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

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STRATEGIC CONCEPTS FOR THE 1980'S

by

Colonel William O. Staudenmaier

1 May 1981

DISCLAIMER

The views of the author do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense.

FOREWORD

This special report reviews contemporary strategic concepts. The author discusses the interrelated concepts of national purpose, national interests, national goals or objectives, national strategy, and military strategy. He defines three levels of military strategy--national military strategy, coordinative military strategy, and operational military strategy--and discusses the impact of strategic constraints on the development of military strategy. In Chapter 2, the strategic trends of the midterm are examined for their effect on four fundamental elements of US national interest: Survival; Preservation of Territorial Integrity; Maintenance or Enhancement of the US Standard of Living and World Order. Then strategic guidelines are developed and used to propose a military strategy that would be relevant to the strategic environment of the 1980's.

This special report was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the Army War College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLONEL WILLIAM O. STAUDENMAIER has been assigned to the Strategic Studies Institute since his graduation from the US Army War College in 1976. Previously he served as a divisional air defense battalion commander in Germany and in various staff assignments at the Department of the Army. Colonel Staudenmaier graduated from the University of Chattanooga and earned a master's degree in public administration from Pennsylvania State University. He has published articles on air defense and military strategy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FIGURES

SUMMARY

Any US strategist preparing military plans must be aware of the impact that contemporary strategic concepts will have on his design. The interrelated concepts of national purpose, national interest, national objectives, national strategy, and military strategy establish the framework within which the strategist operates. The emergence of three distinct, although interrelated types of military strategy--national, coordinative, and operational--reflects the complexity of the emerging strategic environment. An appreciation of the fundamental elements of military planning and of the constraints acting upon the strategist is necessary to an understanding of how contemporary strategy is developed.

Beginning with the strategic concepts developed in Chapter 1, the strategic regional trends of the midterm are analyzed for their impact on achieving the fundamental national interests of the United States. Then six strategic guidelines--Independence of Action, Flexibility, Preparedness, Integration, Dislocation, and Selectivity--are postulated and examined for their relevance to the development of contemporary military strategy. Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of the current military strategy and, using the strategic guidelines developed earlier, proposes a military strategy for the 1980's.

CHAPTER 1

CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

In theory, there are two fundamental and competing approaches to the development of a midrange military strategy and its supporting force structure. In the first, the President, with the advice of his national security advisors, allocates a certain share of the nation's budget and resources to national defense, and the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are expected to develop and implement a strategy which will employ these resources to secure the nation's interests. This approach, which was in vogue in the years immediately following World War II, has often been called the "remainder" method because defense was allotted the money remaining after the domestic and foreign policy accounts were finalized. The second approach, which has never been fully implemented, requires that the national goals or objectives be derived from the nation's interests. Next, a national strategy would be developed to achieve these goals. From the national strategy, a national military strategy is then created together with the force structure needed to implement it. In the first approach, program and budget concerns dictate the strategy and force structure; in the second, theoretically, objectives and plans are the critical factors. Although the latter method is embodied in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), fiscal realities supersede theoretical constructs, so programs and budgets continue to dominate objectives and strategies. However, a military strategy developed through the interests-objectives-strategy approach provides a more rational guide to the short-range decisions required by the realities of the program budget system.

Fundamental to an understanding of the current system used to develop military strategy are the interrelated concepts of national purpose, national interest, national goals or objectives, national strategy, and military strategy.

NATIONAL PURPOSE

The development of a military strategy must begin with a consideration of the concept of national purpose. The national purpose impacts upon the national interests and national goals that the United States seeks to achieve. Unfortunately, the national purpose is such an abstract concept that many analysts doubt that it can ever be adequately defined. Some have described it as the expression of the enduring values in which a nation is rooted; others have defined it as the "nonverbal" consensus of the chief values of the people of the United States or claim that it is to be found in the Preamble to the Constitution. President Eisenhower declared that the American purpose was the nation's need to seek peace with justice. In 1950, a National Security Council (NSC) strategic assessment[1] considered that the national purpose was "to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity of the individual." In practical terms, the values inherent in the American national purpose do affect the development of national and military strategy. Because the United States eschews aggression, a philosophy which reflects its democratic values, preemptive war is not a practicable strategic option for national planners. Thus, if in a general nuclear war context the United States will not plan to launch a disarming first strike, the only remaining viable strategic option is deterrence based on a capability to retaliate in strength after an enemy nuclear strike has been absorbed.

The national purpose also manifests itself in other ways. It can be argued that regardless of the exact definition of the national purpose, the character of striving to attain it has changed over the years. In the last 80 years, the United States has changed from a young nation asserting itself, striving for perfection in its society and in its relations with the rest of the world, to a more mature nation that is principally concerned with maintaining its place in a more sophisticated and complex world. The first circumstance signifies action, boldness,

initiative, and opportunity; the second can be characterized by the status quo, caution, and reaction. Perhaps, it should not be surprising that modern US strategies are so often defensive and threat oriented, rather than offensive and opportunity centered. For the strategist, the strength of the national will is frequently a reflection of the national purpose. In a democracy, a firm articulated public opinion can be decisive and the strategist must learn to recognize it and to anticipate it or risk the failure of his strategy. Certainly, there were options that were foreclosed to strategists during the Angolan affair because of the adverse contemporary public attitudes towards intervention.

NATIONAL INTEREST

National strategy must be founded on national interests. A national interest may be defined as a defense, economic, political or ideological concern of importance to the United States. Although not unchanging, perceptions of national interests are relatively stable and enduring. A nation should construct a national strategy to secure its national interests. Since it is possible for national interests to be in conflict or to compete with one another, plans to harmonize competing interests must be part of an inclusive national strategy. Other policies must furnish guidelines which will enable strategies to establish priorities among national interests. In this respect, it is possible to speak of national strategy and of national strategies in much the same way that we speak of the foreign policy of a nation and also of its foreign policies. The ambiguity that naturally surrounds the concept of national interest is compounded in the pluralistic society of the United States, where there is no authoritative spokesman short of the President who can articulate national interests. And even after a national interest has been authoritatively expressed, there are varying degrees of intensity with which the United States might pursue it. The intensity depends on public opinion, on congressional support, and on the priority assigned by the executive

branch. Because of this difficulty, military planners must make assumptions regarding the intensity of effort and degree of risk that the nation might be willing to take to secure its n nal interests. There are a number of ways that this intensity might be expressed; one useful way is as follows:

· Vital Interest--of such importance as to have a direct bearing on the attainment of basic US national security objectives. The United States would risk escalation to general nuclear war to protect a vital interest.

· Significant Interest--of such significance that the United States would be willing to use military force to protect it, short of risking escalation to nuclear war.

· Important Interest--of lesser significance than vital or significant interest, but important enough to use limited air, naval, and logistic support. Ground forces would only be used in an advisory role.

· Of Interest--of less importance and more indirect than important interests. The United States would probably take actions short of war to include supporting the indigenous population. Possibly the United States would commit military forces.

National interests may also be direct or indirect. Hypothetically, if Western Europe is a vital interest of the United States, then the Persian Gulf oil fields and sea lines of communications between the Persian Gulf and Western Europe, which the Europeans consider vital to their interests, would also be a vital interest of the United States, albeit indirectly. Another example: if Korea is considered to be vital to the defense of Japan and if Japan is a vital interest of the United States, it may be concluded that for that reason, Kor a is an indirect vital interest of the United States. Other interests may derive from the satisfaction of these indirect interests. Korea is an example of a success story of a US ally that due to US hopes for a free and stable Korean government, coupled with

significant economic investments, has taken on a degree of interest to the United States quite apart from its relationship to the defense of Japan. This case illustrates the need to periodically review the basis of our stated national interest for a given country.

While the definitions of interests are helpful as an analytical tool, there are no existing objective criteria, no easy tests which would identify one nation rather than another, one event rather than another, or one circumstance rather than another to be in the national interest. Rather, it is a consensus that exists among top-level governmental decisionmakers at any point in time.

National interest is a dynamic concept both in its abstract and contextual elements. In the abstract the concept in the post-World War II world has taken on some overtones of internationalism. In some cases national interests and international interests have become indistinguishable. For example, the national interests not only of the United States and the Soviet Union, but also of all of the nations of the world, require that general nuclear war be avoided. It is even conceivable that the concept of national "self-interest" may be a vanishing concept in a world in which increasing interdependence and technological advances in weapons and destructive power make it dangerous even for superpowers to pursue national interests with military means. Some political scientists and futurists suggest that in the future transnational interests may transcend in importance national self-interest. International treaties on space and Antarctica, as well as the international concern over pollution, population, and food represent some examples of this trend. However, too much should not be made of this trend in the midterm, since it seems certain that through 1990 nations will acknowledge few obligations beyond their own national self-interest.

If the national interests of a nation represent its compelling needs, then the national objectives that the nation selects for itself must lead to the realization

of those interests. By extension, the interests and objectives determine, in large measure, the strategic options of a nation. The most critical element in the development of a military strategy is the proper translation of the national political objectives into military objectives and strategic concepts. Since the end of World War II, this has been the weakest aspect of the development of strategy. The Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal in 1956 is a clear illustration of the failure to translate a political objective into correct military terms. After Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, English and French political leaders were convinced that they were faced with an emergent dictator, who might ultimately engulf the Middle East in flames. Mindful of the results of the failure of France and Britain to forcibly oppose Hitler's takeover of the Rhineland 20 years before, the allies were determined that this mistake should not be repeated. The French and English, therefore, prepared a combined force for the invasion of the Suez Canal. The political objective--the unseating of Nasser--was never transmitted to the operational military commanders, who naturally focused their attention on securing the Suez Canal. Had they been given the objective of deposing Nasser, they would undoubtedly have planned to take Cairo and, perhaps, to occupy much of Egypt. In any event, the entire enterprise failed, resulting in the strengthening of Nasser's position both within Egypt and throughout the Arab world. Although the Suez crisis was an extremely complicated international affair, the failure to remove Nasser can be attributed to the fact that the French and English policymakers never communicated the actual political objective to their military commanders. This resulted in the selection of a military objective and strategic concept totally inconsistent with the political effect desired.[2]

NATIONAL STRATEGY

After national objectives that are consistent with the national purpose and in harmony with the central values of the American people have been derived to achieve

national interests, a national strategy may be developed. One significant indication of the future path of a nation's national strategy is its traditional pursuit of its national interests. Walter Lippmann commented on this issue when he wrote:

> . . . the behavior of nations over a long period of time is the most reliable, though not the only index of their national interest. For though their interests are not eternal, they are remarkably persistent. We can most nearly judge what a nation will probably want by seeing what over a fairly long period of time it has wanted; we can most nearly predict what it will do by knowing what it has usually done. . . . Even when they adapt themselves to a new situation, their new behavior is likely to be a modification rather than a transformation of their old behavior.[3]

Most modern nations have exhibited this phenomenon. For example, the central thrust of British security policy for centuries has been to provide for the security of the home islands by pursuing national security policies that would insure that its fleet was supreme in home waters, that no hostile power should occupy the Low Countries and that no hostile power or coalition should establish hegemony over the European continent.

Since 1945 the United States has followed a policy of world leadership. Since that time, three variations of this policy have been dominant--they are: the geopolitical, the nuclear, and the ideological.

· Geopolitically, the strategic thinking since World War II in the United States has sought to insure that no single power or combination of powers hostile to the interests of the United States could establish hegemony over either Western Europe or Northeast Asia. While reminiscent of the regional interest of the United Kingdom in the political viability of the Low Countries, the US interests are global, a condition which is apparently difficult to comprehend or to accept, particularly by our NATO allies.

· The strategic nuclear theme deals with the problem of deterring strategic nuclear war. While this problem has been with us for over a generation, it is becoming more difficult to cope with as the United States has passed through

successive stages of nuclear monopoly and nuclear superiority to nuclear parity and now, in the opinion of some senior military officers, to a state close to strategic nuclear inferiority.

Containment, the ideological element of American postwar foreign policy, has evolved from the general containment of monolithic communism to the more traditional approach of selectively containing the political influence of the USSR when and where it is in the US national interest to do so. This policy is euphemistically, and perhaps optimistically, referred to as managing the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower. It was manifested in the SALT negotiation and in the policy of detente. As the recent eclipse of these policies demonstrates, events color policies in different shades and while it is true that contemporary interests can change (we are now the allies of our World War II enemies), it is also true that traditional interests and strategies also change, although much more slowly.

The term strategy, deriving from the ancient Greek "strategos"--the art of the general--has been obscured in a semantic fog since its revival in the 17th century. In order not to add to this confusion, it will be necessary to define somewhat precisely not only what is meant by the term national strategy, but also to differentiate it from some allied terms such as grand strategy and national policy. To begin in reverse order, a clear differentiation between the meanings of policy and strategy has been provided by the Institute for Defense Analysis:

> Although there is often a legitimate overlap of these words . . . , the distinction between them can be retained if we keep in mind that a 'policy' is essentially a pattern (of action or decision), while a 'strategy' (i.e., any particular strategy, not strategy itself, as an art or science) is essentially a plan. . . . In other words, a policy is a rule governing action or decision; a strategy is a plan in accordance with which various means, including actions and decisions, are directed toward the achievement of objectives.[4]

Clausewitz properly understood this interrelationship of policy and strategy, wherein policy establishes the political framework in which strategy must operate.

In Clausewitz's mind the distinction was clear, strategy was an instrument that was guided, shaped, and controlled by political policy. So policy really operates on two levels--first it can designate the political objectives towards which strategy is directed and, secondly, it can be taken to mean a rule which governs action.

Grand strategy and national strategy must also be differentiated. Essentially, grand strategy implies a heavier emphasis on military force than does the concept of national strategy. The following exemplifies this notion:

> . . . 'grand strategy' has come into use to describe the overall defense plans of a nation or coalition of nations. Since the mid-twentieth century, 'national strategy' has attained wide usage, meaning the coordinated employment of the total resources of a nation to achieve its national objectives.[5]

MILITARY STRATEGY

Theoretically after a national strategy has been determined, a military strategy should be developed to help to achieve the ends desired. In military strategy, to paraphrase Clausewitz, everything is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult--and that extends to its definition. One reason that such an aura of mystery surrounds the subject is that, unlike the history of warfare, the history of strategy is fragmentary. It has been only recently that military strategy has been conceived of as anything more than the art of distributing and applying military means, such as armed forces and supplies, to fulfill the ends of policy. Today, at least three distinct, although interrelated, types of military strategy may be identified--national military strategy, coordinative military strategy, and operational military strategy.

In the development of an integrated global national military strategy, the military works with individuals who are experts in dealing with the other elements of national power--political, economic, psychological, and technological. National military strategy may be defined "as the art of the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives."[6] It is

usually joint or combined in nature and primarily has to do with translating political objectives into military objectives and broad strategic concepts. It is also at this national level of strategic analysis that the National Security Council, JCS, and DOD interface in the conduct of crisis management activities.

Coordinative military strategy is focused on the military problems that arise out of the separation of military strategy from the executive civilian policy function. When the head of state was both the political and military leader, unity and coherence between ends and means--between policy and strategy--was easier to achieve. The military complexity of the last half of the 20th century, when the head of state cannot effectively function as the operational military commander, has led to the growth and increased importance of the coordinative level of military strategy.

In step with the growing and multifaceted responsibilities of contemporary defense planning, the nature of and preparation for warfare have become increasingly complex. The national security process created in the aftermath of World War II shifted from its traditional concentration on war to the more ambiguous demands of Cold War. This required that the military forces of a country be designed and maintained in readiness in peacetime against a threat that was not only global, but one that was not bounded by time. Required was a system of interlocking parts that would allow the military to suggest ways in which military force might help to achieve political objectives and to design and maintain the force structure, as well. Coordinative military strategy impacts greatly on the development of force structure. Because of these force structure implications, the Department of Defense and the military departments develop coordinative military strategy, although the JCS also plays an important role.

Coordinative military strategy may also be defined as that planning which links the military concepts established at the national level to the contingency plans of the unified commands. It also develops the policy and programs needed to build the force structure necessary to implement the midrange military strategy. The function of the military establishment during peacetime, in addition to deterrence, is to prepare to fight. The problem, however, is that since at least the early 1960's, system analysts and programmers have had a disproportionate impact on military planning because of their ability to influence budgetary decisions. This has led to an imbalance wherein professional judgment has given way to political expediency, not only in the development of a force structure, but also in the conduct of war. Strategy planning, not programming, should be the primary determinant of the way that military forces will be used in battle.

The last level of military strategy is the more traditional and better understood concept of operational military strategy. A concept used by the French, Germans and Russians among others, it consists of one or more interrelated military campaign plans designed to achieve a stated military objective. Since operational military strategy is the generally accepted view of what is meant by the term military strategy, the literature abounds with suitable definitions. One that is both suitable and familiar derives from Clausewitz.

> . . . the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war. In other words strategy forms the plan of the war, maps out the proposed course of the different campaigns which compose the war and regulates the battles to be fought in each.[7]

Clausewitz understood that the military object of war had to be subordinated to the political object. But many of the followers of Clausewitz twisted his conception to mean the very opposite of what the great man intended. Moltke, in particular, took the political-military interface to mean that the military should be free from political restraints in the conduct of military operations[8]--a refrain

that is being heard with alarming frequency today in the post-Vietnam US military establishment. There is an obvious necessity for cohesion and coherence among the elements of the national military strategy, the coordinative military strategy, and the operational military strategy. This unity or integration does not come easily. One reason is the absence of a comprehensive military theory.

MILITARY PLANNING

Coordinative military strategy overlaps with national military strategy and operational military strategy in the development of the military capabilities required to achieve the objectives of the national military strategy and the operational plans to employ these capabilities. This necessarily involves two distinct types of planning--force planning and operational planning. The fact that DOD is largely responsible for force development, that the JCS devote much effort to operational matters, and that the Service staffs plan in both areas, often simultaneously, has been a source of confusion for many years. The major differences between force planning and operational planning are shown at Figure 1.

Any operational military plan must consist of two major components--selection of the proper military objectives and the development of an effective operational concept.[9] The translation of the political objective into a proper military objective is the most critical factor in the development of an operational plan. Conversely, the most critical action that the political leader must accomplish when directing the use of military force is to provide a clear statement of what the use of force is to achieve--the political objective. The initial transformation of a political objective to a military objective is usually accomplished at the national military strategy level. Eventually, however, a physical objective (key terrain, enemy army, air superiority) will be developed. The military planner must not only consider the objective, he must visualize the effect that the achievement of the objective is desired to create. During the Suez Crisis, the advice of Field Marshal

	Operational Planning	Force Planning
Perspective	Employment of military force	Development of military capabilities
Timeframe	1-2 years	3-10 years
Conceptual Basis	Military strategy	Resource allocation
Organizational Focus	DOD/JCS/Unified Commands	DOD, JCS, CINC's, and Services
Scenarios Employed	Regional orientation, both those scenarios likely to occur and those taxing US capabilities	Worldwide war and specific scenarios to test forces across full spectrum
Products Produced	Contingency plans	Input to DOD programming and budgeting documents
Forces Considered	Current forces, with and without mobilization, including their deficiencies	Programmed forces and planned forces at various levels of risk
Threat Considered	Deployed enemy forces	Projected enemy forces
Treatment of Employment and Deployment	Unified Commander's concept of operation forms basis for deployment requirements	Broad concept of employment; deployment considered only for major force elements

Figure 1. Differences Between Operational Planning and Force Planning

Montgomery was sought. Montgomery, who was at the time Deputy Supreme Commander at SHAEF, asked about the objective of the use of military force. He was told that it was to overthrow Nasser. Montgomery said that this was not enough; he had to know what condition was desired after the objective of deposing of Nasser was achieved for this should determine the military objective and concept of operation. Consideration of the effect desired must be accomplished before a military objective is selected.[10]

Once the proper military objective has been determined, it is attained through the development and implementation of an effective strategic concept. Successful

operations are the result of a plan that considers, in addition to the development of a correct military objective, the salient factors of projecting force from positions which offer significant advantages over the enemy; of balancing the requirement for adequate forces over competing priorities; and of maintaining freedom of action. The strategic concept can be evaluated for effectiveness by using three criteria--suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Each of these factors is dependent upon the other two.

The first standard, suitability, determines whether the military objective, if achieved, will lead to the desired effect. But the objective sought must also be feasible. This requires that the resources available for the attainment of the objective be compared to the enemy's capability to prevent its attainment. Finally, if the strategic concept has met the demands of suitability and feasibility, it must yet be determined whether the operation can achieve its military objective at reasonable cost--acceptability. The influence of this factor may require the abandonment of the entire project, if, after being advised by his military commander, the political leader decides that the gains do not justify the costs. During war this is obviously a highly subjective determination.

Each of these three factors and their subelements could be considered in much more detail. For example, in determining the suitability of the appropriate effect desired, there are two possible choices, either the status quo may be maintained, or some change to the situation can be effected. To determine his objective, the military planner considers the salient aspects of the situation. To determine the balance of relative combat power, such nonmilitary factors as the political and economic situation must be considered along with factors more directly relevant to the military such as major combat forces, logistics, and weapons systems. Estimates for both friendly and enemy forces must be made. The survey of the characteristics of the operational area should include such things as terrain, climate,

base infrastructure, and lines of communication. Costs may be measured in casualties, dollars, or in other less tangible ways such as loss of a nation's prestige, military reputation or credibility as an ally.

All of these criteria are based on the evaluation of the factors relevant to military operational planning. Each military objective and each supporting strategic objective will require a determination of the suitability of the effect desired, an examination of the feasibility of the operational plan with regard to its physical objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength and freedom of action and, finally, of its acceptability with reference to its relative cost.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY STRATEGY

For strategists there is, in reality, no such thing as a totally unconstrained strategy. The constraints on US strategists are severe. Some of the more important constraints are discussed below:

· Vulnerability. The vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack has caused American strategists to avoid a military confrontation with the USSR; it is strategically significant that the USSR is also vulnerable to a US nuclear attack. Yet, it is not merely the fact that the United States is vulnerable that constrains American strategists, it is the degree of vulnerability that really matters--the very survival of the United States is at stake. So the two superpowers have attained a "balance of terror" that promotes the status quo where the vital interests of each are concerned and allows strategic flexibility only in peripheral areas. At the same time, due to its strategic arsenal and geostrategic location, the territory of the United States is relatively invulnerable to conventional attack, making a strategy of retrenchment tempting. In fact, to adopt any other strategy requires proof that the country or area in question is important to the United States. This proof is couched in such terms as economic

interdependence, resource requirements, moral commitments, and ideological opposition to communism. With the exception of Western Europe and Japan, whether or not the factors apply and to what degree, are and will continue to be subject to significant debate.

· Principles. Americans have certain deeply held beliefs as to what is "right." These principles have evolved from historical, cultural, and psychological roots, and are difficult to change. As President Carter stated in his 1980 State of the Union message, ". . . our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or the rights of any human being." Because Americans want to be right, many of our wars have had an ideological, if not messianic quality to them. They have been couched in terms of "making the world safe for democracy" and "fighting communism anywhere, anytime." These concepts make it difficult to select war termination goals short of total victory or unconditional surrender. Americans are also a pragmatic people who attack distasteful jobs directly, who want to end them quickly so that they can get to other things. The experiences of Korea and Vietnam have caused the American public to view limited war with distaste. Therefore, the strategist must be concerned with public opinion, hopefully, choosing a strategy that is not only morally "right," but also one which is in harmony with the American character and one with which the public can identify.

· National Will. National will is a dynamic element of national power and, for the United States, is composed of at least three subelements: public will, congressional will, and Presidential or executive will. Crucial to the expression, and more significantly to the formulation of national will, is the communication media. The adverse impact of the Vietnam experience on the national psyche has led to a perception of a loss of will which could very well set the stage for costly errors in foreign policy by American statesmen and foreign diplomats as well. In a democracy, a firm, articulated public opinion can be decisive. Since Americans

are also concerned about their image, strategists must recognize the constraints that world opinion places on military options.

· Legal. Legal constraints also affect the development and execution of military strategy. The most controversial legal constraint is the War Powers Act, passed during the height of the Vietnam withdrawal period. This is an especially significant constraint in view of the development of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. This constraint will be critically sensitive to the President's relations with Congress. The act is ambiguous enough to allow room for interpretation--with good congressional relations, the President can expect favorable interpretations; if poor relations exist restrictive interpretations may result. So the military strategist must be cognizant of the status of Presidential-legislative relations. Other congressional acts which constrain strategy include constraints on security assistance, refusal to vote for assistance to Angola, the passage of the Nunn Amendment, and the end of the draft.

· Geographic. Geography is a basic element of military strategy. The lack of depth in Europe is one of the factors that forces the United States and NATO to adopt a strategy of forward defense that might not otherwise be the best choice. This is particularly significant to the United States. Throughout most of this century, the United States, a maritime nation, could like Great Britain before it, rely on having time available to mobilize its forces for war. It could also primarily rely on its naval forces for its defense. The collapse of the Western allies on the continent in World War II caused the United States to send a huge army to participate in the invasion and liberation of Western Europe. The emergence of the large Soviet ground threat in the 1950's caused the United States and NATO to extend membership to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in exchange for its contribution to NATO defense. The price exacted by the FRG for this exchange was a Forward Defense strategy at or near the Inter-German Border (IGB). This need

to defend forward against the contiguous Warsaw Pact armies negated the advantage of distance and time that had enabled the United States to mobilize behind the Atlantic Ocean. Today, in a strategic sense, it is as if the Eastern territorial border of the United States were conterminous to the IGB. In this context the friendly ocean now becomes an extremely fragile line of communication, which causes the paucity of a US merchant fleet to be a matter of great concern to US strategists, considering the importance of US reinforcements to NATO strategy. If this were not enough, the linkage of NATO defense with the US strategic nuclear force has made it virtually impossible to decouple US interests from NATO interests. In essence, then, the current forward defense of the IGB is not a "forward defense" of CONUS insofar as that strategy has developed. The United States has become as mobilization dependent and as strategically rigid as any continental power ever was, gratuitously, and apparently without realizing it, giving up the precious flexibility provided by the maritime nature of its geostrategic location.

· Force Structure and Risk. Strategic concepts can be changed almost instantaneously, but it takes considerably longer to develop the forces, equipment, doctrine, and training that is needed to implement a new strategy. This indicates that changes in military strategy in the coming decade, because of force structure considerations alone, will probably be marginal or incremental in nature. There is a close and obvious relationship among the concepts of military strategy, force structure, and risk. A military strategy is devised to achieve political objectives in the face of some threat. The force structure provides the capabilities needed to implement the strategy. Since only rarely are military requirements and capabilities in equilibrium, to balance the books the shortfall between the two is termed risk. When risk becomes unacceptable, and resources to increase force structure are not forthcoming, then the strategic objectives must be reassessed to bring them into terms with the reality of the strategic environment.

Since objectives are real and risk is abstract, this reassessment seldom occurs. It is this reluctance to align strategy with reality that is at the root of most military failure.

· International Negotiations. International negotiations, such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and SALT, although beneficial, constrain strategy because they limit the weapons and the forces available to the strategist. Arms control agreements which could have major impact on strategy include:

- A comprehensive test ban.
- SALT.
- Chemical warfare.
- Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.
- Conventional arms transfers.
- Antisatellite convention.

· Alliances. Due to the Soviet ability to maintain a large standing army, the United States has adopted an alliance strategy. The introduction of allies always leads to constraints because allies generally are asymmetrical in power and in interests, both within, but especially outside of the alliance area. Vietnam and the 1956 Suez incident are cases in point. Of equal importance is the fact that US forces are not available for use without regard to location and prior commitment to alliances. Particularly in countering a Soviet threat outside of central Europe, the United States would find it difficult, for political as well as military reasons, to weaken the main front (NATO) in order to use such forces in a peripheral area. At the same time, the NATO alliance further constrains the United States by its commitment to an articulated strategy of forward defense.

· Bureaucracy. In considering more indirect or creative approaches to strategy, the strategist is constrained by bureaucratic inertia. The bureaucracy is based on stability and routine and resists innovation and change. Strategic

concepts are usually compromise positions--Lowest Common Denominators--with which all agencies can agree and, because of this drive for consensus, are not very imaginative. One reason why generals are so often accused of preparing to fight the last war is the fierce bureaucratic resistance that bold changes generally encounter.

· Economic. The economic resources that a nation is willing to devote to defense are major considerations in the formulation of strategies. Economists correctly tell strategists that they are competing for scarce resources. Even in the affluent United States, there is never enough to go around. Ideally, strategy would derive from interests, then resources would be allocated to implement the strategy. Nevertheless, the strategist must be a pragmatist and propose strategies that are financially obtainable. Realistically, however, the programmer commands the strategist--and the budget shapes strategy. It is axiomatic that in each Five-Year Defense Plan, strategy and resources are always in equilibrium in the fifth year--but in reality the fifth year is never attained.

SUMMARY

Any US strategist drawing up military plans must be aware of the impact that contemporary strategic concepts will have on his design. The interrelated concepts of national purpose, national interest, national objectives, national strategy, and military strategy establish the framework within which the strategist must operate. The emergence of three distinct, although interrelated types of military strategy--national, coordinative, and operational--reflects the complexity of the emerging strategic environment. An appreciation of the fundamental elements of military planning and the constraints acting upon the strategist is necessary to an understanding of the discussion of the strategic model in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2

A STRATEGIC MODEL

Of the three levels of military strategy--national, coordinative, and operational--the latter is the least difficult to cope with because it is concerned with either current operations or future short-range contingencies. This means that operational military strategy considers only the existing military capabilities of the United States and its enemies. As the uncertainty is greater, the problem is more complicated when dealing with the other levels of military strategy which look further into the future. The core planning issue is how to come to grips with uncertainty. There are basically two ways that the military attempts to cope with uncertainty--either the planner can attempt to predict the future or he can postulate a range of alternative futures. Both have been used in the Joint Strategic Planning System. The Joint Long-Range Estimative Intelligence Document (JLREID) attempted to predict the factors and trends that would affect world power relationships in the long-range planning period (10-20 years). The Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA), which replaced both the JLREID and the Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS), outlines four distinctly different and discrete future worlds, which collectively represent a spectrum of possible future worlds.

Regardless of which method is used, the requirements posed by the future strategic environment must somehow be translated into strategic decisions that will impact on today's program or budget process. Without such impact, long-range planning becomes an interesting, but largely sterile, exercise. Basically, what has been said of long-range planning is also true of midrange planning (3-10 years).

Most military planners would agree that an examination of the future strategic environment is necessary to develop strategies that will be useful in fighting future wars and in making the force structure decisions that will provide the necessary military capabilities for such wars. To determine where the United States

might use military force, the issue of what the United States will fight for must necessarily be considered. Analysis of the strategic environment points to significant challenges to some fundamental US interests in the midterm. Using four categories of US national interests as a focal point--survival of the United States (with its national values intact), preservation of the territorial integrity of the United States, maintenance and enhancement of the US standard of living, and maintenance of a favorable world order[1]--the seven regional matrices (beginning on page 23) summarize challenges to US interests in the (1) Western Hemisphere; (2) Western Europe; (3) Mediterranean Basin; (4) Sub-Saharan Africa; (5) Indian Ocean Region; (6) East Asia and the Pacific; and (7) Soviet Union and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact area. The major strategic trends suggested by these regional appraisals are discussed below.

STRATEGIC TRENDS

The United States, in the opinion of most strategic analysts, is no longer superior to the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear power. Proponents of this view are concerned that if the present adverse trends in the strategic nuclear balance continue, the United States will be in a "period of maximum peril from 1983-1987."[2] Comparisons of the strategic nuclear forces by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reveal that the Soviets lead the United States in missile throw-weight and equivalent megatons (EMT) and the trends favor the USSR in hard target kill potential. The decline in the US advantage in number of deployed warheads that leveled off in the mid-70's with the fielding of MIRV has begun again. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, evaluates the balance in these terms:

> There is no question that Soviet momentum has brought them from a position of clear inferiority to their present status of at least strategic equality with the United States and the trends for the future are adverse.[3]

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues	Remarks
Survival	· Deterrence of Nuclear War · Nonproliferation	· Assured Destruction ·· Second Strike ·· Triad · Flexible Nuclear Options · Withheld Reserve · Essential Equivalence · Termination Favorable to the United States	· Proliferation Potential	NOTE: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.
Territorial Integrity	· Prevent Hostile Power on Mainland and Sea Approaches · Protect Caribbean Basin · Defend Air and Sea Approaches to North America · Defend Atlantic LOC's · Defend Panama Canal According to Provisions of 1978 Treaties	· Forward Defense in Caribbean and Panama · NORAD · Collective Security · Security Assistance · Coalition Warfare · Military-to-Military Relations · Inter-American Defense Board · Multinational Defense Arrangements	· Role of Latin America in NATO War · US Force Presence in Panama · US Response to Caribbean Contingency · Puerto Rico Status · Brazil · Inter-American System	
Economic Well Being	· Retain Access to Critical Raw Materials and Markets · Maintain and Expand Trade · Promote Economic Interdependence Among Key Regional States	· Security Assistance · Forward Defense in Caribbean and Panama	· Naval Requirements to Keep Caribbean and Atlantic LOC's Open · Mexico's Future Regional Security Role	
World Order	· Peaceful Resolution of Conflict Through OAS · Pursue Human Rights	· Security Assistance · Multilateral Peacekeeping	· Canadian Separatism · Cuba Problem · Caribbean Instability	

Figure 2. Basic US National Interests in the Western Hemisphere

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues	Remarks
Survival	· Deterrence of Nuclear War · Nonproliferation	· Assured Destruction ·· Second Strike ·· Triad · Flexible Nuclear Options · Withheld Reserve · Essential Equivalence · Termination Favorable to the United States	· Nuclear Trends · Proliferation Potential · Escalation	NOTE: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.
Territorial Integrity	· Protect US Bases and Territory · Defend Air and Sea Approaches to North America · Maintain Integrity of NATO Countries · Maintain Air and Sea Approaches to Europe	· Forward Defense Based on the Continent of Europe · Protect LOC's Between US and Forward Deployed Forces/ NATO ALLIES	· Detente/Confrontation · Maintain General Equilibrium Between East and West	
Economic Well Being	· Maintain and Expand Trade and Investments · Continue Free Passage Over International Air/Sea Routes	· US/NATO Naval Force Presence to Demonstrate Access to LOC's · Forward Basing to Enhance Force Presence	· Burden Sharing · Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability	
World Order	· Prevent Extension of Soviet Influence in Europe and Around the World · Maintain US Credibility and Regional Influence · Prevent the Outbreak of Hostilities in Region Threatening US Interests	· Collective Security · Maintain Credible Military Posture in Europe · Promote Soviet Concern With Two Front War · Security Assistance	· Strategic Flexibility · Exploit Soviet Vulnerabilities Outside NATO · Presence/Reinforcement	

Figure 3. Basic US National Interests in Western Europe

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues	Remarks
Survival	· Deterrence of Nuclear War · Nonproliferation	· Assured Destruction ·· Second Strike ·· Triad · Flexible Nuclear Options · Withheld Reserve · Essential Equivalence · Termination Favorable to the United States	· NATO Preparedness for War · French Nuclear Forces and Export of Technology/Materials · Avoid Israeli and Arab Development and Use of Nuclear Weapons	NOTE: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.
Territorial Integrity	· Control of Sea/Air Approaches to North America	· Forward Defense · Present USSR with Multiple Threats from Multiple Directions · Presence of US 6th Fleet	· Importance of Sea and Air LOC's Control · Importance of Defense of Europe and Role of Med · If Deterrence Fails, What Concept for War in Med?	
Economic Well Being	· Deter Attacks on Sources of Raw Materials and Associated SLOC's · Protect Access to Oil and Facilities · Promote Regional Stability · Promote Trade and Investment and Free Passage/LOC's	· Naval Force Presence to Demonstrate Access to LOC's · Increase Security Relations · Deter/Offset Soviet Efforts to Increase Presence/Power; Intervention · Security Assistance	· Importance of LOC's for Access to Materials · Defense of Saudi Arabia	
World Order	· Prevent Political Coercion of US Allies and Friends · Preserve Alliance Territory · Limit Soviet Access to Allied/Client States · Revitalize Southern Flank Strategy · Firm Defense of Israel. · Settle Arab-Israeli Conflict · Avoid Destabilizing Force Expansions · Combat Terrorism	· Coalition Strategy · Present USSR With Multiple Threats from Multiple Directions · Permanent Naval Deployment in Med · Control Soviet Access to Med Through Turkish Straits; to Atlantic through Gibraltar	· Importance of LOC's to Assist Allies/Protect Security Interests · Improve Mobility, Lift, Deployability, Base Systems, RDF · Settle Greek-Turkish Dispute · More Closely Integrate: Portugal Italy Greece Turkey and France · Possible Roles of Spain · Morocco and Tunisia · Egypt · Greater Allied Participation	

Figure 4. Basic US National Interests in the Mediterranean Basin

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues	Remarks
Survival	· Deterrence of Nuclear War · Nonproliferation	· Assured Destruction ·· Second Strike ·· Triad · Flexible Nuclear Options · Withheld Reserve · Essential Equivalence · Termination Favorable to the United States	· Nuclear Trends · Proliferation Potential ·· South Africa ·· Possibly Others	NOTE: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.
Territorial Integrity	· Defend Air and Sea Approaches to North America	· Protect LOC's Between United States and Western Europe	· Soviet Bases in Sub-Saharan Africa	
Economic Well Being	· Maintain and Expand Trade and Investments · Access to Natural Resources of Region · Continue Free Passage Over International Air/Sea Routes · Promote Economic Development in the Region	· Military Access and Transit Rights · Security Assistance · Limited Peacekeeping Functions · Coalition Warfare · Protect US Personnel and Property	· Majority Rule in Southern Africa · Soviet/Cuban Presence · US Military Presence	
World Order	· No Hegemony in Sub-Saharan Africa Hostile to the United States · Maintain US Credibility and Regional Influence · Prevent the Outbreak of Hostilities in Region Threatening US Interests · Reduce the Threat of Communist Insurgency in Non-Communist Countries · Promote Respect for Human Rights · Prevent Regional Arms Races	· Limited Peacekeeping Functions · Security Assistance · Coalition Warfare · Protect US Personnel and Property	· Soviet/Cuban Presence · Majority Rule in Southern Africa · US Military Presence	

Figure 5. Basic US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues	Remarks
Survival	· Deterrence of Nuclear War · Nonproliferation	· Assured Destruction ·· Second Strike ·· Triad · Flexible Nuclear Options · Withheld Reserve · Essential Equivalence · Termination Favorable to the United States	· Theater Nuclear Forces · Proliferation Potential · Escalation Control	NOTE: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.
Territorial Integrity	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Economic Well Being	· Retain Access to Oil and Other Natural Resources · Continue Free Passage Over International Air/Sea Routes · Maintain and Expand Trade and Investments	· Maintain Rapid Reaction Force in CONUS · Naval Force Presence to Demonstrate Access to LOC's in Indian Ocean · Develop Theater Infrastructure · Act as NATO/Japan "Executive Agent" in Southwest Asia	· Rapid Deployment Force ·· Deployability Constraints ·· Sustainability ·· C^2 ·· Intratheater Swing (PACOM - SWA) · Iraq/Iran · Iraq/USSR · Multinational Naval Force · Japan SDF Increase (Naval) · Can Oil Be Protected at Reasonable Cost?	
World Order	· Maintain US Credibility and Regional Influence · Limit Soviet Influence in Southwest Asia and the Indian Subcontinent · Reduce Threat of Communist Insurgency in Non-Communist Countries · Prevent the Outbreak of Hostilities in Region Threatening to Western Nations · Settle Arab-Israeli Dispute Without Losing Moderate Arab States · Avoid Destabilizing Force Expansions	· Deter USSR Use of Military Force in Southwest Asia · Security Assistance · Maintain Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia US Allies	· Arab-Israeli Dispute · Palestinian Question · Priority vis-a-vis NATO/NEA · Terrorism	

Figure 6. Basic US National Interests in the Indian Ocean Region

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues	Remarks
Survival	Deterrence of Nuclear War · Nonproliferation	· Assured Destruction -- Second Strike -- Triad · Flexible Nuclear Options · Withheld Reserve · Essential Equivalence · Termination Favorable to the United States	· Nuclear Trends · Proliferation Potential	NOTE: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.
Territorial Integrity	· Protect Hawaii, Alaska, US Bases and Territory · Defend Air and Sea Approaches to North America	· Forward Defense Based on South Korea and Asian Offshore Bases · Maritime/Air Oriented--Avoid Major Ground Troop Involvement on Asian Mainland · Protect LOC's Between US and Forward Deployed Forces/ Pacific Allies	· Status of 2ID · Europe First Priority; Economy of Force in East Asia	
Economic Well Being	· Maintain and Expand Trade and Investments · Access to Natural Resources of Region · Continue Free Passage Over International Air/Sea Routes	· Naval Force Presence to Demonstrate Access to LOC's · Forward Basing to Enhance Force Presence	· Possible Overextension of US Pacific Fleet Between NEA and SWA	
World Order	· No Hegemony in NEA Hostile to the USA · Maintain US Credibility and Regional Influence · Prevent the Outbreak of Hostilities in Region Threatening US Interests · Reduce the Threat of Communist Insurgency in Non-Communist Countries · Improve Relations with PRC While Pursuing Satisfactory Resolution of Taiwan Issue	· Collective Security · Maintain Credible Military Posture in WESTPAC to Respond to Contingencies · Promote Soviet Concern With Two Front War · Security Assistance	· Increase of Japanese SDF · Strategic Flexibility Regarding WESTPAC Contingencies · Proper Military Relationship Between USA/PRC · Exploit Soviet Vulnerabilities Outside NATO	

Figure 7. Basic US National Interests in East Asia and the Pacific

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues	Remarks
Survival	· Deterrence · Nonproliferation	· Assured Destruction ·· Second Strike ·· Triad · Flexible Nuclear Options · Withheld Reserve · Essential Equivalence · Termination Favorable to the United States · Control Escalation	· Nuclear Trends · Proliferation · Arms Control	NOTE: Some strategic issues transcend the analytical categories established here. For example, the issues relating to general nuclear war would impact on all categories of national interest. Strategic issues have been listed only once and then under the category which seemed most appropriate.
Territorial Integrity	· Protect Hawaii, Alaska, US Bases and Territory	· Defend Air and Sea Approaches to North America	N/A	
Economic Well Being	· Maintain and Expand US Standard of Living · Access to World's Natural Resources · Continued Free Passage Over International Air/Sea Routes	· Increased Worldwide Force Pressure to Insure Access to LOC's and Raw Materials · Forward Basing to Influence Events from Position of Recognized Military Strength	· Quids for Access Could Create Conflicts With Other Interests	
World Order	· Insure That Region Does Not Become Major Area of East-West Confrontation Causing Military Conflict · Encourage Independent Actions and Loosening of Economic, Political, and Military Ties Among NSWP Nations and USSR · Improve US Political-Economic Relations with USSR · Encourage USSR to Become a More Responsible Actor in International Environment · Promote Order and Stability and Peaceful Solution of World Problems	· Containment ·· Collective Security ·· Forward Defense · Return Sufficient Military Flexibility to Counter Soviet Worldwide Military Initiatives · Promote Soviet Concern for Two Front War · Insure Soviet Worldwide Presence Not Lead to US Allies Seeking Accommodation with USSR · Maintain Credible Military Forces to Conduct Global Operations from Position of Strength · Protect LOC's to Forward Deployed Troops	· Exploit Soviet Vulnerabilities Outside NATO and Terminate Strategic Initiatives Once Started · Proper Balance Between Europe First and Other US Military Requirements · Reconfirm Alliance Strategy With Proper Recognition of Benefits and Costs · Status, Positioning of Forward Deployed Units in Europe and Korea	

Figure 8. Basic US National Interests in the Soviet Union and the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown echoed these sentiments. He said:

> In strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have come from a position of substantial numerical inferiority 15 years ago to one of parity today--and a potential for strategic advantage if we fail to respond with adequate programs of our own.[4]

Regardless of how one views the political value that may be gained from nuclear superiority, the fact remains that the Soviet Union has progressed from a position of nuclear inferiority in 1962 to one of parity.

The world environment is no longer the simple bipolar milieu of the recent past. The near institutionalization of conflict avoidance between the United States and the Soviet Union and the reduced credibility of the United States as the protector of the rights of lesser states to self-determination and national sovereignty have stimulated the need of major regional powers to assume greater responsibility in intraregional affairs. The post-World War II gravitation of medium and smaller regional states to either of the superpowers is no longer the dominant trend in national alignments. In contention with the bipolar balance, there is the continuing trend toward greater interdependence among nations, combined with a gradually developed system of regional and subregional centers of power.

Nuclear proliferation is a significant issue in the emerging strategic environment. There were only four nuclear powers 20 years ago--the United States, Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom. Today, the PRC has joined these ranks and India has exploded a nuclear device. Former Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance, has estimated that "at least a dozen more /countries/ could produce a weapon within a few years of deciding to do so."[5]

While the availability and rising cost of hydrocarbons currently hold the industrialized world's attention, access to other important nonrenewable resources could also become a problem during the next decade. Recent energy problems have served far more than the previous oil embargo of 1973-74 to alert the Western World

to the serious consequences of dependence on foreign oil. They highlight the constraints on the use of military force in assuring access to strategic resources when their denial is caused by governmental collapse, as in Iran, rather than the usually assumed denial scenario involving interdiction of choke points, blockades, or embargoes. Current trends portend, if anything, a worsening of the availability of foreign oil to the Western World in the face of gradually increasing demands. This trend, coupled with forecasts that the Soviet Union may become an oil importer, indicates strongly that the worldwide energy crisis and its security implications will worsen in the midrange. The availability of a large amount of Mexican oil or access to new resources could, of course, have a leavening effect on the seriousness of US energy-related problems during the next decade, but there is still no certainty as to Mexico's intentions or future production capabilities.

The reassertion of Islamic fundamentalism, exemplified most recently by its contribution to the revolution in Iran, the ongoing counterrevolution in Afghanistan, and its influence in affecting certain reforms in Pakistan, is a trend which is likely to continue. The rise in Muslim influence in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia will provide a platform for criticism of government and national development. However, the Islamic "movement," while transnational, does not appear to have a coordinated international direction. Universal Islamic resistance to Marxism does serve as a powerful impediment to the spread of communism. Whether Islam can provide the basis for unified government in, for example, Iran and eventually in Afghanistan, remains to be seen. To date, however, it has not provided an alternative to government in these countries, nor is it certain that the movement can deter political separatist sentiment.

At least into the early 1980's, Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East are likely to continue to bear the brunt of terrorist acts with business executives and influential government officials as the primary targets. High

visibility bombings, arson, kidnapping, and assassination will remain the main tool of terrorists throughout most of the midrange time period. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations will remain a threat, which may become greater as more countries acquire a military nuclear capability. No precedent yet exists for the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists, but it is not likely that once acquired nuclear weapons would be used in the same fashion as traditional means. Since it is difficult to envision even subkiloton nuclear weapons being used discriminately in a noncombat environment, and assuming some discretion continues to be a basic precept of terrorist strategy, it is doubtful that terrorists could arbitrarily detonate a nuclear weapon in a populated area without estranging their cause. In a situation involving terrorist possession of a nuclear weapon, the more likely tactic would be its use as a bargaining device.

Uncertainty over the course of US-China relations, combined with the likelihood of offsetting Soviet maneuverings as a consequence of closer Sino-American ties, casts superpower competition in an increasingly complex setting. The recent record of the US-Soviet relationship shows a considerable increase in tensions, caused in part by the normalization of US relations with China, by Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa, and by the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. Nonetheless, the basic purposes of detente, as they seemingly have come to be agreed upon by both sides, continue to be fulfilled: the avoidance of direct US-Soviet conventional military conflict and ultimately of a nuclear war. A danger will continue to be the superpower arms race played out against the backdrop of unrelenting competition for worldwide influence. Barring the early commencement of serious SALT negotiations which could lead to progress toward demilitarization of the superpower relationship, this trend will easily continue into the 1990's with negative domestic implications for both countries, not to mention the increased risks of direct US-Soviet military conflict.

Current trends suggest a number of potentially troubling developments for the United States in the future: the growth in the number of newly independent states whose leadership--as in much of the Third World--will find it impossible to maintain order because of the pressures for and of modernization; the continuing dependence of the United States and its important allies on raw materials and oil from a capricious Third World; the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as, and probably of greater short-term significance, the spread of high technology conventional weapons; and the growing strategic importance and role of the developing countries in the continuing East-West struggle for primacy. The strategic environment that these trends seem to indicate as the most likely is multipolar--a future world that envisions five major power centers (United States, USSR, PRC, Western Europe, and Japan), a proliferation of nations, low economic growth and resource availability problems for the United States, and a world in which nuclear weapons have been proliferated. While it is by no means inevitable that the world will develop in this way, the United States has an opportunity now to choose a national strategy that will, in some degree, put the country in a favorable position to cope with the serious issues that would accompany such an environment.

From this analysis of the emerging strategic environment, the following conclusions may be drawn regarding the impact of strategic trends on the four fundamental elements of US national interest.

· Survival. The Soviet Union, presently and into the 1980's, will be the only nation that will possess the nuclear weapons and delivery means in sufficient quantity to decimate the United States. It may be of little solace, but it is of immense strategic importance that the USSR may be similarly vulnerable to a US nuclear strike. The superpowers have attained a "balance of terror" that must be maintained as a matter of first priority. Proliferation of nuclear weapons in the waning years of the 20th century will complicate this issue.

· Preservation of Territorial Integrity. It does not appear that the United States need be overly concerned regarding the preservation of its territorial integrity. The oceans that separate the United States from the Eurasian landmass, although no longer an obstacle to strategic nuclear attack, are still effective barriers to conventional invasion. So long as the United States maintains relatively strong armed forces, it need not fear for the security of its base area, although recent developments in the Caribbean must be closely monitored lest instability or Soviet military capabilities in that area hamper our ability to project power elsewhere in the world.

· Maintenance or Enhancement of US Standard of Living. This national interest has two major subelements: (1) access to US trading partners and (2) access to required critical resources, especially energy. Access to the major trading partners of the United States in the Western Hemisphere is not a significant problem. Access to the major markets outside of this hemisphere is assured by maintaining the two main centers of strength in Western Europe and in Northeast Asia, and by insuring freedom of the seas. Since the United States is primarily a maritime and commercial nation, worldwide stability is also an important US global objective. Maintaining access to energy and critical resources in the Third World at reasonable cost may become more of a problem in the waning years of the 20th century, perhaps even calling for the use of force. In that eventuality, a strategic military reserve, capable of projecting its power from the United States, will be essential. Equally essential, due to the dangers of escalation present in superpower conflicts, will be the necessity to insure that these Third World ventures are not linked to superpower relations.

· World Order. This is an interest that requires the lessening of tensions throughout the world, especially with regard to superpower relationships. The United States should, so far as it is possible, influence international relations

so that it will not become a beleaguered nation in a hostile world. In practical terms, this translates into a policy that will insure that no single nation or group of nations hostile to the United States can establish hegemony over either Western Europe or Japan, nor establish client states in Latin American that could directly or indirectly threaten neighboring states or serve as a base for subversion.

The interaction of the strategic trends with the four fundamental national interests of the United States indicate possible areas where military conflict could erupt. The United States must be prepared to fight in Western Europe and Korea to oppose Communist expansionism. The security of Western Europe will probably remain the preeminent world order interest of the United States, although outbreak of hostilities there is probably the least likely conflict that could occur during the midterm. A more likely area of conflict is the Korean peninsula, though fighting could break out in other areas where interests have been less clearly defined and where adversaries are more willing to probe. During the midrange, the United States might be required to respond militarily to threats in Southwest Asia (SWA) because of the confluence of Western resource interests, especially oil, and because of instability--fueled by Islamic religious issues, Arab-Israeli issues, and Soviet destabilization efforts--in an already volatile region. A US and Soviet military confrontation could very possibly occur in this region. If such a direct confrontation should occur, it would represent the end of an era in superpower military relations.

CONFLICT AVOIDANCE

During the post-World War II period, the United States and the USSR have wisely avoided situations that would involve direct military involvement against each other. This mutual, tacit inhibition is based primarily on an assessment of the dangers of escalation inherent in superpower confrontations. The dire consequences of escalation

in such a confrontation are potentially so great, particularly in view of the huge nuclear arsenals maintained by the superpowers, that it has been clearly more prudent to avoid such clashes than to attempt to control them should conflict erupt. Moreover, for most of the period, the United States enjoyed a perceived superiority of strategic nuclear weapons and power projection capability.

A nuclear stalemate currently exists because neither superpower has the technological capability to execute a disarming first strike against the other. Implicit in this judgment is the underlying assumption that the US fundamental deterrent concept--Assured Destruction--will not be invalidated in the midrange because of technological advances. Fully realizing that this concept may not be accepted by the Soviets, who emphasize damage limiting and warfighting capabilities, the terrible destructiveness, frightening uncertainties, and cataclysmic consequences associated with nuclear warfare should continue to convince both sides that the avoidance of a strategic nuclear exchange is by far the best strategy. Certainly, limited nuclear options to cope with nuclear launches caused by accident or miscalculation, a withheld nuclear reserve for intrawar deterrence and essential equivalence for political purposes are all necessary and useful elements of US nuclear strategy, but at bedrock, an assured destruction capability is the factor that will continue to underwrite nuclear deterrence. The strategic nuclear Triad and new ICBM basing options will increase the likelihood that technological improvements to Soviet offensive missile accuracy, which could place the US land ICBM force increasingly at risk during the midrange, will not provide the Soviet Union with a disarming first strike capability.

One consequence of the change in the strategic nuclear equation over the past 15 years has been the flexing of Russian political and military muscles in areas formerly the preserve of the United States. When the United States had a clear lead in strategic nuclear forces, Soviet military activities throughout the Third World

appeared to be restrained. Since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Soviet Union has not only built up its strategic nuclear force to its present dimensions, but the Soviets show few signs of slowing their momentum. The USSR has also designed and fielded an improved navy that sails in all of the oceans of the world. This is not to say that the USSR has achieved a significant power projection capability such that major forces can be moved and sustained in a hostile environment outside of the lands that rim the Soviet Union. In many areas of the world, the United States is still superior in terms of strategic mobility, although it is in danger of losing that capability over the next decade. During the midrange, the Soviet Union will remain unable to compete successfully with the United States across the spectrum on political, social, or economic terms, but Soviet military strength may embolden them to use their military capability to achieve strategic objectives in the Persian Gulf and to project either their own, Cuban, or possibly other surrogate forces in other more distant areas. Present Soviet capabilities to use force at long range against significant military opposition are still limited, but these capabilities will increase in the midrange as improvements to Soviet naval and airlift forces continue.

It should be noted, however, that the Soviet military posture also constrains its politico-military flexibility and ability to project military power beyond contiguous borders. The preponderance of Soviet combat ready divisions are already deployed against its two most serious threats: NATO and China. In addition, except for eight airborne divisions, all other Soviet divisions are heavy and therefore cannot be rapidly diverted or transported to counter various other contingencies. The degree of difficulty in rapidly diverting or transporting Soviet combat ready divisions is underscored by the lack of Soviet strategic lift. Currently there are only about 50 aircraft in the Soviet military which can lift outsized loads. Range limitations and the lack of adequate inflight refueling capabilities also restrict

Soviet airlift abilities. Moreover, despite significant improvements in Soviet naval capabilities made during the last 20 years, Soviet ship construction remains focused on its two historical areas of interest: strategic nuclear submarines and antisubmarine warfare. Suffice it to say that Soviet military forces are primarily oriented toward a European and Asian land warfare contingency and not toward a conflict which would require massive movement of Soviet forces to distant areas. This posture obviously provides Moscow with certain advantages, but it also limits Soviet military flexibility.

The deployment of new conventional weapons in the NATO armies that can accurately acquire targets in the air or on the ground, track them relentlessly and destroy them unerringly, usually with a single shot, introduces a new battlefield calculus. These lethal, sophisticated weapons could make it very difficult for a Soviet attacker to plan the outcome of a battle with confidence, even when the defender is seriously outnumbered. This uncertainty, coupled with the inhibitions arising from the dangers of escalation to nuclear war, should convince Soviet policymakers and strategists that the use of military force in central Europe would be a losing proposition.

Given an environment in which neither superpower seems likely to achieve a first strike nuclear capability against the other and in which neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO can "win" in Europe with any degree of certainty, it would then appear likely that the unarticulated policy of conflict avoidance between the United States and the USSR should continue, at least throughout the midterm. Unfortunately, however, this does not preclude a superpower confrontation brought about either through accident or miscalculation. The chances for a crisis beginning this way increase as the locus of superpower conflict shifts from central Europe or Northeast Asia, where the vital interests of both superpowers are immediately engaged, to the more turbulent, grey areas of the Third World, in which the vital interests of only one of the

superpowers or neither are involved. The use of coercive diplomacy in these resource-rich areas, where the utility of force is high, particularly in the proxy wars being waged by the Soviets and Cubans, carries the very real danger of uncontrollable escalation. Relations between the United States and the USSR are tense and could easily snap if put to stress by a crisis somewhere in the Third World, where it is not in the mutual interest of both of the superpowers to preserve the status quo. Because the vital interests of both superpowers would not immediately be called into question, there could be room to maneuver, and the crisis might be prolonged. Once this happens, prestige, honor, and credibility could replace original, less rigid policy objectives, thereby increasing the chances for accident or miscalculation that might lead to war. If escalation in the local areas failed to provide a solution, the door would be opened for escalation outside of the local area, perhaps leading to threats to interests more vital than those initially involved. This scenario is by no means inevitable, but has become more likely, considering the convergence of interests, opportunity, and activity of the superpowers in the Third World.

Conflict avoidance is not the only change in the strategic environment driven by the destructive power of nuclear weapons. From the time of Napoleon until the end of World War II, the role of the decisive battle was central to operational military strategy; there is evidence now that the importance of the decisive battle is waning. Military confrontations since 1945 reflect a pattern that includes a desire to end a crisis or conflict quickly, to stabilize the situation or conflict before it can escalate to something more dangerous and to end the crisis through negotiation before the stakes and the risks become too great. The central battle, which traditionally resulted in the destruction of the enemy army and in peace terms dictated by the winner of that battle, no longer seems relevant in the nuclear era.

The Korean Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the Sino-Vietnamese War all ended similarly--first, the battlefield was stabilized and, secondly, a negotiated settlement to the conflict or crisis was effected. This pattern is rooted in the perception that war between the superpowers or between other major military powers has become too costly in terms of human life and material resources to be pursued to its ultimate Napoleonic end--the destruction of the enemy army. Few countries have the financial or military resources necessary to sustain modern warfare at the high level of intensity required to destroy an opposing force. The proliferation of the highly accurate and lethal precision weapons produced by the new military technology, as well as the fear of escalation of nuclear warfare on the part of the superpowers, their allies and their client states has brought about this change in the nature of modern mid-intensity conflict.

The United States, without the capability to launch a disarming first strike, without an adequate active defense which could intercept missiles in flight, and without an effective civil defense for protection of its population and economy has, since 1960, deterred the launching of Russia's nuclear force by threat of massive retaliation. But nuclear threats cannot be used lightly. In fact, a threat to escalate to nuclear war was used only twice against the Soviet Union--in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when the United States went on a global military alert. In situations less critical, the United States has perceived it to be in its best interest not to resolutely pursue a military solution toward its ultimate nuclear end. Rather, it limited the political goals it sought. This lowering of diplomatic and military sights results from the view that the outcome of war is so uncertain and the risks so high that the use of military force by a nuclear power is an unprofitable venture at mid and high-intensity levels. If either through miscalculation or by accident deterrence fails, this

pattern of battlefield stabilization and negotiation could dictate warfare in central Europe and Northeast Asia, provided that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact allows the other side to gain an overwhelming preponderance of combat power. Once the battlefield was stabilized, negotiation would quickly follow to prevent the war from becoming too costly or escalating to nuclear warfare.

STRATEGIC GUIDELINES

One of the major problems facing contemporary US military planners is that of insuring that the national, coordinative, and operational military strategy are in harmony. This seemed completely beyond our capability during the Vietnam War. During that conflict, General Westmoreland controlled the ground war in South Vietnam; pacification, until 1967, was the responsibility of the American Ambassador; the naval war was fought by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the air war over Hanoi was planned from Washington, DC. There never was any combined command of US, allied, and Republic of South Vietnam forces; instead there was a policy of cooperation, which is a difficult way to run any war and a particularly poor way to conduct a counterinsurgency. The end result of this fragmentation was strategic discord. In seeking unity, the cement which binds the various layers of military strategy, there are several guidelines which may help to produce a more coherent strategy.

The establishment of such guidelines is far from easy, but would be highly desirable because, before any unity of strategic effort can be achieved, there must be common understanding and shared values among strategists and policymakers at all levels. This was not a problem when the ruler was both the policymaker and the military strategist. Today, however, there is a tension between the policy-maker and the military strategist; between the strategist and the programmer. Strategic guidelines could help to ease this tension. This attempt to harmonize the types of military strategy, particularly national military strategy and

coordinative military strategy, is not intended to replace the traditional principles of war which are still appropriate to considerations of operational military strategy. Nor is the following listing of strategic guidelines to be considered comprehensive or complete; rather it is a first approximation, hopefully, to be refined later.

The first general guideline is Independence of Action.[6] Independence of Action implies that the United States must devise its own strategy in terms of its own national interests. While the intentions and capabilities of other nations to threaten our national interests, particularly our vital interests, must be taken into account, they should not be overemphasized. Since 1945, overemphasis has seemingly been the norm. To completely disregard the military capabilities of our enemies would also be foolish, but neither must we conform to them unthinkingly. Herbert Rosinski has stated that military strategists must use "sufficient realism in assessing our opponents not to be taken again and again by surprise by them and sufficiently consistent so that the strategy can be conducted as a continuous process and not a series of 'crash programs.'" Focusing our national military and national strategy on US national interests also has implications for relations with our allies. We must only surrender that portion of freedom of action to the allied cause that is absolutely necessary. The dilemma, of course, is that under the realities of the current strategic environment the United States needs allies to counter the military power of the USSR.

A second closely associated strategic factor is Flexibility. This guideline admonishes the strategist not to design military strategies that are based on rigid, single scenarios. Flexibility requires that the United States stay a step ahead of its opponents in sensing trends and in exploiting opportunities. Today, strategy and force programming are tied to the threat to US interests. This is not to say that the threat is not a vital consideration; it is, but it must not be the sole

consideration. To make it so, as the United States seemingly has in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, is to be condemned to react and not to initiate.

The third guideline is Preparedness, which recalls the more classic term of "security of the base area." Preparedness involves such things as the morale and will of the people, the nation's mobilization capability, and the ability of the military to project power globally from the United States. In the past several years, strong evidence suggests that the United States faced the temporary erosion of its base. The weakening of national will and morale during and after the Vietnam War foreclosed strategic options, particularly in Angola, simply because of the public attitudes that existed toward intervention at that time. In a democracy, a firm, articulated, and consensual public opinion can be decisive and the strategist ignores it at his peril. During the post-Vietnam period, the manpower mobilization system was discarded and industrial preparedness was in disarray. Currently, strategic analysts are becoming concerned about instability in the Caribbean Basin, which might cause the United States either to divert US military forces to the area or to withhold forces in anticipation of a need to secure its base area to the detriment of the ability of the United States to project military power elsewhere in the world.

The next concept--Integration--has already been alluded to as strategic unity. It is the need for cohesion and coherence among the elements of the national military strategy, the coordinative military strategy, and the operational military strategy. This unity or integration does not come easily. One reason that it does not is the absence of and an urgent need for a comprehensive military theory. Several military theories exist today, but there is no single theory of military power. There are, for example, the Continental Theory of Land Warfare (Clausewitz); the Maritime Theory (Mahan); the Air Theory (Douhet) and the Revolutionary Warfare Theory (Mao). However, each of these theories have limiting assumptions. The

continental theory is based on the notion of a decisive battle; maritime theory assumes that land areas can be controlled from the oceans; Douhet ignored both the land and the sea by assuming that the enemy nation could be controlled by strategic bombing and command of the air; and Mao believed that a revolution could be based on the rural peasant. While a comprehensive military theory might not solve many practical problems, it would enable the experience of the senior military leaders of all Services to be communicated to others. The current divergence of Service views is enough to make the development of such theory a matter of first priority.

Another concept that is particularly important at the interface between coordinative military strategy and operational military strategy is Dislocation or what Clausewitz called center of gravity. This was also the key concept behind Liddell Hart's strategy of the indirect approach. Dislocation seeks to attack the point that would so psychologically shock the enemy as to cause his defeat. Discerning the enemy's point of dislocation is no easy task, as the United States discovered in Vietnam. To further complicate the matter, this point need not even be a military target. For example, many strategic analysts believe that the point of dislocation in today's strategic environment for the Western industrial nations and Japan is access to Persian Gulf oil.

The last guideline and one appropriate for national military strategy and coordinative military strategy is Selectivity. In an era of constrained defense budgets, it is more important than ever that a strategy make the most efficient use of manpower and resources that is possible. There must be no wasted effort in achieving the military and political objectives of the strategy.

MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE 1980'S

The current military strategy and attendant force structure is the base from which any future change must be measured. A basic element of this strategy is to deter nuclear war through a reliance on a countervailing strategy. The United

States maintains a set of flexible nuclear options in order to provide intrawar deterrence, to control escalation, and to limit undesired collateral damage. The strategic nuclear Triad must also maintain essential equivalence with enemy nuclear forces in order not only to maximize our deterrence posture, but to insure that all nations perceive that a true nuclear balance exists between the superpowers. Essential equivalence will also help to provide the United States with the flexibility and the influence that it requires in its relations with the Third World. SALT negotiations are aimed at achieving nuclear deterrence at lower force levels.

The United States also hopes to deter conventional war in Europe and East Asia. In order to accomplish this, the United States is committed to a forward deployment, forward basing posture in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is also committed to a forward defense in Europe and to an economy of force role in Asia should deterrence fail. The strategic reserve in the United States is largely configured to its supporting role in Europe. The military establishment, particularly the Army, is heavily dependent on mobilization and the Reserve Components not only for a long war hedge, but for round out of many of its active forces, particularly with respect to support units.

The United States also maintains theater nuclear forces in Europe and the Pacific for deterrence against both conventional and limited nuclear attack and for warfighting as well. The US employment policy governing these forces does not preclude their first use, thus broadening the range of available options should deterrence fail; however, the thrust of US strategy is to conduct a nonnuclear defense, using TNF's only if used against the United States or its allies or as a hedge against an uncontainable attack. In broad outline, this is the current US military strategy.

Using the strategic guidelines that were developed earlier, a framework for new strategic directions for the United States may be constructed. Some broad

strategic considerations that are relevant mainly at the national military and coordinative military strategy level will be developed. Specific changes to operational military strategy would require a detailed exposition of the higher levels of US strategy.

The concept of independence of action would require a rethinking of the national interests of the United States. If the United States is to pursue its own national interests in a constantly changing international environment, it must reevaluate the relative value of a continued military commitment to NATO of large numbers of US forces. This will require a precisely stated national strategy--something which presidents are either unable or unwilling to provide. The current perception of the overriding value of Europe to US security is long overdue for serious reassessment by the National Command Authority. The concern of current defense programs with the threat posed by a short notice Warsaw Pact attack, the need for national mobilization and continuous reinforcement seem to be more appropriate to the doubts of the 1950's and less relevant to the problems posed for the 1980's. Military strategists seeking to achieve greater independence of action must realistically assess the contribution to overall US national security of the current emphasis on NATO defense. A retreat from NATO is not contemplated here, simply a reevaluation of its priority, given other competing US interests.

The concept of flexibility presents the United States with its most formidable problems. US strategists are in a dilemma. By preparing to fight a single scenario war in NATO and by committing virtually the entire Army to that rigid defensive scenario, the Services in general, but the Army in particular, may be in the early stages of a sort of strategic rigor mortis. The most urgent strategic need is to make the armed forces more flexible. If we permit the major portion of the Army to be tied down, both physically and intellectually, to the static defense of Europe and Northeast Asia, the USSR and its proxies will be free to challenge US inerests

in the Third World with virtual impunity. Flexibility also implies that the United States should be free to take advantage of opportunities to advance its interests throughout the world. This is a recognition that in this imperfect world there may be times when the United States will be forced by other nations to resort to the use of military force to secure its national interests. If this is so, then the necessary military capability to accomplish this objective must exist. A flexible or multipurpose force will be required because it is unlikely that the specific area in which the force will be needed can be predicted. In an era of economic austerity, the United States may not be able to afford the expense of continued forward deployments at current levels, and to respond to military needs, primarily naval, in other areas of the world. The demanding requirements of forward deployment and forward defense are threatening to bankrupt US strategy now. Because of this, flexibility and selectivity are indissolubly linked.

Selectivity is a guide to the setting of priorities based on the probability of war and the risks or consequences of losing a conflict should deterrence fail. If one accepts the argument advanced earlier, that the fear by both superpowers of the consequences of a nuclear war will lead to conflict avoidance, then the estimation of the risk or probability of war in NATO is lowered. Not to be misunderstood, this is not intended to suggest that the US commitment to NATO is not important or that it should be abandoned. What is suggested is that the United States might be able to preserve its national interest in Western Europe at reduced cost in both dollars and committed troops. The need is for a flexible strategic reserve force that could be used not only to respond to the more likely challenges in the Third World in the future, but in NATO and the Pacific as well.

Dislocation of the strategic center of gravity is also an important concept in this context. The USSR has apparently decided that under the current conditions the American center of gravity lies in Western Europe and that the West European's major

point of vulnerability is access to Persian Gulf oil. Therefore, the point of dislocation for NATO may be the Persian Gulf. Paradoxically, the United States, in structuring to meet the requirements of NATO, had virtually precluded itself from developing an adequate joint force for the Persian Gulf contingency. The point to attack to dislocate the Soviet center of gravity is more difficult to pinpoint. There is some evidence that it may be in the Far East opposite the PRC. It may not even be political or geostrategic at all, it might be psychosocial. The growing populations of eastern Russia, together with their cultural differences from the European Russians, may in the end prove to be the Achilles heel of the Soviet Union. In any event, the interest shown in the past few years in studying the problem of Soviet vulnerability should soon pay dividends and assist in the search for the point that will dislocate the Russian center of gravity.

Preparedness relates to securing the US base. To secure the US base obviously means continued emphasis on nuclear deterrence, maintenance of a secure and stable North America, with special emphasis on the Caribbean, a sound economy, and the revitalization of the American people. This is a prerequisite to the reestablishment of an effective manpower mobilization system (not necessarily a draft) and an effective industrial mobilization base. For it seems clear that so long as the United States maintains its global interests, there will be a need for some degree of mobilization to provide the manpower needed to back up the active force. But manpower mobilization is not only sensitive to the requirements dictated by a more turbulent world, but even more profoundly to the current nature of the American social order and the willingness of the US citizen to make sacrifices to preserve the basic American values--not to mention a comfortable standard of living.

In this respect, it is important to think through the type of war that the United States is prepared to fight. Clausewitz indicated that the shorter a war, the more popular it is likely to be. Given the American character, any conflicts

or wars in which the United States might participate will have to be relatively short. The United States is preparing to fight a war of singular violence in Europe based on the Napoleonic concept of the decisiveness of the central battle. This orientation is robbing the United States of flexibility in other more volatile areas. If the view that both superpowers consider escalation to nuclear warfare both inevitable and unacceptable is correct, then battlefield stabilization and negotiation might be the prime factors in a future NATO conflict. If this is the case, more thought and study should be directed to war termination possibilities short of the destruction of the enemy army or unconditional surrender.

The final strategic factor and one of the most important is integration. The lack of unity among the types of strategy in Vietnam has already been mentioned. The current European strategy of the United States and its implementing programs display a serious disconnect between fighting the initial stages of NATO war and the ability to sustain that fighting over longer periods of time. However, a greater disconnect is between our more global interests and our ability to protect them. In an era of constrained economic resources, it does not appear likely that current defense programs projected into the mid-1980's in support of military strategy will be achievable. There must not only be a unity among the levels of military strategy, but also between strategic requirements and available resources. When the military at the coordinative level translates the objectives and broad strategic guidelines determined at the national military level into strategic plans and programmatic requirements, the job is just begun. The Secretary of Defense must then consider these plans and issue guidance to allocate the available resources. Still the job is not complete. The joint planners then assess the risk associated with the program force as measured against the plans or strategy. Today, this is the end of the cycle, but it need not be. To insure that there is unity between the strategy and its resources, one further step is needed--and that is that the objectives and

strategic concept should be adjusted to be compatible with the resources allocated. This last step is seldom taken or what is done is ineffectual. If it were taken, then it would be the responsibility of the politicians to decide if the new "strategy," which of necessity must eliminate some military capabilities, is adequate. If it is not, the politicians then must allocate more resources or determine which US interests or objectives must be lowered in priority.

Measures such as those outlined above or others like them would go a long way toward the creation of a more flexible military strategy. A more flexible US strategy and force structure would enhance the ability of the United States to secure and protect its vital interests in the emerging strategic environment of this decade.

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6. These guidelines for military strategy were suggested, in another context, by Herbert Rosinski.

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Any US strategist preparing military plans must be aware of the impact that contemporary strategic concepts will have on his design. The interrelated concepts of national purpose, national interest, national objectives, national strategy, and military strategy establish the framework within which the strategist operates. The emergence of three distinct, although interrelated types of military strategy--national, coordinative, and operational--reflects the complexity of the emerging strategic environment. An appreciation of the fundamental elements of military planning and of the constraints acting upon

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the strategist is necessary to an understanding of how contemporary strategy is developed.

Beginning with the strategic concepts developed in Chapter 1, the strategic regional trends of the midterm are analyzed for their impact on achieving the fundamental national interests of the United States. Then six strategic guidelines--Independence of Action, Flexibility, Preparedness, Integration, Dislocation, and Selectivity--are postulated and examined for their relevance to the development of contemporary military strategy. Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of the current military strategy and, using the strategic guidelines developed earlier, proposes a military strategy for the 1980's.


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