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THE USSR COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
(Selected Portion)
by

N.M. Kiryayev, Ye.F. Nikitin and Yu.I. Korablev



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PREPARED BY:

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WP-AFB, OHIO.

U. S. BOARD ON GEOGRAPHIC NAMES TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM

| Block | Italic | Transliteration | Block | Italic | Transliteration |
|-------|------------|-----------------|-------|------------|-----------------|
| А а | <i>А а</i> | A, a | Р р | <i>Р р</i> | R, r |
| Б б | <i>Б б</i> | B, b | С с | <i>С с</i> | S, s |
| В в | <i>В в</i> | V, v | Т т | <i>Т т</i> | T, t |
| Г г | <i>Г г</i> | G, g | У у | <i>У у</i> | U, u |
| Д д | <i>Д д</i> | D, d | Ф ф | <i>Ф ф</i> | F, f |
| Е е | <i>Е е</i> | Ye, ye; E, e* | Х х | <i>Х х</i> | Kh, kh |
| Ж ж | <i>Ж ж</i> | Zh, zh | Ц ц | <i>Ц ц</i> | Ts, ts |
| З э | <i>З э</i> | Z, z | Ч ч | <i>Ч ч</i> | Ch, ch |
| И и | <i>И и</i> | I, i | Ш ш | <i>Ш ш</i> | Sh, sh |
| Й й | <i>Й й</i> | Y, y | Щ щ | <i>Щ щ</i> | Shch, shch |
| К к | <i>К к</i> | K, k | Ъ ъ | <i>Ъ ъ</i> | " |
| Л л | <i>Л л</i> | L, l | Ы ы | <i>Ы ы</i> | Y, y |
| М м | <i>М м</i> | M, m | Ь ь | <i>Ь ь</i> | ' |
| Н н | <i>Н н</i> | N, n | Э э | <i>Э э</i> | E, e |
| О о | <i>О о</i> | O, o | Ю ю | <i>Ю ю</i> | Yu, yu |
| П п | <i>П п</i> | P, p | Я я | <i>Я я</i> | Ya, ya |

*ye initially, after vowels, and after ъ, ы; e elsewhere.
When written as ë in Russian, transliterate as yë or ë.

RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH TRIGONOMETRIC FUNCTIONS

| Russian | English | Russian | English | Russian | English |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|--------------------|
| sin | sin | sh | sinh | arc sh | sinh ⁻¹ |
| cos | cos | ch | cosh | arc ch | cosh ⁻¹ |
| tg | tan | th | tanh | arc th | tanh ⁻¹ |
| ctg | cot | cth | coth | arc cth | coth ⁻¹ |
| sec | sec | sch | sech | arc sch | sech ⁻¹ |
| cosec | csc | csch | csch | arc csch | csch ⁻¹ |

Russian English

rot curl
lg log

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THE USSR COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET ARMED
FORCES

Editors: Major General N. M.
Kiryayev, Professor Colonel Ye. F.
Nikitin, and Docent Colonel Yu. I.
Korablev.

To ensure collectivism in the work of the leading political body of the army and fleet, the Chief Political Directorate was created in 1960 by the decree of the CC [central committee] of the CPSU which is called upon to solve all the paramount problems of the Party-political work in the Armed Forces¹.

The political apparatus of the army and fleet is improving with every year. It is being supplemented by new highly qualified cadres of political workers who have graduated from military academies and institutes and who have a comprehensive knowledge and good political training. Towards 1965 every fourth political worker had the highest level of military training. Among the heads of the political departments in the formations, 98% were officers with higher education. The deputy regiment commanders in the political units of the tank troops and many political workers of this category in the Air Force have a proficiency rating and are capable of operating the military hardware in any situation. Many officers in the command and technical positions

¹ See "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil," 1960, #5, p.79.

were assigned to do political work. All the heads of the political organs and the deputy commanders of the political units in the Missile and Air Defence Forces had higher military and political education and many of them had special training.

Much has been done for the ideological and organizational strengthening of the army and fleet Party organizations. From 1958 to 1962 the number of sergeants and starshiny among the communists of the Armed Forces has almost doubled, and the number of soldiers and seamen increased by over 4 times².

Measures were taken to expand the network of primary Party organizations, and especially of the Party groups, in the subunits. Throughout the Armed Forces, as a whole, 40% of the companies and subunits equivalent to them had Party groups by 1 January 1958. The network of Party groups increased steadily in the subsequent years: by 1 May 1960, Party groups were organized in 65% of the subunits, while the Air Defence troops, aviation, and tank troops had Party groups in 75% of the subunits.

Upon the resolution made by the Central Committee of the Party, a meeting of all the secretaries of the primary Party organizations from all services was called in May of 1960. This meeting was a new aspect of the concern shown by the Communist Party concerning the strengthening of the political work in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Many elective Party workers were invited to this conference. The conference dealt with the important problems of build-up and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, and also the state and the task of Party work in the army and fleet.

The participants of the conference discussed the problems facing them in principle and in a business-like manner, thoroughly analyzed the most valuable experience gained from practical work of training and indoctrination of troops, sharply criticized the shortcomings observed in the military and political training, and decided on the measures for their elimination. A total of 214 people presented reports at the plenary meeting and in seven sections.

² See K. Bochkarev, I. Prusanov, A. Babakov. CPSU's program for the defence of the Socialist Fatherland. Voyenizdat, 1963, p. 135.

In his long speech at the conference, L. I. Brezhnev showed great appreciation for the state of the Party-political work in the army and fleet and, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, outlined the next tasks dealing with its further improvement.

It was noted in the resolution made at the conference that intensifying the effect of Party organizations on all aspects of life and activity of the troops is one of the main results of their work. The Party organizations, themselves, have hardened and gotten stronger in the ideological and organizational respect; their activity became richer and more versatile. They began to devote more attention to the problems dealing with Party work as a whole, get more involved in the life of the units and subunits, act bolder in pointing out the deficiencies and be more effective in helping the commanders to eliminate these, and take a more active participation in organizing a socialist competition.

The conference has noted that the commanders, political organs, and Party organizations have taken into account the directives of the Party concerning the decisive role of ideological indoctrination of the masses in the period of large-scale building of communism and have become more specific and devote more time to the problems dealing with agitation and propaganda among the personnel. Improvements have been made in conducting political studies, Marxist-Leninist education of officers, new forms of ideological work have appeared which made it possible to broaden the sphere of its effect on troops.

Soon after the All-Services Conference of the secretaries of the primary Party organizations, the Central Committee of the Party passed a resolution regarding the structure of the primary Party organizations in the army and fleet. The Committee has permitted, as an exception, the formation of Party committees in the Party organizations of the regiments and units equivalent to them which have 75 communists and more, and grant the rights to the primary Party organization to the Party organizations of battalions and the subunits equivalent to them. With the permission of the political organs of the formations, Party organizations with shop rights were organized in the companies, batteries, and subunits equivalent to them, if they had three or more Party members. In the subunits with one-two Party members and several candidates, Party groups were organized headed by a Party organizer ap-

pointed by the committee of the unit¹.

In accordance with th's resolution passed by the CC CPSU, the Chief Political Directorate worked out standard recommendations regarding the structure of Party organizations in the Navy. Party committees were organized on cruisers, air regiments, aircraft-maintenance bases, individual divisions of antisubmarine defence, in the headquarters of an auxiliary fleet of naval bases, and arsenals if the membership of the Party organizations of these units numbered over 75 communists². Rights of primary organizations were granted to the Party organizations of combat units on cruisers. Party organizations were formed in the divisions and combat units, and Party groups were formed in the turrets, batteries, and crews.

Primary organizations were formed on all submarines, destroyers, escort ships, and tenders; and Party organizations with shop rights were formed in the combat units of these ships which included three Party members.

Granting the rights of primary organizations to the battalion and division Party organizations indicated the increasing role played by the battalion section in raising the combat readiness of troops. Under these new conditions, the Party organizations were afforded the possibility to delve deeper into the specific forms of combat readiness, into the practice of the indoctrination work, better ensure the exemplary behavior of the communists in training and discipline, and be closer to the troops. The Party committees created in the regiments have acquired the possibility to get more involved in the organizational and ideological work, study and implementation of positive experience, indoctrination of the active members and officer cadres, and broaden the ties with the local Party organizations.

As a result of this transition to the new structure, the number of primary Party organizations in the army and fleet has doubled as compared to 1957. In October of 1961, 93% of the subunits (of the total number) already had Party organizations or Party groups³.

¹ See "Krasnaya zvezda," 13 September 1960.

² See "Krasnaya zvezda," 11 December 1960.

³ See "Krasnaya zvezda," 29 October 1961.

The resolutions passed by the XXII Congress and the new CPSU Program did much to stimulate the level of activity in the Party-political work. The documents of the congress define the specific ways for increasing the level of activity in the Party-political work, which is called upon to organize and direct the efforts of the masses to solving major problems and to unite the knowledge and experience of the masses together for accomplishing new large tasks.

The problems of Party-political work in the Armed Forces were being solved in accordance with the principal directions and tasks of a communistic indoctrination of people.

Having thoroughly familiarized themselves with the materials of the XXII Congress, the commanders, political organs, and Party organizations strived daily to see that the ideas of the Party's Program and Regulations, moral code of the builder of communism, became the personal convictions and stimulating motives in service, training, and behavior of every soldier, worker, and serviceman of the army and fleet. The entire structure of military life, organization of combat training, service, and leisure time of personnel were directed at solving the problems outlined in the CPSU Program and Rules as regards the education of a new person.

Much has been introduced into the organization, content, and methodology of political training after the XXII Party Congress: forming groups by years of service, changing most of the groups to the lecture-seminar method, introduction of problems dealing with world outlook into all training programs, study of the history of military development of the Soviet Armed Forces, revolutionary and military traditions of the Soviet people. In 1964 political schools were established in the regiments and on ships: these are three-year schools in the land and aviation forces and four-year schools for the Navy. The first course of these schools was attended in 1964 by soldiers and seamen who were in the first year of service in order to give them the chance to finish the entire program while they were fulfilling their obligation in the Armed Forces.

Night Marxism-Leninism Universities and division Party schools play an enormous role in the Marxist-Leninist training of officers. These schools train skilled cadres of supernumerary propagandists and raise

the educational level of commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol members. Special attention is being devoted to increasing the number and improving the quality of training given at the general night universities operating in accordance with the program of the Higher Party School.

On the basis of the resolutions passed by the XXII Party Congress and the Program and Rules adopted by the congress, changes have occurred in the structuring of the army and fleet Party organizations. In January of 1963 the CC of the Party ratified new Instructions to the CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy. "The main mission of the Party organizations," the Instructions go on to say, "is to put in to practice the requirements of the CPSU Program, to ensure that the Soviet Armed Forces would be a precise coordinated organism, have high level of organization and discipline, carry out in an exemplary manner the task set before them by the Party, government, people, and be ready to give a smashing repulse to imperialistic aggressors at any moment."

The same idea runs through the Position concerning the political organs of the Armed Forces.

In fulfilling the requirements set by the Party, the army and fleet Party organizations have activated the inner-Party life, strengthened the advance-guard role of communists in military and political training, and are devoting more attention to accepting young communists into the Party and training them. However, the check conducted during the first half of 1965 with regard to the new membership in the Odessa Military District and twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet revealed gross deficiencies in this area.

The prescribed requirements were not always adhered to strictly in accepting new members into the CPSU ranks. In the pursuit of the quantity, the principle of an individual approach to people was not adhered to, those being accepted were not studied sufficiently. Formalism and haste were permitted in examining the applications. At times, Party members gave recommendations to individuals whom they did not know well and characterized their political and moral qualities unobjectively. Some Party organizations did not show the necessary concern in educating the young communists, to their ideological training. Many candidates and young Party members had a poor knowledge of their prescribed res-

possibilities and were lacking in their understanding of the questions dealing with the internal and external politics.

All this resulted in the fact that among those accepted to the Party were individuals who were undeserving of the high title of communists; they were not exemplary in their education, service, and personal behavior. This lowered the prestige of the Party organizations.