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THE ASTARITA REPORT:
A MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE MULTIPOLAR WORLD

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FOREWORD

This series of "Occasional Papers" provides a means for the publication of essays on various subjects by members of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. As such, it represents the author's views and does not reflect the official position of the Strategic Studies Institute, the US Army War College, the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

This Occasional Paper, although written in 1974, is being published in its original form as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. It provides a record of early attempts to chart a course for the post-Vietnam Army, and, although world events have not developed precisely as predicted, it also demonstrates that midrange strategic analysis can provide a workable basis for future planning.

ANDREW C. REMSON, JR.
Colonel, CE
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

THE ASTARITA REPORT: A Military Strategy For The Multipolar World

Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., Infantry

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., Infantry, a designated Army strategist, holds bachelor's and master's degrees in military arts and science. An infantry squad leader in the Korean war, he served as a battalion and corps operations officer in the Vietnam war and later as a negotiator with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in Saigon and Hanoi. Now on the faculty of the US Army War College, he has served as an instructor of strategy at the US Army Command and General Staff College, a political-military action officer on the Army General Staff, a member of General Creighton Abram's strategic assessment group, and, from 1975 to 1979, in the office of the Army Chief of Staff. His articles on strategy have appeared in *Army, Military Review* and the *Naval Institute Proceedings*. Among his decorations and awards are the Combat Infantry Badge for both Korea and Vietnam, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star for valor and two Purple Hearts for wounds received in action. He is an associate member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

INTRODUCTION

The following article was prepared in 1974 at the behest of then Secretary of the Army Howard Callaway. It was intended as an unclassified account of the so-called "Astarita Report"—a SECRET three-hour oral report briefed extensively in 1973-1974 throughout the Defense establishment. This article, the closest approximation in print of the report itself, represents the author's understanding of the report findings, which are not necessarily those of the other members of the group.

The Astarita Group, formally known as the Strategic Assessment Group, was formed in the Spring of 1973 at the specific direction of then Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Lieutenant General Donald H. Cowles. Colonel Edward F. Astarita, who enjoyed the personal confidence of the Chief of Staff, was brought in from the Pacific Command to head the study. Members of the group included Lieutenant Colonels Warren Anderson, Harold Brandt, Robert Carpenter, Neal Kempf, Thomas Noel, Harry Summers, John Todd, Major Theodore Frederick, and the late Sergeant First Class Ignatius Dolata from ODCSOPS; Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Stallings and Major Tyrus Cobb from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Colonel W. G. Allen from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

Originally organized on a "close hold" basis within then Major General Rolland V. Heiser's ODCSOPS Plans Directorate, the charter of the group was to determine if there was a legitimate role for conventional strategy and for the Army in the post-Vietnam world. Throughout its deliberations the Chief of Staff maintained his close involvement, and, beginning in the Fall of 1973, General Abrams directed that the group's findings be presented in a series of briefings throughout the National Security establishment. More than 100 three-hour briefings were conducted for selected groups from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense Staff, the Navy Staff, the Air Staff, the USMC Planning Group, as well as the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat. Briefings and discussions were also conducted with the students and faculty at the Army War College and the Army Command and General Staff College. The group disbanded in the Spring of 1974.

The Astarita Report, although not a formal Army position, had considerable impact within the Defense establishment. For example, the very phrases "conflict prevention, conflict control, and conflict termination" now used throughout the Department of Defense originated with the Astarita Group. Commenting on the findings of the group in a December 1976 article in *Military Review* former Army Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand noted that its primary thrust was to legitimize current Army strategy. He dismissed criticism of such findings with a line from T. S. Elliot: "At the end of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And know the place for the first time."

In March 1981, General John W. Vessey, Jr., the Army Vice Chief of Staff, commented that the Astarita Report, the 16-division decision and the decision to organize the two Ranger battalions marked a turning point in the post-Vietnam Army. It is at his suggestion that this article is reprinted.

H.G.S.
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
9 April 1981

Introduction

The theme song for strategists today might well be "The World Turned Upside Down". Imagine the disbelief of World War II strategists that 30 years later there would be officers from our mortal enemies, Germany and Japan, on the faculty of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and no representation from our allies, Russia and China. Imagine the disbelief of Korean War strategists that 20 years later the President of the United States would be visiting Peking. Imagine the disbelief of the Cold War strategists of the 1962 Berlin crisis or Cuban missile crisis that 10 years later the Soviet Union and the United States would be pursuing détente, that some of our more vexing problems would be economic competition with our West European and Japanese allies, and that some of our more promising opportunities would be pursuit of parallel interests with our Soviet and Chinese adversaries.

George Washington would no doubt see these seeming paradoxes as proof of the wisdom of the warnings of his farewell address in 1796:

> The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interests.

What are these duties and interests of the United States in the foreseeable future? What is the military strategy that will further and promote these duties and interests? This article will attempt to answer these questions.

We must begin our look into the future with full appreciation that the past is prologue. Many of the problems we face ahead were created more by our past successes than by failure. Present economic competition with West Europe and Japan grew out of the success, not the failure, of our post-World War II policies of reconstruction and out of the shield of security that the United States provided. The need for and the utility of military force is questioned precisely because the military has succeeded in keeping war from America's shores, and because of the military contribution to relaxation of world tensions. The Yugoslav political commentator, Milovan Djilas, has argued that the world is shaped by the fact that the United States has won the Cold War. Whether or not one accepts Djilas' analysis, it is nevertheless true that what appeared to Cold War strategists as a monolithic world communist threat has fragmented into communist polycentrism, with Soviet, Chinese, neutral and independent communist powers. This, too, is a mixed blessing. As General Maxwell D. Taylor commented, in a 1972 address to the Army War College, "We can no longer afford to be the Cyclops with a single eye in his forehead watching a single enemy; we have to be more like Argus with his many eyes looking in all directions." Over-reaction to faulty perceptions of failure leads to hypersensitive fears of the future. Pessimism, doom and despair are inherently self-defeating. Failure to recognize and acknowledge past successes may lead to abandonment of the very programs that made success possible. Conversely, failure to recognize success may also lead to continuation of programs that have outlived their usefulness. The course for the future must be based on optimism, albeit an optimism tempered with full realization of our own fallibilities.

Charting a course for the future is full of pitfalls. It is at best an imprecise science, shaped more by perceptions of the past and present than by visions of the future. Apocalyptic forecasts, in particular, more often than not reflect dissatisfaction and dismay with current conditions, rather than reasoned assessments of what lies ahead. Another pitfall is that forecasts are often shaped to fit a particular parochial interest and to prove a particular point of view. Such forecasts range from Armageddon if a particular policy is not approved to a latter-day Garden of Eden if only the forecasters ideas are adopted. The framework for examination is crucial, since it dictates the evidence that will be considered. Conscious bias and distortion must be eliminated, lest the final product be merely a self-fulfilling prophesy. The analysis which follows has attempted to eliminate such conscious bias and distortion and base its findings on a continuation of present trends, needs, and realities -- what futurologists call a "surprise-free" projection. The pitfall with "surprise-free" projections, of course, is that they may, to a degree, be negated by unforeseen developments. This is a price one must pay, for the only certainty in the future is uncertainty.

Domestic Considerations

Using the "surprise-free" projection, the United States appears to be on a relatively stable domestic course. The "Greening of America" predictions of several years ago have withered and the doom's-day forecasts of a fascist "Amerika" are out of style. A middle path between these extremes seems a much more likely eventuality. While leaving detailed political, social, and economic analyses of the United States to the specialists, the impact of domestic factors on international relations and military

strategy will be examined.

Domestic political relations have become increasingly complex. Bipartisan support for foreign policy and its attendant military policy has been seriously eroded by the Vietnam war. The present generation of strategists, accustomed since World War II to take such support for granted, has viewed this erosion with concern. Some, lacking in historical perspective, tend to magnify this problem out of proportion. As Senator Jacob K. Javits pointed out in his recent book on Presidential war powers (Who Makes War: The President versus Congress, Morrow, 1973), bipartisan support is the exception, not the rule. It is unusual for politics to stop at the water's edge. Widespread debate on foreign involvement can be expected. Foreign policies, and their supporting military policies, will have to be justified on their own merits, not presented as articles of faith.

For the military, justification will not be easy. Since the beginning of the Republic, standing military forces in peacetime have been unpopular . . . and are no less so after 25 years of paying for a large standing military force whose contribution, especially in an era of détente, is difficult to measure. Kipling's jingle "Oh, it's Tommy this, and Tommy that, and Chuck him out, the brute; But it's savior of his country when the guns begin to shoot" never applied in America. It was the citizen soldier, not the regular soldier, who was "the savior of the country". While consciously realizing that in the nuclear era reliance on mobilization for national defense is not practical, subconsciously many Americans tend to visualize "preparedness" as a militiaman with musket over the fireplace.

It is one of the ironies of our time that the most vociferous critics of a

standing military are the intellectuals who should be those most able to appreciate the subtleties and ambiguities of a sophisticated foreign and military policy -- to appreciate the necessity for a foundation of strength from which to negotiate, to grasp Frederick the Great's aphorism that "Diplomacy without armaments is like music without instruments", to see the relationship between wars on the marches and security at home, to understand the complexities of a need for military force both to deter adversaries and assure allies. There is at least a kernel of truth in Commentary editor Norman Podhoritz' observation that it is now intellectuals, not the masses, who see things in terms of black and white rather than as shades of grey. "Saying the right thing" has become an imperative, and national flagellation a way of life.

There is a danger that intellectual failure to appreciate the need for military forces in peacetime will be matched by military failure to appreciate the need for intellectual support. Such a reaction would be self-defeating, since intellectual backing for a meaningful and viable foreign and military policy is essential. The false opposition of "Peace and War", as Aleksander I. Solzhenitsyn recently pointed out, must be replaced by a better understanding and appreciation of the role of military force in the preservation of world peace.

This role is hardly new. Fifteen hundred years ago, Vegetius, the Roman military writer said, "Qui desiderat pacem praeparet bellum (Who desires peace should be prepared for war)." George Washington echoed similar sentiments when he told Congress in 1790, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving the peace." James Madison's argument

in The Federalist still holds, "With what colour of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offense? . . . How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit in like manner the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and dangers of attack." Like the test for emeralds (to prove whether an emerald is genuine or synthetic you hit it with a hammer -- if it breaks, it's genuine), the test for the contribution of military force to world peace runs grave risks. As Henry Kissinger pointed out in 1969, "Deterrence is tested negatively by things which do not happen. But it is never possible to demonstrate why something has not occurred . . . the longer peace is maintained -- or the more successful deterrence is -- the more it furnishes arguments for those who are opposed to the very premise of defense policy." The counter-argument is difficult to articulate, since history, unfortunately, does not provide its alternatives.

Distrust of a standing military is not the only psychological trend laced through American policy. The contradictory trends of idealism and isolationism have been constant factors in the American mystique. Like anti-militarism, these trends have been enhanced by the relative military security provided by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and by weak neighbors to the north and south. As this relative military security erodes in the nuclear and missile age, these trends are becoming expensive luxuries. Idealism, the belief that America was the last best hope of mankind, led Americans to believe that they knew what was right for the world, led Americans to meddle in the internal affairs of other countries "for their own good". This trend was checked somewhat by isolationism, a "let the rest of the world

be damned" attitude. In combination these trends could be deadly. It has been argued that President Wilson's Fourteen Points, for example, raised the hopes of the Chinese that America would guarantee self-determination. The failure of America to back up its "righteous rhetoric" with deeds led to frustration, a turning away from "democracy", and the birth of the Chinese Communist Party. John Paton Davies called this phenomenon "diplomacy by incantation". The effect of these trends on foreign relations has been that America's words are suspect. Tangible and realistic economic, political and military commitments are necessary to lend credence to America's rhetoric. Another impact of idealism is the difficulty of justifying American policy solely on pragmatic grounds. "Self-interest" is somehow too crass and materialistic. The result is obfuscation of policy in high-flown terms -- forward military bases justified as "protecting freedom's frontier", and "keeping the world safe for democracy". Once such an idealistic bubble is burst -- when Asian allies, for example, abandon democracy for what they see as more viable forms of government -- the United States is hoist on its own petard. Attempts then to articulate policy as supporting American national security sound after-the-fact and self-serving. American foreign policy and its supporting military policy must be founded and publicly justified on practical considerations of enlightened self-interest, not idealism. That is not to say there is no room for moral considerations. As Professor Bernard Brodie states (War and Politics, MacMillan, 1973), morality is quite important. "Policies abroad that are either conspicuously immoral to begin with or likely to lapse into behavior that can be easily so labelled, whether justly or not so justly, are likely to prove quite inexpedient and ultimately self-defeating."

Like idealism, isolationism is no longer a viable course for the future. Increasing economic interdependence and the increasing growth of multinational corporations -- West European and Japanese, as well as American -- indicate a shrinking economic world. The economies of the developed world are dependent on trade, especially the importation of energy and raw materials. The United States is not alone in this regard. West Europe and Japan are even more dependent than America on outside raw materials and energy sources. Both China and the USSR are importing food grains. Multinational corporations bind nations closer together and, contrarily, are also the source of international friction -- the ITT in Chile is a recent case in point. While some have argued -- Professor Klaus Knorr of Princeton, for instance -- that this shrinking economic world has obviated the need for military force, it is well to remember that this belief was popular in 1873 . . . a hundred years and a hundred wars ago.

Although the economic world may be shrinking, the United States retains a significant economic advantage in relation to the other major powers. With a gross national product nearly twice that of its nearest competitor, with its immense food production, productivity, and volume of world trade, the American economy is a powerful force. Harnessing this force in order to use it as an element of power in international relations is another matter. The relative lack of central control and central planning -- paradoxically a major strength of the American economy -- severely limits the ability of the United States Government to orchestrate the application of economic power to achieve political ends. Add to this the fact that "Dollar diplomacy" has almost as bad a connotation as "Gunboat diplomacy", and it can be seen that economic power is an advantage most difficult to exploit. These

problems notwithstanding, Americans should not lose sight of their relative economic advantage in international relations.

It is also important that the United States not lose sight of its relative advantage on the social scene as well. Alienation from government, disenchantment with impersonal controls, and challenges to the "Establishment" are not confined to the United States, or even to the Western world. Recent Soviet trials of dissenters and the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revlution both testify to the global aspects of this trend. Open dissent, with all its problems, at least provides a safety valve for the venting of these frustrations. The mass revolts, the counter-culture movement of the 1960s, has dissipated in the West, but continues to smolder under the surface in authoritarian countries.

From a national security standpoint, the primary impact of sociological trends will be the continuing competition between domestic welfare programs and national security programs for a share of the Federal budget. Trends indicate that national security programs will decrease as a percentage of the Federal budget, while domestic welfare programs increase. This competition has sparked an increasingly bitter internecine quarrel over spending priorities. Articulation of the security argument is muted somewhat by the preponderence of the humanist left in the "knowledge industry". This "knowledge industry" -- communications media, data processing industries, universities, think tanks -- is becoming a major sector of the American economy as it shifts from extractive and manufacturing occupations to service occupations. With a vested interest in domestic welfare programs, from which they derive a considerable degree of their income, environmental

determinists are also heavily represented in the "knowledge industry". Ideological mind-sets often defy rational arguments, with both sides denying the legitimacy of the other. The arguments between domestic welfare spending and national security spending should not be phrased in terms of "either/or". In the words of the preamble to the Constitution, it is a question of both providing for the common defense and promoting the general welfare.

As living, breathing proof that the humanist millenium has not yet arrived, the military should not expect love from its critics. It should, however, work for their respect as a necessary ingredient in an imperfect world.

International Considerations

The imperfect world of the foreseeable future appears remarkably similar to the world of the present. No cataclysmic changes are forecast, nor changes on the magnitude of the end of the colonial era following World War II. While changes will be principally a matter of degree, some will have significant implications, such as the projected ability of China to strike the American mainland with nuclear ICBMs within the next decade. The preeminence of the United States will be inhibited, but, with realistic strategies to cope with these changes, the United States will retain its relative standing as the dominant world power.

The primary challenge to America will be the growing strength and independence of other world powers -- Western Europe, Japan, and China. Their ascendency will be matched by the relative decline of the United States and the Soviet Union. There will not, however, be five global superpowers. Only the United States and the Soviet Union will be truly global powers. Western

Europe, still lacking in political unity, will be a global economic power but will lack the military capability and resolve to project power worldwide. The same will be true of Japan. While China has global ambitions, her developing economy will limit her ability to challenge the two superpowers. A classical 19th Century balance of power among five relatively equal power centers does not appear likely in the foreseeable future, nor does it appear that such an equality of power would be in the best interests of the United States.

The United States is in a relatively advantageous position among the world powers. Deputy Secretary of State John N. Irwin, II, in an address in September 1972, visualized the world as two great triangles, joined at their apexes through US "membership" in both:

> One of these triangles embraces the US, the Soviet Union, and China. It is rather uneven in shape since China is still many steps behind the other two angles. But politically and militarily, these three are the major power centers and, to put the matter in an uncomfortable way, we are the three nations that could probably do the greatest harm to the world if we were so inclined . . .
>
> . . the second triangle -- the United States, Japan and Western Europe . . are the wealthy nations of the world. Again, the legs and angles are uneven. Japan has not yet decided fully how to shape its participation in the international system. Western Europe is in some ways more in a state of becoming than of being. It is within this triangle that the level of interdependence is highest . . .

Applying Secretary Irwin's geometry to the other major powers, we find the Soviet Union in a pentagonal/adversary relationship with the other but diverse four powers -- an untenable position for the long term and certainly one of the considerations behind Soviet détente with West Europe, Japan, and the US. China has moved from its previous pentagonal relationship to a

quadrangular adversary relationship with the US, the USSR, and Japan; while sharing with West Europe parallel interests in containing the USSR. Like the Soviet Union, China is also attempting to lessen its adversary relationships through détente. West Europe's relationships are complex. Many West European nations are pursuing détente with their major adversary, the Soviet Union, while retaining their ties with the US and encouraging a community of interest with China, and to a lesser degree with Japan, in the containment of the USSR. Japan alone among the major powers has a dual triangular relationship similar to that of the United States. On one hand is Japan's adversary relationship -- attenuated somewhat in the recent past -- with China and the Soviet Union. On the other hand Japan has close ties with the US and friendly ties with West Europe. The primary difference between Japan and the US, of course, is that Japan does not possess the military power to retain her position without the assistance of the United States.

The primary actors on the world stage will be these five major powers -- the United States, the Soviet Union, West Europe, Japan, and China. With the exception of China, these are developed countries and their attention will be concentrated to a considerable degree upon one another. Along side these world powers are the rapidly developing regional powers--Brazil in Latin America, Iran in the Middle East.
Plagued by excessive population growth, food shortages, and all the problems of development, the so-called "Third World" will remain unstable. A past article of faith for strategic planners has been that the instability of the "Third World" would generate requirements for military force. This assumption does not appear valid for the future. While seeking to retain some influence in the "Third World", the major powers will operate at low-key and seek to avoid confrontations that might lead to war. Harvard

economist John Kenneth Galbraith's assessment of the risk/gain equation is probably at the heart of this cautious opportunism:

> The Third World consists, by definition, of poor rural societies--that is what undeveloped and underdeveloped countries are. It follows that whether such countries call themselves free, free enterprise, capitalist, socialist, or Communist, has, at the lowest levels of development, only technological significance. They are poor and rural however they describe themselves. For the appreciable future they will so remain. Even by the crudest power calculus, military or economic, such nations have no vital relation to the economic or strategic position of the developed country.

The prospect for the foreseeable future is that the internal political problems of the Third World are more likely to be ignored than exploited, as world indifference to the terrible massacres in Burundi in 1973 indicates.

US Interests

Given this world of the foreseeable future, what then, are vital American interests? Only two vital interests can be identified . . . interests so essential that the nation would almost automatically go to war for their preservation. These overriding interests are survival of the United States and preservation of American freedom of action -- stated negatively, American freedom from coercion -- in the international arena. Other interests have varying degrees of importance, importance certain to vary with time, circumstance, other nation involvement, and domestic perceptions. While such an interest may prove "vital", such identification would require a conscious decision by the President to stake the national will on its preservation. Korea, it would appear, became a "vital" US interest on 27 June 1950 when President Truman committed American forces to its defense. This despite previous statements by the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Korea was not essential to United States security. Time has eroded the reason for Korea becoming "vital". It was not Korea per se, but, as

President Truman stated, it was the perception that "Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to c quer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." It was to counter this tactic that on 27 June 1950, President Truman not only committed American troops to the defense of Korea, but also:

> . . . ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa . . . directed that the United States Forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippines Government be accelerated . . . similarly directed acceleration in the furnishings of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States of Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces . . .

Later, as part of the same action, President Truman also ordered both active and national guard divisions deployed to West Europe. As President Truman concluded, "A return to the rule of force in international relations would have far reaching effects." It was to counter this "rule of force" that military forces were committed to the defense of Korea. Far from being a mere legal technicality, the rationale for American intervention in Korea clearly indicates that it was not altruistic concern for the independence of a beleagured nation (although that was a consideration), but rather the protection of United States freedom from coercion from what was then seen or at least treated as a monolithic world communist threat.

While threats to the survival of the nation are unlikely so long as strategic nuclear "sufficiency" is maintained, the preservation of freedom of action or freedom from coercion will remain a major task of American strategy. In the foreseeable future the threats to those freedoms will be more multi-faceted, more amorphous and more difficult to define than the "monolithic" threat of the Cold War. Military threats from potential adversaries will be intertwined with economic threats from allies and complicated by competing

domestic interests. The problem ahead is how to cope with the complex threats to American freedom from coercion/freedom of action.

Defining the Problem

Critics of past strategy have complained that not only did strategists fail to see the forest for the trees, too often they missed the trees because of the underbrush. Enmeshed in a morass of detail, they failed to perceive the grand course of world events. The problem is that to analyze the complexities of the modern world in their totality is an impossible task. These complexities must be reduced to workable segments and subsegments. Once analyzed at these levels the segments must be reassembled into the whole. During the MacNamara era in the Department of Defense it was believed that this task could be quantified and computerized -- a misconception, it must be emphasized, not shared by Secretary MacNamara himself. The sad truth is that when there is conflict between hard, quantified physical data and soft, ephemeral moral data (perceptions, attitudes, etc), the tendency is to fall back on the hard data. While lip service was given to Napoleon's dictum that "the moral is to the physical as three to one", in practice the reverse was true.

In formulating a national strategy for the future it is fallacious to concentrate on any one factor. Military factors, for example, do not stand alone. They not only spring from economic, political, and social factors, but ideally they should be designed to support and enhance those factors. The task is truly synergistic -- that is, "the simultaneous action of separate agencies which, together, have greater total effect than the sum of their individual effects".

The problems in the foreseeable future are also synergistic. They too have political, military, and economic components. The task of the strategist is to analyze these components, both separately and in combination, to define the basic issues involved. Once these basic issues are isolated, then strategies can be formulated -- political, military, and economic strategies -- for the attainment of United States interests and objectives. For example, while the primary thrust of a military strategy might be to cope with the military component of a problem, it also should be in consonance with and complimentary to the political and economic strategies devised to cope with other components of the problem. These mutually supporting strategies should all focus on resolution of the basic issue. To talk of a military (or political, or economic) strategy in isolation is to miss the synergistic nature of national strategy.

This national strategy is, and should be, ambiguous and not precisely defined. There is a certain strength in clouding one's intentions, since it complicates an adversary's task in devising counter strategies. Such an amorphous national strategy maximizes flexibility and freedom of action to adapt to changing international situations. It is not without cost, however. Component strategies -- political, military, and economic -- have to be more definitive. They must, in the final analysis, deal with specifics. Certainty can only be obtained at the price of flexibility. A continuing problem is the difficulty of adapting rather rigid component strategies to a dynamic and ever-changing national strategy . . . What cynics have called the problem of erecting great logical edifices on foundations of gas. The solution is to find an acceptable balance for component strategies between the polar extremes of certainty and flexibility.

This analysis will conceptualize a national strategy for the foreseeable future -- realizing that the actual national strategy can never be reduced to such finite terms -- and will conclude with more specific and definitive recommendations for a supporting military strategy for the future.

National Strategy

The goal of a national strategy for the foreseeable future should be to retain the relatively advantageous position of the United States among the world powers . . . the fulcrum (in the sense of exerting influence and pressure) between the dual triangles of the US-West Europe-Japan and the US-USSR-China discussed earlier. In order to retain this relative advantage, the dynamics of the world power relationships must be understood.

Consider the United States-West Europe-Japan relationship. The size of the US economy is twice that of West Europe, and triple that of Japan, and will remain the dominant economy in the foreseeable future. The US is Japan's largest trading partner, and, excluding trade within the European Economic Community, is also West Europe's major trading partner. Over 40% of United States foreign trade is with West Europe and Japan. While competition has caused strains, economic interdependence also creates a community of interest among all three partners. Unlike the other two, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power, and the US geographic position facilitates trade and communication with both powers. It is an accepted fact that the US has close ethnic and cultural ties with Europe. Not so widely recognized is the fact that the United States has more citizens of Japanese ancestory than any country outside of Japan. Japanese tourism, and, recently, Japanese investment, is growing in the

United States.

The United States provides the primary nuclear shield for both West Europe and Japan, and has mutual defense treaties with Japan and the Atlantic Alliance nations. It is in the best interests of West Europe and Japan to retain US security guarantees, since their nullification would subject both to either intimidation or to the enormous costs of creating their own deterrent force. This commonality of interests -- economic, social, political, and military -- should assist in the maintenance of the triangular relationship for the foreseeable future.

The intense antagonism of the US-USSR-China triangle has somewhat lessened to what might be called "polite hostility". The visits of the President of the United States to Moscow and Peking, emerging trade between the United States and the Soviet Union, quasi-diplomatic relations and expanding trade between the United States and China, have all served to lessen tensions. The Soviet Union and China, while still hostile, have moved away from the armed clashes of 1969. Given these improved relations, it is still in the best interest of each of these parties that an adversary relationship exist between the other two. Such a relationship serves as an effective deterrent to war, since conflict between any two parties would weaken both vis-a-vis the third. Conflict, as well as alliance between any two, would severely destabilize world power relationships. Movement within the triangle can be expected, as all three powers attempt to maintain their relative balance. Recent speculation that China may move closer to the Soviet Union should be interpreted as a corrective adjustment to what some Chinese leaders evidently see as an imbalance toward the United States. The adversary

relationships within this triangle should not preclude pursuit of parallel interests between the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States and China. These interests can and should be pursued with full knowledge that ideological hostility will remain, and that both the USSR and China will exploit every advantage presented to them. In like manner, the United States should not become so lulled into false complacency that it does not also pursue opportunities for American advantage. Maintenance of sufficient United States military force is an essential ingredient of the US-USSR-China triangle. It is the underpinning of détente, providing the strength from which to negotiate. The deterrence that US military forces provide to the use of force by the Soviet Union and China encourages their use of non-military means to advance their national objectives. Failure to recognize the contribution of military force to détente and relaxation of world tensions risks the elimination of the very foundation upon which détente and the relaxation of world tensions is built. A peaceful and stable world does not just happen. The principal actors have to exert efforts to bring it about.

The primary thrust of United States national strategy should be toward these major power relationships. Strategy toward other nations should be formulated in the context of major power considerations. As Harvard Professor Samual P. Huntington stated in his article, "After Containment: The Functions of the Military Establishment" (Annals, March 1973):

> . . U.S. concern with the maintenance of a global balance of powers system. . means that U.S. security interests in the affairs of minor powers, in the peripheral regions of the system, and in local balance of power, will be limited to those matters which in turn have an effect on the overall global balance of power. . .

> Whether changes in the control of any particular piece of territory threaten American security depends upon its effect on those global relationships . . .
>
> The criterion for U.S. involvement, in short, is not who suffers from aggression, but who benefits from it. The overall object is not to deter aggression, but to maintain a balance of power.

Whether the United States can pursue such a pragmatic policy of power politics will depend to a considerable degree upon domestic psychological perceptions. As we have seen, idealism has been a strong force in American political relations. Ironically the very persons who decry America's past role as a "world policeman" are the very same persons who demand that the United States "do something" about massacres in Burundi, civil war in Chile, and unrest on the Indian subcontinent. John Quincy Adams warned against such moral initiatives on 4 July 1821:

> Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. (America) well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy and ambition, which assumes the colors and usurp the standards of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force . . .

Adams spoke from a theoretical basis, but his admonition has been proven by events of the last decade. What begins as a moral crusade to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty" ended with recriminations, violent dissent, and American disenchantment with foreign involvement. For the foreseeable future this repugnance will tend to limit foreign involvement to those areas where hard tangible United States interests are unequivocally involved.

Strategic Problems Ahead

For many reasons -- economic, political, cultural, racial and historical -- Western Europe occupies center stage in American strategic thinking. Critics have accused the National Security Council of operating, in effect, solely on Greenwich Mean Time, and ignoring the rest of the world. The extreme proponents of the "NATO-First" strategy would subordinate all American military interests to the defense of West Europe.

The problem for the foreseeable future is the survivability of the United States-West Europe alliance. The present alliance -- NATO -- served American security interests well, but there are strains against its cohesion. Two fundamental issues ahead are (1) a clash between conflicting American political-military interests and American economic interests, and, (2) a conflict between American security interests and West European security interests.

The first issue is raised by the ambivalent nature of West Europe-United States relations. West Europe is at one and the same time an economic competitor and a group of military allies. The strength of this relationship -- from an American point of view -- is that it provides leverage for American political initiatives. The weakness is the economic costs involved. At first glance it would appear that Congressional demands for troop cuts in Europe spring largely from the financial burden of maintaining these forces abroad, a burden exacerbated by the economic competition between the United

States and the European Economic Community. One must closely examine this economic argument, however. There are those critics genuinely concerned over purely economic costs whose criticism would disappear if economic problems could be ameliorated. There are other critics, however, who are opposed to American force presence abroad on principle, and who use the economic arguments only as a convenient vehicle for their attack. Economic arguments are further complicated by the ambivalent nature of statistics. One can sympathize with the gradation of falsehood as "lies, damned lies, and statistics". A more charitable explanation is that statistics for American force presence in Europe were devised as political instruments to prove particular points. Some balance of payment statistics, for example, used to demonstrate that West European allies are not paying their fair share, do not include such items as the amount of money spent by West Germany to renovate American barracks. The actual contribution of West Germany to American force presence in West Europe is lost in the intricacies of American bookkeeping. Economic arguments often tend to be mutually exclusive. On the one hand, our European allies are told the costs are exorbitant, and they must do more. On the other hand, the American public is told that the security advantages outweigh the economic costs. Both arguments are true, but neither the Europeans nor the American public is convinced.

The issue is further complicated by the rationale used in the past to justify American force presence in Europe. Cloaked in idealistic terms, American forces were defending West Europe from the communist hordes. This altruistic basis is difficult to defend against critics who point out that the population and gross national product of West Europe exceeds those of the Soviet Union and East Europe, and therefore West Europeans should be perfectly capable

of defending themselves. Add to this the euphoria of détente and summitry which has drastically eroded public perception of the threat, and the past rationale is almost indefensible. Practical, pragmatic reasons -- the need to maintain West Europe in the advantageous dual triangular relationship discussed earlier, the need for American influence in West Europe, the need for American access to European markets, the need for a forward defense of the United States in Europe, the fact that détente requires a foundation of strength and security -- are difficult to articulate in hard, quantifiable terms to match the tangible economic arguments of the critics.

The second issue grows out of the contradictory policies of the United States and West Europe. Both have a continuing interest in containing Soviet expansion, yet both are pursuing accommodation with the Soviet Union. This is complicated by the diversity of West Europe . . . not an entity but separate nations whose political interests are not necessarily parallel. The political and security interests of West Germany, sharing a hostile border with Eastern Europe, are not the same as the interests of France or insular Great Britain. The divergence of American and European security perceptions was evident during the Vietnam war. Europe, an Atlantic power, did not share the interests of the United States, both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. While the United States saw an expanding China as a danger to its status as a Pacific power, Europe saw an expanding China as a useful counter to the Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization assumes parallel interests, whereas in truth these interests may be tangential. A case in point is the visualization of how a war in Western Europe would be fought. One basic United States interest is in sparing the American homeland. West Europeans do not relish the destruction of their territory to protect

America and rely heavily on early use of nuclear weapons as the most effective deterrent. The United States would rather rely more heavily on conventional forces to avoid crossing the nuclear threshold, since the Soviet strategic nuclear threat poses the greatest danger to the continental United States. These divergent views have been plastered over, but the schism remains as a weak point in United States-European relations.

Selection of alternative courses for the future is complicated by the American penchant for seeing problems in Manichaean terms -- as opposite ends of a spectrum. The tendency is to assume that solutions involve maximization of one interest at the expense of the other . . . maximize economic interests and unilaterally withdraw all military forces from Europe . . . maximize security interests and maintain forces in Europe regardless of the cost.

There is another view. Instead of viewing problems as contending opposites, they can be seen as complimentary opposites -- as halves of a circle -- that must be brought into harmony. With this view, there is no question of chosing one at the expense of the other. The solution lies in the reconciliation, not the elimination, of problems. Applying this view to the problems of Europe would mean, for example, finding the balance between competing American economic and security interests, rather than seeking to maximize either. In a complex and contradictory world where options are limited, Americans would do well to borrow this world view.

In West Europe, American options are limited. Unless present conflicts of interest are resolved they will seriously weaken present policy. This danger is illustrated by current Congressional debate. A return to the simpler days of bi-polarity is an absurdity, since neither the United States nor

the Soviet Union can orchestrate the policies of their former Cold War allies. A classical Nineteenth Century balance-of-power is equally out of the question, since only the United States and the USSR are truly global powers. The remainder are regional powers in varying stages of development. The United States must balance its contradictory policies. Containment of the Soviet Union remains a necessary ingredient of security. Accommodation with the Soviet Union remains a necessary ingredient of world stability and reduced tensions. Economic interests between the United States and Western Europe remain essential, as do American security interests in West Europe. The only viable course of action for the future is a synthesis of alternatives, with West Europe paying a more equitable share of the cost of the global United States deterrence of the Soviet Union. So long as the United States' share is seen by the Congress and the American public as inequitable, the pressures for unilateral American withdrawal from Europe will continue. For the long term, the perception must be that the United States is buying a dollar's worth of security for America with every dollar spent on forces in Europe; while West Europeans must also believe the money they spend is in their best interests. As we have seen, there is a real dilemma concerning the assessment of these costs. There is a requirement for an honest, credible set of books that clearly enumerates the total cost of American assurance of West Europe -- the costs of conventional deployments in West Europe, the costs of conventional reinforcements in the United States, the costs of air and sea mobility, the costs of the strategic nuclear retaliatory force, including the costs of the United States maintenance of a global presence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Once these total costs are enumerated, then it can be determined

whether they are equitably shared among the United States and the nations of West Europe.

In East Asia the basic problem is the continued viability of the United States as a Pacific power. As President Nixon said on 3 May 1973:

> Since V-E Day in 1945, nearly every American killed in war has died in Asia . . . the vast, changing, throbbing world of Asia will figure importantly in our thoughts and policy calculations as far ahead as any of us can see . . .
>
> Asia, and particularly Northeast Asia, is the locus of interaction among four of the five great power centers in our world . . . The ways in which these powers act and interact will, to a significant degree, shape the future and determine the stability of Asia.

Notwithstanding this Presidential statement, the United States still retains an Occidental bias. American ties with Europe are not matched by ties with Asia. Consider, for example, the use of the very term "East Asia".

In stages of development, in race, culture, religion, and language, East Asia is in no sense homogeneous. While a common West European policy has some basis in fact because of NATO and the EEC, there is no such basis for a common East Asian policy. Lacking such a commonality, the United States must key on its important interests in the area. By far, the most important interest in East Asia is Japan. President Nixon emphasized this point on 9 February 1972:

> Japan is our most important ally in Asia . . .

> Our security, our prosperity, and our global policies are . .intimately and inextricably linked to the U.S.-Japanese relationship.

As in Europe, the fundamental issues are two-fold: (1) contradictions between American political-military interests and American economic interests, and (2) differences in popular perception of American security interests and Japanese security interests.

Japanese-American relations, too, are somewhat ambivalent, with Japan at one and the same time an economic competitor and a military ally. While this gives the United States some leverage, it is at a high economic price. Economic competition between the United States and Japan is intense and the Japanese advantage gained by allocating a relatively small percentage of their gross national product to defense is viewed as an irritant by some American observers. While the economic issues are relatively clear-cut, the security issues are clouded. Again, American bases and forward deployments were justified in idealistic terms of containing Communist China, and "defending Freedom's frontier" in Asia. American détente with Communist China, combined with the fact that Japan's gross national product is more than double that of mainland China, make such an argument increasingly difficult to justify. The need to maintain Japan in the advantageous triangular relationship discussed earlier, the need for American access and influence in Japan, the need for a forward projection of power in order to remain a Pacific power . . . all are difficult to articulate in hard, quantifiable terms to match the tangible economic arguments of the critics.

In a limited sense, the United States is pursuing contradictory policies in East Asia. The United States has a continued interest in containing

Chinese expansion, with an equal interest in pursuing accommodation with China. Japan, too, has contradictory policies vis-a-vis both China and the USSR, exploiting areas of mutual benefit while seeking to limit Chinese and Soviet influence on Japan. The United States also desires a Japan capable of its own conventional defense but would not wish to see a rearmed, militaristic and nuclear Japan. Japan has a continuing interest in events on Taiwan and in Korea. The United States is committed to "ultimately" withdraw its military forces from Taiwan. An abrupt withdrawal of United States forces from Korea under certain circumstances could have an unstabilizing effect in the area. Korea is the nexus of power in Northeast Asia, where four of the five major world powers come together. Within the last century all four have fought wars over Korea -- the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, and the Sino-American war of 1950. In the past American presence in Korea has been justified primarily in terms of defense of Korea itself, rather than in the larger terms of stability of Northeast Asia. While these reasons were intertwined this divergence was unimportant but, since the quasi-normalization of Sino-American relations in 1972 and the initiation of North-South talks, the argument for an American military presence in Korea has become increasingly vulnerable. Unlike Europe, where force presence can be anchored to a considerable degree on the Soviet threat, the issue in Northeast Asia is more one of maintaining the present delicate equilibrium. This equilibrium could easily be upset by a precipitous American withdrawal, especially after the massive United States drawdown in Southeast Asia. The United States must focus on its primary interest in East Asia -- Japan -- and must work at maintaining the US-Japanese security relationship.

Again American options are limited. Abandonment of Japan for closer relations with China -- a bugbear of some Japanese with memories of pre-World War II American policy and past American romanticism toward China -- would fly in the face of reality, since Japan, not China, is the dominant Asian power and will remain so for the foreseeable future. A United States-Japan-China alliance against the Soviet Union has attraction for some but, like Dr. Frankenstein, the United States might well create a monstor by wedding the industrial base of Japan to the resources of China. As in Europe, the most hopeful approach is a synthesis . . . maintain the present power equilibrium and encourage Japan to assume a greater economic share of the cost of maintaining global and regional stability. With the United States acting as an "honest broker" to allay Asian fears of a resurgent Japan and a greater Japanese sensitivity to national fears and aspirations, the Japanese might play a broader role in East Asia than would otherwise be possible. It will require careful orchestration, however, to resolve the apparent contradictions between a strong Japan playing a major economic role in Asian stability and a non-nuclear armed Japan, a non-militaristic Japan, that does not upset the equilibrium of power in Asia.

While not part of the dual triangular relationships, there is another area of the world that is assuming increasing importance. The Middle East, and especially the oil-rich Persian Gulf, is a factor that must be considered in any strategic planning. West Europe, Japan, and,

to a lesser extent, the United States are dependent on Middle East oil. For the United States this problem is aggrevated by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the eastern Mediterranean. Caught up in the dilemma between the emotional issue of Israel and the economic issue of energy, the United States is in danger of being isolated from its allies -- West Europe and Japan -- whose interests are primarily in oil. It is in the best interests of the Palestine guerrilla movement to keep these issues closely linked so as to play one against the other. It is in American interets to delink them wherever possible, realizing that complete separation is probably not attainable. Support for moderate Arab governments in Lebanon and Jordon, however, weakens this link. Again faced with contradictions, the United States can only work to find an acceptable balance.

The United States has a special relationship with Latin America. It would prefer a sphere of predominant influence and the exclusion of any extra-hemispheric power from the area. The dilemma is that if the United States does too much it is condemned for paternalism. If it does too little, it is damned for neglecting Latin American problems. The solution would appear to lie in abandonment of the rubric of a "Latin American policy" and instead concentrate on carefully tailored programs for the individual and individualistic nations of the area.

In the other nations of the so-called Third World, the United States must walk a tightrope, doing neither too much nor too little. In South Asia, United States interests are minimal. Some alternatives to total Indian and Pakistani reliance on the USSR and China should be offered, however the United States must recognize its inability to contol events on the subcontinent, and must limit

its involvement accordingly. The same is true in Africa. Again on the horns of a dilemma, with current economic interests in white Africa, and current political interests (and long-term economic interests) in black Africa, the United States must look for a middle way. With some latitude because of the current lack of black African unity, the United States should expect increasing domestic political pressure to "do something" about the racial policies of white Africa.

Given these strategic problems, the question remains as to how the United States projects its influence abroad . . . how the United States applies its power to achieve desired ends. The primary means, of course, is political. Backing up these political means are social, economic, psychological and military factors giving weight to American diplomacy. With "power" in his briefcase -- the economic power of American resources and productivity; the psycho-social power of American will, determination, and resolve; and the military power to resist coercion -- an American diplomat talks from a position of strength. It is this power that provides a basis from which to negotiate.

Military Strategic Considerations

As has been emphasized earlier, military strategy is only one of the component strategies of a national strategy. While the remainder of this analysis will concentrate on a military strategy it is with full realization that such a strategy would have to be integrated into complimentary economic

and political strategies in order to achieve United States policies and objectives.

The role of the military in national strategy was prescribed by the people of the United States through their elected representatives in the Congress. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, charges the military, not only with the traditional role of providing for the common defense, but also with the mission of promoting the general welfare through support of national policies and implementation of national objectives. During the Cold War these two missions were closely intertwined and interrelated. Accomplishment of one -- confrontation and containment of the Soviet Union and Communist China -- tended to accomplish the other. Now, in a new era of foreign policy, where détente and accommodation coexist with a continued need for national defense, these two broad missions are not only no longer synonomous, they may, unless carefully orchestrated, actually work against each other. To resolve these apparent contradictions requires an understanding of the relation of military strategy to national strategy.

As Clausewitz emphasized, military strategy is the application of military means to achieve political ends. American abhorrence of war has led to the denial of this principle, with paradoxical results. As Professor Russell F. Weigley points out (American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy, MacMillan, 1973) Americans saw military strategy as separate and apart from political ends. War became a means unto itself, with "total victory" as its primary rationale. This separation of war and politics was bolstered and reinforced by the view, among civilians and military alike, that the military was an apolitical instrument. While quite

properly denying the military a role in domestic politics, they tended to apply this notion to international politics as well. As in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass, the subordination of the military to domestic political considerations became the subordination of international political considerations to the military in times of crisis. This was not because of any military "plot". As Professor Bernard Brodie commented concerning President Roosevelt's World War II strategy, "the supremacy in authority of the civilian leader merely favors the possibility, but certainly does not guarantee, that political purpose will dominate strategy." (War and Politics, MacMillan 1973). Noting General George C. Marshall's reply to General Eisenhower concerning the liberation of Czechoslovakia where Marshall wrote, "I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes", Brodie observes "To avoid hazarding American lives is bound to be commendable, but if it was not done for 'purely political purposes', what, then was that or any other war all about?"

Missing the essential truth of Mao Tse-tung's aphorism, "Politics is bloodless war; War is bloody politics", Americans missed the connection between war and political ends, between war and peace, and therefore failed to see the contribution of military forces to political interests and objectives, and the contribution of military forces to peace as well as war.

In what Americans considered the abnormal conditions of the Cold War, this contribution was recognized. As the official definition states, "Cold war includes the complete scope of actions, other than limited or general war, that can be used in a power struggle between contending nations or coalitions. . employing not only political, economic, and psychological strengths, but military strengths as well." The paradox now is that while this definition remains valid, the term it describes, "Cold war," has fallen into disrepute in this "era of negotiation." But "Cold war" is not an aberration-- the "power struggle between contending nations or coalitions" is, unfortunately, the normal conditions existing among nations throughout world history. . .an unpleasant fact ignored by Americans isolated from the harsh realities of the world community for several centuries. Americans tended to view "war" as a separate entity involving military forces, "peace" as a separate entity excluding military forces. Military strategy, therefore, concentrated almost exclusively on war and war-fighting, with little provision for the use of military power to support national strategy in peacetime. . .the environment of the foreseeable future.

Support of national strategies requires a clear understanding of what military power is and is not. The substance of the projection of power is the projection of American will, resolve, and determination, which are much more political and psychosocial than military. While the military can provide the form of American power, it alone cannot provide the substance. Consider that the 15th Infantry in Tientsin in 1937 did nothing to stop the Japanese advance into North China in violation of the American "Open Door" policy. Four infantry divisions sitting in Japan in 1950 did nothing to stop the North Korean invasion of South Korea. It has been argued that the prolongation of the Vietnam war was caused by North Vietnamese disregard for the half-million man military form of American commitment to South

Vietnam in favor of what they perceived as the political and psycho-social substance of the anti-war movement in the United States. If the United States is to construct a viable military strategy for the future, an understanding of the relationship between form and substance is essential. They are inseparable parts of a whole. Projection of American will, resolve and determination is difficult, if not impossible, without concrete economic, political and military commitments. These commitments, on the other hand, are meaningless without underlying resolve.

With this understanding, the relationship between conventional military forces and strategic nuclear retaliatory forces becomes clearer. Strategic nuclear retaliatory forces are the keystone of American military strategy, and United States nuclear "sufficiency" is an absolute imperative for survival. These forces deter an attack on the United States by posing the threat of unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union and China. The probability that the United States would reply to a nuclear attack on its homeland is high. This high probability of use, combined with nuclear "sufficiency", virtually insures the survival of the United States. In protection of the homeland, strategic nuclear recaliatory forces are substance.

Strategic nuclear retaliatory forces alone, however, do not guarantee freedom of action -- or freedom from coercion -- in the international arena. Without a high probability of their use, they are only form. To add substance, both allies and potential adversaries must be assured that the United States will, in fact, jeopardize American survival to guarantee allied survival . . . to risk New York to save Frankfurt, or, when the Chinese acquire an ICBM capability, to risk San Francisco to save Tokyo. The higher the credibility

of such assurances, the higher the probability of the use of strategic nuclear retaliatory forces to protect allies, the higher is American freedom of action and freedom from coercion in international relations.

This assurance of allies is a primary role of conventional forces. As Professor Michael Howard has convincingly pointed out ("The Relevence of Traditional Strategy", Foreign Affairs, January 1973) the function of conventional forces is "to maximize the credibility of a decision by the United States to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in response to an invasion of territory other than its own". As a detonator to an otherwise inert mass of nuclear credibility, "conventional forces were rather a kind of fuse which should be made as long as possible so that even when it was lit there would still be time to stamp out the flame before it reached the nuclear barrel".

There are degrees in the commitment of conventional forces, ranging from combat forces stationed overseas, mobile combat forces stationed in the United States, to military missions and advisory groups. The intensity of the commitment should be governed by the intensity of United States interests and objectives in the particular area. As Professor Howard points out, "Like that of a policeman on the beat (conventional force effectiveness lies) less in the force they can command themselves than in their capacity to represent and if need be to commit the total strength and interest of their state. They play the role of fuses that nobody in his right senses would wish to ignite". It is well to remember that the military force itself is only the fuse. The decision to ignite the fuse is a political act. The military advisory groups in Korea in 1950 and in Vietnam in 1954 were

fuses that led to United States involvement.

Again, it is easy to confuse form and substance. Conventional forces are forward deployed as a signal of American interest and as an assurance of United States commitment to protect that interest.

The interest is the "substance", the forward deployed force merely the "form". When that interest is challenged by an adversary, a conscious political decision is made whether the interest is worth further involvement. As Professor Geoffrey Blainey conclusively proves, there has never been an "accidental" war (The Causes of War, Free Press, 1973). A nation must believe that it has more to gain from waging war than from not waging war. As Blainey states, "No wars are unintended or 'accidental'. What is often unintended is the length and bloodiness of the war. Defeat too is unintended."

Conflict Prevention

The first requirement for military forces is a requirement for sufficient forces to avoid or prevent conflict from breaking out. We have seen the role of strategic nuclear retaliatory forces in this capacity, and the essential contribution of conventional military forces to add credibility to the nuclear forces. While volumes have been written on the subject of "How much is enough" for deterrence of adversaries, little or no thought has been given to "How much is enough" for assurance of allies. Yet the assurance of allies is equally as important as the deterrence of adversaries if the advantageous dual triangular world power relationship is to be maintained. How much is enough to assure West Europe and Japan that this dual

triangular relationship is also in their best interests? How much is enough to assure West Europe and Japan that the United States will honor its military commitments? To answer these questions requires some analysis of the relative merits of the various kinds of military power, each with their own strengths and weaknesses. There are two broad categories of military force -- strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces. The Air Force and the Navy have prime responsibility for the strategic nuclear force with their triad of manned bombers, ICBMs, and Polaris missiles. The weakness of sole reliance on "massive retaliation" has been discussed earlier. As Professor Howard emphasized, "the more remote a crisis or a country from the territory of a nuclear power, the more necessary it will be for that power to deploy conventional forces if it wishes to demonstrate the intensity of its interest in that area, and the less will be the significance of its bare nuclear strength." Conventional forces (somewhat a misnomer, since all have a tactical nuclear capability) include naval forces, air forces, and ground forces. For deterrence the Navy and the Air Force can deploy rapidly, can threaten the enemy homeland with conventional or nuclear weapons, and pose an offensive threat. Army forces, lacking inherent mobility, are slower deployed, and are more defensive than offensive oriented because of the relatively short range of their weapons. For assurance the high mobility of Navy and Air Force units work to their disadvantage, since they can disengage as rapidly as they engage. Army forces are more inexorably committed and their presence, therefore, gives greater assurance of American commitment. In a crisis they are less escalatory than more offensive forces and have more firepower at the lower end of the spectrum. Forward deployed Army forces should be restricted to areas where American interests are high

and the risk of American involvement is considered worth the benefits obtained. West Europe and Japan (and, by extension, Korea) are such high interest areas.

Conflict Control

Just as the strategic nuclear retaliatory force must have "sufficiency" in order to be credible, conventional forces must also have "sufficiency" in warfighting capability in order to be credible. This warfighting capability is measured in terms of their ability to control a potential conflict . . . to limit a conflict as to area, degree, and intensity. Possession of this ability not only lends credence to their role in conflict avoidance, it also provides a hedge against the failure of conflict avoidance. The United States must possess the capability to halt aggression that threatens its vital interests without resorting to strategic nuclear weapons. The arguments for such a flexible response were well articulated in the early 1960s, when President John F. Kennedy saw the need for alternatives to either abject surrender or nuclear holocaust. The objective of conventional forces in conflict control is to bring the aggression to a halt and bring the aggressor to the negotiating table. The political end to be achieved is the maintenance of world stability and the re-establishment of an effective deterrent. To achieve these ends without resorting to nuclear weapons requires adequate conventional military forces in being -- adequacy measured in terms of the risks the United States is willing to take that the conflict cannot be controlled at the non-nuclear level.

Conflict Termination

As the final hedge against failure of both conflict avoidance and conflict

control, the United States must possess a capability to terminate a conflict rapidly, at minimal cost to the United States and allies, and under advantageous conditions. To terminate at conventional levels would require considerable forces-in-being, an unlikely contingency in the foreseeable future. Without such conventional forces, a full range of nuclear options is necessary. Potential adversaries must be convinced that the United States will use this full range of options to protect vital interests. The greater the credibility of their use, the greater the deterrence -- and the less likelihood that their use will be necessary.

Military Strategy for the Multipolar World

A cohesive military strategy for the foreseeable future includes both constants and variables. The constants are maintenance of a "sufficient" nuclear retaliatory capability to insure the survival of the United States in the nuclear era, maintenance of "sufficient" conventional forces-in-being along with the strategic mobility capabilities to bring these forces to bear to control potential conflicts short of nuclear war, and maintenance of a sustaining base -- manpower, equipment, research and development, training, etc -- to support the forces-in-being. There is little responsible argument over the need for these constants, although there are different perceptions of "sufficiency".

The debate ahead will focus on the variables. These variables are the projections of American military power abroad to support United States interests and objectives. It is this area that is, and will be, most misunderstood and most open to Congressional and public attack. This attack can only be overcome with a better articulation of why it is in America's best

interests to deploy American forces overseas. It must be demonstrated that these forces have, détente notwithstanding, a positive value to the United States.

A useful theme for such articulation is the theme of assurance and deterrence. The first step is to convince the American public that the United States is in a relatively advantageous position among the world powers and that it is in their best interests to maintain this advantageous position. Given the penchant for self-criticism, viewing-with-alarm, and pessimism that has grasped America of late, this will not be an easy task. The real danger is that the apocalyptic visions of both the right and the left will become self-fulfilling prophesies if not checked by rational analysis. Sitting at the fulcrum of the dual triangular relationships of the US-USSR-China and the US-West Europe-Japan has its disadvantages and the responsibilities of global power weigh heavily. But there is no acceptable successor waiting in the wings. There is only the Soviet Union. Recalling Winston Churchill's remarks on the problems of a democracy - the United States is in the worst possible strategic position -- except for all others.

The second step is then to determine how to retain America's advantage. This depends upon foreign perceptions as well as domestic perceptions. Western Europe and Japan must be convinced that it is in their best interests to maintain their present relationships. Economic competition will tear at these perceptions, both in America and abroad. The principal advantage that West Europe and Japan gain from the present relationship is the assurance of America's security guarantees. Without such guarantees both West Europe and Japan would either have to yield to pressure from their

militarily stronger neighbors or undergo the enormous costs of providing for their own nuclear deterrent. The United States strategic nuclear retaliatory capability, made credible by forward deployments of conventional forces, provides the required assurance. The question for the future is "How much is enough for assurance?" Current forward deployments -- like elephant bane -- must be assumed to represent the upper limits, since the alliances have endured. The lower limit remains to be determined. In Europe the negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force Reduction and the Conference on European Security and Cooperation may provide some answers. If the United States is to retain some leverage in West Europe, however, the realistic lower limit cannot be zero. In Asia the discussions on withdrawal of American forces from Korea must recognize the contribution these forces make to Japanese security and to stability in East Asia.

United States forward deployed forces also have a secondary role in assurance. Their presence in West Europe and Korea also assures the Soviet Union and China that the United States has parallel interests in deterring German revanchism and Japanese militarism. With assurance of United States protection, militaristic groups in either country lack an excuse for rearmament and militarism.

United States deterrence of the Soviet Union and China, seen as an advantage to West Europe and Japan, would, at first glance, seem completely unfavorable to the USSR and the PRC. As long as the triangular relationship of at least "polite hostility" remains, however, both China and the Soviet Union are deterred from war upon one another, since a Sino-Soviet war would weaken both vis-a-vis the United States. American deterrence, coupled with a

realistic American policy of détente, also strengthens the hands of the moderates within the Chinese and Soviet governments, since they can demonstrate that more is to be gained by peace than by war. The question of "How much is enough for deterrence" has been debated, quantified, and computerized at length. There is no question that nuclear "sufficiency" is an absolute requirement. The debate ranges over conventional "sufficiency". The United States must possess sufficient conventional capability to deter limited Soviet or Chinese conventional attacks, and to control such attacks without resorting to nuclear weapons. Under the Nixon Doctrine, allied conventional capabilities are an important adjunct to American forces. The United States must take care, however, not to blithly assume parallel allied and American interests and must not weaken its unilateral capability to the point where the United States is hostage to allied, not American interests.

It can be argued that present world stability is in the best interests of all the major world powers. Their mutual self-interest should help to perpetuate a stable world order . . . especially when the price of upsetting it is exorbitant. It is the role of American military forces to demonstrate that the price is indeed unacceptable.

While limiting forward deployments to West Europe and Northeast Asia where important and potentially vital United States interests are involved, there is also a need to project American power and influence into the "Third World". While world stability and the status quo might not be in "Third World interests, they will lack the power to do much about it. United States interest should be limited to retaining an influence, countering

Soviet or Chinese initiatives, and assisting, within reasonable bounds, in their internal development. Military involvement in these areas should also be limited. Military assistance groups, advisory teams, exchange programs, ship visits, disaster relief, and other such low key options, tailored to specific American interests in each country, should be the extent of American military involvement.

Conclusion

This military strategy, in consonance with parallel economic and political strategies, should protect America's vital interests in the foreseeable future -- the survival of the nation and preservation of freedom of action in the international community. But this strategy provides only the form. The substance to give it meaning is the will, the resolve, and the determination of the American people to carry it out. This backing and support is dependent to a large degree on American public understanding of the hard, practical benefits to be obtained from such a military strategy in peacetime.

The benefits of a military strategy are somewhat analogous to those of an insurance policy. The military strategy above provides relatively high coverage against the most dangerous risk -- a nuclear attack on the American homeland -- by providing for nuclear "sufficiency". It provides moderate coverage for conflict prevention -- the retention of America's relatively advantageous position among the world powers without resort to war -- by providing for sufficient conventional forces-in-being to project American power abroad. It provides somewhat less coverage for conflict control -- the capability to limit and control conflicts and bring them to a negotiated

end without the use of nuclear weapons -- by providing for conventional forces, both deployed overseas and in the United States. It provides lowest coverage for the least probable eventuality, conflict termination -- the capability to terminate a conflict on terms advantageous to the United States without resort to nuclear weapons.

Neither the forces to execute a military strategy nor the coverage provided by an insurance policy can guarantee that untoward events will not occur. But, like an insurance policy, a military strategy can provide the means to cope with and recover from such unfavorable events. Again, as in insurance, the amount one is willing to pay is a factor. One may trust in luck, paying for no insurance, or, on the other extreme, chose to protect against every eventuality and risk bankruptcy. The dilemma is to balance costs versus risks in order to arrive at a realistic balance.

This military strategy, with the force levels necessary for its execution, represents such a realistic balance. To bring such a strategy into being the American people must believe that it indeed provides adequate coverage against expected risks, and must be convinced that the premiums to be paid are reasonable and necessary.

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