs and advises on the security policies and actions to combat these threats.

The intelligence requirements addressed by the intelligence system in internal defense and development operations fall into two broad categories: (1) preparedness and (2) operational. Preparedness consists of basic intelligence or a comprehensive data base on any area and on all subject matters, plus current intelligence or input on a day to day basis. The combat intelligence requirements for tactical operations in an insurgency differ little from those of other types of warfare. What is distinct in low intensity conflict operations, however, is the need for intelligence to support missions such as civil affairs, psychological and population and resources control operations on a continuing basis.

In dealing with internal defense and development, intelligence has three major objectives. First determine the indicators of an impending insurgency, second, obtain information about the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population; and third, reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

Let's look at some of the indicators of an insurgency. Anything that insurgents can do to influence and direct a society toward revolution will be reflected by some overt occurrence or action which we call indicators. No one could list in sufficient detail all the possible indicators existing in the different nations of the world. The greater the perception of an insurgency situation within a particular country and the greater the knowledge of the type of insurgents involved, the easier it will be to identify the insurgent activity indicators which are applicable.

Indicators are most easily broken down into those applicable to rural areas in one group, and those applicable to urban areas in another. Traditionally, communist theoreticians have emphasized that the key to success is the countryside and the rural population. Initial efforts of the insurgent may be located in the countryside and small towns. Looking at rural indicators first, these are some of the things we might expect to find:

- a. General Activity.
 - (1) New faces in the community
 - (2) Unusual gatherings among population
 - (3) Disruption of normal social patterns
- b. Actions taken against the government

- (1) Murder and kidnapping of local officials
- (2) Strangers attempting to join security forces
- (3) Growth of general hostility toward government

c. Commodity indicators

- (1) Diversion of crops from markets
- (2) Increased reports of theft of foodstuffs
- (3) Strangers attempting to buy crops or produce
- (4) Disappearance of wild game from area
- (5) Appearance of unusual numbers of pack animals
- (6) Increased loss of weapons from police/military outposts
- (7) Unexplained attacks on patrols
- (8) Scarcity of drugs, herbs and plants for medicine, material for footgear

d. Environment indicators

- (1) Evidence of increased foot traffic in remote/isolated areas...
- (2) Unexplained trails and cold campsites
- (3) Establishment of new, unexplained agriculture areas

Having seen some of the indicators of insurgency in a rural area let me turn now to the urban environment. The institutions and political processes peculiar to the city-state have always been a prime target for subversion insurgency. Urban insurgent leadership is especially selected because of the ability to manipulate people. Leadership training is conducted in absolute secrecy because at this point, the insurgency is extremely vulnerable. It is rare that the insurgents will at this point reveal their activities or existence. The insurgents must, however, reachout beyond themselves for growth, and this is when insurgency indicators appear. Urban indicators might include some of the activities shown here:

a. General Activity

- (1) Increase in size of pro-insurgent oriented embassy or consulate staff
- (2) Increase in visitors from pro-insurgency oriented countries
- (3) Appearance of many new members in established organizations like labor unions

- (4) Infiltration of student organizations and unions by known agitators
 - (5) Appearance of new organizations with titles stressing patriotism, minorities, etc.
 - (6) Evidence of participation of paid and armed demonstrators in riots
- b. Activity Against the Government
- (1) Assassination or disappearance of government agents
 - (2) Attempts to bribe or blackmail govt/police employees
 - (3) Attempts to obtain classified information or documents
 - (4) Increased student activity against government
 - (5) Unexplained disruptions of public utilities
- c. Arms and Ammunition
- (1) Increased assaults on police/military personnel to obtain arms
 - (2) Increased purchase and theft of metal products like pipe, wire, nails
 - (3) Increased purchase of surplus military goods
 - (4) Reports of theft or purchase of basic chemicals used in explosives
- d. Environmental Indicators
- (1) Apartments rented but not lived in as homes
 - (2) Slogans on walls, bridges, streets
 - (3) Terrorist acts directed at destruction of government buildings

One of the primary functions of the urban section of a rural-urban insurgency is to finance and supply the movement. An effective intelligence operation must become conscious of commodity indicators in order to accomplish the important task of denying critical supplies to the insurgents. The indicators concerning scarcity of drugs, herbs and medicines in the rural environment are equally applicable here. We might also look for unusual purchases of clothing materials possible indicating the operation of factories to make insurgent uniforms or footwear. Of course there are many other indicators of urban insurgent activity.

One other area of indicators is common to both the rural and urban insurgency, and that is the emphasis given to propaganda by the insurgents. Propaganda indicators of an existing insurgency should be apparent in every society. The extent of the propaganda usually provides an indication of the phase of insurgency a country is experiencing. For example, in an urban insurgency, when the first concrete propaganda indicators appear, it usually means that minimum underground insurgent organization has been established. Some of the propaganda indicators we could expect are shown here.

a. General Activity

- (1) Circulation of petitions advocating standard insurgent demands
- (2) Reports from other countries that the area is "Ripe for Revolution"
- (3) Anti-government slogans, posters, etc.
- (4) Letterwriting campaigns to newspapers listing complaints
- (5) Mass demonstrations advocating standard communist demands
- (6) Clandestine in-country radio broadcasts to ethnic/poor

b. Against the Established Government

- (1) Movement to remove strong anti-insurgency leaders
- (2) Rumors that government is a pawn of a foreign power
- (3) Radio propaganda from foreign countries denouncing established government

c. Against the Military and Police

- (1) Spread of idea that military and police are corrupt
- (2) Pleas to the people to stop cooperating with military/police
- (3) Accusations of police brutality or ineffectiveness

Other indicators of insurgent propaganda activities are to be expected, and the intelligence officer will use his experience and knowledge of the particular area in question to add to the list shown here.

Having looked at the first intelligence objective in IDAD operations, determining the indicators of an insurgency, let's now focus on the second objective, i.e., obtaining information about the insurgent, weather, terrain and population. The intelligence officer in IDAD operations has a wide variety of sources to draw from in addressing these four areas of interest. Most nations already have background studies on the terrain and population of their own and other countries. Similarly, the modern world of air transportation with its special safety requirements has provided the technology to answer most questions pertaining to the weather. Special emphasis then must be directed primarily to obtaining information about the insurgents. It should be recognized, however, that in IDAD operations the intelligence officer must focus his attention on the population in order to collect information about the insurgent. The population is the primary target of the insurgent and a principal source of his intelligence, cover, personnel, and logistical support. Therefore the civilian population as well as the insurgent forces represent major intelligence targets. Intelligence collection will differ somewhat from conventional collection due to the nature of the insurgent environment. Requirements will be satisfied only by reporting information in minute detail and analyzing all data to accurately assess the insurgent capabilities and plans.

Although the entire population can be considered a potential source of intelligence about the insurgent, some groups and individuals should receive primary consideration among collection planners. Some examples are shown here: Leaders of dissident groups, merchants, bar owners and bar girls, medical personnel, ordinary citizens, insurgent defectors, students, educators, police, and foreign country officials.

Leaders of Dissident Groups. Minorities, religious sects, political factions, who may be able to identify insurgent personnel, their methods of operations, and the targets the insurgents hope to exploit. The insurgents will attempt to contact these groups and their leaders in order to recruit supporters and determine how to best exploit these dissidents.

Merchants who may be able to identify insurgent personnel and their specific needs if they have been requested by the insurgents to provide specific items.

Bar Owners and Bar Girls are frequently employed by insurgents to collect information and bars are used as meeting places.

Medical Personnel who may be able to identify insurgent personnel, plans and medical needs for doctors, nurses and medicine.

Ordinary Citizens who are typical members of organizations or associations which play an important role in society, and are thus targets of insurgent operations, examples might be farmer's organizations, trade unions, political parties.

Insurgent Defectors who can provide first-hand information about insurgent organization and plans. Since their information may only be valid up until the time of their defection, it must be acted on quickly before the insurgents take countermeasures.

Students who have become politicized and are subject to insurgent attempts to recruit new personnel.

Professors/School Administrators who may be able to identify insurgents and the details of their operations in student recruitment. As we can see, almost anyone can be a potential source of information about the insurgents. In the rural areas, loyal village and town officials may be able to suggest specific human sources.

Police - Perhaps one of the best sources of information about insurgents is the police. The police are involved in investigating crimes, disturbances, and other activity which may be the result of insurgent activity. The arrest records of agitators may provide considerable information about known or suspected insurgents, their methods of operation, known or suspected hideouts, front organizations, and meeting places. The police are often the first government agency to learn about the theft of weapons, drug and crimes against property. Their investigations may reveal significant information about insurgent operations, and it is for this reason that there must be very close cooperation

between police and military intelligence personnel. Too often, a seemingly unimportant report of unusual activity is disregarded or filed away by local police, when in fact that very piece of information may be the missing piece of an intelligence puzzle needed by the military or national level intelligence officer.

Foreign Country Officials. Embassy and consulate personnel, friendly military personnel, custom and other administrative officials can all provide information about known or suspected insurgents, organizations, and plans.

The intelligence officer does not limit himself to just human sources of course, and the many other sources of intelligence used in conventional intelligence operations are also applicable to IDAD actions. Some examples of non-human sources are shown here:

- a. Captured insurgent documents
- b. Photographs
- c. Maps
- d. Newspapers
- e. News magazines

Insurgent documents can provide a wealth of information about the insurgent cadre members and organization. Insurgent plans, doctrine, routes of communication, and locations of "safe houses" and drops are often detailed in such documents. Photographs of insurgents engaged in illegal activities, or which provide for positive identification can be most helpful. Ordinary topographic maps may indicate the local areas best suited for insurgent bases and routes of communication. Newspapers may contain valuable information which has not yet come to the attention of the government. The newspaper reporters frequently have an excellent informant network from which they can obtain new information as early as possible. News magazines can also be a valuable source of information. One example that can be used by all nations in the Pacific is the Far East Economic Review. It is an excellent source of general information and very often has detailed articles concerning insurgent movements throughout the Pacific.

At this point, let's review very briefly the specific items of information about the insurgent force we want to learn from the sources of information mentioned. The information required is not so different from that collected about enemy forces in a conventional warfare situation. Order of battle data must be gathered in somewhat greater detail, however, in an insurgency situation. Instead of thinking in terms of division, brigades, and battalions, we must look to much lower echelons--even down to the squad. This applies not only to the military aspects, but the separate and distinct political command channels usually found in an insurgent organization. OB requirements in an insurgency includes information about these elements.

- a. Composition/strengths
- b. Organization (HQ, personalities)
- c. Disposition (Bases, operational training, supply locations)
- d. Logistic capabilities
- e. Tactics
- f. Training
- g. Combat effectiveness

It should be noted that the insurgents will try to deceive the government about their actual strength. They may employ rapid movement of units and multiple designations for a single element in order to have their strength overestimated. Reports must be analyzed carefully, and the importance of actual counts of insurgent personnel must be stressed.

In addition to order of battle information, we need to know about the insurgent force capabilities. These are: Order of battle, insurgency force capabilities, strength and weaknesses, support from external powers, and support from local police. Tactical capabilities include actions such as raids, ambushes, and harassment. Support capabilities include supply, transportation, communications, intelligence engineer and medical activities. Strength and weaknesses for which intelligence is required include items such as recruitment and retention, intelligence, organization and training, finance, and communications. The government forces may be able to exploit discovered insurgent weaknesses, or methods to overcome apparent areas of insurgent strength. Intelligence requirements concerning support from external powers might include manpower, weapons and equipment, training and sanctuary. Support from the populace, both direct and indirect, is absolutely vital to the insurgents, and the intelligence effort in this area is critical. In his 20 Sep 80 "Meet the Press" special, President Marcos of the Philippines commented on the bombings by urban terrorists and said "they do not understand that ... they need the support of the people and ... a strong armed force behind the urban terrorism ... " He went on to say that the terrorists have neither.

As you will recall, the third objective of intelligence in IDAD operations is to reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage. The implication in this objective is that government forces will take action against the insurgent force to defeat the threat. The operational force must have access to the results of the intelligence collection and processing effort. Sometimes it seems that there is a great flow of information into the national center, but it just disappears into a huge file cabinet and is lost. Intelligence must be disseminated to operational commanders if it is to be of any value. The task of balancing requirements of security in one hand and disseminating intelligence in the other is difficult, but it must be accomplished in a manner that gives operations personnel the tools they need to do the job. Intelligence

can be disseminated by personal contact, messages and documents. In IDAD operations, all those methods are used. Some of the more common types of intelligence documents we can expect to find include:

a. Area study - Describes in a general manner all conditions within an area focusing on geography, weather, economy, sociology, and insurgent organization and activities.

b. Estimate of the insurgent situation.

- (1) Mission
- (2) The area of operations
 - (a) Geography
 - (b) Politics
 - (c) Economy
 - (d) Sociology
 - (e) Psychology
- (3) The insurgent situation
 - (a) Organization and leadership
 - (b) Strength and disposition
 - (c) Recent and present significant actions
 - (d) Strengths and weaknesses
- (4) Insurgent capabilities
- (5) Conclusions
 - (a) Effects of operational environment
 - (b) Probable insurgent courses of action
 - (c) Insurgent vulnerabilities

c. Special studies relating to one or more aspects of the insurgency such as patterns of terrorist activity, or weapons produced by insurgent personnel.

Up to this point, I have covered briefly some of the doctrine or theory concerning the role of intelligence in IDAD operations. As we all know, however, unique problems and situations will arise in a real-life insurgency

for which no solution is readily apparent. It is obvious that the more information we can get about the organization, plans and capabilities of the insurgent, the easier it will be to defeat him. The insurgent is limited in his actions by physical limitations such as lack of money, food, equipment and adequate force. The other restrictions he faces are those he imposes on himself by whatever moral code he lives by. The government, on the other hand, is not limited so much by physical limitations as by ideals, morals, and of course, law. Methods to gain information such as torture, extortion, cruel and unusual punishment, have been declared illegal by the nations of the world and rightfully so. Yet even when the government is acting within the law, problems can develop. A government effort to penetrate an insurgent organization is probably a legitimate action to be taken. What happens though when the "new member" being brought into the organization is told to prove his loyalty by killing a local policeman or a very senior public official? In reality, the identity of the individual to be killed might affect the decision. Morally speaking, there is no difference. If the agent doesn't pass the "test" of his loyalty, he will possibly be killed by the insurgents. The point here is that the controlling authority must anticipate these kinds of problems and be ready to decide if the anticipated information gains are worth the cost before the penetration is attempted.

Another area that causes problems is that of actions taken by the insurgents against individuals suspected of being informants for the government. This places special requirements on the government to protect individuals who cooperate by observing strict security measure in its collection effort. By the same token, it must be remembered that the insurgents also look to the population to satisfy their intelligence requirements. For this reason, care must be taken not to discuss government plans and other sensitive information with individuals not having a need to know.

What happens when the insurgents are in an extremely isolated area, or where the population is unwilling to provide government personnel the information needed to locate and neutralize insurgent forces? I have noticed with considerable interest various programs ongoing in Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines wherein the governments are having some success in getting insurgents to voluntarily surrender under various amnesty agreements. If good information is in fact received from returnees, it should be acted on quickly before the insurgents take protective measures. One of the actions which can be taken to draw out the insurgents is to publicly announce or "leak information" that the returnees have been very cooperative in providing information about the insurgent force. Rumors that captured insurgents have cooperated in order to lessen expected punishment can also be started. Both of these actions are designed to provoke the insurgents into revealing their location or at least disrupting any plans they may have in process.

In summary, then, intelligence does play a 'key role' in IDAD operations and the degree of success the government can expect to enjoy in defeating the insurgent force is directly related to its ability to collect, process, and disseminate timely and accurate information to its operational forces. The intelligence effort is a continuous operation to expand and update the government's storehouse of knowledge. Through internal vigilance, and government-to-government cooperation, the insurgent force can be defeated thus leading to peace and prosperity.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

4 NOVEMBER 1980

"MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE ARMY IN INTERNAL DEFENSE
AND DEVELOPMENT"

COLONEL ADAM SALEH

INDONESIA

The Management and the Role of the Indonesian Army in the Internal Defence and Internal Development

The question of internal defence is at present very important and has become a topic in the developing countries, not only among those who have chosen the military profession as their career, but also among other people who, although outside the military establishment, have a great interest in matters concerning the country's security. This is something natural since the question of internal defence at the present time does not merely include the military field. Internal security is closely linked with matters of welfare, so that every sector of life plays a role either in security as well as in prosperity.

Security is the responsibility of the whole nation as it is the case with prosperity.

The Indonesian Army as a part of the Indonesian Armed Forces and as a part of the social force in social life bears an important role, not only in the field of defence and security but also in matters related to the nation's welfare. The fact at present indicates that the Indonesian Army constitutes a social force in the national political arena, so that its responsibility for the nation's safety, security, welfare and prosperity has become something unconditional.

So this presentation is arranged as follows:

- Introduction. The Indonesian Army as a defence and security force and as a social force.
- Internal defence.
- Internal development.
- The Indonesian Army's role in the field of security and development.
- Organization of the Indonesian Armed Forces' second function (as a social force) as a vehicle for its role in the field of welfare.
- Conclusions.

The objective of the defence and security strategy is to safeguard the country against all challenges, obstructions and threats, externally as well as internally, with all their forms and manifestations.

As a consequence of the pattern of totality, universally accepted nowadays, the security of the nation and the state is not solely the responsibility of the military but also of the whole nation.

This defence and security strategy in Indonesia has been transformed to a national defence and security doctrine which is implemented by applying the total people's defence and security system.

Concerning war, the Indonesian people take a stand that they love peace because they are aware of the fact that the use of force in solving disputes will always bring about disaster upon mankind. Yet as a peace loving nation they are very determined and definitely resolved to defend their country's independence and sovereignty against all forms of threats from whatever direction they come.

The most probable external and internal threats which can endanger the life of Indonesia and its people, in line with current trends in the world development, will take the form of:

- Disturbances of security and public order.
- Violations of the national territory.
- Terrors.
- Subversions and infiltrations.
- Armed rebellions.
- Limited armed attacks.

The total people's defence and security system is somewhat distinct from that of other countries, because for Indonesia this system has been considered as a powerful defence against either an external enemy or an internal challenge. This defence capacity mainly relies on the strength of the Indonesian people themselves and does not depend on any foreign power whatsoever.

Therefore the adopted strategy must be able to shape a defence power capable of making a bold stand against threats of war from abroad and security disturbances within the country itself. External threats will be met by operations on the basis of a defence operation pattern, whereas internal disturbances will be overcome by applying an internal security operations pattern.

Based on the above described systematics and eventual threats we will have to encounter and by looking back to past experiences, various patterns for the application of the total people's defence and security system have been adopted, namely a total people's defence which is based on the principle of "islands of resistance," in which every "wehrkreigse" constitutes an "island of resistance" in the relative sense, capable of conducting a prolonged and stretched out resistance by applying the strength and the potency available in the "island" until victory is achieved. By applying this principle of "islands of resistance" it will be impossible for the enemy to control all islands. This principle is the essence of the total people's defence.

The above mentioned pattern must be viewed from the eventuality of open armed attacks or invasions from abroad, either directly or indirectly through third parties (war by proxy). To encounter such attacks or invasions, operations are conducted on the basis of the defence operations pattern which is broken down into the following phases:

- To destroy or cripple the enemy during its advance to the target.
- To destroy or cripple the enemy at the threshold of the Indonesian territorial waters and aerial territory.
- To destroy or cripple the enemy after it enters the Indonesian territorial waters and aerial territory.
- To destroy or cripple the enemy after it succeeds in launching landing operations in Indonesian territory.
- To destroy or cripple the enemy in case it succeeds in occupying partly or entirely the Indonesian land territory by launching decisive counterattacks. If these counterattacks fail, then resistance operations will be carried out until victory is achieved.

As it is already known, the Indonesian Armed Forces as a defence and security force consist of:

- The armed services (Army-Navy-Air Force) with a small standing force and a sufficient reserve force capable of encountering external as well as internal threats which endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia.
- The police which is capable of executing its tasks and duties in maintaining public order, safeguarding and saving human lives and properties, and enforcing the law.

In situations when disturbances of security and public order are still within certain limits, it is expected that the police will be able to cope with them. If the situation worsens, in which the police is not able to cope with and the stability of security becomes threatened, then the armed services will be required to assist. The next probable forms of threats are infiltrations, subversions and rebellions which can bring about problems relating to the internal security of the country. In coping with such situations, operations will be launched on the basis of an internal security operations pattern as follows:

- Combat operations.
- Territorial operations.
- Intelligence operations.
- Operations for maintaining security and public order.

The operation launched within the framework of the defence operations pattern as well as the internal security operations pattern reflect the adopted tactics and strategy which contain several types of operations forged together, such as intelligence operations, territorial operations, operations in maintaining security and public order and combat operations. In each type of operation the technological weapon system as well as the social weapon system is applied harmoniously and thus reflecting the aspect of totality of the total people's defence and security system.

Speaking of the question of internal security, we have observed that the eventual challenger concerned in creating internal security problems will resort to any form of activity in exploiting all the weaknesses and vulnerabilities existing within the country. Therefore the initial preventive measure to be taken is to prevent the occurrence of any problem on which basis the enemy will be able to exploit existing weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the country. This means that in the first instance, efforts must be made in maintaining the functioning of a good and efficient government. However, as we all know, there are always weaknesses and gaps within the government apparatus of every developing country, brought about by the system applied as well as the men managing the apparatus. In exploiting these weaknesses and vulnerabilities the enemy usually attempts to instigate public dissatisfaction which may develop into disturbances of public order in the forms of increasing criminality, which may give the impression that the government authority is not functioning as it should. Such disturbances of public order are normally faced by the police apparatus through the enforcement of law. If such disturbances are continually increasing in intensity, then security operations will be applied in order to normalize security and public order. These security and public order operations are aimed at bringing back security and public order to a normal degree.

In facing an armed rebellion, which is using one or several regions as a base, political solution will be issued initially to isolate the rebel leaders from the people. If such rebellion involves part of the people or population, then intelligence, combat and territorial operations will be conducted.

The intelligence operations are mainly of psychological nature with the objective of winning the support of the people. In the course of these operations the elements forming the nucleus of the rebellion must be identified and secluded from the people/population, while at the same time efforts are being made to strengthen the national unity.

Combat operations are aimed at crushing or forcing the armed elements of the rebellion to surrender, and at destroying targets identified through intelligence operations.

The territorial operations must be able to cut off the people/population from the rebels, and to win over the people to assist our operations. All these need to be carried out conscientiously, patiently and with understanding toward the people. The social weapon system is applied as best as possible to achieve above mentioned objectives.

Internal development is in essence a process of continuous changes, in reflecting progress and improvement toward a desired goal.

The goals of development have always been the same, namely:

- To raise the standard of living and welfare of the people.

- To lay a firm foundation as a base for the next stages of development.

Within the scheme of this dual goal each stage of development is directed toward the raising of the people's welfare in every respect, physically and mentally, while at the same time preparations are being made for the next development stage.

The current national development of Indonesia is the development of the Indonesian human being in his entirety and the development of the whole Indonesian nation and country. This implies the following:

- There is harmony, balance and unimpaired roundness in all development efforts and activities, based on the principle that development is for the sake of the human being, not the reverse of it, i.e., the human being for the sake of development.

- The development is distributed evenly, covering the entire Indonesian nation and throughout the whole country.

- The goal is to develop the Indonesian man and society, and thus the development must reflect the Indonesian personality and identity, producing progressive human beings and a modern society which remain Indonesian in all respects.

Thus development does not merely strive after bodily or worldly progress such as food, clothing, housing, etc., but rather harmony, balance and unimpaired roundness in all aspects of development.

The political development is directed toward the desired national goal in line with the aspirations of the Indonesian nation, namely:

To protect the whole of the Indonesian nation and the whole of the Indonesian fatherland, to promote and raise the general welfare, to improve the education of the people, and to partake in maintaining world order on the basis of the principle of freedom/independence, everlasting peace and social justice.

In developing the political field political stability must be attained as a condition for the smooth running of the overall development. The program of political development includes the education of the people in order that the people obtained the sense of democracy and the sense of being a state's subject.

The economic development implies that the resources of the country, potentially as well as actually, constitute common capital and common possession. A harmonious and balanced economic unity must be created throughout the whole country.

The social and cultural development implies the development of the whole culture. Indonesian culture is in essence one culture, although expressed in various manners and styles.

The development in the field of defence and security implies the stabilization and consolidation of the total people's defence and security system which is capable of encountering all kind of challenges as well as obstructions to the national development.

The question of prosperity is inseparable from the question of security. Both of it will be found at any moment of the national life of every nation. Both are two matters which are distinguishable but unseparable from each other. Efforts pertaining to prosperity need a certain degree of security, on the other hand efforts in the field of security also need a certain degree of prosperity. Both must be developed in a harmonious and well balanced manner. In actual life national welfare and national security constitute one image, namely the national resilience. This implies that the application of the national resilience will reflect the picture of prosperity and all at once the picture of security. This implies that national resilience is in essence a method of arranging and applying prosperity and security in national life.

The welfare to be attained in realizing the national resilience can be described as the ability and capability of the nation in developing its national resources and transforming them into the greatest possible prosperity, a just and well distributed prosperity, spiritually and materially. Whereas the security which is needed in realizing the national resilience constitutes the ability, capability and capacity of the nation in safeguarding and protecting the national resources against external as well as internal threats. The arrangement and the application of national welfare put to use the ideological, political, economic, social-cultural and military aspects as it is the case with national security. Scientific aspects such as geography, natural resources and the people's capability have an impact upon welfare as well as upon security. Ideology and politics play the same role in welfare and security. Economics and social-cultural matters play a big role in welfare but must also be arranged to have a role in security. The military and defence and security aspects play a big role in security but should also play a role in welfare. In order to attain the desired national resilience, the realization of the welfare and the security of each aspect mentioned above must be appraised quantitatively and qualitatively.

The Indonesian Army as a defence and security force is a government instrument with the main responsibility to defend and to safeguard the state and the nation along with all the interests against threats and disturbances, externally as well as internally. This main responsibility laid on the shoulders of the Indonesian Army embraces:

- To intensify territorial activities in guiding, directing and developing the regions throughout the whole country so as to establish a stable and consolidated territorial condition.

- To raise the regional striking capability, including the capability in providing supplies and in maintaining the required condition within the regions.

- To raise the intelligence capability at all command levels, so that the intelligence will be able to sense forthcoming eventualities, to delay, hinder, localize and neutralize every disturbance and threat.

- To develop and to raise a centralized striking force with a high combat capability/capacity, preparedness and a great mobility.

- To develop a reserved force, organized into reserve units to increase the capacity of territorial defence as well as centralized defence.

This main responsibility borne by the Indonesian Army constitutes at the same time the Indonesian Army's role in national defence and internal security, which can be summed up as follows:

As an armed service, a unit or a soldier the Indonesian Army's attitude, posture and behavior must have the effect of protecting any part of the country, wherever it is performing its duty. Either strategically or tactically any backward part of the country should not be neglected or sacrificed. Thus the Indonesian Army must be guided, directed, and developed as such so as to enable it to attain an operational capability and preparedness in conformity with the targets and objectives fixed in the total people's defence and security.

Being a social force, the Indonesian Army is entitled and has obligation to devote, body and soul, not only to the defence and security of the country and the people, but also to the nation's welfare. This devotion or servitude which contains national security aspects as well as aspects relating to welfare is generally called "kekayaan tni-ad," broadly meaning "the devotion/servitude of the Indonesian Army toward the country in matters related to the social and political condition."

Basically the Indonesian Army's role as a social force is as follows:

- To partake in determining the direction and the course to be adopted by the state, and the directing and checking of certain national politics and national strategy which are considered important.

- To act as pioneer, stabilizer and motor/activator in maintaining and steadying the national stability in all fields.

- To participate in the national development, particularly in accelerating the economic growth within the scheme of distribution of development results so as to realize social justice.

In acquitting itself of its role as a social force the Indonesian Army has always based itself on the principles that govern its second function as a social force, to bear, together with the other social forces, the responsibility for the nation's struggle. Consequently the members of the Indonesian Army in implementing its role in non-military and non-security field have always been governed by the spirit and the enthusiasm of their devotion and servitude.

In performing its function as a social force, the Indonesian Army has always applied an approach while paying attention to the aspects of security and of welfare. Every problem it has encountered has been handled by applying such approach, meaning that every problem has been solved while giving attention to both aspects all at once. In striving for its aspirations and concepts the Indonesian Army puts to use the existing constitutional channels, i.e., the legislative institutions, where decisions are made on the basis of consultations and consensus, without resorting to pressures or coercions based on strength or power. In striving for its concepts the Indonesian Army has adopted the way of persuasion by approaching other social/political groupings.

In implementing its second function the Indonesian Army is governed by the following directives:

- To safeguard and to put into practice the Indonesian philosophy and the 1945 constitution as the idealistic and spiritual basis for defending and giving substance to the independence of Indonesia.

- To give priority to and to carry into effect the national development in conformity with the broad outlines of the state's course.

- To maintain and develop national unity and national oneness, and to maintain and develop an orderly dynamic national stability for the sake of a successful national development.

- To canalize the people's opinions and aspirations within the framework of problem identification and the realization of democracy.

- To carry into effect social communications between the Army and the people and other social forces so as to realize mutual understanding, loyalty, cooperation and integration.

- To assign members of the Indonesian Army to fields outside the military establishment according to the following considerations:

- To place the emphasis on the aspects of prosperity without neglecting the factor of security.

- Based on the acts and laws in force.

- Based on requests from the institutions/agencies for assignment of Indonesian Army members.

In organizing the second function of the Indonesian Armed Forces the following basic factors have been observed:

- The aim of the second function of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

- The dual function, giving the Indonesian Armed Forces two roles at the same time, namely being a defence and security force and a social force. As a consequence of these roles the organization must have the following characteristics:

- Roundness in the entire organization.
- Flexibility in adapting to the political and the national defence and security system.
- Effectiveness and efficiency.
- The situation and condition of environment/millieu which consist of:
 - The environment/millieu of living of the Indonesian Armed Forces;
 - The environment/millieu of living of the institutions/agencies to which members of the Indonesian Armed Forces will be assigned.
 - The national environment of living.

As already known, there are within the Department of Defence and Security under the minister three chiefs of staff; i.e., chief of staff for operations, chief of staff of administration, and chief of staff for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces.

The minister in addition to his function as minister of defence and security and as commander of the armed forces is also functioning as chairman of the central board for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces, in which he is assisted by:

- Chief of staff for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces.
- Assistant for social & political affairs.
- Assistant for matters pertaining to armed forces personnel with non-military assignments.
- Committee for guiding and directing the implementation of the second function of the armed forces.

Hierarchically the structure and the organization are as follows:

- At the central level there is the central board for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces, composed of:

- Chairman - Minister of defence & security/commander of the armed forces.
- Vice Chairman - Deputy commander of the armed forces.

- Members:
 - The chiefs of staff of the services and chief of police.
 - Chief of staff (Dept of Defence & Security) for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces.
 - Other functionaries assigned by the minister of defence & security.
- Secretary
 - Assistant for social & political affairs, Dept of Defence & Security.
- Staff
 - The staff of the chief of staff for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces.

Within the framework of guiding and directing the implementation of the second function of the armed forces the central board has the following functions:

- To formulate policies.
- To put into effect the participation of the services and the police.
- To direct the activities of the region boards and the area boards.

At region level there is the region board for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces composed of:

- Chairman
 - Commandant of the defence region command.
- Vice Chairman
 - Deputy commandant of the defence region command.
- Member
 - Functionaries in the region appointed by the minister.
- Secretary
 - Staff coordinator for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces in the region.
- Staff
 - Staff for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces in the region.

The region board has the following functions:

- To coordinate and to direct the area boards in their respective jurisdictions.

- To give technical guidance to the area boards in their respective jurisdictions.

At area level (in the provinces) there is the area board composed of:

- Chairman - Commandant of the military area command.
- Members - Chief of the police of the area.
 - Navy and Air Force functionaries in the area appointed by the minister of defence & security.
 - Other functionaries in the area appointed by the minister of defence & security.
- Secretary - Staff coordinator for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces in the area.
- Staff - Staff for matters pertaining to the second function of the armed forces in the area.

The area board has the following functions:

- To execute the central board policies.

- To guide and direct activities in the area related to the second function of the armed forces.

In addition to the above mentioned organizations, coordinating officers are appointed, according to need, in every institution/agency where members of the armed forces are assigned, at central level as well as area level.

These coordinating officers, either at central level or area level, have the following functions:

- To guide and direct social-political matters in their respective environs.

- To coordinate, guide and direct activities relating to the second function of the armed forces within their respective environs.

- To assist in the guiding and directing of the activities related to the second function of the armed forces within their respective environs.

In executing his duty the coordinating officer at central level as well as area level is responsible to and shall only communicate with the next higher organization in hierarchy.

- The control of the implementation of the second function of the armed forces is centralized with the minister of defence & security/commander of the armed forces.

- The services and the police assist the minister of defence & security/commander of the armed forces in guiding and directing the armed forces as a social force and in guiding and directing social-political matters within their respective environs.

- At regional level and area level the minister of defence & security/commander of the armed forces designates other organizations which assist him in the supervision, coordination and execution of the second function of the armed forces.

- To maintain elasticity in facing eventual changes in situation and condition, committees and task forces may be formed according to the requirements of the task to be carried out for a limited period of time.

AD-A110 596

ARMY WESTERN COMMAND, FORT SHAFTER HI
PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR IV, HELD AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, ---ETC(U)
NOV 80

F/G 15/7

UNCLASSIFIED

SBI-AD-E750 178


NL

2-2

AT 0296



END
DATE
FILMED
3 82
DTIC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NBS 1963-A

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

5 NOVEMBER 1980

"COUNTERINFILTRATION TRAINING AND COASTAL SECURITY"

COLONEL NAM HYUNG WOOK

KOREA

COUNTER-INFILTRATION TRAINING AND COASTAL SECURITY

As everyone knows, we Koreans have had a long history and tradition of about 4,300 years with a single-race nation. However, we were destined by World War II to be separated into south and north, each with different political ideologies: democracy and communism. In 1950, the North Korea communist regime, fully backed by the Soviet Union, launched its invasion into the Republic of Korea. The Korean war lasted for 3 years and open combat ended with a military demarkation line that was formed according to the armistice agreement. Since that time, two big military powers have remained deployed along the truce line.

Let's look briefly at the reality of North Korea (NK). The Chief of NK, Kim Il Sung, has during his 30-year management of the northern half of this nation set up his own dictatorial government. The type of dictatorial power is the most extreme both within and outside the communist bloc. The style of his political methods show that he doesn't care about the welfare of the NK people. He has made intense efforts to complete the unification of Korea according to his basic strategy that is to communize the south through a popular revolution or other violent means rather than pursue peaceful unification methods. For this single purpose, he has been reinforcing military strength in every possible way, and he is still persistently looking forward to a golden chance to invade the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The ROK, however, has tried to maintain minimum strength to deter and retaliate for NK's provocations on the one hand and, on the other, has tried to build an economically sound republic. The following statistics provide good evidence of this.

In terms of the size of the territory, there is not any big difference, but the population of the ROK is 38 million, while that of the NK is 18 million. In 1979, the GNP and per capital income of the ROK were \$61 billion and \$1,624 respectively; while those of NK were \$12.5 billion and \$719 respectively. However, in terms of military strength, NK has 720,000 standing forces; while we have 620,000. The proportion of military expenses is 5.3% of GNP for the ROK; while that of NK is 20%. The burden of defense expenses for each person is \$86 for the ROK; while that of NK is \$150. These statistics clearly show to what extent the NK communist regime is concerned about strengthening its military power.

One of the striking aspects in NK's military forces is that they have highly trained unconventional warfare units. When a war breaks out, they plan, with these units, to wage an unconventional warfare by infiltrating wide rear areas of the south through land, sea, and air for the purpose of making the whole territory a battleground and paralyzing such elements as command, communication, combat, and combat support. Their basic strategy is the so-called "quick ending strategy." For this strategy, they plan to make the maximum use of the unconventional warfare units, because these units are most suitable for causing chaos in politics, economics, and in society as well as for making helpless the military forces of the ROK.

During peacetime, on the other hand, North Korean communists conduct espionage and infiltrate guerrillas of small size in every possible clandestine way to detect our secrets and to inflict social chaos. However, we have always been successful in smashing their provocations with our forceful and thorough defensive measures.

Today, many Asian countries are exposed to the direct and indirect threats of the communists. Considering the situation of Asia, I am going to introduce and discuss our basic peacetime counter-infiltration operation efforts with my humble hope that it would be of some help for our friendly nations of Asia in defending their nations from the communists' threat.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA


First of all, I'd like to talk about the unconventional warfare threat from NK as evaluated by our armed forces and UN forces in Korea.

NK UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ORGANIZATION

For both peacetime and wartime operations, the North Korean organization is as indicated by the chart at Figure 1.

Among these units, the "X" marked ones are for the war and peacetime spy activities and the others are for the wartime guerrilla war. According to recent reliable information, they have the so-called "peony" platoon in their sniper brigade. This platoon is composed of girls, all in their twenties. It is estimated that these girls are sent south to the rear areas of the ROK for collecting secret information or assassinating important persons while working in coffee shops or acting as "kiseng," or as maids in the nearby restaurants of military troops or in high government officials' houses. In addition, we have other reliable information that the North Korean communists also have "gangster platoons" composed of prisoners.

These unconventional warfare units are equipped with light arms and weapons suitable for special warfare. The members are very strong in their physical conditioning as well as in their loyalty to the communist party. They are outstanding in their martial and warfare techniques. Their philosophy of life and death is well expressed in their motto: "Glory in Life or Even in Death." It is also estimated that they maintain a high level of marching and swimming capability for infiltration by water and land. Besides, it is reported that for the last several years they have reinforced their training skills for city warfare, the surprise attack of special objectives and for the destruction of important strategic targets. For these purposes, they have constructed a combined special training ground which has mockups of major targets in the Seoul area.



NK CONCEPT OF EMPLOYING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCES

Those guerrillas sent south for peacetime unconventional warfare are under strict control of such departments as liaison, investigation, national politics and security, and reconnaissance. All the members of these different departments are also supervised by the Secretary for South Korea Activities Agency in the Workers' Party.

Normally, those guerrillas infiltrate through land and sea, and their missions are strategic and military scouting, detecting secrets, disturbing rear areas, and fanning underground activities.

The 8th Special Corps, light infantry brigades and light infantry battalions are expected to be utilized in actual war. It seems that North Korean communists are developing their own war tactics in which large units are used strategically and small units are used tactically. Another aspect of this is that regular and unconventional warfare tactics are intricately combined for a greater effect.

In addition, North Korean communists sometimes dispatch their guerrilla warfare instructors to third world nations mainly in Africa, or they sometimes invite trainees of the third world nations into NK. In this way, they are arousing international troubles.

NK TRANSPORT AVAILABLE FOR INFILTRATION

With this operational concept in mind, I'd like to look at North Korean communists' capability to dispatch their unconventional warfare units into the rear areas of the ROK.

- Ground Infiltration Capability. A total of 40,000 irregular warfare forces from light infantry brigades, sniper brigades, and light infantry battalions are expected to infiltrate by land. Surprisingly enough, the north communists started in 1972, digging about ten secret underground tunnels, 1.5-4 kilometers long, to sneak by the heavily defended truce line. Among these tunnels, three have already been discovered and blocked by our forces. It is estimated that one underground tunnel has the capacity to pass through 3,000 armed troops in an hour.

- Sea Transportation Capability. For the purpose of infiltration by sea, the north communists now have about 170 high speed landing ships, small and medium-sized submarines and espionage ships. These 170 ships have the capacity to carry 7,300 personnel at one time. If they use available fishing ships, they can carry 7,300 additional personnel.

- Air Transportation Capability. Using air transportation, they have roughly 300 airplanes including the twin-winged low speed and altitude AN-2, and various kinds of helicopters. These 300 planes have the capacity to transport 4,500 armed troops simultaneously. In addition, they also have balloons and gliders for air infiltration.

INSTANCES OF NK INFILTRATION TO THE SOUTH

So far, we have looked at NK's attempts and capabilities for unconventional warfare. In order to help your understanding of north communists' infiltration strategy and method, I'd like to tell you more about the typical cases of their infiltration.

Since 1953, the North Korean regime has been charged with no less than 1,600 cases of armistice agreement violations with various kinds of attempts to infiltrate spies and guerrillas into the south. Among these violations, I selected two typical cases of guerrilla infiltration made 10 years ago and two more cases from this year. I will tell you about these four cases very briefly as I must finish my topic within the limited time.

21 JANUARY INCIDENT

On 21 January 1968, Kim Il-Sung sent south a team of 31 guerrillas with the specific mission of raiding the presidential mansion in Seoul and killing the late President Park Chung Hee. This team penetrated the heavily defended truce line with ease. However, they were stopped only a few spaces from their target, but not before five civilians and one police officer were killed. With the South Korean police and armed forces reacting quickly, they were driven to the hills where all, except one, were eventually killed during a 2-week mopup operation.

These guerrillas belonged to the 124 Special Forces Unit under the Bureau of Reconnaissance, the Ministry of People's Armed Forces. They went through animal-like guerrilla training for quite a long time.

The lessons we got from this inhumane incident are as follows. The first one I'd like to point out to you is north communists' cruelty. Their attempts were absurd to the point of penetrating, with one ground guerrilla team, the strong guard of the presidential mansion without considering any return plan for the team. In other words, their attempt was nothing less than sending the team to the jaws of death.

The second one I'd like to point out to you can be found in the guerrillas' astounding capability in physical strength and the communists' cruel method of indoctrination. The guerrilla team infiltrated our strict guard without being caught and took precipitous mountain routes with formidable speed, and all that in the dark! Even though they knew that they were helplessly surrounded by our mop-up operations teams in the hills, they resisted to the last moment until all, except one, were eventually killed. This doesn't mean that the last one surrendered wisely. He also fought to the last minute until caught alive.

UL-JIN, SAM-CHUCK INCIDENT

On 30 October 1968, the North Korean regime sent eight teams of 120 guerrillas by sea to Ul-Jin and Sam-Chuck areas of the east coast with the purpose of building guerrilla strongholds and initiating irregular warfare in the mountain areas of the central south.

At first, our coast guards of those areas failed in mopping up the guerrillas before landing. So all the guerrillas succeeded in landing and deploying among the rough mountain areas. After that, the guerrillas threatened those peasants in the mountain areas to join the communist party, or sometimes they took every possible measure to win those peasants over for cooperation by use of their counterfeit bank notes. When they found their efforts useless at last, they resorted to every possible means of cruelty, killing men and women, the young as well as the old. They were cruel to such an extent that they stoned to death one grammar school child who was crying, "I don't like communism for the life of me!" However, some of the residents of the mountain areas escaped at the peril of their life and reported to the police. It took roughly 2 months to sweep out those guerrillas. As for the south, the incident has led to a better awareness of Korea's necessity of reinforcing coast guards and effective counter-infiltration measures for vulnerable mountain areas.

INFILTRATION OF THE THREE SPIES THROUGH THE HAN RIVER ESTUARY

At daybreak of 23 March this year, three spies belonging to the Department of Liaison of the Workers' Party, infiltrated by water into the estuary of the Han River. All of them were shot dead by our guards while attempting to land in the dark.

Especially on the Korean west coast, there is a big difference between the rise and fall of the tide. Making the most use of this tidal current, the spy can easily approach the west outskirts of Seoul through the Han River. For this reason, our guards are on strict watch against the enemy's infiltrations around the clock along the banks of the Han River, using various kinds of obstacles as well.

At daybreak of 23 March this year, two privates who were on duty at one of these guard posts, located the three approaching spies. However, those privates had the calmness to wait until the spies approached within the range of 27 meters. Then, they opened fire. Two spies were shot dead on the spot, and the other running was also killed by the shots of the next guard post.

Looking back over this incident, we can come to the conclusion that our complete success was possible because of our private guards' outstanding loyalty, bravery, and self-composure in carrying out their mission.

SPY BOAT INFILTRATION INTO THE WEST COAST

On 20 June this year, the North Korean communists attempted to send a group of their guerrillas through the west coast. Around 1700 that afternoon, one of our private guards on the west coast line located one fishing boat-like vessel of 5 tons or so approaching 600 meters in front of the guard post. The guard sent a pre-arranged signal with a flag, but there was no answer from the vessel. Instead, knowing that it was detected, the boat kept on moving to the north. So the guards opened machinegun fire at the communists, but the vessel sped away into the high seas firing back. As soon as it was identified as an enemy vessel, the Air Force and the Navy initiated a combined operation of 10 hours or so. At dawn, the enemy vessel was sunk. In this combined operation, nine enemy personnel were killed and one captured.

The interrogation of the captive revealed that the North Korean regime planned to infiltrate three spies belonging to the Bureau of Reconnaissance, the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, through the Korean west coast. For this purpose, they left Hae-Ju port of North Korea which is located near the truce line on 18 June 1980. Around 2000 the next evening, they moved from the mother ship to the fishing boat-type vessel on the high seas, some 100 miles west of Dae-Chun port. There were ten people on board, and they were detected and destroyed by our forces during their infiltration, as I mentioned above.

In conclusion, we have successfully set back the communists' infiltration scheme by a strong sense of responsibility of the private guard as well as by the elaborate combined operations of the Navy and Air Force.

As the above examples clearly show, the North Korean communists have tried to send their guerrillas and spy agents into south by every possible means of infiltration scheme. However, everytime they tried their infiltration schemes, they were checked and smashed by our strong sense of anti-communism, our successful mopping-up operations of the police and armed forces, as well as by the willing cooperation of our people. Moreover, their frequent provocations have brought about the result of instilling a strong sense of anti-communism into the hearts of our people.

ROK COUNTER-INFILTRATION OPERATIONS

As mentioned above, the Republic of Korea stands face-to-face with NK on both sides of the truce line. Under the threat of the possible unconventional war by the belligerent NK, we are planning positive counter-infiltration measures to overcome the enemy threat and to maintain national security both for peace and wartime. Of these two, I will discuss the counter-infiltration operations performed during peacetime, omitting wartime operations.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Counter-infiltration operations are those which we carry out by combining the armed forces and other elements to block, capture, and destroy the enemy guerrilla or agent infiltrating through land, sea, and air. The general concepts of the operations are as follows:

- Detect the infiltration enemy in the early stages and check and destroy them before they cross the DMZ or the coast line.
- Isolate the enemy shortly after the infiltration and mop up.
- Eliminate social or geographical vulnerabilities. With these concepts, we should block their insidious activities against the south.

SYSTEM OF COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION

For the maintenance of the counter-infiltration operations, available elements such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, and homeland reserve forces should be combined. It is important to unify the chain of commands in order to concentrate the fighting capability and to harmonize mutual support. Thus, we keep the system of command and coordination (Figure 2).

The major role of the Central Defense Committee is to coordinate all the operations of the armed forces, the government and the civilians for CI operations. It is also responsible for the cooperation between the central government and towns and villages. The CI operation should be conducted in such a way as to prepare for the mobilization of the nation's whole efforts for total war. Particular emphasis is laid on the people's participating spirit and especially on their reporting of the suspects. For this reason, the Defense Committee continues to educate the people and thus gives no place for the enemy to settle in our country.


The CI Operations Center supervises the performances of all the operational procedures. With the overall analysis of this, it works out countermeasures to make recommendations to the Central Defense Committee. For this, it cooperates and controls the operations of the related government agencies.

The elements of the operation under the above system include:

- Armed Forces: The Army, Navy, Air Force.
- The Police: The general police, combat police, marine police.
- The Homeland Reserve Forces.
- Additional elements:
 - Related governmental and local administration officials.
 - Related personnel of business groups and their self-defense guards.

EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS

Counter-Land Infiltration Operation. This is performed around the armistice line area to check and to destroy the enemy that infiltrates through the truce line. The deployment of the main Army troops along the line and combined measures of various means provide for the nearly perfect blocking of the enemy. To help your understanding, I will give you some explanation of the present deployment of the enemy and the friendly forces along the truce line. The area within the boundaries of 2 km to the south and to the north from demarkation line is the demilitarized zone. Both sides maintain the same number of guard posts. Just beneath the southern limit line, an iron wire fence and various kinds of obstacles are laid along the whole front line to block the enemy agents and guerrillas. Beneath them are deployed the guard units that maintain around the



clock vigilance performing ambush, reconnaissance and using detection equipment and every possible means. Besides these, infiltration-tunnel detecting operations have been carried on for some years using up-to-date scientific technology. We have also made countermeasures against the possible infiltration of enemy units, to prepare for the situation when a tunnel is not detected.

Counter-Sea Infiltration Operation. The Korean peninsula is surrounded by sea on three sides, and it has a long indented coastline that makes it difficult to block the enemy's infiltration by the sea. To cope with this difficulty, we are performing the following operations along the whole coastline.

-- Keeping the strict guard on the sea. The Navy and Marine Police reinforce patrol activities to destroy the infiltrating enemy in the early stages on the sea.

-- Coastline operation. To destroy the enemy before they land, coastline guard posts of the military, the police, and the homeland reserve forces are maintained. Obstacles, detecting equipment, including radar, and firepower plans are maintained, too.

-- Seaport. The control of the entry into and departure from the ports is strengthened to deny infiltration under the mask of legality. Coastal check points are maintained.

-- Combined operations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are always maintained in a ready status.

- **Counter-Air Infiltration Operation.** This operation is for blocking and destroying the enemy that tries to infiltrate into the rear area of the south by using airplanes, gliders, and balloons. This method has not yet been tried by the enemy, but considering their capability, we can judge that this would be adopted when the enemy thinks it necessary. And so we prepare the following positive measures:

-- Air surveillance.

-- Employment of air defense weapons.

-- Countermeasures against possible air landing sites.

Deployment of the forces, employment of mobile strike forces.

Laying the obstacles such as balloons, wires, cables, barricades, explosives.

Besides these, our anti-communist agency works to detect infiltration through the international airport by way of the other countries disguising as lawful entrance.

- Inland Area Operation. Inland area mopup operations are performed when the enemy infiltration is not blocked in the early stages at the coastline or the truce line. These operations should be carried out according to the following points:

-- Information and cooperation provided by the people are essential elements from the detection of the suspects till the operation is completed. For this, thorough education of the people is necessary.

-- Self-defense activities of the villages and towns including the homeland reserve forces and other organizations should be beefed up.

-- Positive and effective self-defense capability should be carried out around the important facilities.

-- All possible elements for military operations should be combined for to form an encircling net. During the night, ambush patrols should be employed, and during the daytime, coordinated patrols on the ground and air should be carried out. With these, inspection and search should be reinforced.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

5 NOVEMBER 1980

"THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE"

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NG JUI PING

SINGAPORE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE

Following its defeat in a rural-based guerrilla insurgency in the Malayan peninsula in the early fifties, the Communist Party of Malaya (which also operates in the Republic of Singapore) decided to revert to political insurgency. This move was envisaged to lead to a city insurrection patterned after the Bolshevik revolution in Soviet Russia. Singapore, because of its large and politically-conscious urban population, became the natural arena for the Communists to try out their strategy. A powerful and energetic Communist United Front movement soon emerged on the island and almost held the reins in the political development of the country until it was destroyed by the popularly-elected Government in the sixties.

The Communists adopted a typical modus operandi. They attempted to create public unrest and disrupt law and order so as to undermine government control. As the champions of popular causes and through their control of tightly-disciplined organizations, they hoped that, in the chaos that followed, they would emerge as the strongest contender for power. To incite the masses, the Communists exploited firstly, the struggle against colonialism and the fight to attain internal self-government and later independence, and secondly, the issue of Chinese language, education and culture. These issues were all the more contentious since they provided the people the rallying point for their frustration and general discontent which arose because of unemployment and poor living conditions.

This presentation will deal with the Communist efforts to exploit these issues and whip up agitation against the Government through the Chinese schools, the labor movement and later, the political parties. Then, we will examine the means by which the Government of Singapore effectively defeated the Communist political insurgency and the efforts made to prevent it from resurfacing.

COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF CHINESE MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS

The student movement was the ignition point of all Communist activities during the whole history of the Communist United Front in Singapore. It was therefore fitting that the first salvo was fired by students at the British colonial administration. In May 1954 under the pretext of opposing National Service conscription, the Communists mobilized the Chinese middle school students in Singapore against the Government. Young students were manipulated into open clashes with the police and later into prolonged sit-in strikes in the schools. The student agitation was later called off as suddenly as it had first erupted. This was because the Communists perceived that its primary objective of mobilizing the student movement had been achieved. The strategy was to consolidate their gains and prevent unnecessary sacrifices.

The May 1954 student incident, though hardly a success, is of considerable significance historically. It was the first time that students organized themselves (under Communist direction, of course) to demonstrate against the Government. It did much to awaken students' political consciousness and solidarity and indirectly strengthened the position of their leaders. It also aroused the feelings of the Chinese public especially the large number of chauvinists, who were sensitive about any interruption of the process of education in the Chinese schools. Their sympathy was strengthened by the alleged use of violence by the police against school children.

Following their initial success, the Communists began to infiltrate Chinese-language schools effectively. They exploited the emotive issues of Chinese education and culture, and penetrated not only the classrooms but also alumni and teachers' organizations. This led to a public proposal in October 1954 to form a centralized student body called the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union (SCMSSU). Its registration was officially approved in October 1955 with the condition that it would not participate in any political or labor activities. The Preparatory Committee of the SCMSSU had earlier been admonished by the Communists for short-sightedness in its initial objection to this prohibition. They were instructed to accept the condition as otherwise public opinion would not be in the students' favor and registration of the SCMSSU would be delayed. Soon after the SCMSSU was registered in October 1955, the Union began to attack the conditions which they had just accepted. This shows the hidden hand of the Communists and the methods they adopted for political expediency.

COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF LABOR

Exploiting what initially appeared to be a minor industrial dispute between a bus company and its workers, the Communists succeeded in thrusting themselves into the labor movement. Striking workers of the Hock Lee bus company augmented by students and other communist sympathizers repeatedly blocked buses from being driven out by non-striking employees. Police, acting on judicial orders to clear the pickets, was confronted by the militant workers hurling stones and bricks. The Communist-instigated mobs of students and workers eventually rioted on 12 May 1955. Burning vehicles, bloodstains and bodies marked the sites of hit-and-run attacks. Four people were killed, including a 16-year old student, who need not have died. But the Communists wanted a martyr to dramatize their cause and to inflame public feelings. So, when the student was found injured after police opened fire on a mob attacking them, the rioters paraded him round the area instead of rushing him to the near-by hospital; he died soon after admission through excessive loss of blood. At his funeral 2 days later, his death was portrayed as the result of police brutality.

Following the gains made out the Hock Lee bus riots, the Communists quickly infiltrated labor unions, and fomented or exploited industrial action in support of political objectives. A case in point was that of the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union (SFSWU) which later spearheaded the Communist-directed anti-colonial struggle. The SFSWU with an initial strength of 200 in April 1954, hit the 30,000 membership mark within a matter of 10 months after the Communists seized control of it. Widespread strikes and industrial disputes crippled government administration, trade and commerce. In 1955 alone, 275 strikes were called which resulted in a loss of 946,000 man-days.

In September/October 1956, the Government took a series of drastic security actions against the Communist United Front organization and personalities. The Communists mobilized their CUF machinery and formed a Civil Rights Convention in protest against Government actions. Students soon joined the fray. Eventually widespread rioting broke out in Singapore which lasted about 5 days (from 25 to 30 Oct 56). Curfew had to be imposed. The riots resulted in about 950 persons arrested, 13 deaths, about 130 injured, about 30 vehicles burnt and another 100 damaged.

COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Soon after the election victory of the People's Action Party (PAP)* in June 1959, a number of pro-Communist labor leaders detained earlier by the previous Government were released from detention. They immediately rejoined the labor movement and steadily consolidated their hold on the labor unions. The Communists also beavered their way into numerous branch committees of the PAP. There was a steady buildup of agitation and maneuvering by the Communists against the non-Communist leadership of the PAP.

The first open break came on the issue of merger with Malaysia. The Government advocated independence through merger, and this was challenged by the pro-Communist labor union leaders who demanded complete self-government for Singapore. Clearly, the Communists did not relish the prospect of independence through merger with Malaysia. Merger would therefore upset their plans for a Communist Malaya--plans which were being pursued under the camouflage of anti-colonialism.

In June 1961, the Communists began to criticize the Government on a wide range of grievances and repeated their warning that unless the Government rescinded their pro-merger stance, they would withdraw their support. In a subsequent by-election, the Communists threw their support for the opposition candidate. The rift widened after this and the open showdown began. The Communists soon formed a rival political party called the Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS) taking with them 13 of the Government Assemblymen and the bulk of the PAP branches. A chapter in Singapore's political and labor union history came to a close. A new chapter opened--one of intense open struggle for the hearts and mind of the population.

The pro-Communist BSS came into being in September 1961. In its 15-man Central Committee were six Communist United Front leaders. They immediately set about recruiting members for the new party from the labor unions under their control. They embarked on a big program to whip up popular feelings through indoctrination sessions, cadre training classes, speeches and publications.

In June and July 1962, the Communists stepped up agitation against a proposed Referendum to be held by the Government to obtain a mandate from the population as to which type of merger they preferred. The Communists held protest rallies and demonstrations, and decided to call for the casting of blank votes as a sign

*The present ruling party in Singapore.

of protest against merger. However, the result of the Referendum in September 1962 was a crushing blow to the Communists--only 25% of the electorate cast blank votes. Merger was certain, but the Communist threat remained. In February 1963, the Government mounted a large-scale security operation and broke up the whole Communist United Front machinery in Singapore. Security action was initiated after the battle for public opinion was won through the Referendum.

With the breakaway of the Communists from the Government, the two camps of the labor movement lost no time in regrouping. There was no doubt that the Communists carried overwhelming majority of the labor unions with them. They soon formed a centralized labor body called the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU) in August 1961. In the same month, the pro-Government labor group also announced the formation of a rival body, the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC). While larger political forces were to determine the eventual emergence of the NTUC as the dominant national centre, not to be underrated were the tactical errors committed by the pro-Communist SATU unions. With the coming into being of a fully elected Government, anti-colonialism as the dominant political climate was on the wane. The workers were more concerned now with the economic aspirations than with political slogans. The non-communist labor leaders recognized this. The SATU leaders failed to do so. Pro-communist unions continued to resort to the old tactic of fomenting industrial unrest in a bid to create instability and discredit the Government. The NTUC concentrated on meeting the economic aspirations of workers, by way of securing better bonuses, better salary scales, and so forth.

CHINESE LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

Communist exploitation of Chinese language, education and culture to inflame and incite the ethnic Chinese population in Singapore against the Government had its historical origin in the early development of the Communist Party of Malaya.

One of the most serious political problems in Singapore in the fifties and the sixties concerned British discrimination of Chinese education, and indirectly Chinese language and culture. At that time, large numbers of school-age ethnic Chinese Singaporean children were being educated in institutions that were almost wholly oriented toward China and did virtually nothing to develop a sense of loyalty rooted in Singapore. British policy towards Chinese education in the past was a simple one: let the Chinese set up and run their own schools, with a minimum of government aid or interference. This was exactly what the Chinese did. After the turn of the century, they developed an extensive Chinese school system. Many of the schools were organized and supported by clan associations or management committees composed of community leaders; others were commercially-run institutions. Almost all of them were supported by the Chinese themselves without government assistance. This British neglect of Chinese education was what made the Chinese community in Singapore extremely sensitive to any attempts to change or control their privately-supported educational institutions, and "preservation of Chinese culture" was an issue which the Communists could easily use to arouse receptive sympathizers.

As shown earlier, infiltration of Chinese schools in Singapore has always been a major objective of the Communist Party of Malaya. The Communists concentrated on the Chinese middle schools and achieved remarkable success. Only a handful of students were Communist cadres but they were able to lead, control or intimidate most of the others. Appealing to the students' strong feelings of Chinese language and arousing them on issues of immediate local concern, the Communists converted the Chinese middle school students in Singapore into a potent political force. The school committees, principals and teachers were thoroughly intimidated by the students, who did not hesitate to issue threats or employ violence, such as throwing acid in the faces of teachers considered as "reactionary."

Small Communist cells existed in the key Chinese middle schools but most of the students themselves did not know of their existence. Although the Communist nerve centres for the student movement were small, the organizational network which they controlled, however, included most of the students in the Chinese middle schools. Many kinds of student organizations were used by the Communist student cadres. There were also "hsueh-hsih" sessions, or study groups, modelled after those in Communist China. These consisted of small groups of students under an appointed leader which held regular get-together sessions and studied Communist or pro-Communist literature. In those days, Singapore's Chinese middle school students were in almost every respect imitating the Chinese student movement which existed in China before 1949 and which had a significant political influence.

The protest against military conscription in May 1954 served the purpose of mobilizing and uniting the students and making them increasingly radical, sympathetic to the Communists and defiant of all outside authority. Student leaders soon found four issues on which to mount agitation against the Government:

- In 1956, the students concentrated their attention on Nanyang University, which was being organized in Singapore as the first university for Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. At first, they did all they could to support it, since it was to be a citadel of "Chinese culture." Later, they played an important role in the attacks, against a University Chancellor employed from Taiwan who was known for his anti-Communist views.

- Any proposals to change the curricula or system of the Chinese schools and institutions of learning were swiftly seized upon by the Communist United Front as Government attempts to destroy Chinese education, language and culture. Therefore, in late 1961, the Chinese secondary school students supported by pro-Communist students from the Nanyang University strongly agitated against a Government plan to restructure the system of Chinese education in Singapore. The pro-Communist students subsequently organized a boycott against the school leaving examinations conducted by the Government under the re-organized school system. The boycott was however unsuccessful because parents would sneak children through the picket lines.

- In late September 1965, a Curriculum Review Committee was set up by the Government to reorganize Nanyang University with a view to raising its academic standard. This was portrayed by the pro-Communist students as another attempt by the Government to destroy Chinese education by anglicizing Nanyang University. The students subsequently organized protest meetings, forums, a signature campaign, boycott of classes, pamphleteering, house-to-house campaigns and processions in the city areas. Security action by the Government put a stop to such student agitation. The following year, student protests were again mounted in opposition against Government legislations tabled in Parliament to reorganize Nanyang University. The University authorities took action to dismiss more than 100 pro-Communist student ring-leaders.

- In 1966 too, the administration of another tertiary institution, the Ngee Ann College, planned to reorganize the college's syllabus to raise academic standard. The pro-Communist students condemned the reorganization move as an attempt by the Government to suppress Chinese education. They staged boycotts of classes and examinations and organized a demonstration outside City Hall where the unruly student demonstrators broke into a riot. Eight policemen and three civilians were injured by the rioting students.

Those were the heydays of Communist-organized agitation over the issue of Chinese language, education and culture. Today, these sensitive issues had long been defused due to the increasing acceptance and recognition of English as the language for technological progress. Fewer and fewer parents send their children to Chinese-medium schools. Consequently, the enrollment at Chinese primary and secondary schools and at the Nanyang University showed steady decline over the years. The best of the pre-university students opt for the English-medium University of Singapore. Early this year, the Government took action to merge Nanyang University with the University of Singapore and formed the National University of Singapore. The action was rationalized on purely education grounds as the only sensible way to arrest the decline in enrollment and standard. The merger of Nanyang University, once considered the "citadel of Chinese culture" was readily accepted by ethnic Chinese Singaporeans as a necessary move.

Singaporeans have come a long way from the days when Chinese language, education and culture were emotive issues. Today, our fears are that excessive but necessary stress on the use of English can result in a general deculturation of the young. The Government has emphasized the need to use and retain our ethnic languages so as to preserve our oriental traditions and cultural roots.

The ability to treat such hitherto sensitive issues in a rational and unemotive manner shows how far Singapore has gone towards achieving a national identity despite the diversity in ethnic origins. This mature environment will make it more difficult for the Communists to exploit such issues henceforth to undermine the Government.

LESSONS LEARNED

Singapore has learned a number of lessons from her experience of the Communist political insurgency:

- The superior organization, dedication and sheer doggedness of the Communists are worth emulating.

- The Government is now wary of any close link-up between workers and students. Hence, in the mid-seventies when some student activists became involved in exploiting issues like the supposed grievances of ill-treatment of workers in factories, the Government acted against them immediately.

- Concessions given to pro-Communist unions, whether justified or not, are not the answer because the concessions invariably boost the image and standing of these unions.

- Our struggle against the Communist is a slow and painful process. You can never be sure that you have nabbed them all. That is why those of us responsible for Singapore's security are always on our guard. The Communists have the remarkable ability to regroup and reorganize just when everyone has given them up for dead.

GOVERNMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

The evolution of a successful counterinsurgency strategy must be based on the defeat, or at least the neutralization of the basic premises of the insurgents. Communist insurgency strategy requires, as a fundamental prerequisite, the existence of large-scale chaos, discontent and lawlessness in society so that the Communists can exploit the resulting mass dissatisfaction and direct it against the Government. The Communists know that very few people would take up arms for the sake of Communist ideology alone. What is needed therefore is a situation where many are discontented with the status quo. If that does not readily exist, then it has first to be engineered. A professional revolutionary can then exploit the discontented population without their being conscious that they were exploited in support of an ideology which they would otherwise abhor.

The focus of the counterinsurgency strategy for Singapore was therefore to ensure a fair degree of political stability and economic prosperity. It is imperative for the government to meet the political and economic expectations of our population.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FRONT

In the early years, the first priority was to secure independence and safeguard it against external Communist aggression and internal Communist subversions. Fortunately, through their bitter experiences of Communist-inspired riots and violence, the people in Singapore have become more aware of the Communists' evil designs and less vulnerable to Communist political subversion.

Our pre-independence experiences showed us that in the Singapore context, political stability with racial harmony can only be attained through a commitment to multi-racialism. The ease with which the Communists exploited the sensitive issues of language and education leaves us in no doubt that these matters should be handled with extreme care. Hence, in Singapore, the major languages are accorded equal treatment. They are used as media of instruction in schools and

all students are encouraged to study a second language apart from the medium of instruction used. The actual process to being about racial harmony begins early with the young in the schools.

The Government's implementation of universal conscription for National Service helps to reinforce the need to cultivate racial harmony and social tolerance. Every able-bodied male is drafted at age 18, regardless of his family background and social status. During the 2 years of military service, young Singaporeans from all walks of life, and different cultural and linguistic backgrounds, live together and learn to work and trust each other in the intimate and demanding environment of military training.

ECONOMIC FRONT

Economic growth is the ~~lynch-pin~~ linch-pin of any solution to prevent widespread discontent. The aim of economic growth in the anti-insurgency context is more than the mere provision of jobs. It has to provide for a society where all citizens can make a decent living and have adequate housing and education. The best way Singapore could generate sufficient economic growth to provide for its population was through industrialization; specifically by attracting multinational corporations to Singapore. The Government therefore embarked on an extensive program to bring about rapid and successful industrialization.

DEVELOPING HUMAN RESOURCE

The development of human resources is an important aspect of this program. Accordingly, there is a need to modify and upgrade the education system so as to produce enough skilled workers to man industry and administration. Many new schools were built and thousands of teachers trained in a very short time. The first phase saw emphasis in the expansion of primary schools, with later phases concentrating on secondary schools and institutions of higher learning. Student enrollment increased from 305,758 in 1959 to 516,690 in 1978. The most notable increases were in secondary and tertiary education: secondary school enrollment rose from 48,723 to 179,811 and tertiary from 4,981 to 20,377 during the same period. At the beginning of the industrialization process, the demand for more technically-trained workers increased. The school system had to be restructured to accommodate greater vocational and technical education.

INDUSTRIALIZATION

The modest success of our industrialization program can best be seen in the value added for industrial output which grew from a meager US\$83.7 million in 1959 to US\$2,226 million in 1978. In percentage terms, it grew to more than 35% of the GNP from 13% in 1959. Manufacturing industries employed 236,693 persons in 1978, counting only those establishments which engaged 10 or more workers. Industrialization has solved the problem of unemployment by directly generating jobs and through secondary effects. By the early 1970's, it has become necessary to import foreign workers to meet our labor demands. In 1978, there were almost 105,000 foreign workers in Singapore.

THE TRI-PARTITE COOPERATION OF GOVERNMENT, EMPLOYER AND LABOR

Industrialization stimulates the growth of organized labor organizations. To prevent the Communists from re-establishing control over the labor movement, tri-partite cooperation between government, employers and labor has been institutionalized. This allows the Government, employers and labor to work out mutually-agreed policies on employment, service conditions, etc. Potentially decisive politics of labor agitation and organized violence so evident in the past have been avoided.

Today, this tri-partite cooperation continues to remain a fundamental plank of our labor policy. A case in point is the National Wages Council (set up in 1972) where labor, employers and government are represented. Each year the NWC studies the performance of the economy and analyses changes in cost of living, investment climate and other related factors. On the basis of its study, the NWC recommends to the labor unions, employers and government, guidelines for orderly wage increases for the year. Although the recommendations are not mandatory, the practice has been for its guidelines to be generally adhered to, and all labor negotiations take place within its general framework. The economic benefits that should rightfully accrue to labor is hence realized without adversely affecting the larger interests of the economy as a whole. Employers and Government, likewise can ensure that wage increases are pegged to increased productivity.

HOUSING

In Singapore, inadequate and overcrowded housing conditions have long been an effective rallying point for Communist insurgent effort to undermine the Government. In the early years, almost 600,000 people (30% of the population) lived in slum conditions where basic hygienic and health amenities were grossly inadequate. A solution was found through the development of highrise, low-cost flats in satellite towns equipped with the basic amenities. The satellite-town concept also makes it possible to build within each town sufficient schools, markets, medical clinics to serve the population. Light industries currently located within the satellite towns, provided employment for the residents.

The Government has succeeded in solving the housing problem and removing an important anti-government issue. The number of low-cost flats built by the Government increased more than 13 times, from 23,091 in 1959 to 315,830 in 1978. By 1979, the Government was housing a total of 65% (1,555,000) of the overall population in 12 satellite towns of which the main ones are Bukit Merah (252,000), Ang Mo Kio (235,000), Bedok New Town (208,000), Toa Payoh (185,000), Queenstown (158,000), Kallang (144,000), Clementi (118,000) and others (255,000). The improved housing conditions and education have meanwhile greatly facilitated the acceptance of family planning. By 1979, the rate of population was reduced to 1.2% from a galloping 4.1% in 1959.

CONCLUSION

The Communist political insurgency against the Singapore Government petered out by the mid-sixties. The fact that the Communists lost the battle for the hearts and minds of Singaporeans was confirmed in June 1968 when the Communist Party announced its return to the policy of armed struggle. Although there has been no assassination or attack on military installations in Singapore, this does not mean that the Communist threat does not exist. The ultimate objective of the Communists remains the overthrow of the legitimate government and the establishment of a Communist regime. Now the Communists plot and conspire with greater secrecy, and are more vigilant in avoiding detection by the authorities. Their activities are no less serious because they are covert, for the underground activities of the Communist Party in Singapore are meant to serve the armed struggle objective of the Party.

The historical lesson that Singapore learned from the unsuccessful Communist political insurgency has enabled the Government to remain vigilant of the continuing Communist threat. We are mindful that a revival of the Communist political insurgency is likely if the hitherto adverse political, economic and social conditions are allowed to recur. Our strategy is to ensure this does not happen.

It must also be emphasized that two natural conditions greatly assisted the Singapore situation. The smallness of the country and the consequent compactness of our society greatly facilitated the organization and management to counter political insurgency. The highly urban nature of Singapore society also worked towards the same end. Had it not been for these natural advantages, the Singapore story may well have turned out differently.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

5 NOVEMBER 1980

"INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT: DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS"

MAJOR (Ret) STANLEY HYROWSKI

UNITED STATES ARMY

"INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT: DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS

We have just completed work on the new US Army Field Manual for IDAD. I had hoped it would be available for this conference. However, the final product was not forwarded for printing until September 30th and it probably will not be distributed until next month. (Dec)

In lieu of the manual, I have prepared a paper which will give some insights into US Army Concepts and Doctrine for IDAD. This paper (was distributed) is available to anyone who wants a copy. I would mention here that I also was the project officer for the previous edition of the US Army Manual for Internal Defense and Development.

Doctrine--to be effective--must be simple. It is a tremendous challenge to take complex theories and practices and produce written material which is accurate--yet simple, clear, and complete. This is what we try to do; it is extremely difficult for IDAD--but very necessary.

One of the problems of Doctrine for Internal Defense and Development is definition of terms. Let's look at a couple of terms which are currently in use. I would point out that the first two definitions begin with internal defense and development assistance operations:

Low Intensity Conflict (Type A): Internal defense and development assistance operations involving actions by US combat forces to establish, regain or maintain control of specific land areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution, subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power (TRADOC letter).

Low Intensity Conflict (Type B): Internal defense and development assistance operations involving US advice, combat support, and combat service support for indigenous or allied forces engaged in establishing, regaining, or maintaining of specific land areas threatened by guerilla warfare, revolution, subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power (TRADOC letter).

Foreign Internal Defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, published under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS Pub 1)).

Internal Defense: The full range of measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JCS Pub 1).

Internal Development: Action taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions--political, military, economic, and social--that respond to the needs of its society (JCS Pub 1).

Internal Defense and Development (IDAD): This is an abbreviation of the combination of the two terms "Internal Defense" and "Internal Development." IDAD is simply the combining of these terms and is not otherwise defined (Army Regulation (AR) 310-50).

From these definitions, it is clear that any US Army involvement in "low intensity conflict" will also be considered "foreign internal defense." The actions taken by the host country government will, of course, be internal defense and internal development.

Counterinsurgency: This term is no longer used in US Army Doctrinal literature. It is used by the other US military services in much the same sense as "internal defense" (JCS Pub 1).

Stability Operations: This term is no longer used in US Army doctrinal literature. It was introduced in 1967 to replace the term "counterinsurgency," but subsequently dropped in 1974 (Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Internal Defense and Development, US Army Doctrine, 1974).

Environment: One important, distinguishing characteristic of US Army IDAD doctrine is that it recognizes environmental factors as a significant element of the threat of insurgency. Trying to deal with insurgency as only a "law and order" problem will simply not solve long range problems.

Another important element is the recognition that each nation is unique-- each has its own history, culture and goals. Each has its own problems which are in some ways different from other nations. Should insurgency occur, it too will have some differences from other insurgencies. Recognizing these things, we still feel it is possible to write concepts and doctrine that will be useful in a general way in promoting understanding of the requirements for successful holding down escalation of insurgency and defeating it.

Insurgency: As has already been stated, insurgencies taken different forms. However, there appears to be three (3) major requirements for an insurgency to have much of a chance for success:

Vulnerable population.

Direction and leadership.

Lack of government control.

For whatever reason, a large part of the people dissatisfied to the point of wanting, or being willing, to have the government forcibly overthrown. There must be a leadership to convince them it can and must be done and organized the effort. The government must be unable, or unwilling, to suppress the efforts.

Strategies: There are many strategies which insurgents can use in their attempts to gain political control of a nation. In our manual, we use three (3) generalized models which we have termed "left," "right," and "mass."

The "right" strategy is predominantly political. Party members attempt to infiltrate social and political organizations to spread their influence. Little emphasis is placed on armed elements, although they may employ some small groups and terrorists. They would disavow violent incident since they wish to appear to operate within the legal framework of the nation.

The "left" strategy might appear to be mindless violence. The idea is to create a revolutionary situation which can be triggered by a series of incidents. The group leadership can then come forward as the government appears to have lost control. The top leadership has dual roles as leaders of armed elements and political leaders.

The "mass" strategy expects a long drawn out conflict. It emphasizes organization of the masses and confrontation of the government with armed elements. There is a complex party structure which controls all aspects of the movement. Because it employs armed forces, some variation of this strategy is most likely the kind which could be encountered by the US Army.

Phases of Insurgency.

Within a mass type strategy, we can identify three (3) phases.

Phase I (Latent and incipient insurgency).

Phase II (Guerrilla warfare).

Phase III (War of movement).

There is no sharp delineation between phases. The activities begun in Phase I continue throughout the duration. Therefore, we can expect to identify such activities as getting organized, psychological operations, planning, recruiting, logistics, and attacks on police and other terrorist acts beginning in Phase I and continuing thru the guerrilla warfare and war of movement phases if the insurgency progresses. In Phase II there are organized guerrilla attacks against police and military forces and the insurgents may be able to gain control of some areas. In Phase III, larger sized insurgent forces are used to seize and hold geographical and political objectives.

Concepts.

IDAD strategy calls for using all the powers of the government; the political, economic, psychological, and military, including police and internal security forces, to prevent or defeat insurgency.

The objective is a level of internal security which will permit political, economic, and social growth through balanced development programs.

The US concept is based on coordinated internal defense and internal development programs being conducted at the same time.

This concept is better seen as being composed of the three (3) components of balance development, mobilization and neutralization.

The "right" strategy is predominantly political. Party members attempt to infiltrate social and political organizations to spread their influence. Little emphasis is placed on armed elements, although they may employ some small groups and terrorists. They would disavow violent incident since they wish to appear to operate within the legal framework of the nation.

The "left" strategy might appear to be mindless violence. The idea is to create a revolutionary situation which can be triggered by a series of incidents. The group leadership can then come forward as the government appears to have lost control. The top leadership has dual roles as leaders of armed elements and political leaders.

The "mass" strategy expects a long drawn out conflict. It emphasizes organization of the masses and confrontation of the government with armed elements. There is a complex party structure which controls all aspects of the movement. Because it employs armed forces, some variation of this strategy is most likely the kind which could be encountered by the US Army.

Phases of Insurgency.

Within a mass type strategy, we can identify three (3) phases.

Phase I (Latent and incipient insurgency).

Phase II (Guerrilla warfare).

Phase III (War of movement).

There is no sharp delineation between phases. The activities begun in Phase I continue throughout the duration. Therefore, we can expect to identify such activities as getting organized, psychological operations, planning, recruiting, logistics, and attacks on police and other terrorist acts beginning in Phase I and continuing thru the guerrilla warfare and war of movement phases if the insurgency progresses. In Phase II there are organized guerrilla attacks against police and military forces and the insurgents may be able to gain control of some areas. In Phase III, larger sized insurgent forces are used to seize and hold geographical and political objectives.

Concepts.

IDAD strategy calls for using all the powers of the government; including police and internal security forces, to prevent or defeat insurgency.

The objective is a level of internal security which will permit political, economic, and social growth through balanced development programs.

The US concept is based on coordinated internal defense and internal development programs being conducted at the same time.

This concept is better seen as being composed of the three (3) components of balance development, mobilization and neutralization.

IDAD strategy then, is directed toward both the people at large and the insurgent organizations specifically.

Working at correcting the conditions that can be exploited by the insurgents must be part of the national strategy. This may require programs to meet the needs of particularly vulnerable groups. The strategy must recognize that changes, by their very nature, may promote unrest, and--must recognize that unless the people know the government can keep them reasonably secure from insurgent pressure, their response to government programs will be cautious and reluctant. Once security is present, people can be mobilized on behalf of the government.

Also, all the needs of all the people cannot be addressed at the same time, so priorities must be established. Problems need to be carefully analyzed and objective priorities established which are based on capabilities and resources available, as well as on need.

Balanced Development.

Development programs should promote advances in the economic, political, and sociological fields. They should tend to bring overall development into a reasonable balance. All groups should have opportunities to share in the nations development. Recognizing and working toward correcting existing conditions which render a nation vulnerable is the long term solution to the problem of insurgency.

Mobilization.

The objective of mobilization is to organize and mobilize the populace in support of the government. Successful mobilization will provide organized manpower and material resources for internal defense and internal development. It denies, or at least minimizes, the availability of these same resources to the insurgent. The governments ability to mobilize manpower and material resources and motivate its people is directly related to its management and administrative capabilities. Most nations must emphasize efforts to improve their administration and management as part of the IDAD effort.

Neutralization.

Neutralization of the insurgent organization is the task of internal security organizations. It is decisive. It includes all lawful activities to discredit, disrupt, disorganize, and defeat an insurgent organization. Its primary target is the element which controls the insurgent movement and provides its leadership. Neutralization can take many forms--it varies from public exposure and discrediting of the leaders during a low level of insurgency when little political violence has taken place--to arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken--to combat action if the insurgency escalates.

All efforts to neutralize the insurgent organization must be conducted within the legal system of the country. Constitutional provisions regarding rights and responsibilities must be scrupulously observed. The need for security forces to act lawfully is not only humanitarian, it is essential. If special

emergency powers have been granted by legislation or decree, they must not be abused if popular support--so essential to winning an insurgency--is to be maintained. Balanced development contributes to neutralization by attempting to satisfy legitimate grievances which the insurgents could try to exploit. Denying the insurgents legitimate issues discredits their propaganda and leaders.

Planning.

Plans are based on an overall national strategy. In countries where centralized planning has been adopted for economic development and modernization, planning for IDAD is made easier. Planning should integrate all IDAD programs, to the extent possible, into an overall plan. Programs designed to improve conditions which make the nation vulnerable to insurgency will thus complement operations to defeat insurgent organizations.

Programs at the national level provide the basis for IDAD activities at regional, state, and local levels. The planning activities at the lower level should contribute to national plans and the achievement of national objective. Planning should be supervised and coordinated by a national level organization.

Planning must recognize that success depends upon people oriented programs and area oriented execution of programs by civil and military agencies.

Internal development planning must produce specific programs to improve attitudes among the people concerning these programs.

Specific planning objectives should include:

Defining development objectives and establishing priorities.

Determining actual and potential resources.

Providing a basis for the allocation of limited resources.

Selecting means for mobilization of the people and needed resources.

Providing a means for training in public administration and development programs and techniques at all levels.

And one could add: Insuring coordination and consistency of plans and operations of various government departments and private groups.

The more highly organized the society, the more likely it is to achieve the objectives of internal development programs. Through organizations and the institutions they promote, the people can become better unified in support of programs to improve economic, social, and political conditions.

Internal defense planning is based on knowledge of the threat; the operational environment; and national objectives, organization and requirements. The internal defense planning objective should be to provide for the most efficient employment of defense resources to support both internal defense and internal development programs.

The national plan provides guidance for long range objectives and a basis for national and lower level plans with shorter range objectives.

In Phase I insurgency, internal defense plans should give emphasis to military civic action programs. In Phases II or III, the emphasis must be against the insurgent tactical threat.

Certain key factors need to be recognized for internal defense planning.

Plans must be responsive to established national priorities and resource allocations and coordinated with internal development planning.

The organizational design must provide for clear division of 30th military and political responsibility and lines of authority.

Combat power must be applied selectively, "minimum essential force" must be the guide.

Tactical operations are oriented on the enemy and his base areas.

Contingency plans must provide for the reinforcement of military forces, as necessary.

Administrative and logistical support plans must be prepared for emergency operations just as well as they are for routinely planned operations.

Military Plans.

At the highest echelons, Army plans for IDAD operations would be an annex to the military IDAD plan. Subordinate Army headquarters would generally follow this format in their own plans. The annex should include the following six (6) appendices:

Intelligence, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Populace and Resources Control, Tactical Operations, and Advisor Assistance.

Organization.

The concepts of organization for IDAD present examples of national and subnational level type coordinating centers to illustrate the principle of achieving a coordinated and unified effort at each level.

The national level organization is concerned with planning and coordinating programs. The major offices will normally correspond to the branches and agencies of the national government concerned.

There is a Planning Office responsible for long range plans. These plans should provide the chief executive of the government with a basis for delineating authority, establishing responsibility, designating objectives and allocating resources.

The Economic, Social, Psychological, Information, and Political Affairs Offices; and any similar agency, represent their parent national level branches or agencies. They develop concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan. The idea is to be able to coordinate and direct the IDAD efforts of these agencies and yet not unduly interfere in their normal day-to-day functions.

The Populace and Resources Control Office develops concepts, programs and plans which will provide guidance to forces operating in the security field. It is staffed mainly by branches involved with law enforcement and justice.

The Intelligence Office is staffed mainly by representatives from intelligence, police, and military intelligence agencies. It, of course, coordinates intelligence, plans, and programs with operations it supports.

The Military Affairs Office develops and coordinates broad general plans for mobilization and allocation of manpower for armed forces and possible paramilitary forces.

Subnational Level

Area coordination centers (ACC) may be established as combined civil military headquarters at subnational, state and local levels. These centers are responsible for planning, coordinating and exercising operational control over all military forces and government civilian organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The area control center does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the area of operations.

Area control centers have a two-fold mission: (1) They provide integrated planning, coordination and direction of the IDAD effort; and (2) They insure an immediate coordinated response to operational requirements.

These ACC's should normally establish a capability for 24 hour a day communications and operations. This could be operated like an emergency operations center.

The ACC's are headed by the senior government official responsible for operations within the area. In addition to the highest political official, there should be representation from: (1) Senior military command in the area, (2) Senior police official, (3) Local and national intelligence organization in the area, (4) Public information and Psyop agencies, (5) Paramilitary forces; and, (6) Local and national agencies in the area involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of IDAD.

Urban ACC

An urban area coordination center can be organized very much like those already described but they can take on an added dimension. Local Police, fire fighting, medical, public works, public utilities, communication, and transportation representatives are also included. They may be required to respond to immediate operational requirements on a 24 hours-a-day basis.

Under some circumstances, a state or local area operations center can also serve as an urban area operations center. This would, in large part, be determined by the authority and resources available to the official at the head of the urban area government. If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall local political control, the ACC establishes the control necessary to insure proper planning and coordination.

Civilian Advisory Committee

Civilian advisory committees should be formed to assist ACC's at all levels to evaluate the success of their activities and to help gain popular support for the programs. Members should be prominent figures in the community. Membership should consist of leaders of civilian organizations. A chairman should be appointed by the government or elected by the membership of the committee. This committee can provide an essential link with the people and provide feedback useful in planning future operations.

Now to Move into Operations and Campaigns.

The degree to which security forces participate in IDAD will depend a great deal on the level of insurgent activities. For example, police forces, to include internal security police, are critical in combating insurgency before there are large scale activities. They continue to participate fully if the insurgency progresses.

Maintenance of law and order is a fundamental responsibility of government. Many insurgent activities will be considered terrorist or criminal. Thus, countering these criminal and terrorist activities is, at least initially, the responsibility of police.

If the police can meet these threats early, preventive measures will have a better chance of succeeding. If the threat is recognized and taken seriously and resources applied early, this will be the most economical time to prevent or defeat insurgency. The problem is that it is extremely difficult for a nation to apply scarce resources to combat a threat which is not fully developed. The probabilities are that a low level threat will be in progress for a long while before a government can muster the resources and support to defeat it.

The police are generally better trained, equipped, and organized to handle low levels of violence. They are a sensitive point of contact between the government and the people and generally more acceptable than the military as keepers of order over a long period of time. Also, police have powers of arrest, are trained in handling evidence, and are accustomed to legal proceedings.

However, in rural areas, a small police force may require early assistance from military, paramilitary, or some type of local auxiliary force. Even small groups of organized insurgents operating in a rural area may require the commitment of military forces.

One aspect of mobilization may be the establishment of local paramilitary or auxiliary police units to combat organized groups of insurgent forces.

If required, military forces may be called on to support or augment police or even to assume a police role.

Major IDAD Operations.

What we call the six (6) major IDAD operations could be appendices to the military IDAD Plan.

The first of these is Intelligence. In broad terms, the objectives of the early intelligence effort are to: (1) Determine to what extent the indicators of insurgency are present, (2) Gather information about the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population; and, (3) Take action to reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

Some of the concepts about intelligence are:

It should be unified and centralized.

Able to operate freely through the nation.

Maintain a central registry of information.

Maintain a centralized system of source control.

Coordinate all intelligence and counterintelligence programs.

Conduct special operations, as directed.

In IDAD, psyop is used a great deal by both the government and the insurgent. As used in our manual, psyop is not limited to operations directed against enemy or foreign audiences, but also includes host government operations directed against its people and armed forces.

We show five main target groups and list objectives for each of them. The first group is the insurgents, the objectives are to create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent force. Programs designed to win insurgents over to the government side are needed.

The second main group is the civilian population. The objectives are to gain, preserve, and strengthen citizen support for the host country government and the IDAD programs.

Armed Forces. The objectives are essentially the same as for the population at large, but the host government must also place emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these forces.

Neutral Element. Here we are talking about uncommitted foreign groups within and outside the host country. The idea is to try and gain the support of these groups by revealing the subversive nature of the activities. Hopefully, international pressure can be brought on any foreign powers sponsoring or supporting the insurgency.

External Hostile Powers. The objective with this group is to convince them that the insurgents and insurgency will fail; thus reducing support for the insurgents.

Military organizations and civilian agencies develop psyop plans based on and in conformance with the approved national plans. Local plans are coordinated through the appropriate area coordination centers.

The actions and behavior of military forces are a major factor in the formation of attitudes and behavior toward the government. For this reason, commanders must constantly be aware of the psychological effect of operations as well as the effect of troop behavior.

The success of an operation may depend on the commander's awareness of the psychological and political implications of his unit's actions.

Effective Psyop Planning Requires:

An intimate knowledge of the history, background, current environment and attitude of each potential target group.

An intimate knowledge of the insurgent's organizations, motivation, resources (both personnel and materiel), and how they are obtained.

A knowledge of political and ideological strengths and weaknesses of opponents.

Knowledge of the government plans, programs and objectives.

Knowledge of all means of communications available to psyops.

The ability to classify target audiences by type so themes can be tailored for specific groups.

The availability of continuous timely, accurate and detailed intelligence (including evaluations of current psyop's programs).

Civil Affairs

Although CA doctrine is oriented toward the host country military forces, the principles will generally apply to other security forces.

CA operations are a responsibility of commanders at every level. They include any activity of military forces concerned with relationships between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in an area.

Activities may range from military civic action projects to populace and resources control to the exercise of certain authority that is normally the responsibility of local government.

Major CA efforts normally include:

Prevention of civilian interference with military operations.

Support of government functions.

Community relations.

Military civic action.

Civil defense.

The overall objective of CA in IDAD is to mobilize and motivate the civilian population to assist the government and military forces.

CA operations are directed at eliminating or reducing military, political, economic, and sociological problems. Close and continuous psyop support is needed to maximize the effect of CA.

All military units have some capability to participate in CA projects, particularly military civic action. Major roles in military civic action can be undertaken by units having assets specially suited for military civic action projects. Examples are engineer, medical, and transportation units.

A civil-military staff officer should be assigned down to battalion level in IDAD. CA projects should support national development programs. Civic action projects simply for the want of something to do may be useless or even worse--counterproductive.

Whatever the level of intensity of insurgent activities, military civic action projects should be planned and coordinated to fit in with internal development programs. In advanced stages of insurgency, priorities on military operations may reduce military civic action to such tasks as require immediate attention such as medical aid to sick or wounded or providing water, food, and shelter for temporary care of displaced persons and refugees.

Populace and Resources Control

The police-type activities of populace and resources control are the type of activities with which military forces may become involved. Military forces used this way should support police - not replace them. Some special police training should be considered. The military participation must be in accordance with and comply with host country law.

Police, intelligence, and other internal security forces will probably require expansion for the IDAD mission of populace and resources control.

Objectives of populace and resources control operations include:

Provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the people.

Mobilize the people and resources on the behalf of the government.

Detect and neutralize insurgent organizations and activities.

Cut and reduce any supporting relationships between the population and insurgent forces.

Carefully designed psyop programs should support control operations. People need to understand that it is because of the insurgent threat to them that controls must be imposed.

The overall plan for populace and resources control is put together at the national level coordination center where assistance is provided by all the national agencies concerned and coordination is insured. Lower level programs must conform with the national plan.

It is essential that populace and resources control measures conform with legal codes and that they be enforced firmly and justly. Also, laws must specify how contraband seized will be disposed of legally. Operations must be carefully supervised because, in these programs, some persons, even at the lowest levels, may be easily tempted to use their powers for graft and corruption.

If measures are not enforced fairly and impartially, they will surely result in turning many of the people against the government.

Measures must be instituted for in-country controls and for control of imports. Some population and resources control operations may include:

Employing population surveillance (both overt and covert) based on area coverage.

Controlling movement of both personnel and materiel.

Establishing curfews and blackouts.

Establishing checkpoints and road blocks.

Screening and documenting the population.

Conducting cordon and search operations.

Establishing rationing and price controls.

Controlling refugees and displaced persons.

Protecting resources and installations from attack.

Border operations.

When instituting populace and resources control measures, actions must be taken to increase the capability to deal with offenders. Even simple offenses must be dealt with using some sort of legal machinery. It is important that cases be tried quickly and fairly.

Tactical Operations.

Tactical operations by their very nature, are the most violent and extreme of all internal defense activities. But, they are not an end unto themselves. They support the overall goals of the nation's IDAD effort.

The objective of tactical operations is to destroy or neutralize insurgent tactical forces and bases and to establish a secure environment. (When this objective reaches the troop level, it can be interpreted as "to close with the enemy and kill or capture him").

Tactical operations are coordinated with other IDAD operations through the use of area coordination centers.

Organization for tactical operations emphasizes appropriate firepower and mobility. Tactical self-sufficiency and adequate support elements to conduct semi-independent or independent operations should be stressed. Consideration must be given to providing the tactical force capabilities for CA and psyops. Police, internal security forces, or paramilitary forces may also participate in tactical operation with military forces.

Tactical operations are characterized by offensive operations to find, fix, destroy, or capture guerrillas. They generally include such tactics as (1) Reconnaissance-in-force, (2) Movement to contact, (3) Hasty attack, (4) Deliberate attack, (5) Exploitation; and, (6) Pursuit and raid.

Units are assigned operational areas which they get to know quite well over a period of time. If the insurgents develop large size forces and a mobile warfare threat, tactics and combat power use must be adjusted to meet the increased threat. Larger reserves are maintained as reaction forces. The size of units conducting operations is increased and firepower capabilities are also increased.

While the guidance is, and must be, the use of the "minimum essential force," large guerrilla forces and hardened targets must be attacked with all "necessary firepower."

Continuous pressure must be maintained against insurgent forces. When contact is "lost," aggressive efforts must be made to reestablish contact and engage the enemy force. Friendly forces should not permit the enemy time to rest, reorganize, and prepare for offensive operations.

Tactical forces are usually assigned a base of operations from which they project operations. This may be either a permanent or a semi-permanent installation. It normally contains the command, control, and communications element and the support elements necessary to sustain the tactical force.

Advice and Assistance

The host nation's military forces may provide assistance to internal security forces, paramilitary forces, self defense forces, and other governmental agencies participating in IDAD. Centers may be established for

organizing, equipping, and training established or newly activated security forces. Mobile training teams may be used to provide on-site training or advice and assistance to other security forces.

In IDAD, a campaign is a series of related government operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.

Consolidation campaigns are organized in priority areas as interdepartmental civil-military efforts. These campaigns integrate internal defense and internal development activities designed to restore governmental control of the population and the area. They include programs for the improvement of economic, political, and social conditions.

Success of these consolidation campaigns is more likely if they are conducted in the early phase of insurgency before the threat and hostile activity have escalated to higher levels. Actually, consolidation campaigns may be conducted in any phase of insurgency. However, as mentioned earlier, it is doubtful that a lot of resources can or will be devoted to defeating an insurgency before a serious threat becomes obvious.

Normally, consolidation campaigns are organized at the state (or provincial) level and supported by national agencies and resources. Consolidation campaigns should enlarge areas over which the government has control. They will expand outwardly from these areas. The area undergoing a consolidation campaign should not be extended beyond the limits of combined civil-military capabilities.

Once cleared of significant insurgent forces, adequate defense and internal security must be established to protect and defend the area. Police and paramilitary forces should have the major role in this. If attacked, it is very important that controlled areas be prevented from falling under insurgent domination. If this should happen, even for a short period, it will be extremely difficult to gain the confidence of the people again and their acceptance and support of IDAD programs will be minimal.

We talk about consolidation campaigns in terms of four stages: The first stage, logically enough, is called the Preparation Stage. Obviously, it is the time used to plan the operations, gather the resources, organize and to train the personnel. Teams which will work together should train together.

The objective of the second or Offensive Stage is to clear the area of insurgent forces. Military forces must guide their action by the principles of "minimum essential force." Combat Power must be selectively applied to preclude unnecessary harm to the population.

During the third or Development Stage, emphasis shifts from military operations to civilian developmental efforts. Remaining insurgent elements are sought out and dealt with by military internal security and police forces. Paramilitary forces may be organized, equipped and trained for local security. Political, economic, social and psychological action cadres implement their programs and conduct programs in pursuit of internal development goals. Military

civic action projects which demonstrate genuine concern for the population and support internal development programs will be very useful at this time. Police forces operate to maintain an adequate and effective state of law and order and implement populace and resources control programs.

The final or Completion Stage calls for a speedup and spreading of internal development programs. The local authorities assume responsibility for internal security. The people become responsible for local government to the extent possible. National military forces may be withdrawn and the local and regional paramilitary forces assume the primary responsibility for defense of the area.

Strike Campaigns

The Strike Campaign consists of a series of major combat operations targeted against insurgent forces and bases in insurgent controlled or contested areas. Other internal defense activities may support military forces engaged in strike campaign operations. Strike campaigns are conducted in contested areas or in remote areas occupied by insurgent forces. Armed forces attack the insurgent forces and then withdraw after mission accomplishment. The main objective of the attack is the destruction of insurgents and their base areas. Military units are assigned an area in which they develop and then attack a target.

Military units are organized as task forces capable of operating for extended periods in areas away from home bases. In addition to combat forces, task forces may have intelligence, psyop, civil affairs, police and paramilitary elements. Operations outside the support range of fixed combat service support installations may require attachment of these elements.

When small units conducting reconnaissance locate relatively large insurgent tactical forces, surveillance should be maintained and sufficient reaction forces quickly deployed to destroy them.

When a location is suspected as being the base area of an insurgent group or an installation, reconnaissance and surveillance should be conducted and followed by an immediate attack or raid by reaction forces when sufficient information has been developed.

Reconnaissance is characterized by continuous, decentralized, small unit operations within an assigned area of operations. Since strike operations are normally conducted in insecure areas, plans must be made for withdrawal of units immediately after mission accomplishment.

We have a section in the manual devoted to what we call "operations in selected areas." Remote area, urban area, and border operations are the three areas addressed under operations in selected areas. I have already mentioned remote area operations in conjunction with the strike campaign.

Remote Area Operations

Remote area operations are undertaken when it is desirable to establish an operating base and government strength and authority in an area. This is the type operation which may be necessary when the area is populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups and where national government influence is minimal. This type operation also could be undertaken in unpopulated areas to interdict infiltration routes or where insurgents have established staging areas, training areas, logistical facilities or command posts.

Initially, a strong combat force with heavy support is required to establish the operational base. Combat power in the form of firepower and airmobile forces should be available to quickly attack identified targets.

Success of remote area operations is more likely if there is an indigenous population present which is willing to support government programs and operations. This support is easier to obtain when the government force includes personnel indigenous to the area who are able to influence the local population.

The benefits of using personnel indigenous to the operational area are obvious. In addition to their rapport with the people, these troops will know the area. Local leaders should be used to enhance motivation and control. Where military ability is limited, advisors from regular forces can be used to provide advice and assistance in both training and operations.

Remote area operations are long term and, where successful, may result in decisions to develop the area and go into a consolidation campaign. All of the military IDAD operations may be included in remote area operations.

Urban Area Operations

Urban areas are critical and require a continuing IDAD effort whether or not they are included in a specific campaign. Often, they will be included in consolidation campaign planning and operations.

Military representatives should participate in IDAD planning for urban areas during all phases of insurgency. Although the police normally have primary responsibility for law and order, military forces should be prepared to assist law enforcement agencies if situations requiring assistance develop.

Covert insurgent activity may be extensive in urban areas. The government must place emphasis on intelligence and police operations to counter insurgent intelligence, logistical, organizational and terrorist activities.

Police and internal security organizations are high priority targets of insurgents. Terrorist and propaganda activities will be used to try to provoke an over reaction by government forces.

Armed forces may be required to reinforce police combating riots and disorders provoked by insurgents. Tactical operations may be necessary if insurgents attempt direct action to seize urban areas or critical installations within them.

To minimize the loss of life in densely populated areas, emphasis must be placed on the use of nonlethal weapons. "Minimum essential force" is the principle and this should reduce loss of life and injury to people innocently caught up in the fighting and hold down on destruction of property.

Operations require careful planning and coordination, particularly those operations involving application of force. Military forces designated to provide assistance must be able to communicate with police and other agencies involved in the operations. They must collect and have readily available detailed information on the areas and critical installations.

Intelligence data on an area of operations should include detailed information about its urban centers. It should include detailed city plans, subterranean construction, and locations and description of all critical installations. Information should be field checked for accuracy. Information on IDAD activities and the insurgent situation must be kept current for operational plans.

A great deal of information will be needed on facilities and areas likely to be targets of insurgents. Thinking in terms of assembly areas, approach routes, locations of command posts, supply points, evacuation routes, aid stations, collecting points for refugees, collecting points for captured or detained persons, places where helicopters can land, places where vehicles can be parked. A great deal of this information will have to be collected for contingency plans for many different possible scenarios.

It is best to implement populace and resources control activities in urban areas before the insurgent can develop a significant capability for armed conflict. Police intelligence operations support populace and resources control programs. Criminal acts such as robberies, kidnappings, terrorism, and extortion may be linked to insurgent psychological or money-gathering activities. Careful records and surveillance should be maintained over government and civilian sources of weapons and ammunition. Intelligence operations should also be targeted on production, collection, and storage activities which may form part of the insurgent's logistical system. Psychological operations are used to justify restrictive measures such as rationing, curfews, searches, and setting up checkpoints and restricted areas when these measures are necessary. Military support may be required for urban populace and resources control operations if other security forces cannot adequately handle them.

Tactical operations may be required inside or near an urban area to defeat an insurgent attack. Any insurgent attempt to seize and hold an urban area will probably involve operations in nearby areas as well. When the police and other internal security forces can cope with the attack inside the urban area, military

forces can best participate by establishing security around the urban area and by denying the insurgent reinforcement or support. When military forces are required to defeat insurgent forces inside the urban area, operations must be closely controlled and coordinated. Military forces should be withdrawn as soon as police forces can handle the situation.

Psyops are more significant in urban areas because of the mass media present and the size and composition of the target audience. The government must seek and win the support of the major opinionmakers in the area. These include news editors radio and television personalities, religious leaders, educators, and leaders of organizations whose support of the IDAD effort will increase its chance of success. Emphasis should be placed on programs to improve and maintain a favorable image of government forces when they are operating in urban areas. Security forces should be continually indoctrinated on their role and how individual actions impact on the success of their mission.

A major activity of psyop in urban areas is the support of populace and resources control programs.

All psyop resources available in the urban area should be considered in planning support of tactical operations. If there is an insurgent attack, psyop resources can be used to help avoid panic, direct and movement of civilians, and assist in control and care for refugees.

Since the military may have to deal with many civilians, CA operations require added emphasis. Military participation in populace and resources control programs and military support of civil defense may be major activities. Plans for and preparation to assist civilians in case of an insurgent armed attack are essential. This assistance may include:

Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical care.

Recovery and disposition of the dead.

Handling refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons.

Providing prepared food and/or means for food preparation.

Issuing food, water, and essential supplies and materiel.

Restoring utilities.

Clearing debris and rubble from streets, highways, airports, docks, rail systems, and shelters.

Damage assessment.

Border Operations

Under some circumstances, armed forces may be required to support other security forces in border operations or they may be charged with responsibility for an area or an entire border. The objective of border operations in IDAD is to

deny infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. Tasks which may be performed in attaining this objective include:

Intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

Operations of authorized points of entry.

Refugee control.

Enforcement of movement and travel restrictions.

Psychological operations.

Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.

Attacks against insurgent forces.

Destruction of insurgent base areas.

Security of friendly areas.

Barrier and denial operations.

In Phase I insurgency, operations in border areas are normally a function of police, customs, and other government organizations. Armed forces may assist particularly in remote areas. In Phases II and III, denial of external support for the insurgency may require combat operations in border areas. These operations require close coordination and cooperation between all government agencies involved.

Physically sealing the border may not be possible since it could require the commitment of more government forces and materiel than overall national resources permit.

Since placing forces and barriers at all possible crossings or entry sites may be impossible, priorities should be established. Natural barriers must be used wherever possible. Using patrols, sensors, and obstacles in selected areas will increase the effectiveness of natural barriers. Herbicides, if approved for the area operations, may be used to enhance the visibility in vegetated areas.

Barrier and denial operations are established after careful consideration of the threat, the environment, and the location of the infiltrator's probable targets and methods of operation.

Border operations are planned, directed, and supervised from the national level. Authority to conduct these operations may be delegated to subnational and other area commanders.

Border task forces are tailored to meet requirements in their assigned areas. They should contain sufficient combat support and combat service support elements to support operations for extended periods.

Restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones can be established if needed. Either of these operations, which could require relocating many persons, must be carefully planned. Although armed forces may assist, civil authorities normally are responsible for planning and carrying out a relocation program. Forced relocation should be held to a minimum. The 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit forced population resettlement unless there is clear military necessity.

Continuous and detailed surveillance is required to determine infiltration and infiltration routes and support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type of transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of material, terrain and traffic conditions, and the probable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Aerial reconnaissance, unattended ground sensors, and ground reconnaissance patrols may be employed to insure adequate reconnaissance and surveillance of remote areas. Surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline, coordinated offshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategic observation posts along the shoreline, and an effective system of licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian aircraft and watercraft.

Border units establish operational bases at brigade, battalion, and company levels to direct operations. Aviation, signal, engineer, and fire support augmentation usually is required.

In a restricted zone operation, a carefully selected area, varied in width and contiguous to the border, is declared a restricted zone. Persons living in this zone are relocated. Public notice is given that all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone will be dealt with as infiltrators or insurgents.

In the friendly population buffer zone, civilians living within the area of operations are limited to those believed to be loyal to the government. Persons whose loyalty cannot be established are relocated. This concept offers a good potential for establishing information nets and using loyal citizens in self-defense border units. It denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities. A continuing psyop effort should be directed toward maintaining the morale and loyalty of the population.

I have just tried to give you an overview of the concepts and doctrine in our field manual for internal defense and development. I hope this will give you some feeling of current thinking. If you have any ideas on the subject, I would appreciate getting them from you any comments on the paper will also be appreciated.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

6 NOVEMBER 1980

"THE VANUATU OPERATION"

COLONEL TONY HUAI

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

THE VANUATU OPERATION

Good morning gentlemen. I take this opportunity on this last day of the seminar to say how pleased my colleague and I have been to attend PAMS IV and to exchange ideas and views. Indeed, in the past few days many a view has been exchanged and opinions expressed. These exchanges can only be of mutual benefit to all of us concerned.

Our topic for presentation is titled--"Vanuatu Experience."

-I will cover the background, geography, history and political situation of the Republic of Vanuatu and

-I will cover Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF) involvement.

Before we delve into the details of the presentation, it is essential we orient you all on the location of Vanuatu or as it was known, New Herbildes (NH). It lies in about the same latitude as Townsville and Mackay in Australia. Her immediate neighbors are the Solomon Islands to the north and north west, Fiji islands to the east, New Calendonia to the south, and Australia to the south west. Many American servicemen and ex-servicemen today will recall during the WWII staging through NH and in particular, island of Espiritu Santo en route to Guadalcanal.

Geography. The former Anglo/French colony consists of an irregularly shaped chain of islands running some 500 miles long from north to south. The islands are of coral and volcanic origin with active volcanoes on Ambrym, Lapevi and Tanna islands. The chain of islands consists of 12 principal islands and 60-odd smaller islands and islets.

Population and People. The country has a population of about 110,000. Of these about 3% were non-nationals, 40% were French speaking and the remaining 57% were the English speaking. The past tense here is used quite deliberately because the figures have changed since independence. The Ni Vanuatu are Melanesians.

History. The island chain was discovered by a Portugese navigator, Pedro Fernandez De Quiros, in 1606. More than a century later a French explorer, Louis De Bougainville, rediscovered it in 1768 and eventually in 1774, the prominent British sailor, Captain James Cook, chartered and mapped the islands. Thereafter, settlers, mostly French and British, began arriving in the 19th Century, as sandal wooders in 1843, missionaries in 1848, followed by coconut planters and other businessmen in 1868. Gradual immigration followed, and increasing French interests in the islands resulted in a number of important events which led to joint Anglo/French administration of the NH.

During the 1878 convention, Britain and France agreed on the policy of mutual exclusiveness, the mixed naval commission in 1887 for "rudimentary joint control," and finally the 1906 Protocol for the Condominium Agreement between Britain and France.

Political Situation. There are three major political groupings:

-Anglophone, Vanua'aku majority party (VP) and the government of today.

-The Independents.

-The Moderates (Francophones).

The Independents and Moderates form the opposition. Of these two the Moderates were and will be a threat to the present government. They have rejected government decisions, opposed independence and demanded island autonomy in Espiritu Santo and on the southern island of Tanna.

The Francophones saw the VP as British oriented and viewed it as a government for the Anglophones and not for the minority French speaking. This resulted in their refusal to accept government decisions and derogated its authority making it impossible for the government to exercise its responsibilities throughout the condominium. The independents acknowledge the legitimacy of government while in some cases disagreed with it.

According to one French diplomat, the French-speaking minority would be manipulated and ill-treated after independence as they were before independence. We found this statement to be totally misleading and from a diplomat highly irresponsible.

One important feature of the VP and despite the opposition's accusations of its English orientation, it in reality had a more nationalistic approach to governing the new nation, it established a NH government on the foundations of NH culture and not the English way nor the French. This principle was feared by the French who had the view of preserving their language, ideals, and resulted in support of the Francophones for secession particularly in Santo and Tanna and a change of government.

France also feared the VP aim to regain all alienated native land and to press for all Pacific neighbors to be free of foreign rule, in view especially of French commitments to its Pacific Island possessions, especially New Caledonia, a very close neighbor of Vanuatu.

With independence approaching the major task of the co-rulers and the new government was to resolve the differences at both levels.

Up until 31 July 1980, which was the date set for independence, the condominium was jointly administered by the British/French. This resulted in the duplication of services and of government facilities. The society was split into four groups:

- The Anglophone - British and English speaking Ni Vanuatu;
- The Francophone - French and French speaking Ni Vanuatu;
- Rural dweller - Very much untouched by either influence; and
- The rest - Vietnamese, Chinese, Polynesians, etc.

The only thing held in common was that they were mutually antagonistic towards each other. The Ni Vanuatu then, approached independence as they had existed for 74 years--without real unity, with opposing languages, deep divisions and bitterness. In the elections of Nov 79, FR Walter Lini's Vanua'aku party won two-thirds of the national vote, and in a shock to the Francophone population of Espiritu Santo and Tanna, also won in the regional voting.

As to be expected, these results were not accepted by the Nagriamel party of Jimmy Stevens or the other parties of the Moderates. So the stage was set for the rebellion. Claims for secession, island autonomy, rejection of the new government and opposition to independence flourished, resulting in many clashes all over the country particularly in Tanna and Espiritu Santo. The flames of the rebellion were fanned by many influential outside interests, both within and without the country:

-Firstly, the French settlers who wished to retain their way of life, their very considerable assets, their language and culture were supported by the French-speaking colons and Ni Vanuatu.

-Secondly, Jimmy Stevens gained stature by his vocal and charismatic approach to the question of lands and custom rights for "Man Snato." Jimmy and his Nagriamel party and their supporters physically took over the island of Espiritu Santo on 28 May 80 and for over 2 months subsequently, proclaimed that they would not, under any circumstances, give in to the new government. They proclaimed Santo an independent island under his leadership.

-Thirdly, the Phoenix Foundation providing finance and political support to the Nagriamel Movement and Moderate Party with the aim of having a tax-free haven in the Pacific. They envisioned a "no government" concept and a free enterprise system. Jimmy and his followers had been manipulated into pressing for Santo independence and separation from NH by these foreign adventurers and capitalists. Whilst he maintained that he was for returning the land to the people, he was influenced, through bribery, to support these capitalistic interests at the expense of the voiceless Ni Vanuatu.

PNG Involvement. So far we have given you the background, history, and events that led to the breakdown of law and order in the newly independent state of Vanuatu. We would like to turn now to how and why PNG became involved.

Early in July this year, the South Pacific Forum was held at Tarawa in Kiribati. It was during this conference that the subject of assistance to Vanuatu was discussed. A little later Prime Minister Lini of Vanuatu formally requested Prime Minister Chan of PNG provide military assistance. Why did Prime Minister Lini request assistance from PNG? There were several reasons:

-Firstly, because of the inaction of the condominium force who had been there for some time and who had virtually done nothing to sort out the troubled area of Espiritu Santo.

-Secondly, Prime Minister Lini could not afford the time needed to get a VN peacekeeping force organized and any delay would only give the rebels time to assert themselves.

-Thirdly, the social and cultural make up of the people of Vanuatu are basically the same as the people in PNG. We are Melanesians, it was best to ask a Melanesian brother to sort out the problem.

-Fourthly, the troubles of Vanuatu are in our region and in ensuring peace and stability, someone had to go to their aid. We were asked to go in.

-Fifthly, we had the military capacity to respond.

This was the last option open to Prime Minister Lini. The condominium government, in our view, did as little as possible before independence to quell the troubles in Tanna and Espiritu Santo. In fact one of them tried to delay the independence date of 30 July 1980. For the two metropolitan powers, Vanuatu is a speck in the vast ocean and meant little or nothing to them. The politics of home, EEC, joint Anglo/French programs were far more important in comparison with an insignificant island nation in the Pacific. Britain was prepared to grant independence; France was not. Its interests in the Pacific were slowly diminishing, and it was reluctant, but eventually agreed to independence for the new republic.

With this in mind, and on being asked, PNG gave military assistance. We (PNG) were still faced with politics at home as parliament had to be convened for a special session to approve the commitment. This period had its own frustrations as our planning got underway amidst political in-fighting. Lack of clear guidelines was coupled with an unusually slow response by the Australian government to use its military personnel. Despite these hang ups, operations Wantok Durua ("to help a friend") was launched from PNG.

-Reconnaissance elements and independence contingent departed on 22 July using our own aircraft, and our chartered national airline, Air NG. This contingent was comprised of 100 infantry soldiers, three aircraft and two patrol boats for independence celebrations.

-On return of the RECON elements, detailed planning to launch the operations commenced. On 8 Aug 80, formal parliamentary approval was granted, and, for the first time in our national history, PNG committed her troops for peace-keeping duties outside her own territory.

Operation Wantok Durua was conducted in the following phases:

- Phase 1. Insertion of independence troops.
- Phase 2. Insertion of main body and forward tactical HQ.
- Phase 3. Conduct of operations in Espiritu Santo.
- Phase 4. Withdrawal of Kumul Force from Vanuata.

The Kumul Force had this mission: "To assist Vanuatu Government to exercise its authority to govern." In order to accomplish this mission our concept of operations was based on consideration of certain factors. These were:

- The threat.
- Size of Luganville.
- Numbers and sizes of installations.
- Resources available.

Our plan, after these factors were considered, was:

-Our forward maintenance base was established in Port Vila (capital of Vanuatu) on Efate Island;

-The forward operational base in Luganville, with HQ Kumul Force commanding all PNGDF units, deployed there. Immediate task of Kumul Force here was "to secure the town of Luganville from dissident elements so that peace could be established as soon as practicable in order that both government and private enterprise could reopen for normal business. Having attained that, we were "to conduct further operations out of Luganville into known dissident areas of Vanafo, Port Olry, Big Bay, South Santo to assert government influence.

Three months was initially given to Kumul Force Commander to achieve his mission with a combat force not to exceed 300 men.

Prior to our arrival in Vanuatu, the British and French commando units had already moved there to attempt to sort out the trouble. Kumul Force commenced Phase 3 on 18 Aug 80 and to our amazement the situation in Luganville was the same as it had been for the previous 2 months; i.e., the British and French had done nothing to assert government influence. The force was most disappointed on its arrival to find the rebel flag missing from the public park where it had been flying for the past 2 months or so. We immediately secured certain key installations in town and began continuous patrols in the township. Roadblocks were set up at all main feeder roads into the airport, and a continuous coastal surveillance of Espiritu Santo and neighboring islands, with the aim of preventing smuggling of arms, was initiated.

On arrival of Kumul Force in Luganville, the police mobile unit came under our command thus boosting our manpower resources, which were insufficient anyway. We operated under the general direction and control of the government of Vanuatu and not the PNG Government.

During the first week, the dissident elements tested our metal. We were confronted with some incidents, at road blocks, where they had tried to ram them at high speeds, or when flagged to stop, would drive through again at high speeds. On one occasion they fired at a mobile patrol at night; fortunately no one was injured. They also attempted to blow up the local power station. During the first week, we knew we had them on the run; especially when several of them were seriously injured. We knew it would only be a matter of time before the known rebels would either give themselves up or be arrested by our force.

After Luganville security was achieved and normality of government and private business established, Kumul Force conducted further operations out to Vanafo, Port Olry and Big Bay areas with the aim of asserting government influence. This portion of the operation took a further 2 weeks, many suspects were detained, stolen goods including vehicles were confiscated. By 20 September, PNG force had accomplished its mission.

Well, what did we gain out of Vanuatu operations. Several things:

-Firstly, the authority of the elected government which was usurped was established.

-Secondly PNG and Vanuatu have strengthened relations and laid the foundation for trade and cultural exchanges and military ties.

-Thirdly, as a military force, we have learned a lot from this operation with regard to our operational weaknesses, shortfalls in equipment, our own organization and most of all shortcomings our own contingency planning procedures.

-Fourthly, we the Pacific people, small as we are, have realized we are capable of solving our own problems without the help of outside powers.

In conclusion gentlemen, the Vanuatu operation was an experience for all concerned in PNG, the government, the bureaucracy, the military and the average citizen. For me as the commander, it was most satisfying to have gone to the aid of another Melanesian brother whose authority was usurped and whose colonial administrators could not sort out a problem they had created.

Although we saw little military action, the mission was achieved the best way; i.e., with little bloodshed to the opposition and little to us. Personally, I believe Kumul Force was extremely lucky in that we moved in quickly when the problem of insurgency was at an embryonic stage. I had not yet developed to the "passive phase."

We have sorted out a short-term solution to the problem in Vanuatu and it 's now up to the government to sort out the long-term problems.

Gentlemen, that ends our presentation we will now be only too pleased to answer any questions you may wish to ask.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

6 NOVEMBER 1980

"ADP IN SUPPORT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE"

COLONEL DAVID G. RHOADS

UNITED STATES ARMY

ADP IN SUPPORT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE

Good morning, I'm COL Dave Rhoads, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation Management in Western Command. Or as they say around here, the WESTCOM ACSAM.

During this presentation, I will discuss with you what a computer is good for, how we use computers in the US Army, and show you some possible uses of automatic data processing in internal defense.

To start with, I want to make one thing abundantly clear, I am not a computer salesman, I am a soldier, the same as you. My job is to see that where automation can help the commander accomplish his mission, he gets the tools that can do it best. Therefore, please do not construe my selection of commercial examples in this presentation as our Army's or my personal indorsement of any of the machines I will discuss. They are just random selections to show the variety of minicomputers readily available to help commanders make better decisions.

Since the present and the future are often best understood in terms of the past, it will be valuable to an understanding of how computers could be utilized in "internal defense" to briefly review the history of computers.

All of us have been using a digital computer most of our lives. Of course, this is a European model. We count 1, 2, 3, 4, and the thumb as 5. The Pacific model is different, of course, using the thumb for 1. The term "computer" has come to mean a special type of calculating device having certain definite characteristics. The characteristics typically found in a digital computer that differentiates it from mechanical or electronic calculators are (1) speed, (2) internal memory, and (3) stored programs. The speed of the modern computer is the result of electronic circuitry which is limited only by the speed of light. Computers hold data and instructions in an electronic presentation which adds to the speed of processing and forms the basis for stored programs. These programs are written by people, stored in the internal memory and direct the computer automatically through each operation, step-by-step. The first computer was built for the Army and called the ENIAC. It was developed in the early 1940's, and was the machine that bridged the gap between mechanical calculating machines and the electronic computer. The ENIAC, using vacuum tubes, was massive in size, consumed large quantities of electricity, required an elaborate air conditioning system, and would not fit in this room.

In 1948, Bell Laboratories developed the transistor which moved us into second generation computers. The transistor performs the same function as the vacuum tube, but is smaller, less expensive, generates almost no heat and requires little power. The military were also the first users of second generation computers.

Rapidly on the heels of the transistor came microminiaturization which leads us to the use of monolithic integrated circuits--"the age of the miracle chip" and into third generation computers. Central processing unit or CPU performance trends have rapidly increased over the past few years and hardware costs have dropped so fast that applications which would have seemed absurd a few years ago are now definitely cost-effective. Computers can be especially useful in areas where there is a large amount of data that needs to be correlated and accessed quickly. Unlike humans, once data is entered into the system, it is always there unless someone changes it. As you will see, modern equipment is very small and relatively easy to install in either fixed installations or mobile configurations.

In a moment, we will look at the computer system currently in our division, and what our plans are for the future. As I make the transition from the present to the future, you will see that the Army is moving from centralized management information systems to distributed data processing. Let me explain that concept.

The Army traditionally has centralized their information systems, for ease of control and coordination, and to limit redundant costs. Locating large centralized management information systems at installations, divisions/corps, etc., has allowed us to handle larger problems, reduce people, and support users with batch processing. However, as the dependency on these large systems grew, so did the vulnerability to disaster through the possible loss of the single large system.

Recently, there has been an ever-increasing trend to decentralize computing in which the user is more involved in the system, thereby reducing the complexity and overhead in operating systems, providing user control of job priorities, and most important to us, reducing vulnerability.

The Army is moving toward what may be the best of both worlds. Distributed data processing, the natural evolution in data processing. This is an approach that combines the advantages of both centralized and decentralized systems, and in which the user runs his own system but has access to large files. The objective is to capitalize on today's technology and provide the information required by the commander to help him make better decisions. My intent for the remainder of this presentation is to show how minicomputers could possibly be used in "internal defense."

All major areas of management are automated in the US Army, to include personnel, finance, supply, and maintenance. Intelligence and command and control systems have been operating for sometime at the strategic level and we have fielded tactical operations systems down to the corps level on a test basis.

Every division in the US Army has an IBM 360-30 that processes its personnel, supply, maintenance and financial transactions. This centralized configuration is called CS3, the Combat Service Support System. After this session, we will go across the street and get a detailed briefing and tour of the Division Data Center of the 25th Infantry Division, which we have moved here from its home station at Schofield Barracks. You will see this configuration set up as it would be in the field, except we are using commercial power to conserve fuel. We practice this move on a quarterly basis and have proved that the Data Center is completely mobile and will go where the commander wants it.

When the Army selected the IBM 360-30, it was visualized that it would satisfy our information needs far into the future. We have experienced the same growth of information processing as the rest of the country, and while this equipment has served us well for the last 10 years, we need to replace it.

As we look to the future, minicomputers will play a key role. In the near future we plan to field the division-level data entry device, which is a small minicomputer that will be scattered throughout the division functional areas. It will have some standalone capability to process data but will be used primarily as a data entry system. The data collected will be distributed to larger minicomputers called Decentralized Automated Service Support System (DAS3), which will be located within the division trains area. Each of these computers, which are smaller, more compact and faster than the current CS3 hardware, could individually replace it.

At the installation level, we are also moving toward a distributed network. At WESTCOM, we recently acquired two minicomputers to increase our information processing capabilities. Our contracting officer is using an IBM System 34 to handle local purchase actions. (Incidentally, this system, which can be set up in the corner of a standard size room, has more computing power than the division system you will visit.) Our engineers are using Wang minicomputers.

To manage work orders and job orders--this is a montage of Wang systems. As you can see, they are small and have great flexibility.

My point is that the market place is saturated with powerful, relatively inexpensive equipment. Their capability is limited only by our imagination to use them.

While you may never have used computers in an internal defense type of operation, that does not mean they would not help. During the conference, I sat in on many of the discussion sessions to see how we could readily utilize computers to support internal defense. I'm sure you can think of many ways, through your familiarity with the necessity to compile large volumes of information, and then use that data for operational plans and decisions. The following are some areas that came to my mind during the discussions:

- Resource Control

Fund accounting
Supply status/inventory (control distribution)
Maintenance
Weapons
Ammo
Economic production

- Population Information

Demographic studies
Political organization/local officials
Civic action programs

- Force Readiness

Regular forces
Local security forces
Paramilitary forces
Police
Local officials (Force structure
(training requirements
(readiness status

- Insurgent Information

Biographical files on individuals
Organization/structure
Resources

Subsistence
Weapons/ammo

In peacetime, I see automation as a tool for the commander to maintain a high state of readiness and do it inexpensively. In war, I see it as a tool to sustain the fighting forces to ensure victory.

My conclusion is that "automation helps."

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

6 NOVEMBER 1980

"THE MILITARY AS A MODERNIZING FORCE"

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GARY A. DE BAUCHE

UNITED STATES ARMY

THE MILITARY AS A MODERNIZING FORCE

Military forces in new nations have the potential of playing a prominent role in modernization. The term modernization as used in this presentation is intended to convey development of political and social systems that will enhance stability, the improvement of productivity, as well as achievement of a national consensus and sense of nationhood. The sum of these factors, and others too numerous to list, has been referred to in the past as nationbuilding. So, the topic of this discussion could be concisely stated as the Role of the Military in Nationbuilding.

As stated previously, military forces may play an important part in internal development. Perhaps this is because the military system is potentially one of the strongest systems in a new nation. In some countries it controls the political system. The pros and cons of military involvement in the affairs of government have been the subject of countless writings. Whether one agrees with this involvement or not, it is a fact of life in many societies. Although many examples can be cited of ineffective or totalitarian military regimes, other examples can be noted where the military have performed a stabilizing mission by taking the reins of government and keeping them until an orderly transfer is made to civil government. The military is inherently a strong contender for power. It is highly institutionalized and is often the only viable replacement for an ineffective civil administration.

It is important to note, however, that traditional military institutions such as rigid discipline, single person control and emphasis on pragmatic and expedient solutions to problems often differ markedly from those institutions such as consensus and compromise which have been proven essential for effective government. This factor makes long term military control difficult to maintain.

An additional consideration in this respect is that when the military is given direct governmental responsibility it tends to fragment the leadership into civil administrators and troop commanders. The split reduces the effectiveness of the officer corps and over time denigrates the military capabilities. Then too, the reputation, career potential, and ultimately the quality of the civil administrators suffers, since power and advancement seem to result from troop command.

The military may be a major contributor to the economic and social development of the nation. Military units are organized to be selfsufficient and are thus ideally suited for economic and social betterment missions in the more remote areas of the country where use of civil organizations is impracticable. Engineer, signal, and medical units of an army have specialized equipment of great value in these programs. The use of this equipment on civil projects assists the nation while training the military personnel. But "civic action," the term most often used to describe such civil assistance tasks, has benefits other than the tasks themselves.

- First it brings the government and civilization to remote areas which have little or no national ties.

- Second, it provides training in a variety of skills for military personnel, many of whom will later utilize them as civilians.
- Third, it stimulates a favorable relationship between the population and the military as the representative of the national government.
- Fourth, it seeks to develop cooperative patterns of behavior among the people that support the government.
- Fifth, it involves the people in development thus reduces the instability that often accompanies change.
- Sixth, it focuses on self-development - development of the people - so that they can help themselves.

Finally, as implied above, military civic action plays a vital role in institutional development in that it focuses on developing the inhabitants of a community. As the people participate in building or later using physical development projects, they will improve their own standard of living.

Perhaps the most important role of the military, other than its national defense and security role, is that of value changer and national integrator. Personal qualities and organizational characteristics which reside with the military can provide role models for development or reinforcement of values within the populace. Attributes such as discipline, dedication, sense of organization, spirit of initiative, emphasis on efficiency, honesty and integrity which have been impressed on military personnel prior to return to the civilian community, or presented as emulative qualities for young adults, will improve productivity and national standards.

As a force for integration, the military is almost unique. It has one language, one set of rules, one uniform, and other features normally of a unifying character that apply to the total membership. This standardization usually promotes the equalization of values among the membership. If the military enlists or drafts its membership from the total population, without preference, it will promote national integration. Ethnic, religious, and other sociological prejudices tend to be erased within the armed forces. As long as sociological bias is not condoned, the military can be a model for social change within a nation.

Additionally, education and training programs for armed forces personnel can cause or force changes in thinking and patterns of behaviour. Sanitation, personal hygiene, and citizenship programs are typical of such programs. The military, once engrained with the desired social standards, can be used to enhance social change in a population. In this the military becomes a social change agent and can be used to promote cleanup of communities, to administer preventive medicine programs, and to teach civilians subjects of importance in creating social change. All of these, of course, promote improvement and modernization.

A list of modernizing and nationbuilding roles which have been assumed by military organizations is included for consideration and discussion.

- Major developmental construction.
- Participation in economic planning.
- Administration of economic development programs.
- Construction or administration of public communications, transportation, public facilities.
- Provision of health services to the civilian population.
- Provision of technical personnel for governmental services.
- Perform customs/immigration functions.
- Conduct military civic action programs at local level.
- Conduct public works programs to include housing and squatter relief.
- Plan and administer land reclamation projects.
- Colonization and development in rural areas.
- Participate in educational development.

In conclusion, the military has the capability to function as a strong force for modernization. The various factors of this capability have been outlined; however, what concerns this group perhaps more than the actual capabilities are the principles that our respective armed forces must practice in order to enhance the military's role as a modernizing force and participant in the IDAD process. In general, a military organization should practice the following policies:

- It should sustain the typical military institutions of discipline, uniformity, dedication, and others that constitute a mold that can be used to promote value formation or value change among the membership.
- The military should be a reflection of the total population. All sociological groups should be given equal opportunity to enter the military. There should be no sociological bars to promotion or assignment to a particular duty. The officer corps should not be privileged duty for an elite group.
- Advancement should be by merit.
- Training programs, although normally directed toward military functions, should be structured to shape or change values and patterns of behaviour favorable to the national interest. If necessary, educational programs not directly related to military missions, should be created to further promote this value change.
- Military forces should identify with the people, avoiding "the we-group/they-group" outlook.

- The military should not seek favored legal, social, or economic status in comparison with the general population.

- Military forces should be well-trained in their missions and well-indoctrinated in their authority and responsibilities. In performing internal security missions they should not alienate the population and any use of force should be precise and discriminative.

That concludes the prepared portion of the briefing. What are your comments and questions?

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

6 NOVEMBER 1980

"INSURGENCY: THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE"

COLONEL MOHD KALAM AZAD BIN MOHD TAIB

MALAYSIA

INSURGENCY: THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE

Good morning, gentlemen, my presentation is on the subject of "Insurgency - the Malaysian Experience". In the next few minutes I hope to cover this subject along the following lines:

The nationwide command and control organization to counter insurgency.

The planning and conduct of Security Forces operations.

The development plans that form the main part of the countermeasures.

I shall attempt to answer questions that you may have after the presentation.

Malaysia covers an area of 208,000 sq km and is a federation of 13 States. She has a population of 13 million. From this number there are more races than there are States. But to simplify, there are 3 major racial groups - 46% indigenous or Bumiputra, 41% Chinese, and 10% Indians. The disuniting factors of a heterogenous society have plagued governments for centuries. But more than the problems of a plural society, for which we believe we have found the answer, Malaysia needs to satisfy a relatively new form of nationalism - it is the revolution of rising expectation. Advances in education, communication, transportation, and especially in the eradication of illiteracy, have made the population expect the government to provide a better way of life. Not only are they impatient to wait for the 100 years or more which developed nations need to attain today's standards, they want it now. The process of modernization brings demands and hopes and at the same time instability and political, social and personal frustrations. Malayan Communist Party (MCP) sought to take advantage of the situation. Established in 1930 through the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern, MCP aided the British during the War and terrorized the country after the War until they were decimated and defeated in 1960. The organization still exists, and today it still provides the government with a problem to solve. But for the potential insurgent, an organization exists for him to join.

We believe that the continuing occurrences of conflict in countries around the world are manifestations of restlessness and selfishness of man. Because man is a never satisfied animal, he is perpetually seeking a better way and a better life. If his progress is blocked or should his status be threatened, his reaction may vary from mild unhappiness to savage reprisal. Restlessness is a consequence of human aspiration. The relationship of aspiration to dissident potential can be better understood if aspirations are considered with respect to expectations. We consider aspirations as goals that are sought but never quite reached. Expectations are some level below aspirations and constitute a minimum level of satisfaction. The population that is provided by the government in the area between their expectation and aspiration is basically content. Those that

are provided for less than their expectation will be discontented and vulnerable to influence. Some of these vulnerable people are resigned to the situation, but others may react violently. It is among these vulnerable people that the MCP may find their recruits.

We believe that security and nation building or internal development are inter-dependent and must be totally integrated and coordinated for maximum effectiveness. Failure to achieve unity of effort will lead to counter-productive programs, wasted resources, and probably failure in the overall counterinsurgency effort.

Malaysia is governed by a system of states, districts and villages. Area identification is vital for our command and control organization because the civil, police and military boundaries can then be meshed in together. The area organization enhances coordination of all our counterinsurgency efforts.

The criterion for the formation of our command and control organization is simply the requirement for an organization to ensure that the internal security and internal development programs are planned, coordinated and implemented. On the slide we have the overall command organization for our counterinsurgency effort. Please note the following:

The overall command is in the hand of the civil government. The military forms only a part of the overall national effort against insurgency.

To preserve our system of government and to give representation of the people the overall responsibility lies with the Cabinet.

The Prime Minister is the Chairman of the National Action Council and the members consist of all Cabinet Ministers, Chief Secretary, Chief of Defence Staff and the Inspector General of Police.

Functions. The functions of the NAC are:

To control and coordinate all measures taken to eliminate the insurgency threat.

To resolve and discuss with a view to rectify all problems and difficulties be they of policy, implementation or weaknesses in government machinery.

Implementation. To assist the NAC in the discharge of its duties 2 other councils are established - one responsible for internal security referred to as the National Security Council (NSC) and the other responsible for internal development referred to as the National Economic Council (NEC). To coordinate and implement the policy decisions on all internal security and development activities, the National Action Working Committee is established.

The Prime Minister is the Chairman of the National Security Council with the Deputy Prime Minister as the Deputy Chairman. The members consist of a number of relevant Ministers, Chief of Defence Staff and the Inspector General of Police.

Functions. The Council is responsible for coordinating policies relating to the security of the country and the overall direction of security measures, including security operations, public order and matters having direct security implications.

Assisting Committees. Four committees are established to assist the NSC in the discharge of its functions:

Operations Planning Committee.

Composition. The Chief of Defence Staff and the Inspector General of Police are Joint Chairmen of this committee. Members consist of various heads or chiefs of the civil ministries, police and armed forces.

Functions. The Committee is responsible for:

The conduct of security operations and psychological warfare.

The coordination of command, control and the deployment of security forces engaged in security operations.

The operation to deny supplies.

The issue of necessary instructions and directions to Divisional Commanders and the State Security Executive Committees in matters relating to security operations.

Sub Committees. The OPC may appoint any sub-committee from among its members to study, consider and make recommendations on any matter within its sphere of responsibility.

National Intelligence Committee (NIC).

Composition. The Prime Minister is the Chairman and the members of heads of ministries, Chief of Defence Staff and the Inspector General of Police. In attendance are the various police and military intelligence directors.

Functions. NIC is responsible for:

Coordinating intelligence efforts.

Deciding on the areas of need for intelligence.

Deciding on the intelligence and threat papers to be prepared.

Determined priorities in the collection of intelligence.

Sub-Committees. The Committee is empowered to establish sub-committee or working groups for the purpose of:

Dealing with an specific area of intelligence need.

Preparing papers for consideration by the committee and subsequently by the NSC.

Producing intelligence digest.

Psychological Operations and Psychological Warfare Committee.

Composition. The Chairman is appointed by the Prime Minister with the Minister of Information as the Deputy Chairman. The members are heads and chiefs of various security operations establishments.

Functions.

To determine the areas of need that require more intensive psyops and psywar efforts.

To provide guidelines to the Government mass media in the presentation of an emphasis to be given to Government policies and statements.

To bring to the notice of the NSC any weaknesses in Government policies or their implementation.

Civil Administration Committee (CAC).

Composition. The Chief Secretary to the Government is the Chairman and heads of all civil ministries are members.

Functions. The Committee is responsible for:

Maintaining the administrative and legislative machinery of government.

Providing civil support for the Security Forces when required.

Relief measures in national disasters.

Composition. The Prime Minister is the Chairman of the National Economic Council with a number of ministers as members.

Functions.

To discuss major national development policies including social policies involving major financial and national economic implications. All proposals in this respect should have been discussed with the various ministers under whose portfolios the problem falls into, prior to their presentation to this Council.

To discuss and present to the Cabinet plans for development and to review and recommend amendments of the Malaysian Development Plans from time to time.

To ensure that essential research and analysis in the fields of economic and social, be carried out with the assistance of external experts, if necessary.

To assess and review capital and expertise assistance plans under the auspices of the United Nations Organizations, Colombo Plan, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other international organizations.

To assess and measure all policies and plans to extend economic relations with friendly countries.

To assess all regional economic cooperation plans.

To assist the NEC in the discharge of its duties, two committees have been established. They are the National Development Planning Committee and the Foreign Investment Committee. The Economic Planning Unit is the agency that services the NEC.

Composition. The Prime Minister is the Chairman of National Action Working Committee which consists of a few Cabinet Ministers.

Functions. To meet once a week to:

Keep track of the progress on the implementation of the development plans.

Identify bottle-necks and other problems faced in implementing the development plans.

Act as coordinating machinery at officers' level in Ministries and Departments.

Assess the implementation of the development projects.

Maintain and man the National Operations Room.

Administer the meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Action Council.

To assist the Executive Committee of the National Action Working Committee in the discharge of its duties, an organization, known as the Implementation and Co-ordination Unit (ICU), is established.

I have covered aspects of command and control at the national level. I have talked of ministries and heads and chiefs of services. Earlier in this presentation, I mentioned that Malaysia is divided into 13 States and each State is further divided into districts. The village is the smallest unit. The further implementation of this command and control chain at state level is shown in my next slide/diagram. You will see that a similar organization as was seen at the national level is repeated. Where we had the Prime Minister at the

national level, we will not have the State's Chief Minister (a political appointment). The Chief of Defence Staff and the Inspector General of Police are also either Divisional or Brigade Commanders, depending on the State, and the Chief Police Officer of the State. Whereas ministers are represented by elected representatives at state level and by state department heads.

District Level. At district level the principal committees remain as they are at the national level, but the Prime Minister/State's Chief Minister at the district level is now the District Officer who is a civil servant. The military and police representation may be brigade or battalion commanders and the Officer-in-charge Police District. The others are represented at the relevant district equivalent. Needless to say, it is quite impossible to continue the process at the village level. However, the village headman, who is a government servant, chairs a combined development and welfare committee. He presents the decisions and village requirements to the District Officer. He may be invited when necessary to attend one of the district committees.

The national strategy is based on the following:

The Police conduct operations to locate and neutralize all insurgent underground units. The underground units operate in villages and towns and they carry out the following functions:

Provide logistic support to militant units.

Collect funds for the organization.

Subvert populace.

Recruit new members.

Provide and place nuisance mines/booby traps in populated areas to embarrass the government.

Provide replacements to militant units.

Collect information.

Carry out assassinations of key intelligence personnel.

Paramilitary policy forces operate in populated operational areas such as rubber estates, palm oil estates, jungle fringes etc. to:

Provide security to the population in the affected areas.

Deny the insurgent access to the population.

Destroy insurgents located in the areas.

Provide governmental representation where government machinery cannot normally reach.

Military forces operate in the jungle areas to:

Deny the insurgents from organizing themselves into assault units or regiments by relentless operations.

Cut lines of communications in the jungle, thus denying the insurgents movement from one area to another.

Locate and destroy food and arms/ammunition dumps thus denying enemy future base areas.

Deny the insurgents access to the populated areas thus denying them logistical support.

Provide protection and assistance to aborigines living in jungle areas.

As an infantryman I would feel incomplete if I did not cover the functions for which we are best suited. However, in covering tactical operations, I will not cover Police operations which include intelligence operations by the Police Special Branch. It is a very specialized function which I know little about nor will I cover psyops/psywar operations.

We carry out 3 types of operations:

Strike Operations. These operations aim to find, fix and destroy insurgent tactical units and groups. They are characterized by offensive tactical operations. They are carried out in response to information and intelligence.

Framework Operations. It is not possible for us to provide sufficient forces to operate simultaneously and with equal effort in all areas. Framework operations are defensive/offensive economy of force operations conducted in low priority areas. These operations destroy insurgents when located, deny contact with locals and recover insurgent food, ammunition and arms dumps. Population and resources control operations coming under this heading.

Remote Area Operations. These operations deny the insurgents free movement in deep jungle areas and influence the aborigines living in these areas to the side of the established government.

If prevention is better than cure, then we can prevent insurgency by providing the people higher standards of living and a good future for generations to come. In Malaysia, the solution is found in the New Economic Policy. This Policy is aimed at eradicating poverty irrespective of race and to restructure

society so that the present identification of race with economic function and geographical location is reduced and eventually eliminated. These objectives are set to be accomplished within 20 years or one generation. We are at the moment on the threshold of the eleventh year of this perspective period. These broad objectives are to be achieved by policies, programs and projects designed to:

Generate employment.

Increase productivity and income.

Expand opportunities for those engaged in low productivity activities.

Reduce the existing inequitable distribution of income between income classes and races.

Promote the creation of a commercial and industrial community among the indigenous population.

Modernize rural life and improve living conditions of the poor in the urban areas.

Expand education and training facilities, social services and the physical infrastructure of the country.

Encourage and support private investment both domestic and foreign.

Promote further utilization of the country's abundant human and natural resources.

What all these mean to the people in the remote areas exposed to the insurgents are:

Provision of training facilities for skills and techniques in agriculture.

Opening of land to increase land ownership.

Provision of irrigation schemes.

Provision of roads, water supply and electricity.

Provision of schools at all levels.

Moving manufacturing industries to the rural areas.

All of these and other benefits must make the insurgent not only an unwelcomed intruder but a public enemy.

For the urban dweller opportunities are opened for those who wish to make good. Opportunities in investment and opportunities in employment are abundant and the full force of the free enterprise system is in operation. Meanwhile, housing is built at very low cost by the government and much more are being built by the private sector.

The New Economic Policy not only provides for the population's expectation but also narrows the gap between expectation and aspiration.

That, gentlemen, completes my presentation on insurgency as experienced by Malaysia. It is a very broad subject and one that our Staff College spent one year studying. There are many areas which I have not covered such as the Rule of Law, control measures etc. However, I feel that I have chosen the essentials required to understand the Malaysian experience. Malaysia defeated one insurgency that lasted 12 years. We are confident that we will defeat any such communist venture again.

I would like to thank you for your kind attention and I shall now accept questions.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

7 NOVEMBER 1980

"THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE IN RHODESIA"

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID W. S. MOLONEY

NEW ZEALAND

THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE IN RHODESIA

Good morning, gentlemen. It is my pleasure to describe to you today a rather unique operation in which I took part earlier in this year--the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia. I will begin by describing to you the geography of the area and the background as to why we were deployed into Zimbabwe or Rhodesia. I will describe the protagonists in the battle which caused our involvement, the vehicles they used, the type of forces they were, and the areas where we operated. The logistic operation will be addressed as a separate issue. Finally, I will summarize the effects of the whole operation.

First of all, the geography. Rhodesia is a landlocked nation in the southern part of Africa. It is bound by Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa. It is about 391 square kilometers and has a population of 7 million. Ninety-five percent of that population is black and is divided into two major tribal groups. Of the 95% black population, some 70% were Shwana, and that is the tribe to which the Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe belongs, with 15% being in the Beliby, which is Mr. Joshua Nkomo's tribal grouping.

The election results were decided basically on tribal relationships and the number of seats won by the Prime Minister and Mr. Nkomo were directly proportional to the tribal allocation in the country. The geography of the country consists of a high belt, a middle belt, and a low belt. The high belt is excellent agricultural country with a temperature of about 30°C and spreading down to the lower belt, which is very scrubby country with a noon temperature being about 45°C. Lake Kariba is in the north, which is the largest man-made lake in the world, Victoria Falls, the Wankie Game Park, Zimbabwe Ruins, and all with a good infrastructure of road and rail. The railways run through to the neighboring countries and the Rhodesian or Zimbabwe railways run the railroad in both Zambia and Mozambique. There are strategic airstrips able to take the largest of aircraft in the world, at Gwelo where the Rhodesian Air Force was based and Bulawayo. As you can see, Rhodesia is a very well-developed country. Topographically, the northeast portion of the country is characterized by the large boulders and rocky hills. The country is more open and flat, is in the south in the low and the middle belt. The Zimbabwe Ruins are in the south and were built somewhere around 1300 by a group of people thought to be either from the Middle East or from some other African nation. At one stage it was believed that they were Bantu people. They are extraordinarily well-constructed structures which do not rely on cement to hold the very high walls together.

The situation before the Commonwealth Monitoring Force became involved in operations in Rhodesia was this. There were two armies, the Zirpa Army of Mr. Nkomo and the Zanu Army of Mr. Mugabe, which were competing for a hold on the country. Those areas in which the government control was totally lost had no schools, administration, medical support or anything of that nature. The guerrillas reigned supreme and only in the middle of the country did the government have any authority. For the guerrilla operations, the security forces divided the country, in classic counterinsurgency style, into a series of operational areas. They started early in the war in 1964, with operational area

"hurricane" and as the war spread in 1972 it rather developed into a full-scale guerrilla war and the areas were spread across the whole country. They were simply brigade areas of operation. The whole operation was commanded by a brigadier in the largest town in these areas and when we arrived in Rhodesia, the army and that brigadier were running the whole structure including its economic structure.

I will now describe for you the concept of operations for the Monitoring Force. It was decided at a conference in Lancashire House in London, which went on for some 17 weeks, that there would be established a Commonwealth Monitoring Force. The protagonists were around the table and due to international pressure, war weariness, or the offer of rehabilitation following the war; all parties decided that there would be a cease-fire in Rhodesia and elections would take place. It was decided that the Monitoring Force--which would supervise the cease-fire, would consist of members of the Commonwealth, which were in fact 1,200 servicemen from the United Kingdom, 150 Australian service soldiers, 74 New Zealanders, 50 Kenyans, and 23 Fijians. The Fijians, I might add, were then and are currently still heavily involved in Lebanon and were really pushed to produce 23 people. The Monitoring Force was to monitor and report; that is, they had no power to intervene in any action. They reported through their chain of command to their superiors and later to a cease-fire commission consisting of the senior people of the Rhodesian security forces and the Patriotic Front, under British chairmanship, responsible for the cease-fire. There were representatives of the Monitoring Force in all areas and those representatives monitored both sides of the fence. Monitoring of the Rhodesians was accomplished using the chain of command. There was a joint operation center which was in fact the brigade headquarters. There was a British lieutenant colonel and a small staff, about half a normal battalion headquarters. Under him he had a number of subordinates which were monitoring the battalion headquarters. There was a captain and about two men with each of the companies, or as many companies as we could man. Some company bases consisted only of a lieutenant and senior NCO. On the Patriotic Front side, as they were in the countryside and didn't have any set chain of command, it was decided to set up 24 rendezvous points. These points were manned by a small group of British Army personnel. These rendezvous points were to be opened for a period of 7 days between 29 December 1979 and 5 January 1980. The idea was that the Patriotic Front soldiers would report to those rendezvous points, during the dates designated, and no action would be taken against them. Once in the rendezvous point they were transported to 16 assembly places where they were to remain until the elections took place and the elected government would take over. It was a simple concept. There was a lot of criticism at the time that we wouldn't have enough people for the task outlined. As we proceeded, we discovered that we had more than sufficient people. The Patriotic Front monitoring system was slightly different in each area of operation, in fact there was a separate organization for each of the different guerrilla armies.

As far as the New Zealand forces were concerned, we had two assembly places for the Patriotic Front, both for Zirpa forces and on the Rhodesian side. We had eight company-based teams and a border liaison team which became involved in investigating intimidation of the various areas.

Now I will discuss the protagonists. The Rhodesian Army had a strength of some 9,000 regular forces and 15,000 territorial force soldiers. Some of the 9,000 regular forces were national servicemen. The infantry consisted primarily of two battalions of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, an all-white organization; two battalions of the Rhodesian African rifles, a black soldier-white officer organization; and 12 battalions of the Rhodesian rifles, which were a mixture with territorial forces. They had a series of special forces units, the Grey Scouts, and, of course, the SAS. The Grey Scouts were really only mounted infantry. They had armor with primarily French equipment, 25-pounder artillery pieces as well as 5.5 inch guns. The young men of the Rhodesian Light Infantry were operating in a hostile environment with severe strains of malaria and water-born diseases but were without long trousers, long-sleeved shirts, hats and many other pieces of equipment that would be normal in most armies.

The Air Force strength was 1,500 regular force and 10,000 territorials. They had a wide range of equipment which was relatively old with Canberra bombers, Dakotas, and the like. They had a reasonably modern helicopter fleet of French oulouettes. They used the light aircraft as fighter, ground attack aircraft.

The police had 8,000 full-time personnel with 35,000 in the reserves. Every able-bodied male between the ages of 18 and about 90 was involved in some sort of military duty, whether it be temporary, 2 or 3 weeks, or 6 months of the year. Every male in the country was involved in some form of military or police operations during each year.

The Patriotic Front forces included some 16,000 Zanu soldiers and 7,000 Zirpa troops. They were generally young, wore civilian clothes, and were armed with an assortment of weapons, almost all of which were of communist origin. Some of the Zirpa soldiers were wearing clothing and equipment which were of Libyan or Algerian origin. They were trained by the East Germans, and came into our assembly place organized as a conventional battalion with the normal range of weapons including some 12.7 machineguns. They looked relatively impressive. They "goose-stepped" about and used the normal communist terms of address, like "comrade"; but the standard of training was relatively high.

The other day, in his opening keynote address, GEN Starry talked about the fact that the US Army had not really come to grips with the mine warfare problem. The Rhodesians had been involved with countering the mine warfare for a number of years because the Patriotic Front guerrillas had mined most of the roads in the country. For this reason, they had a whole series of strange vehicles. The Commonwealth Monitoring Force was equipped or provided with British Landrovers that were heavily mine-proofed and were able to survive a mine, provided of course that the people driving the vehicle or in the vehicle were strapped in as required. The thing to note is that many of the military vehicles that we saw were relatively modern and came from nations like Germany and France in a period when sanctions were supposed to apply. The Rhodesians should not have been able to buy this military equipment at all.

The assembly places were not exactly the most hospitable spots in Rhodesia. They were very open, very uncomfortable, and very lacking in water.

The British Army provided a small headquarters of brigade size, called a "Field Force," which controlled the whole logistical operation. They initially supported deployment of the force and later provided the accommodations and food for the assembling Patriotic Front forces. They used six C-130's. They carried an enormous amount of freight, flew 200+ sorties which involved some 600+ hours of flying and were never stopped from flying through unserviceability or the weather. It was quite an incredible performance.

Once the threat from mine warfare had slowed; that is, the Patriotic Front had removed some of the mines from the road, we were able to use contractors to move supplies into the areas of both the Monitoring Force and the Patriotic Front. Our headquarters was not structured to support the Patriotic Front in any shape or form. It was designed to look after the 1,300 monitoring people but because no one else was prepared or available to look after the Patriotic Front, a small brigade headquarters became involved in total logistic support for a field army of 23,000 people. One of the major problems was medical support due to the large distances. If something had happened to any of the soldiers we wouldn't have been able to get them out. The British deployed doctors into each of the locations and used helicopters to evacuate casualties and for normal logistic operation. Those doctors, in addition, provided medical coverage for the assembly-place teams and were able to treat the rural population--many of them were seeing 800 people a day. A lot of these people walked large distances to see the doctors. The health of the people because of the war was in very poor state.

As far as helicopter support was concerned, the Gazelles and the Scouts were used for such things as mail and emergency runs and general liaison.

What did the Monitoring Force accomplish? The elections took place. If you had asked any one of the people who were involved in the first week of the deployment whether the election would have taken place, the answer would have been a positive "no." It was almost a miracle that, despite the political and military problems, the election took place; a result was announced; and, I think, generally accepted by most of the population. There were no casualties from either side from hostile action. There were three Royal Air Force servicemen killed in a motor accident in the far north of the country and two British soldiers were killed in a mine proof Landrover when it rolled and they weren't strapped in. There could have been, and it is surprising there weren't, a number of casualties from hostile action because the Patriotic Front used their weapons to demand food or to make a point when they were angry about something. They carried grenades on the end of their rifles and, in fact, 57 of their number were either killed or wounded by these grenades through rough handling or just bad maintenance. It was a matter of some concern to those of us at the headquarters of the operation that would suffer a casualty either through some Patriotic Front misdeed or just a sheer accident. For example, on one occasion, the two forces described fired at each other for some particular reason, which was not known to us. A captain from the Monitoring Force went down the next morning to straighten it out and spent 3 or 4 hours with an AK47 at his temple. He managed to talk his way out of that. It was the sort of incident that happened on a daily basis. There were also problems with the Rhodesian security forces, who were quick to

seek any chance to get at the Patriotic Front forces and on one occasion napalmed a bus. It was this sort of tension that was constant and, therefore, the fact that we had no casualties from hostile action was incredible. We did not have a major health problem because the health of the fellows was pretty good. They were fit, and they took the normal preventative malaria tablets and the doctors, with the teams, kept a good watch on them. It was a surprise that we didn't have a major health problem with the guerrillas. They came out of the field, many of them badly wounded and many of them suffering from all sorts of diseases. There was always the chance that we could have an epidemic. That didn't occur. I think the British Field Headquarters did a great job in providing the logistics support for that large number of Patriotic Front soldiers. They had to get uniforms from Hong Kong, shoes from Taiwan, and beef from South Africa.

Finally, from a national point of view, I had always been a little doubtful about the usefulness or practicality, if you like, of using New Zealand soldiers in a United Nations peacekeeping type of operation because they are generally aggressive in nature. However, the officers, and particularly the NCO's, in the team demonstrated skill, tact, and diplomacy where in normal circumstances they might have reverted to something a little less diplomatic. As for the elections, the people knew they had to vote and it seemed to me they knew what they were voting for. There was no doubt in anyone's mind toward the end, that Robert Mugabe was going to be the winner of the election. He, or his followers, rather cleverly told the people of the rural areas that if they didn't vote in day 1 and 2 of the 4-day election they wouldn't be able to vote for Mugabe. Mugabe, at the end of day 1 and 2 when polling stopped, was able to know exactly from his followers how many votes he had won. Perhaps the political achievement of the whole operation was the arrival for 1 week during the polling period of 500 British "Bobbies" or policemen from England. There was a great deal of doubt expressed by the Commonwealth Observer Teams, that were there in large numbers, that the election would neither be free or fair. The "Bobbies" were brought out in order that they might stand at the election post and so allow this free and clear election to take place. This seemed to be accepted by everybody and there was then no real criticism about the conduct of the election. As it turned out of course they were ordinary British "Bobbies" from the beat somewhere in the UK and they neither spoke the language nor understood the customs. If there was somebody organizing the polls or manipulating the people, those policemen would never know. I did feel a little sorry for them because it was quite warm at that particular time and they came off the chartered aircraft, were thrown some army kit, delivered to the polling place by helicopter and picked up 5 days later and thrown back on the airplane.

Well, gentlemen, that is my presentation on the force in Rhodesia and particularly New Zealand's part in it. As I mentioned before it was a rather unique and unusual operation of which I was very proud to be involved.