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

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OPTIONS FOR US NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE 1980'S AND BEYOND

by

William O. Staudenmaier

9 January 1981

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

FOREWORD

This memorandum examines the interrelationships among the evolving strategic environment, US national interests and national strategy. The author considers the concept of national strategy by placing the current national strategy in historical perspective and examines the differences between strategy and policy. In order to develop strategic options, the four fundamental elements of US national interest—survival, preservation of national territory, preservation of contemporary American values and maintenance or enhancement of the US standard of living—are analyzed in the context of the emerging global strategic situation. Next, four national strategic options are developed and one element—deterrence—common to them all is discussed. The author concludes that the dynamic nature of the future world environment will require flexibility and perhaps a synthesis of the four basic options examined.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

JACK N. MERRITT
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLONEL WILLIAM O. STAUDENMAIER has been assigned to the Strategic Studies Institute since his graduation from the US Army War College in 1976. Previously he served as a divisional air defense battalion commander in Germany and in various staff assignments at the Department of the Army. Colonel Staudenmaier graduated from the University of Chattanooga and earned a master's degree in public administration from Pennsylvania State University. He has published articles on air defense and military strategy.

SUMMARY

The United States has passed through three phases of national strategy—isolationism, imperialism and world leadership. Since 1945, three variations of the world leadership theme have dominated US national strategy. First, geographically, the United States has sought to insure that no single power or combination of powers hostile to the interests of the United States could establish hegemony over either Western Europe or Northeast Asia. Secondly, the strategic nuclear theme has dealt with the problem of deterring strategic nuclear war. The third theme—containment—has evolved from the containment of monolithic communism to a more traditional approach of selectively containing the political influence of the USSR. Will these elements of national strategy remain viable in the waning years of this century? To answer this question will require a consideration of the interrelationship of the national interests of the United States, the emerging strategic environment and national strategy.

The four fundamental elements of US national interests are the survival of the United States, the preservation of national territory, the preservation of contemporary American values and the maintenance of the US standard of living. Survival will require the assured deterrence of the Soviet nuclear forces and halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. The preservation of US national territory is assured by the oceans that separate the United States from the Eurasian land mass remaining effective barriers to conventional invasion. The preservation of contemporary American values requires a stable world order favorable to the United States. The maintenance or enhancement of the US standard of living requires that the United States retain access to its major trading partners and its critical resources. The national strategy that will secure these fundamental categories of national interest must also be altered to the demands of the strategic environment.

Current trends in the strategic environment suggest a number of troubling developments for the United States in the future: a growth in the number of newly independent states that will add further turmoil to an already unstable Third World; the continued dependence of the United States on raw materials and oil from an unpredictable Third World; the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

terrorism; the reassertion of Islamic fundamentalism; and, the struggle with the Soviet Union for world leadership. Any viable strategic option must consider the demands of this dynamic strategic environment.

Four strategic options seem relevant to satisfy US national interests in the context of the strategic environment described above. They are: containment, detente, regionalism, and isolationism. One further element, deterrence of strategic nuclear war, is common to all four. Containment requires that the United States continue to maintain its two main centers of power in Europe and Northeast Asia and to respond to threats to the US global commitments and interests. Detente involves a mutual superpower agreement not to permit ideological differences, economic rivalry and political competition to induce conflict, particularly nuclear conflict. Regionalism is based on the judgment that the United States would no longer be the dominant partner in the alliance system. In Europe and Northeast Asia, the allies, including Japan, would be expected to shoulder a greater share of the defense burden. The United States, working with regional partners, would develop an effective strategic deployability capability to exert US military influence worldwide. An isolationist strategy would center on the military defense of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. The political and economic elements of national power would grow in importance in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. Although each of the four strategic options are discussed as though it were a discrete choice, in fact, elements of each could be combined to form a new national strategy for the 1980's and beyond.

OPTIONS FOR US NATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE 1980'S AND BEYOND

A significant indication of the future path of a nation's national strategy is its traditional pursuit of its national interests. Walter Lippmann has written that:

> . . . the behavior of nations over a long period of time is the most reliable, though not the only index of their national interest. For though their interests are not eternal, they are remarkably persistent. We can most nearly judge what a nation will probably want by seeing what over a fairly long period of time it has wanted; we can most nearly predict what it will do by knowing what it has usually done . . . . Even when they adapt themselves to a new situation, their new behavior is likely to be a modification rather than a transformation of their old behavior.[1]

Most modern nations have exhibited this phenomenon. For example, the central thrust of British security policy for centuries has been to provide for the security of the home islands. To this end, Great Britain has pursued national security policies that would insure that its fleet was supreme in home waters, that no hostile power should occupy the Low Countries and that no hostile power or coalition should establish hegemony over the European continent.[2]

Examination of the broad sweep of Russian history also reveals a remarkable consistency in its pattern of lasting national interests. Tsars and Commissars alike have acted to facilitate continental expansion, to exert pressure southward and eastward in the search of warm water ports and to operationalize the belief that Russia is destined to inherit the leadership of Western civilization.[3]

The United States has passed through three periods of national strategy. The first period—isolationism—began in 1783 and lasted until the end of the 19th century, being reborn in 1919, after a short hiatus in which imperialism was in vogue, and holding sway until the eve of America's entry into World War II. The isolationist policy was guaranteed by the century-long protection of the United States by the British Fleet (just as the security of Japan today is underwritten by US military power) and by the equilibrium of power that existed in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon. A second national strategy, imperialism, was curiously superimposed over isolationism during the first two decades of the 20th century. Imperialism was popularized by the great American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who envisioned the United States taking a more active political role in world affairs. This temporary lapse in our isolationist posture impelled the United States to become a Pacific power after the Spanish-American War. After the Panama Canal established the United States as a continental and hemispheric power, the United States engaged in a series of "gunboat" interventions in the Caribbean Basin. These flirtations with imperialism were quickly subordinated to the main theme of US foreign policy—isolationism. The third policy of national strategy, begun in 1945, can be characterized as world leadership. Since then, three variations of the world leadership theme have dominated US national strategy—the geopolitical, the nuclear, and the ideological.

Geopolitically, the strategic thinking since World War II in the United States has sought to insure that no single power or combination of powers hostile to the interests of the United States could establish hegemony over either Western Europe or Northeast Asia. While reminiscent of the regional interest of the United Kingdom in the political viability of the Low Countries, the US interests are global, a fact which is apparently difficult to comprehend or to accept, particularly by our NATO allies. The strategic nuclear theme deals with the problem of deterring

strategic nuclear war. While this problem has been with us for over a generation, it is becoming more difficult to cope with as the United States has passed through successive stages of nuclear monopoly and nuclear superiority to nuclear parity and now, in the opinion of some senior military officers, to a state close to strategic nuclear inferiority. Containment, the ideological element of American postwar foreign policy, has evolved from the general containment of monolithic Communism to the more traditional approach of selectively containing the political influence of the USSR when and where it is in the US national interest to do so. This policy is euphemistically, and perhaps optimistically, referred to as managing the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower. It was manifested in the SALT negotiation and in the policy of detente. As the recent eclipse of these policies demonstrate, events color policies in different shades and while it is true that contemporary interests can change (we are now the allies of our World War II enemies), it is also true that traditional interests and strategies also change, although much more slowly.

THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

The term strategy, deriving from the ancient Greek "strategos"—the art of the general—has been obscured in a semantic fog since its revival in the 17th century. In order not to add to this confusion, it will be necessary to define somewhat precisely what is meant by the term national strategy, and to differentiate it from some allied terms such as grand strategy and national policy. To begin in reverse order, a clear differentiation between the meanings of policy and strategy has been provided by the Institute for Defense Analysis:

> Although there is often a legitimate overlap of these words . . ., the distinction between them can be retained if we keep in mind that a 'policy' is essentially a pattern (of action or decision), while a 'strategy' (i.e., any particular strategy, not strategy itself, as an art or science) is essentially a plan . . . . In other words, a policy is a rule governing action or decision; a strategy is a plan in accordance with which various means, including actions and decisions, are directed toward the achievement of objectives.[4]

Clausewitz properly understood this interrelationship of policy and strategy, wherein policy establishes the political framework within which strategy must operate. In Clausewitz's mind the

distinction was clear, strategy was an instrument that was guided, shaped, and controlled by political policy. So policy really operates on two levels—first it can designate the political objective towards which strategy is directed and secondly, it can be taken to mean a rule which governs strategic action. To amplify, armed neutrality has been a basic national objective of Switzerland for over 300 years. The Swiss have followed this objective unswervingly; they have been as scrupulous to keep out of the affairs of other states as they have been determined to resist invasion of their land. "This national objective," Herbert Rosinski pointed out, "has been supported not by a continuous National Strategic Concept but by a continuous National Military Policy: namely the famous Swiss Militia System . . . ."[5] While the national military policy has remained virtually unchanged in its general thrust since the Renaissance, the Swiss national strategy has changed at least twice since World War II, when it feared a Nazi-Italian joint aggression and today when it must fear not a North-South invasion, but one oriented on an East-West axis. This means that the old "redoubt" concept, which envisioned a resistance centered on the central Alpine Redoubt, is no longer relevant. Because of geographic considerations, the defense against the East-West threat must be broadened throughout the country and consideration must be given to the peripheral effects of a nuclear war in Europe upon the Swiss population. These considerations have led to changes in Swiss strategy but not to the Swiss Military Policy.

Grand strategy and national strategy must also be differentiated. Essentially, grand strategy implies a heavier emphasis on military force than does the concept of national strategy. The following exemplifies this notion:

> . . . 'grand strategy' has come into use to describe the overall defense plans of a nation or coalition of nations. Since the mid-twentieth century, 'national strategy' has attained wide usage, meaning the coordinated employment of the total resources of a nation to achieve its national objectives.[6]

National strategy is the art and science of employing all of the elements of national power to control areas and events to achieve national objectives. The threat or use of military force is an essential element of this concept.

THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST

As a minimum, national strategy must include a set of specific national objectives and a general strategic concept designed to achieve them. A national interest is a defense, economic, political, or ideological concern of importance to the United States. A nation will construct a national strategy to secure each of its national interests. Since it is possible for national interests to be in conflict or to compete with one another, plans to harmonize competing interests must be part of an all-inclusive national strategy, as well as policies to furnish guidelines which will enable strategists to prioritize among national interests. In this respect, it is possible to speak of national strategy and national strategies in much the same way that we speak of the foreign policy of a nation and also of its foreign policies.

The concept of national interest is a critical determinant of national strategy. The ambiguity that naturally surrounds the concept of national interest is compounded in the pluralistic society of the United States, where there is no authoritative spokesman short of the President who can articulate national interests. Once a national interest has been authoritatively expressed, there are varying degrees of intensity with which the United States might pursue it. The intensity depends upon public opinion, on congressional support or lack thereof, and on the priority assigned to the interest by the executive branch. For example, the United States might be willing to go to war to protect one national interest, while another interest might merely receive modest diplomatic attention. Although, hypothetically, we might be able to define several levels of varying intensity, which could be helpful as an analytical tool, there are no existing objective criteria, no easy test which would identify one nation rather than another, one event rather than another, or one circumstance rather than another to be in the national interest.

Nevertheless, four fundamental national interests may be identified: the survival of the United States, the preservation of the US national territory, the preservation of contemporary American values, and the maintenance or enhancement of the US standard of living.[7] The emerging strategic environment of the 1980's will pose some challenges regarding these interests.

Survival. The Soviet Union, presently and into the 1980's, will be the only nation that will possess the nuclear weapons and delivery means in sufficient quantity to destroy the United States. It may be of little solace, but it is of immense strategic importance that the USSR is similarly vulnerable to a US nuclear strike. The superpowers have attained a "balance of terror" that must be maintained as a matter of first priority. Proliferation of nuclear weapons in the waning years of the 20th century will complicate this issue.

Preservation of National Territory. It does not appear that the United States need be overly concerned regarding the preservation of its territorial integrity. The oceans that separate the United States from the Eurasian landmass, although no barrier to strategic nuclear attack, are still effective barriers to conventional invasion. So long as the United States maintains relatively strong armed forces, it need not fear for the security of its base area, although recent developments in the Caribbean must be closely monitored lest instability in that area hamper our ability to project power elsewhere in the world.

Preservation of Contemporary American Values. This is an interest that requires the lessening of tensions throughout the world, but especially with regard to superpower relationships. The United States should, so far as it is possible, influence international relations so that it will not become a beleaguered nation in a hostile world. In practical terms, this translates into a policy that will insure that no single nation or group of nations hostile to the United States can establish hegemony over Western Europe or Japan.

Maintenance or Enhancement of US Standard of Living. This national interest has two major subelements: (1) access to US trading partners and (2) access to required critical resources, especially energy. Access to the major trading partners of the United States in the Western Hemisphere is not a significant problem and access to the major markets outside of the United States is assured by maintaining the two main centers of strength in Western Europe and in Northeast Asia and insuring freedom of the seas. Since the United States is primarily a maritime and commercial nation, worldwide stability is also an important objective. Maintaining access to energy and critical resources in the Third World at reasonable cost may become more of a problem in the

closing years of the 20th century. In that eventuality, a rapid deployment force, capable of projecting its power from a secure base area, will be essential. Equally essential, however, will be the necessity to insure that these Third World ventures are not linked to superpower relations because of the dangers of escalation that that would hold.

National strategy is constructed to secure these and other more specific national interests. National values also influence the development of national strategy. These national values which impact heavily on the development of national strategy are deeply held beliefs that have evolved from historical, cultural, and psychological roots, and are, therefore, difficult to change. In practice, they normally serve to constrain or limit national strategy. For example, because the United States disavows the use of aggression to achieve political objectives, preemptive war is not a viable national strategic option. Thus, in a strategic nuclear context, since the United States will not launch a disarming first strike, then the only strategic option remaining is deterrence based on a retaliatory force structure. Moreover, any national strategy that is proposed must derive from and reflect the central values of the American people.

The manner in which the United States has pursued the perfection of its central values and the protection of its national interests has changed over the past 80 years in a way that influences the development of national strategy. In 1900, America was a young nation asserting itself on the global scene in the pursuit of its national interests and in *striving* for perfection in its society and in its relations with the rest of the world. Today, the United States is a more mature nation that is principally concerned with *maintaining* its place in a more sophisticated and complex world. The first circumstance signifies action, boldness, initiative, and opportunity; the second is characterized by the status quo, caution, response, and threat. If this is so, it is no wonder that the nature of American strategies, both national and military, are so often defensive and threat-oriented, rather than offensive and opportunity-centered. But it is not enough for a national strategy to be in harmony with the US core values; to be relevant it must also be attuned to the demands that the strategic environment make upon it.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1980'S AND BEYOND

In order to develop options for US national strategy, the strategist must make some judgments regarding the direction that current international trends will take. While some individuals have been remarkably prescient in predicting the future, institutions have fared rather badly. Generally, these institutional predictions have taken the form of "glide path," surprise-free futures—essentially a straight line projection of current trends. There is, however, an alternative approach which is gaining currency. Adherents of this methodology postulate a range of future alternative environments that focus on the future world order and which will hopefully include most of the "plausible environmental possibilities" (see Figure 1).

	Bipolar	Tripolar	Multipolar	World Order
Power Alignments	US versus USSR/PRC	US/USSR/PRC Balance	Rise of 3d Nations	Relative Stability
US International Commitments	Extensive	Limited	Selected Bilateral	Multilateral
Nuclear Proliferation	Constrained	Moderate	Accelerated	Arrested
Economic Growth	High	Moderate	Low	Moderate to High
Resource Availability	Good	Fair	Poor	Relatively Good

Figure 1. Alternative 1995 World Environments[8]

The bipolar environment is essentially a return to the Cold War of the 1950's, wherein the United States and USSR were antagonists leading two opposing blocs through a series of confrontations, perhaps intensified because of economic competition for the raw materials and energy resources of the Third World. This competition could lead to superpower conflicts in the Southern Hemisphere, either directly or through proxies. Because the threat of nuclear war would be relatively high compared to the other environments, nuclear proliferation would be constrained.

Arms limitation agreements would break down and the arms race would resume.

The tripolar environment envisions a world in which the power of the United States, USSR, and PRC are in equilibrium, which means that a rapprochement between the two Communist nations has not occurred. Economic growth would not be as high as in the bipolar world configuration, but would still be substantial. The potential of large-scale conflict between the United States and USSR would be low, but the probability of limited or low intensity conflict among other nations, perhaps involving one superpower or another (but not both) would be higher.

In the multipolar world, the leading positions of the superpowers would be challenged by the PRC, Western Europe, and Japan. Because the United States and the Soviet Union could no longer dictate policy, the developing nations of the world would gain greater relative power. The United States would be very careful and selective in its commitments and they would be bilateral rather than multilateral. The increased power of the Third World nations that control the critical raw material and energy resources needed by the industrialized nations would mean that worldwide economic growth would probably be low. Nuclear proliferation would continue with about 20 nations achieving a nuclear capability by 1995.

The fourth environment—world order—is one in which the superpowers have agreed to cooperate to "rule the world." This might be done through the United Nations, with the United States and USSR supplying the required military forces. Enforced stability would be high and nuclear proliferation would be low. Economic growth would be high and access to resources would be relatively good.

While this range of futures approach is helpful when dealing with the long-range future, the strategist must somehow cope with the more immediate strategic environment of today and tomorrow. To do this, he must begin with the major trends in the current strategic environment and make some judgments on how they will affect the midrange strategic environment.

STRATEGIC TRENDS

The United States, in the opinion of most strategic analysts, is no longer superior to the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear power. Proponents of this view are concerned that if the present adverse trends in the strategic nuclear balance continue, the United States will be in a "period of maximum peril from 1982-1987."[9] Comparisons of the strategic nuclear forces by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reveal that the Soviets lead the United States in missile throw-weight and equivalent megatons (EMT) and the trends favor the USSR in hard target kill potential. The decline in the US advantage in number of deployed warheads that leveled off in the mid-70's with the fielding of MIRV has begun again. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, evaluates the balance in these terms:

> There is no question that Soviet momentum has brought them from a position of clear inferiority to their present status of at least strategic equality with the United States and the trends for the future are adverse.[10]

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown echoed the sentiments of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said:

> In strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have come from a position of substantial numerical inferiority 15 years ago to one of parity today—and a potential for strategic advantage if we fail to respond with adequate programs of our own.[11]

Regardless of how one views the political value that may be gained from nuclear superiority, the fact remains that the Soviet Union has progressed from a position of nuclear inferiority in 1962 to one of parity.

The world environment is no longer the simple bipolar milieu of the recent past. The near institutionalization of conflict avoidance between the United States and the Soviet Union and the reduced credibility of the United States as the protector of the rights of lesser states to self-determination and national sovereignty have stimulated the need of major regional powers to assume greater responsibility in intraregional affairs. The post-World War II gravitation of medium and smaller regional states to either of the superpowers is no longer the dominant trend in national alignments. In contention with the bipolar balance, there is the con-

tinuing trend toward greater interdependence among nations, combined with a gradually developing system of regional and subregional centers of power.

Currently five countries possess a militarily significant nuclear weapons capability. These are the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France. Former Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance, in a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 March 1980, estimated that "at least a dozen more [countries] could produce a weapon within a few years of deciding to do so."

While the availability and rising cost of hydrocarbons currently hold the industrialized world's attention, access to other important nonrenewable resources could also become a problem during the next decade. The recent energy crisis has served far more than the previous oil embargo of 1973-74 to alert the Western World to the serious consequences of dependence on foreign oil. It highlights the constraints on the use of military force in assuring access to strategic resources when their denial is caused by governmental collapse, as in Iran, rather than the usually assumed denial scenario involving interdiction of chokepoints, blockades, or embargoes. Current trends portend, if anything, a worsening of the availability of foreign oil to the Western World while demands gradually increase. This trend, coupled with forecasts that the Soviet Union will soon become an oil importer, almost assures that the worldwide energy crisis and its security implications will worsen during the midrange. The availability of a large amount of Mexican oil or access to new resources could, of course, have a leavening effect on the seriousness of US energy-related problems during the next decade, but there is still no certainty as to Mexico's intentions or future production capabilities.

The reassertion of Islamic fundamentalism exemplified most recently by its contribution to the revolution in Iran, the ongoing counterrevolution in Afghanistan, and its influence in affecting certain reforms in Pakistan, is a trend which is likely to continue. The rise in Muslim influence in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia will provide a platform for criticism of government and national development. However, the Islamic "movement," while transnational, does not appear to have a coordinated international direction. Universal Islamic resistance to Marxism does serve as a powerful impediment to the spread of communism. Whether Islam can provide the basis for unified government in, for

example, Iran and eventually in Afghanistan, remains to be seen. To date, however, it has not provided an alternative to government in these countries, nor is it certain that the movement can deter political separatist sentiment.

At least into the early 1980's, Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East are likely to continue to bear the brunt of terrorist acts with business executives and influential government officials as the primary targets. High visibility bombing, arson, kidnapping, and assassination will remain the main tools of terrorists throughout most of the midrange time period. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations will remain a threat, which may become greater as more countries acquire a military nuclear capability. No precedent yet exists for the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists, but it is not likely that once acquired they would be utilized in the same fashion as traditional means. Since it is difficult to envision even subkiloton nuclear weapons being used discriminately in a noncombat environment, and assuming some discretion continues to be a basic precept of terrorist strategy, it is doubtful that terrorists could arbitrarily detonate a nuclear weapon in a populated area without estranging their cause. In a situation involving terrorist possession of a nuclear weapon, the more likely tactic would be its use as a bargaining device.

Uncertainty over the course of US-China relations, combined with the likelihood of offsetting Soviet maneuverings as a consequence of closer Sino-American ties, casts the superpower competition for influence in an increasingly complex setting. The recent record of the US-Soviet relationship shows a considerable increase in tensions, highlighted by the normalization of US relations with China, by Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa, and by the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. Nonetheless, the basic purposes of detente, as they seemingly have come to be agreed upon by both sides, continue to be fulfilled: the avoidance of direct US-Soviet conventional military conflict and ultimately of a nuclear war. Even should the United States ratify the SALT II agreement, the danger will continue to be the superpower arms race played out against the background of unrelenting competition for worldwide influence. Barring the commencement of serious negotiations in the next few years toward demilitarization of the superpower relationship, this trend will easily continue into the

1990's with negative domestic implications for both countries, not to mention the increased risks of direct US-Soviet military conflict.

Current trends suggest a number of potentially troubling developments for the United States in the future: the growth in the number of newly independent states whose leadership—as in much of the Third World—will find it impossible to maintain order because of the pressures for and of modernization; the continuing dependence of the United States and its important allies on raw materials and oil from a capricious Third World; the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as, and probably of greater short-term significance, the spread of high technology conventional weapons; and the growing strategic importance and role of the developing countries in the continuing East-West struggle for primacy. The strategic environment that these trends seem to indicate as the most likely is the multipolar—a future world that envisions five major power centers, a proliferation of nations, low economic growth and resource availability problems for the United States, and a world in which nuclear weapons have been proliferated. It is by no means inevitable that the world will develop in this way—and the United States has an opportunity now to choose a national strategy that will, in some degree, put the United States in a favorable position to cope with the serious issues that will accompany such an environment.[12]

OPTIONS FOR US NATIONAL STRATEGY

Four national strategic options, containment, detente, regionalism, and isolationism, and one element—deterrence—common to them all will be discussed. Other options certainly exist and could also be analyzed, but the four basic options above have been selected because they not only seem to be representative and viable, but have also been described rather extensively in national security literature. Each of these national strategies will be described along with some implications for national security. While the major thrust of the following discussion is on the military aspects of national strategy, it is important to also keep in mind their economic and political implications.

Containment was the national strategy pursued by the United States during most of the postwar period. It was a strategy, initially proposed by George F. Kennan in 1947, that envisioned the United

States "buying time" by resisting or containing Communist probes with counterforce, while awaiting the inherent contradictions of communism to moderate Soviet external behavior. Containment led to the establishment of a worldwide alliance and base system to confront Soviet expansionism in whatever form it took —political, economic, or military. In practice, containment requires that the United States continue to maintain its two main centers of power in Europe and Northeast Asia, and to maintain freedom of the seas so that the United States can respond to threats to its global commitments and interests. Nuclear deterrence, an element of each of the national strategy options, would be central to not only the survival of the United States, but to that of its allies as well.

Detente, currently considered to be dead by many strategic analysts, is the second national strategy option. Detente involves a mutual superpower agreement not to permit ideological differences, economic rivalry and political competition to induce conflict, particularly nuclear conflict. A major tenet is that the mutual, tacit policy of conflict avoidance that has characterized relations between the United States and the USSR for the last 35 years would continue. Other elements of the US national strategy of detente are expanded economic relations with the Soviet Union, particularly in the areas of food, energy, and technology. This expanded trade between the two countries would be accompanied by increased cultural and scientific cooperation. An important aspect of detente has been and would continue to be the control and limitation of arms. Detente requires deterrence, but deterrence with effective agreements that would establish strategic nuclear forces at minimal levels and with adequate safeguards that will insure that neither nation will circumvent the agreements by a technological advance that would invalidate the basis of deterrence—mutual assured destruction. Limits would also be sought in conventional arms, particularly in Europe, to establish and preserve a military balance. Although each country would probably retain a capability to project military power abroad, processes would be established that would serve to insure that the conflict that required intervention would be quickly localized and any tendency toward escalation controlled.

The third strategy—regionalism—is based on the judgment that the United States would no longer be the dominant power in an alliance system, but rather a "first among equals." It is not a

return to an isolationist strategy, because the United States would remain a world power and would continue to support two centers of strength—in Europe and in Northeast Asia, albeit of a different character. Deterrence would still insure the survival of the United States and its allies. In Europe and Asia, the allies would be expected to shoulder a greater share of the defense burden. In Asia, it would mean that Japan would be required to increase its defense forces to enable it to assist the United States in patrolling the sea lines of communications from Japan's territorial waters to the Straits of Malacca. In Europe, there would be no precipitous pullback of US forces, but the long-term US objective would be to reduce (not eliminate) the US military presence. The United States would also develop an effective power projection force capable of rapidly exerting US military influence around the globe.

An isolationist strategy, which is included because the United States periodically seems to find it attractive, usually after major foreign policy disappointments such as the World War I peace conference and the Vietnam War, would center on the military defense of the United States and the Western Hemisphere, and of the island fortresses off the Eurasian continent—the United Kingdom and Japan. Europe would defend its own interests not only on the continent, but in the Persian Gulf and Africa, with the possibility of the United States providing military support, not necessarily including the commitment of US military forces. The deterrence of nuclear war would be aimed not only at the USSR, but at the PRC as well because a rapprochement between the PRC and the USSR would be a precondition of the United States assuming an isolationist strategy. Under this national strategy, the economic and political aspects would gain an importance not seen in the other strategies, with the possible exception of detente. It would be vital that the United States achieve as much resource sufficiency within the Western Hemisphere as possible. It could then use its economic power to achieve its foreign policy goals. No less important would be the use of diplomatic initiatives to avoid confrontations with the Soviet Union in areas of peripheral interest to the United States where the US power could not effectively be brought to bear.

Having described the fundamental US national interests, having examined a range of plausible strategic environments, and selected one as the most likely, and having proposed four viable national

strategy options, it remains to sketch out the national strategy most relevant to achieve the US fundamental interests given the multipolar strategic environment. Although each of the four strategic options were discussed as though it were a discrete choice, in fact, elements of each can be combined to form other new strategic options.

A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE EIGHTIES

The first step in developing a national strategy is to determine the national security objectives that it must satisfy. The following list describes the conditions that must prevail during the 1980's.[13] That is, the United States should enter the 1990's:

- Without a war that resulted in strategic nuclear devastation to the United States.
- Without a tactical nuclear war.
- With the US Government still operating under the provisions of the Constitution.
- With such control over international and domestic terrorism that it is no longer a threat.
- With having solved the energy crisis so that the United States is no longer hostage to OPEC.
- With a successful international nonproliferation program.
- With access to foreign markets that permits industry, commerce, and agriculture to provide a reasonable standard of living for American citizens.
- With the continuation of current alliances, at minimum the NATO Alliance; continued cooperation with Japan; improved ties and expanded trade with China; hemispheric solidarity brought about by improved relations with South and Central America; improved relations with the Third World with special emphasis on the Western Hemisphere.
- With the elimination of Cuba's interference in international affairs of other nations by use of surrogate forces.
- With improved relations with USSR including a much reduced deployment of strategic nuclear weapons by both superpowers.
- With improvements in the solution of such domestic problems as inflation, crime, and drug abuse, that affect the quality of life and confidence of people in government.

• With the recognition that the ultimate objective in correcting internal problems is development of an educated electorate with an informed public opinion that permits strong national leaders to exercise the full range of national capabilities—economic, industrial, agricultural, communications-ideological, and military—to achieve the national security conditions stated above.

These may not be the best national security aims or objectives; individuals or groups can prepare their own outline. For the nation they should be spelled out by the President so that the people, the Congress, and the agencies of government know what they are. An outline, with realistic objectives spelled out in enough detail to guide national agencies in developing capabilities to achieve objectives believed to be in the national interest, is essential as a guide to action. The nation has been so divided and power so diffused for the past 15 years that a coherent and consistent national strategy has been impossible to achieve.

The United States, then, is faced with a decade of challenges posed by a strategic environment that is more complex and perhaps more dangerous than any that it has faced in the past. Problems in the emerging nations of the Southern Hemisphere and the Pacific are competing for attention, but US strategists cannot ignore the demands of nuclear deterrence or US interests in Europe. In the multipolar future world, US national strategy must continue to emphasize nuclear deterrence based on assured destruction not only directed at the Soviet Union, but also at the other nations that might achieve a nuclear capability during the midrange. Essential equivalence with the Soviet Union would continue to be an important element of nuclear deterrence that would enable the United States to pursue its economic and diplomatic policies in the Third World from a position of recognized strength. The use of economic power to influence political events throughout the world would be a major element of US national strategy in a multipolar world, perhaps even overshadowing military power. Because of the power and economic rivalry that would radiate from the other power centers, the United States would be required to control external trade and investments to a greater degree than in the past in order to insure that economic policies were integrated with and enhanced other diplomatic efforts. Even in this much more competitive world, the United States need not fear conventional invasion, but relations with Japan and Western Europe might be strained.

Certainly, collective defense would be much different in an environment in which the United States was no longer looked upon as the unquestioned leader of an alliance. Regardless, however, the United States would continue to adhere to close ties with the democratic nations of Europe and Asia as a means to secure the protection of its own national values. While relations with the four world power centers would take on certain aspects of detente, the United States would pursue regionalism in the selected areas of the Third World that are vital to the maintenance of the well-being of its citizens. This regionalism would be buttressed by contingency forces that would be able to quickly reinforce the selective, bilateral regional partners of the United States.

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13. This list provided by LTG Arthur Collins (Ret).

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This memorandum examines the interrelationships among the evolving strategic environment, US national interests and national strategy. The author considers the concept of national strategy by placing the current national strategy in historical perspective and examines the differences between strategy and policy In order to develop strategic options, the four fundamental elements of US national interest -- survival, preservation of national territory, preservation of contemporary American values and maintenance or enhancement of the US standard of living are employed in the context of the emerging global strategic

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situation. Next, four national strategic options are developed and one element, deterrence, common to them all, is discussed. The author concludes that the dynamic nature of the future world environment will require flexibility and perhaps a synthesis of the four basic options examined.