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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Demands for Orderlines in the Cuban Revolution in the

1980s

by Jorge I. Dominguez

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Cuba enters the 1980s having witnessed impressive changes during the previous two decades. Cuba has become a major factor in the international system. Its revolutionary government has transformed many aspects of its own society, economics and politics. To its credit, it continues to build on its already impressive accomplishments in certain areas such as education and public health. This paper has had a much more modest goal: What are the demands for orderliness in the Cuban revolution?

They are those of a regime that could be described as a "consultative oligarchy." The Cuban political system is neither the one-man terroristic dictatorship that its enemies claim nor the participatory egalitarian paradise painted by some of its supporters. Hierarchy, bureaucracy, performance, bargaining over organizational stakes -- these are the hallmarks of Cuban politics. Cuba is not unique in this regard, of course, but the two alternative descriptions just cited seem to be more prevalent.

The political authority of the top leadership remains unchallenged in effect. Centralized power at the top was strengthened as the 1980s opened. There is also impressive stability, albeit with some changes, at the Central Committee

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of the Communist party. Organizational representativeness became an increasingly important criterion for membership at the same time that lines of rank and authority were delineated more clearly. Performance also became more clearly related to organizational rank, promotions and demotions. While the importance of historically grounded factionalism has declined, the symbolic politics of "affirmative action" on the grounds of class and sex (but not race) have appeared.

The demands for orderliness in the revolution also lead to stratified political participation. There is a good deal of many kinds of political participation in Cuba. Most of it, however, is only consultative, with very little discernible impact on decision-making. Again, this does not make Cuba unique, but it does characterize it. The political participatory channel that is most open to independent actions by the mass of the population -- citizen contacting of public officials -- is precisely the one that has little bearing on incumbent identity. This consultative participation is itself stratified.

For the top and the intermediate elites, participation is more meaningful. Party members, the overwhelming majority of the National Assembly (many of them are Central Committee members, too), argue and bargain with each other, at times openly, with important effects. Disputes at this lofty level do matter for policy. The stakes have become organizational as well: arguments rage over jurisdiction and rank, over responsibility and institutional power. This widened organizational context has revived the lobbying skills of an organization

such as that grouping the small peasants, and it has provided a possible opening -- as yet more potential than realized -- for managers. It has been a boon to that long-standing master of Cuban bureaucratic politics, the Armed Forces, whose influence over Cuban social life has climbed markedly since 1978. At the bottom of the stratification pyramid are the "politically marginal." The party and government deal with them primarily through the exercise of naked state power. The lines separating them from the majority of the population have hardened as well.

Techniques of problem-solving have become organizational, too, from the armed forces to the running of the economy. Even Fidel Castro's political style has begun to take into account his new role as the arbiter among competing organizational claims.

For the world beyond Cuba, there are some implications from this analysis. First, the combination of the conflict-ridden international situation around Cuba's world role in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the stronger organizational position of the Cuban Armed Forces in a more stratified context has strengthened the hands of the military over society, economy and politics. There have been a series of military policy successes.

Second, foreign policy is one of the last vestiges of extremely centralized political decision-making, less subject to the organizational competition that has become more important in other policy arenas. Foreign policy remains a matter for the Political Bureau, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and the Council of State -- with considerable overlaps in their membership. Above all, it remains Fidel Castro's domain.

Third, despite the above, the tendency in the Cuban political system away from the rule by a few "heroic" individuals, toward the rule of organizations represented in the top councils of decision-making by their leaders, suggests that foreign policy, too, might become an arena for competitive organizational bargaining. Virtually all agencies of the Cuban government now have international links and programs. One-third of the delegates to the Second Party Congress have served abroad in military or civilian tasks (compared to one-twelfth at the First Party Congress). The stakes of much of Cuban foreign policy many need to respond in the next few years, too, to the demands for orderliness in the revolution.

Fourth, for those who seek to affect internal affairs within Cuba from the outside beyond foreign policy concerns, the new organizational context and the sharpening political stratification are all the more important.

For Cubans themselves, there might be even more important questions. Do the demands for orderliness in the revolution compete with, overcome, or exclude altogether, the demands for a revolution within the revolution? Are the dreams of the late 1950s, which turned the revolution into a national epic for many Cubans, to be realized through rising political and social stratification? Will Cuba respond more to order or to revolution? Can these be combined, as Fidel Castro's formulation hopes for? These questions are only opened, not settled, by this analysis, but they are, indeed, at the heart of Cuba's future.

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The Demands for Orderliness  
in the  
Cuban Revolution in the 1980s\*

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June 1981

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### ABSTRACT

For a summary of the paper, read the section on "Conclusions," pp. 61-64.

"Demand for orderliness," President Fidel Castro told the Second Congress of the Cuban Communist party in December 1980, "should never be neglected in a revolution."<sup>1/</sup> Thus he summarized his response, and that of the government and party that he led, to the tumultuous events in Cuba in 1980. He also pointed to a principal political outcome in Cuba in the late 1970s that would shape the political structure of the early 1980s. This is "political stratification."

Only some of this political stratification was the result of deliberate policies consciously pursued by the leadership, such as those that increased the scope of power of the Cuban armed forces in the society. Some was the result of the unintended consequences of such policies, such as the excessive successes of judicial restraint, or the appearance of managerial lobbying, in the late 1970s. The links between social and political stratification occurred despite the best efforts of the leadership, suggesting the structural obstacles that even a highly powerful and committed leadership finds difficult to overcome.

The consolidation of political stratification in contemporary Cuba affects the understanding of its internal politics and the development of the politics of a consultative oligarchy. Fidel Castro's personal power in Cuba remains, of course, supreme, but it works increasingly (although not exclusively) in organizational settings e.g. acting as a judge to settle competing policy arguments or organizational positions. Second, the boundaries that separate sets of people in Cuban politics have jelled.

It became clearer in the late 1970s, for example, who was "within the revolution" and who was not. Third, hierarchical relations were clarified. The control of the top leadership (not just Fidel Castro's) became more evident as changes were made to the political structures adopted earlier in the 1970s.

Fourth, participation opportunities were stratified as well. The opening of political participation opportunities at the local level, developed in the mid-1970s, was consolidated but not extended. The favored modes of mass participation remained either political mobilization or citizen contacting. The effective control of the top ranks of Cuban politics remained at the top, not at the bottom, of the political system. Participatory stratification, however, also meant that the participation opportunities for middle level personnel increased. Participatory chances in Cuba, therefore, are becoming institutionalized as they relate to rank.

Fifth, the stakes of politics are increasingly organizational. Fundamental decisions now must be made about relations among organizations and about the membership in them. Sixth, while there is still an occasional reliance on the traditional political methods of the Cuban leadership, especially in crises, the techniques for problem solving as well as longer range programs are also increasingly organizational. Finally, the leadership's own explanations of success and failure point increasingly to organizational consciousness and criteria. Even when individuals are blamed for mistakes, it is less for the failings of revolutionary virtue, as

was the case at times in the late 1960s, and more for sheer incompetence. Organizational responsibility rather than revolutionary good intentions are becoming the essential criteria for judging personal performance.

The Events of the Late 1970s: Background<sup>2/</sup>

When the First Party Congress of the Cuban Communist party met in December 1975, guarded optimism about the future appeared justified. The Cuban economy had benefited from a half-decade of economic recovery, making up for the severe economic crisis of the 1968-71 period. Cuban relations with the Soviet Union had become very close; Soviet assistance to Cuba had increased markedly. The Cuban Armed Forces had been professionalized and were winning in the Angolan war. The international situation looked very favorable, with the U.S. highly restrained in the wake of the Vietnam war, the collapse of the Portuguese empire, greater independence from the U.S. in Latin America, and fresh possibilities for Cuban leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Cuban Communist party had grown and become better articulated internally; the party had become a recognizable organization rather than merely a conglomerate of individuals singled out for praise. The party began, in effect, to exercise its so-called "leading role." An experiment in local participation in Matanzas province had gone well enough that the Congress ratified its extension nationwide; other state organs, including a National Assembly and a Council of State, were added to the existing national organizational network. A new Constitution,

and new procedures for law enforcement, the courts and government and party behavior, were about to be approved. The mass organizations had reached new heights in membership and activity. Performance in education and health continued to improve. All this had created new bases of legitimacy and popular support for the regime.

Five years later, much had been accomplished but many unanticipated and genuinely surprising problems appeared. Papers in this project by Carmelo Mesa-Lago, John Nichols, William LeoGrande, and Edward Gonzalez discuss the trends in the areas of economics, mass media and international relations. Suffice it to say here that the economic problems that Cuba faced especially in 1979 and in early 1980 (before the world price of sugar rose in the closing months of 1980) were among the most severe since the revolution came to power in 1959 and served as the background to the major political events of those years. The rising conflict with the U.S. in the late 1970s brought to the fore within Cuba new concerns about the national security, providing a rationale for the expansion of the Cuban military. This paper will turn specifically to the political questions. The most dramatic events of the 1979-1981 period were the departure of over 125,000 Cubans to the United States and other countries, the replacement of many top party and government office-holders, and the new concern with internal and international security.

The Elite: Organizational Hierarchy and Stakes<sup>3/</sup>

Changes of the Cuban party and government elite strengthened those at the very top. These delineated lines of hierarchical authority more clearly and expanded the representation of organizations in the Central Committee. Performance became the operative criterion for promotion or demotion for elites just below the very top.

Notwithstanding the events of the second half of the 1970s, not one of the members of the Political Bureau of the Communist party, as constituted in 1975, was dropped five years later. Blame and responsibility for errors committed during that five-year period were born exclusively by subordinates. The 1980 Political Bureau was increased by three members, all of whom had belonged to the Central Committee and the higher ranks of party and government since the revolution came to power. This confirmed the political strength at the top of the stratification hierarchy.

Only one of the members of the 1975 Secretariat appears to have been demoted (Raúl García Peláez, the Ambassador to Afghanistan), even though he remains a member of the Central Committee in an important post. The two most elderly members of the Secretariat (Roca and Rodríguez) left that office but they remained as members of the Political Bureau; Isidoro Malmierca also left the Secretariat but to shift to the roughly comparable rank of Foreign Minister. Four new members were added to the Secretariat, thus keeping its size intact.

The rank of alternate member of the Political Bureau (with

11 members) was created. This enlarged the top leadership by drawing from heretofore weakly represented organizations. Three Division Generals lead the list of alternate Politbureau members. No military officers (other than the Armed Forces and Interior Ministers) served on either the Political Bureau or the Secretariat. The Presidents of the four principal mass organizations have also become alternate Politbureau members. The other alternates are two members of the Secretariat and the President of the Central Planning Board, who speaks for high ranking technical and managerial personnel.

Political Bureau members are generalists who serve in many roles. Eleven of the sixteen are also members of the Council of Ministers with direct line responsibility; fourteen of them belonged to the Council of State. In contrast, all of the alternate Political Bureau members (including the two party Secretariat members) are organizational specialists; none belonged to the Council of Ministers although 5 of the 11 belonged to the Council of State. The creation of this new rank at the top, therefore, has added to the inner high councils of the regime people who are most likely to be representatives of the organizations in which they work. The Cuban top elite had lacked this component of organizational representativeness. Even so, the combined ranks of Political Bureau, alternate Political Bureau, and Secretariat membership include only 29 people because several belong to two of these ranks.

There were also changes at the Central Committee. The number of full members, which had only increased from 100 to

112 from 1965 to 1975, was 148 in 1980. There had been no alternate members from 1965 to 1975, when 12 such positions were created; there were 77 in 1980. The composition of the Central Committee also changed. There has been a marked increase in mass organization leader representation as full members of the Central Committee matched by a comparable decline in the share of the military. The latter decline, as can be seen from Table 1, is the continuation of a long term trend.

The decision to expand the Central Committee probably responded to the difficulty in deciding who might be dropped. Indeed, 78.7% of the 108 full members that were still alive in 1980 were re-elected. Six of the twelve alternates were promoted to full members, and only two of these twelve were dropped. The number of military members of the Central Committee remained unchanged (at 36); because a number of people on active military duty in 1975 took up civilian responsibilities, this opened up posts as full Central Committee members for other military officers. The share of membership in the bureaucracy, foreign relations, and in education, science and culture remained remarkably consistent from 1975 to 1980. The number of those in the party and the Communist Youth Union fell slightly but it was compensated by the increase in mass organization representation -- people whose work is akin to that of the party and Youth Union.

Considering all the members of the Central Committee (full and alternate), the changes are a bit more modest. The decline in the military share is much less because officers account for a third of all alternates; thus the actual

number of officers who belong to the Central Committee in either category has increased considerably as one might expect from the great services that they have performed in the Angolan and Ethiopian wars. Less than a tenth of the alternates were mass organization leaders, a proportion far closer to the historical pattern.

In sum, the composition of the entire membership of the Central Committee exhibits considerable stability, despite the relative shift between military and mass organization shares. The expansion of membership accommodated more easily the organizational stakes of politics, sharing growth rather than having to choose among worthy claimants for power. The need for organizational representativeness accounts best for the changes in structure and composition. The strength of the organizational hierarchy has been preserved. The role and representativeness of the Political Bureau were enhanced, thanks to the alternates. The interlocking patterns of power at the top of party, government and state organizations were maintained.

#### Organizations and Performance Criteria

Central Committee membership patterns also illustrate other features of the organizational stakes of politics. One is the importance of performance on the job. Among the most public jobs are those of the fourteen first secretaries of the Communist party in each province (including the first secretary of the special independent municipality of the Isle of Youth, formerly Isle of Pines). Five of the fourteen were dismissed from their jobs between 1975 and 1980, indicating the high stakes in assuming

such a post. They were held responsible for poorer political and economic performance. Three of these five were also dropped from the Central Committee. A fourth, Faure Chomón, remained in the Central Committee but continued his long decline within the leadership (he had once been a member of the National Secretariat). Only one of the five, Raúl Curbelo, was transferred to a job of comparable rank as head of the civilian assistance efforts in Ethiopia. Of the five new provincial first secretaries, only one had belonged previously to the Central Committee, and was so continued. The other four, however, were reminded of their lower rank by being added only as Central Committee alternates.

Three provincial first secretaries were singled out for promotion. Julio Camacho, the first secretary for the city of Havana (an independent province), became a Political Bureau member and Miguel Cano, from Holguín province, became a Political Bureau alternate. Julián Rizo, the Matanzas province first secretary who helped to launch the first experiment in local government in 1974, joined the Secretariat. While Camacho's promotion may depend on the importance of his job and on his long-lasting closeness to the top elite, Rizo's and Cano's promotions appear to be related to performance.

Cano's promotion is especially interesting because his rise has been recent even though he has been a party official since the early 1960s. The performance of Holguín province

in 1976-1980 on some key indicators was far superior to that of the other eastern provinces. For example, gross production increased 67% and productivity jumped 46%. In contrast, Granma province did not even fulfill its plan, and its provincial first secretary was fired. Guantánamo and Santiago provinces' first secretaries held to their posts, but their respective rates were 38.9% and 21.1% for the first, and approximately 30% and 35% for the second. Neither number matched Holguín province's, so that only Cano was promoted from these eastern provinces.<sup>4/</sup>

The result has been that the fourteen provincial first secretaries now reflect hierarchical orderings far more than had been the case in 1975. Three of them have joined the top elite, five are virtually on probation, and the balance remain as ordinary Central Committee members. Their experience thus shows the new and clearer links between policy performance and organizational position and power.

Other highly visible office holders are the members of the Council of Ministers. Beginning in late 1979, many Ministers were held responsible for poor performance in broad areas of the economy, society and internal security. Three ministers were replaced in December 1979. A month later, 11 ministers, presidents of state committees (also of ministerial rank) or presidents of other central state organs responding directly to the Council of Ministers, were dismissed. Nine others were dropped from the Council of

Ministers, or from direct access to it, because their agencies were dismantled or subordinated to others, thereby losing their independence. Never had such a massive political shakeup occurred in the upper reaches of the government since 1959. Nine of these 23 had been Central Committee members or alternates as well; six of these nine were dropped from the Central Committee.

These changes have clarified the role of the Council of Ministers subordinate to top party organs. The Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers is one of the key organizations that interlocks with top party organs. Of its 14 members, 8 are in the Political Bureau, one is a Politbureau alternate, and the others belong to the Central Committee. For the 22 ordinary Ministers, the pattern is rather different. Only 10 belong to the Central Committee (two others are Central Committee alternates). Ten Ministers do not belong to the Central Committee at all (in contrast, all Division Generals in the Armed Forces do).

Many of the Ministers who belong to the Central Committee are former military heroes of the revolution in the 1950s who have since assumed civilian jobs. A clearer picture of the limited political weight of Ministers who lack such "historic" merit emerges by looking at the recent career patterns of those who are Ministers in 1980 but who were not elected to the Central Committee when the first party Congress met in 1975. There were 9 Ministers in 1980 who were also Ministers in 1975 and who were left out of the Central Committee at that time. Only two

of these were added to the 1980 Central Committee as full members, and one other as an alternate. There were also 6 Ministers in 1980 who had become so only between 1975 and 1980 and who had not been members of the 1975 Central Committee. Only two of these six were in the 1980 Central Committee.

The stratification of the Council of Ministers, therefore, is far sharper and precedes the stratification of the provincial first secretaries. At the top there is the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers with close interlocks with high party organs. At the bottom there are the more technically oriented Ministers who are not Central Committee members. In between there are the Ministers who do belong to the Central Committee. Unlike the provincial first secretaries (all of whom are at least Central Committee alternates), a large minority of the Council of Ministers is excluded altogether from the Central Committee. Among those Ministers who belong to the Central Committee, there is the entire range from Central Committee alternate to full Political Bureau member. This organizational hierarchy is related not only to historic merit but also, increasingly, to performance. Good performers are promoted; bad performers are dismissed; new ministers tend to be virtually on probation.

Two other aspects of the changes in the Council of Ministers clarified hierarchical relations. The first was the recentralization of power in the hands of the Vice Presidents who constitute the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Instead of appointing new ministers to replace those dismissed, the Vice Presidents assigned new responsibilities to themselves. While

only two of thirteen Vice Presidents had direct ministerial responsibilities prior to December 1979, all but three had acquired them by the end of January 1980. Instead of a "circulation of elites" at the very top, there was a reconcentration of power that reversed some of the modest trends from the mid-1970s toward decentralization.

A second factor was the manner in which the changes were made. According to the 1976 Constitution, the National Assembly -- Cuba's national legislature -- is supposed to approve the Ministers. The leadership could have waited to announce the changes made in early December until the National Assembly met later in the month, and it could have made a bit sooner the changes announced in mid-January. Instead, all the changes were authorized formally by the much smaller Council of State, to which all the Political Bureau members at the time belonged. While, as we will see, the National Assembly is not a trivial organization, top personnel decisions remain effectively beyond its real authority.

#### Factional Politics

One long-standing concern in studies of the Cuban elite has been the relative weight of "factional politics," specifically the rivalry evident in the 1960s between former members of the prerevolutionary Communist party (the Partido Socialista Popular or PSP) and former members of the Twenty-six of July Movement and of the less important Revolutionary Directorate.

There is no evidence that that historical factional split has much relevance to Cuban politics in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the "balance of origins" that has characterized top party organs remains. Former PSP members accounted for 23% of the 1965 Central Committee and for 20.5% of the full members of the 1975 Central Committee.<sup>5/</sup> While the data on pre-revolutionary background for the 1980 Central Committee remain incomplete, it is expected that the PSP share would decline. The reason is, of course, chronological age. Former PSP members are much older than the rest of the elite; two of the four Central Committee members who died between 1975 and 1980 were PSP members. Moreover, many of the new Central Committee members born in the 1930s and early 1940s were too young to have participated much in pre-revolutionary Cuban politics. What, then, does the fragmentary evidence show?

The old PSP share of the Political Bureau was slightly diluted by enlargement, but it is still 19%. Among the alternate Political Bureau members, old PSP members account for 18%. Cuba's daily newspaper, Granma, has been publishing the biographies of new 1980 Central Committee members. Of 48 new full members for whom biographies have been published, the PSP accounts for 15%. The PSP's contribution to the 23 demotions of full members in 1980 from the 1975 Central Committee (excluding the four dead) was 17%. And of 21 new alternate members for whom biographies have been published, the PSP accounts for 19%.

These numbers are far too consistent to be random. How, then, might this apparent fixation with historical political origins be explained? Perhaps efforts to alter the historical share, except through natural death, might be taken to mean a change of policy that is otherwise unintended. Thus, paradoxically, historical factional shares may have to be maintained to prevent their renewed politization. Another explanation might be the continuing need to amend for purges undertaken against former PSP members in the 1960s. To develop current elite harmony, good performers who had been punished for their factional affiliations in the past should be rewarded now, with the effect of maintaining the historical PSP share. There is some evidence to support this hypothesis.

Of the eleven new, full or alternate, former-PSP members of the Central Committee identified so far, seven had only belonged to the youth wing of the old party; none of these appeared to have had their careers interrupted in the 1960s. Of the four who had been full PSP members, one has been a simple worker, now promoted to the Central Committee primarily for symbolic reasons (see below), and the second made his career as a military officer in the Interior Ministry and became a war hero in African wars. The two remaining people, Evaristo Baranda and René Peñalver, suffered career interruptions.

Baranda joined the party, then called the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) when it was led by Aníbal Escalante (later fired from the job of Organization Secretary

by Fidel Castro) in 1962. Baranda appears to have been expelled from the party at about that time, along with many other former PSP members, because he is said to have joined the Communist party only in 1965. No information is given of his whereabouts during the intervening three years.<sup>6/</sup>

Peñalver joined the party in 1962 and rose quickly through the ranks. He served as first party secretary of several important regions in western Cuba. Then the second major factional dispute surfaced in late 1967, with many former PSP members once again clustered around Aníbal Escalante. Peñalver lost his high party rank. He ran a repair shop from late 1967 until 1970. Peñalver reemerged as second party secretary in a region of western Cuba in 1972, and later to become national secretary general of the agricultural workers union.<sup>7/</sup>

In short, then, factional politics do not seem to matter much for active political disputes or for policy formulation, but the historical shares have been maintained partly not to give offence and partly to make amends to those who had suffered, perhaps unjustly, from factional disputes in the 1960s.

#### Symbolic Politics

As organizational stakes and procedures become important, the principles that legitimate political rule are affected. Political legitimacy since 1959 has depended on several factors, only one of which has been Fidel Castro's personal appeal. During the 1970's, the organizational bases for legitimacy became more important, complementing the earlier sources.

Organizational representativeness in top party organs may be becoming a basis to legitimate rule for middle and upper ranking elites. Decisions are right not only because they may make sense but also because there are varied organizational inputs. This is not a generalized, but a bounded participation, within the hierarchical channels. It is consistent with some lines of argumentation about politics in the Soviet Union, too.<sup>8/</sup>

As organizational representativeness rises in importance, however, a political leadership part of whose legitimacy derives from its links with humble people is likely to feel the need to include some non-elites in the Central Committee's membership, giving rise to symbolic representation.

This symbolic representation did not occur in the 1965 Central Committee, when the organizational framework of Cuban politics was in its infancy, and it is at most barely noticeable for the 1975 Central Committee. In the 1980 Central Committee, however, at least 7 of the full members lack a high political, economic or military rank. They are only "exemplary" workers -- "vanguards" in their work place or "National Heroes of Labor." This is "affirmative action" on the grounds of social class. The most spectacular is Antonio León del Monte Pérez, a technician in a textile factory, born in 1924 and an old PSP member, who has been cited numerous times within his industry for his good work, and who was honored as "National Hero of Labor" for five consecutive years in 1974-1978.<sup>9/</sup> In addition,

17 leaders of the Cuban Confederation of Labor became full members of the 1980 Central Committee -- an unprecedented number.

Another feature of symbolic politics that has surfaced in Cuba, as in other countries, is "affirmative action" for women. Women accounted for only 5.4% of the full members of the 1975 Central Committee, but for almost half of the dozen alternates. Only the high share (though small number) of the women alternates served as a glimmer of affirmative action politics in the 1975 Central Committee. There was also some evidence of this in the elections of women to the Organs of People's Power (local and provincial government) earlier in the 1970s. By 1980, women account for 12.2% of the full members of the Central Committee and for 14.3% of its alternates. This more than doubling of the share of full members would not have occurred unless specific steps had been taken to accomplish it. For example, 4 of the 7 full members and 3 of the 4 alternate members, of the 1980 Central Committee who appear to be there only for their "exemplary work" merits are women; these women do not even have national responsibilities in the women's federation. Eight leaders of the Women's Federation also became full members of the 1980 Central Committee. If these affirmative action cases were to be excluded, the women's share of the Central Committee would approximate its historical level.

The use of Central Committee membership for symbolic representation is an innovation to convey political messages and policy orientations through organizational means. The limits of symbolic politics are also clear, however. There have never been women members in the Political Bureau or in the Secretariat of the party, or in the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. There is only one woman Minister (there had been three others until early 1980, when two were dismissed from their posts and one died).

The one area where symbolic politics might apply but has not is race. The proportion of full members of the party's Central Committee who are blacks or mulattoes has changed little; it is about 11.5%; among the alternates, the proportion is about 14.3%. No less than a quarter of all Cubans are non-white.<sup>10/</sup> While the proportions of nonwhites in the 1980 Central Committee are slightly higher than for the 1975 Central Committee, there is no evidence of the kind of affirmative action in the area of race that has become plain with regard to social class and gender. Racial politics, still, remain behind a political veil in Cuba, as has always been the case.

Stratified Elite Participation: The National Assembly

The study of policy formation in Cuba is among the more inaccessible topics for research by outsiders. However, the debates in the National Assembly have become somewhat open. The Cuban National Assembly was established in the 1976 Constitution as the State's highest legislative organ. Over

90% of the members of the National Assembly are also members of the Communist party, so that National Assembly debates can be taken as a reflection of intra-party discussions. National Assembly members are elected indirectly. In effect, membership is an appointment that reflects decisions by the national leadership. The structure and origin of the National Assembly virtually ensures that major leadership policies will not be challenged. The National Assembly has little discernible impact on foreign policy, military policy, or economic planning and budgeting. It would be an error, however, to consider the National Assembly to be only an adornment. Some genuine debates have occurred in committee and in plenary meetings. Because information about the latter is more available, the two 1980 sessions are examined as a proxy for some of the new context of Cuban politics.<sup>11/</sup>

Case 1: As usual, little debate occurred over most issues that surfaced at the typically brief session of the National Assembly in December 1980, but considerable debate ensued over a bill on environmental protection and on the rational use of natural resources. This debate was rather open, not manipulated. While the National Assembly committee that guided the legislation prevailed on most issues, an exception was deciding where the new organizational power would be. The committee, and the bill, recommended that the Academy of Sciences would have "direction and control" over new policies. Vice President José Ramón Fernández, of the Executive Committee of

the Council of Ministers, objected that the bill would reduce ministerial authority unnecessarily; instead, he proposed that the Academy's powers be limited to "coordination." The matter was solved only upon President Fidel Castro's personal intervention. He proposed to assign the overall responsibility to the Council of Ministers which could decide, entirely at its discretion, what the proper role of the Academy and the Ministries should be in enforcing this legislation. His proposal was approved unanimously.<sup>12/</sup>

Case 2: Another aspect of the discussion of this law was the six amendments proposed by Faustino Pérez, member of the Central Committee. Although Pérez did not at the time have organizational responsibility relevant to this bill, he had professional expertise because he once directed the Institute of Hydraulic Resources. Four of his amendments were rejected or withdrawn. One that was approved simply inserted in the preamble a section on the advantages of a socialist system to implement this kind of legislation. The only one of his substantive amendments that was approved went on to prohibit the dumping of garbage in rivers and waterways. It passed, at least in part, because Fidel Castro spoke in its favor.<sup>13/</sup>

Case 3: At the also brief earlier session in July 1980, there was a major debate over a bill to rehabilitate soils and to preserve inland wetlands. The bill had been proposed personally by Armed Forces Minister Raúl Castro. It had

been debated extensively. It was formulated at the level of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, not at a lower level, perhaps because it was proposed by Vice President Castro. However, the Executive Committee had to amend it and distribute it for comment by appropriate agencies three times before it was ready to be submitted to the National Assembly. A major change from the original design was the insertion of the previously neglected subject of inland wetlands.

In the plenary session, Vice Minister of Culture Antonio Núñez Jiménez argued that the bill should be expanded even more to include soil preservation. Núñez had no organizational responsibility over this subject, but he is recognized as the government's foremost expert on geography and associated sciences. He was supported by Félix Duque, the chief officer of the Agriculture Ministry in Matanzas province, who claimed that the bill should be discussed further with his own Ministry and with the Academy of Sciences. A number of leading figures, Vice Presidents Rodríguez and Cienfuegos, and city of Havana first party secretary Camacho defended the existing bill. Vice President Raúl Castro, however, proposed that the bill be withdrawn for further study. Some of the bill's original critics, then, switched positions suggesting that his bill be passed and another one be drafted, but President Fidel Castro put an end to the discussion by supporting Raúl Castro's motion for withdrawal.<sup>14/</sup>

Case 4: Another example is the new Traffic Code, also approved at the July 1980 Assembly session. The Committee on Internal Order steered the bill; all of its proposals but one were approved easily. The exception was the committee's proposal that cargo trucks could be used to transport people for recreational purposes on weekends or on vacation. It was opposed, for a variety of reasons, by Havana city first secretary Camacho and others. Interior Minister Ramiro Valdés urged the Assembly to approve the bill as drafted, leaving to the Interior Ministry the issuance of regulations that would address this problem. Secretariat member Jesús Montané reminded the country's chief law enforcement officer that the Interior Ministry could issue no regulations unless authorized to do so by law. President Fidel Castro resolved the debate by retaining the committee's language but adding a phrase to give the Interior Ministry the necessary discretion to issue further regulations.<sup>15/</sup>

Case 5: A related debate concerning the Traffic Code was the severity of sanctions against those driving under the influence of alcohol. Some, including Secretariat member Montané, wanted a tougher bill. Others opposed a total ban on the grounds that it was impractical. As Vice President Rodríguez put it: "We must bear in mind our country's specific conditions, not to establish a penalty that does not elicit compliance from our society." The debate was solved when President Castro moved to establish a committee that would redraft this section.<sup>16/</sup>

These cases illustrate several aspects of policy debates in Cuba. The first, of course, is Fidel Castro's personal role as a judge among contending opinions. He rarely spoke early; he allowed the debate to unfold, and then took decisive action to settle the controversy. He was never challenged. Equally important is the kind of solution he favored. He sought to create political discretion for top government authorities to act with less constraint than originally envisaged. This was so in the first and fourth cases, and to some degree in the fifth.

The cases also indicate some vigorous debate. It is extremely unlikely that these were staged or pre-arranged. Even a bill introduced by Raúl Castro had to be withdrawn temporarily. Indeed, the discussions are the best public manifestation of substantial freedom of expression at the elite level. The latter is, of course, the fundamental qualification: this is only an intra-elite debate. Serious and sustained challenges are mounted only by those National Assembly members of a high and secure rank.

While lower ranking National Assembly members do participate, their interventions tend to be formalities; only by exception so

far have they attempted to challenge the leadership. One exception occurred at the December 1979 National Assembly when a deputy from the city of Manzanillo complained about inadequate drainage systems in her home city. President Fidel Castro chided the delegate for representing the interests of the local community even though all delegates should represent only the interests of the whole country. President Castro then went on at great length, and apparently with considerable passion, to detail the benefits the revolutionary government had conferred on Manzanillo. No comparable challenge to the leadership has been reported since that time.<sup>17/</sup>

In short, political stratification has occurred within the National Assembly. Certain topics, such as the budget or foreign and military policy, are in effect the exclusive prerogative of elites in the Council of State, the party's Political Bureau and the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Other issues may be debated at National Assembly plenaries provided one had either appropriate organizational rank or recognized expertise. Those who had neither have played minor roles ordinarily.

The National Assembly cases also show the organizational context of much of the debate. In the first, third and fourth cases, the organizational powers of the Ministries generally, or of specific agencies such as the Academy of Sciences and the Agriculture and Interior Ministries, were at the heart of the debate. There is also evidence of much prior discussion

among organizations. The fourth and fifth cases also show the renewed importance of routinized procedures. In the fourth case, the view that discretion was implicit in the general powers of the revolutionary government, as the Interior Minister suggested, was criticized and did not prevail. Discretion was retained, but the value of established legal procedures was preserved, too. In the fifth case, although the matter was not settled, the debate was about the appropriateness and the efficacy of law. This is plainly different from earlier times when the view that Interior Minister Valdés manifested had been the ordinary practice.

Those who had no direct organizational responsibility who took a part in debates were either very high ranking government and party leaders, such as Camacho or Montané, or they had recognized expertise, such as Faustino Pérez or Antonio Núñez Jiménez. The top leaders are necessarily involved, even if they do not have direct line responsibility. The "expert" interventions are to be expected in a political system where historical merits of pre-revolutionary times, or mere "revolutionary virtues," have a declining role.

There is no evidence of permanent factions. Perhaps because the issues do not lend themselves to factional debates, the historical origin of leaders seems to be unimportant. However, the personal predilections and temperaments of leaders are shown. For example, the positions taken by Ramiro Valdés and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in the fourth and fifth cases are almost caricatures.

Finally, although concern for following legal procedures prevailed, there is no civil libertarian consensus as a result. For example, Montané's position in the fourth and fifth cases is not opposed to government discretion or to severe sanctions: it only seeks to uphold the importance of procedures. The opponents of severe sanctions in the fifth case did so on the grounds of practicality, not principle.

#### Stratified Participation in Mass Politics

Participation opportunities outside of these elite settings are more limited. They also exhibit further ranges of political stratification. Budget legislation mandates that the Provincial Assemblies discuss the budget bill before it is submitted for the consideration of the National Assembly. This has not happened in practice. The budget bill has been discussed only by the Executive Committees of the Provincial Assemblies and not by the Assemblies themselves. Evidence of this violation of the law has been given by the national coordinator of People's Power (which includes both provincial and municipal government levels) as well as by the Executive Committee Presidents in some of the provinces. While the Provincial Assemblies might begin to discuss budget laws in the early 1980s, the precedent of budget law discussion at the National Assembly level is not encouraging: because there is no real discussion of the budget, the provincial executive is likely to retain real discretion.<sup>18/</sup>

This problem was noted with greatest eloquence by Vice President Rodríguez who observed that blaming practical difficulties to justify the lack of genuine discussion and participation has the effect of "transforming democracy into technocracy and allowing a group of people to decide everything." He warned of the danger of "turning the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the Secretariat."<sup>19/</sup>

The Presidents of the provincial executive committees, in turn, have lower rank than the party first secretaries in the provinces. For example, all the first secretaries are Central Committee members or alternates. Only one provincial president (a former General) belongs to the Central Committee, and two others are alternates.

Discussions of the planning and budget laws are also supposed to be a means for enterprises and, especially, for workers to have an input into regional, provincial and national decision making. The experience so far is discouraging. In 1978, 34% of all enterprises failed to discuss at all the 1979 plan with the workers. An additional 58% of the enterprises brought the 1979 plan before a workers' assembly, but they then paid no attention to suggestions made. Thus only 8% of the enterprises had some resemblance of effective participation -- and only they were in compliance with the law. Even in this minority of enterprises the pattern of participation tends to be very heavily weighted toward those in positions

of responsibility such as party officers or labor leaders.<sup>20/</sup> Partly in response to these deficiencies, some improvement occurred in the discussion of the 1980 plan. The proportion of enterprises that held meetings and that made changes in response to suggestions rose sharply to 58.8% (although stratification within the enterprise continued). Still 5.7% of the state firms were in complete violation of the law by holding no meetings, and the balance held meetings but subsequently ignored suggestions.<sup>21/</sup>

The text of the 1980 plan bill said that it had been discussed previously with the workers. Party Secretariat member Jorge Risquet noated that while there had been difficulties for several years in discussing the plans with the workers, the situation had gotten worse in the case of the 1980 plan. The Assembly approved Risquet's proposal that the bill's reference to prior participation by workers be deleted. Form came to correspond to fact.<sup>22/</sup>

The pattern of stratification, therefore, ranges from complete (and illegal) exclusion to merely formal meetings, to those where some substantive discussions occur; in the latter, the local plant political, managerial and labor leadership, in turn, accounts for the bulk of the participation. As will be seen in the later discussion of managerial participation, however, the degree of participation by anyone at any rank at the enterprise level remains very modest --

another feature of stratification and of persisting centralization of decision making.

It is more difficult to assess the extent of participation at the local level outside of the work place, that is, in the relationship between ordinary citizens and the delegates to the municipal assemblies of People's Power. The innovations of the mid-1970s had two principal features. Elections for delegates to municipal assemblies were introduced; these, in turn, elected delegates to the Provincial Assemblies and deputies to the National Assembly. The municipal elections -- the only direct ones -- were competitive in the sense that there were at least two candidates per post, but the electoral system restricted the meaning of competition. There was no freedom of association: candidates opposed to the government could not coalesce to advance their views. There was no freedom to campaign as an individual on behalf of a program. Only the party and the government could campaign. Party-controlled nomination procedures above the municipal level guaranteed elite control. These features have not changed. They provide for limited elements of electoral participation, greater than in the U.S.S.R., but under sharp constraints.

The second innovation legalized, legitimated and, to some degree, promoted citizen-contacting of public officials to bring to their attention community problems and inefficiencies. This innovation was an impressive manifestation of concrete

democratic commitments that also sought to improve the efficiency of the delivery of government services.<sup>23/</sup>

The citizen-contacting mode of participation remains.<sup>24/</sup> However, the responsiveness of government officials to citizen complaints is weak at times. Vice President Humberto Pérez has said that the meetings at which municipal delegates are to render an account of their work before the assembled local citizenry have become a "liturgy," the fulfillment of a duty without content or purpose. Discussions in the National Assembly of these problems confirm Pérez's observation. President Fidel Castro's Main Report to the Second Party Congress noted that many of these meetings had become nothing but "mere formalisms."<sup>25/</sup>

Part of the explanation for the behavior of the local delegates is that they have such limited resources to meet the numerous citizen demands. All municipal and provincial governments have authority over only about 20% of the country's budget. While central state revenues (in current prices) are expected to increase by 18.2% from the 1980 to the 1981 budget, all subnational government revenues are expected to rise by only 14.7%. And although subnational governments have formal authority over a large number of enterprises within their jurisdiction, these enterprises accounted for only 9% of the country's state sector gross production in 1978. Subnational government resources, therefore, remain inadequate to meet the needs posed by the volume of citizen demands.<sup>26/</sup>

Political stratification operates at the local government level as well. The levels of government above the municipal remain rather insulated from direct electoral contact, even under electoral procedures that are weighted to ensure that the regime would not be threatened fundamentally, and subordinate to the party. Municipal elections are competitive in a limited way. The most open channels of participation are only those of citizen-contacting, with the apparently growing limitation of formalistic responsiveness from government officials and the continuing inadequacy of subnational government resources to meet citizen demands. The most open channel is precisely the one that does not determine who shall rule.

Another means for organized mass participation has been membership in local voluntary organizations that render specific community services. These include community councils, neighbors' committees (independent of the formally organized mass organization, discussed below, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), local sports councils, and the like. Because these organizations are somewhat depoliticized, in contrast to the formal mass organizations, they may indicate how many citizens actually choose to participate on their own rather than responding to the inducements of political mobilization. A study conducted in December 1976 in 282 rural communities showed a complex associational life, with 2,714 different community organizations, or an average of almost ten per community. However, only about 25% of the adult

population (ages 15 and over) participated in these community organizations. This might be taken as the level of participation that would occur in the absence of much political mobilization. It is a substantial level, but it does leave three quarters of the population outside of the participatory strata.<sup>27/</sup>

The oldest means of political participation in Cuba has been membership through mass organizations. In the late 1970s, political stratification has also surfaced most clearly with regard to the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Women's Federation. Up to the mid-1970s, with but minor interruptions, both of these mass organizations increased steadily the share of the adult population included within their ranks. Approximately 80% of the adult population was included in the Committees by 1973 and a comparable proportion of adult women was included in the Federation by 1975.<sup>28/</sup>

In January 1981, the proportion of adult women who belonged to the Federation stood at 80.3%. At the annual mass meeting of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution in September 1980, their share of the adult population stood still at 80%. There is no other five-year period since 1959 during which the share of the population participating failed to increase. In the Committees' case, Fidel Castro explained: "The only reason for the membership not being larger is that, in the past few years, the organization has been especially careful in choosing new members."<sup>29/</sup>

The decision to establish a clearer political boundary between those within and without the revolutionary mass organizations has defined sharply who is on the margins of political life. This, too, consolidates political stratification -- it identifies the polar opposite of the national elite. Including their children, this "politically marginal" population amounts to about two million people.

In conclusion, political stratification has come to delineate the Cuban population. The elites have considerable opportunities for participation structured around organizational stakes. Participation opportunities below the elite are much more limited, but middle-ranking elites in the provinces or in the work place still have elements of input. The most open channel for participation for ordinary citizens is the one that has no impact on incumbent identity or replacement. Finally, the trends in political stratification have rigidified the boundary setting apart the "politically marginal" with greater precision than ever.

#### The "Politically Marginal"

The "politically marginal" include those who do not belong to the mass organizations for which some political "merit" is required and also those that do belong but who are still disaffected with the regime. The 125,000 people who migrated to the United States in 1980 (and a few thousand more to other countries) included many who had belonged to such organizations. Those who were excluded from membership

entirely -- by their own choice or not -- are of course at the bottom of the political stratification pyramid.<sup>30/</sup>

At the most extreme level, violent and illegal political participation resurfaced in Cuba in 1980 in ways unparalleled during the preceding decade. These acts of violence were not aimed at overthrowing the government but at seeking political asylum in embassies accredited in Havana. The embassies of Peru, the Vatican and Ecuador have now witnessed such efforts. They reveal the existence of an organized and occasionally armed underground society beyond the reach of the government.<sup>31/</sup>

At a less extreme level are those who left the country in 1980 without recourse to armed violence. Many left voluntarily; others did so because the government induced them to depart. In some instances, the choice was between prison and exile, and they naturally chose the latter. This is the third wave of emigration from Cuba since the revolution came to power. It is also the most demographically representative. The occupational and racial composition of the emigration appears to match that of urban Cuba; the most recent exodus is unrepresentative only in that it is still overwhelmingly urban. Comparing the three waves of emigration, there is a gradual universalization of the exile pool, suggesting that support and opposition to the government are much less related now to social and economic cleavages than they were in the early 1960s. Except for the rural-urban cleavage, support or opposition appears to depend more on political beliefs than

in one's position in the social structure. This is, however, a self-liquidating participation. The exiles are no longer a problem at home for the Cuban government. The opposition has been exported once again, contributing to the regime's consolidation in a difficult time.<sup>32/</sup>

Many of those who left have complained of consumer shortages in goods and services. The "consumerist" critique of the Cuban government's performance is, at times, devastating. For example, the national newsmagazine Bohemia conducted a small survey among 135 respondents in the cities of Havana and Matanzas concerning the supply and quality of clothing. Clothing, a basic need, has been included in the rationing system since 1962 but it has also become available in recent years at higher prices in the so-called "parallel market" in government stores. The respondents to the Bohemia survey were citizens whose political views on other subjects remain unknown; there is no reason to think that they are other than a random sample of the population of these two cities. What, then, do they think?

A substantial majority (59%) believe that the supply of clothing is good or sufficient, consistent with its availability through both the rationing and the parallel market systems. But 78% of the respondents believe that clothing does not respond to fashions; 84% find little variety in the clothing supply; 62% believe that the clothing available is neither

functional nor practical; 76% complain about the quality of materials and 47% specifically mentioned that they were inappropriate for Cuba's climate; 76% had difficulty finding clothing for their size. In addition, 65% believe that the enterprises responsible for the clothing supply do not take into account the opinions of consumers and, most surprisingly, reflecting the increasing importance of the parallel market, 91% believe that prices are too high.<sup>33/</sup>

The consumer's dissatisfaction with economic performance is thus not limited to those who have chosen exile. It is a fact of Cuban public opinion. While the government has attempted to meet this criticism by improving the supply and the quality of production, its principal approach to its critics in 1979-1981 was to increase internal security controls.

The leadership has thus turned much of its attention to the alleged weaknesses in the work of the Interior Ministry and the courts. The most extensive official discussion was given by Fidel Castro in his report to the Second Party Congress. He chided the Interior Ministry for its "tendency toward bureaucratism and a weakening sense of discipline and rigor." He said that its efficiency had declined not so much against the clearly counterrevolutionary enemy but against other manifestations of "highly dangerous elements with serious crime records." These crime records, of course, include activities only some of which are strictly "common crime."

Efforts to leave the country without an exit permit, or violations of the rationing system, are considered crimes in Cuba; but they result, in fact, from aspects of the Cuban political and economic system that generate crime. Nonetheless, Fidel Castro criticized the Revolutionary National Police because it did not respond well to these tasks of "crime control;" he also complained of "some legal mechanisms that did not promote a more active and efficient struggle against crime."<sup>34/</sup>

The only sector whose top leadership was changed entirely in December 1979-January 1980 was that of internal order, law and courts. The Ministers of Interior and Justice, the Attorney General and the President of the Supreme Court were all replaced (the latter through retirement). Why did this happen?

In addition to the rise in political and economic discontent, the revolutionary government may have encountered the "excessive success" of the Constitution and the new legal codes approved in the mid-1970s. These helped to set a climate for the laws to be observed and the arbitrariness reduced.<sup>35/</sup> Such measures worked too well. Beginning in 1979, the courts were criticized for their enforcement of procedural safeguards whose consequence was to set free people accused of crimes. For example, 22,138 cases (37.1% of those on file) were dismissed in 1978. About a third of these were dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence,

and the balance because the guilty party could not be determined. In addition, there were also 3,830 acquittals, of which almost half occurred because the prosecution withdrew the charges. A storm of protest broke out over the leniency of the police and the courts. President Fidel Castro summed up the mood saying that the effect had been to create "guarantees for the criminal;" instead, the rights of society had to prevail.<sup>36/</sup>

That criticism set the stage for the personnel changes and for the toughening of the laws and of law enforcement. Political Bureau member Armando Hart summarized the policy as it had evolved a year later: "the general policy, with regard to the penal regulations, . . . is that legislation be made more severe."<sup>37/</sup> There were also extra-legal moves, particularly the promotion of "assembleas de repudio" where members of local Committees for the Defense of the Revolution were to express their disgust at those who had chosen to leave the country in 1980 -- these served as settings for uncontrolled violence. A street brawl at the U.S. Interests Section was also a part of this increased legal and extra-legal repressive climate as a means to deal with opponents. Repressive measures were also applied within the intellectual community. For example, a number of professors and students at the University of Havana were dismissed, or placed on probation, on the grounds of insufficient ideological zeal.<sup>38/</sup>

The repressive apparatus was strengthened in 1980 compared to immediately preceding levels as one response to the crisis of those months. Combined with measures already discussed, the boundary between those within and outside the revolution has been sharpened. Patterns of political stratification are clearer. Participation for the "politically marginal" is severely constrained. The procedures to deal with this minority of the population are confrontational and repressive. And, as the extra-legal measures have again subsided from their temporary reappearance in 1980, the mechanisms for the State to relate to its opponents, too, have come to rely on formal, albeit tougher, procedures.

#### Intermediate Elites

The evolving pattern of political stratification does not simply separate elite from mass. It has also led, albeit cautiously, to the development of organizational politics at the intermediate level. Intermediate-level organizations struggle over degrees of centralization or autonomy, regulation and deregulation which have been critical issues in Cuban revolutionary politics. At stake is a challenge to central power. Two examples will be used to illustrate opportunities and problems: managers and the Peasants' Association (ANAP).

#### Managers

One political consequence of the changes in Cuban economic policies, alluded to by Carmelo Mesa-Lago in his paper in

this project, has been the emergence of a managerial interest. There is, to be sure, no national association of managers. Managers belong to labor unions as do other workers; and they are subordinate to ministerial bureaucracies. But managers have begun to articulate their interests at meetings called to discuss management issues; their views also appear to be represented in part by the officials in charge of implementing the new planning and management system.

At the second meeting on the implementation of this management system, held in 1980, some managers argued publicly about the need to enhance managerial autonomy from the central state organs in order to improve general economic efficiency. They complained of bureaucratic restrictions imposed from above.<sup>39/</sup>

The officials of the Central Planning Board in charge of the management system are also blunt. Their main report in 1980 notes that a serious problem is how to establish, maintain and enhance enterprise autonomy: "At present, there is excessive tutelage or paternalism by the majority of central state organizations over the firms that are subordinate to them." The report notes that this is a violation of the law as well as undermining economic efficiency.<sup>40/</sup> Moreover, while enterprise participation in the formulation of the national plan has increased, progress made "is still insufficient and occasionally formalistic."<sup>41/</sup> The report details examples of gross centralization of economic decision making which, in

effect, nullify the policy toward greater managerial independence.

In turn, managers are being criticized both by central state organization technocrats and by labor union leaders. Technocrats criticize managers for talking about enterprise autonomy but doing little to defend it in practice. For example, managers have been slow to use available legal marketing mechanisms that require entrepreneurship to sell their marginal or lower quality products or by-products ("seconds" as they might be called in the U.S.). Managers complain that the quantitative targets embodied in the plans are sometimes illusory; they do not reflect adequately the reality of the work center and, just as importantly, they reduce the funds to be distributed at the year's end to management and labor. Technocrats counter that they are opposed to designing plans that can be fulfilled effortlessly just to generate such funds; technocrats also argue that it is the management's responsibility to make certain that all numbers in the plan are based on objective facts.<sup>42/</sup>

Because labor unions have little impact over wages and benefits at the enterprise level (these are set centrally), much of their effort turns towards problems of occupational health and safety and to disciplinary relations between labor and management. Early in 1981, the Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC) inspected health and safety job conditions and found about 3.5 million violations of the law in 2,386,874 labor

files surveyed. Only 400,000 cases could be resolved quickly.<sup>43/</sup> The unions have also complained of managerial "excesses" in the application of labor discipline regulations. They have also complained that regulations covering managerial indiscipline and abuses are being applied too leniently and, in some egregious cases (such as in the rather vast educational establishment, for Cuban and foreign students, in the Isle of Youth), not at all.<sup>44/</sup>

The future of organized managerial politics in Cuba remains uncertain because the observed behavior is so new. The limited increase in managerial autonomy has generated a debate about the kinds and extent of autonomy. Many managers are clearly unaccustomed to behaving as innovative and risk-taking entrepreneurs because their experience had been with rigid centralization. The increase in managerial autonomy has also given rise to an increase of labor union activity in the limited areas where managers can be held personally responsible: these are the work environment and discipline. Discussions over managerial abuses and indiscipline, in turn, indicate the reappearance in public of concerns about stratification and inequality in the work place.

So far, managers' fate seems closely linked with officials in the Central Planning Board, under the general supervision of Vice President Humberto Pérez. The emergence of as much managerial politics is yet another indication of the rising organizational stakes in Cuban politics. The disputes are

focused at the core of the political system: centralization versus autonomy and authority in the work place.

ANAP

The National Association of Small Peasants (ANAP) has the most interesting history of all Cuban mass organizations. Early in the 1960s, it behaved somewhat as an interest group seeking advantages for its members even at the expense of others.<sup>45/</sup> The ANAP became a more typical mass organization later in the 1960s, eschewing those autonomous goals and practices. It entered the 1980s with two major projects in political balance. For the sake of the party and government, ANAP pursues the promotion of cooperatives; for its own peasant members, ANAP has promoted and defended the new free peasant market.

Early in 1980, in response to the economic crisis, the Cuban government legalized the free peasant market. Peasants, cooperative members and all those who raise crops, may sell in the free peasant market at any price that the market will bear, in the absence of all government price controls, all surpluses that remain after commitments to state agencies recorded in the national plan targets have been met. Until 1975, the government had opposed any private sales by peasants. The first Party Congress reversed that policy, but it set strict limits on the quantities that could be sold freely; no market places were set up to facilitate such

sales. In 1980, controls were relaxed entirely for surplus production and market places were established to facilitate private sales. Supply and demand have operated. Peasants have set prices many times higher than those set under price control because the demand is so great. This undoubtedly serves the need of upper income consumers; it is likely to stimulate peasant crop production; but it is also a financial breakthrough for the peasantry. No other sector of Cuban society has been deregulated (albeit only partially) as much. ANAP cannot claim all the credit. One reason for the policy change was probably the belief of the Central Planning Board staff that this was a more efficient agricultural policy. Nonetheless, the ANAP's constituents are the principal gainers. Conscious of the political problems already posed by high prices in the free peasant market, ANAP remains committed to preventing excessive speculation. ANAP's President, alternate Political Bureau member José Ramírez, continues to uphold the view of a "worker-peasant alliance," despite high prices.<sup>46/</sup>

ANAP's principal ideological concession to the government has been to promote peasant cooperatives to lead the peasants to pool resources to obtain credit and share services (already widespread practices) and also to share land and labor collectively. Notwithstanding many efforts during the first decade and a half of revolution, cooperatives of this latter type were few. Their number actually declined from 328 in 1963 to 126 in 1967 to 43 in 1975. The fifth peasant Congress,

under party prodding, approved new efforts to promote these cooperatives. By the end of 1980, the number of cooperatives reached 1,017, accounting for 11.4% of all the land in the hands of ANAP members and including 26,454 members (approximately 13.7% of the total ANAP membership).<sup>47/</sup>

It remained difficult to convince peasants to join these cooperatives. ANAP President Ramírez explained the slow growth of this ideologically visible program: because peasants had to choose voluntarily to join, it was necessary to "woo and convince" them. The drafters of the 1981-1985 five-year plan were more impatient with ANAP foot-dragging. While most political statements in the published plan outline are very discreet, its reference to the slow growth of cooperatives is uncharacteristically blunt: "The cooperative process in the countryside has been delayed and there must be an effective economic, ideological and political work to bring this task to the level that is required."<sup>48/</sup>

ANAP has thus entered the 1980s with a substantial success in obtaining favorable partial deregulation to benefit its members. To retain political support, it may have to work harder to develop what remains an unpopular cooperative movement among the peasants. ANAP's political skills depend greatly on its small but durable top leadership. Only two ANAP leaders belong to the party Central Committee. In ANAP's case, what has made the difference has been the quality of that leadership's organizational bargaining skills rather than the quantity of

their representation in top organs. ANAP's reappearance as an effective lobby is also consistent with the view that more autonomous intermediate-level organizations may become more important in a politically stratified system; just as in the case of managers, they are challenging past practices of political centralization.

The Armed Forces: Renewed Importance

The Armed Forces have been essential for the survival of revolutionary rule. They were among the first entities to be professionalized and institutionalized; the rest of the party and government subsequently learned from them. The Armed Forces have also been very capable over the years to protect their organizational stakes and to expand their influence.<sup>49/</sup> In the second half of the 1970s, Cuba fought two wars abroad (in Angola and in Ethiopia) and came to maintain a large permanent overseas military presence. In the Fall 1980, that amounted to approximately 35,000 troops.<sup>50/</sup> To support them, the Armed Forces undertook new programs that increased their social weight and claimed additional resources. Partly as a result of those commitments, and partly because of deteriorating relations with the United States since 1978, the Cuban Armed Forces induced these policy changes. This section will discuss only the political and organizational aspects of the recent growth of the Cuban Armed Forces.

The Cuban military accounts still for a very high proportion of the party Central Committee; although their share of the membership has declined, the absolute number of military full and alternate Central Committee members has increased. Military overrepresentation in the Central Committee, compared to the military share of party membership, also increased from 1975 to 1980. It should be assumed that the membership composition of the party Congress reflects the composition of the party membership rather more closely than does the Central Committee. The latter necessarily overrepresents the top elites. Therefore, the ratio of Central Committee membership shares to Congress membership shares (as a proxy for party membership shares) is a measure of the relative strength of representation of a given category of people.

The military accounted for about 19% of the First Party Congress but for only 13.7% of the Second Party Congress. The party was formed most quickly within the armed forces in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the military share of the entire party probably declined in the late 1970s because the party's civilian sector grew more rapidly. This would also explain the relative decline of the military shares from one party Congress to the next. The military share of Central Committee membership, however, declined more slowly than the military share of the Congress (Table 1). Military overrepresentation thus increased from 1975 to 1980. The ratio of the military's share of the full membership of the

Central Committee to its share of the membership of the party Congress was 1.69 in 1975; in 1980, that statistic grew to 1.77. For all members (full and alternate) that statistic grew from 1.70 in 1975 to 1.98 in 1980. The Armed Forces and the Interior Ministries thus entered the 1980s claiming a rising relative share of party power.<sup>51/</sup>

The Armed Forces have obtained approval of "veteran's preference" for returning troops in jobs and housing, including getting some of both left vacant by those who became exiles in 1980. The Society for Patriotic-Military Education (SEPMI) was established in January 1980. It helps to prepare low-skill specialists who might work eventually in the Armed Forces and it promotes sports that help to train people in militarily useful activities (target shooting, parachuting, etc.). The SEPMI is also a propaganda organ for the Armed Forces, building support for the military and its programs. Within a year of its founding, SEPMI had 80,721 affiliates in 671 associations; its 371 sports clubs had over 13,000 members.<sup>52/</sup>

Also in 1980, the government established a new Territorial Militia. These units are to be financed by the people's donations, not out of the military budget; the militia's training is to occur during weekends and vacation time. Thus, the military have successfully claimed more resources from the rest of the society. The Territorial Militia's creation has been justified in 1981 as a response to threats from

the Reagan Administration in the United States. In fact, as Armed Forces Minister Raúl Castro has explained, the Armed Forces pushed for the establishment of these units out of their strategic and organizational perspectives: "The organization of these units is necessary in order to round out our defense system." "We have accelerated the process," added General Castro, "to meet the threats hurled by the new U.S. administration."<sup>53/</sup> The basic rationale, then, comes from the Armed Forces' need for organizational growth, now only made politically easier within Cuba by the changing international situation.

The Territorial Militia revives in part the old notion of the Militia that had disappeared as the military reserves, on the one hand, and the civil defense, on the other, developed professionally. The Territorial Militia seeks to include students who are not yet in the military or the reserves, women, able-bodied people above military reserve age limits, and workers who cannot leave the factories to serve in the armed forces on a regular basis. The Territorial Militia is to be included in military planning and exercises. It will be used primarily in military construction, rearguard operations, and the protection of factories and farms. The units most closely linked to the regular armed forces will be commanded by regular officers.

To implement this organizational innovation, a military officer has been assigned to every municipal and provincial

government to coordinate national defense at the grass roots. Never before had the armed forces penetrated subnational government so effectively. The ideological rationale also harkens to a pattern of role expansion familiar in the Cuban military in earlier years. As General of the Army Raúl Castro put it, "the organization of the militia is also related to a broader concept of national defense, which should be seen as the unity of all factors of defense and production."<sup>54/</sup>

The Armed Forces have also obtained full recognition of their five top schools as equivalents of a university. When the reform of higher education in 1976 established the Ministry of Higher Education, only the Military Technical Institute was designated as a center of higher education. By academic year 1977-78, all five of the top military schools qualified as higher education centers. Finally, in December 1980, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers established full equivalency between the engineering degrees granted by these five military schools and the universities. The Armed Forces Ministry retained full control over these schools; they were not turned over to the Ministry of Higher Education even though the latter is headed by a former General. More importantly, this reflects the continuing upgrading of the professional quality of the Cuban military officer corps. Beginning with the class of 1982, the Cuban Armed Forces will receive only officers who are university graduates; that had not been the norm previously.<sup>55/</sup>

The Armed Forces have also obtained resources to raise the standard of living of officers and troops. Facilities have been improved; housing has been built; social and recreational clubs for officers and troops have been established. Wages, pension and other social security benefits have been increased. These benefits maintain differences by rank, so that in each instance the rewards of officers are greater.<sup>56/</sup>

The Armed Forces succeeded as well in changing the draft recruitment policy. Beginning in 1979, they began to draft the male graduates of technological and senior academic secondary schools before they went on to the university, thereby markedly improving the quality of draftees. The terms of service were also changed. Draftees who distinguished themselves militarily and politically could get a reduction of up to one year in the ordinary three-year term of service so that they could continue their university education. While the Armed Forces were thus allowed for the first time to tap systematically higher trained young people, the intention has also been announced of generalizing this practice so that the completion of secondary education (academic or vocational) will become a prerequisite for military service, raising the draft age from 16 to 18. Given the extraordinary expansion of the Cuban educational system, this further policy change should be feasible soon.<sup>57/</sup>

The changes in draft policy clarify the motivations for the other policy changes. The Territorial Militia and the SEPMI will reach students not in active military service either

before or after they join the armed forces. The quality of military personnel will be improved without interrupting the links between the Armed Forces and the country's youth from age 16 on. A probable corollary policy (not, however, yet mentioned) is that young people with poor academic records and discipline problems might be excluded from the regular armed forces and channelled to the Army of the Working Youth, devoting their time to difficult economic tasks (sugar cane harvest, construction, etc.) under military discipline for three years.<sup>58/</sup>

The Armed Forces began training regular university students as reserve officers in the 1976-77 school year. As of 1981, over 5,000 new reserve officers were made available by these university programs; the flow would remain at least at that number through 1985. Indeed, as the program is extended to all universities (and comes to include women) in the early 1980s, General Raúl Castro expected to be receiving 10,000 new reserve officers per year. As a part of the policy of strengthening the armed forces, these regular university students are called up for one month's intensive military training at the end of each school year and for 6 months' training upon graduation.<sup>59/</sup>

Reserve call ups for training also became more frequent and all-encompassing in the early 1980s. Reservists who had not been called up for military training in a number of years, including many over age 40, were called back for further

military training in 1980 and in 1981.<sup>60/</sup>

The formal military budget has changed little in the late 1970s (after doubling in real terms from its level in the early 1970s). Military expenditures in the 1981 budget are 842 million pesos, the highest sum ever, but accounting for only 7.5% of the total expenditure budget, the lowest share in recent years.<sup>61/</sup> However, the military's economic burden is much higher upon adding the new extra-budgetary costs, such as the financing of the Territorial Militia. But the most important way to assess the military burden is its impact on personnel. More than 100,000 military have been sent to Angola and Ethiopia (original troops, plus replacements) in 1975-1980. Thus the combined effect of past practices (including a large and active military reserve), recent changes, and foreseeable innovations in the military's relations with society have greatly increased the scope and weight of the Armed Forces' authority and influence in a systematic, organized fashion.<sup>62/</sup>

The Armed Forces have, of course, maintained the most hierarchically strict command relations within their own organization. Systematic politization by the Communist party has not challenged the military rank structure. The persistence of the military hierarchy within the party can be shown in part by an analysis of the ranks of military delegates in the leading units to the Second Party Congress. Combining the three territorial armies (West, Center and East), the

Air Force, and the Rear Guard Forces, the delegates elected through normal processes in these units were: 17 Division and Brigade Generals, 35 Colonel and Lieutenant Colonels, 8 other officers, and no one below the rank of first lieutenant (4 civilian workers of the Armed Forces were also elected).

Partly in compensation, the Central Committee developed a procedure (applied generally, not just in the military) to reach into any organization to pick delegates with outstanding work records to the Party Congress. The "direct" delegates, thus selected, included no Generals, 2 Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels, 7 other officers, and still no one below the rank of first lieutenant (7 civilian workers were also selected). Even after these efforts, the military delegation to the Second Congress remained top heavy. The Navy, too, adhered to this pattern. No one below the rank of ship captain was a Congress delegate (2 civilian workers were also sent). In addition, no one below the rank of Colonel became a full member of the Central Committee. All Division Generals but for the head of the Air Force made it as full Central Committee members (the Air Force Chief remained a Central Committee alternate).<sup>63/</sup>

The Armed Forces have shown once again that they are Cuba's most politically skillful bureaucracy. Their achievements in organizational politics far exceed what ANAP has accomplished; managers, in contrast to the military, have hopes, but few successes, to their credit. The mixture

of a plausible international threat, a considerable weight within the party elite, and extraordinary organizational skills have prepared the Armed Forces well to continue to succeed in a politically stratified Cuba.

Social and Political Stratification

There is also a relationship between political and social stratification. Tables 2 and 3 present some information relating party membership and rank to occupational categories. In each table, the term "mass" refers to those directly linked with production, services and education (a category that also includes professionals and technicians). This is the key statistic reported by the Cuban Communist party at all levels. Despite its fuzziness, it sets apart this large conglomerate of people from those referred to as "elites" in the tables. The latter are political and administrative leaders and staff. In the fourth row of Table 2, the term "elite" also includes all Second Party Congress members who are not "mass" (most of the additions are military officers who should, indeed, be considered elites).

The elite is far better represented in the party than is the mass (Table 2). Whereas the civilian elites account for only 15.2% of the State civilian labor force, they account for 37.7% of the civilian party membership, and for 47.6% of the civilian membership of the Second Party Congress. Because most military party members are officers, and because more military members of the Second Congress were officers, it is plausible to add the military to the elite category. Then

the elite share of the Second Party Congress rises to a high of 55.3%. The elites' share of the Second Congress is over three times their share of the labor force. At the Second Party Congress, there were 39 civilian mass delegates for every 100,000 mass members of the State civilian labor force, but there were 198 civilian elite delegates for every 100,000 elite members of the State civilian labor force. (This is in fact, a very conservative estimate of elite over-representation. Because most military members of the Second Congress are elites, too, the combined elite overrepresentation score is likely to be much larger). Thus at a minimum, the elites were five times more likely to be represented at the Second Congress than the mass.

At the level of the party, the computation in Table 2 is extremely conservative. It assumes that the military share of the party is exactly proportional to their share of the membership at the Second Party Congress. In fact, the better guess is that the military share increases from the party at the base all the way to the Central Committee; it has already been shown that the military share of the Central Committee is twice the military share of the Second Congress (recall also that most military party members are officers). Nevertheless, the Table 2 computation, conservative as it is, shows that the civilian elite is at least twice as represented in the party as is the civilian mass. While over a quarter of the State Civilian labor force elites belong to the party, somewhat less than a seventh of the State civilian labor force

mass belongs to the party.

Another problem with Table 2 is that there are no pertinent data on the entire labor force: peasants are excluded from the available statistics. While it is difficult to assess what difference this makes for the analysis, it is likely that peasants contribute fewer members to the party than the rest of the society. If so, the party would be even more unrepresentative of the labor force than is suggested in Table 2. It is also difficult to say whether the mass-elite ratio in the peasant sector is different than in the State civilian labor force; my guess is that more peasants are likely to be in the "mass" category. If so, the underrepresentation of the mass of the population in the party would be even more severe than is reflected in Table 2.

Table 3 confirms at the local level the patterns identified at the national level. Bear in mind that these plants are described in the Cuban press because they are considered to be good examples. It is likely that other work centers perform much less well. Both factories have a mass majority within the local Communist party, consistent with the national party figures in Table 2. However, only 19% of the mass at the cement plant and only 6% of the mass at the preserves plant belong to the party, whereas 53% and 43% of the elites do so, respectively. (These latter figures give further credence to the argument that the 27.5% statistic in the right-hand column in Table 2 is a serious underestimate).

There is, therefore, a close and striking relationship between social class and party membership, and between social class and party rank. This can be seen at both the national and the local levels.

Nevertheless, it is equally correct that the Cuban Communist party has made great efforts to increase the mass share of the membership. Figures on social stratification's link to party membership were much more lopsided at the First Party Congress. President Fidel Castro rightly pointed out that the number of mass party members increased very substantially from one Congress to the next. The rate of increase of mass members was greater than the rate of increase of elite members, and that is why the mass share of the party membership rose to 62.3%.<sup>64/</sup>

The arithmetic of social stratification, however, has some often unsuspected effects. Let us return to the example of the "René Arcay" cement plant. Let us assume that the plant's labor force in 1976 was the same as in 1980. Then, 24% of the elites at the plant belonged to the party in 1976 versus only 7% of the mass belonging to the party.<sup>65/</sup> By 1980, the mass statistic had risen by a factor of 2.7 and the elite statistic by a factor of 2.2 -- the "right" trend for a party at the vanguard of the proletariat. However, the percentage gap between elite and mass in 1976 was only 17%; by 1980 it had widened to 34%. Inequalities had thus doubled during a five year period notwithstanding the

sincere best efforts of the Communist Party.

Educational data show also a widening of inequalities. In 1975, the modal party member only had a sixth grade education; only 16% of them at the time of the First Congress had completed senior high school. The educational gap between party and people was narrow. While 59% of the people had at least a sixth grade education by the mid-1970s, 80% of the party had such a level. At the time of the First Congress, the situation could be described as a junior high school elite leading a grammar school people. By the Second Congress, the bulk of the Cuban population had reached sixth grade, so that one can speak of a junior high school population. But the rate of educational increase has been much faster for party members. In 1980, 75.5% of all party members had at least a high school education, almost five times the rate five years earlier.<sup>66/</sup> What had been a gap of only about three years of education between party and people has now probably doubled too.

Evidence of stratification has begun to appear in interpersonal relations. At the "Manuel Martínez Prado" sugar mill, reporters for the newsmagazine Bohemia found that university-trained technicians, who had joined the mill's work force recently, complained that the experienced workers did not trust them and did not communicate what they knew about the mill's operations. The experienced workers, in turn, complained that some of the university-trained technicians were arrogant and impractical. These feelings, of course, are not unique to Cuba or to its mills; but the spread of these feelings of inequality reflect the increasing social and political stratification in Cuba in recent years.<sup>67/</sup>

Social and political stratification acquire a dynamic of their own. Cuba is simply finding out how difficult it is to overcome the difficulties of strong stratifying patterns.<sup>68/</sup>

#### Conclusion

Cuba enters the 1980s having witnessed impressive changes during the previous two decades. Cuba has become a major factor in the international system. Its revolutionary government has transformed many aspects of its own society, economics and politics. To its credit, it continues to build on its already impressive accomplishments in certain areas such as education and public health. This paper has had a much more modest goal: What are the demands for orderliness in the Cuban revolution?

They are those of a regime that could be described as a "consultative oligarchy." The Cuban political system is neither the one-man terroristic dictatorship that its enemies claim nor the participatory egalitarian paradise painted by some of its supporters. Hierarchy, bureaucracy, performance, bargaining over organizational stakes -- these are the hallmarks of Cuban politics. Cuba is not unique in this regard, of course, but the two alternative descriptions just cited seem to be more prevalent.

The political authority of the top leadership remains unchallenged in effect. Centralized power at the top was strengthened as the 1980s opened. There is also impressive stability, albeit with some changes, at the Central Committee

of the Communist party. Organizational representativeness became an increasingly important criterion for membership at the same time that lines of rank and authority were delineated more clearly. Performance also became more clearly related to organizational rank, promotions and demotions. While the importance of historically grounded factionalism has declined, the symbolic politics of "affirmative action" on the grounds of class and sex (but not race) have appeared.

The demands for orderliness in the revolution also lead to stratified political participation. There is a good deal of many kinds of political participation in Cuba. Most of it, however, is only consultative, with very little discernible impact on decision-making. Again, this does not make Cuba unique, but it does characterize it. The political participatory channel that is most open to independent actions by the mass of the population -- citizen contacting of public officials -- is precisely the one that has little bearing on incumbent identity. This consultative participation is itself stratified.

For the top and the intermediate elites, participation is more meaningful. Party members, the overwhelming majority of the National Assembly (many of them are Central Committee members, too), argue and bargain with each other, at times openly, with important effects. Disputes at this lofty level do matter for policy. The stakes have become organizational as well: arguments rage over jurisdiction and rank, over responsibility and institutional power. This widened organizational context has revived the lobbying skills of an organization

such as that grouping the small peasants, and it has provided a possible opening -- as yet more potential than realized -- for managers. It has been a boon to that long-standing master of Cuban bureaucratic politics, the Armed Forces, whose influence over Cuban social life has climbed markedly since 1978. At the bottom of the stratification pyramid are the "politically marginal." The party and government deal with them primarily through the exercise of naked state power. The lines separating them from the majority of the population have hardened as well.

Techniques of problem-solving have become organizational, too, from the armed forces to the running of the economy. Even Fidel Castro's political style has begun to take into account his new role as the arbiter among competing organizational claims.

For the world beyond Cuba, there are some implications from this analysis. First, the combination of the conflict-ridden international situation around Cuba's world role in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the stronger organizational position of the Cuban Armed Forces in a more stratified context has strengthened the hands of the military over society, economy and politics. There have been a series of military policy successes.

Second, foreign policy is one of the last vestiges of extremely centralized political decision-making, less subject to the organizational competition that has become more important in other policy arenas. Foreign policy remains a matter for the Political Bureau, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and the Council of State -- with considerable overlaps in their membership. Above all, it remains Fidel Castro's domain.

Third, despite the above, the tendency in the Cuban political system away from the rule by a few "heroic" individuals, toward the rule of organizations represented in the top councils of decision-making by their leaders, suggests that foreign policy, too, might become an arena for competitive organizational bargaining. Virtually all agencies of the Cuban government now have international links and programs. One-third of the delegates to the Second Party Congress have served abroad in military or civilian tasks (compared to one-twelfth at the First Party Congress).<sup>69/</sup> The stakes of much of Cuban foreign policy many need to respond in the next few years, too, to the demands for orderliness in the revolution.

Fourth, for those who seek to affect internal affairs within Cuba from the outside beyond foreign policy concerns, the new organizational context and the sharpening political stratification are all the more important.

For Cubans themselves, there might be even more important questions. Do the demands for orderliness in the revolution compete with, overcome, or exclude altogether, the demands for a revolution within the revolution? Are the dreams of the late 1950s, which turned the revolution into a national epic for many Cubans, to be realized through rising political and social stratification? Will Cuba respond more to order or to revolution? Can these be combined, as Fidel Castro's formulation hopes for? These questions are only opened, not settled, by this analysis, but they are, indeed, at the heart of Cuba's future.

Table 1  
 Primary area of activity  
 of  
 Communist party Central Committee members (%)<sup>a</sup>

Area of Activity	1965 full members (N=100)	1975 full members (N=112)	1980 full members (N=148)	1975 all members (N=124)	1980 all members (N=225)
Politics	10.0	28.6	20.3	26.6	20.4
Bureaucracy	17.0	17.9	16.9	17.7	17.3
Military	58.0	32.1	24.3	32.3	27.1
Foreign rels.	3.0	8.9	7.4	8.1	6.2
Mass organizations	7.0	6.3	18.9	8.1	15.6
Education, science and culture	4.0	5.4	6.8	5.6	5.8
Other	1.0	0.8	5.4	1.6	7.6

a. All those on active military duty are classified as military. All nonmilitary personnel who held principal posts in the Communist party or the Communist Youth Union are classified under politics (only 4 of 225 members were in the Youth Union in 1980). All those whose principal job appears to be in government or state organizations are classified as bureaucrats, except the ministers of armed forces and interior, all those working in education, science or culture, or in foreign relations. In 1980, there are 1 and 5 unknowns, respectively, in the full and all member columns.

Source: See end-notes 2 and 3.

Table 2

Social Stratification in the Cuban Communist Party:

National Level, 1980

	N	% mass	% elites	Members as	
				% of mass in labor force	% of elites in labor force
Labor Force <sup>a</sup>	2,397,500	84.8	15.2	--	--
Communist party civilian membership <sup>b</sup>	434,143	62.3	37.7	13.3	27.5
II Party Congress civilian membership <sup>d</sup>	1,520	52.4	47.6	39 <sup>c</sup>	198 <sup>c</sup>
II Party Congress full membership	1,780	44.7	55.3 <sup>e</sup>	39 <sup>c</sup>	--

a. Refers to State civilian labor force in 1977. Excludes military and small private (mostly peasant) sector.

b. Assumes that military and "other" share of the Second Party Congress is exactly proportional to their share of the party membership. Military and "other" party members are thereby excluded from this row. Includes peasant sector.

c. Per 100,000.

d. Excludes 13.7% of the Congress who are military and 0.9% classified as "others." Includes peasant sector.

e. Includes military and "other."

Source: Granma, December 20, 1980, pp. 1,5; Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980, p. 12; Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Anuario estadístico de Cuba, 1978 (Havana), p. 58.

Table 3  
 Social Stratification in the Cuban Communist Party, 1980:  
 Local Examples

	Labor force		PCC (N=244)		Members as	
	% mass elite	% 21	% mass elite	% 43	% of mass in labor force	% of elite in labor force
"René Arcay" cement factory, Mariel, (N=938)	79	21	57	43	19	53
"La Conchita" fruit and vegetable preserves factory (N=849)	93	7	62	38	6	48

Source: Computed from Granma, July 9, 1980, p. 1; January 7, 1981, p. 2.

### Notes

\*This paper is part of a project on "Cuba in the 1980s" of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, funded by the U.S. Department of State's Office of Long Range Assessments and Research. The author alone is responsible for opinions, findings and interpretations. Parts of an early draft of this paper appeared as "Cuba in the 1980s" in Problems of Communism 30, no. 2 (March-April 1981): 48-59.

1. Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980, p. 13.
2. For background material, see Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). I will refer to this book for historical background to simplify the references.
3. My biographical files are the principal source. The Cuban daily newspaper, Granma, published short biographies of new Central Committee members in the first months of 1981. A very helpful reference work is the National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba (February 1981).
4. Granma, December 1, 1980, p. 2; ibid., December 5, 1980, p. 2; ibid., December 15, 1980, p. 2; ibid., December 16, 1980, p. 2.
5. For a list, see Domínguez, Cuba, pp. 533-534.
6. Granma, February 17, 1981, p. 2.
7. Ibid., February 7, 1981, p. 2.

8. See, for example, Jerry Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?," in Leonard J. Cohen and Jane P. Shapiro, Communist Systems in Comparative Perspective (New York: Anchor Press, 1974).
9. Granma, February 10, 1981, p. 2.
10. For a complete set of photographs, see Granma, December 27, 1980, Supplement.
11. See Domínguez, Cuba, pp. 243-249 for background. As should become clear, I believe that I underestimated the utility and importance of the National Assembly in those pages. In the paragraphs that follow, I describe not only the limitations that I expected and that have occurred in the Assembly's work but also a surprising (at least to me) level of discussion with somewhat greater policy consequences than I had thought likely.
12. Granma, December 27, 1980, p. 1.
13. Ibid.
14. Granma, July 4, 1980, p. 3.
15. Ibid., July 3, 1980, pp. 1-2.
16. Ibid.
17. Departamento de Versiones Taquigráficas, Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz, Primer Secretario del CC del Partido Comunista de Cuba y Presidente de los Consejos de Estado y de Ministros en la clausura del II período de sesiones de 1979 de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular. December 27, 1979. This speech has circulated in mimeographed form only. Pagination varies. Section quoted is

around the beginning of the third part of the speech.

18. Granma, July 4, 1980, p. 3.
19. Ibid.
20. ¿Cómo marcha la implantación del sistema de dirección y planificación de la economía? Bohemia 71, no. 27 (July 6, 1979), p. 36; Domínguez, Cuba, pp. 300-301.
21. Comisión Nacional de Implantación, Sistema de Dirección y Planificación de la Economía, Informe Central: Reunión Nacional (Havana: July 1980), p. 48. These sharp limitations on participation in the work place -- especially violations of the law -- also surprised me, especially because they are so unnecessary to the maintenance of elite control. In my book, I had assumed that the law was observed, that is, I had thought that the norm was what had turned out to have occurred not at all in 49.2% of the firms even in 1980.
22. Granma, December 27, 1979, p. 4.
23. Domínguez, Cuba, pp. 281-291.
24. Susana Tesoro, "Primero vivir, luego filosofar," Bohemia 71, no. 38 (September 21, 1979): 40-42.
25. Granma, July 4, 1980, p. 4; Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980, p. 9.
26. Computations from Bohemia 73, no. 1 (January 2, 1981), p.58; Granma Weekly Review, January 6, 1980, p. 3; and Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, Anuario estadístico de Cuba 1978 (Havana), p. 54. For a quantitative breakdown of citizen demands, see Granma, April 6, 1981, p. 4.

27. Mario Escalona Reguera and Nisia Agüero Benítez, "La participación popular en la gestión estatal en Cuba," Revista cubana de administración de salud 5, no. 3 (July-September 1979), pp. 218-219.
28. Domínguez, Cuba, pp. 265, 267.
29. Granma, January 31, 1981, p. 1; Granma Weekly Review, October 5, 1980, p. 2.
30. For a review of events and a statement of U.S. policy, see U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy, no. 193 (June 20, 1980). For a discussion closer to the Cuban government's views, see Lourdes Casal, "Cuba, abril-mayo 1980: la historia y la histeria," Areito 6, no. 23 (1980): 15-25.
31. On the Vatican and Ecuador embassy seizures, the official Cuban view is available in Granma Weekly Review, December 21, 1980, p. 1, and ibid., March 1, 1981, p. 12. For information on those who seized the Ecuador embassy, see Granma, February 14, 1981, p. 1.
32. See survey conducted by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, cited in Boston Globe, June 4, 1980, p. 73. For historical comparisons, Domínguez, Cuba, pp. 139-141.
33. Computed from Tania Quintero and Magda Martínez, "Desde el diseño hasta la talla: encuesta de Bohemia sobre las confecciones textiles," Bohemia 73, no. 3 (January 16, 1981): 32-37.

34. Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980, p. 10.
35. For a good discussion, see three articles by Max Azicri in the Review of Socialist Law (Leyden) 6, no. 2 (1980): "An Introduction to Cuban Socialist Law," pp. 153-163; "Change and Institutionalization in the Revolutionary Process: The Cuban Legal System in the 1970s," pp. 164-182; and "The Cuban Family Code: Some Observations on Its Innovations and Continuities," pp. 183-191.
36. Verde olivo 20, no. 28 (July 15, 1979), pp. 11, 14; Granma Weekly Review, July 15, 1979, p. 2.
37. Granma, July 3, 1980, p. 2.
38. See Casal, "Cuba, abril-mayo 1980;" some of this information was also culled from observations and conversations during my visit to Havana in August 1980.
39. Raúl Lazo, "Notas sobre la autonomía empresarial," Bohemia 72, no. 48 (November 28, 1980), p. 19; Granma, January 5, 1981, p. 2.
40. Comisión Nacional de Implantación, Informe, p. 249.
41. Ibid., p. 12.
42. Raúl Lazo, "El tritón y otros mitos," Bohemia 73, no. 13 (March 27, 1981): 32-33.
43. Granma, March 14, 1981, p. 4.
44. Ibid., March 16, 1981, p. 2.
45. For a discussion of the ANAP from its foundation until 1977, see Domínguez, Cuba, pp. 445-463.

46. For a national listing of free peasant markets, see Magacín, August 1, 1980, p. 7. This is the monthly paper with information on retail facilities. For a discussion and defense of the market by peasant leaders and central planners, see, respectively, Granma, January 30, 1981, p. 2, and Granma Weekly Review, November 9, 1980, Supplement, p. 5.
47. Elsa Blaquier and Luis López, "¿Qué nos trajo este quinquenio?" Verde olivo 21, no. 51 (December 21, 1980): 34-43; Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1981, p. 11.
48. Granma, January 30, 1981, p. 2; and Departamento de Orientación Revolucionaria, Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, Proyecto de los lineamientos económicos y sociales para el quinquenio 1981-1985 (Havana: 1980), p. 5, section 003.
49. For background, Domínguez, Cuba, Chapter 9.
50. Computed from Granma Weekly Review, August 3, 1980, p. 3; and ibid., November 30, 1980, Supplement, p. 3.
51. Granma, December 20, 1980, p. 5; Domínguez, Cuba, p. 332.
52. Granma Weekly Review, June 22, 1980, p. 3; Granma, January 5, 1981, p. 1; Bohemia 71, no. 33 (August 17, 1979), p. 54 Lesmes La Rosa, "Primer aniversario de la SEPMI," Verde olivio, 22, no. 5 (February 1, 1981): 14-15.
53. Granma Weekly Review, February 8, 1981, p. 12.
54. Ibid. See also ibid., February 1, 1981, p. 2.

55. Lesmes La Rosa and Jorge Luis Blanco, "Las FAR en el primer quinquenio," Verde olivo 21, no. 51 (December 21, 1980), p. 8; Mario Rodríguez, "Convertirse en oficial-ingeniero," ibid., 21, no. 46 (November 16, 1980), p. 34; and Concepción Duchesne, "Incremento y desarrollo de la educación superior," Bohemia 72, no. 48 (November 28, 1980), p. 36.
56. For examples, see Jorge L. Blanco, "Casa de Oficiales," Verde olivo 20, no. 16 (April 22, 1979), pp. 35-36; ibid., 20, no. 30 (July 29, 1979), p. 52; La Rosa and Blanco, "Las FAR en el primer quinquenio," pp. 4, 7-8; and José Cazañas Reyes, "Nace una comunidad," ibid., 21, no. 49 (December 7, 1980): 11-13.
57. Verde olivo 20, no. 32 (August 12, 1979); "Ejército Occidental: primera década," ibid., 21, no. 51 (December 21, 1980): 53-55; La Rosa and Blanco, "Las FAR en el primer quinquenio," p. 6; Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980, p. 10.
58. For an update on the Army of the Working Youth, see Luis López, "Un trienio de intensa labor," Verde olivo, 21, no. 44 (October 12, 1980): 48-49.
59. Granma Weekly Review, April 19, 1981, p. 2.
60. Jorge Luis Blanco, "Reservistas," Verde olivo 22, no. 5 (February 1, 1981): 38-40.

61. Granma Weekly Review, January 11, 1981, p. 4, for the 1981 budget. For earlier ones, Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political and Military Limitations and Consequences of Cuban Policies in Africa," Cuban Studies 10, no. 2 (July 1980), pp. 23-24.
62. Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980, p. 10, carries the military section of Fidel Castro's main report to the Second Party Congress.
63. José Cazañas Reyes, "IV conferencia del partido en el ejército occidental," Verde olivo 21, no. 41 (October 12, 1980): 50-51; Rubén Fonseca, "VII conferencia del partido en la MGR," ibid., pp. 52-53; Jesús Casal Guerra, "VII conferencia del PCC en la DAAFAR," ibid., 21, no. 40 (October 5, 1980): 50-51; "Sexta conferencia del Partido-Jefatura de Retaguardia," ibid., pp. 52-53; Lesmes La Rosa, "VI conferencia del partido en el ejército oriental," ibid., pp. 53-55; Pablo Noa, "VIII conferencia del PCC en el ejército central," ibid., pp. 55-56.
64. Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980, p. 12.
65. Granma, July 9, 1980, p. 2.
66. Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1980, p. 13; Domínguez, Cuba, pp. 170, 317.
67. "Dentro del 'Martínez Prado'," Bohemia 73, no. 1 (January 2, 1981), p. 18.

68. For comparable examples from other socialist countries, Sidney Verba and Goldie Shabad, "Workers' Councils and Political Stratification: The Yugoslav Experience" The American Political Science Review 72, no. 1 (March 1978): 80-95; David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (New York: New York University Press, 1978), pp. 394-414.
69. Granma, December 20, 1980, p. 5; Domínguez, Cuba, p. 331.

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