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Daniel Schwabe

Formal Specification and Verification of a Connection-Establishment Protocol

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This paper presents an exercise in the verification of a connection-establishment protocol. A specification language named SPEX, tailored to the needs of communications protocols, is proposed, and its relation to a semi-automated verification system, Affirm, is discussed. This language is then used to specify a connection protocol currently being used. Certain errors are uncovered by analysis using the verification system. However, the major portion of the protocol's operation is shown to be correct.

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Daniel Schwabe

Formal Specification and Verification of a Connection-Establishment Protocol

INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

4676 Admiralty Way/ Marina del Rey/ California 90291
(213) 822-1511

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FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Computer networks are becoming increasingly widespread; their use already permeates our everyday life. As a consequence, their correct functioning becomes paramount. Given that computer networks are extremely complex systems, the task of certifying that they behave properly is nontrivial.

This report presents an exercise in verifying that a particular algorithm to realize an important function in computer networks, namely *connection establishment*, does indeed behave properly. The methods discussed are applicable for analyzing a wide range of other network functions as well.

The remainder of this section gives background material. Section 1.1 discusses the nature and need for connection establishment in computer networks; Section 1.2 then presents a new language suitable for the specification of protocols; and Section 1.3 describes a system in which properties of such specifications can be proved.

Section 2 presents a specification of a connection protocol currently in use, given in the language introduced earlier. Section 3 then discusses particular properties of this protocol and shows their verification.

1.1 Connection-Establishment Protocols

This section presents the motivation for connection-establishment protocols in general and for the three-way handshake used in the ARPANET in particular.[1] Consider a distributed system with several interconnected nodes. The nodes are connected by an unreliable transmission medium in which messages may be lost or duplicated, and each node has several processes. Imagine now that two processes wish to communicate; a common method to overcome the possible loss of data is to attach a sequence number to each data packet that flows, in either direction, between them. If the two nodes can agree on a starting number to be used, again in each direction, then they will be able to detect packets arriving out of order or being duplicated.

Suppose now that the system, when it is created, initializes the nodes to have agreed-upon sequence numbers, thus allowing the data transfer to take place immediately. Unfortunately, such systems are *impractical, for a number of reasons.*

First, since the system is intended to be distributed, a failure at one node would require the whole system to be re-initialized. Second, although there is a potential for communication between any two processes in the system, only a few pairs will actually be engaged in data exchange at any one time. Since the resources needed to maintain communication between processes are quite significant, the nodes should be able to keep these resources allocated only while the exchange is taking place, thus increasing their utilization.

---

[1]The reader familiar with the three-way handshake may skip this section.

These considerations lead to the notion of *connections*: When two processes wish to communicate, the corresponding nodes will cooperate among themselves to establish a common frame of reference, e.g., sequence numbers for data flowing in each direction, for the exchange of data: when the exchange is complete, the connection is closed, freeing the resources for use by other processes. The period of time that a particular connection is open between two processes, i.e., the period of time a particular frame of reference is in effect, is called an *incarnation* of that connection.

It is clear that for the exchange of data to be successful, the two nodes must agree on the state of the connection. A further problem is introduced by the fact that the transmission medium may delay or duplicate packets that flow between the two nodes. Since connections can open and close, it is possible for packets from old incarnations to be in the medium: when they are present, they should not be mistaken for packets belonging to a newly opened connection.

Since packets may be lost, a positive-acknowledgment retransmission-on-timeout scheme is used. In other words, the sender keeps a copy of each packet sent until the receiver acknowledges that the packet has been received. If no acknowledgment arrives after some predefined amount of time, it is assumed that the packet or its acknowledgment was lost and it is retransmitted. Acknowledgments themselves are not acknowledged.

It is important to note that if there is a positive probability (no matter how small) that a packet is lost, then it is actually impossible to completely separate the connection-establishment from the data transfer itself. To see why, consider the last (synchronization) packet exchanged during the connection establishment; each node will consider the connection to be open upon sending and receiving this packet. It is clear that the node receiving this packet can be sure that the other node has a compatible view of the connection. The sender, however, cannot be so sure, given the possibility that this last packet may be lost; only when the first data packet arrives (in the reverse direction) will it be sure that the other node actually received it. Therefore, the sender node must maintain both the data exchange and the connection-establishment information for that period of time. An equivalent problem is discussed in [2].

In many systems, connections are opened and closed quite frequently. Since the medium may duplicate packets, it is possible for a connection-request packet from a previous incarnation to appear at one node at such a time as to be mistaken for a current one, thereby initiating a connection with the wrong frame of reference (see [15]).

A problem still remains as to how to identify packets from previous incarnations as being old. The sequence numbers chosen to establish the frame of reference of a new connection must prevent that. Sunshine, in [15], discusses this issue in more detail.

A protocol has been proposed to handle the connection-establishment problems discussed so far. It is called the three-way handshake [19, 15]. The particular version used here is taken from TCP [12], the second-generation transport-level protocol being used in the ARPA internet system.

This protocol derives its name from the sequence of steps a node goes through in order to establish a connection. Suppose that node A wishes to communicate with node B and that node A takes the initiative. The two nodes then go through the following steps:

1. Node A sends node B a connection request, called SYN (for SYNchronize).

2. Node B receives the SYN packet, and responds with a SYN of its own together with an acknowledgment, together called SYNACK (for SYNchronize and ACKnowledge).

3. Node A receives the SYNACK packet, verifies that the ACK portion does indeed acknowledge its own previous SYN, and sends an ACK packet acknowledging node B's SYN. At this point, node A considers the connection to be opened.

4. Node B receives the ACK packet, verifies that it does acknowledge its own previous SYN, and then considers the connection to be opened.

There are two basic modes for opening a connection: an active mode, in which the issuing node takes the initiative; and a passive mode, in which the issuing node merely listens for incoming connection requests, and accepts the first to come in. The basic protocol described above can be modified to handle the case when both nodes do an active open simultaneously.

If at any point an incorrect packet arrives, then a RST (reset) packet is sent back to abort the connection-opening procedure.

Figure 1-1 contains a state-transition diagram taken from [12]. It does not show transitions caused by RST or incorrect packets.

1.2 Overview of SPEX

We present here an overview of a language, called **SPEX**, to be used for the specification of a distributed system in general and computer networks in particular. This language will be used later to describe the three-way handshake protocol. As will be evident from the details given below, the underlying model in **SPEX** is that of a nondeterministic state-transition system, with some specialized features to facilitate protocol specification. **SPEX** is discussed at greater length in [13].

A system is regarded as consisting of a set of interconnected *Nodes*. In the case of the example presented here, a *Node* can be a *Station* or a *Medium*. The pattern of interactions of the nodes constitutes the layer's definition. A particular pattern of behavior characterizes a node's *type*. A system may in general be composed of several distinct types of nodes, each with its own behavior, and may have several *instances* of each type of node as well.

Thus, in order to completely characterize a system, it is necessary to describe the behavior of each type of node (given in the *Node Behavior* part of the specification), the set of instances of each node type and the way

Figure 1-1: Three-way handshake state-transition diagram

the instances are interconnected (given in the *Topology* part), and the desired properties of the interactions between the instances (given in the *Properties* part). In addition, the specification of any data types used in specifying a node's behavior must be included.

A node is some entity that has some internal *State Variables* and some externally visible *Interface Variables*; these variables may be of arbitrarily complex data types (which may be defined using algebraic data type specification methods [9, 7, 8, 5].). A node reacts to a set of specified *Events*. When one such event occurs, some state variables and some interface variables may have their values changed.

State variables can be accessed only locally at each node. Interface variables, on the other hand, can be accessed from the outside--this is how a node communicates with the outside world, i.e., other nodes in the same system or other systems using the system in which the node is defined. Accordingly, the interface variables at each node are divided into two kinds: those that are *exported* to other systems, and those that are

connected to other nodes in the same system. In addition, each interface variable may have a *direction of data flow* associated with it, meaning that data in that variable flows *into* or *out of* a node; if no direction is specified, data in that variable flows in both directions.

The actual behavior of a node is given by describing how a node reacts to the occurrence of certain specified events. Each event known at a node has a *precondition* associated with it; this precondition is a predicate involving state and interface variables at that node. As long as a precondition is *true*, its associated event is said to be enabled; enabled events may fire at any time.

The node's behavior is given in terms of the new values of all its variables when each of the possible events occurs. All changes for an event are considered to happen simultaneously, i.e., the events are considered atomic. This means that if any variable X is used to compute the new value of some variable, the value used in the computation is the value X had *before* the event happened. For brevity's sake, if a variable is *not* mentioned on the left-hand side of any event-effects statement, then its value is *not* changed by the occurrence of that event.

Since state variables are not visible externally, they can be regarded as *history* variables [11] which accumulate information about the computation.

Since interface variables are externally visible, it is possible for an event *e1* at some node *N1* to change the value of some interface variable at another node. say *N2*. In fact, *e1* may actually enable some event at *N2*; this is effectively how nodes exchange data and synchronize their activity.

The last item necessary to completely describe a node's behavior is its *Initial State*, specifying the values of any variables at system-creation time. The most general way to specify the initial state is to give predicates which must be *true* in the initial state; it may not be necessary or even possible to give actual values to the variables.

All of the above must be specified for each node type that exists in the system.

The overall system behavior specified is defined as the set of *all valid* sequences of events. A valid sequence is formed by starting from an initial state (i.e., a state satisfying the initial state predicates) and successively firing enabled events; it may be of infinite length. If it is of finite length, then the final state arrived at by executing the sequence has no enabled events.

Once all node types have been specified, it is necessary to describe how the several nodes are connected. This is achieved by allowing interface variables at each node to be connected to interface variables at other nodes; the intended semantics is that these are in fact shared variables between the corresponding nodes.

The *Topology* part then specifies how the interface variables of each node in the system (i.e., each instance of each type of node) are connected to interface variables of the other nodes.

The *Properties* section states two kinds of properties of the protocol, *Assumed* and *Asserted* properties. Asserted properties are those that must be proved true by the specifier and serve as an additional check of the accuracy of the specification. In other words, proving these properties increases the confidence of the specifier that the specification corresponds to her/his intuitive understanding of the system.

Assumed properties are used to *define* certain operations in a noncomputational fashion by giving input-output relationships between arguments and returned values.

SPEXifications[2] can be conveniently translated into algebraic style data type specifications of the kind that are supported by the ***Affirm*** system (see Section 1.3). This capability can be exploited to prove properties of the protocol using analysis methods from the abstract data type specification domain or to perform a limited form of symbolic execution of the specification, which helps in determining the accuracy of the specification.[3] This translation is dicussed in detail in [13].

An overview of algebraic specification of data types and of ***Affirm*** is given in the next section.

1.3 Overview of Algebraic Specification of Data Types and of Affirm

The material presented in this section has been abridged from [4, 17].

Affirm [10] is an experimental system for the algebraic specification of and the verification of properties of user-defined abstract data types. The heart of the system is a natural deduction theorem prover for the interactive proof of these properties, which are stated in the predicate calculus extended with data types. Programs, written in a variant of Pascal extended with user-defined abstract data types, may be verified using the inductive assertion method [3]. Additional features include tools for the analysis of algebraic specifications, a library of useful data types, and user interface facilities. Experience with ***Affirm*** includes extensive experimentation with data type specifications, verification of small programs, the specification and partial proof of a large file-updating module, and the proof of high-level properties of security kernels.

The specification and theorem-proving portions of ***Affirm*** are relevant to the current discussion.

Like other specification and verification systems, ***Affirm*** follows its own particular theoretical and programming paradigm--abstract data types specified algebraically and properties verified by rewriting rule techniques. A brief description of the algebraic style of data type specifications and of the theorem-proving portions of ***Affirm*** follows.

---

[2] "**SPEX**ification" will be used to mean **SPEX** specification.

[3] I e . whether the specification captures the designer's intuitive understanding of the system

Following the algebraic style of data type specifications [9, 7, 8, 6, 5], a data type is specified by first defining three sets of functions:

1. *Constructors.* These functions create values of the type. Their range is the data type being specified. All values of the type can be described in terms of some functional composition of these functions.

2. *Extenders* (or *Modifiers*). These functions also have the data type being specified as their range, but in contrast to the constructors, they are not needed to express values of the data type--they are derived operators. These functions can be defined in terms of the constructors.

3. *Selectors.* These functions yield values of types other than the one being specified. The general term for these functions is *selector*, but functions yielding values of type *Boolean* are often termed *predicates.* These functions are defined in terms of the parameters of the constructors.

For example, the constructors of a queue are *NewQueue* (the empty queue) and *Add* (appends an element to a queue). Example extender functions are *Remove* (deletes the first element from a queue) and *Append* (concatenates two queues). Observe that these extender functions can be defined in terms of the constructors *NewQueue* and *Add.* Example selector functions are *Front.* *#Elements* and *in* (a predicate). These are definable in terms of the parameters to *Add.*

The effect of such a specification is to view values of the type in terms of the constructors which can build them. Hence, all selectors and extenders are defined in terms of these constructors. For example, the queue of integers

$$\langle 1, 2, 3 \rangle$$

is represented (in infix form) as

$$((\text{NewQueueOfInteger Add 1}) \text{ Add 2}) \text{ Add 3}$$

The first part of a specification gives the *signature* of all operations, i.e., their domains and their ranges. Figure 1-2 shows an example for the type *QueueOfInteger.*

```
declare q,q':QueueOfInteger;
declare i:Integer;

interface NewQueueOfInteger, q Add i : QueueOfInteger;
interface Remove(q), Append(q,q') : QueueOfInteger;
interface # Elements(q), Front(q) : Integer;
interface i in q: Boolean;
```

Figure 1-2: Signature of type *QueueOfInteger*

The second part of a data type specification provides semantics for the operations whose domain and range information was given in the first part. Extenders and selectors are defined by equational axioms of the form

lhs = = *rhs* relating how each function behaves when applied to each of the constructors. Constructor functions are treated as primitive, unspecified operations.

Examples of axioms taken from a specification of the type *QueueOfInteger* are given in Figure 1-3.

```
axioms
        Remove(NewQueueOfInteger) = = NewQueueOfInteger.
        Remove(q Add i) = = if q = NewQueueOfInteger
                              then q
                              else Remove(q) Add i,

        # Elements(NewQueueOfInteger) = = 0,
        # Elements(q Add i) = = # Elements(q) + 1;

        Append(q, NewQueueOfInteger) = = q,
        Append(q1, q2 Add i) = = Append(q1, q2) Add i,
```

Figure 1-3: Some axioms for type *QueueOfInteger*

Data types in general have properties that the specifier may wish to prove. For example, "the number of elements in the concatenation of two queues is the sum of the number of elements in each queue." Formally, this property is stated as

$$\# \text{Elements(Append(q,q'))} = \# \text{Elements(q)} + \# \text{Elements(q')}$$

Properties of a data type are proved using a method called *structural induction* [14, 7] which is based on the notion that all values of the data type can be produced by repeated applications of the *constructor* functions. To prove a property *P* of all elements of a data type, it suffices to show that

1. It is true for the "base" cases--the constructors that produce values of the type without taking values of the type as arguments (e.g., *P*(*NewQueue*)).

2. Assuming *P* is true for some value *q*, then it is also true for all values obtained by applying constructors to *q* (e.g., for all q.i *P*(*q*) implies *P*(*q Add i*)).

There is much more to specifying a data type specification than just giving a set of axioms. A good data type specification should provide the desired set of operations. These operations should have the expected (intuitive) properties. The axioms should also facilitate simple proofs. In other words, the type has an associated *theory* that expresses properties derived from the axioms. (Building these theories is a mathematical art.) The main method of proof of such properties is induction, for which the schema part of a type provides the proof structure.

Affirm is not exactly a proof checker, nor is it a proof finder. The responsibility for finding and executing a proof strategy rests solely with the user. At each proof step, modifications are made to a system-maintained

proof structure. Then the rewriting rules of the data types of the program, together with the rules of propositional logic, are applied to simplify the proposition currently being worked upon. In general, the user is attempting to reduce a formula to a set of subgoals so simple that their proofs are immediate, i.e., can be obtained by the system without further direction. Some example commands for carrying out proofs and their effects are:

try proposition Set up *proposition* as the current goal.

employ Induction(v)

> *Induction* is a user-defined schema for the type of induction desired and *v* is the variable to be induced upon. The proof structure is modified to show the various cases of the induction.

apply proposition Use *proposition* as a lemma in the proof (*proposition* must be proved or assumed separately). A separate *put* command instantiates the variables in the lemma to the proper values in the current goal.

suppose proposition

> Break the current goal into two subgoals, one with the additional hypothesis *proposition* and the other with ~*proposition*.

split   Break up the proposition at a designated spot into subgoals, e.g., the proposition $H\ imp\ (C_1$ *and* $C_2)$ can be split into the two propositions $H\ imp\ C_1$ and $(H\ and\ C_1)\ imp\ C_2$.

replace   Replace subexpressions with other subexpressions according to designated equalities in the current proposition.

invoke defn Invoke a definition *defn* that the user has made at some time.

The user can explore various avenues of proof until the proof is complete or until the conjecture is found to be unprovable, at which point the proof of the corrected conjecture must be *restarted* or *the bad proof steps corrected*.

Each theorem or intermediate proposition in *Affirm* is represented by a named node in a directed acyclic graph called the *proof forest*. The proof of a theorem comprises a tree, whose named arcs represent *Affirm* commands and thus deductive steps. *Affirm* checks for circularity within the current tree.

An example of an *Affirm* proof is discussed in Section 3.

1.4 Relation to Other Work

There is a large body of work regarding techniques for specifying protocols. These include Petri nets (and related graph models), formal languages, sequencing expressions, and (parallel) programming languages. Much of this work is limited in expressive power, in the sense that specifications grow unproportionally large

as the complexity of the protocol being specified increases. Many also suffer from lack of a solid theory or of automated tools for verification. Sunshine [16] provides a survey of this work.

Although the underlying model of **SPEX** is not new, it is believed to be the first language allowing the formal specification of nondeterministic state transition systems in a modular, hierarchical fashion, and for which semi-automated verification tools exist. An important advantage of the modularization and the symbolic nature of the specification is that there is no combinatorial explosion when analyzing more complex protocols. Schwabe [13] provides an example in which a complex protocol, involving an arbitrary number of nodes, is specified and verified, but where the complexity of the proof is independent of the number of nodes.

2. SPECIFICATION OF THE THREE-WAY HANDSHAKE IN SPEX

This section examines a **SPEX**ification of the three-way handshake protocol described informally in Section 1.1. Appendix I contains the actual text of the **SPEX**ification.

First the state variables, interfaces, initial state, and events for one station are given; the main portion of the specification shows the behavior of the station for each event. A small specification for the medium is also given, stating that the medium is essentially a queue with an added *LoseMessage* event. In the sequel, a brief explanation of the **SPEX**ification is given.

The three-way handshake protocol involves two nodes with identical behavior. The corresponding node type is *Station*.

Each station needs the following state variables:

ISS is some constant to be used as Initial Send Sequence number.

Incarnation# In
    is an incarnation identification for the packets coming in from the other node.

Incarnation# Out
    is an incarnation identification for the packets leaving this node.

OldUnack
    is the sequence number of the oldest sent packet which has not yet been acknowledged.

Seq# ToSend
    is the sequence number that should be attached to the next data packet to be sent.

Seq# ToReceive
    is the expected sequence number of the next packet coming in.

TimeoutBuffer
    is a queue of packets containing copies of packets which have been sent but not yet acknowledged.[4]

The exported interface to using systems contains two variables:

Command
    is a command buffer through which the user indicates what type of open request is desired.

---

[4]Strictly speaking, TimeoutBuffer does not have to be a queue, but just a collection, of packets. Modeling it as a queue results in simpler axioms in this situation.

StateOf
> is a variable that remembers the state of the station, i.e., somehow remembers the recent history of messages that have been exchanged. Its value can be one of {Closed, Listen, SynSent, SynReceived, Established}.

Each station has two interface variables which are internal to the system, namely:

InPort
> is a queue of incoming packets, with possible loss.

OutPort
> is a queue of outgoing packets, with possible loss.

The initial state of each station requires that the *State* of the station be *Closed*, the *TimeoutBuffer* be empty and the sequence numbers and incarnation number of incoming packets be zero.[5]

The events to which a station can react are:

ActiveOpen
> which is caused when the user issues an active open command. This means that a connection request will be sent to the other party.

PassiveOpen
> which is caused when the user issues a passive open command. This means that the station will listen for incoming connection requests and accept the first one that comes.

Timeout
> which is caused when a timeout occurs, i.e., when a certain amount of time has elapsed without a packet being acknowledged.

ReceiveRst
> which is caused when a packet arrives whose control field is *rst* (reset). This is a control packet used to indicate the discovery of an anomalous situation.

ReceiveAck
> which is caused when an acknowledgment packet arrives.

ReceiveSyn
> which is caused when a packet arrives whose control field is *syn* (synchronize). This is a connection request.

ReceiveSynAck
> which is caused when a packet which is both an acknowledgment and a connection request arrives.

---

[5]Zero is used as an arbitrary initial value.

The node type representing the medium has only an interface variable, *Buffer*, which is a queue of packets. There is only one event that can happen, *LoseMessage*, which models the medium being faulty. Note that the *transmit* operation of the medium is modeled as an *Add* to the queue, and the *receive* operation is modeled as a *Remove* from the queue, with the packet delivered obtained by *Front* of the queue (before the *Remove*).

The definition of the data type *Packet* can be found in Appendix II. A brief description is given here.

The fields of a packet are the following:

SeqNumber
      is the sequence number of the packet.

Seq#Inc
      is the incarnation number associated with the sequence number.

AckNumber
      is the sequence number that the packet is acknowledging.

Ack#Inc
      is the incarnation number of the acknowledgment field.

Ctl   is the control field of the packet.

As an illustration of the effects of an event, consider the *ActiveOpen* event (see page 26). Its precondition states that it can fire only if the *StateOf* the node is *Closed*, and the user issued an active open command by placing the value *Active* in the *Command* buffer. When this event fires, the effects specified state, for instance, that a SYN packet is sent to the other side by appending it to the *OutPort* interface variable. It is also specified that the *StateOf* state variable becomes *SynSent*.

Finally, the *Topology* section states that there are two stations, *Left* and *Right*, connected by a medium in each direction (i.e., *OutPort@Left*, *Buffer@LeftToRight*, and *InPort@Right* are all a single shared queue).

The *Properties* section states properties concerning the correct operation of the system that will be discussed in Section 3.

The **SPEX**ification given in Appendix I is a simplification of the one given in TCP [12]. The main differences are:

> ▶ TCP allows connections between arbitrary pairs of addresses within a large address space. As in TCP, the **SPEX**ification assumes this addressing function is performed by a higher (sub) level, so that only fixed pair of nodes need be considered.

> ▶ TCP uses a sequence number and an initial send sequence number selection algorithm to handle the problems of distinguishing incarnations. TCP sequence numbers correspond roughly to a

14

concatenation of incarnation and sequence numbers in our specification. TCP sequence numbers are of finite size, whereas they are of infinite size in the **SPEX**ification.

▶ The **SPEX**ification concerns itself only with the connection-opening phase of the protocol; it does not allow closing of the connection in the middle of an opening. Likewise, it does not allow data to be sent while a connection is being opened.

▶ When a RST packet arrives at a node that is in SYNSENT state, the TCP remembers whether the connection started via an active or via a passive open. If the open was passive, the station returns to the LISTEN state rather than closing the connection. The **SPEX**ification always closes the connection after a reset. This modification does not affect the functional correctness of the protocol, but makes the corresponding **SPEX**ification simpler.

For the purposes of verifying properties of the three-way handshake, the **SPEX**ification has been manually translated into an algebraic data type specification that can be understood by the *Affirm* system. Appendix II contains the generated axioms and auxiliary data type definitions (e.g., Packet, QueueOfPacket) in *Affirm* syntax.

3. VERIFICATION

3.1 Introduction

This section discusses the verification of properties concerning functional correctness and liveness. The discussion is presented in terms of the algebraic style data type specification as understood by *Affirm*.

As was discussed in Section 1.1, the functional correctness of a connection protocol cannot be completely separated from the succeeding data transfer phase. This introduces a problem as to the instant at which the claim of functional correctness should be made. Ideally, functional correctness should state that

> *At the end of the connection phase, both stations are in the Established state and are synchronized, which means that "old" data will not be accepted, but "new" data will be.*

Therefore, it would be necessary to describe at least part of the data transfer protocol as well.

Because the data transfer has been omitted from the specification, a modified version of this property must be used. The following sections describe this in more detail.

3.2 Functional Correctness

Consider now the *functional correctness* of the protocol, as stated above, but from only one node's point of view:[6]

> (StateOf = Established)@Right
> imp Seq # ToReceive@Left = Seq # ToSend@Right and
> Incarnation # In@Left = Incarnation # Out@Right ;

In English, this says that if the station on the *Right* side is in the *Established* state, then the connection is synchronized for data flowing *out* of this node.

This property is proved to be invariant by inductive proof methods which are used for abstract data types. Work with this specification showed that this theorem was not strong enough to be used in an inductive proof, for the following reason. Careful study of the protocol shows that it is possible for the above properties to hold in the SynSent state also, when simultaneous active open commands are issued at both nodes, as follows: one side may be in the SynSent state and may already have received an acknowledgment for its SYN packet; this side would not enter the Established state until it receives the SYN packet from the other side. This situation is characterized by the fact that OldUnack (the oldest unacknowledged sequence number) is not ISS anymore. Since this side has received an acknowledgment for its SYN, it can be sure that the other side knows its Seq # ToSend and its Incarnation # Out.

---

[6] The notation *P*@*n* means *P* is to be evaluated in node *n*.

Hence the statement of functional correctness must be strengthened (for one side only) as follows:

Theorem FC:

$(\;$(StateOf = Established) or ((StateOf = SynSent) and OldUnack~ = ISS)$\;)$@Right
        imp
              Seq # ToReceive@Left = Seq # ToSend@Right and
              Incarnation # In@Left = Incarnation # Out@Right ;

This need to strengthen or generalize a theorem in order to prove its invariance is typical of inductive proof methods used for abstract data types.

Notice that this strengthened statement implies the weaker one, so that proving the stronger one proves the weaker one as well.

Figure 3-1 contains a proof tree for this theorem produced by the ***Affirm*** system; the lemmas and definitions used are given in Figure 3-2 (these figures contain axioms and theorems stated using ***Affirm*** syntax; the correspondence to **SPEX** syntax should be obvious).[7] The proof follows an inductive argument over all possible events in the system. Broadly speaking, this can be expressed as the following: given a *goal* state (e.g., Established), examine how each event can move the system *into* that state (e.g., *ReceiveAck* event in SynReceived state). In general, there are many states from which the system may move into the goal state. Considering now each of those states, one uses the inductive hypothesis to try to prove the theorem.

After some examination of the proof tree, it is possible to see that most cases follow directly from the inductive hypotheses; this can be seen in the proof tree by looking at the branches and noticing where only an *invoke IH* command (possibly preceded or followed by some *replace, cases* and *invoke* commands) was given. Now the cases are examined which do *not* follow directly from the inductive hypotheses, i.e., involve the application of some lemmas.

Consider what happens when a ReceiveAck@Right occurs ($\leftarrow\leftarrow<1$).[8] *The relevant case to consider has the* node at right in SynSent or in SynReceived, and the incoming acknowledgment has the current incarnation number (since otherwise the packet would be discarded as old). In other words, the incarnation number in the packet is equal to Incarnation # Out@Right. (See hypotheses of theorem AcksAndSyns in Fig. 3-2, applied at $\leftarrow\leftarrow<2$.) But if the incarnation number is current, then there must have been a SYN packet in the past which this *current* packet acknowledges (see definition of HasSyn, invoked at $\leftarrow\leftarrow<3$). Thus, the current ACK carries the *same* incarnation number that the SYN carried, which means that the station at left has its Incarnation # In set to the incarnation number of that SYN packet. Therefore, we can conclude that Incarnation # Out@Right = Incarnation # In@Left.

---

[7] Numbers on the left should be ignored: they result from bookkeeping in ***Affirm***.

[8] Indicators of the form $\leftarrow\leftarrow<n$ are used to point to the corresponding places in the proof tree

```
theorem Synchronized,    StateOf(S,Right) = Established
                      or StateOf(S,Right) = SynSent and OldUnack(S,Right) ~= ISS(Right)
                  imp synchronized(S);
Synchronized uses EorSSimpEorSR%, SynchNoLorCorSS%, AcksAndSyns%, FrontInQ%,
Seq#ToSendVals%, and Seq#ToReceiveVal%.


proof tree:
68:!    Synchronized
                  apply  EorSSimpEorSR {proved by Schwabe using Affirm 120 on  4-Feb-81 in
                                    transcript <SCHWABE>Affirmtranscript.3-FEB-81.2}
70:     54    put  S'=S
74:     55    employ  Induction(S)
           Empty:
              Immediate
76:        apr:
              56    employ  NormalForm(iiS)
78:           ActiveOpen:
                 57    cases
80:              65    invoke  IH
82:              66    replace
84:              67    invoke  synchronized  | all |
84:              (proven!)
221:          PassiveOpen:{Synchronized, apr:}
                 58    cases
223:             125   invoke  IH
225:             126   invoke  synchronized  | all |
225:             (proven!)
227:          LoseMessage:{Synchronized, apr:}
                 59    invoke  IH
229:             128   invoke  synchronized  | all |
233:             (proven!)
231:          Timeout:{Synchronized, apr:}
                 60    invoke  IH
233:             130   invoke  synchronized  | all |
233:             (proven!)
235:          ReceiveRst:{Synchronized, apr:}
                 61    cases
237:             131   employ  NormalForm(i')
239:             Left:
                    132   invoke  IH
241:                134   invoke  synchronized  | all |
241:                (proven!)
243:             Right:
                    133   invoke  IH
253:                136   invoke  synchronized  | all |
253:->              (proven!)
88:           ReceiveAck:{Synchronized, apr:}
                 62    cases
90:              69    employ  NormalForm(i')
92:              Left:
                    70    invoke  IH
94:                 72    invoke  synchronized  | all |
94:                 (proven!)
96:              Right:                                                      ←←<1
                    71    invoke  IH
98:                 74    replace
105:                75    invoke  synchronized  | all |
107:                76    apply  AcksAndSyns                                  ←←<2
109:                77    put      pk = Front(Medium(ss', Left))
                                and S=ss'
111:                78    apply  FrontInQ
113:                79    put  Q = Medium(ss', Left)
116:                80    replace
121:                81    invoke  PreCond  | -4 : -3 |
123:                82    apply  Seq#ToSendVals                              ←←<4
125:                83    put  S=ss'
127:                84    invoke  IncomingAck#Valid  | all |
129:                85    invoke  HasSyn                                     ←←<3
131:                86    replace
133:                87    apply  Seq#ToReceiveVal                           ←←<5
135:                88    put  S=ss'
135:                (proven!)
```

Figure 3-1: Proof tree for the functional correctness of the three-way handshake

```
137:        ReceiveSyn:{Synchronized, apr:}
            63     cases
139:        90     invoke  IH                                      ←←<6
141:        91     replace
143:        92     invoke  synchronized | all |
145:        93     cases
150:        94     replace
161:        95     apply  SynchNoLorCorSS                          ←←<7
163:        97     put  S=ss'
165:        98     replace
            (proven!)
167:        ReceiveSynAck:{Synchronized, apr:}
            64     cases
169:        99     employ  NormalForm(i')
171:        Left:
            100    invoke  IH
173:        102    invoke  synchronized | all |
175:        103    cases
177:        104    replace
179:        105    apply  SynchNoLorCorSS
181:        106    put  S=ss'
181:        (proven!)
183:        Right:{Synchronized, apr:, ReceiveSynAck:}
            101    invoke  IH
185:        108    invoke  synchronized | all |
187:        109    apply  AcksAndSyns
189:        110    put       S=ss'
                      and pk = Front(Medium(ss', Left))
191:        111    apply  FrontInQ
193:        112    put  Q = Medium(ss', Left)
195:        113    replace
199:        114    invoke  IncomingAck#Valid | last | .  PreCond | 1 |
201:        115    replace
203:        116    invoke  HasSyn
205:        117    invoke  PreCond
207:        118    replace
209:        119    apply  Seq#ToSendVals
211:        120    put  S=ss'
213:        121    replace
215:        122    apply  Seq#ToReceiveVal
217:        123    put  S=ss'
219:        124    replace
            (proven!)
```

Figure 3-1: Proof tree (continued)

```
theorem Synchronized,       StateOf(S, Right) = Established
                or    StateOf(S, Right) = SynSent
                      and OldUnack(S, Right) ~ = ISS(Right)
                imp synchronized(S);

theorem AcksAndSyns,       pk in Medium(S, Left)
                and StateOf(S, Left) ~ = Listen
                and StateOf(S, Left) ~ = Closed
                and Inc # Ack(pk) = Incarnation # Out(S, Right)
                and (Control(pk) = ack) or (Control(pk) = synack)
                imp HasSyn(S, pk);

theorem FrontInQ, Q~ = NewQueueOfPacket imp Front(Q) in Q;

theorem Seq # ToSendVals,       StateOf(S, Right) ~ = Closed
                and StateOf(S, Right) ~ = Listen
                imp Seq # ToSend(S, Right) = 1 + ISS(Right);

theorem Seq # ToReceiveVal,       StateOf(S, Right) ~ = Closed
                and StateOf(S, Right) ~ = Listen
                and    StateOf(S, Left) = SynReceived
                  or StateOf(S, Left) = Established
                and Incarnation # Out(S, Right) = Incarnation # In(S, Left)
                imp Seq # ToReceive(S, Left) = 1 + ISS(Right);

theorem EorSSimpEorSR,       StateOf(S, Right) = Established
                or    StateOf(S, Right) = SynSent
                      and OldUnack(S, Right) ~ = ISS(Right)
                imp    StateOf(S, Left) = Established
                  or StateOf(S, Left) = SynReceived;

theorem SynchNoLorCorSS,       StateOf(S, Right) = Established
                or    StateOf(S, Right) = SynSent
                      and OldUnack(S, Right) ~ = ISS(Right)
                imp    StateOf(S, Left) ~ = Listen
                  and StateOf(S, Left) ~ = Closed
                  and StateOf(S, Left) ~ = SynSent;
define   synchronized(S)
         = = (   Seq # ToReceive(S, Left) = Seq # ToSend(S, Right)
            and Incarnation # In(S, Left) = Incarnation # Out(S, Right)),

       HasSyn(S, pk)
         = = some SS, SS', pk'
           (   SS join SS' = S
            and pk in Medium(SS, Right)
            and Inc # Seq(pk') = Inc # Ack(pk)
            and Inc # Seq(pk') = Incarnation # In(S, Left)
            and if Control(pk) = synack
               then Control(pk') = syn
               else (Control(pk') = syn or Control(pk') = synack));
```

Figure 3-2: Theorems and definitions used in the proof of the three-way handshake

For the sequence numbers to correspond, it suffices to see that, if the state of a node is not Listen or Closed, then its Seq#ToSend is always equal to ISS+1 (Seq#ToSend will not change until data is sent -- see theorem Seq#ToSendVals, applied at ←←<4), and that all SYN packets carry ISS as their sequence numbers. Since the Seq#ToReceive is taken from the SYN packet, it must perforce be ISS+1 (see theorem Seq#ToReceiveVals, applied at ←←<5). Therefore Seq#ToReceive@Left = Seq#ToSend@Right.

The next relevant case is when a ReceiveSyn@Left occurs (←←<6). This can be correct only if the node at left is in either Listen or SynSent: all other cases either cause an error or ignore the packet. But a careful examination of the state machine shows that it is not possible to have the station at one side in either Listen or SynSent, and the other in either Established or in SynReceived with OldUnack ~= ISS (theorem SynchNoLorCorSS, applied at ←←<7). Therefore this situation really cannot occur.

The other relevant cases are when a ReceiveSynAck occurs at either node. If it happens at the node at right, then the proof follows the same argument as the case for the ReceiveAck@Right. If it happens at the node at left, then the proof follows the reasoning for the case ReceiveSyn@Left.

3.3 Liveness

Another useful property that this protocol possesses is *Liveness*, which states that either some event in the system is enabled or the system is in its final state. Since open events are *user* generated, these events are ignored, and we assume that the system starts in a state where neither side is in the Closed state and both sides are not passively listening. In this case, it is expected that the correct protocol will complete the connection-establishment and reach a final global state in which both sides have reached the Established state.

In order to prove such a property, however, it is necessary to prevent certain sequences from actually being valid for the system. These are sequences composed entirely of *LoseMessage* or *Timeout* events. Such sequences reflect *fairness* assumptions on the medium, as well as finite capacity. Thus, restrictions must be made in the specification to insure the fairness of the medium. These restrictions are incorporated by including a limit on the number of occurrences of the *LoseMessage* event, as well as on the size of the medium.

Accordingly, the number of occurrences of the *LoseMessage* event is limited by having an extra auxiliary counter such that *LoseMessage* can be enabled only when the counter is positive, and each time *LoseMessage* fires it decreases the counter by one. It is set to some constant value each time a message or an acknowledgment is received. This constant value must be finite, but can be arbitrarily large.

The capacity of the medium can be taken into consideration by augmenting the precondition of all events that put something into the medium with a test to see if the length of the corresponding queue is less than a certain constant, which again must be finite but arbitrarily large. This rules out behaviors in which a node times out over and over, without anything else happening in the system.

With these modifications introduced, an attempt was made to prove that this protocol is alive, i.e., it satisfies

Theorem Liveness:

For all S,i

> [~PreCond(S,Receive*XX*) and ~PreCond(S,Timeout)
> and ~PreCond(S,LoseMessage) and StateOf~ = Closed]@i
> and ~(StateOf@i = Listen and StateOf@OppositeSide(i) = Listen)
> imp   (StateOf = Establis' ed)@Left and (StateOf = Established)@Right ;

where *XX* = {Ack,Syn,SynAck,Rst}.

An inductive proof goes through for all cases except for ReceiveRst. After some investigation, it was found that there is a scenario in which it is possible for the two nodes to end in the Closed state, which is a contradiction of the theorem! Figure 3-3 shows this scenario (with SEQ treated as a single item representing both the sequence number and the incarnation number).

This situation is considered an error because old duplicate packets in the medium prevent a connection from being established. Note that this is a liveness error, not a safety error, since nothing bad happens, i.e., no *incorrect synchronization* or data transfer takes place, but the intended progress does not occur.

Another situation in which there is no progress may occur because of the introduced protocol simplification that a node always returns to Closed state when a RST packet arrives. Note that this is *not* the scenario described above.

Interestingly, if data packets are allowed to be sent, this scenario can be continued in such a way that it actually accepts data incorrectly. It is sufficient for the appropriate old data packets to arrive at Node A at the point Node A entered the Established state and before any RST packets were sent by Node B; this is indicated in Figure 3-3. However, it should be noted that this situation depends on an *extremely unlikely* timing of message exchanges, which is not expected to be of practical significance.

This incorrect data can be avoided with a small change in the protocol. Work is under way to verify that a corrected version of the three-way handshake avoids it.

In [1], Berthomieu discusses the verification of other types of liveness properties in algebraically described state transition systems.

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```
Node A                                                          Node B

CLOSED                                                          CLOSED
act. Open        <SEQ=200><CTL=SYN> ->  ...
       (delayed)   <-  <SEQ=300><CTL=SYN>                       act. OPEN

SYNSENT                                                         SYNSENT
                                                               ... rcv SYN
SYNSENT                                                         SYNRECEIVED
                 <-  <SEQ=301><ACK=201><CTL=ACK>                snd ACK
rcv ACK
SYNSENT                                                         SYNRECEIVED
                 <-  <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN>  old duplicate !!
rcv SYN
ESTABLISHED                                                     SYNRECEIVED
snd ACK          <SEQ=201><ACK=101><CTL=ACK> -> bad ACK !!


         -------------------------------------------------
         *** bad data might be accepted here ***
         e.g.,   <-  <SEQ=101><DATA>
         -------------------------------------------------


                                                               rcv ACK
ESTABLISHED                                                    SYNRECEIVED
                 <-  <SEQ=101><CTL=RST>                        snd RST
rcv RST
CLOSED                                                         SYNRECEIVED
                 <-  <SEQ=300><CTL=SYN> original delayed syn
rcv SYN
CLOSED                                                         SYNRECEIVED
snd RST          <SEQ=0><ACK=301><CTL=RST>  ->

                                                               rcv RST
                                                               discard- bad ACK#
rcv ACK          <-  <SEQ=301><ACK=201><CTL=ACK>              snd ACK
CLOSED                                                         SYNRECEIVED
snd RST          <SEQ=201><CTL=RST> ->                        rcv RST
CLOSED                                                         CLOSED
```

Figure 3-3: Example of a liveness error in the three-way handshake

4. CONCLUSIONS

This report has presented an exercise in the verification of properties of a connection-establishment protocol. A specification language tailored to the need of communications protocols has been proposed, and its relation to a semi-automated verification system discussed. This language was then used to specify a connection protocol currently being used, and certain errors were uncovered using the verification system, although the major portion of the protocol's operation was shown to be correct.

This work is part of an ongoing project to develop better protocol specification and analysis techniques; further work is described in [13, 18]. Our preliminary experience indicates that the combination of state transition and abstract data type specification methods being pursued provides a reasonably convenient and powerful approach to these problems.

I. SPEXIFICATION OF THE THREE-WAY HANDSHAKE

Node(Station)[
    State Variables
    [

ISS,	*Initial Send Sequence #*
Incarnation # In,	*Incarnation # of Incoming packets*
Incarnation # Out,	*Incarnation # of outgoing packets*
OldUnack,	*Oldest unacknowledged seq. #*
Seq # ToSend,	*Seq # to put in the next outgoing packet*
Seq # ToReceive	*Next expected seq #*
:Nat,	*Nat stands for Natural*
TimeoutBuffer : QueueOfPackets,	*buffer with packets sent and not acknowledged*

    ]

    Interfaces
    [

      Exported::

Command : Command,	*One of {Active,Passive,Null}*
StateOf : SysState,	*State of this side of the connection*

      Internal::

InPort ,	*msgs coming in*
OutPort	*msgs going out*
:QueueOfPackets ;	

    ]

    Initial State
    [

      Incarnation # Out = Maxval(InPort Append OutPort) and| *Maxval produces a unique value*
                                               | *see Properties section*

      Incarnation # In = 0 and
      Seq # ToSend = 0 and
      Seq # ToReceive = 0 and
      StateOf = Closed and
      OldUnack = 0,
      TimeoutBuffer = NewQueueOfPackets ;

    ]

    Events
    [| *Events and their preconditions*
      ActiveOpen : **PreCond is** StateOf = Closed and Command = Active,
      PassiveOpen : **PreCond is** StateOf = Closed and Command = Passive,
      Timeout : **PreCond is** TimeoutBuffer ~ = NewQueueOfPackets,
      ReceiveRst : **PreCond is** InPort~ = NewQueueOfPackets and Control(Front(InPort)) = rst,
      ReceiveAck : **PreCond is** InPort~ = NewQueueOfPackets and Control(Front(InPort)) = ack,
      ReceiveSyn : **PreCond is** InPort~ = NewQueueOfPackets and Control(Front(InPort)) = syn,
      ReceiveSynAck : **PreCond is**
              InPort~ = NewQueueOfPackets and Control(Front(InPort)) = synack

    ]

Behavior
[

|first we define some auxiliary predicates and
|functions to improve readability of the specification

define IncomingAck # Valid = =

  (AckNumber(Front(InPort)) = + OldUnack) and
  Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)) = Incarnation # Out;

                                                        | Acknowledgment for X has Ack = X + 1

define IncomingSeq # Valid = =

  (SeqNumber(Front(InPort)) = Seq # ToReceive) and
  Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)) = Incarnation # In;

ActiveOpen::
  Command ← Null,

  Incarnation # Out ← Maxval(InPort Append OutPort),

  OldUnack ← ISS,

  Seq # ToSend ← + ISS

  StateOf ← SynSent

  TimeoutBuffer ←

    NewQueueOfPackets Add pkt(ISS,Maxval(InPort Append Outport),AnyNat,AnyNat,syn)

  OutPort ←
    Outport Add pkt(ISS,Maxval(InPort Append Outport),AnyNat,AnyNat,syn) ;

PassiveOpen::
  Command ← Null,

  StateOf ← Listen,

  TimeoutBuffer ← NewQueueOfPackets;

ReceiveRst::
  StateOf ←
  if StateOf = SynSent and IncomingAck # Valid
   then Closed
   else if StateOf = Listen
     then Listen
     else if IncomingSeq # Valid
       then Closed
       else StateOf,

```
        TimeoutBuffer ←
     if StateOf = SynSent and IncomingAck # Valid
      then NewQueueOfPackets
      else if IncomingSeq # Valid
          then NewQueueOfPackets
          else TimeoutBuffer,

     InPort ← Remove(InPort),


ReceiveAck::
  OldUnack ←
     if StateOf = SynSent
       then if IncomingAck # Valid
           then +OldUnack
           else OldUnack
       else if StateOf = SynReceived
           then if IncomingAck # Valid and IncomingSeq # Valid
               then +OldUnack
               else OldUnack
           else OldUnack,

  StateOf ←
     if StateOf = SynReceived
       then if IncomingAck # Valid and IncomingSeq # Valid
           then Established
           else SynReceived
       else StateOf,

  TimeoutBuffer ←
     if StateOf = Closed or StateOf = Listen
       then NewQueueOfPackets
       else if StateOf = SynReceived
           then if IncomingAck # Valid and IncomingSeq # Valid
               then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer,Seq # ToSend)
               else TimeoutBuffer
           else if StateOf = SynSent
               then if IncomingAck # Valid
                   then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer,Seq # ToSend)
                   else TimeoutBuffer
               else TimeoutBuffer,
```

```
OutPort ←
  if StateOf = Closed or StateOf = Listen
    or ((StateOf = SynSent) and ~IncomingAck # Valid)
    then   OutPort
       Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
          Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
          AnyNat,AnyNat,
          rst)
    else if StateOf = SynReceived
         then if ~IncomingSeq # Valid
            then   OutPort
               Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,Incarnation # Out,
                  Seq # ToReceive,Incarnation # In,
                  ack)
            else if ~IncomingAck # Valid
                then OutPort
                   Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
                      Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
                      AnyNat,AnyNat,
                      rst)
                else OutPort
       else OutPort,


  InPort ← Remove(InPort) ;

ReceiveSyn::
  Incarnation # Out ←
    if StateOf = Listen
      then Maxval(InPort Append OutPort)
      else  Incarnation # Out,

  Incarnation # In ←
    if  ((StateOf = Listen) or StateOf = SynSent)
      then Seq # Inc(Front(InPort))
      else Incarnation # In,

  OldUnack ←
    if StateOf = Listen
      then ISS
      else OldUnack,

  Seq # ToSend ←
    if StateOf = Listen
      then  + ISS
      else Seq # ToSend,

  Seq # ToReceive ←
    if StateOf = Listen or StateOf = SynSent
      then  + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
      else Seq # ToReceive,
```

```
        StateOf ←
          if StateOf = Listen
           then SynReceived
           else if StateOf = SynSent
               then if OldUnack = ISS
                    then SynReceived
                    else Established
               else StateOf,


     TimeoutBuffer ←
       if StateOf = Listen
        then    NewQueueOfPackets
            Add pkt(ISS,Maxval(InPort Append OutPort),
                + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
                ,Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
                synack)
        else if StateOf = Closed
                then NewQueueOfPackets
                else TimeoutBuffer,

  OutPort ←
     if StateOf = SynSent
      then    OutPort
         Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,Incarnation # Out,
             + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
             ,Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
             ack)
      else if StateOf = SynReceived or StateOf = Established
          then if IncomingSeq # Valid
             then OutPort
             else    OutPort
                Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,
                    Incarnation # Out,
                    Seq # ToReceive,
                    Incarnation # In,
                    ack)
         else if StateOf = Listen
             then    OutPort
                Add pkt(ISS,Maxval(InPort Append OutPort),
                    + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
                    ,Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
                    synack)
             else    OutPort
                Add pkt(0',Incarnation # Out,
                    + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
                    ,Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
                    rst),

  InPort ← Remove(InPort) ;
```

```
ReceiveSynAck::
  Incarnation # In ←
     if (StateOf = SynSent) and IncomingAck # Valid
      then Seq # Inc(Front(InPort))
      else Incarnation # In,

  OldUnack ←
     if StateOf = SynSent
       then if IncomingAck # Valid
           then + OldUnack
           else OldUnack
       else if StateOf = SynReceived or StateOf = Established
           then if IncomingAck # Valid and IncomingSeq # Valid
               then + OldUnack
               else OldUnack
           else OldUnack,

  Seq # ToReceive ←

     if StateOf = SynSent
       then if IncomingAck # Valid
           then + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
           else Seq # ToReceive
       else Seq # ToReceive,

  StateOf ←
     if StateOf = SynSent and IncomingAck # Valid
      then Established
      else StateOf,

  TimeoutBuffer ←
     if StateOf = Closed or StateOf = Listen
       then NewQueueOfPackets
       else if StateOf = SynSent
           then if IncomingAck # Valid
               then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer,OldUnack)
               else NewQueueOfPackets
           else TimeoutBuffer,
```

```
OutPort ←
  if StateOf = Closed or StateOf = Listen
    then   OutPort
       Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
           Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
           AnyNat,AnyNat,
           rst)
    else if StateOf = SynSent
       then if IncomingAck # Valid
           then   OutPort
             Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,Incarnation # Out,
                 + SeqNumber(Front(InPort)),
                 Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
                 ack)
           else   OutPort
             Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
                 Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
                 AnyNat,AnyNat,
                 rst)
       else if StateOf = Established
           then if IncomingSeq # Valid
               then OutPort
               else   OutPort
                 Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,
                     Incarnation # Out,
                     Seq # ToReceive,
                     Incarnation # In,
                     ack)
           else if StateOf = SynReceived
               then if ~IncomingSeq # Valid
                   then   OutPort
                     Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,Incarnation # Out,
                         Seq # ToReceive,Incarnation # In,
                         ack)
                   else if ~IncomingAck # Valid
                       then   OutPort
                         Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
                             Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
                             AnyNat,AnyNat,
                             rst)
                       else OutPort,


  InPort ← Remove(InPort);


  Timeout::
    OutPort ← OutPort Append TimeoutBuffer ;
  ]
| Node Station |]
```

```
Node(Medium)[
      State Variables[| No state variables |]
      Interfaces
      [
          Exported::
            Buffer : QueueOfPacket ;
      ]
      Initial State
      [    Buffer = NewQueueOfPacket ; ]
      Events[   LoseMessage : PreCond is Buffer ~ = NewQueueOfPacket ;]
      Behavior
      [
          LoseMessage::
            Buffer ← Remove(Buffer) ;
      ]
|Node Medium|]


Topology
      [     |There is a medium RightToLeft and a medium LeftToRight
            |There are two instances of node type Station: Left and Right

          Instances::
            RightToLeft,LeftToRight : Medium,
            Left,Right : Station ;

          Connections::
              InPort@Left,OutPort@Right  <—> Buffer@RightToLeft,
              OutPort@Left,InPort@Right <—> Buffer@LeftToRight;
      ]
Properties
      [
          assume Maxval(Q),
           forall pk(
             pk in Q imp (Maxval(Q) > Seq # Inc(pk) and Maxval(Q) > Ack # Inc(pk))
               ),

          assert CorrectSynch,
              ((StateOf = Established) or StateOf = SynSent and OldUnack~ = ISS)@Right imp
              Seq # ToSend@Right  =  Seq # ToReceive@Left and
              Incarnation # Out@Right = Incarnation # In@Left ,

          assert Liveness,
          For all i                                          |I can be one of {Left,Right}
          ( ~PreCond(ReceiveAck) and ~PreCond(ReceiveSyn) and
          ~PreCond(ReceiveSynAck) and ~PreCond(ReceiveRst) and
          ~PreCond(Timeout) and ~PreCond(LoseMessage)  and StateOf~ = Closed)@i
          and ~(StateOf@i = Listen and StateOf@OppositeSide(i) = Listen)
          imp (StateOf = Established)@Left and (StateOf = Established)@Right ;
      ]
```

II. AXIOMS GENERATED FROM THE SPEXIFICATION OF THE THREE-WAY HANDSHAKE

The axioms that follow contain the translation of the **SPEX**ification of the three-way handshake given in Appendix I. The medium interface variables (*InPort*, *OutPort* and *Buffer*) have been collapsed into the variable *Medium*. The precondition of event *e* is called *PreCond(S,e)*. The *Command* interface variable has been eliminated, since it is not really necessary when analyzing the properties of the system specified.

II.1 Three-Way Handshake

```
type ThreeWay;
needs types Event,SequenceOfEvent,Packet,QueueOfPackets,SysState,Side;
declare Q,q,q':QueueOfPackets;
declare seq # ,seg # ,ack # ,snd # :Integer;
declare cf:ControlField;
declare S,SS,SS':SequenceOfEvent;
declare pe:Event;
declare pk,pk':Packet;
declare i,ii,j:Side;

interface ISS(i):Integer;

interface
    TimeoutBuffer(S,i),
    Medium(S,i)
    :QueueOfPackets;

interface
    StateOf(S,i)
    :SysState;

interface
    Maxval(q),
    Incarnation # In(S,i),
    Incarnation # Out(S,i),
    OldUnack(S,i),
    Seq # ToSend(S,i),
    Seq # ToReceive(S,i)
    :Integer;

interface Induction(S):Boolean;

{auxiliary functions to help in the readability of the axioms}

interface PreCond(S,pe),
    IncomingAck # Valid(S,i),
    IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
    : Boolean;

define {auxiliary function definitions}

    PreCond(S,ActiveOpen(i)) = = StateOf(S,i) = Closed,

    PreCond(S,PassiveOpen(i)) = = StateOf(S,i) = Closed,

    PreCond(S,Timeout(i)) = = TimeoutBuffer(S,i) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets,

    PreCond(S,LoseMessage(i)) = = Medium(S,i) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets,

    PreCond(S,ReceiveRst(i)) = =
    ( Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets) and
```

Control(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) = rst,

PreCond(S,ReceiveAck(i)) = =
(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets) and
Control(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) = ack,

PreCond(S,ReceiveSyn(i)) = =
(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets) and
Control(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) = syn,

PreCond(S,ReceiveSynAck(i)) = =
(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets) and
Control(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) = synack,

IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) = =
(AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) = 1 + OldUnack(S,i)) and
Inc # Ack(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) = Incarnation # Out(S,i),

IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i) = =
(SeqNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) = Seq # ToReceive(S,i))
and Inc # Seq(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) = Incarnation # In(S,i);

axioms {Initial State}

Incarnation # Out(Empty,i) = = Maxval(Medium(Empty,Left) Append
                                Medium(Empty,Right)),

Incarnation # In(Empty,i) = = 0,

OldUnack(Empty,i) = = 0,

Seq # ToSend(Empty,i) = = 0,

Seq # ToReceive(Empty,i) = = 0,

Medium(Empty,i) = = NewQueueOfPackets,

StateOf(Empty,i) = = Closed,

TimeoutBuffer(Empty,i) = = NewQueueOfPackets;

axioms {Active Open}

Incarnation # Out(S apr ActiveOpen(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ActiveOpen(i))
  then Maxval(Medium(S,Left) Append Medium(S,Right))
  else Incarnation # Out(S,j),

Incarnation # In(S apr ActiveOpen(i),j) = = Incarnation # In(S,j),

OldUnack(S apr ActiveOpen(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ActiveOpen(i))
  then ISS(i)
  else OldUnack(S,j),

Seq # ToSend(S apr ActiveOpen(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ActiveOpen(i))
  then 1 + ISS(i)
  else Seq # ToSend(S,j),

Seq # ToReceive(S apr ActiveOpen(i),j) = = Seq # ToReceive(S,j),

StateOf(S apr ActiveOpen(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ActiveOpen(i))
  then SynSent
  else StateOf(S,j),

```
TimeoutBuffer(S apr ActiveOpen(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ActiveOpen(i))
  then    NewQueueOfPackets
      Add pkt(ISS(i),Maxval(Medium(S,Left) Append Medium(S,Right)),
          AnyNat,AnyNat,syn)
  else TimeoutBuffer(S,j).

Medium(S apr ActiveOpen(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ActiveOpen(i))
  then    Medium(S,i)
      Add pkt(ISS(i),Maxval(Medium(S,Left) Append Medium(S,Right)),
          AnyNat,AnyNat,syn)
  else Medium(S,j);
```

axioms {PassiveOpen}

```
Incarnation # Out(S apr PassiveOpen(i),j) = = Incarnation # Out(S,j).

Incarnation # In(S apr PassiveOpen(i),j) = = Incarnation # In(S,j).

OldUnack(S apr PassiveOpen(i),j) = = OldUnack(S,j).

Seq # ToSend(S apr PassiveOpen(i),j) = = Seq # ToSend(S,j).

Seq # ToReceive(S apr PassiveOpen(i),j) = = Seq # ToReceive(S,j).

StateOf(S apr PassiveOpen(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,PassiveOpen(i))
  then Listen
  else StateOf(S,j).

TimeoutBuffer(S apr PassiveOpen(j),i) = = NewQueueOfPackets.

Medium(S apr PassiveOpen(j),i) = = Medium(S,i);
```

axioms {ReceiveRst}

```
Incarnation # Out(S apr ReceiveRst(i),j) = = Incarnation # Out(S,j).

Incarnation # In(S apr ReceiveRst(i),j) = = Incarnation # In(S,j).

OldUnack(S apr ReceiveRst(i),j) = = OldUnack(S,j).

Seq # ToSend(S apr ReceiveRst(i),j) = = Seq # ToSend(S,j).

Seq # ToReceive(S apr ReceiveRst(i),j) = = Seq # ToReceive(S,j).

StateOf(S apr ReceiveRst(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveRst(i)) then
  if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent and IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
    then Closed
    else if StateOf(S,i) = Listen
        then Listen
        else if IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
            then Closed
            else StateOf(S,i)
else StateOf(S,j).

TimeoutBuffer(S apr ReceiveRst(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveRst(i)) then
  if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent and IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
    then NewQueueOfPackets
    else if IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
            then NewQueueOfPackets
            else TimeoutBuffer(S,i)
else TimeoutBuffer(S,j).

Medium(S apr ReceiveRst(i),j) = =
```

```
          if i = j
            then Medium(S,i)
            else if PreCond(S,ReceiveRst(i)) and j = OppositeSide(i)
                then Remove(Medium(S,j))
                else Medium(S,j);


axioms  {ReceiveAck}

    Incarnation # Out(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j)  = =  Incarnation # Out(S,j),


    Incarnation # In(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j)  = =  Incarnation # In(S,j),


    OldUnack(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveAck(i))
      then if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
          then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
              then 1 + OldUnack(S,i)
              else OldUnack(S,i)
          else if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived
              then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) and IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
                  then 1 + OldUnack(S,i)
                  else OldUnack(S,i)
              else OldUnack(S,i)
      else OldUnack(S,j),


    Seq # ToSend(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j)  = =  Seq # ToSend(S,j),


    Seq # ToReceive(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j)  = =  Seq # ToReceive(S,j),


    StateOf(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveAck(i))
      then if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived
          then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) and IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
              then Established
              else SynReceived
          else StateOf(S,i)
      else StateOf(S,j),


    TimeoutBuffer(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveAck(i))
      then if StateOf(S,i) = Closed or StateOf(S,i) = Listen
          then  NewQueueOfPackets
          else  if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived
              then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) and IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
                  then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer(S,i),Seq # ToSend(S,i))
                  else TimeoutBuffer(S,i)
              else if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
                  then if AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) = 1 + OldUnack(S,i)
                      then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer(S,i),Seq # ToSend(S,i))
                      else TimeoutBuffer(S,i)
                  else TimeoutBuffer(S,i)
      else TimeoutBuffer(S,j),


    Medium(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j)  = =
    if PreCond(S,ReceiveAck(i)) then
      if i = j
        then if StateOf(S,i) = Closed or StateOf(S,i) = Listen
              or ((StateOf(S,i) = SynSent) and ~IncomingAck # Valid(S,i))
            then    Medium(S,i)
              Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                  Inc # Ack(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                  AnyNat,AnyNat,
                  rst)
            else if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived
                then if ~IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
                    then    Medium(S,i)
                        Add pkt(Seq # ToSend(S,i),
                            Incarnation # Out(S,i),
                            Seq # ToReceive(S,i),
                            Incarnation # In(S,i),
```

```
                              ack)
                    else if ~IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) then
                              Medium(S,i)
                              Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                              Inc # Ack(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                              AnyNat,AnyNat,
                              rst)
                              else Medium(S,i)
                    else Medium(S,i)
           else if j = OppositeSide(i)
                then Remove(Medium(S,j))
                else Medium(S,j)
         else Medium(S,j);


axioms  {ReceiveSyn}

    Incarnation # Out(S apr ReceiveSyn(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSyn(i)) then
     if StateOf(S,i) = Listen
      then Maxval(Medium(S,Left) Append Medium(S,Right))
      else  Incarnation # Out(S,i)
     else Incarnation # Out(S,j).

    Incarnation # In(S apr ReceiveSyn(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSyn(i)) then
     if ((StateOf(S,i) = Listen) or StateOf(S,i) = SynSent)
      then Inc # Seq(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i))))
      else Incarnation # In(S,i)
     else Incarnation # In(S,j).

    OldUnack(S apr ReceiveSyn(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSyn(i)) then
     if StateOf(S,i) = Listen
      then ISS(i)
      else OldUnack(S,i)
     else OldUnack(S,j).

    Seq # ToSend(S apr ReceiveSyn(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSyn(i)) then
     if StateOf(S,i) = Listen
      then 1 + ISS(i)
      else Seq # ToSend(S,i)
     else Seq # ToSend(S,j).

    Seq # ToReceive(S apr ReceiveSyn(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSyn(i))
     then if StateOf(S,i) = Listen or StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
         then 1 + SeqNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i))))
         else Seq # ToReceive(S,i)
     else Seq # ToReceive(S,j).

    StateOf(S apr ReceiveSyn(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSyn(i))
     then if StateOf(S,i) = Listen
         then SynReceived
         else if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
             then if OldUnack(S,i) = ISS(i)
                 then SynReceived
                 else Established
             else StateOf(S,i)
      else StateOf(S,j).

    TimeoutBuffer(S apr ReceiveSyn(i),j)  = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSyn(i))
     then if StateOf(S,i) = Listen
         then   NewQueueOfPackets
             Add pkt(ISS(i),Maxval(Medium(S,Left) Append Medium(S,Right)),
                 1 + SeqNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i))))
                 ,Inc # Seq(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                 synack)
```

```
                else if StateOf(S,i) = Closed
                    then NewQueueOfPackets
                    else TimeoutBuffer(S,i)
           else TimeoutBuffer(S,j).

    Medium(S apr ReceiveSyn(i),j) = =
    if PreCond(S,ReceiveSyn(i)) then
    if i = j
      then if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
           then   Medium(S,i)
               Add pkt(Seq # ToSend(S,i),Incarnation # Out(S,i),
                    1 + SeqNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i))))
                    ,Inc # Seq(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                    ack)
             else if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived or StateOf(S,i) = Established
                  then if IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
                       then Medium(S,i)
                       else   Medium(S,i)
                           Add pkt(Seq # ToSend(S,i),Incarnation # Out(S,i),
                               Seq # ToReceive(S,i),Incarnation # In(S,i),
                               ack)
                  else if StateOf(S,i) = Listen
                       then   Medium(S,i)
                           Add pkt(ISS(i),Maxval(Medium(S,Left) Append
                                        Medium(S,Right)),
                               1 + SeqNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i))))
                               ,Inc # Seq(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                               synack)
                       else   Medium(S,i)
                           Add pkt(0,Maxval(Medium(S,Left) Append
                                        Medium(S,Right)) ,
                               1 + SeqNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))).
                               Inc # Seq(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                               rst)
         else if j = OppositeSide(i)
             then Remove(Medium(S,j)))
             else Medium(S,j)
         else Medium(S,j);

axioms {ReceiveSynAck}

    Incarnation # Out(S apr ReceiveSynAck(i),j) = = Incarnation # Out(S,j).

    Incarnation # In(S apr ReceiveSynAck(i),j) = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSynAck(i)) then
      if (StateOf(S,i) = SynSent) and IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
        then Inc # Seq(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i))))
        else Incarnation # In(S,i)
      else Incarnation # In(S,j).

    Seq # ToSend(S apr ReceiveSynAck(i),j) = =  Seq # ToSend(S,j).

    OldUnack(S apr ReceiveSynAck(i),j) = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSynAck(i))
      then if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
           then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
                then 1 + OldUnack(S,i)
                else OldUnack(S,i)
           else if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived or StateOf(S,i) = Established
                then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) and IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
                     then 1 + OldUnack(S,i)
                     else OldUnack(S,i)
                else OldUnack(S,i)
      else OldUnack(S,j).

    Seq # ToReceive(S apr ReceiveSynAck(i),j) = =
    if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSynAck(i))
      then if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
           then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
                then 1 + SeqNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i))))
                else Seq # ToReceive(S,i)
```

```
              else Seq # ToReceive(S,i)
          else Seq # ToReceive(S,j).


StateOf(S apr ReceiveSynAck(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSynAck(i))
  then if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent and IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
       then Established
       else StateOf(S,i)
  else StateOf(S,j),


TimeoutBuffer(S apr ReceiveSynAck(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,ReceiveSynAck(i))
  then if StateOf(S,i) = Closed or StateOf(S,i) = Listen
       then NewQueueOfPackets
       else if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
            then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
                 then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer(S,i),OldUnack(S,i))
                 else NewQueueOfPackets
            else TimeoutBuffer(S,i)
  else TimeoutBuffer(S,j).


Medium(S apr ReceiveSynAck(i),j) = =
if PreCond(S,ReceiveSynAck(i)) then
if i = j
  then if StateOf(S,i) = Closed or StateOf(S,i) = Listen
       then   Medium(S,i)
            Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                Inc # Ack(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                AnyNat,AnyNat,
                rst)
       else if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
            then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
                 then   Medium(S,i)
                     Add pkt(Seq # ToSend(S,i),Incarnation # Out(S,i),
                         1 + SeqNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i))))
                         ,Inc # Seq(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                         ack)
                 else   Medium(S,i)
                     Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                         Inc # Ack(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                         AnyNat,AnyNat,
                         rst)
            else if StateOf(S,i) = Established
                 then if IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
                      then Medium(S,i)
                      else   Medium(S,i)
                          Add pkt(Seq # ToSend(S,i),
                              Incarnation # Out(S,i),
                              Seq # ToReceive(S,i),
                              Incarnation # In(S,i),
                              ack)
                 else if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived
                      then if ~IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
                           then   Medium(S,i)
                               Add pkt(Seq # ToSend(S,i),
                                   Incarnation # Out(S,i),
                                   Seq # ToReceive(S,i),
                                   Incarnation # In(S,i),
                                   ack)
                           else if ~IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) then
                                   Medium(S,i)
                                 Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                                     Inc # Ack(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
                                     AnyNat,AnyNat,
                                     rst)
                           else Medium(S,i)
                      else Medium(S,i)
  else if j = OppositeSide(i)
       then Remove(Medium(S,j))
       else Medium(S,j)
  else Medium(S,j);
```

axioms {Timeout}

Incarnation # Out(S apr Timeout(i),j) = = Incarnation # Out(S,j),

Incarnation # In(S apr Timeout(i),j) = = Incarnation # In(S,j),

OldUnack(S apr Timeout(i),j) = = OldUnack(S,j),

Seq # ToSend(S apr Timeout(i),j) = = Seq # ToSend(S,j),

Seq # ToReceive(S apr Timeout(i),j) = = Seq # ToReceive(S,j),

StateOf(S apr Timeout(i),j) = = StateOf(S,j),

Medium(S apr Timeout(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,Timeout(i))
  then Append(Medium(S,i),TimeoutBuffer(S,i))
  else Medium(S,j),

TimeoutBuffer(S apr Timeout(i),j) = = TimeoutBuffer(S,j);

axioms {LoseMessage}

Incarnation # Out(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) = = Incarnation # Out(S,j),

Incarnation # In(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) = = Incarnation # In(S,j),

OldUnack(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) = = OldUnack(S,j),

Seq # ToSend(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) = = Seq # ToSend(S,j),

Seq # ToReceive(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) = = Seq # ToReceive(S,j),

StateOf(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) = = StateOf(S,j),

Medium(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) = =
if i = j and PreCond(S,LoseMessage(i))
  then Remove(Medium(S,i))
  else Medium(S,j),

TimeoutBuffer(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) = = TimeoutBuffer(S,j);

end;

II.2 Auxiliary Data Type Definitions

type Packet;

needs types Integer, ControlField;

declare   dummy, pk: Packet;
declare   seq # , ack # , inc # s, inc # a: Integer;
declare   cf: ControlField;

interface pkt(seq # , inc # s, ack # , inc # a, cf): Packet;

interfaces SeqNumber(pk), AckNumber(pk), Inc # Seq(pk), Inc # Ack(pk): Integer;

interface Control(pk): ControlField;

```
axiom    dummy = pk
         = = (    (SeqNumber(dummy) = SeqNumber(pk)) and   AckNumber(dummy
)
                                    = AckNumber(pk)
           and Control(dummy) = Control(pk)
           and Inc # Ack(dummy) = Inc # Ack(pk)
           and Inc # Seq(dummy) = Inc # Seq(pk));

axiom    SeqNumber(pkt(seq # , inc # s, ack # , inc # a, cf)) = = seq # ;

axiom    AckNumber(pkt(seq # , inc # s, ack # , inc # a, cf)) = = ack # ;

axiom    Inc # Seq(pkt(seq # , inc # s, ack # , inc # a, cf)) = = inc # s;

axiom    Inc # Ack(pkt(seq # , inc # s, ack # , inc # a, cf)) = = inc # a;

axiom    Control(pkt(seq # , inc # s, ack # , inc # a, cf)) = = cf;

end {Packet} ;
type QueueOfPacket;

needs  type Packet

declare dummy, q, q1, q2, qq: QueueOfPacket;
declare i, i1, i2, ii: Packet;

interfaces
    NewQueueOfPacket, q Add i, Remove(q),
    Append(q1, q2), que(i): QueueOfPacket;

infix   Add;

interfaces
    Front(q), Back(q): Packet;

interfaces
    NormalForm(q), Induction(q), i in q: Boolean;

infix   in;

axioms  dummy = dummy = = TRUE,
    q Add i = NewQueueOfPacket = = FALSE,
    NewQueueOfPacket = q Add i = = FALSE,
    q1 Add i1 = q2 Add i2 = = ((q1 = q2) and (i1 = i2)),

    Remove(NewQueueOfPacket) = = NewQueueOfPacket,
    Remove(q Add i) = = if q = NewQueueOfPacket
            then q
            else Remove(q) Add i,

    Append(q, NewQueueOfPacket) = = q,
    Append(q, q1 Add i1) = = Append(q, q1) Add i1,

    que(i) = = NewQueueOfPacket Add i,

    Front(q Add i) = = if q = NewQueueOfPacket
            then i
            else Front(q),

    Back(q Add i) = = i,

    i in NewQueueOfPacket = = FALSE,
    i in (q Add i1) = = (i in q or (i = i1));

rulelemma
    Append(NewQueueOfPacket, q) = = q;

schemas NormalForm(q) = = cases(Prop(NewQueueOfPacket),
                all qq, ii (Prop(qq Add ii))),
```

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```
Induction(q) = = cases(Prop(NewQueueOfPacket),
              all qq, ii (IH(qq) imp Prop(qq Add ii)));
```

end {QueueOfPacket} ;

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