



**Rethinking US  
Security Policy  
for the 1980s**

The Seventh  
National Security  
Affairs Conference  
**1980 Proceedings**

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# BETHINKING US SECURITY POLICY FOR THE 1980s.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>President's Foreword</b>	
Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr. President, National Defense University .....	vii
<b>An Overview: Rethinking US Security Policy for the 1980s</b> .....	ix
 <b>Panel 1—Evolving Relations Between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China</b>	
Panel 1 Participants .....	3
Panel 1 Summary (Seyom Brown and George Kolt) .....	5
The Strategic Triangle: China, Russia, and the United States (Frederick H. Hartmann) .....	11
Sino-Soviet-American Relationships: Prospects for the 1980s (Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.) .....	21
Choice and Consequence in Sino-American Relations (Thomas W. Robinson) .....	37
 <b>Panel 2—The Western Alliance, Japan, and International Security Threats</b>	
Panel 2 Participants .....	57
Panel 2 Summary (Richard H. Ullman and Michael B. Hughes) .....	59
The Western Alliance, Japan, and International Security Threats (Jeffrey Record) .....	67
European Perspectives on Europe's Roles in the World: The Partial Partner (Edward A. Kolodziej) .....	87
 <b>Panel 3—Rethinking Essential Equivalence</b>	
Panel 3 Participants .....	125
Panel 3 Summary (William W. Kaufmann and Arnold Lee Tessmer) .....	127
Rethinking the Unthinkable: The Strategic Dilemmas of the 1980s (James L. Foster) .....	135
Strategic Stability Reconsidered (Colin S. Gray) .....	161

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<b>Panel 4—Emerging Security Issues in the “Arc of Crisis”</b>	
Panel 4 Participants .....	191
Panel 4 Summary (L. Dean Brown and Walter “R” Thomas) .....	193
The Arab States of the Gulf (John Duke Anthony) .....	201
Communicating in the Middle East (Thomas C. Barger) .....	229
Emerging Security Issues in the “Arc of Crisis” (Robert G. Neumann) .....	245
<b>Panel 5—Advanced Technology and US National Security Problems</b>	
Panel 5 Participants .....	259
Panel 5 Summary (Gordon O. Moe and James B. Motley) .....	261
Science, Technology, and the US-Soviet Competition (Barry J. Smernoff) .....	265
The Linkage Between Technology, Doctrine, and Weapons Innovation: Experimentation for Use (Arthur J. Alexander) .....	293
<b>Biographical Notes .....</b>	<b>309</b>
<b>Glossary of Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>333</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

### **Panel 2—The Western Alliance, Japan, and International Security Threats**

Table 1. Ratio of Trade (Imports and Exports) to GNP: EEC and the United States 1972 and 1978 (billions of current US dollars) .....	97
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### **Panel 5—Advanced Technology and US National Security Problems**

Table 1. Relative US/USSR Standing in the 20 Most Important Basic Technology Areas .....	266
Table 2. Relative US/USSR Technology Level in Deployed Military Systems .....	267

## PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD

Although we sometimes characterize entire decades of history by a single theme, real world events do not occur in neat, ten-year chapters. In national security affairs, policymakers of the early 1980s will confront lingering crises spawned in the late 1970s. Capping the decade was a series of events which, taken together, may signal an as yet undefined watershed in American national security.

We do not understand fully the implications of the normalization of relations with China, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the appearance of Islamic fundamentalism, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the hiatus in the progress of strategic arms negotiations. President Carter's State of the Union Address in January 1980 took note of these events in its somewhat unique emphasis on foreign affairs and their security implications. The National Defense University, through our National Security Affairs Institute, welcomed the opportunity to assist in "Rethinking US Security Policy for the 1980s," as we chose this theme for our Seventh Annual National Security Affairs Conference (NSAC).

Given such a broad mandate, it was important that the distinguished conference participants focus their discussions carefully. This they did, aided by the keynote address of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, whose remarks on important national security issues set the tone for the conference deliberations which followed. We all appreciated Secretary Brown's taking the time not only to share his perceptions with us, but also to respond to questions.

Our conference participants represented a broad spectrum of military and civilian government officials, able policymakers from previous administrations, respected scholars, and others from the private sector. These participants went from the Secretary's opening speech to their five working panels where discussion was focused by papers prepared beforehand by knowledgeable students of the issues. The two days of concentrated discussion produced limited consensus; rather, as we had hoped, an array of salient policy proposals emerged to assist policymakers as they address future choices. These results are presented in the overview and panel summaries which, along with the full texts of the stimulating discussion papers, follow in this publication. I am pleased to commend these 1980 NSAC Proceedings to all those who are concerned about the security of our Nation in the decade ahead.

I must express the gratitude of The National Defense University to the Honorable David E. McGiffert, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who again cosponsored our annual Conference. The staffs of

both organizations, working so well together and with our distinguished participants, also deserve our thanks. Finally, our panel chairmen, authors, and other participants must be recognized for their dedication to their assigned tasks, making it possible for us all to rethink US security policy for the 1980s.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'R. G. Gard, Jr.', written in a cursive style.

**R. G. GARD, JR.**  
**Lieutenant General, USA**  
**President**

## AN OVERVIEW: Rethinking US Security Policy for the 1980s

As the United States enters the 1980s, unforeseen events have altered the national security policy environment and dictated a reexamination of many important security policy areas. Clarity of perspective and an understanding of the issues and opportunities contained within these challenges are fundamentally important to the development of policy initiatives for the future. This Seventh Annual National Security Affairs Conference (NSAC) attempted to focus the attention of a select group of scholars, businessmen, decisionmakers, and observers on several key issues in order to articulate perspectives, sharpen understanding, and suggest policy alternatives.

Several factors have shaped the challenges of the early 1980s. Unfolding events in Iran and Afghanistan have been met by sometimes divergent US and allied responses. The United States is reconsidering its historic geographic priorities for force deployment and, with consideration of SALT II suspended, the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union is at question. In a quieter vein, US and Chinese relations have multiplied since the reemergence of China as a full participant in world politics and since the normalization of relations with the United States. Longer range challenges concern the potential of US technology to assist in meeting these shifting realities, and the US capability to improve the integration of its technologies, policies, and strategies.

Our conference participants divided into five separate working panels, each of which was asked to rethink a different national security challenge facing the United States in the eighties. The ultimate goal of each panel was to suggest a set of policy alternatives for consideration by officials and others concerned with US security policy. No panel produced fully coherent, unanimous policy prescriptions. What is presented in this Overview is a summary of majority viewpoints and significant minority perspectives. For a fuller exposition of these opinions, and for more details in general, the reader is referred to the panel summaries and the papers themselves. No written report can recreate the insights, lively discussions, and serious exchanges that prevailed in the two days of panel sessions. Nevertheless, we would be remiss in not attempting to share the insights provided by our distinguished chairmen, authors, and panelists. This *Proceedings*, then, represents our best effort to make the results of those two exciting days more generally available to the Nation.

### **PANEL 1. EVOLVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND CHINA**

The panel briefly examined the development of the US-Soviet-Chinese relationship and concluded that the triangle was not equilateral—that US

policy toward China was framed in large part for its effect on US-Soviet relations, whereas US policy toward the Soviet Union was not affected to any great degree by US-China policy considerations. Accepting the premise that this situation would continue, the panel felt that the big question for the 1980s was to what extent and how the United States should help the Chinese build up their power against the Soviet Union. There was considerable disagreement among the panelists as to whether building up China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union was necessary or desirable as a way of managing the US-Soviet balance, or of avoiding one-power or one-bloc dominance of Eastern Eurasia.

Discussion revolved around the various risks and benefits that would attend a US attempt to help China increase its power. In dealing with this question, the panel considered the following factors: the nature and future of the Sino-Soviet conflict; the effects of a *de facto* Sino-American alliance on the Soviet Union and on US maneuverability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; Chinese absorptive capacity; possible Chinese perceptions of massive US aid as an open-ended commitment; the congruence or divergence of US and Chinese interests in Asia; and the effects of Sino-American cooperation on other nations of the region. The panel generally thought that all these factors would make a US-Chinese alliance counterproductive. Additionally, the panel agreed that the Chinese connection could not substitute for US efforts to redress unfavorable power relationships in the strategic arena or in other regions of the world.

The overall thrust of the panel discussion was that the United States should continue to develop its relationship with China, but that this relationship could not be a panacea either to the United States or to China.

## **PANEL 2. THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, JAPAN, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS**

The extraordinarily broad mandate assigned Panel 2 covered the entire globe, challenging the members to reach the broadest and yet the most basic conclusions regarding US security interests and policies. While a comprehensive and forthright national energy policy designed to reduce US and allied vulnerability was considered absolutely essential, the panel did not address these problems in detail, since the energy issue has been the focus of extensive study by more expert groups.

Despite the vast resources and potential aggregate power of the Western alliance, divergence in policy and in action has remained the rule. The growing Soviet threat, Western economic woes, and lack of confidence in American leadership threaten to heighten tensions and diminish the possibility for coordinated actions. Yet lack of foreign confidence in American leadership is further exacerbated by our own awareness of American vulnerabilities, our own concern for a seeming American incompetence, and our own deflated self-confidence.

Against this rather gloomy background, the panel's approach to the Third World involved a rather schizophrenic viewpoint. While members generally recognized the existence of a greatly increased Soviet threat throughout the world, they also agreed that the primary threat to stability in the Third World was internal and based on indigenous factors.

A "division of labor" approach to international security holds a theoretical attraction, but differing threat perceptions, the lack of congruent interests, and hesitancy to forego sovereign prerogatives make such an undertaking highly improbable. Although European nations and Japan can and should be expected to increase their security efforts, it would appear unlikely, and perhaps even inadvisable, that any radical departure from existing roles will occur. The panel foresaw no likelihood of establishing allied force structures except in the Indian Ocean area, but did not recommend such endeavors.

The panel strongly encouraged greater recognition of regional powers, for example India, and their special interests in regional affairs. Although Afghanistan received special attention, panel members did not reach a consensus on specific policy measures. The panel agreed that Southeast Asian, Latin American, and African regions exemplify the thesis that the primary threat to international security and stability is internal and based on indigenous factors. Although the United States must be prepared to prevent Soviet exploitation of these woes, we also must recognize that military policies alone will not provide solutions.

Panel 2 members concluded that the United States should not attempt to undertake grand new initiatives or forge new alliances at this time. Instead, we should reinvigorate existing security arrangements through ongoing consultations. Crisis decisionmaking should remain ad hoc, and based on prior consultation.

It seems likely that the various Western security alliances will face even greater pressures toward divergence in the near future. The panel concluded that the United States must make a major effort to understand and diffuse contentious issues between alliance members, because in the absence of closer intra-alliance relations, it can expect very little of coordinated security efforts in the Third World. Finally, the panel generally concluded that US maintenance of its leadership role will be impossible without the reestablishment of more coherent foreign policy goals and a reputation for dependability in the international arena.

### **PANEL 3. RETHINKING ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE**

Panel 3 examined the political and military utility of "essential equivalence" in the context of where the United States now stands in the strategic deterrence equation—and found it wanting. This conclusion, once drawn, immediately called into question the viability of extended deterrence as well. It was understandable, therefore, that the group dwelt on approaches available for strengthening US strategic capabilities and, by extension, US deterrent posture. Since current arms control objectives impinge on many of these approaches, the panel also wrestled, albeit briefly, with the relationship of arms control objectives and force planning. Finally, the panel mused over the budget implications of the various options available for strengthening our deterrent posture.

With respect to the utility of essential equivalence, the panel concluded, with little dissent, that it is flawed both as a term and as a concept. That it is necessarily an ambiguous term because it attempts to explain an ambiguous measure of the strategic balance—one that allows offsetting

asymmetries—is perhaps understandable, but no less troublesome, when that ambiguity also invites misperceptions of the strategic balance. More troublesome, in any event, is the ambiguity of the concept as an operational definition or tool from which strategic force characteristics can be derived for acquisition planning. In short, the panel concluded that essential equivalence is not relevant to the issues of the 1980s.

Given strategic nuclear parity, whether measured in terms of perceived essential equivalence or not, there is cause for concern whether extended deterrence can continue to be maintained by the threat of US strategic retaliation. Panel members, most of whom shared this concern, explored a number of ways to strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence. The panel's sentiments lay with improving our defense posture—both strategic and conventional.

Sentiments notwithstanding, there was no clear consensus on what specific steps should be taken to improve our defense/deterrent posture. Some—probably the majority—thought that qualitative and quantitative improvement in strategic offense was the more effective option; others opted for substantial improvements in strategic defense. Each advocacy group delineated a number of programs thought to correct current deficiencies. Neither group would deny that conventional force capabilities needed to be strengthened in parallel, but here too there was no consensus on how much was needed.

With respect to arms control initiatives, the panel unanimously agreed that the process ought to move ahead. With few dissenting voices, the panel also agreed, however, that national strategic objectives ought to drive arms control objectives. The United States should not defer national strategic programs that might not be “needed” or that might “interfere” with agreements yet to be negotiated. Nor, in the name of arms control, should the United States tamper with strategic forces to render them more inspectable, countable, or verifiable.

Finally, a majority of the panel asserted that a credible strategic posture is affordable if 15 percent of a defense budget with some 3 percent annual real growth is dedicated to Program I strategic requirements.

#### **PANEL 4. EMERGING SECURITY ISSUES IN THE “ARC OF CRISIS”**

The members of this panel analyzed many of the issues that might affect relations between the United States and the nations of the Middle East or even, under extreme circumstances, lead to military confrontations between nations within the “Arc of Crisis.”

Although the current Arab-Israeli impasse was recognized as the paramount concern, other potentially explosive issues were addressed, including the apparent fear of Soviet expansionism in the Middle East, the possible manipulation of oil resources by Arab countries, and the probability that radical changes in governmental structures could threaten the independence of some Islamic nations.

Additionally, the panel members reviewed the internal problems that exist within many Middle East societies, such as religious differences, unemployment, urban violence, economic instability, and dynastic jeal-

ousies. These factors, while not all-encompassing, have security implications that will continue to influence US-Middle East relations, and which the United States also must consider when proposing cooperative programs or initiating diplomatic efforts throughout the region.

The panel members also agreed that the United States, in order to form closer ties with the independent countries of the Middle East, should pursue some innovative policies in concert with other nations, specifically because the territorial security of the Arab states is of prime concern to all nations of the free world.

### **PANEL 5. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND US NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS**

In its deliberations, Panel 5 analyzed the interaction between technology and US national security policy for the 1980s. An essential portion of this task was assessing technology's importance, trends, and future prospects. The focus of the discussions was directed to identifying and analyzing the process for applying technology effectively to meet national security requirements.

Three major types of technological activities—production, application, and distribution—were considered by the panel. In terms of supporting national security, the panel generally concluded that the production of technology constituted a less serious linkage problem than application and distribution. Thus, panel analyses and findings emphasized the latter.

In its analysis, the panel arrived at six major points which impacted on the interaction between technology and US national security for the 1980s. It was generally concluded that: US quality offset will not compensate for Soviet quantity; a need exists to proceed with a combination of quality/low-cost quantity technological developments; avoidance of USSR technological surprise will require US selective prioritization of potential high payoff technologies and exploitation of allied technology; a US process should be established to select among technologies for which US superiority is essential rather than discretionary; experimentation has the potential for being an important evaluation tool in the innovative technological process; and finally, expanded missions or charters should be established for operational test and evaluation organizations.

\* \* \* \* \*

At our NDU conferences, we impose a policy of nonattribution to insure candid, open exchanges; we thus make no attribution of positions to specific individuals. Similarly, nonattribution does not allow us to report the keynote address of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and the dinner remarks of Ambassador Gale McGee, other than to note the excellent reception which their timely comments received.

The panel summaries, although more comprehensive than the synopses presented above, are necessarily somewhat selective; while every effort was made to include points of view based on their merit and not necessarily their popularity, it is possible that a few minority viewpoints are not fully expressed.

Each of the following sections contains: the panel's specific charter; a

list of panel members and their affiliations; the full texts of the papers commissioned to frame the discussions; and a panel summary, authored by each chairman and his rapporteur. Finally, these *1980 Proceedings* conclude with some biographical sketches of our participants and a glossary of frequently used abbreviations.

**PANEL 1**  
**EVOLVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE**  
**UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION,**  
**AND CHINA**

**This panel addressed the shifts in relationships among the major powers in the 1980s. Significantly changed patterns of cooperation and competition may emerge as a consequence of the growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional force, Soviet willingness to use its growing power projection capabilities, the emerging role of China as a major actor in international affairs, and the increasing US effort to establish itself militarily in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The group reviewed the implications of increasing US cooperation with the People's Republic of China and the Chinese drive to preclude "hegemonism." This panel examined worldwide US-USSR-PRC relations, but generally avoided discussion of the strategic nuclear balance between the US and USSR, which was treated in a separate panel. The papers and discussions examined recent motives for and shifts in US policies and concluded with an examination of the implications of all aspects of this triangular relationship for US national security strategies, alliance relationships, and defense budgeting.**

## PANEL I PARTICIPANTS

**CHAIRMAN:** Dr. Seyom Brown, Brandeis University.

**RAPPORTEUR:** LTC George Kolt, USAF, National War College.

**AUTHORS:** Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc; Professor Fred Hartmann, Naval War College; Professor Thomas W. Robinson, National War College.

**PANELISTS:** Dr. A. Doak Barnett, Brookings Institution; Mr. Jacob D. Beam, Former US Ambassador to USSR; Ms. Priscilla A. Clapp, Department of State; Honorable Raymond L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution; Dr. Harry Harding, Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution; Dr. William Heaton, Central Intelligence Agency; CDR Steve F. Kime, USN, National War College; Mr. Gary L. Matthews, Department of State; Mr. Charles Neuhauser, Central Intelligence Agency; Mr. Nicholas Platt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia & Pacific Affairs; Mr. Dimitry Ponomareff, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning; Dr. Lucian W. Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Mr. David M. Shilling, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning; Dr. Dimitri K. Simes, The John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Mr. Roger Sullivan, National Security Council; Dr. Vladimir Petrov, George Washington University.

## **PANEL 1 SUMMARY**

### **Evolving Relations Between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China**

**Seyom Brown, Chairman**  
**George Kolt, Rapporteur**

The panel took as a point of departure the papers of Fred Hartmann, Thomas Robinson, and Robert Pfaltzgraff which complemented one other nicely. Hartmann demonstrated that one value of discussing the triangular relationship was that such a discussion broadened our scope beyond the artificially narrow bipolar perspective; Robinson reminded us that China is not an inert card, but an actor with a will of its own; Pfaltzgraff explored the steps which the United States might want to consider in order to retain the cooperation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and to enhance its value as a partner in the triangular relationship.

Stimulated by these papers, the panel concerned itself with developments in the triangular relationship that could affect US security interests. The panel sought to ascertain policies available to the United States to affect such triangular developments and to weigh the benefits, costs, and risks of the policy alternatives.

The panel paid particular attention to the ways in which developments now taking place or being considered by the United States and China might impact on the US-Soviet relationship. This bias in our discussion reflected the historical record in that the triangle has not been equilateral; rather, US policies toward China have been greatly influenced by their potential impact on the US-Soviet relationships, whereas US policies toward the Soviet Union have been but little affected by their potential impact on US-Chinese relations. The underlying issue that pervaded most of the discussion was: Is the US strategy still correct, or should the US-China relationship be allowed to develop primarily "on its merits," whatever that might mean? We never answered that question as such. However, the overall thrust of our discussion was clear in its implication that the basic bias of US policy in the triangular relationship is rooted in the facts of life—in power realities and fundamental US interests that will be with us for a long time. These power realities and fundamental US interests translate into the primary security objectives of (1) maintaining a global balance in military power against the Soviets, and (2) preventing one power or one bloc from dominating either the western or the eastern part of Eurasia.

The panel generally agreed that the big 1980s issue was not so much whether the United States should continue to regard US-China relations primarily as a function of US policy toward the Soviet Union (the behavior of the Soviet Union would remain, in any case, a dominant consideration,

## PANEL 1

although surely not the only consideration, in the conduct of US-China policy). The big issue, rather, that emerged from our discussion, is to what extent, and how, the United States should help the Chinese build up their power against the Soviet Union? It was not self-evident to the panel that a US policy of building up China as the main counterweight to the Soviet Union in Asia is necessary or desirable as a way of managing the US-Soviet balance or of avoiding one-power or one-bloc dominance of Eastern Eurasia.

The most intense debate revolved around that issue. On the one side were those who emphasized the risks of not helping China to build up its power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and the benefits to be gained from such assistance. On the other side were those who stressed the risks of a build-up of China by the United States and discounted the benefits to be gained from it. The differing evaluations of the general policy of building up Chinese power and of particular measures for attending to Chinese needs were based upon differing assessments of Chinese motivations and of the Sino-Soviet conflicts—its sources; its intensity and durability; and its future evolution as affected by US policies toward China and the Soviet Union. Most panelists recognized, of course, that to conclusively or definitively answer these questions would require a great deal of additional study.

There was considerable difference on the panel over the probabilities and consequences of:

- A major war developing between the Soviet Union and China;
- Sporadic border wars with high, almost constant, brink-of-war tension;
- Open political rivalry with normal tension and conflicts of interest, but no open warfare;
- A simple detente relationship (relaxation of tensions; some negotiations, perhaps, to resolve conflicts; coexistence without confrontation; and very little public polemics);
- A fullblown detente involving commerce, scientific, and cultural exchanges;
- The resumption of an entente, of at least a tacit political coalition generally supportive, at least in rhetoric, of each other's causes; or finally,
- The resumption of a military alliance premised on coordinated action against the capitalist powers.

None of these developments was ruled out as an impossibility, but as might be expected, most panel members projected a continuation of rather intense Sino-Soviet rivalry.

There were differing assessments on the extent to which US interests would be affected should the Sino-Soviet relationship undergo substantial change. The differences in assessments of US interests were most prominently revealed in panelists' responses to a set of proposals for enhancing Chinese military capacities to deter and withstand a major Soviet attack against China. The proposals, which were based upon suggestions in the paper by Pfaltzgraff, called for contingency discussions between the United States and China on plans for responding to various types of Soviet

## US, USSR, CHINESE RELATIONS

attacks. They also called for promises of major infusions of US weapons and logistical support, though not direct US military combat involvement, in the event of a Soviet large-scale conventional invasion of China. Finally, they called for current measures to insure the survivability or reduce the vulnerability of Chinese strategic nuclear forces so that at least they would not have to launch on warning. This would involve US assistance to the Chinese in command and control systems, hardening, and possibly launcher mobility or even ABMs. The objective would be to insure that the Chinese would have a survivable retaliatory capability to deter Soviet escalation of conventional conflict to the strategic nuclear level and would therefore avoid Soviet strategic intimidation.

The premise behind the set of proposals was *not* that such a military buildup of the PRC, including the assistance for its strategic arsenal, was the way to close the so-called "window of vulnerability" that the United States itself might have vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the near future. That, panel members agreed, would have to be addressed mainly by unilateral US efforts. China could not serve as a surrogate for filling gaps in the US military posture. Rather, the main premise behind this set of proposals was that such concerting with and help to China was required in order to reassure the Chinese who otherwise—through domestic regime change, or even calculation on the part of the current Chinese leadership—might attempt to enhance their security through rapprochement or realignment with the Soviet Union. Alternatively, without such help from the United States, and failing to achieve a reconciliation with the Soviet Union, China might be driven to act irrationally in crises—to preempt a Soviet strategic blow, or to bring about a large conflagration involving the United States.

These proposals and their rationale were challenged on a number of grounds: One objection was that if the intensive concerting with China and major help in building up their military capability would cross the threshold between keeping the Soviets anxious—a situation which probably does give us some leverage on Kremlin foreign policies—and stimulating Soviet fears that we are dedicated to organizing the world against them; it would confirm their encirclement hypotheses, especially since we would be allying with the most hostile enemy of the Soviet Union. The Soviets would see no alternative to an all-out, no-holds-barred power competition and arms race with the United States.

Another objection to militarily concerting with and aiding China was that it might well push Vietnam and possibly North Korea into a more total dependence upon the Soviet Union. This in turn would stimulate even further polarization of Asia and therefore a greater Soviet role than would otherwise be the case.

Still another objection was that making China a primary US military partner in Asia would not be acceptable to Japan, Indonesia, and others in the area. Related to this concern was a more general hypothesis that such a policy would make the United States hostage to the Chinese in Asia, where China's interests are not always congruent with US interests even though they temporarily parallel on containing Soviet influence in Asia. We may eventually rediscover a need to contain Chinese hegemonial aspirations.

## PANEL 1

Indeed, the implication, it was alleged, of going in this direction would be to reverse the current defect of US policy of holding US China policy hostage to the US-Soviet relationship; now the US-Soviet relationship—and indeed, much of US global policy—would be made hostage to the US-China relationship.

Another set of objections to the proposal for building up the Chinese military potential was that the Chinese absorptive capacity was limited. Help to the Chinese along the lines being discussed would probably not be able to truly reduce China's strategic vulnerability unless the United States were to transfer very sophisticated military technologies to China in quantity. And if a sufficient Chinese buildup were to prove infeasible, because of either US domestic opposition or the lack of Chinese absorptive capacity, this could create new frustrations in China; and the result could be the very dangers that the policy was originally designed to avert.

China, it was also argued, will not in any event allow the degree of coordination with the United States that these policies assume. The Chinese will not allow anyone else to exercise any control over what they regard as their necessary independence in the use of their own military capabilities. And yet, they will expect the United States to honor its implied strong commitment to Chinese security should China get into a conflict over its head.

Most members of the panel did not feel that the uncertainties and risks associated with proposals for heavy US-China military collaboration warranted the problematical benefits. If a major military buildup of China would not really be necessary or sufficient to close the window of vulnerability, if the "China card" hand has been largely played out anyway, then why rush to close the Soviet-Chinese military gap?

The centrist position in the panel held that basic systemic forces in both societies, as well as in the world at large, worked against any fundamental change in the Sino-Soviet relationship; that even the gap between China and the Soviet Union is not such as would really tempt actions by the Soviets against the Chinese, which would be irrational from the Soviet point of view; and that the Chinese would also not act in a self-defeating or imprudent manner.

The notion was frequently voiced that the United States had less leverage on the Sino-Soviet relationship than was assumed in recent US policy. There was a solid consensus, however, against a reversal in the basic policy of normalization of US-China relations, including US disengagement from a politico-military role in Taiwan's defense, for such a reversal would perhaps provoke the Chinese into seeking a reconciliation with the Russians. Neither was there any enthusiasm on the panel for handing Taiwan over to China on a silver platter (like a Beijing duck), for not only was this unnecessary, but paradoxically it could convey to China further evidence of US weakness and thus engender greater Chinese *disrespect* for the United States.

The discussion was pervaded by a concern, at times made explicit, that the switch over the last 15 years from a preoccupation with the harm China could do US interests to the ways in which the China connection

## US, USSR, CHINESE RELATIONS

could rectify our deficiencies in the global balance of power was perpetuating illusions. These illusions divert us from the crucial but more mundane tasks in Asia of managing our growing difficulties with the Japanese and sustaining cooperative relationships with Indonesia, India, and other states in the area. Also, the fixation on the "China card" as a compensation for a generally weak hand vis-a-vis the Soviets in the Persian Gulf area or other regions is being increasingly seen as just that—an indication of impotence in other aspects of power and a lack of diplomatic resourcefulness.

**PANEL 1 PAPER:  
The Strategic Triangle:  
China, Russia, and the United States**

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Analyzing the relations between China, Russia and the United States has one enormous and initial merit: It moves the discussion out of the sterile, bilateral confines so typical of Cold War thought. At the height of the containment doctrine we grew accustomed to having the world neatly categorized into the "Free World" and the "Communist bloc." China and Russia, simply because they "shared" communism, were grouped together on one side, the "democracies" on the other. This oversimplification did a good deal of damage to reality, as we now certainly appreciate. But its neat bilateralism was merely one aspect of a whole system of thought that was highly popular in the United States for many years after World War II. One of its first intellectual expressions was the suggestion that we were now living in a "bipolar" world. Although that notion contained some elements of truth, especially if viewed in purely military terms, it was even in those terms a severe distortion, since it was initially applied to American nuclear power versus Soviet conventional forces—certainly not a parity situation. And the idea was promulgated and popularized at a time when most other major powers either were reeling from the effort of World War II, or were confronting occupation as a result of a lost war, or were preoccupied (like China) with civil struggle. In short, the transient postwar situation was elevated to a permanency it did not deserve.

Even at its best, the bipolar approach suffered from obvious defects, especially by tending to identify military potential with political policy; a tendency continued into later years in other forms, as we shall see. It was as though nations would resort to war as a *consequence* of an adequate arsenal; as though that were the main or even sole thing.

Much of what was advanced as strategic thinking immersed itself in a similar bilateral context, especially the new deterrence theory which focused attention on signaling and psychological interaction. Although a desirable exploration per se, there was not much regard for the thought that we live in a world in which two nations confronting one another necessarily leave flanks and rear in great jeopardy (since the world is round). Nor was there much regard for the thought that different cultures foster different interpretations of the meaning of events. Deterrence theory encouraged a bilateral focus; it encouraged thinking in frontal confrontation terms; and it encouraged thinking in accultural categories. It was far too mechanical and

## PANEL 1

simplistic, but it was an excellent intellectual companion piece for the "bilateral world" which was its political counterpart.

These contributions to political and military theory were predominantly American insights. Although usually advanced in the conviction that they were universal truths, they were even better guides to how Americans saw relationships. "Two scorpions in a bottle" was ultimately of most value not as a description of strategic reality but as a clue to American perceptions of how international relations worked.

A very striking feature of the American approach was the valuation it placed on the unifying effect of an ideology and the supposed ability of a common ideology to override divergent (or opposed?) national interests. Indeed, the prevailing assumption was that a common ideology ruled out divergent or opposed interests—an assumption orthodox Communist theory hastened to encourage. Little attention was paid to Stalin's remark about the Chinese "margarine Communists." Views about Sino-Soviet relations in the United States tended to assume a generally friendly long-term relationship, an assumption that had little historical validity to support it. This attitude was encouraged by the Korean war, in which American troops faced Chinese troops in combat; it was made thereafter into a self-fulfilling prophecy by reciprocal American-Chinese acts of hostility. Even after the public exchange of venomous notes which marked the very public phase of the Sino-Soviet split, the US Government at least persisted in viewing the "Communist bloc" as an enemy: unrelenting and homogeneous. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 18 February 1966, said:

We are in Vietnam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live. . . .

This is the problem as it looks to us. Nor do the Communists themselves see the problem in isolation. They see the struggle in South Vietnam as part of a larger design for the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat.<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, the very idea of the United States mounting a significant military effort on the southeastern flank of China could only be justified by some such set of assumptions which would have to include, high on the list, a unitary and aggressive Communist movement, plus the domino theory. If China instead were visualized *not* to have automatic alignment with Moscow's policies, then the involvement in Vietnam had to be considered from an entirely different viewpoint. Shorn of the dialectics of the domino theory, it would be most difficult to field and sustain an argument that Vietnam as Vietnam was worth much American effort, particularly if it in any degree *restrained* China from harassing Russia.

Almost everyone is prepared to nod at this point today. But few were prepared to nod to it when Rusk spoke. How shall we see it then? That China and Russia were firm friends and allies but changed at some point? Or that their "friendship" was superimposed over a fairly antagonistic

## THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

relationship extending back before Borodin and even before communism? The facts remain the same whatever the perception; only the belief about the facts alters. A really dispassionate appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations would have to stress the wariness and uneasiness which permeated them.

Before proceeding further, let us sum up the main observations to this point. First, we have called attention to the theoretical tilt in favor of bilateralism, both in terms of general international relations theory and in terms of nuclear strategic theory. Both tended to discourage thoughts that the world was round and that it would take a triangular or even a pentagonal figure to describe it. The very structure our thinking gave the world we were observing obscured the more complex reality of interplay (actual or potential) among three or more powers. To state it starkly, implicitly or explicitly, the view was being advanced that *third parties do not count* in a nuclear age, particularly if their armaments do not measure up to the dimensions of the lesser of the bilateral antagonists. Second, as a corollary of the first, it was being argued that comparative piles of weapons in effect determined (or at least, strongly influenced) the lines of policy.

From the vantage point of the history of international relations theory, these were highly novel viewpoints which in many important respects contradicted earlier "wisdom." It made hash, for example, of the idea of the "balancer" of the balance of power by assuming that a weaker third party could play no meaningful role. A lot of it even did away (theoretically) with the balance of power itself, replacing it with a bipolar balance of terror. These "improvements" were justified by the notion that we had entered a new dimension of international politics through the achievement of weapons of unprecedented destructive power. That the weapons were such was obvious; that it did away with past history and experience was far less obvious.

If one believes that third parties do not count and if one of the three believes in addition that a common ideology guarantees the unity of the other two, then the possibilities implicit in the more complicated multilateral world are automatically discounted or ignored.

Albert Einstein once said:

Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious, he may form some picture of a mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations.<sup>2</sup>

On another occasion, Einstein said "No collection of empirical facts, however inclusive, can ever lead to the setting up of . . . complicated equations. A theory can be tested by experience, but there is no way from experience to the setting up of a theory." In short, we bring the relationships we observe to the facts we are observing. Karl von Clausewitz, speaking from

## PANEL 1

the wisdom of quite a different discipline, argued exactly the same point. He said:

There is, on the whole, nothing more important in life than to find out exactly the point of view from which things must be regarded and judged . . . for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity from one standpoint.<sup>3</sup>

## SOVIET POLICY CONSIDERED

It emerges that there is not just a triangular relationship between China and Russia and the United States to be observed. There is, even more critical than those facts—whatever they may be—our perception of those facts.

It is here that great differences immediately surface, particularly about the Soviet Union. The fact is that in December 1979, Soviet forces crossed the border in force into Afghanistan. George Kennan, looking at that fact, emphasizes the defensive aspect of that action. Edward Teller, looking at the same fact, speaks of the Soviet flanking movement toward Middle East oil. This is only the latest in a continuing series of events widely given incompatible or noncongruent explanations. Henry Kissinger's view of detente could not be reconciled with Elmo Zumwalt's view, for instance. Reaching way back, Henry Wallace's view of Russia could not be reconciled with Harry Truman's. Ambassador Davies' final dispatch from Moscow, proudly reprinted in his *Mission to Moscow*, describes a Soviet policy which neither Dean Acheson nor John Foster Dulles could have recognized as resembling reality even remotely.

The argument will no doubt continue through the 1980s as in the past, particularly if observers continue trying to decide the question either in the *attitudinal* terms especially beloved by American conservatives ("What are they up to?") or in the *moral-tactical* terms especially beloved by revisionist historians ("Whose fault is it?"). A much more useful approach instead would be to ask questions of a fundamentally strategic nature, such as: How well are the Soviets coping with their foreign policy and military problems? Have they paid excessively for their achievements? Have they on balance improved their situation?

Let us begin with the last of the three questions. To pick a date for comparison purposes, suppose we choose 1945: the end of World War II. What was Russia's situation? After immense human and material losses, her armies were in occupation of Warsaw, Bucharest, Prague, Vienna, and Berlin. Her two most serious enemies—Germany and Japan—were devastated and disarmed. All the enormous territories stripped from Russia at the end of World War I were regained, and all but Finland directly reincorporated into the Soviet Union. In addition, Soviet armies were in occupation of substantial areas in Eastern Europe which historically had sheltered hostile regimes or offered convenient jumping-off places for invasion. That advanced position included undisputed German territory which Russia was eventually to convert into a barbed-wired puppet state. Possession of these areas was not an unmixed blessing, since periodically the people stirred in

## THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

unrest and tried for their liberty from Soviet rule. Such revolts or risings happened in Berlin and Germany in 1953, in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This problem has never been solved by the Russians, and we shall return to it. The point for the moment is that the Soviets at least controlled the western approaches in a way which gave them considerable satisfaction.

On the Asian frontier the picture was, if anything, even better. Participating in the last few days of war against Japan, Russia was able to take control of North Korea and achieve concessions in Manchuria, and to receive back Southern Sakhalin, while her old enemy, Japan, lay humbled and disarmed and her immediate neighbor, China, continued to be engrossed in internal dissension and civil war. This combination was already a free gift of tranquillity in the tenuously connected Aisan provinces of Russia. But, as an unearned but heartily welcomed dividend, the United States and China were soon to be absorbed into an increasingly hostile stance which settled into a semihabitual mold as it continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and into the 1970s. This free gift was further adorned after 1965 with the commitment by the United States of most of its ready forces off China's flanks, thus ensuring the Soviets an unprecedented and undeserved freedom of action. (In Henry Kissinger's generally hard-headed memoirs there is the odd and persistent reiteration of his belief that the Soviets could be induced to bring pressure on their Communist "allies" to make peace—a peace that would automatically have undermined the "unearned increment" in this Soviet position.)

To the south, where the Moslem and non-Russian populations not only predominate but where, in many cases, the people share similar cultures with neighbors directly across the frontiers, peace prevailed. That is to say, from a Soviet viewpoint no real threat existed on the horizon. India and Pakistan effectively neutralized each other. CENTO and SEATO, while not precisely laughing matters from a Soviet viewpoint, were close to it. Only an anti-Communist optimist like John Foster Dulles would probably have thought it even worth trying to organize this area for "Free World" purposes. There was no virulent Moslem movement. The only real emotional flashpoint was the Israeli issue and the only really volatile leader was Abdul Nasser. He and Egypt and his issue were far enough from Soviet frontiers to allow the Soviets to pile up gunpowder in the area without real fear that the explosion would likely damage Russia. With America tied down in appearance to merely supporting Israel and tied down in fact in Vietnam, the opportunity to meddle was irresistible.

In 1955, Khrushchev, in his usually innovative way,<sup>4</sup> broke out from the conventional Soviet habit of aiding Communists to aiding those (like Nasser) who had prospects of effectively annoying the United States. This policy, continued by his successors, led to involvement with Cuba, ultimately to Angola, ultimately to Somalia against Ethiopia—and then Ethiopia against Somalia. By that time, Sadat was expelling the Soviet "advisers" from Egypt. These efforts, usually put together in Western analyses under the rubric of "turning NATO's flank," could also be seen as evidence that the Soviets were having difficulty solving the age-old riddle which confronts every power capable of exporting arms or troops or aiding allies outside its own territories: where to draw the line of involvement. In any event,

## PANEL 1

for a very long time while the United States remained tied down in Vietnam, such adventures abroad were not too risky, and, at worst, represented wasted resources if they did not pay off. Despite having to back down in the Cuban missile crisis and despite continuing unrest in the satellites, the expansive policy of Khrushchev seemed to pay good dividends with limited risks and bearable costs. Nearer at home, German rearmament remained limited, Japanese rearmament modest, and Chinese freedom severely circumscribed.

That situation continued essentially unchanged so long as the United States was unable to regain its strategic mobility (i. e., remained tied down or bogged down in Vietnam). In principle, however, the "free ride" ended for the Soviets in March 1968, when President Johnson announced that he would not be a candidate for reelection and the United States was no longer intent on winning a military victory in Vietnam. The incidents on the Ussuri River followed in March 1969—a fairly clear sign that the Chinese, now that the Americans in principle were withdrawing from their southern flank, were resuming a certain freedom in their behavior toward the Soviets. What was symbolically stated here was underlined concretely by the secret Kissinger visit to Peking in July 1971, which in due course was followed by President Nixon's visit for a summit meeting in February 1972. The "China card" was being played.

The Soviets had no great range of effective response to this move. After all, the US policy toward China (and vice versa) was, although understandable (i. e., we can trace how it happened), at the same time unnatural (i. e., it cost both China and the United States far too much curtailment of freedom of choice without conferring obvious substantial benefits). Nonetheless, the Soviets did try a "friendship treaty" with India as an initial gambit. But, as a response, it did not come near balancing the impact of the Sino-American move. It is highly probable that, if the Soviets had had plans for tapering off their on-going military buildup, these plans were jettisoned at that time. After all, national security has at least two essential components which in principle are complementary: the military and the political; and what the political component cannot provide, the military component must, if security is not to be degraded.

The simple truth which confronted the Soviets was that many opportunities for meddling in the Third World still existed, but nothing of great strategic impact. "Turning NATO's flank," however attractive as a slogan or even accomplished in fact in outlying areas, could not relieve the growing pressure along significant portions of the Soviet frontiers. While the pressure in Asia increased, Soviet concern on the European side could hardly diminish. After all, the *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt, although it culminated in an ostensible acceptance of German frontiers, also extended West German economic and political influence into Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. A new East German Embassy permitted in London was more than offset by a new West German Embassy in Warsaw. Progress in extending Soviet influence into Angola or maintaining it in Cuba hardly compensated. When Sadat required the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Egypt and the Soviets switched sides from aiding Somalia against Ethiopia to aiding Ethiopia against Somalia, the negative aspects of these ventures were substantially revealed. What did it really profit the Soviets to indulge in these

## THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

adventures? How, from a very hard-headed point of view, did it relieve the pressures along the Soviet periphery—pressures necessarily more important to Soviet security?

It is not difficult to imagine that the sequence of events just recorded may have sparked some version of a Soviet equivalent to the debate over the US involvement in Vietnam: whether the Soviets were not throwing good money after bad in areas of little strategic significance to the Soviet Union while multiplying troubles, much closer to home, were minimized or ignored.

Finally, of course, came the upsurge of Moslem emotionalism in Iran and the development of a dangerous situation (for the Soviets) in Afghanistan. If the debate over priorities between exerting influence at a distance and exerting influence close at home did not occur in Russia before those events, it strains credulity to imagine that such a debate did not finally occur at this point.

What is suggested here is that the Soviet Union, like any great power capable of exporting forces, is not immune from that fundamental and vexing problem of where to deploy and where to draw the line of commitments. It is suggested that the Soviets have been experiencing a degradation in the security of their frontier areas in the sense that Eastern Europe is not really pacified, the Chinese frontier is far from quiet, and now the Southern frontier has come alive with serious potential problems. The fact that the Ayatollah's government in Iran has caused gratuitous strains in relations with the United States (particularly in reference to the hostage issue) need not obscure the other fact that a militant Moslem movement across Russia's southern borders constitutes a serious potential threat to the Soviet Union. It is Soviet concern over these developments, plus the problem of accepting a public loss of face if the Soviets permitted Marxist influence in Afghanistan to be terminated, which probably explains the principal (although not sole) reason for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That occupation attempt by the Soviets hardly puts them on a direct route to control of Persian Gulf oil, and as the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out on television, Afghanistan is not militarily as good a jumping-off point for a Soviet invasion of Iran as is Russia itself.

In short, although it would be quite unwarranted to write-off the Soviet move on Afghanistan as of no concern to the United States, it is hardly likely that it is the prelude to a military move against Persian Gulf oil. It does dramatize the weakness of the US military position in the area, but it probably demonstrates even more the Soviet sense of insecurity. After all, even the Israeli issue has shrunk (with progress in Egyptian-Israeli peace efforts) to much less of an item to be exploited to counterbalance the Soviet problems already mentioned along the Soviet southern frontiers—where many, many Soviet Moslem citizens live.

Summing up, it is difficult to make a convincing case for the proposition that the Soviets are, on balance, improving the political component of their national security—especially in the frontier areas. As a consequence, they have put strenuous efforts into the military component—more than the United States—and have been pulling ahead there. Does the potential advantage for the Soviets in the arms area outweigh the weaknesses on the

## PANEL 1

political side? Probably not. But, again, as Einstein and Clausewitz insist, it depends upon one's point of view—in this case, in particular, it depends to a great extent on how important one thinks third parties are (like China).

On balance, if Russia were an open democratic society, one would expect their parliamentary halls to ring with charges of waste and mismanagement, as well as bad judgement. At great cost the Soviets have achieved very little by their meddlings in far-away places. At the same time, that they have troops deployed on German, Japanese, and Chinese-claimed territories continues to play havoc with their hopes for tranquility in nearby areas.

Jules Jusserand, the witty French Ambassador to the United States before World War I, once said that the United States was highly fortunate in its location and neighbors—a weak neighbor to the north, a weak neighbor to the south, fish and water on the east and west. A United States in that position, assured of safe frontiers, is even in danger of downgrading how a nation—like the Soviet Union—feels to be in a different situation.

## CHINA'S SITUATION CONSIDERED

China's situation and choices provide less fuel for argument, although the idea that the Sino-Soviet split is temporary (or a ruse) is not entirely dead among American conservatives.

One of the best parts of Kissinger's memoirs is his discussion of the style and approach of Soviet as compared to Chinese leaders during the Nixon summit meetings in Peking and Moscow. Kissinger brings out the roughness, the rawness, the brashness of Soviet leaders bragging about their power and contrasts it with the subtle Chinese approach.

China is a nation whose civilization stems unbroken for thousands of years back in history and whose sense of proportion and time and change is fundamentally different from that of the "newly arrived" Soviet Union. Indeed, newly arrived in more than one sense, for the "unequal treaties" imposed on the Chinese by the Russians when they arrived in Asia in a significant way only date back to 1858 and 1860—a small moment in time for the Chinese. It is not difficult to imagine that the Chinese can believe that some day that frontier will probably change again—as it has effectively so many times in Chinese history—and to their advantage.

It is always possible that the "common" bond of communism may reassert itself and prevail over such cultural and territorial considerations. But one must look full in the face the fact that Chinese communism was largely an agrarian movement when it succeeded in grasping power because there were very few industrial workers in China at the time. The Chinese movement, after the Communist failures at Shanghai, simply took an entirely different direction of development. Even then, the age-old Chinese cultural characteristics almost pushed the development into more pragmatic paths, as Mao in his final years wrestled to restore the old sense of mission and sacrifice to the movement. Mao, of course, lost, partly because he died. A more pragmatic generation has moved to the leadership. What can it gain for China by better relations with the Soviet Union compared with what can be gained through better relations with the West? Very little. The Soviets, after the fundamental anxiety they have developed

## THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

about China, are not at all likely to help China modernize and industrialize, least of all in any field with national defense associations.

The ill-considered Soviet retention of a couple of small Japanese islands just north of Hokkaido continues to be a public guarantee of bad Soviet-Japanese relations. The Japanese alliance with the United States continues strong; but if it should ever be replaced, the natural alternative for the Japanese could hardly be the Soviet Union for all kinds of reasons. China would be a more likely bet. Also, the strong economic community of interest beginning to link China and Japan should not be discounted. To express the point succinctly: China does not have to take seriously into account a resurgent nationalistic and imperialistic turn in Japanese policy in the near future. China's "rear" is now as tranquil as formerly it was active and unreliable because of US policy. Far from the maddening lack of maneuverability China formerly had, with equal or serious threats simultaneously at the front and rear and flanks ("surrounded" by the superpowers), China now enjoys breathing room. Why would China voluntarily change this advantageous condition?

Nixon in his memoirs records Brezhnev's anxious questioning as to American intentions in the wake of the "China card": whether America intended to make a mutual defense treaty with China. This event is very unlikely to occur, most of all because it is not really needed to meet the needs of either China or the United States in their triangular relationship with the Soviet Union.

The prognosis, therefore, is for more of the same in the 1980s, rather than any spectacular change or *volté-face*.

## THE US POLICY FRAMEWORK

Life is, of course, uncertain, therefore any generalizations and speculations about what has not already happened are always hazardous. The United States itself is an element in the equation, and the United States has by no means demonstrated an aptitude for continuous pragmatism in foreign policy. The Nixon-Kissinger years gave way to new emphasis on human rights and a new administration whose foreign policy has been criticized by many as lacking a well-thought-out conceptual basis. A new election is in the offing, one in which only secondary foreign policy issues are being discussed (for however tragic the impasse with Iran over the hostages, the issue is hardly fundamental or vital or even permanent). It is noticeable that in the rhetoric emerging from the State Department in the last several years the primary position of human rights at the top of the list of concerns or goals has eroded. Security is now usually at the top and human rights at the bottom—a reaction to Soviet moves. But whether there is any significant conceptual tightening behind that shift is not known. So long as the American people or government periodically venture into the complicated morass of international politics clothed in the thin garments of moral abstractions, the future remains uncertain.

In a more theoretical sense, even though the United States, through the playing of the "China card," has shown an awareness that the world is really round (that there are flanks and rear, that third parties influence

## PANEL 1

bilateral relations), the thrust of strategic thinking remains rather bilaterally oriented. It is more influenced still by the bilaterally focused psychological precepts of deterrence than by the multilateral geographical and spatial implications of location. United States threat analysis, with its rather secondary treatment of "intentions" and its complete disregard of what might properly be called "circumstances" (opponent flanks and rear), ends up stressing what is left—which is frontal "capability." And capability analysis always ends up being an essentially bilateral comparison. That is not in and of itself incorrect as a focus. The point is simply that the continued popularity of bilateralism in both deterrence theory and threat analysis, coupled with the pursuit of open-ended goals like human rights, does not lead to the conclusion that pragmatism in policy and an appraisal which looks at the world as round will necessarily prevail. In a word, the United States is at present enjoying the natural fruits of a multilateral and triangular relationship with Russia and China without an articulated body of academic and official theory understood and supported by Americans generally.

In that sense the present situation is fragile. That means should the situation develop adversely from the standpoint of American interests, it would more likely be because of an American lack of comprehension as to how to play the game than because of any great change in the objective situation of the three players.

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke's speech to the National Council on US-China Trade may or may not have shown some change in this respect. He remarked (June 1980) that "while strategic factors remain a central consideration in our relationship, the famous triangular diplomacy of the early 1970s *is no longer* an adequate conceptual framework in which to view relations with China." (Italics added.) It never was. His other remark that "we will develop our relations with China on their own merits," if taken literally, will lead to the same problems any bilateral approach faces. If, alternately, we are to construe it as a statement of posture designed to allow more flexibility in US policy, one can answer: yes, good.

### ENDNOTES: THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE: CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE UNITED STATES

1. US, *Department of State Bulletin*, 7 March 1966.
2. Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1950), p. 33.
3. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Modern Library, 1943), p. 596.
4. There is the arms aid to Indonesia even earlier, of course. But that seems a more or less isolated case.

**PANEL 1 PAPER:  
Sino-Soviet-American Relationships:  
Prospects for the 1980s**

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For almost a decade it has been fashionable in the United States to view relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union in a triangular framework. As the deep split between Moscow and Beijing evolved from polemics to the armed border incidents of 1969, American policymakers saw the possibility of a Sino-American relationship that would contribute to global stability. Both China and the United States sought normalization as a means of countering the growth of Soviet power. For the United States, normalization with the PRC supposedly would contribute to the detente relationship by inducing Moscow to evolve with the United States a better relationship than the Soviet Union could develop with China and by enabling the United States to maintain with both the Soviet Union and China a better relationship than either could maintain with the other. American policymakers did not publicly refer to the "opening to China" as an anti-Soviet move; however, the American impetus toward a new relationship with China coincided both with the manifest growth of Soviet strategic military capabilities and evidence of Moscow's commitment to the expansion of its influence around the world.<sup>1</sup> For the United States, China represented an actor of growing importance in a changing international system whose principal characteristic supposedly was the replacement of a bipolar structure by several major power centers. In such a system knowledgeable national security analysts in the United States assumed that American power could be replaced by various surrogates, allies, and friends whose interests were largely parallel with those of the United States. In this respect, the global conception set forth in the United States coincided with the predilections of official and unofficial elites. The principal task of this group was to develop a framework for foreign policy commensurate with the reduced means or willingness of Americans to maintain the global commitments that had been borne by the United States for more than a generation after World War II.

By the mid-1970s, it had become evident that the Soviet Union, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, would constitute the world's leading "imperial" power—as suggested by then Secretary of State Kissinger.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union was recognized to be a state with global interests and a propensity for seeking to extract political advantage by virtue of the possession of vast military power. The immediate implications of President Nixon's historic visit to the People's Republic of China seemed to be bene-

## PANEL 1

ficial to the United States. In early May 1972, the United States had escalated the Vietnam War by mining and bombing North Vietnamese ports containing Soviet arms shipments and shipping. By the end of May 1972, the United States had concluded the SALT I accords with the Soviet Union. Those who had criticized the Nixon administration for jeopardizing its relationship with Moscow by stepped-up military action in Vietnam seemed to have been proven wrong. It is impossible to know what would have been the outcome of the SALT I negotiations and the May 1972 Summit Conference in Moscow, which was the capstone of the detente relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, had there been no US opening to China: nevertheless these events followed President Nixon's visit to China and the commitment of both sides to eventual full normalization.

In retrospect, the Soviet interest in the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Systems, together with the other accords symbolizing detente in the early 1970s, occurred at the same time that Moscow was engaged in a vast strategic military build-up. The SALT agreements codified what was then termed "strategic parity" between the superpowers. In turn, this became the basis for the growth in strategic military forces accomplished by the Soviet Union since the early 1970s. Well before the end of the decade, Soviet behavior seemed little affected by the broadening and deepening relationship between China and the United States. By the late 1970s the momentum of Soviet policy had developed to such an extent that the United States could not threaten credibly to play a "China card" as a means of restraining the Soviet Union. Although the comparison of military force levels is dependent on a series of static indicators (numbers of forces and their quality) and dynamic measures (interactive scenarios in which they are used), the Soviet Union seemed to have evolved a capability against which the United States, even if aligned with China, was no match in regions of increasingly vital importance to the United States and its allies, such as the Persian Gulf. In short, the Soviet Union appeared to be acting largely without regard for the Sino-American relationship, and it can be argued that the accords of the 1972 Summit Conference, and especially the SALT I agreements, provided an effective framework not only for the codification of the then existing strategic military capabilities of the superpowers, but also for the Soviet quest for strategic-military superiority and thus for a Soviet capacity to pursue its objectives even if the United States normalized its relations with China.

### THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

Such considerations form the basis for an assessment of Sino-American relations in the 1980s. The Sino-American relationship exists within a global system which has had one enduring characteristic found in a classical balance of power, namely, a tendency among threatened actors to unite against a would-be hegemonistic power. Implicit in American diplomacy of the early 1970s was the notion that a series of emergent power centers—China, Japan, and Western Europe, in addition to the United States—could be called into being not only to reduce the burden borne by the United States, but also to serve as a countervailing coalition in the event of continued growth of Soviet capabilities and aspirations. Although designed initially to enhance the prospects for detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, the strengthening of the Sino-American relationship coin-

## SINO-SOVIET-US RELATIONS

cided with the deterioration in relations between Washington and Moscow, and thus the failure of the American detente policy, brought about by the heightened propensity of the Soviet Union to take risks in support of its foreign policy objectives as its military capabilities increased. By the end of the decade the United States and the PRC not only had completed their diplomatic normalization, but also had initiated a large number of other contacts and exchanges. These included American agreement in principle to sell certain defensive technologies to China and a growing Chinese interest in an alliance or, as stated in Beijing, a united front encompassing the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and China against the Soviet Union.

From the early 1970s, the American approach to relations with Beijing and Moscow, respectively, had been transformed from a framework based upon equilibrium or equidistance, to one providing for *de facto* alignment, but not alliance, with China against the Soviet Union. By 1980, the extent of an American alignment with the PRC against the Soviet Union remained undecided; however, the scope of that relationship would be determined in the future, as historically it had been in the case of other states in the international system, by the perceived dangers emanating from the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, together with Moscow's apparent efforts to exacerbate tensions in the "arc of crisis" with potentially disruptive effects upon the supply of oil to the United States and its industrialized allies, provided the basis for the unfolding Sino-American relationship of the early 1980s.

An examination of the Sino-American relationship in the 1980s encompasses also an assessment of diadic relations set within the triadic context of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, or the extent to which relationships between one pair of actors will affect, or be affected by, changes in relationships between the other pairs of states. Because of fundamental asymmetries between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, it is difficult to offer generalizations about the effects of such changes. Nevertheless, it is possible to assert that a reconciliation between Beijing and Moscow would have profoundly destabilizing consequences because it would augment the already vast military power of the Soviet Union by freeing Moscow of the specter of a two-front war. An important restraint on the Soviet Union as an expansionist power would have been removed. In contrast, it would be impossible for the United States to make massive arms transfers to Beijing to influence Soviet behavior in the perceived "window of vulnerability" that is said to be opening during the first half of this decade. If the American capacity to "play the China card" against the Soviet Union was of limited significance in the 1970s, its relevance in the early 1980s is diminished by the disparities between the superpowers in military capabilities that have been the object of growing US concern. Even if the United States were prepared to devote a large percentage of its defense budget to arms transfers to the PRC, little could be accomplished in the years immediately ahead, assuming that we were in agreement as to precisely the types of military technologies that should be made available. Much the same can be said for the United States own military capabilities because of the lead times involved even in the development of those "quick fixes" defined as being possible within a 1000-day period.

## PANEL 1

Although China will not provide—and does not wish to furnish—a surrogate for the United States in East Asia or elsewhere, the period ahead is likely to be one of increasing contact and even the development of deepening parallel interests between Beijing and Washington. Strategically, China is of great importance to the United States and Western Europe because approximately one quarter of Soviet ground forces are earmarked for, or actually deployed along, the Sino-Soviet frontier. Without China, the Soviet Union would be able to redeploy its capabilities for potential use against NATO or in the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere. It is estimated that approximately one-fourth of the Soviet SS-20 force (now said to number approximately 200 with an average of one new system being deployed each week) is configured for use against the PRC. Increasingly, the United States and China share a common geostrategic understanding of the Soviet challenges to their respective security positions. This includes not only a Chinese acceptance of the expressed American view that the first half of this decade will be a period of substantial danger resulting from the growth of Soviet strategic military power in the 1970s, but also that the Soviet Union is pressing forward its efforts toward the eventual neutralization of Western Europe by attempting to outflank it from the south and is seeking to encircle China by the establishment of alliances and client states in South and Southeast Asia. The PRC's invasion of Vietnam in early 1979, together with its support for the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot in Kampuchea, stated mildly, go far beyond the expressions in Washington of opposition to the growth of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Beijing has become the principal opponent to Soviet influence in Indochina. In the Chinese view, Moscow's efforts to establish a dominant position in the Persian Gulf and eventually to control the Strait of Malacca are designed to gain access to oil and, in doing so, to dictate the terms upon which oil will flow to industrialized states. Not unlike analyses of Soviet policy that have increasing credence in the United States and elsewhere, the PRC emphasizes the need to thwart such Soviet objectives because of the importance attached by China to a strong Western Europe and Japan as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union.

Although the parallel interests of China and the United States extend to Soviet strategy with respect to the "arc of crisis," there remains a difference in perspective as to how to respond. Beijing has been critical of American policy toward revolutionary Iran, including the abortive effort to rescue the hostages. The United States is faulted by China for not having rendered more substantial military assistance to combat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and for not having made a much greater offer of military equipment to Pakistan. The Chinese appear to be apprehensive about American policy whose effect, as in the case of the ill-fated hostage rescue effort, may be only to strengthen the position of the Soviet Union by presenting overt manifestations of American weakness or ineptitude—justly deserved or not. Beijing seeks clarification of the meaning of the Carter Doctrine and of American expressions of resolve in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area. The United States is urged both to strengthen its naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and to maintain adequate levels of forward deployed power in the Western Pacific, but outside the Korean Peninsula.

## SINO-SOVIET-US RELATIONS

For China an alignment with the United States represents an effort to develop countervailing power against a state perceived as seeking hegemonism. In this respect, China's behavior may be likened to that of Yugoslavia after 1948, although Tito at no time went as far as have the Chinese in calling, to an even greater extent than the United States wishes, for an alliance against the Soviet Union. Historically, however, the PRC and the United States have been deeply at odds with respect to revolutionary movements in the Third World. This division was most apparent at the time of the Vietnam War. In Vietnam and elsewhere China sought to remove remaining vestiges of American and Western influence only to discover that the principal beneficiary was the Soviet Union. In this respect, the PRC's anti-American policy of the 1960s in Indochina has had potentially disastrous consequences for the PRC. It may be inferred that China's "parallel interests" with the United States extend principally to opposing the extension of Soviet influence. However, the replacement of Soviet influence by a dominant China would accord neither with the interests of the United States nor with those of the peoples of Third World states. But the prospects for such a condition does not exist in the 1980s and, as a result of Soviet power, the *de facto* alignment on Third World issues between the PRC and the United States is likely to grow rather than diminish.

Crucial in importance to Sino-American relations is the course of events in Northeast Asia for, as widely noted, this is the point of geographic intersection of each of the three major powers, together with Japan. Although China and the United States have apparently parallel interests in insuring the political stability of the Korean Peninsula and, particularly, in preventing the extension of Soviet influence there, they remain deeply at odds concerning the appropriate means to be used for that purpose. From an American perspective, there is little appreciation in Beijing of the potential available to North Korea to launch an attack against the Republic of Korea. Since the late 1960s, North Korea has built a huge indigenous weapons production capability and has developed forces that could be used for a lightning attack across the Demilitarized Zone into South Korea. The concentration of firepower available to the North Koreans is greater per kilometer of frontline than in the NATO central front. The political uncertainties that have confronted the Republic of Korea, especially since the assassination of President Park in October 1979, give rise to justifiable concerns about the future prospects on the Korean Peninsula. The PRC maintains its call for the withdrawal of American forces from the Republic of Korea as a potential basis for negotiations between North and South Korea. Conceivably, Beijing hopes to retain whatever residual influence the PRC has in Pyongyang and thus thereby to minimize the likelihood of any North Korean attack against the Republic of Korea out of fear that the principal beneficiary of a forceable reunification of the Korean Peninsula, as in the case of Vietnam, would be the Soviet Union.

Following quickly in the wake of the initiation of American normalization of relations with the PRC, Japan embarked upon its own efforts to develop links with China. The economic relationship between Beijing and Tokyo has evolved much faster and further than it has between the United States and China. Clearly, Japan seeks to play a major role in the

## PANEL 1

modernizing efforts upon which the current Chinese leadership has embarked. But Japan is not prepared to heed the call of Beijing for a military alignment, or alliance, against the Soviet Union. Although it may be argued that Japan, in signing the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship of August 1978, has moved toward a closer relationship with Beijing than with Moscow, Japan remains unwilling to develop military capabilities to the level desired by China against the Soviet Union. The PRC has made numerous references to the need for Japan to increase rapidly her defense forces, especially maritime capabilities, in response to the growth in recent years of Soviet naval forces in the Western Pacific and as a result of the relative decline in American naval power in the region because of security problems confronting the United States in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf. Japan can be expected in the 1980s to augment its defense capabilities and to manifest reduced domestic opposition to military spending. Since the late 1970s, Japan has been engaged in a domestic debate on defense issues that is without precedent since World War II. Nevertheless, Japan will seek to maintain with the Soviet Union a correct relationship both because of the territorial issues dividing Tokyo and Moscow and because the Soviet Union poses a potential threat to Japan as a result of the growth of Soviet military capabilities. Japan's interest is perceived to lie not in joining an anti-Soviet coalition, but rather in encouraging the emergence of conditions conducive to economic growth and trade, especially in the Asian Pacific basin. In fact, Japan would regard further heightening of tensions between Moscow and Beijing, or between Moscow and Washington, as destabilizing. As in the case of the future prospects for Sino-American relations, Japan's efforts toward rearmament will be stimulated by Soviet behavior, just as the development of greater Soviet military strength in East Asia, including the construction of military installations on islands seized by the Soviet Union from Japan at the end of World War II, has heightened Japanese concern about security. The Japanese defense forces, especially in maritime capabilities, will not reach levels which the PRC avowedly would like Japan to build, nor will they match the potential threat to Japan's sea lines of communication that the Soviet Union will be able to pose in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Of at least equal importance to the PRC in its relationship with the United States in the years ahead will be economic modernization. The Chinese leadership has embarked upon efforts designed to produce major advances in agriculture, science and technology, industry, and defense—what are termed the four modernizations. To a far greater extent than during the earlier years of the PRC, emphasis is being placed on the development of technical skills and expertise rather than on political activism as the basis for advancement. In its modernization program, the PRC seeks technology transfer and scientific exchange with the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, including limited sales of military equipment. As a result of negotiations between Beijing and Washington, at least ten American companies have received permission to undertake sales presentations to China for possible export of items which include C-130 transports and CH-47 helicopters, as well as tactical air defense radar sets, early warning radar antennae, truck tractors, and passive countermeasure devices.<sup>3</sup> Although the PRC has shown evidence of substantial interest in foreign

## SINO-SOVIET-US RELATIONS

investment and even foreign ownership in selected zones in China, its principal emphasis is likely to be placed upon two basic approaches: the purchase for domestic production, perhaps under co-production agreements, of existing US technologies, and those of US allies; and the building of a domestic production base from which to design and manufacture wholly Chinese technologies. Such approaches will be considered to be preferable to the purchase of large quantities of products of advanced technology manufactured outside China, because China lacks necessary amounts of foreign exchange or hard currency for this purpose and seeks to avoid excessive dependence on the outside world. Thus, the Chinese leadership regards as indispensable to its long-term security the development of a more modern economy which will include a domestic production capability. In fact, so important is the economic modernization component of present PRC policies that it seems to have priority over the defense sector in the four modernizations presently emphasized by the leadership.

### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Sino-Soviet conflict is said to be deeply rooted in the Chinese perception of Moscow's unwillingness, or inability, to maintain relationships with neighboring states other than those based upon Soviet dominance. The Chinese allude to Moscow's repeated efforts to subjugate East European peoples as well as other states on her borders, including China herself, and most recently, Afghanistan. The Chinese maintain that the Soviet Union did not abide by agreements concluded with the PRC in the 1950s, including a commitment to assist the PRC in its nuclear weapons program. Beijing's differences with Moscow encompass ideological factors as well as traditional boundary disputes. As a result of Soviet expansionism, the view is expressed in Beijing that the prospects for reconciliation with the Soviet Union are all but non-existent.

Of central importance to American policy in the years just ahead will be the evolution of the Sino-Soviet relationship—the extent to which it is based not simply on tactical considerations but instead on a broader, longer term strategic perspective in light of the perceived Soviet threat. As in the past, the overriding American strategic interest will lie in the perpetuation of a condition of divided power on the vast Eurasian land mass. To be sure, a "worst case" situation for the United States would arise from the ability of the Soviet Union to unite under its hegemony all of those states with which it shares a common frontier in Eurasia, and especially China, and to achieve at least the neutralization of Western Europe. Although China will not provide a surrogate for American power in the world of the 1980s, it is an indispensable actor—as is Western Europe—in effecting the Eurasian power balance; for the essence of American strategy in the late twentieth century lies in the links that we maintain, or forge, with states on the periphery of the Soviet Union as we seek to build American military strength itself. Conversely, for the Soviet Union it must be prudently assumed that the normalization of relations with Beijing represents a desirable objective for Moscow, just as Soviet strategy is designed to detach the United States from its allies in Western Europe and East Asia, especially Japan. While the Chinese have spoken of encirclement by the Soviet Union, there have been expressions of concern from Moscow about

## PANEL 1

"counter-encirclement." Juxtaposed in the 1980s are likely to be the strategies of "encirclement" and "counterencirclement." Perceived Soviet efforts toward encirclement of China and US allies can be expected to produce various proposals for concerted responses which could be arrayed along a spectrum from strictly limited cooperation to a tightly knit alliance or coalition against the Soviet Union. Moscow is likely to embark upon a variety of steps to foreclose such a possibility. These would include increased negotiations with the PRC, possibly leading toward reduced tensions and even limited cooperation. In 1979, the Soviet Union and China initiated talks designed to reduce Sino-Soviet tensions, although China informed the Soviet Union on 3 April 1979, that it would not renew the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 when it expired in 1980.

Periodically there have been expressions of concern in the United States that China would eventually seek a reconciliation with the Soviet Union following the victory of a pro-Soviet faction in the PRC. Debates are said to have gone on periodically in Beijing between those who favor such a reconciliation and those who believe that China's future lies in broadening and deepening links with the United States and other Western countries. It is pointed out that only the United States, Western Europe, and Japan possess the technologies and economic capabilities needed by China to achieve the modernization objectives embraced by the post-Mao leadership. At least for the moment, there seems to have emerged in the PRC a very strong commitment to an opening to the West, and to Japan, as the basis for such modernization. If the influx of technologies and ideas from the outside world were to threaten the political structure of the PRC or to pose a challenge to societal values (a problem to which Deng Xiaoping has alluded), China would have the option of turning inward once again or seeking technology transfer from the Soviet Union, rather than from the open societies of the West. Furthermore, concern is voiced occasionally in the United States about the stability of China's leadership, faced as it is with the prospect that the gerontocracy currently in power will inevitably give way to a younger generation.

Such questions are indeed appropriate in any examination of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the years ahead, with its attendant implications for Sino-American relations. However, the evolving relationship between Beijing and Washington began well before the death of Mao in 1976. It was initiated during the decade of the political instability approximating civil war—the Cultural Revolution—which began in 1966. The evolution of the Sino-American relationship encompasses the rise and fall, and the subsequent rehabilitation, of Deng Xiaoping. With respect to the United States, the foreign policy of the PRC can be divided into essentially three periods: the hostility of the 1950s which coincided with Beijing's close relationship with Moscow; the heightened tensions of the 1960s between Beijing and Moscow culminating in the border clashes of 1969 and the beginning of a thaw in the Sino-American relationship; and the deepening of Sino-Soviet tensions in the 1970s, together with full normalization of relations with the United States. Although it is risky to project the present into the future, the evidence is abundant that the years ahead will be characterized by deep differences between the Soviet Union and the United States and between the Soviet Union and China, arising from the threat posed by Moscow to the

## SINO-SOVIET-US RELATIONS

national security of the states on its periphery, and to the United States itself.

Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union has replaced the United States as the principal perceived threat to the PRC. From China's perspective, the opening to the United States was seen, first and foremost, as a means of enhancing the prospects for deterring the Soviet Union from an attack against China. The intense Chinese interest in the acquisition of advanced military technologies from the United States and Western Europe bespeaks the concern of the leadership about the backwardness of the PRC's military capabilities relative to those of the Soviet Union. In fact, as a result of the momentum achieved by the Soviet Union in its military build-up, the gap between the PRC and the Soviet Union has probably widened during the last decade. While making overtures to the industrialized West for military technologies and calling for a united front against the Soviet Union, China asserts that, in the event of an invasion by the Soviet Union, the PRC would fight a protracted People's War in which eventually Soviet forces would be defeated. The Chinese indicate that an invasion and occupation of their territory, however extensive, would eventually be repulsed. They even suggest that a scenario in which the Soviet Union occupied the industrialized northeast, notably Manchuria, only to destroy its productive capabilities before withdrawing, would be met by long-term Chinese hostility and counterattacks against the Soviet Union. While emphasizing the potential for the conduct of a People's War based on the legacy of the Maoist revolution itself, the PRC is making a major effort to develop its own strategic-nuclear force, of which the two tests of the CSSX-4 in May 1980 represent but the most recent example. It must be assumed that China will seek to deploy substantial numbers of such systems in the decade ahead. Although they will be sufficient in range (6,500 miles) to strike the United States, the principal targets will lie in the Soviet Union. They will be designed to furnish a form of Chinese deterrence against a potential Soviet attack. As such, they will be intended to offset the gross deficiencies in Chinese conventional forces, contrasted with those of the Soviet Union.

Increasing attention is given in China to the growth of Soviet chemical warfare capabilities as well as to the modernization of Soviet forces deployed along the vast Sino-Soviet frontier. Soviet military literature has placed some emphasis in the last decade upon the combined arms offensive launched by the Soviet Union against Japan on 9 August 1945, in the closing days of the Second World War. This campaign is considered by Soviet military writers to provide insights into the conduct of large-scale land warfare in Eurasia. Therefore, it may have relevance to an understanding of Soviet strategy both on the Sino-Soviet frontier and in the NATO-Warsaw Pact context. Under such circumstances the PRC would face massive concentrations of Soviet frontal aviation and tactical airpower, together with the use of armor, including the most advanced tanks available in the Soviet inventories. By its own admission, China lacks adequate capabilities to withstand such an attack, at least in its initial phases. The disparities between Chinese and Soviet forces will continue in the years ahead to constitute a form of international instability. The Soviet Union is likely to retain the potential for some time to come to preempt China's nascent nuclear force. In turn, China will probably find it necessary to

## PANEL 1

embrace the idea of launch-on-warning until and unless it can provide secure means for command, control and communications and for the survivability of its strategic-nuclear force. Such factors introduce additional elements of potential instability into the world of the 1980s.

## SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Much of the domestic debate about foreign policy in the United States in the last decade has focused upon the nature of the Soviet-American relationship. The euphoria of the early 1970s has been eclipsed by the pessimism of more recent years about the Soviet Union and its enhanced capabilities for the extension of influence into regions from which Moscow historically was excluded. The Soviet Union has evolved strategic military capabilities that enable it potentially to fight and win a war on the NATO Central Front and to pose a threat to the survivability of at least a fixed land-based portion of the triad of US strategic forces. The United States is confronted, for the first time in its history, with a Soviet maritime force capable of projecting power on a global scale. The Soviet Union is unsurpassed in its airlift capabilities. In fact, the threat posed by the Soviet Union results from its military power rather than from economic strength or diplomatic skills. For the United States the immediate question for the early 1980s is the propensity of the Soviet Union to utilize its new-found capabilities in pursuit of political gain. Implicit in the "window of vulnerability" scenarios is the perceived ability of the Soviet Union to control the escalatory process in a crisis with the United States. In the hypothetical interaction of military forces, would the Soviet Union be able to confront the United States with unacceptable risks? The danger inherent in this context arises from Moscow's potential perception or misperception of American resolve. For example, would the Soviet Union conclude that the United States would not respond effectively to a crisis situation forced upon it by Moscow? Such a misperception by the Soviet Union in itself would represent a source of potential instability. Stated differently, would repeated evidence of irresolution lead an adversary to calculate its prospects for success on the basis of its opponent's recent behavior. If irresolution gives way to resolution, as occurred in the transformation in Britain between the Munich Crisis of 1938 and Hitler's invasion of Poland in September 1939, a state seeking to extract gain from superior military power may clearly miscalculate the resolve of its adversary. It may be prudently assumed that the Soviet-American relationship in the years just ahead may have considerable potential for such miscalculation, and it must therefore be in the fundamental interest of the United States and its allies to minimize the prospect for Soviet miscalculation.

Much has been written about the likely sources of conflict between Moscow and Washington. The Soviet Union has acted boldly to develop new relationships with as many states as possible on the Indian Ocean littoral. Whatever its motivations in invading Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is in the process of attaining bases for the projection of power to the south. In recent years, the effect, and in all likelihood the intent, of Soviet strategy has been to gain ultimate control of the resources of the Persian Gulf area. Whether or not the Soviet Union itself becomes dependent upon oil imports

## SINO-SOVIET-US RELATIONS

within the next decade from the Persian Gulf, the abundant sources of political instability in the region will provide ample opportunity for the Soviet Union to exploit for its own purposes the various sources of divisiveness within and among states. Thus, the Persian Gulf-Middle East furnishes the most widely discussed potential flashpoint for military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. It has led, of course, to protracted discussions about the requirements for a rapid deployment force by the United States as well as ample scope for debate in the United States about the appropriate response to hypothetical situations in which oil were no longer available to the United States and its allies.

In the early 1970s, the United States was faulted for having unduly emphasized its relationship with the Soviet Union to the detriment of its alliances, especially with Western Europe and Japan. At the beginning of the 1980s, the United States faces far more formidable problems in alliance relations as a result of the Soviet-American relationship. A decade ago, American allies, especially in Western Europe, expressed apprehension that the United States would conclude agreements with the Soviet Union, including in the field of arms control, without adequate consultation with West European governments. By the late 1970s, Europeans had become equally apprehensive about the implications of a deterioration in Soviet-American relations for their security interests. The heightened tensions between Moscow and Washington coincided not only with the military asymmetries increasingly favoring the Soviet Union, but also with a perceived inability of the United States to act decisively in support of its interests, especially in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region. Western Europe confronts an emboldened Soviet Union which is seen to be prepared to act brutally and ruthlessly in a region of vital importance to European security because of its oil resources. At the same time, West Europeans, and especially the Federal Republic of Germany, avowedly have a stake in the preservation of a detente relationship in Europe because of the tangible benefits that have accrued in the form of trade and, in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, increased contacts with the German Democratic Republic since the early 1970s. The notion had developed of the "divisibility" of detente. That is to say, in Western Europe the view has gained currency that Soviet behavior in Afghanistan must not be linked directly to the overall relationship between members of the Atlantic Alliance and Moscow. To the notion of the divisibility of detente is related the concept of "political decoupling." For many years the United States has confronted questions related to "military decoupling" between the US strategic-nuclear guarantee and the deterrence of battlefield conflict in Europe and especially on the NATO Central Front. Although apprehension about military decoupling has been heightened by the continued growth of Soviet strategic military power relative to that of the United States, the term "political decoupling" has entered the lexicon in the dialogue between the United States and its European allies. Under this concept, European diplomatic initiatives with respect to the Soviet Union would be decoupled from American policy. Increasingly, Western Europe seeks to act independently of the United States, not because of any growth of European military power, which remains unable to replace the United States in Europe, but as a result of misgivings about the United States and the perception that European

## PANEL 1

interests may be jeopardized by inept American action in response to the growth of Soviet power and expansionism. If in the past there was concern in Europe that the United States would take action detrimental to European interests from a position of strength, the present fear seems increasingly to be that the United States will act rashly from a position of weakness. In this sense, the Soviet-American relationship poses a series of difficult policy problems for the United States in its alliance relationships in the early 1980s.

Not unlike Japan, Western European allies of the United States, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, seek to reconcile their relationships with the PRC with their relationships with the Soviet Union. It may be inferred that the European conception of the divisibility of detente has implications for the Sino-American relationship, for strengthened ties between Beijing and Washington would represent a manifestation of a deteriorating relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. To the extent that Moscow could attribute the difficulties between the United States and the Soviet Union to an American alignment with China, the opportunity would arise to divide further the United States from its West European allies. In particular, the Federal Republic of Germany has warned the United States, as well as Britain and France, against antagonizing the Soviet Union by engaging in arms transfers with the PRC. The Soviet Union has indicated to West European leaders that the expansion of contacts with China could have adverse implications for their relations with the Soviet Union. For this reason, European allies, committed to the maintenance of "normal" relations with the Soviet Union in Europe, are unlikely to welcome links between the United States and China which will be construed by Moscow as contributing to a decline in Soviet-American relations. Unless American policy with respect to a broadened relationship with China is accompanied by a clear manifestation of US resolve to renewed strength, including restoration of European confidence in American foreign policy, the Sino-American relationship could serve to enhance European tendencies toward "political decoupling" from the United States.

The geographical focal point for alliance problems facing the United States with respect to Western Europe and, only to a lesser extent, Japan, lies in the Persian Gulf. If the divisibility of detente from a European perspective is based upon an unwillingness to link Soviet behavior in Afghanistan to Soviet behavior elsewhere, including in Europe itself, the Europeans and the United States face the prospect of further divisiveness with respect to the military options available for safeguarding their respective interests in the Persian Gulf. In the United States the idea of a rapid deployment force has attracted considerable attention. Such a force should be available for overseas contingencies wherever they may arise in situations which affect vital American interests. Unless the United States is to augment substantially both its manpower and equipment for a rapid deployment force, it must reallocate existing capabilities. From an American perspective, there is a logic in earmarking for the Persian Gulf American capabilities presently available either for the Atlantic Alliance or presently in NATO. Equally plausible would be an expressed willingness by Western European allies to fill whatever gap was created in Europe by the reassignment of American capabilities elsewhere. For their part, Europeans have

## SINO-SOVIET-US RELATIONS

shown little, if any, willingness to replace American forces withdrawn in adequate numbers to compensate for the substantial growth of Soviet-Warsaw Pact capabilities during the last decade. In part, this European reluctance has stemmed from apprehension that American force withdrawals from Europe would diminish further whatever residual linkage remains between the deterrence of battlefield conflict in Europe and the American strategic-nuclear guarantee (military decoupling). Manifestations of unwillingness by Western Europe to bear a greater burden of European security, if the United States is compelled to place greater emphasis upon military forces outside Europe, provide the basis for further divisiveness between the United States and Western Europe. Why, it would be logically asked in the United States, should the United States continue to bear as great a burden as it has in the past on behalf of European security in Europe, while at the same time preparing for military contingencies in the Persian Gulf region, where European interests are at least as fully at stake as are those of the United States?

Although this analysis is not focused principally upon American alliance relationships, it is nevertheless presented because of the inextricable link that exists in the early 1980s, as it has in the recent past, between US-Soviet relations and the principal alliances of which the United States is a member. In addition to the relative decline of the United States with respect to the Soviet Union and its attendant consequences for our dealings with allies, we confront another major point of differentiation between the early 1980s and the world of a decade ago, at least as perceived from the United States. At that time we saw the prospect, illusory as it was, that surrogates for United States power could be found not only in the major power centers—Western Europe, China, and Japan—but also in the various regions in which the United States had vital interests. The loss of Iran as a stabilizing influence for the West in the Persian Gulf represents a change whose consequences, it is widely acknowledged, have yet to be fully realized. More than any other single event, the Iranian transformation has not only symbolized the failure of a policy of building surrogates for the United States, but it has also provided evidence of the relative decline of the United States and the West with respect to the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf. This, in turn, enhances not only the likelihood that Soviet influence will increase in the region, but also the prospect that the United States and Western Europe will face a period of further divisiveness with respect to their relations with the Soviet Union.

The principal concentration of Soviet ground forces lies in Europe. Just as the Chinese deployment of military power draws a substantial number of Soviet forces from possible positioning on the European front, so does the Soviet deployment of forces in Europe subtract from power that could otherwise be arrayed against China. As the Chinese themselves have noted, approximately 68 percent of all Soviet ground forces are positioned in, or earmarked for, NATO-Warsaw Pact contingencies in Europe. It is widely recognized that the Soviet Union has been engaged in a buildup of armaments that has included the augmentation of its forces in manpower, together with rapid modernization in armor, frontal aviation, and tactical airpower in Europe. With the passage of years, NATO has reduced the military warning time that would necessarily be available to anticipate a Soviet-

## PANEL 1

Warsaw Pact attack. Although the prospects for a Soviet-Warsaw Pact offensive against Western Europe are generally discounted, the fact remains that the Soviet Union has been developing force levels in Europe far in excess of those that would be necessary strictly for defense. In contrast to its position a decade ago, NATO is no longer assured of superiority even over its own air space in the event of a war on the NATO Central Front. The Soviet Union has evolved a maritime capability that would probably be sufficient to interdict surface shipping needed to resupply NATO forces on the Central Front. The SS-20 and the Backfire bomber afford the Soviet Union new generation capabilities for strikes against important military targets in Western Europe, including port facilities that would be vital in any resupply effort. The Backfire bomber, together with Soviet naval units, would be utilized to counter NATO maritime forces on the sea lanes between North America and Western Europe. In the years just ahead, as in other sets of relationships with the Soviet Union, the United States faces the prospect that Moscow will attempt to derive political advantage from its possession of formidable military forces in Europe. Such capabilities on the ground, together with the strategic asymmetries now favoring the Soviet Union, will serve only to exacerbate European apprehension about the relationship between US strategic-nuclear forces and the deterrence of battlefield conflict. It can be anticipated, furthermore, that the Soviet Union will make a concerted effort to prevent NATO theater-nuclear modernization. In fact, Moscow has placed diplomatic pressure on Western Europe in an effort to thwart the deployment by NATO of new generation theater-nuclear forces that are deemed to be necessary to attack Soviet-Warsaw Pact second echelon forces in order to destroy their reinforcement capabilities at an early stage in a European war. On 12 December 1979 the NATO Council took an initial decision in support of theater-nuclear force modernization, however, there are likely to be numerous pressures designed to postpone or prevent such action by the Atlantic Alliance.

Although the Soviet Union has used arms control negotiations, and in particular SALT, as part of its strategy against theater-nuclear modernization in Europe, it is likely to view the resumption of arms control negotiations in the context of its broader strategic-nuclear interests in the 1980s. During the SALT decade, the Soviets achieved their present position in strategic-nuclear capabilities. The SALT II Treaty would have codified the basic asymmetries favoring the Soviet Union in strategic-nuclear forces. It is conceivable, and perhaps likely, that the Soviet Union will seek to revive negotiations on central strategic forces and that Moscow actively seeks talks that encompass theater-nuclear capabilities in Europe. If the experience of the past decade is instructive, the Soviet Union will continue to believe that it has much to gain from entering such negotiations. In the case of the European theater, SALT, with special emphasis on European issues, may be used to codify the very substantial asymmetries that have already emerged as a result of the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 far in advance of NATO theater-nuclear modernization. For example, a freeze at whatever levels that exist during the early- to mid-1980s, given current Western deployment plans, would automatically provide a huge advantage to the Soviet Union, which could even afford to make modest reductions in its SS-20 deployments in return for Western nondeployment.

## SINO-SOVIET-US RELATIONS

There is an emerging consensus in the United States that American defense capabilities, as presently constituted, are inadequate to the security issues of the 1980s. There is less agreement about the precise form that an American rearmament effort should assume, but it is probable that the next administration, of either political party, will increase in real terms the military capabilities of the United States. This will confront the Soviet Union with an important dilemma. On the one hand, should the Soviet Union seek political gain at the time of maximum military strength with respect to the United States? Such a course of action would have within it the potential for immediate gain by the Soviet Union, which might force the United States, in a Cuban missile crisis in reverse situation, to back down, faced with Soviet military superiority both in strategic-nuclear forces and in general purpose forces. The cost of such action to the Soviet Union in the longer term would be enormous, for it could be expected to lead the United States to a vast military effort. On the other hand, the Soviet Union might respond to a manifestation of American rearmament by embarking upon various "peace offensives" whose apparent purpose would be to revive in the United States those forces seeking reductions in arms spending and favoring a political accommodation with Moscow. Such groups would be encouraged as the Soviet Union continued its own arms buildup and as Moscow sought incrementally to expand its influence even in areas of vital interest to the United States. In the former contingency, the period of maximum danger to the United States would appear to lie at that point in time when the gap favoring the Soviet Union is largest and just before it begins to decline as a result of new American weapons programs.

### IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

In the years ahead, American policymakers are likely to confront a series of difficult policy issues arising from the triangular Sino-Soviet-American relationship. These relate to the inherent limitations for the United States in making use of its relationship with China as an effective counterpoise to the Soviet Union, especially in the early- to mid-1980s. To counter the vast military power of the Soviet Union, the United States cannot rely much more extensively than it already does upon Western Europe, China, or Japan, even though Western Europe and Japan possess the means for a greater contribution both to their own security and to that of adjacent sea lanes. Only the United States possesses the potential for large-scale power projection capabilities into potential crisis areas. In the absence of a greater willingness of the United States to develop such forces, and to rebuild other components of its military establishment, the incentives to the Soviet Union to maximize potential believed to be inherent in Soviet power will grow. Under such circumstances, we face the prospect that the Soviet Union will become the dominant actor in the triangular relationship that has been conceptualized during the last decade.

Much was written, especially in the early-1970s, about the diffusion of power to a series of other states beyond the superpowers. It is widely recognized that the diffusion of power encompasses economic and military capabilities. It has been based upon the transfer of wealth from industrialized oil-consuming countries to producer states. The transfer of economic

## PANEL 1

wealth has made possible the diffusion of military capabilities through arms sales and technology transfers. In the 1980s, oil-producing states can be expected to accumulate large new monetary reserves resulting from the price increases in oil since the late-1970s. Without embarking upon an extended discussion of the implications of such mass transfers of wealth on the functioning of the global economic system in the years ahead, there will be great potential for serious economic dislocation stemming from energy issues both in their economic and political dimensions.<sup>4</sup> The need will exist for broadened collaboration among the United States and its industrialized allies. Conceivably, the extraction of oil in China by the end of the decade could begin to provide an alternative to certain existing sources; thus, in this respect, the PRC could contribute to the mitigation of security problems for the industrialized states of which it has warned so extensively in recent years.

Notwithstanding such efforts on the part of China, together with the strengthening of allies of the United States in Western Europe and Japan, the key to the achievement of a modicum of global stability in the decade ahead will lie above all with the United States itself. That is to say, the United States must take whatever steps are necessary in its security policies, as well as in its domestic economy, to ensure that it remains, or once again becomes, the single most important actor in the Sino-Soviet-American triangular relationship. In the absence of such action, the world of several power centers, based upon pluralism and independence postulated to be in the interests of the United States, will not be possible. Thus, the power of the United States remains the indispensable ingredient both in fashioning a stable world structure for the decade ahead and in creating a global system adequate to the needs of the United States and its allies and friends in the final years of this century.

### ENDNOTES: SINO-SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980s

1. In this respect, American official statements about the Sino-American relationship have not changed since the early 1970s. During his meeting with China's Premier Hua Guofeng in Tokyo on 10 July 1980, President Carter emphasized that growing relations between the United States and China should not be directed against other nations, namely, the Soviet Union. He stated that the United States considers its relationship with China too important to have it controlled and modulated by the behavior of any other nation. *Boston Globe*, 10 July 1980, p. 1.

2. However, this view was not accepted in the foreign affairs "establishment" of the 1970s, which was the "natural successor to the old internationalist establishment which presided over American policy during the era of the Cold War and which collapsed as a result of America's defeat in Viet Nam." Carl Gershman, "The Rise and Fall of the New Foreign Policy Establishment," *Commentary* 70 (July 1980): 13.

3. David R. Griffiths, "Sales Data Cleared for China," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 9 June 1980, p. 16.

4. See Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Summer 1980): 999-1015; Robert L. Pfaltzgraf, *Energy Issues and Alliance Relationships. The United States, Western Europe, and Japan*, Special Report, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, April 1980.

## **PANEL 1 PAPER: Choice and Consequence in Sino- American Relations**

**by Thomas W. Robinson  
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### **GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

With the exchange of visits in the first half of 1980 of the American Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, and the Chinese Deputy Prime Minister, Geng Biao, American-Chinese relations entered a new stage. For all intents and purposes, the two had established the foundation for a defense relationship against the Soviet Union. The United States dropped the pretense of treating Peking and Moscow equally and looked to perfecting the details—indeed, testing the limits—of the new relationship. The proximate cause for Washington was Afghanistan. But longer term factors were at work: deterioration in the American-Soviet balance of military power; felt American weakness in general; the desire to use China as a makeweight against the Kremlin; and the hope that catering to Chinese military needs would continue Chinese interest in post-Maoist liberal pragmatism.

Even before normalization of relations in 1979, the United States and China acted increasingly in parallel in their relations with the Soviet Union. Such terms as "proto-coalition" and "quasi-alliance" were applied, and from the first Nixon trip forward there was the implication and, to some, the reality of military cooperation. Indeed, from the very onset of formal contacts in 1971, both parties had in mind joint or parallel policy toward Moscow, as was clearly shown in the anti-hegemony clause of the 1972 Shanghai Communique and in every subsequent joint statement. Moscow also realized the nature of the new trans-Pacific connection, charging correctly that China was attempting to construct an anti-Soviet global united front and with some reason that the United States only pretended to treat both Communist powers equally.

All three parties, then, thought that a Sino-American coalition existed, and all three acted on that assumption. The Russians considered it an accomplished fact. They protested every successive step in Sino-American detente, but conducted their political and military strategy accordingly. The Chinese worked hard to convince everyone that the Sino-American-European-Japanese united front was proceeding on schedule, in accord with well-known Chinese principles of diplomacy, and under Chinese leadership. The United States, embarrassed in the decline in its relative power, found the Chinese connection a convenience, coming just when

## PANEL 1

Washington needed to augment its own relative strategic position and when it could not do so without enormous additional outlays.

Obviously, elements of charade as well as reality characterized this situation. The Chinese made more out of the new relationship with Washington than the facts warranted. The Russians converted images and hints into trends and facts, thus confirming their worst suspicions. American policymakers were happy to allow things to move further and faster than intended, since short-term results were beneficial and costs practically nil.

But how far would America lead China into thinking that we saw eye-to-eye with respect to the Russians? Should we go the next few steps and solidify the military basis of anti-Sovietism with hard goods, transferred technologies, and a multitude of "grey area" ties, convincing everyone of the reality of the new alliance? Would not proposals for joint action follow declarations of explicit parallelism in policies toward Moscow? How long could the United States and China jostle each other along cost free? On the other hand, would not transfer of substantial volumes of military-related equipment and skills to China merely make it easier for Peking to approach Moscow from strength and propose settlement of the border dispute and the Indo-China question? Would not that in turn free Moscow to become an even greater and immediate threat to the United States?

In the longer run, is a very strong and active China really to America's advantage, particularly as concerns our Asian allies and our Taiwan protectorate? Must we pay the inevitable price, in Asia and elsewhere, to make sure that China is with us in the coming decade of relative weakness vis-a-vis the Russians? It is cost-effective in the short to medium term to pay Peking to stay on our side, but is there not bound to be a reckoning someday? Will not the eventual price be higher than we now figure? Maybe we should do some figuring now.

## THE SINO-SOVIET-AMERICAN TRIANGLE

The basis of world politics, and therefore of American security policy, is the three-sided game we play with China and the Soviet Union. In that relationship, a change in attitudes of one toward either or both of the others transforms the triangle. In this regard, several verities should be noted. First, China has put aside, in the face of the Soviet threat, long-felt difference with the United States over a number of issues, Taiwan being only the most obvious. How long will it be before Peking brings such matters back into full view and demands concessions from us, as a price for continued cooperation against Moscow or because Peking thinks its increasing strength warrants reopening these questions for their own sake?

Second, aside from the Indo-Chinese issue, nothing (including Afghanistan) precludes Peking and Moscow from addressing and settling on their merits all non-ideological issues that have hitherto driven them apart, including the border question. It is merely a matter of time—i.e., augmentation of relative Chinese power—before Peking decides it can work a deal with Moscow and thus mitigate their two-decades separation.

Third, the changing balance of American-Soviet military power makes the stakes higher for Washington than for Peking in the emerging Sino-

## CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE

American military relationship. America must pay China just to stay in place, since it is the United States, and not China, that must lead the coalition of anti-Soviet forces. The United States cannot avoid this responsibility. It is not possible for the United States to decide one day to make major changes for the better in its Soviet policy. China is not similarly vulnerable. Unlike America, whose responsibilities and interests are global, China's interests are regional and she is responsible for no one else's security, aside from North Korea's.

Potential for movement within the strategic triangle thus lies with Peking, not Washington. America's relative power decline makes it vulnerable to rapid changes in Peking's Soviet policy, as does Washington's refusal over the last decade to modernize its military forces to the extent necessary to fulfill alliance obligations and protect innate interests. Will not China someday demand payment in kind and in policy changes favorable to itself, just to stay away from Moscow, or merely to postpone settlement of differences?

## BAD AND GOOD REASONS FOR SINO-AMERICAN MILITARY TIES

Perhaps these worries are extraneous to the present and foreseeable course of Sino-American relations. Two other items seem uppermost in the minds of many analysts: how China can assist the West in case of war with the Soviet Union, especially Soviet invasion of Western Europe; and what assistance the United States might be called upon to render China upon Soviet invasion of that country. In other words, American policymakers assume the existence of Sino-American harmony of interests against the Soviet Union and presume that differences will be put aside by both countries in the face of the common danger. In a position of relative weakness, long-run considerations are sacrificed to short-term security needs.

These two possibilities must vitally concern defense planners, since their occurrence would involve the United States in war—probably nuclear—with the Soviet Union or cause such a shift in the balance of power as to mortgage American policy far into the future. War in Europe or Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East with a possible European follow-on, would exert extreme pressure on the United States to involve the Chinese as directly as possible, or at least to prevent Peking from standing neutral in a Soviet-American death struggle. A Sino-Soviet war of the type usually envisaged (e.g., massive Soviet attack to defeat and destroy large numbers of Chinese units and/or occupy significant territory) would fatally disorganize China, eventually put Europe and the Middle East at Soviet jeopardy, and ruin any further chance of improvement in Soviet-American relations.

Policymakers cannot be blamed for wishing to take out insurance against these possibilities, by moving toward closer security ties with China. But neither is likely enough a possibility to warrant by itself the kinds of investments and costs likely to be associated with such a tie. On balance, costs appear to outdistance benefits so long as the prospects for either scenario are judged, as seems likely, to be relatively low. It is

## PANEL 1

therefore necessary to adduce other reasons why direct, overtly anti-Soviet military ties with Peking could be worth the risks.

Other reasons do exist. One is the deliberate creation of a coalition so strong that Moscow, finding itself hemmed in, would give up its plans to expand its influence in areas contiguous to its borders and farther away. If a coalition comprising America, China, Japan, and West Europe, were sufficiently strong, stable, and long-lived, the Soviet Union would presumably be forced to turn its energies inward, where they belong. This would set the stage for real Soviet-American detente, including mutually beneficial arms control agreements. The United States already heads a coalition with NATO and Japan, and relations between the latter two components will probably develop under American encouragement as the Soviet military threat increases. It would only remain to bring the Chinese in on an agreed, even if informal, basis. That process seems already to be underway, thanks to the Soviet threat—evident both before and after Afghanistan. Some think a bit more substance and a few more symbols will make it a reality. Of course, bringing the Chinese into such an arrangement means paying them sufficiently such that, when the going with Moscow gets rough, Peking will stay the course. But if this will tame the Russians, then—so argument goes—overall security benefits outweigh whatever entrance and continuation fees are necessary to assure Peking's allegiance.

But will the Russians behave as we would want them to, once the coalition is in place? Would Moscow not move to smash the coalition before it solidifies or transform the situation by one or another breakout strategy? To avoid either of these, the coalition must remain loose enough as not to threaten unduly the Soviet Union and it must successfully convince Moscow that the new arrangement is really for Russia's own good—e.g., everyone, including the Russians, will live in a safer world as a result or that commensurate material benefits will come Moscow's way once it decides to quit the expansion/power projection game. It is a fine trick, of course, to know how close, i.e., effective, such a "loose" coalition need be while still not threaten the Soviet Union. Moreover, is a loose, flaky coalition really a coalition? Are the putative gains worth the risks? In particular, will the Chinese be satisfied with an inchoate arrangement in which the other parties but not themselves are jointed by formal ties?

The Chinese have never liked second class citizenship. At the least, moving toward a coalition raises the questions of how formal the ties should become, whether it should be based on only a bilateral tie, or whether it should include Peking in some multilateral arrangement. At present, a formal tie seems unnecessary and to the Chinese perhaps undesirable. It is not the Chinese habit to enter into formal multilateral coalitions that inhibit their freedom of maneuver. But eventually it may be to the American advantage to seek to commit China to some more definite bilateral arrangement with ourselves, and perhaps with Tokyo and the West European capitals. Failing that, for both safety's and planning's sake it may be desirable to spell out with precision the nature and limits of any politico-military arrangement with Peking.

The argument in favor of a loose coalition thus evolves in the direction of an ever-firmer tie. But would not such a tie beget just the result that joint

## CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE

Sino-American action with Peking seeks to avoid—increasingly strong Russian reaction, even to the point of taking military action against one or more of the new coalition's members or seeking compensation elsewhere? How could the coalition be sure that, a *cordon sanitaire* having been drawn around Soviet borders and its East European sphere of influence, Moscow would see the error of its ways and become a satiated, status-quo power? Would Moscow not fracture the coalition before it solidified—or adopt one or another breakout strategy?

### SOVIET STRATEGIES IN RESPONSE TO SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATION

What strategies might Moscow adopt to forestall, smash, or outflank a Peking-Washington centered coalition? The most likely and efficient Soviet response is internal measures designed to counter the awesome potential power of the new coalition. By internal, I mean measures that Moscow can now carry out or could, if it so wished, with its own resources. For example, the Soviet Union could partially re-Stalinize the economy, thereby transferring a greater proportion of the social product to military and other foreign policy purposes. It could do the same in domestic society, extirpating what little latitude of expression has grown from within the system over the years and enforcing near-wartime discipline on the population. The Kremlin could also enforce similar social and economic measures on East Europe, thus making even more resources available to counter the strength of the perceived coalition. Finally, Moscow could attempt to solidify ties with its allies and protectorates in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, fashioning as nearly as possible a single, Russian-directed alliance system.

In combination, these measures would go some distance in countering the real or potential power of the new anti-Soviet East-West coalition. Moreover, the Soviet Union can carry them out, however harmful they might be. One consequence would be a new and vicious Cold War, largely wiping out progress in Soviet-Western relations since 1959 and making the intervening two decades a mere interlude. Such developments may be inevitable, given international trends after Afghanistan, and also "necessary" in that a new Cold War may be the price the coalition must pay to stop Soviet expansionism and preserve the balance of power. Presuming this would be the Soviet response to the coalition, the United States would have to decide soon whether arms budgets, failure of strategic arms control, and accompanying changes in American society are worth the gain in long-term security.

The Russians have a second response, short of war, to formulation, or perceptions of formulation, of the coalition. It could seek to shield domestic Soviet developments in present directions from the deleterious effects of competition with the coalition. It could do this by compromising with one or another member of the alliance-under-construction, most probably China and/or Japan, thus forestalling its solidification. For over two decades, Moscow has been attempting to do just that with Peking but with little success, thanks to Chinese intransigence to the Kremlin's own policies of over-garrisoning its borders with China and building its own alliance system surrounding China. The Soviet Union has also tried unsuccessfully

## PANEL 1

to improve relations with Japan, always stumbling over its own diplomatic crudities and its unwillingness to compromise the Northern Islands issue.

Required would be a renewed, more genuine, effort to entice from the American embrace either or both of the Asian members of the coalition. In the Chinese case, enticement could only mean coupling offers to compromise the border issue with two other concessions: first, a workable scheme of arms control and force reduction along the Sino-Soviet border; and second, a major diminution of Soviet force deployments in Vietnam. The latter would have to include such a diplomatic and economic distancing from Hanoi that it would be clear that Moscow would expect to abandon Southeast Asia to China as an area of its own exclusive influence.

Just to mention these minimal conditions, that China would probably insist upon as the price for improved relations with Moscow, is to note their futility. The Kremlin may already have gone too far in Southeast Asia and in Afghanistan to turn back. Under only two conditions would Moscow be prepared to sell out a smaller Communist ally to improve relations with its major Communist adversary: long-term Chinese-Soviet friendship and cooperation against the West; and a direct, immediate, and overwhelming threat from the West (in which case the question of "sell-out" to China would not even arise). Neither seems likely in the foreseeable future.

Moscow could, finally, attempt to reinstate detente with NATO, especially its European component. It could then face the challenge from the East more directly. But again, that is highly unlikely, given the still increasing Soviet military buildup against NATO; the various strategic and conventional "windows" of the early 1980s, all favoring Moscow; the realization in the West that if Soviet forces invaded China or destroyed its major military installations, Europe could be next; and the ever-greater Soviet willingness to use force in pursuit of Soviet interests. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan probably has caused this option for Moscow to be stillborn.

The Russians are thus driven back to the first, hard line, policy choice. This seems to be the option Moscow has decided to adopt. The domestic screws are being tightened already. Pressure to follow suit in East Europe should be expected. A Soviet diplomatic offensive can also be anticipated, with the aim of uniting as many states as possible into a common, Moscow-directed alignment. This would in fact be the formal expression of the Soviet "collective security" proposal of several years ago. Such a move is also likely as a response to the extension of the American security blanket to the Persian Gulf, the administration's anti-Soviet military cooperation with China, and the various other measures to punish Moscow for its Afghan transgression.

## VIEWING THE MATTER FROM PEKING

How does the situation look to Peking? Several elements are germane. Most important is the domestic situation. Having finally gotten beyond Mao, his Party survivors and the Chinese populace are determined to make up for the enormous losses suffered under the Great Helmsman and put society back on the track of all-around modernization. Two implications follow. First, the foreign policy of the Four Modernizations is one of peace, e.g., of arranging the security environment so that prospects for conflict are

## CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE

minimal. China therefore wishes not merely to avoid war but to compromise where possible with its opponents. Peking's habitual means to this end has been to decide which one of its enemies is most threatening, to compromise temporarily with all others, and to lead a united front against the chosen opponent. Peace is thereby preserved or war, if it comes, is fought on the most favorable terms possible. That is exactly the policy China pursues at the moment: compromising with its long-term and less-threatening enemy, the United States, in order to face its short-term and more threatening opponent, the Soviet Union. Peace is the product, or at least delay of conflict. In either case, China can devote greater attention to, and enjoy a longer period of, economic modernization.

A second implication is that China will do what it can to obtain economic assistance and technology from a diversity of suppliers. Although in the short run this means the West, there is no intrinsic reason why it could not eventually include the Soviet Union and East Europe. Indeed, when Western capital and technology are as fully invested in China as capitalist economic principles and Western governmental policies allow, China is likely to approach Moscow as the sole remaining supplier!

A final domestic force is the character of leadership politics in Peking. Since Mao's demise and the removal of the "gang of four," the leadership appears to be more solidly united than at any time since 1956. However, there has been an undercurrent of opposition and resentment felt by many middle and higher Party administrators against the rather high-handed and ultra-pragmatic policies of Deng Xiaoping. This has caused Deng to be somewhat more circumspect than he would otherwise have been in his policies, including foreign policies.

In 1980, Deng succeeded in removing four additional neo-Maoist high Party officials reputedly opposed to him and promoted his associates to high posts. As a result, the top Party leadership seems more nearly in Deng's personal control than before. Having freed himself of this opposition, Deng and his followers can pursue their own foreign policy directions with less worry. And if Deng is really the ultra-pragmatist of his reputation, the way also is open for a more open approach to Moscow for negotiating Sino-Soviet differences on their merits and for establishing a policy of balance between Washington and Moscow.

Domestic determinants of Chinese foreign policy thus point toward eventual lessening of tensions with Moscow. The Kremlin's support of Vietnam against Cambodia and China, and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan do pull Chinese policy the other way. But the second major element informing Chinese policy—its international environment—also tends in the long run to turn Peking back to the necessity—and the desirability—of settling disputes with the Kremlin. For 20 years, China has made anti-Sovietism the principal feature of its foreign policy. From 1959 to 1969, this was coupled with anti-Americanism, since Peking considered that superpower discord made the environment safe enough to pursue an independent course or to concentrate on internal problems. Since 1969, the greater security threat from Moscow has caused Peking to lean toward Washington within the strategic triangle and to fashion an international united front

## PANEL 1

against the Russians. In so doing, it has mortgaged almost every other aspect of its foreign policy.

The Peking leadership must remain uncertain that the strength of the new coalition-in-formation will be great enough to deter Soviet attack. The reasons are three. First, China's military strength—however great absolutely—clearly lags behind Soviet power along the Sino-Soviet border. Second, China has discovered how far behind it really is in military modernization and has taken fright. And third, the United States—China's only alternative protector—has lost considerable ground to the Russians in the strategic realm (to say nothing of the conventional, where the Soviets have always held the lead). The consequent shift of power has kept China from doing what she would prefer, which is to regain her freedom of maneuver between Washington and Moscow. The recent events in Southeast and Southwest Asia have only enhanced the need to seek security through alliance and accentuated Peking's inability to pursue an independent policy. Nonetheless, even the seriousness of the current situation will merely defer, but need not forever deter, Peking from that goal.

Indeed, achieving a reasonable degree of security is the essential precondition for recapturing the freedom of maneuver lost at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. All measures that enhance Chinese defensibility therefore increase the probability of, and thus shorten the time until, Peking approaches Moscow from a position of strength to compromise some of their differences.

Thus the dilemma for the United States. Given its own felt military weakness relative to Moscow, Washington has little alternative but to move closer to China. One principal means has been assisting China to increase its own military strength. Chiefly on that basis, Peking seems interested in a security tie with the United States. But those very measures make it easier for China eventually to distance itself from America and settle at least part of China's dispute with Moscow. In this we also see the current manifestation of the dual strategy long familiar to students of Chinese policy. That is the real meaning to China of playing the "American card": use the United States to help ward off the Russian Polar Bear while preparing for an eventual turning of the tables on the United States and emancipating China from the onerous necessity of taking advice and assistance from the main capitalist enemy.

## THE BASIS OF CHINESE POLITICAL STRATEGY

Particular notice should be taken of how the Chinese attempt to use the united front and what the relation is between that strategy and the similar—but not identical—American strategy of balance of power. The two resemble each other in a number of particulars, especially in their short-term operational characteristics, but differ in assumptions and long-term outcomes. Both combine true and false assumptions that make for superficial congruence in needful circumstances, such as at present, but that contain seeds of mutual misunderstanding and eventual conflict.

United Front strategy can be summarized as follows:

1. The object is to render incapable China's principal enemy, the

## CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE

Soviet Union, in two senses: by making impossible a successful Soviet attack on China or on states and regions Peking defines as vital to its security; and by freeing China from Soviet-imposed restrictions on China's policy freedom, principally around its Asian periphery.

2. The means to this end is to isolate Moscow by combining with China's "secondary" enemy, the United States; with Washington's allies—Japan, Western Europe, and a scattering of other selected states elsewhere; and with as many Third World countries as can be enlisted, thus confronting Moscow with an unbeatable combination.

3. China regards itself as leader of the united front. It defines the principal enemy, divides the secondary enemy from him, settles on the strategy for first resisting and later settling with the Russians, and takes decisions which the others are expected to accept and carry out. There is little possibility of genuine coalition decisionmaking in Peking's scheme of things.

4. All states play a role in the united front as enemy, friend, or neutral. The secondary enemy—the United States—is treated cautiously, since at any time it may betray China by compromising with the Russians or even pointing its weapons against Peking. Genuine "friends" are few in number, given China's historic experience before and after 1949. But every effort is made to keep them satisfied (which means catering to some of their benign desires) and to increase their number. Friends are somewhat more reliable than neutrals, if only because some of them have interests that innately bind them to China. But at the stroke of a pen China can cast a "friend" into the ranks of the enemy, of his accomplices, or of the wavering neutrals. "Neutrals" eventually split into supporters or detractors of Chinese united front leadership, becoming "friends" or accomplices of the enemy. Thus, neutrals are not valued for their own sake, as in a balance of power policy, but for the benefits or harm they can bring to or inflict on China.

5. Although in the short term China does seek to balance power, it does so only to destroy or render harmless the principal enemy, not for its own sake. Ideology, interest, and power, the three principal elements in the balance of power, are treated differently in a united front policy, with ideology occupying a more important part. Moreover, China does not admit that national interest is a determinant of foreign policy, although its actions indicate it realizes the connection. Neither does it recognize that power operationalizes and expresses interest and that, since power changes, so does interest. Rather, China claims its interests, ideological and state-centered, are independent of its power and will thus be the same two decades hence, just as they were two decades ago.

6. What changes rapidly are the tactics necessary to survive in a perfidious and unfriendly world. United front tactics are the most important aspect of policy, since they link power and interest. Because China thinks its interests are constant, while it knows its relative power is determined by the power, policies, and interests of the United States and the Soviet Union (as well as its own), it feels constrained to fall back on tactics—manipulation—as the only remaining means of assuring security.

7. The most important decision in the united front strategy is to determine who the main enemy is. Everything else follows: categorization of all other states and the tactics China will apply toward them. The cases of the

## PANEL 1

United States and the Soviet Union are instructive. The United States was the "principal enemy" in the 1950s. It shared that distinction with the Soviet Union in the 1960s. In the 1970s and early 1980s, America has been a secondary enemy. As a near mirror image case, the Soviet Union has gone from China's closest "friend" in the early 1950s to Peking's principal enemy in the 1970s. China's policies toward all other states and issues flowed from the assigned character of its relations with the two superpowers. Thus, for instance, China treated Japan and Thailand with distance and disdain in the 1950s and 1960s: then they were allies of the United States, China's main enemy. Those two states came into greater favor in the 1970s, when the United States was declared the secondary enemy. Then they were to be allied with against the new main enemy, the Soviet Union.

### PEKING BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW IN THE 1980s

Since China has varied its evaluation of the Soviet Union from one extreme to the other in less than two decades, Peking could well redefine its attitude toward Moscow in the 1980s were there to be improvement in China's security posture vis-a-vis that country. If so, there seems little doubt that the United States will resume its historic place as China's principal enemy, for three reasons. First, Peking has only temporarily put aside its difference with the United States on the most important issue—Taiwan. That issue will have to be addressed frontally within the next several years. Second, for the foreseeable future the United States is the only country, aside from the Soviet Union, that can counter Chinese power in Asia. Remove or mitigate the Soviet threat to China and America once again becomes of paramount concern to Peking. Third, Chinese power over the next two decades is likely to grow so rapidly that China will undoubtedly be able more and more to exert its weight against its regional neighbors and to insist that its interests (which will expand with its power) be taken into account by the United States.

If the United States and the Soviet Union are today Asia's principal external powers, China will seek to supplant them tomorrow, first by balancing one against the other and then, gradually, by squeezing both out of the region. This process can only bring Peking and Washington into a relationship first of mixed friendship and adversity, depending on the issue, and then more or less constant opposition, with the merits of particular issues mere covers for a broader struggle for primacy of power in Asia. Given America's preoccupation with the expansion of Soviet power everywhere and the maintenance of its own role as the principal global power, it appears likely that the United States at first will have to defer to China in Asia and later oppose Peking there.

Since Mao's death and the removal of his associates, Peking has twice looked into improving relations with Moscow. The first was during the summer and fall of 1977. It ceased in 1978 with the onset of the events that culminated in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia late that year and the Chinese "counterattack" into northern Vietnam in early 1979. Almost immediately after the Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam, in March 1979, and Peking's denunciation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1950, China again

## CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE

appeared to evince an interest in improving relations with Moscow by proposing a new set of state-level talks. They began in late summer 1979 and continued in a reasonably positive manner until they were cut short by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December.

In each instance, it was Soviet action that spelled an end, *pro tempore*, to Sino-Soviet negotiations. How long will it be before the next round of aggressive Soviet policy initiatives fail to eventuate "in time" and thus fail to forestall improvement of Moscow-Peking relations at the expense of Washington?

Ideology points in the same direction. Its influence is usually swamped by the requirements of national security and of the domestic political situation. It then becomes a mere talisman of policy. But when ideology points in the same direction as foreign policy and domestic politics, it exerts an important contributing influence. That is the case now for China in the American and the Soviet cases: ideology is not only a vocabulary for discussing policy but also a policy orienting criteria.

In the American case, China regards capitalism and the foreign policy it supposedly produces as the major long-term enemy and a perfidious short-term ally. That is one reason why Peking reacted negatively to American suggestions of coordinated actions against Moscow after Afghanistan. Because of these views (among other reasons), the United States can never expect China to be more than a sometime friend. Indeed, once the Soviet threat to China is mitigated or eliminated, Washington should expect Peking to do what it can to exclude American influence from Asia. Nor should America be surprised when Chinese assessment of the United States as a society should revert to a Marxist-based rejection of American values and actions. In fact, after a period of relatively open reporting of American domestic developments and foreign policy moves, the Chinese media and decisionmakers already evidence a return to a severely critical norm.

Ideology is an even more useful indicator of Peking's orientation toward the Soviet Union, the "enemy within" the socialist community. The Sino-Soviet dispute began as—or at least was initially expressed primarily in terms of—an argument over doctrine. Chinese ideological evaluations have gone through three phases over the last two decades. In the period after 1957, the Soviet Union was termed "revisionist." With the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the phrase "social-imperialist" was added. Since Mao's death in 1976, the Chinese favor the term "hegemonists" to describe Soviet leaders.

In each instance, the Chinese appraisal summed up what most bothered them about the Soviets. In the case of "revisionism," Peking was most worried about the character of Soviet domestic policies and their tendency, in Chinese eyes, to compromise with the United States. Revisionism must not spread to China nor should it infect Chinese foreign policy. "Social-imperialism" symbolized Chinese worries over Soviet use of armed force abroad and China's evaluation of Moscow's military rule over East Europe. China could be next. "Hegemonism" pointed up Chinese concern over the possibility that Moscow might prove so strong, despite resistance by the United States, NATO, and China, that it could impose its will on any

## PANEL 1

state or region, thus creating a world empire. "Hegemonism" must be resisted at all costs and by whatever means lest China find itself facing alone an overwhelming combination of the Russians and their regional lackeys.

Recently, however, China revised its ideological view of the Soviet Union. In 1979, it dropped the revisionist label, thus indicating that ideological differences were no longer basic to its quarrel with Moscow. By stressing the hegemonism theme, Peking clearly indicated that its concern centered on national security. Moreover, in early 1980, the first indications appeared that China once again considered the Soviet Union to be a socialist state. The most important implication of this change was for the internal Chinese order; China had to eliminate the contradiction between its own adoption of economic revisionism and its criticism of the Russians for the same policy. But there was an important foreign policy implication as well. If Moscow was now a socialist country after all, it could no longer conduct a social-imperialist foreign policy. China then need not be quite so fearful of the possibility of Soviet military action against Chinese territory, since China is another socialist country and thus less likely to suffer from Soviet political-military ambitions.

China's problem is thus reduced to competing with the Soviets for influence in Asia and other regions and to amassing enough power to approach Moscow through negotiations from strength. The US role correspondingly shrinks to that of security insurance agent in case the Russians were, in some unlikely instance, to surprise the Chinese militarily, and supplier of equipment and technology to help China modernize and eventually obtain a better deal from Moscow. Peking has not yet spelled out these implications of its changed ideological attitude toward the Soviet Union. But its policy toward the United States seems clearly to envisage this role for Washington.

### **AMERICA'S CHINA POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS**

What about American policy toward China in the context of its global rivalry with the Soviet Union and as it relates to the overall character of American Asian policy?

1. American foreign policy purposes are similar in many respects to those of China. The United States must first see to its own security, which of course means defense against Soviet nuclear attack. Because of America's insular geographic location, the United States seeks to defend its land boundaries as far away as possible, and supports the independence of as many—particularly industrial—states as possible around the Soviet periphery. In an era of stringent global competition with the Soviet Union, this interest motivates the United States to work out a security relationship with Peking. The other, more positive, side of security is access. The United States does not want to be frozen out of Asia or any substantial part of it. Hence the United States opposes any power that attempts to dominate Asia or its regions or one that tries to exclude American presence, be it economic, cultural, or military.

2. A second purpose is economic. America has become

## CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE

interdependent, especially with its most important regional trading partners in non-Communist Asia. For over a quarter century, the United States has fostered the economic development of its Asian friends and allies. Asian economic development has been so successful and rapid that some states are already highly industrialized, more are clearly on the way, and the rest have a good chance. That success enhances America's prosperity and security.

American economic policy in Asia also serves more basic purposes. One is to foster Asian prosperity as an essential condition for democratization. A second is to strengthen economic interdependence with Asian states, thus assuring US economic access to Asian markets and resources, including human capital and technology. Third, economic development on the foreign trade-foreign capital investment-economic interdependence model provides non-Western examples of the virtues of capitalism and interdependence.

China fits pursuit of these purposes. Through good economic relations with the United States, China looks with favor on America's Asian friends and allies and develops economic ties with them. That lessens military tensions. Second, the United States gains access to Chinese markets, resources, and goods. Third, China becomes partially integrated into the world economic system—which, because it is largely separated from the Soviet-led socialist economic system, tempts Peking less to reintegrate itself with Moscow. Finally, a close economic relationship with China enables the United States to influence the pace and the character of Chinese economic development. Thus, when China becomes the economic giant of Asia, as it surely will, it will be less tempted to turn against the United States, but will continue to cooperate with America and its Asian friends in a wider, mutually beneficial trans-Pacific cooperation.

3. The third American purpose in Asia (as elsewhere) is ideological. The United States wants a world of states similar to itself, politically and philosophically. This does not necessarily mean capitalist states; democratic socialism seems perfectly acceptable to latter-day America. It does mean, however, states whose people value the "open" society and basic political rights, and who take a charitable and humanitarian—if still prudent and realistic—approach to others. Certainly China does not meet this test. Leninist-type communism, of which the Chinese Communist Party is a principal example, is inimical to closely held American political and social values. This fact cannot be obscured by *realpolitik*-based political rapprochement nor by Peking's efforts, welcome as they are, to carry through needed socio-political reforms.

This poles-apart and ultimately irreconcilable ideological situation severely limits the ultimate character of Sino-American relations. How close, for anti-Soviet purposes, should America move toward China if continued cooperation means that Washington must ignore Chinese domestic policies at variance with basic American values? Ultimately, it would mean a double standard for the United States: submitting America's Asian allies to a higher test of moral and political goodness and China to a more relaxed standard.<sup>2</sup>

Although Peking has muted ideological criticism of America and of its Asian allies for foreign policy purposes, it remains faithful to long-held

## PANEL 1

Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles. And while the Maoist component is under stern scrutiny, even casting off its more extreme tenets would not lead to a genuine and permanent change in underlying attitudes toward Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and other relevant capitals. Moreover, the anti-Soviet glue that currently binds Washington and Peking some day will crack with age. And when differences over other issues re-emerge of their own accord, Chinese ideological attitudes toward the United States will again be important to China's policy toward Washington and its Asian friends.

4. The principal American foreign policy means has been the balance of power, whether it be called Cold War, containment, or detente. Transnationalism, isolationism, and other attempts to go beyond the balance of power have so far proved unworkable. America's China policy also centers on the balance of power by contributing to the balance against Soviet expansionism and by promoting America's Asian goals.

America's Asian balance of power policy has two components. First, to assure that no external state or combination of states dominates the region. That would place Asian resources and territory at the disposal of possibly unfriendly powers, subvert Asian economic development and democratization, and freeze out the United States. Second, to make certain that no indigenous Asian state or group of states, alone or in league with some external power, dominates the area. These two components indicate a policy of opposing expansion of Soviet power in Asia and that of any Soviet ally, e.g., Vietnam, since the Soviet Union is the only external power that has the capability to rule large parts of Asia. Asia also contributes to this policy by subtracting that region from places under undue Soviet influence and by contributing some of its resources to opposing Soviet expansion elsewhere.

America's Asian policy must center not only on Japan but also on China, as the strongest militarily and most centrally located geographically, if not yet economically most highly developed Asian state. This has been the case in every era since World War II: China's position between America and Russia has been a key element in setting America's policy toward the Soviet Union, Asia, and China itself.

China has been the "swing" member of the strategic triangle. Its policy variations have forced or made possible commensurate changes in America's China policies: opposing China in the 1950s, ignoring it in the 1960s, and allying with it in the 1970s. Each change was a natural, if not entirely automatic, reaction to the requirements of regional and global balance of power. Washington has always maintained the balance, but usually in response to made-in-Peking policy changes taken strictly for reasons of Chinese national interest.

Most instruments of policy have been employed principally for balance of power purposes. Thus, American economic and military assistance, trade patterns, immigration laws, clandestine and intelligence operations, military interventions, alliances, cultural and academic exchanges, basing agreements, troop stationing, naval and air deployments, shows of force, interpretations of international law, membership in and fostering of international and transnational organizations, attitudes toward the Asian

## CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE

component of global issues, and encouragement or discouragement of an activist role for other Western powers in Asia all have varied with Washington's relationship with Moscow globally and Peking regionally. So it is today and so it will be in the future. Since it is unlikely that Soviet-American relations will improve in the next decade or two, movement in American Asian and China policy will be determined by Peking's course between the two superpowers. This will be all the more so to the extent that Washington allows, as it does now, portions of its Asian and China policy to be made in Peking.

### COMPARING UNITED FRONT AND BALANCE OF POWER POLICIES

China's Washington-Moscow policy is based on the united front as a conservative and temporary device to preserve Chinese security under relative weakness. Washington's Peking-Moscow policy is based on the balance of power as a conservative but more permanent device to preserve Washington's security vis-a-vis Moscow and secure its regional Asian interests. Are united front and balance of power compatible in the sense of forming a solid basis for long-term Sino-American cooperation and friendship? Or are they mutually consistent only over the short term, destined eventually to drive the two states and peoples apart once again? If there are immediate and obvious benefits, in terms of national security, economic development, and cultural (if not ideological) harmony to the present arrangement, are they not being purchased at the expense of higher long-term costs?

Balance of power and united front are congruent so long as both Washington and Peking regard Moscow as a common and overriding threat and China considers economic development as its chief domestic priority. But they are not the same, even though they utilize many of the same policy instruments and even though they require some compromise in interests on both sides. And in the long run the changing situation and innate differences in the two policies may well drive America and China apart. China need not worry for a while about their ultimate incompatibility. A united front policy is quite capable, for a finite and presumably short period, of compromising some interests and postponing some goals, e.g., absorption of Taiwan and ideological competition with capitalism. Its short-term security goal, deterring Soviet expansionism in Asia and elsewhere, is identical to that of the United States, and the means thereto—cooperation in all spheres, including military—are similar in most cases.

It pays, however, to note the differences. One is that China must always feel it is leading the united front and not merely jointly cooperating or even serving as a junior partner in a budding alliance. Peking wishes to set the pace of mutual cooperation, stipulate its direction and distance, and decide which instruments of policy to use. Fortunately, Washington seems aware of these psychological needs on the part of the Chinese leadership. But a workable balance-of-power policy needs more. It needs, first, stability in policy direction and, second, cooperation in (joint and separate) use of policy instruments over a fairly lengthy period. The reason is that the overall global balance (which is what concerns Washington) changes only slowly—over decades.

## PANEL 1

Washington thus seeks assurances that China will not relatively suddenly change its policy, drop the anti-Soviet united front, and revert to one of its traditional historic postures— independence from both Moscow and Washington, isolation/autarchy, or reversal of united front opponents. To this should be added possible future policies of "Asianism" (a mixture of anti-Westernism and racism under Chinese leadership), a Third World-against-the-superpowers emphasis (presumably also under Chinese leadership), and regional expansionism as its power grows. China is not willing to give such assurances, of course, because it does not want to mortgage again its policy freedom to the dictates of a foreign power. A mutually binding relationship with the United States will not enhance Chinese maneuverability.

Thus a basic contradiction exists between the policies the two countries use to serve their similar, but not identical, goals. Washington wishes to enter into an ever-increasing series of treaties, agreements, arrangements, and working relationships on all levels, so that Peking will find interdependence advantageous and that there be stability in the relationship. Then the United States will be reasonably free to address the problem of Soviet power without having to worry about a Chinese double-cross (or, more positively, with the assurance of Chinese support for its anti-Soviet policies elsewhere) and without having to be side-tracked about Chinese assertiveness in Asia in ways, sub-regions, and at times inconvenient and inimical to American priorities and interests. Washington wants to put the China problem (in the large sense) on ice for two decades until it has successfully stymied Soviet expansionism. And it wants China to carry the principal anti-Soviet burden in Asia at little or no cost to the United States in terms of fatally compromised interests or any but marginal investment in policy instruments.

The other difference is in eventual outcomes, in Asia and as concerns the Soviet Union. Chinese policy is dual. The eventual purpose of a pure united front strategy is to reverse the power relationship with the opponent, to overthrow him, and ultimately destroy him. Peking probably does not have such drastic intentions in mind toward Moscow, to say nothing of lacking the means, in any reasonable future, of doing so. Nonetheless, the logic of the united front drives Peking in that direction, and it is that propensity, coupled with China's growth in power, that so troubles the Russians. On the other hand, China desires mere security from the Russian military threat. The united front is only one way to achieve that goal. The others are compromise with Moscow over the merits of their differences (the border question and the division of Soviet and Chinese power in Asia and elsewhere) and such vast growth in power that it can dispense with the need to truck with its American opponent and such wavering middle elements as Japan and West Europe. On balance, it is highly doubtful that Peking will stick with a united front policy forever. Indeed, the "lessons" of the Chinese Communist past, pre- and post-1949, point toward Peking's dropping the united front policy in favor of going it alone (as in the 1960s) or of maneuvering between Washington and Moscow (as in the late 1940s.) In either case, China would distance itself from the United States and seek a new, more positive, relationship with the Soviet Union.

The United States has a somewhat different set of outcomes in mind.

## CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE

In Asia, Washington wants a reasonably strong China, but one that, as it modernizes, joins with other Asian states and the Americans in a trans-Pacific comity of interdependent nations. Then Chinese power will be submerged in, and contribute to, a greater whole. Then also the probability of Sino-Soviet reconciliation injurious to the United States will be minimized. With China "captured," American access in all senses to Asia and security from Asian military threats will be served.

It is idealistic to think that such a felicitous outcome is probable. More likely is the gradual emergence of an increasingly powerful China demanding that its interests be served first and that external powers—the United States as well as the Soviet Union—leave the area. This would, of course, put other Asian states at China's mercy unless they banded together against Peking or unless they were able to find, or retain, an external protector. The first is unlikely (who would be the leader: Japan? India?), and the second would bring China back into conflict with the United States and its Asian allies. China need not, of course, turn Asia—or significant regions such as Southeast Asia—into its own sphere of influence by standing up to the Russians and the Americans simultaneously, or even by excluding their influence in turn. It can maneuver and balance between the two, with each policy swing selling its favors in distant regions for another increment of exclusivity in Asia. But in this case also, the United States must expect to find its Asian interests increasingly compromised as it purchases Chinese support for its greater policy needs elsewhere.

Sino-American detente, normalization, and now anti-Soviet entente are thus, in all probability, not steps toward permanent friendship and cooperation but a series of expedients. They are taken on both sides for a mixture of similar and different reasons and presume quite different outcomes. So long as the United States is constrained to subordinate its Asia policy to its interests elsewhere, so long as America feels itself weak vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and so long as it depends heavily on China to do much of its work for it, Peking is likely to raise the price of its services continuously. China's desire for Western technology and capital and its inordinate fear of Soviet military power are preventing, for a while, that price from rising rapidly. But it will do so, regularly and increasingly, when China progressively diminishes its fear of the Russians and when it lays in enough of an industrial base to wean itself from economic dependence on the West.

The United States has no choice, at the moment, but to continue its policy of all-around cooperation with China, including military. But it does so at a cost, the bills for which may be made known at inconvenient times and in higher than expected amounts. Perhaps the best—and the only—policy alternative open to the United States is to take a leaf out of Chinese history. What Washington needs is a "self-strengthening movement." It needs to put its domestic house back in order, thus providing the base from which it can, with confidence and ease, do what is necessary in the international sphere to compete on equal terms with the Soviet Union. These two tasks, at home and abroad, will surely occupy America's energies for the next two decades. After that, the Soviet Union will hopefully have been tamed and made a responsible member of the international community. Then it will be time to face the real China question: how to adjust to the expansion of Chinese power in a manner that will prevent war and still

## **PANEL 1**

secure American interests in Asia. The trick is to use China for anti-Soviet purposes in the near term but not mortgage our Asian policy, our interests, or our allies over the long pull. That is a tough job, but one that must be done.

### **ENDNOTES: CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS**

1. Moscow has constantly made known its willingness to resume close economic relations with China. That is the principal carrot the Kremlin has held out to Peking during the last two decades of estrangement. Additionally, a still large portion of China's industrial stock is Soviet-derived. It would thus be comparatively easy to reintroduce Soviet equipment into the Chinese economy, which in any case is also socialist and becoming ever more Soviet-like as modernization proceeds. Finally, China possesses many scientists, technicians, and managers who were trained in the Soviet Union or by Soviet personnel in China. These people probably would not feel particularly remiss were Peking and Moscow to make up economically, and they form a still-important "pressure group" in China.
2. There is, in fact, a dual ideological tension between Washington and Peking: differences between the attitudes with which the two regimes (and societies) view and treat each other directly, and differences in attitudes that each in turn uses when approaching each others Asian allies.
3. During the 1950s Peking allied with Moscow. Washington responded by forming its own united front through a series of alliances. In the 1960s China split with the Soviet Union, and the United States approached the Soviet Union with proposals for detente. Washington would have done the same with China had the Vietnam war and Chinese domestic politics not interfered. In the 1970s China felt threatened by Soviet arms and the United States needed support against Soviet expansionism. Washington thereupon moved with reasonable speed to make its peace with Peking, to keep the balance globally and restore it in Asia.

## **PANEL 2 THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, JAPAN, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS**

**Papers and discussions in this panel strived to increase our understanding of potential security threats in the Third World that affect the Western Alliance and Japan and that might call for concerted efforts. The group defined which potential international threats have the broadest impact and which issues might foster further security cooperation or policy divisiveness. The prospects for concerted NATO and US-Japanese actions were weighed against the obstacles to coordinated responses. The panel suggested appropriate coordinated military and nonmilitary actions and reviewed the coordinating mechanisms for these actions. An agenda of policy initiatives was proposed.**

## PANEL 2 PARTICIPANTS

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**RAPPORTEUR:** CDR Michael B. Hughes, USN, National War College.

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## **PANEL 2 SUMMARY**

### **The Western Alliance, Japan, and International Security Threats**

**Richard H. Ullman, Chairman**  
**Michael B. Hughes, Rapporteur**

Panel 2 had an extraordinarily broad mandate: "potential security threats in the Third World that affect the Western Alliance and Japan and that might call for concerted efforts." Although the scope seemed to exclude NATO Europe and major power confrontations, the panel members found, time after time, that such was not the case. To make sense of security issues outside the European theater, the panelists had to refer to events, problems, and negotiations within Europe and in the context of superpower relationships. The panel soon recognized that its bailiwick was the entire world.

The task was further complicated in that Panel 2's mandate also cut across the charters of Panels 1 and 4. Panel 4 focused directly on emerging security issues in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. Panel 1, while directly concerned with the evolving triangular relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), also dealt with the impact of that relationship on Southeast Asia. This overlap and the overall time constraints discouraged Panel 2 from examining either of these regions in particular depth.

At the same time, panel members were disinclined to examine in any depth the nonmilitary aspects of energy security. There was a ready consensus on the desirability—indeed the necessity—of the oil-importing states developing strategic petroleum reserves (storage) of at least 90 days' supply to cope with supply disruptions. However, the panel did not examine related aspects of the energy problem, such as the development of alternate fuels, schemes for oil-sharing, and measures to limit consumption. Although there was unanimous recognition of the absolutely primary requirement for a comprehensive national energy policy, these problems have been the focus of extensive study by groups and individuals far more expert than the individuals who constituted Panel 2.

The panel was acutely aware of the discrepancy between the vast resources and potential power at the disposal of Japan, the nations of Western Europe, and North America, and the relatively dismal record of these like-minded states in attempting effectively to aggregate this power. Time after time, separate national interests have been asserted; threats have been differentially assessed; and measures to coordinate responses to those threats have often been at best only rhetorical. That is scarcely

## PANEL 2

surprising given the fundamental fact of separate, sovereign nation-states, and the very considerable difference in circumstances in which they find themselves. The panel was always mindful of those differences in circumstances, in perceived interests, and in assessments of threats to those interests among the several Western states. In fact, panel members generally agreed that greater allied involvement in bilateral inter-bloc relations and Third World relations has emphasized national differences.

These differences have been exacerbated by changes in world politics over the past two decades. Two decades ago, as now, the Soviet Union was seen to be the state most threatening Western interests, although Americans, if not others, also looked upon the PRC as an implacable adversary and a potential enemy in war. However, in 1960 the Soviet Union posed a real military threat only in Europe, and although the PRC was seen to be seeking hegemony in Asia, its ability to project power beyond its immediate borders was less—considerably less—than that of the Soviet Union. Today, the Soviet Union appears capable of threatening Western interests at any point on the globe. Moreover, the Soviet Union shows no sign of slackening its very considerable effort to augment and improve its armed forces in response to its leaders' own apparent perceptions of an encircling hostile world—and of attractive opportunities in which those forces might be used, as they have been used in the Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan, to extend the scope of Moscow's influence.

At the same time, other circumstances seem very much less propitious for the Western states than they appeared two decades ago. At that time nearly all stood on the verge of enormous and impressive economic growth that not only promised better lives for all their citizens, but also made the choice between guns and butter seem unnecessary, or at least considerably less painful than it does now to societies whose growth rates are drastically reduced and in some cases even negative. Moreover, the Western states have allowed their economic well-being to become hostage to the governmental decisions of a small number of sparsely populated states that happen to possess enormous quantities of oil. Whether or not the Western nations might have been able, a decade or even 5 years ago, to avert this potential stranglehold is an issue of historical controversy which the panel did not examine. Yet, the Panel was generally in agreement, with only one or two dissenting voices, that the time had passed—if, indeed, it ever existed—when Western military action to seize the oil fields was a viable option. That, in itself, was an important—if easily reached—conclusion.

The acute dependence of most Western states on the actions of foreigners to assure their well-being in crucial respects is now a pervasive fact, although one that was not obvious prior to the 1970s. For some nations this dependence has justifiably become an obsession. Japan, for example, depends on foreigners for nearly all its energy resources and for crucial raw materials of other kinds. At the same time, it depends on foreigners for the markets that are vitally necessary to pay for the irreplaceable imports that fuel its economy. If the Japanese are more aware than ever before of their dependence on the actions of foreigners, Americans have become aware for the first time of a similar, if much less drastic, vulnerability. Over the last two decades the US economy has become

## THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

dependent on imported oil. Moreover, the United States has become truly vulnerable, for the first time, to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. Vulnerability—ways to reduce it, and at what price—has become an issue of acute importance in our politics, as the current election amply demonstrates.

The circumstances described above all contributed to the generally gloomy tone of the panel's discussions. One aspect of that tone is worthy of particular note: there was quite widespread nostalgia for a time when the United States was more "competent" in the world. Indeed, competence, or incompetence, was a yardstick frequently used to assess American foreign policy directions, the political/bureaucratic process, and military planning and execution. One member asserted that the United States has not demonstrated true military competence since the landing at Inchon in 1950. Several others stated, and still others undoubtedly felt, that a new demonstration of military competence is essential to the restoration of the respect, if not liking, that is the hallmark of relations between leaders and followers, and of deterrence between potential enemies. That is why the failure of the attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran seemed so painful. Yet a historian member of Panel 2 could not help wondering whether Americans had ever felt "competent" in the sense that so many members of the panel seemed to desire. A recital of the major events of the 1950s—the decade to which so many Americans nostalgically seem to hark back—puts the "competence" thesis in at least some doubt; we often felt impotent—and even vulnerable. It can be observed instead—or perhaps as well—that the perceptions of foreign friends and adversaries alike are clearly affected by our perceptions of ourselves, and the panel reflected a lack of confidence in American capability and will.

There was thus a nearly pervasive mood of unease, or distress, running through all of Panel 2's deliberations. It is important to note that this mood was reflected in members who themselves occupy all points on the domestic political spectrum. It perhaps explains the relatively modest and diffuse nature of the panel's conclusions. Before we can expect more of our allies, we must expect more of, and achieve more, ourselves. At present our allies are unlikely to follow us out on many limbs: our capacity to wield the safety net is too much in doubt in our own minds, and, therefore, in theirs.

Throughout its discussions the panel was schizophrenic regarding ours—and our allies'—ability to solve urgent problems through enhancing military forces. That we and they should augment our forces by at least 3 percent real growth was never challenged; but nor was the contention that very little of the turmoil in the Third World that might so disrupt our economies (and our comfort) is even remotely owing to Soviet actions. One of the excellent papers prepared for the panel declared that "poverty, corruption, autocratic rule, excessively rapid economic development in a backward social and religious environment, gross maldistribution of wealth, inequitable ownership of land—these are the ultimate enemies of Western interests in the non-Western world." Panel members agreed, and added to the enemies' list the rapid population growth that outpaces food production and the consequent overwhelming of urban regions. The industrialized nations find themselves increasingly dependent on a Third World characterized by growing chaos and rising doubts about the possibility of

## PANEL 2

establishing stability. No one asserted that military solutions can be found to any of these woes, all of which would exist even in the complete absence of expansionism on the part of the Soviet Union. (The existence of that expansionism as a fact of current international life was accepted, without dissent, by all members of the panel.)

Panel members generally agreed, however, that a visibly more capable Western military presence in areas of potential or actual Soviet intervention—notably the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean—is highly desirable. The panel appreciated the logic behind Secretary of Defense Brown's contention that the most cost-effective division of labor would be for the United States to take on the responsibility of deterring the Soviet Union in such regions, and for our allies to pick up the slack entailed in our diversion to other theaters of American forces previously earmarked for reinforcing Europe or maintaining stability in Northeast Asia. Some members argued that, in any case, this division of labor was inevitable—that no more than token contingents of non-US forces would be likely to take part in patrolling so far afield. But other members expressed concern that if our allies did not participate at some level greater than tokenism, they would find it too easy to opt out, psychologically, from confrontations. It would be too easy, post facto, to criticize the United States or even, when push came to shove, to take measures—such as restricting overflight—that would make American actions more costly. It was further argued that it would be critical for our domestic political consensus that the first Western casualties coming home from the Indian Ocean or the Gulf not be exclusively American.

These desiderata notwithstanding, the panel felt that a substantial allied (as distinguished from US) presence in the Indian Ocean would be most unlikely. Past French and British efforts in the area were recognized; but the panel's expectation was that neither the French nor the British government would in the future feel it could afford to maintain more than a ship or two, and a few visiting aircraft, in the area on anything like a continuing basis. Allies that could afford more—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Japan—would be prevented by constitutional and domestic political constraints from exercising military power so far from their home territories. On the other hand, both the FRG and Japan can be expected to increase their economic assistance to troubled nations in the area, such as Turkey.

Japan might well be prepared to take on greater responsibility for maintaining the security of the sea and air lanes around its home islands. Japanese defense expenditures are rising, and post-1945 inhibitions against any but very limited military roles are eroding. The political advocates of unarmed neutrality have been discredited and the internal debate on defense has become more open, less polemical, and more clearly a question of alternate methods and emphasis. Japanese perceptions of threat are changing and serious operational issues are being discussed. While the panel believes that it is propitious to continue diplomatic support for rearmament measures and incrementally increasing roles, it did not recommend radical departures from Japanese patterns of the recent past. That would disturb Japan's politics and perhaps those of some of its Asian neighbors as well.

## THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

The panel felt that Australia could be another potentially useful contributor to Indian Ocean security arrangements; it could, for example, deploy an aircraft carrier in the area from time to time. It was observed that, naturally enough, the Australians are more concerned about possible turmoil to their immediate north, and devote both military forces and economic assistance programs to the ASEAN area. Yet, it was still felt that Canberra might be induced to play a contributory role in the Indian Ocean as well.

An important aspect of the panel's discussion of responses to Indian Ocean contingencies was the great amount of attention given to the role of India. The panel unanimously concluded that American policy has been fundamentally misguided in its consistent underestimate of the benefits inherent in close and cordial relations with India. India fields by far the most powerful military forces in the area. They are also more modern, in every arm and service, than Americans commonly assume. India is now in the process of modernizing its forces still further, with plans for an air force capable of long-range missions, and a navy with increased capabilities.

It was pointed out that India has had the only consistently stable political system in the area—one, moreover, that has been generally democratic as well. Mrs. Gandhi is scarcely pro-Soviet by inclination. India fears instability elsewhere on the subcontinent and would be likely, as well, to respond to turmoil in the Gulf. India could not, and certainly should not, ever play the same role in American policy calculations as did the Shah's Iran. The very fact that India is so evidently not an American client is a potential source of strength. India requires American recognition of its paramount role in the area, American consideration for its military ambitions (except those aimed at Pakistan—if indeed, any aggressive designs still exist), and substantially higher levels of trade with, and aid from, the United States. It should be noted that this does not constitute a recommendation for any grand new diplomatic initiatives, but a conscious effort to improve consultations, and to broaden and deepen the existing bilateral relations with India.

There was disagreement within the panel as to whether the United States should continue to supply aid, perhaps in larger quantities and more overtly, to Afghan freedom fighters opposed to the Soviet occupation of their country. Most members felt that so long as Afghans wished to maintain their struggle they should be given arms to do so. Outsiders who furnish aid should harbor no illusion that the Afghan resistance will eventually succeed in expelling the Soviets; rather, aid should be rendered to make Moscow pay as heavy a price as possible, and, hopefully, to discourage similar future acts of aggression. Some members expressed doubt whether the Central Intelligence Agency could, under present disclosure procedures, furnish the Afghans with the weapons they need (including missiles for use against helicopters). Others argued that precisely for that reason our aid should be overt, even to the extent of being debated and approved by the Congress. Our commitment should be public, as should our willingness to furnish Pakistan with the means for defense against Soviet retaliatory attacks on resistance bases and supply depots. It should be emphatically restated that panel members hold, and continue to hold,

## PANEL 2

strongly divergent views in this area, particularly with regard to the covert/overt issue.

The panel expressed concern as to whether Congress would be willing to appropriate funds necessary to furnish the aid to both Pakistan and India that might enhance American influence with each nation. The panel also worried that congressionally mandated procedures for dealing with evident nuclear weapons proliferators were so narrowly cast as to deprive Washington of bargaining leverage. Given the recent damping of the hostility between India and China, Indian interest in a nuclear weapons program has seemed to be abating. But in Pakistan, which wants nuclear weapons for protection against possible Indian attack, the clandestine nuclear weapons program appears to be flourishing.

It should be noted that the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region was the only one in which the panel thought it worthwhile to have an organized allied force in being. For other potential contingencies—in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia—the panel felt that, unless the Soviet Union were substantially to augment its own presence, measures to organize anything more than the present levels of individual Western efforts were unnecessary, and were likely to be counterproductive. (These separate Western presences, of course, are not inconsiderable—e.g., the US military presence in the Caribbean, or that of France in substantial parts of Africa.)

Specifically, the panel agreed that the primary threats to stability in Southeast Asia were internal. While there was no disagreement that instabilities could be exploited by the Soviet Union or surrogate powers, most panel members believed that our current policy toward ASEAN and individual member states is appropriately balanced. The panel also felt that continued Australian involvement in this region should receive full support from the United States.

Latin America was another region where there was doubt about the need for joint efforts, and where the panel felt US policies should be more country and area specific. The relative importance of internal threats versus Cuban inspired and directed pressures (perhaps in coordination with Moscow) received some attention in the discussion. Yet most panel members agreed that the internal causes of instability were primary although they might be exacerbated by externally backed groups. No specific policy measures towards Cuba were recommended, but some panelists recommended that it be treated as a representative of Soviet power. Blanket human-rights policies and their impact on security relations with the major South American states were also discussed without reaching unanimity.

Africa received particular attention in the discussion because its geographical proximity to the NATO area made joint endeavors more probable. However, important states, such as Nigeria, and also the Organization of African Unity, are at least as opposed to any enhanced Western effort as they are to an increased Soviet presence. A higher Western profile in this area would appear to be especially counterproductive, given this initial African resistance and the likely racial overtones. Continued instability in Africa seems certain, given administrative borders that bear little

## THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

resemblance to ethnic boundaries, governmental incompetence, incoherent societies, and the resultant vulnerability to coups d'etat. Interventions in the area should involve states with traditional interests, be minimal, and be conducted on an ad hoc basis.

Just as the panel saw little pressing need now for a substantially augmented organized Western effort, it also saw no need for new institutional mechanisms for decisionmaking and coordination. Such machinery should for the time being be informal and ad hoc—a "coalition of the willing," as one member of the panel put it. Certainly, existing NATO machinery should not be used for decisionmaking (as distinguished from discussion and consultation) regarding contingencies beyond the NATO treaty area: the French would not take part in such formal deliberations, and their presence in so many regions is of considerable importance. Members of the panel cited the consultations and ad hoc decision processes that took place in connection with the 1978 Western interventions in Shaba as about right both in intensity and duration. An important underlying factor in these conclusions was a sense of the relative fragility of the NATO alliance; now is not the time to build new organizations, take new initiatives, or assign new tasks to the existing infrastructure.

If the panel saw no present need for a greater institutional capacity for organized decisionmaking, it did see a need for more extensive and continuing consultation. That is scarcely a startling observation: but merely because every report on the workings of the alliance (as well as the alliances of the United States in the Pacific with Japan and with Australia and New Zealand) includes a plea for greater and more extensive consultation is no reason for not reiterating the point again! The need is as considerable and continuing as meeting it is inconvenient and difficult.

Consultation takes place at many levels and in many forms, and obviously what the panel had in mind was effective communication at the highest political levels. But because of its sponsorship and the location in which it met, the panel felt that it would be remiss not to make the following point: it deplores the short-sighted action by the Congress that in an effort to save trivial sums of money, has sharply decreased the number of foreign military officers in American senior service schools (and American officers sent abroad to foreign senior service schools). The interpersonal relationships forged in the War Colleges and in other such institutions are invaluable not only for communication between American officers and diplomats and those from other countries, but even for communication among nationals of various other countries. On a few occasions in the past these relationships have been crucially important in defusing tensions. The now weakened links should be restored to their full potential richness.

Now for some concluding remarks that might have been made at the outset. As members of the panel observed, there are political processes in train which, over the next 12 months, will necessitate dealings between the West—particularly the Europeans—and the Soviet Union. In September the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation) review conference begins in Madrid. Confidence-building measures will be a major item on the Madrid agenda, particularly from the smaller European NATO members. And

## PANEL 2

smaller and large members alike will have a strong interest in pushing negotiations with the Soviets over LRTNF (Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces); that process has already been triggered by the conversation between Helmut Schmidt and Leonid Brezhnev. It is likely, as one member of the panel put it, that the Soviets will begin a "peace campaign." It will coincide with election campaigns not only in our own country, but in Germany and France as well. The present politics of the United States will not be influenced by conciliatory Soviet overtures—indeed quite the contrary. But European leaders will feel strong pressures upon them to demonstrate that, despite Afghanistan, detente is alive and well. Continued pressures from leftist factions in European politics can be expected: the likelihood is that Chancellor Schmidt will be returned to power, but that the center of gravity of the Social Democratic Party ranks in the Bundestag will be farther left than it now is; in France, President Giscard D'Estaing feels compelled to play his Moscow card in order to preempt the left; in Britain, although Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives enjoy a safe majority and face no immediate election, the Labour Party is being hammered by a disarmament-oriented left wing rallying around slogans reminiscent of the 1950s. Meanwhile, our own increased awareness of US vulnerability, widespread American disenchantment with detente, and added emphasis on national security concerns in the context of the 1980 election campaign have broadened the scope for increased disharmony between Washington and its European allies. (The same is true in US-Japanese relations which are seriously impaired by conflicts over trade issues.)

This probable scenario and resultant tensions make it especially incumbent that American diplomacy be alert to recognize and understand the pressures that impel US allies, particularly the Europeans, towards negotiations with Moscow. Further, it is incumbent upon Washington to explore seriously the prospects for fruitful negotiations: where the Soviet peace campaign is simply propaganda, it should be exposed as such. However, opportunities for substantive progress in reducing the likelihood of war in Europe should be exploited as they arise. This does not mean—and on this the Europeans should be left in no doubt—that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan should in any way be condoned or swept under the rug. The measures now in place to raise Moscow's costs for its aggression should be continued. But at the same time, the health of the alliance and, indeed, our own long-range interests, suggest that we pursue other tracks that can buttress stability. It was generally agreed that clear linkage existed between our European policies and any effort to coordinate actions in the Third World; agreement on coordinated Western security policies in external areas remains highly unlikely without substantial agreement on European issues.

The panel often returned to a central and most basic issue: the United States is in urgent need of a policy consensus. Without clearer directions in security policy and increased predictability regarding US actions and initiatives, increased coordination among the allies on almost any security issue will remain an extremely difficult, if not unachievable, goal.

## **PANEL 2 PAPER: The Western Alliance, Japan, and International Security Threats**

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### **THE GEO-STRATEGIC CRISIS**

Today the West—which for the purpose of this paper is defined as the North Atlantic area, Japan, and Oceania—confronts a grave security crisis outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area. Certain and uninterrupted access to resources vital to the West's economic survival is being jeopardized by myriad threats challenging not just Western economic interests but the West's very capacity, through its principal instrument of collective security, to respond in a coordinated and effective fashion.

Indeed, events of the past decade in Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia raise serious doubts about the continued utility of NATO as the primary instrument for the collective defense of Western security interests. Both the locus and character of the main threat to those interests have radically changed since the Alliance was formed in 1949. As former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger has observed, in 1949

we needed to protect the land mass of Western Europe against the possibility of Soviet invasion and to provide for the recovery of Western Europe. Those requirements were met through the creation of NATO and the Marshall Plan. Today, the security problem has taken on an altered form. The easiest route to the domination of Western Europe by the Soviet Union is through the Persian Gulf. And it is to be noted that NATO is a defensive alliance. It cannot in terms of its own charter respond to what may be the more serious threat against security of Western Europe.<sup>1</sup>

On the contrary, during the past decade it has become apparent that NATO's very success in deterring a direct Soviet military advance against Western Europe has compelled Moscow to adopt an alternative, indirect approach to undermining Western security. Blocked in Europe, emboldened by its rising military power, and encouraged by the flaccidity of Western responses to it, the Soviet Union now seeks to gain a stranglehold on the economic foundations of Western security. This intended flanking maneuver across the West's vital, but comparatively undefended, economic underbelly in the Third World is the common denominator of Soviet and Soviet-sponsored violence in Central America, Angola,

## PANEL 2

Mozambique, Ethiopia, Yemen, Iran, Afghanistan, and Indochina. It accounts in no small part for the steady and impressive growth in the size and capabilities of Soviet surface naval, amphibious assault, airlift, airborne, and other forces dedicated to the projection of power beyond the traditional confines of the Eurasian landmass. It is manifest in the establishment of Soviet-controlled military bases astride the West's economic lines of communication with the Third World.

The Soviet aim is not confined simply to posing the threat of economic interdiction; forces capable of denying the West access to the raw materials of the Third World are forces capable of disrupting the movement of vital US reinforcements across the Atlantic in the event of war in Europe. It is the conclusion of the noted American kremlinologist Richard Pipes that:

The Soviet Union may be said to be laying siege to Western Europe . . . in the same manner in which medieval castles were blockaded prior to the introduction of gunpowder—that is, by a systematic effort to cut off the flow of reinforcements and supplies: reinforcements of manpower and material from the United States, and supplies in the form of fuel and metals from the Middle East and South Africa.<sup>2</sup>

Specific threats to Western security interests in the Third World may be grouped into three categories. The first is the direct employment of Soviet forces against a Third World state. Until December 1979, this threat was dismissed in many Western quarters: for decades the Soviet Union had confined its military conquests to the European area (Mongolia being the sole exception), and had relied mainly on surrogate forces to achieve power and influence outside Europe.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, has demonstrated both a capacity and a willingness to employ military power directly against a non-European state in a fashion that poses a distinct menace to Western interests outside the NATO area. Given the steady deterioration of central authority in neighboring Iran and a history of unflagging Russian imperial designs on that country, the invasion of Afghanistan threatens to compromise defense of the entire structure of Western interests in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. The establishment of a Soviet Afghanistan almost doubles the length of Soviet-controlled border with Iran, brings Soviet forces some 300 miles closer to the Kremlin's realization of a centuries-old dream of a warm water port in the Arabian Sea, and opens the lengthy Afghan-Pakistan border to potential Soviet penetration. From a purely military standpoint the occupation of Afghanistan threatens an already tenuous balance in the region; aside from stunning proof that the Soviets have achieved an operational mastery of their growing capacity to project military force abroad, the occupation extends the reach of Soviet tactical airpower to areas in the Indian Ocean heretofore regarded as aerial sanctuaries by the West. In so doing, the occupation of Afghanistan furthers the erosion of the East-West naval balance in the Indian Ocean.

Whether Soviet forces will advance beyond Afghanistan (against Iran or Pakistan) remains a matter of speculation. In Afghanistan Moscow

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

obviously was deterred neither by Western military power in the region nor by the prospect of indigenous resistance. Admittedly, the logistical burden of sustaining major aggression against Iran or Pakistan would be far heavier than that in Afghanistan; moreover, a Soviet invasion of either country probably would inflame the entire Islamic world, provoking a level of indigenous armed resistance far exceeding that in Afghanistan. With respect to countries on the other side of the Arabian Sea, the Soviet Union would confront the formidable logistical difficulties stemming from the lack of a contiguous force presence (i.e., the absence of direct land lines of communication).

Nevertheless, it would be imprudent for the West to discount entirely the possibility that another "Afghanistan" might be visited upon a Persian Gulf state. With the exception of Iraq, no Persian Gulf state possesses military power sufficient to guarantee success against even those forces the Soviet Union could bring to bear against them by sea and air. Such forces include no fewer than seven airborne divisions, each of which contains over 300 armored vehicles—more than possessed, for example, by either the Omani army or the army of the United Arab Emirates.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, uncertainty over the possibility of another Afghanistan is implicit in the Carter Doctrine, proclaimed in the President's State of the Union address in January 1980. Stimulated by the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan, the doctrine is directed against further "external" aggression against the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.

A second category of threats to Western interests outside the NATO area is local transnational aggression by a Soviet client state. Examples include the Angolan invasion of Shaba in 1978, the Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia in 1979, and recurring Libyan intrusions into Chad. Possible future manifestations of this more subtle threat are a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand, an attack on Oman by South Yemen, and an Iraqi move to gain control of Kuwait and the oil-bearing regions of Saudi Arabia.

The last contingency merits particular attention because it exerts a major influence on US force planning for non-NATO contingencies and because the Soviet-supplied Iraqi armed forces are the largest and most powerful of any in the critical Persian Gulf area. Although Iraq is certainly no puppet of the Soviet Union, Iraqi foreign policy since 1968 has been distinctly hostile to the West and to the more conservative Arab regimes on the Arabian peninsula (especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia). This hostility constitutes a potentially explosive factor in the region, given the comparative military weakness of Iraq's neighbors. Iraq's army of 180,000 men, 12 divisions, and the 3,700 armored fighting vehicles (including Soviet T-62 main battle tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles) dwarfs the combined ground forces of Saudi Arabia, Oman, North and South Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>4</sup> More significant, its firepower and tactical mobility dwarf that of the ground forces which the West could rapidly bring to bear on the Arabian peninsula.

The third and perhaps most significant category of threats to Western interests outside the NATO area is the internal overthrow of regimes friendly to the West, either by Soviet-sponsored subversion or by purely indigenous forces hostile to the West. Examples of Soviet-sponsored

## PANEL 2

internal revolutions are the Neto regime in Angola, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, and the Frelimo government in Mozambique. All of these countries are positioned along critical Western maritime lines of communication with the Third World. The establishment of Soviet naval and air bases in those countries similar to those installations already constructed or abuilding at Cam Ranh Bay, Socotra, and Aden constitutes a potential vise on the West's economic jugular.

That a national revolution *unsupported* by the Soviet Union can be just as detrimental to Western security interests as those that have taken place in Africa with Soviet and Cuban assistance has been evident in Iran. In fact, the collapse of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini underlines a central reality that the West cannot afford to ignore in devising responses to its threatened interests outside the NATO area: the turmoil that has engulfed the non-Western world since the demise of colonialism is attributable for the most part to indigenous political, social, and economic factors over which neither the West nor the Soviet Union has any immediate influence, much less control. While there is no doubt that the Soviet Union has sought to exploit that turmoil for its own purposes, and in so doing has contributed to instability, it would be a profound mistake to view Soviet policies in the Third World as the principal cause of instability.

Poverty, corruption, autocratic rule, excessively rapid economic development in a backward social and religious environment, gross maldistribution of wealth, inequitable ownership of land—these are the ultimate enemies of Western interests in the non-Western world. As such, the problem of *internal* aggression, supported or not by outside forces, is far less susceptible to purely military solutions than the problems of direct Soviet aggression and transnational aggression committed by a Soviet client state. In discussing the question of how best the West should respond to the emerging global threat to its interests, the British Defense White Paper of 1980 correctly observes that:

The best answer is to try to remove the sources of regional instability which create opportunities for outside intervention. In some circumstances, military measures will not be appropriate at all; in others, they may form only one component of the total response. Diplomacy, development aid and trade policies will usually have a great contribution to make. . . . Nonetheless many forms of defense assistance can and should play a part in the support of friendly nations. . . . Over and above this, the West must make it clear to the Soviet Union and its allies that it is capable of protecting essential interests by military means should the need arise.<sup>5</sup>

That these challenges to Western security outside the NATO area constitute threats as potentially deadly as any posed within the NATO area by the Soviet Union is glaringly evident in a host of statistics on the present and projected Western dependence on Third World oil and other critical raw materials. The sensitivity of the West's economy even to momentary disruptions in the steady flow of Third World raw materials was graphically demonstrated during the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74. Less well appre-

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

ciated was the embargo's direct and immediate impact on NATO's military readiness. Within a few weeks, the US Navy was driven to reduce steaming hours by 20 percent, while the US Air Force cut flying time by 33 percent.<sup>6</sup> In Europe, NATO training exercises were sharply abridged and fuel-sharing arrangements undertaken among various national commands.

It is important to keep in mind that Western economic dependency on the non-Western world is not a new phenomenon. Since the beginning of the Industrial Age, Europe has been increasingly reliant on access to raw materials outside the Continent. The present geostrategic crisis confronting the West is thus not attributable to the *need* for assured access, but rather to the fact that access is *no longer assured*.

For well over a century, uninhibited Western passage to the fossil fuels and mineral resources of Africa and Asia was guaranteed through the medium of colonial empires and by continued, unchallenged Western control of the seas in the immediate post-colonial era. By the late 1970s, however, there had occurred three seminal developments which together placed that access in jeopardy. The first was the collapse of Europe's colonial empires in the 1940s and 1950s, and the emergence of a host of largely unstable and often warring states incapable of providing the requisite political stability associated with the West's traditionally untrammelled access to vital non-Western sources of raw materials.

The second was the steady recession of Western military power outside the North Atlantic area that accompanied the demise of colonialism. That recession was highlighted by Britain's decision in the late 1960s to withdraw all but token forces deployed "east of Suez" and a concomitant decline in the US military presence overseas. Despite the emergence of a powerful "blue-water" Soviet Navy sustained by ever-expanding Soviet access to far-flung naval bases and facilities, the size of the active US Fleet declined from a pre-Vietnam (1964) level of 803 ships to but 413 vessels by 1980. United States naval and air bases overseas—essential for the sustained projection of power in logistically remote areas of the world—dwindled from a high of 150 in 1953 to approximately 30 in the late 1970s.<sup>7</sup> In the critical Indian Ocean area, naval facilities available to the United States shrank during the same period from 23 to seven.<sup>8</sup>

The third and most ominous development has been the relentless (and continuing) establishment of Soviet military power in critical areas vacated by the West. Nowhere has this trend been more profoundly illustrated than in Southeast Asia, where Soviet utilization of US-constructed naval facilities at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay has led to the establishment of a permanent, hostile naval presence in the South China Sea, astride one of the West's critical sea lines of communication to the Persian Gulf.

In short, what for the West was once a purely economic matter has now become a security crisis as well: what were always vital economic interests whose security was taken for granted are for the first time being challenged by a combination of local instability and a hostile, external power both willing and ever more capable of exploiting that instability to the West's disadvantage.

## PANEL 2

In sum, the essence of the West's geostrategic crisis is the presence in large areas of the world of vital interests unattended by a military presence and capability sufficient to deter and defeat burgeoning threats to those interests. The crisis is compounded by several factors. First, unlike the Eastern bloc, which is dominated by a single state capable of orchestrating a coordinated international threat (e.g., the combination of Soviet weapons, East German technical advisors, and Cuban troops) to Western interests outside the NATO area, the Atlantic Alliance is a grouping of sovereign states possessing disparate and sometimes conflicting national interests in the Third World. European interests in the Third World have never been identical to those of the United States. This is especially true in the Middle East, where substantial differences continue to separate US and national European policies on such critical issues as nuclear proliferation, conventional arms transfers, and the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the Middle East process. An excellent example has been the strong US opposition to France's agreement in 1976 to provide the Soviet client state of Iraq highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium for its French-built reactor near Baghdad.<sup>9</sup>

A second factor compounding the West's geostrategic crisis is the differing levels of dependency on Third World raw materials among the member states of NATO. This is particularly the case with respect to Persian Gulf oil: for example, over 60 percent of Western Europe's imported oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, compared to a figure of less than 10 percent for the United States. Japan is even more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than is Europe.

The far greater reliance of Western Europe and Japan on Persian Gulf oil has generated Allied perceptions of the Soviet threat to the region and proposed responses to it quite different from those harbored by the United States. The United States, whose economy is less vulnerable than are the economies of Europe and Japan to an interruption in the flow of Middle East oil, has (at least since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979) been more forceful than its NATO or Asian allies in responding to Soviet penetration of the Middle East and Southwest Asia. In contrast, Japan and the nations of Western Europe, seemingly numbed by their utter dependence on Gulf oil, have yet, as Albert Wohlstetter has correctly observed, "to face candidly the dangers made visible by the recent crisis in the gulf region."<sup>10</sup> This different perception of the threat has been manifest in the lukewarm Japanese and European support provided for strong countermeasures proposed by the United States. The US imposition of a partial embargo on grain sales and technology transfers to the Soviet Union in the wake of the Afghan invasion was not accompanied by any significant similar measures on the part of its allies. Nor did the allies respond adequately to President Carter's call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games: France refused to join the boycott; Japan did so only under US pressure; and Germany postponed its decision for fear that the Carter administration would change its mind.

In fairness it must be admitted that more is involved in allied reluctance to follow the US lead than simply varying perceptions of the threat. As Richard Burt has astutely noted:

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

The disinclination . . . of some European governments to adopt a tougher line toward Moscow not only reflects fears of possibly entering a new Cold War. It also reveals the new caution of Europeans in following American policy initiatives. The caution, obviously, is not difficult to understand: for three years America's allies in Europe have been almost continuously surprised and irritated by Carter administration policies that they neither expected nor understood.

The confusion and inconsistency of Carter administration policy toward the Soviet Union is a case in point. While highly critical of Moscow's human rights performance at home, the administration only gradually grew concerned with the projection of Soviet power abroad. Rapid reversals in policies toward Moscow led some European governments to conclude that Washington's strong initial reaction to Afghanistan would probably soon be replaced with a more conciliatory line. But European confusion over Washington's policy toward Moscow is only part of the problem. Other aspects of American foreign policy over the last three years, particularly efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology, and conventional arms, have also irritated Europeans and contributed to the fundamental divergence of perspective that now threatens NATO."

A third and closely related factor compounding the West's geostrategic crisis is Western Europe's sense of greater dependence on Soviet good will than exists in the United States. If Western Europe has yet "to face candidly the dangers" to its security posed by Soviet expansion in the Third World, it seems much more fearful than the United States of the potential dangers in challenging that expansion. The proximity of massive Soviet military forces to NATO Europe; Western Europe's heavy investment in trade with the Soviet Union; the reliance of many Allied governments on parliamentary support from parties and factions ideologically committed to a pervasive and permanent politico-military detente with the Soviet Union—all serve as dampers on Western Europe's willingness to challenge surrogate or even direct Soviet aggression outside the Continent.

In fact, many Allied governments appear to treat detente as a geographically restricted venture: Soviet behavior that would be unacceptable in Europe, and might even lead to war, is tolerated and often ignored outside the NATO area even though that behavior may pose no less a deadly threat to the West. Indeed, a resolution of the question whether detente is divisible is a prerequisite for the resolution of the geostrategic crisis now facing the West. Can the West meet the burgeoning Soviet challenge to its interests outside the NATO areas if it chooses to apply two separate standards for judging the Soviet Union's international behavior? Or to put the question in broad operational terms, can the United States be expected to sustain a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf while the Europeans continue a policy of cooperation with Moscow in Europe? Simply to pose the question is to answer it.

## PANEL 2

A final factor is the near certainty that the Soviet Union itself will become a net importer of oil. Although predictions vary as to when rising Soviet requirements for oil (which include supplying Eastern Europe and maintaining a level of oil exports to the West sufficient to finance imports of desperately needed grain and advanced technology) will exceed domestic production, most analysts agree that the Soviet Union will become a net importer of oil well before the turn of the century. As such, Moscow will have an additional incentive to gain control over Persian Gulf oil supplies; control would provide not only a stranglehold on the West's economic well-being, but also a solution to what appears to be an impending Soviet energy crisis.

### ADDRESSING THE CRISIS

Manifestly, the effectiveness of any collective Western military and nonmilitary measures aimed at meeting the challenge of regaining secure and uninterrupted access to the oil and other Third World raw materials essential to the West's survival will depend on the degree of Western political consensus achieved on the character of the threat as well as the urgency and proper means of responding to it. That such measures must be collective—representing a common effort of at least the major Western powers if not a formal commitment by the NATO alliance as a whole—is evident in the magnitude of the Soviet challenge and in the fact that for at least the remainder of the decade the United States alone will be neither militarily nor politically in a position to assume the burden of defending shared Western interests outside the North Atlantic area.

Such a political consensus, however, will not come easily since it requires not only a reassertion of strong, consistent American leadership singularly lacking during the past half-decade, but also a fundamental redefinition of Western policy toward the Soviet Union that would hold hostage to Soviet behavior in the Third World the continued pursuit of commercial, political, and military detente (especially further efforts to achieve strategic and other arms limitations) north of the Tropic of Cancer. A consensus cannot be created in the face of a timid and inconstant US foreign policy that has done little save irritate friends and encourage adversaries; nor is a consensus possible in an environment characterized by a progressive European willingness to accommodate the Soviet Union even on European security issues.

With respect to the specific measures required to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World, first and foremost among them is the reestablishment of a substantial Western force presence outside the NATO area, particularly in the critical Indian Ocean. The steady recession since 1945 of Western military power from the non-Western world, which has created a vacuum of force that the Soviet Union has all too willingly filled, must be reversed. If the West is to deter direct threats to its vital interests in the Third World, it must rearmy those interests to a visible force presence. Vital interests unattended by military power requisite for their protection provide a standing invitation to hostile adventure.

How large and visible a reestablished Western force presence outside the NATO area should be is a matter of continuing debate, at least within the United States. What is not in dispute is the need for a larger standing

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

Western force presence in the non-Western world. Moreover, it is widely recognized that such a presence must of necessity be largely maritime in character, since there is little political prospect for the West's reestablishment of a major ground and tactical air presence ashore in the Third World.

In short, the reassertion of Western military power in the non-Western world will dictate a substantially heightened investment in naval power and sea-based air power, even at the expense of a concomitant comparative disinvestment in ground and tactical air forces that for thirty years have provided the foundation for the defense of Western interests on the European continent. At issue is not simply an expansion of Western military power; Western military power additionally must be restructured to meet the demands of an environment where the pre-positioning of major forces ashore is not possible.

Second, the West must create a substantial capacity to project military force ashore in the non-Western world, should its standing force presence offshore fail to deter a direct challenge to its interests. Meeting this requirement will entail increases in existing amphibious assault capabilities in order to deal with contingencies involving contested entry. It will certainly demand major increases in the strategic mobility of Western ground and other general purpose forces through larger numbers of strategic air- and sea-lift platforms and through the concept of maritime pre-positioning—measures that are prominent in the proposed US Rapid Deployment Force. It is not within the purview of this essay to prescribe specific programmatic actions or levels of military investment; however, it is important to recognize that the West's new geostrategic requirements for power projection capabilities have emerged against a backdrop of over two decades of declining investment in such capabilities. For example, the level of US amphibious shipping is at its lowest point since World War II.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, US strategic air- and sea-lift capabilities are currently insufficient to meet the stated requirements of a war in Europe, to say nothing of those of a simultaneous conflict in a logistically remote area such as the Arabian peninsula.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the questionable US ability to project even a tiny military force ashore in that area of the world was underscored by the disaster that befell the attempt to extract US hostages in Tehran in April 1980.

A third essential requirement, related to both the reestablishment of a standing Western force presence in the non-Western world and an enhanced capacity to project force ashore, is the restoration of the West's sagging military reputation, particularly that of the United States. By reputation is meant a demonstrated willingness to employ force in defense of vital Western interests outside the NATO area and an ability to do so competently.

The decline of Western military power vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union during the past decade has not gone unnoticed in the Third World, nor has US inaction in the face of mounting Soviet-Cuban military penetration of Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. The Atlantic Council of the United States has correctly observed that:

There has been a change in the perception of  
Western power and influence on the part of Third World

## PANEL 2

nations. The withdrawal from Vietnam, the Guam doctrine, the Vietnam syndrome as exemplified by Angola, and the decline in Western military capabilities—not only American, but British and other Western capabilities as well—Soviet successes in Ethiopia and Afghanistan, together with the trend toward an overall balance of power favoring the Soviets, all contribute to lessened confidence.<sup>14</sup>

The Council might have added that confidence in the West's will was certainly not restored by the feeble American responses to the 1979 seizure of US diplomatic personnel in Tehran or by the subsequent unedifying spectacle of Western disarray over the question of whether to boycott Olympic Games hosted in a country in the process of suppressing with lethal nerve gas what appeared to be the remaining vestiges of armed resistance in Afghanistan. As James Schlesinger has noted, "A great power cannot retain influence when the conviction becomes widespread that it lacks the will to employ force to protect its interests."<sup>15</sup> Yet with the exception of France, since the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, no member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has shown a consistent willingness to employ force to protect its interests outside the NATO area.

In the case of the United States, doubts surrounding will to use force have been accompanied by questions of competence. It is worth recalling that the bungled military attempt to free the US hostages in Iran was not the first such debacle. Indeed, for two decades the United States has fumbled every significant military adventure it has undertaken. The American-sponsored invasion of Cuba in 1961 was defeated on the beaches at the Bay of Pigs because it was unsupported by US air power. American arms were defeated in Indochina for a host of reasons, not the least of which were an unbounded confidence in technology to resolve what were nontechnological problems and the application of a strategy of hesitant incrementalism that fooled no one except its authors. The masterfully executed US commando raid on North Vietnam's Son Tay prison camp in 1970 was denied success because the US intelligence community failed to detect the prior evacuation of US prisoners of war from the camp. The 1975 descent of US Marines on the island of Koh Tang in search of the hijacked crew of the *Mayaguez* was a grim comedy of errors entailing high casualties among the assault forces, ignorant of the fact that the vessel's crew had already been set free.

Although the precise causes of failure differed in each instance, they were failures nonetheless. Their cumulative impact upon perceptions in the Third World and the Soviet Union of America's military reliability has been highly detrimental, particularly when stood against the recent and comparatively masterful Soviet military performances in Ethiopia and Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup>

In sum, even the reestablishment of substantial Western military capabilities in the non-Western world will be of little avail if those capabilities are not accompanied by a manifest willingness and ability to use them.

A fourth requirement is the strengthening of the West's peaceful ties with the Third World by means of increased trade, investment, economic

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

aid, and where appropriate, security assistance. The steady decline over the past decade in the level of Western economic aid to, and investment in, the Third World, together with the persistence of formidable barriers to North-South trade have often contributed to the very instability in the non-Western world that the Soviet Union has exploited. With respect to security assistance, the Carter administration's ideological aversion to arms transfers outside the NATO area has served to deny weapons even to those who are prepared to resist direct Soviet aggression. The apparent refusal of the administration to supply Afghan rebel forces with anything more than a limited number of small arms is perhaps the most prominent case in point. As noted by the Atlantic Council:

From the point of view of many Third World governments seeking to maintain their independence, and feeling the need to turn to an outside nation for assistance, the failure of the Western nations to provide support in such circumstances seemed incomprehensible. To their eyes, it seems clear that if the presence of outside forces and weapons is not responded to by Western help, the balance of power in the situation will be determined by default. To them it seems clear that if Western military training is not available for their officer cadre or equipment for their troops, the Warsaw Pact will be ready to fill the void. In such circumstances, the Third World nation may well consider the West an uncertain and unreliable ally, and turn away from the West toward accommodation with the East. Inaction, then, does not always equate with safety, as its proponents so frequently allege.<sup>17</sup>

What is needed is a coordinated program among the United States, its principal NATO allies, and Japan to provide selected Third World states with a level of economic and security assistance sufficient to promote internal political stability and a capacity for competent local self-defense. Such a program could draw heavily upon a combination of Japanese and European financial resources and North Atlantic weapons and military expertise.

### OBSTACLES TO MEETING NEW WESTERN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

It is easier to define Western security requirements outside the NATO area than it is to fulfill them. Obstacles to meeting those requirements are formidable, challenging the very capacity of the West to provide joint defense of its common interests in the non-Western world.

The first and perhaps most redoubtable obstacle is rooted in the inability of most Western nations to muster a significant force presence outside the NATO area. With the exception of France, and to a lesser extent Great Britain, only the United States deploys significant military forces outside the NATO area.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, for a host of political, economic, and military reasons, the United States is the only member of the Alliance capable of generating most of the additional forces and capabilities required for an expanded Western force presence and capacity to project force ashore outside the NATO area.

## PANEL 2

Of equal importance is the fact that, at least until the latter half of the 1980s, the United States can meet these new requirements only at the expense of a diminution in US military capabilities inside the NATO area. Although US military planning since 1969 has called for capabilities sufficient to wage simultaneously a major conflict in Europe and a lesser conflict elsewhere (the so-called "one and one-half war" strategy), the simple truth is that US force levels, lower now than at any point since before the Korean war,<sup>19</sup> are not sufficient to meet the demands of more than one sizable conflict at the same time.<sup>20</sup> The "one-half war" in Vietnam was waged in no small part by US forces earmarked for European contingencies. Similarly, the deployment in early 1980 of US carrier battle groups in the Arabian Sea was made at the expense of carriers maintained on station along NATO's southern flank and in the Western Pacific. Planned increases in the size of the US Fleet and in other US power projection capabilities will not be realized until the late 1980s, and are unlikely in any event to be adequate.<sup>21</sup> In short, the burden of defending Western interests outside the NATO area will fall largely on the United States, which at least in the near-term will be incapable of assuming that burden except at the expense of forces slated for contingencies inside the NATO area.

The gap between Western force levels and expanding force requirements both inside the NATO area (i.e., the Alliance's Long Term Defense Program) and outside the NATO area confronts the Alliance with four alternative military futures:

1. A reduced US contribution to the defense of Europe unaccompanied by compensatory increases in Allied contributions to NATO.
2. A reduced US contribution to the defense of Europe accompanied by compensatory increases in Allied contributions to NATO.
3. Maintenance of the current US contribution to the defense of Europe with an increased US investment in force capabilities for non-NATO contingencies.
4. Increased US and Allied contributions to NATO with increased US investment in force capabilities for non-NATO contingencies.

All of these choices involve either a short-term weakening of Europe's conventional defense or costly increases in existing Western force levels. Choices 2, 3, and 4 entail a new and more specialized division of military labor within NATO.

The second obstacle to meeting Western security requirements outside the North Atlantic area is the paucity of politically reliable and militarily competent Western client states in the Third World, particularly in the critical Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region. While many commentators pronounced the demise of the Guam (Nixon) Doctrine following the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, the doctrine's fundamental premise remains as valid today as it was when promulgated in Guam in 1969: the sustained application of at least US military power in the Third World is not likely to succeed if unsupported by viable and competent local regimes capable of assuming the primary burden of the land battle. This is surely one of the principal geostrategic lessons of US intervention in Indochina. Rushing to the defense of any nation either unwilling or sufficiently incapable of

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

defending itself is to rush into the potential abyss of another Vietnam. As stressed by Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer in a recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

The United States would be hard pressed to defend its interests in the [Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf] region if regional forces are not able or inclined to participate in their own defense. Accordingly, we would hope to have direct military support from regional states which are at risk.<sup>22</sup>

On what grounds, however, can the West "hope to have direct military support from regional states which are at risk," particularly the kind of effective support required in the face of direct Soviet aggression or aggression by a Soviet client state? The availability of such support is ultimately a function of the political stability of the regime supplying it; its effectiveness is a product of the size and competence of the regime's military forces. In the Persian Gulf the West for decades enjoyed in the Shah of Iran a powerful and stable local client committed to the defense of shared interests. Yet, today, which potential Western client among the littoral states of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean can be regarded as both politically stable and militarily competent? Somalia? Oman? Saudi Arabia? Kuwait? The Emirates? Pakistan? All of these states—one hesitates to call them nations, since most are essentially collections of disparate and often warring ethnic groups and tribes cohabitating within boundaries arbitrarily drawn by European colonial offices in the nineteenth century—are governed by military regimes or semi-feudal monarchies whose social and political fragility renders them exceedingly vulnerable to internal overthrow by Soviet-sponsored leftist groups or the forces of religious fundamentalism now sweeping the House of Islam.

In the light of the Shah's overthrow and subsequent disturbances in Mecca and Islamabad, one is propelled toward the view that the primary threat to Western interests in the Persian Gulf is not, as implied by the Carter Doctrine, Soviet aggression from without, but rather collapse from within. In dealing with the last named challenge, however, Western and especially US military intervention appear particularly ill-suited. Could, for example, the Carter administration's proposed Rapid Deployment Force forestall a *coup d'état* in Saudi Arabia? Could it effectively preserve the Saudi monarchy against a swelling Khomeini-style revolution? Would not the very presence of US troops on Saudi soil in such an environment strip the Riyadh government of whatever legitimacy it retained in the eyes of its people? Even were Saudi Arabia invaded by the Soviet Union or, say, Iraq, on what grounds could the United States expect a resolute, vigorous, and competent Saudi performance on the battlefield?

These are profound and difficult questions, but they must nonetheless be addressed, since, as indicated, neither politically nor militarily can the United States expect to be in a position to defend—certainly against direct Soviet aggression—another country, much less an entire region of the world, without the assistance of reliable and competent indigenous forces. Coalition warfare has been the foundation of American military success in modern times, yet with whom can the United States coalesce in the Persian

## PANEL 2

Gulf and Southwest Asia? Even Pakistan, confronted with the menacing arrival of Soviet forces along its borders, has refused \$400 million worth of proffered indirect US military assistance for fear that the very act of acceptance may further compromise the already tainted internal legitimacy of a regime threatened as well by the same forces that toppled the Shah.

The very intrastate political instability that denies the United States reliable and effective regional partners in any program to block further Soviet penetration of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf also deprives the United States of a second prerequisite for sustained military intervention in the region: an infrastructure of US controlled military bases. It is unfortunate for the West that the United States continues to deploy its military forces overseas through the medium of a base structure established thirty years ago in response to threats different in both locus and character from those facing the West today. With the exception of Diego Garcia, the United States possesses no military bases in that area of the world stretching eastwards from Turkey to the Philippines. (In contrast are the large Soviet installations at Cam Ranh, Socotra, and Aden, and Soviet access to the Iraqi bases at Umm Qasr and Al Basrah.)

Simply having the promise of access on a contingency basis to facilities in Mombasa, Berbera, Masirah, and elsewhere—the option selected by the administration—is no substitute for US controlled and operated bases whose use is not subject to momentary political calculations of host governments. The refusal of the Kenyan, Somali, and Omani governments to permit the permanent stationing of US ground and tactical air forces on their respective territories is certainly understandable. A sizable US force presence could compromise the internal legitimacy of all of those governments. Yet, can we assume that these same political considerations would not be invoked to deny the United States access to those facilities in the event of crisis, irrespective of the letter of the provisional agreements now being negotiated?

## NEW TASKS FOR THE WEST

As formidable as are these and other obstacles to meeting the West's new security requirements in the post-Afghanistan world, they are not insurmountable. Overcoming them, however, will require time—perhaps the remainder of the decade. The forging of new security relationships with selected Third World states, many of which have come to regard (and not altogether unjustifiably) the *United States* as politically unreliable and militarily ineffective, cannot be accomplished overnight; nor can proposed increases in naval power and in ground and tactical air capabilities specifically tailored for operations in logistically remote areas of the world. Until the gap between capabilities and requirements is closed, the West must be careful to refrain from political or military commitments beyond its capacity to defend. It is easy to proclaim new lines of containment designed to block further Soviet expansion in the Third World; it is dangerous to do so, however, as long as rhetoric remains the only means at hand of defending them.

As for the requirements themselves, it is obvious that unless it is to

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

*compromise its present and planned investment in the defense of Europe, the West can fulfill those requirements only by means of substantially higher levels of defense spending and a more pronounced division of military labor within NATO.*

Pledged real increases of 3 percent on the part of member states may not be sufficient to finance even those force improvements contemplated in NATO's Long-Term Defense Plan, to say nothing of the additional forces and capabilities required for non-NATO contingencies. The ravages of inflation, the relentless growth of Western military manpower costs,<sup>23</sup> and the steady real increases in Soviet defense outlays on the order of 4 to 5 percent per year, argue strongly for NATO increases considerably higher than 3 percent, if NATO is to meet the growing Soviet military challenge in Europe alone.

Moreover, if the United States is to assume a disproportionate burden of defending Western interests outside the North Atlantic area, then NATO Europe must be prepared to assume a larger proportional share of the conventional defense of Europe. Both Europe and Japan are far more dependent than the United States on secure access to the oil and raw materials of the non-Western world. Further, the United States continues to bear, as it always has, the primary burden of strategic and theater nuclear deterrence in both Europe and Northwest Asia as well as the main burden of Japan's conventional defense. America's allies must recognize that traditional isolationist sentiment in the United States is only dormant—not dead. They must also realize that neither the Congress nor the American public can be expected to tolerate a situation in which a US move to provide an adequate defense of common Western interests outside the Treaty area is unaccompanied by political support and the requisite compensatory measures by its allies.

As indicated, such measures must at a minimum encompass higher levels of national defense expenditure and the assumption of greater allied responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe. Simply accelerating the completion of already planned force improvements will not suffice.<sup>24</sup> As a means of demonstrating the Alliance's recognition of—and determination to protect—its vital interests outside the NATO area, serious consideration should also be given to the creation of a standing Western force to be maintained permanently in those areas of the Third World where Western interests are most immediately threatened. The force could be placed under the operational command of a European officer and might consist of US, French, British, German, and Australian surface naval vessels with token contingents of amphibious assault troops and helicopter-borne infantry aboard. If nothing else, such a force would demonstrate European awareness that its security is no longer definable in regional terms, but rather in global terms.

As for Japan, it is unrealistic to expect that country to make any direct military contribution to the defense even of its own interests in the Third World. However, Japan could make greater use of its enormous financial resources to bolster the economic viability of selected Third World states and even of such prostrate NATO nations as Turkey. Additionally, by assuming a greater responsibility for its own conventional defense, Japan

## PANEL 2

could "release" thinly stretched US naval and tactical air forces in the Western Pacific for deployment into the Indian Ocean.

What is required is a new defense partnership between the United States and Japan based upon growing Japanese public awareness of the dangers posed to that island nation by the Soviet Union's expanding military power in the Far East and the need to strengthen Japan's Self-Defense forces.<sup>2</sup> The Japanese government's approval in 1978 of the Guidelines for United States-Japanese Defense Cooperation is a significant step in this direction, opening as it does the door to improvements in Japan's own defense efforts as well as greater cooperation with the United States in many key defense areas.

Realization of the goals proclaimed in the Guidelines, which include joint planning, development of highly interoperable US and Japanese forces, increased joint military exercises, and major improvements in Japanese naval mining, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, could permit some portion of US forces now allocated to the defense of Japan to be reoriented toward such missions as the defense of US and Japanese sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Needless to say, Japan's assumption of the full costs of stationing and operating US forces in Japan also would release US defense dollars now allocated for that purpose for reinvestment elsewhere.

For its part, the United States must develop a unified and clear policy on Japanese defense efforts, since all too often the US Government has addressed the subject with more than one voice. More important is the need for the United States to restore full Japanese confidence in the US security commitment, a confidence that has been shaken by an inconstant policy with respect to US troop withdrawals from Korea, past force level reductions in the 7th Fleet, and an excessive focus of US defense planning on NATO contingencies.

In conclusion, as the West enters the decade of the 1980s it would do well to heed the wise counsel of Franz Josef Strauss:

To consider the invasion of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan as an aberration of a partner who is interested in real detente is fatal wishful thinking. Afghanistan is nothing but a preliminary objective in the long-term planning of the Kremlin on its way to communist world ascendancy. With this action, however, Moscow has put the Atlantic Alliance to the test. This cannot be the moment to weigh the mistakes of the past (which on both sides of the Atlantic were plentiful). Faced with this global menace we must refrain from those petty considerations so that the undeniable process of growing alienation between America and Europe does not end in America backsliding into isolationism. Neither America nor Europe can afford that. On the contrary, it is necessary that, in these days of humiliation and provocation by the events in Iran and Afghanistan, Europe should be on the side of the United States without "ifs" and "buts." On the other hand this solidarity requires that the superpower U.S.A. does not

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

treat Europe as a second class partner. Information and consultation with Europe must be early and comprehensive. In turn, the European partners should be ready to take global joint responsibility instead of passing the role of the policeman of the world to America and watching the action from the box seat of world history with helpful advice and occasionally sharp criticism.

The necessary common strategies can be developed without frictional loss only on the basis of this widely coordinated communication within the Atlantic Alliance. It will be of decisive importance to find more than merely a military answer so that peace will no longer be threatened by the tempting weakness of the free world. Full transatlantic solidarity on the basis of mutual coordination of political, economic, psychological, military, and technical measures is the only conceivable and historically possible way to cope with the problems of the eighties. It would certainly not be sensible to discuss these inevitable and common strategies based on division of labor in the open market.

Western Europe needs to be persuaded that America cannot be held responsible for deterrence and defense while Europe pursues detente and, for the time being, takes economic advantage of this distribution of labor. After all, Europe cannot expect America to take any risk in Europe's favor, while Europe itself shirks political joint responsibility for domestic weakness and misses no opportunity to jostle and offend its most important ally.<sup>26</sup>

### ENDNOTES: THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, JAPAN, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

1. James R. Schlesinger, "The Geopolitics of Energy," *The Washington Quarterly* 2 (Summer 1979):7.
2. Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," *Commentary* 69 (April 1980): 37.
3. C. Kenneth Allard, "A Clear and Present Danger: Soviet Airborne Forces in the 1980s," a paper presented before the Conference on Projection of Power: Perspectives, Perceptions, and Logistics, Ninth Annual Conference of the International Security Studies Program, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Boston, Massachusetts, 23-25 April 1980.
4. John Keegan, *World Armies* (New York: Facts on File, 1979).
5. *Defense in the 1980s, Statement on the Defense Estimates, 1980*, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980), pp. 40-41.
6. Chris L. Jeffries, "NATO and Oil," *Air University Review* 31 (January-February 1980): 44.
7. Alvin J. Cottrell and Thomas H. Moorer, *U.S. Bases Overseas: Problems of Projecting American Military Power Abroad*, the Washington Papers no. 47, published for the Center for Strategic and International Studies of the Georgetown University (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1977), pp. 8-9.

## PANEL 2

8. Albert Wohlstetter, "Half Wars and Half Policies in the Persian Gulf," *National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength*, ed. W. Scott Thompson (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), pp. 145-146.
9. Claudia Wright, "Iraq—New Power in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Winter 1979/1980): 263.
10. Wohlstetter, "Half Wars and Half Policies," p. 129.
11. Richard Burt, "Washington and the Atlantic Alliance: The Hidden Crisis," Thompson, *National Security in the 1980s*, p. 110-111.
12. Amphibious ships are essential to the projection of ground forces from ship to shore against a hostile beachhead. The present US level of 63 vessels is sufficient to lift only one of the US Marine Corps' three divisions. However, because the ships are widely dispersed throughout the US Navy's various commands, no more than a battalion landing team's worth of shipping is usually available at any given location. To assemble the shipping required for a division-size amphibious assault would require 30-45 days.
13. "Our existing mobility forces cannot meet the deployment objectives we have set . . . for NATO or for some non-NATO contingencies." Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981*. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 208. The magnitude of current shortfalls in US strategic lift capabilities is evident in US plans to double the number of US divisions in Europe within 10 days of a decision to mobilize for a NATO contingency and in administration plans to procure an additional 150 to 200 strategic lift aircraft, add 18 tankers and dry cargo ships to the Ready Reserve Fleet, and construct 14 specialized Maritime Pre-positioning Ships for non-NATO contingencies. Enhancement of rapid reinforcement capabilities is also a major objective of NATO's Long-Term Defense Plan.
14. *After Afghanistan—The Long Haul, Safeguarding Security and Independence in the Third World* (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1980), p. 13.
15. James R. Schlesinger, "Some Lessons of Iran," *New York Times*, 5 May 1980, p. A32.
16. See Edward N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?" *Commentary* 69 (April 1980): 40-49; and Jeffrey Record, "Military Reputation, Political Nerve and 'Desert I'," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 May 1980, p. 26.
17. *After Afghanistan—The Long Haul*, The Atlantic Council, p. 41.
18. France deploys sizable military forces outside the NATO area, including a large standing naval presence in the Indian Ocean and over 8,000 ground troops in Francophone Africa, where she has bilateral defense agreements with Cameroun, Benin, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal, Togo, the Central African Empire, Chad, the Congo, Gabon, and Djibouti. Major French ground deployments in Africa include 4,150 troops in Djibouti, 1,800 in Chad, and 1,170 in Senegal. French willingness to use force on behalf of threatened interests on the Continent was demonstrated in Chad during the 1970s, when French troops were employed to support the suppression of Libyan-sponsored guerrilla activity; in 1978 in Zaire, when a French parachute battalion intervened at Kolwezi, to rescue European survivors of an attempted Angolan incursion; and in 1980, when French naval and air units were deployed in Tunisian waters in response to a Libyan-backed incursion into that country. British forces deployed outside the NATO area include small ground and air units in Belize (formerly British Honduras), a detachment of Royal Marines in the Falkland Islands, four infantry battalions and a squadron of helicopters in Hong Kong, and a Gurkha battalion in Brunei. Forces are also maintained at Gibraltar and on Cyprus, where the British enjoy two sovereign base areas. Additionally, once a year a Royal Navy task group undertakes a major deployment outside the NATO area.
19. A benchmark year widely used for comparisons with the present is 1964, the last year preceding the US buildup in Vietnam. For example, in 1964 personnel assigned to the active armed forces totalled 2.685 million compared to 2.059 million in fiscal year 1981; the active US Fleet contained 803 vessels compared to the present 418; the US Air Force fielded a total of 439 active squadrons of all types compared to 253 today; and strategic sea-lift vessels numbered 100 compared to the present 48. In 1964, the United States allocated 8.4 percent of its gross national product to defense compared to less than 5 percent in the fiscal years 1977-1980.
20. A recent study by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress has concluded that only a small fraction of active US forces would be available for contingencies in the Persian Gulf even if a crisis in that region were not accompanied by a crisis in Europe or Northeast Asia. The study estimates that virtually no US naval or ground forces would be available for employment outside the NATO area in the event of a conflict in Europe. John

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

Collins, et al., "Petroleum Imports from the Persian Gulf: Use of US Armed Force to Ensure Supplies," Washington, DC: Library of Congress CRS Issue Brief No. IB 79046, 1980.

21. A total of 97 ships are requested in the administration's Fiscal Year 1981 Defense Budget and Five-Year Defense Plan. Together with those vessels authorized in preceding years but not yet completed, the Plan, if fully authorized, will generate an active US Fleet of approximately 550 ships by the mid-1980s. No net increase is planned in the present level of (63 vessels) amphibious shipping, which is a critical component of US capability to project power ashore in a hostile environment. In contrast is the present Soviet Fleet of over 1,500 vessels, including 15 comparatively modern amphibious vessels. Moreover, it is highly doubtful whether the US Navy in the current volunteer environment will be capable of manning a 550-ship fleet; existing shortfalls in skilled personnel are so severe that a growing number of active ships have been taken off patrol.

22. Prepared statement on the Indian Ocean and Rapid Deployment Force before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 21 February 1980, p. 3.

23. The major factor underlying the failure of the United States and other Western countries to compete effectively with the Soviet Union during the past decade in the military arena has been the West's comparatively high military manpower costs. For example, some 55 to 60 percent of US defense spending is currently consumed by such costs, compared to an estimated 15 to 25 percent of Soviet defense expenditure. Thus, by virtue of its relatively low-paid conscript army, the Soviet Union enjoys the benefit of having a far larger portion of its defense budget available for research and development, procurement, and operations and maintenance—the real sinews of military power.

24. At the twin NATO Defense and Foreign Ministerial Meetings convened in Brussels in May 1980, European ministers agreed to accelerate existing programs designed to increase European ammunition reserves, improve chemical warfare defenses, and provide military assistance to Turkey and other Southern Flank members. They further agreed to accelerate longer term programs calling for improved electronic warfare defenses, conversion of European commercial aircraft for military use, and increased training and readiness for European reserve units. These actions, however, constituted little more than a reaffirmation of NATO Europe's commitment to the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) established in 1978. Moreover, since they were not accompanied by any commitment to real annual increases in defense spending above 3 percent, it is not clear how NATO Europe expects to finance an acceleration in the LTDP, given that several members of the Alliance have already failed to meet the 3 percent commitment (including Belgium, Denmark, and the United States in 1977, 1978 and 1979).

25. See "United States-Japan Security Relationship—The Key to East Asian Security and Stability," Report of the Pacific Study Group to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979).

26. Franz Josef Strauss, "After Afghanistan," *Policy Review*, no. 12 (Spring 1980), pp. 111-112.

**PANEL 2 PAPER:  
European Perspectives on Europe's Roles  
in the World:  
The Partial Partner**

**by Edward A. Kolodziej  
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This paper tries to identify the roles that Europe is playing in the world today and to assess their implications, principally for Atlantic cohesion. The angle of vision is deliberately broad and general. Much rich and often conflicting detail will be ignored, even distorted, in the search for a global view of Europe's role in international politics and what they might be in the future based on current conduct and trends. These roles are examined primarily from a European, not an American, perspective although American behavior obviously shapes the quality and possibilities of Europe's performance. Roles are not considered as patterned behavior in an established political drama in which the Europeans have set lines to read and functions to perform—largely as foils for other actors. Least of all should these roles be seen as projections of how American policymakers wish Europeans would act now or in the future. They are understood instead as the parts played by the European states, severally and collectively, to effect outcomes, wittingly or not, in their dealings with themselves and others on things that matter—their security, economic well-being, independence, and the political freedoms and institutions they enjoy. European roles refer, therefore, to the impact of what Europeans, especially those in the control of allied governments, say and (more importantly) do to others.

The roles that are discussed roughly correspond in meaning to the definitions that can be attached to the admittedly ambiguous phrase "the partial partner." Partial can mean favored or inclined to favor one party over another; or it can signify a part of a greater whole; or, simply, it may convey the sense of something that is not general or total, something incomplete or otherwise disengaged. These distinctions are useful to differentiate the similar and divergent responses of the European states to a range of European and Third World issues, and to assess from these varied reactions whether the Atlantic Alliance is apt and able to meet the common problems

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## PANEL 2

confronting the Western democracies in concert or, as Aldo Moro once suggested, through parallel convergences of action and policy.

The ambiguity of the term "partner" should also be clarified. One should not expect the European states automatically to be the partner of the United States or even of each other, however the term partial is defined. As in the past, partnerships will have to be earned in the coinage of common or complementary interests. They are not likely to be conferred as a matter of grace or gratitude for past benevolence or services. These fluid possibilities, and the uncertainties they prompt, together with the threats and opportunities they convey, do not derive from the whimsies of an inconstant European leadership or simply from the search for new partners and partnership mixes for small advantages (although these considerations play their part). Rather, they are elicited by the fragmented, fractured, and factious character of international politics. As much by necessity as by choice, the European states must seek solutions to most of their problems within this shifting setting. The governments of these states are like frenzied drivers pressed to keep their vehicles on course while continually beset by flats that must be changed as they move swiftly along. They must rely on the existing power systems to get where they wish to go (even when their destinations are not always clear) while seeking to perfect and even transform these systems, expressed in the differing alignment patterns of states, to suit their perspectives and preferences.

Viewed from Europe the Western Alliance is mostly a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Talk of an Atlantic Community has more rhetorical and psychic effect than political impact. This is not to suggest that Americans and Europeans do not share deeply felt democratic values or that their common interests in security and welfare are thin and brittle, but as de Gaulle tirelessly reminded us and as countless American initiatives since World War II confirm, the Western Alliance is still an alliance, and all alliances are conditional. On some questions the European states can be expected to be partial to United States leadership and to subordinate their qualms and qualifications to American wishes. This will be seen to be largely on questions of European defense and deterrence, but even here great variations in interests, perspectives, and commitments can be detected. On other questions European and American actions will be different but will converge on impact as parts of a greater policy whole. The Berlin and German accords of the early 1970s illustrate this level of cooperation. On still other issues, usually those of lesser conjunctural saliency and urgency, there will be little need for alignment. Burden sharing within the European Community budget comes under this rubric although at one time such a question would have been raised to the level of Atlantic concern, just as the question of enlarging the Atlantic Alliance is today. On still other questions—and increasingly this appears to be the case—Europeans will be inclined to change partners, preferring Third World states or even implicit alignment with the Soviet Union over the United States on some issues. Or, they will stand apart, feigning either to be impartial observers or unsolicitedly advancing themselves as *interlocuteurs valables* where they may not be wanted, as in the Camp David talks.

It is also important to resist the temptation to consider the West European states as a bloc apart, capable of speaking with one voice or acting



## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

together on a host of issues of vital importance that more often than not mask rather than reveal profound fissures. Alfred Grosser, a respected student of American-European relations, offers a synoptic view very close to the truth. After a long, sensitive, and systematic review of the evolution of the Western Alliance since World War II, he concludes that "Europe could have become one of the principal actors in our report and European solidarity a privileged solidarity, but that did not happen. The community of Six and later of Nine . . . is neither a subordinate configuration in a bloc under American leadership nor a second pillar of the Atlantic structure nor a new superpower between the two giants." In speaking of European unity one has to be conscious of the conditions under which cohesion crystallizes, on what issues, at what point in time, and for how long. This circumstance sets further limits to generalization, but it does anchor us to hard facts and the harder choices confronting the Europeans in acting to shape their destinies and partly America's fate.

Part one of this paper is divided into two sections. The first sketches prevailing European images of where power is and where it is being exercised on world and regional issues, especially in security and economic domains, and how these power centers are perceived as determining the capacity of the European states to achieve their security, economic, and political objectives. The "pictures" in the heads of European policymakers, as Walter Lippmann might have remarked, provide some guidance in determining where along a scale from tight alliance to competitors and conflict the Europeans and the United States are likely to find themselves as partners, however variously defined, or as opponents. These images, of course, are not universally shared nor are they necessarily predictable of any one decisionmaker. Taken together they are a snapshot of what appears to be a prevailing mind-set that suffuses European thinking and decisionmaking about foreign and security problems.

The second section of part one briefly reviews differing American and European reactions to select but key regional and functional issues. Regional issues refer to European and American differences over the meaning of detente and the strategies appropriate to its preservation and advancement in Europe and the Third World. Issues that will be covered include Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian revolution and the hostage problem, and the conflicts in western Sahara and Black Africa. Functional issues center on access to energy sources, especially oil, at affordable prices, civilian nuclear development, and arms transfers. The analysis will concentrate on identifying the interests and incentives (positive and negative) molding European pronouncements and practice rather than on detailing their evolution.

A final section sketches the implications for cooperation within the Western Alliance of Europe's impact (or absence of influence) on the issues before us.

### EUROPE AND THE WORLD

#### Images of Power

The images of power increasingly projected in European policy and opinion circles have at least five dominant facets. First, there is decreasing confidence in the American security guarantee although there is no accord

## PANEL 2

and less prospect of finding or organizing a suitable alternative. Confidence has eroded on three levels. At the strategic or global nuclear level, Europeans accept superpower mutual deterrence, and have for some time. What gives them new pause are the progressive vulnerability of critical parts of the American triad—particularly land-based ICBMs and the aging B-52 bomber force—and growing Soviet nuclear capabilities and war fighting doctrine.<sup>2</sup> For some Europeans the modernization and decreasing vulnerability of Moscow's nuclear delivery systems, with their increased payload and MIRV capacity, and the rapid enlargement of its warhead stocks, seriously weakens the US second-strike capability and the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. These are not peculiarly European worries, and some of these fears may well have been prompted by the prolonged American debate over SALT II.<sup>3</sup> Henry Kissinger gave voice to some of these worries in a widely reported talk to a European audience.<sup>4</sup> Whatever the source of European anxieties, they are real enough to resurrect, albeit in new form, decades-old doubts about the reliability and credibility of the American deterrent.

Worry turns less on the ability of the United States to deter a Soviet attack against American cities than on its capacity to prevent a partially disarming strike against its increasingly exposed land-based systems. Under such circumstances, the American President would then be faced with the choice of attacking Soviet cities and the prospect of exposing American population and industrial centers to destruction. The incentives to make that choice even when the physical security of the United States would be at stake are not seen as compelling; they would almost certainly be less if European interests were at issue. These perceived holes in the American nuclear umbrella subject the Europeans to Soviet nuclear blackmail. The immediate threat is not necessarily war (the Soviet Union would run great risks, too). Disturbing to Europeans is the possibility that "improvement of Soviet first-strike capability in land-based missiles could give them [sic] parity and maybe superiority over the United States in the ability to control escalation. This would be an advantage more important than second-strike resources in crisis management, when political victory or defeat would be decided, which might mean primarily the fate of Europe."<sup>5</sup>

These global concerns reinforce doubts about the stability of the theater nuclear balance in Europe or "grey areas" problems.<sup>6</sup> Soviet development of the two-stage SS-20 and the Backfire bomber pose a growing threat to NATO forces. In the short-term of the next half decade, NATO will dispose no capabilities to match directly these Soviet capabilities. The proposed installation of 572 Cruise and Pershing II's is estimated not to begin until 1983 or later, depending on proposed arms control talks with the Soviet Union. The existing imbalance threatens, as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has suggested, to "de-couple" the European nuclear theater from the global superpower balance. To keep the United States as a sanctuary, incentives (partially prompted by Europe's vulnerability) would grow in American decisionmaking circles to abandon or compromise European interests in a crisis.

However much the European powers supported SALT II, the final treaty was not fully satisfactory. The Europeans, although consulted and

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

informed about the Treaty, were not parties thereto. The Carter administration had to assure congressional critics, who partially reflected significant European opinion, that the protocol to the treaty did not preclude the transfer of cruise missile technology to Europe or retardation of efforts to bolster NATO's nuclear deterrent. The focus of SALT II, however, of keeping the SS-20 and Backfire in the category of intermediate-range weapons rather than dealing directly with them as a threat to Europe was not reassuring to many Europeans. The rule-making of SALT II paved the way for SALT III which raised into question French and British nuclear forces. The French Government, moved by reinforcing sentiment on the Left and the Right, was adamant in refusing to consider participation in succeeding strategic arms talks. What may be theater or tactical to the superpowers is clearly strategic to the French and British. To weaken or deny them these weapons would also shift inner European symmetries, a point very sensitive to the Giscard d'Estaing government concerned with not only growing Soviet nuclear capabilities and disparities between the American protector and Soviet adversary but also German conventional superiority within the West European zone.<sup>7</sup>

Perceived weaknesses at the global and theater nuclear levels join still others at conventional arms levels within and outside Europe. Soviet superiority in this area is conceded; hence the persistent European interest in deterrence over defense and resistance to American pressures to implement fully a flexible response strategy. Nuclear deterrence is supposed to prevent a Soviet conventional attack and to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict. Associated French strategy still assigns a "shot across the bow" role to tactical nuclear weapons to test the gravity of an attack and to warn of rapid escalation to strategic nuclear levels. German interest in MBFR is partly related to stabilization of the conventional environment that threatens to tip irretrievably in favor of the Warsaw Pact but also is a tact to widen MBFR talks to a wider range of topics, including nuclear weapons. That would permit Bonn to express its interests in a broadened policy arena. A feared asymmetry at global and theater nuclear levels and an existing imbalance at a conventional plateau give urgency to German concerns.

The stability of the European zone is threatened by the instability in the Third World. European fears here assume several not fully compatible poses. To long-standing worries about a superpower clash in the developing world that would ignite a nuclear war spilling over into Europe are added anxieties about the ability of American military power to protect American or allied interests. Doubts about effectiveness, nurtured by the Vietnam experience, are magnified by the perceived low state of American preparedness and the advantages of local Soviet military strength now only hundreds of miles away from critical Arab oil-producing centers. Where American power might be effective, there are the alternate fears of Washington's lassitude and failure to act to guard vital Western interests, as the French argued was the case in Angola and the Horn of Africa, or of the willingness of the United States to act all too well, but precipitately and recklessly, disregarding European sentiments and interests, as in the botched effort to rescue the American hostages in Iran while publicly assuring the Europeans that such an action would not be taken.

## PANEL 2

If Europe's declining confidence in American military power rests on potential losses in the future, its decreasing reliance (but still continuing dependence) on American economic power rests on a more tangible basis of loss and sense of being disadvantaged. The decline of American economic strength relative to that of the OPEC states and other industrialized countries (the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States were almost equal in Gross National Product (GNP) at approximately \$2000 billion in 1978) has forced a major reorientation of the European states toward the previously American-dominated global economic system within which they conducted their getting and spending. Like the distrust of the American military guarantee, European suspicions about American economic strength have several dimensions. Two merit particular attention. First, there is a widespread European disenchantment with the dollar, although their own renewed efforts to create a European monetary system, partly to insulate themselves from a feeble dollar, have only recently borne modest fruit.<sup>8</sup> As long as the dollar was the vehicle for European economic recovery and the American economy performed key international roles—providing an open market for countries in deficit, lending long-term, and stabilizing monetary fluctuations of weak currencies—the European states could tolerate the self-serving aspects of dollar dominance.<sup>9</sup> The United States could run chronic deficits, at first considered benefits to motor postwar European recovery, and could finance, as Raymond Aron and others have shown, a far-flung imperial system.<sup>10</sup> The criticisms first raised against the United States in the gold war initiated by Gaullist France have been increasingly echoed in foreign capitals.<sup>11</sup> America's economic policies have not been neutral or stabilizing and its political and economic leadership are not viewed as intrinsically legitimate. The Johnson administration unsuccessfully tried to ignore the choice between guns and butter by inflating the economy; the Nixon administration in cutting the tie between gold and the dollar within the Bretton Woods system opened the way to the export of American inflation; the Carter administration's growth and high employment goals reinforced these trends and directly struck at the monetary and economic policies of Japan and Germany, America's closest allies. As one acute observer concludes:

American policymakers did not fully anticipate the disruptive consequences of their own actions and in the years since have needed little encouragement to try to act more responsibly in international monetary affairs. . . . America's leadership has proved it can be destabilizing and as a result foreign distrust of American policy has grown to epidemic proportions, particularly since the Carter administration took office.<sup>12</sup>

A second aspect of European perceptions of an eroding international economic system, and of receding American economic power, concerns oil. Until the Iranian crisis of 1978-79, there was still some strength to the argument that working within the International oil order hastily rebuilt by the United States after the 1973-74 crisis provided the best, if shaky, assurance of continued flow of oil to Europe. Over French protests the International Energy Agency (IEA) was created, but real power was elsewhere. The jerry-built structure rested on strong US bilateral ties to Saudi Arabia (which, under American persuasion, lifted its embargo in 1974) and

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

to the Shah's Iran. Large arms shipments to Teheran sealed the dubious bargain of high prices for oil in return for its assured delivery. The system creaked along as the recycling of Arab oil money grew apace and as moderate Arab opinion, swelled by the Sadat regime's turn to the West, created an atmosphere for reasonable give and take on oil and Middle East issues. Arab radicals were outmaneuvered, and Russian influence declined.

The Iranian revolution and, ironically, the Camp David accords and the subsequent Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty toppled this precarious structure. The United States could not save the Shah from his own people, nor keep the oil wells pumping at satisfactory levels. Less could the United States prevent—and its own increasing consumption of imported oil fueled—multiple increases in OPEC oil prices. The dash for oil, leading to competitive bidding among the industrialized states, pushed oil prices to the \$40 mark by mid-1980 from a base of two to three dollars a barrel less than a decade ago. Meanwhile Saudi and moderate leverage diminished in OPEC, partly because of increased Saudi production to take up the slack of depleted Iranian supplies. The Arab moderates were also hard pressed by Palestinian and radical elements to oppose the Camp David agreements. The result is the present chaos reigning in oil.<sup>13</sup>

Reinforcing European images of crumbling international security and economic regimes, built on American power which appears neither capable nor willing to maintain them, is the view of an American political system in disarray. There are again several aspects to this third image. The ceaseless struggle between the President and Congress for the control of American security and foreign policy could previously be tolerated and even prompted amusement. Now pity, mixed with disdain, animates European feelings. Concern extends to the American public which does not appear informed about or particularly sensitive to European needs and circumstances. The inability of the Federal Government to impose deflationary policies, to reduce oil consumption appreciably, or to create a coherent energy policy is hardly reassuring.

European perceptions of a decline in the importance of the Presidency, and in the quality of its recent incumbents or current aspirants, does little to bolster European sentiment that the United States will be able either to cope with its own problems or to provide leadership for those which concern the Europeans.

To these images of devolution must be added European anxieties about what appears to be a strategically ascendant and expansionist Soviet Union. The threats projected by Moscow are multiple and accumulating. The military threats have already been mentioned. More alarming is the ease and success, until Afghanistan at least, with which Soviet power and influence have spread, partly as a consequence of American withdrawals but largely from the Soviet Union's rise to true global power status. Faced with their own impotence, some of which is imposed but much of which is self-willed, Europeans cannot contest Soviet power directly. Nor are they certain that following American leadership will be sufficient to contain or canalize Soviet behavior down constructive paths. Neither the linkage politics and spheres of influence approach of the Kissinger-Nixon era nor the

## PANEL 2

confusing mix of tolerating Soviet expansion in the developing world while being intolerant of Soviet internal human rights behavior appear to have tamed the Soviet Union. Neither approach transformed it into a satiated state pursuing moderate aims with moderate means. Incentives are thus at play to accommodate Soviet might. Their enlarging traces can be detected with growing ease in recent European behavior toward detente with the Soviet Union in Europe and in the Third World, particularly in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

### The Third World

Overlaying these images of the superpower balance is yet another even more disturbing concern: chaos in the developing world.<sup>14</sup> The Iranian upheaval and the resistance of the Afghan people to Soviet aggression indicate that world politics do not march to a superpower drum whether played in counterpoint or in combination. The Arab-Israeli struggle, inner-Arab strifes, the potential racial explosion in southern Africa, and the Vietnam-Cambodian conflict, abetted by Soviet and Chinese support of rival factions, herald an international system out of control. Dangers arise from multiple quarters. The agendas of the great powers are set by smaller powers for their own advantage. Europe's interests and its stake in detente are seriously threatened as the superpowers are manipulated by local clients, and their conflicts might ignite into a global war that would not spare Europe. These conditions are more hazardous than those that prevailed during the period of tight bipolarity. De Gaulle and other Europeans could then argue that the superpower conflict would draw Europeans into Third World conflicts against their will or superpower collusion would be at their expense. Whatever the risks and inconveniences of this system may have been, they still implied superpower control over local conflicts if Moscow and Washington chose to exercise discretion and direction, jointly or mutually, as the Europeans and Israel discovered in the Suez crisis. These possibilities appear to be less open to the superpowers. New centers of power, military and economic, have arisen that are making new and significant demands on the international system at the very time that it is least prepared in almost 30 years to meet them. Indeed, the superpowers and the European states have contributed to this rising instability and capacity for disruption. Much of the 14.8 percent increase in global military expenditures between 1966 and 1977 is attributable to the developing states. Military spending in the developed states rose only 4.6 percent in constant 1976 dollars during this period while expenditures among developing states grew by over 70 percent.<sup>15</sup> As might be expected, the Middle East led all other regions, recording increases of 270 percent, followed by Black and North Africa. In both cases the rate of military spending exceeded the growth in GNP. In three other instances (the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia), a higher percentage of the region's GNP was spent for military purposes in 1977 than in 1968. In contrast to these increases, North American states decreased their spending by 25 percent.<sup>16</sup>

Third World scenarios are grim whether there is a superpower conflict or not. The Iranian revolution unleashed an uncompromising religious movement that threatens to spread throughout the Islamic world. It has increased tensions between the Western world and Islam and, specifically, ruptured American-Iranian relations. The seizing of American hostages

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

flouts international practice and law. Nor is the Islamic world spared division, for Islam as much divides as unites as Islamic schismatic groups are pitted one against the other. Even the Soviet Union is vulnerable and some Europeans suggest that the Afghanistan invasion was launched partly to offset anticipated unrest among the Soviet Union's large Moslem population.

A world system of impossible demands, under conditions of increased state interdependence but decreased interest in or incentives to cooperation, overloads processes of system maintenance. To these possibilities of a global system collapsing in parts around itself, there is the added image of states imploding from within. This fate has already befallen Pakistan, and the Zia regime is still far from holding on to the Western half of the country. Iran may yet fall apart and Southeast Asia and parts of Black Africa, like Chad, face similar bleak futures.

For the Europeans, some of these problems are not salient to Europe's interests or they are sufficiently costly and intractable to warrant withdrawal, as in the case of France from Chad this year. Others, like the Iranian revolution or the Arab-Israeli struggle, cannot be ignored although the capacity of the Europeans to do much about resolving these problems is problematic.

### **PATTERNS OF ALIGNMENT: WESTERN EUROPE, THE SUPERPOWERS, AND REGIONAL STATES**

A *tour d'horizon* of the alignment patterns of European states with one another and other powers on key issues besetting regional zones of importance to Europeans reveals a crazy-quilt pattern that is hard to describe and even more difficult to explain, especially in the brief compass of this paper. Europe's approach and varied responses to detente in Europe provide a key to an understanding of its approach to the Afghanistan crisis, and to certain general approaches of the European states to the extension of detente to the Third World and how they diverge from the Soviet Union. We will next look at the Middle East where these general considerations of security mix, with potentially incendiary effect, with the politics of oil, the Arab-Israeli conflict, inner-Arab strife, and new and special problems introduced by the Iranian crisis. The alignment patterns become even more confusing when we move to North Africa and to south of the Sahara.

#### **European Detente and the Afghan Affair**

Policymakers and opinion leaders in the United States and West Europe have very different ideas about what *detente* means and how it should be applied to the Soviet Union. For the United States detente has largely meant a change in the rules by which the superpower struggle would be conducted. To be sure some harbored the hope—and still do—that detente would transform the struggle. Each superpower would eventually accept its inability to be secure without the cooperation of the other. These analysts and policymakers even saw the possibility of increased cooperation between the superpowers in building new international regimes in security and economic domains. In these enterprises the weak would join since presumably more and more states would see the virtues and benefits of cooperation over conflict.<sup>17</sup>

## PANEL 2

Whatever hold this optimistic view of detente may have had on the Carter administration has since slipped as a result of rising Soviet military power and the Iranian and Afghanistan crises where force has played a decisive role in frustrating American and European aims for a more safe and sane world. Again, proponents of a more conflict-ridden conception of detente have gained the ascendancy. Notwithstanding these differences, Americans still share a view that detente was indivisible. This view, uniting hawks and doves, amounted to a redefinition of the traditional American claim inherited from Wilson, of the indivisibility of security.<sup>18</sup> Superpower conflict in one region could not be separated from stability in another. Despite often haphazard application of this notion to security, economic, diplomatic, and even sporting and cultural ties between the two nuclear giants over the past decade, the general American approach has been to see links and even to make them where they may not have existed before. The Soviet commitment to detente was therefore measured by Soviet conduct in Vietnam, Angola, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. It was also extended to Soviet restrictions on Jewish immigration and human rights.

European views of detente are considerably more complex. Perhaps the most striking difference with prevailing American sentiment is the accent on the divisibility of detente. This orientation is rooted in the geopolitical settings differentiating Europe from the United States. Washington conducts a global policy propelled by multiple global interests. The European states are primarily concerned with European security and well-being. The first reaction of the Europeans (note their slow responses over Iran and Afghanistan) is to seek a way to become disengaged and to insulate detente in Europe from threats arising outside the region.

Detente carries several distinct and conflicting meanings for Europeans. First, it is an end in itself. The West European states have gained significant tangible benefits from detente: settlement of most of Germany's boundaries with its East European neighbors; the recognition of two German states within one German nation; stabilization of Berlin's status and its ties to West Germany; increased communications and human exchange between East and West Europe and especially between the two Germanies; a major boost in trade and relations between the EEC and the Warsaw Pact states; and, though arguable, a relaxation of domestic tensions between Communist and non-Communist parties, as in Italy.<sup>19</sup>

The Germans have gained the most. In human terms, approximately 250,000 ethnic Germans have been repatriated from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1979 eight million trips were recorded by West Germans and West Berliners to relatives in East Germany. Over 50,000 telephone calls daily pass between the two Germanies. These contacts were unthinkable a decade ago. Germany has the lion's share of East-West trade. Its exchange with East Germany is expected to exceed \$5 billion in 1979.<sup>20</sup>

The other European states have gained much too. Improvement in the relations between the two Germanies and between West Germany's ties and the Soviet bloc have transformed the "Cold War" into a "Hot Peace." If tensions over military security persist, the political context in which they arise has progressed markedly, and no one wishes to see these gains jeopardized by taking harsh measures against the Soviet Union for its actions

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Table 1

**Ratio of Trade (Imports and Exports) to GNP:  
EEC and the United States  
1972 and 1978**  
(billions of current US dollars)

	1972			1978		
	Trade	GNP	Ratio	Trade	GNP	Ratio
EEC	310.5	843.3	37%	925.3	1983.0	47%
USA	108.7	1171.1	9%	326.8	2127.6	15%

Source: The International Monetary Fund

elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan. Take trade, for example. The EEC is heavily dependent on trade. Table 1 contrasts the American and European situations. In both cases the ratio of overall trade to GNP increased between 1972 and 1978, but the prosperity of the EEC remains much more heavily tied to trade than that of the United States. The ratio was 47 percent for the European states in 1978, an increase of 10 percent over 1972, while the ratio for the United States was 15 percent. In 1978, the EEC exported five times as much to the Soviet Union as did the United States (\$15 billion to \$3 billion) and imported twelve and a half times as much material (\$15.1 billion to \$1.2 billion).<sup>21</sup> The structure of this trade is also important. The complementarity of East and West European trade is registered in the high percentage of machinery and industrial goods going East (88 percent) and the high amount of oil, methane gas, and raw materials being shipped West (75 percent).<sup>22</sup> The West European states are also more wedded to trade as good business and good detente than the United States. The EEC states (and Japan) accounted for most of Moscow's \$16 billion hard-currency debt in 1979. America's credits are much less. In 1977 they amounted to less than a half billion dollars in a foreign credit envelope to the Soviet Union of almost \$13 billion.<sup>23</sup>

Second, detente is also viewed as a process by which a Western-oriented Europe would win new concessions on trade, further liberalize person-to-person contacts, loosen Soviet-bloc ties, gradually open Soviet society, and, perhaps, in the long-run, even reunify Germany. For Europeans, and certainly Germans, the agenda for discussion is not global, but regional. What might be trade-offs in detente between one region and another for the United States are not negotiable items with the Europeans, if it is European detente that is being negotiated. This process has multiple levels: between the superpowers, between them and their respective clients, and between the clients themselves. The first two receive most attention, especially in the United States. What is often overlooked in American circles, an oversight that is the source of much misunderstanding on both sides of the Atlantic, is the critical importance attached by Europeans to inner-European relations. There is for example, little press attention given in the United States to the close relation struck by

## PANEL 2

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Poland's Edward Gierek, a tie at least as close as that between the West German Chancellor and President Giscard d'Estaing. Moreover, East European capitals were reportedly as concerned as their Western counterparts in Europe over the threat to detente posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup>

Third, for still others in Europe, albeit a minority, detente is a process leading to a neutral or neutralized Europe between the superpowers. The crisis over Afghanistan has poured new life into this long-standing view. Various aims are at the root of this approach. Avoidance of Europe's involvement in a nuclear war whether started in Europe or elsewhere is a prime mover. A neutralized, united Germany is also an objective. For some the arrangement would be guaranteed by the superpowers so that American influence might still provide some counterweight to Soviet preeminence. For others of this persuasion a unified Germany in a neutralized Europe would be essentially "Finlandized." In foreign policy the tilt would be toward Moscow, although the hope would be that West Europe's democratic institutions would be permitted to continue. The military pacts would gradually dissolve, and Europe would become "a zone of peace and stability" in a divided world.

A final, if still minor, set of opinion in Europe turns the meaning of detente on its head. Advanced most forcefully by the French Communist party, detente is a process leading to the end of American hegemony. It means Western Europe should eventually change partners, shifting from Washington to Moscow. The United States, not the Soviet Union, is pictured as the principal adversary to peace and European social progress. An atmosphere of detente thus sets the stage for the negotiated withdrawal of American forces from Europe, or it is a useful device to slow or paralyze efforts of the Western allies to counter growing Soviet theater superiority in Europe.

The images prevailing in Europe about the hazardous and hostile international system within which they act and the divergent notions of detente abroad frame, if neither compel nor fully explain, the divergent responses of the United States and its principal European allies to security and detente issues in Europe and Afghanistan. Paradoxically, the two are closely linked in European opinion although much of the effort of the European states, in action admittedly more than word, has been to decouple them even as United States policy has tried to forge them together. German tergiversations are most revealing since West Germany has most to lose from a setback in detente; faces the Warsaw Pact's military might directly; and finds itself in the throes of an election campaign which occasions the surfacing of rival opinions and domestic political forces that are often submerged from view. Only recently Chancellor Schmidt voiced deep concern about the prospect that the global and European nuclear theater balances between East and West would be decoupled. These reservations about the effectiveness of NATO and, specifically, American nuclear forces joined still others arising from the excitement over published NATO plans to fall back in case of a Soviet attack, the missteps over the neutron bomb, President Carter's unilateral cancellation of the B-1 bomber without a *quid pro quo* from the Soviet Union, and worries, voiced *soto voce*, about whether SALT II conceded too much to the Soviet Union (protocol, cruise

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

missile deployment limits, silence on the threat of the SS-20 to Europe, and acceptance of the Backfire bomber as a nonstrategic weapon).<sup>24</sup> Despite these qualms and quarrels over US actions and initial enthusiasm for the deployment of theater nuclear systems to counter the Soviet buildup in Europe, the Schmidt government is now in the forefront of those pressing for arms control talks in Europe before NATO missiles are deployed. A principal motive for Schmidt's July trip to Moscow was to gain Soviet assent to negotiations. The effort has the support of significant elements within his own party. The German Chancellor has also succeeded in upgrading the West German role in East-West nuclear talks although its principal effect is to retard allied decisionmaking rather than to hamper Soviet maneuverability. Meanwhile, the Schmidt government protests its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. It is still prepared to accept NATO missiles (if some other European states do also); defense spending will increase by 3 percent in real terms to meet NATO targets; German money and advice have been critical in stabilizing wobbly regimes in Portugal and Turkey; and German conventional forces remain the largest and most modern in NATO. Whereas the Federal Republic wants detente *cum* defense, the Carter administration wants defense *cum* detente laced with periodic pledging ceremonies of loyalty from Bonn. This role reversal, when compared to the days of the Adenauer government, are a source of doubt and suspicion between Washington and Bonn whose depths are far from plumbed.

Afghanistan offers another illustration of the pushes and pulls pressing on West German foreign policy. Like most other Europeans, the Germans were slow to condemn the Soviet Union's manhandling of Kabul, but seemed initially as worried about American overreaction as about the implications of the Soviet invasion. There is now common agreement on the threat: the Soviet move has shifted the military balance in the Persian Gulf in favor of the Soviets; the Russian military presence menaces oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz; the Russian presence places increased political pressures on regional states to accommodate Soviet power; and the West can do very little militarily in the short-run about rectifying the geopolitical strategic balance. In reaction, Bonn, somewhat belatedly by American governmental measures, has adopted a tough line on Afghanistan. Chancellor Schmidt's criticism of Soviet aggression and his call for withdrawal of Russian troops during his Moscow trip reportedly had to be edited by his Soviet hosts. West Germany has also supported the United States on the Olympic boycott, agreed with the EEC's decision not to fill the gaps in grain shipments embargoed by the United States, and acceded to efforts to tighten export controls within Cocom on military-related items. It has been less forthcoming on extending credits to the Soviet Union or slowing trade with Moscow or the Eastern bloc. The 25-year trade accord with the Soviet Union signed by Chancellor Schmidt in Moscow raises serious questions whether trade relations restrain Soviet adventurism or hamper Western efforts to bring pressure on Moscow to desist from threatening others or invading their territory.

The French remain French. Official French opinion is mum about NATO missile emplacements in Europe or SALT II. France takes no part in NATO and refuses to be a party to superpower bloc-to-bloc strategic talks

## PANEL 2

like MBFR. On the other hand, French military strategy under President Giscard d'Estaing has been redefined in such a way that greater cooperation with France's Atlantic allies is implied in coordinating military responses to the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup> Current French strategic thinking calls for giving the French President a larger array of options to meet Soviet aggression than those of national capitulation or suicide, but execution of such a strategy of testing Soviet intent and of stopping a conventional attack implies allied help and cooperation if escalation is to be controlled. Military spending is also up for French conventional forces (partly to balance West Germany) and plans are underway to construct mobile intermediate-range missiles and develop a neutron bomb, while phasing out the vulnerable Mirage-IV forces and intermediate-range missiles in southern France and Pluton tactical missiles that pose as much a threat to West Germany (since that is where they would likely land) as they do to the Soviet Union. These initiatives indirectly bolster Western defenses but not, of course, within the NATO framework.

If France, like Germany, was slow—indeed initially silent—in reacting to the Afghanistan crisis, it has now matched its allies in verbal condemnations. But France, like West Germany, has dragged its feet on sanctions. A French team will go to the Moscow Olympics and trade flourishes, with reservations on grain and military equipment; and lines are kept open. The French President beat his German counterpart in meeting with Brezhnev—and without previous United States approval or notice—to explore a settlement of the Afghan conflict. Foreign Minister Jean François-Poncet defended the French President's decision to go to Warsaw:

France follows an independent foreign policy. It holds talks with whomever it wants, when it wants. . . . I observe that the necessity of maintaining a dialogue with the Soviet Union is unanimously recognized. I note that Chancellor Schmidt will go to Moscow in the next few weeks, and . . . I see that the new United States Secretary of State . . . termed the meeting [with Mr. Gromyko] "useful and necessary."

France thinks it would be a serious political mistake to try and isolate the Soviet Union diplomatically. . . . To want to bar the Soviet Union from the indispensable dialogue regarding ways to eliminate the causes of international tension means not only ignoring the most glaring realities, it also means taking the risk of mirroring international relations in a cycle of misunderstandings and misapprehensions and giving ourselves over to the blind movements of a chain reaction that could be fatal.<sup>27</sup>

President Giscard d'Estaing subsequently acted at the Vienna summit meeting as herald of Moscow's decision to move some Soviet armored units out of Afghanistan. While the Carter administration expressed skepticism about the importance of the move, the French preferred to see it as a good start toward a peaceful solution. "The gesture has two consequences. The first consequence: The Soviet Union recognizes that it is with Afghanistan that the deterioration in international relations must be halted. . . . The second consequence—the fact that such a decision was made and

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

that it was given such publicity—would make any back-tracking on the part of the Soviet Union extremely difficult and fraught with consequences.”<sup>24</sup>

President Giscard d'Estaing, like his German homologue, is in competition for front position in the detente sweepstakes. Talking tough, posturing independently of the United States and searching earnestly for accord with the Soviet Union on France's or Germany's behalf and, unsolicitedly at times, for others, including the United States, are now established steps in the defense-detente minuet perceived to be imposed on European continental leaders if they are to stay on top of the pressures being exerted by the superpowers, allies, and domestic political forces.

As much a fear as Soviet expansionism may be, it is rivaled by concern about possible precipitate American military reaction to Soviet aggression. The French and Germans for their own separate, but complementary, purposes have seized some of the initiative in Afghanistan crisis diplomacy to calm troubled waters to protect what has been gained in East-West relations. However, both nations run the risk that the spirit of accommodation suggested by these moves (opinion in both capitals speaks of the Soviet Union's special interests in Afghanistan) may embolden the Soviet Union to make additional expansionist moves rather than induce it to make compromising gestures towards Europe if not to the United States or the Afghan people. The Europeans see themselves and the United States leading from weakness and make little effort to hide their perceived vulnerability.

Margaret Thatcher's Britain appears to be closer to the United States on NATO strategy, missiles, and European detente and more sympathetic, though not much more effective, than her EEC allies, in supporting American resistance to Soviet expansion in Afghanistan. Here traditional ties and a feeling that not much good would come from challenging American leadership on these issues seem to be at play. The absence of an imminent election test, such as those in the offing for the French President and the German Chancellor, also gives pause to British assumption of a leadership role in this area. London has floated the notion of a neutralized Afghanistan as one way of extracting Soviet military power from the area while saving Moscow's face. The Carter administration, *faute de mieux*, has shown interest in the idea. The Soviet Union, however, has not been tempted by the bait. These neutralization proposals suggest a closer rapport between Washington and its Atlantic allies on this score. Had the same initiatives been taken before or right after the Afghanistan coup of 1978, Moscow might have been more interested than it is today in its commanding position. Some kind of neutralization scheme may thus have the utility of maintaining some semblance of allied unity although the accord has slim chance in the immediate future, barring massive Soviet missteps in Afghanistan, of having any impact on Soviet policy.

### **The Middle East: The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Iran**

Divergence rather than convergence has marked American-European relations in the Middle East since World War II. The latest dispute between Washington and European capitals prompted by the EEC's joint communique of 14 June calling for discussion of Palestinian self-determination and

## PANEL 2

for the association of the Palestine Liberation Front in that discussion, should be seen against a backdrop of successive allied clashes over relations with the states of the region. The roots of these differences lie deep in history and geography. Europe and the peoples of the region have been thrust into uneasy relations with each other for over two millenia. The United States is a late-comer to these affairs, and its supplanting of the European powers in the region still rankles European sensitivities. France has been the principal ally-antagonist although Britain has also clashed with Washington. Now the United States faces the prospect of the EEC Nine moving in loose counter-step to American moves. A sketch of the evolution of these differences may clarify the dimensions of the present divergence among the allies and the conjunctural sources of alliance malaise.

Immediately after World War II, the United States, preoccupied with demobilization, tended to defer to European sentiments in the Middle East. The Truman administration's decision to aid Greece and Turkey and to stand firm against Soviet pressures on Iran were welcomed. The British were pleased to transfer the problem of Palestine to the United Nations. France joined in efforts to pacify the area in 1949; the wartime Western Big Three signed a tripartite accord in 1950 on borders and on limiting arms transfer to the region; and a proposal was also advanced in 1951 for a joint allied command.

The first major confrontation was the Suez crisis of 1956. The United States joined with the Soviet Union in calling for withdrawal of invading Israeli, English, and French troops. The United States opposed military intervention on principle. Secretary of State Dulles was also concerned that the allied action would lead to Soviet intervention or increased political penetration of the region and would polarize much of the nonaligned and neutral states of the Third World against the West. Oil access would be threatened and American influence in the area weakened. Moreover, allied military power and attention would be focused on the Middle East and not Europe which was judged to be the major stake of the East-West conflict.

Secretary of State Dulles was largely insensitive to allied views of their interests. They saw their action as in the service of Western aims to assure oil to Europe, to keep open the Suez Canal, to discipline Nasser, and to contain Soviet influence. Israel launched a preventive attack on Egypt to protect its security; France saw Nasser's overthrow as a way to bolster its eroding position in Algeria; and Britain sought to cling to its receding imperial interests.

The United States had no interest in extending the Atlantic Alliance or NATO to the Middle East. This attitude was confirmed 2 years later when the Eisenhower administration rejected a memorandum from President Charles de Gaulle to create a NATO Directorate of the Big Three which among its several functions would be a vehicle for coordinating allied Third World policy. The American demurrer and its Suez position led leaders of the Fourth and Fifth Republics to develop an independent foreign policy. The United States was not considered a reliable ally, and the Atlantic Alliance was evaluated as less than useful in advancing France's specific interests and responding to its needs. It was particularly irrelevant, even

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

burdensome, in meeting the Algerian challenge. France's allies criticized the deflection of French forces from Europe to fight the rebellion, yet offered no constructive help to end the conflict or ease domestic divisions that eventually destroyed the Fourth Republic and threatened the life of the Fifth Republic and its President. In a speech as Prime Minister on 16 August 1959, Michel Debré denounced the inconstancy of France's principal allies:

It belongs to a renewed France to make its allies understand that it is in the right to demand from all of them the support for a cause [Algeria] that is much greater than one people or one generation.<sup>29</sup>

France's isolation in the Arab community ended with Algerian independence. There followed a calculated policy of maintaining an even hand between the Arab states and Israel. Toward the Arab states, Gaullist France could point to what appeared to be a generous peace offer. (Algeria would later raise doubts about its equity, especially on oil concessions.) Toward Israel, France assumed the role of almost exclusive armorer. This delicate policy could survive only if there were no war. De Gaulle advised Israel against an attack on its Arab neighbors when Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba, but to no avail. With the war, the rupture was swift and the de Gaulle government chose the Arab cause over that of Israel. Oil, trade, resistance to American Third World expansion, a campaign to create the conditions for detente in Europe, *amour propre*—all of these factors played a part in realigning forces in the region.<sup>30</sup>

Britain's reaction to Suez was opposite to that of France. London sought closer, not less, cooperation with Washington. British security planning turned increasingly toward Europe and away from the Third World. Its defense posture needs were cast in a European mold; its former obligations "East of Suez" were gradually reduced; in an effort to create a European Free Trade Association, it applied for membership in the Common Market; and it drew on its special relationship with the United States to enhance its strategic nuclear forces. These reorientations responded to American notions of an Atlantic Community, linked to a united Europe, including Britain as a prominent member. De Gaulle's rejection of this design had its immediate impact on Europe, but set the stage for the gradual readjustment of British policy not only to continental needs in Europe in no small part set by France, but also to perceived European requirements in the Third World and, most particularly, in the Middle East.

The reorientation of British policy was slow. Its shift toward Arab opinion progressed quietly, and not in opposition to American policy or sentiment. Meanwhile, West Germany could not be considered a major political actor although its trade with the region outdistanced that of both France and Britain. Focused on its own problems in Europe, its diplomacy centered on preventing recognition of Eastern Europe by carrots of aid to developing states or sticks in the form of the Hallstein doctrine and other threats.

The 1967 War further exposed allied divisions. The French attacked Israel as the aggressor and the United States because its Vietnam intervention was supposed to have instigated, through example, the Israeli preempt-

## PANEL 2

tive strike. The British joined with the United States in sponsoring UN Resolution 242 that has become one of the bases for Arab-Israeli accord. Even the English and French texts of the resolution proved to be a bone of contention. The English version spoke of Israeli withdrawal from "occupied territories," an ambiguous rendering, while the French translation referred to "*des territoires occupés*" (*the occupied territories*.)

The French subsequently lobbied within the EEC for support. Little came of these ventures until the 1973 crisis and the Arab oil embargo. Under French prompting, the EEC published a communique on November 6, calling for peace in the region based on UN Resolution 242, and for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory. More significant was the refusal of the European states to assist Israel despite the threat to its security posed by the joint Egyptian and Syrian attack. Only Portugal permitted the United States to use bases in the Azores to resupply Israeli forces. West Germans objected to supplies in Germany being shipped to Israel and to the use of German bases and overflights for such purposes.

Since the Six-Day War, however, the United States has largely followed a loner policy in the Middle East. Its experience in 1973 confirmed this posture of the "*cavalier seul*." The Camp David accords are, therefore, in line with the evolution of American policy in the Middle East since the late 1960s. European reaction to the accords and to the Israeli-Egyptian treaty contrast with American views. The polarization in Arab opinion and the ascendancy of radical Arab views have restrained European enthusiasm for the accords. Why it was felt necessary in June to take an initiative over a peace process to which the Europeans have contributed very little and for which, apparently, they wish to shoulder no security responsibilities (note the abandonment of Israel in 1973) is puzzling. The images of declining American military and economic power and diminishing confidence in American leadership, institutions, and even public opinion appear to have urged some initiative. European proponents of the move also argued that there was a need to strengthen Arab moderates. Meanwhile, pressures would be put on the Begin government to face the Palestinian issue. The Europeans could claim that their action was needed to keep the peace process going since American policy was paralyzed by the Presidential election campaign.<sup>31</sup> In the absence of movement on the Palestinian question, the Europeans fear that moderate Arab regimes will be swept away or that another Arab-Israeli conflict will erupt. These conditions encourage Soviet military intervention at a time when the West never appeared weaker. Most important of all: The EEC action is alleged to be indispensable to keep oil flowing.

One can question whether these beneficial results will materialize. The Israeli government is most intransigent when pressed, not stroked. Its confidence in European support for its security is almost nil.<sup>32</sup> How moderate opinion can be increased while Sadat's position is weakened is not clear. If the Europeans have a role in a Middle East settlement, one part of that role is being attentive to American sentiment and its special responsibilities, earned by blood and treasure, in preserving Middle East security. There is no gainsaying the vacillations, confusions, and contradictions of American Middle East policy, but the failures of American leadership are hardly compensated by the weaknesses of European diplomacy bent more on

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

preserving its special interests than on finding a formula for peace acceptable to all parties.

None of the European states can (or wishes to) offer much in solving the security problems of the region, however these problems may be variously defined by regional rivals or the superpowers. The Europeans have an interest in staying out of any confrontation between the superpowers, Arab factions, or the Arabs and Israelis. If the Europeans are sympathetic to Arab claims against Israel, a more fundamental neutralist sentiment lies at the root of their attitude and approach to the struggles of the region. The Europeans see all of the rival claims of the principal opponents in the region, including the superpowers, as threats to their broad security needs. Thus, lumped into the same sack of European concern are Soviet expansion, the spread of Arab radicalism, the rigidities of traditional governments and political factions (like religious fanatics), the shakiness of the Saudi Arabian Government, and the oscillations of American diplomacy in the region. All these elements are potential sources of threat to European interests. The Europeans have few effective means at their disposal to respond to these threats. Even arms sales to the region are viewed as much a tool of trade as an instrument for exerting a positive security role in the area.

Britain relinquished its last remaining security obligations in the Persian Gulf when it withdrew its forces from the Arabian peninsula in 1971. Aden, once a thriving port under British control, is now under Soviet influence. It is a key transit point for arms and supplies to Moscow's clients in the Middle East and Africa and a useful point of entry and refueling for Soviet advisors and Cuban troops en route to flashpoints in the African Horn, Angola, and southern Africa.

Britain's participation in the CENTO Pact has also provided no leverage for itself or Europe to influence events in the Northern Tier. The pact proved more a burden than a relief for the perceived security needs of the principal non-Western members. The Iraqi *coup d'etat* initially transformed the Baghdad Pact into the CENTO group. Subsequently, Iran found CENTO no help against Soviet and radical Arab pressures; Turkey could not use the alliance for its purposes in Cyprus; nor could Pakistan direct the pact against India. Flawed from the start, and lacking American participation which could not assure its survival anyway, the Iranian revolution dealt a *coup de grace* to an already spent alliance body.

The French and Italian (and Spanish) Governments have found the notion of a neutral Mediterranean tempting. Catch phrases, like "Mare Nostrum" or the Mediterranean as "a lake of peace," have been mouthed, but so far they have had little impact on the regional states or the superpowers.<sup>33</sup> Nonalignment is a policy that the Arab states, notwithstanding their wealth, have found difficult to follow in light of their foreign and domestic objectives. Lebanon's tragic plight of civil war and foreign intervention suggests the difficulties of making nonalignment work in a field of clashing forces that are capable of overwhelming governmental efforts to maintain a neutral stance. The European states depend more on others to preserve their security interests—the superpowers and the regional states—than on themselves. The Arab states have shown increasing skill in manipulating Europe's weakness and reticence for their purposes.

## PANEL 2

Characterizing Europe as a "civilian" rather than a military power is attractive to many Europeans since it makes Europe's current military weakness a virtue, rationalizes its impotence except for marginal roles, like the UN force in Lebanon, and positions the European states to draw passing advantage from the conflicts of others or, at a minimum, to limit individually or collectively the damage arising from the clashes of others."

The incentives toward neutralism, beggar-thy-neighbor policies, or counterproductive and destructive competition among European states and between them and the United States are too strong to ignore if the security relations within the European theater are to remain firm and confident. Political and economic consultative and decisional methods are seriously lacking to coordinate Western efforts. The United States has received little open support for its Middle East policies; partly because it has asked for little and has discouraged European initiatives; partly because Arab reaction has been so critical to Israeli-Egyptian peace that the possible collapse of this American diplomatic offensive may lead to a greater exposure of Europe than of the United States to Arab retaliation.

European reaction to the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis has underlined deep distrust and doubt about the prudence of relying on American power and leadership in preserving European interests. The concerns, interests, and incentives for active, low profile diplomacy and military disengagement found in Europe's approach to the Middle East may be predicated on its handling of the Iranian issue. The added dimension was, of course, the renewal of religious fervor and nationalistic xenophobia. These forces make new and straining demands on the fragile processes of international commerce, communication, and civil exchange. More troubling is the virus they may spread in inflaming religious groups to overthrow or undermine other governments (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria are targets.) inner-Arab differences, overshadowed until now by the struggle with Israel, are stirred and serve to incite the Arab-Israeli conflict. The disruption within and between states threatens the supply of oil. Religiously based regimes are also likely to be less sensitive to the industrial needs of the developed states and to be inured to economic manipulation. Before these possibilities the European states felt an acute vulnerability and weakness. Lacking the means and will for military intervention, they have relied primarily on political accommodation and economic blandishment to make their way. But these instruments may be unequal to the task of assuring energy resources and markets in an increasingly chaotic oil-supply system. Europeans believe that American military power would only exacerbate the situation because it will be ineffective, as in the Iranian rescue mission, or too effective. In the latter instance Islamic opinion, whatever its differences, would be galvanized against the West.

European diplomacy consequently has been primarily concerned with preventing Western-Islamic polarization or with linking the Iranian and Afghan crises. Military action has been largely ruled out; thus the shock that coursed through European capitals when the Iranian rescue mission failure was announced and the chagrin the action elicited since the Europeans had gone along with American requests for sanctions in order to head off threatened American action. Few believed the sanctions would

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

help free the hostages; others feared that to the degree that they would cut deep, Islamic Iran would be thrown into the arms of the Soviet Union.

Soviet takeover of Iran would dwarf the Afghan affair and would raise the spectre of a superpower confrontation or give Moscow a commanding position in the Persian Gulf, or both. These worries produced much hesitant discussion within the EEC on sanctions, and the awkward application of a mixed formula whose impact remains to be seen. While the EEC members were willing to apply sanctions to contracts signed after the 4 November seizure of the hostages, Great Britain's Margaret Thatcher, playing the role of staunch ally until sanctions were about to be applied, had to backpedal because her own party would not go along with the American proposal. British sanctions went into effect at the time of the EEC action in May, and not before.

### North Africa and Black Africa

The alignment patterns seen in Europe and the Middle East differ from those in North Africa and Black Africa. New forces, factors, and national aims are also at play. There have been instances of cooperative or separate but converging policies and actions in selected areas (e.g., Morocco, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe), and there may be a basis for building on these discrete cases. The major actors are France within the Francophone countries and Britain in the Commonwealth areas of east and southern Africa.

The views of Washington and Paris on North Africa have recently come closer together although the supporting motivation is not the same. Both seek to minimize Soviet influence in the area and to encourage regional cooperation. Both would like to insulate the area from the Middle East turmoil. Both also are particularly concerned with maintaining moderate Arab regimes in Morocco and Tunisia that have acted as a restraining element on inner-Arab politics: Hassan II in Morocco and Bourguiba in Tunisia. Retaining strategic access to the area and its base facilities also weigh heavily in Franco-American thinking as do the phosphate deposits of Morocco and the western Sahara.

These shared objectives are more easily stated than realized. However helpful it may be with aid and diplomatic support to embattled Morocco and Tunisia, the United States is still the intruder into a sphere that the French believe is theirs. Resentments still linger over the gradual shift in economic ties with Algeria. The United States now imports approximately nine percent of its crude oil from Algeria and two percent of its total gas consumption. Over the past decade American firms have signed more than \$6 billion in construction contracts; Export-Import loans and guarantees total over \$1.4 billion. The United States, not France, is Algeria's major trading partner.<sup>15</sup> French resentment over past American intrusions and suspicion about the United States as a competitor in the region join doubts about Washington's reliability as an ally on matters of conjunctural interest. The United States is torn between Algeria and Morocco; it is also divided domestically on relations with these states. Advocates of human rights and opponents of arms sales contest the recent decision of the Carter administration to ship weapons to Morocco. These include arms like the OV-10 reconnaissance aircraft and attack helicopters equipped with TOW antitank missiles. Since Algeria is key to the war in the western Sahara, the United

## PANEL 2

States jeopardizes its lucrative and essential trade with Algeria. There is also sympathy for the Polisario based on various grounds: self-determination, the weakness of Hassan II's regime to win the desert contest, Third World support for the guerrillas (e.g., the Organization of African Unity), and the fear of drawing the United States militarily into a hopeless cause."

The ambiguities underlying American policy reflect the contradictions of the region. Libya is a wild card. The Qaddafi government has fomented turmoil throughout North Africa and the Middle East. Only recently it has been accused by Tunisia of instigating a raid on a Tunisian village." The French, who along with the Soviet Union and a sprinkling of other West Europeans supply arms to Libya, responded to Tunisia's request for aid with a show of naval force only to risk having Libyan arms which they had supplied being used against them, a possibility that had long plagued French planners in Chad. At the same time, Russian equipment flows through Libya and Algeria with some of it finding its way to the Polisario. The Soviet Union has also extended more economic credits to Morocco than to any other state except (in order of amount) Turkey, India, or Afghanistan. The Soviet package amounted to \$2.1 billion between 1954 and 1978 with the bulk (\$2 billion) accorded in 1978, in exchange principally for phosphates which, besides their commercial uses, can be processed to extract their uranium content." Saudi money supports the Hassan regime and finances its arms purchases from France (Morocco's largest supplier of arms) and the United States. Mauritania, having dropped out of the war, remains a semi-French protectorate. This delicate tissue of counter-alignments can be unraveled at any moment. The United States and France have an interest in keeping the fabric intact. Their control is hostage to the agenda-setting ability of Algeria, Libya, and to some extent the Polisario. In the wings is the Soviet Union, which for the time being is preoccupied elsewhere and has some passing interest in keeping the Hassan regime afloat.

Generalizations about European alignments in Africa are very difficult. The number of states is large; their development and historical ties are different; many are more geographical expressions ruled by an army than integrated states; tribal, ethnic, and linguistic differences are the rule; and European and American interests are not uniformly defined and even much less are they coordinated. The European-American approaches to the area may be characterized in terms of the debate over US African policy since many of the global aspects of this exchange are relevant to European decisionmaking. The French are inclined, with major reservations, to what has been reported (and only with partial accuracy) as the Brzezinski thesis. Here the major priority is security defined in military terms and directed against the Soviet Union and its clients, principally the Cubans and East Germans. The Angolan debacle and Soviet, Cuban, and East European presence in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen are seen as major threats to Western interests. These forces undermine political stability in central and southern Africa, convulsed by racial tensions, internal divisions, and strivings for self-determination; they threaten access to needed raw materials and markets to turn Europe's mills; and the control of these areas threatens the sea lanes vital for oil shipments to the West in the Red Sea, the Indian

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Ocean, and around the Cape of Good Hope. The problems in these regions are also a litmus test of Soviet interest in detente.

Opposed to this summary view is the position of former UN Ambassador Andrew Young that the claims of regional states, especially for Black majority rule and socioeconomic development, should be given precedence over the perceived imperatives of the East-West struggle. Within this alternative frame of reference, the Soviet Union is considered as a receding force once top national aspirations for racial equality and national independence have been met since only the West possesses the economic means and liberal political values that meet long-term African needs. For proponents of this view, detente in Europe can be strengthened if the West's relations with the developing states are improved. The North-South axis will eventually determine the outcome of the East-West struggle. As Canning might have said, the developing world can be called to right the balance of the developed states to the advantage of the Western allies.

The French have been puzzled, perplexed, and piqued by vacillating American policy in the region as it steers an unsteady course between these competing guidelines for action. They have expressed alarm that the United States could have so easily acquiesced in Soviet penetration in Angola and the Horn. Criticism is directed not only against the Carter administration but also at the Congress that has imposed restrictions on Presidential initiative and power to intervene militarily. The French presidency, patterned ironically by De Gaulle on the American model because it could act for the nation and move with "energy, secrecy, and dispatch," is not similarly hampered. The French also feel themselves vulnerable to direct Soviet and Soviet-client military confrontation in Africa as they try to manage detente with the Soviet Union on nonconfrontation lines in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. They would like more American military help but without seeking it. To cooperate openly would damage the larger detente effort and claims of independence. The Shaba crises were awkward since they revealed American, French, Moroccan, and implicit Saudi (and perhaps Iranian) involvement in the effort to bolster the Mobutu regime in Zaire. Discord with Belgium over French implantation and criticism at home and abroad (voiced also in the United States) for supporting an authoritarian regime further complicates France's involvement.<sup>39</sup>

The French are also viewed in American circles as having played a constructive role in what has now been rebaptized as the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) in toppling the Emperor Bokassa (accused of cannibalism and of killing lycée students himself). The intervention has caused disquiet in policy circles in differentiating the French action in the C.A.R. and in other parts of Francophone Africa from Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and elsewhere.<sup>40</sup> France also protects the Western-oriented Black regimes in Ivory Coast, Gabon, Djibouti, and other parts of the Francophone community. Until Spring 1980, the French exercised important mediating powers through their 1800-man contingent in Chad. In all, France reportedly stations about 14,000 troops in Africa or its environs. These face about 34,000 Cuban troops which are concentrated in Angola (21,000) and Ethiopia (12,000), with a scattering in other parts of the continent (Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Mozambique, et al.)<sup>41</sup>

## PANEL 2

Continued exercise of the French *gendarme* role cannot be assured. The Left has no enthusiasm for an interventionist policy. Many on the Right are troubled by the costs and risks of such actions and the challenge they pose for a Gaullist policy that sought to emphasize diplomatic, economic, and cultural levers over military ones (although with only mixed success).<sup>42</sup> The French military are generally agreed that their resources only permit limited, surgical interventions of short duration. Otherwise, France risks being bogged down beyond its military measure or interest; its major defense priority in Europe will also be undermined as much by the unavailability of adequate military power as by the internal division and external isolation France will suffer from extended and costly engagements abroad.

The spectacular Anglo-American success in Zimbabwe gives point to these rising French concerns and criticisms. Working with front-line states, like Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, and Angola, Robert Mugabe's ZANU movement was accorded a peaceful victory at the ballot box that Chinese and Soviet arms might have secured as well, but at considerably greater loss of life and damage to Western interests. The Zimbabwe success (at least until now) raises serious doubts that military intervention, overtly or covertly managed, is an appropriate long-run solution to regional social claims of political urgency and moral weight. These same doubts, of course, can be raised in almost every other instance of Western strategy in dealing with movements of national, racial, and religious self-expression whose manifestation may be retarded or blocked by corrupt, unpopular regimes whose days are numbered.

### EUROPE: ENERGY AND ARMS

#### The Oil Scramble

The unravelling tissue of alliance relations, relieved only by patchworks of alignment of varying strength, resilience, and elasticity, are nowhere more evident than in energy policy, especially in oil and civilian nuclear development, or in the transfer of arms to Third World states. Discord and disarray on these functional issues that directly touch the domestic cohesion and well-being of the Western nations reinforce tensions on regional matters. Presented is a picture of an alliance in incipient dissolution within an international anarchy sliding from anarchy to chaos. This apocalyptic vision may be exaggerated, but at least one close observer of oil disorder has essentially reached that conclusion:

The world, as we know it now, will probably not be able to maintain its cohesion, nor be able to provide for the continued economic progress of its people against the onslaught of future oil shocks—with all that this might imply for the political stability of the West, its free institutions, and its internal and external security.<sup>43</sup>

Why is it that there has been so little progress in cooperation in international oil policy, the most important problem today? There is general agreement that the potential repercussions of continued dependency on foreign oil pose a grave menace to the West: enlarging political blackmail and economic extortion; deepening division, even open conflict, within the Western Alliance; promoting domestic upheaval and the dissolution of free institutions; and enhancing the prospect of nuclear war or economic

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

bankruptcy in the scramble for oil. There is little need to recount current and immediate long term dependency, for these have been done elsewhere." What is of interest are the factors that have prevented the obvious from occurring, viz., a concentrated Western policy on developing a common negotiating position with OPEC on the quantity of oil and gas to be supplied and at what prices. To these critical items should be joined agreement on terms of commercial trade and investment of growing oil supplier assets. Failing accord, one might have expected more progress on a joint plan for sharing available stocks, conserving energy, and launching a search for new energy sources. What cooperation has emerged is mean and meagre: an International Energy Association (IEA) possessed of a plan to share oil stocks with states whose supplies fall below seven percent of normal imports, an agreement to hold imports at 1977 or 1979 levels up to 1985, better statistical information about production and current supplies, and a heightened awareness of the problem if not its solution. But little more has been achieved, and a recent US proposal for cutting oil imports was rejected by the West Europeans." In the period between the first oil shock (1973-74) and the second (1978-79), the West essentially wasted five years. The second shock has produced more profound fissures within the West while prices for oil have soared to \$40 a barrel, in no small part the result of a war between the consuming states for scarce supplies. As the need and urgency for cooperation have grown, the incentives have diminished. This paradoxical circumstance can be attributed to at least five general sets of factors.

First, the shaky oil order underwritten by American power and leadership has collapsed. With no one to lead, there is no one to follow. The surface reasons for this fall from grace are not difficult to discern: the absence of a national energy policy to cut consumption and imports and develop new sources of energy; continued high American consumption and importation of oil, after 1973, sharply exceeding European practice;" inability to save the Shah's regime, key to the American-based system in the Persian Gulf; sustained conflict between the President and Congress over energy; ineptitude in Presidential leadership; receding ability of the multinationals, largely American in composition, to control oil supplies or exercise a moderating influence on prices; and the perceived decline of American military power or its appropriateness in assuring oil supplies to the Western world.

Second, the divergent domestic political and economic perspectives and needs of the Western states hamper cooperation. It is increasingly fashionable in European circles to cite the flaps and flip-flops of the Carter administration. However, a close examination of the records of the European states often reveals little consistency or forceful leadership. While there is no gainsaying the faults of the Carter Presidency, Europeans have seized upon them to rationalize attitudes of *saute qui peut* in their relations with one another. Holland was initially abandoned in 1973 by its EEC brethren. France has oscillated between championing European cooperation (e.g., the Euro-Arab talks) and striking out on its own to make bilateral deals with oil producers, including the sale of arms and nuclear technology to potential adversaries (Iraq). It still refuses to join the IEA. Germany has bid up prices on the spot market and has helped to redefine Western price tolerance upward (and irreversibly). To be sure the West

## PANEL 2

European record is better on internal, national conservation measures and on cutting imports than the US effort,<sup>47</sup> but coordination within the EEC or OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) has not been markedly successful.

One has to go deeper than just the failings of leadership to explain the bankruptcy of the Western position. States differ in their economic needs: the United States and Great Britain have options since they still have oil; the French, Germans, and Italians have none and must pay in cash and political coinage to secure the oil they need. The democratic processes of each state, laborious, delicately balanced, and invariably divided, make the definition of a coherent national energy policy difficult. What is hard to define at the national level is then magnified several-fold in complexity when projected to the international level. As national coalition is piled upon coalition a political Tower of Babel is erected.

Democratic leaders are fain, moreover, to make the hard choices that a coordinated policy would imply. Some states might get more than others; rates of employment and economic growth will rise or fall at varying rates; differential energy policies already in train, involving enormous economic resources and political stakes to individuals, bureaucracies, and corporations, would have to be harmonized with resulting losses and gains; national sovereignty and foreign policy discretion would have to be curbed; large and diverse populations would have to gradually accept or contemplate common restraints on consumption (automobile speed limits, rationing, etc.).

Third, incentives for noncooperation (and even conflict and competition) are inherent in the negotiating process with suppliers. To the degree that accord with producer states appears real or possible, incentives for cooperation decline. Indeed, the West European states have viewed efforts to cooperate as an incitement to suppliers to become tougher on supplies, prices, and conditions of sale. Talk of using arms further alarms those who believe that only diplomacy, political concessions, and economic and technological blandishments are best calculated to keep oil plentiful.

But even if these reservations were overcome, with whom should long-term accords be made? This raises the fourth obstacle: the divisions within supplier states and their own particular needs are increasingly out of phase with Western requirements for continued large supplies of oil. The OPEC states constitute a multiplicity of societies internally rifted by cultural, religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences. Coups d'etat are a continuing concern; revolutions of the Iranian type are constant sources of upheaval and broken contractual arrangements. Nor is it certain anymore that OPEC has control over its own price policies as members set levels to suit their convenience, market demand, and internal political needs. The ideal of oil allocations moving by market mechanisms no longer describes internal decisionmaking of OPEC producers. Political demands (PLO recognition) or calculations (how high a price Western economies can tolerate short of collapse) increasingly decide supply and prices. The domestic economic needs of many suppliers are increasingly unrelated to those of their clients. Why should they produce more at lower prices when doing the opposite will yield greater benefits?

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Finally, the external divisions between states set obvious limits to Western coordination on oil. Inner-Arab quarrels and the Arab-Israeli conflict clearly constrain accord however much one might assert, as one keen observer notes, that it is "absurd that this question [of the Arab-Israeli conflict] should be at the root of a dispute between the United States and Europe."<sup>48</sup> Choosing between moderates (Saudi Arabia or Sadat's Egypt) and radicals (Iraq or Libya) is a problem. So also is the tradeoff in detente in Europe or the Middle East and Africa. To be more concrete, in moving toward the PLO, the European states not only stiffen Israeli opinion but they also polarize American opinion into pro-Israeli and pro-Arab camps. Alignment on regional lines blocks realignment on oil policy.

### **Civilian Nuclear Energy and Arms Transfers**

Add to this oil quandary two other problems: the disagreement and divergencies of the Western allies over civilian nuclear energy development and arms transfers. A few words should suffice to anchor the argument that the West is in deep trouble as a partial, but significant, consequence of its own lack of accord. American policy has sought since the inception of the nuclear age to put curbs on the transfer of fissionable material or know-how that might assist other nations in building nuclear weapons. Successive administrations, armed with an array of legal powers and mandates, worked to erect an international regime to promote these aims. The regime was highly successful for much of the postwar period because of the commanding lead enjoyed by the United States in civilian nuclear technology. During this period US firms could meet international demand for nuclear energy on terms that were economically attractive to other states. These conditions no longer hold. Other developed and developing states have pursued vigorous nuclear programs and now challenge American dominance and even surpass American technology in certain areas, such as breeder reactors. Competitively the United States lags significantly behind foreign enterprise. In 1978 only two of the twenty-nine scheduled reactor orders (from seven countries) went to the United States.<sup>49</sup> American restrictions are viewed by many Europeans as attempts to preserve the US competitive advantage, and to the degree that they accept the nonproliferation motivation of American constraints, they are puzzled about the self-abnegating nature of American nuclear policy which erodes the commercial advantage previously held by US firms. The energy crisis has led more states to turn to nuclear energy to supply basic needs. They also seek to lower their dependency on other states, and in the case of the United States to escape its controls. France, Britain, and Germany now have impressive civilian nuclear capabilities. Britain is a leader in the production of electrical energy; France is acknowledged to be ahead in breeder reactors; and Germany has been a commercially successful competitor to the United States.

American controls and efforts to impose them on other states have met with stiff resistance from the European states. The decision to arrest breeder reactor technology in the United States was not followed in Europe. France expects to produce 55 percent of its electrical power by 1985 with nuclear energy.<sup>50</sup> France and Britain have built reprocessing plants that compete with American facilities. Both Britain and France have

## PANEL 2

let contracts with other states that directly challenge American nuclear restrictions. A multi-billion dollar German-Brazilian accord calls for the construction of enrichment and reprocessing facilities. German industry has resisted efforts through Washington's pressure on Bonn to revise the contract to insure full safeguards designed to prevent weapons-grade nuclear material from being produced by Brazil once its civilian program has been developed. A recent European agreement with Argentina poses the same problems. The agreement with Switzerland and West Germany will send heavy water to Argentina (via Switzerland). The shipment will aid Argentina to close the fuel cycle since it is building its own reprocessing plant. The French Government is still tied to a contract with the Iraqi Government to build a reactor with highly enriched uranium that would be close to weapons-grade quality. Although France has publicly abrogated the sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan, the Pakistani Government reportedly is still using Paris as a base of operations to get the material and know-how it needs to produce a nuclear weapon.<sup>51</sup> Meanwhile, the United States has placed itself in the contradictory position of demanding a renegotiation of the contract with Euratom to place more restrictions on American nuclear materials, including the assertion of a right of prior consent for reprocessing of US supplied materials; at the same time, the President has approved the delivery of 38 tons of enriched uranium to the Tarapur plant, although India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 first touched off much of the concern among nuclear producers, including France, of the dangers of a proliferated world.<sup>52</sup>

Efforts of the Carter administration to encourage or induce multilateral controls on arms transfers have also singularly failed.<sup>53</sup> Europeans are hesitant to be drawn into limitation talks before the Soviet Union or recipient states have signaled a willingness to cooperate. The security, political, and economic benefits of independent arms production and sales are presently too attractive to forego for the seemingly more speculative awards of regional and international arms control accords. European policymaking circles exhibit less concern than the American arms control community about the problem of the impact of technologically advanced weapons of high lethality or sudden shifts in regional military balances due to massive introduction of arms. Whereas the European balance, despite current asymmetries, has shown remarkable stability, the same has not proved to be the case in the Third World. There, political regime and boundary issues remain unsettled. Changes in military balances have already been felt in the political configuration of the African Horn, Southern Africa, the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. These are likely to be endemic to these regions for some time to come. Weapons produced for the East-West struggle have, ironically, had their most immediate and visible impact in Third World areas, a problem explored below under the rubric of regional security.<sup>54</sup>

United States-European differences over arms transfers occur at several levels. Important among these are US objections to European and, specifically, French penetration of Latin American markets. Part of the impetus to increase arms sales to Latin America under the Nixon and Ford administrations was the success of the Mirage in opening French sales to Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. The sale of 19 F-1 air defense aircraft to

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Ecuador not only violated the norms and expectations of the Carter administration but it also weakened the American hold over Latin America. Sales of French aircraft to Latin America violated an American sphere of influence. The same transgression had occurred almost a decade earlier in the early 1960s when Dassault sold Mirage aircraft to Australia, another American preserve. This prompted President Kennedy, like President Nixon after him, to spur American arms sales abroad.

European sales to Middle East Arab states have also been viewed with suspicion by US leaders. Much of Washington's leverage in the region depends on its arms. The sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia and F-14s and sophisticated radar equipment to Iran were viewed as means to influence events in the Middle East in ways to foster an Arab-Israeli settlement and to bolster moderate Arab states in their struggles with radical regimes, like Iran, Libya, and Syria. American efforts and bargaining power were seen as weakened if these states could buy arms from Western Europe. Nor are the Americans fully persuaded by the argument that it was better that Europe sell the Arabs arms than that they turn to the Soviet Union for assistance.

The Europeans, like the Americans, see strategic and diplomatic value in selling arms. Their political presence is established. The superpowers are prevented from monopolizing this aspect of the strategic global balance. Furthermore, the European states believe they are responding to deeply felt needs among developing states for national security and independence. Third World states have been especially critical of efforts to deny them access to modern weapons. They view supplier resistance to provide these arms as a vehicle for continued dominance. However highly motivated American policy may be as a way of diminishing international tensions and managing conflict, it is still misinterpreted in most capitals. The Europeans fear being tarred with the American brush. They pose less formidable obstacles and conditions to developing states' acquisition of arms. Europeans also argue that their arms sales foster nation-building and national unity which are natural barriers to Communist or Soviet expansion. Thus, the European states disagree on the implications of arms transfers for global and regional security. More importantly, they have a different vision of how the world should be organized and the role of the European states within it.

These various strategic and diplomatic differences are particularly acute in the area of economic competition. Arms sales play two critical roles for European producers. First, they assure the viability of an independent weapons production capacity. In contrast to the United States, the European arms industry must sell abroad since the domestic market is too small to sustain an ample production and design system. If states like France and England had to rely on arms purchases solely from their own defense budgets, they would not be able to afford to maintain a separate production capacity or they would be forced to buy fewer and, very likely, less sophisticated and efficient weapons. Sales abroad provide series runs of production, cutting unit costs and increasing revenue that can be used to fuel research and development work. By contrast, the United States has a much larger domestic market for arms purchases. Its arms industries, while still very interested in sales to foreign governments, can normally rely on

## PANEL 2

large orders from the Pentagon to keep production lines open. The scale of operation between the United States and the European states combined is such that this factor alone would account for major differences between American and European behavior in selling arms and arms technology.

Some suggestion of the adverse impact of restricted arms sales on the unit cost of weapons and on military preparedness may be seen by comparing the prices of major combat aircraft in Europe. The Swedish policy of restraining the sale of the *Viggen* has apparently increased the unit price of the aircraft relative to its competitors, including the French F-1 and the US F-16. In 1977 the *Viggen* cost approximately \$8 to \$10 million. The comparable price for the F-1 and F-16 were approximately \$4.6 million and \$6.5 million.<sup>55</sup> Sales reduce unit costs both to foreign *and* to domestic armed forces.

The economic importance of arms sales to the economies of the major West European suppliers must also be recognized. There is a tendency to depreciate the economic significance of arms transfers in American policy circles and, as a result, to be too optimistic about the possibilities of reorienting West European dependence on arms sales. Figures published by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) seriously underestimate the value of European arms deliveries. For example, ACDA estimates French deliveries in 1976 to be \$840 million.<sup>56</sup> French parliamentary sources cite deliveries of \$2.4 billion.<sup>57</sup> Another source finds that ACDA underestimates British deliveries by half. The \$638 million listed for Great Britain in 1976 by ACDA was very likely in excess of \$1.3 billion.<sup>58</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that ACDA calculates arms sales exports as a proportion of total exports for Britain, France, and Germany to be one percent or less.<sup>59</sup>

A closer look at the British and French arms industries reveals how important they are to the economic health of their countries. In 1977 each produced more than \$5 billion in military equipment. In Great Britain approximately \$1.3 billion was for export. There are about 200,000 people working on defense contracts and an additional 70,000 to 80,000 working expressly for export. Arms deliveries comprise about 3.5 percent of all British exports.<sup>60</sup>

In the case of France, the figures are comparable. Employment in the arms industry is between 270,000 and 280,000. Personnel are divided into three industrial groupings, including those under the control of the Delegation Generale pour l'Armement, nationalized units (SNIAS, SNECMA, and SNPE) and private firms, like Matra and Dassault-Breguet. Estimates of the number working for export vary from approximately 80,000 to 90,000, based on parliamentary sources.<sup>61</sup> A parliamentary report calculates that the ratio of military exports to the business affairs of the industry was 32 percent in 1975, 36 percent in 1976, and 40 percent in 1977.<sup>62</sup> These percentages suggest that the number of people working for exports are increasing and presently stand between 110,000 to 120,000 of the arms industry work force. Arms deliveries were 4.3 percent of total exports in 1976. The \$2.4 billion in delivered arms was important for France's precarious balance of payments situation. These arms, the bulk of which went to Third World states, with most being sent to oil-producing

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

states, paid for approximately one-third of France's oil bill and gained French access to growing markets in the developing states.

The significance of arms sales can be measured more accurately by examining their impact on the European aerospace industry. Exports bulked large in British sales, representing 70 percent of all orders. Latest figures for the middle 1970s estimate that 60 percent of overall British aerospace production is keyed to military sales abroad.<sup>61</sup> The dependency of France's aerospace industry on military exports appears even greater than Britain's. In 1976, 53 percent of the business affairs of the industry were attributable to exports of which 78 percent were for military equipment, including aircraft and missiles.<sup>64</sup> The proportion of military exports to the business receipts of four major components of France's aerospace industry in 1975 indicates the heavy dependency on sales abroad. In 1975 these proportions were as follows: Aerospatiale—27 percent; SNECMA—33 percent; Matra—85 percent; and Dassault-Breguet—51 percent.<sup>65</sup> (The comparable figure for Dassault-Breguet in 1976 was 70 percent.)<sup>66</sup>

Europeans alternate between puzzlement and cynicism in their reaction to the contradictions in American policy and behavior. The American sale of advanced radar equipments (AWACS) to Iran and of F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia violated President Carter's policy of the United States not being the first country to send sophisticated equipment to a region. The annual ceiling on new arms orders exempts NATO allies, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Israel, which are major arms recipients. Orders already in the pipeline when President Carter came to office were not affected by his ceiling. High production and delivery of weapons will continue until the 1980s. Legislative prohibition against sending arms to countries which violate human rights have also been ignored for strategic and political reasons in several cases, such as Indonesia and Thailand.

Many Americans find European behavior no less distasteful if perhaps less puzzling. The strong economic motivation underlying European sales is not appreciated in Washington or by many Americans. Making money by selling arms appears to be an unworthy objective. Europe's refusal to acknowledge the sincerity of American efforts to limit arms transfers is also a source of irritation. What appears as realism to Europeans in selling arms seems to be just another example of European opportunism for many Americans. The conditions insisted upon by Europeans of prior Soviet and, in the case of France, recipient participation before multi-lateral talks can open are viewed in Washington as a means to circumvent progress in international cooperation. The misunderstanding on both sides of the Atlantic would seem to preclude much progress on US-European cooperation in arms sales in the near future. Washington needs to be more sensitive to the objectives and constraints which motor European policy. The Europeans need to be more attentive to the international security and economic problems posed by arms transfers. If these minimal conditions can be met in the future, a basis for talks and cooperation between the United States and its European allies may be possible. At the moment that possibility appears somewhat remote.

## PANEL 2

### THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP

The West European nations and the United States are drifting apart on all the issues reviewed in this paper. Growing division threatens alliance cohesion and weakens western security as much from within as from without. Europe is now a partial partner with all of the ambiguities and doubts that these terms suggest. Certainly mutual misunderstandings (some wittingly sought no doubt), impaired communications, and flawed consultation on both sides of the Atlantic contribute to the current malaise. Vacillating, hesitant Presidential leadership and conflicting signals issuing from various quarters of the Washington policymaking community deepen European pique, puzzlement, and perplexity. If the Europeans are keen to find fault, they have not been sensitive to the problems of managing a global foreign policy with factious allies and obstinate clients within an open society. Meeting tests of effectiveness and consent or, more simply, the imperatives of power abroad and legitimacy at home are difficult under any circumstances for the United States, as de Tocqueville recognized long ago. They are doubly so under stress when the means at hand to deal with an enlarging number of seemingly intractable problems have never been so modest or meagre.

But even if communications and consultation were improved (a laudable but not a particularly original appeal) and even if American leadership were more consistent and inspiring, the West's problems would doubtless not be solved. These shortcomings are as much symptoms of its debility as they are contributors to it. For a fuller explanation of why the West is at sixes and sevens, one must probe further to find that perspectives held by American policymakers and their European counterparts are not congruent; that interests conflict as often as not, and sharply so; and that strategies to promote even common aims are seldom compatible or complete.

For the United States, regional and functional issues test Soviet intentions about detente; for Europeans, other issues tend to be tributary to the preservation and extension of detente in Europe. For the United States, Afghanistan marks a watershed in Soviet expansionism; for Europeans, it is an accident along the route. (Must the traffic cease because of a mishap, however lamentable?) For Americans, support for Israeli security is a moral duty and a domestic political imperative; for Europeans, Israeli intransigence over Palestinian self-determination and Jerusalem are obstacles to peace and barriers to the unvexed flow of oil. For Americans, bolstering Western defense in the Mediterranean and along the Red Sea and proclaiming a Persian Gulf doctrine are prudent measures to contain Soviet influence; for Europeans, these moves provoke Arab oil producers and risk either a calamitous war or a disastrous cut-off in oil supplies. For the United States, stopping nuclear proliferation is a high priority; for Europeans, civilian nuclear energy development, despite the risks of proliferation, must be expanded to meet the growing energy needs of Europe and the Third World—and with the added boon of commercial gain. For Americans, weapons in NATO should be standardized and global arms transfers curbed; for Europeans, production must be kept under national control, and no exterior constraints must be imposed to hinder national policy on transfers to other states.

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

No single remedy or simple nostrum can solve these problems. Each has its own set of actors of varying capacity to impose or project their preferences, differing structures of competing and complementary interests, and particular game rules and actor expectations shaping outcomes. On the other hand, these issue domains are linked in European perceptions by a commonly held view of declining American military and economic power, of the unreliability (even threat to European interests) of what remains of American strength, and of the inability of the US political system—its politics, leadership and institutions—to arrest its own downward slide.

Paradoxically, the shortest road to allied cooperation would appear to be to strive less for it—either as an abstract good or as a lame substitute for national power. In the past the United States attracted allies because it was strong, not weak. It held their confidence because their interests were served through the exercise of its power. A stronger America, pursuing coherent and consistent policies, will not restore a lost Atlantis, a visionary scheme that hardly fits a time when the weak appear stronger than the powerful and allies do as they please. On the other hand, a stronger America, pursuing coherent and consistent policies, will make mutually beneficial partnership more attractive for friends and the untoward moves of adversaries costlier and riskier. A framework will have been established within which to address the West's overloaded agenda. By itself a stronger, purposeful America will not solve the West's problems, but it is a precondition for their management, if not resolution.

Through their reticence and demurrers, the Europeans are telling their strongest partner, whose leadership must now be earned not commanded, that there is much that is wrong with American power and purpose. That may be Europe's most important role today.

### ENDNOTES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE'S ROLES IN THE WORLD: THE PARTIAL PARTNER

1. Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945*, trans. Michael Shaw (New York: Continuum, 1980), p. 332.
2. For a spectrum of European opinion largely in favor of a Western response to a Soviet buildup in Europe, consult France de Rose, "SALT and Western Security in Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Summer 1979): 1065-1074; and his "Euro-missiles et force française de dissuasion," *Politique Internationale*, no. 7 (Spring, 1980), pp. 187-198; Gregory F. Treverton, "Nuclear Weapons and the 'Gray Area'" *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Summer 1979): 1075-1089; and Lothar Rühl, "Le défi du SS-20 et la stratégie soviétique à l'égard de l'Europe," *Politique Etrangère* 44 (December 1979): 427-444.
3. For a comprehensive overview, see US, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The SALT II Treaty*, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, and the six volumes of hearings.
4. The full text appears in French: "L'OTAN, les trente prochaines années," *Politique Etrangère*, 44 (December 1979): 263-274.
5. Rose, "SALT and Western Security," p. 1068.
6. See no. 2 above, and the following for a spectrum of opinion: Pierre Gallois, "Leçons d'asymétrie dans un parc d'artillerie (nucléaire)," *Politique Internationale*, no. 7 (Spring 1980):

## PANEL 2

197-212; Aspen Institute, *Strategic Arms Control and West European Interests* (Berlin, 1978); Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," *International Security* 3 (Winter 1978-1979): 17-52; Kurt Birrenbach, "European Security, NATO, SALT, and Equilibrium," *Orbis* 22 (Summer 1978): 297-308; G. Philip Hughes, "Cutting the Gordian Knot: A Theatre-Nuclear Force for Deterrence in Europe," *Orbis* 22 (Summer 1978): 309-332; and Christopher J. Makins, "Bringing in the Allies," *Foreign Policy*, no. 35 (Summer 1979), pp. 91-108.

7. These and other French concerns about arms control and disarmament in Europe and the Third World are discussed in Edward A. Kolodziej, "French Arms-Control and Disarmament Policy: International and Domestic Dimensions and Determinants," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 4 (1980): 14-42; and Jean Klein, "Continuité et ouverture dans la politique française en matière de désarmement," *Politique Etrangère* 44 (1979): 213-248.

8. For recent commentary on European monetary policy, see Benjamin J. Cohen, "Le SME, le dollar, et l'avenir du système monétaire internationale," *Politique Etrangère* 45 (March 1980): 27-46; and notes cited.

9. The basis for the dollar's previous dominance is clearly outlined in Harold van B. Cleveland, *The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966). For later commentary, the views of Benjamin Cohen are relevant: "Europe's Money, America's Problem," *Foreign Policy*, no. 35 (Summer 1979), pp. 31-47.

10. Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973*, trans. Frank Jellinek (Cambridge: Wintrop, 1974), especially pp. 159ff.

11. For a discussion of the "gold war," see Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 176-231.

12. Cohen, "Europe's Money," p. 39.

13. Several works proved useful for understanding the oil problem and American-European relations: Robert J. Lieber, *Oil and the Middle East War: Europe in the Energy Crisis* (Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1976); *idem*, "Energy, Economics and Security in Alliance Perspective," *International Security* 3 (Spring 1979): 139-163; *idem*, "Europe and America in the World Energy Crisis," *International Affairs* (October 1979), pp. 541-557; Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Summer 1980): 999-1015; and volume 23 (Winter 1980) of *Orbis*, especially the article by Hanns W. Maull, "Western Europe: A Fragmenting Response to a Fragmenting Order," pp. 803-824.

14. Claude Julien, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 1980, strikes this note. Accompanying his analysis is a series of shorter pieces of world crisis points that double in brass: "L'Enchevêtrement des conflits et le jeu des trois grands," pp. 14-15.

15. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1968-1977* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 27-31.

16. *Ibid.*

17. These optimistic views are developed in Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). For a different view and critique, see Edward A. Kolodziej, "Living with the Long Cycle: New Assumptions to Guide the Use and Control of Military Force," in Robert Harkavy and Edward A. Kolodziej, *American Security Policy and Policy-Making* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980), pp. 21-44. Also of use is Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" *International Security* 4 (Spring 1980): 3-35.

18. Kolodziej, "Living with the Long Cycle."

19. For commentary of German views of detente and emerging problems with the United States, see Marion Donhoff, "Bonn and Washington: The Strained Relationship," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Summer 1979): 1052-1064; George A. Glass, "The United States and West Germany: Cracks in the Security Foundation?" *Orbis* 23 (Fall 1979): 535-548; and David Schoenbaum, "Dateline Bonn: Uneasy Super-Ally," *Foreign Policy*, no. 37 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 176-191. For a review of German military concerns, the review by Alex A. Vardamis is useful: "German-American Military Fissures," *Foreign Policy*, no. 34 (Spring 1979), pp. 86-106. A penetrating analysis of French criticism of perceived tendencies in West Germany, alternately, toward neutralism and nuclear armament is Pierre Hassner, "Etats-Unis, URSS, Allemagne, Europe: problèmes graves, réponses frivoles," *Politique Etrangère* 44 (December 1979): 275-300.

20. *Washington Post*, 27 April 1980, p. A22.

21. International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade, 1972 and 1979, passim*.

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

22. An overview of East-West trade, discreetly critical of US policy, is Giovanni Agnelli, "East-West Trade: A European View," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Summer 1980): 1016-1034.
23. *Economist*, 15 March 1980, p. 34.
24. *Le Monde*, 24 January 1980, p. 8.
25. See n. 19 above, especially article by Vardamis and n. 6.
26. French armed forces chief, General Guy Mery, outlined this shift in a speech before the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale, found in *Defense*, no. 9 (May 1977), pp. 19-23.
27. French Embassy, Press and Information Division, "Warsaw Meeting: Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet Reports to the National Assembly," 80/45, pp. 4-5.
28. *Idem*, "Giscard Press Conference of 26 June 1980, 80/48, p. 2.
29. *L'Annee Politique*, 1959, pp. 479-480.
30. Kolodziej, *French International Policy*, pp. 489-551.
31. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 22 June 1980, p. 1.
32. Report of the *Washington Post*, 16 June 1980, p. 1.
33. References to these terms appear in Philippe de St. Robert, *Le Jeu de la France en Mediterranee* (Paris: Julliard, 1970); and Andre Fontaine, "Pompidou's Mediterranean Policy," *Interplay*, April 1980, pp. 12-14. The notion of a separate Mediterranean grouping of European, Arab, and African states is still voiced in French foreign policy statements. See French Embassy, Press and Information Division, "France's Position on the European-African-Arab Trilogue, 80/4, p. 1. Quoting President Giscard d'Estaing: "Permanent solidarities based on geography, history and culture . . . are a practical reality for Europe, Africa and the entire Arab world. These three composite entities maintain closer and stronger links to each other than to any other part of the world. . . . What France currently has in mind is a global approach, one that would be aimed at cohesive groups of states, i.e., the Europe of the liberal democracies, the African governments recognized by the OAU, and the Arab World as represented by the Arab League."
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## PANEL 2

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### **PANEL 3**

## **RETHINKING ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE**

**This panel examined the significance for the strategic nuclear policy calculus of changes in international and domestic political environments. In that context, the group considered the sufficiency of the policy of essential strategic equivalence. The group debated whether the US would be willing to accept the economic, fiscal, and international political costs of an increased nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. The role of advanced nonnuclear technologies in any future strategic competition was reviewed. Finally, the panel attempted to determine whether current national security strategies and policies are adequate to deal with the strategic weapon technologies that might be available in the next decade.**

## PANEL 3 PARTICIPANTS

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**RAPPOREUR:** LTC Arnold Lee Tessmer, USAF, National Defense University.

**AUTHORS:** Dr. James L. Foster, Science Applications, Inc.; Dr. Colin S. Gray, Hudson Institute (Represented by Mr. Keith B. Payne).

**PANELISTS:** Mr. William Beecher, *Boston Globe*; Mr. Charles E. Estes, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning; Mr. Stephen J. Hadley, Shea & Gardner; Honorable William G. Hyland, Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mr. Bruce W. MacDonald, Department of State; Mr. Andrew W. Marshall, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Mr. Roger Molander, National Security Council; Honorable Paul Nitze, Systems Planning Corporation; Dr. Earl C. Ravenal, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; LTG Edward L. Rowny, USA (Ret), Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution; Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Consultant; Ms. Joyce Lasky Shub, Office of Senator Joseph Biden; Mr. Leon Sloss, S.R.I. International.

## PANEL 3 SUMMARY

### Rethinking Essential Equivalence

William W. Kaufmann, Chairman  
Arnold Lee Tessmer, Rapporteur

The two papers presented to Panel 3, "Strategic Stability Reconsidered" by Colin Gray—ably defended by Keith Payne—and "Rethinking the Unthinkable: The Strategic Dilemma of the 1980s" by James L. Foster, were important, thought-provoking centerpieces for what was often a lively dialogue on our national strategic posture for the 1980s.

As might be expected from a panel of such distinguished and diverse personalities, there was no unanimity on what combination of force structure and policy would constitute an adequate posture. Neither was there unanimity on how the United States should proceed to achieve such a posture, however the notion of adequacy were defined. This is not to say there was no consensus on a number of major points. There was, as will be seen presently. And there was unanimity on at least two key points that formed the backdrop for our discussion: credible deterrence must remain the immutable touchstone for US security initiatives in the eighties; forces in support of deterrence must be strengthened, or at least adapted, to deal with changing perceptions and impending realities.

The panel began its deliberations with an examination of "essential equivalence" and found it flawed both as a term and as a statement of policy. This conclusion led the panel to question with some concern the future effectiveness of "extended deterrence"—that is, the extension of our strategic nuclear umbrella to cover allies. It was thus logical that the panel spent most of its time considering approaches to strengthening our deterrent posture. And while the panel focused on the strategic aspect of deterrence, virtually all agreed that conventional force capabilities are an integral, probably inseparable, part of the deterrent equation. Talk of improving deterrent posture inevitably led the panel to consider the role of arms control objectives in shaping force structure and policy decisions. Finally, and probably because of the time panelists spend in government service, we mused over the budget implications of the various approaches.

#### RECONSIDERING ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE

Dr. Foster may have succinctly captured the consensus view on essential equivalence with the observation in his paper that, "[it] is an ambiguous term that means many things to many people." Foster and others argued that essential equivalence is, first and foremost, a political term coined to account for events of the recent decade. The most important event, of course, was SALT and the attendant need to move from statements about superiority or quality in certain force characteristics toward a less precise aggregate measurement that would permit offsetting asymmetries in the

### PANEL 3

respective strategic force structures of the United States and the Soviet Union. That such an ambiguous measure of the strategic balance and the term used to explain the measure would mean "many things to many people" is clearly self-evident.

According to some panel members, the ambiguity did hold some advantages from a US policymaker's viewpoint. First, it probably made SALT I possible. Given the qualitative edge in strategic forces held by the United States a decade ago, it was unlikely (impossible, in the view of some panel members) that the Soviet Union would have agreed to codify its nuclear inferiority in a SALT agreement based on straight numbers-against-numbers measurements. Second, during the treaty ratification process, US proponents of SALT I could and did argue (and no doubt believed) that the United States retained substantial strategic advantages over the Soviet Union. Critics were hard pressed to disprove these admittedly subjective judgments from experts. Finally, SALT I and its companion concept, essential equivalence, held no imperatives to improve US strategic forces in a major way. Thus, in the view of some panel members, significant expenditures for strategic forces could be, and were, avoided without calling into question where the United States stood in the strategic nuclear equation. Put another—perhaps too cynical—way, essential equivalence satisfied both the Soviets, who would not consent to have inferior strategic nuclear forces, and the Congress, who insisted by law (PL 92-448) that the United States have strategic nuclear force capabilities at least equal to those of the Soviets.

Other panel members thought the ambiguity of essential equivalence, however troublesome, was not its most relevant flaw. These experts argued forcibly that essential equivalence has no operational definition; that is, one could not use the term or the concept it captures to derive future force characteristics (weapons mix, accuracy and yield, among others) for acquisition planning. To still another panel member, the central flaw in essential equivalence is its incompatibility with deterrence, particularly extended deterrence.

Briefly stated then, all panel members seemed to conclude that the term, if not the concept of essential equivalence, is not relevant to the eighties. It is a politicized term that has scant operational utility. It invites misperceptions of the strategic balance. And, for at least these reasons, it may now well be incompatible with other national security objectives, such as deterrence.

### EXTENDED DETERRENCE

Although the panel did not address the subject at length, a majority appeared to believe that strategic nuclear parity has seriously eroded the credibility of maintaining extended deterrence by means of US strategic forces. This was considered all the more troublesome because these same members had low confidence that US and allied conventional forces could, by themselves, deter a direct Soviet attack on Europe.

What can we do about such a state of affairs? The panel identified four possibilities: strengthen the West's conventional force capabilities; reduce our commitments to match the capabilities we can afford; strengthen our

## ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE

strategic force capabilities: change our declaratory policy. These, of course, are not mutually exclusive.

Steps are already being taken to strengthen conventional force capabilities in the West. NATO's Long Term Defense Program, for example, is an excellent step in the right direction. But how much is enough? Even in a group as small as Panel 3, there was a wide range of opinion on what level of conventional capabilities were needed to achieve and maintain a credible deterrent. One panel member believed that current capabilities are 80 percent adequate for the task; another thought the figure is as low as 30 percent. All of this was decidedly outside our charter, but it is quite relevant to deterrence and deserves mention.

Frankly, there was little support in Panel 3 for a reduction of our commitments, particularly to other Western democracies. That option does, however, have its advocates and cannot be arbitrarily or peremptorily excluded. Its supporters argue that the defense of vital national interests overseas is a paradox because we would end up destroying the very interests we seek to defend. And since the war-winning capabilities underpinning our offer of extended deterrence are less credible in the face of nuclear parity and the conventional force inferiority, we may invite the very attack or threat of attack we seek to deter. A strategy of deterrence is no substitute for a credible defense. If the United States is not willing to field a credible defense, it then at least needs to limit the stakes for retaliation to a realistic core level.

The last two options we considered occupied the bulk of our time and are, therefore, described here in greater detail. Both fit conveniently under a single heading.

### STRENGTHENING OUR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE POSTURE

There were two central questions that drove the strategic offense side of this discussion. (There was also a strategic defense side that is discussed later.) First, what could the United States do with the strategic forces that survived the standard "worst case" scenario wherein the Soviets launch a surprise attack against a US day-to-day alert force that had not been generated to higher levels of readiness? Another version of this question is: how many deliverable warheads would survive a surprise attack? Experts on the panel estimated that on a given day, 3,000-4,000 warheads would survive a worst-case surprise attack. Unfortunately, members of the panel could not agree on whether this surviving force would be sufficient for what needed to be done.

Consequently, the panel was moved to ask a second question: how many surviving warheads do we need to retaliate successfully against all of the targets we wish to retaliate against in the Soviet Union? To answer this, we devised our own highest number target list—a kind of worst-case in reverse. Let it be understood that no one argued that these numbers were necessary, but all agreed that they certainly would be sufficient.

Starting with countervalue requirements first, because they are the simplest to meet in terms of designing a strategic nuclear force, the panel determined that 1,000 targets would be sufficient. These would be targeted

### PANEL 3

against "soft" industrial and population centers or, as one panel member preferred to call them, "bricks." No one suggested that the ability to retaliate against this component of our target list would deter much of anything. Consequently, the panel added another 3,000 "soft" military and industrial targets, such as airfields, military depots, transportation nodes, non-urban industrial sites, and the like.

Since this limited countermilitary capability would not guarantee deterrence or victory, the panel next considered "hard" targets. We estimated that there might be 2,000 hard military targets (such as missile silos) and another 700 hardened leadership centers. To be reasonably confident of destroying these hard targets, the panel allocated an average of two warheads to each of them.

To retain a total of 9,400 surviving warheads for our notional target list means, by rough estimate, that the United States needs about 15,000-20,000 warheads in the inventory. By this worst-case test, the panel concluded that there is a serious shortfall in the existing and, as far as anyone could tell, in programmed central forces. Moreover, under SALT II the United States plans to build "only" to about 12,500 warheads by 1985.

The panel, for the sake of exploring the ideal offense to its fullest potential, ignored SALT and next considered how the United States could build the "required" inventory. One force posture that most thought was affordable and achievable included:

- 25 Trident submarines with C4 missile configurations that would subsequently be fitted with the D5 configurations
- 200 MX ICBMs
- 350 heavy bombers

This force structure, even unconstrained by SALT, would obviously take several years to build—more time than we have if one believes that there is a period of vulnerability of serious consequence over the next 2 to 5 years. Consequently, the panel, working in its perfect world, mused over some "quick fixes" to existing strategic forces that would result in greater numbers of survivable warheads that could be delivered against the target list previously described. The quick fixes (not listed here in any special order) included:

- Improving C<sup>3</sup> capability and survivability, particularly for the SLBM force
- Accelerating deployment of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe
- Increasing the number of bombers on alert
- Dispersing the Minuteman force by building more silos
- Deploying the Trident's C4 missile into more boats and improving its accuracy
- Improving our ASW capability for more utility over time—this is, of course, counter to present national policy which sizes our ASW forces for general purpose force requirement only
- Accelerating deployment of the Air Launched Cruise Missile
- Accelerating deployment of the D5 missile configuration for Trident

There certainly was no consensus on which, if any, of these quick fixes

## ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE

should be pursued. In fact, the panel did not even attempt to examine the feasibility of any of these possibilities—the manpower implications of increased bomber alert ratios, for example. The purpose of the exercise was to point out that there are near-term steps that can be taken to improve our deterrent posture during what many believe are the next few critical years.

A few panel members suggested that policy changes could also serve as "quick fixes" to our deterrent posture. One notion was to develop and publish a key Soviet military target list that the United States could "guarantee" by declaratory policy would be attacked by central systems if the Soviets attacked the United States or its allies. What if, for example, the key military target list included logistics bases and lines of communication for Soviet forces adjacent to the Chinese border? Would not, under this theory, the Soviets thus have to consider seriously the potential for the People's Republic of China to enter the war while it had a significant, albeit temporary, advantage? This approach is, of course, deliberately counter to present conventional wisdom that a strategic nuclear war would be conducted and concluded in a massive initial exchange.

On the strategic defense side of strengthening our deterrent posture, the panel considered a number of damage limiting options. Arguments along these lines are explored in the Colin Gray paper prepared for this conference, so they will be recounted here in an abbreviated form that does them little justice. Dr. Gray says that strategic offense buys only about 50 percent of our extended deterrence. From this premise flows the argument that additional investments in civil defense, an active air defense, and ballistic missile defense are not only prudent, but also cost effective. Neither the premise nor the argument was widely shared among panel members.

With respect to the premise, some thought that defense buys only about a 10 percent improvement in extended deterrence while others found themselves at different points on the curve. The point here is that there was nothing approaching a consensus on the relative contributions to deterrence of offense and defense.

There was a bit more of a consensus in the panel on other proposals advanced in Dr. Gray's paper. Many were sympathetic to the effectiveness of civil defense measures: they can save a lot of lives for reasonable sums of money (say, \$20-25 billion over the next 5 years for a major installment on a fairly good system); and we have high confidence that from the stand point of construction we can do what needs to be done. Unfortunately, according to those who have worked the problem before, public acceptance of civil defense is problematic at best and unlikely at worst. There is, therefore, a political liability involved for the national leaders who propose such measures.

Panel members were also receptive to the notion of ballistic missile defense; a number agreed that increased research and development efforts on a system would be a prudent measure. We were less certain whether point defense for US and Soviet missiles could be negotiated as an exception to the ABM Treaty, but thought that perhaps it might be possible since it is less threatening than area defense.

### PANEL 3

Adding an active air defense to the two other damage limiting measures drives the total investment required to somewhere in the neighborhood of \$150 billion over the next 15 years. The question thus arises whether one could not achieve a more credible deterrent by investing this money elsewhere, such as for a more effective conventional defense in Europe. The answer, may depend in large part on the premise: what portion of extended deterrence one can buy with offense and what portion with defense.

To summarize our deliberations on strengthening deterrence, whether through offense or defense or both, it is fair to say that there was no unanimity on a single approach. The possible exception—at least no panel member argued against it—would be to improve as soon as possible our second-strike hard-target kill capability against time-sensitive targets. The three measures that can be taken to achieve this capability include: pressing ahead quickly with the MX system (even though the 200 missiles programmed are in themselves insufficient for the target system we devised); back-fitting the Trident's C4 missile to improve its accuracy (a relatively quick fix); and accelerating the Trident D5 missile program.

### THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL

The panel eventually had to come to grips with this topic because it had been largely set aside during deliberations on strengthening deterrence. Here it is important to note that, without exception, the panel believed that it is decidedly in our national interests to proceed with the SALT process in one form or another.

It is also important to report that there was a solid consensus on how the United States ought to approach SALT. First, *do what needs to be done in national defense programs*. We should not defer programs that might "interfere" with agreements yet to be negotiated. Nor should we defer programs that might be "needed" because of an agreement yet to be negotiated. Secondly, *we should not fiddle with systems in order to make them more inspectable, verifiable, or countable*. Do what makes sense operationally and worry later on whether some future SALT process can accommodate these systems. In short, our national strategic concept should drive the arms control equation. An effective deterrent posture must be the prime objective.

### BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS/IMPLICATIONS

The panel closed its two days of discussions with some observations on defense budgets. It was an exercise that, in a sense, brought us back to the real world of opportunity, costs, and affordability. We had previously identified and discussed a fair number of measures and approaches to improving our defense posture without fretting too much over cost. On reflection, the panel concluded—once again with a few exceptions—that we can afford what needs to be done.

Our conclusion was based on the assumption that a revised 1981 budget should provide \$175 billion for defense and that this sum would increase in real terms to \$210 billion by 1985. Of this amount, the panel largely agreed that 15 percent would not be too untoward for Program I, which funds strategic nuclear forces minus their R&D. By way of

## ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE

comparison. Program I funds have been running somewhat under 10 percent of the total defense budget for many years. The 15 percent figure we proposed would restore to 1962 spending levels the purchasing power for strategic forces.

With these funding levels, the United States could buy all of the strategic offense the panel thought to be desirable—not, of course, within the next 5 years, but about as fast as would be efficient. These funding levels, if keyed to 15 percent of the defense budget, would buy Trident (and perhaps an accelerated Trident), all of the cruise missiles currently programmed, MX, and a new bomber. For defense, we could begin a substantial civil defense program and increase substantially the investment on research and development for a ballistic missile defense.

What the panel really is suggesting—if that word correctly captures the ruminations of the consensus—is a strategy of countervailing force which covers a substantial target list and contains options to counter any plausible Soviet attack. We leave it to others to coin a new term for such a strategy. Essential equivalence would not be such a term.

**PANEL 3 PAPER:**  
**Rethinking the Unthinkable:**  
**The Strategic Dilemmas of the 1980s**

by James L. Foster  
Science Applications, Incorporated

As I understand the terms of reference for the conference panel on strategic policy, the purpose is to "rethink essential equivalence." In doing so, it is suggested that we "consider the sufficiency of the policy of essential strategic equivalence," consider the "acceptability" of an "increased nuclear arms race," and consider whether current "national security strategies and policies" are appropriate in light of new weapons technologies of the 1980s.

While these are interesting issues, it is not clear that they are the most important issues for strategic policymaking and several implications of this formulation of the issues are at least debatable. For example, it is not clear that essential equivalence constitutes an identifiable "policy." Essential equivalence is an ambiguous term that means many things to many people. Within the strategic policy debate the notion of essential equivalence is alternatively used (or criticized as a rationalization of the current force posture, or as an objective to be achieved in light of Soviet strategic advances, or as one among many criteria for evaluating the adequacy of the force posture.

Furthermore, there is an implication that the alternative to accepting a policy of essential equivalence is an "increased arms race." However, the major differences of opinion among strategic policy advocates is not whether the United States should "race" but, rather, whether there is, in fact, essential equivalence and what is required to achieve and maintain it. There are those who argue, on the one hand, that the United States is "falling behind" the Soviet Union in strategic capabilities and that a hasty effort to "catch up" is critically needed. On the other hand, there are advocates who argue that the state of the strategic balance is not a critical concern as long as the United States is capable of posing an effective retaliatory deterrent threat. For the former group, the essential equivalence notion justifies the "catch up" requirement. For the latter group essential equivalence should be loosely interpreted as being satisfied if neither the United States nor the Soviet Union possesses effective first strike capabilities.

In addition, the implication of the question regarding the appropriateness of "current strategies and policies" in light of impending weapons advances suggests that the US strategic force posture may not reflect clearly identifiable "strategies" and "policies." Yet, except for the clearly

### PANEL 3

stated interest in arms control agreements, the ambiguity in official statements of strategic policy make it difficult to define the fundamental purposes and character of that policy or a clear-cut "strategy" by which strategic forces are intended to support overall national security policy. In any case, technological change should not be conceived as driving policy and strategy. Available technology will pose opportunities and limitations affecting the means by which policy can be served but the fundamental issue is: what policy purposes are to be served by strategic forces?

In light of these comments, a reconsideration of strategic policy issues should not begin with an assessment of the appropriateness of the essential equivalence notion. To understand the possible meaning and relevance of essential equivalence in the context of the 1980s security environment it is necessary, first, to address a number of more fundamental questions: What is the priority defense policy problem of the 1980s; what role might strategic forces play in dealing with that problem; is there a peculiar strategic policy problem and what priority should it be given in allocating limited resources; and what strategic force posture and employment "strategies" are consistent with the purposes and priorities ascribed to strategic forces?

This formulation of the issues is intended to compel consideration of strategic force requirements within the context of overall defense policy requirements. Although it has become increasingly popular to criticize the tendency to assess strategic force capabilities in isolation of other military capabilities, it is still rare to find analyses of strategic requirements that are not focused on the problems posed by Soviet strategic weapons advances. That approach leads to judgements about strategic force requirements apparently deemed necessary irrespective of the implications for other force posture problems and requirements, and irrespective of budgetary limitations.

SALT and the Soviet strategic buildup focused attention on the strategic balance as *the* principal defense problem of the 1970s. In preparing for the 1980s, it will be essential to view strategic forces as part of an overall defense policy response to what appears to be a much more demanding national security environment. Given across the board advances in Soviet military capabilities, coupled with the growth in military capabilities worldwide and the high potential for regional conflict, the United States will require a more comprehensive conceptual framework for making difficult tradeoffs among strategic and theater warfare capabilities. That conceptual framework must, in particular, define what risks are acceptable in the nuclear nonnuclear postures, what hedging actions are possible and necessary to guard against possible Soviet advances or more demanding contingencies than expected.

#### **ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE: THE POLICY PROBLEM OF THE 1970s**

Though there were evident differences in the interpretation of the concept, essential equivalence did seem to capture for a wide range of policy advocates the nature and significance of the basic defense policy problem of the 1970s. That concept reflected a new and particular focus on the state of the strategic balance; but the problem of concern was more a matter of

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

managing the political aspects of a radically changing military balance than of dealing with the military implications of those changes. That is, the formulation of the essential equivalence concept was a response to clearly expressed domestic political concerns and to the potential concerns of foreign political elites about changes in the strategic balance favoring the Soviet Union. The tenuous connection of the concept to particular military requirements has been reflected in the ambiguous and continually changing definition of the purposes of and capabilities assessment criteria associated with essential equivalence.

The political problems addressed by essential equivalence arose from the confluence of a number of mutually supporting events. The winding down of the war in Vietnam and the policy emphasis on detente served to direct attention away from conventional war contingencies and to minimize concerns about conventional force balances. The consequent emphasis on strategic force balances as symbolic of the state of the US-Soviet competition was underlined by the emergence of SALT as a focus of the defense policy debate. The emphasis on strategic forces was further justified by the recognition of the substantial and unwavering growth in strategic capabilities, with the test of the United States being "number one" increasingly measured by relative US strategic capabilities. For US allies, the long-standing emphasis on the US strategic "umbrella" was given new significance by the declining levels of US conventional forces coupled with substantial growth in those forces on the Soviet side. With the conventional balance increasingly in question, it was ever more important that the United States not allow an "unfavorable" strategic balance to emerge.

During the 1960s there was relatively little concern about the state of the overall strategic balance independent of the US ability to meet its deterrence objectives. This fact may not be surprising in light of the generally accepted view that the United States enjoyed substantial advantages in strategic capabilities. However, even the signs of significant growth in Soviet strategic capabilities during the decade did not appear to change that lack of concern. Indeed, William Kaufmann, in his chronicle of the McNamara years at the Defense Department, suggests that McNamara looked with some favor upon the Soviet advances.<sup>1</sup> The expansion of the Soviet forces not only would reduce possible Soviet fears of a US damage-limiting first strike but would, by the same token, reduce the incentives for the United States to attempt to acquire a damage-limiting capability by making it virtually impossible to achieve. Because the growth in Soviet strategic force targets reduced the capability for eliminating them with high confidence, a compelling argument could be made that there was little to be gained by acquiring capabilities beyond those necessary for "assured destruction." In short, for McNamara the Soviet buildup was not only an acceptable phenomenon but it also provided a rationale for limiting US expenditures on strategic forces:

Strategic nuclear war would under all foreseeable circumstances be bilateral—and highly destructive to both sides. Larger budgets for U.S. strategic forces would not change that fact. . . . the same situation confronts the Soviet leaders, in a way that is even more intensely confining.<sup>2</sup>

### PANEL 3

By the time the Nixon Administration assumed responsibility for defense policy, the Soviet investment in strategic weapons advances had begun to mature and the SALT negotiations were set in motion. However, it was not until early 1971 that Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird issued the first "comprehensive" 5-year defense plan of the Nixon administration.<sup>1</sup> That plan established the case for "sufficiency" as a force sizing concept. Laird's description of strategic force posture requirements did not involve a prescription of a particular relationship between US and Soviet capabilities in terms of an aggregate balance. The sufficiency criteria were entirely oriented to the conditions deemed necessary to assure deterrence.

Particular concern about the overall US-Soviet strategic balance of forces did not emerge until after the completion of the SALT I agreement. And when that issue surfaced it was highly politicized. The Congress, in passing Public Law 92-448, demanded that the United States have force capabilities equal to those of the Soviet Union. The precipitant to this action was dissatisfaction with the terms of the SALT agreement that gave the Soviets certain advantages in the numbers and characteristics of particular weapons systems. Reflecting that new political concern, the subsequent Vladivostok accord was based on the principle of equality in US and Soviet force levels and proved to be more acceptable even though the accord did not have significant implications for either the US or Soviet postures.

The subsequent response to the congressional mandate was the formulation of the essential equivalence concept. When Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger first defined this concept, he did not pose it as an objective of policy but only as one of four conditions necessary to maintain "credible deterrence." Nor did he define essential equivalence as a function of the overall strategic balance. Instead, essential equivalence was defined as a function of "the basic factors that determine force effectiveness," focusing, in particular, on weapons systems attributes that affect their destructive potential: "We cannot allow major asymmetries to develop in throw-weight, accuracy, yield-to-weight ratios, reliability and other factors that contribute to the effectiveness of strategic weapons."<sup>2</sup> Schlesinger went on "to elaborate on what I mean by that term (essential equivalence)" in a manner that made weapons technologies the main thrust:

I believe that it would be a mistake to allow *major* asymmetries to develop between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the basic technologies and other factors that shape force effectiveness. . . . We must be sure to keep pace with the Soviet Union in the design of new offensive and defensive systems.<sup>3</sup>

That Schlesinger focused on these factors is not surprising inasmuch as they were the politically charged issues raised in the congressional debate over the administration's SALT negotiation strategy. It was the apparent Soviet advantage in such factors as throw-weight, with their potential for being translated into weapons effectiveness advantages, that were then the focus of Congressional concern.

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

When Donald Rumsfeld assumed responsibility for formulating strategic policy, he made it quite clear that the emphasis on equivalence was an effort to be responsive to congressional concerns.<sup>4</sup> However, unlike the Schlesinger formulation of essential equivalence, Rumsfeld clearly separated that concept and its implications from deterrence requirements; he defined equivalence in terms of the overall strategic balance rather than in terms of particular weapons' effectiveness characteristics. In this view, the purpose of essential equivalence was to aid in crisis avoidance and crisis management:

In the past, we have suffered from bomber gaps, missile gaps, and megatonnage gaps that have caused what some regard as over-reactions to perceived vulnerabilities and disadvantages. . . . there remains the possibility that serious, real asymmetries or misconceptions about them could arise and lead to pressure, crisis, and confrontation. Since it is desirable to forestall situations such as the Cuban missile crisis, we believe that our forces, in addition to meeting the conditions of second-strike assured destruction and multiple options, should be roughly equivalent to the forces of the USSR . . . they should not be inferior in their overall potential effectiveness.<sup>7</sup>

In Rumsfeld's subsequent posture statement he expanded the purposes of essential equivalence to include managing the behavior of domestic as well as foreign political actors in addition to serving crisis management interests:

If friends see the balance as favoring the Soviet Union rather than the United States, their independence and firmness may give way to adjustment, accommodation, and subordination. If potential enemies have a similar perception, they could misjudge the situation and make demands leading to confrontation, crisis and unnecessary dangers. If domestic audiences see real or imaginary imbalances, they could insist on excessive and costly crash programs to restore the equilibrium.<sup>8</sup>

This formulation of the problem appeared to recognize the growing political importance of the state of the overall strategic balance as it might affect the behavior of allies and domestic political actors in light of the continuing Soviet strategic buildup. However, while appearing to extend the scope of the purposes of essential equivalence, Rumsfeld also seemed to reduce the requirements for maintaining essential equivalence. In the previous posture statement he spoke of the requirement for US strategic forces not becoming "inferior in their overall potential effectiveness." In this subsequent formulation he focused on static measures of force balance, rather than assessments of overall force effectiveness, and argued that:

If all or most of these indicators were to favor the Soviet Union, a number of observers might conclude that the United States was not equivalent to the USSR in strategic power and that the balance was now weighted in favor of the Soviet Union.<sup>9</sup>

### PANEL 3

The evident implication is that, whatever the force effectiveness implications might be, the purposes of essential equivalence are satisfied as long as the Soviet Union does not enjoy a lead in *all* or *most* static measures of aggregate capabilities.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's treatment of essential equivalence appears to reflect an uncomfortable struggle with the concept in that the concept appears to have been progressively demoted in importance and ever more limited in terms of its associated force requirements. In his first posture statement, Secretary Brown described essential equivalence as having four major purposes: it "minimizes the probability that opposing strategic forces will be used to seek any diplomatic advantage over us;" it "reduced the chance that one side or the other will become vulnerable to charges of a bomber or missile gap;" it "enhances stability in a crisis by reducing incentives for either side to strike first or preempt;" and it "sets a major objective for current and future SALT negotiations."<sup>10</sup> To serve these purposes, it was deemed necessary that "any advantage in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by the other U.S. advantages."<sup>11</sup> Exactly what would constitute an unacceptable Soviet advantage was never made clear, nor were the offsetting advantages that the United States could or should pursue. Indeed, given that the Secretary minimized the significance of the Soviet counterforce capability—an advantage which was described as potentially significant only if it persisted for a protracted period—it would seem that an unacceptable Soviet advantage would have to be a *very* significant asymmetry.

In his most recent posture statement, Secretary Brown appears to diminish the significance of essential equivalence and to reduce further the minimal conditions necessary for maintaining equivalence. Essential equivalence no longer rated the position of a major heading within the posture statement, being treated only briefly in a section entitled "other objectives." The purpose to be served by essential equivalence is now described as a purely political purpose involving, in particular, an effort to affect the "perceptions" of third parties:

The behavior of all nations will be influenced by their judgments about the state of the nuclear balance . . . . The need for essential equivalence reflects the fact that nuclear forces have a political impact influenced by static measures (such as numbers of warheads, throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage) as well as by dynamic evaluations of relative military capability . . . maintaining essential equivalence of strategic forces is necessary to prevent the Soviets from gaining political advantage from a real or perceived strategic imbalance.<sup>12</sup>

Exactly what force posture conditions are necessary to deal effectively with the "perceptions" problem is, of course, difficult to determine because of our lack of clear understanding about what influences perceptions and, even more important, our lack of clear understanding about the relationship between particular perceptions of the balance and political behavior. That there is a connection between these factors is difficult to

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

dispute; that this connection may be an important element in determining the success of overall US national security policy also seems difficult to dispute. But, apart from our lack of understanding about the connection, significant political changes in the security environment of the 1980s suggest that the "perceptions problem" may take on a different character.

It seems reasonable to assume that official US statements about the nature of defense policy problems and about the state of the military balance are among the most important, if not being *the* most important, factors influencing foreign perceptions of the US role in the military competition with the Soviet Union. In light of this, it might be argued that the particular focus of the US defense debate of the 1970s on the strategic nuclear balance had much to do with the attention given to that balance by foreign political elites. It might further be argued that the increasing concern expressed in the United States about the growth in Soviet theater war capabilities coupled with exploitable political turbulence in such areas as the Middle East—where US allies share a common degree of concern—could focus the "perceptions problem" on nonnuclear force balances and demonstrated will and capability to deal with regional conflicts.

Whether or not this is the view of Secretary Brown, his definition of the force posture requirements of essential equivalence appears to reduce the concept to one of limited significance. Having stated the now-mandatory and ambiguous requirement that "our overall forces be at least on a par with those of the Soviet Union," the Secretary goes on to state the particular requirement "that the Soviet Union does not have a monopoly of any major military capability."<sup>13</sup> Given that "rough parity" is a matter of broad definition and judgment as to its existence, it could mean little more than what the Secretary seems to suggest: rough equivalence means that both the United States and the Soviet Union have substantial second-strike retaliatory capabilities. In that light, only the requirement that the Soviet Union not hold a monopoly of some significant capability stands as a particular requirement of essential equivalence.

The review of the role of the essential equivalence concept in official US defense policy was meant to indicate its basically political character—both in its inception and in its ascribed policy purposes—and to indicate its declining importance in setting strategic policy requirements. It was a concept that reflected the particular emphasis on strategic forces in the defense policy debate of the 1970s. Whatever the meaning and significance of the concept over the past few years, its significance over the coming years seems inevitably confined to its symbolic meaning for various policy advocates. With the SALT negotiations facing an uncertain future, with detente no longer a watchword of policy, with new demonstrations of Soviet willingness to intervene in areas of political instability, the context in which strategic force requirements will be assessed has fundamentally changed. Should strategic forces and the state of the strategic balance remain the focus of US defense policy? What role should strategic forces play in this new world? Although these issues have not been fully joined in the defense policy debate, at least the outlines of the various positions that are likely to emerge are apparent.

## PANEL 3

### THE DEFENSE POLICY PROBLEM OF THE 1980s: ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

The various views of the nature of the principal defense policy problem of the 1980s, and of the particular strategic policy problem within that larger context, are distinguishable along several dimensions. One dimension is the interpretation of the significance of the Soviet military buildup, and especially the relative significance of the buildup in nonnuclear as opposed to nuclear forces. Related to that issue are the imputed motives of the Soviet buildup and the assumed incentives for Soviet exploitation of those capability improvements. The position on these issues is reflected, then, in the assumptions made about the most likely contingencies to confront US forces and the linkage, or lack of linkage, between nuclear and nonnuclear force capabilities in dealing with those contingencies.

#### The Official View and its Implications

Even a casual reader of the defense posture statements for 1980 and 1981 cannot help but be struck by their differences in tone as well as in substance. Those differences have importance for our subject for three reasons. First, they indicate the potential magnitude of the redirection in defense policy, the reasons for that redirection, and the implications for the defense posture. Second, in spite of that redirection of overall policy, strategic policy requirements in both posture statements are considered within the context of the same concept—the so-called countervailing strategy. Although the concept is the same, the posture and force employment strategy implications of that concept appear to be different in important respects. And, third, though the 1981 posture statement may be intended to supersede the 1980 statement, there will very likely be advocates in the impending policy debate who advance arguments very similar to those offered in the earlier posture statement.

The most fundamental differences between the 1980 and 1981 posture statements relate to the definition of the general threat environment, the relative weight given to nuclear as opposed to nonnuclear forces, and the role of nuclear forces in dealing with the contingencies deemed more likely to occur.

In describing the international threat environment in the 1980 statement, the Secretary concluded that, "internationally, these are times for hope, not despair, times of opportunity as well as challenge."<sup>14</sup>

In this context, the contingency demands on which to plan US force requirements were limited. The contingencies of concern were cases of overt and large-scale Soviet aggression, and, therefore, the likelihood of simultaneous conflicts was small:

There is some *small probability* that a number of more or less simultaneous attacks could be *launched on* areas we consider vital. But the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and satellites are far from unlimited.<sup>15</sup>

This formulation overlooked, of course, the prospect of conflict not initiated by the Soviet Union but in which the Soviet Union or the United States might become involved for any number of reasons. As an element of

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

deterrence against the prospect of Soviet aggression, whether by conventional or nuclear means, the Secretary explicitly raised the specter of US resort to nuclear attack in response:

The Soviets and their associates, if considering an attack on the United States, its forces and interests, or its allies and friends, must recognize the possibility that we would make a nuclear response. But we reject nuclear escalation as the *sole* policy on which to base the planning or use of our forces.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, while the Secretary was not suggesting sole reliance on the nuclear threat to deter or prosecute theater war contingencies, he was underlining the potential role of strategic forces in those contingencies. This linkage between strategic and theater war was made more explicit in the subsequent description of a particular scenario context and of the targeting options relevant to that scenario:

No enemy should be left with the illusion that he could disable portions of our nuclear forces—CONUS-based or overseas—as a preliminary to attacks in specific theaters with his general purpose forces. The latter can and should be targeted. . . . So might the command-control, war reserve stocks, and lines of communication necessary to the conduct of theater campaigns. In some circumstances, we might also wish to take war-related industries under attack, especially those decoupled from cities.<sup>17</sup>

In sum, the 1980 statement gave particular emphasis to Soviet-initiated, theater-war contingencies—which might or might not involve Soviet strategic attacks—and on US strategic response options intended to assist in the effective prosecution of the theater war. There was a decided war-fighting flavor to the formulation of force employment strategy.

That the underlying notion of the appropriate strategy for force employment was oriented to war fighting and, in particular, to providing a militarily effective defense against a variety of contingencies, is indicated by the Secretary's reference to a virtually open-ended list of potentially relevant targets: "I recognize that the strategy behind such a [target] list is essentially defensive in nature, designed primarily to prevent an enemy from achieving *any* meaningful objective."<sup>18</sup> The defensive quality of the strategy is underlined by the Secretary's expressed reluctance to pose an effective first-strike counterforce capability and by the emphasis given to destruction of capabilities associated with a Soviet theater war effort. Furthermore, the emphasis is on denial of adversary gains rather than the creation of conditions more favorable to the United States and its allies. But the requirement for denial capabilities is very broad indeed in the reference to denying "any" enemy objective.

In terms of the purposes that may motivate Soviet aggression, the Secretary suggests that they might derive, not from Soviet strength, but from the large number of domestic and political problems faced by the Soviet Union: "With so many problems, but with so much military power, a desperate leadership could cause unparalleled international turmoil."<sup>19</sup> Elsewhere in the posture statement, the Secretary notes: "Their failure to

### PANEL 3

compete successfully in other arenas [non-military] can increase the incentive for the Soviets to use their military power to increase their influence and to gain political advantage."<sup>20</sup> Such desperation, he argues, might even lead to resort to limited strategic attacks on the United States if effective response options are not developed: "The temptation to exploit this loophole in our deterrent would be minute, but it could be real in desperate circumstances."<sup>21</sup> In short, "a desperate Soviet Union could be even more of a problem than a confidently aggressive one."<sup>22</sup>

Contrary to the hopeful international scene posited in the 1980 statement, the threat environment with which the countervailing strategy was confronted in the 1981 statement was one of spreading political instability, intensifying competition with the Soviet Union, and high conflict potential in many regions. The Secretary's projection of future contingencies is one characterized by unpredictability, by the likelihood of multiple conflicts which may erupt quickly and escalate to major conflict proportions. The possibility of multiple contingencies threatening US interests arose from the fact that Soviet initiated aggression was no longer posed as the primary concern for US defense policy.

In this context, there is no mention of Soviet decisionmaking driven by desperation motives. Nor is the principal threat one of a Soviet decision to initiate an unprovoked, major aggression. Instead, reference is made to a pattern of Soviet behavior that, by implication, might reasonably be expected to continue: "The Kremlin, despite the growing military power at its disposal, has tended thus far to exploit existing troubles rather than to create new ones."<sup>23</sup> The Secretary's expectation that this behavior will continue is indicated by his assessment of the dominant problem of European defense: "The greatest dangers to Europe, indeed, would arise less from sudden and unprovoked attacks than from major East-West crises ignited by difficulties in or near the Soviet orbit."<sup>24</sup>

Given the evident weaknesses in US nonnuclear forces, which the Secretary considers in detail, the prospect of multiple contingencies involving Soviet exploitation could have justified an argument for greater reliance on nuclear weapons to offset nonnuclear force weaknesses. Such a priority assignment could have been justified both because of the relative importance of strategic forces (in the Secretary's words: "the foundation on which our security rests") and because strategic capabilities might be conceived as offsetting weaknesses in the nonnuclear forces. However, the Secretary rejects both arguments and appears to argue for reducing the visibility and importance of strategic forces in the overall defense posture. He argues, instead, that the apparent problems associated with strategic forces are, in essence, tolerable and that the critical problem is in developing the nonnuclear capabilities necessary for dealing with the likely regional conflicts of the 1980s:

It should be evident from this review of our problems that we need to make major improvements in our defense posture over and above those we have already programmed. The difficulties do not lie so much with our future strategic nuclear posture. . . . Most important of all, we must increase the deployment, modernization, readiness, mobility, and sustainability of our non-nuclear forces.<sup>25</sup>

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

That point is more pointedly made in the Secretary's review of past accomplishments in improving the US defense posture under the Carter administration. He notes that, in the first year of the administration, the emphasis was on improving the NATO defense posture. In the second year, the focus was on the "problem of modernizing our strategic TRIAD." Then the focus turned to modernizing the theater nuclear posture in Europe. He concludes that:

Programs in each of these areas are under way and have momentum. We can now concentrate special attention and resources on improving our capabilities to deal with the threats and crises around the world and, in particular, on improving our ability to get men and equipment to potential areas of conflict as quickly as necessary.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, while the Secretary recognizes that there are certain problems with the strategic force posture, he argues that current programs should be sufficient to deal with them and that, in any case, strategic force problems do not have high priority in light of the more pressing requirements for regional conflict capabilities. Indeed, the Secretary emphasizes the fact that: "Despite the rhetoric about superiority and inferiority in the nuclear realm, it is increasingly acknowledged that the nonnuclear arena is where the main dangers and action are likely to be."<sup>27</sup>

Not only will the strategic force posture not get priority in budgetary allocations, but the role of strategic forces in dealing with potential conflicts is limited to a very narrow range of contingencies. Unlike the 1980 statement, there is no explicit reference to the threat of US resort to strategic attack in response to Soviet military actions. Instead, the Secretary emphasizes the argument that only a very narrow range of contingencies can be deterred by strategic forces.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, the Secretary does not mention the possibility of complementing US conventional capabilities by strategic attacks to attrit Soviet theater war-waging capabilities. The only scenario explicitly raised involving Soviet attacks against third parties in which strategic forces are deemed relevant is the case of a Soviet *nuclear* attack against those third parties:

Nor should any possible foe believe that our hands would be tied in the event that he threatened or attacked our allies *with nuclear weapons*. He too would place critical targets at risk, both in his own homeland and in the territory of his allies—targets, I might add, the destruction of which would undermine his political and military ability to gain control over such vital regions as Western Europe and Japan.<sup>29</sup>

The 1980 posture statement suggested the scenario of a partial Soviet strategic attack against the United States as a precursor to a major theater aggression. In the 1981 statement, the variant on this scenario went as follows:

As I pointed out last year, no potential enemy should labor under the illusion that he could expect to disable portions of our nuclear forces without in turn losing assets essential to his own military and political security, even if the exchange were to stop short of an all-out destruction of cities and industry.<sup>30</sup>

### PANEL 3

In the 1980 statement the response options for this scenario were countermilitary oriented. The tenor of the above statement is that the targeting options are to be more punitive in nature, threatening to impose costs in the form of the loss of ability to preserve sovereignty. And the final phrase of the above statement implies that the intended implications of the US actions would resemble all-out attacks even if the overall damage inflicted on the Soviet Union would be in some sense restrained.

If the priority assigned to and the role assumed for strategic forces are to be reduced, what, then, are the requirements that the strategic force posture must meet? In spite of the apparent differences in the conception of the roles for strategic forces in the 1980 and 1981 posture statements, both statements assert that a countervailing strategy lays the basis for force requirements. However, the purposes and requirements of the countervailing strategy, like essential equivalence, remain ambiguous. With regard to the purposes of the strategy, at least four different purposes are suggested by the descriptions of countervailing strategy.

One conception of the purpose of a countervailing strategy is, essentially, to deny the feasibility of what might be called the "theory of victory" projected by Soviet military doctrine. As Secretary Brown addressed this problem:

What must trouble us, however, is the heavy emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on the acquisition of war-winning capabilities. . . . Accordingly, it is essential to continue to update our countervailing capabilities so that the Soviets will clearly understand that we will never allow them to use their nuclear forces to achieve any aggressive aim *at an acceptable cost*.<sup>31</sup>

This comment could be read as indicating a need only to pose a threat of unacceptable costs, in the sense, for example, prescribed by the assured destruction concept. However, the Secretary specifically rules out reliance on an indiscriminate, punitive threat embodied in the assured destruction notion except as it may deter indiscriminate, punitive attacks by the Soviet Union.

The threat of imposing unacceptable costs suggests that the purpose of employing forces is to make any enemy "victory" a Pyrrhic victory. An alternative means of denying victory is, of course, to prevent the adversary from effectively using his forces to make any gains. The ability to do this is, on the other hand, much more demanding than imposing costs on an adversary in the event that he has achieved any gains through the use of force. But the Secretary also suggests that this is the principal purpose of a countervailing strategy:

Deterrence, by definition, depends on shaping an adversary's prediction of the likely outcome of a war. Our surest deterrent is our capability to *deny gain from aggression* (by any measure of gain) and we will impose it.<sup>32</sup>

It is, of course, quite possible to deny an adversary's effort to achieve decisive military victory and still have the adversary achieve some gains from that effort. In the case, for example, of a strategic conflict that grew

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

out of a major theater war, the purpose of denying any gains would seem to require successfully countering not only Soviet strategic attacks but also defeating the Soviet theater war effort.

That the denial of gain purpose may be too demanding is suggested by an alternative purpose ascribed to the countervailing strategy by the Secretary. In this formulation US forces are required to prevent "an enemy from achieving any *meaningful advantage*" coupled with an ability to "inflict higher costs on him than the value he might expect to gain from partial or full-scale attacks."<sup>33</sup> This latter formulation of the strategy appears to be a response to critics of US strategic policy who argue that the Soviet counterforce capability against the US ICBM force provides the Soviets with a significant advantage in the context of a strategic campaign. But the Secretary explicitly denies that Minuteman vulnerability offers the Soviets a "meaningful advantage."<sup>34</sup> In this context, the Secretary argues that as long as the United States retains bomber and submarine forces capable of imposing massive destruction on the Soviet Union, the Soviets do not have a meaningful advantage. But, this argument also seems to reduce the countervailing strategy notion to the time-honored notion of assured destruction. That is, if the Soviets are assumed to be unable to gain a meaningful advantage by any form of attack, then the only remaining requirement is the ability to inflict costs.

The fourth purpose ascribed to the countervailing strategy reflects the apparent ambivalence in the Secretary's arguments as to whether punitive or countermilitary operations are the dominant attribute of strategy: "Our forces must be in a position to deny any meaningful objective to the Soviets and impose awesome costs *in the process*."<sup>35</sup> In this case denial and punishment are not alternative means for responding to adversary aggression but, rather, are to be simultaneously employed.

In spite of the repeated references to denying adversary gains, the Secretary's comments return to the prospect of imposing costs to offset gains. In the extreme case of a Soviet threat to attack US urban centers, the United States clearly requires a countervailing cost-imposing threat. The issue is what role cost-imposing actions should play in response to less punitive threats. In this regard, the Secretary strongly rejects the implications of the assured destruction notion. Yet, the Secretary suggests that cost-imposing options may be the only options available.

As a reasonable minimum (but this may also be the best we can do) we *can* make sure that, whatever the nature of the attacks we foresee, we have the capability to respond in such a way that the enemy could have no expectation of achieving any rational objective, no illusion of making any gain *without offsetting losses*.<sup>36</sup>

On the other hand, in contemplating those options the Secretary stresses that the US actions must result in an outcome representing "a cost acceptable to ourselves."<sup>37</sup> While cost-imposing actions with nuclear weapons are the easiest to employ, this additional criterion suggests that the costs that may be inflicted on the Soviet Union to offset its possible gains cannot result in a Soviet response that imposes unacceptable costs to the United States. The ability to limit possible damage on the United

### PANEL 3

States suggests a requirement for countermilitary capabilities that would also be consistent with the denial purpose of the countervailing strategy. Does the apparent ambivalence between denial and cost-imposing emphasis of US strategic retaliatory responses come together in their mutual requirement for effective countermilitary capabilities?

In some contexts the Secretary appears to answer "yes" to this question. He emphasizes, for example, the "attention to the militarily effective targeting of the large and flexible forces we increasingly possess."<sup>41</sup> However, in addressing the issue of whether the United States should develop improved strategic counterforce capabilities, the Secretary draws back. He argues that this is a "difficult issue" because it is "bound to affect long-term stability," and, in any case, "attacks on those targets [Soviet strategic forces] would not disarm an enemy in a first strike."<sup>42</sup> Of course, a disarming first strike is not necessarily a requirement of the "defensive" countervailing strategy described. The issue is whether denial of Soviet gains or of a "meaningful advantage" requires an ability to threaten or actually destroy Soviet strategic forces either decisively or in substantial part. In this regard, the Secretary offers a qualified affirmative answer in suggesting that US air-launched cruise missiles, though slow and limited in number, at least deny Soviet ICBM silos as "sanctuaries."<sup>43</sup>

If Soviet strategic forces are not to be a priority target for countervailing responses, what then are to be the targets of attack? On this matter the Secretary suggests a broad menu of possibilities, so broad as to be open-ended and to imply a very substantial force posture. He suggests, for example, that "to have a true countervailing strategy, our forces must be capable of covering, and being withheld from, a substantial list of targets."<sup>44</sup> In a subsequent formulation, he argued that the forces must be capable of covering a "comprehensive set of targets" in addition to having a withholdable force to employ against Soviet urban-industrial centers and a reserve force capable of post-war enduring survivability.<sup>45</sup>

The ambiguities in the countervailing strategy concept may be both intentional and justifiable given that it is intended to pose a deterrent threat against an unpredictable contingency or range of contingencies. Attempting to be more precise either about the nature of the contingencies or concern of the intended responses could be misleading to friend and foe alike. However, the description of countervailing strategy within the context of the Secretary's definition of the relative priority of nuclear forces, does make several messages reasonably clear. First, in arguing that budgetary priority should be given to nonnuclear forces, the Secretary argues that there are few, if any, near-term risks in terms of the adequacy of the nuclear force posture to meet any Soviet challenge. He asserts that: "At present, there are excellent grounds for confidence in the U.S. strategic deterrent"; and, furthermore, "In the decade ahead, we will have strategic retaliatory forces sufficient to deter Soviet attack."<sup>46</sup>

The longer term forecast is placed in some doubt by the Secretary not because of the implications of current Soviet strategic programs but, rather, because of uncertainty regarding the success of SALT.

My assessment is based on the assumption that Soviet forces remain within the limits set by SALT II. Should the treaty fail of ratification, and should Soviet force

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

levels then increase (as I believe and, in any event, must assume they would), we would have to make a larger commitment of resources to the strategic nuclear element of our defense—a commitment which, though then necessary, would not improve our security beyond that available—at far lower cost—given ratification of SALT II.”

In short, current US programs are sufficient to deal with the implications of current Soviet programs. If SALT should fail, then the likelihood of greater than expected Soviet advances would require greater US efforts—but this presumably would be a longer term problem given program lead times. In any case, the Secretary seems to argue that increases in budget allocations for nuclear forces—whether in response to a SALT failure or otherwise—would not improve the security position of the United States.

### **An Alternative View: The Need for Drastic Action**

A point of view that runs counter to the Secretary's arguments, and which appears to be gaining support finds the short-term problems confronted by US strategic forces to be sufficiently great to demand fundamental and rapid changes in strategic policy and capabilities. Advocates of this viewpoint generally do not minimize the need for substantial improvements in nonnuclear forces as well; but budgetary tradeoffs should not deny programs that are critically necessary to redress perceived weaknesses in US strategic forces. Exactly what priorities and tradeoffs between nuclear and nonnuclear would be desirable or acceptable is not clear in the arguments of most advocates of this viewpoint because of the predominant focus on a comparison of US and Soviet strategic capabilities rather than addressing overall defense requirements within the current and projected threat environment. But, given the limited focus of the arguments, there is no doubt that nuclear force improvement programs represent a requirement that cannot be ignored or minimized.

Examples of this point of view are offered in a recent compilation of papers edited by Van Cleave and Thompson. The concern is focused on “a threatening peak of relative Soviet strategic capabilities during the first half of the 1980s.”<sup>43</sup> As one contributor put the issue more starkly:

It is clear now to virtually all competent analysts that, sometime in the early to mid-eighties, the U.S. will be compelled to pass through a “time valley” of maximum military peril.<sup>44</sup>

The risks faced by the United States in the early 1980s are a function of the failure of official policy to recognize and respond early enough to this impending threat. As a consequence, “time is short and rapidly growing shorter” for undertaking measures to deal with the threat.

The range of problems confronting the US strategic force posture is described as very substantial. In part, this view of the problem differs from that of the Secretary of Defense because strategic deterrence is assigned a role in a broader range of contingencies and the employment objectives assigned to strategic forces are more demanding. However, the problems are endemic to all attributes of the forces: “We face increasing force

### PANEL 3

vulnerability, the erosion of essential equivalence, and the narrowing of the range of deterrent effectiveness and utility of our strategic forces."<sup>47</sup> Because the vulnerability issues are the most pressing they were the focus of the arguments. However, it was made clear that a posture that relied on punitive retaliation for deterrence was not only unacceptable but fell well short of requirements.

Those requirements included "improving" possible strategic war outcomes by being able to destroy all forms of Soviet military capabilities, by destroying Soviet capabilities for "war survival," "post-attack recovery" and "post-war power," and by improving US war survival capabilities. In addition, having a credible capability to employ strategic forces in response to Soviet theater war aggression was important to increase the probability of a favorable outcome in those contingencies.<sup>48</sup>

While these larger and more satisfying purposes might be achieved by longer term programmatic efforts, the short-term emphasis had to be on efforts to avoid the worst possible outcomes. There simply is not time to generate a favorable position, and cash programs are necessary to meet minimal requirements: "We have waited too long for easy solutions or a more measured and gradual response."<sup>49</sup> Given the deterioration of US strategic programs, even maximal efforts cannot hope to deal with all the problems, but they might deal with the most critical of those problems. The necessary effort was one of "determining feasible quick fixes for the most urgent of these problems." While those quick fixes could not solve all the immediate problems, their purpose was "to buy time through relatively short-term correctives so that we may, in time, place longer range solutions in motion."<sup>50</sup>

The Secretary of Defense had argued that there might be a longer term problem if SALT II failed but, in the short-term, the US posture was adequate. Not only does this critical view of current policy argue that the short-term situation is dire, but it also suggests that, if the short-term can be survived, the long-term holds hopeful prospects. As one contributor posed the issues:

If we can safely negotiate the "time valley" of maximum peril (1982-1987), we can expect to reach less dangerous uplands in the late eighties and in the last decade of the century. By then, Soviet military ambitions may be constrained by manpower shortage and cumulative inefficiencies in the statist system. By then, China may have achieved formidable upgrading of her armed forces and, with access to arms from West Europe and Japan, could constitute a significant deterrent factor on Russia's flank. . . . Moreover, given enough time, we can be confident that the American aerospace industries need not yield supremacy to the Russians in any department of strategic armament, communications, surveillance or exotic defense.<sup>51</sup>

In short, with or without SALT II, the short-term situation is very dangerous but, if it can be successfully negotiated, the long-term situation was much brighter.

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

The contributors to this volume were quite aware that the programs they proposed would pose very substantial budgetary demands. They do not suggest that strategic forces should have priority over non-nuclear forces. Instead, they argue the case for much larger defense budgets across the board. In any case, they note that the strategic force budget is a relatively small fraction of the overall budget and contend that even a three-fold increase in that element of the budget would not be an undue burden.<sup>52</sup> However, while the authors do suggest what the magnitude of their short-term programs might be, they do not suggest what the nature of the long-term programs—which they also argue are critically necessary—are, what their costs might be, or whether there might be necessary defense budget tradeoffs if both short-term and long-term programs are simultaneously initiated. The argument is merely posed that, whatever the cost, that cost must be accepted if security is to be achieved.

Whatever one may think of the underlying case made for a dramatic increase in strategic force improvement programs, the suggestions made regarding "quick fixes" add a potentially important new element to the strategic debate. Out of necessity in searching for short-term palliatives the focus of attention is turned to non-exotic, relatively unsophisticated and quickly implementable posture options. In the bulk of the literature that addresses current and prospective strategic force posture problems, the suggested responses not only are very expensive but also depend upon significant technological advances requiring long development lead times with uncertain potential success. Given the very large costs of such weapons development programs as the B-1, Trident and M-X, especially if taken together, the ability to uncover less demanding options, for both the short-term and the long-term, may determine whether or not the United States can compete more effectively with the Soviet Union in the strategic realm.

### **The Technological Option and Nonnuclear Priority**

A survey of the range of opinion on the nature of defense policy problems and strategic force improvement priorities would not be complete without considering the viewpoint that strategic forces can be reduced without risk. The arguments in this vein are well known and need not be treated in detail. However, there are a few new twists on this theme that are worth noting.

A recent study by the so-called Boston Study Group rehearses the arguments frequently put forward for reducing strategic force levels.<sup>53</sup> Beginning with the assumption that the threat of major urban-industrial damage is a sufficient deterrent threat—indeed, the only plausible and credible threat—the US strategic posture is found to be more than sufficient. As a consequence, the authors recommend elimination of the strategic bomber force and all but 100 land-based ICBMs, as well as cancellation of the Trident program. The interesting quality to the argument is that these recommendations are not based on a conclusion that those systems are vulnerable or obsolete but only that they are unnecessary. While those expressing concern about the viability of the US strategic posture emphasize Soviet technological advances, this argument appears to deny the

### PANEL 3

possibility of threatening technological advances except for those being pursued by the United States, which are said to threaten an increased arms race. Thus, the United States can confidently rely on the SLBM because it is and will remain invulnerable.

On the other hand, there are dramatic technological changes under way in the nonnuclear arena. Although strategic forces seem to be technologically immune, the major nonnuclear weapons systems are subject to technological obsolescence. Furthermore, if the United States would modify its nonnuclear force posture to exploit new conventional weapons technology, it would be possible to cut nonnuclear forces as well as strategic force levels. Not only would substantial budget cuts accrue but these new weapons would favor the "defense" and enhance deterrence:

The gradual growth of numerous, cheap hand weapons able to damage expensive fast machines with small probability but high payoff, does seem likely. For this reason and others, an attack by an adversary only marginally stronger in number or technique looks less and less militarily attractive.<sup>34</sup>

Whatever one thinks of the particular arguments, a number of questions are raised by this general approach that are worthy of consideration. Are the militarily most significant technological advances occurring in the nonnuclear force realm? Could those advances be exploited to free resources to deal with strategic force problems?

It could well be argued that these nonnuclear weapons advances may only be relevant for major conflict contingencies involving large, "heavy" combat units and not the more likely "third area" contingencies of increasing concern. However, even if this were true, it would not necessarily deny the potential for dealing more effectively (and at lower cost than otherwise possible) with the major contingencies involving Western Europe and Korea where the bulk of US nonnuclear forces are committed. Given severe constraints on military manpower levels as well as overall budget constraints, it is not entirely clear how Secretary Brown's call for dramatic improvement in US capabilities for "third area" contingencies can be met without also altering the US posture in Europe and Korea. The political environment is such that reduction in capabilities in those areas is not likely to be acceptable. Is it not, then, important to reconsider the orientation of US conventional forces to manpower-intensive, heavy units prepared for attrition warfare? Is it possible that new conventional weapons technology coupled with new engagement strategies could provide effective defense in Europe with fewer men and lighter forces? If it is not possible, it is difficult to see how the US forces can meet the potential challenge of multiple contingencies, as the Secretary suggests may occur, without placing greater reliance on the "nuclear umbrella," especially as it relates to European defense.

### FORCE POSTURE OPTIONS FOR THE 1980s

The decade of the 1980s poses a range of difficult defense policy problems for which there are few easy or near-term solutions. In the strategic arena, the growth in Soviet capabilities finds the United States with very

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

limited ability to respond in the short-term. The Minuteman production line is shut down, the SRAM production line is shut down, there is no bomber production line, and Trident production could not easily be increased, if it is possible at all. That leaves cruise missiles as the "system for all seasons" and all reasons. Furthermore, efforts to reduce US force vulnerabilities within the confines of SALT are slow, very expensive, and subject to considerable uncertainty.

These constraints on strategic force posture improvements are underlined by the resource demands posed by the need to improve US capabilities for dealing with increasingly threatening third area contingencies and to offset the growing Soviet capabilities facing NATO. The difficult tradeoffs posed by these problems are made even more difficult by the fact that there may be important tradeoffs between short-term and long-term programs for dealing with those problems both individually and collectively. Crash programs to deal with immediate problems may come at the cost of less effective long-term solutions.

In light of these considerations, there are a number of alternative force posturing concepts that might be the basis of US defense preparations for dealing with the defense policy problems of the 1980s.

### **Option A: The Strategic Long-Haul/Third Area Force Priority**

This appears to be the force posturing concept preferred by the Secretary of Defense, as revealed in the 1981 posture statement. This posture is based on the assumption that near-term Soviet strategic advances are tolerable and do not require any dramatic, short-term US responses. Instead, investment in strategic capabilities should be focused, as they now are, on relatively long lead-time programs that will improve the relative standing of US strategic forces in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Rather than give priority to either strategic or NATO-oriented forces, the short-term priority should be on improving third-area capabilities.

Minimizing the emphasis on strategic forces that characterized the defense debate of the 1970s poses certain problems and accepts certain risks. The Secretary justifies this deemphasis on the basis of a SALT II agreement that, it is argued, will limit the growth of the Soviet threat. However, that agreement, even if ratified, will have little impact on the near-term Soviet threat and does not apply to the long-term. In this context, the importance of SALT may be to provide political justification for minimizing US strategic force improvement programs. However, if SALT is not ratified, this major political justification is lost.

The military risks posed by minimizing additional efforts in the strategic force realm are not easily dismissed by the argument that the far more likely threat contingencies are nonnuclear in nature. If, in fact, the 1980s find the United States confronting multiple contingencies, as the Secretary suggests might well happen, especially if they involve the Soviet Union, does this not also increase the chances the nuclear weapons will become a more "visible" element of crisis and conflict management? In this vein, the Secretary's call for flexible strategic options seems quite appropriate. However, flexibility seems to be defined by the Secretary as a capability for "covering" a wider range of targets than those associated with

### PANEL 3

indiscriminate urban-industrial damage. But, flexibility would also depend on when and how those other targets can be covered and at what risks in terms of possible Soviet responses. In this regard, the Secretary accepts the fact that the US ICBM force is vulnerable but asserts that this is tolerable as long as the other two legs of the TRIAD are secure. But, the aging US bomber forces, increasingly concentrated on fewer operating bases and bases near the coasts, also pose a vulnerability risk. These vulnerabilities leave the SSBN forces hopefully secure but also give the United States a high confidence ability only to carry out a punitive retaliatory threat.

Will the United States be able to act with confidence, under these conditions, in the case of intense crisis or in regional conflict in which the Soviets may be involved or in which the Soviets attempt to exert leverage by brandishing their formidable conventional and strategic forces? Will US allies be willing to share the burden of more stalwart defense and to support the United States in crisis and regional conflicts under these circumstances?

#### **Option B: Forget SALT/Undertake Low-Cost Hedging Actions.**

The SALT agreement has been championed as a means for limiting the Soviet strategic threat, for increasing "stability" in the strategic arms competition, and for limiting US defense expenditures. However, the terms of SALT II do not limit the most threatening attributes of Soviet capabilities. Furthermore, as with past experience with arms control agreements, the successful closing off of some avenues of weapons development will very likely only redirect the competition along other avenues. And, finally, it is not clear that SALT saves money. The estimates of the savings range from 30 to 100 billion dollars.<sup>55</sup> However, SALT also forces the United States into programs that meet verification requirements that not only increase the costs of strategic systems but extend the period over which force improvement efforts can be realized. This is particularly true of the M-X missile and basing system and also poses problems for the deployment of cruise missiles.

If SALT were abandoned, there would open a number of possibilities for dealing more rapidly and potentially at lower cost with US force vulnerability problems. Instead of fixed, observable silo-basing of missiles, the United States could move to unrestricted mobility or to other means of preventing Soviet detection or confident targeting of missile locations. Further, cruise missiles could be proliferated on a wide variety of platforms in a manner that decreased cruise missile platform vulnerability and increased force capabilities.

This approach runs the evident risk of inciting a far more vigorous strategic arms competition with uncertain implications for crisis and conflict management. However, there may be stronger incentives than SALT for encouraging Soviet restraint in its strategic programs. If the United States were to undertake a more vigorous program of research and development on advanced strategic systems, but make their deployment conditional on Soviet behavior, two conditions might be improved. First, the United States would have available hedges against Soviet force improvements and, second, the United States would present the Soviets with clearer incentives

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

to restrain their actions, especially if those US systems threatened to put important Soviet capabilities in jeopardy.

The idea would be to develop these systems to the point of procurement, and to do so as rapidly as possible, but with the clear promise of restraint given Soviet restraint.<sup>46</sup> Candidate programs might be accuracy improvement methods for the ICBMs and SLBMs. This might include terminally guided RVs and the inverted GPS radio overlay to missile guidance systems. This action might also provide a hedge against the failure of the M-X all-inertial guidance system given its very demanding requirements. In addition, the United States could move more vigorously in its ABM development. A new bomber could be entered in the R&D program as could long-range, ground-based cruise missiles.

This approach, although harboring much uncertainty about its longer term consequences, has the benefit of shoring-up near-term US capabilities and of providing long-term options and incentives for Soviet restraint while doing so within reasonable budget levels.

### **Option C: Lower the Nuclear Threshold for Major Theater War Contingencies**

On the other hand, the Secretary of Defense's presentation of defense policy appears intended to lower the "visibility" of nuclear weapons, to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons for an effective deterrence posture, and to raise the nuclear threshold in the case of deterrence failure. On the other hand, the concept of a countervailing strategy appears intended to provide a rationale for resort to nuclear weapons in a much broader range of contingencies than the simple, canonical scenario of a Soviet strategic attack on the United States.

The ambiguity of purpose can readily be explained as an effort to speak to several audiences simultaneously. To project a declaratory policy reliance on nuclear deterrence and defense, for example, in the context of NATO could reduce whatever momentum exists for improving the conventional defensive posture in Europe. Yet, the remaining weaknesses in NATO defenses make the US strategic nuclear threat a still very relevant element of the NATO defense posture.

Even if the priority defense commitments are viewed as involving those contingencies directly affecting Western European, Japanese, and other major allies' security interests, those interests are intimately related to the security of the Middle East against Soviet encroachment. If, in this context, the "third area" contingencies of concern to the United States are limited to those involving the Middle East, the United States faces serious constraints on its ability to defend, simultaneously, its major allies and the major oil producing areas of the Middle East. In the near-term, especially, the United States will not be able to pursue a credible policy of improving its nonnuclear defense capabilities for Western Europe and the Middle East. Moreover, even if Middle East intervention force capabilities are significantly enhanced, constraints on air and sea lift and tactical air capabilities will seriously constrain the ability of the United States to deal simultaneously with contingencies in the Middle East and Western Europe. And, this problem could well arise without overt Soviet aggression in both

### PANEL 3

theaters. Soviet adventurism in the Middle East could well involve a diversionary increase in tensions in the European theater that demands a clear and strong US response to avoid a crisis of confidence among Western European nations.

One response to these burdensome demands is to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe, while nonnuclear improvements and overall capabilities are focused on third area (i.e., Middle Eastern) contingencies. The expectation would not be that nuclear weapons could deter varieties of NATO-related contingencies; rather, the intent would be that the nuclear deterrent could cover the contingency of massed Soviet invasion of Europe in conjunction with other contingencies.

There are a number of potential pitfalls in this approach. It is not clear that the current US strategic or theater nuclear postures, or programmed changes in those postures, are sufficient to make effective, as a deterrent threat or as a defensive measure, the "lowering of the nuclear threshold" to deal with the worst case European contingency. Even if it were possible to divine an effective theater war application of strategic forces, would that be a sufficient deterrent if the Soviets held potentially effective escalatory options? It is not that the question will necessarily be tested by nuclear attack; the question is whether the United States and its allies are willing to establish the challenge by a change in declaratory policy that places greater reliance on nuclear responses to Soviet aggression.

#### **Option D: A Nuclear Umbrella for Third Area Defense**

Even if Option C were acceptable and could somehow allow diverting nonnuclear assets from Europe, it does not necessarily present the United States with a confident capability for third area contingencies—even if those contingencies are limited to Soviet aggression in the Middle East. It may well be possible for the United States to develop effective nonnuclear capabilities for dealing with military adventures by Soviet proxies or for dealing with major regional actors in contingencies like an Iraqi adventure against Iran or Saudi Arabia. However, it will be very difficult, and will take considerable time, for the United States to develop an effective nonnuclear defense against the threat of a Soviet invasion of part or all of the Persian Gulf area. This problem is particularly pronounced, of course, if such Soviet action was part of simultaneous contingencies in several theaters.

This burden on US forces might be relieved if it were possible to pose a credible nuclear deterrent threat not only against possible Soviet aggression in Europe but also a possible large-scale intervention in the Middle East. Exactly what this deterrent threat might comprise and what would be required to make it credible are not questions easily answered. Theater nuclear forces are not available and could not confidently be made available in the Persian Gulf area. Presumably, strategic forces would have to pose the threat. However, if the targets were Soviet forces and other military assets in or near the area of potential battle, there are important constraints on the types of strategic forces that could be used and the timeliness of their response. Because a determined Soviet effort in the Persian Gulf area would not likely take long to achieve major advances, any effort to deny Soviet ability to consummate its effort would have to be rapid and,

## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

even if it could be, the degree of confidence that could be assigned to this response would not likely be high. Would a more punitive threat be credible? Could the United States threaten Soviet assets that are as important to them as Persian Gulf assets are to the United States?

### **Option E: Drastically Increase the Defense Budget**

It is, of course, not impossible that the budget tradeoffs that are the focus of the preceding options could be relieved by a significant increase in the defense budget. However, even drastic increases still leave open the questions: (1) where should the tradeoffs be made between short and long-term priorities; and (2) what are the measures to be undertaken to deal with immediate weaknesses in the nuclear and nonnuclear postures? It is not at all clear that even very significant increases in the defense budget can simultaneously or quickly serve to close the gaps apparent in the US ability to deal with the strategic, NATO, and third-area defensive problems. Not only are there R&D and procurement lead-time problems, but there are also manpower and other constraints that money alone will not overcome.

In the strategic realm, the "quick fix" approach of Van Cleave and Thompson is consistent with significant increases in the defense budget. Furthermore, those fixes have the virtue of being consistent with the SALT framework. However, while the quick fixes they proposed might have had some chance, at the time they were proposed, of dealing with the early-to-mid 1980s threat they emphasize, there is little hope now that those quick fixes could be implemented in the relevant time period.

In addition to the short-term problems, the longer term goal posed by the Van Cleave-Thompson volume of establishing a position of US strategic advantage will, indeed, compel very large budget increments if the NATO and third-area capabilities are also to be significantly improved. However, their willingness to consider low-cost, nonexotic options for dealing with the short-term strategic threat might be extended to long-term programs as well. One such approach might be to emphasize force improvement programs that reduce the cost element that has increasingly dominated strategic force posture costs—operations and maintenance costs. Over the past two decades, the fraction of the "program one" budget that has grown most dramatically is the fraction spent for operations and maintenance costs. In fiscal year 1962 combined personnel and operations and maintenance costs of the strategic forces amounted to 29 percent of all "program one" TOA (Total Obligational Authority). By comparison, the same expenditures for the fiscal year 1980 budget represented 55 percent of the budget. These numbers suggest that one means for increasing US strategic capabilities without substantially increasing the budget burden, would be to emphasize forces that do not pose a substantial O&M (Operations and Maintenance) increment. The MX missile in a multiple shelter mode will increase O&M costs associated with land-based missiles, and a new bomber and submarine force will do little to reduce O&M costs. Are there strategic systems options that limit O&M costs? For example, a land-based cruise missile instead of a large, air-launched cruise missile launch platform force might offer such savings. There must also be sea-based alternatives to expansion of current SSBN programs that limit O&M costs as well as procurement costs.

### PANEL 3

#### ENDNOTES: RETHINKING THE UNTHINKABLE: THE STRATEGIC DILEMMAS OF THE 1980s

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## STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

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## PANEL 3 PAPER: Strategic Stability Reconsidered

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### THE ARGUMENT

In an important article published in 1978, John Steinbruner claimed that

as the United States force posture has evolved over the past 15 years, the idea of stability has emerged as the central strategic objective, and the asserted conceptual consensus seems to be organized around that objective.<sup>1</sup>

At the basis of this essay are the following concerns: that the particular theories of stability most widely held in the West may be gravely deficient; and that the integrity of the concept of strategic stability itself is questionable.

Discussion of stability and its possible requirements is really a discussion of deterrence theory, which in reality is a debate about the operational merits of different postures and doctrines. There can be no *useful*, objective, doctrine-neutral, exploration of the idea of stability. The discussion which follows makes no pretense of neutrality; instead it endeavors first to explain the roots, meaning, and deficiencies, of the still dominant theories of stability, and second to suggest a theory that has much greater internal and external integrity.

It is very important to recognize that for all its popularity, there is no useful consensus upon the meaning of the idea of stability. Most commentators, and certainly the US Government (and NATO) writ large, acknowledge the value in the twin concepts of *arms race stability* and *crisis stability*. Arms race stability is understood to be a condition wherein neither party to an arms competition is motivated strongly to press military developments or deployments in quest of major advantage—because such advantage is judged to be unattainable (however desirable). Crisis stability is understood to be a quality of strategic relations wherein, during periods of acute crisis, instruments of war (mechanical, electronic, organizational) should not be the immediate cause of war. These concepts, at this level of generality, have been widely understood and approved (in the West) since at least 1960.<sup>2</sup> However, consensus breaks down over the particular policy implications. From an operational perspective, how is arms race stability to

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### PANEL 3

be achieved and maintained and how is crisis stability to be enforced? Both questions arise vis-a-vis a distinctively Soviet adversary.

This quest is for a theory of stability that should work "well enough" given the full dimensions of Western strategic security problems in the context of the military consequences of the unique "cultural thought-ways" of a particular major adversary. As a working hypothesis, this author contends that the ideas of arms race and crisis stability, and the theory of deterrence to which they most usually make (often implicit) reference, have (mis)led Western policy workers into neglecting the operational dimensions of strategy—indeed, many politicians, officials, and analysts seem to believe that nuclear strategy cannot really have any operational dimensions. An adequate theory of deterrence must encompass, as its first priority, a determination of military (and relevant civilian) requirements in war itself. Extant, still-dominant deterrence theory—as the *leitmotiv* for Western strategic preparation—is fully consistent with a strategic force posture that is incredible as a threat because it would not be intelligently useable in practice. It is essential to recognize that the Western ideas on stability, and the relevant Soviet approach to the determination of the principles that should guide defense preparation and war planning, have deep cultural roots—they are not accidents of history.

For much of this essay, as the context makes clear, "stable deterrence theory" refers to the proposition that stability, in arms competition and in time of crisis, is maximized when both sides are unambiguously vulnerable at home, and when each side is confident that a large number of its strategic offensive weapons are invulnerable prior to launch and during mission execution.<sup>4</sup> This condition of mutual assured vulnerability has been identified for many years as a mutual assured destruction (or, pejoratively, MAD) posture. Western orthodox stability theory, even today, rests very heavily upon the assumption that mutual societal vulnerability is desirable. However, it has to be observed that a MAD posture, in principle, is compatible with a wide variety of strategic targeting plans.

By way of providing an initial point of doctrinal reference for this essay, in the view of this author the strategic balance would be stable were it to permit Western governments to enjoy not-implausible prospects of both defeating their enemy (on his own terms) *and* of ensuring Western political-social survival and recovery. This admittedly somewhat muscular definition, which closely parallels the known Soviet approach to defense planning with respect to the requirement for the defeat of the enemy, is already US policy,<sup>5</sup> and is not incompatible with the more familiar connotation of (arms race and crisis) stability. The bedrock of this definition is the proposition that forces which do not lend themselves to politically intelligent employment in war, are unlikely to suffice to deter—at least in those very rare moments when an adversary may be motivated to seek a military solution to his problem.<sup>6</sup> The costs of major war today are anticipated to be so high, and so many of the weapon systems on both sides lack realistic field tests,<sup>7</sup> that the definition's call for a war-survival capability would hardly be likely to encourage Western governments down the path of military adventure.

The thesis of this essay is that the West requires a concept of stability appropriate for the provision of the theoretical underpinning for the

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

determination of military requirements that should enable it to defend its vital interests. The stability theory dominant in the 1960s and 1970s at root was addressed to a relationship between two supposedly like-minded, and ultimately (after detente processes had done their work) like-intending adversary partners. At the beginning of the 1980s, although a sea change is evident in official US (and NATO) appreciation of Soviet habits and motives, the burden of obsolescent strategic theories of stability remains heavy.

### CONCEPTS AND CULTURE

There is much to recommend the working hypothesis that Soviet and American strategic concepts reflect the character and content of their divergent and distinctive "strategic cultures." Jack Snyder has defined strategic culture as

the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.<sup>9</sup>

The insertion of "nuclear" is too preclusive. John Erickson's recent writing on Soviet "style" stresses the all-arms pervasiveness of the Soviet way in war and military preparation.<sup>9</sup> Recognition, if not uncritical acceptance, of the strategic culture working hypothesis is important for the following reasons. First, it might help to explain how and why the concept of strategic stability took such firm root in the soil of the US defense and arms control community. Second, it should facilitate more accurate comprehension of Soviet deeds and words. Third, it should help US policymakers identify programs and doctrines which, while broadly compatible with American values, are adequately responsive to Soviet developments.

### The United States

The concept of strategic stability took firm root as an American strategic *desideratum* long before there was substantial testing in the field of the Soviet-American military competition or a directly relevant formal arms control process. American theoreticians reasoned that the multitier arms competition between East and West could be stabilized through cooperative management effected through tacit or formal bargaining. Moreover, the literature of the early and mid-1960s conveys the very clear message that the US defense community knew both what strategic stability was, and how its fortunes could be forwarded. A gifted Israeli commentator upon the US arms debate wrote in 1964 that

Stability has become a fundamental concept in nuclear strategy, and a magic formula. Strategic situations are measured by the degree of their stability. . . . Once a situation of stability has been achieved, the initiation of war by surprise no longer assures any gain or advantage. A situation is stable, therefore, when there is no temptation to force the issue; it is a situation of mutual neutralization in which both the householder and the burglar know that even if one slays the other, the latter will manage to retaliate posthumously.<sup>10</sup>

### PANEL 3

The US defense community, with very few exceptions, decided that a stable military balance (a) should mean a safer world, (b) should mean a safer world at less cost in resources expended upon defense than would be the case with an unstable military balance, (c) should be compatible with the support of US foreign policy interests (though it is unclear that very careful analysis was performed on this subject), and (d) should *eventually* find favor with the USSR both by reason of its technological inevitability, and by reason of its near-evident desirability. In a book which probably merits description as the fullest and most mature statement of 1960s-style stability (through mutual vulnerability) theory, Jerome Kahan wrote that

a mutual stability approach, in the broadest sense, rests on the premise that the United States is benefited if the Soviet Union maintains a strategic deterrent capability comparable in overall strength to our own; it is an acceptance of both the mutual assured destruction relationship and numerical parity.<sup>11</sup>

A little earlier Kahan had written that "if, then, the USSR's strategic doctrine is largely understandable and somewhat comparable to ours, it is possible to establish a relatively effective U.S. policy of mutual stability."<sup>12</sup>

Thus the United States seemed to know what it wanted, and to believe that what was good for the United States would come to be seen by the USSR as being good for the USSR also. A stable military balance, in American perspective, would be a balance wherein each side's military forces looked roughly comparable, and wherein neither side would believe that it could register a significant military advantage by striking first because neither side would be able to protect its domestic assets against retaliation. This set of stability elements derived initially, in good part from discouraging analyses of the future promise of damage-limiting strategies. Military-technological prediction—that future societal vulnerability will be a fact, not a matter of choice—was transformed into normative terms. Far from being a problem, mutual vulnerability was seen instead as an opportunity to establish more stable Soviet-American strategic relations. The Soviet Union might prefer to compete for "useful advantage" so long as that was believed to be attainable, but technology, surely, has a logic which the Soviets must and will respect. In a 1970 publication, Roman Kolkowicz expressed the then popular, and perhaps even plausible, view that

Soviet strategic doctrine and capabilities appear to have lagged behind those of the United States by about five years . . . modern defense technology determines to a large extent the kind of strategic doctrines and policies that will be adopted by the superpowers. Thus, technology seems to have a levelling effect which subsumes political, ideological and social differences in various political systems.<sup>13</sup>

The convergence of strategic ideas hoped for in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in reality meaning Soviet convergence with the American concept of a stable military balance, did not occur. By 1979-80 most American commentators on Soviet-American strategic policy issues accepted as a very probable fact the existence of a "conceptual gap" between Soviet and

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

American thinking on strategic issues which appeared to be enduring because each side's thought was rooted in what has come to be termed strategic culture.<sup>14</sup>

The important difference between 1980 and 1970 (or 1960) is that what was then plainly recognized as a possibility, that the Soviet Union would not wish to engage in genuinely "reciprocal measures for arms stabilization," has now taken on the plausible character of a fact. Indeed, a major question which should be posed is whether, or perhaps how, the United States can conduct serious arms control business with a Soviet Union which shows no evidence of endorsing a recognizable or attractive concept of strategic stability. Through the 1960s, and at least part of the 1970s, such a troublesome question could be, though should not have been, ignored or deferred. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when American arms control theory was being forged, uncooperative Soviet ideas and practices could plausibly be interpreted as reflections of a relatively backward technology, or of a policy/intellectual "lag." By the early 1970s, the SALT process appeared to carry promise for the cooperative management of strategic relations. It was appreciated both that the Soviet Union still had to catch up in some important military respects, and that program momentum reflecting pre-SALT I thinking and practices would take some time to be amended so as to be compatible with the new relationship.

Today, the US defense community has to grapple with the implications of the hypothesis that Soviet military ideas and activities are deeply rooted in local soil, and hence are very likely to endure; that the Soviet General Staff is extremely well acquainted with Western ideas on stability—Soviet military thinking is not crude and "uneducated;" and that there are no important apparent strains between the policy preferences of the Soviet military and the Soviet political leadership.<sup>15</sup>

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this very widespread, if somewhat belated, Western recognition of the strategic cultural distinctiveness of the USSR. The distinctiveness diminishes markedly, of course, as Robert Jervis has observed, if Soviet military thinking is compared with American professional military thinking.<sup>16</sup> The American military establishment prepares to fight and, if possible, to win wars, and from preference probably would support a military doctrine as traditional in its concerns as is that espoused by the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup> However similar the doctrinal preferences of Soviet and American soldiers, it is only in the Soviet Union that those preferences are fully expressed in postural terms.

Soviet thought on the military dimensions of statecraft, what loosely can be called "strategic theory," is distinguished by its rarity.<sup>18</sup> Soviet writings tend to focus upon efficient force preparation and implementation—generically *operational* matters—or upon grand-strategic, highly politicized topics. There are no functional Soviet equivalents to the Western theories of deterrence, limited war, and arms control, just as the key Western concepts spawned by, and in, those theories—stability, escalation control, bargaining, sufficiency/adequacy, and the rest—appear to play no identifiable role in guiding Soviet military planning.<sup>19</sup> In the half-light of the growing appreciation of the alien character of Soviet strategic culture, US policymakers have to reassess the relevance, and prudence, of the strategic ideas that have held intellectual and declaratory (policy, if not always war-planning) sway for the past 15 years.

### PANEL 3

Despite the accumulating evidence on Russian/Soviet strategic culture and the military-program momentum implications of that culture, Western commentators continue to deny, implicitly, that stability is a condition describing a military-political *relationship*. The vision of stability that pervades much of American theorizing about deterrence questions is essentially static and absolute in character. It tends to be bereft of the idea of competition. In this logic, the United States has a deterrence problem of finite physical dimensions. The complex military balance is stable if the Soviet urban-industrial target set is adequately covered and if the United States looks, and preferably is, resolute in its willingness to retaliate.

The question of what kind of damage a Soviet leadership would most likely judge to be unacceptable has been posed, and even answered, of recent years<sup>20</sup>—with conclusions that cast grave doubts on the merits of the society destruction bedrock of the theory which identifies stability with mutual vulnerability. But the covering of the urban-industrial target set still is accorded pride of place in official US stable deterrence prose.<sup>21</sup>

It may be the case that a theory oriented on the punishment of society can provide a robust basis for a stable military balance, even in the context of an adversary relationship with an alien Soviet strategic culture. It is possible that the Soviet military (and political) establishment is seeking the unattainable in its pursuit of a war-waging/war-winning capability, and that the United States would be ill-advised to compete very vigorously with military programs designed to improve war-waging performance. However, now that it is generally recognized that the Soviet military effort marches to the beat of a distinctly non-American drummer,<sup>22</sup> and as the Soviet military competitive position continues to improve across the board, there should be no serious resistance to consideration of the possibility that the consequences of mainstream Western stability theory may lead to under-recognized dangers.

The ideas that comprise the concept of a stable military balance reflect fairly faithfully the worldview, values, and pertinent education of those commentators, policymakers, and theorists who have articulated American strategic culture.<sup>23</sup> The United States is a satisfied Power, with a fundamentally defensive strategic mission as its international responsibility. From the time of the publication of *The Absolute Weapon* in 1946,<sup>24</sup> to the present day, American strategic theorists have tended to argue, explicitly or implicitly, that the development of nuclear weapons has imposed a "technological peace." The mainstream concept of stability speaks eloquently to the long-recognized US tendency to define conditions as problems to be solved. The existence of very large and diverse strategic nuclear arsenals *solves* the problem of possible premeditated war between nuclear-armed states, because the war initiator will know that he cannot deny the enemy the capability of destroying his society in retaliation. Moreover, this ability to destroy a society in a second strike can deter not only attacks on the US homeland, but also—with only a modest loss of credibility—attacks on at least some of the overseas vital interests of the United States.

The balance of terror is thus massively indelicate. As Soviet strategic capabilities improved relative to US capabilities over the decade 1965–75, so the United States sought to retain or restore the credibility of strategic

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

deterrence through the advertisement of more flexible targeting designs (the so-called Schlesinger doctrine).<sup>25</sup> However, it is important to note that 1970s-style strategic flexibility was, at root, an endeavor to retain the credibility of the ultimate sanction of the very large counter-society strike. What beliefs, attitudes, and perspectives are reflected in this simple theory?

First, it reflects a belief that nuclear war would mean the end of history. The assumed certainty of unrestrained escalation and mutual destruction leads easily to the conclusion that there can be no intelligent way of preparing for or waging nuclear war.<sup>26</sup>

Even if some stable balance theorists are prepared to admit that nuclear war could have quite a wide range of outcomes, they tend to reject the possible implication—that the United States should design a policy and posture so as to minimize the prospective damage in war. US political culture, unlike Soviet political culture, does not take an instrumental view of the value of the lives, and quality of life, of its citizens. But US foreign policy, in its potential need for military support, rests heavily on nuclear threat. However, no operational nuclear strategy is compatible with US societal values. An important reason why US strategic commentators have focused so heavily upon deterrence, as opposed to military operational questions, is that they have realized that US society is profoundly unwilling to contemplate, or debate coolly, the prospect of tens of millions of people being killed in a nuclear conflict.

For the better part of two decades, the United States has been highly dependent upon latent nuclear threat; but American society, and even the US defense community, has shown little inclination that it was willing to think beyond pre-war deterrence, let alone that it was willing to invest large resources in a capability to prevail in, survive, and recover from a nuclear war. Michael Howard was close to the mark when he wrote recently:

But such credibility [of nuclear response] depends not simply on a perceived balance, or imbalance, of weapons systems, but on perceptions of the nature of the society whose leaders are threatening such retaliation. People who are not prepared to make the effort necessary for operational defense are even less likely to support a decision to initiate a nuclear exchange from which they will themselves suffer almost inconceivable destruction, even if that decision is taken at the lowest possible level of nuclear escalation.<sup>27</sup>

Second, stable balance theory reflects a conviction that an enduring East-West political *modus vivendi* is possible—if only for the reason that nuclear arsenals mean that neither superpower dare intrude into regions well understood to be of vital interest to the other. The relationship between intense arms competition, and its associated first-strike alarms, and political tension remains ill understood; but a plateau of stable deterrence resting upon total societal vulnerability and sufficient weapon invulnerability, should—so the argument goes—calm many of the anxieties that the arms competition can foster.

The more reasonable supporters of SALT I tended to avoid asserting that the Soviet political leadership and General Staff had been educated into accepting American-style stable deterrence thinking. Instead, they

### PANEL 3

assumed that American strategic vigilance would deny the USSR any militarily meaningful future advantage, and that Soviet leaders would rein in their programs appropriately. In addition, it was assumed widely that the five-year "Interim Agreement" on strategic offensive arms would be superseded by a *permanent* treaty regime which would greatly assist stability through the survivability it would provide for offensive forces, and the predictability it would provide for defense planning.<sup>28</sup> Although stability could be enforced through expensive competitive effort, the case for attempting to encourage stability through negotiated joint management of the strategic balance had to be attractive.

In short, stable balance theory was believed to reflect inescapable technological truths;<sup>29</sup> those truths were to be codified, at least in part, via the SALT process; and the SALT process was to be both the centerpiece, and the beneficiary, of a multichannel and increasingly entangling detente venture.

Third, stable deterrence theory indicated, quantitatively, "how much is enough."<sup>30</sup> US strategic culture is problem-solving oriented. The US defense and arms control community has extreme difficulty accommodating the idea that it is condemned to an endless competition with the USSR. Stable deterrence plus "the parity principle" appeared to reduce the stress and strain of unwelcome and unfamiliar strategic thought to a fairly simple problem of efficient management.

Fourth, stable deterrence with its logical implication of a finite need for weapons, appeals to the Western belief that peacetime defense preparation has an almost wholly negative social impact. An insular strategic culture, such as that of the United States, tends generally to view the allocation of scarce resources for defense functions as being inherently wasteful. Those cultures support substantial armed forces in peacetime with the attitude that they constitute, at best, regrettable necessities. Major defense program initiatives often are taken belatedly and clearly reluctantly, and they have to be justified in very specific ways in terms of identifiable, or very plausible, threats.

Even on its own terms, it is legitimate to question the validity of mainstream US stable deterrence theory. For example: as Henry Kissinger has argued forcefully, in policy practice it constitutes "a revolution in NATO doctrine"<sup>31</sup> (which was not noticed, or was simply disregarded, by its proponents); it has nothing to say on the problem of self-deterrence (which is not a trivial deficiency, because it would likely be the United States which would be under the most pressure to lead an escalation process); and it is not responsive to the fact that deterrent calculations are not always relevant in the sequence of events that lead to war. However, leaving such reservations aside,<sup>32</sup> the most troublesome aspect of mainstream stable mutual deterrence theory is that it does not speak to Soviet reality.

#### **The Soviet Union**

Soviet thinking on the preferred character of the complex East-West military balance is easily identified as a product of the lessons perceived in Russian and Soviet history, the nature and rationale of the Soviet state, and what may best be termed strategic logic. The Soviet Union cannot endorse

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

a Western style concept of military stability. The legitimacy of CPSU rule in the Soviet imperium resides in its claim to be the sole authoritative interpreter of *the* scientifically correct theory of historical change—and the peoples and the physical resources of that imperium, allied to “progressive forces” everywhere, are the instruments for effecting that process of historical change. Save as a tactical ploy, the USSR cannot endorse a concept of stability in the relations between socialist and nonsocialist states. Richard Pipes almost certainly is correct when he argues that Marxism-Leninism became the state ideology in Russia because the grosser features of that ideology, and the practices which they legitimized, fitted so well a Russian national political character marked by cunning, brutality, and submissiveness.<sup>33</sup> Soviet military thinking today, on this argument, is influenced by, and expresses, a strategic culture that is, at root, Russian rather than Marxist-Leninist.<sup>34</sup> The important point is that obligatory Soviet ideology and Russian historical impulses both drive Soviet military thinking in the same direction.

The commitment to permanent struggle, the need for eternal vigilance, the militarized character of society, the fundamental distrust of independent power centers (domestic and foreign)—all are enduring features of Russian/Soviet strategic culture. “The revolution in military affairs,” as evidenced in Soviet military programs and as discussed in detail in the Penkovskiy “Special Collection,” was dramatically different from the revolution in strategic thinking caused by nuclear weapons in the West.

The Western nonoperational focus upon deterrence as opposed to defense is totally alien to Soviet strategic culture, and is indeed viewed as dangerous, irresponsible, and scientifically incorrect. Since 1956 the Soviet Union has rejected Lenin’s “inevitability of war” thesis, but has continued to believe that war is possible, that the difference in the range of outcomes could encompass the distance between victory and defeat, and that more military power cannot fail to pay political dividends.<sup>35</sup> The notion of having *enough* military power is alien to Soviet thought and appears to be contrary to the Soviet reading of their, and other states’, history.<sup>36</sup> Equivalence and parity are recognized by the Soviet Union as being the *necessary* basis for East-West security relations, but that *necessary* basis is not, and cannot be, accepted as being *sufficient*.

Quite aside from any ideological imperative, Soviet geopolitics—like Russian geopolitics in times past—is the story of near continuous struggle against actual or potential enemies who posed, or might pose, a threat to the (multi) national existence.<sup>37</sup> Russian and Soviet history teaches the lesson that “[t]hose who fall behind, get beaten.”<sup>38</sup> The Soviet Union is engaged in improving its security condition through attaining an increasing measure of control over its external environment. It does not much matter whether one seeks to explain this outward pressure in terms of ideology, strategic calculation, or the absence of imagination (more power is sought for the purpose of being more powerful, which cannot fail to be useful in a world where the USSR is surrounded by enemies).

Even if one attempts to discard cultural and geopolitical explanations, the detail of Soviet military activity drives one back to recognition of the deeper imperatives that have molded Soviet strategic culture.<sup>39</sup> As many

### PANEL 3

observers have recognized, there is enormous indecision within the Soviet military establishment. Much of that indecision *can* be explained in Western military-rational ways, but much of it reflects what amounts to a mindless momentum. That momentum flows from habitual practices of "safesiding" through minimal decisionmaking, of eschewing the taking of potentially dangerous initiatives, and generally focusing on doing that which one knows one can do—all in the context of a society that is near-obsessed with the fear of disruptive change and seeks to avoid risks.

Of course, innovation is possible in the Soviet Union, though that innovation generally has to be ordered and even organized from above. The Soviet military buildup and modernization programs of the past 15 years (in particular) thus speak to forces very deep within the character of the Soviet system. Some alarmed Western observers see clear evidence of the Soviet Union building more military power than it needs for defense (a totally alien formulation in Soviet perspective), and rejecting the Western concept of a stable military balance (as if that concept could possibly strike a genuinely responsive chord in Soviet breasts). However, it is probably more accurate to argue that what we see is the cumulative product of a bureaucratic-industrial system that finds it very difficult to change a course once set (not that there is any evidence suggesting any Soviet official desire to change military direction); and that this system is steadily providing the military means needed to express the Soviet vision of a desirable military relationship with potential enemies (i.e., preponderance).

Unless a thousand years of Russian history, and the strategic cultural attitudes which flow from that history, can be expunged from Soviet consciousness, there is no way in which the USSR is likely to join the United States in cooperative ventures in the management of a stable military balance. The Soviet commitment to compete for relative advantage (real or illusory) is so fundamental, and so rational in Soviet terms, that stability can only be enforced.

The implications of this strategic cultural theme could be very grim for Western security. The strategic concepts and attitudes of both sides are valid, on their own terms. However, the quality of a strategic concept pertains not to its intellectual elegance, but rather to its utility as a policy guide or reference in a context of dynamic competition with opponents who may, and in this case clearly do, hold to very different ideas.

By dint of fairly steady effort, and moved by an ethic of prudence that has expansive military requirement implications, the Soviet Union could come to believe that in East-West crises, it will be the United States that will back down. The ideas and military program details associated with the dominant Western concept of stability amount to a posture, military and civilian, that is not serious about the actual conduct of war. To itemize: the United States has a very limited hard-target counterforce and counter-control capability; it lacks survivable command, control, communications and intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) assets; it has no homeland defense; it has no real plans for timely industrial mobilization or for postwar recovery; it has no vision of how *all* parts of the military posture should cooperate in a global war; it has made only the most feeble preparation for strategic-force reconstitution; and it has no convincing story to tell *vis-a-vis* war aims and the political character of a postwar international order.<sup>40</sup>

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

All of the above criticisms are leveled in the context of a Soviet adversary that attempts to provide adequately in those areas.<sup>41</sup> The idea that some weapons and operating practices promote stability, and that other weapons and practices promote instability, is alien to Soviet strategic culture.<sup>42</sup> The Soviet Union has attended in great detail for many years to what, in Western perspective, might be called the unilateral crisis stability of its military posture (missile silos have been super-hardened, some missiles are truly mobile [SS-20s and stockpiled SS-16], political and military command and control facilities have been proliferated and super-hardened, and so on). Whether it is for reasons of political-cultural insensitivity, or cold military calculation, the Soviet Union seems either unwilling, or unable, to take a systemic approach to what Western analysts identify as stability problems. Judging by the evidence of Soviet deeds, and to employ Western terminology, it is stabilizing, in Soviet perspective, for Soviet strategic and combined arms forces to threaten successful surprise attacks against US strategic systems and NATO's posture in Europe.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, Soviet military thinkers see nothing unstable about a strategic context wherein Soviet society is afforded some useful measure of protection via civil defense and air defense, and American society has none.

There is a distinct possibility that a US Government, in the future, could believe the Soviet Union to be deterred by the assumed short fuse from provocative (Soviet) military action to nuclear holocaust—a belief that projects stable deterrence reasoning onto Soviet decisionmaking processes. At the same time, a Soviet Government could believe that it had a very good prospect of winning a war, and that the US Government should appreciate its weak political position and back down. In short, both sides might falsely project the perspective of their strategic culture onto the other—with very dangerous consequences.

## STABILITY DISSECTED

A focus upon mutual vulnerability-derived stability criteria encourages a defense community to think a strategically. A military posture that is truly innocent on classically defined crisis or arms race instability grounds is likely to be a military posture ill-suited to coercive diplomacy. US strategy is supposed to translate military posture into plans for the efficient and effective application of force in support of political goals. Stability is fully compatible with policy paralysis.

If one postulates stability at every level of potential conflict,<sup>44</sup> the problem disappears. However, unless the United States can enforce multilevel stability, a stability at the strategic nuclear level should mean that the United States could not, responsibly, exert strategic nuclear pressure in compensation for an unfolding theater defeat.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, the integrity of NATO's defense doctrine of flexible response requires that there be a measure of instability at the central war level—translated as a potential for US advantage.

The concept of stability is used in a wide variety of senses. Two uses in particular stand out as meriting individual analytic attention: arms race stability and crisis stability.

## PANEL 3

### Arms Race Stability

The idea of arms race stability holds that the basic engine of competition is the first strike fear encouraged by defense programs designed to threaten at least part of the opponent's ability to wreak massive societal damage in a second strike.<sup>46</sup> A stable arms competition, according to this reasoning, is one wherein neither side invests in programs that the other would view as a challenge to its assured destruction capability—and hence would be motivated to offset. This kind of logic was elaborated in some detail in the late 1960s. It was argued that the arms race was driven not so much by the reality of first strike danger, but rather by the fears that flowed from anticipation of such danger.<sup>47</sup>

The idea of "sympathetic parallelism" in armament programs was the logical corollary of the arms race "spiral" theory. It was argued that just as the superpowers could stimulate each other to build more and more capable weapons, so they should be able, through deliberate restraint, and perhaps explicit cooperative management, to remove much of the anxiety which drives reactive armament programs.

The concept of arms race stability happens to carry with it the stable deterrence ideas that incorporate the desideratum of mutual assured destruction capabilities. Such a linkage is not inevitable. Arms race stability could be held to obtain in a context where one side maintained a permanent, variably substantial lead, and was in a political, financial and industrial position to deter most arms race challenges. With some qualifications, this kind of arms race stability characterized Great Britain's naval relations with her actual and potential rivals from the 1840s until 1914.

Also, stability can obtain in a period when there is a rapid change in technological generations, and considerable unpredictability concerning the building programs of rivals, yet when a tolerable balance of military power is maintained—*albeit near-exclusively through competition*. Indeed, as Bernard Brodie observed in assessing the complex naval competition of the later decades of the 19th century, there are periods in strategic history wherein stability, by any reasonable definition, is best maintained through unconstrained competition.<sup>48</sup> Arms control processes are as likely to constrain the wrong (i.e., ultimately "stabilizing") as the right (i.e., ultimately "destabilizing") defense technologies—given human frailty in strategic prediction.

In its loosest, though most easily defensible, sense, arms race stability could be held to pertain to the pace and degree of rival postural change, regardless of the character of that change. An unusually rapid succession of deployed weapon generations, on both sides, would appear to many people to constitute an unstable situation. However, such rapid change may reflect a particularly fecund period of parallel defense research activity, rather than unusual hostility, and may be fully compatible with some important definitions of a stable situation. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to allow that rapid postural change would be very likely to breed fears abroad that militarily significant, if transitory, breakthroughs were a distinct possibility—breakthroughs which might facilitate or enable disarming first strikes to be planned with some confidence.

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

Probably the major problem attending the concept of arms race stability was that it rested upon an easily challengeable theory of arms race dynamics." Stability theory of 1960s vintage posited an abstract and very simple model of arms competition. The banner-carriers for arms race stability in the late 1960s leapt from abstract propositions to defense policy claims and arms control proposals (e.g., do not deploy BMD or MIRV because they will be destabilizing). The arms race and crisis instability claims deployed to challenge BMD and MIRV (and, later, the Mk 12A RV and MX, etc.) were, by and large, both interesting and internally consistent: but, were they true? And how might they be validated or invalidated? This argument applies, of course, to *all sides* in the ongoing US defense debate.

It is just possible that Soviet offensive force deployments in the 1970s would have been greater than actually was the case, had the United States proceeded with Safeguard or Site Defense BMD deployment in the absence of the ABM Treaty. However, in the presence of US BMD deployment, opponents of that deployment would very likely be attributing the pace and much of the character of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs to alleged Soviet BMD-offset motivations. The kind of Soviet offensive force deployments that should lack for a strong strategic rationale in the absence of US ballistic missile defense, assuming a mutual assured destruction framework to Soviet thinking, have occurred anyway.

On the basis of the often ambiguous and incomplete evidence available, the US defense and arms control community now should consider the proposition that Soviet arms programs are driven not by a determination to (over) compensate for American programs which could threaten Soviet maintenance of an adequate capability to destroy American society, but rather by some combination of a doctrinal imperative to improve Soviet war waging/war winning ability, and bureaucratic defense-industrial momentum. This proposition suggests that for many years our arms control surgeons may have diagnosed falsely (and hence sought to operate inappropriately upon) the causes of the arms race disease.

Many people who debate arms race stability/instability charges are really concerned lest continuous competitive military-technological innovation open temporary windows of opportunity for possible exploitation. "Gaps" may occur with respect to comparison of some elements in super-power postures, but they should not be of such a kind as to call into serious question the overall quality of deterrent effect purchased by the United States through its military investment.

Deterrence stability is compatible with a formidable rate of change in competing postures. For example, the charge that the MX missile will be destabilizing is sustainable only if one equates arms race instability with a large change in posture which may provide a substantial incentive for postural change on the Soviet side. A crisis instability charge is fragile in that the very survivability of the MX system should remove the Soviet incentive to go first in a "use them or lose them" spirit.

### **Crisis Stability**

The concept of crisis stability refers to a strategic condition wherein the very character, readiness, and mobilization procedures of armed forces

### PANEL 3

in confrontation should not themselves comprise the proximate cause of war. Very often, crisis stability/instability is deemed to inhere in particular kinds of weapons. However, as Thomas Schelling has argued persuasively, to focus on weapons technology is to miss a good part of the potential problem:

To impute this influence [of weapons on the likelihood of the outbreak of war] to "weaponry" is to focus too narrowly on technology. It is weapons, organizations, plans, geography, communications, warning systems, intelligence, and even beliefs and doctrines about the conduct of war that together have this influence. The point is that this complex of military factors is not neutral in the process by which war may come about.<sup>50</sup>

Particularly valuable is the distinction Schelling draws between the static and dynamic dimensions of (crisis) stability.

The static dimension reflects the expected outcome, at any given moment, if either side launches war. The dynamic dimension reflects what happens to that calculation if either side or both sides should *move* in the direction of war, by alert, mobilization, demonstration, and other actions that unfold over time." (Emphasis in the original)

It is not difficult to slip into self-congratulation concerning the stability that appears to have obtained with respect both to the military standoff in Europe, and to the central nuclear relationship. However, the stability of those balances is not tested day by day, nor even by the kinds of crises registered over Berlin, Hungary, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia. In none of those cases is it very plausible to argue that either the Soviet Union or NATO was strongly motivated to launch a theater or general war. The real road-test for crisis stability would be that one occasion in 40 or 50 years when nearly everything appeared to be at stake and one or both leadership groups could not see any non-military solutions to its, or their, problems.

A force posture and strategic doctrine good enough for one crisis may not be good enough for another. Those who are inclined to believe that US and NATO forces are broadly resilient to crisis stress should ask themselves what it might take to dissuade a very desperate Soviet leadership.

Robert Jervis, quite rightly, has argued that rival schools of thought over the requirements of deterrence differ over how much deterring it is prudent to assume that the Soviet Union might need.

Thus there is a disagreement over "how much credibility is enough": two policy analysts therefore might agree on how likely the Russians thought it was that a limited war would escalate and disagree over whether they could be deterred.<sup>51</sup>

If taken to its logical extreme, the more pessimistic argument might lead to the conclusion that, at some point in the future, the Soviet Union

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

might be so desperate as to be "beyond deterrence"—meaning, again logically, that considerations of crisis stability, however rigorous, would be irrelevant. The only question remaining would be "how well would the West fare in the war?" Different analysts may agree on the general characteristics of a crisis-stable military balance, and even on the character of Soviet strategic culture, yet they may disagree on whether particular US military postures are sufficiently crisis-stable. The reason for the disagreement lurks in the different range of political crisis that each is willing to consider as relevant to the sizing and nature of the US defense effort. Some interpretations of the military implications of the concept of crisis stability bear the potentially dangerous hallmark of a managerial, as opposed to a strategic, perspective upon security issues. Crisis stability is fully compatible with a US strategic force posture which could take the initiative, compete for escalation dominance, and—if need be—fight the war through to a military decision. However, crisis stability very often is considered narrowly in the context either of a rigid application of mutual assured destruction reasoning or, beyond that in sophistication, in the minor addendum of flexible targeting. Typically, any capability that threatens Soviet strategic forces, pre-launch, or during mission execution, is held to be an affront to crisis stability. Crisis stability, properly understood, does not lend its conceptual authority to such judgments. By reason of extended deterrence duties, the United States cannot afford a quality of crisis stability which precludes first use of strategic nuclear weapons. As Nicholas Spykman has written, "There is no possibility of action if one's strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used."<sup>53</sup> Jerome Kahan has written that "In order to establish a mutual stability policy, it is necessary to classify strategic systems as either stabilizing or destabilizing and to avoid the latter."<sup>54</sup>

Following classical mutual vulnerability theory, Kahan claims that weapons threatening to the (countervalue) mission performance of strategic offensive forces are destabilizing, "since they can directly negate an opponent's deterrent capability."<sup>55</sup> Examples of "stabilizing" weapons include SLBMs, MRVs or inaccurate MIRVs, long-range cruise missiles, manned bombers, and missile site (or bomber base) BMD. "Destabilizing" weapons include accurate MIRVs, strategic ASW systems, area BMD and area air defense.

This simple classification is only as useful as are its doctrinal premises. If, for example, the Soviet Union does not equate the quality of its deterrent with its ability to devastate urban-industrial America, then defense of the urban-industrial US homeland would not threaten the Soviet deterrent. Moreover, one could argue, as noted above, that overall stability in the East-West military-political relationship requires that the United States be able to initiate strategic nuclear use in defense of forward-located allies—and that such central war initiation, no matter how selective, cannot be credible in the event, unless a US President were confident that damage to the US homeland physically could be limited severely.

Given the Soviet traditional military approach to nuclear war planning, strategies and tactics which in the West tend to be judged as destabilizing

### PANEL 3

almost certainly have no such implications in Soviet thinking. Soviet political and military thinkers would be most unlikely, for example, to view programs intended to provide active and passive defense of the American homeland as signalling anything other than common sense.<sup>36</sup> To the extent that those programs threatened the success of Soviet plans for the military conduct of the war, they would be candidates for some Soviet response. However, the mechanistic *ying-yang* envisaged in some simple-minded defense-offense, action-reaction theories of the arms race, is the stuff of the American seminar room, not of the real world of Soviet defense decisionmaking.

The small strategic theory community has paid very little attention to the place, let alone the details, of C<sup>3</sup>I. Like peace and security, everyone, from every school of thought, was *for* good C<sup>3</sup>I. Understandably, it would be difficult to generate a debate over the issue, "does the United States require high quality C<sup>3</sup>I?" Noncontroversial subjects tend to escape attention. John Steinbruner has argued that

The most severe problems with the concept of stability result from the fact that its technical definition has not included a critical dimension of strategic capability: namely, the physical and organizational arrangements for exercising deliberate command of strategic forces.<sup>37</sup>

As Steinbruner proceeds to argue, when the concept of stability is expanded so as to accommodate C<sup>3</sup>I desiderata, the preferred force structure (given classic stability themes) might alter markedly. For example: "The submarine-based strategic force which is clearly the most stable under the conventional definition is just as clearly the worst in terms of command stability."<sup>38</sup>

Those theorists who believe that deterrence is a function of mutual societal vulnerability should be concerned lest command instability either results in unintended armed conflict, or in essentially uncontrolled escalation in the course of a war. Those theorists who believe that deterrence flows from the promise of proficient military conduct, should be concerned lest command instability denies the US armed forces the ability to wage war in a militarily intelligent fashion.

It is almost certainly the case that a good fraction of the strategic debate of recent years has rested upon quite unrealistic assumptions concerning the quality and survivability of US (and NATO) C<sup>3</sup>I assets. There was much weaving of interesting strategic targeting tapestries in the 1970s, but this author suspects that most of the targeting schemes which envisaged the protracted, progressive, unfolding of a deliberate design of destruction (for carefully calculated military and political effect), failed to take adequate note of likely, or possible, command instability phenomena (US *and* Soviet).

There is ample evidence suggesting that classic stability theory, which encourages the belief that nuclear war would be the end of history, promotes a relaxed climate concerning the many details of actually managing a central war campaign. A dominant belief that nuclear forces have failed if they are ever used, is hardly likely to energize officials to think very

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

realistically about command stability problems in a nuclear war environment. Steinbruner's persuasive advocacy of the need to place command stability at the center of nuclear (*et al.*) planning concerns, fails to recognize that the relative neglect of command stability issues flows in good part from the widespread acceptance of a classic stability theory (based on the assumption of the desirability of mutual societal vulnerability) of which he approves.

### STABILITY AND US STRATEGY

John Newhouse, the privileged chronicler of the National Security Council perspective upon the SALT 1 negotiations, asserted that stability was "a truly divine goal."<sup>59</sup> Today, it is apparent that the theories of arms race and crisis stability which permeated the US approach to SALT 1 were either wrong or misleading. At a general conceptual level, arms race and crisis stability are, of course unexceptionable. No one favors frenetic arms race activity per se, or military postures which could themselves precipitate war: so much is well-nigh axiomatic. Where the mainstream of US strategic theorizing erred was in tying the multifold *concept* of stability to a particular theory of deterrence that did not match the burgeoning evidence. That theory of deterrence held that each superpower had an assured destruction (countervalue) requirement vis-a-vis the other, and that an enduring stable deterrence relationship could be constructed only on such a basis.

This theory of arms race stability was wrong—it could not explain the course of the strategic arms competition in the 1970s (under the aegis of SALT I, or in the shadow of SALT II). Whatever mix of motives and institutional forces drove Soviet weapon procurement, a *leitmotiv* of sufficiency resting upon the idea of assured destruction (let alone *mutual assured destruction*) clearly was not prominent among them. It is a matter of unambiguous historical record that the Soviet Union, since 1972, has worked hard to undermine whatever degree of strategic stability (based on mutual societal vulnerability) there may have been at that time. In their ICBM, air defense, BMD (in research and development), ASW, and civil defense programs, the Soviets have been providing persuasive evidence that their systemic view of the arms competition is dramatically different from the view adhered to by succeeding US administrations. They have sought, and are continuing to seek, "useful advantage" through whatever degree of preponderance the United States permits.<sup>60</sup>

The "classical" theory of crisis stability may or may not be correct; fortunately the 1970s have not provided a field test. However, the Soviet perspective on strategic matters suggests that the explanatory power of the theory may be poor. Richard Burt expressed this skepticism when he wrote that

Central strategic war, according to Soviet literature, is not likely to stem from mechanistic instabilities within the superpower military relationship, but rather from real and enduring differences between competing political systems and national interests.<sup>61</sup>

In principle, certainly, it is sensible to argue that it would be undesirable for the superpowers to deploy forces which lend themselves to

### PANEL 3

first-strike destruction. However, it is no less sensible to argue that "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack",<sup>62</sup> as the principal proximate cause of war, merits probable identification as a US "mechanistic" fantasy. This is not to endorse a total indifference to Burt's "mechanistic instabilities", but it is to suggest that the traditional theory of crisis stability—on the basis of which particular weapons and doctrines are praised or vilified—needs considerable amendment for two reasons: (1) it overemphasizes the probable role of "mechanistic instabilities" in an acute East-West crisis, while taking a wholly apolitical approach to an inherently political phenomenon; and (2), it is inimical to the extended deterrence requirement that the United States be capable and willing to take the strategic initiative.

Many of the elements of a new theory of strategic stability already have been expressed in official prose and action over the past 5 years. However, the theoretical revolution remains incomplete. What is missing, above all else, is both a recognition of the pervasiveness and longevity of competition, and a positive approach to the functions of strategic nuclear forces. On this last point, for example, Harold Brown treats both arms race and crisis stability in negative terms. In the former case the United States must ensure "that the balance is not capable of being overturned by a sudden Soviet technological breakthrough . . ."; in the latter case, the United States must ensure that neither it nor the Soviet Union would feel itself under pressure to initiate an exchange in a crisis.<sup>63</sup>

Dr. Brown's concerns are appropriate, but they do not approach the heart of what stable deterrent ideas should indicate vis-a-vis US force planning. An adequate concept of stability has to be anchored in a prospectively effective theory of deterrence at the highest levels of violence. Crisis stability should be approached in terms of the calculations of probable war-waging prowess made by the several parties involved. Concern about mechanistic, or technical, crisis (in)stability would be policy-appropriate only in a condition of such intense antipathy that overall central war campaign analyses would dominate decision processes. The Soviet Union, as a prediction, would not "go to war" because a large fraction of its ICBM force was theoretically vulnerable to a US first strike<sup>64</sup> any more than would the United States. Crisis stability, if possible, would flow from a Soviet belief that any escalation of the military conflict would produce negative military and ultimately political returns. The US Department of Defense acknowledges this logic,<sup>65</sup> but it does not recognize that the United States is most unlikely to be able to enforce stability if damage to the US homeland cannot be limited severely.<sup>66</sup>

Strategic stability should not be equated with strategic stalemate. The United States cannot afford a master strategic concept which implies thorough-going *mutual* US-Soviet strategic deterrence.<sup>67</sup> If strategic stability is to retain its preeminence as a US policy goal, it should be redefined for compatibility with the extended-deterrent duties that the geopolitics of the Western Alliance place upon the US strategic force posture. A stable strategic balance, in US/NATO perspective, is one which would permit the United States to

—initiate central strategic nuclear employment in expectation of gain (this is a requirement of NATO strategy).

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

- seize and hold a position of "escalation dominance."
- deter Soviet escalation, or counter-escalation, both by reason of the potent threat posed to the most vital assets of the Soviet state, and by reason of the ability of the United States to limit damage to itself.<sup>68</sup>

A Soviet Union, confronting a United States that had military and civilian programs appropriately supportive of the above objectives, would have very little incentive either to effect a military "breakout" from a regional crisis, or to engage very persistently in a competition in risk-taking at very high levels of violence. Crisis stability would be enforced through the Soviet perception of the United States as a very tough wartime adversary indeed. It might be objected that a US President should not be trusted with the capabilities suggested above.<sup>69</sup> However, even if such a concern is valid (which is extremely dubious), it must be weighed against the greater danger of a President not having recourse to such capabilities. The concept of strategic stability envisaged here is the only one which speaks persuasively to Soviet strategic culture, and it is intended—of necessity—only to *minimize* that self-deterrence element which is the most crippling deficiency in existing US official strategic thought. Self-deterrence cannot be removed altogether because the United States would know that even under the aegis of a stable military balance, as defined here, several tens of millions of American casualties would most likely result from central war. Nonetheless, the United States would have a guiding concept from which military requirements could be derived in support of militarily and politically intelligent strategic targeting plans. This concept relates robustness in crisis regimes to anticipation of success or defeat in war and to a judiciously competitive program of peacetime armament.

As stated earlier, the identifiable Soviet approach to arms competition is the steady acquisition of a more and more formidable war-fighting/war-survival capability. It is highly improbable that the Soviet Union can be dissuaded from pursuing this approach.<sup>70</sup> The evidence of the 1970s suggests that although, in principle, stability might be encouraged through negotiated SALT restraints—whereby both sides agree to forego those capabilities which the mutual vulnerability theory of stability holds to be undesirable—it is far more likely that stability has to be enforced through competition. It is virtually self-evident that Soviet strategic culture precludes the negotiation route to enhanced stability, save in the context of a very vigorous US strategic effort. Moreover, there is growing agreement within the Western defense community to the effect that stability cannot rest intelligently upon the threat of massive societal destruction (save, possibly, as an ultimate threat). Such damage is unacceptable to the United States, while it may be insufficiently unacceptable to Soviet politicians. If the US concept of a stable military balance *in extremis* makes more or less formal reference to the assured destruction threat—then the United States has a deterrence theory which probably is fundamentally unsound. The "ultimate threat" posed by the United States would be incredible because it would *never* be in the US interest actually to implement it. Execution of such a threat would be the negation of strategy; in and of itself it would solve no military or political problems, while it would near-guarantee a Soviet retaliation that would preclude US recovery from war.

### PANEL 3

The strategic nuclear targeting review of the late 1970s has prepared the way for serious discussion of the concept of stability suggested in this essay.<sup>71</sup> The US Government recognizes that: Soviet military *and political* assets should be the primary focus for US strategic offensive attention;<sup>72</sup> that "limited nuclear options" have little promise unless the United States has a good theory of escalation dominance (and the forces to match); and that Soviet economic "recovery" targets are both difficult to identify and are probably of relatively little interest. However, Washington does not yet recognize that crisis and intra-war stability cannot rest upon intelligent strategic *offensive* planning alone. The US SIOP (single integrated operational plan) can have integrity only in the context of active and passive defense. Fortunately, there is good reason to believe that the technology of air and missile defense for the late 1980s and beyond,<sup>73</sup> with substantial civil defense assistance, could restore a much more even relationship between offense and defense, and a useful meaning to the concept of stability.

### ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE

Essential equivalence, like beauty, exists in the eye of the beholder. This author believes that Soviet and American strategic nuclear capabilities and associated programs (for example civil defense) are not—considered for net effectiveness—equivalent, essentially or otherwise, today, and that they will be even less so, to the US disadvantage, through most of the 1980s. Essential equivalence, like its close slogan relatives of "sufficiency" and "equal security," defies precise definition—indeed it derives much of its expository utility from its "essential" vagueness. If one believes that deterrent effect *really* flows from anticipation of the loss of a number of large cities, then two strategic forces could be considered essentially equivalent even if they were grossly disparate in size and sophistication—always provided a minimum second-strike capability was retained. Harold Brown, although endorsing far more than a minimum countervalue strike-back capability, nonetheless has encouraged the view that deterrence may be a simpler matter than often is alleged. On the one hand the Secretary asserts that

we must respond to the perceived differences that follow from a world of strategic parity—and must certainly avoid parity turning into inferiority . . . .<sup>74</sup>

While, on the other, he proceeds to maintain that

it is simply a myth that from the standpoint of responsible policymakers the United States has suffered a major loss of leverage because of the Soviet nuclear buildup. It is equally untrue that the supposed loss of US nuclear superiority makes us any less willing to act than in those days when the Soviets threatened our allies in Europe over Suez, made life exceedingly difficult over Berlin, or deployed missiles in Cuba. If a golden age of American nuclear superiority ever existed, sober decisionmakers, starting with President Eisenhower never thought so at the time.<sup>75</sup>

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

This is strange logic and curious history. First, Dr. Brown states that the United States must not become strategically inferior, but then he proceeds to argue directly that superiority held little value for the United States, and indirectly that even inferiority does not much matter—witness Soviet boldness during the alleged "golden age of American nuclear superiority." With respect to Dr. Brown's history, Soviet nuclear threats to Britain and France over Suez were not taken seriously at the time, while US policy succeeded regarding Berlin and Cuba.

It is a matter of history that Soviet foreign policy under Khrushchev comprised a long string of failures.<sup>76</sup> Under Brezhnev in the middle and late 1970s, by way of contrast, Soviet intervention has registered unambiguous success; Angola, Ethiopia, and an on-going exercise in Afghanistan which, whatever its wisdom in Soviet perspective, the United States proved totally unable to deter or to thwart. In addition, it is spurious logic to argue the uselessness of strategic superiority by reference to past Soviet activities. We have not yet endured a prolonged period of Soviet strategic superiority for proper assessment, and we do not know whether or not the Soviets would have been *even more* bold during the 1960s had the United States not possessed superiority. More recent Soviet behavior may give a clue to the character of approaching years of Soviet superiority.

It is very difficult indeed to assess the importance of the strategic nuclear equation in what the Soviets term the overall "correlation of forces." The success of Soviet intervention policy of recent years can be traced as much, if not more, to the cumulatively dramatic improvements in the Soviet ability to project military power far beyond their traditional spheres of influence (into Africa for example), or to the recent absence of high-quality leadership in foreign affairs in the United States, as it can to the shifting balance in strategic forces.<sup>77</sup> Nonetheless, a drastic (over the early 1960s) improvement in the strategic balance was a *sine qua non* for a more forward Soviet foreign policy. Given the unpredictability of events, the unknown and incalculable risks, strategic forces provide distant cover, protecting an adventurous foreign policy from adversary escalation.

By way of contrast to Secretary Brown's analysis, one could argue that a superpower crisis in the late 1950s might have led to a central war that the Soviet Union could not have survived, as a state; while a crisis in the early 1980s might lead to a central war which the Soviet Union would have a more than modest prospect of both surviving as a state and even "winning" in a meaningful (in Soviet terms) sense. We will not know whether Secretary Brown's beliefs in the existence of essential equivalence, and the unattainability of meaningful superiority, are valid, until the United States insists that the Soviet Union stop some particular activity and the Soviet Union declines to accede.

Essential equivalence, at a high level of abstraction, is sensible beyond dispute. For example, Harold Brown has said that "By essential equivalence, I mean a condition such that any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by other U.S. advantages."<sup>78</sup>

Stated thus tersely, Dr. Brown's definition is compatible with the new concept of stability identified as desirable in this essay—though this author would prefer that the definition read "are (more than) offset by . . ."

### PANEL 3

In point of fact, essential equivalence has been interpreted by its official sponsors, and more generally, as meaning the same as "rough parity—it has not carried the connotation of an *essential* equivalence weighted favorably to reflect the uniquely burdensome extended deterrent duties placed upon US strategic forces (i.e., it is a genuinely even balance that is referred to—by way of contrast to the Soviet concept of "equal security," which embraces the proposition that, because it is surrounded by potential enemies, the Soviet Union has to be more than equal to the United States in armaments).

This essay, with its focus upon the conceptual basis of US strategy, will not pursue the issue of whether or not the United States does currently, and is likely in the future to, enjoy the blessings of an essential equivalence—interpreted as rough parity—in strategic armaments. Instead, it is the duty of this essay to pose the question whether the concept of essential equivalence, with its obvious implications concerning the desirability of parity, is appropriate to the United States.

Unlike the authors of many editions of the annual defense posture statement,<sup>79</sup> this author is not much disturbed by the thought that the strategic illiterati will misinterpret American slippage in the static indicators of strategic prowess as constituting clear and present evidence of the dawn of the Soviet Century.

Without denying that appearances, reflected in the cruder static indices of relative capability, can matter—the major thrust of those who have argued that perceptions of strategic nuclear (and theater force) imbalance, real or imaginary, should have a political impact, was to the effect that the disadvantageous trends in some of the more visible, or static, indices had real military significance. Perceptions of American and Soviet will and capability flow largely from cultural stereotyping (what kind of a country, performing what kind of roles, is the United States?)—and from fine-tuned assessment resting upon observation of American and Soviet deeds and absence of deeds. The quality and quantity of US and Soviet actions, reflecting, to some indeterminate degree, US and Soviet perceptions of their own relative military standing, is the raw material of foreign perception of who is ahead, or the trend in Soviet-American political-military competition.

For understandable reasons, some US commentators appeared to believe that the debate over the foreign policy implications of (alleged) military imbalance was a debate over military "appearances" only.<sup>80</sup> Since classic stability theory, with its identification of sufficiency in the region of the elbow of the equivalent megatonnage to casualties/economic damage curve, was antagonistic, or antipathetic, to the idea that political points could be scored through the US competing militarily (and by MAD definition) meaningless ranges of values on static indices, adherents to that theory naturally focused upon the "appearances" dimension of the debate. Those who argue that comparison of Soviet and American competitive performance on the static indices was important had a severe problem of evidence.

It is sensible to insist that the United States should not sign arms control agreements which prohibit US pursuit of Soviet advantages (as under

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

the "launcher" and "heavy missile" ceilings of SALT I, and the "heavy missile" carryover to SALT II), while the Soviet Union is able, legally, to pursue US advantages (as in missile accuracy, payload fractionation, and reliability). Nevertheless, this author would not endorse the argument that militarily meaningless numerical advantages must, or even are very likely to, have a destabilizing effect in the realm of perception. Those "static indicators," so heavily maligned by classical stability theory adherents, happen to have major capability implications. Equivalent megatonnage, for example, can be related directly and graphically to anticipated population loss;<sup>41</sup> while missile throw-weight is relevant to the issues of fractionation, war-head yield, and decoy deployment (vis-a-vis BMD). The "static indicators," which many commentators in the mid-1970s assessed purely in a political context, have major potential military operational meaning. For the most obvious of contemporary examples, they speak directly to the Soviet prospect for being able to saturate the baseline, deceptively based MX deployment.

The debate over the political meaning of a perceived military imbalance should not focus upon the arguable merits of forces developed solely for the purpose of ensuring a perceptual symmetry with those of the Soviet Union. The US defense community has never really understood the issue of the political meaning of perceived military imbalance: to repeat, the important issue is not one of appearances, save in very minor key. Very little should be paid for appearances per se. The perception that matters most is the Soviet, and that perception is colored by a war-fighting/war-winning perspective. To impress Soviet observers, the United States needs to invest in the kind of military muscle and societal protection which could yield war-waging advantage or enforced denial of war-waging success.

In 1978, Harold Brown claimed that

Essential equivalence, as defined here [see above], serves four major purposes. It helps to ensure that political perceptions are in accord with the military realities, and it minimizes the probability that opposing strategic forces will be used to seek any diplomatic advantage over us. It reduces the chance that one side or the other will become vulnerable to charges of a bomber or missile gap and contributes thereby to strategic stability. It enhances stability in a crisis by reducing the incentives for either side to strike first or preempt. And it sets a major objective for current and future SALT negotiations. The Soviets have insisted strongly on being treated as equals.<sup>42</sup>

This is a very instructive summary of official thinking. Prominent among a host of questionable items, it embraces very fragile theories of arms race and crisis stability. The politics of "gap prediction" (as the engine of arms competition) appear to be almost wholly a Western democratic phenomenon, while—as observed above—the "mechanistic instabilities" of crisis, although well worth avoiding if feasible, are almost certainly far less dangerous, or "destabilizing", than Dr. Brown implies. Also, it is interesting that Dr. Brown sees essential equivalence as providing conceptual guidance for military requirements so as to ensure that no "diplomatic

### PANEL 3

advantage" will be sought "over us." What Dr. Brown did not recognize was that the Soviet Union was then, in 1978, in the process of acquiring a marginal degree of strategic nuclear superiority, *in addition* to its already clear superiority in conventional forces, its very newly acquired superiority in theater-nuclear strike system, and distant power projection capabilities that could not easily be understood in terms of vital Soviet interests.

In short, even more than in the past, one could conceive of not-implausible circumstances wherein the United States might need desperately to be able to employ, or threaten to employ, its strategic forces for diplomatic advantage—to restore deterrence, for a minimal idea. Essential equivalence, with the emphasis on equivalence rather than "essential," is unlikely to be able to accommodate the support of US foreign policy interests, *in extremis*, in the context of serious measures of Western military inferiority at lower levels of conflict. Equivalence in strategic forces should mean a stalemate which could work to the US (and US-allied) disadvantage in the event of an evolving Soviet theater victory in Western Europe or Southwest Asia/the Persian Gulf region.

*Essential* equivalence, in US perspective, should be defined so as to embrace the requirement for the United States to be able to seize and hold the strategic employment initiative: such a redefinition, as stressed throughout this essay, should include the making of serious provision for the defense of North America. If this is not done, a US President will likely discover, in a period of acute crisis, that self-deterrence is a more potent phenomenon than is his determination to raise the cost of conflict to an adversary.

### ENDNOTES: STRATEGIC STABILITY RECONSIDERED

1. "National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (September 1978): 413.
2. For example, see Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). "It is not the 'balance'—the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation—that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the *stability* of the balance. The balance is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy the other's ability to strike back." p. 232.
3. Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom, Helm, 1979), p. 14.
4. "Hostages must remain unambiguously vulnerable and retaliatory forces must remain unambiguously invulnerable." Ian Smart, *Advanced Strategic Missiles: A Short Guide*, *Adelphi Papers* No. 63 (London: IISS, December 1969), p. 28.
5. See Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal year 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 29, 1980), pp. 65,67.
6. See Colin S. Gray and Keith B. Payne, "Victory Is Possible," *Foreign Policy* 39 (Summer 1980): 14-27.
7. See Stanley Sienkiewicz, "Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic Analysis," *World Politics* 30 (October): 90-110.
8. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, September 1977), p. 8.
9. "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style,'" in Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger, eds., *Soviet Military Power and Performance* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1979), p. 18-43.

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

10. Y. Harkabi, *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace* (Jerusalem: Israeli Program for Scientific Translations, 1966), p. 48.
11. *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), p. 272.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
13. Kolkowicz et al., *The Soviet Union and Arms Control—A Superpower Dilemma* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 35-57.
14. See Fritz Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," *International Security* 3 (Fall 1978): 138-55.
15. See William E. Odom, "Who Controls Whom In Moscow," *Foreign Policy* 19 (Summer 1975): 109-23.
16. "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly*, 94 (Winter 1979-80): 630.
17. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," *International Security* 4 (Fall 1979): 22-39.
18. An excellent presentation of this important point is Robert Legvold, "Strategic 'Doctrine' and SALT: Soviet and American Views," *Survival*, 21 (January/February 1979): 8-13.
19. See Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," *passim*.
20. The unclassified literature on US nuclear targeting policy is almost pathetically thin. Recent contributions by this author include "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory," *International Security* 4 (Summer 1979): 54-87, and "Targeting Problems for Central War," *Naval War College Review* 33 (January-February 1980): 3-21. For a very different but useful perspective, see William H. Kincaid, "A Strategy for All Seasons: Targeting Doctrine and Strategic Arms Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 34 (May 1978): 14-20.  
(Editor's Note: The author presented this paper previous to public disclosure of Presidential Directive 59. This directive formalized an ongoing review of us nuclear targeting policy, shifting the priority from Soviet cities to military installations. See Richard Burt, "Carter To Back Plan for Limiting Any Nuclear War," *New York Times*, 8 August 1980, p. A1; and Burt, "Brown Says ICBM's May Be Vulnerable to the Russians Now," *New York Times*, 21 August 1980, p. A1.)
21. See Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981*, p. 65.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-3.
23. See Booth: *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*; and "American Strategy: The Myths Revisited," in Booth and Moorhead Wright, eds., *American Thinking About Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 1-35. Also useful is Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race* (New York: Praeger, 1972).
24. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946).
25. See Henry S. Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine," in *Commission on the Organization for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, Vol. 4, Appendix K (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 219-34.
26. Sigal, "Rethinking The Unthinkable," *Foreign Policy* 34 (Spring 1979): 39.
27. "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Summer 1979): 983.
28. Notwithstanding the retrospective wisdom which claims, with strict accuracy, that [t]hey [SALT I and SALT II] did not create the problem of Minuteman survivability and cannot be expected to cure it . . ." (Secretary Brown in US, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The SALT II Treaty, Hearings*, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979 p. 159), the historical record shows quite unambiguously that SALT I was advertised, officially, in 1972, as imposing important constraints on Soviet "light" missile programs. "The SS-19 problem," as it is known, entailed some mix of US official incompetence, dishonesty, and cowardice. See David S. Sullivan, *Soviet SALT Deception* (Boston: The Coalition for Peace Through Strength, 1979), pp. 1-3.
29. See Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, "The Mutual Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia," *Foreign Affairs* 52 (October 1973): 109-18.
30. See Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), Chapters 5-6.
31. "Kissinger Looks at Future of NATO," *Congressional Record*, September 6, 1979, p. E4292.

### PANEL 3

32. These ideas are developed in Gray and Payne, "Victory is Possible."
33. Richard Pipes, "A Reply," to Wladislaw G. Krasnow, "Anti-Soviet or Anti-Russian?," *Encounter* 54 (April 1980): 67-72. Pipes' reply is on pp. 72-75.
34. See Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* 64 (July 1977): 21-34.
35. See Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence;" and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoobar, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979). For a usefully skeptical view, see Karl F. Spielmann, *The Political Utility of Strategic Superiority: A Preliminary Investigation into the Soviet View*, IDA Paper P-1349 (Arlington, VA.: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 1979). Still more skeptical is Robert L. Arnett, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Can Win?" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 2 (September 1979): 172-91.
36. The author is attracted to the merit of the following judgment offered by Benjamin Lambeth: "It would probably not be overly facetious to suggest that for Soviet military planners, the favored measure of strategic sufficiency is the notion that 'too much is not enough.'" *How To Think About Soviet Military Doctrine*, P-5939 (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, February 1978), p. 7.
37. See Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York: Scribner's 1974), Chapter 1; and Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Crane, Russak [for the National Strategy Information Center], 1977), Chapter 3.
38. Stalin (speech in 1931), quoted in Arthur J. Alexander, *Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, Adelphi Papers Nos. 147-148 (London: IISS, Winter 1978/9), p. 2.
39. *Ibid.*, *passim*. Also see Karl F. Spielmann, *Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978).
40. These allegations are presented and defended in detail in Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory;" and Gray and Payne, "Victory Is Possible."
41. See Douglas and Hoerber, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War*.
42. See Johan J. Holst, "Strategic Arms Control and Stability: A Retrospective Look," in Holst and William Schneider, Jr., eds, *Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy* (New York: Pergamon, 1969), Chapter 12.
43. Such capabilities discourage adventure on the part of the imperialists.
44. On "multi-stable deterrence" see Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 141-44.
45. See Paul H. Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy* 25 (Winter 1976-77): 195-210.
46. See Jerome Wiesner, "The Cold War is Dead, But the Arms Race Rumbles On," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 23 (June 1967): 6-9; and George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," *Scientific American* 220 (April 1969): 15-25.
47. See Lawrence Freedman, *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat* (London: Macmillan, 1977), *passim*.
48. *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 252-56. This is a modest expansion of Brodie's point, but is faithful to his plain meaning.
49. I have challenged that theory at some length in *The Soviet-American Arms Race* (Farnborough, Hampshire: Saxon House, 1976).
50. *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 234.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
52. "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," p. 622.
53. *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1970, first pub. 1942), p. 21.
54. Kahn, *Security in the Nuclear Age*, p. 272.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
56. Note the judgment on this point in Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," pp. 982-3, 985-6.
57. "National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability," p. 417.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 422.

## STRATEGIC STABILITY

59. *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 9.
60. See Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style,'" pp. 28-29.
61. "Arms Control and Soviet Strategic Forces: The Risks of Asking SALT to do Too Much," *The Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies* 1 (January 1978): 22.
62. The title of Chapter 9 in Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*.
63. *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981*, p. 69.
64. Notwithstanding the enormous significance which the Soviets attach to the surprise disruptive/disarming blow, their operational practices vis-a-vis their strategic forces have never approached the day-in, day-out instant readiness ethos of the Strategic Air Command and the US SSBN force.
65. *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981*, pp. 65-68, 85-88.
66. Damage limitation on a major scale is very far indeed from the desiderata of Harold Brown's Department of Defense. See Harold Brown, *Department of Defense*. See Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 2, 1978), p. 65. By way of contrast, a very useful discussion of the Soviet approach to damage limitation is Daniel Goure and Gordon H. McCormick, "Soviet Strategic Defense: The Neglected Dimension of the U.S.-Soviet Balance," *Orbis* 24 (Spring 1980): 103-27.
67. For a strong statement to this effect from a highly credible source, see "Kissinger Looks at Future of NATO."
68. I have explored this thesis in some detail in my article, "Targeting Problems for Central War."
69. Some US commentators believe that they should be even-handed in their prescriptions between the US and the USSR. Victor Utgoff of the NSC staff, for example, in a speech before the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Monterey, California, 1 February 1978, argued to the effect that the United States could not be trusted not to abuse a strategically superior position.
70. See Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War."
71. Useful background is provided in Henry C. Rowen, "The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine," in Laurence Martin, ed., *Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 131-56.
72. *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981*, pp. 66, 67, 86.
73. See Colin S. Gray, "Ballistic Missile Defense: A New Debate for a New Decade," *International Security* 5 (Fall 1980): forthcoming.
74. *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981*, p. 68.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
76. See Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); and Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Coexistence?*, Adelphi Papers No. 101 (London: IISS, Autumn 1973).
77. On Soviet intervention policy, set in a wider strategic context, see Edward N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?," *Commentary* 69 (April 1980): 40-49; and Keith Payne, *Are They Interested in Stability? The Soviet View of Intervention*, HI-3092/4-DP (Croton-on-Hudson, New York: Hudson Institute, June 1980).
78. *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1979*, p. 56.
79. For example: *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1980*, p. 64; *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981*, p. 69.
80. A view to be found in Walter Slcombe, *The Political Implications of Strategic Parity*, Adelphi Paper No. 77 (London: IISS, May 1971); Paul C. Warnke, "Apes On A Treadmill," *Foreign Policy* 18 (Spring 1975): 12-29; and Abram Chayes, "Nuclear Arms Control After the Cold War," *Daedalus* 104 (Summer 1974): 27.
81. See the testimony of Donald G. Brennan in US, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The SALT II Treaty, Hearings, Part 4*, p. 365.
82. *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1979*, pp. 56-57.

**PANEL 4**  
**EMERGING SECURITY ISSUES IN THE**  
**"ARC OF CRISIS"**

**This group explored the emerging security issues facing the US in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. This panel addressed the implications for energy supplies and other security concerns caused by regional issues such as political instabilities, cross-border conflicts, developments in the Middle East peace process, and increasing Soviet presence and influence. The group attempted to assay recent US policy initiatives and suggest an agenda of potential future US policy directions.**

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## PANEL 4 PARTICIPANTS

**CHAIRMAN:** Honorable L. Dean Brown, President, Middle East Institute.

**RAPPORTEUR:** CPT Walter "R" Thomas, USN, National Defense University.

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**PANELISTS:** Mr. Henry Bradsher, *Washington Star*; Dr. Ellen L. Frost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA (International Economic and Technology Affairs); Dr. Henry H. Gaffney, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA; LTG Paul F. Gorman, USA, Director, Plans and Policy (J-5), Joint Chiefs of Staff; BG Harry T. Hagaman, USMC, Headquarters, US Marine Corps; Dr. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Director, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. William Lewis, George Washington University; Mr. John J. McIntyre, Battelle Columbus Laboratories; Mr. Jack C. Miklos, National Defense University and Department of State; Honorable Robert H. Pelletrean, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA; Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr., Systems Planning Corporation; Dr. Raymond Tanter, Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution; Mr. John C. F. Tillson, Senate Budget Committee; Mr. Joseph W. Twinam, Department of State.

## PANEL 4 SUMMARY

### Emerging Security Issues in the "Arc of Crisis"

L. Dean Brown, Chairman  
Walter "R" Thomas, Rapporteur

Underlying elements of the panel discussions were the complex and interrelational problems affecting those nations within the "Arc of Crisis," as well as the challenge presented by the Arab-Israeli issue. The majority of panel members were convinced that any attempt to decouple the problems of Palestine from other policy considerations would lead inexorably to artificial, or at least superficial, solutions. Nevertheless, and while acknowledging the political conundrum posed by the Arab-Israeli issue, the panel members conscientiously examined the emerging security issues throughout the area—often disagreeing, however, on the definition of "security interests" when applied to specific nations within the "Arc of Crisis."

In his discussion paper, "Communicating in the Middle East," Mr. Thomas C. Barger stressed both the importance of patience in political and personal relations, and the need for a better understanding of Islamic law and Arab culture. Additionally, his historical precis of the development and current composition of the oil industry in Arab nations presented the panel members with a unique insight into the extensive planning which is required for exploration and plant development in the many separate petroleum empires of the Middle East. He also noted that the sheer size of the machinery and the extreme fragility of the production system needed to handle the extraordinary quantities of oil flowing from surface facilities demands special attention because of its technical complexity and critical vulnerability.

Following a discussion of the technology and economic effect of Middle Eastern oil production, and recognizing the apparent Arab-Israeli impasse, diverse opinions were then offered relating to the substantive meaning of an "emerging security issue" and the geographic extent of the "Arc of Crisis" (or "crises," as some preferred).

The central theme on which general agreement focused was that each Islamic nation, in or adjacent to the Middle East, should be discussed individually, not only as it related to the United States, but as its policies coincided or diverged from the policies of other nations as well. In this context

## PANEL 4

the opportunities for the United States to improve its reputation in each section of this often volcanic arena were discussed more pragmatically.

Another of the paper contributors, Ambassador Robert G. Neumann, considered the "Arc of Crisis" a more fanciful than meaningful expression. He emphasized that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the disintegration of both the economy and the central government of Iran were destabilizing factors that have critical strategic implications which the free world cannot afford to ignore.

Unfortunately, the ability of the United States to influence decisions directly in these two nations has been largely muted by Soviet adamancy in Afghanistan, the hostage situation in Iran, and the failure of the Camp David negotiations to lead to a final accord. In fact, as some panel members observed, it may be that preoccupation with Egypt and Israel, or perhaps the predilection to view problems through either Egyptian or Israeli eyes, has been a counterproductive policy for the United States—at least in the opinion of the other nations in the area.

Consequently, the major political factors often inhibiting US efforts to cooperate more fully with Middle Eastern nations were outlined generally as:

1. The failure to resolve the hostage crisis in Iran
2. The inability of the United States to help "neutralize" Afghanistan
3. The Arab-Israeli deadlock

However, once these issues were determined to be somewhat option-limiting, the heritage of close and friendly associations which exist between the United States and many of these nations was acknowledged as a beneficial factor that has permitted many positive geostrategic, commercial, political, and military ties to remain fundamentally intact, though often strained. Specifically, the majority of states within the region have remained anti-Communist, the free world has retained its access to Arab oil, and the commercial ventures and military assistance agreements of most of these nations have remained limited to the democratic world.

Professor John Duke Anthony, directed the attention in his discussion paper to "The Arab States of the Gulf." He further emphasized the diverse nature of the littoral states within the region. He stressed that the ever-present regional dynamics must be understood clearly if international policies are to be implemented successfully. Today, particularly, the individuality, interregionality, and perceptions of each Gulf nation are now factors that must be analyzed when regional plans are under consideration by outside powers. Therefore, the external relations of *each* littoral nation are often affected by regional concerns which have often been given short shrift or at least inadequate attention by the more developed countries.

## THE POLITICAL FUTURE

No discussion of the emerging security issues can avoid the intense and often paralyzing effect of political changes in the Middle East. Considerable attention was devoted to two facts: there is much we do not know about the forces driving Iran and we know little of the internal political

## THE "ARC OF CRISIS"

developments in many of the nations within the area. Thus we cannot be sure what is stable and what is not.

As the panel members viewed the political environment of the area, there was considerable discussion concerning the personal conflicts which exist internally throughout the Muslim world, particularly between the better educated and the more fundamental religious members of Middle Eastern societies. These differences, in turn, often evolve as rival forces, with those favoring industrialization and modernization opposing others who believe that national priorities should be directed toward maintaining those traditional values which are exemplified by Islamic cultural patterns and religious heritages.

This philosophical and sometimes ideological conflict points up the fact that many of the processes of "Westernization" are resented inherently by a large proportion of the population in many Middle Eastern nations. It is also a reminder, if indeed a reminder is necessary, that Western governments cannot detach religion from other areas of political concern.

Since religious commonality is a cement binding Islamic nations firmly on major issues, the panel members concurred that the United States should avoid involvement in religious differences that seem, superficially, to be divisive influences which might provide political leverage for external exploitation. For outside nations, any such conclusions would be specious! Specifically, the Shia and Sunni sects, though differing theologically, maintain a commonality of purpose when non-Islamic interests threaten to intrude. For example, the general concord which exists throughout the area on the necessity for a Palestinian homeland exemplifies the solidarity of the Islamic world, despite the contentious factions that exist within it.

Perhaps the Arab revolutionary movement which has progressed with fits and starts—now and then—here and there, might become a more formidable element of political concern, both internally and externally, than religious extremism. In the past few years the revolutionary changes in Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), although now somewhat moderated, seemed to provide inspiration to many Arab groups which often were antimonarchial or politically radical.

With regard to the extremist nature of this movement the panel members discussed some of the current issues which catalytically aid the revolutionary cause: an influx of foreign personnel; the unsettled territorial claims among many Arab states; the conflict between modernists and traditionalists; the brutality of government police in some countries; the perception that Egypt has accommodated Israel; dynastic jealousies within the Gulf region; a belief that the Western powers in general, and the United States in particular, have excessive influence in the Middle East; and, of course, the perception that Israel is unbending in its policies and intractable in its politics.

Nevertheless, and with due consideration for all of internal dissension caused by these problems, the panel members were inclined to agree that there also is an apparent orderliness in the hierarchical life of many monarchical nations, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf State Emirates, that

## PANEL 4

is neither understood nor properly taken into political account by the Western world.

This is not to say that there is not uncertainty or even distress within the political structure of many Middle Eastern nations, but only that *their uncertainty* at least, often relates to the policies of the United States. The tightly regulated life and "state industry" systems which exist in this area are not always receptive to some of the more liberalized proposals of the West in the political arena, such as human goals programs, more "open and democratic societies," or the parliamentary system. They believe that these efforts to impress foreign standards on their nations are both inappropriate and presumptuous. Perhaps they also have a well-founded fear that the political stress which may result in their area from the advocacy of such "social progress" is subject to dangerous miscalculation.

Therefore, while many Arab political structures and monarchical governments may seem unsupportable to many Westerners, it should be recognized that within the Middle East there now exists a certain fear of the policies which many suspect that the United States is trying to impose on their nations. This unwanted and unsolicited influence, as well as the fear of an arms race and congenital confusion about US leadership, tends to generate a general resentment of "Westernization" which, politically, is not necessarily the same as an anti-US stance.

Whatever the pressures, the nations within the "Arc of Crisis" know that they will have to do business with the West although, at times, they seem to wish that their relations could be limited solely to that cooperative field.

## CURRENT ISSUES

The panel next discussed the stable characteristics of the area, concentrating on the relative possibilities of either peaceful or violent change in specific nations. For example, Iraq, which has been mentioned as a nation that seems to be moderating its revolutionary rhetoric, may evolve as a stabilizing influence in the northern tier of the Middle East. Conversely, Egypt, once the initiator of solidarity, now appears to be isolated from the remainder of the Islamic world.

What do these changes mean for the United States or the Soviet Union and their respective allies? More precisely, could there be a negative aura cast about any Arab nation by its neighbors once it forges superpower links? Certainly, the panel members agreed, there is a regional distaste for foreign land bases, and there may even be a danger that in the Arab quest for arms to assure internal security that the superpowers are misreading national intentions; i.e., the desire by nations to obtain military training and advanced weapons may not be at all synonymous with an intent either to invite foreign personnel on their soil or to form military alliances.

It is more likely that the nations of the Middle East are largely apprehensive about their own security because of the apparent overwhelming power of Israeli forces, internal radicalism, the growing discontent of their often unemployed and well-educated citizenry, the perceived polarization of Egypt, and the vulnerability of their oil-production facilities. Under these conditions many leaders are increasingly insecure; yet, still wary of locking

## THE "ARC OF CRISIS"

themselves into military relationships with outside powers. Additionally, they often tend to view the Camp David agreement, which they disavow (with the exception of Oman), as a "divide and conquer" tactic that, at some future time, will prove threatening. Therefore, in their purchase of arms, as well as in their commercial and political relations with outside nations, Middle Eastern leaders are acting far more independently than they have in the past.

This independence, of course, is most apparent in the pricing and production of oil; and, although the Free World has retained access to this market, Arab leaders remain skeptical about assurances from the West that the sovereignty of their nations will always be honored. Panel members pointed out that neither was the argument that "the Soviets were the ones who invaded Afghanistan" a particularly meaningful one, since the Arabs were quick to respond that it was "the Israelis who occupy Arab lands, not the Soviets."

This is not to say that the Middle Eastern nations believe that they are immune to Soviet plagues, but only that they are convinced that both pro-Israeli and anti-Soviet motives color, or perhaps obscure, all US vision in the field of Middle Eastern relations.

For most Arab states the foreign and occupation policies of Israel are anathema, particularly since many Arabs believe that their national territories are more likely to be menaced by Israel than by the Soviet Union. Concurrently, many Arab leaders are well aware that the Soviet Union may need to obtain Middle Eastern oil in the future, specifically to meet the needs of its Eastern European satellites; but, since the Soviets are free to purchase oil on the open market, overt USSR aggression is not viewed by most of the Arab world as immediate a problem as Israeli intransigence, nor even as a parallel danger to what many foresee as impending disunity among the Free World alliances. If such Western disunity occurred, together with political instability in the Gulf region, a power vacuum might be created that is more likely to encourage the Soviet Union to exploit opportunities in the area politically than to risk a military incursion into the oil field.

In a contrary vein, panel members mentioned that the Afghanistan invasion may have tempered Soviet ambitions because of the intensely negative reaction of the Islamic nations to this flagrant act. However, it may still be too soon to determine whether the Soviets have drawn any conclusions from their Afghan venture, how this conflict will affect their future relations with the Arab World, or what effect it and resurgent Islam may later have in the Soviet Union itself.

In other areas within the "Arc of Crisis," the instability of Syria, the havoc in Lebanon, the radicalism of Libya, the Algerian support of Polisario guerrillas against Morocco, and the economic distress of Turkey all were discussed by the panel members—not so much as security issues for analyses, but as international problems that do not seem to be moving toward solutions. With regard to Turkey, it also was mentioned that although there are no major issues of US-Turkey contention, it is likely that the use of Turkish facilities would be constrained in the event that the United States desired to use them for non-NATO operations in the Middle East. In fact, it was the opinion of most panel members that the United

## PANEL 4

States just cannot conduct military activities in the Middle East with any degree of impunity; and, in most instances, as with the hostage situation that now exists in Iran, US interests in the area might be best served by "watchful waiting."

### FUTURE CONCERNS

In categorizing the problems which are endemic throughout the "Arc of Crisis," the panel members agreed generally that the following factors should be considered:

- Rising violence, typified by the myriad radical groups which seem to be well organized, armed, and funded
- Unemployment and underemployment, affecting all classes, particularly the well educated
- Religious differences, often generating bloody confrontation
- Dynastic jealousies, most noticeably in the smaller Gulf states
- Economic instability and the malappropriate division of wealth
- Soviet expansionism, causing apprehension and political sensitivity toward future Soviet intentions in the Middle East—exacerbated by the shock of the Afghanistan invasion.
- Current relations with the United States and Western Europe, which are subject to ambivalent "pro and con" arguments within and among Arab governments.
- Animosity towards Israel, combined with continued support for the Palestinian cause
- Lack of any real industrial or economic base, other than oil production
- The tenuous position of Iran, and the question of whether that country can survive as an independent entity

With these concerns in mind, and recognizing that they are not all inclusive, the panel members then discussed the potential threats that could have security implications within the area as well as a few of the policies which the United States might adopt. Without designating any specific nation, some of the possible confrontational issues affecting US-Middle Eastern relations are:

- The manipulation of oil resources, including either an extravagant increase in oil prices, an embargo on oil supplies as a political and economic weapon, or the interruption of production through destruction of the very vulnerable facilities
- Soviet expansionism in the Middle East, possibly caused by a future power vacuum in the area, Soviet insistence on port access in the south, or USSR intent to control oil resources in the Gulf region
- Changes in the governmental structures of Middle Eastern nations that threaten the power balance or independence of some countries and permit basing rights or political control to pass to an outside power

Since any interruption of Arab oil supplies would be traumatic for both Free World and Third World nations, logical preventive measures for the United States include improving relations, the pursuit of alternative energy supplies, some degree of stockpiling petroleum reserves, more cooperative

## THE "ARC OF CRISIS"

security measures and, perhaps, a joint study of rapid repair capabilities in the event production facilities are either damaged or destroyed.

For the United States, the panel members agreed, the use of quiet diplomacy and bilateral agreements which address these issues would be the most useful tactics to adopt in our relations with each nation. Conversely, any incentive to establish military bases or to intervene in the internal affairs of the area would probably be counterproductive to the long-range interests of the United States.

With regard to the ever-elusive Soviet intentions, it was considered that all Islamic nations have a coherent influence on Soviet policy which the Soviet Union is likely to consider seriously in planning its future relations with Middle Eastern nations. Therefore, the Soviets recognize that they would pay a considerable political price for any military incursions, either to obtain a warm water port, seize nearby oil fields, or gain additional border territory. Such overt activity, while remote, would not preclude the subversion of Islamic states in order to form pro-Soviet governments. There also is a possibility that some of the more extremist Arab groups would embrace the Soviets voluntarily.

Unfortunately, when analysing these possibilities, the Arab-Israeli issue seems to limit US options to counter Soviet activities in the Middle East; as a result, any direct measures which might deter Soviet subversion might be better initiated by other nations of the Free World than by the United States—at least at the present time.

Additionally, the unsettled conditions in Syria, Iran, and Turkey, not to speak of the Arab-Israeli impasse, the occupation of Afghanistan, or the radicalism of Palestinian groups, also are factors which may at any time affect US-Islamic relations as well as the balance of power throughout the Middle East. Nevertheless, any precipitous military action or political pressure which might be brought to bear by outside nations to gain economic advantages, basing rights, or favorable alliances would certainly generate widespread resentment throughout the "Arc of Crisis."

In considering these myriad problems, the majority of panel members agreed that the United States should first discuss with other concerned nations the concord of interests and mutual apprehensions which exist throughout the Free World in its relations with the Middle Eastern countries. This joint initiative, when combined with greater US bilateral cooperation with each of the states throughout the region, might be favorably viewed as a more sincere effort on the part of the United States to demonstrate that political self-determination and territorial security for the nations in this area are of prime concern to the West.

Additionally, since the Palestinian issue is the "glue" which binds most of these states together, the United States urgently needs to seek post-Camp David solutions to this predominant problem. The improbability of ever "decoupling" this issue from other negotiations in the Middle East requires that the United States should soon initiate an innovative policy on this subject, preferably in concert with our European allies. This is necessary not only because of the political and economic realities which exist in relation to the oil industry, but also because the future effect of Soviet influence in this region could be partially determined by the presence or

#### **PANEL 4**

absence of much closer cooperation between the nations of this area and the Free World.

This is not to suggest that the United States should abandon Israel, disavow its close association with Egypt, or even attempt to guarantee specific cartographic boundaries of the many independent states throughout the Middle East—only that new diplomatic endeavors to form closer US ties with individual nations might be more energetically pursued. Concurrently, United States efforts to cooperate more fully in helping to solve bilaterally the many problems which exist internally might be welcomed as an indication of a more even-handed US policy than the "Arc of Crisis" has, to date, either observed or anticipated.

## **PANEL 4 PAPER: The Arab States of the Gulf**

**by John Duke Anthony  
Johns Hopkins University**

Public commentary in the past decade over expanding Great Power interest and involvement in the Gulf has often laid greater emphasis on Iran's role in this region than on those of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the other littoral states. However, one of the most far-reaching consequences of the October 1973 War was a fundamental shift in this focus away from Iran toward the Arab actors in the region. A principal reason for the change was the Arab oil embargo, together with the associated production cutbacks and the subsequent steep rise in petroleum prices. Owing to these factors, plus the concomitant rapid accumulation of monetary wealth by Saudi Arabia and several other countries in the region, greater attention began to be paid to the Arab states in the Gulf.

The reasons for this transformation are not surprising: seven of the eight littoral states are Arab (counting the seven members of the United Arab Emirates as a single state) and throughout this period it has been primarily Saudi Arabia and its neighbors, not Iran, who have produced and exported most of the area's oil; have possessed the overwhelming majority of its petroleum reserves; have controlled the bulk of its impressive financial holdings; have played the most important roles within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—including, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the strongest voice of any OPEC member in favor of moderation—on matters pertaining to the price of oil; and have exercised a determining influence inside the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) on questions pertaining to industrialization and regional economic cooperation.

Whether the country under examination is Saudi Arabia or one of its neighbors, a clear understanding of the regional dynamics among these countries is essential to any assessment of their future roles in Gulf and international politics. Such an understanding, moreover, is crucial not only to any conclusions which may be reached with respect to the kinds of contributions which Saudi Arabia and its neighbors might make towards the goal of regional security, but also to an appreciation of the context in which foreign and indigenous interests in the area must be pursued.

This paper examines three questions bearing on the local and regional aims and concerns of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states and the way that these questions shape relations both amongst the Kingdom and its

An earlier, substantially different, version of this paper was submitted to the US Congress Joint Economic Committee for internal use by its members and staff.

## **PANEL 4**

neighbors, on one hand, and between them and outside powers, on the other. The first concerns the nature of political interaction among these states. The second focuses on the continuing contest between conservation and radical forces in the area. The third examines the ongoing connection between these states and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

### **POLITICAL INTERACTION AMONG SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER GULF STATES**

In general, political interaction between and among the Kingdom and its neighbors has been and remains a complex mixture of historical, economic, and political competition and cooperation, undergirded by long-standing dynastic, national, and territorial issues colored by distinct ethnic, religious, and tribal sentiments. With the arrival of a succession of foreign powers in the Gulf, the conflict side of the interaction subsided but did not disappear. Even during and after the long period of British domination in Iraq and the emirates, these phenomena continued to affect the political processes of the area.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, such phenomena delayed considerably the emergence of the Kingdom to its present position as a principal Gulf power. Indeed, in contrast to the relative lack of constraints operating on Iran and Iraq during the period in question, any practical, significant role for the Kingdom in the Gulf region, beyond the extension of monetary and other forms of support to counter radicalist trends in the area, was effectively foreclosed until the 1970s. The reason for this state of affairs stemmed less from the absence or presence of the requisite Saudi diplomatic, administrative, or military capabilities for such a role than from constitutional and structural considerations. In short, owing to their long-standing special treaty relationship with Great Britain, the defense and foreign affairs responsibilities for ten of the states lying along the north Arabian periphery from Bahrain to Muscat were, for the most part, conceptualized and administered by London instead of the ten states themselves, or, for that matter, by Riyadh, Baghdad, Kuwait, or Tehran.

In the eastern Arabian reaches of the Gulf, only in Abu Dhabi, and to a lesser extent in Oman, did the Saudis extend themselves externally to a significant degree. Even then, however, the Kingdom was engaged in promoting not so much its interests in areas situated along the shores of the maritime Gulf as in pressing its claims to territories along caravan routes leading to oasis regions, areas at the time thought to contain promising petroleum deposits but which lay deep within the interiors of Abu Dhabi and Oman. As is well known, however, the Kingdom's endeavors in these episodes were largely unsuccessful. Indeed, a far reaching consequence of the failure was the setback it dealt Saudi Arabia's interest in building up a relationship of trust and confidence between itself and two other Gulf states which would themselves, although few realized it at the time, become important actors in Gulf affairs.

The strained feelings that accompanied the mutual feelings of suspicion and distrust engendered by these and other disagreements between Saudi Arabia and a number of its eastern neighbors in the Gulf region were to last far longer than most anyone would have anticipated. Indeed, from

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

the time of the forced eviction in 1955 by British troops of a Saudi police detachment from Abu Dhabi's eastern province (from where the detachment had also encroached on the writ of the Omani Sultan in nearby territories), it would take a full 16 years before events would permit the normalization of relations between the Kingdom and the Sultanate. This was true despite the fact that during 6 of these years (1965-71) a guerrilla war was being waged in Oman that sought to overthrow not only the regime in Muscat but the one in Riyadh as well. And it would take nearly twenty years before the border dispute with fellow OPEC and OAPEC member Abu Dhabi was resolved. Only then did it become possible to establish diplomatic relations and a more institutionalized means of pursuing the range of regional interests shared between the Kingdom and the seven-member United Arab Emirates.

The source of much of the interaction has been a quest for control of the region's limited economic resources. Prior to the discovery of petroleum, various groups within the area struggled with one another incessantly over such issues as control of maritime and overland trade, offshore fishing and pearling rights, access to grazing lands for their flocks, and control over strategic water holes. In conjunction with these encounters, and continuing up to the present day, have been innumerable contests within and among the ruling elites of these states over questions of territory, commercial preeminence, military prowess, and dynastic leadership.

The discovery of oil and the subsequent realization that millions (nowadays billions) of dollars were at stake, added a new and vastly different dimension to these cleavages. While not completely superseding the traditional forms of competition, the disputes now have an increased significance both within the Gulf itself and in the eyes of the outside world. This significance is likely to remain valid as long as the issues contested remain unsettled.

### Boundary Disputes

A major component of the dynamics between Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states derives from their competing claims to disputed territory. The most important among such disputes that remain—most of which have involved outside powers in support of one or more of the parties to the conflict—are those of:

- Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over their maritime boundary;
- Saudi Arabia and Southern Yemen over the lengthy, undemarcated boundary between them and, specifically, in the al-Wadi'a area where armed clashes (and the capture and subsequent exchange of prisoners by both sides) have occurred;
- Saudi Arabia and Oman over Umm Zamul, a waterhole and surrounding territory in the undemarcated border area at the northernmost reaches of the Rub' al-Khali desert;
- Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the ultimate disposition of the island of Sanafir in the Straits of Tiran which, previously under Egyptian suzerainty, fell to Israeli control in the June 1967 war but is to revert to Egyptian control under the Camp David Accords of 1979, although sovereignty over Sanafir is claimed by the Kingdom;

#### PANEL 4

- Iraq and Iran over the exact location in the Shatt al-Arab of their common maritime frontier, a dispute which the world was informed had been "settled" when the late Shah was still in power by the terms of the March 1975 Algiers Accord, the provisions of which were declared null and void by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn in September 1980;
- Iraq and Syria over control and use of the Euphrates River;
- Iraq and Kuwait over their common frontier and the question of control over Warbah and Bubiyan, two strategic islands lying in their off-shore waters;
- Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar Islands group located in the Bay of Salwa and over the village of Zubarah on the west coast of the Qatar Peninsula;
- Ra's al-Khaimah and Iran over the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs, forcibly seized from the former by the regime of the late Shah on 30 November 1971;
- Sharjah, 'Ajman, Umm al-Qawain, and Iran over offshore waters in which petroleum was discovered in 1972 near Abu Musa Island;
- Sharjah and Iran over the question of whether the ultimate locus of sovereignty with respect to Abu Musa Island itself should reside in the former or the latter state or be apportioned between them;
- Sharjah and Fujairah over their respective land boundaries, a dispute which re-erupted in June 1972 and resulted in the death of some two dozen Sharjan and Fujairan tribesmen and, as the 1980s began, still necessitated the intermediating presence of a United Arab Emirates Defense Force battalion;
- Dubai and Sharjah over territory being considered for commercial development along the border between them;
- Ra's al-Khaimah and Sharjah over a valley area situated in disputed territory between them which is believed to contain potentially lucrative deposits of phosphate; and
- Ra's al-Khaimah and Oman over their respective land and off-shore boundaries on the Musandam Peninsula.

In addition, there are other territorial disputes that are less well known but, like those cited above, have the potential to re-erupt and alter the future regional balance of power

Territorial disputes, formerly centered on issues on land and water usage in and between states with sizeable Bedouin populations, are nowadays more frequently centered on questions of sovereignty over strategic island and border areas. The pattern of petroleum discoveries has been the principal factor in the this shift in focus. In areas immediately to the east of Saudi Arabia, Great Britain in the 1950s attempted to resolve such boundary disputes as were then preventing the granting of oil concessions and drilling operations in the seven member states long known as the Trucial States but which now comprise the United Arab Emirates (UAE). British officials proposed final resolutions for some two dozen of the nearly three dozen cases pressing at the time, most of which were accepted by the parties involved. To this day, however, a dozen or more conflicting claims to land boundaries in the UAE, in addition to disputed claims to half a dozen off-shore boundaries among these states plus the other Arab Gulf states, and, as noted, between some of them and Iran, remain outstanding.

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

On the other hand, it is important to note that substantial progress has been achieved in the past decade in close to a dozen offshore disputes, most of which were resolved in conformity with the principle of the median line. Some of the settled disputes, as for example in establishing the maritime boundaries and the sharing of offshore oil revenues between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, were resolved with a minimum of difficulty.

By contrast, the question of sovereignty over Abu Musa Island, which involves a number of similar legal issues, has not been so easily managed. In the early 1980s that dispute, the handling of which contributed directly to the assassination of the Ruler of Sharjah in 1972, was no nearer to *de jure* resolution than in the late 1960s when Britain and other countries were engaged in a concentrated effort to effect its resolution. But in that case, unlike most of the other disputes, there have been the additionally complicating factors of religious differences and competing nationalisms. Rendering the dispute still more intractable in terms of regional security concerns is the geopolitical significance attributed to Abu Musa, and the strategic role accruing to whoever controls the island. This is due to the island's location adjacent to the route through which all oil tankers and most other maritime traffic must pass en route to and from the Straits of Hormuz at the head of the Gulf.

### **Dynastic Competition**

A second category of political interaction, both pre- and post-dating the epochal events of 1973, concerns Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Gulf states and centers on their dynastic rivalries. These occur both within and among the area's twelve ruling families. Popularity contests and the non-violent jostling for position within a given dynastic pecking order (such as those with which much of the Western media seems endlessly preoccupied) are not the object of concern here. Indeed, such competition—most of which is natural given the size (e.g., 7,000 members in Saudi Arabia) of some of the dynasties and by all accounts is conducted almost altogether along peaceful lines—has its positive as well as negative features. In any case, in no instance to date has the phenomenon been a matter of concern comparable in terms of the magnitude or gravity of its impact on regional and domestic political dynamics as the kind of maneuvers that have actually resulted in the forceful displacement of one Arabian ruler by another.

The most recent intradynastic challenge of the latter variety took place within the Al Qasimi ruling family of Sharjah. In February 1972 a former Ruler of that state, deposed and exiled to Egypt in 1965, returned to Sharjah by way of Iraq and Ra's al-Khaimah and, capitalizing on public resentment of the Ruler's handling of the aforementioned Abu Musa Island affair with Iran, attempted to overthrow his successor. Although he and his followers failed to regain the rulership, they succeeded in murdering the incumbent before they were captured and arrested.

In another case, scarcely a month earlier than this event, the Ruler of Qatar, of the Al Thani dynasty, was overthrown. In that incident, Qatar's then Deputy Ruler and Heir Apparent ousted his cousin and seized the rulership for himself. In this instance, Saudi relations with Qatar, which had

#### PANEL 4

been exceptionally close under the reign of the previous Ruler, managed to remain unimpaired. This was not the case, however, with Qatar-Dubai relations. Indeed, the previously strong ties between these two states—due in large measure to the then Ruler of Qatar's marriage to the daughter of the Ruler of Dubai and an array of intertwined relationships which followed as a consequence—underwent a prolonged period of estrangement. This period would last until the death of the former Qatari head of state in 1979 in Dubai, which had granted him asylum at the time of his ouster from Qatar in 1972.

Other such events can be recounted. In July 1970, for example, Sultan Qabus, thirteenth member of the Al Bu Sa'id dynasty to serve as Ruler of Oman, participated in a palace coup which replaced his father Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur (r. 1932-70). And in Abu Dhabi in 1966, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan of the Al Nahyan overthrew his ruling brother, Shaykh Shakhbut (r. 1928-66).

In the case of Oman, Saudi Arabia was unable to embrace the new Ruler immediately upon his accession to power. The reason: the Kingdom's long-standing support for a different, ostensibly more religiously oriented group of Omanis who had opposed the former Sultan, even though the new Ruler, Sultan Qabus, was desirous of Saudi recognition. Traditional Arabian Peninsula notions of civility and the time-honored custom of political asylum, which had been extended to the rival claimants, merely served to forestall for a year and a half the inevitable reckoning between the late Saudi King Faysal and Sultan Qabus, soon after which Saudi aid to the insurgency-ridden Sultanate began to flow.

No such resolution was forthcoming, however, in the aftermath of the 1966 change in rulership in Abu Dhabi. There, the new Ruler, Shaykh Zayid, like his Omani counterpart four years later, was also anxious for the Saudi blessing. Yet he was not so eager for recognition by Riyadh as to yield on territorial matters in dispute between them, and nearly a decade passed before the issues in contention between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi were reconciled.

While the dispute was primarily over territory, it was also the outgrowth of a clash between the strong personalities of two men: Shaykh Zayid and King Faysal. For Zayid, the heart of the contested area had always been a very special oasis. It had long been the center of the emirate's Eastern Province where, at the village of al-Ayn, he spent most of his formative years prior to becoming Ruler. Until well into the 1970s, it had also remained a major source, even though 90 miles away, of much of the capital's water supply. For Faysal equally, the dispute over the area was of special significance. To him it was an issue of pride and honor, a reminder of past Wahhabi glories, and, during his own lifetime, of a humiliating defeat inflicted by Zayid and the British when the Trucial Oman Scouts drove Saudi forces from the area in 1955.

By the mid-1970s, neither Saudi Arabia nor Abu Dhabi were any longer considering a possible confrontation with one another over the areas in dispute. Both states increasingly shared an overriding interest in the perpetuation of traditional rule in the area and in the establishment of a UAE capable of defending itself against external threats. Accordingly, in a move widely interpreted as a sincere effort to end the conflict, high officials

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

from both states agreed, on 29 July 1974, to a formula whereby the disputed issues were resolved peacefully.

According to the formula, the two states acknowledged in principle that Abu Dhabi sovereignty would be recognized over six of the villages in the so-called "Buraymi Oasis" region previously claimed by Saudi Arabia; that the rich Zararah (Shaybah) oilfield previously in dispute would be divided between them, and that Saudi Arabia would obtain an outlet to the Gulf through Abu Dhabi in the Khawr al-'Udayd area. The ratification of the accord, as noted earlier, paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between these two states and facilitated coordination of joint policies toward such questions as oil and regional security. In addition, the ending of the dispute removed the last barrier delaying completion of construction on the road network linking Abu Dhabi and the other UAE states to the western end of the Gulf.

In Saudi Arabia, the replacement of one ruler by another in March 1975, when King Faysal was assassinated, occurred differently. There, the assassin, although a member of the ruling household, the Al Sa'ud, is acknowledged by both the Saudis themselves and outside observers to have acted alone, with the overriding goal in this instance being the assassin's intent to settle a personal grievance against the King. By all accounts, the succession to the rulership of the incumbent King Khalid (the late King's younger brother and since 1965 his Heir Apparent) took place without incident and in strict accordance with the procedure agreed to a decade earlier by the dynasty and its key allies within the Kingdom's elite structure.

Throughout much of the 1970s, intradynastic competition among leading ruling family personalities figured prominently in the political dynamics of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and most of the seven UAE states. In the first three states, the selection of Heir Apparent—Fahd Al Sa'ud in the Saudi Arabia, Sa'd Al Sabah in Kuwait, and Hamad al Thani in Qatar—was determined in 1975, 1977, and 1978, respectively. As the 1980s began, however, most outsiders and many insiders viewed such matters in the case of several other Gulf dynasties with much less certainty.

Dynastic tensions between a number of these states have expressed themselves with similar frequency, the issue in dispute often being irredentist in nature. An example was the situation between Saudi Arabia and Iraq when the former country's King 'Abd al-'Aziz and the latter's King 'Abdallah were alive. At other times the basis of the rivalry was essentially secessionist in nature or arose out of competition between individual Rulers for prestige in the area. In most cases, the latter factor was and has continued to be involved. For example, various aspects of a quest for regional preeminence with respect to particular issues, however muted and good natured the competition may appear on the surface, occur frequently between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Kuwait has often pursued a foreign policy quite different from Saudi Arabia's on such matters of regional importance as maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the pricing and production of OPEC oil, the lending of various kinds of support to the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and the relative freedom of expression within Kuwait permitted such militantly

## PANEL 4

radical groups as various offshoots of the leftist-oriented Arab Nationalists' Movement.

Interdynastic competition also continues to assume the form of a contest for regional ranking and status among practically all the Rulers. However, this has been much less evident in the early 1980s than during the mid- to late-1970s period when, fostered by the infrastructural boom in Saudi Arabia and a number of other Gulf states, the phenomenon was at its zenith. Much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which had labored long and hard to promote a nine-state federation (instead of the seven-member union which emerged) among the Gulf emirates, variants of this dimension of regional political dynamics were instrumental in the process of Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai achieving their independence in 1971. And, to a certain extent, it still influences the degree to which the latter four states, and many of the others as well, are prone to cooperate with one another in such matters of mutual concern as regional security and economic integration. The principal exception to this trend had increasingly been Saudi Arabia. In the spring of 1980, the Saudi government announced that it had decided to cancel previous plans to build an aluminum smelter in order not to compete with the already existing smelters in Bahrain and Dubai.

In its external relations with the emirates of eastern Arabia, Saudi Arabia, then, no less than Kuwait and Iraq, has no choice but to exercise diplomatic finesse in trying to work through the maze of intricacies and sensitivities associated with parochial and familial factors. Indeed, as in Saudi Arabia itself, such matters, however esoteric and elusive they may seem to the foreign observer, form to this day an important component of political life in many of the other Gulf states. In this context, the Kingdom, as a principal regional power, is confronted with no easy task in its efforts to forge a coherent set of policies towards its neighbors not only in pursuit of its own national interests but in the context of regional concerns as well. Local considerations pertaining to such important actors among the smaller Gulf states as Abu Dhabi and Dubai, on one hand, and Qatar and Bahrain, on the other, attest to this fact.

The competition between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, at war with one another as recently as 1948, is historically rooted in the fact that the ruling family of the latter seceded from Abu Dhabi in the early 19th century and settled in Dubai. The heads of these two states, Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai, compete with each other for influence in the UAE, in which they hold the post of President and Vice-President/Prime Minister, respectively.

The competition between Qatar and Bahrain, which lies behind the fact that they have yet to demarcate their borders with one another, is founded in the still outstanding claim of the ruling family of Bahrain to sovereignty over portions of Qatar, territory it once controlled, and, more recently, in their different attitudes towards regional political integration in the Gulf. The heads of many of the smaller emirates have had and continued to have similar, though less dramatic, disagreements among themselves and with Iran and Oman.

Saudi Arabia, being ruled by a family that traces its own roots back at least 500 years, if not longer, is on familiar ground when it encounters the

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

geneological dimension of status and prestige among its neighbors. Not surprising, it has little choice but to factor in such notions as ancestral lineage as an additional aspect of the interdynastic relations among several of its neighbors. Critics of the ruling families of Sharjah, Ra's al-Khaimah and Bahrain, for example, often deride the dynasties of these states for putting on airs, as it were, in considering themselves of more noble pedigree than some of their neighbors. In the case of Bahrain, the aristocratic self-perception of certain members of its ruling family (the Al Kahlifa) contributed to the island state's reluctance, and ultimately its refusal, to enter into an equal political relationship with the neighboring dynasty (the Al Thani) of Qatar during the negotiations between 1968 and 1971 for a nine-state federation in the Gulf. The continuing legacy of this facet of the historical relationship between Bahrain and Qatar diminishes the likelihood of their combining to form the kind of political union that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, only a decade ago, worked so diligently to achieve.

Another Saudi friend of long-standing, Ra's al-Khaimah's Ruler, Shaykh Saqr of the Qasimi family, has been the beneficiary of substantial amounts of Saudi economic assistance, yet has been unable to turn this favored position into advantage for his emirate inside the UAE. Indeed, Shaykh Saqr still bristles at having to occupy a subordinate niche to the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the Union government. When the UAE was established in 1971, these Rulers, the two most powerful in their capacity as UAE President and Vice President, respectively, allotted Ra's al-Khaimah only 6 seats in the federal assembly, while reserving 8 seats each for their own emirates. They also have remained firm in their original, 1971 decision to limit veto powers to themselves. This position remains a source of ongoing resentment by the rulers of all the other emirates and, especially, by Ra's al-Khaimah and Sharjah, inasmuch as both emirates have discovered oil (albeit, to date, in exceptionally limited quantities) in recent years.

The foregoing examples of the manner in which Saudi Arabia and a number of its neighbors relate to one another illuminate the uneasy equilibrium which persists between different forces in the area. These forces, whether in the form of conflicting territorial claims or inter- and intra-dynastic competition, testify to the uniqueness of the Kingdom and its neighbors in term of international relations, and lie at the root of how these states frequently relate to one another politically. At the same time, these forces exist not in isolation but, rather, alongside other phenomena, including those associated with the ongoing contest between revolutionary and traditional forces in the region.

### THE RADICAL-CONSERVATIVE CONTEST

Whether the vantage point has been Riyadh, Baghdad, Muscat, or one of the emirates of eastern Arabia, a major dimension of the competition between radical and conservative forces in the area has been the asymmetry of the contest up until the Iranian revolution. For example, until 1979, only one state, Iraq, could be classified as "radical" in terms of its political values and orientation toward the rest. The other Arab Gulf states were "conservative" or "moderate" states. To this day these politics are ruled by

## PANEL 4

dynasts whose foreign policies and official attitudes have by and large been quite friendly not only to Western countries, but to the evolutionary forces of political and socio-economic change operating in the Gulf, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

The internal political and legal systems of the Gulf's conservative Arab states continue to leave little room to maneuver for the as yet small minority of the citizenry and non-national residents who harbor radical or revolutionary sentiments. To be sure, the revolution in Iran and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by religious fanatics in 1979 serve to heighten the anxieties of all the Gulf regimes. In the aftermath of these and other events, the Rulers have gone to some length to indicate their determination to anticipate and accommodate as many legitimate demands for change and/or conservation as possible. Their goal: to provide a means of preventing extremist groups from gaining—or, where this has already occurred, from retaining—a foothold of any significance in the area.

Among the Gulf's Arab actors, one of the most important points to underscore is the striking numerical imbalance in the ratio of radical to conservative states. Indeed, this fact has long been such an obvious constant in the interplay of regional forces that it has often been discounted by outsiders, especially among many strategists and economists who view the area in impersonal terms. Yet in practice the implications of this imbalance pose as formidable an array of obstacles as any other group of hindrances to the area's actual and would-be dissidents. Iraq's geographic and ideological isolation are but two factors which place constraints on its capacity—not to mention its interest or willingness—to foment internal unrest in the other Arab states of the Gulf. Another is the fact that of the "overseas Iraqis"—individuals whose numbers in these states are tinier than miniscule—few have demonstrated an interest or inclination to become involved in an effort to topple the area's traditional regimes.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran, to be sure, all have lengthy borders with Iraq. Even so, this has not enhanced significantly Iraq's opportunities to foment internal dissidence in these states or even to contribute substantially to forces seeking to foster instability in those countries' border regions. On the contrary, throughout most of the 1970s, Iraqi subversive activities were largely offset by Iran's capacity—as, for example, through the assistance it lent the autonomy-minded Kurds in the northern part of the country—for creating a wide range of problems for the Baghdad regime inside Iraq.

Of further significance in this regard, it was the superiority of Iranian military might that in 1969 permitted Tehran to abrogate unilaterally the 1937 treaty between Iraq and Iran regulating navigation rights in the Shatt al-'Arab, the river which separates their two countries. Similarly, such preponderance of force at the time permitted Iranian naval vessels to traverse those waters at will until a final boundary settlement between the two countries, following on the "Algiers Accord" of March 1975, was reached on 13 June 1975. And of no small concern to the Iraqi government following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 was the powerful attraction of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini and other Iranian revolutionary leaders to the politically disgruntled Shi'a Muslims in Iraq.

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

In the case of Saudi Arabia, although Iraq shares an extensive boundary with that country, territorial ambitions, *vis-a-vis* the Kingdom have not played a major role in the Baghdad regime's calculations of how best to enhance the pursuit of Iraqi interests in the region. Furthermore, any putative Iraqi desires to subvert the Saudi regime would be constrained, at least in part, by the Ba'thist government's limited capacity to instigate or influence political, social, or economic disequilibrium inside the Kingdom. The real deterrent to this capacity has not so much been Iraq's limited abilities to foment disequilibrium in Saudi Arabia as it has been the capacity of the Saudi government to date to meet the demands of the great bulk of its domestic constituency.

To be sure, in common with most of the rest of the world, elements of domestic dissatisfaction in Saudi Arabia do exist. In terms of composition, they cut across the social and political spectrum and include portions of the newly educated, the military, the tribes, regional ("national") groups such as the Front for the Liberation of the Hijaz and various members of the ruling House of Sa'ud. Even so, and notwithstanding the November 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by rightist radicals, all of these groups, on the whole to date, have been relatively small in numbers and poorly organized. More importantly, they have been heavily outweighed by a combination of conservative and moderate reformist forces which, on balance, favor a policy of working for such changes as are necessary from within the existing political, social, and economic structure.

In the case of Kuwait, the situation is substantially different. Indeed, Kuwait's capacity to deter a putatively expansionist Iraq rests not so much on religious or military factors—it is doubtful, for example, whether Kuwait's armed forces by themselves could successfully resist an Iraqi invasion—as on considerations of a political and diplomatic nature. To wit: not a single Arab dynasty, and least of all the House of Sa'ud, would be expected to support or condone any hypothetical or actual Iraqi attempt to violate Kuwaiti territory. The record on this to date has been clear: on previous occasions Iraq has stood completely alone in its attempts to occupy Kuwaiti border outposts and in its demands for control over the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, in exchange for recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty.

Of related significance during the 1970s was the fact that Kuwait received both official and private assurances of support not only from Saudi Arabia and other nearby Arab states. An even greater deterrent was the support it received from monarchical Iran, the one country which, up until the last year or so of the late Shah's rule, had the means, the will, and the tacit approval of all the other Gulf states to do whatever necessary to contain Iraqi expansionism. As a further deterrent, the mutual defense clause of the 1961 British-Kuwait Treaty, invoked when Iraq attempted to seize control of Kuwait in 1961, remained intact.

Iraq, in short, despite its perceived role as a bastion of antimonarchical sentiment and revolutionary socialism in the area, has all along been far more isolated, both militarily and politically—particularly in the context of the region's other Arab states—than many foreign analysts and policy-

#### PANEL 4

makers, especially Americans, have been prone to acknowledge. Compounding Iraq's isolation has been the fact that from the beginning, the radical secularist ideology espoused by the Ba'thist leadership in Baghdad has been rejected *in toto* by all the other Gulf states, Arab as well as Iranian.

In addition to the external limitations discussed above, any would-be activist role for the Baghdad regime in an effort to spread its brand of Ba'thist radicalism to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states remains inhibited, at least in part, by the distraction of Iraq's ongoing ideological cleavage with the rival Ba'thist Party in Syria. On more than one occasion various manifestations of this dispute have had repercussions in the other Arab Gulf states, causing substantial embarrassment to Iraq. For example, in October 1977 UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sayf Ghubash—widely recognized as one of the brightest and most talented government officials in the area—was accidentally assassinated at Abu Dhabi International Airport. At the time of the incident, Ghobash was seeing off Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abu al-Halim Khaddam, who was the intended victim, according to the gunman. Under interrogation, the latter admitted to having acted upon orders from Baghdad.

Up until "Camp David," then, and more specifically prior to "Camp Baghdad" in 1979, Iraq's role was severely circumscribed owing to reasons of geography, politics, ideology, and demography. In practice, the regime's policies were far more cautious and conservative than many observers of developments in the Gulf were aware. During that period in which the Shah of Iran was still in power and it was by no means certain that Egypt would galvanize Arab reaction by signing a separate peace treaty with Israel, Iraq's role was a relative modest one. In general, it was limited largely to its traditional position as a cultural pole for many Arab students from the area who enrolled in its universities; as the site of several religious shrines venerated by the area's Shi'a Muslims; to its support (often together with Iran) inside OPEC for higher oil prices; to its commercial ties, mainly with Kuwait and Bahrain; and to the training and other forms of support it had extended over the years to radical groups operating in the Gulf.

Following the March 1975 agreement—The "Algiers Accord"—between Iraq and Iran, the latter facet of Iraqi influence ceased to become operative. Opportunities for Iraq to encourage subversion in the area thereafter continued to exist, to be sure, but the country's revolutionary potential was nonetheless no longer a volatile issue (to the extent that it ever was) with which either the rulers or the key administrative elites in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and the nine emirates were preoccupied. On the contrary, as the 1980s began most of these leaders drew solace from the close monitoring of former Iraqi-sponsored radicals by their armed forces, intelligence and internal security personnel and the nearly regime-wide view that even had Camp David and the fall of the Shah not transpired, there appeared to be little prospect of a revolutionary challenge emanating from Iraq in the then foreseeable future.

Further bolstering this view is the evidence that Iraq has been redefining its relationships with all the Arab Gulf states for quite some time. There are, to be sure, those who have remained suspicious of the Iraqi govern-

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

ment's ultimate intentions toward Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. Even so, many of these skeptics concede that this redefinition has to date had a salutary effect on the prospects for increased cooperation between Iraq and other Gulf states on regional matters pertaining to security. In this regard, one of the unenvisioned consequences has been the extent to which the Baghdad regime's attitudes and policies have moved to a position more closely in consonance with those of the regime in Riyadh than most analysts would have imagined or predicted would be possible half a decade ago.

Officials of the still highly secular and socialist-oriented regime hold to the view that Iraq has moved inside the so-called "arc of crisis." In so doing, the regime has renounced, in effect, its previously perceived role throughout both the region and a substantial segment of the American foreign policy establishment as one of the "encirclers." The importance of this shift has not been lost on the other Arab states in the area. In short, there has been a genuine and welcomed tendency towards pragmatism and away from radicalism in Iraq's dealings not only with all the other Gulf dynasties but, also, further afield, with the United States and a number of Western European countries as well. At the regional level, the strategic and political significance of these developments would appear to be two-fold. In the first instance, Iraq had become strongly allied with Saudi Arabia and most of the other Gulf states opposition to the Palestine "autonomy" provisions of the Camp David accords. Secondly, the Baghdad regime has emerged as the centerpiece of a nearly region-wide consensus regarding the dangers attendant to any growth in the rivalry of the superpowers in the Gulf. These two factors have combined to lessen the likelihood in the immediate future that Iraq would place any great emphasis on the further spread of radicalism in the region and, concomitantly, to enhance the prospects for greater regional security cooperation among the Gulf states themselves.

Among the Arab regimes, one has to travel nearly a thousand miles to the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula—to PDRY, variously known as Aden, or Southern Yemen, to find a socialist-oriented state, which, ideologically if in no other meaningful way, has often stood in opposition to the conservative governments in the Gulf. In contrast to the policies adopted in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, PDRY's radical regime challenged the manner in which nine of the Gulf emirates achieved their independence in 1971, and not until the mid-1970s did it undertake to extend them diplomatic recognition.

Since 1975, the Aden government has had formal relations with Bahrain, Qatar, and UAE. In May 1976 diplomatic ties were inaugurated between PDRY and Saudi Arabia, and Riyadh, for a period, even extended monetary assistance to the country's resource-poor economy. These ties were severed in 1978, however, in the aftermath of the violent death of PDRY President Salim Rubaya' Ali, who had acted as a moderating force in the country's foreign policies. In keeping with Riyadh's objectives of containing the forces of radicalism and to diminish the opportunities for Soviet involvement and influence in the area, Saudi-PDRY relations improved during the Spring of 1980. Indeed, following the ouster of longtime PDRY President 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il an avowed Marxist, in April, there were signs

## PANEL 4

that the relationship might revert at some near point to the reciprocal policies of peaceful co-existence.

Linking South Yemen's foreign policies to the concerns of some of Saudi Arabia's neighbors, it will be recalled that the Aden regime provided considerable assistance to Marxist guerrillas in Oman who sought to overthrow the Sultan and institute a socialist government. Although this assistance was uninterrupted from 1968 to the mid-1970s, it is significant that, more than a decade later, the Oman guerrillas controlled even less territory than they did when the aid program began.

Although undoubtedly one of the most protracted and fiercely fought of any Arabian insurgency in this century, the rebellion remained confined largely to Oman's southernmost province of Dhufar, 500 miles from the emirates, with the vast al-Rub' al-Khali Desert—which in this instance also served to buffer Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states from the conflict—in between. The most telling limitation in PDRY's ability to aid the rebels, however, was that its assistance was never sufficient for the guerrillas to pose a credible prospect of fighting to a standstill, let alone defeating, the defense forces of the Sultan. In December 1975, the last of the rebel forces were officially reported to have been crushed and the Dhufari Revolution pronounced dead by Sultan Qabus.

With the Dhufari guerrillas suppressed, the potential for insurgency to erupt elsewhere in Oman appeared remote up to the time of the revolutionary events of 1979 in Iran. The Sultan's position had been strengthened substantially by increased financial and military support from Great Britain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, Pakistan, and India; by the ability of the government to integrate Dhufar more fully into the state; and by widespread arrests in 1973 of a number of insurgents' sympathizers and fellow members in the emirates, where the guerrillas had hoped to open a second front. The combination of these factors dealt an immense setback not only to dissidents in Dhufar but to elements in Saudi Arabia, the emirates and elsewhere who had sought to undermine political stability and internal security in the areas beyond Oman.

As the 1980s began, however, there was ongoing anxiety within the Omani government about the prospects for a renewal of the insurgency in the Sultanate in light of the setback dealt the moderate forces in PDRY at the time of the death of President 'Ali; by the revolutionary events in Iran which resulted in the withdrawal of the Iranian peacekeeping force from Oman; by the increased amounts of Soviet weaponry arriving in Aden; and by the considerable controversy generated among the Sultanate's neighbors in the aftermath of the Camp David accords. With respect to this last concern, Oman's initial support for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty—in contradistinction of the positions of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and all the other Gulf states—practically ensured that this facet of the Sultanate's foreign policies would serve as a potential lightning rod for actual would-be radical elements active in the area.

When the Palestine autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel ground to a standstill in the late spring of 1980, however, the situation changed. Following that event, Oman moved substantially closer to the position of the so-called Baghdad Front. Indeed, it roundly condemned Israeli actions

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

and policies toward the occupied territories. In doing so, it lessened what up until then had been a growing isolation between the Sultanate and its neighbors.

The foregoing account of political interaction among the Gulf states would suggest that there is as much if not more cleavage than there is cooperation among the states concerned. What needs to be added is an account of the interests that a number of these states have in common which, despite differences, tend to promote their collaboration. First, among the dynasties, there are at least four categories of shared concerns which transcend their aforementioned differences and competition for influence in the area. Briefly, these encompass their interests in: (1) the perpetuation of their respective monarchial regimes; (2) the prevention of radical groups and movements from gaining footholds and momentum in the area; (3) the continuation of an uninterrupted flow of the Gulf's oil resources to markets outside the region; and (4) securing the highest value possible in exchange for their oil whether this be measured in economic or political terms, or both, and whether the means be through the pricing mechanism or production limitations. Throughout the 1970s, Saudi Arabia and the other eleven Arab dynasties in the area shared these four interests not only amongst themselves but also with Iran.

Moreover, despite the ideological antithesis between the ruling household of Saudi Arabia and its fellow dynasts in the area on one hand, and Iraq as the sole Arab socialist-oriented regime on the other, even further common interests exist. Indeed, doctrinal differences in the realm of secular ideologies apart, the interests of conservative and radical forces tend to coalesce in the third and fourth categories, cited above, which relate to regional security questions bearing on maritime strategies and on ways to increase or protect the value of their oil incomes, respectively.

Finally, especially since Camp David and in a continuing fashion since the Iranian revolution, two particular interests—the preservation and enhancement of Arabism and orthodox Islam—help the governments of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and their neighbors to surmount their ideological differences. In this context, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the other Arab Gulf regimes more often than not continue to stand in unison against Iran whenever the policies or practices of Tehran are perceived as detrimental to Arab interests. This kind of solidarity, notwithstanding the "radical versus conservative" contest between Iraq and the dynastic Arab states of recent years, occurred in reaction to Iran's claims to sovereignty over Bahrain prior to 1970; to events in 1971 when Tehran pressured the Ruler of Sharjah to sign an agreement permitting Iranian occupation of Abu Musa Island and then directed Iranian naval forces to seize the Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands for Ra's al-Khaimah; in more generalized fashion, to the close relationship, much of it clandestine, which Iran maintained with Israel up to the time of the overthrow of the Shah in 1979; and in response to Iranian leader Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini's subsequent attempts to export revolution to these states.

Regarding the religious factor, theological considerations are once more serving as a unifying force not only both within and among the officialdom of these states but also, to a palpable degree, among those who

## PANEL 4

oppose the region's incumbent regimes. Even so, it is important to underscore the fact that differing versions of Islam are adhered to by the government of Iran and its counterparts among the Arab states of the Gulf. In all the latter are officially orthodox Sunni and thus at doctrinal odds with Iran, the citadel of heterodox (Shi'a) Islam. Both factors, the national-ethnic as well as the religious, tend to forge even greater solidarity among Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states with respect to the Palestine problems.

### LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE GULF

The linkage between the Gulf states and those Fertile Crescent ("confrontation") and other states most directly involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute continues to occur within several different contexts. One of these has been in the realm of specific events that occasionally take place in one of the areas—e.g., the sabotage inside Syria or Lebanon of an oil installation involved in the transshipment or refining of oil from Iraq or Saudi Arabia, or, more recently, the embargo by Iran of oil sales to Israel—that have impacted directly on developments in the other area.

A second context has been that of the interrelationships between particular states with important interests in both areas. Examples have been the relations between Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia, on the other; and, until 1979, between both Jordan and Iran, and Israel and Iran. A third context has been the extent to which the mineral and monetary might of the Arab oil-producing states in the Gulf has been perceived, and in certain instances used, as a political and economic arm of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The linkage between the confrontation states and the Gulf in the context of specific events pre-dates the 1973 war. The Arab states of the Gulf both prior and subsequent to that event have repeatedly exerted pressures aimed at regaining the Arab lands seized by Israel in the June 1967 war. They have supported UN resolutions 242 and 338, which call for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied during the conflict (in exchange for recognition of Israel's right to exist), and, in addition, they have insisted on Israeli evacuation of the old quarter of Jerusalem. Without exception, all of them have also demanded recognition of the legitimate rights—among them the right to exercise the principle of self-determination—of the Palestinian people.

In pursuit of these goals, Saudi Arabia and the emirates have helped to finance Jordan's, Oman's, and Northern Yemen's defense network and, together with Iraq, have funneled millions of dollars yearly to the Palestinian guerrillas. They also have contributed heavily to the funding and staffing of the 30,000-man Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

Since the Khartoum conference of Arab heads of state in September 1967, called to assess the lessons learned from the June War, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in particular, have disbursed generous sums to the "frontline" (bordering on Israel) states of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon. Their payments to the first three countries enabled them to pay for much of the damage inflicted by Israeli forces in the course of the war.

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

During the 1973 war, Saudi Arabia and other key Gulf states adopted their most effective position to date on the Arab-Israeli conflict when they imposed the oil embargo and production cutbacks against countries supportive of Israel. They regarded American security assistance to Israel during the war as tantamount to direct US intervention. From October 10 (four days after the hostilities began) until the final ceasefire on October 25, the US Air Force made over 550 flights to Israel in the course of bringing arms and supplies. Especially provocative, in their view, was the White House request to Congress for \$2.2 billion in emergency aid to the Jewish state while the fighting was still going on. King Faysal, in particular, took this as a personal betrayal by President Nixon. His response: on October 18, Saudi Arabia joined Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, and other states in agreeing to curtail its oil production. Two days later it proclaimed, as several of its neighbors had already done, an immediate and total embargo of oil to the United States. This action deprived the United States of nearly 650,000 barrels per day of Saudi crude, the largest single component of America's Arab oil imports.

The Arab states of the Gulf have been able to sway attitudes toward Israel—in the United Nations, in African and Asian capitals, and increasingly within the European Economic Community—only in part through the implicit threat of another embargo in the event of a resumption of hostilities between Israel and one or more of its neighbors. Additional leverage in these matters have been exercised through their influential position with respect to oil prices and production levels and through the generous use of their impressive financial resources. Following the example, first of Kuwait, then of Libya and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and such other Gulf states as Abu Dhabi and Qatar have for several years been in the front ranks of those Arab oil producers who have used their wealth to counter Israeli diplomatic influence in Africa.<sup>2</sup> They have invested heavily in economic ventures in the African and Asian countries viewed not only as states with substantial numbers of kindred Muslims but, also, with governments that, in general, have been sympathetic to their position regarding Palestine.

Since the 1975 Sinai Accords—and especially since the Camp David Agreements—it became clear that most Arab countries had agreed to align with the Arab states of the Gulf. That is, they have been generally receptive to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem, within the limits of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. At the same time, they have opposed the conclusion of separate bilateral treaties between Israel and the frontline Arab states—notably Egypt.

The inability of diplomacy during the 1973-80 period to deal effectively with the Palestinian problem, which lies at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, has been and remains especially troublesome for all these states. More than any other problem, this lies at the root of the ongoing uncertainty among many Arab leaders as to the ultimate interests of the United States and other Western countries. Long perceiving the dynastic Gulf states' policies vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict as overly moderate, some among the more militant elements within the Palestinian diaspora have advocated sabotage of the Arab Gulf states' oil facilities to demonstrate this disenchantment. Others have argued in favor of undermining these regimes and their sources of wealth as a means of indirectly striking Western—particularly the US—and other powers supportive of Israel.

#### PANEL 4

One of the most vexing sources of concern in this context has, of course, been Egypt. Representing fundamental changes in the regional political alignments since Egyptian President Sadat's surprise visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 have been the radically altered relationships between most of these states and Egypt, on one hand, and the nature and orientation of Egypt's ties to Israel, on the other. Cairo's conclusion of a separate peace treaty with Israel—along lines far short of being comprehensive as far as the future of either the Palestinians or the status of Jerusalem is concerned—contributed directly to the distance which most of these states placed between themselves and Egypt following the Camp David Accords of September 1978. In short, one of the consequences of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty was the termination of what up until then had been a growing linkage between the Gulf states and Egypt at the strategic and military levels.

Unlike Egypt, Jordan early on ruled out the option of concluding a similar treaty with Israel and, largely as a result, has maintained its economic and political interests in the area relatively intact. Indeed, Jordan has been particularly active in contributing to the maintenance of the existing governmental systems in the Gulf. As the 1980s began, Jordanian army officers and police and intelligence personnel on secondment and private contract, for example, continued to hold key positions in the defense and internal security forces of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These Jordanians have been generally acknowledged by the conservative Arab regimes as among the most respected and trusted of the various expatriate groups working in the area. In return for the Hashemite Kingdom's multifaceted role in enhancing the security and development of the emirates, Jordan has received important political, diplomatic, and financial support from these states in inter-Arab councils.

Linking the Arab states of the Gulf to the confrontation states in the Arab-Israeli conflict even more directly for a lengthy period were the Iranian-Israeli ties. These two countries had long enjoyed a close political relationship and had collaborated to a significant degree in military and economic matters as well. After the June 1967 War, for example, military equipment bearing Soviet markings found in the Kurdish areas of Iraq bordering Iran was discovered to have been provided the Kurds not by the USSR but by Iran via the Sinai Peninsula, where Israel had recovered considerable amounts of abandoned Soviet-made weaponry in June 1967.

The relationship between Iran and Israel in petroleum grew to be especially close during the 1970s and, for that reason, it came as all the more heavy a blow to Israel when its supply was terminated in early 1979. Following the Sinai II Agreement of September 1975, the importance of Iranian oil to Israel increased dramatically, until, at one point, Iran accounted for nearly ninety percent of Tel Aviv's oil imports.

Lastly, it remains clear that the countries directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict will continue to consider the oil of the Gulf states, and that of Saudi Arabia in particular, as an important political and economic arm of that dispute. This sentiment persists despite growing Arab financial and economic interests in the West which could be jeopardized if another oil embargo were imposed. The linkage between the Palestine problem and

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

the Gulf states, moreover, nowadays extends beyond the Middle East to the basis and kinds of relations these states seek with the United States, Europe and Japan, the most important customers for their oil. Indeed, these states have repeatedly indicated that their willingness to raise or, in some cases, even to maintain existing levels of their oil production to help the consuming countries solve their energy problems cannot be taken for granted. For reasons related to their own national security interests, they have stressed that such cooperation in the future may be made contingent upon the willingness of these countries to alter their Middle Eastern policies toward Israel and, in particular, toward the questions of acknowledging legitimate Islamic rights to the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem and a just and lasting settlement of the problems of the Palestinian people.

### CHANGE, CONTINUITY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE US

As the foregoing account attests, much change has occurred in the past decade in that area which, while including Saudi Arabia as a principal power, actually encompasses a much larger sphere extending from "republican and revolutionary" Iraq and Iran to the eleven dynasties of eastern Arabia. Coups have occurred; revenues among the oil-producing states of the area have more than quintupled; the transition from the strong, highly personalized rule of the late King Faysal to the *de facto* diumverate of King Khalid and Heir Apparent Fahd in Saudi Arabia, and conversely, from the weak, almost totally nominal reign of the late Shaykh Sabah to the more dynamic rule of former Heir Apparent Shaykh Jabr in Kuwait, took place without mishap. Further, a decade-old insurgency in Oman was brought to an end as, likewise, was the Kurdish rebellion, a conflict of even longer duration, in Iraq. Most momentous of all, the dynasty in Iran, the one country in the area throughout this period with a military apparatus, population base, and socio-economic infrastructure both larger and more developed than most of the other Gulf states combined, was toppled.

Even so, amidst these changes—in the case of Iran and oil, changes that were truly epochal and revolutionary in scope—there have been and remain important themes of continuity. Iraq retained the secular and socialist orientation of its government and economy but, of greater importance and for the reasons delineated earlier, brought its foreign policies into greater harmony with those of the other Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. In the dynastic states of Arabia, although these have been portrayed incessantly for the past half decade by Western and especially American analysts as ruled by inherently unstable regimes, coups did not occur. (And of greater significance, notwithstanding the seizure of the Grand Mosque in November 1979, none were attempted.) Compared to the more advanced societies of the industrialized and allegedly far more developed and progressive West, these polities evidenced less theft, less divorce, fewer rapes and other crimes of violence to persons or property; less unemployment; fewer political demonstrations; and fewer related societal problems as those manifested through apathy and alienation born—as in most of the rest of the world, including Western Europe, Japan,

## PANEL 4

and the United States—in a milieu perceived by many to be one of limited educational, economic, and social opportunities.

The institutions relating rulers to ruled throughout the region were, of course, constantly being challenged. But, for the most part, fewer than expected were found to be seriously wanting. Western and other biases against the forms of rule in the area under examination notwithstanding, a close look at the substance of political, social, and economic life within these states revealed what as the 1980s began, was accepted almost as a truism: that most of them were in one way or another insecure, in common with the lot of most other developing countries. In as many other ways, however, they were revealed to be as resilient and responsive, again as most other developing countries, if not more so, to the societal strains of countries caught up in the throes of change along a broad front.

To be sure, such emotionally charged issues as moral probity, economic inequality, and popular participation in the political process constituted the substance of much discussion and debate within these societies as they entered the 1980s. And there appeared to be regionwide agreement that rapid modernization was not only psychologically stressful but, also as the seizure of the Grand Mosque dramatically demonstrated, had revealed some to be less capable of coping with the associated strains than others. Even so, a consensus appeared to hold, however begrudgingly in some instances, that the great majority of the region's regimes were probably as accessible, accommodating, and accountable (if, again, not more so) to the overall concerns, needs, and interests of their citizenry as most other governments. With respect to the latter, this included not only those of the much more austere and authoritarian "revolutionary free officers" or "Islamic republic" models, but, also, for that matter, many of those more frequently associated with Western-style "democracies."

Political interrelationships between and among Saudi Arabia and its dynastic counterparts elsewhere in the Gulf, on one hand, and between these states, both individually and collectively, and Iraq and Iran, on the other, have thus often been exceptionally complicated, as this essay has sought to demonstrate. A comprehensive understanding of the impact of what has and has not taken place in the region continues to elude the grasp of most outside observers. As valid as this statement has been and remains for intra-Gulf relations, it is becoming increasingly applicable with respect to the changing relationship between these states (again both singly and jointly) and more distant powers.

Regarding relationships between the Arab states of the Gulf and the United States, the single most important difficulty remains the festering problem of Palestine. However, in terms of advancing US interests in the Gulf, the leaders of the countries in question are of the view that it should not be for purposes of American economic or strategic concerns alone, that Washington must urgently search for a way out of the hitherto only marginally productive peace negotiations. More than anything else, many of these leaders argue, the real impetus lies in the increasingly unconscionable and not at all unrelated moral cost engendered by the continuation of the conflict and the immeasurable loss of human life—Israeli, Lebanese, Palestinian. Almost daily, countless more people are killed in what must surely rank as one of the most tragic conflicts in this century.

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

Many Americans may find it difficult to accept that in the view of every single government in the Gulf, the principal stumbling block to achieving an early settlement is not so much Israel—which alone, they believe, could not derail the peace train for long—as Washington. After all, they stress, in a world where more than 100 nations, including all of the major Western allies, Japan, and the overwhelming majority of the developing countries have been openly engaged for quite some time in a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the United States remains the one major holdout. Countless spokesmen for these regimes argue, in short, that for reasons owing largely to Israeli and Zionist shackles on US policy towards the Palestine problem, America's critical interests in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world are being pursued more ineffectually than at any point in recent memory.

The regionwide apprehension about American foreign policy intentions and capacities mirror an abiding concern among the local governments about the prospects of the United States ever arriving at a negotiated settlement of the Palestine problem. Virtually all the Gulf states and most of America's West European allies continue to be dismayed, for example, at the apparent inability of the United States to recognize and reward the one Palestinian willing to negotiate rather than fight: Yasir Arafat.

A related apprehension of many Gulf officials is that, unless PLO moderation proves more fruitful than it has to date, the organization's leadership is almost certain to be replaced by more radical elements. And should that occur, they argue, one can expect an ensuing revival of the earlier pattern of hijackings, bombings, and assassinations of Israeli, Western, and other leaders. The reason: to dramatize—again—to a seemingly listless America the point that Palestine is the one US foreign policy difficulty, which, short of an early and unequivocal application of the principle of self-determination to the Palestinian people, will not go away.

Spokesmen for the regimes in question stress further that should US policies contribute much more than they may already have to the eventual downfall of the moderate PLO leadership, the Palestinian commandoes know exactly what they will have to do in order to get Washington to take them seriously. Yet they wring their hands in exasperation at a government, which, they argue, by its timidity and indecisiveness, can knowingly be a major stimulus to such an eventuality.

In terms of the issues examined in this symposium, then, the situation in the Gulf and nearby areas could hardly be more serious. Nor could the risks be greater in terms of American-Arab and American-Israeli interests in the cause of justice and peace, or concerning United States security needs for assured access to its foreign oil supplies. Yet, as leaders in the region in question never tire of emphasizing to Americans and others who take the time to hear them out, the stalemate in which the peace process remains mired need not continue. For the United States merely to engage in a dialogue with PLO officials, they argue, does not have to be construed as recognition of the organization itself, nor as a willingness to "negotiate" with the PLO. Neither, they are quick to add, need it be equated with an American bestowal of imprimatur on any of the PLO's acts or policies.

Those American officials whose apprehensions on such matters run

#### PANEL 4

so deep as to preclude their support for any policy change in this direction have apparently forgotten, this line of reasoning continues, the US government's previous experience in similar matters with respect to the People's Republic of China (PRC). For years, one is reminded, the United States talked officially and openly with PRC representatives in Warsaw without such discussions entailing, either preconditionally or during the process itself, that the United States formally recognize or negotiate with their government. And the point needs underscoring that even though the Communist Chinese refused then and to this day still refuse to recognize Taiwan's right to exist, the issues and interests at stake were such that there was never any serious question that this should prevent either them or the United States from maintaining an official dialogue with one another.

In the eyes of many Gulf states' officials, the PRC analogy to US policy toward the PLO is a telling one. They see the United States, in marked contrast to its position with regard to Communist China, persisting in its adherence to a policy which has patently demonstrated its inability to serve the cause of either justice or peace let alone an array of other American interests in the region. Failing that policy's early abrogation or renunciation, they conclude, the United States will continue to refuse to deal with the PLO simply because it has yet to say (and may possibly never say) that it recognizes Israel's right to exist.

To the overwhelming majority of the Gulf states' politically aware citizenry, such a situation remains unchanged from former US Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young's description of it as "ridiculous." Worse, in their and many other people's eyes, including a growing number of West European nations, it constitutes *prima facie* evidence of the extent to which successive American administrations have been and remain willing to tolerate and prolong the daily risk and loss of still more lives—Muslim, Jewish, Christian. History, they contend, will hold America to account for the attendant dangers that this unfortunate state of affairs has already entailed and still entails, lacking a breakthrough of major significance, for the prospects of achieving anything near to an equitable and enduring settlement of the conflict.

While the Palestinian issue continues to surpass all others as a difficulty requiring the urgent attention of US decisionmakers, other problems affecting America's oil and security needs in the Gulf are arguably more perceptual than factual in origin. For example, many Americans fault the absence of a written constitution along Western lines in Saudi Arabia, implicitly equating this with backwardness and a signal of the eventual if not imminent demise of the regime. Yet many Gulf citizens would point up a paradox here: namely that those who reason thusly are either unaware of, or otherwise they selectively delete from their consciousness, the fact that two nations widely portrayed by Westerners as paragons of political development, England and Israel, are also without written constitutions.

Many observers, moreover, make much of the fact that Western-style "elections" do not occur in Saudi Arabia or in most of the other Gulf states. In so doing they disregard the fact that most politically inclined Gulf citizens express themselves in public and in other forums with great frequency in what many, not all of whom fall in the category of "apologists," characterize as merely different kinds of "elections." As in many other parts of the world, their reference points in this regard are to an array of

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

institutionalized means for regularly ascertaining the public will. The means, to be sure, are not in this instance the same ones which most Americans have grown accustomed to in the unique context of their own system. But the differences, conclude many who have lived under and examined both systems at close hand over long periods of time, are primarily in the realms of form and style, and, to be sure, in the actual process. These same individuals conclude that the similarities, in far more instances than many are aware of or would be willing to acknowledge, are mainly in the substantive results.

American officials who have expressed their preconceived notions and emotional biases on such matters, however, often dismiss the foregoing considerations as little more than apologetic indulgence. Their tendency on the whole, moreover, has been to focus not on the important commonalities. Rather, their concern has mainly been about what, to them, seems unfamiliar, if not unduly esoteric and anachronistic. They appear more than willing, in effect, to turn a deaf ear to what spokesmen for the existing political framework point out: namely, that any system which has been as widely and deeply acknowledged as legitimate—as, for example, the Islamic and Gulf states' systems of government in their broad outlines have been for more than fourteen centuries—can be considered, in a sense, to be "democratic."

What is most in need of radical change, many who live and work under such a system would contend, is not so much other people's political frameworks or processes, in order that in time they might evolve to a position more in conformity and harmony with the ones which exist in the United States. Rather, it is the perceptual lenses through which many American officials tend to view and judge the institutions linking governors to governed in lands which are at once quite distant and quite different from their own. For unless this is done, critics of American policies toward the Gulf contend, the evidence will continue to mount that the United States intends to persist in acting, no less than the British and other foreign powers who preceded them in these waters once did, and whether the United States realizes it or not, as though it seeks to make this part of the world, too, over in its own image.

A further dimension of such perceptual difficulties which many Americans encounter in their efforts to increase their knowledge and understanding of the Gulf states centers on notions of political stability. To be sure, such efforts are made the more difficult when they hear a former US Secretary of Defense and past head of the Central Intelligence Agency decry America's dependence on what he and other former high officials allege, in the case of the Gulf states, to be "some of the most politically unstable regimes in the world." Yet both he and others of similar outlook stand to be refuted and embarrassed if a recent, detailed study of this subject, using Saudi Arabia as a model, conducted by Professor Edward Azar of the University of North Carolina, finds its way into print.<sup>3</sup> Using computers, charts, and comparative data collected assiduously for the past 31 years on every country in the world, Azar has provided a rational, scientific accounting of Saudi Arabia's political stability over the past three decades and arrives at nearly the opposite conclusion.

Indeed, the study completed by Azar demonstrates beyond doubt that Saudi Arabia, over the period in question, has been one of the most stable

#### PANEL 4

countries in the world in terms of its domestic politics. And of nearly equal significance in terms of the interests of the United States and other countries in the Kingdom, the study reveals that Saudi foreign policies and actions have consistently been among the most predictable of any in the world. Only the Kingdom's relations with Egypt, and, to a lesser extent with the United States—for which the latter, one might argue, is an responsible as the regime in Riyadh—could be considered exceptions. (But, if so, they could constitute only partial exceptions, for even the relationships with these two countries over the period indicated have been far more stable and predictable than not.)

Both Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, however, would be among the Arab world's first countries to admit two stresses on their political systems which they have very little prospect of transforming unilaterally. The first is the likelihood that, owing to what they perceive to be Israeli intransigence and domination over US policies pertaining to the Palestine problem and the question of Jerusalem, the Arab-Israeli conflict will continue. The second is the likelihood that the psychological and societal strains occasioned in the course of implementing their ambitious development plans will also continue. In the view of all the Gulf states' governments, it hardly needs underscoring that they consider the United States to be in a position to do a great deal—indeed, more than any other country in the world—to alleviate the first-named stress, even if it is not similarly situated to influence the outcome of the second.

In any case, both strains conjure up the imponderable insofar as American interests in the Gulf are concerned. In the all-important case of Saudi Arabia, they raise questions about the Kingdom's capacity to remain within the range of domestic political stability and foreign relations predictability. And together, to be sure, they underscore the potentially important political consequences both for that country, and to a palpable degree for such Gulf states as Bahrain and Oman as well, which derive from their security, oil, and related relationships with the United States.

Beyond the concern with questions pertaining directly to political stability, there is also the perceptual problem associated with matters of moral probity and corruption. Regarding the latter phenomenon, a growing view inside many of the Gulf states is almost certain not to sit well with many Americans. That view concedes the point that the frequency with which corruption occurs is indeed increasing in their societies, even though it has not yet reached the magnitude or pervasiveness that it has in the United States, which many Gulf states' nationals, based on their experience of living and studying in America for long periods, consider to be one of the most perpetually scandal-ridden and corrupt political systems in the world. Quoting an American folk cliché, they contend that "People who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones."

Other problems may at first glance appear to take on the character of unreality. On closer inspection, however, they often turn out to be quite real indeed. For example, numerous Gulf officials expressed incredulity in 1980 that, during the course of the same month, an American government not only could but actually did neglect to obtain permission from one of the countries in the region prior to using its military facilities to invade one of that country's most important neighbors. These same leaders expressed

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

their astonishment at the fact that Washington not only could but did ask Saudi Arabia if it would be good enough to help fill America's strategic petroleum reserves so that in the event of any future Arab oil embargo aimed at the United States, such as the last one in which the Saudis participated, the effect would be minimal.

And many of these same officials wonder at the political sagacity of an American government which, demonstrably not yet free of Israeli constraints on matters of policy pertaining to the PLO and numerous other items high on their own national security agendas, asks that it be regarded seriously and without suspicion with respect to its motives and intentions. Specifically, these leaders harbor deep-seated reservations about the performance expected of them in the context of US national security interests and *their* oil; about the objectives of diminishing the opportunities for Soviet involvement and influence in their societies; about the goal of enhancing the prospects for greater security cooperation among the Gulf states and the US; and, most important of all, about the sincerity of Washington's oft-stated commitment to helping bring to an early end the Arab-Israeli dispute and its most important dimension, the Palestine problem—in their view, the single greatest impediment blocking the way to a more cooperative dialogue between themselves and the United States on the matter of assuring America's access to the Gulf's petroleum supplies.

Nor has the consternation of these officials with the efficacy of US policies in the region been limited to the foregoing considerations. The concern of many Gulf states' leaders has become far greater and at the same time substantially different from their perceptions when Washington relied overwhelmingly in the region as a whole on the former Pahlavi regime in Iran. Then, as subsequently, to be sure, the United States seemed to be placing an inordinately high degree of faith in the highly personal and seemingly precarious leadership of single individuals; as the 1980s began, in Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel. However, in the case of Pahlavi Iran, the fear was at least mitigated by these states' acknowledgement of a certain appropriateness in the United States having chosen to pursue its regional security interests in tandem with that country.

The rationale behind such a view took into consideration the fact that Iran, at least, was a state situated in the immediate region of America's oil, security, and related concerns. Egypt and Israel, by contrast, are located in Africa and the eastern reaches of the Mediterranean. Secondly, again unlike Egypt or Israel, Pahlavi Iran was a substantial producer of oil for the United States and many of its allies. Thirdly, again unlike Egypt or Israel, Iran's 1,500-mile border with the Soviet Union provided it with a range of security, intelligence, and related interests deemed at the time to be complementary to those of the United States.

Fourth, of immense economic significance was the fact that Iran was by and large both inclined toward and—in contrast to Egypt and Israel—capable of paying its own way in the course of bearing its end of the relationship. Finally, there was little doubt either as to the credibility of the Iranian regime's convictions and commitment on matters of a regional security nature, as its decisive intervention to help put down a Marxist-oriented insurrection in Oman demonstrated.

## PANEL 4

By contrast, virtually all of the Gulf states have come to question the wisdom of a US foreign policy that, although aimed at increasing the level of stability in a region consisting of two dozen countries, has chosen since Camp David to align itself so closely with Egypt and Israel. Based on the record of the past thirty years, most of the governments in the Gulf view Egypt and Israel in highly pejorative terms. Apart from the fact that neither is a Gulf state, together they are considered by many to share the following drawbacks: their previous extensive involvement in activities and policies which have contributed to regional instability; their history of interference in matters pertaining to the internal security of other countries in the area; their proven proclivity toward obtaining—and, in the case of the Israelis, the habit of taking their time relinquishing—other people's real estate; their dire need to gain access to other countries' financial resources—if not from within the immediate region then from other foreign sources, including most prominently the United States, as indicated by their ability to garner for themselves fully 70 percent of all American foreign economic assistance promised for 1980; their persistent monetary and fiscal weakness to the extent of compelling international banking and other economic observers to concede the point that were their foreign, mainly American, aid to cease, both would be near bankruptcy within a perilously short period of time; and in the context of any regional role which Americans might envision either or both of these states performing in the Gulf or most other areas in the Middle East—for all these and other reasons, their political unacceptability.

In addition to the foregoing criticisms by Gulf states officials of the political dimension of US policies in the area, other serious conflicts have been engendered among American economic, diplomatic, and strategic interests. Mounting arms purchases throughout the Gulf have been a principal means of balancing the enormous outflow of US funds for foreign oil. At the same time, very real concerns have been voiced in the United States over the danger of wholesale exports of armaments and complex weapons systems, which involve US government, industry, and personnel in massive military training and logistical support programs. In response, both the Executive Branch and a number of influential members of Congress have favored some form of control and limitation over the flow of military hardware to the area.

Finally, the far-reaching issue of technology transfer from the United States to these states continues to pose yet unresolved (and, to date, little acknowledged) problems. Thus far, mainly goods and services have been transferred. It remains an open question whether the United States and other advanced industrial nations wish to yield American technological superiority which is the basis of much of American wealth and strength. It is also uncertain whether such a transfer can be accomplished and what economic, commercial, and societal disruptions—at either end of the relationship—might be produced in the attempt. These doubts and fears suggest how complex and far-reaching American relations with the Arab states of the Gulf have become in the very recent past.

Looking to the future, numerous other problems threaten the basis of American economic dealings with these states. Congress has itself imposed serious restraints on this relationship through tax legislation

## ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

which, in its complexity—and many have said, as well, in its inequity—has dissuaded a large number of US firms from pursuing economic opportunities in the region. The anti-Arab boycott legislation has also turned a number of Gulf governments and companies away from US procurement. Regarding the last-named impediment, these states remain both resentful and frustrated at US condemnation of their efforts to isolate Israel as immoral and illegal—thus perpetrating, they contend, one of the longest occupations of other countries' territories in this century. These feelings are intensified as a consequence of the American government's record of having operated—and induced these states to join the United States in support of—trade boycotts against Cuba, the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc, North Vietnam, North Korea, Albania, the People's Republic of China, and even against their neighbor and fellow Islamic state, Iran. Their long-standing view of the United States as the Olympic champion of boycotts is only strengthened by what they consider, in this instance, to be a double standard if not moral hypocrisy on the part of Washington's officialdom.

Discouraging as many of these portents may be, there have been signs throughout the period surveyed herein that a growing number of Americans are gradually becoming more aware of the fundamentally different basis on which American political, economic, and commercial transactions with the Arab states of the Gulf will have to proceed. This basis is one in which the previous supplier-client relationship is being replaced by a more genuine interdependence.

The question remains, however, whether the United States can adapt sufficiently and in time to ensure both its national security interests with respect to access to the Gulf states' oil and, at the same time, a substantial share in the developing economies of the area. The rapidly increasing participation of other industrialized countries in the development and related concerns of these states suggests that, as in world trade and other areas of international endeavor generally since World War II, Americans will be hard-pressed to maintain their once predominant role.

### ENDNOTES: THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF

1. The word "obtain" is an accurate depiction of the Saudi view of what transpired. "Permitted" would be a more correct rendition of Abu Dhabi's sentiments as to what was agreed. Of possible future significance, of course, is the considerable difference between the concepts that lie behind these words, most particularly as pertains to the vexsome notion of sovereignty.
2. Black African recipients of Israeli aid have included Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Chad, and the Ivory Coast. Most African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel in the aftermath of the October 1973 war. Since then, in international and regional organizations, they have consistently backed Arab-sponsored resolutions condemning Israel. These include the UN's 1973 "Zionism-is-a-form-of-racism" resolution and its recognition in 1974 of the PLO. In more recent years, Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil-producing states have underwritten the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa as a means of further consolidating their influence in the sub-Saharan region.
3. Edward Azar, "Saudi Arabia's International Behavior," A Paper Presented to the Symposium on "State, Economy and Power in Saudi Arabia," University of Exeter, United Kingdom, 7 July 1980.

## PANEL 4 PAPER: Communicating in the Middle East

by Thomas C. Barger  
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Good communication, in the sense of arriving at complete mutual understanding, is always likely to be difficult. Given the cultural difference between Americans and Middle Easterners, that we have achieved any mutual understanding is almost a minor miracle. Consider the roles of religion and government. In the United States they are kept separate almost to the point of enmity. In the Middle East the tendency is toward the complete ascendancy of religion. Even in Lebanon, before its present descent into utter chaos, the composition of government was based strictly on religious lines. In the states with nearly one hundred percent Muslim populations the religion and the government are one in theory, if not in practice. Whereas the taint of religion is rigorously excluded from our public schools, in the Middle East religion is the core of the curriculum. The Koran is the text by which students are taught Arabic, in Iran as well as in the Arab-speaking countries. Life is not divided into secular and religious compartments.

In other matters our attitudes seem to be almost diametrically opposed. In the Middle East adultery is a serious business; witness "The Death of a Princess." In our current literature and films adultery is portrayed as sort of a light-hearted parlor sport. Gone are the days when the husband who found his wife in bed with another man and shot both of them received at least a certain amount of public if not legal sympathy. Under Islamic law, such an act is perfectly legal as it was under Jewish law as set forth in Deuteronomy. Sodomy is punishable in at least one school of Islamic law by death accomplished by pushing the offender off a high cliff. In the very early days of ARAMCO operations in Saudi Arabia, the local authorities asked to use the tower of a drilling rig for the purpose, lacking any suitable cliffs in the near vicinity; ARAMCO politely declined to interrupt the drilling. In the United States, by contrast, political candidates are busy currying favor with gay rights movements.

Under *Shari'ah* law, like most other law systems, the object of criminal trials is to determine whether the accused committed the crime as alleged. Confession under duress is outlawed, but any other evidence is acceptable. Our peculiar zeal for application of the "exclusionary rule" appears to a Middle Easterner as a preference for form over substance, a preoccupation with ritual as laid down by the Supreme Court, often in split decisions, rather than concern for the public weal. These examples are only the beginning of a tabulation of our contrasts in values.

## PANEL 4

Nevertheless, with patience we do communicate with each other reasonably well. The rest of this essay will be devoted to some observations on why this is so and some fundamentals of background that may be helpful. Whatever we do as Americans, however, the most important factor in our communications is the enormous number of Middle Eastern students educated in our schools and colleges who have learned to understand us and have imparted this knowledge to their countrymen. Our contribution to the process by reciprocal American interest in learning Arabic and Persian is not of the same magnitude. The ratio of Americans speaking Arabic or Persian to English-speaking Middle Easterners is probably of the order of 1 to 100. From these students educated in America we can learn an important lesson—humility.

Most of us having experience with foreign students have been struck from time to time that speaking excellent English is no guarantee the student understands Americans. The failure of many Iranian students in this country to understand our attitude toward the hostages in Iran is a current example. The lesson for us is that the same phenomenon is even more likely to afflict us, given our general ignorance of Arabic and Persian. The prescription for the affliction is humility. Besides humility we would also do well to bear in mind Mr. Dooley's remark on politicians: "It isn't what they don't know that is so bad. It's what they do know that isn't true that causes all the trouble." Many an American who knew that "*In shallah*" means "If God wills" has been exasperated when Abdullah responded to an order to be on the job promptly at 8:00 a.m. with "*In shallah*." Abdullah was not preparing an alibi for tardiness. He was saying he'd be there barring storms, floods, and earthquakes.

Communications requires at least two actors: one giving and the other receiving, each in turn. Though giving is the most fun and most easily done, receiving is the more important and the most difficult. The giving requires good manners, good sense, and patience along with a few formalities easily learned. The receiving requires some background for what is *not* spoken or is taken for granted by the giver as well known by the receiver. Unless the receiving antenna is very finely tuned, the giving is very likely to be on the wrong wavelength. So I leave the giving to improvisation to suit the time, place, and content while I restrict myself to certain aspects of the Middle East I judge fundamental to the beginning of proper reception.

Most fundamental is to understand that not all Arabs, let alone all Middle Easterners, are alike. An extreme expression of this belief I once heard pithily expressed by a travel agent to a customer who had decided to alter her itinerary to avoid the eastern shore of the Mediterranean: "I think you are absolutely right Mrs. Jones. Those Turks, and Ayrabs, and Hindoos and Jews are all shooting at one another and there's no telling what might happen." While we would not think of lumping all Europeans together, we too often think of all the Arabs from the Nile to the Arabian Sea as being out of the same mold. This is not to say that there are no common threads or traits between the Arab states, but King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia could not understand Lebanese colloquial Arabic.\* The facts

\*For my purposes I define the Middle East as Israel, Iran, and all the Arab countries lying between the eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea.

## COMMUNICATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

of geography are fairly readily apparent though the sheer desolation of the Egyptian desert and much of the Arabian Peninsula may come as a surprise to those unacquainted with deserts. Ninety-five-plus percent of the 40 million Egyptians live in the Nile Valley, less than 4 percent of Egypt's total area. Saudi Arabia's area, roughly equivalent to that of the United States east of the Mississippi, is inhabited by not more than five or six million people. The population of Iran is about twice the total population of the Arab countries contiguous to the Persian Gulf (called the Arab Gulf by the Arabs since about 1960). The location of Arab and Iranian oil fields makes the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz self-evident.

What is not so easily grasped is the character and history of the peoples of these countries, including the minorities, the governments, and the various states. An article such as this can do little other than attempt by a somewhat anecdotal treatment to stimulate the imagination and give a brief account of some of the more important fundamentals of the background common to most of the people an American is likely to meet.

Ironically, we generally know more of the ancient history of some of the region than we do of events within living memory. We are likely to know more about ancient Egypt than the building of the Suez Canal and its part in sparking the Suez affair of 1956. We know that the Persians are responsible for the Marathon run but only an utter ignorance of Persian/Iranian history of the last 150 years can explain suggestions made after the invasion of Afghanistan that we should warn the Iranians to beware of Soviet intentions. Given their experience with Russia, much of it within the memory of the Ayatollah Khomeini, such advice is akin to warning a chicken farmer of the propensities of foxes. We see the Iraqi monarchy destroyed in an afternoon with machineguns on a lawn in Baghdad, so we conclude all monarchies, per se, are fragile. Established by the Allies after World War I in a country with no indigenous family, no history of previous ruling in that country and no close supporters, we place it in the same category as one founded on a family that ruled in its area before the American Revolution, is indigenous to the area, and is comprised of hundreds of members. On the other hand, we seemed completely unaware until the last moment that the dynasty of the Shah was founded by his father, without family and with little support other than military force and the largess derived from oil. Essential as acquaintance with the history of the Middle East is for communication, it is hard to come by. I could not find the word "Ayatollah" in the index of any book available to me written before 1979, including *Webster's Unabridged*, the latest *Encyclopedia Britannica*, *Political Elites of the Middle East* (1975), and a 500-page volume on Iran, published in 1978.

Knowledge of history, customs, and religion is no substitute for common sense and exercise of the imagination, an exercise our narcissistic tendencies seem to inhibit. An excellent example that involves another country we seem to have difficulty understanding, Mexico, illustrates the point. When the news of the discovery of large new oil fields got out of the technical press and into the newspapers, the lawyers in the Department of Energy were attracted. We sent a delegation to Mexico City to find out the price at which the Mexicans would sell us

## PANEL 4

oil. Presumably no one involved perceived that an easier way with less potential for embarrassment was possible. The chief of the delegation could have propped his feet on his desk, lighted a cigar, and pretended he was the Mexican Minister of Hydrocarbons. He would then have meditated for a few minutes on the course of American-Mexican relations since 1846. Next, in his mind's eye he would have opened his office door and admitted the Gringos. When the inevitable question was popped, he would have blown a couple of smoke rings, taken his cigar out of his mouth and asked, "What's OPEC getting these days?" A lot of time would have been saved, no studies in depth of human behavior were necessary, and common sense would have triumphed.

In the preceding anecdote, common sense needed at least the support of some knowledge of the war with Mexico. So in the Middle East, the listening or receiving side of communication especially is helped by a knowledge of at least three matters. These are: Islam, Oil, and Palestine. T. E. Lawrence is supposed to have said "Arabs think like every one else. They simply start from a different set of premises." Lawrence's aphorism, nice as it sounds, is not of much practical importance unless one remembers it also applies equally well if "Republicans," "Democrats," "Eskimos," "Texans" and "Chinese" are substituted for "Arabs." In other words, if we know the premises we have a chance at understanding, that is, receiving communications.

## ISLAM

Islam's most striking difference from Christianity and Judaism lies in the nature of the Koran (or *Qur'an*). The Koran is regarded by Muslims as a record of the exact words of God spoken in Arabic to His Messenger, Muhammad, in revelations over a period of some twenty years. The Bible, in both the Old and New Testaments, is generally regarded as written by authors inspired by God but with only those passages so specified as being the words of the Deity and even then not necessarily always in the exact words of the revelation. The originals of the New Testament, for example, seem to have used both Greek and Aramaic. Furthermore, the revelations to Muhammad were written down as they occurred, though their compilation in their present arrangement took place after his death. The revelations are believed to be from an original heavenly scripture from which the books of the Jews and the Christians were also derived. This common source is said to account for the many parallelisms found in the Koran. This status of the Koran then is that it cannot be changed in any way nor can any of its positive injunctions be abrogated by good Muslims.

"Islam" derives from the Arabic "submission," that is, submission to the will of God. One who accepts Islam is a "Muslim" one who has submitted to the will of God. For some reason not readily apparent to me, we seem to expect better behavior on the part of people of a religion not our own than we expect from our fellow believers. While we may not approve, we do seem to expect a certain number of backsliders in those of our own beliefs. Conversely, we do not have the same sort of tolerance for those who do not act in strict accordance with their particular creeds. And we may even go so far as to suppose that one who deviates from the strict

## COMMUNICATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

demands of a religion strange to us has abandoned it, a dangerous assumption. One of my Muslim friends had a couple quartered with him as guests of the Saudi government in the days when public accommodations for Europeans were nonexistent in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. The couple spoke Arabic and had spent a number of years in the Arab world. One evening the host went walking in his garden with the husband. They did not return to the house until long after sundown. The next morning when they were alone in the house the guest attempted to sound out my friend in a rather clumsy way as to the possibility of his conversion to Christianity. My friend, containing himself with difficulty out of politeness, asked the reason for such an approach. The guest replied that he had noticed the evening before my friend did not say his prayers at sundown and so he assumed he was not a truly believing Muslim. Salih, in telling me the story, was still furious, exclaiming that hospitality required that he should not embarrass his guest "and this fool should have known better" than to so misinterpret a gesture of courtesy. So if a Muslim is found drinking whiskey, for example, it's his own business as far as non-Muslims are concerned. And that some Muslims drink does not negate the fact that most of the world's Muslims do not.

In addition to the Koran, Muslims are guided by the "sayings" of Muhammad. These were given orally to the Faithful in response to questions, by rulings on disputed points of law, as suggestions on behavior and by elucidation of the Koran. The sayings are regarded as inspired even though those who wrote them down were not. The sayings were collected long after the death of Muhammad, especially after the great sweep of Muslim conquests in the century following Muhammad's death when the ruling of so many diverse peoples raised questions not readily answered by reference to the Koran. They were carefully sifted for authenticity and became embodied in formal books called "The Traditions." Together with the Koran they form the basis for the *Shari'ah*, the law of Islam.

Muhammad had made no explicit provision for his successor nor did the Koran contain any instructions. On his death, 6 June A.D. 632, after some initial confusion, Abu Bakr, a close companion and father-in-law of Muhammad and of his clan, the Quraish, was chosen as his "successor," that is, he became the first Caliph (or *Khalifah*) of Islam. The next two, 'Umar and 'Uthman, were also close companions of Muhammad. The former was his father-in-law, the latter his son-in-law, and both were of the Quraish. They were elected, or perhaps better, selected by the Muslim community of Medina not without dissent, especially from those who felt that the Caliph should be of Muhammad's immediate family. Both died by assassination—'Umar by the hand of a Persian Christian slave aggrieved by what he regarded as an unfair decision on wages due him. 'Uthman was besieged in his house in Medina by mutineers from Egypt and what is now Iraq. He was accused of permitting corruption and of nepotism in his appointment of governors of the conquered provinces. After a prolonged stand-off, with the more senior members of the Muslim community giving him no help, the house was attacked and the Caliph murdered.

The twenty-five years following the death of Muhammad had been years of almost uninterrupted Muslim victories. The religion of Islam had

## PANEL 4

been carried to Libya on the west and Persia on the east and the Byzantine Empire had been shorn of the province of Syria. The spoils remitted to Medina by the conquering armies had been enormous. But the strains of governing the conquered territories, of dividing the spoils, of satisfying ambitious men had begun to tell. 'Ali, one of the first converts to Islam, son-in-law of Muhammad, father of his only two grandsons—Hasan and Hussain—was elected Caliph. Shortly thereafter civil war broke out: Muslim fighting Muslim for the first time in disputing the succession to the Caliphate. In the end 'Ali was assassinated and the older of his sons, Hasan, who had retired to Mecca, was poisoned. The second son, Hussain, who posed a threat to the governor of Damascus who had proclaimed himself Caliph, was brutally murdered with his younger children. His martyrdom is celebrated annually by the Shi'ahs on the tenth of Muharram with a highly emotional reenactment of his death.

The dispute over the succession to 'Ali and the deaths of his sons lead to the great split in Islam between the Sunnis and the Shi'ahs, largely based on the quarrel between those who favored the election of the Caliph and those, the Shi'ahs, who believed the Caliphate could be held only by a direct descendant of Muhammad. Therefore, to the Shi'ahs, who use the term "Imam" rather than "Caliph," 'Ali was the first legitimate successor to Muhammad. The Shi'ahs of Iran belong to the largest of the Shi'ah sects called "Twelvers," that is, they reckon there have been only 12 legitimate successors to Muhammad. The twelfth disappeared but is still alive and one day will return to earth. The other principal division of Islam, the Sunnis, who far outnumber the Shi'ahs, have four schools of law differing only in minor points and all regarded as orthodox.

The total number of minor sects in Islam is very great, some one hundred and fifty, but whatever the sect, all Muslims accept the Koran though they differ on the traditions of what Muhammad said and many other points of doctrine and practice. Also they all accept the "Five Pillars of Islam" which are derived directly from the Koran. These are:

1. Bearing witness by the recitation of "There is no god but God (Allah) and Muhammad is His Messenger." ("Messenger" is a closer rendering of the Arabic than the more usual "Prophet" and the Koran distinguishes between "Prophet" and "Messenger.")
2. Prayer five times a day; at dawn or an hour before sunrise, noon, midafternoon, sunset, and night about two hours after sunset. The ritual of the prayer varies with the sects, but in all the worshipper faces toward Mecca.
3. The giving of alms. At a minimum the legal tax of about 2½ percent on property is collected and distributed by the government in Islamic states. The exact amount varies with the kind of property involved, minutely described by Shariah law. Much merit is accorded to generous voluntary giving.
4. Fasting during the month of Ramadhan is enjoined by the Koran and consists of abstention from food, water, and sexual intercourse from the dawn prayer until sundown. Muhammad abolished the intercalary month that had been inserted every 3 years before his time, but continued the use of lunar months. As the lunar year is about 10½ days shorter than

## COMMUNICATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

the solar year the lunar months rotate through the seasons. When Ramadhan falls in the hot summer months in the lower latitudes, the fast is a real hardship.

5. Every Muslim who can do so must make a pilgrimage to Mecca once in his lifetime.

The pilgrimage to Mecca did not originate with Muhammad. An annual pilgrimage existed before his time, having the character of a sort of country fair in that warfare was suspended so people could travel and bring their goods with them for exchange. The *Ka'abah* in Mecca was a place of sanctuary and of idol worship. Muhammad, born about A.D. 570, received his first revelations and began his mission about 610. It is believed that some of the unpopularity of his teachings derived from fear by the Meccans that his doctrines might interfere with the lucrative pilgrimage. As persecution grew the Muslims left Mecca for Medina on 16 July 622, a date which later became the beginning of the Muslim calendar, marking the "emigration," *Hijrah* in Arabic, whence the designation of dates, as A.H. 1400, the present year. Welcomed in Medina, they defeated Meccan forces sent against them. Gaining in converts and military power Muhammad returned to Mecca in triumph in 622, destroyed the idols in or around the *Ka'abah* and made the pilgrimage obligatory. In the Mecca days prayers were said facing Jerusalem. Some 16 months after the emigration to Medina, the direction of prayer changed to Mecca but Jerusalem remains sacred as the first "*qiblah*" as well as the place from which Muhammad ascended into heaven. Muhammad returned to Medina, died, and was buried there. Hence, though only the pilgrimage to Mecca is obligatory, visits to Medina and Jerusalem are regarded as meritorious acts.

Though the acts prescribed by the Pillars are divinely ordained and not subject to any essential change, various accommodations to practical needs are made as in the instance of prayer mentioned earlier. Travelers are not required to fast, but the days so lost are to be made up later.

It is noteworthy that all of the Pillars so cursorily described are fundamentally similar to practices common to both Judaism and Christianity. Besides their common monotheism, a great many passages in the Koran run very close to similar passages in the Old Testament. Christians and Jews are called "The people of the Book," i.e., they have books of divine revelation of their own, the Torah and the Gospels, which give them a place above the followers of all other religions, save Islam. Among "the Messengers of God" enumerated in the Koran are Adam, Noah, Moses, Abraham, Jacob, David, and Jesus. However, both the Christians and Jews are held guilty of having distorted the meaning of their respective books, thereby producing erroneous doctrines. Nevertheless, one of the "sayings" of Muhammad is, "He who wrongs a Christian or a Jew will have myself as accuser on the day of Judgment." A Christmas card to me last December from an official of the Saudi government bears the following verse from the Koran:

Behold; The Angels said: "O Mary! Go Giveth thee Glad tidings of a Word From Him: His name will be Christ Jesus the son of Mary, held in honour in this world and the Hereafter and of those Nearest to God."

## PANEL 4

### THE WAHHABI MOVEMENT

Before going on to oil, an outline of the history of a religious movement that originated in Saudi Arabia and corollary political developments may be useful. Besides containing a fourth of the Free World's oil reserves and being strategically located between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia is also important as the guardian of two of the holiest places in Islam, Mecca and Medina, which receive annually some million-and-a-half pilgrims from the Muslim world.

In the middle of the 18th century, about 1740, Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab began preaching a return to what he regarded as the original fundamental principles of Islam. He had studied abroad and concluded that his fellow townsmen of al' Ayainah in central Arabia (the Najd) had strayed from the right path and must be reformed. His teachings accorded with orthodox Sunni beliefs but carried these to a much more rigorous extreme than was common practice.

The townspeople of al' Ayainah, reluctant to give up their pleasant and somewhat heathen ways, expelled Ibn Abdul-Wahhab who then sought refuge with the Al Sa'ud (family of Sa'ud) ruling in Dar'iyah, a town a few miles north of present day Riyadh. Having converted the Sa'udis to his way of thinking, they supported him in spreading his message in the Najd. The military gifts of Al Sa'ud, combined with the missionary fervor of the Ibn Abdul-Wahhab's converts, eventually resulted in the conquest of most of the Arabian Peninsula by the first decade of the 19th century, including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

One of the most fundamental of the Wahhabi tenets was that not only was there only one God, there was absolutely no one who could in any way stand between a true Muslim and God. Hence the practice of building tombs to the memory of the dead or to venerate saintly people was an anathema to them. Just as Muslims never call themselves "Muhammadans," so the followers of Ibn Abdul Wahhab did not call themselves "Wahhabis" but "Muwahhidin," that is, "Unitarians," thus emphasizing their belief in the absolute oneness of God. (No connection with the Unitarians of Europe and North America.)

Consequently when they captured Mecca and Medina they not only confiscated rosaries, amulets, banners, and other items such as pipes and hookahs (on the basis that tobacco was unknown in the Prophet's time and so illegal), they also levelled all the tombs erected in memory of holy men as well as those of common citizens. As if the conquest of the Holy Cities were not enough, this behavior was piling injury on insult to the Caliph of Islam in Constantinople. Muhammad'Ali, his viceroy in Egypt, was ordered to recapture the Hijaz and destroy the upstarts from the deserts of central Arabia who challenged the might of the Ottoman Empire. After eight years of war, Muhammad'Ali not only recaptured the Holy Cities, but took Dar'iyah after a long siege, destroyed the town and carried the reigning leader of Al Sa'ud, Abdullah, off to Constantinople. Abdullah was beheaded in December 1818. The house of Sa'ud had varying fortunes during the 19th century. Toward the middle of the century, the area under their control covered much of central Arabia. However, in 1890, the head of the family had fallen on such evil days he was forced into exile in Kuwait by Ibn

## COMMUNICATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Rashiyd, Shaikh of the Shammar tribe and ruler of Hayil, some 450 miles north of Riyadh.

The restorer of the fortunes of Al Sa'ud, Abdul-Aziz bin Abdur-Rahman Al Faisal Al Sa'ud, at the age of 22 set out from Kuwait in 1902 with 40 men to recapture Riyadh. By following a very circuitous route he reached Riyadh without detection. Leaving more than half his force with the camels hidden in gardens outside the town, he entered Riyadh with 15 men in the dead of night. They made their way to houses across the open square from the mud brick fort of the governor. Threatening the householders with instant punishment if they made a move or noise, they awaited the opening of the gate of the fort when the governor came out for his morning ride. Abdul-Aziz and his men then fell on the governor and his entourage in the square, caught the governor and killed him just as he was about to escape through the postern gate to safety. Pouring in through the quickly opened main gate, the attackers subdued the surprised garrison and the fort was theirs.

The citizens of Riyadh welcomed the return of Al Sa'ud; supporting Abdul-Aziz in such fashion that by the time the Shammar got around to trying to regain Riyadh, their opportunity had passed. Abdul-Aziz gradually extended the area under his control until in 1913 he drove the Turkish garrisons out of Hofuf and Qatif and thereby brought the whole of the Persian Gulf littoral from Kuwait to Qatar under his control.

After pondering how he was to suppress intertribal raiding (the great outdoor sport of the Bedouin), build up the desert economy, and get a body of fighting men on whom he could depend on being ready at command and whose allegiance would not be tribal or parochial, Ibn Sa'ud actively fostered a recrudescence of Wahhabi doctrines amongst the Bedouin in a new way. This was an enterprise that he found congenial to his own religious beliefs as well as to his political, economic, and military aims. He supplied money, seed, and arms to those whom his missionaries converted in order to enable them to settle in agricultural communities. Romantic as the life of a Bedouin may be in both Western and Arab eyes, it is a very hard life from which many nomads are ready to escape if given the opportunity. The instances of Bedouin turning townsmen are common; the converse is rare. He gave them this opportunity. Dozens of these new agricultural communities were formed by this new fraternity who became known as the *ikhwan*, that is, "The Brethren." In part they may have gone to the new settlements because they were unwelcome in some of the older communities. As Philby remarks, "their tendency to fanaticism and exclusive self-righteousness soon embroiled them with the other inhabitants." In time they numbered in the thousands, fanatically courageous, loyal unto death, but needing to be kept in check in the hour of victory as well as in time of peace. They were prone to include in their classification of "infidels" all who did not share their concepts of the true faith, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

During World War I, Ibn Sa'ud more or less marked time. He was given a monthly subsidy and arms by the British to harrass the Shammar, subsidized by the Turks, so as to keep them too occupied to do much damage to the left flank of the British forces fighting the Turkish armies in Mesopotamia. After the end of the war his activity increased. His forces

## PANEL 4

utterly destroyed an army sent by King Hussain of the Hijaz to occupy the border towns of Khurma and Turaba in 1919. Hayil was taken in 1921 and the leading members of the Rashiyd family became permanent guests in Riyadh.

In 1924 events in Arabia were decisively shaped by Mustafa Kamal, the dictator of Turkey. He had previously stripped of political power the Caliph of Islam, but had allowed him to continue a restricted religious role. Kamal now decreed the abolition of the Califate. King Hussain of the Hijaz immediately decided that he would become the new Caliph, an act Ibn Sa'ud regarded as justification for a holy war.

Taif, the summer resort of the Hijaz, was taken early in 1925 by an Ikhwan army that completely routed the Hijazi forces commanded by King Hussain's oldest son, 'Ali.

Panic seized the inhabitants of Mecca and Jiddah who had little confidence in Hussain's ability to protect them from the dreaded Ikhwan. They forced his abdication in favor of his son, 'Ali. But Ibn Sa'ud was in no hurry as he did not want any fighting to take place in the holy cities. Mecca had been abandoned by 'Ali's army and was occupied peacefully. Jiddah and Medina were invested and the former subjected to a desultory bombardment. But the besieging armies were not permitted to mount an assault on either city. Both eventually surrendered peacefully. In the meantime the Ikhwan had taught the unruly nomads of the Hijaz that their immunity to the demands of law and order were over. They also once again leveled the domed tombs of Mecca and Medina. On the 8th of January Abdul Aziz bin Sa'ud was proclaimed King of Hijaz.

In 1929/30 the Ikhwan revolted, largely because the King refused to let them carry on raids into Iraq and to fight the infidels, British and Arab, to the death. The British response to their raids was to hold Ibn Sa'ud responsible. The reply to the King's disclaimer that he could not control the Ikhwan, was that either he was King or he wasn't. If he could not control the Ikhwan, they, the British, would. They did agree to close the Iraq and Kuwait borders so the rebels could neither receive supplies nor seek refuge in those countries. In the end the Ikhwan were completely crushed and their leaders imprisoned. Some of the settlements were destroyed, others were simply forbidden to be inhabited and fell into ruin, and some, with little remaining of the fervor of their founding, survive to this day. However some of the spirit of the Ikhwan lingers on as demonstrated by the occupation of the great mosque of Mecca in November 1979.

## OIL

Everyone "knows" the Middle East possesses a very large amount of oil, but beyond this qualitative piece of information most are hazy about the actual quantities. Rather than bare statistics, a few simple comparisons may serve to give a better feeling for what a lot of oil there really is in the Middle East. The proved reserves, i.e., the amount of oil reasonably certain to be produced at present prices with present technology, is about 13 times as great as comparable US reserves of 28 billion barrels. The Middle East fields with the plant equipment now installed can produce about 3 times as much oil as the United States. At the moment, about half the total

## COMMUNICATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

production of oil in the Free World outside the United States comes from the six OPEC countries around the Persian Gulf, and half of that is from one country alone, Saudi Arabia, which has about one-fourth of the known reserves of the world to draw upon.

Given the importance of oil to the Middle East, the ordinary competent business man, government official, soldier, and academician of the Middle East will usually know more about oil than his American or European counterpart. The Middle Easterner is much more likely to have official, business, and social contacts with oil men simply because oil bulks so much larger in relation to his everyday life than it does for most other people. At the same time, inasmuch as the technology of oil production is a product of the West, the Middle Easterner is prone to think, however subconsciously, that most Westerners simply must know as much about oil as he does. And these differences in perception can lead to problems.

When a Middle Easterner reads a piece about "taking Arab oil fields" or "bombing Iranian refineries" he shudders as he knows what oil fields and refineries look like. The thought of a few dozen oil wells on fire spurting out 10 to 30 thousand barrels a day each, is too horrible to contemplate. He cannot believe that much is written, and spoken, in the West about such matters by people who know next to nothing of the subject. Illustratively, I wince whenever I read that "Saudi Arabia is now *pumping* umpteen million barrels of oil per day." No wells are pumped in Saudi Arabia. If they were, ARAMCO couldn't possibly produce 9.5 million barrels a day from some 800 oil wells. The United States produces about the same amount, but it takes more than five hundred thousand wells to do so because most of them do have to be pumped. The distinction is important. When some political scientist writes about "blowing up the oil wells" either to punish someone or to deny them to someone, he knows little of what he speaks. NO one is going to deny oil to an aggressor by "blowing up" flowing oil wells if he thinks there is a chance of regaining them for the sustenance of his grandchildren. Nor is he who covets them going to destroy them either—a self-defeating action.

But if denial of oil to an aggressor for a considerable length of time is the objective, the surface facilities lend themselves admirably to this end. In the first place, even without the use of explosives these facilities in large part are suitable for quick self-destruction, given the pressures and temperatures at which many of them operate. Secondly, in the most important oil producing countries in the Middle East the sheer size of the hardware needed to handle such extraordinary quantities of oil means that much of it has been especially manufactured for a specific use. In other words, the surface facilities, despite their size, are essentially fragile—easy to destroy, but hard to replace.

Leaving aside the technological characteristics of oil fields, our commercial, political, and military interest ought to center around access to the oil produced rather than ownership or control of the fields themselves. The question of access is becoming much more complex than it was a few years ago. Then, most of the oil in international trade was handled by about two dozen large oil companies. By and large these companies had contractual arrangements with the governments of the producing countries that enabled them to produce the oil and ship it to the markets of the world.

## PANEL 4

The companies paid the governments royalties and taxes calculated on the volumes and prices of the oil produced and sold. Few government oil companies had become deeply involved in the international market. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), created in 1960, was largely an organization that acted as a clearinghouse for its members for information on the industry and provided a forum for consultation and coordinating of policies. It was only beginning to serve as a vehicle for coordinated bargaining with the oil companies.

The oil companies not only supplied their own refineries with crude oil, they also supplied other refineries with crude oil and supplied independent marketers, whether private or government, with oil products. They also carried on worldwide exploration for oil and the development of fields discovered. From time to time some members of OPEC even criticized the companies for "spending our money to search for oil that would compete with us." And I might add nothing so exasperates oil men as the suggestion that the United Nations ought to undertake oil exploration in the lesser developed countries because the oil companies are alleged to have failed to explore them properly. How was Dammam in Saudi Arabia discovered half the world away from San Francisco in a barren desert in the midst of the great depression when oil was selling for 60 cents a barrel or less in the United States? How was it found more recently on the eastern slope of the Peruvian Andes in one of the most impenetrable rain forests in the world? And so on, ad nauseam.

Now the proportion of oil sold by national oil companies has so increased that the international oil companies generally do not have access to enough oil to more than satisfy their own refineries. Some must purchase oil either from government oil companies or on the spot market. More and more refineries are buying oil directly from the producing government. OPEC is now setting the price, restrained not by the market but by the calculation of how much money its members can profitably use currently and of the effects of oil prices on the markets in which they must buy their imported goods and invest their surplus earnings. Planning of exploration, development, and plant requirements has of necessity become more parochial. Transportation of oil from producer to customer has become less efficient to the extent that the greater number of shippers, each acting on its own, has already brought a noticeable change in the shipping industry. Demand for smaller tankers has increased with the increase in the numbers of customers taking crude oil directly from the producers. The decline in the use of the supertankers with their great economy of scale will result in higher transportation costs overall to the ultimate consumer.

Contracts with major oil companies by independent refiners that guaranteed delivery are rapidly becoming a thing of the past. No longer do oil companies have the diversity of sources of supply necessary to provide substitutes for a source that has dried up, whether by accident or by intent. Iran at the present time is such an example. Its exports have shrunk by more than 4 million barrels a day in the past year. Their loss to world markets has been cushioned only by a drop in world demand and a willingness of certain OPEC countries to produce at a rate higher than they would like. In addition to a growing inflexibility in the market, the terms of contracts are becoming much more demanding as to time allowed for

## COMMUNICATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

payment, guarantees of destination, amounts of oil that must be taken irrespective of seasonal market demands and the coupling of the sale of oil with other objectives, industrial and political, of the producing country.

The full development of what is happening in the international oil industry is not yet clear, but obviously communication with the Middle East is an essential element in coping with these changes. The possibilities of misunderstanding are legion. For example, the Saudis are producing at least a million barrels a day more than they would prefer to do in order to be sure demand is met and to give them a chance to moderate OPEC pricing.

As the world's largest importer, though we import only about 15 percent of Saudi production, we would be the largest benefactor of lower prices and should give the Saudis all possible help. But the press reports that when the matter was discussed between American and Saudi officials in March, we asked the Saudis to sell us oil for our strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) and the Saudis not only refused to do so, but threatened to cut production if we added to world demand by such purchases. Officials of both countries deny that this account of the discussions is true. But the damage is done. Congress is now insulted that the Saudis should "threaten" us and some members are trying to mandate purchases for the SPR, presumably to show those Saudis a thing or two. No oil has been put in the reserve since August 1979—waiting for prices to settle down. In the meantime we have auctioned off US Government oil for \$41 a barrel, more than \$10 above the composite price of imported oil. We are producing only 100,000 barrels per day from the Elk Hills Petroleum Reserve, which is capable of producing twice as much, but Congress has not appropriated the necessary funds to do so, according to *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*. The Arabs read English very well and *PIW* is one of their favorites.

### PALESTINE

The most difficult subject of communications between Americans and the Middle East remains the future of the Palestinians.

The dispute itself is too involved and the subject of too many books to undertake an exposition that would be reasonably acceptable to both sides—if such an exposition is possible at all. But anyone wishing to "communicate" with Arabs or Iranians, best be familiar with its elements. The Israeli perception of the issue is fairly well known in this country. On the Arab side, however, an attempt to describe the perception of an Arab "moderate" may be useful. With several models in mind, this moderate Arab is fairly well educated. He speaks and reads English very well. He may be Palestinian. If not, he has Palestinian friends. He is fully familiar with the history and politics of the Middle East in the 20th century. He reads avidly. He is familiar with World War II, Hitler, and the Holocaust of the Jews. He would have been born in the 1930s. He sends me books from London like David Hirst's *The Gun and the Olive Branch* and Alfred Lilienthal's *The Zionist Connection* to be sure I don't miss them.

His basic position is that the West inflicted Israel on the Arabs to save its own conscience. He goes back to the genesis of secular Zionism in Herzl's shocked discovery of the virulence of French anti-Semitism while

#### PANEL 4

as an Austrian reporter he was covering the trial of Captain Dreyfus in the 1890s. This same anti-Semitism carried to its ghastly conclusion by Hitler produced the mass of refugees necessary for the Zionists to establish the state of Israel. He says, "You of the West burned the Jews in gas furnaces, not we Arabs." Even so, he believes Israel could not have been established and the Palestinians driven out of their homeland without the help and active connivance of the West, particularly the United States.

He is ready to accept Israel into the comity of the Middle East provided that Israel accepts the United Nations Resolution 242 in the spirit in which it was accepted by the Arabs and acknowledged by such Zionists as Nahum Goldman and most of the world before the accession of Mr. Begin to head the government of Israel. He would approve of reasonable rectification of the Arab-Israeli borders to enhance Israeli security, but he would insist on the return of east Jerusalem to Arab control or the establishment of a *corpus separatum* under international control as envisaged by the United Nations in 1947. The status of Jerusalem is not vital to Israeli security.

He does not trust the Israelis to keep any promises unless they are forced to do so. He goes back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which stands as a cornerstone of the claims to legitimacy by the Israeli government, and points out the utter disregard by the Zionists of that portion relative to the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people: "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."

He remembers Israel was admitted to the United Nations in 1949 on signing the Lausanne Protocol and the UN Resolution that called for return or compensation of the Palestinian refugees and Israel's pledge to abide by the UN Resolutions on Palestine. He also believes that Israeli behavior in the occupied territory violates the Geneva Convention signed by Israel.

Because he believes that the Israelis respond to nothing but force, he is opposed to the Camp David process because it removes the Egyptian threat from Israeli calculations. Without the assistance of Egypt no combination of Arab countries, in his view, will ever be taken seriously enough by the Israelis to impel them to seek a just peace. He admires Sadat's guts in trying to find a way to make peace, but believes Sadat has been duped by Begin, leaving him shunned by the Arabs and insufficiently supported by the Americans. Though he has many American friends and one or more of his children have been educated in the United States, he does not really understand why the American government swallows the contempt with which it is treated by the Israeli government.

The Arab moderate is fully aware that Israel could not survive economically or militarily without the private and public support of the United States. Yet, the State Department sends note after note to the government of Israel to which the Israeli government pays not the slightest heed. He is well aware of the importance of the Jewish vote in the United States, but he believes that the Zionists are duping their fellow Jews as well as the US Government. He does distinguish between Zionists and non-Zionists. If taxed with the charge that the quarrel between the Jews and Arabs is age-old and he is really against all Jews, Zionist or not, he will point out that

## COMMUNICATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

before the 1920s there were more Jews in Baghdad than in Jerusalem.

He takes a sort of wry amusement out of Mr. Begin inveighing against the activities of the PLO and distinguishing between their terrorist tactics and his own as head of the Irgun which Mr. Begin claims to have been directed only toward military personnel and objectives. He has a hard time understanding the difference as compared to the results of blowing up the King David Hotel or the massacre of women and children by an Irgun unit at Deir Yassin as reported by the Swiss Red Cross representative. He does not condone terrorism, but he does support the PLO as the principal spokesman for the Palestinians.

He is not only friendly to Americans personally, but friendly towards the United States Government even though he is also exasperated. His friendship does not mean he is for America, right or wrong, nor is he about to subordinate his country's interests to those of the United States. He is somewhat taken aback by the denseness of people who, for example, cannot understand how King Hussain of Jordan can be "pro-American" and still be opposed to the Camp David formula. "After all, Middle Easterners do have some right to suppose that they understand Middle Eastern politics a bit better than foreigners."

In the same vein, just as he must look after his interests, so he expects the United States will look after its interests. And he does not wholly trust the United States to know what its real interests are in the Middle East, especially as he has found that he is generally more politically sophisticated than his American counterparts, which is not surprising. As a concerned and knowledgeable citizen of a small state in a dangerous world, his interest in global politics is far more intense and direct than that of most Americans. And he fully understands and knows that if it were not for the oil and the strategic position of the Middle East at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa, American interest in his part of the world would be minimal at best. As an anti-communist, as an observer without illusions or sentiment, he finds his interests parallel to ours, which provides him with a shield he cannot provide for himself. But he is frustrated.

The proliferation of settlements on the West Bank looks to him like another case of the Israelis "making facts," in this instance making further obstacles to peace. He does not see why a Palestinian state must necessarily be either a Soviet satellite or "a dagger pointed at the heart of Israel." The Soviet influence will be there only if the West not only permits, but forces reliance on the Soviets. He sees no reason why appropriate safeguards cannot be developed to safeguard Israeli security by arms agreements and other devices, including international monitoring. In any event he cannot envision any situation in which the Israelis would not be able to overwhelm such a state in any armed conflict. He believes that the present Israeli "misgivings" are a device to hide real Israeli intentions of further expansion. In any event he longs for peace. He does not believe that this can be accomplished without meeting at least the minimum demands of the Palestinians. And he does not see how Israel can expect to exist forever as an alien organism in a hostile Arab sea rather than as a nation accepted by its neighbors in peaceful, if not amicable, relations with them.

## **PANEL 4 PAPER: Emerging Security Issues In the "Arc of Crisis"**

**by Robert G. Neumann  
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The "Arc of Crisis" is one of the more fanciful and less meaningful expressions coined by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. It merely expresses, in colorful language, that which everybody has known for a long time—namely, that the region from North Africa and the Middle East to the Persian Gulf and into the beginning of the Indian subcontinent holds great peril for America and the Western world because of its high degree of volatility and instability. In the past, any discussion of that region immediately leaped to the Arab-Israeli problem as the most important and seemingly all important. While that still remains most important, it is now only one problem among others: from a strategic point of view it no longer ranks as number one.

That distinction can now be transferred to the area of the Persian Gulf where there are two new factors of destabilization: one is the Soviet strategic shadow which has fallen over the area after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan; the other is Iran's continuing disintegration.

### **THE ISSUE OF AFGHANISTAN**

Afghanistan is not, strictly speaking, a part of the Middle East. Until 1978 it was a neutral country which could even be called neutralized. The world and Afghanistan itself recognized Soviet interest in having stable and unthreatening conditions on Russia's southern border, which caused Afghanistan's neutrality to be somewhat tilted towards the Soviet Union. In April 1978, this situation was radically reversed by a Communist coup with clear pre-knowledge and involvement of the Soviet Union. The entire Middle East—Iran both under the Shah and also later under the revolutionary regime, Saudi Arabia, and even Iraq—regarded the Communist Soviet incursion into Afghanistan of 1978 as a projection of Soviet power and threat towards the entire Persian Gulf region and towards the subcontinent. Other nations, including, alas, the United States, seemed less alarmed.

However, the Afghan Communist rule and the close Soviet involvement offended every segment of the Afghan population, causing a general uprising throughout the entire country. This demonstrated that Communism, Afghan or Soviet, had no support whatsoever. The Soviet Union was left with no choice than either to let the unpopular hated Communist regime fall or move in and take over itself. The world knows which choice the Russians made. But the world still does not seem to realize that the

## **PANEL 4**

original, fateful move by the Russians was made in April 1978 and that the lessons of that event show that "Finlandization" does not protect a country from subsequent "Afghanization."

The consequences of this Russian foray went far beyond the "Arc of Crisis." It awakened America, or at least we may hope so, out of the illusion of "detente," an illusion well characterized by Secretary of Defense Brown when he said, "When we built, the Russians built. When we stopped building, the Russians built." President Carter admitted the same by his astonishing statement that he had "learned more about the true intentions of the Soviet Union in one week than in the preceding three years" of his mandate.

The Europeans, despite their even greater dependence on Middle East oil, have not yet quite abandoned their "Eurocentric attitude." They have been fearful of losing even the illusion of detente which has given them relatively settled political conditions in Europe, increased East-West trade, and some slight easing in the relationship between East and West Germany. Hence, the almost unseemly haste with which European leaders attempted the hopeless task of searching for some kind of "neutralization formula" for Afghanistan in order to defuse the situation. I say "hopeless" because in considering formulas for Afghanistan, the mood and attitude of the Afghan people should also be taken into account. The fact simply is that Communism, as well as Russian occupation, is totally unacceptable to virtually the entire Afghan population. They have proven this and continue to prove it with their blood which they are spilling with extraordinary courage and without letup in spite of little or no help from the West.

Any neutralization formula which would tend to leave a Communist or even partly Communist government in power in Afghanistan would last only as long as Russian bayonets could keep it alive. That kind of "neutralization" would be nothing but a fig leaf masking a Western acceptance of the Soviet invasion. If, on the other hand, the Soviets were prepared to leave Afghanistan, then some kind of artful "neutralization formula" might be devised to hide what in effect would be a Soviet defeat and retreat. But there are no indications whatsoever that the Russians are ready for such a step despite their continuing difficulties in Afghanistan. If and when they are ready for such a step, then the initiative for the "neutralization" fig leaf would obviously have to come from them. Therefore any Western initiative in that direction merely gives the Russians the impression that the West might, once again, be willing to ratify another Soviet conquest and could only encourage them to persist, while the lesson of yet another Western cave-in would not be lost on the Middle East. I therefore feel obliged to regard the European initiative for a "neutralization" of Afghanistan as pointless and harmful.

## **THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN**

The Soviet strategic shadow also now falls very perceptively over Iran. Yet events in that country are dominated by internal rather than external factors. Conditions may not remain that way for long. To look back a moment . . . Britain's withdrawal from the vast region east of Suez created a power vacuum which could not immediately or directly be filled by the United States. The age of decolonization had gone far. It would not have

## EMERGING SECURITY ISSUES

been possible for America to play a colonial role, nor would that have been in line with American political sentiments, which were basically anticolonialist. As stabilizing influences, especially in the general region of the Middle East, only two countries were theoretically available: Egypt and Iran. Egypt under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser was clearly not available for that role and hence it was Iran or nothing.

The United States Government was anxious that Iran should play this role as an independent power, but in this it was only partly successful. America had not, at first, been totally opposed to Premier Mossadegh's attempts to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In fact, Secretary of State Dulles strongly interceded against some of the more intransigent demands of the British. But Mossadegh's increasing weakness and his toleration of the Communist Tudeh party's steady growth produced increasing concern in Iran and caused public opinion to turn against him. Without that turn, the relatively small-scale and under-financed American covert action which brought back the Shah could not have succeeded. Nevertheless, the American action was sufficiently central and visible to place on the returning Shah the indelible stamp of a foreign ruler, or at least, a ruler heavily supported by and governing for the benefit of foreigners. This undermined his legitimacy and made the American role in Iran a central one until the time of his fall.

Still, imperfect as the Shah was, he did give the region over 25 years of stability, which is more than can be said for many areas in the world. His strength, even with all the American arms, may never have been as great as it appeared, but in politics, foreign or domestic, appearances, as long as they are credible, are realities. And the system worked as Iran became rapidly modernized.

However, that very modernization was the root of the Shah's downfall. It proceeded too fast and its speed became even more accelerated after 1973 when the quadrupling of the oil price brought into the country billions of dollars. When billions are spent rapidly, mistakes invariably occur. Masses of people poured into the towns, especially Teheran, at a time when more and more development projects malfunctioned and the Iranian planning machinery had virtually collapsed. As the expectations of these new urban masses were disappointed, they also found themselves bewildered and alienated by the cultural changes and shocks that accompanied a transit from their villages to the big towns. They turned increasingly for comfort to the mullahs, the Shia clergy, as a link to the less developed but more secure life which they had known in their villages. Thus, the mullahs became both the confidants of these rootless urban masses as well as the recipients and the mobilizers of their frustration.

One must never forget that Iran is a Shiite country and that under Shiism, in contrast to the Sunni part of the Moslem world, state and ecclesiastic power have never become reconciled. In fact, Shiism does not really recognize the legitimacy of any temporal power. Modernization was achieved only when, as in 1906, the mullahs—then not sufficiently strong—had to enter into an alliance with progressive democratic elements; or as in 1921 when army officer Reza Khan established a military dictatorship, deposed the weak shahs of the Kajar dynasty, and imposed the rule of his Pahlevi dynasty.

#### PANEL 4

The so-called "Islamic Revolution" is not "Islamic" in the sense that the struggle was one of religion. To be sure the Shah had been unwise in defying religious symbols such as the Moslem calendar and had foolishly further antagonized the already hostile clergy by cutting off their subsidies. But the main strains which brought the revolutionary masses into the streets were a combination of grievances, among which social tensions, a declining economy, excessive corruption, and the obtuseness and oppressiveness of the regime all played a role. Religion and the militant clergy formed a platform on which a great variety of groups and grievances could work together to achieve power; the clergy was the indispensable mobilization factor which time and again brought the enraged masses into the streets.

Once the Shah was overthrown, the clergy became all-powerful in spite of early assertions that it, and especially its leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, would become only the "guide-Faguies" (legal experts). The mullahs quickly filled many governmental and judicial offices and Khomeini became the unquestioned ruler without whose agreement no decision could be made. The elections of a president, Bani-Sadr, and of a parliament have increasingly proven empty charades. Bani-Sadr's election was a fluke, even if there had not been massive fraud, because the opposing candidate of the Religious Party was discovered almost at the last minute to be ineligible because of Afghan ancestry. In the new parliament, the Religious Party headed by Ayatollah Beheshti has a clear majority. Every time Bani-Sadr has tried to move on his own, be it in connection with control over the American hostages or in the appointment of a Prime Minister, he has been frustrated by the religious group and by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini has indulged in the age-old oriental game of playing one group against the other, of giving one encouragement only to slap it down again, and to do so all around with the result that his power has remained unchallenged.

The tragedy of this evolution is that the all-powerful clergy and especially Khomeini do not have the slightest idea of how to govern a modern state or a modern economy. Nor do they show any indication of any interest, either because many of them are near illiterate, or because they believe that all answers are found in the Koran and that no further data are necessary or desirable. As a result, Iran's industry is deteriorating rapidly. Even the maintenance of the oil wells is diminishing. Unemployment is ever growing. To be sure, as long as oil revenues flow into the country, money can be spread around sufficiently to prevent the worst, but Iran with its 36 million people is too vast, and the birthrate is too high, to provide employment on an acceptable scale.

At the same time, the regime has proven incapable of relating to the non-Persian part of the population which comprises almost half of the country; fighting rages in many areas, and what is left of the armed forces has little stomach for civil war.

To sum up, Iran is in the midst of a process of political, economic, and ethnic disintegration. The process can last many months and conceivably even a year or two as the influx of oil money obscures the country's true condition. But it would be difficult to hide the truth much longer than that. So the question arises, which group or which person will eventually inherit

## EMERGING SECURITY ISSUES

the mantle of strong leadership, without which Iran has never throughout its history been able to function?

Obviously, the political left is preparing precisely for that moment. The Tudeh party and other Marxist groups closely related in one way or another to Moscow are steadily growing, well-organized, and heavily armed. It is doubtful that they will move decisively before the regime has either completely collapsed or, as is more likely, Khomeini dies. But they have not as yet used their considerable power and are clearly waiting for the right moment. Under those circumstances it is also unlikely that Russia will move in physically as it has a good chance of having the ripe apple fall into its lap.

Still, this is not a foregone conclusion. Other groups are also forming. They are, of course, better observed outside Iran than inside, but there is no doubt that their support inside the country is also growing; though it is impossible to say at what rate. Shapur Bakhtiar, the short-term Prime Minister during the transition period from the Shah to Khomeini, is one such focal center currently residing in Paris, but making frequent appearances in neighboring Iraq. Although he accepted office from the Shah, it was at a period of considerable deterioration and, while he is marked in some quarters by the imprint of the Shah, it is also a fact that he had been long in opposition and that, as a leading member of the National Front, his credentials date back to the Mossadeq period.

Another and in some respects more ominous candidate is General Oveissi, a former powerful chief of staff under the Shah. If he were to come to power, he is cut in the model of Reza Shah, the father of the last Shah, a harsh and unforgiving man.

It is a tragedy that at such a time of great peril, Iran and America have to be cast as antagonists. As the symbol of modernization which has caused such strains and as the presumed power behind the Shah, America is pilloried as "Satanic." Such perceptions can, of course, change very rapidly. In the face of the volatile Iranian masses, a period of mutual disengagement might well achieve better relations if it were not for the intractable problem of the hostages. These hostages have, unfortunately, continued to serve as a political football between different Iranian political groups. Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh, no friends of the United States, recognized earlier that the continued holding of the hostages tended to isolate and weaken Iran. But for that very reason, their opponents, especially the religious group, have used the hostage issue as a weapon against Bani-Sadr. With Khomeini constantly intervening to foil Bani-Sadr, the hostages have now become such a valuable property in this internal power struggle in Iran that there is little motive to release them. On the other hand, America, whose interests are in no way served by a dismemberment of Iran or by the takeover of a leftist dictatorship, has allowed the hostage issue to loom so large as to make any early settlement appear unlikely. Even though many Iranians, including Bani-Sadr, recognize that neighboring Russia constitutes the greatest threat, the deeply ingrained plotting habit of the Iranian society cannot refrain from continuing the game of group-playing-against-group while the ship of state sinks slowly but definitely.

## PANEL 4

Since military action against Iran is not really feasible, now even less so after the failure of the rescue attempt, the cogency or acceleration of a blockade and similar measures of economic pressure have to be seriously questioned. Such measures do not have a history of great effectiveness ever since Napoleon's unsuccessful continental blockade against Britain, and European tastes for such measures have appreciably diminished since the rescue attempt. To believe that even greatly accelerated economic blockade measures would have any favorable result for the hostage situation has now become a very long shot. In fact, one might argue that it could be counterproductive. The Iranian economy's deterioration is clearly the result of the ruling "bureaucracy's" incompetence; but if blame for it can be laid to external pressure, it will strengthen rather than weaken the mullahs' rule, and thus prolong the ordeal of the hostages.

This is an important point because in Iran's deterioration, internal or external opposition groups might finally and eventually wrest control from the mullahs. But that is possible only if people suffer as the result of internal and not external factors. Whether even that can happen before Khomeini's death is a question, and by then it will be highly uncertain whether the left or the right or moderate groups will be able to get control into their hands.

To the extent that the United States can influence the development at all, clandestine operations in Iran proper or in other neighboring countries would seem the only feasible action. They could, however, have only marginal effect even if well done, to the extent that we are still capable of engaging in them, and would be heavily counterproductive if prematurely discovered.

Thus, the left would seem to have the better chance at present and the longer Khomeini lives the greater that may be.

## ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a long and protracted one. Legend asserts that Arabs and Jews lived peacefully side-by-side and that only "agitators" have upset that relationship, but this was clearly not the case after the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which promised a vaguely formulated "Jewish National Home" in Palestine. President Woodrow Wilson sent a mission, the King-Crane mission, to Palestine in 1919 to investigate the probable consequences of the Balfour Declaration. It came back with an extremely unfavorable report. But since such a response was not welcome, the King-Crane report has rarely been mentioned since. Tension persisted after the creation of the State of Israel in 1947, and the immediate Arab hostility and attempt to prevent it from existing. Then, from 1947 to 1973, Israel, once established, hoped for peace from its Arab neighbors, but the latter proved adamantly opposed and the diplomatic situation remained totally immobile.

However, 1973 opened an entirely new phase. The fourth Palestine war of that year (referred to in America as the Yom Kippur War, and in the Arab World as the Ramadan War because of the coincidence of those two highest holidays of the two religions) returned considerable self-esteem to the Arabs because they fought well. Israel absorbed considerable losses,

## EMERGING SECURITY ISSUES

and Arab objectives were limited but were reached, at least for a short period. The vast humiliation of previous defeats was largely alleviated by the Arab performance of 1973. More important were the new perspectives for vast development opening to the Arab world by the quadrupling of the oil price. Although that was caused more by Iranian and Venezuelan pressure than by Arab action, it benefited the entire Arab world both materially and psychologically. Now that vastly new opportunities existed, the Arabs had for the first time a motive to try and settle the disputes between them and Israel.

Nevertheless, the central issue still remains, although perhaps slightly diminished in importance, and that is the Palestinian problem. Just as the Jewish people desired and deserved a homeland in which they could be free and to which they could repair in time of peril, so the homeless Palestinians, as well as those Palestinians who had remained but lived under foreign occupation, also wanted and felt that they had the right to a homeland of their own. As the first president of the State of Israel had so wisely emphasized, "The difference between Jews and Arabs was not a difference between right and wrong, but between right and right."

Although the 1973 war did make a psychological difference, some evidence had to be produced to show that the hitherto frozen diplomatic situation was now beginning to thaw. This was largely the work of Kissinger's "step-by-step diplomacy" in which he, as well as President Nixon, recognized that America alone had credibility on both sides and that American action was needed to produce momentum. The physical changes achieved by this step-by-step diplomacy were not great, but the psychological changes were both important and indispensable because they proved that indeed new opportunities existed.

When the Carter administration came into office, it was determined to drive the Kissinger process forward with greater speed and in a comprehensive form. "Comprehensive" solutions were a general approach of the Carter administration and they were also applied to the Middle East. The foundation of that policy rested on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, which was adopted unanimously and which also gained the acceptance of the then government of Israel. Its main provisions were the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war (Sinai, Gaza, and the West Bank). It was indeed accepted by all, including the Israeli Government of the period, as later affirmed by all of its surviving leaders, especially Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who negotiated the resolution for Israel. Resolution 242 applied to all occupied territories including the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Golan Heights, though not necessarily to every inch of that territory.

To be sure, Resolution 242 does not mention Palestine or Palestinians. However, the expression "withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war" could only mean that some kind of Arab sovereignty was to return to those regions. And the people living there are overwhelmingly Arabs. Despite extensive Israeli settlement efforts, Jews have remained tiny minorities in the areas under contest.

The Carter administration's policy was well-formulated in a speech cleared on all levels by the then Ambassador-at-Large Alfred L. Atherton in

## PANEL 4

Atlanta, Georgia on 5 April 1978:

Here [in Resolution 242] for the first time was spelled out the framework for a settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. That Resolution was and remains the basis for all the peacemaking efforts over the past decade. At its heart is a very simple formula: in return for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, the Arabs will recognize Israel within a framework of peace and security agreed by both. . . . Resolution 242 is clearly a package. Its parts are linked together to make a balanced whole, to be carried out together or not at all.

And later in the same address, Atherton said, "In the decade since the passage of the Resolution, it has become inescapably clear that a solution of the Palestinian problem is essential in reaching a lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict."

Although the policy of the Carter administration was a logical extension of the step-by-step diplomacy of Nixon and Kissinger, the execution thereof left much to be desired. Much has been written on that subject and there is no need here to repeat the many missteps and contradictory moves which finally convinced President Sadat of Egypt that he had to take matters into his own hands in order to achieve a breakthrough. He achieved this in his dramatic trip to Jerusalem.

Unfortunately, the personalities of Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin are as different as night and day. Sadat is impatient with details and haggling; he is a man of extraordinary courage and dramatic flair. Begin is a typical lawyer from Eastern Europe and a stubborn negotiator. Nobody can say whether the Israeli response to Sadat's gesture would have been more forthcoming under a Labor government than under the Likud cabinet of Begin. But little visible progress was made and America had to insert itself in order to push the process further. That led to the negotiations at Camp David which produced a much touted triumph that proved, however, seriously flawed.

It was clear that what Sadat sought was a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace, which is also what Carter had in mind. It is equally clear that what Begin sought was a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel. Consequently, Israel was willing to make considerable concessions towards Egypt regarding the return of Egyptian territory but virtually none on the broader issues of the Palestinians. Faced by this stubborn resistance and confronted by the choice of either allowing the whole Camp David process to break down or to settle for a separate peace between Israel and Egypt and a vague, general agreement to negotiate on broader Middle Eastern questions, Presidents Carter and Sadat settled for the latter.

For Israel, this was a diplomatic triumph. For Egypt it was lesser, but it was still advantageous to the extent that it brought the series of bloody wars to an end. The Egyptian people had become tired of those wars in which they carried the main burden in blood and treasure for the Arab cause. But for America's hope for peace in the Middle East, the Camp David agreement and the subsequent Washington accords were a mixed bag.

## EMERGING SECURITY ISSUES

Once again, the Palestinian problem had been left unsolved and that was deeply divisive in the Arab world outside Egypt.

It is not that the Palestinians are so deeply beloved, but rather that there is throughout the Arab world, and in fact throughout the Moslem world, a sense of solidarity which reacts against foreign incursions and perceived or real denigrations. Moreover, throughout the Arab world outside Egypt, there lives a sizable Palestinian population. Since Palestinians are among the most highly educated Arabs, they are found in many important positions, especially throughout the Persian Gulf region. If enraged, they could become a highly destabilizing element in an area which has already sufficiently unsettled conditions and in many cases relatively weak governments. Especially in the oil-producing countries, outside Iraq, foreign workers from many parts of the world, Arab and non-Arab, do much of the work and the Palestinian capacity for organizing could add to potential destabilization.

This is why America's tenacious pursuit of the Camp David process is deeply resented throughout the Arab world and regarded as a real obstacle to closer American-Arab relations. The basic problem here is twofold: (1) nobody in the Arab world believes seriously that this process can lead anywhere to a solution of the Palestinian problem; and (2) Israel has made sizeable concessions to Egypt in the abandonment of the Sinai Peninsula with its area, its oil fields, as well as significant military facilities. Even the abandonment of a few Israeli settlements in the Sinai have had significant political repercussions in Israel but they were not so great that they could not be overcome by the Begin government.

However, the smaller West Bank area presents quite a different problem. Although Israel has existed for 20 years, from 1947 to 1967, without the West Bank, and despite the fact that significant attacks on Israel have not come from that direction, Israel regards, not entirely without reason, the abandonment of the West Bank as a serious security problem. Mr. Begin's repeated assertion that Arab sovereignty over the West Bank would constitute a deadly peril to Israel should be considered vastly exaggerated, because the assembly of significant Arab forces in that small terrain could not possibly remain undetected and would be immediately crushed by superior Israeli forces; yet there are significant security problems. The former West Bank terrain juts within 8 miles of the Mediterranean Sea and Israel's border would become four times as long on the eastern side of the country. Infiltration and other attacks would certainly become more possible. In any future peace negotiations, Israel's security problem would have to be accepted as real, and serious negotiations would have to be devoted to the satisfaction of those legitimate concerns.

But unfortunately, these security concerns of Israel are constantly confused by Israel's parallel claims to the Biblical "Land of Israel." Settlements, especially in such urban centers as Hebron, which could not conceivably serve any strategic or military purpose, are taken as evidence that Israel's security concerns are a pretext hiding a wish for permanent annexation. Thus to the Arabs, any participation in the Camp David peace process would serve only to prolong and legitimize Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank. The unproductivity of negotiations on a broader Middle East

## PANEL 4

peace settlement has weakened those Arab states which want a closer relationship with the United States, such as Saudi Arabia, and has strengthened the leadership claim of more radical states, such as Iraq. But Iraq, which is also concerned about the Russian strategic shadow over the area, is resolutely and strongly opposed to the Camp David process.

Egypt had hoped for greater Israeli concessions and had also hoped for more American assistance and pressure on Israel. But this has not come about. President Sadat's hope of returning to the Arab world in triumph with tangible evidence that his approach obtains results has not been realized. Egypt's isolation from the Arab world continues and Sadat has also remained totally isolated within his entourage as the only Egyptian resolutely determined to continue the Camp David process.

America's close relations with Egypt have also served to distort America's official perception. There has been a tendency to view Arab reactions and Arab tactics essentially through Egyptian eyes. But the Egyptians, even in the days of closest relations with the Arab world, have often been resented by that world as arrogant and overbearing while Egyptian perception of Arab policies and sentiments, especially during Sadat's Jerusalem visit and in the subsequent process, has proven consistently wrong.

As these lines are written, it would appear that the Camp David process has run its course and that no evidence of further progress is in the offing. The Israelis say, quite openly, that they are unwilling to make meaningful concessions. What they call "full-autonomy" is less than is normally granted to municipalities. Moreover, they say quite freely that in view of the proximity of American elections, they see no need to make any further concessions until they know with whom they will have to deal and under what conditions. It is unlikely that the Begin government can be moved under any circumstances.

## SHIFTING PUBLIC OPINION

But what has moved is public opinion—in Israel, in the United States, and in the Arab world. Although the Arabs are deeply frustrated, there is certainly no doubt that they are much closer to an acceptance of Israel than at any time before 1973. Prince Fahad's interview in *The Washington Post* makes this very clear, if read carefully. Even the PLO attempted several times to find a way towards some sort of acceptance of Resolution 242 which does recognize the existence of Israel and the need for peaceful relations between all neighbors. The PLO, like many exiled movements, is composed of so many groups that agreement is virtually impossible. Moreover, in order to be acceptable to the PLO, Resolution 242 would have to be amended in order to replace the word "refugees" by "Palestinians" and that has been adamantly resisted by the Israeli government.

America too has undergone a change. A few years ago the Arab-Israeli conflict was viewed almost universally through Israeli spectacles. Even the naming of the 1973 conflict as the "Yom Kippur War" shows that bias. But since then the significance of peace with the Arab world, the Soviet threat to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf, and the fact that the Begin government's settlement policy is most unpopular in America, have led to a change in political and editorial opinion, which, to those who have watched

## EMERGING SECURITY ISSUES

the Middle East over the last 25 years, is rather remarkable.

Perhaps most important and remarkable is the shift in Israeli public opinion. Israel is a highly politicized country. It could not be anything else considering the constant threat to its existence and the location of the land. In the deeply democratic tradition of Israel, all political questions are constantly and hotly debated. As public opinion polls reveal, gradually, but significantly, Israeli public opinion is increasingly becoming aware of one cardinal fact: in this day and age the continued occupation by one country of a territory inhabited overwhelmingly by another people, race, and religion is unacceptable. More concretely, it is corrosive especially to a democratic society. This fact is well-known and well-understood by the greatest statesman of Israel's history, David Ben-Gurion, who always rejected Begin's policies on that very ground.

Israel's settlement policies, especially the events in Hebron, have triggered a series of violent attacks and counterattacks which are only too reminiscent of the Battle of Algiers during the French rule over that land. That battle too was "won" by the occupier in the short run but it only served to demonstrate that the situation had become untenable. Just as the French draftees increasingly resented occupation duty in Algeria, so Israeli soldiers increasingly resent occupation duty on the West Bank. As the struggle in Algeria corroded France's democratic society, and as the prolonged and unpopular war in Vietnam had its effect on America's political fabric, so the West Bank struggle begins to have its effect on Israel's society and political life as well. Public opinion polls now show that this policy is rejected by a majority, though not as yet a large majority of Israelis. The leader of the opposition, Shimon Peres, has clearly indicated that some compromise on the West Bank is necessary. The Former Chief of Intelligence of the Israeli Armed Forces, General Yariv, has expressed an increasing viewpoint especially in the ranks of the Labor Party, that "the Palestinian problem is the core of the problem of peace." This is a long way from the statement of another Labor Party Premier, the late Mrs. Golda Meir, that "there is no such thing as a Palestinian."

Thus, even if present negotiations run aground and the Camp David process were to come to an end, there would not be a return to square one. Nothing stands still and the Middle East has changed as have all other parts of the globe. But diplomacy is a slow game. Deeply felt passions have operated and drawn much blood for well over 35 years; powerful traumas have been created which cannot be removed by the most ingenious formulas of diplomats and theoreticians. For each step, both Arabs and Israelis need time to adjust to new conditions, to accept new relationships, to begin to have confidence in the very possibility of peace; therefore, to rush the process is to incur the danger of the one or the other side digging in its heels.

And Jerusalem remains a totally intractable problem. It seems inconceivable that Jerusalem could once again be divided. But simply to leave it under Israeli administration as it is now is also unacceptable to the Arabs. Diplomats know that, when divisions are deep, solutions which satisfy completely one side of a dispute cannot be obtained. The best that can ever be hoped for is a solution with which both sides can just barely live. But

#### **PANEL 4**

there is the psychological factor that with each stage of progress the next stage is viewed gradually in a different light by the participants. Thus, the very raising of the Jerusalem issue at this time endangers the success of any kind of negotiation. But if, after some time and political changes, visible and credible progress is made which satisfies both Arab aspirations and Israeli security needs, then some Jerusalem formula may begin to appear in a more benign light. Then—and only then—can one begin to think about formulas which preserve the unity of a city and yet incorporate a measure of Arab autonomy over its quarters and absolute access to all the holy places of the three great monotheistic religions.

The Afghan, Iranian, and Arab-Israeli crises do not cover all the trouble spots of the "Arc of Crisis." Instability is present elsewhere, such as in Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrein. The recent events in Mecca have profoundly affected Saudi Arabia's sense of security; but, at least for the immediate future, the Saudi government has recovered well and drawn some of the necessary conclusions from the weaknesses revealed in the attack on its holiest shrine.

There is also concern that US acquisition of facilities in Somalia would drag us into a new conflict with Ethiopia, straining our political and physical resources.

Finally there is North Africa, where Libya, sometimes in conjunction with Algeria, sometimes without it, does everything in its power to destabilize, undermine, and destroy other regimes.

Yet, even crises have priorities and this is why I have thrown the spotlight on the consequences of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the disintegration of Iran, and the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict which poisons all relations throughout the entire area.

## **PANEL 5**

### **ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND US NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS**

**This panel sought to integrate policy and strategy choices with research and development issues. The group analyzed the potential of advanced technologies to: assist in reducing the energy threat to US national security, mitigate resource scarcities, or develop leverage against the Soviet military threat at a time when theories of nuclear deterrence are showing their age or becoming less credible. This panel sought to identify the problems that advanced technology can realistically be expected to "solve" and review the appropriate balance between tactical and strategic technologies. It also addressed the balance between "low" technology and "high" technology, the possibility of international cooperative R&D ventures, and arms control prospects for limiting qualitative technological advances. Finally, the group addressed linkages, or problems in linkages, between the R&D scientific communities and the strategic and security policymaking communities.**

## PANEL 5 PARTICIPANTS

**CHAIRMAN:** Mr. Gordon O. Moe, Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation.

**RAPPORTEUR:** LTC James B. Motley, USA, National Defense University.

**AUTHORS:** Dr. Arthur J. Alexander, Rand Corporation; Dr. Barry J. Smernoff, B.J. Smernoff Associates.

**PANELISTS:** Mr. William K. Brehm, Systems Research & Applications Corporation; Dr. William H. Evers, W.J. Shafer Associates, Inc.; Dr. Edward A. Frieman, Department of Energy; Dr. Catherine Kelleher, National War College; Mr. Robert T. Grey, Department of State; Dr. Steve Lukasik, Federal Communications Commission; Mr. John P. Merrill, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Dr. Frederick J. Milford, Battelle Columbus Laboratories; Dr. Robert H. Moore, The Conference Board; Dr. Ralph Sanders, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Dr. Robert H. Trice, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA; Dr. Dov S. Zakheim, Congressional Budget Office.

## **PANEL 5 SUMMARY**

### **Advanced Technology and US National Security Problems**

**Gordon O. Moe, Chairman**  
**James B. Motley, Rapporteur**

The task of Panel 5 was to analyze the interaction between technology and US national security policy for the 1980s, assessing technology's importance and trends, as well as its future prospects.

As a basis for discussion, Dr. Smernoff and Dr. Alexander summarized their respective papers, "Science, Technology, and the US-Soviet Competition" and "The Linkage between Technology, Doctrine, and Weapons Innovation: Experimentation for Use." Dr. Smernoff's paper presented a preliminary discussion of what may become a major debate in the United States regarding the concept of quality offset (i.e., attempts to use sophisticated American military technology to offset Soviet numerical advantages) and its implications for the future of the US-Soviet competition. The basic purpose of this paper was to raise the level of informed discussion about the essentially technological nature of the US-Soviet competition and how this interacts with important aspects of international affairs. The theme of Dr. Alexander's paper was that the linkages between innovations and their incorporation in weapons and doctrine are strongly dependent on experiments that generate information about possibilities. Dr. Alexander concluded that innovation is uncertain and risky, but failure to innovate carries its own risk.

There was an early consensus that for the panel report to be useful, the panel should also address ways to improve the Nation's use of its technological resources in furthering its national security interests. The panel focused more on the question of identifying and analyzing the linkages between technology and policy, especially the process for applying technology effectively to meet national security requirements, than on forecasting or advocating specific high-payoff technologies. However, it was decided to cite some broad technological areas that either undergird current policies or might support future policies.

At the outset, the panel found it necessary to define national security and technology. The definitions it chose largely conditioned the major thrusts of its subsequent deliberations and conclusions. It was recognized that national security encompassed both national defense and foreign relations of the United States and its allies, especially those policies and actions taken to protect themselves from external threats and aggressive actions. As used in this report, however, because of time limitations and

## PANEL 5

panel constituency, the definition of national security was limited to the field of defense (military) technology. This restricted definition made the subsequent discussions more manageable.

To answer the question "Toward what defense (military) objectives should the United States apply its technological assets?" the panel used an abbreviated statement of goals drawn from those in the *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1981* which it considered most closely related to its concept of national security. These included:

### *National Defense*

- Protect America's people, its institutions, and its land from foreign aggression.
- Improve the overall current military balance between the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies.
- Deter a nuclear attack on the United States and its allies and be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union in retaliation.
- Maintain military power to counter aggression anywhere.
- Seek international agreements for arms control and arms traffic.

Technology was defined as a body of knowledge by which things are commonly done or made, especially systematized knowledge of the industrial and practical arts. Technology, of course, can be viewed either as product (the actual hardware), know-how (data, design, and production process that convert knowledge into product), or product with know-how embedded (when the design and process that went into a product can be identified and sometimes replicated). The panel decided that the term included all three elements. For its purpose, however, emphasis would be on know-how, embedded know-how, and innovative application.

The panel concluded that it should consider three major types of technological activities:

- Production of technology. Making available the basic knowledge needed to fashion products, e.g., basic and some applied research, and promoting invention.
- Application of technology. Converting this basic knowledge into a useful product through both technical and social innovation.
- Distribution of technology. Transferring technology between government organizations, between government and the private sector, and between nations.

In terms of supporting national security, the panel concluded that the production of technology constituted a less serious linkage problem than application and distribution. Therefore, the panel analyses and findings would emphasize the latter.

Relative to the US-USSR standing in basic technology, an assessment of a broad spectrum of capabilities indicates that US technology "generation" rate continues to be sufficient to minimize the possibility of technological surprise. However, US basic technology leadership is due largely to commercial rather than defense incentives, e.g., microelectronics,

## TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

computers. Imbalances may occur; thus the necessity to review military incentives. USSR equality in basic technology is evident in new, potentially high payoff multidisciplinary endeavors, which include directed energy weapons (DEW) and antisubmarine warfare. Major gaps, however, are conceivable. Avoiding technological surprise, after all, does not preclude Soviet development of a significant technological capability.

As to the relative US-USSR technology level in deployed military systems, current status and anticipated changes in status indicate the following. United States technology "application or deployment rate" is projected to be insufficient to maintain military parity. Specifically, the USSR enjoys quantitative superiority in most deployed systems, qualitative superiority in some systems, and is anticipated to obtain qualitative parity in most systems. The US research and development and acquisition process has resulted neither in quantitative superiority today nor in qualitative superiority for the future. The United States must recognize the necessity of the "quality offset" concept which precludes quantitative superiority but it must evolve an implementation structure to accommodate dynamic balance. The United States needs to improve its process for identifying, assessing, and fostering potentially high-payoff multidisciplined technologies. Examples include:

- Directing Energy Weapons, Antisubmarine Warfare, C<sup>3</sup>I, Fieldable Technology.
- Establishing a better balance between quality offset and quantity/ simplicity supplemented by incremental improvements.

Regarding distribution of technology domestically, it appears that deployment of advanced equipment to US forces is hampered by the test and evaluation system, although this system is clearly needed to insure that deployed equipment meets specifications. Another factor restraining utilization of advanced technology is the rigidity of the system for defining requirements and system characteristics. Increased flexibility in the requirement process may permit greater use of allied equipment and enhance the utilization of advanced US technology. The basic problem confronting the United States in the international technology transfer question is the lack of a coherent approach and a systematic definition of what constitutes possible or desired leverage. Such transfers cannot be treated as black or white issues. Each case must be examined and specific objectives and goals articulated as to what is to be accomplished by virtue of the transfer.

In discussing the application of technology to warfare through experimentation, it was felt that this subject required the attention of high level policymakers. Experimentation provides the means to explore tactical and doctrinal changes, real data for analysis, and the basis for design changes, and has numerous historical cases for precedence. Several types of experiments are possible, e.g., controlled, paper (system analysis), mind (imagination), games and simulations. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses but all are required for successful innovation of complex systems. The panel suggested the following recommendations for stimulating experimentation and disseminating the results obtained.

## PANEL 5

—*Training*. It is important for high-level commanders to legitimize variability of approaches in their subordinate units and promote systematic analysis of the different outcomes.

—*Exercises*. Special ad hoc exercises can be used to test innovations and to ask what-if questions.

—*Controlled Experiments*. This would utilize ad hoc organizations, e.g., a permanent experimental brigade to test new tactics, organization, and weapons.

—*Schools*. Senior Service and Command and General Staff Colleges, as well as speciality schools, could be used more extensively for experimental thinking. Faculty research and greater faculty stability would permit an accumulation of knowledge through continuity of programs, i.e., corporate memory.

The panel concluded that without dissemination, the information generated from experiments would be useless. Some panelists suggested that "user conferences," for example, of battalion and division commanders held on a quarterly basis, could bring accumulated experience of operational commanders' problems and solutions into the open for review and dissemination. The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) may be an excellent source to test innovative military technology. Inasmuch as the RDF is a joint force with a myriad of roles and missions, which require assorted types of training, new equipment could be provided to the force with the purpose of fostering its multiple missions.

In sum, the panel reached six general conclusions in its analysis of the interaction between technology and US national security for the 1980s:

—US quality offset will never be fully successful in compensating for Soviet quantity.

—The United States should proceed with a combination of quality/low cost quantity technological developments to improve the US-USSR balance.

—The United States may avoid USSR technological surprise by selective prioritization of potential high-payoff technologies and exploitation of available allied technology.

—The United States should establish a process to select among technologies for which US superiority is essential versus those for which it is discretionary.

—Experimentation is potentially an important evaluation tool in the innovative technological process.

—Expanded missions or charters should be established for operational test and evaluation organizations.

# **PANEL 5 PAPER: Science, Technology, and the US-Soviet Competition**

**by Barry J. Smernoff  
B. J. Smernoff Associates**

## **Introduction**

The clear preeminence of American science and technology is one of the last vestiges of postwar power claimed by the United States as it enters the turbulent decade of the 1980s. An intriguing vignette of US technological superiority is given by the flurry of typographical activity before the signing of the now-shelved SALT II treaty, itself designed to limit strategic nuclear weapons which embody the highest levels of military technology. The Soviet and American delegations each typed two versions of the negotiated agreement on 14 June 1979 in Vienna. Completing the two Russian versions was a tedious task for the Soviets since they used manual typewriters and course, cardboard-like treaty paper on which mistakes could not be corrected. Conversely, the Americans used modern electronic word-processing machines with video correction and editing features. Even though the technical approaches contrasted sharply, each team completed its job in time for the chief negotiators to initial nearly 300 pages that evening.<sup>1</sup>

The innovative strength of scientific research in the United States and the technological clout of its diversified industrial base is unmatched by any other nation. After building the world's first nuclear weapons and landing men on the lunar surface, America's special talent for organizing large-scale projects to produce technological innovation on demand has been taken for granted. For more than three decades, the United States has been a world leader in almost all areas of science and technology (S&T). The ability to apply S&T to practical problems is recognized widely as a basic prerequisite of sustained economic growth and military power. America's position as the world's largest economy and one of the military superpowers is closely related to its collective talent for developing and applying key technologies across a broad range of industrial and military problems.

Industrial and military innovation, however, is a highly dynamic process in which world leadership is a perishable commodity. Japan is overtaking the United States in many important areas of industrial technology, demonstrating its competitive superiority by adapting new technologies for commercial purposes, thereby increasing its economic productivity much more rapidly than the United States. More ominously, the Soviet Union has

## PANEL 5

matched the United States in areas of technology with critical implications for the military balance and for international security (see Tables 1 and 2).

As the momentum of massive Soviet investments in defense research and development (R&D) pays off, new areas of parity in military technology can be expected and some new Soviet leads will be created. The Soviet technological threat is neutralizing the traditional American doctrine of quality-offset: attempting to use the US leads in advanced military technology to compensate for the highly visible quantitative advantages in

Table 1  
**RELATIVE US/USSR STANDING IN THE 20 MOST  
 IMPORTANT BASIC TECHNOLOGY AREAS**

BASIC TECHNOLOGIES	US SUPERIOR	US-USSR EQUAL	USSR SUPERIOR
1. Aerodynamics/Fluid Dynamics		X	
2. Automated Control	X		
3. Computer	-X		
4. Military Instrumentation	X		
5. Directed Energy		X	
6. Electrooptical Sensor (including IR)	X		
7. Guidance and Navigation	X-		
8. Hydro-acoustic	X		
9. Intelligence Sensor	X		
10. Manufacturing	X		
11. Materials (Lt Wt & High Strength)	X-		
12. Microelectronic Materials and Integrated Circuit Manufacture	-X		
13. Non-Acoustic Submarine Detection		X	
14. Nuclear Warhead		X	
15. Optics	X-		
16. Propulsion (Aerospace)	X-		
17. Radar Sensor		X	
18. Signal Processing	X		
19. Software	X		
20. Telecommunications	X		

• The list in aggregate was selected with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing overall US and USSR basic technology. The technologies were specifically not chosen to compare technology level in currently deployed military systems. The list is in alphabetical order.

• The technologies selected have the potential for significantly changing the military balance in the next 10 to 20 years. The technologies are not static; they are improving or have the potential for significant improvements.

• The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly in the direction indicated.

• The judgements represent averages within each basic technology area.

Source: *The FY 1981 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition*, Statement by Dr. William J. Perry, USDR&E, to the 96th Congress, 1 February 1980, p. II-36.

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

**Table 2**  
**RELATIVE US/USSR TECHNOLOGY LEVEL IN DEPLOYED**  
**MILITARY SYSTEMS\***

DEPLOYED SYSTEM	US SUPERIOR	US-USSR EQUAL	USSR SUPERIOR
<i>STRATEGIC</i>			
ICBM		X	
SSBN/SLBM	X-		
Bomber	X		
SAMs			X
Ballistic Missile Defense			X
Anti-satellite			X
<i>TACTICAL</i>			
<i>Land Forces</i>			
SAMs (including Naval)		X	
Tanks			-X**
Artillery	X-		
Infantry Combat Vehicles			X
Anti-tank Guided Missiles		X	
Attack Helicopters	X-		
Chemical Warfare			X
Theater Ballistic Missiles		X	
<i>Air Forces</i>			
Fighter/Attack Aircraft	X		
Air-to-Air Missiles	X		
PGM	X		
Air Lift	X		
<i>Naval Forces</i>			
SSNs		X	
Anti-Submarine Warfare	X-		
Sea-based Air	X-		
Surface Combatants		X	
Cruise Missile		X	
Mine Warfare			X
Amphibious Assault	X-		
<i>C<sup>3</sup>I</i>			
Communications	X-		
Command and Control		X	
Electronic Countermeasure		X	
Surveillance and Recon-			
naissance	X-		
Early Warning	X-		

\*These are comparisons of system technology level only, and are not necessarily a measure of effectiveness. The comparisons are not dependent on scenario, tactics, quantity, training, or other operational factors. Systems farther than 1 year from IOC are not considered.

\*\*The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly in the direction indicated.

Source: *The FY 1981 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition*, Statement by Dr. William J. Perry, USDR&E, to the 96th Congress, 1 February 1980, p. II-37.

## PANEL 5

deployed Soviet hardware such as tanks, tactical aircraft, ships and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Indeed, a growing number of senior American defense officials believe that the doctrine of quality-offset is bankrupt in the presence of Soviet determination to close the gap in military technology. For instance, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E) William Perry testified recently before the US Congress on this theme:

For years we have have acknowledged that the Soviet Union held a quantitative lead in military equipment, but believed that our qualitative lead would more than compensate for this. It is time to re-examine that belief and to reject the complacency that went with it.<sup>2</sup>

The comfortable notion that the proven resourcefulness of American scientists and engineers will suffice to meet the strong challenges posed by Japan and the Soviet Union (among others) to US superiority in science and technology is no longer as easily tenable as it once was. After all, Britain led the world into the industrial revolution 200 years ago and has recently become trapped in a complex web of sociopolitical constraints that have stifled the contemporary impulse to innovate and slowed its economic growth to a crawl. Germany led the world into the age of modern military technology with its Blitzkrieg tank strategy and V-2 rocket developments in World War II; now, its Western part is a middle power relative to the nuclear-armed superpowers which spend many billions of dollars and rubles each year to support large enterprises that are organized specifically to nurture military innovations.

The Soviet Union and United States convert R&D resources into useful industrial and military strength under quite different constraints and with different efficiencies. Each participant in the long-term US-Soviet competition develops and applies new technologies according to its own perceived needs, R&D style, and doctrinal inclinations, and each has its own distinctive set of economic and sociopolitical boundary conditions. The relative degree of success in converting comparable technological resources into economic and military power will largely determine which side in this competition comes out "ahead" near the turn of the century. If the United States cannot maintain its stated goal of technological leadership and yields to Soviet parity (and possibly Soviet superiority) in many key areas of military science and technology, the long-range implications for the Western world and for international security could be severe. Conversely, the outlook is more favorable if the United States renews its commitment to preeminence in military technology in the face of Soviet determination to catch up and surpass the West, and back up this renewed commitment with a bold new R&D investment strategy and managerial innovations designed to take better advantage of proven American skills in creating and applying new technologies.

Is it conceivable that the United States would accept a position of parity with the USSR in military technology during the foreseeable future, given that American industrial technology is so far ahead of its counterpart in the civilian sector of the Soviet economy? What would the loss of American S&T superiority imply for perceptions of the military balance, for the credibility of American power, and more generally, for foreign affairs? If it

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

desired, could the United States restore its historical superiority in military technology by selecting specific high-leverage areas of comparative advantage for accelerated development, in the proven style of the successful Manhattan and Apollo Projects during the 1940s and 1960s? Or are the necessary decisions and actions for such unique undertakings all but impossible due to considerations of domestic politics and public disillusionment with S&T? Finally, can the United States (and its allies) organize an effective response to meet the formidable challenge of Soviet military technology without wrecking much of what Western civilization has created during the last half of the 20th century?

Within the framework established by these and other related questions, this paper presents a preliminary discussion of what may become a major debate in the United States about military technology and its implications for the future of the US-Soviet competition. The basic purpose is to raise the level of informed discussion about the essentially technological nature of the US-Soviet competition and how it interacts with important aspects of international affairs.

### IS THE THREAT OF SOVIET MILITARY TECHNOLOGY REAL?

The case that a major Soviet military buildup has been occurring during the past 10-15 years is now indisputable. Humiliated in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Soviet leaders evidently decided to accelerate their military R&D and production programs to meet the challenge of American strategic power deployed in the form of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered submarines, a blue-water naval force, and an emerging constellation of space systems. But the Soviet military buildup was far from a carbon-copy of American forces and associated doctrines. According to their perceived defense needs and R&D style, above and beyond the standard American fare, the Soviets also developed and deployed a large-scale air defense system, a first-generation ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, an impressive civil defense organization equipped with hardened facilities, extensive chemical warfare capabilities for the European theater, a new supersonic aircraft (the well-known Backfire), and their own (smaller) version of aircraft carriers.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, the Soviet educational system was primed to build the S&T infrastructure by training everyone more thoroughly in science, mathematics, and engineering skills, as well as to produce many more scientists and engineers (the total number of Soviet scientists has quadrupled since about 1950). The Soviets have steadily increased the share of their defense expenditures (measured in rubles) devoted to R&D, from 20 percent in 1970 to about 25 percent in 1980, demonstrating their determination to eliminate the overall American lead in military S&T. In comparison, only 10 percent of US defense spending was allocated for R&D throughout the 1970s, a decade which began on a clear note of austerity in the US military R&D system and closed on an upturn as the implications of the Soviet buildup became part of the conventional wisdom.

But does a meaningful Soviet threat to American superiority in military technology really exist, or is it merely a figment of the collective Pentagon imagination? Can the largest (and possibly last) empire in the world pose a

## PANEL 5

serious S&T threat if it cannot produce enough grain, shoes, trousers, and toothbrushes? In an economic environment dominated by central planning and numerous structural inefficiencies and rigidities, where financial and other incentives for stimulating innovation are scarce at best, is it surprising that almost half of the metal used in the machine-tool industry goes for scrap and about three times as many designers are required to develop comparable amounts of new machinery as in Japan and West Germany?<sup>4</sup> Soviet technology for recovering oil and natural gas lags behind its American counterpart by 25–40 years, depending upon which estimate is heeded. The well-known Soviet lag in computer technology and electronics is about ten years and widening: the prevalence of vacuum tubes (even if miniaturized) in Soviet products ranging from commercial radios to high-performance jet fighters is legendary. More importantly, a senior official recently complained in *Izvestia* that an old state decree precluded the use of computers to help design complex new machine tools because the typeface and distance between printed lines in computer output differs from the prescribed standard—at a time when the computer-aided development of “intelligent” industrial robots utilizing microcomputers is on the threshold of revolutionizing the machine-tool industries in Western nations.<sup>5</sup>

The contrasting realities of the impressive Soviet military buildup side-by-side with the technologically primitive Soviet industrial economy have stimulated theories about a two-tier system in which the prestigious military sector has the highest priority and absorbs most of the key R&D resources, leaving the civilian sector in the lurch and making it noncompetitive in world markets. Absent the significant element of reciprocity that characterizes the relationship between the corresponding sectors in the American system,<sup>6</sup> due largely to the Soviet penchant for secrecy and tight information control, it should be no surprise that the two-tier model of the Soviet R&D system is widely used even though it is an imperfect and oversimplified representation. The relative absence of internal technology transfer between the civilian and military sectors is matched in its negative impact on the uneven progress of Soviet science and technology by the strong disincentives to innovation which force many nonevolutionary military development programs into separate tracks outside the traditional design bureaus.

In a related matter, it is reasonable to speculate that the most creative Soviet scientists and engineers tend to shun the risk of failure in advanced military technology programs and “instead seek out the relative safety of pure science and mathematics and theoretical rather than applied pursuits.”<sup>7</sup> With the relative scarcity of electronic computers, this hypothesis would help to explain why the so-called blackboard sciences are as highly developed in the Soviet Union as in any other country. On the other hand, it appears that mediocre scientists, research projects, and published papers generally survive in the Soviet system because they are protected by the risk-aversion features of the layered Soviet bureaucracy.<sup>8</sup> Soviet scientists have won only eight Nobel Prizes since the revolution in 1917, less than one-tenth as many as Americans; two of the eight were awarded in 1964 to Nikolai Basov and Aleksander Prokhorov for co-invention of the laser with Charles Townes, an American.

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

It is reasonable to conclude that the Soviet Union does pose a threat to the historical superiority of American military technology, but certainly does not to that of Western industrial technology in general, on both counts largely because of the enormous diversion of resources to support military R&D programs. Indeed, the dichotomy of the Soviet technological threat is quite consistent with the fact that the Soviets cannot compete effectively with the West in any dimension of international life other than military affairs. Since the mid-1960s, Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues in the Kremlin have discovered that "good news" on the military side of the house is accompanied by bad news on the civilian side: the USSR cannot compete in the manufacture of marketable industrial goods and modern commercial items such as consumer electronics, telecommunication equipment, passenger automobiles and aircraft, and industrial robots. It is no wonder, then, that Soviet leaders are tough negotiators when well-intentioned Americans—who generally want to slow the strategic arms race and introduce a modicum of cooperation into the US-Soviet relations—attempt to constrain their successful military buildup with arms control proposals. As Stanley Hoffman has pointed out:

The Soviet's very tendency to play military cards above all in the world game—because of their deficiency in other kinds of cards or reluctance to play them, and their abundance of might—makes it more difficult for them to give up any sizable amount of strength. Their remarkable paranoia about the outside world, fed by sixty years of insulation and the existence of formidable foes, contributes to this unwillingness.<sup>9</sup>

Notwithstanding their deep-rooted xenophobia, during the early "euphoric" years of detente Soviet leaders made a strong bid to acquire Western industrial technology and concomitant long-term credits to shore up their ailing economy, with specific emphasis on Siberian energy resource development. This move was abetted by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's desire to entangle the Soviet Union in a web of trade and technology transfer arrangements which would make detente a many-dimensional relationship extending beyond its centerpiece of SALT. Failed Soviet expectations on this score, in large part due to the Jackson-Vanik amendment linking most-favored nation status to free emigration, helped to set the stage for the 1979 decision to send troops into Afghanistan after Senate ratification of SALT II became improbable, Sino-American relations grew warmer, and deployment of the so-called Euromissiles (to offset the new Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile) was decided by NATO.<sup>10</sup>

The potentially severe economic problems lurking in the mid-term Soviet future will be exacerbated by the continued absence of Western technology, which in principle could ameliorate those problems. Some analysts have suggested that this darkness at the end of the long Soviet economic tunnel might convert the military optimism and self-confidence currently enjoyed by the Soviets (who have finally caught up with the West, at least in the military arena) into the increasingly serious risk of "map-changing" incentives which could propel them into Persian Gulf adventures to grab oil-rich lands as their own energy problems mount, thereby pushing the world once again into the nuclear brink.<sup>11</sup> That this type of

## **PANEL 5**

contingency is taken so seriously by a growing number of defense analysts confirms the centrality of science and technology in the US-Soviet competition—but in such a manner that the principal determinant of such risks of future conflict can be traced to a surprising combination of technological factors: the presence of intense US-Soviet competition in military technology, unmoderated by cooperation in industrial technology that is so badly needed by the USSR. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to consideration of these competitive and cooperative aspects of the S&T relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

### **THE DOCTRINE OF QUALITY-OFFSET, REVISITED**

From this perspective, reexamination of the American doctrine of quality-offset in military systems is long overdue. The point of departure is the fact that the Soviet Union has engaged in a sustained military buildup to equal and surpass the United States in both the quantity and quality of military equipment. Most observers of the military balance credit the Soviets with unambiguous superiority in conventional forces, primarily due to overwhelming numerical margins, and "essential equivalence"—if not incipient superiority (often termed tolerable inferiority by humorous American analysts)—in strategic nuclear forces. The demonstrated Soviet commitment to improve the quality of its strategic forces (four new Soviet ICBMs have been identified since the mid-1970s, compared to zero for the United States) contrasts with the large problems encountered by the United States when it tries to embody new strategic technology into operational military equipment; ongoing public debates over the Navy's Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) submarine communication system and the Air Force's advanced MX ICBM system are noteworthy in this regard. The sharp contrast between the relative abilities of the two superpowers to develop and deploy advanced military technology in a timely manner indicates that the American doctrine of quality-offset is rather outdated and unworkable at this juncture in the US-Soviet competition, if not actually bankrupt. The United States can no longer rely heavily on military technology to be developed and deployed in a timely and effective manner, thereby compensating for the large numbers of men and machines that constitute Soviet military power.

But the decline of the policy of using sophisticated American military technology to offset Soviet numerical advantages is far from an unmitigated disaster. One can argue that the long-term implications of procuring relatively few, costly, high-technology weapons rather than larger numbers of less sophisticated ones could be quite damaging for US national security. Counting on small numbers of advanced systems to accomplish military missions did not help to produce an American victory in Vietnam nor enable the United States to achieve more limited objectives in such recent missions as the aborted attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran. Indeed, US reliance upon technology to substitute for the larger numbers of military men and machines that may be needed can be viewed as little more than an overarching expedient for coping with the political difficulties entailed by specific hard choices about the allocation of human and capital resources to achieve national security objectives. To the extent that this thesis is valid, the American doctrine of quality-offset became an

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

ineffectual surrogate for traditional military strength long before the Soviet technological threat surfaced in its current form during the mid-1970s.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has noted that even in his own office there were people overly "entranced" with technology.<sup>12</sup> A growing number of congressmen and defense analysts are calling for less attention to the attraction of technically elegant and complex weapon systems and more attention to the real problems of operational readiness, military manpower (including the crucial issue of insuring adequate financial compensation in an inflationary economy), and strategic mobility. However, if the doctrine of quality-offset is relegated to the intellectual dustbin, it is extremely important to remember that military technology is far from an insignificant factor in the US-Soviet competition. Whereas the United States must change its attitude toward the development of new military technology and alter its cumbersome system for carrying innovations through to completion, the relevance of technology for sustaining American military (and industrial) strength and the overall balance of world power has not lessened and may actually be growing with time. A better balance between quality and quantity must be sought.

An implicit policy to do more with less by using advanced military technology to compensate for the larger numbers of military men and machines the United States is unwilling and/or unable to muster has existed for many years, virtually unnoticed by many American defense analysts. The policy of using qualitative technological advances to maintain American military strength "on the cheap" was politically convenient long before strategic arms control became an easy way to satisfy popular demands resulting from the deep-rooted public attitudes unfavorable to militarism, power politics, and foreign entanglements which shaped American foreign policy before World War II and tend to resurface in the absence of stark dangers to the national security.<sup>13</sup> Placing the burden on advanced military technology has been the easy way out, given the staying power of these public attitudes and the widespread disfavor with which the American body politic views arduous preparations to deter and fight wars that create excessive burdens on national resources.

Twenty years ago, President Eisenhower's farewell address contained twin warnings about the "acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex" and the "danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite."<sup>14</sup> Whereas the phrase "military-industrial complex" has gained currency, Eisenhower's second warning is less widely known but possibly more important, given the critical role played by the doctrine of quality-offset in determining the existing structure of the US military posture. Contemporary defense policy in the United States (as well as in the Soviet Union) has to an increasing degree become dependent upon the intellectual style and analytical calculus of groups that utilize science-based technology both as the substance of major defense programs and as the tools with which these programs are analyzed and compared, promoted or aborted. The politics of the periodic budget battles over competing US military programs is laden with technical jargon and abstruse concepts which informed laymen, let alone average members of the American public, would find extremely difficult to understand. The doctrine of technological

## PANEL 5

quality that crept into postwar American defense policy is just as much a reflection of how these elites have accrued bureaucratic and political power within the US defense community as a commentary on the putative desirability of utilizing high technology for securing the Nation against its adversaries.

It is apparent that technology developed for its own sake cannot contribute to national security unless it can be embodied into operational systems, and that such embodiment has become increasingly difficult and contentious for many important weapon systems. Similarly, the risk of overdependence on the doctrine of quality-offset is equally apparent. Outright abandonment of this doctrine would be foolhardy absent an adequate replacement. Otherwise the American defense posture may be caught short on both quantity and quality compared with its principal adversary, the Soviet Union. The necessary search for a proper balance between military quantity and quality can be formulated along the familiar line of "how much is enough;" how much quality is enough to mix with the limited quantities of men and machines the United States is willing and able to support in order to provide for the common defense, as mandated by the US Constitution?

### SEARCHING FOR A BALANCE BETWEEN QUANTITY AND QUALITY

Ten years ago, the President's National Goals Research Staff issued a report whose title, *Toward Balanced Growth: Quantity with Quality*, expresses the central theme of balancing the growth of economic activities and science-based technology with an emphasis on the quality of the environment and the quality of life. In 1980, the search for a proper balance between economic growth and protection of the natural environment is continuing as the United States strives to address its competing domestic priorities. In defense policy, on the other hand, serious debate about the balance between quantity and quality is just getting under way. Powerful proponents of advanced military technology as the best way to cope with virtually all aspects of the Soviet threat confront a growing number of critics who believe that the clear trends toward skyrocketing costs and technological complexity must force military R&D toward low-risk, limited payoff programs.<sup>15</sup> In turn, this R&D strategy can be successful only if it is combined with decisions to acquire sufficient military hardware to meet directly the substantial investment challenge posed by the Soviet Union.

There is some chance that the swing of the pendulum will carry American military technology away from its historical style of engineering complexity and technological elegance (which cynics refer to as gold-plating) toward the Soviet paradigm of design simplicity, commonality of component subsystems, and less use of untested innovations.<sup>16</sup> The politics of US military R&D decisions is likely to become more contentious during the 1980s as compromises are sought between advancing the frontiers of technology and waiting until the payoffs are in hand before applying them, and converting state-of-the-art techniques as quickly as possible into deployable hardware. The process of embodying technology in usable military hardware which is cost-effective, reliable, and easy to maintain has never been straightforward, nor has military R&D

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

decisionmaking ever been easy. In the framework of the unfolding new controversy about quality versus quantity, the efficient conversion of American military technology into equipment may get worse before it begins to get better.

The practical difficulties of finding a workable mix between military quality and quantity are illustrated by the growth of complexity and the cost escalation of the Navy's F/A-18 "lightweight" fighter aircraft currently under development. The congressionally-imposed strategy of buying a "high-low" mix of expensive/high-performance and cheaper/lower-capability fighters was severely eroded by the growth of complexity and technical sophistication in the supposedly low-cost F/A-18, especially after it was redesignated as a mixed fighter-attack aircraft. Some critics of the Navy's approach contend that its technological growth was a deliberate attempt to drive the unit cost toward that of the much more capable and popular F-14, which can cope with the threat to the US naval fleet from Soviet Backfire bombers armed with long-range missiles.<sup>17</sup> Although more than \$3 billion has been sunk into development of the F/A-18, there are few reasons for the Navy to purchase a less capable fighter if its cost is comparable to that of the superior F-14.

Cost convergence in connection with the F-14 versus F/A-18 competition represents a microcosm of the quality/quantity tradeoffs which tend to permeate decisions that must be made by senior officials in the US defense community when dealing with the dilemmas of modern military technology. As the technological quality of Soviet forces increases, the clear need to deploy larger numbers of American force elements to cope with already large numbers of Soviet force elements will confront the equally clear need to deploy systems which can meet increasingly sophisticated Soviet military threats, such as the supersonic Backfire. Given the political realities of living within budgetary constraints which are expanding less rapidly than perceived needs, specific debates over quality versus quantity issues are likely to proliferate and intensify in the foreseeable future.

The growing furor over the MX ICBM system presents another major conflict between technological sophistication and quantitative considerations. Deployment of the MIRVed MX (which is more accurate and larger than the current Minuteman ICBM) in a deceptive basing mode would constitute reliance upon advanced technology to meet the conflicting requirements of strategic deterrence and (prospective) arms control agreement. Hidden in a basing complex of thousands of launchers, 200 mobile MX missiles would be less vulnerable to Soviet ICBM strikes than the current deployment of 1000 Minutemen ICBMs in fixed (hence targetable) silos, while remaining within the numerical and verification constraints of the Interim Offensive Agreement of SALT I (now expired) and the SALT II treaty (now shelved indefinitely).

However, the less technically demanding, more socially acceptable, and possibly cheaper alternative of deploying thousands of new unMIRVed mini-ICBMs in fixed silos might resolve the emerging ICBM vulnerability problem as well as mitigate the destabilizing aspect of accurate land-based MIRVed missiles. This strategic force option has not been given serious consideration on two counts. Such a hypothetical deployment would be inconsistent with the SALT regime, even though SALT appears to be a dead

## PANEL 5

letter with respect to political viability during the near-term.<sup>18</sup> Second, the development and deployment of a large strategic force of mini-ICBMs would be contrary to the doctrine of quality-offset (and its psychological concomitant, the principle of technical elegance or "sweetness") which has dominated many military R&D decisions in the postwar years. Hence the mini-ICBM alternative to MIRV and mobile MX technologies has few serious advocates in the US Air Force, the office of the USDR&E, and the Department of State even though this option appears to provide a straightforward (and possibly stabilizing) solution to the high-priority problem of sheltering the ICBM component of the strategic Triad from the imminent threat of accurate Soviet MIRVs.<sup>19</sup>

The quality versus quantity debate takes on a more acrimonious tone in connection with large nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and missile-bearing submarines. The evident need for building more US ships to cope with the blue-water threat posed by burgeoning Soviet naval power is confronted by the entrenched attitudes of Admiral Rickover's nuclear navy which demands large, powerful, and costly surface vessels and submarines. There are few doubts that nuclear propulsion has revolutionized the US Navy and has produced large theoretical benefits for combat effectiveness, at least in certain circumstances and conflict scenarios. However, the historical emphasis on naval task forces centered on high-value aircraft carriers requires rethinking in an era of long-range precision-guided munitions (PGMs) which can be targeted by remote ocean surveillance systems located on satellites and/or aircraft. Strategic submarines such as Trident may become vulnerable to expected developments during the next 10-15 years in Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) sensors, which could be utilized to guide nuclear barrage attacks launched by ICBMs or other systems, thus jeopardizing the most survivable component of the strategic Triad in the 1990s and beyond. The notion of placing too many eggs in too few high-value baskets which are increasingly vulnerable to modern military technology embodied in various kinds of advanced sensors and PGMs threatens the viability of large aircraft carriers and large submarines. The alternatives include smaller carriers hosting vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft, and small submersibles, each of which might be proliferated to reduce its vulnerability.

## ASYMMETRIES IN EXPLOITING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

American military innovation is often characterized by the archetype of "big science" in which Manhattan-like projects are undertaken on a crash basis to develop critical new weapons. Certainly, the historical developments in the 1940s and 1950s of nuclear weapons and ICBMs fit this paradigm. More recently, however, the process of evolutionary improvement has produced most of the technological developments embodied in contemporary tactical and strategic weapons. Some observers have described this evolutionary process of development as "technology creep" in which major improvements in military capabilities accumulate over time through a series of relatively small independent advances.<sup>20</sup> One of the principal difficulties in the classical approach for negotiating limitations on strategic weapons can be traced to the conflicting sets of incentives by which industrial scientists, military program managers, the

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

armed services, and civilian defense officials in both superpowers justify and promote incremental improvements in military systems.

A low-level intellectual debate about the actual style of American military R&D—whether it is better characterized by unstinting enthusiasm for new technology or by conservatism that focuses upon incremental advances and cost limitations—has unfolded during recent years.<sup>20</sup> Some students of the contrast between Soviet and US defense R&D hold that the Soviets can be as technically ambitious as their American counterparts, especially if large-scale Manhattan-like projects must be adopted for areas in which incremental and evolutionary approaches are unworkable. Infrequently, innovative Soviet programs have been supported at the instigation of high-level intervention, such as those for developing nuclear weapons, ICBMs, satellites, lasers, and the TU-144 supersonic aircraft.<sup>21</sup> Contemporary examples of technologies which expand the frontiers of scientific knowledge and are not amenable to the evolutionary approach include the generic class of directed-energy technologies (based on high-energy lasers and particle-beam devices) and nonacoustic ASW sensors, each of which could have a significant impact on the military balance if it can be integrated into effective weapon systems.

There is little doubt that one of the most constraining factors in the US military innovation system is the overpowering bureaucracy which provides important checks and balances on emerging new technologies and weapon systems even as it impedes responses to new ideas and "urgent" requirements.<sup>22</sup> Perhaps the most penetrating statement about this critical problem was given in a workshop on asymmetries in exploiting technology in connection with the US-Soviet competition held at the Rand Corporation in 1976:

The military establishment in the Soviet Union exploits technology through organized, controlled, single-minded problem solving. Sometimes this technology can be called advanced, sometimes not. But the Soviet system makes it meet the users' requirements. By contrast, the using commands in the American forces sometimes promptly receive weapons having technology appropriate to their needs, but usually this is not the case. . . . the United States has no shortage of good technical solutions; moreover, it knows how to put complex systems into serial production better than the Soviets. But the pathway of decision in the United States—from a perceived need of the user to the final deployment of weapons using new technology—is a complex road with many detours, sidetracks, and over a dozen major decision-makers with varying incentive structures. All of these factors affect the kinds of weapons the user finally receives. American strength is best demonstrated when brilliant and forceful leaders coincide with good ideas for putting technology to use in response to users' requirements. Soviet weakness is manifest when a rigid and inflexible leadership errs or fails to respond to change and is not called to account. But Americans can hardly count on such failures.<sup>23</sup>

## PANEL 5

Where are the "brilliant and forceful leaders" who can move critical new technologies forward, such as high-energy lasers and nonacoustic ASW sensors, just as J. Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller did for nuclear weapons, Admiral Hyman Rickover did for nuclear propulsion, and General Bernard Schriever did for the ICBM? Where are the movers and shakers who can pursue the next phases of American military innovation—which will be the cornerstone of our part in the superpower competition—with intellectual vigor and patriotic enthusiasm? Who will cut through the morass of difficult decisions and tangled bureaucracy to make the US commitment to superiority in military technology a real one instead of a hollow promise, responding to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's stern warning that:

We must decide now whether we intend to remain the strongest nation in the world. Or we must accept now that we will let ourselves slip into inferiority, into a position of weakness in a harsh world where principles unsupported by power are victimized, and that we will become a nation with more of a past than a future.<sup>24</sup>

## PROSPECTIVE DECISIVE DEVELOPMENTS

If the United States desires to maintain its longstanding technological superiority in military affairs, a comprehensive search is urgently needed to find developments which could make a large difference if provided with selective funding and high priority. Given the normal pace of the weapon acquisition cycle spanning concept initiation and the final phase of engineering development—a cycle which the Defense Science Board indicates has lengthened to 12-15 years—it is reasonable to assume that foreseeable developments in military technology will be based upon existing scientific knowledge. Consequently, decisive developments in military technology during the next few decades will depend more upon dedicated efforts to convert the fruits of previous research into military equipment than upon hypothetical breakthroughs in basic areas of scientific inquiry. Eugene Kopf recently stated the same theme in a speech on future military activities in space:

It is customary when speaking of space and space systems to say, "We are at the dawn of a new era," and then go on to describe a future taken from *Star Wars*. Perhaps that future will come some day, but not, in my opinion, by the year 2000. I believe that we already have a good idea of what those space systems will look like in the year 2000, which is not so much a testament to our foresight as it is a grudging acceptance of the snail-like progress we make in transforming technology and concepts into operational systems.<sup>25</sup>

Only one major weapon-system component based on a new scientific phenomenon has been introduced since the development of nuclear weapons during World War II: the laser, which stands for "light amplification through the stimulated emission of radiation."<sup>26</sup> Senior DOD officials have indicated during the past two decades that lasers are the modern

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

technological artifacts with the greatest potential for making a truly decisive contribution to national security. In late 1979, a key assistant to the USDR&E stated before Congress that low-energy laser development has been the single most successful DOD investment during the 1970s. Low-energy lasers are currently used widely as target rangefinders and designators for PGM; lightwave communication systems using fiber optic cables projected for deployment during the 1980s will have significant advantages over conventional copper-wire communications in the increasingly important area of electromagnetic countermeasures (e.g., jamming).

The next decisive payoff associated with lasers is likely to come from the development of high-energy devices which can generate powerful beams of coherent light to damage targets.<sup>28</sup> Weapon systems based on high-energy lasers (HELs) are undergoing feasibility studies and exploratory research in the single largest technology-base program in the defense R&D portfolio, funded at an annual level of more than \$200 million in FY 1981 after approximately \$1.5 billion has been expended during the 1970s. The Soviet Union is credited with a HEL program that is about 4 times larger than its American counterpart. These facts suggest that a major superpower competition is unfolding to exploit HEL as one of the most promising new military technologies—a competition with highly significant implications for the military balance in the late 1980s and beyond. Some observers of the US-Soviet military competition have suggested that with the possible exception of laser weapons applied to the BMD problem and ground warfare, revolutionary developments which are comparable in qualitative novelty to those made in the 1950s and 1960s (such as the ICBM and MIRV) are not on the technological horizon.<sup>29</sup>

Relatively vulnerable and predictable satellites are likely to be early targets of ground-based and possibly space-based laser weapons in the foreseeable future. Missiles and aircraft inside the atmosphere are more difficult targets for first-generation laser weapons due to propagation and basing problems. Some observers project the advent of laser ballistic missile defense systems which might be based in space and the related possibility that serious weaponization of space-laser technology could ultimately pose the problem of technological obsolescence for the entire strategic Triad of each superpower. The prospects for vigorous pursuit of laser BMD systems might increase substantially in the US if the sharp deterioration of Soviet-American relations does not improve by the mid-1980s, especially if the ABM Treaty of 1972—the only remaining product of the beleaguered SALT process—experiences either *de jure* or *de facto* abrogation.

For those who are fascinated by the intermediate outcomes of the half-technical, half-political process by which new weapons emerge from the US military R&D system, the case of laser weapons will be of more than passing interest. During 1979, a task force of the Defense Science Board examined the DOD's high-energy laser program and redefined its objective as the determination of the highest military potential for laser weapon systems.<sup>30</sup> In essence, this task force found the current HEL state-of-the-art wanting and opted for the relatively timid approach of focusing on exploratory research in lieu of an aggressive redirection of the large and promising HEL program (which would have been more consistent with a renewed

## PANEL 5

American commitment to compete vigorously with the Soviet Union), for instance through the accelerated development of space-based laser weapons designed to attack satellites (and ultimately ICBM and SLBM boosters).<sup>31</sup> The arguments of enthusiastic proponents of laser BMD systems have generally been counterproductive, souring the US defense community on the near-term potential of any laser weapons since unrealistic expectations have characterized past assessments of their prospects. However, the long-term technical potential and overall attractiveness of strategic laser weaponry are clear.

The prevailing timidity in this high-leverage area is due to a combination of legitimate apprehensions that HEL technology is not quite ripe for exploitation and successful weaponization of lasers may signal the beginning of the end for strategic nuclear weapons (and the Triad), and an erroneous judgment that space-laser weapons are technically infeasible in the foreseeable future. In this connection, the fact that some senior defense officials believe that serious consideration of departure from the strategic Triad would be "psychologically unbearable" suggests that serious consideration of laser BMD weapons, which could ultimately make the entire Triad obsolete, is virtually unthinkable and tantamount to heresy. It is noteworthy that in the early 1950s, numerous impossibility theorems were proven by honest men regarding the technical feasibility of the ICBM until the Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee chaired by John von Neumann, inventor of the digital electronic computer, reported in 1954 that an ICBM could be developed and laid the groundwork for the *pre-Sputnik* acceleration of this high-priority defense program.<sup>32</sup>

The fact that the debate about space-based laser BMD weapons is being carried into the political arena<sup>33</sup> far earlier than usual for emerging new weapon technologies strongly indicates that its outcome will be a harbinger of whether the United States is serious about competing with the Soviet Union in potentially decisive areas of advanced military technology. The only official DOD statement about the technical prospects for developing militarily useful space-laser weapons, other than unsurprising statements that this technology is under active research, appears in Secretary Brown's annual report:

Although the Soviets may be investigating the application of high-energy lasers and even charged particle beams to ABM defenses, severe technical obstacles remain in the way of converting this technology into a weapon system that would have any practical capability against ballistic missiles. We still have no evidence, moreover, that the Soviets have devised a way, even conceptually, to eliminate these obstacles.<sup>34</sup>

It is important to note that the technical side of the rapidly evolving debate does not (yet) focus upon the ultimate feasibility of developing the needed technology; rather, the key issue is how soon this technology can be developed: the mid-1980s, or much later (such as the early 1990s). Too many "impossible" technological innovations (e.g., nuclear weapons and the ICBM) have occurred within recent memory, making arguments that space-based laser weapons cannot be developed and "perfected" implausible on *prima facie* grounds. Rather, the key arguments in the early phase of this

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

debate relate to the difficulty of absorbing large sums of research funds in a relatively small and young research program managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the apparent fact that the Soviets have not achieved technical breakthroughs yet even though they may have a more serious and larger space-laser program than the United States.

There are some military officers who believe that the US HEL program—and especially the space-laser program—is little more than “highly technical WPA.” Undoubtedly, similar views existed during the mid-1950s as the American ICBM program encountered and eventually solved many challenging technical problems. As the bureaucratic politics of space-laser weapon development in the United States gets hot and heavy during the mid-1980s and beyond, such views will be displaced by considerations of service roles and missions. On one hand, the Army has overall responsibility for the BMD mission but little interest in complicating its political problems by tackling such a demanding and risky project as space-laser BMD. On the other hand, the US Air Force has responsibility for the ASAT mission and for nearly all military space systems but little interest in tackling space-laser developments; its Airborne Laser Laboratory—the centerpiece of the large USAF HEL program—is far behind schedule. Moreover, ground-based and airborne laser ASAT weapons strike most Air Force officers as less risky and more in keeping with conventional incentives and perceived needs than “exotic” space lasers.

However, once the early hurdles have been cleared and space-laser weapon development is on a relatively stable track, the services might begin to struggle for control of this potentially revolutionary strategic technology. Assuming that the US Air Force “wins” the mission of developing and using this technology, additional pulling and hauling will occur between the Strategic Air Command and joint American-Canadian North America Air Defense Command. While the latter has been emasculated by internal Air Force organizational decisions, the former operates two-thirds of the US strategic Triad (ICBMs and bombers) and would not willingly undermine its own missions by developing “Triad-busting” space-laser technology. Consequently, institutional innovation in the form of a new organization which could pursue vigorous development of space-laser weaponry (as well as that of other kinds of advanced space technology) may eventually be required to overcome the problems of recalcitrance and bureaucratic inertia in existing Air Force organizations. Analogous to the formation of the USAF itself in 1947, it may be necessary to create a US Space Force which would develop and use many of the technological developments (such as space lasers and the space shuttle) which tend to fall between the cracks of existing Air Force organizations and missions.

Turning from the new, somewhat exotic domain of space to the old and romantic realm of the oceans, another type of technology which might introduce major changes in the strategic aspects of the US-Soviet military balance relates to the development of antisubmarine warfare systems based on improved acoustic and/or nonacoustic sensors. Serious apprehensions that the ocean might prove to be transparent in some portions of the acoustic or electromagnetic spectrum have bedeviled the ASW research and arms control communities for some time. In 1972, a

## PANEL 5

symposium was organized to discuss the emerging belief that technological advances in submarine detection methods could erode the virtually complete invulnerability of missile-carrying submarines which constitute the most secure leg of the strategic Triad(s). The symposium concluded that "the invulnerability of the sea-based deterrent is in no way in doubt for the foreseeable future."<sup>35</sup> In 1980, however, the possibility is not easily dismissed that combinations of new sensors and sophisticated signal processing techniques might be capable of uncovering large parts of the ocean basins, making them partially transparent for meaningful periods of time to reveal the locations of strategic (and other) submarines.

Recent comparisons of American and Soviet progress in the basic technology of nonacoustic submarine detection and in the level of technology in deployed ASW systems indicate that both of these areas are characterized by relative parity.<sup>36</sup> No doubt, intensive and highly sensitive activities in both the United States and the Soviet Union are directed at resolving this problem. No basic scientific principles seem to present prohibitive obstacles, but the technical work is exceedingly complex and slow, and no clear breakthrough is in sight. Given the critical importance of concealment for the survivability and deterrent credibility of the SLBM leg of each superpower Triad, technological breakthroughs in ASW systems would be quite significant if and when they occur; this is especially true if reliable submarine detection could be achieved from a platform in space.

Insofar that the United States has superior technology in acoustic sensors, submarine quieting, and advanced signal processing, the prospects are bright for converting the unquestioned American advantage in electronic computers and signal processing into a growing lead in submarine detection. On the other hand, internal politics in the US Navy (which are similar to the situation in the US Air Force regarding space-laser developments) could interfere with the timely pursuit of powerful ASW capabilities which may ultimately compromise the third SLBM-based leg of the strategic Triad. Given the anticipated pressure of Soviet ASW R&D during the 1980s, and the real possibility that technical breakthroughs may be in the offing—especially in the uncertain area of nonacoustic sensors in which the United States is not preeminent—the evolution of Navy attitudes toward innovations in ASW capabilities may involve nearly as much controversy as its changing attitudes toward large nuclear-powered aircraft carriers faced with the threat of accurate long-range PGMs.

Turning to the area of tactical weaponry, the technical development with the highest potential for exercising leverage on the military balance between US-led NATO and Soviet-led Warsaw Pact troops facing each other in Europe is closely linked to the rapidly advancing technology of microelectronics in which the United States has a clear and growing lead. The second generation of precision-guided munitions (laser-guided missiles and projectiles) will be going into the inventory during the early 1980s; the third-generation family of PGMs is under active development to overcome weather limitations and susceptibility to relatively simple countermeasures such as obscurants.<sup>37</sup> The new PGM systems will use sensors based on new developments in microelectronics to extend their operational range to night and poor weather and reduce the user's vulnerability by having a "fire

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

and forget" capability, thereby giving the United States a competitive edge in ground combat against quantitatively imposing Soviet armor.

A specific example of how US-dominated microelectronics can shift the European balance back toward NATO is given by miniature remotely piloted vehicles (mini-RPVs), the modern military analogs of advanced model aircraft. Just as progress in microelectronics and lightweight propulsion systems made possible the successful development of strategic cruise missiles which will play an important role in sustaining the airbreathing leg of the US Triad during the 1980s, these same advances are leading to the developing of small, light, low-cost mini-RPVs which can carry reconnaissance sensors and/or target designators (such as low-energy lasers) for use with many types of PGMs. Mini-RPVs might have operational ranges of 50-100 kilometers and would constitute very small and elusive radar targets. As with PGMs, the lack of comparable Soviet expertise in microelectronics (as well as the measurably lower interest of Soviet citizens in the expensive hobby of building model aircraft) suggests that the United States and its NATO-European allies will preserve their sizable technological lead in the new area of mini-RPVs for the foreseeable future.

In terms of supporting overall US security objectives, developments in energy technology could prove to be as decisive as those in military technology if they produce substantial reductions in the dependence of the United States and its industrial allies on their economic life-blood, imported petroleum. The worst fears about the decline and imminent fall of American preeminence in industrial technology appear to be confirmed by the seeming incompetence of the US Government to deal effectively and coherently with its energy problems. The postwar research emphasis on nuclear fission and the outright failure to anticipate, study, and resolve the interlocking sociopolitical problems engendered by the widespread utilization of nuclear energy constitutes a massive failure of American science and engineering.<sup>28</sup> This failure in technological foresight is likely to be criticized by future historians of the late 20th century in the context of rising Soviet pressure on the Persian Gulf energy supplies that fuel the Western industrialized economies. If modes of building nuclear power plants based on fission technology could be developed which are deemed by Western societies to be acceptably safe, environmentally sound, and relatively affordable, the extensive construction of hundreds of properly sited reactors might contribute to a significant lessening of dependence on expensive and unreliable OPEC oil well before the end of this century. Science and technology alone cannot provide an easy and timely exit from the increasingly hazardous international energy conundrum precipitated by OPEC. To be feasible, this type of innovation would be sociotechnical in nature,<sup>29</sup> requiring large-scale reorganization of both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy to remove severe bureaucratic obstacles to fresh thinking that could permit serious development of such options as underground nuclear plants and large nuclear parks remote from electrical load centers. Moreover, the rapid commercialization of electric vehicles which could utilize nuclear electricity to displace demand for petroleum products would be necessary.

## PANEL 5

On the face of the matter, it is exceedingly curious that the country which pioneered the nuclear age during the 1940s strongly rejects the non-military use of fission technology at a critical juncture in its history when energy self-reliance has become such an important element of national security. As Amory Lovins and other energy observers have described, however, this state of affairs can be explained by the acute lack of foresight demonstrated by the US Government and the nuclear industry in failing to examine the multiple problems that large-scale use of fission energy would entail. Given the sharply narrowing options available to support this country's energy future and that of the West generally, major innovations that can be implemented to save energy and/or supply new forms of energy would contribute to US security and international stability as directly (or more so) as important new military technologies.

### NEW GOALS AND DIRECTIONS FOR US MILITARY INNOVATION

With the exception of diplomacy and overt military actions, the prevailing focus of the US-Soviet competition is military technology and will continue to be so in the future. To paraphrase Leonid Brezhnev, the center of gravity of the superpower competition is science and technology. There is little doubt that the "long pull" we can expect in adversary relations will be increasingly dominated by surrogate technological conflict between large and growing Soviet and American R&D systems vying to develop innovative approaches for undertaking fundamental military missions as well as attempting to strengthen their respective industrial economies. What is the outlook for this highly technical competition? Is it realistic to anticipate a "post-SALT" acceleration of the strategic arms race in which the danger of unremitting competition becomes quite real? Do new types of destabilizing weapons loom on the technological horizon which might substantially increase the risk of nuclear war? Will the so-called technological imperative reassert its old primacy in driving the military competition into expensive and dangerous directions as nonacademic interest in arms control wanes? Can a reasonable balance be found between the competitive needs of developing new military technology and the equally (if not more) important needs of maintaining and expanding cooperative programs with the USSR?

The US defense community must undertake a searching examination of its limited ability to respond to the formidable challenge posed by the advent of Soviet parity in military technology, and must decide to make some changes if it is serious about competing with Soviet R&D. Selective development of high-leverage technologies should become the rule rather than the exception in a redirected American R&D investment strategy which is consistent with modified defense goals and priorities that will result from interagency reviews during the next few years. For instance, the United States can no longer maintain *unambiguous* nuclear deterrence with respect to a broad spectrum of Soviet military threats. For a combination of technical and political reasons, the credibility of the American deterrent has eroded in connection with a wide range of Soviet military threats below the "unthinkable" threshold of all-out nuclear war. Moreover, at a time when directed-energy weapon technology is advancing rapidly, the

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

*postlaunch* vulnerability of nuclear-weapon delivery systems may become a more serious issue than the prelaunch vulnerability of, say, the fixed land-based missiles. As a consequence, traditional technical fixes such as the high-priority MX ICBM system do not even begin to address the principal strategic problems of the 1990s and beyond, when MX and its technological neighbors will become fully operational, and certainly cannot adequately cover the so-called window of vulnerability during the mid-1980s. Similarly, the maintenance of US naval superiority must remain a key military goal, but not merely as a rhetorical device for retaining large aircraft carriers as the centerpiece of American seapower.

The technically demanding and politically sensitive transition from the offense-dominated Triad toward a new strategic posture which can accommodate new technological artifacts such as defensive laser weapons in space must be faced squarely. This task will not be an easy one and will require fresh thinking and bold actions at the very least, if not the acuity and moral courage of "brilliant and forceful leaders." Anticipated developments in PGMs and ASW systems indicate that the years of large submarines and surface combatants may be numbered and a new emphasis is on fast (possibly surface-effect) ships and small submersibles in order. A reasonable path to facilitate the demanding and sensitive naval transition from large old carriers toward new smaller VTOL hosts must be sought.

The search for a workable balance between quality and quantity in American military forces will continue in almost every area of the defense establishment. The doctrine of quality-offset has seen better days. Pursuit of advanced military technology to infuse into modern military systems will be moderated by the unequivocal need to develop cheaper and more reliable weapons, platforms, and sensors which can be used in hostile environments. The fact that military technology cannot substitute for the traditional quantitative aspects of military power will be given more attention; at the same time, the need to selectively and aggressively develop high-leverage technologies to maintain US superiority in key areas will grow.

Competition with the USSR is not the ultimate goal of American relations with its principal adversary. Unmoderated by an element of cooperation and restraint in certain areas, US-Soviet competition will be misguided and counterproductive. The metastable and fluid nature of the strategic balance spurs serious consideration of technologies which could get the world out from under the pervasive threat of nuclear war and mass destruction. With SALT on the shelf and born-again hawks calling for large increases in US defense spending, it is not fashionable to call for a renewed search for modes of Soviet-American cooperation which can moderate the inevitable new round of technology-oriented competition. Nevertheless, it is important to place this search high on the national agenda for the 1980s. Without some elements of serious cooperation in the strategic weapon competition between the superpowers, the advent of potentially destabilizing new technology such as space-based lasers will tend to move this competition into a new and riskier level.

Restraint in military technology can usefully begin in areas such as biological and chemical weapons where the ethical stigmas are

## PANEL 5

substantial. Indeed, the promising future of biotechnologies such as recombinant DNA suggests that a blurring between chemical and biological warfare agents might be in store if full-scale competition in these areas were begun. It is probably asking too much to believe that the chances for near-term restraint in nuclear-weapon development, undertaken in the mutual interest of decelerating the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, are more than bleak. Given the possibility that a "post-nuclear" strategic world could begin to unfold as laser weaponry moves toward engineering reality from its traditional realm of science fiction, the need for reciprocal restraint in competitive nuclear-weapon development will increase even as the likelihood of such restraint decreases. There is very little chance that the superpowers will be capable of making a long, smooth transition into any postnuclear era unless some explicit cooperation can be arranged by future "brilliant and forceful leaders" who understand the great value of verifiable arms control agreements negotiated for the sake of national security, *not* for their own sake.

American R&D cooperation with its military allies has produced mixed results in recent years. Whereas the natural US instinct is to tighten R&D ties with NATO, the real payoff for restoring American superiority in military technology may lie in innovative R&D arrangements with Japan. The story of Japanese competitive superiority in advanced industrial technology as told by sociologist Ezra Vogel is well known even as it continues to unfold.<sup>40</sup> Instead of competing with Japan and the Soviet Union in industrial and military technology, respectively, the United States would be better off if it could develop ways to cooperate with Japan on joint military R&D ventures (directed not solely against the Soviets, but toward the legitimate goal of defending the homelands of both Japan and the United States against all manner of military threats) and also cooperate with the Soviet Union on certain key commercial R&D projects, such as the development of Siberian energy resources to reduce future pressures on the world petroleum market. In terms of the US-Soviet competition over the long haul, the West would be better off if the Soviets could play economic and other types of nonmilitary cards in the world game, which would tend to take the edge off the enduring military threats posed by the USSR to international stability. Moreover the West would be better off if countries other than the United States and its NATO-European allies could begin to compete effectively with the Soviets in advanced military technology, but in such a manner that there are no serious new threats to the Soviet homeland (e.g., from new members of the nuclear-weapon club). Japan is the most likely candidate to fill that bill since it lies outside NATO, has the economic strength and increasingly the inclination to enlarge its defense industry, and is the key American ally in the Pacific.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Throughout this overview of the fundamental role of science and technology in the US-Soviet competition, a recurring theme has indirectly touched on attitudes. For many years, the typical Western attitude toward science and technology has been one of faith that S&T can expand human horizons by the creation of new public knowledge. Coupled with this

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

expectation was the belief that technology generally was beneficent and whatever could be developed should be developed. More recently, the "growth of limits" has occurred in which S&T were viewed as being necessary but insufficient to cope with the burgeoning resource, environmental, population, and military problems of planet Earth. With the growth of perceived limits came the view that technology must be assessed before its development to anticipate side-effects and spill-overs, thereby discovering if new technology, on balance, had more benefits than disadvantages.

As noted above, the failure to carry through the development of acceptable nuclear fission technology as an energy source is perhaps the major failure of postwar American science and technology. Together with the perceived need for technology assessment prior to serious development, this failure has promoted a strong sense of timidity among many Americans who make major decisions concerning the future pace and direction of new technical developments in both the industrial and military sectors. Burdened by multiple regulations and confronted by numerous bureaucratic obstacles, it is rather surprising that so much high-risk innovation is undertaken successfully in the United States—in spite of the regulations and bureaucracy, certainly not because of them.<sup>41</sup>

Objectively, there is no doubt that technology has been the principal engine of social change and economic development in the industrial world,<sup>42</sup> and that its military component has become the principal instrument of competition in the US-Soviet relationship. Military science and technology have become highly institutionalized in both superpowers. In the Soviet Union, they apparently are viewed as the trump cards in the superpower competition. In the United States they are viewed with a mixture of felt necessity and wishful thinking that enterprises other than large-scale military R&D could provide better investments in the American future if only the Soviets would exhibit restraint. There is a deep-running belief that military technology is both difficult to assess for its actual contribution to national security and difficult to steer away from potentially destabilizing areas once basic developments have been demonstrated to be feasible (such as MIRV).

A new phase of the US-Soviet competition is unfolding during the 1980s in which military technology is destined to play an even more important role than it has in the past. However, American military technology can no longer be treated as an adequate offset to numerical Soviet advantages, and massive Soviet R&D investment has eroded many leads the United States once held in the quality of military hardware. These facts imply that Americans need to make a serious reappraisal of goals and directions for military R&D together with serious, high-level consideration of how the American military innovation system might be reorganized to achieve these goals by pursuing the related technological directions more efficiently.

The challenge is a formidable one: without a national decision to compete seriously with the Soviet Union, the United States may indeed become a nation with more of a past than a future. Serious competition means that after the political and bureaucratic dust has settled, the United States gets down to the business of restructuring and not merely

## PANEL 5

modernizing its strategic and tactical forces in such a manner that new realities—the bankrupt nature of the doctrine of quality-offset, and the demonstrated excellence of Soviet military technology—are taken fully into account. Serious competition means that high-leverage technologies such as lasers and certain types of ASW sensors which could have decisive implications for the military balance are selectively pursued with vigor, but that the destabilizing potential of such technologies not be ignored. Serious competition also means that the military component of super-power rivalry needs to be moderated by meaningful actions (not simply words) designed to encourage areas of cooperation which touch the core of Soviet and American concerns, not their perimeter. While risky and currently unfashionable, the pursuit of cooperative projects in industrial technology (such as helping the Soviets open up their Siberian hydrocarbon resources for full-scale development) will be much more important for US-Soviet relations in the long run than fingertip cultural and academic S&T exchanges—although the latter certainly have their place.

Ten years ago, shortly after Americans landed on the moon, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that scientific exploration has become the functional equivalent of American's frontier tradition:

... a major world power such as the United States has to pioneer in those areas of life which are historically relevant and crucial. To the extent that ours is a scientific age, the failure of the United States to push beyond existing frontiers—and space offers a very dramatic challenge—would mean the loss of a major psychological motivation for innovation.<sup>43</sup>

In this spirit, one method for making the US-Soviet competition more than an outright military competition would be to counter-challenge the Soviets to cooperate in areas where the Western comparative advantage is relatively clear (e.g., industrial base and economic revitalization) in order to make the Soviet economy competitive in world markets. There is no doubt that innovative approaches must be found to heal the large problems in both the American and Soviet economies, and the sooner the better. This need can be usefully linked to the overall problem of meeting the Soviet challenge with a judicious blend of dedicated military competition and bold industrial cooperation. Science-based technology is the essence of this linkage. The Soviets have much to learn from the United States and the West in areas of *traditional* industrial technology, just as Americans have much to learn from Japan in the leading edges of *modern* industrial technology. These learning processes will not occur unless not-invented-here syndromes are scuttled and bold initiatives are designed to make the required transfers of technology really happen.

The bilateral politics of the US-Soviet competition in the foreseeable future, and international relations quite generally, will be increasingly dominated by the technological dimension of the modern world that makes it the ken of *homo faber*, man the maker. Unless Soviets and Americans begin to understand how to make Janus-like technological innovation work in their mutual interests, the destructive side of modern technology might unmake much of what has been built during the last half of the 20th

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

century. Unfortunately, the feasibility of political innovations is much tougher to demonstrate than that of most technical innovations.

### ENDNOTES: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE US-SOVIET COMPETITION

1. Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 9.
2. *The FY 1981 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition*, Statement by Dr. William J. Perry, USDR&E, to the 96th Congress, 1 February 1980, pp. 1-1 and 1-2.
3. Various "enigmatic" products of Soviet military R&D have also surfaced, such as the so-called Caspian Sea Monster, the titanium-hulled Alpha submarine, and the controversial proton-beam facility at Semipalatinsk. The existence of technological enigmas is not the sole province of the Soviets; the United States has had its abortive nuclear airplane and Pluto (the nuclear-powered ramjet) programs, among others.
4. Kevin Klose, "Soviet Production Lags," *Washington Post*, 10 June 1980.
5. Kevin Klose, "U.S. Technological Curbs Impose Strain on Soviets," *Washington Post*, 11 June 1980. The cover story of *Business Week*, "Robots Join the Labor Force," on 9 June 1980, was the precursor to a special issue of *Business Week* on the reindustrialization of America (30 June 1980) that highlighted the keystone technology of microelectronics and the future significance of computer-aided design combined with computer-aided manufacturing (CAD-CAM) for "retooling" the American economy (pp. 103-4).
6. Alexander H. Flax, "The Influence of the Civilian Sector on Military R&D," *The Genesis of New Weapons*, edited by F. A. Long and Judith Reppy, (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon, 1980).
7. Stephen J. Lukasik, "Military Research and Development," *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets*, edited by Francis P. Hoerber and William Schneider, Jr. (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1977), p. 204.
8. Malcolm W. Browne, "Soviet Science Assessed as Flawed But Powerful," *New York Times*, 20 May 1980.
9. Stanley Hoffman, *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 253.
10. In the interest of fairness, it should be noted that although Jewish emigration from the USSR more than doubled to about 50,000 per year by the late 1970s, the political prospects for granting most-favored nation status to the Soviets had not improved proportionately. This was partly a consequence of negative reactions that accompanied Soviet military actions in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen.
11. See Edward N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?" *Commentary*, April 1980; and Robert W. Tucker, "America in Decline: The Foreign Policy of 'Maturity,'" *Foreign Affairs* 1980.
12. Leslie H. Gelb and Richard H. Ullman, "Keeping Cool at the Kyber Pass," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1980, p. 7.
13. See Barry M. Blechman, "Is There a Future for Negotiated Arms Limitations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980.
14. See Herbert A. York, *Race to Oblivion* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1970), p. 9.
15. In essence, these critics argue that the best is often the enemy of the good. The search for sophisticated aircraft such as the F-111 and C-5A frequently produces long delays and cost escalation amounting to management disasters; see Edwin A. Deagle, "Organization and Process in Military Research and Development," in *The Genesis of New Weapons*.
16. In this connection, there has been an odd tendency recently for some defense analysts to commend the Soviet military R&D program even though its capacity for innovation is widely perceived as adequate, and a complementary tendency to criticize many aspects of US military programs. See F. A. Long and Judith Reppy, "Decision-Making on Military R&D: An Introductory Overview," in *The Genesis of New Weapons*.

## PANEL 5

17. Henry Simmons, "Lightweight Fighters Fattened for the Kill," *Astronautics and Aeronautics*, May 1980.
18. See Blechman, "Is There a Future for Negotiated Arms Limitations?"
19. See Alexander H. Flax, "Military Aerospace to 2000," *Astronautics and Aeronautics*, May 1980.
20. Deborah Shapley, "Arms Control as a Regulator of Military Technology," *Daedalus*, Winter 1980.
21. Colonel Richard G. Head, "Technology and the Military Balance," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1978, and Alexander Flax's reply, *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978, pp. 207-211.
22. *The FY 1981 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development and Acquisition*, p. II-9. Also see Arthur J. Alexander, *Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, Adelphi Papers Nos. 147 and 148 (Dorking: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1978-79).
23. See generally George S. Odiorne, "The Military as Bureaucracy: The Super Activity Trap," in *The Changing World of the American Military*, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978).
24. James Digby and Peter deLeon, *Asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet Exploitation of Military-Related Technology: Workshop Summary (U)*, Rand Corporation, R-2060-NA, October 1976, Secret.
25. Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 13 December 1979, as reported by *New York Times*, 14 December 1979, pp. A1, A6.
26. Eugene Kopf, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research, Development, and Logistics), speech to the AIAA Global Technology-2000 meeting, Baltimore, 7 May 1980.
27. Alexander H. Flax, "Military Aerospace to 2000," p. 33.
28. The reader should note the distinction between high-energy lasers that are used for nonweapon applications (such as spaceborne blue-green lasers under development for performing the submarine communication mission without the adverse environmental and social impacts that a large land-based system as ELF might have) and those designed to damage targets.
29. Harvey Brooks, "The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race," *Daedalus*, Summer 1975.
30. *The Department of Defense Statement on the Science and Technology Program*, by Arden L. Bement, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology, before the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 1980, p. III-17.
31. The case for space-based laser BMD is made by Senator Malcolm Wallop in his article, "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1979, and by Max Hunter in his unpublished paper, "Strategic Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry," Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, 31 October 1977.
32. Edmund Beard, *Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
33. Steward Lytle, "Secret Senate Debate to Decide Whether U.S. Enters Laser Race," *Albuquerque Tribune*, 20 June 1980.
34. *FY 1981 Annual Report*, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 29 January 1980, p. 82.
35. Kosta Tsipis, et al., editors, *The Future of the Sea-Based Deterrent* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1973).
36. According to the USDR&E statement to Congress for FY 1981, the US is superior in deployed ASW systems, with the lead narrowing (see Figure 2). This judgment, however, is acknowledged to be debatable, with some observers contending that the US and USSR are "equal" in this technological area.
37. USDR&E Statement to Congress, FY 1981, p. 1-13.
38. See Colin A. Gray and Barry J. Smernoff, *The Encyclopedia of the Nuclear Age*, New York: Facts on File, forthcoming.
39. See generally Harvey Brooks, "Technology, Evolution, and Purpose," *Daedalus*, Winter 1980.

## TECHNOLOGY AND US-SOVIET COMPETITION

40. Ezra Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

41. It must be understood that there is a valid social need for (at least some) regulation and bureaucracy since these are nothing but the modern words for rules and organizations without which society cannot function properly. The question is one of excess.

42. Philip Handler, "Science, Technology, and Social Achievement," in *Science, Technology and the Human Prospect*, edited by Chauncey Starr and Philip C. Ritterbush (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).

43. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 247.

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**The Linkage Between Technology,  
Doctrine, and Weapons Innovation:  
Experimentation for Use**

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**INTRODUCTION**

The theme of this paper is that the linkages between innovations and their incorporation in weapons and doctrine are strongly dependent on experiments that generate information about possibilities. The linkages involve the experiments, the information, the communication channels for transmitting the information, the evaluation of the information, and the decisions or policies to do something about the information. I shall extend here a line of reasoning introduced by Elting Morison in his historical treatment of civil and military technology in the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Morison describes several stages in the development of technology. The first stage, from the late 18th to the late 19th century, centered directly on making things. In the absence of established engineering knowledge and practice, great uncertainties attended the construction of useful products: canals, bridges, railways, turnpikes, steel-mills, etc. The project itself was the experiment, and the great historical projects were the classrooms of a budding generation of self-taught engineers as well as the source of abstracted engineering knowledge.

The second stage began with the recognition that research could be applied to the making of things before the product itself was engineered in its final form. The creation of the prototype industrial research centers, first in the chemical firms of Germany, and later at General Electric, Westinghouse, and other companies in the United States, signalled the attainment of the new stage. Experiments in science, technology, and prototype products preceded product development. Morison concluded, however, that the richness of the technological opportunities, created by the very success of the process, carried with it the possibility of confusion. He described, for example, how the United States Navy reacted to the flow of new things by building a wide variety of ships without any unifying idea, and by convening over one thousand technical boards between 1865 and 1890 to consider the vast array of possibilities.<sup>2</sup> Morison then notes that Mahan's studies of naval history and the doctrine derived from those studies provided the theory and rationale of *how* Navies should be used.

## PANEL 5

"For the first time in half a century, men had a clear idea of what they were trying to do with their mechanical structures and how they might shape and use them in support of their purpose."<sup>3</sup>

One of the main arguments of this paper is that a crucial step is required between the output of organized research and development (R&D) and the formation of doctrine and weapons procurement decisions. This step involves *systematic experimentation in the use of the product*. Today, when systematic, organized R&D can be so successful in producing a mind-boggling array of potential technologies, subsystems, systems, and assorted improvements to existing weapons, I suggest that the choice among these is the critical problem. Questions surrounding the *use* of these new things are loaded with the very strong uncertainties that we have come to accept in the technology development process itself. An experimental approach to use is therefore a necessary concomitant to the successful incorporation of technology and to the derivation of doctrine that will govern its use. The linkages between technology and use, therefore, require careful and explicit attention.

The development of the argument here will first consider the notion of "strong uncertainty," and the importance of the process of dealing with it. I shall then describe examples of successful and less successful attempts to deal with the uncertainties of use; and finally suggest a variety of experimental means for reducing these strong uncertainties, and also consider some of the organizational attributes that seem to be necessary to do the job.

### TYPES OF UNCERTAINTY

Key features of innovative behavior are the amount and kind of uncertainty faced by innovators, and how these venturers into the unknown confront uncertainty. It is analytically useful here to define several classes of uncertainty, ranging from the certain to the chaotic.<sup>4</sup>

- Class I. Certainty.
- Class II. Probability distributions of known form embedded in known models, covering known possible states.
- Class III. Probability distributions of unknown form embedded in known models.
- Class IV. Uncertain models (strong uncertainties).
- Class V. Chaos.

We can note to begin with that R&D and innovation are concerned with the strong uncertainties of Class IV, but let us consider the other states in sequence of increasing uncertainty. Class I, certainty, describes the world of neoclassical economics, classical physics, and engineering practice. The analytical techniques applied to this state include the solving of systems of equations (the model), typically through the application of optimization, maximization, or equilibrium conditions. Large bureaucracies perform well here (e.g., the Social Security Administration); structures and rules are clear and slow to change. Detailed procedures and regulations ensure efficiency. Such a world may be complicated, but it can be dealt with by established techniques.

## TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE, WEAPONS INNOVATION

The addition of probability distributions to key variables of Class I models converts them into Class II levels of uncertainty. Statistics and probability techniques are used in the analysis of events, often by transforming the uncertainties via certainty-equivalents into Class I. Operations research, systems analysis, and decision-theory were developed to handle this state. Bureaucracies can still be efficient, especially when their operations extend over large numbers of events. Insurance is the standard social technique for dealing with the state of known probabilities.

When the probability distributions are themselves uncertain, Class II becomes Class III. Bayesian statistical techniques are used for experimentation and sampling in order to convert this state of the world back into one of better-known probabilities. When the number of experiments are few, the time pattern of events is relevant, as learning depends on the outcomes of experiments. Systems analysis and operations research are sometimes useful in showing where more information is needed. Typical military techniques for fleshing out the shapes of probability distributions include operational intelligence and reconnaissance.

When key variables can only be guessed at; when only fragments of theories exist; when considerable ambiguity is the norm; when we possess just hints or clues of possible relationships; these are some of the features of the class of strong uncertainties. Here, researchers probe intriguing phenomena rather than establish the parameters of distributions. Experiments are typically surprising rather than information-gathering exercises. Broad strategies rather than detailed plans are the appropriate means for dealing with strong uncertainties; examples of broad strategies include weapons development approaches that emphasize parallel projects, sequential decisionmaking, and prototype testing. Effective operation in a state of strong uncertainty requires the generation and use of feedback to modify one's view of the world and how one will act in it, which in turn demands a flexibility of mind and behavior. Successful actions can convert this state into states of lower uncertainty.<sup>5</sup>

Chaos (Class V) exists when no regularities or consistencies are found between information and theories. Either the world is truly chaotic, or the theories may be wrong. Responses to chaos may be myth and superstition (nonscientific theories), withdrawal to a more regular microcosm (pulling your head under the blanket), or living for the moment, madness. If the chaos is really due to bad theories, then diversity in the generation of alternative theories may turn up one that fits (i.e., "explains") the heretofore chaotic events, thus transforming chaos into a lower order of uncertainty.

In warfare, Generals Patton and Marshall and B. H. Liddell Hart viewed open, mobile military operations as resembling what has been defined here as the state of strong uncertainty. Marshall, for example, described his dismay upon taking command of the infantry school at Fort Benning in 1927. Amidst "the even tenor of their theoretical ways," classroom battles were organized and predictable.<sup>6</sup> He found officers "had been taught an absurd system, which proved futile the moment a normal situation of warfare of movement arose."<sup>7</sup> Marshall sought to train his officers to "solve problems rather than to memorize rules." "The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice."<sup>8</sup>

## PANEL 5

According to this view, the unit commander is clearly acting under strong uncertainty. The individual soldier, however, in the middle of the shooting, is often in a state of chaos; the grand strategists sitting far from the battle perceive the scene as Class II events of probability distributions. Military bureaucracies, though, often plan as though the world were certain. The Soviet strategy of mass and concepts of battlefield control attempt to convert warfare at all levels to Class II, or better yet to the certainty of Class I. Uncertainties and surprises are met by throwing more forces into the battle, where, it is hoped, the law of averages will prevail. Control is maintained by battlefield algorithms. How then is one to judge the outcomes of military contests between one party that thrives on strong uncertainties (e.g., Israel) and those that count on mass (the combined Arab states)? The answers are as uncertain in this context as they are in the R&D domain, but it is certain that processes can be as consequential as inputs in deciding the results.

Successful strategies for dealing with strong uncertainties recognize the risks involved and the overwhelming possibilities of setbacks and mistakes; plans incorporate the likelihood of changes as information begins to flow from the innovative endeavors. It is not easy to pick winners in advance, and system planners must therefore have a flexibility that the uncertain conditions demand. An illustrative example of a mistaken focus on structure rather than process is provided by the attempts of the French Government to promote high technology industries from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. The stated goals of the policy (principally de Gaulle's) were: (1) to instill a new sense of self-confidence based on solid achievements in the new world of advanced technology; (2) to meet the threat of economic and technical penetration by large American corporations; and (3) to promote German-French cooperation toward establishing a strong and independent Western Europe.<sup>9</sup> The policy, as implemented in the computer and electronics industry, had several dimensions: the fusion of small firms into larger organizations that would dominate their markets; the support of French exports in less competitive markets (Eastern Bloc and Third World); and creation of internally protected markets and outright subsidies.<sup>10</sup> Another strand of this policy was for France to become independent of outside suppliers: in computers, the entire system would be designed and produced in France itself.

All of these moves were counterproductive. The protective umbrella reduced the pressures in French firms to match international developments. Rather than compete on a price and quality basis, the policy encouraged firms to follow a political as well as economic strategy. The products the government desired were not those the firms would have chosen if facing market demands.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the advantages of size were disproven by statistical analyses of the relationship between R&D activity and industrial concentration that showed the effect of increased seller concentration on the volume of industrial R&D is likely to be perverse.<sup>12</sup>

The policy for electronics and computers was repeated in atomic energy, high-performance aircraft, space technology, and other areas identified by the government as critical. In very few cases did the policy achieve the desired goals. Paradoxically, a study of computers and electronics

## TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE, WEAPONS INNOVATION

concluded that the effort "may only have perpetuated a traditional industry looking to the state and the French market rather than toward its competitive situation in a world industry."<sup>14</sup> Additionally, participation across too broad a front forced programs to operate on narrow margins where financial or technological setbacks caused later cancellation or severe cutbacks in government support.

One of the sources of failure of the French policy was the attempt to duplicate the *structure* of American success, rather than the *process*. Large size, integrated system production, and even government support were more the result than the cause of American success. What seems to have been overlooked by French policymakers were the motivations of profit-making opportunities and a tremendous amount of uncertainty in the life cycles of firms and the people associated with and affected by them.<sup>14</sup> This, of course, is not new. Klein shows similar patterns of highly volatile firm growth and decline for the early years of automobiles, transport aircraft and engines, and semiconductors. For example, of the 181 companies that produced automobiles between 1903 and 1926, firm mortality data indicate:

- 28 percent lasted 3 years or less;
- 49 percent lasted 6 years or less;
- 36 percent lasted 10 years or more;
- 19 percent lasted 16 years or more.<sup>15</sup>

Of the top 10 automobile manufacturers in 1903, only 2 remained in those ranks 6 years later.

The purpose of this excursion into R&D policy is to demonstrate that the strong uncertainties of innovation must be faced, together with all the potential for unplanned outcomes. Firms in the United States electronics and computer industries in recent times, and in most new industries in the past, were first confronted by technical uncertainties in bringing their products to market, and then had to deal with feedback from the market experiment as customers investigated the use of the product. Some firms and many products never made it past the first stage. But, increasingly, as firms have become experienced in the process of R&D, failure is more likely to occur in the marketing phase. Despite the growth of market research, which attempts to simulate and predict market response, product development continues to be a risky business. Mimicry of market structure is not a substitute for this kind of market experiment. Military product development is beset by these problems in extreme form. Clear tests of profitability do not exist. Even when weapons have been used in war, the results may often be ambiguous. The next section considers the case of weapons development.

### IMPEDIMENTS TO MILITARY INNOVATION

Decisions to develop a weapon with specific characteristics, to procure it, and to use it in a certain way in combination with other forces according to a doctrine that governs its deployment—such decisions are fraught with uncertainties. Moving onto uncertain ground is dangerous and difficult. The dangers arise from the consequences of incorrect decisions. The difficulties arise from informational ambiguity, organizational rigidities, and technical problems.

## PANEL 5

The value of innovative weapons can remain ambiguous for many years, despite the evidence of war—even many wars. Interpretation of the experience of decades of actual combat experience with machineguns, for example, was clouded by conflicting evidence. Omdurman in 1898 showed the machinegun deadly against undisciplined tribesmen, but how would it perform against trained European troops?<sup>16</sup> The *mitrailleuse*, the early multiple-barrel French machinegun, had been generally acknowledged to be a failure in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, partly because it was used as an artillery piece without the appropriate range; but evaluation of that war had also to acknowledge the inept generalship of the French.<sup>17</sup> Later, the Boer War of 1899–1901 showed the Maxim machinegun to be useless when used (sparingly) as artillery against aimed fire from dispersed troops. The contrary experience from the Russo-Japanese War (1904/1905) did little to remove the confusion surrounding the use of machineguns—a confusion that was not relieved until 1915.

A similar story could be told about American tank design and evaluation in World War II. Faith in the M4 Sherman “was based on a surprisingly limited amount of experience in tank versus tank combat.”<sup>18</sup> In the one major action between German and American tanks in North Africa at the Kasserine Pass, the United States forces suffered a serious defeat, but Army leaders attributed it, quite accurately, to lack of experience. On balance, the Sherman compared well with the early German Mark IV models, but the Tiger was a different matter. However, in its first use, the Tiger was defeated by small antitank guns: this, though, was due to poor tactics, terrain, and scarcity rather than to its quality. In Sicily, defeat of German Tiger tanks was aided by naval gunfire and faulty German tactics. “There was no convincing demonstration that American equipment was inferior.”<sup>19</sup> Salerno, Italy, and Normandy produced conflicting evidence: poor tank country, quantitative United States superiority, changing tactics and experience, and a mixture of victories and defeats left the Americans convinced that the Sherman was, according to the Chief of Ordnance, “the best tank on the battlefield.”<sup>20</sup> Even after engagements with the German Panther, which was almost invulnerable to the Sherman except at close range, American tankers stuck to their belief in the preeminence of their weapon. Not until late 1944 did the weight of accumulating operational experience demonstrate the need for a new American design—a need, incidentally, that the Germans had recognized in 1941 when they first met the Russian T-34, which they responded to by design of the Panther. By late 1944, despite the urgent demands of Generals Eisenhower and Marshall, it was too late to develop and deliver a superior American tank to the European theater.<sup>21</sup>

Following World War II, debates about the appropriate use of rifles, in American military service for 150 years, were not resolved by recourse to the recent combat experience. Despite the arrival of operations research on the scene, commanders could point to their own positive experiences with long-distance, aimed fire in the marksman tradition, while other commanders based their arguments and biases on the combat usefulness of short-range, large-volume fire. These debates culminated in the controversy over the selection of the M14 and M16 rifles.<sup>22</sup>

## TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE, WEAPONS INNOVATION

The ambiguities of experience, however, eventually became resolved by time and the weight of accumulated evidence. Less easy to resolve are the rigidities of organizations. Large, complex organizations such as military services have many understandable, and sometimes even laudable, reasons for resisting innovations. Often enough, however, the reasons are obscure and the results disastrous. Large, complex organizations do not spring up overnight, nor are they designed and built in one piece. They evolve gradually in a very complicated process that owes more to historical accident than to rational design. Large investments in equipment, training, and the mastery of existing doctrine produce inertia to change. Within the organization, information has to be coordinated if it is to be of use. Communication channels must be created. The efficiency of the channels can be increased by the use of codes that compress the volume of information to be transmitted.<sup>23</sup> Understanding and managing internal communications and learning the codes require considerable investment by individuals. Organizations, once created, have distinct identities because changing of the codes or rechanneling of the information are costly.

The value of firm-related experience to individual employees is a common observation of labor economists. But, more important for our purpose, behavior patterns of the organization itself may persist over long periods because of the investment in the routines and techniques that the organization develops to go about its business. Large oil companies, for example, have persisted in identifiable corporate strategies over 50 years or more. Some are noted for their exploration abilities, others for refining efficiency, or marketing, or finance. These strategies apparently originated in early successes of the firms (often the accomplishments of single individuals) that continue to color and shape behavior decades later.<sup>24</sup>

Persistent behavioral patterns also reflect the primary functions of the organization. Channels, codes, and behavior appropriate to the primary functions will tend to serve secondary, complementary functions less efficiently. The primary function of military organizations is the coordination of large masses of men and material, often over continent-wide distances. The command of divisions, armies or of an entire service requires an approach that is inappropriate to the complementary but secondary function of R&D and innovation. If military commanders are tutored in a school that sees their career fulfillment as leaders of large, coordinated actions, their corporate ability to face the strong uncertainties of innovation will be impaired.

Other factors also intervene in the military innovation process. Size and complexity usually cause delays in innovation decisions and make the process an awkward one. The evolution of the organization is gradual, involving marginal changes and the successive addition and reduction of parts of the system and the weapons it uses. The organization will therefore be constituted at most times by both older and more recent weapons of varying technological vintages whose use is governed by an amalgam of doctrines.<sup>25</sup> In 1939, for example, the United States Army Air Corps had almost completely converted its first line bombers and fighters to modern monoplane aircraft with retractable landing gear and enclosed cockpits,

## PANEL 5

whereas every shipboard fighter of the United States Navy was a wire-braced, fabric-skinned biplane.<sup>26</sup> (The Germans at this time were testing the first turbojet powered aircraft.)

Because of the organizational rigidities of large, complex military organizations, the introduction of innovative technologies usually takes place in several stages.<sup>27</sup> In the first stage, new systems replace older ones, with little change to the organization or its doctrine. In most cases, the new system will be a marginal improvement to the older one; or if it is a new type, it has a greater chance of acceptance if it is independent, standing alone, imposing few perturbations on the rest of the system. An example of the latter type of innovation is the air-to-air missile. When first introduced, it had little effect on other aspects of the tactical aircraft mission, although United States Air Force proponents predicted close to revolutionary results from its expected high kill probabilities.

The second stage of innovation generally incorporates later, improved generations of the weapon, and some modification of organization and doctrine occurs. The effectiveness of air-to-air missiles was gradually seen to be considerably smaller than originally thought, but it was also recognized that they had capabilities not possessed by guns: longer range and wider angles of attack. The tight flying formations favored for gun-carrying aircraft gave way to more spread-out, "loose-deuce" patterns that gave better offensive and defensive capabilities to the missile-armed (and missile-endangered) aircraft. These changes evolved during the 1965-75 period, largely in response to disappointing early experience in Vietnam.

The final innovation stage is characterized by organization and doctrine fully cognizant of and adapted to the evolving capabilities of the new technology, often integrated with other new technologies, systems, and subsystems, perhaps accomplishing the original mission in novel ways. Recent analyses of air-to-air combat, based on data generated from Vietnam combat experience and from experimental evidence of simulated combat (AIMVAL/ACEVAL) propose the concept of a "weapons platform;" aircraft with powerful radar and other sensors, discriminating data processing capabilities, and long-range, all aspect, maneuvering air-to-air missiles with their own sensors. Such aircraft-missile combinations would perform the long-range phase of the air battle. The missile would replace the complex and expensive aircraft as the active, killing vehicle, but it would depend on the aircraft in a symbiotic relationship. Close-in defense would then be allocated to shorter-range, smaller, cheaper, more traditional fighters. If this stage of development actually occurs, it will have brought air defense by aircraft and missiles through several decades of evolution.

Decades-long adaptation periods are not unusual. Not only is the technology new, but the final form of the organization in which it is ultimately embedded is also new—the organization, its routines, channels, codes, and doctrines do not exist anywhere in the form they will eventually assume in the future. Therefore, the issues of strong uncertainties, experiments, feedback, and flexibility must apply to the using organizations as well as to the technology. No wonder it takes decades.

I have been assuming, until now, that the technology behind a weapon innovation is well in hand at the time the use of it comes into question. This

## TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE, WEAPONS INNOVATION

is not always the case; indeed in the United States, and particularly in the United States Air Force since World War II, doctrine and use have often been based on extrapolations of past technological trends. The R&D community has then been asked to respond to these requirements.<sup>28</sup> Although such extrapolations are seldom revolutionary, recalcitrant technology and premature decisions have often blocked progress. Adherence to a philosophy of continual improvement of familiar forms virtually ruled out operational experiments to test the value of marginally improved weapons—experiments that might have demonstrated greater effects from improved training, tactics, or quantities than from the uncertified marginal improvements in range, speed, etc.<sup>29</sup> More importantly, this emphasis on improved performance of the known precluded trials of the innovative. Before 1957, the ballistic missile was the handicapped competitor against cruise missiles and manned bombers. Significantly, it took powerful outsiders (allied with a few enthusiastic insiders) to force the ballistic missile on a reluctant Air Force.

Premature attempts to introduce unready innovative technology into complex organizations can have chilling effects on its acceptance. This is as true for civilian as it is for military innovations.<sup>30</sup> The best way to kill a project is to take an unreliable prototype into the field. Changes in structure involving disruption of past roles and relationships produce apprehension and resistance, sometimes making the social cost of change larger than the monetary costs. Normal problems associated with new equipment are magnified and distorted by participants resisting the change. Immature products invite excessive discounts of the change on future performance. Adequate R&D is therefore essential to successful operational trials. The response of the United States Army in 1928–29 to the Christie tank illustrates this point. Infantry and cavalry promoters of tank innovations enthusiastically supported the designs of the American inventor J. Walter Christie. The Ordnance Department, however, rejected Christie's ideas in favor of their own improvements to models designed within the Army. Congress and the Army Chief of Staff then directed Ordnance to purchase the tank and conduct trials with it. This, Ordnance did, but rejected the model on the basis of mechanical defects found while operating the prototype. The Army's strict insistence on Christie's meeting detailed specifications and reliability standards was ultimately successful in killing the project. The Soviet Union, in the meantime, purchased the prototypes and used them as the basis, over the next 8 years, for developing the highly successful T-34.<sup>31</sup>

Given the ambiguity of information, the rigidity of organizations, and the difficulties inherent in new technology, is it possible to make efficient decisions about the choice of new technology and reduce the extended period to fully introduce innovations into military use? The next section makes some modest suggestions to improve this process.

### EXPERIMENTATION FOR USE

The choice and use of new technologies must contend with strong uncertainties at least as numerous, as complex, and as powerful as those found in the development of the technology itself. Linkages between the

## PANEL 5

sources of ideas and the users are critical to success in coping with these uncertainties. Just as the means for dealing with uncertainty in science and technology is through research and experiment, so it must be with the uncertainties of use. Experiments are kinder than warfare—mistakes send one back to the drawing board, not to the grave. But experiments can be dangerous in their own way—to established routines, missions, organizations, and budgets—and for these reasons they are often ignored or explicitly avoided. Nevertheless, especially in the United States, the philosophy of quality weapons opposed to Soviet mass (and increasing quality) requires a systematic method for the introduction of innovative weapons, doctrines, and the organizations to use them.

I focus here on four kinds of experiments: (1) natural experiments (history, combat experience); (2) explicit, designed experiments (operational testing, experimental brigades, etc.); (3) paper experiments (systems analysis, operations research); and (4) mind experiments (imagination). Each of these types of experiments has strengths and weaknesses that complement the others. All are useful. None of them, by themselves or together, will produce certainty; but they can reduce uncertainty.

Natural experiments generated the data used by Mahan and Clausewitz in their formulations of doctrine and their analyses of war. Mahan's best known work, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, covered a period that began 230 years before he wrote and ended more than a century earlier. His next book carried this history to 1812 and the end of the Napoleonic empire. These works illustrate many of the advantages of the historical approach, and also a critical deficiency. The deficiency, "a fundamental error," arose from his confidence in the unchanging character of strategic principles.<sup>32</sup> Mahan failed to anticipate the importance of the submarine and torpedo, even though they were already developed weapons at the time he wrote.

A general disadvantage of history is that it is backward looking. Developments beyond the period examined cannot, by the nature of history, be taken into account. Nor can other variables easily be "held constant," as modern analysts would say. The very richness and reality of historical experience, which is its chief virtue, is also an analytical nightmare. How does one account for inept leadership, experience, terrain, morale, genius, and the other characteristics of real events. As we have seen above, combat experience can supply uncertain results, especially in short campaigns where battlefield feedback is limited. Nevertheless, warfare is the ultimate proving ground; despite the perplexities and riddles that reality imposes on analysis, it is only in warfare that one finds innovations tested in their full contextual environment.

Designed experiments, in contrast, can hold other things constant. This is their strength. They can exercise weapons, organizations, doctrine, and tactics in a planned array of combinations, but without the full richness and reality of war. Despite the deficiencies of experiments, they have produced major benefits in the past, and are an underutilized technique today. Experiments can take many forms. According to General Guderian, for example, the German army developed its doctrine of armored warfare

## TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE, WEAPONS INNOVATION

on the strength of field trials in 1930 on dummy tanks made of sheet iron set up on a wheeled chassis."<sup>11</sup>

In a similar vein, Eisenhower described his and George Patton's experiments with tanks at Camp Meade in 1919 and 1920. Noting the primitive nature of the vehicles in his possession, he commented that correcting deficiencies "would require constant use in field maneuvers plus cooperation between military men and manufacturers."<sup>12</sup> Taking advantage of Patton's experience in France, they began a year of field experimentation in tactics combined with evening discussions of theory. When their tanks could not perform some desired mission because of technical limitations, they improvised by towing the tanks with trucks or by using the trucks alone. Eisenhower claimed that their ideas on equipment, tactics, and tank doctrine underwent continuous change with each day's trials. "In one respect, these circumstances were better than battle itself. Trial and error and the testing of alternatives is experiment and research—but in action, you are offered few second chances."<sup>13</sup> However, the rigid, official view of doctrine in this period was inhospitable to innovation. When Eisenhower and Patton began to write articles based on this experience, Eisenhower was called before the Chief of Infantry. "I was told that my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous and that henceforth I would keep them to myself. Particularly, I was not to publish anything incompatible with solid infantry doctrine. If I did, I would be hauled before a court-martial. George was given the same message."<sup>14</sup> Such was the official stance on issues about which no one at the time could possibly have had an informed understanding.

The use of experimental units is another technique for developing experience with new equipment. When the Soviet Union first began to produce tanks on a large scale in 1930, it collected all the tanks available to form an experimental brigade for collective trials prior to large-scale production.<sup>15</sup> The Soviets continue this practice today by introducing new equipment in pre-series production quantities to operational units. Early versions of the T-64 and T-72 tanks were first observed by Western viewers on large-scale maneuvers in 1972. Similarly, the Yak-36 (Forger) vertical take-off and landing aircraft served on board a Soviet cruiser in limited pre-production numbers for some time before series production versions reached the fleet.

Training and maneuvers are other sources of experimental information. For training to be used in this way, it is essential that feedback be generated about the problems, successes, and failures encountered. Soviet training seems to have this characteristic, at least as viewed through articles in Soviet military journals that discuss the results of various units' attempts at solving problems during the training year. Large-scale maneuvers by the United States Army in the late 1930s provided direct evidence and experience with many of the new weapons and organizational formations that had been under development since 1918. For example, the importance of not separating tanks from their supporting elements was one of the organizational lessons coming out of the 1939 maneuvers.<sup>16</sup>

Carefully designed experiments, large-scale and small-scale, are another important technique for generating empirical evidence on war. The AIMVAL/ACEVAL aircraft-missile trials mentioned above produced

## PANEL 5

surprising and uncomfortable information on aircraft and missile types, tactics, and doctrine. These tests are now having an important influence on debates about the next generation of aircraft and their armament.

Whatever the many possible sources of evidence, it is essential for the proper conduct of paper experiments. The enormous growth since World War II of systems analysis, operations research, combat modeling, cost-benefit analysis, and other techniques, has not been matched by the data necessary to adequately carry out many of the studies. Nevertheless, such studies can be quite valuable in answering "what if" types of questions. The combination of facts and assumptions can establish the dominance or inferiority of prescribed cases; the analysis, however, cannot prove the truth of the assumptions. The advantages of paper experiments are that they focus on central, abstracted relationships; they are relatively inexpensive; many combinations and patterns of variables can be analyzed quickly; and they provide means for holding other things constant. However, they are limited by their sparseness and unreality, although some quite elaborate models have been built. Therefore, decisions on innovative technologies that may only be used in 10 years or more cannot be based on very detailed systems analyses or on war games. The major uncertainties inherent in the fundamental assumptions can only be reduced by actual work on hardware and field trials. Volumes of analytical work and greater specificity in the models cannot increase the informational content of the results. Field experiment and historical analysis, though, can support paper experiments by providing the necessary information to round out the models and evaluate the parameters. A principal critic of paper experiments has acknowledged that although "much more emphasis must be placed on empirical work, and particularly on operational testing," this kind of analysis "likely has not achieved its fullest potential."<sup>39</sup>

Finally, we come to mind experiments—imagination. Not much need be said about this except that it is the foundation of all the other kinds of experiments.<sup>40</sup> Some analysts even imply that imagination will have its way despite the inadequacies of the other approaches. Bernard Brodie wrote that

*in the long run, technology has transformed war pretty much in its own fashion. The bumbling ideas of men about the utilities of new weapons have often caused painful and costly maladjustments, and have even determined at times which side would enjoy victory; but the mistakes that have been made in the past in these matters seem rarely to have affected the technological conditions in which men found themselves.<sup>41</sup>*

However, he goes on to note that the long run can be very long indeed, and that in the meanwhile, events of grave moment "have their outcomes determined by gross errors of judgements on the significance of new military techniques."<sup>42</sup> Avoidance of gross errors of judgment is the joint task of those who originate ideas and those who use them.

## CONCLUSIONS: LEARNING TO LIVE WITH UNCERTAINTY

Innovation is uncertain and risky, but failure to innovate carries its own

## TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE, WEAPONS INNOVATION

risk. A conservative approach may require large jumps in performance at inopportune moments in order to make up for missed chances. Persistence in the conventional approach will surely result in a considerable lag behind technological potentials. If wartime exposes technologically backward systems and inadequate doctrine, it suddenly becomes necessary to carry out crash programs with reduced probability of success. It is therefore desirable to plan a systematic approach to experiment for use in peacetime—an approach that generates considerable uncertainty, surprise, and feedback, but that can reduce the occurrence of unwelcome and catastrophic surprise in war.

How can operational experiments and a more open, flexible attitude toward innovation be encouraged? I have already noted the many natural impediments to this course. But we must also recognize two important attributes of military organizations that may help alleviate the problem. First, the very size and complexity of military establishments permit a heterogeneous mix of organizations and activities to coexist. There may be room between the primary organizations and their supporting routines for suborganizations with somewhat different approaches. It was the United States Air Force research and development community, for example, that promoted ballistic missiles inside the service, even though the Air Staff opposed the concept. Second, military organizations are hierarchical. The normal diffuse and fragmented decision structure can be overcome through strong, high-level support and command decisions. People devoted to new ideas are essential to carry them forward. This process can be encouraged by directions set at the top. Experimentation can also be squelched by official condemnation, as in the Eisenhower and Patton incident described earlier.

Operationally, these advantages imply different kinds of activities, possibly acting in parallel. One approach is through explicitly designated experimental units associated with analytical organizations that could jointly design and carry out operational testing in controlled, realistic contexts. If permanent organizations were undesirable, an *ad hoc* mini-organization, especially created to carry out specific tests and then disbanded following the tests, is another technique used in the past. The first possibility is represented by the Soviet experimental tank brigades of the early 1930s. They were permanent organizations intended to continuously carry out experiments in technology, tactics, organization, and doctrine. The second technique was used by the American Army in the 1930s, when tank units were formed for summer maneuvers and then disbanded several weeks later. These two possibilities are presented here as illustrative examples and are not meant to exhaust the possibilities. The essential point is that command decisions, budgets, and organizational change are required to implement an experimental policy.

It should be noted that organizational design and all the human issues associated with military systems have been much less well treated by the research community than hardware issues. To some degree, this reflects a weakness of demand for such analysis; but the analytical gaps make experimentation for use even that much more important.

I have been discussing experimentation throughout this paper with relatively little to say about it. The essential character of experiment in the

## PANEL 5

realm of strong uncertainties is that the results are very likely to be surprising. The validity of concepts and the advisability of continuing must be reexamined after each stage. Planning should focus on the next stage. Projects should be structured as questions, not as assertions. A "Can do!" attitude must be replaced by, "Can do what?"

Elting Morison, with whom we opened this paper, makes some suggestions as to how to proceed, despite the enormous complexity of existing systems, and the unilluminated state of the future.<sup>41</sup> His central recommendation is to scale problems to life size. Whole systems cannot be designed and created from scratch. Concentration on manageable structures at least removes projects from the realm of the impossible. By proper scaling of the problem, interested parties can contribute their special knowledge while reducing the danger of compartmentalization. Beginning with specific projects encourages learning, confronts decisionmakers with real trade-offs, and supplies the evidence to evaluate the alternatives. "As the accumulating particular decisions move toward generality, a context is gradually assembled within which the parts and pieces and forces of the technological world can be fitted together."<sup>42</sup> This may not be the route to an optimized system with every part contributing the maximum, but it is a prescription for a system that works. As Morison concludes, within the context pulled together from the accumulated experience and knowledge, "responsible leaders can act with authority to fulfill the obligations implied by the context rather than blunder forward, patching the leakage, damping down the explosions, adjusting the shortfalls."<sup>43</sup>

The fog of peace is incomparably more impenetrable than the fog of war. Experiment, adaptability, innovation, and change, in small steps first, can help pierce that fog. But in the end, it will always be with us, so that every step is experiment. The necessity of learning to live with uncertainty is perhaps the main conclusion of this paper.

### ENDNOTES: THE LINKAGE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE, AND WEAPONS INNOVATION: EXPERIMENTATION FOR USE

1. Elting E. Morison, *From Know-How to Nowhere, the Development of American Technology* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

2. *Ibid.*, Chapter 8; particularly pp. 155-156.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

4. These ideas are stimulated by the work of Burton H. Klein. See, for example, *Dynamic Economics* (Harvard University Press, 1977).

5. Although it is theoretically possible to become more uncertain when accepted theory is confronted with surprising or disconfirming new evidence, the more likely source of increased uncertainty is through a change in the external environment.

6. F. C. Fogure, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General* (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 251.

7. *Ibid.*

## TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE, WEAPONS INNOVATION

8. R. F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973), p. 215.
9. John Zysman, "Between the Market and the State: Dilemmas of French Policy for the Electronics Industry." *Research Policy* 3 (1975): 315.
10. Zysman, "Between the Market and the State," p. 319.
11. Many of the original small firms had, in fact, competed successfully in the world markets by specializing in components rather than in complete systems.
12. In the French industry "electrical and electronic measuring and computational equipment," research expenditures as a percentage of sales are 240 percent greater in firms with less than 500 people than in firms with 2,000-5,000 people. William James Adams, "Firm Size and Research Activity: France and the United States." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August 1970, Table IV, p. 397.
13. Zysman, "Between the Market and the State," p. 326.
14. Robert G. Gilpin, Jr., "Science, Technology, and French Independence," in T. Dixon Long and Christopher Wright, eds., *Science Policies of Industrial Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 124.
15. Cited in Klein, *Dynamic Economics*, p. 99.
16. Christopher Harvie, *Technological Change and Military Power in Historical Perspective*, Adelphi Paper No. 144 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978) p. 6.
17. Bernard Brodie, "Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political Outcomes," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 286, 291.
18. Charles M. Bailey, "Faint Praise: The Development of American Tanks and Tank Destroyers During World War II," Ph.D. dissertation (History), Duke University, 1977, p. 85.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
20. Quoted by Bailey, "Faint Praise," p. 87.
21. Arthur J. Alexander, *Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States, R-1860-NA* (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1976), pp. 97-99.
22. Thomas L. McNaughter, "Marksmanship, McNamara and the M16 Rifle," *Public Policy*, Winter 1980, especially pp. 12-14.
23. These ideas were originally developed by Kenneth J. Arrow, *The Limits of Organization* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), Chapter 3.
24. William Greene, "Strategies of the Major Oil Companies," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Business School, 1980.
25. These points are made by Zeev Bonen, Director of the Israel Armanent Development Authority in an unpublished paper distributed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Developing the Weapons of the 1980s," 1976, p. 5.
26. Robert Perry, *The Interaction of Technology and Doctrine in the USAF, P-6281*, The Rand Corporation, 1979, p. 5.
27. The stages described here are those mentioned in Bonen, "Developing the Weapons of the 1980s."
28. This is the central theme of Perry, *Interaction of Technology and Doctrine*.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
30. Examples of government-sponsored demonstration projects that failed in civilian applications are described in Walter S. Baer, Leland L. Johnson, and Edward W. Mellow, *Analysis of Federally Funded Demonstration Projects: Executive Summary, Final Report, and Supporting Case Studies, R-1925-DOC, R-1926-DOC, and R-1927-DOC* (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1976).
31. Alexander, *Armor Development*, pp. 71-73.
32. Brodie, "Technological Change," p. 277.
33. Cited by Bonen, "Developing the Weapons of the 1980s," p. 23.
34. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 156.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
37. Alexander, *Armor Development*, pp. 22-23.

## PANEL 5

38. Ibid., p. 69.
39. J. A. Stockfish, *Models, Data, and War: A Critique of the Study of Conventional Forces*, R-1526-PR (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1975), p. iii.
40. A colleague is using imagination directly in his research by reviewing the scores of novels written about nuclear terrorism. The authors of these works have faced and solved in their minds many of the possible operational problems involved in both carrying out and preventing terrorist activities. In the absence of actual history, imaginary experiments provide a kind of evidence of potential acts. If it cannot be imagined, it is unlikely to take place.
41. Brodie, "Technological Change," p. 299.
42. Ibid., p. 300.
43. Morison, *From Know-How to Nowhere*, pp. 184-185.
44. Ibid., p. 184.
45. Ibid., p. 185.

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**COLONEL GAYLE D. HECKEL**, USAF, Deputy Director, National Security Affairs Institute. Former Associate Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs at the National War College, Colonel Heckel came to Fort McNair from Maxwell AFB, Ala., where he served as the National Director of College Curriculum for Air Force ROTC Headquarters. He previously served as Chief of the AFROTC Educational Services Division. He earned master's and doctoral degrees at Brigham Young University, where he earlier had served as Associate Chairman, Department of Aerospace Studies.

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**HONORABLE WILLIAM G. HYLAND**, Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Hyland was Chief of Staff for Soviet and Far Eastern Affairs on the Board of National Estimates before joining the National Security Council staff at the White House as Staff Member for Soviet and European Affairs in 1969. In 1974 he was appointed Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. In 1976 he returned to the White House as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Mr. Hyland, now retired as Director of European and Soviet Affairs on the NSC staff, is a respected analyst of strategic systems and has participated for many years in the US-Soviet arms control negotiations. He has a master's degree from the University of Missouri and has done other post-graduate work at American University.

**DR. AMOS A. JORDAN, JR.**, Executive Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. Dr. Jordan has served as the Deputy Under Secretary of State and Acting Under Secretary for Security Assistance, and as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. A consultant on numerous educational and government projects, he was Director of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, and Professor of Social Sciences and Director of the Social Sciences Program at the United States Military Academy. He received his first bachelor's degree at West Point, then earned B.A. and M.A. degrees in philosophy, politics and economics from Oxford University, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar. He won the Einstein Prize while earning a Ph.D. degree in international relations from Columbia University. He is the author of *Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia* and numerous journal articles.

**DR. WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN**, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and member, Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Kaufmann previously served as head of the Social Science Department of the Rand Corporation and, earlier, as a senior staff member there. He was an Assistant Professor of History at Princeton University and an instructor in Government at Yale. Dr. Kaufmann was Managing Editor of *World Politics*, then a Ford Foundation Visiting Professor of Government at Yale and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He has served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget. Principal publications include *British Policy and the Independence of Latin America*, *Military Policy and National Security*, and *The McNamara Strategy*. A 1980 recipient

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**MR. ANDREW W. MARSHALL**, Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Marshall has been a member of the Gaither Committee, the McCloy Arms Control Panel, the US Delegation to NATO and a consultant to the Office of Management and Budget. He was also a consultant to the National Security Council and Director of the Net Assessment Group in the White House in 1972-73. He has published in the areas of

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**DR. JAMES A. NATHAN**, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Delaware. Formerly of The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Dr. Nathan recently completed a term as Scholar-in-Residence at the Naval War College Center for Advanced Research. He has been a Research Assistant with the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research and with the Institute for Defense Analysis. Dr. Nathan received a bachelor's degree at Indiana University, and master's and doctoral degrees at The Johns Hopkins University. His articles have appeared extensively in leading political and military journals. He has coauthored several books, including *International Education in a Global Age*, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, and *The Future of Sea Power*.

**MR. CHARLES NEUHAUSER**, Assistant National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, Central Intelligence Agency.

**DR. ROBERT G. NEUMANN**, Vice Chairman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. Dr. Neumann has been affiliated with Georgetown University since 1977, following completion of a tour as Ambassador to Morocco and an earlier tour as Ambassador to Afghanistan. He was Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles, and Director of UCLA's Institute of International and Foreign Studies. Dr. Neumann has written numerous articles and several books, including *The Government of Germany and European Government*. Educated in France, Austria, and Switzerland, he received a master's degree from Amherst College after coming to the United States. Following a break for World War II service with the US Army in the European Theater, he returned to school at the University of Minnesota for his doctorate in 1946.

**HONORABLE PAUL HENRY NITZE**, Chairman of Policy Studies, Committee on the Present Danger. Until he resigned in 1974, Dr. Nitze represented the Secretary of Defense on the US Delegation to the SALT negotiations. He has served as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. A former President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation, he served with the Department of State for several years, beginning as Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade Policy. His last position there was as Director of the Policy Planning Staff. He currently is Chairman of the Advisory Council of The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and serves as a member or chairman of the board of several corporations. A "cum laude" graduate of Harvard University, Dr. Nitze received his law degree from The Johns Hopkins University.

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**HONORABLE ROBERT H. PELLETREAU, JR.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs). He joined the Defense Department following a tour as US Ambassador to Bahrain. Previously, Ambassador Pelletreau served in the Department of State as desk officer for Guinea and Mali, then for Morocco, Mauritania, and the Sahara. Earlier assignments sent him to seven Arab countries: Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Bahrain. Following graduation from Yale University and Harvard Law School, he joined the New York law firm of Chadbourne, Parke, White-side, and Wolfe and became a member of the New York bar. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

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**MR. NICHOLAS PLATT**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Affairs). Before this appointment to ISA, Mr. Platt was a staff member of the National Security Council, specializing in East Asian matters. He served as First Secretary in the American Embassy in Tokyo and, later, as Country Director for Japan in the Department of State. He was the first Chief of the Political Section in the US Liaison Office in Peking when it was opened in 1973. As Director of the Secretariat staff in the State Department from 1971-1973, he accompanied President Nixon to China in 1972. A graduate of Harvard College, Mr. Platt holds a master's degree in international relations from The John Hopkins School of International Studies.

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**LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD L. ROWNY**, US Army (Retired), and a Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution. General Rowny capped a 36-year military career with a 6-year tour as the JCS Representative for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, negotiating with the Soviets for more than 1,000 hours face-to-face and making some 65 trips to and from Geneva and Moscow. He previously was Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee, in Brussels, where he established and chaired the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Group. Other assignments include command of I Corps in Korea, Deputy Chief of Staff of US European Command in Germany, and command of the 24th Infantry Division in Germany. He developed tactics which led to the airmobile division and introduced armed helicopters into Vietnam. A combat veteran of Korean War and World War II campaigns, he is a West Point graduate with two master's degrees from Yale and a Ph.D. degree from the American University.

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**MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT LAURENCE SCHWEITZER**, USA, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, US Army. General Schweitzer also serves as Chief of the US Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board and Chairman, Joint Mexican-US Defense Commission. He previously was assigned to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, in Belgium as chief of the Policy Branch. Earlier, he commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Europe. General Schweitzer was Director of Insurgency Studies at the Army War College, then a Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, between a two-tour assignment to Vietnam and his 6-year stay in Europe. A graduate of the Army War College, General Schweitzer earned his bachelor's degree at the University of Maryland and a master's degree in international relations at Georgetown University.

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**MR. LEON SLOSS**, Vice President, SRI International-Washington, and Assistant Director, Strategic Studies Center. He is a former Assistant Director and Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Carrying the personal rank of Ambassador, he also headed the US Delegation to the Seabed Treaty Arms Control Review Conference in Geneva. While working with the Department of State, he served as Foreign Affairs Officer and Assistant Director of the Bureau of Politico/Military Affairs and was presented the Department's Superior Honor Award. A graduate of Stanford University with a master's degree from Princeton University, Mr. Sloss is a published author on topics relating to NATO and Soviet military posture.

**DR. BARRY J. SMERNOFF**, B.J. Smernoff Associates. Dr. Smernoff is a policy analyst specializing in problems of national security and energy policy, with an emphasis on future technology. After 9 years with the Hudson Institute, he established his own research firm. At Hudson, he conducted research on such topics as implications of conflict in space, trends in nuclear proliferation, and the strategic implications of high-energy laser weapons. He currently consults for both federal and state agencies. A graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he holds a Ph.D. degree in physics from Brandeis University. Dr. Smernoff is coauthor of the forthcoming *Encyclopedia of the Nuclear Age*.

**MR. HELMUT SONNENFELDT**, guest scholar, The Brookings Institution. A distinguished government official and educator, he has held the position of Director of Office Research and Analysis for the USSR and Eastern Europe, Department of State; lectured at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; and was a Senior Member of the National Security Council. Mr. Sonnenfeldt holds bachelor's and master's degrees from The Johns Hopkins University. He is a member of the American Association of Slavic Studies, American Political Science Association, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

**HONORABLE MONTEAGLE STEARNS**, Vice President, National Defense University. Ambassador Stearns has served at diplomatic posts in Europe, Asia, and Africa as a specialist in political and politico-military affairs. He came to the National Defense University from the Republic of the Ivory Coast in West Africa where he served as US Ambassador 1976-1979. Previously he was in Greece for his second tour, this time as Minister-

Counselor of the US Embassy in Athens. Before that he served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Laos, as Political Officer in London, and as Chief of the Political Section in Zaire. A graduate of Columbia University, Ambassador Stearns has authored several articles on diplomacy, including "Making American Diplomacy Relevant," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973.

**HONORABLE LEONARD SULLIVAN, JR.**, independent consultant on matters of national defense and national transportation policy. He formerly served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, and also as Principal Deputy Director and Deputy Director for Southeast Asian Matters in the Office of Defense Research and Engineering. Mr. Sullivan has also been Manager of Advanced Systems at the Grumman Corporation. He received bachelor's and master's degrees in aeronautics and became aeronautical engineer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has collaborated on defense studies and other publications on defense matters and is presently project director for "Securing the Sea Lanes," a study by the Atlantic Council of the United States.

**MR. ROGER. W. SULLIVAN**, National Security Council. A foreign service officer since 1956, Mr. Sullivan has served in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Indonesia as well as in the Department of State in Washington. Most recently he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before joining the National Security Council. Mr. Sullivan is a graduate of Bowdoin College and was a Princeton Fellow in Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton Community.

**DR. RAYMOND TANTER**, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan. Dr. Tanter teaches American Foreign Policy as well as International Security and Arms Control courses. He also conducts research on two major topics: Israel's crisis decisionmaking, and American foreign policy. He coauthored *Rational Decision Making: Israel's 1967 Security Choices*, judged the winner of the \$1,000 Furniss Award for 1978 of the Mershon Center for Research and Education in National Security at the Ohio State University. Dr. Tanter formerly taught at Northwestern, Stanford, the University of Amsterdam, and annually for 6 years at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has lectured throughout Europe, but more often in the Federal Republic of Germany. A graduate of Roosevelt University, he holds a Ph.D. degree from Illinois University.

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARNOLD LEE TESSMER**, USAF, Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. Colonel Tessmer came to NDU after serving as an Assistant for NATO Standardization in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Since entering the Air Force in 1962, Colonel Tessmer has served as a navigator bombardier in the Strategic Air Command and Pacific Air Forces as well as a staff officer in a number of headquarters elements. A graduate of the University of Buffalo, he received his master's degree in geography from the University of Washington. He also is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

**CAPTAIN WALTER "R" THOMAS**, USN, Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. A naval aviator, Captain Thomas has served in numerous flight units, including assignments as Commanding Officer of Reconnaissance Squadron Four and Operations Officer of the helicopter

carrier, USS Okinawa, in Vietnam. Shore duty has included Washington assignments in the US Navy's Human Goals Program, Personnel, Congressional Liaison, Politico-Military Affairs, and, most recently, as Assistant Chief of Information. He is the author of two books and numerous articles in Navy Times, US Naval Institute Proceedings, and the Naval War College Review. He received a B.S. degree in naval science from the US Naval Postgraduate School and a master's degree in international affairs from George Washington University. He also is a graduate of the Naval War College.

**MR. JOHN C. F. TILLSON**, Director of the National Security Group, Senate Budget Committee. Mr. Tillson is responsible for the evaluation and analysis of the defense and international affairs portions of the President's annual budget request. Before joining the Budget Committee staff, Mr. Tillson was Director of the Special Regional Studies Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. While there he was responsible for conducting studies of Persian Gulf contingencies. Mr. Tillson served in the US Army for 7 years and commanded an Armored Cavalry troop in Vietnam and Germany.

**DR. ROBERT H. TRICE**, Director for Technology and Arms Transfer Policy (International Economic and Technology Affairs), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Before joining the Department of Defense in 1978, Dr. Trice taught political science at Ohio State University. He is the author of numerous works on American Middle East Policy, including *Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process* and several articles in political journals. A graduate of the College of William and Mary, he received master's and doctoral degrees from the University of Wisconsin.

**HONORABLE JOSEPH W. TWINAM**, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State. Ambassador Twinam was the Director of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, after serving as the first US Ambassador to Bahrain. Prior to his term as Desk Officer for Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, he attended the Foreign Services Institute School of Arabic Language and Studies and served as the Economic and Commercial Officer in Kuwait. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Virginia, and a master's degree in international relations from Georgetown University. From 1956-59, he served in the US Navy.

**DR. RICHARD H. ULLMAN**, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University and Editor of Foreign Policy. He has served on the National Security Council staff and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He was Director of Studies and Director of the "1980's Project" at the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the Editorial Board of the New York Times, and on the faculty of Harvard University. Dr. Ullman earned a bachelor's degree from Harvard and bachelor's and doctoral degrees in philosophy from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He is the author of three volumes on Anglo-Soviet relations during 1917-21: *Intervention and the War, Britain and the Russian Civil War*, and *The Anglo-Soviet Accord*.

**DR. SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.**, Secretary, International Security Studies

Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Wells previously taught at the University of North Carolina where he was an Associate Professor of History and at Wellesley College. Specializing in the fields of American foreign relations, economic diplomacy, arms control, and national security policy, Dr. Wells has had numerous articles published on those topics. He has held several fellowships, including a Ford Foundation grant for research in international security. A graduate of the University of North Carolina, he received his master's and doctoral degrees in history and international relations from Harvard University.

**DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM**, Principal Analyst, Congressional Budget Office. Dr. Zakheim is a distinguished economist, who while a Research Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford University, was associated with a London bank and lectured on comparative politics and international finance to various American collegiate programs in Britain. His research and publications address naval and other national security issues, European politics, the Atlantic relationship, and British finance. He earned his bachelor's degree at Columbia University, New York, where he graduated summa cum laude and was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He spent his junior year as a student at the London School of Economics, financed by a Columbia College scholarship. He studied at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, as a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellow and then as a Columbia College Kellett Fellow, earning his doctor of philosophy degree in 1974.

## GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	antiballistic missile
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AMIO	Arab Military Industries Organization
ARAMCO	Arabian American Oil Company
ASAT	antisatellite interceptor
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
AWACS	airborne warning and control system
BMD	ballistic missile defense
CAR	Central African Republic
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
C'I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
DEW	directed energy weapons
DNA	deoxyribonucleic acid
EEC	European Economic Community
ELF	extremely low frequency
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GPS	guidance power supply
HEL	high-energy laser
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IEA	International Energy Agency
ISA	international security affairs
MBFR	mutual and balanced force reduction
MIRV	multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
NSC	National Security Council
O&M	operations and maintenance
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PGM	precision-guided munitions
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC	People's Republic of China
R&D	research and development
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
RPV	remotely piloted vehicle
RV	reentry vehicle
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
S&T	science and technology
SIOP	single integrated operational plan
SLBM	sea-launched ballistic missile
SPD	Social Democratic Party (West Germany)
SPR	strategic petroleum reserve
SRAM	short-range attack missile
SSBN	fleet ballistic missile submarine
TOA	total obligational authority
UAE	United Arab Emirates

WPA Work Projects Administration  
ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

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