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GREECE AND NATO: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B. A. Western Kentucky University 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1980

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Greece and NATO: Problems and Prospects

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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GREECE AND NATO: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, by Major R.N. Palarino, USA, 66 pages.

This study analyzes the relationship between Greece and NATO. The investigation focuses on Greece's accession into the Alliance, its eventual departure from the Organization, the current situation between Greece and NATO, and an assessment of the reasons Greece is important to the defense agreement.

Investigation reveals that Greece's accession into the Alliance was directly linked to American involvement in that country. However, Greece's departure was caused by a variety of reasons, the most important being that of Cyprus. Current negotiations are ongoing between Greece and NATO to reintegrate it into the military structure, however many disagreements are hindering the talks. The main issue concerns the control of airspace over the Aegean. Further examination reveals Greece is a very important member of the Alliance and if not reintegrated quickly, a possible further disintegration of the southern flank could occur.

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PREFACE

There have been few attempts to analyze in a comprehensive fashion the relationship between Greece and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the relationship is of a comparatively recent vintage, a full assessment will not be realized for some years to come. However, during the interim, a document is needed to outline the events that led to Greece's entry into the Alliance, its exit from the integrated military command structure, and current attempts to reintegrate the military forces of Greece into NATO. This will provide the reader with an understanding of the problem, and a departure point from which he can make his own assessment of the contemporary situation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

At this point I would like to express my appreciation to several individuals, and the organization that made this research effort possible. First, to my wife, Pat, who typed, edited, and bore the frustrations of my work. Second, to Colonel Harry J. Psomiades, and Lieutenant Colonels Gene Johnston and Clyde Glosson, my faculty advisors who guided my research efforts and gave me the encouragement to continue. Last, but not least, to the United States Army for its trust in selecting me to attend the Command and General Staff College where I have had the opportunity to accomplish this work.

INTRODUCTION

The Southern region of NATO, commonly referred to as the southern-flank, consists of four countries: Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey. These four countries provide for the defense of a land and sea mass stretching 3,000 miles from Gibraltar to the Turkish-Soviet border, and 800 miles from Sicily to the Austrian frontier. To defend a land and sea mass of this size and to maintain a credible deterrent, as well as the integrity of the NATO Alliance, maximum cooperation among NATO members is essential. The loss of a NATO member would create a deleterious situation for the Alliance as a whole.

Thus it is not surprising that most political and military leaders in the Alliance are greatly alarmed over the prospects of divisiveness in its southern flank. Political instability in this region, as well as disputes between member states, have placed a great deal of strain on NATO and have served to undermine its capacity for the defense of Europe.

One of the most serious challenges facing NATO today is the dispute between Greece and Turkey and the subsequent withdrawal by Greece from the military arm of NATO. Unless the situation is resolved, to the satisfaction of all parties, it could not only lead to the disintegration of NATO's southern flank but also seriously question the efficacy of NATO in a changing world.

Organization

During the preparation of this paper, the historical research

method was used to gather, examine, and analyze relevant material. While examining the multitude of literature available, and accumulating the facts, an effort was made to interpret and evaluate the information before drawing conclusions. In an attempt to make a systematic and complete presentation of the information and indicate trends of opinion that are significant, it was necessary to sometimes duplicate the information already presented. This adds special emphasis to certain situations and reminds the reader of significant events.

In order to analyze the reasons for Greece's apparent shift away from NATO, this study will focus on two areas. First, the historical background of Greece's accession into NATO and its ultimate departure from the integrated military structure of the Alliance. Second, and more important, the current issues which have a direct impact on Greece's return to the military side of the Alliance. In addition, the study underscores the problems of alliances in latent war communities in the contemporary world.

One last note of explanation: Greek attitudes toward the United States and NATO are interchangeable. They feel that since the United States is the leader of the Alliance they cannot separate the two. Therefore, the Greeks view the organization and the country from the same viewpoint.

Methodology

This study will focus on four specific questions:

1. How and why did Greece enter the Alliance?
2. What caused Greece to withdraw its forces?
3. What is the prospect for its return?
4. Why does NATO need Greece in the Alliance?

Chapter I and II of this paper deal with the historical aspects of Greece's relationship with NATO. In the first chapter, the Greek Civil War (1946-49), American involvement, accession into the Alliance (1952), and Greece's military organization and missions in the Alliance are outlined. This gives the reader an appreciation of how and why Greece entered NATO. In the second chapter, covering the period 1952-1974, Greece begins its eventual transition from a willing partner to a member that becomes disenchanted with NATO. The alienation of Greece in the Alliance was largely the result of its struggle with Turkey over Cyprus and of its perceptions that the Alliance consistently favored Turkey in the Cyprus dispute. It concludes with an analysis in detail of the reasons for Greece's withdrawal from the military wing of the Alliance in 1974.

In Chapter III, which covers the period 1974-1980, the foreign policy of the Greek government and the position of the major opposition political parties in Greece are discussed. The chapter provides an analysis of the Aegean problem between Greece and Turkey as well as the Cyprus dispute. It ends with US/NATO efforts to reintegrate Greece into the Alliance.

The final chapter assesses Greece's importance to NATO. By outlining specific scenarios and describing Greece's role in each situation, an appreciation is gained of the importance Greece has in the current world situation.

Sources

Information contained in this paper was acquired from books, periodicals, newspapers and speeches on file at the U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College Library, research papers from the Defense Documentation Center, and conversations with Greek military personnel in Greece and the United States. No classified information has been included in this treatise.

CHAPTER I

GREECE'S ACCESSION INTO NATO

1944-1952

Greece has always been influenced by foreign countries. Either it was occupied by a foreign power or had its internal political system interfered with by outside forces. This interference was to reach a climax during the period 1944-1952. A civil war, American involvement, and accession into the Atlantic Alliance all came about during this brief period of the country's history.

Civil War

When World War II ended, many European countries were left in shambles. Greece was one of these countries. Four years of German occupation left the country in ruins, but more important, politically divided. The new government of Greece was not able to deal with the political elements that were an outgrowth of the war.

Resistance in Greece during the German occupation began with passive non-cooperation, but eventually developed into sabotage and the formation of guerilla bands. There were two principal anti-German forces, the communist controlled E.A.M.-E.L.A.S (National Liberation Front and National Popular Liberation Army) and the E.D.E.S. (Greek Democratic National Army). These two groups cooperated little in actions against the Germans, and at times fought against each other. With the war winding down, the E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. forces

began competing for control of the country. In a series of conflicts E.A.M./E.L.A.S. set up a provisional government in the mountains of Greece, while the E.D.E.S. controlled Athens.

Meanwhile, a coalition government was established in Egypt, and as the Germans withdrew, the government returned to Greece. They were accompanied by a small British force to lend support to the new regime. This government, headed by George Papandreou, ordered the E.L.A.S. forces to disarm and disband. The E.A.M./E.L.A.S. refused, and a bitter civil war broke out in December, 1944.¹

The first communist rebellion lasted for approximately six months, followed by uneasy coalition governments and a renewed outbreak of hostilities. In this six-month period, the E.A.M./E.L.A.S. forces had overrun virtually all the rural areas of Greece. The British military forces intervened, and in February of 1945 a truce was established. A period of reconstruction followed under the regency of the archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos. Greece's King, still in exile, had agreed not to return to Greece pending a plebiscite on the monarchy. Many governments succeeded each other before a general election was held in March 1946. The communists abstained, and a royalist majority was returned. A plebiscite followed in September and restored the king as monarch. The communists reopened the war. Another war in Greece proved to be too much of a commitment for Great Britain. It gave Greece and the United States notice they could no longer provide assistance. Consequently, the United States assumed responsibility

¹C. M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece, A Short History, (London: Faber, 1977) pp. 1-30.

for keeping Greece out of the communist sphere.²

American Involvement

On February 21, 1947, Washington was informed by Britain that by April it would have to discontinue, because of its own difficulties, its military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. It hoped the United States could take over this burden in both countries. Perceptions in Washington were that unless the U.S. did take over, Greece would be overtaken by its communist partisans strongly supported by the Soviet Union, through communist Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; that if this happened Turkey would find itself in an untenable position in spite of its large but antiquated army, and that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in that event would eventually fall under communist domination. The U.S. interpreted Soviet demands and threats on Iran, Greece, and Turkey as an attempt to penetrate and get control of these countries and then push on into the Arab World.³

The decision by the United States to take over the responsibility, after full public debate and passage of the necessary legislation by the Congress, marked the beginning of a national policy for the containment of the Soviet Union. Henceforth, the U.S. was virtually committed to taking all necessary measures to prevent the intrusion of Soviet power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

In an address to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman asked the United States government for \$400 million to

²Ibid., pp. 33-38.

³John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, (New York: Praeger, 1960) p. 34.

strengthen the governments of Greece and Turkey. Along with the massive aid program, America was destined to become deeply involved in Greek affairs.⁴

Although the specific commitment covered only Greece and Turkey and was limited to economic aid and military equipment, the statements made in the address went much further. The "Truman Doctrine " was a commitment to all countries outside the communist sphere. The commitment was designed to stop communist expansionism throughout Europe and the Middle East.

When Dwight Griswald, head of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, arrived in Athens on July 15, 1947, he found the government in the hands of Rightist forces. The Rightists were using authoritarian-type tactics against the Leftist forces and the communist guerrillas. These tactics included the indiscriminate executions of political prisoners. It was not surprising that Griswald sought more democracy for Greece and urged a more liberal representation in the government. In order to accomplish this, Griswald embarked on a program to support liberal politicians. Since Griswald was controlling the money coming into Greece, his opinions were highly regarded. Consequently, American support helped bring the resignation of many Rightist officials, which eventually resulted in the integration of more liberal politicians into government posts. But Griswald also set a precedence for other Americans in Greece to follow.

Another example of involvement in Greek internal affairs was

⁴Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1970) p. 67.

the advice provided to the Greek military. General Henry Van Fleet assumed the duties of Chief, American Military Mission in Greece in February 1948. Since the communist forces were gaining more and more territory, and there was a perception in Washington the Greek Army was doing little to stop them, General Van Fleet was assigned the task of helping the Greek Army. By the spring of 1948 Van Fleet completed his plans; first, to clean up central Greece, and then attack other guerrilla strongholds in the outlying areas. Within thirty-five days, central Greece was restored to government control and operations had begun against communist strongholds in other areas.

Van Fleet's plans boosted the morale of the armed forces and made Greek commanders seek American military advice before embarking on other maneuvers. The Griswald and Van Fleet missions were only the beginnings of American influence in Greek national life. Washington worked out a number of reconstruction plans to help re-build the Greek economy. With this reconstruction came American advisors to oversee the fruits of the aid program.

Consequently, by the end of the Civil War, 1949, the United States had become the single greatest influence in Greek national life. There was no attempt by the Athens government or Washington to hide this. Cabinet members and army generals, political party leaders, and members of the business establishment all made reference to the American wishes or views in order to justify or account for their own actions or positions. This influence was to carry over to the international scene as well.⁵

⁵Ibid., pp. 69-80.

Setting the Stage

As Greece began to recover from nine years of war, the government began to focus its attention on the international scene. What it saw taking place was not a peaceful world developing, but rather one in which a country would have to choose sides. The cold war had begun between East and West and Greece, like so many other countries, would have to take up its obligations as a member in the world community. For Greece, the choice of which side to be on was not difficult. Since the United States was committed to Greece, Greece felt it should be committed to the United States. With this ideal and Greece's attempt to gain international recognition, the stage was set for Greece's accession into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Although the stage was set, the actual acceptance of Greece by NATO members took over three years. Discussions concerning Greece's entry into NATO began in 1949. The United States considered Greece and Turkey important to the overall defense of Europe. However, Britain and other European nations were not in agreement. Britain argued that Greece and Turkey should be considered part of a Middle East defense arrangement and not linked to the defense of Western Europe. In addition, other members of NATO, namely the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, argued that an extension of NATO would drag them into a war in the Mediterranean region in which they had little interest.

Although the disagreements between the United States and other NATO members came to a standstill, numerous world events were to play a major role in helping Greece and Turkey enter NATO. The first atomic test by the USSR and the invasion of South Korea by North Korea undoubtedly were events that helped soften the position of Great Britain.

Thus, during a meeting of NATO members in New York in September 1950, the delegates agreed to invite Greece and Turkey to participate in defense planning related to the Mediterranean. The United States, acting on behalf of the NATO council, extended an invitation to Greece and Turkey to participate in planning.

Although defense planning was the first step to inclusion into NATO, Greece and Turkey still had not become full-fledged members. Britain was still not totally convinced Greece should enter NATO. Then the crises in Iran and in the Middle East during the spring of 1951 and the active participation of Greek and Turkish units in the Korean War helped Britain make up its mind. By July 1951, the British agreed to fully support the inclusion of Greece and Turkey into NATO.

On September 20, 1951, the twelve members of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) met in Ottawa to confer on many issues. These issues included a progress report on the cold war, and a request from General Eisenhower for more authority and troops for NATO. But these were side issues. The conference centered its attention on the only subject it intended to decide - the proposal to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO.⁶ There were still objections from the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, specifically Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands. But with British support secured, the objections of the smaller countries did not prevail.⁷

⁶"Ottawa Significance: A Bigger, Costlier NATO," Time, (September 24, 1951): p. 27.

⁷Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, The Price of Freedom, (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1953) pp. 186-189.

The United States, very eager to establish Greece and Turkey in the military structure of the Alliance, immediately dispatched General Omar Bradley (Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff) to confer with Greece and Turkey.⁸

In Greece, the general satisfaction of the leaders and people over their admission prevailed, and they were ready to discuss entry into the Alliance. Greece promised General Bradley that it would fight with western countries to preserve its independence.⁹ In order to fight, Greece first had to be assimilated into the complex organization of NATO.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an elaborate system made up of civilian and military councils. Before focusing attention on Greece's specific mission and agreements with NATO, it is necessary to describe the Organization and its principle bodies.

Organizations and Missions

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an international body originally created to implement the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty was signed on April 4, 1949 and promotes "the stability and well-being of the countries in the North Atlantic area." Article 5 is the most important article of the treaty. It states:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America, shall be considered an attack against them all . . .

⁸"Harriman, Bradley to Speed Greek-Turkish Role in Pact," New York Times, 21 September 1951, sec. 1, p. 1.

⁹"Turks, Greeks in Pledge," New York Times, 9 October 1951, sec. 1, p. 3.

In addition to Article 5, the member nations agreed, in Article 9, to create bodies to implement provisions of the Treaty. It is these bodies which constitute the Organization as such within the strict meaning of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Council and Defense Planning Committee (DPC) are two of the policy-making bodies agreed to by the member nations. The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority of the Alliance, composed of civilian representatives of all member countries. Military policy is discussed in the DPC, consisting of major military representatives of those countries taking part in NATO's Integrated Military Command Structure. While the command structure is comprised of three major commands: Atlantic, Channel, and Europe, it is the European command which is given the greatest attention.

The European command, commonly referred to as Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), is separated into three sub-commands: Allied Forces North (AFNORTH), Allied Forces Central (AFCENT), and Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH). In each sub-command, member countries place their forces at the disposal of the commands in the event of war. These forces would be used to defend their national borders, or as an attacking force against aggressor nations.

Allied Forces South, commonly referred to as the southern flank of NATO, has two land force commands, one Air Force command, and a Naval command. Allied Land Force South is located in Italy; Allied Land Force Southeast is in Turkey. Fifth and Sixth Allied Tactical Air Forces located in Italy and Turkey, respectively, and Allied Naval Forces located in Italy are all made up of military forces from the countries of Italy, (Greece prior to 1974), Turkey the United Kingdom and the

United States.¹⁰

Greece committed the majority of its ground and air forces to the Alliance as did most of the NATO members. This included over 150,000 Army troops and 259 combat aircraft. In addition, all its naval forces, 72 fighting ships, would come under command of Allied Naval Forces in the event of war. However, Greece went a step further and agreed to establish a number of military installations on its soil. These installations have evolved into a complex defense structure which strengthened the strategic capabilities of the United States and NATO.

Currently, Greek facilities help guard the Aegean Sea approach to the Mediterranean, provide important communication links between NATO and the U.S. military forces, provide staging centers and supply depots for United States and NATO air and naval forces, and permit surveillance and monitoring of the activities of the Soviet Union's military forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Foremost among the major facilities utilized by U.S. military personnel in Greece is the Souda Bay complex on the northwest side of the island of Crete. Souda Bay is a major support center that houses fuel and ammunition used by the U.S. Navy as well as forces of NATO member states. Souda has fine port facilities and an anchorage large enough to accommodate the entire U.S. 6th Fleet. Besides serving as a supply center, the Souda Bay complex provides an excellent airfield, which is used for staging military reconnaissance operations by U.S. forces. Also associated with the Souda Bay complex is the NATO missile

¹⁰ Andre Beaufre, NATO and Europe, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1966) pp. 38-42.

firing range at nearby Namfi, where military training and testing exercises are conducted by U.S. forces and those of other NATO member states. Iraklion Air Station, located on the north central coast of Crete, supports air reconnaissance flights and air tanker refueling operations of U.S. military forces. Also associated with Iraklion is an electronic surveillance station manned by the U.S. Air Force Security Service, (USAFSS) - a component of the National Security Agency (NSA). This sophisticated listening post is charged with monitoring military activities of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean, and other activities of interest to U.S. military planners.

U.S. Military Personnel in Greece (1977)

Army	742
Air Force	2,206
Navy	415
Marine Corps	<u>12</u>
Total	3,375

On the Greek mainland, Hellenikon (Athenai) Air Base, located at Athens, is used as a headquarters and support installation for other United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) facilities in Greece. This base serves as a staging point for air transport operations of USAFE and as a support base for the U.S. Military Airlift Command (MAC). Electronic and photographic reconnaissance missions performed by U.S. C-130 aircraft are also deployed from this airbase. Five early-warning sites of the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment System (NADGE) are dispersed at strategic points throughout northern continental Greece for the purpose of monitoring military activity of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations.

A major military communications center which is part of global U.S. Defense Communications System (DCS) is located at Nea Makri, situated near Marathon Bay, 27 miles northeast of Athens. Nea Makri is tied into the Licola terminal of the U.S. military communications complex at Naples, Italy, and the Moron communications terminal in Spain. Kato Souli terminal, situated 7 miles northwest of Nea Makri, is linked with the U.S. 6th Fleet afloat, with the Lago di Patri terminal of the Naples communications complex, and with the Rota Naval Base in Spain. Mt. Pateras terminal, located roughly 300 miles north of Athens, serves to connect Greece with the Yamanlar terminal near Izmir, Turkey, on the Turkish west central coast. The Mt. Pateras terminal also interconnects a number of U.S. military communications terminals throughout northern and southern Greece.¹¹

All the installations on Greek territory are NATO affiliated and part of a link in the Mediterranean defense system. In addition, the ground and air forces provided by the Greek military enhance the overall posture of NATO in the region. If these installations were not available, the southern flank of NATO and U.S. defense interests in the eastern Mediterranean would be severely hindered.

Analysis

At this point, it is necessary, after examining the historical background of how the United States became involved in Greece, and the events that took place leading up to Greece's accession into NATO, to

¹¹"NATO and U.S. Security," Report of the Committee Delegation to NATO, submitted to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 25 May 1977, pp. 4-5.

further develop the reasons Greece entered NATO.

As stated previously, the United States' influence was felt throughout Greece by 1950. This influence was displayed in an overt manner and the Greeks themselves did little to hide the fact. But after the Civil War, Greece began to strengthen its government. It began to take its place in the international community. The Greek government at this point was attempting to lessen its dependence, or at least give the impression it was, on the United States. This attempt came in the form of NATO.

NATO participation for Greece was primarily an outgrowth of the entangling relationship between Greece and the United States dating back to 1947. The government in Athens desired membership in the Alliance for defensive needs, but also for psychological reasons. Greece, as a member of NATO, could soften its direct dependence on the United States and assume the appearance of an equal and sovereign member of the defensive club of the West. While membership for Greece was more psychological, NATO, specifically the United States, wanted Greece for material reasons.¹²

The geopolitical importance of Greece to NATO and the United States cannot stand alone. When looking at the Eastern Mediterranean region, Greece and Turkey are strategically interdependent. Therefore, when the United States considered recruiting additional countries for the Alliance, Greece and Turkey were considered together. This

¹²T. A. Couloumbis, J. A. Petropulos, H. J. Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics. An Historical Perspective, (New York, New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976) pp. 122-123.

interdependence has been recognized from ancient times.

The modern strategist, when considering Balkan-Mediterranean security, must realize the defense of Greece and the Greek islands is influenced by the defense of Turkey and the Turkish Straits. Conversely, the defense of Turkey and the Straits is dependent on the defense of Greece and its islands. If either Turkey or Greece would become a communist state, or even neutral, the other would be severely compromised.

Specifically, Greece provides control over the southern approaches to the Turkish Straits, air corridors to the eastern and central Mediterranean regions and shares with Italy control of the Adriatic at the Straits of Otranto. It also shares common borders with two non-Warsaw Pact communist states of Yugoslavia and Albania, the future of whose regimes is a major cause of anxiety, and Bulgaria, a Warsaw Pact state.¹³

Greece, NATO, and the United States by 1952 were all pleased with the integration of Greece into the Alliance. Greece was a faithful member of NATO and participated enthusiastically. However, situations change, and as instability in the Eastern Mediterranean developed, relations between Greece and its Atlantic partners eventually deteriorated.

¹³T. A. Couloumbis and J. O. Iatrides, eds. Greek-American Relations A Critical Review, (New York, New York: Pella Publishing Co. 1980), pp. 97-99.

CHAPTER II

GREECE AND NATO

THE CRISES YEARS 1952-1974

The period 1952-1974 brought about a change in relations between Greece, the United States, and NATO. When Greece entered the Alliance there was hope Greece would contribute significantly to the common defense of Western Europe. But events during the period would change that opinion.

Various critical situations in the Eastern Mediterranean along with internal upheaval in Greek politics helped bring an end to military involvement in NATO. The island of Cyprus, in the Eastern Mediterranean, was the main problem. It was the scene of many confrontations between Greece and Turkey. However, this was not the only problem. The events of April, 1967 in Greece, specifically the military coup, also strained relations between Greece and its allies. The ultimate result was the withdrawal of Greek military forces from NATO.

Cyprus

An understanding of the complexities involved in the Cyprus situation requires a familiarity with the historical background of the issue. The island of Cyprus has long been recognized as having both strategic and commercial value. The ownership of Cyprus passed, over a period of several centuries, from one ruler to another. However, the dominant powers that ruled Cyprus were not of the same extraction as

the people who inhabited the island.

For over 2,000 years the Greek Cypriots formed the vast majority of the island's population. In 1571, when the Ottoman Empire took control of the island, it had a population of 160,000 Greek Cypriots. After the Ottoman conquest, about 30,000 Turkish settlers were given land on the island. From time to time, Turkish population increased and for a brief period, the Turks outnumbered the Greeks. However, by 1821, 80% of the population was Greek. It has remained this way ever since.

In 1878 Great Britain, realizing the strategic importance of the island, took over administrative control from the crumbling Ottoman Empire. This administration lasted until 1914, when Britain annexed Cyprus after Turkey joined the Alliance of Central Powers. British sovereignty over the island was confirmed in 1923, by Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, to which Greece and Turkey were signatories. But this treaty would not bring stability to the island.

Throughout British rule, and for that matter during the many centuries that Cyprus was ruled by foreign dynasties, a vital element of continuity was evident among the majority of the island's population. The Greek language and Orthodox Christian religion manifested itself into a feeling of "Greekness." This feeling in modern times gave rise to a nationalist movement for union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis). Agitation in favor of enosis led to riots, which lasted from 1931 through 1933, and required Britain to declare a state of emergency on the island. However, the future world struggle overshadowed the nationalist movement, and enosis was laid aside. But the issue was not dead, and would cause international repercussions in future

years.¹⁴

First Crisis

By 1952, Greece had not only aligned itself with NATO, but was becoming involved in another alliance as well. The Balkan Defense Pact was a politico-military alliance which linked Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia against a common enemy, the Soviet Union. However, each country had different reasons for joining the Pact. Yugoslavia feared the Soviets and its satellites would attempt a takeover of its country and needed to ally itself with others to prevent this. Greece and Turkey, on the other hand, felt they were making a contribution to NATO by forming a distinct regional defense system, which included a communist country. While Greece was making enthusiastic attempts to firmly establish itself with the West, and contribute to its defense, the Cyprus issue was reaching a critical period that would have an opposite effect.¹⁵

On Cyprus the enosis movement was again gaining ground. A bishop in Cyprus was elected archbishop primate of Cyprus, with the title Makarios III, who soon became the recognized leader of the enosis movement. He requested a plebiscite on enosis; however, the British refused. The church conducted its own poll and it was determined that 95.7% of the population favored enosis. The British, because of strategic bases on the island, and concerned over losing them, would not

¹⁴ Charles Feley, The Struggle for Cyprus, (Stanford University: Hoover Institution 1969), pp. 10-15.

¹⁵ Couloumbis and Iatrides, eds. Greek American Relations, A Critical Review, pp. 155-156.

discuss a change in the political status of the island. At this point, other countries began voicing their opinion concerning the Cyprus issue.

Three NATO countries, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, although signatories to a mutual defense agreement, each had different views concerning the island of Cyprus. Great Britain argued that Cyprus was an internal affair and refused to discuss the matter. Greece, on the other hand, favored self-determination for the people and wanted the matter brought before the United Nations. Turkey initially wanted the British to continue control over the island, but failing this, wanted the island partitioned into Greek and Turkish sectors. Greece took the lead in the dispute, and sought to insert the issue in the General Assembly's agenda. However, as the United Nations deliberated over their agenda, other developments overshadowed the debates.

The British, increasingly concerned over the rift Cyprus was causing among the three NATO members, invited the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers to London in August 1955 to discuss the situation. Although the conference did not settle anything, it did bring a response from various elements.

The first response was from the Turkish people. Turkish mobs attacked the Greek communities in Istanbul and Ismir in September 1955. In addition, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States, sent a telegram to both Greece and Turkey. Both telegrams, worded identically, told each country to "mend their fences" and compromise their differences (over Cyprus) in the interest of allied solidarity. Both the attack and the telegram outraged the Greek people. But the worst outrage was yet to come.¹⁶

¹⁶T.A. Coulombis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences (New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966) pp. 95-96.

On September 21, 1955, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted against the inclusion of Cyprus on the agenda for the fall session. Five of the seven negative votes were cast by Greece's fellow NATO member nations: the United States, Britain, France, Norway, and Luxembourg. A Greek daily newspaper, Kathimerini, usually a conservative, pro-western daily, expressed in an editorial entitled "Shame," its utter disillusionment with the West. The editor advocated isolationism for Greece and a withdrawal from NATO because NATO members refused to support Greece.¹⁷

Although the events during summer and fall of 1955 caused the Greek people to condemn NATO, the Greek government was more prudent. The government still regarded the Alliance as a security shield against aggression. Therefore, the country swallowed its pride and decided to remain within NATO and fight for Cypriot objectives in spite of Turkish and British wishes.¹⁸

At the close of 1956 and the beginning of 1957, the concern in Greece was centered on the United Nations' handling of the Cypriot issue. Once more the Greeks were disappointed because this international body decided to have the matter resolved by referring it to the disputant parties for settlement. This was to be accomplished by direct negotiations. Britain, at this point, developed its "partnership plan" calling for a joint British-Greek-Turkish rule during a seven year cooling-off period, followed by a vote on the island's future. Greece flatly opposed this plan and wanted the matter resolved in the U.N.

¹⁷Ibid, p. 97.

¹⁸Ibid, p. 109.

By 1958 criticism of NATO, specifically Great Britain and Turkey, was at a fever pitch in Athens, and the government had to react. Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas stated "Greece could not sacrifice the interests of the Cypriotes for the sake of allied solidarity." These words were substantiated with deeds.¹⁹ On 14 July, Greece ordered the withdrawal of her contingent of military personnel stationed at Landsoutheast (NATO) Headquarters in Izmir, Turkey. This caused NATO officials to react.

NATO Secretary General Paul Heniri Spaak flew from his Paris headquarters to Athens and negotiated with the Greeks. He convinced the Greeks and all other disputants to agree to a NATO conference, and settle the embarrassing problem between NATO nations.²⁰ The conference that followed, between the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers, helped bring about a temporary solution.

Zurich-London Agreements

The Zurich-London Agreements of 1959 were a culmination of three meetings between officials of Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, and representatives of Cyprus. While this agreement was intended to settle the dispute, its rigid and complicated system of checks and balances, designed to protect the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, had a disastrous effect.

The conferences for the eventual compromise began in Washington with two of the disputants and ended in London with representatives of all the countries involved. Greek and Turkish foreign ministers met in

¹⁹Ibid, p. 128-129.

²⁰"Cyprus: In the Fateful Hours," Newsweek, (6 October, 1958): p. 39.

Washington in December 1958, and agreed to a compromise. Cyprus would become a republic. Both parties agreed not to push their causes of enosis or partition. This paved the way for a meeting in Zurich between Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis of Greece and Prime Minister Adrian Menderes of Turkey. They confirmed the agreement and departed for London to meet with the British Prime Minister and Archbishop Makarios, who represented the Cypriot people. At the London conference, Greece and Turkey agreed to the independent republic. Great Britain agreed only after insuring its bases were secure. Makarios was very hesitant because of the complicated constitution that would be needed. However, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers applied pressure on Makarios and he relented. By the end of the conference the complicated settlement was finalized and initialed by all parties.

Makarios was correct. The Zurich-London Agreements were complex. A Greek Cypriot was to be president and a Turkish Cypriot, vice-president. The vice-president would have veto power on foreign affairs, defense, security, and financial matters. In addition, a Treaty of Guarantee was established which gave Britain, Greece, and Turkey, the three protecting powers, the right to take joint or individual action in Cyprus in the event its independence was threatened and for the restoration of its constitution. This guarantee would be enforced by stationing British, Greek and Turkish forces on the island.

When Makarios returned to Cyprus he began to implement the agreement. The situation of a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, in this case Dr, Fazıl Küçük, proved to be unacceptable. There was an initial attempt by Makarios and Küçük to appear in agreement, however, as the new republic attempted to begin

governing itself, disputes began to materialize. Disputes over municipalities, tax laws, and a revised constitution led to a new outbreak of hostilities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.²¹

Second Crisis

Renewed fighting broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on December 21, 1963. Intermittent clashes caused Greece, Turkey and the international community to react. Initially, the various countries involved used diplomatic channels; however, as the situation deteriorated, stronger measures were taken.

Due to the differences of opinion between Greek and Turkish Cypriots concerning the new republic's constitution, clashes between the two communities continued. A barrage of visitors and messages flowed into Cyprus from all parts of the world. Representatives of the United States and Britain called on Makarios to express their concern over the situation. They appealed for moderation from both communities. The Greek government also urged Makarios to use his influence to stop the bloodshed, and the Turkish government appealed to the Turkish Cypriots to stop fighting. However, it was too late, and the situation escalated.

The British, Greek, and Turkish military forces became involved in the situation. On December 24, Turkish troops marched out of their compound and took up security positions around the city of Nicosia. The Greek troops also left their barracks. While the troops were in defensive positions, Turkish jet aircraft flew low over the island. The

²¹H. J. Psomiades, "The Cyprus Dispute," Current History Magazine 34 (May 1965): 274.

British, sensing the grave situation if NATO troops clashed, persuaded the Greek and Turkish governments to agree to a temporary mutual command of all forces. In addition, British forces were placed in between the Greek and Turkish forces to prevent a confrontation. The swift action by the British coupled with a visit by General Lyman Lemnitzer, the NATO Commander in Europe, to Athens and Ankara, averted a confrontation between two NATO members. By December 27, all sides agreed to a cease fire. This end of the hostilities did not last long.²²

While clashes on the island continued, hasty diplomatic efforts were being formulated in Washington and London. In January 1964 while Turkish jets were again flying over the island and the Greek Navy was put on alert, the United States prepared to send George Ball, Under Secretary of State, to negotiate with the Cypriot government. His proposal was to send a NATO peacekeeping force to the island. This force, initially composed of 1,200 men, with a follow-on of another 8,800 men, would help stabilize the island. Makarios rejected the proposal. The failure of Ball's mission was due to the mistrust Makarios had toward NATO. He felt since NATO relied so heavily on Turkey for its defense arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean, it would tend to favor Turkey's position on the issue. Makarios favored going to the United Nations but Britain was first in taking up the issue in New York. By March 4, the Security Council adopted a resolution to send a peacekeeping force to the island. These forces were in place by June 1964, but their attempt to part the combatants was to no avail and fighting continued.

²²Psomiades, "The Cyprus Dispute," p. 275.

After Ball completed his mission in Nicosia, he traveled to Greece to persuade George Papandreou, the Prime Minister, to come to Washington, D.C. When Papandreou arrived on June 24, President Lyndon B. Johnson told him he wanted an early settlement of the dispute between Greece and Turkey. He considered a Greek-Turkish War unacceptable and wanted Greece and Turkey to resolve their differences within NATO and not at the United Nations. He also wanted Papandreou to work closely with Dean Acheson, who was assigned the job of bringing the Greeks and Turks together to negotiate.

The Acheson plan called for enosis of Cyprus with Greece, a 30-50 year lease of a military base to the Turks, whose size would be approximately one-fifth of the island, two governments for the island, and a joint military command for Greece and Turkey on the island. Papandreou rejected the offer and told President Johnson; "In 1940 we were asked to surrender or face attack. The Greek nation said no to facism then. We regret deeply that in 1964 we must also say no to democratic America, for the choice you offer us is no different than that offered Greece by Mussolini."²³

When Papandreou returned to Greece, his son, Andreas, who had accompanied his father on the trip, leaked Johnson's requests and the outline of the Acheson Plan to the newspapers. Andreas then advocated an end to American interference in Greek affairs and a new foreign policy no longer subordinate to NATO. This caused a wave of anti-American/NATO sentiment in Greece. Meanwhile, the fighting on Cyprus continued.

²³ Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1970) pp. 131-135.

The most dangerous point in the Cyprus dispute came in early August, 1964. Turkish jets bombed Greek Cypriot forces. Greece declared that unless the Turkish attacks ended, they would assist Cyprus militarily. On August 11, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire. A mediator, Galo Plaza, was sent in and he made a report to the U.N. on his efforts in Cyprus. He concluded neither enosis nor partition of Cyprus would work and recommended a plan for majority rule and safeguards for the minority. For the time being the fighting subsided. The Greeks accepted his report but the Turks rejected it on the grounds that Plaza had exceeded his authority.

Third Crisis

The third crisis on the island was basically an extension of the previous situations. However, it centered around the period November-December 1967. Prior to this timeframe, a succession of governments ruled Greece which made negotiations even more complicated. The various governments sometimes differed in their views. They often interfered in Cyprus to the point of naming commanders to Cypriot military posts. This eventually led to a series of reactions by Turkey and involvement by the international community.

During the period 1965-1967 three different governments were caretakers of Greece. George Papandreou resigned his post due to various disagreements with the king. Next came Stephanos Stephanopoulos, and then John Paraskevopoulos. Both of these individuals wanted to resolve the Cyprus issue by implementing the Acheson plan. However, they were not successful. By 1967, the Greek people, and in particular

the military, were concerned about the direction the country was headed. To insure Greece would follow the correct path, a successful coup was conducted in April 1967. The "Colonels," as they were called, set about to resolve the Cyprus situation and steer the country in their own direction.²⁴

The Colonels caused a multitude of problems for themselves and Cyprus. The Zurich-London Agreements provided for a small contingent of Greek and Turkish forces on the island. This was to consist of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers. These forces could be reinforced if the government of Cyprus requested it. By 1963, with the approval of the Colonels, there were approximately 9,000 Greek forces on the island. Ankara had also increased the number of Turkish soldiers on the island. General George Grivas, a strong advocate of enosis, was put in command of Greek Cypriot and Greek forces by the dictatorship in Athens. In November, Grivas ordered patrols into the Turkish sector of the island. The Turkish Cypriots responded by firing on the patrols which violated their territory. At the end of the fighting, 26 Cypriots were left dead.²⁵

The Turkish Parliament responded to these clashes. First, they mobilized their armed forces. Then they presented the Greek Ambassador in Ankara with a series of demands; the immediate recall from Cyprus of General Grivas, withdrawal from the island of Greek soldiers back to 1964 levels, compensation for the Turkish Cypriot village that sustained the attack, and effective guarantees against any further assaults on Turkish Cypriot communities. To emphasize they wanted these demands

²⁴Ibid, pp. 138-140.

²⁵"Cyprus on the Brink," Newsweek 4 December 1967.

met, Turkey sent fighter-bombers to Cyprus. This was a reminder that Turkey, with bases only ten minutes away, could dominate the airspace over the island. The Greek government turned down these demands and war became imminent.

Alarmed by the clear possibility of war, the world community began to swing into action. United Nations Secretary General U Thant, appealing for restraint, dispatched Under Secretary Joe Rolz Bennet, a Guatemalan, to represent him in the region, and the Security Council held a night session to consider the dilemma. Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson suggested the U.N. force on Cyprus be immediately increased and given wider powers. NATO, fearing disintegration of the Alliance's southern flank, dispatched Secretary General Manlio Brasio to mediate the crisis. President Johnson also dispatched his own emissary, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance. The primary responsibilities of mediation fell on Vance.²⁶

After two weeks of shuttling between Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia, Vance persuaded all parties to come to an agreement. Ankara agreed to withdraw any additional forces from the island not provided for by the Zurich-London Agreements. Greece would also withdraw its extra forces and their commander, General Grivas, and compensate Turkish villages injured in the November clashes. The Cypriot government was obligated to grant the U.N. peacekeeping force greater powers to insure no further clashes occurred. Vance's efforts did prevent a bloodbath between two NATO members. However, an outcry arose from the Greek people against its own government, and that of the United States

²⁶"Cyprus," Newsweek 11 December 1967.

and NATO.²⁷ They felt NATO and the United States were forcing them to relent to Turkish demands.

The Junta

At this point, it is necessary to turn away from the events in Cyprus and focus on the internal developments of Greece during the period 1967-1973. As stated previously, between 1965-1967, Greece experienced frequent changes in government. This not only caused instability on the international scene, but also within Greece. The military coup that took place in 1967 was destined to cause another dispute between Greece and its allies. But the Alliance, taking into consideration the world situation, could not turn its back totally on the country. Therefore, the United States and NATO were torn between a policy of expediency or principal.

On April 21, 1967, a bloodless coup d'etat was staged by a group of rightist junior army officers under General Gregorios Spandidakis, Chief of the Army General Staff. The actual leaders were Brigadier General Stylianos Patakos, Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos, and Colonel George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos emerged as the real leader and spokesman for the military junta. Martial law was declared, the constitution was suspended, and strict censorship was enforced. Prominent political leaders, including George and Andreous Papandreou, were jailed and eventually exiled. The junta claimed they had saved Greece from communism. They felt the political upheaval in the country during the previous ten years was a clear indication that communism would become the new power in the government. To stop their country

²⁷"Cyprus," Newsweek, 18 December 1967.

from making the same mistake as others had, the generals took over.²⁸

The military coup in Greece, and the collapse of the democratic system in that country, inevitably caused a crisis of conscience in NATO countries. NATO was, after all, the product of an avowed desire to preserve and protect the democratic institutions in the member countries against possible encroachment and subversion by communist totalitarian forces. To have these same democratic institutions destroyed by non-communist forces was regarded by many as an equally unacceptable blow to NATO's objectives. To emphasize NATO displeasure with the new regime, military aid was cut off, aid supplied primarily by the United States.

Greece stayed under totalitarian rule for almost seven years. During that time there was much debate in the United States and NATO as to whether Greece should remain a NATO member (Greece had been forced out of the council of Europe and most EEC agreements with Greece were suspended). These debates, are summed up in a Foreign Relations sub-committee meeting held in the House of Representatives on July 12, 1971:

NATO, in particular the United States, could not lose sight of the fact that Greece is an important ally and has consistently honored its treaty obligations even though there were a number of changes in its government. Political differences aside, the United States and Greece have mutual security interests that cannot be lightly dismissed. The facilities afforded NATO and the United States are important for the western position in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time it is clearly recognized that the interests of the free world and of the Greek people would best be served if Greece were returned to a more normal political order.²⁹

To help achieve this goal the United States felt its influence

²⁸"Greece: Under the Knife," Newsweek, (25 April 1967): p. 34.

²⁹U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Greece and the Southern NATO Strategy, S. Rept. 1971, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1971.

in Greece could be used constructively. By maintaining its relationship with the new regime, and urging it, through continuous quiet exchanges, to fulfill its commitment to return the country to democratic norms the regime would be more receptive.

From the beginning, the new Greek regime indicated that it considered its authoritarian rule a temporary measure. In accordance with this measure the regime took a number of steps toward the establishment of institutions necessary to the foundation of democratic political order.

In 1968, a new constitution was drafted and submitted to plebiscite. The regime began in the following year to prepare the necessary institutional laws for its implementation. Many persons detained for political reasons were released, and restrictions on the travel of former politicians were relaxed. Press censorship was lifted and martial law abolished. Thus, through most of 1970 it appeared that a trend toward democratic norms was being established.

In the meantime, it was apparent that the partial suspension of military assistance from NATO and the United States to Greece (imposed after the coup) was weakening Greece's ability to meet its NATO obligations and lessening the credibility of the NATO Alliance. This erosion of Greece's position in the critical area of NATO's southern flank came sharply to the attention of the United States at the time of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. During the later crisis, the United States found it had to send previously embargoed heavy equipment to Greece. The United States stepped up its commitment and resumed sending equipment in November 1968. In addition, in 1973, during the Middle East Crisis, American

bases in Greece and Greek territorial and air space were used extensively.³⁰ Specifically, the United States Navy wanted to station an aircraft carrier near Athens. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, effectively pushed the plan through, even though there were opponents in the Congress. This plan was an indication to the Greek people that the United States supported the military dictatorship.³¹

The junta period caused the United States and NATO to choose between their desire to protect democracy (principal) and their need for Greece as an ally during crisis situations (expediency). Expediency eventually won. Although the United States placed an embargo on military equipment to Greece, world events required the embargo to be lifted. The arms shipments continued even after the crisis dissolved, and the stationing of U.S. naval vessels in Greece was an indication to the Greek people that the U.S. supported the regime. The promises of the military regime in Athens helped sway the opinions of the Americans. The Colonels instituted several measures that gave the impression democracy would return. But the junta was too slow. The Greek people reacted violently against the regime and against the institutions and governments supporting it. The loser in the junta affair was, of course, the United States and NATO. They lost the confidence of the Greek people because expediency overtook principal.

³⁰ Couloumbis, Peitropoulis, Psomiades, Interference in Greek Politics. p. 138.

³¹ Lawrence Stern, The Wrong Horse, (New York: Times Books, 1977) p. 71.

The Final Act

From 1967-1974, Greece remained a dictatorship. Although it had been condemned by the European community, with expulsion from the Council of Europe, and indirect pressure was constantly applied by the United States, the Greek government refused to give up its authority. However, the events of 1974 would change this. The military regime in Athens still believed in enosis and attempted to bring it about. But the reaction from Turkey was not considered by the dictators and brought about their downfall.

On July 15, 1974, the Greek Cypriot national guard, led by Greek officers and with the encouragement of the military junta governing Greece, launched a coup against the government in Nicosia. Although initially reported dead, Makarios escaped and fled abroad to appeal his cause. Nikos Sampson, a former guerrilla leader, assumed the presidency as tension between Greece and Turkey mounted.

Because of the coup and its right to intervene as outlined in the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey attacked the northern coast of Cyprus on July 20, thrusting inland to Nicosia. Three days later, Sampson resigned and was succeeded by Glafkos Clerides, the president of the House of Representatives. The foreign ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Britain agreed to a conference in Geneva. On July 30, they signed an agreement to consolidate the cease-fire accepted by the combatants on July 22.

But the fighting on Cyprus continued. The peace conference resumed in Geneva on August 8 to consider the island's political future, with representatives of both Cypriot communities. Within a week the conference collapsed as Greece rejected as excessive Turkey's demand that 35% of Cyprus be placed under Turkish Cypriot administration.

The Greek delegation had requested a recess of 48 hours but Turkey refused. A UN Security Council resolution (for the fourth time) called for a ceasefire. But Turkey, in a renewed offensive, divided the island from Lefka in the west through Nicosia to Famagusta in the east. By August 18, after pushing southward, Turkey controlled about 40% of Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriot leader, Vice President Rauf Denktash, now declared his willingness to form a provisional independent Turkish state on Cyprus if the Greeks continued to refuse to negotiate a peace settlement. Toward the end of August, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim traveled to Nicosia, where he met with Clerides and Denktash, together. Although the fighting subsided, communal animosities persisted.³²

Meanwhile, the Military junta in Greece, now headed by Phaidon Gizikis, was shaken by the events in Cyprus. On July 23, 1974, they called upon Greece's conservative and moderate politicians to form a government to rescue the situation. After conferring with the major junta opponents within the country, Gizikis called on Constantine Karamanlis, who had been in exile in Paris. Gizikis urged Karamanlis to come home and head the new government. When news of this reached the people of Athens, mass demonstrations of joy were staged, and when Karamanlis arrived, the population knew a democratic government was forthcoming. Although Karamanlis returned to a joyous welcome, there was one major problem that needed a solution if he was to remain in power.³³

³²Ibid., pp. 88-95.

³³The Washington Post, 24 July 1974.

With the collapse of the peace conference in Geneva on August 15, renewed advances by Turkey on Cyprus, and pressure from Andreas Papandreou, the left wing political leader of Greece, then in exile, Karamanlis decided to withdraw Greek forces from NATO. Greece's official statement was short and to the point:

Following the inability of the Atlantic Alliance to stop Turkey from creating a situation leading to a conflict between two allies, Prime Minister Constantine Karamanalis has ordered the withdrawal of Greece from NATO. Greece will remain a member of the alliance only on its political side.³⁴

Immediately following the Greek announcement of withdrawal, the North Atlantic Council met in emergency session on August 15, 1974, and ordered an urgent study of the defense capability of NATO's southern flank. The council urged Greece to reconsider withdrawal and at the same time expressed hope that the Greek action would be temporary. However, the Greek government stood its ground.³⁵

Reflections

An attempt to analyze the factors that caused Greece's withdrawal from NATO, while not an easy task, can be broken into two separate factors. First and foremost, the Cyprus issue. Second, the military junta.

Each crisis on Cyprus brought a renewed and stronger response from Greece. The 1952 crisis ended with a conservative daily newspaper, one which was usually pro-west, condemning the Western powers. Eventually, due to pressure from its people, the government was required to withdraw its forces from NATO headquarters in Turkey. The second crisis

³⁴The Washington Post, 14 August 1974.

³⁵New York Times, 14 August 1974.

in 1963, demonstrated a resolve by the Greek people to no longer subordinate themselves to NATO. This opinion was expressed by George Papandreou's statements to president Johnson during his visit to Washington, D.C. The crisis of 1967 brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. The only thing that prevented this was Athen's inability to project its forces to the island of Cyprus, and the Colonel's reluctance to arm the Greek people. The US/NATO traditional call for solidarity at any cost had little if any effect.

Although the United States and Europe condemned the junta and took specific actions against it, they did not convince the Greek people. Actions such as an arms embargo and expulsion from the Council of Europe were temporary measures. These measures could not be left in effect for long because the United States and NATO needed Greece. This was especially true during the period 1967-1974. In addition, the United States thought it more wise to attempt to bring about the restoration of democracy, not by cutting off supplies, but rather by using diplomatic pressure from within. However, the Greek people did not perceive the situation as the United States government did. Therefore, they condemned the United States for conspiring with the junta and keeping it in power; for seven long years, thereby, also condemning NATO.

The final act was the ultimate step Greece could take and still be protected from aggression. It withdrew its forces from the alliance because NATO, specifically the United States, could not prevent another NATO member from creating a crisis between two allies. Today the situation remains the same. Greece's forces are still out of the military structure of NATO.

CHAPTER III

THE CURRENT SITUATION

GREECE AND NATO 1975-1980

The purpose of this chapter is to deal with the current problems facing Greece and NATO. In order to accomplish this, four major areas have been selected which impact on Greece's return to NATO. The first area deals with foreign policy. The government of Greece, after a long period of dictatorship, has embarked on a new approach. Whether this approach leads it toward the Western powers, only time will tell. The second part of the chapter is an analysis of the various political parties in Greece. How each of these parties perceive the government should handle foreign policy matters is outlined in detail. The next section discusses problems between Greece and Turkey. How the most significant problem, Cyprus, had led to other disputes which could be just as damaging as the Cyprus controversy. The last portion examines what actions NATO has taken to re-integrate Greece into its integrated military command structure. An analysis of these major problem areas will lead to definitive conclusions as to the form of Greece's ultimate association within the Atlantic Alliance.

Foreign Policy of the New Democracy

To Karamanlis and his party, several foreign policy options emerged after the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The first option was continued dependence on the United States. The second option was one of a

primarily Western European orientation (for political, military, and economic affairs), thereby reducing dependence on the United States. A third option was neutralism and non-alignment while the last choice was a Warsaw Pact orientation. Karamanlis appears to have chosen the second option. However, if option number two does not prove satisfactory, he has left other alternatives open for Greece.

The cornerstone of Karamanlis' foreign policy has been "Greece belongs to the West," not only ideologically and historically, but also organizationally. He has steered Greece along the guidelines of Western Democracy since he returned to Greece in 1974. Karamanlis is attempting to erect a pyramid in Greece with the first side complete, the democratic side, and the second side, the economic one, underway with the signing of the treaty of accession into the European Economic Community. But the third side, the military side (Greece's reintegration into NATO), has not been completed yet. The military side will probably be the most difficult to erect.³⁶

Mr. Manolis Kothris, the president of the Parliamentary Committee on foreign affairs, believes that unless the military side of the pyramid is built, the pyramid may crumble. Mr. Karamanlis' opponents in Greece, the opposing political parties, could eventually succeed in "Finlandizing" Greece - removing it from Western Europe's mainstream and making it a docile southern neighbor of the Soviet Union.³⁷ While Mr. Karamanlis has attempted to align Greece with the West, he is also leaving other options open to Greece. If, as Mr. Kothris stated, the

³⁶International Herald Tribune, Paris, October 1978.

³⁷International Herald Tribune, Zurich, October, 1978.

pyramid crumbles, then the entire structure may fall. Therefore, the other choice Karamanlis has left open is a multidimensional foreign policy. This policy has improved relations with Greece's Balkan neighbors and, more importantly, established links with the Soviet Union.

Karamanlis established economic and cultural contacts with Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito paid a visit to Greece in May 1976. In October of that year, Greek Defense Minister Evangelos Averoff visited Belgrade. In April 1976, Romanian Defense Minister Ion Coman visited Greece and, in June, Yugoslavia's Defense Minister Nikola Ljubicic paid a visit to Athens. These visits, coupled with Karamanlis' willingness to open a dialogue with the Soviet Union have proven fruitful for the USSR.

From a dialogue to contacts in such fields as energy, transportation and military maneuvers, the Soviets began to improve relations with their new found friend in the Mediterranean. The USSR supplied technical and economic assistance to the Greek Public Power Corporation which constructs power stations in Greece. The Kremlin is also supplying Greece with over 100 trolley buses for the municipal transport systems in Athens. In addition, the Kremlin invited Greek officers to visit military maneuvers in Soviet Georgia and Armenia early in 1976. In return, Soviet military representatives observed the military exercise, code named "Phillipos 77," held in eastern Macedonia and Thrace in September 1977. Moscow felt more assured of its new found friend when, in the 1978 elections, socialist and communist parties in Greece gained a substantial voice in the Greek government.

The Soviets, hoping to expand on Karamanlis' change in attitude, invited Foreign Minister George Rallis to visit Moscow in

September 1978. This led to the signing of agreements improving cultural and scientific cooperation. In addition, Soviet and Greek consulates were established in Salonica and Odessa respectively. After Rallis' return to Athens, two Greek Navy destroyers sailed through the Turkish Straits to make a five-day visit at Odessa. In return, Soviet naval units visited Piraeus in the spring of 1979. Rallis' trip was a milestone in Greek-Soviet relations and prompted a visit by Karamanlis to the Soviet Union in October 1979.³⁸

Karamanlis is an adept diplomat. He has publicly stated he advocates Greece aligning itself with the free world. This has been emphasized by actions. Specifically, he has restored democracy to Greece, and built the foundation so that Greece can enter the EEC. But he has also learned from history. In the past, Greece relied heavily on the United States. This is no longer the case. Karamanlis projected Greece into the international arena in several directions; toward its Balkan neighbors, the Middle East, and eventually to the Russians. Karamanlis' plan has been effective.

Karmanlis has used his multidimensional foreign policy as a lever, both internationally and internally. By opening talks with communist nations, especially the Soviet Union, Karamanlis has demonstrated to the West the old days of a subservient Greece are gone. No longer will they be influenced by the wishes of western countries which do not suit the national interests of Greece. In addition, Karamanlis' dialogues with the communist nations have helped him against his

³⁸M. K. Leighton, "Greco-Turkish Friction: Changing Balance in the Eastern Mediterranean," Conflict Studies. 109 July 1979.

political opponents within Greece. The growing trend within Greece to throw their support to leftist political parties that are anti-NATO and anti-EEC, has caused a shift in policy in the government. Karamanlis is using the dialogues with the communists as political leverage against his opponents. He is demonstrating to the people of Greece that if one foreign policy option fails, then others are open to them.

However, Karamanlis' opponents have also voiced their opinions concerning his adept diplomatic maneuvers. Andreas Papandreou, the leader of PASOK (the main opposition party in Greece), maintains that Karamanlis is still pro-west and insists the only significance of the visit to Moscow was the visit itself which will have no long-term impact on Greek-Soviet relations. While Papandreou's assessment of the visit is most likely correct, Karamanlis is not foolish enough to close all of his options and will remain cordial to communist nations.³⁹

Other Political Forces in Greece

Karamanlis' New Democratic Party, in the elections of 1974, won an overwhelming majority. The elections of 1974 proved the people wanted a democratic government rather than a dictatorship. But the elections held in 1977 demonstrated a different trend.

The events of 1952-1974, specifically, the American involvement, the Cyprus dispute, and the dictatorship, had an impact on the voters in Greece. Attitudes toward the United States, NATO, and the Western nations were changing. This was demonstrated at the polls when a good percentage of the voters gave their support to two of the

³⁹Ibid.

political parties that advocate disassociation from the west. However, besides the anti-western parties, there are other political factions in Greece which have a voice in foreign policy decisions.

The party that benefited most from the 1977 election, at the expense of the center party, was PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) led by Andreas Papandreou. PASOK polled 25% of the vote, almost double its 1974 vote. This gave PASOK 93 seats in the Greek parliament. PASOK's platform advocates the transformation of Greece into a socialist state. It is opposed to the accession of Greece into the EEC and advocates complete withdrawal from NATO. In addition, Papandreou has taken a hard line against negotiations with Turkey. He feels the Cyprus question should be handled in the U.N. and the Aegean dispute is a ploy Turkey is using to increase tensions. Therefore, there is nothing to negotiate. There is no doubt Papandreou and his party are gaining ground, however, they are not the only anti-western parties in Greece making headway.⁴⁰

On the far left, the KKE (exterior), the communist party of Greece, running on an "anti-imperialist" platform, scored a success, winning 9.36% and 11 seats in Parliament. The KKE views itself as the vanguard of the working class - "waging a struggle against imperialism." The party adheres to the traditional Marxist-Leninist orientation and is strongly pro-Moscow. Therefore, it advocates the decoupling of Greece from the EEC and NATO. The party, led by Charilaos Florakis, has not taken a hard line against Turkey and advocates negotiations over the Aegean question, obviously in support of Soviet policy toward Turkey (Turkey receives a large amount of Soviet aid). While the KKE

⁴⁰Couloumbis, Iatrides, Greek American Relations, pp. 35-38.

(exterior) has strong Soviet ties, the other communist party in Greece is more European orientated.⁴¹

Five left-of-center parties combined forces in 1977 to form a leftist coalition. These parties, the most prominent being the KKE (interior), favor socialism for Greece and approve of Greece's membership in the EEC. However, they do not advocate Greece's re-integration into NATO. They have also avoided speaking out against Turkey and feel all disputes should be negotiated. This block of coalition parties only polled 9.4% of the vote in the 1974 elections and when compared to the center party in Greece which polled 20.4% of the vote, is not as powerful.⁴²

The EDIK's (Greek Democratic Center) foreign policy is similar to that of the New Democracy. It supports membership in the EEC, and a special relationship with NATO rather than the close ties Greece previously had with the Alliance. The EDIK wants to stay in NATO politically but form an independent defense separate from NATO. The party is willing to negotiate with Turkey (however, negotiations should not be prolonged). The party also advocates a speedy settlement of all disputes.⁴³

The last party, the National Array (EP) is the political element to the far right. They attained 6.8% of the vote during the last election. The EP is pro-West and wants to immediately re-integrate the country into NATO. Unlike PASOK, they advocate negotiations with

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 39-41.

⁴²Ibid., p. 41.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 38-39.

Turkey concerning all disputes; however, they favor a strong military force in case negotiations fail.⁴⁴

Since three of the political parties in Greece, the New Democracy, Greek Democratic Center and National Array, received over 60% of the votes, and their platforms advocate alignment with the West, we can conclude the majority of the Greek people favor a pro-Western position. On the other hand, the political parties that advocate a break from the West, PASOK and the KKE (exterior), received 34% of the vote. The remaining 6% of the voters are somewhere between alignment and non-alignment or have no opinion. Therefore, for the time being, the majority of the Greek people advocate aligning themselves with the West. But what about the future?

The elections of 1977 also reflected a trend of increasing popular support for PASOK and the KKE (exterior). Previously, in the 1974 elections these two parties combined had only polled 13% of the vote but in 1977 received 34% of the vote. While this trend does not mean the people in Greece want a realignment away from the West, it does represent disillusionment with the West. If this trend continues into the next election, Greece may very well follow option three and become neutral and non-aligned.

The Disputes Between Greece and Turkey

Although the Cyprus dispute has overshadowed all other disagreements between Greece and Turkey, there are related issues which have become as complex as the Cyprus question. The Aegean dispute is a

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 41.

composite problem concerning three separate but related issues: the exploitation of subsurface mineral rights in the Aegean area; the extent of territorial seas in the Aegean; and air space control over the eastern Aegean. Two other questions are intimately involved and must be considered in connection with the Aegean dispute: the remilitarization of the islands in the eastern Aegean; and the problem of minorities, specifically in Thrace and Istanbul.

The Cyprus dispute, which separates Greece and Turkey, can be traced back to the Ottoman rule over the island in the 16th century. However, the fate of the small island did not become an international issue until the 1950's. Since that time, after much bloodshed and negotiations, the island has become politically divided between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The guarantor powers of Britain, Greece, and Turkey have struggled to arrive at an acceptable constitutional formula clarifying the relationship between the two ethnic communities.⁴⁵ Out of the Cyprus dispute, a series of other questions have materialized which further divide Greece and Turkey.

The problem between Greece and Turkey over the exploration of subsurface mineral rights can be traced back to the Geneva Law of the Sea Conference held in 1958. The convention declared that the continental shelf and the sovereign rights of states therein will be the seabed adjacent to the coast, but outside territorial seas to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond, to a depth where exploitation is technically feasible. This convention was signed and is recognized by

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 29

Greece but not by Turkey. Its obvious advantages to an archipelagic state, such as Greece, has made Turkey put forward its own definition of the Aegean continental shelf as the natural prolongation of the Anatolian islands. Under this formula the Turkish continental shelf would extend to the west of the Greek islands adjacent to the Turkish coast.⁴⁶ Turkey's formula, coupled with other disputes concerning territorial seas and air space, would encourage Turkey to raise other questions in the future about the sovereignty of Greek territory, particularly its islands.

Although the territorial sea dispute is not as critical as the other disputes, in the future it may become as important. At present, both Greece and Turkey continue to observe the six-mile territorial sea limit adopted by maritime countries. The threatened dispute arises from the possibility that Greece and Turkey might follow most other states and extend their territorial waters to twelve miles. If Greece did this and Turkey followed suit, 64% of the Aegean would become Greek territorial waters with Turkey acquiring 10%. The remaining 26% would be considered the High Sea. However, all ships sailing westward from Turkey would be obliged to pass through Greek waters. Turkey considers that these circumstances would make it vulnerable to total enclosure and would have no access to the sea except through Greek waters. Consequently, Turkey has asserted it will oppose any move by Greece to

⁴⁶ Thomas J. McCormick, "The Aegean Sea Dispute, "Military Review, March 1976.

enlarge its territorial waters to twelve miles.⁴⁷

Control of the air space over the Aegean, as in most other parts of the world, is exercised through flight information regions (FIRs). These regions are established under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized international agency of the United Nations. Both Greece and Turkey are members of the ICAO. They both agreed that airspace over the Aegean would be controlled by the Athens FIR. However, in 1974, Turkey decided it should have control of all aircraft approaching Turkey at the Aegean median line. Turkey published NOTAM 741 (a notice to the ICAO for transmission to all air users) requiring all aircraft approaching Turkish airspace to report their position and flight plan on reaching the halfway point between Greece and Turkey. Greece refused to accept these instructions and issued its own NOTAM declaring Aegean air routes unsafe because of the threat of conflicting control orders.⁴⁸ As a result of the NOTAMs, international commercial flights over the disputed area have been discontinued. (The NOTAMs have recently been rescinded, however the problems with military aircraft remain.)

The exploration of subsurface mineral rights, territorial sea dispute and airspace question are all controversies which could spark a conflict between Greece and Turkey. However, two other disputes are also likely to lead to confrontation between the two countries. Militarization of the islands and the minority problem are potential high

⁴⁷Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," Adelphi Papers, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978) 155. pp. 12-13.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 15-16.

risk questions which could, given the almost cold war situation between Greece and Turkey, magnify themselves into a war.

The militarization of the islands in the east Aegean took place after the Turkish landings in Cyprus in 1974. The military status of these islands is defined in four separate international agreements. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, confirmed sovereignty by Greece and Turkey over islands in the Aegean. It also restricted military forces, fortifications and naval bases on the islands. At the same time the Lausanne Convention on the Straits in the Aegean were held. This convention established demilitarized areas and explicitly forbid fortifications, military forces or the use of any islands as bases of operations against another country in the Aegean. In 1936, the Montreux Convention, modified the Convention of Lausanne of 1923. It states Turkey may immediately remilitarize the zone of the straits to include the Bosphorous, Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara. The last document, the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1947, re-emphasized the demilitarization of the islands of the Aegean. However, all of these treaties have not prevented both Greece and Turkey from establishing military forces in the region. The Greeks have built up their forces on the islands, some of which are only a few miles from the Turkish coastline. In Turkey, the government has established the Turkish Fourth Army, better known as the Army of the Aegean, which has no ties to NATO as its other forces do. This militarization by Greece and Turkey creates a dangerous military confrontation which could lead to a war.⁴⁹

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 16-17.

The last problem that should be discussed is that of minorities. There is a Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul and a Muslim minority in Western Thrace. In 1934, there were approximately 110,000 Greek Orthodox Christians in Istanbul. However, due to taxes levied on them in 1942, riots in 1955, and the expulsion of Greek nationals in 1965, the population has been reduced to less than 10,000. In Western Thrace, Muslims number 130,000 compared to 105,000 in 1934. These Muslims complain of Greece's illegal practice of acquiring their land and discrimination by the government. Since both minorities have complaints about discrimination, any settlement will not only need to remove discrimination but also any suspicion of discrimination.⁵⁰

The Aegean and Cyprus questions could be considered technically separate. Greece does consider the issues separately, but Turkey has tended to link all issues together. However these issues are treated, the dominant issue is still Cyprus. If the Cyprus question can be resolved, then the other issues can also be resolved.

The current situation on the island is tense with two separate administrations involved in negotiations. The Turkish one is backed by a considerable military force (approximately 25,000 troops). The Greek administration is recognized internationally (except by Turkey) as the legal government of Cyprus. Progress toward a settlement of the dispute was made in February, 1977. In a meeting at Nicosia, Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, and U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim agreed to proceed with

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 17-18.

talks in Vienna. However, with the death of President Makarios the talks have broken down, and the United Nations is still attempting to find an equitable solution to the problem.⁵¹

While the island is still a crucial issue between Greece and Turkey the governments have, for the moment at least, resolved themselves to let the United Nations handle the dispute. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit of Turkey stated in an article in the New York Times on June 10, 1979:

The matter (Cyprus) is now taken up in its proper platform (United Nations) it is a historic fact whenever others become involved in problems between Greeks and Turks, they become more difficult to solve and sometimes even result in conflict.⁵²

Greece, specifically Karamanlis, has taken the same position and feels the United Nations should handle the Cyprus dispute.⁵³

Questions Concerning Greece and NATO

Since 1974 Greece has not been an active military member of NATO. As discussed previously, due to various political reasons, the government of Greece withdrew its forces from the integrated military command structure. However, with time, changes in attitudes come about, and Greece and NATO are attempting to reach an agreement for its re-entry into the Alliance. But certain questions come to mind related to military aspects of Greece's exit from NATO. First, what does Greece's loss mean to NATO's defense? Second, since Greece's attitude has

⁵¹Couloumbis and Iatrides, eds. Greek American Relations, A Critical Review, p. 124.

⁵²The New York Times, 10 July 1979.

⁵³International Herald Tribune, Paris, October 1979.

changed, what is NATO doing to re-integrate Greece into the Alliance? Third and most important, what will happen if Greece does not return to the Alliance?

Greece's exit from the Alliance blocked out several defense installations available to NATO. First and foremost was the link Greece provided in communications. Greek communication facilities linked Italy, Turkey, and Spain with the U.S. 6th Fleet afloat. This hampered operations until an alternate method was found. In addition, Greece refused to provide early warning information from its five NATO Air Defense Ground Environment System (NADGE) sites located throughout the country. This degraded NATO's ability to effectively observe aircraft approaching the Mediterranean area. While the communication links have been restored, the early warning systems are still not operational, and will not be provided until Greece's forces are re-integrated.⁵⁴

In addition to valuable defense installations, Greece also withdrew forces from the defense system. Over 200,000 ground troops and 300 combat aircraft were integrated into NATO. These forces were to be used for the defense of Greek territory, however, other contingency type operations could have been planned for their use. The withdrawal of military forces from NATO installations on Turkish soil, specifically from Allied Land Forces South East Europe (HQALFSE) and 6th Allied Tactical Air Force (6th ATAF) at Izmir, Turkey, which controlled all allied land and air forces in Greece and Turkey, hindered

⁵⁴Frederick Bonnart, "The Situation in Greece and Turkey." NATO's Fifteen Nations. December 1978 - January 1979.

planning for the ground defense of Greece and Turkey.

From a geopolitical standpoint, when Greece withdrew its forces, NATO had to reassess its defensive line. This line extended from the tip of Norway to the Caucasuses. The imaginary boundary would remain cohesive only as long as all present members in NATO adhered to it. In addition, the uncommitted position of Yugoslavia and semi-hostile one of Albania were not threatening while the straits of the Adriatic could be controlled by the allies, which meant firm links between three Southern members. Similarly, the control of the Dardanelles, the Turkish land mass, and the Eastern Mediterranean all depended on NATO solidarity. But with NATO no longer able to rely on Greece all areas had to be re-examined.⁵⁵

During the period 1974 through 1978, little was accomplished to re-integrate Greece into NATO's command structure. However during that time frame, Karamanlis decided it was time to re-establish the attitude that "Greece belongs to the West." Greece proposed a new command structure for the Aegean area. It proposed establishment of a new NATO headquarters at Larissa, Greece to take command of assigned Greek forces facing a possible Warsaw Pact threat from the North, plus the creation of a new allied tactical air force (7th ATAF) to incorporate the 28th (Greek) Tactical Air Force and provide the required air support. Greece wanted 7th ATAF to have operational responsibility for the whole of the Aegean.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization studied the Greek proposals and put them to a vote. All NATO decisions of this nature must

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 29.

be unanimous, and Turkey vetoed the proposal. Turkish representatives indicated that the Greek proposal would permit Greece to control the entire Aegean. Turkey felt it would be more operationally efficient to divide responsibility for the Aegean. Turkey declared it would welcome Greece's full reintegration but not on the terms specified by Greece.⁵⁶

The next move was up to NATO. General Alexander M. Haig, the Supreme Allied Commander, had a new set of proposals drafted. The new plan took the Turkish position into account and split control of the Aegean. However, it was Greece's turn to reject the proposals. A period of discussions followed with NATO attempting to conciliate. In addition, when Premier Karamanlis returned from a tour of Western Europe in November 1979, he had the distinct impression that the "Haig Plan" was being revised.⁵⁷

Currently, a new Supreme Allied Commander has taken over the job of negotiating Greece's reintegration into the Alliance. General Bernard Rogers, in an attempt to work out the problems, submitted new proposals to both Greece and Turkey. However, as of the writing of this document, neither side has made any official comment about the new proposal.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 32.

⁵⁷International Herald Tribune, 7 November 1979.

What Will the Future Bring?

An analysis of these major issues leads to the following conclusions. Premier Karamanlis and his New Democracy party want to align Greece with the West. They feel "Greece belongs to the West." In addition, over 60% of the voters in Greece cast their ballots for parties whose foreign policy advocated solidarity with Western nations. Therefore, we can conclude that the current government and the majority of voters in Greece are pro-West. Since this is the case, then it follows that at least a good majority of the voters in Greece would favor a return to some type of Western Alliance. But what about the next elections in Greece?

Karamanlis is over 70 years of age. The next elections are scheduled for 1981 and there is no apparent heir to the New Democratic Party. On the other hand, there is a political leader in Greece who has immense popularity. Andreas Papandreou, leader of PASOK, advocates an anti-NATO, anti-EEC platform for his party. In addition, his party and the KKE (exterior) almost doubled their percentage of votes in the 1977 elections. Therefore, given the age of Karamanlis, the popularity of Papandreou, and the growing popularity of PASOK and the KKE (exterior), we can conclude that by the next election Papandreou could be Prime Minister of Greece, or at the very least play an even more significant role in Greek politics. If this happens, then Greece will become neutral and non-aligned.

The majority of the Aegean disputes were made public after the Cyprus crisis. Therefore, these disputes are an extension of the animosities which persist between Greece and Turkey. If the Cyprus crisis can be settled, then the Aegean questions can be resolved.

With the United Nations working diligently toward a settlement and the current governments in Athens and Ankara resolved to letting the U.N. handle things, the Cyprus situation can be set aside for the time being. However, one of the Aegean disputes which could erupt in war is the question over militarization of the islands. With Greek and Turkish forces facing each other, only a few miles apart, eventually something will erupt. The United Nations, as an international body, should act to demilitarize the Aegean islands and edges of the land mass that borders these islands.

Finally, NATO must realize Greece and Turkey are equal. One nation without the other is of little use to their defensive scheme. Greece and its islands protect the Turkish flank. Turkey protects the Greek flank. Therefore, since each country complements the other, and both are needed for NATO's defense, NATO must insure equality. When attempting to resolve the reintegration problem one country should not be given priority. An example of this occurred when NATO submitted its proposal to Greece for its reintegration which favored Turkish objectives in the Aegean.

These conclusions have been based on historical analysis of the events surrounding Greece's reintegration and direct experience by the author. It is clear to me, after serving three years in Greece and traveling extensively in the Eastern Mediterranean, the effects of Greece pulling its forces out of NATO have been disastrous. Time is not on our side and if the problem is not resolved soon, Greece may pull out of NATO altogether.

CHAPTER IV

WHY IS GREECE IMPORTANT TO NATO?

After Greece withdrew its military forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, many political leaders in Europe and the United States asked the question; what is, or was, the role of Greece in NATO?

First and most important, the countries of Greece, Italy and Turkey previously provided a geographic cohesiveness for the southern flank of NATO. Planning for military operations was simplified because these three allies could move from one country to another and operate out of an unbroken string of bases. Greece provided the center link in this partnership and denial of this cohesiveness separates the other two countries into isolated fragments. This made military operations much more difficult and reduced the effectiveness of allied forces on the southern flank.

The solidarity of the southern flank is also important to stability in the area. The countries of Greece, Italy and Turkey serve to limit Soviet moves in the Balkan/Mediterranean region. If Greece were to completely disassociate itself from NATO, prospects for Soviet gains due to the psychological and political effects of this fragmentation would be enhanced, particularly among the nonaligned nations in the area, specifically Yugoslavia. The southern flank molded what would otherwise be an individual effort of geographically separated countries into a cohesive political and military interdependent force. With Greece's withdrawal of its military forces, this mold has been weakened.

Greece also has a common border with three communist countries. In this uncertain Balkan region, Greece provides strategic stability, which abridges Soviet strategic planning in the area. Specifically a Soviet move into Yugoslavia would have to take into account reaction from the Athens government which in turn would affect the resolve of Belgrade to resist Soviet encroachment. Also, if the Soviets were to invade Yugoslavia in an attempt to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea, it would also seek to reestablish itself in Albania. However, the Straits between Greece and Italy could deny the Soviets free movement into and out of this region.

If Greece were to turn its back on NATO, both Turkey and the United States Sixth Fleet would face a dilemma. The U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean would lose its flexibility. No ports east of Naples could substitute for the bases in Greece, which favor rapid response to the Dardenelles, as well as the Middle East and Israel. Important communication facilities on the mainland and supply bases on the island of Crete would have to relocate to the west because there are no available ports east of the island. No NATO Air Defense Ground Environment sites in Greece would signal impending air strikes on Italy, Turkey or the Sixth Fleet if war broke out with the Warsaw Pact. The Greek Air Force would be grounded, including its air defense Nike Hercules Missile capabilities. Turkey would be isolated from the nearest friendly land border by over 700 miles of rugged terrain. Communist thrusts from Bulgaria could assail the Straits without fear of a flank attack from Greece. A success would afford the Soviet Black Sea Fleet ready access to the Mediterranean, unimpeded by the Hellenic Navy or blocking forces on Greek islands.

Greek bases are a vital link in the defense of the Mediterranean. Hellenikon Air Base, near Athens, provides a land-based airfield which enables tankers to refuel aircraft in flight. This helps project aircraft into the politically unstable region of the Middle East. The communications facilities on the Greek mainland, at Nea Makri and Mount Pateras, link Italy, Turkey and the U.S. Sixth Fleet afloat into a cohesive communications system. Major facilities on Crete include Iraklion Air Station, located on the north central coast of the island, and the Souda Bay complex on the northwestern coast near Khonia. Both of these facilities provide storage and supply for the U.S. Sixth Fleet and a missile firing range for NATO units. All these facilities furnish NATO and the United States with valuable capabilities which would be difficult to replace. More important, in the event of a major conflict, these bases could be built up rapidly and used as staging areas.

Current NATO planning focuses most of its attention on Central Europe and a possible Soviet invasion through West Germany, at the expense of its southern and northern flanks.

In 1941, when Germany invaded Greece, Hitler's forces used two main axes of advance. The Soviets are probably contemplating these same routes of approach in the event of war in Europe and an attack on Greece became necessary. In their contingency plans, the Soviets surely have forces earmarked for such a thrust. Because Greece is a member of the Alliance, Warsaw Pact forces are committed against its borders.

If a war was to break out in Europe, the opposite of an invasion into Greece could be possible. Winston Churchill, during World War II, advocated an assault on fortified Europe by way of its "soft underbelly." Greece could be used to out flank the main thrust into Europe and pin

down Soviet forces. Supplemented by other forces, allied armies could attack the flank of the advancing columns. This could be the offensive capability needed in an otherwise purely defensive doctrine of the NATO Alliance.

Cohesiveness, strategic stability, base facilities, and military possibilities for the Greek forces all describe Greece's role in NATO. These factors when taken individually might not be viewed as important. However, when all of these elements are considered, Greece becomes very important to the Alliance.

Also, Greece's departure from the military structure signifies a more apparent danger. It appears the Alliance, after 30 years, is showing signs of political instability. In the past, there have always been disagreements between NATO members, but never have two countries in the Alliance come to the brink of war as Greece and Turkey have on numerous occasions. Therefore, solidarity must be re-established or this crisis in NATO could cause shock waves throughout the entire Western defensive system.

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