DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING FORCES: THE NATURE OF —ETC(U)

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DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES: THE NATURE OF TRANSPORTATION AND REVIEW OF CURRENT METHODOLOGIES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES: THE NATURE OF TRANSPORTATION AND REVIEW OF CURRENT METHODOLOGIES, by Major Anthony S. I. Ukpo, Nigerian Army,

The United Nations, in its thirty-five years of existence, has launched about fourteen peace-keeping and observer operations all over the world. The most important aspect of establishing a peace-keeping force is the ability to transport the force from its location to the area of operation as quickly as possible. To date, the United Nations has continued to depend on ad hoc arrangements to deploy all its peace-keeping forces.

This study analyses the various methodologies currently in use by the UN to determine their suitability for present and future employment. To highlight the various problems, three case studies—United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 1956; United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC), 1960; and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1978)—were selected for analysis.

Some of the major points that came out of this study include:

-- heavy dependence on the United States for air- and sealift of the UN force,

-- waste of vital time due to questions of neutrality and incompatibility of resources,

-- nonchalant attitude by countries capable of providing necessary transportation, and

-- an increasing attempt by developing nations to be entirely self-supporting in transportation of their troops, sometimes to the possible detriment of the entire UN force.

This study concludes that the current ad hoc arrangements for deployment of UN forces leave too much room for failure. Therefore, there is a need to examine alternative methods of providing neutral transportation assets for the UN to deploy peace-keeping forces.
Deployment of United Nations Peace Keeping Forces: The Nature of Transportation and Review of Current Methodologies

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ABSTRACT


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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Introduction

Since its inception in 1945, the United Nations (UN) has held as one of its priorities the maintenance and/or restoration of international peace and security. Chapter VII of the UN Charter deals with "Action with respect to threats to the Peace, breaches of the Peace, and acts of aggression." ¹

Although one of the guiding purposes behind establishment of the UN is "world peace and security," member nations have been satisfied with the existing ad hoc arrangements used for setting up "peace-keeping" operations (which is the primary mission of the UN). Due to lack of advanced planning, the UN deployment of forces for peace-keeping operations has always presented problems. In 1965 the importance of transportation was demonstrated when the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) was established. The UN Secretary General reported that further recruitment of observers had to be stopped because "any larger number could not be satisfactorily provided with ground

transport and communications equipment."  

The purpose of this research is to examine the existing methods of deployment of UN peace-keeping forces and to determine their suitability for current and future use.

**Background**

**General**

The first UN Peace-Keeping Forces, as they are known today, originated from the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) on 23 April 1948. Armed conflict between Arabs and Jews had been going on in Palestine since 1939, and, during the British Mandate of Palestine, had given rise to the establishment of various UN commissions to settle the dispute. The commissions consisted mainly of civilians and were charged with responsibility to implement the respective UN resolutions that governed their establishment. By 1948 the conflict had reached such dimensions that troops from neighbouring Arab states began entering Palestine, and open fighting developed between them and armed Jewish groups. Because of this new dimension in the Palestine question the Security Council established a Truce

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3 UN, Resolution S/727 (23 April 1948). Discussion on Palestine by the Security Council began on 24 February 1948, and on 1 April 1948 it called a truce. The UNTSO was the truce commission established to "assist the Security Council in supervising implementation by the parties [Arabs and Jews]"--Wainhouse and others, p. 25.
Commission by its Resolution S/727 of 23 April 1948. Full text of the resolution may be seen in Appendix A.

Since the establishment of UNTSO the UN has continued to play an important role in the establishment and maintenance of world peace and security. To date the following twelve UN peace-keeping organisations have been established:

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 1948

United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), 1948 to date

United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 1956-1967

United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 1958

United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC), 1960-1964

United Nations in West New Guinea (UNTEA), 1962-1963

United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), 1963-1964

United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 1964 to date

United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), 1965-1966

United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF), 1973-1979

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 1974 to date

United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 1978 to date

Although there have been many UN peace-keeping operations, the UN still depends on ad hoc transportation arrangements. Various trends and circumstances can make risky the current ad hoc arrangements. These
factors include increases in the number of troops and participating countries, increased participation by developing nations, and declining United States dominance in the UN system. Significantly, not even the UN's Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations has thus far thought it important enough to consider the question concerning the means of deployment.

Increases in Troops and Countries

The initial observers in UNTSO consisted of officers from Belgium, France, and the United States of America. This was in compliance with the text of the resolution which restricted the composition to "representatives of those members of the Security Council which . . . [had] career consular officers in Jerusalem" at the time. The force numbered some 500 observers at the height of the truce supervision operation. This figure represents the highest number of observers at any point in the existence of UNTSO. Members of the UNTSO were transported to Palestine by the countries that were providing the force. Their movement did not pose any problems since they were few in number and came from developed nations that could afford the cost of transportation. Even so, transportation as a means to accomplish its job was still a major concern of the UNTSO.

---

4 Belgium, France, and the United States had consular offices in Jerusalem at the time.

The next UN experience in peace-keeping was in 1956 with the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai. The strength of the force was 6,000 officers and men supplied by 10 countries. This was followed by an even greater peace-keeping operation, United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC), which, at its peak, numbered approximately 20,500 officers and men. Other peace-keeping operations have had varying strengths of officers and men as follows:

United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 7,000.
United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF), 7,000.
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 1,218.
United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 6,000.

A number of other UN observer and peace-keeping operations ranged from 500 to more than 1,000 officers and men. It is apparent from the foregoing that the logistics problems of a force that has increased above the 500 limit of UNTSO will be more difficult, particularly in the area of transportation.

**Increased Participation by Developing Nations**

The first UN peace-keeping operation, UNTSO, was composed of personnel from Belgium, France, and the United States. According to the text of Resolution S/727, the composition of UNTSO should have included

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6 Higgins, p. 13.
Syria, a developing nation that was a member of the Security Council and had "career consular officers in Jerusalem." Resolution S/727 noted, however, "that the representative from Syria had indicated that his Government was not prepared to serve on the commission." So the only developing nation that should have participated in UNTSO declined the offer. With subsequent peace-keeping operations, representation by developing nations kept increasing as the composition of the various UN missions changed gradually to reflect regional representation. The idea of regional representation was manifested in the composition of ONUC. A complete listing of troop contributing nations in all UN peace-keeping operations to date is shown in Appendix B.

With increased participation of developing nations in UN peace-keeping operations, the option of having troop contributing nations provide their own transportation now poses a serious problem. This is because most of the developing nations do not have the means for such large scale movement of troops over long distances. They also lack the experience.

United States Role in UN

At the inception of the UN in 1945, the United States was indisputably the most powerful nation in the world. As a result, it

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7 Wainhouse and others, p. 558.

8 Nations which participated in ONUC operations were Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, New
played the leading role in establishing and running the UN. The United States saw the UN as a forum for preserving world peace and championing its ideals of democracy and a free world. The United States shouldered most of the financial burden of the UN in addition to being a willing host. As Leon Gordenker has pointed out:

[The] wide influence [of the United States] during the first ten years produced decisions that, far more often than not, fitted into the American policy framework. [Further,] the Americans were usually able to muster a majority to support them against the Soviet Union [and her allies].

As time progressed and the entire structure of the UN continued to change, the ability of the United States to effectively use it to further its own foreign policy objectives declined. A number of factors are responsible for this phenomenon. Among the factors are the Soviet Union's rapid development to the status of a superpower, China's position in the world as a major power and an undeclared leader of the Third World, increased membership of the UN by developing nations with unpredictable voting inclinations, and the increasing financial burden that results from peace-keeping operations.

The examination of some peace-keeping operations in Chapters II, III, and IV shows that the United States is the major financial and logistical supporter of peace-keeping operations, particularly in the

Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia. See Wainhouse and others.

aspect of transportation. Although it has been suggested that the United States would not want the Soviets to take over the role of "prime mover" for the UN peace-keeping operations by refusing its services, alternatives must be considered for reasons that are demonstrated in this study.\(^9\) It has further been suggested that "in reducing her commitment to the United Nations she [the United States] stands to lose still more influence in this body, as well as weakening its potential for peace."\(^1\) Nevertheless, the trend has been established, and it indicates a continued decline in America's role in the UN system. It is therefore necessary to investigate alternatives to UN peace-keeping operations' heavy dependence on United States transportation.

In all the reports of the special committee on peace-keeping established by the General Assembly (GA Res/2308 1965) no mention is made concerning the important aspect of transportation. A preview of the committee's framework for its Model I study deals with authorization, establishment, legal arrangements, financial arrangements, and administrative matters. As can be seen in the list of contents of chapters of Model I attached as Appendix C, there is no direct mention of the means of deployment.

**Current Methodologies**

The UN has employed various methods to deploy forces to the areas of operation. The most commonly favoured method has been reliance

\(^9\)Wainhouse and others, p. 334.  
\(^1\)Gordenker, p. 169.
on the troop contributing country to provide its own transportation for its own troops. Other methods include asking for assistance from one of the developed nations of the world, particularly the United States, to provide the airlift or the sealift to transport the troops to the troubled area. In some instances the UN has chartered commercial carriers to perform the task of troop movement. What are the inherent problems in the existing methods of transportation?

Method 1: Self-Assisted. In this method troop contributing nations are requested to provide the means to transport their troops and equipment from their home base to the area of operation. Possible Problem Areas: Suppose the contributing nations accept the request. Can the developing nations with limited strategic and tactical transportation facilities move all their troops and equipment to the operational area in time to conform with the general UN plan? An examination of Nigeria's role in UNIFIL, in Chapter IV, highlights some of the problems that can be encountered.

Method 2: United Nations Assisted. The UN headquarters in New York charters commercial carriers to move the troops from different countries to the area of operation. Possible Problem Areas: Commercial carriers are not configured to transport military hardware. Also, there is the question of overflights, landing and berthing sites, and cancellation of scheduled flights and voyages. Will commercial carriers be readily available at the time they are needed by the UN? Will host
countries allow commercial carriers of certain nationalities to land in their countries? During the establishment of UNEF (1956) some ships under certain flags could not be used for the transportation of supplies into Egypt.\textsuperscript{12} In UNIFIL some commercial airlines were not allowed to overfly or land in Israel and had to land in Beirut, Lebanon.

Method 3: Letter of Assist. The UN, by a system of "Letter of Assist,"\textsuperscript{13} requests another nation to provide the transport to move the troops and equipment from various countries to the area of operation. Also, the UN may accept an offer by a country to transport the troops and equipment. It is under this method that the United States and a few other countries have contributed to UN peace-keeping efforts. The part the United States has played and continues to play regarding movement and deployment of UN troops is so significant it is discussed in Chapters II, III, and IV. Possible Problem Areas: It is possible that some countries, for national reasons or interest, will refuse to assist when requested to do so by "Letter of Assist." What would happen if the United States, currently the major logistic supporter of the UN, did not offer its services? It is also possible that the host country or other countries, for that matter, could decide for political reasons to

\textsuperscript{12} Ships flying colours of the United States. Wainhouse and others, p. 226.

\textsuperscript{13} "Letter of Assist"—This is the system employed in the UN whereby a troop contributing country can write a letter requesting assistance from the UN on a repayable basis. When the UN itself uses the system, it also does so on a charge to the UN basis.
The Problem: Integral Neutral Lift Capability

The ability for rapid deployment of forces to an operational area in time of trouble is one of the secrets to success in peacekeeping. This ability can be enhanced with an integral lift capability. The UN does not currently own an integral lift element that is capable of transporting the number of forces involved in peace-keeping operations. In the event of crisis, as demonstrated by the case studies in Chapters II, III, and IV, valuable time is wasted while negotiations for transportation are made.

Another factor that affects the current method of transportation is the question of neutrality of the carriers used in transporting UN peace-keeping troops. In UNEF a staging area had to be created in Capodichino, Italy, for troops that were flown by United States aircraft, because United States carriers were not allowed into Egypt. Valuable time was wasted while this transshipment took place in Italy. Only vessels owned and operated by UN personnel can be assured of this neutrality essential to achieve rapid deployment in cases of emergency.

Research Method and Assumptions

This study's research method included an analysis of the problems of movement and deployment of some UN peace-keeping operations in the past, with particular reference to UNEF, ONUC, and UNIFIL. The
assumptions were:

1. The UN will continue to establish peace-keeping operations.
2. The UN will continue to select contributing nations on the basis of regional representation--thus including developing nations.
3. The current policy of excluding the five permanent members of the Security Council from peace-keeping duties will continue.

Definitions and Acronyms

The word peace-keeping is a broad term that has come to be accepted and constantly used to embrace different kinds of UN operations. It gained wide recognition with the creation of UNEF (1956) and was first formalized in the title of a committee, the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, established by the General Assembly in February 1965. Peace-keeping, as defined by the International Peace Academy, states:

Peacekeeping: The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or with states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.

For this study, it is important to add to the definition stated above that the troops are of battalion size and are lightly armed.

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16 The size of a battalion varies from one country to another,
**Enforcement action:** The use of force by a UN peace-keeping force to maintain peace.

**Initial deployment:** The transportation of both men and equipment of an entire UN force to the operational area, excluding subsequent rotations.

**Observers:** A small unit of officers, normally unarmed, from one or more countries, working under UN auspices, established to observe demarcation lines, truces, or peace treaties.

In the interest of brevity, many acronyms are used in this thesis. The ones with high frequency usage are:

- **ILMAC** Israel Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission
- **OAU** Organisation of African Unity
- **ONUC** *Operation des Nations Unies au Congo* (United Nations Operations in Congo)
- **UN** United Nations
- **UNDOF** United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
- **UNEF** United Nations Emergency Force
- **UNIFIL** United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
- **UNIPOM** United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
- **UNMOGIP** United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
- **UNOGIL** United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
- **UNTSO** United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

but for UN operations the guideline fixes the strength of a battalion between 500 and 700 officers and men.

17 The only UN peace-keeping operation that can be classified under this category would be the Korean operations in which the United States troops fought under UN auspices. Some people also classify the later stages of ONUC as enforcement in nature.
Review of Literature and Commentary

There is extensive literature dealing with the legal, political, and financial aspects of peace-keeping, but very little has been written on the logistical aspects of peace-keeping with specific examination of transportation. The problem of logistics is well known and appreciated, but no concrete studies have been completed which investigate the various aspects of the logistics system.

Regarding logistics, the best available source is a study titled *International Peacekeeping At the Crossroads: National Support--Experience and Prospects* by David W. Wainhouse with the assistance of Frederick P. Bohannon, James E. Knott, and Anne P. Simons. This work provides a wealth of data, assesses international peace-keeping efforts by examining a number of UN and other international organization peace-keeping operations, and provides an insight into national support of peace-keeping operations. Considerable emphasis is placed on United States support, policies, and future trends.

My personal experience in UNIFIL provides an insight into the logistical problems of peace-keeping forces on this operation and has a major influence on the examination of UNIFIL in Chapter IV.

As has been demonstrated in almost all of the UN peace-keeping operations, the support of the United States in terms of financial and logistics backing is what has enabled UN operations to survive. Almost total dependence on the United States for financial support to manage peace-keeping operations can bring about a situation in which a mission
might not be established if the United States Government objects to the idea of setting up that particular mission. For example, it has been suggested that the United States Government might try to hinder an operation by withholding financial support if the operation's intent was to "stabilize the Castro government in Cuba."18

The most expensive aspects of maintaining a peace-keeping force are the costs of transporting personnel and equipment to the mission area, deploying them, and keeping them supplied and rotated on a routine basis. The UN has no problem in transferring the costs of maintaining a force to the mandatory contributions of all participating nations, which can afford to transport their own troops, as part of their mandatory contribution. Still, a need exists for the UN to provide a means of transportation that is not entirely dependent on the good-will of any one nation or group of nations to lift those countries that are willing to participate but are lacking the means.

**Preview of Chapters**

The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established in 1956 to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of UN Resolution 998 (ES-1) of 3 November 1956" relating to the armistice line between Egypt and Israel. UNEF was the UN's first experience in organising and establishing a UN peace-keeping

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force that fits the definition of "peace-keeping) as stated and modified. That was also the first real test of the UN's logistics capability. Details of the establishment and function of the force and the support by the United States are discussed in Chapter II.

The next UN mission of a peace-keeping nature was ONUC. Once again, the part the United States played in airlifting troops to the mission area was substantial. The ONUC has been the largest UN peace-keeping force established to date. A detailed discussion of ONUC is presented in Chapter III.

As previously stated, UNIFIL is the most current UN peace-keeping operation. Deployment of the force was carried out by the U.S. Air Force, national airlines, and the Royal Air Force (United Kingdom). Nigeria, a developing nation which is participating in this peace-keeping force, transported all its men and equipment to the mission area and continues to sustain and rotate them entirely by itself. The establishment and function of UNIFIL, with a special look at Nigeria's participation, are discussed in Chapter IV.

Chapter V draws several conclusions from the study and makes recommendations which may be used for further study.
CHAPTER II

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF), 1956-1967

General

The UNEF was the first major peace-keeping operation launched by the UN that complies with the meaning of "peace-keeping" as defined for use in this study. This chapter examines the methods the UN employed to lift the troops and their equipment to the operational area. It also examines the effect of increased troop strengths, the guiding principle behind United States support of the operation, and the inadequacy of sealift for initial deployment. Available data illustrate that, besides the United States, other developed nations contributed actively, to support the force logistically, by way of providing the initial and subsequent transportation for their own contingents. A short historical background of the establishment of UNEF will shed some light on the origin of the unwritten principle of exclusion of the five permanent members of the Security Council from physical participation in peace-keeping operations. It also explains the wide support accorded the force by the western powers which wanted to retain control in the region.
Background

The establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) to supervise and ensure that the various parties were observing the armistice line between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states did not deter the combatants from continuing violence. The armistice agreement, particularly between Egypt and Israel, had continued to deteriorate, with frequent raids by "fadayeen" ("freedom fighters") from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. These raids called for reprisal raids by Israel. Egypt, meanwhile, had barred Israel from using the Suez Canal and was having constant disagreements with Great Britain and France because of their support of the latter. Both Britain and France had imposed a mutual arms embargo against Egypt. These tensions worsened when, in July 1956, President Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company and declared that the canal dues would be used to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam. British reaction to this act was as expected—hostile. Britain and France (the latter also affected by the nationalization of the Suez Canal), since their suggestion to use force against Egypt had not drawn support from the United States, resorted initially to diplomatic means to solve the problem. When they did not seem to be making any headway, they decided to cooperate with Israel to attack Egypt.

On 29 October 1956 Israel attacked Egypt and was joined by the British and French only two days later. The United States wasted no time in calling on the Security Council to ask for a cease fire, but, as
a result of negative votes of Britain and France in the Security Council, no resolution could be passed. On the suggestion of Yugoslavia, the matter was transferred to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution.¹ The General Assembly passed a series of resolutions. The first (GA Res. 997 (ES-1), 2 November 1956) called for a cease fire and a return of forces to the armistice lines. The second resolution (GS Res. 998 (ES-1), 4 November 1956) established a United Nations Emergency Force. (Resolutions relevant to UNEF are attached as a part of Appendix D.) Relevant portions of the resolution read:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with the resolution 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956,

Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution.²

The General Assembly also passed three other resolutions that related to UNEF.

¹Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: International Peace Academy, 1978), p. 11/5. The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution was introduced to enable matters that could not be resolved in the Security Council to be transferred to the General Assembly, where the right of "veto" cannot be applied. Note: The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and United States of America.

The principle of exclusion from participation in UN peacekeeping operations of the five permanent members of the Security Council was reinforced in General Assembly Resolution 998, in which the commander of the force (UNEF) was authorised "to undertake the recruitment directly, from various Member States other than the Permanent Members of the Security Council." The nearest the UN comes to legalizing the aspect of transportation appears in Resolution 1001 (ES-1) of 7 November. Member States were requested "to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved." There is, in the resolution, neither direct reference to this important aspect of establishing the mission nor any indication as to whether it was discussed in the General Assembly debate. This can be attributed to the fact that this was the UN's first experience in establishing a force of the size and composition of UNEF. The exclusion of the five permanent members of the Security Council from contributing troops did not mean they could not support the force logistically. In fact, General Assembly Resolution 998 specifically called for support by member nations without exception. This is the light in which Italian, Swiss, and United States support can be viewed.

Deployment

Arrivals

Two weeks after the fighting between Egypt and Israel commenced and ten days after the call for cease fire and withdrawal of forces, the
first elements of the peace-keeping force arrived in Egypt. They consisted of officers recruited from UNTSO. The advance units of the troops arrived three days later, on 15 November.

The Italian Government, in its offer of assistance, assigned Capodichino Airport, Naples, as a staging area for the force and also provided a limited airlift of supplies from Capodichino to Egypt. Twenty-four countries initially offered to provide contingents, but, after the selection process,\(^3\) which is guided principally by host nation acceptance of the countries, the number of contingents accepted was reduced to ten. They were Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. The force numbered about 6,000 men.

Deployment of the force was accomplished in three phases. The first phase was the initial airlift of contingents to the staging area in Capodichino Airport, Naples, by the U.S. Air Force (USAF). The second phase was the airlift from Capodichino Airport to Cairo, initially by Swissair and later by the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). The third phase was deployment by road from Cairo to Suez, Port Said, and the Sinai in UN-owned or UN-chartered vehicles. Only the first and

\(^3\)See also: Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 119-20; and David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping At the Crossroads: National Support--Experience and Prospects (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 208-209. Geographical representation, offer of participation or acceptance to participate, and, most important of all, the acceptance of a suggested contingent by the host nation are the guidelines for selection of contingents.
second phases are of interest in this research. Heavy equipment for the contingents arrived by sea. Two other contingents, the Yugoslav and Brazilian contingents, arrived by sea on 28 November 1956 and 11 January 1957, respectively.

Rotations

The UNEF, in cooperation with the UN, arranged the rotations of the contingents. The Scandinavian countries set up a joint air connection between their countries and Naples called SCANAP\(^4\) which provided continuous resupply to the troops. The Brazilians, Canadians, and, at a later stage, the Yugoslavs instituted regular air force flights to resupply their troops with essential items. The rotation of the troops was principally achieved by means of chartered commercial flights. The RCAF handled a partial rotation of its troops. The part played by sealift was restricted mainly to the supply of heavy equipment and food to the entire force. The Indian and Yugoslav contingents rotated their troops a few times by sea during the first eighteen months of UNEF's existence but later reverted to airlift for all their rotations.

Movement by air continued as the dominant mode of transportation. It provided the quickest and most efficient means of moving the troops back and forth from their countries during rotations and also served as an internal means of communications.

\[^4\]See also: Wainhouse and others, p. 225.
United States Logistic Support

The United States support for UNEF was limited to logistics support. This was in keeping with the UN practice of excluding the five permanent members of the Security Council from UN peace-keeping operations. With Great Britain and France accepting the UN's call for an unconditional cease fire and the UN's creation of the peace force, the United States immediately offered to assist the UN in transporting the troops to the operational area. The legal tool that permits United States support of the UN is The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, As Amended (Public Law 264, 79th Congress), relevant portions of which read:

SEC. 73(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President, upon the request by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest to comply with such request, may authorize, in support of such activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of the United Nations Charter--

(1) the detail to the United Nations, under such terms and conditions as the President shall determine, of personnel of the armed forces of the United States to serve as observers, guards, or in any non-combatant capacity, but in no event shall more than a total of one thousand of such personnel be so detailed at any one time: Provided, That while so detailed, such personnel shall be considered for all purposes as acting in the line of duty, including the receipt of pay and allowances as personnel of the armed forces of the United States, credit for longevity and retirement, and all other perquisites appertaining to such duty: Provided further, That upon authorization or approval by the President, such personnel may accept directly from the United Nations (a) any or all of the allowances or perquisites to which they are entitled under the first proviso hereof, and (b) extraordinary expenses and perquisites incident to such detail;
(2) the furnishing of facilities, services, or other assistance and the loan of the agreed fair share of the United States of any supplies and equipment to the United Nations by the Department of Defense, under such terms and conditions as the President shall determine. The full text of Public Law 264 is in Appendix E.

The system to be followed when the UN Security Council requests "cooperative action" from the United States is embodied in Executive Order 10206, which President Truman issued on 19 January 1951. The full text of the order is in Appendix F. The order provides for "the Secretary of State, upon the request by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest to comply with such request." It also authorizes the Secretary of State to mandate the Secretary of Defense to act to provide the necessary support. In the case of UNEF, the Acting Secretary of State submitted to the President a joint proposal by the Departments of State and Defense for United States assistance to UNEF. It was immediately approved. Executive Order 10206 also provides for the Secretary of State to ask for reimbursement from the UN for expenses incurred as a result of the support provided. It also allows for partial or total waiver of cost in "exceptional circumstances."

The United States provided the initial airlift and sealift of


6Wainhouse and others, p. 238.
the contingents and their equipment from their home countries to the
staging ground in Capodichino Airport in Naples, Italy. As soon as the
President approved the recommendation to provide logistic support, the
United States Government designated the Navy as Executive Agent\(^7\) to
coordinate the entire operation. This system provided for all requests
for assistance from the UN to be sent to the U.S. Navy, which then
instructed the appropriate service to implement.

**Airlift**

The airlift to Capodichino started on 10 November 1956 with the
arrival of 45 officers in Naples. By 14 November, 649 men and 111 tons
of equipment had been airlifted to Capodichino. The following U.S. Air
Force units took part in the airlift:

-- 332d Air Division, based at Evreux-Fauville in France. This
unit was responsible for most of the airlift of the European contingents
from the Scandinavian countries to Capodichino.

-- U.S. Military Air Transport Service (MATS), located in
Continental United States. The Atlantic Division, based in Charleston,
South Carolina, transported the Colombian, Indian, and Brazilian contin-
gents. MATS based in Hawaii also lifted a portion of the Indian contin-
gent.

-- USAF 315th Air Division, based in Japan, lifted most of the
Indonesian contingent.

\(^7\)Wainhouse and others, p. 238.
Different types of planes were employed in both the troop and equipment lifts. Some of the planes were the C-121C, C-124, C-119, and C-54. By the end of the initial airlift the U.S. Air Force had transported approximately 3,543 men and 1,014,698 pounds of equipment and baggage at a cost of $1,191,586. A total listing of the contingents the U.S. Air Force airlifted to Capodichino Airport, Naples, is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1.--United States Airlift for UNEF, November 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating Country</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Pounds of Equipment/Baggage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>(none)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>197,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>61,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>91,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>178,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>77,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;UN Support&quot; cargo</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>98,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,543</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,014,698</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Sealift

Sealift by the United States was limited due to the fact that ships of some nationalities were not allowed entry into the Suez Canal.
American ships definitely fell into this category. All shipments were limited to the transportation of supplies to the UN supply depot at Pisa, Italy.

Support by Developing Nations

Logistic support offered by developing nations contributing troops to UNEF was very limited. Two developing nations offered one form of logistic support or another. They were Brazil and India.

Brazil moved its entire contingent, minus the advance party of fifty that were moved by the U.S. Air Force, and all their equipment by Brazilian naval vessels to Egypt. Brazil also rotated her contingent every six months by sea. The Brazilian Air Force provided long range support. All assistance was on reimbursable terms to the UN.

India, on the other hand, supplied some logistics units like transport units, supply depot units, a small postal unit, and a small medical unit. The U.S. Air Force handled all of India's initial transportation, and the rotations were by UN arrangements.

The Yugoslav contingent was moved entirely by sealift provided by the UN headquarters in New York.

Support by other states that contributed troops to UNEF varied between financial support, logistics support, or service in UNEF Advisory Committee (e.g., Ceylon).

Analysis

The emergence of UNEF as a viable UN mounted peace-keeping
operation was due largely to the fact that UNEF had the blessing and support of the developed nations that were members of the UN. After successfully negotiating the establishment of the force, however, neither the Secretary General nor the General Assembly had any transportation assets to implement the mission. The UN's lack of experience in establishing peace-keeping operations of this magnitude may account for some of the shortcomings of the force.

As soon as the decision to interpose a neutral force between two warring factions is taken, the time between that decision and the actual positioning of the force is very critical. The Israeli Defence Forces needed a total of only seven days from the commencement of hostilities on 29 October 1956 to advance from the Egyptian/Israeli border to just east of the Suez Canal. It took the UN ten days from the day UNEF was legally constituted to the day the first troops set foot in the operational area. This allowed sufficient time for both parties to influence drastically the course of events in the area. Valuable time was wasted between Capodichino and Egypt because the aircraft of some nationalities were not allowed to fly into Egypt. The transshipment in Capodichino could have been avoided had a neutral organisation like the UN itself carried out the airlift.

The UN depended heavily on one country for the transportation of the force. Although the assistance provided was free, the entire mission could have been jeopardized if something had gone wrong with the strategic lift capability of the United States. The United States is
committed to providing assistance to the UN as reflected in the UN Participation Act referred to earlier.

Public Law 341 of 10 October 1949 amended the Participation Act by inserting a new Section which authorized the President, when he finds it in the national interest, to comply with UN requests for "cooperative action"... or when the President finds it to be in the national interest.8

Constant repetition of the phrase national interest in both the text of the original Act and the amendment indicates that United States support of peace-keeping can only be guaranteed when United States interests are served.

The U.S. Air Force and Navy systems of loading and unloading aircraft and ships are different from those of most other countries. This caused delays at both loading and unloading points while the loading teams made necessary adjustments. Having established that time is a vital factor when establishing a UN force, airlift will invariably be the primary means of initial transportation to the operational area. The Yugoslav and Brazilian contingents arrived on 28 November and 11 January, respectively. Again respectively, that meant 18 and 31 days after the force was ordered to the operational area. This shows the inadequacy of sealift for the initial deployment of forces. Airlift is expensive but fast; sealift is cheap but slow. A trade-off here dictates the use of airlift for initial deployment and sealift for personnel rotations.

8Wainhouse and others, p. 519.
The fact that the United States offered to provide the airlift of the contingents made nations that could afford to transport their contingents decline to do so and rely on the United States airlift. This added to the overall cost of transportation and also the overall delay. The cost would have been much cheaper had the Scandinavian countries transported their own troops direct from their home bases to Capodichino. As it was, the U.S. Air Force flew from France to the Scandinavian countries and lifted their troops to the staging ground in Capodichino.

Taking into account the UN's limited experience in mounting such a large scale operation, the ad hoc arrangement of the UN headquarters in New York regarding the movement of the contingents worked considerably well on the whole. The question to be answered, nonetheless, is whether the UN can afford, in the future, to rely on the kind of ad hoc arrangements used in the launching of UNEF.
CHAPTER III

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN CONGO
(ONUC), 1960-1964

General

Four years after establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the UN once again faced a situation that threatened international peace and stability. Heightened tensions in Central Africa increased the possibility of establishing another peace-keeping operation of the type discussed in Chapter II, UNEF. This chapter reviews the procedures for establishing the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC)\(^1\) and also delineates the factors which played a major role in the initial deployment of the various contingents. The strength factor, for example, had a major impact from the very start. The force increased from approximately 6,000 officers and men in UNEF to more than 20,000.

Participation by developing nations had increased considerably, thus setting a trend that in later years may require the establishing of a preference system for selecting developing nations to participate in peace-keeping operations. It is also evident that dependence on the

\(^1\)The United Nations operations in the Congo is referred to as ONUC. This acronym originated from the operation's French title, *Operation des Nations Unies au Congo.*
United States for initial and, indeed, subsequent transportation requirements continues to increase. It is likewise apparent that certain developed nations which are fully capable of transporting their own contingents have chosen the alternative of allowing the United States to bear the burden. Most important, however, is the heavy inclination of the UN to fall back on the United States "after a long, fruitless effort to obtain suitable commercial sea and airlift arrangements."²

Background

The history of the Congo as a colonial territory under Belgium dates back to the 19th century, when, in 1884, King Leopold of Belgium sent British-born explorer Henry M. Stanley to Central Africa.³ The Congo, known before independence as the Belgian Congo, remained a colonial territory until 30 June 1960, when it was granted independence. One week after independence, the Congo Army mutinied. That was followed on 11 July 1960 by the secession and declaration of independence of Katanga Province by Moise Tshombe. As a result of the turmoil these acts created, the Security Council, on the request of Congolese President Kasavubu, adopted Resolution S/4387, which established ONUC. (Details of UN Resolution S/4387 and others relating to the

³Ibid., p. 267.
establishment of ONUC may be seen in Appendix D.)

The Secretary General, in attempts to implement the resolution, found himself constantly returning to the Security Council to explain his interpretations of it. One such interpretation was reported as Security Council Document Number S/4389, and a relevant portion of it reads:

1. Restoration of order was the main task.

2. The UN force should be regarded as a "temporary security force" in the Congo with Congolese consent,

3. Although "it may be considered as serving as an arm of the Government for the maintenance of order and protection of life," the UN force was exclusively under UN Command and would not be permitted to become a party to any internal conflict,

4. Security Council permanent members would be excluded from the UN force. Its "hard core of military units" would be sought from African states. Seven African battalions and 1 Swedish battalion had been obtained; more were sought. Requests for specialized units, equipment and airlift had been made to certain non-African states,

5. UN troops would employ force only in self-defense. Any initiative in the use of force was prohibited.

The now-accepted principle of exclusion of the five permanent members of the Security Council from in-country peace-keeping operations was emphasized in that interpretation. Regarding composition of the force, the Secretary General, contrary to the accepted principle of geographical representation in peace-keeping operations, recommended in the preceding fourth enumeration that the "hard core of military units" weaving and others, p. 269. weaving and others, p. 269.
for the force be sought from African states. This explains the large representation of African contingents in ONUC. An examination of the total of twenty-eight ONUC-troop contributing nations shows that eleven were from Africa and a total of twenty-one were from developing nations.

Deployment

Arrivals

By 15 July 1960, the first elements of the UN peace-keeping force began arriving in the Congo. Staging areas were established in Pisa, Italy, and in Kano, Nigeria. The staging area in Pisa was convenient because of the easy access to the UN supply depot located there, while Kano provided an appropriate mid-way point from Europe, Asia, and the east of Africa to the Congo. Kano also had the advantage of having a fairly large international airport that was capable of receiving U.S. Air Force (USAF) aircraft.

The United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom undertook the massive airlift of troops and equipment. Argentina, Brazil, India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden also participated in a limited way in the airlift. Commercial airliners were also utilized. There are no records which indicate that the Congo objected to the airlift the various nations provided. However, the Central African Republic, the Congo (Brazaville), France, and

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Portugal, at one time or another, barred overflights of UN aircraft. In late December 1960, at the end of the buildup period, more than 20,500 individuals had been airlifted into the operational area. The initial airlift to ONUC was as shown in Table 2.

Here is a table showing the initial airlift to Congo:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airlifter</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
<td>16,441</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Air Force</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway &amp; Sweden</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina &amp; Brazil</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,166</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Departures and Rotations**

During the buildup period, Mali and Yugoslavia withdrew their contingents while Ghana and Morocco reduced the strength of their contingents. The United States and Royal Air Forces accommodated those...
departures. Rotation of troops was handled mainly by the Air Force and Navy of the United States. The constant withdrawal of contingents which characterized the ONUC placed a heavy burden on the transportation requirements of the UN.

Of significance is the fact that transportation support by the United States continued throughout the duration of the Congo crisis. On 7 December 1963, for example, a representative of the UN Field Operations Service, in requesting airlift from the United States, indicated that the requirement was being sought "only after a long, fruitless effort to obtain suitable commercial sea and airlift arrangements." That airlift alone resulted in the movement of a total of 2,200 personnel and 345,474 pounds of cargo between Leopoldville in the Congo, Karachi, and Bombay as well as between Elisabethville and Djakarta.

**United States Support**

United States support for ONUC, as with UNEF, was mainly in providing logistics support in the form of air- and sealifts, technical assistance, and famine relief. Only a highlighting of the airlift and sealift are necessary in this study.

**Airlift**

The airlift of contingents to the Congo has been the largest of any UN peace-keeping operation. Airlift to and from the Congo for the

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8 Wainhouse and others, p. 302. 9 Wainhouse and others, p. 302.
duration of the operation was handled mainly by the U.S. Air Force. Intra-Congo airlift was also directly provided by USAF in some cases. For example, the USAF airlifted the Ethiopian, Irish, and Swedish contingents from their area of operations to Katanga during December 1961.\textsuperscript{10} Indirect intra-Congo airlift by the United States was achieved by the provision of aircraft to the UN. Between 14 July 1960 and 31 December 1960 the USAF airlifted approximately 15,004 troops to the Congo. The totals per each contingent are shown in Table 3.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lrr}
\hline
Contingent From & To Congo & From Congo \\
\hline
Austria & 57 & 0 \\
Ethiopia (moved 700) & 1,872 & 0 \\
Guinea & 750 & 0 \\
India (except small air detail) & 700 & 0 \\
Ireland & 1,400 & 0 \\
Ireland & 250 & 0 \\
Mali & 575 & 575 \\
Morocco & 3,200 & 100 \\
Nigeria & 1,500 & 0 \\
Pakistan & 540 & 0 \\
Sudan & 375 & 0 \\
Sweden (from UNEF) & 650 & 0 \\
Tunisia & 2,620 & 0 \\
United Arab Republic & 515 & 0 \\
\hline
Total & 15,004 & 675 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Troops U.S. Air Force Airlifted
14 July 1960 Through 31 December 1960}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{10} Wainhouse and others, p. 297.
An examination of the composition of contingents lifted shows that the majority of those moved by the USAF was from developing nations. It also indicates that although countries like Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, and Italy were able to provide air support to ONUC for intra-Congo airlift and fighter cover, they were not able to provide the strategic airlift required to lift their contingents to the Congo. It is estimated that by the end of the entire operation in the Congo, the USAF had airlifted a total of 43,303 men and 8,542 tons of equipment to the Congo and 31,093 men and 1,904 tons of equipment from the Congo. Airlift within the Congo totaled 1,991 men and 3,642 tons of cargo. The total cost of the airlift was put at $36,136,713, of which $10,317,622 were waived for the initial airlift.\footnote{Wainhouse and others, pp. 302-303.}

**Sealift**

United States participation in sealift during ONUC was more extensive than in UNEF. During the Congo operation the United States used 8 vessels to sealift approximately 20,352 men and 5,322 tons of cargo to the Congo and 23,343 men and 2,801 tons of cargo from the Congo. The total cost of the sealift to the UN was $8,463,631.\footnote{Wainhouse and others, p. 303.}

**Other Logistic Support from Developing Nations**

It was mentioned earlier that certain developing nations provided support for intra-Congo airlift. Argentina and Brazil jointly...
provided airlift for 43 men. Ethiopia airlifted 700 men using the Ethiopian Air Force, while India airlifted 50 men. As for transportation of troops to the UN operational area, it was clearly evident from ONUC that although developing nations were increasingly favored for peace-keeping, the burden of moving their troops from their home countries continued to rest with the developed world, particularly the United States. Even the Soviet Union provided limited airlift of troops for the first time.

Analysis

Once again the UN survived with ad hoc arrangements to establish and maintain a peace-keeping operation. Without going into the political and financial ramifications of ONUC, it is painfully obvious that given the same circumstances in today's world it would be nearly impossible to muster the kind of support that was necessary to mount such an operation. For the first time in the history of peace-keeping, the Soviet Union provided logistic support. The Soviets, it was reported, transported 450 Ghanaians to the Congo at a cost of $1.5 million.13 A largely African force had successfully served the UN in ONUC only because of support of the developed nations of the world. The fact that Ethiopia was able to provide substantial logistic support was due largely to the fact that the Ethiopian Army was equipped by the United States on a Military Assistance Program (MAP) arrangement. In fact,

13 Wainhouse and others, p. 326.
before Ethiopia could respond to the Secretary General's request for fighter planes, it had to obtain approval from the United States since the aircraft were also provided under the Military Assistance Program.

Mistakes which plagued the UNEF operation were repeated in the ONUC operation. There was little or no prior planning, overflight and landing rights constituted a problem, and extensive costs resulted from dispatch of transportation means from the United States or Europe. All of these contributed to jeopardizing the outcome of the peace-keeping effort. The UN's attempt to discontinue its dependence on the United States after the initial airlift failed, as it did in UNEF. It was also increasingly difficult to charter commercial carriers to move troops to the Congo. Finally, it was obvious that during the decision making process, the Secretary General gave very little, if any, consideration to the logistical problems, particularly movement of forces to the operational area.

\[ ^{14} \text{Wainhouse and others,} \]
CHAPTER IV

UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL), 1978 TO PRESENT

General

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is examined in this chapter. This case study was selected not only because it has all the attributes of a peace-keeping force, like the preceding two case studies, but because it is the latest peace-keeping force the UN has established. Also, it is significant in that, for the first time in the history of peace-keeping, a developing nation, Nigeria, provided the transportation assets to lift its men and equipment to the operational area. Once again, one can see here that an important aspect of peace-keeping like transportation is not considered a priority when the UN is thinking of the establishment of the force. Also once again, the United States is involved in the airlifting of contingents. For the second time in the history of peace-keeping, a permanent member of the Security Council, France, is providing troops for a peace-keeping operation.\(^1\) Also seen are the effects of uncoordinated lift resulting from lack of experience and inadequate resources by a developing nation.

\(^1\)The first time was when the British provided troops for the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 1964 to date.
Most of the recording of events in this chapter is based on my personal experience. I was a member of UNIFIL between September 1978 and April 1979.

**Background**

The confrontation between the Arab nations and Israel, as previously mentioned, dates back to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. One aspect of that confrontation which is always swallowed up by the great battles of the Sinai desert and the Golan heights is the continuous low intensity conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs of the Middle East. Each of several UN observation and peacekeeping missions in the Middle East was created as a result of open warfare between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states. UNEF I (United Nations Emergency Force) was established to separate the Egyptian and Israeli forces; UNEF II was established once again to separate the Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai; UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) was established to supervise the disengagement of forces between Israel and Syria; and UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation) was established to supervise the truce and observe the armistice line created in 1948 between Israel and all its neighbouring states—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

On 12 March 1978 a bus on the highway between Haifa and Tel Aviv was hijacked by a group of Palestinian "terrorists" or "armed

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2Israel uses the term **terrorists**, among a great many others, to
from Lebanon who had entered Israel by boat. About twenty to thirty people were killed in the resulting fire fight between the Palestinians and Israeli security forces. That incident was only one among many acts of terrorism that Palestinian armed elements have carried out in the past and continue to carry out against Israel. The policy of the Israeli Government toward acts of terrorism is to respond in kind against Palestinian targets all over the world, but particularly in Lebanon. After the Palestinians were driven out of Jordan in a military action ordered against them by King Hussein of Jordan, they were afforded a new haven in southern Lebanon. It was mainly from Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon that these raids were mounted into Israel. Apart from raids, there also were rocket and artillery attacks on northern Israeli towns bordering on Lebanon. These attacks on Israel, originating from Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon, were the reasons for an Israeli response in southern Lebanon in March 1978.

The Invasion

On the night of 13-14 March 1978, the Israeli Defence Force describe Palestinian guerrillas. Depending on the side taken, the term terrorists also means "liberation fighters," "guerrillas," "freedom fighters," or "fadayeen."

UNIFIL and UN sources use the term armed elements to describe all armed persons who belong to any faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The term is used in this thesis to mean exactly that.
(IDF) launched a significant military operation into southern Lebanon. The Israeli Government sanctioned and deliberately planned a full scale military operation, differing from the limited operations the IDF previously conducted in pursuit of Palestinian armed elements across the Lebanon/Israel border. The operation lasted ten days. Various Palestinian bases were attacked and destroyed. Armed Palestinians who were not killed or captured withdrew from southern Lebanon to the River Litani (the river from which the operation got its name, "Litani Campaign"). The town of Tyre and its environs, which later became known in UN circles as the "Tyre Pocket," was by-passed because of the large concentration of armed Palestinians who would have caused the Israeli force to suffer heavy casualties (see Map I).

Establishment of the Force

The UN called for a cease fire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. On 19 March 1978, after an emergency session of the Security Council during which statements were heard from the permanent representatives of Lebanon and Israel, the Council adopted Resolution S/425 (1978).4 That resolution expressed the decision to establish, under Council authority, a United Nations Interim Force for Southern Lebanon. Later on the same day, Resolution S/426 (1978) was

MAP I: UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT SEPTEMBER 1978, SHOWING TYRE POCKET
also adopted. Both resolutions are included in Appendix D.

The report of the Secretary-General is very important because it spells out all details concerning the force. A full text of the report may be seen in Appendix G, but relevant portions follow:

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978)

[Original: English]
[19 March 1978]

General considerations

(c) The Force will be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation.

Proposed plan of action

(e) In view of the difficulty in obtaining logistics contingents and of the necessity for economy, it would be my intention to examine the possibility of building on the existing logistics arrangements. If this should not prove possible, it will be necessary to seek other suitable arrangements.

In the report the Secretary-General talks of the force having "at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council."

UN, Resolutions and Decisions, p. 5.
One presumes that "confidence and backing" include logistic and financial support. The nature of the composition of the force is spelled out. It confirms the accepted principle of geographic representation and acceptance by the parties concerned. Logistics of the force, once in place, are discussed. The difficulty of acquiring logistics units is highlighted and the decision to build on "existing logistic arrangements" is wise and also possible in this particular area of operation due to the proximity of other existing UN missions. Of considerable importance to this study is the part of the report that deals with the financing of the force. The Secretary-General worked out an estimate of "$68 million for a force of 4,000 all ranks for a period of six months." He then explained that the breakdown included "initial setting-up costs (excluding the cost of initial airlift) of $29 million and ongoing costs for the six-month period of $39 million." Nowhere else in the report is mention made of how the force will be transported to the operational area or who would pay for the cost of the initial airlift envisaged in his report.

In his progress report of 23 March 1978, the Secretary-General elaborated further on the establishment of the force. The composition of the force began to take shape with the acceptance of "the offers of the French, Nepalese and Norwegian Governments to provide contingents for the new Force." A more detailed picture of how the logistics

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problem would be solved started to emerge. Portions of the report relevant to logistics read:

6. I am giving urgent attention to the problem of logistic support for the Force. The United Kingdom has offered to provide in Cyprus a forward mounting base for UNIFIL and facilities including provision of supplies, storage and maintenance. It would be my intention to request the Governments of France and Norway to provide the necessary logistic elements for service with UNIFIL. In this connexion [connection] and as a first step, I have requested Norway to provide a workshop company, capable of servicing three battalions, and a helicopter unit consisting of one flight of four helicopters.

7. The Government of France has agreed to provide the initial airlift of its contingent free of charge to the United Nations. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has offered to provide similarly initial airlift facilities for some of UNIFIL contingents and, in particular, for the bulk of the Norwegian contingent. The Government of the United States will provide, also free of charge, initial airlift facilities for UNIFIL contingents, upon request.\footnote{UN, Security Council, pp. 66-67.}

Offers of assistance in the form of free initial airlift had been accepted from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United States.

Commencing from 21 March 1978, when the offer of contingents by France, Nepal, and Norway were accepted, the force continued to grow with the addition of more contingents. By mid-June the force had reached its new approved strength of about 6,000 troops of all ranks. The composition of the force as of 13 September 1978 was as shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4.--Composition of UNIFIL As of 13 September 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Infantry Units</th>
<th>Logistic Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>. .</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Deployment

Arrivals

The first elements of the force to arrive were a few officers from UNTSO who were drawn from their nearby headquarters in Jerusalem and observer posts on the Lebanon/Israel border. Some of those officers were used to establish a temporary force headquarters in Naqura, Lebanon; others were stationed at Beirut International Airport in Lebanon to receive incoming contingents.

On 22 March 1978 an advance party of the Iranian company from UNDOF and a Canadian movement control team arrived in Lebanon. The main contingents started arriving in the operational area as follows: 8

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8 Emmanuel A. Erskine, "Presentation to the International Peace Academy Seminar" (Lagos, Nigeria, 1979), p. 17.
Contingent                Dates of Arrival
French                   23 March to 06 April 1978
Norwegian                26 March to 02 April 1978
Nepalese                 11 April to 16 April 1978
Senegalese               27 April to 30 April 1978
Nigerian                 12 May to 19 May 1978
Irish                    23 May to 10 June 1978
Fijian                   03 June to 08 June 1978
Iranian                  09 June to 11 June 1978

Staging areas were established in Beirut, Lebanon, and at Ben Gurion Airport in Israel. The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Iran, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States flew contingents into the mission area. By 11 June 1978 approximately 6,000 troops of all ranks had been airlifted into the mission area.

Rotations and Departures

With the force established, the UN commenced to make arrangements for the rotation of the contingents by UN means. The Nigerian and Norwegian Governments rotated their own troops, but charter flights were used to rotate the other contingents. As of March 1978 two withdrawals of contingents from UNIFIL had occurred. The first, the French paratroop battalion, departed with all its equipment aboard French naval vessels. The other, the Iranian contingent, departed by UN chartered aircraft and ships.

United States Support

United States support for UNIFIL was more restrictive than for
UNEF and ONUC. As usual it was mainly in the field of logistic support in the form of airlift of contingents. The United States also airlifted at no cost to the UN some items of equipment and vehicles that were purchased for UNIFIL. The exact figures concerning the number of troops and the tonnage of equipment the United States has airlifted are not available at this time, but it is known that the United States transported the Nepalese and Senegalese contingents, a total of 1,276 troops of all ranks. Records indicate that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iran airlifted an additional 2,000 troops of all ranks to UNIFIL. That places the total figure of troops the United States transported at more than 1,500 for all ranks. The United States did not provide sealift to UNIFIL. Subsequent United States support has been restricted to payment of its UN assessed contributions.

Logistic Support by Developing Nations

France and Norway provided logistics support for UNIFIL in the mission area. Nevertheless, two of the developing nations in UNIFIL, Iran and Nigeria, provided the entire initial airlift of their respective contingents to the mission area at no cost to the UN. Iran pulled out of UNIFIL in March 1979. As already mentioned, the withdrawal was achieved by means of UN-chartered aircraft and ships. From the day the

9 UN, General Assembly, Thirty-Third Session Agenda Item 113(b)--Financing of the UN Peace-Keeping Forces in the Middle East--UNIFIL, Report of the Secretary-General (New York: General Assembly, 1978), p. 3.
UN approved the decision to withdraw, to the day the contingent and its equipment were evacuated from Lebanon required more than one month. Delay was due principally to the fact that commercial carriers considered Lebanon a war zone and were unwilling to make the journey there. Also, the fact that Iran was torn by revolution at the time frightened commercial carriers away from the journey to Iran.

During this period, the UN succeeded on occasion in chartering some aircraft and ships to evacuate the Iranians and their equipment from Lebanon to Iran. After this arrangement was conveyed to UNIFIL, the Iranian troops were assembled in Beirut International Airport and their equipment was moved to Beirut seaport. At the last moment word was received that the arrangement had been cancelled. An on-and-off arrangement continued for a whole month before the entire Iranian contingent could be evacuated.

Even though Iran was capable of evacuating its own troops, evacuation was not possible at the time desired due to instability in Iran. This is one of the problems that can be encountered if the transportation of contingents is left in the hands of developing nations whose stability is unpredictable. The other developing nation that has provided and continues to provide considerable transportation needs is Nigeria.

Support by Nigeria

Initial Support

In April 1978 Nigeria agreed to provide a one-battalion
contingent to UNIFIL. The government immediately communicated the requirement to the armed forces. The Army was asked to maintain a battalion on standby for services with the UN in Lebanon. The Airforce stood by to airlift the contingent. An advance party consisting of four officers and a communications team were flown to Beirut in a Nigerian Airforce C-130 aircraft. During subsequent planning based on the report of the advance party, it was decided that the civilian-owned Nigeria Airways would have to provide the aircraft since the Nigerian Airforce could not cope with such a large strategic airlift.

Two ships of the Nigerian National Shipping Line were acquired to transport the heavy equipment and vehicles to Lebanon. After a series of administrative problems, the force eventually commenced its deployment to the mission area. The contingent moved in three flights beginning on 12 May 1978 and terminating on 19 May 1978. Equipment for the contingent arrived about one week after the troops. The Nigerian element had to depend on other contingents and UN items of equipment to sustain it and ensure mission accomplishment during the one-week period.

**Rotations**

In accordance with the plan of both the UN and the Nigerian Government, the latter's contingent (NIBATT I)\(^\text{10}\) was due to be rotated

\(^{10}\)NIBATT is the acronym for the Nigerian battalion in UNIFIL. Other contingent battalions are Fiji, FIJIBATT; France, FRENCHBATT; Iran, IRANBATT; Ireland, IRISHBATT; Nepal, NEPBATT; Norway, NORBATT; and Senegal, SENBATT.
in October, after a six-month tour of duty. Information received in UNIFIL headquarters indicated that the first half of troops from NIBATT I was to depart on 9 November. The first half of NIBATT II would come in the same flight. The first half of NIBATT I left for Beirut International Airport on the night of 9 November 1978 but did not leave the airport for Nigeria until the morning of 11 November. The second half departed 12 November, thus completing the rotation of the first contingent.

The entire rotation was completed in a matter of two days. In terms of strategic transportation it was a commendable exercise, but it did not conform with UNIFIL's tactical plan and could have resulted in some unpleasant consequences for the new contingent, which did not have the opportunity of being shown the ground by the outgoing contingent. There were also other mistakes. Failure to properly document the troops before they left Nigeria resulted in the lack of a passenger manifest, the load list was not accurately prepared, and in one case there was no record of the tonnage of equipment that was transported with the troops. As a member of the Nigerian contingent, my thoughts concerning the operation were as reflected in my diary entries that are attached as Appendix H. The Nigerian Government continues to keep its contingent resupplied with spare parts and Nigerian food by means of an Airforce C-130 resupply plane. The schedules are rarely kept due to one administrative hitch or another. Each time, however, the arrangement gets better with experience, and to date the Nigerian Government has
continued to arrange the rotations and resupply of its contingents in UNIFIL on a repayment basis.

**Analysis**

The UNIFIL is the latest of all the UN peace-keeping operations which is still active, and from all indications it will continue for a long time to come. It was established thirty years from the day the first UN peace-keeping mission (UNTSO) was created. Thirty years later, the UN was still operating on an ad hoc arrangement to transport its forces from their home countries to the area of operation. The problem of movement of forces is known, but for some odd reason it seems to be ignored. The Secretary-General did not consider it important enough to give it full attention in his report of 19 March 1978 to the Security Council on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 425 (1978).

In his subsequent progress report, 23 March 1978, he mentioned:

7. The Government of France has agreed to provide the initial airlift of its contingent free of charge to the United Nations. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has offered to provide similarly initial airlift facilities for some of UNIFIL contingents and, in particular, for the bulk of the Norwegian contingent. The Government of the United States will provide, also free of charge, initial airlift facilities for UNIFIL contingents, upon request.\[11\]

Interestingly, apart from France's initial free airlift, all subsequent airlifts France has provided have been on a repayment basis. Perhaps if the Secretary-General had asked the Security Council for definite guidelines on the question of initial deployment, the matter might have

been given some concrete considerations by now.

For the first time in the history of peace-keeping, developing nations were not content with merely being lifted and taken to the area of operation by a third party. They decided to go all the way on their own. Also significant is the fact that the two countries--Iran and Nigeria--are fairly rich oil-producing nations. Although the official reasons for their decision are not known, it can be reasonably assumed that they probably did so to demonstrate their independence in a world in which nations are constantly trying to outplay each other. The eventual outcome of their actions in one case, Nigeria (whose rotation was accomplished in a single night), almost jeopardized the accomplishment of the mission.

Depending on commercial carriers that have no contractual arrangements with the UN can be unreliable. There is still evidence of lack of advance planning for mounting UN peace-keeping operations by both the UN itself and troop contributing nations.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The three case studies in Chapters II, III, and IV represent an examination of the initial deployment and rotation of UN peace-keeping forces. The role of the United States, on the one hand, and developing nations, on the other, in providing transportation for initial deployment was also examined. The analyses revealed the following similarities:

--- increased participation by developing nations,
--- an increase in the number of troops,
--- heavy dependence on the United States for initial lift,
--- delay of deployment because of waste of time due to questions of neutrality,
--- exclusion of the five permanent members of the Security Council from peace-keeping operations,
--- adequate geographic representation, and
--- ad hoc arrangements.

This chapter seeks to draw some conclusions on the basis of the research reported. The recommendations offered, after further study, should provide alternative methods of transportation that the UN needs to enable it to continue to perform its duties of maintaining world
peace and security.

Conclusions

The UN, in thirty-five years of existence, has launched about fourteen peace-keeping and observer operations all over the world. The first peace-keeping operation, United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), was essentially an observer type operation. Its officers were selected on an individual basis from different countries, the majority of which were developed. The transportation of these officers to the operational area was the responsibility of the contributing country. There was no requirement for strategic transportation, because the few officers were unarmed and carried only their personal effects. The problem of transportation was therefore confined to internal movement of the officers in performing their duties.

Eleven years after the establishment of UNTSO, the UN again confronted a situation that threatened world peace and security. That situation in the Middle East gave rise to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956. The UNEF was the first UN experience in establishing a peace-keeping operation as defined for use in this study. Deployment of the force was achieved in three phases. Time could have been saved if the UN had thought of the political implications of accepting aid from one of the superpowers in launching the operation.

Egypt, the host country, refused the entry of U.S. Air Force
(USAF) aircraft into its borders. Consequently, the transshipment that occurred in Capodichino, Italy, resulted in the waste of vital time.

Since UNEF was the first experience of its kind, however, the logical assumption is that the problem could not have been anticipated. With the establishment of UNEF, a number of weaknesses in the ad hoc arrangements used came to light. Among others were the need for a neutral lift capability, the inadequacy of sealift for initial deployment, the need for advance planning, and the enormous cost of the initial transportation ($1,191,586).

Developed nations of the "western" world supported UNEF, but the Soviet Union and most of its allies gave little or no support. One can argue that national considerations motivated the support by the western countries. For example, the Suez Canal is a vital sea lane for trade between the industrialized developed nations of the west and the developing nations of Africa and Asia. The United States of America acted promptly by providing the initial airlift free of charge to the UN. It could justify its action before its own people with The United Nations Participation Act of 1945. Also, it acted to retain its influence among the free world and to ensure that the Soviet Union did not expand its influence in the region. The United States, by its support of UNEF, inadvertently established a precedence which has contributed to make the UN complacent about studying an alternative for the initial lift of its peace-keeping forces.

The considerable support of nations in establishing UNEF began
to decline gradually in subsequent peace-keeping operations. This can be attributed to the fact that the United States was providing the bulk of the lift at no cost to the UN.

The next peace-keeping operation the UN established was the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC) in 1960. The ONUC was composed mainly of developing nations. Out of a total of 20,166 officers and men who were lifted to the Congo, the United States airlifted 16,441 (81.53%) while the Soviet Union, also a superpower, lifted only 450 (2.23%) at a cost of $1.5 million. Again, heavy dependence on the United States was further demonstrated in ONUC. Yet some people have suggested that the "dependence of sizeable peacekeeping operations on the United States for their initial launching is a myth."¹

The question that arises, then, is: Does the dependence on United States airlift constitute, in effect, a second veto which the United States can use to jeopardize a UN peace-keeping operation it does not support? Some will argue that it does not. High on the list among the various reasons is that the United States will not want the Soviet Union "to gain, through UN peacekeeping airlifts, the additional experience and know-how without which even adequate aircraft and crews fail to constitute a proven strategic airlift capability."² Also, because most


²Ibid., p. 334.
peace-keeping operations have been in the national interest of the
United States, that Government will not find it difficult to gain
support at home for peace-keeping operations. Nonetheless, the question
of what may happen if there is an instance of peace-keeping that con-
flicts with its national interest still remains.

The three UN methods of peace-keeping have proved workable so
far, but each has its own loophole. First, since the most expensive
aspect of peace-keeping is transportation to and from the operational
area, contributing nations might do all in their power to avoid having
to shoulder that responsibility. In this light, France, a highly
developed country with sufficient strategic lift capability, still
depended on the UN to make arrangements for its troop rotations in
UNIFIL. The Scandinavian countries were able to establish resupply
flights between their countries and Naples, Italy, during the UNEF
operation, but the same countries preferred to have the USAF provide
their initial flight to the operational area.

Valuable time is normally wasted during the loading and unload-
ing of aircraft and ships that do not belong to the troop contributing
nation. This is because of the differences in the systems of loading
and unloading between different countries.

Transportation by ship, although the cheapest, is inappropriate
for initial deployment of men and equipment. The Yugoslav and Brazilian
contingents required 18 and 31 days from their respective countries to
Cairo during UNEF. Shipping is more appropriate for rotational and
resupply needs.

The fastest means of deployment is airlift of men and essential equipment. Also, time could be saved if the troop contributing nations provided their own lift. As has been seen, however, developing nations lack the facilities and experience to achieve large scale lifts. Furthermore, it would be much faster and also cheaper if aircraft were prepositioned in areas that matched the UN's geographic division of the world. Those aircraft could lift the regional troops directly to the operational area.

The enormous cost of air- and sealift can also be reduced if the source of the lift is common (i.e., under UN command). The Soviet Union airlifted 450 Ghanaians from Ghana to the Congo in ONUC at a cost of $1.5 million. The United States, on the other hand, charged approximately $1.5 million for 1,600 men airlifted from places farther from the Congo than Ghana. This kind of situation, which proves that the cost of transportation is not uniform but varies according to an individual country's rates of charge, could be eliminated.

Recommendations

Different scholars of peace-keeping operations have made many suggestions on how to improve the logistics of the force in general, but very little has been said about transportation in particular. From the analyses of the three case studies examined in this study, it becomes obvious that the transportation aspect of peace-keeping is the lifeline
of any UN peace-keeping operation and should not be left to ad hoc arrangements like the other aspects of logistics. Some recommendations on how to improve the present methods of arranging for transportation are offered in this section.

**UN-Owned Transportation Assets.** Elvira Fradkin has concentrated on the need for the UN to possess an airforce with capabilities to perform duties comparable to an average country's airforce. This author emphasizes police duties and advances very strong arguments on why and how the force can be established. The argument supports the idea of UN-owned assets. This study examined only the transportation aspects of a UN force, and some methods by which UN-owned transportation can be raised are:

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- Sale of UN bonds to raise money to purchase aircraft and ships.

- Requests by the UN to various countries (preferably developed countries) and multinational corporations for donations of transportation assets.

- Request that individual countries dedicate some aircraft and ships for UN use in times of need. This method is already in practice with some of the Scandinavian countries and Canada, which have dedicated troops and equipment for UN peace-keeping operations. The Secretary

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General, in his report to the General Assembly on 27 August 1979 concerning a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, submitted replies received from various governments to the request made by the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, on the above question. Attached as Appendix I are the reply from the United States and a portion of the reply from the Netherlands, both of which show the organization of the stand-by forces for UN peace-keeping operations. The United States reiterates its commitment to providing airlift of troops on request from the UN. In addition to troops, the Netherlands promised a "destroyer-, frigate type for logistic and other supports." Also, the Netherlands Air Force has earmarked "one F-27 'Troopship' (troop/cargo transport aircraft)."

If more countries, particularly the Soviet Union and the other three permanent members of the Security Council, could be persuaded to dedicate transportation assets to the UN, most of this long-standing problem could be resolved. My experience is that an aircraft carrying UN colours would be allowed to overfly and enter almost any country, irrespective of who is actually employed to operate it. For example, in the Middle East, intra-UN mission flights between the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are operated by a Canadian provided UN operated Buffalo aircraft and an F-27 executive plane which fly freely between Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem,
Contractual Arrangement. Another solution to the problem could involve the arrangement of contracts with existing air and sea lines for release of aircraft and ships to the UN for use in times of need. This solution is highly dependent on availability of funds since this would probably be strictly a business deal. This recommendation, like the others, will require further study to examine the details and establish feasibility.

Categorizing "Peace-Keeping" As a Specialized Agency. Peace-keeping is the most expensive single commitment by the UN. Presently, it is financed on an ad hoc basis. If peace-keeping is to attract regular financing, it will perhaps have to be designated as a specialized agency. Many obstacles to this proposition exist, but it is nevertheless a solution worth studying. If it is possible to vote money on an annual basis for peace-keeping, the "peace-keeping agency" should, with time and during a lull in peace-keeping activities, be able to raise sufficient funds to buy essential transportation assets. An argument in favour of having the UN physically possess its own transportation is that when these assets are not engaged in peace-keeping duties, they could be employed as commercial carriers and make money to assist in running the affairs of the UN in general.

Assigning Deployment Responsibility. Finally, another recommendation worth considering involves assigning the responsibility of
providing the transportation assets for deployment to the five permanent members of the Security Council. After all, the Charter of the UN assigns the responsibility of maintaining peace and security to the Security Council. Since, traditionally, the five permanent members do not take part in the actual peace-keeping effort, it would not be out of place to assign them such responsibility. Presently, the Soviet Union and France do not actively support peace-keeping operations.

In summary, then, transportation of peace-keeping forces is a very vital aspect of the total logistics that needs to be provided for UN peace-keeping operations. Currently, the ad hoc arrangements and the almost total dependence on the United States for providing this most vital requirement leave too much room for failure. There is, therefore, a requirement to examine alternative methods of providing neutral transportation assets without which no peace-keeping operation can be successfully launched.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION S/727, 23 APRIL 1948

The Security Council

Referring to its resolution of 17 April 1948 calling upon all parties concerned to comply with specific terms for a truce in Palestine,

Establishes a truce commission for Palestine [United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)] composed of representatives of those members of the Security Council which have career consular officers in Jerusalem, noting, however, that the representative of Syria has indicated that his Government is not prepared to serve on the Commission. The function of the Commission shall be to assist the Security Council in supervising the implementation by the parties of the resolution of the Security Council of 17 April 1948;

Requests the Commission to report to the President of the Security Council within four days regarding its activities and the development of the situation, and subsequently to keep the Security Council currently informed with respect thereto.

The Commission, its members, their assistants and its personnel shall be entitled to travel, separately or together, wherever the Commission deems necessary to carry out its tasks.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall furnish the Commission with such personnel and assistance as it may require, taking into account the special urgency of the situation with respect to Palestine.

APPENDIX B

COMPOSITION OF UN PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS/OPERATIONS
1948 ONWARD

Supervisory/Observer Missions

UN Truce Supervisory Organisation (UNTSO)

Location: Palestine/Israel
Duration: 1948-
Typology: Interstate
Function: Observation of armistice lines
Authority: Security Council
Size: Maximum 500
Contributing Countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Soviet Union, Sweden, United States

UN Observer Group, India/Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

Location: Kashmir
Duration: 1949-
Typology: Interstate
Function: Observation of armistice lines
Authority: Security Council
Size: Maximum 89
Contributing Countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United States, Uruguay
**UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)**

Location: Lebanon  
Duration: 1958 (6 months)  
Typology: Intrastate  
Function: Border patrol  
Authority: Security Council  
Size: 600  

Contributing Countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Italy, Netherlands, Norway

**UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)**

Location: Yemen  
Duration: 1963-1964 (15 months)  
Typology: Intrastate  
Function: Internal pacification  
Authority: Security Council  
Size: 200  

Contributing Countries: Canada, Denmark, Ghana, India, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Yugoslavia

**UN India/Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)**

Location: India-Pakistan border  
Duration: 1965-1966 (6 months)  
Typology: Interstate  
Function: Supervision of ceasefire  
Authority: Security Council  
Size: Maximum 93  

Contributing Countries: Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Venezuela
Force Level Operations

UN Emergency Force (UNEF I)

Location: Egypt-Israel border
Duration: 1956-1967
Typology: Interstate
Functions: Border patrol; interposition
Authority: General Assembly
Size: Maximum 6,000
Contributors of: Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Finland,
Contingents: India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia

UN Operations in Congo (ONUC)

Location: Congo (Zaire)
Duration: 1960-1964
Typology: Intrastate
Function: Internal pacification
Authority: Security Council
Size: Maximum 20,000
Contributors of: Ethiopia, Ghana (+ police), India, Indonesia,
Contingents: Ireland, Liberia, Malaya, Mali, Morocco,
Nigeria (police), Pakistan, Sudan, Sweden,
Tunisia, United Arab Republic

UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

Location: Cyprus
Duration: 1964
Typology: Intrastate
Function: Internal pacification
Authority: Security Council
Size: Maximum 6,500
Contributors of: Australia (police), Austria, Canada, Denmark (+
Contingents: Poland), Finland, Ireland, New Zealand
(police), Sweden (+ police), United Kingdom
**UN Emergency Force (UNEF II)**

Location: Egypt (Sinai)
Duration: 1973
Typology: Interstate
Functions: Interposition; buffer force
Authority: Security Council
Size: Maximum 6,000
Contributors of Contingents: Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden

**UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF)**

Location: Israel Syria (Golan Heights)
Duration: 1974
Typology: Interstate
Functions: Interposition; buffer force
Authority: Security Council
Size: Maximum 1,200
Contributors of Contingents: Austria, Canada, Peru, Poland

**UN Security Force (UNSF)**

Location: Dutch West New Guinea (W. Irian)
Duration: 1962-1963
Typology: Interstate
Function: Internal pacification
Authority: Security Council
Size: 1,600
Contributors of Contingents: Pakistan, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Nigeria, Sweden, United States
UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL)*

Location: Lebanon
Duration: 1978-
Typology: Intrastate
Functions: Internal pacification; interposition
Authority: Security Council
Size: Approximately 6,000

Contributors of Contingents: Canada,** Fiji, France, Ghana, Iran,** Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal

NOTES: *Based on personal knowledge of this writer.
**Has withdrawn its contingent.

APPENDIX C

CONTENTS OF SCHEMA OF MODEL I BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS


United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observations purposes pursuant to Security Council resolutions

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CHAPTER I Authorization

CHAPTER II Establishment (formation, strength, composition and command), direction and control

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B. Strength and structure of the Military Observer Mission

C. Composition of the Military Observer Mission
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D. Appointment of the chief of the Military Observer Mission and staff officers

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B. Agreement on the status of military observer missions between the United Nations and the host country

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CHAPTER V Organization, development and functioning of the Military Observer Mission

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B. Facilities and services
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CHAPTER VIII Administrative matters

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APPENDIX D

SELECTED SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
ON UNEF, ONUC, AND UNIFIL
I. United Nations Emergency Force - Middle East

A. General Assembly, Resolution 997 (ES-1), November 2, 1956.

[adopted by a vote of 64 to 5, with 6 abstentions]

Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab armistice agreements of 1949 of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,

Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,

Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is now interrupted to the serious prejudice of many nations,

Expressing its grave concern over these developments,

1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;

2. Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;

3. Recommends that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution;

4. Urges that, upon the cease fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter;
6. **Decides** to remain in emergency session pending compliance with the present resolution.


[adopted by a vote of 57 to None, with 19 abstentions including all nine members of the Soviet Bloc and Egypt]

Bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with its resolution 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956,

**Requests**, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution.

C. General Assembly, Resolution 1000 (ES-2), November 5, 1956.

[vote same as for Resolution 998 (ES-2)]

Having **requested** the Secretary-General, in its resolution 998 (ES-1) of 4 November 1956, to submit to it a plan for an emergency international United Nations Force, for the purposes stated,

**Noting** with satisfaction the first report of the Secretary-General on the plan, and having in mind particularly paragraph 4 of that report,

1. **Establishes** a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956;

2. **Appoints**, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Major-General E. L. M. Burns, as Chief of the Command;

3. **Authorizes** the Chief of the Command immediately to recruit, from the observer corps of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, a limited number of officers who shall be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council, and further authorizes him, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment directly, from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council, of the additional number of officers needed;
4. Invites the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.

II. Operation des Nations Unies au Congo

A. Security Council, Resolution 4387, July 14, 1960

[adopted by 8 votes--Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, Italy, Poland, Tunisia, the U.S.S.R., and the United States--to 0, with 3 abstentions--China, France, and the United Kingdom.]

Considering the report of the Secretary-General on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,

Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (document S/4382),

1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;

2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

B. Security Council, Resolution S/4405, July 22, 1960

[adopted unanimously]

Having considered the first report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960 (document S/4389),

Appreciating the work of the Secretary-General and the support so readily and so speedily given to him by all Member States invited by him to give assistance,

Noting that as stated by the Secretary-General the arrival of the troops of the United Nations force in Leopoldville has already had a salutory effect,
Recognizing that an urgent need still exists to continue and to increase such efforts,

Considering that the complete restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recognizing that the Security Council recommended the admission of the Republic of the Congo to membership in the United Nations as a unit,

1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960, on the withdrawal of their troops, and authorizes the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect;

2. Requests all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;

3. Commends the Secretary-General for the prompt action he has taken to carry out resolution S/4387 of the Security Council and his first report;

4. Invites the specialized agencies of the United Nations to render to the Secretary-General such assistance as he may require;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report further to the Security Council as appropriate.

C. Security Council, Resolution S/4426, August 9, 1960

[adopted by 9 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions--France and Italy]

Recalling its resolution of 22 July 1960 (S/4405) inter alia, calling upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of 14 July (S/4387) on the withdrawal of their troops, and authorizing the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect,

Having noted the second report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the aforesaid two resolutions and his statement before the Council,
Having considered the statements made by the representatives of Belgium and the Republic of the Congo to this Council as this meeting,

Noting with satisfaction the progress made by the United Nations in carrying out the Security Council resolution in respect of the territory of the Republic of the Congo other than the Province of Katanga,

Noting however that the United Nations had been prevented from implementing the aforesaid resolutions in the Province of Katanga although it was ready, and in fact attempted, to do so,

Recognizing that the withdrawal of Belgium troops from the Province of Katanga will be a positive contribution to and essential for the proper implementation of the Security Council resolutions,

1. Confirms the authority given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council resolutions of 14 July and 22 July 1960 and requests him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby;

2. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council's resolutions;

3. Declares that the entry of the United Nations force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution;

4. Reaffirms that the United Nations force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise;

5. Calls upon all Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to implement this resolution and to report further to the Security Council as appropriate.
Resolution 425 (1978)
of 19 March 1978

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,

Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;

3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.

Adopted at the 2074th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
Resolution 426 (1978)
of 19 March 1978

The Security Council

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978;

2. Decides that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides.

Adopted at the 2075th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
APPENDIX E

UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945, AS AMENDED


AN ACT

To provide for the appointment of representatives of the United States in the organs and agencies of the United Nations, and to make other provision with respect to the participation of the United States in such organization.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "United Nations Participation Act of 1945."

SEC. 2. (a) The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint a representative of the United States to the United Nations who shall have the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and shall hold office at the pleasure of the President. Such representative shall represent the United States in the Security Council of the United Nations and may serve ex officio as representative of the United States in any organ, commission, or other body of the United Nations other than specialized agencies of the United Nations, and shall perform such other functions in connection with the participation of the United States in the United Nations as the President may, from time to time, direct.

(b) The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint additional persons with appropriate titles, rank,
and status to represent the United States in the principal organs of the United Nations and in such organs, commissions, or other bodies as may be created by the United Nations with respect to nuclear energy or disarmament (control and limitation of armament). Such persons shall serve at the pleasure of the President and subject to the direction of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations. They shall, at the direction of the Representative of the United States to the United Nations, represent the United States in any organ, commission, or other body of the United Nations, including the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council, and perform such other functions as the Representative of the United States is authorized to perform in connection with the participation of the United States in the United Nations. Any Deputy Representative or any other officer holding office at the time the provisions of this Act, as amended, become effective shall not be required to be reappointed by reason of the enactment of this Act, as amended.

(c) The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall designate from time to time to attend a specified session or specified sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations not to exceed five representatives of the United States and such number of alternates as he may determine consistent with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. One of the representatives shall be designated as the senior representative.

(d) The President may also appoint from time to time such other persons as he may deem necessary to represent the United States in organs and agencies of the United Nations. The President may, without the advice and consent of the Senate, designate any officer of the United States to act without additional compensation as the representative of the United States in either the Economic and Social Council or the Trusteeship Council (1) at any specified session thereof where the position is vacant or in the absence or disability of the regular representative or (2) in connection with a specified subject matter at any specified session of either such Council in lieu of the regular representative. The President may designate any officer of the Department of State, whose appointment is subject to confirmation by the Senate, to act, without additional compensation, for temporary periods as the representative of the United States in the Security Council of the United Nations in the absence or disability of the representatives provided for under section 2(a) and (b) or in lieu of such representatives in connection with a specified subject matter.

(e) The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint a representative of the United States to the European office of the United Nations with appropriate rank and status who shall serve at the pleasure of the President and subject to the
direction of the Secretary of State. Such person shall, at the direc-
tion of the Secretary of State, represent the United States at the
European office of the United Nations and perform such other functions
there in connection with the participation of the United States in
international organizations as the Secretary of State may, from time to
time, direct.

(f) Nothing contained in this section shall preclude the President
or the Secretary of State, at the direction of the President, from
representing the United States at any meeting or session of any organ or
agency of the United Nations.

(g) All persons appointed in pursuance of authority contained in
this section shall receive compensation at rates determined by the
President upon the basis of duties to be performed but not in excess of
rates authorized by sections 411 and 412 of the Foreign Service Act of
1946 (Public Law 724, Seventy-ninth Congress) for chiefs of mission and
Foreign Service officers occupying positions of equivalent importance,
except that no Member of the Senate or House of Representatives or
officer of the United States who is designated under subsections (c) and
(d) of this section as a representative of the United States or as an
alternate to attend any specified session or specified sessions of the
General Assembly shall be entitled to receive such compensation.

SEC. 3 The representatives provided for in section 2 hereof, when
representing the United States in the respective organs and agencies of
the United Nations, shall, at all times, act in accordance with the
Instructions of the President transmitted by the Secretary of State
unless other means of transmission is directed by the President, and
such representatives shall, in accordance with such instructions, cast
any and all votes under the Charter of the United Nations.

SEC. 4 The President shall, from time to time as occasion may
require, but no less than once each year, make reports to the Congress
of the activities of the United Nations and of the participation of the
United States therein. He shall make special current reports on deci-
sions of the Security Council to take enforcement measures under the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and on the partici-
patation therein, under his instructions, of the representative of the
United States.

SEC. 5 (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,
whenever the United States is called upon by the Security Council
to apply measures which said Council has decided, pursuant to the
said Chapter, are to be employed to give effect to its provisions of
said Charter, the President may, to the extent necessary to
apply those measures, through any agency which he may designate.
orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) Any person who willfully violates or evades or attempts to violate or evade any order, rule, or regulation issued by the President pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000 or, if a natural person, be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both; and the officer, direct, or agent of any corporation who knowingly participates in such violation or evasion shall be punished by a like fine, imprisonment, or both, and any property, funds, securities, papers, or other articles or documents, or any vessel, together with her tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, or vehicle, or aircraft, concerned in such violation shall be forfeited to the United States.

SEC. 6 The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution, providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general locations, and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein: Provided, That, except as authorized in section 7 of this Act, nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such special agreement or agreements.

SEC. 7 (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President, upon the request by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest to comply with such request, may authorize, in support of such activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of the United Nations Charter--
(1) the detail to the United Nations, under such terms and conditions as the President shall determine, of personnel of the armed forces of the United States to serve as observers, guards, or in any non-combatant capacity, but in no event shall more than a total of one thousand of such personnel be so detailed at any one time: Provided, That while so detailed, such personnel shall be considered for all purposes as acting in the line of duty, including the receipt of pay and allowances as personnel of the armed forces of the United States, credit for longevity and retirement, and all other perquisites appertaining to such duty: Provided further, That upon authorization or approval by the President, such personnel may accept directly from the United Nations (a) any or all of the allowances or perquisites to which they are entitled under the first proviso hereof, and (b) extraordinary expenses and perquisites incident to such detail;

(2) the furnishing of facilities, services, or other assistance and the loan of the agreed fair share of the United States of any supplies and equipment to the United Nations by the Department of Defense, under such terms and conditions as the President shall determine.

(3) the obligation, insofar as necessary to carry out the purposes of clauses (1) and (2) of this sub-section, of any funds appropriated to the Department of Defense or any department therein, the procurement of such personnel, supplies, equipment, facilities, services, or other assistance as may be made available in accordance with the request of the United Nations, and the replacement of such items, when necessary, where they are furnished from stocks.

(b) Whenever personnel or assistance is made available pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a) (1) and (2) of this section, the President shall require reimbursement from the United Nations for the expense thereby incurred by the United States: Provided, That in exceptional circumstances, or when the President finds it to be in the national interest, he may waive, in whole or in part, the requirement of such reimbursement: Provided further, That when any such reimbursement is made, it shall be credited, at the option of the appropriate department of the Department of Defense, either to the appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the purposes for which expenditures were made.

(c) In addition to the authorization of appropriations to the Department of State contained in section 8 of the Act, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense, or any department therein, such sums as may be necessary to reimburse such departments in the event that reimbursement from the United Nations is
waived in whole or in part pursuant to authority contained in subsection (b) of this section.

(d) Nothing in this Act shall authorize the disclosure of any information or knowledge in any case in which such disclosure is prohibited by any other law of the United States.

SEC. 8 There is hereby authorized to be appropriated annually to the Department of State, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary for the payment by the United States of its share of the expenses of the United Nations as apportioned by the General Assembly in accordance with article 17 of the Charter, and for all necessary salaries and expenses of the representatives provided for in section 2 hereof, and of their appropriate staffs, including personal services in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, without regard to the civil service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended; travel expenses without regard to the Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended, the Travel Expense Act of 1949, and section 10 of the Act of March 3, 1933, as amended, and, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of State may prescribe, travel expenses of families and transportation of effects of United States representatives and other personnel in going to and returning from their post of duty; allowances for living quarters, including heat, fuel, and light, as authorized by the Act approved June 26, 1930 (5 U.S.C. 118a); cost-of-living allowances for personnel stationed abroad under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of State may prescribe; communications services; stenographic reporting, translating, and other services, by contract; hire of passenger motor vehicles and other local transportation; rent of offices; printing and binding without regard to section 11 of the Act of March 1, 1919 (44 U.S.C. 111); allowances and expenses as provided in section 6 of the Act of July 30, 1946 (Public Law 565, Seventy-ninth Congress), and allowances and expenses equivalent to those provided in section 901 (3) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (Public Law 724, Seventy-ninth Congress); the lease or rental (for periods not exceeding ten years) of living quarters for the use of the representative of the United States to the United Nations referred to in paragraph (a) of section 2 hereof, the cost of installation and use of telephones in the same manner as telephone service is provided for the use of the Foreign Service pursuant to the Act of August 23, 1912, as amended (31 U.S.C. 679), and unusual expenses similar to those authorized by section 22 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, as amended by section 311 of the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act, incident to the operation and maintenance of such living quarters; and such other expenses as may be authorized by the Secretary of State; all without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 5).
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 619), as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the act of August 8, 1950 (Public Law 673, 81st Congress), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Secretary of State, upon the request by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest to comply with such request, is authorized, in support of such activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the employment of armed forces contemplated by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to request the Secretary of Defense to detail personnel of the armed forces to the United Nations, and to furnish facilities, services, or other assistance and to loan supplies and equipment to the United Nations in an agreed fair share of the United States under such terms and conditions as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly determine and in accordance with and subject to the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 7(a) of the Act, and the Secretary of Defense is authorized to comply with the request of the Secretary of State, giving due regard to the requirements of the national defense.

2. The Secretary of State, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of section 7(b) of the Act, shall require reimbursement from the United Nations for the expense thereby incurred by the United States whenever personnel or assistance is made available to the United Nations, except that in exceptional circumstances, or when the Secretary of State finds it to be in the national interest, he may, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, waive, in whole or in part, the requirement of such reimbursement.

3. The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of section 7(a)(1) of the Act, may authorize personnel of the armed forces detailed to the United Nations to accept directly from the
United Nations (a) any or all of the allowances or perquisites to which they are entitled under the first proviso of section 7(a)(1) of the Act, and (b) extraordinary expenses and perquisites incident to such detail.

Harry S. Truman

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 19, 1951.

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978 in which the Council, among other things, decided to set up a United Nations force in Lebanon under its authority and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it on the implementation of the resolution.

Terms of reference

2. The terms of reference of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are:

(a) The Force will determine compliance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 425 (1978);

(b) The Force will confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area;

(c) The Force will establish and maintain itself in an area of operation to be defined in the light of subparagraph b above;

(d) The Force will use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation will not be utilized for hostile activities of any kind;

(e) In the fulfilment of this task, the Force will have the co-operation of the Military Observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), who will continue to function on the Armistice Demarcation Line after the termination of the mandate of UNIFIL.
General considerations

3. Three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.

4. Although the general context of UNIFIL is not comparable with that of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the guidelines for those operations, having proved satisfactory, are deemed suitable for practical application to the new Force. These guidelines are, mutatis mutandis, as follows:

(a) The Force will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field will be exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Commander will be responsible to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General will keep the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force will be referred to the Council for its decision.

(b) The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force and its personnel should be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

(c) The Force will be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation.

(d) The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It will not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The Force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Council.

(e) In performing its functions, the Force will act with complete impartiality.
(f) The supporting personnel of the Force will be provided as a rule by the Secretary-General from among existing United Nations staff. Those personnel will, of course, follow the rules and regulations of the United Nations Secretariat.

5. UNIFIL, like any other United Nations peace-keeping operation, cannot and must not take on responsibilities which fall under the Government of the country in which it is operating. These responsibilities must be exercised by the competent Lebanese authorities. It is assumed that the Lebanese Government will take the necessary measures to co-operate with UNIFIL in this regard. It should be recalled that UNIFIL will have to operate in an area which is quite densely inhabited.

6. I envisage the responsibility of UNIFIL as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force will confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this is achieved, it will establish and maintain an area of operation as defined. In this connexion, it will supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.

7. The Force is being established on the assumption that it represents an interim measure until the Government of Lebanon assumes its full responsibilities in Southern Lebanon. The termination of the mandate of UNIFIL by the Security Council will not affect the continued functioning of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, as set out in the appropriate Security Council decision [see S/1061 of 19 April 1972].

8. With a view to facilitating the task of UNIFIL, particularly as it concerns procedures for the expeditious withdrawal of Israeli forces and related matters, it may be necessary to work out arrangements with Israel and Lebanon as a preliminary measure for the implementation of the Security Council resolution. It is assumed that both parties will give their full co-operation to UNIFIL in this regard.

Proposed plan of action

9. If the Security Council is in agreement with the principles and conditions outlined above, I intend to take the following steps:

(a) I shall instruct Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, to contact immediately the Governments of Israel and Lebanon and initiate meetings with their representatives for the purpose of reaching
agreement on the modalities of the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the establishment of a United Nations area of operation. This should not delay in any way the establishment of the Force.

(b) Pending the appointment of a Force Commander, I propose to appoint Major-General E. A. Erskine, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Interim Commander. Pending the arrival of the first contingents of the Force, he will perform his tasks with the assistance of a selected number of UNTSO military observers. At the same time, urgent measures will be taken to secure and arrange for the early arrival in the area of contingents of the Force.

(c) In order that the Force may fulfil its responsibilities, it is considered, as a preliminary estimate, that it must have at least five battalions each of about 600 all ranks, in addition to the necessary logistics units. This means a total strength of the order of 4,000.

(d) Bearing in mind the principles set out in paragraph 4c above, I am making preliminary inquiries as to the availability of contingents from suitable countries.

(e) In view of the difficulty in obtaining logistics contingents and of the necessity for economy, it would be my intention to examine the possibility of building on the existing logistics arrangements. If this should not prove possible, it will be necessary to seek other suitable arrangements.

(f) It is proposed also that an appropriate number of observers of UNTSO should be assigned to assist UNIFIL in the fulfilment of its task in the same way as for UNEF.

(g) It is suggested that the Force would initially be stationed in the area for a period of six months.

Estimated cost and method of financing

10. At the present time there are many unknown factors. The best possible preliminary estimate based upon current experience and rates with respect to other peace-keeping forces of comparable size is approximately $68 million for a Force of 4,000 all ranks for a period of six months. This figure is made up of initial setting-up costs (excluding the cost of initial airlift) of $29 million and ongoing costs for the six-month period of $39 million.

11. The costs of the Force shall be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter.

APPENDIX H

EXTRACTS FROM THIS WRITER'S DIARY

9-11 NOVEMBER 1978
November 9

1976. Left today morning for Beirut for the NWITT situation. During our way we were told by some people from NWITT that the plane was not coming only the following day. Went to NWITT to meet him and asked the day there trying to get horses to do something to correct the situation which was fast becoming an embarrassment to me. We were told that the plane would depart dents the day to come on Friday morning by 12:00. We managed to obtain permission for the change决定ing in Beirut to
November 10

1978: left very early in the morning - 6:30 am for Beirut from Damascus. Got to Damascus by 8 am only to find that the plane had not gone there and so we had to wait. Finally, all attempts to take to any body in Beirut were fruitless. Breakfast with the chief officials held in one restaurant. This same restaurant is responsible for feeding the boys at the airport. We dined out at the restaurant for some meals. It was a sunny day at the airport - change at offering home looking for sound news. It was a sunny day out and back with very little to do. At dawn one morning to sleep. Luckily the boys had their sleeping bags and so they could be down from being cold and sleep. The weather was very bad but had lasted all day yesterday and we changed today.
November 11

1978. Wake up very shiishly, after having my bath and getting dressed. I came out to the
cool morning to call up the driver to take
my thing down. I see two soldiers riding
on a motorcycle. When I asked them,
asked me if they said that the plane
had come. I could hardly believe it.
I told Lawrence and the Charge- the office
the way and you could see that there
was a sign of incredible excitement. He would
not take his tea again and wanted us to
drive immediately to the airport.

We got into the airport. The boys were
so happy that they started cheering us,
which they had exchanged news. After saying
hello to the Charge, I met some of his staff
who asked me if I wanted to go. The boys were
enjoyed from the beginning and after everybody
was more excited in order me left and
to UNRIL. He wrote me
the way and asked if I could beforehand
send a letter to Lawrence for
the next time. I went back to Nicaragua tonight.
Notes

Abu: refers to Lieutenant Colonel Abubakar, the battalion commander of NIBATT II

Beirut: capital of Lebanon; location from which the Nigerian contingent was flown in and out of Lebanon

Boys: troops of the Nigerian contingent

C-in-C: Commander in Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obansanjo, who was the Head of State of Nigeria

FC: Force Commander of UNIFIL, Major General E. A. Erskine

Lagos: capital of Nigeria

Lawrence: Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Uwumarogie, the battalion commander of NIBATT I

Naquora: headquarters of UNIFIL, located approximately 4 km from the Israeli-Lebanon border

NIBATT: used here in reference to the Nigerian battalion headquarters in Lebanon
APPENDIX I

COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS, WITH REPLIES FROM GOVERNMENTS OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES

[An extract from UN, General Assembly, Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects, A/AC.121/30 (27 August 1979), pp. 5-6, 10-11, & 13-16]

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE STAND-BY FORCES

1. Royal Netherlands Navy

(a) General

(1) The contribution of the stand-by forces comprises in the first instance: (a) a contingent of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC), composed of a contingent staff (in which a liaison group) and a reinforced company (approximately 300 men); (b) an underway replenishment ship, equipped with one or two helicopters (displacement 16,800 tons, service speed 18 knots); (c) a number of patrol ships (destroyer-, frigate type).

(2) In a later phase this naval contribution may be enlarged with other units: (a) command frigate type for headquarter duties; (b) destroyer-, frigate type for logistic and other supports; (c) a second contingent RNLMC as a reinforcement of the first contingent (similar in composition).

The offered ships are continuously and practically at once ready for prolonged actions and do not need special measures. The first contingent RNLMC is ready to move within 24 hours, the second contingent, if needed, will be able to move within two or three days.

(b) Characteristics of the marines contingent

(1) General

The units of the RNLMC, being of a high professional quality should
not be used for garrison and guard duties.

(2) Mobility

If needed both contingents can on request be equipped with sufficient transport to carry all personnel.

(3) Communications

Apart from equipment for communication within the own unit (radio and telephone up to 20 miles), the contingent is equipped for communication with a higher echelon at a distance of maximum of 150 miles.

(4) Logistics

(a) Supply - for thirty days

Fuel and lubricants for vehicles - the contingent will not carry fuel and lubricants for vehicles

Maintenance - second echelon of armament and vehicles

For resupply the contingent must revert to the United Nations supply system.

(b) Medical

Sufficient drugs, dressings and instruments for first aid in the field

Evacuation of casualties to the aid station

Maintaining aid station for extended first aid and preparing the casualties for further evacuation to the rear, providing them with temporary shelter.

(5) Missions

The contingent is capable of independent actions and specially trained for all circumstances and forms of action which may arise in peace-keeping operations.

Normally a reinforced rifle company is working as a whole. However, it is possible to detach parts of a company to operate separately as outposts, covering forces, patrols etc. The detached units, if
operating beyond supporting distance may be reinforced with supporting infantry weapons.

(3) Communications:

The equipment provides for communications within the platoon by radio up to 12 miles.

(4) Logistics:

The platoon is dependent on logistic support to be given by other Netherlands units in the mission area. This support is up to and inclusive third echelon. For higher echelon support the platoon relies on the United Nations-logistic system.

(5) Missions:

The platoon is capable of carrying out the following missions in close co-operation with local (military) police-organizations or with other United Nations police teams in the mission area:

- to maintain public order
- to protect personal and public property
- to control the observance of laws and rules
- to perform judicial- and traffic control duties
- other specific public tasks.

3. Royal Netherlands Air Force

(a) Organization

For peace-keeping operations of the United Nations are earmarked:

(1) one F-27 "Troopship" (troop/cargo transport aircraft) with three pilots, two flight mechanics and one wireless operator;

(2) three Alouette III helicopters with six pilots and four mechanics;

(3) additional technical personnel, when aircraft are operating in areas without possible technical support from their home country:
1 technical officer
5 specialists F-27
5 specialists Alouette III
1 NCO administrator

Except for personal small arms no armament is carried nor installed in the aircraft.

(b) Mobility

The units or parts thereof are able to deploy to the theatre of operation within forty-eight hours. Concerning the helicopters it is noted that - dependent on the geographic place of the mission area - transportation by ship might be necessary.

(c) Communications

Airborne communication equipment consisting of:

(a) for the F-27: VHF, UHF and HF
(b) for the Alouette III: UHF.

(d) Logistics

The spare parts package for aircraft and helicopters, communications and ground equipment are based on the expected need for three months with a minimum stock for one and a half months. However normal aerodrome cross-servicing facilities are imperative. Utilization per F-27 and per Alouette III is estimated on fifty hours per month.

(e) Missions

Within the technical limitations of each type of aircraft, flights for all purposes can be carried out if normal aerodrome cross-services and landing facilities are available.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Original: English]
[19 June 1979]

I. Introduction

The United States believes that an efficient and effective peace-keeping capability is vital and indispensable if the Organization is to
accomplish its primary objective - the maintenance of international peace and security. Our Government has actively supported the adoption of practical measures designed to enhance the ability of the Secretary-General to mount and support peace-keeping operations authorized by the Security Council. We co-sponsored resolution 33/114, and we welcome this opportunity to report to the Secretary-General in accordance with its provisions. We hope that other Member States will likewise see fit to provide their views so that the Secretary-General can prepare and publish an analysis that would identify common concerns and attitudes of Member States with regard to practical measures, going beyond the generalized answers given to resolution 32/106, such an analysis would be helpful in the development of agreed measures for strengthening United Nations peace-keeping.

II. Stand-by capacities

The United States undertakes to do the following:

- On receipt of a request from the Secretary-General, the United States is prepared, as in the past, to consider assisting with the airlift of troops and equipment required for establishing a peace-keeping force authorized by the Security Council;

- The United States remains prepared to examine, on a case-by-case basis, the possibility of not requiring reimbursement for the provision of initial airlift facilities;

- The United States is prepared to examine with the United Nations possible ways of upgrading the technical equipment available to observer missions and peace-keeping forces, and of enhancing their observation capability through the use of, or access to, relatively inexpensive, easily operable, modern technologies available in those fields;

- The United States is considering ways to provide funds and/or facilities, in co-ordination with the United Nations, for training of individuals or elements identified by Member States as being available for peace-keeping operations. We have included funds in our Fiscal Year 1980 Budget to conduct a pilot regional training programme;

- As in the past, the United States is prepared to consider with other Member States the possibility, once the current peace-keeping arrears are eliminated by payments of amounts owed, combined with voluntary and/or assessed contributions, of establishing a special peace-keeping fund to help cover the initial costs of peace-keeping operations authorized by the Security Council;
- Subject to national security considerations, the United States is prepared to approve overflight, landing and freedom of passage rights for United Nations peace-keeping forces in transit.

III. Practical experience gained in peace-keeping operations

The most direct practical experience acquired by the United States relevant to peace-keeping is in the provision of air-lift and logistic support and the use of technical equipment.

A. Provision of air-lift and logistic support

The United States Government has contributed directly to all major United Nations peace-keeping operations by providing initial air-lift, as well as logistic support through the United States Army supply system. In practice, United States policy has been to provide air-lift on a non-reimbursable basis for the initial deployment of peace-keeping forces authorized by the Security Council. For the initial deployment of UNIFIL to Lebanon, the United States Air Force flew 117 missions (employing C-141 and C-5A aircraft) carrying 2,462 troops and 3,281 tons of cargo at a cost to the United States of $8 million. We have also planned to provide similar air-lift services for the initial deployment of UNTAG. Regarding logistic support, the United States provides the United Nations with equipment, supplies, and services on a reimbursable basis, provided these items are available in sufficient quantity in the United States inventory. Through United Nations assist letters, military items and spare parts are requisitioned and are shipped direct to United Nations forces in the field or to the supply depot in Pisa, Italy. The number and dollar volume of these assist letters increased from 68 requests valued at $825,000 in the fiscal year 1977 to 117 requests valued at $2 million in fiscal year 1978.

B. Use of technical equipment

The United States Sinai Support Mission has operated a tactical early warning system in a United Nations Buffer Zone in the strategic Mitla and Giddi passes of the Sinai Peninsula since 22 February 1976. This system functions as an integral part of the comprehensive disengagement and arrangements of the 1975 basic agreement between Egypt and Israel and the over-all supervision of the United Nations. It serves as a tactical supplement to the strategic surveillance facilities allowed the two parties.

The United States Early Warning System deploys a network of unattended ground sensors in order to detect any unauthorized movement into or within the early warning area. When an intruder triggers one or
more of the sensors, an alarm is transmitted instantly to a watch station where observer personnel on duty seek to identify the intruder visually. The watch stations are equipped with high-power binoculars, night observation devices, and, in one instance, a remotely-controlled, day-and-night television camera which allows operators to monitor a remote area where there is no watch station.

If it is determined that an unauthorized intrusion has occurred, the two parties (Israel and Egypt) and the United Nations are notified immediately. If the identity of the intruder cannot be determined, or if some interdictory action appears necessary, the Sinai Field Mission calls upon UNEF for appropriate action.

Drawing upon experiences acquired during more than three years in the Sinai, we believe that the basic operational concepts employed there may be applicable, with modifications to accommodate local terrain and weather conditions, to other border or buffer areas. An early warning/alert system can be designed to monitor a border or disengagement line, possible invasion routes, or even an entire area, using a combination of unattended ground sensors, advanced night observation devices, aerial surveillance and observer personnel. Such a surveillance system could detect any hostile movement of ground forces or clandestine infiltration by armed groups and provide sufficient alert to allow an interdiction force to react.

In considering the possible installation of such an early warning/alert system, it is important to note that, in addition to the sensors and observation devices currently used in the Sinai, there are many other surveillance devices. All are based on one or more of the scientific principles of seismic, acoustic, infra-red, magnetic, electric, pressure and electromagnetic phenomena. The choice of equipment for deployment in any given situation depends upon the particular geographic, climatic and demographic conditions. The specific selection from among the wide range of sensor and other surveillance equipment that has been developed in the United States should be determined after an on-site inspection by technical personnel experienced in the use of these devices. Surveillance devices essentially sharpen and extend in range the eyes and ears of an observer. Therefore, the combination of equipment and human observers provides a more effective and efficient utilization of resources than do the individual components taken alone. By equipping observer stations with high quality surveillance devices such as image intensifying night observation devices and ground surveillance radar, the effectiveness of observer personnel can be greatly enhanced. In addition, the remote imaging surveillance system developed for use in the Sinai shows great promise of extending substantially the distance at which an operator can observe activity of a military or paramilitary nature, even under adverse weather conditions.
The application of concepts used by the Field Mission could, under the right circumstances, make a valuable contribution to easing tensions and improving the climate for political negotiation in other parts of the world. Such arrangements are not, however, a substitute either for diplomacy or for peace treaties or other agreements. The technology employed is not prohibitively expensive, though it would obviously increase the budget of a normal peace-keeping operation.

It is probable that a force augmented by technology would require a substantially smaller staff to perform the same tasks at the same level of effectiveness. Thus, whenever the early warning and surveillance can contribute to peace-keeping efforts, the concepts merit careful consideration.

Much of the surveillance equipment in question employs fairly advanced technology. Qualified personnel will be needed initially to survey and determine the exact mix of equipment required for a particular environment, to train operators and to maintain the equipment. Once a system is in place, it can be operated by relatively unsophisticated military or civilian forces.
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