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
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16. Abstract The report includes an analysis of the current threat against civil aviation along with information regarding hijacking attempts, security incidents, bomb threats, and passenger screening activity. It also summarizes ongoing activities to assure adequate protection of civil air commerce against hijacking/sabotage and related crimes, and other aspects of the Civil Aviation Security Program.			
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THIRD SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM



JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1975

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
Civil Aviation Security Service

April 19, 1976


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THIRD SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

I. Introduction

This is the Third Semi-Annual Report to Congress on the effectiveness of the civil aviation security program directed toward the prevention of aircraft hijackings and related crimes involving aviation safety. Included is specific information regarding hijacking attempts, bomb incidents and threats, passenger screening data, airport and air carrier security and other aspects of the program. The report covers the six month period July 1 - December 31, 1975, and is submitted pursuant to Public Law 93-366.

Currently, airline passengers are processed through weapon detection devices and carry-on baggage is inspected by X-ray or physical search. Law enforcement officers are present at screening stations to provide support and ensure the availability of immediate and appropriate law enforcement action. The security of air operations areas is provided by airport operators.

II. Current Threat Against Civil Aviation

The detection of an increased number of weapons and other dangerous items at screening stations and the absence of successful hijackings indicate that procedures in use remain effective. However, documented instances of one unsuccessful U.S. air carrier hijacking and 15 possible hijackings prevented during the reporting period highlight the fact that the threat of aircraft hijacking remains with us and is, in fact, comparable to the peak periods of hijackings in the country (1969 - 1972). During those four years, there were respectively, 40, 25, 25 and 27 hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft.

Sabotage and threats of sabotage constitute the other basic element of the threat against civil aviation. Since 1972, 132 people have been killed as a result of 17 explosions aboard U.S. aircraft or at U.S. airports. Of the total 26 actual devices and explosions during that period, 7 or 27% were in public lockers, 8 or 31% were at various other airport locations, and 11 or 42% involved aircraft. The current official threat estimate indicates that due to the increase in terrorist activities and the increasing use of explosives worldwide, the danger to lives and property is greater than ever.

2.

To highlight this growing element of the threat, brief synopses of several sabotage incidents during the reporting period are set forth below in Section V. These include an explosion at Miami International Airport, discovery of bombs in unclaimed baggage and aboard aircraft and, of course, the recent tragedy at La Guardia Airport.

The explosion on December 29, 1975, at La Guardia Airport, which killed 11 and injured 54 persons, resulted in the immediate establishment of a joint government-industry task force. This group, comprised of Government and aviation industry officials, was directed to review current security procedures and to recommend measures to prevent this type of crime against civil aviation. Specific actions designed to prevent the introduction of explosives into the airport/aircraft environment were immediately adopted by some air carriers and airport managers. These actions included increased security awareness, the closing or relocation of public storage lockers, and tighter control of checked baggage. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initiated a comprehensive program of aviation explosives security surveys and seminars at the nation's air carrier airports.

The following facts concerning the increased number of incidents involving dangerous weapons and explosives, set forth in Sections IV and V, together with the current assessment of the near term future threat to civil aviation, emphasize the need to maintain the security measures in use and to adopt additional equally effective procedures to meet the changing threat.

III. Measures Taken to Improve Aviation Security

A number of actions were taken to improve security during this reporting period including the development of an Air Carrier Standard Security Program designed to prevent or deter aircraft hijacking, sabotage and related criminal acts. This Standard Security Program was developed in coordination with the airlines and has been adopted to date by 28 of the 32 scheduled air carriers. Universal adoption of the Standard Security Program by the air carrier community will assure greater uniformity and effectiveness of civil aviation security requirements throughout the air transportation system.

3.

Although not required by Federal Aviation Regulation, seven Air Taxi Commercial Operators (commuter airlines) have elected to implement similar security procedures by amendment of their FAA operations specifications. This action improves their security posture and facilitates passenger operations as they interface with the scheduled airlines.

Additional flight and cabin crew emergency security training material was furnished to 14 air carriers upon request. This training material outlines recommended crew tactics in response to hijack situations and supplements training aids provided the air carriers on a continuing basis.

Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121.575 was amended, effective July 20, 1975, to prohibit the serving or acceptance of alcoholic beverages to prisoners in custody and their escorts or to persons authorized to carry weapons aboard aircraft, such as law enforcement officers.

FAR 121.584 was amended to establish safety requirements that must be met when prisoners are carried aboard aircraft.

FAR 121.585 was amended to establish requirements that must be met when persons authorized to carry weapons, such as law enforcement officers, are permitted to take their weapons aboard air carrier aircraft. Procedures were also established for carrying weapons in checked baggage. These rules apply to passengers as well as air carriers.

A Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) was issued to amend FAR 121.538 by adding a requirement that U.S. air carriers refuse to transport persons that do not consent to search of themselves and their property to determine whether or not they are carrying a dangerous weapon.

FAR 129 was amended, effective after October 9, 1975, to require the use of a security program by each foreign air carrier engaged in scheduled passenger operations conducted with large aircraft to, from, and within the United States. This regulation provides that each such foreign air carrier adopt security measures similar to those of U.S. airlines including the requirement that all passengers and all property intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin be screened by weapon detecting procedures or facilities.

4.

An NPRM was issued on December 31, 1975, to provide that X-ray systems used by foreign air carriers for carry-on baggage inspection in the U.S. meet minimum U.S. safety, operating and detection standards.

IV. Aircraft Hijacking

A. Air Carrier Aircraft

During the six month period covered by this report, there were no successful hijackings and only one unsuccessful hijacking of U.S. air carrier aircraft. The unsuccessful hijacking occurred at San Jose, California, on September 15, 1975, when an armed man boarded a parked aircraft with two hostages and took two other hostages while on board. One of the hostages was shot and seriously wounded by the hijacker. After negotiations, the hijacker appeared at the top of the aircraft boarding stairs holding a gun at the head of one of the hostages. When the hijacker was distracted and pointed his gun at a police officer who had ordered him to drop his weapon, a police marksman fatally shot the hijacker.

In contrast, during the first six months of 1975, there were five attempts to hijack U.S. air carrier aircraft that were not successful. For the year 1975, there were six unsuccessful hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft. For comparison, during 1974, there were three hijacking attempts of U.S. air carrier aircraft. (Reference Charts 1 & 2.)

During this reporting period, there were five attempted hijackings of foreign air carrier aircraft, one of which was successful. For the year 1975, there were 12 attempted hijackings of foreign air carrier aircraft, three of which were unsuccessful.

B. General Aviation Aircraft

Although current civil aviation security requirements do not extend to general aviation activities, hijackings of general aviation aircraft continue to be a matter of concern. During this reporting period, there were four hijackings of general aviation aircraft, two of which were unsuccessful. During the previous reporting period -- January - June 1975 -- there were two general aviation hijackings, both successful.

5.

Of the four general aviation hijackings during this reporting period, the first occurred on August 16, 1975, when an armed man commandeered a Piper Cherokee aircraft as it taxied for departure at Woodbridge, Virginia. The aircraft headed south, but ran out of fuel and landed on a highway near Fayetteville, North Carolina. The man subsequently surrendered to local authorities. He was declared incompetent to stand trial on the hijacking charge and was committed to a mental hospital for treatment. Homicide charges resulting from two murders committed by the man just prior to the hijacking are still pending.

On October 7, 1975, three men chartered an aircraft from Greensboro, North Carolina, to Atlanta, Georgia, and shortly after departure, demanded that the pilot fly them to Tampa, Florida. After landing at Tampa, two of the men escaped and one surrendered to authorities. The two escapees were subsequently captured. Two of the hijackers were sentenced to 20 years and prosecution of the third man is currently under consideration by the U.S. Attorney, Middle District of Florida.

On November 8, 1975, a man chartered a flight for a ride around Evansville, Indiana. Once in the air, he pointed a gun at the pilot and told him to dive the aircraft into the ground. The pilot got into a struggle with the man and managed to push him out of the aircraft to his death.

On November 24, 1975, a man chartered a Piper Navajo aircraft allegedly to fly himself and musical instruments from Palomar, California, to Dallas, Texas. While over Imperial, California, the man opened one of the foot lockers supposedly containing the instruments and removed a rifle and pointed it at the pilot. The pilot was ordered to fly to Mazatlan, Mexico, where the aircraft landed. Several armed men met the aircraft and unloaded the foot lockers which apparently were loaded with weapons. The alleged hijacker escaped with the men who met the aircraft and the pilot was released unharmed. The hijacker has been charged with aircraft piracy and a warrant has been issued for his arrest.

6.

C. Possible Hijackings Prevented

The 15 unusual aviation security incidents which represent possible hijackings prevented during this reporting period are summarized as follows:

- o A passenger, after an X-ray device detected a firearm in his carry-on baggage, refused to open his bag and tried to flee. A policeman gave chase and overtook the suspect, but only after overcoming a second individual who attempted to block the officer's chase. Both passengers were apprehended. They had arrived at the airport by private auto and militant material, ski mask, rubber gloves and tapes were discovered in suspects' auto. One of the subjects was on parole from a previous jail sentence.
- o A passenger, while changing flights, requested that his luggage be given to him prior to boarding. The passenger agent inspected the luggage and discovered a gun secreted inside a small bag, whereupon the passenger was arrested. The passenger was a parolee from a Federal prison and before boarding the flight at his point of origin, he impersonated a Secret Service Agent at the airport restaurant using a false document. He since failed to appear for trial and a Federal warrant has been issued for his arrest.
- o A passenger aboard an air carrier shuttle flight on September 22, 1975, became drunk and disorderly and had no money to pay for his flight. He was detained and questioned by the FBI upon landing and was identified as a mental patient who had previously hijacked an air carrier flight. He was arrested for bank robbery in July 1975 and in August 1975 for threatening an air piracy attempt. Prosecution was declined due to his mental condition. On November 4, 1975, he called the FBI, using a false name, and stated that he had just arrived in Miami and intended to hijack an aircraft. He is currently at large and considered dangerous.
- o A man attempted to board an air carrier aircraft with a 9 MM handgun in his carry-on bag and \$3,000 concealed in one of his socks. He had purchased his ticket under an assumed name; was subsequently arrested and held under \$50,000 bond. The man would not explain the false name and would not provide his address. On October 1, 1975, a U.S. Attorney dismissed the charge for lack of evidence regarding commission of a crime aboard an aircraft.

7.

- o A non-passenger attempted to proceed through a screening station after alarming the detection device. A police officer on duty discovered a five-inch knife taped to the small of his back. He was placed under arrest but subsequently found not guilty.
- o A man attempted to enter the airport operations area via steps leading from the observation deck. When observed by police, he ran out of the terminal and onto the air operations area. He boarded an air carrier aircraft that was being serviced, stating that his parents were on board and that he must get them off. He was forced to leave the aircraft and arrested. He was subsequently admitted to a mental institution.
- o A non-passenger was observed by an airline agent at a jetway door. He told the agent he wanted to "get a plane, do his thing, and go to California." The agent called a police officer, but the man ran and he was later seen on the ramp and taken into custody and admitted to a hospital.
- o A man was found wandering around the air operations area and stated that he had been "directed" to the runway to catch a plane. He gained access to the runway by climbing over a security fence. He was admitted to a hospital for observation and evaluation. Subsequently, he was released from the hospital in the custody of his parents.
- o A man attempted to enter the exit side of a secure concourse. The police officer on duty yelled for him to halt and the subject ran down the concourse toward the aircraft boarding area. The officer overtook and tackled him. During the ensuing struggle, the man grabbed the officer's revolver and pointed it at the officer. The officer managed to take the revolver away and the man gave up. He was arrested by local authorities for assault with a deadly weapon. The U. S. Attorney declined prosecution. Trial by local authorities is scheduled for March 12, 1976.

8.

- o A man ran through an alarmed exit door and on to the air operations area. The police officer in the sterile concourse, alerted by the alarm, apprehended the man. He was carrying six knives, an eight-inch screwdriver and 50 rounds of hollow point ammunition. He said God had instructed him to board an aircraft and if successful in boarding, he would receive further instructions.
- o A man and woman were arrested on armed robbery charges by local police. They were seen earlier at the airport and said they had planned to hijack a small twin engine airplane and fly to California where they would work to get Charles Manson out of jail. The man had a prior arrest record. Both were admitted to a state mental hospital. The man is now in Federal custody awaiting trial.
- o A man jumped over an observation deck railing onto the air operations area. He ran up the boarding steps into an aircraft and stated in a loud voice, "All right, I'm taking over this plane." He was immediately taken into custody by airport security personnel. On October 7, 1975, he was charged with attempted hijacking. Federal charges were subsequently dropped and he was held on local trespass and bad check charges. He was held in jail October 5 through 9, and then released.
- o A man acting strangely and incoherently was removed from an FAA Flight Service Station by airport police and escorted off the airport. He advised that he was a Federal undercover agent with instructions to contact the Air Force Base. If unsuccessful, he was to hijack an aircraft. He was released and later observed breaking and entering a sporting goods store, stealing a shotgun and threatening police with the gun. After firing one shot, the gun jammed and he was subdued. While in jail awaiting trial, he was released on bond. He appeared in city court on January 13, 1976, and was granted a continuance of his case to January 21, 1976. He is currently free on bond and is considered dangerous.

- o A man who alarmed a weapons detector was asked to empty his pockets. Upon alarming the device a second time, he was asked if he had anything else in his pockets, and he stated, "No." However, a law enforcement officer alerted to the situation, observed a bulge and the print of a pistol in the individual's right pants pocket. Search revealed a .25 caliber fully loaded pistol with a round in the chamber and a 3 1/2 inch knife. He was taken to jail and subsequently released on \$520 bond to stand trial on charges of carrying a dangerous weapon.
- o A man was observed by a food service employee scaling a wall into the air operations area and entering an air carrier aircraft. Police were called and confronted the man. He admitted scaling the wall and did not have an airline ticket or any identification. He would not explain why he was on board without authorization. He was charged with conveying false information regarding attempted sabotage of an air carrier aircraft and was remanded to Federal custody on November 24, 1975. A Federal judge committed him to a Federal mental hospital on December 5, 1975.

D. Current Status of Hijackers

To date, 244 individuals have been involved in hijackings of U. S. registered aircraft since 1961. Of these, 100 are still in fugitive status. Most hijacked aircraft to Cuba and are believed to still be there.

Thirty-one hijackers who went to Cuba are known to have returned to the United States. Fourteen of the 31 have been sentenced to prison on charges of hijacking or related crimes. Sentences have ranged from two years to life imprisonment. Three of the returned hijackers have been committed to mental institutions, one was acquitted, charges against another were dismissed and another was killed in an attempted bank robbery. Of the 11 remaining, some have not yet come to trial while others have been placed under psychiatric observation.

10.

V. Aircraft/Airport Sabotage

A. Sabotage Incidents - Aviation Explosives Security

The First Semi-Annual Report took note of the threat posed by the use of explosives against civil aviation. In the second report, several such incidents were summarized and an overview of the FAA explosives security program was provided. A summary of incidents of this nature follows and is graphically depicted in Charts 3 & 4.

Two bomb explosions occurred at U.S. airports during the reporting period. At La Guardia Airport, the result was devastating -- 11 dead, 54 injured, \$750,000 property damage. In that incident, a bomb exploded in a public locker located in an airline baggage claim area. No one was injured in the other airport explosion at Miami International Airport and only minor property damage was incurred.

Two explosive devices were discovered in pieces of unclaimed baggage at another U.S. airport. Both devices had previously been offloaded from an arriving flight. If the device(s) had detonated, the aircraft could have been destroyed.

Another explosive device was discovered aboard a foreign aircraft at a U.S. airport. A mechanic discovered the device concealed behind a wall panel. Again, a highly destructive blast would have resulted had the device exploded.

A bomb was also discovered in the U.S. office of a foreign air carrier. The device had apparently malfunctioned and did not explode.

Also, an explosion caused damage to a helicopter. Six to eight blasting caps had been stuffed between the landing gear and the fuel tank. Estimated damage was \$10,000.

In only one of these six incidents was a suspect identified. In that incident, the suspect managed to flee the country prior to apprehension. The record reflects that those who commit such crimes are usually not apprehended. Consequently, the deterrent of apprehension and conviction might not be taken into consideration by the intended saboteur. Accordingly,

11.

the necessary response to these criminal acts involves maintenance of strengthened security measures designed to prevent hijacking/sabotage incidents from occurring in the first instance.

The joint government-industry task force established in response to the tragedy at La Guardia, identified three areas of necessary concentration: Public Locker Security, Explosive Detection Research and Development and Strengthened Security for Checked Baggage and Cargo.

Explosives security surveys at the nation's airports have been initiated by FAA to identify explosives security needs and to develop appropriate and effective corrective measures.

The FAA is also expanding the current explosives security training program to include the conduct of seminars at all airports and to maximize utilization of the explosives safety training now available.

In the area of explosives detection, the explosives detection dog team program (dogs and handlers), initiated in 1972, has continued to expand due not only to the increasing threat but also because of the high degree of explosives detection surety these teams can provide.

In the area of explosives detection research and development, the FAA is continuing to examine the possibilities of improving existing X-ray, vapor detection and other concepts as well as evaluating new locker design/modification concepts to minimize loss of life or airport damage resulting from a detonation.

In the area of checked baggage and cargo, the FAA is working closely with the airlines to examine the problems and ramifications associated with passenger checked baggage operations, and is exploring the need for and feasibility of implementing increased security measures. Measures range from examining each piece of baggage to the development of less time-consuming but effective methods to determine quickly baggage and cargo that require special security attention.

12.

B. Bomb Threat Information

Threats involving the use of explosives against aircraft and airports in the U.S. increased by 27% over the previous reporting period. During the period July - December 1975, 974 bomb threats against aircraft and 315 bomb threats against U.S. airports were reported. These figures represent an 11% increase in aircraft bomb threats and a 135% increase in airport bomb threats over the last reporting period January - June 1975.

The significant increase in bomb threats is due mainly to numerous threats being received after wide publicity was given to two bomb explosions; one at Miami International Airport on October 17, 1975, and the other at La Guardia Airport on December 29, 1975. The tragic bombing at La Guardia Airport induced an unprecedented number of threats in the days following the explosion. In the week following the explosion, over 300 threats directed against airports and aircraft all over the nation were reported. Most of the threats, some of which may have been evaluated as hoaxes during another period of time, were taken seriously. Authorities ordered emergency evacuation of aircraft and terminals, the number of bomb searches increased and, in several instances, airports were evacuated and aircraft diverted.

On a monthly basis, bomb threats against aircraft averaged 162 per month as opposed to 147 a month during the first six months of 1975. Bomb threats against airports averaged 52 per month as opposed to 22 per month in the first six months of 1975. Twenty-two of the threats during this reporting period were accompanied by extortion demands on the airlines or airports involved.

Many of the threats were made at passenger screening points by persons attempting to be humorous and frequently were made in a manner which made them inherently unbelievable. To obtain a more accurate picture of the effects of bomb threats, the Civil Aviation Security Service is attempting to distinguish between joking-type threats and the more significant serious threats. Serious threats are defined as threats involving one or more of the following criteria:

13.

(1) directed against a particular aircraft or flight, (2) impossible to determine immediately if made in a joking manner, (3) results in inconvenience to passengers or, (4) results in a search or otherwise disrupts airline or airport operations. It is believed that a separate analysis of serious threats as defined will provide a more accurate account of the effects on the aviation industry.

An analysis of bomb threats to aircraft from July-December 1975 indicates there were 377 serious threats, which is about 39% of the total number of reported statements. Approximately 80% of the serious threats were received telephonically.

Bomb threats directed against aircraft resulted in 52 persons being arrested under either Federal or local statutes. Thirty-six of the threats resulted in local charges; 16 resulted in Federal charges, four of which involved Federal criminal charges.

Most of the telephonic and written bomb threats were made by anonymous persons; and thus, legal action against the perpetrator was difficult. However, in those cases involving a suspect, the record of legal actions was good. For example, of 56 serious threats against aircraft at passenger screening points or other locations, 46 resulted in arrests and charges against those responsible.

VI. Effectiveness of Passenger Screening

During this reporting period there was an 8% (14.6 million) increase in the number of persons screened. There was also a 14% (818) rise in the number of persons referred to law enforcement officials for alleged criminal violations during the screening process at security checkpoints.

Although there was an overall 17% (226) decrease in the number of arrests at screening points, there was a 19% (118) increase in the number of arrests involving carriage of concealed weapons and explosives from the previous reporting period. There were 623 arrests of this type in the previous six months and 741 during this reporting period.

There was an increase of 16% (10,180) in the total number of weapons and dangerous articles detected at screening stations during this reporting period. The previous Report to Congress reflected a 100% increase during that reporting period. Again, the major increases occurred in the number of knives and other dangerous articles detected such as clubs, mace and tear gas canisters.

The detection of 2,440 firearms, including 1,035 handguns, represents an increase of 4% (97) from the last period. There was an 8% (77) increase in the number of handguns detected. Of the 1,035 handguns detected, 72% (743) were found by X-ray inspection of carry-on bags, 11% (113) by physical search of carry-on bags and 16% (165) by weapons detectors used to screen enplaning passengers and others passing through security checkpoints. A few (1%) were declared by persons when confronted with the screening process.

Six hundred and ninety-three incident/arrest reports were received involving the 1,035 handguns reported detected. The 693 handgun incidents/arrests occurred at 91 air carrier airports. Twenty-six large hub airports (e.g., Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chicago) accounted for 438 or 63%. Thirty-three medium hub airports (e.g., Memphis, Nashville, Birmingham) accounted for 158 or 23% of the incident/arrest reports, while 90 or 13% occurred at 25 small hub airports (e.g., Jackson, San Jose, Little Rock). Seven or 1% occurred at non-hub airports (e.g., Macon, Georgia, Panama City, Florida; Burlington, Vermont).

The significant increase in weapons and dangerous articles detected throughout 1975 (reference Chart 5) may be attributed to the increased use of X-ray machines, a more uniform reporting system and improved performance of screening personnel as a result of increased training by the air carriers.

VII. Compliance and Enforcement

The FAA has the responsibility to ensure compliance by the airlines and airports with the requirements of applicable FARs. FAA also has the responsibility to ensure compliance by airline passengers with the requirements of those FARs which deal with the carriage aboard aircraft of deadly

15.

or dangerous weapons. In accordance with FAA policy, alleged or apparent violations of regulatory requirements are investigated and appropriate administrative or legal actions taken. Enforcement actions completed with respect to alleged violations by airlines during this reporting period increased 49 or 50% over the first half of 1975. The number which resulted in payments of civil penalties increased by 26 or 144%; however, the amount of civil penalties collected increased only \$6,900 or approximately 36%. Overall, during the second half of 1975, enforcement experience with regard to air carriers in 1975 was generally consistent with that experienced in 1974. (Reference Chart 6.)

In the second half of 1975, as a result of a regulatory change, four investigations were completed with respect to individuals who boarded airlines with weapons without proper authority. These investigations resulted in one civil penalty. Activity in this new area of enforcement is expected to increase.

A system has been initiated whereby when minor and correctable violations of the FARs are discovered, the FAA security inspector is authorized to issue a Warning Notice to the involved air carrier or airport manager. This system provides a simple means of warning the air carrier or airport operator of minor infractions and of actions necessary to maintain current security effectiveness.

The Warning Notice is issued only when the violation is correctable on the spot, is of a minor nature, and under circumstances where a more serious sanction is considered unnecessary.

Airport (FAR Part 107) compliance and enforcement activity was comparable to that experienced last year in that 100 new cases were opened and 106 cases were closed in CY 1975 as opposed to 113 opened and 96 closed in CY 1974. As in the past, most closed cases were terminated with letters of correction (83). Civil penalties were received in 16 cases as compared to 14 in 1974, but the total of civil penalties this year is more than double that of last year. A total of \$14,450 was collected in CY 1975.

16.

A Compliance and Enforcement Procedures training course was initiated for FAA inspectors at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City. This course is designed primarily for Civil Aviation Security, Flight Standards and legal personnel who have responsibility for carrying out the FAA compliance and enforcement programs. Thirty-three Civil Aviation Security personnel completed the two-week course during this reporting period.


CHART 1

Updated By: ACS
Source: ACS-20

Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

HACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT

Goal 2: Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum



CARRIER	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	Total	Total, per Carrier
AA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
AL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
AT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
BA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
DL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
EA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
FA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
GA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
HA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
IA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
JA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
KA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
LA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
OA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
PA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
QA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
RA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
TA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
VA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
WA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
XA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
YA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ZA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

CHART 2

Updated By: ACS
Source: ACS-20

Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

HIJACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. AND FOREIGN AIRCRAFT

Goal 2: Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum




CHART 3


Issued: 2/20/76
Updated: Monthly
As Of: 1/1/76

Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

BOMB THREATS AGAINST U.S. AIRPORTS

Goal 2— Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum

Drawn By: ACS
Office: ACS-20



Analysis: The significant increases in threats shown for August 1974, and December 1975 are the result of explosions at Los Angeles International Airport on August 6, 1974, and at La Guardia Airport on December 29, 1975.


CHART 4
Issued: 2-10-76
Updated: Monthly
As Of: 1-1-76

Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

Updated By: ACS
Source: ACS-20

BOOMB THREATS AGAINST U.S. AIRCRAFT AND FOREIGN AIRCRAFT IN THE U.S.

Goal 2—Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum.



Analysis: The significant increase shown for December 1975 is the result of an explosion at La Guardia Airport on December 29, 1975. Threats have been relatively consistent but with a gradual overall increase.

CHART 5

CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
AIRLINE PASSENGER SCREENING RESULTS

	1974	(1/1-6/30) 1975	(7/1-12/31) 1975
PASSENGERS SCREENED (MILLIONS)	200.7	97.2	105.01
PASSENGERS DENIED BOARDING	2663	*	*
REFERRALS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT	*	5726	6544
PERSONS ARRESTED	3501	1345	1119
AVIATION OFFENSES DETECTED:			
CARRYING WEAPONS/EXPLOSIVES ABOARD AIRCRAFT	1147	623	741
GIVING FALSE INFORMATION	1465	152	75
OTHER OFFENSES DETECTED:			
NARCOTICS	593	161	114
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION	925	332	116
OTHER	679	77	73
WEAPONS DETECTED:			
FIREARMS	2450	2343	2440
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES	14,928+	113	45
AMMUNITION-FIREWORKS	*	12,483	14,564
KNIVES	21,468	20,878	25,440
OTHER	28,864	26,161	29,669

* NOT AVAILABLE, COLLECTED OR TABULATED
+ INCLUDES AMMUNITION AND FIREWORKS

CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Air Carriers (FAR 121.538)

Actions Taken:

Warnings Issued	-	-	329
Letters of Correction	152	124	128
No Action	66	36	63
Civil Penalties (Amount)	43 (\$42,850)	58 (\$75,750)	56 (\$45,300)
Investigations Closed	261	218	576
Investigations Pending			126

Airports (FAR 107)

Actions Taken:

Warnings Issued	-	-	125
Letters of Correction	40	68	83
No Action	11	14	7
Civil Penalties (Amount)	1 (\$1,000)	14 (\$6,750)	16 (\$14,450)
Investigations Closed	52	96	231
Investigations Pending			25

Individual (FAR 121.585)

Actions Taken:

Administrative Corrections	1		
No Action	2		
Civil Penalties (Amount)	1 (\$25.00)		
Investigations Closed	4		
Investigations Pending	10		

No Regulation Applicable
During CY 1973 & 1974