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RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT FY75/1
1 Jul 74- 30 Sep 74

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
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⑥ Defense Attaché Saigon: RYNAF
Quarterly Assessment, 1st Quarter
FY 75.

⑨ DAO QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT
Rept. for 1 Jul - 30 Sep 74.

⑩ H. D./Smeln ⁷⁶⁹
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⑪ 1 Nov 74

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
FPO San Francisco 96620

AOSOP-OR

1 November 1974

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal -- RVNAF Quarterly Assessment

Commander
U.S. Support Activities Group
Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB
Thailand

The attached assessment is forwarded in compliance with JGS Secret message, 072105Z March 1973, subject: Continuing SEA Reports (U).

1 Incl
as

Maximilian Lamont
MAXIMILIAN LAMONT
Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

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FOREWORD

This will be my first quarterly assessment and of a quarter which had already run two of its three months before I arrived on the ground. It was a quarter of constantly changing programs all designed to meet constantly changing funding constraints. While the ARVN, VNAF, VNN and VNMC elements were continuing to defend the country against intensified efforts on the part of the NVA/VC, their commanders in Saigon, in concert with personnel of the DAO, were engaged in re-examining priorities, force structures and the overall logistical support posture in order to determine how best to assimilate the significantly reduced military assistance program.

The deck was shuffled and dealt many times before the final hands were decided upon. By far the largest slice went to the ARVN -- the defenders on the ground. Ammunition and POL immediately claimed the lion's share. The VNAF received the next larger part of the pie and after partially digesting it found that they could no longer support their entire force. Ten squadrons were set aside. Contractor assistance was drastically reduced. Flying hours were cut by more than half. The VNN fared little better. While their internal rearrangement is still the subject of internal examination, the facts are evident. The Riverine Fleet will of necessity have to be reduced. The same is true for the Blue Water Fleet. Support bases are being reduced in number. No end item replacement for the entire RVNAF is the name of the game because resources simply will not support end item replacement.

During the short time I have been here, I have learned to admire and respect the military leadership involved. Never before have I seen people more willing to do what is necessary to reduce costs, reduce consumption and to live with what is available. Directives have gone out detailing the whys and wherefores of ammunition expenditure control, POL usage control and the control of everything else for which U.S. dollars are spent. And at the same time commanders have been told to continue their mission of defeating the enemy in battle. The results speak for themselves. They haven't been bested yet. Of necessity they have given up outposts which they might have held on to had the resources necessary for a sustained fight been available.

At what price has the above been accomplished? During the quarter we have seen some evidences of deteriorating morale but no significantly reduced operational readiness. Stockpiles were eroded some-

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
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what. Field expedients were resorted to. The effort to live with the reduced program is being made. We won't know the price until more time passes.



H. D. SMITH
Major General, USA
Defense Attache

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INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Anti-Aircraft
AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAD	ARVN Associated Depot
AB	Air Base
ABF	Attack(s) by Fire
AB&T	Alaska Barge & Transport, Inc.
ACC	Army Calibration Center
AC&W	Aircraft Control & Warning
ACFT-A/C	Aircraft
ACI	Analytical Critical Inspection
ACS	Armored Cavalry Squadron
AD	Air Defense
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADM	Administration
AF	Air Force
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AG	Adjutant General
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AIM	Air Intercept Missile
AIMI	Aviation Intensely Managed Item
ALC	Area Logistics Command
AMC/PAC	Army Material Command/Pacific Area Command

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AMSF-V	Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Saigon
AO	Area of Operations
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AOSAF	DAO Air Force Division
APC	Aerial Photo Center
ASC	Army Supply Center
ASGN	Assigned
ASL	Authorized Stockage Level
AT	Anti-tank
ATC	Air Training Center
ATLC	Air Technical Logistics Command
AUTH	Authorized
AVGAS	Aviation Gasoline
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
BBL	Barrels
BCE	Base Civil Engineering
BCM	Bulk Construction Materiel
BII	Basic Issue Item
BNH	Bien Hoa
BOA	Basic Ordering Agreement
BOH	Balance on Hand
BOM	Bill of Materiel
BS	Bachelor of Science
CALTEX	California Texas Oil Company
CBD	Crash/Battle Damage

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CD&LD	Community Development & Local Development
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CE	Civil Engineering
CEM	Communications Electronic Meteorological
CEN	Center
CETS	Contractor Engineering & Technical Service
CEIMP	Communications Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan
CG	Commanding General
CHD	Cablehead
CIC	Corps Interrogation Center
CINCPAC	Commander In Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT	Commander In Chief, Pacific Fleet
CLC	Central Logistics Command
CMA	Communications Management Agency
CMD	Capital Military District
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
CONST	Construction
CONUS	Continental United States
COMD	Command
COSVN	Central Office of South Vietnam
CP	Command Post
C&P	Care and Preservation
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRDC	Central Reconstruction & Development Council

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CRIP	Coastal Radar Improvement Plan
CSAF	Chief of Staff, Air Force
CSC	Computer Science Corporation
CS/JCS	Chief of Staff, Joint General Staff
CTC	Central Training Command
CTD	Central Telecommunications Directorate
CTEA	Combined Telecommunication Engineering Agency
CY	Calendar Year
DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DC	Damage Control
DCA	Directorate, Civil Aviation
DCA/SAM	Defense Communications Agency/Southeast Asia Mainland
DC/LOW	Frequencies Below
DF	Direction Finding
DGSC	Defense General Supply Center
DIFM	Due In for Maintenance
DIRCON	Director of Construction
DLILTD	Defense Language Institute, Language Training Detachment
DLI	Defense Language Institute

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DLIELB	Defense Language Institute English Language Branch
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DODAC	Department of Defense Ammunition Code
DOI	Director of Intelligence
DSG	Direct Support Group
DSU	Direct Support Unit
DTC	Division Training Center
DTE	Dial Telephone Exchange
DTG	Date Time Group
DYNALECTRON	Dynalectron, Inc
EBD	Engineer Base Depot
ECCOI	Eastern Construction Company International
ECL	English Comprehension Level
EIUI	End Item Use Inspection
ELTP	English Language Training Program
EM	Enlisted Man
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAST	Field Assistance Support Teams
FEC	Federal Electric Corporation
FM/TM	Field Manuals/Technical Manuals
FOD	Foreign Object Damage
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSN	Federal Stock Number

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FTD	Field Training Detachment
FTG	Fleet Training Group
FTR	Fighter
FY	Fiscal Year
FWMF	Free World Military Forces
GCI	Ground Control Intercept
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
HJMA	Highland Junior Military Academy
HQS	Headquarters
HUGHES	Hughes Aircraft, Inc.
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IBM	International Business Machines
ICP	In Country Procurement Program
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
IP	Inside Plant
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
ISB	Intermediate Support Base
JEIM	Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance
JEC	Joint Eradication Committee
JGS	Joint General Staff

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JGS/IG	Joint General Staff/Inspector General
JMA	Junior Military Academy
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
KIA	Killed in Action
LOC	Line (s) of Communication
LN	Local National
LOG	Logistics
LOX	Liquid Oxygen
LSB	Logistics Support Base/Branch
LSI	Lear Siegler, Inc.
LTD	Language Training Detachment
LTG	Lieutenant General
LTL	Interprovincial Road
LVT	Landing Vehicle Tracked
LVTP	Landing Vehicle Tracked Personnel
LZ	Landing Zone
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MBBLS	Thousand Barrels
MED	Materiel Exploitation Division
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MHE	Materiel Handling Equipment
MIA	Missing in Action
MILCON	Military Construction

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MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation Movement Procedure
MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisitioning and Issues Procedure
MMC	Medium Maintenance Center/Material
MOGAS	Motor Gas
MOI	Method of Instruction
MOND	Ministry of National Defense
MOTU	Mobile Ordnance Training Unit
MP	Military Police
MPCO	Military Property and Construction Office
MR	Military Region
MRMC	Maintenance Repair & Minor Construction Program
MRO	Materiel Release Order
MRTT	Military Region Tri-Thien
MSC	Military Sealift Command/Minesweeper Coastal
MSS	Military Security Service
MT	Metric Ton/Measurement Ton
MTC	Marine Training Center
MTN-V	Military Telecommunication Network Vietnam
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MWV	Ministry of War Veterans
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVILCO	Navy International Logistics Control Office
NC	Not Carried
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer

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NCOIC	Non-Commissioned Officer-In-Charge
NCR	National Cash Register
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NHA	Nha Trang
NIS	Not In Stock
NMMA	National Materiel Management Agency
NORM	Not Operational Ready-Maintenance
NORS	Not Operational Ready-Supply
NRTS	Not Repairable This Station
NSN	National Stock Number
NTC	National Training Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVAF	North Vietnamese Air Force
NVN	North Vietnam
OB	Order of Battle
OCE	Office of Civil Engineer
OIC	Officer-In-Charge
OJT	On-The-Job Training
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OMA	Operations/Maintenance Army
OPCON	Operational Condition
OR	Operational Ready
OST	Order and Shipping Time
(P)	Province
PACAC	Pacific Air Command

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PA&E	Pacific Architect & Engineering, Inc.
PAGE	Page Communication Engineering, Inc.
PDM	Programmed Depot Maintenance
PF	Popular Force
PHOTINT	Photo Intelligence
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PMEL	Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory
PMP	Performance Monitoring Program
PMS	Planned Maintenance System
POI	Program of Instruction
POL	Petroleum Oil and Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum
POW	Prisoner of War
PRC	Portable Radio Communications/Peoples Republic of China
PRE-IRAN	Preliminary Inspect and Repair as Necessary
PSDF	People's Self Defense Force
QA	Quality Assurance
QL	National Road
RAMMS	Republic of Vietnam Automated Material Management System
RB	Refuel Barge
RECCE	Reconnaissance
REDCON	Readiness Condition

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RF	Regional Forces
RF/PF	Regional Forces/Popular Forces
R&I	Recruiting and Induction
RPC	Reparable Processing Center
R&R	Repair & Return
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
RVNAFLS	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SAS	Stability Augmentation System
SATP	Security Assistance Training Program
SBD	Signal Base Depot
SCARWAF	Special Category Army with Air Force
SCD	Special Collection Department
SEA-ATS	South East Asia Automatic Telephone System
SEAS	South East Asia Services
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIMS	Single Integrated Military System
SLSC	Sector Logistics Support Center
SMO	Supply Management Office
SNUD	Stock Number User Directive
SOC	Special Operations Center
SOI	Standard Operating Instructions

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STCAN	From (French Designed River Patrol Craft)
STCP	Sector Tactical Command Post
STS	Specialty Training Standards
SVN	South Vietnam
TA	Table of Allowance
TACAIR	Tactical Air Support
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TAT	Technical Assistance Team
TCG	Technical Control Group
TCMD	Transportation Control & Movement Document
TCN	Third Country National
TDY	Temporary Duty
TF	Territorial Forces
THAI AM	Thai American
TI	Province Road
TM	Technical Manual
TMDE	Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment
TME	Test and Measurement Equipment
TMS	Training Management Center
TNG	Training
T/O	Task Organization
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOW	Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided Missile

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TROPO	Tropospheric-Scatter
TSC	Tandem Switching Center
TSN	Tan Son Nhut
TTB	Technical Translation Branch
TWV	Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
UHT	Undergraduate Helicopter Training
UPT	Undergraduate Pilot Training
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAILC	United States Army International Logistical Center
USCDA	United States Army Catalog Data Agency
USG	United States Government
USN	United States Navy
VAA	Vietnamese Army Arsenal
VARs	Visual Air Reconnaissance Search
VC	Viet Cong
VDA	Vietnam Dredging Agency
VDP	Vehicle Deadlined, Parts
VINNELL	Vinnell Corp, Inc
VIP	Very Important Person
VN	Vietnam
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNAF-LS	Vietnamese Air Force Language School
VNMA	Vietnamese Military Academy

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VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNA	Vietnamese Naval Academy
VNNDPC	Vietnamese Navy Data Processing Center
VNNLSC	Vietnamese Navy Logistic Support Center
VNNSC	Vietnamese Navy Supply Center
VNSY	Vietnamese Navy Ship Yard
WIA	Wounded in Action
WPAFB	Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

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CHAPTER 1

THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. (S) NORTH VIETNAM:

a. During the first six months of 1974, North Vietnamese imports exceeded by approximately 28 per cent the level noted during the same period in 1973: 1,746,000 metric tons (MT) in 1974 versus 1,263,000 MT in 1973. Imports this year will certainly top the all-time high of 2,700,000 MT recorded last year. Additionally, the normalization of shipping operations at Haiphong has resulted in increased seaborne vice overland delivery. Overland routes were extensively used during the period Hanoi's ports were interdicted. Imports are expected to continue at a high level for the remainder of the year.

b. Hanoi's needs, especially in long-term reconstruction and development requirements, are considerable. Despite record aid levels since the Ceasefire, Hanoi still needs long-term commitments of aid and technical assistance. Le Thanh Nghi's July discussions with Chinese, Soviet, and East European officials were aimed at assuring continued economic, scientific, and technical assistance from these countries, especially in regard to Hanoi's long-term development plans. The overall effect of Nghi's trip is unknown, but if Hanoi is seriously attempting to follow a five-year domestic development program, outside technical advice and guidance is a necessity.

c. During August, Hanoi expressed the debilitating effect that Congressional cuts of U.S. military aid to South Vietnam would have:

"At present, there is no 'wonder drug' that can be used to help Ford exercise influence over South Vietnam situation, which is unfavorable to the United States." - Radio Hanoi, 23 August 1974.

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d. Meanwhile, Hanoi's news media produced some unflattering assessments of ARVN's capabilities:

"The Puppet Army has shown that its capability has been weakened in regard to concentrating its mobile forces and firepower. Its forces have been scattered and have revealed many deficiencies. A number of its strong positions have been eliminated and it has been forced to withdraw. Its occupation force has also been subjected to pressure in many areas. A new situation has developed: The Puppet Army has reduced its large-scale operations while abandoning many isolated positions, shrinking back in an attempt to avoid losses and reorganize its defense system. It is certain that it cannot overcome the acute contradictions between the dispersion and concentration of troops and between the protection of land and the preservation of its numerical strength." - Nhan Dan, 29 Aug 74.

e. In general, Hanoi's propaganda has taken a more belligerent tone since the change in the U.S. Presidency. Hanoi reacted sharply to President Ford's vow to continue his predecessor's foreign policies and has strongly suggested that U.S. domestic problems and the situation that now exists in South Vietnam have tipped the balance in the Communists' favor. For the first time since the ceasefire, Hanoi has called upon the South Vietnamese people to remove President Thieu.

f. Although the propaganda line that the southern population opposes the Thieu Government has been used prior to major offensives, its appearance at this time does not seem to portend a similar event in the near future. The new theme comes at a time of increased battlefield activity and may be designed to encourage Communist military forces to exploit the uncertainties facing the Thieu Administration. It could also serve as a basis for justifying future increases in military activity.

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g. Hanoi has also questioned the support of its two major allies. A 16 August article in the Army newspaper used the writings of Lenin, Marx and Stalin to justify Hanoi's "revolutionary war" as necessary to counter U.S. aggression in Vietnam:

"Our people have used a revolutionary war to counter the imperialist's war of aggression. Our national liberation is very just."

h. The anonymous author stressed that the Vietnam war does not endanger world peace (i.e., detente):

"Vietnam's great resistance against the U.S. imperialist aggressor's biggest local war -- a resistance that has achieved great victory -- is a striking reality testifying to the possibility of successfully and vigorously advancing the revolution while successfully protecting world peace."

i. He also emphasized that Hanoi's allies are duty bound to support the conflict.

j. The article implicitly criticized the USSR and China, apparently for their efforts to restrain the North Vietnamese. The article's appearance in the Army newspaper does not indicate that the author's view is final or authoritative; nor does it signify an official strain in diplomatic relations. It seems, however, to be a justification for increased military activity in the South and may be intended to indicate that Hanoi will fight the war on its own terms.

k. Hanoi's media continued through September the hardened propaganda line mounted in mid-August following President Ford's assertion that the United States' Vietnam policy would not change. Reference to an urban struggle "to topple" the Thieu Government, noted for the first time since the Ceasefire on 15 August, was carried forward:

"The contradictions between the southern people ...and the Thieu clique have become very acute and are of an explosive character. The time has come for the compatriots...to realize clearly that if Thieu is not toppled, there will be no peace, no national concord." - Nhan Dan, 14 September 1974

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1. This theme was taken a step further by liberation radio in a rare appeal to ARVN officers to take part in the overthrow of their Government:

"Toppling Thieu and compelling the U.S. to end its involvement in SVN...are the tactful and correct lines of action and a path that you, well-informed officers in the Saigon Army, are advised to follow in order to cope with the present situation." - Liberation Radio, 19 Sep 74.

m. Hanoi also suggested that Washington's political support for Thieu is waning:

"The new U.S. rulers, stubbornly continuing to pursue the Nixon Doctrine, are still using Thieu as a tool to continue the Vietnamized war policy and repress all opposition forces while preparing conditions for changing horses when compelling circumstances arise." - Nhan Dan, 14 Sep 74.

n. In the meantime, Hanoi claimed that U.S. authorities are trying to make cosmetic improvements designed to gain additional aid for the Thieu administration:

"...They want to pull Thieu out of his isolated position and force him to display good will for peace and democracy and cleanse his administration, with a view to deceiving the U.S. Congress and public opinion and having a pretext to implement the plan for increasing aid to Thieu." - Nhan Dan, 14 Sep 74.

o. A shift to hardline propaganda has preceded previous major Communist offensives. The generally aggressive tone of the present campaign, however, seems designed to bolster morale and motivation among troops and cadre, exhorting them to take advantage of what Hanoi perceives as "new opportunities" created by the uncertainties facing the Thieu administration, i.e., the transition of power in Washington, U.S. and SVN domestic economic problems, Congressional cuts of military aid, and recent internal SVN expressions of discontent.

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p. Furthermore, Premier Pham Van Dong's 1 September DRV National Day Address was rather subdued in regard to Communist intentions in the South. The Premier concentrated on accomplishments in the North since the ceasefire and reasserted Hanoi's commitment to "strictly respect and seriously implement" the Paris Agreement. In a key passage, Dong listed these tasks for the future:

"We must devote all our strength to restoring and developing our economy and developing culture (and) stabilize and gradually improve our people's life." - Hanoi Radio, 2 Sep 72.

q. He consistently referred to the war in the past tense and tied the North's military potential to defense of the homeland:

"We must remain highly vigilant, constantly strengthening our national defense potential and standing ready to smash all provocative acts of the enemy against the DRV." - Hanoi Radio, 1 Sep 74.

r. In short, Dong seemed to disallow any major near-term change in Hanoi's current pursuit of a balanced military-political policy to achieve its objectives in the South. In concluding his speech, however, the Premier called on Party cadre to "achieve unanimity of views and unity of actions." This unusual plea, along with the variance between the media's on-going hardline propaganda and the softened tone of Dong's speech, suggests some disunity among the Party leadership.

2. (S) INFILTRATION:

a. Personnel infiltration in RVN during the quarter was at a seasonal low level. Since mid-April, all combat replacement groups have been dispatched to the northern areas of SVN. However, the NVA's total effort so far this year (over 87,000) has been surpassed only by those of 1968, 1969 and 1972. Significantly, since the Ceasefire, the NVA has deployed over 160,000 replacements. Added to this build-up are some 20,000 men who entered South Vietnam in air defense units and an estimated 30,000 men in rear service forces.

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INFILTRATION 1973	75,200
INFILTRATION 1974	87,200
AIR DEFENSE	20,000
REAR SERVICES	30,000
TOTAL	212,400

All are considered capable of engaging in combat operations.

b. The NVA's manpower base can replace losses, such as those suffered in 1968 and 1972, indefinitely. Out of a population base of 23-24 million, there are 4.2 to 4.5 million males between 15 and 49 years of age. Some 200,000-250,000 males reach draft age each year. The NVA, with a yearly minimum training capacity (based on 3 month training cycle) of 168,000 personnel, has the capacity to train the 130,000-140,000 males reaching draft age who are fit for military service each year.

3. (S) LOGISTICS:

a. During July -- the dry season in MR-1 and eastern MR-2 -- the NVA mounted the largest resupply effort ever noted in South Vietnam. Photo readouts of the Route 9/Route 14 complex reflect this large-scale logistics effort. Photos of 23 and 24 July revealed 406 trucks on the Route 14 complex. On 29 July, VNAF reported 50 trucks destroyed in the Quang Nam/Quang Tin area.

b. To streamline its logistics and expedite the flow to the South, the NVA is building dual-lane bridges in northern Quang Tri Province. One is over the Ben Hai River in the DMZ. When completed, it will eliminate the last major bottle neck between the DMZ and Dong Ha. Three other bridges have been built between the Ben Hai River and Dong Ha.

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c. An ARVN long-range recon patrol obtained new information on the POL pipeline system. On 9 July, the team photographed and measured a section in the tri-border area of Kontum. The pipe had Chinese markings and was 8 inches in diameter. Previously, the entire pipeline system was believed to be Soviet 4-inch pipe, except for a short, dual, 10-inch section east of Hanoi. The NVA is continuing to extend the pipeline. It has apparently been extended 65 miles south of its previous known terminus in Pleiku Province. An unconfirmed agent report indicates that it has already reached Binh Long Province.

d. The current storage capacities of the major NVA POL storage facilities in RVN and Southern Laos are:

Country	Metric Tons	Barrels	Gallons
RVN	2,820	21,150	888,300
Laos	1,774	13,305	558,810

e. During August, preparations for use of the road through Southern Laos during the upcoming dry season were noted. By late October the road will provide the 300 mile link between NVN and Southern SVN. As the South Laos Road becomes usable, the northern portion of Rte 14 will fall under the influence of the rains of the northeast monsoon.

f. The NVA has begun to strengthen MR 559 rear service units. These rear service units are upgrading the system's capability to support a sustained, high volume, dry-season infiltration and logistics effort. Heavy road building equipment -- road graders, road rollers and rock crushers -- is being sent by sea to Dong Ha, along with pipeline sections, cement and other construction material. Meanwhile, food, supplies, and ammunition are being repositioned.

g. The NVA has continued to ship munitions into RVN. It is estimated that some 46,000 tons of ammunition were stockpiled throughout the South by the end of August.

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4. (S) NVN COMBAT STRENGTH:

a. The DRV continues to maintain a strategic reserve of six infantry divisions in addition to the 968th Division (minus one regiment) in South Laos:

Division	Deployment Strength	Location
308	8,500	Hanoi area
308B	8,500	NW of Hanoi
312	8,500	Thanh Hoa
316	8,500	Upper Panhandle
320B	8,500	Thanh Hoa
341	8,500	Lower Panhandle
Total	51,000	

b. Should Hanoi decide to escalate the conflict in the South significantly, several reserve divisions would be committed, probably those subordinate to First Corps -- the 308th, 312th and 320B -- which have previously operated in MR-1.

c. The Communists could commit their reserve in record time. The following shows the days required for the divisions to deploy to various areas. The estimate is based on movement time plus four days for the units to engage.

Division	MR-1	MR-2	MR-3
341	2	0	0
308	10	16	27
308B	10	16	27
312	9	15	26
320B	9	15	26

* 341st Division is currently deployed in extreme southern NVN and could be committed immediately to combat in MR-1.

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d. The North Vietnamese have a small naval combatant force which constitutes a limited threat. The naval order of battle consists of approximately 40 small combatant vessels (SCV's):

- 2 submarine chasers
- 30 motor gunboats (PGM)
- 6 torpedo boats (PT)
- 3 KOMAR Class small guided missiles boats (PTG)

e. The most formidable threat is the KOMAR Class boats armed with STYX cruise missiles. The maximum range of the STYX, which carries an 840 pound high explosive warhead, is 22 NM. The KOMARs are based at the Ha T'ou Naval Anchorage and are not known to have operated outside the Haiphong area.

f. The most significant air defense development during the quarter was the expansion of SAM defenses to cover all of Quang Tri Province. Two new sites in the Cam Lo area provide defense for the Cam Lo/Dong Ha logistics and settlement areas.

g. The NVA's Air Defense Order of Battle:

	North Vietnam North Region	North Vietnam Panhandle	South Vietnam
Divisions	2	2	2
Regiments (SAM)	9	4	1
Regiments (Air Defense)	9	21	28
Guns	540	1,260	1,620

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5. (S) MILITARY REGION SUMMARIES:

a. MR-1:

(1) Communist activity in MR-1 during the quarter was at its highest level since the Ceasefire, as VC/NVA forces launched major attacks in Quang Nam and Thua Thien Provinces. Sporadic fighting also occurred along RVNAF forward defense lines in the North while local forces maintained a high level of harassing actions against GVN pacification and resettlement areas in the southern provinces. The district towns of Thuong Duc in Quang Nam Province and Minh Long in Quang Ngai Province, as well as the isolated outpost of Gia Vuc fell under Communist control.

(2) Quang Nam Province received the brunt of Communist action over most of the quarter. In the initial attacks beginning on 18 July, NVA 2nd Division Forces overran the ARVN outpost at Da Trach, decimating the defending 78th Ranger Battalion and the 3rd Battalion/56th Regiment, which was in the process of relieving the Rangers. Major action then shifted to the north in the vicinity of Duc Duc District Town, as ARVN 3rd Division forces deployed forward to counter the Communist attacks. On 29 July, NVA forces, subsequently identified as the 29th Regiment/324B Division, began massive shellings of Thuong Duc District Town followed by ground attacks which resulted in the fall of the town on 7 August. NVA forces in the area then deployed northeast and successfully countered 1st Airborne Division efforts to move back to Thuong Duc for the remainder of the quarter. Following the fall of Thuong Duc, NVA forces generally refrained from major ground attacks, except for sporadic actions northeast of Thuong Duc and in the vicinity of Duc Duc. The major assaults on Thuong Duc and Duc Duc were accompanied by numerous VC/NVA local force unit attacks throughout the lowland districts and periodic shellings of Danang Airfield. Both sides took heavy losses in fighting which netted relatively insignificant gains for the Communists. The major impact of the fighting was the virtual destruction of GVN security in the lowlands.

(3) Over the course of the quarter, the NVA deployed the 29th Regiment/324B Division; the 24th and 66th Regiments, plus elements of the 68th Artillery Regiment

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of the 304th Division; two new regiments, the 36th and 41st; and the 591st AAA Regiment to Quang Nam Province to support the NVA 2nd Division and Front 4 local forces. The threat posed by these forces necessitated a similar commitment of RVNAF forces from vulnerable areas to the north, as well as to the south in Quang Ngai Province, apparently a principal Communist objective. There were also indications that a new military control entity, the NVA 3rd Corps, was being established to exercise command and control over Communist forces in southern MR-1.

(4) In late August, VC/NVA forces in southern Thua Thien Province exploited weakened RVNAF defenses by re-asserting control over the commanding terrain overlooking the lowlands in Phu Loc District. The 803rd and 812th Regiments of the 324B Division moved forward to support the 5th and 6th Regiments in heavy attacks that inflicted significant casualties on the ARVN 1st Division. Communist efforts to advance into the lowlands near Phu Loc District Town were blunted, however, and by mid September the situation had stabilized, although activity continued around Mo Tau Mountain northwest of Phu Loc. Similar VC/NVA efforts to overrun RVNAF positions west and northwest of Hue and in Quang Tri Province netted only minor Communist gains.

(5) Elsewhere in the region, Communist local forces exploited weakened RVNAF defenses in Quang Ngai Province through continuous attacks on demoralized and ineffective territorial forces. The cumulative impact of the attacks was to produce a serious decline in security throughout the Province, particularly in the Batangan Peninsula area and in Mo Duc and Duc Pho Districts to the south. Additionally, NVA 52nd Brigade elements overran the isolated district town of Minh Long on 17 August and maintained continuous pressure on Nghia Hanh District Town to the north for the duration of the quarter. Probable elements of the 52nd Brigade which reportedly was being upgraded to Division status also overran the isolated GVN outpost at Gia Vuc in southwestern Quang Ngai on 21 September and pressure against similarly isolated outposts at Tra Bong and Son Ha increased.

(6) In Quang Tin Province local forces stepped up pressure against outposts at Hau Duc and Tien Phuoc in September amid reports that 2nd NVA Division units would also deploy to the area for eventual attacks.

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(7) Overall, RVNAF denied Communists major military victories that would have imperiled critical objectives. However, the Communists realized some important gains in outlying areas, making defense of those critical objectives more difficult in the future, and achieved considerable success in one of their basic objectives of attriting RVNAF.

(8) The Communist order of battle in MR-1 is as follows:

DIVISIONS	4 (+1 AD)
BRIGADES	1
REGIMENTS	31 (+21 AD)
COMBAT STRENGTH	95-105,000
ARTILLERY	260-290
ARMOR	350-400

b. MR-2:

(1) In MR-2, Communist activity during July and August was characterized by limited attacks in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Pleiku Provinces. During September, activity was at a low level throughout the Region, as Communist units pulled back to rear areas to refit and began to redeploy into forward pre-attack positions.

(2) In Binh Dinh and Northern Phu Yen Provinces, NVA/VC forces continued the MR-5 summer campaign. The first phase was conducted from mid-May through June. Through most of July, Binh Dinh Province unit forces maintained pressure on RVNAF along QL-1, while 3rd NVA Division elements attempted to refit in rear areas and counter RVNAF harassment of their supply lines. Communist local forces in Phu Yen were completely ineffective in opposing GVN territorial force intrusion into Base Area 236. In late July, 3rd Division forces were re-committed and provincial unit forces struck with new intensity in Phu My and Phu Cat Districts.

(3) The second phase of the Communist summer campaign resulted in higher activity levels throughout Binh Dinh and northern Phu Yen Provinces through early August, as 3rd NVA Division and Binh Dinh and Phu Yen

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Provincial Unit forces attempted to gain control of GVN population centers. Communist forces temporarily occupied major portions of Phu My District. By mid-month, however, the RVNAF counter-offensive had alleviated the primary threat in Phu My and Phu Cat Districts. In an attempt to preempt the planned third phase, the 22nd ARVN Division and associated territorial forces and Rangers conducted probes into the Kim Son and southern An Lao Valleys to interdict Communist supply routes and attrite their forces. By the end of the month, the Communists were on the defensive with the 141st Regiment/3rd Division blocking approaches to the southern An Lao Valley, and the 2nd Regiment/3rd Division defending against probes toward the Kim Son Valley. Heavy casualties in the NVA 2nd Regiment necessitated reinforcement by two battalions of the 12th Regiment/3rd Division, while the remainder of the 12th Regiment held eastern Phu My District. Binh Dinh Provincial Units abandoned positions threatening De Gi Port at mid-month to conduct forays against GVN population centers in the Go Boi area, but returned later to the Phu My/Phu Cat District border area. GVN sources assessed the end of month situation as favoring government forces and improving, with significant casualties having been inflicted upon major Communist units, particularly the 2nd Regiment.

(4) Initiation of the third phase of the Communist summer campaign in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces was expected, but Communist activity remained relatively low in both scope and intensity. In Binh Dinh, the 2nd and 12th Regiments were rebuilding in rear base areas while the 141st Regiment continued to defend the approaches to the lower An Lao Valley against limited RVNAF probes. RVNAF resecured a series of strategic villages on the Phu My/Phu Cat District border and cleared the De Gi Plains which had been held by Binh Dinh Province Unit forces since late May. BG Niem, the 22nd ARVN Division Commander, estimates that the 3rd NVA Division has the capability to conduct only limited attacks against selected objectives for the remainder of the year. Continued development of LOCs and logistics complexes, however, will enable the Communists to conduct major combined arms operations in early 1975. In Phu Yen, local forces apparently abandoned plans for third phase attacks on GVN population centers and LOCs in the northern districts and concentrated on seasonal rice acquisition activities in southern districts.

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(5) In Pleiku Province, the 48th Regt/320th Div, supported in later phases by elements of the 64th Regt, conducted continuous attacks against Plei Me Outpost from 26 July through 31 August. ARVN Rangers, supported eventually by the 53rd ARVN Regt, conducted a successful defense against ground attacks, while VNAF inflicted heavy casualties with close ground support. The 48th Regiment quickly refitted and was re-targetted against Thanh An District Town. By the end of September, all major units, supported by artillery, were committed. The 9th and 26th Regiments were probing forward RVNAF positions along Rte 509 West of Pleiku City, while 48th and 64th Regiment elements were in the Thanh An area.

(6) The remainder of the region experienced only sporadic activity. In Kontum Province, Communist activity increased briefly in mid-July in the form of major ABF's north and northeast of Kontum City, followed by ground attacks in the vicinity of OP-4 and OP-5 by 10th NVA Division elements designed to eject RVNAF from positions dominating the NVA's Route 715. Kontum Province unit forces overran the isolated GVN outpost of Mang Buk on 20 August. Subsequently, in late September, 28th Regiment elements prepared to attack the Chuong Nghia outpost. In Darlac Province, Communist forces harassed LOC's throughout the period. In mid-July, the 25th Regiment/B-3 Front reacted sharply to GVN attempts to attack Communist resettlement sites south of Base Area 238. In Quang Duc Province, 271st NVA Regiment elements refitted and conducted harassing attacks and reconnaissance along LTL 8-B during September. Captured documents indicated that MI elements of the B-3 Front were in Quang Duc Province making an assessment in preparation for the annual fall campaign. In Binh Thuan Province, the 812th VC Regiment and associated local forces intensified terrorist and harassing attacks throughout the period in the Thien Giao/Ham Thuan Triangle and against major GVN development projects in Hoa Da District. Communist forces continued sporadic but effective sapper/artillery attacks against GVN installations/depots vic Nha Trang City and the GVN Cam Ranh Bay logistics complex.

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(7.) The Communist Order of Battle in MR-2:

DIVISIONS	3
REGIMENTS	17 (+4 AD)
COMBAT STRENGTH	35-40,000
ARTILLERY	60-75
ARMOR	115-135

c. MR-3:

(1) In MR-3, Communist military activity subsided during the early part of the quarter following heavy fighting during May and June. By mid-August, activity significantly increased throughout the Region, but then subsided once again by the end of the quarter.

(2) In the west, 5th NVA Division forces returned to action in August after four months in the southern Parrot's Beak in Cambodia. Commencing in mid-August, elements attacked several RF positions west of the Vam Co Dong River. By the end of the month, they had succeeded in pushing GVN control along LTL-13 back to positions just west of the river, while gaining control over some 1,200 people. Lesser damage was done to the southeast. At the same time, local force elements from the Tay Ninh Provincial Unit conducted supportive harassing actions against territorial forces and several key locations in South Central Tay Ninh. These units succeeded in temporarily occupying several hamlets and villages. The attacks in Tay Ninh were designed to eliminate all GVN presence west of Vam Co Dong, prevent 25th ARVN Division elements from deploying to threatened areas in central MR-3 and gain control over additional land and population. By the end of September, elements of the 5th Division were apparently gradually moving back toward the Elephant's Foot; however, the majority of the Division remained in the northern Parrot's Beak area. Activity in Tay Ninh Province consisted mainly of harassing attacks designed to keep RVNAF off balance, while the Communists went about consolidating territorial gains west of the Vam Co Dong River.

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(3) In the 9th NVA Division AO, NVA forces maintained a strong defense along LTL-7 southwest of Ben Cat and in the base of the Iron Triangle. Communist forces used ABF's as an effective conservation of force tactic while continually rotating units to rear areas to rest and refit. Near the end of the quarter, ARVN forces gradually moved to the outskirts of Base 82, only to be forced to withdraw after receiving heavy attacks by fire and counterattacks by the 141st Regt, 7th NVA Division.

(4) In the 7th Division AO, VC/NVA forces shifted southward during mid-quarter. The Division, supported by approximately three sapper regiments (116th (AKA 367A), 119th and 113th) and the equivalent of one artillery regiment, had the apparent mission of eliminating all GVN presence north of the Dong Nai River. Of major significance was the movement of 85MM artillery within range of military, industrial and logistical centers in the Bien Hoa area; however, the Communists limited 85MM artillery attacks to RVNAF positions in northern Bien Hoa Province. In early September, ARVN forces, moving against light resistance, reoccupied the Thai Hung/Ba Cam area in northern Bien Hoa Province. Communist forces suffered heavy casualties from air and artillery strikes and subsequently moved to safer ground farther north. Toward the end of the month, 7th Division forces were conducting reconnaissance of Phu Giao and Chon Thanh.

(5) In air defense developments, 16 July photography revealed two additional radar-controlled AA sites in the Bo Duc area of Phuoc Long Province. As of early August the Communists had a total of 4 radar-controlled 57MM sites and two 57MM sites without radar.

(6) The Communist Order of Battle in MR-3:

DIVISIONS	3 (+1 SPR, 1 ARTY, 1 AD)
REGIMENTS	18 (+7 SPR, 3 ARTY, 3 AD)
COMBAT STRENGTH	40-45,000
ARTILLERY	80-90
ARMOR	190-200

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d. MR-4:

(1) Communist activity in MR-4 during the quarter increased slightly. A greater proportion of incidents occurred in the Southern Delta (VC MR-3) as Communist forces stepped up their year-long campaign to expand control and influence in outlying areas. The July and August highpoints were the most intense of the year and netted considerable Communist military/political gains in Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, and Kien Giang Provinces. Similar activity in other provinces produced less radical results. A number of Communist units increased their strength through infiltration and local recruitment, but they still rank far below RVNAF forces in terms of total strength. VC/NVA firepower was not significantly altered, though possible improvements were noted in the upper Delta where VC/NVA transportation units can take advantage of seasonal floods to move logistics by sampans. Despite having made only limited progress in improving combat capabilities, however, Communist units generally improved when measured against their relative strength vis-a-vis RVNAF, as the latter suffered declines in territorial force strength and effectiveness.

(2) There was very little change in either the level or intensity of activity in the northern Delta (VC MR-2) during the quarter, most of which was focused in lower Kien Phong Province and the western two-thirds of Dinh Tuong Province. Communist forces pursued three main objectives: securing a base area in lower Kien Phong Province, regaining control along the northern edge of Tri Phap, and denying RVNAF freedom of movement and access to contested areas of Dinh Tuong Province. In mid-September, Communist units began a minor campaign to weaken RVNAF control in central and northeastern areas of Dinh Tuong Province, with the objective of facilitating logistical input into central VC MR-2. VC/NVA forces were not overly successful in any of these endeavors, and on a number of occasions, took moderate to heavy losses in abortive attempts to inflict casualties on RVNAF and eliminate outposts which hinder Communist operations. It was a costly stand-off period for both contestants, aside from a gradual stabilization of RVNAF control north of Tri Phap. There were inconclusive indicators regarding the possible deployment of the 5th NVA Division elements to Dinh Tuong Province. Should such a move materialize, the resultant alteration of the balance of forces would enable the VC/NVA to assume a much more aggressive posture.

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(3) In VC MR-3, Communist units were very active in all but a few traditionally quiet provinces. Using tactics followed throughout the course of the year, to include numerous, and at times heavy shelling of outposts and RVNAF positions, VC/NVA elements were able to seriously undermine RVNAF presence and effectiveness in areas of Kien Giang, An Xuyen and Bac Lieu Provinces. A similar development occurred in adjacent areas of Vinh Long and Vinh Binh Provinces, where the Communists, through aggressive small unit tactics, increased their control along the border. In Phong Dinh Province, two main force regiments moved into the western districts and systematically destroyed RVNAF outposts, ceasing only when an ARVN regiment arrived on the scene. Currently, VC/NVA units may be planning a series of sporadic interdictions of highways in central portions of the lower Delta, primarily in Chuong Thien, Ba Xuyen and Phong Dinh Provinces. This lies well within Communist capabilities and would be a logical exploitation of the favorable position they have attained during the course of the year. Conversely, VC units in An Xuyen Province appear to have yielded some momentum to RVNAF; however, they have not sustained any major defeats which could undermine their capabilities in the near future.

(4) In general, activity during the quarter represented nothing more than an extension of developments which began in December of last year. The VC/NVA continued to make some tangible gains in territorial and population control by conducting monthly highpoints against less than adequate RVNAF resistance. Gains accruing to the Communists during the past quarter should be viewed as the culmination of ten months of prolonged activity, rather than a result of offensive operations during this specific quarter.

(5) The Communist Order of Battle in MR-4:

DIVISIONS	0
REGIMENTS	14
COMBAT STRENGTH	20-25,000
ARTILLERY	0
ARMOR	0

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6. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS:

a. The increased emphasis on heavy attacks that has been manifest in recent months is expected to continue. Reporting continues to point toward early 1975 as a critical period for enemy operations, with the current and anticipated attacks setting the stage. A significant factor that Hanoi's planners are expected to exploit is the reduced U.S. military aid to the GVN. Enemy initiatives may force RVNAF to expend ammunition and deplete stocks to dangerously low levels. At the same time, an upsurge in sapper attacks on logistics facilities is expected.

b. Reduced ARVN artillery fire, air support and tactical mobility will give the Communists new advantages and inhibit RVNAF initiatives. The cutback may also necessitate ARVN retrenchment on maintenance of outposts in Communists territory which, despite their limited strategic value, are psychologically important to the GVN.

c. A substantial volume of reporting indicates that the current Communist strategy is designed, at least in part, to force the GVN to negotiate a settlement. The continued military build-up, combined with indications of forthcoming major attacks, leave little doubt, however, that Hanoi envisions major successes on the battlefield as its best opportunity for forcing the GVN to accept NVN terms for a settlement. Since the intransigence of the Thieu Administration toward negotiations precludes such a development in the near-term, Communist planners hope to produce a situation leading to the downfall of his administration.

d. The outlook for the coming months, then, is for continued build-up of Communist capabilities and for a series of major attacks in strategic areas of MR-1 and MR-3. Prospects for MR-2 are less clear, but major initiatives cannot be ruled out. In MR-4 and in coastal areas of MR-1 and 2, we expect a continuation of pressure designed to erode GVN security gradually. These actions may be only precursors of more intense offensive activity early next year.

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CHAPTER 2

FRIENDLY SITUATION

1. (C) OVERVIEW. Communist ceasefire violations reached a record high both in number and intensity during the quarter. The peak exceeded that at Ceasefire I. Most significant fighting occurred in Military Region (MR) 1. Heavy shellings coupled with ground attacks enabled the enemy to overrun the district towns of Thuong Duc, Quang Nam Province (P) and Minh Long, Quang Ngai (P). Additionally, the enemy was successful in capturing three strategic outposts: Gia Vuc in Quang Ngai (P); Da Trach and Landing Zone Lion in Quang Nam (P). As a result of the fall of Thuong Duc and action in the Duc Duc District (D), approximately 30,000 inhabitants were moved to communist-controlled areas. Due to the loss of Thuong Duc and the resultant threat to Danang, division (Div) area of operations (AO) were realigned. The 1st and 3d Airborne (Abn) Brigades (Bde) were assigned to Quang Nam (P) in support of the 3d Div, while the 2d Div AO was extended to include the Que Son Valley. The airborne brigades are positioned west and southwest of Danang. In Thua Thien (P), enemy action around hills 300 and 144 resulted in the mauling of four 1st Div Battalions (Bn) and one Regional Force (RF) Bn. The enemy gained control of the strategic high ground, thereby posing a serious threat to QL-1 between Phu Loc and Phu Bai air base. With the subsequent shift and commitment of reinforcing ARVN units, the threat was temporarily lessened. In MR 2, Mang Buk RF outpost, Kontum (P), was abandoned on 20 August after receiving heavy attacks by fire (ABF). Two hundred fifteen military and 500 civilian survivors safely reached nearby Chuong Nghia (D). During the period 5-31 August, increased enemy activity near Plei Me Base and Fire Support Base (FSB) 711 in Pleiku (P) was reflected by heavy ABF and a determined but unsuccessful enemy effort to overrun ARVN positions. Binh Dinh continued to be the most active province as the enemy applied pressure against fire bases along QL-1. The 22d Div returned to Binh Dinh (P) and pushed enemy units west, securing QL-1. In MR 3, activity continued in Ben Cat (D), Binh Duong (P) and incidents increased in western Tay Ninh (P). Two outposts on LTL-13, near the Cambodian border, were overrun after a week of enemy attacks. Activity in Ben Cat (D), Binh Duong (P) consisted of daily enemy ABF with occasional small ground attacks. ARVN units were ordered to retake Base 82 but failed in their efforts. During the period 10-27 August, Bien Hoa Air Base and vicinity were rocketed nine

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times. These ABF prompted friendly operations along the Dong Nai River in the Bien Hoa rocket belt, which succeeded in securing the area. Activity in MR 4 remained sporadic in response to changes in Viet Cong (VC) MR 2 and 3 resupply capabilities. ARVN concentrated forces in southern Kien Phong (P) to block enemy attempts to establish a base complex replacing Tri Phap. Throughout other provinces the enemy activity continued to follow the usual pattern of interdiction of lines of communication (LOC), attacks on isolated outposts, shellings, night infiltration of populated areas and assassination of local officials.

2. (C) MILITARY REGION 1.

a. Activity reached its highest level since the First Quarter of 1973. Marine and Territorial Forces in the northernmost province of Quang Tri experienced sporadic exchanges of small arms and mortar fire along the front. Beginning in early July, Marine strongpoints southwest of Phong Dien (D), Thua Thien (P), were subjected to light assaults and an eventual massive ABF of 5,000 rounds of mixed artillery, mortar and rocket followed by ground attacks on 21 September. The Marines repulsed the attacks by effective use of timely and reliable intelligence and artillery support, killing 247 enemy. In mid-August the 1st Bn Bde from Joint General Staff (JGS) Reserve in Saigon and the 3d Abn Bde from Thua Thien (P) redeployed to positions west and southwest of Danang. To compensate for the loss of the airborne units, the 15th Ranger (Rgr) Group was transferred from Quang Tri (P) into the 2d Abn Bde AO in Thua Thien(P). On 28 August, the 3d Infantry (Inf), 1st ARVN Div lost Hills 144 (YD8701), 273 (YC9299) and 300 (YC9599) which they had seized in (July). The 3d Inf was declared to be combat ineffective due to the heavy casualties and loss of equipment sustained in the fighting.

b. The enemy launched its summer offensive in Quang Nam (P) 18 July by overrunning the Da Trach Base (78th Rgr Bn) in Duc Duc (D). Enemy follow-up attacks quickly occurred in the nearby districts of Thuong Duc, Dai Loc and Que Son. Thuong Duc District Seat, defended by the 79th Rgr Bn and territorials, fell to the enemy 7 August after the defenders' ammunition, water and medical supplies were exhausted. ARVN forces committed to the defense of Quang Nam at this critical period were the 3d Div, the 1st and 2d Abn Bdes, 54th Inf 1st Div, 4th Inf/2d Div and the 12th Rgr Group. Second Inf/3d Div continued successful mopping up operations northwest of Tam Ky, Quang Tin (P). Satisfaction with the operation,

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


Figure 2-1

2-5

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Tactical Air (TACAIR), were dispatched to the area and the positions were retaken. In early August, OP-5 was again lost to the Communists for the remainder of the quarter. The military situation in Pleiku (P) remained stable. Enemy initiated incidents consisted primarily of shellings against ARVN artillery and outpost positions. North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Forces made a major effort to overrun the Ranger outposts at Plei Me, but defenders succeeded in holding the camp. In Darlac (P) the only activity of significance was a ten day ARVN and Territorial Force operation conducted in the vicinity of Base Area 238, northern Darlac (P); primary objective was Buon Trap Village. This operation met with stiff Communist resistance and failed to accomplish its objective. Quang Duc (P) remained relatively quiet until the end of September. Territorial Forces and Rangers were attacked, losing Dao Trung FSE and a portion of provincial route 8B. A reaction force of Rangers and Armor moved into the area retaking the FSE and reopening LTL-8E.

b. In the coastal provinces, the preponderance of ground action occurred in Binh Dinh Province. Heavy fighting was reported throughout the quarter in Phu My District. In late July the Communists initiated determined ground assaults, preceded by intense ABF, or GVN troop positions and installations throughout the Province. Major thrusts were made against the strategic Phu Cu and Deo Nhung Passes in southeastern Phu My (D) and northeastern Phu Cat (D). The Communists attempted to overwhelm GVN forces but were driven back by air support. In response to this increased threat, the 22d Div Headquarters, 42d Inf and two squadrons of Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) were deployed from Pleiku (P) to Binh Dinh earlier. Communists were successful in controlling key terrain in the Deo Nhung Pass and approximately ten kilometers of QL-1. Heavy GVN pressure forced the Communists to withdraw from the Deo Nhung Pass in early August (to the An Lao Valley) and traffic was resumed on QL-1. By the end of August, the military situation had stabilized despite a relatively high incident level. The 41st Inf later joined the division in Binh Dinh and deployed in eastern Phu My (D). The Communists made several attempts to interdict QL-1 by destroying bridges and culverts. Traffic was halted only temporarily, however, as bypasses and Bailey bridges allowed traffic to resume within a short time. ARVN continued aggressive pursuit into Communist base areas and cut off resupply to Communist forces east of QL-1. Heavy TACAIR was employed in Binh Dinh against Communist positions and logistical areas throughout the quarter. In Khanh Hoa (P), the Communists shelled the Nha Trang Airfield, causing minor damage.

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Sapper attacks were conducted against the Naval Noncommissioned Officer Academy on the Cam Ranh Peninsula resulting in damaged buildings and vehicles. The Communists stepped up their activity in Binh Thuan (P) with heavy ABF and ground contacts along QL-1 in the vicinity of the Song Luy resettlement site, northeast of Thien Gio District town. Traffic was only temporarily halted on QL-1 as a result of these actions. Communist forces hoped to divert Territorial Forces from their mission of protecting the rice harvest.

c. In late July, the Mang Euk Camp, Kontum (P) began to receive ABF and the outposts around the camp received light probes. The Camp was defended by less than 200 men of the 2C1 RF BN. Mang Euk's principal radio antenna was knocked out by the heavy shelling but light aircraft provided radio communications. The severity of Communist attacks was less than expected and the defenders repulsed the attacks. No plans existed to reinforce the Mang Euk Camp and defenders were to evacuate the camp if pressure became too heavy. There was a lull in activity during the first part of August but, by mid-month, the camp again received heavy ABF of over 5,000 rounds of mortar and artillery. Communist forces assaulted outpost positions around the camp and forced the RF to withdraw. Shortly thereafter, radio contact was lost, and the main camp fell to the Communists at 0150H 20 August. Survivors made their way south and arrived in Chuong Nghia (D) town a few days later.

(Figure 2-2)

4. (C) MILITARY REGION 3.

a. Activity in MR 3 remained at a level well above the Cease-Fire average. Approximately half of the activity was in the Ben Cat/Iron Triangle Area where GVN operations to retake two outposts, lost on 15 May, remained stalled. The area north of the Dong Nai River in Bien Hoa (P) was the most seriously threatened in the Region. The enemy took a village and an RF outpost and used the area as a base for daily rocket attacks on Bien Hoa Air Base and surrounding villages. Tay Ninh (P) was very active for a two-week period. Two of the three outposts west of the Vam Co Dong River along LTL-13 fell, and the third was seriously threatened. Simultaneously, an enemy force moved into Truong Hue Village, southeast of Tay Ninh City. The lack of route security within the region was further demonstrated when the VC/NVA cut QL-1 east of Rung La resettlement site in Long Khanh (P). In order to improve security

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


Figure 2-2

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border and the Rung La resettlement village in Long Khanh (P). The 3th Regt, 5th Div was assigned the mission of clearing the roadblock; the resultant operation took a total of seven days to dislodge the enemy from this vital route of commercial traffic to Saigon markets. At the same time, QL-20 was interrupted several times in northeast Long Khanh. QL-1 was again cut in MR 3 when the Dong Bridge, 16 kilometers northwest of Saigon in Gia Dinh (P), was destroyed by explosives. Engineers erected a Bailey bridge, and traffic was resumed in less than 24 hours.

e. Truong Hue Hamlet, on Provincial Route 241 southeast of Tay Ninh City, was occupied by an enemy force on 19 August. The enemy force withdrew the following night and RF forces reoccupied the village the next day. A subsequent attack occurred on the Phuoc Tan RF outpost and village on LTL-13 by an enemy force supported by tanks. The village was occupied by the enemy immediately but the outpost held for several days before it was evacuated. A second outpost, Luu Buu Lam, midway between Phuoc Tan and Een Soi town, became the focal point of enemy attack. This outpost was reinforced by a battalion from the 46th Regt and an armor troop for two days. However, the day after these reinforcements returned to Tay Ninh (C), Luu Buu Lam was overrun. The one remaining outpost on the west side of the Vam Co Dong River, Een Soi, was then threatened. A Bn from the 49th Regt was sent to reinforce, and the attack subsided. At the end of September, this Bn remained in Een Soi.

(Figure 2-3)

5. (C) MILITARY REGION 4.

a. For the second consecutive quarter, activity in MR 4 increased, although the increment was slight. In contrast to the previous quarter, neither side initiated a major action or offensive. The enemy instead continued to follow a pattern of avoiding major confrontations with major ARVN units while attacking isolated RF/PF outposts. Enemy actions during the quarter were designed to keep RVNAF committed to a static defense highly vulnerable to selected attack.

b. Terrorist acts and seemingly random LOC interdictions continued in the enemy's efforts to create an alternative Communist civic structure. CVN village and Hamlet offices were targeted as were local officials.

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


Figure 2-3

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c. The enemy appears to have accurately assessed ARVN's recent reluctance to expend large quantities of artillery to support small isolated outposts under attack and has exploited this situation by sharply increasing attacks on positions. Lack of reactive fire support, combined with sharply reduced air support, has had a noticeable effect on the morale of RF/TF defenders. RVAF intentionally abandoned many smaller outposts of marginal value. Each loss of an outpost, whether by intention or force, expands the enemy's area of influence.

d. The enemy attempted to reinfiltate into its former base area in the rugged woods of northern Kien Van (D), Kien Phong (F). RVAF detected this effort. Aggressive patrolling and interdiction actions by elements of the 14th and 15th Regt, 9th Div were successful in frustrating the enemy's attempt. Continued aggressive patrolling and artillery support by the 7th Div has stymied enemy efforts to reestablish operations in the nearby Tri Phap area. SA-7 missile activity continued at a high level in the southern Kien Phong/western Dinh Tuong missile belt. Fifteen missiles were fired during the period; three aircraft, including a China Airline C-123 chartered by Air America, were destroyed.

e. Attempts to interdict major highways have increased sharply. While incidents were scattered throughout the MR, there was a concentration in Dinh Tuong (P); four bridges were damaged or destroyed in this province alone. Use of pressure-detonated mines implanted in road beds resulted in increased damage and destruction of numerous military and civilian vehicles.

f. The burden of security within Region fell increasingly on Territorial Forces as the enemy found success in avoiding major unit confrontations and concentrating instead on vulnerable targets of opportunity. The MR 4 Commander, LTG Nguyen Vinh Nghi, has instituted a program designed to upgrade Territorial Forces and introduced a concept of mobile reaction forces in lieu of static defense.

(Figure 2-4)

6. (C) SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS.

a. The Communists continue to make inroads in their efforts to gain control over territory and population. The more serious salients into CVN territory have been in MR 1. The fall of Thuong Duc (D), Da Trach base and LZ Lion in Quang Nam of Minh Long (D)

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


Figure 2-4

2-15

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and Gia Vuc outpost in Quang Ngai, has placed a serious strain on RVNAF. To meet the threat to Danang City and counter enemy activity, the GVN has been forced to realign AO and commit reserve forces. RVNAF units in MR 1, although successful in temporarily impeding enemy advances, have suffered serious losses in both personnel and equipment. With the continued reduction in logistical support, artillery and TACAIR, RVNAF's ability to meet a major enemy offensive in MR 1 remains questionable.

b. Enemy inroads into GVN population control were discernible in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces of MR 1 and in several areas of the Delta, particularly in Kien Giang and Vinh Long Provinces. Loss of GVN population control in these cases is largely attributable to the Communist tactic of directing attacks against isolated RF/PF outposts while avoiding contact with ARVN main force units.

(Figures 2-5 through 2-11)

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JULY-SEPTEMBER 1974

MAJOR ENGAGEMENT WON-LOST LEDGER

<u>NR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEDGER</u>
1	<u>Da Trach Base, Quang Nam (P)</u> The Da Trach Base, defended by elements of the 78th Rgr Bn, the 3/56th Inf and the 146th RF Bn, was overrun 18 July 1974. The ground assault was preceded by several AEF commencing at 180210H and culminating in a 500 rd ABF of mixed fire at 180630H. Five days later, 174 members of the overrun base made their way back to friendly controlled areas.	Lost
1	<u>Fire Support Base Lion, Quang Nam (P)</u> In the early morning hours of 31 July, Communist forces attacked elements of the 57th Inf defending FSB Lion. The attacks, which overran the base, were preceded by AEF. Simultaneously, in order to prevent ARVN from supporting the base defenders, the Communist forces brought nearby units under fire.	Lost
1	<u>Thuong Duc Subsector (D), Quang Nam (P)</u> Following ten days of intense attacks by fire (more than 4,000 rds) and an unsuccessful ground attack on 4 August, in which the enemy lost 53 killed, the Thuong Duc Subsector defended by elements of the 79th Rgr Bn, the 704 RF Co, 16 PF Platoons and a Rgr Arty Platoon, was overrun on 7 August. Surviving defenders moved east and, by 9 August, 114 personnel made their way back to friendly units. The remaining civilian population, estimated at between eight and ten thousand, reportedly was moved into Communist controlled territory.	Lost
1	<u>Minh Long District Town, Quang Ngai (P)</u> Minh Long District Town, defended by two RF companies and 15 PF platoons, came under heavy AEF 170630H	Lost

Figure 2-5A

2-17

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NR

DESCRIPTION

LEDGER

August, followed by ground attacks against outlying outposts. Radio contact was lost by 171100H August. Prior to loss of radio contact, the Communists employed all types of rockets, mortars and artillery, including 122mm field gun fire. The initial Communist barrage immobilized the two 105mm howitzers belonging to the GVN defenders. By the evening of 17 August, Minh Long District Town and environs, with a pre-attack civilian population of 10,000 civilians, fell to the invaders. An RF Bn, dispatched from Quang Ngai (P) Headquarters to assist the Minh Long defenders, was unable to reach the area.

1 Hills 300, 273, 144, Thua Thien (P) Lost

On 23 August, Communist forces retook the key terrain high ground complex dominated by Hills 300, 273, and 144, located west of Phu Loc and south of Phu Bai. This terrain had previously been overrun by Communist forces in April 1974 and recovered by ARVN by early July. The 129th RF Bn and elements of the 3d Inf bore the brunt of the attack. As of 1 September, 273 troops of the 3/3d Inf had reported back with 268 still missing. As of 31 August, 102 troops of the 129th RF Bn had returned, but as of 9 September, 150 were still missing in action.

1 Gia Vuc Ranger Camp, Quang Ngai (P) Lost

Gia Vuc Ranger Camp in southwest Quang Ngai, defended by the 70th Rgr Bn, came under intense indirect fire, followed by ground attack, on the morning of 19 September. The isolated location of the camp made timely reinforcement by ARVN forces impractical and bad weather limited VNAF support. By 20 September, most of the Gia Vuc outposts had been overrun, and radio contact was lost due to the destruction of camp antennas. Radio contact was possible for a short while on 20 September on an intermittent basis through VNAF aerial observer relay. By 21 September, the Gia Vuc Camp was lost. On 26 September, a VNAF UH-1 extracted 20 members of the camp, who had made their way west into Kontum (P), and airlifted them to Quang Ngai. Final losses are still unknown.

Figure 2-5B

2-18

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<u>NR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEDGER</u>
2	<u>Mang Buk Subsector, Kontum (P)</u> <p>Withstanding a Communist siege from 25 July until 4 August, the Mang Buk Subsector defenders, the HQ and 1st and 3d Companies of the 2S1 RF Bn, augmented by two PF platoons, sustained six KIA, 25 MIA and 4 MIA, and killed 55 enemy. Preceded by heavy ABF, including 120mm mortars, 107mm rocket and 75mm and 57mm recoilless rifle fire, ground attacks resumed on 18 August. The defenders fell back from bunker to bunker. In all, 9 of the 10 bunkers were destroyed. The battle continued through the day and night of the 19th but in the early morning hours of 20 August, the enemy succeeded in overrunning the Subsector. Bad weather precluded VNAF support to Mang Buk. Its remote position was also out of range of friendly artillery. The defenders withdrew south to Chuong Nghia. Two 81mm and four 60mm mortars and a number of M60's and M16's were lost.</p>	Lost
2	<u>Plei Me Camp, Pleiku (P)</u> <p>During the first week of August, the Plei Me Camp, containing the HQ of the 24th Rgr Cp and defended by the 82d Rgr Bn and elements of the 81st Rgr Bn, came under heavy Communist attack and siege. Thousands of rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fire were expended by the enemy in his effort to take the camp. The enemy mounted heavy ground assaults and by 17 August had penetrated to within 200 feet of the center of the camp, having overrun all outside positions. Still, the defenders held out. By 18 August, clearing weather permitted helicopter supply drops and 28 bombing sorties. By 19 August, the NVA had been driven out of the camp and were again hit by air strikes and friendly artillery. ARVN, on 7 August, had deployed elements of the 53d Inf from Ban Me Thuot to Pleiku (P) as reinforcements. These units, supported by the 223d RF Bn and other Rgr units, coordinated their attacks against the NVA forces, forcing them back. Attacks against Plei Me</p>	Won

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<u>MR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEDGER</u>
	<p>Camp continued intermittently throughout the remainder of August and into early September. Exact enemy losses are not known, but are believed to have amounted to about 60% of their force committed against Plei Me. Over 500 enemy were killed, mostly by air and artillery. Friendly casualties were significantly less.</p>	
3	<p><u>Route QL-1, Long Khanh (P) and Binh Tuy (P)</u></p> <p>During late June and the early part of July, security along QL-1 south of Xuan Loc, Long Khanh (P) to the Binh Tuy (P) border deteriorated to the extent that travel was hazardous and traffic often disrupted. VC/NVA forces in the area sniped at traffic and frequently erected roadblocks. In early July, 8th Inf forces were deployed to the area to assist RF forces. These forces were subsequently augmented by two Rgr Bn. The clearing effort assisted by VNAF air and ARVN artillery support took several weeks. By early August, Communist activity along QL-1 had greatly diminished; occasional roadblocks erected during the evening hours were removed by friendly forces by early morning. Since then, QL-1 has remained open during daylight hours.</p>	Won
3	<p><u>Phuoc Tan-Luu Buu Lam Outposts on Route 13 West of Ben Soi, Tay Ninh (P)</u></p> <p>On 14 August, the Phuoc Tan Outpost on the Cambodian border, defended by one company of the 312th RF Bn, came under heavy attack by the 6th Inf of the 5th NVA Div. After 11 enemy ground attacks, supported by over 100 rounds of mixed ordnance, including direct fire from T-54 tanks, the outpost fell on 20 August despite a magnificent defense. The RF Co sustained 56 killed or missing. The survivors made their way east to the Luu Buu Lam Outpost, which also was under attack. Luu Buu Lam Outpost was attacked 15 times. Its defenders withdrew east on 22 August to Ben Soi. The Luu Buu Lam Outposts sustained 25 KIA or MIA and 19 wounded in action. Ben Soi Outposts were also attacked but held, with the help of the 3d Bn of the 46th ARVN Inf. In the engagements, friendly units sustained 95 KIA or MIA</p>	Lost

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<u>NR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEDGER</u>
	and 84 MIA. The 5th NVA Div lost in excess of 300 KIA plus 107 small arms, four anti-aircraft weapons and one T-54 tank destroyed by Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).	
3	<u>Ba Cam Outpost, Cong Thanh (D), Dien Hoa (P)</u> On 14 August, the Ba Cam Outpost in Thai Hung Village along the Dong Nai River, defended by two companies of the 316th RF Bn, was overrun by sapper forces. The 43d Inf, supported by the 92d Rgr Bn, pushed the 209th NVA Inf out of Thai Hung Village and recovered the Ba Cam Outpost on 7 September. In the fighting to recover both village and outpost, ARVN forces suffered moderate casualties but are believed to have virtually eliminated one Bn and badly mauled another of the 209th NVA Rgt.	Won
3	<u>Suoi Da on Route 13 East of Tay Ninh City and Several Hamlets Along Route 22 South of Tay Ninh City, Tay Ninh (P)</u> During 15-25 August, elements of VC D16 Bn attempted to infiltrate Suoi Da and did infiltrate several hamlets south of Tay Ninh City along Route 22 during the night of 19 August. The attempt at Suoi Da was repulsed on 25 August. The infiltrated hamlets were cleared on 20 August. Casualties were light on both sides.	Won
3	<u>Iron Triangle Area, Ben Cat (D), Binh Duong (P)</u> On 15 August, two Bns of the 272 Inf 9th NVA Div, attempted to flank the ARVN 1st Bn 50th Inf 25th ARVN Div, by attacking the Phu Thu outpost defended by a RF Co. The RF Co held allowing the 1st Bn to counterattack. Friendly forces sustained 36 KIA, 150 WIA and 17 MIA, but killed 173 and captured two enemy. Additionally, the 1st Bn 50th Inf captured two K-67 APC and destroyed one T-54 tank and one K-67 APC.	Won

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
A/C Destroyed by SA 7 from 1 July - 30 Sep 74

<u>A/C TYPE</u>	<u>\$ COST (EA)</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
C-47	140,000	1	140,000
AC-119G	807,872	1	807,872
EC-47	86,650	1	86,650
A-37	455,000	1	455,000
			<u>1,489,522</u>

Figure 2-6

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**REPORTED SA-7
FIRINGS IN RVN
28 JAN 73 - 30 SEP 74**



MISSILES FIRED

	MR 1	MR 2	MR 3	MR 4	TOTAL
28 JAN 73 THRU 30 JUN 74	6	24	67	35	132
1 JUL 74 THRU 30 SEP 74	3	0	6	14	23
TOTAL	9	24	73	49	155

Figure 2-7

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


Figure 2-8

2-27

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


Figure 2-9

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR I

WEEK	22 MAR - 28		5 APR - 11		12 APR - 18		19 APR - 25		3 MAY - 9		10 MAY - 16		17 MAY - 23		24 MAY - 30		7 JUN - 13		14 JUN - 20		21 JUN - 27		28 JUN - 4		5 JUL - 11		12 JUL - 18		19 JUL - 25		26 JUL - 1		2 AUG - 8	
	INCIDENTS	87	104	81	92	154	207	148	113	206	222	162	150	202	182	148	149	188	312	258	343													
MAL/IN ABF	10	16	7	15	18	35	29	15	33	36	28	30	40	39	27	8	30	52	36	64														
MAL/IN CTX	3	3	4	2	11	8	5	5	11	9	6	3	10	7	6	6	6	5	12	18	15													
EN ARTY INCOMING	520	850	630	1010	845	2227	1677	1144	2410	2746	1664	1305	2445	1803	1409	607	2319	2885	13660	5199														
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	3953	2233	1804	2328	3253	5131	4906	4390	7358	11263	7450	9434	8722	5743	4687	1655	10828	16214	22865	31049														
SCH/IN VNAF	154	154	154	154	160	182	150	186	156	154	154	154	152	176	206	174	236	232	214	566														
FIN SORTIES	19	8	10	0	22	18	84	50	56	66	24	33	12	10	10	13	40	292	358	535														
K/W FRD GAS	43	43	48	49	71	135	74	70	148	130	88	73	90	84	51	61	101	93	121	174														
K/D EN GAS	133	107	80	91	161	180	176	84	240	267	246	203	169	186	154	347	226	650	883	1062														
K/W CIV GAS	6	3	11	1	10	16	11	2	20	9	11	11	16	5	0	6	18	61	27	17														
	28	26	9	4	14	22	10	15	54	44	19	25	33	23	14	1	62	161	62	61														

Figure 2-10A

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE MR 1

WEEK	AUG 9	AUG 15	AUG 16	AUG 22	AUG 23	AUG 29	AUG 30 - SEP 5	SEP 6 - 12	SEP 13 - 19	SEP 20 - 26	SEP 27 - OCT 3	OCT 4 - 10	OCT 11 - 17	OCT 18 - 24	OCT 25 - 31	NOV 1 - 7	NOV 8 - 14	NOV 15 - 21	NOV 22 - 28	NOV 29 - DEC 5	DEC 6 - 12	DEC 13 - 19	DEC 20 - 26		
INCIDENTS	289	372	390	332	356	367	400	344	334																
MAL ABF	58	92	87	80	69	79	94	73	72																
MAL CTX	101	137	138	114	131	155	159	144	113																
MAL EN ARTY INCOMING	7	16	7	8	9	10	7	9	4																
MAL EN ARTY EXPENDITURES	123	127	158	130	147	123	140	118	145																
EN ARTY INCOMING	3518	8998	7901	6823	4369	5365	13,475	5,408	8,357																
EN ARTY EXPENDITURES	29,669	26,295	30,880	28,149	34,500	26,072	30,375	37,459	33,029																
EN FIN SORTIES	520	532	532	347	266	246	250	259	253																
EN FIN SORTIES	260	379	348	206	156	134	124	217	153																
EN PRO GAS	71	128	130	110	134	138	172	104	201																
EN PRO GAS	403	646	652	591	551	650	902	674	913																
EN EN GAS	623	649	566	356	322	421	566	399	508																
EN EN GAS	4	9	10	1	5	3	9	9	1																
EN GN GAS	11	34	11	6	4	16	14	6	19																
EN GN GAS	51	83	32	7	23	37	53	15	16																

Figure 10B

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**SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR 2**

COM 4

WEEK	MAR							APR							MAY							JUN							JUL							AUG																																																																																																																																																																																																				
	20	29	4	11	18	25	31	3	10	16	23	30	31	7	13	20	27	28	4	11	18	25	31	14	21	28	5	12	19	26	1	8	2	9																																																																																																																																																																																																						
INCIDENTS	105	75	66	85	86	90	78	89	134	133	118	110	88	92	83	113	134	147	219	153	5	12	24	15	12	7	12	14	8	13	23	25	20	23	16	16	16	17	11	8	8	24	15	39	18	6	5	70	43	46	36	55	58	46	42	3	8	6	6	5	4	5	4	1	5	3	5	7	11	16	13	315	551	307	535	553	319	712	2144	719	1606	1697	928	931	757	870	330	336	670	4,238	4,751	12880	15,366	12,659	20,023	26,706	22,937	15,616	9,648	23,846	14,297	17,033	16,692	13,241	17,848	8,591	18,139	22,212	18,469	28,228	30,301	456	516	508	522	562	412	440	396	420	404	410	406	364	410	442	422	434	434	430	505	132	340	279	357	164	140	72	222	431	357	270	178	162	205	117	110	205	182	335	281	32	48	107	110	51	35	44	46	65	55	52	41	28	33	25	34	71	93	109	83	225	303	452	1052	320	364	268	297	334	316	275	344	141	199	181	332	457	312	519	581	5	1	1	15	2	5	9	8	18	5	3	0	0	2	5	0	0	4	6	10	16	3	4	4	21	9	13	43	9	47	6	6	0	5	7	19	1	17	22	35	20

Figure 2-10C

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE MR 2

WEEK	9 AUG	15 AUG	16 AUG	23 AUG	30 SEP	6 SEP	12 SEP	13 SEP	20 SEP	27 OCT	4 OCT	10 OCT	11 OCT	16 OCT	18 OCT	25 OCT	1 NOV	7 NOV	8 NOV	14 NOV	15 NOV	21 NOV	22 NOV	28 NOV	5 DEC	6 DEC	12 DEC	13 DEC	19 DEC	20 DEC
INCIDENTS	163	214	163	130	135	147	155	121	96																					
MA/AM ABF	29	36	22	19	15	15	14	10	2																					
MA/AM CTX	37	53	40	38	38	31	43	31	20																					
EN ARTY INCOMING	14	7	3	0	1	3	5	4	1																					
EN ARTY EXPENDITURES	83	118	98	73	81	98	93	76	73																					
SCH/VNAF	4,376	4,319	759	1,911	787	730	797	1,721	157																					
K/W	31,356	30,036	24,484	18,266	18,453	13,430	11,277	9,173	4,981																					
K/D	434	434	434	270	276	238	226	244	28																					
K/W	133	239	242	139	95	92	128	206	98																					
K/D	113	78	94	63	59	75	80	54	7																					
K/W	352	288	250	237	200	208	237	128	119																					
K/D	603	327	250	248	186	162	293	309	158																					
K/W	7	3	2	2	6	0	14	1	3																					
K/D	1	6	18	5	4	11	3	1	4																					
K/W	4	28	85	6	12	30	7	6	5																					

Figure-10D

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 3

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WEEK	22 MAR - 28		5 APR - 11		12 APR - 18		19 APR - 25		3 MAY - 9		10 MAY - 16		17 MAY - 23		24 MAY - 30		7 JUN - 13		14 JUN - 20		21 JUN - 27		5 JUL - 11		12 JUL - 18		19 JUL - 25		26 JUL - 1 AUG	
	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN	INCIDENTS	MAJ/ MIN		
INCIDENTS	155	248	209	157	190	109	75	111	176	225	245	180	177	177	157	160	181	146	145	160										
MAJ/ MIN	21/ 55	47/ 113	26/ 101	20/ 65	36/ 71	12/ 54	10/ 25	14/ 50	32/ 73	45/ 98	45/ 104	42/ 68	33/ 53	30/ 80	22/ 66	12/ 56	35/ 75	22/ 56	18/ 67	22/ 63										
MAJ/ MIN	9/ 70	14/ 79	14/ 68	7/ 65	9/ 74	1/ 42	1/ 39	3/ 44	10/ 61	10/ 72	16/ 80	9/ 61	14/ 77	7/ 60	5/ 64	4/ 88	3/ 68	2/ 66	5/ 55	2/ 73										
EN ARTY INCOMING	1905	2845	2591	1851	1938	582	466	863	1361	2924	3349	2494	2468	2494	1754	750	2436	1361	1187	1098										
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	10120	19197	23160	27957	36108	20425	12205	15021	34576	47455	63379	28075	28091	39172	37497	23378	16507	16211	22148	19842										
SCH/ VNAF/ TN SORTIES	407/ 284	442/ 287	524/ 328	501/ 347	478/ 372	611/ 446	409/ 255	350/ 195	474/ 261	560/ 344	593/ 351	522/ 344	514/ 339	491/ 357	560/ 328	449/ 282	532/ 233	504/ 246	495/ 360	500/ 481										
K/ W	62/ 136	140/ 359	100/ 289	39/ 299	51/ 330	60/ 224	16/ 111	23/ 65	104/ 307	91/ 322	59/ 394	116/ 494	88/ 403	62/ 356	93/ 555	35/ 268	33/ 177	40/ 190	28/ 159	45/ 165										
K/ D	158/ 3	198/ 0	244/ 6	286/ 4	337/ 11	54/ 1	242/ 1	79/ 2	302/ 3	408/ 5	352/ 2	944/ 24	538/ 2	381/ 4	488/ 2	321/ 1	139/ 2	258/ 1	349/ 1	296/ 4										
K/ W	8/ 28	34/ 37	25/ 116	10/ 29	13/ 49	3/ 12	9/ 11	6/ 12	9/ 46	8/ 30	42/ 130	10/ 46	6/ 53	17/ 31	21/ 27	7/ 9	5/ 28	10/ 15	4/ 8	3/ 10										

Figure 2-10E

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE MR 3

WEEK	9 AUG - 15	16 AUG - 22	23 AUG - 29	30 SEP - 5	6 SEP - 12	13 SEP - 19	20 SEP - 26	27 SEP - 3 OCT	4 OCT - 10	11 OCT - 17	18 OCT - 24	25 OCT - 31	1 NOV - 7	8 NOV - 14	15 NOV - 21	22 NOV - 28	29 DEC - 5	6 DEC - 12	13 DEC - 19	20 DEC - 26	
INCIDENTS	198	346	287	194	149	148	176	136	102												
MAJ ABF	26	47	39	34	18	20	21	21	6												
MIN	92	155	154	83	64	63	71	52	40												
MAJ CTX	4	17	8	12	2	4	4	2	3												
MIN	76	127	86	65	65	61	80	61	53												
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,417	2,806	3,222	1,701	1,276	1,610	1,506	1,334	498												
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	28,077	58,370	53,437	28,097	14,952	7,133	11,339	14,045	7,621												
SCH VNAF	504	504	284	231	231	292	282	231													
TIN SORTES	271	308	319	207	144	144	127	154	38												
K _W FRD GAS	40	136	90	73	45	60	34	111													
K _W EN GAS	162	560	446	336	255	147	161	194													
K _W CNV GAS	297	977	607	350	224	221	62	81													
K _W EN GAS	5	8	3	3	1	2	2	2													
K _W CNV GAS	18	10	5	8	7	7	12	11													
K _W EN GAS	55	111	32	16	16	20	7	34	28												

Figure 2-10F

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE MR 4

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WEEK	22 MAR - 29 APR		5 APR - 12 APR		19 APR - 26 APR		3 MAY - 10 MAY		17 MAY - 24 MAY		7 JUN - 14 JUN		21 JUN - 28 JUN		5 JUL - 12 JUL		19 JUL - 26 JUL		2 AUG - 9 AUG	
	INC	EN	INC	EN	INC	EN	INC	EN	INC	EN	INC	EN	INC	EN	INC	EN	INC	EN	INC	EN
INCIDENTS	480	441	295	333	479	465	309	320	487	405	330	322	407	275	271	275	641	491	433	288
MAJ/ MIN	23/228	20/174	9/132	21/144	35/227	23/181	17/135	25/146	41/223	14/203	21/163	30/145	30/198	8/141	18/126	16/105	47/297	30/237	29/200	5/120
MAJ/ MIN	17/212	19/228	5/149	6/162	11/206	21/240	11/146	6/143	11/212	16/172	20/126	13/134	4/175	11/115	7/120	7/147	18/279	18/206	8/196	7/136
EN ARTY INCOMING	2182	1357	999	1113	2269	1590	1178	1627	2796	1731	1478	1574	2220	1009	1065	994	3327	2265	2439	856
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	34929	35253	19837	16682	20995	29395	20981	18000	21189	21839	15932	19330	16694	13598	11114	11366	20913	16175	10653	6367
SCH/ MIN SORTIES	154/125	154/137	154/116	161/96	158/96	154/96	329/177	185/123	168/98	212/128	208/138	159/139	224/117	154/104	168/63	154/88	154/136	154/106	154/113	179/36
K/W FRD CAS	131/564	132/374	71/379	63/226	110/439	177/480	57/389	43/195	84/409	118/379	78/309	53/257	82/216	52/233	62/248	62/246	193/652	223/404	10/402	25/187
K/O EN CAS	337/3	243/0	404/2	282/3	422/3	511/4	1078/35	302/4	285/4	340/0	275/4	337/1	212/9	308/2	236/4	201/4	399/9	532/13	346/4	268/0
K/W CIV CAS	18/51	24/68	6/44	27/48	21/41	48/110	14/71	4/24	41/70	15/34	10/30	26/71	13/32	13/38	13/46	25/51	43/83	21/36	15/33	31/30

Figure 2-10G

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE MR 4

WEEK	9 AUG	16 AUG	23 AUG	30 AUG - SEP	6 SEP	13 SEP	20 SEP	27 SEP - OCT	4 OCT	11 OCT	18 OCT	25 OCT - 31 NOV	1 NOV	8 NOV	15 NOV	22 NOV	29 NOV - DEC	6 DEC	13 DEC	20 DEC	
INCIDENTS	345	577	386	262	331	480	321	246	237												
MAL /M ABF	23	39	18	6	15	24	16	11	14												
MAL /M CTX	15	29	13	10	11	15	11	5	8												
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,405	2,347	1,303	681	1,288	1,908	1,570	862	982												
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	7,262	15,587	12,034	9,584	10,218	14,446	9,782	9,110	7,961												
SCH /VNAF FILM BURNERS	154	154	188	161	98	144	140	142	140												
K /W FRD CAS	70	211	93	62	86	152	74	63	86												
K /D EN CAS	204	695	324	201	351	438	252	174	292												
K /W CN CAS	226	472	269	200	240	199	170	192	259												
K /W CN CAS	29	24	13	23	28	10	16	6	32												
	97	42	39	46	62	80	59	34	61												

Figure 2-10H

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

**KILL RATIO
EN KIA
FR KIA**




Figure 2-11

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIALKILL RATIO 1974

<u>MO</u>	<u>FRD</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
JAN	821	3035	3.70
FEB	821	3324	4.05
MAR	976	3465	3.55
APR	1352	5461	4.04
MAY	1281	5625	4.39
JUN	1118	5451	4.87
JUL	1504	6732	4.48
AUG	1733	9026	5.21
SEP	1466	4545	3.10

Figure 2-12

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CHAPTER 3

RVNAF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY

1. (S/NFD) J2/JOINT GENERAL STAFF.

a. Organization.

(Figure 3-1)

b. Personnel. The authorized strength of J2 remains at 288, and actual strength showed an increase of four officers, four NCO's, and two EM from the last reporting period:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	156	120
NCOs	102	92
EM	<u>30</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL	288	232

c. Operational Effectiveness. The operational effectiveness of the Office of the J2 continues at a high level. A contributing factor is the personal integrity and professional competence of the J2 who has been in office since May 1971.

2. (S/NFD) UNIT 306.

(Figure 3-2)

a. Organization. Unit 306 is the designation of the former Military Intelligence Center and consists of Division 1 (Intelligence); Division 2 (Document Exploitation); Division 3 (Military Interrogation); Division 4 (Materiel Exploitation) and Division 5 (Administration/Support).

b. Personnel. The authorized strength remains at 414. The actual strength was reduced by 17, which included a loss 11 officers, two NCO's and four EM.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	159	108

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J-2, JOINT GENERAL STAFF, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES




Figure 3-1

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM




Figure 3-2

* ALSO SERVES AS DEPUTY J2.

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

NCOs	153	151
EM	<u>102</u>	<u>82</u>
TOTAL	414	341

c. Operational Effectiveness.

(1) Division 1 (Intelligence): Division 1 is the most effectively managed and productive element of Unit 306. The Target Branch is particularly outstanding and its products are highly professional. The Order of Battle Section and Imagery Interpretation shops are also highly regarded and staffed with high caliber, competent personnel. The Intelligence Data Handling System Branch (IDHS), still short qualified officers, has made progress and on 23 September provided the Intelligence In-Country Division/J2 with three different computerized outputs dealing with daily enemy activity. This system will be continued and provides the first computerized output from IDHS since December 1972. The major impetus in the development of this system was provided by two DAO-Hired Computer Specialists. There have been important spin-off benefits. System requirements, parameters, and procedures for development of future systems have been established and the new chief of IDHS has gained experience. With the completion of the Daily Enemy Activity System, attention will be given to computerizing the monthly Order of Battle summary. Junior officers with aptitude and interest in analysis and programming are required for continued progress.

(2) Division 2 (Document Exploitation): The increase in enemy contacts during the reporting period has not generated any significant increase in documents available for exploitation. ARVN field elements still do not give priority to the timely transmittal of documents to higher headquarters for exploitation, except for those of high-level interest. Approximately 50 percent fewer document pages were received during this quarter, compared to the last quarter. The field acquisition of captured documents has been given to the Military Interrogation Division Regional Teams who have been making weekly visits to the Military Regions. They serve as couriers for captured documents from Corps Headquarters to Document Exploitation Division.

(3) Division 3 (Military Interrogation): Division 3 continues to be led by competent, experienced personnel. Funds have been allocated to provide subsistence for PWs and ralliers

CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT (CMD)




Figure 3-3

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

a. Organization. The MSS is still commanded by Brigadier General Vu Duc Nhuan. It is subordinate to the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the Joint General Staff (JGS). Despite MSS subordination to a staff element within the Ministry of Defense, it reports directly to, or receives tasking directly from, the highest levels, including the Office of the President and the Prime Minister. The headquarters element (Military Security Directorate) is located in Saigon and is composed of 657 officers and men. The remainder are assigned to either military units or to regular MSS units throughout South Vietnam. In the Capital Military District there are 48 officers, 125 NCO's, and 48 EM; a total of 221 personnel. A field office of 30 is maintained in each province and in the major cities. A contingent of six makes up the sub-field offices within each district. Also, units of 20 and 25 officers and men are assigned to Corps and Divisions, respectively. MSS personnel are attached at regiment, battalion, company and platoon level.

b. Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	1,087	1,021
NCOs	2,426	1,991
EM	<u>1,248</u>	<u>1,036</u>
TOTAL	4,761	4,048

The authorized strength remains at 4,761 while actual strength declined by 31.

c. Operational Effectiveness. MSS efforts have been successful in assisting the government in maintaining political stability. In furtherance of the countersubversion mission, MSS has provided valuable information concerning the VC infrastructure. The MSS is co-equal in power and prestige with the National Police and the Central Intelligence Office. During the reporting period, the MSS continued bilateral operations with US military intelligence elements in RVN for the purpose of satisfying mutual Order of Battle collection requirements in MR-1 and MR-3. Additional bilateral operations are under consideration for implementation in the Capital Zone and in each military region. A new MSS policy of screening all incoming intelligence reports and messages at the Directorate HQ for further dissemination has

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The Unit has second echelon maintenance capability for all its equipment. Maintenance above that level is obtained through ARVN support channels. Unit facilities throughout the country are excellent. Relocation of the unit headquarters to a new facility in Saigon will take place during October and November 1974.

d. Operational Effectiveness. Unit 101 maintains liaison with US Army Special Activities, Thailand. One US project officer is assigned at the headquarters level and provides technical and financial assistance. Monthly production now averages about 1,000 intelligence reports. Training of case officers and redirection of assets will improve the quality of the reporting; however, quantity will be lower than that of past years when the emphasis was on satisfying immediate tactical requirements. US military intelligence contingency operational support currently exceeds \$7,000 per month. Ten case officers from ten unproductive nets were transferred to non-case officer duties in September 1974. The unproductive sources under these nets were terminated. As a result, the unit currently has 85 active agent nets pending the redevelopment of the other 10 nets.

7. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE NAVY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

a. N-2.

(1) Organization. The N-2 is an operational staff for the Chief of Naval Operations with four main branches: Administrative/Personnel, Hydrographic Mapping, Intelligence and Exploitation. Its mission is to analyze information received from the Special Collection Detachment (SCD), naval forces at sea, naval coastal zone headquarters and other RVN intelligence agencies and to provide estimates of Communist intentions.

(2) Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	42	15
Petty Officers	24	18
Seamen	<u>15</u>	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	81	45

Strength last quarter was 21 officers, 14 Petty Officers, and

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14 Seamen. The change in strength is as follows: Six officers are in training at the Naval Training Center, Nha Trang; four Petty Officers were assigned to N-2 by the Personnel Bureau; one Seaman was promoted to Petty Officer and transferred; and a second Seaman was transferred. Additional personnel will probably be assigned to N-2. The morale of N-2 remains good. All are volunteers and most have completed their sea duty.

(3) Equipment and Facilities. A recent DAO/N-2 conference determined a need for cameras for 21 of the Navy's larger ships to assist in ship identification. Agent radios for the Navy's two junks were also requested. Acquisition of these items will upgrade the capability of the naval forces to develop better quality and more timely intelligence.

(4) Operational Effectiveness. The N-2 organization has continued to produce good quality briefings, reports and studies. One of their most significant products is the weekly intelligence summary. It is based on information obtained from SCD, naval forces at sea, naval coastal zone headquarters, riverine forces and other RVN intelligence agencies. The N-2 HQ staff now has an interrogation team which can be dispatched from the HQ to exploit targets of opportunity such as the crew of a captured junk. The team has the capability to interrogate in Vietnamese, Chinese, Cambodian and Thai language as well as to exploit foreign documents and materiel. During the period when N-2 was in liaison with the US Naval Advisory Group, an attempt was made to computerize junk sightings by Vietnamese Navy Ships. The form devised was too complicated for the average Seaman and many errors developed in the system. DAO is now assisting N-2 in the development of a new system based on a simple form. It should help the VNN control the movement of junks in Vietnamese coastal waters.

b. Unit 701 - (SCD):

(1) Organization. Effective 1 July 74, the SCD was reorganized and redesignated Unit 701. The Headquarters element of the unit consists of a command section and three branches: Operations, Signal and Support. It has two field elements:

(a) The covert element has six collection teams of agent handlers and informants. Because of the growing threat to Vietnamese Navy warships in the Saigon Port, Unit 701 plans to establish a seventh collection team which will be responsible for

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

CMD. CMD is now covered by Collection Team 6 which is also responsible for the Rung Sat Special Zone. The seventh team will not be assigned until another TO&E is approved by the Joint General Staff.

(b) The overt element consists of 28 naval intelligence liaison officers who are assigned to the military regions, sector and/or sub sector headquarters. In the past, the liaison officers functioned in a dual capacity. In addition to contact with official intelligence collection sources, they also worked as covert collection officers and managed the agent handlers in their areas. As a result of the reorganization of 1 July, HUMINT collection officers have been assigned to the field to assume the management of the covert collection nets.

(2) Personnel.

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	50	68
Petty Officers	62	146
Seamen	9	16
TOTAL	121	230

The total includes 34 radio men and one electronics technician.

(3) Operational Effectiveness. Operational effectiveness continues to improve. A new effort is being directed against VC/NVA units at the battalion and regimental headquarters level, especially against units located near the coast where most of Unit 701 informant nets operate. Heretofore, Unit 701 has been reporting mainly tactical intelligence obtained by visual means. The emphasis will now be on recruiting assets in the ranks of the VC/NVA to obtain intelligence on enemy plans and intentions.

8. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE.

a. HUMINT Collection.

(1) Most VNAF intelligence officers have developed skills to a point where they can successfully operate unilaterally.

(2) VNAF DOI Personnel:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	249	220
NCOs & EM	389	304
TOTAL	638	524

Ten officers, 11 EM are in training status.

(3) The VNAF Special Collection Unit still has an authorized strength of 15 and an assigned strength of 12. The US provides all of the Unit's operational funds. Without this assistance, the Unit could not operate.

b. PHOTINT.

(1) VNAF's Photo Intelligence collection was severely curtailed on 1 September 1974 because of cuts in US aid which resulted in reduced fuel allocations, reducing flying hours for VNAF photo reconnaissance. VNAF is scheduling only 150 hours of RC-47 and 45 hours of RF-5 time per month. Prior to the reduction, RF-5's were scheduled 68 hours per month and the RC-47's had 170 hours. The photo reconnaissance capability has also been degraded by the increased AA threat. Procurement of an improved camera system with greater operating altitude flexibility is under consideration, but no action can be taken under the current budget constraints. VNAF continues to be hampered by the limited number of reconnaissance aircraft, their vulnerability to enemy AA defenses (which have grown stronger during this period), and the inadequacy of the camera system. VNAF can provide very little photo coverage over MR's 2, 3 and 4. Due to the AA threat, virtually all of MR-1, along with the most active areas of MR's 2 and 3, are denied to VNAF's reconnaissance aircraft. Therefore, the RVN continues to rely on the US Buffalo Hunter for its coverage of these important areas.

(2) Despite several recent attempts to improve the VNAF's Reconnaissance Program, the major problem continues to be camera systems, especially the KS-92 70mm framing camera mounted in the RF-5. There is a definite requirement for a panoramic camera with higher operating altitude and greater resolution than is

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adaptable to the RF-5 aircraft. However, funding constraints prevent any action toward procuring such a camera system.

(3) In photo exploitation, the VNAF Air Photo Center (APC) continues to be plagued with inadequate and obsolete equipment. Imagery Interpreters, at APC and J2, continue to show high standards of professionalism, despite problems with aging equipment and inadequate working conditions.

9. (S/NFD) SIGINT.

a. The J7 is responsible for RVNAF SIGINT collection. Serving a dual role as one staff element of the JGS as well as civilian organization directly responsible to the Office of the President, the J7 (or Directorate General for Technical Services) provides timely intelligence to field commanders.

b. One ARVN Special Technical Detachment is assigned to each Infantry Division (11) and Special Support Teams are subordinate to Airborne, Marine and Ranger commanders. This collection effort is further augmented by the four Corps Centers located in Danang, Pleiku, Saigon and Can Tho. I&E shortages, especially of AN/PRR-15 radios, are inhibiting the collection potential. Manufacturing costs and lead time preclude solving shortage problems in the immediate future.

c. The Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) Program is comprised of 28 operational aircraft which fly 12 missions a day over the RVN. The ARDF Program is a joint effort with VNAF supplying aircraft and flight crews and the J7 providing "backend" personnel. Funding limitations have reduced the number of flying hours available to the ARDF Program. To compensate for this loss of collection time the J7 has instituted collection management procedures which should improve the quality of the intelligence product.

d. The RVNAF SIGINT program continues to make progress in the analytical and reporting fields but shortages in equipment and the need for additional secure communications hinder the collection effort.

10. (S/NFD) SUMMARY.

RVNAF intelligence services benefit from personnel who, on

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the whole, are highly competent, dedicated professionals. DAO liaison with them continues to improve, and the products received from them are generally satisfactory and timely. Some RVNAF intelligence activities would have to be drastically reduced or eliminated without US funding assistance. DAO is trying to assist VNAF in improving its photo reconnaissance capability. Procurement of an improved camera system with higher operating altitudes is still in great need and this need will increase in coming months as the enemy increases activity during the dry season. Other weak areas in RVNAF intelligence are the failure to exploit captured documents and materiel in a thorough, timely manner, and the lack of an operational data processing system for intelligence information.

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CHAPTER 4

RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

1. (C) INTRODUCTION. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) message 271729Z August 1974 (S), subject: FY 75 DAV Programming Guidelines and congressional approval of a 700 million dollar funding level appropriated for fiscal year 1975 (FY 75) Defense Assistance to South Vietnam (DAV) forced the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Joint General Staff (PVNAF JGS) to start a comprehensive review of present RVNAF force levels and develop a force structure reduction time table for implementation within the scope of the announced FY 75 budget. Representatives from RVNAF service components and JGS met with Defense Attache Office (DAO) division representatives, Security Assistance Division representatives and representatives from Force Structure Section to develop comprehensive force reductions which fit within the restricted funding and yet gave RVNAF the most effective combat power and support for the dollars available.

2. (S) RECOMMENDED FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES.

a. VNAF. Upon announcement of 183.3 million dollars breakout of VNAF share of the FY 75 DAV budget, a joint VNAF/DAO committee reviewed the total VNAF in conjunction with JGS stated priorities of close air support, mobility, medical evacuation, and reconnaissance. The committee proposed a time phased plan to reduce the number of squadrons from 66 to 56, and the aircraft inventory from 1857 to 1312; eliminating support for the A-1, AC-47, AC-119G, T-37, T-41, O-2, and C-7 aircraft. All T-41, T-37 aircraft in the Training Squadrons, and O-2 aircraft in the Liaison Squadron are to be deleted from VNAF inventory and removed from RVN. All A-1 aircraft in the Fighter Squadrons and C-7 aircraft in the Transport Squadron are to be placed in flyable storage in RVN, and if the threat diminishes or supplemental funding does not permit active use, the aircraft will be removed from RVN. The AC-119G and AC-47 aircraft in the Gunship Squadron will remain indefinitely in RVN in flyable storage. Deactivated A-1 squadrons are being replaced by detachments from A-37 squadrons. All T-41's used for in-country pilot training will be replaced with U17's. A-37 aircraft from operational units will replace T-37 aircraft in Training Squadron and UH-1 Helicopter training will be accomplished by operational units.

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b. VNN. Representatives from DAO, Navy Division and VNN made a study/estimate of the VNN capability under the VNN FY 75 budget breakout of 11 million dollars in conjunction with JGS priorities of mobility, fire support, prevention of infiltration and performance of coastal surveillance. After tabulating reductions the joint committee proposed a time phased plan to reduce the VNN blue water fleet by 39 percent; the brown water fleet by 82 percent and close all intermediate support bases. This reduction will cause decommissioning of 22 ships/craft from the blue water fleet (six Patrol Gunboats (PGM); two Gasoline Barges (YOG), six Landing Ships Utility, one Floating Repair Ship (YR), three Repair, Berthing, Messing Ships (YRMI), two Utility Boats 100 foot (UE), and two Salvage Light Lift Ships (YLLC). A total of 148 craft from the brown water fleet will be decommissioned, deleting support for two Patrol Craft Fast (PCF), four Patrol Boats (WPB), 111 Junks and 31 Harbor Defense Craft. The River Assault Groups will be reduced from 42 to 12 resulting in the decommissioning of 450 Riverine Craft. Of the remaining brown water craft 312 will be deactivated. Bases to be inactivated, but per JGS direction not closed are Cat Lai, Dong Tam, Vinh Long, Cho Moi, Rach Soi, Long Phu and Ca Mau. The VNN proposal for reduction is still under review by JGS and has not been approved.

c. ARVN. Representatives from DAO Force Structure Section met with representatives from JGS J3, Organization Division, Force Structure Branch to discuss actions taken to review and revise RVNAF force structure to include reductions in ARVN and Territorial Forces in particular. JGS position is to maintain strength level. Plans are to undertake a study to reduce ARVN and revise Territorial Forces once VNAF and VNN reductions have been completed. JGS is reviewing the combat support units, Armor and 175mm Artillery Battalions as possible areas where reductions can be made. Representatives from DAO Force Structure Section have pointed out that there are other areas in which reductions can be made, such as Engineer Combat Battalions, Military Police Units, Airborne Training Center and Military Police Battalions. In late September, representatives from JGS informed DAO Force Structure Section that a proposed general plan for reduction in RVNAF Force Structure, that included ARVN and Territorial Forces, has been submitted to the President for approval.

3. (S/NFD) IMPACT OF FUNDING CONSTRAINTS ON RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE. As a result of current DAV funding constraints forcing RVNAF action on force structure adjustments, JGS has stated the following major impacts upon RVNAF capabilities under current and high intensity combat levels:

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(1) VNAF.

- Budgetary constraints will cause severe degradation in supporting element and limit VNAF effectiveness.
- Progressive deterioration in combat capability with magnitude of deterioration predicated on level of enemy actions. Any prolonged increase in activity will definitely impact on VNAF's ability to effectively retaliate.
- An approximate 13 percent reduction in VNAF aircraft inventory with an overall 50 percent reduction in aircraft flying time.
- Visual reconnaissance degraded by loss of O2/U17 aircraft and reduction in number of O1 aircraft.
- Aircraft availability (operationally ready rates) will decrease despite increased manpower/aircraft ratios due to elimination of practically all contract repair programs. Corrosion control, periodic depot maintenance and analytical condition inspections will be cancelled.

(2) VNN.

- The VNN allocation of \$11.0 million will cause 39 percent of blue water ships and 82 percent of brown water craft to be taken out of service. In addition ARVN water craft will be taken out of service for lack of maintenance support.
- Missions which will be severely curtailed or completely discontinued include naval gunfire support, participation of riverine units in joint combat operations, protection of commercial ships in RVN ports and other harbor defense activities.
- Based on FY 75 budget constraint 19 ships and craft and 19 barges will not be overhauled. The overhaul cycle for all ships and craft will be increased from two to three years.

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- The VNN shipyard drydock pump replacement program will be discontinued, jeopardizing the operation of the only drydock in Vietnam.
- No replacement of equipment, vehicles, ships or craft of any type.

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CHAPTER 5

VIETNAMESE ARMY (ARVN)

1. (C) AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH. The authorized and assigned strengths of the ARVN combat divisions are shown in Figure 5-1. The Vietnamese Marine Corps authorized strength increased by 38 personnel.

2. (S) AREAS OF OPERATION (AO).

a. Military Region (MR) 1 is broken into five Division AO. The Airborne Brigades were deployed into three separate AO due to the threat in Quang Nam Province (P). The 2d Division's AO was increased to encompass the southern portion of Quang Tin (P).

b. In MR 2 the 22d and 23d Division Headquarters are now in their former locations although no well defined AO boundaries have been established.

c. MR 3 is comprised of five AO. Boundaries of the 5th, 18th, 25th Divisions and the Ranger Command were altered during this quarter.

d. MR 4 is subdivided into three (7th, 9th and 21st Divisions) AO.

(Figure 5-2)

e. Locations of tactical units, battalion and above, are shown in Figures 5-3, 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6.

3. (C) COMPAT ARMS.

a. Combat Divisions:

(1) The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VnMC) Division (Div) remains committed to a defensive posture in the northernmost AO. A change in the disposition of the VnMC was brought about by the transfer of two Airborne (Abn) brigades to Quang Nam (P) and the consequent extension of the Marine AO. The new AO extends from the Thach Han River in Quang Tri (P) to the Bo River west of Hue City. With this move the VnMC has experienced more combat activity. Communist forces have probed several outposts west of Hue in the O'Lau River Valley. In the past few months, four of these outposts were lost

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
AS OF 30 AUG 74

DIV	AUTH	A S S I G N E D				% AUTH
		OFF	NCO	EM	TOTAL	
1st	17102	1116	3766	10854	15736	92
2nd	14159	914	2847	7875	11646	82
3rd	14159	1000	2964	8593	12557	89
5th	14159	874	2443	7865	11182	79
7th	14175	911	2912	7248	11071	78
9th	14175	953	2894	7289	11136	79
18th	14159	881	2695	8067	11643	82
21st	14175	904	2871	6839	10614	75
22nd	17233	1081	3378	9002	13461	78
23rd	14168	930	2518	7728	11176	79
25th	14220	874	2677	9035	12586	89
Abn	13684	965	2929	9414	13308	97
Rgr	34418	2075	5567	21443	29085	85
Mar	14471	1023	2615	11504	15142	105
TOTAL	224457	14501	43086	132756	190343	85

Figure 5-1

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AREAS OF OPERATION



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Figure 5-2

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ARVN

MR 1





Figure 5-3

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MR 2



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Figure 5-4

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ARVN




Figure S-5

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


Figure 5-6

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to the enemy but have since been retaken. The program designed to provide well-fortified positions is nearly complete in the Marine AO. Units now have well dug-in defensive strongpoints. Training emphasis has been placed on antiaircraft and tank infantry tactics. The increase in combat activity has lessened disciplinary problems within the VMC and has contributed to an improvement in morale. Battalion rotation to Saigon has been discontinued due to the extension of AO and enemy activity. A leave program has been instituted as an interim measure until the rotation program can be reinstated. The Marines continue to maintain their reputation as an elite and highly effective combat unit.

(2) The Airborne Division was not operational as a division. As a direct result of enemy inroads which threatened Danang City, the 1st and 3d Abn Brigades (Bdes) were moved to Quang Nam (P). The Div Headquarters (HQ) moved from Thua Thien (P) to the vicinity of Danang. The 1st and 3d Bdes are assigned operational responsibility for the area west and southwest of Danang. Both Bdes are employed as mobile containment forces. They have been successful in firming up control of some areas previously threatened by the enemy. The 2d Bde in Thu Thien (P), under operational control (OPCON) of the VMC, saw very little activity as units conducted small reconnaissance patrols and remained in a static defensive posture. These units continued to demonstrate their capability to respond rapidly and effectively. The Div maintains its reputation as an elite force and appears capable of performing up to expectation when the need arises.

(3) The 1st Infantry (Inf) Div's area of responsibility did not change upon deployment of the 1st and 2d Abn Bdes to Quang Nam. Responsibility for the Song Bo corridor lies with the 3d Abn Bde to the west and the 15th Ranger (Rgr) Group (Gp) on the eastern flank. The 3d and 51st Inf took over the AO formerly held by the 54th Inf southwest of Phu Bai. Subsequently these units were badly mauled on 28 August and driven from their positions. Their inability to cope with the enemy resulted in a severe loss of morale and confidence. On 25 July, the 54th Inf was redeployed from its strategic reserve position near Hue to the fighting in Quang Nam, (P) OPCON to the 3d Div. The unit was returned in early September to the Phu Loc Area, Thua Thien (P), linking up with the 1st Inf to keep strategic QI-1 open. The performance of many company and battalion-level officers has been substandard. The many changes at the battalion and regimental level, due to heavy casualties among company grade officers, creates cause for concern. Replacement of NCO and officer losses continues to be a problem. A major

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operational problem for the division continued to be the lack of sufficient hard intelligence on enemy strength and movements. The Division's capability decreased during this quarter; however, the Division is regarded as combat effective.

(4) The 3d Inf Div has been heavily engaged since the current enemy campaign in Quang Nam (P) commenced 18 July. Attacks in Que Son, Dai Loc, and Duc Duc Districts gave the 3d Div its first heavy combat test since reorganization. ARVN losses in the Quang Nam action unquestionably affected the combat proficiency of the 2d Inf and the 56th Inf. Pressure on ARVN units in Quang Nam (P) required a change in AO; the Que Son Valley was given to the 2d Div which moved the 4th Inf from Quang Ngai (P). Reinforcement was also necessary. On 25 July, the 54th Inf, 1st Div, was attached to the 3d Div with responsibility for keeping Route 4 open in the vicinity of the Dai Loc/Dien Ban District boundary. On 13 August, the 3d Abn Ede was deployed west of Danang astride the Happy Valley/Leech Valley approach to the city; simultaneously, the 1st Abn Ede was moved west-northwest of Dai Loc along the Vu Gia River. The mission given to the Abn Bdes was that of a containment/mobile reserve force. The 3d Div has demonstrated considerable resilience throughout the offensive in Quang Nam (P). Although replacement of losses under combat conditions is not ideal, the 3d was able to absorb the replacement and maintain its units on the line. There has been no noticeable loss of combat effectiveness due to shortages of critical equipment, although equipment losses since the beginning of the enemy campaign have been moderate to high. A key factor in the support of ARVN forces in Quang Nam has been the performance of VNAF. At the peak of the campaign an average of 55-60 sorties per day were provided with timeliness and accuracy.

(5) The 2d Inf Div was heavily committed throughout the quarter in its AO which includes the Que Son Valley in southern Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The defenses of the 2d Div in Quang Ngai were over-extended due to the deployment of the entire 4th Regt to the Que Son Valley on 2 August. The 5th and 6th Inf were deployed to the high threat areas in the southern half of Quang Ngai. Territorial forces were responsible for the security of northern Quang Ngai and proved inadequate to the task. The 2d Div units sustained heavy losses during the previous quarter in military actions in Quang Tin and have not fully recovered. Replacements are being assigned; however, they are not adequately trained for combat and the existing situation in the 2d Div AO does not permit further training at this time. The 4th Inf had

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reasonable success in its defensive role in the Que Son Valley, allowing 3d Div units to operate aggressively to the north. At the end of the quarter, the 4th Inf was preparing to return to Quang Ngai. The loss of Minh Long District town and Gia Vuc Rgr camp in southern Quang Ngai has allowed increased communist pressure on 2d Div units in Nghia Hanh and Tu Nghia Districts in central Quang Ngai. Leadership remains a major problem. On orders to relocate commanders have difficulty assembling units resulting in many units moving well below strength. The 2d Div continued to be the weakest of the divisions assigned to MR 1 and is considered to be marginally combat effective.

(6) The 22d Inf Div was deployed to Binh Dinh (P) from the Central Highlands. The 40th Inf remained deployed northwest of Kontum City. The 47th Inf moved to Binh Dinh in May to an area east of Phu My where the communists had been expanding control. The Regiment made a poor showing in light contacts with enemy forces. It was neither aggressive nor did it react to developing situations; poor leadership was the main factor. Subsequently, the Regiment was moved to northern Binh Dinh to strengthen the Ranger AO. In contrast, the 41st and 42d Inf stopped and eliminated a determined communist threat to interdict QL-1 and gain complete control of the area southeast of Phu My and the shallow water port at De Gi. These regiments, with Ranger support, also cleared the mountainous area northeast of Phu Cat and retook several villages. Communist losses in the actions were heavy. They were forced to withdraw to their base area to the west. The 22d Div made extensive use of long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs) to interdict communist supply routes and to direct artillery and air strikes on enemy positions. Late in the quarter, these missions were reduced by the curtailment of helicopter support. Initial success by the 22d Div in the Deo Nhung Pass was made possible by the excellent mobility demonstrated in its move from the Central Highlands and its subsequent tactical maneuvers. Communist forces were not able to react in time to block the Division's advance. Refresher training was not possible during the quarter due to continued contact. The 22d Div is considered to be combat effective.

(7) The 23d Inf Div continued to demonstrate its capability to respond quickly and effectively to enemy activity throughout Darlac, Quang Duc, Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. The 23d Div Command Post (CP) moved from Darlac to Kontum. Two regiments, the 45th with three battalions in Darlac and the 53d minus one battalion in Quang Duc, remained in place. When enemy threats

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developed in Darlac, the 45th responded rapidly and inflicted heavy casualties in driving the enemy westward from QL-14. Later, the 45th Inf moved to Kontum and conducted security operations northeast and southwest of Kontum City; it inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy during numerous minor contacts while absorbing shelling and sustaining casualties and equipment losses. The 3/45th Inf ran road security operations southwest of Kontum City on QL-14 to the Chu Pao Pass. The road remained open. The 53d Inf moved from Quang Duc (P), where it had assisted Ranger units to secure QL-14 and LTL-8B and had inflicted heavy enemy casualties, to the vicinity of Phu My Base, Pleiku. There, it relieved enemy pressure on Ranger units, allowing them to rest and refit. During the latter part of August, the 45th Inf moved from Kontum to an area southwest of Pleiku City, while the 53d Inf moved to the vicinity of Thanh An City. Elements of the 44th Inf, northeast of Kontum City, conducted security operations and other elements kept QL-14 open through the Chu Pao Pass to Pleiku. The continual commitment of the 23d Div precluded refresher training; however, the division has conducted on-site training whenever combat conditions permitted. The Division is considered combat effective.

(8) Enemy activity in the 25th Div AO was directed primarily against Territorial Forces; consequently, only limited opportunity existed to test 25th Div readiness and willingness to fight. Enemy attacks in mid-August against RF/PT outposts west of Tay Ninh City did enable some elements of the 25th Div to engage the enemy. However, the MR 3 after-action assessment of unit performance concluded that the units, particularly those elements involved in the Phuoc Ton battle, made a poor showing and were clearly less motivated than the other two divisions in MR 3. JGS continued to rate the 25th Div as the least effective of the Region's divisions. The MR 3 Commander, LTC Pham Quoc Thuan, said that the 25th Div started to show some improvement, noting that corruption within the division was reduced. Effective 1 October, the 25th Div was to be reinforced with an RF mobile group comprised of one battalion each from Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, and Gia Dinh Provinces. During this quarter, three 25th Div battalions were OPCON to the 18th Div in the Ben Cat/Base 82 operation, Binh Duong (P), and did not distinguish themselves in their assigned objective. Continued stress on correction of administrative malpractices, coupled with the assignment of a mobile RF Group, should assist in improving division morale and effectiveness.

(9) The 5th Inf Div began the long-awaited improvement expected since Nov 73 when COL Vy assumed command. The division cannot be

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be called aggressive; however, improvements are noticeable in military discipline and morale. Saluting and personal appearance are strongpoints of the soldiers of this division. The Division assumed the area of Route 7, Ben Cat (D), from the 18th Div and has maintained contact with the enemy. Although LTC Thuan ordered an aggressive operation to retake Base 82, tactics used were limited to trenching toward the base. While trenches were being dug in an effort to reach a strong point 300 meters south of Base 82, the enemy launched an attack. Thereafter, the 5th Div made no further efforts to complete its mission. Two battalions of the 33d Rgr Gp and one RF battalion were sent to An Dien Village in September to reinforce division elements positioned there. The 1/8th Inf Bn, which suffered most of the casualties in the aforementioned trenching, was sent back to the Lai Khe Base for R&R. One problem facing the 5th Div is operational space. The AO does not afford maneuverability as the area of control is limited to the immediate vicinity of An Dien, Ben Cat, Lai Khe, and north on QL-13 to Bau Bang. Combat commitments continued to preclude refresher training. The 5th Div is still considered only marginally effective although some improvement has been noted.

(10) The 18th Inf Div has continued to be the mainstay of the combat forces in MR 3. The Inf Battalions have an average combat strength of 450 men each. The soldiers are tired and many noncommissioned and company grade officers were casualties of the An Dien Battle. Little time was available for training during the quarter, as the division was tactically committed to the area north of the Dong Nai River in Bien Hoa (P). Elements of the 209th NVA Regiment overran Ba Cam RF outpost and captured Thai Hung Village. The 52d Regt was committed along LTL-16 in western Bien Hoa; the 48th Regt set up blocking positions to the north in Phu Giao, Binh Duong (P); the 43d Regt with two Rgr Battalions moved eastward from Tan Uyen and retook the area. There were indications that enemy elements were hurt badly; very few friendly losses were incurred. The daily shellings of Bien Hoa Air Base ceased. To maintain control of the southern end of the Iron Triangle, the Division had OPCON over three battalions from the 25th Div. One battalion of the 48th Regt, however, was left in the An Dien area for the entire quarter. QL 1 through Long Khanh (P) and Binh Tuy (P) was covered by the 7th Rgr Gp during this period, allowing the 25th Div to make maximum use of organic elements. A continuous operational posture precluded rotation of units for retraining and refitting. Despite these difficulties, the Division remains combat effective.

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(11) The 7th Inf Div continued to be one of the better divisions of NVAF. The three organic regiments continued to be highly mobile and moved frequently in their AO. Their major operations have been in Dinh Tuong (P) and Kien Tuong (P). Active patrolling denied the enemy access to his old base areas and restricted use of the major infiltration routes. Rotation of units to Dong Tam for refit and refresher training was limited due to the continuing attempts of the NVA to infiltrate the Delta. One battalion was under OPCON of the 9th Div to help block infiltration routes in the southeastern section of Kien Phong (P). The Division continued to make good use of attached support units in combined operations against enemy forces. Inflation contributed to lowered morale and a higher desertion rate. Nevertheless, the 7th Div is considered combat effective and capable of meeting future contingencies.

(12) The 9th Inf Div did not function as a unit during the quarter. Division headquarters moved from the western Delta to its present location at Cao Lanh during the first part of the quarter. The 16th Regt continued to cover the western reaches of the AO with blocking forces and active patrolling to deny the enemy use of land and sea infiltration routes. It was very effective in this role. The 14th and 15th Regts were pulled back to division headquarters in early September to provide security along QL-4 and LTL-30. The 14th Regt headquarters with two battalions moved to Phong Dinh under OPCON of the 21st Div. The 15th Regt headquarters plus two battalions moved to Kien Van (D). The other battalion of the 15th was stationed on the Kien Phong/Dinh Tuong Province border west of the Tri Phap area to deny enemy reinfiltration into its old base area. Aggressive patrolling by the three regiments exacted a sizeable toll of enemy forces and forced them to operate in small elements. The Division is noted for its judicious use of artillery and armor in its battle plans. During this quarter, the Division's artillery exacted a high toll of enemy troops. The 9th Div shared responsibility with the 7th Div for preventing enemy forces from reestablishing their Tri Phap base area. The 9th Div recruitments are the highest and desertions the lowest. The 9th Div is considered capable and combat effective.

(13) The 21st Inf Div is considered to be the least combat effective division in MR 4. Ubiquitous corruption, poor leadership at all levels, profiteering, "flower" soldiers, and lack of proper training, all contribute to its ineffectiveness and low morale. The Division is responsible for the largest AO in the Region. Under these circumstances the enemy organized small,

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highly mobile units striking anywhere along the lengthy LOC with little, if any, retaliation. There were no instances of large, prolonged or decisive contacts with the enemy. The burden of containing the enemy and providing security fell upon the RF and PF. The Division was involved in only a small fraction of the fighting that took place in its AO. The deterioration of security, in general, and the lack of decisive and timely action clearly indicated the combat effectiveness of the 21st Div is unsatisfactory.

(14) Ranger Command.

(a) Ranger units in MR 1 sustained high casualties during this quarter in the Quang Nam (P) offensive and in the loss of Gia Vuc Camp, Quang Ngai (P). The 15th Rgr Gp moved from OPCON Marine Division, Quang Tri (P) to OPCON 1st Inf Div, Thua Thien (P) in a Corps forward reserve status. It was in screening positions along the eastern Po River corridor and reported frequent but light enemy activity since its arrival. The 12th Rgr Gp was shifted from Quang Ngai to Quang Nam at the outset of hostilities and performed credibly. The 14th Rgr Gp was in static bases in Quang Nam and Quang Tin until Da Trach and Thuong Duc were lost with the virtual elimination of the 78th and 79th Rgr Battalions. The 11th Rgr Gp in Quang Ngai is in static defense with the 69th Rgr Bn at Tra Bong and the 68th Rgr Bn at Son Ma. The 70th Rgr Bn at Gia Vuc was overrun by a determined effort of communist forces. Final casualties sustained by the 70th Rgr Bn at Gia Vuc are unknown. It is believed the Ranger Command (Cmd) will receive its required replacements, training and refurbishing within the next quarter. The casualty breakdown 18 July through mid-September, but not including Gia Vuc, follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
Officers	31	31	27
NCOs	48	55	101
DI	191	455	597

(b) With the exception of the successful defense of the Plei Me Ranger Camp, Pleiku (P), by elements of the 81st and 82d Rgr Battalions, the Rgr Cmd in MR 2 saw little combat. The 24th Rgr Gp moved from Pleiku to Quang Duc (P) to assist the 21st Rgr Gp in reopening LTL-8B, the LOC connecting Gia Nghia and Ban Me Thuot. The 90th Rgr Bn replaced the 82d Rgr Bn at Plei Me. The 22d Rgr Gp HQ remains in Kontum (P). The 4th and 6th Rgr Battalions continue to support the 22d Inf Div on operations in Binh Dinh (P).

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(c) There was no noticeable change in the deployment and combat effectiveness of Ranger units in MR 3. Ranger units continued to defend isolated outposts and were deployed in support of ground operations on a limited basis. The 81st Rgr Gp continued to conduct reconnaissance operations into the enemy's base areas with some degree of success.

(Figure 5-7)

b. Artillery. ARVN continues to fabricate many repair parts necessary to keep a prescribed level of readiness. There are some shortages in recoil mechanisms and periscope mounts. Unserviceable recoils for M-105 are being reinspected to determine the scope of repairs required. It appears that many may be recovered by purging the hydraulic system and recharging with nitrogen.

ARTILLERY OPERATIONAL READY RATES

	<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>175mm</u>
REDCON 4th Qtr/74	93%	91%	87%
REDCON 1st Qtr/75	95%	92%	87%

(Figures 5-8A, 5-8B and 5-8C)

c. Armor. The overall readiness rate for Armor has been maintained at 89% which is well above the ARVN standard of 83%. There are continuing problems in repair of electrical fire control systems and computers. These are being resolved by extensive on-site training conducted by Third Country Nationals (TCN) and by the development of a capability for repairs of critically needed items.

ARMOR OPERATIONAL READY RATES

	<u>M113</u>	<u>M41A3</u>	<u>M48A3</u>
REDCON 4th Qtr/74	84%	79%	88%
REDCON 1st Qtr/75	86%	81%	88%

(Figure 5-9)

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RANGER DISPOSITIONS




Figure 5-7

5-23

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UNIT	HOW 105mm			HOW 155mm			GUN 175mm		
	Auth	OH	Uns	Auth	OH	Uns	Auth	OH	Uns
I ALC									
Log Spt Ctr/Thua Thien	12	12	0						
11th Arty Bn	18	18	0						
12th Arty Bn	18	18	0						
14th Arty Bn	10	10	0						
21st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
22d Arty Bn	18	18	0						
32d Arty Bn	18	17	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Quang Nam	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Quang Ngai	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Quang Tin	8	8	0						
44th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
10th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
20th Arty Bn				18	19	1			
30th Arty Bn				18	18	3			
101st SP Arty Bn							12	12	0
102d SP Arty Bn							12	11	1
105th SP Arty Bn							12	12	2
31st Arty Bn	16	18	6						
33d Arty Bn	18	18	2						
SUB TOTAL	172	171	2	72	73	4	36	35	3
II ALC									
Log Spt Ctr/Kontum	8	7	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Phu Bon	6	6	0						
63rd Arty Bn	18	16	1						
69th Arty Bn	18	18	0						
221st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
223d	18	20	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Binh Dinh	20	20	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Phu Yen	16	16	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Pleiku	6	6	0						
37th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
103d Arty Bn							12	12	3
220th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
222d Arty Bn	18	18	0						
SUB TOTAL	146	145	1	36	36	0	12	12	3
III ALC									
Log Spt Ctr/Gia Dinh	12	12	1						
Log Spt Ctr/Long Khanh	10	10	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Tay Ninh	8	8	0						
52d Arty Bn	18	18	3						
53d Arty Bn	18	18	0						
181st Arty Bn	18	18	3						
182d Arty Bn	18	18	0						
183d Arty Bn	18	17	0						
251st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
252d Arty Bn	18	18	4						
253d Arty Bn	18	18	0						
(Continued)									

Figure 5-8A

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UNIT	HOW 105mm			HOW 155mm			GUN 175mm		
	Auth	OH	Uns	Auth	OH	Uns	Auth	OH	Uns
61st Arty Bn	18	18	2						
Log Spt Ctr/Bien Hoa	8	8	3						
Log Spt Ctr/Binh Duong	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Binh Tuy	6	6	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Hau Nghia	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Phuoc Tuy	6	6	2						
46th Arty Bn				18	18	5			
180th Arty Bn				18	18	2			
150th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
104th SP Arty Bn							12	12	3
Amphibious Spt Bn/Mar	54	54	0						
Spt Bn/Abn Div	54	54	1						
51st Arty Bn	18	18	1						
Log Spt Ctr/Binh Long	6	6	1						
Log Spt Ctr/Phuoc Long	8	7	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Long An	8	8	0						
SUB TOTAL	376	375	20	54	54	7	12	12	3
IV ALC									
Log Spt Ctr/Phong Dinh	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/An Giang	4	4	0						
Log Spt Ctr/An Xuyen	12	12	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Ba Xuyen	8	8	1						
Log Spt Ctr/Chau Doc	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Dinh Tuong	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Go Cong	6	6	1						
Log Spt Ctr/Kien Giang	12	12	2						
Log Spt Ctr/Kien Hoa	10	10	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Kien Phong	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Kien Tuong	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Sa Dec	6	6	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Vinh Binh	8	8	0						
Log Spt Ctr/Vinh Long	8	8	0						
67th Arty Bn	18	18	0						
68th Arty Bn	18	18	0						
71st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
72d Arty Bn	18	19	2						
73d Arty Bn	18	18	0						
91st Arty Bn	18	18	0						
92d Arty Bn	18	18	9						
93d Arty Bn	18	18	0						
211st Arty Bn	18	18	4						
212d Arty Bn	18	18	2						
213d Arty Bn	18	18	4						
47th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
70th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
90th Arty Bn				18	18	8			
210th Arty Bn				18	18	0			
SUB TOTAL	312	313	25	72	72	8			
(Continued)									

Figure 5-8B

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UNIT	HOW 105mm			HOW 155mm			GUN 175mm			
	Auth	OH	Uns	Auth	OH	Uns	Auth	OH	Uns	
V ALC										
Log Spt Ctr/Darlac	12	12	0							
Log Spt Ctr/Binh Thuan	8	8	0							
Log Spt Ctr/Khanh Hoa	14	14	0							
Log Spt Ctr/Ninh Thuan	8	8	0							
Log Spt Ctr/Tuyen Duc	8	8	0							
Log Cpt Ctr/Quang Duc	12	12	2							
231st Arty Bn	18	18	0							
232d Arty Bn	18	18	0							
233d Arty Bn	18	18	0							
230th Arty Bn				18	18	0				
SUB TOTAL	116	116	2	18	18	0				
GRAND TOTAL	1122	1120	50	252	253	19	60	59	7	
		105mm			155mm			175mm		
REDCON 4th Qtr/74		93%			91%			87%		
REDCON 1st Qtr/75		95%			92%			87%		

Figure 5-8C

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UNIT	APC M113			TANK M41A3			TANK M48A3		
	Auth	OH	Uns	Auth	OH	Uns	Auth	OH	Uns
7th Armor Cav	42	42	2						
4th Armor Cav	42	42	3	17	17	4			
20th Tank Sqn	12	12	0				54	54	8
17th Armor Cav	42	40	3	17	17	0			
11th Armor Cav	42	40	5	17	18	7			
I ALC SUB TOTAL	180	176	13	51	52	11	54	54	8
14th Armor Cav	42	29	1	17	16	0			
3d Armor Cav	48	45	7	17	15	1			
21st Tank Sqn	12	12	1				54	53	5
19th Armor Cav	42	43	10	17	18	4			
II ALC SUB TOTAL	144	129	19	51	49	5	54	53	5
15th Armor Cav	49	49	3	17	18	2			
1st Armor Cav	42	40	1	17	16	1			
5th Armor Cav	42	40	3	17	13	3			
10th Armor Cav	42	41	1						
22d Tank Sqn	12	12	0	17	17	3	54	54	4
18th Armor Cav	58	54	4						
III ALC SUB TOTAL	245	236	12	68	64	9	54	54	4
2d Armor Cav	58	58	11						
9th Armor Cav	58	58	9						
12th Armor Cav	58	58	7						
16th Armor Cav	58	57	10						
6th Armor Cav	58	56	6						
IV ALC SUB TOTAL	290	287	43						
18th Armor Cav	42	37	2	17	15	2			
V ALC SUB TOTAL	42	37	2	17	15	2			
ALL ALC'S GRAND TOTAL	901	865	89	187	180	27	162	161	17
	M113			M41A3			M48A3		
REDCON 4th Atr/74	84%			79%			88%		
REDCON 1st Qtr/75	86%			81%			88%		

Figure 5-9

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4. (U) SUPPLY/LOGISTICS.

a. During this period the impact of suspension of funds in Jan 74 continued to be felt. The receipts from CONUS and off-shore have improved but remain below the level necessary to replenish stocks even at reduced levels. Some of the critical needs have been met; however, shortages continue. Current fund restrictions have imposed additional constraints upon the processing of normal rebuild/replenishment requirements. This condition will continue to slow maintenance management efforts to alleviate shortfall in critical rebuild programs. The Collection and Classification Center and Annexes are steadily moving unserviceable assets to rebuild facilities. These assets constitute an important part of end item stock for various rebuild programs. Progress on generation and shipment of excess continues at a slow steady rate. Approximately 131,000 items have been identified, 120,406 reported. Of those reported, the following data is provided:

25,020	MRO to AAD
11,643	MRO to C&C
80,650	MRO to PDO
2,501	Require research
592	Awaiting processing

b. Depot Operations.

(1) There are currently 50 ARVN personnel on six months temporary duty (TDY) to the 1st AAD, Long Binh. These personnel are from the 2d AAD at Danang.

(a) Contract DAJB004-74-C-0018 with Eastern Construction Company Incorporated (ECCOI) continues to provide technical assistance training and operational support in all areas of supply as it pertains to depot operations, including formal training classes as well as on-the-job training.

(b) The seven man Army Materiel Command/Pacific Area Command (AMC/PAC) Quick Reaction Team (QRT) departed 1 August 1974 and was replaced on 29 August 1974 by a three-man AMC QRT. This team provides technical assistance, guidance and recommendations for improvement of depot operations. Significant areas and activities addressed include efficiency of rewarehousing, upgrade of care and preservation, monitor CONUS receipts, and provide assistance to the ongoing location survey.

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c. Status of Ammunition (July through September 1974).

(1) Available beginning of quarter:

Short Tons	129,462
Dollars	258,585,231

(2) Expenditures during quarter:

Short Tons	62,393
Dollars	108,611,577

(3) On-Hand at end of quarter:

Short Tons	108,401
Dollars	245,414,150

(4) Requisitions:

Short Tons	54,905
Dollars	70,481,576

(5) Stockage Levels (SO):

Short Tons	126,150
Dollars	249,802,384

d. Shortfall.

(1) Logistics/Management. The Army Supply Center (ASC), formerly NMMA, level of operational effort continues to advance. The primary shortfall in providing the full spectrum of supplies necessary for operation is caused by continued fund constraints. Levels of supply have been reduced to less than standard to compensate for lack of funds. Tighter internal fiscal controls combined with forced reduced requirements should assure operational efficiency for the short range period. Maximum use is being made of assets on hand.

(2) Depot Operations. The entire operation is still understrength and undertrained.

(3) The depot consolidation action continues. The 40th Engineer Depot annex completed in mid-September. The 60th Signal Base Depot has 182 lines left to move for which materiel release orders have been issued.

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(4) Ammo Deficiencies. (Term Usages: DODAC = Department of Defense Ammunition Code; BOH - Balance on Hand).

(a)	DODAC	C445 CTG 105mm HE
	BOH	1,360.9 Thousand Rds
	Stockage	1,931.7
	% Stockage	70.4
(b)	DODAC	B568 CTG 40mm
	BOH	1,389.9 Thousand Rds
	Stockage	4,428.6
	% Stockage	31.3
(c)	DODAC	B632 CTG 60mm HE
	BOH	639.4 Thousand Rds
	Stockage	1,038.1
	% Stockage	61.5
(d)	DODAC	3881 Grenade Frag
	BOH	812.9 Thousand Rds
	Stockage	2,226.1
	% Stockage	36.5
(e)	DODAC	G911 Grenade Offensive
	BOH	216.6 Thousand Rds
	Stockage	760.8 Thousand
	% Stockage	28.4

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(F) DODAC H557 Rockets 66mm
BOH 36.5 Thousand Rds
Stockage 208.6 Thousand Rds
% Stockage 17.4

(5) Critical Shortages. See paragraph 4a (Supply/Logistics) above.

5. (C) MAINTENANCE.

a. Field Maintenance.

(1) End Item Use Inspections performed since April 1973 totaled 421. Visits were curtailed due to shortages of US personnel and to permit accomplishments of more detailed studies involving assistance required by ARVN in achieving a state of self-sufficiency.

(2) The Operational Readiness (OR) rate continues to remain at an acceptable level. The slight improvement in OR for Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE) is significant since this equipment is operated excessively and in high usage category.

OPERATIONAL READINESS (OR)

<u>Items</u>	<u>4th Qtr/FY 74</u>	<u>1st Qtr/FY 75</u>
Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE)	66%	68%
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV)	80%	81%
Combat Vehicles	85%	84%
Artillery	95%	94%
Communication & Electronics (C&E)	95%	94%

(3) There is a pronounced increased interest by commanders to improve readiness and reduce cost. Management methods are used more effectively to identify specific problems and correct causes of premature failures in equipment. There is a move to establish model maintenance activities for others to imitate. Hopefully, this will improve performance at operator and organizational maintenance levels.

b. Artillery. The overall OR rate improved slightly from previous report. It remains above the DA standards of 83%.

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c. Combat Vehicles.

(1) The OR rate improved for APCs and tanks M41A3 while remaining at an acceptable level of 88% for tanks M48A3.

(2) Most significant problems are associated with the turrets. They require detailed electrical repairs but there are not sufficient trained personnel to effect required repairs.

d. Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE). OR rate improved from 66 to 68%. This appears slight but it is significant since most assets are in high usage category and subject to strenuous operations. Commanders are becoming more concerned over the condition of this equipment. Therefore, improved maintenance performance is evident. In addition, refresher courses are being conducted by contract personnel for 1st thru 4th echelon maintenance and are proving very effective not only to raise skill level but also to recover many unserviceable assets. In this calendar year 81 forklifts were repaired by this training method.

e. Tactical Wheel Vehicles:

(1) The OR is improving. It now stands at 81% and more near the actual OR than previously reported. Commanders are now reporting deadline those vehicles requiring batteries and tires which may have not been reported in this category previously.

(2) Recycling high mileage vehicles through Depot Maintenance remains a problem. Several problems are restricting this program; capacity of rebuild facilities, timely retrograding of assets and lack of repair cycle float.

f. Depot Maintenance:

(1) The level of self-sufficiency at 40th Engineer Base Depot (40th EBD) rebuild facilities, particularly in areas of technical proficiency of personnel, is steadily increasing. However, deficiencies in ability to prepare realistic Bill of Material requirements and basic managerial skills are still apparent. A concerted effort is being made to rectify these conditions.

(2) Maintenance Facilities:

(a) Due to limited diagnostic and test equipment available at 40th EBD the Inspect and Repair Only as Needed (IROAN) program cannot be fully implemented. In addition, equipment required to restore

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unserviceable track groups (track shoes, rollers, carriers and idlers) for crawler tractors is lacking. Therefore:

1 Costly repairs are made in overhauling components, when possibly only a minor or no repair is required.

2 Unserviceable track groups are being replaced with new, yet the unserviceable could have been restored to a serviceable condition at considerable savings.

3 To help rectify the above conditions and reduce cost in obtaining required test equipment, a survey is being conducted to determine which items can be fabricated and may be in-country, however, unidentified. Some equipment (approximately \$60,000) required to upgrade the rebuild facilities has been located in Storage Area 777 at Long Binh. Arrangements are currently being made to draw the equipment.

(b) The FY 75 Rebuild Program production on construction equipment slipped by 22 percent during the first quarter. However, the production on generators and engines slipped by 50 percent. A concerted effort is being made to rectify these conditions.

(3) Technical Supply:

(a) Reworking of Bill of Material (BOM) assets that started on 8 May 1974 has been completed.

(b) An inventory is currently being conducted.

(c) Six thousand one hundred lines of excess have been reported to Army Supply Center, requesting disposition. As of this date disposition instructions have been received on 1800 lines.

g. Vietnamese Army Arsenal (VAA):

(1) Shop Supply. A location survey of 41,000 locations has been completed. A 10 percent audit revealed an accuracy rate of 84 percent. To date, 7988 locations have been inventoried. It is anticipated that this inventory will be completed by the end of October. The newly installed railway network continues to pay dividends in the transporting of material to and from the Arsenal, Newport and Long Binh.

(2) Maintenance Facilities:

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(a) Power Train Shop. The planned reorganization of equipment layout has not been implemented. Delay in this project is due to current production slippage. The great demand for continued production makes it difficult to convey the need for new production techniques. Training of personnel on the testing of the CD500 cross drive transmission is completed. ARVN performance is satisfactory.

(b) Tire Shop (VAA). The planned upgrading in production capability to increase production is well on its way. Requisitions have been forwarded to the Army Supply Center.

(c) Tire Shop (Danang). This facility has suspended production because of fire loss. Restoration is now underway, with start-up with 50/60% of capacity expected in November 1974/100% production can be expected 30 days after receipt/installation of new equipment.

(3) Phase II Upgrade and Foundry Installation:

(a) A contract for construction and installation of equipment for the new combat vehicle shop was awarded in mid-June. Work commenced in July with an estimated construction time of one year to completion. To date, 204 pieces of machinery and equipment have been received from the US Army Depot at Sagami, Japan. The remaining equipment is in Sagami and is being readied for shipment to Vietnam.

(b) Work on the Foundry Installation is progressing satisfactorily. Operational testing is being delayed due to the inability of the contractor to procure the required air compressors and transformer. Testing will be accomplished with government furnished transformers and ARVN supplied air compressors. It is planned to complete the required testing by the end of 2d quarter. Investigation into the need of a reserve water supply for the furnaces reveals that a need exists. The water system is being designed and the feasibility of incorporating the installation cost into the current contract is being studied.

6. (C) PETROLEUM OIL AND LUBRICANTS (POL).

a. As previously reported during 4th Quarter FY 74 it became apparent that reliance on MILSTRIP for supply of special lubricants to RVNAF could not be continued. Long lead time for procurement by Defense General Supply Center has caused many items to be classified

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as critically short. This was a serious situation for those products required to keep VNAF in the air.

b. All special lubricants were offered in solicitation to suppliers located in Southeast Asia. Response to solicitations indicated that 82% of required products would be available early in 1st Quarter FY 75 at a cost less than Defense General Supply Center MILSTRIP cost. Action to reprogram MILSTRIP funds to in-country procurement funds was taken and critical supply items were made available during 1st Quarter FY 75.

c. Beginning 1 July 1974 all AVGAS 115/145 requirements were satisfied by RVNAF contracts. Shell will supply 52.0 thousands of barrels and EXXON will supply 26.8 thousands of barrels per month for a total of 78.8 thousands of barrels per month. The combination meets RVNAF/FANK/DAO needs.

d. From January-May 1974, RVNAF was dependent on sole source supply from SEAS (SHELL) to meet fuel requirements. This was an unsatisfactory arrangement for preservation of the fuel supply line and left RVNAF at the mercy of SEAS. Although SEAS had registered strong protests, contracts have been let to EXXON and CALTEX for fuel supply at the expense of SEAS quantities. The breakdown, by percentage of supply by contractor during 1st Quarter FY 75 is shown below.

	<u>SEAS (SHELL)</u>	<u>EXXON</u>	<u>CALTEX</u>
MOGAS	39.8%	29.6%	30.6%
AVGAS	65.9%	34.1%	0
DIESEL	48.5%	33.1%	18.4%
JP4	83.5%	16.5%	0

e. During the acceleration of hostilities, RVNAF was compelled to draw upon some of its contingency stock. To offset this an increase of allocations to meet consumption requirement and maintain a 60-day supply was implemented. The increase went from 528.0 thousands of barrels per month during 4th Quarter FY 74 to 636.8 thousands of barrels during 1st Quarter FY 75.

7. (U) PORT OPERATIONS.

a. On 29 March 1973, RVNAF assumed responsibility for military port operations less Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP) documentation functions which are performed

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by a US contractor, Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc. Stevedoring is performed by ARVN military personnel and Vietnamese commercial companies under contract with ARVN. Tonnage handled through ARVN operated water terminals during the period 1 April 1973 through 30 September 1974, amounted to 775,111 MT inbound and 35,031 MT outbound for RVNAF and for US-interest cargo totalled 11,567 MT inbound and 85,488 MT outbound.

b. The intra-coastal cargo backlog on hand at military water terminals during the 3d and 4th Quarter FY 74 has been reduced to a manageable workload. The joint effort of DAO and RVNAF transportation managers has improved the utilization and productivity of RVNAF LSTs and other military watercraft, thereby contributing significantly to the reduction in the volume of cargo on hand at the various ports. During the 1st Quarter FY 75 there were no Military Sealift Command (US) assets applied to the inter-coastal movement of RVNAF cargo.

c. Shortfall:

(1) Cargo handling operations at ARVN ports remain below the desired Military Sealift Command standard of 1,500 MT per day. During the 1st Quarter FY 75 the cargo handling rate at ARVN water terminals dropped slightly to an average of 1,092 MT per day from 1,210 MT per day during the 4th Quarter FY 74. This decrease may be attributed in the most part to reduced volume of break bulk cargo received and its distribution within the ships calling in RVN ports. With the lifting of funding constraints and its attendant increase in the volume of cargo to be received, the cargo handling rate is expected to improve.

(2) Port operations throughout the country must continue to be a subject of prime importance for the appropriate Central Logistics Command staff element.

8. (U) RVNAF FACILITIES ENGINEERING SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM.

a. Large Generator, Air-Conditioner Support Facility (LGACSF) Program. The current deadline rate of generators and air-conditioners is fourteen and seven percent respectively. There are eight Single Integrated Military System (SIMS) sites currently on Hazardous Condition (HAZCON). The percentage of fill of the Authorized Stockage List (ASL) at the Medium Maintenance Centers (MMCs) is now 70%. The percentage of BOM (FY 73-74) on hand at the 40th EBD has increased to 61% from 48% and there are 61 complete BOM kits assembled by the 40th EBD that have been shipped

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or are awaiting transportation to respective MCs for support of the overhaul program.

b. Bulk Construction Materials (BCM) Program. There has been no major changes in the status of BCM issues since the last report. There will be no additional issues against FY 73 allocations.

c. Engineer Technical Assistance:

(1) The technical inspection (Phase I) of the electrical upgrade of the 551st Ammunition Depot, Dong Ba Thin has been completed. Required materials for Phase II (repair) were placed on order to CONUS. Delivery is expected in two to three weeks. Approximately 70% of the CONUS ordered material for the 534th Ammunition Depot upgrade has been received.

(2) The Electrical Power Surveys at the seven designated VNAF Air Bases have been completed. The last final reports are currently being prepared.

(3) The SIMS power survey was updated and a total of 42 generators are recommended for disposition.

(4) The Base Development Plan for Long Binh was completed and copies of the report were provided to Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) and the 3d ALC Commander.

(5) The project of developing a recommended water cooling system for four designated power generating plants was completed. Recommendations included: radiator modification, additional radiators and a cooling tower.

(6) With the completion of a well renovation program for the Air Force at Bien Hoa Air Base, a total of 62 wells have been renovated since the start of the program in February 1974.

9. (U) DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM.

a. Construction of RVNAF dependent shelters has now been halted by the Chief, OCE, ARVN due to nonreceipt of US promised materials. OCE has also directed that remaining materials will be used to complete units already under construction.

b. US Secretary of Defense message DTG 032150Z August 1972 initiated program delay by deferring expenditure of half the FY

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73 Operation Maintenance Army (OMA) funding and the entire year's Military Construction (MILCON) funds. Other necessary DAO Saigon reprogramming actions eliminated remaining FY 74 funding and current FY 75 DAV funding. The program presently is carried as an \$11.2 million shortfall for FY 75.

c. Program statistics are:

	<u>Number of Units</u>
Completed	40,300
Under Construction	6,530
Not Started	<u>3,170</u>
Total Program	50,000

10. (U) ARVN LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC) PROGRAM.

a. The ARVN LOC Program slowed during the first quarter of FY 75 because of the monsoon rains. Availability of asphalt products and continued improvements in the delivery of crushed rock products in the Mekong Delta made possible some gravel on most of QL-4 and LTL-80 and good progress on QL-20. The restraint of short fuel supplies has been overcome and the few shortages are delivery problems.

b. The delivery of approximately 2 million gallons of asphalt products was a milestone.

c. The contract for the delivery of certain crushed rock products to the Delta worksites was most successful. US Agency for International Development (USAID) awarded other rock contracts under the Delta Rock Agency to provide the services. At this time the USAID contracts are effective and rock is being received at all rock ports.

d. Vietnamization in the form of asphalt delivery continues. Engineer units provide drivers and trucks for the pickup and delivery of drummed bitumens. RVNAF has leased five bulk asphalt trailers which are operated by the troops for the delivery of bulk asphalt to the worksites.

e. The Dynalectron MCA-LOC equipment contract is being renegotiated for extension to June 1975 with a cutback of personnel to 50 Americans and 250 Local Nationals on or about 1 October and

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a further reduction to 40 Americans 1 January 1975. The ARVN Engineers have committed 259 officers, NCOs and men to participate in first, second and third echelon maintenance training which began 1 August and which is providing excellent early results which will lead to Engineer self-sufficiency in the maintenance of the MCA LOC equipment.

11. (U) SPECIAL CATEGORY ARMY WITH AIR FORCE (SCARWAF).

a. The contemplated SCARWAF program faltered shortly after its conception when the DAO was unable to obtain funding from higher commands for utilization in the program. ARVN's role in this program is to assist the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) Base Civil Engineers in accomplishing selected projects required at the nine major VNAF air bases. Preliminary groundwork has been accomplished to permit the ARVN to make contributions to the program in the form of troops and equipment during FY 75 and over 100 projects have been tentatively allocated to the ARVN engineers for accomplishment. Over \$2.5 million in materials will be funded from US sources in support of this program.

b. Implementation of the SCARWAF program is in abeyance awaiting further funds.

12. (U) RETROGRADE PROGRAM. Preliminary retrograde preparations started on 10 June 1974 and Delong Pier Barges 6801 and 6802 were tentatively scheduled for ocean tow on 9 September 1974. The aforesaid units are now scheduled to be towed from Cam Rang to Pusan, Korea by the USS Molala on 21 October 1974.

13. (U) ARVN AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY PROGRAM.

a. The ARVN Engineers inaugurated an ambitious self-sufficiency agricultural program for the purpose of supplementing the food supply available for the troops. The objective of this program is to provide a free breakfast and a free lunch to all engineer troops prior to the end of 1974. Each engineer group has gotten its program underway and some troops are already receiving at least one free meal a day. Sales of agricultural products assist in providing funds for those products not raised by the troops. The program includes the clearing, developing and planting of land and rice paddies. Vegetables and fruits of all kinds are also being grown and animal, fowl, and fish husbandry is being pursued. This program has received the attention of the Political Warfare Command

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and it is expected that similar programs will be established within other elements of RVNAF.

b. This ARVN Engineers inaugurated self-sufficiency program has been quite successful and will be carried on by other groups without further technical assistance of DAO.

14. (U) PROCUREMENT.

a. Quality Assurance Training:

(1) During the 1st Quarter FY 75, two RVNAF officers from the Quartermaster Corps Technical Inspection and Specification Center were given 40 hours of formal training on Procurement Quality Assurance with special emphasis on the use of MIL-STD-105D and sampling inspection techniques. Additionally, these officers received 40 hours of OJT under the direction of qualified US QA specialists.

(2) A total of 40 RVNAF officers in grades WO-1 to O4 have completed this program. To date, approximately 25 trainees have been performing in-process inspections in contractor facilities. However, due to the completion of many of the FY 74 In-Country Procurement contracts, only 19 of the RVNAF are currently being utilized for inspection of subsistence items, textiles and medical supplies.

(3) The success of the Quality Assurance training effort has been noteworthy. The increased capability of the RVNAF in the quality surveillance area now enables US Quality Assurance personnel to apply greater emphasis to quality assurance functions which by regulation are required to be performed by US citizens.

b. Specification Review:

(1) Expressions of dissatisfaction with the stability of the canned meat and fish used in combat rations has been reaching DAO through various channels. Reasons for the cause of spoilage and estimates of the magnitude of the problem differ according to source.

(2) Recognizing that this was a problem involving both US and RVNAF interests, the Commander, Central Logistics Command, proposed the establishment of a joint team to determine means by which improvements can be effected in the technical characteristics of canned food being procured in-country by the US government for

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RVNAF. DAO involvement will be through the participation of quality assurance and subsistence specialists from Procurement Branch. US participation in this effort is viewed as a technical assistance effort to be pursued within the limits of restricted resources.

(3) FY 75 ICP of canned food will be temporarily deferred pending the outcome of the joint study effort which is targeted for completion by 1 November 1974.

15. (C) SUMMARY.

a. Supply:

(1) The impact of January 1974 fund suspension is still being felt despite receipts from CONUS and offshore. Further, current fund constraints will slow maintenance management efforts to alleviate shortfall in critical rebuild programs.

(2) The excess program continues at a slow but steady rate.

(3) Formal and on-the-job training programs began at the 2d AAD, Danang. The established program at 1st AAD, Long Binh continues to graduate personnel in all aspects of Depot Operations; however, the entire operation remains understrength and undertrained.

(4) AMC Quick Reaction Team provides technical assistance, guidance, and recommendations to ARVN for improvement of Depot Operations.

b. Ammunition: Paragraph 4c provides status on ammunition while paragraph 4d(4) displays deficiencies.

c. POL: RVNAF POL requirements are satisfied through in-country procurement contracts let to three suppliers located in Southeast Asia. Increased hostilities caused increase of allocations to meet consumption; however, 60 day supply was maintained.

d. Transportation: Cargo handling rates at military transportation showed a slight decline during the quarter and is attributable to reduced volume of break bulk cargo received and its dispersed distribution throughout the vessels. The deteriorated condition of electric materials handling equipment at Cat Lai, the major RVN ammunition port, resulted in slow cargo operations on one vessel. DAO interest in the situation resulted in action which should preclude similar problems in the future. Maintenance of

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support equipment at all ports remains a subject of prime importance for terminal commanders and DAO transportation personnel.

e. Field Maintenance: As noted in the last Report, the maintenance of Artillery remains high, and that of combat and tactical wheeled vehicles continues to improve. Progress in MHE maintenance continues; however, deadline rate remains high. First and second echelon problems persist and generate an overall situation that remains serious. Continued problems in operating direct exchange programs and in establishing and maintaining PLLs and ASLs hinder improvement at mid-echelon maintenance activities.

f. RVNAF Facilities Engineering Self-Sufficiency Program. ARVN continues to grow increasingly self-reliant and currently requires only limited assistance. Formal instruction currently is confined to large generators and air conditioning facilities support. Technical assistance continues to be required in the more complex tasks such as equipment calibration and diagnosis of mechanical and electrical failures.

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CHAPTER 6

VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF)

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. The VNAF strengths, weaknesses, logistics, equipment status, Operational Ready (OR) rates and the DAO assessment are presented in the following paragraphs.

2. (S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL READINESS.

a. Current overall VNAF manning is as follows:

<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
Officers	10180	7888	77%
Enlisted	54725	55403	101%
Civilian	762	680	89%
Total	<u>65667</u>	<u>63971</u>	<u>97%</u>

(Figure 6-1)

b. VNAF pilot manning, which largely reflects manning of other crew positions, is considered sufficient to fly available VNAF aircraft on a sustained surge basis. The 1,830 squadron pilots represent 76 percent of the authorized manning. Figure 6-2 reflects the current manning by type of aircraft/mission. The special air mission unit figures have been omitted.

c. Personnel readiness of the rated force can be roughly determined by reference to Figure 6-2, column labeled (OR). This figure, however, refers to aircrews which are in continuous training. The majority of the aircrews are capable of performing basic combat missions.

3. (S) VNAF FORCE DEPLOYMENT. The authorized force deployment is shown by military region and represents the areas of operation with the exception of the support aircraft in the 5th Air Division which operate throughout the country.

(Figures 6-3 & 6-4)

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VNAF PERSONNEL BY ORGANIZATION

UNIT/DIVISION	OFFICER		ENLISTED		TOTAL MIL.		CIVILIAN	
	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN
VNAF HQS	884	578	1927	1803	2811	2381	45	36
Air Medical Center	62	37	174	110	236	147	6	4
Air Ops Comd	425	267	872	685	1297	952	0	0
AC&W Gp	145	131	882	833	1027	964	1	1
Air Log Comd	403	276	5932	5215	6335	5491	369	334
Air Tng Cen	487	315	1170	1046	1657	1361	7	7
TSN Prop Const Area	19	11	62	52	81	63	0	0
Air Adm Unit	17	18	117	132	134	150	0	5
Detached Pers	122	177	63	166	185	343	0	0
1st Air Div	1234	838	7030	5924	8264	6762	150	90
2nd Air Div	1019	106	5903	6183	6922	6889	22	22
3rd Air Div	1310	919	7735	6808	9045	7727	70	61
4th Air Div	1350	870	7341	6287	8691	7157	32	19
5th Air Div	1295	999	6653	5964	7948	6963	95	94
6th Air Div	1109	752	6394	5591	7503	6343	10	7
Sub Total	9881	6894	52255	46799	62136	53693		
Pipeline	299	994	2470	8604	2769	9598		
Total	10180	7888	54725	55403	64905	63291	762	680

Figure 6-1

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FORM 104 15 MAR 60 (REV 10-64) (GPO: 1964 O-348-744)

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TYPE A/C	AUTH	ASSIGNED	OR	% OR
A-37	350	327	243	74
A-1	123	74	74	100
F-5	217	122	108	88
Total Ftr/Attack	690	523	425	81
C-7	60	52	45	86
C-130	54	47	24	51
Total Cargo	114	99	69	70
UH-1	944	589	553	94
CH-47	80	73	55	75
Total Helo	1024	662	608	92
VC-47	15	8	8	100
(U-17, O-1, O-2)	329	294	294	100
Total Liaison	344	302	302	100
AC-119K	27	29	23	79
AC-119G	27	29	21	72
AC-47	24	26	15	58
Total Gunship	78	84	59	70
RC-119L	20	15	11	73
EC-47	48	44	44	100
RC-47	19	14	11	79
U-6	10	10	10	100
Total Recce	97	83	76	92
T-37	31	29	29	100
T-41/O-1	27	48	48	100
Total Training	58	77	77	100

Figure 6-2

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SECRETVNAF FORCE DEPLOYMENT

AIR BASES	WING	SQUADRON	NUMBER & TYPE AIRCRAFT	
MR 1				
DA NANG	41	110	5-01/7-U17/20-02	
		120	25-01/7-U17	
		427	16-C7	
		718 Det.	10-EC47	
		821 Det.	8-AC119K	
	51	213	38-UH1	
		233	38-UH1	
		239	38-UH1	
		253	38-UH1	
		257	24-UH1	
		247	16-CH47	
	61	516	24-A37	
		528	24-A37	
		550	24-A27	
		538	24-F5	
	MR 2			
	NHA TRANG	62	114	25-01/7-U17
215			38-UH1	
219			38-UH1	
259C			8-UH1	
817			16-AC47	
ATC		918	18-T41	
PHAN RANG		92	524	24-A37
	534		24-A37	
	548		24-A37	
	259D		8-UH1	
	ATC	920	21-T37/8-UH1	
PLEIKU	72	118	10-01/7-U17/15-02	
		530	24-A1	
		229	38-UH1	
		235	38-UH1	
		259B	10-UH1	
PHU CAT	82	532	24-A37	
		241	16-CH47	
		243	38-UH1	
		259A	10-UH1	

Figure 6-3

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MR 3			
BIEN HOA	23	112	25-01/7-U17
		124	25-01/7-U17
		514	24-A1
		518	24-A1
	43	221	38-UH1
		223	38-UH1
		231	38-UH1
		245	38-UH1
		251	38-UH1
		237	16-CH47
		259E	12-UH1
	63	522	24-F5A/B/6-RF5
		536	18-F5/6-F5E
		540	24-F5
542		24-F5	
544		24-F5	
TAN SON NHUT	33	314	4-VC47/4-UH1/2-U17
		716	12-RC47/2-EC47/2-C47/8-U6
		718	20-EC47
		429	16-C7
		431	16-C7
		259G	12-UH1
	53	819	18-AC19G
		821	10-AC119K
		435	16-C130
		437	16-C130
MR 4			
BINH THUY	74	116	25-01/7-U17
		122	25-01/7-U17
		520	24-A37
		526	24-A37
		546	24-A37
	84	211	38-UH1
		225	38-UH1
		227	38-UH1
		259I	12-UH1
		CAN THO	64
255	38-UH1		
249	16-CH47		
259H	12-UH1		

Figure 6-4

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4. (C) VNAF AIRCRAFT INVENTORY.

The established base line for the VNAF aircraft inventory is currently under review. The following schedule shows aircraft status as of 30 September 1974.

ACFT TYPE	RECEIVED		POSSESSED	ATTRITED	OTHER
	AUTH	28 JAN 73		(1)	LOSSES
A-1	72	79	64	15	3 (2)
A-37	240	248	226	22	10 (2)
C/AC 119G/K	36	66	54	4	8 (3)
C-130	32	32	32		
O-1	165	239	183	21	46 (4)
O-2	35	35	32	3	1 (2)
T-37	21	24	24		
U-6	8	10	9	1	
U-17	58	85	84	1	3 (2)
C-123		19			19 (5)
C-7	48	56	53	3	1 (2)
T-41	18	24	22	2	0 (2)
CH-47	64	70	64	6	0 (2)
UH-1	842	859	780	79	38 (2)
F5A/B/E/RF	152	151	127	24	3 (2)
C-47 ALL	66	76	64	8	5 (6)

Legend:

- (1) Losses which have been verified by Joint General Staff (JGS).
- (2) Damaged or lost aircraft which have not been verified by JGS as of 30 Sep 74. Totals included in possessed column.
- (3) Eight aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF.
- (4) Thirty-five aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF. Eleven aircraft damaged or lost which have not been verified by JGS as of 30 Sep 74.
- (5) Nineteen aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF.
- (6) Four aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF. One aircraft damaged or lost which has not been verified by JGS as of 30 Sep 74.

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5. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. VNAF Flying Hour Program. A comparison of programmed flying hours with actual hours flown, during the first quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 1975, is reflected in the following schedule. Due to FY-75 Defense Assistance Vietnam (DAV) funding constraints JGS has grounded seven weapon systems. Utilization rates of the remaining aircraft have been reduced.

ACFT TYPE	JULY		AUGUST		SEPTEMBER*
	PROG	ACTUAL	PROG	ACTUAL	PROG
C-119G	396	470	396	454	396
AC-119G	792	559	792	645	792
AC-119K	600	568	600	562	600
AC-47	546	556	546	500	546
EC-47	3,294	1,871	3,294	1,527	3,294
RC-47	496	479	496	399	496
VC-47	148	124	148	123	148
C-130	1,184	1,092	1,184	1,146	1,184
C-7	1,485	1,213	1,485	1,253	1,485
O-1	8,900	9,889	8,900	9,279	8,900
O-2	1,120	984	1,120	1,169	1,120
U-6	495	427	495	396	495
U-17	2,436	1,709	2,436	1,910	2,436
A-1	1,820	1,668	1,820	1,608	1,820
F-5	3,050	1,745	3,050	1,525	3,050
A-37	3,960	4,006	3,960	4,581	3,960
T-37	744	761	744	521	744
T-41	836	904	836	1,105	836
UH-1	24,100	23,916	24,100	22,489	24,100
CH-47	1,386	1,140	1,386	1,271	1,386

b. Seek Point. VNAF personnel are in training in four locations i.e. Bien Hoa, Pleiku, Da Lat and Da Nang. Training consists of both formal classroom and On the Job Training (OJT) and is being conducted by Sierra Research Corporation. During the past quarter the following Seek Point events occurred:

(1) The site at Hue was relocated to Da Nang.

(2) A supply point was established at Tan Son Nhut for peculiar Seek Point supply items. Stock levels are being reviewed and necessary adjustments are being made.

* Actual September flying hours will be available late October 1974.

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c. Commando Gopher. (Restoration of Ground Equipment). Phase I was a one time effort to restore equipment to limited operational status. The equipment condition was verified, supply requirements identified and parts requisitioned at Bien Hoa Air Base. Teams were dispatched from Air Technical Logistics Command (ATLC) to install the parts. This phase was completed in July 1974 with only a limited degree of improvement in the equipment condition. The follow-on effort to replace the system equipment that had been overhauled in Continental United States (CONUS) depots was started in May 74 with the (AN/MPN-13) Ground Control Approach (GCA) system located at Bien Hoa. Additional (AN/TRN-31) Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) systems have now been received and installed at Nha Trang, Pleiku and Da Nang. This effort has experienced slippages due to in-country transportation delays. Maintenance continues to be hampered by the lack of replacement parts. This condition has resulted in deterioration of the newly overhauled system and caused higher equipment outage rates than anticipated.

d. Precision Approach Radar (PAR) 2 Project. Installation of the PAR-2 project at Tan Son Nhut was cancelled on 13 August 1974 with DAO, VNAF, Pacific Air Force (PACAF), Air Force Logistic Command (AFLC), Command-In-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) and Chief of Staff Air Force (CSAF) concurrence. Disposition instructions have been requested.

6. (C) MAJOR EQUIPMENT STATUS.

a. Status of major VNAF equipment is depicted in Figures 6-5 through 6-8. The following paragraphs address the OR, Not Operational Ready Maintenance (NORM) and Not Operational Ready Supply (NORS) rates for liaison, transport and fighter aircraft.

(1) Transport Aircraft. The OR rate for transport aircraft averaged 66 percent, NORM rate 21 percent and the NORS rate 13 percent. The main contributing factors for the OR rate to be below the standard of 71 percent were:

(a) C-130 Aircraft. Trend fluctuations were attributed to both inadequate supply and long term maintenance and wing modifications at Lockheed Air Services, Singapore. The high NORS rate was due to shortages of components for which VNAF has no repair capability. Stock levels causing the NORS condition are being reviewed and follow-up actions initiated to improve deliveries.

(b) C-119 Aircraft. The OR, NORM, and NORS rates were results of low torque problems with reciprocating engines in addition to processing aircraft through scheduled workloads; Inspect and Repair as Necessary (IRAN), flare and propeller modifications, Analytical Condition Inspection (ACI) and Crash

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


Figure 6-5

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STANDARD

OR: 71.0%

NORM: 24%

NORS: 5.0%




Figure 6-6

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STANDARD

OR: 71.0%

NORM: 24%

NORS: 5.0%




Figure 6-7

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


Figure 6-8

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Battle Damaged (CBD) repairs. Five aircraft had been programmed for ACI during FY-74; two were terminated prior to input and one will be completed. At present no program has been established for FY-75.

(c) C-47 Aircraft. The OR rate was slightly under standard. This is attributed to a relatively high percentage of aircraft undergoing analytical condition inspection during the third and last quarter of FY-74. Two aircraft were produced in the first quarter of FY-75 for the FY-74 Corrosion Control Program. One aircraft remains in work with the Chinese Air Force in Taiwan. No program has been established for FY-75.

(d) C-7 Aircraft. The OR and NORM rates were attributed to unprogrammed repairs on 11 weather damaged aircraft and excessive time-phased inspections in addition to scheduled maintenance and overhaul requirements. The NORS rate was the result of landing gear and hydraulic system failures. Aircraft is being considered for deactivation due to funding constraints.

(2) Liaison Aircraft. The OR rate for liaison aircraft averaged 61 percent, NORM rate 15 percent and the NORS rate 23 percent. The main contributing factors for the OR rate to be below the standard of 71 percent were:

(a) T-41 Aircraft. The OR and NORS rates were the results of parts shortages. The major items are propellers and governors. Although follow-up action has been taken, assets are not available in CONUS. The contractor has agreed to expedite NORS requirements and the first units were scheduled for shipment 15 July 1974. The NORS trend is expected to decrease in the future.

(b) T-37 Aircraft. The OR and NORM rates were results of increased maintenance requirements between training schedules. The NORS upward trend was caused by problems with oxygen regulators and fuel pumps. Both items are being received and the NORS trend is now on a decline.

(c) U-6 Aircraft. The OR and NORM rates were within acceptable standards. The NORS trend is being caused by lack of items which do not reflect enough consumption data to authorize stock levels. Reviews are being conducted and consumption data are being recorded in order that justified stock levels can be established.

(d) U-17 Aircraft. The descending OR trend was attributed to delayed supply support from CONUS. The high NORS rate was due to lack of support from Department of Defense (DOD) sources.

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The U-17 aircraft is commercially supported, and most items were requisitioned by part numbers, causing long procurement and production lead times. Stock levels have been reviewed and adjusted. Modernization of communication system modification will be accomplished during the second quarter of FY-75.

(e) O-1 Aircraft. The OR/NORM/NORS rates were within acceptable standards.

(f) O-2 Aircraft. The OR and NORS rates were affected by limited consumption data on the majority of O-2 items requisitioned. Actions taken include identification of critical items and follow-up against outstanding requisitions. The aircraft is being considered for deactivation due to funding constraints.

(3) Fighter Aircraft. The OR rate for fighter aircraft averaged 75 percent, NORM rate 12 percent and the NORS rate 13 percent. The factors contributing to fluctuations of the OR rate within the standard of 71 percent were:

(a) A-1 Aircraft. During the first quarter of FY-75 four aircraft were input to ATLC for Preventive Depot Maintenance (PDM); three were completed and four aircraft have been placed in storage. Programmed PDM work, CBD repair and modifications have been cancelled pending force structure changes.

(b) A-37 Aircraft. Twenty-one aircraft from the FY-74 Wing Modification program were completed during the first quarter of FY-75; seven aircraft remain in work. Four aircraft programmed for corrosion control in FY-74 have been completed. Three ACI are being accomplished at Air Vietnam. One has been completed to date. The (ALE-20) Flare Modification was completed on 194 aircraft during FY-74; completion of the remaining aircraft is pending receipt of missing kit parts, cases, switches and isolators.

(c) F-5E Aircraft. The NORS rate fluctuation was caused by the lack of replacement items and Generator Control Units (GCU's). In addition, premature failure of resistors caused generator control units to be inoperable. Lack of in-country repair capability resulted in items being Not Repairable this Station (NRTS) to CONUS. Requisitions are being processed for replacements. Corrective action has been taken to improve supply support for replacement parts.

(d) F-5A/B Aircraft. The OR rate was affected by scheduling of aircraft for AIM-9E capability modification, corrosion control and CBD repairs. The NORS rate was affected by lack of parts including generators, valves, gear-boxes and tip tanks required to satisfy routine maintenance workloads. Follow-up actions are being expedited to assure availability of parts. Twenty-seven

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aircraft were processed through scheduled maintenance, two CBD aircraft were repaired and two are in work.

(4) Helicopter. The OR rate for helicopters averaged 63 percent, NORM rate 14 percent and the NORS rate 22 percent. The main contributing factors for the OR rate to be below the standard of 71 percent were:

(a) UH-1H Aircraft. The OR rate declined in August 1974 due to lack of short shaft boots, hydraulic pressure switches and skid assemblies. Production of power train items has also decreased due to lack of repair parts. Feasibility of repairing skids is being investigated.

(b) CH-47 Aircraft. The OR rate is attributed to inadequate in-country supply support and limited repair capability for recoverable components. The NORS rate reflects an improvement due to receipt of outstanding NORS items. Feasibility of establishing in-country repair of reparable components is being investigated.

7. (C) CIVIL ENGINEERING.

a. General. Review of the VNAF Base Civil Engineering (BCE) function indicates all facilities are being maintained and operated by the VNAF; however, effectiveness is less than desired and improved management is needed. Key items affecting the operational capability follow:

b. Manning. Lack of manpower is one of the major causes affecting the BCE capability to maintain the bases at the required level of readiness. Assigned military personnel are approximately 400 men below the authorized level. Civilian employees are also below authorization. A total work plan is being developed which will establish a work schedule to effectively utilize the assigned manpower and accomplish necessary base level maintenance and repair work. The skill of the work force also remains low and is a problem that will require time to rectify. A supplemental contractor work force of 500 men will be utilized during the remainder of FY-75 to assist the VNAF. Requests to have a total VNAF civilian work force, consisting of 2183 positions, have again been forwarded to the Ministry of Defense. Training of the existing work force will be limited to the production control area under the proposed FY-75 Operations and Maintenance (O&M) contract. Progress is being made in the manning of the VNAF Construction Division Headquarters. The Director of the Division has 25 assigned personnel (10 officers and 15 Non Commissioned Officer (NCOs)) against a total authorization of 33 (18 officers and 15 NCOs). In addition, three of the Local National engineers, employed by the Air Force Division of DAO, have been assigned to VNAF to assist with technical problems.

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c. Equipment. VNAF equipment possessed in support of the civil engineering function remains a problem area. Three factors prevail whenever an equipment review is accomplished. First, redistribution of available assets needs to be accomplished and such action has been initiated by VNAF Headquarters. Second, a survey of the VNAF bases is being conducted by a VNAF Equipment Management Team (VEMT) to review all assets at each base and validate requirements. The third factor concerning equipment is the ability to maintain it in serviceable condition. A considerable amount of equipment is deadlined due to the lack of parts. A joint US AF/VNAF survey will be initiated to identify spare parts requirements and obtain minimum stock levels.

d. Training. Under the Civil Engineering training program a total of 3684 students have been trained as of 1 Jul 74. During FY-74, 804 VNAF personnel completed training in the various civil engineering skills and 228 students will receive further training in production control and as Power Plant Electricians and Mechanics under the present contract. Emphasis is being placed on training in the production control area in order that management techniques be implemented. This portion of the training is to continue through FY-75. No further contract training will be conducted for the different shop skills. Future plans call for training in shop skills and overall civil engineering functions. The training will be accomplished by the VNAF at an engineering school to be established at the Air Training Command located on Nha Trang Air Base. Training for fire fighting personnel was dropped from the Kentron Hawaii contract (0043) on the first of April 1974 due to the ineffectiveness of their training program. A training program is now being developed by the Air Force Division civil engineering fire prevention personnel for implementation by the VNAF.

e. Fire Protection. The training conducted by DAO civil engineering personnel at the VNAF bases has raised the Nha Trang Fire Department from a satisfactory to an outstanding level of performance. Letters have been forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief of the VNAF asking for action against mishandling of flammable liquids. As a result, a special Fire Prevention Program was established throughout the bases holding the base commanders responsible for accidents in which improper handling of flammable liquids is the decisive factor. Also, crash and rescue procedures for all VNAF assigned and transit aircraft have been established and translated to Vietnamese. All base fire departments were considered as being above satisfactory with the exception of Phu Cat and Pleiku. The upkeep on fire fighting vehicles was considered satisfactory and the down time of major crash apparatus had been kept at the minimum of one or two days.

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f. Aircraft Egress Training. One AC-141 aircraft was used at Tan Son Nhut on 28 Sep 74 to conduct egress training for Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut fire protection personnel (70). The results were satisfactory. Information obtained from the program will be used to instruct personnel at the other bases. Ninety-two personnel were given like training on the C-5 aircraft on 9 May 74.

g. Facilities. Facilities (structure and utilities) at the VNAF bases continue to improve as three Maintenance Repair and Minor Construction (MRMC) projects were completed during the first quarter of FY-75. Overall, the bases are in need of much work to bring them up to full readiness. Due to FY budget limitations dictating the rate of accomplishment, the original 3-year master plan for accomplishment has been revised and reevaluated under a 5-year plan.

8. (S) MAP/MASF FUNDS.

a. General. The Joint Air Force Division/VNAF FY-75 operational and logistical plans were seriously affected by US Congressional action which reduced the DAO budget. Projected FY-75 objectives in all major defensive and offensive operational programs are undergoing extensive re-evaluation and adjustments.

b. Self-Sufficiency. VNAF self-sufficiency progress has been slowed down pending revision of mission essential objectives to match the reduced VNAF capabilities. The magnitude of the budget reduction dictates the necessity for a complete major reorganization effort in lieu of minor adjustments to FY-75 projected plans.

c. Budget. The 70 percent reduction to the VNAF operating budget from 592 million to 183 million dollars shifts the impetus from attaining and maintaining a sound defense posture to one of VNAF survival. The initial impact has been critical as pertains to the VNAF defensive posture; the net result may be a deterioration of the progress made to date. The Air Force Division has and will continue to seek methods for reducing costs and maintaining an acceptable VNAF level of readiness within available resources.

9. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. General. Operations and support have been drastically affected by the reduced FY-75 budget. The reduced flying hour program and pending deactivation of various aircraft have resulted in reevaluation and reprogramming of maintenance, supply and transportation and material management requirements. The impact as related to specific functional tasks is addressed in the following paragraphs; but they contain only representative examples and do not reflect the total impact.

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b. Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance (JEIM) Program. The reduction in flying hours will have an impact on special tools and spare part requirements. Requisitioning has been deferred pending an in depth review of the total JEIM program including production schedules at each JEIM shop. A review to determine essential special tools required, on hand and excess at each air division is being conducted by General Electric and Lycoming technical representatives. Also, the expected engine generation is being computed based on the new flying hour program to determine bench stock levels. The revised program is expected to be developed by 15 October 1974.

c. Crash Battle Damaged Aircraft. System management teams started arriving on the first of August, on 45 to 120 day Temporary Duty (TDY) orders, and were subsequently dispatched to VNAF sites for assessment of CBD aircraft. Due to current funding constraints TDY assignment of the system management CBD recovery teams from Sacramento, San Antonio, and Warner Robins ALC's were terminated since aircraft may not be required to fulfill reduced operational requirements. Re-evaluation of the complete CBD recovery program is being accomplished and it is anticipated that a revised program will be ready by the end of October 1974. Prior to departure the CBD teams had identified 36 CBD aircraft. Twenty-one were not assessed. The remaining 15 aircraft; i.e., eight A-1, five A-37, one C-7 and one AC-47 have been assessed and repair requirements identified.

d. Aircraft Repair Augmentation Contract. The scheduled phase down of the Repair Augmentation Contract (SMO-1) has been accelerated due to the FY-75 DAO reduced funding. In the original plan the current authorized manning of 536 US nationals was reduced to 459 personnel by 31 December 1974 and Vietnamese nationals would remain at the 511 level. The revised schedule requires an immediate reduction to 205 US and 456 Vietnamese spaces. Reduction is planned to be accomplished by elimination of contract support for the UH-1, A-37, T-37 and C-7 aircraft augmentation and training programs, and reduction of the C-130, C-119G, CH-47 aircraft repair augmentation. Requirements represent the contractors assessment and are open for negotiation.

e. Corrosion Control Program. AFLC corrosion engineers and technicians conducted a survey during 21-27 October 1973 and found excessive aircraft corrosion due to a lack of corrosion control equipment and materials. AOSAF confirmed the AFLC findings in February 1974 and projects were established to improve the posture of the VNAF corrosion control program. Status of corrosion control program projects is reflected in the following paragraphs:

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(1) Facilities. Civil engineering has projects established and funded to repair and construct washracks at five VNAF bases; i.e., Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Can Tho, and Nha Trang with an estimated completion date of December 1974. Unfunded projects have been established to repair and construct washracks at the remainder of the VNAF bases (Phu Cat, Binh Thuy, Pleiku and Phan Rang). Funding is forecast for FY-75, with estimated completion date of July 1975. No projects have been established at this time to repair existing paint facilities at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Pleiku, Phan Rang, and Phu Cat, or to construct paint facilities at Binh Thuy, Can Tho, Nha Trang and Da Nang.

(2) Equipment and Materials. All necessary equipment and materials for operation of paint facilities and washracks have been identified and are being requisitioned. Receipt of equipment and materials is estimated December 1974.

(3) Resources and Procedures. A program is being developed for hiring dependent LN's to augment manning of washracks at all bases. This program is contingent the availability of equipment, materials, and facilities. A corrosion control monitor program has been developed and submitted to VNAF for implementation. Estimated implementation date is December 1974.

(4) Training. Additional training aids (35mm slides, corrosion training films and charts) are available to VNAF. A program is being developed to upgrade technicians in corrosion control. However, this has been suspended until more materials are available for OJT.

(5) Technical Data. All required tech data has been identified and is being requisitioned by VNAF. Receipt of data is estimated by December 1974.

f. VNAF Air Munitions Status. The VNAF air munitions program underwent a complete change of requirements and stockage objective during the first quarter FY-75. Due to funding constraints imposed for FY-75, the computation methodology was changed to assure only minimum essential munitions are programmed for replacement. The cease-fire level of airmunitions has been on the decline and the new FY-75 stockage objective will require the draw-down of munitions stocks even further. Every effort has been expended by the VNAF to program munitions requirements to support the FY-75 planned expenditures.

(1) VNAF Missile Status. An armament technician was assigned to assist VNAF with the current "B" missile and in the preparation for the new "E" missile program. Problems encountered with the high failure rate of the guidance and control units of the "B" missile will be resolved and the cost to maintain the program will

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decrease accordingly. Of the 302 missiles authorized, 231 serviceable units are on hand.

(2) Inspection. The VNAF country-wide munitions inspection program has been completed. Item records are being adjusted and items requiring renovation were transferred to the Army Republic Vietnam (ARVN). The renovation program has begun and the benefits should be reflected in the near future.

g. Contractor Engineering & Technical Services (CETS):

(1) FY-75 began with 14 contractors and 131 spaces authorized to accomplish the CETS program at all VNAF bases. In August 1974 the totals were raised to 15 contractors and 132 spaces with an estimated cost of \$6.720 million. Due to reduced financial support the CETS program was cut to 89 spaces with an estimated cost of \$4.592 million. A comparison of the initial authorization of contractors with the current level of spaces is as follows:

CONTRACTOR	NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED SPACES	
	1 JULY 1974	1 NOVEMBER 1974
Allison	1	1
Bell	7	7
Bendix	18	14
Boeing	4	2
Cessna	11	5
Fairchild	3	1
Federal Electric	11	11
General Electric	8	5
Harris Corp	29	29
Lockheed	1	1
Lycoming	22	6
Northrop	10	4
Space	2	1
Teledyne	0	0
Texas Inst.	4	2
Total	<u>131</u>	<u>89</u>

(2) Local Nationals: An innovation in world-wide CETS is being experienced in the DAO/VNAF program. The Harris Corporation has contracted to recruit, hire, and train 32 Vietnamese nationals (LN) with intent to use 21 of these to replace the 21 US spaces now on the contract. The plans and contract call for a target date of 31 December 1975 for the final conversion to the 21 LN spaces. However, the plan may have to be terminated on 28 February 1975 with only two of the conversions accomplished due to the funding situation. That date coincides with the ending date of the current contract with Harris and avoids possible termination costs.

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h. Redistribution and Retrograde of VNAF Excess. The DAO/VNAF Authorization and Utilization Survey of VNAF Bases to reduce shop equipment authorizations to minimum essential quantities is progressing satisfactorily. Results of Nha Trang and Air Training Center, completed 4 September 1974, are included in the VNAF computer data base as of 27 September 1974. The aggregated results for completed surveys at the 1st AD, 3rd AD, 4th AD, 5th AD, Nha Trang Air Base and ATC are as follows:

Line items reviewed	27,416
Line item changes	25,268
Dollar Value of Excess Turn-in	11.0 Mil
Dollar Increase of Authorization	7.2 Mil
Dollar Decrease of Authorization	30.5 Mil
Dollar Value found on Base	1.8 Mil
Dollar Value of Cancelled Due-outs	6.8 Mil

i. Computer Events:

(1) Computer downtime for all systems decreased from 21 percent in the 4th quarter FY-75. The decrease resulted from less power outages, power fluctuations and air conditioning failures. Twelve hours of downtime in August 1974 were attributed to rocket attacks. An increase in downtime due to weather was experienced due to seasonal intensity of monsoon rains. Difficulties at Clark AB were the main factors contributing to the downtime on the VNAF DCT 2000 transceiver.

(2) Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) Conversion. Approval for improvement of existing communication lines and installation of additional lines for EOQ conversion, still requires RVNAF JGS approval.

(3) Improving Computer Areas. Construction by Pacific Architects & Engineers (PA&E) contractors of offices in the computer area is in progress. Double doors leading into the area and installation of Very Important Person (VIP) viewing windows in the computer rooms have been completed to date. Air conditioners for the "C" system have been received and the contractor began installation on 30 September 1974. Completion is expected by 10 November 1974.

j. Aviation Intensively Managed Items (AIMI). The first and second quarter FY-75 AIMI requirements reflect a marked decrease from the FY-74 quarterly requirements. The third and fourth quarter FY-75 increased requirements are due to the projected depletion of present excesses. Current requirements are direct results of the reduced flying hour programs and prudent management by VNAF personnel. Improved inventory control

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has been realized and a new computation of requirements methodology has been developed. Improved repair capability at ATLC and the Air Asia Contractor (Taiwan) have also reduced the dollar value of AIMI buy requirements from CONUS. Comparison of quarterly requirements follows:

	<u>FY-74</u>	<u>FY-75</u>
1st Qtr	\$8,754,600	\$599,316.92
2nd Qtr	\$9,116,294	\$27,929.00
3rd Qtr	\$6,364,670	\$44,371.00
4th Qtr	\$7,603,143	\$49,055.00

k. Inventory Control: A ten men AFLC Rapid Area Distribution Support (RADS) Supply Inspection Team inspected 17,612 items between 22 February and 15 August 1974. Included were 5,487 Found on Base (FOB) items, 2,492 shelf-life items, 943 computer rejects, 2,091 Contractor Operated Parts Systems (COPARS) vehicle parts, 4,453 Commando Wheels vehicle parts and 1,146 miscellaneous items. The inspection resulted in changing 503 items with a dollar value of \$1.2 million from serviceable to reparable condition, condemnation of 474 items with a dollar value of \$139 thousand and disposal of 743 items as scrap.

1. Supply and Transportation:

(1) Vehicle Parts: Research and inspection to identify vehicle parts which were turned-in to the ATLC Supply and Transportation Center as the result of contractor phase-down is nearing completion. This project consists of transferring and computerizing approximately 20,000 parts. Manual stock records have been established and bench stock levels determined. Action is in process to consolidate like-items, screen stock numbers, prepare turn-in documents and move materiel to ATLC storage facilities. Target date for completion is 31 December 1974.

(2) Storage: A contract has been awarded to a Vietnamese firm for renovation of eleven supply and transportation warehouses. The work package includes repairing of light fixtures, floors, roofs and walls, plus repainting metal and concrete structures. Work began 15 July 1974 and is scheduled for completion by 28 October 1974. Project is approximately 90 percent complete. Rearchiving of all metal stocks in outside storage has been accomplished by utilizing metal racks obtained from the Sealantic Corporation in June 1974. As a result space utilization and materials handling has been greatly improved.

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(3) Inventory:

(a) Inventory of all Base Support Group Property began 1 August 1974 and is scheduled for completion 31 October 1974. This inventory will include Civil Engineer Base Construction Materiel (BCM) and Base Support stocked items. Four thousand two hundred or 33 percent of approximately 12,300 items have been inventoried to date.

(b) A second-cycle inventory of ATLC assets began 15 August 1974 and is scheduled for completion 30 April 1975. Quality checks will be conducted throughout this inventory to insure maximum accuracy. Inventory lots not meeting a count of 95 percent accuracy are being rejected and recounted until the 95 percent accuracy is obtained. As of 30 September, 4,000 or 3 percent of the projected 130,000 items have undergone this check.

(4) ATLC Central Receiving:

(a) A chain-linked fence has been installed around the processing area for sensitive items to improve security. Also, two conveyor lines were installed to alleviate congestion and expedite processing.

(b) The NORS item processing area was rearranged and enlarged to permit improved flow of NORS receipts.

(c) The processing areas for Due In From Maintenance (DIFM) and Serviceable Turn-in receipts have been relocated to two small newly acquired buildings adjacent to the main receiving building. These changes provided more space for the processing of small item receipts in the central building.

10. (C) CONCLUSION.

a. As a result of the current funding constraints, actions such as force structure adjustments, priority alignments and project deferrals are taking place. These actions have major impacts upon VNAF capabilities under both current and high intensity combat levels and could further reduce VNAF capabilities in key areas to critical situations.

b. Reprogramming of overall VNAF operational plans is required and will result in delaying the basic objective of attaining VNAF self-sufficiency. Milestones require adjustment and time-frame must be expanded. Final adjustments will be incorporated into the revised logistics plan for the VNAF during the General Officers Review scheduled for December 1974.

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c. Initial reactions to the present financial constraints reflect concern for VNAF operational readiness. Revisions to logistic plans and programs will define those tasks which can be done within available resources. The criticality of those tasks which cannot be done will not diminish.

d. Much of what has been built may now be left to decay. Some improvement projects may never materialize, while still others must remain half finished. There was little time for a phase-down and the VNAF must be commended for their rapid transition to the present circumstances.

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CHAPTER 7

VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)

1. (C) PERSONNEL.

a. Authorization. The 30 September 1974 VNN manpower authorization is 40,177 (5,712 officers, 13,641 petty officers, and 20,824 enlisted personnel). These figures represent a slight decrease from recent quarters.

b. Strength. The actual strength as of 30 September 1974 was 40,258, composed of 5,798 officers, 13,711 petty officers, and 20,749 other personnel, including midshipmen, recruits, and pipeline personnel. These figures represent a small increase over last quarter.

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS.

a. The personnel readiness of the VNN is considered to reflect longstanding and periodically demonstrated characteristics of responsiveness to emergency situations, high combat morale, willingness to face personal danger and active use of formal training programs. Similarly, familiar serious deficiencies persist on a broad scale in such vital areas as assignment/utilization of trained personnel, unit level training and readiness development, morale, and basic shipboard subsistence (food). In the face of these traditional shortcomings, however, indications of responsiveness and periodic high performance continue to offer encouragement.

b. The recent evaluations of the readiness posture of representative major units of the VNN Fleet Command, which were conducted jointly by a USN underway training Technical Assistance Team (TAT) and the VNN Fleet Training Group (FTG) provided ample confirmation of various standard personnel readiness shortfalls in such areas as maintenance, unit level training, utilization of trained personnel, etc. While these problem areas are prevalent throughout VNN, they continue to be particularly evident in the demanding technical context of Fleet Command Ships. Additionally, the impact of these deficiencies on such critical and generally fragile factors as morale, motivation, and confidence continues to be more conspicuous aboard ship. VNN sea duty has long been notable for additional morale problems relating to poor food and the aggravation of economic hardships on VNN dependent families. Of special interest in relation to these problems, as reflected during the combined USN TAT/VNN FTG evaluations, was the fact that crews seemed generally well disciplined and responsive to training, and improvement was noted in all underway training drills and exercises where the poor material readiness condition

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of the ships did not pose major limitations.

c. During the quarter, the VNN reported a total of 1,662 personnel entering and 1,931 completing in-country training courses, with an average of about 2,559 personnel in training throughout the period. Participation in offshore training courses included 20 officers and 7 enlisted beginning and 23 officers and 12 enlisted personnel completing training. Some of these graduating personnel were enrolled in prior quarters.

3. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS OF SHIPS AND CRAFT.

a. As of 30 September 1974, the authorized number of ships and craft remains at 1,547.

b. Reports of ships and craft figures normally vary from month to month due to combat losses and other mishaps, faulty reporting from the field and faulty tabulation of reports and records. The N4 project to purify records and reconcile the actual number of craft on hand with inventory records by HQ number is continuing and is gradually improving craft accountability. Latest figures for VNN craft by general category (which do not include sunken craft awaiting salvage) are as follows:

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND PATROL CRAFT

DER (Destroyer Escort Radar Picket)	2
WHEC (High Endurance Cutter)	7
PCE (Patrol Craft Escort)	7
PGM (Patrol Gunboat Motor)	20
WPB (Patrol Boat)	25
PCF (Patrol Craft Fast)	103
Yabuta Junk	146
Kien Giang Junk	6
Command Junk	31
Coastal Raider - Ferro Cement	85
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	432

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RIVER PATROL CRAFT

ATC (Armored Troop Carrier)	69
ASPB (Assault Support Patrol Boat)	69
CCB (Command Communications Boat)	6
Commandement	12
LCM Monitor (Landing Craft Mechanized)	21
LCM Refueler	15
LSIL (Landing Ship Infantry Light)	3
LSSL (Landing Ship Support Large)	4
Monitor	11
Monitor Zippo	7
PBR (Patrol Boat River)	292
RPC (River Patrol Craft)	27
STCAN	38
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	574

HARBOR AND MINE DEFENSE CRAFT

LCMS (Landing Craft Mechanized Minesweeper)	4
LCPL (Landing Craft Personnel Large)	23
MLMS (Motor Launch Minesweeper)	10
MSM (Minesweeper Mechanized)	7
MSR (Minesweeper River)	6
Picket	18
Vedette Y 3000	1
Vedette I 3.00	15

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HARBOR AND MINE DEFENSE CRAFT (CONT)

Vedette S 3700	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	35

LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CRAFT

AGP (Auxiliary General Purpose)	2
ARL (Landing Craft Repair Ship)	1
APL (Auxiliary Personnel Lighter)	2
YB (Water Barge)	1
CSB (Combat Salvage Boat)	4
FNC (Floating Naval Club)	1
LCM-3	23
LCM-6	103
LCM-8	48
LCM Fire Boat	1
LCI Pusher	12
LCU (Landing Craft Utility)	15
LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel)	39
LCVP Pusher	5
LSM (Landing Ship Medium)	5
LSM/H (Hospital Ship)	2
LST (Landing Ship Tank)	6
Skimmer	28
UB 50 (Utility Boat)	2
UB 100	6
YFR (Refrigerated Covered Lighter)	1

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LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CRAFT (CONT)

YILC (Salvage Light Lift Craft)	3
YOG (Yard Oiler)	6
YR (Floating Repair)	1
YRBM (Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge)	4
YTL (Small Harbor Tug)	9
YTM (Medium Harbor Tug)	3
Flag Officer Barges	3
RB (Refuel Barge)	4
YW (Transport Craft)	1
FB (Fuel Barge)	5
BW (Boston Whaler)	56
Viper	6
EC (Transportation Barge)	7
WLV (Floating Radar Site - HQ 304)	1

TOTAL:	416
GRAND TOTAL:	1507

c. From the beginning of the ceasefire (28 January 1973) through 30 September 1974, 91 miscellaneous craft have been lost or sunk by enemy action. Many of these craft have either been salvaged or are awaiting salvage. Latest cumulative loss report is as follows:

<u>CRAFT TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS</u>
WPS	2
Command Junk	8
PBR	16
Monitor	1

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<u>CRAFT TYPE (CONT)</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS</u>
ATC	11
LCM-6	6
LCM-8	1
Yabuta Junk	5
LCVP	7
STCAN	5
Picket	3
PCF	4
LCM-3	2
PCE (lost during engagement with PRC)	1
ASPB	7
CCB	2
Coastal Raider	5
LCMS	1
LCM Monitor	2
Skimmer	1
Commandement	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	91

4. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. General. The final status report has been completed and distributed for the 1973 Combined Logistics Development Plan. Proposed projects for a new 1975 plan have been reviewed by the VNN and the Navy Division, DAO Saigon, and are in final form. Due to budgetary constraints, all project proposals are being reviewed to identify those which must be deferred or modified because of the reduced funding level. Preliminary review indicates approximately half of the proposals will fall out due to

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inadequate funds.

b. Technical Management:

(1) The implementation phase (Phase III) of the Coastal Radar Improvement Program is in progress and is approximately 30% complete. The goal of this phase is to maintain effective system availability for an additional two years. Based on VNN provided data, the availability of the Coastal Radar System averaged 84.6% for the quarter.

(2) Field overhaul and modification of motor-generator sets at all sites is progressing well. Although most generators are in operation, not all switchboard instruments are operable. Final tests are delayed due to the lack of suitable instruments. At Vung Tau (Site 302), a Cat Lo LSB repair team continues work on one Libby and two Caterpillar generators. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and Cat Lo Public Works will soon replace the transformers that were damaged by lightning. At Poulo Obi (Site 401), efforts continue to schedule an ARVN airlift to move two 30KW generators to the radar van.

c. VNN Shipyard:

(1) The VNN Shipyard pier extension is progressing satisfactorily. Contractor personnel have completed pouring 30 of the required 120 deck slab sections. The first three pilings have been driven and will be load tested prior to further driving. Two pile driving rigs have been set up and are operational. Contractor personnel are loading pile sections on one barge preparatory to further driving. With contract mobilization essentially completed, field progress will accelerate.

(2) Seawall repairs have been completed and a final acceptance inspection has been made on this project.

(3) The construction of additional sanitary facilities for the docking shop has been satisfactorily completed.

(4) Classes covering the AN/SPS-10 radar system are continuing. Classroom work has been extended through the second week of October 1974 which will be followed by two weeks of on-the-job training. It is planned to conduct AN/UQN-1 classes following this training.

(5) The CY-74 program scheduled 25 ARVN LCM-8 river craft to start overhaul by 1 September 1974. Of these 25 ARVN craft, 10 units have been completed while 13 others are still currently in overhaul. The remaining two LCM-8's at Da Nang Base scheduled

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to be completed by July 1974 are delayed due to a lack of spare parts.

d. Construction and Base Maintenance:

(1) The number of completed U.S. Navy sponsored dependent shelters remains 5047 out of 5129 units planned. Actions in process at Hon Tre, Ha Tien and Binh Thuy will add to the number of completed units in the upcoming quarter.

(2) No further work is planned on the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Dependent Shelter Program. If funds become available the program will be reactivated.

(3) Contract 74-C-0356 for the commercial power line connection to the Vietnam Power Company System (external portion) is now undergoing final inspection. Design of the Nha Be power system (second phase) has been completed but will require additional funding for construction. The power plant has two of four 500KW generators operating in parallel. Of the remaining two, one has been repaired and is on standby, the other is undergoing inspection by the Medium Maintenance Center, Long Binh.

(4) ARVN has completed the overhaul of electrical generation facilities at Cam Ranh. Major strides have been made at all sites to overhaul generators. Most are now in operation, but not all switchboard instruments are operable.

e. Funding. Due to the new Defense Assistance Vietnam (DAV) funding procedures and fiscal constraints, major efforts have taken place to assist the Vietnamese Navy in preparing the FY-75 budget. This has included careful review and prioritizing of all requirements, development of justifications, identification of shortfalls and technical evaluation of operating capabilities under expected funding levels. Immediate action was taken to curtail operations and expenditure of funds in a number of areas to preclude dissipation of funds on relatively low priority requirements

5. Supply.

a. Conversion of Federal Stock Numbers to National Stock Numbers (NSN) was completed on schedule at the Vietnamese Naval Supply Center. The first offset under the NSN system was run on 30 September 1974 and the results were flawless. The conversion, which commenced at Vietnamese Navy Supply Center (VNNSC) in early June 1974, entailed amendment of 82 data processing programs, complete revision of eight card files and changes to 26 VNN/NSN Combined Operating Procedures. During the entire changeover operation, normal business had to be conducted without interruption.

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It was therefore necessary to develop, test and perfect the new automatic data processing programs under a precise schedule which would not interfere with on-going supply support. The conversion was achieved by VNN personnel with only minor guidance from U.S. consultants and no outside assistance. From outset to completion, it was evident to U.S. observers that the VNN team had complete understanding and control of the project.

b. Average order and shipping time for VNNSC stock replenishment items received this quarter was 114 days. The trend was steadily downward during the period, from 143 days in July to 104 days in September. Much of the decrease from month to month is attributed to improved performance in VNNSC requisition and receipt processing. Both these areas had deteriorated significantly in July but remedial action by the VNNSC Commanding Officer brought the processing times back to acceptable levels by the end of the period. Some improvement was also noted in the CONUS processing time.

c. The effectiveness of supply support provided by VNNSC was essentially unchanged from the previous quarter, although demands and issues reached all time high levels. VNNSC supply effectiveness data was:

<u>Demands</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>NIS</u>	<u>NC</u>	<u>Effectiveness</u>		
				<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>	<u>AR*</u>
55,042	42,176	6,887	5,979	86.0%	76.6%	89.1%

*Accommodation Rate= The percentage of requisitions received for carried items

d. Overall supply effectiveness of the Logistic Support Bases (LSB's)/Intermediate Support Bases (ISB's) decreased slightly from the previous quarter. The volume of business dropped off about 4%. Effectiveness data for LSB's/ISB's was:

	<u>Demands</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>NIS</u>	<u>NC</u>	<u>Effectiveness</u>		
					<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>	<u>AR</u>
LSB's	23,882	14,173	5,226	4,483	71.1%	59.3%	83.5%
ISB's	9,296	6,034	1,713	1,713	79.6%	64.9%	81.6%
Total	33,178	20,207	6,775	6,196	74.9%	60.9%	81.3%

e. The VNN Data Processing Center (VNNDFC) experienced the following equipment down time during this quarter:

Maximum potential operating time: 2208 hours

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System down due to malfunction: 155.45 hours

System down due to scheduled preventive maintenance:
18.77 hours

Percentage of scheduled hours system was inoperative:
 $155.45 \text{ hrs} \div (2208 \text{ hrs} - 18.77 \text{ hrs}) = 7.1\%$

These down time figures include the computer (360/20), printer, card reader, sorter and collator. An estimated 5% of the work done by VVNDPC for VVNSC was delayed for short periods because of equipment malfunctions.

f. Combined DAO/VNN Field Assistance Support Teams (FAST) inspected four LSB's, two ISB's and eight Coastal Radar Sites. Guided by a detailed checklist, the teams evaluated each unit's compliance with supply procedures and, where applicable, the quality of supply support provided to its customers. The rating scale allows a unit to be judged unsatisfactory, satisfactory, good, excellent or outstanding. Two of the LSB's inspected this quarter were satisfactory and two were unsatisfactory. One ISB was rated good and the other was unsatisfactory. Three radar sites were good, two were satisfactory and three were unsatisfactory. Within 30 days of receipt of a FAST inspection report, each field unit is required to notify the Commanding Officer, VVNSC, of action taken to correct supply related deficiencies.

g. Of nine functional areas checked continuously by the Quality Control Team at VVNSC, eight had an error rate well within acceptable limits. Only "location maintenance" was rated deficient throughout the quarter. Storage location errors ultimately will result in warehouse refusals and decreased supply effectiveness. The VVNSC Planning Officer attributes the location maintenance problems to a shortage of personnel assigned to the Location Audit Team, which is charged with finding and correcting these errors. He has requested the Commanding Officer to obtain additional auditors.

6. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. Coastal Surveillance System:

(1) VNN reported boarding 93,543 craft during the quarter, which resulted in 411 craft and 2,065 persons being detained for various reasons.

(2) The readiness rate of the coastal radar stations average 84.6%, which is a negligible change from the previous quarter. An average of two of the 16 stations were down per day. Total contacts detected during the quarter were 7,099, of which 6,832 were

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tracked. A total of 192 Filter King exercises were conducted to test the system of which 174 were considered satisfactory for a detection rate of 90%. These figures continue a substantial upward trend which began with the preceding quarter and is considered to be a reflection of the Coastal Radar Improvement Program progress. Of interest was a recent (19 September) enemy sapper attack on a radar station which left the power plant completely destroyed and resulted in other less serious damage. While coastal radar stations have occasionally been subject to enemy indirect fire attacks and lesser harassment, a sapper attack is highly unusual and reflects a much greater enemy effort, suggesting major importance attached to the facility by the enemy. The station involved is the second northernmost radar site and often tracks Communist country shipping enroute to or from North Vietnamese ports. After emergency repairs, the station was again operating within 36 hours.

(3) Visual Air Reconnaissance Search (VARS) flights were requested on 370 occasions, but only 206 were actually flown. Additionally, 44 air support missions were requested and 29 provided. These figures represent substantial reductions from previous quarters due to decreasing fuel authorizations and other more stringent funding constraints.

b. Material Readiness. Average material readiness rates developed by the Navy Division for blue water ships were 82.5% for the Ocean Flotilla, 79.3% for the Coastal Flotilla, and 84.4% for the Logistics Flotilla. The average material readiness rate for brown water craft during the quarter was 80.3%. Blue water figures improved significantly over last quarter, while brown water figures changed only slightly.

c. Tempo of Operations. Average figures for the tempo of operations and days away from home port for major fleet units for the quarter are as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TEMPO OF OPERATIONS</u>	<u>AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS AWAY FROM HOME PORT</u>
DER	53.4%	21
WHEC	57%	21
PCE	53.7%	22
LST	42.6%	18
AGP	60.6%	21

NOTE: Above figures exclude ships which were undergoing regular overhaul during a majority of the period.

d. Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS). VNN ships provided NGFS for tactical operations in 87 missions. A total of 25 ships were

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assigned to these missions at various coastal areas as requested by field and territorial ground forces, as well as other naval commands. Expenditures included 874 rounds of 5", 1749 rounds of 3", 217 rounds of 81mm, and 2,357 rounds of 40mm ammunition. For the second successive quarter, a substantial increase in requests for NGFS was received and responded to. This increase is considered to reflect the continuing step up in the level of hostilities throughout the country and a growing trend on the part of territorial forces to seek naval support. This trend appears encouraged at least in part by shortages of artillery ammunition available to territorial forces.

e. Combat Operations. During the quarter, VNN units were involved in 121 fire fights, 19 mining incidents, and 46 attacks by fire. These actions led to a total of 212 VNN casualties, of which 24 were KIA. Following the usual pattern, incidents within RVN were initiated by both sides and included unprovoked attacks by enemy forces as well as enemy reaction to joint RVNAF security operations in which VNN units participated.

f. Miscellaneous:

(1) Of special importance to the operational readiness posture of the VNN Fleet Command during the quarter were comprehensive Operational Readiness Evaluations of representative major fleet units. The ORE's, conducted jointly by the CINCPACFLT arranged USN underway training TAT and the VNN FTG, were completed aboard four ships, a DER, WHEC, PCE, and AGP during their visits from 23 July to 23 August, 1974. These evaluations identified various significant general problem areas such as unsatisfactory Planned Maintenance System (PMS) procedures, inoperative fire control equipment, inadequate damage control capabilities, serious fire hazards, generally poor material conditions, a great deal of inoperative equipment, and a paucity of junior officers qualified to stand Officer of the Deck (underway) watches. Only one of the four ships was considered in a condition of operational readiness sufficient to meet patrol commitments. Of the various problem areas noted, PMS and fire control were considered the most serious. As noted earlier, however, VNN crews were well disciplined and very receptive to training. The VNN FTG was professionally competent and well led, but appeared to be seriously hampered by a lack of authority and insufficient support from higher headquarters.

(2) Various specific recommendations for corrective action were presented to the VNN CNO and his staff, which will be areas of continuing liaison emphasis. Beyond correction of specific shipboard discrepancies, recommendations included upgrading the role and authority of the VNN FTG, an increase in both the

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scheduled underway training and refresher training, and a requirement that the VNN FTG certify each ship's operational readiness for patrol prior to its leaving the shipyard.

(3) Of further importance to longstanding operational readiness shortfalls aboard VNN Fleet Command ships was action initiated during the quarter to establish a much needed Mobile Ordnance Training Unit (MOTU) and a formal damage control (DC) training program. The MOTU is designed to initially perform troubleshooting functions throughout the fleet in order to assist in making operational all basic shipboard fire control and weapons systems, and will then concentrate on instruction in proper weapons maintenance and operating procedures. The required publications and tools have been identified and ordered, appropriately trained personnel are being assembled, and the MOTU is to become fully operational during the next quarter. The DC instruction commenced on 1 October, and plans for a "Buttercup" DC trainer, to simulate ship compartment flooding, have been completed.

(4) Mekong Convoys. During the quarter, 11 regular convoys were escorted to the Cambodian border with no incidents in RVN territory.

(5) Cargo moved by LST's under operational control of the Central Logistics Command was as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AMOUNT (SHORT TONS)</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TRIPS</u>
July	5,177	15
August	4,455	12
September	5,016	15

7. (C) SHORTFALLS:

a. Significant limitations of VNN capabilities continue to include inadequate defense against North Vietnamese aircraft and missile boats, inadequate amphibious transport capabilities, and a serious shortage of heavy water transportation assets.

b. The shortages in amphibious and heavy water transportation are considered to be increasingly important as the level of the current conflict and projected threat increases. The extensive coastline and far more extensive inland waterways system, which together contain the vast majority of the population and critical economic resources, clearly define priority naval responsibilities. The mounting threat to major population concentrations and economic resources accessible by water, as well as vital riverine lines of communication, logically create an increasing need for amphibious transport assets sufficient to support an

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effective Navy/Marine Corps team. The obvious importance of VNN logistic sealift in support of ground forces is increasing with the current level of conflict in areas such as MR-I.

c. Significant shortfalls relating to the routine operational role of the VNN include speed limitations which significantly hamper the pursuit and interdiction capabilities of Fleet Command ships, chronically inoperative fire control systems, often including marginal or inoperative weapons which limit the effectiveness of shipboard main batteries, intelligence collection operations, and political warfare (POLWAR) operations. While Fleet Command ship speeds and fire control systems represent obvious deficiencies, intelligence and POLWAR, which include various pacification and psychological warfare operations activities, are also considered to be vital mission areas which fall short of the potential exploitation offered by the VNN operational role.

d. Additionally, the serious problem of food aboard VNN ships is considered to be a significant limitation on Fleet Command crew morale and performance. While inadequate food remains a major problem in messes throughout RVNAF due to inadequate funding, the quality of messes aboard VNN ships continues to be especially serious. The VNN sailor at sea still faces a fundamental disadvantage in coping with this hardship because he is less able to supplement his diet from other sources, as is normally done at shore units.

e. The most serious shortfall which continues to limit VNN progress toward realizing its potential level of operational effectiveness is the general problem of command management. This problem is most critical in the lack of consistent, concerted headquarters level emphasis on comprehensive VNN operational readiness. The effects of this deficiency seem most conspicuous in the more technical context of Fleet Command ships and include vagueness in both the minimum acceptable readiness standards and in the distribution of responsibilities for maintaining appropriate standards.

8. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. The combat capability of the VNN remains sufficient to meet the current operational requirements of the VNN mission.

b. Beyond the need to upgrade the material capabilities of the VNN, as relate to amphibious and transport assets, ship speed and fire control capabilities, the need is believed to exist for shifts in emphasis within the VNN operational role. A more balanced general emphasis is considered necessary to support priority operational responsibilities peculiar to the VNN role within the

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war, such as riverine and coastal operations vis-a-vis sea operations of Fleet Command ships.

c. The ability of the VNN to make effective use of available capabilities of both equipment and trained personnel assets is often lacking due to general command management deficiencies. These shortcomings emanate from senior levels of the VNN and impact throughout the chain of command. The Navy Division must continue to address command management deficiencies in liaison and joint program development efforts with the VNN. Primary objectives in such an effort must continue to include consistent, concerted command attention from the highest VNN levels to the comprehensive operational readiness posture of the VNN. This attention should maintain an initial emphasis on Fleet Command ships, where readiness shortfalls and technical management problems are more conspicuous, and must focus on clearly defined readiness standards, a clearly defined distribution of supporting responsibilities, and an effective monitoring and evaluation system which ensures prompt emergency reaction to readiness shortfalls.

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CHAPTER 8

VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC)

1. (C) PERSONNEL STRENGTH.

a. Authorization: The total VNMC personnel authorization as of 30 September 1974 was 15,882 Marines, with 964 officers, 2,490 non-commissioned officers (NCO's), and 12,428 other enlisted. These figures represent a ten percent increase in the manning level approved by the Joint General Staff (JGS) in December 1973. However, the VNMC has been directed to reduce to 95% of Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) by 31 December 1974 and is in the process of reducing recruit input to meet that end strength.

b. Strength: The VNMC reported a current on board strength of 14,762 Marines at the end of September 1974. This figure includes 1,007 officers, 2,600 NCO's and 11,155 other enlisted Marines. Deducting 780 personnel on recruit training status leaves an on board strength of 13,982 Marines filling T/O billets. The personnel authorization and current strength of the VNMC is indicated by grade as follows:

RANK	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
Major General	1	0
Brigadier General	1	1
Colonel	9	3
Lieutenant Colonel	34	20
Major	75	45
Captain	262	112
First Lieutenant)		269
Second Lieutenant)	582	299
Warrant Officer)		258
Master Sergeant	49	74
Gunnery Sergeant	326	224
Staff Sergeant	787	831
Sergeant	1328	1471
Corporal	2213	1158
Lance Corporal	1755	2164
Private First Class	2898	4595
Private Second Class	4118	3238
Pipeline	<u>1444</u>	<u> </u>
TOTAL	15882	14762

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2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS.

a. Personnel: Experienced, dedicated officers and noncommissioned officers lead the Marines. Noncommissioned officers represent nearly twenty percent of the enlisted strength of units in the field. These NCO's provide steady leadership at all levels throughout the VNMC and are instrumental in maintaining a spirit of unit pride and cohesiveness. Turnover of personnel in the division remains low, further reinforcing the strong unit attachment characteristic of the entire division.

b. Training:

(1) The VNMC continues to excel in its conduct of unit and individual training. Two infantry battalions completed refresher training during the quarter at the Dong Da Training Center. Training emphasis on position in Military Region (MR)-1 was concentrated on squad reconnaissance techniques, mine detection, raid tactics, anti-tank defense, passive defense measures, artillery fire adjustment, anti-sapper techniques, training of TCW missile crews, medical evacuation techniques, and equipment maintenance.

(2) Nine hundred students attended formal courses of instruction conducted during the quarter by the Central Training Command.

(3) Recruit and advanced infantry training continued with heavy emphasis on individual weapons training. Training inspections by DAO representatives revealed that the basic training provided VNMC recruits at the Song Than Base Camp continued to be well organized, effectively presented and thoroughly learned.

(4) The VNMC continues to stress amphibious training within its various internal programs, and progress in this area remains a primary goal of the VMC Commandant. Limited sealift assets have restricted Vietnamese Navy (VNN) support of the program.

3. (C) LOGISTIC READINESS.

a. General: The VNMC continues capable of logistically supporting its assigned mission; however, the decrease in Defense Assistance Vietnam (DAV) funding for FY-75 already is being felt at the user level. The VNMC is representative of many Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) units at the end of the supply and maintenance pipeline that starts often with U.S. funding. It does not manage a major supply and maintenance system; rather, it is a customer of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) system for common item support and 4th and 5th echelon equipment maintenance. The most obvious effect of the decreased funding level has been a necessary postponement of all replacement of major items of equipment from

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offshore. The Marines are particularly hard hit by that postponement, because of the situation described in the following subparagraph.

b. Major Items of Equipment: The VNMC has delivered several hundred major items of equipment to various authorized maintenance and disposal activities since the ceasefire early in 1973. For a variety of reasons replacements were, for the most part, not received. As of this time the VNMC has identified all the items turned in by serial number and has matched all the items to a turn-in document showing the agencies that received the items. The next action must be to show the TO&E authorization for each item, the on-hand quantity, the difference between the two, the requisition and receipt history for each item since the cease fire, and then to concentrate efforts on obtaining replacement for items where the Marines are short of their TO&E authorization.

c. Supply of Common Items: Supply support through the ARVN for common items (except for replacement of major items) was generally very good during the quarter. Fuel was rationed by Joint General Staff (JGS), which necessitated vigorous management actions within the VNMC to live within the allocation while still performing its mission. Toward the end of the quarter, some of the first effects of low funding for common spares were becoming apparent, with spot shortages of some high usage spares.

d. Ongoing Projects: Progress during the quarter on five ongoing projects designed to permit the VNMC to understand, comply with and gain the maximum possible support from the RVNAF logistic system was as follows:

(1) Achieve a Valid Inventory of All Equipment with a High Level of Confidence of Accuracy. Two hundred and thirty-three major items of equipment were selected for the first phase of the inventory. The items were all high dollar value equipment for which differences existed between stock records and supporting (DAO) mechanized equipment status reports. Supply records and supporting mechanized records were corrected for 133 of the items. For the balance of 100 items, fifty-eight were recommended for recount with action pending on forty-two that require inventory of substitute items.

(2) Validate and Redistribute Major Equipment Excesses in the VNMC; Validate and Fill Major Equipment Shortages in the VNMC. Redistribution of excesses was begun among VNMC units and will continue upon completion of the re-inventory discussed in the preceding paragraph.

(3) Develop Self-Sufficiency in Internal VNMC Supply Accountability.

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(a) The VNMC Amphibious Support Battalion (the principal Marine supply and maintenance organization) has developed comparative statistical charts to provide a visible index of trends in potential problem areas. Twenty-six different areas currently are being analyzed graphically.

(b) Technical publications listing the components and accessories of collection-type items such as sets, kits, outfits, and assortments of common hand tools were requested from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, at the beginning of the quarter. As of the end of September, sixty percent of the requested publications had been received. The publications are being translated into Vietnamese language and will be provided to VNMC units holding the end items to assist in inventory control and in proper requisitioning of replacement components and accessories.

(c) Revised stock record cards and custody receipt control cards were prepared for use by the Amphibious Support Battalion. The new formats contain detailed information necessary to provide efficient control of material, permit sound inventory management, reduce layering of supplies, gather usage data, and provide statistics for adequate support of responsible units. Contingent upon successful testing and upon concurrence of the VNMC they will be integrated into the VNMC supply system.

(d) The Marines and ARVN have developed over the past several months a system for requisitioning and coordinating the movement of supplies that seems to have corrected what previously had been a major problem in moving material to Marine units in MR-1. All requisitions are entered into the ARVN system at the Army Supply Center, Saigon. If the material is available in the Danang Depot, Danang is directed to ship to the Marines' Amphibious Support Battalion at Hue. If the material is not available at Danang, but is available at Long Binh, the Marines pick up the material, place it in locked containers under guard and arrange shipment to Danang and transshipment via ARVN transportation from Danang to Hue. Marine liaison personnel are now stationed full time both at Long Binh and Danang.

(4) Develop Financial Management Procedures Adequate to Support Budgeting and Monitor Spending. A semi-mechanized system for monitoring requisitions and material receipts monthly by material category was tested, but has been suspended. Liaison near the end of the quarter with personnel at the Army Supply Center revealed that it may be possible to prepare the desired monthly reports from data maintained on magnetic tape. This possibility is being actively pursued, as such reports would provide a basis for financial controls by the Military Assistance Program "Record Control Number," rather than the much less desirable material category controls

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provided in the semi-mechanized system. The fully mechanized system would also preclude time-consuming manual coding and key punching.

(5) Develop Improved Equipment Maintenance Procedures. JGS has modified its instructions to ARVN maintenance units so that VNMC units turning in sub-assemblies are credited for the turn-in and are given authority to requisition replacement items. This major change in procedures should improve maintenance support for the VNMC. Internally, statistical display data are being developed to assist the VNMC in identifying trends and concentrating on areas where performance is less than desired.

4. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. The Marine Division continued to occupy defensive positions in the northernmost area of operations in the Republic of Vietnam. The assigned area was extended during the quarter by approximately 290 square kilometers to the southeast, and now abuts the area of operations of the 1st ARVN Division. The 15th Ranger Group was reassigned out of the Marine area, and a brigade of the Airborne Division was assigned under the operational control of the Marines. Reinforcing units at the end of the quarter included an Airborne Brigade, an Armored Brigade, one battery of 155 (SP) artillery, and seven Regional Force (RF) battalions.

b. Close coordination between the Marines and the Quang Tri Province Chief is evident. In addition to responsibility for an area of operations within the Marines' area, the Province Chief is responsible for seven RF battalions, ten RF companies and 110 Popular Force (PF) platoons throughout the Province, all of which are closely tied-in to the defense of the overall Marine Area. Communications are excellent between provincial forces and the VNMC, and the Marines provide logistic assistance as available and needed (e.g., motor transport support).

c. Contact with enemy forces was sporadic, consisting primarily of attacks by fire, with one major exception: On 21 September the enemy attacked a Marine position in battalion size, preceeding the attack with over 5,000 rounds of artillery and mortar preparation fires. That attack had been anticipated, however, because of battlefield intelligence. It resulted in the decimation of the attacking force (247 killed) with relatively light Marine casualties (10 killed, 31 wounded).

d. VNMC casualties throughout the quarter were substantially more than in the preceeding quarter:

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April - June

July - September

KIA	26	96
WIA	11	163
MIA	0	50

5. (C) CONCLUSIONS. The Vietnamese Marine Corps continues able to perform its mission. Its training programs are sound, its units well led, its logistic system internally strong. The significant decrease in funding in FY75, however, already has been translated into zero replacement of major items of equipment, and it appears likely that the equipment deadline rate will increase during the second quarter because of spare parts shortages in the supporting supply system.

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CHAPTER 9

TERRITORIAL FORCES

1. (C) REGIONAL FORCES/POPULAR FORCES (RF/PF).

a. This chapter presents an assessment of the Republic of Vietnam Territorial Forces (TF) and significant changes and/or modifications in their organization, mission and employment that reflects progress or regression since the previous quarterly assessment. This assessment is based upon an analysis of staff and field activity reports from the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), the Defense Attache Office (DAO) and the U.S. Embassy field operations staff. Its purpose is to determine whether or not the RF/PF have, or are, effectively adjusting to the current cease-fire situation militarily, politically and psychologically. Enemy forces continued to apply moderate to heavy pressure against deploved TF tactical and defensive positions, populated rural areas, national borders areas, and inter-sector boundary areas where enemy forces continue to contest or subvert GVN control. Enemy attacks against the Territorials continued to have a serious and deleterious impact on territorial security during the quarter, a situation that is not expected to significantly improve in the immediate future.

b. The RF and PF continue to constitute approximately 50% of the total manpower in the RVNAF. Under the territorial security system of the Government of Vietnam (GVN), the RF is province/district (sector/subsector) oriented while the PF is village/hamlet (sub-subsector) oriented. The primary mission of the Territorial Forces, as decreed by the GVN, is to provide adequate security to the rural populace while the GVN carries out the national goals in support of rural reconstruction and rehabilitation, return-to-village, land reform, and village self-sufficiency and self-government; the essential elements and ingredients of "nation building." Protective security for the rural populace by RF/PF frees the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) regular forces to conduct large scale operations against communist main force units, particularly in those areas of South Vietnam where progress in implementing national economic, political and development programs has been severely hampered by continuing enemy initiated cease-fire violations.

c. In the previous assessment, information was provided concerning the recent implementation of the Sub-subsector program

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decreed by President Thieu. The revised plan which increased the total authorized strength of the program from approximately 7,000 to over 13,000 Regional Forces (RF) officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) assigned to 2,200 sub-subsectors has been completed. First phase training of the sub-subsector personnel was completed with a total of 7,159, out of a scheduled 7,449 graduating from five National Training Centers (NTCs). Second phase training, which will train an additional 6,600 RF soldiers, under the control of the Central Training Command (CTC), was programmed to be completed 30 September 1974.

2. (C) REGIONAL FORCES.


a. There was no significant change in overall RF operational concept since previous assessment except to revise slightly the organizational chart to reflect command and control of the Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) down to the sub-subsector (Figure 9-1).

b. Current RF strength is approximately 239,600 men, a decrease of about 3,000 from that reported in the previous assessment. This represents a reduction of approximately 23,000 men (or 7.4%) from the August 1973 peak strength of 312,000 (Figure 9-2). Military Region (MR) field reports during the quarter indicate increasing combat losses have continued to take a steady toll of RF combat unit personnel. These losses have been the result of continued moderate to heavy enemy pressure against RF positions in their assigned Areas of Operation (AO). Additional losses resulted as Corps/MR Commanders either attached RF battalions in significant numbers to augment the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), or deployed them to other sectors that required reinforcement due to deterioration of territorial security. Increased combat losses, continuing high desertions, normal attrition, poor recruiting, and the assignment of over 13,000 men to the sub-subsector program, continue to be the major contributing factors to a declining RF combat strength. The Joint General Staff (JGS) Inspector General Directorate inspection teams continued during the quarter to closely screen and scrutinize TF unit personnel strength reports and conduct head count musters in an effort to eliminate "Ghost" and "Flower" soldiers. A major investigation of corruption in the Armed Forces is continuing.

c. As has been pointed out in previous assessments, the GVN is continuing in its efforts to restore, improve, or consolidate security in the rural populated areas of the country. This effort is applied primarily to those areas that have traditionally suffered from enemy incursions and areas where trained enemy agents have penetrated village governments for the purpose of subverting

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REVISED COMMAND AND CONTROL OF REGIONAL FORCES/POPULAR FORCES(RF/PF)



— Command and Control
 - - - - - Coordinates and monitors implementation of territorial security program; prepares plans, directives, TO & E's and logistical support requirements.

- NOTE:
- (a) Chief/JGS concurrently Commander, ARVN.
 - (b) RF/PF is an integral part of ARVN Infantry Branch.
 - (c) RF/PF commanded by Sector Commander. RF primarily OPCON to Sector SCTP, Sub-Sector, or ARVN for Opns; PF asgd to village/hamlet chief and OPCON to Sub-Sector Commanders.
 - (d) Recently created to strengthen military territorial security down to village/hamlet level.

Figure 9-1

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**REGIONAL FORCES
ASSIGNED STRENGTH**

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 324,799




Figure 9-2

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GVN control. Territorial security in general has deteriorated since the first of the year, particularly in the enemy's traditional areas of interest. As an example, the government deactivated Dong Ha, Cam Lo and Gio Linh subsectors of Quang Tri Sector in MR 1 which have been in enemy hands since the 1972 offensive. At the same time, the GVN activated three new subsectors in MR 4: Phuoc Hung (Kien Hoa Province), Mau My (Dinh Tuong Province), and Hung Long (Chuong Thien Province). In those areas, the enemy had been able to expand his base areas and to strike at government forces, because of insufficient RF. The additional troops assigned to these areas should improve security.

d. The mission of the RF is to insure effective implementation of GVN territorial security policies and to defend the rural populace against enemy action. JGS has directed MR Commanders to place command emphasis on intelligence collection, reconnaissance and analysis of enemy movements, as a basis for attacking enemy forces when they are operating in GVN controlled areas. The degree to which this mission is being implemented varies by MR and sector, and depends on the local situation. To state that territorial security has been a failure or has been ineffective would be inaccurate as evidenced by the fact that most of the 12 million rural inhabitants live in relative security. However, the Central Government still needs to take forceful action to correct long standing shortcomings in implementing territorial security policies set forth in the GVN Four-Year Community Defense and Local Development (CD&LD) Plan. Enforcement of these policies from the Central Government down to the local governments coupled with effective use of the TF, would do much to improve the Government's image that has long been tarnished by a state of inertia in some areas of Vietnam.

e. The most significant event that affected RF operational policy during the quarter, as in the previous quarter, was the continued implementation of the sub-subsector program. The sub-subsector plan has gone through several revisions since its inception, both in operational concept and manpower requirements.

(1) The initial plan called for an RF force of approximately 7,800 men (5,200 officers and 2,600 NCOs) that, in six phases, would be selected, trained and assigned to nearly 2,600 sub-subsectors. This was later revised to 2,200 sub-subsectors and 6,600 men. The sub-subsectors (village/hamlet complexes) were to be selected on the basis of the GVN Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) ratings, starting with the least secure villages, i.e., those rated E and D then progressing to the more secure C, B and A villages.

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(2) During phase four of the implementation plan, President Thieu directed the Chief/JGS to increase the strength of the sub-subsector teams from three men (two officers and one NCO) to six men (two officers and four NCOs)--a decision that increased the overall sub-subsector strength from 6,600 to over 13,000.

(3) To achieve the additional sub-subsector spaces needed, the Chief/JGS was required to deactivate 46 separate RF companies. This deactivation was accomplished in two phases; 31 companies from 1-31 August 1974, and 15 companies from 1-30 September 1974. J3/JGS reports the deactivation was completed on schedule. The CTC reports that the training of 7,159 sub-subsector personnel was completed in July and that the training of the additional RF selectees needed under the revised plan was completed by 30 September 1974.

(4) Figure 9-3 depicts progress in implementing the sub-subsector program since its inception in March 1974 as compared with what was planned by MR commanders.

(5) JGS has completed the sub-subsector handbook. This handbook provides guidelines to sub-subsector commanders on what to do from the period of initial implementation until the sub-subsectors are fully operational. The handbook will be revised as required after MR and JGS review the problem areas and suggestions from the field.

(6) Figure 9-4 shows the organizational chart of the sub-subsector and composition of the six-man team. Figure 9-5 depicts the sub-subsector Signal Communications System which is unchanged. The J6/JGS in coordination with the Central Telecommunications Directorate (CTD) has issued a Signal Operations Instruction (SOI) to all sub-subsectors and their respective sector and MR commanders covering integration and operational use of signal assets at the sub-subsector.

(7) Figure 9-6 is the organization chart of the village government, as revised recently by the GVN. This organization is general in concept, and may vary throughout the country depending on the economic, political, military and security situation of the sub-subsector. Normally, the sub-subsector commander is both the Deputy Village Chief and Deputy for Security, which includes control of National Police, PF, and People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF). In villages that do not have an elected village chief, or in villages that have continually been given a low HES security rating, the sub-subsector commander can be appointed temporarily as village chief.

(8) Whether or not the sub-subsector concept will be successful is open to question. It seems doubtful that village chiefs and villagers in general will readily accept appointed military

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**IMPLEMENTATION OF GVN SUB-SUBSECTOR PROGRAM CY -1974
[TARGET: 2,200 ACHIEVED: 2,164]**





Figure 9-3

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CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN RVN




REMARKS:
 Command and Control
 OPCON to Village
 Chief, receive technical guidance and support from appropriate service at District

Figure 9-4

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RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS BETWEEN
DISTRICT/SUBSECTOR AND VILLAGE/SUB-SUBSECTOR




*: SUB-SUBSECTOR TO & E AUTHORIZES EACH PF PLATOON 2 AN/PRC-25's AND
1 ANTENNA RC-292

Figure 9-5

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ORGANIZATION OF SUB-SUBSECTOR *
(SIX-MAN TEAM)



NOTE: * Depicts the organization of Sub-Subsector as currently approved by the JGS.

** The Signal Team, which was under study during the previous quarter, has now been assigned to the Sub-Subsector; under the management of the Commander, supervised by the Signal NCO. The Signal Team will incorporate all equipment of the PF, PSDF and National Police into the Sub-Subsector communications system.

Figure 9-6

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authorities in their villages regardless of the apparent good intentions of the Government. It appears that the sub-subsector organization will have to pass the test of time before its success or failure can be judged.

f. Territorial security continued to deteriorate in many areas of South Vietnam, particularly in MR 1. Battlefield casualties inflicted on the RF ranks as well as PF were the heaviest during enemy assaults against Thuong Duc and Duc Duc subsectors in Quang Nam Sector, and several locations in Quang Ngai Sector. As a result of the situation in MR 1, all available RF battalions and significant numbers of PF were placed in general reserve status to reinforce ARVN when required. MR field reports reflect that enemy forces continued to apply pressure against TF units, outposts, LOCs, static defense lines, and subsector headquarters. Infiltrations, ambushes and harassing attacks against the TF continued, particularly in lightly defended rural populated areas, where RF units have been redeployed outside their normally assigned sector AO to reinforce ARVN.

(1) MR field reports also reflect that the enemy is testing the recently established sub-subsector commands, in an increased effort to usurp and subvert GVN control at the village/hamlet level. From the inception of the sub-subsector plan in March 1974 through the end of August, 91 villages have been attacked by enemy forces including 25 villages overrun and 11 reoccupied. Of the 91 attacks, 59 occurred in July and August, when enemy forces significantly increased their level of violence against the rural populated areas. The Chief/JCS continues to direct Corps/MR commanders and sector commanders to maintain a strong defensive posture in all areas under GVN control and on borders of contested areas. Continued enemy initiated cease-fire violations, coupled with increased enemy offensive operations against ARVN regular forces have forced MR commanders to redeploy significant numbers of RF outside their assigned sector to reinforce ARVN forces, interdict enemy LOC and conduct blocking and security operations. Undoubtedly, as Corps/MR commanders continue to realign ARVN combat forces in their tactical areas, increasing numbers of RF units and supporting forces will be expected to fill the void created with the departure of ARVN regular forces.

(2) During the third quarter CY 74 enemy forces initiated a total of 6,887 incidents against the TF, and inflicted a total of 12,319 combat casualties. This is an increase of 661 enemy incidents and 3,318 TF casualties over the second quarter. Of this total, 4,295 incidents and 5,791 TF combat losses occurred in MR 4. The most significant increases in enemy initiated incidents and TF combat losses occurred in MRs 1, 2 and 4. Enemy casualties during the quarter were reported as 6,895 killed in action (KIA) and 185 captured.

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g. Concept of employment remains generally unchanged. The customary role of the RF has been to man an integrated series of outposts, interdict enemy LOC's, prevent infiltration of Viet Cong (VC) units into rural populated areas, and to assist the people in improving their state of existence. Their overall performance in meeting these objectives ranges from poor to good with a few ratings of excellent, as reflected in recent JGS Inspector General inspection reports. The latter rating normally occurs when MR commanders allow the RF to operate within the parameters of their established mission, rather than attaching them to ARVN for prolonged periods of time. Overall performance would improve with more frequent standdowns from operations for rest and recuperation and a more rigid policy for rotation of units deployed outside their home sectors. Enforcement of territorial security policies and prudent employment of the TF continues to be a matter of command emphasis. Aggressive and responsive leadership is still required at all levels if the RF/PF are to be raised to an acceptable level of effectiveness.

(1) RF field operations employ 45 Sector Tactical Command Posts (STCPs), 360 battalions, which include 1,440 RF rifle companies, 326 separate companies, and 2,164 sub-subsectors. Additionally, RF are manning approximately 1,200 outposts ranging in size from major operating bases of battalion level down to squad size. Continued manning of this large number of outposts has not improved territorial security of the rural populace, as evidenced by the large number of these outposts that have been overrun or abandoned since January 1974. If anything, security of the rural countryside has deteriorated and combat losses among the TF in defending or retaking outposts have remained high. Experience indicates that whenever the RF have been successful it has usually been when they have been mobile, and when they have been given the authority to pursue the enemy within their assigned sector AO. The RF have enjoyed, over the years, a significant degree of success when deployed primarily on mobile offensive or security operations and reconnaissance, intelligence and interdiction operations, as established in GVN territorial security policies.

(2) In addition to organization of 2,200 sub-subsector headquarters, JGS has recently approved the organization and activation of 31 RF Mobile Groups in MRs 1, 2 and 4. Each RF Mobile Group will consist of three RF battalions, a tactical headquarters and supporting territorial artillery. The RF Mobile Group concept has not as yet been officially approved for MR 3, according to J3/JGS. However, there are indications that the III Corps/MR 3 Commander is going ahead with a similar plan of his own to organize and deploy three RF Mobile Regiments in MR 3. The general plan is to organize and activate the RF Mobile Groups in two phases. Phase one will cover the period 1 September to 15 November 1974 during which 13 RF Mobile Groups and 13 105mm howitzer territorial artillery batteries will be organized. Phase

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two will cover the period 1 November through 31 December 1974; during this period, the remaining 18 RF Mobile Groups and 18 105mm howitzer territorial artillery batteries will be activated. When fully implemented, the RF Mobile Group Order of Battle will include seven in MR 1, eight in MR 2 and 16 in MR 4. The 31 RF Mobile Groups will use the existing TOEs for the RF battalion, the STCP, and for the territorial artillery batteries, pending a complete review of the new organization. This TF concept will be covered in greater depth in the next assessment.

3. (C) POPULAR FORCE.

a. There was no significant change in the organization statement. Current strength is about 194,800, a decrease of approximately 2,000 from that reported in the previous assessment (Figure 3-7). Monthly strength of the PF has varied only slightly since September 1973, although their combat losses remain high. Authorized strength is 206,000 consisting of 6,699 29-man platoons. Actual number of platoons reported during the quarter was 6,548, of which 6,362 were deployed. The remainder are held in zero balance reserve, allowing spaces for pipeline replacement by JGS.

b. There has been no significant change to alter PF performance in manning 4,200 various size outposts throughout the country. More than one-third of their operational strength is used for this purpose.

c. Overall PF performance remains basically unchanged. J3/JGS field visits and JGS/IG inspection reports reflect that operational effectiveness of the PF continues to improve slowly. Field activity reports reflect that enemy attacks against PF positions have increased since the second quarter. However, battlefield reports also reflect that the PF continue to inflict more than twice the number of casualties on the enemy as they sustain. J3/JGS sources stated that the Sector IGs have been directed to increase the number of inspections of PF platoons and report discrepancies through command channels. Efforts at all command levels continue to eliminate long standing deficiencies that have plagued operational performance of the PF.

4. (C) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. No significant change from that reported in previous assessment. The Commander, Central Logistics Command (CLC), concurrently Chief of Staff/JGS/RVNAF, is continuing his effort to modernize and improve the Territorial Forces logistics system. Every effort is being exerted by CLC to identify major problem areas in TF logistics and to resolve them as expeditiously as possible. This action has been given top level priority by the Chief/JGS.

5. (C) SHORTFALLS. No significant change from that reported in previous assessments. The staffing of 2,200 sub-subsectors by

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**POPULAR FORCES
ASSIGNED STRENGTH**

CY 1974

AUTH STRENGTH : 206,000




Figure 9-7

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assignment of over 13,000 RF officers and NCOs, and the organization and activation of the newly created RF Mobile Groups, will undoubtedly surface new shortfalls for the TF, but it is still too early to determine what they are. DAO will monitor these two new organizations for any problems that might develop.

6. (C) SUMMARY.

a. The sub-subsector program is nearly completed with 2,164 of the 2,200 sub-subsectors organized. First phase training of approximately 7,200 RF officers and NCOs has been completed, and second phase training of over 6,000 was scheduled to be completed at the end of September 1974. Assignments of personnel to these sub-subsectors should be completed by MR commanders prior to the end of December 1974.

b. The Regional Forces are undergoing yet another change—that of the RF Mobile Group. When fully implemented in December 1974, there will be 31 RF Mobile Groups (each group consisting of three RF mobile battalions, a tactical headquarters, and supporting territorial artillery deployed in MRs 1, 2 and 4. The MR 3 plan has not been officially approved by JGS, however, there are indications that the III Corps/MR 3 Commander has already started mobilizing his RF battalions into three RF Mobile Groups, to be attached to each of the three organic Divisions of MR 3.

c. Because of current austere funding, the Chief/JGS/RVNAF has directed MR and sector commanders to accelerate their efforts at modernizing and improving the Territorial Forces to insure effective utilization of resources.

d. There continues to be slow but noticeable improvement in RF/PF performance and capabilities. The JGS remains firm in its efforts at modernizing and improving the Territorial Forces to bring them in line with their ARVN contemporaries.

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CHAPTER 10

ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF COMMUNICATIONS- ELECTRONICS CAPABILITY

1. (U) C-E Self-Sufficiency.

a. Skill levels of the RVNAF technicians have continued to improve. As they gain operational and maintenance experience and professional self-confidence on the Single Integrated Military (Telecommunications) System (SIMS) they are relying less on US contractor assistance. Minimal contractor technical assistance was required on Area Maintenance and Supply Facility-Vietnam (AMSF-V) emergency/technical assistance callouts in both Military Regions (MRs) III and IV during this reporting period. Lack of experience on the high power troposcatter systems in MR I and II makes contractor technical assistance necessary in those areas. Another area where self-sufficiency is lacking is the Automatic Tandem Switching Centers (TSCs) located in all four MRs. This has been especially true in the VNAF-operated TSCs in Da Nang, Nha Trang and Tan Son Nhut. Some part of this weakness was the result of the VNAF logistics system being unresponsive to the sites' requirements. Hopefully, this portion of the problem is nearing a solution. During the quarter, VNAF headquarters authorized VNAF SIMS sites to requisition parts directly from the AMSF-V vice the local base supply - Air Division-Air Logistic Command route. Training has been provided to VNAF SIMS supply personnel in ARVN supply procedures so the change can be implemented. The effectiveness of the change cannot yet be evaluated.

b. As the RVNAF increased their technical proficiency, formal training has been deleted from the Federal Electric Corp (FEC) Statement of Work. All further training in their area of responsibility will be over-the-shoulder on-the-job training (OJT). This action reduced the FEC Training Branch to the absolute minimum.

2. (U) Communication Management Agency (CMA).

a. The CMA was organized in October 1972 by the direction of JCS. CMA was charged with the responsibility for engineering, installation management of all fixed plant communications, upgrade, and consolidation of communications facilities in RVN into a SIMS. The SIMS was to enhance the RVNAF's communications posture subsequent to the withdrawal of US Forces. RVNAF communications enhancement was based on the objectives set forth in the (JCS) Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan (CEIMP).

b. In order to implement the CEIMP and consolidate RVNAF/US residual communications, MACV in conjunction with the RVNAF, JCS/J6 first developed a comprehensive Plan 1-70A to implement CEIMP

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actions. This plan defined immediate and future RVNAF requirements and the engineering effort associated with the plan.

c. Communications equipment for the implementation of the SIMS was identified from RVNAF Tactical Military Telecommunications Network-Vietnam (MTN-V) resource, key residual ICS facilities, and the telephone switching network associated with the Southeast Asia-Automatic Telephone System (SEA-ATS).

d. Organization and Objectives:

(1) Subsequent to the establishment of CMA, the Program Division (then designated the Combined Telecommunication Engineering Agency (CTEA)) was tasked to engineer and configure the consolidation of ICS/MTN-V projects into a workable system to satisfy the RVNAF requirements. The original engineering projects identified in Plan 1-70 totalled 327.

(2) Contractor support was initiated through a sequence of events. In June 1971, MACV directives implemented the CEIMP and established manning levels using military and DOD civilian personnel to assist RVNAF in the engineering of the SIMS in accordance with Plan 1-70A.

(3) As the result of the continued drawdown of DOD personnel, MACV received directions to withdraw military and DOD civilian personnel supporting the CMA effort (Plan 1-70) and initiate contractor support. A contract was let to Philco-Ford for a 6-month period terminating in December 1971. However, with the accelerated drawdown of DOD personnel, the scope of the CMA contract was enlarged from an engineering effort to include DCA-SAM activities. The objective of the contract was to provide management assistance and training for CMA personnel to:

(a) Ensure that the SIMS was planned, engineered, established and operated to effectively meet the long haul, point-to-point telecommunications requirements of RVNAF units, the DOD and other Government agencies, when required.

(b) Obtain the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of DOD resources.

(c) Act as the single manager having operational direction and management control of the SIMS facilities.

This contract was awarded to Page Communications Engineers, Inc., for an annual cost of \$1,683,738 in January 1972 for a 3-year period. This contract will be terminated on 16 January 1975.

(4) After almost 3 years of CMA operation, the following assessment is made:

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(a) CMA's efforts, with contractor assistance, relative to DCA activities is highly commendable. However, it is not realistic to expect that they should be completely self-sufficient and capable in the relatively short period of time they have managed and controlled the diversified and complex communications system which comprises the SIMS. A comparable commercially operated system in the United States would be staffed by management personnel with 15 to 25 years experience and technicians with 5 to 15 years experience. Most of the RVNAF CMA personnel have 2 years experience or less and for many their experience is 1 year or less with little prior technical background.

(b) CMA is chartered to provide management control over SIMS implementation and resources associated therewith. CMA is severely handicapped and, in fact, incapable of performing this mission under the present organization of the RVNAF. In order for CMA to become a self-sufficient organization, it is imperative that corrective measures be taken to rectify the situation. Programs Division of CMA has completed engineering packages on 126 of the above mentioned 327 projects identified in plans 1-70, 1-70A and 1-70B. This covers efforts expended during calendar years 1972 through the present date. Progress in the implementation of these projects has been extremely disappointing. The prime reason for the lack of progress is the RVNAF logistic system over which CMA has no control. The system is not set up to recognize a single unit bill of material requisition containing the project numbering code. This impacts the supply channel in that procurement of materials are not identified by project to be routed to a specific location for implementation of the engineered project. In turn, the material goes into general stock and is issued on a first-come first-served basis. The engineered and approved projects remain incomplete or unstarted. C-E Division is working with Central Logistics Command, ARVN Signal Department, the JGS-J6 and CMA to develop a solution to this problem.

(c) Personnel attrition remains high in CMA. A former CMA Division Chief and a former Branch Chief recently returned to Vietnam after completing CONUS training. Neither were reassigned to CMA. This has been, and is expected to remain a problem in the future; however, efforts are being made to stabilize CMA tours.

(d) CMA Plans Division is actively engaged in strategic planning. The CMA Plans Officer is currently attending RVNAF J3 conferences to develop necessary planning data. Based on this data CMA will develop a RVNAF Strategic Communications Plan to support JGS/J3 short and long range objectives. Subsequent to the review of JGS/J3 long range objectives, a communications plan will be developed to implement the RVNAF objectives.

3. (U) Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System (SIMS).

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a. Reliability:

(1) A minimum acceptable management threshold for trunk reliability of the SIMS was established by the RVNAF CMA. Reliability objective is 99.8 percent and the management threshold is 99.0 percent. These reliability thresholds constitute minimum acceptable levels of operational performance. As a general rule, failure of trunks to perform at or better than the established objective level should be just cause for concern and the initiation of remedial action. At this point in time, the RVNAF Signal Department still cannot maintain the SIMS at the level of reliability previously set as US standard. This is influenced by many factors some of which are transportation and logistic support problems and also technical proficiency. This resulted in CMA reducing the previous US objective of 99.98 percent to current reliability objective of 99.8 percent.

(2) During the past 6 months, the RVNAF have not met their reliability objective. The reliability figures for the 3rd quarter of 1974 are as follows:

<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
99.20%	99.72%	99.77%

As a comparison, the reliability for the same period on the remaining US operated and maintained radio link in the RVN was as follows:

<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
99.98%	99.99%	99.18%

The drop in September was due to eight power failures at Long Binh. Power at this station is provided from RVNAF source.

(3) System performance is apparently improving to a small degree as the RVNAF gain experience in the management, operation and maintenance of the SIMS. This is reflected by the system performance during previous months.

b. Undersea Cable System:

(1) The RVNAF operate five undersea cablehead (CHD) terminals on the 439L and 484N undersea cable systems. The multiplex equipment at the cableheads had functioned well whether operated by US contractor personnel or RVNAF personnel. Assessing RVNAF maintenance capabilities on the multiplex is difficult due to the high reliability of the equipment.

(2) On 3 September 1974, the 439L "G" link (Vayama/Vung Tau) began to deteriorate due to varying levels received at both ends.

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Preliminary tests put the fault somewhere between repeaters 18 and 19. The CS Neptun was called out on 5 September 1974 and reached the break area on 10 September 1974. Circuit reroute action was begun at 100001Z September and completed at 100908Z September 1974. The in-country (Phase I) reroute began at 0800H and was completed on 1708H local time on the same day. The cable was back to traffic on 12 September 1974 and all groups/circuits were normalized at 120710Z September 1974.

(3) It is significant that the reroute was completed in only 9 hours. A significant improvement over past performances.

c. Tandem Switching Centers (TSCs)

(1) The RVNAF operate four TSCs which provide long distance direct dial capability throughout the RVN. Two tandems were visited during FY175 to assess RVNAF operational and maintenance effectiveness.

(2) The Da Nang TSC was found to be in good condition. Of great significance was the fact that site personnel were performing preventive maintenance on the TSC equipment. This was evident by the results of several tests conducted by contractor and RVNAF inspection team personnel. No serious problems were found in site management, operation, maintenance or equipment.

(a) As mentioned previously, equipment was in good condition. Most deficiencies uncovered were of minor nature and site personnel were capable of correcting the problems. Outlook is promising as site personnel are capable of, and are performing, preventive maintenance. This reduces the necessity for extensive corrective maintenance as the equipment is not being allowed to deteriorate excessively. However, there were malfunctions which required AMSF-V technical assistance.

(b) Problems were also found to stem from engineering and installation errors/oversights, unequal equipment use caused by improper grading and degraded TSC/DTE trunks/circuits.

1. Site personnel were not identifying and reporting degraded channels to prevent their use by either near or distant DTEs and TSCs. Trunk problems can result in lowered call completion rate and accelerated deterioration of equipment.

2. ICS personnel were not cooperative in logging out or restoring degraded circuits reported by the TSC. The common reason given for this by RVNAF personnel is that the TSC is operated by the VNAF while the ICS/TSC is operated by the ARVN.

(c) PLL status at the TSC was critical as 49 of 92 authorized items were found to be at zero balance. It is expected that the

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parts situation will improve due to a recent change in RVNAF supply procedures which authorizes VNAF operated TSCs to requisition SIMS parts directly from the AMSF-V.

(3) The Tan Son Nhut TSC was found to be in poor condition. From observed deficiencies, it was concluded that regular, proper and adequate preventive maintenance was not being performed. Major equipment problems were encountered which resulted in great difficulty for Saigon area subscribers to reach (or to be reached from) subscribers served by other tandem switches. Difficulties were also experienced in reaching local area DTEs through the TSC.

(a) Minor deficiencies, while not being significant in themselves, were so numerous that their cumulative effect on service provided by the tandem was serious.

(b) Compounding equipment problems were the large number of degraded trunks. Site personnel were not regularly performing tests on TSC/DTE trunks, nor were they logging out those trunks found to be substandard. The most common trunk problems, high/low levels, excessive noise and intermittent fades on ICS links, contributed to unreliable long distance telephone service. ICS problems also caused faster equipment deterioration due to unnecessary operation of switches, relays, etc.

(c) VNAF TSC personnel attempting to report circuit outages to ARVN ICS personnel often do not get full cooperation in logging out circuits and restoring them to service. Situation is similar to that encountered at Da Nang.

(d) VNAF maintenance personnel have often cited supply problems in acquiring parts necessary to keep the TSC within acceptable operational standards. However, supply was not considered to be a crucial problem here, especially with the AMSF-V close by.

d. Dial Telephone Exchanges (DTEs).

(1) RVNAF DTEs provide dial telephone service to authorized subscribers in and around major RVNAF bases. These DTEs, in conjunction with tactical exchanges and switchboards, serve 124 areas in the RVN. RVN-wide telephone service is available via the four RVNAF TSCs.

(2) RVNAF telecommunications engineers completed the reengineering of the Long Binh (LBN) DTE during this quarter. ARVN technicians are now implementing the actions called for in the engineering package to reduce the capacity of the LBN DTE from 5000 lines to 2000 lines. The reduction was necessitated by the withdrawal of the Free World Military Forces (FWMF) from the RVN. This action will result in decreasing equipment maintenance requirements at Long Binh, freeing excess DTE equipment for use elsewhere in the RVN and decreasing the number of primary and

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secondary trunks supporting the LBN DTE. If the RVNAF are successful in the implementation of this project, other DTEs will be reengineered to more effectively and efficiently serve current RVNAF requirements. RVNAF telephone engineers are expected to become self-sufficient in projects of this nature in the future. However, they still lack the skill and expertise to be self-sufficient in all aspects of telephone engineering.

(3) Inside Plant (I/P).

(a) Nineteen RVNAF DTEs are equipped with Stromberg-Carlson X-Y switching equipment. This equipment, for the most part, has been adequately maintained. Differences in site conditions are mostly attributable to the effectiveness of site OICs and NCOICs. Preventive maintenance is especially important now that spare parts are becoming scarcer due to DAV funding cuts.

(b) The four OKI Denki DTEs, contrary to what was reported in the previous assessment, will be supportable past FY79. Studies performed during this reporting period indicate that American-made Strowger switch parts are adaptable for use with the Japanese equipment. This is very fortunate as the OKI Denki DTEs are among the best operated and maintained DTEs in the RVN. Personnel at the four OKI DTEs appear well trained, motivated and equipped to maintain this high standard of operation.

(4) Outside Plant (O/P).

(a) The Inspect, Repair as Necessary Program (IRAN) for RVNAF outside plants is continuing. This program is designed to assist RVNAF cable maintenance personnel to develop their skills in outside plant fault location and troubleshooting techniques as well as increase the reliability of RVNAF cable plant.

(b) During FY175, VNAF maintenance personnel successfully completed the pre-IRAN survey of the outside plant at Bien Hoa AB. This is the sixth such survey completed by the RVNAF. More surveys will be scheduled as priorities for cable repair work are established.

(c) Lack of adequate supply support continues to plague outside plant improvement and expansion efforts. Numerous outside plant projects, including cable IRANS, have been adversely affected by lack of material. This situation was affected by FY 74 funding constraints; however, more efficient use of available in-country assets would have lessened the impact of the material shortage. It is expected that the outside plants in the RVN will continue to deteriorate during this FY due to the aforementioned reasons.

(d) DAO has taken steps to identify and turn over to the RVNAF all outside plant cable excess to US requirements. These

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cables will be used by the RVNAF to upgrade or expand their present cable plant.

e. Air Conditioning and Power Generating Equipment:

(1) The plight of the air conditioning and power generating equipment remains precarious and generally the same as reported during the previous quarter.

(2) Problems include:

(a) Nonavailability of lubricants and solvents.

(b) Ineffective conservation measures, and poor control/security of fuel stocks.

(c) Lack of properly maintained equipment logs, charts, and records.

f. Significant Effects Toward Improvement:

(1) RVNAF Plan 1-76 - SIMS Quality Improvement:

(a) The RVNAF JGS/J6 in coordination with DAO C-E Division has established a communications committee to improve the SIMS within the RVN. The communications committee began work on 15 Jul 1974. Initial objectives of the committee were development of a plan to improve communication service and to enable RVNAF to operate and maintain the SIMS within an acceptable level. This plan has been designated RVNAF Plan 1-76 SIMS Quality Improvement Plan. Initial phases of the plan encompassed the collection of system performance data and the verification of operational equipment deficiencies. Subsequent to the completion of this phase, RVNAF maintenance teams were dispatched to correct these deficiencies. At the present time, RVNAF teams are correcting SIMS equipment deficiencies identified in the initial phase.

(b) In order to assist the JGS/J6 in the successful completion of this plan, C-E Division has formalized the efforts with the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), Thailand to obtain their assistance in this project. Coordination with DCA-Thailand on 29 August 1974 indicated a systems evaluation team consisting of one officer and two enlisted personnel were available to support the RVNAF effort to improve the SIMS. The DCA-Thailand team arrived in-country on 2 October 1974 to coordinate and establish communications systems test procedures. Also, DCA-Thailand has set aside a period of time, 20 October through 20 November 1974, for participating in this effort.

(2) The Da Nang ICS Site, Site No. 14, has shown a marked and discernible improvement since site turn-over to the ARVN. A

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comprehensive and detailed EIUI of this site by a competent and experienced inspector, who had knowledge of the condition of the site when US Army/Contractor personnel were responsible for operations and maintenance, cited in detail the overall improvement of the site. A copy of this laudatory report has been forwarded the accomplishment attainable when technical competence, dedicated leadership, and high command management support are all present in combined effort.

(3) By JGS Memorandum No. 5411/CTT/SKHI/KT 3-4-5S. KH/S.TV/CTCT Phase 2 of a RVN-wide competition to select the best of each of four categories of communications sites was initiated:

(a) ICS (SIMS) main sites; i.e., those terminating four communications links.

(b) ICS (SIMS) tributary sites; i.e, terminating one to three communications links.

(3) Area Tandem Switches and dial telephone exchanges.

(4) Sub-Communications Centers throughout each of the four MRs.

(5) Evaluation criteria utilized in evaluation of all categories of site consists of:

(a) Quality of communications

(b) C-E equipment maintenance status

(c) TMDE maintenance status

(d) Power and air conditioning maintenance status

(e) Supply parts status

(f) Accurate accounting

(g) OJT program

(h) Discipline of military personnel

(i) Facility organization and management

(j) Physical security.

(6) The preparation and initiation phase extended from 1 May to 31 July 1974, with primary elimination tests during August 1974. Semifinal tests were conducted during the period 1-15 September 1974, and the final tests to be conducted by inspectors

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of the Signal Department, will be accomplished between 16 September and 15 October 1974. During the period 16 October-31 October, all inspection records will be reviewed and evaluated and award announcements will be made soon thereafter. In addition to the morale factor involved in winning recognition as the best site in the competition category, cash prizes and extra leave authorizations are also given, with P40,000 for the best LCS Main Site, and P30,000 for the other three categories.

4. (C) Selected C-E Evaluations:

a. (C) Sensors:

(1) In the report of the preceding quarter, it was reported that GVN approval has been given to JGS for the establishment of a Sensor Branch. During this reporting period, the Branch was activated, and is assigned to Special Operations Center, J3/JGS with a mission that includes operational control, training and management of all sensor resources in RVNAF. Supply and maintenance of sensors and auxiliary equipment remains the responsibility of the ARVN Signal Department.

(2) Surveys to determine sensor requirements for perimeter defense of vital installations are continuing. There is a shortage of line sensors designed primarily for perimeter defense. As an interim measure the DAO C-E Division has recommended that recoverable tactical sensors be used in lieu of line sensors. The additional line sensors required for perimeter defense are in-country but missing component parts. All component shortages are on valid due-in requisitions.

b. (C) Operational Readiness: The C-E Division Field Teams stationed in the four MRS are beginning to produce meaningful results in the EIUIs of both SIMS sites and tactical C-E units, and of the Direct Support Groups and Medium Maintenance Centers. A summary of some 290 unit/site visits has revealed some commendable growth in RVNAF progress toward self-sufficiency, but has also (and more often) shown a decline in RVNAF operational readiness. This decline in operational readiness is not necessarily associated with an absence of leadership and the further development of technical and management skills, but in many cases is a matter of steady deterioration in the supply of parts and material required to maintain equipment in an operative condition.

c. (U) Prescribed Load List (PLL) Status: An estimate of the on-hand status of PLL of both SIMS sites and tactical communications is approximately 68 percent, with a high of 88 percent and a low of 58 percent. These data are admittedly based upon less than a full survey of all RVNAF units but are indicative of a deterioration in the ARVN logistic posture. This estimate will be reduced to firm data in the forthcoming quarter, with FSN definition of shortages, and a similar definition of items found to be excess.

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d. (U) Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE): The lack of properly calibrated test equipment at both operating sites and units, and at DSG and MMC level is so common as to be the rule rather than the exception. While this is basically a problem involving a lack of adequate parts to repair equipment, there is also a factor concerned with the reluctance of units to evacuate unserviceable test equipment when there is little expectation of early return. This entire problem of TMDE operations in RVN, including the logistics interface deficiencies between the ARVN (Army Calibration Center) and the RVNAF (PMEL) is the subject of a current study being conducted by C-E Division. The study will result in a recommendation for an assignment of an office of primary responsibility within DAO, to be followed by a statement of current conditions transmitted to the JGS/CLC. The statement will also request a similar centralization of responsibility within the RVNAF, and the designation of a counterpart office or agency to work with DAO on this problem. The statement contained in para 4e, C-E Division's previous RVNAF Quarterly Assessment, to the effect that the ARVN was achieving a high degree of self-sufficiency in TMDE operations has proven to be overly optimistic.

e. (U) Technical Publications: There is a wide variance in the on-hand quantity of adequate technical publications in tactical units. A very preliminary survey of this problem reveals that, of required C-E publications, the ARVN publication center had completed translation of 64 documents, had 77 translations in progress, and had the very significant backlog of 956 publications yet to be translated. The long term significance of this situation is obvious as fewer and fewer ARVN technicians will become English language proficient, will receive CONUS technical training, and fuller dependence must be placed on Vietnamese language technical publications.

f. (U) Hand Tool Shortage: There are increasingly frequent reports of shortages of even the most basic of hand tools required to repair electronics equipment. There is a normal expenditure and loss of such tools in all maintenance operations, but without a sustaining logistic system for replenishment, the situation becomes increasingly serious.

g. (U) Wet Cell Batteries: EIUI reports have established a number of instances where wet cell battery banks at SIMS sites and DTEs have deteriorated through the lack of proper preventive maintenance. All C-E Division Field Teams have been alerted to this problem and are to provide information concerning these battery banks in the course of EIUI visits. When sufficient data has been obtained to accurately define the extent of the problem, findings will be presented to the J6/JGS and ARVN Signal Department for their comment/observation and recommended solution.

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h. (U) RVNAF Communications Centers: There is substantial evidence establishing the continuing deterioration of the quality of tactical teletype operations, directly related to the lack of training and technical proficiency of operating personnel at Communications Centers and Sub-Communications Center level, the lack of adequate technical publications delineating field operating specifications at appropriate operating and maintenance levels, and the lack of operational and properly calibrated test equipment at DSG and MMC level. This finding has been forwarded to the J6/JCS and the ARVN, together with certain C-E Division developed technical checklists, for their evaluation of the problem and comments as to contemplated corrective action.

i. (U) Dry Battery Consumption: The consumption of the BA-4386, used in various sensor equipments, the Radio Set AN/PRC-77, but in the greatest quantities in the Radio Set AN/PRC-25, is a major cost item in support of RVNAF tactical forces, especially since the price per battery has risen from \$4.10 to \$5.60 recently. In an effort to reduce the consumption rate of this battery, and at the suggestion of the C-E Division, the ARVN have:

(1) Undertaken the forced issue of in excess of 2400 AN/PSM-13 battery testers to be used in determining the remaining usable life in batteries, thus insuring full utilization without premature discard.

(2) Initiated action to insure the use of the AO-3633, Amplifier Power Supply Group in DSG and MMC repair operations, rather than utilizing the BA-4386 as a power source.

(3) Initiated the development, based upon plans and drawings provided by C-E Division to the ARVN Signal Department, of improved non-BA-4386 power supplies for Radio Sets AN/PRC-25 where used in a static or fixed location.

j. (C) Tactical Radios - AN/VRC-46:

(1) Operational problems associated with the secure X-mode feature of the AN/VRC-46 were encountered during the reporting period. Although the using units do not belong to the ARVN Signal Corps, the Signal Corps maintenance technicians at the 60th Signal Base Depot (SBD) are responsible for depot repair of these radios. Third and 4th echelon maintenance is performed by MMC personnel who are trained by 60th SBD and Vung Tau Signal School.

(2) The fact that the radios operated satisfactorily (although at a reduced level) in the clear but not in the X-mode indicated that part of the problems were caused by low receiver sensitivity resulting from poor alignment. It was further suspected that improper maintenance procedures were being used by the maintenance personnel and that this may be a result of lack of training.

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An operational evaluation visit to a unit using the AN/VRC-46 in X-mode disclosed that on-site operator and maintenance personnel were not aware that in addition to proper control settings on the RT-524/VRC front panel, they also had to make the proper internal adjustments. To correct this situation the following actions have been taken:

(a) ARVN Signal Department has been requested to emphasize to the 60th SBD and Vung Tau Signal School the necessity for upgrading training on these radios and to stress that technical manual procedures and specifications must be used.

(b) Operator and maintenance personnel in using units have been advised of internal adjustments required to change the RT-524/VRC from the normal to secure X-mode of operation.

(c) The contractor instructing the 60th SBD technicians and the 60th SBD Quality Control Section were informed of the requirement for continued observance of the bench personnel to insure conformance with technical manual specifications.

It is concluded that the quality of repair work done by 60th SBD maintenance technicians on the AN/VRC-46 radio is not adequate. The problem is especially noticeable when the secure X-mode of operation, which requires that the radios be operating at a high level, is used. The 60th SBD must improve their quality assurance and quality control procedures, and this along with improved management may alleviate the situation.

k. (U) The evident awareness of the seriousness of the logistics situation, and of the need for the conservation and husbanding of those resources now available, is evident in policies which have been established by the JGS/CLC. It has been noted that the minutes of a recent meeting of the JGS/CLC stated a policy of arbitrary imprisonment for any ARVN personnel who lost either their weapon or AN/PRC-25 radio.

l. (U) In a previous RVNAF Quarterly Assessment, the apparent low usage of the Night Vision Device, Sight, AN/PVS-2A by RVNAF was reported. Research into this situation has continued, and based upon the same degree of field observation, but primarily upon the consumption rate of the battery BA-1100 which is required in the operation of the PVS-2A, the low usage rate previously reported has been firmly and factually established. A letter to JGS/CLC is now being staffed to request their evaluation as to the necessity and desirability of the retention of this equipment in the RVNAF inventory. The actual presentation of this letter to the RVNAF is being delayed by the matter of determination of whether or not dollar value credit allowance would accrue to the RVNAF should these equipments be retrograded. Significant monies are involved: 4985 equipments in inventory at an acquisition cost of \$1881.00 per unit, for a total value of \$9,376,785.

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5. (U) Logistics.

a. Area Maintenance and Supply Facility-Vietnam (AMSF-V):

(1) In-country support of SIMS sites. After the dramatic decrease in dues out last May, when there was a wholesale cancellation of requisitions by AMSF-V to purify existing records, dues out have begun to build up again. Some of this increase reflects sites resubmission of previously cancelled requisitions. There has been a steady downward trend this quarter in number of items shipped because of the limited receipts of assets due to fund limitations.

(Figure 10-1)

(2) Supply Effectiveness. Demand accommodation and demand satisfaction for ASL items seem to have stabilized in the 70 to 80 percent range. This is below the CLC objective of 80 percent indicating that there is still need for further review of ASL/FRINGE items at AMSF and closer coordination between AMSF and sites to insure adherence to requisitioning procedures.

(Figure 10-2)

(3) Maintenance. During this period receipts of unserviceables and repair completions were generally in the range of 350-450 per month. It is believed that these figures could be improved substantially if a concerted effort were made at the user level to turn in unserviceables expeditiously.

(Figure 10-3)

(4) Maintenance backlog has been relatively stable during the past quarter with a slight increase in deadlined equipment. Most deadlined equipment is awaiting parts.

(Figure 10-4)

b. 60th Signal Base Depot:

(1) Module repair program is falling behind schedule. 11 percent of the FY-75 program completed at the end of the first quarter. The time lag in turning in unserviceables and lack of repair parts are the major contributing factors.

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AMSF SIMS SITES SUPPLY STATUS IN COUNTRY SUPPORT




Figure 10-1

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AMSF
SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS
(ASL ITEMS)




Figure 10-2

10-17

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**AMSF MAINTENANCE
RECEIPT OF UNSERVICABLES
COMPLETIONS**




Figure 10-3

10-19

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AMSF MAINTENANCE BACKLOG - DEADLINED




Figure 10-4

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(Figure 10-5)

(2) Major components rebuild program overall is performing a little better than the module program, primarily because of the completions in microwave (43 percent complete) and wire (50 percent complete). Comment in para b(1) above applies.

(Figure 10-6)

c. Conversion to NSN (National/NATO Stock Number): Conversion from FSN to NSN was accomplished by ASC (NMMA) on schedule 30 September 1974. Conversion to NSN could not be accomplished on schedule by the AMSF-V due to lack of hardware for the NCR-500. The necessary 400-word module required for the conversion could not be leased because of lack of funds. USAILC has agreed to accept and convert AMSF-V requisitions until such time as AMSF-V's NCR-500 is modified. Receipt of the modules, installation and testing should be accomplished by 30 November 1974.

d. AMSF-V Catalog Update: The NCR-500 magnetic ledger file (stock record cards) of the AMSF-V was updated during the past quarter. In July 1974, 11,293 cards submitted to the US Army Catalog Data Agency resulted in 8685 changes to the ledgers.

6. (C) Conclusions:

a. The RVNAF are becoming proficient in operation and maintenance of the SIMS. A satisfactory degree of proficiency has not been attained in the management control area, project implementation and resources associated therewith. Significant effort must be expended by JGS/J6, the ARVN Signal Department, CLC and C-E Division of DAO to correct the situation

b. Due to the RVNAF command structure and the RVNAF logistic system, progress in the implementation of Plan 1-70 has been extremely disappointing. For the same reasons it is beyond the capability of CMA to rectify the situation. A concerted effort is required before improvement can be realized.

c. The CMA personnel attrition problem has not been solved and contractor assistance will terminate in January 1975. Even if funds were available for continued contractor assistance, it is not believed that this would be the best solution. It appears that command emphasis on stabilizing CMA tours and necessary assistance provided by DAO personnel would be a better solution.

d. Failure of the SIMS to meet its performance objective cannot be faulted to any single area. Management, technical skill level, logistic support and transportation are some of the areas that need improvement.

e. Many OICs and NCOICs are not providing the direction and leadership to effectively implement preventive maintenance and

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60TH SIGNAL BASE DEPOT
 MODULE REBUILD PROGRAM FY-75
 SEPTEMBER 1974




Figure 1U-5

10-23

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60TH SIGNAL BASE DEPOT
 MAJOR COMPONENTS REBUILD PROGRAM FY-75

SEPTEMBER 1974




Figure 10-6

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quality assurance programs. Higher levels of management have been made aware of this problem but as yet have been unable to rectify the situation.

f. Rectification of these problem areas will require firm guidance and closer observation by middle and upper management levels;

g. The RVNAF are capable of satisfactorily operating and maintaining the TSCs and DTEs. This is best illustrated by the conditions of the Da Nang TSC, and the Saigon A, B, C and D DTEs. However, highlighting the best sites and ignoring the rest, which are a majority, will not give a true assessment of RVNAF O&M posture.

h. Therefore, from the condition of the majority of RVNAF O&M'd TSCs and DTEs, it can be concluded that the RVNAF have not yet attained sufficient expertise, maturity and dedication to adequately and properly carry out operation of these sites. The extremes in site performance and condition as exemplified by the TSCs at Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut, can be mostly attributed to the competency, aggressiveness and devotion of site managers (both OICs and NCOICs). Contributing to RVNAF problems in this area are inadequate engineering support (power and air conditioning), limited transportation capability for both men and equipment, difficulties in obtaining required spare and repair parts, finding replacements for tools that have either been worn out, misplaced or broken and numerous morale problems common to all branches of the RVNAF.

i. The RVNAF have been very successful in reducing the time to accomplish reroutes necessitated by an undersea cable failure. During the past cable outage, the reroute plan was accomplished in only 9 hours as compared to approximately 4½ days previously. As successful implementation of the reroute plan depends on proper performance of the ICS as well as the concerned technical controllers, this event is a very significant one. It is too much to draw a definite conclusion based on this one performance alone; however, it is a hopeful sign that future reroutes will also be satisfactorily accomplished in minimal time.

j. While the RVNAF do not have any direct responsibility in repairing undersea cable faults, their ability to determine cable fault location is questionable. At this time, however, there is no data available with which to make a more specific assessment.

k. Adequate maintenance of the no break power units will never be accomplished until site technicians overcome their reluctance to work with the high voltages present in the system. As it stands now, US technical assistance is usually requested when corrective maintenance is required on the power panels.

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l. Engineer support is not improving. SIMS sites continue to be adversely affected by defective and/or inoperative power generating and air conditioning units. It is expected that this area will be of some concern for the foreseeable future.

m. Tactical C-E has been adversely affected by the reduced level of supply support necessitated by cutback in DAV funds. Numerous other problems ranging from ineffective or improper preventive maintenance to lack of TMDE continue to plague the tactical C-E effort.

n. The overall C-E logistic support capability has been impacted by funding constraints. The problem is compounded by reluctance of field and lower echelon units to evacuate equipment to higher echelons of maintenance due to long lag time before equipment is returned (if ever), technicians not following proper procedures in repairing and aligning equipment and lack of publications at all echelons of maintenance.

7. (C) Summary:

a. (U) RVNAF C-E self-sufficiency continues to improve. Evidence of this is found in the increasing number of technical assistance visits being performed by ARVN personnel without the presence of US contractor technicians. Emphasis is now on OJT as RVNAF technicians have acquired the basic skills necessary for routine operation and maintenance of SIMS facilities. Areas requiring strengthening are in the corrective maintenance of high power tropospheric scatter systems and in both preventive and corrective maintenance of TSCs. Remedial action has been taken to improve supply support to VNAF SIMS sites.

b. (U) CMA continues to be ineffectual in providing operational management for the SIMS. The situation is not expected to improve unless the present RVNAF command structure is modified to provide CMA with the necessary authority to carry out its responsibilities as defined by its charter. CMA also suffers from other problems such as lack of experienced engineers, technicians and managers; a high personnel attrition rate; and a lack of control over SIMS project materials.

c. (U) The RVNAF have greatly reduced the time required to reroute critical circuits in the event of an undersea cable outage. This was the result of good system and personnel performance at the time the reroute was required.

d. (U) The condition of RVNAF TSCs/DTEs varied greatly from site to site. Site performance was impacted by various factors, among them being:

- (1) Inadequate logistics support
- (2) Air conditioning and power problems

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(3) Improper and/or inadequate preventive maintenance

(4) Ineffective site management

e. (U) RVNAF cable plants are deteriorating and are expected to continue to deteriorate unless funding constraints ease and material is made available to carry out outside plant improvement projects. Efforts are continuing to make the best use of available in-country assets.

f. (U) Engineer support (power and air conditioning) problems continue to affect both SIMS and tactical sites. RVNAF engineering elements are aware of the problems and are working to improve the operational status of power and air conditioning units.

g. (U) The RVNAF recognize that SIMS performance has been substandard and have launched a concerted effort to improve system performance. The initial phase of this project, designated as RVNAF Plan 1-76, has already been implemented. Equipment deficiencies identified in this phase are now being corrected by RVNAF maintenance teams. As part of this effort, a DCA-Thailand team will provide assistance in establishing and coordinating communications system test procedures during FY275.

h. (U) The Da Nang ICS site was found to have improved under RVNAF O&M. The site was found to have improved from the time it was under US Army/contractor O&M.

i. (C) The Sensor Branch of JGS/J3 was activated during FY175. The new branch exercises operational control, training and management over all RVNAF sensor resources. Responsibility for supply and maintenance of sensors and ancillary equipment remains with the ARVN Signal Department. Surveys to determine sensor requirements for perimeter defense of vital installations continued during FY175.

j. (C) Operational readiness of both SIMS and tactical sites is declining. Observations of C-E Division field teams indicate that ineffective supply has adversely affected ability of units to keep equipment at peak operating capability.

k. (U) PLL status at sites is deteriorating. A more detailed report will be made in forthcoming assessments.

l. (U) The RVNAF are not as self-sufficient in TMDE as previously reported. Problems in this area include inadequate supply support and reluctance of using units to turn in equipment for repair and/or calibration. It is proposed to establish a joint DAO and RVNAF working group to take action on the situation.

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m. (U) Efforts to reduce consumption of BA-4386 continues. If successful, this will result in reduced support requirements for AN/PRC-77 and AN/PRC-25.

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CHAPTER 11

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) TRAINING

1. (C) OFFSHORE TRAINING.

a. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

(1) Objectives of the ARVN Fiscal Year 1975 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) are:

(a) Strengthen the training base by improving the qualifications of instructor personnel, particularly in the area of combined arms training.

(b) Improve the management capabilities of ARVN by providing management training in the command and staff skills, logistics and supply areas.

(c) Develop skills required to support introduction of new items of equipment and maintain facilities transferred to ARVN.

(2) The beginning ARVN FY 75 SATP contained 221 students who were scheduled to attend 384 courses at a cost of \$908,370.

(a) During FY 1/75 ARVN operational requirements necessitated adding 19 spaces to the original program.

(b) During FY 1/75 austere funding and a reassessment of training requirements, particularly in the areas of English language instructor training and Ranger training, necessitated cancelling 100 spaces from the original program. A combination of factors such as, nonavailability of training, course discontinuance and rescheduling necessitated cancelling another 18 spaces from the original program. The net result of these changes was to delete 62 trainees from the FY 75 SATP.

(3) The current ARVN FY 75 SATP as of the end of FY 1/75 contains 159 students who are scheduled to attend 285 courses at a cost of \$774,560.

(a) The cancellation of training during FY 1/75 will not significantly impact on the ARVN FY 75 SATP as each space cancelled was subjected to intensive review prior to cancellation

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to insure that training objectives remained viable. Spaces not affecting FY 75 objectives, but considered necessary to insure in-country self-sufficiency, will be reprogrammed in the ARVN FY 76 SATP.

(b) The ARVN FY 75 SATP will provide management training to enhance command and staff skills and logistics management skills at upper and middle management levels.

(4) Special emphasis has been placed on advanced training in all branch areas for instructor personnel, thereby increasing the ARVN in-country training capability, particularly in combined arms area. All students scheduled to return to Vietnam to serve as instructors have been programmed to receive special Methods of Instruction (MOI) training in an effort to improve their qualifications.

(5) Technical training to further enhance the skills required to support introduction of new items of equipment and skills required to operate logistics/support facilities transferred to ARVN is another vital part of the ARVN FY 75 SATP.

b. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

(1) Objectives of the VNAF Fiscal Year 1975 SATP are:

(a) Minimize the CONUS pilot training program.

(b) Provide training necessary to support new equipment and systems.

(c) Support revitalization of the in-country technical schools.

(d) Develop resources management skills.

(2) The joint planning effort by VNAF training personnel and Training Management Section (TMS) established minimum essential training requirements to meet the above objectives. Initially, there were 354 students programmed to receive training in a total of 758 courses at a cost of \$4,548,690.

(3) There were 14 program notices submitted changing 144 lines of training. The net result of these changes was to delete 309 trainees from the FY 75 SATP.

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(4) The present program calls for 45 students to receive a total of 107 courses of instruction at a cost of \$830,770. The carryover from previous years, to be charged to the FY 75 SATP as estimated by Headquarters USAF, includes 881 students and 1167 training courses at a cost of \$4,321,257.

(5) The impact of the reduction in the FY 75 program is expected to slow the rate of progress toward VNAF training self-sufficiency. The revitalization of the in-country technical schools and efforts to improve the resources management capability will not be achieved as originally planned. The most essential training eliminated from the FY 75 program, such as technical and instructor training, will be reprogrammed in the FY 76 program.

(6) The FY 75 SATP scheduled 432 Undergraduate Helicopter Trainees (UPT) and 318 Undergraduate Pilot Trainees (UPT) for CONUS training. These personnel and the pilots trained in-country were intended to provide an 80% level of manning of authorized aircraft. However, the funding of military aid to RVN was reduced to a level that required TMS to return 318 of these trainees home before completion of their training. It was determined that students to be returned would be allowed to complete the phase of training in which they were enrolled as of 20 August 1974. The reduction in the VNAF force structure made these 318 pilot trainees surplus to VNAF requirements. VNAF has a sufficient number of pilots to man the reduced force structure at this time although they will be top heavy on Fixed Wing pilots. A certain amount of in-country cross training in the immediate future and UPT in both helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will be needed in the out years to provide a constant supply of new crew members into the rated force.

c. Republic of Vietnam Navy (VNN).

(1) Objectives of the VNN Fiscal Year 1975 SATP are:

(a) Acquire and improve upon the knowledge and skills required by officers and enlisted personnel that ensure combat effectiveness.

(b) Provide advanced professional training for officers and petty officers to ameliorate the middle-management shortfall.

(c) Improve the qualifications of instructor and supervisory personnel by providing technical training beyond the in-country capability, thus improving the training capability and quality of the VNN.

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(d) Support the training and upgrading of VNN medical and dental care both in quality and quantity, thereby improving combat readiness and treatment of injuries.

(e) Maximize the proper use of U.S. equipment, supplies and materials transferred to VNN custody by providing qualified personnel through proper motivational training and indoctrination.

(2) The beginning VNN FY 75 SATP contained 156 students who were scheduled to attend 243 spaces at a cost of \$491,322.

(a) Both FY 5/74 and FY 1/75 are represented in the Navy program for the same period, 1 July thru 30 September 1974.

(b) In the FY 5/74 Navy program 32 students were sent for offshore training, to receive training in 54 courses at a cost of about \$157,000.

(c) In the FY 1/75 program four students were sent offshore, representing four spaces at a cost of about \$14,250.

(3) Program changes:

(a) In the FY 5/74 VNN program (Aug 74), the university training for one student was cancelled at a cost savings of \$16,500.

(b) In the FY 75 program 15 personnel were added to the program while five others were deleted resulting in a net increase of ten training spaces and a net decrease in cost of about \$400.

(4) The present FY 75 Navy program consists of 167 students, 249 training spaces and \$568,500. Four students are in CONUS training at this time.

(5) Assessment:

(a) The increasing ability of VNN training officials to initiate effective procedures in planning and processing offshore students was demonstrated during FY 1/75 as no spaces were cancelled due to unqualified candidates.

(b) Based on the results of FY 1/75, continued success during the remainder of FY 75 is anticipated with VNN striving to maintain an efficient offshore training program that is capable of utilizing all training spaces available.

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d. Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps (VNMIC).

(1) Objectives of the VNMIC Fiscal Year 1975 SATP are:

(a) Provide individual training in combat arms, technical, administrative staff and medical fields.

(b) Develop the capability to conduct effective amphibious operations.

(c) Improve the qualifications of instructor personnel and strengthen the recruit basic training, particularly in the areas of discipline and combined arms training.

(2) The beginning VNMIC FY 75 SATP contained 85 students who were scheduled to attend 108 courses at a cost of \$193,460.

(a) Both FY 5/74 and FY 1/75 are represented in the Marine Corps program for the same period, 1 July thru 30 September 1974.

(b) In the FY 5/74 VNMIC program seven students were sent offshore to receive training in 13 courses at a cost of \$19,000.

(3) Program changes: In the FY 75 VNMIC program 69 students representing 77 training spaces and about \$173,000 were deleted. The majority of this decrease was due to the cancellation of training for 62 students on the LVT-7.

(4) The FY 75 Marine Corps program now consists of 16 students, 31 training spaces, and about \$32,702. The only VNMIC students in CONUS training as of 30 September 1974 are those from the FY 74 program. Eight VN Marines are attending four courses.

(5) Assessment: Increased VNMIC combat role has dictated that operational requirements take precedence over offshore training, and as a result only a small percentage of actual training requirements will be satisfied by offshore training during FY 75.

2. (C) IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.

a. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

(1) General.

(a) The recruit training program at the National Training Centers (NTCs), although slightly short of programmed strength, has

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registered an improvement in the first quarter of FY 75. Division Training Centers (DTCs) continued to exceed the programmed recruit training requirements.

(b) Antiarmor training throughout NTCs and DTCs has increased in the Programs of Instruction (POI) both in maintenance and tactics, but has decreased in overall operational readiness.

(c) ARVN Air Defense (AD) training for the individual soldier has shown great improvement in training centers but still remains substandard in the four AD battalions.

(d) RVNAF service schools are experiencing some shortfall in student inputs for support type courses. However, personnel inputs to combat arms schooling consistently meet the yearly training forecast in a timely manner.

(2) National and Division Training Centers.

(a) Recruit Training. During this reporting period 51,057 recruits have completed their basic training in the ten NTCs, and 9,423 recruits completed training in the 11 DTCs and the Marine training center. The NTCs have completed 44% of their programmed recruit training (for CY 74), and the DTCs completed 180% of their recruit training. Training is for ten weeks in all training centers and is progressing well with the exception of the M16 and M60 training. Due to the severe cut in monies for training ammunition, these courses are affected the most. The M16 training was reduced in phase five (182 rounds per trainee), then further reduced to 90 rounds at all training centers. It is inconceivable that a new trainee, firing three ranges and four positions, could achieve confidence and proficiency with this amount of ammunition. The M60 course for recruit training is set up on a rank structure basis; 51 rounds for EM, 35 rounds for NCOs and 89 rounds for officer cadets. No proficiency can be obtained in this case either. There have been no monies allocated for training ammunition in FY 2/75, and hopefully the quota for training will be raised in FY 3/75.

(b) Unit and Refresher Training. Unit training in NTCs is below programmed figures due to operational commitments in the four Military Regions (MR). Most division commanders are conducting unit battalion training in their division areas, rather than sending units to the NTCs. The regiments are conducting unit training, up to and including company size, within regimental areas.

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Units have excellent POI, and individual training is continuous. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) have been updated with new PCI, and provide valuable training to units unable to attend special courses at NTCs. During this reporting period 36,879 personnel received refresher training in the NTCs, and 13,298 in the DTCs. For CY 74 the NTCs have completed 64% of programmed training, and DTCs completed 57%. The above figures combined with refresher training conducted within the units indicate that training progress is continuing.

(c) Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF) training. The PSDF cadre trained 3,438 new recruits during FY 75 out of 6,015 programmed. In the first nine months of CY 74, 14,092 new recruits have been trained leaving a shortfall of 4,598 recruits. Training is good and conducted in accordance with standardized POI.

(d) Popular Forces (PF) training. Eight NTCs trained 98 PF platoons in basic training from a programmed 104 during this period. MTTs were programmed to train 551 platoons (in-place) but trained only 132. The shortfall of 419 platoons was attributed to lack of transportation, fuel and higher priority commitments.

(e) Regional Forces (RF) training. RF unit training for phase one and two increased at the NTCs during FY 1/75. Out of 17 companies programmed for phase one unit training, 12 completed the course. In phase two training, 30 battalions were programmed and 18 completed. MTTs were short of their goal for their in-place training. Of the 108 companies programmed in the four MR for in-place training, only 15 participated. The explanation of the shortfall was the same as for the PF training--transportation, fuel, and higher commitments.

(f) The sub-subsector (SSS) training appears to be moving along with no major problems. A total of 40 separate RF companies were deactivated during August and September. Personnel from these units were reassigned to 2200 SSSs throughout the four MR. Each SSS will consist of two officers and four enlisted men, one PF platoon and a combat team of PSDF. After deactivation, the former RF personnel were given two weeks refresher training prior to assignment to the SSSs.

(3) Service Schools General. In CY 75, CTC forecast training of 54,000 military personnel in the 28 RVNAF service schools. During the first nine months of CY 74, more than 40,000 Army, Navy,

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Air Force and Junior Military Cadets have or were receiving training in these schools. In FY 1/75, 16,000 personnel commenced training in RVNAF schools. Some shortfalls exist in support type schools, but student input to combat arms schooling consistently met the yearly forecast in a timely manner. Problem areas peculiar to specific schools are noted below.

(a) The ARVN Infantry Officer Candidate School at Long Thanh is experiencing operational and maintenance problems. The new school has excessive walking distances between the cantonment areas and the firing ranges. This will necessitate valuable training time being lost in long marches as fuel shortages will soon disallow the use of motor transport. There is a need for a self-help program to build mock-ups for city combat fighting, confidence and infiltration courses and an air defense training program. The school's curriculum is deficient due to the lack of physical security. The problem is so acute that overnight bivouacs are not scheduled, and courses in night compass reading, patrolling and infiltration are not planned for the foreseeable future. The school's training mission will continue to suffer as excessive amounts of time and energy are lost in efforts to increase security at the expense of school development.

(b) CTC reported military student school enrollment numbers are often at variance with actual classroom trainee counts. Of particular note is the RVNAF Social Service School. CTC records show the enrollment of 98 students during FY 1/75 with an actual count of 47 now in attendance. The other 51 students were assigned for two days. Between January and September 1974, the school, with a cadre of 42 assigned, had 23 students enrolled.

(c) The RVNAF Engineer Technical School has an enrollment of 200 officers attending a 60-week engineering preparation course. The school is without training aids, equipment, engineering laboratories or a technical library. There are six classrooms, but during a training visit the accumulation of debris noted inside each building indicated that classes had not been conducted on a scheduled basis.

(d) During FY 1/75 visits were made to 11 RVNAF service schools. In 80 percent of these schools the overall performance rating remains good to excellent. The schools have motivated cadres of instructors, complete curriculums and POI. To a large degree, shortages are being overcome by innovation of suggestions received from staff and students. However, as budget restrictions increase, more

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training hours will be lost in each quarter. To minimize the impact on training of this austere funding, TMS submitted a proposal to CTC for the consolidation of some RVNAF service schools. This proposal has been strongly opposed by all three services, even though consolidation would minimize overhead support and reduce operating costs.

(4) Antiarmor.

(a) Major improvements continue in NTCs and DTCs for training in antiarmor defense. The courses presented at the training centers encompass eight phases in antiarmor defense, from basic tank traps to the firing of various weapons. The POI are standardized and are very good. MR 1 and 2 are the strongest in combat readiness, with MR 3 lacking in correct training procedures, mainly due to lack of command emphasis.

(b) The tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) missile systems reached a high of 80% operational readiness (OR) in FY 4/74. During FY 1/75 the systems reached a high of 96% OR only to decrease to 86% during the last month. Of 136 TOW systems in country, 19 systems are presently deadlined for battery assemblies, optical sights and missile guidance systems.

(c) During FY 4/74, 10 additional TOW missile mini battery chargers were issued to units throughout MR 1, 2 and 3, making a total of 20 mini chargers now in country. This greatly reduced the recharging time on the TOW missile system batteries.

(5) Air Defense (AD).

(a) The individual Air Defense training for recruit and refresher trainees in all training centers has greatly improved. Courses are thorough and well conducted, using charts, mock-ups, silhouettes and wire-guided models of enemy aircraft. It is apparent that self-help and many hours of command ingenuity have been put into this program. The POI for this course is 10 hours.

(b) No marked improvements have occurred in the four AD battalions since the last reporting period. Seventy percent of the weapons are still considered to be in poor condition, and parts are not available as yet. AD troops are still being used by MR commanders in a ground defense posture. Another deficiency is communications. ARVN AD battalions do not have the capability to coordinate with the Air Force and Navy AD units.

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b. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

(1) As of 30 September 1974, 5450 VNAF personnel were in all types of VNAF-conducted training, excluding US contractor-administered training. During CY 3/74, 4772 VNAF personnel entered formal training and 3548 graduated. For various reasons 291 personnel entered On-The-Job Training (OJT) during CY 3/74 while 1729 personnel completed OJT. Currently, 2396 personnel are undergoing OJT.

(2) The number of VNAF personnel that entered ARVN-conducted training is 1805, while 282 graduated. Currently, 1820 VNAF personnel are undergoing ARVN-conducted training.

(3) The following is a summary of personnel in VNAF-conducted formal training for CY 3/74.

<u>Pilot Training</u>	<u>Entry</u>	<u>Elim</u>	<u>Grads</u>	<u>In Trng</u>
T-37 UPT*	0	0	16	27
UP-1 UPT	123	0	115	123
O-1 Liaison	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>34</u>
TOTAL	123	0	136	194

*Program shutdown 30 August 1974. Second class completed (31 cum grads), the 27 students in training will be transferred to ATC Nha Trang for O-1 Liaison UPT.

Crew Training

Navigator	0	0	17	0
Observer (FAC)	0	4	53	0
Flight Gunner	21	0	0	21
Loadmaster	32	0	0	32
Aircrew Survival Training	<u>130</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>40</u>
TOTAL	183	4	160	93

Technical Schools

Air Trng Cen (ATC) Nha Trang (NHA)	76	0	108	140
5th Air Liv Tan Son Nhut (TSN)	16	0	30	16

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	<u>Intry</u>	<u>Elin</u>	<u>Grads</u>	<u>In Tng</u>
Sub-Tech Sch, TSN	41	0	99	41
Sub-Tech, BNH	<u>32</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>32</u>
TOTAL	165	1	300	229
<u>Comm & Eiect Schools</u>				
ATC, NHA	61	7	65	94
5th Air Div, TSN	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>22</u>
TOTAL	72	7	65	116
<u>General Service Schools</u>				
ATC, NHA	329	25	315	238
3d Air Div, BNH	49	0	50	24
5th Air Div, TSN	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	378	26	480	262
<u>Civil Engr School</u>				
3d Air Div	79	1	74	38
<u>Air Command & Staff Sch, TSN</u>				
	0	1	83	0
<u>Basic Mil Tng</u>				
	1274	11	521	2122
<u>OJT</u>	2448	240	1729	2396

(4) Technical School. The ATC Technical School is capable of conducting 25 courses at the 3, 5 and 7-level skills. Since the first of the year 15 of these courses have been active at one time or another. Currently, only 6 courses are active, that is, students are in attendance and these are 5 and 7-level courses. Records indicate there have been no student entries into 3-level courses this year. The quality of the students graduating from 5 and 7-level courses is satisfactory.

(5) The Communication/Electronic and General Service Schools are producing graduates from 3, 5 and 7-level courses. The 3-level

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course graduates are marginal, between a helper level (1) and apprentice level (3). The 5-level and 7-level graduates are satisfactory.

(6) Summary of VNAF In-country Training.

(a) The ideal skill level distribution of enlisted personnel is as follows:

<u>Level</u>	<u>%</u>
3	25
5	50
7	23
9	2
	<u>100%</u>

VNAF manning reflects 45.3% at the 1 and 3-levels while the remaining 54.7% are at the 5, 7 and 9-levels. Since 31 December 1973 the improvement has only been 6.9%. At this rate the ideal distribution will be achieved by the end of CY 76.

(b) VNAF appears to be nearing a 5-level Air Force. In reality they remain a 3-level Air Force. For example a maintenance shop supervisor and his personnel may be able to produce professional work but not in a timely manner when and as needed. The reason for this is lack of middle management skills in planning, assigning priorities and scheduling in maintenance and administrative areas. They have been guided and helped in the past by U.S. personnel, military and civilian. Without this on-going help VNAF would revert to 3-level capability. They need more time to acquire middle management expertise.

(c) VNAF has become acutely aware of the cutback in funds for military aid. They have reduced their aircraft inventory and as a result the CR aircraft stands near 70%. VNAF must adjust their training requirements. It would be ideal if the VNAF could maintain their current personnel strength and cross train personnel from surplus career fields into career fields needing skilled personnel. The training situation is on unsteady ground and will remain that way until VNAF develops new training requirements.

(7) ARVN conducted training of VNAF personnel.

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On the basis of the number of personnel graduated from this course in the past two years, plus the additional output from the new training facility, shipboard damage control billets should be adequately manned and an on-going supply of training personnel available. However, VNN and DAO inspection tours of ships have identified existing damage control problems. These are:

- 1 Shipboard damage control equipment inadequate or inoperative.
- 2 A continuing 10 percent monthly turnover in ships' personnel.
- 3 A high percentage of cancellations of shipboard training drills.
- 4 Damage control officers and men lacking in actual experience.

5 An Underway Training Group team, consisting of one officer and 13 enlisted men of various shipboard ratings, will depart Vietnam for counterpart training at San Diego in October. This team will include two Damage Controlmen. Upon completion of their refresher training, the team will conduct underway training exercises aboard VNN blue water units in their respective ratings. Positive results are expected from this program as well as the synthetic trainer at the Saigon VNNSY.

(b) Another area where considerable improvement should be realized is that of the Storekeeper (SK), Disbursing Clerk (DK), and Commissaryman School (CS) at Cat Lai.

1 Primarily, the VNN Supply School supplements the ARVN Supply School. ARVN logistic sources are utilized for general equipment common to both services. For supplies and equipment peculiar to ships and waterborne activities, the US Navy is the primary source of supply. In order to obtain needed logistic support with a minimum of delay and confusion, storekeepers must learn US Navy supply procedures.

2 In FY 2/74, it was discovered that VNN graduates of the USN Oakland Supply Officer's School and the VNN Supply Officer's School were not being given credit for having earned a military supply or logistics school certificate. Graduates were at a serious disadvantage when being considered for promotion. To correct this inequity and to upgrade the competence level for VNN supply officers in the mid-management area, the Supply Officers course at Saigon Naval Training Center has now been established.

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3 A rehabilitation program for classrooms, living quarters, and sanitary facilities at Cat Lai River Force Base, SK, DK and CS school will, upon completion, increase the capacity of the facility from 200 to 350 students per year. The assignment of six recent graduates of the Supply Officers School to replace five petty officer instructors should result in increased competence of enlisted graduates in both quality and quantity in the very near future.

4 Special attention is being given by VNN (N7) toward increased unit training and a concerted overall effort with VNN Bureau of Naval Personnel toward reducing the fleet personnel turnover rate which is still holding at 10% per month.

(c) The training of VNN middle management personnel is in essence the training of the professional commissioned naval officer corps. From VNN's inception in 1952, career training has not followed a designated pattern of schooling. In the first six months of CY 74, only 56 officers were enrolled in the Junior Officers Staff Course. However, the policy was changed during CY 3/74. One hundred junior officers entered training in July, with an additional 100 programmed for entry in November 1974. A prerequisite for entry is 12 months of sea duty. Junior Officers should attend this course not later than two years after graduation from the VNN Naval Academy (a two-year course at Nha Trang).

(d) Entry into Senior Officer Staff School requires 36 months of total sea duty. Through June 1974, 60 officers graduated from the Senior School and 32 entered in September. None are programmed for entry in FY 2/75 due to lack of training facilities. Additional entries must await the graduation of the current class and will not enter training until January 1975. Completion of both courses is required for an officer to be eligible for attendance at the RVNAF Command and General Staff College, which is a requirement to qualify as a candidate for the National Defense College. Facilities at the Senior School will have to be increased to meet current manning needs of the fleet and shore establishment.

(2) During FY 1/75, 501 officers, 1048 NCO/EM and 1220 recruits graduated from in-country service schools and training centers. The increases this quarter are a reflection of an increased emphasis on junior officer and petty officer up-grade training. The increase in recruit training is a seasonal reflection of recent high school graduate enlistees. Officer professional training still is behind

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is completed and in use. Coordinated planning between VNMC and VNN in the use of LVTP-5's and other equipment involved in amphibious operations continues, but no actual amphibious training or operations were conducted during FY 1/75.

(3) The VNMC Training Center continues to meet its CY 74 programmed commitments, but the training program will be cut back during FY 2/75 to permit a gradual reduction from a 110% to a 95% manning requirement. This is necessitated by monetary considerations in line with the general reduction in operational funding. The quarterly quantitative training results are as follows:

<u>Courses</u>	<u>CY 1/74</u> <u>Graduated</u>	<u>CY 2/74</u> <u>Graduated</u>	<u>CY 3/74</u> <u>Graduated</u>	<u>CY 74</u> <u>Programmed</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>%</u>
Officer Refresher	138	106	0	200	122
NCO Refresher	30	0	20	100	50
Team Leader, Enl	537	420	0	1800	53
Squad Leader	95	0	0	200	48
Recruit Training	794	1337	1516	4000	91

(4) Assessment: The training capability of the Vietnamese Marine Corps continues at the high degree of effectiveness it has shown in the past. While differing radically from the USMC in the fact that it is an integral part of the Army, rather than being under the Secretary of the Navy, it has many parallels. It is an proud tradition and a high esprit de corps, and it has a great potential which alone would justify its existence. This potential keeps the enemy off-balance in coastal actions, as the VNMC represents an ever ready potential of an amphibious flanking or rear area attack landing. VNMC does not actually participate with the VNN in training exercises, for various reasons, but planning is coordinated with the Navy, and net and landing drills give a reasonably realistic effect to Marine training. The realism factor is sufficiently high that little difficulty is expected in performing the actual operation. As field combat requirements permit, additional officers and NCOs will be released for refresher and team leader training. Consideration is being given to relieving units from combat duty in battalion strength for specialized training. Additionally, jungle warfare, jungle survival, and independent small unit operations training with ARVN Ranger training units is being given serious consideration. The goal is not merely to maintain the present effectiveness, but, through additional intensive training, to offset the anticipated reduction in personnel strength and make a good outfit better. All indications are that they can and will do it.

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3. (U) IN-COUNTRY ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM (ELTP).

a. Intensive ELTP.

(1) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School (RVNAFLS), designated by the CTC as the primary English language training center for all three services is now operating at only 23% of its rated capacity. The student load has dropped steadily during the first three months of FY 75--from 701 at the end of July, to 375 by the end of September. VNAF students who averaged 46% of the prior student load were reduced to nine percent by the end of September 1974 as a result of drastic budgetary cuts in the offshore SATP for FY 75. The relatively high instructor level of 151 military and nine civilians in relation to the reduced student load of 375 has not resulted in a reduced instructor cadre. Moves in that direction are inevitable if the administration endeavors to keep all instructors presently assigned in spite of budgetary restraints. Results of the new 7400 Series English Comprehensive Level (ECL) tests have been most satisfactory. Of 237 SATP designated candidates who took the ECL test, 81% achieved the necessary qualifying score of 70 for direct entry to CONUS training. The overall capability of RVNAFLS to qualify candidates for direct entry into CONUS training remains as high as ever.

(2) Vietnam Air Force English Language School (VNAFELS), Nha Trang. This school, maintained by the VNAF, also conducts an intensive ELTP geared to qualifying SATP candidates for offshore training. The student load has declined from 197 to 41. TMS, in a recent study on consolidation of RVNAF training sites, recommended this school be phased out and its mission transferred to RVNAFLS.

b. Nonintensive ELTP.

(1) The following units of the RVNAF conduct SATP supported ELTPs: Vietnamese National Military Academy (VNMA) and Political Warfare College (POLWAR) in Dalat, Vietnamese National Naval Academy (VNNA) in Nha Trang, Highland Junior Military Academy (HJMA) in Pleiku, Junior Military Academy (JMA) in Vung Tau, and the Naval Training Centers (NTCs) in Cam Ranh and Saigon.

(2) Technical assistance visits were made by members of the DLI Language Training Detachment (LTD) to the VNMA and POLWAR in Dalat, the VNAFELS and VNNA in Nha Trang, and the NTC in Cam Ranh.

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ELT Administrators were advised to conserve American Language Course materials in view of uncertainties concerning allocations for training aids in the FY 75 SATP budget.

(3) A test sampling of recent graduates of the VN Naval Academy confirmed the high level effectiveness of this nonintensive two-year ELTP in which English is taught for six hours a week. Thirty-one graduates who took the official ECL test on 18 September achieved an average score of 68. The entire ELTP at the Academy is conducted by five Army officers on detached duty from RVNAFLS in Saigon.

c. Accomplishments.

(1) LTD personnel initiated a film program designed to motivate interest in English and American culture on the part of all personnel attached to RVNAFLS. Special emphasis was placed on the selection of films with good visual/audio fidelity and correlation to subjects treated in the American Language Course materials. Questionnaire samplings and class monitoring indicate the films have generated considerable interest and discussions on the part of students, instructors, and administrative staff members.

(2) Training Management Section requested the assistance of the Central Training Command in expediting the return of a large shipment of language laboratory spare parts which had inadvertently been sent to Dalat. The parts were received on 18 September and inventoried by the Chief, Training Aids Section of RVNAFLS and LTD personnel. Work on rehabilitating the labs at RVNAFLS has begun and will take several months. Any surplus parts will be distributed to other RVNAF schools/academies in accordance with priorities established by TMS in coordination with CTC.

(3) Coordination was effected with the Deputy Chief of CTC for Training Evaluation on matters pertaining to English language training. It was agreed that RVNAFLS would continue to receive first priority and that the ELTP conducted by the National Military Academy in Dalat would receive second priority insofar as TMS support was concerned.

4. (U) CONTRACT TRAINING.

a. As of 1 July 1974 all formal training requirements were deleted from statements of work of all contractors supporting the RVNAF. Formal training is defined as scheduled, classroom type training where accurate attendance and progress records are maintained and reported to DAO.

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b. All training being conducted by contractor personnel is OJT in three categories. They are defined as follows:

(1) Specialized OJT is provided in three contracts with Lear Siegler, Inc. (LSI). They are the SMO1 and SMO2, aircraft maintenance contracts at nine air bases country-wide and the Air Technical Logistics Center (ATLC) at Bien Hoa AB. The Satellite Repair Team (SRT-Commando Wheels) contract provides for specialized OJT on Special Vehicle Maintenance (SVM-fire truck, FOD sweepers forklifts, etc.). This semi-formal training is conducted in shops, hangars and line facilities by designated instructors with specific VNAF maintenance personnel assigned to production/training projects. Theory training is conducted from bi-lingual lesson materials in conjunction with hands-on OJT. Written reports are required to be submitted to VNAF and DAO verifying attendance, progress, examination and skill certification. These are the only three contracts which require a written report of goals, accomplishments and progress evaluation toward VNAF self-sufficiency.

(2) Augmentation OJT is provided for in several contracts monitored by DAO Air Force, Army and C-E Divisions. Navy Division reports no contractor training of any kind. Augmentation OJT provides for training in a production mode with the trainee actually doing the work under the supervision of contractor personnel, not necessarily trainers or instructors. If the student is available, contractor personnel conduct OJT as a primary consideration. If the student is unavailable, contractor personnel perform primary production functions. No written reports are required.

(3) Production OJT is oriented toward over-the-shoulder hands-off OJT with the student observing contractor personnel in a primary production mode. Hands-on OJT may be conducted whenever and wherever production is not impeded. In a qualitative analysis, this type of training offers the greatest potential return at zero cost. Students participate in a quasi-volunteer status, prompted by personal interest. The contractor works essentially in a production situation. Neither contractor nor RVNAF are required to conduct, report or evaluate. The system involves RVNAF semi-skilled personnel observing professionals where production is achieved with training fall-out at no additional cost.

c. While there are no formal training requirement lines in any contractor statements of work for the RVNAF, several contractors continue to conduct and report OJT and observer training to various divisions of DAO. They are as follows:

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(b) Performance by RVNAF under DAO Army Division contracts is rated as good. It is considered that the reduction/elimination of contractor support and technical assistance rendered under these contracts would produce the least impact on RVNAF self-sufficiency.

(4) Contracts Monitored by DAO Air Force Division:

(a) Air Force Division monitors 15 contract engineering technical services (CETS) contracts; seven special service direct support contracts and five specialized and production OJT oriented contracts. All the contracts have potential OJT fall-out but only the latter group of five have specific training tasks assigned or authorized under the contract. The five are LSI, PA&E, PAGE, Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc. (Northrop) and Parsons of California (Parsons). All are invited contractors. LSI, PA&E and PAGE are reported elsewhere in this report. Northrop provides augmentation OJT on the F-5E and Parsons on the helicopter rotor blade repair facility at Bien Hoa ATLC.

(b) By contract requirement LST reports the following accomplishments this quarters.

1 All contracts were rewritten effective 10 August 1974. A one-time contract-end close out report was sent to CINCPAC in September. The submitted figures are shown below for information and comparison.

TOTAL TNG REQ (As of 29 Mar 73)	IN TNG (1 Jul 74)	GRADS (Jul)	GRADS (Cum)	IN TNG (1 Aug 74)
3232*	1076	182	2743	849

*Per VNAF request the original training requirement (3232) was revised to 3637 subject to further revision/renegotiation at no additional cost to DAV funds under the "best effort" clause in the contract.

(2) Figures for the period 11 August-30 September 1974 are as follows:

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(b) Performance by RVNAF under DAO Army Division contracts is rated as good. It is considered that the reduction/elimination of contractor support and technical assistance rendered under these contracts would produce the least impact on RVNAF self-sufficiency.

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
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(2) Figures for the period 11 August-30 September 1974 are as follows:



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TOTAL TNG REQ (As of 10 Aug 74)	IN TNG (1 Sep 74)	GRADS (Sep)	GRADS (Cum)	IN TNG (1 Oct 74)
1187*	933**	100	153	833**

*This figure is for the initial period of the contract 11 August-31 December 1974.

**In training high (933) for September includes carryovers from the previous contract. Low end figure (833) indicates planning shortfalls not yet programmed by VNAF as extension and size of the contract was in doubt until it was renewed. The contract is subject to further cutbacks as the service allocations from DAV funds are finalized by RVNAF JGS.

5. (C) INTELLIGENCE TRAINING. (This marks initial report on intelligence training Chapter 11 previously reported elsewhere in the Quarterly Assessment.)

a. In response to USARPAC's request to provide input for in-country intelligence training given by the 500th MI Gp for FY 75, 13 courses for 308 students were requested by Navy MSS, Air Force MSS, Army MSS, Unit 101, Navy N-2 and VNAF. Most of the instruction is on intelligence collection.

b. Although the RVNAF Intelligence School is responsible for in-country intelligence training, it does not offer operational intelligence photography, strategic intelligence, intelligence report writing, survival, evasion, resistance and escape, and training for air intelligence officers. In some cases, units have not received sufficient allocations and some courses lack adequate training aids.

c. Training at the Intelligence School:

<u>TITLE OF COURSE</u>	<u>NO. OF STUDENTS</u>
Intelligence/Security Officers Course	56
Special Intelligence/Security Officers Course	49
Intelligence Staff Officers Course	58
MSS NCO Course	59
Basic Security Officers Course	67
MI Course	<u>40</u>
TOTAL	329

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(1) The school is operating at 50% of capacity. The number of students to be trained this year is approximately 2,500.

(2) Due to the lack of training aids, the school has discontinued instruction in Defense Against Mechanical Entry (DAME) and Defense Against Sound Entry (DASE).

(3) In September, five Richards light tables were presented to the school. These light tables have contributed significantly to photo interpretation training.

6. (C) RVNAF TRAINING SUMMARY.

a. The implementation of the Defense Appropriation for Vietnam (DAV) by the U.S. Congress had a devastating effect on the RVNAF training program in FY 1/75. The net result was an immediate and total reevaluation of both off-shore and in-country RVNAF training, based upon revised structure of the military services and the reduced training dollar ceiling in the DAV.

b. The most immediate impact was felt in off-shore (CONUS) training, for VNAF students in particular. DAO had anticipated that carryover training lines (primarily VNAF pilot training and all service university training) would be funded, as before, by the US military services under the FY 74 program. However, DOD relayed the congressional order that all training courses convening after 1 July 1974 would be funded from the FY 75 DAV. None of these requirements were programmed and a huge shortfall of training funds was immediately evident.

c. The Training Management Section, in coordination with DAO Security Assistance and Service Divisions and the individual RVNAF services, undertook a comprehensive study of training requirements in light of new, scaled down force structures and capabilities of internal RVNAF training organizations. The following resulted:

(1) Because of decreased pilot requirements, the VNAF off-shore pilot training effort was virtually cut in half. Those students in the final phases of rotary wing (UH-1) and fixed wing, jet (T-37) training as of 20 August 1974, were allowed to complete their training to maximize return on investment. Of the 665 pilot trainees in CONUS on 20 August 1974, a total of 347 remained in the states.

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(2) Those students in the preliminary phases of pilot training (English Language, T-41, and UH-1, Phase I) were allowed to complete their immediate phase of training, then return to Vietnam for further training and/or reassignment. A total of 318 students originally programmed for FY 74 funding were identified for return at a cost savings of \$5.42 million for the FY 75 DAV.

(3) All RVNAF FY 75 off-shore training programs were thoroughly reevaluated in light of current dollars and force structure and future needs. Program reductions resulted in a savings of \$3.03 million dollars for the FY 75 DAV.

d. The cutback in off-shore training throws a corresponding load increase on the RVNAF training centers/schools. The in-country training system, including certain schools and centers with roots in the early 1950's under French supervision, is slowly developing into a relatively modern educational institution. Influence of American advisors under the MACV is strongly evident in the form of organization, POI and instructional techniques. On one hand, the same shortages affecting operational units (POL, food, ammunition, and logistic support) impact directly to slow self-sufficiency of the in-country training effort. On the other hand, the loss of large amounts of off-shore training, decreased contractor training, and increased emphasis on training instructor-qualified personnel in remaining CONUS courses, should help offset the shortages. Schools and centers teaching the traditional military subjects, such as military education, small arms, artillery, armor, etc., are well on the way to self-sufficiency. However, the training facilities teaching the newer and more technical skills in flying, aircraft maintenance, radar and communications, etc., will rely on U.S. input and assistance into the outyears.

e. Three underlying problems slow the development of the entire training system and increase the costs of training in this critical period.

(1) The continual operational commitment to the war effort drains much needed resources from an already austere training system.

(2) The weak logistics base needed to support the training centers/schools as well as operational units, creates long delays and shortages of needed materials and supplies.

(3) Many of the centers/schools are overstaffed as a result of decreasing student loads. Inflated staffs can only drive up the

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training cost per student. The staffs were originally designed to handle large loads of recruits during the buildup phase following withdrawal of American forces in 1973. That mission has been largely accomplished, yet the staffs remain.

(4) TMS is advocating the creation of new middle management training for young officers and NCOs. Such an effort will not only gainfully employ the existing instructor staffs, but if successful, will help to solve problem 2 by strengthening management in support and logistics.

f. One bright light in the RVNAF training picture is the development of a virtually self-sufficient English Language Training program, a tribute to the sustained efforts of the RVNAF themselves and the technical specialists of the Defense Language Institute.

g. With the close of FY 1/75, the presence of American and third country contractor personnel providing in-country training showed a steady decrease. "Formal" training by contractors ceased as of 30 June 1974. Production work by contractors, with spinoff OJT/observer training benefits, continued throughout the quarter, but at an ever decreasing rate. Cutbacks in contracts and personnel will reduce the OJT benefits and force the RVNAF to pick up an ever-increasing share of the production and training loads, primarily in the highly technical areas where the in-country capabilities are most limited.

h. In the final analysis, the FY 75 DAV forced the RVNAF and DAO into very serious and difficult decisions which were never necessary under previous funding for Vietnam. The results of these decisions are presently being felt in nearly all areas of training, but the ultimate impact has not yet become apparent. Subsequent assessments in the remainder of FY 75 should provide a much more accurate estimate of future RVNAF training capabilities. The internal politics in South Vietnam at the close of the quarter, coupled with the constant drain of resources to maintain the war effort, make the overall training picture anything but bright.

(Figures 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4 and 11-5)

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ARVN SERVICE SCHOOLS

THU DUC:
QM SCHOOL
BAND SCHOOL
MARTIAL ART & PHY SCH
ADMIN & FIN SCHOOL
AG SCHOOL
MIL INTEL SCHOOL

SAIGON:
LANGUAGE SCHJOL
MIL DOG TC
MIL ENGR TECH SCHOOL
MIL MED SCHOOL
NDC
ORD SCHOOL
POLWAR CADRE TC
SOC SVC TNG SCHOOL
TRANS SCHOOL
WAFIC SCHOOL

LONG THANH (BEAR CAT)
INFANTRY SCHOOL
ARMOR SCHOOL

PHU CUONG
ENGR SCHOOL

PLEIKU:
JR MIL SCH

DUC MY:
ARTY SCH

NHA TRANG:
NCO ACADEMY

DALAT:
POLWAR COL
-VNMA

VUNG TAU:
JR MILITARY SCHOOL
MP SCHOOL
SIGNAL SCHOOL

LONG BINH:
LOG MGT SCHOOL
C&GSC




Figure 11-1

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VNAF
TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS




Figure 11-3

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ARVN TRAINING CENTERS




Figure 11-4

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BREAKDOWN OF REPLACEMENTS RECRUITED AND TRAINEE BY THE FOLLOWING UNITS IN 1974

MR's	MONTH												
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	
<u>MR 1</u>													
1st Div	188	377	406	252	313	87	244	256					
2nd Div	58	548	496	333	330	210	310	182					
3rd Div	217	459	466	303	417	106	238	281					
ABN Div	57	348	685	445	478	378	372	318					
Marine	114	747	684	506	288	275	142	101					
<u>MR 2</u>													
22nd Div	170	464	471	325	396	423	389	356					
23rd Div	181	513	549	479	458	440	398	314					
<u>MR 3</u>													
5th Div	42	134	1120	206	226	122	234	482					
18th Div	0	168	842	687	589	89	841	486					
25th Div	0	0	491	269	257	338	423	310					
81st ABN RGR	0	0	0	0	32	27	02	77					
<u>MR 4</u>													
7th Div	299	798	684	656	598	171	528	514					
9th Div	224	195	480	415	417	554	593	559					
21st Div	89	295	266	190	233	254	294	252					
<u>FOR ALL MR's</u>													
Rangers	455	1826	1941	2044	1791	1390	1590	1402					
AF	0	0	0	238	1447	428	0	0					
VNN	0	0	350	586	165	101	170	0					
RF	2146	5344	5966	5774	6187	6862	8099	8100					
PF	538	2090	3449	2084	2755	3887	1325	4161					

Figure 11-5

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CHAPTER 12

RVNAF PROGRAMS, PLANS AND MORALE

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. Chapter 12 contains topics concerning all services including:
 - a. Lines of Communication (LOC).
 - b. Military Construction (MILCON).
 - c. RVNAF Retirement Plan CY 74.
 - d. RVNAF Morale.
 - e. RVNAF Medical Evacuation.
 - f. Chieu Hoi Program.
 - g. Terrorism.
 - h. Refugee Program.

2. (U) LINES OF COMMUNICATION. In previous assessments, data reported pertained primarily to the RVN commercial lines of communication. In this assessment for the 1st quarter of FY 75, those data as pertain primarily to the RVNAF lines of communication will be addressed.
 - a. Railways:
 - (1) Total tonnage moved by the RVNAF by railways was 11,280 metric tons.
 - (2) Tonnage hauled was primarily between Saigon, Go Vap, Long Binh, Bien Hoa and Saigon Island (PDO) and Danang-Hue and Qui Nhon-Phu Cat.
 - (3) No passenger movements by rail were sponsored by the RVNAF.
 - (4) During the 1st quarter FY 75, the following enemy actions took place disrupting the flow of traffic in the Danang-Hue area:
 - (a) July -- 6 minings of rail trackage and 2 minings of bridges.

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(b) August -- 12 minings of rail trackage, 4 minings of bridges and 1 mining of a work train.

(c) September -- 2 minings of rail trackage and 1 mining of a bridge.

(d) On 18 August 1974, due to the above damages, heavy fighting in the Danang-Hue area and lack of adequate security of the railways, service between Danang-Hue was temporarily discontinued.

b. Highways:

(1) During the 1st quarter of FY 75, the RVNAF moved 551,986 metric tons of cargo by highway utilizing military assets and 44,776 metric tons of cargo by commercial contract vehicles.

(2) Passengers moved by highway during the 1st quarter FY 75 amounted to 758,706. This figure includes troops and RVNAF dependents moved throughout RVN. Primarily, military assets were utilized to effect these movements.

(3) The above represents both inter- and intra- Air Logistics Command (ALC) movements.

c. Waterways:

(1) During the 1st quarter FY 75, 17,711 metric tons of cargo moved by RVNAF brown water watercraft. Commercial hire watercraft moved 21,598 metric tons of RVNAF cargo during this period.

(2) Passengers transported by RVNAF brown water watercraft amounted to 13,058 during the 1st quarter FY 75.

(3) The above represents inter- and intra-ALC movements.

d. Ocean vessels (LSTs and LSMs) transported 10,028 metric tons of RVNAF cargo and 1,184 passengers during the 1st quarter FY 75 within RVN.

e. VNAF aircraft assigned to the RVNAF JGS/CLC for transportation of cargo and passengers lifted 3,642 metric tons of cargo and 79,305 passengers during the 1st quarter FY 75. Once again, these figures represent inter- and intra-ALC movements.

3. (U) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MILCON).

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a. The Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)/Military Construction (MILCON) program provided for construction and major rehabilitation of RVNAF facilities. Although Military Assistance Program (MAP)-type funding will be instituted in FY 75, obligated MASF/MILCON dollars will continue to be expended through FY 76. Other than contract and Supervision Inspection Over Head (SIOH) charges, all remaining FY 74 and prior year funds were reported as available for withdrawal to the respective service organizations.

b. Projects under construction are administered by the Director of Construction (DIRCON). All work is done by fixed-price contractors. Construction problems arise when unforeseen cost changes occur because of changed site and conditions, escalated cost of U.S. Government Furnished Material and war risk damages. Based on a recent SECDEF message, the service organizations are allowed to use FY 74 MASF funds for financing in-scope cost increases to FY 74 construction projects.

c. The present construction program consists of the following:

(1) Current Major Construction Program.

	<u>No. of Construction Projects</u>	<u>\$ Value*</u>
Hospital	1	2,837
Port Facilities	4	1,788
Airfields	14	2,286
Training Facilities	3	471
Logistics Depots	4	424
TOTAL		7,806

(2) Construction Program for FY 75.

	<u>No. of Construction Projects</u>	<u>\$ Value*</u>
Army	0	-0-
Navy (Army funded: Common Support)	17	1,000(est)
Air Force (MISC)	58	2,688
TOTAL		3,688

*Thousands of Dollars.

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d. Inflation during FY 75 has posed severe financial problems for the fixed-price construction contractors in Vietnam. In addition, periodic shortages of construction materials because of the inability of local manufacturers to meet demand, have created delays in the completion of some projects.

4. (U) RVNAF RETIREMENT PLAN CY 74.

a. The last assessment reported 20,300 personnel were demobilized during the first half of CY 74. The number of personnel demobilized during the third quarter CY 74 is shown at Figure 12-1.

b. There has been no change in the military pension regulations or responsibility of the Ministry of War Veterans.

5. (C) RVNAF MORALE.

a. As in the past, efforts, to improve the lot of military personnel, continue. The battle against inflation, 37% this calendar year, is being slowly but surely lost. A 14% pay increase and implementation of travel regulations cutting RVNAF personnel commercial transportation costs 75% tend to alleviate the problem but are insufficient to stem the tide.

b. Surveys are underway to determine the attitudes of RVNAF personnel. Results from MRs 1 and 2 are complete while surveys in MRs 3 and 4 are in progress. Seventy percent of personnel surveyed were in combat situation. All personnel were lower ranking officers or enlisted. Opinions expressed were:

- (1) 92% thought pay/allowances were inadequate.
- (2) 50% reported necessary expenditures of up to twice pay and allowances (inference here of either moonlighting, corruption/theft or outside financial help).
- (3) 50% reported being shorted on sugar issued at the commissary.
- (4) 80% reported standard rations were insufficient.
- (5) 50% felt standard of living inadequate.
- (6) 88% felt quality of food was substandard.
- (7) 50% reported insufficient clothing.

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DEMOBILIZATION DURING THIRD QUARTER CY 74

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Over Age Personnel				
Regular Forces	<u>143</u>	<u>263</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>476</u>
RF	<u>21</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>365</u>
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	<u>164</u>	<u>357</u>	<u>339</u>	<u>860</u>
B. WAC Contract Expiration & Retirement	<u>5</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>33</u>
C. Category #2 Physically Unfit				
Regular Forces	<u>203</u>	<u>393</u>	<u>1657</u>	<u>2253</u>
RF	<u>16</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>257</u>
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>628</u>	<u>628</u>
Total	<u>219</u>	<u>502</u>	<u>2417</u>	<u>3133</u>
D. Category #3 Disabled				
Regular Forces	<u>127</u>	<u>164</u>	<u>2248</u>	<u>2539</u>
RF	<u>16</u>	<u>163</u>	<u>844</u>	<u>1023</u>
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>622</u>	<u>622</u>
Total	<u>143</u>	<u>327</u>	<u>3714</u>	<u>4184</u>
E. Overall				
Regular Forces	<u>473</u>	<u>820</u>	<u>3975</u>	<u>5268</u>
RF	<u>53</u>	<u>366</u>	<u>1226</u>	<u>1645</u>
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1269</u>	<u>1269</u>
WAC	<u>5</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>33</u>
Total Demobilization	<u>531</u>	<u>1199</u>	<u>6485</u>	<u>8215</u>

Figure 12-1

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- (8) 60% reported adequate housing.
- (9) 58% reported level of medical care was satisfactory, however, 33% reported facilities too distant.
- (10) 11% live in military facilities while 72% live in personal or relatives homes.
- (11) 47% reported working wives/dependents.
- (12) Preponderance of single personnel stated economics as reason for their marital status.
- (13) 67% reported a desire to leave service.

c. The surveys in MR 1 and 2 represented valid samples and conclusions can be drawn. Pay is below subsistence level, commissaries could be improved and military housing is probably substandard while medical facilities might be better placed. Morale within RVNAF, from all indications, is not high.

d. Desertions have stabilized, even lowered, during the quarter, however, this could be attributed to measures taken against those who are apprehended.

e. RVNAF desertions for June, July and August 1974:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Desertions</u>
ARVN	27,626
VNAF	424
VNN	251
VNMC	600
RF	18,855
PF	7,247
Ranger	4,504
Airborne	652

f. Desertion rates for the past three quarters:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Dec-Feb</u>	<u>Mar-May 74</u>	<u>Jun-Aug 74</u>
ARVN	*2.38	2.11	2.28
VNAF	.19	.31	.23
VNN	.22	.21	.21

*Numbers represent percentage of assigned strength.

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Dec-Feb</u>	<u>Mar-May 74</u>	<u>Jun-Aug 74</u>
VNMC	2.16	1.58	1.31
RF	1.72	1.90	2.17
PF	.67	1.03	1.26
Ranger	5.72	5.17	5.11
Airborne	1.84	1.39	1.63

g. Desertion trends are shown in Figure 12-2.

6. (C) RVNAF MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC). Medical evacuation is accomplished through use of the UH-1 helicopter. Overall statistics for 1974 are as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
Jan	3,771	1775	2,552
Feb	3,606	1636	2,540
Mar	3,796	1894	2,631
Apr	2,990	1703	2,588
May	3,452	1706	3,461
Jun	4,029	1942	2,885
Jul	3,379	1942	2,638
Aug	4,300	2194	2,521

7. (C) CHIEU HOI PROGRAM. The number of communist ralliers to the Government of Vietnam declined for the third straight month. This could be an indication that the communists are improving their psychological warfare techniques.

(Figure 12-3)

8. (C) TERRORISM. The civilian populace suffered the highest casualties of the year during July and August. The high water levels of September contributed to the lower level of activity.

(Figure 12-4)

9. (C) REFUGEE PROGRAM. A new dimension has been added to the refugee program this quarter. While refugees (in camps) have been reduced, the numbers now carried in private homes, etc., have increased such that total refugees remain at past levels with re-settlement at a virtual standstill. Disruption of the program continues as a prime target of communist planners.

(Figures 12-5 and 12-6)

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



Figure 12-2

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CHIEU HOI TREND



1974 TO DATE 3,416

Figure 12 3

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


Figure 12-4

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REFUGEE HISTORY




Figure 12-5

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CURRENT REFUGEE STATUS




Figure 12-6

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CHAPTER 13

JGS (COMMA) AND CONTROL

1. (U) CLASS. OF COMLINE. The Defense Attache Office has, in the past, shown the interrelationships between the Joint General Staff (JGS) and various staffs within the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVMAF). This assessment outlines JGS functions in relation to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for personnel (JGS/J1).

2. (C) OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel is organized and staffed as shown in Figure 13-1. The office has two secretaries, two aide-de-camp, two administrative noncommissioned officers (JCO); two clerk typists and two liaison personnel assigned. Mission is as follows:

a. Collection of information and data deemed useful for submission to the Deputy Chief of Staff.

b. Presentation to the Deputy Chief of Staff of all documents for approval and signature.

c. Dissemination of all orders pertaining to personnel to subordinate agencies.

3. (C) JGS/J1.

a. The Chief of J1 operates within the guidelines determined by the Chief/JGS, Chief of Staff/JGS and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The JGS/J1 has staff supervision over the Adjutant General/JGS and the Military Police Command for administration and basic laws governing the conduct of male and female (military and civilian) personnel. The JGS/J1 is also responsible for monitoring and maintaining the strength of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, this is accomplished by the operation of four Military Regions (MR) Recruiting and Induction (R&I) Centers and 45 Sector R&I offices. The JGS/J1 has operational supervision over all of the above R&I centers/offices. MRs and Sectors are responsible for the security and discipline of the centers/offices, respectively. The chart at Figure 13-2 depicts the JGS relationship with Sectors (Province) and Divisions. The J1 staff has an authorized strength of 165 officers and men (105 officers, 49 NCOs and 11 enlisted men (E4)). Figure 13-3 outlines the JGS/J1 organization.

b. General Mission of JGS/J1. To plan, provide direction,

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

JOINT GENERAL STAFF RVNAF




Figure 13-1

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COMMAND AND CONTROL




Figure 13-2

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J1/JGS ORGANIZATION CHART




Figure 13-3

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exercise general staff supervision, coordinate and control general personnel policies and basic principles pertaining to military and civilian personnel of RVNAF including prisoners of war (POW) and returnees.

(1) Function of JGS/J1 Divisions, Branches and Section:

(a) Administration Section.

1 Staffs incoming and outgoing documents.

2 Administers personnel of JGS/J1 and four R&I centers.

3 Maintains service records of officers, NCOs and EM assigned to the JGS/J1.

4 Manages equipment and office supplies.

5 Organizes political and social welfare briefings along with ceremonies and other miscellaneous tasks of the JGS/J1.

(b) Programs and Study Division.

1 Study and Plans Branch - studies and coordinates with agencies concerned, to:

a Answer questions relating to requirements for organizing and recruiting military specialists, and Ministry of National Defense (MND) civil servants.

b Plan and program for utilization of national manpower and resources.

c Develop solutions to problems relating to recruitment of personnel including cadre and specialists, establishes programs for the utilization and improvement of RVNAF units.

2 Programs Branch - plans, prepares, publishes and amends the following:

a Programs for recruiting personnel, including cadre and specialists for Military Services, Arms and Branches (including Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF)). Supervision of the execution of this program is included.

b Programs for training RVNAF specialists.

c Programs pertaining to separations and reenlistment.

d Promotion quotas and programs.

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e Project quotas for recruitment of RVNAF civil servants.

3 Statistics Branch.

a Studies methods for developing personnel and strength statistics.

b Researches, processes and publishes documents concerning strength and personnel statistics.

c Studies and analyzes statistical data in order to comment on variations of strength and personnel status.

d Develops and provides strength and personnel statistics according to requirements of agencies and the JCS/J1.

(c) Strength Division.

1 Management and Replacement Branch.

a Establishes short range replacement objectives for major units, branches, agencies and services.

b Assigns officers, NCOs and E1 graduating from military schools and training centers.

c Reconciles RVNAF unit strengths.

d Monitors the assignment of students that possess technical occupations prior to enlistment.

e Plans and requests transportation means for graduate students.

2 Manpower Control Utility Branch.

a Develops charts and periodic strength statistics according to requirements.

b Conducts strength audits of units and solves problems concerning the utilization of RVNAF personnel.

c Provides agencies with strength documents as directed.

d Processes inspection reports for resolution and appropriate action.

(d) Recruiting and Induction Division.

1 Recruiting Program Plans Branch.

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a Studies, develops, publishes and amends recruiting and induction regulations - Regular Forces, Regional Forces (RF)/ Popular Forces (PF).

b Design and programs quotas for recruitment of Regular Forces, RF and PF volunteers based on strength requirements.

c Processes sector requests to enroll conscripts into the RF and PF.

d Coordinates with the Mobilization Directorate for Manpower and Resources. Coordinates with J3/JGS for unit projects, and with the Central Training Command (CTC) for training programs to effectively guide the recruitment of volunteers and encourage youths to fulfill their military obligation.

e Guides operating activities concerning the recruitment and induction at R&I centers and offices.

2 Control and Recap Branch.

a Controls and monitors daily activities of R&I centers and offices.

b Contacts other agencies to resolve problems concerning operation of R&I centers and offices.

c Establishes programs for inspecting, visiting and briefing at R&I centers and offices.

d Follows up, summarizes and controls the status of volunteers and conscripts, reenlistees, NCO students and officer cadets at R&I centers.

e Programs assignment of conscripts to military schools and training centers for training.

f Considers and solves status of conscripts who have sufficient conditions for draft deferment, but volunteer to enlist.

(e) Personnel Regulations Division.

1 Regulation Branch.

a Researches, prepares and promulgates regulations concerning Regular Forces, RF and PF military personnel.

b Follows up the execution of the regulations and studies amendments to RVNAF regulations.

2 Personnel Management Procedures Branch.

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a Studies, prepares and disseminates procedures for administering regular force, RF and TF personnel.

b Follows up the implementation of basic principles and documents relating to the administration of VMAF personnel (guiding, explaining, correcting mistakes and amending).

3 Civilian Personnel Branch.

a Researches, prepares and promulgates regulations for WOND career civilian personnel.

b Follows up the exercise of WOND civilian personnel statutes.

(F) Morale and Law and Order Division.

1 Law and Order Branch.

a Coordinates with Military Justice Department on the study of questions on military law and delinquents.

b Researches and supervises the implementation of military conduct and discipline.

c Researches and publishes regulations concerning the punishment of deserters and administration of deserters/laborers.

d Coordinates with the Military Justice Department, J2 and Military Police Headquarters/JGS to study, prepare and issue POW regulations.

2 Awards and Decorations Branch - studies, prepares and issues documents pertaining to the application and improvement of:

a Types and formats of decorations, certificates of outstanding achievement, letters of commendation and fourragere.

b Basic principles pertaining to formalities, conditions and authorities for awarding and/or withdrawing decorations, and benefits for being granted decorations, certificates of outstanding achievement, letters of commendation and fourragere.

3 Morale Branch - studies, proposes, prepares and improves regulations concerning:

a Civil status of active personnel, home reservists, veterans, war invalids and the widows and orphans of war dead.

b Interest of military personnel and the above said

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personnel in regard to salary, allowances, retirement pensions; social security and mutual aid insurance; vocation and education benefits; Family Support Programs; and burial and settlement of grievances.

(2) Committees on desertion, alcohol abuse and social evils meet monthly to discuss general morale problems. Desertion is a major concern. Prior to Cease-fire I, the desertion rate was running about 23,000 men a month. Currently, it is about 13,000 and holding. A deserter is now registered on a computer printout which is distributed to all commands and police units. A man is classified a deserter after being gone from his unit for fifteen days. Apprehended deserters are fingerprinted for future control. Normally, deserters are sent to a prison, then to a combat unit to work as laborers until they exhibit that they can be productive again. At this point, they are sent back to a unit to serve as soldiers again. Territorial Forces contribute heavily to the desertion problem. For those forces who are serving outside of their native area for a period of more than six months, the desertion rate rises. Under the established RVNAF leave policy, no more than five percent of a unit should be on leave at any one time. Over a year's period a soldier should be able to take one 3-day leave and one 7-day leave. JCS/J1 monitors personnel on leave and sends reminder messages to those who are not complying with the policy. Where possible, free air transportation is made available to personnel on leave. Discount tickets are also available for train and/or bus travel.

(3) The four MR R&I centers are under the control of JCS/J1 for command, operation and supervision. For security and discipline the R&I centers are under control of Corps and the Military Region GI. Figure 13-4 outlines the MR's R&I center organization. The four R&I centers are organized similarly with a headquarters, three divisions and nine sections. The JCS/J1 R&I Division has formed a five-man R&I team consisting of two officers from JCS/J1, the GI/MR 4, one officer from R&I center MR 3 and one officer from the R&I center MR 4. Mission of the team is to visit the 16 sector R&I offices of MR 4 to hold seminars with the sector R&I offices to resolve recruiting problems in MR 4. The mission, capabilities and authorized strength of the R&I centers is as follows:

(a) Mission.

1. Receives and processes recalled veterans, volunteers and conscripts (MR 1 and 2 R&I Centers). The MR 3 R&I Center is the same with the addition of the Junior Military and Women's Armed Forces Centers. The MR 4 R&I Center is the same as MR 3 less the Junior Military Center.

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MR'S RECRUITING AND INDUCTION CENTERS ORGANIZATION CHART




Figure 13-4

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2 Command subordinate R&I offices.

3 The MR 3 and MR 4 R&I Centers provides administrative and personnel support to subordinate R&I offices. This support is provided by sector for the MR 1 and MR 2 R&I offices.

(b) Capabilities.

1 To process and feed volunteers and conscripts (maximum capacity for MR 1 and 2 R&I Centers, 3,000; MR 3 R&I Center, 4,500; and MR 4 R&I Center, 3,500).

2 To process and transfer physically unfit recruits, reserve NCO and officer cadets to disposition boards.

3 Issue equipment and clothing to recruits from time of induction or enlistment to time of delivery to training centers or receiving units.

4 Administer recruiting funds, to receive and feed volunteers and conscripts.

(c) Authorized Strength.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st R&I Center	31	58	90	179
2d R&I Center	33	62	93	188
3d R&I Center	48	132	226	406
4th R&I Center	46	92	146	284

(4) There are 45 recruiting and induction offices. One located at each sector (province), and one in Saigon. The R&I offices are of two types, A (capacity 400 men) and B (capacity 600 men). There are 15 Type A and 30 Type B (including the Saigon R&I office). All R&I offices are under the control of the MR R&I Centers for command, operation and supervision, and they come under the control of the Sector Headquarters for security and discipline. The Saigon R&I office is under control of the MR 3 R&I Center for command, operation and supervision. The Capitol Special Zone Headquarters is responsible for security and discipline. Figure 13-5 outlines the Recruiting and Induction office organization. The 45 R&I offices are organized with a headquarters and three sections. The capabilities and authorized strength are as follows:

(a) Mission.

1 Recruit volunteers in accordance with the programs and quotas prescribed by the R&I center.

RECRUITING AND INDUCTION OFFICE ORGANIZATION CHART (TYPE A & B)




Figure 13-5

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2 Receive inductees that voluntarily report for military obligation and those apprehended in police roundup operations conducted by sectors.

(b) Capabilities.

1 Receive and feed volunteers and conscripts.

2 Administer funds for feeding volunteers, conscripts and RF recruits.

3 Process Regular Force volunteers, RF recruits and complete their records.

4 Classify volunteers, inductees and prepare and submit rosters of these individuals to pertinent R&I centers and sector for information.

5 Request sector to transport and escort volunteers and inductees to the R&I centers concerned.

(c) Authorized Strength.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
R&I Office (Type A)	4	10	5	19
R&I Office (Type B)	5	13	16	34
R&I Office Saigon	6	28	5	39

4. (U) RETIREMENT. There is a fairly comprehensive retirement plan in force. Early retirement is encouraged to make way for younger people. Periodic screening of records at all levels, from NCOs to General, is undertaken to weed out people. The Ready Reserve Plan is still under study. Colonel Chuan is making a two-week trip to the United States during October, to study the U.S. reserve system. Colonel Chuan mentioned that use of the PF as a reserve was not a good idea since these are the youngest group of people. He felt they should be in the Armed Forces in order to release older and more experienced people from RVNAF who would form the nucleus of the Reserve.

5. (C) SUMMARY/CONCLUSION. The Joint General Staff primarily coordinates RVNAF resources. While the Chief/JGS and his staff exercise little command over most MR elements, the JGS/J1 (an ARVN Colonel) has complete control of the MR R&I Centers and Sector offices. JGS/J1 is primarily involved in allocating resources, publishing and monitoring of administrative policy and directives. The JGS/J1 is experiencing some difficulties in carrying out its mission with only 75% of its authorized strength assigned.

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CHAPTER 14

DAO DISTINGUISHED VISITORS

1. JULY 1974:

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
1-3 Jul 74	RADM H.P. Glindeman, Jr.	Chief, Fleet Coordinating Group, Nakhon Phanom
1-3 Jul 74	COL Henry L. Baulch	13th Air Force
1-3 Jul 74	COL Joe Elliot	Headquarters, United States Army Support Activities Group
1-4 Jul 74	Congressman G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery (Democrat-Mississippi)	Member, House Committee on Veterans Affairs and Committee on Armed Services
2-3 Jul 74	COL Albert N.J. Weidhas	Commander, Detachment K, 500th Military Intelligence Group
7-11 Jul 74	Mr. Frank Kiehne	Executive Director, United States International Division, Young Men's Christian Association
	Mr. Irvin Chapman	Chairman, United States Young Men's Christian Association, International Division Committee

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
	Mr. Donald Payne	Chairman, The World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations Standing Committee on Refugees and Rehabilitation Work
	Mr. Craig Altschul	Director, Communications and Public Relations for the National Board of Young Men's Christian Association of the United States
	Mr. Robert Dye	Director, Urban and Program Services of United States National Board, Young Men's Christian Association
	Mr. Ronald Donaldson	Member, United States Young Men's Christian Association International Division Committee
	Mr. Paul Permar	Pacific Region Associated National Board, Young Men's Christian Associations
	Mr. Yasutaro Owaku	National General Secretary, Young Men's Christian Associations of Japan

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
8-12 Jul 74	RADM Arthur W. Price, Jr.	Commander, Amphibious Group One
10-12 Jul 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
10-14 Jul 74	COL Dmitri J. Tadich	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Support Activities Group
11-14 Jul 74	Captain W.E. Muncy, United States Navy	Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, Military Sealift Command, Far East
12-13 Jul 74	General D.V. Bennett	Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
15-16 Jul 74	COL E. Esper	J4, United States Support Activities Group
15-17 Jul 74	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
15-18 Jul 74	BG G.W. Connell	Commander, Defense Property Disposal Service

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
19-24 Jul 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
	COL C. Ward	Staff Member
22-24 Jul 74	COL James E. Ryan	Thailand Post Exchange
23-26 Jul 74	COL Albert N.J. Weidhas	Commander, Detachment K, 500th Military Intelligence Group
25-26 Jul 74	COL Edward J. Kamin, III	United States Army, Pacific, Medical Evaluator
28 Jul-1 Aug 74	COL R.O. Rowland	Chief, Personnel Services, Pacific Command Staff
31 Jul-4 Aug 74	COL Douglas K. Logan	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Support Activities Group

2. AUGUST 1974:

2-3 Aug 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
7-9 Aug 74	COL Thomas Dillon	500th Military Intelligence Group
9-10 Aug 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
10-11 Aug 74	RADM Roland Rieve	Supply Officer, Pacific Fleet
11-13 Aug 74	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
11-15 Aug 74	Dr. H. Paul Ecker, GS-18	Executive Director, Naval Management Support Center
11-17 Aug 74	COL A.L. Meredith	Chief, Research Development Test and Evaluation Division, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Staff
12-13 Aug 74	RADM H.P. Glindeman, Jr.	Chief, Fleet Coordinating Group, Nakhon Phanom
13-16 Aug 74	Captain R.M. Fluss, United States Navy	Deputy Commander, Pacific Division, Naval Facility Engineering

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED -VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
15 Aug 74	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
15 Aug 74	LTGen E.F. O'Connor	Vice Commander, Air Force Logistics Command
15 Aug 74	General Timothy F. O'Keefe	Commander, United States Support Activities Group/7th Air Force
15-20 Aug 74	Mr. John H. Eisenhower	Senior Examiner for Military Assistance and Sales, International Affairs Division, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President
18 Aug-6 Sep 74	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
19-20 Aug 74	LTGen Carlos M. Talbott	Vice Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
23-26 Aug 74	COL Robert F. Brockmann	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, United States Support Activities Group

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
25-30 Aug 74	Mr. John P. Constandy	Deputy Inspector General of Foreign Assistance
26 Aug 74	MG G.A. Godding	Commander, United States Army Security Agency
27-29 Aug 74	Mr. Walter L. Shepherd, GS-15	Regional Executive, Thai Regional Exchange
30 Aug 74	Admiral Noel A. Gayler	Commander in Chief, Pacific

3. SEPTEMBER 1974:

4-9 Sep 74	Captain Edward J. Williams, United States Navy	Officer in Charge of Construction, Thailand
9-11 Sep 74	COL W.L. Stringer	Headquarters, Pacific Air Force
11-18 Sep 74	Mr. Kenneth L. Riner, GS-15	Assistant Regional Manager, San Francisco Region, Defense Contract Audit Agency
15-19 Sep 74	Captain D.D. Ruebsamen, United States Navy	Commander, Military Sealift Command, Far East

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
17-21 Sep 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
20-21 Sep 74	Dr. Robert L. DuPont	White House Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse
	COL C.V. Yarbrough	Staff Member
22 Sep-7 Oct 74	Mr. William M. Paz, GS-16	Director, Regional Office for Civilian Manpower Management, Pearl Harbor
	Mr. David Refsahl, GS-15	Personnel Services Officer, Office Civilian Manpower Management, Washington, D.C.
23-27 Sep 74	COL Strathmore K. McMurdo	Inspector General, United States Army, Pacific
24 Sep-10 Oct 74	COL Leo M. Brandt	Office, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

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DATE(S)

29-30 Sep 74

DISTINGUISHED
VISITOR

Captain George D.
Stein, United States
Navy

TITLE

Defense Attache Office,
Technical Representative
Special Unit No. 1,
Washington

14-9

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CHAPTER 15

DATT ASSESSMENT

1. (S/NFD) GENERAL. The constraints of the FY 1975 Defense Assistance, Vietnam appropriation forced some hard decisions on RVNAF leaders. The quarter saw the grounding of a significant slice of VNAF's attack and transport aircraft while plans have been drawn, although not finally approved, for the deactivation of the majority of VNN's River Assault Groups. RVNAF likewise dramatically reduced ammunition and petroleum-product allocations to its field forces. While GVN retains its presence in all provinces, control in Kontum has eroded to that of a single enclave, Kontum City; GVN control in Binh Long Province continued to deteriorate as the enemy noose about An Loc tightened. In MR 1, the military situation, although essentially stable, remains serious; the presence of seven NVA divisions in reserve in North Vietnam pervades the interest of the military leadership in GVN's northernmost region.

2. (S/NFD) PROBLEM AREAS.

a. Economics: The harvest season brought a measure of stability to basic food prices although the overall inflationary trend in other prices continued. The 14 percent pay raise granted RVNAF members, while a step in the right direction, was insufficient to offset the effects of inflation on the soldier and his family.

b. Military: War material stockpiles continued to fall. Although field commanders continued to operate against increased enemy pressures, constraints were felt through reduced allocations of ammunition and POL. Any major Communist effort would strain RVNAF resources and possibly roll back defenses at vital points.

3. (S/NFD) SUMMARY. While the losses of Mang Buk, Thuong Duc, Minh Long, Da Trach, FSB Lion and Gia Vuc were important, the defensibility of those positions had long been questioned by RVNAF leaders and the Defense Attache Office analysts. The short term combat posture of RVNAF did not change appreciably despite US aid reductions; however, a prolonged offensive would severely tax, if not overcome their limited resources. The deterioration noted in the previous assessment has not continued, at least, not at the same rate. Maintaining no less than status quo under adverse conditions is the major problem facing South Vietnam.

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